Studying Chinese Politics in an Age of Specialization

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In American academia, two trends in the study of Chinese politics have intensified of late. The first is a growing disciplinary orientation, especially among younger scholars. Although it remains as vibrant as any area study in political science, the field of Chinese politics is being integrated into the examination of comparative politics (and international relations) to an extent unseen before. Second, researchers on Chinese politics tend to choose relatively narrow topics and display some hesitancy to link what they have discovered to larger questions about how the political system operates. Instead of making grand statements, they burrow into a topic and stick to close-to-the-ground generalizations about what it might mean for China.

As a result of this disciplinary and topical specialization, researchers are more deeply embedded in political science than was common a generation ago (Dittmer and Hurst 2002/2003; Baum 2007; Alpermann 2009; Carlsen, Gallagher, Lieberthal and Manion, 2010), and findings are more solid than ever, but we cohere less as a group engaged in the enterprise of understanding Chinese politics broadly construed.¹ This change is perhaps not of great issue for individual scholars, most of whom have either adjusted to it or are actively working to bring it about; it has, however, led to a certain hollowing out of the field of Chinese politics.

Disciplinary Specialization

A hole at the center of the field became apparent while updating the syllabus for my graduate seminar on Chinese politics. For over a decade, I had arranged weekly readings around a series of debates: memorable tussles over the reach of the state, neotraditionalism, the role of guanxi, peasant power, civil society, corporatism, and so on. But by the mid-2000s this structure was no longer tenable and I switched to a string of exemplary new books. Why? The old debates had largely exhausted themselves and there were few new ones to take their place. Yes, some lively areas of contention remain on issues such as state capacity (Wang and Hu 2001; Naughton and Yang 2004) and nationalism (Gries 2004; Zhao 2004), but most current debates are somewhat polemical, narrow-gauge, or marked by agreement as much as disagreement. Could this be because we are in accord on the big questions about Chinese politics at a moment when authoritarian resilience has become the consensus view, or is it more likely that we are not talking with each other as much, not meeting as often in area studies journals to hash things out, but instead aiming to engage disciplinary colleagues who focus on social capital or popular contention or corruption or political trust or production chains or the policymaking process in other countries? Our target readers, in other words, increasingly include comparativists and international relations scholars as

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4 See Perry (2008, 2009) and Li (forthcoming) on contemporary protesters and their rules or rights consciousness.
well as China studies colleagues, and we often put our primary effort into delighting this new audience with the significance of our findings for theory or conceptual clarity rather than highlighting what they mean for understanding Chinese politics.\(^5\)

Growing disciplinary orientation is not surprising for many reasons. To begin with, career incentives point in this direction. Chinese politics faculty at most American universities are evaluated in a way that privileges “hits” in political science journals, even at a time when leading China studies journals continue to score high on the citation charts and rival the most prestigious disciplinary outlets for impact. The tendency to favor disciplinary publication is less strongly felt elsewhere, but in the United States salary increases, promotion, and mobility often depend on visibility in the discipline more than visibility among other China scholars.\(^6\) This is especially so in highly quantitative departments and formal modeling shops, but it is also the case in more qualitative departments and at universities that host area studies centers. This incentive structure affects faculty and is internalized by graduate students, who quickly notice which of their classmates are considered stars and often conclude that bringing knowledge from China to a disciplinary audience is the path to a marketable dissertation, a good first job, and rapid advancement.

But it is more than securing a position or tenure or career-mindedness that has drawn students of Chinese politics into closer contact with political science. Many of us

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\(^6\) Nearly twenty years ago, Lucian Pye (1992: 1161) wrote: “It is not enough to hold the respect of other area specialists. Tenure depends upon the judgment of those who guard the standards of each discipline.”
do not want to be exotic zoo animals confined to an area studies pen.⁷ We wish to speak
to disciplinary colleagues much as sociologists, for example, have for some time.⁸ Survey
researchers have led the way into mainstream political science, but Chinese politics
experts of all stripes are designing articles for The American Political Science Review or
World Politics, or seeking to gain an acceptance in Comparative Politics or Comparative
Political Studies or more specialized disciplinary outlets. This makes sense at a time
when reform and opening up has made China look more familiar to those who study
other countries. Researchers on Chinese politics have much to say to political scientists
who examine the political economy of development, the role private entrepreneurs play
in political change, the effects of foreign direct investment, policy implementation,
regulation, the rule of law, citizenship, legitimacy, popular support, property rights and
many other topics. There is much low-hanging fruit⁹ to be harvested from the China
case and perhaps the time has come to put Chinese exceptionalism aside permanently
and to associate ourselves not with a single country but with problems than can be
studied in that country. This has already happened to a large extent for most area
studies within political science: why should we be holdouts?

Topical Specialization

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⁷ For similar thinking among political scientists who focus on Southeast Asia, see
Kuhonta, Slater and Vu (2008).
⁸ Andrew Walder and Victor Nee are prime examples from the senior generation, Ethan
Michelson and Xueguang Zhou more recently. On reasons why sociologists and
economists of China have found it easier to “transcend the perennial divide between
area studies and social science,” see Walder (2004: 322).
⁹ For this image and a defense of this research strategy, see O’Brien (2006).
Topical specialization also has unmistakable benefits and is a natural
development, given the avalanche of information now available on Chinese politics. No
one can begin to read everything that appears online or in the academic and popular
press, and even trying to keep up with news filters and postings on listservs is a
challenge. If depth is to be achieved in our research, some division of labor is inevitable
and desirable.

Very fine-grained studies are also a result of field work opportunities that have
opened up over the last thirty years. Particularly at the local level, researchers can go
(nearly) everywhere and study (nearly) everything.\(^{10}\) This had led to a flourishing of
empirical investigations that explore political dynamics in single (or small number of)
settings. Much of lasting value has been learned by homing in on individual pieces of
the puzzle of Chinese politics. This research strategy has also made China scholars more
like other area specialists in political science and even natural scientists. Students of
American politics, for example, have long ago learned to live with a high degree of
topical specialization and clear lines have been drawn between what scholars,
journalists, and pundits do. Natural scientists, for their part, tend to be even more
specialized and have proliferated subfields at a swift rate.\(^{11}\) Nearly all academics are less
conversant with subfields some distance from their own than was true in the past.

\(^{10}\) For vigorous disagreement, see Holz (2007) and Mann (2007). There remain of course
some “forbidden zones,” including significant parts of, for example, ethnic politics and
elite politics. For a balanced treatment of fieldwork opportunities and constraints, see

\(^{11}\) For growing signs of this tendency in the social sciences, see the 20 subfields (and over
600 sub-sub fields) into which research on economics is divided under the Journal of
Economic Literature classification system.
Perhaps we are simply witnessing the maturing of the study of Chinese politics in an era when it no longer makes sense (or is feasible) to be an expert on more than a few aspects of political life in China. If this is so, specialization is the path to progress.

Islands of Research

Advantages aside, disciplinary and topical specialization also have some troubling implications. First, narrow topics make it difficult for those who study other aspects of Chinese politics to place the best new research and to figure out what it all adds up to.\(^\text{12}\) Topical specialization produces high resolution pieces of a puzzle, but little sense of how the pieces fit together and no boxcover that illustrates what the puzzle depicts.\(^\text{13}\) At a time when China’s economic growth and prominence in world affairs have generated extraordinary interest inside and outside the academy, relatively few of us are willing to take a stab at characterizing the polity or addressing other equally large questions.\(^\text{14}\) When policy makers, citizens, and other scholars need maps of Chinese politics more than ever, we offer less insight than we might about what connects scattered islands of research.\(^\text{15}\)

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\(^{12}\) In Harding’s (1993: 32-33) words, “as we learn more about the minutiae of life in China, it is becoming more difficult to comprehend the broad patterns of change and structure.”

\(^{13}\) On the jigsaw puzzle metaphor, and the need to assemble pieces into a full picture, see Perry (1994: 712-13).

\(^{14}\) Exceptions include Mertha (2010) on “fragmented authoritarianism 2.0,” and Landry (2009) and Wright (2010) on the underpinnings of authoritarian resilience. For a time, not long ago, when there were arguably too many characterizations of the Chinese state, see Baum and Schevchenko (1999).

\(^{15}\) See Tarrow (2008), for example, on the “gap between studies of [China’s] political economy and studies of contentious politics.”
Disciplinary specialization also has some worrisome consequences, including discouraging interdisciplinary, China-centered discussion. Most of the debates I taught in my Chinese politics seminar involved Sinologists across the social sciences. These exchanges become less likely when immersion in political science is expected from sociologists or economists or anthropologists, who are understandably focused on their own discipline and China’s role in it. Disciplinary specialization inevitably cuts off experts on Chinese politics from non-political scientists, journalists, and other China watchers who are more interested in China than in political science. It creates new islands of research, fenced off by disciplinary jargon and parochial concerns, which can inhibit interdisciplinary work and hamper efforts to develop a holistic understanding of Chinese politics, economics and society. In Alpermann’s (2009: 352) words, “what looks like ‘integration’ from a disciplinary perspective can be seen as ‘fragmentation’ from the vantage point of China area studies.”

Disciplinary specialization hives us off from other China scholars and also from each other. These days, experts on Chinese politics seem to discuss less as a group and share less common knowledge. This encourages agreement or, more precisely, deference to specialized knowledge, largely because there is not enough engagement to disagree or to appreciate fully what is at stake. Leaning toward political science makes researchers less “legible” (Scott 1998) to other students of Chinese politics who do not follow or find great relevance in some disciplinary debates. These debates may be

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16 While lauding “falling barriers between the area and the disciplines,” Walder (2004: 337, 338) also sees fragmentation, as China scholars become “more insulated in their respective disciplines, their work increasingly accessible to those without specialized training.”
pivotal in political science, but that does not make them so for China. The old debates that structured my syllabus had China scholars on both sides and exploring and adjudicating them touched on issues that virtually all researchers on Chinese politics agreed were important. In the new disciplinary debates, the “other side” is often unknown to many China scholars and what the received wisdom maintains is clearly not the case in China. This creates a potential for theoretical and conceptual payoffs that are indescribable or not overly revealing to students of Chinese politics: findings that are slightly disappointing, or obvious, or of abiding interest primarily to those who know little about China.

Finally, disciplinary and topical specialization affect teaching, in particular training the next generation of researchers on Chinese politics. My current graduate seminar does not add up especially well, generating mainly prosaic conclusions such as China is globalizing, international actors play a growing role in domestic politics, and it is helpful to disaggregate the state. It is also challenging to place a title above each week’s assignments: to summarize what large issues have been addressed and how the readings relate to each other. Composing broad, overarching questions about China for the East Asian Politics Ph.D. exam has likewise become more difficult. In fact, I still return to and encourage anxious test-takers to consult my 2005 syllabus, which laid out a more organized and coherent field, packed with what seemed to be enduring questions.

17 The conclusion nearly every week is: “China is in transition, it is a moving target, a political hybrid that is unfamiliar and difficult to get our arms around.” With the post-Mao period now longer than the Maoist era, this is unsatisfying. I am beginning to worry that for my entire career, from my first day of graduate school in 1979, we will be saying “China is in transition.”
and debates. Sharp graduate students have of course noticed the empty space at the center of the field, and more of them are designing dissertations that tackle questions drawn from political science (or other social sciences) rather than China studies. This promises further hollowing out of the field, as the next generation of researchers looks outward, toward interlocutors who are not fellow China scholars. This will bring much to political science, but also means missed opportunities in an era when so many want and need to know about China for its own sake.

**Terms of Enlistment**

It is possible that the gains from disciplinary and topical specialization outweigh the costs. Chinese politics as a whole is too much to keep up with, especially for non-resident scholars; engagement with comparativists and international relations experts does bring knowledge about China to political science and reduces the paradigmatic role that European and American experiences still enjoy on too many questions. Students of Chinese politics, moreover, do not face a one-time, either-or choice between allegiance to China studies or the discipline. As Emmerson (2008: 305) aptly put it: “a career is not a snapshot but a film.” Researchers can, across time and in different works, address distinct audiences and identify more or less with area studies or disciplinary colleagues.

Contemporary political science also allows for mixed and shifting loyalties. Since the heat in the area studies debate died down in the early 2000s, we less frequently hear statements like: “I have long regarded area programs as a problem for political science” (Bates 1996) or “The idea of having a political science specialist for every piece
of international real estate may soon seem as arcane as having a specialist for every
planet in an astronomy department” (Laitin 1993). Instead, we are more likely to be told
there is “no necessarily fatal tension between studying an area and doing political
science” (Emmerson 2008: 305) or, as three young Southeast Asianists concluded, there
can be “a synergy between region and discipline” and a “complementary and mutually
reinforcing relationship” between area studies and political science (Kuhonta, Slater, and
Vu 2008: 2, 3).

Still, there are questions about what the “terms of enlistment” (Emmerson 2008:
304) should be for China scholars in political science. In my view, it would be a mistake
to follow the example of the discipline of economics, where country-based studies are
uncommon and area specialists are marginalized. Nor would it be advisable to heed
Yang Zhong’s (2009) call for students of Chinese politics to revive the search for a science
of comparative politics that has little use for country names. It may even be unwise to
emulate the field of European politics, where many Europeanists have come to identify
with political scientists who study the same topic (e.g. federalism, legislatures, political
economy) or problem (e.g. multilevel governance, democratic transition, immigration)
over area studies colleagues who conduct research on the same piece of “real estate.”

There are many reasons to produce country specialists on China. First, social
science theories come and go but China will last. It is a sad truth that much social
science knowledge disappears with little trace, because it is ignored or falls out of
fashion and is supplanted by the next big thing. This is much less likely for China.
Second, mainstreaming the study of Chinese politics may at times be wrong-headed or
premature, if it springs from a belief that China is more familiar than it is. Using theories and concepts from political science to interpret protest or voting behavior or elections or bureaucracy may place findings from China in a Procrustean bed that slices off what matters most. Third, interest in Chinese politics is high. A large and growing demand for informed, broad-gauged, country-based analysis exists, both inside and outside the classroom. If scholars do not address this need, and instead limit themselves to ever more-focused studies and intramural disciplinary debates, others will step into the breach.

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REFERENCES


