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Planning, Power, Politics: Urban Redevelopment in Istanbul

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Planning, Power, Politics:

Urban Redevelopment in Istanbul

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Urban Planning

by

Imge Akcakaya Waite

2016
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Planning, Power, Politics:
Urban Redevelopment in Istanbul

by

Imge Akcakaya Waite
Doctor of Philosophy in Urban Planning
University of California, Los Angeles, 2016
Professor Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris, Chair

This study examines how local power structures have influenced the politics of planning and decision-making in urban redevelopment projects in Istanbul. The theoretical motive for choosing this topic stems from the small number of empirical work that examines the interplay of power and politics in planning practice, relative to the recognized importance of these factors. Examination of the wide array of questions surrounding planning, power, and politics and the challenges of participatory planning in the context of Istanbul proves rewarding in this respect. On the one hand, as in most developing nations, pluralistic planning processes face significant obstacles in Turkey, such as excessively top-down traditions, lack of accountability on the part of the public sector in establishing public-private partnerships, absence of measures to encourage meaningful citizen participation, and tendency of groups who hold legal, political and financial powers to influence public agencies for their own benefit. On the other hand, Istanbul faces the added problems of earthquake threat and
mitigation, illegal settlements, excessive population and building densities, and the resulting safety concerns, all of which call for urgent redevelopment measures.

To address the questions related to the above problems and motives, the study conducted in-depth interviews with well-informed stakeholders from different actor groups (i.e. planners, local and central government officials, residents, community advocates, and planning faculty of local universities) who influenced the decision-making in two pioneering redevelopment projects in Istanbul, Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer. By using participant observation and triangulation methods, the analysis allowed for comparison within and between different groups of actors as well as comparison of the two projects. Supporting secondary data included archival documents, such as physical and socio-economic analyses of case areas, project contracts, maps, plans, reports and media accounts.

The study revealed that the involvement and influence of stakeholders in the two case areas were framed by the existing national legislative and political setting and the search for financial profit on the public and private actors’ side, which tended to ignore or weaken local community involvement and marginalized the less powerful actors. Nevertheless, the two cases also showed differences in the means of community organizing and had different outcomes in regards to population displacement. Overall, it is argued that the inclusion of communities and non-public actors in planning and management has the political function of acting against marginalization by giving these groups access to decision-making, by empowering them, and by making interventions more appropriate to local needs, resources and opportunities. Balanced power relations, equality, social justice and democratic forums are important components of participatory redevelopment processes, and can contribute to the betterment of the planning profession.
The dissertation of Imge Akcakaya Waite is approved.

Vinit Mukhiya

Diane Favro

Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2016
To the beautiful and courageous people of my beloved country
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party, Turkey (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BİMTAŞ</td>
<td>Boğaziçi Construction and Consultancy Co. (Boğaziçi Peyzaj İnşaat Müşavirlik Teknik Hizmetler San. Tic. A.Ş.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party, Turkey (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Floor area ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Göç-Der</td>
<td>Migrants’ Association for Social Cooperation, Istanbul (İstanbul Göç Edenler Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Kültür Derneği)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ha</td>
<td>Hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEMP</td>
<td>Istanbul Earthquake Master Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFACCA</td>
<td>International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>İMECE</td>
<td>Urbanism Movement of the Society, Istanbul (İMECE Toplumun Şehircilik Hareketi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Money Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMM</td>
<td>Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISMEP</td>
<td>Istanbul Seismic Risk Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İSPER</td>
<td>Istanbul Zeytinburnu Curtain Manufacturers Retail and Wholesale Market (İstanbul Perdeciler Çarşısı)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>KİPTAŞ</td>
<td>Istanbul Housing Development Organization Co. (İstanbul Konut İmar Plan Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>km</td>
<td>Kilometers</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBI</td>
<td>Municipality of Başakşehir, Istanbul</td>
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<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>Nationalist Movement Party, Turkey (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKI</td>
<td>Municipality of Küçükçekmece, Istanbul</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mw</td>
<td>Moment magnitude</td>
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<tr>
<td>MZI</td>
<td>Municipality of Zeytinburnu, Istanbul</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>PAR</td>
<td>Participatory action research</td>
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<tr>
<td>REIT</td>
<td>Real Estate Investment Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>sqm</td>
<td>Square meters</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEM</td>
<td>European Highway E-80</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOKİ</td>
<td>Housing Development Administration of Turkey (T.C. Toplu Konut İdaresi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRY</td>
<td>Turkish Lira</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-HABITAT</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Program</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>YTU</td>
<td>Yıldız Technical University, Istanbul</td>
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PART I

INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1. The Why and How of Studying Redevelopment in Istanbul

By the end of the 20th century, it had become increasingly recognized that planning and decision-making processes were significantly influenced by the distribution of power in a society and within specific institutional contexts. At the same time a number of voices emphasized the importance of participatory planning structures to address power related issues. Nevertheless, and unlike political science and sociology, the scholarly field of planning still lacks a main body of research that places power relations at its core. Despite their value, existing contributions to the literature that characterize power tend to remain strongly theoretical without a substantive understanding of the practice-oriented rationalities that may prevail in different contexts. It is therefore important that planning research is encouraged to develop an understanding of the issues of power which are faced by planners in their everyday professional practice. Such issues include political realities in/of the locality, power imbalances that occur in collaborative decision-making processes, exclusion of the local community and in particular the oppressed ethnic or political groups, unmet expectations regarding social justice and democracy, as well as planners’ preparedness to overcome such challenges.

Clearly, the wide array of questions surrounding planning, power and politics and the challenges of participatory planning provide an interesting area of research. What is even more thought-provoking and challenging is the examination of these issues in the context of Istanbul, Turkey, where recent urban redevelopment efforts are subject to particular challenges arising from a combination of traditional governing structures that favor top-down

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rather than collaborative approaches and neoliberal governing trends that favor the interests of private actors over those of the local public.

1.1. Problem statement and case selection

Throughout its history, the scope of Western planning has increasingly been enhanced to include ways for collaborative and participatory approaches to encompass matters of public concern and social justice. Planning theory tries to do this through different windows of thought towards different courses of action. In order to respond to power and value-driven issues emerging in contemporary planning practice, planning scholars have introduced concepts such as empowerment,\(^2\) deliberation,\(^3\) and trust.\(^4\) These concepts define various justifications for public participation in decision-making processes. Commonly cited justifications for direct citizen involvement include democratic, substantive, and pragmatic rationales. Among numerous questions that are posed in both theory and practice-oriented debates are: ‘How do public bodies define or constitute the public that they wish to engage in dialogue?’; ‘What notions of representation do participants and public officials bring to deliberative forums?’; and ‘How do such forums contribute to, or help improve, processes of

---

\(^2\) **Empowerment** has been defined as a process by which people, organizations, and communities gain mastery over their affairs (Rappaport, 1985; Rappaport, Swift, & Hess, 1984). Empowerment in planning tends to focus primarily on economic development, community participation, and grassroots coalitions formed around the provision of goods and services (Friedmann, 1992; Goldsmith & Blakely, 1992; Jacobs, 1992; Krumholz & Forester, 1990).

\(^3\) The idea of **deliberation**, which is also called **democratic deliberation**, as a special form of communication is expressed by Gutmann and Thompson within the core idea that “when citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions” (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 1). To be deliberative, reasoning should be subject to conditions such as openness, reciprocity, publicness, and authenticity (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996).

\(^4\) **Trust** is essential for community, social, political, familial, and even linguistic relations (Wittgenstein, 1969). In public planning, it is considered useful for legitimate conflict resolution and consensus building (Stein & Harper, 2003). If participants in planning processes see everything in terms of power, this perception could breed a sense of suspicion and mistrust, making it ever more difficult to develop the relationships of mutual respect and trust so essential to collaborative planning (Parekh, 2000).
social inclusion and exclusion?’ Answering such questions requires reviewing in which political setting participation is practiced, and what kind of planning paradigm is being utilized in a specific context—ranging from traditional rational (cost-benefit) planning to pluralistic schools such as communicative (or collaborative) planning, advocacy planning and so on.

Planning practice in Turkey has not moved beyond traditional planning models to a large extent, nor have participatory approaches progressed beyond the information and/or consultation stage, due to reasons that are often embedded in national and local politics. Traditional approaches to urban and neighborhood development in Turkey are based on the master planning model, whereby policies and action strategies are mostly linked to physical information, such as land use and building condition.

Additionally, the complexity of big Turkish cities, such as Istanbul, with their large numbers of inhabitants and institutions, usually results in a fragmentation of functions and a division of power, roles, and responsibilities among different stakeholders. At the same time, communities are not always homogenous and there are likely many disconnections among community members. A most visible example of such tensions between a Turkish majority group and a Kurdish minority group was the case of Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment project in Istanbul.

Turkish planning practice provides an example for current public participation theories which suggest that politicians and bureaucrats often exploit ordinary people and people of color, youth, women, children and the elderly. It is also the case that in many community improvement projects, the values that prevail and are reinforced tend to be those of the dominant individuals or groups in the municipality.

\[5\] See Yönder, Akçar, and Gopalan (2005); Hester (1999); Lowe (2008); David and Craig (1997); Jennings (2004); Swartz (2012); Webler, Tuler, and Krueger (2001).
1.1.1. *Istanbul’s redevelopment at the community’s expense*

On the one hand, as in most developing countries, democracy has not been fully institutionalized in Turkey. Pluralistic and participatory planning processes face significant obstacles such as excessively top-down traditions, the lack of public-friendliness on the part of the public sector in establishing public-private partnerships, the absence of measures to encourage meaningful citizen participation, the tendency of politically and financially powerful groups to influence public agencies for their own benefit, and prioritization of elite interests over the interests of other stakeholders. On the other hand, since witnessing the heavy consequences of the Marmara earthquakes of 1999, there has been an increasing demand by the public for safer and more resilient settlements in Istanbul, which could mitigate the effects of another expected major earthquake. To respond to such demands as well as address physical, social and economic challenges of urban settlements, local governments have attributed special consideration to urban redevelopment projects.

In addition to the aforementioned factors, the government’s consideration for urban redevelopment bears a neoliberal drive particularly in Istanbul, which is the largest, most populated and developed city of Turkey, as part of a trend also observed in other developing countries. Neoliberalism drives from the neoclassical economic argument that society functions better under a market logic than any other logic, so the state pursues privatization and free market capitalism. This diminishes the central government’s role and gives significance to local governments, who become actors that foster economic development policies, enable private investments, and compete in the global economy. Today, Istanbul is promoted by its local government, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM), as a “world city” with high-end mixed-use developments, shopping malls, hotels, office towers and high-income housing projects.
These new developments in the city center often result in displacement of the low-income residents and their loss of established economic and social networks, without a remedy by the state or government. Further gentrification of these areas becomes inevitable by the continuous capital pressure. The government’s profit seeking policies and the lack of laws that protect the residents’ rights favor private actors over the community. The result is a powerhouse of the government and private actors against the local community. As will be discussed in detail in the two case projects of this study—Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer neighborhoods—this is a common struggle for the local communities of Istanbul whose neighborhoods go through urban redevelopment.

1.1.2. Case projects: the Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer neighborhoods

Located on the European side of Istanbul, the Küçükçekmece and Zeytinburnu districts house a population of around 740,090 (in 3,754 Hectares [ha]) and 292,300 (in 1,159 ha) respectively, according to the 2013 census based on the address-based population registration system by the Turkish Statistical Institute (Figure 1). In terms of population density, these figures make Küçükçekmece and Zeytinburnu the 12th and 9th densest districts out of a total of 39 districts in Istanbul, which had a total population of 14,160,000 in 2013.

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6 For source and further information, visit the Turkish Statistical Institute’s database website at https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/medas/?kn=95&locale=en (retrieved in June 2016).
Zeytinburnu was established as the first illegal settlement of Turkey in the early 1950s, and has been sheltering a major portion of the immigrant population in Istanbul since then. The district has been suffering from unplanned and vulnerable developments for decades. These factors have made Zeytinburnu a focus of urban redevelopment debates in Istanbul; however, the leading rationale for redevelopment has been earthquake risk. The district was selected as a pilot project area in the context of a redevelopment, rehabilitation and retrofitting program for high-risk areas based on the Istanbul Earthquake Master Plan (IEMP) of 2003. In particular, Sümer neighborhood is determined by the IEMP to carry the highest risk for physical damage from an expected earthquake.\(^7\)

Küçükçekmece suffers from earthquake risks and illegal developments as well, and has housing areas that have been developed contrary to official plans. There are also unplanned housing areas, which have been developed through illegal processes on private and State

\(^7\) The full report of the IEMP in Turkish is available at http://ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/SubSites/DepremSite/Documents/IDMP_TUR.pdf (retrieved in May 2016).
Treasury land. Ayazma and Tepeüstü are such housing areas with extremely poor living conditions, overcrowding and resulting social problems.  

The redevelopment projects of Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer provide significant cases for this dissertation project for a number of reasons. First, Küçükçekmece and Zeytinburnu have been major foci for the alternative polycentric development vision of the IMM since the early 2000s. This vision was documented in the Istanbul Environmental Order Plan that was prepared by the IMM according to the Article 5 of the Development Law No. 3194. According to this plan, dated in 2006 and scaled 1:100,000, three districts were selected as priority areas to achieve planning objectives on the ground: Kartal, Küçükçekmece and Zeytinburnu. Besides the illegal housing problems and the earthquake hazard because of the weak housing stock and excessive population and building densities, important rationales in the selection of the districts were their central locations, economic potential, and convenient political conditions such as party unanimity. The consequent redevelopment projects prepared for Kartal were not realized due to reasons outlined in the previous section; however, the ones for Küçükçekmece and Zeytinburnu have been—at least partially—implemented.

Second, both Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer urban redevelopment projects are pioneers of the larger redevelopment scheme of Istanbul. Sümer is the first earthquake-based redevelopment project, whereas Ayazma-Tepeüstü is the first completed large-scale redevelopment project aiming slum clearance in Istanbul. Other districts model Sümer and Ayazma-Tepeüstü cases in designing their redevelopment projects.

Third, as analyzed later in this study, most of the redevelopment projects that are designed for major districts of Istanbul have not been realized mainly for political reasons and due to the reactions of the local communities. The cases of Sümer and Ayazma-Tepeüstü,

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8 See Turgut and Çağtaş-Ceylan (2012).
however, are two redevelopment projects in Istanbul that have been completed. Completion of the projects is essential for the purposes of the study so as to assess them in a holistic way, and to reveal the impact of power relations on the project outcomes derived only after the fulfillment of the projects.

Finally, data availability is another important factor in the selection of these case studies. Availability of technical reports, plans and maps in the district municipalities and the IMM have enabled this research to define and compare the two cases. However, as explained in the next section, there is a significant difference in the availability of academic and media accounts. According to the secondary data research I carried out for the two cases, Sümer neighborhood in Zeytinburnu has not received significant scholarly attention other than a few conference presentations; however, the case of Ayazma-Tepeüstü has been the subject of a considerable amount of scholarship already. There are two reasons for this difference: on one hand, the Sümer project has very recently been completed in its first phase, in February 2013. As project completion is a commonly expected factor in most research contexts, more scholarly analyses should be expected on the Sümer case in the future. Ayazma-Tepeüstü project was completed in 2007, which has allowed for the production of more publications. On the other hand, the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case has been subject to many social and political tensions from initiation to completion. It is reasonable to expect more media debates, power conflicts and organized community resistance to occur in this project that involved displacement, as in the case of Ayazma-Tepeüstü; hence this project has attracted more public and scholarly attention compared to the Sümer neighborhood.

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9 Some planning-related sources in English that examine the Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment project are Baysal (2013), Demir and Yılmaz (2012), Turgut (2008), Lovering and Türkmen (2011), Kuyucu (2014), Kuyucu and Ünsal (2010), and Pérouse (2015).
One significant contribution of this study to the planning literature involves the comparison of the two cases. There appears to be no other work in the existing literature that compares and contrasts the power dynamics of two redevelopment projects, one that involved no displacement (Sümer neighborhood) and another that did (Ayazma-Tepeüstü neighborhood). As stated above, displacement of residents, especially of the legal titleholders of property, is an issue that attracts significant conflict among the actor groups, and thus, plays an important role in forming and shaping power structures, as observed in Ayazma-Tepeüstü. The two case studies are also compared in regards to the extent of collaborative planning and community inclusion in the decision making processes.

1.2. Research design and methodology

1.2.1. Goal and scope of the study

The aim of the study is to examine how central and local power structures have influenced the politics of planning and decision-making in two urban redevelopment projects in Istanbul. This general goal necessitates an understanding of the strategies and processes of urban redevelopment in Istanbul as well as the concept of power and its implications in planning theory and practice in general.

To reach its aims, this study primarily draws from North American and Western European scholarly work as a basis for the theoretical discussion. The main reason for this is that the prominent ideas and scholars of these developed geographies lead the theoretical discourse in the world. This specific focus raises some concern as to whether the processes and challenges described can be generalized to non-Western locales. Thus, this study aims to investigate to what extent the theories explaining Western experiences apply to urban redevelopment projects in the districts of Zeytinburnu and Küçükçekmece. The purpose of the empirical work
is to contribute to the more general, theoretical contention that localities present unique transformations through their specific ways of interrelating with global and local forces. The validation of larger theoretical frameworks and implications comes from the analysis of case studies from as many different geographical regions as possible.\(^\text{10}\) The dissertation aims to contribute to this validation by examining cases in Istanbul, Turkey.

1.2.2. Research questions


The main research questions of the empirical work can be elaborated as follows.

\textit{What have been the strategies and processes of urban redevelopment in Istanbul? What internal and external forces influence these processes?}

In particular, what are the physical, social, economic and political factors that affect urban redevelopment decisions in Istanbul? How is this process influenced by the Turkish redevelopment agenda, and the influence of the European context, by which Turkish traditions are shaped? These questions require examination of local, regional and global dynamics at the city, national and international levels.

\textit{What is the relationship between the network of actors (residents, planners, politicians, private developers) and the power relations among them, in the context of Istanbul? How do these relationships affect planning decisions and outcomes in urban redevelopment schemes? How do the structure of this network and power relations within it inform each other in policy-making?}

In addressing these main questions, a set of more tangible questions guide the empirical study and compilation of primary data. Who are the key actors shaping the decision-making

\(^{10}\text{There are scholarly works that examine places as diverse as Zanzibar (Hoyle, 2002), China (Zhang & Fang, 2004), Cairo (Ghannam, 1997), and Bacalar Chico (Few, 2001).}\)
process? What are the underlying structural determinants that facilitate the emergence of these key actors, and the exclusion of others, in the process? To what extent do the actors affect policy- and decision-making? What are the factors that affect the redevelopment processes? Defining the nature and influence of perceived power contributes to the explanation of power structures and further identification of political and economic factors that impact their character. These more specific questions also allow addressing the larger questions of how collaborative the decision-making process is, and what the issues of power that emerge as disincentives to effective collaborative planning are.

To what extent has the affected community influenced the process of urban redevelopment?

This question informs the study on the issues related to public participation. What public participatory approaches have been employed in the decision-making process? What are the determinants for the exclusion of the community, if any? In what ways has the community attempted to influence decision-making? What are the distinguishing motives of titleholders and tenants, women, and different ethnic and socio-economic groups within the community, if any? What are their perceptions regarding the public-friendliness of the redevelopment project? Are they happy with the project outcomes? By addressing these questions, the study aims to decipher the roles and motives of the residents, and the extent to which their voices were heard regarding the challenges they encountered in policy-making decisions.

1.2.3. Methods and process of data collection and analysis

This study employs qualitative methods to answer the primary and secondary research questions outlined above. From a methodological standpoint, the aim of the study is to analyze the cases of Istanbul and in particular the redevelopment projects of Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer by way of looking at the published and unpublished material, as well as
collecting and analyzing primary data through qualitative methods. Discourse analysis of the secondary data allows a general understanding of the international, national and local planning debates and practices around the influence of power and redevelopment. Such data include unpublished dissertations focusing on Küçükçekmece and Zeytinburnu areas, papers published in national and international scholarly journals, articles from newspapers and magazines, and documents published by the central and local governments on various levels, all in either Turkish or English. As already explained, a larger body of secondary data existed for the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case. Although this case has attracted more public attention and is more largely examined by scholars, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media, a similar thorough data search was conducted for the Sümer redevelopment case.

During the field research in the province of Istanbul, archival and library research was also conducted in the IMM and the planning departments of universities in the city. In particular, the IMM departments of planning and archival services provided a rich array of booklets, articles and information about the history of redevelopment projects in Istanbul. The secondary data obtained have served to contextualize more general information about the process of redevelopment and the various development projects in Istanbul, as well as the redevelopment agenda and activities of the IMM and central government institutions that led the two case projects examined.

Primary data collection and analysis must together arrive at a robust and comprehensive understanding of the politics of the redevelopment. For this purpose, this study employs coding and triangulation methods for data collection and for data analysis. In general terms,
triangulation refers to a set of methods used by qualitative researchers to check and establish validity in their studies by analyzing a research question from multiple perspectives.¹¹

Primary data collection was conducted through in-depth interviews in one-on-one sessions. These interviews aimed at revealing the levels of power perceived by the actor groups of local governments (district and metropolitan levels), governmental development institutions (central or local government based), private development or construction companies, NGOs (at different levels), and the community groups (representatives of different user types—owner or tenant—, status groups and ethnicities, where applicable) —in other words, stakeholders who in one way or another were linked to decision-making processes of the projects. Two written interview guides were developed for two main categories of actors: formal/government institutions (Appendices A and B), and local community and the NGOs (Appendices C and D). In developing the interview guide, a set of open-ended questions were employed to allow assessment of the perceived power within decision-making processes as compared to a variety of variables embedded in the research questions. They served to reveal the power structures in these processes, and to highlight similarities and differences in the groups’ and individuals’ perceptions.

A snowball sampling method was used to detect and employ research subjects. This way, all different actor groups that were directly involved in decision-making were interviewed for the two projects. In addition to in-depth interviews, the qualitative research involved participant observation with an ethnographic approach. Being the sole researcher of this study and the sole conductor of all the interviews allowed the author to take on the role of overt participant observer throughout the research, and gain familiarity with the actors and their perceptions, ambitions and concerns. As a native of Turkey and resident of Istanbul, the

¹¹ The most cited references for definition and methods of triangulation include Denzin (1978), Patton (2001), and Lewis and Ritchie (2003).
researcher was also able to utilize academic and professional contacts in the city to get access to possible interviewees and information.

Once the qualitative data were acquired from the transcriptions and interview notes, they were coded and examined for common themes and notable outliers related to the research questions. In line with the study’s purposes as well as the triangulation methods, the analysis process allowed comparison within and between different categories of actors as well as comparison of the two projects. A detailed description and use of research methods are conveyed in Chapter 4.

1.3. Outline of the study

The study is organized in five parts: introduction, theoretical discussion, methodology, empirical findings, and conclusions. These large topics were elaborated in one or more chapters in each part. The current chapter, Introduction, provides a broad outline of the problem statement, case selection and contexts, scope and goal of the study, research questions, methodology, and significance as well as a short outline of the subsequent chapters.

Part II presents a review of the study-relevant theoretical literature with a brief overview of local practice. Chapter 2 examines the discourse of power in decision-making through definitions of power from political science and other social disciplines in a temporal setting, and elaborates on the concept, uses and problems associated with decision-making power in the planning literature. In particular, power machines in local governments receive attention in relation to collaborative and participatory efforts. Collaborative planning, which has emerged largely following the so-called communicative turn, is given a special emphasis as a planning paradigm that takes power relationships and imbalances in the core of its debate.
These debates are associated with broader theories of governance, social justice, and democracy.

Chapters 3 focus on the discourse of urban redevelopment through international and Turkish perspectives. It starts with an examination of the concept of urban redevelopment in general, and compares it with similar concepts which use different terms. Reviewing the process of urban redevelopment policy in the Western context provides important clues for the analysis of existing components and catalysts of urban redevelopment, particularly in Turkey, which takes the European experience as a model in shaping its agenda. The chapter then examines neoliberalism as a motive for redevelopment that constitutes the basis of understanding the yesterday and today of the Turkish practice. The remaining two sections aim to provide an empirical background for the case study. They analyze the evolution, political, economic and legislative motives, and the recent agenda of urban redevelopment in Turkey in general. Special emphasis is given to the specific dynamics and projects that shape the activities in Istanbul where redevelopment is practiced more ambitiously than in the rest of the country.

Part III of the study provides a thorough examination of the methodology that is summarized above. The methods and process of primary data collection, ethnographic analysis by triangulation of stakeholder perspectives and case comparison, and research notes and challenges are described in Chapter 4, followed by validity assessments. This chapter also introduces the actor groups and their representatives, in other words the informed interviewees, of the case projects through a stakeholder analysis.

Part IV conveys the empirical findings of the study, followed by a comparative assessment of two case projects. Chapters 5 and 6 provide an in-depth analysis of Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer redevelopment cases, respectively. The outlines of these two chapters are similar so as
to offer the researcher and the reader a precision in observing the common themes of the findings and analysis: development of the case, actor structure, institutional policies and goals, factors in decision-making, informed conflicts, community involvement and perceptions, and assessment of the decision-making process by actors. The individual case chapters are followed by Chapter 7, which offers a comparative assessment of the power reality in terms of the case contexts, formal collaborations, and the perspectives of the governments and residents regarding community inclusion and responses. Finally, Chapter 8 analyzes the informed lessons for future redevelopment activities in Turkey as suggested by the practitioners of the two case projects. These lessons are also organized parallel to the interview and analysis themes, under main components of the redevelopment practice: policy formulation, physical, financial and collaborative planning, and local community involvement and organizing.

The final part of the study, Part V, relays conclusions with Chapter 9. The last chapter starts with research implications that are drawn from the theoretical discussions and empirical findings. These are followed by a set of policy recommendations for Istanbul and Turkey. Closing words of the study point at the direction planning theory and practice can take, and offer an insight for why planners and policy-makers should continue examining and addressing central and local power structures that influence the politics of planning and decision-making in urban redevelopment.
PART II

THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
Chapter 2. Discourses of Power in Decision-Making

2.1. Conceptual framework

In order to understand the semantics of power as undertaken in this study (i.e., formal uses, context, and extent), this chapter reviews a broad literature about power to reveal the classic and contemporary definitions of the term from an evolutionary perspective. These definitions are applied throughout many disciplines of social sciences, such as sociology, psychology, public policy, management sciences, and political science. In the case of planning, however, there is no significant attempt for a definition. Treatment of the use of power in planning is, however, influenced by certain definitions that are discussed below as well as theories such as communicative rationality that underlie collaborative planning. The section that follows discusses these different approaches and definitions.

2.1.1. Classic and contemporary definitions of power

The classic definition of power is described by Weber, and is ‘the probability that one actor within a social relationship would be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance’ (Weber, 1947 in Blokhuys et al., 2008). A decade after Weber, Dahl (1957) provided another widely cited definition, which asserts that power is the ability to affect the behavior of another—to prompt a person to “do something he would not otherwise do” (p. 202). Similar to Dahl, Pfeffer (1981) defines power as “a relationship among social actors in which one social actor, A, can get another social actor, B, to do something that B would not otherwise have done” (p. 3). Bachrach and Botwinick (1992), expanding on Dahl’s definition,

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12 Dahl criticized former studies for analyzing only the potential power of actors and not their actual, exerted power (e.g. Dahl, 1957). In order to establish which of the participating actors had really influenced resulting decisions, Dahl (1961) carried out an empirical study of New Haven that covered three issue areas: political nominations, urban redevelopment and public education.
include the lack of overt conflict in their power definition: “A exercises power over B when in her own interest, she gets B to do something that is contrary to B’s interests” (p. 55).

Building on this statement, McClelland (1975) constructed a four-celled typology of power experiences, based on the source of power and the object of power (Table 1). McClelland’s stage III power experience corresponds to Dahl’s definition of power, suggesting the power to control others, manifest as competition with the goal of winning influence or controlling action and domination. The four stages of power are developmental in nature (each stage must be experienced before progressing to the next). In McClelland’s typology, “modes of experiencing power are learned in succession, more or less in the order given, each depending on the successful experiencing of the earlier ones” (p. 24). Like stage III, all stages are also legitimate experiences of power with their own strategies.

Table 1. Experiences of power. Adapted from Power: The inner experience by D. C. McClelland, 1975, Irvington, p. 253.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Power</th>
<th>Object of Power</th>
<th>Power Experience Stage I</th>
<th>Power Experience Stage II</th>
<th>Power Experience Stage III</th>
<th>Power Experience Stage IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>It (God, mother, leader, food) strengthens me</td>
<td>I strengthen, control, direct myself</td>
<td>I have impact, influence on others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nurturing environment</td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Classic definition of power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>I gain support</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assertion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Helping behavior (as a form of domination and control)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These attempts suggest a one-way direction and influence of power, in which the two sides of flow are distinct. It was Hawley (1963) who first mentioned the multidirectional
nature of power. In an attempt to expand the so-called classic definition, he expressed power in two ways: “(1) as functional power—that is required to execute a function; and (2) as derivative power—which spills over into external relationships and regulates the interaction between parts” (p. 423). It is possible to see recent accounts of this point, such as Dryberg (1997) who stated that power is distributed among several actors, and should be regarded in terms of influence over the action of others and in terms of relationships, not as a possession or an attribute of individuals.

Despite significant attempts like Hawley’s, it was not until the 1980s that the traditional understanding of power shifted with the writings of Michel Foucault. His extensive and innovative conceptualization of power led to a new definition supported by later critical theorists. Concisely, Foucault regards all former concepts as contingent, meaning they reflect the seemingly random interplay between certain social circumstances; he accepts power as absolute truth and all-inclusive (Stein & Harper, 2003), depicting it as a universe that embodies both negative and positive relationships. Foucault asserts that any kind of relationship that occurs between A and B is a power relationship:

When one speaks of “power,” people immediately think of a political structure, a government, a dominant social class. . . . This is not at all what I think when I speak of “relations of power.” I mean that in human relations, whatever they are—whether it be a question of communicating verbally . . . or a question of love relations, institutional or economic relations—power is always present (Foucault 1985, pp. 11-12).

Foucault’s overarching definition suggests that all social interactions should be seen as power relations. Therefore, all institutional, economic, religious, political, cultural, linguistic, etc. relationships are exercises of power.

The critical use of the term power by Foucauldians and other critical theorists usually revolves around the coercive, insidious, and repressive role that power often plays in our lives as social beings. This tendency of Foucauldians recalls the classical definition. For example,
according to Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997), power implies a (potential) possession of coercive, utilitarian, or normative means necessary to impose one actor’s will on others who are involved in any decision-making process. Blokhuis, Schaefer, Vries, Snijders, and Leengoed (2008) clarify this definition by adding that coercive means are based on physical resources of violence or restraint; utilitarian means are based on material or financial resources; and normative means are based on symbolic resources. Stein and Harper (2003) suggest that the understanding of coercive power arises from Marx and, later, from critical theory: ideological distortion is used by those with economic wealth (those who control the means of production) to dupe ordinary people into accepting institutions that do not operate in their interest (i.e., institutions that support existing power relations). This view stems from the Marxist notions of ideology and false consciousness.

To further this definition, Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998) contribute: “On the surface, power is exercised through the mobilization of scarce, critical resources, and through the control of decision-making processes. At a deeper level, power is exercised by managing the meanings that shape others’ lives. Deeper still, is the suggestion that power is embedded in the very fabric of the system” (p. 460). The potentially complex resulting interactions suggest that, as Mitchell et al. (1997) note, power is not difficult to recognize, but is challenging to define.

More recently, Irazabal (2009) has attempted to distinguish different meanings and uses of power: “Power is the capacity to make things happen (‘power to’ or ‘network power’), make others do things (‘power over’), or prevent things from happening (‘preemptive power’). Different modes of power may be in operation simultaneously. That is, in order to govern, there are occasions in which it is necessary to exercise some power to or network power (gaining a capacity to act, or to act cooperatively and to mutual benefits, respectively) and power over others (controlling others’ actions). This is accomplished, as DiGaetano and
Klemanski (1999) concede, “either by defeating them (dominating power), persuading them (bargaining power), or precluding them from the decision-making process (preemptive power)” (p. 124).

This study combines the above two approaches to define power: the Foucauldian notion of power—that it encompasses all relationships—and the traditional notion of power—that it is merely coercive, and thus negative—to generalize to all possible relationships. The aim is to explore the power play in all sorts of observed relationships and reveal positive and negative effects, or as Stein and Harper (2003) call them, legitimate and illegitimate, power relationships. At this point, critical theorists claim that such an approach may cause a rather pessimistic depiction of the use of power, ignoring its possibly more positive and constructing aspects. Some, in turn, call for the need for a normative basis that would enable distinction of legitimate and illegitimate exercises of power.\(^\text{13}\) It is the aim of this study to reveal the two faces through an empirical study of actual exercises of power. It does this by keeping in mind the possible generalization bias. However, coercive interactions are the kind of power exercise that shapes the most determining and critical turning points of the decision-making process. Thus the empirical part of this study depicts all power episodes revealed by the research subjects to obtain meanings and implications from the whole narrative as well as pay particular attention to the coercive episodes that shape means towards ends.

\[\text{2.1.2. Input from planning: collaborative and participatory approaches}\]

A distinction between Foucault’s definition and the traditional theory driven recognition, is that Foucault sees power as an all-inclusive fact infused in events as they unfold during the planning process. Thus, its complex structure should be explored and recognized. Starting in

\(^{13}\) See, for example, Stein and Harper (2003).
the latter half of 1980s, it became possible to trace the Foucauldian approach to power in planning. One of the pioneers in this line of thought, John Forester, observed planners in the San Francisco City Planning Department and showed that they were exercising power everyday through their communications with planning commissioners, citizens, developers, and others (Forester, 1989). Planners had the power to focus attention and get people to hone in on certain issues and divert focus away from others. Similarly, in his case study of transportation planning for Aalborg, Flyvbjerg (1998; 2002), through close examination of power relationships, details how a plan that was developed through consultation and aimed at sustainability failed in its goals. He looks both at the forces that shaped the projects instituted under the plan and also at what the plan actually accomplished rather than at its rhetoric. Planning scholars have also studied other aspects of communication, often relating it directly to power.\(^{14}\)

Planning literature has attempted to assimilate this new way of Foucauldian thinking through new planning paradigms. On the one hand, the issue of power has moved more to the fore in planning thought, in part because of the growth of collaborative planning\(^{15}\) and consensus building\(^{16}\). These sets of practices involve a variety of stakeholders in long-term,

\(^{14}\) See, for example, Healey (1993), and Sager (1994).

\(^{15}\) The communicative or collaborative turn has dominated theoretical discourse since the late 1980s. Since then, as Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones (2002) list, it has undergone a number of mutations as ‘planning through debate’ (Healey, 1992), ‘communicative planning’ (Healey 1993; Innes 1995), ‘argumentative planning’ (Fischer & Forester, 1993), ‘collaborative planning’ (Healey, 1997) and ‘deliberative planning’ (Forester, 1999). It has also developed in different directions due to various academic schools such as communicative approach, including neo-pragmatics (Harper & Stein, 1995), critical theory (Forester, 1993), Foucauldian perspectives (Flyvbjerg, 1998) and planning practice (Hoch, 1992). In its general manifestations, the communicative turn has been referred to as ‘collaborative planning,’ although it is also called ‘deliberative planning’ in the US literature (Forester, 1999).

face-to-face discussions to produce plans and policies on controversial public issues (Booher & Innes, 2000). Hence, planning processes need experts skilled in communicative, people-centered practices, and perceptive strategic actors who understand the power dynamics of the wider political context.

In reality, unlike political science and sociology, the field of planning research still lacks a regular body of central scholarly works that place power relations at their core. The status quo, observed by Flyvbjerg in 2002, has not seen any notable improvement in the last decade despite some earlier triggering contributions.17 Flyvbjerg adds that, because of their focus on Habermasian communicative rationality,18 these theorists tend to remain strongly normative and procedural without the substantive understanding of Realpolitik and real rationality that characterize studies of power. It is the very aim of this study to unpack such procedural approach, and contribute to the kind of development Flyvbjerg and Friedmann encourage: the search, capture and dissection of the real politics that are practiced in hands-on planning cases.

On the other hand, for many decades there has been an increasing emphasis on direct citizen participation in policy formulation and decision-making in planning, at least at a rhetorical level, in numerous scholarly works and policy documents. Participation can be broadly defined as the involvement of a community in projects affecting them and calling for more government accountability in such projects. Many different meanings and uses exist of the term participation, and a certain level of ambiguity about the term exists when putting

17 For examples of contributions, see Crush (1994); Fischler (1998); Hajer (1995); Richardson and Jensen (2000); and Yiftachel and Huxley (2000).

18 Habermas’s (1984) theory of communicative rationality describes human rationality as a necessary outcome of successful communication, concerned with clarifying the norms and procedures by which agreement can be reached. The theory has been criticized for being utopian and idealistic (Foucault, 1988; Calhoun, 1992), for being blind to issues of gender, race, ethnicity, and sexuality (Cohen, 1995; Fraser, 1987; Ryan, 1992), and for ignoring the role of conflict, contest, and exclusion in the historical constitution of the public sphere (Eley, 1992).
participation into practice. Remarkable efforts date back to late 1960s, pointing to Arnstein’s (1969) *ladder of participation*, a typology which illustrates a continuum of public involvement, ranging from a more tokenistic to a more genuinely participatory approach. She defines participation as “the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future” (p. 216). The classic definition serves as a basis for the relevant arguments presented in this study, as it describes participation in terms of power, parallel to the intentions of the study. Arnstein, more than four decades ago, revealed the inextricable relationship between the two, directing attention to the difference between taking part in the ritual of participation and having the real power needed to affect the outcome of the planning process: “Participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless. It allows the power-holders to claim that all sides were considered, but makes it possible for only some of those sides to benefit” (p. 216).

It should be noted that Arnstein’s typology does not include an analysis of the most significant obstacles, on both sides of power imbalances, to achieving genuine levels of participation. Those who hold power, in other words the “haves,” must overcome racism, paternalism, and resistance to power redistribution, while the “have nots” have to contend with inadequacies of infrastructure and knowledge base (i.e. time, organization, knowledge capacity for effective discussions, etc.), in addition to the difficulties of organizing effective citizen groups because of the considerable distrust about the system. Early attempts at achieving meaningful participation revealed the limits of participatory planning strategies that did not take these obstacles into account. In order to overcome such limitations of Arnstein’s categorical definition for *citizen power*, a more pragmatic approach has emerged, in which the purposes of participation have been expanded to include empowerment,
networking, deliberation, and supplementing design and planning. These concepts are reviewed in detail later in this chapter, in relation to collaborative planning.

In her work that presents a breakdown of the evolution of planning thought, Fainstein (2005) suggests that during the 1970s, neo-Marxists emphasized the structural underpinnings that limited the potential of planning to achieve change that did not primarily support the owners of capital. This conclusion proved very discouraging to progressive planners who by then were also working for community-based organizations rather than only for city governments and developers. The problem, from the perspective of planning theory, was that although these efforts were rooted in an underlying normative position, their theoretical premises were rarely made explicit. The later, more theoretical response was to identify in democratic forms a way to counter structural power. This response combined with moves in other disciplines—especially philosophy and cultural studies—to examine communication. The logic of the new discourse was that by “speaking truth to power,” employing multiple forms of discourse, and engaging all stakeholders in the communicative process, it would be possible to attain a more just outcome (Forester, 1989). Where for Marx a just outcome could only occur when the economic structure was transformed, for the communicative theorists it was the product of transforming communication (Fainstein, 2005). All in all, in the last few decades, the planning academy has begun to move away from the primarily normative and

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19 Also see Castells (1977), and Harvey (1978).

20 In the US, “speaking truth to power” has become a popular way to describe taking a stand, even when the people speaking truth to power are powerful themselves. Although the origin of the phrase is commonly ascribed to a 1955 book, Speak Truth to Power: A Quaker Search for an Alternative to Violence, advocating against the Cold War, it appears to have been coined earlier by civil rights leader Bayard Rustin. In the planning field, it has been used by prominent scholars such as John Forester and John Friedmann to invite the “haves” to honesty when admitting to the power relationships they pursue.
hypothetical exercises of the previous generation and has begun to study the actual planning practice.21

2.2. Power in planning literature: issues and reflections

As Albrechts (2003a) puts it, planning needs a fine-grained analysis of what actually takes place in formal decision-making and implementation in the transition from plan to formal adoption of the plan and in its execution, as opposed to what planners normatively would like to see happen. This section points out some important issues of power that must be considered to achieve this aim. These issues, compiled from the literature, relate to theories of networking, rationality, representation, social justice, democracy, collaborative planning, and governance. They are evident in several case studies, the most important of which are cited in this section. After all, it is this study’s aim to close the gap between the theory and practice of power relationships in planning.

The selection of the case studies examined in this section was made to represent the practical and contextual diversity of planning practice, with an aim not necessarily to search for the best practices, but to represent what is available in the literature. Unfortunately, in the planning field, there is not a vast availability of case studies specifically analyzing power relations/structures. In looking for case studies to review, a special attention was given to define and select cases that explicitly examine actors in power relations, their interactions and how they have affected the planning process due to their interests and rationalities, although the methods to do so might vary.

The reason for the illustration of diverse forms of planning practice is to once more review that power relations are exercised for all types of planning phenomena. This is true

21 See Booher and Innes (2000), and Innes (1995).
for different scales of planning practice, from local decision making to decision making at a variety of regional levels. Nevertheless, all cases show the ambition and efforts to perform collaborative planning and governance, either stated by the authors of the articles describing them, or by the central or local governments that conduct the planning exercise examined in the case study. Tensions due to power relations are more evident and notable in collaborative practices that seek inclusion of more stakeholders than in conventional planning approaches. This is evident in the theoretical debates as reviewed in the earlier sections; and is evident in this section as well where analysis of power relations are assessed by the authors around a series of common keywords: participation, collaboration, governance, politics and so on.

Arnstein used her aforementioned illustration to address the necessity of redistribution of power in decision-making. Based on the literature assessed, main issues surrounding this concern are rationality, participation, power imbalances, and political realities. Yet, another important concern that participatory planning deals with is the issue of values. The concern with values considers cultural differences, informal relationships within society, gender roles and specific needs of communities of color, vulnerable and/or deprived groups, etc. as priorities in a pluralist planning agenda. It is frequently argued that planning practice should seek transformative participatory approaches—instead of isolating ones—to overcome value and power related planning practice challenges.\(^2\) Finally, all of these concerns elaborated below and their practices suggest a number of lessons for planning students and practitioners, which are reviewed at the end of this section.

\(^2\) See Cameron and Grant-Smith (2005); Swartz (2012); and Jennings (2004).
2.2.1. Rationality and/or power

For Foucault (1983), all truth, knowledge, and rationality are merely reflections of power relations, an observation that follows from his definition of power as any set of relations that restrict: “The exercise of power . . . is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely” (p. 220). Even rationality is seen as a form of power because it restricts behavior. As Stein and Harper (2003) imagine it, for example, if you do not want to be hit by lightning and there is a severe lightning storm, then you cannot go outdoors and be rational. Thus, rationality restricts your behavior. Therefore, it is a form of power. In the same way, truth and knowledge are also seen as restrictive.

Indeed, debates around power and rationality in planning are frequently based on Flyvbjerg’s (1998; 2002) extensive case of Aalborg, Denmark, which was an urban preservation project aimed to reduce auto traffic in the historic core by one-third. This goal was challenged by the fact that the only parties consulted before the proposals went to the City Council were a council committee, the police, and the Chamber of Industry and Commerce. Thus, the chamber’s special elite position enabled it to negotiate changes in policy that conformed to what Flyvbjerg (1998) calls their rationality (i.e., the view that what was good for Aalborg was the idea that “the car is king” [p. 357]), in contrast to the planners’ rationality (i.e., the idea that the core would remain viable only if auto traffic there was significantly reduced).

In his essay, Flyvbjerg (2002) identifies an under-investigated grey area between rationality and power. He claims that modern democratic constitutions typically prescribe a separation of rationality and power, much like the untenable separation of fact and value in conventional social and political thinking. The ideal, which often remains unrealized, prescribes that first we must know about a problem, then we can make a decision. For
example, first the planners investigate a policy problem, then they inform the city council, which decides on the problem. Power is brought to bear on the problem only after we have made ourselves knowledgeable about it. In reality, however, power often ignores or designs knowledge at its convenience.

Flyvbjerg then tries to understand how rationality and power relate in real planning in real democracies. He further argues that while power produces rationality and rationality produces power, their relationship is asymmetrical (Flyvbjerg, 1998). Power has a clear tendency to dominate rationality in the dynamic and overlapping relationship between the two. The case of tourism planning in Squamish, Canada, as examined by Reed (1997), mirrors the Aalborg case. The emphasis of the tourism plan on process over project effectively retained the status quo within the conventional power structures. As a result of the power oriented manipulation of rationality, the Chamber of Commerce of Squamish maintained its hold on tourism and constrained its development in the immediate future. Struggles over who should make decisions were evident both in project leadership and in specific recommendations made by the committee. Both individual personalities as well as institutional priorities conflicted within the organizational policy arena.

In his debates, Flyvbjerg also discusses Francis Bacon’s dictum that knowledge is power, and adds that ‘power is knowledge.’ In other words, power defines what is counted as knowledge. He adds that power is not just the social construction of rationality, but also it defines physical, economic, social, and environmental reality itself. Following this ambitious statement, Flyvbjerg (1998) assesses the weakness of modernity and of democracy and planning in light of the context-dependent nature of rationality:

*Modernity relies on rationality as the main means for making democracy and planning work. But if the interrelations between rationality and power are even remotely close to the asymmetrical relationship depicted in the Aalborg case—which the tradition from Thucydides, Machiavelli, and*
Nietzsche tells us they are—then rationality is such a weak form of power that democracy and planning built on rationality will be weak, too. The asymmetry between rationality and power makes for a fundamental weakness of modernity and of modern democracy and planning. The normative emphasis on rationality leaves the modern project as ignorant . . . and therefore as open to being dominated by power (p. 361).

In this respect, Flyvbjerg’s Aalborg study shows conceptualization and institutional reform based on the communicative rationality of Habermas to be inadequate: “To enable democratic thinking and the public sphere to make real contributions to democratic planning and action, we have to tie them back to what they cannot accept in much of communicative planning theory: power, conflict, and partisanship” (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 361).

On a different note, Albrechts (2003a) attempted to combine different models of rationality within a broader contextual understanding of power (strategic rationality) in planning and formal decision-making.23 Contrary to Flyvbjerg (2001), who states that Habermas and Foucault are so profoundly different that it would be futile to envisage any kind of theoretical or meta-theoretical perspective within which these differences could be integrated into a common framework, we see these concepts as necessarily separate in inevitably complementary interrelations.24 Indeed in contrast to the Aalborg case (Flyvbjerg, 1998; 2002) which reveals that the raw exercise of power tends to be more effective than appeals to objectivity, facts, knowledge and the better argument, Albrechts’s (2003a) Flanders case shows a much more diverse picture. In the latter case, “agreements on values are very much a precondition for the initiation of the project” (Albrechts, 2003a, p. 263). The purpose of the planning team launching a study of the spatial needs of the Flemish industry was to achieve power through knowledge, and thus to bring about a more equal relationship between the Confederation and the planning team. The planners revealed alternative figures

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23 For more information, see instrumental rationality (Etzioni, 1967), substantive (Mannheim) or value (Weber) rationality, and communicative rationality (Habermas, 1984).

24 See Alexander (2001), and Healey (2001).
and corrected false information, which had been used to further private interests. This in turn forced an influential actor such as the Confederation to communicate with the planner. The case makes it clear that the knowledge acquired had a considerable impact on the power relations between the planning team and the Confederation. Rationality was strategically used in order to achieve power, and made it possible to move in the direction of dialogue and collaboration ideals (Albrechts, 2003a).

As Fainstein (2005) summarizes, communicative planning theorists and progressive political economists share a skepticism concerning the usefulness of models of rationality and their associated privileging of efficiency. These theorists argue that means and ends are interrelated and thus cannot be rigidly separated as they were in the rational model. But, Fainstein (2005) claims, “somewhat oddly given their acceptance of this proposition, they back away from a concern with ends and aim their spotlight virtually entirely on the planner’s mediating role rather than on what should be done or on the context in which planning operates” (p. 125). In contrast, Flyvbjerg (1998) “caution[s] against an idealism that ignores conflict and power” (p. 7). Nevertheless, as Flyvbjerg suggests, power has its own rationality that ensures those interested parties who hold economic and institutional power are always likely to lead development in a certain direction, regardless of public opinion.

2.2.2. Participation and power imbalances

One definition of planning is that it is a political activity aimed at redistribution of power (Douglass & Friedmann, 1998). On one hand, communicative theorists emphasize the role of participatory processes in transforming power relations. On the other hand, Foucauldians

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26 See Forester (1989); Fischer (2006); Booher and Innes (2000); and Stein and Harper (2003).
suggest that power corrupts any process. These competing dynamics could suggest an ambiguous role of public participation in planning processes. Revisiting Reed’s (1997) case of tourism planning in Squamish, Canada, through the commitment of citizen participants, the plan for the development of tourism introduced a much broader vision of community aspiration than would have been possible by development applications made to the council on a project-by-project basis. Although public participation was not successful enough to effectively challenge power constituted by conventional power holders, participatory processes played a role in transforming power relations. In contrast, Few’s (2001) case of conservation planning in Bacalar Chico, Belize, provides a much less optimistic picture. The planning agencies were in a commanding position to exert control at least over the official channels of public involvement. They arranged and conducted the meetings and surveys, drew up the agendas and reported on the outcomes. They were able to steer the discussions and selectively encourage the participation of stakeholders perceived as supportive of the emerging plans, such as reef tour guides. Such control rendered public participation as reactive and consultative, rather than pro-active and executive.

The problem of power imbalances between stakeholders is also commonly noted in collaborative governance and participation literature. First, Ansell and Gash (2007) claim that if some stakeholders do not have the capacity, organization, status, or resources to participate, or to participate on an equal footing with other stakeholders, the governance process will be prone to manipulation by stronger actors. For example, Bradford (1998) demonstrates that attempts by the Government of Ontario to make job training and occupational health and safety policy through collaborative means were thwarted by the

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27 The most famous example is of Flyvbjerg (1998).
28 See Gray (1989); Short and Winter (1999); Tett, Crowther, and O’Hara (2003); Fainstein (2005); Warner (2006); and Ansell and Gash (2007).
privileged status of firms who, through ‘informal channels,’ were able to gain access to senior officials. Ultimately, such imbalances produce distrust or weak commitment. In the case of Squamish, from the inception to the completion of the plan, the conventional elite in both the community and the chamber ensured that their own basic interests were addressed. The municipality and the proponent of the ski hill development was successful in using the planning process to their ends. However, in this case, although the elites were able to ensure that the ski hill project remained on the agenda, they were not successful in derailing the entire planning process (Reed, 1997). Similarly, in the case of Bacalar Chico, the very fact that planners entered negotiations with stakeholders, sought their support and sought to demonstrate their involvement to enable participatory approaches, opened up the opportunities for conflict, dissent and disruption (Few, 2001).

The political realities for the Aalborg Project were shaped by the interests of the Chamber, while the formal politics in democratically elected bodies like the City Council have had only minor impact on the project. Rational, deliberative democracy gave way to premodern, tribalistic rule by the strongest: distorted relations of political power produced a distorted project (Flyvbjerg, 1998). Such statements are valid for the case of Squamish as well, where the Chamber held dominant and manipulative power over the project compared to the municipality officials (Reed, 1997).

As Ansell and Gash (2007) articulate, power imbalances are particularly problematic where important stakeholders do not have the organizational infrastructure to be represented in collaborative governance processes. English (2000), for example, argues that the more diffuse the affected stakeholders, and the longer term the problem horizon, the more difficult it will be to represent stakeholders in collaborative processes. In many cases, the problem is that organized stakeholder groups do not exist to represent individual stakeholders
collectively. Another common problem is that some stakeholders may not have the skill and expertise to engage in discussions about highly technical problems. A third common problem is that some stakeholders do not have the time, energy, or liberty to engage in time-intensive collaborative processes. None of these problems are necessarily unbeatable; proponents of collaboration have pointed to a range of strategies that can be used to empower weaker or underrepresented groups, as elaborated later in this chapter.

From another perspective, Corubolo (1999) states that under the emphasis of the democratization and market-oriented approach of neoliberal policies, prominence has been given to issues of decentralization and to the role of local authorities, seen as more flexible and adaptable than the central state and therefore more responsive to local needs. This has resulted in urban governments being overloaded with new responsibilities but lacking the power and resources to face the new reality: “Such imbalance in power distribution causes dependence on irregular transfers from central authorities and from donors, an indication of the fact that during adjustment the capacity to manage cities has been largely ignored” (Corubolo, 1999, p. 7).

As a final addition to this scheme, Fainstein (2005) examines the possible power imbalances through the power of truth telling: “Yet if the powerful lose their advantages as a consequence of open communication, they are likely to either suppress unpleasant truths or to marginalize the tellers of them. Social power includes the capacity to control and channel communication and is extremely difficult to counter simply through voice” (p. 125).

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29 See Rogers et al. (1993).


2.2.3. Informal networking

According to Castells (1996) the integration of and changes in the nature of the global economy, which amount to a dramatic change in the nature of both society and the individual, are driven by and depend upon the flow of information. In the so-called ‘informational age,’ he claims, network power is what works most effectively. As Booher and Innes (2000) elaborate, network power is collective among many linked players. It emerges from communication and collaboration among individuals, agencies, and businesses in a society. It provides a network focus on a common task and develops shared meanings and common heuristics for action. It grows as these players identify and build on their interdependencies to create new potential. In the process, innovations and novel responses to environmental stresses can emerge. These innovations, in turn, make possible adaptive change and constructive action of the whole.

Much as Flyvbjerg (2002) suggests, power structures in the form of networks of interest have their own rationality. This point is explored by Hillier (2000) when she examines the power of informal networking in the planning system. Informal networking has political power when two or more players’ interests correspond. Apart from the formal networks which are established through formal means of inter-organizational planning schemes, Hillier states that actors network informally in order to further their own ends in an attempt to persuade other actors certain views, or to assist policymakers or take a more informed decision. As she argues, informal networking has political power when two agencies’ interests correspond—as, for example, in the riverside case in Perth, Australia, where the council and the developers were keen to see river frontage brownfield sites developed to their maximum potential as luxury housing (Hillier, 2000). The developer benefitted through high returns on her/his investment and the council benefitted through an income that was higher for housing than it would have been for industry or mixed development. Moulaert and Cabaret (2006) also
reiterate that in most networks economic rationality and strategies play a role. Property relations, labor-capital relations, finance capital, the State as an extended logic of capital, etc., play a direct role in most networks embedded in the socio-economic world. As the authors explain, in network terminology, this means that stakeholders hold significantly unequal stakes, that the decision-making space is limited or even, in extreme cases, that the outcome of negotiation processes is known beforehand, because the structural-institutional impact of the logic of capital and politics is so significant. Such discourse highlights the inevitable organic relationship between power and networking in the planning practice.

In Flyvbjerg’s (1998) Aalborg case, the interests of one group, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce, were allowed to penetrate and transform the project. The main viewpoints of the chamber overlapped with the views of the Aalborg Police Department and the local newspaper, two powerfully positioned bodies in local decision making. This threefold overlapping of interests endowed the chamber’s viewpoints with a special impact. However, existing and potential network powers may well be dissolved and disabled due to personalities and circumstances of individual parties. For example, it would be true to argue for the Aalborg case that even if all parties had sought the same vision for development, this vision may have eluded them because of characteristic circumstances such as historical interaction, personal complaints, inexperience, or attempts to build a career or reputation. Interests and perceptive rationalities of individuals may either bear convergence or divergence depending on the case conditions. This brings out the importance of the role of leadership through explicit consideration of how individuals intersect with institutions within and across policy arenas.

Yet another challenge that pluralist paradigms of planning face today is the growing diversity and differences at the community level and the limitations of institutionalized participation. In response, the role of informal processes can be examined in overcoming
institutional and social barriers and negotiating differences of identities, values, and interests. Some scholars suggest that through animated interactions, building of trust, experiential learning, and spontaneity, informal activities and processes can serve as important vehicles for creating meanings, social relationships, and collective actions and enable planners to navigate the cultural and political terrain of community differences.

2.2.4. Representation

Agger and Löfgren (2008) argue that power relations are concerned with the very essence of the classical representation debate, whether or not representation should be based on ideas and interests, or should embody politics of presence, for example, that women are represented by other women, etc. One main criticism of participatory processes is that they tend to exclude members of ethnic minorities, that they consist of fewer women than men, and that they are often age-biased. Structural inequalities make it more difficult for certain groups to participate, and favor citizens and representatives with resources (Fung, 2004). Studies in collaborative planning demonstrate that a bias exists in favor of those who are politically active. Citizens with resources (i.e. knowledge, time, etc.) are more likely to be active than those lacking these means (Nordvig-Larsen, 1999). Albrechts (2003a) also points that developments towards more direct forms of democracy, the focus on debate, public involvement and accountability introduce the danger of making democratic public involvement more and more dependent on knowledge and on the skills of the more highly educated.

32 See Innes and Booher (2004); Hou and Kinoshita (2007); Wandersman (2009); Irvin and Stansbury (2004); and Ramsey (2009).
33 See Pitkin (1967).
Feminists have long argued for attention to embedded relationships, not just to more abstract notions of rights. Forester (2006) suggests that this means asking not only about who seems to “have power,” but also, crucially, about where they are vulnerable (requiring public consent or deference, public image or cooperation, and so on)—and so we can learn about limits to power. Examining these practical relationships can lead us to the conditions of participation and voice: “who can speak and who cannot, who controls the forms of relationship, the relevant languages and processes, the terms upon which ethnic and inter- and intra-communal relationships take shape?” (Forester, 2006, p. 26).

Drawing specifically on Young (1990; 2000), Fainstein (2006) argues for a politics of collective identities, of groupings according to gender, race, sexual orientation, and immigrant status beyond those of social class, which had been the tradition on the Marxist Left throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. She also supersedes the customary equity argument of this tradition by arguing not merely for greater income equality but also for improvements in the total circumstances of life of both poor and middle-income groups in their particular living environments. To overcome the structural elements of unequal access to and distribution of resources, inequalities in social position, class, skills, status, gender and financial means, Albrechts (2003a) rightly calls for empowerment for ‘ordinary’ citizens and ‘deprived groups.’ He also addresses planners with a charge: “Rather than being a neutral eunuch, the planner him- or herself is a strong partisan for certain outcomes as opposed to others, for the interests of some groups over others, for some styles of governance, for some concepts of justice, some patterns of future development and so on” (Albrechts, 2003a, p. 252).
2.2.5. Additional political realities

Based on his Flanders case, Albrechts (2003a) asserts that political actors are confronted with the spatial complexity of a wide variety of activities in disparate sectors, and the resultant diversity of power coalitions (mayors, cities, economy, agriculture, etc.). The interviews in the case study make it clear that “none of the political actors intensively involved in the formal decision process was fully aware of the consequences of the plan, neither for Flanders as a whole nor for specific sectors or areas” (Albrechts, 2003a, p. 264).

Research by Flyvbjerg (1998) makes it clear that critical analysis of cases is needed to discover the ‘whys and wherefores’ of how elected representatives or preferential actors change the plan and why and how executive officers depart from the formally approved plan. Through a detailed ethnography of actions engaged by different stakeholders, Flyvbjerg’s analysis of the strategies and tactics employed by stakeholders serves to emphasize how power is not just based in force and law, but also in the subtleties of ‘real’ life politics. His analysis of systemic power suggests that political regimes such as representative democracy still protect power through alliances and legal rights beyond the level of participation, management and debate. From this perspective, power is ‘omnipresent,’ situated and relational, and as a result planning and participation are always permeated with power, tactics and strategies (Bedford, Clark, & Harrison, 2002). Hence, participatory practices that rely on sound argument to deliver ‘better’ decisions fail to address how the strategy-tactics of participants are embedded, and reproduced in even seemingly ‘collaborative’ forms of planning.35

Also, Bedford et al. (2002) find that “the political realities of the planning system serve to reproduce existing structures of power that do little to overcome public distrust either

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among groups who have traditionally taken an active role in local affairs, or new participants recruited into the process” (p. 311). Consequently, they warn planning theorists and practitioners against the accurate operation of public participation: “As long as the structures and practices associated with the development control process continue to constitute and reproduce power relations that privilege property owners and powerful economic interests, public participation, no matter how wide, is unlikely to enhance confidence in public institutions or empower citizens” (Bedford et al., 2002, p. 329).

Ansell and Gash (2007) further state that where incentives to participate are weak, power and resources are asymmetrically distributed, and prior antagonisms are high, leadership becomes all the more important. The more stakeholders fundamentally distrust each other, the more a leader “must often intervene to help keep stakeholders at the table or empower weaker actors. These different functions of leadership can create tensions. . . . Moreover, there are sometimes tensions between the role of neutrality and the role of persuasion. When conflict is high, the role of honest broker is often given to an outside mediator who appears to have no vested interest in the outcome either way. Yet an outside mediator may also have little influence with the various stakeholders” (Ansell and Gash, 2007, p. 555).

In wider contexts the political reality is also related to factors external to planner-stakeholder interactions: factors operating at the national and global scales. For instance, as examined in Bacalar Chico by Few (2001), external resources provided by NGOs proved crucial in securing a strong financial package for the project from the European Union (EU). The incoming funding commitment, in turn, set up outgoing channels of responsibility in the form of progress reports to the EU. There was also concerted political and administrative impetus for the project from within Belize. The proposed reserve was included in the government’s application for World Heritage Site status, an application that proved a spur to the
establishment of several protected areas. It was also promoted as the Belizean component of a potential transboundary reserve. Political and bureaucratic commitment to the project was considerable, providing the ministerial support seen as key to planning progress. All in all, the project had powerful momentum from the top down. In pursuing these actions, planners drew on the pre-conditional planning base built from adequate finance and governmental commitment, which enhanced the power resources of knowledge, authority and institutional capacity available for containment.

2.2.6. Planners’ education and preparedness

Communicative planning calls urban planners to reflect on their roles and to become more aware of the role of politics and power in decision contexts, but also to be politically deliberative on how to deal with this awareness (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002). Albrechts (2003b) presents the Flemish case in which planners acted “as institution builders, as counterweights, as catalysts and as initiators of change, a way of mobilizing, building alliances and presenting real political opportunities, learning from action not only what works but also what matters” (p. 264). In this way the case illustrates that “planning is not an abstract analytical concept, but a concrete process, that is inextricably part of social, cultural, economic and political reality” (Albrechts, 2003b, p. 264). Therefore, to be successful in a decision-making process, planners should anticipate and reshape relations of power and powerlessness and assess the practical context of power relations (Forester, 1989).

Indeed, when given the initiatives, planners can take the lead in crucial change. In the Flanders case, one could call the relationship between the planners and the minister a win-win power relationship (Albrechts, 2003a): The minister hid behind a scientific authority and took up the position of an observer viewing the process from the outside. This position reduced the political risk for the minister, in the sense that he could wait for reactions from
key groups in society before he formulated his own policy. This in turn gave the planners a considerable amount of enabling power, as they had a direct link to important actors in the process.

Forester (2006) advises planners to more carefully learn from the practical-political wisdom that is present in planning practices in which communities struggle with issues of social justice and power, with bureaucracies and coalition-building, with problems and challenges of health care and poverty, poor housing, poor jobs, deteriorating environmental quality, and more. He claims that the more powerfully evocative the labels—racism, power, participation, resistance—the more difficult it becomes to understand these issues in new and more insightful ways—and still more difficult to learn how to act constructively, re-constructively, to do better. Thus, planners need to rediscover the powerless and analyze power far more than they do; they need to turn more not just to acknowledge its existence but to figure out how to resist, employ, and build power in the particular cases; they must begin—not end—critical analyses by assessing power relations (Forester, 2006). De Souza Briggs (1998) argues that democracy is a labor-intensive business, especially in a diverse society, but relatively little theory-driven planning research has considered how to make that business work at the micro level, through face-to-face talk with planning or policy making as a part. In fact, as Innes (1995) argues, “what planners do most of the time is talk and interact” (p. 52). As for the details of interaction, however, we mostly have ‘how to’ guides on public meetings and other media that are terse on points of power and culture.36

The individualistic element of planners’ reflecting and learning in the face of collective community need or action is perhaps the crucial aspect of the urban planning academy’s

36 For example, see De Souza Briggs (1998), and American Planning Association (1993).
precarious role in all this (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002). Forester (1999) contends that it is simply not sufficient for urban planners to identify or rediscover power in practice.

On the other hand, Booher and Innes (2000) make it clear that for planning education to help its graduates to meet power-related challenges, it will require a significant rethinking of what is taught. They argue that planning students in the U.S. will need to be far more sophisticated about politics and power than they typically are today: “Most professional planning programs skim lightly over the political setting of planning, if they deal with it at all. The word ‘power’ is almost a taboo in some curricula” (Booher & Innes, 2000, p. 26).

Scholars give a large number of recommendations for planning theory and education to overcome the challenges mentioned above. For example, Albrechts (2003b) considers it valuable if critical analysis of a wide variety of case studies (related to scale, issues dealt with, contexts and traditions, complexity) is provided to discover how political actors handle plans, projects and planning processes. So the study of practice in the face of complex relations of power, political loyalties, ethnic, religious and territorial identities (and more) must reach far beyond taking anyone’s intentions at face value: it must reach the micro-political details of planning practices (Forester, 1999; 2006). Moreover, abstract conceptualization and generalization of the accumulated knowledge of these cases may help academics see some of what can be learned from practice and help them to gear their teaching to the realities of practice (Forester, 1999; Hoch, 1994).

Finally, Booher and Innes (2000) provide a detailed set of needs to orient change in planning academia and education:

Those who are primarily analysts need to learn to work with collaborative groups, providing information organized and designed in a way that makes sense to the group. They need to be willing and able to accept that there is no one best way to do an analysis . . . They also need to learn not to be afraid of conflict nor to avoid it, but rather to work with differences constructively (pp. 26-27).
2.3. Collaborative planning revisited

As Friedmann (2008) discusses, by the end of the last century, Healey’s (1997) Collaborative Planning argued that the challenges of urban development in the neoliberal era could no longer be handled effectively by government alone but required the participation of all sectors of society in a form of planning that involved dialogue and negotiations among stakeholders seeking an actionable consensus. Indeed, collaborative planning is often mentioned as one of the most appropriate planning theories in relation to the network society.  

It engages public and private sector players, who represent many different interests and are concerned about the power distribution, with an aim to reach consensus through deliberation.

2.3.1. Limitations on governance, social justice and democracy

Some of the issues of power in planning mentioned earlier in the chapter attract more attention by the collaborative planning literature. Collaborative planning practitioners, i.e. communicative planners, are often criticized for lacking a credible strategy for dealing with imbalanced power relations (Sager, 2006). It is also the issue that citizens, being at the very core of the idea of planning, remain ambivalent about the power system. They are not convinced that the creation of informal structures and frameworks which can be used to influence the flow of events that affect citizens is sufficient to provoke change (Albrechts, 2003a). For them, the most powerful still wins.

Another issue of collaborative planning associated with participation and power balance is about the questions of inclusion. Communicative theorists emphasize the role of participatory processes in transforming power relations, but power corrupts any process

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(Baxamusa, 2008). Furthermore, although broad participation must be actively sought, Reilly
(2001) argues that successful collaboratives pay considerable attention to getting
stakeholders to participate and that exclusion of critical stakeholders, who might well be
representing the less powerful, is a key reason for failure in collaborative planning schemes.
Yet, stakeholders may not have an incentive to participate, particularly if they see
alternative venues for realizing their agenda. Therefore, the literature suggests that
inclusiveness is closely linked to the exclusiveness of the collaborative forum (Schuckman,
2001; Ansell & Gash, 2007).

A growing number of researchers have also begun to question whether collaborative
planning can lead to weight or precedence being given to public concerns. For example,
Bedford et al. (2002) infer that researchers point to the precedence given to business
interests rather than to community interests (Stoker, 1997) and to how the diversity of social
action involved in initiatives designed to be of a collaborative kind serves to compromise the
collective basis of outcomes (Phelps & Tewdwr-Jones, 2000). Perhaps the most trenchant
critique of collaborative approaches to planning has come from Flyvbjerg (1998) through his
evaluation of the Aalborg case. Overall, it would be correct to state that, especially in the
short term, collaborative practice by itself may offer conflicts: it does not necessarily resolve
conflicts. However, it has the positive and necessary intentions to define and solve power
struggles.

In addition, Baxamusa (2008) defines two limitations of the Habermasian approach in
empowering civil society: The first is that it operates within core structures of
constitutionally organized democracy.38 This makes any ad hoc project-specific substantive
deliberation subordinate to the planning process. The second limitation he defines is that it

38 See Gutmann and Thompson (2004).
assumes ‘private persons’ are acting autonomously in the process. This underplays the significance of community organizing and interest group participation, often based on the portrayal that the community is the ‘radical other’ to the public interest.\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{2.3.2. Notable concepts to address power issues}

Among the most debated concepts offered to address power-related challenges of collaborative planning mentioned above are empowerment, governance and collaborative governance, deliberation, and deliberative democracy.

\textit{Empowerment}

Being perhaps the most widely debated recipe that addresses many of the above criticisms, the concept of empowerment has been commonly associated with collaborative planning.\textsuperscript{40} Empowerment has been defined as a process by which people, organizations, and communities gain mastery over their affairs (Rappaport, 1985; Rappaport, Swift, & Hess, 1984). Thus, empowerment is about democratic participation of individuals in the life of their community (Baxamusa, 2008). It is not only multidimensional, taking on a different form in different people, contexts, and time; it is also multilevel: individual, organizational, and community (Zimmerman, 1990 in Baxamusa, 2008). It also supports wider collective efforts to

\textsuperscript{39} See Sandercock (1999).

\textsuperscript{40} As Rocha (1997) analyzes, related early studies concerning powerlessness in poor communities of color (see, for example, Clark, 1965; Moynihan, 1970; Lewis, 1968), community participation (see Warren, 1969; Aronstein, 1969; Friedmann, 1973), and the potential of grassroots organizing (see Boyte, 1980; Perlman, 1976) illuminated facets of both community powerlessness and models of empowerment, although none of these studies used the term empowerment. Contemporary theory explicitly using the term empowerment continues to be fragmented. For example, empowerment theory in community psychology focuses primarily on change within the individual (see Rappaport, 1987; Zimmerman, 1990), while in political science, empowerment theory focuses on group processes such as voting and political representation (see Regalado, 1988). Empowerment in planning tends to focus primarily on economic development, community participation, and grassroots coalitions formed around the provision of goods and services (Friedmann, 1992; Goldsmith & Blakely, 1992; Jacobs, 1992; Krumholz & Forester, 1990).
change power relations (Albrechts, 2003a). Overall, in the context of planning, empowerment represents a series of strategies seeking to give voice and agency to disenfranchised groups, thus improving uneven power relations. Nevertheless, as in the case of collaborative planning, the concept and uses of empowerment are criticized for their ambiguity. Practitioners, professionals, and community organizers speak about action they consider to be empowerment, but that others would not consider empowerment under any circumstance (Rocha, 1997). In addition, in spite of the fact that planning decisions are increasingly taking place outside the traditional government structures, Corubolo (1999) argues that they still provide a state-centered perspective in many real world practices, and many top-down interventions neglect the questions of community.

Collaborative governance

Referring to her earlier work, Collaborative Planning, Healey (2003) defines planning as “a governance activity occurring in complex and dynamic institutional environments, shaped by wider economic, social and environmental forces that structure, but do not determine, specific interactions” (p. 104). Indeed, planning increasingly moves away from the idea of government as the mobilizer of the public sector, providing solutions to problems, towards an idea of governance for a more desirable future situation through the mobilization of different interests, goals, and strategies (Albrechts, 2003a). By governance, Healey (2003) means the processes by which societies, and social groups, manage their collective affairs. Other

41 Much research has been devoted to establishing a workable definition of governance that is bounded and falsifiable, yet comprehensive. Ansell and Gash (2007) introduces that for instance, Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2001) interpret governance broadly as “regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goods and services” (p. 7). This definition provides room for traditional governmental structures as well as emerging forms of public/private decision-making bodies. Stoker (2004), on the other hand, argues: “As a baseline definition it can be taken that governance refers to the rules and forms that guide collective decision-making. That the focus is on decision-making in the collective implies that governance is not about one individual making a decision but rather about groups of individuals or organizations or systems of organizations making decisions (p. 3)."
scholars highlight the regenerative aspect of governance that reshapes policy ideas and institutional structures through a bottom-up approach. There are, of course, many modes in which governance can occur.

As Corubolo (1999) suggests, in its early definitions the term governance has been often equated with ‘government’ or with ‘state’, as a consequence of the emphasis that at the beginning of the 1980s lending agencies, the World Bank in particular, were putting on the necessity for ‘less and better government’. The notion of government itself, though, has been broadened to include new actors that provide an increasingly important contribution to the management of urban areas; as a consequence, also the contents of ‘urban governance’ had to be adapted to the new circumstances: therefore, the notion is rather being referred to as “the relationship between civil society and the state, between rulers and the ruled, the government and the governed” (McCarney, 1996, p. 4).

In explaining her relational approach to governance processes, Healey (2003) recognizes the multiplicity of social worlds, ‘rationalities’ and practices that coexist in urban contexts and the complexity of the power relations within and between them, resulting in typically dispersed or diffused power contexts. Yet, she adds that despite the diversity, governance capacity could emerge through these struggles and interactions with sufficient power to challenge structural driving forces and to sustain them. Addressing governance instead of government provides the basis not only for more broadly handling issues of power but also ensuring greater participation and inclusion. Also, governance can include institutions that are not normally considered in a narrower ‘government’ approach to planning decisions and processes. This brings up the definition of ‘collaborative governance’ in planning literature.

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42 See Innes and Booher (2003); Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones (2000); and Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones (2002).

43 See Cars, Healey, Madanipour and De Magalhaes (2002), for a detailed analysis.
As examined earlier, because collaborative planning, by nature, calls for a bottom-up approach, it overlaps academic concern relating to governance processes that reshape policy ideas and institutional structures. Accordingly, collaborative processes have become part of an emerging governance system which lacks formal authority, is linked in varying ways to formal government, and engages stakeholders who are typically outsiders to public choices (Innes & Booher, 2003). This new form of governance, which has come to be known as ‘collaborative governance,’ brings public and private stakeholders together in collective forums with public institutions to engage in consensus-oriented decision making (Ansell & Gash, 2007).

Imperial (2005) notes that the wide-ranging use of the term has been a barrier to theory building. Among these, Ansell and Gash’s (2007) definition of collaborative governance is as follows:

A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets (p. 544).

This definition typically requires participation by non-state stakeholders. Most other literature also uses the term collaborative governance to describe a participatory relationship between public institutions and non-state stakeholders. For example, Reilly (2001) describes collaborative efforts as a type of problem solving that involves the ‘shared pursuit of government agencies and concerned citizens.’ Smith (1998) argues that collaboratives involve ‘representation by key interest groups.’ Connick and Innes (2003) define collaborative governance as including ‘representatives of all relevant interests.’ Such definitions set standards for the type of participation of non-state stakeholders which makes collaborative governance never a merely consultative process. Thus, it is no surprise that in their collaborative governance model that they developed by analyzing 137 cases, Ansell and Gash
(2007) define the features of their cyclical collaborative governance process as face-to-face dialogue; trust building; commitment to the process; shared understanding; and intermediate outcomes. Although interest groups and public agencies have always engaged in a conventional two-way flow of influence, the definitions of collaborative governance here imply an explicit and public strategy of organizing this influence. There is a clear emphasis here on the power over process and procedures to effect, presumably through the weight of rational thought, reflection, and expression, change for the good of the majority of stakeholders (Phelps & Tewdwr-Jones, 2000).

Albrechts (2003b) summarizes that in the literature of collaborative governance and democracy, the questions of power are evident regarding concerns for inclusiveness in democratic procedures, for transparency in government transactions, for accountability of the state and planners to the citizens for whom they work, for the right of citizens to be heard and to have a creative input in matters affecting their interests at different scale levels and for reducing or eliminating unequal power structures between social groups and classes.

Nevertheless, there are a number of scholars who disagree with the Habermasian approach that underpins the discourse of collaborative planning as well as collaborative governance and democracy. For instance, in one respect, Agger and Löfgren’s (2008) recognition of democratic deliberation diverges from Habermas’s: they do not agree that the end goal of deliberation should always seek consensus among stakeholders and among power groups. Rather they agree with Mouffe (2000) who criticizes the Habermasian ideal of consensus as conceiving conflicts as ‘unwelcome’ antagonism, rather than (productive) agonism. In their words, “conflicts are inevitable, and striving for consensus might in fact undermine the quality of the deliberation process, as it may set up certain ‘frames’ for the dialogue too early in the process, thereby suppressing other views and assertions” (Agger & Löfgren, 2008, p. 155).
Deliberative democracy

Friedmann (2008) suggests that Forester (1999) has taken deliberative democracy's moral vision the furthest by working it into the language and practice of community planning. In *The Deliberative Practitioner* Forester departs from the rationalist models of political scientists and philosophers such as Habermas to confront the deep grievances and passionate commitments people often bring to public deliberations. If the parties to a conflict seek to reach agreement, their pains, passions, and grievances, he argues, must first be publicly acknowledged, in line with the goals of deliberative democracy.

Thus, collaborative approaches and collaborative governance rely on deliberative democracy, which is defined by Agger and Löfgren (2008) as a dialogue that generates planning recommendations and alternatives in accordance with democratic criteria. Friedmann (2008), on the other hand, prefers the definition of Gutmann and Thompson (2004), whom he describes as two of the leading advocates of deliberative democracy: “a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives) justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future” (p. 7).

In the language of deliberative democracy, Sager (2002) suggests that planning recommendations and planning alternatives emerge from the dialogue that is based on a variety of arguments introduced by the actors. Dialogue encompasses the incorporation of arguments in accordance with democratic criteria, and ensures the communicative rationality of the process and the legitimacy of the recommendations (Sager, 2002). Indeed, scholarship on deliberative democracy describes a dynamic, pluralistic form of participatory planning that calls for an interactive engagement—and for recognition of power relations—absent in typical
aggregative processes. The ideal of collective problem-solving, actual participation and dissolution of power imbalances through deliberative discussions not only appears in political science literature on democracy, but is also the very essence of the whole collaborative planning tradition.

2.3.3. Other remedies

There are various methods that are used to enable and support public participation in planning processes, especially in collaborative and consensus-oriented approaches. By nature, potential levels of inclusion of the community and levels of participation vary for almost every method. Such methods are also compared and assessed according to a set of criteria such as representativeness, independence, early involvement, influence, transparency, accessibility and cost-effectiveness.

Most formalized public participation methods include referenda, public hearings, public opinion surveys, negotiated rule making, consensus conferences, citizens’/jury panels, public advisory committees, focus groups, and participation games. More recently, information technology has offered new potential for citizen participation in urban planning. The use of new media is supposed to provide a communication platform which suppresses a barrier of non-professionalism, allows for distant contacts, and enables participatory process management. Innovative implementations involve crowdsourcing, a Web-based problem solving and production model, Public Participatory Geographic Information Systems (GIS).

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44 See Baxamusa (2008); Cohen (1989); Fishkin and Laslett (2003); Fung (2004); Gutmann and Thompson (2004); Macedo (1999); Macedo et al. (2005); Elster (1998); Nino (1996); and Bessette (1994).
applications for spatial decision making, 3D models, communication platforms and computer games.\textsuperscript{47}

One of the most passionate and traditionally applied participatory methods is Participatory Action Research (PAR). PAR is widely used in a variety of fields such as social work, education, community development, and public health. In the planning field, it involves user (community) participation, empowerment, leadership, and knowledge generation in the development, implementation, and evaluation of the urban planning practice. The long-term goal of participatory research is to empower people to effect social change. As Sanoff (2000) puts it, this outlook is not unique to planning, but has been taken up by professionals of many disciplines in regard to the distinction between research for the people versus research by the people.

Against the participatory planning challenge of growing diversity and differences at the community level and the limitations of institutionalized participation, the role of informal processes can be examined in overcoming institutional and social barriers and negotiating differences of identities, values, and interests. Through animated interactions, building of trust, experiential learning, and spontaneity, informal activities and processes can serve as important vehicles for creating meanings, social relationships, and collective actions and enable planners to navigate the cultural and political terrain of community differences.

Consensus building among people with conflicting interests often requires the intervention of mediators, and so mediation has become an important new branch not only of

\textsuperscript{47} See Rowe and Frewer (2000) for formalized participation methods that are used in applied sciences in general; Sanoff (2000) for planning-specific participation methods; Conrow and Delp (1999) for popular theater as another participatory technique; and Hanzl (2007) for different IT applications. In addition to Sanoff’s chapter mentioned above, McTaggart (1997) presents the basic idea and principles of PAR; while The SAGE Handbook of Action Research (Reason & Bradbury, 2008) is an extensive action research source.
planning but of legal studies as well (LeBaron, 2002). In his work, Baum (1994) takes the majority rule as a tool for consensus and as a basis to solve tensions that may arise within parties in the planning agenda. When differences between parties are greater, when parties are more self-interested or more inflexible, and when conflicts are frequent, majority rule may better lead to decisions. Its effectiveness requires that all participate voluntarily, have relatively equal power, and agree on the legitimacy of every interest. In short, he states: “Consensus focuses attention on dissidents but defines them as eventual allies. Consensus rules give minorities power; by holding their ground, the minorities can force the majority to move toward them or prevent a decision. Deliberation may be aggressive, but it will be guided by reason. The end is a caring agreement—no one is a loser, no one is defeated, and no one is shamed” (Baum, 1994, p. 255).

Finally, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, a key objective of new participatory practices in local affairs is to increase public trust in civic institutions in a setting where distrust can constitute a major problem. Whereas unequal power relations can undermine and thwart community, trust will underwrite it. In fact, Stein and Harper (2003) assert that trust is essential for community, social, political, familial, and even linguistic relations: “We believe that trust is at least as basic as power, to understanding human relationships and institutions and to reforming them. Trust is also a necessary condition for any kind of communication, understanding, knowledge, or learning” (p. 136). Such conceptualization that competes with the Foucauldian view of power appears as a strong alternative to the prominence of power, bearing the potential to develop as an important future concept in the planning literature.
Chapter 3. Urban Redevelopment as a “New Urban Policy” Tool: 
International and Turkish Perspectives

3.1. Conceptual framework

Throughout the world, in the field of urban planning, models to better existing urban areas have had many different names: renewal, redevelopment, regeneration, recovery, revitalization, transformation, framework, gentrification, restructuring. The current projects of urban redevelopment are often described with one or more of these terms but, in fact, these terms are used interchangeably and are almost synonymous. However, a common feature of most of them is the prefix “re-,” which offers a change or revision of ways of thinking, interpretation and assumptions that further shape the existing urban conditions and fabric of the city.

3.1.1. The many faces of redevelopment

In the United States (US), the term redevelopment—or in some cases, renewal—is more dominantly in use today, whereas in Western Europe, regeneration is a commonly preferred term. In Turkey, the words dönüşüm, which is translated as transformation or regeneration, and yenileme, which more closely corresponds to renewal and less to redevelopment, are used interchangeably. This is not only the case in Turkey. As it happens for many concepts that are derived from multiple disciplines and sub-disciplines, there are no uniform definitions or strict boundaries around the concept.48

Sutton (2008) emphasizes helpful distinctions in the motive of these initiatives: if they are people- or place-centered; and if they are used as means or ends. She suggests that in

48 For attempts that suggest distinction between the terms, see Longa (2011), and Roberts and Skyes (2000).
pursuit of a specific goal, employing people as a means implies altering behavioral patterns, whereas using place as a means refers to physically changing the built environment. From an outcome-focused perspective, treating people as the ends indicates an emphasis on improved livelihoods and quality of life. This is development in the broad sense. Treating place as an end is effectively a subset of growth in the economic sense of increasing property values and returns on investment. In this study, the term redevelopment is used in order to address the people-centered concerns of power relations and questions around community inclusion.

The initiation of urban renewal in the US relies on a rather vague term, the appearance of “blighted” in an area (Sutton, 2008; Gordon, 2003). As a result, a number of interpretations of the term “blight” are given from different municipal entities. For example, the New York State General Municipal Redevelopment Law defines a “blighted area” as “an area within a municipality in which one or more of the following conditions exist: (i) a predominance of buildings and structures which are deteriorated or unfit or unsafe for use or occupancy; or (ii) a predominance of economically unproductive lands, buildings or structures, the redevelopment of which is needed to prevent further deterioration which would jeopardize the economic wellbeing of the people” (§970-c).

The European counterpart of this definition is urban regeneration, as mentioned above. As widely accepted by Western European planners, urban regeneration has been defined as the transformation of a place (residential, commercial or open space) that has displayed the symptoms of physical, social and/or economic decline (Evans, 2005; DCMS, 2004). According to the Sydney, Australia based International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies (IFACCA), regeneration is a response to decline, or degeneration and can be described as the renewal, revival, revitalization or transformation of a place or community (IFACCA, 2006). It is both a process and an outcome. It can have economic, physical and social dimensions, and the three commonly coexist. It comprises economic issues (job prospects, employments for
social deprivation), physical improvements, environmental aspects, and social issues (neighborhood strategies, community issues, education and training).49

3.1.2. Redevelopment traditions in the Western world

Urban redevelopment has a longstanding tradition in Europe. Reviewing the process of urban redevelopment policy in the European context provides important clues for the analysis of existing components and catalysts of urban redevelopment. For this purpose, Roberts (2000) provides a useful table that conveys different phases of urban redevelopment activities in the European planning agenda (Table 2).

The history of urban redevelopment in Europe dates back to the 1940s, to the beginning of the reconstruction process after World War II. In the immediate period after 1945, repairing wartime damage and reconstructing the fabric of towns and cities, many of which had been neglected for years, initially took priority (Roberts, 2000). This process of reconstruction was seen as a task of national—even international—importance throughout Europe. Consequently, the emphasis in the 1940s and 1950s was on reconstruction, replacement, and the eradication of the physical problems of the war-torn cities. As Couch (1990) states, government-led, with enthusiastic support from local authorities and the private sector alike, the priorities of slum clearance and reconstruction led to the embrace of high-rise housing and industrialized building techniques.

49 Among other numerous scholarly works, these aspects of urban regeneration are elaborated by several authors who have contributed to the book, Urban Regeneration: A Handbook, edited by Roberts and Skyes in 2000.

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<tr>
<td>Major strategy and orientation</td>
<td>Reconstruction and extension of older areas of towns and cities often based on a ‘master plan’; suburban growth</td>
<td>Continuation of 1950s themes; suburban and peripheral growth; some early attempts at rehabilitation</td>
<td>Focus on <em>in situ</em> renewal and neighborhood schemes; still development at periphery</td>
<td>Many major schemes of development and redevelopment; flagship projects; out of town projects</td>
<td>Move towards a more comprehensive form of policy and practice; more emphasis on integrated treatments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Key actors and stakeholders</td>
<td>National and local government; private sector developers and contractors</td>
<td>Move towards a greater balance between public and private sectors</td>
<td>Growing role of private sector and decentralization in local government</td>
<td>Emphasis on private sector and special agencies; growth of partnerships</td>
<td>Partnership the dominant approach</td>
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<td>Spatial level of activity</td>
<td>Emphasis on local and site levels</td>
<td>Regional level activity emerges</td>
<td>Regional and local levels initially; later more local emphasis</td>
<td>In early 1980s focus on site; later emphasis on local level</td>
<td>Reintroduction of strategic perspective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic focus</td>
<td>Public sector investment with some private sector involvement</td>
<td>Continuing from 1950s: growing influence of private investment</td>
<td>Resource constraints in public sector and growth of private investment</td>
<td>Private sector dominant with selective public funds</td>
<td>Greater balance between public, private and voluntary funding</td>
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<td>Social content</td>
<td>Improvement of housing and living standards</td>
<td>Social and welfare improvement</td>
<td>Community-based action and greater empowerment</td>
<td>Community self-help with very selective state support</td>
<td>Emphasis on the role of community</td>
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<td>Physical emphasis</td>
<td>Replacement of inner areas and peripheral development</td>
<td>Some continuation from 1950s with rehabilitation of existing areas</td>
<td>More extensive renewal of older urban areas</td>
<td>Major schemes of replacement and new development; ‘flagship schemes’</td>
<td>More modest than 1980s; heritage and retention</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environmental approach</td>
<td>Landscaping and some greening</td>
<td>Selective improvements</td>
<td>Environmental improvement with some innovations</td>
<td>Growth of concern for wider approach to environment</td>
<td>Introduction of broader idea of environmental sustainability</td>
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By the mid-1960s growing dissatisfaction with slum clearance and the resultant decanting of population to peripheral estates, together with a more participatory and decentralized approach to government, led to a series of adjustments to policy informed by a growing influence of private investment and a greater balance between public and private sectors (Roberts, 2000). In the urban policy field this change in priorities resulted in an increased emphasis on improvement and renewal. This ‘discovery’ of the city together with the first uncertain steps towards the generation of urban policy, led to a major expansion of urban initiatives during the 1970s (Turok, 1987). The effects of the increase of initiatives during this period were a series of attempts to improve coordination between the previously separate economic, social and physical notions of policy.

Many of the urban policy initiatives of the 1970s, involving peripheral renewal with a local spatial focus triggered by private investments, initially continued into the 1980s, although substantial modifications and additions were subsequently introduced (Turok, 1987). During the 1980s there was a move away from the idea that the central state should or could provide all of the resources required in order to support policy interventions. This new policy stance in Europe was matched by a greater emphasis on the role of partnerships. Roberts (2000) states that the more commercial style of urban redevelopment evident in the 1980s reflected yet another set of changes in the nature and structure of political philosophy and control. Redevelopment of flagship projects under private investments reduced the role of public sector more than ever before: to merely a facilitator position that provided selective public funds as well as very selective state support in the social context that mainly involved community self-help.

Further adjustments to the form and execution of urban policy occurred in the 1990s, with a move back to a more consensus driven style of politics and the recognition of a series of new problems and challenges (Vickery, 2007). It was during this decade that the ‘cultural’
dimension of urban regeneration appeared strongly in policy contexts, and it did so most visibly through two practices: urban design (including architecture) and public art (DETR, 2000). The national policy statements on ‘design’ in urban regeneration were stronger, placing design matters as central to urban and economic planning (DOE, 1997; DETR, 2000). The prospect of integrating design, cultural activities and urban regeneration gave rise to an emphasis on heritage and preservation, and on the role of community. Vickery (2007) suggests that a review of any literature on the subject from the mid-1990s onward—policy, professional advocacy or critical literature—will find the following common aspirations for urban regeneration:

- the ‘humanization’ of the built environment - where the urban-physical infrastructure gives priority to people and public life, not roads or buildings;
- the reconstruction of civic identity and expression of collective aspirations;
- a creative interaction between culture and commerce, social and institutional life;
- inspiring visionary ideas providing an impetus for cultural change and social participation without traditional social divisions;
- a visible expression of international cultural consciousness; and
- an enlightened integration of advanced environmental, ecological and material technology (pp. 18-19).

Based on these aspirations, components of urban redevelopment programs can be defined as the identification of problems, constraints, opportunities, resource requirements, and overall strategy with a detailed schedule of implementation and action in the framework of partnership and sustainability. Based on these components, Roberts and Skyes (2000) enumerate some potential weaknesses of redevelopment programs as absence of an adequate definition of problems, lack of clear position of the role of redevelopment, unrealistic planning against the potential development of an area, lack of coordination in the design and
discharge of policy and implementation, unnecessary exclusion of a key group, problem of bureaucratization, and lack of strategy in long-term, of an open, transparent and accurate means for evaluating the outcomes.

British academics, referring to their experiences of housing provision and urban redevelopment, have drawn three conclusions: first, that urban redevelopment should not be left completely at the mercy of free-market dynamics; secondly, that it should not be completely subject to the directives of central government (as in the case of postwar New Towns); and thirdly, that it should not be a means for local authorities to create a large volume of social housing as part of their own domain (Ball & Maginn, 2005). However, as will be elaborated in the following chapters, Turkish policy-makers at the central government level ignored these principles during the restructuring process, resulting in legislation that gave substantial power to central government to become a direct provider of housing.

The above-mentioned economic, physical and social ambitions as well as the weaknesses are also evident in the Turkish redevelopment agenda, which predominantly follows the Western tradition. In Turkey, the general components of redevelopment are apparent in publicity project reports as rationales, and as observed in the empirical research of this study, accompanied by local justifications such as earthquake threat and mitigation, illegal settlements, excessive population and building densities, and the resulting safety concerns. However, even though the current projects are defined as urban redevelopment, due to their ignorance for present social structure and potential future social conflicts, to an extent, the redevelopment concept in Turkey deviates from the abovementioned Western notions and experiences. These points regarding the Turkish experience are discussed later in this chapter and further revealed in the case study.
Of course, as is elaborated in the following sections, Turkey is not the only one to suffer from an ill interpretation of urban redevelopment that has moved away from people-centered planning. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, urban renewal, highway construction, public housing, and noxious facility siting were frequently contested across US cities (Lineberry & Sharkansky, 1978; Judd, 1979). These contestations were not always successful but frequently facilitated of new ways of understanding and organizing. Engagement of the planning and implementation agencies and the local community, in particular the disadvantaged, helped forge a more democratic and people-sensitive urban restructuring in both the planning and implementation of redevelopment projects. But as Wilson and Grammenos (2000) point out:

Organizing people has reached a new low, real estate capital has shown itself resistant to grassroots social pressures, investors flaunt their mobility and leverage vast amounts of municipal resources, the motors that propel accumulation now operate at an international scale, and people struggle to understand a hyper-fast and complexly signified and ascribed world (p. 361).

In short, the ambitions that compel urban redevelopment have not changed, however, the mechanisms and instruments have.

3.1.3. The bigger picture: neoliberalism as a motive for redevelopment

In the postwar era, a Keynesian economic policy regime instituted strong union power, significant state control over the economy and regulation of capital, and a relatively large welfare state apparatus in the Western world (Jessop, 1993). The capital accumulation crisis, and ensuing economic recession, of the postwar developmental model, which emerged in mid-1960s, triggered Keynesianism opponents who argued for an alternative, a neoliberal

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50 Among many others, examples of suppressed disadvantaged groups in the US include Cuff’s (1989) examination of community redevelopment in the African American community of Fourth Ward in Houston, and Wilson’s (1993) work on gentrification of downtown enclaves and neglect of inner-city neighborhoods in Indianapolis. Such case studies have shown that redevelopment proceeds with minimal participation from the part of disadvantaged populations.
ethic in which the state would play a minimal role in the economy, and the invisible hand of
market decisions would determine economic outcomes (Jessop, 1993). Öktem-Ünsal and
Türkün (2014) explain that with this impetus, the neoliberal economics policies started to be
implemented rigorously in early 1970s, first in Latin American countries such as Chile and
Mexico, then expanding to the Western countries such as the US and England with the
additional help of international organizations such as the World Bank (WB) and the
International Money Foundation (IMF). This process has been the trigger of restructuring and
redevelopment in a variety of geographies comprising economic, cultural and political
dimensions. It has become the dominant assumption in policymaking.

of today’s neoliberalism. Neoliberal thinking asserts the neoclassical economic argument that
society functions better under a market logic than any other logic, especially a state-
command one, because the market is far more “efficient” in allocating resources than the
state or other institutions. This suggests giving firms and individuals freer reign so that they
can rationally maximize their private economic interests in open and competitive markets.
These markets not only produce the most efficient allocation of resources, but they also
stimulate innovation and economic growth. Thus, market logic and economic competition
should be fostered in the economy, to institutions like the state, universities, hospitals,
schools, and so on. Moreover, because state policies are the primary impediment to
competitive markets, the state should “get out of the way” as much as possible. As examined
by Purcell (2008), those values have informed a wide-ranging policy agenda, including urban
redevelopment.

The scale variety of today’s widespread neoliberal policies provides another base to
analysis. Neoliberalism was initially conceptualized as a set of national state policies favoring
the above-mentioned privatization and free market capitalism as ideal mechanisms for
regulating social, political, and economic life, emphasizing a downsized state and greater institutional and economic efficiency (Krieger, 1986, and Moody, 1997 in Elwood, 2002). In the ensuing neoliberal era, with the help of the relative lifting of trade barriers, economic dependence on private and non-profit sectors increased along with transportation and communication means, and redefined the scale geography. National scale lost its significance. This scale, on the one hand, was replaced by supra-national organizations such as WB, IMF, World Trade Organization, and EU. On the other hand, sub-national scales such as region and city gained significance, a phenomenon referred to as “glocalization” in the economics, sociology and planning literatures. Indeed, local governments, who, in the past were merely operators of central government decisions, now became actors that foster policies for economic and social development, enable private investments, and compete in the global economy. Rather than demand-oriented redistribution policies, they proposed supply-oriented interventions and policies, such as high-tech restructuring, infrastructure and professional skill improvements, to attract investment to their territory (Brenner, 2000 in Öktem-Ünsal & Türkün, 2014). Proponents of these interventions and policies were Western countries of the developed world, which found the opportunity to expand to the developing and underdeveloped spheres.

**Developed vs. developing and underdeveloped countries**

Bearing in mind the assumptions and consequences of neoliberalism, scholarly research of the last two decades has been examining how neoliberalism within urban policy regimes might alter the production and reproduction of urban spaces and change power relations in urban politics. After the 1970s, with the shift of production—in particular its labor intensive phases—

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51 For a review of *glocalization* in planning literature, see Swyngedouw (1997), Purcell (2008), and González (2006).
to countries with low labor costs, many industrial cities of Western countries evolved from production spaces to consumption spaces due to deindustrialization and its replacement by a service economy. They were restructured through new urban policies to offer new investment and possibilities to capital (Fainstein, 1996). This policy shift in turn caused restructuring of the urban space largely based on exchange value, especially after 1990s. In order to increase the exchange value of the space, government and planning institutions became entrepreneurial actors that steer the market and maximize profit (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). The resulting approaches and policies sought entrepreneurship and competitiveness and assumed that growth coalitions would successfully bring public, private and civil actors together, accelerate local development, and thus, attribute great importance to spatial redevelopment (Öktem-Ünsal & Türkün, 2014; Smith, 2002; Swyngedouw, Moulaert, & Rodriguez, 2002). Türkün (2012) further defines the expectation that the globalized production and freely moving capital in the globe, if/when considered wisely, would create new opportunities and improve social welfare. Other scholars identify the growing responsibility of citizens and civic institutions for local urban planning and service delivery as evidence of further devolution and downsizing of the state, toward the neoliberal goal of greater economic and institutional efficiency (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2001; Elwood, 2002).

On another note, Smith (2002) notes the role of neoliberal state as a consummate agent of the market—rather than its regulator—and warns policy makers that the resulting “revanchist” urbanism that dominates the cities of the advanced capitalist world increasingly emphasizes capitalist production rather than social reproduction: “The true global cities may be the rapidly growing metropolitan economies of Asia, Latin America, and (to a lesser extent) Africa, as much as the command centers of Europe, North America and Japan” (p.
There is a shift from an urban scale that is defined through social reproduction to one in which investment of productive capital is dominant and determinant.

As a consequence of the above mentioned restructuring process in international allocations and national economies, certain sectors show significant development in all major de-industrialized cities: qualified production services including FIRE (Finance-Insurance-Real Estate), and areas of cultural industry or creative sector such as film and television production, advertisement, music, fashion and design. The expectation is that these investments will increasingly compete to locate in the nodal points, and also attract global capital and qualified work force. The resulting expansion of the job and labor market is related to economic growth and growth potential of cities, leading to another expectation that the resulting comprehensive increase in welfare will decrease socio-spatial segregation.

However, as Öktem-Ünsal and Türkün (2014) state, empirical research regarding cities that are integrated to the global economy clearly shows that increase in jobs in a growing competitive market does not always mean equal distribution of opportunities to all labor groups. The service sector of the globalized economy creates high-wage jobs for skilled labor, while very low-wage and vulnerable jobs increase as well. In other words, the majority of employment offered increases the proportion of the “working poor” and triggers socio-spatial segregation in cities. In particular, the focus on growth and increased productivity leads to inequitable outcomes. Indeed, the observed growth in many countries under the globalization process does not lead to new employment opportunities, often resulting in a rise of unemployment.

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52 See Florida (2002; 2005); Amin and Thrift (1995); and Pratt (2008).
Despite contextual differences, one can assert that global capitalism creates similar
tendencies in many cities of the world. Place-centered transformations enable redistribution
of the land profit and maintain a hassle-free production and reproduction by segregating
classes in the urban space. It is observed that particularly in big metropolitan cities, class
segregation has become apparent and in-class social layers have diversified after the 1980s,
all of which has an impact on shaping urban space (Bourdieu, 1984). Differentiation of life
styles and safety concerns accompanying the suburbanization process lead to *gated
communities* that emerge in all urban peripheries. Inner city housing areas abandoned by
middle and upper income groups turn into deprived quarters that house low income,
marginalized communities. In order to prevent diminishing local tax income, local
governments try to attract the middle and upper income groups back. This has led to
gentrification and displacement, especially in the attractive historic cores or central
neighborhoods.\(^{54}\) This way, entrepreneurial governments revalorize city neighborhoods making
them marketable commodities. Other potential areas for revitalization (or restructuring)
projects are *brownfields* (i.e. old harbor, industry and storage lands) that can be converted
into tourism and recreation areas that attract middle and upper income local and
international visitors.\(^{55}\) In addition to realizing these existing potentials, central and local
governments initiate *mega-project* for shopping, entertainment, and tourism, such as
stadiums, expo grounds, theme parks such as Disneyland, and large shopping and
entertainment malls.\(^{56}\)

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\(^{54}\) See Atkinson and Bridge (2005), and Slater (2006).

\(^{55}\) Brownfield is a term used in urban planning to describe land previously used for industrial purposes
or some commercial uses. Such land may have been contaminated with hazardous waste or pollution or
is feared to be so. See Weber (2002); Fainstein and Judd (1999); Zukin (1991); and Türkün (2007).

\(^{56}\) See Beauregard (1998); Sorkin (1992); and Mullins (1999).
The main tool to realize these ambitious projects is urban redevelopment projects. The so-called flagship projects, in which government mainly acts as the agent of infrastructure and land reclamation, are carried out by public-private-partnerships and expected to trigger large scale urban redevelopment in the urban area. Urban redevelopment projects of this context cover mega lots in countries of Europe and North America. They offer favorable settings for domestic and foreign capital. They aim high commercial revenues to their (initiating) investors rather than public welfare (Öktem-Ünsal & Türkün, 2014). In other words, as Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez (2002) claim, “enhancing the competitive advantage of cities is seen as largely dependent on improving and adapting the built environment to the accumulation strategies of a city’s key elites. Therefore, physical reconstruction and economic recovery tend to go hand in hand and, very often, are perceived as quasi-simultaneous processes” (p. 572).

As discussed earlier, reflections of so-called “new urban policies” are not limited to the developed world. Similar approaches/policies have emerged in major cities of late industrialized/capitalized countries despite varying local dynamics. Smith (2002) asserts that “in this respect, at least, turn-of-the-century neoliberalism hints at a thread of convergence between urban experiences in the larger cities of what used to be called the First and Third Worlds” (p. 441).

Öktem-Ünsal and Türkün (2014) observe two parallel processes in cities of late industrialized countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, India, Mexico, Turkey and Japan. On one hand, these cities are foci of global production; on the other hand, they

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57 Amsden (1989) notes that whilst the 1st industrial revolution in the United Kingdom towards the end of the eighteenth century, and the 2nd industrial revolution 100 years later in Germany and the US both involved new products and processes, the countries that did not start industrialization until the 20th century tended to generate neither new products nor processes. These, the late industrializers, raised their income and transformed their productive structures using borrowed technology.
become areas where quality service sector emerges and actors of global real estate market invest in. Following the 1970s, metropolitan districts such as Seoul, Taipei, São Paulo, Mumbai and Istanbul gained attractiveness due to outward-oriented growth and export-based industrialization policies of these countries. These metropolitan cities, which offer cheap labor and low manufacture cost, have become places where global production nestled via contract manufacturing networks. The resulting problems of unsecured employment networks, bad working conditions, illegal small workshops and home-based low-waged jobs accompany, however, some rapid growth problems that these cities are facing today (Türkün, 2007).

It is estimated that the world population will reach 10 billion by 2050 (www.census.gov), and that 95% of the fastest population growth will take place in underdeveloped and developing countries (www.un.org). One of the most important phenomena that emerged in cities of these countries after 1980s is the divergence of urbanization from economic growth process: rapid urbanization continues despite downsizing of public sector, decrease in real wages, increase in prices and unemployment (Davis, 2006). As a consequence of agricultural deregulation policies of the IMF and the WB, governments of late industrialized or developing countries removed the agricultural support and incentives, allowing local agricultural activity to be replaced by international corporations around the world. This trend continues to abolish the survival chances of small-scale manufacturers and causes a global recession and upset in agriculture.

A major consequence of these policies is massive migration patterns to large industrial cities in developing countries. David (2006) claims that in cities that have grown through

rural-to-urban migration, large scale industry starts to decentralize in the urban region to create giant urban corridors that attract informal settlements for the working class. Another related finding is, as Öktem-Ünsal and Türkün (2014) define it, that the growth rate of informal settlements exceeds the urbanization rate. Many squatter settlements around the world emerged and grew after 1960s. There are 4 million people living in Iztapalapa (México D.F., Mexico) 2.2 million in Libertador (Caracas, Venezuela), 1.5 million in San Juan de Lurigancho (Lima, Peru), and 1.5 million in Ajegunle (Lagos, Nigeria), which are the largest squatter neighborhoods of the world (UN-HABITAT, 2003). Deepening of poverty and existing urban problems is inevitable in these settlements, where migration rates can go as high as twice the growth rate (Öktem-Ünsal & Türkün, 2014). Finally, another trend emerging with industrialization and rapid population growth in some of the abovementioned developing cities is the significant changes in qualified services, real estate and construction sectors, as elaborated earlier.

In the context of pushing global realities, neoliberal politics increasingly becomes about city marketing: the peddling of government efficiency, civic entrepreneurialism, public-private partnerships, and good business climates. These attract large redevelopment projects that target the growing service and tourism sectors as well as the upper-income groups. Thus, urban redevelopment projects become the most important tool for the new urban policy.

3.2. Towards locality: agenda shifts in Turkey and Istanbul

As already mentioned, a number of concepts and terms exist related to redevelopment, the meanings of which overlap despite their basic differences in functions, objects, aims and methods. Redevelopment, renewal, renovation, restructuring, rehabilitation, revitalization, functional diversification, and gentrification may be mentioned in this respect. As in the case of Europe and North America, definitions and names of urban projects in Turkey have changed
or are used interchangeably with others, in different times and projects. *Redevelopment* is used in this study as an umbrella term that involves similar projects, which express the concepts above as their goals.

As organizers of urban development in the modern sense, municipalities have a history of more than one and a half century in Turkey.\(^{59}\) Today, the Turkish territory hierarchy for urban planning, from large to small scale, is *ülke* (country), *il* (province), *ilçe* (district), and *mahalle* (neighborhood). Although the current Turkish Zoning Law No. 3194 specifies different types of development plans at different levels and scales, the most widely used ones are “master plans” and “implementation plans”. Master plans are usually drawn on 1:5000-scale maps and show general land uses, main zoning types, main transportation routes and population densities. They are used as guides or strategy plans for implementation. Applications are made according to implementation plans that are produced at 1:1000 scale and show all the details at the level of building lot.

Municipal councils are the sole authority in making decisions for planning and ratifying the prepared plans in Turkey. There exists no technical control mechanism related to the quality of the plans prepared (Ersoy, 2001). Comprehensive modifications on current plans can be made through *revision development plans, partial development plans, and additional development plans*. However, minor amendments at the level of lots are made through *plan modification*, which is the most frequently used tool to change the plan decisions in the name of private interests. Through such plan modifications, specific individuals and local groups may be protected or favored. Profit seeking through increase of land value is still considered to be the most effective tool in the hands of municipalities as a means of distribution of wealth at the local level. Some researchers estimate the share of this sort of land profit to be

\(^{59}\) See Ersoy (2001).
around 75 per cent (Beşiktepe, 1990). In this respect plan modifications play a significant role in measuring clientelism at the local level, as revealed by the case study.

3.2.1. Historical overview

The roots of urban redevelopment activities in Turkey are found in the gecekondu settlements emerging in major Turkish cities in early 1950s. As in post-war Europe, policies of economic growth and industrialization motivated the rapid growth of urban centers and the development of gecekondu in large cities in Turkey. By the 1970s, the gecekondu areas were regarded by municipal governments as the source of all negative externalities in the large cities, and demolition and resulting public housing applications were suggested by municipal agencies as the only solution. The policy of demolition resulted in the eviction of population in the gecekondu in cities' central areas. Although not mentioned in plans, the replacement of a lower-income population by a higher-income group—in other words, gentrification—was an expected and deliberate underlying purpose of redevelopment (Güzey, 2009). Hence redevelopment plans, shaped by physical redevelopment projects of pre-1970s, aimed at improving the highly dense and irregular housing areas, and redevelopment was treated as a means for the increase of the housing stock.

Beginning in the 1980s, the large urban settlements in Turkey began to undergo redevelopment, impacted by liberalization and the globalization of the country’s economy under the influence of neoliberalization discussed earlier. In the 1980s, two important developments in the urban space attracted attention: an increase in the construction of

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60 Gecekondu is the term used for the squatter settlements in Turkey, which are occupied illegally by working class people. The literal meaning of the term refers to “shacks built up in one night,” as was the case in their early emergence. Today, gecekondu are the longstanding residential neighborhoods that were gradually built on public land.

61 Also see Eğercioğlu and Özdemir (2007).
authorized residential areas and _gecekondu_, and the decentralization of residential areas. Urban redevelopment within this period took place in the inner city residential and industrial areas, the central business districts, and the coastal areas.

Indeed, the year 1980 was a turning point for Turkey in many respects. After a military coup on September 12, 1980, the central government implemented neoliberal economic policies and structural adjustments to integrate Turkey into international markets and to embrace the dynamics of the free market economy (Kazgan, 1997 in Özdemir, 2011). The military intervention in 1980 prepared the ground for the rise of the entrepreneurial municipal model. Municipalities became stronger financially. Their priorities were redefined, and their investments shifted increasingly towards infrastructure, which had been neglected so long in the cities. On the other hand, especially in large cities, the local government became “big business” and the cities, perhaps for the first time, “came to the attention of big firms and corporations” (Şengül, 1993).

However, the restructuring of central-local government relations in the early 1980s had a mixed outcome for the subsequent provision of housing and urban development (Özdemir, 2011). Restructuring created powerful local municipalities armed with various rights and plan-making powers, yet the very same processes created conflicts in the planning system, as a result of confusion about the responsibilities of various ministries and departments at the central government level and those of local authorities. Consequently it became difficult to implement concerted actions between central and local authorities in Turkey (Erten, 1999 in Özdemir, 2011).

Nevertheless, urban redevelopment projects of this period became the basic source of revenue for almost all the large municipalities, with funds coming from the central government agencies and large private development companies. Legislators, in search of ways
in which applications could be supported and facilitated, passed the Local Administration Law No. 2972 of 1984 as the main legal facilitator during this period. This law brought a two-tier system, consisting of the greater municipality and the district municipalities. It introduced new financial resources for the local governments by encouraging public-private partnerships. Privatization of under-utilized public lands by the local or central governments became a major source of income generated from the redevelopment process, especially in the 2000s (Aksoy, 2012). The law also introduced changes in the organizational structure, such as bringing agencies formerly attached to central ministries in Ankara (for instance, the Master Plan Bureau, and the Water Supply and Sewerage Authority) under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan mayor. All this rendered the mayor’s office more powerful with enhanced administrative and financial resources. These changes led to the emergence of an entrepreneurial local government acting as a market facilitator, and the privatization of various municipal services such as transportation, housing, and provision of natural gas (Bartu-Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008). Güzey (2009) defines urban redevelopment in Turkey after 1980 as “market-oriented through government assistance,” which is the preferred intervention style for the circulation of capital and urban development (p. 30).

Housing Development Administration of Turkey (Toplu Konut İdaresi — TOKİ from here on), tied to the Prime Minister, emerged as another significant factor central to the urban restructuring process in Turkey. Established in 1984 with the aim of dealing with the housing problem of middle and lower-middle income groups, TOKİ became an active investor of mass housing until it became even more powerful in the 2000s, equipped with special powers and with financial resources to accomplish vast urban transformation projects (Aksoy, 2012).

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62 Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ) is a central government organization that provides public housing programs for the low and middle-income people who cannot own a housing unit under the existing market conditions in Turkey. For more information, see [http://www.toki.gov.tr/en/background.html](http://www.toki.gov.tr/en/background.html) (retrieved in July 2016).
Güzey (2009) examines the reshaping of Ankara, the capital and second largest city of Turkey with a majority of its population (60% by 1990) living in *gecekondu*, through urban redevelopment projects in the 1990s. In this process, all municipalities undertook an active role, as legal arrangements rendered possible any and all redevelopment. While these redevelopment applications were processed and supported by the local authority, particularly in central areas with high-incomes, the private sector together with TOKİ emerged as the main investors. The aim of almost all projects was declared at the outset to be the public good; however, the projects seemed to favor mid- and high-income groups rather than lower-income local residents. Three urban redevelopment projects which were the first ones to be implemented in Ankara in the early 1990s—namely the Dikmen Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project (DVP), the Portakal Çiçeği Urban Renewal Project (PÇV), and the project for transformation from squatter housing to contemporary housing (GEÇAK)—exemplify this issue (Uzun, 2005). All three of the project areas are located in the southeastern part of the city, next to upper-middle- and high-income residential areas, which led to the adoption of gentrification as a tool for the redevelopment of urban locality. Nevertheless, they have been leading examples, showing the district municipalities how to tackle the redevelopment of *gecekondu*. By the year 2009, in Ankara, 31 such urban redevelopment projects were either approved or under construction (Güzey, 2009). In general, it will be correct to characterize the urban redevelopment projects in Ankara as an extension of the process of government-assisted redevelopment and gentrification.

3.2.2. Istanbul’s redevelopment vision and consequences

In the case of Istanbul, the main motive to transform the city was to reposition it as a ‘global’ city, competing with the leading metropolitan cities in the world. The largest urban center of Turkey with a population of over 12 million, Istanbul is a metropolitan city with
economic growth potential and a unique historic and cultural background, both of which serve as main reasons for its global visioning. However, in the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, this global vision achieved only partial and piecemeal results. Real estate developments, such as the notorious Park Hotel construction, the Gökkağas Hotel, and gecekondu clearance projects, such as the intrusive opening of the Tarlabası Boulevard and the sweeping away of the industrial infrastructure along the banks of the Golden Horn, all attracted huge protests from the city’s planning circles, including the Chamber of Urban Planners and the planning departments of universities (Aksoy, 2012). The various shopping malls, residential complexes and commercial headquarters that started to spring up on the edges of the city remained for the most part isolated and scattered projects for the city’s globalizing elite.

Recent research in Europe has shown that there is a tendency among EU member states to incorporate social housing issues into the urban redevelopment agenda and to fight segregation in social housing. As a result, integrated policies to achieve sustainable communities have appeared on EU agendas. However, after 2002 the policies that were adopted by the Turkish central government under the Islamic and conservative Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi — AKP from here on) differed significantly from practices in Europe, especially regarding the emphases made on fulfilling the social dimension of redevelopment. The most remarkable reflection of the policy changes is again observed in Istanbul, which has been the flagship of the AKP’s ambitions to achieve Turkey’s recognition as a major player in the global economy. Since it came to power in November 2002, the AKP has encouraged the consolidation of neoliberal spatial policies. The new model of urban management has allowed it to transform the city’s main functions, to generate urban income and to distribute this income arbitrarily to give birth to a new, conservative bourgeoisie (Bakçay-Çolak, 2012).
This new bourgeoisie, dominant in Istanbul, has escalated the process of land speculation, with consequences for urban planning: The beginning of the 2000s is marked by a sharp increase in the amount of demolitions performed in Istanbul. This period also marks the beginnings of urban mobilizations protesting against the demolitions. Public authorities have been forced to legitimize their ambitions of maximizing urban income by the central government’s interventions. The law no. 5366 on “regenerating, protecting and renovating deteriorated historical and cultural real estate properties” has legitimized the central role of the IMM and of TOKİ regarding the implementation of urban renovation projects. This has caused the destruction of the gecekondu to be replaced with new housing, mostly for a wealthy clientele. Bakçay-Çolak (2012) argues that the laws passed by the AKP between 2002 and 2005 led to a marked increase in municipalities’ power over planning-related policy, as well as TOKİ’s power regarding land management, restoring older urban fabric and urban planning. This facilitated demolition and accelerated the privatization of land in Istanbul.

There are a number of consequences of the new legal framework and the neoliberalization process observed in major cities in Turkey, particularly in Istanbul. Bartu-Candan and Kolluoğlu’s (2008) assessment allows a summary of these consequences:

- A new language, neoliberal newspeak, that involves abundant usage of the terms vision, mission, transparency, efficiency, accountability and public participation;
- A dramatic shift in the type of private investments, marked by a spectacular increase in the number of hotels, shopping malls and office buildings since 1980s;
- A change in actors of the real estate market such as the emergence of real estate investment trusts and TOKİ, introduced by the legislative interventions of the central government; and
• The emergence of the discourse of natural disasters following the 1999 Marmara earthquakes, which recalls strengthening the housing stock for an anticipated high-magnitude earthquake in Istanbul.

In the housing provision, these consequences are reflected in urban redevelopment projects either as mega-projects designed by world-renowned architects (i.e. Kartal project by Zaha Hadid, Küçükçekmece project by Ken Yeang), or as gecekondu transformation projects, both of which are examined in the next section. What distinguishes the applications in Turkey from the models in developed countries is the tendency to regard urban redevelopment as a form of project-based housing supply, rather than as a holistic restructuring process that should be evaluated at a larger scale. Accordingly, applications in Turkey have been directed mostly at residential contexts, especially gecekondu, and they are used as tools in the re-acquisition of rent in the cities’ most appealing locations (central areas, development sites, and the like) and in the creation of high-income and high-status housing (Güzey, 2009).

Turkey has produced in global terms a significant volume of building stock within a limited period, whereas the pace of production has barely allowed full professional services and supervision. As a result, the dominant nature of urban areas is low standard and low-quality unauthorized environments, representing large pools of risks. Turkey cannot afford to follow the same policies of urban growth for another number of decades; it must upgrade its urban environment extensively, introducing better infrastructure, transportation systems, public services, shifts in scale economies, ensuring higher safety, reclaiming superior design standards and aesthetics, and restructuring social justice, and make a historical turn to comprehensive policies of urban redevelopment. Based on the above criticism and arguments, the dissertation will argue for a thorough understanding of power relations and the real politics at such a top-down, clientalist and neoliberal setting.
As a final analysis of the urban redevelopment processes in Turkey, it is necessary to mention a new development in the legislative arena. Due to the central government’s increasing ambitions regarding redevelopment and its need to further control project initiation, the long-standing work of the Turkish parliament on the latest—and actually, the first directly-addressed—law on urban redevelopment has recently been concluded. The law no. 6306 on the “Redevelopment of Areas under Disaster Risk,” more commonly called the “the Urban Redevelopment Law,” was ratified by the parliament on May 16, 2012. It aims at “determining procedures and principles regarding rehabilitation and renewal of lands under disaster risk or plots with buildings under disaster risks in order to provide healthy and safe living environments” (Official Journal, 05/31/2012). The most remarkable change the law brings is a process of redevelopment controlled even more by the central government: Instead of the local governments, the cabinet is now assigned to provide final approval in designation of the redevelopment areas at neighborhood scale. This and other provisions of the law are still being discussed in the media and planning environments; however, due to its recent adoption and thus, lack of practical evidence—this law does not directly influence the recent redevelopment projects or case studies analyzed in the dissertation. Nevertheless, implications derived from the theoretical and empirical research will inform possible consequences of the Urban Redevelopment Law.

3.3. Recent redevelopment projects in Istanbul

In 2004, the Municipality of Küçükçekmece, Istanbul (MKI) sponsored an international symposium on urban redevelopment with the aim of ‘learning from the mistakes and lessons of the European experience’ in order to reduce any future implementation errors associated with urban redevelopment projects. Özdemir (2011) informs about the symposium as follows:

Ten invited scholars from Northern Europe contributed to the symposium, focusing on domestic experience, in particular the shift from large-scale
property-led urban renewal projects to multi-partnered, strategic, area-based neighborhood schemes that emphasized the importance of community involvement and public-private partnerships. Of particular note was the opportunity this symposium gave Turkish representatives to learn from policy formulation and implementation errors emerging from the urban regeneration experience in the UK (p. 1107).

Unfortunately, neither Istanbul nor other cities in Turkey have sufficiently taken these experiences and lessons to heart. The IMM initiatives and various district municipalities have produced urban redevelopment projects mostly in gecekondu areas, most of which approached the problem by reducing it to a matter of clearing and rebuilding existing neighborhoods (Özdemir, 2011). The table below (Table 3) shows major urban redevelopment projects that were designed by the IMM and district municipalities. The actors of these redevelopment projects can be generalized as the IMM, local district municipalities, TOKİ, local communities, technocrats, and academics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Size (hectare)</th>
<th>Type of project</th>
<th>Motives</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Financers</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karanfilköy</td>
<td>21.5 ha</td>
<td>Slum clearance</td>
<td>Attainable location, profitable lands</td>
<td>Local municipality, IMM, consulting firm, resident organization</td>
<td>TOKİ, Yapı Kredi Koray Construction Company</td>
<td>Postponed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarlabası</td>
<td>2 ha</td>
<td>Urban renewal</td>
<td>Attainable location, profitable lands</td>
<td>Local municipality, consulting firm, res. org.</td>
<td>GAP Construction Company</td>
<td>In progress (started in 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulukule (Neslişah- H. Sultan)</td>
<td>1.3 ha</td>
<td>Urban renewal</td>
<td>Attainable location, profitable lands</td>
<td>Local municipality, IMM, residents</td>
<td>TOKİ (contracted to Oızkar Group)</td>
<td>Started in 2009, cancelled in 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fener, Balat, Ayyansaray Süleymaniye</td>
<td>10 ha</td>
<td>Urban renewal</td>
<td>Attainable location, profitable lands</td>
<td>Local municipality, IMM, resident organization</td>
<td>KİPTAŞ (İstanbul Housing Development Org. Co.)</td>
<td>In progress (declared in 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal industrial area</td>
<td>550 ha</td>
<td>Industrial area transformation</td>
<td>Defined as a secondary center, value potential</td>
<td>Local municipality, IMM, local community</td>
<td>KENT-DER (land owners organization)</td>
<td>Postponed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayazma-Tepeüstü</td>
<td>13 ha</td>
<td>Slum clearance</td>
<td>Transportation routes, the Olympics Stadium, profitable lands</td>
<td>Local municipality, IMM, TOKİ, construction company, residents</td>
<td>TOKİ (contracted to Ağaoğlu Construction Company)</td>
<td>Completed (2004-2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal zone</td>
<td>93 ha</td>
<td>Urban regeneration</td>
<td>Defined as a secondary center, profitable lands</td>
<td>Local municipality, IMM, resident organization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Postponed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Başbüyük</td>
<td>400 ha</td>
<td>Slum clearance</td>
<td>Attainable location, profitable lands</td>
<td>Local municipality, IMM, resident organization</td>
<td>TOKİ</td>
<td>Postponed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armutlu, Derbent, Pınar</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Slum clearance</td>
<td>New bridge and surrounding highways, profitable lands</td>
<td>Local municipality, IMM, resident organizations</td>
<td>TOKİ</td>
<td>Postponed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture Valley</td>
<td>240 ha</td>
<td>Slum clearance, revitalization</td>
<td>Earthquake risk, attainable location</td>
<td>Local municipality, IMM, resident organizations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Postponed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sümer</td>
<td>17 ha</td>
<td>Earthquake focused regeneration</td>
<td>Earthquake risk, attainable location, profitable lands</td>
<td>Local municipality, IMM, KİPTAŞ, construction companies, residents</td>
<td>KİPTAŞ (contracted to YDA Group and Kuruluş Construction Company)</td>
<td>First phase completed (2007-2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In her study analyzing the roles and motives of municipalities in Istanbul’s urban redevelopment projects, Sakarya (2011) examines the motives of district municipalities in undertaking these projects. For example, the Municipality of Beşiktaş emphasizes physical improvement and introduces its project as a sign of being a metropolitan city. On the other hand, the municipalities of Fatih and Beyoğlu have initiated gentrification projects, but prefer to use the term redevelopment, as “redevelopment projects seem more acceptable and less irritable for the public” (p. 3). These municipalities see the projects as a chance to pull tourism investments to their districts while renewing the physical structure of the historical buildings. The MKI aims to pull global investments with wide ranging projects. With this purpose, the municipality implements redevelopment projects to change the physical and social appearance of the district.

The projects in Kartal and Küçükçekmece deserve special emphasis. Determined as sub-centers of Istanbul by the IMM, these municipalities are planned as new spaces of future global investments through large-scale projects. In 2006, the IMM announced an urban design competition as part of urban redevelopment activities in the coastal zones of these districts. Two foreign architectural offices, led by the famous Iraqi-British and Malaysian architects Zaha Hadid and Ken Yeang, were eventually chosen as the winners for Kartal and Küçükçekmece, respectively. The employment of renowned architects has been a common practice in developed countries since 1980, and criticized by a number of scholars such as Hall (1998), who has pointed out that “the employment of a publicly known “superstar” architect whose presence on a project will attract a great deal of media attention is also responsible for the production of urban landscapes recognized to be spectacular, imageable

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63 Also see Smith (2002).
or scenographic enclaves which are largely divorced from their immediate urban and social contexts” (p. 89).

Hall’s description should be considered in the light of the IMM strategy of seeking to promote Istanbul as a world city. In doing this, the IMM chose to organize its architectural competition between exclusively foreign invitees, while excluding Turkish architects (Ekinci, 2006). A number of Turkish urban planners also criticized these projects as an attempt to solve planning problems through architectural competitions whose participants lacked sufficient local knowledge and failed to offer appropriate solutions. Thus, even though the architects were chosen and the designs were prepared, these projects have not been implemented because of the reaction of the local public (in Kartal and Küçükçekmece) and the conflict between local and metropolitan municipalities (in Kartal).

Greatly contributing to these conflicts are the tensions between different ruling political parties in charge of the municipalities, tensions that lead to significant friction between metropolitan and local municipalities in decision-making and implementation processes. In the IMM, the AKP is the ruling party whereas in Kartal Municipality, the middle-left wing Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* — CHP from here on) is in power. Because the Municipality of Kartal is not implementing the coastal project, the development strategy for Kartal is currently postponed by the IMM. Indeed, municipal elections in Turkey held in March 2009 made a great difference for Kartal, Maltepe and Sarıyer districts where the ruling parties changed from the AKP to the CHP, and the new mayors called off the formerly planned redevelopment projects.

Beşiktaş is another district that has faced political consequences. Beşiktaş is a central business district and so mostly promotes large-scale business investment projects. The local

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64 See Demirdizen (2007).
The district municipalities of Fatih and Beyoğlu, ruled by the AKP, have implemented the urban renewal projects in collaboration with the private investment and construction company GAP, TOKİ (not for all the projects) and the IMM, while excluding the local public. Local and metropolitan municipalities aimed to pull new tourism investments to Fatih and Beyoğlu; however, not all of these projects, which are located in historic preservation sites, have been successful in their execution. Although implementation processes of Sulukule and Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray projects, both located in Fatih, started, they have been recently cancelled by the courts due to planning decisions opposed to the conservation guidelines of the Regional Conservation Board, and the violation of the property rights of the local populations (Yazman, 2012). On the other hand, in Küçükçekmece, the AKP based coalition received strong support from the central government; therefore, the gecekondu-focused Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment project was implemented easily despite negative reaction from the local people, as examined one of the two case projects of this study.

Zeytinburnu aims to realize the economic, social and spatial redevelopment of the Culture Valley area, which covers the majority of the residential part of the district, facing a high earthquake damage risk. Based on this main motive, the intention was to follow the framework of the vision of creating high standard, livable, sustainable, innovative, lively and retrofitted urban spaces as an alternative to the problem of unplanned developments, mainly under the earthquake threat. However, due to legislative and political conflicts experienced
in the Culture Valley process, only one of the four phases of the larger redevelopment scheme, Sümer neighborhood Redevelopment Project, has been implemented and analyzed in this study as the second case project.

Overall, the local municipalities legitimize their redevelopment projects under the aegis of the public good, a concept which is embedded in the theoretical definition of redevelopment in literature. However, in the implementation process these municipalities are subject to serious political tensions and resulting legal obstruction. Even if they are able to implement their projects, they carry them out in ways that are reflections of the neoliberal economy politics on the space while disregarding the social, economic and political outcomes of these projects. Affected residents are ignored. They are forced to give up their houses and living spaces for potential wealthy settlers. Projects are designed to serve the economic interest of the districts. The coalitions involve mayors, private investors, and the non-governmental organizations that build up their own political capital as a result of their role in the projects.
PART III

METHODOLOGY
Chapter 4. Assessing the Reality of Power:

Research Design, Methods and Validity

The methodological aim of this study is to examine the power relationships within the redevelopment projects of Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer by looking at published and unpublished material and collecting and analyzing primary data through qualitative methods. The empirical part of the study does this through a number of methods introduced in Chapter 1. This chapter elaborates on primary data collection, instruments, subjects, methods, analysis, and research notes. It also presents subject profiles and a validity assessment of the research methods and process.

4.1. Data collection and analysis

To serve the aforementioned purpose of triangulation, elaborated below, the data collection methods of this study’s qualitative research involved interviews and participant observation. Primary data was collected from knowledgeable actors within the decision-making structure of Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer redevelopment projects through in-depth interviews. Interviews lasted on average a little less than two hours, and served to illuminate the power structures in these processes and to highlight similarities and differences in the perceptions of the various groups and individuals involved. I sought to conduct interviews with members of all different actor groups. However, as elaborated below, some actors were unavailable or unwilling to participate in the research.

4.1.1. Interview guides and questions

In developing the interview guide, a set of open-ended questions were developed to elicit the initial expectations and subsequent perceptions of the interviewees regarding the
redevelopment projects during one-on-one interview sessions. These questions facilitated discussion on the development of the decision-making process and on possible biases that occurred in the process due to power relations. The questions also gave them the chance to convey case stories from their own perspectives and based on their own experiences.

Two interview guides were generated, one for the formal decision-makers of the government institutions (Appendices A and B), and the other for community members and NGOs (Appendices C and D). These guides consisted of 20 and 16 questions, respectively, whose design was based on the research questions and theoretical literature review and discussion introduced in the earlier chapters. The guide administered to formal institutions contained more detail-oriented questions, since officials naturally possessed more knowledge of both the decision-making process and the technical details of the project terms and process, and as the residents and NGOs were relatively less involved in decision-making. The guide for the residents and NGO representatives and community activists was designed from a community-oriented viewpoint to survey their knowledge and feelings regarding the redevelopment project.

Following basic questions to determine subject profiles, the first question of both interview guides asked the subjects to describe as precisely as possible and to the best of their recollection, the evolution of the project from its start to completion. While they were relating their stories, the subjects were not interrupted unless to make on-the-spot inquiries about dates or numbers and so as to prevent distraction from the topic at hand.

There were a number of similar questions in the two interview guides to allow for a comparison of the perceptions of formal and informal actors. The interview guide for residents and NGOs also asked the subjects’ opinions on community inclusion: how they were informed about decisions, the extent to which they were involved, and the public-friendliness
of the project. Questions that diverged from the institutional interview guide were designed to extract further details of the residents’ perceptions.

After the first two interviews conducted with the executive officers of the district municipalities of Zeytinburnu and Küçükçekmece, who boasted of their respective institutions’ dominance in decision-making, the subjects were also asked for their opinion on which actors were more dominant and why, along with the questions concerning competitiveness and conflicts. These questions served to better reveal perceptions of institutional roles and power hierarchies in the decision-making schemes of the two projects. The wording of some questions was also revised early in the interview process to more easily communicate with the subjects and more directly determine their opinions on the decision-making process and power relations.

The interview questions were interactive in nature, supporting and complementing each other in the aim of extracting the realities of power and powerlessness: where and how power mechanisms emerged, how they affected project decisions and the relationship within and between actor groups, subjects’ perceptions of power, and mistakes and lessons learned during the process.

4.1.2. Employment of subjects

As mentioned earlier, the case study aimed at interviewing the actor groups of local (district and metropolitan) governments, government development institutions (both central and local), private development and construction companies, NGOs (at different levels), and the community groups (representatives of both owners and tenants, status groups and ethnicities, where applicable)—in other words, stakeholders who in one way or another were linked to decision-making processes of the projects. The first interviews of both case studies were conducted with deputy mayors of the district municipalities in office during the project
term, as they were known for their direct and heavy involvement in the decision-making processes of the projects from initiation to the completion.

A snowball sampling (or chain referral sampling) method was employed to detect research subjects by holding a snowball log. In short, snowball sampling is a non-probability sampling technique where existing study subjects recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances. Thus interviews, which began with higher municipality officers, continued with individuals inside and outside the municipality. This method assured that all actors that constituted the decision-making structure, or that were affected by the decisions taken, were identified and contacted for an interview until the subjects repeatedly stated that they could not think of any other knowledgeable person associated with the project. A total of 14 individuals associated with the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case and 12 individuals associated with the Sümer case were interviewed in this way between January and May of 2014.

4.1.3. Participant observation and authenticity

The qualitative research involved participant observation, which is the most common ethnographic approach, in addition to in-depth interviews. Originating mainly in the field of anthropology, ethnography emphasizes the study of a culture of a defined group. In this study, participant observation as an ethnographic approach refers to the observation of the redevelopment culture of the actor groups.

All interviews were conducted by myself, which enabled me to assume the role of a participant observer throughout the research, and gain familiarity with the actors and their

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65 For an extensive definition and description of the uses of the snowball sampling technique, see Noy (2008). For further description, problems and techniques of the method, see Biernacki and Waldorf (1981).

66 For definitions and an extensive examination of ethnographic methods, see O'Reilly (2012). For some of the applications ethnographic research in collaborative planning, see Sandercock and Attili (2010), and Maginn (2007).
perceptions, ambitions and concerns. As a native of Turkey and resident of Istanbul, I utilized my academic and professional contacts in the city to obtain access to possible interviewees and information. The fact that my native language is Turkish allowed fluent communication with participants, which enabled a better perception of the actual power interplays and the political context. Even though each interview began with the previously prepared set of questions, in some cases the discussion led to a more explicit and open dialogue, and sometimes the interviewees presented information on topics that were not anticipated initially.

Other benefits of my self-efficacy were direct interaction with the subjects, which encouraged a genuine exchange, and observation of their work environments. In particular, visits to planning departments and the project-specific redevelopment offices where residents were consulted about project negotiations and agreements allowed me to observe the community interaction atmosphere and to collect material specific to the case projects.

Using the interpretative approach discussed above, I utilized interview notes to reflect my perceptions from casual conversations and observations during interviews. I also did all Interview transcriptions, and saved all research logs, audio and written documents, photographs and transcriptions.

4.1.4. Coding and triangulation of data

Following the transcription of the audio records of interviews, I organized rough transcripts according to the interview guide question groups explained above. In other words, I marked and categorized the pieces of the full transcript texts that corresponded to each question, and later coded these pieces for analysis. The remaining information consisted of subjective accounts such as memories, opinions, or remarks unrelated to the research questions and topics. These were further searched and narrowed down for coding as relevant,
in particular for the “development of the case” sections (i.e. dates, numbers and other
details of the project process). The seemingly unrelated data helped me identify the
subjects’ political views, ethical judgments and perceptions of the government, NGOs and
their local community, all of which were reflected in the analysis as necessary.

The coding process involved grouping of the sorted data. In forming the coding themes,
the interview guide design logic was as follows:

- Development of the case (all descriptive data in temporal order)
- Policies and aims
- Institutional/formal collaboration
  - Actor structure (groups, actors, changes over time)
  - Conflicts within and between formal actor institutions
- Community inclusion and responses
  - Community involvement, participation and perceptions
  - Conflicts between formal actors and the community and within the community
- Assessment of the decision-making scheme
  - Factors that affected decision-making (legal, financial, political, institutional, etc.)
  - Assessment of the decision-making process (strengths, weaknesses, lessons, other
    thoughts)

The next methodology phase involved an in-depth analysis of coded data, using
triangulation methods to ensure that the case accounts were rich, robust, comprehensive,
and well-developed. As discussed in Chapter 1, triangulation is a method used by qualitative
researchers to check and establish validity in their studies by analyzing a research question
from multiple perspectives. The benefits of triangulation include “increasing confidence in
research data, creating innovative ways of understanding a phenomenon, revealing unique
findings, challenging or integrating theories, and providing a clearer understanding of the
problem” (Thurmond, 2001, p. 254). These benefits are largely the result of the diversity and quantity of data that can be used for analysis.

The empirical research of this study employs two types of triangulation for data analysis. The first, triangulation of sources, examines the consistency of different data sources from within the same data collection method (i.e. data collected at different points in time and from subjects with different viewpoints) in order to increase the validity of a study. In this context, the sources of this study are the stakeholders and actors of the two cases who were interviewed. In-depth interviews allowed the assessment of the sources’ deep perspectives on the redevelopment projects, while the analysis process allowed comparison of perspectives within and between different actors and categories of actors. In other words, I compared feedback from the subjects to determine areas of agreement and divergence. Based on the coding themes, the in-depth analysis of case data led to the following case chapter outline:

1. Development of the case: chronological and descriptive background and project information, with special emphasis on case-specific notable accounts;
2. Actor structure: analysis of actors in decision-making and project execution, and notes on the weight of actors’ influence;
3. Institutional policies and goals: formal actors’ accounts of their institutions’ redevelopment policies and project goals specific to their redevelopment case;
4. Factors in decision-making: categorization of legal, political, financial and institutional factors that affected the decision-making process as defined by all subjects;
5. Informed conflicts: subjects’ accounts of conflict between formal actors, as well as between formal actors and the community; detailed inquiry of the significant conflicts;

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68 For more information on and applications of triangulation of sources in qualitative research, see Lewis and Ritchie (2003); also see Cheek, Onslow, and Cream (2004).
6. **Community involvement and perceptions:** levels and context of formal participation and inclusion of the community reported by subjects; special emphasis on residents’ and the NGO representatives’ accounts regarding displacement, allegations of unfair benefits, self-expression, consistency of government’s promises, and satisfaction with the redevelopment project;

7. **Assessment of the decision-making process by actors:** all subjects’ accounts regarding the strong and weak aspects of the decision-making process; special emphasis on formal actors’ perceptions of how project outcomes were influenced by power mechanisms (i.e. power coalitions, struggles, and influences significant in each case project).

The second type of triangulation method employed, *environmental triangulation*, involves the use of different locations, settings, and other key factors related to the environment in which the study took place. These factors are altered to see whether the findings are the same across settings. In this study, the environmental factors are the two case projects, which offer comparable locational and contextual settings and actor groups. This part of the data analysis process thus allowed for the triangulation of the two projects. The similarity of the coding and analysis themes of both case studies allowed for practicality and precision in the comparison of the cases. Based on the coding themes and triangulation of sources, the analysis of case comparison revealed the following outline for Chapter 7:

1. **Context summary of cases:** comparison of significance of cases, case selection rationales of authorities, socio-economic profile of the affected communities, and physical and financial formulations of projects;

2. **Institutional/formal collaboration:** comparison of the nature of project collaboration environments (i.e. formal actor groups, central government and political party

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*For more information on and applications of environmental triangulation in qualitative research, see Lewis and Ritchie (2003); also see Ndanu and Syombua (2015).*
organizations, private stakeholders, and national media); revisiting institutional policies and factors that affected project decisions (i.e. legal, political and financial factors);

3. **Community inclusion and responses**: comparison of governments’ perspectives around the extent and level of community involvement, empowerment and mobilization of the community, government integrity and community trust; comparison of residents’ perspectives on resettlement and displacement, agreements and conflicts, reliability and trust, community organizing, and their new lives and thoughts of redevelopment after completion of the projects.

Finally, in the third and last phase of data analysis, I coded and analyzed the lessons the interviewees had derived from their redevelopment experience. The triangulation of sources was repeated in the comparison of the two case projects. These lessons are also organized along interview and analysis themes, under the main components of the redevelopment practice:

1. **Community oriented policies**: policy lessons concerning the housing rights of homeowners and tenants, public housing, quality of life, and gated communities;

2. **Physical planning**: lessons concerning master development planning, local redevelopment planning and methods, and population and building densities;

3. **Financial planning**: lessons concerning improvement of the supply of public housing, financial incentives for residents, low-cost public housing, and engaging alternatives to capital pressure;

4. **Collaborative planning**: lessons concerning multidisciplinary and multi-actor collaboration, centralized planning in developing countries, strategic organization and sustainability of redevelopment outcomes, community representation, and longitudinal studies on redevelopment;
5. *Community involvement and empowerment*: lessons concerning local participation models, capacity building for mediation, community organizing methods, building community motivation and trust, and understanding idiosyncratic conditions of communities.

This analysis largely comprises the responses of the informed subjects of this study, who are the leading practitioners of redevelopment practices from central and local government institutions, and the representatives of community advocacy groups and academia in Turkey. The methodological purpose of this analysis is to infer lessons learned through experience, or in other words, to probe the subjects of the research to generate their own prospects for future redevelopment projects in Istanbul and Turkey.

4.2. **Subject profiles**

Based on the actor structure analysis carried out in Chapters 5 and 6, it is possible to group the actors as local and central government representatives (including academics who consulted for the local municipality during redevelopment), the members of the affected communities, and NGOs that supported the rightful citizens affected by the redevelopment activity. As mentioned above, I conducted 14 and 12 interviews, respectively, with knowledgeable subjects of the Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer urban redevelopment projects. The first group of questions in the interview guide aimed at determining the details of the subjects’ profile information (Appendix D). A short description of each case subjects’ institutional and personal information allowed for an understanding of the subjects’ profile (Tables 4 and 5).
Table 4. Profiles of the research subjects of the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case. Produced by the author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full name</th>
<th>Institutional information</th>
<th>Years in inst.</th>
<th>Title and department during project</th>
<th>Personal information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Seydi Karaoğlu</td>
<td>Housing Development Administration, Turkey (TOKİ)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Director of Real Estate Affairs, Istanbul Region</td>
<td>52 Male Bachelor's Business administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banu Tantan</td>
<td>TOKİ</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Expert, Urban Redevelopment Dept, Istanbul</td>
<td>N/A Female Master's Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yavuz Çelik</td>
<td>TOKİ</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Planner, Planning and Development Dept, Istanbul</td>
<td>40 Male Bachelor's Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Kemal Topal</td>
<td>TOKİ</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Technician, Planning and Development Dept, Ist.</td>
<td>N/A Male Community College Master's Civil technician Planning &amp; private law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hüseyin Oflaz</td>
<td>Municipality of Küçükçekmece, Istanbul (MKI)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Deputy Mayor, Technical and Development Affairs</td>
<td>44 Male Master’s Planning &amp; private law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birgül Sığınaksoy</td>
<td>MKI</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Director, Plans and Projects</td>
<td>42 Female Bachelor’s Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eda Çaçtaş Ceylan</td>
<td>MKI</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Head Urban Planner, Urban Redevelopment Dept.</td>
<td>35 Female Master’s Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>University</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sırma R. Turgut</td>
<td>Yıldız Technical University, Istanbul (YTU)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, Urban and Regional Planning Dep.</td>
<td>47 Female Doctorate Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NGOs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cihan U. Baysal</td>
<td>Migrants' Association for Social Coop., Istanbul (Göç-Der)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>N/A Female Master’s Human rights law Planning &amp; public admin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatice Kurşuncu</td>
<td>Urbanism Movement of the Society, Istanbul (IMECE)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>35 Female Doctoral candidate Planning &amp; public admin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local residents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kasım Aydın</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>42 Male Elementary N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tacettin Acar</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>49 Male Elementary N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatma Özdemir</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>47 Female No educat. N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukaddes Turan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>28 Female No educat. N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Almost all subjects of the Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment case were directly involved in the project process in one way or another. Some of the government officials interviewed had been promoted or left their institution by the time of the interview. Ali Seydi Karaoğlu had become the head of all departments of the Istanbul region of TOKİ, which made him one of the highest officials of the agency. Banu Tantan, who is the daughter of the former Minister of the Interior, Sadettin Tantan, and Yavuz Çelik had become the managers of TOKİ’s Istanbul departments of Urban Redevelopment and the department of Planning and Development, respectively. Hüseyin Oflaz had left his position as the deputy mayor of Küçükçekmece to concentrate on the operations of his private planning firm. Birgül Siğnaksoy, Eda Çaçaş Ceylan, and Ali Kemal Topal had remained in the same positions since the project’s completion. Now an associate professor of planning, Dr. Sırma Ramazanoğulları Turgut was interviewed at her university office, as she had stepped down from her advisory position at the Mayor’s office towards the end of the project because of conflicts discussed in the following chapter. Finally, activists Cihan Uzunçarşılı Baysal and Hatice Kurşuncu were still engaged in the NGOs they represented during the project’s course.

All affiliated subjects except Topal had at least 8 years affiliation with their institutions. All except bureaucrat Karaoğlu had received higher education in the fields corresponding to their positions, most being planners, while the NGO representatives had additional expertise in human rights law and public administration. All subjects, except for the relatively recently employed Topal and doctoral candidate Kurşuncu, were older than 40 years of age.

All Ayazma residents interviewed had lived in the neighborhood until they were displaced by the project. Kasım Aydın was the main representative of his community throughout the infamous tenant struggle discussed in the following chapter. He worked as the manager of a small local grocery shop until the demolition of the neighborhood. He was unemployed during his time in the barracks in Ayazma, despite having to take care of his family. At the time of
his interview, he was working as the janitor of an office building in Küçükçekmece. Tacettin Acar continued to work as a self-employed construction painter, as he had done during the project. The other interviewees, Fatma Özdemir and Mukaddes Turan, were housewives with three children each. The youngest subject, Turan, gave birth to her third child while living in the barracks. The husbands of both women had been actively involved in seeking their housing rights during the conflict.

The education level of the residents interviewed reflects that of the Ayazma-Tepeüstü community in general. Aydın and Acar had an elementary school education while Özdemir and Turan did not receive any formal education and were at least partially illiterate; these levels were consistent with the education levels of most men and women, respectively, in the community. However, it is necessary to note that despite the lack of a formal education, the detailed verbal accounts and material these residents offered to the research and their willingness to participate and express their opinions and feelings were particularly valuable to this study.
Table 5. Profiles of the research subjects of the Sümer case. Produced by the author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full name</th>
<th>Institutional information</th>
<th>Years in inst.</th>
<th>Title and department during project</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Education level</th>
<th>Education field</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government institutions</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semih Demirci</td>
<td>Istanbul Housing Development Organization Co. (KİPTAŞ)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>General Coordinator, Plans and Projects</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Bachelor’s</td>
<td>Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turgut Büyükçolak</td>
<td>KİPTAŞ</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Manager, Process Payment and Settlement Dept</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Bachelor’s</td>
<td>Civil engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Müjdat Küçükbükücü</td>
<td>KİPTAŞ</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Deputy Manager, Process Payment and Settlement Dept</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Bachelor’s</td>
<td>Civil engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zafer Alsaç</td>
<td>Municipality of Zeytinburnu, Istanbul (MZI)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Deputy Mayor, Technical and Development Affairs</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Master’s</td>
<td>Civil engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hacer Bakkal</td>
<td>MZI</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Chief, Mapping and Planning Division, Planning Dept</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Bachelor’s</td>
<td>Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akin Coşkun</td>
<td>Mukhtarship of Sümer neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mukhtar</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Bachelor’s</td>
<td>Space sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Enver Ülger</td>
<td>Okan University, Istanbul</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Head of Sümer urban design and planning group, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM) Planning Co.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>Survey and cartography engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayhan Özsoy 70</td>
<td>Istanbul Zeytinburnu Curtain Manufacturers Market (İSPER)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local residents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ömer Adali</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedat Küçükuygun</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferhat Cihangir</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

70 Ayhan Özsoy owned housing and business units within the Sümer project area, and thus, represented both community groups.
As in the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case, the snowball sampling engaged interview subjects from government institutions, university, NGO, and local residents. Table 2 excludes one interviewee who worked for the local government because she/he wished to remain anonymous. Some of the government officials interviewed had been promoted by the time of the interview. Semir Demirci had moved up to the position of Deputy General Director and was responsible for all projects of KİPTAŞ. At the MZI, Hacer Bakkal had become the chief of the Mapping and Planning and Urban Redevelopment divisions of the planning department. All other subjects, including Zafer Alsaç, Turgut Büyükçolak, Müjdat Küçükbükücü, and Akın Coşkun, were in the same positions in their institutions. Professor Enver Ülger, who did not consent to be recorded and decided to halt the interview soon after it started, was not involved in the IMM’s planning corporation anymore. Finally, Akın Coşkun, who is the elected Mukhtar of Sümer neighborhood,71 and Ayhan Özsoy, who is the founder and president of the local NGO İSPER, remained in their positions in their organizations.

In the Sümer case, too, all affiliated subjects were highly experienced members of their institutions associated for at least 8 years, most for 14 years or longer. All but Coşkun had received higher education in the fields corresponding to their positions, almost half being civil engineers, while Demirci is an architect, Bakkal is a planner, and Dr. Ülger is a survey and cartography engineering scholar. These subjects, except Coşkun, who was 38 at the time of

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71 In Turkey, a mukhtar is the person elected as the head of a village or of a neighborhood within a town or city. The mukhtar is the most familiar face of the government in the community that he or she represents. The ministry and municipalities might thus be in contact with the mukhtar as necessary in order to develop a sustainable and efficient communication and collaboration with the neighborhood community, as mukhtars can easily orient and organize their communities. For instance, in times of emergency and recovery, the central and local governors may not be able to easily communicate with the victims of the stricken areas. In those times, mukhtars can function as mediators and communicators between the community and government. For more information on the organization and responsibilities of muktarship, see Koçak (2016).
the interview, were in their mid-40s or older. Among all the subjects of the Sümer case, only Bakkal is female.

Three residents gave interviews regarding the Sümer project. Ömer Adalı and Sedat Küçükuygun were both retired; Küçükuygun used to run a small carpenter shop in the Sümer neighborhood, and had closed his shop after its demolition, in accordance with the project terms, and had moved to new housing. Ferhat Cihangir, who ran an auto repair shop in the later developed project area, moved his shop adjacent to the project borders, remaining in the Sümer neighborhood. All residents interviewed had an elementary level of education. They were very willing to participate in the research and provided detailed verbal accounts for data collection.

4.3. Research challenges and notes

As mentioned above, I used the snowball sampling method to discover new interview subjects, and interviewed every person suggested by the interviewees. The relatively small number of interviewees and reliance on self-selection and referrals represents a methodological shortcoming; however, I believe that the repetition of competing views by multiple subjects indicates sufficient representation of available perceptions of power and interactions among different actors. Due to the traditional hierarchical structure of decision-making, respondents from the higher positions of a government institution possessed more knowledge and provided more insights regarding the decision-making process. However, the highest officials of the government institutions from both case projects were left out of the interviews. Then mayor of Küçükçekmece, Aziz Yeniay, was not in office during the research process and thus was not accessible, whereas the offices of the mayor of Zeytinburnu, Murat Aydın, and the general director of KİPTAŞ, İsmet Yıldırım, were unwilling to schedule interview appointments despite repeated attempts. The then-president of the Prime
Ministry’s TOKİ, Erdoğan Bayraktar, was a bureaucrat positioned in the capital Ankara; my attempt to reach him through TOKİ’s Istanbul office did not yield any result. Nevertheless, as argued by their respective subordinates that I was able to interview, the institution heads would not have been able to provide rich enough information on the case projects, simply because they were not knowledgeable of project details, as they had been present only during the protocol signings and a few project publicity events (such as project announcement and turn-key ceremonies) and likely would not have been willing to discuss power relationships due to their prominent political positions.

Once they consented to an interview, all subjects were asked for permission to voice-record the session. While most subjects agreed with little or no hesitation, a few were reluctant or declined. One subject did not consent to being recorded and decided to halt the interview soon after it started, arguing that she/he had “gotten into trouble” because of a past recorded interview. One subject preferred no recording and full anonymity throughout the interview. One subject consented to be recorded but preferred to address questions in two sessions of interviews: one onymous and one anonymous. During the interview, one subject showed explicit hesitation in answering some of the questions by pointing at the voice recorder, laughing nervously, and skipping the question. This subject then declined to make comments off-the-record. Similarly, another subject from a government institution claimed that she/he would reveal more detailed information if the recorder was paused, but then declined to have it paused and changed the subject. One resident interviewed revealed off-the-record information after the interview was completed. The main reason for such hesitation was the unwillingness to confront or criticize the government, lest the subjects risk their government positions or confrontation from the government institutions and partisans.
Topal, Büyükçolak and Küçükbükücü, as they held technical positions in their institutions, refrained from addressing subjective questions that invited them to relate their perceptions of decision-making and power, despite their involvement in resident negotiations. They rather provided descriptive data regarding the project.

As analyzed in Chapter 3, there are many names used to describe the redevelopment work, in Turkish dönüşüm, such as regeneration, renewal, transformation, etc. Like their western colleagues, Turkish scholars use these terms, sometimes in an interchangeable fashion. This study uses the rather inclusive term redevelopment to describe both case studies examined. Finally, in this study, the numeric data collected (i.e. money, area, distance, etc.) are conveyed in their original measurement units (metric system and Turkish Lira- TRY) as reported. Both the Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümür case projects’ conception goes back as far as 2004. The yearly averages of TRY/US Dollar (USD) exchange rates from 2004 to the year the interviews were conducted, 2014, can be found in the table below (Table 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average rate (TRY/USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.69189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.737407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.699470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.766558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.777516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0.649245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.664201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.598368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.555506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.526435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.457677</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4. Validity assessments

Depending on their philosophical perspectives, some qualitative researchers reject the framework of validity that is commonly accepted in more quantitative research in the social sciences.\(^{72}\) They reject the assumption that there is a reality external to our perception of it. Consequently, it does not make sense to be concerned with the “truth” or “falsity” of an

\(^{72}\) For details of the validity debate in qualitative and quantitative research, see Newman and Benz (1998); also see Winter (2000).
observation with respect to an external reality, which is a primary concern of validity. These qualitative researchers argue for different standards for judging the quality of research.\textsuperscript{73}

For instance, Guba and Lincoln (1994) propose four criteria for judging the soundness of qualitative research and explicitly offer these as an alternative to more traditional quantitatively-oriented criteria.\textsuperscript{74} They argue that their four criteria, described below, better reflect the underlying assumptions involved in much qualitative research.

\textit{Internal validity: credibility}

The credibility assessment, which corresponds to internal validity, involves establishing that the results of qualitative research are credible or believable from the perspective of the participant in the research. Since from this perspective, the purpose of qualitative research is to describe or understand the phenomena of interest from the participant’s eyes, the participants are the only ones who can legitimately judge the credibility of the results.

Although the interview guide strives to provide an accurate reflection of power, the results may suffer to some extent from the inflated responses of the government officials, who may believe they have more power and decision-making input than, in fact, they do. This was the case in the competing claims of dominance of the MZI and KİPTAŞ officials, for instance. I attempted to overcome the resulting possible pitfalls by contrasting such claims as they were detected.

Another limitation may result from the differences in managerial level among the respondents from the same institution. For example, a deputy mayor, and the chief planner

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{73} For a detailed description of validity criteria in qualitative research, see Golafshani (2003), and Creswell and Miller (2000).}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{74} See Guba and Lincoln (1994).}
and a planner of the planning department of a municipality may perceive increasingly lower levels of institutional power due to the decreasing influence of their positions. The related intra-institution findings reveal hierarchy-related power distributions, and are mentioned in the case chapters as they appear, which also exposes notable political dynamics within and between different actor groups.

One potential limitation is the refusal of some of the subjects to be interviewed. These cases are conveyed in the research notes and challenges of the previous section. Also, the subjects may want to manipulate the findings by purposely omitting some facts or emphasizing or changing others for the benefit of their own and their institution’s reputation. For instance, the interviewees from the district municipalities may appear to be reluctant to discuss topics that have been subject to public debate and conflict (i.e. displacement in the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case or oppression cases of Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer). The amount of information received may be limited in such cases. One way to overcome such challenges was to thoroughly explain to the interviewees that the research was academic rather than journalistic. This hoped to allow them to expect the use of scientific approaches and analyses compared to possibly more subjective assessments of the non-academic accounts. During the analysis phase, triangulation of the responses of actors and actor groups was a sure way of covering the missing accounts and skewed facts.

External validity: transferability

Transferability refers to the degree to which the results of qualitative research can be generalized or transferred to other contexts or settings. From a qualitative perspective, transferability is primarily the responsibility of the person doing the generalizing. The qualitative researcher can enhance transferability by doing a thorough job of describing the research context and the assumptions that were central to each case. The person who wishes
to “transfer” the results to a different context is then responsible for making the judgment of how sensible the transfer is. In-depth analysis and thorough examination of both case projects were therefore essential to this study. The researcher conveyed the findings as they were suggested by the subjects, with an utmost attention for avoiding generalizations. Salient statements of subjects were relayed in quotation marks as they were relevant to the discussion at hand.

One limitation had to do with the political profile of the residents and NGO members. Those interviewed for Ayazma-Tepeüstü possess an anti-government political stance, and the residents are the so-called “victims” of redevelopment of Ayazma, whereas two of three residents and the NGO representative interviewed in Sümer neighborhood are supporters of the AKP, which was the political party in charge at central and local governments. Thus, the findings may suffer from confirmation bias from the subjects’ perspectives, as they may have tried to induce their political views in their personal experiences. In addition, despite recurring attempts, homeowners of Ayazma did not respond to my calls for interviews. All residents interviewed were former tenants of Ayazma except for Kasım Aydın, who, despite his homeowner status, rejected project agreements and stood by his fellow tenant neighbors to seek their housing rights. Two of the interviewees had foreseen this obstacle because, as they claimed, the former homeowners of Ayazma might have been subject to unfair allegations for their project involvement, so they had experienced considerable pressure. Thus, they would not want to face questions about or recall the events related to the project.

As mentioned above, in line with the snowball sampling method, all contacts referred to by subjects were attempted for contact and interviewing, and all contacts who accepted an interview were interviewed. Rejections happened by the so-called government-friendly residents or those who were happy with the redevelopment in Ayazma-Tepeüstü, whereas
there was no organized group of opposers in Sümer. In the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case, the government-friendly remarks were expressed by the government officials, so their opinions and those of the residents and NGOs interviewed were compared and contrasted. In the Sümer case, both political views (i.e. being for or against the AKP government) were represented by the interviewees from the institutions and local community. Throughout the analysis, which employed triangulation of sources, I sought to convey the contrasting views and remarks of all subjects of both persuasions in the most balanced and fair way possible.

Reliability: dependability

The traditional quantitative view of reliability is based on the assumption of replicability or repeatability. The idea of dependability, on the other hand, emphasizes the need for the researcher to account for the ever-changing context within which research occurs. From the environmental triangulation method’s perspective, if the findings remain the same under varying environmental conditions, then validity has been established.

It was explained above that in this study, environmental factors refer to two case projects, which offer comparable locational and contextual settings as well as description and views of the actor groups. The research describes the diverging aspects of and changes that occur in the case projects. The way I approached the study points at these differences in the detailed examination of the development of the cases, and in the comparison of cases. Thus, the study hopes to address the concerns of dependability through the use of the two methods of triangulation. The availability of sufficient secondary data (i.e. reports, books, booklets, maps, numbers offered by officials) has allowed for a reliable depiction of case projects. Finally, dissemination of the research results is another primary concern and aim of this study in order to increase the general dependability of the planning research around displacement, which is observed in the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case.
**Objectivity: confirmability**

Qualitative research tends to assume that each researcher brings a unique perspective to the study. Confirmability refers to the degree to which the results could be confirmed or corroborated by others. This chapter documents the scientific procedures for collecting, checking and analyzing the data. As a westernized female conducting the interviews, like the majority of female scholars in Turkey, I took the utmost care to maintain neutrality in appearance and tone during my interaction with the subjects in order not to influence their perceptions and responses. I sought to avoid relaying my own opinions to prevent any subjective remarks or confirmation bias. I have also actively searched for instances that contradicted prior observations, and described them in the following chapters as they appeared. Nevertheless, after the study, a repeat of conduct of a data audit that examines the data collection and analysis procedures may be useful to arrive at judgements about the potential for bias or distortion.

Lastly, and as already mentioned, although the Sümer redevelopment case has not received significant scholarly attention, the case of Ayazma-Tepeüstü has already been the subject of a considerable amount of scholarship. This may raise concerns about the confirmability of the results of the Sümer case in particular. However, a detailed reading of the existing scholarly works reveals that none of the previous scholarly inquiries approach the cases from the perspective of the actors and power dynamics involved in the decision-making process. Previous studies include information on actors and their dynamics of power but in a piecemeal fashion, without a detailed analysis of the issue. Therefore, dissemination of this research and encouragement of similar studies may help increase the confirmability of findings.
PART IV

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Chapter 5. Ayazma-Tepeüstü Redevelopment Case

The official title of the project, as it appeared in the project protocol signed in 2004, is “Istanbul Province, Küçükçekmece District, İkitelli Ayazma and Tepeüstü Urban Renewal Project.” Among the other names that the project is called, the short version most widely used by government institutions, the general public, and the media is the “Ayazma-Tepeüstü urban redevelopment project.” Although Ayazma and Tepeüstü are two separate neighborhoods in the northern part of the Küçükçekmece district, the project is also referred to as “the Ayazma project” because of the below-analyzed famous conflict that arose in Ayazma and gave the project nation-wide recognition. In this study, the second and third names are used as relevant and as cited by the interview subjects.

Küçükçekmece is an area where 90% of housing was informal (i.e. mostly occupied by gecekondu (squatter settlements) built without planning permission, and often lacking formal entitlements to property) as stated by the local municipality, MKI, which has taken gecekondu clearance as a main redevelopment agenda for over a decade. In particular, neighborhoods with low urban quality, such as Ayazma and Tepeüstü, were prone to public health concerns and socio-economic deprivation. In early 2000s Küçükçekmece was said to be a pilot case by the IMM that could demonstrate how such neighborhoods would be turned into livable places with increased property values that became the main drivers of the urban redevelopment process that was underway for Istanbul. The Ayazma-Tepeüstü urban redevelopment project was the first large-scale project of its kind in Turkey.

In fact, by the time that the keys for this housing development were being given to the new owners in 2006, municipal and central government authorities had drawn up plans for a massive escalation of the urban redevelopment program, going so far as to announce that ‘half of Istanbul’ would have to be pulled down. This development, the “project of the
century,” according to IMM Mayor Kadir Topbaş, was necessary, not just because of the risks associated with the anticipated next earthquake in the city, but, perhaps above all, in order for Istanbul “to rise up and shed its deformed and twisted image and become a world city.”

The Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment project covered a total of 33 ha, 20 ha of which composed Ayazma, and 13 ha Tepeüstü. Both neighborhoods were located to the north of the European Highway E-80 (TEM) lying on west-east axis, and separated by the İkitelli organized industrial zone (Figure 2). As elaborated in the following sections, most residents of these neighborhoods were transferred to a newly built social housing project in Bezirganbahçe, Halkalı, around 5 Kilometers (km) to the south of TEM.

*Figure 2. Ayazma, Tepeüstü, Bezirganbahçe and other important land uses within the former Küçükçekmece district border. Produced by the author, June 2016.*

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75 Cited by Aksoy (2012).
The advantages of the locations of Ayazma and Tepeüştü were mentioned multiple times by almost all interviewees who participated in the study. Both neighborhoods are valuable because of their location and because they are easily visible from surrounding major developments. They are adjacent to TEM, close to the exit that connects to the Atatürk International Airport, which is 13 km away. Tepeüştü, in particular, is in the corner of the exit intersection. The word tepeüştü means “hill top,” describing the topographic significance of the neighborhood. Ayazma’s significance came mainly from the Atatürk Olympics Stadium that was adjacent to the neighborhood’s west border. The metropolitan municipality had planned projects for an Olympics Village around the stadium. Although the Olympics Village project was not realized, it created speculation about whether the MKI would ‘clean up’ Ayazma and other surrounding lands near the stadium and transfer the land to the Prime Ministry’s TOKİ for development as high quality housing for rent and sale.

There were two main types of questionable development on both sites. Then MKI deputy mayor and project executive, Hüseyin Oflaz, stated that around 40% of Ayazma and 80% of Tepeüştü (943 units in total) was developed on land belonging to the State Treasury of the Ministry of Finance. This made it easy to label such residents as “illegal occupiers” as they held titles for neither the land nor the buildings on it. The residents on private land held joint-owned titles, which meant they had a share of the land, but did not hold building licenses because they lacked the consent of other shareholders. This state of affairs was the case especially in Ayazma and made such shareholders legally vulnerable. Their green-but-deprived outlook in such fair locations (Figure 3), an abundance of illegal housing on state-owned land, and marginal (and non-urban) activities such as animal breeding and farming on site made both neighborhoods open targets for initiation of district-wide redevelopment activity.
Figure 3. Ayazma before redevelopment in summer (top) and in winter (bottom). Reprinted from the TOKİ Redevelopment Office, 2014.

5.1. Development of the case

Symposium, initial survey, and site selection

On November 27-30, 2004, the MKI organized “The Symposium on International Urban Regeneration: Istanbul 2004” to bring together western and Turkish academics and government officials to discuss and derive lessons for redevelopment practices. The head organizer of the symposium and a former MKI mayoral advisor, Dr. Sırma Ramazanoğulları Turgut, explained that during the symposium the MKI organized field trips, conducted surveys (a field survey to reveal the physical condition of the land and buildings and a community
survey to reveal the residents’ profiles and expectations) and held workshops to generate rapid and tangible outcomes for Küçükçekmece’s urgent problems. Ayazma and Tepeüstü were determined in these activities to be two of the four most problematic neighborhoods. Their selection over other neighborhoods was mainly due to the location and land ownership factors detailed above. Other factors Dr. Turgut suggested were the lack of urban facilities (i.e. schools, community health centers), hardship in pedestrian access to nearby facilities due to highways, buildings built on river beds that posed a flood threat, and poor public health conditions.

Another hardship the residents suffered was their low income level. Most were blue collar workers with informal jobs that paid at or below the minimum wage, while some lived off of public assistance programs or the municipality’s food stamps. The MKI’s community survey revealed that some wanted to stay in their neighborhoods but could not afford the luxury housing their homes would be replaced with. Others preferred to live elsewhere, tired of poor living conditions. According to Oflaz, while there was a “marginal” portion who expressed a strong preference for staying and caused serious distress, the ratio of residents who wanted to move out of Ayazma and Tepeüstü was in fact quite high: up to 80% of women, tired of having to look after impoverished households, favored leaving the area (Oflaz did not know the rate of men who favored leaving).

Institutional partnership

Based on the physical and social structure data collected as well as lessons learned from foreign practices, Oflaz explained, the MKI, lacking the financial and organizational means to

76 The symposium was co-organized by the MKI and the Turkish Chamber of Urban Planners at the Lütfi Kirdar Convention and Exhibition Center in Istanbul. For more details of the symposium workshops on Ayazma and Tepeüstü see the book, The Symposium on International Urban Regeneration Istanbul 2004: Municipality of Küçükçekmece Workshop Study, edited by Özdemir, Pınar, and Turgut (2005).
redevelop an area that housed approximately 8,800 people living in 2071 vulnerable units in around 700 buildings, soon realized the necessity of establishing an inter-institutional partnership to accomplish the project. In the same year, 2004, an amendment to the TOKİ Law No. 2985 enabled TOKİ to perform urban redevelopment activities, which opened the way for local municipalities to realize large-scale redevelopment projects with the central government’s political and financial support. The MKİ thus started negotiations with TOKİ to partner in the project, which involved removal of gecekondus and unlicensed construction and the acquisition of relocation housing for the residents. Because Küçükçekmece, and thus the MKİ, was part of the IMM’s greater jurisdiction, the IMM was involved in the project scheme as well.

Formal negotiations and project formulation

As the MKİ’s planning supervisor active throughout the Ayazma-Tepeüstü project, Eda Çağrı Ceylan stated that in this three-tier partnership the local government and the MKİ played the role of the community representative who communicated residents’ expectations, TOKİ that of the central government representative who financed the project and thus had final say in decisions, and the IMM that of the aloof, informed monitor. As a result of a series of negotiations the three institutions—all controlled by the same political party, AKP, amicably formulated basic decision-making policy.

They decided that TOKİ would construct a public housing site in Bezirganbahçe, in the İstasyon Neighborhood, Halkalı, which was roughly 6 km from Ayazma and Tepeüstü. Gecekondu residents would have to be transferred outside their neighborhoods to make room

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77 The fifth amendment to the TOKİ Law No. 2985 made by the legislation No. 5162 on May 5, 2004, is that TOKİ has authority to realize urban redevelopment projects in both illegal housing areas and areas where existing urban redevelopment laws (laws no. 5366 and 5104) are applied. For more information, see Türk and Korthals Altes (2010).
for development that could benefit from the advantageous location and high value of the land. Ceylan recalled that initial rounds of decision-making, in line with the MKI’s vision for the area, called for the construction of a convention center in Tepeüstü and new housing in Ayazma. The first 1:5000 zoning plan and its corresponding 1:1000 implementation plan were prepared by the IMM and the MKI accordingly. The plan reports explicitly stated that some of the residential function of Ayazma would be allocated as public housing. The MKI even studied sketches for a public housing design in Ayazma. As elaborated below, these plans were later replaced with TOKİ’s plans, which enabled the gentrification of the area: a mixed use project, the Mall of Istanbul, in Tepeüstü, and a gated community project, My World, in Ayazma, which created a negative reputation for the project in the eyes of the local and larger public.

Prime Minister’s consent and protocol signing

After agreeing with TOKİ in principle and acquiring then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s consent78 to realize the project, Ceylan stated, the MKI publicly announced that the Ayazma and Tepeüstü neighborhoods would become redevelopment areas. Four days after the local municipal council gave its approval, TOKİ, the IMM and the MKI signed a joint protocol in Ankara on June 13, 2004.

The tasks and responsibilities of all three project parties were quite explicitly designated in the protocol. TOKİ was to obtain finance and build social housing for the local residents. The IMM was to ensure access to basic infrastructure (i.e. water, power and sewage systems)

78 The TOKİ Law’s aforementioned 2004 amendments lacked addressing legal foundation to initiate redevelopment projects. The Prime Minister’s official consent was the only way to allow these projects in the absence of compliance with other specific laws.
to the Ayazma, Tepeüştü and Bezirganbahçe sites for new construction. The MKI was to set up and maintain local organization.

As Ceylan and Birgül Sığınaksoy, director of the Plans and Projects Department of the MKI, reported, in July 2005, while formal negotiations were proceeding, the MKI contacted the residents again to determine roughly the number of people who desired to stay in the Ayazma area and move to Bezirganbahçe or other TOKİ-built public housing sites. This early census allowed TOKİ to determine the number of public housing blocks to be built. An activist and member of the Migrants’ Association for Social Cooperation, Istanbul (İstanbul Göç Edenler Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Kültür Derneği – Göç-Der from here on), Cihan Uzunçarşılı Baysal, claimed that it also created high expectations and speculation within the community, especially for those who did not want to be displaced.

*Bezirganbahçe public housing project*

According to Ceylan, TOKİ acquired the Bezirganbahçe land, which originally belonged to the State Treasury, in mid-2005.\(^79\) It was a vacant site that was protected from gecekondu development and previously occupied by a state vehicle inspection station. In 2005, TOKİ began the outsourced construction of the so-called Bezirganbahçe Public Housing Project (Figure 4). An executive interviewee from TOKİ’s Urban Redevelopment department, Banu Tantan, reported that the project consisted of 55 11-story buildings with a total of 2,640 apartments to house 5,000 residents. Only one unit type had two bedrooms in a 90 square meters (sqm) gross area. One unit was to be offered for each *gecekondu* on state land.

\(^79\) The fourth amendment to the TOKİ Law No. 2985 made by the legislation No. 5162 on May 5, 2004, is that TOKİ became authorized to take over the lands of public domain upon the proposal of relevant Minister and Minister of Finance and the approval of Prime Minister without charge. This authority means that TOKİ can use public domain lands primarily in order to develop projects. For more information, see Türk and Korthals Altes (2010).
regardless of its size. For the gecekondu on private lots, the homeowner’s title share was examined in order to offer the corresponding number of 90 sqm units. Construction was completed in 2007, which is the year in which Ayazma and Tepeüstü gecekondu were demolished. As Tantan explained, in exchange for offering the Bezirganbahçe public housing units to residents, TOKİ was to retrieve vacated Ayazma and Tepeüstü lots that were previously owned by both state and private entities.

![Figure 4. Bezirganbahçe public housing site. Photographs by the author, May 2014.](image)

Assessment of ‘rightful’ owners and units

While construction in Bezirganbahçe was under way, the Ayazma-Tepeüstü project was progressing as planned. Tantan stated that in line with the protocol, an assessment commission was formed, consisting of 4 members: two from the MKI, one from the IMM and one from TOKİ. As was common practice in similar gecekondu renewal projects in Turkey, the commission was first to determine the ‘rightful owners’ of the buildings according to the criteria set by TOKİ and the MKI. Then on-site assessments took place: The commission assessed the buildings of the rightful owners who were occupying the state-land to determine how many Bezirganbahçe units they corresponded to. Commission members also measured the buildings and title shares of the rightful owners of occupied private land to determine the

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80 The most crucial criterion for rightful owner status was evidence of residence in the neighborhood. This could be a utility bill addressed to the resident or a certificate of residence from the mukhtar’s office. Some of the residents who illegally resided in the neighborhood lacked these documents.
gross area the owners deserved in Bezirganbahçe. After the number of units due was determined, TOKİ-led formal negotiations, and designed a model for *gecekondu* allowances, down-payments, terms, and installments. The commission communicated the conditions to the residents in the hope that they would then sign deeds of consent.

The routine work of public relations, ‘rightful owner applications,’ site visits and unit measurement was carried out by a redevelopment office that the MKI established specifically for the project. The head executor of the redevelopment office, Ceylan, described other crucial duties of the office as to inform the residents about the projects and convince them to agree to settlements. The office was located outside the MKI building, on a frequently visited public square. Ceylan recalled that residents formed long lines in front of the office with their ‘rightful owner application’ documents proving their residence. They also paid frequent visits with numerous questions about the project and their individual outcomes. The office personnel consisted of informed planners, architects, and engineers from the MKI’s project team. Some site visits were organized merely to establish positive relationships with residents to ensure an easy agreement process. The MKI officials recalled the redevelopment office activities in the summer of 2005 as fruitful and fun, and to an extent Ceylan missed those days.

*Financial formulations*

Tantan reported that as financier of the public housing project and a non-profit developer that did not aim for any financial gain from the unit sales, TOKİ calculated unit prices based on land, construction and project costs. The resulting unit price for Bezirganbahçe was around TRY 51,000. Tantan relayed that Ayazma residents living on state-owned property objected to this sum based on financial hardship. The MKI communicated the community’s concern to the President of TOKİ, who brought the issue to the Prime Ministry.
Then Prime Minister Erdoğan used his right of initiative in favor of the community and announced a 10% discount. Multiple TOKİ and MKI officials interviewed stated that this incentive was politically motivated, seeking to assure a quick and trouble-free agreement process in the first large-scale gecekondu redevelopment project in Turkey.

There were other incentives offered, Tantan explained. TOKİ appraised each gecekondu unit on state-owned land in Ayazma at a flat price of TRY 10,000 regardless of its size, condition or location. This amount was considered a down-payment toward the Bezirganbahçe units. The remaining TRY 35-40,000 was termed for 15 years of fixed installments (TRY 200-250 per month) that were free of price-index based interest. If residents agreed to pay the unit price in advance, they were offered an additional 20% discount.

As Ceylan explained, for the rightful owners of Tepeüstü, all of whom owned gecekondu on state property, the offer was simple: one Bezirganbahçe unit in exchange of every unit they had in Tepeüstü. The rate of private ownership was higher in Ayazma. Those who had title deeds were excluded from the 10% discount. However, they were granted a particular privilege: they could obtain more than one unit if their houses in Ayazma had additions (e.g. coal cellar, extension for enlarged family, etc.). The MKI officials including Sığınaksoy and Ceylan argued that this offer was made because some of these Ayazma residents were much more willing to stay in their neighborhood. They could choose a unit from Bezirganbahçe or Çakmak, another public housing project that was later built by TOKİ in the Ayazma vicinity, if they paid the difference (in 15-year equal installments) between the value of the new units to be built there and the gecekondu they had vacated.

(Dis)agreements with rightful owners

According to the TOKİ and the MKI officials interviewed, most of the rightful owners (around 90%, according to Sığınaksoy) signed the deeds of consent and vacated their
gecekondu without any resistance. On September 15, 2006, TOKİ organized a lottery to distribute Bezirganbahçe units with a ceremony in the presence of the national media. Rightful owners submitted their keys to the MKI, who transported their household goods for free as another incentive. As a result, Tantan reported that starting in late 2006, a total of 943 households on state-owned land and around 300 households on private-owned land with either ownership type moved to Bezirganbahçe, and 608 households later moved to Çakmak. Vacated gecekondu were demolished by the MKI in line with municipality regulations of the zoning law No. 3194 (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Aerial view of Ayazma-Tepeüstü after most gecekondu were demolished. Reprinted from “Riding the storm: ‘new Istanbul,’” by A. Aksoy, 2012, City: analysis of urban trends, culture, theory, policy, action, 16(1-2), p. 96.

As mentioned above, these agreements were made with rightful owners. Tenants were initially regarded by the MKI as ‘rightful,’ but this position was ignored later in the project, which caused tenants to go through a long period of resistance. Residents, who despite the incentives opposed displacement, the agreement terms, and the intended gentrification of
the project were not treated amicably by the government, as described later in this chapter in detail. Some simply could not afford new housing despite the incentives, while others claimed that the assessment of *gecekondu* units was questionable because the commission had given more units to some than others for political reasons or as bribes. In addition, many families who moved to Beşirganbahrçe had serious troubles adapting to their new environs. Having left their simple houses with yards in Ayazma, households of 4.5-5 people had to live in 90-sqm units inside high-rise buildings, largely detached from their previous low-density rural lifestyle. These and other struggles are analyzed in detail in the sections below.

**Plan changes after transfers**

After the Ayazma and Tepeüstü lands were largely vacated, an intensive process of plan changes took place. Ceylan explained that the first 1:5000 zoning plan had been prepared by the IMM, followed by a conforming 1:1000 implementation plan by the MKI with low-density housing and convention center uses for Ayazma and Tepeüstü respectively. These were generated based on the urban design study specifically carried out for Ayazma and Tepeüstü by the Küçükçekmece work group of the IMM’s planning venture, the Istanbul Metropolitan Planning and Urban Design Center. Tantan argued that these plans were inefficient and had to be left aside. They were impossible to implement because the proposed expropriation rate was above the allowed 40%, which would have forced the government to pay private landowners for the excess expropriation portion.

TOKİ’s Planning and Development Department Manager of the Istanbul Region, Yavuz Çelik, explained that plan changes were kicked off with a change of the status of Ayazma and Tepeüstü to “*gecekondu* prevention zones” by initiatives of the President of TOKİ, dated May 8, 2007, and December 23, 2008. First, TOKİ enlarged the Ayazma urban redevelopment area to 139 ha to include the *gecekondu* to the north of Ayazma as sites for new public housing
Soon after that, a new set of 1:5000 and 1:000 plans were prepared concurrently by TOKİ based on the direct plan-making and approval power it had acquired in accordance with the Gecekondu Law No. 755 (Figure 7). These new plans suggested a decrease in expropriation rate and an increase in building density in housing zones. For instance, Tantan reported, for the area where Ayazma residents used to live, the new building height was now unlimited while the floor area ratio (FAR) was 2:1, which was many times higher than that of the original low-density settlement.

Figure 6. New urban redevelopment area of Ayazma as extended by TOKİ. Produced by the author, 2016.

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81 The third amendment to the TOKİ Law No. 2985 made by the legislation No. 5162 on May 5, 2004, TOKİ became authorized to make local physical plans for the areas where the property belonged to TOKİ and determined as housing development area or mass housing area. For more information, see Türk and Korthals Altes (2010).

82 Floor area ratio (FAR) (also known as floor space ratio, floor space index, site ratio and plot ratio) is the ratio of a building’s total floor area (gross floor area) to the size of the piece of land upon which it is built.
Çelik and Tantan stated that at the 1:1000 scale, TOKİ planners separated the privately owned lots to clarify the lot boundaries for actual implementation. Once both zoning and implementation plans were ready, TOKİ presented them to the IMM for its opinion and any revisions. The IMM supported the plans with few if any significant changes.
Çakmak public housing project

In order to appease opposing media and professional circles, as well as Ayazma’s rightful landowners who had demanded not to be displaced, TOKİ began construction of public housing at Çakmak in the extended Ayazma area, around 1 km to the north of the former Ayazma neighborhood (Figure 8). The first stage ended in 2009. Ali Kemal Topal, a technician of the Planning and Development department of TOKİ, explained that there were a total of 308 units in 7 blocks, all of which were to be allocated to Ayazma landowners (Figure 9). Since the construction quality of this project was higher than that of Bezirganbahçe, it was appraised with higher unit prices for both 2- and 3-bedroom apartments.

Figure 8. Çakmak blocks (left) and the My World gentrification project built in the former Ayazma neighborhood (right). Photograph by the author, May 2014.

Figure 9. Çakmak public housing site. Photographs by the author, May 2014.

Gentrification projects with private developers

Once both zoning and implementation plans had garnered the approval of TOKİ and other government institutions, Tantan stated, TOKİ sold the former-Ayazma and Tepeüstü lots to its
own Property and Housing Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) Company, which announced that it would open bidding on these lots.\(^{83}\) The Ağaoğlu REIT Co., or the so-called Ağaoğlu Group, known for their gentrification projects, won the bidding and acquired the Ayazma site to build the luxury housing project *My World* through a public-private partnership with TOKİ (Figure 10). Although financial details were not made explicit by its officials, TOKİ gained substantial profit from the newly built units via bidding contract and the partnership.

![Figure 10. My World housing project built on the Ayazma site. Photographs by the author, May 2014.](image)

Tantan continued that Tepeüstü, on the other hand, was sold to the Torunlar REIT Co., or the Torunlar Group, as land zoned for retail and tourism with a FAR of 2. The first round of bidding with 4-5 companies participating resulted in an offer of TRY 113 million, but this offer was rejected as too low by then TOKİ President Erdoğan Bayraktar. The Torunlar Group won

\(^{83}\) TOKİ has two real estate investment trusts (REITs) as affiliates, to which TOKİ may sell the retrieved lots for later bidding. REITs play important roles in TOKİ’s investment decisions and future programs. For more information, see Özdemir (2011).
the second bidding with TRY 177 million. Another plan change was made after the purchase: the FAR was increased to include basement floors. Torunlar built a high-end mixed-use complex, the Mall of Istanbul, with offices, luxury condos, and a shopping mall, which attract high-income groups today (Figure 11).

![Figure 11. Mall of Istanbul mixed-use project built on the Tepeüstü site. Photographs by the author, February 2016.](image)

Interviewees from TOKİ repeatedly argued that TOKİ had to generate funds from such high-yield private partnerships so that it could transfer profits to other projects, mainly public housing, in other parts of Turkey. Corresponding major project decisions were made at the top executive levels of TOKİ and the MKI, led by the TOKİ president. However, according to Ceylan, Dr. Turgut and Baysal, the resulting plan interventions and drastic changes in the redevelopment project outcomes put the MKI in a fairly difficult position with Ayazma-Tepeüstü residents and the greater public and media. Despite his relatively community-friendly attitude in the first stages of the redevelopment project, MKI Mayor Aziz Yeniay
suffered the greatest consequences as the local government head who had to be accountable to the public. Previous more community-friendly plan decisions and reports went to waste. Promises of preserving the low-density green fabric, and keeping the willing Ayazma residents in their neighborhood were not kept.

The latest plans and ongoing constructions

Five years after its initiation in 2004, the Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment project was mostly finalized. Tantan stated that while Tepeüstü was completely cleared of gecekondus by 2009, roughly 15% of the original gecekondus in Ayazma remained. In this local government election year (2009) the Turkish parliament decided to reshape jurisdiction of some districts of Istanbul. The area north of the TEM highway, including Ayazma and Tepeüstü, now lies within the borders of the newly established Municipality of Başakşehir, Istanbul (MBI). Despite the loss of northern Küçükçekmece, which contained a large concentration of AKP voters, Yeniay was reelected in Küçükçekmece, albeit with a lower margin of victory. Ceylan argued that because of the relatively negative reputation of the project and TOKİ’s dominance over it, the MBI did not take over the project protocol. As Tantan confirmed, later Çakmak construction phases and the unit allocation of public housing sites to approximately 200 remaining titleholders in Ayazma were carried out by TOKİ alone.

Topal reported that as it settled agreements with the remaining rightful owners and took over their private lots, TOKİ made changes to the 1:5000 and 1:1000 plans in order to dispose the land once more. More recent plans for Çakmak, dated March 30, 2011, were drawn to include two more stages of construction (Figure 12). The second stage, consisting of 300 units

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84 The number of districts of Istanbul was increased from 32 to 39. The Başakşehir district consisted of 6 neighborhoods of Küçükçekmece (including Ayazma), and 4 neighborhoods of the Esenler and Bahçeşehir districts. Despite the decrease in the number of neighborhoods, Küçükçekmece remained as the second most populated district of Istanbul with over 550 thousand inhabitants.
in 7 blocks, was finished in 2012, while the third stage, consisting of 377 units in 8 blocks, was completed in 2014. To allocate these units TOKİ continued to perform a value-based assessment of the rightful owners’ property (i.e. considering the footage, building age, construction type, etc.). As before, the price assessed was considered down-payment toward a Çakmak unit and the remaining balance was split into 15-year monthly installments starting from the move-in date.

While new allocations were under way even after 2009, it was found by the MKİ and TOKİ officials that the majority of formerly transferred residents (in particular those who used to live on state-owned lots in Ayazma) had sold their Bezirganbahçe units and moved out. Neither of these institutions followed up with the residents after their transfer; the reasons for their moves were therefore not explicitly known. Tantan, speculated that they earned income by selling their unit for a high value that doubled up in a couple of years: TRY 80,000 for the TRY 40,000 they acquired it. Other subjects interviewed, including activists and members of NGOs, claimed that despite the Prime Ministry and TOKİ incentives, the residents could not afford the installments because they continued to live under poverty line. It was also mentioned that the Ayazma residents in particular left because they could not adapt to the new lifestyle imposed on them in Bezirganbahçe.
Figure 12. Stages of TOKİ Çakmak neighborhood public housing project on the 1:2000 layout plan (Legend- yellow: remaining buildings; light pink: 1st stage (308 units); dark pink: 2nd stage (300 units); red: 3rd stage (377 units); grey: demolished buildings). Reprinted from TOKİ Istanbul Redevelopment Office, retrieved in April 2014.
5.1.1. Bizim Halka social empowerment program

Initial engagement and founding

Indeed, as previously discussed, Ayazma residents’ adaptation problems were the result of several historically-rooted problems: lack of education, social exclusion due to ethnic and political minority status, a non-urban community profile (rural lifestyle), unemployment, and so on. The MKI, with the help of Dr. Turgut from YTU’s planning department, who worked as Mayor Yeniay’s advisor and project coordinator over the course of the redevelopment, had foreseen the potential problems the community would have after their transfer to the drastically different environment of Bezirganbahçe. Dr. Turgut was also one of the managing organizers of the 2004 Küçükçekmece symposium and had developed good relations with all levels of the MKI planning team. In late 2005, she convinced the Mayor to plan a social empowerment project and establish a project office shortly before the residents started to move to Bezirganbahçe. Mayor Yeniay supported the idea, as he realized and claimed that urban redevelopment had not only a physical planning dimension but also a social one. The project was called *Bizim Halka.* It had a logo, agenda, and publicity plan and an office opened in a Bezirganbahçe unit in early 2006.

Ceylan explained that the office had 6 full-time personnel from a variety of expertise areas: two sociologists, one psychologist, one preschool teacher and two administrative staff. They were supervised directly by the MKI’s planning supervisor Ceylan and overseen in general by Dr. Turgut. All experts had been previously engaged in on-site practices that included disadvantaged groups and harsh physical conditions. For instance, the psychologist specialized

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85 The name *Bizim Halka* has two interpretations because of the word “halka.” *Bizim Halka* means either “our circle” or “to our community.”
in treating disabled and troubled children. This helped to establish a good communication base with Ayazma residents.

Projects, activities and agencies

Dr. Turgut explained the program activities in detail. The *Bizim Halka* program was designed as a totally voluntary initiative for contributing institutions and the community. It was a hub for small projects under four main categories: employment, education, distribution of information, and personal development. The program targeted mainly women, because they were the ones who most suffered from the conditions while men were away in social and work life. The majority of Kurdish women were illiterate, and some spoke only Kurdish. Mainly engaged in child-raising, they did not know the world outside Ayazma.

The projects offered numerous free services in different areas: literacy, family planning, children education, dental screening, breast cancer screening, psychological support for women and adolescents, domestic violence counseling, crime awareness, city trips, vocational training and recruitment, and so on. The community’s education and health care were provided on-site. For vocational and recruitment projects and those for children and youth, the MKI provided EU grants. Other services were provided by roughly 40 international, national and local voluntary agencies attracted through *Bizim Halka*’s outreach network.86

Based on the needs that arose, the MKI’s project team designed and arranged for TOKİ to build pro bono a so-called Social Communication Center next to the primary school adjacent

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86 Some of the contributing institutions are Mother Child Education Foundation of Turkey (Anne Çocuk Eğitim Vakfı - AÇEV), The Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habitats (Türkiye Erozyonla Mücadele, Ağaçlandırma ve Doğal Varlıklar Koruma Vakfı - TEMA), The Turkish Foundation for Education Volunteers (Türkiye Eğitim Gönüllüleri Vakfı - TEGEV), the IMM Courses for Arts and Occupational Education (İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Sanat ve Meslek Eğitim Kursları - İSMEK), Sakıp Sabancı Museum, Istanbul Chamber of Dentists, numerous universities, UNICEF, and World Bank. For more information on the volunteer institutions and the program activities, see Turgut and Ceylan (2012).
to Bezirganbahçe. Apart from spaces for educational training and health screenings, the center had a library, Internet access points, an infant care room, a kindergarten/nursery, and a room for casual gatherings. In particular the daycare served a crucial function for women who were not used to being away from their infants and small children during their 200-hour planned trainings.

Problems and closing

Despite the positive efforts of the MKI and all contributors, Dr. Turgut admitted, the Bizim Halka program faced crucial challenges. The biggest issue was that neither training nor recruitment projects could attract considerable attendance from the community. Residents were reluctant to take the employment opportunities offered by the MKI. They would not sign up for vocational courses or left the jobs they took soon after they started. Dr. Turgut stated that she did not know the reasons for this trend. However, another interviewee who actively witnessed and organized the residents’ rights struggle, Baysal, bitterly criticized the organization’s vocational efforts. She claimed that many of the jobs offered to the willing residents, such as administrative assistant positions, required a high school degree while high school graduates made up only 1.5% of the Ayazma population. Many people who took jobs had to leave soon after because employers would refuse to register them for social insurance or fire them before the six-month threshold for insurance obligation. Others left the excessively-heavy-duty jobs they started because of inadequate wages. Baysal also argued that most of the time the vocational training did not target real needs of the residents: for instance, some merely taught how to pose or sit in a job interview. There were condescending trainings, too, such as “how to live in an apartment building” which stirred residents’ resentment against the program. Out of hundreds of multi-child households targeted, there were only around 20 children who attended the daycare.
Perhaps more effective in bringing a halt to the program in the later stages of the redevelopment project were two factors suggested by Ceylan and Baysal. First, the construction quality of the public housing projects was very low. Soon after Ayazma residents moved to their units, when the buildings were not even a year old, several physical problems were observed: leaking roofs, displaced walls, pipes and interior equipment (e.g. window frames, door knobs). Second, news of the gentrification of their neighborhood and of the tenant conflict arose, which created mistrust toward the MKI. The greatly increasing complaints made the redevelopment project vulnerable to heavy criticism from media and academic circles, damaging of the MKI’s immense effort to succeed in general. The social concerns and projects of Bizim Halka were the first to be ignored while residents had ‘tangible’ problems on their plate and weak confidence in their local government.

Ceylan recalled that the program office was closed in 2009 and its ongoing projects were cancelled with little notice. Deeply disappointed in the failure of her project and the direction of the redevelopment project, Dr. Turgut stopped working for the MKI soon after the closure.

5.1.2. ‘Rightful’ tenants’ struggle for housing rights

Starting point

In 2004 when the MKI was publicizing the project after the protocol signing, Mayor Yeniay distributed a public letter to the residents with an explicit promise: “From gecekondu owners to tenants, a solution will be offered to all one by one” (Figure 13). Baysal argued that the perceived violation of this pledge was what ignited the Ayazma residents’ resistance. Their project participation applications to the redevelopment office and the assessment
commission were rejected, although they had been told early in the project that they were ‘rightful.’

Figure 13. Invitation letter of Mayor Yeniay on letterhead with logos of the project protocol’s three institutions. Reprinted from Ayazma Victims (p. 6), author and year unknown.
In fact, as confirmed by all interviewees, the involvement of tenants in the project was not an explicitly stated goal in either the project protocol or in TOKİ’s agenda. Redevelopment projects in Turkey traditionally have not involved tenants or observed their rights. By default, TOKİ simply had not planned to allocate new housing to both the owner and tenant of an existing unit. The MKI’s initial community-friendly approach, however, caused distress not only between the formal actors and the community, but also among the formal actors themselves, as outlined in this section and analyzed in detail in succeeding sections.

Development of resistance

The most detailed account of the tenants’ struggle was related by former Ayazma resident and community representative Kasım Aydı̇n. He stated that initially there were 256 tenant families in Ayazma. After observing the early agreements and demolitions around them, a lot of these families moved elsewhere (probably to other *gecekondu* areas in Istanbul or hometowns in Anatolia). Others stayed in Ayazma, because they were paying a very low monthly rent (TRY 50-120), were unable to find equally cheap accommodation elsewhere, or held out the hope of moving into the new houses to be built on the site. Citing Yeniay’s early words and holding the written promise in their hands, these tenants paid numerous visits to the MKI and TOKİ offices to claim their housing rights. They were generally denied admittance with an unpleasant attitude. In MKI and TOKİ officials’ words, they became “insurgents.”

Aydı̇n and Baysal recalled that a number of other neighborhood associations and activist groups, including professionals, academics and students, were drawn to support the residents’ campaign and publicize the provocative words and actions of the authorities. By that time the tenants’ *gecekondu* had been bulldozed, but a group of activists (led by Baysal and the NGOs Urbanism Movement of the Society, Istanbul (İMECE Toplumun Şehircilik Hareketi – İMECE
from here on [İMECE, meaning Self-Help]) and Bir Umut [meaning One Hope]) still remained on site to help tenants and draw the attention and support of outsiders. 42 families endured in tents and barracks amidst the ruins (Figure 14). Aydın stated that eventually, after the authorities (mainly MKI officials with city and state police) demolished these shacks repeatedly by force, 24 families gave up, but 18 families remained on site, in appalling conditions, for almost two years.

Figure 14. The lives of the resisting 18 families left in Ayazma. Reprinted from Ayazma Victims (p. 11), author and year unknown.

The ties of the 18 families with other neighborhood organizations and groups became stronger. With the guidance and support of these outside groups, Aydın and his friends organized a petition in central Küçükçekmece to attract public attention and support (Figure 15). They contacted the AKP members of parliament and the media: the most useful contacts proved to be the AKP Members of Parliament (MPs) from Istanbul and some of the media channels. As a result, the final demolition raid attracted media coverage and roused ‘outsider’ public sympathy. Aydın and other residents interviewed stated that in response to
the nationalized news broadcasts recounting the families’ victimization, Mayor Yeniay and the president of TOKİ promised to find a solution. Mayor Yeniay made this promise during a live television broadcast with tenants from the area.

*Figure 15.* Petition for public support. The banner reads: “Children should not suffer in cold in Ayazma. Give a signature here!” Reprinted from *Ayazma Victims* (p. 10), author and year unknown.

**Negotiations with tenants**

Thanks to Baysal, Aydın and other volunteer residents, with the involvement of AKP MPs and the media as well as the formal parties of the project, the struggle was carried to Ankara. Prime Minister Erdoğan and the AKP’s central organization called for a halt to speculation. At the local level, the MKI, in particular mayor Yeniay, strongly urged TOKİ to give housing to the 18 families. Baysal argued that they feared the growing tension could shrink their voting base and perhaps escalate the conflict to an armed one, which they had faced in the past in some smaller cases in Turkey.

Tantan explained that TOKİ was then building a grand public housing site in Kayabaşı, 10 km to the north of Ayazma (Figure 16). The construction quality of this project was higher than that of Bezirganbahçe, she argued, so instead of the usual lottery method they used to
distribute the units, TOKİ decided to offer the 18 families smaller basement-level units with less favorable payment conditions than in Bezirganbahçe. As interviewees from both TOKİ and the MKİ openly stated, they obviously did not want to “reward” insurgent tenants with both better units and more favorable conditions.

When TOKİ made the Kayabaşı public housing offer the tenants, equipped with organizing skills and support, and represented by Aydın, turned it down and asked that all 243 tenant families are included in the offer. They also did not give in to the Mayor’s more moderate approach of granting incremental incentives such as moving and rent allowances until the completion of Kayabaşı. Eventually TOKİ was convinced to accept the tenants’ conditions and promised Kayabaşı units for all. This time, Aydın recalled, the tenants asked for written proof of the offer for their 243-person list and the allowances. Having attained that goal, they objected to the TRY 10-15,000 down-payment and sued TOKİ when it insisted. However, all residents interviewed admitted that they could not wait for the court case to end. Two years
was a long enough time to live in tents and barracks through harsh winters and unfair conditions. Babies were born in tents, children fell behind their school, and people got sick. They could not resist anymore.

Result and consequences

Tantan stated that TOKİ was able to reach 130 of 243 families and give them new Kayabaşı housing in 2010. Financial details were not made explicit by TOKİ officials based on the fact that unit prices differed in Kayabaşı according to several features. ‘Rightful’ tenants had to pay the aforementioned down-payment. The remainder was termed for 15 years of installments increasing every six months, unlike the equal installments offered to Bezirganbahçe residents.

Another condition TOKİ introduced in Kayabaşı was the prohibition of sales or rent until the debt was paid in full. Tantan argued that TOKİ imposed this in order to protect other potential or actual owners’ rights. TOKİ had already appraised the units at a much lower price than their market value (for instance, TRY 70,000 for TRY 100-120,000 actual value).

Overall, conditions did not change much. Despite various groups’ offers of support, a grassroots movement was not developed, and the displaced Ayazma residents had to accept their displacement as a fait accompli. In some respects, as the residents interviewed claimed, the living conditions in the TOKİ apartment buildings in Kayabaşı to which they were relocated were worse than in Ayazma: many discovered that they could not afford to live there after all. They guessed that more than one-third of those who moved in had left their public housing homes by mid-2014. Social exclusion in both Bezirganbahçe and Kayabaşı estates seemed to be worsening and the tension between Kurdish and Turkish residents was often evident. In the end, as Baysal and the resident admitted, in the Ayazma-Tepeüştü case,
the authorities succeeded in achieving their development goals despite the suffering that some titleholders and tenants had to go through.

5.2. Actor structure

5.2.1. Actors in decision-making

The primary actors of the decision-making scheme naturally emerged from the protocol: TOKİ, the IMM, and the MKI. The protocol, upon Prime Minister’s authorization for the redevelopment area and project, was addressed multiple times by various institutions as the main source guiding the overall tasks and responsibilities of the project, including establishing the expertise commissions and appointing the commission members from each of the main three actors. These actors led the redevelopment scheme.

The Prime Ministry

As a public legal entity affiliated with the Prime Ministry, TOKİ is closely tied to this position, as its operations require the consent of the Prime Minister. Ali Seydi Karaoğlu, the head of the Istanbul Real Estate and Operations Department of TOKİ, stated that this requirement was a very important determinant, which assured that both central and local governments would carry out then Prime Minister Erdoğan’s decision. When asked about the role of the Prime Ministry in the project’s decision-making, Dr. Turgut hesitantly laughed and pointed at the voice recorder. When asked if she wanted to continue the interview off the record, she said that it would not be a problem, but she mentioned only that after the national press questioned the well-being of the residents, mainly tenants, who reportedly suffered displacement, it was the Prime Minister who slowed down the process and eventually
granted remission of down-payments. She reported that she found the press response constructive in said decision-making.

**TOKİ (Housing Development Administration, Turkey)**

In fact, Dr. Turgut saw TOKİ and the Prime Ministry as a single actor: “Together, they were not even 1.25. They were one. This unity is the main channel of all.” Inside TOKİ’s organizational structure, Tantan reported, senior executives were the active decision-makers. In particular, in preparing the protocol, Erdoğan Bayraktar, the president of TOKİ, actively collaborated with the mayors of the IMM and the MKİ. “They made all the decisions. We were merely executors.” The President mandated necessary tasks and responsibilities to the Istanbul Department’s project team. Their technical and legal opinions were solicited for specific articles of the protocol, but the President made the final decisions. The MKİ’s Sığınaksoy, on the other hand, highlighted the weight of TOKİ in decisions, characterizing the MKİ mostly as the operator during the project. Ceylan also asserted that TOKİ had no role in direct operations, especially after vacating residents from the Ayazma neighborhood. Because the MKİ executed day-to-day operations, it was the on-site decision-maker, while TOKİ stepped in to take over the vacant land and perform its property transfer and construction on land dedicated to public housing. TOKİ also participated in the lottery of public housing units and the situation of the right holders in their new TOKİ units in Beşirganbahçe, Çakmak and Kayabaşı. At TOKİ, while project decisions were mostly made by the president and head of departments of the Istanbul branch, main units that were in charge of execution of the redevelopment project were Istanbul branch’s Urban Redevelopment, and Planning and Development departments.
The MKI (Municipality of Küçükçekmece, Istanbul)

Sığınaksoy said that although TOKİ was more involved in the senior decision-making, the MKI and TOKİ worked together in local decisions, for which Dr. Turgut advised the MKI a great deal. Sığınaksoy also stated that, while the primary role of the MKI was overseeing day-to-day activities, it would be fair to view the MKI as much of a decision-making actor as TOKİ. Mayor and deputy mayor were primarily involved in making decisions as well as overseeing the operations that were carried out by the Urban Redevelopment and Plans and Projects departments, and the urban redevelopment office established specifically for the Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment project.

The IMM (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality)

As mentioned earlier, most interviewees from all institutions described the IMM as a party that provided basic infrastructure to the project site and had minimal impact in the actual project operations. Ceylan stated that the IMM was involved in the project as a representative of the “central government” in Istanbul and expected to be informed of formulative and executive processes, as the 1:5000 development plans of the project required its approval. Therefore, the IMM is not mentioned in the project booklets of the MKI except in the mention of the protocol signing. However, Karaoğlu, who was a senior executive of TOKİ and the Ayazma project, stated that the IMM definitely held influence over decision-making. “They have influence. They steer us. When we work together, we work more productively.” He also mentioned that the mayor of the IMM, Dr. Kadir Topbaş, was a visionary who as an architect displayed a special sensitivity to the urban fabric of Istanbul.

Ceylan highlighted the hierarchical structure of the decision-making mechanism when addressing the IMM’s role. Other than being the party that approved the local development plans of the project, the IMM had to be present to assure inter-institutional relations. The MKI
is one of 39 cities under the IMM’s jurisdiction; therefore “the MKI would not want to make a decision without the IMM’s knowledge. That would certainly have a political impact on Aziz Yeniay and Dr. Kadir Topbaş,” who are the MKI and IMM mayors, respectively. Dr. Turgut supported the strategic presence of the IMM in the initial decision-making process. She was critical of the fact that the IMM did not have a mediating or scientifically steering role, as it should have according to its mission. Rather, the IMM acted as “an aloof elder brother who kept his centralist position did not get his hands dirty” due to possible conflicts in the decision-making process.

Local community

Oflaz stated that in the beginning of the project, a group of 7-8 representatives emerged among the local homeowners of Ayazma. Although he did not mention the representatives’ names, he called them “opinion leaders,” as they did not establish a formal organization. When asked whether there were any conflicts with this group, both Ceylan and Dr. Turgut emphasized that the group did not cause any tension or armed conflict, interpreting the word “conflict” as a physical confrontation. They recalled the relations with the representatives as well adjusted and friendly until, Dr. Turgut added, “the crisis of the transfer of insurgent tenants.” She was referring in particular to the 18 tenant households who struggled against the MKI and TOKİ to claim their housing rights. These households were represented by a small group of residents led by Kasım Aydın who was an unemployed father of three at that time. In time, although he was a homeowner in Ayazma, Aydın not only became the face of the community, but also visited the AKP affiliates in the parliament in Ankara a few times to claim his tenant friends’ housing rights.
Activists and NGOs

There were also supporting actors on the local community’s side. Although she was a representative of Göç-Der at the time, Baysal was mostly involved as an individual housing rights advocate for the community, in particular tenants. İMECE is a non-profit that consisted mostly of planning activists, graduate students and recent graduates who also supported tenants in their 2-year resistance. When conditions became more volatile during later stages of the project, these activists aided the community in its involvement with the Küçükçekmece Platform, an informal gathering that brought together all interested local groups and nonprofit organizations to perform community advocacy against gentrification and non-democratic transformations in the city of Küçükçekmece. The Bir Umut Association, which mainly provides legal support for redevelopment victims, engaged in the Ayazma tenants’ struggle through the Platform. Kurşuncu, a doctoral student of planning and a member of İMECE, mentioned the possibility of intermittent involvement of mostly leftist political parties and/or groups, but she said she did not know for certain as İMECE became involved in the local support in the later years of the project. When asked about the possibility of any formal or illegal political groups, Çelik stated that it would not be right to talk about such groups or affiliate them with the project. He said such groups “are totally politically driven and evil-minded,” so he did not recognize them.

Indirect actors

Technically, the Yıldız Technical University, Istanbul (YTU) was not involved in the decision-making process. The MKI officials stated that they relied heavily on the counsel of Dr. Turgut, an assistant professor in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at YTU at the time, who mostly contributed to the social planning of the project. Mayor Yeniay became familiar with Dr. Turgut during the 2004 urban regeneration symposium she organized in
Küçükçekmece and appointed her as his advisor the same year. As a professor in one of the leading planning schools of Istanbul and advisor to the mayor, Dr. Turgut mainly monitored the transformation of the city, in particular in Ayazma. She contributed to the overall coordination of the project during its first few years via weekly meetings that monitored day-to-day activities. She also oversaw the physical strategic plan for Küçükçekmece that defined the city’s spatial development and high level strategies. She also initiated and managed the social empowerment program of the Ayazma redevelopment scheme, *Bizim Halka*, which was abandoned in 2010, the year she stepped down from her advisory position.

All interviewees who addressed the question of private sector actors denied the involvement of any private institutions. The common understanding was that both the decision-making and operations of the redevelopment project were undertaken by public sector actors. As financier of the public housing projects, TOKİ outsourced their construction to private development firms; however, these firms did not produce any project decisions for Ayazma and Tepeüstü. After the transfer of state-controlled National Treasury land in Ayazma and Tepeüstü to TOKİ, TOKİ sold the Tepeüstü land to Torunlar Corporate Group, and the Ayazma land to Ağaoğlu Corporate Group. Both firms are major luxury housing and mixed development and construction groups in Turkey, and are known for their proximity to government and disputes with grassroots activists. However, both TOKİ subcontractors and these development groups were not considered as decision-making actors in the process. On a remarkable note, none of the formal interviewees of the research provided any further information about these firms when answering the in-depth open-ended questions.

Dr. Turgut stated that some notable planning scholars and planning schools in Istanbul were informed and mentioned their support for the project after the 2004 urban redevelopment symposium was held in the city; however, the later processes that involved
displacement, tenant conflict, and the Ağaoğlu and Torunlar engagements drove them away. She thought that the national press may have been another indirect actor that affected the tenants’ rights process toward the end of the Ayazma case, but she did not choose to define its impact as positive or negative.

5.2.2. Actors in project execution

There was a clear distribution of tasks and responsibilities in the project protocol signed by TOKİ, the IMM, and the MKI. These institutions were identified as main actors by multiple interviewees of different managerial levels and institutions. In line with the protocol, IMM undertook the basic infrastructure work (power, water, sewage, and a nearby stream remediation); TOKİ and the MKI executed design and planning; the MKI worked to organize residents and sign agreements with them; and TOKİ conducted the public housing construction and contributed to project organization. Ceylan, who was the MKI’s supervising planner for the project at the time, stated that the project was a multi-scale government collaboration and that the private sector was not involved in the decision-making. The community was informed, but not involved in a formal participation framework.

When asked, the interviewees all responded that the MKI and TOKİ had executed the project and repeatedly reported that the IMM was not an active executor of the redevelopment project. Rather, it collaborated in its upper-scale formulation and in signing the protocol. Dr. Turgut, planning professor at YTU and the mayoral advisor who consulted on the project, stated that the IMM was indirectly involved through its planning corporation Boğaziçi Construction and Consultancy Co. (Boğaziçi Peyzaj İnşaat Müşavirlik Teknik Hizmetler San. Tic. A.Ş. – BİMTAŞ from here on). Except Dr. Ülger, BİMTAŞ was not mentioned any further in Ayazma-Tepeüstü Redevelopment Project by any of the research
subjects due to TOKİ’s precedence in producing physical design and planning—a situation that was repeated in the Sümer case.

Ceylan claimed that almost all real-time operations were carried out by the MKI, whereas TOKİ only financed the construction of public housing and oversaw the subcontractor of the constructions. “The MKI did everything from transferring the residents to conducting the social project... the whole process.” Sığınaksoy, who was the Director of the Plans and Projects Department, praised MKI’s performance and in particular the voluntary overtime of energetic recent graduates on its planning team. In particular, male team members were on site, persuading residents in person to trust the project, sign the agreements and vacate their homes. She emphasized trust as a vital factor in the project process. However, after the city’s borders changed prior to the local government elections in 2009, TOKİ had to commit to direct community affairs, Tantan explained, as the later local government, MBI, did not take over the protocol.

5.2.3. Dominant actors

The united power of public actors

There was a tendency to view the Prime Ministry as an absolute power that directed not only TOKİ, but also the IMM and MKI. TOKİ, being the closest party to Prime Minister, related the guidance of the Prime Minister’s office to local government. As Dr. Turgut put it, “It is out of question to disconnect these government institutions. Whatever is needed to be said, it comes from the top like a lightsaber.” She also mentioned that even if the local municipality tried to resist with what little power it had, its will was considered subordinate.

87 In science fiction, lightsaber is a sword whose blade is in the form of a laser or powerful beam of plasma, as used by characters in the Star Wars films.
Kurşuncu stated that while the MKI may have been the weakest link because of its lower position in the public hierarchy, these powers, in fact, could not compete with or defeat each other: they were one large entity backed by the immense power of laws that they could enact or amend as they wished. Operating with immense legal and financial power, they acted all together to cause an inequitable governing mechanism. On the other hand, Çelik claimed that decisions were made at the highest executive levels (i.e. the TOKİ president, mayors, and their deputies), so he was not knowledgeable enough to address their decision-making affairs.

**TOKİ**

Sığınaksoy viewed TOKİ as the most dominant party, and stated that the MKI mainly served as a buffer between TOKİ and the residents. During negotiations on behalf of tenants, Baysal reported that Mayor Yeniay of the MKI told her that final decisions were always made by TOKİ, and that they did everything they could to help out the tenants, but TOKİ President Bayraktar had final say. Baysal was not sure if the mayor’s words were simply an excuse. Yeniay even gave Baysal the names of certain government officials in Ankara and asked her to call them to seek help in saving the tenants from the communal tent they lived in; the usual response she received on the phone was to direct her to TOKİ. She believed TOKİ was the nodal point. In response, Çelik asserted that TOKİ provided the financial and legal sources for the project, so it had a responsibility to monitor and inspect the local government’s activity.

**The MKI**

The MKI was the main actor that led the operations to a conclusion, according to Çelik. Oflaz, who was the deputy mayor at the time, confirmed that the MKI had a bigger say in the project’s general decision-making, in part because the MKI represented the local community,
and in part because the MKI organized the project and took on the burden of persuading the right owners to sign deeds of consent.

Resisting community

When asked to assess the relative power of the community, Kurşuncu from İMECE stated that the capabilities of local residents were measured by their ability to self-organize, and that their success in decision-making was therefore dependent upon their will to stick together. She further stated that they were even more powerful when they collaborated with community organizers such as Baysal, İMECE, Bir Umut, and other neighborhood organizations. When standing together in solidarity, the chances of achieving their demands were higher, as in the case of tenant housing claims.

5.3. Institutional policies and goals

Removal of gecekondus

The goal most repeated by the public actors connected to the Ayazma-Tepeüstü project was the realization of more livable settlements for the local community. TOKİ head of Istanbul operations Karaoğlu framed their utmost concern as being able to provide the citizens with quality homes under reasonable payment conditions. This motive was in line with TOKİ’s nation-wide urban redevelopment target of producing 500,000 high-quality housing units and reshaping cities as healthy, livable environments that were free of unlicensed development and gecekondus. Oflaz and Sığınaksoy mirrored this goal in the MKI’s vision for Küçükçekmece. Ceylan, however, stated that the only intention of the Ayazma project when it was initiated in 2004-2005 was to remove gecekondus from these empty and undeveloped areas. Ayazma’s loose infrastructure and transportation connections to the more
developed part of the city south of the TEM highway were the main cause for its deprivation. Ironically, despite the earthquake threat that involved all Istanbul, she claimed that earthquakes were never considered to be a big concern for Ayazma, as the *gecekondu* were low rise buildings in yards, apart from each other, and that the areas south of the highway had more cause for alarm.

*Facilitation of the MKI’s redevelopment vision*

For Tantan and Çelik, both serving in managerial positions at TOKİ, supporting the MKI was another goal. Their support was two-fold: financial, including expropriation and eviction compensations for displacement of residents, and legal, accelerating the local zoning process that is assigned to TOKİ under TOKİ Law No. 2985. This arrangement cemented TOKİ’s overseeing role, leaving interactions with the community to local government. Oflaz admitted that in order to realize the long-desired redevelopment of Ayazma and Tepeüstü, the MKI had to collaborate with the central government due to its scarce resources in these two arenas. Ceylan further claimed that this somewhat compulsory situation involved including major development companies in freeing up lands, but that their involvement was not the initial intention of the MKI.

*Economic profit*

On the other hand, officials of the MKI stated that the vacation of Ayazma and Tepeüstü sites and the transfer of the community elsewhere were their two starting points, a redevelopment model that the MKI sought from the beginning. While Tepeüstü, a smaller area, was initially intended to be a convention center, Ayazma was too valuable to dedicate to public facilities.
Ceylan believed it would be unfair to overlook the value potential of these areas. By 2004, the surrounding vicinities, such as Sazlıdere and Kayabaşı, were undeveloped and held great financial potential. She posed the question: “Is it possible to find empty development land in Istanbul now? Then there were these areas. It was almost like a joke to design and plan on vacant land. That is what we did in college!” In particular, vacating Ayazma was a crucial part of the process, as its rent potential increased more and more with surrounding development. For one, it was close to the E-5, the historic main east-west arterial highway of Istanbul, and international Atatürk International Airport, one of two airports of Istanbul at the time. Second and perhaps more importantly, an Olympics Stadium had recently been built very close by. Baysal quotes Aziz Yeniay in a speech he gave when he was elected as mayor of Küçükçekmece in 2004: “Above all, [Ayazma] is within the earshot of the Olympics Stadium. The sledge hammer will therefore first hit the gecekondu around the stadium.” Baysal asserted that Yeniay kept his promise to wipe out “the place of ugliness and hot bed of terrorism” that would be on exposition to foreigners during international mega events. Yeniay was a very determined person, who shared the metropolitan and national governments’ ideals of making Istanbul a competing European metropolis in accordance with Istanbul’s title of the 2010 European Capital of Culture. She further claimed that the mayor Küçükçekmece should have been concerned with the well-being of his poor communities rather than their eradication.

When asked what the main redevelopment policy for the Ayazma project was, Karaoğlu began by saying, “Our goal in redevelopment is not to provide rent for anyone.” One possible reason behind this impetus may be based on TOKİ’s financing policies. In cases like Ayazma, TOKİ makes high profit through selling the transferred development site, which is later channeled toward producing public housing projects. However, Baysal suspected that TOKİ also profited through the formalization of illegal settlements in which displaced residents are
transferred to public housing for which they have to pay. Kurşuncu, in turn, claimed that the
government did not necessarily make an inequitable profit but rather scored cheap political
points by sustaining the housing sector’s continuity and recruiting from the private
development sector. Dr. Turgut stated that she had come to question all dimensions of the
project after private circles became involved in the process. She thought that when the
project first started, its intentions were very innocent; she, together with the MKI, believed
that there was a concrete solution to problems of the area, although they knew that finding
such a solution would not be easy. Then the situation, however, proved more complicated:
because political actors directed the process, it became difficult to decipher the intentions
underlying decisions, intentions which she thinks must have been linked to important political
motives. She did not think it her place to attempt to interpret these motives either and so
could not reach an objective judgment.

Displacement of ethnic-political groups

As mentioned earlier in Mayor Yeniay’s words as relayed by Baysal, one of the motives of
the project was to clear Ayazma from the left-wing political groups that it housed. Baysal
claimed that this tactic was typical of the conservative AKP when dealing with opposing, in
particular Kurdish, communities such as Ayazma: dissolving solidarity and togetherness
through displacement. She quoted one Ayazma resident: “We have become nuclear
individuals,” meaning that residents felt isolated and unable to collaborate as a group. She
also claimed that having to earn and pay TOKİ mortgage payments “tamed” the residents,
who now had greater income struggles, and that residents had lost their neighborhood
relations in the new high-rises. Baysal surmised that as a result of this systematic process the
residents’ opposition power had been dissipated and asserted that the mayor’s “terrorist”
discourse was a way to legitimize the ruling party’s projects of “modernizing” and “civilizing”
Baysal quoted Yeniay again from an off-the-record meeting she had with him during the tenant conflict: “We have offered them apartments they would have not even imagined they could have. We don’t care; we did them a favor.”

5.4. Factors affecting decision-making

5.4.1. Legal factors

Gecekondu status of former settlements

According to managers from both TOKİ and the MKI who were interviewed, the illegal status of gecekondu on public property was the main factor that led to the realization of the redevelopment project. These officials were not necessarily friendly to the gecekondu community, whom they viewed as unlawfully and unrightfully exploiting public land. Yet Sığınaksoy explained that they sought the community’s benefit: “We had so many [legal] tools at hand to evict those people very easily. . . But that was not the case. In the end, they are people. We tried to adapt them to city life.” The legal tools that Sığınaksoy mentioned are mainly based on the Gecekondu Law No. 775. According to article 73 of this law, the municipality can demolish the gecekondu buildings and their additions, sometimes even on the day of the eviction notice or without any notice at all. This stipulation applies to unlicensed gecekondus that are built on both legal and illegal properties. Sığınaksoy emphasized that despite the power accorded by the law, they preferred not to use this tool due to the “social catastrophe” it would create.

88 For more information, see the UN-HABITAT Advisory Group on Forced Eviction (AGFE) Mission to Istanbul’s Report to the Executive Directors of the UN-HABITAT Program at http://mirror.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/10008_1_593995.pdf (retrieved in February 2016).
Instead, the project coordinators offered *gecekondu* residents the opportunity to claim public housing. Sığınaksoy recalled their communication with the residents: “All in all, you cannot claim anything legal here. We are trying to help you. We don’t want to throw you in the street. These are the most convenient conditions according to your situation. Come, brother, sign this [deed of consent]. You have no other choice.” Most of the residents yielded to this approach. Deeds were signed on a “voluntary basis,” as Sığınaksoy described it. Residents packed up their belongings and submitted their *gecekondu* keys; the MKI shipped furniture to their new homes and demolished their former houses. The ones who resisted were simply evicted by law. She added that though the project was perhaps not fully successful, even a 10% success rate for transferring particular groups to public housing projects was a great success.

*TOKİ’s public land transfer and plan-making powers*

One main reason for Ayazma’s selection for redevelopment was the concentration of public lands in the vicinity. An amendment to the *TOKİ* Law enabled *TOKİ* to take over Ayazma, the project site, and many other surrounding empty lots under the control of the Treasury department for free. This proved a major boon in cutting down project costs. As Çelik put it, had *TOKİ* not been involved in the project, the MKI would have had to buy the land, an undertaking for which it did not have the resources, and that *TOKİ*’s involvement enabled public housing to be built on land acquired outside of the Ayazma and Tepeüstü project sites and for the *gecekondu* residents to be transferred to the new affordable housing sites. Regarding the no-cost land transfer, Tantan defended her institution: “But *TOKİ* does this for the community. No one did anything illegitimate. *TOKİ* gave it back to the community.”
TOKİ also possessed legal tools within the zoning process. In the conventional planning process the metropolitan municipality first prepares the 1:5000 zoning plan, then presents it for public opinion. After the 1:5000 plan is taken down, the local municipality produces the 1:1000 implementation plan, which is sent first to the local municipal council, then to the metropolitan municipal council—if it is a designated metropolitan area—for approval. This process can take several months before the implementation plan goes into effect and on-site implementation begins. However, as explained earlier, based on the TOKİ law, TOKİ can make 1:5000 and 1:1000 plans directly for public housing projects. This arrangement accelerates the overall pace of the project to the benefit of both central and local governments and private subcontractors.

5.4.2. Political factors

Top-down political impositions

As examined earlier in this chapter, TOKİ’s involvement in the redevelopment project required the consent of the Prime Minister for the project’s realization, consent which, as Prime Minister Erdoğan was favorably disposed toward the project, was not difficult to acquire. Later Erdoğan’s positive opinion also allowed his consent for the removal of the requirement of a 10% down-payment for TOKİ’s public housing units due to financial difficulty of the residents. The removal decision was made solely and directly by Erdoğan, who used his executive power to push through project changes.

Dr. Turgut thought that in general, these two powerhouses were enough to exert control over the project’s decision-making and implementation, and that the resulting top-down approach was “very dogmatic.” For instance, while executing several projects simultaneously, the Prime Minister or TOKİ could decide to transfer funds from one project to another in the
case of a deficit. This arrangement does not translate to a transparent and accountable governing process. Dr. Turgut asserted that based on the legal powers, Prime Minister and TOKİ are closely tied; they are the absolute power: “You cannot object to them. You have to make overtures to them [or ingratiate yourself into their favor].” On the other hand, Çelik did not agree with this assessment and stood for his institution. He thought that TOKİ’s legally equipped power was not political, noting that all TOKİ officials were merely government employees who performed their assigned planning and construction duties. He suggested that relatively speculative questions around site selection, displacement and consent issues be posed to the elected local government.

As is to be expected in a project whose initiation depends on the consent of a political office, the project was largely shaped by political concerns. The decisions in the preparation phase that led to signing of the project protocol were entirely negotiated and made by top executives of TOKİ, the IMM and the MKI. Despite its municipal nature, the IMM acted as a central government agent that did not embrace its own city government, Küçükçekmece, but monitored it to make sure central government goals were met. There was no legal power that equipped the MKI to decide for the project by itself.

During the later implementation phases, MKI’s experienced bureaucrats such as Sığınaksoy continued to rationalize local project actions on legal grounds in line with the politically driven overall goals, Ceylan reported. Dr. Turgut added that this phase became more and more politically charged and complicated, although it appeared innocent and transparent at first. Eventually, she came to suspect every phase and aspect of the project. She believed it was not easy—or even correct—to try to understand and reveal the underlying motives due to security concerns. However, she briefly described how TOKİ transferred the Ayazma site to the Ağaoğlu Group, who gentrified it for high-income groups. She claimed that
process was totally out of control of the local government, and that she personally had no knowledge of this decision.

Following the local government elections of 2009, party politics intervened in the MKI’s operations, although Mayor Yeniay was reelected and stayed in power representing the AKP. Many qualified personnel of the MKI, including those worked in the Ayazma project, were replaced with less skilled officials introduced by the AKP’s city organization. Dr. Turgut claimed that Mayor Yeniay parted with his ambitions and beliefs for the project after increasingly losing control of his management. In 2010, Dr. Turgut left her advisory position because she could not make herself heard nor represent the positive aspects of the project in planning academia any more.

Sustaining political success and image

Ayazma-Tepeüstü was the first large-scale gecekondu renewal project of the AKP government. It would be a flagship project that served as a model for subsequent redevelopment projects. The success of the project was therefore of crucial importance to the government. Kurşuncu believed that government prestige, though never directly mentioned, was an important concern for the AKP in general.

Tantan linked certain project incentives that emerged later in the process to these concerns, such as the 10% discount and housing grants to tenants. She claimed that redevelopment depended on communities’ volunteerism, without which TOKİ would have to coercively displace the community. One factor that contributed to the aforementioned tenants struggle was Yeniay’s pledge to make them rightful owners when the project was presented to public for the first time. To keep his promise, Yeniay stood by tenants in negotiations with TOKİ and the Prime Ministry. On one hand, he had to sustain his image of a strong mayor who abided by his word to his community, which had already gotten in the way
and delayed the project for two years. On the other hand, central and local governments had to act in accordance for the sake of party solidarity. Hence incentives were offered to homeowners and tenants, despite the fact that Tantan openly stated that neither group, tenants in particular, deserved such accommodation. Had not the residents been somehow persuaded, had they caused a bigger conflict, the project’s success would have been jeopardized.

On the MKI’s defense, Ceylan argued that Yeniay was indeed a community-friendly mayor and a good manager. The MKI’s project team consisted of skilled planners, architects, social profile experts, and even a press secretary. Considering the many other redevelopment projects in Istanbul that were not completed, the Ayazma project owed its success in part to the dynamic team that was formed thanks to Yeniay’s ambitions and vision. However, Baysal interpreted Yeniay’s ambitions as merely egocentric. She argued that he had no other choice but to maneuver toward “his people,” particularly after the national press coverage of the tenant conflict.

Party unanimity at central and local levels

Despite the tenant conflict that arose between the local and central governments, interviewees from all institutions repeatedly stated that the project’s execution was a success thanks to the party unanimity. All protocol parties shared a similar vision and thus acted in accord to realize the project quickly and efficiently. The MKI benefited from TOKİ’s legal and financial power. In turn, TOKİ left most on-site work (i.e., negotiations, acquiring deeds of consent, site clearing) to the MKI, and concentrated on marketing the emptied Ayazma and Tepeüstü to private developers. However, Karaoğlu denied that this collaboration was due to political homogeneity, arguing that TOKİ supported the municipalities of all
political parties that showed a good redevelopment vision and professional competence. He advocated TOKİ’s mission at a national level: “It is all a matter of patriotism.”

Çelik not only agreed with Karaoğlu based on examples of successful TOKİ and opposition party collaborations in projects in Istanbul, but also argued that party unanimity could in fact yield negative consequences. He observed that working with other party institutions provided a sense of freedom and flexibility because municipal officials of the same party could ask for more incentives or try to steer TOKİ’s operations from top party management through political alliance. This point, in fact, is reflected in the tenant conflict in the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case from an alternative viewpoint.

Electoral concerns

Just as with the issue of party cohesion, there were opposing views on whether a community’s voting power was a significant factor in government actors’ decision-making. The concerns discussed above regarding sustained political success and image (i.e., project completion, housing acquisition, and fulfillment of promises) were among the main subjects of discussion. No matter how powerful the government was, both Baysal and TOKİ’s Tantan believed that politicians did not desire confrontation with local communities, because that might have eroded their voter base. However, Çelik firmly rejected the possibility of the selection of Ayazma and Tepeüstü because of the AKP voter base in these areas. He recalled that TOKİ President Erdoğan Bayraktar explicitly denied that TOKİ was politically biased in its site selection, offering examples of opposition party partnerships such as similar housing projects both in Çorlu in Tekirdağ and in Sarıyer and Kartal in Istanbul.

Dr. Turgut observed that Yeniay’s successful image and the increased quality of transferred residents’ lives reflected positively on the 2009 local government elections. She also pointed out the fact that the MKİ stopped another redevelopment project, İç-Diş Kumsal,
due to serious reactions they received from Küçükçekmece residents as evidence of electoral concerns. In the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case, however, most homeowners were successfully transferred to public housing. Sığınaksoy and Ceylan backed the MKI team’s overall stance for its sincere intentions of providing housing to their citizens and increasing their quality of life, in other words, “social municipalism” advocacy. Ceylan quoted Yeniay on this: “We lose [elections] if need be.”

Dr. Turgut claimed that there were many children who were now very happy to sleep in a bedroom with a window and women to have a home with a kitchen and running water. She believed Yeniay was considered successful by the community and that the AKP’s votes thus showed a great decline when he withdrew from running in 2014. Kurşuncu argued that overall, the relative success of the project made up for the suffering of victimized rightful owners and that the unjust suffering thus did not have any effect on local elections. In the end, there were only 18 households involved in the tenant conflict. However, with the recent realization of Ağaoğlu’s gentrification project, My World, in Ayazma and the colossal mall, Mall of Istanbul, built in Tepeüstü, the Küçükçekmece community may soon come to understand the economic rent side of the redevelopment project and express their disapproval in future elections.

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89 İç-Dış Kumsal, which can be translated in full name to English as the “Küçükçekmece Internal-External Urban Transformation Project,” was opened to an international design competition by the IMM and won by the world-renowned Malaysian architect Ken Yeang’s team. Dr. Turgut argued that the Turkish planning academia made an effort to involve the local public in finalization of Yeang’s project, but the local government’s reaction to any involvement was truly uncompromising. For more information on Yeang’s project, see http://www.ibb.gov.tr/en-US/Pages/Haber.aspx?NewsID=8 (retrieved in June 2016).

90 When Aziz Yeniay was elected as the Küçükçekmece mayor for the first time in 2004, the AKP received 47% of the Küçükçekmece votes. This figure was 44% in the 2009 local elections when he was reelected. The AKP votes dropped to 18% in the 2014 local elections without Yeniay’s candidacy, although the AKP still won the district.
Kurdish identity and Kurdish politics

Clearing left-wing political groups from Ayazma to dissolve solidarity and togetherness through displacement was one of the project goals discussed earlier in this chapter. The majority of the Ayazma population were Kurds who immigrated from eastern Turkey, in particular Siirt, after 1980s. Ceylan confirmed the history of political tensions between these groups and the conservative Islamic and neoliberal government in Ayazma. She defined Ayazma as a hub where all social and political negativities had gathered: very low education and income levels, unemployment, and a shared non-governmental drive. The locals' opposition to the government was driven by the historic Kurdish movement in the east that the Turkish state had been fighting since the early 1990s. The conservative, nationalist majority, both in government and in the nation at large, regard the Kurds as a population to be suppressed and assimilated; and so bringing Kurdish groups to heel has had a prominent place in the AKP agenda at central and local levels since it came to power in 2002. Baysal quoted TOKİ officials and Yeniay on their stance: “They either learn to live like humans in Bezirganbahçe, or they go elsewhere. We don’t care.”

Baysal and Dr. Turgut come from different political ideologies: leftist and nationalist, respectively. Dr. Turgut took offense to Baysal’s “pro-Kurdish” criticism that Baysal expressed in articles published in national press. She claimed there were unspoken details on this topic. She pointed at the voice recorder, but continued that the Municipality of Diyarbakır, which was a heavily Kurdish populated city in eastern Turkey known for its Kurdish sympathies, sent food and clothing support to the tenant insurgents living in tents in Ayazma on a weekly basis. She claimed that Kurdish activist Osman Baydemir91 organized the deliveries with the

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91 Osman Baydemir is a Kurdish politician, lawyer and human rights activist in Turkey. He is the current mayor of his home town of Diyarbakir and member of the Peace and Democracy Party that seeks Kurdish rights.
Chairman of the Turkish Chamber of Urban Planners of the time, Tarık Şengül, who was also an advisor of Baydemir. She found this support humanitarian but questionable. She added that this issue was tied to the greater national Kurdish problem, which could not easily be solved even by the central government.

5.4.3. Financial factors

Construction-dependent national economic policy

According to the members of the community and activists interviewed, the ultimate goal of TOKİ’s national housing policy was not to produce public housing for low-income populations. Kurşuncu argued that TOKİ’s public housing agenda was driven by the AKP government’s economic growth and employment policy, which depended on supporting the construction sector in Turkey. Ayazma was one of the regions favorable to this agenda for its high land value. The government did not necessarily gain economic rent from it; it had to bring jobs and profit to the development sector. The government also achieved political rent from the public and the private sectors through outsourcing construction and development tasks and the public housing programs it produced to obtain sustainability.

TOKİ’s financial provider role and economic gains

TOKİ’s financial superiority was a major factor in its decision-making power. TOKİ acquired the Ayazma, Tepeüstü and Bezirganbahçe lands at no cost, covered the eviction costs of residents, and financed the construction of 1640 public housing units to be transferred to residents, all of which enabled the realization of a project that the MKİ could not have completed otherwise. Tantan stated that TOKİ always undertook project formulation from a financial standpoint, because it had to retrieve their investments: land revenue for land costs, or unit revenue for construction costs. She explained that technical experts
conducted cost analysis—including project, land and construction costs—and calculated the unit cost of the housing project. In the Bezirganbahçe project, the unit cost was around TRY 50,000, which was demanded from the rightful owners. Later, Prime Minister Erdoğan used his initiative to subsidize 10% of this price because they could not afford it. This was an exceptional action that was done for the benefit of the community at the expense of the government.

The earlier section on institutional policies and goals revealed contradictory claims around whether TOKİ sought profit. Ayazma and Tepeüstü were the revenue generating sites of TOKİ, whereas Bezirganbahçe was the public housing site. Çelik argued that this was how TOKİ was able to generate revenue to realize affordable housing for low-income population. Oflaz, who was an AKP bureaucrat of the MKİ, stated that due to the income that it generated from land bidding for upper-class housing, TOKİ gained roughly 3-4 times its investment in the project. In addition, Baysal claimed that TOKİ profited from the formalization of illegal settlements too by having residents pay for the public housing units they were transferred to.

When asked if TOKİ made any profit from the project, Tantan replied: “We made profit here. We made a lot of profit here.” When asked how much, she first said she did not know, but then admitted that she did not want to mention numbers to avoid any speculation and conflict.

**Marketing opportunity of the site**

That the locations of both the Ayazma and Tepeüstü sites were advantageous due to their proximity to main transportation arteries, the Atatürk International Airport, and the Olympics Stadium—a major factor in the selection of the sites—was examined in an earlier section. The resulting profit was shared by TOKİ and the bidders, the Ağaoğlu and Torunlar development groups, who won the Ayazma and Tepeüstü biddings, respectively. Ağaoğlu built *My World* in
Ayazma, which drew major criticism from the public and national media, as in the case of many other luxury housing projects the corporation develops in Istanbul and other major cities in Turkey. It was speculated that Ağaoğlu marketed their project units with ease and sold all of them before the construction was finalized. According to unconfirmed information by one resident, the majority of the purchases were made by Arabs who were enticed to invest in Turkey by the AKP government with which Ali Ağaoğlu, founder and CEO of Ağaoğlu, is known to be close. After acquiring the land, Torunlar acquired a zoning change for Tepeüstü and developed a high-end mixed-use complex, the Mall of Istanbul, with retail and office units that attracted high-income groups.

*Profit seeking through market competition*

For the reasons elaborated above, TOKİ was easily able to capitalize on Ayazma and Tepeüstü properties. This was TOKİ’s leading objective for acquiring the land from the Treasury. In order to increase their value, TOKİ also encouraged gentrification on these sites, and marketed gentrification projects to capital holders other than the Ağaoğlu and Torunlar Groups to attract additional capital to buy surrounding lands for other high-income housing projects. TOKİ benefited from this in three ways. First, through market interest and competition, TOKİ was able to increase the bidding margins to generate a higher profit from the liquidation of project sites. Second, by increasing land value through market competition, TOKİ secured a higher gain from other public lands it would acquire in the future at no cost. Third, by pulling in many other development projects, TOKİ helped to fulfill the government’s greater economic policy to bring jobs and profit to the private development sector.

Dr. Turgut summarized the market competition process after TOKİ started the land speculation: “It goes so fast. Someone buys a lot closer to a project site, then another buys the adjacent lot. The one down from that lot goes to another. They profit one by one.” She
claimed that the AKP got votes not only from the poor, but also from these capital holders. The process established a web of landowners, investors, businessmen and industrialists, commissioners, and promoters. Dr. Turgut, who did not realize that Ağaoğlu was in direct contact with the MKI, whispered the TOKİ President’s name in the following quote: “This is orchestrated by Erdoğan Bayraktar. When they say ‘You get this, you get that, you get the other one,’ as a local municipality you try to capture some of the benefits, because you see billion-dollar investments rising everywhere so rapidly. These are splendid projects. This is the cost of saying ‘I am a part of this market.’” She added that in this setting, no one would observe planning principles and standards such as preserving the forests in northern Istanbul; if a mayor was to do that, he or she would pay the price, perhaps as Yeniay did when he was excluded from the 2009 local elections.

5.4.4. Institutional factors

Lack of competitiveness

When asked how they would assess the level and context of competitiveness between formal actors, all interviewees reported that there was no competition at all throughout the project’s term. Tantan emphasized close relationship between Mayor Yeniay and TOKİ President Bayraktar, and stated that all parties were in accord. Both central and local governments were careful about reaching consensus because they shared common political interests. She noted that Bayraktar did not react negatively while Yeniay promoted the redevelopment project widely through the media. Oflaz added that in the project presentations of the MKI, protocol parties were given equal weight, and that the project execution followed the protocol terms.
Institutional accordance and coordination

As noted earlier, the formal actors successfully coordinated throughout the project decision-making and implementation. Both TOKİ and MKI officials were pleased with their own and each other’s institutional performances despite the aforementioned political frictions. The protocol-driven expertise commission that consisted of members from each of the main three actors worked in harmony during the assessment process of the rightful owners’ units. Çelik noted that TOKİ mostly monitored the assessments and the MKI’s other on-site activities. As a consequence of the project risks and liabilities, TOKİ had to make sure that the MKI carried out operations correctly.

Dr. Turgut attributed the MKI’s success in project implementation and completion partially to its organizational structure. The MKI had a research and development department directly tied to the Mayor’s office and managed by a planner, Deputy Mayor Hüseyin Oflaz. Yeniay’s openness to scientific knowledge and new ideas as well as his reliance on planning principles enabled the success of the project. As his advisor, Dr. Turgut was content that Yeniay acknowledged that her influence led to the social empowerment project *Bizim Halka*. In addition, Sığınaksoy emphasized the hard work of the planning team, who established a trust between the MKI and the local community by being available and approachable during negotiations with residents, without which the project would not have been completed.

Political frictions at government levels

Despite the relatively positive picture conveyed above, there were serious consequences of inter-institutional conflicts and their effects on the project’s decision-making. Ceylan reportedly mentioned that Yeniay saw his promise to the tenants as a major mistake in his political career because of the tensions that arose between him and TOKİ and the IMM. His opposition ran contrary to the AKP’s wishes and put the government in a difficult position,
even though TOKİ was the more powerful entity that owned the public housing properties and financed the entire project.

Another political factor in decision-making that Dr. Turgut mentioned was regarding the career potential of Yeniay, who had been successful in promoting Küçükçekmece as a “rising star” in Istanbul and could have been a favorable metropolitan mayoral candidate. According to Dr. Turgut, the upper party organization in both Istanbul and Ankara, hostile to this idea, decided to “breathe down his neck.” The Prime Minister did not directly deal with the local mayor: the AKP’s province and district organizations confronted him. Yeniay’s reputation as a smart man with years of public sector experience and political wisdom was seen as a threat. For these reasons and because of the aforementioned top-down political impositions, Yeniay was weakened. He did not run for the next local elections in 2014, although the AKP won in Küçükçekmece again with a majority of votes.

5.5. Informed conflicts

5.5.1. Between formal actors

When asked to list any conflicts that occurred between formal actors of the project other than the community—TOKİ, the IMM, the MKI—most subjects, like Karaoğlu, claimed that there had not been any conflict at all. They might have associated the word “conflict” with a fight or an armed response, so they refrained from confirming any coercive conflict with a firm “no.” Only Oflaz and Ceylan from the MKI defined a couple of ‘soft conflicts’ as described below.
Transfer of residents

Oflaz claimed that during the initial project decision-making, the most significant conflict between the formal actors concerned whether or not the residents would be transferred. The parties to this conflict were mainly TOKİ and the MKI; the IMM did not take on a major role in the discussions. The MKI, going beyond the role of mere facilitator, acted as the voice of community. Oflaz claimed that it coordinated the whole project; that it was, in fact, the owner of the project. The MKI officials wanted to conduct the project in a way that kept willing residents in the area and transferred ones who wanted to move out. There were numerous discussions concerning this suggestion between TOKİ and the MKI. The transfer area was already planned as Bezirganbahçe, which was around 10 miles from Ayazma. The MKI conducted a survey of how many residents wanted to stay and how many wanted to transfer. As a result of negotiations, TOKİ and the MKI decided to build on-site public housing blocks for the interested residents. In the end, TOKİ was convinced to initially build seven 10- and 13-story apartment buildings in an empty site relatively adjacent to Ayazma. According to Oflaz, these blocks were built on-site, but Baysal claimed that they were nowhere close to the original site that the residents lived in. In fact, the Çakmak neighborhood is roughly 1 km from the Ağaoğlu Group’s My World luxury housing development.

Once decided to construct these additional public housing buildings, TOKİ did not express any dissatisfaction regarding the project execution. The residents were offered two cost options: one for staying in the area, and another for transferring to Bezirganbahçe. The former was considerably higher due to the location’s aforementioned advantages and better construction standards. The latter, however, did not require any additional down-payment from the residents: their former gecekondu buildings automatically served as down-payment in most cases. Oflaz stated that because they did not want to pay extra for the on-site option, most residents moved to Bezirganbahçe. However, “interestingly enough,” half of the
transferred residents sold their new homes and moved out. He preferred not to analyze the reason for this trend.

**Value assessment for gecekondu**s

When deciding on how much each gecekondu was worth in order to determine compensation for titleholders, the MKI argued for an assessment procedure that would place high value on them in favor of the community, whereas TOKİ tried to lower the estimates. Oflaz said that the MKI did not want the community to suffer or be mistreated. There was not a formal real estate appraisal mechanism at that time in Turkey to which the consortium could outsource this task. The three main actors—TOKİ, the IMM, and the MKI—formed a commission to assess the value of each building, formed by officials of each of the three parties.

The commission undertook a value-based assessment, instead of an area-based one. It reviewed building location, age and condition, construction material, and any physical additions. According to Oflaz, unlike TOKİ, which favored the easier and more conservative method of area-based assessment, local opinion leaders were very happy with this method, which estimated higher values than the area-based approach. He viewed this as a victory for the MKI in speaking for the community.

**Design and planning**

Ceylan reported that the process of plan revisions stirred some conflict between TOKİ and the initial redevelopment vision of the MKI. When it became involved in the project scheme,

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92 As opposed to the area-based model which calculates the value of a unit based only on its area measurements, the value-based model takes into consideration the distinctive unit aspects, or intangible qualities, such as the location, orientation, age and condition of the building, and floor of the unit.
TOKİ acquired plan-making power for the project site in accordance with the TOKİ Law. Once it gained ownership of the redevelopment site and conducted the Bezirganbahçe public housing project, TOKİ altered the pre-existing zoning arrangement to allow for new uses. Instead of using the MKI’s initial plans for a public housing project, TOKİ gave the Ayazma land to the Ağaoğlu Group, which rendered the initial planning decisions irrelevant and led to an uprise of the local community. Oflaz admitted that the local “opinion leaders,” meaning the community representatives, were not involved in the decision-making of the three main actors. He claimed that these representatives were not knowledgeable enough to express a working formal opinion on the planning process. They were only asked if they wanted to stay on site or move out, if they demanded new homes, how many rooms they wanted in their new homes, etc.

5.5.2. Between formal actors and community

Interviewees were also asked to define any conflicts that arose with the community. They were then asked to analyze in detail one prevailing conflict with its informed parties, how they were informed, if there was any facilitator, their institution’s stance, and factors affecting the resulting decision. It was remarkable that interviewees were keener to discuss conflicts with the community than those between formal actors. This might be the case because the centralized power relations between formal actors allowed conflicts to be processed in a more closed setting.

Designation of new units to rightful owners

Apart from value assessment for each gecekondu unit, the rightful owners were entitled to have one unit for each unit they owned or occupied on site. Karaoğlu claimed that the “vigilante” residents demanded more units than they actually had. In some cases tenants and
owners both claimed the same unit. In others, there was more than one household that claimed a particular gecekondu because both had co-occupied it at one point in time. Sığınaksoy added that some residents built additions to their gecekondu overnight to claim one more unit. Karaoğlu thought that these disputes were a natural consequence of the owner-free (illegal) status of the land, but that the protocol parties successfully overcame these conflicts and neither treated any rightful owner unjustly nor unduly rewarded any opportunist, thanks to their experience and common sense. The value assessment commission, composed of officials from TOKİ, the IMM, and the MKİ, was in charge of deciding on such conflicts when there was a complaint or objection. Sığınaksoy recalled the commission work as very tiring at times: “We sometimes became overwhelmed because there were just too many objections. We had to go back to the site and assess some units over and over again.” Ceylan thought that though it was impossible to satisfy every single need, the commission did its best to reach optimum solutions.

Regarding this issue, Baysal reiterated that the most victimized group was the tenants. The commission work mostly covered homeowners’ petitions and ignored tenants’ rights completely until tenants won their right to housing. She believed that in fact all groups (i.e. homeowners, tenants, retail owners and tenants, other occupants) were denied proper housing rights because they were all displaced and forced to live in housing conditions that were worse than what they had in Ayazma. Another group she highlighted were retail owners. There were only a few small businesses that satisfied daily grocery or clothing needs of the community; Baysal claimed that the project victimized these businesses by ignoring them completely and excluding them from any sort of negotiations or offers.
Financial hardship of residents

The poverty of the Ayazma community was repeatedly acknowledged by all subjects, including the residents themselves. Recalling the Prime Ministry’s 10% down-payment exemption, Sığınaksoy claimed and laughed, “Despite all the patronage, some people even claimed they could not even pay 5 Kuruş.”93 She later added that some residents in fact could not afford any payment at all, while some refused to pay hoping that they could get away with payments with government resolutions/exemptions they expected in the future. Ceylan explained how the MKI’s recruitment efforts regarding the residents failed: “We created employment by finding jobs for them through İTKİB94 and KOSGEB95. We found them jobs. They alleged the pay was low, the shuttle stop was far. They did not go! Instead, they waited in the long lines of municipality’s White Desk96 to receive food with their stamps. We asked them: ‘Brother, we found you a job. Why don’t you go work instead of begging for food here?’ No answer. That drove me crazy.” She suggested that this phenomenon deserved further examination for these special groups.

Regarding the government incentives and displacement of residents, Baysal claimed that due to their financial hardship, all residents who moved to Bezirganbahçe either had already been forced or would eventually be forced into insolvency because they could not afford the monthly payments on their new units. Some tenants had already been excluded from the opportunity for housing because they could not afford the down-payment. Baysal added that

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93 Kuruş is one hundredth of a Turkish Lira, equivalent of the Cent for Dollar.
94 Istanbul Textile & Apparel Exporters’ Associations (İstanbul Tekstil ve Konfeksiyon İhracatçı Birlikleri - İTKİB)
95 Small and Medium Enterprises Development Organization of the Republic of Turkey (T.C. Küçük ve Orta Ölçekli İşletmeleri Geliştirme ve Destekleme İdaresi Başkanlığı - KOSGEB)
96 Ceylan explained that White Desk was an AKP government program that set up desks in front of municipalities to distribute food stamps and food for the people in need.
she foresaw this eventuality but could not convince the residents of it because of their enthusiasm for getting a new home.

**Politically illegal groups**

Tantan recalled clearly that some “illegal groups” tried to provoke the termination of the project in its initial phases, but the MKI managed to avert the conflicts professionally by establishing a positive dialogue. She claimed that *gecekondu* areas such as Ayazma were conducive to the formation of illegal groups. In Ayazma, while they demolished one *gecekondu*, the government officials found a tunnel under the foundation. Tantan wondered what the residents did in the tunnel: “You never know if they produced drugs there, or if they drew something out from the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] pipeline that lies there.” Oflaz defined the protestors as “marginal groups” that caused “a lot of trouble to the project.” But he added that over 80% of the women in 2,640 Ayazma households surveyed did not want to live in poor conditions any more. He thus thought that women had enabled the success of the redevelopment project in Ayazma. They were the driving force of the agreements because they were the real ones who suffered, so the project focused on them as a persuasion strategy as observed in the *Bizim Halka* social empowerment program. However, an Ayazma resident anonymously accused the MKI of attempts at coercion through assault.

Dr. Turgut recalled the agreement process as being very smooth until the tenant crisis broke out. Sığınaksoy and Ceylan confirmed the general trouble-free course of the project while signing agreements. They thought that the MKI did a very good job in establishing and sustaining good relations with the residents. The municipality officials knew the social profile well and so were able to explain the agreement terms in “the residents’ language,” although they were not given options.
**Living conditions in Bezirganbahçe**

When asked about any conflicts that occurred after the residents’ transfer to Bezirganbahçe, Sığınaksoy mentioned some representatives who visited the municipality with site management complaints, although these people were not well organized. According to the residents interviewed, these problems spanned from security of the playgrounds to ethnic disparities to a lack of friendly neighbor relationships. In particular, crime rates in Bezirganbahçe were considerably higher than in their old neighborhood in Ayazma. Ceylan revealed that the physical condition of the TOKİ-built social units appeared to be very poor soon after the transfer. She stated that within the first year after construction the residents’ homes were suffering from leaking roofs and displaced walls, pipes and interior equipment (e.g. window frames, door knobs). The increasing complaints made the redevelopment project vulnerable to heavy criticism from media and academic circles, leading to a disappointment of their immense effort to succeed. Ceylan stated that because of these setbacks, the MKI learned the hard way that the success of the project demanded quality buildings to be delivered.

### 5.5.3. Specific conflict: a closer look at the tenants’ struggle

Throughout the Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment project, the conflict with the tenants was by far the most significant struggle between the government actors and the Ayazma community in scope and magnitude. Because of the negative national press history and internal political conflicts and deprivation this conflict created, some of the TOKİ and MKI subjects did not want to discuss or even recognize the topic. However, these subjects were more open with their stories and opinions when asked indirect open-ended questions. One interviewee suggested that a simple Internet search with Turkish keywords for “Ayazma, barracks, tents, 18 families” would reveal a great deal of information. Another interviewee
referenced the feature documentary *Ecumenopolis: The City without Limits*, written and directed by Imre Azem in 2011, which largely supported the Ayazma tenants’ case. The most detailed account was relayed by Baysal and the residents interviewed, in particular by Aydın, Acar, and Turan. The analysis below is based on the tenant episode conveyed in the first section of this chapter as well as primary interview data.

*Changes in discourse*

When discussing the tenant conflict, Tantan repeatedly mentioned the “intruder” nature of Ayazma residents. She was alluding to 18 households that remained in Ayazma to represent all 243 tenant families in their claim for rights to public housing. According to her, these people not only were illegally occupying the land but also were not even owners of *gecekondu*. She also stressed that TOKİ received serious pressure from the MKI about giving housing to tenants. She referred to Mayor Yeniay’s promise that “tenants will be offered a solution” on published project fliers during the project kick-off announcement. This reasoning was revisited by other parties, such as Baysal, Ceylan, and the residents. TOKİ and MKI officials of varying levels implied that tenants were against paying anything for public housing, not only because they could not afford it, but also they were politically disinclined to settle with the government; Baysal, Kurşuncu and the residents claimed that the primary reason was the lack of affordability, but also that they did not trust the government who handed their neighborhood to the Ağaoğlu Group’s luxury housing project.

There was a shift in Mayor Yeniay’s discourse: from committing in writing to assign tenants as rightful holders to calling tenants “terrorists” because they protested the MKI after they realized they were being neglected. Ceylan recalled watching tenants speak on national TV: “We are suffering in tents here in a cold winter. We are freezing.” She called this “agitation.” Ceylan also recalled Mayor Yeniay’s claim that tenants were offered necessary
solutions but they did not agree to compromise. She claimed that they were actually never hungry or cold because they were supported and fed by certain organizations, meaning İMECE and Baysal. This was a general picture that TOKİ and the MKI drew in conveying the story of the conflict.

Even after Ankara made the decision to offer public housing to 243 tenants, TOKİ did not execute the decision despite the tenants’ persistence. Tantan admitted that they “had to give” housing to these occupants after a certain wait period. She claimed that they were able to reach 130 out of 243 now-rightful owners and offered social units in Kayabaşı to all. The reason they were not offered Bezirganbahçe housing was the relatively higher value of Bezirganbahçe over Kayabaşı, which was also located on the outskirts of the city. Tantan also smilingly admitted that based on TOKİ’s initiative and due to the hardship tenants caused to the government, these residents were not offered equal (interest-free) payments, but were rather charged with interest installments over the course of their mortgage payment.

*Parties, mediators, and facilitators*

Tantan remembered the names of community leaders from 18 households (Kasım Aydın, Tacettin Acar, and Hakan Akkaya) and all NGOs and individuals (İMECE, Cihan Baysal) who helped them. Both TOKİ and MKI stated that the conflict happened mainly between the community and TOKİ, which was at the time the owner of the land and public housing projects and thus allocated the tenants’ units. Contrary to Tantan’s recalling, one former tenant, Özdemir, and Aydın stated that they dealt with the MKI because they did not have access to or know anyone in TOKİ. Baysal confirmed Özdemir and Aydın’s version of events, claiming that tenants could easily walk into the MKI building and seek help from the officials there. It was interesting to her that the tenants had to side with the MKI, which did not genuinely seek their benefit from the beginning. Parallel to the resident’s accounts, Oflaz
claimed that the MKI acted as a representative of the tenants in their dealings with TOKİ. Perhaps the most rational explanation came from Kurşuncu, who thought that the tenants were more in touch with the MKI until they signed the deeds of consent, and once they became official rightful owners, they dealt more with TOKİ to claim their units.

When asked if there was any facilitator between the community and the MKI and TOKİ, Ceylan pointed to İMECE, calling it “the organization.” Resident representative Aydın confirmed this and added activists Baysal and Bir Umut, who mostly provided residents with legal support. Aydın also mentioned community groups composed of “redevelopment victims” from other Istanbul neighborhoods such as Gülsuyu-Gülenșu and Başibüyük, both located in the district of Kartal, as friendly groups that showed solidarity and support.

Baysal was careful to not label her role as “mediator,” but perhaps “facilitator.” She explained that the community put her in an advisory position in time: When the press or the MKI or someone else approached them, they called Baysal to ask for her opinion and advice as to how to respond. After becoming a United Nations Human Settlements Program (UN-HABITAT) representative of the Istanbul Mission of the Advisory Group on Forced Evictions, Baysal, who was formerly denied any meeting with the mayor, was now able to meet with Mayor Yeniay and make herself heard on behalf of the community with the international reputation she had now gained. She described her role as being a “bridge in communication,” stressing that it was the community who made and declared decisions in the end.

In time, Baysal took more initiative and engaged important parliamentary figures in the process. Tenants needed some form of financial support to move out of tents and live elsewhere while they sought a written promise that they would be given new homes by TOKİ. In her initial search for tenants’ recognition as rightful owners, when communication channels with the MKI did not yield any constructive results, Baysal was able to reach out to Nursuna
Memecan, a popular AKP MP at the time and also an old friend of Baysal’s from her high school years. Baysal said she had to reach out to her friend in the parliament because it was evident through her experience that the MKI was not going to find a quick, proper solution for the community. Thanks to their friendly relationship, MP Memecan promised Baysal that she would handle the issue. Eventually, the tenants were offered the deeds of consent by the agreements commission, which was mostly led by the MKI. Only then did the tenants leave their tents in Ayazma and accept the government’s rent allowance of TRY 500 per month for living elsewhere for three months until TOKİ finished construction of their Kayabaşı homes.

In the second half of the struggle involving allocation of public housing units with reduced cost to tenants by TOKİ, Baysal was able to reach out to another AKP MP, Lokman Ayva. MP Ayva was also interested in helping the tenants to gain their rights, although he was not as influential in the AKP majority in Parliament. Baysal recalled what Ayva told her after a series of negotiations: “That’s it. I couldn’t bring it up any further. They are willing to remove down-payments. They fear even this would set an example for other redevelopment projects. You don’t want to miss this opportunity.” Eventually, the tenants accepted the public housing offer with no down-payment and one after another signed the agreement letters.

Parallel to Baysal’s parliament outreach, resident leader Aydın conveyed his story of making multiple trips to the parliament in Ankara with two other community representatives. With the flyers promising solutions to tenants in their hands, they managed to attract the attention of and meet with a couple of MPs from the AKP. When they returned to their barracks in Ayazma, they followed up with their Ankara contacts through phone. Aydin thought that their persistence might have led to positive effects. Kurşuncu claimed that it was not easy to know who was more influential in affecting the decision: Aydın’s resident team, Baysal’s contacts, or both.
Not mentioning the MPs involved, Tantan described the MKI and TOKİ as facilitators in the community’s outreach to then Prime Minister Erdoğan, who removed the down-payment requirement. One resident, Özdemir, defined the MKI, which was their primary target in claiming their rights from the beginning to end, as the mediator. Sığınaksoy confirmed the MKI’s mediating position between the community, TOKİ, and the Prime Minister. In short, it appeared that the community’s main addressee was the MKI during the struggle. In this case, the MKI acted as a mediator more than as a decision-maker because of the written promise they gave to tenants during the project kick-off. While İMECE and Bir Umut provided more logistical support to tenants, such as barracks, food, clothing and legal advice, it was Baysal’s involvement of the MPs that led to more tangible solutions in the process. MPs Memecan and Ayva actively lobbied in Parliament and with the Prime Ministry. The local and in particular national press accelerated the process of reaching a consensus.

Community’s dissolution

As conveyed earlier in the chapter, after the first round of gecekondu demolitions by the MKI in 2007, most of the 42 tenant households that were left unsheltered soon left the area—some were reported as having gone back to their home towns in East Turkey, others to other gecekondu areas in Istanbul where their relatives lived in search of proper shelter. The remaining 18 households, with the help of İMECE and Bir Umut, built tents and barracks in place of their demolished homes. Aydın stated that in total, they lived in these barracks with little to no water or power for almost two years, including the harsh winter of 2008. The MKI demolished these temporary homes three times during these two years. During these demolitions, municipal officials were accompanied by not only cranes and diggers, but also the police, who were in charge of suppressing any riots and taking residents into custody if
any resisted. One resident argued that the police physically assaulted their teenage son because he shouted at them to stop the demolition.

As explained above, Baysal sought peaceful negotiations through political lobbying rather than armed conflict. After the first round of negotiations that resulted in the MKI offering protesters rent allowance and new homes not from Bezirganbahçe but from Kayabaşı without any down-payment or lottery, she relayed the offer to residents. The offer, though informal, was appealing to the residents. Aydın recalled that 3-4 women had given birth in the tents. They were suffering in poverty, left in despair. On November 25, 2009, Aydın went up to the Mayor’s office, where he was told: “We promise you: we will cover your rent for three months, and give you units in Kayabaşı. We will give homes to all of 256 households on your tenants list.” They decided to take the offer and moved out of the rough living conditions of the tents. This was the first breaking point for the residents’ protests.

During the second round of negotiations, TOKİ invited the residents to enter the public housing lottery for their assigned units. Impatient to receive their new homes, residents drew their units and signed TOKİ’s lottery contracts, although they had not yet received any written letter for the removal of the required down-payment. Baysal warned the residents about this, speaking to them: “You will not pay any down-payments, you will resist until the end, right?” But she later learned that some of the families had paid down-payments so as to not miss the opportunity for housing. She admitted that, in other words, the residents did not keep their promise to stay in solidarity.

Among 18 families, Özdemir, mother of three elementary school age children, reported: “Everyone left. They either couldn’t endure the winter conditions, had paid for TOKİ houses, or had gone elsewhere. I gave up. My husband wanted to resist more. I told him, ‘Osman, you stay here if you want. I will take the children with me and leave. I can’t stand this anymore.
What if someone comes in your way and shoots you because of the resistance? What would I do alone with kids? What if they decide to harm our children? I’m scared.’ I was left all alone in Ayazma, even afraid to go out in day time.” Soon after, they signed the TOKİ papers and were given a home in Bezirganbahçe with no down-payment but installments with interest.

The Acar family, however, stayed in their tent in Ayazma until the very end. At that time, Ağaoğlu’s construction had started and the company had built a sales office right next to the Acars’ tent. Acar reported that one day, Ali Ağaoğlu, the CEO of the Ağaoğlu Group, landed next to their tent with his helicopter. Seeing the Acar family living in poverty next to his high-end construction, Ağaoğlu approached Acar and inquired about their story. In the end, Ağaoğlu promised to give them a home at no cost at all. A few days later, Ağaoğlu’s attorney visited the Acar family and took them to the TOKİ office. Initial arrangements were made. Mr. Acar signed the paperwork that assigned them a unit in Kayabaşı. Acar reported that although it appeared that their resistance paid off, they could not afford the monthly condo maintenance fees, which were being increased by the site management every few months.

The Turan family with three children, the oldest of whom was three years old, was among four households who were left out completely because they had to leave the tents due to health conditions but could not afford the mortgage for housing in Kayabaşı. They moved to Bezirganbahçe as Mr. Turan’s uncle’s tenants. Turan tried to be optimistic about their struggle: “We did not get anything, but at least [other families] became homeowners. They became aware and sought their rights. Everyone did, including my husband. We are still in despair but I am happy for the Ayazma families who have homes in Kayabaşi now.”
Other factors that affected the formal decision-making

Tantan repeatedly grounded the decision to make tenants homeowners on Mayor Yeniay’s abovementioned written commitment to residents. This seemed to be true, considering that protesters mostly relied on said fliers. Oflaz claimed that the MKI had resolved the tenant crisis based on the same published promise. He claimed that TOKİ complied with the MKI’s plan of giving tenants social homes due to two reasons. The first was residents’ insolvency as conveyed earlier in this chapter. Second, the MKI’s relationship with TOKİ involved politics: TOKİ had to agree to conclude the struggle soon because of electoral concerns. Oflaz recalled the challenges in persuading TOKİ; he also believed that no change came easily, especially in a 5-year project like this one that involved TOKİ and giving homes to illegal homeowners and tenants: the first project of its kind in Turkey.

The activism process had an effect on the decisions of the tenant struggle as well. As analyzed above, Baysal’s visits to Mayor Yeniay, her correspondence with MPs Memecan and Ayva, and Aydın, and fellow residents’ visits to Ankara were factors in accelerating and enabling tenants’ public housing acquisition in Kayabaşı. Aydın believed that the residents’ appearance in national TV networks also had an impact. He recalled that this triggered Mayor Yeniay’s anger toward them, and also attracted the attention of Muammer Güler, then Governor of Istanbul, who accused the press of letting Ayazma residents disseminate their story of agitation throughout the country, harming AKP’s reputation. Nevertheless, Aydın reported that the residents did not give up until the MKI came back with the offer: after shooting for news broadcasts, they went back to their tents in Ayazma, living in miserable conditions and risking the government’s anger.

Overall, Sığınaksoy believed that although the MKI lost its professional stance at times by acting as a community facilitator, it delivered a successful performance in dealing with the
protests. She added that though she was aware of the heavy criticism, especially from academic circles, and success was relative, MKI officials thought that they had brought the tenant situation to a fair conclusion. On the other hand, Baysal believed that the community had achieved its goals through its ability to organize and resist as one, although the residents’ eagerness to become homeowners became an obstacle to reaching further potential achievements. She feared that this eagerness prevented residents from realizing the heavy toll of increasing mortgage payments and condo maintenance fees that they would have to pay for years, from which they were already suffering by that time. Baysal claimed around 60% of former tenants sold their Kayabaşı units for that reason.

5.6. Community involvement and perceptions

5.6.1. Formal participation and inclusion

Extent community was involved

There were competing views about the extent to which the community was involved in the project decision-making. Çelik argued that it was not TOKİ’s duty to conduct one-on-one interviews with community members to inform them of the project. In general TOKİ undertook redevelopment projects on a broader scale, as in the case of Ayazma-Tepeüstü. It was the local government’s task to organize and conduct community meetings by inviting local NGOs and universities if need be. Concerning the selection of the site to which residents would be transferred, Çelik reported that the formal decision-makers, TOKİ and the MKI, were, as they should have been, the sole decision-makers, and that as there was no convenient public housing site other than Bezirganbahçe, they did not open site selection up to debate.
Sığınaksoy claimed that the residents were not in a position to formally deliver their opinions because they occupied the land illegally. She believed, still, the government acted “very generously” towards residents throughout the project, offering them so much that they had no choice but to accept. Sığınaksoy and Tantan described community involvement as taking place through three surveys the MKI conducted under Dr. Turgut’s supervision: one before the project to find out the residents’ expectations from redevelopment in general, one during the project to determine their transfer preferences, and one to identify their social profiles and needs for the social project of the redevelopment scheme. After determining residents’ expectations, the formal actors formulated the conditions and invited them for agreement interviews. Tantan suggested the Prime Minister’s decision to offer a 10% discount in unit price as a positive example of the survey outcomes. However, Baysal strongly disagreed with the way the surveys were designed. She claimed that 94% of the residents answered ‘yes’ to the question of whether they wanted to live in a house with yard, a question which created the false hope that that was what the government would offer them. Oflaz argued that the community was as involved as the political context permitted. Considering national and local economic conditions and the political profile of the Ayazma community, they could not offer more. In fact, he thought Turkey was not advanced enough democratically to do anything more.

Public participation level

According to Tantan, community surveys were a means of formal participation, whereas Kurşuncu and Baysal rejected this view, arguing that by design, the surveys were one-way instruments designed to reveal the residents’ tendencies rather than enable a two-way discussion that facilitated collective decision-making. Sığınaksoy was careful to include surveys in the formal participation process. She thought that it would be right to assess the
overall participation level in order to both disseminate information and find a way to reconcile the positions of the residents and formal actors.

Dr. Turgut, Ofıaz and Ceylan believed that there was no formal participation to speak of, despite Dr. Turgut’s scholarly approach and encouragement to involve the residents, which did not go beyond surveys mainly in the initial project phase. Dr. Turgut and Ofıaz emphasized the residents’ socio-economic status as a major obstacle to participation. They mentioned the community’s extremely deprived living conditions and very low education level—many of the residents were illiterate. Furthermore, they both defined the community as a “special group” that did not have state identification cards or lacked the ability to speak Turkish, alluding to their Kurdish identity. Ofıaz argued that in order to achieve a desired participation level, it was necessary to conduct a robust capacity building study that lasted much longer than the five years of the overall project duration.

Kurşuncu had a different approach to the participation mechanism. She believed that there did not have to be revolving participation meetings and public persuasion processes if the community clearly did not want to realize a project or if they wanted to stay in their area. In this case the community’s will and needs were so explicit that it was not in need of such democratic charades. She thought that the process could have been drastically different if residents had been able to organize and demand their rights collectively at the beginning of the project. Instead, in the Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment project, they had to force concessions from TOKİ and the MKI towards the end of the project.

How the public was informed about decisions

When asked how the public first heard about the project, Baysal recalled the project flyer that the MKI distributed in 2004. This flyer displayed the logos of the three protocol parties—TOKİ, the IMM, and the MKI—and the statement as conveyed earlier in the chapter.
They also asked for a number of documents from the residents showing they were ‘rightful’ owners. Baysal argued that such manipulative language and requirements created false hope for the community.

When asked about how the public was informed of formal decisions over the course of the project, Oflaz and Şiğınaksoy referred to the local Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment office that the MKI established in front of the municipality building. The office personnel made frequent visits to the project site to familiarize the community with project goals and terms. They held meetings in residents’ gecekondu homes or local cafes at the community’s convenience. Mayor Yeniay would sometimes join these meetings. At other times, the redevelopment team scheduled one-on-one meetings at the office, even setting up recurring meetings for residents that were hard to persuade. Şiğınaksoy argued that all this team asked from the residents was to empty their illegal gecekondus and hand over the keys. The MKI took care of the rest, including covering the costs of the delivery of the residents’ furniture and other belongings. Having taken an active role in the redevelopment office, Ceylan recalled those days as fun and exciting, emphasizing the team’s high commitment to sustaining the peaceful relationship with residents. However, Baysal recalled one resident who complained about the complex and overly persuasive language these experts used in order to manipulate them into signing the deeds and contracts.

Kurşuncu explained that as a third means of disseminating information, particularly after the tenants crisis arose, volunteer lawyers from Bir Umut collected data, reviewed the agreements for the residents, and conveyed to them their rights and responsibilities. She also mentioned Baysal’s immense individual efforts in retrieving upper level information from the MKI for the residents.
Public-friendliness

Tantan stated that although there was no end to the community’s complaints in general, she believed TOKİ’s performance was public-friendly in the Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment project. Both Oflaz and Sığınaksoy drew a more ambitious picture, arguing that regardless of its outcomes, the project was 100% public-friendly in its intentions. Oflaz believed that the next generation of Ayazma community would live healthier lives than they did in the gecekondu and was thus extremely content with the project. Sığınaksoy associated public-friendliness with the close relationship the redevelopment office employees established with the residents during home visits, although she stated that the residents in fact did not deserve such treatment because they were occupying public land. Dr. Turgut was more reserved in her response. She put the level of public-friendliness at 50%, favoring neither the MKI nor the community in this respect. Baysal had a radically different view. She believed the level of public-friendliness was an absolute zero. She recalled her friend and colleague Tuna Kuyucu’s definition for such projects: “anti-public housing projects.” One resident, Turan, argued that in every phase of the decision-making, the government had a self-absorbed, profit-oriented stance, which resulted in crowding residents into 12-story buildings without following up on their progress.

5.6.2. Residents’ perceptions

Allegations of unfair benefits

The case of Tacettin Acar, a former resident and protester, was already discussed earlier in this chapter. In the story Acar relayed, Ali Ağaoğlu landed his helicopter next to Acar’s tent and placed his family in an apartment he bought in Kayabaşı, so that Acar’s tent would not visually pollute his high-end housing project any more. During her involvement in the project,
Baysal recalled several cases of bribery by the MKI, in particular given to AKP supporters, in order to break the resistance of the community. Bribes were frequently given by registering building additions, such as bathrooms and oven ditches, which entitled the owners to extra public housing units. Baysal also argued that in some cases, the commission organized putting up walls inside some gecekondu and adding extra doors to the buildings in order to register them as multiple units. The commission and the redevelopment office then pressured neighboring residents with the cooperation of the former rightful owners: “Look, your neighbor has already signed. Legally you have no rights; you are an occupant. If you don’t want to be thrown out on the street, let us make you a homeowner too, like your neighbor.” She argued that the bribed sympathizers joined in this pressure.

Fatma Özdemir, who was with the 18 families that resisted resettlement in tents and barracks, claimed that Mayor Yeniay called her husband Osman in person and offered them 5 Bezirganbahçe units in return for their withdrawal from the resistance. As one of the leading and most trusted community representatives, Osman turned down the offer. Mrs. Özdemir recalled that a friend of theirs, who was also assumed to be a community representative but secretly sided with the MKI, was offered the same opportunity and took it. She claimed that although this person owned only one unit for his entire family in Ayazma, the MKI not only gave him and his four sons one unit each in Bezirganbahçe, but also arranged for jobs at the municipality for all of his children, all in exchange for persuading other residents to sign agreements, which, she argued, he did successfully. Özdemir recalled another former resident who owned 2 or 3 units in Ayazma but received 8 or 9 units in Bezirganbahçe. As in the first case, in return, this person went door-to-door to convince his neighbors to sign the agreements. Özdemir said she knew of 4 or 5 similar cases. Another resident interviewee, Turan, claimed that she witnessed several bribery cases, one of which involved registering an attached coal cellar as an extra unit. Her family was not given the same opportunity although
they, too, had a coal cellar attached to their *gecekondu*, because they were among protesters.

*Coerced resettlement*

Considering the issue from the right to housing and usage perspectives, Baysal and Aydı̈n argued that regardless of their homeowner status, all residents were forcefully displaced and that the whole community’s housing rights were thus violated. According to her, residents who were neglected the most suffered most acutely, but in the longer term, all residents were victimized because of their inability to afford the increasing maintenance fees and installments in both Bezirganbahçe and Kayabaşı. She emphasized that many had already sold their condos and moved back to their home towns in the east or to other *gecekondu* neighborhoods in Istanbul. Baysal repeatedly stated that TOKİ saw this danger coming, but that residents were so enthralled by the prospect of becoming formal homeowners that they would not heed warnings.

Özdemir recalled a few families who lost their right to claim their new homes because they were not present in Ayazma during the agreements and demolitions. Turan, who was an Ayazma tenant and now lives as a tenant in her uncle’s Bezirganbahçe apartment, gave her family as an example of one that was forced to leave Ayazma without any resolution. She stated that they simply could not afford the TRY 10,000 TOKİ asked as down-payment for a unit in Kayabaşı.

*Inability of effective self-expression*

Over the course of their struggle, tenants seemed to have made their voices heard eventually, but interviewees among this group, namely Aydı̈n, Acar, Özdemir and Turan, all believed that the government generally did not listen to them. They claimed that although
the project was supposed to be an affordable housing project, they had to fight extremely hard to assert their rights and receive their homes, if they received any. Özdemir argued that although the MKI initially announced that it would give public housing units in Ayazma, residents were scattered to Bezirganbahçe and Kayabaşı. Turan added that the state should have stood by the poor, because it operates on tax yield generated by their people. Instead, the state sought maximized profits from the *gecekondu* renewal project.

*Inconsistency of Promises*

Based on their long fight to gain their housing rights, the interviewees also argued that the government did not keep its initial commitment to make all tenants homeowners. Turan claimed they were stalled with promises the government did not keep for over two years. In the end, the 18 families pressed charges on the MKI for their unjust treatment. The decision in the case was mostly unfavorable towards the tenants. Some of the families, including the Turan family of five, who could not afford to pay any down-payment or installments, were eventually offered very small units suitable for 1-2 people. The few who accepted the offer were later unhappy and had to sell their apartments. The Turan family had to turn down the offer because it could not fit in such a small unit.

*Overall Unhappiness with the Project*

As evident above, residents that were interviewed repeatedly underscored their unhappiness with the Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment project. Baysal described the level of depression displaced residents suffered: “Once, with a couple of Ayazma women and their kids, we passed by the sales office of Ağaoğlu in Ayazma. They could not stand seeing the luxury cars and flamboyant blocks under construction in place of their former beloved homes. They asked to change routes. We used a distant muddy road instead.” Turan admitted that
Ayazma teenagers were furious, too, showing instant anger at the mention of the Ağaoğlu name.

Turan also expressed her regret for having left Ayazma. Now living very unhappily in Bezirganbahçe, she longed for her life in Ayazma where both children and adults were more joyful. She believed that her mental state would be much better had they been able to remain. Baysal attributed this discontent to residents’ memories, bonds, and close neighbor and family ties being suddenly taken away from them when they were displaced. She gave several examples of children whose lives were affected because they now had to work to contribute to the family finances, which now included the condo mortgage: among these were Kasım Aydın’s oldest daughter Zeynep, who dropped out of school and left her family to enter an under-age marriage, and teenager Yusuf, who dropped out and joined the work force for minimum wage.

Özdemir, Turan and Baysal went on to depict life in Bezirganbahçe. They used the words “claustrophobic” and “prison” to describe the 12-story housing blocks with small units and not enough green space, compared to their one-story homes within fields in Ayazma. Baysal stated that she brought a psychiatrist friend of hers from Ege University to aid the women and children. Most of the women who were prescribed antidepressant pills later requested refills, she recalled.

Özdemir also talked about the social profile of Bezirganbahçe. She said that the government had allocated 8 blocks as public housing for police officers and their families. Contrary to what they initially expected, soon after they moved to Bezirganbahçe, the transferred residents noted that crime rates increased after the police families moved in. She believed the police might be involved in the narcotics and theft crimes that are common in their neighborhood. She explained that because there were no security measures in building
entrances and because they did not know most of their neighbors living in the same building, thieves found it easy to prey on residents, which happened all too often. Turan argued that Bezirganbahçe was not safe for children in particular, as they were vulnerable to traffic while they played on playgrounds. She further claimed that some families had left the housing site after several child deaths due to falling out of windows and off the balconies of high-rises.

Aside from the pessimistic picture drawn by the so-called displacement victims, when reminded that the tenants in fact won a victory over the government, Baysal recalled positive feedback from housing activist circles about the tenants’ episode. She thought they could have yielded better results with more effective organizing that involved more and better empowered residents as well as more brave activists and supporters with better guidance. As a result, she felt somewhat bittersweet about the overall picture.

5.7. Assessment of the decision-making process by actors

5.7.1. Influence of outcomes by power mechanisms

When describing how power relations between government actors affected the project outcomes, the interviewees from TOKİ and the MKİ seemed reluctant to express their sincere opinions; rather, their answers seemed political. In their defense, Çelik emphasized that the most vital decisions of the project were made at the top executive levels of the government. The interviewees therefore could not have had enough knowledge of the details of the process to make precise assessments about power relations.

Power coalition of central & local governments

When asked how power relations informed project decisions and outcomes, Karaoğlu drew a positive picture: “Power relations affected Ayazma’s decision-making process
positively.” He did not get into details, though, except recalling the tenants’ resistance, to which, he claimed, TOKİ responded amicably. Siğnaksoy emphasized the collaboration of central and local governments. According to her, they were all on the same side, under the same political party and seeing the whole picture from the same angle, so power relations “affected [decisions] very positively.” She saw these factors as vital to the project’s success, since failure would be shared by all as well. She evaluated the negative press coverage as harmful not only to the MKİ, but also to TOKİ, the central government, and even the Prime Minister. She claimed, though, that these attacks actually assured the success of the project, meaning they could better meet the community’s demands because of the conflicts.

Kurşuncu, in turn, argued that as they shared party allegiance and ideology, the different levels of governments were not meant or allowed to compete with or defeat each other. She also emphasized the magnitude of their powers: “TOKİ has immense power. The public sector is enormous in power. It is unbelievable.” Kurşuncu said that the MKİ seemed to be relatively weaker than the other government institutions, but that it leaned greatly on the legal and economic powers derived from TOKİ and the central government. Oflaz also revisited the relatively powerful position of TOKİ.

Power struggle of local community

Oflaz believed that the fact that the residents did not sufficiently know how to seek their rights diminished their potential influence over the decisions made. He claimed: “They didn’t know anything indeed. For instance, an Ayazma man cannot gather his case and go to Ankara.” Apparently, Oflaz was not aware of community leader Aydın and his neighbor friends’ several trips to Ankara. Similar to the interviewed residents, Baysal and Kurşuncu underscored repeatedly that although their efforts were not sufficient, Ayazma residents’ organizing and resistance had tangible effects in their struggle for tenants’ rights.
Baysal also highlighted the reciprocal nature of power relations in the tenants’ case. While the government, both at local and central levels, asserted its coercive power over community, the community created their own power against coercion. In many cases like Ayazma’s, a community member stood up as leader and encouraged collaborative work in resisting a larger government power. This person, whose opinions and suggestions were often accepted by other residents without much discussion, served as the face of the community. Based on the tenants’ struggle, she thought that the resistance mechanism depended on the leader’s determination. Baysal suggested that in Ayazma, this person was Kasım Aydın. Aydın was a strong-willed man who was capable of influencing his community and thus all of its power relations with the government.

Parallel to Baysal, Kurşuncu recognized the self-governing ability of the community in organizing and creating its own power. She also added that activists such as Cihan Baysal and *Bir Umut*, along with other neighborhoods in similar situations, acted in solidarity with the community. She believed that such outside support was as important to success as the resistance of the community itself. Kurşuncu noted that when redevelopers and the redeveloped butted heads, it was usually the redevelopers who prevailed in the ensuing power struggle. She admitted that this struggle was not by any means easy: it was evident that inequality, injustice and power imbalances prevailed for the most part.

*Power influence of capital*

Baysal viewed all redevelopment projects in Turkey, including the Ayazma case, as projects that did not consider neighborhood rights and concerns and in which the government and capital joined forces. Similarly, Kurşuncu asserted that when identifying the foci of power in the Ayazma redevelopment, one had to define the sources of capital in addition to the government and community. Although the most visible forces of capital were the Ağaoğlu
Group in Ayazma and the Torunlar Group in Tepeüstü, both of which were known to be closely connected to the AKP government at multiple levels, she believed that TOKİ’s capitalist relations with its contractors and other developer groups played a big role in steering capital. As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, among the financial factors that affected decision-making was TOKİ’s power to create market competition to both seek profit on sales of Ayazma and Tepeüstü lands and to increase the value of its adjacent public housing projects. Considering the bigger picture, Kurşuncu reemphasized that TOKİ’s social housing agenda was driven by the AKP government’s economic growth and employment policy, which depended on sustaining the construction sector in Turkey.

5.7.2. **Strengths**

It is evident that defining the strengths and weaknesses of any redevelopment case depends on the actors’ viewpoints, which are aligned with their institutions: in this case, the government or the community.

**Tangible and perceived powers of the state**

The analyses thus far show that power in the Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment case was mainly held by the public sector, which had legal, economic, political, technical, and proprietary advantages over the community. In particular, Oflaz, Tantan, and Baysal highlighted the legal tools the government wielded as one of its major strengths. In addition to these advantages, Kurşuncu mentioned that the local municipal police took charge of demolitions and suppressed the tenant protests, remarking that even the local government was armed with coercive power. Tantan emphasized the great knowledge and experience the government had in both conducting projects and confronting opposition, accelerating the process effectively once the project framework was decided.
Oflaz suggested more abstractly that the state, which consisted of central and local government institutions including the MKI, was one huge powerhouse in and of itself. According to him, TOKİ’s and the Prime Minister’s involvement in the project, as well as the AKP government’s prioritization of urban redevelopment as a national policy since the early 2000s, only added to this already overbearing image. The public felt that it was obliged to accept government domination, which Oflaz suggested was the government’s primary strength throughout the project. Baysal recalled that the community addressed Mayor Yeniay as “dear Mr. Mayor” or “your honor” in person, especially in the earlier stages of the project, before residents organized and started to oppose the government’s decisions. On the other hand, Baysal believed that although the government had the full backing of the laws and used coercive means to impose its project upon the community, all officials felt a conscientious responsibility to varying degrees; hence they made efforts to portray the government as innocent and using words such as “grace,” “favor” and “blessing” when describing the residents’ conditions as created by the government.

_Profitability of the project and TOKİ’s financial power_

Sığınaksoy and Tantan attributed the speedy execution of the project to the lack of any financial difficulties thanks to TOKİ funds. When reminded that TOKİ finished the project with profit, Tantan also admitted that although TOKİ did not pursue any profit from redevelopment projects as a general principle, Ayazma-Tepeüstü case enabled “quite a big gain” for the institution. However, she preferred not to disclose the profit rate when asked, suggesting that the information was available. Instead, she reemphasized the non-profit status of TOKİ and its redevelopment projects formulation with a gain of 1-2% maximum in general.
Organizational structure and freedom of the MKI

During the decision-making process, the right people were involved with the right strategies, according to Dr. Turgut. In the initial steps of the project, MKI personnel worked in a labor-intensive fashion, available 24/7 when necessary. They worked hard to convince the residents with the attitude of “What else do you expect?” Dr. Turgut said this was the public participation level pursued until rightful owners signed the agreement letters. As Ceylan argued, the fact that the MKI was highly involved with the residents made it a powerful figure in local government in influencing the local project decisions: “No one objected with ‘Why are you giving that unit to this person? Why are you doing so and so that way? Why are you taking that decision?’” In addition to these points, as was examined in a previous sections of this chapter, the MKI also indirectly—or not-so-willingly—played a role in providing the tenants with the housing rights that they claimed, evidence that the MKI’s motives and positions were not necessarily aligned with the central government institutions’.

Resistance and voting powers of the local community

The fact that the existing housing structures in Ayazma were illegal made the government’s hand stronger, Sığınaksoy argued. She further reminded that although the residents had to accept whatever was proposed, the MKI did not flaunt its power but was aware of it as its strength. However, at the other end of the negotiations, Baysal claimed that the empowerment and illumination of residents thanks to housing rights advocates, NGOs, neighborhood associations, etc. changed the course of this otherwise destructive process for residents. She recalled the change in the residents’ discourse from “May the benevolent state [parens patriae] help us. We are not against the state. We are all Muslims,” to defining their fight as a struggle for their rights and a righteous resistance. This shift was pivotal in helping the local community change the course of its redevelopment experience. Had the discourse
not changed, residents would not have been able to claim their rights in the end. Baysal also added that this change was led by the community representative Kasım Aydın, and involved 18 families in the struggle. Kurşuncu added to resistance power the voting power of the residents, because despite the fact that the AKP government was confident in its voting base, it had to be careful to not alienate voters. Ayazma also housed ethnicities, in particular Kurds, whose votes counted and could change the election results of the area.

5.7.3. Weaknesses

Lack of social dimension and the centralist mindset

As examined earlier, the MKI imagined the project with a community-friendly impetus before its initiation. After the involvement of TOKİ, Oflaz argued, the direction of the project shifted towards a more mechanical approach. TOKİ focused on planning and design aspects of redevelopment rather than the social aspects, which the MKI would have liked to have been given more rigorous attention: “[TOKİ’s] intent was to remove the buildings, enhance the physical space and move the citizens to a healthier environment as soon as possible.” Oflaz admitted that the project did not deliver the desired healthy outcomes in Ayazma because the social dimension was overlooked. The MKI initiated the Bizim Halka social empowerment program to cover this deficiency, but as Dr. Turgut, the project head, repeatedly admitted, it did not yield the desired results or community satisfaction. Kurşuncu supported this point by defining it as the lack of community consent. The legal and executive powers that the government held turned out to be weaknesses from the community standpoint. The public sector thought that it could exert its will in all aspects, but in reality it could not, because it was confronted by the public. The government created the community resistance and was thus weak against the community.
From a more general standpoint, Dr. Turgut emphasized centralized planning as a major weakness of the redevelopment schemes in Turkey in general, and in Ayazma in particular. Centralized planning led to top-down redevelopment decisions that were dictated rather than arrived at through thorough examination of local conditions and the community’s will. She argued that such a comprehensive project had to be flexible to follow scientific direction. Executive actors simply had to follow the right courses of action involving citizens, and right sets of specialization. Otherwise, as experienced in Ayazma-Tepeüstü case, the project was condemned as vulnerable in the aforementioned aspects.

*Lack of multi-disciplined structure and effective coordination*

In line with Dr. Turgut’s previous point, Karaoğlu freely confessed when asked what the biggest weakness of the project was: The project partnership could have better analyzed the area before designing the project; they did not utilize the expertise of scholars or a multi-disciplinary collaboration that involved researchers, sociologists, economists, etc. In other words, the government could have undertaken project design with an integrated approach. The MKI hired Dr. Turgut at a consultancy/advisory level to represent university support, which proved to be inadequate for project coordination due to the political unfolding.

For instance, Ceylan complained that what appeared as a strength at first glance could have opposite effects, referring to the MKI’s power and freedom in local project execution. The MKI followed the planned three-tier protocol of the project, but no one questioned TOKİ or the IMM when criticizing the project results for allowing gentrification and/or not being community-friendly. According to Ceylan, the MKI had to deal with all the burdens and consequences on the site. The municipality’s organizational structure proved to be problematic, too. Dr. Turgut recalled occasions when they could not fit a task to any position in the municipal personnel organization, even while the mayor had an open-minded attitude.
toward the Ayazma redevelopment. She gave the building of the Bizim Halka office and the
day care next to it as an example: not only was it a huge struggle to convince TOKİ to build
these facilities in Bezirganbahçe, but the MKI also had difficulty managing their maintenance,
because there was no consensus about which of the several departments of the MKI would be
tasked with such maintenance, and also because the MKI thought that it was TOKİ’s duty to
carry it out. After a while, such “nonsensical struggles” made Dr. Turgut question the Bizim
Halka project as a whole.

Suppression of financial concerns over planning criteria

Karaoğlu mentioned that TOKİ’s other weaknesses were due to its inability to provide for
both community and institutional needs. TOKİ could not retreat from its no-financial-loss
policy while building its public housing projects such as Bezirganbahçe and so could not offer
the housing conditions the residents sought. In addition, TOKİ had to raise funds to realize
these projects, which prevented it from serving only the residents. As a result, Karaoğlu
admitted, building density in the project was increased greatly. While the former FAR was
around 0.50-0.60, the new plan and construction conceived a ratio of around 2.00 in Ayazma.
Oflaz reflected on the building density too, concluding that partnering with TOKİ was a
mistake because such an increase was inevitable with TOKİ’s involvement.

Tantan believed that the privately-registered landowners who held property deeds
proved to be a big burden in this project: “They became pumped up about their possession,”
finding the appraisal low. This proved to be a lingering problem for the project. She recalled
a conversation with one of the deed-holders, which revealed this and other problems (starting
with Tantan):

— You have built five units, so you should get five new units.
— No. I have eight children. I want eight units.
— But your building is a *gecekondu*. It is against the zoning legislation. You are not licensed by the municipality.
— But I bribed the municipality to build it.
— Well, you shouldn’t have.
— But the municipality shut its eyes to my building.
— Well, it shouldn’t have. You shouldn’t have let it do so!

Aside from the residents’ expectations, despite all financial concerns and profit expectations of both the state and the development companies, Oflaz defended the project partnership’s work as an effort to enhance the area to provide a more livable environment to the residents. Such concerns and expectations caused the plan to be fragmented. What they should have done was to assess the *gecekondu* problem at the regional level and undertake Ayazma and Tepeüstü as parts of a redevelopment master plan that the central and local governments should have collectively prepared.

**Time and organization constraints regarding elections**

Oflaz also pointed to the short-sighted and ephemeral nature of local governments as general weaknesses that affected the Ayazma-Tepeüstü project. Governments had to successfully complete their election programs and policies within a limited time in order to be reelected. Although such extensive redevelopment programs took 10-15 years to complete in developed countries, in Turkey, they had to be developed and realized in only 5 years, which is the election period. Oflaz asserted that in the western world, both governments and communities had completed the awareness stage and moved on to bettering the physical environment collectively, whereas in Turkey, they had to skip awareness and shape the physical spaces. In response to this problem, the MKI built information offices at the
neighborhood level to inform and empower the public in Turkey, but public satisfaction was nevertheless not guaranteed.

Regarding regulations affected by electoral concerns, Tantan mentioned the reorganization of district boundaries of Istanbul in 2009. That year Ayazma, which was formerly within the jurisdiction of the MKI, was included in the then-founded Başakşehir district based on an amendment to the Metropolitan Municipalities Law No. 5216. This change happened shortly before the local elections in 2009. The common understanding was that the AKP government wanted such reorganization to ensure winning in all districts in Istanbul. Because the MKI did not have any say in the project anymore and the MBI did not want to take over the redevelopment project and its political frictions, TOKİ was forced to carry out all duties and handle the remaining appraisal and allocation problems with the residents.

*Hardship in planning for low community profile*

The fact that the local community of the redevelopment area lacked necessary education and urbanization culture was repeatedly reported by interview subjects to have affected project management and decision-making process negatively. They emphasized that the majority of the local Ayazma population were migrants who moved to Istanbul in early 2000s from underdeveloped and rural eastern Anatolia. These residents’ short experience of living in Istanbul prevented them from assimilating to urban life. Çelik recalled that former Ayazma residents tried to breed chickens on their balconies, while Karaoğlu mentioned that he did not like the images of laundry hung out at balconies in Bezirganbahçe. Dr. Turgut reported that not only were many Ayazma women illiterate and without a state ID, but that they also only spoke Kurdish. Oflaz argued that it was impossible to raise the community’s knowledge to the level necessary for discussing project decisions and outcomes. The resulting difficulty in communicating with these residents was suggested to be a major problem for the
government. Çelik complained that foreign attention, in particular of researchers and students from European countries such as Holland, revealed the problematic image of the redevelopment scheme in Ayazma. Although the MKI received some EU supported social empowerment and adaptation projects, thanks to Dr. Turgut, they were constricted in their scope, realm and timeframe against the expected impacts. Çelik interpreted this as a huge problem across the country. However, Sığınaksoy was more optimistic: although she recognized the communication problem with the Ayazma community, she was content that their efforts to build trust overcame the surrounding issues in time. She believed that although the residents were biased against the government at first, the MKI managed to establish and sustain a level of trust sufficient to reach out to and persuade the residents to sign the agreements, which was the main concern of the project.

Displacement of local community

It is evident that in the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case that the greatest conflict arose from the displacement of the local community. Oflaz recognized this and claimed the project should have resolved the residents’ problems while keeping them in their neighborhoods. Instead, it transferred all residents to Bezirganbahçe, Kayabaşı, Çakmak and other unknown locations, leaving them to their fate. Çelik also criticized the displacement of residents: “Frankly speaking, I find the site selection to have been problematic. I wish that we could have reshaped the residents’ lives on the same site.” However, he argued that the decision to transfer the community had positive and negative impacts on the project.

In the government’s defense, Oflaz claimed that in the survey the MKI conducted with the Ayazma residents before the implementation phase, approximately half the residents reported that they did not want to live in Ayazma and preferred to live elsewhere in order to obtain an easier and more pleasant life. Women were disgusted with the neighborhood in
particular, citing the lack of water, power and other basic amenities. Others, whom Oflaz called “the mosque community,” had a different stance: “They begged ‘Let us stay here for goodness sake. Keep us in our neighborhood.’” While the community had such diverse attitudes, the MKI was strictly bound to TOKİ, who acted very quickly to take possession of the land. When TOKİ suggested building social housing elsewhere and transferring the residents, the MKI did not have a say. The residents were persuaded, some more easily than others, and displaced. Oflaz admitted that their transfer to denser high-rise buildings and the expectation that they would adapt to a life they were not a part of caused other weaknesses that have been examined above.

*Lack of an established community organizing tradition*

As discussed earlier in the chapter, the community ran into obstacles in obtaining information and processing it to organize its actions. The residents lacked the will and ability to organize in order to achieve the lives they pursued. Even if they did organize, their impact was not large enough to actually effect significant change. In particular, while describing the local social weakness, Baysal pointed to the ethnic and political profile of the Kurdish-dominant Ayazma community. Because they were historically displaced and “slapped” by the state, they did not want to get into trouble by any means. They did not know their rights because they were not educated enough. Furthermore, they felt vulnerable because they were squatters on the site. Baysal recalled the community’s self-reproach: “They would say ‘One cannot resist the government. The government acts as it wishes. We are intruders anyway, we have no rights. They will throw us in the street. We had better do whatever they ask us.’” She remembered one resident’s efforts to resist and cited him: “I turned around to see everyone had gone. There were only a couple of people left. All the neighbors had signed [the agreements] one by one.”
However, in Ayazma-Tepeüstü case, it was thanks to Kasım Aydın who, although not a tenant himself, managed to change the course of tenant struggle and enabled the change they sought, although not to the full extent that he sought. Kurşuncu observed that in other ongoing redevelopment projects in Istanbul, if there was any pro-community change in a neighborhood, there were 1-2 such people in the community actively pursuing it.

All in all, the Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment case remains one of the most controversial projects of Turkey’s redevelopment history. The interviewees offered many suggestions concerning the betterment of future redevelopment projects in Istanbul and Turkey based on the lessons they derived from their Ayazma-Tepeüstü experience. These lessons, together with those of the Sümer case, are discussed in Chapter 8.
Chapter 6. Sümer Redevelopment Case

Officially titled the “Zeytinburnu Sümer neighborhood Urban Transformation Project” in the project protocol, redevelopment activity in the Sümer neighborhood, realized by a collaboration between the Municipality of Zeytinburnu, Istanbul (MZI) and the IMM, is generally considered to be the first earthquake-based redevelopment carried out in Turkey. The process and reasons that led the project partnership to select the Sümer neighborhood as the site of its flagship project, discussed below, also reveal the significance of not only the development potential of the Zeytinburnu district and its Sümer neighborhood but also its historical background and vulnerable condition.

As the Chief of the Mapping and Planning Division of the MZI, Hacer Bakkal, pointed out, Zeytinburnu became home to Turkey’s first gecekondu settlement as a result of the rural-urban migration to Istanbul that started in the 1950s. It was also the first district in Turkey to undergo a reclamation project under the then Ministry of Public Works and Settlement in accordance with Gecekondu Law No. 775.\footnote{The Gecekondu Law No. 775, enacted in 1966, rules to demolish slums and gecekondu and to prevent the construction of new ones. For more information on legalization and upgrading of illegal settlements in Turkey, see Uzun, Çete, and Palancioğlu (2010).} Over the course of their 60-year existence in Zeytinburnu, many gecekondu were legitimimized and given access to infrastructure in election periods, but this area still suffered from an illegal settlement pattern and poor conditions. After factoring in the high earthquake risks of the district, Bakkal argued, it was almost inevitable for Zeytinburnu to be one of the flagship projects of urban redevelopment in Istanbul.

The 1999 Marmara earthquakes, however, proved to be a more pressing problem for Zeytinburnu than the illegal gecekondu settlements. The first of the earthquakes occurred on
August 17, 1999 in the İzmit-Kocaeli-Gölcük zone with a moment magnitude (Mw) of 7.4, leaving roughly 17,500 dead, 24,000 injured and 600,000 homeless as a result of the destruction of 134,000 buildings, and causing $25 billion in damage.\(^{98}\) The most significant aftershocks occurred on November 12, 1999 in Düzce along the same North Anatolian fault line with a magnitude of 7.2 Mw and a lighter casualty toll (around 1,000 dead and 5,000 injured). Although its epicenter was more than 110 km away, the major Kocaeli earthquake resulted in serious structure damages in Istanbul. Perhaps the biggest impact of these earthquakes for Istanbul was an alarming awareness of the high risk of an earthquake of similar magnitude to strike in Istanbul in the next few decades, and the even more devastating potential: Istanbul was a mega-city of over 12 million people living in mostly disaster-prone buildings in a high density urban area.

In 2002, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in coordination with the IMM completed an extensive earthquake risk assessment study.\(^{99}\) It estimated that a major earthquake of 7.4 Mw near Istanbul might cost more than 50,000 lives and result in economic losses in excess of USD 60-70 billion. According to JICA’s scenario analysis, the number of injured would reach 150,000 people and the city would have difficulties meeting emergency response requirements, as 30% of its hospitals (in total of 635) were located in the highly vulnerable southwest part of the city. Concurrently with the JICA study, scholars from four leading Turkish universities (Boğaziçi, Istanbul Technical, Middle East Technical, and Yıldız Technical universities) collaborated in creating the IEMP in 2003.\(^{100}\) In line with this plan’s

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\(^{98}\) For more information, see Spence et al. (2003).


guidelines, the Istanbul Governorship and the IMM undertook several projects to assess the existing building stock and take mitigation and preparedness measures against the expected Istanbul earthquake. The two most considerable projects of this sort are the Istanbul Governorship-owned and the World Bank-funded Istanbul Seismic Risk Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness (ISMEP) project, completed in 2004, and the seismic microzoning project funded and conducted by the IMM. Both projects determined the most earthquake-vulnerable zones of Istanbul. As Deputy Mayor of the MZI, Zafer Alsaç, reported, after a series of meetings held in 2004 with the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, the IMM, and the district municipalities, Zeytinburnu and Bakırköy were chosen as pilot districts for earthquake mitigation focused urban redevelopment projects.

One of 39 districts of the province of Istanbul, Zeytinburnu is located on the southern coast of the western side of the city, covering a total of 1,142 ha with an approximate population of 248,000 in 2004, the year of the project’s initiation. In the last few decades Zeytinburnu has become an increasingly important business and transportation hub of Istanbul as the city’s borders and population have grown due to the aforementioned rural-urban migration flow. The Sümer neighborhood, which is the subject of this case study, is one of the

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102 Seismic microzoning is defined as the process of subdividing a potential seismic or earthquake prone area into zones with respect to some geological and geophysical characteristics of the sites such as ground shaking, landslide and rock fall hazard, earthquake-related flooding, so that seismic hazards at different locations within the area can correctly be identified. Microzoning provides the basis for site-specific risk analysis, which can assist in the mitigation of earthquake damage. For more information, see Tuladhar, Yamazaki, Warnitchai, and Saita (2004).

103 Reports and executive summaries for the latest seismic microzonation projects for the Asian and European sides of Istanbul as well as other relevant projects can be found at [http://ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/SubSites/EarthquakeSiteEn/Pages/MainPage.aspx](http://ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/SubSites/EarthquakeSiteEn/Pages/MainPage.aspx) (retrieved in May 2016).

104 According to the 2013 publication of the Turkish Statistical Institute, the population of Zeytinburnu district was 292,313 in 2013 ([http://www.ibb.istanbul/tr-TR/kurumsal/Pages/IlceveIlkKademe.aspx](http://www.ibb.istanbul/tr-TR/kurumsal/Pages/IlceveIlkKademe.aspx); retrieved in May 2016).
neighborhoods most poised to benefit from these advantages in the district (Figure 17). It is close to the main transportation artery of Istanbul, the E-5 highway. It is also located in very close proximity to the more recent city-wide rail systems, such as Marmaray, the Zeytinburnu-Kadıköy line, with a submerged tube tunnel that connects the European and Asian sides of the city, and the light rail system that connects Istanbul’s historic and recent central business districts. Only one km to the south of the neighborhood is the Zeytinburnu Kazlıçeşme international seaport, and six km to the west is the Atatürk International Airport.

Figure 17. The Sümer neighborhood within Zeytinburnu district in central Istanbul. Produced by the author, July 2016.

According to the results of the JICA study, six out of the fifty-four neighborhoods with earthquake damage risk across Istanbul are located within the Zeytinburnu district. Also, the building density of Zeytinburnu is twice the average building density of Istanbul, which
enhances the risks and difficulty of earthquake management. Zeytinburnu’s remarkable risks are primarily due to its problematic building stock, built in most cases without regard for any planning or construction standards, and without consideration of geological conditions. Furthermore, unplanned development, inadequate social facilities, lack of open spaces, narrow roads, and urban poverty deepen the problems and risks in Zeytinburnu.

Alsaç and Bakkal stressed the influence of the aforementioned studies in the selection of the Sümer redevelopment area. Dr. Ülger explained that following the pilot district designation of Zeytinburnu, the IMM’s BİMTAŞ conducted a detailed 2-year risk inventory study that marked 2,295 buildings as high risk, which constituted 12.5% of the approximately 17,000 buildings in Zeytinburnu. About 25% of these buildings were in the Sümer neighborhood, and 43% in the Sümer redevelopment area (536 of the 1,250 units within the overall project borders) (Figure 18). According to him, the fact that the Sümer community was open to their neighborhood’s redevelopment as long as they were not displaced was another significant factor in the redevelopment decision. To these factors the Deputy General Director of Istanbul Housing Development Organization Co. (İstanbul Konut İmar Plan Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. — KİPTAŞ from hereon), Semih Demirci, added the existence of vacant lots adjacent to the project area, which increased the feasibility of the project. In fact, Demirci defined this factor as the *sine qua non* of the project site selection. Alsaç claimed that the IMM and the MZI thus decided to implement *in situ* redevelopment, one of the many disaster mitigation scenarios drawn up by the IEMP and ISMEP, in the selected area in Sümer.

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105 See Özçevik and Akçakaya (2008).
MZI and KİPTAŞ officials provided a brief numeric description of the Sümer redevelopment project. According to the MZI records shared by Bakkal, the project covered 1,250 existing units in 13 building blocks that housed 3,594 residents within a 3.66 ha settlement area (which is marked in yellow in Figure 18). Demirci claimed that around 65% of the buildings in this area were illegal (i.e. with gecekondu titles, lacking habitation permits or construction servitude); however, the MZI press release presentation provided by Bakkal reveals the number of unlicensed units to be 437, 35% of the total 1,250 units. The presentation also reveals the ownership distribution of the lots within the project area; out of
147 lots, 135 (91%) are privately owned, 10 (7%) possess joint ownership with private parties, 1 belongs to the MZI and the Water Department, and 1 belongs to the State Treasury (Figure 19). According to the same source, 1038 (83%) of these units were housing and 212 (17%) were retail units. Considering Zeytinburnu’s overall history of gecekondu settlement, the Sümer neighborhood suffered from low quality constructions in a high-density environment (Figure 20).

*Figure 19. Ownership distribution of lots within the former Sümer redevelopment area borders (Legend- blue: private (135 lots); orange: private & MZI (6 lots); pink: private & State Treasury (2 lots); light yellow: private & private company (1 lot); light green: private & foundation (1 lot); dark green: MZI & Water Department (1 lot); yellow: State Treasury (1 lot). Reprinted from the MZI press release presentation, retrieved in May 2014.*
Unlike the Ayazma-Tepeüstü urban redevelopment project, the Sümer case was not entirely completed at the time of this study; the second phase was still ongoing. This study examines the first phase of the Sümer urban redevelopment project, which has seen the construction of around 680 housing and small business units in a gated-community design. The project has also realized parks, playgrounds, sports facilities and a multi-story parking structure. As discussed earlier and repeated by the interviewees, the Sümer urban redevelopment project provides a significant case study because it is the first earthquake focused urban redevelopment project in Turkey to be implemented in a developed neighborhood with a high population density.

6.1. Development of the case

Preliminary studies and institutional partnership formation

An MZI official, who preferred to remain anonymous in the study, stated that soon after the selection of the Sümer neighborhood for redevelopment practice in 2003, the MZI announced the temporary termination of development work that involved around 2,000 buildings in the neighborhood to prevent any construction activity that could later be
demolished by the redevelopment project. The termination continued until the end of 2004 when the project area was officially designated. Demirci explained that during the 1.5 years of halted development, the IMM’s planning corporation, BİMTAŞ, conducted the first planning and design study for the Sümer neighborhood, which proposed a decrease in building density and the displacement of residents. Demirci and the anonymous MZI official stated that although a density decrease was desirable, this project was not implemented due to negative reactions of the local community towards displacement.

According to the anonymous interviewee, uneasiness among the public, caused by speculation about displacement and nearly two years of halted development, and the fact that he could not afford to risk the success of a flagship project that held citywide and national significance for the AKP government pushed MZI Mayor Murat Aydın to seek a quick solution. The MZI had to partner with a higher government institution to increase its financial and political power. The obvious choice was the IMM, which governed Zeytinburnu at the provincial level and could bring to bear a large budget, technical competence, and an experienced staff. Alsaç, however, argued that the central government was not adequately equipped for the partnership that the MZI sought, because of the absence of any redevelopment laws and authority at that time in Turkey. He added that it made the most sense to collaborate with an autonomous government actor that could also provide speed and flexibility to the project. Nevertheless, the IMM’s subsidiary (economic enterprise) KİPTAŞ filled the partnership position. Thus, KİPTAŞ and the MZI were established as the principal members of the project partnership, and as multiple officials from both institutions reported, the leading decision-makers of the Sümer urban redevelopment project were KİPTAŞ General Director İsmet Yıldırım, KİPTAŞ Deputy General Director Semih Demirci, MZI Mayor Murat Aydın, and MZI Deputy Mayor Zafer Alsaç.
Formal negotiations and declined project alternatives

According to Demirci and Alsaç, the project preparation phase, which included feasibility studies, preliminary analyses and formal negotiations, lasted quite longer than anticipated by the partners: Indeed, delays at this stage led to the first phase of the project’s completion in ten years rather than the more optimistically projected five. The anonymous interviewee stated that from 2004 through 2008, the IMM, KİPTAŞ and MZI executives held numerous meetings and made expensive field trips to successful cases in Europe to formulate an optimum set of in situ redevelopment terms for the Sümer project.

At first, Demirci conveyed, KİPTAŞ and the MZI considered building a massive shopping mall to recoup the project and housing development (housing to be allocated to the rightful owners) costs but demurred because of an existing nearby large-scale shopping mall. Later, they proposed a project design with two 20-plus-storey towers of income-generating luxury condos next to lower housing blocks to be allocated to the rightful owners of Sümer. Upon seeing the model of the project, the residents perceived an attempt at gentrification, believing that those towers would be enough to subsidize the whole cost of the project and create profit for the government. Put off by what they saw as excessive profit-seeking on the part of the government, residents rejected that proposal.

Resulting project formulation

At this point, as Demirci stated, the project partnership knew it had to build a separate housing project for the residents that preserved the original uses of the housing and on-street retail units. In order to determine the residents’ existing unit conditions as well as their expectations and ability to financially contribute to the project, the MZI-KİPTAŞ collaboration conducted a survey that measured unit sizes and the education and income levels of resident households. Alsaç and Demirci emphasized that the survey revealed a very low average
income in Sümer (Alsaç reported that 1,038 households in particular were well below the poverty line).\textsuperscript{107} In order to keep these residents in their neighborhood and spare them any out-of-pocket expenses, project executives decided to use a nearby 1.4 ha piece of state-owned vacant land that had been used as a soccer field,\textsuperscript{108} the Sümer Neighborhood Amateur Sports Field, to construct a gated housing site with street-facing stores, transfer the residents and retail stores to these new units with a 25% area deduction from their existing unit footage, and build the second phase on the land vacated by these residents (Figure 21). The project also planned for the development of an approximately 10.6 ha nearby parcel of privately owned land to build a new sports facility and a luxury housing site on a flat-for-land, i.e. flat received for land ownership, basis, the income generated from which would be used for the Sümer residents’ new housing.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{107} Neither Alsaç nor Demirci disclosed specific information about the residents’ average incomes.

\textsuperscript{108} Demirci stated that KİPTAŞ had owned the former soccer field land; however, Bakkal explained that ownership of the land was transferred from the State Treasury to KİPTAŞ, a process that later sparked a legal dispute between the two agencies. This conflict is analyzed in more detail later in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{109} The process of the private land development and gentrification, as explained by the MZI and KİPTAŞ executives interviewed, is also discussed in a separate section below.
When detailing the project formulation, Demirci provided a thorough explanation of how the partnership reached the 25% unit area deduction rate; he defined this rate as the project’s “point zero,” meaning that this deduction rate would allow KİPTAŞ to meet project costs with no excess profit or expense. Accordingly, for example, an old 100 sqm apartment would be replaced with a new 75 sqm apartment. The project also allocated a 25 sqm parking space to each unit in the underground parking structure to be built. In case the owner received a unit larger than 75% of the old unit, the residual amount would be covered by a 10-year low-interest loan from banks associated with KİPTAŞ, whereas if the owner received a smaller unit, KİPTAŞ would compensate the owner for the difference through direct deposit.
Alsaç stated that according to the fair property value analysis the partnership undertook, the equalization price for the unit area was set at TRY 1,500/sqm for the new and earthquake-resistant units, while the existing deprived units were valued at TRY 700 to 1,000/sqm. At one point, despite careful feasibility studies, use of state-owned vacant land, and the involvement of the Koç Group\textsuperscript{110} for private land development, Demirci claimed that the project’s financial goal of “point zero” was barely met thanks to increasing property values due to the high-quality construction and the resulting uplift of the area. Had the property values not increased considerably, the project would not have achieved its financial balance. He did not want to provide further insight on this remark.

\textit{Formal planning process}

Bakkal reported that the MZI was not involved in the preparation of the concept design undertaken by KİPTAŞ but partook in planning decisions and resulting plan changes, which she conveyed in detail. The MZI first followed the standard formal procedure of modifying the 1:5000 zoning plan in accordance with the Zoning Law No. 3194. According to this plan, the project boundaries were set to include four pieces of land (Figure 22): the 13-block lot to be vacated by the Sümer neighborhood residents with residential and retail uses, the Koç Group’s land, the State Treasury’s land, and another vacant field that was transferred to the MZI. Within the total planning area of around 17 ha (the area within the red-dotted border in Figure 22), an approximately 6.3 ha area was officially designated as an “urban development and transformation area” (the purple area in Figure 22) based on Article 73 of Municipality Law No. 5393.

\textsuperscript{110} Koç Group, or Koç Holding, is Turkey’s largest group of companies and the top industrial conglomerate. The Koç family, one of Turkey’s wealthiest families, controls the company with its headquarters in Istanbul. For more information, see \url{http://www.koc.com.tr/en-us} (retrieved in June 2016).
The zoning plan used the following land readjustment technique (permitted by article 18 of the Zoning Law no. 3194) to realize change of land uses and open them to development:

State Treasury land was exchanged for MZI land to the north, and the former Treasury land

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111 According to Article 18 of Zoning Law No. 3194, municipalities are authorized to combine land parcels and landowners with or without buildings within the limits of the zoning plan with one another, with residues left over from the roads or with places owned by public entities or municipalities without consent of the property owners or beneficiaries, subdivide the same again into blocks or plots or subdivide again in compliance with the land development plan, or distribute to the beneficiaries on the basis of individual, joint or divided co-property ownership and make registration process. During the distribution of land parcels and landowners arranged by municipalities or governorships, sufficient area may be deducted as “share of common land use” from their areas in return for the increase in value due to the land readjustment. For more information see Yomralıoğlu and Ülger (2014).
was zoned for housing rather than social and technical infrastructure and designated as a transfer center; the ownership of all of the former Treasury land and around 30% of the Koç Group’s land was then allocated to KİPTAŞ, the latter being set per “share of common land use.” To accelerate the implementation process, project executives chose not to produce a detailed 1:1000 implementation plan (i.e. with setback distances of each lot and/or outlines of the buildings), but rather to mirror the 1:5000 plan and initiate construction based on the concept design, so the MZI added a plan note to the 1:5000 plan that authorized the use of a concept plan for project application (Figure 23).

Figure 23. 1:1000 implementation plan of the Sümer urban redevelopment project. Reprinted from the MZI planning office archive, retrieved in May 2014.
In accordance with regulation, the modified 1:5000 zoning plan was forwarded to the relevant institutions for their written opinions (i.e. the IMM departments of transportation, ground and earthquake, parks and gardens, water works, etc.). After obtaining positive opinions from all parties, the plan was put into effect on February 17, 2008 with the approval of the IMM council and the IMM and MZI mayors. As the new owner of the transfer area, KİPTAŞ contracted out the drawing of the concept design of the new housing site to a private company and monitored its production. Demirci, predicting a slight decrease in the overall density of the area, claimed that upon final completion of the Sümer redevelopment project, the former net FAR of 4.58 within the designated redevelopment area would be replaced with a 3.00 gross FAR and approximately 4.20 net FAR across the whole project area. However, both Demirci and a group of KİPTAŞ and MZI interviewees admitted that the realized density of the first phase was higher than the targeted 4.20 and around the same as the former net density (Figure 24). The interviewees agreed at the excessiveness of the final density, especially given the limitations of local transportation and utility infrastructure.

Figure 24. First phase of the Sümer project before (below) and after (above) redevelopment. Reprinted from Haberturk, Retrieved in October 2013, from http://www.haberturk.com.
**Designation of rightful owners**

Following the plan changes and formal designation of the Sümer redevelopment area, during preparation of the concept design, the MZI-KİPTAŞ partnership began field work to determine the list of “rightful owners” for the project. Tenants were completely excluded from the project; there were no incentives or solutions offered to them. Defending the inclusion of homeowners alone, Demirci stated that the only condition for rightful ownership status was residence in the unit: in the few cases in which the residents claimed to own a unit but did not have an official land or unit title, the project officials inquired after their actual residence with neighbors and the mukhtar’s office. When confirmed as residents, those illegal homeowners were designated as rightful owners as well. Bakkal reported that within the project boundaries were 1,368 rightful residential shareholders residing in a total of designated 1,038 existing housing units. Demirci argued that none of the rightful owners were drawn out of the project boundaries and that all were given the option to obtain upgraded earthquake-resistant homes and stores in a project with a planned parking garage, social facility, landscape design and so on. Regarding the first phase of the project, one resident, Ferhat Cihangir, confirmed Demirci’s claims and added that KİPTAŞ was also generous with the existing unit area measurements: even illegally occupied garret stories (attics) and balcony additions of buildings were included in the net footage calculations.

**Community information and disputes**

By the end of the formal negotiation, project formulation and planning processes in 2008, project executives were ready to begin public information and negotiation meetings on the first phase of the project, which consisted of housing and retail spaces for the rightful Sümer residents. The residents interviewed and the anonymous interviewee from the MZI reported that the authorities of the project held a publicity meeting in which IMM Mayor Kadir Topbaş
and MZI Mayor Aydın, together with Alsaç, Yıldırım, Demirci and other MZI and KİPTAŞ senior executives, presented the Sümer project in the presence of national and local media. The anonymous interviewee argued that to project an image of “inclusive governance” to local, national and international circles, the authorities presented the government’s accomplishments and exhibited the Sümer redevelopment project as a “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity” for residents, referring to the earthquake resilience, upgraded housing and land value increase they were offered.

However, not all residents were happy. As reported by interviewees from formal institutions and community, those who raised questions and concerns about the government’s financial and political machinations were silenced by the municipal police force. After receiving continued negative reactions from residents, the MZI official argued, the government’s discourse changed to calling the residents “ungrateful” and “ignorant,” but it persisted in publicizing the project. KİPTAŞ and MZI executives produced 3D sketches and numeric presentations of the concept design (Figure 25). Alsaç explained that they worked like marketing agents: the material they prepared answered for residents all sorts of questions regarding the new housing project (e.g. the height of the buildings, size of the units, allocation of different unit types, and the locations of retail stores, car parks, other facilities).

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112 This claim was confirmed by other interviewees from the MZI and KİPTAŞ, although not with the words quoted.
In the summer of 2008, the project partnership held a total of 25 negotiation meetings in the apartments of supportive residents, during which multiple households gathered and were introduced to the project details and agreement terms (Figure 26). The number of households that they met remains ambiguous: Demirci claimed that there were a total of 300 families, Alsaç estimated 250, and the anonymous interviewee argued that it did not exceed 100 due to negative reactions and numerous questions the residents posed. Both the anonymous
interviewee and Bakkal argued that the executives later preferred to meet with the residents one by one in order to avoid any group confrontation.

Figure 26. Negotiation meetings with KİPTAŞ and MZI executives at the Sümer residents’ homes.

Reprinted from the MZI press release presentation, retrieved in May 2014.

Although there was no organized reaction from the public, the community had several concerns. For one, although Demirci and Alsaç refrained from providing details, the involvement of the private land and the development agreement between KİPTAŞ and the Koç Group, raised concerns and speculation that the government was unjustly profiting from the project. Second, the government’s aforementioned justification for the 25% unit area deduction rate did not satisfy many residents who believed the government could have come up with a no-deduction formula and still benefit from the project. Third, the owners of retail units within the project area refused to take possession of new retail stores because they were forced to pay high amounts of added-value and income taxes in the absence of relevant legislation. These and other resulting conflicts between the unit owners and the authorities are analyzed in detail in the sections below.

Regarding household visits, Demirci stated that at first, the residents were receptive and more positive towards the project, tying their welcoming attitude to cultural notions of Turkish hospitality, but reactions against the project arose later. Regardless, the MZI-KİPTAŞ partnership persisted in its attempts to persuade residents. Alsaç highlighted the importance of the community outreach works of local AKP party members, municipality-friendly
tradesmen and residents, and the later-established KİPTAŞ Sümer redevelopment office (Figure 27). He argued that the MZI and KİPTAŞ executives also held lunch and late-night meetings so as to elucidate all curious and concerned residents. They relied heavily on media outreach, too. In his press statements, Mayor Aydın frequently highlighted one distinguishing aspect of the project: “None of our residents will be dislocated; no one will suffer.” It was assured that all units of the first phase of the project would be submitted to the rightful owners at no additional cost to them, leading Yıldırım to refer to the project as the “Robin Hood model.” In March 2011, Mayor Aydın claimed that while the former 100 sqm residential unit cost around TRY 100,000, the new 75 sqm unit would cost between TRY 200-220,000; therefore, as a result of the dramatic increase in the land prices, he warned the titleholders against selling their apartments before completion of the project.

![Figure 27. KİPTAŞ's Sümer Urban Redevelopment Office. Photographs by the author, May 2014.](image)

On the 10th anniversary of the Marmara earthquake, August 17, 2009, project executives held another publicity event in which Mayor Aydın announced that recent residents who would purchase property in the neighborhood after that date would be subject to a 40% loss of their unit areas instead of 25%. (A KİPTAŞ official stated that a 60% deduction rate was

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113 For example, see “Earthquake regeneration implemented” (2011).
114 See “KİPTAŞ project” (2011).
Demirci and Alsaç defended this decision, claiming that its intent was to protect the residents from outside investors who sought to benefit from the rapidly increasing property values and force residents to sell their units. This measure too created some tension between the community and the government, leading to further trust issues. Despite these efforts, Demirci admitted that the community’s opposition was “severe” until the completion of the first phase of the project, which consisted of the Sahilpark housing project reserved for the residents.

**Sahilpark housing project**

Having taken possession of the transfer area and having produced the concept design, KİPTAŞ outsourced the construction of Sahilpark to a private consortium comprised of the YDA Group and Kuruluş Construction Co. Demirci emphasized that these groups were merely contractors; KİPTAŞ decided on the building and interior materials and inspected the construction quality. When comparing Sahilpark to the residents’ former apartment buildings, Alsaç stated that the resulting construction quality was so high that it “excessively” surpassed the MZI’s expectations. He highlighted the promised facilities that were realized, too: one underground car park per unit and a shared green courtyard with a small recreation area and exercise station. The construction of Sahilpark took place between 2009 and 2012 (Figure 28).

*Figure 28. Sahilpark housing site. Photographs by the author, April 2014.*
While most MZI and KİPTAŞ senior executives gave conflicting and heavily rounded figures, the manager of the KİPTAŞ Department of Process Payment and Settlement, Turgut Büyükcölkölak, provided very precise numbers for the Sahilpark project. The project consisted of 661 residential and 21 retail units; all of the retail units were produced for the existing store owners. Out of the 661 residential units, 201 (around 30%) were allocated to the YDA-Kuruluş consortium, while 460 were allocated to KİPTAŞ to be given to the titleholders. Once all owners of this phase moved into their new earthquake-resistant apartments and their former buildings were demolished, the second phase of the project would start on the emptied land to accommodate the remaining 790 rightful owner units.

The Sümer Redevelopment Office and titleholder agreements

In order to inform the rightful owners of the project conditions and have them sign the project agreements for their transfer to Sahilpark, KİPTAŞ built a redevelopment office on a small MZI-owned lot right across from the ongoing Sahilpark construction. The office personnel consisted of KİPTAŞ staff led by Büyükcölkölak, who regularly reported to Demirci. A project model and maps were displayed inside the office, and the staff was careful to provide a friendly atmosphere for rightful owners (Figure 29). KİPTAŞ officials and Alsaç described the caring and interested approach of the KİPTAŞ personnel towards the owners, and most residents interviewed confirmed their friendly manner, but Bakkal admitted that no matter how well their welcome, most of the residents’ questions and concerns were left unaddressed and many ended up in the planning and redevelopment office of the MZI, where they were referred back to KİPTAŞ.
Müjdat Küçükbükücü, the deputy manager of the KİPTAŞ Department of Process Payment and Settlement and an expert actively engaged in informing residents and persuading them to sign agreements at the redevelopment office, described the staff’s work process. When a resident applied to them, the office staff confirmed her or his rightful owner status, made precise unit measurements on site, applied the relevant deduction rate to the unit area, and offered them the closest corresponding units at Sahilpark. It was up to the rightful owners to decide on a larger or smaller unit than what they owned. Once decided, they signed the project agreement contract with KİPTAŞ. According to the rightful owners’ preference, either they or KİPTAŞ paid the price of the differential area based on the equalization price per sqm set by the project executives. KİPTAŞ made the payments as single up-front disbursement, while the resident paid in a 10-year installment plan with a lower-than-market interest rate.
KİPTAŞ staff were also careful to present the unit which corresponded most closely to the rightful owner’s existing unit in tangible qualities such as height and orientation.

Both Büyükçolak and Küçükbükücü mentioned some cases in which the residents were very eager to sign the agreements and others in which they were quite suspicious and reactive. Demirci stated that he visited the office on weekends to observe the residents’ reactions and convince them to partake in the project and transfer to Sahilpark. He recalled them expressing two opposite reactions: either “May God bless you,” or “This project has a political agenda and you are going to make your political friends benefit the most.”

As mentioned earlier, Demirci maintained that the residents’ reluctance continued until the completion of the Sahilpark construction in 2012. He argued that the most crucial factor in their persuasion was the two-fold increase in property values in Sahilpark: for instance, Demirci stated that as of that year, while a 100-sqm existing unit was appraised TRY 70,000, a corresponding 75-sqm unit in Sahilpark was worth TRY 140-150,000. Alsaç claimed that the property values increased throughout Zeytinburnu, but the rise was considerably higher in Sahilpark where the construction quality and amenities greatly surpassed former neighborhood conditions. Demirci also recalled that the first few units were given to friendly rightful owners in a hurry, without even having issued them a new unit title, so as to have them serve as an example to the rest of the community, who indeed followed soon in great numbers.

Alsaç went on to explain that the real chaos arose when many rightful owners preferred larger units: because the proportion of different unit sizes was calculated and implemented based on the initial community survey in which the residents had claimed low income levels, the high demand on larger units did not match KİPTAŞ’s Sahilpark unit inventory. He claimed that the residents were forced to choose among the available units they were offered. Alsaç
also reported that in early 2013, the MZI-KİPTAŞ partnership announced a two-month allowance for all rightful owners to sign agreements; if they refused, they would lose their rightful owner status and the remaining unclaimed units would be sold to outsiders. He was confident that the approximately 350 remaining rightful owners applied within the given timeframe. On February 23, 2013, keys of the Sahilpark units were officially submitted to the signatory Sümer residents by then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and then Minister of Environment and Urbanism Erdoğan Bayraktar in a public ceremony.

As of the interviews conducted in January 2014, Büyükçolak and Bakkal reported that out of 460 Sahilpark residential units reserved for Sümer residents, around 370 units were submitted to a total of 418 rightful titleholders, while around 120 of the submitted 370 units had “leaked,” meaning they were allocated to owners who purchased their Sümer homes after August 2009 and might have not been Sümer locals. Out of 21 Sahilpark retail units, only 2 were submitted to the rightful store owners due to the aforementioned taxation problem, discussed in detail below. The KİPTAŞ Sümer Urban Redevelopment Office was working to make deals for the remaining 90 residential and 19 retail units with the owners of the select blocks, which they were trying to vacate and demolish completely as soon as possible to start the second phase of the Sümer project (Figure 30).
Later project stages: the new Urban Redevelopment Law

It is mentioned above that there are around 1,250 planned units (for an existing 1,038 residential and 21 retail units) for allocation to rightful owners in the overall Sümer urban redevelopment project; roughly 680 (460 residential and 21 retail) have been built in Sahilpark. As of May 2014, there were 790 residential and retail units to be built and allocated to the remaining 950 rightful titleholders in the second phase of the project. As analyzed in a section below, many residential and retail unit owners who did not agree to sign the project agreement were relegated to this phase. Alsaç, Demirci and Büyükçolak explained that because of the project’s early conflicts and the government’s urge to finish the project as soon as possible, the second and third phases were combined.
Although concept design of the second phase was not yet ready, project executives Demirci and Alsaç claimed that the second project phase would be similar to Sahilpark in its design style, construction quality and 25% deduction rate. However, they both claimed that they would be more careful in collecting rightful owners’ precise unit size preferences to avoid any inventory problems and other unpredicted issues. The net FAR of Sahilpark would be sustained as well, and that of the overall scheme would not exceed 21:5, which is below the net FAR of the built phase. The equalization price of TRY 1,500/sqm of the first phase would be raised to around TRY 3,500/sqm, considering the continuous increase in land values in the region.

The most remarkable change in the second phase is legal in nature. Toward the end of the first phase in May 2012, a new law was introduced to the Turkish planning system: the “Law on Redevelopment of Areas under Disaster Risk,” No. 6306, or the “Redevelopment Law” for short. It is the first law enacted to specifically regulate and monitor redevelopment activities in Turkey, which has been a priority in the economic and political agenda of the AKP government since early 2000s. It is frequently argued in the Turkish planning literature that the new Redevelopment Law grants the government and the practitioners of redevelopment activities higher powers regarding titleholder agreements, building demolition and private lot development in disaster risk areas.\footnote{For more information on and review of the Redevelopment Law No. 6306, see Eraydın and Taşan-Kok (2014), Güzey (2016), and Durmaz (2015).}

Project executives explicitly stated that the MZI-KİPTAŞ partnership saw the coming of the Redevelopment Law as a grand opportunity to lessen the severity of its former community relations problems. In accordance with the law and upon application of the local government to the Turkish council of ministers, the Sümer urban redevelopment project site was officially
designated a “disaster risk area” on January 25, 2013 with the approval of the Turkish cabinet in Ankara. Alsaç briefly explained that thanks to the new law, the second phase was now revised to temporarily send the remaining rightful owners to outside rental units and compensate them for their rent for up to 18 months and to clear and rebuild all vacated blocks during this term. Demirci, on the other hand, argued that the only reason the project was included in the scope of the Redevelopment Law was the ability to easily expropriate opposing residents’ property. He admitted that without this law and its expropriation tool, the second phase, and thus the whole Sümer project, could have fallen into a stalemate due to the anticipated conflicts. Now, he added, he could challenge the residents very easily: “You either sign the agreement or we expropriate your property.”

6.1.1. Land development with private actors

Throughout the interviews, Demirci and Alsaç refrained from providing details about the agreement terms with the Koç Group, who owned one of the lots involved in the Sümer redevelopment site. Demirci once stated that “the mathematics behind that side of the project [were] confusing.” The most revealing story came from two interviewees of the MZI, who preferred to remain anonymous, one of them asking for anonymity during this specific part of the interview. In this section, the accounts are those of these two interviewees unless otherwise stated.

Plan changes under the public-private agreement

The most remarkable fact about the anonymous interviewees’ account concerns the zoning changes of the Koç private land. They reported that this land was not zoned for housing development of any sort in former development plans because it was marked off as an “afforestation area.” In its former state, there were a number of unlicensed small
businesses (e.g. auto repair, garment production) in deprived-looking sections of an old and then-shut down Bozkurt Weaving Factory. Along with the land readjustment application of Article 18 of Law No. 3194 that is introduced above, the lot was reclassified as a “housing and development area.”

One anonymous interviewee argued that the afforestation area was not opened for development for free. In return for the zoning change, there was an attached plan note which asserted that 30% of the lot’s (approximately 1.4 ha) ownership was granted to KİPTAŞ, as well as the rights to develop the entire parcel. The Koç Group also donated another close by lot (approximately 2.6 ha) to the MZI for a new public sports facility to replace the one removed for Sahilpark. The interviewee also claimed that the Koç Group made a large donation to a foundation which is claimed by some to have close ties to the government and which is frequently questioned for its involvement in similar planning and development schemes in Turkey.

One general principle of land readjustment application is that the readjustment area consists of adjacent lots that form a geometric unity as a whole. Following Koç lot’s zoning change, this lot along with the State Treasury’s vacant land, even though they were cater-cornered in their position, were designated as a land readjustment area on the 1:5000 zoning plan. One of the anonymous interviewees admitted to having proposed the readjustment technique within such amorphous boundaries in order to cater to the project partnership’s vision but claimed to have never personally approved the application.

To defend the project, Büyükçolak highlighted that a public sports complex was built by the KİPTAŞ-MZI partnership on the vacant land the Koç Group donated to the MZI to replace the former amateur sports field that used to belong to the State Treasury, now owned by KİPTAŞ. Despite this replacement, the anonymous interviewees stated that the Sümer
community had not gained any additional public facility in return for the lost afforestation area: “It is all for profit gain.”

Soon after the concurrent zoning modifications that converted both the Koç Group’s and the former Treasury’s lots to housing areas, the groundbreaking ceremony of early 2008 for the construction of both sites took place. At that time, the concept design and application projects did not yet exist. MZI officials argued that the construction activities on both lands stopped for 1.5 years after the foundations were laid, and while the project executives worked on the design process and on mitigating confrontations with the public.

The Istanbul housing project

The resulting luxury housing project built on the Koç Group’s lot was named The Istanbul and consisted of 486 units in 15 14-story apartment blocks and one U-shaped 35-story residence block (Figures 31 and 32). KİPTAŞ outsourced the construction of The Istanbul to the same private companies that constructed Sahilpark, the YDA Group and Kuruluş Construction Company. KİPTAŞ and the private consortium agreed on a 40%-flat-for-land method, which granted 60% of the units to the consortium in return for the project construction and left 40% to the Koç Group. As of May 2014, one unit in the residence block was valued at TRY 1.5 million, according to anonymous interviewees and the residents. These prices betray the extravagant qualities of the housing units and neighborhood gentrification when compared with the average Sahilpark unit of TRY 275-300,000 and old Sümer unit of TRY 70,000 for a 100 sqm apartment, numbers suggested by Demirci as of May 2014.
Figure 31. The Istanbul housing project concept illustration. Reprinted from the MZI press release presentation, retrieved in May 2014.

Figure 32. Construction of The Istanbul blocks. Photographs by the author, April 2014.
Justifications by formal actors

One anonymous interviewee thought that the Koç Group, though an indirect actor in the project scheme, was the entity that profited the most from the project (i.e. through property zoned for housing and the 40% of new luxury units gained). Demirci did not offer a comment on this claim, but he repeatedly reported in defense of KİPTAŞ that the MZI-KİPTAŞ project partnership transferred the profit obtained from The Istanbul to Sahilpark: Had they not built The Istanbul and obtained 60% of the units there, the YDA-Kuruluş consortium would not have been able to develop Sahilpark and still earn profit. Demirci stated that, roughly speaking, the consortium assessed the costs of the Sahilpark construction at TRY 90 million and, having received around 200 Sahilpark units valued at roughly TRY 40-45 million, expected to recoup its losses with proceeds from construction of The Istanbul. Alsaç also argued for this formulation, which he claimed was the only way to realize the project at a 25% area deduction rate. He further claimed that in the absence of the Koç Group’s involvement, Sümer residents would have been offered a 50% unit area deduction, which, he argued, was the norm in Istanbul.

Demirci was careful to note that KİPTAŞ did not claim any units from The Istanbul, but rather gained units only from Sahilpark to deliver them to Sümer’s rightful owners. As for the increased construction quality, Demirci argued that the partnership had to realize “charming” projects in both Sahilpark and The Istanbul so as to increase the land value and meet the “zero point” it expected from the redevelopment project. Regarding the new public sports complex built on the Koç Group’s donated lot, Büyükçolak, like Demirci, stressed the high quality of the facility when explaining that the community’s public facility needs were not ignored but met at a higher standard than before. He also noted that in return for the approximately 1.4 ha land KİPTAŞ received, the project earned a 2.6 ha for this public facility.
6.1.2. The government’s overall uncompromising stance

Although many local residents are satisfied with the improved environmental and safety conditions and increased unit prices at Sahilpark, there have been notable cases of discontent. Among others that are analyzed later in this chapter, one major criticism is that the initially-planned 8-story housing blocks were raised up to 16 stories during the course of the project, while owners’ loss of 25% unit area was sustained. Low-income residents have been forced to agree with KİPTAŞ under the threat of expropriation of their property shares, and if they could not afford to pay for the residual unit area allocated for them, they had no choice but move out of their neighborhood. The former owners of smaller units in particular suffered from such hardship. One resident, who owned an old 60 sqm apartment had a right only to a 45 sqm unit; however, this resident was left with no option but to pay TRY 37,500 to afford the smallest unit available in Sahilpark. Low-income residents have been suspicious about the ends of the greater redevelopment activity in their district as well. One resident, Ömer Adalı, voiced his ultimate concern: “Once the marina is built on the nearby shore and higher-income residents move into the luxury blocks built within the project, we will not be able to afford to live in this area anymore.”

During a press interview, Mayor Aydın publicly addressed these complaints by highlighting the public meetings they held: “We would not have started the project unless an absolute majority [of titleholders] agreed,”\footnote{See “Sümer regenerated” (2013).} although it is not clear whether they obtained the majority consent before August 2009 when they started construction of Sahilpark and The Istanbul. Nevertheless, he has further announced that in accordance with the new
Redevelopment Law, redevelopment projects will continue to be realized if a majority of titleholders consent.\textsuperscript{118}

All in all, the opposing residents and the anonymous interviewees emphasized the government’s intention to derive profit in realizing Sümer’s redevelopment. One anonymous official foresaw the construction of approximately 3,500 units to replace the 1,250 existing units of Sümer by the end of the second phase. This official claimed that after the allocation of the residents’ units, KİPTAŞ would take possession of roughly 500 units, while the remaining half of the 3,500 units would cover the contractors’ construction costs. KİPTAŞ’s units were to be built last, on the Sümer land the last residents would vacate after they were all transferred to new housing, based on a 40% flat-for-land method with the YDA-Kuruluş consortium. In other words, the official claimed, although KİPTAŞ appeared not to make any profit for now and claimed to be the “Robin Hood” of the project, it was awaiting huge gains in the end.

6.2. Actor structure

6.2.1. Actors in decision-making

As observed in the development of the case, active decision-making in the project was carried out by KİPTAŞ and the MZI, which were the main drivers of the project’s execution. These actors, in particular the MZI’s deputy mayor Zafer Alsaç, purposely mentioned the involvement of universities and the IMM and emphasized their contributions, although these contributions were not directly related to the decision-making scheme.

\textsuperscript{118} See Öztürk (2013).
different actors involved in the redevelopment is conveyed below and an analysis of their relative weight in project decision-making.

*KİPTAŞ (Istanbul Housing Development Organization Co.)*

*KİPTAŞ* is a government-owned economic enterprise of the IMM. During the Sümer urban redevelopment project, KİPTAŞ played a big role due to its legal and financial powers that came from its subsidiary relationship to the IMM: It negotiated with the private land owners and the contractors, and realized the Sahilpark housing project’s construction, the allocation of units, and the management of the differential unit area compensations with the residents. These powers elevated KİPTAŞ to a higher position in decision-making than the MZI, which, as of 2009, was one of 39 district municipalities within the IMM’s jurisdiction. KİPTAŞ was represented by then General Director İsmet Yıldırım and the Deputy General Director Semih Demirci in the Sümer redevelopment project’s decision-making mechanism.

*The MZI (Municipality of Zeytinburnu, Istanbul)*

As the local government, the MZI was involved in the project from its early initiation. Demirci explained that it was the MZI which possessed the legal authority (based on Article 73 of Municipality Law No. 5393) to apply for the “urban development and transformation area” status for Sümer neighborhood. Initially, this equipped the MZI with a considerable legal weight, in addition to its on-site knowledge and skills such as engaging the residents, with whom it already had close ties, in the project. After signing the project protocol with KİPTAŞ, the MZI delegated some of its powers to KİPTAŞ, because KİPTAŞ possessed a bigger room for maneuver due to its above-mentioned subsidiary status. In line with its realm of authority, the MZI co-designed the project formulation, prepared the 1:5000 and 1:1000 plans for zoning and implementation, and partook in initial negotiations with the community and the private
developers as well as the designation of the rightful owners. On the MZI’s side, the decision-making was carried out at the top executive levels involving Mayor Murat Aydın and the Deputy Mayor Zafer Alsaç.

Local community

Both Demirci and Alsaç reported that there were no community representatives or associations in the Sümer redevelopment’s actor scheme. They met with the households during house visits and with the neighborhood men in local coffee houses. One resident claimed that KİPTAŞ and the MZI later negotiated with the residents one by one to avoid any group confrontation and unity against the project.

Residents Ömer Adalı and Sedat Küçükuygun recalled suggesting forming a neighborhood association in 2008, when they heard about the project for the first time. They wanted to ensure a fair share for all homeowners during negotiations with the help of lawyers and representatives. However, both residents argued that such a unity was not realized due to the community’s ignorance or neglect. Adalı cited the residents, including his brother, who opposed: “What are you striving for? Let it go. No one may gather and chip in to hire lawyers here.” Adalı and Küçükuygun gave up their individual efforts soon with frustration, as they did not feel strong enough to negotiate with the mayor and KİPTAŞ on their own. Mukhtar of the Sümer neighborhood, Akın Coşkun, suggested that the reason for the inability to form a unity was partially political. He claimed that the residents were soon confronted with the following argument by the municipal circles and the AKP followers in the neighborhood: “This is a useful project. If you support it, you are one of us. If you oppose, you are a man of others.” Coşkun stated that he felt uneasy about the early and easy politicization the residents were pulled into.
Alsaç emphasized the involvement of Mukhtar Coşkun in the project’s publicity and negotiations as a facilitator, who also represented the local community. Coşkun recalled Alsaç’s invitation and how he organized the household meetings in apartment buildings. He was present in all meetings, but careful to note that he did not take side with either the projects executors or the community. He saw the danger of being held responsible by the residents if things went wrong. Whenever the residents posed questions to him regarding the project, he pointed at Mayor Aydın and the KİPTAŞ head Yıldırım to address their inquiries. He claimed that he chose to neither become a party nor embrace the project. However, he added that if he had to choose, he would prefer to be on the side of the rightful and legal demands of his community.

In the Sümer redevelopment project, tenants were not given any rights. They were not recognized as ‘rightful’ stakeholders in the project, so they were completely left out. One resident, Ferhat Cihangir, recalled that tenants asked for rent compensation for a few months in response to their displacement, but their voice was not heard. He personally helped his former tenant financially, who lived in his later demolished apartment (i.e. not receiving the rent for the last few months before he had to vacate the unit). Nonetheless, there was not any organized support for tenants in any phase of the Sümer urban redevelopment project.

**İSPER (Istanbul Zeytinburnu Curtain Manufacturers Market)**

Sümer neighborhood houses the oldest market of curtain sellers of Istanbul. There were over 70 stores of varying sizes and business volumes on the ground floors of apartment buildings along the main streets, 24 of which are located within the Sümer urban redevelopment site. The market, which was established in early 1960s, has an association named Istanbul Zeytinburnu Curtain Manufacturers Retail and Wholesale Market (İSPER). İSPER’s president, Ayhan Özoys, who partook in the project with multiple housing and retail
units he owned in the project site, explained that he represented the market businessmen in project meetings concerning the Sahilpark stores that were built to replace their existing stores. Although he did not confirm it, other residents claimed that Özsoy was also the deputy chair of the AKP’s Zeytinburnu district organization, which had tangible political ties with the local government. He made use of these ties in the multiple units he bought in The Istanbul site in exchange of his former Sümer apartments. Özsoy claimed that as a businessman and as a resident, he was an active supporter of the Sümer urban redevelopment project.

**Indirect actors**

Alsaç and Bakkal from the MZI mentioned the four-university collaboration and the IMM, which together prepared the IEMP and designated Zeytinburnu as a pilot district for redevelopment, as indirect actors. As mentioned earlier, the Sümer project’s site selection was partially based on the IEMP and the ISMEP reports. Once the project’s implementation phase started, these groups retired from the scheme because they had completed their duties. Bakkal added that the decision-making processes for Sümer’s selection and other redevelopment goals were completely political, therefore, the universities were not invited by the government.

The development of the Sümer case summarized above reveals that YDA-Kuruluş and Koç were two private groups involved in the project. YDA-Kuruluş was a consortium comprised of three firms, whereas the Koç Group is one of the largest and most powerful family-based holdings in Turkey. Demirci suggested not considering the YDA-Kuruluş as a project actor, because it was merely a contractor. He noted that had the project introduced the YDA-Kuruluş consortium to the community as a negotiator, both KİPTAŞ and the MZI would have had to face serious conflicts with the residents because the YDA-Kuruluş would bargain for unit allocations in its favor. Despite the Koç Group’s involvement in project negotiations and
decisions around the plan changes and unit stocks for Sümer residents, Demirci also denied that the Koç Group was a project actor. However, an anonymous interviewee defined Koç as a stakeholder that was indirectly involved in decision-making. According to her, the Koç Group was a main actor on the Istanbul portion of the project, not directly related to the Sahilpark site, which involved the residents. The interviewee also claimed that the group was the biggest beneficiary of the redevelopment because its land, which was formerly zoned for afforestation, was rezoned for housing and constructed as a gentrification site.

6.2.2. Dominant actors

Overall, all interview subjects defined KİPTAŞ and the MZI as main decision-makers of the Sümer redevelopment project. Household visits to Sümer residents were done by the KİPTAŞ General Director İsmet Yıldırım, Deputy General Director Semih Demirci, the MZI Mayor Murat Aydın, and Deputy Mayor Zafer Alsaç. Büyükçolak from KİPTAŞ claimed that these four people’s impressions of these visits formed the basis for initiation and initial formulation of the project.

KİPTAŞ

When asked whether KİPTAŞ or the MZI was the more dominant actor, Demirci responded that KİPTAŞ had to be more dominant in decision-making and more active on site, because it was KİPTAŞ that “set out the rules of the game,” and the MZI stood behind KİPTAŞ as the government agency. He claimed that KİPTAŞ forced the rules upon the community and the MZI, and did not allow any changes in rules throughout the project to remain accountable and trusted. Demirci also noted that besides the fact that the KİPTAŞ headquarters were located in Zeytinburnu, he was born and raised in the district like many Sümer residents; therefore,
he had a thorough understanding of the social relationships and thus held a natural weight in decision-making.

The MZI’s Bakkal confirmed KıPTAŞ’s dominance and stated that the MZI did not interfere with KıPTAŞ’s acts or decisions at any time. Adalı went further to claim that after the initial decision-making, the IMM-backed KıPTAŞ dismissed the MZI from the project picture completely: “KıPTAŞ threw Murat Aydın [the MZI mayor] away.” He continued with citing KıPTAŞ general director: “‘You give false promises to some people,’ he said to the MZI. ‘Who are you?’”

The MZI

Asked about the relative power levels of actors, Demirci suggested a descending sorting of the IMM, the MZI and KıPTAŞ, putting the MZI in a more powerful position than KıPTAŞ despite his above claims for KıPTAŞ’s dominance. He rationalized his suggestion by citing the IMM’s decision to commence Sümer’s redevelopment with the MZI and then leave the project’s execution to KıPTAŞ. Here, Demirci seemingly preferred a contractor role for KıPTAŞ, leaving the project’s initiation to the local governments. Alsaç preferred to favor the MZI Mayor Aydın as the project coordinator “despite the existence of the IMM” because the project site was located in the MZI’s jurisdiction, Zeytinburnu. He claimed that Mayor Aydın was the most responsible person for the scheme regarding project implementation and risks.

In line with these rationales, Alsaç argued that the MZI had the most say in decision-making process and thus, it was the most dominant actor. He justified this referring to the local identity of his institution, which thoroughly understood and kept in touch with the local community. However, when reminded about the IMM’s existence, he admitted that the IMM was the decision-maker, but the MZI was more dominant in generating ideas, implying that the ideas preceded the decisions.
6.3. Institutional policies and goals

Disaster mitigation

Alsaç defined the 1999 Marmara earthquakes as an opportunity for Zeytinburnu. Not only did the MZI aim to prepare the buildings for the expected Istanbul earthquake, but also to recover the district from the low quality of life threatened by the disaster risk. After all, he reminded, the project was called an “earthquake-focused urban redevelopment,” which was the first of its kind in Turkey. Bakkal recalled the IEMP as a means to alert the MZI for such redevelopment effort, which was already in the agenda of the municipality.

However, Demirci and Bakkal posed criticism to the redevelopment agenda, arguing that the government called the project with the earthquake reference to mask the real intentions. Actually, Demirci claimed that it was he who added “earthquake-focused urban redevelopment” to the name of the project in the first place. To explain why he did so, he admitted that the government perceived the idea of redevelopment through density increase before and independent from the disaster risks. Although he believed that securing the lives of Zeytinburnu residents was the project’s foremost objective, the means the redevelopment was practiced were not exactly compatible with this end. Nevertheless, because it was the government politicians’ decision to realize Sümer’s redevelopment, the project executors KİPTAŞ and the MZI had to pursue it and thus used disaster mitigation as a rationale of/for the urgency of the physical intervention and to cover the less community-friendly project decisions of the zoning change and the increased FAR.

Rehabilitation of the gecekondu areas

When asked about her institution’s drives for the redevelopment decision, Bakkal started with recalling the fact that Zeytinburnu was the home of first gecekondu settlement of
Turkey. It was also the first district of Turkey to go through a reclamion development plan according to the *Gecekondu* Law No 775. During the 60 years of low-quality *gecekondu* history of Zeytinburnu, many existing *gecekondu* s had been granted titles and given access to infrastructure, but Zeytinburnu still suffered from illegal and distorted settlements. Therefore, Bakkal argued, it was almost inevitable for Zeytinburnu to be one of the flagships of urban redevelopment in Istanbul.

Based on these facts, Bakkal suggested that the secondary purpose of the project was rehabilitation of the irregular and distorted residential areas. Demirci mirrored Bakkal’s suggestion by particularly adding the need for planned car parks and a social environment for the residents. He also mentioned the purpose of creating a safe and gated living space for the local population. Residents Cihangir and Özsoy believed such rehabilitation of Sümer neighborhood was in line with Istanbul’s redevelopment vision and very beneficial for both the residents and businessmen of the area.

**Economic profit**

According to interviewees’ interpretations, the above-mentioned and repeatedly stated political impetus behind the redevelopment decision as well as the selection of Sümer as the start of redevelopment in Zeytinburnu can be related to four factors that brought the project economic profit. First factor is the convenience of the vacant lots in close vicinity of the project area. KİPTAŞ interviewees as well as residents Cihangir and Adalı argued that the unbuilt soccer field was a great chance for the government to build the first phase while residents remained in their *gecekondu* s. Otherwise, KİPTAŞ would have had to pay rent allowance or draw the unit area deduction rate at higher than the actual 25%. Other vacant lot, which used to be a textile factory of Koç, was also an opportunity for the financial formulation of the project. The construction of *Sahilpark* and *The Istanbul* on these lots was
realized by YDA-Kuruluş simultaneously. The exorbitant profit generated by *The Istanbul* gentrification project enabled fund transfer toward *Sahilpark*, by which the project became considerably profitable for both private and government actors. Second, Bakkal explained that the concept design that was drawn and implemented by KİPTAŞ was an open ended planning tool that enabled the project to be reshaped in the most lucrative way. There were no legal impositions regarding the FAR or construction area. As a matter of fact, the first design composed of 8-to-10-story blocks was increased to blocks with 15 stories, which made redevelopment more profitable. Third, with speculations surrounding this redevelopment practice in addition to the locational advantages of the Sümer neighborhood, land prices increased by around three times in only the first two years of completion of *Sahilpark* and *The Istanbul*. Demirci saw this as a major advantage of the project for both formal actors and the residents. Fourth, as Adalı elaborated, at the upper-scale level, *Sahilpark* and *The Istanbul* projects proved the ability to realize profitable projects and thus increased the appeal and competitiveness of Zeytinburnu in favor of the government actors, in particular.

6.4. Factors affecting decision-making

6.4.1. Legal factors

*Illegal status of former settlements*

Based on his suggestion that 65% of the buildings in the Zeytinburnu district were illegal, Demirci attributed the project’s realization to the government’s legal power over residents: if a homeowner was not keen on signing the agreement, the MZI could expropriate and demolish his or her illegal building (i.e. with semi-legal *gecekondu* title, lacking the habitation permit
or construction servitude) according to Zoning Law No. 3194.119 Throughout the interview, Demirci repeatedly referred to the law as a tool that equipped the government with a major legal advantage during negotiations, calling it “the stick in the government’s hand.” He also claimed that the residents, who signed the project agreement willingly (e.g. Ferhat Cihangir and Sedat Küçükuygun) did so because their illegal units would become legalized thanks to the project. Indeed, Cihangir expressed content that the government overlooked their buildings’ illegal status and granted them rightful owner status.

**KİPTAŞ’s quasi-governmental status**

As a subsidiary of the IMM, KİPTAŞ is a public entity, but it has the power to act as a private company in the housing development sector. On the one hand, it is a public institution in that it is subject to the Public Procurement Law No. 4734, which allows it to open and conduct public bidding and auctions.120 The IMM owns all shares of the company, its board of directors comprises government officials of the IMM, and it handles the audits of the Turkish Court of Accounts.121 On the other hand, KİPTAŞ has private status in that it is subject to the Turkish Commercial Law No. 6102, which allows it to carry out commercial transactions and enter bidding in private status.122

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119 For information on the consequences of disagreements according to the Zoning Law No. 3194, see Gülkan (2001), and Uzun et al. (2009).

120 For more information on the Public Procurement Law No. 4734, see Onur, Özcan and Taş (2012) and Erdis (2013).

121 The Turkish Court of Accounts was established in 1862 by the Ottoman Sultan Aziz I as a supreme audit institution on the basis of the model in use in continental Europe, and France in particular. It has judicial power and functions through chambers. Its traditional structure has recently been affected by reforms to the system of public financial management and control in Turkey. For more information, see [http://www.sayistay.gov.tr/en/](http://www.sayistay.gov.tr/en/) (retrieved in June 2016).

122 For an examination of innovations and regulations of the Turkish Commercial Law No. 6102, see Tuan and Aroğlu (2014).
6.4.2. Political factors

Electoral concerns

When asked about how the local elections had affected the Sümer redevelopment project, Alsaç complained about the temporal limitations of projects due to elections in Turkey: local elections are held every five years, an interval which, he argued, forces the municipalities to complete redevelopment projects in this short timeframe. He believed that a redevelopment project of Sümer’s scale could be performed in a better planned and better organized fashion with 10-to-15-year projections. Demirci interpreted this as a common concern of politicians and municipalities in Turkey: local governments have to satisfy their voter base in election cycles, because in the end, their merit is measured in votes. He implied that while doing so, some mayors positioned themselves on the side of the community more than others. He praised Mayor Aydın for his positive attitude towards Zeytinburnu residents and quoted him: “My voters are my priority, because I am in this position thanks to them. I have to serve them. I should not offend them so that they vote for me in the next elections.”

Demirci also emphasized IMM Mayor Kadir Topbaş’s request to KİPTAŞ to settle friendly agreements with residents. Nonetheless, he defined KİPTAŞ as a firm “above politics,” and so as the deputy general manager of KİPTAŞ, he believed that it would not have been right for him to view the project through the lens of electoral concerns: his firm held legal and financial leverage of which the residents were aware, and residents thus had to comply with the project conditions KİPTAŞ set.
Demirci viewed redevelopment projects such as Sümer as highly risky, as he thought that they were susceptible to “gossip” and “speculation.”\textsuperscript{123} They could also be used as opportunities by opposition parties to advance their interests, as the CHP attempted in Sümer.\textsuperscript{124} He stated that, as a result, the Sümer neighborhood reported the lowest proportion of AKP votes in Zeytinburnu in the last local elections. However, if the government were to hold an election then (at the time of the interview), Demirci argued, Sümer would raise the highest proportion of AKP votes, because, with the first phase over, people had moved to Sahilpark and were happy in their new homes. He further claimed that members of the local community frequently visited him demanding the expansion of the redevelopment activity to other neighborhoods after the planned third phase, but that he balked at expressing support for such an expansion because he thought that political risks and organizational challenges made redevelopment in Zeytinburnu too difficult. Küçükuygun, a resident who supported the AKP, argued that even if the approximately 1,200 voters of Sümer affected by the project were discontent, the AKP did not need their votes: they could change neither the party’s nor the mayoral candidates’ agendas with such small numbers because the AKP had already been quite strong in Zeytinburnu for many years.

\textit{Party unanimity and partisanship}

In-depth interviews have revealed that the AKP-centered political agenda affected relationship dynamics within both government institutions and the Sümer community. Bakkal specifically stated that one of the strongest political factors that enabled and shaped the

\textsuperscript{123} Although Demirci did not explicitly state what he meant by “gossip” and “speculation,” based on his other statements, it can be interpreted that he meant the community’s opposition to the project due to the economic profit assertions.

\textsuperscript{124} Residents Adalı and Küçükuygun mentioned that the CHP organization claimed to offer smaller unit area deduction rates to the rightful owners, but there is no concrete account that any of these offers produced any tangible outcomes.
project was party unanimity at the state, metropolitan and district levels. Had the IMM and
the MZI not been of the same party, she claimed, KİPTAŞ would not have become involved,
and the MZI might thus never have initiated the project. Working towards the same party
vision, both institutions wanted to contribute to the AKP’s nation-wide redevelopment agenda
and thus increase their political credibility.

Adalı had similar views about the weight of party unanimity as a political factor. He
further argued that if the district municipality had been governed by an opposing party, not
only would KİPTAŞ not have been involved, but the IMM would have threatened lawsuits
against the project. Although he had multiple court disputes with MZI Mayor Aydın, and the
two did not get along well whenever they met, Adalı claimed that Aydın would welcome him
in his office for any matter; however, if Adalı brought up Sümer’s redevelopment conditions,
Aydın would refuse to see him because he was not an AKP partisan. On a similar note, Özsoy
suggested that the recent 2014 local government elections had had a negative impact on
solving the conflict with small businesses, which is to be discussed later in this chapter. Some
businessmen had to keep silent against the government’s impositions to avoid any future
challenges that would affect their business. Under normal circumstances, Özsoy claimed,
İSPER and the business community would have a relatively stronger hand in the decision-
making process.

As a supporter of another conservative political party, the Nationalist Movement Party
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi — MHP from hereon), Adalı interpreted this as a consequence of
the AKP’s political domination: “Let’s say, if I become the ruling party and put my humanity
aside, I start dominating others, too. I become like them.” He argued that the AKP’s
stranglehold on local politics happened as a result of the public’s ignorance. He recalled
reminding one of his fellow residents of the AKP’s (he made no distinction between the AKP
and the government) unfair unit distribution in Sümer, and his friend, agreeing with Adalı, cursed the AKP. Only half an hour later, when Adalı asked him why he voted for the AKP candidate in local elections, the friend responded: “Because he is Muslim.”

*Community’s sympathy toward the AKP and Mayor Aydın*

AKP supporters in Zeytinburnu, including those who resided in Sümer, had strong emotional ties to their party. Cihangir, an AKP supporter who now lived in Sahilpark and owned an auto mechanic business in the neighborhood, believed that the success of the AKP in Zeytinburnu depended on Mayor Aydın’s personality as much as his performance. He viewed Aydın as a proper, modest man who frequently visited him and other business owners at their shops to listen to their concerns and demands. He also recalled the many occasions on which he was warmly welcomed at the municipal building when he sought help.

Cihangir and Küçükuygun believed that AKP followers voted for their party out of blind loyalty, not according to the redevelopment terms and how the projects were rated. Even if the government deducted 60% of the unit area from all pre-2009 units instead of 25%, Cihangir claimed, the sympathizers would have voted for the AKP again. For instance, when his second home, which he bought in Sümer in 2009, was assessed at a 60% deduction, he did not complain although he thought the reduction was a little too high, because he was aware of the terms of the project, which the government maintained unchanged when he bought the unit. Again, he attributed much of the AKP’s popularity in Sümer to the persona of Murat Aydın: “He is a sympathetic mayor. He endears himself to his people.” Cihangir noted that if voters loved a politician, the smear campaigns did not matter; the community would elect that same person.
6.4.3. Financial factors

Construction-dependent national economic policy

When asked about the most important factor underlying Sümer’s redevelopment, Küçükuygun tied the project to broader economic trends. He recalled then Prime Minister Erdoğan’s words when the economic distress in Europe broke out in early 2000s: “We will be barely affected.” Küçükuygun claimed that Turkey overcame this economic distress through investment in the construction sector, which created jobs and spilled over into adjacent industries, such as cement production and interior design. He saw Sümer’s redevelopment as a spur for many similar projects to follow. When confronted with the argument that construction was not an economic driver as sustainable as other sectors such as industry and manufacturing, he defended the AKP government by giving pre-AKP examples of false development and industrial site selection decisions made by former ruling parties: the current industrial sites around Istanbul such as in Çerkezköy lacked operating treatment facilities and thus impacted the environment and Istanbul residents’ lives negatively. The same defensive attitude was adopted by the other pro-AKP resident interviewee, Cihangir, throughout the interview.

KİPTAŞ’s non-profit status and economic gains

As examined earlier, KİPTAŞ, like TOKİ, is a non-profit firm that can earn financial profit but must invest that profit in the public interest. In response to the question of whether KİPTAŞ could build a public housing project under a deficit to be covered by profit from other projects or the creation of other sources of funds, Demirci emphasized that KİPTAŞ was accountable to the Turkish Court of Accounts, so that it could not plan for a deficit in any way. He explained that the 25% unit area deduction KİPTAŞ calculated was what enabled the
firm to cover its project costs and the community to avoid paying any monetary compensation for their units’ upgrades. Demirci called this percentage “the zero point.” He proudly claimed that KİPTAŞ was going to finish the project with a mere TRY 1 profit: “I cannot go for a deficit, but I will say I did not make any profit from this project.”

Demirci repeatedly emphasized the non-profit status of his firm throughout the interview. He believed the project would have no chance of success if KİPTAŞ had pursued a commercial approach. Instead, reflecting on its subsidiary status under the IMM, he claimed KİPTAŞ approached the project in Sümer from the standpoint of providing public housing, which brought the project public satisfaction and success. However, as examined above, Bakkal claimed that KİPTAŞ produced the project’s concept design in the most profitable way that was in times opposed to public-friendly planning criteria (i.e. increase in FAR and the number of new units, and gentrification of the site).

_Profit seeking at Sümer and Zeytinburnu_

In the discussion of institutional policies and goals above, the drive for economic profit behind the Sümer redevelopment project was analyzed through four factors (i.e. involving the adjacent state- and private-owned vacant lots in the project; taking impaired development decisions to maximize project feasibility; increasing land prices through market speculation; and encouraging upper-scale redevelopment through market competition). Based on these motivations, Adalı claimed that both KİPTAŞ and the MZI were not being sincere when they said they would not continue redeveloping Sümer after completing the third phase, giving examples of ongoing and planned projects in the close vicinity of Sümer designed by both institutions (e.g. the extension of their Sümer redevelopment project down to the recently gentrified Denizatı housing site, located approximately 250 m from Sahilpark in the Sümer neighborhood, and the Akıllı Evler project led by KİPTAŞ in the adjacent Merkezefendi
neighborhood). In short, he believed that what had started in their neighborhood with Sahilpark would shortly expand to all Zeytinburnu, including the Zeytinburnu’s Kazlıçeşme shoreline.

For his own part, Adalı predicted that through this grand redevelopment plan, KİPTAŞ would eventually allocate the coastal region to the south of Denizatı to itself and its private partners, deriving huge profits from the TRY 2-3 million unit price in this region versus the average TRY 500-600,000 price for the units that were distributed to the residents in inner Zeytinburnu. He noted that the Sümer community heard the news of new public-private partnerships and new redevelopment projects led by the MZI and/or KİPTAŞ in Zeytinburnu everyday. These claims were also implied by other interviewees such as the Sümer Mukhtar Coşkun. This profit-oriented approach, the residents claimed, was the main reason for their opposition to project decisions such as the 25% unit area deduction and the excessive increase in the proposed building density.

6.4.4. Institutional factors

Increasing the project’s cogency

Both Demirci of KİPTAŞ and Alsaç of the MZI admitted that they needed the MZI-KİPTAŞ partnership to realize the Sümer redevelopment project, suggesting two principal motivations for such cooperation: the financial and legal interdependence of these institutions, explained earlier in this chapter, and the fact that together they would appear stronger and thus influence the community more easily. Demirci admitted that, despite its positive public image, had it not partnered with the MZI, KİPTAŞ’s para-governmental status could have been interpreted by the community simply as a profit-driven project initiative. For the same speculative reasons, he argued, the project partnership would not have been able to even
realize the project, if they had involved a private developer as an active decision-maker who negotiated with residents.

Despite institutional advantages—in particular legal tools such as expropriation—the project partnership possessed, Demirci claimed that KİPTAŞ followed an empathetic approach toward the residents. He believed that it was natural that the community would react negatively towards the local government that threatened to evict them from the homes they had earned after long years of hard work and saving: “I would resist, too, if I were them. I would ask them to convince me.” With this in mind, KİPTAŞ and the MZI decided that the best approach was to build Sahilpark on the vacant lot and show the residents proof of the life they promised rather than a mere project model. If they had conducted negotiations over a model, as they did in regular build-and-sell projects of KİPTAŞ, Demirci believed, they would have still been struggling to convince the people.

On the other end of the actors’ spectrum, the community, there was still suspicion. Like Adalı, Coşkun thought that there was a strong political opportunism involved in the project decisions. He particularly questioned the profit KİPTAŞ and the MZI gained from The Istanbul, which they allowed to be built on a lot owned by the Koç Group (which was supposed to be an afforestation area). He believed that the government promoted the rehabilitation of the disaster-prone illegal settlements through wide media coverage and public billboards, but that its real attitude was perfunctory: “Eh, we have redeveloped the residents’ houses, too.”

**Institutional coordination and lack of competitiveness**

Both Demirci and Alsaç agreed on the lack of competitiveness between their institutions and believed that competitiveness was replaced with commensurate collaboration in the Sümer case. Bakkal, however, suggested that the MZI assisted and supported KİPTAŞ in that the mayor’s office approached the whole redevelopment idea positively from the beginning.
She assessed the MZI’s performance positively in keeping its end of the bargain up. Alsaç went further in claiming that when he looked back, he did not see any mistakes in the formulation or execution of the project on the MZI’s end and on the whole.

6.5. Informed conflicts

6.5.1. Between formal actors

When asked whether there had been any conflicts between KİPTAŞ and the MZI, Demirci reported that KİPTAŞ never encountered problems with the local municipality and highlighted the fact that KİPTAŞ took sole control of project negotiation with residents. Bakkal also denied any conflict between the MZI and KİPTAŞ; however, Alsaç stated that there was some friction during the initial stages of the project to a certain degree, although in the end both parties came to a consensus concerning all decision-making points.

Project method: rent allowance vs. transfer in phases

Alsaç recalled discussing the project method with KİPTAŞ executives until they established a mutually agreeable road map. He referred to two issues to illustrate what that method encompassed: “Should we accommodate the residents in rental units with rent allowance, or should we build the project in phases? Should we deduct 25% or 30% of the residents’ units?” The latter question is analyzed in detail in a separate section below, as all actor groups agreed that it was a point of considerable contention between the formal actors and the community.

The alternative to rental allowance, Alsaç reported, was designing small project phases so that the government could transfer some portion of residents to the newly built housing in a short timeframe and demolish these residents’ homes in time to implement the next phase.
In addition to the MZI and KİPTAŞ, he identified the residents as party to this conflict, because both institutions aimed at meeting their demands. In fact, he claimed that at the end of the day, all exchange of views between the MZI and KİPTAŞ were done to satisfy the community’s will and needs. He proudly suggested that Mayor Aydın was the primary mediator of the discussions, suggesting that despite the IMM's precedence over the MZI, the implementation was in Zeytinburnu, and thus Aydın had to be the leading individual responsible for the project’s execution and political risks. Alsaç was also proud of the resulting decision to transfer residents in phases, which the MZI had argued for, because it was what the community had desired. By the end of the first phase, the project was able to transfer 370 of the 1250 ‘rightful’ households to the 460 Sahilpark units allocated to them.

State Treasury’s objection to the expropriation decision

Bakkal stated that despite a lack of serious conflicts between formal actors, a state institution outside of the project scheme—the Treasury of the Ministry of Finance, which initially owned the vacant soccer field lot—objected to the MZI’s expropriation decision: “Why did [the MZI] send [the Treasury] off to a worse location?” She argued that she did not explicitly know the reasons, but believed that the Treasury wanted to partake in the Sümer redevelopment project’s economic gains through keeping the ownership and assigning the use of the lot to the MZI.

In defense of the MZI, Bakkal offered that it was within the organization’s power to perform land readjustment in line with its planning decisions. In other words, it was an autonomous decision of the MZI whose authorization was granted by the Zoning Law No. 3164 and the Municipality Law No. 5393. Further, the plans were approved by the municipal council and opened to public opinion in line with the legal planning process. There was no facilitator during the negotiations between the Treasury and the MZI. At the end of a long process of
persistent arguments, the Treasury opened a court case against the MZI, which had not concluded at the time that the interview was held in March 2014.

6.5.2. Between formal actors and community

Political frictions

The extensive informing and persuasion process at the KİPTAŞ Sümer redevelopment office lasted almost a year in 2008-2009. Demirci stated more than once that the residents' reactions were wide-ranging; some residents reacted with “May God bless you,” while others accused the government: “This is a political project. You will nestle your political friends here!” To illustrate KİPTAŞ’s interactions with critics, Demirci recalled a three-hour discussion he had with a resident that resulted in the following exchange (starting with the resident):

— I am opposed, because I don’t share your views or ideology.
— Have I ever asked about your political views?
— No.
— Have I ever asked about your religious views?
— No.
— That is because we are merely doing business here. We are not interested in anyone’s personal life. You cannot blame us for making benefits for our political followers.
— Alright. The project looks great and all, but because the success of the project would hurt us, I won’t support you.
— Alright then. We will see again after the court’s expropriation decision.

There were also allegations of more heated, even physical, exchanges between residents and the government. The anonymous interviewee from the MZI who opposed the project as
well as the AKP’s rhetoric recalled an incident at IMM Mayor Topbaş’s public announcement of the project. After some residents shouted at Topbaş “This is not urban redevelopment, this is lucrative redevelopment! We won’t let you benefit from our homes!,” the mayor’s guards pulled them aside and assaulted them. Adalı claimed a similar incident occurred when he wanted to express his concerns at a meeting between the top project executives and a group of 8-10 opposing rightful owners; according to Adalı, they were publicly labeled as “agitators” and assaulted. Cihangir, too, mentioned a few meetings with such conflicts, but he argued that the antagonists were very few and not even rightful owners but tenants. Demirci admitted that in some cases there was trouble but added that the number of opponents did not exceed even 10% of the total number of rightful owners. At the end of these conflicts, the anonymous interviewee argued, the government switched from the “with-residents” stance to a “despite-residents” argument with rhetoric similar to the AKP’s: “We are working for their benefit but they are thankless, they don’t even understand.”

Initial negotiations for the project

As mentioned above, the initial model of the Sahilpark project presented to the public differed from the project’s eventual outcome: Coşkun stated that on the model were two 20-plus-storey towers of luxury condos next to the lower housing blocks that would be allocated to the rightful owners of Sümer. He recalled KİPTAŞ President Yıldırım’s words when the residents asked about the towers: “These are symbolic structures of the project, just like a fountain that represents a neighborhood. You are not involved in these buildings.” Like Coşkun, the residents foresaw that those towers would be enough to subsidize all project costs and create profit for the government. They did not think the project’s model honest and rejected the first proposal.
The distrust of the residents continued after the design was revised to involve only lower-rise blocks for the rightful owners. Büyükçolak argued that the residents objected to the overall project: “Why are you disturbing us? We did not ask for a solution or for your help. You want to develop very high-rise buildings here. You will not allocate all of them to us. You are after profit only.” One MZI interviewee further argued that the top executives of the MZI and KİPTAŞ had to end the house visits of 2008 after a few months because they were denied entry by the residents. In fact, he argued, the number of households these officials visited was well below the 250-300 that Alşaç and Demirci suggested. Later, led by Büyükçolak at the KİPTAŞ Sümer Redevelopment Office, the KİPTAŞ personnel had to work hard for 5-6 months to convince the residents before they could gather a considerable amount of support for the project. Büyükçolak stated that it became easier after they convinced the first few residents to sign the agreements. When some residents sold their Sahilpark units because they were too small for them after the deduction, others saw the increase in the new housing market—Alşaç noted that the units had more than doubled in value—and rushed to sign agreements at the KİPTAŞ office. In fact, interviewees from all actor groups, namely Alşaç, Demirci, Coşkun, Büyükçolak, Özsoy and residents Adalı, Cihangir and Küçükuygun, agreed that the project was very profitable for the rightful owners. Alşaç went further, claiming that one should question the “real intentions” of a person who would oppose signing an agreement which guaranteed a 100% value increase and a brand-new earthquake-resilient unit with underground parking and playgrounds on site.

Claims for intangible qualities in new unit allocations

After the residents were convinced to be involved in the project, new problems arose. Demirci recalled some residents who claimed to own a unit in the project area but lacked title deeds. KİPTAŞ officials then asked their neighbors and Mukhtar Coşkun, whether they
could confirm these residents’ ownership. Coşkun also recalled many rightful owners visiting him and the Sümer redevelopment office with claims that their units were more valuable than their neighbors’ and were thus worth more or better units in Sahilpark. Their reasons were many: the relatively young age of a building versus the adjacent older ones; orientation, number of floors, or quality of appliances versus other units in the same building; that the unit faced a main street versus a unit in the back of a building on a small street; that the building was built for a higher cost and according to the earthquake regulations versus very low-quality buildings around it; that the building was totally legal with all municipal taxes and fees paid versus an illegal building that lacked construction permits.

KİPTAŞ stood firm that the unit area value would remain the same, and there would be a 25% deduction for all units independent of these conditions. However, it suggested that units with better conditions would be given more valuable Sahilpark units with orientation or floor advantages. Coşkun was not sure whether the residents with such claims were given better new units or satisfied with what they received, but he argued that the residents were justifiably distrustful of the government. Demirci, on the other hand, expressed his disappointment in residents’ reactions, expecting them to welcome the project “with a flourish of trumpets.”

*Financial status of residents*

Küçükuygun argued that agreement was particularly hard for the residents who would have to go into debt to move to Sahilpark after the 25% area deduction of their already small former units. There were many elderly residents living on their humble retirement pensions, and many that had to afford a living at or under the poverty line. It was also difficult for these residents to afford the monthly maintenance charges of a gated community with security and building maintenance staff.
On the other hand, Alsaç recalled that the socio-economic survey the MZI had conducted with the Sümer residents revealed 1038 households under financial hardship based on the residents’ verbal statements. It was for this reason, Alsaç and Demirci claimed, that the MZI-KİPTAŞ partnership decided to set the reduction rate at 25%, which would relieve the residents of the project contribution fees and allow them to incur minimal debt in cases where their new units exceeded the area allocated to them. The new unit types were designed in footage and numbers to correspond to the existing units of this financially incapable resident majority. However, both Alsaç and Demirci argued that after seeing the value potential of the new construction, residents demanded larger or more units in Sahilpark. When reminded that they suffered financial hardship they responded: “Now I say I can pay. It’s not your business!” Alsaç called this the “under-the-pillow money” that the Sümer community had, and added sarcastically: “We realized we had cried over spilt milk. My citizens were indeed rich!”

This new reality created tension between formal actors and the community because the project was not prepared to accommodate changing demands; KİPTAŞ, for example, refused to increase the unit inventory allocated for resident use. Demirci stated that some residents accepted what they were offered, while some did not. The concerns of those who opposed were set aside for subsequent project phases. He also admitted that the project partnership should have conducted a more thorough survey with residents before the design stage to reveal more accurate results. Had it done so, the agreement process might have been much smoother and shorter. Having learned their lesson, Demirci noted, KİPTAŞ and the MZI were now conducting such in-depth surveys with the residents of the second phase of the Sümer redevelopment project.
Living conditions in Sahilpark

After moving to their new homes in Sahilpark, some residents experienced challenges they were not prepared for. A repeatedly mentioned problem concerned the unit plans. Most units, especially the smaller ones, had open kitchens that were part of the living room. This conflicted with the cultural expectations of the community, as residents Küçükuygun and Adalı suggested. Coşkun recalled one particular resident who came to him in frustration: “If my fellows from my rural hometown see this kitchen, they’ll make fun of me. It doesn’t even have a door!” Büyükçolak reported that unit types of the second phase of the project would not have open kitchens. There were other complaints about the low quality of labor and interior materials—e.g. plumbing had to be replaced frequently, and there were multiple cases of ill-sloped floor tiles in bathrooms. Coşkun noted that had the redevelopment project centered on the residents through community involvement and pluralistic approaches, they would not have had such complaints.

The anonymous interviewee raised concerns about the cost of living in Sahilpark. Accordingly, the fact that the residents were now happy with a more comfortable and civilized lifestyle, using modern appliances and living in more luxurious buildings, did not mean much, since such a standard of living was simply not sustainable. The interviewee argued that soon residents would start complaining about their gas bills, that they did not have to pay before because they had used propane cylinders in their old kitchens and bathrooms. Besides, some had already complained about the “concrete jungle” they had to live in. As analyzed earlier and stated by residents Cihangir, Adalı and Küçükuygun, the security and maintenance fees of their relatively luxurious housing sites were also a common problem for many Sahilpark residents, who were not accustomed to such expenses in their earlier, more modest lives. The anonymous subject also claimed that the considerable
increase in their unit values did not mean much for the people who needed shelter more than an investment.

All in all, despite the complaints discussed above, all Sahilpark residents interviewed reported that they enjoyed their elevated lifestyles. They could now enjoy sitting at the pergola by the fountain and did not have to worry when their children went out to play in their gated community (Figure 33). Cihangir described their newfound content: “I know an old neighbor who could not even walk straight on the street before. Now he works out at the fitness station in the courtyard in his sweatsuits and enjoys it very much!”

Figure 33. Sahilpark courtyard and amenities. Photographs by the author, April 2014.

6.5.3. Specific conflict: unit area deduction

Almost all interviewees suggested that the most consistent conflict between the residents and the government centered on the unit area deduction rate. Aside from questioning the very need for unit area deduction at all, residents were also critical of what they saw as unjust allocation and equalization practices for the Sahilpark units.

Array of resident claims

As analyzed earlier, the determination of 25% as the deduction rate was found too high by many residents, who simply wanted to benefit from the project that was initiated upon their consent without any area loss. On the one hand, as Adali repeatedly mentioned, the
residents suspected that the government would make a profit even if it settled for one-for-one allocation. On the other hand, Alsaç argued that the residents wanted a bigger share of the project after seeing how appealing it was, but their demand was unfeasible because the project had been designed to produce unit types in numbers and footage based on residents’ initial claims that were found to be false later in the project. For instance, the MZI and KİPTAŞ planned for 50 75-sqm units in Sahilpark to replace the same number of 100-sqm units in Sümer. They assumed that the few cases of residents demanding larger units and the few cases of residents leaving the project without an agreement would balance each other out. In reality, however, Alsaç claimed that 90% of the rightful owners demanded units larger than those with 25% deducted area.

Bakkal reported that even more residents objected to the deduction after the authorities announced that the rate for units purchased after August 2009 would be raised to 60%. The rightful owners argued that they should be exempt from the increase. According to Alsaç and Demirci, the decision was taken simply to “protect” the rightful owners from any land speculation and to preserve the homogeneity of the local community in Sümer. A few residents, such as Cihangir, who bought his second unit in 2009, already had plans to buy another unit in their home neighborhood and so had to oblige with the rule. Few others, both residents and ‘outsiders,’ foresaw the potential profit of the value increase and invested in Sümer despite the elevated deduction rate. In Cihangir’s case, this meant merging the areas of two existing units to merit a larger Sahilpark home, in which he and his family now happily occupy.

Küçükuygun stated that the Sahilpark unit types offered areas of 60, 71, 83, 99, 105, 121, and over 130 sqm with open or enclosed kitchens and one, two or three bedrooms. He and Coşkun recalled multiple cases in which the existing unit was already too small (e.g. 60 sqm).
and did not correspond to a unit in *Sahilpark* after the 25% deduction. To be eligible for the smallest unit available in *Sahilpark*, the owners of such existing units were forced to pay for the difference at prices above market value. Coşkun recalled the equalization price was TRY 1,500 per sqm in 2007; Bakkal claimed that this rate was quite high for many low-income families when they had to pay compensation for a bigger unit in *Sahilpark*. Both Bakkal and Coşkun stated that for the project to be responsible and resident-friendly, the authorities should have formulated a less cumbersome solution for many small unit owners, such as adding only construction costs to the equalization price. The application of the 25% deduction was also problematic in some cases: Bakkal reported that multiple residents applied to the MZI in frustration because they had been allocated *Sahilpark* units well under 75% the size of their Sümer apartments. The reason behind such misallocations was simple: Coşkun and Büyükçolak claimed that KİPTAŞ ran out of available unit inventory after the initial allocation stage.

*The government’s stance*

According to many interviewees including Demirci, Bakkal, and the residents, there were only two parties to the conflict: KİPTAŞ and the rightful owners. Bakkal explained that the MZI’s active role in the project had diminished after the Ministry of Public Works and Development designated KİPTAŞ as the sole project executor early in the project. This made KİPTAŞ the only legal addressee of complaints; however, to voice their complaints and claims, the rightful owners frequently went to their local government, the MZI, with which they historically had stronger bonds. Bakkal stated that the MZI supported KİPTAŞ in order to assure the project’s success. She added that the residents should compromise to an extent for disaster-focused redevelopment projects like this one, because in the end, the government was working to increase their quality of life. Alsaç had a slightly different approach to the
MZI’s role. He argued that the MZI was the “referee” of the project that assured that both government and residents had fair shares.

When asked how different parties steered the conflict, Demirci replied that KİPTAŞ did not yield to demands at all and explained: “Tolerance is a serious problem at that point. The news travels fast to everyone. If you tolerate it at all, you are done.” He then complained that residents pushed for changes despite this firm stance and explained that KİPTAŞ had to persuade some residents to support the project over and over again. According to Demirci, the only reason for the set deduction rates was the cost of the redevelopment project. Bakkal and Adalı confirmed KİPTAŞ’s inflexibility during negotiations over the unit area deduction rate. Adalı claimed that not only did KİPTAŞ officials not negotiate, they often showed a negative attitude: “Okay, don’t sign the agreement. We don’t care.” However, Cihangir argued that concerned residents, who, for instance, lived in a 60 sqm unit in Sümer, were suggested an incentive by KİPTAŞ: they were forgiven half the interest of their loan debt by the Ministry of Public Works and Development (which was later renamed the Ministry of Environment and Urbanism). He also added that despite its characterization by critics to the contrary, KİPTAŞ had been quite community-friendly throughout the project.

A remarkable clarification on the project partnership’s attitude and the end of the conflict came from Alsaç. He asserted that many residents were obliged to agree to the Sahilpark unit they were offered because they simply had no other choice. To make the “obligation” point explicit, he revealed a mutual January 2013 announcement of the MZI and KİPTAŞ: “We told them, ‘Folks, you are going to forfeit your rightful status unless you claim your new unit within two months. We are going to sell the unclaimed units to others.’ And they all agreed.” He admitted that this was how they gave away 350 units. At the end of February 2013, keys of Sahilpark units were submitted to the residents who agreed. Alsaç
defended their stance and announcement with the residents’ misconception: “At first, they fancied that they could influence us through pressure, that their cumulative power would get them the nod; but in time, they saw that it was not the case.”

**Efforts of the residents, speculators and facilitators**

As Bakkal put it, the residents “ran around in circles” in their individual efforts to find a solution to their demands, but they ended up in KİPTAŞ, which was the only place to find one. She, Demirci and Küçükuygun argued that there was no mediator during the negotiation process between the residents and KİPTAŞ, which became heated at times. When asked whether the residents had tried to form an organized attempt at negotiating, both Küçükuygun and Adalı recalled how they individually called for a neighborhood association in the very beginning of the project when the authorities conducted the house visits; disappointed by their fellow Sümer residents’ neglect and ignorance, however, they eventually abandoned their efforts. Adalı claimed that he and other residents lobbied to increase the building height of Sahilpark to reduce the project costs and thus the 25% deduction rate or the unit area cost, but that they were denied any compromise, with KİPTAŞ claiming that the project terms had already been approved by the municipal council. Concerning this point, Adalı criticized the municipal board members of the opposition parties: “They should have come to us before the project terms became definite to inform and advise us on what was to be done and what we could do.” On the contrary, Cihangir recalled that the MZI council members from the CHP tried to organize and seek the support of the neighborhood men in local coffee houses, arguing for the possibility of the one-for-one option, but did not attract considerable attention from the AKP-follower majority.

Demirci mentioned speculation about the deduction rate initiated by the district organization of the CHP, speculation which Coşkun conveyed in more detail. Before the local
elections of 2009, Adil Emecan, who was the CHP’s mayoral candidate for Zeytinburnu, specifically targeted the Sümer residents, arguing for the possibility of a one-for-one formulation against Mayor Aydın’s 25% deduction proposal. At the time, the AKP’s mayoral candidate was not set, but Aydın was highly favored to extend his mayorship in Zeytinburnu. A Sümer native and architect who was well-known in the neighborhood, Cemil Coşkunbudak, was also a potential AKP nominee. Seeking to siphon off support from Emecan and Aydın, Coşkunbudak gathered the Zeytinburnu neighborhood mukhtars, including Coşkun of Sümer, and made a slide presentation with his redevelopment version based on the one-on-one alternative in Sümer. One month later, he promoted his project to the Sümer residents. In the meeting, Coşkunbudak promised to bring the residents’ concerns about the 25% deduction rate to IMM Mayor Topbaş and explain to him the feasibility of the one-for-one option. Coşkun claimed that this promise was misinterpreted by the Sümer homeowners as a promise to realize the one-for-one plan and resulted in misplaced high hopes among the community. He also suggested that the AKP might have put forward Coşkunbudak as an alternative in response to Emecan’s claims and the unrest against the 25% deduction that was rising in the community. In the end, Coşkun conveyed, in order to cease the resulting speculation at the community level and limit the risk of losing Aydın’s votes, the mayor and KİPTAŞ executives kick-started their project with a 25% deduction before the local elections of 2009. Demirci argued that it was impossible to go one-for-one anyway: “How can you even do it? How much are you going to increase the density? It’s nonsense.”

Overall, Coşkun implied that he found the MZI’s and KİPTAŞ’s approach to be disrespectful to the community because both institutions believed that the rightful owners were obliged to them, a claim which Alsaç and Demirci explicitly and repeatedly made during interviews. As discussed in a previous section, although his position as the Sümer neighborhood mukhtar by its very nature involved acting as a facilitator or a “bridge”
between the government and the community, Coşkun chose not to take either side because
he saw the danger of being held responsible by the residents if things went wrong. He also
felt uneasy about the authorities’ above-mentioned stance against the residents.

However, Coşkun stated that on the many occasions the residents came to ask his opinion
on the project, in particular the 25% deduction rate, he encouraged them to agree to the
proposed terms: “I don’t have a home in the project area, but if I were you I would accept
it.” He rationalized his position by arguing that the authorities’ objective of profit
maximization would be beneficial for the residents as well (i.e. through value creation,
increase in density, reducing construction costs, etc.). It was already evident that the land
prices were going to increase considerably. In addition, Coşkun saw and explained to his
community the advantages of the lack of displacement or temporary transfer: they were to
stay in their neighborhoods and in their apartments until they witnessed the completion of
their new homes in Sahilpark. This latter aspect of the project, he argued, was advantageous
when compared to many projects that convinced residents to consent with mere models.
Finally, Adalı recalled that Sümer natives such as Ayhan Özsoy and Mahmut Şeker, who had
tangible ties with the AKP’s Zeytinburnu district organization, tried to persuade the rightful
owners to sign the agreements, arguing that KİPTAŞ was a credible and reliable government
institution.

**Resulting agreements**

In conclusion, as stated by all interviewees and conveyed above, the residents were
forced to consent to the 25% unit area deduction rate. The KİPTAŞ Sümer redevelopment
office invited the rightful owners one by one to sign the agreements soon after the
completion of construction at Sahilpark in 2009. Many residents welcomed the office’s
invitations. Many of the opposing residents also signed the agreements soon before the turnkey in February 2013.

Although they could not provide numbers, Adalı and Küçükuygun argued that some residents, whose former homes were too small to be eligible for a Sahilpark unit, had to sell their property and drop out of the project, while others agreed to pay for the excess unit area on KİPTAŞ’s terms. Küçükuygun gave the example of two brothers who merged their former units and received one 105-sqm unit in Sahilpark, which they now rented and split the rental income. He argued that when they sold their shares after two years for around TRY 600,000, each of the brothers would be able to buy one decent apartment elsewhere.

Cihangir purchased a second apartment in 2009 to merge with his previous apartment, despite knowing that the deduction rate would be 60%. All in all, the residents believed that their profit from the project was twice the value of their former homes, and that it continued to increase. Bakkal reported that there were still residents who opposed unfair allocations and wanted to sue the project management: these residents called or submitted petitions to the MZI’s planning office, which forwarded these appeals to KİPTAŞ. She did not report any numbers for her statement.

6.5.4. Specific conflict: financial dilemma of small businesses

The “big problem” of taxation

İSPER President Özsoy claimed that in the beginning, the Sümer redevelopment project news was highly welcomed by the owners of all 24 stores located within the project borders, who saw it as an opportunity for a profitable upgrade of their stores. However, neither the business owners nor the MZI and KİPTAŞ were aware of the “bad lottery” awaiting them: the store owners were merely told that their unit would be renewed with a 25% area deduction.
Büyükçolak explained the “big problem:” In Turkey, the transactions within urban redevelopment projects were subject to 1% added-value tax for housing units, which is a remission granted by the state. Commercial units, however, are not subject to such a subsidy; they are subject to an 18% added-value tax, because the state (specifically, the Ministry of Finance) perceives businesses as for-profit entities, which have to pay taxes for all business transactions they perform. The 18% tax rate amounted to TRY 360,000 (versus only TRY 20,000 at 1% rate) for the Sahilpark stores, each of which was valued at approximately TRY 2 million as of 2014. In addition to the added-value tax, the businesses were also subject to income taxes for the transaction in question, which, as Özsoy claimed, increased their tax expense to around TRY 1 million per owner on average. As a general rule, added-value and income taxes are paid by the recipients who—in this case are the store owners—who refused to pay such an exorbitant amount.

Özsoy argued that it was unfair that the businesses were excluded from benefitting from redevelopment subsidies and considered operational during the project, especially when it was the government that called for the redevelopment of the Sümer neighborhood. He added that even the recent Redevelopment Law No. 6306, which involves subsidies for the governments, developers and homeowners, did not immunize the commercial unit owners from such tax burdens. The issue has thus continued to be a matter of contention between government and local businesses.

Other less persistent issues

Büyükçolak claimed that the store owners were also critical of the physical conditions of the Sahilpark stores. For instance, the facades of most stores were now narrower, which, he argued, was inevitable because KİPTAŞ had to fit the same number of stores as the existing ones on the main-street-facing facade of Sahilpark. Özsoy mentioned the columns and beams
inside the new stores that diminished the practicality of the indoor and the showroom spaces, but added that this was a tolerable feature of the now earthquake-resilient structures, which he found essential for the safety of their employees and customers.

Another problem Özsoy mentioned concerned the business owners who had built one- or two-floor stores while they had the plan-based developmental right to build up to 5 floors. For such cases, the KİPTAŞ-MZI partnership offered a 25% area deduction for the existing floors and 60% deduction for the unbuilt space bound by the developmental rights. As the representative of all store owners and the İSPER president, Özsoy attempted to communicate to the project partnership that its approach was unreasonable and that it should offer at least 50% of the unbuilt space to the property owners instead of 40%, but his request was denied.

Finally, Özsoy argued that speculation about the demolition of their stores due to redevelopment had negatively impacted their business volume. Many businesses, he claimed, had lost customers who assumed the stores were no longer in business, while regular customers frequently mentioned the redevelopment activity in the neighborhood and were under the misconception that the stores were going out of business because the government would take them over. Özsoy accused KİPTAŞ of not having planned the project’s impacts from a professional standpoint ahead of time, although, he believed, it was a well-organized and long-established government institution.

İSPER’s efforts and the negotiation process

Özsoy recalled holding the first project meeting about the business units in his Sümer store in early 2009 with the participation of Mayor Aydıñ, Deputy Mayor Alsaç, KİPTAŞ General Director Yıldırım, his deputy Demirci and the rightful owners of the 24 stores that were involved in the project. Later, the whole negotiation process continued under KİPTAŞ, with which the business owners were to sign the project agreements. He thought that as the NGO
of the business community, İSPER had played an active role in managing effective negotiations since the beginning of the project. The community established a commission of 6 persons who were determined to “beat a path to KİPTAŞ’s door” to convince KİPTAŞ executives to solve the taxation problems. They also made visits to the Ministry of Finance in Ankara and involved the leading financial advisors of certain holdings and the ministry itself. Özsoy stated that the advisors seesawed between the government and the businesses’ claims for a long time: “In the end, they foresaw that the ministry would certainly charge the taxes because it was the ministry’s legal right to do so.” He believed the business owners were in a way the victims of underdeveloped redevelopment legislation and practices in Sümer, which was the first project of its kind in Turkey.

Büyükcolak stated that representatives of the business community had visited KİPTAŞ with a few proposals. For example, they suggested sharing the tax costs evenly with KİPTAŞ in return for their involvement in the project, but KİPTAŞ rejected the offer, arguing that it was not its responsibility to shelter the owners. The more recent and reasonable suggestion, according to Özsoy, was that instead of transferring to Sahilpark, the store owners would develop at their own expense the portion of the redevelopment area in question—where their stores were located—in a separate project phase in line with the design and implementation plans of KİPTAŞ. By performing an in situ redevelopment for their own property, the rightful business owners not only could build up to the allowed developmental rights they already possessed (they also accepted the standard 25% deduction for the unbuilt rights), but also would not have to pay any taxes in the absence of any official involvement with KİPTAŞ. Özsoy argued that this was a highly viable option for KİPTAŞ as well, because it would absolve KİPTAŞ from related project risks and costs. The business community was willing to pay for the estimated TRY 1.1 million construction cost and outsource the construction to the
subcontractor of KİPTAŞ’s choice. He expressed perplexity at the hesitant stance of KİPTAŞ toward this latest offer.

Suspended state of dispute settlement

KİPTAŞ executives responded that they would study the offer and contact the business owners, but by the time the interview with Özsoy was conducted in May 2014, KİPTAŞ had not come up with a working response. Özsoy stated that only recently (one month before the interview) the business community had held its first meeting at the KİPTAŞ headquarters. Present were the business owner representatives (including Özsoy), KİPTAŞ General Manager Yıldırım, KİPTAŞ Deputy General Manager and now MZI Deputy Mayor Demirci, and MZI Deputy Mayor Alsaç. The KİPTAŞ-MZI partnership insisted on going back to the original project plan, as Özsoy quoted: “We have built the new units already and increased the property values. They are there, ready and waiting for you. What else do you want? We will sell them if you don’t want them.” In response, the rightful owners struck a “suit yourself” attitude and repeated their self-conducted in situ redevelopment offer. Özsoy argued that alternatively, if KİPTAŞ had come to them having solved the added-value and income tax issues, they would have been ready to sign the agreements right then.

Özsoy also mentioned the most recent development regarding taxes. He claimed that according to a recent issue of the Turkish Supreme Court Journal, in a case that set a precedent for the Sümer owners’ situation, the state council had decided to cancel the collection of added-value tax in the absence of a regulation in the Urban Redevelopment Law regarding tax collections from businesses. In other words, he stated, KİPTAŞ would probably no longer be able to retrieve the 18% added-value taxes from the Sümer business owners via redevelopment. At the time of the interview, Özsoy had not communicated this development with the formal project partnership and thus could not report any further on the topic. When
asked if the disputes were conveyed to the IMM, Özsoy argued that had the IMM been informed of an issue of such a long history and magnitude, it would have taken action and ordered the KİPTAŞ-MZI partnership to resolve the mess. Instead, he stated, progress toward a solution was halted as both sides dug in.

6.5.5. Deferment of conflicts to later project phases

Regarding the long-enduring conflicts analyzed above and despite the many still-vacant housing and commercial units of Sahilpark, the concerns of many rightful home and business owners of Sümer who were actually willing to participate in the project were deferred to later project phases. As for the residential units, Demirci reported that he had conducted a recent resident survey that revealed the rightful owners’ final expectations and prescribed the number, size and features of the units to be allocated in the second phase accordingly. During the survey, the residents were asked to decide which unit type they desired based on the revised equalization price, which was increased from the initial TRY 1,500 to 3,500 per sqm, commensurate with the increased property values. He hoped that KİPTAŞ would finally meet the residents’ demands and settle the remaining agreements under these conditions. Adalı reported the additional condition that the residents would have to live elsewhere for 20 months until the completion of the new phase. Küçükuygun foresaw that more residents would be forced to sell their units individually or to KİPTAŞ, which, he argued, would offer to buy their property for unit prices adjusted according to its intangible qualities such as TRY 1,400 or 1,500 per sqm. He believed that the residents who were facing financial hardship should merge to share new units in Sahilpark or in the second phase site and sell them after the completion of the two-year prohibition against selling the units. As for the business units, the settlement options were still to be clarified and negotiated between the local businessmen, led by Özsoy, and KİPTAŞ and the MZI.
6.6. Community involvement and perceptions

6.6.1. Formal participation and inclusion

Lack of community involvement and participation

Alsaç pointed out the simultaneity of the decision-making process and the gathering of the community’s opinions during the initial stages of the project: the decision-makers reached decisions which then communicated to the rightful owners through presentations and models, asserting that the KİPTAŞ-MZI partnership used this method to obtain community members’ verbal consent for the ultimate decision to realize the redevelopment project. He mentioned that opinion toward the project was overwhelmingly favorable during the house and cafe visits. Demirci, on the other hand, mentioned the ambivalence in the community’s reactions and repeated his sharp stance towards the opponents: “If we make such big sacrifices and give of ourselves so much for this project, sorry, but you either sit down with us and agree, or we will expropriate your property.” He described the sacrifice as the small size of the 25% area deduction rate relative to a probable 60% or 50% rate by a private contractor and the “serious” amount of funds KİPTAŞ had transferred to the project. Thus, Demirci reported, the Sümer community was not involved in the decision-making.

Bakkal also commented on the exclusion of the community, pointing out that in addition to the house visits, the MZI merely fulfilled its legal obligation to display for one month a public presentation of the 1:5000 zoning and 1:1000 implementation plans in the municipality building and on the Internet, an arrangement which did not allow home or business owners to participate directly in the decision-making. She also noted that for the most part, the household visits were conducted one-on-one to discourage any collective opposition. Coşkun confirmed Demirci’s summary of the authorities’ stance and assessed these visits as...
representative of a complete lack of community initiative in the absence of any decision alternatives or workable agreement options. On the rightful owners’ side, residents Adalı, Küçükuygun and Cihangir made similar statements that described an absolute lack of involvement that ended with them either signing the agreements or receiving their homes’ value in cash at the rate of TRY 1,500 per sqm as assessed by the project management. The business representative, Özsoy, mirrored this assessment and added that even though most rightful business owners did not consent, the project partnership initiated the redevelopment project unilaterally, which resulted in major conflicts. The resulting formal public participation level was “informative” according to Demirci and Bakkal. Bakkal reemphasized the general lack of legal guidelines for formal participation methods in urban planning in Turkey; the guidelines in place did not prompt the MZI or KİPTAŞ to apply any further methods, such as co-deciding on design alternatives or receiving the rightful owners’ written consent.

Inefficient information and communication

When asked how the public was informed about decisions, Adalı and Coşkun recalled the publicity campaigns that involved IMM billboards around Istanbul introducing an upcoming redevelopment activity in Sümer, Zeytinburnu and the accompanying national and local newspaper coverage. Around the same time in late 2008, the formal project actors started house visits as part of the project’s local community outreach. As discussed earlier, there is no consensus on the number of household meetings held: Demirci claimed there were 300, Alsaç suggested 250, and the anonymous interviewee argued there were no more than around 100 house visits due to conflicts with the residents. Cihangir stressed that MZI and KİPTAŞ approached residents in a very friendly manner during these visits, often bringing flowers and small gifts. Demirci and Alsaç explained that following the house visits KİPTAŞ established the
Sümer Redevelopment Project Office across from Sahilpark and conducted a survey to measure the area of each unit to be demolished by the end of the first project phase; they later assessed the value of these apartments at TRY 1,500 per sqm. Owners of the assessed units were then invited to the KİPTAŞ redevelopment office to be informed of the final agreement terms. Alsaç insisted that the Sümer residents were fully involved and informed about every stage of the project’s decision-making scheme: community members had no problems gaining access to the government and receiving responses to their questions, partially thanks to the Zeytinburnu AKP organization and reputable locals, who helped the MZİ and KİPTAŞ convince the residents of the project’s feasibility. However, Demirci recalled a frequent conversation between the officers and the owners at the redevelopment office, typically ending in the owners’ frustration:

— I am the owner of the unit [address].
— Good. Let’s see its value.
— My unit is very valuable.
— Are you sure? It is [area of the unit] sqm. Its market value is only TRY [value of the unit].

When asked whether the Sümer redevelopment office operated productively and efficiently, Bakkal stated that it was not possible to fully satisfy the rightful owners under the adopted participation method, because their essential questions and demands were left unaddressed. Küçükuygun and Cihangir also characterized the house visits as the beginning of both the formal information process and the emergence of project opposition, the conflicts resulting from which have been analyzed in detail earlier in this chapter. Büyükçolak hoped that the conflicts would cease in the later phases of the project as KİPTAŞ conducted the recent surveys to not only inform the residents of the project terms but also determine their purchasing power and preferences regarding the unit area they want to receive. Later phases
of the project were to be designed according to these preferences. However, as of the
interview held in April 2014, he was not sure how the conflict with business owners would be
resolved.

Conflicting claims on public-friendliness

As the deputy department manager who played the most active role in resident
negotiations at the redevelopment office, Küçükbükücü emphasized that he relied on the
value increase, the biggest indicator of the project’s benefit to the public, to convince the
rightful owners to sign the agreements even despite the 25% and 60% unit area deduction
rates. Alsaç suggested the same rationale when explaining the “100% public-friendly” aspect
of the project: even after the deductions, the rightful owners had derived a 100% profit from
the project. Thus, he claimed, he questioned the intentions of the owners who opposed the
project. When asked whether the Sümer redevelopment scheme was public-friendly or not,
Demirci stated, “If I had a unit within the project borders and was offered KİPTAŞ’s terms, I
would accept it with my eyes closed.” Many interviewees including Demirci, Büyükçolak,
Coşkun and Özsoy repeatedly offered the “lottery” metaphor to describe the project from the
residents’ point of view. Finally, Alsaç and Demirci offered the following sentiment in
evaluating the project’s positive returns in spite of the conflicts that arose: “It is a pro-
community project in spite of the community.” Expanding on the pro-community aspects of
the project, Demirci also brought up the added protection of the lives and property of the
Sümer community from major earthquakes.

When asked how public-friendly the Sümer project was, Cihangir suggested a lower rate
of 80%, which, in his opinion, was the rate of residents who were persuaded to sign the
agreements. Bakkal of the MZI offered an overall rate of 50% and added with laughter: “Let’s
not offend anyone,” with which she implied that she could not take the community’s side
against her institution. Adalı replied negatively to the same question, emphasizing the aforementioned economic gains derived by the government. The project could have been called public-friendly if, Adalı argued, the government had pursued the community’s interests more, and as Küçükuygun argued, the residents’ preferences had been sought in the early stages and the project had been designed accordingly; they hoped that these mistakes would not be repeated in the later phases. Adalı also questioned the public-friendliness of the more recent impacts of the project—referring to the high maintenance fees necessary to sustain a living in Sahilpark. Nevertheless, they both gave the project credit for providing a more livable environment than what their neighborhood offered before.

6.6.2. Residents’ perceptions

*Fair distribution of benefits*

Büyükcolak and Küçükbüyükçu from the KİPTAŞ redevelopment office explained that they were very careful to distribute the Sahilpark units by the most fair and just means that the project allowed: they did their best to recognize and consider both the tangible and intangible qualities of the existing units and match them with the most closely corresponding Sahilpark units at hand. If anyone demanded a more valuable unit than what they deserved, they were asked to pay for difference. If they did not like the conditions of the remaining available Sahilpark units, the office suggested that they wait for the next project phase. The units above the Sahilpark stores were built for and allocated to the owners of the store buildings; however, because the Sümer businessmen chose not to join the first phase, KİPTAŞ decided to give these units to willing residents. These units were larger and thus more expensive than the usual Sahilpark units, but in order to make them more affordable while remaining fair to residents with more standard units, KİPTAŞ executives decided to ask for
half of the difference in value based on the minimum Sahilpark residential unit of 73 sqm. Büyükçolak illustrated these practices as examples of their sensitivity in ensuring a fair share for all residents. He added that KİPTAŞ executives, including the redevelopment office managers, designed such conditions based not on the demands of the later constituted Redevelopment Law but on their free will.

Although he avoided providing any details, Büyükçolak recalled a few instances in which residents attempted to influence KİPTAŞ through the municipal council or AKP organization, but he claimed that KİPTAŞ officials at the office persisted in the organization’s fairness and equality principle in all allocations, thanks in part to Yıldırım and Demirci’s unbending stances. He claimed that no one could come forward with tangible claims of partial treatment. Küçükuygun and Cihangir, both of whom defended the project in general, concurred that the assessment of former units and the distribution of new ones were conducted on fair grounds, as they had not heard of any specific cases of partiality and trusted the good nature of KİPTAŞ redevelopment office officials like Büyükçolak and Küçükbükücü. Another AKP partisan, Özsoy, believed that there might have been a few instances in which particular residents received preferential treatment, but that such occurrences could easily be neglected because they were only normal for a project that involved the replacement of as many as 1,200 units.

During the interview with Coşkun, Halil [last name unknown], a resident who briefly joined the conversation, specifically named a few residents who received new units on a one-for-one agreement. Impressed by these claims, Coşkun pointed at the “insincerity” in the project process and assessed these suggested facts as the invasion of politics into the project, which implied that the named privileged people were close to or within the AKP organization.
Adalı also suspected that there could have been some incidents of patronage, although he could not mention any solid cases.

**Indirect displacement of residents**

Based on the fact that some residents owned units too small to merit a unit after the 25% deduction and could not afford the resulting high difference in value of a Sahilpark unit, Adalı and Cihangir argued that there were people who were forced to leave their lifelong neighborhood. Adalı claimed that this so-called indirect displacement negatively affected the lives of many of his friends. Such instances were why, he argued, the community demanded one-for-one allocation for all residents in the first place.

There were some residents, as many as 10% according to Adalı, who sold their existing units in order to avoid the 25% deduction and moved to other, less favorable parts of Istanbul. He claimed that others, who constituted 15-20% of total population, received new units, and sold them at more profitable rates, and bought two units in periphery settlements of Istanbul such as Beylikdüzü. There were also those who were waiting for the two-year prohibition against selling their Sahilpark home. Cihangir speculated, however, that the proportion of residents who had sold or would sell their units was not high because they generally loved living in their new gated community. Küçükuygun argued that even if many sold their Sahilpark units, their decision to do so would be of their own free will and thus could not be regarded as a fault of the project.

**Inability of self-expression**

One thing that all community members interviewed agreed upon was that the community could not make themselves heard by the project’s formal actors. Adalı claimed that the community faced this problem throughout the project; Cihangir believed the opposing 20%
would not have been satisfied with any solution whatsoever. According to Küçükuygun, it would be absurd to claim that the residents were listened to and involved in the Sümer redevelopment process. Regarding the small businesses, Özsoy suggested that the recent 2014 local government elections had had a negative impact on the rightful business owners’ ability to make themselves heard, as analyzed earlier. Under normal circumstances, Özsoy claimed, İSPER and the business community would have had more say in the decision-making.

**Inconsistency of promises**

Adalı stated that the MZI-KİPTAŞ partnership’s initial plans and projects proposed 8-floor buildings in Sahilpark, and Küçükuygun recalled that the rooftops of these buildings were designed as parks and gardens. Most residents, including Adalı, suggested that the project build 15-20 floors with no unit area deductions for rightful owners. In the end, however, the residents were subject to a 25-60% deduction even though the project was realized as 15 floors with no rooftop amenities. Adalı also claimed that the residents were only presented the model of the Sahilpark project, which was still on display at the KİPTAŞ Sümer Redevelopment Office.

In addition to the lack of consistency between the project terms and the end result, Küçükuygun argued that after having lived in Sahilpark for a while, the residents noticed signs of poor craftsmanship in their units: pipes, door knobs, tile work, etc. were problematic in many units. He inferred that this might be the result of the inefficient construction management process, during which KİPTAŞ changed the subcontractors in charge of interior work three times in pursuit, he alleged, of cheap labor to decrease construction costs. Cihangir, on the other hand, was content with the end product and his lifestyle in his Sahilpark home. He liked both the quality and the aesthetics of the equipment and materials in both the units themselves and the common spaces of the apartment buildings. When
comparing the physical condition of the newly produced Sahilpark stores to that of their existing stores, Özsoy expressed general acclaim, noting only that the structural elements inside some of the new stores decreased the usable spaces that are vital for showrooms and indoor circulation.

*Overall happiness with the project*

Despite all the conflicts and complaints examined above, the residents of Sahilpark generally expressed happiness with their new living space. Parallel to the formal actors’ claims, all resident interviews (Adalı, Küçükuygun, Cihangir and Coşkun) revealed that the leading factor in resident satisfaction was the increase in property values, which was already two-fold by the time they received their Sahilpark keys and almost three-fold after one year. The interviewees were also happy that the ongoing redevelopment projects in Zeytinburnu ensured that values would continue to increase. Küçükuygun and Cihangir emphasized the lack of displacement in their redevelopment project, a rarity for redevelopment projects in Istanbul and Turkey. They did not consider their transfer to a nearby block as displacement: staying in their life-long Sümer neighborhood was a major source of satisfaction for them.

Interviewees also mentioned the positive aspects of living in Sahilpark in describing their satisfaction. Adalı liked the arrangement and openness of the courtyard and the fact that residents of all ages could safely circulate within their gated site. In particular, women could get out of their homes and interact with the outside world and with each other more easily. Küçükuygun stated that his grandchildren could finally play freely at the playground in the courtyard. He also enjoyed the central heating system they now had after many years of heating problems in their former Sümer apartment. Cihangir particularly liked the elevators, which saved his wife from chronic health problems due to the high staircase in their old apartment building, and the underground parking facility that saved him and his fellow Sümer
residents from their former parking problem. In general, he believed one of the biggest gains of the redevelopment project was modernization of the residents: the high-rise setting and better-kept arrangement of Sahilpark, with sports and recreation amenities, gradually adjusted the life of its residents to a more urbanized and decent way of living, which they would have never experienced otherwise.

6.7. Assessment of the decision-making process by actors

As done in the previous sections of the chapter, the power influences and the strong and weak aspects of the decision-making process below are conveyed as reported by the interviewees. There are, however, more possible conclusions to be derived from the findings above, in particular regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the decision-making process. Those that are left out in the sections below are evaluated in the following chapters on comparisons, lessons, and implications.

6.7.1. Influence of outcomes by power mechanisms

Power dominance of the ruling party

When asked how power relations affected the decisions and outcomes of Sümer’s redevelopment, Küçükuygun suggested that AKP’s dominance at all levels of government and national media had the most impact on the feasibility and realization of the project. He recalled occasionally speaking with local CHP officials on how the community and opposing party groups could affect the decisions, consistently receiving a simple answer: “There is nothing we can do.” He claimed that even the AKP-controlled local government, the MZI, had no say in decision-making against the IMM’s KİPTAŞ, arguing that institutions higher in the AKP’s political hierarchy assumed a more prevalent role in the process. In order to influence
such a firm party-based dominance, one would have to establish a strong and well-articulated opposition with concrete alternative plans and programs, feats which, Küçükuygun thought, the CHP, MHP, and the community itself could not effect. Rather, he claimed, opposition groups merely spoke out against project decisions without bothering themselves to provide a workable alternative.

Adalı recalled one situation in particular, though not directly related to the Sümer project, as an indication of the AKP’s political dominance: Before the 2014 local elections, AKP volunteers entered Sahilpark to distribute political campaign material (e.g. flyers and small gifts) door-to-door, despite the fact that soliciting was firmly banned on the premises. As a former MHP volunteer, he was furious at the Sahilpark security and the MZI, who denied entry to other party groups but admitted AKP representatives. As a result of this practice, Adalı argued, the AKP managed to win a large majority of the vote from Sahilpark and up to around 70% of the overall electorate in Sümer. At one polling place in the Sümer neighborhood, the AKP won approximately 150 votes, the CHP 30, and other parties between 10 and 20s. When asked whether these results could be linked to the redevelopment activities and the level of the community’s contentment regarding the project, he responded negatively, arguing that the election results were due to unfair competition and undemocratic use of competitive advantages by the AKP.

Power coalition of government and private actors

Demirci stated that one could not omit any of the stakeholders in assessing the decision-making scheme of a project. In the Sümer case, he thought, the coalition of powerful actors who partook in decisions included the MZI, the IMM-KİPTAŞ group, the Koç Group, the Ministry, and the Treasury. If any of these pieces had been missing in the grand picture, the decision-making process would have been shaped differently, pointing out that had the
government not possessed the vacant land, KİPTAŞ would have had to bear the land costs and factor them into the unit prices at the expense of the community. When asked how this coalition influenced decisions, Adalı stressed the economic profit-based aggregation of the powerful government and private actors.

*Power influence of local government*

Bakkal stressed that there was indeed a pro-community faction of the government-private domination mentioned by Adalı. She criticized the local community as “sluggish” in taking a stand and generating decisions and counter-arguments regarding redevelopment, although she understood that residents were slow to act because they could not foresee their future (they did not know what to expect from the project). She believed that the redevelopment was in favor of the community and that the MZI consulted the community’s interests when making project decisions. The community might have been better informed and more directly involved in the project, but it was also evident that the MZI-KİPTAŞ partnership avoided group meetings and extensive information sessions to prevent any group opposition. Bakkal was reluctant to state whether she approved of the government’s dividing strategy.

Unlike many other interviewees, Özsoy defined the roles of KİPTAŞ and the MZI as naturally profit-seeking stakeholders of the project. He saw KİPTAŞ as a private firm, so he argued that KİPTAŞ’s approach was profit-oriented, whereas the MZI was more community-oriented because it was the political representative of both the residential and business communities. Yet, he argued, because KİPTAŞ was positioned as the “older brother” of the MZI because of the government hierarchy, the MZI was faced with red lines in financial decision-making points. In other words, the MZI had a voice, but not a definitive say, in decisions.
6.7.2. Strengths

*Effective government collaboration*

Alsaç stated that during the first phase of the Sümer project, in the absence of specific redevelopment laws, the MZI “compulsorily” partnered with KİPTAŞ, which is in part a private company. However, he argued that in spite of the lack of legislation and scarcity of municipal resources, the MZI-KİPTAŞ partnership collaborated in a coherent and effective way and brought one third of the project to fruition, which, according to him, was a grand success for Istanbul and Turkey. During the interviews, Demirci, Büyükcolak and Bakkal also stressed the successful collaboration and partnership of the MZI and KİPTAŞ in achieving the desired outcomes. Residents Adalı and Küçükuygun seconded the partnership’s success in obtaining its goals, but stressed that those goals were mostly government-friendly.

*Trusted image of KİPTAŞ*

The success of the project was attributed in part to government-oriented project execution. Some interviewees argued that the formal decision-making scheme became stronger in the absence of any profit-seeking private firms. This view was expressed most forcefully by Demirci, alluding to the non-profit status of KİPTAŞ. He claimed that had he been the sole developer of the project, he would have viewed it as a commercial opportunity, sought maximum profit, and tried to gain concessions from the government. Rather, because he worked at KİPTAŞ as personnel on payroll, he had no interest in misleading residents: “I don’t have a reason to deceive them. I don’t care whether the company makes more or less money. I will earn the same salary at the end of the month. There is no change for me.” As one of the top decision-makers of the Sümer project, Demirci highlighted the importance of conveying this message to the community. He added that he could distance himself from the
profit-loss account and advocate for KİPTAŞ with confidence when negotiating with the residents: “It’s the rule of the game. We decided for the terms as the project management. If you agree to sign the deeds, the project ends in a year. If you don’t, we take it to the court and it ends in 1.5 years. We will finish it either way.” He then quoted the residents to voice their perspective: “KİPTAŞ equals the IMM, so they won’t trick me.” He believed its association with the IMM was what gained KİPTAŞ a highly trusted image.

Indeed, Demirci stressed that one of the missions of KİPTAŞ was to market institutional trust to the citizens. It therefore had to be careful when outsourcing and inspecting construction work on behalf of its customers. He made sure that the YDA-Kuruluş consortium fulfilled all quality commitments (i.e. construction material, equipment and labor) that were promised on the Sümer project agreements for Sahilpark. With other private firms, he argued, customers could not be sure whether they would receive their units on time, to whom they would voice any concerns, or even whether the business would survive in the long term. With KİPTAŞ, customers had no reason to be concerned; they took possession of their homes with no uncertainty concerning their long-term habitability. Demirci believed that the resulting credibility of KİPTAŞ and the government was the primary force behind their confidence in project decision-making.

Former and recent laws in favor of the government

Bakkal suggested that the empowerment of municipalities by Turkish development laws was their strongest point in general: legislation worked in municipal governments’ favor, so they simply held the most power. She argued that this power was the sole factor in the Sümer project’s success. Redevelopment regulations were not as strong during the first phase of the Sümer case, which is the focus of this study, as they are today; as explained earlier, Zoning Law No. 3194 and Gecekondu Law No. 775 were the tools of earlier redevelopment works such
as the Sümer project’s initiation and first phase. According to this legislation, the municipalities could take possession of a building in the case of legal irregularities such as the lack of building permits, insufficient earthquake resistance measures, or the presence of unpermitted extra floors and other additions. Because most of the buildings in Sümer and Zeytinburnu fulfilled one or more of these criteria, it was easy for the MZI to use eviction as a threat against opposing residents. However, Demirci admitted that if a building was proper in all means, it was extremely difficult for the government to demolish it; it was therefore crucial to convince the owners of such legal buildings consent to the redevelopment project.

Demirci explained that with the adoption of the recent Redevelopment Law No. 6306 in 2012, municipalities can demolish any building within a designated redevelopment area, if the building does not comply with the redevelopment project, regardless of its legal status. He recalled that the MZI-KİPTAŞ partnership demolished a not-yet occupied new residential building in Sümer that was otherwise proper using the new law, arguing that its presence interfered with the design of the entire redevelopment area. This building belonged to Özsoy, who reported that he happily agreed to his building’s demolition in exchange for several Sahilpark units valued considerably higher than what he had developed. All in all, Demirci believed that the recent Redevelopment Law strengthened the government’s hand even more, ensuring that it did not have to compromise with opposing residents in later phases of the Sümer redevelopment project.

6.7.3. Weaknesses

Not-so-favorable project methods

When asked whether there were any weaknesses in the Sümer project’s decision-making, Demirci suggested that the project executors, namely KİPTAŞ and the MZI, could have more
thoroughly examined possible methods of redevelopment and decided for better options. For one, assessing the value of units based on their area alone proved inefficient. KİPTAŞ redevelopment office personnel visited each existing unit to measure the net unit area and then applied the area deduction rate to determine the deserved footage over a fixed compensation value of TRY 1,500 per sqm. The conflicts around intangible qualities that arose from this method are examined in detail earlier in this chapter. Demirci believed that in order to eliminate conflicts and check the delay in implementation, the project should have undertaken a value-based assessment method that takes into account both tangible area and intangible aspects such as the age, construction material, condition, earthquake resistance, location, floor and orientation of the unit.

He also argued that the initial brief resident survey had proven insufficient in assessing residents’ real expectations. The project should have determined the final number and footage of Sahilpark units that the rightful owners would have liked through a more thorough process of discussion rather than collecting vague responses with a short questionnaire conducted by MZI staff. Negotiating with residents more seriously would have avoided speculation concerning unfair allocations and the unfriendliness of the government as well as the delay in agreements, all of which weakened the project partnership’s stability to an extent. Both Demirci and Alsaç pointed out that they had learned to take into consideration the “under-the-pillow money” of the residents when designing the unit inventory for the second and third project phases, so they were now conducting a new survey with the remaining rightful owners tailored to obtain their ultimate new unit expectations. In defense of the project, Alsaç argued that because the residents did not trust the government enough to speak the truth about their purchasing power, a deliberate negotiation process would not have worked out in the beginning of the project. However, now that they had seen the
construction quality and the property value increase, it would be easier to draw out their sincere intentions for the second and third project phases.

Finally, Demirci admitted that the resulting net building and population densities of Sahilpark were really high, as the building density of the realized Sahilpark project was more than twice the recommended building density for Sümer and its surrounding neighborhoods set by the zoning plans of Zeytinburnu. Demirci argued for more community-friendly project scenarios KİPTAŞ could have generated in cooperation with the MZI that could result in a lower density scheme for the sake of a more livable environment for the residents. He stated his desire for an ideal formulation with no density increase and claimed that the Sümer urban redevelopment project did not stand out as a good example for Istanbul and Turkey for that reason.

Lack of trust in the government and within the community

In general, the residents interviewed saw trust issues as an obstacle to unification against unfair government decisions and programs. On the one hand, they viewed Turkish politics as unreliable regardless of the party involved. Adalı, for instance, claimed that while he was not content with Mayor Aydın, he did not favor any other local government candidates, even those of the party he sympathized with. He questioned the sincerity of all candidates or delegates because, he claimed, they approached the local community with alternative plans for Sümer’s development only during election campaigns and disappeared afterwards. He also mentioned the anti-community actions of the IMM and MZI, such as the installation of paid parking spaces that replaced playgrounds and the privatization of public properties.

On the other hand, residents did not trust each other enough to reach consensus and act together. As a local aged 53 who was born and raised in the Sümer neighborhood, Adalı saw this lack of trust as an ever-increasing problem in his community. He recalled that even his
brother stood against him when he attempted to organize his fellow Sümer residents soon after they heard of the redevelopment project in 2008. Küçükuygun had similar views regarding the lack of trust, particularly within the community. Both Adalı and Küçükuygun suggested ignorance as the main reason for the Sümer residents’ insecurity. To justify this view, Adalı claimed that of the rightful owners that were involved in the Sümer redevelopment project, 85% were primary school graduates.

Lack of community organizing laws and will

Bakkal argued that the decision-making scheme of the Sümer project did not have any major weaknesses; however, the problem in general was the lack of community organizing in Turkish culture and legal literature. She believed that had legislation encouraged the formation of neighborhood associations and Sümer residents had formed one, the community could have made an impact on the project’s course. At least, she claimed, they should have chosen one or two community representatives to communicate their needs and demands to the MZİ and KİPTAŞ.

Küçükuygun blamed the media for not providing enough support for the community and neglecting citizens’ concerns while giving voice to those of the government. According to him, the national mainstream media was merely a means to publicize the municipalities’ project and election campaigns. He recalled that only local newspaper reporters reached out to residents for interviews. For both Küçükuygun and Adalı, these facts, in addition to the residents’ ignorance, were the reasons why they gave up their individual attempts to organize residents. They each reported incidents of long-lived friendships with their fellow neighbors shaken when they harshly reacted to uniting calls with “What do you care? Why are you so interested in my home?” Adalı argued that organized opposition could have given residents a chance of lowering the unit area deduction rate down from 25% to perhaps 10-15%.
Nevertheless, he was hopeful that his and other Sümer residents' children would be more proactive in the future, because most of them were receiving higher education.

Thus, as in the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case, the residents of Sümer interviewed expressed regrets about and suggested lessons based on their redevelopment experience. The next two chapters of case comparison and the lessons derived by the interviewees provide better insight on redevelopment practices in Istanbul.
Chapter 7. Comparative Assessment of Cases

The joint analysis of the two case projects of this study, the Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer urban redevelopment projects, aims to reveal similarities and differences in their case stories, formal collaboration environments, and the perspectives of the formal actors and residents on the extent of community involvement and participation in project planning and development. This way, comparison will allow the case projects to inform a more thorough understanding of the redevelopment framework in Istanbul and Turkey and illustrate how the realities of power impact the relationships between formal actors and community.

7.1. Context summary of the projects

7.1.1. Site selection and characteristics

Significance and uniqueness of cases

Küçükçekmece and Zeytinburnu were designated pilot districts by the IMM and the government for multiple reasons, the most significant of which was the need for large-scale rehabilitation and revitalization of gecekondu sites and preparedness for an expected major Istanbul earthquake. Both cases are the primary examples of their kind in Istanbul and Turkey. The Ayazma-Tepeüstü case is the first large-scale gecekondu redevelopment project undertaken with TOKİ, whereas the Sümer case presents the first earthquake focused in situ urban redevelopment project that was realized in a high-density settlement.

The novelty of the projects attracted attention and extra support from the upper levels of government. Interviewed officials have suggested a tie between this interest and some of the obstacles to formal collaboration and community involvement. They repeatedly
emphasized how they were forced to learn on the job, while addressing the project’s weaknesses, and explained how they derived lessons for further redevelopment activities in Istanbul.

*Selection of cases by authorities*

Ayazma and Tepeüstü were determined by the field and community surveys conducted by the MKI to be two of the four most problematic *gecekondu* neighborhoods of Küçükçekmece. As reported by the MKI and TOKİ interviewees, their selection over other neighborhoods was mainly due to their location, land ownership pattern, lack of urban facilities, pedestrian access problems, and the poor public health conditions around the river bed, which also posed a flood threat. The problems of the Sümer neighborhood were rooted in larger scale issues that affected the whole Zeytinburnu district. Zeytinburnu’s earthquake risks are remarkable due to its problematic high-density building stock built without consideration for the area’s hazardous geology and poor urban conditions such as unplanned development, inadequate social facilities, lack of open spaces, narrow roads, and urban poverty. These problems were concentrated in Sümer neighborhood, 43% of which fell into the high earthquake risk category of BİMTAŞ’s risk inventory study. According to MZI and KİPTAŞ executives, the fact that the Sümer community was open to their neighborhood’s redevelopment and the existence of nearby vacant lots that increased the feasibility of the project were other significant factors in Sümer’s selection.

*Location advantages*

The advantages of the locations of Ayazma and Tepeüstü were mentioned multiple times by almost all interviewees who participated in the study. Both neighborhoods are valuable and easily visible from surrounding major developments. They are adjacent to main highway
arteries and junctions that connect the sites to the Atatürk International Airport. Ayazma’s additional significance came from the nearby Atatürk Olympics Stadium, which was envisioned as a major focus of mega-event planning in Istanbul, an aspect of the ambitious “world city” vision of the government for Istanbul.

The Sümer neighborhood’s significance is mostly attributed to its favorable location in the transportation system of the European side of Istanbul. Its proximity to the E-5 highway, important railways such as the Marmaray tunnel and the Kabataş-Zeytinburnu light rail, the Atatürk International Airport and the Kazlıçeşme International Seaport makes Sümer advantageous from the standpoint of both accessibility and marketability for further redevelopment activities. In short, location-related redevelopment potential was clearly a major factor in the selection of both case areas.

Illegal ownership status

Issues of land and unit ownership were especially problematic in both cases where gecekondu phenomenon was experienced heavily. While land ownership in the Sümer neighborhood was roughly 90% private, around 40% of Ayazma and 80% of Tepeüstü were developed on State Treasury land. Almost all pre-existing Ayazma and Tepeüstü units and 35% of Sümer units were illegally built, which prompted the government to call some of their residents “illegal occupiers.”

Socio-economic profile of the communities

The general socio-economic status of the residents of the Sümer community was reportedly higher than those of the Ayazma-Tepeüstü community. According to TOKİ and the MKİ, Ayazma was a hub of social, economic, and political disadvantages: the community was plagued by very low education and income levels, unemployment, and a shared enmity
towards government, all of which contributed to the poor living conditions in Ayazma and Tepeüstü. High unemployment negatively impacted family life, while those in the work force were mostly blue-collar, working at or below minimum wage, either of which increased the prevalence of public assistance, child labor and non-urban marginal activities in the area. The majority of women were illiterate and stayed at home, mainly engaged in child-raising in the absence of proper family planning awareness. The average household size of five in Ayazma-Tepeüstü was presumably higher than that of Sümer. The average education level of Sümer residents was comparatively higher than that of residents of Ayazma-Tepeüstü (around 85% were primary school graduates, according to one resident), and they had higher paying jobs on average, either through blue-collar work or small businesses they operated in Zeytinburnu. The community surveys conducted by the local municipalities in both cases determined that the communities were unable to partake in redevelopment activity at their own expense due to their low income levels.

TOKİ and the MKI attributed the above mentioned shared enmity towards the government of the Ayazma community to its ethnic profile. In fact, it was a significant determinant of the community conflicts in the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case. While the population of Tepeüstü was mostly heterogeneous, the majority of the Ayazma population were Kurds, who had immigrated from eastern Turkey. The locals’ opposition to the government was driven by the historic Kurdish movement in the east that the Turkish state had been fighting for almost two decades. The MKI and NGOs mentioned the history of political tensions between these groups and the AKP government because of its conservative and nationalist stance. Ayazma was seen as a potential Kurdish threat, an assessment which was reflected in Mayor Yeniay’s description of the area as quoted by Baysal: “a place of ugliness and a hotbed of terrorism.” Such tensions were not as severe in Sümer, because more than half of the Sümer population
supported the AKP government and thus approached to the government-driven redevelopment activity more positively.

7.1.2. Project formulation: physical and financial aspects

Initial project alternatives

The earlier project alternatives for Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer had different stances on community needs and displacement than the projects’ eventual outcomes. The first zoning plan and design study by the MKI foresaw on-site public housing for existing Ayazma residents and a public convention center in Tepeüstü; however, these measures were replaced by TOKİ’s plans, which displaced the residents and offered an uplift of the area with a gated community project in Ayazma and a mixed-use mall project in Tepeüstü. In Sümer’s case, the initial plans of the IMM’s BİMTAŞ foresaw a decrease in building density and displacement of the residents, but the KİPTAŞ-MZI project partnership had to generate an in situ solution due to public reaction against displacement. These decisions turned both the local population and the greater public largely against the Ayazma-Tepeüstü project, while public outcry in Sümer was not as severe because residents were kept on-site.

With these new project parameters, authorities in Sümer considered constructing a large-scale shopping mall to recover the costs of the project and in situ housing development costs, followed by a project alternative with two towers of income-generating luxury condos next to the lower housing blocks where the residents lived. Both alternatives were rejected, the first by the government due to an nearby similar sized shopping mall, the second by the community because of concerns about gentrification and the government’s apparent profit from the project.
Implemented projects

The fourth project alternative was the one implemented in Sümer: project executives decided to use the nearby state-owned soccer field to construct Sahilpark, a security-controlled gated housing site with street-facing stores, transfer the residents and retail stores to the new units, and build the second phase on the land they vacated. The project also called for the concurrent development of a nearby private lot to build a new sports facility and luxury housing, The Istanbul, to generate income for the development of Sahilpark. As evident in the residents’ and formal actors’ accounts, the gentrification of their neighborhood also raised questions and opposition among the local community, but the project was implemented by the government regardless.

In determining the allocation of new units, KİPTAŞ officials decided for a 25% deduction of the existing unit area in order to compensate the project costs. The Sahilpark housing site also offered a 25 sqm parking space to each unit in an underground parking structure, and recreational activities in its courtyard such as a leisure area by an ornamental pool, a playground and an exercise station.

In the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case, the TOKİ-MKI partnership decided to construct a public housing site in a distant Bezirganbahçe location that originally belonged to the State Treasury, and transfer the gecekondu residents there to make room for development that could take advantage of the favorable location and high value of the original land. Later, in order to address the demand of some Ayazma homeowners who wanted to stay in their neighborhood, TOKİ built a few housing blocks in Çakmak, which was closer to Ayazma. The rightful owners were asked to choose to what area they wanted to be transferred.

TOKİ sold the former-Ayazma and Tepeüstü lots by auction through its Property and Housing Real Estate Investment Company. The Ağaoğlu Group purchased the Ayazma site to
build the luxury housing project My World, whereas the Torunlar Group purchased Tepeüstü as land zoned for retail and tourism with an increased building density and built a high-end mixed-use complex, Mall of Istanbul, with offices, luxury condos, and a shopping mall. TOKİ partnered in both developments.

In all development projects, the construction duty was outsourced to private firms that had been in ongoing arrangements with the higher institutions that owned the land and/or oversaw the project (i.e. TOKİ and KİPTAŞ). These firms used their own workforce in construction; they did not recruit local residents to work on the projects or associated tasks (e.g. food provisioning of workers). The firms’ construction activity was inspected by the employer institutions, which proved to be insufficient in maintaining construction quality and safety.

Financial planning and the hidden agenda

Financial conditions offered to Ayazma-Tepeüstü residents were relatively simple compared to those offered to Sümer residents. The rightful owners of Tepeüstü, all of whom owned gecekondus on state property, received one Bezirganbahçe unit in exchange for every unit they owned. As financier of the public housing project and a non-profit developer, TOKİ determined the unit price in Bezirganbahçe to be TRY 51,000 based on land, construction and project costs. It appraised each gecekondu unit on state-owned land in Ayazma at a flat price of TRY 10,000 regardless of its size, condition or location, an amount which was considered a down-payment toward the Bezirganbahçe units. The remaining balance was termed for 15 years of fixed interest-free installments. Upon the objections of the Ayazma residents due to financial hardship, then Prime Minister Erdoğan used his right of initiative in favor of the community and announced a 10% discount. If residents agreed to pay the unit price in advance, they were offered an additional 20% discount.
As mentioned above, TOKİ used Treasury land to build social housing, vacated the neighborhoods, and sold the vacated land to private buyers. Although financial details were not made explicit by its officials, residents and NGOs claimed that TOKİ gained substantial profit from the public-private partnership projects realized in Ayazma and Tepeüstü.

In the case of Sümer, MZİ and KİPTAŞ officials considered the aforementioned 25% unit area deduction rate a major incentive to the community in a metropolis like Istanbul, where, they claimed, the average so-called rate was 50%. KİPTAŞ staff conducted a gross unit measurement study for each unit of the rightful owners of Sümer neighborhood. After application of the 25% deduction, if the owner received a Sahilpark unit larger than what they deserved, the difference would be covered by a ten-year low-interest bank loan provided by banks under contract to KİPTAŞ; if the owner received a smaller unit, KİPTAŞ would compensate the missing difference to the owner through direct deposit. In accordance with the fair property value analysis they undertook, KİPTAŞ and the MZİ set the equalization price for unit area at TRY 2,500 per sqm for Sahilpark units, with the existing units valued from TRY 700 to 1,000 per sqm. A similar set of deals was formulated for the store owners of the project area, but a business taxation problem caused by the lack of proper legal remedies hindered them from signing project agreements over the course of the first phase of the project.

The anonymity of some interviews helped reveal a hidden financial agenda of the Sümer case. It was claimed that the Koç Group was the actor that profited from the project the most: its former afforestation property was now zoned for housing and the eventual development of The Istanbul, 40% of which was allocated to the group. One official also predicted the construction of approximately 3,500 units to replace the 1,250 existing units of...
Sümer by the end of the second phase, and argued that some portion of the remaining units would be delivered to KİPTAŞ as profit based on a 40% flat-for-land method.

As apparent above, in both case projects, the rightful owners were offered a seemingly limited flexibility regarding the units they could choose to receive. However, with little to no room for negotiation, if they did not agree with the project terms, they were forcibly excluded from the project through legal means, which favored the government. There were numerous claims of apathy, bullying, despotism, unfair allegations and neglect which caused multiple conflicts between the government and the community in Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer projects, claims that are analyzed in detail in the two previous chapters and are further discussed below.

7.2. Institutional collaboration

7.2.1. Nature of collaboration: actors and power influences

Formal actors

In both cases, the formal project partnerships emerged from the protocols: TOKİ-IMM-MKI in Ayazma-Tepeüstü, and KİPTAŞ-MZI in the Sümer redevelopment project. The various actors’ tasks and responsibilities were made explicit in these protocols. Both projects consisted of the local government that focused on local organization and a higher institution that financed and steered the project. In the Ayazma case the higher institution was the Prime Ministry’s TOKİ, in Sümer case it was the IMM’s KİPTAŞ, both of which are non-profit development agencies of the government. TOKİ designed the Bezirganbahçe and Çakmak sites itself, whereas KİPTAŞ contracted the site design of Sahilpark. Both contracted out the construction activities to private firms.
During their interviews, the senior executive officials of the partnership institutions emphasized a high degree of institutional collaboration, drawing a picture of balanced weight in decision-making and responsibility. It was true that project implementation was carried out as projected for the most part; however, whenever the direction of the project changed, the decision-making weight was skewed to favor the higher governing levels. Equipped with the greater decision-making and financial powers mentioned below, TOKİ and KİPTAŞ were dominant in overall project decisions, expecting the local governments, the MKI and MZI, to assist them in implementing these decisions. The IMM did very little in real time implementation, but it was present in the overall decision-making as a strategic and informed indirect actor that monitored decisions and execution, in particular those of the local municipalities.

Central government and the AKP organization

An excessive top-down governing approach in general and during the course of the redevelopment project was mentioned by the interviewees of both Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer cases multiple times. The AKP controlled state, which controlled all central and local government institutions in Turkey, was one huge powerhouse in and of itself. The AKP government’s prioritization of urban redevelopment as a national policy since the early 2000s only added to this already overbearing image. Interviewees from both cases asserted that in working towards the same political party vision, all formal institutions wanted to contribute to the AKP’s redevelopment agenda and thus increase their political clout.

In the absence of an established legal framework for redevelopment, the Ayazma-Tepeüstü project was made possible by the consent of AKP leader and then Prime Minister Erdoğan’s. The head of the project for TOKİ, Karaoğlu, stated that this consent assured that both the central and local governments would carry out Erdoğan’s decision. TOKİ’s dedication
came not only from the AKP’s culture of submissiveness, but also from the fact that TOKİ was a state department directly accountable to the Prime Ministry. After the low-income Ayazma residents’ objections to the Bezirganbahçe unit prices and the infamous tenants’ struggle were carried to Ankara with the involvement of AKP MPs, the media and the formal parties of the project, Erdoğan and the AKP’s central organization called for a stop to speculation. Erdoğan actively intervened in the project in favor of the community by using his right of initiative for a 10% discount in Bezirganbahçe unit prices. Eventually, the Ayazma tenants were granted housing at another TOKİ public housing project in Kayabaşı. TOKİ and MKİ officials viewed these incentives as political measures meant to assure a quick and trouble-free agreement process in the nation’s first large-scale gecekondu redevelopment project. MKİ Mayor Yeniay’s pro-resident stance in his role as mediator between his community and the higher government agencies during the tenants struggle cost him his political career within the AKP. The Prime Minister, however, did not directly deal with the local mayor: The AKP’s province and district organizations forced Yeniay to withdraw his candidacy in the next local elections.

In the Sümer case, central government and partisan influence was less visible but evident. An anonymous interviewee described the consequences of the public unease caused by speculation about the possibility of displacement and the neighborhood-wide development termination that lasted almost two years in initial phase of project formulation. MZİ Mayor Aydın was warned by IMM Mayor Kadir Topbaş that unless a solution could be implemented quickly, Aydın was risking the success of the pilot project and his political career; thus the project partnership decided to keep the residents on site. During the agreement negotiations, the KİPTAŞ-MZİ partnership made intensive efforts to persuade residents through household visits and one-on-one meetings. Local AKP party members and AKP-friendly tradesmen and residents were involved in community outreach activities. The fact that the majority of the
Sümer community were AKP supporters also made this process relatively easy for the government.

In both cases, there are claims of patronage and bribery in unit allocations and other incentives. Partisanship was noted within both the government and the communities. In Sümer, privileges tended to be granted to those close to the AKP organization, while in Ayazma-Tepeüstü those who expressed views favorable toward the AKP and critical of the Kurds were sometimes rewarded. As one Sümer resident put it, to topple such a firmly established party-based dominance required a strong and well-articulated opposition with concrete alternative plans and programs; the existing opposition parties and the community lacked the cohesion necessary to form such resistance.

*Private actors*

Among the indirect actors of both case projects were private groups. In the Ayazma case, Ağaoğlu and Torunlar groups were included in the project by TOKİ, which partnered with them in the development of the My World and Mall of Istanbul projects, respectively. In the Sümer case, the Koç Group was involved from the early stages of the project as the provider of some of the land used for redevelopment. The three-actor partnership of KİPTAŞ, the MZI, and the Koç Group agreed on the Koç Group’s land and monetary donations, set a flat-for-land rate, and made plan changes to rezone the group’s land, which had been marked for afforestation, for the luxury housing project, The Istanbul. The senior government officials of both projects made very little reference to these public-private partnerships throughout their interviews, as though they were not a part of the urban redevelopment activity in discussion.

The government’s relationships with private stakeholders remained questionable in the eyes of the Ayazma and Sümer residents. Project authorities either denied or did not address the local and general public’s related concerns. Instead, they repeatedly reminded that the
local communities were given the privilege of receiving upgraded legal homes and stores in a modern, safe and livable environment. In addition, TOKİ officials argued that TOKİ had to generate funds from high-yield public-private partnerships in order to transfer profits to other public housing projects in different parts of Turkey. Similarly, KİPTAŞ official Demirci defended the development of *The Istanbul* as the only way to increase the land value so as to create enough revenue to cover the *Sahilpark* construction costs. These and many other sets of issues were left unresolved between the formal actors and the communities of Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer over the course of the projects.

*Local community*

As analyzed above, formal decision-making was steered by local communities to a varying but limited extent. In the absence of any organized support, the local community of Sümer was able to prevent displacement at the project formulation phase. The Ayazma community, however, could do nothing to alter their own project’s course and prevent displacement, with one exception: In later stages of the project, some Ayazma tenants were able to organize, engage NGO support and resist the development until they claimed housing rights for all tenants, which the government initially promised and later neglected to honor. The continuous attention and efforts of the NGOs, namely Baysal from *Göç-Der*, İMECE, and *Bir Umum*, were a major factor in the community’s success. In the Sümer case, a similar resistance was offered by local business owners, backed by the local NGO İSPER: they refused to be involved in the project until their taxation problem was solved. The Sümer residents, however, had intra-community trust issues when it came to organizing. Their search for help from the neighborhood mukhtar did not yield any tangible support despite his community-friendly disposition, because he wanted to avoid the risk of confrontation by both the public and the government in case of any conflicts. In the end, the idea of owning legal and safe
homes and the increase in property values overcame any unaddressed concerns of Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer residents. Neither of the resident communities was able to establish an association or formal organization to defend and empower itself against the undesired effects of redevelopment.

*National media and community representation*

It is evident in both the Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer cases that the project authorities, along with the Prime Minister, TOKİ president and the IMM mayor, used televised and print national media to promote the redevelopment projects as representative of their vision of Istanbul as a safe and competitive city, and validate project decisions and their pro-community rhetoric. Sümer residents opposed to the project were disappointed with the lack of local media attention devoted to their concerns, but with NGO support, Ayazma residents were able to make their voices heard on national and local press and via the pamphlets they produced and distributed in Küçükçekmece.

The MKI and MZI also at times gave voice to the concerns of their communities during decision-making. In the beginning of the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case the MKI sought the dedication of part of Ayazma to public housing for the residents who did not want to be displaced but could not prevent TOKİ from taking over the planning and design of said housing. TOKİ generated the Çakmak housing alternative, which was also considered displacement because of its physical disconnection from Ayazma. During conflicts with the community, the MKI positioned itself as an active mediator for the community, TOKİ, and the Prime Minister, as the community’s main addressee was its local municipality. In the tenants’ case, the MKI acted more as mediator than decision-maker because of the written promise Mayor Yeniay gave to tenants when the project was initiated. In Sümer, Alsaç was confident that the MZI spoke for the local community during the project formulation phase, advocating in favor of a
low area deduction rate and against resident displacement. The Sümer residents interviewed had conflicting views on this claim; however, the majority believed that KİPTAŞ had been the major force behind most decisions. The fact that MZI officials recalled having to refer the residents’ project complaints to KİPTAŞ tends to support this belief.

The ultimate stance of all formal actors from both cases was that the redevelopment projects aimed to improve the community’s quality of life and that several incentives were offered to the rightful owners at varying levels of government. Therefore, when the conflicts came to a deadlock, the formal actors—in other words, the government—accused the residents of being ungrateful and ignorant, or even politically charged antagonists, and used coercive power over the ones who persisted in their opposition. The government officials of both Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer emphasized that the majority of the rightful owners expressed their content with redevelopment during press interviews, actively choosing to exclude the opposition from representation. While some of the opposing residents could not sustain their resistance and eventually signed the project agreements or moved elsewhere as in the Ayazma case, others were relegated to later project phases by the government for further negotiation with the aim of eventual agreement, or if they continued to resist, exclusion through expropriation.

7.2.2. Revisiting policies and decision factors

Institutional policies and goals

Continuing economic development policies in place since the 1980s, the economic growth and employment policies of the AKP government have depended on supporting the construction sector, which is by its nature rich in short-term spillover effects and job-creation. In line with this policy, the redevelopment of unsafe and run-down settlements in
Turkey has been a priority for the government since the early 2000s. TOKİ and KİPTAŞ, which were founded in 1984 and 1987 respectively, have been serving this vision in combination with the national and metropolitan governments’ ideals of making Istanbul a competitive European metropolis. The officials of the MKI and MZI shared this vision and ambition for their districts. Thus the redevelopment through uplift of these areas was an opportunity for the project partnerships in both projects. TOKİ and KİPTAŞ made high profits by partnering in gentrification activities, while the MKI and MZI gained political and financial credibility as facilitators and increased the potential for other gentrification projects in their jurisdictions.

Aside from financial and political motives, the formal institutions of both projects aimed at resolving negative characteristics of the redevelopment areas. In Ayazma-Tepeüstü, the long-enduring gecekondu problem presented itself as an enduring illegal occupation of the state land in Istanbul, a threat to the quality of the residents’ lives, and a source of Kurdish discontent. The intent to solve the gecekondu problem was also evident in Sümer, but there was a more urgent need to mitigate the potentially severe negative effects of the expected Istanbul earthquake by replacing the poor building stock with earthquake-resilient homes. In reality, Demirci admitted that Sümer’s redevelopment was already on the government’s agenda and that the project executors KİPTAŞ and the MZI were thus able to use the rationale of disaster mitigation to obscure less community-friendly project decisions such as zoning changes and increased building density. A similar rationalization was posited for the profit-yielding redevelopment scheme of Ayazma-Tepeüstü by its residents and the NGOs interviewed. Finally, to achieve its problem-solving objectives, the government sought the displacement of the Ayazma and Tepeüstü communities from the beginning, whereas the Sümer partnership listened to its community and realized a project that kept the existing residents and businesses in the neighborhood.
Legal factors

The historic gecekondu phenomenon in Sümer and Ayazma-Tepeüstü provided the main legal framework for the projects. In both cases, many residents were in a vulnerable position due to their so-called illegal occupier status on state owned land or in their illegal apartment buildings. The Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment project was initiated by the Prime Minister’s consent and was executed based on the gecekondu clearance guideline of Gecekondu Law No. 755. Under its disaster mitigation rationale, the Sümer redevelopment project relied on Zoning Law No. 3194. The second phase of the Sümer project has been formulated according to the more recently adopted Redevelopment Law No. 6306, which was introduced in 2012 and has since significantly accelerated the area- and parcel-based redevelopment activities throughout Turkey.

Under all these laws the governments holds the power to evict illegal occupiers from their homes through expropriation. The formal actors of both cases used the prospect of expropriation openly against residents during agreement negotiations: aware of the legal coercive power they possessed, they did not hesitate to threaten the rightful owners and assert their power whenever an opposing argument presented itself. During the tenant conflict in Ayazma, the MKİ used brute force against protesting residents multiple times, claiming that resistance to the government was a crime against the state.

TOKİ and KİPTAŞ, as the higher partnering institutions, held different advantages in steering the projects’ legal planning. A 2004 amendment to Public Housing Law No. 2985, or the so-called TOKİ law, enabled TOKİ to perform urban redevelopment activities in Turkey. The then-President of TOKİ, Erdoğan Albayrak, used his initiative to enlarge the designated redevelopment area and change the status of Ayazma and Tepeüstü to “gecekondu prevention zones” based on Gecekondu Law No. 755 in 2007 and 2008. Soon after that, a new set of
1:5000 and 1:000 plans were prepared concurrently by TOKİ based on the direct plan-making and approval powers granted by the TOKİ law. These new plans suggested an increase in building density in both neighborhoods many times higher than that of the original low-density settlement in Ayazma. TOKİ was also able to acquire the Treasury’s land in Ayazma and Tepeüstü and the remaining private lots in exchange for the public housing it offered. In line with the TOKİ law, it sold these lands to private companies and partnered in the aforementioned gentrification projects. The role of the MKİ in this process was minimal due to the suppressive legal, political and financial powers of TOKİ.

KİPTAŞ is a subsidiary of the IMM, which holds the legal power to perform planning activities in districts under its metropolitan jurisdiction. On the one hand, it is a public institution that is subject to Public Procurement Law No. 4734, which allows it to open and conduct public bidding. On the other hand, it has the power to play the role of a private company in the housing development market. The IMM monitored the plan making process performed by the MZI. The MZI followed the standard formal procedure of the 1:5000 zoning plan change according to Development Law No. 3194. Under this plan, the project boundaries were set and the project area was officially designated as an “urban development and transformation area” based on Article 73 of Municipality Law No. 5393. The zoning plan used the land readjustment technique permitted by article 18 of the Development Law to realize zoning changes and open the afforestation land to development in which the private stakeholder, the Koç Group, was involved.

Inadequate redevelopment legislation also led to two legal conflicts in the Sümer case. The Treasury of the Ministry of Finance, which initially owned the vacant soccer field lot that was transferred to KİPTAŞ for Sahilpark construction, objected to the MZI’s land readjustment application, which allocated to the Treasury a less desirable close by lot formerly owned by
the Koç Group. Bakkal argued that it was within the MZI’s ex officio power to perform expropriation in line with its planning decisions, a power granted by law no. 3194, and suspected that the Treasury wanted to partake in the Sümer redevelopment project to benefit from its economic gains. In the conflict with the owners of small businesses, there was an apparent gap in law no. 6306: retail owners were neither included in the added-value tax remission granted to the homeowners nor were they exempt from the income tax, oversights which forced them to pay substantial taxes upon signing project agreements. By the end of the first phase of the project, the retail owners continued to refuse to participate in the project, and KİPTAŞ had not generated a working solution; the conflict remained suspended and the Sahilpark stores vacant.

**Political factors**

The comparative ramifications of top-down political impositions, partisanship and political infighting within communities in the redevelopment experiences of Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer have already been discussed above. The governing culture in Turkey and its reflections at the local scale caused several conflicts in both cases between government agencies and communities and between the agencies themselves. Common sources of these conflicts were displacement and gentrification, project alternatives and methods, expropriation, the financial hardship of residents, the Ayazma tenants’ resistance and its cost for the MKI mayor, and Kurdish politics.

Electoral politics also became a factor that affected the cases. Held every five years, local elections are a source of stress for both local municipalities and higher tiers of governments, especially in competitive metropolitan districts like Küçükçekmece and Zeytinburnu, because in the end, their success is measured in votes. According to Alsaç, the five-year election cycle forces municipalities to complete redevelopment projects in this
short timeframe when they could generate more cogent and organized remedies if they had 10-to-15-year electoral projections. In any case, politicians aimed to avoid confrontation with local communities to prevent the erosion of their voting base. Demirci’s recalled MZI Mayor Aydin’s typical stance: “My voters are my priority, because I am at this position thanks to them... I should not offend them so that they vote for me again.” Perhaps that is also why the government decided against displacing the rightful owners of Sümer. However, according to the MKI officials, Mayor Yeniay took a more courageous stance, upholding the MKI’s principle of “social municipalism” by displacing his citizens to provide housing and increasing their quality of life even if they opposed: “We lose [elections] if need be.”

Though multiple subjects raised the topic of party unanimity and partisanship, TOKİ officials firmly rejected the notion that Ayazma and Tepeüstü were selected because of their large AKP voter base or the fact that the MKI was an AKP municipality. Çelik even argued that sometimes it was more comfortable for TOKİ to collaborate with municipalities run by opposition parties, because the possibility of intra-party conflicts, political interference and top-down assertion was lower with them. On the other hand, opposition parties can use community conflicts as an opportunity to discredit their political foes, as Demirci claimed to have happened in the Sümer neighborhood, which reported the lowest number of AKP votes in Zeytinburnu in the 2009 local election. Still, following the completion of the first phase of the project and their transfer to Sahilpark, most Sümer residents were content with the escalation of their property values and were generally satisfied with living in a modern, gated and earthquake-resilient environment. The Ayazma tenants, however, were less satisfied because of their new expensive lifestyle and the poor living conditions in Beziprangbahçe.
Financial factors

The redevelopment of Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer, favorable locations for their high property values and the redevelopment potential of their location, are reflections of the abovementioned national economic policy and redevelopment vision of the AKP at the municipal level. Both projects were funded by two of the leading housing development institutions of Turkey, which utilize massive state and government funds to produce public housing projects and are inherently non-profit government agencies. However, while they provided the local community with new housing opportunities and claimed to break even by the end of the projects, both TOKİ and KİPTAŞ used the redevelopment projects to benefit financially.

As mentioned above, TOKİ profited through the sale of the transferred development site and partnership in the gentrification of the former Ayazma residents’ neighborhood in the form of a luxury housing project, *My World*, and a mixed-use complex, the *Mall of Istanbul*. Oflaz suspected that TOKİ recouped roughly 3-4 times its investment in the project through the bidding for these projects. Baysal suspected that TOKİ also profited through the transfer of formerly illegal residents to public housing for which they had to pay even though there were many families living at poverty level who reported financial hardship despite incentives.

A similar conflict arose among the Sümer community, who demanded a decrease in the unit area deduction rate, either because they could not afford a unit in *Sahilpark*, or because they perceived injustice in the government’s financial plans. Arguing that it was necessary to create funds to finance *Sahilpark*, KİPTAŞ partnered in development of *The Istanbul*, which is one of the most expensive housing sites in Istanbul today. Planning criteria were subordinated to financial concerns when the partnership increased building density and enacted zoning changes at the expense of the wellbeing of the local and the larger public. The potential
monetary profits of the MKI and MZI were not made explicit by the interviewees, although the interviewed residents and NGOs were suspicious of the local municipalities’ share in both financial and political gains. Government actors in both cases viewed the profitability of their projects as a strength of the decision-making process that benefited both communities and private stakeholders.

Finally, in both the Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer regions, land prices increased even more than the partnerships expected: values almost tripled in two years in Sümer. These increases demonstrated the viability of other profit-seeking projects in Zeytinburnu, such as Sahilpark and The Istanbul, and thus increased the marketability and competitive advantage of the district in line with the government actors’ ambitions. The same advantage was mentioned by the formal actors of the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case, which witnessed a twofold increase in land prices by the end of the project.

7.3. Community inclusion and responses

7.3.1. Governments’ perspectives

Extent of involvement: surveys and negotiations

In both cases, the majority of the interviewees from the government institutions and all of the interviewed rightful owners stated that the community was adequately involved in the project’s direct decision-making. In the MKI’s defense, Siğınaksoy and Oflaz claimed that the residents were not in a position to formally deliver their opinions both because their education level did not allow an informed decision-making involvement and because they were illegal occupiers of the land. Alsaç of the MZI attested that the Sümer community was involved to whatever extent that the law and the government’s resources permitted.
In the early stages of the projects, the residents of Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer were surveyed by the local municipalities in order to determine their socio-economic status and their views and needs regarding redevelopment. MKI officials referred to three surveys conducted under Dr. Turgut’s supervision to explain community involvement in Ayazma-Tepeüstü: one before the project to find out the residents’ expectations from redevelopment in general, one during the project to determine their transfer preferences, and one to identify their social profiles and needs for the social empowerment program of the redevelopment scheme. Baysal from the Göç-Der found these surveys strongly biased and manipulative, in that they created false hope for the residents who reported a preference for staying in Ayazma in low houses with gardens. In Sümer the survey process was more mechanical, utilized mostly to assess the community’s income level and household and unit sizes. The formal project partnerships then formulated the physical and financial conditions of the projects and invited the rightful owners for agreement interviews.

Sümer’s formal project officials, accompanied by the MZI mayor and KİPTAŞ president, paid numerous formal visits to rightful owners’ homes in order to inform them of the project terms and persuade them to sign the agreements. The Sümer Mukhtar Coşkun assessed these visits as indicative of a complete lack of community initiative in the absence of any decision alternatives or workable agreement options. The officials also attempted more informal means of persuasion by engaging local AKP members and followers in the residents’ daily lives.

In both cases, the government established redevelopment offices to continue attempts to inform and persuade the homeowners to sign the agreements. These offices, staffed by MKI and KİPTAŞ personnel, reportedly did a good job in creating a friendly environment for the
residents. However, when there was a persistent disagreement, higher government officials mostly took a colder, non-compromising stance.

**Formal participation method**

All interviewees that participated in the study reported that the level of formal public participation was “information giving” at the most. According to Tantan, community surveys were a means of formal participation, while Kurşuncu and Baysal argued that the surveys were by design one-way instruments tailored to gather information about residents rather than enable a two-way discussion that facilitated collective decision-making. Çelik claimed that it was not TOKİ’s but the local municipality’s duty to conduct formal participation activities (i.e. community meetings in which local NGOs and universities were invited) to inform residents of the details of the project. In general, TOKİ undertook redevelopment projects on a broader scale, as in the case of Ayazma-Tepeüstü. As for Sümer, Alsaç pointed at the simultaneity of the decision-making process and the collection of the community’s opinion in the early stages of the project: The decision-makers made a decision, then communicated it with the rightful owners via presentations and models. He stated that the project partnership used this method to obtain the community’s verbal consent for the ultimate decision to implement the redevelopment project.

Bakkal pointed at the general lack of legal regulation for formal participation methods in urban planning in Turkey, an absence which resulted in neither the MZİ nor KİPTAŞ applying any further methods, such as codiscussing and codeciding on design alternatives or receiving the rightful owners’ written consent. While she agreed on the inadequacy of Turkish legislation, Kurşuncu offered a different approach to the participation mechanism. She believed that revolving participation meetings and public persuasion processes were unnecessary if the community clearly did not want to realize a project or wished to remain in
their area. In the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case, for instance, the community’s desires and needs were so explicit that there was no need of such democratic charades. Kurşuncu criticized Dr. Turgut and the MKI officials’ view that the residents’ socio-economic status (extremely deprived living conditions and very low education level) was a major obstacle to participation, asserting that it was the government’s job to empower and involve its citizens.

**Community empowerment and mobilization**

The government’s positive attempt to elevate the education level and general quality of life of the local community was spearheaded in the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case by Dr. Turgut and Mayor Yeniyay, who realized that urban redevelopment had not just a physical planning dimension but also a social one. Dr. Turgut founded a social empowerment project, *Bizim Halka,* and established a project office that employed sociology, psychology, and preschool education professionals shortly before the residents started to move to Bezirganbahçe. The new residents of Bezirganbahçe were given training in employment, education and personal development with voluntary contributions of local, national and international organizations. However, the program was terminated because of a number of challenges concerning project operations, effectiveness, and lack of community trust. In the Sümer case, such an empowerment program was not considered, possibly because the new lifestyle in *Sahilpark* was more welcomed by the residents who were able to stay in their neighborhood and whose socio-economic status was on average higher than that of Ayazma residents.

**Community organizing**

The most significant and resonant community resistance of the two redevelopment projects was that of the tenants of Ayazma. TOKİ and the MKI’s response to this conflict was antagonistic rather than conciliatory. Officials from these institutions defined the protestors
as “marginal groups,” alluding to their partial Kurdish identity. Oflaz believed that the fact that the residents did not sufficiently know how to seek their rights diminished their potential influence over decisions. He claimed that an Ayazma resident could not make a reasonable case and “go to Ankara,” apparently unaware of community leader Aydin and his neighbor friends’ several trips to Ankara, which paved the way for their eventual success in claiming housing rights for Ayazma-Tepeüstü tenants. In Sümer, Bakkal and an anonymous interviewee of the MZI asserted that for the most part, household visits and informal resident meetings were conducted one-on-one to prevent any group “synergy” or opposition. As claimed by multiple interviewees, using this and other project marketing and persuasion strategies, the MZI-KİPTAŞ partnership was largely successful in its attempts to divide the community.

According to Bakkal, the problem with community organization, as with public participation, was the general absence of the subject in legal literature. She believed that had the legislation encouraged the formation of neighborhood associations and the Sümer residents had formed one, the community could have made an impact on the project’s course. At least, she claimed, the community should have chosen one or two representatives to communicate its needs and demands to the MZI and KİPTAŞ.

Government integrity and community trust

Before its initiation, the MKI envisioned a community-friendly approach toward the redevelopment of Ayazma-Tepeüstü. After the involvement of TOKİ, the project took on a more mechanical approach, with a focus on the planning and financial aspects of redevelopment rather than the social one. Oflaz admitted that the project did not yield the desired outcome in Ayazma because the social dimension was overlooked, despite Bizim Halka, which could not achieve its aims or satisfy the community. Alsaç and Demirci described the redevelopment as “a pro-community project despite the community,” maintaining that
the project was successful even when taking into consideration the resistance the partnership faced. When explaining the pro-community aspects of the project, Demirici specifically mentioned security of the lives and property of the Sümer community against the major earthquake risks and the financial gains of the residents. Kurşuncu believed that the legal and executive powers that the government held turned out in reality to be weaknesses from the standpoint of community relations, a lesson specific to the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case but perhaps relevant to Sümer as well. The public sector thought that it could exert its will in all areas, but in reality it could not because it was confronted by the public.

Despite the general pro-community stance the senior executives maintained, officials from both cases had varying views on the integrity of their projects. Tantan believed that in spite of endless community complaints, TOKİ’s performance in the Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment project was public-friendly, while MKI officials argued that regardless of its outcomes, the project was 100% public-friendly in its intentions. In Sümer, Alsaç used the area’s property value increase as a rationale for his judgment that the project was 100% public-friendly: even after the deductions, the rightful owners had derived a 100% profit from the project. Dr. Turgut of the MKI and Bakkal of the MZI were more suspicious. They estimated that the actual profit margin was closer to 50%, while Bakkal expressed unease at her position between the community and the government on this issue.

Finally, the anonymous MZI interviewee in the Sümer case argued that to project an image of “inclusive governance” to local, national and international circles, the authorities exhibited the Sümer redevelopment project as the residents’ “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity,” and called the project a “Robin Hood model,” referring to the promised earthquake resilience, upgraded and legitimized housing, incentives and the land value increase. Upon receiving persistent community criticism, the MZI official argued, the
government’s discourse changed to calling the residents “ungrateful” and “ignorant,” but it was otherwise consistent in its presentation of the project.

Community follow-up

Toward the end of the Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment project, the TOKİ-MKI partnership found that the majority of formerly transferred residents, in particular those who used to live on state-owned lots in Ayazma, had sold their Bezirganbahçe units and moved out. Their reasons were unknown, as neither the MKI nor TOKİ regularly followed up with residents. Tantan speculated that the now official homeowners had taken advantage of the newly high property values in the area and sold their units. Activists claimed that the residents could not afford the installments because they continued to live below the poverty line in Bezirganbahçe and Kayabaşı. The former Ayazma residents in particular left because they could not adapt to the new lifestyle imposed on them in Bezirganbahçe.

At the time of this study, the first phase of the Sümer project had almost been completed. Despite the presence of still-vacant housing and commercial units in Sahilpark, many rightful home and business owners of Sümer, who were actually willing to participate in the project, were relegated to later project phases, as their many problems and questions turned into long-enduring conflicts. Demirci reported that in order to eliminate these conflicts in the second phase, the project partnership had recently conducted a resident survey that assessed the rightful owners’ real intentions and prescribed the number, size and features of the new unit allocations. Regardless, Küçükuygun predicted that more residents would be forced to sell their units to private buyers or to KİPTAŞ, which, he argued, would offer to buy their property for unit prices adjusted for intangible qualities. He believed that the residents who were facing financial hardship should merge to share new units in Sahilpark or the second phase site, the profits from the sale of which they could split upon completion.
of the two-year prohibition against selling their unit. As for the business units, the settlement options were still to be clarified and negotiated between the local businessmen, led by Özsoy, and KİPTAŞ.

7.3.2. Residents’ perspectives

Resettlement vs. displacement

The MKI’s community survey revealed that two main opinions were common among residents regarding displacement: Some wanted to stay in their neighborhoods but could not afford the luxury housing their homes would be replaced with, while others preferred to live elsewhere, tired of poor living conditions. Oflaz argued that while there was a “marginal” portion, who expressed a strong preference to stay and caused serious distress, up to 80% of the neighborhood’s women, tired of having to look after impoverished households, favored leaving the area. In the Sümer case, the MZI’s community opinion survey revealed that though many residents were concerned about the earthquake vulnerability, age, lack of safety and generally run-down conditions of their buildings, most did not want to be dislocated.

In the end, the Sümer residents were lucky, because they were presented with an in situ solution. The transfer area, Sahilpark, was at maximum a couple of blocks away from their former homes. However, there are accounts of indirect displacement. The residents claimed that there were people who were forced to leave their lifelong neighborhood because after the unit area deduction they merited too small a Sahilpark unit and could not afford the resulting high difference for the available ones. There were some, around 10% according to Adali, who sold their existing units in order to avoid the 25% deduction and moved to other, less favorable parts of Istanbul. He claimed that others, who constituted 15-20% of total population, received a new unit, sold it at more profitable rates, and bought two modest
units in other parts of Istanbul or in Anatolia. There were also those who were waiting for the passing of the two-year sales prohibition on their Sahilpark home, which was imposed by the government to keep the residents in the area. Nonetheless, Cihangir guessed, the overall proportion of those who had sold or would sell was not high because all the residents generally enjoyed their new gated community. Furthermore, Küçükuygun argued that even if many of the residents were to sell their Sahilpark units, their decision to do so would be of their own free will and thus should not be regarded as a fault of the project.

Many Ayazma and Tepeüstü residents had to face bigger challenges than residents in Sümer. Most were dislocated to Beşirganbahçe, which was 6 km away from their former homes, while those who could afford to remain nearby moved to the Çakmak housing site one km away. Tenants, on the other hand, were given their right to housing quite late and offered public housing in Kayabaşı, 10 km away from Ayazma. One resident, Özdemir, recalled a few families who lost their right to claim their new homes because they were not present in Ayazma during the agreement and demolition periods. Another, Turan, said that her family was one of those that was forced to leave Ayazma without any resolution, because they simply could not afford the TRY 10,000 TOKİ required as a down-payment for a unit in Kayabaşı. Baysal argued that in the end, regardless of their rightful owner status, all residents were forcefully displaced and that the whole community’s housing rights were thus violated. In her view, the residents who were neglected the most suffered most acutely, but in the longer term all residents were victimized because of their inability to afford the increasing maintenance fees and installments in both Beşirganbahçe and Kayabaşı. She emphasized that many had already sold their condos and moved back to their hometowns in the east or to other gecekondu neighborhoods in Istanbul. Baysal repeatedly stated that she and other fellow activists foresaw this outcome, but that residents were too enthralled by the prospect of becoming formalized homeowners to heed their warnings.
Agreements vs. conflicts

There is no account of any cancellation of early alternatives in the Ayazma-Tepeüstü project caused by community resistance. The initial on-site public housing proposal of the MKI was rejected when TOKİ assumed control over the project’s financial formulation and planning. In Sümer, the only real community-induced changes happened in the beginning of the project: the first when residents demanded in situ redevelopment, and the second when they objected to an early project alternative with two 20-plus-storey towers of income-generating luxury condos, which they considered a blatant attempt to gentrify the neighborhood.

The later realized Sümer redevelopment alternative was more acceptable but was accompanied by problems for the community such as the increased building height, a 25% area deduction rate perceived by residents as excessive, financial incapability, and demands for intangible qualities to be included in new unit allocations. In the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case, the one-for-one unit allocation method for Tepeüstü residents and the incentives offered to those in Ayazma made the agreement a relatively easy choice for some residents. However, Ayazma residents and project officials related reports of conflicting existing unit claims, illegitimate additions for extra unit designation, financial hardship for many who lived under poverty line, adverse living conditions in Bezirganbahçe, and similar claims. In both Sümer and Ayazma-Tepeüstü, the government showed little to no recognition of these issues. Residents’ accounts described an absolute lack of involvement which ended in an ultimatum: that they either sign the agreements or be compensated for their homes and leave their neighborhood. As for the business owners’ problem in the Sümer case, Özsoy confirmed the government’s rigid attitude and added that even though most rightful business owners did not consent, the project partnership initiated the redevelopment project unilaterally and left the taxation problem unsolved.
Demirci claimed that the residents’ reluctance continued until the completion of the Sahilpark construction in 2012, and they witnessed land prices doubling in worth. The first few units were given to friendly rightful owners in a hurry in the hope of creating a ripple effect. In early 2013, the MZI-KİPTAŞ partnership announced a two-month allowance for all rightful owners to sign agreements or they would lose their rightful owner status, and the remaining unclaimed units would be sold to outsiders. The government was content that the remaining approximately 350 rightful owners, who constituted more than 75% of the targeted 450 households, applied to them within the given timeframe.

According to the TOKİ and the MKI officials interviewed concerning the Ayazma case, most of the rightful owners (around 90%, according to one MKI interviewee) signed the deeds of consent and vacated their gecekondu without any resistance to move to Bezirganbahçe or Çakmak housing sites. There is no record of the actual numbers of those transferred or who dropped out of the project either directly or indirectly; however, the NGOs and residents interviewed claimed that the rate of the latter was higher than 10%.

In the Sümer case, tenants were completely excluded from the project; there were no incentives or solutions offered to them. The Ayazma tenants’ were in a similar situation until some resisted as described previously. Because of their “insurgence,” their homes and barracks were bulldozed by the municipality multiple times; they were assaulted; they were left to live in despair with children, elderly and pregnant wives through hard conditions, especially those of winter. But with the help of the volunteer activists, they survived these conditions for over two years, involved local support, managed to attract national attention, and reached out to the parliament. In the end, they could not reclaim their neighborhood, but all Ayazma tenants were offered public housing in Kayabaşı. From a housing rights perspective, Baysal reiterated that although the most victimized group was the tenants, all
the groups of Ayazma (i.e. homeowners, tenants, retail owners and tenants, and other occupants) were denied proper rights because they were all displaced and/or forced to live in housing conditions that were worse than what they had in Ayazma.

**Reliability and trust**

It can be deduced from their accounts that residents’ perceptions of government actions were at least partially influenced by their political affiliations. This is particularly apparent in their views on the reliability of the formal actors of the project. As Demirci recalled for the Sümer redevelopment project, the residents generally expressed two opposite reactions to the government: either “May God bless you,” or “This project has a political agenda and you are going to benefit your political friends the most.”

Although there was no organized reaction in the Sümer case, the community expressed several claims and concerns in the form of passive resistance to the government, such as refusing to sign agreement papers. The involvement of private land and the development agreement between KİPTAŞ, the MZI and the private Koç Group raised concern and speculation about the government’s unfair financial profit-seeking at the expense of the Sümer community. The low-income residents had been suspicious about the end of the greater redevelopment activity in their district as well. However, only AKP-opposed resident Adalı and Mukhtar Coşkun vocalized these suspicions. AKP supporters Küçükuygun and Cihangir either did not acknowledge the related facts or argued that they were not peculiar to the AKP, but typical of all governments in the history of Turkish politics. According to others, these residents’ mentality was: “Maybe, but the AKP works for its citizens, too” that AKP supporters are generally known for in Turkey. Similarly, the AKP bureaucrats involved in the project mostly defended their local redevelopment program, preferring to not mention or provide details about the questionable aspects of the project. It was thanks to two
anonymous interviewees of the MZI that the full course of plan changes, the public-private partnership and some other suspicious claims were unveiled.

The case in the Ayazma-Tepeüstü project was similar to that of Sümer. The AKP officials of TOKİ and the MKI took a pro-government stance that covered up or defended actions inimical to the public, with the partial exception of Dr. Turgut and one MKI interviewee. The Ayazma residents who participated in the study were also involved in the tenants’ struggle: their stance was naturally opposed to the government in general, even more so regarding the Ayazma-Tepeüstü project. Despite multiple attempts it was not possible to interview former homeowners now living in Bezirganbahçe or Çakmak, reportedly because these residents avoided any possible government-related confrontation due to the likely shady unit agreements and/or their sympathy for the AKP. Thanks to the claims and feelings the interviewed residents and activists shared, it is possible to evaluate the Ayazma-Tepeüstü project from alternative viewpoints. The facts behind the tenants’ struggle and the private partnerships made with Ağaoğlu and Torunlar Groups for the My World and Mall of Istanbul gentrification projects are tangible accounts of this sort. Residents and NGOs also reported numerous cases in which the government had given more or cheaper new units or other privileges such as municipality jobs and monetary donations to some residents as bribes or political recompense, actions which made the fairness of the project questionable and the formal partnership untrustworthy in their eyes.

Evaluations on community organizing

The project authorities’ active attempts to put a stop to the organization of the community are evident in both cases. The community ran into obstacles in obtaining and processing information to help organize its actions. Residents who despite incentives opposed displacement, the agreement terms, and the intended gentrification were not treated
amicably by the government. Most residents lacked the will and ability to organize in order to achieve the lives they pursued, and even when they did organize, their impact was generally only as large as the government allowed.

Adalı and Küçükuygun repeatedly complained about the inability of the community to effectively organize regarding their Sümer case; there was a clear trust issue among the residents themselves. The reluctance of the Sümer mukhtar Coşkun to represent his community was another factor in the failure of the community to unify. In Ayazma-Tepeüstü, in particular, Baysal explained the locals’ reluctance to organize by pointing to the community’s Kurd-dominated ethnic and political profile; because they were historically displaced and “slapped” by the state, they sought to avoid trouble by any means. As in Sümer, the residents did not know their rights because they were not educated enough. Furthermore, most felt vulnerable because they were squatters on the site. However, in the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case, Ayazma resident Kasım Aydın who, although not a tenant himself, managed to change the course of the tenant struggle and enable the change they sought. All the residents who were involved in this struggle were proud of their resistance, though they did not achieve the full extent of their demands. Kurşuncu believed that the decision-making process of the project could have been drastically different, if residents had been able to organize and demand their rights collectively from the beginning of the project.

New lives and thoughts on redevelopment

Many interviewees from both cases predicted that the burden of long-term debt for Bezirganbahçe and Kayabaşı public housing units and Sahilpark on top of already hard financial conditions would inevitably cause more residents to drop out of the project scheme. While most of the rightful owners of Sümer viewed the project not just as a means to legitimize and increase the value of their property but also as a step-up in their lifestyle, the
anonymous interviewees and some Sahilpark residents also questioned the sustainability of their new lives as they found the security and maintenance costly, and that they had difficulty in adapting to the open-kitchen unit plans they had never lived in before. For former Ayazma residents, the hardship of their new way of life was more severe. Bezirganbahçe was different from their former homes in many respects. During interviews, these residents used the words “claustrophobic” and “prison” to describe the 12-story housing blocks with small units, lack of green space, and extremely unsafe conditions, when comparing their new units with their former, safer one-story homes within fields in Ayazma. Some missed their old neighborhood so much that they could not stand driving by the My World development. Some received psychiatric help and medication. Both leaving their neighborhood and living in Bezirganbahçe were traumatic experiences for them.

All in all, redevelopment was a poignant experience for the local residents of Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer. With mixed views and many vivid memories in mind, they continue their lives, embracing the uncertainty caused by the redevelopment of the neighborhood they identified with and loved.
Chapter 8. Informed Lessons from Redevelopment Practice

The chapter presents the responses of the leading practitioners of redevelopment practices from central and local government institutions and the representatives of advocacy groups for the residents involved in the projects and academia in Turkey when they were asked about the lessons they drew from their experience with the redevelopment projects. The suggested approaches to redevelopment are categorized in the following topics: community oriented policies, physical planning, financial planning, collaborative planning, and community involvement and empowerment.

8.1. Community oriented policies

8.1.1. Housing rights and public housing

Many of the conflicts and arguments raised in the case study relate to the larger topic of housing rights and their importance and effects on redevelopment policies. Sığınaksoy specifically claimed that she was “not belittling” the residents when calling them “free-riders.” She stated that the state-land occupiers of Ayazma, who randomly migrated from eastern Turkey, had no right to demand the sustaining of the low-density lifestyle they unlawfully pursued in the gecekondu settlement. She complained that a part of the Turkish academia supported such unreasonable demands, which was unfair to the lawful citizens who had worked hard to afford a house. Concerning the opposition to gentrification, she argued that it was the incontestable right of the central government to foster in vacated state lands whatever function or development it considered necessary.

Tenant rights activists argued that housing rights should include both homeowners and tenants. Based on her experience with the Ayazma case, Kurşuncu criticized the government
for neglecting to consider any tenant-specific public housing policies despite the tenants’ long and compelling resistance. Even with the support of outside activists, she considered their struggle a failure because of its inability to inspire discussions about general state policy towards tenants. Dr. Turgut added that the existing legal framework for redevelopment only recognized homeowners as ‘rightful.’ She admitted that she did not know how to solve the “tenant problem,” although everyone, in particular planning scholars, recognized the need for housing provisions for tenants. She believed that this was a challenging topic for zoning lawyers and legislators as well.

Though Dr. Turgut agreed with Sığınaksoy that displacement was inevitable in many parts of Istanbul, she preferred a more community-friendly stance. She remarked that Istanbul was “full of Ayazma residents,” meaning that the low economic and social profile of the local community was not peculiar to Ayazma. She suggested that the Ayazma case should have been undertaken as a social housing project, and not as a means for gentrification. However, she thought that in situ redevelopment possessing the former neighborhood characteristics was too “romantic,” and not realistic. She argued that it was not viable to offer the Ayazma community new single-family detached houses with yards, similar to those they had inhabited illegally for years in Ayazma. She admitted that the dilemma of unrealistic community expectations was a very complex and comprehensive issue for Istanbul that could only be solved by a major policy overhaul and collaboration among all levels of government. The government should, first and foremost, directly acknowledge illegal settlements and their communities’ desires. Acknowledging the need for such reforms, Dr. Turgut confessed that the social dimension of the Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment project was largely overlooked.

As an advocacy planner, Kurşuncu objected to the need for displacement, considering displacement to be an option only if the local residents were not eager to live in their
neighborhood or if geological conditions did not allow for any kind of development. She claimed that, because the occupied land already belonged to the state, the government could easily adopt genuine public housing policies in these areas to accommodate the local residents and other communities in need. Such an *in situ* formulation would free the government from the burden of expropriation and allow it to retain centrally located state lands. It was not necessary to develop public housing; the units could be either for rent or sale, or they could be given at no cost to the residents but without transfer of ownership. Kurşuncu also claimed that this way, the state’s earthquake relief taxes collected from the citizens since the early 2000s would be spent on their intended purpose of disaster mitigation instead of on unrelated purposes such as highway construction.

Dr. Turgut believed that the burden to solve these problems was not on the citizens; it was the responsibility of government officials at all levels to seek out workable housing strategies to promote their citizens’ happiness. In fact, she argued, housing provisions were not enough to sustain public happiness; public housing policies had to work hand in hand with other social programs to combat large-scale unemployment and education problems in these low-income populations. One simply could not achieve this at the municipal level without a deep change in an understanding of governance on a national scale.

8.1.2. Quality of life

A main aim of the redevelopment projects was the rehabilitation of irregular residential areas that lacked proper planning. In the Sümer case, the creation of planned car parks, recreational amenities, and safe and gated living space for the local population was added to the plans. Indeed, these features were among the main concerns of the residents in both projects, even more so in Ayazma, because of the quality of construction. Dr. Turgut acknowledged an increase in the construction quality of Bezirganbahçe and Kayabaşı, but
criticized these public housing projects for not offering their residents proper living spaces. However, for a city that housed a population not of a few thousand but of 15 million, Dr. Turgut thought, assuring such spaces was another huge challenge for housing providers.

First and foremost, according to Dr. Turgut, planners should not be considered merely tools in the planning process; private development companies’ hegemony should be replaced with planners’ initiative, and communities’ social needs should be sought out and provided for. Public housing projects need not be luxurious like My World in Ayazma; they should be modest but offer high quality of life, meaning that the safety of the community should be prioritized at a cost that is within reach of residents who cannot afford monthly TRY 60 maintenance fees. She also called for playgrounds for children within the site and close by educational facilities. Kurşuncu on the other hand argued that the health and employment problems of low-income communities surpassed their housing problems; she therefore called for government programs that provide free access to health facilities and allow citizens to work in jobs that would normally exclude them from such government assistance.

8.2. Physical planning

8.2.1. Master redevelopment planning

When explaining his institution’s redevelopment policies in Sümer, Demirci admitted that the idea of redevelopment through density increase was developed by the government prior to and independent of the disaster risks. Although he believed that securing the lives of Zeytinburnu residents was the project’s foremost objective, the means by which the redevelopment was carried out, e.g. the zoning change on Koç land and the increase in population density and resulting traffic congestion, were not exactly compatible with this end. Demirci argued that if they had carried out a metropolitan level study that integrated
similar projects in a holistic manner, government authorities would not have been obligated to hide behind earthquake mitigation to legitimize the Sümer redevelopment project.

In fact, government officials from both case studies, such as Oflaz, Karaoğlu, Demirci and Alsaç, believed that their projects lacked a holistic approach to redevelopment, which integrated all past, current and future redevelopment activities in Istanbul. They called for planning at the metropolitan scale so that important aspects redevelopment, such as circulation and transportation infrastructure, project phasing and financial scenario alternatives, could be better projected. Oflaz and Demirci called their suggested approach a “master redevelopment plan.” Alsaç stressed the importance of changing the timespan of redevelopment projects, arguing that projects should be allowed at least 10 years (instead of 5 years, which is the interval between local government elections), and thus be free of election concerns in order to allow for a more thorough project formulation and implementation.

8.2.2. Local redevelopment planning

Bakkal believed that redevelopment, though very necessary, was particularly difficult in districts like Zeytinburnu, which is densely developed with poor building quality and lacks open areas. She admitted that the authorities implemented the Sümer project by private decision-making and forced the local community to accept its terms. To prevent such circumstances in future projects, she pointed at the need to foster community consent and participation before project initiation. She explained that the MZI had recently attached a note to the 1:5000 zoning plan for Zeytinburnu to the effect that the residents of a building block are now encouraged to gather and agree on redevelopment via 15% increase in FAR if they initiate the redevelopment of an area of at least 1000 sqm. She believed that this was a useful tool to also promote block-based rather than lot-based redevelopment, which she
believed could yield greater benefits for the community. Alsaç also argued for a larger
redevelopment area and added that the 1:1000 implementation plans were being prepared in
line with this 1:5000 plan report. He hoped that these measures would allow for more orderly
building clusters and the elimination of the neighborhood’s parking problems.

Oflaz criticized TOKİ for the excessive increase in building density in both Ayazma and
Tepeüstü. Moreover, the population had to move from their low-rise homes to 10-to-15-story
buildings. Tantan admitted that TOKİ “confined the people to high-rises.” Karaoğlu seconded
this criticism and added that if TOKİ were to plan the Ayazma-Tepeüstü redevelopment
project over again, it would look for ways to a lower density further than what has been
realized in the original neighborhoods, better organize urban facilities to provide a more
balanced and sufficient social infrastructure, and perhaps transfer a portion of the
gentrification funds to the Bezirganbahçe public housing project to increase its building
quality and the quality of life there.

Officials of the Sümer case were unsatisfied with the density increase in their own
project. Demirci recalled the heavy construction activity that started in Zeytinburnu in early
1990s. Had there been the political will at the time to undertake the development of the
district in a more professional way, Zeytinburnu would have become a more valuable area
today. After twenty years, he stated, the government began to search for ways to reverse its
mistake and demolish the high-density settlement. Demirci did not want this process to be
repeated twenty years from now. He believed that as a general principle, the FAR of a
redevelopment area should be kept the same, if not lowered, and that in order to do so,
KİPTAŞ should work on alternative scenarios with local municipalities. He believed that his
hometown, Zeytinburnu, deserved better than what was realized in the Sümer redevelopment
case.
Ceylan offered the more recent redevelopment projects of the MKI in Küçükçekmece as a model for projects seeking to retain willing residents in the area and preserve an existing urban pattern. The Küçükçekmece project, instead of displacing all residents and changing the original character of the area through gentrification and gated communities, offers a conventional open street design with an increased number of buildings that would exceed their original height at a 50% unit area deduction rate to the rightful owners. Some residents are expected to stay on site, while others will be compensated for the property they vacate or offered public housing elsewhere; some, however, will have their property expropriated. Like Bakkal, Ceylan believed that redevelopment was a necessary and inevitable physical intervention measure to solve the rooted housing problems of Istanbul, but the municipalities had to offer the residents more agreement options than a mere “sign or leave.” Finally, Demirci argued that the value assessment of existing units should be carried out by using the value-based assessment instead of the area-based method that was used in the Sümer case. According to him, the value-based method was more precise in assessing the intangible qualities of a unit (i.e. the floor, view, orientation, building quality, etc.) and could yield faster and fairer results by preventing conflicts.

8.3. Financial planning

8.3.1. Improving the public housing supply

Dr. Turgut suggested that the government, perhaps at central or metropolitan levels, could employ a “depot housing” concept: building public housing in suitable locations and making it available to tenants for long-term housing in times of redevelopment. This, she believed, demanded the central government's attention.
Rationalizing the “confinement” of the residents of Bezirganbahçe, Tantan suggested that the tunnel form system\textsuperscript{125} was considerably cost-effective when the buildings were built to be 20 floors; it was simply easier to increase building height than to dig more foundations. Tantan and a member of the planning team of the TOKİ public housing department, Ali Kemal Topal, also explained that TOKİ used only one unit type for all family sizes and lifestyles to assure low construction costs. It was this approach, they argued, that allowed public housing units to be offered to residents at a low price, although sites like Bezirganbahçe created social and physical costs. All TOKİ officials interviewed, including Karaoğlu, Tantan, Çelik and Topal, argued that the urgent need for low-cost public housing developments was almost over, as the majority of low-income people were provided with public housing in Turkey and the market had reached a balance. It was now time to generate more unit types at lower-height buildings to increase the quality of life of their inhabitants. Tantan also acknowledged the inadequate workmanship at Bezirganbahçe but placed blame squarely on the contractors, even though TOKİ undertook quality management and inspection of construction activities. She admitted that political concerns kept TOKİ from interfering with the contractors’ work to a large extent. When asked to elaborate on these concerns, she laughed and refused to provide any detail during the recorded interview, but suggested that TOKİ should recruit and train intermediate staff to improve the construction inspection process and avoid lowering the construction costs further.

\textsuperscript{125} Tunnel form, or formwork, is the term given to either temporary or permanent molds into which concrete or similar materials are poured. For removable forms, once the concrete has been poured into formwork and has set, the tunnel form is removed to expose the finished concrete, and reused for other floors and buildings.
8.3.2. Low-cost public housing

Topal suggested that 95% of the residents wanted to stay in their neighborhood in urban redevelopment schemes, and everyone demanded at least one-for-one formulation, if not more than that. He concluded that the people took a self-oriented and defensive stance, not considering any compromise that would aid the public housing programs. Topal therefore called for decreasing the unit costs; the government could generate feasible solutions once it managed to break the resistance. To do so, he argued, the government should offer livable and appealing public housing projects to its citizens (i.e. with improved transportation connections, better community amenities, and higher construction quality). To keep costs low, it should produce these projects on less valuable land outside the city centers.

Tantan and Siğınaksoy believed that the government offered excessive incentives for the rightful owners who were illegally residing on the state land. The owners of Bezirganbahçe and Çakmak units could generate income by selling or renting their units while paying equal installments on the already deducted unit price, referring to the 10% allowance of the central government. Siğınaksoy went further, calling the government “unprofessional” and “too giving” for tolerating these practices, although she believed that the project might not have gained such high rate of success otherwise. Tantan suggested that if it were up to her, the installments would have been subject to interest, and the new owners would not have been allowed to sell or rent their units during the first two years of agreement, as was stipulated to the tenants who were offered Kayabaşı public housing. Siğınaksoy further believed that the residents, in particular tenants, should not have been offered housing in Bezirganbahçe and Kayabaşı in the first place, because the value of these lands was higher than what they deserved. Oflaz, too, argued for a prohibition on the sale of newly acquired units as he suspected that the residents who sold their units had bought or built gecekondu elsewhere in Istanbul.
As for the Sümer case, Demirci referred to the unit area deduction as a type of incentive offered to the residents in order to keep the cost of their participation in the project low. He recalled Mayor Aydin’s election concerns and request to offer a less than 25% deduction when faced with continuous community protest, but having completed the financial formulations based on the 25% deduction rate and announced the agreement options to the rightful owners, Demirci had argued against it, claiming that the government should not make promises it could not keep. Having learned from this case, he suggested that the financial formulation for the future redevelopment projects should be made over one-for-one principle with increased unit prices while keeping residents on site and retaining the area’s original density. This approach would not aim for low project costs and construction quality and, the parking spaces and recreational amenities would still be still designed, perhaps with higher standards. Demirci called this “producing a quality work despite the citizens,” as he believed that it was impossible to satisfy all residents anyway.

In the longer term, Topal hoped for improvement in the national economy in order to provide more feasible options to citizens. On this front, Alsaç conveyed good news: The new Redevelopment Law mandated the transfer of 0.01-to-0.1% of all government institution fees to the state’s redevelopment fund. He foresaw the accumulation of USD 50-60 billion in this fund over the next 5 years, which should financially empower the state to realize bolder public housing projects and rebuild any earthquake-threatened part of the city without having to ask its citizens’ opinions.

8.3.3. Engaging alternatives to capital pressure

Bakkal’s overall interpretation of the government’s decision-making in Sümer was that it displayed the mentality of a private developer rather than that of a provider for its citizens. She argued that the swap of private and state lands, the lack of public facilities for the added
population and the development of the afforestation area all indicated that the government’s primary concern was to profit itself and private stakeholders. In order to avoid this trend, Dr. Turgut suggested the development of projects through fair competition open to all planning and architecture professionals in Turkey. She hoped that such a process would allow for more community-friendly and better-thought-out projects while stemming the influence of capital over the government.

8.4. Collaborative planning

8.4.1. Multi-discipline and multi-actor collaboration

Similar to his peers, Karaoğlu also favored master planning for redevelopment, but he suggested undertaking a more multi-disciplinary approach, with the inclusion of historians, sociologists, psychologists, economists, tourism professionals and investors along with planners, architects and cartographers. He believed that such an approach was necessary to ensure more sustainable and viable outcomes from redevelopment practices. Çelik called for a similar collaboration and emphasized the government’s role in it; he argued that central and local governments should adopt a more active role in guiding and monitoring the collaboration of various parties, in particular regarding compliance with the law, rather than acting as a financial provider. He argued that leading central government institutions such as the Ministry of Environment and Urbanism and the legislators of Urban Redevelopment Law No. 6306 should be involved in redevelopment discussions. At the local level, Çelik emphasized the uniqueness of each redevelopment project in its physical, economic and social conditions, differences which any collaboration should consider carefully in tailoring project formulations rather than adopting general redevelopment guidelines.
In order to assure successful realization of redevelopment projects, Oflaz emphasized the need for a powerful central government in Turkey. In his opinion, unlike in Europe, where redevelopment is understood as painting and planting around an industrial plant, redevelopment in Turkey is defined as the total removal of building(s) or function(s) and that the central government should thus have significant economic and legal power to initiate, plans, and execute projects. Oflaz added that this necessity was not peculiar to Turkey but necessary in all developing countries: the government had to “hold the stick” in order to persuade its people and accomplish its projects. Demirci used this metaphor several times in the same manner. According to officials in both cases, using forceful tactics was an inevitability in societies like Turkey, where the citizens refused to compromise.

8.4.2. Strategic organization and sustainability

Despite Oflaz’s claims, many interviewees, including Ceylan, Baysal, Kurşuncu and the anonymous official, believed that the central government was already in an exceedingly powerful position in decision-making. For instance, Ceylan asserted that her institution, the MKI, was overshadowed by TOKİ and the IMM in the most crucial decisions regarding the displacement of residents, plan changes, gentrification of the original neighborhoods, payment incentives, etc. Had the local government had more decision-making initiative, it could have engaged in a more scientific collaboration in the planning phase and would have more power to achieve desired project outcomes. She thought that ensuring the betterment of the lives of those now living in public housing should be the government’s priority. She recalled in particular her immense efforts to appeal to the IMM for outdoor cleaning in Bezirganbahçe; however, as a mere local municipality officer, her voice was not heard. The upkeep of the housing site was abandoned shortly after the project’s completion, as Ceylan
and the residents claimed that the private site management company employed by TOKİ did an inadequate job.

Ceylan also asserted that a healthier distribution of tasks and responsibilities to the formal project actors should have been organized in the project protocol. Instead of shortly mentioning the to-dos of each party, the responsibilities and initiatives should be laid out in a broader and more flexible manner, because one could not anticipate community demands and conflicts that might arise along the way, as in the case of Ayazma. In addition, Ceylan discussed the need for strategic formulation of actor interactions in the management, organization, and sustainability of a project rather than a mere action-oriented approach: How will the parties protect themselves against potential problems? How will they address these problems?

Sığınaksoy likened the MKI’s treatment of the Ayazma-Tepeüstütü redevelopment to child abandonment. She wished that the MKI had conducted a follow-up study on the project participants now residing in Bezirganbahçe, Kayabaşı and Çakmak. However, the planning department of the MKI was a technical office with a very high volume of tasks and responsibilities; it did not conduct social programs or data collection studies of this sort. She thought that such follow-up studies were well suited with the interests of planning academia. As a scholar, Dr. Turgut also emphasized the necessity of longitudinal studies and offered some research topics based on her experience at Bezirganbahçe: the increase in crime rates and the profile of organized crime, residents’ social interactions and sense of security, and the change in former Ayazma women’s lifestyle.

8.4.3. Social dimension and community representation

Thus far the lessons that official actors have suggested they learned have been focused on the collaboration of formal actors. It was Çelik from TOKİ who brought up the active
involvement of the local community in project decision-making. He admitted that the formal redevelopment actors, including TOKİ, carried out planning decisions on a two-dimensional platform (physical and financial planning) and dismissed the third social dimension. If TOKİ and the MKI had included this third dimension, he argued, the problems of social and financial adaptation to the new high-rise lifestyle could easily have been foreseen. He envisioned a set of tools to collect the residents’ sincere opinions and needs before the project formulation phase, so that formal institutions could make decisions accordingly.

Demirci and Alsaç offered similar statements about surveying the residents of Sümer who were expected to be involved in the second phase of the project. However, Coşkun offered a more thorough analysis of the local community’s reactions. He believed that the residents’ complaints were principally the result of the lack of knowledge regarding redevelopment techniques and laws, trust in their fellow community members and in the government, and awareness of the progress of the project. He accepted that these problems were not easy to address but added that it was not necessarily crucial to address them all in any case. He argued that the government’s primary duty was to represent its citizens and make decisions on their behalf while seeking their best interests. If the community were aware of the beneficial nature of the government’s representation, it would have a more positive approach towards the project. However, Coşkun argued that when the government’s primary concern is financial, as in the case of Sümer, residents start seeking their own financial interest as well.

8.5. Community involvement and empowerment

8.5.1. Local participation model

According to Oflaz, despite the “marginal” number of residents who expressed a strong preference for staying and caused serious distress, the proportion of those who wanted to
move out of Ayazma and Tepeüstü was in fact quite high, especially among women, over 80% of whom no longer wanted to live in the poor conditions of their neighborhood. The project partnership, he argued, formulated the redevelopment terms accordingly, and moved the residents elsewhere. He then emphasized the importance of surveying local residents before a project’s initiation to determine their will and ensure their satisfaction. Oflaz, Ceylan, Sığınaksoy and Dr. Turgut all argued that participation was not an option when the education profile was as low as in Ayazma and Tepeüstü.

Çelik, however, believed that, even if a formal participation method might not be employed, it was necessary to communicate more effectively with the community regarding the alternative settlements to which people would be transferred in order to ensure more widespread public consent. He argued that residents should be made familiar with the public housing environment they will live in with models and visuals that display unit plans, schools, community clinic, parks and other amenities and should be informed of the profit they stood to gain by the increase in the value of their units. He believed that the more knowledgeable residents were of their situation going into the project, the more accommodating they would be in future negotiations and agreements.

Ceylan also emphasized the residents’ lack of knowledge prior to being asked to sign agreements. She argued that the residents’ verbal consent had no real meaning as they could change their minds any time and that they were rightfully reluctant to sign any paper without knowing in detail what they were agreeing to. In order to overcome this obstacle, Ceylan had a more progressive suggestion than that of Çelik or others. She described the public participation method of a redevelopment project in Yeşiłova that the MKI had recently started but suspended because of the local election period of 2014. In this case, the MKI gathered the local community and the development company at a meeting to inform the
community of the intended redevelopment project and ask for its members’ opinions. The community was interested in the project idea, so they asked the MKI and the firm to work on a design concept. After a couple of months, the MKI organized another meeting to present the firm’s concept proposal and ask for the community’s opinion again: “Would you like this to be implemented?” They addressed the residents’ questions and collected their responses for further development of the project concept. Ceylan believed that the MKI had hit upon a well-done participation process that could serve as a model for others.

In fact, the MZI and KİPTAŞ followed a similar process at the beginning of the Sümer case, but the options they suggested were rejected by the community because they were not realistic or community-friendly enough; they were oriented more toward profit for the government and private stakeholders. As the MKI did in Ayazma, the MZI also conducted a survey, but its indication that most residents were living near the poverty line proved to some extent untrue: Upon seeing potential profit in the increasing land values, Alsaç and Demirci argued, the residents revealed economic power initially hidden from surveyors and demanded higher stakes from the project. Having learned from this experience, Alsaç stated that the project partnership should have conducted a more realistic survey and negotiation process and ask for the residents’ signatures before the construction started. He added that this method would not have been applicable in the first phase of the project because the community lacked trust in the government. Now that residents had seen the end product and its huge profits, they would be more than willing to sign the deeds of consent.

Mukhtar Coşkun also suggested that operations in Sümer should have been more community-driven. He believed that the government could have gathered community members to inform them of the project terms and gather their opinion in an open forum type of setting, with question and answer sessions and discussions on the feasibility of both the
government’s suggestions and the residents’ alternative ideas openly held in the presence of the local or greater public. He added that measures that aimed at public participation and approval should not be elitist. Residents, he argued, should regard an alternative as a sign that they can trust that the government is on their side, not after high profits.

8.5.2. Capacity building and organizing

Oflaz argued that in order to involve a community in formal participation, it was absolutely necessary to raise its awareness of the redevelopment process in general and certain technical aspects of the process in particular. In other words, he emphasized ‘community capacity building.’ Most government officials argued that the low education levels among Ayazma and Tepeüstü residents led to an awareness gap too large to communicate the project terms to them. Sığınaksoy argued that the local government had no responsibility or means to educate its citizens so that they could meaningfully participate, and that there was therefore nothing to do about this issue. However, Oflaz believed that through central government’s public education programs, the government should budget for community capacity building programs targeting select representatives of the community and implement these programs for 4-5 years before the initiation of the redevelopment project. He also cared about the community’s social and economic well-being, which should go hand-in-hand with its awareness of redevelopment, and attributed the failure of the Bizim Halka community empowerment program to timing, as the program started only after the rightful owners of Ayazma and Tepeüstü moved to Bezirganbahçe.

Kurşuncu’s capacity building approach offered a shorter term solution. She argued that with the help of the NGOs and invited experts, residents should be educated about their legal constraints and opportunities. She agreed with Oflaz that such teaching activities should be carried out before the initiation of the project and the signing of the deeds of consent; it was
simply too late to ask the community to organize after the majority of residents had already signed the agreements. Had the Ayazma residents known about the essentials of redevelopment, reclamation and lawsuit processes before the government collected a fair number of agreements, they could have been more influential in the negotiations and in advocacy for their housing rights.

Sümer residents Küçükuygun and Adalı recalled their futile attempts to organize their neighbors and complained about the community’s lack of education and awareness, as in the case of Ayazma-Tepeüstü. Adalı argued that had the community been better informed, it could have founded a neighborhood association and organized to achieve better redevelopment outcomes. Unlike Oflaz, who also argued for neighborhood organization, Adalı maintained that the government should have initiated the organizing process, as it was its first and foremost duty to serve the interests of its communities. He recalled that the government instead informed the public of the details of the implemented redevelopment process only after having consulted all higher government entities and received their approval.

Oflaz’s approach to neighborhood organizing was very locally-driven. Rather than local government initiation, he argued for the self-selection of representatives from each street of Ayazma and Tepeüstü and the formation of some form of neighborhood coalition. If the residents needed any informed assistance, in his opinion, it should be the NGOs like İMECE to provide it. He was aware of the NGOs’ support in the tenants struggle, specifically naming İMECE and Baysal. And while he believed that the residents had not been successful in their struggle, he claimed to support NGOs’ community organizing attempts and hoped for their improvement in similar activities.
Both Kurşuncu of İMECE and Oflaz emphasized the novelty of the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case in explaining the inefficient nature of community organization during the project. Kurşuncu explained that in more recent ongoing redevelopment cases, İMECE had quickly established relationships with local communities and other NGOs. Together, these NGOs gathered project information from the municipalities and central government agencies and disseminated it to the community. They also carried out local awareness activities such as film screenings on the topic and neighborhood forums with speakers who were former redevelopment “victims” or who had managed to organize and have their voices heard. Kurşuncu happily disclosed that the volunteers of Ayazma such as Kasım Aydın were frequently involved in such activities to relate the Ayazma tenants’ experience. She argued that the NGOs became involved in the Ayazma-Tepeüstü case too late due to inexperience, and that they should have worked more effectively to organize the community from inside.

Kurşuncu, however, warned that the first spark had to come from the neighborhood: The NGOs could only do so much to mobilize residents if they were unwilling to organize, bringing up a few recent examples of such failure, such as in the redevelopment of Tarlababaşı in Istanbul. She argued that every neighborhood should have a ‘Kasım Aydın’ to evoke the local population. And instead of proposing alternative projects to those that the government sets forth, Kurşuncu believed that communities should demand from the government improvements to its project, such as the addition of a neighborhood park or the maintenance of a sports facility. It was not about redevelopment, after all—it was about the quality of life of the inhabitants. She added that these ideas, however, could be easily overlooked when communities experienced more urgent and essential problems like lack of shelter.
8.5.3. *Building motivation and trust*

The issue of trust was raised multiple times by residents and some government officials who were interviewed, indicating a fundamental problem underlying others. For residents the lack of trust was present in community organizing attempts, in the economic status results of the initial survey, in the perceptions of private land development, in persistent unit area deduction conflicts and in long lasting negotiations in Sümer. It was present in ethnicity-based frictions, in the gentrification attempts, and in reactions to the government’s promise of housing for tenants in Ayazma-Tepeüstü. Also in general, the interviewed residents did not trust that the government’s redevelopment vision was genuine. On the other hand, the government’s general dislike for opponents fostered the sentiment that it was not necessary to negotiate with them further before resorting to expropriation or forced eviction.

Baysal suggested that it was of the utmost importance to learn from the Ayazma case, since it showed everyone, including the local residents and activists of this and other redevelopment experiences that awaited Istanbul and Turkey, that a well-organized and adequately resourced resistance could yield positive results in claiming housing rights. She believed that it was the duty of communities and NGOs involved in such experiences to spread hope to the new “victims” of redevelopment through the sharing of these experiences. Hope was the primary motivation for trust within the community. Baysal seconded Kurşuncu’s opinion that a community’s drive to seek housing rights should come from within. Neither Baysal nor any other interviewees proposed any method for building trust in the government except Alsaç, who argued from a more pragmatic viewpoint that the success of the government’s first phase constructions and the increase in land values had bolstered the community’s trust in the government; Alsaç hoped that this newfound confidence would lead residents to sign agreements more easily in the second phase of the Sümer project.
The above lessons comprise many issues the practitioners have faced in the redevelopment of Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer. The lessons drawn by the various respondents depended on their institutional positions and professional experiences prior to the case projects. The more general implications from the case study chapters, the respondents’ suggestions above, and the recommendations in the theoretical discussion of this study are examined in the next chapter.
PART V

CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 9. Implications from Theory and Practice

Considering the urgent need for intervention in areas affected by problems such as *gecekondu* settlement and earthquake risk, redevelopment is inevitable in Istanbul. Today, Istanbul is a city of over 14 million inhabitants, growing in both size and population. *Gecekondu* s are prevalent in ever more valuable central locations whose development is considered a major opportunity for financial profit through land exchange and gentrification. Considering, however, the many problems with the redevelopment practices analyzed in this study, the question must be asked: How can redevelopment be conducted in a way that leads to healthier outcomes which take into account the local community’s needs and wellbeing? How can redevelopment practices tackle power imbalances while addressing these problems and needs?

9.1. Research questions revisited

In Turkey, the local redevelopment agenda is largely modeled on that of the state. The country’s economic development policies, which call for the bolstering of the construction sector through small and large scale redevelopment activities, shape the vision and ambitions of central government. The image of Istanbul, pushed by the central government and broadly accepted by the people of Turkey, as a center of urbanity (e.g. the aspirations of becoming a “world city” and “world capital”) is a strong force in shaping the purpose and direction of urban renewal projects. Areas with problems such as illegal housing, high earthquake risk, low urban and socio-economic standards, and political conflicts make for desirable redevelopment locations when located in the valuable central parts of the city. The existence of nearby vacant lots, and public housing land and building stock are other drivers for site selection. Governments may use physical problems and the urgent disaster mitigation needs
of the city as rationales for intervention in order to conceal a profit-driven and less public-friendly redevelopment agenda.

Though the majority of the residents may perceive their transfer to new housing after the redevelopment as an opportunity for the regularization and uplift of their housing, those who want to stay in their neighborhood have a strong desire for an in situ formulation. The unwilling displacement of the community can give redevelopment a bad name in the eyes of the local and greater public, while the public confrontation is less severe when residents are kept on-site. The community is fine with a value increase, so long as they benefit from it as well. Nevertheless, excessive gentrification attempts can create tension and public rejection.

High-profit public-private partnership developments for gentrification sow mistrust in the community toward the government when they benefit the partnership more than the local community. The more questionable these developments, the higher the suspicion government policies attract. However, such partnerships support and maintain the redevelopment vision of the government by attracting capital and market forces, increasing the financial and political power of the state.

Harmony in multi-level government collaboration benefits formal partnerships, and to an extent the community, in that it helps to quickly and accurately realize project implementation. Similarly, top-down governing approaches allow for government integrity, financial flexibility, the overcoming of legal obstacles, quickness in execution, and thus political credibility for the party in charge. However, they can also result in the accumulation of power at higher levels, deviation from a more public-friendly redevelopment agenda espoused by local governments, and limitations on the free expression of lower government officials for steering the project. Such approaches can also negatively impact the community through the coercive use of legal and political power over residents, and in particular over
political opponents and ethnic minorities. Patronage, bribery and partisanship harm these minority groups the most. In general, conflicts with the community arise when the means of collaboration, such as one-party politics or the assertion of government power over the community and project formulation have adverse consequences for the affected community members. The government’s claims of betterment of the community’s quality of life through redevelopment projects do not correspond to the perceptions of the suspicious residents under these circumstances.

The community holds as much power over the government in seeking their housing rights as they have the will, ability and means to organize and receive NGO support. The resistance of the community to government oppression may yield the achievement of rights. Local government can play the role of mediator between higher government and the community to lessen the severity of these conflicts, an act which may result in political confrontation between local and higher government levels. The voting power of the community has influence over the government, which seeks the increased stability of its voting base through public satisfaction with the success of redevelopment projects. The media holds the power to heighten the awareness of the greater public.

Community involvement was inadequate in both case projects. All actor groups blamed this inadequacy, at least partially, on the fact that the residents lacked the knowledge and education level to actively participate and contribute to decision-making. The lack of laws that encourage or require formal participation and of government programs for capacity building have also discouraged further community inclusion. And even though some government officials called for higher involvement from the residents, others denied that residents should be further involved in project decisions, as they considered the residents to simply be occupiers of the land, without any legal ownership or rights. In any case, the
project authorities’ active attempts to hinder the organization of the community are evident in both cases.

A common method for the local governments to determine public opinion is the surveying of affected residents. The problems with this method, however, include inadequacy in community outreach and collective decision-making, failure to reveal accurate results regarding the community’s tendencies (e.g. purchasing power), and inefficient communication about the project terms, which may create false hopes for the residents (e.g. preference for staying on site in single-story houses with gardens). The projects’ publicity and outreach methods included project publicity ceremonies, one-on-one meetings with rightful owners in their houses or in redevelopment offices, and additional lobbying and persuasive activities with the help of government-friendly citizens and party organizations, while opposition parties have proved to be inadequate in achieving minority rights and community demands in general. Residents who, despite these methods, were not convinced to participate in the projects were presented with a participation deadline, after which they would forfeit their rightful owner status or be forced to leave their homes. Some of them were relegated to later project phases.

Of those who participated in the Ayazma-Tepeüstü project, gecekondu owners who were financially powerful were given new units in the nearby Çakmak public housing site, while others received units in the more affordable Bezirganbahçe public housing project. These residents were allocated units based on the number of units they possessed, regardless of the size. In Sümer, rightful homeowners were offered housing in KİPTAŞ’s Sahilpark development in the existing neighborhood under certain unit area deduction conditions. After a long struggle for their housing rights, the tenants of Ayazma were able to have the option to receive a unit in TOKİ’s Kayabaşı public housing site under more strict payment conditions.
than the titleholders. Otherwise, tenants were excluded in the project formulation of both cases and left out of the project. In both Ayazma-Tepeüstü and Sümer, there are accounts of displacement because of the small size of former homes, inability to afford new unit installments and maintenance costs, and indirect political frictions.

Most of the government officials interviewed found their projects and their institution’s stance public-friendly. They believed that they were doing a favor to residents by providing them with legitimate and upgraded housing in spite of their resistance. Some residents, however, did not see thing this way and openly expressed distrust in the government. Political affiliation and unpleasant redevelopment experiences were the main factors in this discontent. The burden of long-term debts for new housing units on top of already difficult financial conditions has caused some residents to drop out of the project scheme. Transferred residents have questioned the sustainability of their new lives, as they found security and maintenance fees costly. In particular, low-income residents were not happy with the redevelopment projects and how their lives have been affected by them.

9.2. Policy recommendations for Istanbul and Turkey

The lessons offered by the research subjects already provide a rich set of policy recommendations for future redevelopment activities in Istanbul and Turkey. Combining them with policies derived from theoretical discussions will help this study offer a more thorough set of suggested prospects for governments, communities, and NGOs.

9.2.1. Democracy and governance

Despite the relative practicality of the centralist and top-down governing approaches in developing countries like Turkey, which entrust significant political, economic and legal powers to the central government, the assertion of these powers over communities whose
needs and demands are overlooked causes friction between the state and its citizens. This is against the very essence of libertarian democracy, which protects the rights of the individual citizen on an equal basis. Housing rights should be sought and provided for every citizen, independent of her or his ethnicity, gender, education level or land ownership status. Therefore, the state and its agencies must assimilate and reflect democratic attitudes, in particular transparency and accountability, in practicing redevelopment policies and projects.

Advocates of deliberative democracy suggest that planning recommendations and planning alternatives emerge from a dialogue shaped by a variety of arguments introduced by actors. Such a dialogue allows for the incorporation of arguments in accordance with democratic criteria and ensures the communicative rationality of the process and the legitimacy of the recommendations. Indeed, scholarship on deliberative democracy describes a pluralistic form of participatory planning that calls for an interactive engagement absent in typical aggregative processes, and for the recognition of power relations inherent in such engagements. The ideal of collective problem-solving—actual participation and dissolution of power imbalances through deliberative discussion—is the essence of the collaborative planning tradition.

Governance can be understood as an arrangement in which one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets. It should be seen as a set of processes by which societies and social groups manage their collective affairs while reshaping policy ideas and institutional structures through a bottom-up approach. Policy makers and practitioners should recognize diverse social settings, rationalities and practices that coexist in urban contexts and the complexity of the power relations within and between them. Even in a diverse public, the
capacity for governance can emerge through these struggles and interactions with sufficient
down to challenge and sustain the forces that drive decision-making.

The case studies have revealed that the residents’ complaints were contingent on their
lack of knowledge of general redevelopment techniques and laws, lack of trust in their fellow
community members and in the government, and lack of awareness of the project terms. The
government’s primary job should not be to seek political and financial profit, but rather to
represent its citizens and decide with their input and on their behalf while seeking their best
interests. If residents perceive that they are fairly represented by the government, they will
have a more positive attitude towards projects. Local government should be given higher
decision-making initiative in order to foster such representation, engage in a more scientific
collaboration in the planning phase, and have more weight in ensuring the sustainability of
the desired project outcomes. Ensuring the betterment of the lives of those now living in
public housing should be the government’s priority. The distribution of tasks and
responsibilities of formal project actors should be organized in the project protocol in a broad
and flexible manner and through strategic thinking. In order to produce and carry out pluralist
redevelopment policies, government institutions and individuals should be empowered so that
the democratic participation of citizens can be assured while wider collective efforts to
change power relations can be supported.

9.2.2. Policy formulation

The national economy should be steered toward the production of more feasible options
for citizens, while financially empowering the state in realizing public housing projects and
building earthquake-resilient urban areas. Redevelopment planning should be carried out at
national, regional and metropolitan scales, in accordance with which local redevelopment
projects should be generated. Large-scale planning should project population movement,
transportation infrastructure, project phasing and financial alternatives to inform local practices. Local projects should be allowed at least 10 years to achieve their goals and be free of electoral concerns for more thorough project formulation and implementation.

When considering communities’ needs and interests, planning agencies should employ methods to assess residents’ sincere opinions and demands before the project formulation phase, so that formal institutions can make more public-friendly decisions. These tools should also reveal the idiosyncratic conditions of the community. In order to secure citizens’ housing rights, redevelopment projects should benefit tenants as well as homeowners, and, if necessary, the government should consider tenant-specific public housing policies.

Redevelopment should prioritize social housing over gentrification. This prioritization is necessary to acknowledge low-income illegal settlements and their communities’ desires. Redevelopment projects should aim to solve long-established housing problems of metropolitan cities such as Istanbul while keeping the willing population on site. Municipalities should offer the residents more agreement options than a mere “sign or leave.” Displacement should not be an automatic policy for redevelopment but an agenda only if local residents are not willing to live in their neighborhood or if the geological condition of land does not allow for any kind of development. Where the occupied land already belongs to the state, the government can adopt in situ public housing policies to legally accommodate the local residents and other communities in need while retaining ownership of the land.

The central government should adopt public education policies that will equip local governments with the knowledge and resources to enable community capacity building programs. These programs may target select representatives of the community and educate them for at least a few years before the initiation of the redevelopment project. The government should also initiate programs for the social and economic well-being of residents
that go hand-in-hand with those that promote awareness in order to effectively involve the community in decision-making.

9.2.3. Community empowerment and participation

Low-income residents should learn to protect their neighborhood and community as necessary through local capacity building and empowerment programs. In general, residents should be equipped with the knowledge and tools to confront the legal constraints and take advantage of the opportunities of redevelopment processes. Such teaching activities should be carried out before project initiation and the signing of the deeds of consent. Thus educated, residents can be more influential in negotiations and while seeking their housing rights.

As an alternative to local government-initiated community organization, individual communities can form coalitions by selecting their representatives and receiving informed assistance from relevant NGOs. NGOs can facilitate this process by gathering project information from government organizations and disseminating the information to the community. They can also bring together the affected communities of multiple redevelopment projects at neighborhood forums or activities such as panels and film screenings to learn from other experiences and enhance community power. Where applicable, NGOs may also assist the community in demanding quality of life improvements to the government’s project alternative, rather than proposing an entirely new alternative.

Advocacy circles should engage not only communities but also community supporters, informal groups, activist individuals and groups, and chambers of planners and architects to unify and attract more public and media attention in seeking housing rights. In particular, professional organizations vested with a constitutional role, such as the relevant chambers,
can play an important role in highlighting, criticizing, or legitimizing developments, often through protracted negotiations in the courts.

In order to ensure more energetic public consent, governments should communicate with the local community regarding the alternative settlements to which people will be transferred. If relocation is a part of the redevelopment agenda, the residents should be presented the public housing environment they will live in with models and visuals that show the unit plans, schools, community clinic, parks and other amenities. They should also learn about their potential financial profit through value increase of their units. The more knowledge the community is offered beforehand, the more easy-going they will be about project negotiations and agreements.

In developing project alternatives with the community, the government can employ formal participation methods beyond information dissemination such as referenda, public hearings, public opinion surveys, negotiated rule-making, consensus conferences, citizens’ panels, public advisory committees, focus groups, participation games, and participatory action research. To combat the participatory planning challenge of growing diversity at the community level and the limitations of institutionalized participation, the ability of informal processes to overcome institutional and social barriers and negotiate differences of identities, values, and interests can be explored. By using methods for animated interaction, trust-building, and experiential learning, informal activities and processes can serve as important vehicles for creating meaningful social relationships and collective actions. They can also enable planners to navigate the cultural and political terrain of community differences.

A key objective of local participatory practices should be to increase public trust in government institutions in a setting in which distrust can constitute a major problem. Unequal power relations can undermine and impede community needs and in turn feed
distrust. Trust should be considered essential for community, social, political and familial relations as well as for understanding and reforming human relationships and institutions. It should also be understood as a necessary condition for any kind of communication, understanding, knowledge, or learning.

9.2.4. Public housing

In addition to the policies discussed above, public housing should seek to fulfill two major community-friendly criteria: affordability and livability. In general, public housing projects should be designed as modest living spaces that offer high quality of life. If development must be carried out at the less valuable periphery of the city to reduce land costs, the government should not only offer livable and appealing public housing projects to its citizens in these distant areas (i.e. improved transportation connections, better community amenities, and higher construction quality) but also foster close-by employment opportunities to ensure the citizens’ socio-economic wellbeing. In accordance with central or metropolitan level policies, the government can make pre-built public housing sites available to homeowners or tenants for long-term housing to prevent them from having to move to other illegal or disaster-prone areas.

While looking for ways to reduce unit costs, the government should take measures (e.g. personnel training) that will increase the effectiveness of inspection of the contractors’ job to prevent them from reducing construction costs at the expense of quality. Moderate building height, and rental and sale options for units should be other remedies sought in public housing projects. As for high quality of life, the safety of the community should be prioritized above all. Public housing projects should offer a lower density than the already dense neighborhood prior to redevelopment and better organized urban facilities to provide sufficient public amenities such as playgrounds, social facilities, schools, and health clinics.
9.2.5. **Local planning decisions**

Zoning and local redevelopment plans should call for community consent and participation before project initiation. Planning guidelines should promote block-based rather than lot-based redevelopment, as redevelopment in larger lots tends to yield greater benefits for the community (i.e. by allowing for more orderly building clusters and the elimination of parking problems). Plans should be generated to allow some residents to stay on site, some to be compensated for the property they are willing to vacate, and some to be offered public housing elsewhere.

The assessment of existing units should be carried out on the basis of value rather than area, as the value-based method is more precise in considering the intangible qualities of the unit (i.e. the floor, view, orientation, building quality, etc.) and can yield more practical and fair results. As a general principle, building and population densities should be kept the same if not lower than those of the existing settlement. As an alternative to deducting from the existing unit area to compensate for project costs, a financial formulation that embraces a one-for-one principle with increased unit prices while keeping the residents on site and the density the same may be encouraged. With this approach, low project costs and construction quality are not required, and the parking spaces and recreational amenities can still be designed, perhaps with higher standards. Redevelopment project partnerships should work on developing alternative scenarios with local communities and other stakeholder groups.

9.2.6. **Planning practitioners**

In general, planners should be equipped with more initiative in the decision-making of redevelopment projects in order to seek and provide for the community’s physical, social and economic needs. In the presence of private stakeholders and multi-level government actors,
planners should not only reflect on their roles and the role of politics and power in decision contexts, but also take on a politically deliberative approach in dealing with this awareness.

Redevelopment schemes should be cultivated in a multi-disciplinary setting involving not only planners but also architects, cartographers, historians, sociologists, psychologists, economists, tourism professionals and investors. Such diversity is necessary to assure more sustainable and viable outcomes from redevelopment practices. The central and local governments should adopt a more active role in guiding and monitoring the collaboration of different parties, in particular regarding projects’ compliance with laws, rather than acting as financial provider. Such a collaborative environment may be sought through fair competitions open to interdisciplinary groups led by planners and architects. The distinctive physical, economic and social conditions of redevelopment areas should be carefully examined in order to tailor project formulation to the unique circumstances of individual neighborhoods while also adopting broader redevelopment policies. Last but not least, planning practitioners can benefit from a wide range of planning research to derive policies and practice roadmaps while addressing redevelopment challenges. They should also employ a number of operating principles that are outlined below and derived from the policy recommendations above.

9.3. From policy to action: some guiding principles

At a more abstract level, the definition of a set of essential principles which are derived from the above policies and could be applied in other redevelopment projects and contexts might be helpful for practitioners and scholars. I have set out a brief translation of the above recommendations to operating principles in the table below (Table 7).
**Table 7. Operating principles derived from policy recommendations. Produced by the author.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy group</th>
<th>Operating principles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy and governance</td>
<td>Representation of the powerless, egalitarianism, transparency, accountability, equality, dialogue, deliberation, pluralism, diversity, participation, direct engagement of actors, mutual respect, consensus building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy formulation</td>
<td>Coherence in planning decisions across different scales, long-term and longitudinal planning, idiosyncratic approaches, inclusiveness in decision-making, social housing over gentrification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community empowerment and participation</td>
<td>Community capacity building, resource building, community organizing, non-profit and advocacy collaboration, inter-community collaboration, thorough community information, further participation methods and techniques, community trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public housing</td>
<td>Affordability, livability, quality of life, cost-effectiveness, safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local planning decisions</td>
<td>Citizen wellbeing, sufficient community amenities, job creation, community consent, partnership with community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning practitioners and scholars</td>
<td>Community advocacy, interdisciplinary collaboration, idiosyncratic understanding, institutional capacity building, research-based policy formulation and follow-up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table summarizes the essential principles underlying the successes and failures of the projects that I have analyzed above. It is my hope that these principles may contribute to the development of action-oriented and just planning practices in and beyond the realm of urban redevelopment. Combined with the concluding remarks below, these ideals will hopefully help lead to the realization of more community-friendly projects.

**9.4. Final words: room for further (re)development**

Literature and empirical evidence make it clear that planning and decision-making processes are strongly related to the distribution of power in a society and in specific institutional contexts. Insight into the factors that include or exclude people from involvement in determining their actions, and thus into the power relations among actors and actor groups, is necessary to improve decision-making processes in planning; an increasing
number of planning scholars have thus expressed a need for emancipation and inclusion as means to address power issues. Still, there is a need for a better theorization of the power relations at the heart of planning practices. A combination of the two approaches to the understanding of power (i.e. the Foucauldian notion that power encompasses all relationships, and the traditional notion that power is merely coercive, and thus negative), which this study attempts, may satisfy these needs.

The main aim of the examination of theory and the selected case studies was to further inquire the development of planning under power related conceptual frameworks. Overall, and based on this study’s findings, I would argue that the participation of communities and non-public actors should not be seen only as a contribution to the scarce resources of central and local governments. Rather, their inclusion in planning and management has the political function of acting against marginalization by giving these groups access to decision-making, by empowering them, and by making interventions more appropriate to local needs, resources and opportunities. Balanced power relations, equality, social justice and democratic forums are important components of this desired foundation. Taken together, these terms and theories have contributed to the changing face of the planning profession.

Such an understanding requires that theories of collaboration incorporate such relations not only as an explanatory variable that demonstrates why collaborative efforts succeed or fail, but also as an instrumental variable that suggests how power can be balanced or convened. Theories of planning must employ the normative notions examined in this study, and continually adjust their orientation to what is actually happening in the complex world of power relations. Planning professionals need to develop new ways of thinking about leadership in an informational, networked age, in which effective processes are collaborative
rather than hierarchical. Most of all, planners and educators need to embrace what is new and innovative regarding the concepts and debates presented in this study.

Following this path in developing countries such as Turkey necessitates examination of the neoliberal economic system, which has a great effect on the nation’s redevelopment agenda through its capital-seeking policies. In a setting where policies, laws and ambitions for economic growth work against communities, the most viable option for community organizing seems to come from advocacy groups and communities themselves. The Ayazma-Tepeüştü redevelopment case provides a good example for having achieved this type of organization, while the Sümer community provides a case of its failure. Based on the fact that financial profit through land value increase by the government, as happened in Sümer, cannot always be achieved, communities’ reliance on such appreciation is not feasible in the long-run. When studying in the neoliberal and ill-democracy settings, planning theories should aim at a better understanding of regime and party dynamics along with political conditions and consequences. In this way, the scholarly literature of community organization and empowerment can better serve practice.

Indeed, planning scholars can engage in a wide range of research to derive recommendations for planning theory and education in order to address redevelopment challenges. The sustainability of quality of life is as important as its establishment; therefore, academics should be encouraged to conduct longitudinal studies about residents affected by redevelopment and disseminate their findings to inform planning practitioners. Some research topics for these follow-up studies may be an examination of the change in crime rates and the presence of organized crime, social interactions and sense of security, and the change in the lifestyles of women, children, minorities and the elderly. Other valuable contributions would be critical analyses of a wide variety of case studies (e.g. related to scale, contexts and
traditions, complexity, success rates etc.) to discover how political actors handle plans, projects and planning processes worldwide. The study of practice in the face of complex relations of power, political loyalties, and ethnic, religious and territorial identities (and more) should extend to the micro-political details of planning practices. Abstract conceptualization and generalization of case findings may help academics see some of what can be learned from practice and help them to gear their instruction to the realities of practice.

There are a number of more specific potential applications that are inspired by the case projects and conclusions of this study. Some interesting topics that merit further exploration include the ways in which the urban identity of Istanbul perceived by the government and its inhabitants have affected the form, appearance, and aspirations of the redevelopment projects; the changing concept of mahalle in today’s Istanbul as a major factor in defining area-based redevelopment sites; the role of the press as an important participant in redevelopment debates; religious influences beyond the oblique associations inherent in the references to the Kurds; the impact of the 5-year local election cycle on redevelopment projects; the ultimate housing outcomes of redevelopment projects for the different kinds of gecekondu households (i.e. owners, tenants, households with small homes, others with larger homes); and as mentioned earlier, post-occupancy research to determine why people sold their units, resulting changes in lifestyle, disintegration of community, etc.

All in all, based on the research and empirical work in Turkey, this study urges planners and policy-makers to continue examining and addressing central and local power structures that influence the politics of planning and decision-making in urban redevelopment. Employing awareness of power structures and engaging all stakeholders in the planning process leads to a series of achievements, such as democratization of choices and decision-
making, maximal reduction of bureaucracy and clientelism, decentralization of urban services, and some influence in design and investment decisions. Such concerns will make it possible to attain a more just outcome from the actual politics of the planning discipline.

This study is the first of its kind in Turkey in examining and addressing the power mechanism embedded in redevelopment practices, and in providing a contextual and methodological exemplar for future redevelopment projects. The products of this study are both academic and policy-oriented in nature. Overall, the study hopes to inform scholars, policymakers, planning practitioners and communities not only about the challenges faced in local redevelopment projects but also on how to contribute to a planning process which incorporates community participation and input. To that end, the research findings can contribute to the discussion about the influence of power dynamics in planning processes as well as the challenges of collaborative planning. More broadly, based on the research and empirical work in Istanbul, the study hopes to contribute to the larger purpose of a more just and democratic society in Turkey and aid in the empowerment and development of Turkish society.
Appendix A. Interview guide: formal actors (English)

I am a PhD candidate in the Department of Urban Planning at University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). This survey aims at measuring the dynamics of power relationships within decision-making structures of urban redevelopment projects in Istanbul, which is the subject of my PhD project. Your participation in this survey will be anonymous and you can refuse to take part or answer any questions at any time. Your input is valued even if you or your institution have only partially taken part in the decision-making board of the redevelopment project. It will take about 90 minutes of your time. Thank you for your participation.

Case study: ___________________________ Date: __________________
First and Last Name: ___________________ Group or organization, if any: __________________
Age: _____ Gender: ______ Education level: ________________ Education field: ________________

1. What is the chronological development of the redevelopment project as far as you remember?
2. What has been your institution’s policy in the redevelopment process?
3. Who are the actors that participated in the decision-making process of the redevelopment project?
   a. Public and private sector institutions?
   b. Community representatives or organizations?
   c. Other individuals (i.e. big property owners)?
4. Were there any changes in the actor/stakeholder structure during the decision-making process? If yes,
   a. Please define the change(s).
   b. What were the factors for the inclusion and/or exclusion?
   c. How were the policies and outcomes affected by the change(s) in the actor scheme?
5. What are the factors you have observed that affected the decision-making?
   a. Political factors?
   b. Financial factors?
   c. Other factors?
6. Were there any conflicts between the actors that arose in policy formulation? What was the (dominant) reason for the conflict(s)?
7. Can you tell me about one specific conflict that arose between the actors in policy formulation/decision-making?
   a. What was the subject/topic of the conflict?
   b. Who were the different sides of the discussion?
   c. How did different parties inform the discussion?
   d. Was there a facilitator in the discussion process?
   e. What was the resulting decision?
   f. What are the factors that affected this decision?
   g. (If your institution was not a direct party) What was your institution’s stance in the process?
8. How would you describe the level of competitiveness in the decision-making process?
   a. Who were the dominant actors?
   b. How competitive was your institution?
   c. How well did your institution perform in the (competition) process?
9. How did you learn about the decisions made?
10. To what extent was the community involved in the decision-making process?
11. What was the public participation level applied (from lowest to highest degree: manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power, citizen control)?
12. Were there any conflicts that were introduced by the public? What was the (dominant) reason for the conflict(s)?
13. Can you tell me about one specific conflict that arose with the public (outside the representatives) in policy formulation/decision-making?
   a. What was the subject/topic of the conflict?
   b. Who were the different sides of the discussion?
   c. How did different parties inform the discussion?
   d. Was there a facilitator in the discussion process?
   e. What was the resulting decision?
   f. What are the factors that affected this decision?
   g. (If the institution was not a direct party) What was your institution’s stance in the process?

14. How was the public informed about the decisions made (general decisions and title-specific decisions)?

15. Overall, how ‘public-friendly’ do you think the project was?

16. How do you think the power relations informed redevelopment decisions and outcomes in general?

17. In your opinion, what were the strengths of the decision-making process in general?

18. What were the weaknesses of the process?

19. What are the lessons and/or implications you can define out of the decision-making process of this redevelopment project?

20. Do you have any other thoughts to add within the context of this interview?
Appendix B. Interview guide: formal actors (Turkish)


İlgili proje: _________________________________ Tarih: _____________________
Ad, Soyad: _______________________________ Grup veya kuruluş adı, varsa: _______________________________
Yaş: _______ Cinsiyet: _________ Eğitim düzeyi: _______________ Eğitim alanı: __________________________

1. Dönüşüm projesinin kronolojik gelişim süreci hatırladığınız kadarıyla nedir?
2. Dönüşüm sürecinde kurumunuzun politikası ne idi?
3. Dönüşüm projesinin karar alma sürecine katılan aktörler kimler idi?
   a. Kamu ve özel sektör kurumları?
   b. Halk temsilcileri veya birlıkları?
   c. Diğer bireylər (i.e. büyük arsa sahipleri)?
4. Karar alma süreci boyunca aktör/paydaş yapında herhangi bir değişiklik oldu mu? Oldu ise,
   a. Lütfen değişiklik(ler)i tanımlayın.
   b. Aktörlerin dahil ve/veya hariç olmasındaki faktörler nelerdi?
   c. Politika ve çıktılar aktör dağılmındaki bu değişiklik(ler)den ne şekilde etkilendi?
5. Gözlemlerinize göre karar almaya etki eden faktörler neler?
   a. Politik faktörler?
   b. Finansal faktörler?
   c. Diğer faktörler?
6. Politika oluşumunda aktörler arasında ortaya çıkan anlaşılmazlıklar/çatışmaları oldu mu? Bu
   anlaşılmazlık(lar)ın baskın nedeni ne idi?
7. Politika oluşurma/karar alma sürecinde aktörler arasında ortaya çıkan belirli bir anlaşılmazlktan
   söz edebilir misiniz?
   a. Anlaşımlazlığın konusu/başlığı ne idi?
   b. Tartışmanın farklı tarafları kimler idi?
   c. Farklı taraflar tartışmayı nasıl yönlendirdi?
   d. Tartışma sürecinde bir arabulucu var mıydı?
   e. Sonuçta alınan karar ne idi?
   f. Bu karara etki eden faktörler neler?
   g. (Eğer kurumunuz birincil taraflardan biri olduysa) Kurumunuzun bu süreçteki duruşu
   neyi?
8. Karar alma sürecindeki rekabetçi düzeyini nasıl tanımlarsınız?
   a. Baskın aktörler kimlerdi?
   b. Kurumunuz ne kadar rekabetçiydi?
   c. Rekabet sürecinde kurumunuz ne kadar iyi bir performans gösterdii?
9. Alınan kararlar hakkında nası bilgi sahibi oldunuz?
10. Karar alma sürecine halk ne ölçüde dahil edildi?
11. Uygulanan halk katılımı düzeyi ne idi (düşükten yükselge: manipülasyon, terapi, bilgilendirme,
   danışma, yatıştırma, ortaklık, delege gücü, vatandaş kontrolü)?
12. Halk tarafından ön sürüler anlaşılmazlık/çatışma oldu mu? Bu anlaşılmazlık(lar)ın baskın nedeni ne idi?
13. Politika oluşturma/karar alma sürecinde halk ile (temsilciler dışında) ortaya çıkan belirli bir anlaşmazlıktan söz edebilir misiniz?
   a. Anlaşmazlığın konusu/başlığı ne idi?
   b. Tartışmanın farklı tarafları kimler idi?
   c. Farklı taraflar tartışmayı nasıl yönlendirdi?
   d. Tartışma sürecinde bir arabulucu var mıydı?
   e. Sonuçta alınan karar ne idi?
   f. Bu karara etki eden faktörler neler?
   g. ( Eğer kurumunuz birincil taraflardan biri olmadiysa) Kurumunuzun bu süreçteki duruşu neydi?

14. Halk, alınan kararlarla ilgili nasıl bilgilendirildi (genel kararlar, tapu kararları)?
15. Genel olarak sizce bu proje ne kadar halkın yanındaydı?
16. Sizce güç ilişkileri dönüşüm kararlarını ve çıktılarını genel olarak nasıl etkiledi?
17. Sizce genel olarak karar alma sürecinin güçlü yönleri nelerdi?
18. Sürecin zayıf yönleri nelerdi?
19. Bu dönüşüm projesinin karar alma sürecinden tanımlayabileceğiniz, çıkarılabilecek dersler ve/veya çıkarımlar neler?
20. Bu görüşme kapsamında eklemek istediğiniz başka fikirleriniz var mı?
Appendix C. Interview guide: community members and NGOs (English)

I am a PhD candidate in the Department of Urban Planning at University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). This survey aims at measuring the dynamics of power relationships within decision-making structures of urban redevelopment projects in Istanbul, which is the subject of my PhD project. Your participation in this survey will be anonymous and you can refuse to take part or answer any questions at any time. Your input is valued even if you or your community have only partially taken part in the decision-making board of the redevelopment project. It will take about 90 minutes of your time. Thank you for your participation.

Case study: ___________________________________________ Date: ___________________
First and Last Name: ______________________ Group or organization, if any: __________________
Age: _____ Gender: _______ Education level: _______________ Education field: _______________

1. What is the chronological development of the redevelopment project as far as you remember?
2. What was the main policy in the redevelopment process?
3. Who are the actors that participated in the decision-making process of the redevelopment project?
   a. Public and private sector institutions?
   b. Community representatives or organizations?
   c. Other individuals (i.e. big property owners)?
4. What are the factors you have observed that affected the decision-making?
   a. Political factors?
   b. Financial factors?
   c. Other factors?
5. How did you learn about the decisions made?
6. To what extent was the community involved in the decision-making process?
7. Did some part of the community benefit from the project more than others? If so, why?
8. Was anyone forced to leave in the process?
9. Were there any conflicts that were introduced by the public? What was the (dominant) reason for the conflict(s)?
10. Can you tell me about one specific conflict that arose with the public (outside the representatives) in policy formulation/decision-making?
    a. Who were the different sides of the discussion?
    b. How did different parties inform the discussion?
    c. Was there a facilitator in the discussion process?
    d. What was the resulting decision?
    e. What are the factors that affected this decision?
    f. (If the institution was not a direct party) What was your institution’s stance in the process?
11. Overall, how ‘public-friendly’ do you think the project was?
    a. Was the community’s voice heard?
    b. Were the outcomes of the project consistent to what they were promised?
12. Are you happy with the redevelopment project?
13. How do you think the power relations informed redevelopment decisions and outcomes in general?
14. In your opinion, what were the strengths of the decision-making process in general?
15. What were the weaknesses of the process?
16. Do you have any other thoughts to add within the context of this interview?
Appendix D. Interview guide: community members and NGOs (Turkish)


İlgili proje: ____________________________________ Tarih: ________________
Ad, Soyad: ______________________________ Grup veya kuruluş adı, varsa: _______________________
Yaş: _______ Cinsiyet: _________ Eğitim düzeyi: _______________ Eğitim alanı: ____________________

1. Dönüşüm projesinin kronolojik gelişim süreci hatırladığınız kadarya nedir?
2. Projenin (gelşim sürecini göz önünde bulundurarak) dönüşüm politikasını nasıl açıklarız?
3. Dönüşüm projesinin karar alma sürecine katılan aktörler kimler idi?
   a. Kamu ve özel sektör kurumları?
   b. Halk temsilcileri veya bireylər?
   c. Diş bireyler (i.e. büyük arsa sahipleri)?
4. Gözlemlerine göre karar almayı etki eden faktörler neler?
   a. Politik faktörler?
   b. Finansal faktörler?
   c. Diğer faktörler?
5. Alınan kararlar hakkında nasıl bilgi sahibi oldunuz?
6. Karar alma sürecine halk ne ölçüde dahil edildi?
7. Halkın bir bölümü projenden diğerlerine göre daha büyük fayda sağladı mı? Evet ise neden?
8. Süreci terk etmek zorunda bırakılan kim olursa?
9. Halk tarafından ola süreçler anlaşılmazlık/çatışma oldu mu? Bu anlaşılmazlık(lar)ın baskın nedeni ne idi?
10. Politika oluşturulma/karar alma sürecinde halk ile (temsilciler dışında) ortaya çıkan belirli bir anlaşılmazlık söz edebilir misiniz?
    a. Tartışmanın farklı tarafa kimlikleri?
    b. Farklı taraflar tartışımayı nasıl yönlendirdi?
    c. Tartışma sürecinde bir arabulucu var mı?
    d. Sonuçta alınan karar ne idi? Hangi tarafın savuduğu şekilde sonuçlandı?
    e. Bu karara etki eden faktörler neler?
    f. (Eğer Kurumunuz birincil taraflardan biri olmasa) Kurumunun bu süreceteki durumu neydı?
11. Genel olarak sizce bu proje ne kadar halkın yanındaydı?
    a. Halk sesini duyurabilidi mi?
    b. Projenin çıktıları önceden vaat edilenlerle uyumlu mu?
12. Dönüşüm projesinden memnun musunuz?
13. Sizce güç ilişkileri dönüşüm kararlarını ve çıktılarını genel olarak nasıl etkiledi?
14. Sizce genel olarak karar alma sürecinin güçlü yönleri nelerdi?
15. Sürecin zayıf yönleri nelerdi?
16. Bu görüşme kapsamında eklemek istediğiniz başka fikirleriniz var mı?
Appendix E. Subject profiles

Legend

Interview number; Interview date; Full name; Institution- current; Title- current; Supervisor- current; Institution- during project; Title- during project; Supervisor- during project; Education level; Education field; Years in institution; Years- urban planning/management

AYAZMA-TEPEÜŞTÜ CASE

Government institutions

05; 4-15-14; Ali Seydi Karaoğlu; TOKİ; Head of Departments, Istanbul Region; Deputy General Manager; TOKİ; Director of Real Estate Affairs; Head of Departments, Istanbul Region; Bachelors; Business; 10; 28

04; 4-11-14; Banu Tantan; TOKİ; Urban Redevelopment Department Manager, Istanbul Region; Head of Departments, Istanbul Region; TOKİ; Expert (Urban Redevelopment Dept, Istanbul Region); Urban Redevelopment Department Manager, Istanbul Region; Masters; Planning; 12; 21

09; 5-7-14; Yavuz Çelik; TOKİ; Planning and Development Department Manager, Istanbul Region; Head of Departments, Istanbul Region; TOKİ; Planner (Planning and Development Dept, Istanbul Region); Planning and Development Department Manager, Istanbul Region; Bachelors; Planning; 8; 16

09b; 5-7-14; Ali Kemal Topal; TOKİ; Expert (Urban Redevelopment Dept, Istanbul Region); Urban Redevelopment Department Manager, Istanbul Region; -; -; -; Comm College; Civil technician; 3.5; 12

01; 2-19-14; Hüseyin Oflaz; IMPO Planning Co.; Owner; N/A; MKI; Deputy Mayor, Technical and Development Affairs; Mayor; Masters; Planning + MBA + Private law; 11; 28

03; 4-1-14; Birgül Sığnaksoy; MKI; Director of Plans and Projects; Deputy Mayor, Technical and Development Affairs; MKI; Director of Plans and Projects; Deputy Mayor, Technical and Development Affairs; Bachelors; Planning; 10; 20

02; 2/26-27/14; Eda Çağtaş Ceylan; MKI; Urban Planner (Urban Redevelopment Dept.); Director of Plans and Projects; MKI; Head Urban Planner (Urban Redevelopment Dept.); Director of Plans and Projects; Masters; Planning; 10; 10

126 Some information of a personal nature has been left out to respect the privacy of the subjects.
University

08; 5-6-14; Sırma Turgut; YTU; Assoc. Professor; N/A; YTU; Assist. Professor; N/A; Doctorate; Planning + Public Affairs + Planning; 22; 22

NGOs

07; 5-3-14; Cihan Uzunçarşılı Baysal; N/A; Activist; N/A; Göç-Der; Activist; N/A; Masters; Human rights law; N/A; N/A
11; 5-9-14; Hatice Kursuncu; İMECE; Activist; N/A; İMECE; Activist; N/A; Doctoral Candidate; Planning + Public administration; 8; N/A

Local residents

06; 5-2-14; Kasım Aydın; N/A; Janitor; N/A; N/A; Unemployed; N/A; Elementary; N/A; N/A; N/A
10; 5-7-14; Tacettin Acar; Self-employed; Construction painter; N/A; Self-employed; Construction painter; N/A; Elementary; N/A; N/A
12; 5-12-14; Fatma Özdemir; N/A; Housewife; N/A; N/A; Housewife; N/A; No formal education (half-literate); N/A; N/A; N/A
13; 5-12-14; Mukaddes Turan; N/A; Housewife; N/A; N/A; Housewife; N/A; No formal education (literate); N/A; N/A; N/A

SÜMER CASE

Government institutions

01; 1-9-14; Zafer Alsaç; MZİ; Deputy Mayor, Technical and Development Affairs; Mayor; MZİ; Deputy Mayor, Technical and Development Affairs; Mayor; Masters; Civil engineering + MBA; 15; 23
03; 1-10-14; Hacer Bakkal; MZİ; Division Chief (Division of Mapping, Planning and Urban Redevelopment Atelier); Asst. Director of Planning and Development Department; MZİ; Chief of Mapping and Planning Division; Asst. Director of Planning and Development Department; Bachelors; Planning; 24; 24
04; 1-21-14; Semih Demirci; KİPTAŞ; Deputy General Director, Projects; General Director; KİPTAŞ; Deputy General Director, Projects; Bachelors; Architecture; 14; 21
06a; 1-23-14; Turgut Büyükçolak; KİPTAŞ; Department Manager (Department of Process Payment and Settlement; responsible for the Sümer project); Deputy General Director, Projects; KİPTAŞ; Department Manager (Department of Process Payment and Settlement; responsible for the Sümer project); Deputy General Director, Projects; Bachelors; Civil engineering; -; -
06b; 1-23-14; Müjdat Küçükbükücü; KİPTAŞ; Deputy Department Manager (Department of Process Payment and Settlement; active in public negotiations); Department Manager (Department of
Process Payment and Settlement; responsible for the Sümer project); KİPTAŞ; Deputy Department Manager (Department of Process Payment and Settlement; active in public negotiations); Department Manager (Department of Process Payment and Settlement; responsible for the Sümer project); Bachelors; Civil engineering; 15; 22
05; 1-23-14; Akin Coşkun; Sümer neighborhood; Mukhtar; N/A; Sümer neighborhood Unit; Mukhtar; N/A; Bachelors; Space sciences; -; -

University
07; 1-29-14; Enver Ülger (later no consent); Okan University; Professor; N/A; IMM Istanbul Metropolitan Planning Co.; Head of Sümer urban design and planning group; General Director; Doctorate; Survey engineering; -; -

NGO
10; 4-23-14; Ayhan Özsoy; İSPER; President & Business owner; N/A; İSPER; President & Business owner; N/A; High school; N/A; -; -

Local residents
08; 4-23-14; Ömer Adalı; N/A; Retired; N/A; N/A; Retired; N/A; Elementary; N/A; N/A; N/A
09; 4-23-14; Sedat Küçükuygun; N/A; Retired; N/A; N/A; Retired; N/A; Elementary; N/A; N/A; N/A
11; 5-14-14; Ferhat Cihangir; Self-employed; Auto repair; N/A; Self-employed; Auto repair; N/A; Elementary; N/A; -; -
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