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The Yellow Man's Burden: The Politics of Settler Colonialism in Hokkaidō and Taiwan

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts

in

Anthropology

by

Tomonori Sugimoto

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2013
The thesis of Tomonori Sugimoto is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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University of California, San Diego

2013
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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

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by

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Master of Arts in Anthropology

University of California, San Diego, 2013

Professor Joseph D. Hankins, Chair

This thesis examines the politics of settler colonialism and indigeneity in Taiwan and Hokkaidō, Japan in the last one hundred and fifty years. I argue that the histories of these two settler colonial formations are inextricably linked due to their shared experience of Japanese colonial rule. By analyzing a wide range of archival materials such as newspaper accounts, legal texts, and government documents, I first trace the emergence of what I term "settler colonial biopower" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and its mutations in the immediate postwar period on both islands. This mode of settler colonial power, however, has undergone a significant transformation
with the rise of multiculturalism over the last few decades. The second part of this thesis is thus devoted to examining recent shifts in the meanings of indigeneity and the changing contours of settler colonial governance in contemporary Hokkaidō and Taiwan.
Introduction

Indigeneity—Indigenous difference—is fundamentally the condition of "before," of cultural, philosophical, and political life that connect to specific territories and of the political exigencies of this relatedness in the present. This present is defined by the political projects of dispossession and settlement, and the difference that is Indigeneity is the maintenance of culture, treaty, history, and self within the historical and ongoing context of settlement. This settlement was wrought through violence and bloody dispossession and now maintains itself through the threat of military force and the force of law. — Audra Simpson, "Settlement's Secret" (208)

Attention here is on to ruin as an active process, and a vibrantly violent verb. In this forum, we turn with intention not to the immediate violence of Iraq and declared war zones, but to the enduring quality of imperial remains and what they render in impaired states. This is not a turn to ruins as memorialized and large-scale monumental “leftovers” or relics—although these come into our purview as well—but rather to what people are “left with”: to what remains, to the aftershocks of empire, to the material and social afterlife of structures, sensibilities, and things. Such effects reside in the corroded hollows of landscapes, in the gutted infrastructures of segregated cityscapes and in the microecologies of matter and mind. The focus then is not on inert remains but on their vital refiguration. The question is pointed: How do imperial formations persist in their material debris, in ruined landscapes and through the social ruination of people’s lives? — Ann Laura Stoler, "Imperial Debris: Reflections on Ruins and Ruination" (194)

Settler colonialism is a structure, not an event. It is impervious to regime change. It is a colonialism that never ends. Patrick Wolfe (2008) thus argues. Whereas franchise colonialism is a project centered on the exploitation of native labor, the primary concern of settler colonialism is territorial, in that its “priority is replacing natives on their land rather than extracting an economic surplus from mixing their labor with it” (Wolfe 2008:103). Therefore, settler colonialism is double-edged: “Negatively, it strives for the dissolution of native societies. Positively, it erects a new colonial society on the expropriated land base” (103).

However, native people persist in this new society and resist settlement through their persistence. Settler colonialism then tries to undermine this native resistance by assimilating them. Such assimilation strategies inherit rather than discontinue settler colonialism enacted in the earlier phase of settler colonialism. Wolfe continues:
Indeed, depending on the historical conjuncture, assimilation can be a more effective mode of elimination than outright killing, since it does not involve such a disruptive affront to the rule of law that is ideologically central to the cohesion of settler society. When invasion is recognized as a structure rather than an event, its history does not stop (or, more to the point, become relatively trivial) when it moves on from the era of frontier homicide. Rather, narrating that history involves charting the continuities, discontinuities, adjustments, and departures whereby a logic that initially informed frontier killing transmutes into different modalities, discourses, and institutional formations as it undergirds the historical development and complexification of settler society (120-121).

Therefore, settler colonialism is a structure, not an event. Wolfe is not employing the term "structure" to characterize settler colonialism as an unchanging edifice. I rather understand Wolfe's evocation of "structutre" here as a refusal to accept settler colonial temporality, which is divided into the past, understood as the period of massacre and settlement, and the present/future, understood as the period of post-settlement and possibly reconciliation. In this sense, we need to focus on settler colonial formations\(^1\), understood as processes of becoming, in order "to register the ongoing quality of processes of decimation, displacement, and reclamation" (Stoler 2008:193). As Ann Stoler provocatively notes in the epigraph, we need to pay attention to “ruin” as a verb rather than a noun, to "the political life of imperial debris, the longevity of structures of dominance, and the uneven pace with which people can extricate themselves from the colonial order of things" (193).

\(^1\) Here I am invoking Ann Stoler's term "imperial formations," or "states of becoming rather than being, macropolities in constant formation" (Stoler 2006:135-136).
A flourishing field of settler colonialism studies\(^2\) represented by Wolfe forcefully unsettles and troubles settler-centric histories and narratives that naturalize the subjugation of indigenous people and the invasion of their lands. This critique so far, however, has tended to "whiten" settler colonial projects by depicting them as always white European projects. For example, in *A Companion to Postcolonial Studies*, Johnson and Lawson (2000) bases their definition of settler colonialism “on the presence of long-term, majority *white* racial communities, where indigenous peoples have been outnumbered and removed by colonial policies and practices” (361, emphasis added). The primary examples of settler colonies, according to this book, are then reduced to Anglophone contexts such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the US, and South Africa.

Reformulating this limited definition which assumes all settler colonial projects to be white,\(^3\) this thesis attempts to complexify a critique of settler colonialism by examining settler colonial formations in East Asia. Like Ching (2001), who critiqued the ghettoization of Japanese colonialism in postcolonial studies, I challenge the limited scope of current settler colonialism studies and look at the expansion of settler colonialism in modernity as a global process that also occurred in Asia. Indeed, in both Hokkaidō and Taiwan, the two contexts I examine in this thesis, settler colonialism is endemic to the histories of these places of the past several hundred years. As Simpson’s epigraph suggests, for indigenous subjects, to live in these places today is to maintain

\(^2\) Books and essays that discuss settler colonialism are too numerous to list all of them here. For representative work, see Wolfe 1994; 1999, 2008; Smith 2005; Elkins and Pedersen 2005; Kauanui 2008; Fujikane and Okamura 2010; Veracini 2010; Byrd 2011; Morgensen 2011; Simpson 2011.

\(^3\) That said, recently there have been critical attempts to examine non-white immigrants' participation in settler colonialism, especially in the US. See Fujikane and Okamura 2010; Byrd 2011.
“culture, history, and self within the historical and ongoing context of settlement” (Simpson 2011, 208).

In fact, the past few decades have seen the appearance of scholarship that critically analyzes these histories of Hokkaidō and Taiwan. While I build on this important body of scholarship, I also have two broad criticisms of it. First, it tends to focus only on the processes in which indigenous peoples, namely the Ainu in Hokkaidō and the yuanzhumin in Taiwan, have been othered as “ethnic” minorities. While this is certainly true, I also see settler colonization and ethnic minoritization as two different processes. In settler colonial formations, chronologically speaking the former necessarily takes place before the latter (Wolfe 1994, Byrd 2011). Only examining the latter might mask the conditions of invasion on and after which ethnic othering has occurred. As I will explore later, the indigenous populations such as the Ainu and the indigenous peoples in Taiwan and non-indigenous ethnic minorities such as Koreans and Okinawans have had overlapping yet different experiences in Asia in the prewar and the postwar periods. In the Japanese Empire, for instance, while the former were often confined to their land as those too "savage" to be even useful for imperial capitalist labor, the latter were hyper-mobile labor migrants that were exploited in various locations throughout the

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4 For critical scholarship on the history of colonialism in Hokkaidō, see Shinya 1977; Siddle 1996; Morris-Suzuki 2000; Walker 2001; Higashimura 2006; Medak-Saltzman 2008; Winchester 2009; Hirano 2009; and Mason 2011, 2012. Critical scholarship on the history of settler colonialism in Taiwan is much harder to find. Employing the lens of "stigmatization," Xie 1987 was one of the first works that looked at the othering process of indigenous peoples in Taiwan. Fujii 2001 provides a good summary of riban (see below) in the Japanese Empire and the KMT's policy towards the indigenous populations in the postwar period. Ching 2001 also touches on the indigenous population in colonial Taiwan throughout the book, especially in Chapter 4. For the notion of “savagery” in colonial Taiwan, see Tierney 2010, especially Chapters 1 and 2. Ishigaki 2011 is one of the few Japanese-language accounts of indigenous politics in postwar Taiwan.
empire. By using the lens of “settler colonialism,” therefore, this thesis seeks to refine our understanding of specific forms of violence that have been committed against indigenous subjects in the Japanese Empire and its aftermath.

Second, little of recent scholarship on indigenous histories in East Asia explore the important connections between Taiwan, Hokkaidō, and other settler colonial formations in Asia and the Pacific. The reason I discuss Hokkaidō and Taiwan together in this thesis is not because of the coincidental existence of these settler colonies in the same geographical region. I argue that the lives of indigenous subjects in these now two separate nation-states are intimately connected precisely through the history of Japanese

5 While I am aware of some scholars' and activists' attempt to equate the histories of Okinawa and Hokkaido, my hesitation to call Okinawa a "settler colony" arises out of these historical differences I am underscoring. See also note 6.

6 To my knowledge, Elkins's and Pedersen's edited volume Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies (2005) was one of the first attempts to look at settler colonialism in East Asia (Jun Uchida, who is one of the contributors to this volume and who discusses colonial Korea, later published a monograph, Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876-1945. See Uchida 2011). Although this volume was groundbreaking, the contexts examined in it are curiously only colonial Korea and Manchuria. There are certain characteristics about these two colonies that lead me to believe “settler colonialism” is not necessarily an apt tool with which to discuss these contexts. Although Japanese colonialism did bring settlers from various parts of the Japanese Empire to these two locales in large numbers, they never completely supplanted the local populations. Although the local populations in Korea and Manchuria were definitely depicted as culturally inferior to the Japanese, they were still placed above those who were called dojin, or "savages," such as the Ainu in Hokkaidō and indigenous peoples in Taiwan, in the Japanese racial hierarchy, partially due to the fact that Korea and China had had state formations prior to Japanese colonization. The Japanese colonial projects in Korea and Manchuria came to a sudden halt with Japan’s defeat in the Asia-Pacific War in 1945, which led to hikiage, or repatriations of millions of overseas Japanese settlers in the postwar period. Since these projects were endemic to prewar Japanese imperialism rather than “Korea” and “Manchuria” in and of themselves, they cannot be considered to be structurally continuing as settler colonialism (This is not to deny that the history of Japanese imperialism continues to affect people in these two places today). In the end, I believe, the essays on East Asia in this volume merely analyze settler colonialism as a historical event, not a structure.
imperialism before 1945. Looking at this connection helps us understand settler colonialism in East Asia as a process in which the ontologies and epistemologies of indigenous peoples in various locales were undermined by the emergence of global capitalism and modern nation-states in the region (especially Japan). Indeed, even before the emergence of the transnational indigenous movement in the late twentieth century that brought them together again, in the late nineteenth century the Japanese imperial government had already commensurated indigenous peoples in Hokkaidō, Taiwan, and throughout the world as *dojin* or “savages” and created connections among them. This commensuration was reflected in the very similar ways in which the Japanese imperial government managed indigenous populations in Hokkaidō and Taiwan, as I will show in detail in Chapter 1.

By examining the extremely complex, long, and deeply interconnected histories of settler colonial violence in Hokkaidō and Taiwan, I hope to contribute to the three inter-Asian and transnational projects in Asian Studies proposed by Kuan-Hsing Chen (2010) in his recent book, *Asia as Method*. These projects are "decolonization," "deimperialization," and "de-Cold War." His contention is that although the Cold War

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7 There are other settler colonial formations that can be examined through the same lens. In this sense, this thesis does not purport to be exhaustive. For instance, I do not explore the politics of settler colonialism in Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands, and Micronesia, all of which were Japan's colonies in the prewar period. Analyzing these settler colonial formations would require more thorough research on participation of the Russian Empire and the US Empire in these settler colonial projects as well, which is beyond the scope of this brief thesis. I hope to include these locales in my future project. For the history of US and Japanese colonialisms in Micronesia, see Peattie 1988; Camacho 2011. Morris-Suzuki 2000 touches on the relationship between Hokkaidō, Sakhalin, and imperial Russia.

8 For semantic shifts of the Japanese word *dojin* since the nineteenth century, see Nakamura 2001.
has hindered the decolonization of "former" colonies and the deimperialization of "former" empires, the formal end of the Cold War and the contemporary era of globalization create a possibility for these three projects to take place. What do these projects look like in Hokkaidō and Taiwan?

Chen argues that while decolonization is a task assumed by the colonized, deimperialization is imperialists' task. In settler colonies specifically, decolonization needs to be assumed by indigenous subjects and deimperialization by settlers. However, these two tasks are complicated from the outset in Hokkaidō and Taiwan because who are "indigenous subjects" and "settlers" today in these two settler colonial formations is far from clear. In both Hokkaidō and Taiwan, through histories of rape and miscegenation, many indigenous peoples that survive today are of mixed descent. Some people with indigenous descent are not even aware of their native background because their family often never told it to them for fear of stigmatization and discrimination. Even many indigenous people who are aware of their descent do not wish to identify themselves as indigenous because they believe they are “Japanese” or “Taiwanese” and wish to let the sleeping dogs lie. For settler states, there is no motivation to stop this increasing non- and dis-identification with indigenous identity because natives are to be eliminated through assimilation anyway. Even today, unlike in Hawaii, where there exists a blood quantum-based definition of indigenous Hawaiian (Kauanui 2008), there is no attempt to clearly set the definition of indigeneity either in Japan or Taiwan. Living such ambiguity is precisely the condition of being indigenous in Hokkaidō and Taiwan today. What complicates the matter even more is that many non-indigenous settler subjects in Hokkaidō and Taiwan identify themselves as "indigenous" to these lands because many
of them as well as their ancestors were born and raised there. In Taiwan, because many non-indigenous subjects also experienced what was for them colonial rule by external forces, notably, Japan and the Kuomintang (KMT, the Chinese Nationalist Party), they primarily identify themselves as the colonized rather than settler subjects who are complicit with continuing settler colonialism.

However, settler subjects in Hokkaidō and Taiwan, even Taiwanese-born settlers who experienced multiple colonialisms, need to reckon with their collusion with long histories of settler violence. If native "people got in the way [of settlers] by just staying at home" (Rose 1991:46, cited in Wolfe 2008), settlers also get in the way of natives by just staying where they are. As a third-generation settler subject born to a wajin⁹ family in Hokkaidō, I know this self-critique can be a difficult process of unlearning. But only through such reckonings with the complexity of identity and complicity in settler colonies can we advance the projects of decolonization and deimperialization in Hokkaidō and Taiwan. In this sense, these two projects necessarily need to occur simultaneously by supplementing each other.

If decolonization and deimperialization are familiar enough terms in postcolonial studies today, "de-Cold War" needs more elaboration. Chen (2010) defines it as confronting the legacies and continuing tensions of the Cold War in Asia (x). Chen's point is that the emergence of the Cold War blocked the processes of decolonization and deimperialization that could have happened in the postwar period. Now that the Cold War

⁹ Wajin refers to those of "Japanese" descent originally from the mainland. In the Ainu language, they are also called shamo.
is formally over, it has opened up opportunities for us to critically examine the numerous effects of the Cold War on many societies in Asia.

Indeed, the rise of the Cold War hindered any formal decolonization process from occurring between Japan and Taiwan. No bloody violence followed the collapse of the Japanese Empire as happened in Algeria, Vietnam, and elsewhere. This was hugely influenced by the US’s Cold War policy to secure both Japan and Taiwan as anti-communist democratic capitalist allies in East Asia. It would have been against the political interests of the United States to have Japan and Taiwan holding antagonistic feelings against each other. This Cold War history is reflected in people’s memories about Japanese imperialism in postwar Japan and Taiwan. In Japan, the history and memories of Japanese imperialism have been repressed, where many believe that ordinary Japanese people in the prewar period were mere victims of a military junta rather than people who were complicit with Japanese imperial expansion. National amnesia about the history of Japanese colonialism in Asia and the Pacific still pervades Japan today (Yoneyama 1999). In Taiwan, while the KMT regime was critical of the history of Japanese colonialism and portrayed itself as a liberator of the Taiwanese from the Japanese, its most immediate enemy was always Communist China. Such Cold War-era epistemology prevented strong Taiwanese critiques from being directed at Japan. In fact, many Taiwanese people remember the Japanese colonial period fondly, comparing it to the corrupt KMT dictatorship in the postwar period.

For indigenous subjects in Japan and Taiwan, especially, the beginning of the Cold War immediately following the end of World War II meant that the possibility of decolonization was closed for them. The national divisions created between Japan and
Taiwan without a real process of decolonization made it impossible for many indigenous subjects to seek for redress for colonial violence committed by the Japanese Empire. In Taiwan, the effects of the Cold War were acutely felt especially by indigenous subjects, who were forced to switch loyalty from the Japanese Empire to the Republic of China overnight.

In the following chapters, I will analyze a variety of written records since the late nineteenth century, including newspaper accounts, magazine articles, government reports, brochures, and legal texts, with these three projects in mind. These texts allow us to track how shifting contours of power over indigenous subjects as well as discursive positions that the figure of the indigene has occupied have over the last one hundred and fifty years in Hokkaidō and Taiwan. Chapter One, “Colonial Concerns: The Emergence of Settler Colonial Biopower in Hokkaidō and Taiwan,” focuses on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although I do recognize the long durée of settler colonialism in Hokkaidō and Taiwan, I argue that the issue of "indigeneity" in East Asia only came to the fore with the emergence of the modern Japanese imperial nation-state in the late nineteenth century. It was not until this period that a political regime concerned itself with how to manage an "indigenous population" that had occupied the lands that it now needed to claim as its own in ways that would not disturb the rule of law. In both Qing China and Shogunate Japan, settlers were relatively unconcerned with the lives of natives and at best conceived indigenous peoples as “savages” that could be exploited, raped, or killed at their disposal. Only with the emergence of the Japanese imperial nation-state did indigenous peoples need to be eliminated, but only in a way that did not interfere with liberal and modern ideals that were the foundations of the new imperial nation-state.
Drawing on Foucauldian theories of power, I am interested in the emergence of what I term “settler colonial biopower” in Hokkaidō and Taiwan in this period and its subsequent growth as the Japanese Empire continued to expand, colonizing other indigenous lands such as Sakhalin and the Pacific islands. This modern mode of power manifested itself in various forms, most conspicuous of which were the Hokkaidō Former Native Protection Act (1899) passed in Japan and a series of riban projects practiced in colonial Taiwan. What is noteworthy is that modern imperial Japan often criticized settler regimes that preceded it for lack of concern for indigenous people and clearly differentiated its rule from theirs. In both Hokkaidō and Taiwan, the modern Japanese government emphasized that it was the first regime in history to sympathize with the pitiful fate of backward natives and to protect and nurture them. This new settler colonial rhetoric justified the massive invasion and dispossession of indigenous lands that still continue today.

After Japan's defeat in the Asia-Pacific War in 1945, the Japanese Empire officially collapsed, losing its "external" colonies including Taiwan. However, settler colonial violence against indigenous peoples in Hokkaidō and Taiwan persisted, as US

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10 The term riban is a difficult term to translate. It consists of two Chinese characters, ri and ban. Ri means "manage," "reason," and "order," while ban means "primitive," "savage," and "foreign," as in banjin, as indigenous people in Taiwan were called at that time. Combined, the two characters mean something like "governing and enlightening savages." Tierney (2010) defines it as “a compound of the characters reason and barbarian, [which] denoted the Japanese colonial policy of managing the aborigines by a combination of punitive raids (seibatsu) against those who had not submitted to Japanese rule and acculturation policies (kyōka) to alter the economic activities and lifestyle pattern of those who had surrendered to the authorities” (43). Although I largely agree with this definition, the stress of the term was clearly placed on the latter aspect as most indigenous tribes surrendered to the Japanese by the 1920s. Due to this complexity, I will leave this term untranslated whenever it appears in the texts I will cite.
policies on East Asia informed by the Cold War and the complicity of postwar regimes in Japan and Taiwan with the United States hindered indigenous decolonization in East Asia. This will be the topic of Chapter Two, “In the Shadow of the Economic Miracle: Being Indigenous Under the Cold War.” In the immediate postwar period, I find it significant that Hokkaidō was not even acknowledged as a colony by Japan nor the Occupation forces. This suggests that settler dominance in Hokkaidō had been established by 1945 so firmly that the fact that Hokkaidō belongs to the Ainu had been completely forgotten. In postwar Taiwan, the Japanese colonial government was merely replaced by another settler government from China, the Chinese Nationalist Party, which narrated its colonization of the island as a "glorious recuperation to China (guangfu)," to which Taiwan had always legitimately “belonged.” As both Japan and Taiwan experienced rapid economic development, except for minimal welfare measures focused on issues such as poverty, medicine, and hygiene, the lives of indigenous people were overshadowed by the international race for capitalist success.

However, spurred by the emergence of the transnational indigenous movement, the postwar period also saw the rise of indigenous struggles for sovereignty and autonomy. Chapter Three, “Be Yourself, Know Yourself: Globalization, Multiculturalism, and the Transformation of Indigenous Politics in Late Liberalism,” looks at this moment and the processes in which multiculturalist discourse in Japan and Taiwan has appropriated these critical indigenous struggles. In Japan, as multiculturalism became a catchword the 1990s, the Ainu were suddenly reclaimed as a population that contributes to Japan's ethnic and cultural diversity. This led to the passage of the New Ainu Law in 1997 and the recognition of the Ainu as the indigenous people of Japan by
the National Diet in 2008. In Taiwan, as the martial law period came to an end in the late
1980s, the indigenous rights movement began to gain momentum, leading to the
emergence of pan-tribal *yuanzhumin* identity. At the same time, the nativist movement
(called *bentuhua*), which is mostly led by the *benshengren* and which seeks to recover
Taiwan's uniqueness and autonomy that had been denied by the postwar authoritarian
regime, appropriated the existence of indigenous peoples to claim Taiwan’s difference
from mainland China, with which KMT had forced Taiwanese people to identify. This
appropriation has been co-opted by the still Han-dominated government, which
recognized the *yuanzhumin* as the indigenous peoples of Taiwan and which passed the
Aboriginal Basic Act in 2005. I understand these recent multicultural incorporations,
celebrations, and appropriations of indigenous subjects in both Japan and Taiwan as a
form of governance that prolongs settler colonialist rule rather than contest it. However,
the globalization of the indigenous movement and multiculturalist discourse has also led
indigenous subjects in Japan and Taiwan to come up with creative ways to negotiate with
ongoing settlement by organizing transnational solidarity building projects. These
projects, I believe, have the possibility of allowing the *yuanzhumin* and the Ainu to
critically reflect on their shared history of Japanese colonization and together challenge
settler dominance in Japan and Taiwan.

Now, let us step back into the late nineteenth century.

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11 *Benshengren* refers to the Han Chinese population that was already in Taiwan prior to
Taiwan’s “recuperation” to the ROC, as opposed to *waishengren*, those who fled to
Taiwan with the KMT after the communist victory in Mainland China.
Chapter 1

Colonial Concerns:

The Emergence of Settler Colonial Biopower in Hokkaidō and Taiwan

In his Collège de France lectures of 1975-76, Michel Foucault (2003) traces the emergence of a distinct form of power in Europe in the late eighteenth century. If the end of the seventeenth century saw "the emergence of techniques of power that were essentially centered on the body," which he calls "disciplinary power," the second half of the eighteenth century was characterized by the rise of a new technique of power. The passage in which he delineates this shift is worth quoting at length:

This [new] technology of power does not exclude the former, does not exclude its disciplinary technology, but it does dovetail into it, integrate it, modify it to some extent, and above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it, embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques. . . . Unlike discipline, which is addressed to bodies, the new nondisciplinary power is applied not to man-as-body but to the living man, to man-as-living-being; ultimately, if you like, to man-as-species. . . . [T]he new technology that is being established is addressed to a multiplicity of men . . . to the extent that they form . . . a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on. So after a first seizure of power over the body in an individualizing mode, we have a second seizure of power that is not individualizing but, if you like, massifying, that is directed not at man-as-body but at man-as-species. After the anatomo-politics of the human body established in the course of the eighteenth century, we have, at the end of that century, the emergence of something that is no longer an anatomo-politics of the human body, but what I would call a "biopolitics" of the human race (242-243).

What was significant about this new form of power was, as Foucault stresses, that it was concerned with the nurturance of life. In contrast to sovereign power, this power that he
terms biopower "is continuous, scientific, and it is the power to make live. Sovereignty took life and let live. And now we have the emergence of a power that I would call the power of regularization, and it, in contrast, consists in making live and letting die" (247, emphasis added). Here, we see a "gradual disqualification of death" in modern Europe, which still continues today (247).

How was this biopower formulated in colonial contexts? After all, the period in which this new power emerged also corresponded with the expansion of numerous imperial projects. As Stoler (1995) shows in her reexamination of volume one of The History of Sexuality and his 1975-1976 Collège de France lectures, Foucault's theories are open to readings that emphasize this imperial landscape against which biopower was formed. Foucault himself, however, did not pursue this line of research. Was the colonized population made to live, just as those in the metropole? Or was it, on the contrary, let die? Did concerns with issues such as public hygiene, the mortality rate, and the birth rate come to the fore in the same ways in the metropole and the colony? These questions have haunted historians and anthropologists interested in colonialism for some time now.

Gary Wilder (2003) addresses some of these questions in the context of French West Africa in the interwar period. Wilder maintains that following a crisis in republicanism and a turn to welfarism in Metropolitan France after the First World War, French West Africa saw "the related shift from a civilizing mission concerned with economic exploitation and individual behavior to a colonial humanism oriented onward economic development, native welfare, and the management of indigenous populations" (50). Through minutely analyzing colonial discourse in this period, he traces the wedding
of humanism and colonialism informed by biopower. He asserts: "Taking colonial humanism seriously does not mean accepting reformers' claims to be agents of progress. Nor does it mean that colonial coercion had been abandoned by caring administrators. The point is that care became a political instrument for the colonial state. Humanism here does not refer to reformers' benevolent attitudes toward natives but to how their concern with native welfare indexed a new way of ruling and racializing native populations" (78, emphasis added).

This chapter is concerned with the similar shift that occurred in the Japanese Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the Japanese colonial government's management of the indigenous populations in Hokkaidō and Taiwan. This was the period in which the humanist logics of care, sympathy, protection, and nurturance became tools of settler colonialism in these two locales. In other words, it is this moment that we see the emergence of what I term "settler colonial biopower" in the Japanese Empire. If much of the scholarship and activist work on the indigenous populations in East Asia so far has stressed the exclusion of indigenous subjects from universality and liberal polities, I slightly shift focus and instead discuss the emergence of settler subjects' humanist and liberal desire in the Japanese Empire to include them into the modern capitalist nation-state as those in need of protection, care, pity, and sympathy (but in ways that would not threaten the superiority of settlers). This desire was clearly entangled with biopower, which was concerned with the colonial population as a whole and the incitement rather than the destruction of its life. Unless we examine such settler colonial violence inherent in (rather than contradictory with) modern liberalism and humanism,
we cannot understand why indigenous dispossession has continued until today in both Hokkaidō and Taiwan.

I am not the only one who is concerned with these issues. Recent years have seen the proliferation of rethinkings of Foucauldian theories in the context of the Japanese Empire. Takashi Fujitani's groundbreaking book *Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans During World War II* is one such attempt. In this book, Fujitani (2011) integrates US history and Japanese history by looking at the politics of biopower and governmentality in the US and Japanese Empires during the Second World War. Fujitani's contention is that it was not until both the United States and Japan entered the total war period in the late 1930s that they incorporated racialized subjects, specifically Koreans in Japan and Japanese Americans in the United States, into the biopolitical realm of power. In the Japanese empire, for example, although Korea officially became Japan's colony in 1910, “for most of the colonial period the greater masses of the Korean people were more outside than inside the regime of governmentality and bio-power. . . . However, once the logic of total war transformed the population into one of lack, the policies of the metropolitan and colonial governments toward their colonial subjects in Korea began to shift dramatically” (38). In looking at this dramatic change in both Japan and the United States, Fujitani traces the global shift from what he terms "vulgar racism" to “polite racism” in this period, from a type of racism that is explicitly exclusionary and brutal to the one that is less overtly discriminatory. He argues:
While I do not mean to ignore ongoing practices of brutality and necropolitics—a violence often without concern for life or law that continued into the period of total war—I want to insist that such spaces or explosions of brutality and repression existed alongside and in fact supplemented another project: one of welcoming newly constituted national subjects such as Japanese Americans and Korean Japanese into the nation, with promises and practices of health, education, sustenance, security and even greater access to political rights (21).

By treating Japanese imperialism as a project inextricably linked to the other Western imperial projects rather than as an "anomaly," as many scholars have done in the past, Fujitani helps us understand how this turn to colonial biopower in the late 1930s was a global trend, manifesting itself in the Japanese Empire as well as in the US Empire.

However, other scholars offer a slightly different reading of the operation of colonial biopower in the Japanese empire. In his fascinating *Absolute Erotic, Absolute Grotesque*, Mark Driscoll (2010) argues that the emergence of Japanese colonial biopower can be traced to a much earlier period of Japanese colonialism than the total war period, as Fujitani contends. This difference between Driscoll's and Fujitani’s periodizations partially comes from the fact that Driscoll’s reading of Foucault is slightly different from Fujitani’s. Driscoll pays particular attention to the fact that biopower has two aspects that I mentioned above: making live and letting die.

If we revisit Fujitani's arguments in *Race for Empire*, it is clear that his primary focus is mostly on the first *making live* part of biopower. In fact, this is a standard reading of biopower shared by many scholars, both in and outside of colonial studies. Driscoll argues that we should pay equal attention to the other side of biopolitics, the letting die part, which he interprets as meaning "something like 'allowing something to die off if that is its inherent tendency'" (14). Therefore, not the entire population is subject to the same
form of biopower. Since biopower is exercised differently on different populations, “certain populations within a body politic will be selected for health maintenance and disease control, while other populations will be left to fare for themselves” (14). It is crucial to understand, Driscoll maintains, that these other populations that are let die are mobilized for capitalist expansion. As a Marxist critic, he is interested in how biopolitics and capitalism worked together in the Japanese imperial project. Thus he writes:

In my reading, biopolitics vectors in two directions in its concern with life: one leads to health and the other to wealth. This is to say that life as species-population needs to be improved on in terms of health, while life as desiring production needs to be released from its carceral confines to work for capital accumulation, something made explicit in Foucault’s lectures of 1978, The Birth of Biopolitics. To add a Marxist supplement to biopolitics’ vector of wealth, life is liberated so surplus can more readily be expropriated from living labor (15, emphasis added).

Within the Japanese empire, such populations that were liberated so that capitalists could extract more surplus value from them included, Driscoll argues, Japanese working-class migrants, Chinese coolies, and Korean farmers. They were the "ontological motors and constituent energy of Japan's imperialism" (15).

My investigation in this chapter attempts to "indigenize" these debates on biopower in the Japanese Empire by looking at the processes in which indigenous peoples emerged as populations under biopower's care, protection, and nurturance. If, as Driscoll suggests, Japanese imperial biopower primarily exercised the right to let die on certain racialized populations such as Korean farmers and Chinese coolies, there were other minority populations who were “made to live.” I argue that the "making live" rather than "letting die" was the primary mode of power exercised on indigenous peoples in
Hokkaidō and Taiwan from the late nineteenth century on. This settler colonial biopower's goal was to conquer indigenous lands and replace them with a new settler-dominated society. Why were indigenous peoples singled out for the application of this power? This was because of the peculiar construction of the "savage/native/indigene" in Japanese colonial discourse at that time.

If modernity for "Japan" was a struggle for the racialized yellow subject to become, emulate and supplant the post-Enlightenment European transparent subject, this struggle necessarily needed to produce other subjects "who can be excluded from universality without unleashing an ethical crisis" (Silva 2007:xxxi). As Robert Tierney (2010) puts it, “The motto of dissociating from Asia was achieved not only by civilizing Japan but also by discovering uncivilized others among Japan's Asian and pacific neighbors" (28). This emergence of the modern Japanese subject (who was implicitly male, middle-class, heterosexual, and able-bodied), which coincided with Japanese imperial expansion into Hokkaidō, Okinawa, Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria and the Pacific Islands, meant that he required “globality” (Silva 2007:xxxx) as an ontological context, that is to say, it required the existence of "the others of Japan" that were construed as "affectable," or or vulnerable to exterior forces (158). These others were deemed so

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12 Although his theoretical approach is slightly different from mine, Robert Tierney (2010) similarly points out the different positions in which indigenous subjects and the Chinese were placed in Japanese colonial capitalism: “Toward the aborigines, the Japanese system of rule became one of expropriation by dispossession. The colonial government conquered the aboriginal lands primarily to exploit their potential wealth but it actually had little use for the people living there. By contrast, the colonial state sought to have the Han Chinese in the plains work the land and contented itself with skimming off the profits produced through normal circuits of capitalism.” (43).
13 There have been scholars who analyze colonial Taiwan using the Foucauldian term governmentality. Their analyses mostly focus on the Han-Chinese population. See Tsai 2009.
affectable that they would cause their own subjection by the Japanese and eventually their disappearance. While such others of Japan included Koreans, Okinawans, and the Chinese, indigenous subjects in Hokkaidō, Taiwan, and the Pacific were especially perfect objects against which Japan could project its modern self. They became the yellow (i.e. Japanese) man’s burden, so to speak.

In ruling these indigenous peoples, Japan employed what Povinelli calls (2011a) "the governance of the prior." The governance of the prior maintains that "what held in the past [has] a preeminent hold on rights" and "the simple fact of their being prior, possessing the quality of the prior, [gives] them priority in law" (18). We might be led to believe that if what held in the past had rights, indigenous peoples in Hokkaidō and Taiwan would have been given the right to self-rule. However, as we already know, this was not the case. Why? This is because "the governance of the prior [did not] foreclose the possibility of violent seizure. Rather, the priority of the prior forced, and forces, states to account for such seizures in such a way that their authority as sovereign is not undermined" (18). How is this achieved? Povinelli argues that temporally dividing indigenous people and settlers is crucial in this process: "not all people are located in the same narrative structure of belonging within the [settler] nation-state, although all people are absorbed into the same political logic of the prior. Therefore, in the governance of the prior, there are two priors. One—the governed prior—would be the customary, while the other—the governing prior—would be free" (23). This means that through casting the indigene into the past, the settler is turned toward the future: "projecting itself against the metropole, the settler state constituted itself as prior to it. But in acceding to the logic of the priority of the prior as the legitimate foundation of governance, the settler state
projected the previous inhabitants as spatially, socially, and temporally before it as the ultimate horizon of its own legitimacy (18-19).

Such peculiar use of tense was precisely how the Japanese Empire accounted for the seizure of indigenous lands in Hokkaidō and Taiwan and the assimilation of indigenous subjects. Placed in the perfect past tense of the nation, indigenous peoples in Hokkaidō and Taiwan were presumed to disappear eventually because of their “affectability.” To salvage this pitiful disappearing race and assimilate them into the futurity of the Japanese Empire, the Japanese government placed these two indigenous groups under its liberal humanist care and protection. As those on the bottom of the Japanese colonial racial hierarchy, indigenous subjects in Hokkaidō, Taiwan, and elsewhere were considered to be too “uncivilized” to be even exploitable as capitalist labor. As Katsuya Hirano states with regard to the Ainu in Hokkaidō, indigenous peoples in the Japanese Empire were reduced to "an existence incapable of even becoming wage labor (incapable of even being commodified)" (Hirano 2009:page unspecified). Many colonial officials and scholars (such as the prominent colonial policy studies scholar Yanaihara Tadao) claimed that exploiting these “savages” who were not ready for wage labor as disposable labor for Japanese imperial capitalism would lead to an undesirable consequence, namely the decline of the native population. Such decline would be contradictory with liberal and modern ideals officially endorsed by the Japanese Empire. Thus, imperial Japan assumed the role of nurturing and protecting these indigenes so that they would be eventually ready for capitalist labor in the future. Based on these logics, it intervened in various areas of indigenous life, including hygiene, birth, death, and health.
This chapter traces the emergence of Japanese settler colonial biopower towards indigenous peoples in Hokkaidō and Taiwan by examining a variety of texts in the colonial archive. I argue that one of the crucial ways in which the Japanese imperial nation-state justified its settler colonial rule in Hokkaidō and Taiwan was through the exercise of this biopower on affectable indigenous peoples, combined with the logic of the governance of the prior. The Japanese government constantly tried to differentiate its rule from that of the regimes that preceded it. By criticizing these earlier regimes for lack of care and sympathy for indigenous populations, Japan was able to establish itself as a legitimate ruler of Hokkaidō and Taiwan. It was only as objects of the Japanese race's care and protection that indigenous peoples were allowed to live, because settler temporality did not have any place for them but the tense of the past (Povinelli 2011). In the tense of the future of the settler colony, these indigenes will have completely disappeared and assimilated into settler society and culture.

The Japanese settler colonization of the Ainu did not abruptly begin in the late nineteenth century. When *ainu mosir*, as the Ainu used to call the land they inhabited, was incorporated into Meiji Japan as "Hokkaidō" in 1869, *wajin* had already had contact with the Ainu for several centuries. This violent colonization was the culminating point of the *wajin* dispossession of the Ainu and invasion of Ainu lands that slowly began in the sixteenth century, when *ainu mosir* was still called *ezo chi*\(^\text{14}\) by the Japanese. This slow attrition of the Ainu over several centuries occurred in such forms as *wajin* men's

\(^{14}\) *Ezo* meant “savage” at that time and was used to refer to the Ainu. This is why Ainu lands were called *ezo chi*, or the “place of savages.”
rape of Ainu women and wajin merchants' exploitation of Ainu labor in the ukeoi contract system,¹⁵ which some go so far as to call "slavery" (e.g. Shinya 1977). In a groundbreaking book that examines Ainu history before 1800, Brett Walker (2001) shows how since the sixteenth century the Ainu became gradually weakened through contact with wajin and eventually placed under control of the Matsumae domain despite their repeated resistance. Walker concludes his book by saying:

[By the time of the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the settlement of Hokkaidō could be conducted with little resistance from local inhabitants because Ainu society had weakened to the point that the Japanese intrusion went virtually uncontested, making it, ironically, all the more legitimate. Japanese officials, in other words, came to see themselves as rescuing the Ainu from a barbaric oblivion characterized by disease and starvation. Officials believed that through enlightened Confucian policy they were saving a people who lay on the brink of extinction because of poor hygienic and medical practices, not to mention problems rooted in their primitive means of providing sustenance for their communities. The word that best symbolizes the tenor of this new post-1802 shogunal policy regarding the Ainu was buiku, “to care, tend to, or show benevolence toward. (229-230) My account begins where Walker leaves off. Although, as Walker states, the rhetoric of “buiku” had already emerged before the establishment of Meiji Japan, it was not until the

¹⁵ David Howell (1995) provides a good summary of the ukeoi contract system: “Never formally created, only abolished [in Meiji Japan], contracting was an institutional anomaly that emerged piecemeal over the course of the early eighteenth century as the daimyo and his retainers found it more convenient and more profitable to turn management of their trading posts over to merchants than to run them themselves. Without a formal basis in domain law, the exact nature of the contracting institution necessarily remained ambivalent. . . . However, by the nineteenth century the contractors had assumed an official function as agents of the state. Their contracts reflected this new responsibility with stipulations that they provide food to the Ainu; maintain roads, station houses, and facilities for government officials traveling in the Ezochi; rescue shipwreck survivors; keep an eye out for strange ships and, perhaps most importantly, collect a levy of ten to twenty percent of the catch of independent fishers operating at their fisheries” (36). The exploitation of the Ainu in this system is said to have caused a rapid decline in the Ainu population.
end of the nineteenth century that this rhetoric was institutionalized as settler colonial biopower exercised on the Ainu as a population, "to the extent that they form . . . a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on" (Foucault 2003:245).

But first, the Japanese government needed to secure Hokkaidō as its own to smoothly advance colonization. Eight years after the founding of Hokkaidō in 1869, an ordinance called *Hokkaidō Chiken Jōrei* of 1877 declared Ainu lands as *kan-yū*, or state-owned. With the passage of this ordinance, vast lands of the Ainu became *terra nullius* that should and can be owned and developed by the Japanese nation-state. Based on this settler colonial understanding of Hokkaidō, Japan sent large numbers of (mostly working-class) settlers to this newly acquired territory for *kaitaku*, or development, and advanced its invasion of indigenous lands.

Although a series of measures to turn the Ainu into modern citizens were practiced in this early period of colonization, they all turned out to be not terribly successful due to lack of funding and the local government’s preoccupation with industrial and agricultural development in the early period of the *kaitaku* of Hokkaidō (Howell 1997:618-620). Then, what led the National Diet to pass the Hokkaidō Former-Native Protection Act (*Hokkaidō Kyū-dojin Hogo Hō*), in the very end of the nineteenth century, three decades after the founding of Hokkaidō? It is important to note that it was around this time that the central government officially started to criticize the very (mostly working-class) settlers that it sent to Hokkaidō in large numbers as a "bad" and "corrupt" influence on Ainu people as well as incompetent local officials in charge of Ainu affairs in Hokkaidō. These factors threatened the survival of the Ainu population as a whole,
which was alarming for some liberal humanist *wajin* politicians in the metropolis as well as some local officials. Biopower, Foucault (2003) argues, derives "its knowledge from, and define[s] its power's field of intervention in terms of, the birth rate, the mortality rate, various biological disabilities, and the effects of the environment" (245). It is such concerns of these politicians and local officials that I will turn to now. I find this moment so important because of the way liberal and humanist logics were used to articulate a new colonial rationality inflected by biopower.

As the nineteenth century drew to a close, a few Diet members in Tokyo demanded that biopower be exercised on the pitiful Ainu population and called for the passage of a law that can be used to protect them. Some heated debate about this proposed law, the Former-Native Protection Act, occurred on and off in the Diet from 1889, when a proposal for this law was first submitted. In 1895, four years before the passage of this law, a proposal signed by five Diet members was discussed extensively in a reading group in the Lower Diet. As one of the men who submitted this proposal, Diet member Chiba Tanemasa says: "The so-called natives [*dojin*] in Hokkaidō pay taxes and fulfill other obligations as citizens, as *wajin* do. [But] when it comes to the issue of protection, they need to be treated differently from *wajin*. For instance . . . when natives find a few appropriate places for fishing, settlers who immigrated to Hokkaidō take over. . . . And when they find appropriate places for agriculture, they are also robbed by *wajin*" (Naikaku Kanpōkyoku 1895:851). As a result, the lives of many Ainu people in Hokkaidō are under threat. Chiba also states that funding allocated to the protection of the Ainu always magically disappears, implying it is embezzled by local officials (851). Throughout this discussion, the Ainu are depicted as those overwhelmed by self-
indulgent and cunning *wajin* settlers in a fierce competition dictated by the idea of "the survival of the fittest" [*yūshō reppai*] and hence in need of care and protection by the central government.

Although they were criticized by Chiba for lacking managerial skills and possibly even embezzling money, local officials in Hokkaidō had started to show concern for the plight of Ainu residents by the end of the nineteenth century as well. In *Hokkaidō Shokumin Jyōkyō Hōbun: Hidakakoku* (A Report on the Situation of Settlement in Hidaka), a government report published by the local government of Hokkaidō in 1899 on the part of Hokkaidō that was called "the capital of Ainu," Japanese working-class settlers are also criticized as a bad influence on the Ainu. In a section on Saru, which is one of the areas most densely populated by the Ainu in Hokkaidō even today, the report says: "Although Ainu people in this county fare relatively better than others of the same race, their living conditions are extremely bad and their customs are vulgar. It is deplorable that they only learn bad habits of Japanese settlers and become cunning, their morality is extremely low, and they don't give any thought to frugality" (Hokkaidō chō shokuminbu 1899:76). The section on the village of Biratori details this: "This village's Ainu people originally had a lofty character and occupied the top position among the Ainu. Even today, some of them still think of themselves this way. However, through contact with Japanese settlers, they learned their bad habits. Moreover, Japanese rogues came to deprive them of money and goods. As a consequence, they have lost their innocent character and have become even more cunning than other Ainu people" (87).

Local officials in Hokkaidō clearly had what Renato Rosaldo (1989) famously calls “imperialist nostalgia”: a longing for “the very forms of life they intentionally altered or
destroyed” (69). While they mourn the disappearance of “the innocent and lofty Ainu,” they are completely oblivious to the fact that it was they that brought Japanese settlers to Hokkaidō in the first place.16

Although there was some opposition to the passage of the Former-Native Protection Act (due to lack of a clear definition of who the "Ainu" are, for example), it was passed eventually and took effect in 1899. Simply put, this law was three-fold: first, it gave all Ainu people lands for cultivation that were exempt from taxation and non-transferable except to heirs; second, it established a series of welfare measures that included medical care, tuition support, and funeral expenses; and lastly, it led to the founding of dojin gakkō, or native schools, throughout Hokkaidō (Howell 1997, 630).

After the passage of this law, the state policy on the Ainu was first and foremost assimilation. Influenced by such an assimilationist policy, not only settlers but also some Ainu people themselves argued for the assimilation of this "dying race" (horobiyuku minzoku) in the early twentieth century. As is clear from the Former-Native Protection Act, the central state’s goal was to turn the Ainu into propertied modern citizens free from uncivilized customs and cultures. As Howell (2004) puts it: “Implicit in government policy was the assumption that once the Ainu became “useful citizens” they would disappear from statistics and hence cease to exist as a distinct ethnic group. In contrast, Ainu activists argued in effect that becoming “useful citizens” was the only way for the Ainu to survive as a community” (6). As the culmination of this move to assimilate the Ainu, Ainu Kyōkai, or the Ainu Association, was founded in Hokkaidō in 1930, with a

16 However, agreeing with Wolfe's critique (1994) of Rosaldo, I would also argue that the figure of "the innocent and lofty Ainu" was settlers' construction as well.
wajin official, Kita Masaaki, as its first Chairman. Due to the group's complete
dependence on the state apparatus, the scope of this group was, of course, limited to
assimilation through welfare, in accordance with the Protection Act.

Either way, in contrast to its negative aspect, what Patrick Wolfe (2008) calls the
positive aspect of settler colonialism centered on assimilatory elimination became
prominent in early twentieth-century Hokkaidō, if not completely supplanted its negative
aspect. This continued until 1937, when "Ainu affairs dropped off the state's list of
pressing problems after the revision of the Hokkaidō Former Aborigine Protection Act"
(Howell 2004:24) as the Asia-Pacific War became the most pressing concern for the
Japanese state. The protection of a "dying" indigenous population in the northern frontier
was hardly a priority in this period. The Ainu themselves were not exempted from
partaking in the war. Many Ainu men, as Japanese citizens, fought as soldiers in the
imperial army and were expected to die for the emperor (Hashimoto 1994). In this sense,
the use of positive settler colonial biopower was temporarily suspended during the war
years, only to come back in the postwar period.

Now let us cross the ocean and step back to the late nineteenth century again. In
1895, Japan acquired Taiwan as a colony after its victory in the Sino-Japanese War.
Taiwan, formerly ruled by Qing China, had already become a settler colonial formation
where Han and Hakka Chinese immigrants were the majority by the time of Japanese
colonization17. Therefore, Japan, as a colonial force, joined this settler majority to expand

17 It was Qing China that ruled the island for over two hundred years (1683-1895) after
brief colonizations by the Dutch (1624-1662), the Spanish (1626-1642), and Koxinga
on already existing settler colonialism. Because of its complex history, Taiwan was ethnically heterogeneous. The population on the island was divided into three categories: the Japanese from the mainland (naichijin), the Chinese (hontōjin), and the indigenous tribes (banjin and later takasagozoku). Although the Japanese colonial government inherited many aspects of Chinese settler colonialism (for example, the distinction between “raw savages” residing in the highlands and Sinicized “cooked savages” living in the lowlands), it also departed in significant ways from the previous rulers in that Japan was the first settler regime that employed modern biopower for settler colonization. Although technically speaking Taiwan was a franchise colony, from the perspective of indigenous peoples the difference between franchise colonialism and settler colonialism hardly mattered. What changed were the regimes, not settler colonialism that was already endemic to Taiwan.

As Wolfe (2008) repeatedly says, settler colonialism is first and foremost a territorial colonization. As soon as Japan acquired Taiwan in 1895, all lands on the island of Taiwan without proof of ownership were declared to be kan’yūrin, or “state-owned forests,” in the Regulation on State-Owned Forests and the Production of Camphor (Kanyūrin oyobi shōnō seisōgyō torishimari kisoku). This was obviously disadvantageous for indigenous tribes, many of whom did not have the concept of individual property rights. Since Japan was a latecomer in the global imperial race and its mainland lacked any significant natural resources to speak of, a tropical island rich in sugar and camphor (1662-1683). This series of colonizations caused an influx of non-indigenous immigrants from China into Taiwan, slowly but firmly overpopulating indigenous peoples. While some lowland indigenous tribes were assimilated and Sinicized through contact with new immigrants, others were driven out into highlands. While Qing China called the former shoufan, or “cooked savages,” they called the latter shengfan, or “raw savages.”
like Taiwan was extremely valuable, and camphor was concentrated in highlands heavily populated by indigenous tribes (Fujii 1989). This move to first secure lands as *terra nullius* for further development obviously reflects what the Japanese government had done in Hokkaidō two decades earlier and other settler nations (like Australia) had done elsewhere.

Although the management of indigenous peoples, at that time still called *banmu*, or "savage affairs," had emerged as a concern in 1895, in the early period of colonial rule the Japanese colonial government was so preoccupied with the subjugation of Han-Chinese rebellions that it did not allocate significant resources to the subjugation of the indigenous population. It was not until the rule of the Fourth Governor-General Kodama Gentarō and his extremely capable right hand man, Kodama Shimpei, (1898-1905) that *banmu* was reformulated as more modern and scientific *riban*. In 1903, *riban tāikō*, or the Fundamental Principles of Riban, were adopted, and a series of projects were begun to develop highland indigenous lands rich with camphor. It was the Fifth Governor-General Sakuma Samata who conducted massive genocide of rebellious indigenous tribes, forcing them to choose surrender or death (Fujii 1989:228-237). With this bloody violence, most indigenous tribes slowly came under Japanese control by the late 1920s.

In the historiography of colonial Taiwan, the year 1930 is often understood as a watershed moment, when a significant incident led to a shift in the Japanese colonial government's policy toward indigenous peoples.\(^\text{18}\) The direct cause for this change is said to be the Musha Uprising, which was organized by a Seediq man, Mona Rudao, and his

\(^{18}\) Leo Ching traces a similar shift in cultural representations of "savagery" after the Musha Uprising. See Ching 2001, Chapter 4.
followers. They successfully killed 134 Japanese residents in Musha and two Han-Taiwanese mistaken for Japanese. This uprising by an indigenous tribe that was known to be “compliant” shocked the Japanese authorities and prompted them to radically change their policy on the indigenous communities.

In 1931, only a year after the Musha Uprising, *riban seisaku taikō*, or the new Principles on Riban Policies, were codified. What is significant is that this rationality informed by settler colonial biopower was officially adopted and codified by the colonial government so that it would be put into practice by all colonial agents. In contrast to *Riban Taikō* codified in 1903, which focused largely on development, the first three articles of the new 1930 *riban* principles are explicitly concerned with political rationalities that should guide *riban* policies: "Riban's purpose is to enlighten savages, stabilize their lives, and equally place all of them under wisdom *[isshi dōjin no seitoku ni abiseshimeru]*" (Article One); "Riban needs to be established based on accurate understanding of savages and their actual lifestyles" (Article Two); and "We should believe in savages and guide them with consideration" (Article Three). Based on these fundamental principles, what is suggested in the rest of *riban taikō* include agricultural development (Article Five), investment in roads and transportation (Article Seven), and the improvement of medicine (Artcicle Eight). The similarity of the new principles to the Former-Native Protection Act in Hokkaidō is striking. With these principles, Taiwanese indigenous peoples emerged as a population under Japanese settler colonial biopower's care and nurturance.
Numerous articles published in Riban no tomo ("Friends of Riban"), a magazine about riban's achievements published by the police department, also reflects this shift in Japanese colonial political rationality. In fact, the publication of this magazine itself, which began in 1932, tells a great deal about the fact that colonial officials inevitably had to change their attitude toward the colonized and publicize their humanist benevolence and care to the larger public. In an article published in 1932, one year after riban taikō's codification, one colonial official, Takezawa, insists that agents of riban, namely police officers, stop using the derogatory term "banjin" to refer to Taiwanese indigenous people. He says that given the fact that most indigenous people still have not been civilized enough, it is inevitable that some people still call them banjin. However, he continues, "we do not want to instruct some [indigenous] people in the same ways as [more common] uncivilized savages. There are some indigenous people like passionate children wanting to be not savage but Japanese [banjin de ha nai nihonjin] by receiving the benefits of education and enlightenment. There are also young indigenous adults who are very enlightened." For this reason, he excoriates police officers who still call indigenous people banjin. Takezawa insists that it is important to refer to indigenous people using the tribal names they prefer to use for themselves, such as “Tayal” and “Paiwan”, and guide them with mercy and affection [renbin to shitashimi]. In this process, he hopes, the use of the word banjin will be gradually banished not only from the police department but also from the entire Japanese empire.

19 The police department was in charge of all affairs related to the management of indigenous communities throughout Taiwan.
In 1934, too, a similar article prompting police officers to alter their attitude toward indigenous peoples was published in *Riban no tomo*. A police officer, Yoko'o, argues that the modernization and Westernization of Japan have corrupted the traditional Japanese spirits of magnanimity [*kanjo*] and sympathy [*dōjō*]. The loss of such spirits has led cultured people (like Japanese people) to judge others using their own standards and to completely lack understanding and sympathy for others. Here Yoko'o turns to a speech delivered by Martin Heidegger when he was elected rector of Freiburg University in Nazi Germany in 1933. According to Yoko'o, Heidegger rather cryptically said that only when the rulers are like the ruled will the core principles of the German university become obvious [*shidōsha ga hishidōsha de aru toki ni nomi doitsu daigaku no honshitsu ga hajimete meikaku to nari*] (*Ribán no tomo* 1934:2). Yoko'o reinterprets this as meaning sympathy should be at the core of colonial rule. Unlike Japanese people, Yoko'o maintains, indigenous peoples in Taiwan completely lack the feeling of sympathy because their emotions are extremely simple. However, precisely because of this simplicity, they are also impressionable. Therefore, inspired by Heidegger, Yoko'o argues: "If a different group that comes into contact with them are of good nature, they will be of good nature as well . . . . Thus based on self-reflection, humbleness, and self-discipline, *riban* agents should put themselves in *banjin*’s shoes [*hishidōsha taru banjin no tachiba ni mi wo okikae*] and make our minds aligned with theirs" (2). What is fascinating about Yoko'o's piece is that sympathy is conceptualized here as a tool of governance.20 We can

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20 For a similar conceptualization of sympathy in the context of the Dutch Empire, see Rutherford 2009.
see how close attention to what the ruled felt and knew came to matter in Japan's management of the Taiwanese indigenous communities.

Based on this shift in political rationality, the Japanese colonial government intervened in almost all aspects of indigenous life in Taiwan. For instance, the custom of tattooing bodies and faces among some tribes had been condemned as barbaric by Japan from the early period of colonial rule (Yamamoto 2005:237-238). However, even this was formulated as a humanist project informed by biopower. One riban official, Seno’o, (Ribin no tomo 1933a) argued in 1933 that tattoos not only lead to antagonistic sentiments among tribes (because tattoos function as markers of tribal difference for many tribes) but also physically damage indigenous people. Since women get tattoos on their faces, this necessarily results in serious swelling, and recovery could take nearly twenty days. If conducted under unsanitary conditions, it could even lead to infection with harmful viruses and, in the worst case, death. As a humanist official, Seno’o says: "We cannot just say, 'That's what they willingly do, so leave them alone.' From the perspective of today's riban policy, which is centered on the protection of their life, this is not an acceptable attitude" (2).

Of course, public hygiene was also a primary concern of riban. In 1935, Riban official Masuya urged his fellow officials to pay attention to the concept of hygiene given the extremely short life expectancy of "savages" (Riban no tomo 1935). What is concerning for him is the rapid population decline, the prevalence of infirmity, and the consequent reduction in productivity in certain indigenous communities. He formulates several projects to tackle this predicament, such as giving them nutritious foods,
improving bodily hygiene and the surrounding environments, and installing proper ventilations and lighting in huts of indigenous people (9).

While implementing this rule informed by settler colonial biopower, it is noteworthy that Japan emphasized its difference from the prior regimes, especially Qing China and Han-Chinese settlers. In other words, in order to legitimize its own rule, Japan had to de-legitimize the previous rulers. This parallels the Japanese government’s use of the same rhetoric in Hokkaidō, as I showed earlier in this chapter.

For example, Inō Kanori, who was one of the first anthropologists who conducted research in Taiwan, wrote a massive book called Taiwan Banseishi in 1904, which is on the history of tactics of governing natives used by a series of colonial regimes from the seventeenth century. The recurrent trope in this book is that of the cunning Han Chinese duping ignorant savages. For example, he describes Qing rule this way: “At that time, the Chinese were cunning. Since savages were illiterate, they inserted sections that would only benefit themselves into contracts and duped savages into signing them” (Taiwan sōtokufu minseibu shokusankyoku 1904:513-514). Inō also criticized Han-Chinese anthropological observations about Taiwanese natives: “Chinese people’s observations about the essential racial characteristics of Taiwanese savages were so crude . . . that they did not come up with any theories that are academically reliable. The only reason for this is that they considered savages as a different race outside of civilization [kagai no irui] and almost completely excluded them from the realm of humanity” (623).

A brochure published in 1944, Takasagozoku no kyōiku ("The Education of Natives"), is also illuminating (Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku 1944). The whole text is devoted to self-congratulatory accounts of Japanese colonial educational policies on the
native population and minute statistics taken on their progress. In the section that elaborates on educational policies on natives conducted by the regimes that preceded the Japanese colonial government, policies of the Dutch, the Spanish, Koxinga, and the Qing periods are all characterized as failures: "The Dutch and Spanish colonial periods mainly focused on the education of "cooked" natives and a small number of highland natives through religion and medicine. Koxinga took a carrot-and-stick approach, but it did not work well" (5). The report goes on to describe the subsequent period of rule by Qing China as "sometimes taking an active approach, other times taking a passive approach," eventually failing to civilize indigenous people: "Although native education was started . . . in 1886 [during the tenure of Governor Liu Ming-Chuan], the subsequent governor Shao You-Lian abolished native schools and sent back native children. Therefore, there was no visible effect [of this education] on these children. After that, indigenous peoples remained "outside civilization" [kagai no tami] until our colonial period started" (5). In contrast to these bad and illegitimate rulers, the role of the Japanese government was defined as nurturing and enlightening these indigenous subjects that had been neglected by the previous rulers.

I have so far suggested that by the early twentieth century settler colonial biopower had become the primary mode of power in Hokkaidō and Taiwan, in spite of the slight differences in the time periods. The logics of care, protection, sympathy, and nurturance became tools of settler colonial governance, if you will. Based on this political rationality, a variety of measures were designed to transform and assimilate indigenous
subjects to the settler nation-state. The ultimate purpose of this power was to replace the indigenous communities with a new settler society founded on indigenous lands.

Both the Ainu and indigenous peoples in Taiwan were called *dojin* or savages in the Japanese Empire and occupied the lowest stratum in the Japanese racial hierarchy. These two different indigenous groups became commensurable not only with each other but also with other indigenous peoples all over the world, such as Native Americans in the United States, Maoris in New Zealand, and Aborigines in Australia (Japanese scholars' comparative studies on colonial policies towards indigenous peoples all over the world attest to this commensuration). The Japanese colonial archive reveals how this commensuration of the Ainu and Taiwanese indigenous peoples sometimes led to surprising encounters between them. For example, when indigenous people were taken to the mainland Japan for study tours called *naichi kankō*, they sometimes had a chance to meet Ainu people. As early as 1907, there is an archival record that shows that a group of Taiwanese indigenes visited Hokkaidō (Taiwan nichi nichi shimpō 1907). This newspaper article commensurates the Ainu and the Taiwanese indigenous peoples, calling them *ryōkyoku no banjin*, or “savages from the two opposite ends of the Japanese Empire.” In 1912, the same newspaper reports a Taiwanese indigenous tour group's visit to the Colonial Exposition held in Tokyo. There they were faced with four Ainu people as well as three indigenous people from Sakhalin displayed together as "savages" (Sakhalin had become Japan’s colony in 1905). A Giliyak and an Ainu on display were obviously surprised by this visit. The account reports that Taiwanese indigenes expressed the same feeling, saying "they can't be Japanese" and "they must be savages, just like us" (Taiwan nichi nichi shimpō 1912).
There was a flow in the opposite direction as well, namely a flow of Ainu people to colonial Taiwan. In 1933, four Ainu people visited an indigenous community in Taiwan, to present a brief talk and show a dance performance. According to a small article about this visit in Riban no tomo, an Ainu man, Monbetsu Kōzō, discussed the Ainu's progress after getting guidance from the Japanese government. Some people in the indigenous community believed that they and the Ainu must belong to the same race because of similarities such as tattoos, accessories, languages, and dancing styles. The article states that the indigenous people who saw this performance and listened to the talk got inspired to work harder to become like them (Riban no tomo 1933b).

Although scholars like Danika Medak-Saltzman (2010) see moments like this as the origin of a global indigenous consciousness, I would be much more modest and say these were moments of burgeoning intimacy between different indigenous groups inhabiting the same Japanese Empire at that time. Although all of these fragmentary accounts were presumably written by non-indigenous authors, they allow us to glimpse circulations of affect between two different indigenous groups in the Japanese Empire who shared similar experiences. However, this intimacy did not last long; it was forcibly and abruptly interrupted by the collapse of the Japanese empire in 1945. In the US-led restructuring of East Asia, while Hokkaidō remained part of Japan, Taiwan was “liberated” from Japan and “returned” to the Republic of China. Two indigenous groups in the same empire thus became separate groups in two different national communities.

This reconfiguration of East Asia according to the logic of the Cold War had a tremendous effect on the lives of indigenous peoples in Hokkaidō and Taiwan. In postwar Japan, as the myth of ethnic homogeneity emerged as opposed to the wartime rhetoric of
a multiethnic empire (Oguma 1995; Befu 2001), the Ainu were understood to have been already assimilated into the larger Japanese race. In Taiwan, as the Nationalist Party attempted to maintain strong cultural ties with China, indigenous peoples were forced to switch loyalty from "Japan" to "China" overnight. It is this complex postwar history of indigenous peoples in Japan and Taiwan that I turn to in the next chapter.
Chapter 2

In the Shadow of the Economic Miracle:
Being Indigenous Under the Cold War

In *The Other Cold War*, anthropologist Heonik Kwon (2010) challenges accounts of the Cold War that proliferated after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. These standard accounts of the Cold War often emphasize a complete shift from a bipolar world to a globalized world in the 1990s. Problematizing such a neat distinction, he provocatively asks: "When we say the cold war is over, whose cold war and which dimension of the cold war do we refer to? Did the cold war end the same way everywhere, or was the "struggle for the world" the same everywhere?" (6). Kwon attempts to offer a slightly different picture of the Cold War by attending to its continuing force that keeps shaping and affecting the lives of many people all over the world. After all, as Kwon repeatedly states, whereas the Cold War period was a time of peace in the US and Western Europe, in other parts of the world the Cold War was not “cold” at all.

Based on his fieldwork in Vietnam and Korea, where the Cold War had a tremendous impact on people as a national community was divided into two based on ideological differences, Kwon prompts fellow anthropologists to begin what could be termed an "anthropology of the Cold War," a surprisingly underdeveloped field:
Cold war history is fundamentally an anthropological problem—both in the sense that an understanding of how the peripheral others experienced and recounted the history of the cold war is central to putting into perspective the way in which the exemplary center conceptualizes the nature of this history and also in the sense that struggles between the image of the whole and the representation of the parts are critical to the understanding of the global cold war (8).

Building on emerging scholarship like Kwon's that critically approaches the history of the Cold War in Asia, this chapter looks at the effects of violence enacted by the Cold War on indigenous subjects in Japan and Taiwan. In the postwar period, the Ainu and Taiwanese indigenous peoples, who had occupied the same position as dojin in the Japanese Empire, became separate national indigenous groups as the Allied Forces dismantled the Japanese Empire. Japan's territory was significantly reduced to Hokkaidō, Honshū, Shikoku, and Kyūshū, while Taiwan was "returned" to the Republic of China. Indigenous decolonization was blocked by the rise of the Cold War, as there was no formal decolonization process for either the Ainu or Taiwanese indigenous peoples (or for Taiwan and Japan, for that matter). For the US-led Allied Forces, securing Japan and Taiwan as pro-capitalist democratic US allies in East Asia against the global threat of communism was more important than decolonization.

As Japan and Taiwan pursued rapid economic recovery and development, the governments in both countries emphasized national cohesion and homogeneity. In Japan, the history of the Japanese Empire was quickly forgotten, or only selectively remembered. Self-victimizing narratives centered on the deception of the public by the fascist regime and the experience of atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

21 For a similar approach to the Cold War in the field of Asian American studies, see Kim 2010.
pervaded Japanese postwar reflections on its pre-1945 years (Yoneyama 1999). Therefore, in contrast to prewar discourse on Japan as a multi-ethnic empire, the myth of the homogenous nation became extremely popular in both intellectual and popular discourse in post-1945 Japan (Oguma 1995, Befu 2001). Many simply assumed that the Ainu had been almost completely assimilated into the Japanese race. In Taiwan, the ROP government presented itself as a liberator of Taiwan from Japanese colonialism and a true inheritor of Chinese history (as opposed to Communist China). Based on this understanding, the ROC sinicized Taiwan and its heterogeneous populations, only emphasizing Taiwan's historical connection with China after the seventeenth century and erasing much longer indigenous history that had existed long before that. Indigenous peoples were forced to switch loyalty from Japan to China overnight by learning Mandarin Chinese and adopting Chinese names.

However, despite (or rather because of) such utopian image of national cohesion and homogeneity, it was clear that indigenous peoples were othered by the settler majority in both Hokkaidō and Taiwan in political, economic, and social realms. Issues such as discrimination and poverty were disproportionately prevalent in many indigenous communities. Settler colonial biopower was reestablished by the postwar settler regimes in Japan and Taiwan to address such issues, or to make indigenous peoples live. In Hokkaidō, this power manifested itself in a series of welfare projects conducted in cooperation with the Utari22 Kyōkai, which was the association that succeeded the Ainu Association and which had strong ties with the state apparatus. These projects were

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22 *Utari* became a preferred term of self-address by Ainu activists in the postwar period due to the fact that many non-Ainus used the word "Ainu" in extremely discriminatory ways and some Ainus wanted to use a more neutral term not tainted by such uses.
mainly centered on alleviating poverty and lack of infrastructure prevalent in many remaining Ainu communities. In Taiwan, despite its self-presentation as a liberator of Taiwanese people from Japan, the KMT regime inherited many of the institutions the Japanese colonial government left behind. In mountain-area reserves now reformulated as shandi baoliudi, the government promoted the "life improvement movement," or shenghuo gaishan yundong, forcing the use of Mandarin as well as imposing many changes in areas such as hygiene to improve the livelihood of the indigenous populations.

Tracing the lives of indigenous subjects in Hokkaidō and Taiwan amidst these numerous changes and continuities in settler colonial rule in the postwar period exposes the interconnected violence of several colonial forces, namely Japan, the Republic of China, and the United States. Indeed, for these subjects, the Cold War was not merely reducible to conflicts between two polars with different political, economic, and social ideologies and ideals in faraway places. They intimately experienced the effects of such global politics on their own bodies and lives. It is these people's stories that I am concerned with in this chapter.

The construction of postwar settler colonialism in Japan and Taiwan had already begun before the formal end of the Second World War. Two declarations by the Allied Powers in the early 1940s bespeak settler colonial violence that was to continue during the Cold War period. Indeed, it was at the Cairo conference (1943) attended by Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek (representing the Republic of China) that they declared: "The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial
expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that *all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese*, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China" (emphasis added). Two years later, the Article Eight of the Potsdam Declaration in 1945 cites the Cairo Declaration and declares: "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaidō, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine" (emphasis added).

The reason why I find these two declarations so illuminating is because of how Taiwan and Hokkaidō, two indigenous territories in East Asia, are perceived in them. On the one hand, Taiwan is portrayed as naturally belonging to the "Chinese," from whom Japan had illegitimately stripped the island. It was decided that Taiwan belonged to the Republic of China, which was representative of "China" at that time. On the other hand, Hokkaidō is depicted as legitimately belonging to Japan and does not need to be returned to any entity. It is nothing but the territory of "Japan," even when it is stripped of all of its "colonies" and restored to its "original" state. Hokkaidō's status as a settler colony was not even mentioned, let alone questioned.

Therefore, these two declarations expose better than anything the constitution of what Naoki Sakai (2012) calls "trans-Pacific complicity"—between Japan and the US, between Taiwan and the US—in the postwar East Asian political order and the location of indigenous subjects in this new order. Both the Republic of China, which fled to Taiwan after being defeated by Communist China, and Japan, which was "restored" to its "original" state before imperialization, were trusted by the United States as legitimate
colonial rulers of two settler colonial formations in the region, Taiwan and Hokkaidō, respectively. They continued settler colonial occupation of indigenous lands in complicity with the United States, so to speak. Then, how was this postwar settler colonialism sanctioned by the US Empire and its trans-Pacific complicity with Japan and Taiwan actually practiced? How did it affect the lives of indigenous subjects?

Immediately after the Second World War ended, Japan was swiftly occupied by the Allied Forces. In 1947, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) Douglas MacArthur conducted drastic land reform, called nōchi kaikaku. The SCAP ordered compulsory purchases of absentee landowners' lands for cheap redistributions to tenants, who were suffering from their unequal relationships with exploitative large landowners. This was one of the projects conducted by the SCAP to present itself as a "liberator" of the Japanese public.23

In Hokkaidō, this project held a meaning that the SCAP probably did not fully expect. In the prewar period, many Ainu people had become absentee landowners, having rented lands given to them under the Former-Native Protection Act to Japanese settlers.24 The SCAP did not take it into account that the prewar Japanese government had given lands for farming to the Ainu as a welfare measure and did not exempt the Ainu from this land reform. The Ainu Association, which was reestablished immediately after the war, repeatedly requested them to exempt Ainu landowners, to no avail (Siddle 1996:149-23

Similarly, Lisa Yoneyama (2005) aptly points out how Japanese women's enfranchisement was used to reinforce this rhetoric of liberation by the SCAP.23 Although the Former-Native Protection Act had originally prohibited the sales of lands given to the Ainu to non-Ainu owners, the 1937 reform made it possible under certain conditions.
Although there is an archival record that suggests that the SCAP at one point asked a few Ainu leaders if they were interested in founding an independent nation (Asahi Shimbun 1989a; Siddle 1996:148), this incident shows that the SCAP had no intention of treating Ainu people differently just because they were indigenous.

After the Allied Occupation ended in 1952, Japan rapidly recovered from the ruins of the Second World War as a pro-capitalist democratic US ally in Asia. In 1956, the Japanese government's white paper on Japan's economy famously declared: "it is no longer the post-war period [mohaya sengo de ha nai]." During this early stage of the postwar period, however, the Ainu benefited little from this economic prosperity. Poverty and discrimination pervaded many Ainu communities.

It was as a response to such plight of the Ainu that the first major postwar welfare project for the Ainu was organized in the 1960s. Under the name of furyō chiku kaizen shisetsu seibi jigyō, or "the project to build facilities that improve poverty-stricken neighborhoods," public housing, community centers, and public bathhouses were built in many Ainu communities to improve Ainu people's well-being (Asahi Shimbun 1962a). From 1974 on, the Hokkaidō Utari Welfare Project was begun to promote similar measures centered on the notion of Ainu welfare. All of these state projects were conducted in cooperation with the Utari Association, the association that succeeded the Ainu Association after its brief hiatus following its failure to change the SCAP’s land reform. This organization, like its predecessor, emphasized assimilation and welfare and essentially "functioned as an arm of the government from which it received both financial and personnel assistance" (Siddle 1996, 160). The Utari Association's attitude toward
Ainu politics is represented in their conversation with the then Prime Minister Satō Eisaku in 1971:

Association: "... [Although there used to be native schools before,] now the Ainu are being educated properly. There is no discrimination, ethnic or otherwise, in terms of education."
Satō: "It's much better now then. You need to make one last effort (mō hitoiki dane)."
Association: "Yes, we need to make that one last effort [and then will be completely assimilated] (hai, mō hitoiki nandesuyo)." (Quoted in Shinya 1977:271-272)

In other words, the settler state was asked to help this very last stage of assimilation advocated by the association.

However, predictably enough, the lives of Ainu people in Hokkaidō changed little even after these projects were conducted. This can be partially explained by settler colonial attitudes guiding these biopolitical welfare projects. A report written by the local government of Hokkaidō in 1960 described the Ainu community as "continuing to hold onto a primitive economy reliant on fishing and hunting without any creativity" (cited in Higashimura 2006:296). This type of discriminatory and patronizing attitudes also became apparent in another government report, *Hokkaidō Utari Jittai Chōsa Hōkokusho* ("Utari Livelihood Survey"), published in 1972. This report's choice of terminologies to describe Ainu people is downright discriminatory: "Since the Ainu population is much smaller in comparison to the non-Ainu, the gap between them is huge in all aspects. Because of this, the Ainu lack a sense of independence and are dependent on the *wajin* economy in their community." Moreover, the report states: "it is extremely difficult to give guidance to Utari people who have practice old evil customs" (cited in Ōtsuka 1972). For these reasons, Richard Siddle (1996) goes so far as to call postwar welfare
projects "welfare colonialism" because "the Ainu welfare project illustrates that although Japanese society was undergoing transformation, the Ainu were still enmeshed within power structures reminiscent of the pre-war period. The Ainu remained powerless wards of the state under the Protection Act, and were controlled by the Dōchō [The Hokkaidō Government Office] through channels established in the 1930s" (160).

Such discriminatory attitudes were pervasive in general society as well. In one telling newspaper article, an Ainu woman discusses "otsunenmuko," a common occurrence in Ainu communities in Hokkaidō. This term refers to incidents where Japanese men "marry" Ainu women only when they are living in Ainu communities and drop off the face of the earth after they are done with their temporary contracts or work assignments in Hokkaidō. Although this woman's first husband was Ainu, he died of tuberculosis soon after their first child was born. She remarried a Japanese man and had a child with him together. However, one day, he left her saying he would go back home to get permission from his parents to marry her, to never return. Their child passed away from malnutrition right after this. Although she remarried a different Japanese man, after she got pregnant, this new husband too disappeared, lying that he would go look for a job. (Asahi Shimbun 1962b). This article is significant because it shows us the gendered nature of settler colonialism in Hokkaidō, in which Hokkaidō is feminized and wajin men exploit the labor, affection, and sexuality of Ainu women (let us remember that one of the ways in which the premodern dispossession of Ainu people occurred was through wajin men's rape of Ainu women).

Another newspaper article traces the life of an Ainu man who graduated from high school with superb grades. Although he acquired a teaching certificate, he was
unable to get a teaching job due to anti-Ainu discrimination. He then decided to work at
the City Hall, but he was rejected after an interview. He says: "Since my face was hairy,
they immediately knew that I was Ainu [and rejected me on the grounds of my ethnic
difference]." Then he joined the Self-Defense Force, but he was dismissed after having a
fight with his boss who derogatorily called him "Ainu" (Asahi Shimbun 1962c).

The coexistence of the "letting die" mode of biopower alongside the "making
live" mode became most visible in the forcible construction of a dam in Nibutani, which
some call the Mecca of the Ainu, in the Hidaka region in Hokkaidō. Starting from the
70s, Hokkaidō kaihatsuchō, or the Hokkaidō Regional Development Bureau, began a
dam construction project for flood control as well as irrigation for the surrounding areas
and a nearby industrial park under the guidance of the state. They slowly acquired most
of the lands required for the construction through offering massive compensation
packages to (mostly Ainu) residents whose houses and farms would be submerged under
this dam. All but two residents agreed to give up their lands. The two who refused were
prominent local Ainu leaders, Kayano Shigeru (who would later become a Diet member
in 1994, see Chapter Three) and Kaizawa Tadashi.

Both Kayano and Kaizawa argued that the dam would destroy the sacred Saru
River, where the Ainu used to fish salmons and continued to hold annual rituals even
after the Japanese invasion and settlement, and situated this dam construction in the
centuries-long history of Japanese colonization of Ainu lands. In 1987, however, the
Bureau resorted to the exercise of eminent domain, forcibly taking away the lands of
Kayano and Kaizawa. Although the two responded by complaining to the Hokkaidō
Commission on Condemnation, the commission declared that this condemnation was "legitimate" (Asahi Shimbun 1989b).

Those who agreed to give up their lands by no means did so because they did not care about the significance of the Saru River. One Ainu man who had 50 million yen in debt and who sold his rice fields for 150 million yen says: "I do understand the ideals of Mr. Kayano and his supporters. But we gotta eat too [orera ha kutte ikanakereba naranai]." This man ceased speaking to his brother who was opposed to the dam construction (Asahi Shimbun 1991). This man's powerful comment shows many were forced to give up their lands due to dire poverty that plagued many remaining Ainu communities like Nibutani.

Although Kayano and Kaizawa eventually sued the Commission on Condemnation in 1993 and the Sapporo District Court eventually ruled that its approval of condemnation was illegal in 1997, by the time of this court decision the construction project had already been completed. This court decision was also the first that recognized the Ainu as Japan's indigenous group, which, combined with the New Ainu Act passed in the same year, suggests that liberal multiculturalism had started to emerge by then. This will be discussed in the next chapter. But the violent invasion of Ainu lands that manifested itself in the construction of the Nibutani Dam also powerfully demonstrates that settler colonialism was a strong undercurrent of postwar Japanese society. Despite numerous welfare projects conducted to "improve" the Ainu population and assimilate them to "general society," for Ainu subjects to live in postwar Japan meant to live under the condition of ongoing settlement.
The situation was little different for indigenous subjects in Taiwan. The recurring trope that is available to tell the postwar history of Taiwan is, of course, that it experienced an "economic miracle." A political scientist Hung-mao Tien's (1997) summary of postwar Taiwanese history is representative here:

Although the KMT regime frequently resorted to oppression, its iron-fisted rule evidently provided Taiwan with three decades of political stability that enabled the government to launch a steady course of economic development. In the 1950s, the Taiwan authorities successfully undertook a land-reform program that equalized land distribution and prompted agricultural production. Once land reform was accomplished, the government switched to an industrial development plan that led to a prosperous export-intensive economy. By the end of 1989, Taiwan's two-way trade exceeded $118 billion, making the island nation's trade volume the thirteenth largest in the world" (4).

Thus, the logic of sacrifice pervades standard social scientific accounts of Taiwan's postwar history: although Taiwanese people were subjected to oppressive authoritarianism for nearly forty years, it paid off because it contributed to "social stability" required for economic development. Of course, accounts like this one mask massive violence committed against indigenous peoples under developmentalist authoritarianism.

Since the ROC was founded in Mainland China and foresaw its rule in Taiwan as only temporary until it reclaims China, it did not have any clear vision as to how to manage the indigenous population in Taiwan. The ROC constitution, which took effect in 1947, reflected this. Although the constitution did have several articles that recognized the equality of all ethnic groups and the right of self-determination of non-Han peoples, they were not specifically written with indigenous tribes in Taiwan in mind. Moreover, this notion of ethnic self-determination, which originates in Sun Yat Sen's ideas of Three
People's Principles of "nationalism" (minzu), "democracy" (minguan), and "people's livelihood" (minsheng), was assimilationist in nature, assuming that all non-Han ethnic minorities would eventually assimilate into the Han race or that they are already part of an expansive “Chinese ethnicity.” Based on this constitution, the new KMT government's policy was thus to assimilate indigenous peoples into Han-Chinese culture as fast as possible, by promoting the use of Mandarin, improving their hygiene, doing away with their old "barbaric" customs, and giving them necessary job training (Fujii 2001:156, 158-159, 184-186). In other words, indigenous peoples in Taiwan were forced to shift their loyalty from the Japanese empire to the Chinese nation overnight.

One notable change in the postwar period was that indigenous peoples were now addressed as shanbao in Mandarin Chinese, literally meaning "compatriots in the mountains," replacing “takasagozoku” that was an official designation in the later period of Japanese colonial rule. By giving them this new name, it is noteworthy that the ROC government tried to differentiate itself from the Japanese colonial government and presented itself as a generous protector of indigenous peoples, just like the Japanese colonial government did in relation to the previous regimes, as I already examined in Chapter One. The government's memorandum in 1947 states: "[Indigenous peoples] experienced discrimination and oppression during the Japanese colonial period. They were also forced to live in the highlands and regarded as uncivilized people [huawaizhimin, note that the Japanese also argued that Qing China considered them as kagai no tami, the exact same expression that the ROC is used in Mandarin Chinese]. Since we recovered [Taiwan], we have considered them as our equals. We have to immediately stop using the term "takasagozoku"" (quoted in Fujii 2001:159). This new
form of address was supposed to index the new regime’s attitude toward indigenous peoples.

Despite its self-differentiation from Japanese rule, however, KMT's settler colonial rule had many similarities to that of Japan's. In fact, some policies and projects were directly inherited by the Japanese colonial government. One of the most striking continuities is the two settler colonial regimes' management of indigenous lands. Since the ROC government inherited all properties and lands owned by the Japanese colonial government when it took over Taiwan, it also inherited the lands of indigenous peoples as well, because they were all owned by the Japanese colonial state after 1900 (see Chapter One). These lands, formerly called banchi by the Japanese colonial government, were now reformulated as shandixiang, or "mountain communities," and a variety of measures were taken under the name of shandi xingzheng, or "mountain community administration," such as the exemption of shanbao from taxation (Fujii 2001:164-165). Later these lands were again reorganized as "shandi baoliudi," or "mountain reserves." Although the government prohibited the sales of these lands as well as the use of them by the Han-Chinese, it was ultimately up to the state to do whatever it needed to do with them, because of the state-owned nature of these lands (176-177). Thus, to use Fujii's words, the ROC government "inherited the outcomes of the Japanese government's forced dispossession of indigenous peoples" (178).

The continuing effects of settler colonial biopower established by the Japanese colonial government were also clear in KMT's attempts to have direct power over indigenous life. The government's project to "improve" the lives of indigenous people, shandirenmin shenghuo gaijin yundong, formulated in 1951, was a case in point.
According to Fujii, this project attempted to intervene in six aspects of indigenous life, to make it live: 1. The use of Mandarin will be strongly promoted; 2. Plain and simple clothing should replace the bad custom of being "naked" or "semi-naked"; 3. Pay attention to nutrition and hygiene and use chopsticks and bowls when eating. Heavy drinking and eating with hands are strongly discouraged; 4. In order to maintain a sanitary environment, housing should be improved; 5. Inculcate discipline to be productive and hard working; and 6. Do away with customs and practices such as shamanic medicine, early marriage, and burial inside one's house (Fujii 2001:189-190).

Most of the realms KMT intervened in are classic spheres biopower is typically concerned with, such as health, medicine, hygiene, and productivity, as we already saw in Chapter One.

Despite the prohibition of use of *shandi bao liudi* by the Chinese and sales of these lands, illegal uses and sales, not few of which were forced, did not stop (Fujii 2001:204-205, 227; Ishigaki 2011). This, of course, corresponded with the government's aggressive promotion of agriculture and development on the island for rapid economic growth. Rather than trying to put a stop to this dispossession of indigenous lands by Han-Chinese people, the government decided to permit the non-indigenous use of *shan di bao liu di* under certain conditions in 1958. After this, the Chinese dispossession of indigenous lands became even more intense than before (Fujii 2001:205).

Moreover, with dire poverty lingering in most indigenous communities, many indigenous people left their own communities for large cities, which were rapidly industrializing under KMT developmentalist authoritarianism. This massive migratory move started in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, when the Taiwanese government
shifted its economic policy to export trades with developed nations. Many indigenous people settled in industrial cities such as Taipei, Kaohsiung, Taizhong, and Taoyuan to take up low-ranking or low-paid jobs that required little technical expertise, such as factory work and construction work (Cai 2001).

Although this massive displacement of indigenous peoples from their communities to industrialized cities is commonly explained using the sociological framework of “push and pull,” rural poverty being the push factor and increasing industrialization in large cities being the pull factor (e.g. Cai 2001), this type of analysis masks the fact that this migration occurred against the backdrop of settler colonial violence. It also fails to understand postwar Taiwanese history in a bigger picture, as a place shaped by the history of Japanese colonialism and US neoimperial interests in postwar East Asia. As Kwon's quote in the beginning of this chapter says, it is imperative for scholars to examine how the lives of peripheral others like Taiwanese indigenous people were shaped by the global Cold War.

The epitome of postwar settler colonial violence in Taiwan manifested itself as a forcible invasion of an indigenous territory, just like in Nibutani, Hokkaidō. Since 1982, the largest electric company in Taiwan, Taipower, has been leaving nuclear waste on the Orchid Island, 50 miles off the southeastern coast of Taiwan. The Orchid Island, called Lanyu in Mandarin, is traditionally an island inhabited by the Yami tribe. Although there is no clear record as to why this location was chosen for a nuclear waste site, this project is just another instance of the KMT's denigration of Taiwanese indigenous people's sovereignty, which coexisted with the rhetoric of welfare and integration. In fact, many Yami residents on the island state that during the construction of the waste site, they were
told that what was being built was a fish-canning factory, not a nuclear waste site (Fan 2006:436). Despite opposition from the local community ongoing since 1987, Taipower still has not shut down the nuclear waste repository.

However, the fact that they were able to openly express opposition in the late 1980s bespoke a sea change that was occurring in Taiwan in the late 1980s. In fact, it reflected the emergence and expansion of the global indigenous rights movement that has been active since the 1970s. This globalized movement also had an impact on Ainu politics in Japan, which started to openly show dissent against continuing wajin settler colonialism and dispossession in the early 1970s. Faced with indigenous peoples' calls for sovereignty, autonomy, and respect for indigenous cultures and traditions, Japan and Taiwan in recent years have adopted multiculturalism as a state ideology. It is this drastic shift that I will examine in the next chapter. What does it mean for neoliberal settler colonial states to apologize for their past wrongs and respect indigenous people's unique cultures? What happens when they officially declare that the Ainu and the Taiwanese indigenous peoples are, indeed, indigenous to "Japan" and "Taiwan," respectively?
Chapter 3

Know Yourself, Be Yourself:

Globalization, Multiculturalism, and

the Transformation of Indigenous Politics in Late Liberalism

Elizabeth Povinelli (2011b) traces the emergence of what she terms "late liberalism" to the "anticolonial and new social movements [that] transfigured the prior way in which liberalism governed alternative forms of life by putting extreme pressure on its legitimating frameworks — imperial arts of paternalist and civilizing governance” (25):

Activists and [anticolonial] theorists, such as W. E. B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon, claimed that Western arts of caring for the colonized and subaltern were not rectifying human inequalities but creating and entrenching them. But this legitimacy crisis was, over time, turned into a crisis of culture for the governed as state after state instituted formal or informal policies of cultural recognition (or cognate policies such as multiculturalism) as a strategy for addressing the challenge of internal and external difference that they faced (25).

Therefore, in late liberalism, multiculturalism has become the liberal state’s strategy of containing dissent from a variety of minority groups, including indigenous communities.

Political philosopher Will Kymlicka has been a staunch supporter of this multiculturalism. He (1995) argues that liberalism and minority politics can peacefully coexist. Although many see the emergence of minority politics in liberal democracy as a threat to fundamental ideas of liberalism, he maintains that "many . . . of the demands of ethnic and national groups are consistent with liberal principles of individual freedom and social justice" and "they can be 'managed'" within the framework of liberalism (193).
Thus, in multiculturalist societies, when minorities ask for redress for their social subordination or discrimination against them, liberal subjects "will listen to and evaluate the pain, harm, torture they might unwittingly be causing minority others" (Povinelli 2001:329). If liberals are convinced that they are in fact causing harm to minorities, their dissent is incorporated into the liberal democratic polity so that it can become an even better liberal democratic society tolerant of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity.

This multicultural rationality has been flourishing in many societies throughout the world over the last few decades. However, such liberal multicultural politics of inclusion have an inherent paradox. Wendy Brown (1995) elucidates it succinctly: "efforts to pursue redress for injuries related to social subordination . . . [cast] the law in particular and the state more generally as natural arbiters of injury rather than as themselves invested with the power to injure. Thus, the effort to "outlaw" social injury powerfully legitimizes law and the state as appropriate protectors against injury and casts injured individuals as needing such protection by such protectors" (27). In this sense, any state-centered approach to redress for injustices and violences is bound to face limitations because it is blind to the generation of injustices and violences in the very state from which it seeks redress.

This is the exact conundrum that indigenous subjects have been facing in Hokkaidō and Taiwan over the past few decades. In response to the globalization of the indigenous rights movement, the settler regimes in Japan and Taiwan have adopted multiculturalism as an official policy to deal with dissent from indigenous subjects. In Japan, a new law centered on the celebration and promotion of Ainu culture was passed in 1997 to replace the Former-Native Protection Act. The Ainu were also recognized by
the Japanese government as indigenous to Japan in 2008. In post-martial law Taiwan, following the rise of the *yuanzhumin* movement, the state now recognizes the indigeneity of (at least some) indigenous tribes and respects (some of) their traditions and customs. Although many scholars and activists celebrate this flourishing of liberal multiculturalism in the two countries as progress,^{25} I want to pause for a second and linger on the meaning of this significant moment in the histories of Hokkaidō and Taiwan. What does it mean for obviously still racist, patriarchal, nationalist, and settler colonial states to suddenly start to atone for past wrongs against indigenous peoples, recognize their indigeneity, and/or even celebrate their cultures and traditions? Is settler colonialism challenged by this move, or rather prolonged? In other words, I am concerned with "the possibility that liberalism is harmful not only when it fails to live up to its ideals, but when it approaches them" (Povinelli 2002:9).

Elizabeth Povinelli (2002) points out a crucial distinction between postcolonialism and multiculturalism: whereas postcolonialism inspires a desire to identify with their colonizers in colonial subjects, multiculturalism works by inciting minority subjects to be "themselves." In the context of indigenous politics in Australia:

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^{25} Some social scientists' responses to the rise of multicultural discourse in Taiwan are representative here. For example, anthropologist Scott Simon (2007) calls this flourishing of multiculturalism as “progress,” saying "the DPP [the Democratic Progressive Party] under the leadership of President Chen Shui-Bian [which was the first non-KMT regime in the history of postwar Taiwan from 2000 to 2008] made significant changes to the relationship between the state and indigenous peoples; and made progress in indigenous human rights that was once thought to be impossible" (223). He believes that Taiwan “can thus become a multicultural state as envisioned by Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka" (240). Michael Rudolph (2006) also states "it has become clear . . . that human rights of Taiwan's Aborigines are very well respected today and that charges of violations of these rights [by indigenous activists]—as it can sometimes still be seen on the internet—are merely polemic" (88).
As the nation stretches out its hands to ancient Aboriginal laws (as long as they are not "repugnant"), indigenous subjects are called on to perform an authentic difference in exchange for the good feelings of the nation and the reparative legislation of the state. But this call does not simply produce good theater, rather it inspires impossible desires: to be this impossible object and to transport its ancient prenational meanings and practices to the present in whatever language and moral framework prevails at the time of enunciation (6, emphasis in original).

As she astutely points out, under multiculturalism, celebrations of indigenous alterity are only possible in ways that make sense in liberal societies. Such limitation of liberal tolerance ironically makes the demand placed on indigenous subjects to be "themselves" impossible.

Therefore, with the rise of liberal multiculturalism in Japan and Taiwan in the 1990s, settler colonial rule informed by biopower has undergone important transformations. Settler colonial biopower until this period, as I've been showing, had assimilation as its ultimate goal. Indigenous peoples were cared for, protected, and made to live so that they would eventually assimilate into settler culture and the new society founded by settlers. In the age of multiculturalism, this is no longer necessary. As long as indigenous people agree to play by the rules of liberalism politically and economically and stay within the limits of liberal tolerance, they are free to do whatever they want. They are free to, and often even urged to, wear their traditional attire, speak their own language, and protect their traditional foodways.

However, in this process, we have become blind to settler violence inherent in and enacted by the idea of liberal multiculturalism and disguised by it as tolerance. Even in
multicultural societies, discrimination and violence against indigenous subjects have not been eradicated. As Rey Chow (2002) points out:

[I]t is precisely . . . [the] displacement of violence to another space (other than ours, other than our own nice arena) that continues systematically to perpetuate violence. . . . Humane, genteel, philanthropic, ever-expanding, ever-eager for a bigger and brighter future, this liberalist alibi is itself generating endless discourses of further differentiation and discrimination even as it serves as enlightened correction/civilized prohibition against physical and brutal violence, and it is the glaring schism produced by its unstoppable positive discourses on life that needs to be confronted as the basis of racial and ethnic unrest in the contemporary world today (15).

As I will show in this chapter, in Japan and Taiwan too, multiculturalist discourse, in which many activists, intellectuals, politicians, and government officials have come to invest so much energy and resources since the 1990s, displaces settler colonial violence onto the past that was "not liberal enough" and encourages indigenous and non-indigenous subjects to turn toward a bright future where the issue of discrimination and marginalization will have been resolved. Such discourse cunningly makes settler colonialism "appear accidental to a social system rather than generated by it" (Povinelli 2002:7). Violence here and now is considered to be an impossibility.

Liberal multiculturalism, however, can never completely dictate the form in which indigenous critique takes. Indigenous subjects have come up with creative ways to negotiate with ongoing settlement in the midst of liberal multiculturalism (Povinelli 2002). In Japan and Taiwan, the transnationalization of the indigenous rights movement and the proliferation of multiculturalist discourse have also enabled indigenous subjects to reflect on their shared experience of Japanese colonization and build a connection between them through solidarity-building projects. Such projects are not limited to those between the yuanzhumin and the Ainu, but also include those with indigenous groups
from China, the United States, Canada, Hawaii, Australia, and New Zealand. I argue that transnational indigenous solidarity created through these projects has the possibility of generating a critical consciousness to challenge and unsettle ongoing settlement.

It was in the 1970s that young Ainu activists began to organize politics centered on the notion of Ainu identity. Many of them were dissatisfied with the conservative Utari establishment with strong ties to the ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. In 1972, *Ainu kaihō dōmei*, or the Ainu Liberation League, was founded, in which some members such as Yūki Shōji formed ties with leftist activists like Ōta Ryu. Often using strong language, this new generation of activists explicitly contested the ongoing conditions of settlement in Hokkaidō.

Especially of significance was their contestation of the relationship between knowledge and power. Since the early twentieth century, Ainu studies (*ainu gaku*) scholars in physical anthropology, folklore studies, and philology purported (and still purport) to accumulate records of this "disappearing race" (*horobiyuku minzoku*) before it would completely die out (Sakano 2005). Many prominent Ainu studies scholars such as Kindaichi Kyōsuke were thus unconcerned with the plight facing the Ainu and conducted depoliticized and allegedly "objective" research. Many Ainu activists in this period began to openly express dissatisfaction with such "objective" scholarship that only benefited the scholars themselves and not the Ainu community. In addition, they started to question the official narrative about the history of Hokkaidō, which described *wajin* settlement and development in Hokkaidō as a smooth teleological process by erasing the presence of the Ainu in Hokkaidō. In 1977, for example, with several students from Hokkaidō
University, an Ainu Liberation League activist Yūki Shoji protested against a series of discriminatory lectures delivered by an economics professor, Hayashi Yoshihige. Hayashi, in a course on the economic history of Hokkaidō, joked about (what he perceived to be) the physical characteristics of the Ainu and made derogatory remarks about Ainu women. He went so far as to say that Ainu history would be ignored in his course because the Ainu are not the subjects of the history of Hokkaidō (Ueki 2010:2). In 1985, an Ainu woman Cikap Mieko filed a lawsuit against a wajin author and his publisher, who without her permission published a picture of her from her childhood with an insulting caption, "a disappearing race" (Gendai kikakushitsu henshūbu 1995).

One of the issues with which many (more moderate and mainstream) Ainu activists were also concerned after the 1970s was to abolish the Former-Native Protection Act and replace it with a new law that is more aligned with the current predicament facing the Ainu. Many argued that, after its 1934 reform, the Former-Native Protection Act had become a dead letter. Besides, the word kyūdojin, "former-native" was insulting enough to many Ainu people, who thought they were no different from the Japanese. Since the Utari Association unanimously adopted a proposal for a new law in 1984, a lot of activist work devoted to lobbying for this law (Siddle 1996:183). After the Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro notoriously stated that Japan has no ethnic minority in 1986, this call for a new law became even stronger.

In 1992, an Ainu activist Nomura Gi'ichi delivered a speech in a special meeting at the United Nations General Assembly convened to inaugurate the International Year of the World's Indigenous People. Two years later, one of the activists who were involved in the Nibutani Dam case, Kayano Shigeru, became the first Ainu National Diet member in
history, replacing a member in the Upper House who passed away suddenly. Kayano was instrumental in bringing attention to Ainu issues in the Diet. As one of the few remaining fluent speakers of the Ainu language, Kayano addressed the Upper House in Ainu in November 1994, criticizing the history of Japanese settler colonialism in Hokkaidō (Asahi Shimbun 1994).

1997 was a watershed moment for Ainu activism. In March, the Sapporo District Court declared that the construction of the Nibutani Dam, for which Kayano and Kaizawa had sued the Commission on Condemnation and the Japanese state, was illegal and recognized the Ainu as the indigenous people of Japan. In May, partially due to Kayano's passionate lobbying, the New Ainu Act was passed by the Diet unanimously. This law, officially named "The Promotion of Ainu Culture and the Propagation and Education of Knowledge About Ainu Traditions Act" (ainu bunka no shinkō narabini ainu no dentō tō ni kansuru chishiki no fukyū oyobi keihatsu ni kansuru hōritsu), mostly focuses on situating Ainu culture as one of minority cultures in Japan and promoting it not only among the Ainu but also among the wider public.

Almost ten years later, in 2008, right before the G8 Summit was held in Tōyako, Hokkaidō, both the Upper House and the Lower House in the National Diet unanimously passed "the Resolution to Urge the Government to Recognize the Ainu as Indigenous People" (Ainu minzoku wo senjū minzoku to suru koto wo motomeru ketsugi). After decades of denying the Ainu this status, the resolution urges the Japanese government to officially recognize them as indigenous to the northern part of Japan, especially Hokkaidō.
While these changes were occurring in Japan, across the ocean Taiwan underwent numerous changes as well. After martial law was lifted in 1987, Taiwan rapidly "democratized": Lee Teng-hui, the first benshengren president originally from Taiwan, was elected as President from within the Nationalist Party in 1988. In 1996, the first direct presidential election was held, and four years later, the first non-KMT president in the history of postwar Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian, was elected. Coinciding with these numerous changes, the so-called nativist movement, which attempts to de-Sinicize Taiwan and to emphasize Taiwan's uniqueness that distinguishes itself from Mainland China, gained momentum. This movement, led by intellectuals, authors, politicians, and activists, allowed some Taiwanese to reckon with forty years of KMT authoritarianism and its lingering traces in Taiwan.

The emergence of a pan-tribal indigenous social movement also coincided with this democratizing and nativist movement. It adopted the pan-tribal term yuanzhumin, literally indigenous people, to collectively refer to a variety of indigenous tribes in Taiwan, denouncing the derogatory tone of shanbao (Xie 1987). In 1988 and 1989, the "return our lands" (huan wo tudi) movement was organized, criticizing the history of Han-Chinese invasion of indigenous lands that intensified in the postwar period. Prompted by this growing movement, the 1994 amendment to the ROC constitution included the word yuanzhumin for the first time in the history of the ROC, declaring that the state has to actively protect and promote indigenous languages and cultures. It also states that the rights of indigenous people need to be protected in such realms as politics, education, economy, and welfare. In 1996, the Council of Indigenous Affairs was founded in the Legislative Yuan to supervise a variety of measures regarding indigenous
peoples. In 2004, as a culmination of approximately two decades of indigenous organizing, the Yuanzhumin Basic Act was passed, detailing the government's measures to protect and promote the human rights of yuanzhumin as an ethnic minority in Taiwan.

There are numerous similarities between Japanese and Taiwanese multiculturalisms. One of them is of course their strong emphasis on cultural recognition. The New Ainu Act stipulates that the state needs to make efforts to promote Ainu culture (Article Three). The Yuanzhumin Basic Act in Taiwan also states that it is the government's role to "protect and maintain indigenous culture, develop the culture industry and train professionals [who can promote indigenous culture]" in Article Ten.

However, as I stated earlier, "indigenous culture" in liberal multiculturalism is defined so as not to disturb liberal multicultural tolerance and cause disgust (Povinelli 2002). Article Two of the New Ainu Act, for instance, defines "Ainu culture" as "the Ainu language as well as music, dance performances, and crafts passed on to the Ainu." Some of their cultural traditions and customs deemed "primitive" are intentionally omitted. For instance, facial and bodily tattoos, which were an important part of indigenous culture before Japanese colonization in both Japan and Taiwan, are not even mentioned (nor are they reclaimed by most of the current indigenous activists).\(^{26}\) Such "barbaric" customs would definitely cause moral disgust and go beyond the limit of liberal tolerance.

\(^{26}\) In this sense, it is interesting that the ban on the Ainu ceremony called iomante, which involves sacrificing of animals such as bears and which had been forbidden by the local government since 1955, was lifted in 2007. See Kyōdō Tsūshin 2007.
Moreover, in both Japan and Taiwan the existence of the settler state is naturalized. Article One of the New Ainu Act reads: "This law is passed . . . to establish a society where Ainu people's pride as an ethnic group is respected and they can contribute to the development of our country's diverse cultures" (emphasis added). Ainu culture's role in the contemporary moment of multiculturalism is to contribute to Japan's cultural diversity, without questioning the fact that the existence of "Japan" as a nation-state itself has been violence against Ainu people. Similarly, Article 1 of the Yuanzhumin Basic Act reads: "This law is established to protect yuanzhumin's basic rights, promote their existence and growth, and establish the co-existence and co-prosperity of different ethnic groups." The goal of this law is thus to resolve conflicts that exist between different ethnicities, not to question ongoing violence that has been committed by numerous settler regimes against indigenous peoples.

These recent moves for redress and reconciliation in Japan and Taiwan take the form of collective apologies, as discussed by Michel Rolph-Trouillot (2000). These apologies "mark a temporal transition: wrong done in a time marked as past is recognized as such, and this acknowledgment itself creates or verifies a new temporal plane, a present oriented towards the future. . . . My apology . . . creates a new era: I repent, let us now be friends. Or, it registers that a new era has indeed been launched: I can now tell you how remorseful I am, I was wrong" (174). Through such apologies, settler colonial violence in Taiwan and Hokkaidō is displaced onto the past.

For example, the 2008 Resolution in Japan I mentioned above clearly takes this form. The resolution states at the outset: "We need to solemnly recognize the historical fact that many Ainu people were discriminated against despite their legal equality with
other citizens and forced to live in poverty in the process of our country's modernization."
However, this past needs to be forgotten for a better future. The resolution continues: "It is a
global trend for indigenous peoples to maintain honor and respect and pass their
culture and pride onto the next generation. It is indispensable for Japan to share such
international values in order to become a leader in the international community in the
twenty first century." In the future imagined by this resolution, tensions between the
settler state and the Ainu will have been resolved.

In Taiwan, a similar aspiration is present in recent liberal multicultural
recognitions of yuanzhumin. The former president Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008), who
advanced "multicultural" politics during his presidency, implicitly relies on an apologetic
logic in a white paper that he published when he was running for presidency in 2000. His
account of his policy on indigenous politics is devoted to criticizing the oppressive and
assimilationist policy on the indigenous community taken by the KMT government in the
martial law period. The introduction to the white paper starts this way:

Since the KMT government moved to Taiwan, in addition to continuing
the riban policy during the Japanese colonial period, it ruled with the idea
of Chinese chauvinism. Within fifty years, many social contradictions and
hardships appeared within the indigenous community. The main cause is
that the ruler's policy and plans did not consider the indigenous people's
unique history and cultural background . . . and adopted the ideologies of
assimilation and Sinicization.27

It is striking that this critique of KMT settler colonialism does not lead to a
critique of Japanese colonialism or Chinese colonialism before Japanese colonization.
Nor is critique directed at the settler colonial nature of Chen's own regime (after all, his

27 The entire white paper is available online. All the following quotes from the white
paper are from his website. See Abian de zheng ce baipishu 2000.
party, the Democratic Progressive Party, is dominated by benshengren). Instead, the white paper naturalizes the role of the settler state as a protector of "indigenous rights" when it states: "Only through the mechanism of state power's authority can Taiwanese misunderstandings about the indigenous past be reversed, rehabilitate uneven development, and correct the entire economic, political, educational, and welfare systems."

Chen's white paper needs to be situated in a larger trend of the Taiwanese nativist movement since the 1980s, which has led to critiques of postwar KMT and which has also contributed to the growth of the yuanzhumin movement. However, the nativist movement has been mostly led by benshengren. In other words, just as Hiroshima has been functioning as a point of self-victimization for postwar Japan (Yoneyama 1999), the history of KMT-led developmentalist authoritarianism that lasted for almost forty years does the same work for the benshengren in the post-martial law period. This trauma might allow the benshengren to criticize KMT's colonialism, but not their own complicity in settler colonialism that had begun long before that. It is true that under KMT’s ideological education, the benshengren were forced to speak Mandarin instead of their language, Minnanese, told to identify with China, and forbidden to even conceptualize Taiwan as a separate place from China. However, this self-victimizing discourse fails to examine the benshengren’s status as settlers who invade indigenous lands merely by inhabiting them. From the indigenous perspective, the distinction between benshengren and waishengren hardly matters, because both are equally settlers.

Moreover, the benshengren-led nativist movement often appropriates indigeneity for its own political interests. The existence of indigenous peoples in Taiwan is often
used to emphasize Taiwan’s uniqueness that distinguishes it from Mainland China. In addition, indigenous peoples, along with the benshengren, Hakka people (who account for approximately 20% of the whole Taiwanese population), and foreign brides from Southeast Asia (called waiji xinniang), are depicted as contributors to Taiwanese ethnic diversity. However, this reduction of indigenous people’s indigeneity to ethnicity among ignores the fact that indigenous people’s concerns are slightly different from those of ethnic minorities. What indigenous people are concerned with are not only racial exclusion and discrimination but also the fact of invasion and settlement, which was an underlying condition on which racism has later occurred (Wolfe 1994; Byrd 2011).

This is why Trouillot (2000) calls apologetic redress for "past" violence "abortive rituals," because "[t]he very formulas they use to create their collective subjects —the attribution of the features of the liberal individuals—though successful in placing these subjects on stage, make it impossible for them to act. Thus collective apologies are meant not to succeed—not because of the possibly hypocrisy of some of the actors but because their very conditions of emergence deny the possibility of a transformation" (185).

However, liberal multiculturalism can never completely dictate the form that indigenous dissent takes. In recent years, indigenous subjects in Japan and Taiwan have come up with creative ways to negotiate with ongoing settlement in the age of liberal multiculturalism. Indeed, the globalization of the indigenous movement and multiculturalism has also significantly opened up the possibility of transnational indigenous coalition. For instance, it was in the 1970s that Ainu people started to form transnational ties with indigenous communities outside of Japan. After a delegation of Ainus visited ethnic minorities in China in 1973 (Siddle 1996:177), numerous Ainu
people started visiting, and welcoming as guests, indigenous peoples from all over the world, including those from the United States, Canada, Hawaii, Australia, New Zealand, and, of course, from Taiwan.

While transnational solidarity building among different minority groups has often faced numerous difficulties,28 these projects have been especially productive for the Ainu and the Taiwanese yuanzhumin, not least because they share the history of Japanese colonization. This transnational coalition has enabled indigenous activists from both countries to re-create the connection that existed between them in the Japanese Empire, as I showed in the end of Chapter One. For example, Ainu people from Shiranuka, Hokkaidō and the Puyuma tribe from Eastern Taiwan began solidarity-building projects in 2009. They visit each other's communities, organize cultural activities and performances, and exchange information about indigenous politics in Japan and Taiwan. There can be uncanny moments for Ainu participants, because many from the Puyuma community can still speak the Japanese language and even sing Japanese songs (Shiranukashi 2010). Somehow, some Ainu people feel responsible for Japan's imperial violence, of which they were victims too. However, I believe that further reflections on this shared history by indigenous subjects in Japan and Taiwan can enable them to nurture a critical consciousness to challenge ongoing settler colonialism and demand the reconfiguration of the settler state. Just as former "comfort women" re-created and re-lived the Japanese empire in a painful yet positive way when they gathered at the Women’s Tribunal in Tokyo in 2000 and collectively indicted Hirohito and Japan of

28 Joseph Hankins (2009) discusses such difficulties in solidarity-building projects between Buraku people in Japan and the Dalit in India.
having established the massive institution of sexual slavery in Asia and the Pacific (Yoneyama 2003), the Ainu and the yuanzhumin could rekindle the connection that once existed between them and possibly demand the Japanese government and the ROC government to redress for their settler colonial violence together, fully recognizing that state apologies are "abortive rituals" (after all, given extreme poverty prevalent in the indigenous communities in Japan and Taiwan, arguing that apologetic financial compensations for "past" violence are "abortive rituals" could be possibly interpreted as privileged scholars' elitist smugness). Their solidarity could also allow them to together think about what kind of indigenous existence and survival is possible in Asia and the Pacific today.

I have been showing how the recent rise of liberal multiculturalism, while it purports to celebrate indigenous alterity within the nation-state, is ultimately an inadequate tool to challenge ongoing settler colonialism in Hokkaidō and Taiwan. Even worse, it might perpetuate it. Nevertheless, I also suggested that the globalization of the indigenous movement, which corresponded with the adoption of this ideology in Japan and Taiwan, has also led to the formation of a renewed transnational indigenous connection and solidarity. In conclusion, I will revisit some of the questions I’ve been addressing.
Conclusion

The statistical premise is a way of acknowledging the genocidal origins of North America, whereby a few “survivors,” representing “survivals” (and thence, representatives) of an earlier order or an experience, perhaps may be incorporated into discipline and institutions and thence make the space better, or more just. Their incorporation is meant to heal the violence that made their numbers thin and therefore their presence significant. However, statistical, representative forms of justice are never enough and are never going to be enough in the normative order of things, which, I have argued, is structured on disavowal of dispossession, on spectacles that obscure those genocidal origins, and on the deep force that is now structured through law. What is needed is, yes, more people, more Native people in all disciplinary locations, of course, but paired with structures, peoples, and institutions that labor for a radically different historical consciousness, one that is deeply cognizant of the means of its own societal production so that it may afford Indigeneity (and the conditions of many others) a robust present as well as a vigorous, variegated past and future.

—Audra Simpson, "Settlement's Secret" (211-212)

Following Wolfe and Stoler, I have been tracing settler colonialism in Hokkaidō and Taiwan as an ongoing process that "saturate[s] the subsoil of [indigenous] people's lives and [that] persis[s], sometimes subjacently, over a long dureé" (Stoler 2008:192). I roughly focused on the last one hundred and fifty years, examining the emergence of what I term settler colonial biopower in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the Japanese Empire and the mutations of this mode of power in the subsequent settler regimes. This particular form of power instituted by the Japanese imperial government was guided by liberal humanist sentiments: it attempted to make indigenous peoples live through caring for, protecting, and nurturing them so that they would gradually assimilate into the new settler society founded on the colonized indigenous lands. The postwar regimes in Taiwan and Japan mostly inherited this power and emphasized the assimilation of the indigenous populations into settler society, as they attempted to configure themselves as ethnically homogenous nation-states.
While this mode of power has not completely disappeared, a significant change is occurring in these two settler colonial formations due to the rise of liberal multiculturalism. In the age of multiculturalism, the logic of cultural recognition emerged as a self-critique of the past assimilatory policies. This new logic cunningly deflects critiques directed at the liberal settler nation-state as it purports to correct itself to advance an even better liberalism (Povinelli 2001). Settler colonial violence inherent in and enacted by liberalism is often left unexamined.

Liberal multiculturalism, therefore, fails to be a critical force for decolonization, deimperialization, or de-Cold War. Some might say that challenging multiculturalism might be counter-effective when some right-wing politicians, authors, and activists attack even the legitimacy of multiculturalist projects. In Japan, for example, some have been questioning the necessity of multicultural projects for Ainu people saying that taxpayers' money should not be spent on the protection of a race that does not exist any more and that the Ainu Association is merely reproducing discrimination to secure funding from the state.29 Attacking the multicultural state might dangerously overlap with such extremely settler colonial, racist, and neoliberal attack on multiculturalism. I am not arguing that the state should completely recede from multiculturalist policies. My point is that, as Simpson (2011) forcefully argues in the epigraph, multiculturalism needs to "be

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29 In addition to the notorious ultra-nationalist cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori, the Diet member Yoshi'ie Hiroyuki and local politicians in Hokkaidō such as Onodera Masaru and Kawada Tadahisa have been challenging the legitimacy of Ainu politics. What is ironic is that a half-Ainu activist Sunazawa Jin as well as a prominent Ainu studies scholar Kōno Motomichi have been collaborating with these right-wing people. This type of critique is directed against other minority groups in Japan, including the Buraku. I thank Joseph Hankins for pointing this out.
paired with structures, peoples, and institutions that labor for a radically different historical consciousness, one that is deeply cognizant of the means of its own societal production so that it may afford Indigeneity (and the condition of many others) a robust present as well as a vigorous, variegated past and future” (212).

How can this consciousness be cultivated? I discussed transnational-solidarity projects between the yuanzhumin and the Ainu as one of such sites where indigenous (and non-indigenous) people can reflect on the histories of settler colonial violence in Asia and the Pacific and develop a critical awareness to challenge the active participation of the liberal nation-states in it. In order to work toward decolonization, deimperialization, and de-Cold War in Asia and the Pacific, it is time for anthropologists too to rewrite and reread the history of the region from an indigenous-centered perspective and acknowledge our historical complicity with settler colonialism and racism.

My thesis hopes to contribute to such rereading and rewriting in rudimentary ways. We also need to turn to dissident praxes among indigenous subjects and sites of subversion that they create within liberal multiculturalism, rather than obsessive descriptions of “indigenous culture” that have flourished with the rise of multiculturalist discourse (Wolfe 1999). The transnational solidarity-building project between the Ainu and the Taiwanese indigenous peoples is certainly one example of such praxes. Only by refusing the role of "the agent of love" assigned to us in multiculturalism can

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30 I am referring to Richard Rorty's (1990) contention that anthropologists should become "agents of love" in liberalism, those "who are expected and empowered to extend the range of society's imagination, thereby opening the doors of procedural justice to people on whom they had been closed" (206). Anthropologists, according to him, need to "insist
anthropologists radicalize the past, present, and future of settler colonial formations such as Taiwan and Hokkaidō.

that there are people out there whom society has failed to notice . . . [and] make these candidates for admission visible by showing how to explain their odd behavior in terms of a coherent, if unfamiliar, set of beliefs and desires." Then "agents of justice," or guardians of universality, will incorporate these candidates into liberalism (206). Such "agents of love" obviously cannot challenge violence enacted by liberalism, as I've been showing throughout this thesis.
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