Title
Presidential Cabinet Formation as Leadership Strategy in Asian Democracies

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Lee, Dong Seong

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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2015
DEDICATION

To my parents who have made this journey possible
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Parts of Chapters 2, 3, and 4 have been converted for future publication in the following papers: "Legislative Support Versus Policy Performance: Presidential Power and Cabinet Formation in Asian Democracies" (Chapters 2 and 3), and "Quality of Bureaucracy and Ministerial Choice in Presidential Democracies" (Chapter 4). In each paper, I was the primary author and source of the material used here.
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Presidential Cabinet Formation as Leadership Strategy in Asian Democracies

by

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Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, San Diego, 2015

Professor Samuel Kernell, Chair

This dissertation examines the political and institutional determinants of executive cabinet appointments in the young presidential democracies of East Asia. The researcher develops theories of presidential leadership strategy to explain the variation within countries, across countries, and across ministries in the patterns of cabinet partisanship, focusing on three different dimensions: executive-legislative relations, executive-bureaucracy relations, and executive-ruling party relations. These theories are tested using cabinet-level data from four democracies and an in-depth, minister-level case study of South Korea, where presidents have different incentives to appoint their party
members and professional nonpartisans to the cabinet. The researcher finds that the appointment of professional nonpartisans is more prevalent in high-profile positions and with an increase in presidential influence vis-à-vis the legislature. However, the dominant type of these nonpartisan ministers varies significantly across countries with the nature of the civil service system within the executive branch.
1. The Politics of Presidential Cabinet Formation in Asian Democracies

In 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), a retired general who became a presidential candidate of the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, PD), won the Indonesian presidential election with vice presidential candidate Jusuf Kalla on his ticket. Kalla was a businessman with a strong political base in the largest party, the Golkar Party, in parliament. As a party chairman and a presidential candidate from the PD which was taking only ten percent of legislative seats in the Indonesian Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), Yudhoyono's choice of Kalla was a strategic move to garner political support for his election and post-electoral governance. Once the Yudhoyono-Kalla government was formed, Golkar was soon realigned under the chairmanship of Kalla. With the Golkar chairmanship, Kalla was given the powerful task of hands-on cabinet formation, unusual for a vice president.¹ In 2009, when the PD became the largest party in the parliament after the April general election, Yudhoyono's choice of a vice presidential candidate for the upcoming presidential election was Boediono, a former central bank governor and university lecturer who had no strong independent political base.² With his party being largest in the DPR, Yudhoyono chose a politically weak

¹ Interview with the former Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, in Jakarta, Indonesia, June 17, 2013. The pre-electoral agreement on cabinet formation placed Yudhoyono in charge of the appointment of every post except economy-related ones. Once the Yudhoyono-Kalla government was formed, however, Kalla took an extensive role in the allocation of general posts.
² Indonesia's electoral laws require 25 percent of the votes in legislative elections or 20 percent of the seats in parliament for the president-vice president ticket to be eligible for presidential elections. In 2009, the PD won 26.4 percent of the seats in parliament and SBY need not seek a coalition from other parties. Sources: Horowitz (2013, p. 186); http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/17/the-key-to-understanding-indonesias-upcoming-elections-the-jokowi-effect/
figure as his vice president and started his second term with more leeway on his cabinet formation.

In 2000, Chen Shui-bian won the Taiwanese presidential election as a party leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a major opposition to the long-time dominant Kuomintang (KMT). His election ended decades-long KMT dominance in the presidency but not in the legislature. When Chen took office in May 2000, his party held less than thirty percent of the seats in the Taiwanese legislature (Lifayuan; Legislative Yuan). As one of several accommodative gestures to the majority party, Chen appointed multiple cabinet members from the KMT, including Tang Fei, who once was the Minister of National Defense under the KMT government, as first Premier. Chen's party won the largest share of seats in the legislature after the 2001 general election and Chen's cabinet appointments shifted away from the selection of opposition party members. The improved electoral performances of the president's party helped Chen to have more leverage over cabinet appointments (Wu, 2005). In presidential systems, the head of government and the legislature are separately elected to equal branches, and the former governs without serving at the pleasure of a majority of the latter. Paradoxically, chief executives in this system need to generate broad legislative support for reform programs as they do not necessarily control the legislature. Therefore, copartisans' gaining ground in the legislature allows presidents to exercise prerogatives in making cabinet appointments, less serving for legislative interest.

However, governance has not always proceeded this way. Suharto, Ferdinand Marcos, and Park Chung-hee - these are well-known presidents who led dictatorships in Asia. These regimes were based on restrictions on free and fair competition for legislative
seats after the declaration of martial law and thus heavily imbalanced executive-legislative relations in their respective countries.\(^3\) Under their personal rule, the president's party was simply an electoral vehicle for controlling the legislative branch whose \textit{de facto} role was merely being a rubber stamp for the executive agenda. With legislative checks and balances mostly impeded, presidents could appoint loyal agents to the government who were administratively competent without strong political ambition.\(^4\) The real political challenges for Asian presidents have come after democratization and a series of constitutional reforms that reinstated the legislature as a lawmaking institution representing the public will.

Presidents of new democracies face a variety of challenges. These include consolidating the institutions of democratic rule in order to make democracy "the only game in town" (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 15). Not a few immature democracies gave way to military intervention or dictatorship when faced with political instability and social disorder. In the 1950's and 60's, a short history of "Guided Democracy" in Indonesia and parliamentary democracy in South Korea was followed by decades of military rule in these countries. At the same time, democratic transition may lead presidents to face tough political scenes such as divided government or assertive parliaments on a pathway of democratic development. As Dalton, Shin, and Chu (2008, p. vii) illustrate, presidents in

\(^3\) For example, in Indonesia only two opposition parties were allowed to compete against the president's party, and in Taiwan no opposition was allowed to form a party. In the Philippines and South Korea, the legislature was powerless during the martial law period.

\(^4\) Interview with the former Minister of Mining and Energy and the former Speaker of the DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah; Regional Representative Council), Ginandjar Kartasasmita, in Jakarta, Indonesia, June 13, 2013. During the Suharto's era, the nature of the authoritarian regime needed not accommodate the parliament and most cabinet members had professional background without strong party affiliation. See also Kartasasmita (2013).
Asian new democracies face institutional challenges from the opposition to bring down the government:

In Indonesia, the National Assembly impeached President Abdurrahman Wahid and elected Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri as his successor. In South Korea, the National Assembly impeached President Roh Moo-hyun and suspended his executive powers. In Taiwan and the Philippines, the losers of presidential elections tried to bring down their democratically elected governments ... 

While democratization gave rise to the president of the people, the institutions of democratic rule and political competition also legitimized legislators as significant challengers against the president pursuing his goals. The president may have various reforms programs which now require broad legislative support to realize. On the other hand, he needs to recruit policy experts reliable enough to put his programs above individual political ambitions.

In this dissertation, I examine how democratic institutions of governance affect public policy in developing Asia. There are three main questions that my dissertation will address:

1) How do presidents balance legislative support and policy performance in cabinet formation?

2) What are the appointment mechanisms for executive control of bureaucracy?

3) How do the president's policy incentives shape executive organization?

The rest of this chapter discusses the significance of cabinet formation in the literature of comparative presidential studies and introduces a research puzzle that has not previously

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5 For simplicity and gender balance, I will refer to all presidents in the masculine (he) and all ministers in the feminine (she).
been solved. The main body of the literature on cabinet politics in presidential systems is based on the cases of Latin America. However, cabinet formation patterns in Asia reveal that they are substantively unlike those in Latin America. In Asia, presidential cabinets feature frequent changes in both ministerial portfolios and the proportion of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet, even when the partisan configuration of the cabinet remains stable during the presidential term.

In Chapter 2, I introduce a comparative theory that takes into account institutional and political contexts including the president's copartisan share in the legislature and public opinion. Contrary to the conventional approach, I focus on the balance of power in presidential-legislative relations mainly based on the "internal" strength in the form of copartisan shares in the legislature and the "external" popularity from public support for presidents to explain cabinet formation patterns. My main argument is that presidents favor nonpartisan members (i.e., policy experts without party affiliation) under increasing internal strength and external popularity, which give chief executives leverage vis-à-vis the legislature in making cabinet appointments. In Chapter 3, I empirically test a series of hypotheses derived from my theory, using original data. With the proportion of nonpartisan members in presidential cabinets as a main dependent variable, a dataset records the monthly observation of cabinet formation from twenty-one administrations in four major presidential systems in Asia from their respective years of democratic transition through 2012: Indonesia (1999-2012), the Philippines (1987-2012), South Korea (1988-2012), and Taiwan (1993-2012). In Chapter 4, I address an important subject in public administration: the quality of bureaucracy. The presence of nonpartisan ministers is prevalent in presidential cabinets and should not be neglected. In general,
nonpartisan cabinet members include career bureaucrats, professors, and businessmen. I examine the relationship between the quality of bureaucracy and the appointment of specific types of nonpartisan ministers to discuss how administrative institutions shape presidential incentives to appoint certain types of nonpartisan ministers. In Chapter 5, I examine why and how the types of ministries each feature ministerial appointees with distinct characteristics. Through the in-depth, minister-level analysis of cabinet politics in South Korea, I delve into the systematic relationship between the types of ministers and the types of cabinet posts they receive.

1.1. Why Cabinet Formation in Presidential Systems?

1.1.1. Changing Agenda in Comparative Presidential Studies and Cabinet Appointments

In the 1980s and 90s, one of the main scholarly debates in political science was whether democratic regime type had a systematic impact on government and regime stability. Compared with parliamentary democracies, presidential systems seemed to have inherent problems of undermining government and regime stability due to the constitutional design of the separation of powers (e.g., Linz, 1990, 1994; Mainwaring, 1993; Stepan & Skatch, 1993; Lijphart, 1994; Valenzuela, 1994). Since then, however,

---

6 According to Juan J. Linz (1990, 1994), the incentives of presidents and legislators shaped by the separation of powers make mutual cooperation difficult in presidential systems. First, presidents and legislators are elected in different constituencies, and their goals in office thus will be different. Second, executive governments in presidential systems are not held accountable to a legislative majority, and presidents in minority status may not actively seek legislative support to form a coalition government. Third, without an institutional mechanism of legislative confidence, political parties in presidential systems tend to be less disciplined than in parliamentary systems, and copartisan support for presidents therefore may not be reliable. Fourth, presidents and legislators are not dependent on each other for survival in office, and executive-legislative relations in presidential systems have a nature of mutual independence. Moreover, the governability problems can degenerate into the potential risks of regime instability for presidential democracies; due to weak incentives for mutual cooperation between presidents and legislators, executive governments in minority status are legislatively ineffective and may experience frequent gridlock in
scholars have explicitly disputed and implicitly disproved the general argument of presidentialism as an inferior regime\(^7\) by manifesting a rich variation within presidential systems in the diverse regional contexts. Rather than comparing them with parliamentary systems, comparative presidential scholars focus on the variation across presidential democracies. Among their findings: presidential systems are not all the same and there is a variation in president's constitutional and partisan powers (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997a); the constitutional powers that are granted to popularly elected presidents and their impact vary across semi-presidential countries in and outside Europe (e.g., Elgie, 1999; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Elgie & Moestrup, 2007, 2008; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2010, Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Elgie, Moestrup, & Wu, 2011); the formation of coalition governments is not rare in presidential systems; and the more fragmented the legislature, the more actively presidents seek political cooperation with opposition parties to form a coalition government (Cheibub, Przeworski, & Saiegh, 2004; Cheibub, 2007). The institutional combination of presidential systems with multipartism once caused scholarly concerns about their governability and regime stability (Mainwaring, 1993). Today, scholars discuss the presidential strategic management of multiparty presidential systems (Chaisty, Cheeseman, & Power, 2012), suggesting that the Linzian view of "perils of presidentialism" could be somewhat over-generalized.

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\(^7\) For example, Cheibub (2007) shows that it is not because of the regime type itself that makes presidential democracies more vulnerable to regime breakdown but because of the experience of military dictatorship before democratization that functions as a significant factor.
Given that presidents do actively seek legislative support from opposition parties, what executive resources are available to construct legislative support? For example, Philippine presidents can take advantage of their control over the budgetary process in order to have legislative aids in the policy-making process (Bolongaita, Jr., 1995; de Dios, 1999; Kasuya, 2008). Presidents of Indonesia can use informal institutions such as consultation meetings with party leaders in the legislature to set the agenda and resolve inter-branch issues (Hanan, 2012, pp. 182-188). Among various executive tools granted, cabinet appointments form "a privileged site to study presidential strategies" as their choice in portfolio allocation is driven by their goals and constrained by the scarcity of cabinet posts and the saliency of the appointment process that draws considerable media and public attention (Amorim Neto, 1998, pp. 26-26):

[T]he analysis of presidential policy-making strategies is a difficult exercise because they are hard to observe... Yet we can observe how presidents implement their strategies. In this sense, cabinet appointments constitute a privileged site to study presidential strategies. Every time presidents make a cabinet appointment they are signaling to the political system which interests they are willing to please, how they expect to exercise executive power, and how they plan to relate to the other branches of government...

As Table 1.1 shows, the different types of presidential cabinets in Latin America and Asia mean the formation of coalition governments is not rare in presidential systems. In Latin America, three-fourths of cabinets are formed through such coalition building. In Asia, about 40 percent of executive governments consist of multiparty coalitions. In addition, presidents in former communist countries and Africa are no exception about the

--

8 Chaisty, Cheeseman, and Power (2012) list five key tools, the so-called "presidential toolkit", used to build executive coalitions in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet Union. The five tools include agenda power (legislative powers granted to the president such as decree authority), budgetary prerogatives (control of public spending), cabinet management (distribution of portfolios to alliance members), partisan powers (influence of the president over one or more coalition parties), and informal institutions (a diverse residual category reflecting country-specific historical and cultural factors).
flexible use of cabinet posts to handle a multiparty legislature (e.g., Van de Walle, 2003; Whitmore, 2003; Chabal & Daloz, 2004; Remington, 2006; Bagashka, 2012; Chaisty, Cheeseman, & Power, 2012).

Table 1.1: Number of Cabinets and Number of Types of Cabinets in Latin American and Asian Presidential Democracies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>N of Cabinets</th>
<th>n of Single-Party Majority Cabinets</th>
<th>n of Single-Party Minority Cabinets</th>
<th>n of Coalition Majority Cabinets</th>
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<td>18 (14%)</td>
<td>23 (18%)</td>
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Sources: Amorim Neto (2006, p. 427) and East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.

Notes: The periods of countries may vary. For Latin America, see Amorim Neto (2006, p. 425). For Asia, the figures are from the following periods of four regimes: Indonesia (1999 to 2012), the Philippines (1987 to 2012), South Korea (1988 to 2012), and Taiwan (1993 to 2012). For Taiwan, four cabinets formed under the president-parliamentary system (after 1997) are also included.
1.1.2. Cabinet Formation Patterns and Unanswered Puzzle

The frequent formation of coalition governments in presidential systems, however, does not necessarily denote an equivalent mechanism across all presidential democracies. Moreover, looking into the actual formation process of presidential cabinets may reveal a nuanced and clear variation within the regime. The literature on presidential cabinet formation provides two main points on this. First, scholars have focused on a president's legislative powers as a key factor to determine the composition of the cabinet (e.g., Amorim Neto, 1998, 2006; Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010). According to the constitutional power theory, cabinets under legislatively weak presidents should feature more partisan ministers as they need legislative support in the policy-making process; but cabinets under presidents with extensive lawmaking power will include more nonpartisan ministers because chief executives have weak incentives to build a strong relationship with legislators for policy making.

Second, as empirical evidence to support the theory of cabinet formation, scholars have mainly employed Latin American cases where changes in cabinet formation are driven by changes in the partisan configuration of the government. According to the literature (e.g., Lijphart, 1999, 2012; Amorim Neto, 2002, 2006; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Martinez-Gallardo, 2011, 2012), a new cabinet starts whenever one of the following conditions is met: 1) the inauguration of a newly elected or a re-elected president, or 2) any change in the partisan configuration of the government. For example,

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9 We may need the third criterion for the cases that a president is dismissed from office and a vice president or a prime minister formally inherits the presidency, because a president deceased or was impeached. However, this is rare. In East Asia, there has been only one case in the Philippines where Vice President Arroyo succeeded to the presidency in 2001 when President Estrada stepped down through a successful
in Brazil, the Franco administration started with seven parties (PMDB-PFL-PSDB-PTB-PDT-PT-PSB) joining the government in October 1992 and ended with four parties (PMDB-PFL-PSDB-PP) represented in the government in December 1994 (Amorim Neto, 1998, p. 94). Between the two cabinets, there were three more cabinets formed and dismissed due to changes in the party membership of the government. During the period between the early 1980s and the mid-2000s, about 55 percent of new cabinets in Latin America were formed due to these party membership changes in the government and the rest by presidential elections (Martinez-Gallardo, 2012, pp. 74-75).

Since democratic transition, presidents in Asia also have appointed members of the opposition parties to their cabinets. For example, Presidents Abdurrahman Wahid of Indonesia and Corazon Aquino, Joseph Estrada, and Gloria Arroyo of the Philippines composed their cabinets, particularly at the outset of their terms, with more partisan ministers, facing political challenges (e.g., Timberman, 1991, pp. 169-174; Slater, 2004, pp. 72-74). Some of these presidents filled a majority of their cabinet posts with partisan ministers at the beginning but gradually replaced them with nonpartisan members during their terms, while others maintained the same cabinet composition, even after several cabinet reshuffles, from the beginning to the end of their terms. Yet, there are major differences of cabinet formation patterns in Asia compared with those in Latin America.

impeachment. Another criterion - "a change of more than 50 percent in the identity of individual ministers" - might lead to over-counting a number of new cabinets (e.g., Amorim Neto, 2002, p. 55).

10 For the cases of Estrada and Arroyo, interview with the Director-General of the Liberal Party and former Undersecretary of Education, Jose Luis Gascon, in Manila, the Philippines, May 4, 2013. The dynamics of cabinet politics among these presidents were different though. In Indonesia, the cabinet appointments of Wahid were by and large constrained by the executive's accountability to the legislature. In the Philippines, the cabinet appointments of Aquino were to a large extent driven by the need to fill a political vacuum in lawmaking institutions. The cabinet appointments of Estrada and Arroyo were constrained by institutional threats as they faced serious threats to their holding on to office with the impeachment initiative.
In Figure 1.1, the short and long vertical lines denote the proportions of reshuffling in the cabinet in any given month; and the horizontal dotted line means the shares of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet observed in a monthly sequence. This figure illustrates two distinct features of cabinet formation in Asia: frequent changes in both ministerial portfolios and the share of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet. These changes seem more active in South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines - particularly large-scale reshuffling in South Korea - than in Indonesia, but the latter has also experienced some changes in ministerial portfolios and the share of nonpartisan ministers during the presidential terms.

Figure 1.1: Percentage of Nonpartisan Ministers and Percentage of Cabinet Reshuffling in Asian Presidential Cabinets

*Source: East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.
Note: The percentages of nonpartisan ministers and cabinet reshuffling are month-by-month variations.*
Moreover, while presidential cabinets feature these changes in ministerial portfolios and cabinet composition, changes in the partisan configuration of the government are relatively rare during the fixed terms. Thus far, there have been only three cases of party membership changes in the government during the presidential terms in Asia. In 2001, President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea lost a partner of his coalition government, the United Liberal Democrats (ULD) by its defection. In 2000 and 2005, the Liberal Party (LP) of the Philippines withdrew as a coalition partner from the Estrada government and the Arroyo government, respectively. In sum, presidential cabinets feature frequent changes in both ministerial portfolios and the proportion of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet, even when the partisan configuration of the cabinet remains stable during the presidential terms.

Theoretically, these patterns of cabinet formation in Asia call into question the application of the conventional approach to Asian presidential systems. According to the constitutional power theory, cabinets under legislatively powerful presidents feature more nonpartisan ministers. Then we should see relatively consistent patterns of nonpartisan appointments within one presidential system or administration, because constitutional powers tend to be constant within a country and their reform is also rare. Since democratic transition in major presidential systems in Asia, there has been only one instance, in Taiwan, of any of these countries experiencing a constitutional reform. The patterns of cabinet formation illustrated in Figure 1.1, however, show that the proportions of nonpartisan ministers vary within one presidential system or administration, as well as from one to the next. For example, Presidents Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993) and Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) of South Korea filled a majority of cabinet posts with partisan ministers
at the beginning of the terms but gradually replaced them with nonpartisan members over time during their terms. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia formed his cabinets with clearly different configurations in the first term (2004-2009) and the second term (2009-2014) without any constitutional reform during this period.

Another puzzle is why presidents seem to overhaul their cabinets with frequent changes in ministerial portfolios as well as cabinet composition but try to keep the same partisan configuration of the government. Presidents may want to dismiss cabinet ministers who are incompetent, disloyal to their agendas, or involved in a scandal. However, replacing is not an easy and simple task as it usually takes a substantive amount of time and can be a lengthy process since it requires thorough screening, profile reviews, and multi-level approval. Moreover, frequent substitutions will deplete a pool of talented personnel (e.g., Dewan & Myatt, 2010). These puzzles are beyond existing explanations in the literature on presidential cabinet formation.

1.1.3. A Comparative Approach

In this dissertation, I will attempt to explain why some presidents have frequently changed their cabinet formation during the terms, while others have maintained relatively the same composition, even after several cabinet reshuffles, from the outset to the end of their terms, as well as how presidential cabinet formation affects economic policy making. I will use a comparative approach that examines not only the variation in cabinet formation between countries, but also between the administrations in those countries, focusing in particular on institutional and political contexts.
The four major presidential systems in Asia - Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan - face the same structural issues which for the most part are embedded in presidential systems. Presidents and legislators are independently elected to equal branches of government, with neither having direct control over who holds which office. Presidents may have a variety of reform programs which, nonetheless, will be vetoed if they fail to induce broad legislative support for them. Moreover, chief executives govern with a mandate of the people. When they are strongly supported by the public, they can have para-constitutional prerogatives to go over the heads of legislators by directly appealing to voters. On the contrary, prevalent public grievances and mass protests may become a backdrop to legislative impeachment against presidents, which may force chief executives to leave office. This is no less plausible in the context of new democracies, where political parties have failed to function as an effective mechanism of representing public interest and party systems of electoral competition are characterized as clientelistic.

At the same time, the four countries show some variation in the following aspects of institutional context and development, which should be reflected in presidential-legislative and presidential-bureaucratic relations. First, legislative arrangements in Indonesia and the Philippines are more fragmented than those in South Korea and Taiwan. Second, political parties feature higher fluidity in the Philippines and South Korea than those in Taiwan and Indonesia. Third, South Korea and Taiwan are equipped with more professionalized civil service systems than the Philippines and Indonesia, where bureaucracy is politically more permeable. These common and distinct features rooted

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11 In addition, some kinds of informal institutions in executive-legislative relations are more actively functioning in the Philippines and Indonesia than in South Korea and Taiwan. Informal institutions can be effective in some young democracies, and they seem to be accommodating or complementing rather than
in the four presidential systems will allow me to explain not only the variation in cabinet
formation between countries, but also between the administrations in these countries.

Models of presidential cabinet formation often suggest that there should be a
higher incidence of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet when presidents are granted more
constitutional power (e.g., Amorim Neto, 2006; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Schleiter
& Morgan-Jones, 2009b, 2010; Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010). Yet, if cabinet
formation was related only to presidential constitutional powers, then we would expect to
see such shares of nonpartisans in presidential cabinets be relatively stable within all
presidential democracies. The fact that the proportion of nonpartisan ministers in the
cabinet varies within one presidential system or administration suggests that there should
be conditions of different nature, which co-vary with this cabinet formation pattern. If we
want to understand the dynamics of cabinet politics, it is necessary to seek out potential
explanations for why the real, or perceived, value of a cabinet post in a given institutional,
political, economic, social, or cultural context results in supply and demand incentives, of
varying degrees, for providing and pursuing such political patronage. Therefore, I will
propose a comparative theory that takes into account both institutional and political
contexts that shape incentives of the president and the parties in the legislature, in order
to explain such cabinet formation pattern.

I contend that presidents are more likely to appoint nonpartisan cabinet members
in the context featuring increasing copartisan shares in the legislature, more fragmented
legislative configuration, strong public support for presidents, and the outset of the
presidential term, granted more leverage vis-à-vis the legislature. The president's

subverting or substituting in the operation of formal institutions in the former countries (Helmke &
legislative contingent (i.e., the copartisan share in the legislature) will produce basic supply conditions for a particular cabinet formation process, and the incentives of the parties in the legislature will form demand-side conditions in such process. Yet appointment decisions are not made in a vacuum; the political context may not directly influence the appointment decisions but will generate additional conditions for the real, or perceived, value of a cabinet post. These components of institutional and political contexts - the president's legislative contingent, legislative fragmentation, presidential popularity, and electoral cycle - will allow me to leverage variation both between countries and across the administrations within countries, in order to evaluate the key institutional and political determinants of cabinet formation from a comparative perspective.

I will test my theory of cabinet formation using original cabinet-level data from twenty-one administrations of four Asian democracies that vary in terms of these institutional and political contexts within one presidential system and one administration. Time-series cross-section analysis will provide a comparative look at presidential cabinets across administrations within one presidential system as well as across these four cases. In addition, my analysis will make use of original minister-level data from the same four cases in Asia to assess whether differences in the quality of bureaucracy and presidential-bureaucratic relations have any effect on the proportion of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet who have extensive experience in civil service in their career.

Recently, there have been a growing number of comparative studies of political institutions comparing Asian democracies as an attempt to consolidate case-specific or context-oriented research into theme-oriented research in order to facilitate comparative
analysis across and outside the region (e.g., Hicken & Kasuya, 2003; Rüland, Jürgenmeyer, Nelson, & Ziegenhain, 2005; Reilly, 2006; Dalton, Shin, & Chu, 2008; Hicken & Kuhonta, 2011; Kasuya, 2013a). Yet, no study to date has attempted to systematically analyze cabinet formation patterns in the region. Nor has any study sufficiently considered the potential causal contribution of those components of institutional and political contexts - the president's legislative contingent, legislative fragmentation, presidential popularity, and electoral cycle - to the formation of the government in presidential systems. Therefore, this dissertation will be the first comparative study to systematically compare Asian democracies with a new theoretical approach.

1.2. Organization of the Dissertation

The dissertation will proceed in the following way. In Chapter 2, I introduce the theoretical motivation behind my argument and the relevant literature on which it builds. I first discuss presidential goals and trade-offs underlying in the cabinet formation process. Presidents want to both generate broad legislative support for necessary reform programs and deliver their policy commitments as planned through cabinet appointments, but they find that political clout and administrative loyalty often become a trade-off in the cabinet formation process. Then I introduce a theory of cabinet formation in presidential democracies. I argue that the institutional and political contexts, particularly the president's legislative contingent, legislative fragmentation, presidential popularity, and electoral cycle contribute to variation in cabinet formation in a given presidential system. These variables will affect the supply and demand incentives in the cabinet appointment
process, and result in varying proportions of partisan or nonpartisan ministers in presidential cabinets. There will be a higher incidence of nonpartisan appointments in the cabinet when presidents are backed by more copartisans in the legislature, face more fragmented legislatures, are strongly supported by the public, and are beginning their terms. Under such conditions, presidents are granted more leverage vis-à-vis the legislature, and the perceived value of legislative support to trade with cabinet posts declines, resulting in weaker incentives to appoint partisan ministers from opposition parties.

The theory of cabinet formation is empirically tested with original cabinet-level data in Chapter 3, where I introduce four cases of major presidential systems in Asia - Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan - and describe the patterns in cabinet formation over two decades and across administrations. The selection of cases is based on the commonalities of political history, regional proximity, and institutional structure and the distinct features of institutional context and development. Time-series cross-section analysis will provide a comparative look at how cabinet formation differs at the administration and system levels across democracies of varying conditions of institutional and political contexts and assess the effect of these conditions on the practice of cabinet politics in Asia. In addition, interviews with nearly 40 cabinet members including a current prime minister, a former vice president, and current and former cabinet ministers provide case- or context-specific evidence explaining my statistical findings.

In Chapter 4, I examine the relationship between the appointment of specific types of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet and presidential-bureaucratic relations. Nonpartisan ministers are prevalent in presidential cabinets and generally include career
bureaucrats, professors, and businessmen. I argue that the quality of bureaucracy shapes presidential incentives to appoint different types of nonpartisan ministers to the cabinet. In professional civil service systems, presidents may have delegation problems due to a closed nature of the system but enjoy a sizable pool of talented personnel supplied from bureaucracy; however, in politicized civil service systems, presidents may easily control executive agencies more directly but face a limited pool of qualified personnel within bureaucracy. My argument is empirically tested with original minister-level data including information about over 1200 cabinet ministers from the same cases of four presidential democracies in Asia. A considerable number of nonpartisan cabinet members from South Korea and Taiwan have career records of several years' experience in their professionalized civil service systems, but in Indonesia and the Philippines, where civil service systems are politically more permeable, a majority of nonpartisan ministers have backgrounds in business or academia without experience in bureaucracy.

In Chapter 5, I examine the relationship between the types of ministers and the types of cabinet posts they receive. I argue in Chapter 5 that executive organization reflects the president's policy incentives. In forming a cabinet, presidents will delegate the delivery of policy commitments in the key issue areas to those who are competent and most reliable professional ministers, while they delegate the fulfillment of the administration's political capability, such as responsiveness to the public interest and effective coordination across ministries, to senior politicians or political leaders from their party. I test this argument through the in-depth, minister-level analysis of cabinet appointments in South Korea. In Chapter 6, I conclude with a summary of my dissertation.
References


2. A Theory of Cabinet Formation in Presidential Democracies

What explains the variation in cabinet composition in Asian presidential systems? As examined in Chapter 1, presidential cabinets in Asia feature frequent changes in both ministerial portfolios and the proportion of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet, even when the partisan configuration of the cabinet remains stable during the presidential term. Then, why is the existence of nonpartisan ministers more prevalent in some countries and some administrations in certain periods of time than in others? In this chapter, I introduce a theory of cabinet formation in new democracies that takes into account differences in institutional and political contexts between countries and administrations. Before presenting this theory, I first address presidential goals in office and trade-offs in the cabinet formation process that shape presidents' incentives to form different types of cabinets, enabling us to better understand the observed patterns of cabinet formation in Asian presidential systems.

2.1. Presidential Goals and Cabinet Appointments

Presidents of new democracies face a range of challenges and often address them with executive resources such as cabinet appointments (e.g., Geddes, 1994; Amorim Neto, 2006; Chaisty, Cheeseman, & Power, 2012; Martinez-Gallardo, 2012). On one hand, these challenges include generating broad legislative support for necessary reform programs for the purpose of consolidating the institutions of democratic rule or simply for their political survival in the situations where there is a high level of political uncertainty or regime instability. With diverse issues threatening regime stability - from
great difficulty of putting military forces under civilian control to frequent violence from regional insurgencies - presidents will be pressured to compose their cabinets with representatives from a variety of political persuasions and at least may attempt to secure a clear majority of legislative support for their leadership. In other cases, presidents who have a strong desire to retain office will be motivated to seek out legislative support with their political patronage when they encounter institutional threats such as impeachment. Legislative endorsement to presidents may not always secure a peaceful fixed-term career in office, but presidents with strong legislative support are less likely to be impeached successfully (e.g., Kada, 2002, 2003; Kasuya, 2003, 2006; Pérez-Liñán, 2007). Therefore, presidents occasionally award executive cabinet posts in return for their individual survival when facing such threats.

On another hand, presidents need to recruit policy experts who are reliable enough to put the president's programs above individual political agendas. In other words, chief executives need executive agents that are administrative efficient and politically loyal. In presidential democracies, an executive's ability to keep his promises to the public is important in the eyes of the voters, and the presidential capacity to accomplish their policy agendas tends to be "a necessary condition for a successful presidency" (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997b, p. 399). Therefore, a presidential cabinet should be reflecting "the president's calculations regarding policy and political challenges he might face" (2005, p. 7).
These goals might not exhaust important political objectives that presidents are supposed to embrace in their cabinets,\(^1\) but in this dissertation, I contend as presidents' key objectives that chief executives generally want to have their government and necessary reform programs broadly supported by the legislature and their agendas well implemented in the executive through cabinet appointments.

2.2. Trade-off in Cabinet Appointments

Presidents, pursuing these goals as a single national leader, have dual objectives in cabinet formation: garnering adequate legislative support and delivering their programs as planned. For this reason, presidents will appoint to their cabinets representatives with both political clout and administrative loyalty, but these characteristics often become a trade-off in the cabinet formation process. Amorim Neto (1998, pp. 11-12) discusses a presidential dilemma in cabinet formation to achieve their goals:

Allocation of cabinet posts is a chief resource available to presidents in the accomplishment of the presidential goals. [T]o pass legislation, presidents may make necessary the appointment of some party politicians to the cabinet. [T]o efficiently control the executive branch from above, presidents have to look for individuals personally loyal to them. Yet there may be tradeoffs between these goals. On the one hand, party politicians appointed to the cabinet often have their own agendas, which may collide with that of the president. On the other, should a president appoint mostly trustworthy people to the cabinet, he or she may deplete the latter of the political capital necessary to successfully deal with the legislature. This is a dilemma faced by all presidents when it comes to forming the cabinet.

The studies of party organization and behavior suggest that chief executives in presidential systems engage in different incentive mechanisms than those in

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\(^1\) Among others, one of the most typically and widely sought political objectives is representation in the government. For example, the Indonesian decision-makers tend to pursue harmony in the cabinet by appointing cabinet members from diverse political, regional, religious, and ethnic backgrounds (Interview with the former Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, in Jakarta, Indonesia, June 17, 2013).
parliamentary systems in terms of appointing partisan ministers (e.g., Samuels, 2002; Amorim Neto & Strom, 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009b, 2010; Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Based on the principal-agent approach, these studies argue that the differences in the constitutional design shape the distinct natures of the relationship between legislators and chief executives, which affect the chief executives' incentives to appoint partisan ministers to their cabinets. In parliamentary systems where a single chain of delegation links the voters' choice of parliamentary members to government formation by majority leaders of the parliament, political parties play a central role as an efficient vehicle for screening and selecting cabinet ministers as well as parliamentary candidates (Müller, 2000). As Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2010, p. 1425) point out, the incentive of appointing partisan ministers to the cabinet is compatible with the legislators' aim, because in parliamentary systems "party affiliation ensures that ministers share with the legislators who empowered them the aim of serving the party's electorate and delivering the party's policy commitments as well as the fear of electoral accountability, which may cost their party its ministerial and legislative seats." In presidential systems where chief executives and legislators are separately elected by different constituencies, however, appointing partisan ministers to presidential cabinets may lead to a political tension with chief executives due to mutually incompatible incentives.

According to Samuels and Shugart (2010), the institutional features of separate origin and separate survival paint presidential democracies with a tension between presidents and partisans. Under the separation of origin where presidents and legislators are elected in mutually independent constituencies, they consequently have incongruent voter concerns and campaign strategies. Presidents or presidential candidates whose
electorate is a single national district may try to appeal to broader voter groups even at
the expense of the importance of their party ideology and party organization (Samuels &
Shugart, 2010, p. 171). Hence, different electoral incentives mean inherent tensions
between the two.

Once presidents are in office, the mutual tensions are more likely to be intense
rather than moderate. Under the separation of survival where the president has a fixed-
term tenure, the chief executive is held accountable neither to his own party nor to the
legislature. Given their personal legitimacy and relative autonomy as well as without
such a threat as the parliamentary no-confidence motion, presidents will serve as de facto
party leaders in the governing arena regardless of formal party leadership (Samuels, 2002,
p. 469; Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 201). Since presidents cannot enjoy the same high
level of incentive compatibility through partisan appointments as chief executives in
parliamentary systems, even partisan presidents often combine party members with loyal
nonpartisans in their cabinets (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010, p. 1425).

In the context of Asian presidential systems, the institutionally structured strain
between presidents and partisans is implicitly and explicitly observed. With Indonesia’s
fragmented legislature, presidents of Indonesia have strong incentives to form a
multiparty coalition government but are still likely to limit the number of partisan
ministers in order to recruit policy experts who are qualified for technical ministries. In
the Philippines, where individual members and leaders of political parties tend to put
their personal ambition ahead of their party's policy agenda (Kasuya, 2008, p. 110),
presidents will find more than a certain number of partisan ministers unnecessary for

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2 Interview with former Vice President Jusuf Kalla, in Jakarta, Indonesia, June 17, 2013.
effective governing in normal circumstances. In Taiwan and South Korea, we can more clearly see the presidential governing strategies at the cost of the importance of their party position. In 2000 when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan won the presidential election, President-elect Chen Shui-bian faced a legislature dominated by the opposition Kuomintang (KMT). As an accommodative gesture for the national mandate, Chen appointed Tang Fei, the former Minister of National Defense under the KMT government, as first Premier of the DPP government. Although it was a strategic move that seemed necessary for Chen's effective governing under divided government, his keeping the DPP out of the decision loop upset and frustrated a number of his party members. In 2005, President Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea reached out to the opposition Grand National Party (GNP), which held the second-largest number of seats in the legislature, accounting for slightly over 40 percent. Seeing his party slipping away from a legislative majority due to its violation of election laws, Roh formally proposed the formation of a grand coalition to the GNP. However, Roh’s choice to not discuss this statement initially with his party members put them in the position of convening a posterior national executive committee to form an interparty consensus.

2.3. Literature Review

Presidents have a fixed-term tenure to accomplish their goals, yet they encounter the dual-executive dilemma in their cabinet appointments. How does the chief executive

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3 Interview with Deputy Director of the DPP International Affairs Department, Hsieh Huai-hui, in Taipei, Taiwan, October 8, 2013.
4 Yonhap News, "Reactions from Political Parties" (in Korean), http://search.ytn.co.kr/yn/view.php?s_mcd=0101&key=200507291558008365&q=%EC%97%AC%EC%95%BC%2C+%EB%8C%80%EC%97%B0%EC%A9%95+%EB%B0%98%EC%9D%91 (accessed March 29, 2014).
balance the cabinet to accomplish his goals? What explains the variation of cabinet composition in presidential systems? Why is the existence of nonpartisan ministers more prevalent in some countries and some administrations in certain periods of time than in others?

Much of the existing literature on cabinet politics in presidential systems has focused on the presidential constitutional powers of policy making by linking their policy-making strategies to the incentives to form different types of cabinets (e.g., Amorim Neto, 2006; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009b, 2010; Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010). These studies commonly claim that there is a higher incidence of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet when presidents are granted more powerful authorities. For example, Amorim Neto (2006) argues that in presidential systems, chief executives whose proposals pass through the regular statutory process have strong incentives to appoint more partisan ministers than those who can use executive prerogatives such as decree powers to enact bills, because they need legislative support in the statutory process and thus seek to build a strong relationship with legislative parties. Chief executives who can obtain their policy-making goals in a more unilateral way have no such incentives to appoint partisan ministers in their cabinets. Similarly, Cheibub (2007, p. 62) argues that presidents have weak incentives to seek legislative support if they are granted strong policy-making powers (i.e., a monopoly on important legislative initiatives or veto power), making coalition governments less likely in the circumstances.

In semi-presidential systems where both presidents and legislatures have a say over cabinet appointments, the president's greater influence over cabinet formation tends
to lead to a higher proportion of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Almeida & Cho, 2007; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009b, 2010).

Introducing a model of cabinet selection in semi-presidential systems that is described as a "tug-of-war" between a prime minister and a president, Amorim Neto and Strøm (2006) find that the existence of a legislatively powerful president as well as of a popularly elected president is positively correlated with a share of nonpartisan ministers in semi-presidential cabinets. Proposing a principal-agent account of semi-presidential governments where a president and parliamentary parties are main actors that influence the formation process, Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009b, 2010) argue that presidential influence on government formation increases with presidential constitutional power, which is empirically supported by a rise in the share of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet. In addition, a formal model presented by Almeida and Cho (2007) draws equilibrium cabinets where the stronger the president's power to nominate the prime minister, the higher the share of nonpartisan ministers in semi-presidential governments.

Thus, the share of nonpartisan ministers in presidential cabinets can be viewed as an indicator of presidential leverage over cabinet appointments vis-à-vis the legislature. As Martinez-Gallardo (2005, p.101) points out, a presidential cabinet will reflect "a bargaining equilibrium - a (sometimes explicit) bargain between the president and the parties in the legislature that will, on the one hand, provide the president with the political support necessary for effective policymaking, as well as allowing him to incorporate the expertise that will provide the government with policy credibility and capacity." If the president is powerful enough not to bargain with the parties in the legislature for their support, a high proportion of nonpartisan ministers is more likely in his cabinets.
Therefore, "the participation of a president with substantial powers in the government formation process increases the likelihood that nonpartisans will be appointed to the cabinet" (Almeida & Cho, 2007, p. 5).

However, these studies have problems too. Existing studies of presidential cabinet formation have separated presidential policy-making strategies based on whether presidents are granted executive prerogatives or not. Executive prerogatives such as presidential decrees can be powerful policy-making tools as these constitutional practices allow the chief executive to act unilaterally vis-à-vis the legislature. However, they could be costly and are often seen as only to be used for exceptional cases or specific purposes, because going over the heads of legislators touches on a legitimacy component (Amorim Neto, 2006, pp. 416-420). In response to these provisional measures, the legislature generally has its own ways to amend them or regulate the use of them (Mainwaring, 1997, p. 107). Therefore, although such prerogatives could technically be useful instruments for the chief executive, their actual use may not be as simple and perennial within presidential administrations.

More importantly, the argument based on presidential constitutional powers does not much help to explain the prevailing appointment patterns in Asian presidential systems, where cabinet composition varies within one presidential system or administration, or from one to the next. In democratic political systems, constitutional powers tend to be constant within a country and their reform is also rare. As seen in Table 2.1, since democratic transition in major presidential systems in Asia, there has been only one instance, in Taiwan, of any of these countries experiencing a constitutional reform.
A quick view of Table 2.1 seems to reveal distinct features of presidential constitutional powers across four presidential systems in East Asia. Presidents of South Korea and the Philippines are granted more power in total, while presidents of Indonesia are constitutionally least powerful. However, a deliberate view of the table may give two notable commonalities among these cases, which further undermine the applicability of the conventional approach to Asian presidential systems. First, presidents in these countries have sufficient discretion to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers so that cabinet appointments are perceived to be executive prerogatives.\(^5\) In Taiwan, where semi-presidential institutions were adopted after the 1997 constitutional amendment, the legislature (Legislative Yuan) has a no confidence vote against the premier and the executive branch (Executive Yuan), but the president may dissolve the legislature once such a vote has been cast (Hicken & Kasuya, 2003, p. 126). Thus, the Taiwanese president has a powerful institutional weapon to defend against any legislative attempt to dismiss the cabinet.\(^6\) Second, presidents in all four systems have some policy-making powers that are far from weak. Presidents of South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia are granted powers to issue decrees. Philippine presidents, with their power of the purse, can have their policy programs proposed and enacted in the legislature even without any direct policy-making power (Balongaita, Jr., 1995; de Dios, 1999; Kasuya, 2008).

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\(^5\) In the Philippines, according to the 1987 Constitution, presidential appointment of cabinet ministers requires confirmation by the congressional Commission on Appointments which is composed of 12 Senators, 12 House members, and the Senate President. However, a good number of ministerial appointees have occupied cabinet positions without a final confirmation by the Commission and sometimes presidents do not bother to follow the formal appointment process (Interview with the former Secretary of Education, Edilberto de Jesus, in Manila, the Philippines, April 26, 2013).

\(^6\) Thus far, the institutional weapon to defend the executive branch has been powerful enough to deter legislators from actually attempting to dismiss a cabinet at the cost of their jobs. The similarity in the operation of the Taiwanese system to other Asian presidential democracies makes it comparable with the three other cases in Asia despite its constitutional feature of semi-presidentialism (Personal Conversation with Dr. Yu-Shan Wu at Academia Sinica, October 21, 2013).
Moreover, except in post-1997 Taiwan, these powers have not changed since the democratization of these respective countries. Therefore, at the system level, the formal powers have been static, which do not seem to explain well the prevailing variation patterns in Asian presidential cabinets.

### Table 2.1: Constitutional Powers of Popularly Elected Presidents by Country in East Asia

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<th>South Korea</th>
<th>Taiwan (before 97)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Exclusive Introduction of Legislation</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budgetary Powers</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal of Referenda</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-legislative Powers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Formation</td>
<td>3.5*</td>
<td>3.5*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Dismissal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Censure</td>
<td>3**</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissolution of Assembly</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Notes:** The scores on each type of powers vary from 0 to 4. See Shugart and Carey (1992, p. 150) for the breakdown of scores. *A president names all cabinet ministers without need for legislative confirmation but a prime minister is subject to legislative confirmation; **Assembly may censure by proposing dismissals, but president may respond by vetoing legislative proposals.

The changing patterns of cabinet appointments in Asian presidential systems also make us suspect that the actual influence of presidents may not be the same within one
presidential system or administration. In established democracies, it is not unusual to observe the actual power of presidents disagreeing with their formally granted powers (e.g., Duverger, 1980; Elgie, 1999; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006), and this tendency is more likely in young democracies where the institutions of democratic rule are in the consolidating process. The fact that the proportion of nonpartisan ministers in presidential cabinets varies within one presidential system or administration suggests that there should be conditions of different nature other than constitutional powers, which co-vary with such cabinet formation pattern. If we want to understand the dynamics of cabinet politics, it is therefore necessary to seek out potential explanations for why the perceived value of a cabinet post in a given institutional, political, economic, or social context results in supply and demand incentives, of differing degrees, for providing and pursuing such political patronage. Thus I will propose a comparative theory that takes into account both institutional and political contexts that shape incentives of the president and the parties in the legislature, in order to explain such cabinet formation pattern. In the rest of this chapter, I present such a theory of presidential cabinet formation, building on general theories of presidential power and party behavior as well as other models of cabinet politics in presidential and semi-presidential systems that have been developed in the existing literature. I will argue that such cabinet formation patterns manifest changes in the equilibrium cabinet due to varying degrees of players' incentives shaped by institutional and political contexts, which also vary during the presidential term. Specifically, presidents have greater incentives to appoint nonpartisan members in the cabinet when institutional contexts provide more leverage to the president vis-à-vis the legislature.
2.4. Theory

2.4.1. Institutional Factor I: President's Legislative Contingent

The president's legislative contingent may generate some basic conditions for a particular cabinet formation process due to the presidential incentives involving his policy goals. Presidents tend to trade off political support and policy expertise in the cabinet formation process to provide both stable legislative support and effective governance (Martinez-Gallardo, 2005, p. 103). The president's legislative contingent could be a rough measure of the strength of his legislative support base. Based on his party’s strength in the legislature, the president is likely to face a different nature of executive-legislative relations and his strategies in the cabinet formation process are also likely to vary accordingly. When his party takes a firm control over the legislature, the president may get his agendas easily enacted (Amorim Neto, 2006, p. 421), and his cabinet formation strategy is likely to focus more on finding individuals with policy expertise that will help to perform his programs. On the contrary, when his party is in a minority status, the chief executive is willing to take advantage of executive resources in exchange for more legislative support for him; thus his incentives to form a coalition government are stronger in this situation (Cheibub, Przeworski, & Saiegh, 2004; Cheibub, 2007).

Research on presidential powers lists two categories of presidential powers: constitutional and partisan (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997a). Presidential partisan powers are defined as "abilities to shape (or, conceivably, dominate) the lawmaking process that stem from the president's standing vis-à-vis the party system" (Shugart & Mainwaring, 1997, p. 13). Although constitutional and partisan powers are two separate sets of powers
from different sources, scholars of presidential studies have observed that the latter seems more essential for successful governing, as "presidential effectiveness is severely limited when executives face opposition partisan majorities in the legislature" (Carey, 1997, p. 203; Fiorina, 1992; Mainwaring, 1993; Linz, 1994; Valenzuela, 1994). Even though they are granted strong constitutional powers, chief executives with a lack of sufficient legislative support may struggle to have their agendas enacted, as in the case of Brazil (Mainwaring, 1997). In contrast, considerable support from their party in the legislature helps presidents to get their policy programs passed without such executive prerogatives as decree powers, as in the case of Costa Rica (Carey, 1997). Therefore, the partisan strength of presidents, as they see it grow with an increase in the president's legislative contingent, should be an important factor to influence the strategies of presidential policy making and the incentives of their cabinet appointments.

Additionally, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997b) note that there is a second component to presidential partisan powers: the coherence of the support presidents receive from their party. When the president's party is internally fragmented, his partisan powers will be attenuated even when his copartisans hold a legislative majority (Archer & Shugart, 1997, p. 110). Whether copartisan members can be disciplined along the party line during their leader's term in office (i.e., to provide consistent support for the chief executive) depends on other institutional mechanisms in the electoral process (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997b)\textsuperscript{7} or in the policy-making process (Cheibub, 2007).\textsuperscript{8} In

\textsuperscript{7} The electoral mechanism is related to how much influence the party leadership exerts on the rank-and-file members' reelection. The three features that affect the degree of leaders' influence are: control of candidate selection and nomination; control of the order where members are elected from a party list; and pooling of votes among a party's candidates (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997b, p. 421).
general, parties in presidential systems tend to show lower cohesion than those in parliamentary systems (Carey, 2009). Moreover, the separation of powers easily shapes the different agendas of interest and creates distinct incentives between the president and his party members, which may generate intraparty conflict. Nevertheless, individual members of the president's party are likely to stay in the governing party and support the president, because with little choice, they are better off doing so and getting even a little in return than withdrawing support and getting nothing (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 210). At any rate, presidents will serve as *de facto* party leaders in the governmental arena, regardless of formal party leadership (Samuels, 2002; Samuels & Shugart, 2010).

Gaining the president's legislative contingent can be viewed as shifting presidential incentives for partisan to nonpartisan appointments. As their party becomes large enough to control the agenda in the legislature by taking a majority or even a plurality of seats, chief executives will gradually lose an incentive to seek legislative support, because they can enjoy more leverage vis-à-vis the legislature. In this process, there will be some copartisan appointments to presidential cabinets for electoral or partisan purposes, but their share is not likely to be a majority in the cabinet.\(^8\)

---

\(^8\) The policy-making mechanism is related to who controls the legislative agenda between the executive and legislature. According to Cheibub (2007, pp. 125-132), the structure of the policy-making process affects the behavior of individual representatives in presidential democracies. If it is the legislature that makes proposals, the decision-making process tends to be decentralized, as in the U.S. system where individual legislators have more say on policy decisions. On the other hand, if the government can set the agenda, individual members of the party are often limited to amending government proposals.


\(^10\) The East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set collected for this dissertation indicates that there has been only one instance when the proportion of copartisan ministers was over 50 percent in presidential cabinets since the four Asian presidential systems' democratization. The cabinet formed by President Roh Tae-woo of South Korea included 52 percent of ministers from his *Democratic Justice Party* for eight months between 1988 and 1989.
In Asian presidential systems, the importance of the president's legislative contingent as institutional leverage for the president vis-à-vis the legislature cannot be understated in the cabinet formation process (Kasuya, 2013b, p. 24). When chief executives are supported by copartisan majorities in the legislature, typically through electoral gains, but also through merging parties (e.g., Roh Tae-woo of South Korea) or party-switching by members of other parties (e.g., Fidel Ramos and Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines), we commonly observe a high incidence of nonpartisan cabinet members as prevalent patterns of ministerial appointment. Even copartisans' taking pluralities in the legislature can help presidents to appoint more nonpartisan ministers to their cabinets (e.g., Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia, Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan). On the contrary, presidents tend to struggle in executive-legislative relations when they are faced with a lack of such legislative support. In this case, we are likely to see more members of other legislative parties appointed to presidential cabinets or similar gestures to do so from the chief executive (e.g., Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea, Abdurrahman Wahid of Indonesia, Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan, Gloria Arroyo of the Philippines).

**Hypothesis 1:** As the president's legislative contingent increases, there is a higher incidence of nonpartisan cabinet members in presidential cabinets.

### 2.4.2. Institutional Factor II: Party System

An additional, possibly crucial, institutional factor that contributes to cabinet formation is the party system that presidents face in executive-legislative relations. Although there are multiple ways to define a party system, the most common way to
clearly outline key characteristics of a competitive party system in a democratic country is a classification by the number of relevant parties and the degree of fragmentation in the legislature (Sartori, 1976). Legislative fragmentation tends to be correlated with the president's legislative contingent (Amorim Neto, 2006, p. 422), but has its own effects in the cabinet formation process due to the main component of the party system.

The main component of the party system involves the behavior of other legislative parties vis-à-vis the president (e.g., Altman, 2000; Samuels, 2002). In presidential systems, the behavior of political parties is largely driven by their chances of victory in the executive election, because the most important and largest electoral prize for political parties is the chief executive post. Although the separation of powers denotes separate origin and survival where executives and legislatures are elected in distinct constituencies and mutually independent in governing, the existence of direct elections for the executive branch affects the organization of political parties and their incentives in the governmental as well as electoral arenas. Political parties in presidential systems will aim primarily at winning the presidential election and concentrate their party resources and efforts on this particular election since it is the most important prize for them to target. However, not every party will contend for the executive election, particularly the smaller parties in situations of multiparty competition, and those who cannot compete in the executive election will rather support other major contending parties by coordinating with them to advocate a particular presidential candidate. Therefore, the strategies of a political party and its behavior depend to a large degree on the "subjective evaluation of its chances of winning the presidential election" (Samuels, 2002, p. 471).
When there are only two parties fielding presidential candidates, an intense rivalry emerges around the winner-take-all feature of competition in the executive election. Since one party's gain means the other's loss, political interaction and relationships often have the nature of a zero-sum game (Downs, 1957). In this type of party competition, the opposition party has weak incentives for political cooperation with the president, because it has the same objective which leads to a conflict of strong vote-seeking incentives with the presidential party. As the number of parties competing in the party system increases, however, the nature of party competition is likely to change. Small parties that have a lower chance to win are likely to coordinate with large parties. With their strategy of not competing against but instead supporting a large party, small parties can increase the latter's electability and may have access to executive offices or policy concessions in exchange for their support, once their partner wins.

In multiparty systems, there is usually no dominant party taking control over the legislature, particularly when it is more fragmented and parties have room for strategic interaction to boost their political leverage (Strøm, 1990). The president whose party holds only a minority of seats is willing to offer cabinet posts or policy concessions to other parties for more stable legislative support. Small parties are also willing to support the president in return for obtaining benefits from office resources or policy influence.11

11 The literature tends to see the party's (short-term) office-seeking or policy-seeking goal as a trade-off with its (long-term) vote-seeking one (e.g., Strom, 1990; Samuels, 2002). In the circumstances where these incentives are mutually compatible, however, one may not be necessarily at the cost of the other, because the party's strategies of pursuing short-term benefits can be instrumental to boost its votes in the upcoming election. In multiparty systems where small parties themselves cannot be influential as an opposition to the government, they are better off accessing office perks and using them in favor of their local constituencies so that they can claim the credit. Voters in turn will support their parties or politicians in the election, regardless of whether they are inside or outside the government, as long as they can deliver pork for them. This type of patron-client relationship is not unusual in Asia, particularly in the Southeast Asian region.
Therefore, political parties tend to be cooperative with chief executives in multiparty systems, because their incentives are compatible with the chief executives' in the cabinet formation process. The more parties in the legislature, the greater the probability of a coalition government, because, with legislative fragmentation, parties are likely to shift their strategies from competing against to cooperating with chief executives. In sum, legislative fragmentation in presidential systems induces strong incentives for political cooperation between the chief executive and the parties in the legislature, which will lead to a high likelihood of coalition formation (Cheibub, 2007).

Note that the impact of the party system may interact with the president's legislative contingent, because of the differences in the intensity of legislative competitiveness against presidents in different party system contexts as the president's legislative contingent increases. When his party holds only a minority of seats in the legislature, the president has strong incentives to seek legislative support with the strategic use of executive resources. In multiparty systems, where legislative parties tend to be cooperative with the chief executive in exchange for their access to government resources, the mutually compatible incentives will be conducive to coalition formation. In two-party systems where the opposition party has strong incentives to compete against the president, however, the chief executive is likely to engage in hostile relations with the legislature. Often, what is observed in this situation is the choice of more nonpartisan ministers to neutralize the cabinet as a mutually acceptable entity (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006, p. 627; Almeida & Cho, 2007, p. 5).

Specifically, those parties seeking particularistic goods for their constituencies will easily hire out their support for the president in return for office benefits (Kellam, 2013).

\[12\] In addition, Altman (2000) finds that in a multiparty legislature, legislative parties that are ideologically closer to the president's party have a higher chance to join a coalition government.
With the presidential party's gaining seats in the legislature, the president will enjoy more clout in the cabinet formation process. The chief executive's incentives to pursue legislative support become weaker as his party takes a majority (in two-party systems) or a plurality of seats (in multiparty systems) in the legislature. Presidents have considerable institutional leverage when copartisans hold the most seats in the legislature, though they may feel more influential in multiparty systems than in situations of two-party competition, because of the differences in the nature of party competition and in the intensity of legislative competitiveness. In multiparty systems, it should be more costly and difficult for the parties to be organized together to challenge the president who gains institutional leverage. Therefore, the more parties in the legislature, the greater presidential leverage vis-à-vis the legislature with an increase in the president's legislative contingent, because the president is likely to face relatively weak competitiveness in a more fragmented legislature. The relationship suggested in the following hypothesis is depicted in Figure 2.1.

**Hypothesis 2:** As the president's legislative contingent increases, the marginal increase in a share of nonpartisan cabinet members will be higher in multiparty systems than in two-party competition.
Figure 2.1: Hypothesized Effect of the President's Legislative Contingent Interacted with Party Systems on the Incidence of Nonpartisan Appointments

2.4.3. Contextual Factor I: Presidential Popularity

The president's legislative contingent and legislative fragmentation may generate institution-level conditions for legislative support (for presidents) and top executive posts (to legislative parties) to be more or less attractive to the chief executive and the parties in the legislature. However, the actual decisions of cabinet appointments are made in the context where the value of legislative support and top executive posts may vary depending on the circumstances surrounding the chief executive and legislative parties. I examine specifically two contextual factors - presidential popularity and electoral cycle - to argue that there are supply and demand components, shaped by the context-level conditions interacting with institution-level conditions, which contribute to cabinet formation.
In presidential systems where chief executives are directly elected by the public and govern with a national mandate, public support is an enabling factor that creates room for presidents who desire to lead or implement a program to exercise their prerogatives. Often, presidents "go public" as a strategy to enhance their chances of success in the policy-making process and a decent popularity helps in their actual practice of this strategy (Kernell, 2007). Popular presidents, who can directly appeal to voters by going over the heads of legislators, seem to have para-constitutional prerogatives (Amorim Neto, 2006, p. 416). Thus, being popular may give more discretion to chief executives in any decision-making process as much of the public and media will be sympathetic to their decisions; on the contrary, legislative actions undermining the authority of chief executives who are strongly backed by national constituents could be costly to their immediate political fate.

Research on cabinet politics in presidential systems suggests that presidential popularity influences the demand of top executive posts (e.g., Altman, 2000; Martinez-Gallardo, 2011, 2012). Political parties, generally driven by their electoral prospects, calculate the benefits and costs of forming part of the government. The parties in the legislature can obtain executive offices and policy influence through cabinet membership, but being affiliated with an unpopular president can be risky for the next election. Once in the government, whether they stay or leave is also strongly affected by voters' evaluations of government performance. If presidential approval ratings drop, parties are likely to distance themselves from the president who might struggle to keep cabinet members in the government. Gaining access to executive resources should be attractive to the parties in the legislature, but how they actually value these resources will vary within
the context of the popularity of the chief executive. Therefore, the parties' incentives to be part of the government will be affected by public perceptions of presidential performance.

In sum, presidential popularity is likely to interact with the president's legislative contingent, because of supply and demand incentives shaped jointly by these institutional and contextual factors. When the chief executive is a member of a minority party in the legislature, he has strong incentives to offer cabinet membership to other parties in exchange for their support for the government. Parties in turn will be more motivated to join the government of a publicly popular leader based on their own cost-benefit calculations. In addition, presidents who are losing public confidence may feel more constrained to select partisan ministers in the regional context where public trust in political parties is fairly low (Table 2.2).13

Table 2.2: Citizens' Trust in Political Parties as a Political Institution in East Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A Great Deal</th>
<th>Quite a Lot</th>
<th>Not Very Much</th>
<th>None at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>4 (0.3%)</td>
<td>146 (12.4%)</td>
<td>613 (51.9%)</td>
<td>418 (35.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>24 (1.7%)</td>
<td>200 (13.8%)</td>
<td>892 (61.5%)</td>
<td>334 (23.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>66 (5.6%)</td>
<td>353 (29.9%)</td>
<td>531 (45.0%)</td>
<td>230 (19.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>55 (3.9%)</td>
<td>591 (42.1%)</td>
<td>488 (34.8%)</td>
<td>270 (19.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The following question is asked to survey respondents in respective countries: "I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them? Trust in Political parties [not any specific party]."

As the presidential party gains seats in the legislature, we should expect a higher incidence of nonpartisan cabinet appointments, because the presidential incentives to

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13 Interview with National Assemblyman, Lee In-je, in Seoul, South Korea, September 12, 2013.
seek legislative support become attenuated. With their institutional leverage gained from copartisan support, popular presidents will have stronger incentives to appoint nonpartisan members than unpopular presidents due to their political leverage gained from public approval. Therefore, the more popular the president, the greater presidential leverage vis-à-vis the legislature with an increase in the president's legislative contingent, because popular presidents are likely to have more discretion in their decision making. The relationship postulated in the following hypothesis is described graphically in Figure 2.2.

**Hypothesis 3:** As the president's legislative contingent increases, the marginal increase in a share of nonpartisan cabinet members will be higher when presidents are popular than when they are unpopular in the public.

![Graph of Hypothesized Effect of the President's Legislative Contingent Interacted with Presidential Popularity on the Incidence of Nonpartisan Appointments](image)

Figure 2.2: Hypothesized Effect of the President's Legislative Contingent Interacted with Presidential Popularity on the Incidence of Nonpartisan Appointments

2.4.4. Contextual Factor II: Presidential Electoral Cycle
In presidential systems where the next presidential election date is common knowledge from the first day of a national mandate, the incentives of the chief executive and the parties in the legislature will be shaped by the fixed electoral calendar and shifting over the course of the presidential term (Altman, 2000). At the outset of the president's term, the fate tends to be particularly favorable to a newly elected president who enjoys the presidential honeymoon (Shugart & Carey, 1992). But as his fortunes start fading during the midterm and near the end of the term, he is called a lame duck president who is only waiting for his term to finish. Therefore, presidents will have more discretion in their decision making early in their terms, and this is likely to wane toward the end of their terms.

Research on presidential cabinet appointments indicates that the president's fixed term is related to strong demand-side incentives for cabinet posts (e.g., Altman, 2000; Martinez-Gallardo, 2011). The parties in the legislature are more likely to seek political patronage and policy rewards after the inauguration of a newly elected president (Altman, 2000, p. 264). Yet the value of the patronage tends to slip over the course of the president's term (Amorim Neto & Santos, 2001), and the parties that are mainly driven by their electoral prospects will try to distance themselves from the lame duck president. In addition, party members who intend to participate in the next executive election as candidates or campaign members are likely to leave or not join the government as the election approaches (Martinez-Gallardo, 2011, p. 6). Thus, the presidential electoral cycle will by and large influence the legislative parties' incentives to be part of the government.

Similarly to the effect of presidential popularity, the presidential electoral cycle is expected to interact with the president's legislative contingent, because of the ways in
which supply and demand incentives are shaped together by the institutional and contextual factors. When the president's party holds only a minority of seats in the legislature, presidential incentives to seek legislative support are stronger. Given the patronage offer from the chief executive, the parties in the legislature will be more motivated to support the government at the outset than the close of the president's term in office.

As the presidential party gains seats in the legislature, there should be a higher incidence of nonpartisan cabinet appointments, which is related to chief executives' institutional leverage. Holding growing support from copartisans equal, presidents earlier in their term will have stronger incentives to appoint nonpartisan members due to their political leverage gained from the effect of the presidential electoral cycle. Therefore, the earlier the appointment takes place in the president's term, the greater presidential leverage vis-à-vis the legislature with an increase in the president's legislative contingent, because situations tend to be more favorable to the president at the outset of his term. The relationship proposed in the following hypothesis is outlined graphically in Figure 2.3.

**Hypothesis 4:** As the president's legislative contingent increases, the marginal increase in a share of nonpartisan cabinet members will be higher when the president's term is beginning than ending.
The preceding hypotheses jointly form a comprehensive model of cabinet formation in Asian presidential systems (Figure 2.4). The president's legislative contingent will produce basic supply-side conditions for a particular cabinet formation process due to presidential incentives involving his policy goals. But the incentives of the parties in the legislature are also important since the actual formation process usually includes them, specifically when the president is a member of a minority party in the legislature. Thus, legislative fragmentation will not only generate demand-side conditions with its own effects but also will interact with the president's legislative contingent to shape institution-level incentives of the chief executive and the parties in the legislature. Yet the appointment decisions are not made in a vacuum; and presidential popularity and electoral cycle will produce context-level conditions. The contextual factors themselves
may not directly influence cabinet formation, but they will interact with the president's legislative contingent to generate additional conditions for legislative support (for presidents) and top executive posts (to legislative parties) to be more or less attractive to presidents and the parties in the legislature, respectively. Specifically, when presidents face a more fragmented legislature, when presidents are popular in the public, and when the president's terms are beginning, there will be a higher likelihood of nonpartisan appointments in the cabinet as the president's legislative contingent increases. On the contrary, partisan appointments are more likely to the cabinet under the same institutional (i.e., a more fragmented legislature) and contextual conditions (i.e., popular presidents or the president's terms at the outset) as the president's legislative contingent decreases, because the perceived values of legislative support and top executive posts are relatively high to both presidents and the parties in the legislature, respectively.
2.5. Acknowledgements

Parts of Chapter 2 has been converted for future publication in the following paper: "Legislative Support Versus Policy Performance: Presidential Power and Cabinet Formation in Asian Democracies." In this paper, I was the primary author and source of the material used here.

References


3. The Patterns of Presidential Cabinet Formation in Asian Democracies

How well does the theory of cabinet formation presented in Chapter 2 account for the actual patterns in cabinet politics in presidential systems? In this chapter, I test the main empirical implications of my theory and provide a comparative look at presidential cabinets across democracies of varying institution-level and context-level conditions in order to assess the effect of these conditions on the practice of cabinet politics. For this purpose, I use cabinet-level time-series cross-section data from twenty-one administrations of four Asian democracies whose presidential systems vary on these sets of institutional and contextual variables of interest. I start the chapter with an introduction of an original data set compiled for the analysis in this dissertation before describing the variables and the empirical models used for the analysis. I present the results of the empirical tests with an interpretation of them, followed by the discussion of the evaluation on the coincidence of pattern between the theory and the empirical results.

3.1. Case Selection and Data

I have chosen as my cases four major democracies in Northeast and Southeast Asia which have a popularly elected president and whose population is over five million: Indonesia (1999-2012), the Philippines (1987-2012), South Korea (1988-2012), and Taiwan (1993-2012). I use the Polity score,¹ which lists a political regime ranging from 6

¹ Source: www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
to 10 as "democracy", to determine the respective beginning year of democracy. The choice of cases showing a similar level of democratization is important since these levels tend to be correlated with the degree of institutional development. The selected four cases are all relatively new but stable democracies in the process of consolidating democracy as they have "witnessed at least two complete presidential terms and survived at least ten years as a democracy" (Amorim Neto, 1998, pp. 53-54). In addition, presidents in these Asian democracies have sufficient discretion to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers so that cabinet appointments are perceived to be executive prerogatives (see Table 2.1 in Chapter 2). Included in the final sample are twenty-one administrations from four presidential systems (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Twenty-one Presidential Administrations from Four Asian Democracies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roh Tae-woo</td>
<td>Lee Teng-hui*</td>
<td>Corazon Aquino</td>
<td>Abdurrahman Wahid*†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Young-sam</td>
<td>Lee Teng-hui</td>
<td>Fidel Ramos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Dae-jung</td>
<td>Chen Shui-bian*</td>
<td>Joseph Estrada†</td>
<td>Megawati Sukarnoputri*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roh Moo-hyun</td>
<td>Chen Shui-bian*</td>
<td>Gloria Arroyo**</td>
<td>Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee Myung-bak</td>
<td>Ma Ying-jeou*</td>
<td>Benigno Aquino III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ma Ying-jeou†</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2012-2016)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reelected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *indirectly elected; **inherited the presidency as a vice president; †impeached

---

2 For example, the period of the post-war and pre-authoritarian era in the Philippines (1946-1972) is not counted as a democracy since the scores that the country marked do not meet the minimum threshold value of 6.
There are two things to note about the selected cases. First, in some cases such as Taiwan and Indonesia, the beginning of democracy did not come together with a direct executive election. Instead of being directly elected by the public, Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan (before 1996) and Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia were chosen by an electoral body made up of elected or a mix of elected and appointed members.\(^3\) Indirectly elected presidents of Indonesia were accountable to the electoral body, but both Taiwan and Indonesia granted extensive power to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers to these presidents. Second, Taiwan in the post-1997 period has adopted a semi-presidential constitution, based on which the cabinet is partially accountable to the legislature that has a vote of no-confidence against the premier and the executive branch. But the president may dissolve the legislature once such a vote has been cast. According to the categorization of semi-presidentialism (Shugart, 2005, p. 332), Taiwan is a political system with a constitutionally powerful president (i.e., "president-parliamentary" subtype) who has broad powers of cabinet selection and de-selection and may dissolve the legislature once a no-confidence vote has been cast. In other words, presidents of Taiwan have a powerful institutional weapon to defend against the legislative attempt to dismiss the entire cabinet.\(^4\) Therefore, the similarity in the operation of the Taiwanese political

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\(^3\) Taiwan had a National Assembly - not a legislative body - whose member was elected and which had no legislative power. It convened once every four years to choose a president and a vice president before 1996. Indonesia's electoral body is called the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat; People's Consultative Council), a majority of whose members were also members of the Indonesian Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat; People's Representative Council). See Hicken and Kasuya (2003, pp. 125-126) for further details.

\(^4\) The president's institutional weapon to defend the executive branch has been powerful enough to prevent legislators in Taiwan from attempting to dissolve the cabinet at the cost of their jobs.
system to other presidential democracies makes it comparable to the three other Asian cases.⁵

To test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2, I compiled an original data set called "East Asia Presidential Cabinet Dataset", which records the cabinet composition of twenty-one presidential administrations from four Asian democracies: Indonesia (1999-2012), the Philippines (1987-2012), South Korea (1988-2012), and Taiwan (1993-2012). The periods that the data cover vary across cases but span over two decades per case on average. To compile the cabinet-level data set, I first collected detailed data on cabinet ministers from the four cases. The individual-level data set called "East Asia Cabinet Minister Dataset" includes the biographical, educational, occupational, and political backgrounds of each individual minister. The sources for the list and profile of cabinet ministers are described in detail in the appendix (Table A1). I use a country-month as a unit of analysis and analyze the monthly variation in composition of presidential cabinets from the four cases.

There are two reasons that a country-month is a preferable unit of analysis for this dissertation. First, as examined in Chapter 1, the cabinet formation patterns in Asian presidential systems are distinct from the ones in Latin American presidential systems. In contrast with presidential systems in Latin America where scholars have explained the variation in cabinet composition based on changes in the partisan configuration of the cabinet throughout the presidential terms (Martinez-Gallardo, 2012, pp. 74-75), the variation in composition of Asian presidential cabinets is largely based on the frequent replacement of individual ministers with little change in the partisan configuration of the

⁵ Personal Conversation with Dr. Wu Yu-Shan at Academia Sinica, October 21, 2013.
To capture these unique patterns in Asia, therefore, I use a country-month as a unit of analysis, instead of a cabinet or a country-year that was used in the literature (e.g., Amorim Neto, 2002, 2006; Cheibub, 2007). Structuring the data in this way will help to analyze the prevalent patterns of cabinet formation within one presidential system or administration, or from one to the next. Second, it is an appropriate unit of analysis for time-series cross-section analysis and has been recently used in the literature on cabinet politics in presidential systems, particularly on cabinet termination (e.g., Martinez-Gallardo, 2011, 2012; Kellam, 2013).

3.2. Measurement

In this section, I introduce a dependant variable and a set of independent variables that are used in the analysis. Before describing these variables, I first address some important questions of the common standards across countries with regards to the categorization of cabinet ministers into different types (what qualifies as a nonpartisan member?) and the size of the cabinet (what is a list of specific ministers that are included in the cabinet?).

3.2.1. Categorizing a Type: Partisan versus Nonpartisan Ministers

Following the definition from the literature (e.g., Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Almeida & Cho, 2007), I list a cabinet minister as a nonpartisan member when she is not
affiliated with any political party at the time of the appointment. Typically, included in this category are professors, civil servants, businessmen, lawyers, and other experts whose appointments have nothing to do with political commitment or partisan purposes. In contrast, legislative members are most commonly partisans across cases, but non-politicians who represent a political party under the party banner are also coded as partisans. Nonpartisans and partisans are mutually exclusive categories. In general, nonpartisans are expected to play a different role as they are "not members of the structures of power within the party, cannot participate in party decisions, and cannot bring together other party members to defend their policies" (Teruel, 2012, p. 5). Moreover, the chief executive's incentives to appoint nonpartisans versus partisan members are dichotomous as discussed in Chapter 2. Therefore, an official status of party affiliation at the time of the appointment will be a clear-cut criterion for categorizing the partisan/nonpartisan type of cabinet ministers.

In the four cases of Asian presidential systems, a majority of nonpartisan ministers have backgrounds in academia, civil service, or business (Table 3.2). Yet some of them seem connected with a political party, particularly after their appointment. For example, the current Minister of Transportation and Communications of Taiwan, Yeh Kuang-shih, was a professor of business administration at the time of his appointment to the Ma Ying-jeou government. Yeh joined the presidential party Kuomintang (KMT) after his appointment and became an appointed member of the central committee of the party (zhidingzhongchangwei). Although Yeh earned party membership, he is coded as a nonpartisan minister because his appointment was based on his academic background.

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7 For simplicity and gender balance, I will refer to all presidents in the masculine (he) and all ministers in the feminine (she).
rather than his connection with the KMT. In addition, some nonpartisans become partisan members in the middle of their career paths in the government. For instance, Jiang Yi-hua, who is the current Premier of Taiwan, was a professor of political science when he first joined the Ma Ying-jeou government as the Minister of the Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission in 2008. Then he was appointed as the Minister of Interior but still remained unaffiliated with the KMT. Later, he joined the KMT while he was serving as the Vice Premier of Taiwan in 2012. Minister and Vice Premier Jiang are listed as nonpartisans, but Premier Jiang is coded as a partisan member due to his party membership at the time of the appointment as Premier.

Table 3.2: Share of Subtypes of Nonpartisan Ministers in Four Asian Presidential Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Civil Service</th>
<th>Academia</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Journalism</th>
<th>Military/Police</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>0.522</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Proportions represent the shares of subtypes among nonpartisan ministers in presidential cabinets. A unit of analysis is a country-month. Source: East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.

3.2.2. Determining the Size of Cabinet

To make cases comparable to one another, it is important to set the scope of the cabinet based on a common standard. The reason behind this is because of the instrumental view of the cabinet as a team of the presidential equipment to promote the effective exercise of his authority and to help implement his ultimate responsibilities.

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8 Interview with the Minister of Transportation and Communications, Yeh Kuang-shih, in Taipei, Taiwan, October 9, 2013.
Once in office, every president has his own governing agenda and will organize his team accordingly. Some presidents might reform the structure of the executive branch as a whole by creating a new agency, splitting or merging old agencies, or promoting or demoting an existing agency.

To determine a list of departments or ministries to be included in the analysis, I use official government web sources and the organization chart described on the web pages. Included are all the departments or ministries in the executive branch whose heads are appointed and dismissed on the sole basis of presidential authority. For this reason, the executive agencies whose heads are formally independent from the government, such as the Central Bank, are excluded from the sample. Formal independence may not be equivalent to political independence in every place, but the dynamic of appointing the head of the independent agency should be different from that of appointing other ministers (Martinez-Gallardo, 2005, p. 141). The existing literature also excludes heads of independent agencies from the sample. (e.g., Martinez-Gallardo, 2011, 2012). The full list of the titles of cabinet members included in the analysis is in the appendix (Table A2).

3.2.3. Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in the analysis is the share of nonpartisan ministers in the presidential cabinet. It is calculated based on the number of cabinet positions allocated to

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9 Interview with the former Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, in Jakarta, Indonesia, June 17, 2013. Interview with the former Minster of Employment and Labor, the former Presidential Chief of Staff, and the former assemblyman, Yim Tae-hee, in Seoul, South Korea, August 21, 2013.

10 In Taiwan, the National Communications Commission, the Fair Trade Commission, and the Central Election Commission are excluded from the sample for the same reason.
nonpartisan members divided by the total number of cabinet posts. Figure 3.1 presents data on the share of nonpartisan ministers in presidential cabinets from twenty-one administrations of four countries. The proportion is based on the monthly observation of cabinet composition within presidential administrations in the respective country cases since the unit of analysis is a country-month. The proportion varies within administrations and countries as well as across them. In South Korea and the Philippines, the within-administration variation in the share of nonpartisan ministers seems wider than in Taiwan and Indonesia. For example, in South Korea, the lowest share is 0.28, recorded in the Kim Dae-jung administration, where the highest share is 0.89. Similarly, the first Arroyo administration records a huge difference between its lowest and highest shares throughout its term - 0.32 and 0.78. In contrast, the largest difference recorded in Taiwan is during the second Lee Teng-hui administration, where 0.57 was the lowest and 0.81 was the highest. Similarly, in Indonesia, the within-administration variation is relatively narrow with the widest spread being recorded during the Wahid administration where the lowest and the highest shares are 0.29 and 0.48, respectively.

11 In terms of potential variation in the relative value of cabinet portfolios, every cabinet post might not carry equivalent importance and some positions that require more professionalism, such as Defense, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Justice Ministers, may be more likely to be assigned to qualified nonpartisan members. Moreover, the relative value can vary across cabinets, administrations, and political systems over time. Scholars have used weighted measures based on an expert survey method to give different scores across cabinet portfolios (e.g., Kato & Laver, 1998; Druckman & Warwick, 2005; Druckman & Roberts, 2008). An expert survey of these four Asian countries, if it provides scores of the relative importance of all ministerial portfolios in these countries, would be a unique contribution to the study of presidential democracies in Northeast and Southeast Asia. However, the nature of time-series cross-section analysis for this dissertation introduces a main challenge to conducting this survey, because the scores only reflect the experts' assessment on the value of existing portfolios at the time of survey. Thus, I will leave this for a future research agenda.
Figure 3.1: Share of Nonpartisan Ministers within Twenty-one Presidential Administrations from Four Asian Democracies

**Notes:** Ma in Taiwan, Aquino III in the Philippines, and SBY in Indonesia are incumbent presidents still in office as of the end of 2012. A unit of analysis is a country-month.

*Source:* East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.

3.2.4. Independent Variables and Operational Criteria

The series of hypotheses described in Chapter 2 are derived from the theory that presidential cabinet formation is mainly explained by the incentives of the president and the parties in the legislature that are significantly shaped by institutional and contextual factors. These incentives should be based on the perceived trading values of legislative support (for the president) and top executive posts (to the parties in the legislature) that
may vary depending on the conditions generated by the institutional and contextual factors.

There are two institutional variables and two contextual variables among four independent variables. The first institutional variable is called *Presidential Power* and measures the president's legislative contingent, which is calculated based on the number of seats in the lower chamber of the legislature taken by the presidential party divided by the total number of seats in the lower chamber of the legislature. Other than the Philippines, which adopted a bicameral system, three of the four Asian cases have a unicameral legislature. In some of these countries, switching, merging, and splitting parties are more common and frequent than in others. In the Philippines, legislative members tend to switch to the presidential party, particularly at the outset of the president's terms. South Korea used to experience legislators' jumping on the presidential (party) bandwagon in the early years following democratization in the late 1980's and 1990's. Taiwan saw the presidential party split due to intraparty factionalism in the late 1990's. To track these changes on a monthly basis, I mainly use official government web sources and procedural reports written in the plenary sessions of the legislature that are updated on the web pages.

The second institutional variable is *Party Competition*, measuring legislative fragmentation, which is computed based on the following formula: 

\[
\frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i}
\]

where \( n \) is the number of parties holding at least one seat in the lower chamber of the legislature and \( p_i \) is the seat share of the \( i^{th} \) party in the lower chamber of the legislature. The formula takes into account the degree of fragmentation as well as the number of parties in the
legislature because it weighs the number of parties by their share in the legislature (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979). Note that I list the nth party as the presidential party and do not include its share in the computation for two reasons. First, since Party Competition is a conceptual measure of the nature of party systems - the nature of party competition and the intensity of legislative competitiveness against the president, the adopted formula will actually represent the own effects of legislative fragmentation without counting the president's legislative contingent. Second, legislative fragmentation tends to be strongly correlated with the president's legislative contingent (Amorim Neto, 2006, p. 422). Thus, the adopted formula may solve the potential multicollinearity problem that could be caused by using the original formula. Similarly with Presidential Power, the calculation is based on the number of seats in the lower chamber of the legislature. I follow Mainwaring and Zoco (2007, p. 173) to treat the cases of independent legislative members and minor parties grouped jointly as others. Official government web sites and procedural reports written in the plenary sessions of the legislature are the main sources for tracking any possible changes in the seat share of the parties in the legislature between legislative elections.

The third independent variable and the first contextual variable is Presidential Popularity, which measures the president's popularity among the general public. I use presidential approval ratings that are based on the results of national public opinion surveys conducted in each of the four countries. Presidential approval ratings, which range from 0 to 1, are the proportions of survey responses of "very satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied" combined in answer to the question of "How satisfied or dissatisfied you are in the performance of (name) as President of (country)?". The data on
presidential approval ratings come from survey organizations with a nationwide reputation and scholarly acknowledgement for reliability.

The fourth independent variable and the second contextual variable is *Electoral Cycle*, measuring the number of days left until the end of the president's term that is mandated by the constitution.

### 3.2.5. Control Variables

Four variables are included in the analysis as control variables. The first control variable is *Economic Shock*, measuring the economic context where unfavorable situations happen unexpectedly due to economic events. I use the monthly change in the consumer price index, which has been also used to control the impact of economic shocks in the literature on cabinet politics in presidential systems (e.g., Martinez-Gallardo, 2012).

The second control variable is *Age of Democracy* and measures the age of democracy in years. The possible impact of this measure on cabinet formation is that "the share of non-partisans in the cabinet may depend on the level of consolidation of the democratic regime" so that "a transitional polity with an unconsolidated party system may be more conducive to non-partisanship in the cabinet" (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006, p. 639).

The third control variable is *Constitutional Powers*, which measures the formal powers of the president. This variable has been a main independent variable in the literature on presidential cabinet formation. I use ordinal scales from the classification by Shugart and Carey (1992), which is slightly re-interpreted based on the world constitutions and other academic sources. The classification by Shugart and Carey divides the formal powers into two categories - legislative and non-legislative powers -
which have multiple types of powers within each category. The overall measure is the sum of the individual scores (ranging from 0 to 4) of each subtype of powers within the two categories. In my sample, the overall measure records the lowest from 9 (Indonesia) to 21.5 (South Korea) as the highest (See Table 2.1 in Chapter 2).

The last control variable is *Copartisan Share*, measuring the share of copartisan ministers in the cabinet. It is included to control for the effect of any incentive for the president to appoint copartisans, because my theory mainly explains presidential incentives to appoint nonpartisan ministers versus partisan ministers from the parties other than the president's in the legislature.

For the variables *Presidential Popularity* and *Economic Shock*, I assign the values for the moving average of three months prior to the month in which the cabinet was formed (e.g., Martinez-Gallardo, 2012). Sometimes, the presidential popularity drops and the inflation rate surges, but the transmission of their effects on the decision making process has a lag rather than an immediate impact as they are unexpected events (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006, p. 637; Martinez-Gallardo, 2012, pp. 77-78). The sources of all independent and control variables described in this section are listed in detail in the appendix (Table A3). Table 3.3 provides summary statistics for the independent and control variables employed in the analysis.
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidential Power</strong></td>
<td>1004</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>300</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party Competition</strong></td>
<td>1004</td>
<td>17.05</td>
<td>21.37</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>97.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>10.74</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>25.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>8.99</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>33.83</td>
<td>32.19</td>
<td>9.42</td>
<td>97.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8.76</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>10.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidential Popularity</strong></td>
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<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral Cycle</strong></td>
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<td>961</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>921</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>1164</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>158</td>
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<td>503</td>
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<td>1790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Shock</strong></td>
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<td>3.79</td>
<td>-2.35</td>
<td>20.18</td>
</tr>
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<td>2.23</td>
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<td>11.17</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.51</td>
<td>-2.35</td>
<td>5.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>4.09</td>
<td>-1.60</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>3.98</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
<td>18.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age of Democracy</strong></td>
<td>1019</td>
<td>12.06</td>
<td>7.01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>158</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constitutional Powers</strong></td>
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<td>17.37</td>
<td>4.22</td>
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<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>21.5</td>
<td>21.5</td>
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<td>Taiwan</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables, Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copartisan Share</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A unit of analysis is a country-month.
Source: East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.

3.3. Method: Modeling Presidential Cabinet Formation

To test the series of hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2 by modeling the conditions under which political interaction between presidents and the parties in the legislature leads to cabinet formation, I use an extended beta-binomial model. The extended beta-binomial model has been widely used in the literature on cabinet formation in presidential and semi-presidential systems for two reasons (e.g., Amorim Neto, 2006; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009b, 2010). First, with choice of the share of partisan or nonpartisan ministers as a dependent variable, its distribution ranges from 0 to 1, like the range of my dependent variable. Second, the share of nonpartisan members in the cabinet is based on collective binary outcomes (i.e., the appointment of either partisan or nonpartisan ministers) that are likely to influence each other rather than be totally independent of each other, because the appointment decisions take into account the overall cabinet formation. When the probability $\pi$ of binomial choice is not identical,\(^{12}\) which is likely in reality, the extended binomial model handles the degree to which $\pi$ varies by introducing the other parameter, $\gamma$ (King, 1998, p. 47). When binary

---

\(^{12}\) When binary outcomes are mutually independent and the probability $\pi$ of binomial choice is identical, the beta binomial model can be used (King, 1998).
outcomes are positively correlated ($\gamma > 0$) or negatively correlated ($\gamma < 0$) so that there is any dependence of each other, the extended beta-binomial model can cover it and make up each observation (King, 1998, p. 48). Given the structure of time-series cross-sectional data, I also use a panel fixed effects model as an additional estimation to check the robustness of the estimation of the extended beta-binomial model. Country fixed effects are used for both models with South Korea as a baseline category to cover any unobserved country-specific sources of variation.

3.4. Empirical Results

Before discussing specific results, I first reiterate the four hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2 and follow with a summary of the expected signs of estimated coefficients of variables in the analysis (Table 3.4).

**Hypothesis 1**: As the president's legislative contingent increases, there is a higher incidence of nonpartisan cabinet members in presidential cabinets.

**Hypothesis 2**: As the president's legislative contingent increases, the marginal increase in a share of nonpartisan cabinet members will be higher in multiparty systems than in two-party competition.

**Hypothesis 3**: As the president's legislative contingent increases, the marginal increase in a share of nonpartisan cabinet members will be higher when presidents are popular than unpopular in the public.

**Hypothesis 4**: As the president's legislative contingent increases, the marginal increase in a share of nonpartisan cabinet members will be higher when the president's term is beginning than ending.

---

13 To address potential serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in error terms in the panel data, I use a cluster-robust standard error option for both models.
Table 3.4: Expected Signs of Estimated Coefficients of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Expected Sign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><em>Presidential Power</em></td>
<td>President's Legislative Contingent</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><em>Party Competition</em></td>
<td>Legislative Fragmentation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Presidential Power</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Presidential Power x</em> Party Competition</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><em>Presidential Popularity</em></td>
<td>Presidential Approval Ratings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Presidential Power</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Presidential Power x</em> Presidential Popularity</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><em>Electoral Cycle</em></td>
<td>Days Left until Presidential Term End</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Presidential Power</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Presidential Power x</em> Electoral Cycle</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables 3.5 and 3.6 demonstrate estimated coefficients of variables on the institution-level and context-level conditions. The results lend relatively strong support to my argument even after controlling for presidential constitutional powers, the copartisan ministers' share, economic contexts, and the age of democracy. Specific results are discussed below.
Table 3.5: Results from Extended Beta-Binomial Models of Cabinet Formation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Share of Nonpartisan Ministers</th>
<th>Extended Beta-Binomial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Power</td>
<td>1.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.411)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Competition</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Power x</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Competition</td>
<td>(0.03)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Popularity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Power x x Presidential Popularity</td>
<td>4.639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Cycle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Shock</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Democracy</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Powers</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copartisan Share</td>
<td>-4.737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.357)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.623)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>-1.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.36)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Observations 1004 1004 865 1004

Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by countries) in parentheses. The omitted category in all models is South Korea.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 3.6: Results from Panel Fixed Effects Models of Cabinet Formation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Share of Nonpartisan Ministers</th>
<th>Panel Fixed Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidential Power</strong></td>
<td>0.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.069)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party Competition</strong></td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidential Power x Party Competition</strong></td>
<td>-0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidential Popularity</strong></td>
<td>-0.428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidential Power x Presidential Popularity</strong></td>
<td>0.901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral Cycle</strong></td>
<td>0.00003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidential Power x Electoral Cycle</strong></td>
<td>-0.00005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Shock</strong></td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age of Democracy</strong></td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constitutional Powers</strong></td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Copartisan Share</strong></td>
<td>-0.966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.080)**</td>
<td>(0.099)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>0.669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.089)**</td>
<td>(0.173)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Observations</strong></td>
<td>1004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by countries) in parentheses.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

The findings suggest that Hypotheses 1 and 3 are strongly supported by the results while Hypotheses 2 and 4 are only partially supported. First, the president's legislative contingent (Presidential Power) has a strong positive effect on the share of nonpartisan
ministers in the cabinet. In Model 1, the coefficient of *Presidential Power* indicates that a 10 percentage-point increase in the president's legislative contingent leads to about a 2.6 percentage-point increase in the nonpartisan share. The positive correlation remains statistically significant throughout the empirical tests of diverse models except in Model 3. Figure 3.2 shows the marginal effect of the president's legislative contingent and the predicted share of nonpartisan cabinet members.

Figure 3.2: Marginal Effect of President's Legislative Contingent and Predicted Share of Nonpartisan Cabinet Members

*Note: Predictive margins with 95 percent confidence intervals.*  
*Source: East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.*

Second, the results in Model 2 are about the effect of the institution-level conditions on the share of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet. The interpretation of the
two coefficients related to the institution-level conditions (Presidential Power and Party Competition) needs caution as they interact with each other. The results in Model 2 predict that the effect of legislative fragmentation on the nonpartisan share of cabinet posts should vary depending on the president's legislative contingent as the coefficient of the interaction term is statistically significant. My expectation is that the coefficient of Party Competition will be negative while the coefficient of the interaction term is positive. However, the results show that actual signs of both coefficients are opposite to my prediction, indicating that the effect of the president's legislative contingent seems mediated rather than strengthened by legislative fragmentation. Although the results do not exactly match my prediction, the nonpartisan-held share of ministerial positions in presidential cabinets is still higher in the presence of multiparty competition (than in two-party competition) throughout the varying extents of the president's legislative contingent (Figure 3.3). The estimated coefficient of Presidential Power is reported to be positive (and statistically significant) as expected. Figure 3.3 shows the marginal effect of legislative fragmentation on the share of nonpartisan cabinet members across the range of the president's legislative contingent.
Third, in Model 3, I measure the effect of presidential popularity on the share of nonpartisan cabinet members with varying extents of the president's legislative contingent. The interpretation of the two coefficients (*Presidential Power* and *Presidential Popularity*) is not simple due to their interaction. The results in Model 3 predict that the effect of presidential popularity on the share of cabinet positions assigned to nonpartisans should vary depending on the president's legislative contingent since the coefficient of the interaction term is statistically significant. My theory suggests that 1) the coefficient of the interaction term should be positive because the effect of one factor is reinforced by the presence of the other; and 2) the coefficient of *Presidential*...
*Popularity* should be negative because the parties in the legislature are more likely to join or stay in the government led by popular rather than unpopular presidents. The results indicate that both coefficients show the same signs as predicted. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient on *Presidential Power* is found not statistically significant, implying that the effect of the president's legislative contingent is substantively attenuated by the presence of unpopular presidents. For instance, the difference between the share of nonpartisan cabinet members is about three times larger among popular presidents than among unpopular ones when the president's legislative contingent is at its maximum compared to its minimum. In Figure 3.4, I illustrate graphically the marginal effect of presidential popularity on the share of nonpartisan cabinet members across the range of the president's legislative contingent.
Fourth, in Model 4, I measure the effect of the presidential electoral cycle on the share of nonpartisan cabinet members with varying extents of the president's legislative contingent. Similarly, the interpretation of the two coefficients (Presidential Power and Electoral Cycle) is not straightforward due to their interaction. The results in Model 4 predict that since the coefficient of the interaction term is not statistically significant, there is no differential effect of the presidential electoral cycle on the nonpartisan share depending on the president's legislative contingent. The only statistically significant variable is Presidential Power whose sign is positive as expected, indicating that there is
a positive effect of the president's legislative contingent on the appointment of nonpartisans to the cabinet, even for a lame duck president.

Lastly, the estimated coefficients of country dummy variables in Table 3.5 imply that Indonesian cabinets have significantly different composition when compared with cabinets in the three other Asian countries. All else equal, presidents of Indonesia are less likely by 27.6 percentage points to appoint nonpartisan cabinet members than presidents of South Korea.

3.5. Discussion

According to the theory of cabinet formation presented in Chapter 2, the president's legislative contingent is a main source of institutional leverage for presidents vis-à-vis the legislature, and presidential cabinets, when in the presence of more copartisan support in the legislature, should feature higher rates of nonpartisan members. My theory further predicts that the president's legislative contingent will interact with another institutional variable such as legislative fragmentation as well as with contextual variables such as presidential popularity and electoral cycle since these variables may grant additional leverage to presidents in the cabinet formation process. Specifically, presidents who face more fragmentation in the legislature, have higher approval ratings, and are at an earlier point in their term will be more likely to appoint nonpartisan ministers as the president's legislative contingent increases. The time-series cross-section analysis of my original dataset provides strong evidence to support my hypotheses, particularly on the effects of the president's legislative contingent and its interaction with presidential popularity.
First, the positive impact of the president's legislative contingent on the incidence of nonpartisan appointments is consistent and significant throughout diverse empirical tests, suggesting that it plays a critical role as a key institutional condition in the cabinet formation process. Second, presidential popularity has a powerful impact on cabinet appointment decisions as well as on the president's legislative contingent. Presidential cabinets composed by popular presidents feature higher rates of partisan members than cabinets composed by unpopular presidents when in the presence of minority presidents. They also feature higher rates of nonpartisan members when in the presence of plurality/majority presidents. This finding is in line with findings in the literature that popular presidents are less likely to see defections from their cabinets than less popular ones, because parties have stronger incentives to stay in the government led by popular presidents (Martinez-Gallardo, 2012, p. 80). In contrast, unpopular presidents are not granted much leverage from an increasing share of copartisans in the legislature as the effect of the president's legislative contingent is considerably mitigated by their low public support.

Third, legislative fragmentation also has a statistically significant impact on the cabinet appointment decisions as well as the president's legislative contingent, but its positive effect is attenuated rather than reinforced by interaction with the latter. Yet the nonpartisan share in presidential cabinets is consistently higher in multiparty competition than in two-party competition throughout the varying extents of the president's legislative contingent. In sum, facing a less competitive legislature provides some leverage to presidents in the cabinet formation process, but its impact seems somewhat reduced toward the positive end across the range of president's legislative contingent. Lastly, the
effect of the president's legislative contingent on the incidence of nonpartisan appointments is positive and statistically significant even for a lame duck president whose term is ending. However, the effect in Asian democracies of the presidential electoral cycle on parties' incentives to demand cabinet posts is not as clear as in the literature (e.g., Altman, 2000; Martinez-Gallardo, 2011).

3.6. Acknowledgements

Parts of Chapter 3 has been converted for future publication in the following paper: "Legislative Support Versus Policy Performance: Presidential Power and Cabinet Formation in Asian Democracies." In this paper, I was the primary author and source of the material used here.

References


**Appendix**


4. Quality of Bureaucracy and Ministerial Choice in Presidential Democracies

One of the most distinct features of presidential governments is the remarkable share of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet compared to those of parliamentary and semi-presidential governments (Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010). In Chapter 3, I showed that presidential cabinets in four Asian democracies had been occupied, on average, by a majority of nonpartisan ministers since democratic transition. Despite the dominant presence of nonpartisan ministers in presidential cabinets, our knowledge about these ministers is very limited. Typically, the share of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet is treated in an aggregate manner (Amorim Neto, 2006; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Almeida & Cho, 2007; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009b, 2010; Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010; Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015). Supposing there is wide cross-national variation in the composition of nonpartisan ministers (i.e., subtypes of nonpartisans), what would explain this variation? In this chapter, I pay attention to this variation across presidential democracies in Asia.

In Chapter 3, I provided evidence that laid out varying shares of the subtypes of nonpartisan ministers in presidential cabinets across Asian democracies (Table 3.2). There are two notable points that arise from the evidence. First, nonpartisan ministers are professionals in their respective fields, such as civil service, academia, business, or law. Second, these four subtypes together explain four-fifths of nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet, a majority of whom are specifically either civil service officials or professors. However, the cross-national variations of the two categories are quite a contrast; while
professors are popular candidates for cabinet posts in all four countries, the presence of civil service officials is markedly more prevalent in the cabinets of South Korea and Taiwan than Indonesia and the Philippines. The pattern of this cross-country variation is illustrated in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: Share of Nonpartisan Ministers with Civil Service Backgrounds in Twenty-one Presidential Administrations from Four Asian Democracies

Notes: Ma in Taiwan, Aquino III in the Philippines, and SBY in Indonesia are incumbent presidents still in office as of the end of 2012. A unit of analysis is a country-month. Source: East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.

Figure 4.1 presents data on the proportion of nonpartisan ministers with civil service backgrounds to the total number of nonpartisan ministers in presidential cabinets from twenty-one administrations of four Asian democracies. The proportion is recorded
based on the monthly observation of cabinet composition between 1986 and 2012. Focusing on a cross-national pattern gives a clear picture of systematic variation. On average, South Korea (52 percent) and Taiwan (35 percent) have more nonpartisan or professional ministers appointed from the civil service system than the Philippines (14 percent) and Indonesia (19 percent). This observation leads to the question: What explains this systematic variation in the appointment of professional ministers across presidential democracies, and why did some presidents appoint professional ministers primarily from within the executive branch while others engaged more from outside the bureaucracy?

In Chapter 2, I argued that the appointment of nonpartisan ministers would be more prevalent as presidential influence vis-à-vis the legislature becomes greater, which gives chief executives more leeway to focus on administrative goals. Chapter 3 provided time-series cross-national evidence in support of this argument. In this chapter, I turn my attention toward a presidential administrative strategy to increase the effectiveness of policy execution. In particular, this chapter describes how administrative challenges stemming from the structure of the bureaucracy and pressures to obtain effective policy implementation shape the presidential personnel operation, specifically the appointment of professional ministers to the cabinet. While two previous chapters examined cabinet appointments in the executive-legislative dimension, this chapter takes a president's cabinet choices into account in the executive-bureaucracy dimension.

Using the principal-agent framework, I first examine how chief executives in parliamentary and presidential systems face a different type of agency problem given

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1 The respective years of the cases included are: Indonesia (1999-2012), the Philippines (1986-2012), South Korea (1988-2012), and Taiwan (1993-2012). Table 3.1 provides a specific term of each administration.
their delegation mechanisms. Then I look into a variety of political mechanisms used to control executive agencies in presidential democracy, particularly in the American politics literature, focusing on presidential appointment strategies. Finally, I extend this discussion in comparative perspective by examining four presidential democracies in Asia.

4.1. Delegation Mechanism in Democratic Government

In contemporary democracy, citizens elect their representatives to the government, and civil servants are authorized to implement policy on its behalf. The basic insight that this principal-agent framework provides can help us to understand how the policy process proceeds in representative democracy: from voters as principals all the way to executive agencies that implement policy as ultimate agents (Strøm, 2000). The principal-agent framework is particularly useful to compare the two common and pure types of democratic regimes – parliamentary and presidential – because it allows us to detect the circumstances where agency problems are more likely to happen. Figure 4.2 gives a stylized display of the delegation mechanisms in parliamentary and presidential democracies.

The political processes of the two systems show a clear contrast. While a principal-agent relationship in parliamentary democracy is linked by a single chain of delegation from voters all the way to executive agencies, a principal-agent relationship in presidential democracy features a more complicated delegation sequence from citizens to civil servants (Strøm, 2000; Shugart, 2008). In particular, two discrete steps in the policy process are notable as major points of difference between the two systems. First, voters in
a parliamentary democracy have a single agent as they elect their own representative to a parliament, whereas voters in a presidential democracy generally have multiple competing agents as they separately elect legislators and presidents who represent incongruent constituencies. Second, civil servants in parliamentary democracy have a single principal, their respective cabinet minister, and are simply accountable to their head in the department. However, civil servants in presidential democracy have multiple principals, mainly presidents and legislators, who may place conflicting demands on their agents in an attempt to hold them accountable (Strøm, 2000, pp. 268-269). In this section, I will focus on the second scenario to further examine different types of mechanisms to control executive agencies and discuss how institutional design affects a chief executive's efforts to manage agency problems.

---

**Parliamentary Democracy**

Voters → Parliament → Prime Minister → Cabinet Minister → Department

**Presidential Democracy**

Voters → President → Legislature → Secretary → Department

---

Figure 4.2: Delegation Mechanisms under Parliamentary and Presidential Democracy

*Note: The idealypical form of parliamentary democracy is based on the Westminster democracy of Great Britain and that of presidential democracy is based on the presidential system of the United States. Sources: Strøm (2000, 2003), Shugart (2008).*
In representative democracy, one of key governing goals for every government is the effectiveness of policy implementation. Whether in parliamentary or presidential democracy, chief executives have to delegate to agencies in the policy process and thus have explicit concerns for managing policy performance. The principal-agent models addressing democratic governance and control of civil servants have commonly raised the question of how to effectively control agent behavior so that the incentives of civil servants are aligned with principals' policy objectives. Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) list four types of control instruments that can be used as political effort to solidify the agency's response capability by restraining agency problems: (1) contract design; (2) screening and selection mechanisms; (3) monitoring and reporting requirements; and (4) institutional checks. The two former methods are *ex ante* means (i.e., before authority is delegated) of attempting to control agency behavior, and the latter couple are *ex post* tools to contain agency loss. In the political process, one typical combined mechanism to contain agency problems *ex ante* is, although imperfect, appointment.² For example, before chief executives appoint cabinet ministers and authorize their delegates to oversee various agencies, they seek to identify the most qualified candidates for each position (screening and selection mechanisms) and establish shared interests between themselves and their appointees (contract design). Therefore, chief executives who are held accountable for the performance of the government will make every effort to have the best available agents appointed to lead executive agencies.

² There are other *ex ante* control mechanisms such as administrative procedures (e.g., McCubbins, 1985; McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987, 1989), legislation (e.g., Epstein & O'Halloran, 1994, 1999; Huber & Shiplan, 2000), and executive orders (e.g., Mayer, 2001).
Given the delegation mechanisms of parliamentary and presidential government that are illustrated in Figure 4.2, the former performs better for the sake of chief executives who seek to control agency behavior through appointment. Under parliamentary government, where a principal-agent relationship is formed in a single chain of delegation so that agents are accountable only to a single principal, chief executives can take advantage of "institutional simplicity" in order to effectively manage agent performance (Strøm, 2000). First, institutional simplicity can lead to administrative efficiency because civil servants have a single principal, thus avoiding potential conflicting demands under multiple principals (Moe & Caldwell, 1994). When a single principal delegates to a single agent, who thus is given more latitude under single principals' supervision, agents may exert greater effort to complete administrative missions as they have greater opportunities to "realize their own goals with their own chosen means"; and principals may also have incentives to exert more effort in monitoring agents as they can claim exclusive credit (Strøm, 2000, p. 276). Second, the straightforward logic of delegation can increase the chances of selecting good cabinet ministers (who are single principals to civil servants) with the intermediary role of political parties as an efficient vehicle for screening and selecting cabinet ministers (Müller, 2000). Parties can help voters to screen and select their representatives in the parliament, and parliament functions as a major screening institution in the appointment process of cabinet ministers in parliamentary democracy. Schleiter and Morgan-Jones

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3 Deviation from the Westminster model also generates multiple principals and agents in parliamentary democracy. In a coalition government, a common type of parliamentary government where a prime minister has to select cabinet ministers from coalition partners and civil servants, how to hold the agents accountable is a primary concern for the chief executive. Often, delegation to coalition partners may lead to high costs that a prime minister suffers due to the divergence of preferences and the difficulty of sanctions against coalition members (see Strøm, 2000; Thies, 2001).
(2010, p. 1425) describe from a principal–agent perspective how institutional simplicity and the party's role facilitate the compatibility of interests and incentives between parliamentarians (elected by voters) and cabinet ministers (chosen by a prime minister):

For parliamentarians the choice of copartisan ministers is the most reliable means to achieve a cabinet that has incentives compatible with their own… Party affiliation ensures that ministers share with the legislators who empowered them the aim of serving the party’s electorate and delivering the party’s policy commitments as well as the fear of electoral accountability, which may cost their party its ministerial and legislative seats. In short, parliamentarians can achieve high incentive compatibility by appointing party members to the cabinet.

In contrast, civil servants in presidential democracy have multiple principals – presidents and legislators – that compete for the accountability of agents and are likely to encounter conflicting demands from these principals. Moreover, under presidential democracy, where presidents and legislators are separately elected by a different set of voters, presidents and their party members may not share identical electoral accountability and interests (Samuels, 2002; Samuels & Shugart, 2010). In this case, copartisan ministers find themselves caught between two competing interests, the interests of presidents and their party, which can result in substantial agency loss (Carey, 2007; Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015; Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Therefore, chief executives and copartisan candidates for ministers may not share identical electoral accountability and incentives under separation of powers and dual legitimacy (Samuels, 2002; Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015). Therefore, controlling agency behavior has been a major concern for scholars of democratic governance as well as chief executives in presidential democracy.
4.2. Executive Control of Bureaucracy in Presidential Democracy: Presidential Appointment as Administrative Strategy

The question of who controls executive agencies under multiple-principal conditions has long been debated among scholars of American politics. The ongoing discussion makes it clear that no single player is dominant as a principal, and no single control mechanism in operation is most effective in the political process. The fact that presidents have to compete generally against the legislature for the accountability of executive agencies but are typically held accountable for the performance of the whole government provides a significant implication for executive control of the bureaucracy: chief executives will exert considerable effort to influence policy implementation by employing one of their important powers – the authority to staff top executive posts in the bureaucracy – to make agencies serve them (Waterman, 1989; Lewis, 2008, 2011). What are the administrative strategies of presidential appointments to gain control of executive agencies, and how do the strategies function for this purpose?

According to perspectives on the "administrative presidency", presidents adopt a strategy of centralization and politicization to enhance responsive as well as organizational competence of executive agencies so that career employees are set to meet chief executives' political needs (e.g., Heclo, 1977; Nathan, 1983; Moe, 1985b; McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984), McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, (1987, 1989), Ferejohn and Shipan (1990), Epstein and O'Halloran (1999); for the presidential control argument, see Moe (1985a, 1990), Moe and Howell (1999); for the interest group capture argument, see Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), Heclo (1977), Lowi (1979), Becker (1983, 1985); for the autonomous bureaucracy argument, see Niskanen (1971), Skowronek (1982), Brehm and Gates (1997), Scholz and Wood (1998), Carpenter (2001). In terms of control mechanisms, they include ex ante tools such as appointments, administrative procedures, executive orders, and legislation as well as ex post instruments such as oversight (e.g., McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984, Lupia & McCubbins; 1994), judicial review of agency rulings (e.g., Shipan, 1997), and budgets (Niskanen, 1971; Banks, 1989).
With the authority of unilateral action, presidents can create and expand parts of the executive branch that are most closely allied with them (e.g., Executive Office of the President) and give their policy staff a central role (centralization), or they can increase the number and location of administrative positions occupied by their appointees in the executive branch and rely more on the personnel ( politicization) (Moe, 1985b; Rudalevige, 2002; Weingast, 2005; Lewis, 2008). As a control mechanism over executive agencies, a strategy of politicization is particularly attractive to chief executives because the power of appointment, anchored in a formal presidential power, has more significant implications for political control of the bureaucracy than any other authority granted to chief executives: Presidents can "take direct action to enhance responsiveness through the administration … by appointing individuals on the basis of loyalty, ideology, or programmatic support" and are also able to "enhance organizational competence … by emphasizing professionalism, expertise, and administrative experience" (Moe, 1985b, p. 245).

What makes appointment power so important for presidents, and why is politicization such an enticing strategy of influencing policy outcomes? The study of presidential politics and executive control of the bureaucracy provides a line of reasoning. First, presidents find that expectations surrounding their performance are often greater than their authority and institutional capacity (Neustadt, [1960] 1990; Cronin, 1975; Lowi, 1985; Moe, 1985b). Given this imbalance, presidents have strong incentives to enhance
their capacity by initiating reforms and making adjustments in the administrative apparatus around them. However, in acting upon these incentives, presidents will find that their resources are wholly inadequate and are constrained by political and bureaucratic opposition, institutional inertia, inadequate knowledge, and time pressures (Moe, 1985b, pp. 240-244). Second, in the organizational perspective, executive agencies seem embedded within the executive branch. Yet, the agencies are not under the entire control of the chief executive but rather "caught in the middle" between the president and the legislature that often disagree about policy, the evaluation of an agency's performance, and the direction of any policy change by the agency (Weingast, 2005, p. 319). For presidents, it is difficult to persuade legislative members to support their policy but it is also tough to persuade relevant agencies to follow executive directions faithfully and transform "the shadow of the policy into the substance of the program" under multiple principals (Nathan, 1983, p.2). Noting the challenges that chief executives face in dealing with the recalcitrant bureaucracy, Wilson (1989, p. 257) describes presidential appointments mainly as administrative strategy:

Presidents see much of the bureaucracy as their natural enemy and always are searching for ways to bring it to heel. Even though they can already make upward of four thousand appointments outside the merit system, many presidents would like to make even more. Those who do not want more appointments want better ones, and so they encourage the promotion into the top administrative ranks of senior civil servants who seem to be their ideological allies.

Lastly, the role of political appointees has proven effective and consequential in executive control of agency behavior (e.g., Calvert, McCubbins, & Weingast, 1989; Moe, 1982, 1985a; Wood, 1990; Wood & Waterman, 1991, 1994). Appointed to the top positions in the executive branch that require decision-making and management abilities
in the policy process, political appointees can change agency policies and substantially affect policy outcomes. As Lewis (2008, p. 7) writes:

Within agencies, political appointees can provide an important means by which presidents control the bureaucracy and influence policy. Appointees interpret the vague and sometimes conflicting laws enacted by Congress and translate them into policy. Since agencies have multiple responsibilities, appointee decisions about budget requests to Congress, rulemaking, personnel, and the allocation of resources inside the agency can significantly influence policy. More generally, appointees monitor bureaucratic activity and communicate the president's vision to the press and agency employees, clients, and stakeholders.

Bok (2003, p. 265) also notes that the practice of having political appointees "allows a steady infusion of great and diverse talent, … ensures an influx of new ideas, … and counteracts inertia." In sum, it is the inadequacy of institutional capacity in the presidency, a conflict of interest within the executive branch, and the key role of political appointees that generate the politicization we observe.

4.3. Comparative Perspective

Presidents who want to mitigate agency problems and bring effectiveness in policy implementation will place their own people in key positions in the executive branch whose job is to exercise control. Yet the variation in the dominant type of agency heads (e.g., secretaries or ministers) observed across countries suggests that there should be underlying conditions affecting the president's choice of secretaries or ministers. What explains this variation across presidential democracies?

Much of the existing literature on political control of the bureaucracy in presidential democracy outside the US has focused on legislative incentives and means for bureaucratic control (e.g., Geddes, 1994; Eaton, 2002; Huber & Shipan, 2002).
Examining the cases of civil service reforms in five Latin American countries, Geddes (1994) argues that politicians' incentives to pursue a strong, professional civil service are shaped by their short-term political interests, that is, immediate political survival. Although administrative reforms may enhance state capacity and provide long-term collective interests in economic performance and regime stability, legislators will prefer to preserve a politicized, patronage-driven civil service which helps them electorally through resource distribution. Therefore, politicians may consider reforms as a set of shared national goals but "behave in ways that undermine these goals" unless the benefits from reforms exceed the costs in lost political resources from giving up access to patronage (Geddes, 1994, p. 19).

Comparing Argentina and the Philippines, two young presidential democracies, Eaton (2002) argues that legislators' policy preferences and inclination for bureaucratic reforms are shaped by electoral incentives, and different electoral rules can therefore provide different incentives for legislators vis-à-vis the bureaucratic reforms. For the same efforts by presidents to broaden tax bases through reform of the tax bureaucracy, legislators from the president's party in the Philippines, who were elected by candidate-centered rules, preferred to maintain a particularistic tax system and resisted presidential attempts to improve the performance of tax-collecting agencies, whereas representatives from the governing party in Argentina, who were elected by party-centered rules, collectively pursued this reform to be implemented as it could "deliver electoral benefits to the party label" (Eaton, 2002, p. 27).

Huber and Shipan (2002) argue that politicians can make different choices in the design of legislation by varying the level of detail in legislative statutes in order to decide
the level of autonomy granted to the bureaucracy. Politicians intending to constrain bureaucratic autonomy will write longer statutes containing more policy-specific language, whereas those willing to allow greater bureaucratic discretion can write statutes in less detail and with more procedural language. The incentives and ability of political leaders to employ legislation to micromanage policy-making can be affected by such factors as the technical complexity of policy issues, the level of policy conflict with bureaucrats, the legislative capacity to draft detailed legislation, the bargaining environment surrounding the passage of legislation (e.g., the number of veto players), and the bureaucratic environment surrounding policy implementation (e.g., the existence of legislative oversight or judicial review of bureaucratic decisions) (Huber & Shipan, 2002, pp. 11-12).

Most of the relevant comparative studies on presidential control of the bureaucracy examine the arguments about the logic of delegation within the executive branch (Baum, 2007, 2011). Presidents care about policy outcomes and thus have incentives to control the bureaucracy under the conditions facing bureaucrats with divergent preferences. Yet, some presidents, confronted by bureaucrats disagreeing with their policies, cannot simply replace the civil servants who are protected under the law and will instead support more extensive procedural constraints on the administrative decision-making process through the passage of administrative procedure acts (APAs). Among three cases of new democracies in East Asia – the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan – that were commonly having agency problems within the executive branch, the Philippines is arguably the only country that had little need for the enactment of APAs because of no major constraint on displacing recalcitrant bureaucrats.
In the next section, I present the logic of ministerial appointments as a president's administrative strategy, building on the intra-branch delegation logic within the executive branch. I argue that it is the bureaucratic apparatus, specifically the personnel system, that shapes presidential concerns about the aspect of civil service to be controlled or complemented. With varying degrees of civil service autonomy, presidents face a different type of administrative challenge – the political responsiveness versus administrative competence trade-off – which governs their personnel recruitment operation (e.g., Aberbach & Rockman, 1994). To the extent that civil service systems are merit-based and autonomous from political pressures, responsiveness and loyalty will be the main concerns of chief executives over competence and expertise. On the other hand, chief executives equipped with patronage-based and highly politicized systems will gain more direct control over their agents at the expense of administrative capacity due to a limited pool of human resources within the bureaucracy. Thus, personnel systems for civil service provide opportunities and constraints for presidents to exert control over bureaucrats through political appointments. What we need, therefore, is a comparative theory taking into account personnel systems which shape presidential incentives to control civil servants, in order to explain cross-country variation in the pattern of appointing agency heads to executive branch posts such as cabinet ministers.

4.3.1. Theory and Hypotheses

The motivation of presidents to control bureaucrats is predicated on the fact that chief executives are responsible for the performance of the whole government and should thus care about policy outcomes. Given the complex conditions of multiple principals in
presidential democracy, however, presidential policy goals and preferences may not be shared by bureaucrats whose behavior is influenced by other players in the policy process. It takes chief executives' significant effort to control agency behavior by employing their most important power, the power of appointing their own people to top executive positions in every department. In every administration, presidential success in controlling the bureaucracy indeed relies on their success in filling top executive posts (Lewis, 2008).

Since the power to appoint agency heads typically leads to influence in setting agency goals and directing its priorities – possibly changing agency policies and substantially affecting policy outcomes – political leaders and bureaucrats have a particular interest in who heads departments or ministries. Not only presidents have explicit preferences for political appointees who have certain qualities; bureaucrats might also favor one type of principal over another. Given the assumption in a principal-agent relationship that principals will make optimal choices to control their agents (Huber, 2000), we can derive the following logic: if presidents can manage agency problems with ministerial appointments, and the types of problems presidents face in delegation processes vary across institutional settings, then we are likely to see a systematic relationship between the types of problems and the types of appointees selected to address specific agency problems.

As mentioned above, the two conflicting aspects of civil service are political responsiveness and administrative competence (Almond & Powell, 1966; Hojnacki, 1996). For presidents who care about policy outcomes, both elements are essential in the policy implementation process. Chief executives need capable public employees so that the civil servants can perform to the standards required to pursue their policy objectives.
However, presidents also want their policies to be implemented by public personnel who are highly aligned with their policy preferences. Facing this trade-off between the two aspects of civil service, chief executives' concerns in delegation processes are not uniform across presidential governments. Rather, the types of agency problems presidents face are likely to vary, depending on the key institutional characteristics of the civil service system: how civil servants are recruited, trained, assessed, and promoted in the bureaucratic apparatus (Baum, 2007).

How does variation in personnel systems for civil service affect an administrative strategy for presidential control of the bureaucracy? Before addressing the question, let me first examine the variation in personnel systems for civil service. To describe the main features of different personnel systems, I adopt the idea from Evans and Rauch's (1999) "Weberianness Scale," a simple measure of the degree to which civil service systems are characterized by merit-based recruitment and predictable procedures for promotion. At one end of the scale, the highly professionalized and autonomous bureaucracy is characterized by "meritocratic recruitment through competitive examinations, civil service procedures for hiring and firing rather than political appointments and dismissals, and filling higher levels of the hierarchy through internal promotion," (Rauch & Evans, 2000, pp. 50-51) which are also the key institutional characteristics of "Weberian" democracy (Weber, 1978). At the other end of the measure, the highly politicized and patronage-based bureaucracy is characterized by political affiliation as the key selection criteria for executive posts throughout the organization hierarchy, giving chief executives vast influence over the agencies through hiring and
firing political appointees into and from the executive posts.\textsuperscript{6} Therefore, across the continuum of personnel systems, presidents face variation in the types of agency problems ranging between political responsiveness and administrative competence. Presidents have a sizeable pool of talented personnel from meritocratic and autonomous bureaucracies which are also characterized by their negative aspect of political impenetrability and insular professionalism. In contrast, presidents have extensive control over patronage-based and instrumental bureaucracies which, however, also suffer "lower human capital" and "greater difficulty with recruitment and retention of high-capacity bureaucrats" (Krause, Lewis, & Douglas, 2006, p. 772).

I argue that the institutional characteristics of bureaucracies provide incentives for presidents to behave systematically in personnel recruitment operations for executive control of bureaucrats. Given a sizable pool of competent civil servants within meritocratic and autonomous bureaucracies, presidents can pursue and enhance political responsiveness by promoting senior civil servants who seem to be ideologically aligned with them – the so-called administrative loyalists – into top executive positions (e.g., Nathan, 1983; Weingast, 2005; Wilson, 1989).\textsuperscript{7} Since these administrative loyalists are reliable agents who are experts in their field, presidents can empower them to deliver chief executives' policy commitments. Given their experience and long-term careers within the organization, administrative loyalists are also placed in a better position to manage rank-and-file civil servants in meritocratic bureaucracies: "Bureaucrats who see


\textsuperscript{7} In many democratic governments, it is typical to make this kind of "hybrid appointments" where "merit, defined by meeting explicit and contestable criteria, is accompanied by subjective political judgments" (World Bank, 2000).
themselves as having joined their confrères in office by virtue of sharing similar abilities are more likely to internalize shared norms and goals ... Identification with colleagues and the organization itself should also … increase the effectiveness of monitoring (Evans & Rauch, 1999, p. 752).” Employing various politicization techniques to increase a number of political appointees in managerial positions (Lewis, 2008), presidents can staff top executive posts with as many loyalists as possible. In sum, the strategy of appointing administrative loyalists is one indirect but sophisticated means to control autonomous and closed civil service systems.

Facing patronage-based bureaucracies, presidents can enjoy vast influence over the organization but need to seek administrative competence from outside the agency. In cases where political appointments run deep into the organization hierarchy, presidents gain direct and greater control over the bureaucracy (Baum, 2011; Endriga, 2001), but they encounter a dilemma of a limited pool of competence within the bureaucracy. Under a system based on ad hoc criteria, it is difficult to shape individual motivations lined up with organizational, long-term goals (Cruz & Keefer, 2012; Evans & Rauch, 1999), which implies a lower chance of effectiveness in bureaucratic performance. That recruitments and promotions are politicized means a large number of civil servants are likely to leave once newly elected presidents take office. Moreover, a lack of established, transparent hiring and promotion standards as well as unpredictable long-term careers will deter civil servants from putting much effort into policy implementation. Hence, it is relatively rare to see high-capacity bureaucrats promoted into top executive positions in patronage-based systems. In addition, as the presidential term elapses, the availability of high-quality potential candidates inside the bureaucracy will be depleted by the need for
frequent replacements (e.g., Dewan & Myatt, 2010). In most cases, chief executives in patronage-based systems will therefore find executive talent from outside the bureaucracy by staffing top executive posts with cronies who are professionals in their respective fields, such as professors, business leaders, or legal advisors. This discussion leads to the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** Presidents are more likely to appoint professional ministers from within the bureaucracy rather than from an external pool when they face autonomous and merit-based bureaucracies.

**Hypothesis 2:** Presidents are more likely to appoint professional ministers from an external pool rather than from within the bureaucracy when they face patronage-based bureaucracies.

**4.3.2. Institutional Characteristics of Civil Service Systems in Four Asian Democracies**

Before testing the main empirical implications of this theory, I will compare the key institutional characteristics of civil service systems in four presidential democracies in Asia: South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Comparing these four cases has clear advantages regarding research design: while controlling for potential confounding variables across regions and institutional forms (Baum, 2007), the varying degrees of civil service autonomy and competence across bureaucratic apparatuses of presidential democracies will allow us to observe systematic variation between the types of agency problems presidents face and the types of appointees they prefer for controlling bureaucrats. Additionally, a comparative study focusing on presidential democracies in

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8 These professional ministers are described as loyalists because they are often "members of the president's clique" and "selected to have incentives that coincide closely with the president's goals" (Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015, p. 7).

9 See Chapter 2 for the justification of including and comparing Taiwan, a semi-presidential system, with other presidential systems.
Asia contributes to recent scholarly efforts to extend the debate on this topic beyond the U.S. case (e.g., Baum, 2011).

a. South Korea

A merit-based career civil service system has been institutionalized in South Korea since the amendment of the National Civil Service Law in 1963 (Rho & Lee, 2010). Most recruitments are made at the entry level through centralized competitive examinations at civil service grades 5, 7, and 9 (lowest), respectively with limited open recruitment (Moon & Hwang, 2013). Promotions are also based on a relatively transparent and rule-bound system so that civil servants can have predictable and rewarding long-term careers.10 Public employees ranked lower than grade 5 are evaluated for advancement through a written series of tests, and senior civil servants are assessed by the Promotion Review Committee regarding their career history and evaluations as well as specialization and performance (Kim, 2010, p. 455).

While South Korea's civil service system is well-known for its high professional competence and impressive performance that formed a basis of the "developmental state" (e.g., Johnson, 1987; Amsden, 1989), it has its own problems, particularly the problems of bureaucratic rigidity. Under the three decades of military rule in South Korea, bureaucrats' incentives were tied mainly to presidents; with democratic transition, however, other players such as the public and legislators can access and influence the policy-making process. At the same time, there are greater chances of bureaucratic

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10 On average, it takes three years (minimum requirement of two years) to be promoted from grade 9 to 8, five years (three years as a minimum requirement) from grade 8 to 7, seven years (three years as a minimum requirement) from grade 7 to 6, and nine years (four years as a minimum requirement) from grade 6 to 5 (Rho & Lee, 2010, p. 341).
resistance to presidential policy initiatives and reforms because most Korean career civil servants, being extremely independent and highly professionalized in the formulation and implementation of political agendas, are likely to stay in the government longer than their chief executives who are limited to a single five-year term (Kim, 2001; Baum, 2007).

When President Kim Young-sam became the first civilian president of democratic South Korea in 1993, his major economic reforms, including deregulation and privatization, were resisted by bureaucrats who preferred to maintain the status quo (Baum, 2007).

Since the democratic transition, administrative reform has been an important part of presidential agendas, and presidents have recently introduced several reform initiatives in an effort to transform a traditionally closed and seniority-based system into a more open, competitive, and performance-based system (Kim, 2010; Moon & Hwang, 2013). These reform initiatives include using open recruitment and performance-based promotion at the senior level.11 Yet, presidential efforts to improve executive management by influencing agency behavior are not limited to adopting administrative reform initiatives. Chief executives can appoint reliable agents who are experienced and capable of making autonomous and professionalized public employees pursue presidents' objectives.

Appointing senior civil servants as professional ministers to the cabinet has positive implications for bureaucrats as well as for presidents who want to balance the two conflicting sets of administrative goals (i.e., political responsiveness versus administrative responsibility). By selecting and promoting senior civil servants whose

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11 For open recruitment, 20 percent of positions ranked from grade 1 to 3 are open to external candidates. Senior civil servants (grade 3 or higher) are now promoted based on their performance as well as the level of importance and difficulty of their job over seniority (see Kim, 2010, pp. 461-464).
political ideology and policy position are aligned with chief executives', presidents can expect ministers to effectively communicate with the executive office of the president in the policy formulation and implementation process and to skillfully manage subordinates in the bureaucratic organization. The recent assessment of ministerial leadership by 560 senior civil servants in South Korea confirms that ministers with civil service backgrounds are capable of balancing the two conflicting goals in public administration (Jung, Moon, & Hahm, 2008; Lee, Moon, & Hahm, 2010).

Taiwan

Like South Korea, Taiwan's civil service system is characterized by well-established merit-based recruitment and promotion. Similar to South Korea's experience of the developmental state, the national bureaucracy, staffed by qualified and experienced personnel, played a central role in Taiwan's economic development for decades (Wade, 1990; Clark, 2000; Cheung, 2005; Su, 2010). The main personnel system of Taiwan is called the "rank and position combined" system which is composed of three ranks (elementary, junior, and senior) and 14 grades (elementary rank from grades 1 to 5, junior rank from grades 6 to 9, senior rank from grades 10 to 14) (Su, 2010, p. 613). Most prospective entrants must pass highly competitive exams classified as elementary, junior, or senior level and thereafter are assigned to grades 1, 3, 6, 7, or 9 positions depending on the exams they passed. For objective evaluation of public employees, civil servants are

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12 Interview with the former Minister of Construction and Transportation, Choo Byung-jik, in Seoul, South Korea, September 13, 2013. Interview with the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Song Min-soon in Seoul, South Korea on September 16, 2013.

13 The survey results indicate that ministers with civil service backgrounds show high performance in all three categories of agenda setting for presidential preferences, implementation, and internal management (Lee, Moon, & Hahm, 2010, pp. 92s-95s).
assessed annually by an impartial performance evaluation committee that is established by legal requirements.14

However, Taiwan's centralized and insulated personnel administration system has been publicly criticized for its rigidity and uniformity (Su, 2010). Under the current merit-based system, where most civil servants are internally promoted and some of them can reach the highest position in the department, bureaucrats in any rank may have strong motivation for upward mobility which easily leads to high performance.15 At the same time, the closed nature of civil service, including inflexible employment,16 caused a failure to adapt to the changes in the external environment stemming from Taiwan's democratization and created an intra-branch conflict with democratic presidents who saw administrative reforms as inevitable. For more than five decades, from 1949 to 2000, Taiwan was under one party's rule, the rule of the Kuomintang (KMT). Until 1992, when martial law was lifted and opposition parties were allowed to compete against the KMT, bureaucrats' incentives were closely tied to the single-party leadership. Even after 1992, when the KMT retained its control over both executive and legislative branches, bureaucrats' continued loyalty to the KMT was not deemed suspicious until more people, now represented by opposition parties, identified the linkage between KMT's vote buying behavior and bureaucratic corruption (Baum, 2007; Chen & Juang, 2010). For President Lee Teng-hui, who was also the KMT leader, administrative reform was essential for his

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14 For a detailed discussion of the process of appraising civil servants in Taiwan, see Su (2010, pp. 618-619).
15 Interview with the former Minister of Economic Affairs and the former Minister of the Council for Economic Planning and Development, Chiang Pin-kung, in Taipei, Taiwan, October 4, 2013.
16 Specifically, the employment at the senior level (grades 10-14) is only made through promotion of incumbent civil servants except for limited cases of military personnel (Su, 2010, p. 615).
party's survival, facing the declining popularity of the KMT and the risk of losing control over both branches.\(^\text{17}\)

In 2000, when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took control of the government with the election of Chen Shui-bian, the DPP government was doubtful of the veracity of incumbent bureaucrats' accountability to the new party leadership after their decades of civil service under the KMT. The first term of President Chen witnessed intensifying friction over the president's policy agenda between the DPP administration and the national bureaucracy (e.g., constructing a fourth nuclear power plant), which in turn resulted in the resignation of several hundred high ranking civil servants (Su, 2010).

To control the distrustful bureaucracy, President Chen made two strategic personnel choices. First, given a limited pool of reliable candidates among senior civil servants when he took office in 2000, he appointed a large number of professional ministers with academic backgrounds and invited them to join the DPP (jingyingrudang; elites joining a political party). More importantly, Chen deliberately reshuffled the bureaucratic hierarchy by promoting bureau heads and lower ranking government officials to positions as department heads or ministers, some of whom were also later recruited as DPP members. The personnel reshuffle was one way of earning loyalty from promoted civil servants and of filling the previously KMT-dominant system with DPP people.\(^\text{18}\)

When the KMT returned to power with the election of Ma Ying-jeou in 2008, the new administration again showed distrust of incumbent civil servants and accused them of partisan bias (Su, 2010). President Ma selectively appointed senior civil servants to his

\(^{17}\) See Baum (2011, pp. 62-79) for a case study of the KMT's intra-party conflict over bureaucratic reform.  
\(^{18}\) Personal Conversation with Dr. Wu Yu-shan at Academia Sinica in Taipei, Taiwan, October 21, 2013.
cabinet and brought back some former ministers and government officials who served in the KMT administration more than eight years prior. Today, the current civil service in Taiwan is facing a new challenge of "how to secure political impartiality in a transitional system characterized by uncertainty and serve ministers of any government in office with nonpartisan loyalty" (Su, 2010, p. 621). Since democratic transition, the once-insulated bureaucracy has been exposed to greater influences from the external environment, and administrative reform thus far has been aimed at reducing corruption, improving administrative efficiency, promoting integrity, and rebuilding public trust in civil servants (Su, 2010; Moon & Hwang, 2013). The president's dilemma of civil service reform to enhance political impartiality is that it may undermine political responsiveness and loyalty to the incumbent administration. In contrast to South Korea where its authoritarian era was ruled by military leaders who are not likely to return to the government after democratization, the authoritarian period of Taiwan was dominated by the KMT, a single party which is still around as an incumbent governing party since 2008 after experiencing a power transfer with DPP. Presidents with new party leadership have therefore been hesitant to pursue the full political neutrality of the professional civil service to a greater degree, despite their ongoing suspicions about the loyalty and partisan bias of bureaucrats who entered service prior to the time when they took control of the government.

**Philippines**

The current civil service system in the Philippines is based on the constitutional framework for a professionalized and merit-based system. After the fall of a dictatorship
led by President Ferdinand Marcos, the 1987 Constitution mandates the Civil Service Commission (CSC), one of three independent Constitutional Commissions,\(^{19}\) to administer the civil service,\(^ {20}\) and the CSC shall make civil service appointments "only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination" (1987 Constitution, Article IX, Section B.2.2). The principle of merit-based appointments through a competitive technical examination for the Philippine administrative system was reiterated in the Administrative Code issued in 1987 (Mangahas & Tiu Sonco II, 2011). The civil service system is composed of career and non-career track positions, and there are three levels of career employees (first, second, and third) categorized depending on the types of their job characteristics (see Mangahas & Tiu Sonco II, 2011, p. 432). Promotions of career employees to higher ranks need to meet certain standards of qualification and performance.

In practice, the Philippine bureaucracy has been highly responsive and relatively subservient to the political leadership because of presidential power and its associated means of reorganizing the bureaucracy (see Cariño, 1992; Endriga, 2001). As noted, the civil service law in the 1987 Constitution gives exceptions for civil service appointments supposedly based on the merit and fitness principle by allowing special appointment to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical. Thus, the basic legal mechanism exists for party loyalty and patronage to be rewarded through

\(^{19}\) The Commission on Audit and the Commission on Elections are two other independent Constitutional Commissions.
\(^{20}\) The Civil Service Commission is composed of a chairman and two commissioners who shall be appointed by the president with the legislative consent of the appointment commission for a term of seven years for a chairman, five years for a commissioner, and three years for another commissioner, without reappointment (1987 Constitution, Article IX, Sections B.1.1-2).
political appointments (Endriga, 2001). The Career Executive Service (CES), a third level of career positions, was created by Presidential Decree No. 1, and about 10,000 positions in the CES today are subject to presidential prerogative (Mangahas & Tiu Sonco II, 2011). The CES positions are managerial posts that are above division chief level, including undersecretary, assistant secretary, bureau director, bureau assistant director, regional director, assistant regional director, department service chief, and other executive positions.21 Given that undersecretary positions typically go to senior careerists in merit-based systems, the appointments of all these managerial positions under presidential authority indicate that presidents have powerful and more direct control over the Philippine civil service. Sometimes, these political appointments run four or more levels lower into the organization hierarchy.22 When President Corazon Aquino inherited a bureaucracy loyal to the ousted dictator Marcos in 1986, she could reclaim civil service loyalty by replacing thousands of bureaucrats with new appointees, many of whom were from the private sector, and by creating additional patronage positions.23 Overall, patronage politics is considered the norm in the Philippine civil service, and the appointments and promotions of civil servants are subject to political influence throughout the bureaucratic organization (Baum, 2007; Mangahas & Tiu Sonco II, 2011).

The downside of political interference and patronage politics is that, although they may result in high political responsiveness and more direct control over bureaucrats, they

22 Interview with the former Secretary of Education, Edilberto de Jesus, in Manila, the Philippines, April 26, 2013.
23 Other than a lack of institutionalized civil service protection, the transition Freedom Constitution provided a legal basis of dismissing public employees appointed and elected during the Marcos era (see Cariño, 1992; Baum, 2011).
cause governance issues, becoming "major stumbling blocks to government efficiency and effectiveness" (Berman, 2011, p. 24). With political interference and patronage undermining merit-based recruitment procedures and impeding career advancement, government employees have weak incentives to strive for high performance because excellence in public office is not likely accompanied by such rewards as a promotion and an increasing salary (Varela, 1996; Mangahas & Tiu Sonco II, 2011). Moreover, the motivation of individual officeholders to engage in the activities of pursuing short-term private gains (e.g., rent-seeking or other corrupt behavior) over long-term public interest is more pronounced in a civil service system that is susceptible to political influence due to preferential appointments versus the system that is established by transparent recruiting and promotion standards. As Evans and Rauch (1999, p. 752) point out, a system of transparent public personnel administration has the advantage – over a system based on ad hoc criteria – of shaping individual motivations lined up with organizational, long-term goals, which implies a greater chance of effectiveness in bureaucratic performance:

[C]areers that provide the expectation of a series of promotions related to performance and conformity to organizational norms create disincentives to corrupt behavior, especially if such behavior undermines organizational goals. Overall, meritocratic recruitment and predictable career ladders should help structure the incentives of individual bureaucrats in a way that enhances the ability of the organizations they manage to effectively pursue long-term goals.

The major issues and challenges facing the Philippine civil service are evident: lack of competence and weak incentive structure. As witnessed from the Aquino government's massive substitution of business personnel for incumbent civil servants, Philippine presidents seeking a loyal bureaucracy typically find a pool of individuals with
managerial and technical skills from outside the civil service. Due to its susceptibility to political influence on appointments, the Philippine civil service preserves a limited pool of experienced and qualified careerists who can reach the top executive positions. In addition, personnel choices made through this type of political patronage and accommodation system often cause a mismatch between required and actual performance as politicians, who are less restricted by transparency requirements and rule-bound standards in employee selection, can place the types of clients not otherwise qualified for work in the public sector, into plum positions solely for their private objectives (Huber & McCarty, 2004; Cruz & Keefer, 2012). Since the Philippines' democratic transition, administrative reform efforts by presidents have aimed primarily at enhancing government efficiency and effectiveness through streamlining the bureaucracy. Yet, without fundamental reforms that establish and institutionalize transparent and objective public personnel administration, civil servants will hardly be motivated to pursue organizational, long-term interest as their career goals. When it comes to appointments across high ranking positions at the CES, political accommodations prevail, and it is the president who has the authority to maintain or change the status quo (Mangahas & Tiu Sonco II, 2011).

Indonesia

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24 Without a predictable and rewarding prospect of career advancement in the civil service, individual officeholders also have little incentive to stay and strive for high performance in the government (Evans & Rauch, 1999).
25 For politicians' incentives to undertake reforms for a merit-based bureaucracy, see Geddes (1994) and Huber and McCarty (2004).
The current civil service system of Indonesia is legally based on Law No. 5 of 2014 which amends Laws No. 8 of 1974 and No. 43 of 1999. Because it has been only a year since the enactment of a new civil service law on January 15, 2014, most aspects of the Indonesia's civil service discussed here will be based on the observation of administrative reform efforts after the enactment of Law No. 43 of 1999, accompanied briefly by the outlook under the new law. After President Suharto's dictatorship in the New Order regime collapsed in 1999, an amended civil service law (i.e., Law No. 43 of 1999) put emphasis on the civil servants' duty to serve the public as well as the state. The reform attempts included requiring objective criteria and competitive processes for appointments and promotions, combating corruption and nepotism in employee selection, and a ban on civil servants holding party membership (Law No. 43 of 1999, General). The principle of civil servants' political neutrality is a particularly important element of administrative reform in the post-Suharto period because the civil service, represented by the Association of Civil Servants (Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia; KORPRI), played a key role in Suharto's authoritarian political machinery. According to Law No. 5 of 2014, Indonesia's civil service system is composed of career civil servants and contract-based public employees, and careerists are expected to provide three types of services: senior leader, general administrative, and special functional services.

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28 Republic of Indonesia Public Administration Country Profile.
29 The Jakarta Post, "Finally a New Civil Service Law". According to Law No. 43 of 1999, the Indonesia's civil service system has four ranks from I to IV (highest), and each rank has four to five grades from a to e (highest). In total, there are 17 grades from Ia to IVe (highest). Individual officeholders' rank is determined
Indonesia's civil service is in transition as the country progresses in its democratization, evolving from an organization whose incentives and loyalty were once closely tied to a single dictator (i.e., former President Suharto) to the more centralized and institutionalized professional body striving for the establishment of transparent and rule-bound public personnel administration. However, there are many obstacles observed in this process. First and foremost, the accountability mechanism for human resource management needs streamlining. The amended Law No. 43 of 1999 lists the National Civil Service Agency (Badan Kepegawaian Negara; BKN), which sets up guidelines on civil service appointments and promotions, as the main agency in charge of appointing and promoting career civil servants. Yet, the National Institute of Public Administration (Lembaga Administrasi Negara; LAN) is also involved in the promotion process as it designs training programs and conducts examinations required for career advancement.30

Then, the Ministry of Administrative Reforms (Menteri Pemberdayaan Aparatur Negara; MENPAN) is the key department in the government which takes responsibility for public personnel policy and administration by supervising and monitoring the BKN and LAN.31

Supervisors and their superiors in the departments and agencies additionally exert significant influence on promoting general civil servants.32 On top of this, some members of the national civil service are recruited by regional governments now that they are

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30 Republic of Indonesia Public Administration Country Profile.
31 The new civil service law mandates the formation of the independent Civil Service Commission which likely takes over the oversight role.
32 Republic of Indonesia Public Administration Country Profile.
empowered to manage civil servants working in the regions under Law No. 22 of 1999 on regional government (Law No. 43 of 1999, General).

With complexity in the accountability mechanism for human resource management, Indonesia's civil service is inevitably open and susceptible to political influence on recruitment and promotion processes. When there is no clear mechanism to centralize and authorize personnel choices with transparent standards in employee selection, there is ample room for political interference such as favorably placing politicians' clients in plum positions in the public sector, possibly for the patrons' private purposes. Without transparent and rule-bound hiring and promotion criteria, civil servants also lack strong incentives to pursue their career goals in public service and align them with the organization's long-term interests due to the uncertainty of reward or even predictability. Like the Philippine civil service, public employees in a system lacking institutionalized public personnel administration have a greater chance of engaging in corrupt activities that undermine organizational goals. Nepotism and corruption in the Indonesian civil service have long been major issues and challenges, and administrative reform efforts by presidents have been targeted at improving the transparency and accountability of personnel administration and management since democratic transition (Moon & Hwang, 2013). The new civil service law enacted in 2014 is a legacy of reform by President Yudhoyono.33 However, the country still has a long way to go to establish a centralized, institutionalized, and merit-based public personnel administration.

Table 4.1 provides a summary of the description regarding the key institutional characteristics of civil service systems and the types of agency problems presidents face

33 The Jakarta Post, "Finally a New Civil Service Law".
in four presidential democracies. In South Korea and Taiwan, where civil service systems are merit-based, responsiveness is the main concern of chief executives over competence. On the other hand, presidents of Indonesia and the Philippines, who are equipped with patronage-based systems, gain more direct control over bureaucrats at the expense of administrative competence. From the logic of a president's administrative strategy postulated above, I predict that presidential cabinets in South Korea and Taiwan include significantly more professional ministers with civil service backgrounds than those in Indonesia and the Philippines.

Table 4.1: Factors Affecting Appointment Mechanisms for Civil Service Control

|                                | South Korea (1988-) | Taiwan (1993-) | Philippines (1986-) | Indonesia (1999-)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Merit-based Civil Service?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>High Political Influence on Civil Service?</td>
<td>No (Lowest)</td>
<td>No (Low)</td>
<td>Yes (Highest)</td>
<td>Yes (High)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness as Personnel Issues?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence as Personnel Issues?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Share of Professional Ministers from Bureaucracy</td>
<td>Yes (Highest)</td>
<td>Yes (High)</td>
<td>No (Lowest)</td>
<td>No (Low)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4. Empirical Analysis

In this section, I test the main empirical implications of the theory presented above with original data collected for quantitative analysis. The central argument points to the importance of variables that affect the administrative strategy of presidents for controlling civil servants and presidential incentives to appoint professional ministers to
accomplish their competing goals in public administration. To test the proposed hypotheses, I use the "East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set," an original dataset described in detail in Chapter 3. The dataset records the composition of 21 administrations in four Asian presidential democracies for the following periods: South Korea (1988-2012), Taiwan (1993-2012), Indonesia (1999-2012), and the Philippines (1986-2012). As previously mentioned, by focusing on presidential democracies in Asia, I can control for possible confounding factors across regions and institutional forms. As a unit of analysis, I use both a country-year and a country-month in various models given the frequency of observation of the key independent and dependent variables, respectively. The dependent variable, *Ministers from Civil Service*, is the share of professional ministers with civil service backgrounds to the total number of professional ministers in the presidential cabinet, which is recorded based on the monthly observation of cabinet composition for each country. Categorization of professional (i.e., nonpartisan) versus partisan ministers and how to set the scope of cabinet are discussed in Chapter 3. The rest of this section depicts the specific measures for the independent and control variables included in the models estimated below.

4.4.1. Independent Variables and Operational Criteria

The hypotheses described above are derived from the theory that presidential selection of professional ministers is mainly explained by the executive incentives that are significantly shaped by the key institutional characteristics of civil service systems. Presidential personnel strategies are based on the types of administrative problems
presidents face that may vary in delegation processes across institutional settings of presidential democracies.

The key independent variable is *Bureaucracy Quality*; this measures the degree to which the central government bureaucracy tends to be autonomous and run by a transparent and rule-bound mechanism for hiring and promotion. The original data are from ratings by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of "Bureaucratic Quality," one of the indicators of Quality of Government. The scale runs from 0 to 4, with the highest marks given to countries where the national bureaucracy is autonomous, transparent, and operates under clear rules for employing and advancing personnel.\(^{34}\)

ICRG ratings on bureaucratic quality, previously used for research on the performance of the national bureaucracy (e.g., Knack & Keefer, 1995), are regularly updated and recorded based on the yearly observation of bureaucratic structure in the world. For this analysis, I use a scale from 0 to 1, normalized from the original 0-4 scale by the Quality of Government Institute.\(^{35}\)

In addition, I also use indices of bureaucratic structure by Rauch and Evans (2000) as a benchmark against ratings from ICRG on bureaucratic quality. The bureaucratic structure indices, employed as an alternative measure for robustness, are constructed based on survey responses from country experts. I adopt two indices – *Merit* ("the extent

\(^{34}\) http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx. ICRG methodology describes how to measure ratings on bureaucratic quality as follows: "The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions (http://www.prsgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/icrgmethodology.pdf)."

\(^{35}\) http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.
to which recruitment is meritocratic at the entry level", ranging 0-1) and Career ("the extent of internal promotion", ranging 0-1) – and sum up each of these index scores within the four respective countries (see Rauch & Evans, 2000, pp. 54-56). Likewise, high points should be given to countries where the national bureaucracy is characterized by "meritocratic recruitment through competitive examinations, civil service procedures for hiring and firing rather than political appointments and dismissals, and filling higher levels of the hierarchy through internal promotion," so-called "Weberian bureaucracy" (Rauch & Evans, 2000, pp. 50-51).

4.4.2. Control Variables

As control variables, six variables related to political and economic settings are included in the analysis. Some of these variables, estimated in the literature, may affect presidential choices or preferences regarding the types of ministers in general, which in turn can influence the share of professional ministers with civil service backgrounds. Five control variables are related to this broad political context. The first control variable is Nonpartisan Share, which measures the share of nonpartisan (i.e., professional) ministers in the cabinet. I include the nonpartisan ministers' portfolio share in order to account for the effect of a president's cabinet choices in light of his or her (unobserved) administrative strategy. The second control variable, Constitutional Powers, measures formal powers granted to the president. It is the most common parameter of presidential power and likely to have a positive impact on the appointment of nonpartisans to the cabinet (Amorim Neto, 2006). I adopt the classification by Shugart and Carey (1992, p. 150) and apply their ordinal scales to information from the constitutions of the four Asian
democracies and other academic sources. The third variable, Popularity, is a measure of the incumbent president's popularity among the broader public. I use presidential approval ratings from national public opinion surveys conducted in each country on a monthly basis. This variable, ranging between 0 and 1, is the combined proportion of respondents who answered "very satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied" to the survey question: "How satisfied or dissatisfied you are in the performance of (name) as President of (country)?" The fourth control variable is Electoral Cycle, measuring the number of days left until the end of the president's term that is mandated by the constitution. It is likely to have a negative relationship with the appointment of nonpartisans to the cabinet, because of the political dynamics of executive-legislative relations that are shaped by the fixed electoral calendar and shift over the course of the president's term (Altman, 2000). Newly elected presidents enjoy the presidential honeymoon and tend to fill their cabinets with more party-affiliated people, whereas lame-duck presidents tend to fill top executive posts with nonpartisans as a relatively easy option (Altman, 2000; Alemán & Tsebelis, 2011; Martínez-Gallardo, 2011, 2012). Fifth, I also control for Age of Democracy, which is the number of years since the country’s democratic transition, because new democracies with an immature party system may be "more conducive to non-partisanship in the cabinet" (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006, p. 639). Finally, I control for Inflation using the monthly change in the consumer price index. As observed in the 1997 Asian financial crisis, presidents tend to increase the number of nonpartisan technical ministers in response to economic calamity. Adopting the proxy measure used to account for this

36 The classification by Shugart and Carey divides the formal powers into two categories – legislative and non-legislative powers – which have multiple types of powers within each category. The overall measure is the sum of the individual scores (ranging from 0 to 4) of each subtype of powers within the two categories. The measure ranges from 9 (Indonesia) to 21.5 (South Korea).
possibility (Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015), I control for this economic context factor in the analysis.

For the two variables *Popularity* and *Inflation*, measurement is based on the estimation of the moving average of three months before portfolio allocation was made (Martínez-Gallardo, 2012). Often, the impact of popularity drops or inflation surges on cabinet formation is not immediate (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006, p. 637; Martínez-Gallardo, 2012, pp. 77-78). Moving averages therefore smooth the monthly data and allow us to measure their lagging impact on cabinet composition. The sources of all control variables described in this section are listed in detail in the appendix (Table A3). Table 4.2 provides summary statistics for the independent and control variables included in the analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<th>Std. Dev.</th>
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<td></td>
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<td><strong>0.17</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.85</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.85</td>
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<td><strong>Electoral Cycle</strong></td>
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<td><strong>961.38</strong></td>
<td><strong>559.34</strong></td>
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables, Continued

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Note: A unit of analysis is a country-month.
Source: East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.

4.4.3. Method: Modeling Presidential Personnel Choice of Professional Ministers

To test the hypotheses proposed above, I chose linear panel models for two reasons. First, the data structure includes repeated monthly observations on the same four cases for more than two decades per country on average. Second, the dependent variable is a continuous variable, which is a proportion ranging from 0 to 1.

My hypothesis predicts that the variation in presidential choice of professional ministers is explained mainly by the variation in bureaucratic structure. Given the relative rigidity of bureaucratic structure within individual countries over time, most of the variation in the estimation of bureaucratic structure should be observed across countries rather than within countries over time. Cameron and Trivedi (2005, pp.715-716) write:

The fixed effects model has several practical weaknesses. Estimation of the coefficient of any time-invariant regressor, such as an indicator variable for gender, is not possible as it is absorbed into the individual-specific effect. Coefficients of time-varying regressors are estimable, but these estimates may be very imprecise if most of the variation in a regressor is cross sectional rather than over time. For these reasons economists also use random effects models, even if causal interpretation may then be unwarranted.
However, the random effects model is typically considered to be less conservative than the fixed effects model because of the possibility of its inconsistent estimation due to "unobserved individual heterogeneity." When there is such heterogeneity correlated with regressors (i.e., independent variables), the fixed effects model can address potential omitted variable bias and produce consistent estimation; on the other hand, the random effects model simply assumes that any unobserved individual heterogeneity is "distributed independently of the regressors" (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005, pp.697-698).

Yet, this assumption of the random effects model that allows for consistent estimation of any time-invariant parameters can be a strong advantage over the fixed effects model. Therefore, my empirical strategy is to build models that can take advantage of this strength of random effects estimation and relax the problematic independent distribution assumption at the same time. Due to its flexibility, the random effects model has been recently used in the literature on coalition formation in presidential democracies (e.g., Alemán & Tsebelis, 2011; Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015).

For this empirical strategy, I adopt two models. First, I use the feasible generalized least-squares (FGLS) estimator of the random effects model for long panels. Given the original data with many time periods but relatively few individuals, FGLS estimation should perform consistently (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). Due to the possibility of cross-sectional and serial dependence in data structure, I run this model with Newey and West standard errors that permit heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to some lag (Newey & West, 1987).37 I also include a lagged dependent variable typically used as an instrument to address the potential correlation between unobserved individual 

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37 The estimation using random effects GLS with robust standard errors and FGLS with panel-corrected standard errors produced qualitatively similar results.
heterogeneity and regressors, which is problematic in the random effects model (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). Specifically, the first model (FGLS random effects model) that I estimate is as follows:

\[ y_{i,t} = \phi y_{i,t-1} + \beta \text{ICRG Index}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_k Z_{i,k,t-1} + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \]

where \( y_{i,t} \) refers to the proportion of professional ministers with civil service backgrounds in country \( i \) in month \( t \), and \( Z \) to a vector of \( k \) control variables that affect the dependent variable, including the share of professional ministers in cabinet, presidential approval ratings, days left until the end of the presidential term, monthly changes in the consumer price index, presidential constitutional powers, and age of democracy.\(^{38}\) The disturbance term, \( \varepsilon_{i,t} \), is assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over \( i \) and \( t \), and the \( \alpha_i \) are random variables that capture unobserved heterogeneity (see Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). The lagged dependent variable is \( y_{i,t-1} \). According to the theoretical expectation of presidential personnel strategies, we should expect \( \beta > 0 \).

Second, I also use one of richer models for random effects, which are "closer in spirit to fixed effects models" and thus relax this assumption of the random effects model. With time averages of the regressors in the panel model, efficient GLS estimation may lead to estimators that "equal the fixed effects estimators" (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005, p. 719). Each of the independent variables based on monthly observations for original data is now averaged per year within the variable. For robustness checks, I use this panel model and estimate robust standard errors clustered on each country. The specification of

\(^{38}\) As explained above, the measurement of presidential approval ratings and monthly change in the consumer price index is based on the estimation of the moving average of three months before portfolio allocation was made.
the second model (GLS random effects model with time averages of the regressors) I estimate is:

\[ y_{i,t} = \beta \text{ICRG Index}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_k Z_{i,k,t-1} + \alpha_i + \epsilon_{i,t}, \]

where \( y_{i,t} \) refers to the proportion of professional ministers with civil service backgrounds in country \( i \) in year \( t \), and \( Z \) to a vector of the same \( k \) control variables that affect the dependent variable. The disturbance term, \( \epsilon_{i,t} \), is expected to be i.i.d. over \( i \) and \( t \), and the \( \alpha_i \) are now equal to \( \bar{x}' \pi + \omega_i \), where \( \omega_i \) is i.i.d. Likewise, \( \beta \) is predicted to be positive.

### 4.5. Empirical Results

The results of the analysis lend strong support to my argument that facing more professionalized and merit-based bureaucracies leads presidents to appoint more professional ministers from within the bureaucracy. The descriptive figure in Figure 4.3 shows the positive relationship between bureaucratic quality and the share of professional ministers with civil service backgrounds. For highly professionalized and autonomous civil service systems, bureaucratic quality scores are high. The civil service in countries from Northeast Asia, South Korea and Taiwan, is characterized by such features, and has a relatively large number of professional ministers promoted from the national bureaucracy. In contrast, civil service systems in Southeast Asian countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, are more patronage-prone, which leads to low scores in bureaucratic quality. In these countries, there are relatively fewer professional ministers appointed from the civil service.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 demonstrate estimated coefficients of variables on bureaucratic quality, political contexts, and the economic environment. Table 4.3 shows estimated coefficients of bureaucratic quality from the univariate regression analysis. For Models 1 and 2, I use the two models specified in the previous section: the FGLS random effects model with Newey-West standard errors and the GLS random effects model with time averages of the regressors, respectively. For Models 3 and 4, I use the same two models, substituting the Rauch and Evans (2000) index of bureaucratic structure as the main variable on bureaucratic quality for the ICRG ratings on bureaucratic quality that are
estimated in Models 1 and 2. As indicated above, the Rauch and Evans index is used as a benchmark against the ICRG ratings. Across models, the point estimates of bureaucratic quality show a positive sign with statistical significance at the $p < 0.05$ level.

Table 4.3: Bureaucratic Quality and Presidential Choice of Professional Ministers, Univariate Regression Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministers from Civil Service (t-1)</td>
<td>0.977</td>
<td>0.977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRG Index</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.668</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rauch &amp; Evans Index</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>– 0.001</td>
<td>– 0.066</td>
<td>– 0.004</td>
<td>– 0.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country 4 88 858 74

Note: For Models 1 and 3, Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. For Models 2 and 4, robust standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table 4.4 shows estimated coefficients of bureaucratic quality and variables on political and economic contexts from the multivariate regression analysis. Likewise, Models 1 and 2 are estimated with the two models specified above to analyze the effects of bureaucratic quality on the presidential appointment of professional ministers, including the ICRG index as the key explanatory variable. Additionally, Models 3 and 4 are estimated with the same parameters specified above, including the Rauch and Evans index as a measure of bureaucratic quality. The point estimates of bureaucratic quality
show a positive sign with statistical significance at the $p < 0.01$ level across all models. In sum, the results strongly support my argument – facing more professionalized and merit-based bureaucracies leads presidents to the decisions to appoint more professional ministers from within the bureaucracy – even after controlling for political and economic contexts such as the share of professional ministers in cabinet, presidential approval ratings, days left until the end of the presidential term, presidential constitutional powers, age of democracy, and monthly changes in the consumer price index. Specific results are discussed below.
### Table 4.4: Bureaucratic Quality and Presidential Choice of Professional Ministers, Multivariate Regression Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minsters from Civil Service (t-1)</td>
<td>0.962</td>
<td>0.927</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)***</td>
<td>(0.019)***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRG Index</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.553</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)***</td>
<td>(0.051)***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rauch &amp; Evans Index</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonpartisan Share</td>
<td>−0.005</td>
<td>−0.105</td>
<td>−0.0001</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popularity</td>
<td>−0.011</td>
<td>−0.095</td>
<td>−0.011</td>
<td>−0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)*</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Cycle</td>
<td>−0.00001</td>
<td>−0.0001</td>
<td>−0.0001</td>
<td>−0.00004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)**</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>−0.003</td>
<td>−0.0001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Powers</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
<td>(0.008)***</td>
<td>(0.001)***</td>
<td>(0.002)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Democracy</td>
<td>−0.002</td>
<td>−0.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−0.002</td>
<td>−0.065</td>
<td>−0.088</td>
<td>−1.358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.022)***</td>
<td>(0.146)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** For Models 1 and 3, Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. For Models 2 and 4, robust standard errors in parentheses.

* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

In Models 1 and 2, the coefficient for bureaucratic quality (*ICRG Index*) indicates a positive sign with statistical significance. As Figure 4.4 illustrates, its effects are also substantively significant. Based on the estimation of Model 1, an increase in *ICRG Index* from its observed minimum (0.167) to maximum (0.847) values leads to a 40 percentage point increase on average in the appointment of civil service ministers among
professional ministers, holding all control variables constant at their median values. To get a sense of the substantive effects of bureaucratic quality, make a cross-country comparison. Since democratic transition, the average ICRG ratings for the Philippines and South Korea are recorded as 0.43 and 0.68, respectively. If the types of civil service faced by presidents change from Philippine to South Korean styles, the presidential cabinet is likely to have an average 14 percentage point increase in the proportion of civil service ministers among professional ministers, holding all else equal. Figure 4.4 shows the marginal effect of bureaucratic quality and the predicted share of professional cabinet members who have civil service backgrounds.

Figure 4.4: Marginal Effect of Bureaucratic Quality and Predicted Share of Professional Ministers with Civil Service Backgrounds

Note: Predictive margins with 95 percent confidence intervals.  
Source: East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.

39 The lagged dependent variable is automatically dropped to measure substantive effects.
Some control variables that consistently reached statistical significance across models in Table 4.4 are worth mentioning. First, the point estimates of *Electoral Cycle* show a negative sign with statistical significance at the $p < 0.05$ level. The coefficient suggests that presidents finishing their terms tend to choose professional ministers from the national bureaucracy. For lame-duck presidents, promoting senior civil servants should be one easy option to fill top executive posts. Second, the point estimates of *Constitutional Powers* show a positive sign with statistical significance at the $p < 0.05$ level. However, the effect of the president's constitutional powers is limited and not as substantively significant as bureaucratic quality to explain variation in the types of professional ministers in presidential cabinets. Figure 4.5 displays the substantive effect of each coefficient in Model 2 of Table 4.4.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{40} A graphical display of the marginal effect of coefficients based on the estimation of Models 1 and 2 is not qualitatively different.
Figure 4.5: Average Marginal Effect of Coefficients from Model 2

*Note: Estimated values with 95 percent confidence intervals.
Source: East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set - see Table A3 in Appendix.*

4.6. Discussion

In this chapter, I have discussed how the key institutional characteristics of the national bureaucracy, such as public personnel administration, shape presidential incentives to choose certain types of professional ministers for the cabinet in an effort to control bureaucrats. I argue that presidents who face a highly professionalized civil service system are likely to take advantage of this talent pool and try to enhance responsiveness by promoting loyal senior civil servants who can manage the merit-based bureaucracy. On the other hand, presidents who face a patronage-based bureaucracy will
appoint cronies who are experts in the relevant policy areas as they have greater influence on the civil service. To support this argument, I provide a systematic exploration of the nature of "political control of bureaucracy" in comparative context with both a case study and a time-series cross-country analysis (Peters & Pierre, 2004).

This chapter also contributes to the literature on presidential cabinet formation as well as political control of bureaucracy by illuminating the neglected but important component in these respective areas of study. With respect to the literature on presidential cabinet formation, despite the dominant presence of nonpartisan or professional ministers in presidential cabinets, their share in the cabinet is thus far treated simply in an aggregate manner. I disaggregate this category by examining different types of professional ministers, taking their major career occupations into account, and explain cross-country variation in the shares of each type within the cabinet. Concerning the literature on political control of bureaucracy, I confirm the importance of bureaucratic values and variables to precisely infer the factors shaping bureaucratic action and properly explain the administrative process (Meier & O'Toole, 2006). As demonstrated in Figure 4.5, my key findings suggest that bureaucratic quality, rather than political factors such as electoral cycle and president's constitutional powers, has a dominant effect on the process of public personnel choices.

4.7. Acknowledgements

Parts of Chapter 4 has been converted for future publication in the following paper: "Quality of Bureaucracy and Ministerial Choice in Presidential Democracies". In this paper, I was the primary author and source of the material used here.
References


5. Presidential Policymaking Strategy and Portfolio Allocation in South Korea

How does executive organization reflect a president's incentives to achieve policy goals? I explore this question in the context of young presidential democracies in Asia, particularly in the case of South Korea (hereafter Korea). Given the central roles played by cabinet ministers in the policymaking process of every democratic government (Marsh, Richards, & Smith, 2002), any effort to understand the patterns of portfolio allocation where a set of ministries tend to be filled by one type of ministers over the other regarding their party affiliation must focus on presidential incentives to achieve policy goals through their cabinet formation. Previous research on presidential cabinet appointment has offered key insights on the influence of legislative strategy and institutional factors (Amorim Neto, 2006; Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010; Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015). But, little is known about how executive-ruling party relations may affect cabinet formation in spite of the fact that these relations often play a central role in allocating individual portfolios in many presidential systems, not just in Korea.

To explain the variation in the likelihood of a cabinet post being held by a different type of minister across ministries of different characteristics, I focus on presidential policymaking strategy, specifically the linkage between ministers' expertise and policy issue areas. I build on the recent literature suggesting that chief executives may have distinct incentives of appointing their party members and nonpartisans to the cabinet in separation-of-powers systems (Samuels, 2002; Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015). In the Korean context, I argue that a president's
party members tend to receive posts where they can exert legislative influence in the relevant fields, while nonpartisans will be assigned to positions that require professional experience and a high degree of loyalty. Korean presidents have historically built executive cabinets by strategically allocating ministerial posts to different types of ministers and thereby fulfill their policy goals (Park, Hahm, & Jung, 2003). Even after frequent changes in portfolio allocation or the organizational reform of the cabinet during the presidential terms, the patterns are largely consistent across the observations of five administrations in Korea.

The discussion of presidential incentives to appoint ministers on the basis of policy criteria is important in Korea, because with a less fragmented party system and a relatively low chance of coalition formation, executive-ruling party relations shape the main dimension of cabinet choices. Presidents often delegate governmental tasks to their party members for the sake of enhancing accountability and representativeness in the government. Yet, they are unlikely to allocate to their copartisans cabinet posts in key policy areas where the heads of department are expected to handle a highly professionalized civil service in order to manage policy implementation. Instead, presidents can delegate these tasks to professionals who have extensive field experience and are less likely to have divergent policy preferences with them.

I evaluate how presidential policymaking strategy has affected portfolio allocation with original data on 467 ministers in five presidential administrations from 1988 through 2013. Classifying ministries into three different categories based on policy criteria, I demonstrate that a president's party members and nonpartisans are systematically appointed to different types of cabinet posts where different sets of expertise and skills
are required to manage relevant policy issue areas. These trends become more distinct with an increase in the president's support in the legislature. When presidents have more leeway in employing cabinet resources by not having to concede them for coalitional support, they can afford to more strongly exert their preferences over portfolio allocation. My findings corroborate the recent literature on the effects of separation of powers on presidential incentives to appoint different types of ministers by providing empirical confirmation for its predictions.

5.1. Patterns of Portfolio Allocation in Korea

Korean presidents' portfolio allocation has shown that a president's party members and nonpartisans are systematically appointed to different sets of cabinet posts, and these trends are largely consistent across the observations of five presidential administrations. As shown in Table 5.1, although there is variation across administrations, most important cabinet posts have been held by nonpartisans in a vast majority of cases. The major career occupations of these nonpartisans indicate that they have professional expertise in their fields. Most Foreign Affairs ministers are former diplomats, Justice ministers are usually legal experts such as judges, prosecutors, or attorneys, and most Defense ministers are former military generals. By contrast, the ministries most frequently and commonly allocated to a president's party members are characterized by a different nature of policy issue areas: Political Affairs, Labor, Health and Welfare, and Culture, Sports, and Tourism. The question is whether this consistent pattern across Korean administrations can be mainly attributed to presidential policymaking strategy.
Table 5.1: Copartisan and Nonpartisan Ministers in Executive Ministries across Five Administrations: Percent (Number) of Ministers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonpartisans' Share in Ministry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>25% (1/4)</td>
<td>57% (4/7)</td>
<td>100% (6/6)</td>
<td>100% (4/4)</td>
<td>33% (1/3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>100% (3/3)</td>
<td>100% (3/3)</td>
<td>80% (4/5)</td>
<td>100% (3/3)</td>
<td>100% (2/2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>100% (5/5)</td>
<td>80% (4/5)</td>
<td>83% (5/6)</td>
<td>80% (4/5)</td>
<td>100% (3/3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>100% (4/4)</td>
<td>100% (4/4)</td>
<td>75% (3/4)</td>
<td>100% (3/3)</td>
<td>100% (3/3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copartisans' Share in Ministry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Affairs</td>
<td>71% (10/14)*</td>
<td>83% (10/12)*</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>100% (3/3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>80% (4/5)</td>
<td>40% (2/5)</td>
<td>33% (1/3)</td>
<td>33% (1/3)</td>
<td>50% (2/4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health &amp; Welfare</td>
<td>40% (2/5)</td>
<td>50% (4/8)</td>
<td>14% (1/7)</td>
<td>75% (3/4)</td>
<td>50% (2/4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture, Sports &amp; Tourism</td>
<td>60% (3/5)</td>
<td>50% (2/4)</td>
<td>80% (4/5)</td>
<td>25% (1/4)</td>
<td>33% (1/3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The percentage represents the number of nonpartisan or copartisan ministers out of the total number of those appointed to the ministry. An asterisk (*) denotes aggregation of more than one ministry of similar type. For the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, the posts related to Political Affairs were dissolved.

Source: East Asia Cabinet Minister Data Set - see Table A1 in Appendix.

To identify the appointment mechanism behind this pattern, I will depend on interviews with Korean ministers. Interviews can help us to better understand the causal effect process (Brady & Collier, 2010) as they illuminate the incentives of presidents to appoint a particular type of ministers. Combined with descriptive data and quantitative evidence presented here and later, these interviews will provide insights into the mechanism behind the systematic pattern of portfolio allocation. In 2013, I interviewed nine ministers spanning four presidential administrations.¹ I interviewed both party-

¹ The full list of interviewees is in the appendix.
affiliated and nonpartisan ministers from eight different cabinet offices and asked them about the context of their appointments and the observations they made regarding the relationship between the types of presidential portfolios and the types of ministers. They confirmed the idea that the types of ministries each tend to feature ministerial appointees with distinct characteristics.

Head of ministry jobs are often perceived to be reserved for senior civil servants because they are well-trained and extensively experienced in an established system and are considered qualified to control other professional bureaucrats. If presidents ever appoint their party members to the cabinet, it is likely to be for posts where heads of ministries are expected to exert the legislator's power and experience in the political process. On the other hand, the posts in which ministers need to be equipped with technical expertise tend to go to professional nonpartisans.

Which cabinet posts do presidents specifically allocate to their party members?

My personal interview with the former Presidential Chief of Staff can be illuminating some of key considerations presidents make for this allocation, because he was the central figure whom President Lee Myung-bak largely consulted in the cabinet appointment process. In 2009 when President Lee reformed his cabinet after the first year in office, he decided to appoint four members from his Grand National Party (GNP) to the cabinet. The four ministries involved were Labor, Health and Welfare, Political Affairs, and Economy, which were selected mainly for the following reasons: the representation of strong organized interests (Labor, Health and Welfare), an expectation for department heads to be politically savvy given their major tasks (Political Affairs), and a high likelihood for legislative members to succeed in the executive branch by leaving respectable footprints in policymaking (Economy). The list of the criteria seems a

---

2 Interview with the former Minister of Employment and Labor, the former Presidential Chief of Staff, and the former assemblyman Yim Tae-hee in Seoul, South Korea on August 21, 2013.
little broad, but a common denominator was whether the candidates for the posts were able to exercise the legislator's power and experience in such policy areas.³

In the next section, I examine executive-ruling party relations to explain the systematic appointment of a president's party members and nonpartisans to different types of ministries. Building on the recent literature on the impact of separation of powers on party organization and cabinet appointment (Samuels, 2002; Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015), I discuss how presidential incentives to achieve policy goals, shaped by the institutional features of separation of powers, have resulted in the selective allocation of portfolios in presidential cabinets. Then a series of hypotheses derived from this discussion will be developed and tested with original data on Korean ministers.

5.2. Presidents, Party Membership, and Portfolio Allocation

The recent literature on the impact of separation of powers on party organization and behavior suggests that presidents engage in different incentive mechanisms from prime ministers regarding partisan appointments in the cabinet (Samuels, 2002; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009, 2010; Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Based on the principal-agent framework, these studies argue that variation in the constitutional design formulates the different nature of the relationship between chief executives and their party members, which affects chief executives' incentives of appointing their party members to the cabinet. In parliamentary democracies where a single chain of delegation links the voters' choice of parliamentary members to the

---

³ Interview with the former Minister of Employment and Labor, the former Presidential Chief of Staff, and the former assemblyman Yim Tae-hee in Seoul, South Korea on August 21, 2013.
formation of a government by the prime minister, political parties play an intermediary role in screening and selecting cabinet ministers as well as parliamentary members (Müller, 2000). In this system, the incentive of appointing partisan ministers is compatible with parliamentarians' aim, because "party affiliation ensures that ministers share with the legislators who empowered them the aim of serving the party's electorate and delivering the party's policy commitments as well as the fear of electoral accountability, which may cost their party its ministerial and legislative seats" (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010, p. 1425). By contrast, in presidential democracies where chief executives and legislators are elected by different sets of voters, appointing their party members to the cabinet may lead to the divergence of interests and preferences over the direction of the policy agenda between chief executives and partisan ministers due to incompatible incentives (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Legislators, who are elected in local districts and tend to seek reelection, will aim to serve their local electorate and deliver their policy commitments more narrowly focused on regional interests. But presidents whose electorate is a single national constituency may try to appeal to broader voter groups even at the expense of the importance of their party ideology and party organization (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 171). Therefore, different electoral incentives may cause the potential risk of agency loss when presidents appoint their party members to the cabinet.

The scope of partisan appointments in presidential cabinets is reasonably expected to be highly conditioned by the extent to which presidents can control their party organization (Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015). When presidents are granted
resources and institutional leverage to exert control over their party,\textsuperscript{4} they may force their party members to act in their interest. Without such authority to control their party, presidents may choose to delegate managing executive agencies to nonpartisans, with whom they are less likely to have tensions over the direction of the policy agenda (Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015). Moreover, in the context of new democracies where political parties are not as institutionalized as in developed democracies, presidents tend to face a limited capacity in their party organization to recruit executive talent and expand its pools (Samuels & Shugart, 2014). Among new democracies, parties in parliamentary democracies have gradually played an efficient intermediary role in screening and selecting reliable executive agents, but parties in presidential democracies have failed to be as functional to date (Samuels & Shugart, 2014). It is no surprise that presidents in many young democracies seek executive talent for their cabinets from outside their party organization.

Then how does presidential policymaking strategy, shaped by the institutional features of separation of powers, affect portfolio allocation in the cabinet? Previous research on women's appointment to presidential cabinets has examined the types of portfolios women tend to receive (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2005, 2009).

\textsuperscript{4} The resources and institutional leverage can be derived from the electoral and policymaking mechanisms. First, in many presidential democracies, presidents serve as de facto party leaders (Carey, 2003). As party leaders, presidents may exert significant influence on their party members' reelection if they can control candidate selection and nomination process or rank the order in a party list (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997b). Second, if the executive branch has the ability to set the legislative agenda in the policymaking process, decision-making tends to be centralized around the president and individual members of the party are often restricted to amending government proposals (Cheibub, 2007). Legislators in the centralized decision making process act in a more constrained environment, because, "if they want to influence policy, they must do so according to the rules of procedure of the body they belong to and within the terms set by the president" (Cheibub, 2007, pp. 127-128). With these resources and institutional leverage, presidents can reward loyalty and punish dissent by their party members (Zucco, 2009). I acknowledge that resources and leverage can also be determined by other factors such as laws and social norms, but they are beyond the scope of my study.
Despite the recent attention to how separation of powers shapes presidential incentives in cabinet formation (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009b, 2010; Martinez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015), however, little is known about how executive organization reflects presidential incentives to achieve policy goals through portfolio allocation.

I argue that the types of ministries will each feature ministerial appointees with distinct characteristics, given different sets of policy criteria required and requested for heads of ministries (Rose, 1987). There is a set of cabinet posts where professional expertise and experience in the policy areas are deemed the most crucial selection criteria. These areas are critical to the image of presidents and to their performance in office. They are described as "high" policy areas in the sense of being "among the most visible and important responsibilities that a [president] has to manage while in government, and in which alleged failures by incumbents will form a key component of an opposition case against the government" (Shugart, Pekkanen, & Krauss, 2013, p. 5). Those policy areas concern foreign affairs, defense, economy management, and the broad operation of the constitutional system. Qualified candidates for these posts must be competent in the policy areas and should be willing to put loyalty to the president above personal political interests and ambition. Therefore, in forming a cabinet, presidents will delegate the delivery of policy commitments in the key issue areas and the maintenance of their image to those who are competent, experienced, and most reliable. These posts are most likely given not to politicians who may have divergent preferences from the president's policy agenda or may not fully control a highly professional personnel group but are granted to
loyal professionals who have a high level of knowledge and experience regarding what helps the government fortunes as a whole.

In this respect, the choice of nonpartisan ministers can fulfill this qualification. First of all, nonpartisans are "selected to have incentives that coincide closely with the president's goal" (Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015, p. 7). Nonpartisans are generally perceived as loyalists; they are less likely to put their individual political ambition above the president's policy agenda as they tend to stay outside politics before and after serving in the cabinet (Blondel, 1991; Camp, 2010; Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015); and they are usually selected from within the president's inner circle or within the pool of top executive candidates who are ideologically compatible with the president.5 Moreover, by appointing nonpartisan ministers, presidents can take advantage of executive talent from an external pool, not constrained by the limited talent pool of party organization in new democracies. Typically, nonpartisan ministers are regarded as experts in their fields with extensive knowledge and experience6 and are thus expected to competently deliver a president's policy commitments.7 In addition, presidents are also less constrained to control nonpartisans because their appointments and replacements are not tied to the cabinet's factional support within the party or the cabinet's political support in the legislature. Since these policies are the most visible and important responsibilities that every president must properly manage while in office, it is also crucial for the president to be immediately responsive to ministerial drift once identified. Therefore, the choice of

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5 See Nathan (1983), Weingast (2005), Wilson (1989) for "administrative loyalists" who are top executive candidates that are ideologically aligned with the president.

6 For example, more than 80 percent of nonpartisan ministers in Asian presidential democracies are career civil servants, professors, business leaders, or legal advisors.

7 Interview with the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Song Min-soon in Seoul, South Korea on September 16, 2013.
nonpartisan ministers can provide presidents with a variety of advantages for managing their policy program in key issue areas.

But presidents also value the government's political capacity and qualities, such as accountability, representativeness, and governability, which complicates how presidential policymaking strategy affects portfolio allocation. Therefore, executive organization may also reflect the president's desire to enhance the ability of government to respond to the public interest and to coordinate across ministries as well as with their party and the legislature. In this sense, there are some cabinet posts where candidates' political backgrounds and experience are considered more important than their other credentials, because these positions are tasked with consideration of their ability to fulfill this desire. When strong grouped interest exists in the form of civic or political organizations in the issue areas (e.g., Labor, Environment), qualified candidates can be those who specialize in representing organized interest groups or responding to these groups. In other cases, department heads are expected to effectively communicate with other ministries due to the broad and complicated nature of their tasks (e.g., Culture, Sports, and Tourism) or to skillfully coordinate with the legislature and a ruling party for a smooth governing process (e.g., Political Affairs). These posts are most likely given not to politically inexperienced figures who have no basis of party support but are granted to more senior politicians who have experience with the legislature and knowledge regarding how to manage executive departments.

It makes sense to delegate the fulfillment of these political qualities to the members or the leaders of the president's party who are the likely future presidential candidates. The presence of their copartisans in the cabinet is necessary for presidents for
multiple reasons. First of all, presidents need to have their legislative influence and experience in the executive branch. When facing powerful interest groups in the policy issue areas, presidents can place in the relevant posts their party members who represent strong grouped interest. By appointing their copartisans to the cabinet, presidents can promote the aims of enhancing the administration's governability through their political experience and skills to coordinate with the legislature and their party. In addition, presidents may target their copartisan appointments for stronger party cohesion by allocating to their party members the posts that can help them to succeed in the government. In short, the most likely posts for copartisans are those which help them to serve as "a marker for the legislator's power and influence" in the executive branch (Pekkanen, Nyblade, & Krauss, 2006, p. 187), and would not severely hurt the administrations' image and fortunes as a whole when failures are alleged or occur in the policy areas.

Taking this discussion into consideration, I present two basic propositions regarding presidential incentives and portfolio allocation:

**Proposition 1:** Portfolio allocation reflects the value presidents place on the administration's image and fortunes as a whole by naming nonpartisans to "high-policy" posts, rather than other types of posts.

**Proposition 2:** Portfolio allocation reflects the value presidents place on the administration's accountability, representativeness, and governability by appointing their copartisans to "political-qualities" posts, rather than other types of posts.

### 5.2.1. Portfolio Allocation and Political Context

8 Interview with the former Minster of Employment and Labor, the former Presidential Chief of Staff, and the former assemblyman Yim Tae-hee in Seoul, South Korea on August 21, 2013.
How do the patterns of portfolio allocation presented in the previous section change according to political contexts? In this section, I direct my attention toward the effect of political contexts, specifically, the president's support in the legislature, on the president's portfolio allocation. From the two propositions suggested above, I expect that presidents are more likely to name nonpartisans to positions in key policy issue areas; and they are more likely to give their party members posts that can aid in fulfilling their desire to enhance the administration's political qualities. Then, the effect of the president's support in the legislature may strengthen or weaken these trends.

To examine the impact of political contexts on the president's portfolio allocation, I adopt Norris's (1999) elite recruitment theory that includes "supply" and "demand" elements of political recruitment. While supply components include candidates' qualifications and motivations, demand components are decided by political leaders who choose candidates and determine necessary qualifications. For cabinet recruitment, demand should be "a function of political benefits and costs of filling a cabinet post" with a different type of minister (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2005, pp. 830-831). To analyze how the president's legislative support affects the patterns of portfolio allocation presented above, we should understand the presidential calculation of political benefits and costs of filling cabinet posts with different types of ministers, shaped by this political context.

The president's support in the legislature can directly affect the costs and benefits to the president that come from naming specific types of ministers to cabinet posts. When their parties command a majority in the legislature, presidents see their agenda more easily approved (Cox & Morgenstern, 2002) and have weak incentives to form
government coalitions. Presidents with strong legislative support do not pay the cost of distributing scarce cabinet resources that they could concede to opposition parties for coalitional support when they allocate posts according to their preferences (suggested in the two propositions above). When presidents have more leeway in employing cabinet resources, they can afford to strongly exert their preferences over portfolio allocation. Thus, we should see the patterns described in the two propositions more clearly in the president's portfolio allocation. On the other hand, when their party is a legislative minority, presidents have strong incentives to build coalitional support for their policy program. In this case, the benefit of forming a government coalition can be greater for presidents, and the cost of not bringing other parties into the cabinet can be high. Since presidents under minority government are more constrained in their use of cabinet resources, portfolio allocation is less likely to be made following their preferences, and the patterns indicated in the propositions should be less clear.

Taking this account into consideration, I present the third proposition regarding the impact of the president's legislative support on portfolio allocation:

**Proposition 3:** The patterns of the president's portfolio allocation suggested in Propositions 1 and 2 will become more distinct with an increase in the president's support in the legislature.

### 5.3. Empirical Analysis

In this section, I test the three propositions provided above using part of the East Asia Cabinet Minister Dataset, an original dataset on four presidential democracies in
Asia including cabinet members' political biographies and their posts. The Korean part of the dataset contains 467 observations (ministers) across five presidential administrations from 1988 to 2013. It updates but differs from the Korean Ministerial Database used in Hahm, Jung, and Lee (2013) in that it includes political biographies of all ministers (such as their party affiliation and the length of their service as an assemblyman) and covers a more recent time period (from 2008 to 2013).

5.3.1. Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables

In my empirical analysis, my dependent variables are types of cabinet ministers. Specifically, there are three types of ministers in Korea's presidential cabinets: members from the president's party, members from other legislative parties, and members with no party affiliation (i.e., nonpartisans). A large majority (67.7% of observations) of ministers was comprised of nonpartisan members, 28.3% of observations were from the president's party, and 4% of observations were from legislative parties other than the president's. To test the three propositions provided in the theory section, I use two dummy variables as my main dependent variables: nonpartisan and copartisan dummies.

My key independent variables are ministry type and the president's support in the legislature. Analytically, I will divide the cabinet seats into three broad policy areas: high policy, political-qualities, and the rest of low-profile posts. High-policy posts are high-profile positions that are in the most important policy areas. These issue areas involve the salient responsibilities that the president has to effectively manage while in office. Typically, incumbents of these posts are the likely "face" of the president to the public.

9 The four presidential democracies include South Korea (1988-2013), Taiwan (1993-2012), Indonesia (1999-2012), and the Philippines (1986-2012).
and they tend to receive more media and national attention than officeholders in other issue areas (Shugart, Pekkanen, & Krauss, 2013, p. 5). These policy areas concern foreign affairs, internal affairs, defense, economy management, and the broad operation of the legal system. Given the Korean context, the prime minister position is also included in this category. About 29% of posts were for high-policy areas.

Political-qualities posts are those positions that may enhance the administration's accountability, representativeness, and governability. Often, incumbents of these posts are entrusted to respond to strong organized interests on behalf of the president or to play a central role in coordinating across diverse ministries as well as with a ruling party and other government branches. In the Korean context, those areas concern environment, healthcare and welfare, labor, political affairs, and culture, sports, and tourism. About 27% of cabinet seats in Korea can be categorized as political-qualities posts.

The rest of cabinet posts are grouped into the third category. These posts are relatively low-profile positions in the policy areas where benefits are allocated broadly to whole society (public-goods posts)10 or can be used to target specific constituencies if incumbents choose to do so (distributive posts).11 Roughly 44% of Korean cabinet posts in the timeframe under discussion belonged to this category. To test the three propositions provided above, I use two dummy variables for high-policy and political-qualities posts, respectively, as my main independent variables.

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10 Public-goods posts include Education, Energy and Resources, Gender Equality and Family, Public Information, Science and Technology, Unification, and Youth.
11 Distributive posts include the following policy areas: Agriculture, Budget, Commerce, Construction, Fisheries, Forestry, Information and Communication, Land, Maritime Affairs, Trade and Industry, and Transportation.
To measure the president's support in the legislature, the third independent variable in this analysis, I use the size of the president's party in the legislature, which is the proportion of seats occupied by the president's party in the Korean National Assembly. It ranges from 15.4% to 72.9%, with a median of 51.2%, and 90% of the observations fell between 26% and 72%.

Additionally, I also include a set of control variables which may affect the likelihood of one type of ministry being assigned to a specific type of cabinet ministers. The first variable is a measure of how fragmented the legislature is. For this measure, I adopt the effective number of legislative parties, the index created by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). The index gives a higher value for a more fragmented legislature. This variable may be negative correlated with the chances that a president's copartisans or nonpartisans receive cabinet posts, because presidents have stronger incentives to form government coalitions and concede cabinet posts to members of other parties when facing a more fragmented legislature (e.g., Cheibub, 2007).

The second control variable is a measure of the electoral cycle, which is the number of days left until the end of the president's term. This variable can systematically affect the chances that cabinet posts are given to specific types of ministers because of the political dynamics changing with the fixed electoral calendar and shifting over the course of the president's term (Altman, 2000).

12 It is calculated as follows: 

\[
\frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2}
\]

where \( n \) is the number of all parties holding at least one seat in the lower or only chamber, and \( p_i \) is the seat share of the \( i^{th} \) party in the legislature. To handle the cases of independent members and minor parties grouped into others, I employ the scheme developed by Mainwaring and Zoco (2007, p. 173).
The third variable is a dummy for right-wing presidents. I include this variable in consideration of the possibility that political ideology might drive the patterns of the president's portfolio allocation. For example, left-wing presidents may care more about the delivery of policy commitments in the issue areas where incumbents of cabinet posts can promote the government's accountability and representativeness, and place more value on the political-qualities posts by disproportionately appointing a particular type of ministers.

The fourth variable is a measure of economic crisis, and for this I use the monthly change in the consumer price index. As observed after the 1997 financial crisis in Korea, presidents tend to increase the number of nonpartisans in the cabinet in response to economic calamity. Adopting the proxy measure used to explain this possibility (Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015), I control for the economic factor in the analysis. It is notable that this measure is based on the estimation of the moving average of three months before portfolio allocation was made (Martínez-Gallardo, 2012). Often, the impact of inflation surges on cabinet formation is not immediate (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Martínez-Gallardo, 2012), and moving averages therefore smooth the monthly variation and allow us to measure its lagging impact on portfolio allocation.

The last variable of the first set measures the size of cabinet shakeup, which is the proportion of a cabinet reshuffle at the time of individual minister's appointment. The magnitude of cabinet shakeup may affect the patterns of portfolio allocation in a systematic way if it correlates with chances that one type of ministry is more likely to be allocated to a specific type of minister.
The sources of all independent and control variables described in this section are listed in detail in the appendix (Tables A1 and A3). Table 5.2 provides summary statistics for the independent and control variables included in the analysis.

Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-policy</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.453</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political-qualities</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>0.274</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Support</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>0.497</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Fragmentation</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>2.467</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>3.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Cycle</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>1094</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing President</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>0.612</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Crisis</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>4.943</td>
<td>2.371</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>10.979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Reshuffle</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>0.478</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A unit of analysis is an individual minister.
Source: East Asia Cabinet Minister Data Set - see Tables A1 and A3 in Appendix.

5.4. Empirical Results

Table 5.4 presents the results of the logit analysis, which lend strong support to my argument that the president's portfolio allocation varies according to specific considerations. Table 5.4 confirms that nonpartisans are more likely to be assigned to high-policy positions (Model 1), while the president's copartisans are more likely to be given political-qualities posts (Model 3). It also confirms that these two patterns become more distinct with an increase in the president's support in the legislature (Models 2 and 4). Before specific results are discussed below, Table 5.3 provides a summary of the expected signs of estimated coefficients of variables in the analysis.
Table 5.3: Expected Signs of Estimated Coefficients of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Expected Sign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>High-policy</td>
<td>Nonpartisan</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Political-qualities</td>
<td>President's Partisan</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>High-policy x</td>
<td>Nonpartisan</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislative Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political-qualities</td>
<td>President's Partisan</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislative Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.4 shows the results of the effects of ministry type on the likelihood of being assigned to one type of minister. As suggested in Proposition 1, presidents are more likely to appoint nonpartisans to a high-policy post than to other types of posts, which is shown in Model 1. The coefficient of a high-policy post is positive and statistically
significant for nonpartisans. Table 5.4 reports that presidents are more likely to appoint their party members to a political-qualities post than to a high-policy or other type of post, consistent with the logic presented in Proposition 2. In Model 3, the coefficient of a political-qualities post is positive and statistically significant for copartisans.

Table 5.4 also shows the results of the effects of different types of ministerial posts on the likelihood of being allocated to nonpartisans or copartisans, interacted with the president's legislative support (Models 2 and 4). As discussed above, the trends described in the first two propositions - presidents are more likely to appoint nonpartisans to high-profile positions and their party members to political-qualities posts - should be more distinct with an increase in the president's support in the legislature, because presidents are less likely to concede cabinet posts to other parties for additional legislative support in such context.

First, the coefficient of the interaction term (High-policy*Legislative Support) for nonpartisans in Model 2 is positive and statistically significant, which suggests that the probabilities of appointing nonpartisans to a high-policy post become significantly greater than appointing to other type of post with an increase in the president's legislative support. This finding is consistent with the logic stated in Proposition 3. In Figure 5.1, the marginal effect of ministry type on the predicted probability of allocating to nonpartisans is illustrated across the range of the president's legislative support.
Second, the coefficient of the interaction term (Political-qualities*Legislative Support) for copartisans in Model 4 is positive and statistically significant, which indicates that the probabilities of appointing a president's party members to a political-qualities post become significantly greater than appointing to a high-policy or other type of post with an increase in the president's legislative support. This finding confirms the logic presented in Proposition 3. Figure 5.2 demonstrates the marginal effect of ministry type on the predicted probability of allocating to copartisans across the range of the president's legislative support.
The results of the control variables also suggest interesting implications. The coefficient of Legislative Fragmentation for nonpartisans is negative and statistically significant (Models 1 and 2), whereas the coefficient of Legislative Fragmentation for copartisans is positive and statistically significant (Models 3 and 4). A higher value of this variable indicates a more fragmented legislature, and I predicted that the variable would be negatively correlated with nonpartisan appointments, which is confirmed in the first two models of Table 5.4. The variable is, however, positively correlated with copartisan appointments. When presidents face a more fragmented legislature, they have
stronger incentives to form government coalitions and are concurrently more likely to appoint their party members to the cabinet in such context.

5.5. Discussion

The main findings of this chapter are placed in the framework of the dissertation's broad argument: presidents' policy goals and trade-offs they face in achieving these goals. In previous chapters, I demonstrated how presidential incentives to achieve policy goals are shaped by the institutional features of separation-of-powers systems, which I have also discussed at the beginning of this chapter. I have further shown how these incentives are mediated by institutional factors, particularly the president's support in the legislature.

Using the case of Korea, this chapter has demonstrated how the allocation of portfolios is systematically affected by the president's policymaking strategy. The positions in key policy areas are often reserved for nonpartisans who maintain high degrees of loyalty and professional expertise, while the ministries concerned with the administration's political capacity tend to be saved for a president's party members. This allows presidents not only to manage key issue areas where performance significantly influences the administration's image and fortunes, but also to grease the wheels in the governing process.

Moreover, my findings provide evidence of the response to the incentives shaped by political contexts such as the president's support in the legislature. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, legislative support from their own party becomes an important source of institutional leverage for presidents in the cabinet appointment process. When their party gains legislative seats, presidents can afford to strongly exert their preferences over
portfolio allocation. Therefore, we can see more clearly the distinct patterns of portfolio allocation for nonpartisans and a president's party members. Beyond simply observing that different types of ministers are assigned to particular categories of executive office, we see that presidents as chief executives have structured their allocation of cabinet posts, adapting to the changing political contexts.

My findings on portfolio allocation also speak to the recent literature on the effects of separation of powers by providing empirical confirmation for its predictions. This chapter makes a novel contribution to the literature not only by addressing why a president's party members and nonpartisans receive different types of cabinet posts but also by demonstrating how different the types of cabinet posts they are more likely to receive are. Comparative work on the effects of separation of powers suggests that presidents may be reluctant to appoint their party members to key cabinet posts given a limited capacity of party organization to recruit executive talent, particularly in new democracies (Samuels & Shugart, 2014). Indeed, presidential policymaking strategy shaped by separation of powers has a powerful impact on portfolio allocation. How this strategy matters is considerably affected by the particular political context surrounding the chief executive.

References


6. Conclusion

In this dissertation, I examine presidential cabinet formation in Asian democracies. The patterns of cabinet formation in Asia are puzzling, and induce a close examination of the process and the setting through which presidents assign top executive posts to their party members, other legislative members, and nonpartisans. Existing studies, largely based on evidence from Latin American presidential cabinets, account for the partisan composition of the cabinet with presidents' constitutional powers or electoral institutions, which often vary across countries rather than within countries (Alemán & Tsebelis, 2011; Amorim Neto, 2006; Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010; Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015). Yet we observe cabinet changes regularly occur during the presidential terms without new executive elections, and these changes are featured by greater variations within than across countries among Asian democracies.

My theoretical argument, developed in Chapter 2, posits that such cabinet formation patterns manifest changes in the equilibrium cabinet due to varying degrees of players' incentives shaped by institutional and political contexts, which also vary during the presidential term. Presidents have greater incentives to appoint nonpartisan ministers in the cabinet when their party support in the legislature provides them more leverage against the legislature. Presidents, whose cabinet formation is shaped by their legislative strategy as well as the necessity to manage policy performance, have less concern about legislative support and more leeway to control policy implementation when they are dominant in executive-legislative relations. I further examine institutional and political contexts that can affect the incentives of the parties in the legislature, in order to
understand changes in demand incentives for pursuing a cabinet. Specifically, legislative parties are more likely to seek cabinet posts under the following conditions because top executive posts are perceived more valuable to them: when a legislature is more fragmented, when presidential popularity is higher among the electorate, and when a president is closer to the honeymoon period rather than to the lame duck period.

Therefore, understanding the dynamics of cabinet politics requires an explanation for why the perceived value of a cabinet post in a given context results in supply and demand incentives, of differing degrees, for providing and pursuing such political patronage. I evaluated this theory of cabinet formation in Chapter 3 with original data on the monthly observation of 21 presidential administrations in four countries (Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan).

The rest of my dissertation shifts attention to different dimensions of cabinet choice as an effort to identify and fill other major gaps in the comparative literature of cabinet politics in presidential democracies. While Chapter 3 focuses on executive-legislative relations in demonstrating the centrality of balancing legislative support and policy performance to a president's cabinet appointments, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 examine the president's relationship with bureaucracy and with his party, respectively.

The puzzling patterns of cabinet formation in Asia are not limited to frequent variations in cabinet partisanship within countries. Although the remarkable share of nonpartisan ministers is one of the most distinct features of presidential governments (Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010), our knowledge of the cross-national variations in the subtypes of these ministers is still lacking. Notably, the presence of civil service officials
is markedly more prevalent in the cabinets of South Korea and Taiwan than Indonesia and the Philippines. These patterns are a main topic for discussion in Chapter 4.

The argument of a president's administrative strategy, presented in Chapter 4, relates two contrasting types of bureaucracy to variations in the appointment mechanisms for executive control of civil servants. Chief executives need capable public employees so that the civil servants can perform to the standards required to pursue their policy objectives, but they also want their policies to be implemented by public personnel who are highly aligned with their policy preferences. To the extent that civil service systems are merit-based and autonomous from political pressures, responsiveness and loyalty will be the main concerns of chief executives over competence and expertise. Given a sizable pool of competent civil servants within meritocratic bureaucracies, presidents can pursue and enhance responsiveness by promoting senior civil servants who seem to be ideologically aligned with them into top executive positions (Nathan, 1983; Weingast, 2005; Wilson, 1989). On the other hand, chief executives equipped with patronage-based and highly politicized systems will gain more direct control over their agents at the expense of administrative capacity due to a limited talent pool within the bureaucracy. In this case, presidents can enjoy vast influence over the organization but need to seek administrative competence from outside the agency. I evaluated this theory of a president's administrative strategy with the same original data used in Chapter 3.

The systematic relationship between the types of ministers and the types of cabinet posts they receive is another puzzling patterns shown in Asian presidential democracies. Often, the value of top executive posts across the cabinet is perceived not identical, which arguably affects a president's actual personnel practices. However, there
has been no study examining this relationship in presidential cabinets. The observations of five presidential administrations in South Korea described in Chapter 5 reveal that the types of ministries each feature ministerial appointees with distinct characteristics and these trends are largely consistent across administrations.

To account for such correlation in the cabinet, I argue in Chapter 5 that executive organization reflects the president's incentives to effectively govern through selective portfolio allocation. In forming a cabinet, presidents will delegate the delivery of policy commitments in key issue areas and the maintenance of their image to those who are competent and most reliable, namely professional nonpartisans. On the other hand, chief executives delegate the fulfillment of the government's political capability, such as responsiveness to the public interest, effective coordination across ministries as well as with their party and the legislature, and the maintenance of strong party support in the legislature, to senior politicians or political leaders from their party. The in-depth, minister-level analysis of cabinet politics in South Korea corroborates this argument.

My main findings from three empirical chapters (Chapters 3, 4, and 5) can be summarized as follows:

- Presidents are more likely to appoint nonpartisan ministers as their party gains legislative seats, and the president's partisan support seems to be an important source of institutional leverage in the cabinet appointment process.
- Among a set of institutional and political contexts that may affect the incentives of the parties in the legislature, presidential popularity among the electorate is found more consequential than other factors. The parties in the legislature are more likely to
join or stay in the government led by popular rather than unpopular presidents because top executive posts under the former are perceived more valuable to them.

- From these two findings, the following interaction effects are derived: as the president's party gains legislative seats, a marginal increase in nonpartisan appointments is greater for popular presidents than unpopular leaders. When their partisan support is low in the legislature, popular presidents have the advantages over unpopular leaders of attracting other legislative parties to the cabinet, which leads to more ministers of coalition partners in popular presidents' cabinets. On the other hand, when their partisan support is high in the legislature, popular presidents have greater discretion over appointments than unpopular leaders so that the former can name more nonpartisan ministers in their cabinets. These findings are illustrated in the cross-national time-series analysis of Chapter 3.

- Across presidential democracies, presidents who face a merit-based civil service system tend to promote senior civil servants, who seem to be ideologically aligned with them, to cabinet ministers and take advantage of this talent pool. On the other hand, presidents who face a patronage-based bureaucracy tend to appoint cronies who are external experts in the relevant policy areas. These findings are illustrated in the cross-national patterns of Chapter 4, where I demonstrate that presidential cabinets in South Korea and Taiwan include significantly more professional ministers with civil service backgrounds than those in Indonesia and the Philippines. By contrast, a majority of professional ministers in the latter countries have backgrounds in academia or business.
The analysis in Chapter 5 provides evidence that presidents tend to appoint professional nonpartisans to high-profile positions such as foreign affairs, finance, and defense ministries, while they are more likely to appoint their party members to cabinet posts related to the administration's political capacity such as labor and political affairs ministries. These trends become reinforced with an increase in the president's partisan support in the legislature because presidents are less likely to concede cabinet posts to other parties for additional legislative support in such context. The patterns are largely consistent across five presidential administrations in South Korea.

Each of these chapters makes important contributions to the comparative literature of cabinet politics in presidential democracies. In Chapter 3, I demonstrate that presidents have multiple sources of legislative power other than formal authority, which may vary during the presidential terms and affect their cabinet choices. Changes in cabinet partisanship frequently occur during the presidential terms as they provide chief executives with room to adjust to changing political and economic contexts (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Martinez-Gallardo, 2014). Thus far, the literature has overlooked the causes and consequences of the variation in cabinet partisanship within countries. By analyzing these dimensions of Asian presidential democracies that have not previously been explored in comparative perspective, I also contribute new evidence to the debate about the impact of democratic regime type on the quality of governance. Presidential democracies are often criticized due to a lack of incentives for executive-legislative cooperation and weak party representation in the cabinet, which undermine governability
and accountability (e.g., Linz, 1990, 1994; Mainwaring, 1993; Stepan & Skatch, 1993; Valenzuela, 1994). However, recent studies cast doubt on these criticisms with their findings about the frequent formation of government coalitions (Cheibub, Przeworski, & Saiegh, 2004; Cheibub, 2007). My research speaks to this recent literature by demonstrating that presidents work toward coalition formation for legislative support and limit party representation in their cabinets only in specific contexts when they are more likely to control the legislature.

Chapter 4 contributes to the literature on presidential cabinet formation as well as political control of bureaucracy by illuminating the neglected but important component in these respective areas of study. With respect to the literature on presidential cabinet formation, despite the dominant presence of professional nonpartisans in presidential cabinets, their share in the cabinet is thus far treated simply in an aggregate manner. I disaggregate this category by examining different types of professional ministers, taking their major career occupations into account, and explain cross-country variation in the shares of each type within the cabinet. Regarding the literature on political control of bureaucracy, I confirm the importance of bureaucratic values and variables to precisely infer the factors shaping bureaucratic action and properly explain the administrative process (Meier & O'Toole, 2006). This chapter also attempts to consolidate the two different bodies of literature by demonstrating that presidents consider administrative as well as legislative strategy in forming a cabinet (c.f., Martinez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015).

Chapter 5 fills a gap in the literature by presenting how executive organization reflects a president's policy incentives. Often, the value of top executive posts across the
cabinet takes different weights, which, however, has been largely ignored in the comparative literature of cabinet politics in presidential democracies. The in-depth, minister-level analysis of cabinet politics in South Korea demonstrates a president's strategy of distinct portfolio allocation: appointing professional nonpartisans to key policy positions while assigning cabinet posts related to the administration's political capability to his party members. Further research in the future may discover whether and how such patterns of personnel allocation affect the type of policies presidents adopt, and the level of accountability and responsiveness to citizens these policies represent.

References


Table A1: Sources for the List and Profile of Cabinet Ministers in the East Asia Cabinet Minister Data Set

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide</td>
<td>CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments; LexisNexis Academic; Keesing's Record of World Events; Political Handbook of the World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>The Korean Ministerial Database from Hahm, Jung, and Lee (2013); Government and Ministry Web Pages; Yonhap News; Joongang Daily (people.joins.com); Chosun Daily (people.chosun.com); Naver Profile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Executive Yuan and Ministry Web Pages; Kuomintang (KMT) Homepage; Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Homepage; China Times; Liberty Times; UDN; TVBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines; Presidential Office, Government, and Department Web Pages; Business Daily; Business Star; Business World; Malaya; Manila Bulletin; Manila Chronicle; Manila Standard; Manila Times; Philippine Daily Inquirer; Philippine Star; Philippine Journal; Philippine Times Journal; Today; Sunstar; Philstar; The Manila Times; ABS-CBN News; GMA News Online; Bloomberg Businessweek; The Information Site on Philippine Politics and Government at Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Suryadinanta (2002); Jakarta Post; Jakarta Globe; Kompas.com; Merdeka.com; Tokohindonesia.com; The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia Web Site; Government and Ministry Web Pages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A2: List of the Title of Cabinet Members Included in the Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Agriculture and Forestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Culture, Sports, and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Education, Science, and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Gender Equality and Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Health and Welfare</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Employment and Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Knowledge Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of National Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Public Administration and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Special Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Unification</td>
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</table>
Table A2: List of the Title of Cabinet Members Included in the Analysis, Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan (34)</td>
<td>Premier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice Premier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary General of the Executive Yuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Economic Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of National Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Transportation and Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Agricultural Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Atomic Energy Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Central Personnel Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Coast Guard Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Council for Cultural Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Council for Economic Planning and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Council for Hakka Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Council of Indigenous Peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Council of Labor Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Environmental Protection Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Financial Supervisory Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Director of the National Palace Museum</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the National Science Council</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the National Youth Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Public Construction Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Sports Affairs Council</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the Veterans Affairs Commission</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philippines (23)</th>
<th>Vice President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Executive Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Agrarian Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of the Budget and Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Education, Culture, and Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Interior and Local Govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Labor and Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of National Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Public Works and Highways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A2: List of the Title of Cabinet Members Included in the Analysis, Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (23)</td>
<td>Secretary of Social Welfare and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Socioeconomic Planning (NEDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Trade and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary of Transportation and Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia (35)</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinating Minister of the People's Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Communication and Information</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Culture and Tourism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of National Education</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister of Finance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister of Forestry</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister of Health</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister of Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Justice and Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Manpower and Transmigration</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister of Public Works</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister of Religious Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Social Services</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister of Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Minister of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Minister of the Development of Disadvantaged Regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Minister of the Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Minister of National Development Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Minister of Public Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Minister of Research and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Minister of State-Owned Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Minister of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Minister of Women's Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Minister of Youth and Sports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The list is based on the government organization formed at the outset of the presidential term in the most recent administrations from respective countries.
Table A3: Sources of Independent and Control Variables in the East Asia Presidential Cabinet Data Set

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Presidential Power**    | *South Korea* - National Assembly Web Site  
|                           | *Taiwan* - Legislative Yuan Web Site; Wu (2005)  
|                           | *Philippines* - Teehankee (2002, 2013); Kasuya (2008); The Commission on Elections Web Site; House of Representatives Web Site  
|                           | *Indonesia* - Suryadinanta (2002); Horowitz (2013); DPR Web Site  
| **Party Competition**     | *South Korea* - National Assembly Web Site  
|                           | *Taiwan* - Legislative Yuan Web Site; Wu (2005)  
|                           | *Philippines* - Teehankee (2002, 2013); Kasuya (2008); The Commission on Elections Web Site; House of Representatives Web Site  
|                           | *Indonesia* - Suryadinanta (2002); Horowitz (2013); DPR Web Site  
| **Presidential Popularity** | *South Korea* - Research & Research  
|                           | *Taiwan* - Chou (1999); Lin (2013)  
|                           | *Philippines* - Social Weather Station  
|                           | *Indonesia* - Saiful Mujani Research & Consulting (SMRC)  
| **Electoral Cycle**       | Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann (2001); Adam Carr's Election Archive: Psephos; Wikipedia  
| **Economic Shock**        | CEIC Database  
| **Age of Democracy**      | Polity IV Data Set  
| **Constitutional Powers** | Shugart and Carey (1992); Hicken and Kasuya (2003); Kasuya (2013a); HeinOnline World Constitutions Illustrated  
| **Copartisan Share**      | East Asia Cabinet Minister Data Set  

Table A4: A list of interviewees in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lee, In-je</td>
<td>Minister of Labor</td>
<td>Kim, Young-sam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sohn, Hak-kyu</td>
<td>Minister of Health and Welfare</td>
<td>Kim, Young-sam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim, Seok Su</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Kim, Dae-jung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim, Jung Kil</td>
<td>Minister of Justice</td>
<td>Kim, Dae-jung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chung, Sye Kyun</td>
<td>Minister of Industry and Energy</td>
<td>Roh, Moo-hyun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song, Min-soon</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
<td>Roh, Moo-hyun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choo, Byung-jik</td>
<td>Minister of Construction and Transportation</td>
<td>Roh, Moo-hyun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yim, Tae-hee</td>
<td>Minister of Employment and Labor</td>
<td>Lee, Myung-bak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahn, Byung-man</td>
<td>Minister of Education, Science and Technology</td>
<td>Lee, Myung-bak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>