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The Organizational Weapon: Ruling Parties in Authoritarian Regimes

by

Anne Meng

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley

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Abstract

The Organizational Weapon: Ruling Parties in Authoritarian Regimes

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Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Berkeley

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This project examines party building in authoritarian regimes. The overarching puzzle I seek to address is: why are some autocratic ruling parties stronger organizations than others? What explains variation in the institutional capacity of autocratic rule? The collection of three essays in this dissertation outline the strategic logic of party institutionalization, in addition to providing new and original ways in which to measure this key concept of authoritarian party strength. It tests previously untested hypotheses about the origins of strong autocratic parties and provides insights on the conditions under which leaders will be incentivized to rule through binding institutions. The first paper conceptualizes autocratic party strength as institutionalization and provides new ways of measuring this variable. The second paper describes the strategic logic of party institutionalization in autocracies and explains why and when some autocrats choose to tie their own hands. The third paper evaluates the thesis that parties emerging out of revolutions and independence wars tend to be more durable by examining parties that emerged out of independence struggles in Africa.
## Contents

1 Introduction .......................... 1

2 Concept and Measurement ......... 4
   2.1 Introduction .......................... 5
   2.2 Conceptualizing Ruling Party Strength ......................... 7
   2.3 Party Institutionalization as Organizational Strength .......... 11
   2.4 Measuring Ruling Party Institutionalization: A New Dataset .... 17
   2.5 Party Institutionalization and Regime Typologies .............. 20
   2.6 Conclusion .......................... 27
   2.7 References .......................... 28

3 A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change ................ 37
   3.1 Introduction .......................... 38
   3.2 Party Institutionalization in Autocracies ..................... 43
   3.3 A Theoretical Model .......................... 47
   3.4 Data and Methods .......................... 54
   3.5 Stylized Facts .......................... 58
   3.6 Empirical Analysis .......................... 61
   3.7 Conclusion .......................... 64
   3.8 References .......................... 67

4 Armed Conflict and Ruling Party Durability ............... 75
   4.1 Introduction .......................... 76
   4.2 Theories of Conflict and Party Durability .................. 78
   4.3 Party Building in Authoritarian Regimes ..................... 80
   4.4 Empirical Approach .......................... 82
   4.5 Analysis .......................... 86
   4.6 Conclusion .......................... 91
   4.7 References .......................... 93
5 Conclusion
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Chapter 1

Introduction

A central finding from research on authoritarian regimes is that strong ruling parties are a significant source of stability in dictatorships. Scholars argue that ruling parties can be central in promoting regime stability because they fulfill a number of important functions, such as helping leaders solve commitment problems or channeling benefits of state power to elites. It has become somewhat conventional wisdom that once ruling parties become established organizations, they play a key role in regime stability. However, why and how some ruling parties develop into strong institutions remains under-theorized. In addition, our ability to test existing arguments about autocratic institutions is often hampered by the absence of cross-national data on party organizations. As a result, we simply know considerably less about how successful and credible parties are established.

The overarching puzzle I seek to address is: why are some autocratic ruling parties stronger organizations than others? What explains variation in the institutional capacity of autocratic rule? The collection of three essays in this dissertation examine when and how autocratic party building occurs, by outlining the strategic logic of party institutionalization in addition to providing new and original ways in which to measure this key concept of party strength. They also provide empirical evaluations of previously untested hypotheses about the origins of strong autocratic parties and provide insights on the conditions under which leaders are incentivized to rule through binding institutions.

The first paper takes on the important task of conceptualizing and measuring autocratic party strength. Despite the importance of institutions in sustaining stable autocratic rule, systematic ways of defining and operationalizing autocratic party strength have not been explicitly addressed. Scholars typically interpret single-party regimes as having uniformly strong ruling parties, and regime types are often used as an indirect measure of institutional strength. This paper argues that using regime typologies to implicitly define ruling party strength is subject to theoretical and measurement problems, and often conlates party

\[1\]I refer to the first paper as Meng(2016a).
strength with leader strength. Instead, I claim that ruling party strength should be conceptu-
ized as institutionalization: the creation of hierarchies, rules, and procedures that struc-
ture the distribution of power and resources. Since institutions are especially prone to preda-
tion by leaders in autocratic settings, ruling parties are strengthened when rules and pro-
cedures guaranteeing their autonomous existence are put into place.

I introduce a new dataset of party institutionalization in 37 Africa countries from 1960-2005
that reflects the creation of party rules and procedures promoting organizational autonomy,
such as the creation of a vice president or prime minister position or implementation of
leadership succession policies. I show that institutionalized parties are more rare than typ-
ically assumed. Importantly, I find that most ruling parties are unable to remain in power fol-
lowing the death or departure of the founding leader. Moreover, many parties that have
been coded as part of dominant-party regimes are not very institutionalized and actually
more resemble personalist dictatorships. Thus while strong parties may be key to durable
authoritarianism, relatively few parties are actually strong.

The second paper describes the strategic logic of party institutionalization in autocracies
and explains why and when some autocrats choose to tie their own hands\textsuperscript{2} I argue that
institutionalization is the mechanism by which ruling parties can be strengthened because
the process requires autocratic leaders to voluntarily bind their own hands by implementing
rules, procedures, and structures. Party institutionalization is a costly way for leaders to
convince other elites that they will receive a steady stream of benefits in exchange for their
support. Through a formal model, I show how institutionalization can help solve commit-
tment problems in elite bargaining by reducing uncertainty about the future distribution of
materials resources and power.

I find that only weak leaders who face a high likelihood of being removed or challenged by
other elites have an incentive to institutionalize their ruling parties. Institutionalization is
a costly way for leaders to convince other elites that they will receive a steady stream of
benefits in exchange for their support. Strong leaders who do not face a credible risk of
being deposed can always afford to buy off other elites and do not need to institutionalize
their parties to stay in power.

Additionally, I test the hypothesized relationship between leader strength and party institu-
tionalization on my data. Using original proxies of leader strength based on the method by
which the autocrat came into power, I find that patterns of party institutionalization closely
follow my theoretical arguments. Autocrats who were leaders of independence movements or
founding fathers of a party, who I argue faced much lower likelihoods of being removed, were
significantly less likely to have a stable vice president or prime minister. Such leaders were
also less likely to implement constitutional amendments specifying succession procedures.

\textsuperscript{2}I refer to the second paper as Meng(2016b).
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The third paper evaluates and tests one of the dominant explanations of the origins of strong autocratic parties: that parties emerging out of sustained armed conflicts, namely revolutions or nationalist pro-independence wars, become strong ruling organizations once they come into power. Although this argument is commonly presumed true, it has not been systematically tested, in part due to the lack of cross-national data on autocratic party organizations.

Using original data on party organizations in 34 African countries I evaluate the hypothesis that parties emerging out of war tend to be strong ruling organizations. My research strategy capitalizes on the wide emergence of political parties that were formed in the pre-independence period in Africa, many of which emerged out of independence wars. An advantage of comparing pro-independence parties that engaged in violent and non-violent decolonization is that these parties emerged out of very similar circumstances in the same region, allowing me to examine the effects of fighting on organizational strength, while keeping macro conditions constant.

In contrast with existing theories, I find that pro-independence parties that fought in liberation wars are not more institutionalized along most dimensions compared with parties that lobbied for independence peacefully. Independence wars tend to create strong liberation leaders with high levels of legitimacy and popularity, who have already consolidated their authority by the time they come into power. Such leaders have no incentive to pursue high levels of institutionalization once independence is granted. Instead, pro-independence parties with a legacy of conflict are significantly more likely to have independent military structures and seem much less susceptible to coups.

All together, these three papers demonstrate that party building is strategic and pursued only by autocratic leaders who otherwise could not remain in power without implementing institutional guarantees.
Chapter 2

Concept and Measurement

Abstract

A key finding in the literature on authoritarian rule is that single-party regimes are remarkably long-lived and resilient compared with military or personalist regimes. Scholars typically interpret single-party regimes as having uniformly strong ruling parties. This paper argues that using regime typologies to implicitly define ruling party strength is subject to theoretical and measurement problems, and often conflates party strength with leader strength. Instead, I claim that ruling party strength should be conceptualized as institutionalization: the creation of hierarchies, rules, and procedures that structure the distribution of power and resources. I introduce a new dataset of party institutionalization in 37 Africa countries from 1960-2005 that reflects the creation of party rules and procedures promoting organizational autonomy. A comparison of the party institutionalization dataset against the regime typology dataset reveals that many parties that have been coded as part of dominant-party regimes are not very institutionalized and actually more resemble personalist regimes. Using this new dataset I reassess the empirical claim that strong parties lengthen autocratic rule and find no evidence that party institutionalization is correlated with regime durability or longevity.
2.1 Introduction

A key finding in the literature on authoritarian rule is that dictatorial regimes with a single or dominant ruling party tend to be especially resilient. Ever since Barbara Geddes released a seminal paper that categorized dictatorships into personalist, military, party-based, or hybrid regimes, research focusing on regime type have become a staple in studies of authoritarian politics. The finding that single-party regimes are remarkably long-lived and resilient has become a foundational argument in the literature, and regime typology datasets are frequently used and built upon in widely cited studies in comparative politics. Furthermore, in the absence of an explicit definition or operationalization of autocratic party strength, scholars typically interpret single-party regimes as having uniformly strong ruling parties. Distinctions between party-based, personalist, and military regimes are often used as an indirect measure of institutional strength.

This article argues that using regime typologies to implicitly define ruling party strength is often problematic for conceptual and measurement reasons. Categorizing autocratic regimes into distinct types often creates a false dichotomy between party-based regimes and non-party-based regimes, obscuring the fact that most autocratic regimes have ruling parties. Of the 141 states that are considered autocratic during the period of 1946 to 2010, 86 percent maintained a ruling party - defined as the party of the leader or the regime - and only three percent of states had no parties for the entire period. Furthermore, within party-based regimes, ruling parties are not uniformly strong and exhibit many differences across various dimensions. Some parties are created before the regime comes into power and others are created after, different parties have different constituencies, and parties vary in organizational strength and levels of institutionalization.

Moreover, measures of regime typologies aggregate various indicators regarding leaders, parties, and military structures into a single category, which can sometimes risk conflating party strength with leader strength. Some regimes appear to be party-based, when in actuality the party is attached to a strong and charismatic leader who merely exploits the party as a personal vehicle to amplify his authority. Without disaggregated indicators of ruling party strength, it can be unclear whether the primary source of resilience comes from the party, the leader, or some other aspect of the regime. In sum, these concerns may bias our inter-

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3 See, for example, Escriba-Folch and Wright (2008), Frantz (2007), Frantz and Ezrow (2011), Ulfelder (2005), Magaloni and Kricheli (2010), and Wright (2008a, 2008b). There have also been a number of prominent studies in International Relations that have used regime typology datasets, including Peceny et al. (2002), Reiter and Stam (2003), Weeks (2008), and Weeks and Colgan (2012).

2 From 1946-1999 43 percent of post-coup regimes in Africa created a party after coming into power.

3 The United Malays National Organisation (UNMO) in Malaysia, for example, caters mainly to ethnic Malays, while the Golkar party under Soeharto in Indonesia relied on strong military and business ties.

4 The Communist Party of China (CPP) is considered a highly institutionalized ruling party, while the Parti Democratique de Guinee (PDG) under Seko Toure in Guinea lacked institutionalized rules and served only to amplify the leader’s personal power.
interpretation of the frequency in which strong autocratic parties emerge as well as the empirical relationship between party strength and regime durability.

This article provides a more direct approach in which to meaningfully capture ruling party strength in light of these concerns. I argue that autocratic party strength should be conceptualized as institutionalization: the creation of hierarchies, rules, and procedures that structure the distribution of power and resources within the party. Institutionalization de-personalizes the ways in which an organization is run and transforms the party into an autonomous organization, capable of functioning regardless of who is in power. Since institutions are especially prone to predation by leaders in autocratic settings, ruling parties are strengthened when rules and procedures guaranteeing their autonomous existence are put into place.

Using new data that proxies for party institutionalization by examining leadership changes in all non-democratic states from 1945 onward, I show that institutionalized parties are more rare than typically assumed. Importantly, I find that most ruling parties are unable to remain in power following the death or departure of the founding leader. Thus while strong parties may be key to durable authoritarianism, relatively few parties are actually strong.

I also introduce an original cross-sectional time-series dataset on autocratic party institutionalization in 37 African countries from 1960-2005. I collect data on various dimensions of party institutionalization that reflect the creation of rules and procedures that promote organizational autonomy. I compare this dataset on party institutionalization against commonly used regime typology datasets. The comparison reveals that many parties that have been coded as part of dominant-party regimes are not very institutionalized and actually more resemble personalist dictatorships. Using this new dataset, I reassess the empirical relationship between strong parties and durable regimes and find no evidence that party institutionalization is correlated with regime stability or longevity.

By providing a new way to conceptualize and measure ruling party institutionalization, this paper contributes to a growing literature on authoritarian institutions. Although the quality and character of ruling parties are often discussed in case studies, very few quantitative measures of party structures or rules have been developed, placing limitations on our ability to test generalizable hypotheses. While existing measures represent significant advances in the collection of panel data on various dimensions of authoritarian rule - a task that is not easy or trivial - they do not provide direct and nuanced measures of the organizational characteristics of ruling parties.

5 Of the existing data on authoritarian parties, Gandhi (2008) examines the degree to which dictators coopt groups within society by counting the number of parties in the legislature, and Cheibub et al. (2010) measures general restrictions on parties by distinguishing between regimes that allow for none, single, and multiple parties, and Svolik (2012) measures the degree of competition by looking at the vote share of the party in the legislature.
CHAPTER 2. CONCEPT AND MEASUREMENT

The dataset presented in this paper provides new quantitative measures of party institutionalization that more directly reflect the concept of institutional strength. Importantly, these measures capture nuanced organizational characteristics of party institutionalization that are easy to verify and replicate. In addition, the indicators also distinguish between de facto and de jure forms of party institutionalization and allow us to disentangle the party from the leader. This is, to my knowledge, the first paper that offers systematic empirical evidence of authoritarian party institutionalization.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section highlights challenges facing existing conceptions of autocratic parties and party strength. Second, I propose a conceptualization of ruling party strength as institutionalization and present empirical evidence suggesting that strong parties are relatively rare. Third, I introduce a new dataset of party institutionalization from 37 African countries. Fourth, I compare my dataset against existing dataset of regime typologies and reassess the empirical relationship between party strength and regime durability. The final section concludes.

2.2 Conceptualizing Ruling Party Strength

Although the notion of political parties is clearly defined by scholars of American politics and comparative democratic systems, we lack a clear consensus about how an authoritarian party should be defined. This is problematic because it is not immediately clear whether authoritarian parties should share a similar definition as democratic parties. As Svolik (2012) notes, “Unfortunately, the nominal resemblance of many institutions in dictatorships - especially legislatures, parties, and even some elections - to institutions in democracies is poor guidance for their conceptualization in authoritarian politics.”

On one hand, some ruling parties do serve a number of important functions central to promoting regime stability. On the elite level, the party can control and contain elite conflict, providing an institutional channel for members of the ruling coalition to be in power. Magaloni (2006, 4) traces the origins of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico as serving this very purpose. At the conclusion of the Mexican revolution, then-president Plutarco Elias Calles created a political party to “draw into a single organization all of Mexico’s then-relevant revolutionary leaders, local bosses, and existing political parties, most of which held sway only at the regional level.” Jackson and Rosberg (1982, 103) similarly characterized Kenya African National Union (KANU) in Kenya as a “confederation of arenas where political bosses of rival factions collided and colluded in their perennial struggle for the power and patronage of party, governmental, and parastatal offices.” Gandhi (2008) posits that parties can serve as a forum where elites establish their policy preferences and attempt to influence the policymaking process. Thus authoritarian parties can act as valuable channels to diffuse conflict when “elites can envision their party bringing them medium- and long-term gains despite immediate setbacks; moreover their overriding priority is to maintain
CHAPTER 2. CONCEPT AND MEASUREMENT

On the mass level, some authoritarian parties monitor citizens and provide patronage to social groups. In contrast with the military, authoritarian parties can preempt the need for coercive power by monitoring citizens and promoting regime loyalty to prevent oppositional groups or mass movements from forming in the first place. In fact, Geddes (2008) argues that parties can also help reduce dictators’ dependence on their militaries. The Propaganda Department of the CCP in China, for example, employs approximately 20,000-50,000 internet police to monitor online activity and censor posts that have a high likelihood of inciting collective action against the regime (Chen and Ang 2011). Moreover, the CCP also maintains a robust youth league and party school, similar to many other communist parties, in order to foster and maintain regime loyalty. Ruling parties can also channel benefits of state power and turn public resources into patronage (Greene 2007, Slater 2010). Blaydes (2011), in her analysis of the NDP in Egypt, argues that the party participates in elections as a public and credible way to commit to resource distribution to core groups that support the regime. Levitsky and Way (2010) characterize the BDP in Botswana as a patronage-based machine, noting that a major reason why the party is able to maintain control over the government is due to control over mineral wealth. Diamond exports constituted over 50 percent of government revenue in the 1990s, thus providing the BDP with vast resources for preempting oppositional challenges.

On the other hand, many authoritarian parties never achieve these elite and mass level functions and are quite weak the entire time they are in power. The Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR) under the rule of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, for example, lacked institutionalized rules and served only to amplify the ruler’s arbitrary power during his 28-year tenure. The MPR manifesto declared that the party “will adhere to the political policy of the Chief of the State and not the reverse.” The existence of a symbolic regime party simply validated Mobutu’s rhetoric of “revolution” and “the masses.” Unsurprisingly, the party disintegrated upon Mobutu’s death (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 173).

Even parties that now considered highly institutionalized were not always strong institutions with rules and procedures about policymaking or promotion within the organization. The PRI in Mexico and the CCP in China are now generally able to aggregate and communicate information, control public opinion, and institutionalize leadership transition. Yet these parties were significantly less institutionalized and autonomous under their first leaders. The PRI under Plutarco Elias Calles and the CCP under Mao Zedong resembled personalist regimes, where each respective leader had consolidated control, reducing the parties’ influence. Calles, for instance, controlled the actions and decisions of three presidents after him during what is referred to as the Maximato Period (Buchenau 2007). Mao promoted and purged party elites at will and launched political campaigns, such as the Hundred Flowers.

*Parties sometimes perform state functions, and this is especially true in party-state regimes, where the party is integrated with the bureaucracy.*
Movements and Cultural Revolution, during which he arbitrarily purged officials who he deemed critical of the regime (Meisner 1996).

### 2.2.1 Defining Party Strength

Despite the scholarly emphasis on strong and credible ruling parties that perform a number of important functions, the concept of autocratic party strength has not been explicitly defined or measured. One way in which party strength has been implicitly defined is through the regime type framework.

Geddes (1999a) classifies all autocratic regimes into one of the following regime types: military, single-party, personalist, or hybrids of these categories. These classifications are based on whether control over “policy, leadership selection, and the security apparatus is in the hands of a ruling party (dominant-party dictatorships), a royal family (monarchy), the military (rule by the military institution), or a narrow group centered around an individual dictator (personalist dictatorship)” (Geddes et al. 2014).

Single-party regimes are defined as regimes in which the “party has some influence over policy, controls most access to political power and government jobs, and has functioning local-level organizations” (31). By contrast, in personalist regimes, “access to office and the fruits of office depend much more on the discretion of an individual leader. The leader may be an officer and may have created a party to support himself, but neither the military nor that party exercises independent decision-making power insulated from the whims of the ruler” (7). Regimes coded as primarily military seem to reflect the absence of a ruling party, although this is not explicitly discussed. In other words, ruling parties that are coded as part of a single-party regime are implicitly considered strong parties.

Geddes’ study and associated dataset have made immense contributions to scholarship on authoritarian politics. It has set the agenda for renewed interest in the study of undemocratic regimes outside of the industrialized world and stimulated a large body of recent work on the policies, institutions, and consequences of autocratic rule.7 However, using the regime typology framework to implicitly define ruling party strength is subject to three central problems: one theoretical and two-measurement driven. As a result, these issues may bias our substantive understanding of the distribution of strong parties across all autocratic regimes as well as the empirical relationship between party strength and regime durability.

First, placing regimes into mutually exclusive party-based and non party-based categories often promotes the false assumption that all ruling parties in dominant-party regimes are uniformly strong. Communist parties in the Soviet Union and China were indeed strong parties with organizational autonomy. They were created years before the regime came

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7According to Google Scholar, Geddes (1999a) has been cited almost 300 times. Geddes (1999b), an annual review article covering the same material as Geddes (1999a), has been cited over 1,100 times.
into power, had extensive hierarchical structures, and underwent several successful party leadership transitions. By contrast, the PDG in Guinea and Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK, also known as the Khmer Rouge) in Cambodia, which are also coded as part of dominant-party regimes, were entirely concentrated around a single charismatic leader and these parties were not able to survive past the death and ousting of the leader.

On the other hand, regimes that coded as not party-based are often presumed to not have ruling parties. Yet this is not empirically true, and even Geddes (1999a) notes that in personalist regimes, leaders may create a party to support their rule (7). Hastings Banda, the self-proclaimed “President for Life” of Malawi, for instance, maintained the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) as the ruling party during his 28-year tenure. In fact, the MCP existed prior to British decolonization and led the country to independence in 1964, as the successor party of earlier independence struggles. Even some military regimes have functional parties: Park Chung-hee, who ruled South Korea for 18 years as a military dictator, created the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) two years after taking power via a coup.\footnote{The MCP is coded as part of a personalist regime, and the DRP as part of a military regime.} As Svolik (2012) aptly summarizes, the use of regime-typologies often “belie the immense institutional heterogeneity across dictatorships and fails to recognize that the categories of personalist, military, and single-party dictatorship refer to multiple, conceptually distinct dimensions of authoritarian politics” (29).

Second, aggregating various dimensions of leadership, institutions, and military structures into a single regime category can conflate party strength with leader strength. Some regimes appear to be party-based, when in actuality the party is attached to a strong and charismatic leader who merely exploits the party as a personal vehicle to amplify his authority. Without disaggregated indicators of ruling party strength, it can be unclear whether the primary source of resilience comes from the party or the leader.

The Union Soudanaise - Rassemblement Democratique Africain (US-RDA) under Modibo Keita in Mali, for instance, is coded as part of a dominant-party regime. Yet national policies were determined entirely at the discretion of Keita alone, and the US-RDA lacked institutionalized rules and permanent structures. Eight years after taking power, Keita was deposed in a coup and the party was banned. Although Keita, who was also a self-proclaimed socialist, portrayed Mali as a one-party state, the ruling party was actually extremely weak.

Third, although Geddes (2003) outlines a clear set of guidelines that were employed to categorize regimes into different categories, a number of these criteria used to code regime types require the researcher to make subjective decisions about how to code the regime. Examples of subjective criteria include: “Does the party have functioning local-level organizations that do something reasonably important, such as distribute seeds or credit or organize local government?” or “Has rule of law been maintained?” The possibility of measurement error based on subjective coding rules is also heightened by the fact that the dataset spans mul-
Multiple regions and time periods and often rely on information from various country experts. An example of criteria that relies on different country sources includes: “Does the country specialist literature describe the politburo-equivalent as a rubber stamp for the leader?” (Geddes 2003). Different country experts from various regions may have different standards for evaluating institutions, making it difficult to know whether the criteria are being applied uniformly.

The introduction of regime typologies unquestionably constituted a significant advancement for the study of authoritarian durability. However, for the reasons listed above, using the regime typology framework to implicitly define ruling party strength can often be problematic. A more direct approach in which to accurately and meaningfully capture ruling party strength is necessary.

2.3 Party Institutionalization as Organizational Strength

To address this challenge, I introduce a conceptualization of autocratic party strength that is independent of the leader and discuss ways in which this concept may be measured. I argue that ruling party strength should be thought of as the extent to which the party is institutionalized. Party institutionalization is defined as the creation of hierarchical positions and implementation of rules and procedures that structure the distribution of power and resources within the ruling coalition.

Importantly, the creation of such rules and procedures depersonalize the ways in which the party organization is run by constraining the autocratic leader’s ability to make arbitrary decisions in the future. Institutionalized ruling parties are autonomous organizations, capable of functioning regardless of which leader is in power. Since institutions are especially prone to predation by leaders in autocratic settings, institutionalization strengthens ruling parties by implementing rules, procedures, and structures that promote organizational autonomy and permanence. When we think about the quality of parties in autocratic regimes, the extent to which there are structures and procedures in place to guard against personalist rule and perpetuate the survival of the party organization are of critical importance.

My conceptualization of party institutionalization builds on existing definitions. Huntington (1968, 394) defines party institutionalization as the “process by which parties become established and acquire value and stability.” Levitsky (1998, 80) adds a second dimension of “behavioral routinization” to this concept, noting that “[i]nstitutionalization is a process by which actors’ expectations are stabilized around rules and practices. . . . The entrenchment

Interestingly, Galvin’s work on president-party relations suggests that this predatory relationship may also be present in democracies. He argues that American presidents also often use their parties instrumentally to pursue their own independent purposes (Galvin 2010).
of rules of the game’ tend to narrow actors’ behavioral options by raising the social, psychic, or material costs of breaking those rules.” As Panebianco (1988, 53) notes, “Institutionalization entails a “routinization of charisma,” a transfer of authority from the leader to the party, and very few charismatic parties survive this transfer.” Research on party system institutionalization describes strong party organizations as having independent status and value, not subordinated to the interests of ambitious leaders (Mainwaring and Scully 1995).

This conceptualization of strength has two advantages. First, it is theoretically distinct from existing conceptions of autocratic parties, which tend to focus exclusively on party institutions in party-states. In other words, my definition does not neglect the presence of weak parties, which are more prevalent in authoritarian contexts. Second, my emphasis on party institutionalization reflects the idea that a strong party should be an organization that does not rely on the strength or influence of any individual leader. This allows us to create indicators of party strength that are independent of regime durability, the latter of which can be due to a variety of idiosyncratic factors. For instance, a long-lived regime can benefit from an abundance of natural resources, a charismatic leader, or external support (such as from the United States or the Soviet Union during the Cold War). However, these factors reveal very little about the party’s underlying degree of institutionalization. Defining party strength as institutionalization allows us to operationalize the organizational quality of parties in a way that is distinct from the leader and is not conflated with the existence of the party.

2.3.1 Empirical Trends and Summary Statistics

This next section considers the substantive implications of relying on regime typologies to approximate party strength. I present summary statistics of party institutionalization through two proxies that reflect organizational autonomy. In contrast to the relative frequency of single-party regimes in existing datasets, I show that strong ruling parties appear much less often when we examine the extent to which the organization can remain in power, separate from any particular leader.

I construct proxies of party institutionalization for a global sample of autocratic ruling parties. I extend Svolik’s (2012) recent comprehensive dataset on autocratic institutions from 1946-2008, which includes the name of the regime party (if one existed) and the name of the autocratic leader in power for all country-year observations that are coded as authoritarian. For my analysis in this section, I further require that a ruling party must be in power for

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10 The Svolik dataset builds on and expands Beck et al. (2001), Database of Political Institutions (DPI), which covers the period of 1975-2012. The codebook defines a dictatorship as an independent country that fails to satisfy at least one of the following two criteria for democracy: (1) free and competitive legislative elections (2) an executive that is elected either directly in free and competitive presidential elections or indirectly by a legislature in parliamentary systems.
at least 3 years to be included. A few parties, such as the PRI in Mexico or Communist Party in the Soviet Union, took power prior to 1946, so the variables for those parties are calculated from the time they took office.

During the period of 1946-2008, there were 144 ruling parties in 98 countries. The number of years ruling parties were in power has a mean of 28 and a median of 15. However, there is a lot of variation in the data, with 27 parties having survived in power for five years or less, and 37 parties that were in power for over 30 years, with the longest ruling party in power for 102 years. Figure 2.1 presents a histogram that displays the number of years in power of ruling parties that survived at least three years.

Figure 2.1: Distribution of party rule

I then compare party duration against several proxies of party institutionalization. First, I count the number of different party leaders throughout the ruling party’s tenure, and second I count the number of years the party remained in power after the founding leader’s death or exit from leadership. I also create two weighed indicators, where I divide the raw counts by the number of years the party is in power, to avoid biasing the sample towards parties that were in power for long periods of time.

Whether a party undergoes a successful leadership transition is a reflection of the extent to which the party has organizational autonomy. This follows existing conventions set by Geddes (1999a) and others, and ensures that extremely weak parties that do not survive past initial transition periods are excluded from the analysis. Collapsed from 2,863 party-year observations.

The True Whig Party in Liberia was in power from 1878 until 2008.
aspect of party institutionalization as “the extent to which a party is reified in the public mind so that it exists as a social organization apart from its momentary leaders.” Scott (1966, 337) similarly describes how prior to democratic consolidation in Latin America, many parties were the result of “a few local notables [who] built on their own personalistic organizations for each election, allying themselves with national leaders of so-called national parties for reasons of power or material advantage.” In fact, leadership succession is considered to be one of the most significant challenges for the survival of authoritarian regimes (Brownlee 2007).

For every ruling party in this sample, I count the number of different leaders who took power. However, leadership changes that occur too frequently may also be a sign of instability. To guard against this, I only consider leaders who remain in power for three or more consecutive years as a complete leadership cycle.\footnote{The three-year cut point was chosen following existing conventions set by Geddes 1999a and others.} Figure 2.2 presents a histogram that displays the number of different leaders each ruling party had.\footnote{A histogram of this variable as a percent (the original count variable divided by the total number of years the party was in power) is included in the appendix.}

Figure 2.2: Distribution of Party Institutionalization (Proxy 1)

A quick examination of the data reveals that most ruling parties are unable to survive any kind of leadership transition. The number of different leaders across all authoritarian parties had a mean of 1.6 and a median of one.

This point is really driven home when we count the number of years the party is able to
remain in power past the death or departure of the founding leader. First regime leaders tend to be highly influential figures, often in part because they are the founders of the party. In this sample, 64 percent of first leaders were also party founders. Felix Houphouet-Boigny, for instance, founded the Parti Democratique de la Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI) in 1946, won the presidency in the first post-independence elections in 1960, and kept tight control of authority within the party until his death in 1993. In 1995, Houphouet’s favored successor, Henri Konan Bedie, won the presidential election but was overthrown in a coup six years later. Even when a leader did not create the party, the first leader of the regime often takes over party structures. Mao, for instance, was not an original founder of the CCP, but he quickly rose through the ranks and led the party and regime to power (Meisner 1986). In sum, because the first leader of an authoritarian party tends to be highly influential, we can infer that a party that can remain in power past the first leadership transition has much higher levels of organizational autonomy. Figure 2.3 presents a histogram that displays the number of years the ruling party was able to remain in power past the death or departure of the founding leader. \[16\]

Figure 2.3: Distribution of Party Institutionalization (Proxy 2)

The data reveals that 65 percent of parties fail to survive more than a year past the first leader’s death or departure from power. This variable has a mean of seven years and a median of zero. These proxies of autocratic party strength demonstrate that many ruling parties are not very institutionalized or autonomous of particular leaders.

\[16\]Once again, a histogram of this variable as a percent (the original count variable divided by the total number of years the party was in power) is included in the appendix.
In sum, conceptualizing ruling party strength as institutionalization and examining the degree to which the party had organizational autonomy, reveals two important lessons. First, strong ruling parties are *much less common* than we currently expect under the regime typologies framework. Geddes et al. (2014) lists 45 regimes as party-based and 72 regimes total if we also include party-military or party-personal. Out of these 72 regimes, only 28 parties were able to remain in power 20 or more years past the founding leader’s death or departure. Furthermore, only 22 parties out of the 72 regimes had at least three different leaders while the party was in power. In other words, *only about a third of party-based (or party-hybrid) regimes seem to meet basic thresholds of organizational autonomy.*

These findings are consistent with a small number of existing studies suggest that it may be quite difficult to build institutionalized parties. Levitsky and Way (2013) argue, “Contrary to many recent analyses of dictatorship, which treat authoritarian institutions as a product of elite choice or strategy, the institutions that underlie [regime durability] ... cannot be willed into existence by ambitious autocrats. Rather, successful autocrats either inherit such institutions or succeed in building the due to the existence of conditions (such as state breakdown or prolonged violent conflict) over which they have limited control” (15). Boix and Svolik (2013) show formally that effective autocratic institutions that promote power-sharing among elites are possible only when backed by a credible threat of rebellion by the leader’s elite coalition.

In addition, these proxies of party institutionalization highlight the danger of conflating regime *duration* (the number of years the regime was in power, illustrated in Figure 2.1) with the *organizational strength* of parties (illustrated in Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Between 1946 to 2008 there were many ruling parties - 144 parties in power for at least three years - and many parties that were in power for a long period of time - 55 parties that remained in power for 20 years or more. Yet a significantly smaller subset of these parties survived multiple leadership transitions (22 parties had three or more different leaders) and remained in power past the first leader (28 parties that survived 20 years or more past the founder’s death). This comparison reveals that many parties that seem to be durable and long-lived appear so only because they are attached to strong and charismatic leaders. In fact, if we compare the shape of the histograms in Figure 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, the distribution of strong parties becomes much more right skewed as we move from duration to institutionalization. If we are to gauge the extent to which the party organization itself is strong and institutionalized, indicators that disaggregate the party organization from the leader are required - a task I take on in the next section.
2.4 Measuring Ruling Party Institutionalization: A New Dataset

This section introduces new measures of party institutionalization in autocracies, and presents an original dataset of 37 countries and 42 ruling parties in Sub-Saharan Africa, from 1960-2005. I collect historical data on executive ministerial positions and state constitutions, for which I had comprehensive records for every country and year in my dataset. From these records, I document the creation of hierarchical positions and implementation of rules and procedures that structured the distribution of power. I argue that these variables can act as measures of party institutionalization due to the tight overlap between party and state in this particular sample of countries.

Single-party regimes in post-independence Africa dominated politics in the majority of newly independent states following European colonization. In these regimes, the president and ruling party controlled virtually all aspects of the executive, the state, and the constitution. Without exception, the president of the state and president of the ruling party were always the same person, and all cabinet ministerial positions were filled by party elites. State constitutions were frequently drafted by the party central committee and included provisions about the authority of the ruling party over all decision making. The constitution of Angola, for instance, included the following provision: “The MPLA-PT, their legitimate representative, shall be responsible for the political, economic, and social leadership of the nation.” Similarly, the constitution of Guinea-Bissau included the following provision: “The Constitution states that the party that fought against Portuguese colonialism, the PAIGC, shall be the leading political force in society and in the State. The PAIGC shall define the general cases for policy in all fields.” In the absence of direct cross-sectional time-series data on party organizations during this period, we can exploit the close overlap between party and state to create indirect measures of party institutionalization. Because ruling parties were fused with the state in the highest levels of these regimes, rules and procedures that governed the executive reflected whether party organizations developed routinized practices and structures.

My sample includes every yearly observation for which an autocratic country in Sub-Saharan Africa had a ruling party in power. For my coding of autocratic countries, I referred to the Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited dataset (Cheibub et al. 2010), which codes all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa as authoritarian immediately following independence. For my coding of ruling parties, I referred to The Europa World Year Book (Europa Publications 1960-2005), cross-referencing with Beck et al. (2001) and Svolik (2012). The two requirements necessary to be included in my dataset are that 1.) the country is coded as an authoritarian regime and 2.) the country is coded as having a ruling party. My dataset

17 When discussing my data from Africa, I refer to the autocrat as the “president” because that was the formal title used for leaders of one-party regimes.
therefore includes multiple authoritarian regime types, such as military, personalist, or one-party, as coded by Geddes, as long as the regime has a ruling party however weak or strong. Some countries in my dataset include regimes that allowed opposition parties to exist, though elections were not deemed free or fair. As soon as a country is coded as a democracy, as many African countries democratized in the early 1990s, it drops out of my sample.

To construct my measures of party institutionalization I utilize the Europa World Year Book (Europa Publications 1960-2005), which has yearly records of all executive posts, ministerial positions, and constitutions for all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. For every party-year observation, I document the name of the president, the name of the vice president or prime minister if one had been designated, and whether the president held the defense portfolio - a top ministerial post.

For my first measure of party institutionalization, I record whether a vice president or prime minister position existed and was filled by a party elite. The designation of a “second in command” position represents the creation of a hierarchical structure within the party as well as a distribution of authority to other elites. Designating a second in command, a very visible national position, casts another elite as a potential foci of power and possible successor to the executive. In fact, we can even think of the act of naming a potential successor as the autocrat solving the collective action problem for other elites as an alternative leader to rally around. The creation of these positions, therefore, reduces the party’s reliance on a single autocrat and promotes the survival of the organization past the tenure of the first leader.

Moreover, in African party-based regimes, most presidential successors were former vice presidents or prime ministers. Under the Cameroon Union (UC) in Cameroon, for instance, Paul Biya had been the Prime Minister in 1975 under the presidency of Ahmadou Ahidjo before becoming president himself in 1982. To verify that this was indeed the larger pattern in my data, I code the previous positions of presidential successors, conditional on a successful leadership transition. The data reveals that the position of vice president or prime minister is often a stepping stone for the presidency. In my sample, 41 percent of presidential successors

\[18\] If there has never been a transfer of power to another party, then the regime is not considered democratic even if the ruling party participates in elections that are considered competitive. Therefore countries such as Tanzania and Botswana remain in my dataset for the entire period. Autocratic successor parties are not included in this sample. For instance, the PDCI was the ruling party in the Ivory Coast during the authoritarian period from 1960-1993. The PDCI is still involved in politics today but is not included in my dataset past 1993.

\[19\] In fact, many presidents were extremely hesitant to assign the second in command position another party elite. Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the first president of Angola, for instance, named himself as his own vice president for a number of years while he was in power. Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the first president of the Ivory Coast, created a vice-president position, but kept the posit empty the entire time he was in power. These two cases (and other similar instances) are coded as not having the second in command position filled by another party elite.

\[20\] Renamed the Union Nationale camerounaise (UNC) in 1966.
held the position of vice president or prime minister prior to ascending to the presidency, in
contrast with 18 percent who held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs or 12 percent
who held the position of Minister of Defense. Table 2.1 provides a full summary of previous
positions held by presidential successors in my sample.

Table 2.1: Previous Positions of Autocratic Successors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Successor’s Previous Position</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Within the Party</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice President/ Prime Minister</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Defense</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Planning</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor portfolios</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President of National Assembly (without portfolio)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outside of the Party</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Only peaceful handovers of power where the ruling party was maintained are included in this
table. This table therefore excludes leaders that came into power via coups.

Additionally, I document whether the person in the vice president or prime minister position
remains fairly constant over time, or whether the person in this position is rotated very
frequently. If, for instance, a president creates a vice president position, but changes the
person who fills this position every year, then this would be interpreted as a lower degree
of institutionalization compared with a president who creates a vice president position and
keeps the same person in the position for the entire term. In order to determine the stability
of the second in command position, I create a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the
person in the vice president or prime minister position is the same person as the previous
year. Cases where this is more frequently true can be interpreted as having higher degrees
of party institutionalization.

I also examine the creation of rules procedures within constitutions. Albertus and Menaldo
(2012) argue that autocratic constitutions provide an important mechanism for establishing
rules and procedures in a public way that holds autocrats accountable. Constitutions pro-
mote “mutual expectations and impose self-enforcing limits on executive authority” (280).
For every party-year observation, I document whether the constitution had an amendment
outlining procedures governing presidential succession. The Kenyan constitution, for in-
stance, has an amendment that reads: “If a President dies, or a vacancy otherwise occurs
during a President’s period of office, the Vice President becomes interim President for up
to 90 days while a successor is elected.” The transfer of power from Jomo Kenyatta to
Daniel arap Moi during the 1978 presidential succession in Kenya illustrates the importance
of succession rules. Near the end of Kenyatta’s rule, a faction within the ruling KANU party
tried to contest the authority of then vice president Moi on the grounds that he was not a member of the dominant ethnic group. Moi and his supporters were able to effectively dispute their claims by pointing to the policy governing presidential succession outlined in the constitution\cite{Tamarkin1979} 21-26).

If succession rules do exist, I also distinguish whether the procedures specify who would succeed the president, or if the amendment only provides vague rules about nominating a successor. Unlike the Kenyan constitution, which specifies that the vice president should become the interim president, the constitution of Angola provides guidelines that are much more vague. It states: “In the case of the death, resignation, or permanent incapacity of the president, the Central Committee shall designate from among its members the person who shall provisionally exercise the duties of the president of the Republic.”

Finally, I document whether the president kept the Minister of Defense portfolio for himself for every party-year observation. The defense portfolio is an especially important ministerial position because it represents control of military force, which is often used to overturn autocrats. In fact, coups were the most common way in which African leaders were deposed during this time period. Ghana, for instance, experienced 13 coups from independence through 2005. As such, defense is the most commonly kept portfolio by the president in my sample. Whether the president delegates this position to someone other than himself is thus of critical significance.

To summarize, my dataset produces the following five indicators that serve as measures of party institutionalization. Each variable is coded as party-year units and takes the form of a dummy variable.

1. Second named: Was a vice president or prime minister named?
2. Second same: Was the second in command the same person as the year before?
3. Succession rule (weak): Was there a constitutional amendment specifying the rules of succession?
4. Succession rule (strict): Was there a constitutional amendment specifying exactly who would succeed the president in the case of his death?
5. Independent defense: Did someone other than the president hold the Defense portfolio?

2.5 Party Institutionalization and Regime Typologies

This section compares my dataset of party institutionalization against commonly used regime typology datasets and reassess the empirical relationship between party strength and regime
durability using my indicators. As mentioned in the introduction, one of the most commonly used datasets in the authoritarian regimes literature is the regime typologies dataset. This dataset was introduced in Geddes (1999a), then updated and released in 2014 as the GWF dataset (Geddes et al. 2014). GWF covers all country-years with autocratic governments between 1946-2010 in independent countries. From this country-year data, GWF creates a list of 280 autocratic regimes with their start and end dates, as detailed by their codebook. Similar to Geddes (1999a), GWF classifies all autocratic regimes in their dataset into one of the following regime types: monarchy, personal, military, party, party-personal, party-military, military-personal, party-personal-military, oligarchy, indirect military.

### 2.5.1 Comparison: Global sample

A comparison of the GWF dataset against my various indicators of party institutionalization reveals a number of inconsistencies. First I merged the regime-type variable from GWF with my global proxies of party institutionalization (leader count and years past first leader). For my global sample, out of 125 ruling parties, 98 ruling parties were matched against a regime typology from GWF. 26 ruling parties in the global sample were not matched with GWF because they existed within regimes that were not present in GWF. Out of the parties that were matched with GWF, most were associated with personalist regimes (39 percent) or party-based regimes (35 percent). On average, party-based regimes remain in office longer than personalist regimes. On average, party-based regimes are also able to remain in office longer past the founder’s death or departure from office and survive more leadership transitions, compared with personalist regimes. However, a number of inconsistencies between my data and GWF emerge.

First, my global sample suggests that the number of party-based regimes is overestimated in the GWF dataset. Out of the 34 parties that were matched with party-based regimes, 14 (41 percent) of these parties fail to remain in office at least 10 years after the founder’s death or departure. In fact, eight (24 percent) of these parties fail to survive in office even one year after the departure of the founder. In fact, nine (26 percent) of these parties fail to undergo any successful leadership transitions.

Second, my global proxies reveal that some non party-based regimes may have been mis-

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21Country-years for which the government is coded as democratic, in transition, or not independent are excluded from the dataset.

22I also merged my global sample with the Geddes 1999a dataset, which resulted in 70 party-regime type matches. The Geddes 1999a and GWF datasets are largely consistent, however the GWF has much more extensive coverage of regime-year observations. According to Google Scholar, the paper accompanying the GWF dataset has been cited over 150 times. Although the Geddes 1999a dataset has likely been used in more published works, in this section I focus my discussion on how the GWF dataset compares with my data on party institutionalization due to the fact that there is more data to analyze and GWF remains largely consistent with Geddes 1999a.
categorized as well. Certain regimes which are classified as military, party-military, party-personal, or even personalist are able to survive for long periods after the departure of the founder, suggesting that these seemingly personalist regimes actually do have strongly institutionalized parties. Two parties that were matched with military regimes, for instance, were able to remain in power 16 years after the departure of the founder and underwent at least two successful leadership transitions. I also identify 10 parties that were matched with party-military, party-personal, or personalist regimes that were able to remain in office at least 10 years after the departure of the founder. Appendix Table 1 summarizes the parties that may be mis-categorized based on these criteria.

2.5.2 Comparison: Africa sample

A comparison of GWF and my dataset of party institutionalization within the Africa sub-sample also reveals a number of inconsistencies. Since GWF is cross-sectional, I collapse the party-year panel data from my Africa sample into party-level observations in order for my dataset to be comparable with the GWF regime-level observations. The resulting cross-sectional dataset has 47 party-level observations. Since my original measures of party institutionalization are dummy variables, to transform them into cross-sectional indicators I calculate the percentage of years for which a dimension of institutionalization was implemented. For instance, a party that was in power for 20 years and had a vice-president for 10 of those years would score a .50 on the first dimension of institutionalization. The equation below specifies the method.

\[
\% \text{ years with institutionalization} = \frac{\sum \text{years with institutionalization}}{\sum \text{years in power}}
\]

Out 47 party observations in my Africa sample, 42 parties were matched with corresponding GWF regime observations. Out of the parties that were matched with GWF, most are associated with party-based regimes (42 percent) or personalist regimes (37 percent). On average, party-based regimes remain in office the longest and are most likely to have a stable second in command. However, party-based regimes do not have the highest average scores for succession rules or an independent defense. In fact, a closer look at the data reveals a number of inconsistencies between GWF and my indicators of party institutionalization.

Many ruling parties that are coded as part of a dominant-party regime perform very poorly when we examine their party institutionalization scores. The Union Soudanaise (US) in

\[^{23}\text{In fact, some of these parties remained in office 42, 46, 102, and 124 years past the founder’s death or departure.}\]

\[^{24}\text{Cape Verde, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, and Somalia prior to 1970 do not appear in GWF, so five parties from these states were not matched. 55 regime observations from GWF were not matched with my Africa dataset because these regimes did not have ruling parties or GWF uses a slightly different definition of authoritarian.}\]
Mali, for instance, scored zero for all five dimensions of party institutionalization, making it the least institutionalization ruling party in the dataset. The Nigerian Progressive Party (PPN) in Niger and Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu (Parmehutu) in Rwanda both score zeros for the first four dimensions of party institutionalization. The People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in Gambia, Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) in Guinea-Bissau under Cabral, Parti Social Democrat de Madagascar (PSD) in Madagascar, South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)/ Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in Tanzania, United National Independence Party (UNIP) in Zambia, and the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe never have any kind of succession policy in place the entire time these parties are in power. In sum, many ruling parties that are coded as a dominant-party by GWF are actually not very institutionalization at all.

The data also reveals that a number of ruling parties that were not coded as part of a pure dominant-party regime are actually quite institutionalized. For instance, the UC in Cameroon under Adhijo had a vice president for the entire period and the vice president was the same person 69 percent of the time. There was a specific succession policy in place 50 percent of the time, and an independent minister of defense for the entire period. Similarly, the Parti Democratique Gabonais (PDG) in Gabon had a vice president 97 percent of the time, and the vice president was the same person 79 percent of the time. There was a specific succession policy in place for the entire period, and an independent minister of defense was named 64 percent of the time. Both the UC and PDG are coded as party-personalist regimes. The Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) under Biya in Cameroon is coded as a personalist regime. However, the CPDM has had a vice president 83 percent of the time, and the same person has been in the vice president position 54 percent of the time. The CPDM has had succession policies and an independent minister of defense for the entire period. The Rassemblement Democratique Centrafricain (RDC) in the Central African Republic is coded as part of a military-personalist regime, yet it has had a vice president named the entire period and the same person in that role 60 percent of the time. The party has also had specific succession policies in place for the entire period. In sum, a number of ruling parties that are coded as part of personalist, military-personalist, party-personalist regimes, or party-military are highly institutionalized along one or multiple dimensions.

Table 2.2 provides a comparison between my measures of party institutionalization and regime type for the Africa subsample. Shaded cells represent parties that may be mis-categorized, based on a misalignment between the assigned regime type and party institutionalization score on that particular dimension. For instance, a number of parties that are coded as part of party-based regimes have a vice president or prime minister less than 70 percent of the time in which the party was in power. These parties are denoted as having

\[\text{A caveat here is that the RDC was only in power for five years.}\]
shaded cells under the dimension “second named.”\footnote{For non party-based regimes, “Second Named > 80%” means that the parties listed in this column are not coded as part of party-based regimes, but have a second in command named more than 80 percent of the time.} In contrast, a number of parties that are not coded as part of pure party-based regimes actually have a vice president or prime minister more than 80 percent of the time in which the party was in power an even higher threshold level than many party-based regimes. These inconsistencies are also represented by shaded cells. Out of 43 parties in Table 2.2, only 11 do not have any shaded cells. In other words, 74 percent of the observations have an inconsistency between the assigned regime typology and at least one dimension of party institutionalization.

### 2.5.3 Ruling Party Institutionalization and Regime Durability: An Empirical Reassessment

Using my data on party institutionalization in the Sub-Saharan Africa sample, I reassess the empirical relationship between party institutionalization and regime durability. In contrast to established findings that single-party regimes tend to be significantly more resilient, I find no evidence linking party institutionalization with regime durability.\footnote{Smith (2005) also challenges the finding from Geddes (1999a), although he argues that the significant effect of single-party regimes is driven by two outliers - Mexico and the Soviet Union. The results fail to be significant once they are excluded from the analysis.}

Geddes (1999a) carries out statistical tests of the effect of regime type on the probability of regime breakdown, controlling for levels of economic development, growth rate, and region. The main dependent variable, regime breakdown, is a dummy variable, and she employs logistic regression. The paper finds that single-party regimes and “triple threat” regimes (single-party/military/personal hybrids) are significantly less likely to break down compared to personalist regimes.\footnote{Since regime categories are mutually exclusive, the personalist category was left out as the residual category, so coefficients from all other regime types is interpreted as the likelihood of breakdown in comparison with personalist regimes.} She also notes that single-party regimes appear to remain in power for longer periods of time, compared with military and personalist regimes, though she does not carry out statistical tests for this outcome.

I conduct regression analysis using my panel data on the Africa sample to determine the relationship between party institutionalization and regime durability. The dependent variable for these regressions is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the regime ended in that particular year and a 0 otherwise. Keeping with Geddes’ analysis, logistical regression models are used. The independent variables are my five indicators of party institutionalization, estimated separately.\footnote{I estimated each indicator separately due to some collinearity between certain indicators. A correlation matrix is included in the appendix.}
Table 2.2: Comparison between party institutionalization and regime type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Regime type</th>
<th>Second named</th>
<th>Second same</th>
<th>Successor (weak)</th>
<th>Successor (strict)</th>
<th>Defense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>MPLA Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>BDP Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>PPP Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>PDG Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>PAIGC (Cabral) Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>PDCI Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>KANU Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>PSD Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>US Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Frelimo Party</td>
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<tr>
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<td>CPP Party-personal</td>
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<td>UPRONA Party-military</td>
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<td>Congo</td>
<td>PCT Party-military</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>RDC Military-personal</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>MRND Military-personal</td>
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</table>
CHAPTER 2. CONCEPT AND MEASUREMENT

Most of my model specifications report no significant relationship between party institutionalization in regime breakdown. In fact, for two of the regressions which employ fixed effects, the relationship between party institutionalization and regime breakdown are positive and significant - meaning that having a second in command position and an independent military increases the likelihood of regime breakdown. Results from these regressions are reported in Table 2.3.

I also run similar regressions using duration - the number of years the party remained in power - as the outcome variable. Again, for many model specifications I find no significant relationship between party institutionalization and length of rule. In fact, having succession policies in place (whether using the strict or weak coding rules) is negatively and significantly correlated with duration. In other words, parties with succession rules tend to last in office for shorter periods of time. Results from these regressions are reported in Table 2.4.

These findings indicate that the relationship between party institutionalization and regime durability may be more complex than previously thought. Importantly, it suggests that party building in autocracies is a strategic process through which autocrats endogenously respond to threats with “appropriate” degrees of institutionalization (Boix and Svolik 2013, Gandhi 2008, Meng 2016b).

Table 2.3: Dependent Variable = End of regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. Random effects/ fixed effects logistic regression model used. Standard errors in parentheses.

30 Being able to include country year fixed effects represents a higher degree of controls that Geddes was able to employ, since the regime data is cross-sectional, rather than panel structured. She uses region as a quasi-fixed effects estimator.
Table 2.4: Dependent variable: Years in power

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<td>YES</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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Notes: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. Random effects/ fixed effects regression model used. Standard errors in parentheses.

2.6 Conclusion

As the field of authoritarian politics has expanded, researchers have put forth a number of theories and hypotheses about the institutions and processes that drive authoritarian stability. These arguments are often formalized as game theoretic models or illustrated through detailed qualitative cases studies, but few are precisely tested via regression analysis due to data limitations. In presenting a new conceptualization of an important institution - ruling parties - and introducing a new dataset measuring this variable, this paper aims to make a contribution towards producing generalizable theories of autocratic rule.

The data from my global and Africa samples reveal that strong parties may be more rare than previously thought, and that many parties that have been coded as part of dominant-party regimes are not very institutionalized. The data also shows that parties exhibit a lot of variation across different dimensions of institutionalization, supporting the notion that future datasets on authoritarian institutions should push for disaggregated indices. Future research should also continue think of other ways to introduce new panel data that reflects different aspects of autocratic rule, within and outside of Sub-Saharan Africa. Doing so will help us test existing theories, discover broad empirical trends, and complement qualitative scholarship that examines the origins, logic, consequences of authoritarian rule.
CHAPTER 2. CONCEPT AND MEASUREMENT

2.7 References


Geddes, B. Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirica Test of a Game-Theoretic Argument.


CHAPTER 2. CONCEPT AND MEASUREMENT


Appendix
## Mis-categorized parties (global sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weak parties categorized as party-based regimes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party-based</td>
<td>PLA (Albania)</td>
<td>Failed to remain in power at least ten years past first leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RNM (Bolivia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPK (Cambodia)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CCP (Colombia)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>PDCI (Cote d’Ivoire)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>PPP (Gambia)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDG (Guinea)</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>BNP (Lesotho)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSD (Madagascar)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US (Mali)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>FSLN (Nicaragua)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PPN (Nigeria)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Parmehutu (Rwanda)</td>
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<td>APC (Sierra Leone)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNP (Sri Lanka)</td>
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<td>DP (Turkey)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNIP (Zambia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPP (Cambodia)</td>
<td>First leader still in power as of end of dataset (2008) - limits our ability to evaluate party strength</td>
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<td></td>
<td>TPLF/EPRDF (Ethiopia)</td>
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<td>CDR (Tunisia)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strong parties categorized as non party-based regimes</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>ARENA (Brazil)</td>
<td>Remained in power 13 years past first leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party-military</td>
<td>FLN (Algeria)</td>
<td>Remained in power at least 12 years past first leader, has had at least three different leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PCT (Congo)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PCN (El Salvador)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party-personal</td>
<td>PDG (Gabon)</td>
<td>Remained in power at least 19 years past first leader</td>
</tr>
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<td>WPK (North Korea)</td>
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<td>PCR (Romania)</td>
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<td>Baath (Syria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>MESAN (CAR)</td>
<td>Remained in power at least 13 years past first leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Unity (Haiti)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal (Nicaragua)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Once a country democratizes, it drops out of the sample, therefore autocratic successor parties are not included in this table. For instance, the PDCI was the ruling party in Cote d’Ivoire during the authoritarian period from 1960-1993. The PDCI is still involved in politics today but is not included in my dataset past 1993.
## GWF/ party institutionalization comparison (global sample)

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<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Years in Power</th>
<th>Years past founder</th>
<th>Number of Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>16 (0)</td>
<td>3.5 (.707)</td>
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<td>2.868 (9.467)</td>
<td>1.263 (1.200)</td>
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<td>Party-based</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33.382 (17.492)</td>
<td>21.088 (19.970)</td>
<td>3.029 (2.622)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-personal</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.142 (8.706)</td>
<td>1.571 (2.878)</td>
<td>1.142 (3.77)</td>
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<td>24.6 (14.338)</td>
<td>19.3 (38.583)</td>
<td>2 (1.825)</td>
</tr>
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<td>24.666 (9.451)</td>
<td>12 (2.645)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party-personal-military</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34.5 (5.259)</td>
<td>43.25 (42.703)</td>
<td>3.25 (2.872)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>20.848 (15.676)</td>
<td>12.081 (21.239)</td>
<td>2.016 (1.971)</td>
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Note: Mean years reported, standard deviations in parentheses. Party institutionalized indicators are calculated as the percentage of years for which the measure is implemented. Consistent with Smith (2005), when I drop the Soviet Union and Mexico the mean number of years in power falls to 30, the mean number of years past the founder falls to 17, and the mean number of leaders falls to 2.58.
### GWF/ party institutionalization comparison (Africa sample)

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<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<th>Successor (weak)</th>
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<td>(.420)</td>
<td>(.323)</td>
<td>(.300)</td>
<td>(.156)</td>
<td>(.370)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party-based</td>
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<td>25.333</td>
<td>.681</td>
<td>.479</td>
<td>.271</td>
<td>.141</td>
<td>.637</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(11.611)</td>
<td>(.377)</td>
<td>(.287)</td>
<td>(.366)</td>
<td>(.244)</td>
<td>(.397)</td>
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<td>Military-personal</td>
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<td>11.666</td>
<td>.453</td>
<td>.255</td>
<td>.629</td>
<td>.629</td>
<td>.400</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6.506)</td>
<td>(.478)</td>
<td>(.309)</td>
<td>(.548)</td>
<td>(.548)</td>
<td>(.375)</td>
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<td>Party-personal</td>
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<td>.453</td>
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<td>(.234)</td>
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<td>Party-military</td>
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<td>.603</td>
<td>.401</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.195</td>
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<td>(.499)</td>
<td>(.355)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.276)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20.651</td>
<td>.581</td>
<td>.380</td>
<td>.252</td>
<td>.154</td>
<td>.555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(10.620)</td>
<td>(.404)</td>
<td>(.313)</td>
<td>(.370)</td>
<td>(.300)</td>
<td>(.371)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Mean years reported, standard deviations in parentheses. Party institutionalized indicators are calculated as the percentage of years for which the measure is implemented.
### Party institutionalization correlation matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Second named</th>
<th>Second same</th>
<th>Successor (weak)</th>
<th>Successor (strict)</th>
<th>Independent defense</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Second named</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second same</td>
<td>0.708</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<td>Successor (weak)</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<td>Successor (strict)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent defense</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 2. CONCEPT AND MEASUREMENT

Distribution of party institutionalization (proxy 1 weighted)

Note: Kernal density plot overlaid on histogram.
Counts listed above bins.
This variable divides the original count variable by the number of years the party is in power.
Distribution of party institutionalization (proxy 2 weighted)

Note: Kernel density plot overlaid on histogram.
Counts listed above bins.
This variable divides the original count variable by the number of years the party is in power.
Chapter 3

A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change

Abstract

Why do some autocrats institutionalize their parties after coming into power? How does party institutionalization occur in authoritarian regimes, and under what conditions would an autocratic leader choose to institutionalize the ruling party? Examining party institutionalization as instances when autocrats voluntarily take actions that limit their personal authority, such as establishing succession procedures or naming a second in command, I present a formal model showing that strong autocrats who face low probabilities of being deposed are less likely to institutionalize their ruling parties. Weaker autocrats without such guarantees of stability are more likely to pursue a strategy of party institutionalization because doing so provides benefits of stable rule. Employing original data on constraints on executive power and portfolio allocation in African one-party regimes from 1960-2005, I introduce new ways of measuring party institutionalization in autocracies and present empirical tests of my theoretical argument.
 CHAPTER 3. A THEORY OF ENDOGENOUS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

3.1 Introduction

A central finding from research on authoritarian regimes is that strong ruling parties are a significant source of stability in dictatorships. Numerous scholars have argued that one-party regimes tend to last longer (Geddes 2003, Huntington 1968, Magaloni 2008) and experience higher levels of economic growth (Gandhi 2008, Gehlbach and Keefer 2008, Keefer 2008, Wright 2008) compared with regimes that rely primarily on the charisma of a particular leader or military dictatorships. Similarly, regimes with strong parties fall prey to fewer coups (Cox 2008, Geddes 2008, Svolik 2012) and are better able to withstand popular unrest, even during periods of economic crises (Brownlee 2007, Levitsky and Way 2012). In sum, the general consensus is that one-party regimes tend to be more stable than military or personalist dictatorships.

Ruling parties can be central in promoting regime stability because they fulfill a number of important functions. Boix and Svolik (2013), Geddes (1999b), and Magaloni (2008) argue that parties help dictators solve commitment and monitoring problems within the ruling coalition. Magaloni (2008, 716), for instance, posits that parties, such as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico, provide a way for dictators to promise not to abuse their “loyal friends” by “[delegating] control to the access-to-power positions and the state privileges to a parallel political organization, such as a political party.” In his study of the National Democratic Party (NDP) in Egypt and the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) in Malaysia, Brownlee (2007, 12) asserts that ruling parties alleviate elite conflict by “[creating] a structure for collective agenda setting, lengthening the time horizon on which leaders weigh gains and losses.” Parties thus incentivize elites to maintain a peaceful decision-making process by assuring longer term gains. Greene (2007) and Slater (2010) argue that parties can channel benefits of state power and turn public resources into patronage, thereby maintaining elite and popular support. In addition, Geddes (2008) posits that parties can also help reduce dictators’ dependence on their militaries. Gandhi (2008), Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) argue that parties and legislatures also help co-opt opposition groups and reward supporters by providing a forum in which rents and policy concessions can be distributed. Similarly, Svolik (2012) identifies several organizational features of strong ruling parties that help facilitate authoritarian stability, including hierarchical assignment of services and benefits, political control over appointment, and selective recruitment and repression.

These studies suggest that - once established - ruling parties are a key source of regime stability. However, the conditions under which ruling parties develop into strong institutions remains an important question. Existing research on autocratic rule has focused almost exclusively on explaining variation across different types of regimes rather than focusing on differences among ruling parties as the primary outcome of interest. As a result, we know considerably less about how parties actually become durable organizations. As Magaloni
(2008, 725) notes: “A key question that emerges from this discussion is why not all dictators create political parties if they play such powerful roles in minimizing their risk of being overthrown by members of the ruling coalition.” The extant literature simply has not focused on how successful and credible political parties become established in the first place.

Moreover, existing research often overlooks the fact that authoritarian parties exhibit substantial differences in levels of organizational strength and institutionalization. Unlike the often-cited examples of the PRI in Mexico or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China, many autocratic parties are incapable of providing benefits of stable rule. The Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR) created by Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, for instance, lacked institutionalized rules and served only to amplify the ruler’s arbitrary power during his 28 year tenure. Since the MPR was designed to “adhere to the political policy of the Chief of the State and not the reverse,” the party unsurprisingly disintegrated upon Mobutu’s death (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 173). Contrast this with KANU, the party that ruled Kenya for nearly 40 years after independence, which successfully underwent a constitutionally mandated leadership transition upon the death of the first president. Unlike the MPR, KANU was a “confederation of arenas where political bosses of rival factions collided and colluded in their perennial struggle for the power and patronage of party, governmental, and parastatal offices” (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 103). As Levitsky and Way (2012, 870) aptly note: “the key to durable authoritarianism is not the existence of ruling parties per se, but rather the character of those parties.”

This paper seeks to understand why we see differences in the organizational capacity of authoritarian regimes by examining ruling party institutionalization. In particular I ask the following three questions. Why do some autocrats institutionalize their parties after coming into power? How does party institutionalization occur in authoritarian regimes, and under what conditions would an autocratic leader choose to institutionalize the ruling party?

I argue that parties become institutionalized when autocrats see them as key to alleviating commitment problems in elite bargaining. Party institutionalization can be defined as instances where an autocrat voluntarily takes actions to limit his personal authority by designating a successor or creating procedures for party officials to move up the hierarchy. In autocratic regimes, this concept can also be thought of as the process by which power is depersonalized and the ruling party gains autonomy as an organization, independent of any particular leader. When an autocrat institutionalizes a party, he takes actions that voluntarily binds his hands and constrains his ability to take arbitrary future actions.

Building on insights from prior scholarship (Besley and Persson 2010, Boix and Svolik 2013, Dal Bo and Powell 2009) I show that party institutionalization is a mechanism that allows autocratic leaders to create a semi-autonomous organization that can enforce joint rule. I present a formal model in which party institutionalization alleviates commitment problems in elite bargaining by providing the autocrat with the opportunity to make future promises.
CHAPTER 3. A THEORY OF ENDOGENOUS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Using the model, I am able to demonstrate why certain autocrats would choose to institutionalize their parties in order to stay in power for longer time horizons. Yet, the model also reveals that taking actions to limit their future personal authority can be very costly for autocrats - hence not all leaders will choose to rule through an institutionalized party.

In the model, an autocrat is able to make future promises by choosing a baseline minimal division of benefits that other party elites will receive with certainty in each peaceful round of the infinitely repeating game. Then, in each proceeding round, the autocrat can make an offer that is even greater than the baseline offer originally promised, but he is constrained to share at least the amount that he committed himself to giving away at the start of the game. We can think of this baseline offer as an endogenously chosen floor for offers made in each round of bargaining. Party institutionalization can be thought of as guaranteed shares of benefits that are offered to party elites. Remaining offers that are higher than the minimal division can be thought of as patronage, since these offers fluctuate from round to round and depend on the distribution of power between the autocrat and party elites.

I find that autocrats who are very strong relative to other regime elites do not tend to institutionalize, primarily because weak elites do not need very large offers to be deterred from challenging the leader. Bargaining under such conditions can be satisfied without any kind of party institutionalization because the autocrat does not need to make any future promises. Autocrats who, on average, consistently face very little risk of being removed from power will generally follow a strategy of ruling without institutionalizing the party. Conversely, weaker autocrats who do not have such guarantees of stability are more likely to pursue party institutionalization because doing so increases the chance that they will stay in power. In such cases, party institutionalization, formalized as a guaranteed portion of benefits reserved for other party elites, actually incentivizes party elites to support the regime in order to keep receiving these benefits. Party institutionalization thus allows weaker autocrats who, without institutionalization, would have faced high risks of being deposed, the ability to remain in office for longer periods of time.

After addressing why and when party institutionalization is likely to occur, I turn to the question of how autocratic party institutionalization occurs on the ground by presenting empirical evidence of the kinds of promises autocrats can credibly commit to. Although I discuss conditions under which an autocrat would voluntarily institutionalize the party, the model assumes that he actually has the ability to do so. The empirical section of this paper provides evidence of this assumption and tests my theoretical arguments about the relationship of autocratic strength and party institutionalization. Importantly, I introduce original ways to measure the concept of party institutionalization in autocracies - an important variable that remains weakly operationalized in the existing literature.

I present original data of constraints on executive power and ministerial cabinet portfolio allocation in Sub-Saharan African one-party regimes from 1960-2005. This data reflects different
kinds of benefits, both material and non-material, that autocrats tend to have discretionary control over. Some examples include the creation of a vice president or prime minister position or the distribution of important ministerial portfolios (such as defense, foreign affairs, or economic affairs). Although leaders often hand out various types of benefits to elite allies in order to maintain their support, my theory assumes that some offers are difficult to retract once they are distributed or implemented, thus these concessions constitute a form of party institutionalization. I validate this assumption by showing that the establishment of a vice president or prime minister post and the creation of succession procedures in these party regimes, once implemented, are rarely overturned. The distribution of such non-retractable goods most closely resemble instances of party institutionalization. The distribution of ministerial portfolios, on the other hand, is frequently retracted, as autocrats often hand out portfolios then take them back the following year. Thus while the distribution of ministerial portfolios can help autocrats co-opt party elites, these kinds of offers are temporary forms of patronage and do not constitute a kind of party institutionalization.

In addition, I also test the hypothesized relationship between autocratic leader strength and levels of party institutionalization on my data. My theory predicts that strong autocrats with a low probability of being deposed are less likely to pursue strategies of ruling through institutionalized parties. Using original proxies of leader strength based on how the autocrat came into power, I find that patterns of party institutionalization closely follow my theoretical arguments. Autocrats who were leaders of independence movements or founding fathers of a party, who I argue faced much lower likelihoods of being removed, were significantly less likely to have a stable vice president or prime minister. Such leaders were also less likely to implement constitutional amendments specifying succession procedures.

This paper makes two important contributions. First, I develop a new theory of endogenous institutional change by highlighting the conditions under which an autocratic leader would voluntarily take actions to institutionalize his ruling party. The formal model offers a framework that clarifies the tradeoffs inherent in the autocrat’s choice between offering higher levels of party institutionalization versus patronage to elites. Party institutionalization allows the autocratic leader to make future promises, thus alleviating conflict caused by commitment problems and deters elites from attempting to depose him (benefit). However, party institutionalization is costly for the leader because he must offer a larger portion of benefits to party elites that the autocrat would have otherwise consumed himself (cost). Patronage, on the other hand, allows the leader to make the cheapest possible offer to party elites in each round by holding them down to their reservation value (benefit). However, because the autocrat is limited to the maximum amount of benefits he can offer in each period, commitment problems can cause conflict because the autocrat cannot commit to future offers (cost). Because of these tradeoffs, only certain types of rulers will pursue the strategy of ruling through an institutionalized party.

An advantage of this model is that it highlights the idea that party institutionalization is
costly for an autocrat because it involves actions where he voluntarily binds his hands and constrains his ability to take future actions. Committing to offer at least the guaranteed share of benefits in good or bad times is also costly for the autocrat in a distributional sense by implementing party institutionalization, the leader is committing himself to consuming less in each round. Although institutionalized parties can provide autocrats with the advantage of more stable rule, transforming the organization into a vehicle through which these benefits can accrue requires that the autocrat relinquish certain decision-making authority.

The model I present here extends the formal literature on authoritarian institutions and elite bargaining in several important ways. This paper presents an original approach to formalize endogenous institutional change. In contrast with existing models that present a dichotomous choice of either full institutionalization or no institutionalization at all, I fully endogenize the autocrat’s decision to voluntarily undertake party institutionalization by allowing him to implement degrees of institutionalization. Moreover, by modeling party institutionalization as a solution to commitment problems rather than information problems in elite bargaining, my model serves to unify arguments about credible commitments and institutionalization in the existing literature on authoritarian regimes. A key distinction this paper makes is that autocratic party building serves as a commitment device for autocrats contrary to patronage, which operates as a series of uncommitted payments. While scholars have acknowledged that parties can act as vehicles for enforcing promises made in elite bargaining, I highlight how institutionalizing the party is what allows autocrats to make credible commitments to other party elites by depersonalizing the way in which benefits are distributed. Additionally, while other studies have made the general observation that power-sharing institutions provide an effective enforcement mechanism for making inter-temporal promises, this paper offers a distinct theoretical and empirical application of institutionalization to autocratic party building.

As a second important contribution, this paper presents evidence of how party institutionalization actually occurs on the ground and offer insights on why some kinds of promises are easier for autocrats to commit to than others. This is, to my knowledge, the first paper that addresses this question and offers systematic empirical evidence of authoritarian party institutionalization. Although the organizational quality of authoritarian parties is often discussed in case studies, very few quantitative measures of party institutionalization have been developed, limiting our ability to test arguments about parties as commitment devices. Of the existing data, Svolik (2012) measures the degree of competition by looking at the vote share of the party in the legislature, and Gandhi (2008) examines the degree to which dictators co-opt groups within society by counting the number of parties in the legislature. Cheibub et al. (2010) measures general restrictions on parties by distinguishing between regimes that allow for none, single, and multiple parties. While these measures are useful for capturing broad variation across parties and regimes, indicators that reflect more nuanced differences in organizational characteristics of parties are sorely needed. On the other hand,
scholars who work on regimes have identified dominant-party regimes based on a detailed set of party-based criteria (Geddes 1999a, Geddes et al. 2014). However, these coding methods rely on a subjective interpretation of case studies. I present original indicators of party institutionalization that allows us to substantiate the theoretical claim that parties act as commitment devices. Importantly, my measures capture more nuanced organizational characteristics that are easy to verify and replicate. In addition, I also distinguish between de facto and de jure forms of party institutionalization, allowing us to disentangle the effect of leader strength on various dimensions of institutionalization.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents my theoretical argument about party institutionalization. The following section formalizes my ideas in a game-theoretic model. I then introduce my data and methods for testing my hypothesized relationship. The next section provides a series of stylized facts highlighted in my data. I then present empirical tests of my theory. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of my findings.

### 3.2 Party Institutionalization in Autocracies

Existing theories on the origins of strong autocratic parties has focused primarily on the organizational advantages of ruling parties that form as opposition movements, rebel groups, or revolutionary movements prior to coming into power. These studies generally posit that the conditions under which ruling parties are formed have an effect on later party strength. Smith (2005) argues that elites who face organized opposition groups or foreign or colonial armies at the onset of their rule are likely to respond to such threats by building party institutions to mobilize their constituencies. Similarly, Panebianco (1988) claims that parties originating as opposition groups tend to develop stronger organizational structures because they lack easy access to public resources during periods of consolidation. Other theories posit that parties that come into power by prevailing in civil conflict are easily transformed into strong ruling institutions. Levitsky and Way (2012), echoing Huntington (1968), argue that armed conflict, usually taking the form of revolutionary struggles or independence wars, provide ruling parties with a crucial source of cohesion once they take control of the regime. Conversely, Slater (2010) posits that it is more often counter-insurgency movements rather than revolutionary parties that provide a strong basis for regime durability because revolutionary regimes often fall apart when the external threat departs.

These studies highlight the important finding that parties that originate as opposition groups or mass-based revolutionary movements come into power with distinct organizational advantages. Yet, case studies of revolutionary parties and independence movements reveal that organizations that are good at fighting and succeed at coming to power are not necessarily equipped to govern and cannot stay in power without further institutionalization. In his discussion of independence parties in Africa, Welch (1970) asserts that the guerilla style
tactics and organization of parties that were engaged in anti-colonial activities became considerably less effective for creating a self-governing state after independence. Zheng (1997, 15-16) makes a similar case for the CCP in China, arguing that the party’s ability to win a civil war did not automatically suggest that it would be successful in rebuilding the state.

Whereas existing scholarship focuses on party formation, I focus on how party organizations become institutionalized. In particular, I examine how and when parties are transformed into organizations that help sustain autocratic rule after the leader has taken power. My theory builds on existing work examining the development of institutions in the shadow of elite conflict. Boix and Svolik (2013) claim that an autocrat will choose to establish power-sharing institutions if regime elites possess a credible threat of rebellion. Similarly, I argue that certain types of leaders will institutionalize their ruling parties in order to alleviate the possibility of elite conflict after coming into power.

I define ruling party institutionalization as instances where an autocrat voluntarily takes actions to limit his personal authority by committing to sharing at least some minimal threshold of benefits with other party elites. Concrete examples of this include naming a second in command or creating procedures for party officials to move up the hierarchy. Party institutionalization is distinct from patronage, which I argue are uncommitted payments that can fluctuate over time. This distinction between party institutionalization versus patronage is similar to Svolik’s comparison between party-based co-optation and transfer-based co-optation. In his analysis, transfers such as cash, subsidies, or redistribution, can easily be distributed without a party. Institutional co-optation, on the other hand, conditions receiving benefits on prior costly service to the party (Svolik 2012, 164).

My conceptualization of party institutionalization also builds on other existing definitions. Huntington (1965) defines party institutionalization as the “process by which parties become established and acquire value and stability” (394). Levitsky (1998, 80) adds a second dimension of “behavioral routinization” to this concept, noting that “[i]nstitutionalization is a process by which actors’ expectations are stabilized around rules and practices...The entrenchment of ‘rules of the game’ tend to narrow actors’ behavioral options by raising the social, psychic, or material costs of breaking those rules.” Drawing from these ideas, I conceptualize party institutionalization in autocracies as organizational durability. An institutionalized party should have the ability to endure as an organization, independent of any particular leader and autonomous of the state bureaucracy. Authoritarian parties are often at risk of being utilized by autocrats as a personal vehicle for acquiring power, rather than serving as a formal venue for collective elite bargaining. As Panebianco (1988, 53) notes, “Institutionalization entails a “routinization of charisma,” a transfer of authority from the leader to the party, and very few charismatic parties survive this transfer.”

1Benefits can be material or non-material. Examples of material benefits include direct monetary transfers or important ministerial posts with large discretionary budgets. Examples of non-material benefits include the creation of procedures or positions that allocate power or influence.
CHAPTER 3. A THEORY OF ENDOGENOUS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

An autocratic leader will institutionalize his ruling party by relinquishing personal authority when doing so reduces the threat of being deposed by other elites. All autocrats face potential challenges from other ruling elites, which often take the form of intra-elite competition over resources and power. In order to manage this competition, autocrats must offer benefits and concessions in order to maintain elite support (Blaydes 2011, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Geddes 2005, Svolik 2012). However, within this bargaining context autocratic leaders often cannot commit to not abusing their “loyal friends” (Magaloni 2008). As Boix and Svolik (2013, 300, emphasis added) effectively summarize: “power-sharing in dictatorships is complicated by a fundamental commitment problem: no independent authority can guarantee that the spoils of joint rule will be divided as the dictator and his or her allies agreed.”

On this front, scholars have identified stochastic shifts in power as one primary cause of commitment problems in bargaining (Fearon 1995, Powell 2006, 2012). Stochastic shifts in the distribution of power between autocratic leaders and regime elites can occur for a myriad of reasons. Some have argued that economic crises, many of which emerge out of exogenous conditions beyond the leader’s control, create serious threats to autocratic rule (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Pepinsky (2009), for instance, links economic crisis and regime survival by examining how the inability of then President Soeharto to respond effectively to the Asian Financial Crisis led to his forced resignation in 1998. Alternatively, historical institutionalists identify critical junctures as periods of significant change, driven by sudden crisis or the exacerbation of existing cleavages along social or economic lines (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Rokkan 1970). Collier and Collier (1991) note that critical junctures can result from external shocks, such as the depression of the 1930s, the debt crisis of the 1980s, an international wave of social protest (such as the Arab Spring), or a war. The end of the civil war in 1917 Mexico, for instance, generated a surge in radical populism, in which the working class and peasantry became organized interests as a direct result of the mobilization of peasant support during the war (Collier and Collier 1991, 196-270). To sum, autocrats frequently face idiosyncratic shocks to the stability of their rule. As a result, leaders who are especially susceptible to unstable rule have an incentive to construct a mechanism that transfers benefits to elites in a predictable manner.

I argue that institutionalized parties provide a mechanism that regularizes transfers by facilitating binding commitments over time. Importantly, institutionalized parties can perform this function regardless of the distribution of power at that particular time period. Party institutionalization ensures that elites will receive their agreed upon share of benefits, regardless of whether times are good or bad. This claim expands on existing models that portray institutions as power-sharing devices. These studies either model institutional strength as an exogenous parameter (Besley and Persson 2010) or articulate conditions under which an autocrat would bring regime allies into a fully institutionalized power-sharing agreement by perfectly revealing asymmetric information (Boix and Svolik 2013, Dal Bo and Powell 2009). By contrast, my model allows for varying degrees of party institutionalization that alleviate commitment problems resulting from stochastic shifts in power.
Although institutionalized parties promote stable rule, party institutionalization entails a high distributional cost in that the autocrat commits to sharing a set division of benefits with other elites as long as he stays in power. By voluntarily binding his hands, the leader constrains his own ability to make arbitrary decisions about how much to share with other elites in the future. This is true even if the distribution of power shifts, and other elites become less powerful. Party institutionalization essentially functions to smooth the consumption function of other elites, in light of stochastic shifts in the distribution of power. As a consequence, if a leader chooses any level of institutionalization, he commits himself to distributing benefits to other elites even in periods where he otherwise would not have needed to do so in order to remain in power.

Another notable feature of party institutionalization is that it is very difficult to reverse, thus the autocrat incurs the cost of institutionalizing in all future periods. Because actions such as creating set procedures for party promotions carves out benefits for elites in a very observable manner, institutionalization creates the expectation that such benefits will be available to elites within the party in the future. This argument echoes a number of existing studies that have considered the value of publicly observable institutions as coordination devices.\cite{Albertus and Menaldo 2012 282}, for instance, note that “Autocratic constitution[s] allow the members of the launching organization to coordinate to sanction a dictator by serving as a focal point.” Similarly,\cite Hadfield and Weingast 2013 4} argue that constitutions reduce ambiguity, helping people coordinate their enforcement behavior around a similar set of beliefs. This argument is also related to Fearon’s (2011) idea of a self enforcing democracy, whereby elections provide citizens with a commonly understood set of rules and procedures that allow them to credibly threaten to protest if the leader suspends elections or commits blatant electoral fraud. Extending this logic, I argue that doling out benefits that are very publicly observable tend to be non-retractable because attempting to retract them comes at a high audience cost to the autocrat.

Building on these studies, I assume in my model that party institutionalization is de facto irreversible. Trying to reverse such an action, though not technically impossible, can be extremely costly for the incumbent because it may cause party elites to defect, or worse rebel against the regime. For instance, many scholars note that one of the main precipitating events of the Mexican Revolution in 1910 occurred when autocrat Porfirio Diaz made a public announcement that he was going to retire and allow other candidates to run for president. He reneged on this promise and ran for reelection against a popular politician, Francisco Madero. When it became clear that Diaz had rigged the elections, other elites banded with Madero and agreed to take part in the rebellion against Diaz.\cite{Dell 2012 Knight 1986}. The next section of the paper formalizes the logic of party institutionalization in a game-theoretic model.
3.3 A Theoretical Model

Consider an infinite horizon setting where an incumbent autocrat and party elites want to divide a continuous flow of (non-material and material) benefits. The key decision is whether the autocrat wants to institutionalize the party, and if so, how much to institutionalize it. I am primarily interested in examining the relationship between party institutionalization and the distribution of power between the autocrat and other party elites.

The central tradeoff of this model is the following: the more benefits the autocrat guarantees for the party, the less likely other party elites will try to depose him. Therefore, institutionalizing the party helps the autocrat stay in power. However, the more the autocrat guarantees for the party, the less of the benefits he can consume himself. In other words, if the autocrat institutionalizes the party, he gets to keep a smaller piece of a bigger pie for more periods. If the autocrat does not institutionalize the party, he gets to keep more of the pie for fewer rounds because party elites will try to depose him more frequently.

Formally, imagine a two player, infinite horizon stochastic game in which an Autocrat (A) and a coalition of Party Elites (P) divide a flow of benefits or a flow of “pies” normalized to size 1. In every period, A offers $x_t$ to P, who can accept the division or reject it. If P accepts A’s offer in that period, then A and P receive payoffs of $1 - x_t$ and $x_t$, respectively, and A remains in power. The game continues onto the next period, and A makes a new offer.

Alternatively, P can also reject A’s offer and remove his support of A. If P removes his support of A, then a period of conflict ensues and A faces a positive probability of being removed from power. Specifically, if P rejects A’s offer, then A will be deposed with probability $p_t$, which varies stochastically in each round. $p_t$ is uniformly distributed on $[0, \bar{p}]$ such that $\bar{p} < 1$, thus the mean $p_m$ is strictly less than $\frac{1}{2}$.

A period of conflict ends strategic decision-making in the game, and the winner receives all future benefits. However, if fighting occurs, then neither player consumes in the conflict period, thus fighting is costly. Both players have a common discount factor denoted as $\beta$.

Commitment problems arise when A cannot pay P enough to maintain his support in the current round because A is constrained by the fact that he cannot credibly commit to honor future promises to P.

A can decide at the beginning of the game whether he wants to institutionalize the party. What institutionalization means in this model is that A will choose an amount $g \in [0, 1]$ that he will always give away in every period. Critically, once A chooses $g$, he cannot “undo” this distribution in the future - even in periods where P is very weak and A would not have otherwise given him a piece of the pie. In other words, in this game, the autocrat

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Footnote:

2I treat the coalition of party elites (P) as one player in this model.
endogenously chooses a floor for the offers, and we can think of \( g \) as the fraction of the pie that the autocrat relinquishes control over. If A sets \( g = 0 \), we can interpret this as the absence of any party or as the party not being institutionalized at all.

The game proceeds as following.

1. A selects \( g \in [0, 1] \). \( g \) will be given to P in every peaceful period, regardless of what \( p_t \) is in that period.

2. If no fighting has occurred in previous periods, Nature picks \( p_t \), and this is observed by both players.

3. A makes an offer \( x_t \in [g, 1] \) to P.

4. P chooses to accept or reject the offer.
   a) If P accepts, then P receives \( x_t \) and A receives \( 1 - x_t \). The game starts over from step 2. Note that A only picks \( g \) once at the beginning of the game, and this is implemented forever. Also note that \( g \) is not subscripted because it is constant in every period.
   b) If P rejects the offer and removes his support for A, a period of conflict ensues. A will be deposed with probability \( p_t \) and remain in power with probability \( 1 - p_t \). If A is deposed then he gets nothing for all future periods, and P consumes the entire pie for all future periods, beginning in the next period. If A is not deposed, then A consumes the entire pie for all future periods, beginning in the next period, and P gets nothing for all future periods.

### 3.3.1 No Institutionalization

The following two subsections establish the main results of the model, focusing on key intuitions. I restrict my attention to pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria. Proofs of the propositions are in the Appendix.

First I show that if \( \bar{\rho} \) is sufficiently low, then A will not institutionalize. In other words, if P is generally very weak, then commitment problems will never occur and A does not need to set \( g \) greater than 0.

To see this, we work backwards, starting at the last node of the stage game. In order to buy P off, A must make an offer that satisfies P’s peaceful participation constraint. P will accept an offer, \( x_t \), if his expected utility of accepting an offer is at least as great as his expected utility of rejecting an offer. P’s expected utility of rejecting an offer is equivalent to the probability that A will be deposed after a period of conflict, discounted by \( \beta \), multiplied by
the reward of getting the entire pie forever if A were to be deposed. P’s expected utility of accepting an offer is the per-period offer $x_t$ plus his continuation value, denoted as $V_P(p_t)$.

$$E[U_P(\text{reject})] \leq E[U_P(\text{accept})]$$

$$\frac{p_t\beta}{1-\beta} \leq x_t + V_P(p_t)$$

First, assume that there exists some $x_t$ that can always solve P’s participation constraint such that P is indifferent between rejecting the offer and accepting $x_t$ in this period. Importantly, $x_t$ can always meet this constraint when $g = 0$.

Second, in a peaceful equilibrium, P’s continuation value in the current period is the value of fighting in the next period because A will always make P indifferent between rejecting and accepting an offer. P’s continuation value therefore, is equivalent to the average expected utility of fighting. Recalling that $p_m$ denotes the mean of the distribution of $p_t$, it must be the case that $V_P(p_t) = \frac{p_m\beta^2}{1-\beta}$.

Plugging $V_P(p_t)$ into the equation above, we see that A must make the following offer $x_t^*$ to induce a peaceful equilibrium where P is willing to accept A’s offer rather than fight in this period.

$$\frac{p_t\beta}{1-\beta} \leq x_t^* + \frac{p_m\beta^2}{1-\beta}$$

$$x_t^* = \max\{0, [p_t - p_m\beta] \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\}$$

(3.1)

Notice that if $\bar{p}$ or $\beta$ are sufficiently high, then the offer $x_t^*$ can actually be negative. That is, if P is very strong on average but happens to get a low draw of $p_t$ in the current round, then he would actually be willing to pay A in order to keep playing the game in hopes of getting a higher draw of $p_t$ in the next round. Therefore, we must limit $x_t^*$ to non-negative offers.

The most A can offer P is the entire pie in that round. Therefore if $[p_t - p_m\beta] \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \leq 1$ is always true, then peaceful bargaining can always be sustained without institutionalization. This will be true when $\bar{p}$ is sufficiently low - specifically when $\bar{p} \leq \bar{p}_L \equiv \frac{2(1-\beta)}{\beta(2-\beta)}$.

**Proposition 3.3.1 (No Institutionalization).** When $\bar{p} \leq \bar{p}_L$ a commitment problem never exists and peaceful bargaining can be maintained without any party institutionalization. For
all $\bar{p} \in [0, \bar{p}_L]$, there exists $x_t \leq 1$ such that $E[U_P(\text{reject})] \leq E[U_P(\text{accept})]$. In other words, an autocrat who faces, on average, a very low probability of being deposed will not institutionalize the party.

Equation (3.1) highlights why commitment problems can occur in this bargaining game. If $[p_t - p_m\beta] \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}$ is greater than 1 given the current draw of $p_t$, then A will never be able to make an offer that P will be willing to accept. This is because A can only offer a maximum amount of 1 in any individual period, and he cannot credibly commit to honoring future promises to P. To see why, assume that in the next period, Nature draws a low enough $p_t$, such that equation (3.1) can be satisfied with an offer strictly less than 1. A knows that in that if that is the case, then P would prefer to accept an offer strictly less than 1, even though A would be reneging on a “future promise” he had made in the previous round.

### 3.3.2 Party Institutionalization

Now assume that $\bar{p} > \bar{p}_L$ and commitment problems will occur in the absence of party institutionalization. In other words, A will not be able to always make an offer $x_t^* \geq [p_t - p_m\beta] \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}$ if $g = 0$. Again we begin our analysis at the last node of the stage game. In order to make an offer $x_t$ that P will be willing to accept, A must satisfy P’s participation constraint.

$$\frac{p_t\beta}{1-\beta} \leq x_t + V_P(p_t)$$

To determine P’s continuation value, $V_P(p_t)$, we break the distribution of $p_t$ into three cases.

**Definition 3.3.1.** Define $\tilde{p}$ as the exact draw of $p_t$ that leaves P indifferent between accepting $x_t = g$ and rejecting.

The interval $[0, \tilde{p}]$ defines draws of $p_t$ for which P will be satisfied with receiving $x_t = g$. In fact, when $p_t$ is strictly less than $\tilde{p}$, A is overpaying P by offering $g$.

**Definition 3.3.2.** Define $\hat{p}$ as the exact draw of $p_t$ that leaves P indifferent between accepting $x_t = 1$ and rejecting.

The interval $(\tilde{p}, \hat{p})$ defines draws of $p_t$ for which A will need to pay P some $x(p_t) > g$ that exactly fulfills P’s participation constraint. Note that $x(p_t)$ some a function of $p_t$ to be determined.

On the other hand, if $p_t \in (\hat{p}, \bar{p})$, then A will never be able to make an offer $x_t$ that P will be willing to accept. Therefore when $p_t > \hat{p}$, P will always reject any offer $x_t$ and a period of
conflict will ensue. We can now write P’s continuation value by breaking down P’s expected payoffs within each interval.

\[ V_P(p_t) = \begin{cases} 
  g + \beta \int_0^{\tilde{p}} V_P(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{\tilde{p}}, & \text{if } 0 < p_t \leq \hat{p} \\
  x(p_t) + \beta \int_0^{\tilde{p}} V_P(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{\tilde{p}}, & \text{if } \tilde{p} < p_t \leq \hat{p} \\
  \frac{p_t \beta}{1-\beta}, & \text{if } \hat{p} < p_t \leq \bar{p} 
\end{cases} \]

We rewrite the continuation value as an integral.

\[
\int_0^{\tilde{p}} V_P(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{\tilde{p}} = \int_0^{\tilde{p}} \left( g + \beta \int_0^{\tilde{p}} V_P(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{\tilde{p}} \right) \frac{dp_t}{\tilde{p}} \\
+ \int_{\tilde{p}}^{\hat{p}} \left( x(p_t) + \beta \int_0^{\tilde{p}} V_P(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{\tilde{p}} \right) \frac{dp_t}{\tilde{p}} \\
+ \int_{\min\{\hat{p}, \bar{p}\}}^{\hat{p}} \frac{p_t \beta}{1-\beta} \frac{dp_t}{\tilde{p}}
\]

Using Definitions 3.1 and 3.2, we solve for \( \tilde{p}, \hat{p}, x_t^*, \) and \( V_P(p_t) \).

\[
\tilde{p} = \frac{\bar{p}}{\beta} - \frac{\sqrt{\bar{p}^2(1-\beta^2) - 2g\bar{p}(1-\beta)}}{\beta} 
\]

\[
\hat{p} = \frac{(1-g)(1-\beta)}{\beta} + \frac{\bar{p}}{\beta} - \frac{\sqrt{\bar{p}^2(1-\beta^2) - 2g\bar{p}(1-\beta)}}{\beta} 
\]

\[
x_t^* = \frac{p_t \beta}{1-\beta} - \frac{\beta \bar{p}}{1-\beta} + g
\]

\[
\int_0^{\tilde{p}} V_P(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{\tilde{p}} = \frac{\tilde{p}}{1-\beta} - \frac{g}{\beta}
\]

See the Appendix for step by step details.

**Lemma 3.3.1** (Benefits of Institutionalization). *Since \( \hat{p} \) increases as \( g \) increases, the probability of fighting decreases as institutionalization increases. In other words, the interval \([\hat{p}, \bar{p}]\) shrinks as \( g \) increases. Recalling that this is the interval in which \( P \) will never accept any \( x_t \), we conclude that higher levels of party institutionalization shrinks the interval in which a commitment problem is present. Formally, \( \frac{d\hat{p}}{dg} > 0 \).*
Lemma 3.3.2 (Costs of Institutionalization). Since $\tilde{p}$ increases as $g$ increases, institutionalization becomes more costly for $A$ as $g$ rises. In other words, the interval $[0,\tilde{p}]$ in which $P$ would have been willing to accept some other $x_t < g$ widens as $g$ increases. Since this is the interval in which $A$ is overpaying $P$, we conclude that higher levels of party institutionalization result in increasing costs for $A$. Formally, $\frac{dp}{dg} > 0$.

On an intuitive level, it makes sense that $\tilde{p}$ and $\hat{p}$ get pushed up as $g$ increases. As the baseline offer $g$ increases, $A$ needs to offer $P$ a “top up” $x_t > g$ for fewer draws of $p_t$. On the other hand, fighting occurs less in equilibrium as $g$ increases because larger guaranteed divisions of the pie implies that $A$ will be unable to satisfy $P$ for fewer draws of $p_t$.

However, peace comes at an increasing cost to $A$ as $g$ increases. Namely, for every offer $x_t = g$ that is accepted when $p_t \in [0,\tilde{p}]$, $A$ is overpaying $P$ because we have defined $\tilde{p}$ as the draw of $p_t$ in which setting $x_t = g$ perfectly satisfies $P$’s participation constraint.

When will conflict occur in equilibria? Recall that every draw of $p_t$ is bounded above by $\bar{p}$. Therefore conflict will occur when $\bar{p} \geq \hat{p}$. Solving for $\bar{p}$, we get the following:

$$\bar{p} \leq \frac{1 - \beta(1 - g) - \sqrt{(1 - \beta(1 - g))^2 - 2\beta(1 - \beta)(1 - g(2 - g))}}{2\beta} \equiv \bar{p}_M$$

$$\bar{p} \geq \frac{1 - \beta(1 - g) + \sqrt{(1 - \beta(1 - g))^2 - 2\beta(1 - \beta)(1 - g(2 - g))}}{2\beta} \equiv \bar{p}_H$$

The thresholds $\bar{p}_M$ and $\bar{p}_H$ tell us when when conflict will occur. When $\bar{p} \leq \bar{p}_M$ and $\bar{p} \geq \bar{p}_H$, it is the case that $\min\{\hat{p}, \bar{p}\} = \hat{p}$. Conflict can occur in equilibrium because there exists a $\hat{p}$ that is less than $\bar{p}$ in which the maximum possible $x_t = 1$ is necessary to satisfy $P$’s participation constraint.

However, when $\bar{p}_M \leq \bar{p} \leq \bar{p}_H$, it is the case that $\min\{\hat{p}, \bar{p}\} = \bar{p}$. In other words, conflict will never occur when $\bar{p}$ falls within this threshold because $p_t$ will hit its upper bound $\bar{p}$ before it reaches $\hat{p}$.

To understand why $A$ does not set $g$ to fully eliminate conflict for all possible parameter values of $\bar{p}$, we return to our analysis of $\tilde{p}$ and $\hat{p}$. Recall that $p_t \in [0,\bar{p}]$ is defined as the interval over which $P$ will be satisfied with receiving $x_t = g$. $A$ wants to minimize this interval as much as possible because when $p_t$ is strictly less than $\tilde{p}$ $A$ is overpaying $P$. $A$ therefore wants to keep $\tilde{p}$ as low as possible.

Now also recall that when $p_t \in [\hat{p}, \bar{p}]$, $P$ will always reject any offer $x_t$ and a period of conflict will ensue. $A$ wants to minimize this interval as well because conflict is costly. As a result, $A$ wants to push $\hat{p}$ as high as possible.
In light of these contradictory goals, we now observe that \( \frac{\partial \tilde{p}}{\partial g} > \frac{\partial \hat{p}}{\partial g} \) (see Appendix for derivation). This means that given a one unit increase in \( g \), \( \tilde{p} \) increases faster than \( \hat{p} \). In other words, the wasteful interval that \( A \) wants to minimize expands at a faster rate than the conflict interval \( A \) wants to shrink. Institutionalizing the party by increasing \( g \) is thus extremely costly for \( A \).

Now we consider \( A \)'s maximization problem. At the start of the game, \( A \) will pick a \( g \) that will maximize his expected continuation value. We can write out \( A \)'s expected continuation value as the following:

\[
\int_0^{\hat{p}} V_A(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{\hat{p}} = \int_0^{\hat{p}} \left( 1 - g + \beta \int_0^{\hat{p}} V_A(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{\hat{p}} \right) \frac{dp_t}{\hat{p}} + \int_{\min\{\hat{p}, \tilde{p}\}}^{\hat{p}} \left( 1 - x(p_t)^* \right) \frac{dp_t}{1 - \beta \hat{p}}
\]

Denote \( A \)'s expected continuation value as \( V_A^* \) and define \( g^* \) as the optimal level of institutionalization that solves \( A \)'s maximization problem:

\[
g^* = \arg \max_g V_A(g, \tilde{p})^*
\]

In other words, \( A \) will choose an optimal level of \( g \) in order to maximize the payoffs he expects to get for the rest of the game, given that \( p_t \) will fluctuate in every round and keeping in mind that \( \hat{p}, \tilde{p}, \) and \( x(p_t)^* \) are already derived.

**Proposition 3.3.2** (Party Institutionalization). When \( \tilde{p} > \bar{p}_L \), \( A \) will choose the optimal level of \( g^* \) as determined by \( \arg \max_g V_A(g, \tilde{p})^* \). (i) If \( \bar{p}_L \leq \tilde{p} \leq \bar{p}_M \), then \( \min\{\hat{p}, \tilde{p}\} = \hat{p} \). \( A \) will set \( g^* \) at the onset of the game and conflict is possible in equilibrium. (ii) If \( \bar{p}_M \leq \tilde{p} \leq \bar{p}_H \), then \( \min\{\hat{p}, \tilde{p}\} = \tilde{p} \). \( A \) will set \( g^* \) at the onset of the game and conflict will not occur in equilibrium. (iii) If \( \bar{p}_H \leq \tilde{p} \), then then \( \min\{\hat{p}, \tilde{p}\} = \tilde{p} \). \( A \) will set \( g^* \) at the onset of the game and conflict is possible in equilibrium.

### 3.3.3 Comparative Statics

This next section highlights two comparative statics that come out of the model. First, there is a complementary relationship between party institutionalization and autocrat strength. As the autocrat faces a higher probability of being deposed, he will implement higher degrees of institutionalization by choosing a larger \( g \).
Lemma 3.3.3 (Levels of Institutionalization). Since $g^*$ increases as $\bar{p}$ increases, weaker autocrats implement higher levels of party institutionalization. Formally, $\frac{\partial g^*}{\partial \bar{p}} > 0$.

How does party institutionalization affect patronage? Recall that patronage can be thought of as remaining portion of offers that are higher than $g$. Formally, we denote patronage, $\psi_t$, as the following: $\psi_t = x_t^* - g$. Unlike $g$, which stays constant and does not depend on the draw of $p_t$, $\psi_t$ fluctuates from round to round and does depend on the autocrat’s relative strength in that particular round.

Lemma 3.3.4 (Patronage). Since $\psi_t$ decreases as $g$ increases, there will be lower levels of patronage as levels of party institutionalization increase. Formally, $\frac{\partial \psi_t}{\partial g} < 0$.

Party institutionalization and patronage have a inverse relationship. As parties get more institutionalized, elites receive higher proportions of guaranteed benefits, thus eliminating the need to distribute large amounts of patronage. As $g$ increases, $\bar{p}$ gets pushed up, thus shrinking the interval $[\bar{p}, \hat{p}]$ in which $A$ needs to offer additional patronage payments, beyond simply offering $g$. This finding supports existing work arguing that leaders who lack strong institutional mechanisms of distribution will rely much more heavily on the distribution of informal patronage to maintain elite support (Arriola 2009).

3.4 Data and Methods

This next section provides empirical evidence of party institutionalization and tests the relationship between party institutionalization and the leader’s distribution of power. I present original data of constraints on executive power and executive cabinet portfolio allocation in African one-party regimes from 1960-2005. I demonstrate how party institutionalization occurs in autocracies and show that constraints on executive power, such as the creation of formal succession procedures, more closely resemble institutionalization.

Post-independence Africa is an ideal context in which to examine party institutionalization because single-party regimes dominated politics in the majority of newly independent states following European decolonization. In these regimes, the president and ruling party controlled virtually all aspects of the executive, the state, and the constitution. All cabinet ministerial positions were filled by party elites, and state constitutions were frequently drafted by the party central committee and included provisions about the authority of the ruling party over all decision making. Focusing on these single-party regimes, therefore allows me to evaluate the extent to which African leaders institutionalized ruling parties by analyzing data on executive handouts, the establishment of power-sharing positions, and creation of constitutional provisions.³

³Meng (2016a) also details the coding and data collection process.
I collect data on different types of benefits and power-sharing posts, notably the creation of vice presidential and prime minister positions, establishment of constitutional amendments specifying leadership succession procedures, and the assignment of influential ministerial posts. I then establish whether the distribution of these various types of benefits had staying power or if they were easy to rescind by autocrats. Although offering concessions such as top ministerial positions can help autocrats co-opt party elites, I argue that only offers that are difficult to retract should be considered instances of party institutionalization.

In brief, the data show that the establishment of a stable second in command and formalization of succession procedures more closely resembles party institutionalization because such procedures constitute constraints on executive power that are rarely reversed. Once the position of a vice president or prime minister has been established, it is very rare for this position to be subsequently eliminated. Furthermore if it is specified in the constitution that the vice president or prime minister will succeed the president in the event of his death, such amendments are rarely removed once they are implemented.

Conversely, when autocrats assign cabinet minister posts to party elites, these assignments often fluctuate from year to year. For example, presidents frequently distribute economic portfolios to other elites but subsequently take back the portfolio for themselves the following year. In other words, having a ministerial portfolio one year does not guarantee an elite that he will have a ministerial portfolio the following year. The distribution of cabinet positions thus constitutes impermanent transfers from autocrats to other elites that can be retracted at any time.

3.4.1 Dependent Variables

To establish the difference between party institutionalization and patronage, I collect country-level time-series data from 1960-2005 on 37 countries and 42 ruling parties in Sub-Saharan Africa, beginning at independence. My sample includes every yearly observation for which an autocratic country in Sub-Saharan Africa had a ruling party in power. The two requirements necessary to be included in my dataset are that 1.) the country is coded as an authoritarian regime following Cheibub et al. (2010) and 2.) the country is coded as having a ruling party following Beck et al. (2001). My dataset therefore includes multiple authoritarian regime types, such as military, personalist, or one-party, as coded by Geddes et al. (2014), as long as the regime has a ruling party—however weak or strong. Some countries in my dataset include regimes that allowed opposition parties to exist, though elections were not

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4Following existing scholarship on African politics, I consider the following as top ministerial posts: defense, interior, budget, commerce, finance, treasury, economy, agriculture, state/foreign affairs. (See Francois et al. 2012).

5For my coding of autocratic countries, I referred to the Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited dataset (Cheibub et al. 2010), which codes all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa as authoritarian immediately following independence. For my coding of ruling parties, I referred the Database of Political Institutions dataset (Beck et al. 2001) and The Europa World Year Book (Europa Publications 1960-2005)
deemed free or fair. As soon as a country is coded as a democracy by Cheibub et al. (2010), as many African countries democratized in the early 1990s, it drops out of my sample.

To construct my measures of party institutionalization I utilize the The Europa World Year Book (Europa Publications 1960-2005), which has yearly records of all executive posts, ministerial positions, and constitutions for all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. For every party-year observation, I document the name of the president, the name of the vice president or prime minister if one had been designated, the number of ministerial portfolios the president held, and whether the president held the defense portfolio a top ministerial post. In addition, for every party-year observation I also documented whether the constitution had an amendment outlining a procedure governing presidential succession. By coding yearly data on ruling parties, I am able to observe when parties become more institutionalized according to my various indicators.

I document whether the president created a vice president or prime minister position in the executive. The creation of such a post represents a voluntary shift in power away from the autocrat. Designating a second in command, a very visible national position, casts another elite as a potential foci of power and possible successor to the executive. In fact, we can even think of the act of naming a potential successor as the autocrat solving the collective action problem for other elites as an alternative leader to rally around. In African party-based regimes, most presidential successors were former vice presidents or prime ministers. Under the Union Nationale Camerounaise in Cameroon, for instance, Paul Biya had been the Prime Minister in 1975 under the presidency of Ahmadou Ahidjo before becoming president himself in 1982. To verify that this was indeed the larger pattern in my data, I code the previous positions of presidential successors, conditional on a successful leadership transition.

In addition, I document whether the person in the vice president or prime minister position remains fairly constant over time, or whether the person in this position is rotated very frequently. If, for instance, a president creates a vice president position, but changes the person who fills this position every year, then this would be interpreted as a lower degree of institutionalization compared with a president who creates a vice president position and keeps the same person in the position for the entire term. In order to determine the stability of the second in command position, I create a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the person in the vice president or prime minister position is the same person as the previous year. Cases where this is more frequently true can be interpreted as having higher degrees of party institutionalization.

\[6\] Without exception, the president of the state and president of the ruling party are always the same person in my sample.

\[7\] The defense portfolio is an especially important ministerial position because it represents control of military force, which is often used to overturn autocrats. In fact, coups were the most common method of “exiting office” for presidents in Africa during this time period. As such, defense is the most commonly kept portfolio by the president in my sample. Whether the president delegates this position to someone other than himself is thus of critical significance.
I also analyze the creation of constitutional amendments that specify succession procedures for the executive. [Albertus and Menaldo (2012) 282-284] argue that “Constitutions are one of the key mechanisms whereby the political groups and organizations other than the dictator can codify their rights and interests” and “one key function of autocratic constitutions is to consolidate a new distribution of power.” The creation of such constitutional provisions serves as an important channel through which the status of a party elite can be elevated in a visible and public manner. In fact, the transfer of power from Jomo Kenyatta to Daniel arap Moi during the 1978 presidential succession in Kenya illustrates this mechanism. In 1969, an amendment was added to the Kenyan constitution that read: “If a President dies, or a vacancy otherwise occurs during a President’s period of office, the Vice President becomes interim President for up to 90 days while a successor is elected.” Near the end of Kenyatta’s rule, a faction within the ruling KANU party tried to contest the authority of then vice president Moi on the grounds that he was not a member of the dominant ethnic group. Moi and his supporters were able to effectively dispute their claims by pointing to the policy governing presidential succession outlined in the constitution (Tamarkin 1979, 21-26). To evaluate whether the creation of a constitutional provision is easily retractable, I record the number of times a succession procedure was removed after being formally introduced in the constitution.

I also examine how presidents allocate ministerial cabinet positions and portfolios to party elites. There is a consensus among scholars of African politics that autocrats hand out influential portfolios with discretionary budgets as a common form of patronage. [Arriola (2009, 1347)] argues that “all African leaders have used ministerial appointments to the cabinet as an instrument for managing elite relations.” Similarly, [Kramon and Posner (2012, 9)] assert that presidents in Africa keep themselves in power by granting elites “access to portions of the state in exchange for their loyalty and that of their followers this is done by allocating cabinet positions, with the understanding that the holders of those cabinet positions will use their ministries to enrich themselves.” However, do these sources of patronage have any staying power? In other words, once an autocrat gives away a portfolio to another party elite, can he rescind that portfolio at a later date? To evaluate this, I record the number of portfolios the president kept for himself every year, noting the number of times his collection of portfolios changed throughout his tenure. I also record the number of times the president took back or gave away the Ministry of Defense, the portfolio most commonly kept by executives in my sample.

3.4.2 Independent Variables

For my independent variables, I rely on proxies for the distribution of power between the autocrat and other party elites. To construct these proxies, I examine how the autocrat came to power.

For my first strategy, I focus on autocrats who were pre-independence party leaders and
CHAPTER 3. A THEORY OF ENDOGENOUS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

statesmen. In the two decides prior to independence, a number of pre-independence parties emerged in most African colonies. Within this set of parties that existed prior to independence is a subset of parties that were active independence movements. The leaders of these independence movements tended to be very popular and had large support bases (Boone 2014, Collier 1982, Levitsky and Way 2012, Mamdani 1996). I therefore interpret leaders who were successful in organizing mass independence movements prior to coming into power as strong autocrats. I further distinguish autocrats who led parties that fought independence wars, since scholars have argued that liberation struggles produce leaders with high levels of legitimacy (Huntington 1968, Levitsky and Way 2012). In sum, autocrats who were leaders of independence movements or former rebel group parties serve as proxies for strong autocrats who face, on average, a very low likelihood of being deposed. Conversely, in states where active independence movements did not emerge, high ranking politicians were perceived as part of the colonial bureaucracy. Such politicians essentially inherited their positions of power after decolonization but were not shielded by the same influence and mass following that surrounded independence leaders. I therefore interpret pre-independence statesmen who did not lead mass independence movements as weak autocrats compared to independence leaders.

As an alternative proxy for leader strength, I create a variable documenting whether the autocrat was the founder or first leader of the ruling party, in contrast to an autocrat who took power by succeeding another party leader. The founders of authoritarian parties tend to be highly influential and charismatic leaders, often becoming personalist dictators during their rule (Chehabi and Linz 1998, Panebianco 1988). In fact, over 50 percent of ruling parties failed to survive more than a year past the founder’s death from 1946-2005 (Meng 2016a). Being a founding father of a ruling party, therefore, serves as an additional proxy for strong autocrats. Leaders who came to power as a successor, on the other hand, can be considered weaker autocrats.

In estimating all my models, I employ the following lagged control variables: GDP per capita (from Fearon and Laitin 2003), oil production per capita (from Wimmer et al. 2009), the population size logged (from Fearon and Laitin 2003), and a measure of ethnic fractionalization (from Alesina et al. 2003). I also include the number of years the leader was in power in order to control for survival bias.

3.5 Stylized Facts

Analysis of my data on executive constraints and ministerial portfolios reveals a number of stylized facts. The data suggests that the position of vice president or prime minister is

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8For my coding of independence leaders and pre-independence statesmen, I rely primarily on Morrison (1989).
9These controls are all calculated as the mean value during the time period that particular leader was in power.
often a stepping stone for the presidency. In my sample, 41 percent of presidential successors held the position of vice president or prime minister prior to ascending to the presidency, in contrast with 18 percent who held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs or 12 percent who held the position of Minister of Defense.

Furthermore, once a second in command has been named, this position is rarely abolished. Out of 42 ruling parties, there were only five instances where an autocrat created and filled the position of vice president or prime minister, then subsequently eliminated the post or left it vacant. Conversely, in 32 cases this position was created and kept in place. The data thus supports the notion that creation of a vice president or prime minister position is difficult to retract, hence such actions resemble instances of party institutionalization.

There were 32 parties for which a vice president or prime minister position was created. Conditional on such a position existing, there were only seven cases in which the person in the vice president or prime minister position was the same as the previous year for at least 75 percent of years. Conversely, there were 14 cases in which the person holding the vice president or prime minister position was the same as the previous year for less than half of the years.

There were 16 instances in which a constitutional amendment specifying succession procedures was implemented during the tenure of a ruling party. Again, I find that such protocols tend to be difficult to overturn: out of the 16 cases only four were later removed. 12 out of 42 parties created a constitutional amendment specifying rules for succession and kept this amendment in place. However, the majority of parties in my sample choose not to create formal rules of succession: 26 out of 42 either did not have a constitution or did not have a constitutional amendment detailing who would act as the interim leader in the event of the president’s death. This finding is significant in that it suggests that while the creation of a constitutional succession procedure may be interpreted as an instance of party institutionalization, many autocrats in my sample chose not to institutionalize along this dimension.

While for most party-year observations the president did not keep any portfolios for themselves, a number of leaders did retain control over important ministerial positions (such as the ministry of defense, finance, or the interior) and distributed them to other party elites only when necessary. In the most extreme example, President Omar Bongo of the PDG in Gabon kept nine portfolios for himself in 1977, appropriating 31 percent of available ministerial positions.\[10\] I find that ministerial portfolio allocation, on average, tends to fluctuate from year to year. In 29 out of 42 cases, the collection of ministerial portfolios held by the president changed at least once during the period in which the party was in power. In only

---

\[10\] His portfolios that year included the Ministry of Defense, Information, Post and Telecommunications, Planning, Development and Land Management, National Guidance, Specialized Origins of the Party, Civil Service, Women’s Affairs and People’s Education.
13 of these cases did the set of presidential portfolios not change at all. The distribution of defense portfolios changed hands less, though still somewhat frequently. In 17 out of 42 cases, the president took back the defense portfolio at least once after naming a Minister of Defense. I therefore interpret the distribution of the Defense portfolio as a weaker form of institutionalization.

In sum, the data reveals that naming a second in command or implementing procedures governing presidential succession tend to be reversed much less frequently than the distribution of ministerial cabinet positions. The average number of times a vice president or prime minister position was retracted was 0.1667 per party, and the average number of times a constitution amendment specifying succession procedures was removed was 0.0952 per party. By contrast, presidential portfolios changed an average of 1.6905 times per party and in particular, the defense portfolio was given away or taken back by presidents an average of 0.8571 times per party. I conclude that maintaining a consistent second in command and delegating an independent Minister of Defense can be interpreted as various degrees of de facto party institutionalization. The creation of a constitutional succession procedure, especially one that specifies who would act as the presidential successor, can be interpreted as instances of de jure party institutionalization. In contrast, the allocation of ministerial portfolios, excluding the defense portfolio, should be considered patronage because the distribution of these goods seem more easily retractable.

Drawing from these findings, I produce the following five dependent variables that serve as my primary measures of party institutionalization. Each variable is coded as party-year units and takes the form of a dummy variable.

1. Was a vice president or prime minister named?
2. Was the second in command the same person as the year before?
3. Was there a constitutional amendment specifying the rules of succession?
4. Was there a constitutional amendment specifying who will succeed the president in the case of his death?\(^{11}\)
5. Was there an independent minister of defense?

Moreover, using data on ministerial portfolios, I produce the following three variables as measures of patronage, similarly coded as party-year units.

\(^{11}\)This criterion is essentially a stricter version of the previous indicator. A number of parties created amendments about succession that did not specify who would succeed the president. For example, from 1960-1980, the Constitution of the Ivory Coast included the following provision: “In the case of the death or incapacitation of the President his functions are carried out by a deputy chosen by the National assembly.” A clause specifying that the vice president would be the president’s successor was not added until after 1980.
1. The number of portfolios the president kept.

2. The number of portfolios the president kept, excluding the defense portfolio.

3. The number of total cabinet ministerial positions available, excluding the president, vice president, or prime minister.  

### 3.6 Empirical Analysis

This next section tests my theoretical arguments about the relationship between autocratic strength and party institutionalization using my data on African one-party regimes. My theory predicts that strong autocrats with a low probability of being deposed from power are less likely to pursue strategies of ruling through institutionalized parties. Autocrats without such guarantees, on the other hand, should be more likely to institutionalize their parties as a survival strategy. To evaluate these empirical relationships, I conduct several cross-sectional analyses.

For my regression analysis I collapse my panel data of party-year observations into cross-sectional party-leader observations due to the time-invariant nature of my main explanatory variables. For each observation, I calculate the percentage of years for which the leader implemented a dimension of party institutionalization, specified by my dependent variables. Using this cross-sectional data on 65 party-leader observations, I estimate the following general equation:

\[
\text{party\_institution}_i = \alpha + \beta \text{autocrat\_strength}_i + \gamma X_c + \epsilon_i
\]

where \(\text{party\_institution}_i\) are my measures of party institutionalization for party-leader \(i\). These measures are defined as the percentage of years that a particular indicator of institutionalization was implemented, and each of the five measures are estimated separately. \(\text{autocrat\_strength}_i\) is a set of proxies used to measure the autocrat’s relative strength. \(X_c\) is a set of country specific controls, and \(\epsilon_i\) is an error term.

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report the main results from my regression analysis of party institutionalization. Table 3.1 includes regressions using pre-independence party leader characteristics as my proxies for autocrat strength, and Table 3.2 includes regressions using party successors as my proxy for autocrat strength. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in the parentheses.

---

12I thank Leonardo Arriola for the use of his data on ministerial cabinets.

13For instance, an autocrat that was in power for 20 years and named a vice-president for 10 of those years would score a .50 on the first dimension of institutionalization.
### Table 3.1: Party Institutionalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>second</td>
<td>second</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>succession</td>
<td>succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pre independ</td>
<td>0.324**</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.335</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>-0.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.241)</td>
<td>(0.315)</td>
<td>(0.310)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>movement leader</td>
<td>-0.305**</td>
<td>-0.352**</td>
<td>-0.244</td>
<td>-0.164</td>
<td>0.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.223)</td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td>(0.301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rebel group</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>-0.267</td>
<td>0.353***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.130)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
<td>(0.244)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.092**</td>
<td>0.185***</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oil per capita</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.184*</td>
<td>0.090*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic frac</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>0.381**</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.337)</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
<td>(0.363)</td>
<td>(0.387)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>years in power</td>
<td>-0.013**</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td>-0.255</td>
<td>-0.689</td>
<td>-1.391</td>
<td>-0.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.460)</td>
<td>(0.433)</td>
<td>(0.558)</td>
<td>(0.937)</td>
<td>(0.431)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td>0.237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Robust standard errors clustered by country from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions reported in parentheses. Dependent variables are coded as percentage of years. Main explanatory variables are coded as dummies. This sample includes all party-leader observations in my sample.

I find that strong autocrats who face a very low probability of being deposed are indeed less likely to institutionalize their ruling parties. Leaders of highly influential independence movements - who I argue represent extremely strong autocrats - are significantly less likely to name a stable second in command, as reported in columns (1) and (2). My results show that leaders of pre-independence parties are significantly more likely to name a second in command and keep the same person in that position. However, after controlling for autocrats who were influential independence movement leaders - my proxy for autocrat strength - the effect essentially disappears.

14Recall that the variables pre independ and movement leader are dummy variables denoting whether the party existed prior to independence and whether the autocrat was an influential independence movement leader. The variable movement leader is a subset of the variable pre independ - that is, only a subset of pre-
These patterns also seem to reflect across other dimensions of party institutionalization, namely the creation of a constitutional amendment specifying succession procedures, as reported in columns (3) and (4). The results are not significant, possibly because the majority of the parties in my sample - 26 out of 42 - never created such an amendment in the first place. Interestingly, I also find that leaders of former rebel groups are significantly more likely to delegate the Ministry of Defense to another party elite, rather than keeping the portfolio themselves. As a robustness check, I rerun the regressions on a sub-sample that includes only the founders of ruling parties and the results remain consistent. Results from the founders only sub-sample are reported in the Appendix.

A higher GDP per capita is also associated with higher levels of party institutionalization. In addition, the total number of years an autocrat is able to remain in power is negatively correlated with naming a second in command. This is likely because autocrats who are able to remain in power for extremely long periods of time tend to be highly charismatic leaders and have very little reason to institutionalize a party because their influence allows them to remain in office uncontested.

The relationship between leader strength and party institutionalization is reinforced by my second set of regressions, reported in Table 3.2. I find that autocrats who came to power by succeeding another party leader - who I argue represent weaker leaders - are significantly more likely to have a stable vice president or prime minister. Unlike founders of ruling parties, autocratic successors tend to lack the charisma and influence of their predecessors, thus are more likely to rule through a strategy of party institutionalization. Like the previous results, party institutionalization is positively correlated with GDP per capita and negatively correlated with the number of years an autocrat remains in power.

Next, I also analyze the relationship between party institutionalization and patronage. The comparative statics from my model predict that patronage should decrease as levels of party institutionalization increases. I test this hypotheses by regressing my data on presidential portfolios and ministerial cabinet positions on my indicators of party institutionalization. Table 3.3 reports these results.

I find that presidents who have a second in command by naming a vice president or prime minister are less likely to hold onto ministerial portfolios, as reported in column (1). In fact, presidents of highly institutionalized parties frequently hold no ministerial portfolios during their entire tenure. This result holds when we subtract the defense portfolio from the collection of presidential portfolios held each year, as reported in column (2). Surprisingly however, this inverse relationship is not observed in column (3). Presidents who have a second in command tend also to have larger ministerial cabinets, suggesting that these leaders rely on broader coalitions to stay in power (Arriola 2009). However, presidents who maintain a independence party leaders were influential movement leaders. Because of this, I include movement leader as a control, rather than an interaction term.
### Table 3.2: Party Institutionalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) second</th>
<th>(2) second same</th>
<th>(3) succession</th>
<th>(4) succession</th>
<th>(5) defense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>party successor</td>
<td>0.268***</td>
<td>0.226*</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.046*</td>
<td>0.050**</td>
<td>0.125***</td>
<td>0.213***</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oil per capita</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.187*</td>
<td>0.108*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic frac</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.378*</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.288)</td>
<td>(0.199)</td>
<td>(0.192)</td>
<td>(0.369)</td>
<td>(0.363)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>years in power</td>
<td>-0.008*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.413</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>-0.655</td>
<td>-1.366</td>
<td>-0.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.460)</td>
<td>(0.447)</td>
<td>(0.573)</td>
<td>(0.885)</td>
<td>(0.535)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors clustered by country from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions reported in parentheses. Dependent variables are coded as percentage of years. Main explanatory variable is coded as a dummy. This sample includes all party-leader observations in my sample.

*stable* second in command are more likely to have smaller executive cabinets, suggesting that perhaps the inverse relationship between institutionalization and patronage exists only past a certain threshold of party institutionalization. Unsurprisingly, oil production is positively and significantly correlated with larger executive cabinets, which accords with the intuition that wealthier leaders have access to more resources in which to support patronage-based rule.

### 3.7 Conclusion

This paper presented a theory of endogenous institutional change by addressing the question of why autocrats institutionalize their parties after coming into power and provided insight on the conditions under which institutionalization occurs. Examining party institutionalization as instances where autocrats voluntarily take actions that limit their personal authority, such as establishing constitutional succession procedures, I presented a formal model showing that strong autocrats who face low probabilities of being deposed are less likely to institutionalize...
Table 3.3: Patronage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) pres portfolios</th>
<th>(2) pres portfolios</th>
<th>(3) cabinet positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>second named</td>
<td>-0.935***</td>
<td>-0.489*</td>
<td>6.243***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.332)</td>
<td>(0.263)</td>
<td>(2.068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>second stable</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>-0.190</td>
<td>-3.500**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td>(1.583)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>succession</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.260)</td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
<td>(1.750)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.423)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oil per capita</td>
<td>0.125***</td>
<td>0.081***</td>
<td>0.981**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.401)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>3.182***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.505)</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.461**</td>
<td>0.238</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td>(2.164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>years in power</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.713**</td>
<td>0.772**</td>
<td>-12.277**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.712)</td>
<td>(0.365)</td>
<td>(4.711)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 65 65 49
R-squared 0.291 0.221 0.570

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors clustered by country from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions reported in parentheses. Dependent variables are coded as average per party-leader observation. Main explanatory variables are coded as percentage of years. This sample includes all party-leader observations in my sample.

their ruling parties. Weaker autocrats without such guarantees of stability are more likely to pursue a strategy of party institutionalization because doing so allows them to remain in power for longer periods of time.

Employing original data on portfolio allocations and constraints on executive power in African one-party regimes from 1960-2005, I also examined how party institutionalization occurs on the ground. I introduced new ways of measuring party institutionalization by identifying the distribution of benefits that are not frequently rescinded once they are offered. Using this data, I also presented empirical tests of my hypotheses and find that strong independence leaders were indeed less likely to institutionalize their ruling parties after coming into power.
This paper makes important advancements to studies of party building in autocracies by providing a theory of when and how ruling parties can facilitate binding commitments over time. Most existing studies of authoritarian parties either focus on the formation of authoritarian parties prior to coming to power or take fully institutionalized parties as a given. Very little existing research traces out the organizational development of ruling parties within the first few decades of actually being in power. This paper fills in this crucial gap by providing insight on how some ruling parties develop from infancy to institutionalized organizations. Future research on party building strategies will further enhance our understanding of the origins and development of strong party-based regimes.
3.8 References


Appendix

Solving the Party Elite’s Continuation Value

We solve $V_P(p_t)$ for $\tilde{p}, \hat{p}, x_t^*.$

\[
\int_0^{\tilde{p}} V_P(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{p} = \int_0^{\tilde{p}} \left( g + \beta \int_0^{\tilde{p}} V_P(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{p} \right) \frac{dp_t}{p} \\
+ \int_{\tilde{p}}^{\min\{\hat{p}, \tilde{p}\}} \left( x(p_t) + \beta \int_0^{\hat{p}} V_P(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{p} \right) \frac{dp_t}{p} \\
+ \int_{\min\{\hat{p}, \tilde{p}\}}^{\hat{p}} \frac{p_t \beta}{1 - \beta} \frac{dp_t}{p}
\]

We know that when $\tilde{p} < p_t \leq \hat{p}$, the following indifference condition holds:

\[
x(p_t) + \beta \int_0^{\hat{p}} V_P(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{p} = \frac{p_t \beta}{1 - \beta}
\]

\[
x(p_t) = \frac{p_t \beta}{1 - \beta} - \beta \int_0^{\tilde{p}} V_P(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{p}
\]

We plug $x(p_t)$ into equation (3.2) and see that the second and third lines can be collapsed into one expression.

\[
\int_0^{\tilde{p}} V_P(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{p} = \int_0^{\tilde{p}} \left( g + \beta \int_0^{\tilde{p}} V_P(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{p} \right) \frac{dp_t}{p} \\
+ \int_{\tilde{p}}^{\hat{p}} \frac{p_t \beta}{1 - \beta} \frac{dp_t}{p}
\]

Next, we solve for the outer integrals, keeping in mind that for the double integral in the first line, the $p_t$ term will disappear in all the inner integrals, allowing us to solve the outer
integrals.

$$\left(1 - \frac{\beta \bar{p}}{\bar{p}}\right) \int_{0}^{\bar{p}} V_P(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{\bar{p}} = \frac{g \bar{p}}{\bar{p}} + \frac{\beta}{2 \bar{p}(1 - \beta)} \left(\bar{p}^2 - \tilde{p}^2\right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.3)

Now we also know the following.

When \( p_t = \tilde{p} \), the following indifference condition holds:

$$g + \beta \int_{0}^{\bar{p}} V_P(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{\bar{p}} = \frac{\bar{p} \beta}{1 - \beta}$$ \hspace{1cm} (3.4)

We plug equation (3.4) into equation (3.3) to simplify further.

$$\left(1 - \frac{\beta \bar{p}}{\bar{p}}\right) \left(\tilde{p}V - \frac{g}{\beta}\right) = \frac{g \bar{p}}{\bar{p}} + \frac{\beta V}{2 \bar{p}} \left(\bar{p}^2 - \tilde{p}^2\right)$$

$$\tilde{p}^2(-\beta^2) + \tilde{p}(2(\beta \bar{p} + g(1 - \beta)^2)) - \bar{p}(2g(1 - \beta) + \beta^2) = 0$$

We get the following set of solutions for \( \tilde{p} \):

$$\tilde{p} = \frac{\bar{p}}{\beta} \pm \sqrt{\frac{\bar{p}^2(1 - \beta^2) - 2g \bar{p}(1 - \beta)}{\beta}}$$

We can focus our attention exclusively on the negative square root version of the solution for \( \tilde{p} \). To eliminate the positive square root version of the solution, consider the following. The second term on the RHS of the expression for \( \tilde{p} \) is always positive. Now recall that \( \beta < 1 \), which implies that \( \frac{\beta}{\bar{p}} > \bar{p} \). However, it can’t be the case that \( \bar{p} > \tilde{p} \), so it must be the case that only the negative square root version of the solution makes substantive sense. Thus, we have the following for \( \tilde{p} \):

$$\tilde{p} = \frac{\bar{p}}{\beta} - \sqrt{\frac{\bar{p}^2(1 - \beta^2) - 2g \bar{p}(1 - \beta)}{\beta}}$$

Finally, to solve for \( \hat{p} \), we use the following. When \( p_t = \hat{p} \), the following indifference condition holds:

$$1 + \beta \int_{0}^{\bar{p}} V_P(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{\bar{p}} = \frac{\hat{p} \beta}{1 - \beta}$$
\[ \hat{p} = \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} + (1 - \beta) \int_0^{\hat{p}} V_P(p_t) \frac{dp_t}{\bar{p}} \]  

(3.5)

Combining equations (3.5) and (3.4) gives us the following:

\[ \hat{p} = \frac{(1 - g)(1 - \beta)}{\beta} + \bar{p} \]

Proofs of Propositions

Proof of Proposition 3.1. First we show that when \( \bar{p} \leq \bar{p}_L \), peaceful bargaining can always occur without party institutionalization. A can buy P off as long as \( x^*_t = \max \{ 0, [p_t - p_m \beta] \beta V \} \). We know that \( x_t \) is bounded above by 1 and ignore cases where \( x^*_t = 0 \). Note that \( p_m = \frac{\bar{p}}{2} \). We need to find some threshold for \( \bar{p} \) such that the inequality \( 1 \geq [p_t - p_m \beta] \beta V \) always holds. If the inequality is true for the draw of \( p_t \) that is the largest distance between \( p_t \) and \( p_m \), then the inequality will be true for any draw of \( p_t \). The obvious contenders are 0 or \( \bar{p} \). Because \( p_m \) is weighed by \( \beta \) which is always less than 1, when \( p_t = \bar{p} \), the difference on the LHS of the inequality is largest. Therefore A never faces a commitment problem when \( \bar{p} \leq \bar{p}_L \equiv \frac{2(1-\beta)}{\beta(2-\beta)} \).

Proof of Lemma 3.1. We show that \( \hat{p} \) increases as \( g \) increases.

\[ \frac{\partial \hat{p}}{\partial g} = \left( \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta \sqrt{\bar{p}^2(1 - \beta^2) - 2g\bar{p}(1 - \beta)}} \right) \left( \hat{p} - \sqrt{\bar{p}^2(1 - \beta^2) - 2g\bar{p}(1 - \beta)} \right) \]

\[ \frac{\partial \hat{p}}{\partial g} > 0 \]

Since the expression inside the second parenthesis on RHS is always greater than zero, the partial derivative of \( \hat{p} \) with respect to \( g \) must also be greater than zero.

Proof of Lemma 3.2. We show that \( \bar{p} \) increases as \( g \) increases.

\[ \frac{\partial \bar{p}}{\partial g} = \frac{\bar{p}(1 - \beta)}{\beta \sqrt{\bar{p}^2(1 - \beta^2) - 2g\bar{p}(1 - \beta)}} \]

\[ \frac{\partial \bar{p}}{\partial g} > 0 \]
We show that $\frac{\partial \tilde{p}}{\partial g} > \frac{\partial \hat{p}}{\partial g}$ by showing that $\frac{\partial \tilde{p}}{\partial g} - \frac{\partial \hat{p}}{\partial g} > 0$.

$$\frac{\bar{p}(1 - \beta)}{\beta \sqrt{\bar{p}^2(1 - \beta^2) - 2g\bar{p}(1 - \beta)}} - \left( \frac{\bar{p}(1 - \beta)}{\beta \sqrt{\bar{p}^2(1 - \beta^2) - 2g\bar{p}(1 - \beta)}} - \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} \right) = \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta}$$

**Proof of Lemma 3.4.** We show that $\psi$ decreases as $g$ increases.

$$\frac{\partial \psi}{\partial g} = \frac{-\bar{p}}{\sqrt{\bar{p}^2(1 - \beta^2) - 2g\bar{p}(1 - \beta)}} < 0$$
## Robustness Check: Founders Only subsample

Table 3.4: Dependent Variable: Party Institutionalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) second</th>
<th>(2) second same</th>
<th>(3) succession</th>
<th>(4) succession</th>
<th>(5) defense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pre independ</td>
<td>0.403**</td>
<td>0.378***</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>-0.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td>(0.279)</td>
<td>(0.406)</td>
<td>(0.255)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>movement leader</td>
<td>-0.377***</td>
<td>-0.387***</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td>-0.158</td>
<td>0.384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.257)</td>
<td>(0.342)</td>
<td>(0.234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rebel group</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.206)</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.351)</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.219**</td>
<td>0.255***</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.259*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.164)</td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oil per capita</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
<td>-0.152***</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>-0.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population</td>
<td>0.049</td>
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<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic frac</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.319*</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td>(0.236)</td>
<td>(0.435)</td>
<td>(0.369)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>years in power</td>
<td>-0.016*</td>
<td>-0.011**</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>-0.487</td>
<td>-0.906</td>
<td>-0.691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.646)</td>
<td>(0.463)</td>
<td>(0.695)</td>
<td>(1.142)</td>
<td>(0.623)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 |
R-squared      | 0.263 | 0.576 | 0.155 | 0.183 | 0.335 |

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors clustered by country from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions reported in parentheses. Dependent variables are coded as percentage of years. Main explanatory variables are coded as dummies. This sample includes only leaders who were the founders or first president of the party.
Chapter 4

Armed Conflict and Ruling Party Durability

Abstract

How does a history of armed conflict during party formation shape the organization of autocratic parties once they come into power? Do strong party institutions emerge out of war? This paper evaluates the thesis that parties emerging out of revolutions and independence wars tend to be more durable by examining autocratic ruling parties in Sub-Saharan Africa. My research strategy capitalizes on the wide emergence of political parties that were formed in the pre-independence period, many of which emerged out of independence wars. In contrast with existing theories, I find that pro-independence parties that fought in liberation wars are not more institutionalized along most dimensions compared with parties that lobbied for independence peacefully. Instead, pro-independence parties with a legacy of conflict are significantly more likely to have independent military structures and seem much less susceptible to coups.
4.1 Introduction

Although strong ruling parties have been identified as a crucial source of regime stability in authoritarian regimes, why some parties are stronger than others remains under theorized. Of the existing research, the role of initial conditions in determining later party development has been identified as an important explanatory variable. This paper examines how a history of armed conflict during party formation shapes the organization of autocratic parties once they come into power. Do strong party institutions emerge out of war?

Existing scholarship suggests that parties that originate out of violent conflict have high levels of institutional capacity. Huntington (1968) argues that party-based regimes that emerge out of sustained revolutionary or nationalist struggles are more durable compared with regimes that came into power without such a struggle. Levitsky and Way (2012, 2013) credit strong revolutionary parties as a crucial source of stability for autocratic regimes, claiming that ideologically driven conflict promotes cohesion in ruling elite organizations. Slater (2010) and Smith (2005) argue that elites facing strongly organized opposition or endemic unrest are likely to build strong party institutions to manage such threats. Even scholarship on European state building suggests that interstate conflict can promote the development of strong institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Tilly 1992). As Tilly famously claimed: “War made the state, and the state made war.”

A number of party-based authoritarian regimes that emerged out of revolutionary conflicts in the twentieth century do seem exceptionally persistent. The Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico, for instance, ruled the country as a one-party regime for 83 years, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) remained in power for 74 years. Ruling parties in China, Vietnam, and Cuba have been in power for 66 years, 62 years, and 57 years, and remain in power today. Not only are these regimes long lasting, their parties are generally considered to be strong organizations with high levels of elite cohesion and durable mass linkages. The Communist Party of China (CPP), for instance, has an extensive hierarchical structure, an estimated membership of 82 million people, and has undergone four successful leadership transitions since taking power in 1949 (Shambaugh 2008).

In addition to Communist revolutionary parties, ruling parties that emerged out of anti-colonial wars appear to be long-lived as well. Pro-independence parties that fought liberation wars in Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, seem much more durable than parties originating out of peaceful independence negotiations. Out of the 34 ruling parties that were formed prior to independence, seven fought liberation wars against European colonizers, white minority governments, or occupation by other African states. Of these seven parties, five remain in power today. In contrast, out of the 27 ruling parties that existed prior to independence but did not originate out of violent conflict, only three of those parties remain in power today. In sum, there seems to be strong empirical evidence and theoretical arguments supporting the notion that party-based regimes that emerge out of armed conflict tend to be more durable.
Despite these seemingly clear trends, however, the relationship between armed conflict and party building has not been firmly established. Do parties that originate out of war appear to remain in power for longer periods of time simply because they are attached to regimes that is stronger or more durable? What is the effect of conflict on party organization, independent of other aspects of the regime? In trying to understand how legacies of violence shape the organizational characters of autocratic parties, it is often difficult to untangle the effects of conflict on regime durability from the effects of conflict on party organization. This paper aims to identify the effects of conflict on parties and regimes by examining whether the organizational structure and levels of institutionalization of parties with a legacy of violence are systemically different from autocratic parties without origins in conflict.

This paper tackles these questions by examining the formation and development of party organizations around the independence period in Sub-Saharan Africa. My research strategy takes advantage of the wide emergence of parties that were formed during the period of European colonization in Africa, most of which emerged as nationalist pro-independence movements. Importantly, within these pro-independence organizations, only a subset of parties experienced violent decolonization and fought in independence wars, allowing us to compare nationalist movements that lobbied for independence through peaceful means against nationalist movements that fought for independence through protracted wars.

I employ an original dataset of ruling parties in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960-2005 that includes new indicators of organizational strength and levels of institutionalization. I examine whether parties that fought in independence wars have more hierarchical structures within the party organization and whether rules and procedures governing leadership succession were formalized, allowing me to evaluate the question of whether former rebel group parties are more institutionalized as organizations. In contrast with existing scholarship, I find that parties that fought in independence wars are not more institutionalized along most dimensions. Instead, such parties are significantly more likely to have independent military structures and seem much less susceptible to coups.

This paper seeks to contribute to research on authoritarian regimes, civil conflict, and comparative political institutions in the following ways. First, I advance research on authoritarian regime durability by examining the origins of ruling party strength a topic that has been understudied. A central finding from the recent literature on authoritarian regimes is that ruling parties are an important source of stability in autocracies. Scholars have found that strong ruling parties perform a number of important functions, such as solving commitment problems in elite bargaining (Brownlee 2007, Boix and Svolik 2013, Geddes 1999, Magaloni 2008), channeling benefits of state power to party elites (Slater 2010, Svolik 2012), creating a forum for rents and policy concessions to be distributed (Gandhi 2008, Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). However, why some autocratic parties are stronger than others is a topic that has been understudied. A small group of scholars have examined the origins of strong parties, pointing to the role of armed conflict as an important explanatory variable.
Second, this paper contributes to research on how political institutions develop during and after civil war. Although a number of existing studies have addressed the question of how armed groups are transformed into political parties in the aftermath of civil conflict (de Zeeuw 2007, Manning 2004, Reilly and Nordlund 2008), most of the existing work has focused on mechanisms linking conflict settlement to democratization (Fortna and Huang 2012, Huang 2012). Very little attention has been paid to mechanisms linking conflict settlement to authoritarian rule, and this is a surprising omission, as autocratic governments often come to power through the barrel of the gun. In fact, upon taking power, every former rebel group in postcolonial Africa first ruled as an authoritarian power. This paper, to my knowledge, is the first study that provides systematic evidence on the relationship between armed conflict and parties as organizations. As Blattman and Miguel (2010, 42) note, “we have little systematic quantitative data with which to rigorously judge claims about the evolution of institutions during and after civil wars.”

Finally, this paper advances existing research on comparative political institutions by examining how initial party formation influences later institutional development. Existing theories on how parties form and evolve has centered largely on party systems in industrialized democracies (Aldrich 1995, Sartori 1976), and existing research on parties in developing and nondemocratic countries has focused little on party formation.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines existing theories of conflict and party durability, highlighting areas of potential concern and remaining questions. Section 3 discusses the logic of party building in autocracies. Section 4 explains my empirical approach and presents original data on party organizations in 34 African countries. Section 5 presents my results and provides a discussion of the findings. The final section concludes.

4.2 Theories of Conflict and Party Durability

Existing theories on the origins of strong autocratic parties has focus primarily on the organizational advantages of ruling parties that form as opposition movements, armed groups, or revolutionary movements. These studies generally posit that the conditions under which ruling parties are formed have an effect on later party strength. Smith (2005) argues that autocratic leaders who face organized domestic opposition groups or foreign colonial powers and armies are more likely to build up their own party institutions in order to mobilize their constituencies against external challenges. Similarly, Panebianco (1988) posits that parties that originate as opposition groups tend to develop stronger organizational structures because they lack easy access to public resources during periods of consolidation.

1With the exception of Lyons (2016).
A large body of this scholarship centers on how origins in warfare build strong party institutions. Civil conflict has been credited with creating modern state structures and strong central institutions through territorial expansion and interstate wars in early Europe (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Tilly 1992). Looking specifically at authoritarian regimes in the twentieth century, Huntington (1968) claims that one-party regimes emerging out of revolutions are more stable than systems that come to power after a “brief and easy” struggle. Lyons (2016) examines how civil war termination influences authoritarian rule and proposes several mechanisms linking rebel group victory to a strong post-war authoritarian system. He argues that successful insurgent groups often benefit from high levels of elite solidarity, organizational structures developed during war-time, legitimacy from winning the conflict, and the use of transitional processes (such as post-conflict elections) to consolidate power.

Levitsky and Way (2012, 2013) argue that armed conflict, usually taking the form of revolutionary struggles or independence wars, provide ruling parties with a crucial source of cohesion that facilitates stable autocratic rule. They theorize that violent conflict creates enduring partisan boundaries that provide both a non-material sense of attachment for elites as well as heightened costs of defecting. They also argue that violent struggle creates militarized structures and hierarchies during the war which persist after the party takes power. Moreover, such parties tend to have a strong coercive apparatus that can be used to repress regime opponents. Finally, they theorize that armed conflict produces revolutionary leaders with “extreme legitimacy and unquestioned authority” that can impose unity and cohesion on the party and regime. Through these mechanisms, they argue that parties that originate in conflict are less prone to elite defection.

In contrast with this dominant view, some scholars suggest that organizations that are built for fighting and coming to power are not necessarily well equipped to govern. In his discussion of independence parties in Africa, Welch (1970) asserts that the guerilla style tactics and organization of parties that were engaged in anti-colonial activities became considerably less effective for creating a self-governing state after independence. Zheng (1997) makes a similar case for the CCP in China, arguing that the party’s ability to win a civil war did not automatically suggest that it would be successful in rebuilding the state without further party building. In fact, Lyons (2016) notes that insurgent groups are often violent, fractious, and support all-or-nothing policies - characteristics that make them unlikely candidates for successful peacetime regimes (2-3). As Slater (2010, 52) points out “revolutionary parties tend to fragment once their shared enemy is vanquished especially when that enemy is a departed colonial power, as in Burma or Indonesia.”

In fact, detailed case studies of mass-based independence movements in Africa suggest that even during the height of independence struggles, many organizations were plagued with weak organizational structures. Mulford (1967), who details the creation and organization of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in Zambia argues that the party had “almost no funds and lacked sufficient numbers of able and dedicated prepared to devote
themselves to the laborious task of party organization” (143). Bienen (1970) observes similar organizational weakness in Tanzania, noting that “TANU’s rapid growth into a mass movement in the 1960’s was characterized by an absence of central direction, due largely to the fact that there existed neither a central staff nor a firm base for central finances” (43).

These organizations were also frequently strung together by temporary goals of gaining independence that were soon replaced by challenges of how to distribute patronage and implement power sharing in the new regime. Bienen notes that a central problem facing the Nyerere, the first leader in Tanzania after independence, was that not all party elites from the pre-independence era could be afforded top government positions—a source of dissatisfaction that his opponents could exploit. “It was one thing for TANU to organize and become the dominant national movement; it was quite another to establish an effective government over many small-scale and dispersed communities after independenceovercoming parochialisms for the sake of organizing a national movement is very different from ruling a society” (1970, 43). In sum, these studies cast some doubt on the claim that all revolutionary or pro-independence organizations were strong, well organized, and fully capable of dealing with the challenges of governing postcolonial states.

4.3 Party Building in Authoritarian Regimes

If origins in conflict do not explain the emergence of strong and durable ruling institutions, when and why does party building occur in authoritarian regimes? A growing literature has begun to examine the conditions under which autocratic leaders commit to building strong institutions after taking power. The general consensus is that elites have an incentive to build strong institutions when they face serious threats that challenge their ability to remain in power. Therefore the development of strong institutions is a strategic response through which autocratic leaders endogenously respond to threats.

Boix and Svolik (2013) show through a formal model that an autocrat will construct power-sharing institutions (such as parties or legislatures) only if regime elites can credibly threaten to launch a rebellion against the leader. If a leader has enough resources or coercive capabilities to rule alone or if other regime elites are unable to credibly threaten rebellion as a result of collective actions problems, then the leader never has an incentive to institutionalize joint rule. Slater (2010) argues that ruling elites construct powerful and cohesive ruling parties when they face violent internal contention that seems “endemic and unmanageable.” Such circumstances eliminate collective action problems and allow ruling coalitions to band together and support the ruling party.

Though these studies share a similar logic, Boix and Svolik focus on tensions between an autocratic leader and other regime elites while Slater focuses on tensions between the regime coalition (including the leader) and domestic challengers from outside the regime.
Building on these arguments, I claim that autocratic ruling parties are strengthened when they are institutionalized. Party institutionalization is defined as the creation of set rules and procedures that depersonalize the ways in which an organization is run. Since institutions are especially prone to predation by leaders in autocratic settings, institutionalization strengthens ruling parties by implementing rules, procedures, and structures that promote organizational autonomy and permanence. When we think about the quality of parties in autocratic regimes, the extent to which there are structures and procedures in place to guard against personalist rule and perpetuate the survival of the party organization are of critical importance.

Meng (2016b) argues that institutionalization is the mechanism in which ruling parties can be strengthened because the process requires autocratic leaders to voluntarily bind their own hands by implementing rules, procedures, and structures. In other words, party institutionalization is a costly way for leaders to convince other elites that they will receive a steady stream of benefits in exchange for their support. Institutionalization helps solve underlying commitment problems in elite bargaining by reducing uncertainty about future the distribution of materials resources and power within the party structure.

Consistent with Boix and Svolik (2013), I find that only weak leaders who face high likelihoods of being removed or challenged by other elites have an incentive to institutionalize their ruling parties. Institutionalization is a costly way for leaders to convince other elites that they will receive a steady stream of benefits in exchange for their support. Strong leaders who do not face a credible risk of being deposed can always afford to buy off other elites and do not need to institutionalize their parties to stay in power.

A number of scholars argue that independence wars tend to create strong liberation leaders with high levels of legitimacy and popularity, who have already consolidated their authority by the time they come into power (Boone 2014, Levitsky and Way 2012, Mamdani 1996). In their study of African leaders Bienen and van de Walle (1989) argue that first leaders have a special legitimacy and enjoy mass support during their tenure. Moreover, autocrats who lead independence movements benefit from the prestige they accumulate from the anticolonial struggles.

This logic suggests that we should not expect parties that emerge out of conflict to be highly institutionalized after coming into power because war produces strong leaders. In contrast to Levitsky and Way who view liberation war leaders as a stabilizing force, I argue that the very fact that war and violent struggle often produce leaders with “extreme legitimacy and unquestioned authority” is a serious liability for party building in post-conflict autocracies.
CHAPTER 4. ARMED CONFLICT AND RULING PARTY DURABILITY

4.4 Empirical Approach

I present an empirical test of this argument by examining differences in party organizations that emerged around the independence period in Sub-Saharan Africa. I focus on the wide emergence of nationalist pro-independence parties that were formed during the final decades of colonial rule.

A number of these nationalist parties fought in liberation wars in order to gain independence against European colonizers, white minority governments, or occupation by other African countries. The Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) in Angola and Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) in Mozambique fought against Portuguese colonization and gained independence in 1975. The Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe fought against the white minority government that resulted from mass European settlement, which itself had declared independence from Britain. The South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia fought against occupation by South Africa, following German colonization.

On the other hand, many pro-independence parties did not take up arms to fight in liberation wars. Instead, they took the form of organized opposition groups that pressured for independence. The Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA), for example, was a coalition of pro-independence parties formed in 1946 in French West Africa that lobbied for independence through constitutional negotiations. Each participating French colony also had its own pro-independence party that was a branch of the RDA. Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the leader of the RDA and first president of the Ivory Coast, founded the Parti Democratique de la Cote d’Ivoire (PDCI) in 1946 as a platform to run for seats in the French National Assembly as well as an organization that would mobilize support from the masses. After gaining independence in 1960, the PDCI controlled 100 percent of the seats in the Legislative Assembly, and Houphouet officially declared the Ivory Coast a de facto one party state under the PDCI (Zolberg 1969). Similarly, in 1949 Kwame Nkrumah formed the Convention People’s Party (CPP) in Ghana to campaign for independence from Britain. The CPP developed hundreds of branches in rural villages and towns and obtained mass support for rapid independence. A number of these parties also participated in pre-independence elections (Collier 1982). The CPP, for instance, dominated the Ghanian parliament, obtaining a majority in all pre-independence elections (Austin 1964, Cohen 1970).

By focusing on parties that emerged during the pre-independence period in Africa, I am able to compare parties that lobbied for independence peacefully against parties that fought for independence, while keeping macro-conditions constant.
4.4.1 Data

My sample includes yearly observations from 34 Sub-Saharan African countries from 1960 to 2005. Because I am most interested in explaining the durability of ruling parties in authoritarian regimes, I limit my sample to country-years that are coded as non-democracies. For my coding of autocratic countries, I refer to the Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited dataset (Cheibub et al. 2010), which codes all countries in Sub-Sahara Africa as authoritarian immediately following independence. As soon as a country is coded as a democracy by Cheibub et al. (2010), as many African countries democratized in the early 1990s, it drops out of my sample. My sample is also limited to yearly observations for which an autocratic country in Sub-Saharan Africa had a ruling party in power, which is defined as the party of the executive leader. For my coding of ruling parties, I referred to the Europa Yearly Handbook (Europa Publications), cross-referenced with Beck et al. (2001) and Svolik (2012). Finally, I also restrict my sample to ruling parties that predate independence—that is, every party in my dataset was formed prior to decolonization. To summarize, my sample includes all authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa immediately following independence that had a (already existing) ruling party.

4.4.2 Dependent Variables

My main dependent variable is ruling party institutionalization. Party institutionalization is defined as the degree to which the party organization is governed by impersonal rules and procedures. To operationalize this variable, I collected historical data on executive ministerial positions and state constitutions, for which I had comprehensive records for every country and year in my dataset. From these records, I document the creation of hierarchical positions and implementation of rules and procedures that structured the distribution of power. I argue that these variables can act as measures of party institutionalization due to the tight overlap between party and state in this particular sample of countries.

Single-party regimes in post-independence Africa dominated politics in the majority of newly independent states following European colonization. In these regimes, the president and ruling party controlled virtually all aspects of the executive, the state, and the constitution. Without exception, the president of the state and president of the ruling party were always the same person, and all cabinet ministerial positions were filled by party elites. State constitutions were frequently drafted by the party central committee and included provisions about the authority of the ruling party over all decision making. In the absence of direct cross-sectional time-series data on party organizations during this period, we can exploit the close overlap between party and state to create indirect measures of party institutionalization.

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3If there has never been a transfer of power to another party, then the regime is not considered democratic even if the ruling party participates in elections that are considered competitive. Therefore countries such as Tanzania and Mozambique remain in my dataset for the entire period.

4Detailed coding rules and procedures are discussed in Meng (2016a).
For every party-year observation, I document the name of the president, the name of the vice-president or prime minister if one had been designated. For my first measure of party institutionalization, I record whether a vice president or prime minister position exited and was filled by a party elite. The designation of a “second in command” position represents the creation of a hierarchical structure within the party as well as a distribution of authority to other elites. Designating a second in command, a very visible national position, casts another elite as a potential foci of power and possible successor to the executive. The creation of these positions, therefore, reduces the party’s reliance on a single autocrat and promotes the survival of the organization past the tenure of the first leader.

Additionally, I document whether the person in the vice president or prime minister position remains fairly constant over time, or whether the person in this position is rotated very frequently. If, for instance, a president creates a vice president position, but changes the person who fills this position every year, then this would be interpreted as a lower degree of institutionalization compared with a president who creates a vice president position and keeps the same person in the position for the entire term. In order to determine the stability of the second in command position, I create a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the person in the vice president or prime minister position is the same person as the previous year. Cases where this is more frequently true can be interpreted as having higher degrees of party institutionalization.

I also examine the creation of rules and procedures within constitutions. I record whether a constitutional amendment specifying rules of leadership succession exists. The Kenyan constitutions, for instance, has an amendment that reads: “If a President dies, or a vacancy otherwise occurs during a President’s period of office, the Vice President becomes interim President for up to 90 days while a successor is elected.”

If succession rules do exist, I also distinguish whether the procedures specify who would succeed the president, or if the amendment only provides vague rules about nominating a successor. Unlike the Kenyan constitution, which specifies that the vice president should become the interim president, the constitution of Angola provides guidelines that are much more vague. It states: “In the case of the death, resignation, or permanent incapacity of the president, the Central Committee shall designate from among its members the person who shall provisionally exercise the duties of the president of the Republic.”

Finally, I document whether the president kept the Minister of Defense portfolio for himself for every party-year observation. The defense portfolio is an especially important ministerial position because it represents control of military force, which is often used to overturn autocrats. In fact, coups were the most common way in which African leaders were deposed during this time period. Ghana, for instance, experienced 13 coups from independence through 2005. As such, defense is the most commonly kept portfolio by the president in my sample. Whether the president delegates this position to someone other than himself is thus
of critical significance.

To summarize, my dataset produces the following five indicators that serve as measures of party institutionalization. Each variable is coded as party-year units and takes the form of a dummy variable.

1. **Second named**: Was a vice president or prime minister named?
2. **Second same**: Was the second in command the same person as the year before?
3. **Succession rule (weak)**: Was there a constitutional amendment specifying the rules of succession?
4. **Succession rule (strict)**: Was there a constitutional amendment specifying exactly who would succeed the president in the case of his death?
5. **Independent defense**: Did someone other than the president hold the Defense portfolio?

### 4.4.3 Independent Variables

For my main independent variable, *Rebel Group* is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if the party was a former rebel group that participated in a liberation war and a 0 if the party was formed prior to decolonization but did not partake in armed conflict (non-rebel group party). For my coding of rebel group parties and independence wars, I refer to Clodfelter (1992) and the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch 2002). I refer to the UCDP definition of conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Gleditsch 2002).\(^5\)

As a proxy for leader strength, I document whether the leader was the first post-independence leader of the country. *Founder* is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the leader was the first post-independence leader, and 0 for all successors.

Finally, I consider a number of control variables to account for alternative sources of regime durability. *GDP per capita* and *oil per capita* account for economic factors (both variables are lagged by a year) (from Fearon 2003, Wimmer 2009). Other controls include *population*, the log of population size (from Fearon 2003) and a measure of ethnic fractionalization, *ethnic frac*, (from Alesina 2003) as these variables have been shown to be significant in previous studies of civil wars and coups. I also included the number of years the party was in power, *years in power*, in order to control for survival bias.

---

\(^5\)Countries with rebel group parties include: Angola, Cape Verde, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Countries with non-rebel group parties include: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
4.5 Analysis

Since my main explanatory variables are time-invariant, I collapse my panel data of party-year observations into cross-sectional party-leader observations.\textsuperscript{6} I require that a leader must be in power at least 3 years in order to be included in the analysis.\textsuperscript{7} The resulting cross-sectional dataset has 46 party-leader observations, 13 of which have a rebel group background and 33 of which do not.

\[
\% \text{ years with institutionalization} = \frac{\sum \text{years with institutionalization}}{\sum \text{years in power}} \tag{4.1}
\]

For my measures of party institutionalization that are dummy variables, I calculate the percentage of years for which the leader implemented a dimension of institutionalization. The resulting scores range from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating higher levels of institutionalization. For instance, an autocrat who was in power for 20 years and named a vice-president for 10 of those years would score a .50 on the first dimension of institutionalization. A score of 1 would be interpreted as the leader having a second in command the entire time he was in power, while a score of 0 would be interpreted as the leader never having a second in command the entire time he was in power.

I first conduct simple t-tests on the cross-sectional data to assess average differences in levels of party institutionalization between rebel group parties and non-rebel group parties. Table 4.1 reports mean values of my various measures of party institutionalization for the two groups, as well as the p-value of a difference-in-means test.\textsuperscript{8}

On average, rebel group parties and non-rebel group parties do not appear to differ significantly across the first four dimensions of party institutionalization. In fact, rebel group parties are generally less likely formal policies governing succession, though these differences are not statistically significant. Rebel group parties are significantly more likely to have an independent minister of defense, and the difference between the two groups is quite stark. On average, rebel group parties have an independent minister of defense 93 percent of the years they are in power, while non-rebel parties have an independent minister of defense only 45 percent of the years they are in power.

I then conduct regression analysis using my measures of party institutionalization that allow me to add country and leader specific controls. I estimate the following general equation:

\textsuperscript{6}For my control variables, I take the mean value over the course of the party-leader’s tenure.

\textsuperscript{7}This restriction drops three leaders from my dataset: Armando Guevuza of Mozambique and Hifikepunye Pohamba of Namibia, both of whom had only come into office in 2005, and Abdirashid Shermarke of Somalia who had only been in office for two years before being assassinated in 1969.

\textsuperscript{8}Summary statistics and t-test results are reported for founders versus successor as well as control variables in Appendix Tables 4.4 and 4.5.
Table 4.1: Summary statistics and t-test results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rebel group party</th>
<th>Non- rebel group party</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Second named</td>
<td>.691 ( .118)</td>
<td>.627 (.070)</td>
<td>.646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second same</td>
<td>.510 (.106)</td>
<td>.510 (.060)</td>
<td>.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successor (weak)</td>
<td>.256 (.111)</td>
<td>.328 (.072)</td>
<td>.607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successor (strict)</td>
<td>.135 (0.86)</td>
<td>.199 (.059)</td>
<td>.570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indep Defense</td>
<td>.929 (.044)</td>
<td>.454 (.069)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\textit{party institution}_i = \alpha + \beta \text{rebel group}_i + \theta \text{founder}_i + \gamma X_c + \epsilon_i$

where $\textit{party institution}_i$ is my measure of party institutionalization for party-leader $i$. These measures are calculated using the formula above, and each of the five measures is estimated separately. $\text{rebel group}_i$ is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the party has a rebel group background, and 0 otherwise. $\text{founder}_i$ is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the leader was the first post-independence leader and 0 otherwise. $X_c$ is the set of country specific controls, and $\epsilon_i$ is an error term. Results are reported in Table 4.2.

Models (1) through (8) show that rebel group parties do not appear to be significantly more institutionalized across the first four dimensions of party institutionalization. Rebel group parties are not significantly more likely to name a second in command, such as a vice president or a prime minister, and they are not significantly more likely to keep the person in this position stable. Models (5) through (8) suggest that rebel group parties may in fact be less likely to implement formal succession rules compared with non-rebel group parties, but these results are not statistically significant. Despite not performing significantly better on most dimensions of institutionalization, the most striking result reported in Table 4.2 is that rebel group parties are significantly more likely to maintain independent ministries of defense (models (9) and (10)).

These findings remain consistent over a number of robustness checks. One possible concern is that rebel group parties may start out more institutionalized then gradually become less

---

9 The main results remain robust to demeaning and the inclusion of an interaction term ($\text{rebel group} \ast \text{founder}$).
CHAPTER 4. ARMS CONFLICT AND RULING PARTY DURABILITY

Table 4.2: Dependent Variable = Indicators of Party Institutionalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Second Named</th>
<th>Second Same</th>
<th>Succession (weak)</th>
<th>Succession (strict)</th>
<th>Independent Defense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel group party</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>-.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.128)</td>
<td>(1.153)</td>
<td>(.098)</td>
<td>(.105)</td>
<td>(.147)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.244)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founder</td>
<td>-.275*</td>
<td>-.114</td>
<td>-.178</td>
<td>-.113</td>
<td>-.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.122)</td>
<td>(.170)</td>
<td>(.116)</td>
<td>(.183)</td>
<td>(.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. OLS regression used. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

Institutionalized over time as the “effect” of war fades. Levitsky and Way, for instance, argue that the effects of origins in conflict degrade over time; especially after leaders from the liberation struggles die or cease to dominant the party (2012, 872). Slater similarly claims that parties that serve as “protection pacts” for elites may gradually lose its protective logic if initial threats start to subside (2010, 19). I reran the regressions reported in Table 4.2 on a subsample of the data that includes only the first ten years in which the first post-independence leader was in power (or fewer if the first leader died or was deposed before the ten-year mark). For instance, Jomo Kenyatta served as the first leader of Kenya after independence for 14 years. This subsample would only include the first ten years in which Kenyatta was in power. Maurice Yameogo was the first leader of Burkina Faso after independence, but stepped down from office six years after taking power. This subsample would only include the six years in which Yameogo was in power. Results from these regressions are reported in Appendix Table 4.6. The findings remain consistent for the ten-year subsample. In other words, it appears that rebel group parties are not more institutionalized on most dimensions when they first come into power. Consistent with prior findings, rebel group parties are significantly more likely to maintain an independent minister of defense.

Second, I wanted to ensure that my results were not being driven by differences in colonizer identities or the presence of large European settler populations. I reran the regressions controlling for colonizer identity by creating dummy variables for French, British, and Portuguese colonies (coded from Morrison et al. 1989) as well as the density of European settler populations in 1900 (data from Easterly and Levine forthcoming). The findings, which are reported in Appendix Table 4.7, remain consistent with previous findings. Former British colonies are significantly more likely to have stable second in command positions, complementing existing work arguing that British colonies inherited stronger institutions (Hayek 1960, La Porta et al. 1998, Landes 1998, North et al. 1998). The presence of large European settler populations does not seem to be strongly correlated with party institutionalization.
This provides an interesting contrast to the argument put forth by Acemoglu et al. (2001) who argue that colonies that were dense with European settlers tended to have stronger institutions because the settlers themselves did not want to live under exploitative conditions.

As an additional robustness check, I reran my results on a subsample that dropped all Portuguese colonies. One potential concern is that political activity was heavily repressed under Portuguese rule and all Portuguese colonies had to partake in liberation wars in order to gain independence. Parties in Portugal therefore may be weaker as a result of state weakness or heavy political repression. The results, reported in Appendix Table 4.8, remain consistent from before and alleviate the concern that the findings are mainly being driven by Portuguese colonies. In fact, model (3) shows that rebel group parties are significantly less likely to have succession policies in place for the subsample that excludes Portuguese colonies.

Finally, I wanted to know whether the intensity of conflict had an effect on rebel group institutionalization. I reran the main regressions while controlling for the number of rebel groups and duration of war. I counted the number of years that fighting took place, which serves as a proxy for the intensity of fighting. In cases of multiple rebel groups, I also document the number of other groups that fought but did not take power. The Angolan War of Independence, for instance, was carried out by three rebel forces - the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the MPLA, and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). Following negotiations with Portugal and infighting within the three groups, the MPLA took control of the government. The results, reported in Appendix Table 4.9, remain consistent and suggest that there is not a significant relationship between the intensity of conflict and party institutionalization.

4.5.1 Discussion

The empirical analysis reveals that although rebel group parties do not appear to be more institutionalized on most dimensions compared with non-rebel group parties, they are significantly more likely to have an independent minister of defense. In other words, presidents of rebel group parties are significantly more likely to distribute the defense portfolio to elites.

The South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia, for instance, maintained an independent defense minister every single year from the time the party came into power until the end of the dataset in 2005. President Samuel Nujoma, who was in power from independence until 2004, did not simultaneously hold the position of the Minister of Defense at all throughout his 15-year tenure. Moreover, the position of Minister of Defense was held by three different individuals over a period of fifteen years, suggesting some stability in the appointment - the minister holding the defense portfolio was not constantly rotated every year. Similarly, an independent member of ZANU-PF was appointed as the Minister of Defense for 25 out of 26 party-years in Zimbabwe, and President Pereira of PAIGC in Cape
CHAPTER 4. ARMED CONFLICT AND RULING PARTY DURABILITY

Verde never held the position of Minister of Defense during his 14-year tenure.

Non-rebel group parties on the other hand exhibit strikingly different patterns of military authority. While rebel group parties maintained independent Defense Ministers an average of 92 percent of party-years while in power, non-rebel group parties maintained independent defense ministers only 48 percent of party-years while in power. President Dawda Jawara of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) in Gambia, for instance, also served as the Minister of Defense from independence in 1965 until 1992. Similarly, President Hastings Banda of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) held the Defense portfolio his entire tenure, from independence in 1964 until 1993. In sum, autocratic leaders of former rebel group parties seem much more willing to delegate military authority to other party elites. Leaders of pre-independence parties without a history of armed conflict, on the other hand, exhibited much more reluctance in entrusting the Ministry of Defense to other elites.

How should we interpret these differences? On one hand, allowing other elites to serve as the defense minister could simply be a sign of confidence: the leader feels so secure in his position of authority that he does not worry about the possibility of being deposed if he were to delegate military authority to another elite. On the other hand, the distribution of the defense portfolio could represent meaningful power sharing: the leader must institutionalize joint rule in order to decrease the probability of being deposed by dissatisfied elites.

To gain insight into this question, I collect information about the elites who served as Minister of Defense in rebel group parties to assess whether they were influential elites who could pose a credible threat to the leader or whether they were relatives or cronies. Preliminary data collection suggests that elites who served as the Minister of Defense were influential leaders from the liberation wars. Elites who were given the defense portfolio also do not appear to be related to the president.

In Cape Verde for instance, Silvino da Luz was appointed as the Minister of Defense from independence in 1975 until 1981. He had been the commander of the armed wing of the ruling PAIGC and was a ranking committee member of the party who had participated in secret negotiations during the war. Henrique Teles Carreira was appointed as the first Minister of Defense in Angola post-independence and remained in that position throughout the entire tenure of the first president. Carreira had been the head of security during the independence war. In Eritrea, Petros Solomon was appointed as the first defense minister following independence. Solomon had been a leading figure during the armed struggle. He was one of three members of the party’s military committee, the head of the military intelligence unit, and a member of the political bureau of the party’s Central Committee.

Was the strategy of institutionalized power sharing with military elites effective in deterring coup attempts? Were rebel group parties indeed more secure compared with non-rebel group parties? As Roessler (2011) notes coups accounted for almost 60 percent of leadership
removals in postcolonial Africa and posed the greatest threat to incumbent leaders. Using data from Powell and Thyne (2011), I counted the number of failed coup attempts, successful coup attempts, and cumulative (successful and failed) coup attempts for all parties in my sample. I estimate the following equation, maintaining the cross-sectional format:

\[
\text{number of coup attempts}_i = \alpha + \beta \text{rebel group}_i + \theta \text{founder}_i + \gamma \text{X}_c + \epsilon_i
\]

where \( \text{number of coup attempts}_i \) is the total number of coup attempts that took place for party-leader \( i \). \( \text{rebel group}_i \) is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the party has a rebel group background, and 0 otherwise. \( \text{founder}_i \) is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the leader was the first post-independence leader and 0 otherwise. \( \text{X}_c \) is the set of country specific controls, and \( \epsilon_i \) is an error term. Results are reported in Table 4.3.

### Table 4.3: Dependent Variable: Coup Attempts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All attempts</th>
<th>Failed attempts</th>
<th>Successful attempts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel group party</td>
<td>-.389**</td>
<td>-.285*</td>
<td>-.088^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.132)</td>
<td>(.131)</td>
<td>(.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founder</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>-.027</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.161)</td>
<td>(.161)</td>
<td>(.075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. ^p<.10. OLS regression used. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

The results show that rebel group parties are significantly less likely to be deposed by coups, and they are also significantly less likely to face failed coup attempts. In fact, out of the seven rebel group parties, none were ousted from power via coups. If we contrast this against pre-independence parties that did not experience violent decolonization, 16 out of 26 non-rebel group parties were removed from power, following a coup. Every non-rebel group party except for the (BDP) in Botswana and (TANU) in Tanzania faced at least one coup attempt, and many of these parties faced multiple coup attempts. Moreover, rebel group parties faced a total of 3 coup attempts (PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau and Frelimo in Mozambique), while non-rebel group parties faced a total of 157 coup attempts.

### 4.6 Conclusion

This paper considered how a history of armed conflict during party formation shapes the organizational durability of autocratic parties once they come into power. In evaluating
CHAPTER 4. ARMED CONFLICT AND RULING PARTY DURABILITY

existing theories, I aimed to unify literature on authoritarian institutions, civil conflict, and revolutionary regimes—three strands of research that have, in large part, developed independently of each other. My empirical analysis compared parties that fought in independence wars against pre-independence parties without a history of armed conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. I found that rebel group parties do not score better than non-rebel group parties on most dimensions of institutionalization. However, I do find that parties with a legacy of armed conflict are significantly more likely to establish an independent minister of defense and seem much less vulnerable to coup attempts. By introducing new ways to measure various dimensions of party institutionalization, this paper provided a new empirical test of existing theoretical arguments and mechanisms.
4.7 References


Appendix
Summary statistics and t-test results

Table 4.4: Founder versus successor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Founder</th>
<th>Successors</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Second named</td>
<td>.549</td>
<td>.822</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.078)</td>
<td>(.074)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second same</td>
<td>.448</td>
<td>.626</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.068)</td>
<td>(.069)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successor (weak)</td>
<td>.245</td>
<td>.431</td>
<td>0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.066)</td>
<td>(.117)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successor (strict)</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>.290</td>
<td>0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.047)</td>
<td>(.107)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indepth Defense</td>
<td>.618</td>
<td>.504</td>
<td>0.379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.070)</td>
<td>(.116)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary statistics and t-test results

Table 4.5: Control variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rebel group party</th>
<th>Non-rebel group party</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>2.151 (0.623)</td>
<td>1.360 (0.273)</td>
<td>0.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil per capita</td>
<td>0.348 (0.231)</td>
<td>0.018 (0.014)</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>8.791 (0.418)</td>
<td>8.477 (0.157)</td>
<td>0.391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>0.731 (0.034)</td>
<td>0.660 (0.047)</td>
<td>0.411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in power</td>
<td>13.750 (2.209)</td>
<td>14.617 (1.270)</td>
<td>0.731</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The two groups are imbalanced on oil per capita because Angola has a disproportionate amount of oil, relative to all the other countries in the sample. All the regression results are robust to dropping Angola from the analysis, and the two groups are not significantly different (p-value = 0.572) on this variable when we drop Angola.
Robustness Check: Ten year subsample

Table 4.6: Dependent Variable: Party Institutionalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Second Named</th>
<th>Second Same</th>
<th>Succession (weak)</th>
<th>Succession (strict)</th>
<th>Independent Defense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel party</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>-.087</td>
<td>.159</td>
<td>.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.155)</td>
<td>(.159)</td>
<td>(.149)</td>
<td>(.121)</td>
<td>(.154)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Controls? ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔

R-squared 0.026 0.225 0.003 0.312 0.063 0.380 0.047 0.306 0.291 0.337

N 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30

Notes: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. OLS regression used. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Sample includes only the first post-independence leaders and only the first ten years in power (or fewer if the first leader died or was deposed before the ten year mark).
Robustness Check: Controlling for colonizer identity/ settler population

Table 4.7: Dependent Variable: Party Institutionalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Second Named</th>
<th>Second Same</th>
<th>Successor (weak)</th>
<th>Successor (strict)</th>
<th>Independent Defense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel group</td>
<td>.143</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>-.317*</td>
<td>-.121</td>
<td>.572***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founder</td>
<td>-.207^</td>
<td>-.120</td>
<td>-.130</td>
<td>-.139</td>
<td>.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>.258</td>
<td>.242*</td>
<td>.187</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>.724***</td>
<td>.574***</td>
<td>.248^</td>
<td>.168^</td>
<td>.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>.398^</td>
<td>.369*</td>
<td>.531*</td>
<td>.203</td>
<td>-.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlers1900</td>
<td>-.012^</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, ^p<.10. OLS regression used. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
Robustness Check: Dropping all Portuguese colonies

Table 4.8: Dependent Variable: Party Institutionalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Second Named</th>
<th>Second Same</th>
<th>Successor (weak)</th>
<th>Successor (strict)</th>
<th>Independent Defense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel group party</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>-.209*</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>.522***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.187)</td>
<td>(.140)</td>
<td>(.086)</td>
<td>(.084)</td>
<td>(.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founder</td>
<td>-.280^</td>
<td>-.200</td>
<td>-.256^</td>
<td>-.227^</td>
<td>.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.137)</td>
<td>(.121)</td>
<td>(.136)</td>
<td>(.121)</td>
<td>(.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, ^p<.10. OLS regression used. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
Robustness Check: Controlling for conflict intensity

Table 4.9: Dependent Variable: Party Institutionalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Second Named (1)</th>
<th>Second Same (2)</th>
<th>Successor (weak) (3)</th>
<th>Successor (strict) (4)</th>
<th>Independent Defense (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel group party</td>
<td>.288</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>-.072</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>.372**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founder</td>
<td>-.260*</td>
<td>-.174</td>
<td>-.182</td>
<td>-.156</td>
<td>.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict duration</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other rebel groups</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>-.034</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. OLS regression used. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

This project examined autocratic party building in a comparative context. It aimed to contribute to a growing literature on authoritarian rule by providing new theories and data of ruling party durability. In contrast to much of the existing literature, my research shows that strong parties are much more rare than we typically think. Although well-established parties are associated with stable regimes, strong parties tend to emerge out of autocrat weakness. This theory of autocratic party building provides a counterargument to the existing thesis that parties emerging out of revolutions or independence struggles tend to be strong, as war tends to produce strong liberation leaders who have no incentive to tie their own hands after coming into power.

This project makes novel and important contributions to the study of authoritarian institutions in two ways. First, it focuses on the topic of party building and institutional change, addressing the crucial puzzle of *why* some parties are strong organizations - a question that Gehlbach, Sonin, and Svolik (2015) refer to as the “research frontier” in their assessment of the current scholarship on authoritarian institutions. While much of the existing literature has not explored the emergence of party-based regimes, I examine where strong party institutions come from, explicitly acknowledging the fact that party building is an endogenous process.

Second, this project makes a serious attempt not only to generate theories of institutional change but to provide detailed *empirical evidence* of authoritarian party organizations: how they are structured, how they differ across regimes, and how they evolve over time. In their recent review article, Gehlbach et al. also claim that “what is largely missing from the theoretical literature is a *comparative* analysis of institutions” (2015, 27). In other words, they note that existing work has produced abstract models showing how nondemocratic politics and institutions can function in theory but far less research on the empirical realities of authoritarian rule on the ground. Therefore a major contribution of this project is that it provides evidence of how ruling party institutionalization actually occurs and tests these ar-
arguments across multiple cases spanning fifty years. Future research on authoritarian politics should continue to disaggregate institutions from regimes and leaders and consider new ways of measuring and testing arguments about autocratic institutions.