Title
Coffins and Castles: The Political Legacies of Civil War in Lebanon

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/08p3j92x

Author
Rizkallah, Amanda Therese

Publication Date
2016

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
Coffins and Castles:
The Political Legacies of Civil War in Lebanon

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

by

Amanda Therese Rizkallah

2016
Civil war is perhaps the most catastrophic event that can befall a country, and yet the long-term political consequences it has on the states and societies that survive such conflicts are not well understood. Focusing on the case of Lebanon, this dissertation seeks to explain why different geographic regions within the same post-war country often embark on divergent political trajectories. In some regions, former warlords and armed groups are able to successfully establish regional hegemonic party systems where meaningful competition is severely limited. In contrast, there are other regions where elections are meaningfully competitive. Why is this so?

I argue that the interaction between local-level differences in wartime experiences of territorial control and the macro-level outcome of the conflict jointly shape post-war politics. The consolidation of control over territory and populations requires the building, appropriating, and restructuring of local political networks. Armed groups that do this successfully provide for themselves the raw materials for the creation of a post-war political machine. Other areas, whether fragmented or contested, have overlapping and competing political networks that contain in them the seeds for post-war political competition. Whether a wartime legacy of territorial consolidation can be transformed into post-war regional party hegemony hinges on a second important factor—the outcome of the war. The terms of the peace agreement determine whether territorial control can be made useful in the post-war era. If a particular
armed group is a beneficiary of the war’s peace agreement, its leaders are then able to use the resources of the state to transform their local networks into a regionally hegemonic party. If an armed group is militarily defeated or politically marginalized at the end of the war, repression and a lack of resources prevent this transition. Beneficiary groups may succeed in extending their control into some of these losing group areas, particularly where they have latent networks or a critical mass of supporters.

The first empirical part of the dissertation uses an over-time comparison of the eastern and southern suburbs of Beirut to understand how territorial control and the displacement that often comes with territorial consolidation reshape local political networks and post-war local politics. I analyze transcripts from a set of thirty in-depth interviews with local elites and residents in both suburbs. In both areas, incoming displaced persons, due to their vulnerability, were more likely to become imbedded in the political networks of armed groups. In contrast, “original” residents of the area who were never displaced continued to be more connected to traditional local familial elites that were prominent in the pre-war era. Although both areas followed similar pre-war and wartime trajectories, the outcome of the war affected them very differently. The group controlling the southern suburbs was a beneficiary of the war’s final outcome and remained in total control of the suburb’s local politics in the post-war era. The group controlling the eastern suburbs was militarily defeated. The political vacuum created an opportunity for pre-war elites to reemerge and produced a pluralistic post-war political life. Lastly, the power of each type of elite’s core constituency corresponds to that of its patrons. The displaced “new” residents are more empowered in the southern suburbs and the “original” residents more empowered in the eastern suburbs.

The second empirical part of the dissertation provides a national-level quantitative test of the argument’s implications for post-war elections—both their results and their competitiveness. This test relies on originally-compiled data from Lebanon’s five post-war parliamentary elections. I use digitized maps of territorial control in the last phase of the war and each major armed group’s position in the outcome of the war to classify all of Lebanon’s districts as fragmented territories, beneficiary group territories, losing group territories that are directly controlled by beneficiaries, and losing group territories that are only indirectly
contained by beneficiaries. I demonstrate that fragmented territories and losing group territories that beneficiaries indirectly contain have competitive elections and elect a mixture of candidates to parliament—including many pre-war traditional elites and new parties without martial backgrounds. In beneficiary group territories and losing group territories where a beneficiary has taken direct control, elections are uncompetitive and the candidates affiliated with the ruling group always win.

In sum, my dissertation illuminates the profound effects that civil war can have on the nature and composition of a country’s political elite. When warlords become politicians, this has long-lasting impacts on the prospects for competitive and accountable local and national post-war elections.
The dissertation of Amanda Therese Rizkallah is approved.

Michael L. Rosss

Adam Moore

Barbara Geddes, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2016
To my family,
for your unconditional love and constant encouragement.

To the people of Lebanon,
whose resilient spirit never ceases to amaze me.
# Table of Contents

1 Introduction .......................................................... 1
   1.1 Motivation and Questions .................................. 1
   1.2 Summary of the Argument ................................... 3
   1.3 Why Lebanon? .................................................. 6
   1.4 Contributions .................................................. 9
   1.5 Plan of the Dissertation .................................... 11

2 Wartime Territorial Control and Post-War Politics ............... 16
   2.1 Introduction .................................................... 16
   2.2 The Consequences of Civil War .............................. 17
   2.3 Existing Explanations ......................................... 20
   2.4 The Argument .................................................. 24
      2.4.1 Defining Actors ....................................... 25
      2.4.2 During the War ........................................ 27
      2.4.3 Ending the War ........................................ 30
      2.4.4 After the War ......................................... 36
   2.5 Observable Implications for Post-War Elections ............ 44
   2.6 Scope Conditions .............................................. 46
   2.7 Conclusion ..................................................... 49

3 The Lebanese Civil War and Its Aftermath ........................... 50
   3.1 Introduction ..................................................... 50
   3.2 Before the War ............................................... 50
   3.3 Armed Group Development During the War .................... 54
3.4 Taif Agreement .............................................. 58
3.5 After the War .............................................. 60
3.6 Post-War Electoral System ................................. 63
3.7 Case Study: The Amal Movement .......................... 67
  3.7.1 Berri’s Rise and the Transformation of the Shia Political Elite . . . .. 67
  3.7.2 Amal During the War (1975-1990) .......................... 69
  3.7.3 Intra-Shia Conflict ..................................... 70
  3.7.4 End of the War ........................................... 71
  3.7.5 1992 Election ............................................ 72
  3.7.6 Post-War Political Machine ............................. 74
3.8 Conclusion .................................................. 77

4 Displacement and Political Change in Beirut .................. 78
  4.1 Introduction ............................................... 78
  4.2 Wartime Displacement in Lebanon ......................... 81
  4.3 Political Change in Suburban Beirut ....................... 83
    4.3.1 Before the War ....................................... 86
    4.3.2 During the War ....................................... 93
    4.3.3 After the War ....................................... 109
  4.4 Conclusion ............................................... 118

5 Local Politics After Civil War ................................. 120
  5.1 Introduction .............................................. 120
  5.2 Research Design .......................................... 123
  5.3 Data ..................................................... 124
  5.4 Municipalities in Lebanon ................................. 125
5.5 Post-war Suburban Beirut .................................................. 127
5.5.1 Ending the War ......................................................... 129
5.5.2 After the War .......................................................... 132
5.6 Conclusion ................................................................. 142

6 The Electoral Legacies of War ............................................. 143
6.1 Introduction ............................................................... 143
6.2 Argument and Hypotheses ............................................... 145
6.3 Lebanon Overview ....................................................... 146
   6.3.1 Before and After the War ......................................... 148
   6.3.2 Armed Groups and Parties ...................................... 151
   6.3.3 The 2000 Israeli Withdrawal .................................. 152
   6.3.4 The 2005 Syrian Withdrawal .................................. 154
6.4 Data ...................................................................... 155
   6.4.1 Key Explanatory Variables ...................................... 155
   6.4.2 Dependent Variable ............................................... 158
   6.4.3 Control Variables .................................................. 159
6.5 The Who: Winning Candidates ........................................ 161
6.6 The How: Electoral Competition ...................................... 171
   6.6.1 Method and Models ............................................... 176
   6.6.2 Results ............................................................. 178
6.7 Illustrative Qadas ....................................................... 184
   6.7.1 Tyre: A Beneficiary Group Territory ......................... 184
   6.7.2 Keserwan: A Losing Group Territory ......................... 188
   6.7.3 Tripoli: A Fragmented Territory .............................. 190
6.8 Alternative Hypotheses ..................................................... 191
6.9 Conclusion ........................................................................ 197

7 Conclusion ............................................................................. 198

7.1 Main Findings of the Dissertation .................................... 198
7.2 Why Warlords as Politicians Matters ......................... 201
7.3 Why Variation in Political Competition Matters ........... 202
7.4 Implications for Stability: Is There a Trade-off? ............ 203
7.5 Implications for Policymaking ......................................... 204
7.6 Conclusion ........................................................................ 205
# List of Figures

2.1 Ending the War–Possible Outcomes for Armed Groups .......................... 34

3.1 Sectarian Seat Allocations and Representation in Parliament ................ 66

4.1 Study Area in Lebanon: Suburbs of Beirut ....................................... 84

4.2 The Southern and Eastern Suburbs of Beirut ..................................... 85

6.1 Zones of Armed Group Control in 1989 ............................................. 156

6.2 Vote Margins in Five Post-War Parliamentary Elections ....................... 159


6.6 2005 Parliamentary Election Winners and 1989 Zones of Control ............ 169

6.7 2009 Parliamentary Election Winners and 1989 Zones of Control ............ 170

6.8 Vote Margins in Elections by History of Territorial Control (Pooled) ....... 172

6.9 Vote Margins in Elections by History of Territorial Control (By Year) ...... 173

6.10 Illustrative Qadas ............................................................................. 185
LIST OF TABLES

3.1  Sectarian Quotas in the Lebanese Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

6.1  Summary of Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.2  Armed Group and Post-War Parties in Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.3  Proportion of Members of Parliament Affiliated with Beneficiary Groups . . . . . 162
6.4  Proportion of Members of Parliament Affiliated with Losing Groups . . . . . . . 163
6.5  Territory Type and Competition in Post-War Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.6  Territory Type and Vote Margin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.7  Armed Group Territory and Vote Margin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.8  Winning Candidate Party Type and Vote Margin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
6.9  Winning Candidate Affiliation and Vote Margin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation owes its existence of a great many people, first of whom is my advisor Barbara Geddes. This project would have never become a reality without her constant support and guidance. I am truly privileged to have been mentored by Barbara. She is kind and understanding, responsive, and incredibly constructive and insightful in her feedback. Barbara was always available, whether it was for questions on an upcoming application or longer discussions about the internal logic of an argument. I would quite simply be lost without her! I am deeply grateful for and humbled by the opportunity to have been her student. I also want to thank the rest of my committee members. James DeNardo always showed such genuine interest in my chosen topic and challenged me to ask deeper and more theoretically interesting questions. Michael Ross pushed me to keep the policy implications and the big questions of civil war settlement and peacebuilding at the forefront of my inquiries. Thank you Adam Moore for being willing to join my committee right before the defense and for providing useful insights into fieldwork in post-conflict zones.

Several other UCLA faculty members provided invaluable help and encouragement throughout this process. Steven Spiegel’s undergraduate class on the politics of the Middle East first piqued my interest in research on the region. Years later, his connections in the Middle East opened several unique opportunities for me and smoothed the path as I began my fieldwork. In the early years of this project, I benefited enormously from Leonard Binder’s wealth of knowledge and insights about the Middle East, which he was always willing to spend time sharing with me. Chad Hazlett provided critical help with methodological questions. Mike Thies often seemed to be the only other person who truly understood the Lebanese electoral system. He helped me make sense of its implications and taught me how to communicate it effectively to others. Arthur Stein almost convinced me to become an international relations scholar rather than a comparatist. His incisive analytical questions always got to the heart of the matter and helped me see my work more clearly. Both Mike and Art took such a genuine interest in this research and in my progress, and for that I am grateful. I also would
like to thank Joseph Brown who saved the day so many times that I have lost count.

My fellow UCLA graduate students have been the best colleagues and traveling partners on this journey. I am particularly thankful for the members of Barbara’s dissertation writing group for being the sounding board for so many, good and bad, ideas. Jesse Acevedo, Joseph Asunka, Sarah Brierley, Ruth Carlitz, Marika Csapo, Sebastian Garrido, Kristen Kao, George Ofusu, Lauren Peritz, Althea Sirca, Andrea Vilan—thank you for being wonderful colleagues, and then great friends. You made this process infinitely more enjoyable. Thank you to my academic home away from home, the fellows of the Middle East Initiative. Dina Bishara, Steven Brooke, Jamal Haidar, Trevor Johnston, and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl—you made my year in Boston unforgettable. I learned so much from all of you and the perspectives you each bring to the study of the Middle East. Thank you to Tarek Masoud for bringing us all together and being our tireless encourager. I am also greatly indebted to Melani Cammett for the time and effort she spent providing comments and feedback on this project from her unique perspective as an expert on Lebanon.

A special thanks is in order for all those who made my fieldwork possible. Tens of academics, non-profit and civil society members, local government officials, and ordinary citizens gave of their time and knowledge, expecting nothing in return. Thank you to my research assistants for continuing the work during times when I was unable to stay in Lebanon and for my key facilitators, who opened so many doors and introduced me to countless people with important stories to tell. I am particularly grateful to the Hamdan family for their incredible generosity. I also want to thank my own family in Lebanon. They provided me with a home, a sense of belonging and companionship, and delicious food during a time that could have otherwise been isolating.

This project received generous financial support from the UCLA Graduate Division and the Department of Political Science at UCLA. The summer Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship and TRE Grant from the Project on Middle East Political Science made trips to Lebanon to improve my Arabic and begin my fieldwork possible. The IGCC York Global Security Fellowship and the Harvard Kennedy School’s Research Fellowship provided me with the time and resources to complete my dissertation this year.
Beyond academia, I am truly blessed to have a group of wonderful people that share life with me. They love and support me on the good days and bad, whether I deserve it or not. Thank you to my community group from Pacific Crossroads Church for always praying for me and for being my family in Los Angeles. My UCLA sisters and the Lebanese crew from my days as an undergraduate—I am so grateful for their friendship, always cheering me on as I pursue my dreams. I want to especially thank Monzie Pasos, who endured the unenviable task of being my roommate and closest friend during those difficult early years of graduate school. I am forever grateful to Ann Kerr for her wisdom, friendship, and example of a beautiful grace-filled life. Meeting her all those years ago was the beginning of a wonderful adventure together.

Last and certainly not least, thank you to my family. I love you all very much. Thank you to the Chown family for welcoming me with open arms, and supporting me with as much genuine enthusiasm as if I was their own daughter and sister. Thank you to my brother Mark, for being the person I could talk to about anything, even my frustrations and anxieties as I worked on this project. I would be nowhere without my parents and the sacrifices they both made so that I could have every choice and opportunity. I am grateful to my father for giving me the confidence to believe that I could get a Ph.D., and then motivating me to finish. Thank you for championing my education and providing wise counsel throughout the years. Thank you to my mother who was there on a daily basis, with an encouraging phone call or an uplifting note, keeping me joyful and optimistic like only she can. And finally, thank you to my love, Chris. He is the one inspiring me every day to be the best scholar that I can be, giving me much-needed perspective, and teaching me to remember all the things that are true. God is good and He has has given me far more than I deserve. I am nothing without Him.
Vita

2016- Assistant Professor of International Studies. Pepperdine University.


2013 Travel-Research-Engagement Grant, Lebanon. Project on Middle East Political Science.


2012-2013 Affiliates Scholarship. University of California, Los Angeles.

2010-2012 Research Assistant. Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles.

2009-2012 Teaching Assistant. Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles.

2009 Foreign Language and Area Studies Summer Fellowship, Arabic.

2008 B.S. (Political Science), *Summa Cum Laude*. University of California, Los Angeles.
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Motivation and Questions

“The politicians want us to live in 1992, but I don’t want to live in 1992.” These are the words of a former Serb fighter speaking to a reporter\(^1\) in 2012, twenty years after the war in Bosnia began. Other Bosnian citizens echo similar sentiments about ethnic party politicians with wartime roots—“People on all sides are forgotten by the politicians,” and “the problem is politicians.” The notion that warlords-turned-politicians present one of the most formidable barriers to “moving forward” is a commonly held view by citizens in many post-conflict contexts. During my field research in Lebanon, the country studied in this dissertation, most interviewees made statements nearly identical to the ones made by the Bosnians quoted above. These popular frustrations align with the findings of scholars who argue that regional and local wartime elites can present the most formidable obstacle to nation-building, reconciliation, and democratization (Leezenberg, 2005; Nourzhanov, 2005; Jenne, 2010; Zürcher et al., 2013). And yet despite negative popular sentiment, wartime elites and their parties have continued to win multiple post-war elections in places like Bosnia, Lebanon, Tajikistan, and Chechnya. Some of these electoral victories often go to known war criminals. This disconnect between public opinion and electoral outcomes is particularly acute in post-war Lebanon. As recently as 2014, the two major candidates for president were both former warlords\(^2\). And yet, the Lebanese population is deeply displeased with the

---


leaders that they themselves have directly or indirectly chosen. Out of the 144 countries surveyed by the World Economic Forum in 2014-2015, Lebanon was the country in which there was the least public trust in politicians (2016).

Despite the widespread ability of warlords to remain in power and use that power to foment division and prevent accountability, this does not always occur. There is nothing inevitable about the transformation from warlord to politician and from armed group to political party. In Lebanon, for instance, former warlords maintain power in some regions while they have been replaced by new elites or resurgent pre-war elites in others. In Bosnia, wartime elites are obstacles to integration and social peace in the district of Mostar, but are not so in the district of Brcko (Moore, 2013). In light of this empirical variation, this dissertation asks four interrelated questions. First, under what conditions do warlords succeed in becoming politicians? Second, what mechanisms and strategies do these wartime elites use to entrench their power over the long term? In answering these questions, this dissertation identifies systematic factors that shape regional and local variation in the composition of the post-war political elite.

The last two questions I ask in this project are intimately related to the first two. If the disconnect between public opinion and election outcomes is as profound as the anecdotal evidence above suggests, then the only way that wartime elites and armed groups-turned-parties are remaining in power is by short-circuiting mechanisms of accountability that would throw them out office. Electoral competition is one of the chief mechanisms that human societies have developed to generate accountability (Powell, 2000; Limongi, 2000; Boix, 2003). Given the importance of competition to notions of accountable governance, I ask the following two questions. Within the same post-war country, why do some regions have competitive elections while others have consistently uncompetitive elections won by hegemonic parties? How is the prevalence of uncompetitive elections in some regions related to the entrenchment of warlords and their armed groups-turned-parties?

This dissertation seeks to explain why different geographic regions within the same post-war country often embark on divergent political trajectories. In some regions, wartime elites and armed groups-turned-parties are able to successfully establish regional hegemonic or
dominant (henceforth used interchangeably) party systems where meaningful competition—the kind that contains the possibility of leadership turnover—is severely limited. In contrast, there are other regions where political competition is meaningful. Elites that do not have a martial background—whether they be new and emerging post-war actors or pre-war elites that did not militarize—have the possibility of winning elections. Why is this so?

1.2 Summary of the Argument

I argue that patterns of territorial control in the last phase of a civil war shape the post-war prospects for regional party hegemony. Regions that were under the consolidated control of an armed group at the end of a civil war are more likely to have uncompetitive post-war elections that continue bringing that same armed group-turned-party to power. In contrast, regions that were contested and fragmented among multiple armed actors, and were therefore not under the consolidated control of any one of those groups, are more likely to have competitive post-war elections that generate the possibility for leadership turnover.

The legacy of wartime territorial control is critically important to post-war politics because the consolidation of control over territory is an indicator of organizational capacity and the strength of a group’s local networks. Consolidated control over territory offers armed groups many advantages, such as a safe haven and access to resources, trade routes, and potential recruits. For these reasons, establishing control over territory is an important and often primary goal of many armed groups. However, despite the benefits of acquiring territory, the process of consolidating control is costly, particularly because it requires armed groups to control and govern the population living within the territory. One of the key strategies that armed groups use to consolidate control is the displacement of populations that they view as unlikely to cooperate. A second key strategy that armed groups must employ is the cultivation local ties with the remaining population, accumulating local knowledge that allows them to reward, punish, and motivate civilians. Developing local networks within the population is therefore a central avenue for consolidating territorial control.

Resource-poor groups will be motivated to build local networks in order to tax the popu-
ulation effectively and to provide security in a more selective and strategic way. Over time, control over natural resources and the flow of goods through their territory may allow resource-poor groups to distribute additional services in order to develop clientelist relationships with the population. Resource-rich groups with external sources of revenue, most notably foreign funding, are able to more quickly provide social and welfare services to further consolidate and guarantee popular cooperation. Distributing these services in the most politically efficient way also requires local knowledge and a cultivation of local networks. Whether armed groups are taxing or distributing services to the population or doing both, developing organizational capacity and networks at the grassroots level is an integral part of both consolidating territorial control and reaping the benefits of that consolidation.

Under certain conditions, armed group leaders in these consolidated territories may be able, after the end of the war, to transform their organization and these regional networks into a post-war political machine that will dominate the territory they controlled during the war. This is in contrast to what occurs in fragmented and contested territories where no armed group has consolidated control. In the post-war period, these fragmented territories have a more pluralistic and competitive regional political landscape, in which pre-war elites that did not militarize may attempt to reclaim their position, smaller local militias may put forth candidates, and new parties with no wartime background may emerge.

Whether a wartime legacy of territorial consolidation can be transformed into post-war regional party hegemony hinges on a second important factor—the outcome of the war. The outcome of the war determines whether territorial control and local wartime networks can be made useful in the post-war era. It should be noted that in the Lebanese case and in many other contemporary conflicts, this final outcome of the war is heavily influenced, and in some cases dictated, by foreign powers intervening, politically or militarily, in the conflict resolution process.

If a particular armed group wins the war or is a beneficiary of a powersharing agreement, its leaders will then be able to transform regional clientelist networks into a post-war political machine that will dominate the territory they controlled during the war. Winners of wars or beneficiaries of settlements are able to accomplish this because their favorable position in
the war’s final outcome endows them with key advantages. First, they are able to operate and organize freely. Second, their leaders will have a measure of influence over designing post-war institutions and the rules of the electoral game in ways that improve their chances of winning elections. Third, as a group in power or sharing power, their leaders will also have access to a piece of the state pie and more likely that not, discretion in the distribution of those resources, services, and employment opportunities. Fourth, even if the group has formally disarmed, leaders will be able to mobilize core members that receive selective benefits to undertake any necessary voter intimidation during the first post-war elections. This set of overwhelming advantages, combined with their organizational capacity and regional networks, allows armed groups that are beneficiaries of the war’ peace agreement to create an unlevel playing field (Levitsky and Way, 2010) in their wartime strongholds. This uneven playing field deter challengers and prevent competitors from emerging to hold armed groups-turned-parties accountable in post-war elections. In beneficiary group territories, voters have few opportunities to make their voices heard and challenge the local hegemonic party.

In stark contrast, if an armed group is militarily defeated or politically marginalized during negotiations over the peace accord, repression and a lack of resources prevent it from making the transition to a post-war party machine. In the regions where a losing groups held consolidated control in the final phase of the war, a power vacuum results. This opening produces opportunities for other political actors seeking to replace the losing group—most obviously the beneficiaries of the war. However, a beneficiary group’s decision to directly take over a losing group territory in which the former has no networks, local ties, or local supporters is likely to be very costly due to popular opposition. This is particularly true in a fragile post-war powersharing context where other beneficiary groups may view such a power grab with suspicion, increasing the potential costs of a direct take over. In these situations, beneficiary groups are more likely to jointly pursue a strategy of indirect containment in that losing group region. This entails preventing the emergence of a powerful rival while letting local politics run its course. In these losing group regions, post-war politics and elections will look similar to that in fragmented areas, with greater political competition and pluralism.

However, there is the possibility that a beneficiary group does have a previous wartime
history of network-building and grassroots organization in a losing group territory. The beneficiary could have once controlled the region in a previous phase of the war, cultivated an underground network resisting the now-losing group’s control over the territory, or have a critical mass of latent support among co-religionists and co-ethnics living in the area. In such cases, the beneficiary that has local ties in the region will seek to take direct control and extend its political hegemony over it. These types of losing group regions will look increasingly similar to beneficiary group strongholds, with uncompetitive elections in which the beneficiary armed group-turned-party almost always wins.

This argument implies that all regions within a post-conflict country can be divided into three types based on whether they were under the consolidated control of an armed group, and if so, the position of that armed group in final outcome of the war. In the last phase of the war, fragmented territories were contested by various groups or divided among many local militias. Beneficiary group territories were under the control of a group that either won the war or was part of a power-sharing deal, and losing group territories were under the control of a group that was militarily defeated or politically marginalized. This last category can be further subdivided depending on whether the losing group region is indirectly contained or directly controlled and taken over by the beneficiaries of the war’s final outcome. Regionally hegemonic parties are only likely to develop in territories beneficiaries control directly, while a competitive political environment is more likely to take root in fragmented and indirectly contained losing group regions. Chapter 2 develops this theory in greater detail and outlines its observable implications for post-war electoral politics.

1.3 Why Lebanon?

Lebanon’s civil war and post-war experience make it an ideal case for studying how patterns of armed group territorial control, mediated by an armed group’s status as a beneficiary or loser of the war’s outcome, shape the post-war distribution of power. Lebanon exhibits large regional variation in the extent of post-war political competitiveness and party hegemony. It also exhibits a great deal of regional variation in the political background of post-war elites.
In some areas, elites come from pre-war traditional political families of landowners. In others, wartime actors have marginalized the traditional pre-war elites. Political power rests in the hand of politicians affiliated with wartime leaders and their armed groups-turned-parties. And in some, new post-war parties have emerged to contest both the power of traditional elites and of wartime actors. I argue that the legacy of wartime territorial control and the provisions of the war’s final settlement have much to do with explaining this regional variation in both who wins elections and how competitive those elections are.

The fragmentation of Lebanon during the 1975-1990 civil war and the proliferation of armed groups, large and small, provides a great deal of variation in experiences of wartime territorial control. By the end of the Lebanese civil war, some areas were thoroughly fragmented and remained contested spaces. In contrast, other areas were under the consolidated control of an armed group or coalition of armed groups. Furthermore, despite the fact that many armed groups held consistent control over territory in the final years of the war, international intervention in the settlement process ensured that only some of these armed groups would be beneficiaries of the settlement while others would be militarily defeated or politically repressed. Thus, the case contains rich variation on both explanatory variables—consolidation of territorial control and group status as a beneficiary or loser in the outcome of the war. For instance, regions under the consolidated control of groups that ended up becoming beneficiaries of the war’s outcome can be compared to fragmented regions. And regions under the consolidated control of groups that ended up being defeated or marginalized through international intervention by Syria can be compared to regions under the control of beneficiary groups that were allowed to transform themselves into post-war parties.

Two additional sources of variation in the Lebanese case make it an especially good choice for studying the effect of wartime territorial control and the war’s settlement on post-war politics. First, one of the central players in post-war politics is the Future Movement, led by the Hariri family. This party is unusual in that it does not have a history as an armed actor in the civil war. And yet, due to the Hariri family’s private wealth and their backing by Saudi Arabia, one of the international powers brokering the end of the civil war, it became a beneficiary of the war’s final settlement. The existence of the Future Movement, a ben-
eficiary with no history as a territory-controlling armed group, makes it possible to isolate the two explanatory variables of interest and explore the relative importance of territorial control and status in the war’s outcome in shaping post-war political dominance. If being a beneficiary, and the international backing that this position entails, was all that mattered, we would expect the Future Movement to be able to establish party dominance just as any other beneficiary group with territorial control. However, if territorial control is a crucial piece of the path to regional hegemony, we would expect the Future Movement to be unable to establish lasting hegemony over its strongholds. Although the Future Movement did make significant inroads into fragmented territories in post-war elections, it still faced serious competition from pre-war traditional family-based elites that prevented the party from establishing regional hegemony in these areas. This outcome points to the dual importance of a group’s position in the peace agreement as well as its legacy of territorial control.

Second, Lebanon underwent a dramatic political change mid-way through the post-war period that allows for comparisons between contexts in which losing wartime groups are banned from political participation and contexts in which they are legalized. From 1990 until 2005, Lebanon was under the political and military control of the Syrian Army, the guarantor of the war’s settlement and the actor that largely determined whether a particular armed group would be a beneficiary or loser in the implementation of the Taif Accord, the agreement that formally ended the conflict. In 2005, international and domestic pressure forced the withdrawal of Syria’s armed forces from Lebanon. While Syria had enforced Lebanon’s settlement, it had also repressed and banned groups that were opposed to its intervention in Lebanon. In 2005, these groups were allowed back into the system and given the chance to transform into parties, much as other armed groups had done in the early 1990s. This shift in the political context is valuable, as it allows us to investigate the impact of territorial control on electoral outcomes when losing groups are reintegrated after more than a decade of repression.
1.4 Contributions

This dissertation makes several contributions to our understanding of civil war’s impact, not only on post-war election outcomes, but also on the long-term political trajectory of countries emerging from conflict. First, the theory presented in Chapter 2 moves beyond explanations of post-war outcomes that center on the terms of negotiated settlements (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, 2014; Matanock, 2012), the design of post-war electoral institutions (Cammett and Malesky, 2012), and the timing of the first post-war elections (Flores and Nooruddin, 2012; Brancati and Snyder, 2013). These are undoubtedly critical factors shaping post-war politics. The literature’s emphasis on these macro-level variable is also justifiable from a policy application perspective, as the design of institutions and the timing of elections are the areas that international organizations and policymakers are most likely able to influence. However, this scholarly emphasis has left relatively unexplored the question of how the local processes that make up civil war—by which I mean shifting patterns of territorial control, the emergence of new organizations, new forms of mobilization and new forms of governance, the restructuring of political and social networks, and the demographic changes brought about by displacement—exert their own influence on post-war political life (Wood, 2008). In this dissertation, I focus on the consolidation of territorial control and the way that it changes demographics and restructures political networks. I then explore how these local-level political changes interact with macro-level factors such as design of a peace agreement and the role of international powers in the implementation of an agreement. The former cannot be separated from the latter. Local facts on the ground condition the way that national-level decisions are received in different regions and localities of the same post-war country.

Another contribution of this research is to provide a framework for understanding the outcome of post-war elections in fragmented areas where no single armed group has consolidated control in the final stage of the war. The conventional wisdom and new research on post-war parties (Lyons, 2016) carries an implicit assumption that armed groups who win a war can straightforwardly extend their influence into and exercise control over fragmented spaces and the territories of their defeated enemies. However, this study demonstrates that
this is only possible under certain conditions. The goals of winners and settlement beneficiaries run up against the reality of local facts on the ground. In areas that were controlled by a patchwork of neighborhood militias during the war, disarmament and demobilization will be more challenging and competing political voices and forces will be difficult to stamp out, even if the war has clear winners or beneficiaries that seek to do so.

This study also makes a contribution to our understanding of the long-term political prospects of warlords and armed groups that emerge from a civil war to contest elections and participate in peacetime politics. Armed groups that are beneficiaries of a war’s outcome may do best in the first post-war election and experience a decay in political influence thereafter. Or they may lock in advantages that lead to a path dependent entrenchment over multiple elections. This is ultimately an empirical question. By examining electoral results and electoral competition across five post-war elections and two decades of political development, this dissertation takes a step in answering this question. The findings of this study confirm that the entrenchment narrative is the more accurate one for Lebanon. Coupled with anecdotal evidence of the staying power of warlords and armed groups-turned-parties all over the world, this result suggests that civil war may play a critical role in defining the composition of many nations’ political elites for decades to come.

Lastly, a vast literature has emphasized the role of ethnicity and religion in structuring voting behavior and election outcomes. This dissertation demonstrates that the legacy of network-building, and organizational development that occur in the process of consolidating control over territory play a critical and overlooked role in determining post-war elections outcomes and party development. Admittedly, these wartime processes often, but not always, work to reinforce existing ethnic or sectarian cleavages. Yet it is usually difficult to disentangle the effect of identity on voting patterns from the mobilizing effect of political networks and organizations that are often associated with particular identity groups. This dissertation employs a research design that leverages the fixed sectarian quotas of the Lebanese electoral system to explore the legacy of territorial control and network-building in a context where identity-based voting is not possible. This is not to say that sectarian voting would not be rampant in Lebanon if voters were given the opportunity. I simply argue
that, given the sectarian quotas of the Lebanese electoral system, post-war voting patterns in Lebanon serve to illuminate the overlooked importance of wartime networks and territorial legacies for post-war party mobilization and performance.

1.5 Plan of the Dissertation

The remainder of this dissertation consists of five substantive chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 2 presents a more detailed exposition of the theory. Chapter 3 provides a historical narrative of the Lebanese civil war that documents the emergence of clear zones of armed group control during the Lebanese civil war, and how this on-the-ground control was translated into post-war political power for some and not others due to international intervention in the outcome of the war. Chapter 4 and 5 are a two-part comparative study of two suburbs of Beirut that together provide a detailed illustration of the argument’s validity. Chapter 4 explores how armed groups in both areas similarly used large-scale displacement coupled with the provision of significant social services for core members to consolidate control over territory. Despite similar patterns of territorial control, the outcome of the war put these two suburbs on divergent trajectories. The armed group controlling one suburb was defeated and the group controlling the other became a beneficiary of the peace deal. Chapter 5 investigates how this variation in the result of the war interacted with the two areas’ similar wartime transformations to structure post-war local politics. Chapter 6 provides a national-level quantitative test of the argument’s implications for post-war parliamentary elections in Lebanon. It examines the relationship between territorial legacy and election results, as well as between territorial legacy and the competitiveness of those elections. Chapter 7 concludes and discusses the policy implications of the findings. The rest of this section provides a more detailed summary of each chapter’s contents.

Chapter 2 presents a theoretical argument in which wartime territorial control and the nature of a civil war’s settlement jointly shape regional variation in post-war political competition and regional party dominance. The argument is summarized in Section 1.2. This chapter also addresses the scope conditions of the argument and existing explanations for
divergent post-war political trajectories and electoral outcomes.

Chapter 3 provides a detailed narrative of the 1975-1990 civil war in Lebanon that draws primarily from the rich secondary historical literature on the conflict. The narrative is not intended to be a comprehensive account of the war. Instead, it aims to illustrate the theory’s mechanisms at work in three time periods–during the war, the end of the war, and after the war. I document armed groups’ use of displacement and network building as strategies for gaining control over territory during the war. I then examine how international intervention as well as facts on the ground created a clear set of beneficiaries and losers among the major players in the last phase of the war. The last part of the narrative examines how existing wartime networks, control over state resources and institutions, manipulation of electoral rules, and even electoral intimidation were used by armed groups-turned-parties as mechanisms for institutionalizing regional party dominance in the post-war period. I supplement this narrative with a case study tracing the development of one armed group-turned-party, the Amal Movement, and its leader, Nabih Berri. Using in-depth interviews conducted during my field research as well as the secondary literature, I examine the group’s trajectory to political power beginning in the years immediately before the war and ending with the post-war status quo, which remains to this day.

Chapter 4 demonstrates how struggles for territorial control can produce population displacement and social upheaval that restructures citizens’ social and political networks. It explores how population displacement serves as a central mechanism for the consolidation of territorial control during civil war. It also investigates how displacement and the ensuing disruption and re-formation of social networks and neighborhood ties shape the party attachments and networks of different segments of the population. This chapter uses a method of longitudinal process-tracing that focuses on political changes in two densely populated suburbs of Beirut—the southern suburbs and the eastern suburbs. I document the suburbs’ dramatic political, social and economic transformations from pre-war clusters of small villages to sprawling urban population center that became safe havens for the displaced.

I then examine the impact of these wartime experiences of displacement on the political networks of different segments of the population. Displaced co-religionist populations that
seek refuge in an armed group’s territory develop stronger and more direct ties to the organization. As vulnerable populations, detached from local networks in their home regions and with recent memories of victimization at the hands of opposing groups, the internally displaced are a natural constituency for armed groups. They are particularly susceptible to armed group offers of protection and assistance, and become targets of recruitment efforts. Armed groups also try to win over the remaining co-religionists population already living in the territory. However, these “original” residents who were not displaced are able to maintain ties to their pre-war community and to the traditional political families that controlled pre-war local politics in Lebanon. These variations in experiences of displacement and their impact on different populations’ embeddedness in political networks continue into the post-war era. Those who are displaced from their home regions and are newcomers to their currently area of residence are more likely to support armed groups-turned-parties and their role in local politics. In contrast, “original” residents are more likely to support traditional pre-war local familial elites in local politics.

In Chapter 5, I investigate how the macro-level outcome of the war interacts with local legacies of armed group control to shape post-war local politics. More specifically, I examine how an armed group’s status as a beneficiary or loser of the war shapes the balance of power between local family-based elites and the armed group-turned-party in its former regions of control. I also investigate how the relative power of different types of elites in turn empowers the populations that are part of their political networks. This chapter continued the comparison between the southern and eastern suburbs of post-war Beirut, this time highlighting the contrast in post-war local political life. While both areas ended the war under consolidated armed group control, the outcome of the Lebanese civil war affected the southern and eastern suburbs differently. Hezbollah, the armed group controlling the southern suburbs, became a beneficiary of the post-war political order. The Aounist faction of the Lebanese Army, the armed group controlling the eastern suburbs, was militarily defeated by the Syrian military. The Aounists were reintegrated into political life after the Syrian withdrawal of 2005.

In this chapter, I illustrate the mechanisms linking a group’s position in the peace agree-
ment to post-war dominance at the local level. Hezbollah, a beneficiary group, is able to monopolize political power in its localities and empower its core constituents. The Aounists, a losing group, left behind a vacuum of political power in its localities. This produced political competition and allowed pre-war local familial elites to reassert their role in local politics. Furthermore, the relationship between municipal councils and armed groups-turned-parties is starkly different in the two areas. In the southern suburbs, Hezbollah has monopoly political control over the area which allows the party to dictate policy to local councils. Since the party is more locally powerful than the traditional elites, “new” residents with deeper connections to the party are more empowered than “original” residents. In contrast, the marginalization of the Aounists meant that there were no organized parties available to dominate the eastern suburbs in the post-war years. The macro-level outcome of the war provided an opening for traditional pre-war local elites seeking to reassert their role in local politics. When the Aounists were reintegrated in 2005, they had to contend with local elites who had spent the last fifteen years rebuilding their support in the locality. In addition, their years as a banned organization and the resulting lack of resources and atrophy of networks prevented the Aounists from monopolizing the local political space in 2005. The competition with other parties in national electoral races made alliances with local elites who could campaign and mobilize voters for them very important. Because local traditional elites have something to offer the Aounists, their relationships with the party is reciprocal. Furthermore, once they are elected, local leaders have autonomy to deal with local concerns and make local policy without needing to answer to parties. In this context, the “original” residents who have historical ties to these traditional elites are just as or more empowered than the “new” residents.

In Chapter 6, I examine whether elections in districts with different wartime territorial legacies differ in their competitiveness and the likelihood that they will be won by candidates affiliated with beneficiary groups. I leverage variation in experiences of armed group rule during the Lebanese civil war and changes in the international system that allowed Syria to enforce a settlement of its own choosing, creating clear beneficiaries and losers. I digitize historical maps of armed group territorial control and divide the country’s ad-
ministrative districts into the four theoretically relevant categories. These are fragmented territories, beneficiary group territories, directly controlled losing group territories, and indirectly contained losing group territories. Using originally compiled data from Lebanon’s five post-war elections (1992-2009) I examine two outcomes— who wins elections in post-war Lebanon and how competitive those elections are. I find that in fragmented and indirectly contained losing group territories, beneficiary groups are less likely to win elections and elections are relatively more competitive. Conversely, beneficiary groups win the majority of seats in beneficiary group and directly controlled losing group territories. These elections are also significantly less competitive. Furthermore, elections won by candidates affiliated with beneficiary groups in any part of the country are significantly less competitive than other elections. These findings provide evidence that is consistent with the central theoretical argument and the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2.

In Chapter 7, I summarize the main findings of the dissertation and their significance for the study of political competition. I then discuss the policy implications of the central conclusion that war has profound impacts on the nature and composition of a country’s political elite. Finally, I briefly outline the policy implications for international organizations involved in the settling of civil wars and the design of post-war reconstruction plans.
CHAPTER 2

Wartime Territorial Control and Post-War Politics

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an argument about how war and the process by which it is fought and ended have long-term effects for post-war politics, specifically the composition of the political elite and the development of regional dominant-party systems. The theory presented below seeks to answer the following questions. When and why do warlords become politicians? When they do, how does this influence post-war political development?

In answering these questions, the theory speaks to the pitfalls in the powersharing systems that have become the international community’s preferred mode for ending civil wars. By empowering wartime actors and cementing their position in the post-war political system through provisions such as shared executive power, forced legislative coalitions, multiple veto opportunities, regional autonomy, and military, civil service, and election quotas, the resolutions of most conflicts create rigid outcomes that stifle the potential for democratic contestation. And yet there is an important reason why the international community pursues this strategy. Post-war stability can only be achieved if armed stakeholders receive credible guarantees that they will benefit from ending the war and restoring the peace. The argument addresses the production of this kind of stability as part and parcel of the political dominance generated by war settlements that empower wartime actors.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I briefly review the relevant literature on the consequences of civil war. I then review possible existing explanations for the variations in post-war politics that I observe. I then define the actors before presenting the theory. The presentation of the argument is divided into three sections—during the war, ending the war,
and after the war. I outline the observable and testable implications of the argument for national electoral politics and discuss the argument’s scope conditions before concluding.

2.2 The Consequences of Civil War

The long-term political effects of civil war are some of the least understood consequences of conflict (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Although some recent scholarship has examined the individual micro-level effects of violence and combatant participation on political behavior after war (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007; Blattman, 2009; Blattman and Annan, 2010; Bellows and Miguel, 2009), the majority of scholarship on the political consequences of conflict focuses on macro national-level outcomes.

The political outcome that has received the most attention is war recurrence. Much of the research on war recurrence emphasizes that the type of war ending is a key factor in predicting post-war stability. Military victories, although containing heightened risks for political repression and genocide, are the most stable way to end civil wars (Licklider, 1995; Toft, 2010). Ceasefires and armistice agreements are unstable, leading some to argue that the international community should let wars run their course (Luttwak, 1999). Other scholars find that international intervention has a role to play in promoting stability. Third party enforcement makes it more likely that negotiated settlements will be successfully implemented (Walter, 1997). UN peacekeeping missions encourage stability and lead to reductions in violence (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2011; Collier, Hoeffer and Soderbom, 2008). Over-the-horizon guarantees of international military intervention if domestic players renege on settlement terms are promoted as an integral factor in preventing war recurrence (Collier, 2010). Other research focuses on the institutional design and implementation of negotiated settlements and power-sharing agreements (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2014; Roeder and Rothchild, 2005), arguing that multiple types of power-sharing within the same agreement (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003) reduce the risks of war recurrence.

Whether democratization after conflict is possible and helpful in preventing war recurrence is perhaps one of the most controversial and complex questions addressed by this
literature. This is due not only to our normative bias in favor of democracy as a solution to conflict, but also to the ambiguity and broad scope of what democratization entails. Some scholars have indeed found evidence that validates the idea that democratization may be an important part of promoting continued peace. Institutions that encourage accountability and good governance, namely proportional representation systems (Cammett and Malesky, 2012), and access to meaningful options for non-violence political participation (Walter, 2004) are crucial in preventing war recurrence. Most of the scholarship, however, focuses more narrowly on the immediate post-conflict elections, and whether these promote or undermine post-conflict stability. The consensus seems to be that elections as a quick-fix, particularly when held too early, are dangerous and increase the probability of renewed conflict (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, 2008; Flores and Nooruddin, 2012; Brancati and Snyder, 2013). However, others hold that elections that successfully demilitarize politics and allow for power-sharing rather than winner-take-all arrangements can be successful as a first step towards stability and genuine democratization (Reilly, 2002; Lyons, 2004). Elections work best when they contain guarantees of electoral participation that allow armed groups to credibly commit to peace (Matanock, 2012). Others agree but argue that elections are not the heart of the matter. What matters most is the balance of power at the end of the war. When the balance of power is even and a negotiated settlement the outcome, post-conflict democracy is more likely (Gurses and Mason, 2008). Peace and stability are achieved through credible power-sharing arrangements and security guarantees that provide incentives to continue playing the democratic game regardless of the actual results of the first post-war elections (Wantchekon, 2000). Admittedly, the “warlord” democracy that initially results from such an elite pact is a minimalist and procedural kind of democracy, but it is a democracy that has the potential to produce an enduring peace (Wantchekon, 2004).

This literature focuses on how peacekeeping provisions, settlement terms, and the characteristics of post-war institutions shape the prospects for democratization and stability after conflict. Most of it does not address how the facts on the ground and patterns of control constrain and structure the settlement options and by extension, the post-conflict outcomes we most care about. We lack a systematic understanding of how patterns of governance and ter-
ritorial control during the conflict shape post-war political life across different regions within the same country. A few notable exceptions examine the effect of the war itself on post-war electoral performance. Looking at variation in experiences of violence, Allison demonstrates that civilian experiences of state-inflicted violence explain variation in the strength of former rebels’ electoral performance in the districts of El Salvador (2010). Ishayama and Widmeier find that armed group territorial control correlates well with post-war electoral performance in Nepal (Ishiyama and Widmeier, 2013). Costalli and Ruggeri find that localities in Italy with higher rates of partisan mobilization against the Nazis during WWII have higher rates of voting for the radical left in post-war elections (2015).

A related and emerging literature examines post-war party development more directly (Manning, 2004, 2007; de Zeeuw, 2008, 2010; Dresden, 2015). Much of this literature focuses on explaining the conditions under which armed groups will transform into political parties. An armed group’s pre-war history of electoral participation, the geography of it wartime mobilization, the degree to which it has attained its political goals through the war, the type of civil war settlement, and its relationship to the post-war state have all been found to shape whether an armed group becomes an institutionalized post-war political party (Acosta, 2014; Manning and Smith, 2016; Ishiyama and Batta, 2011; Costalli and Ruggeri, 2016). Through an examination of several cross-national case studies, De Zeeuw demonstrates that the organizational structure of armed groups, as well as their relative power vis-a-vis each other and the central state shape the institutionalization and relative power of these armed groups-turned-parties in the post-war period (2010). Lyons argues that when armed groups win outright victories, their legacies as military organizations provide internal coherence and leadership that allows them to establish strong post-war authoritarian regimes (Lyons, 2016). My argument builds on these findings. However, by focusing not just on electoral performance but on the competitiveness of elections, I provide a systematic measure for the degree of a party’s hegemony and political dominance over a particular region. In this way, I bring the literatures on post-war electoral performance and armed group-to-party transformation together into a unified framework.

My research also adds temporal and spatial nuance to our understanding of the con-
sequences of civil war. In contrast to much of the literature on post-conflict elections, I examine *long-term* patterns of political dominance that can be traced back to the conflict, and that persist over two decades of regular elections. In this way, this project maintains the literature and policymaking community’s concern with post-war accountability—an important component of democratization—but moves beyond short-term election results. I also examine sources of sub-national geographic variation. Civil war often fragments states into regions and localities, leading them onto potentially divergent political trajectories. Neighboring areas within the same state and the same conflict may experience vastly different forms of governance and political control during the war years. I identify regional variation in patterns of territorial control and network-building during the war as key factors in shaping post-war political life. I explain why, after a civil war, regional dominant-party system develop in some areas, while pluralistic and competitive political environments develop in others. The lack of meaningful electoral competition in some areas is an important impediment to accountability and democratization. This study also highlights the importance of post-war outcomes not captured by broad cross-national concepts such as war recurrence and democratization. My research seeks to explain how war can produce dramatic variation in the quality of accountability experienced by citizens of the same country that live in localities with different war legacies.

### 2.3 Existing Explanations

In this chapter, I present a theoretical argument that seeks to explain why different geographic regions within the same post-war country often embark on divergent political trajectories. In some regions, wartime elites and armed groups-turned-parties are able to successfully establish regional hegemonic party systems where meaningful competition is severely limited. In contrast, there are other regions where political competition is meaningful. New and emerging post-war actors and pre-war elites that did not militarize have the possibility of winning elections. However, there are several other possible explanations for these diverging post-war trajectories and varying structures of political competition that are important.
to examine first. While all of them undoubtedly contribute something essential to our understanding of electoral outcomes and political competition in divided or post-war societies, none of them is able to fully account for the variation I observe in the Lebanese case. This gap points to the need for an alternative and complementary explanation, which I provide in Section 2.4 of this chapter.

One existing explanation is that variation in post-war political outcomes is rooted in pre-war politics. Pre-war mobilization as well as the nature of pre-war institutions have the potential to shape patterns of wartime armed group governance. When armed groups govern areas with more developed pre-war institutions, they are able to appropriate these institutions in establishing rebel governments that are more sophisticated than they would be in areas with little pre-war institutional development (Mampilly, 2011). The types of institutions that armed groups develop for governance during civil war in turn play an important role in their ability to tax, monitor, and control local populations as well as access political networks (Arjona, 2014). Perhaps armed group that control areas with more developed pre-war institutions and have developed more effective wartime institutions are more able to make the transition to hegemonic political party, as these institutions can be repurposed for electoral and other peacetime political mobilization.

Other possible explanations for divergent political trajectories and levels of political competition are not rooted in a state’s legacy and dynamics of conflict but in more stable characteristics that distinguish different regions. Poorer rural regions may be more susceptible to clientelist appeals and attempts at vote buying, making elections in rural areas less competitive, on average, than elections in urban areas where votes are more numerous, have more diverse interests, and may be less susceptible to clientelistic appeals. Another possible explanation is a demographic one. In ethnically or religiously divided societies (such as those emerging from conflict), parties usually organize themselves along these lines of identity. If this is the case, then voters will vote for the party representing their ethnic or religious group (Horowitz, 1985). This means that districts and areas with mixed populations are more likely to see political competition and contestation, while homogenous areas are more likely to be dominated by one ethnic or religious party.
Differences in pre-war patterns of mobilization, pre-war institutions, and wartime institutions of governance as well as religious-based voting behavior and varying urban and rural dynamics all provide plausible and, for some cases, powerful explanations for post-war differences in electoral competition and the extent of armed group-turned-party hegemony over particular regions. However, these explanations do not sufficiently account for all post-war variation in political competition, particularly in the Lebanese case.

The Lebanese civil war contained multiple phases and lasted fifteen years. Although pre-war mobilization is important to understanding which armed groups successfully mobilized and prevailed in the early years of the war, almost all of these groups were destroyed, divided, or completely reorganized by the middle of the civil war. Of the six major armed groups fighting in the last phase of the Lebanese civil war, only one was an organization that had been one of the relevant players at the onset of the conflict. In fact, the most powerful organization to emerge from the war, Hezbollah, was a product of the war and had no roots in pre-war Lebanese politics (Hanf, 1993). Pre-war institutions also played only a minor role in determining which armed groups would establish sophisticated institutions of rebel governance. While some armed groups did effectively govern areas with a history of greater pre-war institutional development, some of the most of the most institutionally sophisticated armed groups governed areas that had been systematically marginalized and institutionally neglected by the pre-war Lebanese government. Moreover, the heart of the capital city of Beirut, undoubtedly the site of greatest institutional development in Lebanon’s centralized pre-war political system, was one of the most fragmented and chaotic locations during the civil war (Hanf, 1993).

The role of wartime institutions of rebel governance in determining successful post-war party hegemony can only be part of the explanation. Historians of the Lebanese civil war remark that, particularly in the war’s final phase, the major armed groups had developed parallel sets of local institution and effectively divided Lebanon into states within a state. All were using similar and effective systems of taxation, arbitration of disputes, and distribution of services to extract from the population and maintain control of their territories (Picard, 2002). Virtually all the major armed groups had established institutions that provided
them access to local political networks that could be useful in post-war elections. And yet, several of these groups never made the transition to regionally hegemonic post-war parties. The development of wartime institutions may be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the transition of post-war dominant party. The argument below endogenizes wartime institutions of governance as requirements for the consolidation of control over territory. In this sense, it is true that armed groups that never consolidated control over territory were never forced to establish the institutions that could facilitate their transition to post-war regionally hegemonic parties.

Religious or ethnic voting and urban-rural differences also fail to adequately explain patterns of post-war political competition and dominance in Lebanon. Voting along sectarian lines (the politicized cleavage in Lebanese politics) is made impossible by the country’s electoral institutions. Parliamentary seats, as well as positions in the civil service or on municipal councils, are allocated by fixed quotas to one of Lebanon’s recognized religious sects. This makes it impossible for voters to choose candidates along religious lines. All competition occurs between members of the same religious community. This reduces the importance of district homogeneity in explaining election results. In fact, according to the dataset collected for this dissertation (see Chapter 6), there is no significant difference in the degree of religious fractionalization between Lebanese districts with competitive and uncompetitive elections. Similarly, the urban-rural divide cannot account for different structure of political competition. Some of Lebanon’s most competitive districts are some of its most rural areas, as well as many urban areas. The same diversity also exists among uncompetitive areas controlled by hegemonic parties.

While acknowledging the importance of these explanations in some post-war contexts, this dissertation calls attention to a wartime factor that is critical in explaining post-war patterns of political competition—the pattern of territorial control in the final phase of the war. In the following section, I present an argument in which armed group consolidation of territory and the micro-level network-building required in order to consolidate territory interact with the macro-level outcome of the war to structure post-war party dominance and the prospects for electoral competition and accountability. In Section 2.6, I also discuss
the applicability of this argument not only to the Lebanese case, but also to a broad set of post-conflict contexts with similar structural features.

2.4 The Argument

I argue that patterns of territorial control in the last phase of a civil war interact with the terms of the peace agreement to shape sub-national variation in single-party dominance in the post-war period. Wartime acquisition of territory and the consolidation of control over that territory requires armed groups to control the population living within the territory. To accomplish this, armed groups must cultivate local ties and accumulate local knowledge that would allow them to reward, punish, and motivate civilians. Developing clientelist networks within the population becomes an effective strategy for consolidating territorial control. After the war, armed group leaders in these consolidated territories are then able to use the resources of the state to transform these regional clientelist networks into a post-war political machine that will dominate the territory they controlled during the war. This is in contrast to what occurs in fragmented and contested territories where no armed group has consolidated control. In the post-war period, these areas have a more pluralistic and competitive regional political landscape.

The relationship between a wartime legacy of territorial consolidation and post-war regional party hegemony is mediated by a second important factor—the outcome of the war. The outcome of the war determines whether territorial control and wartime clientelist networks can be made useful in the post-war era. If a particular armed group wins the war or is a beneficiary of a powersharing agreement, its leaders are then able to use the resources of the state to transform these regional clientelist networks into a post-war political machine that will dominate the territory they controlled during the war. If an armed group is militarily defeated or politically marginalized in the outcome of the war, repression and a lack of resources prevent them from making the transition to a post-war party machine. The rest of this chapter elaborates this argument and outlines its political implications for variation in the existence and institutionalization of regional hegemonic parties.
2.4.1 Defining Actors

The central actors in the argument are the leaders of organized armed groups and the rank and file members of those armed groups, although these actors interact with local elites, civilians, and international patrons in important ways. By an armed group, I mean quite simply any armed collection of persons who are part of the fighting in a civil war and are recognized by the vast majority of observers to be part of the same organization. This category includes everything from a national army to a local militia. Armed groups can have a centralized structure or be more loosely organized. They may be allied with or part of a state apparatus or alternatively, rebelling against it. They may have ideological, religious, or ethnic identities or visions. They may also be a group motivated primarily by profit-seeking rather than political change. While the term is general enough to subsume all such groups, the only ones that are theoretically relevant for the argument below are those that are of such size, military strength, and political import that they control significant portions of the country’s territory and cannot be ignored in the crafting of any successful resolution to the conflict. When I refer to armed groups in the argument, this is the set of groups that has the potential to spoil the peace as well as exert influence over the shape of the post-war political landscape.

Group leaders are the elites within the organization that are the primary points of contact between the international community and the organization. They are present during negotiations to bring about a settlement to the conflict. The benefits of victory or a powersharing deal accrue directly to them. Group leaders are the actors that, if victorious, can access the state’s resources through control over cabinet positions and critical ministries. These group leaders also have the most to lose from a military or political defeat. Exile, imprisonment, or death are common outcomes for the leaders of armed groups that lose a civil war. As such, armed group leaders have a primary interest in surviving the war and in having more power rather than less. The pursuit of power is particularly important in a fragile post-war context where the “rules of the game” are in flux and the return to conflict is a looming possibility. In the wake of the war’s resolution, the interests of these wartime elites are best served
by maintained their organizations intact as the transition to peacetime politics occurs. By maintaining their organizations as political parties, wartime elites can use them to generate consistent national-level legislative electoral victories that in most political systems makes cabinet-level appointments and control over state resources more likely. Maintaining their organizations’ mobilization capacity is also an important safeguard in the event that a civil war recurs.

The ability of elites to maintain their organizations intact and transform them into political parties requires the participation and cooperation of the rank and file as activists and mobilizing agents during elections. This is more difficult than might be immediately apparent. Rank and file members of armed groups only benefit indirectly from a group’s victory or participation in a powersharing deal in so far as they are spared the repression that often comes with defeat. This basic benefit can be thought of as a public good that is received by all members of the organization simply by association. The rank and file, unlike their leaders, do not stand to benefit directly from victory or powersharing in terms of rent extraction or positions of influence within the government. In fact, these members of armed organizations often find themselves in a precarious position after a civil war. As persons with a comparative advantage in combat, they are in danger of being disadvantaged in a post-war world. Financial opportunities in the world of organized crime may become more tempting that remaining part of an armed group-turned-party if it does not provide concrete selective benefits and a means for economic survival in the post-war era. While armed group leaders use ideological, social, and disciplinary ties to bind members to the organization, I argue that wartime elites recognize this need for the distribution of concrete benefits in order to keep their organizations intact. Therefore, elites will tend to seek settlement provisions that give them discretion in the distribution of state resources within the parts of the government that fall under their control. They will also work to have their rank and file members integrated in the security apparatus and civil service. A wartime leader’s ability to use the benefits of victory or powersharing to provide selective benefits to his armed group-turned-party members is a critical part of keeping the organization intact and turning that initial victory into consistent and repeated electoral success over time.
2.4.2 During the War

During a civil war, the advantages to armed groups of controlling territory are numerous. Territory has the potential to provide groups with access to several sources of revenue. Controlling territory can mean access to natural resources, ports, and control over drug traffic and any trading that must pass through the territory’s boundaries. Control over the population living in a territory can provide a tax base for the group while also limiting the flow of information to opposing forces (Kalyvas, 2006), providing a source of local information, and providing a pool of potential recruits. From a battlefield perspective, territory gives armed groups a safe haven for resupplying and regrouping in the midst of long-lasting conflict. Since territorial control means military advantages, as well as control over populations and resources, its consolidation improves an armed group’s bargaining position vis-a-vis other players in any negotiations. For these reasons, most armed group will have a goal of consolidating control over territory during a civil war. They may be unsuccessful, (for example, during a very asymmetric conflict), but the goal remains.

2.4.2.1 Strategies of Consolidation

While acquiring and consolidating control over territory gives an armed group multiple strategic advantages, territory can be a liability as well. Populations can turn against an armed group and provide information to its opponents. Armed groups need populations to be cooperative or quiescent. For this reason, armed groups often begin their efforts at territorial conquest from within sympathetic towns and villages where the group draws core members and perceives that it has a critical mass of genuine supporters. However, as an armed group seeks to consolidate control in new territories beyond its epicenter, it must work harder to engender popular cooperation. In order to accomplish this, armed groups pursue a variety of strategies. They can and often do change the composition of the population through forced displacement of persons that the armed group has judged are least likely to support it. In the extreme, this can lead to systematic ethnic or sectarian cleansing. Armed groups may also work to attract displaced sympathetic populations, such as co-ethnics, through the
promise of safety from other groups attacks (Steele, 2009). Armed groups must also focus on turning the remaining population into an advantage. The most common way groups accomplish this goal is by providing the fundamental public good of security in exchange for loyalty and cooperation. To do this well, groups need to develop monitoring systems for detecting and punishing the uncooperative, sending a powerful signal to the rest of the population. Accomplishing these challenging tasks requires local information, which can be acquired by tapping into preexisting social networks, co-opting local elites, and developing the organizational capacity for regular contact with the population.

The value of cultivating local networks and developing organized contact with the population is even greater for groups whose access to natural resources or foreign funding is limited. Not only do these resource-poor groups need local information and cooperation against opponents, they also need to develop systems for taxing the local population. However, this does not mean that resource-rich groups do not need to develop networks within the population. Groups with the financial means may often choose to provide social and welfare services to further consolidate and guarantee popular cooperation. The distribution of these services in the most politically efficient way also requires organized contact with the population. Whether armed groups are taxing or distributing services to the population, developing organizational capacity and networks at the grassroots level is an integral part of both consolidating territorial control and reaping the benefits of that consolidation. However, in reality, most armed groups are likely to use a mixture of both taxation and distribution to the population. Over the course of the conflict, the networks required for the repeated exchange of information, resources, protection, and loyalty operate in ways that are analogous to a political machine. These networks often become important pieces of the war effort, mobilized to support combatants in a multitude of ways.

2.4.2.2 Territorial Control in the Final Phase of War

The simultaneous difficulty and great value of controlling territory have led scholars and warlords alike to consider it as the best proxy for a group’s relative power at a given point
during a conflict and a crucial factor improving a group’s bargaining position vis-a-vis other players in negotiations to end the war (Christia, 2012). However, patterns of territorial control often shift. Particularly in long civil wars, a piece of territory may change hands several times. Some armed actors may be completely defeated and their networks dismantled or appropriated by other groups. Other armed actors that were not present at the onset of the war may come into existence at later stages, whether through splits, mergers, or as completely new entities. The territorial configuration that is most directly relevant for post-war politics is the one existing in the last phase of the war.

As armed groups, the government, and international actors seek to resolve the conflict in accordance with their interests, patterns of territorial control allow all the relevant parties to identify the set of players that have, by that point in time, survived the intense wartime competition for power. Because armed groups that control significant amounts of territory can spoil a peace deal or render it nonviable if they were to contest it, these groups need to be “addressed” in any resolution to the war. This could mean including them in a political settlement or defeating them on the battlefield. Territorial control also provides information on the geographic distribution of armed groups’ population networks and is therefore a useful heuristic for projecting post-war electoral performance. The beneficiaries of a war’s settlement can use this information to design electoral institutions and rules that further favor them and their allies in the post-war era. While the war’s final outcome plays a crucial role in shaping an armed group’s ability to transform wartime networks into a post-war party machine, territorial control in the last phase of the war is a first and necessary step towards that transformation. The patronage networks that undergird consolidated territorial control provide local wartime leaders with the “raw material” for building an organization capable of mobilizing the population for post-war political participation.

Not all territories or parts of a country are under the consolidated control of an armed group in the final phase of the war. Fragmented territories are areas where no armed group has consolidated control. These spaces may have been contested by multiple major players. These areas also may have never come under the consolidated control of a single armed group or alliance of armed groups. This does not necessarily mean that a political vacuum exists in
these regions. A patchwork of small local militias, some connected to local elites, may be in control on the ground, but with control varying at the level of the street, neighborhood, or village. The smaller groups that operate in fragmented areas are unlikely to play a significant role in the outcome of the war, as they cannot on their own credibly threaten to spoil a peace agreement. These smaller militias therefore depend on alliances with national-level players to continue existing in the post-war period. Some may be successful at establishing such political alliances, but others may not.

While a region’s legacy of territorial control—of consolidation or fragmentation—is central to explaining variation in post-war regional party hegemony, its effects on post-war politics are conditioned by the outcome of the war. The following section unpacks the dimensions of a civil war’s outcome before explaining how an armed group’s position within the outcome shapes its ability to translate wartime networks into post-war electoral dominance.

2.4.3 Ending the War

Transforming a wartime patronage network into a post-war political machine is not a straight-forward or automatic process, and is not guaranteed for every armed group that controls territory in the last phase of the war. Armed groups need to consolidate control over a consistent stream of resources to maintain and grow post-war networks over the long term. Monopolizing access to resources within their local area is key to preventing challenges to a group’s political control (Way, 2005). Once the conflict has ended and a modicum of government presence and control has been established, conflict-based economic activity may no longer be a viable fundraising option. In order to survive politically and capitalize on the networks they have built, armed groups need to ensure that the war’s settlement gives them not only political guarantees to operate freely as a political party, but also a share of government resources. This may include everything from election quotas and integration of the group’s members into the state’s armed forces to discretion over distribution of state services and control over ministries and foreign aid for reconstruction projects, particularly those concerning their region of control. Armed groups-turned-parties can then combine
this access to financial and policymaking resources with the local knowledge and population networks they have built in their territories over the course of the war. This powerful mix gives them large advantages in mobilizing populations for political participation, both electoral and otherwise, and makes it difficult for potential challengers to contest the armed group-turned-party’s dominance over their region.

Whether a particular armed group benefits from the end of the war and is then able to transform wartime networks into a post-war party machine depends on the group’s position within the war’s outcome. The outcome of the war can be divided into two parts, the military and the political outcome. A group must be a beneficiary or winner on both counts to be able to access the policymaking power and financial resources needed to establish a hegemonic party system in its former territories of control. Although battlefield outcomes set limits to the range of possible peace accords and political settlements, they do not automatically determine the post-war distribution of political power because external actors often influence that distribution. In more overt cases of external intervention, international actors may influence both the military outcomes of civil wars as well as the political outcome. This produces post-war distributions of power and benefits that do not always correlate neatly with wartime patterns of territorial control and political control on the ground. The rest of this section unpacks these two dimensions of a war’s resolution, explains the role that international involvement can play in the process, and outlines all the possible scenarios that armed groups might find themselves in after the end of a civil war.

2.4.3.1 The Military Outcome

The military outcome of the war is a key factor in determining whether an armed group will be able to use its wartime networks and organizational capacity effectively in the post-war era. For any given armed group, the military outcome of the war can leave them in one of two main positions. A group can be defeated on the battlefield. In this case, an armed group’s leader surrenders and the organization is forcibly demilitarized. This does not mean that a defeated group’s networks or support within the population disappear
overnight. However, defeat usually involves the dismantling of key parts of an armed group’s organizational structures, generating a political vacuum at the local level in territories under the control of the defeated group. Military defeat may also involve subsequent repression and precludes an armed group’s participation in the final political settlement, preventing its leaders from accessing the state power and resources that would otherwise help them sustain local networks and the political wing of the organization. In some cases, defeat may occur at the hands of other domestic armed groups. However, this is unlikely when an armed group has robust and consolidated territorial control in the final phase of the war. It is more likely that the defeat of such a group is made possible through foreign intervention. This can be through an escalation of military involvement, an actual invasion by an outside actor, or through a sizable increase of foreign funding and support that shifts the domestic balance of power and allows other domestic players to militarily defeat the group. The second possibility is that a group survives the conflict, which it exits undefeated and with its organization intact. Survivors may be the outright victors of a war, in which case they have defeated and compelled the surrender of all other wartime actors. Survivors may also be one among many armed groups that are stuck in a stalemate or that are brought to the negotiating table by external powers before any of them successfully destroys the other.

2.4.3.2 The Political Outcome

The political outcome of the war is the second key factor determining whether an armed group will transition into a regionally hegemonic party. The political outcome consists of the written and unwritten provisions that end the war and distribute power and benefits to the various armed groups that are part of the deal. Every war, whether it ends in outright victory or a powersharing settlement, contains a political outcome that structures the rules of the game and the allocation of resources in the post-war period. Provisions of a settlement include such elements as the holding of elections, electoral rules, the terms for demilitarization and integration of a group’s members into the armed forces or the civil service, control over regional reconstruction plans, and guaranteed cabinet positions to armed group leaders. Favorable terms have the potential to build in long-term advantages and spheres of influence.
for the leaders of armed groups that participate in the political deal.

Being one of several survivors of the war should theoretically guarantee an armed group’s position as a beneficiary of the final political settlement. If a survivor of the war were not included in a powersharing deal or was disadvantaged by its terms, its leaders could decide to return to armed struggle and spoil the peace. Unlike the leaders of a defeated group, they can do this precisely because their organization and mobilization capacity remains intact. However, there are situations in which an armed group can be marginalized at the political stage even though it was not defeated on the battlefield. If the other survivors can coordinate to repress one of their number, they can reduce the number of groups that must split the pie of state power and resources. This kind of coordination and cooperation is relatively unlikely because of the lack of trust between armed groups coming out of a civil war. The more likely way that political marginalization occurs is through foreign intervention in the conflict resolution process. International powers and neighboring countries that have strong interests in the way that the conflict ends can empower their allies and marginalize opponents through the application of diplomatic pressure, dictating the terms of reconstruction aid, and in the extreme, threatening to or using force to bring about their desired outcome.

Marginalized groups are victims of this post-conflict political intervention. Although military survivors of the war, they are repressed or banned in the aftermath of the conflict’s end. Such groups are effectively prevented from participating in and benefiting from a powersharing deal. They stand in contrast to the armed groups who not only survived the war, but were the beneficiaries of its political outcome. It is this latter category of armed actors that are the real victors of war, both militarily and politically. The beneficiaries are the groups most able to establish regionally dominant parties in former territories of control. Figure 2.1 summarizes the possible scenarios for armed groups as the war comes to a military and political resolution.
Lastly, while it is might be a less common scenario, one can imagine the possibility of international intervention in the political agreement producing a beneficiary that is not an armed group or armed group leader. Social or economic elites that have lived in exile during the conflict period or pre-war political elites that were sidelined during the war may see a peace agreement as an opportunity to enter or re-enter political life. This is a particularly attractive opportunity for those that have strong connections and overlapping interests with leaders of neighboring countries and international powers that are intervening to broker and structure a peace agreement. Their international patrons can use their leverage to bring these elites-in-exile to the negotiating table. International backers can then empower their allies in ways that allow them to secure an advantageous position in the peace agreement. For instance, outside powers may tie aid and reconstruction funds to the political inclusion of elites that they know will be reliable long-term allies and entry points for influencing the war-torn country’s politics in the post-war era. These elites are beneficiaries of the war’s political outcome.

However, they differ from armed group beneficiaries in critical and theoretically important ways. The advantages gained from the political settlement may allow them to organize and build new post-war parties. However, these parties will differ systematically from those that have their roots as wartime armed groups. New parties do not have the “raw materials”
generated by consolidated territorial control. They will be behind the curve in building a grassroots presence, co-opting local elites, and gather local information about potential voters that could prove invaluable in an election campaign. More than simply being disadvantaged with regards to timing, new post-war parties that have no historical foundation as armed groups mobilizing for violent contestation will be qualitatively different organizations than their counterparts with armed group legacies. New post-war parties will be less internally cohesive, disciplined, and hierarchical (Lyons, 2016). These organizational and grassroots deficiencies will prevent them from forming the regional hegemonic party systems that are possible for armed group-turned-party beneficiaries of the war’s outcome.

2.4.3.3 Types of Regions

I argue that patterns of territorial control during a civil war explain the development of hegemonic party systems in some regions of a post-war country and the development of more competitive and plural political landscapes in others. While this is fundamentally a geographic argument about territories, the outcome of the war as I have articulated it is a mediating factor that affects the post-war national political position of organizations and elites. However, the effect of the war’s outcome on armed groups’ ability to transition into hegemonic parties has clear regional implications for post-war politics in the territories those armed groups controlled. In short, wartime territorial control patterns interact with the war outcome to put regions on different political trajectories.

Following from the discussion of consolidated and fragmented territories, as well as the various possible outcomes for groups with consolidated control—defeat, marginalization, or surviving the conflict and becoming beneficiaries of the peace agreement, I classify the regions of a post-war country into four categories. First, there are fragmented regions where no single group had consolidated control in the final phase of the war. Second, there are defeated group regions where the group with consolidated control was militarily defeated. Third are the marginalized group regions where the group with control survived the war but was politically marginalized and repressed as part of the political outcome. And fourth are
the beneficiary group regions, to where the group with wartime control not only survived the war but was empowered by its political outcome.

2.4.4 After the War

As the “winners” of the war, beneficiaries will be able to establish political hegemony over their home regions. They will also seek to extend their post-war influence into other types of regions. However, they will face different opportunities, pursue different strategies, and experience varying degrees of success in different regions. This section explains what occurs after the war in each type of region as the beneficiaries seek to solidify their political advantages.

2.4.4.1 Beneficiary Group Regions

If an armed group ends the war as a beneficiary, its leaders are likely to enter the post-war political arena. While entrepreneurship or organized crime are attractive post-war options for wartime leaders, entering politics offers them the best chance for securing their armed group’s integration into the armed forces as well as access to state resources and “rule-making” powers, without excluding the possibility of pursuing business ventures. In fact, being part of the state’s apparatus can be lucrative, as it provides leaders with discretion in the distribution of post-war aid and power over who benefits from the reconstruction process.

The leaders of beneficiary armed groups will begin turning their armed group into a political party and work to establish the organization’s dominance over their former territory of control. I define dominance or hegemony as a local political environment in which there are no viable challengers that could unseat the dominant political group and generate a local alternation of power. In contexts of political dominance, challengers are not necessarily

---

To clarify, the beneficiary groups referred to in the category of beneficiary group regions are armed groups that became beneficiaries of the peace agreement. This does not refer to beneficiaries, such as elites-in-exile, that were not armed groups leaders during the war. This makes sense as these latter types of beneficiaries did not control territory during the war.
legally banned from participating. However, the playing field is skewed dramatically in favor of the ruling group such that free and fair political competition is not a meaningful avenue for generating political change. This concept of political dominance is analogous to Levitsky and Way’s understanding of power in competitive authoritarian regimes (2010). In the context of my argument, political dominance varies at the level of wartime territories of control. These are often sub-national regions of a country. However, if the war had a single victor that conquers the whole of the state’s territory, then this would likely result in an authoritarian political system at the national level. This post-war regime may, but does not necessarily, take the form of a nation-wide traditional dominant party system.

A reasonable expectation would be that regional dominance achieved by the war’s beneficiaries would erode with time. This may occur if the peace settlement is sufficiently flexible to allow the distribution of power between political actors to change and evolve. However, the commitment problems inherent in ending a civil war (Fearon, 1995; Walter, 1997), in which all parties suspect that others might renege on their commitment to stop fighting, militate against flexible agreements. Instead, winners seek to enshrine their gains political institutions that are difficult to change. In cases of outright victory, this means consolidating control over an authoritarian system. In cases of powersharing among several regional winners, this means agreeing to and enforcing a settlement that includes strict provisions for powersharing that entrench the relative power of wartime players and are difficult to undo in the future. Examples of common powersharing provisions that promote rigidity include mutual veto opportunities for signatories, sharing of executive power, quotas for civil service appointments, and territorial, ethnic, or religious autonomy (Cammett and Malesky, 2012). In these scenarios, the passage of time has the effect of further institutionalizing rather than eroding the power of beneficiaries. This argument, therefore, has the most explanatory power in cases where post-war arrangements for the distribution of power are relatively rigid.
2.4.4.2 Strategies for Institutionalizing Dominance

Beneficiaries have several central strategies they can use for institutionalizing and strengthening their dominance in the post-war period. All these mechanisms contribute to creating an uneven playing field for political contestation, whether in formal electoral contests or in terms of extra-electoral street level mobilization. The goal of these strategies is to discourage potential challengers, largely by creating an overwhelming advantage for the beneficiaries of the war. The most basic advantage that the victor of a war or the beneficiaries of a power-sharing settlement have is the freedom to operate. This gives them the opportunity to use the networks and organizational structures they built in during the war as the foundation for a post-war clientelist machine. Their raw material, gained through the act of fighting the war, does not go to waste but can be repurposed. Instead of building new networks, winning groups only have to ensure that local elites that have already been co-opted during the war are rewarded sufficiently to remain affiliated with the post-war political incarnation of the armed group.

Another important part of being a beneficiary of the war is that group leaders get to contribute to designing the electoral rules in ways that advantage them. Unless it is an outright victory that only benefit one actor, there are obvious limits to this due to negotiations that have to occur among the beneficiaries themselves. The country’s historical institutions and international pressure for a more democratic system of governance may constrain these choices, but I argue that beneficiaries are still able to make adjustments, at least at the margins, that improve their chances of winning post-war elections in their regions. If elections occur immediately after the end of the a civil war, the most likely outcome will be an electoral win for wartime victors in their home regions. At this particular moment, any losers are at their weakest, potentially reeling from military defeat or political repression. New challengers are still unorganized and without the advantage of a wartime network. Beneficiaries can exploit this moment of vulnerability, using their networks to mobilize supporters for any necessary intimidation of voters. Using such tactics to depress or elevate turnout strategically often ensures electoral victory for beneficiaries, particularly in regions where
their networks are strongest. A victory at this critical juncture allows beneficiaries to govern at a time when reconstruction presents many opportunities for discretionary spending to strengthen clientelist ties.

Closely related is another key advantage that accrues to settlement beneficiaries, which is control over some portion of state resources. This can take the form of control over certain ministries and state agencies, including their budgets and hiring practices. It can also include control over the distribution and management of international aid, reconstruction contracts for infrastructure, and compensation packages for the displaced. In a post-war context where much rebuilding needs to be done, having discretion over the allocation of those funds can be a powerful resource for supplying wartime patronage networks and sending a signal to supporters that loyalty will be repaid with tangible benefits. New challengers and losers that have been shut out of state institutions lack these resources.

Equiped with extensive networks to form the foundation of a post-war political machine, a voice in the design of post-war institutions, access to state resources, and the possibility of using voter intimidation, beneficiaries effectively ensure that the proverbial playing field will not be level in the first as well as future post-war elections. Challengers are continually discouraged from entering politics and the armed group-turned remains in power. In these contexts, systemic shocks like renewed war, revolution, or extraordinary international pressure are often required to change the status quo and undermine the structural advantages of the war’s beneficiaries. Barring such changes, I argue that winning groups are likely to establish hegemonic party systems in their former regions of the control. Over time and institutions permitting, they may even extend this dominance to larger parts of the country.

2.4.4.3 Strategies for Extending Influence to Other Regions

If an armed group is defeated or marginalized and repressed at the end of the war, and therefore shut out of any powersharing arrangements, it faces significant obstacles to effective political organization in its former territory of control. Even though it has the necessary networks embedded within the population of its former territory, it lacks the resource stream
for maintaining and growing those networks in the post-war period. More seriously, a loser of the war—whether through defeat or marginalization—lacks the political freedom to maintain those networks. Losing groups often become banned organizations, unable to participate in the formal political system. The wartime networks of losing groups do not necessarily disappear, as they can still be bound together by shared wartime experiences, ideology, and identity. However, without consistent material inducements and the ability to organize openly, these networks atrophy. The resulting political vacuum in defeated group and marginalized group territories as well as the advantageous post-war position of the beneficiaries presents them with an opportunity to extend their influence into these areas. Yet beneficiaries have varying degrees of popular support and historical legacies of grassroots-level networks within these losing (defeated or marginalized) group areas. Beneficiaries will therefore pursue a mixed strategy that maximizes their political power while minimizing the costs of extending their influence.

Where populations are sympathetic to the beneficiary groups and latent networks exist, the vacuum of power allows them to extend their sphere of influence and gain direct control over the region. Latent population networks may exist from territorial control during previous phases of the war or from a sustained resistance against the losing group that once controlled the territory. This extension of the beneficiaries’ geographic reach is accomplished through many of the same methods that dominance is established over their own territories of control. The same rule-making advantages and material resources that accrue to beneficiaries at the national level can be deployed. What makes this particularly feasible is that clandestine or dormant networks can now be openly integrated into the organization and used to mobilize sympathizers for electoral and other political activities. Local information gathered through latent or clandestine networks can make demobilizing the losing group’s networks and supporters feasible with only measured and selective use of threats and voter intimidation. However, due to the continued presence of core supporters of the defeated group, it is likely that intimidation is a larger part of a beneficiary’s strategy for establishing political hegemony over a losing group’s region as compared to their own former territories of control.
In losing group areas where populations are unsympathetic and beneficiaries have no previous history of grassroots activity or network-building, the beneficiaries of the war will not be able to take over and establish regional hegemony without a politically costly strategy of widespread civilian coercion. While uncooperative civilian populations can be violently subdued during conflict, such a strategy may be less tractable in a post-conflict context. The most serious concern for a beneficiary in considering large-scale coercion in this situation is the effect it may have on the perceptions and calculations of other beneficiaries. Other participants in a powersharing deal may feel threatened by such a display of force and resort to arms to preemptively protect themselves, putting the survival of the peace agreement at risk. In such circumstances, beneficiaries will choose to extend their influence in more subtle ways, through a strategy of indirect containment. Candidates may be vetted, but beneficiaries are likely to let local politics run its course, allowing pre-war local elites and new elites not involved in the civil war to emerge and contest elections. Beneficiaries’ political objectives will be more modest—ensuring that no new pole of power emerges to challenge their position of privilege at the national-level. Fragmentation, competition, and the triumph of politicians with more local concerns and ambitions is the second best outcome in areas that beneficiaries cannot feasibly dominate.

2.4.4.4 Defeated and Marginalized (Losing) Group Regions

Defeated group regions present beneficiaries with the most straightforward opportunity to take over and extend their political dominance beyond their wartime territories. This is due to the political vacuum remaining after the defeat of a group that had consolidated territorial control and reduced or eliminated local challenges to its rule. Once such a group is defeated and disarmed, beneficiaries have no organized political groupings that stand in the way of a takeover. However, as previously mentioned, an unsympathetic population and a lack of local knowledge or networks may make a take over and direct control too costly. The situation is similar in marginalized group regions, although the challenges for beneficiaries seeking to exert direct control are likely to be greater. In these cases, the losing armed group is not militarily defeated but politically repressed through bans on the organization and the
assassination, arrest, or exile of key leaders. Marginalization, as opposed to defeat, is more likely to leave some parts of the armed group’s lower-level membership and organizational structures intact. Of course, this depends on the thoroughness of a marginalized group’s repression. In extreme cases, marginalization can result in a weakening and collapse similar to that of a defeated group.

In both defeated and marginalized group areas, the beneficiaries’ choice between a strategy of direct takeover or indirect containment depends on the beneficiaries’ history of network-building and their assessment of latent public support in that territory. However, direct control remains a more likely outcome in defeated group regions and indirect containment the more likely choice in marginalized group regions. In both types of regions, a beneficiary strategy of indirect containment will benefit pre-war elites with no history of militarization and localized kinship-based forms of leadership. These types of elites are less likely to threaten the political positions of beneficiaries and will received less scrutiny than elites with a history of militancy or those seeking to build a mass party with national-level appeal.

2.4.4.5 Reintegrating Losers

Although it seems unlikely in the immediate aftermath of the war, defeated or marginalized groups could theoretically be part of a reconciliation and reintegration effort that takes place several years after the end of the conflict. Such effort usually come about in weak post-conflict countries due to international pressure. It is unlikely that the beneficiaries would initiate such a process of their own accord. If a reconciliation process allows defeated and marginalized armed groups that once controlled territory to re-enter political life as parties, these groups will usually be able tap into networks of wartime supporters and constituents. However, their inability to lock in a share of state power and resources during the critical moments at the war’s end means that these networks will have atrophied since the end of the war. In addition, new post-war players may have cultivated a support base in the strongholds of these losing groups during the period when they were banned or repressed. This puts reintegrated losers at a long-term disadvantage and prevents them from establishing political hegemony.
over their former regions of control. However, they are likely to continue existing and competing politically in their home regions, but only as one of multiple players.

Defeated or marginalized groups that are reintegrated are the analytic opposite of the settlement beneficiaries that were not leaders of wartime armed groups. These beneficiaries, usually elites returning from exile with international support, were introduced in Section 2.4.3.2 as actors with access to state resources and power but without the grassroots organization or wartime networks tying them to the population. In contrast, reintegrated losers have a history of consolidated territorial control that provides them with the raw materials for building a party, including a base of former members, local population networks, and local information. However, they lack the access to state resources and policymaking power that accrue to the beneficiaries.

2.4.4.6 Fragmented Regions

Although beneficiaries will always seek to extend their influence and political dominance over as much territory as possible, areas that ended the war as fragmented regions will be the least straightforward to take over. The end of the war does not necessarily result in a political vacuum in fragmented regions. In the case where a fragmented region was contested by a beneficiary and a defeated or marginalized group during the war, then the beneficiary is more likely to be able to extend their influence and take direct control of the area. However, if the wartime contestation in a fragmented region was between two or more beneficiaries competing for territorial control, then that competition is likely to continue in the post-war era. If a fragmented region was controlled by small local-level groups or if the contestation was between a beneficiary and multiple localized groups that were successfully resisting its consolidation of control, then a beneficiary will have more difficulty dominating the area in the post-war period.

The difficulty of dominating a fragmented area with many localized groups is due to several reasons. First, it is unlikely that small local groups will become the specific targets of repression in the aftermath of the conflict’s resolution. They do not present national-level
threats to the position of beneficiaries; they are in some sense already a set of marginalized groups by virtue of their size. Second, their decentralization and the dispersion of power among local groups in fragmented areas makes military defeat or repression more challenging. Decapitating or negotiating surrender with leaders of many small groups is more logistically difficult than defeating a single centralized organization. Because of these challenges, beneficiary groups will most likely choose a strategy of indirect containment in most fragmented regions. This strategy will result in a more pluralistic political landscape in fragmented territories, where elites emerging from localized armed groups and pre-war elites with no history of militarization will re-emerge to compete for power. Fragmented regions also present opportunities for new post-war parties to emerge, as they are likely to receive less scrutiny than losing group regions where beneficiaries worry about the possibility that supporters and former members of larger defeated or marginalized groups will reorganize.

2.5 Observable Implications for Post-War Elections

There are several observable implications of this argument. In this section and in the quantitative tests in Chapter 6, I focus on the implications for national electoral politics. However, the argument has broader implications beyond voting behavior. The wartime organizational and network-building legacies of different groups, and how those are either strengthened or weakened by the outcome of the war influence the degree and depth of a group’s popular support more generally. In institutionally weak and unstable post-conflict contexts where elections may not be the only mechanism for gaining power, a party’s legacy also shapes its capacity to mobilize members and supporters for high-cost activities such as demonstrations, sit-ins, riots, militia activity, and other forms of political violence (Rizkallah, 2016).

In terms of electoral politics, the argument has implications for both the result of elections as well as the competitiveness of elections and the way in which they are won. In beneficiary group territories, I expect that candidates affiliated with the beneficiary armed group-turned-party would win elections without facing meaningful competition. In fragmented territories where beneficiaries simply contain a myriad of small groups, I expect more competition and
a greater diversity of winning candidates, some associated with smaller local wartime groups, as well as pre-war political elites and new post-war parties.

In the years immediately after the war, defeated group territories and marginalized group territories are most likely to experience a power vacuum, particularly if the former ruling armed group has been banned from political participation. For this reason I combine defeated group territories and marginalized group territories into a more general category of losing group territories for the purpose of generating hypotheses and conducting empirical tests. If a beneficiary has pre-existing networks and sympathizers in a losing group territory, they will take over and directly control the region. I expect that beneficiary to win elections in the area without facing meaningful competition. If no beneficiary has networks or a base of supporters in a losing group territory, beneficiaries will collectively pursue a strategy of indirect containment. These areas will look similar to fragmented regions with a great diversity of winning candidates and more competitive elections.

If a losing group is at any point brought back into the system and allowed to operate legally, it may still contest elections in its region of territorial control and will be able to tap into networks of wartime supporters. However, its inability to lock in a share of state power and resources during the conflict resolution process prevents it from establishing the type of clientelist machine necessary for regional dominance. Even if a losing group does win seats in its former region of control, these elections are likely to be competitive, with other types of candidates vying for and winning some seats.

These implications can be formulated into two sets of related hypotheses.

1. Who wins elections

   (a) In beneficiary group territories and losing group territories where beneficiaries have pre-existing networks and have taken directly control, candidates affiliated with beneficiary armed groups-turned-parties will win most elections.

   (b) In fragmented territories and losing group territories that beneficiaries indirectly contain, a mixture of candidates affiliated with old pre-war elites, and including clients of the beneficiaries (and their international patrons) will win most elections.
(c) If losing groups are at some point reintegrated, they will begin to win some elections in their former territories of control.

2. *How* elections are won

(a) In *beneficiary group territories* and *losing group territories* where beneficiaries have pre-existing networks and have taken direct control, elections will be uncompetitive.

(b) In *fragmented territories* and *losing group territories* that beneficiaries indirectly contain, elections will be relatively more competitive.

2.6 Scope Conditions

The argument presented above applies to civil wars that have two important characteristics. First, wars must have a territorial component, in which two or more armed groups, including the government’s military, have clearly observable strongholds and control different regions of the country. The second scope condition is that post-war elections be held as part of reinstituting a peacetime political system. Most civil wars, and particularly those ended after the Cold War, meet these conditions.

The argument only applies to civil wars in which territorial control by distinct armed groups is consistent and consolidated enough to be a clearly observable phenomenon. The civil wars most likely to fit this description are conventional civil wars. Balcells describes these as conflicts that “are characterized by overwhelming control on the part of armed forces over all the locality in their zone, except for areas that are extremely close to the front lines. [In contrast] in irregular wars, areas under total control are much scarcer, smaller, and less stable” (forthcoming) Conventional wars and symmetric wars in general are also more likely than irregular wars to end in balanced outcomes rather than total victory for one actor in the conflict (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010). Although conventional wisdom is that such wars have become less common and irregular asymmetric conflicts more common, recent research debunks this notion. While the structural conditions of the Cold war made irregular wars
common during that era, conventional wars as well as symmetric but non-conventional wars\(^2\) have become more common since the end of the Cold War (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010). In comparison to irregular wars, upon which most of our theoretical understanding of civil war rests, conventional wars are undertheorized and less well understood (Kalyvas, 2006). This research contributes to filling that gap, as it directly addresses the political consequences of a civil war in which territorial control is consolidated enough to generate new networks and informal institutions that bond armed groups to the population under their control.

Although territorial control is a prominent feature of conventional wars, it may also occur in some irregular wars and symmetric non-conventional wars. Conflicts more generally defined as having a territorial component form a substantial proportion of all civil wars, and have also become increasingly common in the post-Cold war era. Among the 61 cases of civil wars that have begun between 1991 and 2014, \(^3\) 72\% have a clear territorial component.\(^4\)

Territorial wars by definition include, but are not limited to, separatist conflicts. Many center-seeking wars have increasingly involved the division of the state into multiple regions of control. These conflicts share some other important characteristics. About 80\% of these post-1991 territorial wars have a symmetric structure (either conventional or nonconventional), with similar technologies of violence being used by all sides in the conflict (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010).\(^5\) Furthermore, 63\% of territorial wars are multi-party wars in which

\(^2\)Symmetric non-conventional (SNC) wars are the third category that Kalyvas and Balcells propose in addition to conventional wars and irregular wars (otherwise known as asymmetric, guerilla, or insurgent wars). SNC wars frequently occur in weak states, where the government does not have the preponderance of military power required to generate an irregular conflict. SNC wars are similar to conventional wars in their symmetry, but are “low-tech”, with neither side able to marshall heavy weaponry against its opponent. (2010).

\(^3\)The universe of post-Cold war civil wars is based on Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) update (up to 2004) of Doyle and Sambanis’s (2011) list of civil wars (up to 1999). Using country-level information from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (2015), I follow Doyle and Sambanis’ coding guidelines to update the list to contain all civil wars that had begun by 2014.

\(^4\)These wars were coded using the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (2015) A war was categorized as having a territorial component if there was a mention in the encyclopedia entry of territory being held, of clearly delineated strongholds for various groups, or of parts of the country being controlled by different groups. The rest of the cases, 28\%, were unclear based on the description. They were not necessarily cases of “no territorial component.”

\(^5\)The figure of 80\% refers only to wars begun between 1991 and 2004, as coded by Kalyvas and Balcells (2010).
there are more than two central players (Christia, 2012).⁶ Taken together these characteristics imply that wars with a territorial component are, more often than not, situations in which political and military power is fragmented, and in which the conventional assumptions about government forces being the strongest players are less warranted. Multiple players and more symmetric military capacities make these wars difficult to end and power-sharing settlements and stalemates, instead of outright victories, figure heavily in how they are resolved. Examples of these territorial conflicts include such diverse cases as wars in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Bosnia, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Iraq, and Syria. While the argument applies to a broad cross-section of civil wars, there are cases in which the effect of territorial control on post-war governance is likely to be stronger. Territorial control is more likely to have profound effects on post-war governance in civil wars in which the division of territory is more stable through the conflict. In cases where there are shifts in territory, as in Lebanon, the most crucial predictor of post-war party dominance is the configuration of territorial control on the eve of the war’s conclusion. However, this does not preclude the importance of previous territorial configurations in which an armed group may have established networks that continue to exist, but went underground once the group lost control of the region.

A civil war followed by post-conflict elections in the second scope condition. Conflicts followed by elections also form a substantial proportion of all civil wars. Among the 99 countries that have had internal conflicts since the end of World War II, post-conflict elections took place in 92 of them (93%) and elections in 51 of those countries were considered democratic (Costalli and Ruggeri, 2016). Furthermore, civil war settlements that contain formal electoral provisions have become increasingly common since the end of the Cold War (Matanock, 2012). A related trend is the transformation of rebel groups into political parties. In the years between 1950 and 2009, 54.8% of rebel organizations made successful transitions to political parties (Manning and Smith, 2016).

⁶The figure of 63% refers only to wars begun between 1991 and 1999, as coded by Christia (2012). Wars which Christia codes as multi-party and appear in the Kalyvas and Balcells list are coded as such, with all other wars coded as two-party conflicts.
2.7 Conclusion

In summary, if an armed group successfully consolidates control over territory during the last phase of the civil war and then secures a position as a beneficiary of the war’s ending, it can establish a regional dominant-party system in its former territory of control and extend its influence to other areas where it has a history of network-building. The inclusion of wartime actors into the post-war political system is obviously necessary to prevent them from spoiling any peace agreement. In fact, through their political hegemony over particular regions, beneficiary groups act as agents of stability. And yet, their dominance points to a trade-off. By precluding the emergence of challenges to their political power, beneficiaries of the war’s outcome stymie efforts at post-war democratization and short-circuit electoral mechanisms of accountability.
CHAPTER 3

The Lebanese Civil War and Its Aftermath

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a historical narrative of the immediate pre-war, wartime, and post-war periods in Lebanon. Instead of attempting to give a comprehensive and exhaustive account of events, this narrative seeks to highlight events, processes, and patterns that are particularly relevant to testing the argument presented in Chapter 2. The emphasis is on the channels through which the act of fighting the war changed Lebanese politics and the structure of the political elite in the post-war era. The chapter offers critical background information necessary for evaluating the operationalization and testing of theoretical hypotheses in ways that are appropriate to the Lebanese context. The narrative is also crucial for placing case studies of specific parties or localities within a broader timeline of Lebanese political development. The narrative is organized into four parts: before the war, during the war, ending the war, and after the war. Following the narrative is a case study that tracks the pre-war, wartime, and post-war trajectory of a single armed group and its leader. The objective of the study is to provide a concrete illustration of the argument at work, demonstrating how an armed group could translate territorial control and a favorable position in the outcome of the war into post-war regional political dominance.

3.2 Before the War

Clientelism is ingrained in the very foundation of Lebanese politics. The National Pact of 1943 enshrined a system of strict sectarian representativeness in all parts of the government
and administration. The largest of Lebanon’s recognized religious communities include Shia and Sunni Muslims, Alawis, Druze, and Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Armenian Orthodox Christians. Quotas for government positions was fixed at five Muslims to every six Christians, with these categories further subdivided among the different sectarian groups. The president was to be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the house a Shia Muslim, creating a state which favored Christian power. Positions in the civil service were objects of patronage and transfers or promotion were highly politicized. The National Pact was essentially an elite agreement over the relative distribution of power between communities. The electoral system promoted competition within each community and cooperation between them (Hanf, 1993). Controversies over distributions of power between communities were not handled within the parliament, but behind closed doors among key elites from the communities.

Parties were a marginal phenomenon for most of the pre-war period. Two-thirds of the parliamentary seats were held by independents or landed notables known as zuama. In his encyclopedic work about the Lebanese civil war, Hanf describes the role of these prominent pre-war family and clan leaders—

“in pre-war Lebanon the zuama were the most important intermediaries between individuals and the state, a sort of class of ‘political brokers.’ They concerned themselves not only with the political interests of their voters, but took far more comprehensive interest in the concerns of their clients, settling difficulties with the authorities, arbitrating conflicts and arranging jobs, loans, and businesses for individuals.” (Hanf, 1993)[79]

The zuama or notables largely derived their legitimacy from their ability to strike compromises and maintain a peaceful if fragile status quo of coexistence between the communities. It is important to differentiate this feudal or traditional type of clientelism from the more overtly sectarian clientelism practiced by wartime armed groups and their post-war parties. The pre-war zuama usually had smaller, more provincial constituencies. Although they were from a particular sect, their clients and constituents were the people in their province or
town, which often were a mixed group, not simply people from the patron’s sect (Hamzeh, 2001). For example, Christian leaders in the Bekaa town of Zahle had a mixed clientele that reflected the area’s population. Druze leaders in the villages of the Shouf region also had a mixed Christian and Druze clientele. The later clientelism of the armed groups and post-war parties took place on a national rather than a provincial scale, and developed after many regions of the country had been homogenized through wartime displacement. Clientelism in the post-war period was usually focused on representing particular sectarian communities.

The 1960s and 1970s brought rapid social and economic changes, including migration to urban areas, growing inequality, the saturation of the market for an ever-increasing number of university graduates, and the mobilization of segments of the population that felt disenfranchised by the current system. Rural migration to the cities, particularly the capital of Beirut, led to the rapid growth of informal neighborhoods. In Beirut, these new suburban slums, commonly termed “the belt of misery,” surrounded the established city-center. A remarkable feature of the growing societal conflict resulting from these changes was that it was not initially sectarian, but based on social and economic interests (Hanf, 1993).

The population looked to their politicians to address pressing economic and social issues, but most zuama were out of touch with changes on the ground and did not shift their strategy, viewing their role as one of preserving the stability of the elite pact and their clan clientelist networks rather than concerning themselves with issues of nation-wide reform to address these cross-sectarian needs. The institutionally rigid sectarian logic of political representation made cross-sectarian class-based mobilization around programmatic economic platforms very difficult. Instead, underprivileged populations found their voice in the growing ranks of Leftist parties that played a marginal role in parliament but had begun mobilizing outside and against the sectarian structure of the formal political system (Hanf, 1993).

Although these parties were not aligned with a certain sect and drew a diverse following, they found many supporters among Shi’a Muslims who felt marginalized by the system, both because the National Pact privileged Christians and Sunnis and also because they were in fact also the poorest segment of society. Christians held more political power and were generally better off financially (Hanf, 1993). Although many Christians did join Leftist
parties, the majority felt that a growing Muslim population meant that preserving the status quo of Christian power was the more important concern.

A major catalyst that turned the divide into an identity-based sectarian struggle was the influx of Palestinian refugees after the 1967 war, most of whom were Sunni Muslims. After the watershed Cairo Agreement of 1969 and the events of Black September in Jordan, the Palestinian leadership and the armed wing of the PLO moved their headquarters to Lebanon, which became the center of the resistance against Israeli occupation. The Lebanese differed sharply on how to handle the presence of this new and armed population. Christians prioritized Lebanon’s sovereignty and sought to detach it from the majority-Muslim Arab world surrounding it. This meant keeping a neutral stance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and strengthening ties with the West. Muslims sought a much greater connection to the rest of the Arab world, espousing the ideology of pan-Arabism. By extension, this stance meant that Lebanon should support the Palestinians, even if that meant getting involved in a conflict with neighboring Israel. Leftist parties that had been shut out of the political system found an important ally in the heavily armed Palestinian armed groups. Right-wing, mostly Christian, parties felt threatened by the agenda of this powerful alliance that in their view threatened to undo the National Pact of the Lebanese state and turn it into yet another Sunni-majority Arab country and a permanent home for Palestinians. These parties began to arm and train youth organizations and militias with the help of aid from sources as diverse as Czechoslovakia and France. The most famous of these armed groups was the Kataeb (Phalangists). In 1975, an armed group of Phalangist militiamen surrounded and massacred a bus full of Palestinians in retaliation for an earlier attack on a church. This incident was the spark that ignited the Lebanese civil war (Hanf, 1993).

Hanf explains that conflict regulation broke down in Lebanon when economic realities, the Palestinian question, and the arming of the parties eroded the power of the compromising zuama, replacing them with political actors that viewed the conflict as a zero-sum game and a fight over the very identity of Lebanon (Hanf, 1993). Through a series of post-war interviews with the major political players, Hanf confirms that the pre-war and war-time elite viewed the conflict differently. Pre-war politicians viewed the main causes of the war
as external. These included factors such as the Cairo Agreement’s decision to move the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s headquarters to Lebanon, the Israeli government’s desire to destroy those headquarters, Syria’s interest in hegemony over Lebanon, and even Libya’s financing of Sunni forces. In contrast, armed group leaders and warlords viewed the war as internal and due to the policies and action of the opposing side (Hanf, 1993). In the years following the end of the war, some of the traditional zuama would regain their political positions, but in several regions, they would be wholly replaced by armed group leaders-turned-politicians with a more populist and sectarian political agenda.

3.3 Armed Group Development During the War

Between 1975 and 1990, the conflict became increasingly complex and multi-faceted. What started out as a two-sided ideological conflict degenerated into a situation of state collapse and war between more than a dozen overtly sectarian armed groups. In fact, some of the worst fighting was due to power struggles between rival armed groups competing to be the dominant representative of a sectarian community (Hanf, 1993; Cammett, 2014). Several excellent studies exist detailing the developments of the war itself (Salibi, 1988; Fisk, 1991; Traboulsi, 2007; Hanf, 1993), but for the purpose of this research I will focus on the rise of armed group rule and its implications for the organizational development of armed groups, the life of the populations under their control, and the composition of the political elite.

The outbreak of conflict meant that power was now achieved through force of arms, giving a comparative advantage to those leaders who could mobilize fighters to effectively compete in the struggle for control over Lebanon’s political future. Hanf remarks that as the war went on, “the established political and religious leaders gradually lost power to mercenary bosses” (Hanf, 1993)[181]. Despite the rise of parties in the immediate pre-war period, elections were designed to protect the establishment against such destabilizing forces. As mentioned earlier, the majority of elected Lebanese politicians did not belong to any of these parties and were landowning notables. Although many were sympathetic to the perspective of their sect’s party-turned-armed group, most were against the war and continually used
every break in the fighting to search for a compromise. However, by 1988, only seventy-two
of the ninety-nine original deputies were alive. Several had been assassinated and many of
the most prominent were living in exile in Europe. They had been effectively marginalized
by a new generation of politico-military leaders. These military leaders reduced even the
party apparatus to a tool of their armed groups, rather than the other way around. Besides
Jumblatt (Progressive Socialist Party) and Berri (Amal Movement), who had civilian roots
for idiosyncratic reasons, the political leaders of most armed groups rose to power through
the armed groups themselves. Many had few prospects in a non-military political system
and many lower level officers had few chances of acquiring administrative positions in a
civilian government. Their power, prestige, and income depended on the existence of armed
groups. “Mercenaries and mercenary leaders had a profound interest in mercenary rule. Any
mercenary rule required the perpetuation of war. The war brought forth the armed groups;
it was in their interest to prolong it.” (Hanf, 1993)[335]. Although the end of the war
brought some of the old political families and the forces of compromise back into the game,
this largely occurred because international actors empowered them to become the brokers of
a peace agreement. This process is discussed in detail in the next section. The main point
remains that the war fundamentally altered the balance of power in favor of armed group
leaders.

The rise of armed groups during the war had profound social and economic implications
for the population living under their rule. One of the first and most consistent things
armed groups did to consolidate their control over distinct geographical areas was to expel
pockets of population whose denomination differed from that of the surrounding population
and the armed group in that territory. In some instances, before or instead of expelling
the population, armed groups would hold them hostage to exert pressure on the other side.
Forced migrations were most pronounced among the Shi’a and Christians suffered most from
expulsions, mostly because they were the most dispersed population before the war. Hanf
documents the demographic changes in the population throughout the war, demonstrating
how territories became sharply defined by confession. This phenomenon was not a marginal
one. Hanf concludes that one third of the Lebanese population had to flee at least once
during the war but was able to eventually return. Another third of the population was expelled or forced to flee with little possibility of return (Hanf, 1993).

In order to finance their operations, armed groups needed access to a steady stream of revenue. One common source was taxation of the population under their control. Protection rackets developed that required businesses and homeowners to pay a direct tax, but there were also some indirect taxes such as sales taxes at restaurants. Kidnappings for ransom were also common. Much of the armed groups’ revenue came from customs duties on goods entering or exiting their territories, the cultivation and trading of drugs, and trade in contraband. All these activities were made possible and profitable because several armed groups occupied and controlled access to some of Beirut’s most important ports. Bank robberies, fraudulent banking practices, outright thievery and confiscation of property were also part of the armed groups’ repertoires (Hanf, 1993; Zahar, 2000; Picard, 2000; Makdisi and Sadaka, 2003). Overall, Makdisi and Sadaka estimate that the armed groups were able to amass $15 billion from these various sources (Makdisi and Sadaka, 2003). Although foreign patronage was a huge source of revenue, it was not the major source for all armed groups. For example, Zahar estimates that the yearly revenue of the Lebanese Forces averaged $100 million, although only $25 million was from Israel, it’s foreign patron (Zahar, 2000).

In order to extract most of the revenue, armed groups set up military and political administrations, military and civilian police forces, and intelligence agencies. Doing so required the cooperation of the population as well as the rank and file of the armed groups. This was of particular concern because none of the main armed groups ever monopolized the political scene in their respective sectarian community and had to constantly fend off other armed groups who were looking to poach their supporters and fighters. This competition increased expenditures and therefore the dual need for revenue and civilian support for each armed group (Picard, 2000). The largest armed groups provided generously for militia members and their families and established social welfare departments, and press and media outlets. The Lebanese Forces went so far as to create a “National Treasury” similar to the finance ministry and what they termed a Gamma Group in charge of developing a plan for reconstruction (Zahar, 2000). The relationship of the armed groups to the population was a
complex one. While armed groups provided generously for their members and supporters, this was not always felt by the populations under their control. Furthermore, the armed groups’ financial success meant that substantial personal wealth was also accumulated by the leadership and their henchmen (Makdisi and Sadaka, 2003). As the war dragged on, this made armed groups less popular and it became more costly to maintain the support of the population (Zahar, 2000). This was perhaps one of the reasons motivating most wartime leaders to accept the terms of the Taif Agreement that ended the war.

By 1985, the Lebanese Forces (Christian), Amal Movement (Shia), and Progressive Socialist Party (Druze) emerged as the three largest armed groups. All three became very similar in organization and behavior. They all controlled large parts of the country that they had more or less homogenized, controlled their own ports which provided an independent source of revenue, established a civil administration, and took control of state facilities in their region. It is not an exaggeration to say that each operated as a state within a state (Hanf, 1993; Picard, 2000) Beyond these three, several other groups controlled specific territories and populations. Hezbollah emerged as a player in the mid-1980s and began successfully contesting Amal’s control over Shia-majority areas. In addition to these, the Aounist faction of the Lebanese Army gained control of heavily-populated Christian areas in the last year of the war, until its routing by the Syrian Army (Hanf, 1993). The rest of the discussion will center on these five armed groups, as they were the most prominent controllers of territory in the final phase of the war. According to the logic of the argument in Chapter 2, it is the objective of controlling and consolidating control over territory that leads armed groups to invest in developing networks and patron-client relationships between their organization and the population under their rule. This is not to say that other smaller armed groups did not build networks or control territory, particularly at the level of the village, neighborhood, or district of a larger city. However none of the others had a geographically contiguous base of support that could make them spoilers of a peace deal, and therefore relevant in a national-level agreement.
3.4 Taif Agreement

The Taif Agreement was signed in 1989 by the surviving members of the pre-war parliament and provided the basis for a power sharing agreement that would end the Lebanese civil war. It is important to note that the war did not end because the armed groups on the ground decided to begin negotiations for a peace settlement. Instead, it was external regional players that sought to bring an end to the conflict because its continuation was no longer in their interests (Hanf, 1993). The agreement was signed in Taif, Saudi Arabia with the support and backing of Syria, which was to act as the guarantor of the agreement (Hudson, 1999). It reinstated Lebanon’s sectarian power-sharing system but included provisions for restructuring the National Pact, taking the proportion of Christians to Muslims in the parliament from six to five to an equal five to five. The Christian president’s powers were reduced and the Sunni premiership was strengthened. No longer an appointee of the president, the prime minister was now appointed by and accountable to the parliament. This created a ”troika” executive, where the president, prime minister, and speaker (Shia) govern together in a more equal arrangement.

The Taif Agreement also included provisions for the disarmament of armed groups, and stated that the abolition of confessionalism (sectarian representation) be a national priority. Taif’s provisions for the disarming and disbanding of the armed groups were enforced by the Lebanese army, with the threat of reinforcement from the Syrian army if armed groups did not cooperate. Plans were made for the rehabilitation of combatants and many took positions in the army, intelligence, police, and civil service, according to the quota allotted their respective armed group. Collecting weapons was a more difficult process than anticipated. The new government collected most of them but gave up on small arms, which many believe the former armed groups still have hidden in Lebanon in case war should break out again (Hanf, 1993). The exception, of course, is Hezbollah, which was allowed to keep its arms to resist Israeli occupation of the south but was not sanctioned to use them internally. This was to the obvious benefit of the Syrian government, which viewed the Shia armed group as a reliable ally in Lebanon.
The agreement made Syria the enforcer of its provisions. It allowed for a special relationship and complete coordination, particularly on matters of security and foreign policy, between the Lebanese state and the Syrian regime and for a temporary stationing of Syrian troops in Lebanon. In essence, Taif legitimized and legalized the Syrian army’s indefinite presence in and occupation of Lebanon. The Christian camp, which was generally against Syrian involvement in Lebanon, split over whether to accept the terms of the agreement. This led to a bloody confrontation that further divided the Christian community and ultimately resulted in the defeat of General Aoun, the leader of the faction that did not accept the agreement, at the hands of the Syrian military. By 1992, two years after the end of the war, de-confessionalization became the condition for the withdrawal of the Syrian army (Hanf, 1993). There was no road-map to accomplish this, allowing the Syrian army to remain in Lebanon until 2005.1

The Taif agreement also increased the size of parliament from 99 deputies to 108. The number of deputies was a contentious issue particularly because the vacant seats of the 99 (only 68 were alive in 1989) and the new seats were to be filled by appointees chosen by Damascus until elections could be organized (Hanf, 1993; Wantchekon, 2000). This gave the upper hand to armed group leaders who were Syrian allies or clients. The resulting parliament was divided between the armed groups-turned-parties and the zuama from traditional political families. Among the parties, the parliament included a disproportionate presence of new pro-Syrian parties and armed groups and an under-representation of anti-Syria Christian groups (Hanf, 1993). Hence, while Taif is characterized as a power sharing agreement between the warring factions, there were clear beneficiaries and losers among the armed groups. Instead, Taif is more accurately described as a power sharing agreement between two different types of elites: a subset of pre-war zuama and a subset of armed group leaders. The first post-war cabinet illustrates the point best. It was the largest is Lebanese history, with seven armed group leaders as ministers of state without portfolios. The old politicians

---

1 The Syrian army withdrew in 2005 because of large anti-Syrian protests following the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri. Syria is suspected to have been involved in plotting the assassination. Although these protests were met with large pro-Syrian protests, the U.S. backed the anti-Syrian camp and pressured the Syrian Army to withdraw.
saw the participation of these wartime leaders as a positive sign that they were willing to disarm their armed groups in exchange for a piece of the national pie. The largest armed groups-turned-parties, including Amal, the Progressive Socialist Party, and the Lebanese Forces, all participated in the first post-war cabinet (Hanf, 1993).

3.5 After the War

As previously mentioned, when the civil war ended, all major armed groups except for Hezbollah were disarmed with the help of the Syrian army. Armed group leaders transformed their organizations into political machines that continued to provide services and mobilize their constituents for demonstrations, elections, and other political activities (Cammett, 2014). However, the success of armed group leaders in transforming their armed groups into parties was not straightforward and depended heavily upon their relationship with a Syrian regime that, for all intents and purposes, ruled post-war Lebanon. Syrian involvement in Lebanese politics was pervasive, as the Syrian intelligence and security apparatus were intimately involved in matters of electoral engineering as well as the systematic repression of anti-Syrian forces. Armed groups that were allies of the Syrian regime were successful in transforming their military power into political power in the post-war era. There were also other armed groups that were not outright allies of the Syrian regime but found it in their interests to maintain a relationship of cooperation with its agents in Lebanon (El-Husseini, 2012). It is important to note, however, that the Syrian regime was unable to create new post-war loyalist parties that has no bases as civil war armed groups. Instead, it co-opted and allied with parties that emerged out of armed groups. When necessary, it would introduce independent politicians that were its direct clients, with no popular bases of Lebanese support, into the system to carry out its agenda. Yet these clients were wholly dependent on Syrian and distinct from pro-Syrian armed groups-turned-party that had build networks and bases of popular Lebanese support (El-Husseini, 2012). After the 2005 Syrian withdrawal, many of these clients saw their political futures threatened in a way that was not true for the pro-Syrian armed groups-turned-parties.
In 1992, the government resigned, largely in reaction to popular protests against Syria’s increasingly heavy hand against opposing armed groups. The new cabinet was even more pro-Syrian and the new prime minister soon called for parliamentary elections. These elections were on short notice, would take place before formal approval of the constitutional law, and would include regions where populations had not yet returned after wartime displacement. The number of deputies was increased to 128, giving extra representation to peripheral areas where the Syrian army was stationed (Hanf, 1993). Furthermore, the new districts were gerrymandered to constrain or eliminate political opportunities for the Christians and empower a largely, although not completely, Muslim elite whose purpose was to institutionalize Syrian hegemony (Salloukh, 2006). New districts were large in Muslim areas, subsuming minority Christian populations. This meant that Muslims would effectively be choosing the Christian representatives in those areas. Conversely, new districts were small in Christian areas so that Christians would not have the reciprocal ability to choose Muslim representatives. The displaced and those abroad were not able to vote and many Christians boycotted the elections, leading to an extremely low turnout.

The two most striking results of the election were that Shi’a representation changed radically from traditional notables to the Amal and Hezbollah armed groups-turned-parties. The second was that major Christian parties were not represented at all (Hanf, 1993). By 1994, the traditional Christian notables as well as Aoun, the most prominent Christian wartime general, were in exile. Although the Lebanese Forces had been a participant of the Taif Agreement, the organization was repressed and banned for a lack of cooperation with the Syrian regime. Geagea, the leader of the Lebanese Forces, was imprisoned. In 2005, the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon after what is termed the Independence Intifada or the Cedar Revolution brought significant changes to the political landscape. The political wings of anti-Syrian armed groups were allowed to begin or resume operations as political parties and competed in the 2005 elections (Cammett, 2014). This shock to the political system allows for an exploration of the enduring impact of wartime armed group rule on post-war elections, with and without the overt military presence of a foreign power supporting or repressing various parties. Syrian withdrawal in 2005 brought Aoun and Geagea and their
parties back into politics, a testament to the resilience of wartime political forces even when suppressed for multiple years.

The post-war electoral law has facilitated a widespread phenomenon of pre-election bargaining that has all reduced competitiveness in Lebanese elections in all types of regions. Salloukh outlines the methods that post-civil war and particularly pro-Syrian parties have used to reduce uncertainty in three types of districts in the 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections. In homogeneous districts, a cross-ideological alliance is formed by the main parties, ensuring that their list wins by a landslide. This is most clearly seen in the secular Amal’s alliance with the Islamist Hezbollah in Shi’a areas. In mixed districts, cross-sectarian alliances are used to eliminate rival lists. In districts that are dominated by one sect, the major party will use their resources to recruit token individuals from the minority sect to stand for election on their list, also ensuring that the party wins safely (Salloukh, 2006). This system not only yields uncompetitive elections but also makes it nearly impossible for new political forces that were not part of the civil war and the ensuing Taif agreement to emerge and have a chance of winning elections.

The only and notable exception is the Hariri family’s Future Movement. A largely Sunni party, it became an important post-war political force for two main reasons. One was that founder, Rafik Hariri, was an independently wealthy entrepreneur that had been active during the civil war, using his charitable Hariri Foundation to build a political base (Cammett, 2014). This was possible because of a vacuum in Sunni leadership. During the war, the Sunni armed groups had been the least cohesive and organized, largely due to the community’s early alliance with and reliance on Palestinian guerillas. The second reason for the Future Movement’s success is external and related to its financial and political backing by Saudi Arabia (Nizameddin, 2006), a regional power seeking to be a counterpoint to Syria. The Future Movement, however, was always careful not to try and contest the power of beneficiary armed groups in their regional strongholds. Instead, it worked in fragmented, mainly Sunni-majority areas, as well as Christian areas once controlled by losing groups. Overall, the Lebanese case is a good example of how institutionalized power sharing agreements can entail provisions, such as the timing of elections and the drawing of districts, that favor the
beneficiaries of the war and create barriers for new post-war forces seeking to challenge their control.

3.6 Post-War Electoral System

The defining feature of the Lebanese post-war electoral system is a fixed quota of parliamentary seats for each sectarian community. This is a noteworthy attribute of the system that shapes and limits electoral outcomes in ways that are relevant to testing the argument. The fixed sectarian quota means that all electoral competition occurs within sectarian communities rather than among them. An Orthodox Christian candidate would never run against a Sunni Muslim candidate within this framework (IFES, 2011). This electoral engineering creates a system that supposedly prevents inter-sectarian competition and encourages intra-sectarian competition for the allocated seats. Ideally, it also forces candidates to make cross-sectarian appeals in mixed districts. Despite these safeguards, this system has served to reinforce the clientelism that existed before the war, albeit with a new and more militant and sectarian leadership (Salloukh, 2006). The quota is also geographically fixed, meaning that the seats for each religious community are always allocated to the same geographic areas (IFES, 2011). In terms of analysis, this system allows for a more straightforward examination of the dynamics of party competition within each religious community. It also allows for a direct test of the hypothesis that armed group territories of control shape levels of competition against the alternative that levels of competition are driven solely by the sectarian allocation of the seat (see Chapter 6). If armed group control is more important, then a seat allocated to a minority group within a district that was controlled by an armed group (and now party) of the dominant sect will be filled by a token minority loyal to or associated with the majority party rather than from one of the minority community’s parties.

This post-war electoral system is not a product of the peace settlement in Lebanon. On the contrary, it is nearly identical to the pre-war system, making comparisons to pre-war election results possible.\(^2\) The major difference brought about by the Taif Agreement

\(^2\)Although this dissertation does not present systematic data on pre-war elections, the change in the
lies in the proportions of seats allocated to Christians and Muslims. In pre-war elections, Christians were allocated six seats for every five Muslim seats. The Taif Agreement changed this proportion to an even five to five, guaranteeing that the Lebanese parliament will always be equally divided among Muslims and Christians. Within each of the larger categories of Christian and Muslim, seat allocations are also further subdivided amongst the varying sects. These proportions are shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Sectarian Quotas in the Lebanese Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alawite</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Orthodox</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Catholic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total of 128 parliamentary seats are then allocated among twenty-six multi-member qadas in a way that approximately reflects the distribution of registered voters. Figure composition of the legislature brought about by the war are quite striking, despite the preservation of the sectarian quota system (see Chapter 6 for more details). This points to the role of the war in transforming the composition of the national elite. Even the parties that were forming in the years leading up to the war and that went on to become armed groups were not able to win many seats in pre-war elections. The legislative body was largely dominated by landed notables from traditionally powerful families (Hudson, 1999). Many of these notables were marginalized by the growing power of the armed groups once the war began. Others were able to preserve their power (Hanf, 1993; Hudson, 1999). Historians point to the south, a region that saw some of the worst violence and upheaval as one where the old nobility was marginalized. The south stands in contrast to the far north, where less violence and upheaval occurred. This allowed the traditional families to maintain their political influence (El-Husseini, 2012). This observation is consistent with my argument. However, I attribute this difference to the presence of consolidated armed group rule in the south and not in the north. The intensity of violence is, of course, related to armed group rule in potentially complicated ways. By presenting evidence that territorial control is strongly correlated with uncompetitive electoral victories for beneficiary armed groups-turned-parties, I illuminate part of the mechanism that explains this connection between violence and the reduced power of traditional families that historians have noticed.
3.1 shows the allocation of seats to each qada, along with the sectarian assignment of the seat. Smaller Christian communities have been grouped together for ease of exposition. For example, in the small qada of Jbeil, there are two Maronite seats and one Shia seat, officially based on the size and sectarian composition of the registered voter population. The size of the seats in the map represents the number of registered voters that each deputy represents. It is interesting to note that several Shia and Sunni seats, in the south and north respectively, represent a disproportionately high number of voters. This map is evidence of the important fact that the post-war compromise on the sectarian distribution of seats is in fact not directly proportionate to the population but the result of the Taif Agreement, a political deal that preserves the over-representation of Christians in exchange for concessions on Syria’s increased role in Lebanon, a provision favored by Shia groups, and the increased powers of the prime minister, a provision favored by the Sunni community.

These parliamentary seats are chosen through an electoral system that uses a block vote. This means that although candidates may only run for a seat reserved for their sect, voters have as many votes as there are seats in their district, regardless of their religious affiliation. Taking up the previous example of Jbeil, this means that all voters in the qada have three votes to cast. Several Shia may be running against each other for the one seat allocated to their group. The one with the most votes wins the seat. Similarly, several Maronites may be competing for the two seats allocated to their group. The top two vote-getters will win the two Maronite seats. Essentially, the same voters are casting ballots in two parallel elections, the Shia one and the Maronite one. As previously mentioned, this ensures that all electoral competition is designed to be within-sect and not across them.

While the sectarian division of seats and their allocation to specific qadas has remained fixed throughout Lebanon’s post-war elections, the size and makeup of electoral districts has changed. In some elections, each qada has been its own electoral district, in which case the elections would function as described in the Jbeil example above. In other elections, several have been grouped under one electoral district. The qada is, however, almost always the building block for the construction of these electoral districts. While the number of seats and their allocations do not change, the size and composition of the voter base participating
in each election changes significantly. For instance, in some years, Jbeil was combined with the neighboring district of Kesrwan to form a single electoral district. Since Kesrwan is a homogenous qada with five Maronite seats, voters in both Jbeil and Kesrwan now found themselves having eight votes to cast, five votes for the Maronite election in Kesrwan, two vote for the Maronite election in Jbeil, and one vote for the Shia election in Jbeil. Particularly in more diverse areas, these changes in electoral laws have a significant impact on the campaigns of candidates, as they must either broaden their appeals to attract a more diverse voter population or form alliances and electoral slates with politicians of other sects.
Moving beyond the Lebanese case as a whole, this section presents a case study of one armed group, the Amal Movement, and its wartime leader, Nabih Berri. The case study provides a concrete example of a movement that mobilized outside the system in the immediate pre-war years and became an important territory-controlling armed group during the war. Amal was a beneficiary of the Taif Agreement and a key Syrian ally. The armed group-turned-party’s access to key state agencies and its control over a significant portion of reconstruction funds for southern Lebanon were critical. The resources available through his access to the state allowed Nabih Berri to translate Amal’s grassroots-level networks and organizational capacity into a post-war political machine. Berri was a relatively unknown lawyer in the pre-war era. He rose to power through the Amal Movement and became its wartime leader. In the post-war period, Berri has held the position of Speaker of the House since the end of the civil war. No other politician has held the position since the Taif Agreement.

3.7.1 Berri’s Rise and the Transformation of the Shia Political Elite

In the pre-war period, the Shia community was ruled by landed elites, most notably the al-Asaad, al-Khalil, al-Zain, Hamad, and Useiran families. These traditional zuama controlled the rural areas of the south along with their majority Shia populations. These pseudo-feudal families dominated the political representation of the Shia and generally neglected the vast majority of the community (Cammett, 2014). A long-time resident recalls that during the elections of the 1960s, a common expression among the population was that even if Al-Asaad ran with twelve sticks on his electoral slate, they would all win seats.3

In 1960, Imam Musa al-Sadr, a Shia leader, originally Lebanese but born in Iran, moved to the south of Lebanon with the objective of developing the Shia community’s political consciousness and championing its interests. Although al-Sadr tried to do this through

---

3 Interview # 12. (Interviewees are only numerically identified to protect their identities. All are long-time residents of South Lebanon and were contacted through referrals in a method similar to snowball sampling. This was necessary to gain respondent trust and ensure truthful responses due to the sensitive nature of questions. Interviews were unstructured.)
newly established institutions such as the Supreme Islamic Shia Council and the Council of the South, which was charged with promoting development in the south, al-Sadr faced persistent neglect by the central government. In 1974, the proliferation of Leftist parties and militias throughout the country led him to found the Movement of the Dispossessed, with the goal of mobilizing poor Shia to claim their rights and work for their own social and political advancement (Cammett, 2014). As the state became increasingly unable to protect the population against Israeli attacks and armed group violence, a group of activists from the Movement of the Dispossessed founded a armed group known as the Amal Movement (Harakat Amal). Al-Sadr was the official leader of the organization until 1978, when he mysteriously disappeared while on a trip to Libya (Cammett, 2014). His disappearance conferred on him a legendary status and Amal became even more prominent.4

During this time, Nabih Berri was a young man from a modest southern Lebanese family that had emigrated to Sierra Leone. Berri returned to Lebanon for his education and with the intent of entering politics. He tried to run on Kamel Al-Asaad’s list in both the 1968 and 1972 legislative elections. However, al-Asaad refused to add Berri to his list. Instead, Berri joined the Movement of the Dispossessed as a lawyer for the organization. When Amal was created, he was one of its founding members (El-Husseini, 2012). As the civil war erupted, Amal grew into a major armed group, with thousands of fighters, initially resisting the Israeli occupation. At later stages, they fought against the various Palestinian factions and later Hezbollah for control of the south and the southern suburbs of Beirut (Picard, 2000; Cammett, 2014). Berri, the once unknown lawyer, rose to prominence through the ranks of the armed group, and became its leader in 1980, positioning himself as al-Sadr’s rightful heir5(Cammett, 2014).

Meanwhile, the Shia zuama that had ruled the south only a few years earlier found themselves on the defensive. It was clear that political power in the community had shifted in favor of armed actors. To make matters worse, the zuama aligned themselves politically with the Gemayels and Chamouns, the heads of the anti-Palestinian Christian establishment.

---

4Interview # 12.

5Interview # 12.
This was the death blow to their popular legitimacy. They came to be seen as elitist traitors who had not stood with the “resistance” that had captured popular Muslim sentiment. Their efforts to transfer political power to their children proved futile, especially since many of the children of these wealthy families studied abroad instead of remaining present with the population during the war.\(^6\)

3.7.2 Amal During the War (1975-1990)

Although Amal is considered one of the largest and most significant armed groups that participated in the civil war, it would be inaccurate to say that the organization was always cohesive and operating under a unified chain of command. As early as 1982, personal and regional issues, rather than programmatic ones began fragmenting the movement. Its building blocks were local self-defense groups controlling small territories in predominantly Shia areas of the south and southern Beirut (Picard, 2000). Each warlord controlled a village or town and sought to appropriate the benefits of traffic between zones of Israeli occupation, the Shia southern suburbs of Beirut, the port of Tyre, and the illegal port of Zahrani (Picard, 2000).

And yet despite the weaknesses in its chain of command, the political power Amal gained through force of arms allowed Nabih Berri to hold successive positions in the Lebanese cabinet from 1984 to 1992. He also orchestrated the establishment of the Ministry of the South and ensured that an Amal representative, usually Mohammed Beydoun, always presided over the Council of the South (Cammett, 2014). In this way, Amal was able to infiltrate the bureaucracy and public services of the severely weakened state, as well as capture the revenues from the Zahrani refinery and the customs of Khaldeh Airport (Picard, 2000). The Shia population supported Amal in these endeavors, as this presented the community with an opportunity to secure its position in the state bureaucracy and economy (Picard, 2000), something that it had been lacking in the pre-war period. Berri and Beydoun’s roles in linking the Amal armed group to the state allowed the armed group to use the resources of

\(^6\)Interview # 12.
the state to grow its base of supporters. Examples of this include the leaders ordering state-funded public and private infrastructure projects in the region of Amal’s control, distributing public funds with discretion to Shia displaced by violence, and securing positions for their followers in the Lebanese armed forces and ensuring the continual receipt of their salaries even after they had rebelled against army command. Amal’s success also relied in part on its collaboration with networks of diaspora Shia, particularly in West Africa. Amal displaced the Shia bourgeoisie of Beirut as the recipient of diaspora investment flows. The group presided over and benefited from diaspora investments in both industry and real estate in the affluent neighborhoods of west Beirut (Picard, 2000).

3.7.3 Intra-Shia Conflict

In 1988, conflict broke out between Hezbollah and Amal in what would later become known as a Shia civil war. These clashes mostly took place in southern Lebanon and the Shia-populated southern suburbs of Beirut. Through military victories as well as Iranian-funded material inducements, Hezbollah soon controlled the majority of the southern suburbs of Beirut. The Syrian government was Amal’s patron, while it’s most powerful ally, Iran, was Hezbollah’s patron. This put Syria in an awkward situation, as it wanted to assist Amal without breaking ties with Iran. In order to do so, it declared that it would be taking over the southern suburbs to bring stability to the area and called on both parties to retreat to specific locations. After a series of negotiations and announcements, Syrian troops entered the suburbs without a fight. This did not end the Shia conflict, but contained and dampened it. In the next two years, fighting would continue to erupt between the two Shia armed groups. In the spring of 1989, the two sides finally agreed to a cease-fire, brokered by their patrons, Syria and Iran (Hanf, 1993). The alliance between Syria and Iran continued to play an important role in shaping political competition within the Shia community even after the end of the war. While Amal and Hezbollah’s wartime conflict suggests that they would be competitors in the post-war system, the strategic alliance between their foreign patrons compelled them to cooperate. In the late 1990s Syria brokered an agreement forcing them to run joint lists for national elections (Cammett, 2014). While there remains some local-level
competition between the two parties in a few areas, in the large majority of villages and towns, one of the two parties clearly dominates the political scene.\footnote{Interview # 9.}

### 3.7.4 End of the War

In some ways, the end of the war presented several challenges for a leadership that had built an armed group organization well-suited for armed conflict, but not necessarily for electoral competition. With the reduction in violence, Amal’s economic power waned. Its leaders became more interested in securing lucrative positions within the post-war state apparatus than in keeping up the movement’s wartime economic activities. The post-war environment allowed new Shia banks to displace Amal as the recipients of diaspora investment (Picard, 2000) and the state again regained control of major ports that armed groups had used as sources of funding. Hezbollah also rose in popularity due to its provision of services (Hanf, 1993), made possible by extensive funding from Iran, and relegated Amal to the position of junior player in the Shia community.

Despite these challenges, Amal was able to successfully transform itself into a post-war party, albeit an increasingly personalistic one. The keys to Amal’s continuity and transformation were two-fold. The first is that Amal’s close relationship to Syria, the broker and guarantor of the Taif agreement, ensured that their leadership would have a role to play in the post-war government and that the terms of the settlement would be interpreted in ways that were generally favorable to the group. Yet a relationship with Syria was not everything. There were many new politicians, largely independents, that appeared on the political scene after the war that were Syrian clients with no base of popular support (El-Husseini, 2012). None of them formed parties or popular organizations. Berri had the dual advantages of having built a network of supporters within his sectarian community during the war, as well as the Syrian nod of approval. This, in addition to his experience in the wartime government, allowed him to gain control over most state-led efforts at reconstruction.
in the South\textsuperscript{8} and to transition Amal from an armed group to a patronage machine capable of winning relatively uncontested elections.

As part of the Taif Agreement, Berri was initially brought into the cabinet as a minister without portfolio. This was true of most of the major armed group leaders. The architects of the peace settlement, including a mixture of Syrian clients and pre-war politicians without armed group experience, hoped that the promise of cabinet positions and state resources would buy the cooperation of armed group leaders, and in turn their armed groups, by giving them a stake in peace. Although the armed group leaders initially protested the confiscation of their arms caches, the strategy eventually worked, and all acquiesced with the disarmament (Hanf, 1993).\textsuperscript{9} Amal’s armed group was officially disbanded and its units were integrated into the Lebanese army.\textsuperscript{10} However, the process of disarmament was noticeably more lenient on armed groups like Amal that were cooperating with Syria than on the anti-Syrian groups (El-Khazen, 1994).

\textbf{3.7.5 1992 Election}

The first post-war parliamentary election revealed the profound changes that the war had wrought in the composition of the Shia political elite. The era of the old feudal families had come to an undeniable close. Two of the heirs of prominent families that had seats in the 1972 parliament chose to run in the 1992 election. Both were defeated (El-Khazen, 1994). Amal cemented its position as one of the important parties of the post-war political landscape, and Nabih Berri became Speaker of the House and the third member of the troika power-sharing structure, in which a Christian president, Sunni Prime Minister, and Shia Speaker were to share executive power in the post-war government (El-Husseini, 2012).

The general results of the 1992 election are elaborated in Section 6.6, but the local

\textsuperscript{8}Hezbollah was also an important player in reconstruction, but often ran its programs independently from state institutions.

\textsuperscript{9}The notable exception is Hezbollah, which was allowed to keep its armed group only to continue the resistance against Israeli occupation, with assurances that it would not use it against Lebanese targets.

\textsuperscript{10}The movement did maintain some armed components for the purpose of participating in the resistance against Israeli occupation, which ended in 2000 (Cammett, 2014).
details of the campaign in the south are illuminating, as they demonstrate how armed group experience was instrumental in giving a party like Amal a comparative advantage over pre-war elites. The campaign was unusually short and took place before full demilitarization, which scholars have shown favors wartime actors in the context of an immediate post-war election (Reilly, 2002; Lyons, 2004). Syria was an instrumental player in empowering loyal Lebanese actors supportive of its presence in Lebanon. It encouraged the formation of a southern Lebanon coalition between Amal, Hezbollah, the Communists, and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, along with some cooperative members of traditional families (Hanf, 1993). It would be almost impossible for the Al-Asaad family and the pre-war elite to mount a challenge to such a broad coalition of pro-Syrian parties with wartime experience. Within the Amal slate, Berri consistently chose former militiamen from Amal as candidates instead of members of the pre-war landlord elite.¹¹

During the election campaign, there were widespread reports of intimidation and obstruction of opposition candidates—those opposing Syria, its clients, and its allies among the armed groups-turned-parties. For example, Kamel Al-Asaad, head of one of the main formerly ruling families in the southern region, held an election meeting and rally in the town of Tibnin. Roadblocks were set up by his opponents preventing many from attending the meeting. After the rally, one of his assistants, a lawyer, was kidnapped (Hanf, 1993). Many of the other formerly powerful traditional families were deterred from running for elections because Berri and the Amal Movement had sent a clear message through their remaining arms. For example, a traditional notable that tried to run was allegedly shot at by Amal members. In response, he left the political scene and did not run in future elections.¹² A long-time resident claims that in the 1992 election, many people supported Amal out of fear. Despite their official disarmament, local observers recall that the armed group-turned-party still had arms and effectively controlled the situation at the level of “the street,”¹³ which gave them a defacto advantage in contesting the first post-war parliamentary elections.

¹¹Interview # 12
¹²Interview # 9
¹³Interview # 12
The election results were a testament to the profound change in elite structure that had occurred in the Shia community, particularly in the south. The new southern representatives were from a different background than those of the pre-war parliament. Many more winning candidates in the south were affiliated with a party, and fewer came from traditional political families. In strongholds like Tyre, Berri and his slate ended up sweeping a largely uncontested election, with relatively high turnout (Hanf, 1993). Kamel Al-Asaad, the traditional notable, would go on to contest the 1996 and 2000 election, with no success. During post-elections celebrations, Berri remarked that his success was a “victory over four hundred years of feudalism,” (Hanf, 1993, p.632) a comment obviously directed at Al-Asaad, the notable who had once refused to let Berri onto his election slate.

3.7.6 Post-War Political Machine

In the post-war period, Amal pursued a decidedly state-centric strategy. With Berri as Speaker of the House, and other Amal members in parliament, the armed group-turned-party was well positioned to use state patronage to replace the revenue stream lost by the collapse of the wartime economy and its profits. In particular, the movement’s central strategy throughout the post-war period has been to have party cadres hold simultaneous positions in the bureaucracy as well as party institutions, effectively blurring the line between party and state (Cammett, 2014) and taking on some of the characteristics of dominant party regimes in its regions of control. For example, party members employed in the social affairs or medical services wings of the party are frequently found holding positions of influence in the Ministries of Social Affairs and Public Health, respectively (Cammett, 2014). The party’s infiltration of the government bureaucracy facilitates their use of patronage to maintain and grow the network of supporters initially established during the war. This dependence on the state for resources also gives a former armed group like Amal a stake in the post-war state and system, making it much less likely that that organization would be willing to take up

---

14While the available data does not disaggregate parliamentarians according to region, the Lebanese parliament of 1992 had many more college graduates. However, for the first time, some deputies were graduates of the public Lebanese University, instead of only graduates of private American or French-system universities or foreign universities (El-Khazen, 1994).
arms to resolve political conflicts. In this way, bringing the most powerful wartime players into the system can be a strategy for promoting stability.

In this new political system, the traditional families that had not participated in the war were sometimes co-opted by the parties and became local brokers mobilizing the vote for the sectarian parties in exchange for integration into the party and sectarian system that prevailed in the post-war years. However, other parties, like Amal, potentially due to a lack of resources in comparison with the Iranian-funded Hezbollah, chose not to directly co-opt the traditional families. Instead, it usually chose to sideline them by force. Sometimes, it pursued an alternative type of co-opting that was cheaper for the party. In dealing with the traditional families and tribes that were not willing to cooperate, Berri would attempt to co-opt the second-most powerful member of the family, by giving him money or an attractive job in the government. In this way, Berri forced a change in the leadership structure of some families by empowering junior players against the heads of the families. This effectively divided and challenged, from within, the traditional rule of the remaining families in areas of Amal’s control.¹⁵

Perhaps the most important piece of the government pie that Berri was given was complete personal autonomy in running the Council of the South, a agency specifically tasked with helping the victims of Israeli aggression in the south, but eventually took over all matters of post-war reconstruction and relief in the south (El-Husseini, 2012; Leenders, 2012). Although the council receives its budget from the national government, it is controlled by Amal. The discretionary distribution of its resources allows Berri to strategically use the council to reward supporters. Allegations of embezzlement and mismanagement of these and other similar regional reconstruction funds by politicians are widespread (Leenders, 2012). In a post-war context, reconstruction and compensation in the name of alleviating the ill-effects of war can become big business. The key players that were able to control these processes and distribute key contracts in the immediate post-war period, mostly Hariri (Future Movement), Berri (Amal), and Jumblatt (Progressive Socialist Party), became the most

¹⁵Interview # 17
important players in post-war Lebanon.

As the Speaker of the House, the effective head of the Council of the South, and an ally of Syria, Berri used his influence to reshape the atrophying civil service, which was faced with many unfilled positions in the wake of the war. Berri was able to give his supporters many of these positions, whether in the postal service, the Ministry of the Interior, or one of several executive agencies that reported directly to the Prime Minister. He has used these public sector appointments to take control of state agencies that regulate certain industries in order to establish sectoral monopolies that benefit his constituents.16

A key strategy that was used by Berri, among other post-war leaders, was to appoint public servants as consultants on limited contracts. He could then appoint allies into positions in the public administration without having to go through formal recruitment procedures (through the Civil Service Board) or needing the approval of the Council of Ministers. In 2005, the World Bank estimated that about 40% of ministry personnel were hired this way (Leenders, 2012). These appointees, in Berri’s case, would be mostly Shia and from his supporters. These civil servants would then strike demanding that their jobs be made permanent. Berri would then present himself as a protector of citizens in need of greater job security and use the pressure from his base to make jobs permanent.17 It is also rumored that Berri has a great deal of control over the Lebanese University, Lebanon’s public university system. Apparently, Shia students cannot get in without the “express permission of an Amal cadre” (El-Husseini, 2012). A professor went so far as to say that Amal members control the university’s administrative and academic appointments and treat it as if it were their property (El-Husseini, 2012).

Berri’s post-war strategy has been to work within the realm of the state to maintain and grow his control over territory and Shia populations in the south of Lebanon. In some ways, his strategy does not differ markedly from that of a machine boss in any other situation. His political machine is built on the exchange of patronage jobs for popular support. However,

---

16 Interview # 9
17 Interview # 9
Berri’s experience as a armed group leader during the war and his ability to mobilize a substantial number of supporters is what made him a continually valuable asset to Syria. The large parts of the state bureaucracy and budget that came under his control due to the terms of the power-sharing agreement, particularly agencies tasked with rebuilding the south, were key to his survival as an important political player even in the face of the rising popularity of his wartime rival Hezbollah. It is unlikely that Amal would have survived Hezbollah’s expanding influence in the Shia community were it not for its history of network and organizational development during the war. This ground-level presence made Amal an important local ally for Syria—for which it was rewarded with Syrian military support during the war, a position as a beneficiary of the war’s settlement, and incredible post-war autonomy and discretion in the distribution of state resources allocated to the south. These resources are still being used to strengthen and reinforce wartime links with the population today.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter provides a chronological overview of pre-war mobilization, wartime armed group development, and post-war political life in Lebanon. The case study of Berri and the Amal Movement serves as an example of how an armed group developed wartime grassroots networks and a relatively decentralized but widespread mobilization capacity in order to gain control of territory and populations. Being a beneficiary of the war’s final outcome and an ally of the foreign power enforcing the peace agreement ensured that the organization would have access to the resources needed to maintain the loyalty of its members and supporters in the post-war era. Amal’s control of key ministries reconstruction funds along with the political freedom to use electoral intimidation in its strongholds allowed it to win the first post-war election and continued to provide mechanisms for deterring challengers and limiting competition in successive post-war elections. The case of Amal is but one of many armed groups whose legacy of wartime territorial control and position vis-a-vis Syria jointly determined their post-war electoral prospects.
CHAPTER 4

Displacement and Political Change in Beirut

4.1 Introduction

This chapter explores how population displacement serves as a central mechanism for the consolidation of territorial control during civil war. It also investigates how displacement and the ensuing disruption and re-formation of social networks and neighborhood ties shape the party attachments and networks of different segments of the population. This chapter uses a method of longitudinal process-tracing that focuses on political changes in two densely populated suburbs of Beirut—the southern suburbs and the eastern suburbs. I document the suburbs’ dramatic political, social and economic transformations from pre-war clusters of small villages to sprawling urban population centers. During the war, both the southern and the eastern suburbs of Beirut were the sites of several shifts in territorial control, many of them precipitated by international actors invading Lebanon or throwing their support behind certain players. However, in the final phase of the war, both areas were under consolidated armed group control. I document changes in armed group control as well as the displacement and network-building strategies that are part of the process of consolidating control over territory. I examine the impact of these profound wartime demographic shifts on the structure of post-war political networks and the formation of stable political constituencies among the population.

I find that, in the process of consolidating control over territory, armed groups change the composition of the population, displacing out-group members and sometime even attracting in-group members displaced from other regions with the promise of security. Displaced in-group populations that seek refuge in an armed group’s territory (henceforth “new” resi-
dents) develop stronger and more direct ties to the organization. As vulnerable populations, detached from local networks in their home regions and with recent memories of victimization at the hands of opposing groups, the internally displaced are a natural constituency for armed groups. They are particularly susceptible to armed group offers of protection and assistance, and become targets of recruitment efforts. Armed groups also try to win over the remaining in-group population (henceforth, “original” residents) already living in the territory, providing security and services in exchange for loyalty and local information. However, these “original” residents who were not displaced are able to maintain ties to their pre-war community and to the traditional political families that controlled pre-war municipal and local politics in Lebanon. While some of these local elites are co-opted by armed groups, many temporarily leave the area, others exit political life and maintain a low profile but remain in the locality, and a few take the risky route of resisting the encroachment of armed groups on their neighborhoods. Even when armed groups co-opt local elites and use their pre-existing networks to gain the cooperation of “original” residents, the primary relationship of these residents remains to these local pre-war elites from traditional political families.

These variations in experiences of displacement and their impact on different populations’ embeddedness in political networks continue into the post-war era. Those who are displaced from their home regions and are newcomers to their currently area of residence are more likely to support armed groups-turned-parties and their role in local politics. In contrast, “original” residents are more likely to support traditional pre-war local familial elites in local politics. In localities that become permanent refuges for the displaced, such as those in this study, the differing nature of “new” and “original” resident networks has the potential to empower armed groups-turned-parties and their primary constituents—the displaced—well into the post-war era. Chapter 5 discusses the conditions under which this does or does not occur.

In the Lebanese context more specifically, displacement and the different political rela-

---

I place “new” and “original” residents in quotations marks to highlight that these labels are simply for ease of exposition and do not in any way imply that some residents have a greater right to live in these neighborhoods than others. I only use these labels as a shorthand to distinguish those who vote in the area from relatively newer arrivals who cannot vote there. In reality, both groups have now lived in their communities for over a generation and do not necessarily see themselves as different types of residents.
tionships that it produces have an additional effect on local political life. Under Lebanese electoral law, “new” residents do not vote where they live, but where they are originally from. This means that they have no formal voice in the neighborhoods where they live. Instead, they use connections to parties to indirectly influence local politics. In exchange, they return home to vote for the party in parliamentary elections (if return is possible) or provide extra-electoral support for the party, by volunteering as grassroots organizers or organizing and participating in street demonstrations. In contrast, “original” residents use the ballot box to support traditional local elites. In other post-war contexts where displaced “new” residents are able to vote where they now live, political change is more straightforwardly evident through an examination of local election results.

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how struggles for territorial control can produce population displacement and social upheaval that restructures citizens’ social and political networks. It is important to note that territorial control shapes post-war networks regardless of the macro-level outcomes of the war. Similar wartime transformations with consequences for post-war politics occur in the southern and eastern suburbs despite the fact that the outcome of the war affected the two areas differently. Hezbollah, which controlled the southern suburbs, was a beneficiary of the war’s outcome. The Aounists, who controlled the eastern suburbs, were militarily defeated and only re-emerged in 2005 as a legal political party. Despite the contrasting position of each area’s controlling armed group in the war’s settlement, civil war displacement irrevocably and profoundly changed both areas.

While this chapter’s examination of similar wartime displacement and temporal variation in these two cases illustrates the importance of territorial control in structuring post-war networks, the following chapter (Chapter 5) takes a cross-sectional approach. It compares these two cases beginning with the outcome of the war as a critical point of divergence.

---

2 On the surface, this policy seems to disadvantage politicians associated with sectarian armed groups-turned parties. A more homogenized electorate consisting of all the post-war residents in an area under their control would make winning elections easier. However, such reform would require the creation of new and updated voter registration lists, revealing the actual and current religious breakdown of the Lebanese population. In a system like the Lebanese one, with sectarian quotas for all government positions, the true religious breakdown of the population is extraordinarily sensitive. Demography has direct implications for the fairness of allotted sectarian quotas and many political groups fear the instability that such information could generate. As evidence of this, Lebanon has not had a census since 1932.
between their political trajectories. Chapter 5 investigates how the local-level changes I document in this chapter interact with the macro-level outcome of the war to structure political competition and the prospects for party dominance at the local level. In this way, these complementary chapters together provide an in-depth case study of how territorial control and the outcome of the war jointly shape the post-war political landscape.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 uses a 1987 household survey of displaced and non-displaced populations to provide a primer on the extent of wartime displacement in Lebanon. Section 4.3 introduces the eastern and southern suburbs. It examines the role of displacement in creating political change and restructuring networks in the two areas, across three periods—before the war, during the war, and after the war. The sources used for the analysis include the rich secondary historical literature as well as some material from 30 in-depth semi-structured interview with traditional local elites and politicians in the two sets of suburbs (see Chapter 5 for details on methodology). The final section concludes.

4.2 Wartime Displacement in Lebanon

Displacement during the Lebanese civil war was a widespread phenomenon. Theodor Hanf, a historian of the civil war, estimates that one third of the Lebanese population had to flee at least once during the war but was able to eventually return. Another third of the population was expelled or forced to flee with little possibility of return (Hanf, 1993). The best available source of insights about displaced households is the Canadian International Development Research Centre and the Beirut Institute for the Study of the Social Sciences’s survey of Lebanese households (Kasparian and Beaudoin, 1992). The survey is a nationally representative survey of 50,000-households conducted during the war in 1987. The survey focuses on displacement and household conditions. It contains information about patterns of displacement, the socioeconomic characteristics of the displaced, and the types of assistance that households received during the war.

While the survey does not take into account the last several years of the war, in which displacement continued at high rates, it does help situate the southern and eastern suburbs
in a general context. In the entire sample, 20.3% of Lebanese households were displaced. This figure was 25.9% of households in the eastern suburbs and 28.6% of households in the southern suburbs. Unsurprisingly, the survey demonstrates that displacement was most prevalent in central Beirut, around the Green Line which separated Muslim west Beirut and Christian east Beirut during the war. West and east Beirut proper housed the second and third largest percentages of displaced households. The southern and eastern suburbs were fourth and fifth, followed by the rest of Lebanon’s regions. Among the displaced living in the eastern suburbs in 1987, the largest number of displaced households in the sample had come from the southern suburbs, followed by areas within Beirut itself. This was similar but reversed in the southern suburbs, where the largest numbers of displaced had come from the eastern suburbs, followed by Beirut and then the south. Similar patterns in other regions give additional evidence for a widespread sectarian sorting of the population along Muslim and Christian lines. In general, displaced households were more socioeconomically similar to non-displaced households than one would expect, though they did face economic challenges that were related to their situation as uprooted populations. (Kasparian and Beaudoin, 1992) However, the lack of large socioeconomic differences between the displaced and the non-displaced provides confirmation that displacement during the war was political and identity-based rather than an economic phenomenon.

The survey results indicate that the eastern suburbs received cash, housing, medical, education, and in-kind aid at rates that were similar to the national average. This aid came from international governmental and non-government organizations, religious charities and nonprofits, neighboring countries, political parties, and armed groups. In the southern suburbs, the distribution of aid was more prevalent, particularly cash, medical, and in-kind aid. This may partly be due to international efforts that specifically targeted the doubly-displaced and particularly vulnerable Palestinian refugee populations that were gathering in the southern

---

3The large discrepancy between the survey results and Hanf’s figure could be due to a combination of several reasons. First, the survey took place in 1987 and the last years of the war continued to have high rates of displacement. Most likely, respondents who were briefly or temporarily displaced did not recognize themselves as such. Finally, the survey enumerators may have had a more difficult time accessing populations who were still transient or in the midst of displacement.
suburbs during the war. In both the eastern and southern suburbs, displaced households overwhelmingly stated parents and relatives (74.3% in the eastern suburbs and 79.3% in the southern suburbs) as their first resort for assistance in times of trouble. Friends, local notables, religious figures, political parties/armed groups, and civil society organizations were the first line of defense for very few respondents, although they may have been a popular second choice, something the survey results are unable to verify. The responses in the southern and eastern suburbs are very similar to national averages (Kasparian and Beaudoin, 1992).

4.3 Political Change in Suburban Beirut

Before delving into the detailed historical accounts and the content of interviews, I first provide a summary of the central findings. The southern suburbs of Beirut, now collectively called Dahiyeh (which literally means “the suburb”), had many pre-war characteristics in common with the eastern suburbs of Beirut (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2 for maps of study areas). Both areas were once clusters of small villages, hosed Palestinian refugee camps in the pre-war era, came under the control of armed groups during the war, experienced displacement of some pre-war residents early in the war as well as massive resettlements of displaced populations from other parts of the country. As the war progressed and armed groups became increasingly sectarian rather than ideological, this pattern of demographic change along religious lines intensified and reinforced itself. Since the end of the war, both areas have become large politically and economically important suburbs with a population that is overwhelmingly not originally from the area.

The major difference between them is that the southern suburbs came under control of Hezbollah in the last phase of the war. It’s close relationship with Iran and Syria made Hezbollah a clear beneficiary of the final outcome of the war. In the last phase of the war, the eastern suburbs were under the control of the remaining faction of the Lebanese Army, led by Michel Aoun. The armed group was militarily defeated by the Syrian Army at the end of the civil war and its followers were repressed, with Aoun exiled to France. The consequences

4Underlying map from Hiro (1993).
of this difference for local politics are addressed in Chapter 5.

In this chapter, I compare the current relationships of original and resettled residents to armed groups-turned-parties as well as to traditional local elites. I find that in both areas, many local elites from families that were influential before the war are still getting elected to municipal councils due to the fact that the voter base has remained relatively unchanged from the pre-war years. In most cases, the “original” residents are the only ones able to vote in the municipalities where they live. The vast majority of “new” residents are not able to vote in the municipalities where they settled during the war. Given the “original” residents’ ties and familiarity with local pre-war elite families, the relatively high degree of familial continuity in municipal office holders in both areas is therefore unsurprising.
In contrast to these “original” residents, the “new” residents have little historical attachment to the local pre-war political families and their networks. Overall, “new” residents are more likely to support the national-level sectarian parties who are the post-war manifestations of wartime armed groups. With no formal or institutionalized voice in municipal politics in the localities where they live, “new” residents use two informal methods to influence their local government bodies. First, they use their economic power as the primary business owners, taxpayers, and engines of economic growth in the area to induce responsiveness from local leaders. In this sense, wealthier “new” residents are considerably more advantaged that their less well off counterparts. Second, they use direct appeals to the national parties to informally pressure and influence the municipal councils in the locality where they live. While they may have no formal influence in local politics where they live, the displaced “new” residents are often able to return to their hometowns to vote in parliamentary elections, making them a valuable constituency to national-level parties.
4.3.1 Before the War

In this section, I discuss and compare the political, economic, and social situations in the southern and eastern suburbs before the war. Both were clusters of villages with relatively small populations. Their proximity to the capital city and to many employment opportunities made them attractive sites for migrants who had begun relocating from rural areas starting in the 1950s and 1960s but who could not afford to live in the city of Beirut itself (Hanf, 1993). Even before the demographic changes brought about by the civil war, these areas were already the site of significant development and population growth as manufacturing expanded and rural-urban migration increased. It is important, however, to distinguish this first major wave of in-migration to Beirut’s suburbs from later war-induced migration. This first wave was primarily a product of economic rather than security considerations. This first group of migrants integrated into their receiving communities rather seamlessly, perhaps because of the gradual process by which they came to settle in these areas. They also produced few changes in the local politics of their receiving communities. This is in contrast to the more sudden demographic changes brought about by the war, which had profound impacts on local economic and political life. During the years between independence in 1943 and the civil war’s beginning in 1975, local politics was still controlled by traditional notable families. However, starting in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Palestinian and Lebanese Christian groups had begun to mobilize outside of formal political institutions in both areas, making armed confrontations a more frequent occurrence in the months immediately preceding the outbreak of the civil war.

4.3.1.1 The Southern Suburbs

During the 1950s, the southern suburbs of Ghobeiri, Mreijeh, Burj al-Barajne, and Haret Hreik were a cluster of small villages with a few thousand residents living in each one. During this period, this area was known as the south Metn coast, a region with many single family homes, wide open spaces, and fruit orchards. These villages were tight-knit farming communities with predominantly agricultural economies. The southern suburbs of Beirut
were a religiously mixed area. Of the four municipal areas I focus on in this study, Burj al Barajne and Ghobeiri were predominantly Shia Muslim\(^5\) with small Christian minorities of roughly 10% and 5% respectively (Hartmann, 1980). In contrast, Mreijeh was a predominantly Christian village and Haret Hreik was roughly 80% Christian and 20% Shia Muslim (Hartmann, 1980). This religious breakdown was reflected in the municipal councils’ membership. In Haret Hreik, for example, nine of the twelve municipal council seats were held by Christians and three were held by Muslims.\(^6\) There is a historical reason for why none of the municipalities in the area are fully mixed with half Christian and half Muslims residents, despite the area’s apparent religious diversity. This is not due to residents making explicit choices about where to live. On the contrary, this was by government design. In Lebanon’s consociational sectarian system, post-independence presidents and parliamentarians wanted to more easily claim credit for services they provided to their particular sectarian community. To better accomplish this, they divided areas into more or less homogenous municipalities. This is why Haret Hreik and Burj al-Barajne were split into two smaller mostly Christian or mostly Muslim municipalities instead of combined into one larger mixed municipality.\(^7\)

In contrast to this elite preoccupation with sectarian credit-claiming, several respondents noted how Christians and Muslims coexisted peacefully and lived integrated social lives. Muslims and Christians attended each others’ socially and culturally important occasions, such as weddings and funerals.\(^8\) People’s lives were extremely intertwined, with intermarriages between Syrians, Shia, and Christian residents.\(^9\) In 1948, two important Palestinian refugee camps, Shatila and Burj al-Barajneh (named after the adjacent neighborhood) were established on land within and adjacent to these suburbs. The relationship between refugees and residents of the area was a relatively harmonious one for many years.

In the early 1960s, the suburbs began to grow as a result of a first wave of economically-

\(^5\)Interview #18  
\(^6\)Interview #43  
\(^7\)Interview #08  
\(^8\)Interview #47  
\(^9\)Interview #08
driven migration. This occurred when a port and airport were built in the area. Large companies started building factories in the area due to its proximity to Beirut. This economic development led to the first significant wave of migration, particularly from underdeveloped and marginalized rural Shia-majority areas in the south and the Bekaa valley. It was also around this time that the Shia Lebanese diaspora in West Africa began reinvesting in Lebanese industry and sending remittances to their families and communities, creating more opportunities for Shia coming from rural areas in the south. The original residents benefited from this influx, as they were able to subdivide their land and sell it as smaller plots on which housing for the newcomers was built. Most of the newcomers intermarried and integrated with the local population, even assimilating some distinctly Beirut-style religious traditions and modes of dress. This first wave of migrants was an economic boon to the area and did not have any discernible impact on the locality’s political life.

The municipal and local political life of the southern suburbs were controlled by political elites from traditionally influential local families. These local families held positions in the municipal councils and provided constituency services to clients residing within their village by maintaining and nurturing relationships with national-level political patrons. These connections to elites in the capital city created economic opportunities for the residents of the southern suburbs that were not available in more rural and marginalized areas far from Beirut. Interestingly, the relationships of local leaders were with the Christian national-level parties that competed in parliamentary elections for control over the larger electoral district containing the southern suburbs. This was true even among local Shia leaders. These pre-war parties—the Phalangists led by the Gemayel family, the National Liberal Party (NLP) led by the Chamoun family, and the National Bloc led by Raymond Edde—were part and parcel of the consociational establishment and were organized around the political goals and ambitions of national-level political families that had been prominent players in the transition.

---

10 Interview #45
11 Interview #18
12 Interview #18
13 Interview #18 and #43
towards independence.

In elections to fill Shia-allocated parliamentary seats that represented this area, all candidates would be backed by one of the Christian groups that competed for political power at the national level. This meant that whoever won was implementing the political agenda of the Christian-led group they were affiliated with. In return, they were able to access resources and influence that allowed them to provide constituency services and build a local clientele. While local elite Shia families were autonomous at the municipal level, their participation in this arrangement with Christian politicians was key to their ability to win parliamentary elections. This is why many local Shia leaders were members of what are traditionally thought of as Christian parties. This state of affairs persisted until the early 1970s and was partly due to the fact that the Lebanese Shia community had not yet been mobilized in any collective way. However many Shia and Christians in the area were sympathetic to secular organizations such as the Communist Party and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party which were contesting the sectarian system and establishment elites in Lebanon (Hanf, 1993).

In the late 1960s, regional political developments disrupted the status quo in the southern suburbs. After the Arab-Israeli 1967 war, a further wave of Palestinian refugees settled into the camps established across Lebanon, including Shatila and Burj al-Barajneh. Two years later, the 1969 Cairo Agreement removed Palestinian refugee camps from the jurisdiction of the Lebanese Army and placed them under the control of the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command (Hanf, 1993). Palestinian guerillas were permitted to use Lebanon as a base for operations against Israel and Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon were now free to support the armed struggle. The changes brought about by the Cairo Agreement in 1969 transformed the camps from civilian settlements into sites of political and armed mobilization by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and other Palestinian armed groups. By 1972, the PLO had recovered from its losses in Jordan in 1970 and regrouped in Lebanon. It was at this time that the Palestinian armed presence became the all-important factor on the

---

14 Interview #18
15 Interview #43
ground in the southern suburbs. During 1973 and 1974, the southern suburbs became the site of some of the first clashes between Palestinian armed groups and the Lebanese Army that preceded the beginning of the civil war.

After the first clash between the PLO and the Lebanese Army, the fighters residing in the camp of Burj al Barajne started to emerge from it, extending their activities into the neighboring areas, particularly Haret Hreik and the town of Burj al Barajne itself. They began arming their Lebanese leftist allies and young men from the neighborhoods who were sympathetic to their cause. One respondent explains how as a member of the Communist Party, he did a round of basic training with the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) in 1974 in Haret Hreik. Despite the DFLP’s relatively small size, it was conducting systematic training sessions for the Lebanese Communists. This suggest that much larger Palestinian organizations were likely conducting much more extensive training programs for Lebanese youth from the area.\(^\text{16}\)

At this point, polarization in the southern suburbs started to affect the lives of the entire population, not simply those who were active members of one of the political groups. Muslim residents sympathized with the Palestinians and the anti-establishment Leftist parties that were growing stronger due to their alliance with Palestinian armed groups. Christians largely sympathized with the Lebanese Army, although a minority from the community were supporters of leftist parties and were therefore pro-Palestinian. The polarization and militarization of these political groupings marks the beginning of political changes that would overtake the southern suburbs. One respondent explains that it is during this period, on the eve of the war, that the traditional pre-war structures governing political control in the suburbs were first overturned.\(^\text{17}\) The influence of the Palestinians and leftists grew at the expense of the traditional Shia and Christian local families, whose alliance with the Christian national elite was becoming increasingly untenable.

\(^{16}\) Interview #18

\(^{17}\) Interview #45
4.3.1.2 The Eastern Suburbs

After independence and into the 1950s, the eastern suburbs of Dekwaneh, Deir Mar Roukoz and Sinn el Fil were also part of a cluster of small villages mostly composed of single family homes, with each village containing no more than a few thousand residents. Most respondents remarked that during their childhoods, most of the land was covered with orchards, trees, and gardens. Residents of this area were predominantly Christians (Hartmann, 1980). There was a minority Sunni bedouin community that had come from Baalbek in the Bekaa valley seeking economic opportunity. In Dekwaneh, where this group was concentrated, one respondent estimates that Sunnis had about 450 votes out of the roughly 3000 (about 15%) pre-war registered voters in the municipality. The Sunnis had one allotted municipal council member and a mokhtar (see Chapter 5 for details on the role of mokhtar in municipal politics). However, Sunnis did not play a significant role in the political life of the area, which was dominated by Christian political actors. In 1948, two important Palestinian refugee camps, Jisr el Basha and Tal el-Zaatar were established on land within these suburbs. The relationship between refugees and residents of the area was a relatively calm and apolitical one for many years.

Just as in the southern suburbs, the population of the suburbs began to grow rapidly in the mid 1960s. People began moving to the area because of employment opportunities in the capital city. Many of these new residents, who were also mostly from Christian backgrounds, did not permanently settle in the area, but were school teachers, vocational school students, and wage employees who worked in the area on a seasonal basis while returning to their villages on breaks and holidays. A growing manufacturing sector also led to an influx of Syrian workers to the area in the early 1970s. Within the decade, the residential population of the suburbs had more than doubled.

In the eastern suburbs, pre-war local politics and positions on the municipal councils were controlled by a handful of influential families in each village. In Dekwaneh as in

---

18 Interview #38
19 Interview #50
other areas, the families informally agreed upon a system for apportioning seats on the municipal councils and for *mokhtar* positions.\(^{20}\) While local families maintained control over the municipal government, these families were also allied with and often members of the same national-level parties as local families in the southern suburbs. These parties were also the Phalangists, the NLP, and the National Bloc. This type of pre-war party, in which the organization is built around a family from the traditional elite, was not a nation-wide phenomenon, but largely restricted to the Christian and Druze communities.

At the local level, divisions between families seeking positions within the municipality were often organized along party lines, with families aligned with particular parties. However, there was diversity within families. It was possible for some members of a family to belong to national parties while others remained unaffiliated. In Dekwane during the 1952 municipal elections, the Phalangist-backed candidates narrowly won elections. However, in 1958, the Phalangist-affiliated candidates and the National Bloc-affiliated candidates formed a coalition and shared positions in the municipal government.\(^{21}\) In regards to the pre-war relationships between local families and parties, respondents explain that it was reciprocal in nature, with local families enjoying relative autonomy with regards to local decision-making. As for the pre-war “original” residents of the eastern suburbs, they had close ties with the local families but were also supporters of one of the three main Christian blocs, with the most popular in the area being the Phalangists.\(^{22}\)

In the late 1960s, the Cairo Agreement also disrupted the status quo in the eastern suburbs, leading Palestinian guerilla groups to begin training and mobilizing within the refugee camps. The Phalangists and NLP began mobilizing their military wings outside the formal political system to contest the rising power of Palestinian guerilla groups. Respondents (Christians) all identify the politicization of the camps at this time as a source of deep concern and insecurity for the majority-Christian residents of towns like Dekwaneh and Sinn el Fil. They frequently described the situation as one of being surrounded and threatened by an

\(^{20}\)Interview # 50

\(^{21}\)Interview # 51

\(^{22}\)Interview #41 and #51
increasingly armed and numerous Palestinian population. However, respondents were also quick to point out that the clashes that occurred in the suburbs in the immediate pre-war years were between Palestinian groups and the armed wings of Christian parties which were mobilizing outside of formal political institutions. These confrontations were not instigated or organized by local leaders involved in official municipal politics. This process of armed mobilization, which would culminate in civil war in 1975, left local pre-war elites increasingly powerless as armed actors grew in their ability to shape the future of these localities.

4.3.2 During the War

In this section, I describe the changing patterns of armed group control over the southern and eastern suburbs in successive phases of the war. Both areas experienced shifts in territorial control at several turning points during the war and were the sites of internecine conflict between armed groups on the same side of the macro-level cleavage. In the final phase of the war, both areas came under the consolidated control of one armed group. In the southern suburbs, this was Hezbollah. In the eastern suburbs, it was the Aounist faction of the Lebanese Army. At various points during the war, the consolidation of control by armed groups with particular political and sectarian identities precipitated the large-scale displacement of civilians, out of and into the two suburban areas. After outlining these territorial and demographic shifts, I discuss the ways that armed groups established ties with the populations under their control and provided assistance to the displaced. I also discuss other sources of assistance to the incoming displaced, the extent of their reliance on social networks as they transitioned to new residences, and the opportunities that this population change created for real estate developers who were well-poised to benefit from the increased demand for housing. Finally, I describe how the dominance of armed actors changed the role of local traditional political families and municipal councils during the war. On the whole, the southern and eastern suburbs, while controlled by different armed groups, experienced similar demographic, economic, and political transformations during the war.

23 Interview #38
4.3.2.1 The Southern Suburbs

Armed group control of the southern suburbs during the Lebanese civil war fluctuated greatly. Between 1975 and 1991, the area was successively under the control of Palestinian armed groups and their Lebanese leftist coalition partners in the National Movement, the Shia armed group Amal, and finally Hezbollah. Between each of these eras of armed group control, the southern suburbs spent significant periods as a contested territory, where groups that had previously controlled the neighborhoods fought those who were challenging their hold on the area. Each era of territorial control was accompanied by displacement out of and into the southern suburbs as armed groups consolidated control. Armed groups also sought to gain the cooperation and loyalty of populations under their control, sometimes by providing services and assistance, and other times through coercion.

On April 13, 1975, unidentified gunmen in a speeding car fired on a church in the eastern suburb of Ain el-Rummaneh, killing four people including two Phalangists. Later on the same day, Phalangists retaliated by killing thirty Palestinians traveling on a bus in Ain el-Rummaneh. These events are widely considered as the incidents that began the civil war, as they sparked clashes in several neighborhoods and suburbs of Beirut. Some of the first retaliations for the bus massacre were in the southern suburbs, where Palestinian armed groups exited the neighboring refugee camps and began targeting Christians living in Haret Hreik, burning several homes, shooting, and aiming to scare people away. This was the first instance of this kind of activity. Some Christians started to leave the area after these threats and the intermittent clashes that followed (Hamdan, 2013)

Three to four months after the beginning of the war, the National Movement (coalition of Lebanese leftist parties allied with Palestinian groups) and the Palestinians succeeded in making a more systematic and effective effort at taking over the area. This decisive taking of the territory encouraged a more large-scale “sorting” or segregation of the population, as many Christians, especially those that were active supporters of the Phalangists or the National Liberal Party, left in favor of areas controlled by Christian armed groups. Most of

---

24 interview #43
the Christians that left, one respondent estimates about 90-95%, did so of their own volition rather than being forced out. They were not specifically threatened but were seeking safety from an environment that felt generally insecure given their religious affiliation. At this point, many Christian residents of the southern suburbs anticipated a quick end to the fighting and an imminent return to their homes. However, the continuation of massacres and counter-massacres reinforced segregation and Christians realized that it was becoming increasingly difficult to return to the area. The persistence of this segregation then further solidified the control of the left over the southern suburbs. As evidence of this, several leftist parties opened party offices in the area and their armed wings began to operate and train in the open. Starting during this period and continuing through the late 1980s, as new waves of displaced persons arrived in the southern suburbs and the demand for housing increased, Christians came under intense pressure to sell their homes and property. However, respondents disagree concerning the degree of this coercion. They also disagree on the prices at which property was sold. Some state that Christians got fair prices for the property they left behind while others vehemently insisted that they were forced to sell at well below market prices.

This is the point at which, only a few months after the war began, the balance of power and influence in the southern suburbs shifted irrevocably. The influence of the traditional local families and the traditional party blocs led by Christian elites was replaced by that of the PLO and Leftist groups. People that remained in the area were forced to live under the control of these relatively new actors. As outsiders with fewer ties to the community, Palestinian groups were considerably more coercive than their Lebanese leftist allies in their interactions with the population. Many of the Communists operating in the southern suburbs, for example, had social or familial ties to the community. This factor, combined with the greater sectarian diversity of their members, tempered their interactions with residents. One respondent explains that the Communists used to distribute gasoline, flour and sugar to residents in their neighborhoods. They also set up neighborhood councils and attempted to take on the functions of a local government. Although imperfectly, these efforts filled in

---

25 Interview #47
a gaping void. Even in this early phase of the war, the Lebanese state’s institutions were beginning to fragment and divide. The military would formally collapse in 1976. At the local level in the southern suburbs, police officers stopped showing up for work, and some joined armed groups. The municipalities collapsed and Christian council members fled. The Muslim ones remained but were ineffectual. In the early stages of the war, they tried to perform municipal tasks like organizing trash collection, but eventually this became too difficult. Their ability to collect taxes was also severely compromised. Armed groups attempted to take on this tax collection role but did not have the resources to do this very effectively.26

During this same period, the southern suburbs experienced a war-induced wave of migration into the area. In contrast to more economically motivated and gradual migration in the pre-war period, Lebanese Muslims and Palestinians now flocked to the southern suburbs for security after fleeing neighborhoods in the eastern suburbs that had come under the control of right-wing Christian armed groups. This displacement was largely due to the siege of Nabaa and the razing of the Tal el-Zaatar Palestinian refugee camp, both of which were Muslim population centers in the eastern suburbs where Christian groups were now consolidating control.27 Some estimate that as many as 100,000 displaced persons settled in the southern suburbs during this initial phase of the war.28

There was little nearby open space for Muslims fleeing from east Beirut and its suburbs except for in the southern suburbs. When they arrived to the area, many of these displaced households first came to the Shia-majority towns of Burj al-Barajneh and Ghobeiri.29 Many also settled informally into homes left behind by Christian residents that had recently been displaced. The leftist parties occupied empty homes and made arrangements for their supporters that were coming from the east side.30 One respondent explained how Palestinian armed groups would buy a an entire residential street from Christians who were leaving

26Interview #18
27Interview #48
28Interview #42
29Interview #43
30Interview #18
the area. They would then informally build tall housing complexes to house the displaced Palestinians.\textsuperscript{31} This sudden population influx overwhelmed the existing infrastructure in the southern suburbs and created a situation in which “original” Muslim residents who had remained in the area were outnumbered by their newly arrived neighbors.\textsuperscript{32} The new demand for housing began the phenomenon of informal building that would soon characterize much of the southern suburbs. Many residents added extra floors to their existing homes to house newcomers. Open spaces, particularly in beach resort communities on the coastal outskirts of the suburbs, became the building sites for multi-story informal complexes. One respondent even describes how he and his staff housed displaced families in the beach cabins at the resort he managed. This solution was meant to be temporary and but many of these families continue to live in these beach cabins to this day.\textsuperscript{33} One respondent recounts how local government was powerless to stop this informal building, and often turned a blind eye to it. Police officers would encourage new arrivals to build on someone else’s property. After the building was completed, the officer would come back and require a bribe to remain quiet about the fact that the building was not built legally.\textsuperscript{34} In this way, the influx of displaced persons presented opportunities for profiteering. This urban sprawl and proliferation of informal development would continue throughout the war as successive waves of displaced populations sought refuge in the the area.

Despite this religiously-based displacement, it is important to note that at this point, the logic of the war was not completely sectarian but still had some ideological underpinnings. For instance, Christians that were members of leftist parties remained in the southern suburbs and were joined by Christian leftists fleeing areas that had come under the control of the Lebanese Front (coalition of Lebanese right-wing parties led by the Phalangists and NLP). The Lebanese leftist parties coordinated with their Palestinian coalition partners to

\textsuperscript{31} Interview #08
\textsuperscript{32} Interview #18
\textsuperscript{33} Interview #47
\textsuperscript{34} Interview #42
ensure that Christian leftists were protected in the area.  

Beginning in 1977, Harakat Amal, the armed wing of the Shia-led Movement of the Dispossessed, emerged as an increasingly important armed group in the southern suburbs that contested the National Movement’s control over the area. In the pre-war years, the Movement of the Dispossessed, led by charismatic cleric Musa al-Sadr, had begun calling for reforms to the sectarian Lebanese system with an eye towards redressing the grievances of Shia Lebanese, a group that had long been marginalized in terms of effective political representation in national politics. Amal had kept a low profile during the first two years of the civil war. However, as Amal’s foreign patron, Syria, entered the civil war, the group was empowered to contest the leftist and Palestinian control over the southern suburbs. Amal’s distinctly Shia and sectarian discourse successfully capitalized on the frustrations of a disillusioned Shia-majority population that was growing weary of daily life under the control of Palestinian and leftist groups. Amal began arming supporters and opening offices in the area. Clashes between Amal and National Movement coalition members began in earnest in 1979 and continued until the Israeli invasion in 1982. Residents living in the southern suburbs recall this period of contestation as one of the worst of the war, as the neighborhoods of the area became a checkerboard of control, alternating between the Communists in the National Movement and Amal. The advent of Amal as a central player in the southern suburbs also marks a turning point, after which the Syrian military exercised a great deal of influence over the area, sometimes directly, and sometimes through Amal, its most prominent client. One respondent recounts Syrian soldiers putting extraordinary pressure on civilians to pledge their allegiance to Amal.  

In 1982, the Israeli invasion completely changed the facts on the ground. Israel was the foreign patron of the Phalangists, and for a brief moment, the Israeli invasion of Beirut dramatically empowered the right-wing Christian groups and brought the National Movement, the Palestinians, and Amal together to fight against a Phalangist assault on the southern

\[35\text{Interview #18}\]
\[36\text{Interview #18}\]
\[37\text{Interview #42}\]
suburbs. In this moment, the war became irreversibly sectarian. Around 1983, Amal no longer recognized Christian leftists as protected populations in the southern suburbs. Many Christians chose to leave the area at this point. Several respondents insist that people were never forcibly removed from the area. Yet they simultaneously admit that the few that chose to remain were often pressured and threatened. One respondent recounts an incident in which a local Christian doctor who a leftist supporter tried to create an association that encouraged Christians to remain in the area. The doctor soon disappeared. His body was found 40 days later thrown into a landfill, bearing signs of torture.\(^{38}\) The traditionally Christian neighborhood of Mreijeh was also burned and virtually all the remaining Christians left the southern suburbs. This wave of displacement consisted of over a thousand households that had remained in the area up until this point.\(^{39}\)

Israeli incursions into southern Lebanon, culminating with the invasion of 1982, brought yet another wave of displaced persons to the southern suburbs. This time, the displaced were mostly Shia from southern Lebanon, some of whom already had pre-war social networks connecting them to earlier waves of migrants that had come to the suburbs from the south in the pre-war years. These ties as well as the presence of Amal in the area made the southern suburbs a natural destination for those fleeing from the south.\(^{40}\) The displaced southern Shia grew to outnumber the Palestinians that had been displaced from the eastern suburbs in the first year of the war.

When asked if these displaced persons received any organized assistance once they arrived in the southern suburbs, all respondents explained that there was no systematic effort or partisan process for assisting these households. Instead, efforts to help the displaced were largely on an ad-hoc basis. Besides the sudden displacements in the first few months of the war, successive waves of people usually came to the area with the help and support of relatives or friends, and over time opened small businesses throughout the community.\(^{41}\)

\(^{38}\) Interview #42

\(^{39}\) Interview #49

\(^{40}\) Interview #45

\(^{41}\) Interview #48
Others would be connected by their neighbors or local schools with foundations and charities working in their neighborhood. These included groups like Karitas (Catholic charity), the Organization of Churches in the Middle East, and development agencies funded by the European Union. Some provided aid to schools, others provided donations of clothes, shoes, and books to families directly. One respondent explains how the school where he worked collaborated with UNICEF and other international organizations in the distribution of health and social services. They also began a program for youth that were unable to finish school because they were frequently going back and forth between the southern suburbs and their home regions, where they would return when there were episodes of calm. This program provided courses in construction work, plumbing installation, painting, interior design, and tiling that were useful in the housing boom that was taking place.\footnote{Interview #42} Several respondents also recall a one-time disbursements of aid that came from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.\footnote{Interview #49} In terms of assistance by armed groups, several respondents note that this was not a widespread phenomenon. However, armed groups did provide in significant and systematic ways for their combatants’ families, arranging housing for them as they arrived and distributing salaries to fighters. They also provided monthly assistance to retired or disabled members of the group.\footnote{Interview #47} The members of the organization that consistently received benefits from armed groups during the war would often become party activists in the post-war era. In this way, wartime service provision to core supporters created local-level networks that could be mobilized in the post-war era.

In addition to precipitating these demographic changes, the Israeli invasion all but destroyed the Palestinian groups and severely weakened all Muslim armed groups, including Amal and the National Movement. However, when the Palestinian organizations attempted to regroup in the refugee camps of the southern suburbs, the Syrian regime used Amal to contain them in order to prevent another Israeli intervention. The ensuing struggle displaced many Palestinians that had settled into formerly Christian areas during the first year of the...
war. The informal construction that housed these displaced Palestinians then became housing for the steady stream of Shia Lebanese displaced by fighting in the south. The same neighborhood experienced several stages of demographic transformation, with the final displacement resulting in the southern suburbs being inhabited overwhelmingly by a population that was Shia and displaced from the south and the Bekaa valley.\textsuperscript{45}

The weakening of the armed groups that controlled Dahiyeh before the Israeli invasion created an opening for Hezbollah, which began to emerge as as a new actor in the southern suburbs in 1984. Hezbollah had formed in the wake of the Israeli invasion as a Shia force for resisting the occupation of Shia-majority southern Lebanon. However, its emergence cannot be understood apart from the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The revolutionary regime in Iran provided the ideological framework, training, and financial and material support for the establishment of Hezbollah. Members of Amal in the southern suburbs that were more religious began to leave the organization in favor of Hezbollah. Hezbollah also went to great lengths to spread its ideology among the residents of the southern suburbs, many of whom were now southern Shia that had been displaced into the area by the Israeli invasion. One respondent recalls that Islamic revolutionary slogans began appearing on walls throughout the area, including most famously, ones such as “your hijab, my sister, is more valuable than my blood” that called residents to a new lifestyle.\textsuperscript{46} Just as Amal had done a few years before, Hezbollah capitalized on the population’s weariness and unhappiness under an Amal militia that had become notorious for the mistreatment of civilians. Many people perceived Hezbollah to be a “clean” actor, uninvolved in the excesses of the internecine warfare that plagued the southern suburbs in the first years of the 1980s.\textsuperscript{47} From 1984 onward, Hezbollah began slowly building a base of support and establishing a military presence in the southern suburbs. Despite the fact that Amal and Palestinian groups were still vying for control of the area, Hezbollah was working diligently under the surface. Hezbollah began building networks within the population, providing security, education, health care, and social services. It also

\textsuperscript{45} Interview #17
\textsuperscript{46} Interview #18
\textsuperscript{47} Interview #18
invested in co-opting leaders of families.\footnote{Interview #17}

In 1988, conflict between Iran and Syria over control of the Shia community in Lebanon, a group with great strategic importance for gaining leverage against Israel, played out as a conflict between the Syrian-backed Amal and the Iranian-backed Hezbollah in the southern suburbs. Amal was no match for the well-funded and organized Hezbollah, which took control of most of the southern suburbs in a few days. Observers remark that Hezbollah’s support among the population was crucial in precipitating this collapse of Amal control.\footnote{Interview #18} The Syrian Army ensured that Amal remained in control of two neighborhoods, but Hezbollah took the rest. From 1988 to the end of the civil war in 1991, Hezbollah remained in control of the southern suburbs. Chapter 5 describes Hezbollah’s position in the final outcome of the war.

4.3.2.2 The Eastern Suburbs

During the first half of the Lebanese civil war, from 1975 until the Israeli invasion of 1982, the eastern suburbs were under the control of the right-wing Christian groups that formed the Lebanese Front coalition, most prominently including the Phalangists and the NLP. After the Israeli invasion, the area was occupied by the Israeli military as it sought to encircle west Beirut and the Palestinian groups operating from that part of the city. After the Israeli military withdrew to southern Lebanon, the eastern suburbs came under the control of the remaining faction of the Lebanese Army. However, the Lebanese Forces, which begun as the military wing of the Phalangist party but by 1984 were a politically separate entity under new leadership, controlled much of the Christian heartland and contested the Army’s control of the eastern suburbs of Beirut. This struggle for full control over Christian populated regions led to a stalemate in early 1989 in which the eastern suburbs remained under the control of the Lebanese Army. Even as the intra-Christian conflict continued, the eastern suburbs remained with the Aounist faction of the Lebanese Army until his defeat by the Syrian Army in October 1990. Each era of territorial control was accompanied by displacement out of and
into the eastern suburbs as armed groups consolidated control. Armed groups also sought to gain the cooperation and loyalty of populations under their control, sometimes by providing services and assistance, and other times through coercion.

In the first few months of the civil war, the Lebanese Front took control of much of the eastern suburbs of Beirut. The Lebanese Front was a coalition of right-wing, predominantly Christian, nationalist armed groups. The two most prominent members of the coalition and those that were most active in the eastern suburbs were the military wings of the Phalangist party and the National Liberal Party’s Tiger militia, groups that were actively mobilizing against the Palestinian presence in Lebanon in the pre-war period. The small Lebanese Sunni and Shia minorities living in the eastern suburbs left the area early in the war, fleeing to safety in Muslim-majority areas in Beirut and its suburbs. However, the existence of Palestinian camps in Tal el Zaatar near Dekwane and in Jisr el Basha meant that Palestinian armed groups continued to have bases of operation within the Lebanese Front’s area of control. This armed presence presented a barrier to the Lebanese Front’s consolidation of control over the eastern suburbs. Despite frequent attacks and shelling, the camps did not capitulate until 1976. In the summer of 1976, Christian armed groups surrounded and besieged the camp of Tal el-Zaatar. The siege lasted from June until August, until the camp was overtaken and destroyed. Heavy civilian casualties ensued and the camp was razed to prevent the return of Palestinians to the area. The Jisr el Basha camp had been similarly destroyed earlier that summer. Most of these Palestinian refugees were resettled in areas under leftist or Palestinian armed group control, particularly in empty neighborhoods that Christians had left, as well as in other refugee camps on the western and southern side of Beirut.

The destruction of the Palestinian camps, in addition to the eastern suburbs’ proximity to Beirut and the availability of large tracts of undeveloped land in the area made the eastern suburbs an attractive destination for displaced Christians fleeing the southern and western parts of Beirut. The people who owned this open land in the eastern suburbs benefited

---

50 Interview #37
51 Interview # 41
52 Interview #50, #52
greatly from this increasing demand for housing. In the years immediately preceding the war, Christian Lebanese feared living in the neighborhoods immediately adjacent to the refugee camps. Real estate speculators bought this land very cheaply. When the Palestinians were cleansed out of the area, they build tall apartment buildings and sold them to newly arrived Christians. One respondent states that these developers bought the land at around 100 Lebanese Pounds per square meter. After the destruction of the camps and the influx of Christian displaced persons, the value of the land jumped to about 2000 Lebanese Pounds per square meter. These developers began building and selling rapidly. The trend continued and reached its height in the early to mid 1980s during the “War of the Mountains,” when Christians that were cleansed out of Druze-held areas sought refuge in the eastern suburbs. Many “original” residents of the eastern suburbs tore down their single family homes and built multiple story building to house relatives coming from other areas. Other residents subdivided their land holdings and sold them to the displaced Christians who were fleeing into the area for security. One respondent, in describing this process of rapid and unplanned development in Jisr el Basha, mentions how their father was tempted to sell even the plot that contained the family’s house until their mother convinced him to keep it. Just as in the southern suburbs, much of this new development in the eastern suburbs was of an informal nature.

When asked if these displaced persons received any organized assistance once they arrived in the eastern suburbs, all respondents also explained that there was no systematic effort or partisan process for assisting the vast majority of households. In the first months of the war, when displacement was sudden and completely unexpected, religious organizations were the most active in providing assistance. The local convents opened their doors and gave people temporary shelter as they searched for longer-term solutions. In fact, as the war progressed, the convent of Mar Roukoz began renting out part of the convent lands to residents. As the

---

53 Interview #50
54 Interview #05
55 Interview #03
56 Interview #51
demand outpaced the availability of lands, the convent filled and leveled lands that were part of its historical endowment and sold this land to the new arrivals.\textsuperscript{57} Catholic charities such as the Mar Mansour Foundation and Karitas were very active in providing aid in the eastern suburbs, particularly during the first decade of the war.\textsuperscript{58} Just as in the southern suburbs, respondents in the eastern suburbs also recall the one-time disbursement of aid by Saudi Arabia, in which each household received a box of food items.\textsuperscript{59} However, all respondents agree that the vast majority of the displaced persons, particularly those that came gradually in later years, ended up making the move to the eastern suburbs on their own or through the assistance of familial or friendship networks. One respondent estimates that about 70\% of the displaced received assistance from family, friends, or non-profit foundations when they first settled in the eastern suburbs, while about 30\% were financially secure enough to make the move without any assistance.\textsuperscript{60}

Despite this heavy reliance on social networks, health care was an important domain in which there was organized assistance, for the displaced and “original” residents alike. The municipality, armed groups like the Phalangists and later the Lebanese Forces, and even privately wealthy Lebanese such as the Hariri family operated clinics where any resident of the eastern suburbs could seek medical attention.\textsuperscript{61} However this generalized medical care was distinct from the way that armed groups treated their actual members. All respondents agree that armed groups like the Phalangists and NLP Tigers did not provide any actual aid or systematic assistance to the displaced. However, they did generously provide for actual members of the organization and the families of fighters that were displaced into the area. This included salaries for fighters, cash aid, and assistance in finding employment and housing for these displaced core supporters.\textsuperscript{62} Just as in the southern suburbs, this generous

\textsuperscript{57}Interview #37

\textsuperscript{58}Interview #50, #51

\textsuperscript{59}Interview #41

\textsuperscript{60}Interview #50

\textsuperscript{61}Interview #41, #51

\textsuperscript{62}Interview #41, #50
support of their core members allows armed groups to build local-level networks that have the potential to be repurposed and mobilized for peaceful political activity and grassroots organizing in the post-war era.

In terms of the role of traditional local elites, the situation in the eastern suburbs initially contrasted with that of the southern suburbs because local leaders continued to play an important role, at least for a time. Unlike the Muslim-majority and leftist parties which were mobilizing against the traditional elite in the pre-war period, the Christian-majority and right-wing parties were often led by members of traditional families. Many national-level political families became enmeshed in and inseparable from the armed groups and parties that they organized. However, it is important to note that this was not true of all the Christian political families. Those that did not militarize with the onset of the civil war saw their power and relevance rapidly diminish. At the local level in the eastern suburbs, local political families still played an important role in the early years of the civil war if they chose to cooperate with armed groups. Many local families were put in charge of watching and protecting specific streets and neighborhoods. In these early years of the war, the families were important building blocs of the right-wing armed groups. This participation of local families and the popular sympathy for right-wing groups among the Christian population allowed the Lebanese Front to rapidly gain control of the eastern suburbs.

However, as the war progressed, several important developments diminished the power of traditional families, both at the national and at the local level in the eastern suburbs. The first was the increasing professionalization of armed groups. Instead of volunteer fighters from the local neighborhood, armed groups were increasingly composed of salaried full-time fighters. This shifted power away from local political families that had contributed to the initial war effort towards a relatively new cadre of combatants from generally lower middle or working class backgrounds. For example, one respondent remembers that the Phalangists’ militia members in the earliest days of the war were bourgeois, many of them young law students and graduate students who were ideologically committed to the party’s goals and

63 Interview #17
64 Interview #03
would bring their books to study as they manned neighborhood checkpoints. As the war dragged on, these early volunteers were replaced by salaried fighters from a less privileged economic background.\textsuperscript{65}

A second and related development was the violent consolidation of the armed groups in the Lebanese Front by Bashir Gemayel, the leader of the most powerful armed group in the coalition, the Phalangists’ armed wing. Until 1980, the Lebanese Forces were simply the umbrella organization subsuming all the armed groups that composed the Lebanese Front. After this forced unification, the Lebanese Forces became a single armed organization under Gemayel’s leadership. In the process of this consolidation, Gemayel had to silence many of the traditional familial voices that had held important roles in individual militias.\textsuperscript{66} From this point forward, the role of traditional local families was greatly diminished, making the situation similar to that in the southern suburbs. One respondent from a prominent local family in the eastern suburbs explains how “gangsters” essentially ran the neighborhood. Using guns as their currency, they effectively silenced those who had traditionally participated in shaping the community.\textsuperscript{67}

In 1982, Israel invaded Beirut in an effort to neutralize the PLO. In the process of laying siege to west Beirut, the Israeli military occupied east Beirut and its suburbs. Israel was allied with the Lebanese Forces and hoped to destroy the PLO and install a pro-Israeli government led by Bashir Gemayel. However, when Gemayel was assassinated a month after being elected president in August 1982, the Lebanese Forces, with the support of the Israeli military, besieged and brutally massacred Palestinian civilians in the Shatila refugee camp. The international and domestic outcry in Israel made the Israeli position in Lebanon increasingly untenable. The Israeli military withdrew from Beirut and surrounding areas in September 1982.

In late 1982 and early 1983, a new Lebanese government, led by Bashir Gemayel’s

\textsuperscript{65}Interview #03
\textsuperscript{66}Interview #03
\textsuperscript{67}Interview #51
brother, sought to reassert its control over the capital city and reached an agreement with the Lebanese Forces to deploy the army into east Beirut and the eastern suburbs. By March 7, 1983, what remained of Lebanese Army consolidated control over the eastern suburbs of Beirut (Hiro, 1993). Tensions between the government on the one hand, who were supported by the Phalangist elite and the party leadership, and Lebanese Forces militia increased as their interests diverged. This was magnified by class differences between the Gemayels and their supporters and the rank and file of the Lebanese Forces, which were predominantly lower middle class and working class.

In early 1985, Samir Geagea, a Lebanese Forces commander from a similar background as his militiamen, led a mutiny that effectively separated the Phalangists, who were now greatly weakened, from the Lebanese Forces (Hiro, 1993). By this point, the most important Christian armed actors, the Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese Army, were controlled by Geagea and Aoun respectively. Unlike the leaders of Christian armed groups in the first half of the civil war, these new leaders had forged their careers during the conflict and were unaffiliated with the traditional families that had previously dominated national-level Christian politics as well as local politics in the eastern suburbs (Hanf, 1993).

The Israeli military’s relatively sudden withdrawal back to southern Lebanon in September 1982 had other indirect consequences for the eastern suburbs. At this time, the Israeli presence had allowed the Lebanese Forces to contest the Progressive Socialist Party’s (Druze armed group that had been allied with the Palestinians) control over the Shouf mountains, an area that was roughly half Druze and half Christian. The Israeli withdrawal left the Lebanese Forces in a comprising position and eventually resulted in the cleansing and fleeing en masse of the Christians of the Shouf (Hiro, 1993). Many of these displaced persons settled in the eastern suburbs, adding another layer of new arrivals to the first wave of displaced persons from west Beirut and the southern suburbs. These were also joined by “Christians of the periphery” gradually coming from the Bekaa, the north, and the south to settle in the eastern suburbs.68 Most of the displaced chose the particular neighborhood in which

---

68Interview #50
they settled based on existing connections with extended family or friends that could help smooth the transition.⁶⁹ These developments mirrored a similar demographic explosion that was occurring in the southern suburbs as Shia fled the south during the Israeli invasion. The Lebanese Army led by Aoun remained in control of the eastern suburbs most of the remainder of the civil war, even though the Army’s control would be contested by the Lebanese Forces in the last years of the war. Chapter 5 discussed Aoun’s position in the final outcome of the war.

4.3.3 After the War

In both the southern and eastern suburbs, the end of the war cemented the demographic dominance of residents who were displaced into the areas during the conflict. As a population that came to the area seeking the safety that controlling armed groups could offer, but with little connection to the traditional families that controlled pre-war local politics, the displaced “new” residents have different political preferences and ties than the “original” residents. More specifically, “new” residents seem on average to be more likely to support armed groups-turned-parties. Furthermore, because it is generally very difficult to change voter registration in Lebanon, “new” residents must vote in the towns where they are originally from rather than where they currently live. This disenfranchisement in their new neighborhoods further strengthens the link between “new” residents and armed groups-turned-parties. Parties provide an indirect and informal channel through which “new” residents can influence and make demands on their local municipality. These “new” residents provide votes for the parties by returning to the places they are originally from to vote for party candidates in elections. The effect of these political ties of the “new” residents on the southern and eastern suburbs is to increase the overall role of armed groups-turned-parties in local politics.

⁶⁹Interview #41
4.3.3.1 Displacement and Local Politics

The displaced populations that bought land, built homes, and opened businesses, both in the south and the east of the city, became the primary drivers of economic development in the Beirut suburbs. This economic growth, coupled with the suburbs’ proximity to Beirut, fueled continued post-war economic migration into both areas. As the central downtown districts of Beirut became part of a controversial reconstruction effort, the displaced who were squatting in Beirut were compensated but compelled to leave. Many of these displaced households, usually Shia Muslims, made their way to the southern suburbs. Furthermore, continued conflict with Israel in occupied south Lebanon led to a constant stream of southern Shia fleeing into the southern suburbs of Beirut, where many of them already had relatives and social connections.\(^\text{70}\)

In both the southern and eastern suburbs, the massive influx of displaced persons over the course of the war and its aftermath resulted in a situation in which the number of residents who live and work in the area but have no voting rights in it far outnumber the “original” residents. This is due to the fact that in post-war Lebanon, the movement of voter registration from one place to another is severely restricted. While some families were able to move their registration to the new locations in which they now reside, this was a very limited phenomenon. By and large, citizens must vote in their town of origin, regardless of where they currently live. In the southern suburbs, several respondents estimate that the “original” residents who vote in the area make up no more than 10-15% of the resident population. For example, one respondent states that Burj al Barajneh’s pre-war population was about 10-15,000, whereas it now stands at roughly 150,000.\(^\text{71}\) These neighborhoods are remarkably homogenous in their sectarian makeup. One respondent estimates that the southern suburbs are 95% Muslim and only 2-3% Christian. Among the Muslim population, only 5-6% are Sunni and more than 90% are Shia. Of these Shia residents, 15% or so are “original” residents, while the rest are displaced populations, 30% from the Bekaa valley and

\(^{70}\)Interview #18

\(^{71}\)Interview #18
about 55% from the south. Furthermore, birthrates among the displaced are significantly higher than among original residents, even within the same religious community. This means that the proportion of residents able to vote in the area will likely diminish over time. In the eastern suburbs, the demographic situation is similar, except that Christians are the religious community that dominate the area. Only about 10-20% of the area are “original” residents. For example, in Dekwaneh, the resident population is between 80,000 and 100,000. However, there are only roughly 5000 eligible voters in the town. In Sin el Fil, one respondent estimates that about 80%-90% of the population are new residents who do not vote in the town. The eastern suburbs are about 90% Christian, with a minority of Muslims residents, most of whom are Syrians. Among the Christian majority, most are Maronite Catholic or Greek Orthodox. Demographically, the southern and eastern suburbs have both become homogenous areas dominated by “new” residents.

When asked about “original” and “new” residents, the majority of respondents were quick to point out that there were no substantial tensions between the two groups, explaining that while the groups occupy different formal positions vis-a-vis the municipality, the “new” residents still do have their voices heard. Respondents generally rejected the idea that there were any problems between two groups of residents and insisted that all were welcome in their neighborhoods. However, in more specific questions, some “original” residents expressed frustrations with the power of certain parties over their neighborhoods or the rapid and unplanned nature of development brought about by the newcomers. But they also recognized that the “new” residents had also generated greater economic development and more tax revenue for the area. Some “new” residents and those sympathetic to them felt that it was relatively more difficult for them to get things done in the municipality and that the notion of “new” and “original” implied that they were less a part of the neighborhood. Several respondents made statements clarifying after voicing a frustration, that they were

---

72 Interview #48
73 Interview #37
74 Interview #41, #50
75 Interview #37, #50
not frustrated with their neighbors, but with systems or parties. For the most part, it seemed that the two types of residents were relatively well-integrated into the community’s social and economic life. This is partly to be expected. In the highly polarized and sectarian environment that is post-war Lebanon, these distinctions between “new” and “original” residents from the same religious background (Shia in the southern suburbs and Christian in the eastern suburbs) are much less politicized that distinctions between different religious groups. When sect was a salient factor, such as when speaking with members of the tiny “original” Christian community remaining in the southern suburbs, or when speaking in the eastern suburbs about the rapid post-war return of the Lebanese Muslim minority that left the area during the war and the arrival of Syrians, more tension and resentment was evident in the respondents’ views of different residents.

In the southern suburbs, the relationship of “original” residents to the municipality depends on whether they still live in the area or not. In the two Shia municipalities of Burj al Barajneh and Ghobeiri, since the majority of the “original” residents were Shia Muslims, they remained in the area throughout the war. In these two areas, the “original” residents are very active in local politics and elections and their relationship with the municipality is direct and traditional, since they vote in the area. They also pay taxes in the municipality and receive services through it. In the eastern suburbs, the relationship of “original” residents, who are overwhelmingly Christian, to their municipal government is also a direct one, similar to that of Shia “original” residents of Burj al Barajneh and Ghobeiri in the southern suburbs. In contrast, the attachment of the Christian “original” residents to the municipalities of Mreijeh and Haret Hreik in the southern suburbs, where they were once the majority, is largely nominal and emotional. Christians have generally not returned to live in the area since the end of the war. Unlike their Shia counterparts or the Christian “original” residents in the eastern suburbs, they don’t pay taxes in the municipality or receive everyday services through it, and so their connection is limited. However, about 40% do return to vote, mostly so that they can vote for the Christian mokhtar, whom they still need to visit

---

76 Interview #50, #52
77 Interview #8
in order to notarize certain documents and legally register births, deaths, and marriages.\textsuperscript{78}

In both areas, the relationship between the “new” residents and the municipality is not a traditional one that operates through an electoral transaction. The only formal relationship between these residents and the municipal government is through taxation.\textsuperscript{79} Persons who own businesses and property in the locality are required to pay taxes to the municipality, regardless of whether they vote in the area or not. The sheer size of this non-voting population means that the municipal governments are dependent, in no insignificant part, on the financial success of businesses that are owned by “new” residents. This financial link provides a clear incentive for the municipality to encourage development and to be responsive to the business-owning class among the “new” residents so that they keep their factories and shops in the area.\textsuperscript{80} Of course, business owners and wealthier “new” residents can also influence politics more directly by making campaign contributions to candidates for local office.\textsuperscript{81} In return for their contribution to tax revenue, “new” residents are just as entitled as the voting residents of a municipality to benefit from any and all of its public services.\textsuperscript{82} “New” residents also benefit from employment opportunities offered through local government. While they cannot hold elected office in the municipality, “new” residents hold the majority of civil service and administration jobs, and perhaps more importantly, positions in the local police force.\textsuperscript{83} This means that while they have no formal influence in the municipality, the “new” residents are key to the implementation of local policies and the enforcement of law and order. The “new” residents also receive more passive benefits. Particularly in the first post-war decade, local governments helped them buy land, build houses, and start businesses by choosing not to obstruct their efforts with excessive red tape.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{78}Interview #43, #44, #46
\textsuperscript{79}Interview #08
\textsuperscript{80}Interview #41, #50
\textsuperscript{81}Interview #50
\textsuperscript{82}Interview #43, #49
\textsuperscript{83}Interview #44, #40
\textsuperscript{84}Interview #39
One of the central ways that “new” residents have voice and influence in both the southern and eastern suburbs is through their relationships to armed groups-turned-parties.\textsuperscript{85} The “original” residents have their links to the local families that were historically powerful in their neighborhood or town. In contrast, the “new” residents who were displaced into the suburbs during the war were often disconnected from local families and political life as it had operated in the pre-war era. Although only core members received systematic assistance from the parties, the internally displaced were more likely than other populations to be sympathetic toward and supportive of armed groups. Reasons for this support emerge from their wartime experience. As populations unmoored from their pre-war social and political networks, their vulnerability left them more open to the appeals of sectarian armed actors. Their experiences of victimization by opposing armed groups and of protection by co-religionist armed groups contributed to the greater politicization of this population. By keeping some displaced populations dependent on them and presenting themselves as their champions in the immediate post-war, armed groups were able to preserve this wartime links with this constituency. One of the most prominent examples is the Lebanese Forces’ heavy recruitment among internally displaced Christians that were cleansed out of the Shouf mountains and the southern city of Sidon in the latter part of the war.\textsuperscript{86} Historian Elizabeth Picard best describes this relationship in her work on the political economy of the Lebanese civil war:

Among Lebanon’s social groups, displaced populations were the most dependent on the militias, leaving them vulnerable to various forms of exploitation. So while displaced persons were provided with welfare support by militias, and were resettled in facilities the militias had either requisitioned (in the case of the Lebanese Forces) or forcibly and illegally appropriated (in the case of Amal), they were also kept in precarious conditions so that militias could appeal to charitable organizations for support and exploit the presence of these displaced populations

\textsuperscript{85}Interview #41, #43
\textsuperscript{86}Interview #03
to secure political and financial advantages in any future peace negotiations...It was, in turn, among the young generation of these displaced populations populations, cut off from their roots and animated by a spirit of revenge, that militias recruited the core group of their fighters. (Picard, 2000, 307)

In the post-war era, armed groups-turned-parties continued using the displaced as a political chip, working to provide and maintain housing for them in urban and suburban areas of strategic importance to the party while also lobbying for their ability to return to the areas they were originally from. It is important to note that “return” in the Lebanese context often means being able to reclaim land, a historic family home, and the ability to return to vote in home regions. Most displaced Lebanese are tied to the urban economy of Beirut and its metropolitan area during the work week and do not return their home regions in a full-time sense due to financial rather than political reasons. Ensuring that the displaced are both able to remain living in their new suburban homes while also being able to vote in their home regions means that armed groups-turned-parties can benefit from their constituents in two geographic areas. In the suburbs, they can cite pressure from this massive non-voting constituency as a legitimate reason for exerting influence over local and municipal politics. Parties can then also mobilize displaced populations to travel to their home regions during elections, allowing the parties to control political outcomes in those regions as well.

The “new” residents, not simply the parties, benefit from this arrangement, as it gives them a mechanism for inducing local responsiveness in the neighborhoods where they spend most of their lives. One respondent from the eastern suburbs explains that if the president of a municipal council is affiliated with a particular party, then the “new” residents that are supporters of and voters for that party would have relatively more influence than other “new” residents during that person’s time in office, since they would be able to use the party organization to influence the officeholder’s decisions. The relationship works the other way as well. “New” residents that are supporters of an opposing party would use their party connection to work against the head of the municipality and to encourage challengers
that have closer connections to their party. In this way, the armed groups-turned-parties can be said to informally enfranchise the “new” residents. Of course, the success of armed group-turned-parties in solidifying the continuity of this relationship with the displaced in the post-war period varies greatly. The following chapter that discusses the southern and eastern suburbs separately demonstrates how this success is dependent on a group’s position in the final outcome of the war.

This relationships between “new” residents and parties is evident in interview responses concerning the political preferences, political linkages, and voting behavior of the “new” residents as compared to the “original” residents. In the southern suburbs, many of the displaced are from the Bekaa valley, the first region in which the Iranian revolutionary guard began training troops for Hezbollah. For people who were not from the major tribes of the Bekaa (the only remaining tribally organized region of Lebanon), the armed group also provided a bulwark against the historical dominance of a handful of tribes. Most of the rest of the “new” residents of the southern suburbs are from the south of Lebanon, the region most devastated by the Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon, where Palestinian and leftist groups, and later Amal and Hezbollah were active in resisting the Israeli presence in Lebanon. One respondent explains that the displaced could not have settled in the southern suburbs without the help and protection of these armed groups. These “new” residents receive social services from Hezbollah both in the suburbs as well as in their home regions. The party also facilitates their travel to home regions during elections, providing free transportation. One respondent remarked that the neighborhood feels completely empty on election day, as the majority of its residents are away voting in their home regions.

In contrast, the “original” residents have markedly different political preferences than the displaced. The support of “new” residents for Hezbollah is much more significant than it is among the Shia “original” residents. The “original” residents are on the whole less political,

---

87 Interview #41
88 Interview #17
89 Interview #08
90 Interview #42
less sympathetic to particular parties,⁹¹ and were initially much less receptive and even hostile to Hezbollah. This is evident in the huge struggles against Hezbollah in the first municipal elections, specifically in Burj al-Barajneh and Ghobeiri where the “original” residents are Shia.⁹² However, it is important to note that these distinctions in political preferences are not necessarily fixed over time. As Sunni-Shia differences have become increasingly politicized in the wake of recent conflicts in Iraq and Syria, differences between the two types of residents have become attenuated and “original” residents have rallied around Hezbollah’s leadership of the community.⁹³

In the eastern suburbs, this difference in political preferences between “original” and “new” residents also exists. The displaced came to the eastern suburbs from the north, south, and the Shouf mountains. In most of these areas, Christians were demographic minorities that found themselves threatened and isolated during the war. Christians from these areas made their way to the Christian heartland along the central coast and in the eastern suburbs. It is no surprise then, that most of the “new” residents of the eastern suburbs are supporters or sympathetic to the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), the party associated with General Aoun and the faction of the Lebanese Army that controlled the eastern suburbs in the latter part of the war.⁹⁴ In fact, a respondent from the southern suburbs, when discussing the political preferences of the Christian “original” residents, many of whom were displaced to the eastern suburbs, estimates that 60 to 65% are supporters of the FPM.⁹⁵ However, the “new” residents are not a monolith. Some also support the Lebanese Forces, the group that controlled the eastern suburbs in the first half of the war and that actively cultivated relationships among the displaced. Still, the FPM is cited as the most influential and popular group in the eastern suburbs.⁹⁶ Before elections, Christian armed groups-turned-parties work

---

⁹¹Interview #46
⁹²Interview #18
⁹³Interview #48
⁹⁴Interview #41
⁹⁵Interview #43
⁹⁶Interview #07
to mobilize supporters among the displaced residents living in the eastern suburbs to return to their hometowns for elections. This mobilization is often successful and most of the displaced do return home to vote.\textsuperscript{97}

In contrast, the “original” residents maintain their strong links to the local political families and are much more likely to be supporters of the Phalangist party, which was historically dominant and popular in the area in the pre-war era and the early war years. This is despite the fact that the rupture between the Phalangists party apparatus and the Lebanese Forces during the war severely weakened the Phalangist party. The continued support of this weak party in the post-war period is evidence of a political continuity among the “original” residents. In fact, many among the “original” residents have multi-generational family ties to the Phalangists, with many of their grandfathers supporting the pre-war party bloc in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{98}

4.4 Conclusion

This study demonstrates how wartime demographic change can produce political change, even when local political institutions and rules are left unchanged, as they were in Lebanon. The crucial mechanism through which displacement and shifting territorial control shapes politics is through the restructuring of social and political networks. Populations with different wartime experiences of displacement are more closely connected to different types of elites. “New” residents that were displaced into an area are more likely to be embedded in the networks of armed groups-turned-parties. The “original” residents of a locality are more likely to maintain pre-war ties with traditional familial elites. In this sense, the “original” residents are agents of political continuity while the “new” residents are agents of political change. Future research should validate these responses through surveys of “original” and “new” residents. This chapter discussed the similarities in the over-time transformations that occurred in both the southern and eastern suburbs. The following chapter examines

\textsuperscript{97}Interview #41, #51

\textsuperscript{98}Interview #50
the differences in the post-war balance of political power in the southern and eastern suburbs. These differences are rooted in the macro-level outcome of the war.
CHAPTER 5

Local Politics After Civil War

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the long-term consequences of the macro-level outcome of a civil war on local political competition and accountability. This chapter conducts a structured focused comparison of the southern and eastern suburbs of post-war Beirut. It investigates how an armed group’s position in the final settlement of a conflict shapes post-war party dominance and competition in the locality that the armed group controlled during the war. The southern and eastern suburbs of Beirut were structurally similar in the pre-war era. During the Lebanese civil war, both endured a succession of shifts in territorial control and a marginalization of pre-war local family-based elites. Populations that were not of the same religion as the controlling armed groups and the majority of the population were displaced from both areas. Both suburbs also grew rapidly as they became safe havens for in-group displaced populations fleeing targeted violence in other parts of the country. In both areas, the displaced “new” residents far outnumber the “original residents” who have lived there since before the war began.

Despite these similar conflict trajectories, territorial shifts, and demographic changes, the outcome of the Lebanese civil war affected the southern and eastern suburbs very differently. Hezbollah, the armed group controlling the southern suburbs in the last phase of the war, became a beneficiary of the post-war political order. This was due to the organization’s close relationship with the Iran-Syria alliance. Syria was the central player enforcing and guaranteeing the peace and Iran provided a wealth of foreign funding to sustain and extend the armed group-turned-party’s social and political networks. The Aounist faction of the
Lebanese Army rejected Syria’s protectorate over Lebanon and refused to sign an agreement that legitimized this relationship. The armed group was forced to surrender when it was militarily defeated by the Syrian military. The Aounists were reintegrated into political life after the Syrian withdrawal of 2005.

As discussed in Chapter 4, armed organizations seeking to consolidate control over territory develop or co-opt networks that link them to the population. When compared to “original” residents, the “new” displaced residents that seek refuge in an armed group’s territory develop particularly strong ties to the organization. In this chapter, I find that if a territory-holding group is a beneficiary of the final settlement, it is able to monopolize political power in its localities and empower its core constituents. If a territory-holding group loses the war, the vacuum of political power in its localities produces political competition and allows pre-war local familial elites to reassert their role in local politics. Furthermore, the relationship between traditional pre-war elites and armed groups-turned-parties is starkly different in the two areas.

In the southern suburbs, Hezbollah has monopoly political control over the area which allows the party to dictate policy to local municipal councils. Although council are still populated by traditional pre-war local elites, they often act as little more than a rubber stamp on the party’s will. Since the party is more locally powerful than the traditional elites, “new” residents with deeper connections to the party are more empowered than “original” residents and have powerful informal channels through the party to influence local policy despite not being able to vote in the locality.

In contrast, the marginalization of not only the Aounists, but also their Christian rivals, the Lebanese Forces, meant that there were no organized parties available to dominate and exert monopoly control over the eastern suburbs in the post-war years. In this way, the macro-level political and military outcome of the war provided an opening for traditional pre-war local elites seeking to reassert their role in local politics. When the Aounists and

---

1The reason that pre-war familial elites still win some elections is that only the “original” residents with connection to pre-war political networks vote in the area. “New” residents who are more likely to support party affiliated figures do not have the vote in the southern suburbs (see Chapter 4).
Lebanese Forces were reintegrated in 2005, they had to contend with local elites who had spent the last fifteen years rebuilding their support at the local level. In addition, their years as a banned organization and the resulting lack of resources and atrophy of networks prevented the Aounists from monopolizing the local political space in 2005. The competition with other parties in national electoral races made alliances with local elites who could campaign and mobilize voters for them very important. Because local traditional elites have something to offer the reintegrated Christian armed groups-turned-parties, including the Aounists, their relationships with parties are more reciprocal. While party support for candidates is often important in winning local elections, it is a secondary factor. Of primary consideration is a municipal council or mayoral candidate’s local reputation, family name, and networks. Furthermore, once they are elected, local leaders have autonomy to deal with local concerns and make local policy without needing to answer to parties. This is in stark contrast to local officials in the southern suburbs. In this context where local elites are more autonomous from parties and powerful in their own right, the “original” residents who have historical ties to these traditional elites and who vote them into office are just as or more empowered than the “new” residents.

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how the macro-level outcome of a civil war interacts with local changes wrought by the consolidation of territorial control to structure patterns of post-war local politics—including the extent of party dominance or competition, and the local balance of power. During the civil war, both suburbs underwent profound democratic changes and the restructuring of political networks. In both places, the “new” residents, who are more numerous, are more connected to parties and the “original” residents are more connected traditional familial elites. These findings are documented in Chapter 4. However, the study in this chapter demonstrates how these similar local-level changes can produce different post-war political landscapes depending on the armed group’s position in the war outcome and its ensuing ability to transform into a locally hegemonic party. While Chapter 4 took a longitudinal approach in order to document demographic and social change, this chapter takes a cross-sectional approach. I examine differences in post-war competition and the balance of local political power in the southern and eastern suburbs and trace this
variation to the fate of each area’s controlling armed group at the end of the war. This chapter provides the second piece of the in-depth case study of how territorial control and the outcome of the war jointly shape the post-war political landscape.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I describe the research design, the interview methodology, and the nature of the data. Second, I provide background information on municipal politics in Lebanon. Then undertake a comparison of the southern and eastern suburbs of Beirut as the civil war is ending and in the post-war era. The final section concludes.

5.2 Research Design

I undertake a structured focused comparison of the southern and eastern suburbs of Beirut. I select these two areas for comparison because of their striking pre-war and wartime similarities on several important factors that could plausibly shape post-war politics and the local balance of power. These similarities are closely examined in Chapter 4. Their central dissimilarity is that the armed group controlling the Shia-majority southern suburbs was a beneficiary of the settlement that ended the Lebanese civil war, while the armed group controlling the Christian-majority eastern suburbs was a clear loser of the war’s ending terms. This research design allows for an assessment of the importance of being a beneficiary armed group for the possibility of institutionalizing post-war party dominance over local politics. I compare the two areas across two periods of Lebanese history—ending the war, and after the war—to track the points of divergence that produced contrasting post-war local political dynamics despite similar pre-war conditions.

In the southern suburbs, I select four municipalities. The municipalities of Haret Hreik and Mreijeh were Christian before the war and are now inhabited by Shia Muslims. The other two municipalities, Burj al Barajneh and Ghobeiri were Shia-majority municipalities both before and after the war. Selecting both types of municipalities allows the study to demonstrate how displacement transformed local politics in ways that are distinct from and that cannot be reduced to simple changes in sectarian identity. In the eastern suburbs, I
select the municipalities of Dekwane and Sin el Fil, which were mostly Christian both before and after the war. Once again, this allows me to isolate the impact of territorial control, displacement, and the war’s outcome on political change among populations that are of the same religious group.

Admittedly, an ideal design would compare areas within the same religious group. However, this is unfortunately difficult, if not impossible, considering that armed groups associated with the particular religious communities were beneficiaries of the war’s outcome, while the opposite is true for armed groups associated with other religious communities. Another concern is that Hezbollah’s successful political dominance of the southern suburbs is due to its ideology rather than the interaction of its wartime network-building with its favorable position in the war’s outcome. While it is true that Hezbollah and the Aounists espouse very different ideologies, both movements are similar in that they are led by non-traditional elites and thus do not have natural affinities with pre-war family-based elites and notables (Hanf, 1993).

5.3 Data

I use a set of more than 30 in-depth semi-structured interviews that I conducted with local political, economic, and social elites in the southern and eastern suburbs. Interviewees include current and retired municipal council members, real estate developers that were part of the wartime building boom, members of the pre-war local political families, local historians, journalists, and a few long-time elderly residents who witnessed the transformation of the neighborhoods from the perspective of the average person. Interviewees were chosen through a non-probability snowball sampling method that included identifying key contacts in academia and civil society who could then connect me to local historians and local politicians.

This sampling method was necessary due to the potentially sensitive content of the interview questions. Asking about sectarian demographic change, reasons for displacement, and informal mechanisms that parties and their supporters use to exert influence over mu-
municipal politics are sensitive questions in the Lebanese context. While most interviewees were willing to answer all questions, being connected to the researcher through a trusted third party was essential to the success of the interview sessions. Despite the limitations of the sampling method, there was a high degree of convergence between respondents on factual questions about the neighborhoods, which provides an indication of the reliability of the interview content. Furthermore, two research assistants were hired in an effort to ensure that most respondents were being interviewed by someone from the same religious background. Interviews varied greatly in length, as some respondents gave more elaborate answers to open-ended questions. Interviews ranged from roughly thirty minutes in length to more than five hours. Before delving into the two case studies, the following section provides some essential background information on Lebanese municipalities.

5.4 Municipalities in Lebanon

The first Lebanese municipalities were established in the 19th century under Ottoman rule. The municipality as the smallest unit of local governance was further institutionalized during the French colonial period and the immediate post-independence period. The last municipal elections before the war were held in 1963. Municipal governments lost much of their influence during the war years. New elections were not held until 35 years later in 1998. Since then, municipal elections proceed at regular six year intervals, with elections taking place in 2004 and 2010. At the time of writing, Lebanon is preparing for municipal elections that will take place in early May 2016.

As municipalities that operate within a unitary system, a sizable portion of their revenue comes directly from the national-level Independent Municipal Fund (IMF). The disbursement of funds is officially according to population size, but a lack of transparency plagues the distribution process. In 2009, an average of 36% of municipal revenues came from the IMF. Another 16% came from surtaxes collected from water and telephone authorities on behalf of the municipalities. And the remaining 48% came through direct revenue, mostly from real estate and property taxes. A 1977 law codified relatively far-reaching municipal powers,
stating that any “work having a public character or utility” is within the jurisdiction of the local municipality. Despite these robust dejure powers, municipalities are often heavily constrained in their ability to implement local policies and projects. This is mostly due to their small size. Although Lebanon is a small country with an area of 4,036 square miles and a population of approximately 4.5 million, the country is divided into 985 municipalities. This creates a situation in which many municipalities contain less than 4,000 residents. Under current laws, in which municipalities receive most of their revenue from direct local taxation, the small size of most municipalities makes them too small to be economically viable (Atallah, Kallas and Abi-Habib, 2012). The municipalities studied in this paper are exceptional in this regard, as they govern resident populations that are an order of magnitude larger, with around 100,000 or more residents. The municipalities of suburban Beirut are therefore among the most consequential bodies of local government in the country, since they collect significant revenue through direct taxation and affect the lives of a disproportionately large percentage of the Lebanese population.

The fiscal resources and governing capacities of municipal councils are also important for understanding the following sections. First, local government consists of a municipal council headed by a president of the council, ra’is baladiya. This council receives funding from the national government and is part of a formal chain of command that links successively larger administrative units (the municipality, the district, the governorate, and finally the central government). There is always only one president of a municipal council per municipality. In addition to the president of the municipal council, each village or neighborhood elects a mokhtar, a leadership position found in Turkey and some Arab countries. In a smaller village municipality, there is usually only one mokhtar. In a larger municipality, like the ones examined in this study, there are several, often designated to specific neighborhoods and/or religious communities. All local leaders are elected, but they serve in different capacities. The municipal council and its president are in charge of making local policy, managing development projects, and maintaining local infrastructure. Mokhtars are in charge of issuing and keeping records of personal status documents such as birth certificates, marriage licenses, and identification cards. They also notarize documents as part of the process for procuring
business licenses. A shorthand for thinking about the two types of leaders is that municipal
councils deal with structures while mokhtars deal with individual people and their concerns.²

Finally, it is critical to reiterate that the vast majority of Lebanese citizens can only vote
in their home town of origin (see more details in Chapter 4). Succeeding in switching one’s
registration to the neighborhood where one currently lives rarely occurs. On the occasion that
registration change is permitted, whole extended families switch their voting location and
usually do so through political connections and for political purposes. As will be discussed in
following sections, this constraint on voting rights has far-reaching implications in a country
where rural-urban migration as well as war-induced demographic changes are widespread.

5.5 Post-war Suburban Beirut

Before delving into the detailed content of the interviews, I first provide a summary of the
central findings. The southern suburbs of Beirut, now collectively called Dahiyeh (which
literally means “the suburb”), had many pre-war characteristics in common with the eastern
suburbs of Beirut. Both areas were once clusters of small villages, came under the control
of armed groups during the war, experienced displacement of some pre-war residents early
in the war as well as massive resettlements of displaced populations from other parts of the
country. As the war progressed and armed groups became increasingly sectarian rather than
ideological, this pattern of demographic change along religious lines intensified and reinforced
itself.

Since the end of the war, both areas have become large politically and economically
important suburbs with a population that is overwhelmingly not originally from the area.
The major difference between them is that the southern suburbs came under control of
Hezbollah in the last phase of the war. It’s close relationship with Iran and Syria made
Hezbollah a clear beneficiary of the final outcome of the war. In the last phase of the war,
the Eastern suburbs were under the control of the remaining faction of the Lebanese Army,

²Interview #35
led by Michel Aoun. The armed group was militarily defeated by the Syrian Army at the end of the civil war and its followers were repressed, with Aoun exiled to France.

The outcome of the war created a different balance of power in the two suburbs. While “original” residents are more connected to traditional political family networks and “new” resident to party networks in both places, the relative power of these two types of elites differs dramatically between the two areas. In the southern suburbs, the party hierarchically controls local municipal politics. In the eastern suburbs, local municipalities have local autonomy and reciprocal relationships with multiple national-level parties. I argue that these differences in post-war political life are rooted in Hezbollah’s position as a beneficiary and the Aounists’ position as a loser at the end of the war. These differing patterns persist even after the Syrian withdrawal of 2005, when the Aounists were legalized and re-entered the political system.

In the southern suburbs controlled by Hezbollah, pre-war local elites are expected to either toe the party line or risk political marginalization. Hezbollah’s control over local politics manifests in control over the nomination of candidates for municipal elections, in lack of autonomy of municipal councils, and in the party’s central role in maintaining order, security, and resolving disputes. In this environment, displaced “new” residents that have direct links to the party are relatively more empowered. In contrast, in the eastern suburbs, where the wartime group was defeated, no one political group monopolizes the locality’s political space. Local elites function more independently from national-level parties. Multiple parties vye for influence within the municipality and build ties with council members and local families to gain influence in the area. Relationships between these national-level actors and local elites are more complex and reciprocal. Because of the competitive political environment, local elites and national political figures need each other. Local elites can provide ground-level mobilization for parliamentary elections, and national politicians can provide resources and branding to local elites who support them. In the eastern suburbs, the lack of one party dominance manifests as an independently functioning municipality more beholden to the “original” residents who elect it. In this context, “original” residents are just as, if not more, empowered than displaced “new” residents, despite being a much smaller proportion
of the current resident population.

5.5.1 Ending the War

This section provides a brief account of how the outcome of the Lebanese civil war affected Hezbollah and the Aounist faction of the Lebanese Army differently. Participation in state’s policymaking institutions, the political and financial support of the Taif Agreement’s international guarantors, and freedom to operate with near autonomy in their regions of control are all provisions that Hezbollah gained as a result of its status as a beneficiary of the peace agreement. In contrast, the Aounists experienced a lack of access to state institutions, the drying up of financial support from external patrons, and a ban on the organization as consequences of their military defeat and surrender.

5.5.1.1 The Southern Suburbs

In 1988, conflict between Iran and Syria over control of the Shia community in Lebanon, a group with great strategic importance for gaining leverage against Israel, played out as a conflict between the Syrian-backed Amal and the Iranian-backed Hezbollah in the southern suburbs. Amal was no match for the well-funded and organized Hezbollah, which took control of most of the southern suburbs in a few days. Observers remark that Hezbollah’s support among the population was crucial in precipitating this collapse of Amal control. The Syrian Army ensured that Amal remained in control of two neighborhoods, but Hezbollah took the rest. From 1988 to the end of the civil war in 1991, Hezbollah remained in control of the southern suburbs.

When the Taif Agreement was signed, Hezbollah remained a rejectionist party, citing the incompatibility of the sectarian consociational system with its belief in the need for a government according to Islamic law. However, Hezbollah’s close relationship with Iran and by association with Iran’s ally Syria, the primary guarantor and enforcer of Lebanon’s post-war settlement, ensured that the would be allowed to freely operate in post-war Lebanon. In

---

3Interview #18
the final agreement, Hezbollah was permitted to keep its entire organization intact, including its social service networks and its militia, which was to be used to continue fighting the Israeli occupation. On the eve of the first post-war parliamentary elections in 1992, Hezbollah took the pragmatic route and chose to participate in elections (Hanf, 1993; Hiro, 1993; Norton, 2007). This allowed Hezbollah to enter a powerful pro-Syrian coalition of armed group-turned-parties and independent politicians that effectively control Lebanese politics until the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005.

In the post-war period, Iranian funding and Syrian political support preserved Hezbollah’s complete autonomy in the areas commonly recognized as under its control. The organization was never limited by the state in any concrete way. Hezbollah continued to build infrastructure, social service delivery systems, schools, loan programs, and safety nets to care for the families of those fighting in the resistance against Israeli occupation. These programs further strengthened connections between the party and their core constituents (Cammett, 2014). While the other beneficiaries of the Taif Agreement used state resources and control over ministries and agencies to provide jobs and services that would grow their political networks, Hezbollah took a different financial approach. The party used funds from Iran as well as religious taxes and individual donations to remain more autonomous of the Lebanese state and less dependent on its coffers. While this strategy gives Hezbollah less of a stake in preserving the post-war system than may be the case for other beneficiary groups, this does not imply that Hezbollah has no interest in maintaining the post-war status quo. The organization’s decision to participate in elections and take positions in formal state institutions has given it a concrete stake in the Lebanese political system. This decision granted Hezbollah national-level policymaking power it uses to preserve its regional and local autonomy and freedom of operation in places like the southern suburbs.

5.5.1.2 The Eastern Suburbs

The Lebanese Army led by Aoun remained in control of the eastern suburbs from approximately 1983 until the end of the civil war, even thought the Army’s control would be seriously
contested by the Lebanese Forces in the last years of the war. During these last years of the war, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, a traditional rival of the Syrian regime, funded the Aounists. Throughout the late 1980s, Aoun’s popularity grew among the Christian community, particularly in the eastern suburbs. In terms of national politics, he spoke openly against Syrian intervention and made Lebanese sovereignty his central goal. On the ground, his soldiers and civil servants were considerably more professionalized and showed more restraint towards the population than their counterparts in the Lebanese Forces. In 1989, Aoun’s desire to extend the authority of the Lebanese state put him in direct conflict with the Lebanese Forces and Syrian-allied Muslim militias. This brought a swift reaction by Syria and its allies, which put the Christian enclave, including the eastern suburbs under siege and heavy bombardment (Hanf, 1993).

Meanwhile, Syria and Saudi Arabia convened the surviving members of the pre-war parliament for talks, which produced the Taif Agreement at the end of 1989. The agreement would return Lebanon to the pre-war consociational powersharing system with adjustments. It would also legalize Syria’s military presence in Lebanon. Aoun refused the agreement, isolating himself from other politicians but gaining the support of a Christian community staunchly against a Syrian presence in Lebanon. The new government, a supporter of the agreement, dismissed Aoun as commander in chief and suspended payments to soldiers and civil servants in the enclave. The need for revenue brought Aoun into conflict with the Lebanese Forces, who were still controlling a port in the enclave that siphoned tax revenue away from the state. The ensuing “War of Elimination” between Lebanese Forces and Aoun lasted from January to May 1990. This internecine conflict was fought in densely populated urban spaces, leading to heavy civilian casualties. The Lebanese Forces, in need of reinforcements, agreed to accept the Taif Agreement in exchange for assistance from the government. The outcome of the conflict was a stalemate in which Christian areas remained divided between the two armed groups. The eastern suburbs of Beirut were still under the control of the Lebanese Army and Aoun. However, once the Lebanese Forces agreed to Taif, Aoun found himself completely isolated as a rejectionist figure.

The beginning of the Gulf War in the summer of 1990 soon put Aoun at an even more
serious disadvantage. Continued Iraqi financial support for the armed group became untenable. Furthermore, Syria’s support of the U.S. position during the Gulf War led the U.S. to give Syrian regime a green light to end the Lebanese civil war as it saw fit. In October 1990, the Syrian Army moved in to militarily defeat the Lebanese Army faction and Aoun took refuge in the French embassy and fled into the exile. His followers and supporters that had openly protested the terms of the Taif Agreement and Syria’s presence in Lebanon were brutally repressed by Syrian military and security services (Hanf, 1993). This situation persisted until a popular uprising backed by international pressure led to the Syrian military’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005. This provided an opening for Aoun to negotiate his re-entry into Lebanese politics, establish a political party, and resurrect atrophying networks of supporters that had been driven underground and laying dormant for fifteen years.

5.5.2 After the War

In both the southern and eastern suburbs, the end of the war cemented the demographic dominance of residents who were displaced into the areas during the conflict. As a population that came to the area seeking the safety that controlling armed groups could offer, but with little connection to the traditional families that controlled pre-war local politics, the displaced “new” residents have different political preferences and ties than the “original” residents. More specifically, “new” residents seem on average to be more likely to support armed groups-turned-parties. Furthermore, because it is generally very difficult to change voter registration in Lebanon, “new” residents must vote in the towns where they are originally from rather than where they currently live. This disenfranchisement in their new neighborhoods further strengthens the link between “new” residents and armed groups-turned-parties. Parties provide an indirect and informal channel through which “new” residents can influence and make demands on their local municipality. These “new” residents provide votes for the parties by returning to the places they are originally from to vote for party candidates in elections. The effect of these political ties of the “new” residents on the southern and eastern suburbs is to increase the overall role of armed groups-turned-parties in local politics.
However, while the southern and eastern suburbs are similar in all of these respects, the victory of Hezbollah and defeat of the Aounists is a crucial point of divergence. Each group’s fate shapes the strength of the party and the nature of its relationship to the municipality, to local traditional family elites, and to competitor parties. These differences have implications for the relative power of “new” and “original” residents in the eastern and southern suburbs. In the following section, I examine how the outcome of the war led to differences in the local balance of power in the southern and eastern suburbs.

5.5.2.1 Families and Parties in Local Politics

In 1998, Lebanon held its first post-war municipal elections. The last pre-war municipal elections were held 35 years before, in 1963. In the interim period, new parties had mobilized, a fifteen year civil war had been fought, and a settlement had been reached which greatly empowered those armed groups-turned-parties that were allies of the Syrian regime. This meant that by the time the elections took place in 1998, municipal councils were filled with elderly council members from the traditional local families that had controlled Lebanese municipal politics in the pre-war period. During the war, these municipal governments had been sidelined by armed groups and had become ineffectual in meeting the needs of their constituencies. The elections of 1998 provided municipal councils and the families that traditionally controlled them with an opportunity to reassert their role in local administration and service provision. This was especially made possible by the fact that only “original” residents, with historical ties to the families, were able to vote in any given municipality. However, the families were re-entering local politics from a position of relative weakness. Their success in reclaiming leadership of their local communities was highly contingent upon the constraints set by the armed groups-turned-parties operating in their neighborhood.

In the southern suburbs of Ghobeiri, Burj al-Barajneh, Haret Hreik, and Mreijeh, Hezbollah was able to maintain control throughout the post-war era. Its position as a beneficiary of the settlement of the civil war meant that Hezbollah not only remained a legal party, but also had international political and financial support to continue building its political,
social, and military organization. In the eastern suburbs of Dekwane, Jisr el Basha, and Sin el Fil, the Aounists had been militarily defeated and their supporters repressed. This repression created a political vacuum and an opportunity for the families, particularly if they were willing to cooperate with the Syrian military, which effectively took control of political life in the area. The local families in the two suburbs therefore faced markedly different situations in 1998. As a result, the local families in the southern suburbs were completely marginalized and municipal councils became entirely subordinate to the party. An implication of this power configuration was that displaced “new” residents, those with stronger connections to the party, were considerably more empowered than the “original” residents. The municipalities prioritize their demands and interests.

In the eastern suburbs, local families successfully reasserted their control over local politics, producing remarkable continuity with the pre-war period. In 2005, the Aounists (now the Free Patriotic Movement) and the Lebanese Forces re-entered Lebanese politics in the wake of Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. The armed groups-turned-parties began working to reconstitute their organizations and political networks, but were in no position to monopolize local politics. This produced a pluralistic environment, where party competition enabled families to preserve their influence and negotiate reciprocal and cooperative arrangements with the parties. An implication of this power configuration was that “original” residents maintained their historical influence in the community. The following two sections describe these differences in detail.

5.5.2.2 The Southern Suburbs

All respondents in the southern suburbs gave very similar responses about the balance of power in their municipalities. The realities of political control in the area could not be understood by simply examining the composition of formal organs of power such as the municipal councils—institutions which had been devoid of real political effectiveness for multiple decades.\(^4\) Hezbollah is universally characterized as a party with monopoly over political

\(^4\)Interview #45
space in the area. No other armed groups-turned-parties or traditional families are able to challenge its control, both over formal municipal politics and over informal street politics. Even in the historically Christian municipalities (Mreijeh and Haret Hreik) where many of the council seats are still reserved for Christians, Hezbollah remains in control. Hezbollah controls the candidate nomination process, co-opting amenable members of traditional Christian families. Even when Christian voters return to the area to vote, the nomination process has already limited their choices to pro-Hezbollah candidates.5

In municipalities with more Shia voters, respondents that had attempted to run recall that, despite getting the support of a sizable number of voters, their list’s efforts were dwarfed by the resources that Hezbollah was able to marshal to ensure its candidates won. Municipal councils rarely have substantive meetings and discussions. They basically function as a rubber stamp, allocating the municipal budget to projects according to the party’s directives.6 One respondent describes the lack of autonomy and effectiveness of municipal councils in the southern suburbs in the following way–

“The municipality...doesn’t even have meetings and discussions. They [Hezbollah] basically give a lecture where they tell the council members to sign off on whatever they want them to do. It doesn’t matter what the council members think. If you like it, or if you don’t like it, tough.”7

Hezbollah’s control over the southern suburbs is so complete that the state cannot bring a police officer or a civil servant into the area without Hezbollah’s approval. The smallest details of local political life are under the party’s control. At the level of parliamentary elections, Hezbollah are also the kingmakers.8 Their ability to mobilize Shia voters from the “original” residents to turn out during elections means that the Christian politicians and parties that Hezbollah chooses to put on its electoral list (due to fixed sectarian quotas

---

5 Interview #42  
6 Interview #42  
7 Interview #42  
8 Interview #18
in elections) will inevitably win the electoral contest. It is important to note that several respondents see many positive results of the party’s full control over the southern suburbs. Their extensive grassroots networks, organizational capacity, and disciplined cadres allow the party to prevent potential conflicts among residents. The party’s well-developed dispute resolution mechanisms provide security and shift the burden away from the municipalities for fulfilling this role.\footnote{Interview #49}

In this political context, the families have entirely lost their influence. One respondent explains that in the pre-war era, electoral success hinged on the candidates’ relationships to the families. After the war, the families have been systematically replaced by the party as the key actor whose support is necessary for electoral success.\footnote{Interview #43} Many other respondents draw a similarly sharp contrast between pre and post-war local politics.\footnote{Interview #47} The councils may still be filled with members of traditional families, but these families are not autonomous. Their loyalty is with Hezbollah, the party organization that empowers them.\footnote{Interview #45} For example, Hezbollah allows the families to keep one third of the seats on a municipal council, while party allies control two thirds of the seats. By taking this conciliatory approach instead of completely oppressing the traditional families, Hezbollah prevents any serious rifts from occurring within the Shia community. And yet, controlling two-thirds of a council means that the party can have a quorum without the families and that it doesn’t functionally need the traditional families in order to make decisions. One respondent explains that he goes to council meetings but does not have any real influence over what occurs, nor can he object to the dominant opinion.\footnote{Interview #08} One respondent succinctly summarizes the balance of political power between traditional elites and Hezbollah as follows–

“\textit{When the municipal elections happened in 1994, the balance of power had already completely changed and Hezbollah had already dominated the situation.}”

\footnote{Interview #49}{\textit{Interview #49}} \footnote{Interview #43}{\textit{Interview #43}} \footnote{Interview #47}{\textit{Interview #47}} \footnote{Interview #45}{\textit{Interview #45}} \footnote{Interview #08}{\textit{Interview #08}}
So if we want to think about the local balance of power, it really followed from all the changes that happened in the previous period. So today Hezbollah can bring to the municipality people from the “original” residents, but their loyalty is to the organization.” 14

Respondents are also nearly unanimous in their characterization of the relative influence of “new” and “original” residents. One states that “the residents that are really determining the politics of the area, including the political affiliations of those in formal power, are the ‘new’ residents.” 15 Another explains that the residents created by the war and the armed group that controlled the “street” at the end of the war are in full control of the southern suburbs. 16 The “new” residents dominate just by their sheer numbers and the fact that their latent demographic power is organized and mobilized by the party apparatus. This influence means that many “new” residents can do things like skip rent payments on municipality-owned housing units with little to no consequence. One respondent even claims that only 10% of those living in municipal housing in Burj al-Barajneh pay their rent to the municipality consistently. The municipal council has no mechanism for enforcing such regulations without party approval. And yet “new” residents frequently make demands of the municipality, informing it of problems with roads or with access to water. Their expectations of municipal as well as party responsiveness are high. 17

Respondents explain that a large proportion of “original” residents that do not support the party are effectively disenfranchised and relegated to an apolitical role. Recognizing that local elections do not present them with options that represent their political preferences, many of them choose to stay home on election day. One respondent explains that the municipality has no incentive to be responsive to the interests of these “original” residents 18 and that much of the municipality’s tax revenue is diverted away from municipal development.

14Interview #45
15Interview #08
16Interview #42
17Interview #44
18Interview #47
projects and is instead spent on development that serves partisan priorities. The “original” residents are simply described as powerless over decision-making in the municipalities. And yet there are indications that the party is responsive, particularly when a demand is made by both the “original” and “new” residents. For example, one respondent explains that after a series of bombings targeting the area in 2013, Hezbollah erected checkpoints to maintain the security of the area. Many of those manning the checkpoints were described as trigger-happy and unprofessional teenagers. A widespread uproar from residents pressured the party to hand over control of the checkpoints to the more professionalized and mature Lebanese Army soldiers. Being in full control does not mean the party cannot recognize when responsiveness is in its own best interest.

5.5.2.3 The Eastern Suburbs

In the eastern suburbs, respondents gave very different answers than in the southern suburbs concerning the balance of power in their localities. There is a wide consensus about the high level of party competition in the eastern suburbs, particularly after the 2005 return of the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) to Lebanese politics. Unlike Hezbollah, the Aounists do not have the capacity, after their defeat in the civil war, to reassert full control over the area despite their popularity and continued resonance with a large segment of the population. The Christian armed groups’ loss of the war decimated much of their organizational infrastructure and weakened the clientelist networks they had built during the war. After 2005, they began rebuilding, but none of them have been able to dominate their former regions of control in the way that the beneficiaries are able to.

Furthermore, the relationship between the families and parties is more complex than in the southern suburbs. Families have regained control of local politics and have leverage in negotiations with the parties. Respondents explains that there are four main political forces

---

19 Interview #42, #48
20 Interview #47
21 Interview #08
22 Interview #07
operating in the eastern suburbs—the families, the Phalangists (the historic pre-war party of the area), the Lebanese Forces, and the FPM. Because of this competition, families have choices in terms of the parties they can align themselves with. They can make political decisions with relative freedom and maintain the option of not associating with any parties. For parliamentary elections, in which the parties are the most significant players, families can choose to back the political groups that provide them with the greatest support at the local level. In exchange, the families mobilize their supporters to vote for particular parties in national elections.

The traditional families control the day-to-day decision-making of the municipality and represent the continuing influence of the “original” residents. One respondent describes it this way–

“In terms of the parties’ influence on the municipality and [local] elections, it is minimal...They are a few families that know each other, and they are original residents. Whatever they want happens, with little opposition.”

The parties only concern themselves with local politics for the purpose of mobilization around national election cycles. The parties are the most important units of political organization for national elections, while the families still remain dominant in local elections. Several respondents explain that there are no fundamental changes in local political power since the pre-war era and that the system is still controlled by a handful of families in each municipality. While there have been changes in which of the families are more powerful in certain localities, the fact remains that families are still the relevant local players. In Dek-

---

23 Interview #37, #41
24 Interview #41
25 Interview #37
26 Interview #38
27 Interview #38, #41, #52
28 Interview #50
29 Interview #38, #50

139
wane, for example, the mayor (president of the municipal council) is the son of the previous mayor.\textsuperscript{30} Other families sometimes contest this clan’s hold on the municipal government, but more often than not, they simply work with the central family. The families often negotiate powersharing arrangements that divide the seats on the municipal council as well as the positions of mokhtar amongst themselves.\textsuperscript{31} When changes in family power occur, these usually center around changes in the wealth of families that allow them to buy more or less local influence.\textsuperscript{32}

One respondent provides clear evidence of the precedence that traditional families take over parties in local elections. The president of the municipality of Dekwane, who is not clearly partisan, ran on a list that included local elites from various parties, including the Lebanese Forces, Phalangists, and FPM. Another group of Phalangists headed up a competing list that ended up loosing the election. Phalangist partisans ultimately decided which list they were running with based on personal or familial connections to the candidate running for the presidency of the municipal council. Party leaders allowed this local-level division within the party as something normal and non-threatening.\textsuperscript{33} The parties that have only recently begun rebuilding know that they are dependent on the families’ networks for mobilization in national elections and so they are willing to compromise and follow the families’ lead on local matters.\textsuperscript{34} One respondent summarizes the reciprocal relationship between the families and parties in the following way–

“\textsuperscript{30}Interview #38
\textsuperscript{31}Interview #52
\textsuperscript{32}Interview #52
\textsuperscript{33}Interview #51
\textsuperscript{34}Interview #07
I would say it is more about families than parties. This is an old system that existed before the war. It still determines local politics."\textsuperscript{35}

However, such examples do not necessarily signify that families are always more cohesive than parties. While this may have been the case in the pre-war period, when families reliably operated as one bloc under the leadership of a patriarch, families are now considerably more fragmented and diffuse in their structures. Within the same family, it is possible to have some members with the FPM while others are with the Lebanese Forces. Even brother may be aligned with different parties. These alliances are largely dependent on the content of deals made with the parties and the presence of mutual interests.\textsuperscript{36} These dynamics illustrate the existence of party ties that cut across family lines and vice versa, diluting any one political group’s ability to dominate the other.

Respondents explain that the municipal governments of the eastern suburbs are generally responsive to both “original” and “new” residents. There do not seem to be sharp distinctions between the influence of the two groups, particularly in more recent years as municipal revenue has increasingly come from the economic development generated by “new” residents.\textsuperscript{37} However, in the cases where respondents did make a distinction between the influence of two social groups, they would generally state that it was the “original” residents who maintained certain privileges and were treated preferentially as compared to the “new” residents.\textsuperscript{38} “New” residents were a second priority. For example, an “original” resident would have a speedier and smoother experience trying to get a particular license or a document notarized by a local official. One “new” resident explains that he needed some paperwork taken care of that would usually take him three days to complete. Instead of going through this hassle, he looked to his cousin, who is married into a family of “original” residents, to help him and the task was accomplished in half of an hour.\textsuperscript{39} There are also

\textsuperscript{35} Interview #50
\textsuperscript{36} Interview #51, #52
\textsuperscript{37} Interview #51
\textsuperscript{38} Interview #52
\textsuperscript{39} Interview #50
subtle privileges that the “original” residents enjoy. For example, if a “new” resident or other outsider illegally parks their car in the neighborhood, the person would naturally be confronted about the violation. However, an “original” resident is unlikely to be confronted, as the families would be reluctant to irritate a resident whose vote they may need in an upcoming election. This relatively greater influence of the “original residents” is in stark contrast to the marginalized position of the “original” residents in the southern suburbs.

5.6 Conclusion

Among policymakers and international organizations, the establishment of democracy after a civil war is often touted as the ideal and ultimate goal of peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts. And yet, we lack a clear understanding of what factors produce geographic variation in the quality of accountability and the ways in which it is experienced by ordinary citizens. This local-level comparative study demonstrates how the outcome of a civil war at the macro-level can lead to dominant party systems in some neighborhoods and political competition in others. This research also enhances our understanding of the circumstances under which post-war elections are likely to produce continuity or rupture with pre-war political life, and when war does or does not change the composition of the political elite. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the outcome of a civil war can have systematically different consequences for the political voice of various segments of the population, depending on their linkages with wartime organizations and the post-war fate of those organizations. Future research should investigate the effects of these local differences in the balance of power on the provision of public goods.

40Interview #50
CHAPTER 6

The Electoral Legacies of War

6.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the long-term consequences of civil war for political competition and accountability in Lebanon. It asks two related questions. In what ways do wartime legacies of armed group territorial control influence post-war politics? How do these legacies of wartime control interact with the war’s outcome to shape post-war electoral competition and the composition of the political elite? I leverage features of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) to address these questions. Lebanon’s “cantonization” during its civil war produced a great deal of variation in experiences of armed group control, which allows for useful comparisons of post-war election outcomes across areas with different wartime experiences of control. Lebanon also experienced foreign intervention in its conflict resolution and settlement process, empowering one subset of parties and leading to the defeat or repression of others. This outcome was in large part driven by developments in the international system that allowed neighboring Syria a relatively free hand in ending the war and implementing the peace. These historical events allow for an examination of how international intervention in the war’s ending influenced the post-war party development of beneficiary and losing armed actors whose rule during the war itself may have looked quite similar.

In Chapter 2, I present a theory in which the process of consolidating control over a territory during civil war requires armed groups to develop clientelist networks that connect them to the population. These patterns of wartime territorial control, in conjunction with the war’s final outcome, jointly shape the post-war political landscape and the likelihood of regional part hegemony. The argument has observable implications for post-war elections—
both in terms of who wins elections and how competitive those elections are. I test these hypotheses in the case of the Lebanese civil war using originally-compiled data on election results and margins of victory in the country’s five post-war parliamentary elections. I supplement this with information on patterns of territorial control obtained by digitizing historical maps of the final stages of the conflict.

I find that when a group with consolidated control over a region at the time of the war’s ending is brought into government as part of the power-sharing agreement, its leaders are able to use state resources to transform the clientelist networks they developed during the war into a peacetime political machine. This confers certain advantages to these armed group-turned-parties in their home regions and structures political competition well after the end of the war. Territories that were under consolidated armed group control at the end of the war are more likely to be ruled by de facto regional dominant parties after the war and experience low levels of electoral competition. This is in contrast to fragmented regions, where elections are more competitive and new political groups have emerged. In areas where the controlling group was militarily defeated or politically repressed, the electoral landscape depends on the degree to which beneficiaries were able to directly take over. Where they confronted sympathetic populations and where they had latent networks within the population, beneficiaries were able to extend their control into losing group territories, making elections uncompetitive. Where beneficiaries confronted hostile populations, where they had no latent networks, and where direct control proved too costly, losing group areas look similar to fragmented territories and have competitive elections. These findings are evidence of clear continuities and connections between wartime patterns of control by armed actors and post-war political development.

This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 begins with a brief summary of the argument in Chapter 2 and recapitulates its observable implications as a set of testable hypotheses. Section 6.4 introduces the data. Section 6.5 presents a descriptive analysis of which types of candidates are winning post-war elections, while Section 6.6 presents the results of a multivariate analysis of the effect of armed group control on electoral competition. Section 6.7 provides illustrative examples of the argument at work in three Lebanese
administrative districts, or *qadas*, with varying histories of territorial control. Section 6.8 addresses alternative hypotheses that could explain the empirical findings and Section 6.9 concludes.

### 6.2 Argument and Hypotheses

I argue that patterns of territorial control in the last phase of a civil war and the war’s final outcome jointly shape sub-national variation in single-party dominance in the post-war period. Wartime acquisition of territory and the consolidation of control over that territory requires armed groups to control the population living within the territory. To accomplish this, armed groups must cultivate local ties that would allow them to reward, punish, and motivate civilians. Developing clientelist networks within the population becomes an effective strategy for consolidating territorial control. After the war, armed group leaders in these consolidated territories may then be able to use the resources of the state to transform these regional networks into a regionally dominant post-war political machine. This is in contrast to what is likely to occur in fragmented and contested territories where no armed group has consolidated control. In the post-war period, these areas have a more pluralistic and competitive regional political landscape.

The relationship between a wartime legacy of territorial consolidation and post-war regional party hegemony is mediated by a second important factor—the outcome of the war. The outcome of the war determines whether territorial control and wartime clientelist networks can be made useful in the post-war era. If a particular armed group wins the war or is a beneficiary of a powersharing agreement, its leaders are then able to use the resources of the state to transform their networks into a post-war political machine with regional hegemony. If an armed group is militarily defeated or politically marginalized in the outcome of the war, repression and a lack of resources prevent them from making the transition to political power. Instead, the regions that losers once controlled are either directly controlled and subsumed into beneficiaries’ spheres of influence or indirectly contained. The former strategy is more likely where beneficiaries have a history of network-building in the area.
The later is more likely when they do not. If a losing group area is indirectly contained, beneficiaries leave room for local politics to run its course so long as it does not threaten the national-level influence of the beneficiaries. These regions will be similar to fragmented areas, with more pluralism and political competition.

The implications of this argument for postwar elections can be formulated into two sets of related hypotheses (see Chapter 2). Table 6.1 summarizes the expected results and competitiveness of elections in different types of postwar regions.

1. *Who* wins elections

   (a) In *beneficiary group territories* and *losing group territories* where beneficiaries have pre-existing networks and have taken direct control, candidates affiliated with beneficiary armed groups-turned-parties will win most elections.

   (b) In *fragmented territories* and *losing group territories* that beneficiaries indirectly contain, a mixture of candidates affiliated with old pre-war elites, and including clients of the beneficiaries (and their international patrons) will win most elections.

   (c) If losing groups are at some point reintegrated, they will begin to win some elections in their former territories of control.

2. *How* elections are won

   (a) In *beneficiary group territories* and *losing group territories* where beneficiaries have pre-existing networks and have taken direct control, elections will be uncompetitive.

   (b) In *fragmented territories* and *losing group territories* that beneficiaries indirectly contain, elections will be relatively more competitive.

### 6.3 Lebanon Overview

Lebanon’s civil war and post-war experience make it an ideal case for studying how patterns of armed group territorial control and a war’s final outcome shape the post-war distribution of
Table 6.1: Summary of Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District War History</th>
<th>Who wins</th>
<th>How they win</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiary group territories</td>
<td>Beneficiary group(s) candidates</td>
<td>Uncompetitive elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing group territories (beneficiaries control directly)</td>
<td>Beneficiary group(s) candidates</td>
<td>Uncompetitive elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing group territories (beneficiaries contain indirectly)</td>
<td>Mix of candidates</td>
<td>Competitive elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmented territories (beneficiaries contain indirectly)</td>
<td>Mix of candidates</td>
<td>Competitive elections</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

power. First, Lebanon exhibits large regional variation in post-war party control and electoral competitiveness (see Section 6.4), the focal dependent variable. Second, the fragmentation of Lebanon during the 1975-1990 civil war and the proliferation of armed groups, large and small, provides a great deal of variation in wartime territorial control. Yet despite the fact that many armed groups held consistent control over territory in the final years of the war, Syrian and Saudi Arabian intervention in the settlement process ensured that only some of these armed groups would be beneficiaries while others would be militarily defeated or politically repressed. Thus, the case contains rich variation on both explanatory variables—territorial control and group status as a beneficiary or loser of the war. The Lebanese case also includes some defeated group areas that beneficiaries controlled directly and others that they did not. Furthermore, the Lebanese civil war ended in 1990 and five post-war elections have since taken place at regular intervals, allowing for an investigation of whether
the electoral legacies of the war persist over time.

6.3.1 Before and After the War

As in most other conflicts, Lebanon’s history of immediate pre-war mobilization is crucial to understanding why the civil war began when it did and how central political players aligned themselves in its first months. In short wars, pre-war mobilization may also be a key factor in explaining post-war party capacity and electoral outcomes. However, the length of the Lebanese civil war and the aftermath of military interventions by Syria and Israel led to dramatic shifts in the power and capacity of central domestic players. For example, the Phalangists and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) had successfully mobilized for confrontation in the pre-war period. When the war began, they spearheaded the right and left-wing coalitions, respectively. Yet despite the fact that they were the most powerful domestic military players at the outset of the war, they were nearly inconsequential to the war’s resolution in 1990. The PLO had been militarily coerced into surrender by the Israeli military during the invasion of Beirut in 1982. After this period, its role waned dramatically. Later in 1982, the assassination of the Phalangists’ leader and the ensuing withdrawal from Beirut of their most prominent external ally, the Israeli military, led to a crisis within the organization. An internal coup in the military wing of the organization, known as the Lebanese Forces, separated it from the Phalangist party and marginalized the latter, both militarily and politically (Hiro, 1993; Hanf, 1993).

All this to say that pre-war mobilization cannot be decisive in the Lebanese case. The primary actors at the beginning and end of the war were fundamentally different. Many of those that would be key players in the war’s outcome actually emerged out of the conflict itself and did not exist before the war. This most prominently includes Hezbollah and the Aounist faction of the Lebanese Army. These transformations of the main players allows for an examination of territorial control’s effect on post-war politics while limiting potential confounding with the effect of pre-war party mobilization on post-war politics.

After the war, from 1990 until 2005, Lebanon was under the political and military con-
control of the Syrian Army, the guarantor of the war’s settlement and the actor that largely
determined whether a particular armed group would be a beneficiary or loser in the im-
plementation of the Taif Accord, the agreement that formally ended the conflict. In 2005,
about three quarters of the way through the post-war period I study (1992-2009), interna-
tional and domestic pressure forced the withdrawal of Syria’s armed forces from Lebanon.
While Syria had enforced Lebanon’s settlement, it had also repressed and banned groups
that were opposed to its intervention in Lebanon. In 2005, these groups were allowed back
into the system and given the chance to transform into parties, much as other armed groups
had done in the early 1990s. This shift in the political context is valuable, as it allows us to
observe the electoral outcomes in losing group territories both before and after those groups
are able to participate in electoral politics. Furthermore, observing the persistent influence
of wartime territorial control on electoral politics over a two-decade period, despite this sig-
nificant change in the political context, would lend credence to the argument that civil war
produces long-lasting changes in post-war politics.

Lebanon’s electoral system, with fixed quotas of parliamentary seats for each sectarian
community, allows for straightforward comparison and analysis of power distributions and
competition dynamics within each sectarian community. The fixed sectarian quota, common
in several other post-war power-sharing arrangements, means that all electoral competition
occurs within sectarian communities rather than among them. As mentioned in Chapter
3, an Orthodox Christian candidate would never run against a Sunni Muslim candidate,
but only against another Orthodox candidate within this framework (IFES, 2011). For
example, if a hypothetical district was assigned two Orthodox Christian seats and three
Sunni Muslim seats, all voters (regardless of their own background) would have five votes—
two Orthodox and three Sunni. Candidates would only be able to run for seats of the
religious group they belonged to. In this district with five seats, two electoral races are
taking place simultaneously. Lebanon’s electoral system removes the possibility of overt

1Decisions about which sects get how many seats in each district were fixed as part of the Taif Agreement
that ended the conflict. The quotas reflect some continuity from the pre-war era (also a fixed quota system),
consideration of the breakdown of the registered voter population in the district, as well as political deals
during the negotiation of the settlement (El-Khazen, 1994).
ethnic or sectarian voting, a phenomenon which one would expect to be quite common in a divided post-conflict society. This electoral system is important from a research design perspective, as it ensures that the electoral competition observed in Lebanese elections cannot be explained simply by sectarian voting, in which religiously homogenous districts are likely to be the least competitive and vice versa.

Furthermore, this system, although designed to prevent inter-sectarian competition and to encourage intra-sectarian competition, has encouraged less competitive elections across the board. Salloukh outlines the methods that post-civil war parties have used to reduce uncertainty in three types of districts in the 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections. In homogenous districts, a cross-ideological alliance is formed by the main parties, ensuring that their list wins by a landslide. In mixed districts, cross-sectarian alliances are used to eliminate rival lists. In districts that are dominated by one sect, the major party will use their resources to recruit token individuals from the minority sect to stand for election on their list, also ensuring that the party wins safely (Salloukh, 2006). The expectation is that all elections would be uncompetitive. Finding a substantively significant difference in electoral competitiveness among districts with and without wartime histories of armed group control in a context rife with pre-electoral bargaining would provide convincing evidence for the validity of the argument.

Another feature of Lebanese elections places a high premium on parties’ abilities to mobilize networks of voters. Electoral law requires voters to return to their hometown of origin for elections. In the aftermath of a fifteen-year civil war in which permanent displacement along religious lines affected an estimated one-third of households (Kasparian and Beaudoin, 1992; Hanf, 1993) this regulation is extraordinarily consequential. Lebanon is undoubtedly more divided into homogenous religious enclaves than it was before the war, which means that most sectarian parties would, by and large, be helped by a law allowing citizens to vote where they live. Instead, they have to deploy sophisticated political machines that must mobilize voters, not only to cast a ballot, but also to travel long distances in order to do so. When sectarian parties win uncompetitive elections, this does not reflect the impact of demographic changes that have created religious homogeneity. While these demographics
may be a straightforward explanation for the rise of sectarian or ethnic armed groups-turned-parties in many other post-war scenarios, they cannot be the story in Lebanon. Instead uncompetitive elections signals, in part, a capacity to selectively deter certain voters from coming home to vote, while mobilizing others to do so.

6.3.2 Armed Groups and Parties

Table 6.2 lists the major armed groups and parties active in the post-war era. Most all of them have a history as a civil war armed group. The only exception is the Future Movement (FM), a party with roots as a charitable foundation that provided essential services during the war. Its leader, Rafic Hariri, was a wealthy entrepreneur with dual Saudi citizenship. He was Saudi Arabia’s key representative in mediating the Taif Agreement. This international backing facilitated his entrance into Lebanese politics with a goal of filling the vacuum in a Sunni community with no clear armed leadership. Much of Hariri’s success in post-war Lebanese politics can be traced back to his appointment as head of the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), which became an important source of patronage for the Future Movement (Cammett, 2012). In this sense, international support for Hariri’s influence over the Taif process and the state resources he was able to access as a result of that influence make him a beneficiary of the civil war settlement despite his not being a wartime leader. The relatively unusual history of the Future Movement is beneficial from a research design perspective, as it provides a built-in counterfactual of a group that did not have wartime control but was a winner of the war. As will be demonstrated in Section 6.5, although the Future Movement experienced electoral success in fragmented areas, it was not able to consistently prevent competition from challengers in all its strongholds. This is evidence that being a beneficiary of the war’s settlement is not sufficient for the establishment of a regional dominant party system. Both victory and a history of wartime territorial control and mobilization are needed. Table 6.2 summarizes each organization’s

---

\*This lack of Sunni cohesion and organization was partly due to the community’s early alliance with and reliance on Palestinian guerrillas, who were irreparably weakened after the Israeli invasion and siege of Beirut in 1982.
history of territorial control, its position in the settlement process, and its post-war party status.

6.3.3 The 2000 Israeli Withdrawal

While the Lebanese civil war officially ended in 1991, the war in southern Lebanon between Hezbollah on the one hand, and the Israeli military and their Christian-led proxy the South Lebanon Army (SLA) on the other, continued until 2000. Hezbollah mounted a guerilla-style campaign against the occupying forces, one designed to creates casualties and costs that would pressure the Israeli military to withdraw from Lebanon. The SLA was never part of the Taif Agreement. In fact, the agreement legitimized Hezbollah’s continued resistance to the organization. In this sense, the SLA was politically marginalized in 1991, long before the Israeli withdrawal that would precipitate its military collapse in 2000. Elections in 1992 and 1996 for seats representing areas under Israeli occupation were controlled by Amal and Hezbollah, even as those elections had low turnout due to the inability of voters in occupied territories to make it to the polls (Hanf, 1993). When Israel unilaterally withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, the SLA collapsed almost overnight. Many of its leading personnel were evacuated along with the Israeli military and continue to live in exile in Israel. In the wake of the withdrawal, the region had a clear and popular alternative waiting in the wings. Hezbollah, which continued to be an armed organization, swiftly filled in the gap (Norton, 2000; Eisenberg, 2000). This is why SLA territories function electorally as Hezbollah spaces. In these areas, Hezbollah has historically invested in latent networks of supporters of the resistance movement, but it was also able to capitalize on more general popular opposition to the Israeli occupation in building a party base in former SLA territories.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Main Sect</th>
<th>History as Territory-Controlling Armed Group</th>
<th>Position at End of War</th>
<th>Post-War Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amal Movement</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Forces (LF)</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Marginalized Loser (Reintegrated in 2005)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aounist faction of Lebanese Army/Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Defeated Loser (Reintegrated in 2005)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon Army (SLA)</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Defeated Loser</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Movement (FM)</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.3.4 The 2005 Syrian Withdrawal

In 2005, the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri (which many perceived to be Syria’s doing) became a turning point in Lebanese politics. The assassination prompted a popular protest movement against Syria’s continued presence in Lebanon, as well as a counter protest supporting Syria. By this time, US-Syrian relations had soured considerably and the US pressure forced Syrian troops to withdraw from Lebanon. This shock to the political system did not substantively alter Syria’s relationship with its allies among the parties, but granted freedom of operation to Syria’s traditional opponents. The most significant of these marginalized leaders, Geagea (Lebanese Forces) and Aoun (Lebanese army faction), quickly revived their armed groups as civilian parties and contested the 2005 elections.³

However, despite Syria’s 15-year hegemony over post-war Lebanon, it would be a mistake to conclude that Syria’s influence erased the effects of wartime territorial control. Syrian support was not a substitute for a wartime legacy of on-the-ground political organization, mobilization, and network-building among the population. The strongest evidence of this is that, in areas formerly controlled by defeated groups, the Syrian regime was unable to create new post-war loyalist parties that has no grassroots or popular basis. In areas where it had no armed group-turned-party ally, Syria supported individual independent politicians that were its direct clients. However, once Syria withdrew in 2005, most of these politicians declined in influence and were unable to continue getting re-elected (El-Husseini, 2012). This is in contrast to pro-Syrian politicians affiliated with armed groups-turned-parties like Amal, Hezbollah, and the PSP, who have maintained their political influence. The fact that political wings of anti-Syrian armed groups won the majority of Christian seats after they were allowed back into the system is a testament to the resilience of wartime organizations, despite their suppression under Syrian rule.

³Syria’s control over Lebanese politics had prevented the coalescing of any significant alternative political groups within the Christian electorate.
6.4 Data

I test hypotheses using an original dataset covering Lebanon’s five post-war elections, from 1992 to the most recent election in 2009. The unit of analysis is the electoral race in a given year. In the example of the hypothetical district in Section ??, there were five seats but only two races. The variables used in the analysis were constructed by aggregating information from various primary and secondary sources, including official election results, reports from election monitoring organizations, and Lebanese scholarship and analysis of each election’s results (Data Appendix available upon request). This section introduces the variables in the dataset. Section 6.5 examines the validity of Hypothesis 1 through a descriptive analysis of the affiliation of candidates that have won the five post-war elections in districts with different wartime legacies of control. It establishes a clear link between the legacy of control and victories by candidates affiliated with armed actors. Section 6.6 tests Hypothesis 2, examining whether districts with legacies of beneficiary armed group control have less competitive elections, and additionally, whether the races won by armed group-affiliated candidates are less competitive.

6.4.1 Key Explanatory Variables

The qada is the geographic unit to which parliamentary seats and their religious allocation are assigned. These qadas are the building blocs of electoral districts. While the sectarian seat allocations, the number of seats, and the number of electoral races never changes, redistricting is frequent in post-war Lebanese elections and is an focal point for inter-party bargaining. In some years, each qada is its own electoral district. In others qadas are grouped to form larger electoral districts. Electoral redistricting is an intensely politicized process. Particularly in the immediate post-war elections, electoral districts are closely connected to territories of control. In this way, the beneficiaries’ influence over the rules of the game also presents a mechanism through which they prevent electoral competition and the emergence

---

4At the time of writing, the June 2013 elections were indefinitely postponed, purportedly due to security risks associated with the conflict in neighboring Syria.
of challengers in their strongholds.

Figure 6.1: Zones of Armed Group Control in 1989

![Territorial Control (Boundaries in 1989)](image)

_Territory type_, the focal explanatory variable in the analysis, is a straightforward operationalization of the three types of regions that emerge from the central argument. The first version of the variable contains three categories—_fragmented territories_, _beneficiary group territories_, and _losing group territories_ (see Chapter 2). _Losing group territories_ includes both the territories of militarily defeated and politically marginalized groups. The second version contains six categories, one for fragmented territories, and one each for the armed groups that controlled territory near the end of the war.\(^5\) This variable was constructed

\(^5\)Disentangling Amal vs. Hezbollah controlled regions is very difficult. Near the end of war, they fought each other for control of Shia areas in southern Beirut and south Lebanon and the result was a local-level patchwork of alternating control between the two groups. Maps of control always lump them together, partly
by digitizing a historical map of armed group boundaries of control on the eve of the Taif Agreement (Verdeil, Faour and Velut, 2007). If an armed group controlled the majority of a qada in 1989, the district was coded as the territory of that armed group. Districts where the majority of the territory was fragmented among several small local militias or was not ruled by a specific group were coded as fragmented territories. This was straightforward for almost all districts.\(^6\) Figure 6.1 displays a map of the zones of armed group control in 1989, on the eve of the Taif Agreement (Verdeil, Faour and Velut, 2007). The map also distinguishes between beneficiary group territories, losing group territories, and fragmented territories using beneficiary and loser designations from Table 6.2. Districts once controlled by the South Lebanon Army (SLA), Lebanese Forces (LF) and Aounist faction of the Lebanese Army (later FPM) are coded as losing group territories, while districts controlled by the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), and Amal/Hezbollah are coded as beneficiary group territories (see Section 6.3).

The second set of explanatory variables captures the political affiliation of winning candidates in elections. Affiliated with beneficiary is dichotomous and takes a value of 1 when half or more of the winning candidates in an electoral race are affiliated with a party with a history as a beneficiary armed group, and a value of 0 if not. Affiliated with losing group is dichotomous and takes a value of 1 when half or more of the winning candidates in an electoral race are affiliated with a party with a history as a defeated or repressed armed group, and a value of 0 if not. Of course, this latter variable only takes values of 1 after the 2005 reintegration. Member of parliament affiliation is a categorical variable with a different value for each party and a residual category for independents and members of small parties. Analyses with these explanatory variables can only be conducted on data for the 2005 and 2009 elections. Too few official party candidates exist in the prior elections to make the statistical

due to the eventual ceasefire and permanent coalition that formed between the two groups. Verdeil, Faour, and Velut’s atlas of Lebanon (2007) map used in this paper is just one prominent example.

\(^6\) The Baabda district was the only district that was coded as fragmented even though the majority of the territory was controlled by armed actors, including the southern suburbs by Hezbollah, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. This decision was made because the territory was divided approximately into thirds, with one fragmented section, and two other sections controlled by different groups. Staying true to the substantive meaning of the coding scheme, this district was coded as fragmented.
analysis useful. While most nominally independent candidates have always functioned as close allies of particular parties (Hanf, 1993; El-Khazen, 1994), this information is difficult to find and verify for 1992, 1996, and 2000. A feature of Lebanese elections is that candidates are not allowed to officially run as members of parties, although in practice, voters are well aware of the affiliations of candidates. Instead they run as members of blocs, temporary groupings of candidates that may center around a party, coalition, or certain charismatic figure, but that are more diverse and usually formed for short-term strategic purposes. The lack of official mention of party identification means that election observers must record this through independent research. For the 1992-2000 elections, the only available information on party is for official party members. Information on the informal affiliations of independents has only been collected for more recent elections (2005 and 2009).

6.4.2 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable *vote margin* measures the competitiveness of the electoral race. *Vote margin* is measured as follows: \((\text{last winner} - \text{first loser}) \div (\text{last winner} + \text{first loser})\). This is an accepted measure of competition in Lebanese elections that captures how close the race was (Corstange, 2012). It takes on values between 0 and 1, with small values indicating a close election and 1 indicating an uncontested election.\(^7\) In our running example of a *qada* with an Orthodox Christian election and a Sunni Muslim election, the *vote margin* would be different for each of these two elections. Figure 6.2 demonstrates the large amount of variation present in electoral competition. Although most elections are relatively close, the values do span the entire spectrum of competition, including a significant number of virtually uncontested elections.

\(^7\)Of course this variable has limitations. For example, if there were multiple seats at stake in a given electoral race and there was a candidate whose victory was a foregone conclusion while the contest for the rest of the seats was rather close, the variable would not capture this nuance but would only point to the competitiveness of the contest for the rest of the seats besides the first.
6.4.3 Control Variables

Several control variables are included in the analysis to control for factors that may also influence the competitiveness of elections. The first is *election sectarian allocation*, a categorical variable that controls for the sectarian allocation of each election. This is important to include in order to account for a key rival hypothesis that the dynamics of competition are determined more by the sectarian identity of candidates and the particularities of political organization within a sect, rather than a district’s history of wartime control. Of course, it is likely that elections for Shia seats are more uncompetitive because of the Hezbollah-Amal coalition’s hold on that community. However, I claim that within the territories under their control, they also strongly influence the nomination of candidates and the dynamics of com-
petition for other seats as well. I contend that this second hypothesis potentially explains more of the observed variation than the first.

Two additional control variables are included to account for the effect of electoral district characteristics on vote margins. For example, one could imagine that when electoral districts lump together several qadas, the larger voting population and its potentially increased diversity could make elections more competitive. One could imagine that a more overtly sectarian armed group-affiliated candidate would have an easy time winning with a small and homogenous constituency but would face more competition if his voter base suddenly included people from other religious groups. For this reason, the analysis includes the log registered voters and religious fractionalization in the electoral district in that particular election year as controls. While most other variables stay relatively similar across elections, these variables vary from election to election and capture the effect of redistricting.

The analysis also includes a control for war violence, a count measure that summarizes the number of incidents of violence that occurred over the course of the civil war in each qada. It is plausible to think that areas that experienced more violence might have had a different trajectory of post-war political development than those that experienced less. For instance, el-Husseini argues that the larger presence of notables in the political elite in the north of Lebanon, as compared to the south or Beirut, is perhaps due to the fact that the north was less affected by the civil war and therefore had greater political continuity (2012). It is not clear which way wartime violence would influence post-war political competition, since more violence might mean that a territory was heavily contested and therefore likely to have more post-war competition. More violence could also precede a single armed group’s consolidation of control over a territory, and therefore be related to less post-war competition. The data for war violence is coded from the International Center for Transitional Justice’s report “Lebanon’s Legacy of Political Violence” (2013). I use event locations to place them in each qada. This measure is imperfect, since smaller events such as a kidnapping or targeted assassination count the same as a shelling or massacre, and also because the report does not claim to be comprehensive. Still, it is the best available data summarizing these events without apparent regional biases in reporting. Furthermore, trends in the data conform with
historical narratives and aggregate national-level numbers that identify 1975-76, 1982-83, and 1989 as years with particularly high casualty rates (Hanf, 1993; ICTJ, 2013).

Lastly, the analysis includes a control for percent poor. This data provides a rough estimate at the qada level of the percent of the population living below a national poverty line that takes regional price variations into account. This is the best available proxy for economic conditions within different regions of the country. Because of politically sensitive correlations between religious group and income levels, actual income data is not released by the government. This variable is the best alternative and has been calculated through the painstaking combination of multiple data sources by a team of scholars at Lebanon’s branch of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (El Laithy, Abu-Ismail and Hamdan, 2008). Since poorer regions might be easier for sectarian political entrepreneurs to control through propaganda and patronage distribution, I expect that areas with a poorer population will have more uncompetitive elections.

For each electoral race, the database also includes the number of seats decided by the race, the names of the beneficiaries, their individual party identifications, and the sectarian breakdown of the population in the electoral district for that election. The next section uses this data on party identification to examine descriptively whether candidates from armed groups-turned-parties are indeed winning the elections in their former territories. Making this important link lends credence to the notion that armed groups-turned-parties are the central political players in their former strongholds. It also examines whether there was a shift in the affiliation of winning candidates after the Syrian withdrawal, particularly in territories that had been controlled by losing groups that were reintegrated.

6.5 The Who: Winning Candidates

This section tests the first hypothesis in Section 6.2 and examines who wins parliamentary elections and whether candidates affiliated with armed groups-turned-parties are more likely to win in their former regions of control and defeated regions where they are able to rule
Table 6.3: Proportion of Members of Parliament Affiliated with Beneficiary Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group territories</td>
<td>(12/33)</td>
<td>(12/33)</td>
<td>(14/33)</td>
<td>(20/33)</td>
<td>(15/33)</td>
<td>(27/33)</td>
<td>(25/33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(direct control)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group territories</td>
<td>(0/18)</td>
<td>(0/18)</td>
<td>(0/18)</td>
<td>(0/18)</td>
<td>(0/18)</td>
<td>(0/18)</td>
<td>(0/18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(indirect containment)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmented</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Closely allied independents counted as being affiliated with parties (only for 2005 and 2009).

directly. Table 6.3 lists the proportion and percent of seats\(^8\) won by candidates affiliated with the parties of the major territory-controlling groups in all five post-war elections. The pattern is clear. A significantly higher percentage of seats in beneficiary group territories and losing group territories that are ruled directly are going to candidates affiliated with winning groups. Since many independents are informally very close to the armed groups-turned-parties, this is a conservative estimate of the number of parliamentarians affiliated with the PSP, Amal, and Hezbollah. This underestimate is evident in the second data source for 2005 and 2009, which includes closely aligned independents. In these later years, roughly 55 to 82% of winning candidates in these regions are affiliated with beneficiaries. In losing group territories that are only contained indirectly and in fragmented territories, the

\(^8\)Chi-square tests and Fisher’s exact tests result in statistically significant (at the 5% level) differences between the frequency of armed group-affiliated victories across the four types of categories.
Table 6.4: Proportion of Members of Parliament Affiliated with Losing Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiary group territories</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0/33)</td>
<td>(0/33)</td>
<td>(0/33)</td>
<td>(1/33)</td>
<td>(1/33)</td>
<td>(1/33)</td>
<td>(1/33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing group territories (direct control)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0/11)</td>
<td>(0/11)</td>
<td>(0/11)</td>
<td>(0/11)</td>
<td>(1/11)</td>
<td>(0/11)</td>
<td>(3/11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing group territories (indirect containment)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>61.1%</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0/18)</td>
<td>(0/18)</td>
<td>(0/18)</td>
<td>(11/18)</td>
<td>(7/18)</td>
<td>(14/18)</td>
<td>(14/18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmented territories</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0/66)</td>
<td>(0/66)</td>
<td>(0/66)</td>
<td>(5/66)</td>
<td>(6/66)</td>
<td>(5/66)</td>
<td>(9/66)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Closely allied independents counted as being affiliated with parties (only for 2005 and 2009).

percentage is dramatically lower. No beneficiary group candidates take power in Aounist and LF areas. In these areas, quotas for Christians and deeply unsympathetic populations make direct control very costly. In fragmented categories candidates affiliated with beneficiaries take only 5 to 14% of seats depending on the election year.

Table 6.4 lists the proportion and percent of seats\(^9\) going to candidates affiliated with losing groups. Before the 2005 Syrian withdrawal, this is a legal impossibility, which is confirmed in the data. In 2005, the Lebanese Forces and Aounists (under a new party name, the Free Patriotic Movement or FPM) rejoin political life. Their former regions of control were both managed indirectly by beneficiaries, for reasons previously discussed. After 2005,

---

\(^9\)Chi-square tests and Fisher’s exact tests result in statistically significant (at the 5% level) differences between the frequency of armed group-affiliated victories across the four types of categories.
candidates affiliated with these parties and closely aligned independents win about 78% of seats in these areas. They also make some inroads in fragmented areas. In 2009, redistricting favorable to Christian parties and an alliance between the Aounists and Hezbollah allows them to win several Christian seats in losing group territories directly controlled by Hezbollah in the south.

Figure 6.3: Seats Won by Parties in Parliamentary Elections (1992-2000)

When election results are disaggregated by qada, the beneficiaries’ affiliations also largely conform to the expectations of Hypothesis 1. Amal and Hezbollah did well in the 1992 elections. They gained control over a significant number of seats in the Bekaa valley and the south, areas that they had controlled by the end of the war. They also dominated elections that formally represented SLA areas and unsurprisingly, continued to do so after
the end of the Israeli occupation and the collapse of the SLA a few months before the 2000 election. Figure 6.3\textsuperscript{10} displays the results of the 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections. The PSP consistently wins seats in its wartime area of control. Several seats also went to non-sectarian pro-Syrian parties like the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) that did not control a significant territory at the end of the war, but were given preferential treatment because of their relationship with Syria. Also, a few smaller pre-war parties that did not militarize during the war attempted to make a comeback. However, in both these cases, this pattern becomes weaker in later years as the main sectarian armed groups-turned parties further consolidate their control. The figure also demonstrates that party-affiliated candidates are

\textsuperscript{10}In the following figures, the squares and small circles are parliamentary seats, geographically placed in the districts they are representing.
largely absent from both fragmented and indirectly contained losing group territories in these first three elections under Syrian control.

A striking aspect of all these elections is the large number of seats going to independents. There are several reasons for this pattern beyond the availability of data on affiliations of independents. First, since most Christian armed groups were effectively banned before 2005, many Christian seats, particularly in the central coast of the country, were filled by Syrian clients that had little bases of popular support. This was especially true in 1992, when the Christian population largely boycotted the elections, resulting in uncontested victories for Syrian clients in many popularly anti-Syrian strongholds. Many other independents were members of traditional political families that were sidelined during the war. After the war,
Syria perceived them as less threatening than political parties and, in exchange for their cooperation, gave them tacit approval to attempt the revival of their pre-war local bases of support (El-Khazen, 1994).

Independents connected to traditional families and with connections to Syria also made a strong showing in areas that were under fragmented control during the war. These were also areas in which there was an open opportunity for them to reassert their role in Lebanese politics (Hanf, 1993; El-Khazen, 1994; Hudson, 1999). Some of these independents were also Sunni politicians running as a bloc under the leadership of Rafic Hariri, the wealthy businessman at the head of the Hariri foundation. This bloc was successful in filling that vacuum in some, but not all, Sunni areas. It took on a increasingly anti-Syrian stance and was an important player, although it did not officially become the Future Movement party until 2007, after the Syrian withdrawal. In any case, systematic data about the relationship of specific independents to the parties in more recent elections only strengthens the correlation between armed group control zone and post-war electoral outcomes. This can be seen in the comparison of Figures 6.4 and 6.5.

The popular protests that precipitated the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 created a sea change in Lebanese politics. The positions of Lebanese parties as pro or anti-Syrian became a focal point for alliance formation. Lebanese parties structured themselves into two coalitions, March 8 (pro-Syria) and March 14 (anti-Syria), named for the days of their largest protests. Another key change was the reintegration of political groups that were Syrian opponents during the war. General Aoun returned from exile in France and reorganized his followers under the banner of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM). As can be seen in Figures 6.4 and 6.5, his party won important electoral victories in the Christian-majority central coast. The Lebanese Forces (LF) also regrouped, forming a party out of the remnants of its armed organization. They won elections in parts of the territory their group had controlled but many seats in their former territory were taken by the FPM. After 2005, the electoral outcomes in the north-central coast region reflect the resurgence of Christian armed groups-turned-parties as well as divisions within the Christian community between Aounists and Lebanese Forces supporters that can be traced back to the civil war. The other striking development
that coincides with the withdrawal of Syrian forces is the rise of the Sunni-based Future Movement as an official post-war party. With strongholds in Beirut and eventually in the north as well, Hariri built a party that filled some of the post-war political space left in fragmented areas with a Sunni majority.

By the 2009 election, the March 8th and March 14th coalitions had transformed into more permanent fixtures of the political landscape. March 8th is composed of Hezbollah, Amal, and perhaps surprisingly, Aoun’s FPM (after signing a Memorandum of Understanding with Hezbollah in 2006). March 14th is composed of Hariri’s Future Movement and the Lebanese Forces. Both coalitions include independents and members of some smaller parties. The PSP, although part of March 14th for the 2009 election, acts as a crucial pivot party, switching sides and deriving its power from its ability to strengthen or weaken each of the two main alliances. One noticeable change between 2005 and 2009 in Figure 6.5 is the FPM’s 2009 victory in Jezzine, a Christian enclave in the south, which is a traditionally Shia-majority region. About 70% of the enclave’s voters live outside of it, either abroad or in Christian-majority areas of the country—mostly due to wartime displacement (Corps, 2009). The FPM victory in 2009 is partly due to redistricting between the two elections that came as part of the alliance between the FPM and Hezbollah. In 2009, Jezzine was its own electoral district for the first time since the end of the war. In previous elections, it had been grouped into a larger majority-Shia southern district. This district structure, along with its low remaining voter population, diluted the significance of its Christian voters in choosing Jezzine’s parliamentarians.

Figure 6.5 presents the results of the post-withdrawal elections, but uses an alternative coding in which independent candidates that are close allies of parties are counted as affiliated with that party. Here, the old contours of wartime territories can almost be made out, even though these elections took place 15-20 years after the cessation of hostilities. To clarify this pattern, Figures 6.6 and 6.7 superimpose the results of the elections onto the zones of control in 1989. The color of the parties winning the parliamentary seats matches the colors of the armed groups that are associated with those parties. If a group controlled a territory by the end of the Lebanese civil war, it wins the vast majority of the parliamentary seats.
in the districts within its former zone of control. One can also see evidence of Hezbollah and Amal’s consistent and direct control over former SLA territory. The one departure from this trend is the FPM’s success in some formerly Lebanese Forces territories. Although LF candidates made a strong showing in these elections, it is likely that the FPM had greater indirect resources, at least by 2009, due to its rapprochement with Syria and partnering with Hezbollah’s coalition in 2006. Another reason for the LF’s poor performance vis-a-vis the FPM may be rooted in important changes in the LF’s capacity as an organization towards the end of the civil war. Inter-Christian conflict with Aoun and the LF’s ensuing loss of control over a critically important Beirut harbor is often considered a key moment in the reduction of its organizational capacity (Zahar, 2000), independent of the Syrian repression.
of both groups that would eventually follow.

Providing evidence for Hypothesis 1 and establishing the continuity between armed group control and post-war electoral outcomes is an important first step in documenting the development of regionalized dominant party systems. When looking more systemically at the effect of armed group control on electoral competition, we can now be more confident that these elections are indeed ones in which the armed groups-turned-parties are the central players. Particularly when elections in beneficiary group territories and directly controlled losing group territories are uncompetitive, we can know that the overwhelming majority of candidates winning these elections are indeed affiliated with winning armed groups-turned-parties.
6.6 The *How*: Electoral Competition

Table 6.5: Territory Type and Competition in Post-War Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qada War History</th>
<th>High Competition</th>
<th>Middling Competition</th>
<th>Low Competition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote Margin</td>
<td>0-0.33</td>
<td>0.33-0.66</td>
<td>0.66-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiary group territories</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing group territories</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>62.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(beneficiaries control directly)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing group territories</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(beneficiaries control indirectly)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmented territories</td>
<td>62.7%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This section tests Hypothesis 2 concerning variations in electoral competition across territories of different types. The results support the expectations that beneficiary group territories and losing group territories directly controlled by beneficiaries will have less competitive elections, whereas losing group territories that are only indirectly contained and fragmented territories will have more competitive elections. Table 6.5 divides the distribution of vote margins into thirds. Low vote margins means high electoral competition and vice versa. Elections in indirectly controlled losing group territories and fragmented territories are highly competitive 72.5% of the time and 62.7% of the time respectively. This is in contrast to directly controlled losing group territories and beneficiary group territories which have highly competitive elections only 8.6% and 30.7% of the time. The converse is also true. Elections in beneficiary group territories and directly controlled losing group territories are uncompetitive much more often than they are in indirectly contained losing group territories and fragmented territories.

Figure 6.8 displays the same data broken down by individual armed group area. The first
two bars represent the PSP and Amal/Hezbollah areas, while the third bar represents SLA areas which Hezbollah directly controls. They have relatively more uncompetitive elections. The last three bars represent Aounist (FPM), LF, and fragmented areas, which have more competitive elections. Figure 6.9 displays election results for each type of territory broken down by election year. The same pattern emerges. Some temporal variations reflected in the figure are worth noting. In 1992, elections in Aounist areas were uncontested and elections in LF areas were less competitive than we would expect for indirectly controlled territories. This is due to the unique feature of the 1992 election, in which most voters and local elites in Christian areas, particularly Aounists strongholds, participated in a widespread boycott as a response to the repression of the anti-Syrian Christian groups, the exiling of General
Aoun, the Syrian army’s continuing presence in Lebanon, and the perception that the Taif Agreement’s provisions disadvantaged Christians. Syrian clients with no bases of popular support were imposed by Damascus in Aounist areas and claimed the majority of these seats in uncontested elections (Hanf, 1993). Essentially, the boycott unwittingly created an opportunity for Syria and its allies. It lowered the cost of controlling the area for the first post-war election.

It is important to recognize, however, that while LF and FPM territories are consistently competitive after 1992, competitiveness in these areas is due to different mechanisms before and after Syrian withdrawal. Unlike the independents winning pre-2005 elections, many beneficiaries after 2005 are associated with the FPM or the LF. Although these former
armed groups were, quite remarkably, able to resurrect their political organizations, their patronage networks are not nearly as robust or well-supplied as those of beneficiaries who have had access to ministries, state resources and, in some cases, foreign patronage since the end of the war. The LF and FPM cannot use state resources to making the playing field in their home regions so uneven as to become de facto regional dominant parties like Amal, Hezbollah, and the PSP. Instead, the LF and FPM have to actually compete and campaign against each other and independents on a more equal footing. In a sense, the indirect effect of defeat or marginalization in the wake of the civil war likely led to more genuine democratic competition once those players were allowed back into the system.

In contrast, uncompetitive races were a persistent feature of post-war elections in SLA areas, the remaining losing territory. While the SLA was not technically defeated until shortly before the 2000 election, the group was never part of the Taif Agreement that ended the civil war so it was a loser with regards to domestic Lebanese politics long before it collapsed as a military organization. Before 2000, the SLA and Israeli occupying forces made it difficult if not impossible for those physically living in occupied territory to go to the polls (Hanf, 1993). Elections for the parliamentary seats allocated to qadas in occupied territory were held in nearby geographic areas that were not occupied. Voters who had moved out of occupied territory in the course of the war were free to vote. As the armed groups-turned-parties in firm control of the remainder of the south, Amal and Hezbollah easily used their organizations’ mobilization capacity and resources to exercise control over these elections as well. Furthermore, Hezbollah’s continued resistance to Israeli occupation and SLA made them popular among many voters, both Shia and from other religious backgrounds, whose hometowns were under occupation. These beneficiaries’ direct control over electoral outcomes in SLA areas explains the high vote margins in this losing group territory.

Among the beneficiary group territories, there is suggestive evidence of greater institutionalization of the Amal and Hezbollah coalition’s dominance over time. From 1992 to 2009, elections became increasingly less competitive in their areas. The most striking departure from the theoretical expectations is in some years in PSP areas. These areas exhibit more significant temporal variation in competition. However, the reasons for this variation
are two-fold and are consistent with the argument. The 2000 and 2005 elections—the two instances in which the median vote margin in PSP territories dips below 50%, which is still very high—were governed by an electoral law that divided PSP territory in half and then grouped one half of it with a fragmented district in which Hezbollah and the FPM (after 2005) have a considerable presence. This generated more competitive elections than if PSP strongholds had been their own electoral district. The year in which is is most apparent is 2000, where the median vote margin dips below 25%. This election occurs shortly after Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father as president of Syria. The PSP leader, Jumblatt, had been close to the old guard in the Syrian regime and had alienated Bashar’s new regime. In a departure from a previously close relationship with the PSP, the newly ruling Bashar responded by backing an electoral list that included some PSP rivals from the Druze community as well Amal and Hezbollah candidates (Gambill and Abou Aoun, 2000) to run in the electoral district created from joining a fragmented qada with a traditional PSP qada. The result was an election that was more competitive than usual. Candidates from both lists won seats. This competition in PSP territories and the inability to hold on to every seat become less surprising in light of the fact that the opposition was composed of Syrian clients, Amal, and Hezbollah—who are undoubtedly more powerful players within the group of beneficiaries that emerged from the war. On the other hand, the fact that the PSP was able to still hold on to some seats indicates the party’s ability to weather a threat from more powerful players and the depth of its local strength.

Finally, in fragmented territories, elections are consistently less competitive than in Amal/Hezbollah areas, SLA areas (controlled by Hezbollah and Amal), and PSP areas in most elections. However, the distributions suggest that there are some uncompetitive elections that are outliers among electoral contests in fragmented territories. These are often for seats in the capital city of Beirut, where the Hariri family has great influence. As mentioned in Section 6.3, Hariri’s party, the Future Movement, is the only beneficiary of the war’s settlement that did not emerge from a wartime armed group but from the independently wealthy family’s wartime charitable foundation. Due to the fact that the religious allocations of Beirut’s parliamentary seats are extraordinarily diverse, but with a plurality
of seats assigned to Sunnis, the Future Movement has an advantage in shaping the city’s electoral contests. From it’s privileged position, the Future Movement often organizes a list that embodies a temporary coalition between all the significant players in Lebanese politics, often including Amal and Hezbollah, the PSP, traditional family-based independents and after 2005, the Christian parties. This represents a classic elite pact that has the effect of making the city’s politics uncompetitive. These uncompetitive elections explain the outliers in fragmented territories. If one were to omit Beirut’s elections from the fragmented territories, the distributions would be more similar to those losing group territories that are indirectly contained (Aounists and LF in Figure 6.9).

6.6.1 Method and Models

Moving beyond descriptive statistics, the following section provides several multivariate tests of Hypothesis 2 regarding the differences in electoral competition across electoral races in qadas with different wartime legacies of armed group control. The modeling strategy is straightforward. All models use least square regression with the electoral race as the unit of analysis. Models include weights for the number of seats decided by each electoral race. This gives more weight to races that decide five seats, for example, than those that decide a single seat. All models pool elections and some include year fixed effects, which do not have any significant effect on the results.

All the confidence intervals reported in the results are produced by calculating wild cluster boostrapped t-statistics (WCBSTs). Clustering is by electoral district.\textsuperscript{11} Despite the fact that districts often contain multiple separate electoral races, parties almost always create multi-religious lists and present voters with a candidate for every seat in the district. While voters are free to vote for some candidates and not others, in practice, most vote for a particular party or coalition’s whole list. The implication is that electoral races taking place within the same electoral district are hardly independent from each other.

Bootstrapped cluster adjustments provide appropriately conservative estimates of confi-

\textsuperscript{11}The results are consistent if clustering is by qada instead.
dence intervals. Using this method, whole clusters (electoral districts) are resample instead of individual observations (electoral races) as would be customary in standard bootstrapping procedures. Particularly when there are few clusters, cluster (also known as block) bootstrapping is the preferable alternative to the clustered robust standard errors widely used in political science research. There is no single threshold at which data contains too few clusters to use standard approaches, although research suggests that the traditional approach leads to underestimated standard errors when there are 40 or fewer clusters (Esarey and Menger, 2015; MacKinnon and Webb, 2015).

Among the alternatives to clustered robust standard errors, Wild Cluster Bootstrap t-statistics (WCBSTs), as proposed by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) offer the best solution given the structure of this data. WCBSTs work well for clusters of wildly different sizes (MacKinnon and Webb, 2015), which is the case for electoral districts in Lebanese elections. In contrast to other cluster bootstrapping techniques, WCBSTs work by bootstrapping the residuals of a regression rather than the observations directly (Esarey and Menger, 2015; Wu, 1986). Although it is less intuitive, it is the ideal method when a regressor is a categorical or dummy variable, as is true of the focal variables measuring territorial control and candidate affiliation in this analysis. When the value of an explanatory variable is known to be uniform throughout a cluster, this means that there is a high possibility that any given pseudo-sample of the observations will have the same value for the variable, making the coefficient inestimable. In these situations, bootstrapping the residuals is an appropriate solution (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2008). Fortunately, Esarey and Menger have found through simulations comparing multiple types of bootstrapping methods for clustered data that WCBSTs perform very well, with false positive rates close to the target 0.05 even when there are only a few clusters. Unfortunately, they have worse true positive detection than other methods (Esarey and Menger, 2015). For our purposes, this simply amounts to an overly difficult test of hypotheses. If effects are still significant after WCBSTs, we can take this as evidence of robust results.

In the following section, results from four sets of model specifications are reported. Each set of models varies based on the focal explanatory variable. The dependent variable is vote.
margin in all specifications. In the first set, the focal explanatory variable is territory type as the three theoretical categories of fragmented, losing, and beneficiary group territories. In the next set, the same variable is disaggregated into one category for each armed group territory. The third and fourth specifications substitute the territorial measure with a measure of political affiliation of the majority of successful candidates in an electoral race. The third set includes dichotomous affiliated with beneficiary and affiliated with loser variables while the fourth includes affiliation disaggregated by each of the major armed groups-turned-parties.

6.6.2 Results

The overall results from different model specifications show support for Hypothesis 2 regarding electoral competition. In Table 6.6, the results indicate that beneficiary group territories have significantly less competitive elections than fragmented territories, which is the omitted category. In Model 4, which contains all controls as well as year fixed effects, moving from a fragmented territory to a beneficiary group territory increases the vote margin by 24.1%. When defeated group territories are lumped together, the results suggest that they are less competitive than fragmented territories. However, distinguishing between directly controlled and indirectly contained losing group territories reveals two opposing trends that are in line with the expectations of Hypothesis 2. First, directly controlled losing group territories are much less competitive that fragmented territories. The difference in vote margin is a massive 46.8%. In contrast, elections in indirectly contained losing group territories where beneficiaries do not run their own candidates but work through clients, independents, and after 2005, in alliance with the FPM and the LF, are not significantly different from those in fragmented territories. In both types of areas, elections are relatively more competitive. Among the controls, electoral races that are part of Shia and Alawi quotas are less competitive. This is not surprising considering the Syrian regime’s alliance with leaders from these religious communities, which deters serious challenges to their power.

In Table 6.7, territory type is disaggregated by armed group territory. Amal and Hezbollah territories and former SLA territories now controlled by Hezbollah are significantly more
Table 6.6: Territory Type and Vote Margin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.274***</td>
<td>-0.338</td>
<td>-0.871</td>
<td>-0.281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.197; 0.351]</td>
<td>[-1.203; 0.528]</td>
<td>[-2.115; 0.373]</td>
<td>[-1.493; 0.932]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiary Group</td>
<td>0.228***</td>
<td>0.219***</td>
<td>0.226***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.094; 0.362]</td>
<td>[0.124; 0.313]</td>
<td>[0.123; 0.329]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing Group (all)</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.253*</td>
<td>0.273**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.083; 0.322]</td>
<td>[-0.014; 0.521]</td>
<td>[0.033; 0.513]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiary Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.241***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[0.104; 0.378]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing Group (direct)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.468***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[0.335; 0.602]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing Group (indirect)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Fractionalization</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.366***</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.077; 0.701]</td>
<td>[0.004; 0.729]</td>
<td>[-0.620; 0.303]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Registered Voters</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.052; 0.089]</td>
<td>[-0.028; 0.171]</td>
<td>[-0.040; 0.148]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Poor</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.001; 0.005]</td>
<td>[-0.002; 0.004]</td>
<td>[-0.005; 0.002]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Violence</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.000; 0.002]</td>
<td>[0.000; 0.002]</td>
<td>[-0.000; 0.002]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Election</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.051; 0.164]</td>
<td>[-0.042; 0.159]</td>
<td>[-0.038; 0.153]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze Election</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.060; 0.298]</td>
<td>[-0.058; 0.298]</td>
<td>[-0.081; 0.265]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia Election</td>
<td>0.205***</td>
<td>0.195***</td>
<td>0.113***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.069; 0.341]</td>
<td>[0.058; 0.331]</td>
<td>[0.006; 0.219]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alawi Election</td>
<td>0.319*</td>
<td>0.318*</td>
<td>0.357***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.031; 0.669]</td>
<td>[-0.030; 0.666]</td>
<td>[0.013; 0.701]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Fixed Effects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>231.714</td>
<td>209.788</td>
<td>177.272</td>
<td>134.275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>246.970</td>
<td>255.557</td>
<td>238.298</td>
<td>199.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-111.857</td>
<td>-92.894</td>
<td>-72.636</td>
<td>-50.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance</td>
<td>62.247</td>
<td>55.584</td>
<td>49.252</td>
<td>43.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All elections included.
Electoral race is unit of analysis.
All models include weights for number of seats decided by each electoral race.
All models have wild cluster bootstrapped t-statistics, clustered by electoral district.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.
95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
Table 6.7: Armed Group Territory and Vote Margin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.274***</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>−0.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.198; 0.350]</td>
<td>[−0.914; 1.171]</td>
<td>[−1.483; 1.203]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td>0.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.66; 0.431]</td>
<td>[−0.055; 0.399]</td>
<td>[−0.069; 0.431]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amal / Hezbollah</td>
<td>0.257*</td>
<td>0.298**</td>
<td>0.295*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.011; 0.525]</td>
<td>[0.013; 0.584]</td>
<td>[−0.008; 0.597]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon Army</td>
<td>0.439***</td>
<td>0.490***</td>
<td>0.486***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.320; 0.559]</td>
<td>[0.340; 0.640]</td>
<td>[0.337; 0.635]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Army (Aounists)</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>−0.013</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.074; 0.131]</td>
<td>[−0.291; 0.266]</td>
<td>[−0.233; 0.246]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Forces</td>
<td>−0.159**</td>
<td>−0.128</td>
<td>−0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.297; −0.020]</td>
<td>[−0.370; 0.114]</td>
<td>[−0.353; 0.137]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Fractionalization</td>
<td>−0.058</td>
<td>−0.032</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.574; 0.457]</td>
<td>[−0.496; 0.432]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Registered Voters</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.087; 0.097]</td>
<td>[−0.073; 0.147]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Poor</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.004; 0.003]</td>
<td>[−0.005; 0.003]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Violence</td>
<td>0.001**</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.000; 0.002]</td>
<td>[−0.000; 0.002]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Election</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.036; 0.158]</td>
<td>[−0.032; 0.154]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze Election</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.032; 0.246]</td>
<td>[−0.035; 0.251]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia Election</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.088*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.027; 0.203]</td>
<td>[−0.014; 0.191]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alawi Election</td>
<td>0.369**</td>
<td>0.365**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.044; 0.695]</td>
<td>[0.037; 0.693]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Fixed Effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>178.774</td>
<td>165.679</td>
<td>134.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>205.473</td>
<td>222.891</td>
<td>206.636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>−82.387</td>
<td>−67.839</td>
<td>−48.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance</td>
<td>52.204</td>
<td>47.862</td>
<td>42.537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All elections included.

Electoral race is unit of analysis.

All models include weights for number of seats decided by each electoral race.

All models have wild cluster bootstrapped *t*-statistics, clustered by electoral district.

*** *p < 0.01, ** *p < 0.05, * *p < 0.1.

95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>$-1.977^*$</td>
<td>$-1.864$</td>
<td>$-1.823$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$[-4.357; 0.402]$</td>
<td>$[-4.438; 0.709]$</td>
<td>$[-4.266; 0.620]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiary Group</td>
<td>$0.244^{**}$</td>
<td>$0.202^*$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$[0.022; 0.465]$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losing Group (Reintegrated)</td>
<td></td>
<td>$-0.246^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.189^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$[-0.465; -0.026]$</td>
<td>$[-0.414; 0.036]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Fractionalization</td>
<td>$-0.108$</td>
<td>$-0.209$</td>
<td>$-0.235$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$[-0.530; 0.314]$</td>
<td>$[-0.619; 0.201]$</td>
<td>$[-0.590; 0.119]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Registered Voters</td>
<td>$0.194^*$</td>
<td>$0.201^*$</td>
<td>$0.195^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$[-0.016; 0.404]$</td>
<td>$[-0.032; 0.433]$</td>
<td>$[-0.021; 0.411]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Poor</td>
<td>$-0.001$</td>
<td>$-0.003$</td>
<td>$-0.003$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$[-0.006; 0.003]$</td>
<td>$[-0.009; 0.002]$</td>
<td>$[-0.008; 0.002]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Violence</td>
<td>$0.000$</td>
<td>$-0.000$</td>
<td>$0.000$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$[-0.001; 0.002]$</td>
<td>$[-0.002; 0.002]$</td>
<td>$[-0.002; 0.002]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Election</td>
<td>$-0.094$</td>
<td>$-0.028$</td>
<td>$-0.063$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$[-0.207; 0.020]$</td>
<td>$[-0.133; 0.077]$</td>
<td>$[-0.167; 0.042]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze Election</td>
<td>$-0.029$</td>
<td>$0.124$</td>
<td>$-0.009$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$[-0.263; 0.204]$</td>
<td>$[-0.145; 0.392]$</td>
<td>$[-0.246; 0.228]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia Election</td>
<td>$0.086$</td>
<td>$0.239^{**}$</td>
<td>$0.085$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$[-0.110; 0.282]$</td>
<td>$[0.012; 0.466]$</td>
<td>$[-0.108; 0.278]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alawi Election</td>
<td>$0.076$</td>
<td>$0.072$</td>
<td>$0.089$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$[-0.222; 0.375]$</td>
<td>$[-0.253; 0.396]$</td>
<td>$[-0.205; 0.382]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>62.976</td>
<td>65.448</td>
<td>59.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>97.750</td>
<td>100.222</td>
<td>96.862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance</td>
<td>17.080</td>
<td>17.398</td>
<td>16.358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only 2005 and 2009 election included due to data availability. Electoral race is unit of analysis. All models include weights for number of seats decided by each electoral race. All models have wild cluster bootstrapped $t$-statistics, clustered by electoral district. $^{***} p < 0.01, ^{**} p < 0.05, ^{*} p < 0.1$. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.325***</td>
<td>−1.225</td>
<td>−1.446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.208; 0.442]</td>
<td>[−3.540; 1.089]</td>
<td>[−3.877; 0.985]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Socialist Party</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.277; 0.452]</td>
<td>[−0.175; 0.372]</td>
<td>[−0.178; 0.380]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amal</td>
<td>0.524***</td>
<td>0.628***</td>
<td>0.626***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.398; 0.649]</td>
<td>[0.432; 0.823]</td>
<td>[0.439; 0.812]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>0.361***</td>
<td>0.440***</td>
<td>0.435**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.128; 0.594]</td>
<td>[0.129; 0.751]</td>
<td>[0.083; 0.787]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement (Aounists)</td>
<td>−0.192**</td>
<td>−0.155</td>
<td>−0.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.336; −0.048]</td>
<td>[−0.468; 0.159]</td>
<td>[−0.460; 0.156]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Forces</td>
<td>−0.136*</td>
<td>−0.060</td>
<td>−0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.290; 0.018]</td>
<td>[−0.235; 0.116]</td>
<td>[−0.260; 0.130]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Fractionalization</td>
<td>−0.141</td>
<td>−0.130</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.551; 0.269]</td>
<td>[−0.558; 0.299]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Registered Voters</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.063; 0.331]</td>
<td>[−0.058; 0.360]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Poor</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
<td>−0.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.005; 0.003]</td>
<td>[−0.006; 0.002]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Violence</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.001; 0.002]</td>
<td>[−0.001; 0.002]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Election</td>
<td>−0.034</td>
<td>−0.034</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.141; 0.073]</td>
<td>[−0.146; 0.078]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze Election</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.176; 0.197]</td>
<td>[−0.177; 0.190]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia Election</td>
<td>−0.120</td>
<td>−0.122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.270; 0.029]</td>
<td>[−0.275; 0.032]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alawi Election</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.164; 0.416]</td>
<td>[−0.159; 0.406]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Fixed Effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>40.030</td>
<td>33.255</td>
<td>34.918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>60.315</td>
<td>76.723</td>
<td>81.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>−13.015</td>
<td>−1.628</td>
<td>−1.459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance</td>
<td>15.507</td>
<td>13.083</td>
<td>13.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only 2005 and 2009 election included due to data availability.
Electoral race is unit of analysis.
All models include weights for number of seats decided by each electoral race.
All models have wild cluster bootstrapped t-statistics, clustered by electoral district.

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
competitive than *fragmented territories*, which are the omitted category once again. SLA territories are extremely uncompetitive, even relative to other Amal and Hezbollah territories. This is perhaps related to the specific context of southern Lebanon. Hezbollah’s message of resistance as well as its extensive networks for high-risk and violent mobilization are likely to be densest in these border areas. This is in contrast to the Bekaa valley, Lebanon’s only tribal region. While many powerful tribes are Hezbollah supporters, other refuse to be co-opted, generating slightly more competition in Amal and Hezbollah’s northeastern territories than in the south. PSP areas have coefficients that indicate less competition than fragmented areas, but none of these are significant. This unexpected result is partly due to electoral engineering by Syria that diluted some of the PSP’s influence in 2000 and 2005 due to a souring relationship (see earlier in this section for details). It should be noted that before the bootstrapping procedure, results for the PSP were significant. In the cluster bootstrapping procedure, the PSP territories that were combined with fragmented areas into a single electoral district in 2000 and 2005 would be resampled together as a single unit, explaining part of why the significance disappears. Elections in territories formerly controlled by the LF or the Aounists (FPM) are not appreciably different from *fragmented territories* in their competitiveness, which is in line with theoretical expectations.

Moving beyond strictly territorial arguments, the models in Tables 6.8 and 6.9 examine whether elections won by particular parties, regardless of the *qada*’s history, exhibit systematically different patterns of competition. In Table 6.8, the focal explanatory variable is the affiliation of winning candidates for parliament. In electoral races where half or more of the winning MPs were affiliated with a beneficiary armed group-turned-party, vote margins were about 20% higher than in other races. In races where half or more of the winning MPs were affiliated with losing group that was eventually reintegrated, vote margins were about 19% lower than in other races. Results hold when one or both dichotomous variables are included in the model. These results seem to provide evidence for the ability of beneficiary groups to dominate the elections they win in ways that more recently reintegrated armed group-turned-parties struggle to do. The greater competitiveness of elections where reintegrated losers actually win suggest that those victories are relatively uncertain compared to other
elections. In Table 6.9 the affiliation of candidates is broken down by armed group-turned-party with electoral contests won by independents or other parties in a residual omitted category. Races won by Amal candidates are always very uncompetitive, with vote margins that are up to 63% higher than those in races within the residual category. The same is true for elections won by Hezbollah, although the effect size is smaller. Races won by PSP candidates exhibit higher vote margins as well, and races won by LF and FPM candidates lower vote margins than the residual category, but those results are not significant. Overall, these results provide suggestive evidence that Hezbollah and Amal in particular win elections without meaningful challenges.

6.7 Illustrative Qadas

The regional variation in wartime control and post-war party dominance in Lebanon is best illustrated through brief sketches of three qadas that had varying experiences of territorial control. Each district described below is an example of either a beneficiary group territory, a losing group territory, or fragmented territory. All three districts are relatively homogeneous with an overwhelming majority of a single religious community. They each have an urban core that contains one of Lebanon’s mid-size cities. Diverging histories of territorial control produced a different landscape of post-war political elites, parties, and patterns of competition in each district. Figure 6.10 displays the locations of the districts chosen for the vignettes.

6.7.1 Tyre: A Beneficiary Group Territory

Tyre is a Shia district in coastal southern Lebanon. In 2009, the district had approximately 153,000 registered voters, of whom 85% were Shia Muslim. Before the civil war began, Tyre’s official politics were dominated by zuama, landed elites from traditional notable families who has come to power through hereditary succession (Shanahan, 2005). However, in the immediate pre-war years, the marginalized Shia population increasingly rallied behind the anti-establishment Movement of the Deprived, the precursor of the Amal Movement and
militia (Cammett, 2014). During the civil war, this region experienced a great deal of upheaval and was the site of many clashes between Israeli forces, Palestinian guerrillas, and Shia militias. Once the Palestine Liberation Organization was defeated in the Israeli invasion of 1982, and after Israel withdrew to a buffer zone near Lebanon’s southern border, the area became a stronghold for Amal. In the late 1980s, Hezbollah, a relatively new player in Lebanese politics, challenged Amal’s control of the region. While they were on the same side of the macro cleavage in the civil war, in 1987, internecine conflict broke out between the two Shia groups. A year later, both sides agreed to a ceasefire brokered by their international patrons, Syria for Amal and Iran for Hezbollah (Hanf, 1993). The close alliance of their patrons dampened the political and military conflict between the two
Shia groups. By the late 1990s, Syria brokered an agreement in which Amal and Hezbollah became a permanent coalition, running joint lists for all national elections (Cammett, 2014). Throughout this period, the Israeli military and its proxy, the South Lebanon Army, occupied the southern third of the district. When Israeli forces unilaterally withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah and Amal quickly filled the political vacuum despite the presence of UN peacekeeping forces near the border.

After the end of the civil war, Tyre continued to be a stronghold for the Shia coalition, particularly Amal. Nabih Berri, Amal’s wartime and post-war leader, consolidated his increasingly personalistic control over the region in the immediate post-war years. Berri’s close alliance with Syria guaranteed that Amal would benefit from the terms of the war’s settlement. The party’s post-war access to state resources successfully replaced the revenue stream lost by the collapse of the wartime economy and its profits. In particular, the movement’s central strategy throughout the post-war period has been to have party cadres hold simultaneous positions in the bureaucracy as well as party institutions, effectively blurring the line between party and state (Cammett, 2014) and taking on some of the characteristics of dominant party regimes, albeit at the regional level. Perhaps the most important piece of the government pie that Berri was given was complete personal autonomy in running the Council of the South, an agency specifically tasked with helping the victims of Israeli aggression in the south. It eventually took over all matters of post-war reconstruction and relief in the south (El-Husseini, 2012; Leenders, 2012). Although the council receives its budget from the national government, it is controlled by Amal. The discretionary distribution of its resources allows Berri to strategically use the council to reward supporters. Allegations of embezzlement and mismanagement of these and other similar regional reconstruction funds by politicians like Berri are widespread (Leenders, 2012). In a post-war context, reconstruction and compensation in the name of alleviating the ill-effects of war became an important source of patronage.

In this post-war political system, the traditional notable families that had controlled the district before the war were sometimes co-opted into Amal and Hezbollah’s ranks, but those that opposed the armed group-turned-parties lost any political influence they had retained.
The transformation of the political elite in southern Lebanon is profound and difficult to underestimate. Shanahan, an expert on Shia politics in Lebanon puts it this way:

“the post-war Shia elite bore little or no resemblance to those they had replaced. The militarization of Lebanese society brought about by the civil war made it possible for the politically ambitious to ‘fast-track’ to power through militia leadership. The traditional Shi’a zuama, though they employed groups of strongmen (qabadayat) to back up their authority, were not able to turn these groups into dedicated militias and hence were unable to match their newly militarized Shi’a opponents...In the new world of Lebanese Shi’a politics, it is the political parties, or the well-connected individuals within those parties, that hold the reigns of power” (Shanahan, 2005)[79-80].

Post-war parliamentary elections in Tyre reflect this transformation. Tyre is allotted four Shia-allocated parliamentary seats, a quota that has remained fixed in all post-war elections. In 1992, the Hezbollah-Amal coalition’s slate won a resounding victory, establishing a pattern that would continue throughout post-war elections. In the first elections, the highest vote-getter was Mohammad Fneish, the director of Hezbollah’s political bureau (Saade, 1998). Another winner was Mohammad Beydoun, one of Amal’s founders and a member of the party’s political bureau who would go on to become the director of the bureau in 1996. Importantly, Beydoun had been the president of the Council of the South since 1984, the year that Amal gained control of the government body (Harb, 2010). Beydoun’s winning of this seat broke the al-Khalil family’s longtime grip over the seat (Shanahan, 2005). They were joined by two independents, one representing politically moderate Shia intellectuals, and one former ambassador (Saade, 1998; Shanahan, 2005). Both were allied with Berri and ran on the joint Amal-Hezbollah list. The vote margin between these winners and their opponents, a slate organized by a traditional family, gives a sense of how uncompetitive these elections were, especially relative to other types of regions. The winner with the lowest number of votes received 91,006 votes, while the loser with the most votes only won 26,188. Over the course of the next five elections, Hezbollah and Amal party leaders
continued to win elections, independents became less common on the slate, and differences in vote share between beneficiaries and losers became increasingly more pronounced. By 2009, the last winner had earned 67,754 votes while the best-performing loser had only garnered 2,322. These pieces of evidence illustrate the degree to which the Amal-Hezbollah coalition dominates the post-war politics of Tyre.

6.7.2 Keserwan: A Losing Group Territory

Keserwan is an overwhelmingly Christian district, often called the Maronite heartland, in coastal central Lebanon. In 2009, the district had approximately 89,000 registered voters, of whom 98% were Christian. Before the civil war began, Keserwan’s official politics were also dominated by landed elites from traditional notable families. This changed during the war. For most of the conflict, Keserwan was under the control of the Lebanese Forces, one the more important of the groups competing for control over the Christian community. Samir Geagea, the wartime (since the mid-1980s) and post-war leader of the Lebanese Forces, rose through the ranks of the organization’s militia and was not related to the traditional notable elite, much like his Shia counterpart Nabih Berri.

The greatest challenge to the group came towards the end of the war in the form of General Aoun and his faction of the Lebanese Army. Aoun rejected the Taif Agreement because of its provisions for Syrian involvement in Lebanon, while the Lebanese Forces reluctantly chose to accept it. By taking this position, Aoun gained many supporters in the Christian community. Aoun was militarily defeated by the Syrian Army and the leader himself exiled. The Lebanese Forces reluctantly accepted the Taif Agreement, but their lack of cooperation with Syrian’s presence in Lebanon resulted in the banning of the party and the imprisonment of Geagea in 1994 (Hanf, 1993; El-Khazen, 1994). Syrian repression of the Lebanese Forces prevented the group from accessing the resources needed for turning its wartime networks into a post-war political machine. However, in a homogenously Christian district that had been under the consistent control of the Lebanese Forces for the better part

---

12 The contrast in aggregate numbers from 1992 is due to redistricting. The 1992 district included Tyre in a larger district, while in 2009, the region was its own individual district.
of the war, none of the beneficiary groups had any linkages to the population or any history of network-building. Keserwan was only indirectly contained from afar, as the Syrian regime simply worked to prevent the emergence of an organized party that could unify the region and make it politically significant again.

This is one of the reasons why, after the end of the civil war and repression of wartime leaders, the traditional notable families regained their importance in Keserwan. The 1992 election in Keserwan was boycotted by the majority of voters who felt that the parties representing their interests were not on the ballot. The turnout was only 20%. It was even lower in Aounist strongholds in nearby districts. The candidates that won in 1992 were a mixture of notables and Syrian clients. They continued to dominate the district’s elections until Syrian withdrawal in 2005. In 1992, Keserwan’s five Christian seats were won by a relative of the Maronite bishop of Beirut, a landowner from the El-Khazen family, the most powerful clan in Keserwan, and three other candidates with a combination of family and Syrian connections (Saade, 1998; El-Husseini, 2012). One factor that made these candidates successful was their complete cooperation with Syrian policy in Lebanon (El-Husseini, 2012). Yet in contrast to Tyre, where wartime armed groups were still in control, the elections in Keserwan were competitive. No one dominated elections, and margins between the last winner and first losing candidate were within a few hundred votes. Elections changed considerably after the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005. The Lebanese Forces were legalized and Aoun returned from exile to found the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), a party that drew from his wartime following. Both armed groups-turned-parties contested elections in Keserwan in 2005 and 2009 which were also quite competitive. The Aounists were the winners in both cases. The El-Khazen family retained their seat, but candidates affiliated with the FPM won the rest (IFES, 2011; EU, 2005). Yet the FPM’s victories were not foregone conclusions. In the 2009 election, the last winner from the FPM’s list received 30,444 votes while the first loser from the LF’s list received 29,111. This is in stark contrast to the dynamics of elections in Tyre. These results demonstrate both the enduring networks and popular support for

---

13 This was mostly due to the fragmentation in the opposing side. The Lebanese Forces and Kataeb (a party that had a parallel following and similar ideology as the Lebanese Forces, but split from them mid-way through the war) split the vote, allowing Aoun to prevail.
wartime armed groups-turned-parties, even after a period of repression. However, they also demonstrate that these reintegrated losers of the war do not dominate their districts the way that the beneficiaries of the war do.

6.7.3 Tripoli: A Fragmented Territory

Tripoli is a largely Sunni district on the northern coast of Lebanon. In 2009, the district had approximately 196,000 registered voters, of whom 80% were Sunni Muslim. Traditional notable families also dominated the official politics of the district before the war. Yet unlike Tyre and Keserwan, Tripoli was not under the control of a single group or coalition of groups on the eve of the conflict’s settlement. By 1989, the Sunni community in Tripoli was fragmented with no clear militia leadership over the district. There were several reasons for this. Lebanese Sunnis armed groups were closely allied with and dependent on Palestinian groups that were a dominant player in the first half of the civil war. The most prominent of these were al-Mourabitoun, a group that espoused Nasserist Arab nationalism. When the PLO and other Palestinian groups were defeated by the Israeli military in 1982, al-Mourabitoun were significantly weakened. In 1985, Al-Mourabitoun were defeated in conflict with other armed groups (Hanf, 1993; Cammett, 2012). This created a political and military vacuum within the Sunni-majority regions of Lebanon. Although religious figures and Islamist parties sought to fill this void, they were only moderately successful, partly due to Syrian interference to prevent the resurgence of a strong Sunni militia (El-Husseini, 2012).

Relative to other regions, the north of Lebanon was shielded from the worst upheavals of the war and experienced political continuity rather than rupture (El-Husseini, 2012). Islamist movements ran in post-war elections, but were not able to dominate electoral politics the way that the Hezbollah-Amal alliance did in the country’s southern regions. Rafik Hariri, the wealthy entrepreneur whose charitable foundation began making inroads into the Sunni community during the war, saw an opportunity to claim the mantle of Sunni leadership in Lebanon (Cammett, 2012). However, in Tripoli, he confronted many political forces
opposing his ambitions. First was the Syrian regime’s policy of containing Hariri’s influence in a region which it saw as being in its traditional sphere of influence (El-Husseini, 2012). The most important domestic obstacles were the powerful traditional families who preserved more of their pre-war political role here than in other regions, particularly when compared to beneficiary group territories.

In 1992, independent candidates with pre-war backgrounds in politics won most of Tripoli’s five Sunni, two Christian, and one Alawite seats. Of the five Sunni seats, one went to a member of Jamaa Islamiya, an Islamist party that dismantled its militia a year into the civil war, but continued building a network within the population through social work (El-Husseini, 2012). Its role is simply as one of many players competing for political control of the district. Another seat went to a religious legal scholar who had previously been a member the Tripoli’s municipal council (Saade, 1998). The remaining three seats also went to independents with family connections, including Omar Karami, the heir to Tripoli’s most powerful notable family (Saade, 1998; El-Husseini, 2012). Elections were relatively competitive, with only a few thousand votes separating the last Sunni beneficiary and the first loser in Lebanon’s second-largest city. Traditional families continue to have the upper hand in most post-war Tripoli elections. After the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, Hariri’s Future Movement (FM) began to have some success in the district, although it never came to fully control it. The FM won two of the five Sunni seats in 2005 (EU, 2005), one at the expense of the Karami family, which had grown too reliant on Syrian support in its political struggle against other families in the years preceding the withdrawal (El-Husseini, 2012).

### 6.8 Alternative Hypotheses

There are alternative hypotheses that could plausibly explain some of the empirical patterns observed in Sections 6.5 and 6.6. The first and perhaps most obvious is that variation in the type of candidates that win elections and in the competitiveness of those elections may simply represent continuities from pre-war politics, with their root causes in pre-war political developments and mobilization (Balcells, forthcoming) rather than in diverging
experiences of territorial control during the war. However, even a brief examination of pre-
war parliamentary politics in Lebanon is enough to recognize that the most powerful post-war
parties were non-existent before the war, and that the degree of pre and post-war continuity
varies greatly by region in ways that are correlated with wartime territorial control.

Pre-war politics in Lebanon was dominated by prominent families, often wealthy landown-
ers, but also successful merchants and lawyers. The parliament was an exclusive “club” where
seats were commonly inherited and held in the control of these prominent families for genera-
tions. Many of the deputies, particularly those that were not directly part of notable families,
were themselves clients of larger patrons associated with the political families. Parliamentar-
ians were either advanced in age or very young, reflecting the inheritance dynamic. Several
prominent family-based politicians created blocs in the parliament, but these did not have
a clear programmatic goal. Parties with an ideological and programmatic platform such as
the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, the Communist Party, and several smaller pan-Arab
groups and Islamist movements started to gain support among segments of the population
in the immediate pre-war years, but were effectively shut out of the system. Parliament and
most legal and formal politics was the purview of traditional elites that had personal, almost
feudal, patron-client relationships with their constituents. However, there were two notable
political groupings that were hybrids, combining the influence of prominent political families
with modern party organization. They were the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) led by the
Jumblatt family, and the Kataeb (Phalangists) led by the Gemayel family (Picard, 2002).

When comparing this landscape to that of post-war politics, one notices that although
several families retained positions in the parliament, the ruptures outweigh the continuities,
most obviously in areas that came under armed group control. A pattern also emerges in
party development. Parties that did not militarize with the beginning of the civil war, like
many of the parliamentary blocs, lost their relevance. Others, like the elite-led Christian par-
ties that were affiliated with the Lebanese Forces (i.e. Phalangists, National Liberal Party)
were largely overwhelmed and marginalized by a new crop of lower middle class wartime
leaders that came up through the ranks of the Lebanese Forces’ military wing. Through an
internal coup in the mid-1980s, the Lebanese Forces became its own organization, separate
from the pre-war parties that had created it (Hiro, 1993). After the war, the Phalangists were relegated to being a minor party, with consistently weaker electoral performance relative to the Lebanese Forces' armed group-turned-party in 2005 and 2009 elections.

The PSP militarized and took on an increasingly Druze sectarian character as the war progressed (Hanf, 1993) and remains an important post-war player. As for the non-sectarian programmatic parties, most lost their influence during the war and those that militarized were gradually marginalized by sectarian armed actors (Hanf, 1993). However, the SSNP militia and party entered the legal political system and won seats in the first post-war parliament, largely due to its close relationship with Damascus. Despite this advantage, it did not become a major political player but only a junior partner in larger coalitions. The most striking rupture was the proliferation of new parties representing Muslim communities. Some had their roots in anti-establishment political movements that had begun in the immediate pre-war years, whereas others were a product of the war itself. The most prominent examples are Amal, Hezbollah, and the smaller Jamaa’ Islamiya (El-Khazen, 2000).

In short, the pre-war parliament and political system was dominated by individual political families within the formal halls of power and several programmatic parties that were excluded but gathering momentum outside the formal system. In the post-war era, new armed groups-turned-parties with a more overtly sectarian character became the most important players in the system. To varying degrees depending on regional differences in armed group strength and control, political families either completely or partially lost their pre-war influence. The programmatic parties that survived the war were integrated into the system as marginal players, contingent on them toeing the Syrian line.

Alternative hypotheses also arise from the fact that assignment to the explanatory variable or “treatment” is obviously not at random. Another factor, observable or unobservable, could have facilitated both the consolidation of armed group control and the development of regional dominant party systems in certain regions and not others. One possibility is that more religiously homogenous pre-war populations created conditions that were favorable for the establishment of armed group strongholds and regional dominance by a sectarian party in post-war elections. In regions with very mixed populations, fragmentation was the more
likely outcome. Of course, it is undeniable that underlying population characteristics played a role in armed groups’ abilities to establish regional strongholds. Early in the civil war, groups like Amal and the Lebanese Forces, for example, established control over regions where Shia and Christians, respectively, had long-standing historical majorities. However, the relationships between population homogeneity and armed group control is an endogenous one, as historical accounts of the Lebanese civil war prominently document sectarian armed groups’ efforts to further homogenize regions under their control in order to consolidate their rule and remove populations whose loyalty was questionable (Hanf, 1993; Picard, 2000). So while homogenous regions populated by co-ethnics make it more feasible for an armed group to establish control, the further homogenization of the region is one of the primary mechanisms through which that control is consolidated.

Furthermore, there are key instances of homogenous regions that were fragmented territories and heterogeneous regions that were under armed group rule that demonstrate that legacies of wartime governance are more important than population distributions in determining the competitiveness of post-war elections and the development of dominant party systems. Large areas of northern Lebanon are currently and were predominantly Sunni Muslim before the civil war (Hartmann, 1980) and yet no single armed group was able to consolidate control over the region. If population distribution was the determining factor rather than territorial control, we should observe dominance by a Sunni party and relatively uncompetitive elections. However, we observe the opposite. The sketch of the district of Tripoli in Section 6.7 provides further details, but elections in these majority Sunni-regions are competitive, and are won by a mixture of traditional notables, Syrian clients, and more recently, candidates affiliated with the Future Movement, a post-war party with no martial background.

The Shouf and Aley districts of Mount Lebanon, a region controlled by the Progressive Socialist Party is an opposite example. The pre-war population in this region was generally split between Christians and Druze, with Druze having a small majority (Hartmann, 1980). Since voters in Lebanon are required to register in their home region of origin, the breakdown of registered voters in 2009 still reflects this fact. In the most recent elections, 53% of
registered voters in the Shouf were Druze and 43% were Christian. In Aley, 58% of voters were Christians, 32% were Druze, and 28% were Sunni Muslim (IFES, 2011). If population homogeneity was the determining factor driving post-war electoral outcomes, we should not expect elections in this district be dominated by single sectarian party. However, this region has long been considered the stronghold of the PSP, the Druze armed group-turned-party, and its strongman leader Walid Jumblatt. In the 1980s, a campaign of wartime sectarian cleansing sent Christians fleeing for safety in majority Christian areas along the central coast and in Beirut (Hanf, 1993; ICTJ, 2013). While Jumblatt has encouraged the return and electoral participation of many Christians, and official top-down reconciliation between communities has occurred, this return has been carefully controlled by the Ministry of the Displaced, a government organ completely under Jumblatt’s control. Return is often contingent upon cooperation with and support for the ruling party (Leenders, 2012). Post-war elections, while more competitive than those in Hezbollah strongholds, are still less competitive than they are in fragmented or defeated group territories. The vast majority of successful candidates filling Christian-allocated seats in these regions are allied with the PSP and run on Jumblatt’s electoral list. These two counter examples suggest that population homogeneity, while related to armed group control, is not the driving factor behind post-war electoral outcomes.

This alternative explanation, that pre-war homogeneity is driving both the consolidation of armed group control and the lack of post-war electoral competition, is a hypothesis that has actually been dealt with directly in the regression analysis. Because Lebanese electoral law requires voters to register and vote in their home regions and not in the localities to which they were displaced, the distribution of the registered voters in a given district is an accurate picture of what the pre-war, not the current, resident population looks like. So in controlling for the fractionalization of the registered voter population, the analysis is actually controlling for pre-war fractionalization of that electoral district as well. The results do not support this hypothesis.

A third alternative hypothesis is that differences in political cultures better explain the nature of the political elite and political competition within each of Lebanon’s religious
communities. Some common assertions are that the Christian community has historically had a greater openness to political discourse and tolerance for dissension, which promotes competition and division. The Druze are an exceptionally tight-knit community, which explains their tendency to rally around a single strongman. Sunni Muslims have a more decentralized religious leadership and organization, while Shia Muslims have a history of authoritarian leaders and a more hierarchically organized religious leadership.

Such reductive generalizations may contain partial truths about the historical development of Lebanon’s communities, yet they also mask the fact that political competition and internal divisions are ubiquitous within each community, regardless of its particularities. The Syrian-backed Arslan family has posed a consistent though ineffective challenge to Jumblatt and the PSP (El-Khazen, 1994). While this has not changed the PSP’s control over their region, it does demonstrate that the Druze are not immune to internal divisions and challenges to the status quo. And while decentralization in Sunni Islam may explain some of the community’s fragmentation, the PLO militias during the early years of the civil war and Hariri’s Future Movement in the post-war era have both had instances of success in uniting Sunnis (Hanf, 1993; Cammett, 2014). During 1988, Hezbollah and Amal fiercely competed for and divided the Shia community. The strategic alliance between their international patrons is a crucial factor in the community and the parties’ unity (Hanf, 1993). Ultimately, the notion that particular cultural and theological characteristics shape political competition and political leadership in each community is difficult to disprove. However, the inclusion of the electoral race’s sectarian allocation in the regression analysis is an attempt at testing this hypothesis, at least for communal particularities in the post-war period. The results still hold when this variable is included. Furthermore, there is a great deal of evidence suggesting that material factors, such as territorial control, resources to maintain clientelist networks, and international support or repression are able to explain a significant portion of the variation in political leadership and competition in different regions and communities.
6.9 Conclusion

The legacies of civil war are most frequently examined either at the cross-national level or at the level of the individual. This chapter focuses on sub-national regional variation, an intermediate level of analysis that is crucial for understanding divergent post-war political development within the same country. The analysis leverages Lebanon’s diversity in wartime armed group control as well as variation in the post-war fate of different armed groups to examine how the dynamics of war interact with the outcome of the war to shape post-war politics in the longer-term. The results of the analysis demonstrate that there is a clear relationship between armed group territorial control at the end of the Lebanese civil war and the establishment of regionally dominant parties in the post-war period. This pattern only holds for areas controlled by groups that were beneficiaries of the war and Syria’s occupation. In contrast, territories that were fragmented at the end of the war exhibit higher levels of political competition. Territories controlled by armed groups who were militarily defeated or politically marginalized exhibit low competition when beneficiaries succeed in controlling them directly. They exhibit high competition and look more like fragmented areas when beneficiaries only exert control over them indirectly.
CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

7.1 Main Findings of the Dissertation

This dissertation presents a theoretical argument that explains why we observe different post-war political trajectories in different regions and localities of the same post-war country. Some areas continue to be ruled by entrenched warlords-turned-politicians and regionally hegemonic armed groups-turned-parties. In these areas, electoral competition is not meaningful and the prospects for leadership turnover are slim. Other areas do not remain under the grip of wartime actors. They experience a resurgence of traditional pre-war elites or the emergence of new candidates and parties. If former armed groups and their leaders participate in politics in these localities, they are forced to compete for their positions—sometimes winning and sometimes losing.

Chapter 2 presents a theory that provides an explanation for these divergent political paths. The answer lies in the interaction between local-level differences in wartime experiences of territorial control and the macro-level outcome of the conflict. The consolidation of control over territory and populations requires the building, appropriating, and restructuring of local political networks. Armed groups that do this successfully provide for themselves the “raw materials” for the creation of a post-war political machine. Other areas, whether fragmented or contested, have overlapping and competing political networks that contain in them the seeds for post-war political competition.

However, varying regional experiences of wartime territorial control is not the complete story. The outcome of the war—who benefits and who loses, who maintains links to foreign powers brokering an agreement and who does not—are critical to mediating the effect of
wartime territorial control on post-war politics. The outcome of the war determines whether territorial control and wartime networks can be made useful in the post-war era. If a particular armed group is a beneficiary of the war’s outcome, its leaders are then able to use the resources of the state to transform their regional networks into a post-war political machine that can dominate political life in the strongholds they controlled during the war. If an armed group is militarily defeated or politically marginalized in the outcome of the war, repression and a lack of resources prevent them from making the transition to a post-war party machine.

Beneficiary groups will seek to extend their control into these losing group areas. However, unless beneficiaries have latent networks in these regions, taking direct control is likely to be too costly. Instead, beneficiaries will likely choose a strategy of indirect containment. These indirectly contained territories will become politically competitive, looking more similar to fragmented places. If, however, a beneficiary group does have latent networks of support in a losing group area, they are more likely to be able to take direct control of the region. This latter type of losing group region will be political dominated by the beneficiary group and will have uncompetitive elections, just as in the beneficiary group’s stronghold.

Chapter 3 presents critical information about the Lebanese civil war and the development of armed group control over distinct regions of the country. It aims to illustrate the theory’s mechanisms at work in three time periods—during the war, the end of the war, and after the war. Chapter 4 of the dissertation uses an over-time comparison of the eastern and southern suburbs of Beirut to understand how territorial control and the displacement that often comes with consolidation, reshapes local political networks. Both Chapter 4 and 5 rely on a set of thirty in-depth interviews with local elites and residents in both areas, supplemented by the rich secondary literature. Both localities were under the consolidated control of armed groups in the final phase of the civil war. They were also the sites of repeated and massive population changes that were part of that consolidation of control. Both became safe havens for displaced persons from other areas who were of the same sectarian affiliation as the armed groups in control. These incoming displaced persons, due to their vulnerability and detachment from their hometown networks, were more susceptible
to the appeals of armed groups and were more likely to be embedded in their political networks. In contrast, “original” residents of the area who never had to leave continue to be more politically connected to traditional local familial elites that were prominent in the pre-war era. This was the case in both the eastern and southern suburbs.

In Chapter 5, the eastern and southern suburbs are contrasted. Although both areas followed similar pre-war and wartime trajectories, the outcome of the war affected them very differently. Hezbollah, the group controlling the southern suburbs, became a beneficiary of the war’s final outcome. The Aounist faction of the armed, the group controlling the eastern suburbs, was militarily defeated but political reintegrated in 2005. In the southern suburbs, local municipal councils act as mere rubber stamps for the armed group-turned-party, which hierarchically controls local politics. Traditional familial elites are disempowered. In the eastern suburbs, municipal councils are autonomous from armed groups-turned-parties. Politically competitive national elections provide traditional local elites with leverage vis-a-vis the competing parties, making the relationship between the two types of elites reciprocal in nature. Lastly, the power of each type of elite’s core constituency corresponds to that of its patrons. The displaced “new” residents are more empowered in the southern suburbs and the “original” residents more empowered in the eastern suburbs.

Chapter 6 provides a national-level empirical test of the argument’s implications for post-war elections—both their results and their competitiveness. I use digitized maps of territorial control in the last phase of the war and each major armed group’s position in the outcome of the war to classify territories as fragmented territories, beneficiary group territories, and losing group territories. The last category was further subdivided into losing group territories where beneficiaries had networks and were able to take direct control and those where beneficiaries had no latent networks and therefore practiced a strategy of indirect containment. A descriptive analysis demonstrates that fragmented territories and losing group territories that beneficiaries indirectly contain elect a mixture of candidates to parliament—including many pre-war traditional elites and new parties without martial backgrounds. In beneficiary group territories and losing group territories where a beneficiary has taken direct control, the candidates affiliated with that group always win. A statistical analysis finds a similar
patterns regarding electoral competition. In the former two types of territories, elections are competitive. In the latter two, the elections are uncompetitive. This is evidence that armed groups-turned-parties only acquire post-war hegemony in areas where they have a wartime history of network-building. However, this post-war regional dominance is only possible for armed groups that are beneficiaries of the war’s ending terms.

7.2 Why Warlords as Politicians Matters

This research demonstrates that wartime elites are often central actors in the post-war context, frequently able to prevent any political challenges in their regions of control. This new class of political elites, the warlords-turned-politicians, and the parties they control came to power through force of arms. Their *raison d’être* is often rooted in the “protection” of one identity-based group against another and they derive legitimacy from the struggle against the “other.” Because of this historical legacy, wartime actors are unlikely to be the best unifiers and nation builders. This dissertation began with the remarks of a Serbian soldier that illustrate this point. Warlords-turned-politicians have a vested interest in past divisions and they often use their material and political power to prevent attempts at inter-ethnic or inter-religious cooperation and political mobilization among post-war population. Furthermore, the continued existence of wartime armed groups as post-war parties preserves wartime networks of mobilization intact, reducing the barriers to future mobilizations for violence.

The notion that wartime elites’ control over post-war politics prevents productive political change aligns with the findings of other scholars who argue that regional and local wartime elites can present the most formidable obstacle to nation-building, reconciliation, and democratization (Leezenberg, 2005; Nourzhanov, 2005; Jenne, 2010; Zürcher et al., 2013). International organizations promoting these outcomes in post-war countries cannot afford to overlook these players. However, there is also no way to avoid them. Policymakers must design programmatic interventions and distribution of aid with an eye toward incentivizing these leaders to play the democratic game and channel their energies away from perpetuating
7.3 Why Variation in Political Competition Matters

In this dissertation, consistently uncompetitive elections won by candidates affiliated with former armed groups are taken as an observable implication of the development of regional dominant party systems. The lack of meaningful political competition is an important legacy of wartime armed group governance and a potential hindrance to post-war democratization. In theories of democracy, political competition is a crucial mechanism generating accountability, and reducing clientelism in favor of programmatic policies and better provision of public goods. The ability to sanction politicians through elections and the possibility of an alternation of power is central to our understanding of democracy (Przeworski, 1991). However, in political contexts in which there are stable ethnic or sectarian parties, elections center on turnout buying and political competition actually increases patronage and leads to an under-provision of public goods (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Driscoll, 2015). In the Lebanese context, Cammett shows that, among parties invested in electoral politics, a lack of political competition increases the scope of a party’s welfare provision, focusing it on out-group members as well as in-group members, instead of just providing for core members. Yet when a party pursues politics by non-electoral (demonstrations, riots, militia participation) and electoral means, a lack of competition leads it to focus narrowly on providing services for core members that participate in costly activities (Cammett, 2014). This research suggests that political competition in an unstable and religiously or ethnically divided country affects the provision of welfare services differently depending on party characteristics. Further research should make the connections between the wartime legacies of parties, their organizational structure, and its implications for their patterns of service provision.
7.4 Implications for Stability: Is There a Trade-off?

The findings of this dissertation, particularly those on the development of regionally hegemonic parties, have interesting and counterintuitive implications for post-war stability and the geographic distribution and persistence of post-war internal violence. Due to armed group-turned-parties’ consolidated control over beneficiary group territories and directly controlled losing group territories, those regions may be less likely to experience post-war instability and internal violence. If armed group leaders have become successful politicians, integrated into the state and with access to its resources, they have the incentive and the means to promote stability in their enclaves of control. A regionally dominant party can also use its organizational capacity to prevent spontaneous violence from escalating, discipline its own supporters, and deter the formation of new armed groups seeking to challenge its local control. This dynamic might help explain why outright victories are more likely to lead to greater stability (Toft, 2010) despite the often authoritarian character of regimes after this type of war ending. In situations where victory is not complete, the territories under a regional dominant party system stand in contrast to fragmented and indirectly contained losing group territories. In the latter regions, intense competition, generated by fragmentation or a post-war political vacuum, coupled with a fragile post-conflict setting where weapons are still likely to be easily acquired, may create the potential for instability and continued clashes. Furthermore, it is likely that the wartime geography of territorial control continues to shape the geography of post-war violence. Armed confrontations between armed groups-turned-parties, in the event they do occur, may likely be along wartime fault lines that separated different territories during the war and currently separate their geographic spheres of political influence.

I am currently undertaking the collection of geo-coded data on post-war violence in Lebanon to examine whether these implications are confirmed empirically. Preliminary data from the International Center on Transitional Justice (ICTJ, 2013) suggests that internal violence in post-war Lebanon is indeed more likely to occur along old territorial borders. Accounts of internal post-war violence in Lebanon also frequently cite clashes occurring in
fragmented regions where multiple neighborhood-level militias and gangs are unchecked by a dominant party and are allowed the space to proliferate (Mulligan, 2014a,b). However, this eruption of violence seems to be conditional on international events and patrons that make some but not other fault lines salient at particular times, since not all politically competitive spaces experience post-war violence. These patterns suggest that, in the absence of complete disarmament and the severing of financial ties between armed groups and foreign patrons, post-conflict countries remain vulnerable to destabilization by external actors. These patterns also imply that, barring the severing of these ties, there may indeed be an unfortunate trade-off between security and pluralistic politics in fragile post-conflict contexts. Pursuing this research agenda would help explain the existence of pockets of instability below the national level and contribute to a more nuanced understanding of post-war stability and violence that may not register on standard metrics of civil war recurrence.

7.5 Implications for Policymaking

The theoretical argument and findings presented in this dissertation have several implications for policymaking. First, the argument provides a framework of understanding the possible outcomes of multi-player territorial conflicts that end in post-war elections, which are becoming increasingly common in the post-Cold war period (see Chapter 2). This research moves beyond the large structural features of a conflict and binary outcomes such as victories or settlements. Instead, it provides a roadmap for practitioners seeking to develop peacebuilding and reconstruction plans that take regional variation into account. The framework developed in this dissertation and the different types of territories introduced in Chapter 2 could help policymakers classify different regions of the same conflict-ridden country based on their different political landscapes and how those might affect the implementation of peacebuilding, reconciliation, or reconstruction projects.

Perhaps the most clear policy implication of this study is that even within one post-conflict country, there is no one size fits all approach to peacebuilding and reconstruction. The same programs and initiatives may produce radically different results when applied to
regions with different wartime legacies of territorial control and varying degrees of population displacement. In some areas, particularly those where wartime elites exert hegemonic control or are likely to be successful in their attempts to do so, international organizations may need to work with these elites in order to accomplish improvements in public health, education, and infrastructure. Practitioners and policymakers must find overlapping interests with wartime elites and explore new ways of incentivizing their participation in an equitable rebuilding process.

In terms of democratic political reform, the findings of this dissertation suggest that this may the most difficult thing to change. Shutting wartime elites out of peace talks and settlement processes is an obvious recipe for failure. Denying them the guaranteed benefits that so often come with powersharing agreements would provide them with little motivation to put down their weapons. One possible alternative is to introduce long-term sunset clauses on particular aspects of a powersharing agreement. This would involve a gradual reduction in the guarantees afforded to different parties sharing power at the end of a civil war. Over the course of decades, as warlords-turned-politicians establish norms of communication, compromise, and mutual trust, rigid powersharing provisions—such as shared executives, fixed quotas, and guaranteed control over particular parts of the state apparatus—could be relaxed in a piecemeal fashion. Such sunset clauses would need to be implemented with the agreement of all parties and robust international mediation.

7.6 Conclusion

Taking regional and local differences in post-war outcomes seriously is more important than ever. Syria, Iraq, Libya, and many other war-torn countries around the globe are currently being carved up into distinct territories of control by armed groups vying for victory and political power. Each of these territories is experiencing conflict differently. Latakia, Aleppo, and Raqqa in Syria have been on dramatically different political trajectories for several years now. The displacement of civilians, restructuring of networks, and establishment of wartime institutions that comes with the consolidation of territorial control will produce different
post-war outcomes in each city. If the international community hopes to develop effective peacebuilding, reconstruction, and reconciliation programs, it is imperative to understand how these programs will be met by local elites and populations in different regions and local contexts. Only with a more nuanced and systematic understanding of the regional and local-level consequences of civil war can the international community make productive strides to promoting enduring peace.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Costalli, Stefano and Andrea Ruggeri. 2015. “Forging political entrepreneurs: Civil war effects on post-conflict politics in Italy.” Political Geography 44(C):40–49.


Manning, Carrie and Ian Smith. 2016. “Political party formation by former armed opposition groups after civil war.” Democratization pp. 1–21.


Program, Uppsala Conflict Data. 2015. “UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia.”. URL: [www.ucdp.uu.se](http://www.ucdp.uu.se)


