POLICY-MAKING FOR METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT:
AMERICAN AND CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES

By
Donald N. Rothblatt
Urban and Regional Planning Department
San Jose State University
San Jose, California 95192

Working Paper 91-27
POLICY-MAKING FOR METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT: AMERICAN AND CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES

By
Donald N. Rothblatt
Urban and Regional Planning Department
San Jose State University
San Jose, California 95192

Working Paper 91-27

A version of this paper will be published in the forthcoming volume on metropolitan governance in the American and Canadian federal systems as part of the North American federalism project of the Canadian Studies Program at the University of California at Berkeley. Funding was generously supplied by the William H. Donner Foundation, the Business Fund for Canadian Studies in the United States, the Pacific Gas Transmission Company, The McLean Group (Vancouver) and Marathon U.S. Realities Inc.

Working Papers published by the Institute of Governmental Studies provide quick dissemination of draft reports and papers, preliminary analyses, and papers with a limited audience. The objective is to assist authors in refining their ideas by circulating research results and to stimulate discussion about public policy. Working Papers are reproduced unedited directly from the author's pages.
POLICY-MAKING FOR METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT:
AMERICAN AND CANADIAN
PERSPECTIVES

by

Donald N. Rothblatt
Urban and Regional Planning Department
San Jose State University
San Jose, California 95192

Institute of Governmental Studies
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, California 94720

PRELIMINARY DRAFT

A Paper
for presentation at the
Joint International Congress
Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning
Association of European Schools of Planning
Oxford, England
July, 1991
INTRODUCTION

Clearly, a metropolitan planning and management system is needed in order to deal with our growing urban problems which increasingly transcend the boundaries and resources of local jurisdictions. A metropolitan guidance system can help an urban region function more efficiently by limiting the diseconomies of fragmented and inadequate local services by providing the means for dealing with critical area-wide problems, such as the provision of adequate public transportation facilities, housing, open space, and pollution control (Dolan 1990). Such a system is becoming increasingly important at a time when metropolitan areas are experiencing mounting international competition and geographic dispersion.

Yet, despite the importance of metropolitan problems, they are often left unresolved due to the limits of regional government and control in the United States. This is the case because of the unwillingness of the diverse and often conflicting public and private interests to accept regional planning and authority as traditionally presented.

While the United States has recently begun to explore new regional approaches to urbanization, other societies have experimented for decades with extensive regional growth management policies designed to structure growth in metropolitan areas. For example, since the 1960's Canada has employed regional growth management policies to coordinate urban growth and transportation facilities. An evaluation of the regional planning experiences of this neighboring society with similar cultural and geographic characteristics to the United States, could provide extremely useful information for improving American metropolitan planning.

This paper presents the results of a comparative study of Canadian and American metropolitan planning and management systems. In particular, the study attempts to examine the institutional settings and relative successes of regional planning organizations in both countries. An examination was made of the functioning of regional planning institutions in some of the largest and most complex metropolitan areas in both countries. The paper closes with a discussion of institutional patterns for guiding metropolitan growth in both of these North American countries and their implications for regional planning in other industrialized nations.
STUDY PURPOSE AND METHOD

The major objectives of this study are to determine the extent to which we can characterize U.S. and Canadian metropolitan areas as each having distinctive policy-making processes and patterns of inter-governmental relations with respect to regional planning and the provision of major urban infrastructure and to examine the implications of these differences.

To structure our comparative study, we decided to examine a representative sample of large urban areas in both countries, and to pair these areas in order to reflect regional differences in each country (Fallis 1990) and similarities among specific metropolitan areas on both sides of the border (Feldman and Goldberg 1987). Accordingly, our research group paired Canadian and American urban regions based on similarities of these regions in terms of national function, social composition, location, geography, and relative size and history. We first selected the largest Canadian metropolitan areas and then chose what appeared to be counterpart regions in the United States. Our effort resulted in the following pairs of regions representative of large metropolitan areas in both countries:

Toronto --- Chicago
Montreal --- Boston
Vancouver --- San Francisco Bay Area
Edmonton --- Houston
Winnipeg --- Minneapolis - St. Paul

With the assistance of project co-chairs, Andrew Sancton (University of Western Ontario) and Donald Rothblatt (San Jose State University), the following paired teams of Canadian and American researchers were organized to conduct our comparative study of these metropolitan areas:

1) Toronto Frances Frisken (York University)
    Chicago George Hemmens (University of Illinois at Chicago)

2) Montreal Marie-Odile Trépanier (Université de Montréal)
    Boston Mark Gelfand (Boston College)

3) Vancouver H. Peter Oberlander (University of British Columbia)
    Patrick Smith (Simon Fraser University)

    San Francisco Victor Jones (University of California, Berkeley)
    Donald Rothblatt (San Jose State University)

4) Winnipeg *
    Minneapolis Judith Martin (University of Minnesota)
5) Edmonton Theodore Thomas (Mills College)
Houston Robert Thomas (University of Houston)

* We were unable to arrange for a study of the Winnipeg metropolitan area.

Our general hypothesis was that the continental scale and specialized functions of these paired regions would uncover systematic similarities in metropolitan governance. That is, we expected to find special similarities in metro governance between the paired regions beyond the general patterns of each set of Canadian and American urban areas.

For the entire sample, we set out to explore three hypotheses which might help explain the similarities and differences between the two metro governance systems. The first hypothesis is related to the research of Goldberg and Mercer (1986). They found significant urban contrasts between the two countries and argued that their findings were due to differences in a broad range of national social, economic and cultural characteristics. That is, differences would be expected because of many mutually reinforcing social, economic and political variables which reflect the overall dissimilarities of the two social systems.

A second hypothesis claims that metropolitan differences can result primarily from conscious political decisions taken to shape urban development in both countries (Frisken 1986; Hall 1991). Indeed, Frisken fears that shifts in Canadian provincial governmental policies which increasingly favor suburban over central city areas may "Americanize" Canadian metropolitan areas.

A third hypothesis is that urban policy making is increasingly influenced by autonomous global social and economic forces. That is, as the world economy becomes more open and competitive, the slightest diseconomies, such as congestion, pollution and high housing costs, make established centers less desirable and induce continued decentralization of development (Hall and Hay, 1980; Cherry, 1984; Rothblatt and Garr 1986; Castells 1990). Here, we would expect that urban development and policy making would be driven by world trends, would be largely beyond local or national control, and would result in increasing similarities of the two systems.

With these hypotheses in mind, each study team conducted its research during 1989 and 1990. Based on library research, data analysis and interviews with other researchers, public officials, and representatives of the private and non-profit sectors, an examination was made of the functioning of regional planning in the sample metropolitan areas in both countries. Drafts of papers on the sample areas were presented by the end of 1990.
What follows is an attempt to summarize and draw some tentative conclusions from our collective enterprise.

**SUMMARY**

Our general hypothesis concerning similarities in metro governance between the paired regions was shown to be essentially false. We found that the structure of both sets of urban areas differ in terms of the number of local governments, population density, geographic areas covered (see Table 1); and with the possible exception of the Minneapolis - St. Paul metropolitan area, none of the U.S. regions has metropolitan governance approaching that in the most advanced Canadian metropolitan areas (see Table 2). Thus, the Chicago area's highly decentralized political system is vastly different from its counterpart Metro Toronto's regional planning process.

Yet, each national sample of metropolitan areas does represent a comparable population size spectrum of urbanization with regard to its own system of cities. The Canadian areas finally chosen (Winnipeg was deleted) represented an average size ranking of 2.7 of the 26 census metropolitan areas (CMAs) placing them near the upper 10% of Canadian urban regions; while the American sample yielded an average ranking of 8.4 out of 131 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) (with a 1988 population of at least 250,000) putting them in the top 7% of eligible U.S. metro areas. Thus, while each pair of metro areas may not have been comparable with respect to size (excepting Montreal and Boston) and other variables, both samples held comparable positions with regard to their respective national metropolitan size distributions (in the top 10%). Therefore, as a group our sample might be most appropriate to tell us something about overall, rather than specific, similarities and differences between large Canadian and American metropolitan areas.
While nearly every North American metropolitan area has some form of regional institutional arrangement to at least consider metropolitan issues (see Table 1), few of these institutions have the authority to govern. Our study confirms the view held by Goldberg and Mercer (1986) that Canadian metropolitan areas generally have more highly developed collective regional governance systems than their American counterparts. True, the great regional and developmental variations in Canada have generated a rich diversity in political styles, from the more free wheeling resource-oriented province of Alberta, to the more established centers of Ontario and Quebec.

It is also true that even the most highly regarded Canadian metropolitan governments are not without their limitations. While Metro Toronto has clearly been one of the most effective two-tiered metropolitan governments in North America, rationally guiding development and infrastructure within its domain, most of the growth since the 1950's in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) has occurred beyond the boundaries and control of Metro Toronto. Although the Toronto area does not have the large number of local governments found in U.S. metro areas, Frances Frisken in her essay observes, "the GTA has not entirely escaped local political fragmentation and complexity". Metro Toronto is surrounded by four outlying regional municipalities containing a total of 24 municipalities making development decision-making increasingly difficult within GTA, especially when a number of these entities do not even have an agreed upon development plan. Indeed, as Frisken goes on to conclude about the Toronto region:

What has become increasingly apparent is that Metro as a whole is in competition with its regional neighbors (and their member municipalities) for population, economic investment and provincial funds for infrastructure.

In addition, Canadian metropolitan governments are not entirely autonomous within their own boundaries. The provincial cabinet, with its great powers of providing social and infrastructure services and reviewing land use decisions, still has the greatest potential to influence the character of public services and settlement patterns within a metropolitan region. This potential far exceeds the authority excersised by American states, which have usually given great deference to local governments, including home rule powers. Yet, in recent years the province of Ontario appears to have been reluctant to impose a clear development strategy for the Toronto area and has seldom overridden local planning preferences. The growing political influence of the expanding suburban areas and the concern of other portions of the province threatened by Toronto's growing economic power have directed provincial resources for infrastructure and community services away from Metro to other
areas. Thus, while the province of Ontario took great initiative in establishing Metro in the 1950s and reorganizing it with some political consolidation and directly elected representation in the 1960s, the province has become primarily a region-wide and province-wide mediator and consensus builder in recent years.

When we examine Montreal, we see a similar pattern of provincial behavior to the Toronto case. As the second largest French speaking city in the industrialized world and the cultural and economic capital of Quebec, Montreal itself plays a distinctive role without parallel in the rest of Canada. Yet, the function of ethnicity and history in Montreal metropolitan politics are somewhat akin to those in the Boston region.

The regional government in the Montreal Area, the Montreal Urban Community (MUC) was established in 1970 primarily to rationalize transportation and police services. Initially there were hopes that the MUC, which now represents Montreal and 28 much smaller communities, would become a strong metropolitan government with broad powers to implement a vision for the region (Sancton 1988). However, because of the political tensions between Montreal and these other cities (many of which are primarily Anglophone), and because of the community council's requirement for double approvals (by the Council and the city of Montreal) for action, MUC's activities have been greatly constrained. As Marie-Odile Trapanier stated:

MUC's functions, except for police and transit, tended to be limited to noncontroversial technical matters as sewage collectors or air pollution control.

From the outset, MUC boundaries were obsolete encompassing only about 71 percent of the metropolitan population in 1971, and dropping to 60 percent by 1986. The approximately 70 municipalities in the most rapidly growing part of the region, the outlying suburban ring, continue to increase their influence with the Quebec provincial government for public investment in infrastructure and other public services. For example, a major highway planned to link the Montreal area with the Ottawa region will be re-routed away from the city of Montreal to serve instead suburban areas (Simaerd 1989). Thus, like the Toronto case, the Quebec province seems to be involved in the politics of allocation and building metropolitan consensus. As Trapanier put it, "the provincial role has become more of a facilitator than simply a mandator".

The Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD), established in 1969, also showed great promise as a metropolitan government. It not only had a mandated planning function for the Vancouver region comprised of 18 municipalities and 1.5 million inhabitants, but also delivered a wide range of services to the area, such as water supply and hospital facilities. GVRD's Board of Directors
consists of 28 members representing municipal and unincorporated districts which were initially free to "opt out" of a particular function of a district. Thus, the Board in fact had a voluntary characteristic by functional activity.

During its first decade and a half of functioning with uncertain provincial support, the GVRD generated a sophisticated regional planning process to guide development for an extended regional area through its "Livable Region Programme" which dealt with such issues as jobs/housing balance, employment, open space, rapid transit and growth management. Yet, after a series of conflicts with the provincial government as well as shifts to a more conservative provincial cabinet led to the removal of GVRD's regional planning authority in 1983. Consequently, the GVRD was left essentially as an elaborate service district, not a new level of government.

Still, the GVRD continues to have informal influence on regional development because of its past work and prestige. As Oberlander and Smith conclude in their essay:

Yet despite this provincially assigned status, the GVRD has developed a capacity to act for the region. Indeed, after earlier years of ambivalence, intervention and hostility, several recent developments suggest the potential for increased government capacity....

Thus, even without its formal authority, GVRD is the only institution in the Vancouver metropolitan area with the capacity to plan regionally, if not govern regionally.

As a newly developing resource oriented region, the Edmonton metropolitan area is more market oriented than our other Canadian study areas. Spurred by the post World War II petroleum boom, Edmonton's population nearly increased five fold to 515,800 during the 1947-81 period, while the entire metropolitan area nearly quadrupled to 741,000.

Like several emerging cities in America's sunbelt, Edmonton's growth was reinforced with vigorous boosterism and governmental reformism which pushed for extensive annexation of surrounding areas. That is, there was a drive to create a larger central city which would increase the economic importance of Edmonton and rationalize metropolitan government. Thus, between 1947 to 1981 Edmonton grew from about 40 to 234 square miles in area. In fact, its last large annexation proposal, which was only partially approved (due to opposition of adjacent municipalities) by the province in 1981, would have increased Edmonton's size to 888 square miles. As Ted Thomas describes this annexation showdown in his essay:
The provincial government resisted all proposals for regional government, likely out of fears of the influence such a unified government in its own backyard might have on provincial politics. By emphasizing repeatedly its commitment to local autonomy of the communities within the region, the government was quite willing to accept the inefficiencies and redundancies which followed from the policy.

After more than two decades of rivalry between Edmonton and its neighbors over economic development and annexation issues, the Alberta cabinet established the Edmonton Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission (EMRPC) in 1981. EMRPC's boundaries include 4 rural and 15 urban municipalities in a 2,576 square mile area. The commission's mandate is to "...plan for the orderly development of the region..." (EMRPC 1987,6). Its main functions are:

- prepare and administer a regional plan;
- provide advice and assistance to municipalities when requested;
- act as the subdivision approving authority for the region;
- provide advice and recommendations on annexation matters; and
- seek and encourage public participation in the planning of the Edmonton region.

As part of its on-going operations, the commission often serves as a center for coordinating the planning activities undertaken by other levels of government. The EMRPC guides growth and development matters of local and regional significance. The commission works closely with municipalities by providing advice on land use matters, but, except for subdivision approvals, serves in an advisory capacity only. The current goals and objectives of the commission concern enhancing the commission's role as an intermunicipal forum.

Yet, beyond its advisory capacity, the EMRPC seemed likely to run into major problems planning for the region. With the City of Edmonton, possessing 80% of the region's population with only one-third of the votes, and the other rival municipalities having the remaining votes, it has been extremely difficult for the commission to build a consensus for effective action. As Ted Thomas concluded:

The relationships between the regional planning commission with heavy representation from the smaller centers and the city were often strained as were the relations between the city and the provincial government.

In this respect the governance of the Edmonton area is again like those in American sunbelt metropolitan regions, such as the Houston area.
When we turn our attention to the American metropolitan areas, we find similar variety in institutional form, but far less success, in regional governance compared to the Canadian experience. The Chicago area, with its 8,180,900 residents in 1988 covering 5,660 square miles, brings the Canadian-U.S. differences into sharp relief. This third most populous metropolitan area in North America has, as Hemmens and McBride point out, "over 1250 governments ... making it one of the most intensely governed regions in the country". And while there are regional planning institutions in the Chicago area, such as the Northeastern Illinois Regional Planning Commission (NIPC) for general planning and the Chicago Area Transportation Study (CATS) for transportation planning, they have almost no authority to implement their plans. True, NIPC and CATS do provide useful information, technical assistance and regional images and serve as vehicles for metropolitan-wide cooperation. But few of their planning proposals have been accepted by the various cities, counties and special districts which they serve and by which they are governed. As Hemmens and McBride observe about the first long range CATS-NIPC transportation plan of 1962:

Almost none of the plan's recommendations for freeway and transit network improvements have since become part of the region's infrastructure.

Established in 1957 with 32 commissioners reflecting regional and statewide interests, NIPC has no taxing authority and raises funds by contracting specialized planning services and through contributions of local governments in the region. In addition to CATS, NIPC's planning activities have to be coordinated with other influential regional special districts which provide important services, such as public transportation and sewers. At the same time, the city of Chicago and several sub-regional planning efforts in the form of outlying counties and suburban councils of government have also developed policies for major portions of the metropolitan area. These diverse public institutions coupled with private sector interests filtered through non-profit organizations, such as the Metropolitan Planning Council, make regional-wide consensus building very difficult but very important for almost anything implemented the area.

Major cleavages also exist along race and class lines which are reflected in the geopolitics of the region. Chicago, with its 1980 population 40 percent black and 14 percent hispanic residing in clearly defined minority neighborhoods, is perhaps one of the most segregated cities in the United States. Rivalry among the various neighborhoods for jobs, housing and public services represents important controversies within the city, and competition between Chicago and the outlying suburbs for economic development, tax revenues and public resources delineates major points of conflict within the region (Bennett et al. 1987).
Thus, only the most crucial area-wide problems are dealt with at the regional level, such as coping with excessive transportation congestion. For this reason, a considerable amount of cooperation was experienced by almost all parties concerned in the most recent NEPC-CATS sponsored transportation planning process (2010 TSP Plan) for necessary highway and transit improvements. Indeed, surveys undertaken in 1987 indicated that a majority of the regional population believe that transportation is the only problem that can't be solved by localities independently.

Yet, for most issues Hemmens and McBride characterize decision-making in the Chicago area as "chaos, where there is no consistency in how issues are raised or resolved". And since potentially major actors, such as a regional planning institution and the state government, are unable or unwilling to provide leadership for the Chicago area to help resolve these issues, the result is usually inaction.

While representing the oldest U.S. metropolitan area in our study, the Boston region seems to experience governance problems similar to those in much of metropolitan America. With its 1988 population of 4,109,900 over 2,429 square miles, the Boston area has over one hundred cities and towns, five counties and dozens of school and special districts.

Despite numerous attempts to create some form of metropolitan government for the Boston region since the 1880's, none has been established. Instead, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts created the first American regional special district in 1889, the Metropolitan Sewer District, and many others over the years for such activities as parks and transportation. It wasn't until 1963 that the state established a regional planning institution for the Boston area, the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC).

With the arrival of Irish Catholic immigrants starting to dominate Boston's population in the mid-nineteenth century, the old line Yankee protestant population tried to control Boston and its metropolitan area from the statehouse, and eventually from local suburban government. This political cleavage continues on today with perhaps even greater intensity with the emergence of a significant minority group population in Boston (23 percent Black and 7 percent Hispanic in 1980) in recent decades. Thus, it is not surprising that historically regional services were provided by state dominated special districts. It is also not surprising that MAPC, the first regional planning agency for the area, was established as an extension of state government requiring representation of all local governments in the region (now 101) and state agencies and special districts, and having purely advisory planning functions. As Mark Gelfand observed about the state in his essay:
It might have imposed metropolitan government upon the region, but chose not to do so because this would have created a major rival to its own authority.

After nearly three decades, MAPC finally developed enough of a consensus to adopt its first comprehensive regional planMetroplan 2000 in the Spring 1990. However, it remains to be seen if the plan, which calls for more focused development and efficient infrastructural provision as well as a strengthened regional planning agency and several subregional planning councils, will receive the support for its implementation by local and state government.

Clearly, the San Francisco Bay Area has a regional geography and settlement pattern quite different from those in most major North American metropolitan areas. While its development is dispersed around a 100 mile long bay, the region is focused on three major central cities --- San Francisco, Oakland and San Jose --- each competing for its share of political, economic and cultural resources.

Yet, similar to many American metropolitan areas it has a decentralized multi-nucleated political and physical settlement pattern. With its 1988 population of 6,041,800 over a 7,403 square mile area, it is host to 602 units of government including 100 cities, 10 counties and hundreds of special districts.

The most comprehensive look at regional planning for the Bay Area has been undertaken by the region's council of governments, the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG). Created in 1961, ABAG's organization is provided by contractual agreement between member cities and counties acting under the authority of the joint Exercise of Powers Act of the State of California. Its membership includes 92 cities and 9 counties, which send representatives and dues to the organization.

As Jones and Rothblatt indicate in their essay, ABAG's primary function is:

...to provide a framework for dealing with regional problems on a cooperative, coordinating basis. The Association is not in itself a government agency, but tries to provide the means by which city and county governments and special agencies can work together to solve regional problems.

In addition to providing information and a forum for regional concerns, ABAG has the responsibility to create a regional plan in concert with other regional institutions, especially the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC). Its plan, produced in 1970 and amended in 1980, called for a "City Center Region," which would focus increased housing density development near...
existing urban areas and provide open space buffers between cities. However, in the absence of authority to implement these policies, ABAG's plan met with very limited success. During the 1970s and 80s, housing densities did not increase and urban sprawl continued to consume open space and generate traffic congestion at an alarming rate. This process of metropolitan expansion was reinforced by the 1978 Proposition 13 tax change in California which encourages inlying local governments to capture the more fiscally desirable commercial and industrial activity and push service demanding residential development to the periphery of metropolitan areas. As a recent evaluation of ABAG's regional plan indicated (ABAG 1986,3):

Today, what remains of open space is increasingly under development pressures. Annually, regional growth is consuming close to 7,000 acres of undeveloped land. It is only a matter of time before the remaining buffers will disappear.

Another, problem facing ABAG has been the drastic reduction of its federal funding which decreased from 85 to 13 percent of its annual budget during the 1976-86 period. As a result it has expanded its activities by providing many revenue generating services to local governments, such as group liability insurance, credit pooling and technical training. Indeed, nearly 2/3 of ABAG's staff work on these activities in order to support the remaining staff engaged in regional planning activities. Despite the revenues from these services, ABAG does not have the staff to fully conduct the comprehensive studies and persuasive planning required for traditional regional planning and implementation. In addition, planning for the expanding region has become more complex and difficult.

In order to economize on its limited resources, ABAG appears to have shifted to a strategic planning approach involving identifying specific regional problems and generating realistic solutions. As Jones and Rothblatt observe about this new ABAG approach:

While still in its early phases, this strategic approach will attempt to guide growth near existing communities employing sub-regional planning as a means to resolving interjurisdictional issues and as a tool to implement regional policies.

Meanwhile, the automobile oriented transportation system continues to experience mounting near gridlock conditions, such that recent surveys have identified traffic congestion as the leading problem concerning Bay Area residents. In the absence of an enforceable regional plan, many planning activities have been undertaken by numerous public and private actors at varying scales of operation: growth limiting regulations beyond normal land use
controls have been adopted by more than half of the region's local governments; several subregional organizations of local governments and counties have attempted to limit automobile use, through such measures as transportation demand management ordinances; Bay Area-wide organizations representing the private sector, environmental groups and other interests, such as the Bay Area Council, the Greenbelt Alliance, and Bay Vision 2020 have been generating their own long term comprehensive regional plans; and at the state level, legislation and initiatives have been passed to help reduce air pollution and transportation congestion.

What we may be witnessing in the Bay Area appears to be a new collaboration of public and private interests to cope with urgent metropolitan problems of broad concern. This collaboration may be setting the stage for effective regional management in the future. As the Bay Area Council President, Angelo Siracusa, expressed (Bay Area Council 1988,1):

Working with the Association of Bay Area Governments, the Bay Area Council formed an important new regional economic development effort aimed at the long-term health of the region's economy. Made up of the region's top leaders, from the public and private sectors, the Bay Area Economic Forum will provide a unique opportunity for the Bay Area to work towards regional consensus on public policy issues affecting our economy.

Thus, it appears that a new public-private partnership is likely to be the basis of any new regionalism in the Bay Area.

Like other American sunbelt regions, the Houston area has grown rapidly since the end of World War II, especially with the rise in oil prices during the 1970s. By the early 1980s, the population in the metropolitan area had increased to 3.0 million and Houston with 1.7 million persons became the fourth most populous city in North America in 1983. Growth has come from extensive annexation of adjacent areas as well as from migration and natural increase.

Similar to Edmonton, Houston was a newly emerging city located next to large tracts of unincorporated land when it launched its annexation drive. Employing its extra-territorial jurisdictional (ETJ) authority provided by the state legislature since 1963, Houston was able to control development beyond its boundaries and annex as much as 10 percent of its area annually. The growth of Houston through annexation has been dramatic. Houston's land area increased from 160 square miles in 1950 to 434 square miles in 1970, and to 556 square miles in 1980. And this
geographic expansion enabled Houston to capture the lion's share of regional growth so that by 1980 Houston had a majority of the metropolitan population within its boundaries—*the only central city of the ten most populous urban regions in the U.S. to do so.*

Houston's annexation process was also greatly facilitated by utility districts created by the state legislature to provide services for suburban development of nearby unincorporated land. Since the mid 1960's, this was especially the case with the state's creation of Municipal Utility Districts (MUDs) as they established a privatized mechanism to provide infrastructure for outlying residential and commercial development without burdening Houston with front end financing. Then, when all was developed, Houston would annex. Through annexation of these districts, Houston has been able to escape the plight experienced by other major cities surrounded by many incorporated suburban municipalities. Houston has maintained a sound tax base by annexing the fleeing middle class right back into the city.

Since the late 1960s, Houston's population growth has been matched by increments in the built environment. From 1970 to 1985, no less than 361 large office buildings were constructed, representing 80% of all existing buildings by 1985. Housed in Houston's major buildings are the white-collar staffs of the oil and gas companies and allied support companies such as law firms, accounting firms, and banks. Houston has been called the "oil capital of the world" because of the substantial investments of oil, gas, and petrochemical companies in the area.

Houston's growth has not occurred without conflict. Certain minority communities have suffered as a result of the growth plans of the predominantly white business elite. The initial decisions leading to destruction of minority residential communities were made by white leaders in the interest of business-oriented growth (Fisher 1990). In addition, the Houston area experienced a fiscal crisis in 1983. Houston found its expenditures rising much more rapidly than tax revenues. The crisis has been partially attributed to the oil/gas recession which hit Houston in 1982, and partially to the costs of growth. The Houston area faced possible service cutbacks, a situation brought about by the increased costs of services (and increased level of spending), and lack of planning by government officials.

However, the city was already experiencing problems by 1978. Due to the tremendous growth of population and land areas away from the inner city, Houston has been unable to maintain and upgrade the infrastructure of the inner city. In addition, when MUD's are annexed, the city often faces substantial expenditures to provide adequate facilities to replace poorly built, or poorly maintained, facilities previously constructed.
Another important constraint has been placed on Houston's annexation policies—a 1978 U.S. Department of Justice requirement to make its city council more representative of its minority population by shifting from an at-large to a partially district city council. This resulted in the election of some minority council persons who do not want their numbers further diluted by annexing predominantly white suburbs (Harrigan 1989).

The Houston-Galveston Area Council (H-GAC) is the region-wide voluntary association of local governments and local elected officials in the 13-county Houston-Galveston area (Gulf Coast Planning Region). It serves a vast area of 12,500 square miles which contained over 3,700,000 people in 1985 (the smaller Houston PMSA has an area of 7,151 square miles and had a 1988 population of 3,641,500). H-GAC was organized in 1966 by local elected officials after authorization by State enabling legislation.

H-GAC's mission is "...to serve as the instrument of local government cooperation in promoting the region's orderly development and the safety and welfare of its citizens" (H-GAC 1988,4). H-GAC is the regional organization through which local governments consider regional issues and cooperate in dealing with areawide problems. In 1987, H-GAC's membership reached a record high of 147 local governments—all 13 county governments, 107 cities, 18 school districts, and 9 soil and water conservation districts. Membership is voluntary, but all major general-purpose local governments in the region are members.

H-GAC is governed by local elected officials who are selected by, and responsible to, the local governments which are members of the council. Member local governments annually designate their representatives to H-GAC's General Assembly, which meets at least once a year. A 26-member Board of Directors (all locally elected officials) provides more specific guidance and policy-making through its regular monthly meetings. Member local governments pay annual dues based generally on population. These funds are supplemented by appropriations and grants from the State of Texas, and contracts and grants from the Federal government.

Currently, H-GAC's major activity is the establishment of a program to help local governments in their economic development efforts to diversify the regional economy. Another goal of H-GAC is to enhance the regional quality of life by helping local governments improve law enforcement, water and air quality, and transportation services. Like other COGs, H-GAC reviews grant and loan applications, determining the program's consistency with regional planning goals, and sends comments to the funding agencies.

Although H-GAC has no enforcement powers, the council does endorse or oppose federal grants to local governments, and this
sometimes determines whether or not the governments will receive the grants. However, as a voluntary association of local governments, H-GAC was created to serve local governments, which retain the real decision making power.

Indeed, Houston's political and business influence alone has had an overpowering influence on the metropolitan development. As Robert Thomas concluded in his essay:

...through most of the post-war years, urban growth decision-making has been centered in the city of Houston. ...the central city has been the dominant political entity in the region.

Time will tell, however, whether or not Houston will be able to maintain its dominance over the region. With annexation becoming increasingly unattractive, the balance of population growth and political influence may yet shift to the outlying suburban areas.

In many ways the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area is like most large U.S. urban regions. With its 1988 population of 2,388,000 over 5,049 square miles embracing 272 local government units, the Twin Cities region looks as politically complex as the next American metro area. In fact, having two central cities often in competition with one another as well as with the surrounding suburbs, the political structure of the Minneapolis-St. Paul area appears to be quite dispersed, American style.

Yet, upon closer examination, the Twin Cities area is the most Canadian of our U.S. study regions. With its relatively homogeneous population from publicly oriented northern European backgrounds and small minority populations (central cities had 6 percent Black and 2 percent Hispanic in 1980), its citizens seemed to arrive at a regional planning consensus more easily than most American metropolitan areas. Indeed, it is widely believed that it was this consensus building characteristic that enabled the state of Minnesota to establish what is perhaps the most successful experiment in metropolitan governance in the United States --- the Metropolitan Council of the Twin cities.

Prompted by metropolitan area initiative, the council was created by the Minnesota legislature in 1967, replacing a largely ineffective advisory regional planning commission called the Metropolitan Planning Commission. The Metropolitan Council's mission is to coordinate the planning and development of the Twin Cities area --- a responsibility that has expanded over the years to include not just physical development and transportation issues but social programs, such as subsidized housing. However, the council is not truly a level of general government. The state legislature establishes the council's taxing power and functions which usually are limited to functions that cannot be performed by
city and county governments. In fact, regional services are provided by other metropolitan agencies, such as transit and waste control commissions. The council provides the regional oversight and coordination of these services.

Instead of representing local governments and special districts, as the previous Metropolitan Planning Commission had done, the governor of Minnesota appoints the members of the metropolitan council. In the beginning pairs of state senatorial districts were used for representation, but the Metropolitan Reorganization Act of 1974 redefined the districts, and now distinctive boundaries are served. The 1974 Act also increased the number of council members from the original 15 to 17. Except for the council chair who was to represent the area as a whole, each member would represent, on a one-person/one-vote basis, a particular district.

Thus, the basic task of the council is to represent regional interests in certain designated areas over that of the more narrow local interests. To ensure that the council would not become the captive of local governments was one of the major reasons why council membership was not comprised of local government officials who might reflect only parochial viewpoints.

The Twin Cities Metropolitan Council has also made considerable contributions toward financial equalization. Legislation in 1974 passed the fiscal disparities law, and although the law is not directly related to the Metropolitan Council, without it there would great difficulty in implementing regional land use policies. This is because the law, by dividing the commercial/industrial tax base among the communities in the area, reduces the communities' incentive to compete for such development. Tax-base sharing requires each community to contribute 40% of its commercial/industrial tax base growth since 1971 into a metropolitan pool which is then redistributed according to each community's population and overall tax base.

Additional legislation further expanded the Council's authority to review the metropolitan significance of major public and private projects, which meant it could block major development proposals that conflicted with its regional plan called the Development Guide. This authority included local applications for federal and state assistance.

Clearly, the regional gains for the Twin Cities area have been real and positive, and the following outcomes are directly attributable to the Metropolitan Council (Whiting 1984):

- resolving complex regional problems
- distributing equitably regional tax revenues and social resources, such as subsidized housing
- overseeing basic metropolitan services
- generating a comprehensive regional plan
- preventing such costly and unneeded capital undertakings as a heavy rail transportation system
- providing information about the region and its needs

The council's success can be attributed to its broad role of policy-maker rather than being caught up in the details of a service provider. Also, with state backed revenue and taxing authority, it is not dependent on the uncertainties and political pressures of voluntary local government membership. In addition, many of the council's powers were politically digestable in that they were awarded incrementally by the state legislature over a number of years.

Yet, the council has had its limitations. It was sometimes bypassed in the making of important facility decisions, such as the location of a domed stadium, shopping mall, and trade centers (Whiting 1984); and its development policies have not stopped the continued decentralization of the Twin Cities metropolitan area. As Judith Martin points out in her essay:

The Metropolitan Council undoubtedly recognizes that the effective metropolitan area has already outgrown its reaches, and that it is quite unlikely that the Council's own range of authority will be extended to coincide with this reality. Among the many reasons for this are the negative perceptions/realities that still largely-rural counties associate with the metropolitan area, and the disinclination of rural legislators to grant the metro area any more power/authority/representation than it already has.

Nor has the council resolved serious problems in the Twin Cities region that exist elsewhere, such as suburban gridlock, increasing poverty and social problems in the central cities, and central city-suburban competition. Thus, it is still an open question as to how well the council will handle the emerging increasingly diverse and less manageable metropolitan problems of the 21st century.
CONCLUSIONS

As the preceding summary indicates, a diverse pattern of metropolitan governance emerges in both countries reflecting the wide spectrum of regional and cultural qualities of these continental scale societies. However, the relative political dominance of the provincial government in local policy making under the Canadian federal system (L'Heureux 1986) has caused more robust metropolitan governmental and planning institutions to be established in Canada than in the United States. And it seems likely that the importance of provincial authority and influence that has developed in the Canadian federation since World War II will continue in the foreseeable future (Smiley 1987; 1989).

At one extreme, the Chicago region with over 1,200 units of competing local government and no formal centralized metropolitan government with authority seems virtually unmanageable. Yet, Hemmens and McBride found that coalitions can be formed incrementally to build a consensus to deal with a critical problem, such as traffic congestion, and apparently enough adjustments are made to the system so that the region continues to function and grow.

At the other end of the spectrum, we have Canadian urban areas, such as metropolitan Toronto possessing one provincial office for the greater region, five two-tiered governments and only 30 municipalities. And while each province has some form of municipal fiscal equalization, Frisken and Trapanier found in Toronto and Montreal that there is increasing competition among Canadian local governments for economic development, population and provincial funds and infrastructure despite the presence of metropolitan government.

How then can we explain these differences and similarities we've encountered? Are they the result of factors we have hypothesized about the differences between the two countries: national and/or regional social, economic and cultural characteristics; and contrasting conscious public policies shaping urban development? Or are our findings due to global social and economic forces?

While more similar to one another than most western democracies (Birch 1986), it seems clear that there are significant longstanding differences in political culture between Canada and the United States. As Lipset (1990,225) observed in his comparative study of values and institutions in both countries:

The United States and Canada remain two nations formed around sharply different organizing principles. Their basic myths vary considerably, and national ethoses and structures are determined in large part by such
images. One nation's institutions reflect the effort to apply universalistic principles emphasizing competitive individualism and egalitarianism, while the other's are an outgrowth of a particularistic compact to preserve linguistic and provincial cultures and rights and elitism. Ironically, ...the conservative effort has stimulated an emphasis on group rights and benefits for the less privileged; the liberal one continues to stress more concern for the individual but exhibits less interest in those who are poor and outcast.

No doubt some of these differences have influenced policy making for, and the character of, metropolitan areas in both countries. As Goldberg and Mercer (1986) argue, the high degree of American metropolitan political fragmentation reflects the more individualistic market orientation of the American political ethos and makes centralized metropolitan planning and management more difficult in the United States than in Canada where there is a greater value placed on collective and government action. In addition, it's suggested that the greater racial homogeneity and tolerance of cultural diversity and the more supportive safety net of social and economic assistance for the disadvantaged in Canada has made its central cities safer and more livable for traditional families than those in the United States (Feldman and Goldberg 1987). Indeed, Canadian central cities have been shown to be more fiscally and economically viable (with provincial support), and have more compact development and better infrastructure, such as transit facilities, than their American counterparts (Goldberg and Mercer 1986; Artibise 1988).

Yet, while the general tendency of American fragmentation of local government is corroborated by our study (see Table 2), and that such fragmentation is nationally on the rise (see Table 3), there are striking variations. For examples, the Minneapolis - St. Paul area, which was found to be the most fragmented U.S. region (in terms of local governments per million population), has the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council -- the most "Canadian - like" centralized metropolitan governance system of our American study areas; and on the Canadian side, Montreal which was found to be the most fragmented of the Canadian regions has the Montreal Urban Community -- a well established metropolitan government, which, by American standards, is quite strong.

And as cited earlier, despite fewer units of local government to coordinate and the centralizing authority of metropolitan government, Canadian central city - suburban conflicts over development and public resources have been increasing in recent decades. This is the case because during the past 20 years the bulk of metropolitan development and population growth has occurred in the outlying suburban areas, often beyond the boundaries of metropolitan governments -- boundaries which provincial governments have been reluctant to extend because of
concerns over the potential political influence of expanding metropolitan governments. In some ways, the central-city suburban competition could become more pronounced in Canada since the fewer governmental units are more populous and potentially more influential than those in the U.S. and some, like the regional municipalities in the Greater Toronto Area, may become more politically formidable than their smaller sized American counterparts. And despite strong provincial resistance, Canadian local governments appear to be increasing their pressure for more autonomy and resources (L'Heureux 1986; Woodside 1990).

At the same time, the fragmented highly decentralized pattern of American metropolitan policy making and physical development has come under increasing U.S. criticism as its heavy automobile dependency has been causing near gridlock congestion with a corresponding decline in environmental quality. As a result, a spate of sub-regional, regional and statewide growth management efforts have emerged throughout much of the urbanized United States. Our own Boston, Chicago and San Francisco case studies revealed the emergence of multijurisdictional sub-regional planning institutions to manage urban growth. In fact, during the 1970-90 period, no fewer than 14 states have adopted some form of growth management policies involving the improvement of transportation, environmental quality and/or land development, at the local, regional and state levels of government (DeGrove 1989; Chinitz 1990; Turner 1990).

With regard to social diversity, it does appear that Canada's relative social homogeneity has made collective action including spatial redistribution policies for such services as social housing more feasible in its central cities. Indeed, the only American study area with any metropolitan governmental success -- the Minneapolis - St. Paul area -- had the most homogeneous population of our U.S. study regions, during the 1960s when major innovations in its metropolitan governance system occurred.

Although Canada has long had a culturally diverse population regionally, it has become more racially and culturally diverse within regions, as recent immigration patterns have settled increasing numbers of newcomers from Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America (Lipset 1990). Much of this settlement has occurred in Canada's major urban areas so that by 1986 substantial portions of the metropolitan populations were foreign born: Toronto 36.3%; Montreal 15.9%; Vancouver 28.8%; Edmonton 18.4% (Malcolm, 1990). As a consequence of this increasing diversity, groups have emerged to represent Canada's newest immigrants generating a new level of political divisiveness and social backlash in major urban areas (Lipset 1990; Malcolm 1990) and a recent study of all of Canada's CMA's reveal a "deepening residential segregation as measured by declared ethnic origin and by income" (Bourne 1989, 325). Thus, while neighborhood activism has been vigorous in Canadian cities, such as community involvement with housing, urban renewal and
highway projects in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver during the urban reform movement in the 1960's and early 1970's (Harris 1987; Leveillee and Leonard 1987; Caulfield 1988), this recent community action process appears to be more pronounced along racial and ethnic lines than in the past.

In addition, serious confrontations have been developing between native Canadian groups and public authorities over land and water rights. In the most recent outbreak involving armed Mohawk Indians near Montreal, a Quebec police officer was killed and a major bridge was blocked for several weeks. One observer reported that "some Indian leaders have compared the resort to armed defiance in Quebec to the rioting that swept black Ghettos of America in the 1960's" (Burns 1990).

And while in the United States there is some evidence of a slight lessening of residential segregation in western metro areas, such as the San Francisco region (Miller and Quigly 1990), substantial inequalities persist in the older American urban areas (Beauregard 1990). The Fainsteins (1989) argue that despite the emergence of black political leadership in many of the largest U.S. cities, the American black community is just as segregated as before and has actually lost economic ground with respect to the white population during the 1970s and 80s. Indeed, Wilson (1989) and Downs (1991) suggest that, in the absence of appropriate social programs to assist the most disadvantaged, the poverty in black ghettos could be perpetuated indefinitely in American central cities.

When we examine the policy making process, it seems clear that provincial government has substantially moderated its support for metropolitan government. In each of our Canadian case studies, the provincial government has either not supported metropolitan government to the extent that its territorial authority kept pace with regional development, or, in the case of Vancouver, actually rescinded authority. Such constraints on metropolitanism placed by a senior level of government (the province or state) is similar to the long-standing plight of U.S. regional institutions (Wright 1988) and documented by Hemmens and McBride, Gelfand and Martin in our Chicago, Boston and Minneapolis - St. Paul case studies. This shifting of provincial roles has transformed each province into, as Trapanier stated, "a facilitator rather than simply a mandator", clearly reflecting the growing development and political influence of outlying suburban communities. Apart from changes in the Canadian political value system that might divert resources away from central cities as Frisken (1986) fears, the sheer weight of the growing suburban influence would divert provincial resources to outlying areas.

But some of Frisken's fears may be well founded. It does appear that in addition to growing suburban influence, there has been a rapid shift favoring the market mechanism in Canadian
political values. The 1984 election of the Progressive Conservative government led by Brian Mulroney and the passage of the free trade agreement with the United States in 1989 are symptomatic of the Canadian movement toward Anglo-American political conservatism and the increasing market orientation of Canadian political values (Cooper et al. 1988; Cannon 1989). In addition, the passage of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 which encourages constitutional litigation about individual rights similar to that found in the United States. While rapid change on the part of the Canadian judiciary in land use matters is not yet evident (Feldman and Goldberg 1987), in the long run judicial changes are likely to make "Canada a more individualistic and litigious culture" (Lipset 1990,225).

Thus, our Canadian cases demonstrated that during the past decade provincial governments have been less willing to intervene in the political market place of their urban areas. However, it seems likely that provincial governments will not relinquish their potential authority to initiate strong metropolitan guidance, and will not completely abandon policies assisting the central city, such as municipal fiscal equalization and social services, since such policies clearly reflect the long standing social equity values deeply ingrained in Canada's political culture.

Of course, business and other interests have long urged federal, provincial and municipal governments to encourage investment and development in the major central cities (Dyck 1986; Leveillee and Leonard 1987; Leo and Fenton 1990). But as industrial and commercial activity began to decentralize (following residential development), the influence pattern has clearly been altered and directed increasingly toward servicing outlying shopping centers, industrial parks and office centers. Yet, with the possible exception of Montreal, there is little evidence in our Canadian case studies of private or nonprofit interests being directly incorporated into the broad regional planning process, that is, beyond lobbying as narrow special interest groups.

In contrast, in the United States there appears to be a growing tendency for public and private interests to collaborate on solving pressing metropolitan problems of great mutual concern (Weaver and Dennert 1987). In what may be a new form of American regional corporatism, the major private sector organizations appears to have become "public-like" --- behaving more like public institutions than private firms with a telescopic lengthening of their time horizons and broadening of their views about regional development and the public good. For examples, the organizations representing major business interests, such as the Bay Area Council and the Santa Clara County Manufacturing Group in the San Francisco Area and the Metropolitan Planning Council in the Chicago region are heavily involved in metropolitan planning activities. A similar pattern has emerged among non-profit
environmental groups in the Bay Area in the form of the Greenbelt Alliance, which has joined with business interests to create a development strategy for the entire region, Bay Vision 2020 (1991).

At the same time, some of the American public regional institutions, such as ABAG in the San Francisco region and NIPC in the Chicago area, are marketing extensive services to communities while retreating from the idealistic, but ineffectual, long-term comprehensive approach for a more practical strategic planning process with shared local-regional responsibilities. Accordingly, these public institutions seem to have become "privatized" --- behaving more like private firms than public institutions.

While these two sets of U.S. organizations are unlikely to become identical because of the differences in accountability between public and private entities, a substantial convergence of their views and methods is clearly underway. A question remains, however, whether this new public - private collaboration is a coalition created solely for the purpose of short-term crisis management in the absence of a viable metropolitan guidance system, or truly the beginning of a new institutional arrangement designed for conducting effective long-term regional planning.

As mentioned earlier, over a dozen American states have adopted growth management laws designed to rationalize land use, infrastructure provision and protect the environment. Some of these policies, such as those in Oregon and Florida, have established new metropolitan planning institutions with local planning review responsibilities (DeGrove 1989). Although the full powers of these new regional institutions will be tested eventually in the courts, an American movement toward more effective metropolitan guidance systems is apparently underway.

When we consider global social and economic forces impinging on the urban systems of advanced democracies during the past two decades, one overall pattern clearly emerges: decentralization of people and jobs (Hall 1990; Vernon 1991). Clearly, every metropolitan area we examined in our study in both Canada and the United States exhibited substantial decentralization of population, economic activity and political influence to outlying areas. Even the urban regions having the most advanced forms of metropolitan governance, such as those in the Toronto and Minneapolis - St. Paul regions, were unable to contain and control this rapidly expanding growth. Indeed, studies of recent development of major urban areas throughout Canada, the United States, Western Europe and Japan have clearly documented this decentralization pattern (Cherry 1984; Blumenfeld 1986; Bourne 1989; Xheng 1991).

Many researchers of urban systems in the industrialized world agree that some form of evolutionary process may be at work
(Rothblatt and Garr 1986; Dwyer 1987; Alonso 1991). The theories suggest that the initial stages of development occur around a few favored growing areas which attract great concentrations of investment, population, and resources in order to create economies of agglomeration necessary for improved efficiency in the production, distribution, and consumption of desired goods and services.

As shown on Table 4, a model of metropolitan development emerges with the first stage representing 'concentration', which involves the 'polarization effects' -- the growth of large urban centers which dominate and drain the hinterlands of people, resources, and capital. Gradually, 'trickling down effects' result from diseconomies of scale in large urban areas (e.g., traffic congestion, overcrowding, high land costs, pollution) and new investment opportunities in other regions, and government policies to re-direct economic growth away from heavily-developed areas overtake the 'polarization effects' and a process of decentralization sets in. At first, decentralization will manifest itself with the growth and subsequent dominance of suburban rings, then with the decline of the central cities, and finally with population and economic dispersal away from the older or larger metropolitan areas to new growth poles in smaller urban regions and to outlying, less-developed areas.

According to this model, the United States is functioning around Type 5, Absolute Decentralization, and Canada is moving toward Type 4, Relative Decentralization. However, because the global economy is becoming more competitive and open, the metropolitan decentralization process may be accelerating. That is, as our urban markets expand and become more competitive, firms in these markets must not only be more efficient themselves, but also must function in a well managed and supportive metropolitan environment. Thus, the slightest diseconomies in the metropolitan environment, such as increased traffic congestion and housing prices, begin to induce firms to move to less costly areas. In the advanced societies, the breadth of location and high quality of infrastructure can accommodate this decentralization while the reverse is true for the less developed countries or regions.

Some observers, like Chisholm (1989) and Parks and Oakerson (1989), argue that such a decentralized system of public service provision is more adaptive to rapidly changing conditions, and often more efficient in terms of local consumer satisfaction, than a centralized hierarchical pattern of urban development and authority. In fact, Peter Gordon and his colleagues (1989) found that this decentralization process has generated polycentric metropolitan structures which have enabled the largest urban areas in the United States to grow significantly in recent decades while actually shortening the average commuting times.
This process of metropolitan decentralization is likely to continue, not only because of global economic forces of dispersion, but also because of the emergence of what Manuel Castells (1990) calls the \"Informational City\" -- the spreading out and restructuring of urban activities in space due to our increasing capacity of substituting communication of information for transportation of goods and people. In addition, this pressure for decentralization is being reinforced further by the large numbers of baby boomers who are still entering the low-density single family housing market (Dowall 1984). Such housing preferences are often related to a desire for living outside the large central cities, in smaller communities where it is easier to control socially sensitive public services, such as schools and police (Rothblatt 1982; Oakerson 1989).

Finally, a competitive spirit also exists among the local governments vying to capture revenue enhancing commercial and industrial activities. In the absence of a metropolitan-wide tax sharing mechanism, in the United States (excepting the Twin Cities area), and in the presence of a partial fiscal municipal equalization in Canada, it is difficult to convince many communities to forgo the potential revenues from commercial and industrial activity and accept the much needed, but less tax rewarding, residential development (Kitchen and McMillan 1985; Rothblatt and Garr 1986). Consequently, there is a tendency for in-lying local governments to try to capture the more fiscally desirable commercial and industrial activity and push service demanding residential development to the periphery of metropolitan areas (Dowall 1984).

In the face of these overwhelming forces of metropolitan decentralization, most of which are related to long-term global social, economic and technological factors, much of the metropolitan development pattern may be beyond the control of regional or even national public policy. It therefore seems likely that settlement patterns of major metropolitan regions of advanced economies will become more similar as they continue to decentralize in a multinucleated fashion.

Yet, there are some policy choices available which can help to rationalize what appears to be the inevitable continuation of metropolitan decentralization. First, for each metropolitan area, there needs to be some over-arching institutional arrangement with the capacity to build a consensus for a comprehensive long-term shared image of where the region is, and where it should be going. Second, it will be important to have some mechanism for metropolitan-wide property tax and general revenue sharing so as to minimize inter-jurisdictional competition which can distort development patterns.

Clearly, the province or state has the ability to devolve the appropriate authority to a metropolitan institution and modify
local government tax policies. Our study has shown that, while the metropolitan management system is far more developed along these lines in Canada than in the United States, Canadian metropolitan areas are becoming institutionally out-stripped by the decentralization process, both in regional planning authority and in tax equalization policies (Frisken 1986). Consequently, Canadian provincial government may be moving toward more flexible regional planning institutions, with the ability to mediate between increasingly diverse communities in expanding metropolitan areas, such Ontario's Office of the Greater Toronto Area established in 1988.

At the same time, there is a movement to structure the highly decentralized American settlement and authority pattern at the state or sub-state level with urban growth management policies. Recent efforts in the United States have already tried to centralize metropolitan policy making, such as the 1990 measure (Proposition 111) passed in California requiring metropolitan congestion management plans for local communities to be eligible for state funding, and proposals for a Massachusetts growth management law (DeGrove 1989).

In sum, it appears that the character of metropolitan development and each country's institutional response to it are converging. The trends we have observed do not represent the "Americanization" of Canadian urban public policy or the "Canadianization" of U.S. metropolitan planning, but rather the globalization of urban development and corresponding governmental adaptation.

To be sure, some differences exist between urban areas in both countries related to national character and conscious public policies as we hypothesized. For example, it appears that Canada has been better able to nurture more economically viable, safer and livable central cities than the U.S. Yet, another Canadian - U.S. comparative study by Feldman and Goldberg (1987,277) concludes:

At the macroscopic level the systemic contrasts are as real as they are apparent... Yet, microscopically, the powerful explanations gag at their foundations: Boston is more planned, controlled, even "governed" than Montreal... And even with metropolitan government, Toronto is no more successful containing the urban fringe than officials in Oregon trying to preserve the Willamette Valley. The conventional wisdom comparing Canada and the United States, in light of findings here, needs long and hard rethinking.

Thus, while Lipset concludes that "Canadians and Americans will never be alike" (1990,227), our study suggests that in the long-run the development and governance of their metropolitan areas may be.
REFERENCES


Artibise, Alan F. J. 1988 'Canada as an Urban Nation' Daedalus 117, 237-64


Association of Bay Area Governments. 1986 The Future: Is It What It Used To Be? (Oakland, CA.)


Birch, Anthony H. 1986 'Political Authority and Crisis in Comparative Perspective' In State and Society: Canada in Comparative Perspective ed. Keith Banting (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 87-130


Bourne, Larry S. 1987 'Evaluating the Aggregate Spatial Structure of Canadian Metropolitan Areas' The Canadian Geographer 31, 194-208


Burns, John F. 1990 'In Quebec, Yet Another Splintering' The New York Times Week in Review July 29, 3

Cannon, James B. 1989 'Directions in Canadian Regional Policy' *The Canadian Geographer* 33, 230-239


Castells, Manuel. 1990 *The Informational City* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell)

Caulfield, Jon. 1988 'Canadian Urban's Reform and Local Conditions' *Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 12, 477-84


Chinitz, Benjamin. 1990 'Growth Management: Good for the Town, Bad for the Nation?' *Journal of the American Planning Association* 56, 3-7


Communauté Urbaine de Montréal. 1990 *Rapport Annuel 1989* (Montréal, Québec)

Cooper, Barry et al. eds. 1988 *The Resurgence of Conservatism in Anglo-American Democracies* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press), Chapter 1


Dolan, Drew A. 1990 'Local Government Fragmentation: Does It Drive Up the Cost of Government' *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 26, 28-45


Dyck, Rand. 1986 Provincial Politics in Canada (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall)

Edmonton Metropolitan Regional Planning Council. 1987 Annual Report-Fiscal Year 1986/87 (Edmonton, Alberta)


Fallis, George. 1990 'Housing Finance and Housing Subsidies in Canada' Urban Studies 27, 877-903


Fisher, Robert. 1990 'Urban Policy in Houston Texas' Urban Studies 26, 144-54

Frisken, Frances. 1986 'Canadian Cities and the American Example: A Prologue to Urban Policy Analysis' Canadian Public Administration 29, 345-76


Hall, Peter. 1990 'The Disappearing City' Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of California, Berkeley, Working Paper 506


Harrigan, John J. 1989 Political Change in the Metropolis (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman)

Harris, Richard. 1987 'A Social Movement in Urban Politics: A Reinterpretation of Urban Reform in Canada' International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 11, 361-81

Houston-Galveston Area Council. 1988 1987 Annual Report (Houston, TX)


L'Heureux, Jacques. 1985 'Municipalities and the Division of Powers' In Intergovernmental Relations. ed. Richard Simeon (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 179-214

Leo, Christopher and Fenton, Robert. 1990 'Mediated Enforcement and the Evaluation of the State: Development Corporations in Canadian City Centres' International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 14, 185-206.


Lipset, Seymour M. 1990 Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada (New York: Routledge)


Metropolitan Area Council. 1990 It's Time to Begin: Annual Report, 1990 (Boston, MA)

Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department. 1991
Towards a Liveable Metropolis (Toronto, Ontario)

Miller, Vincent P. and Quigley, John M. 1990 'Segregation by Racial and Demographic Group: Evidence from the San Francisco Bay Area' Urban Studies 27, 3-22

Parks, Roger B, and Oakerson Ronald J. 1989 'Metropolitan Organization and Governance: A Local Public Economy Approach' Urban Affairs Quarterly 25, 18-29


Quesnel, Louise. 1990 'Political Control Over Planning in Quebec' International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 14, 25-48


Rothblatt, Donald N. 1989 Metropolitan Dispute Resolution in Silicon Valley (Washington, D.C.: National Institute for Dispute Resolution)


Sancton, Andrew. 1983 'Conclusion: Canadian City Politics in Comparative Perspective'. In City Politics in Canada. eds. Warren Magnusson and Andrew Sancton (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 291-317


Sancton, Andrew. 1988 'Montreal's Metropolitan Government' Quebec Studies 6, 12-25


Sharpe, L. James. 1990 'The Rise and Fall of the Metropolitan Authority' Nuffield College, Oxford, Research Paper

Simaerd, Hubert. 1989 President, Montreal Urban Community Planning Commission, Interview, July
Smiley, Donald V. 1987 The Federal Condition in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Reyerson)

Smiley, Donald V. 1989 'Meech Lake and Free Trade' Canadian Public Administration 32, 470-81

Thomas, Robert D. and Murray, Richard W. 1991 Progrowth Politics: Change and Governance in Houston (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California)


Vernon, Raymond. 1991 'Cities of the Next Century' Journal of the American Planning Association 57, 3-6


Weaver, Clyde and Dennert, Marcel. 1987 'Economic Development and the Public Private Partnership' Journal of the American Planning Association 53, 430-37

Whiting, Charles C. 1984 'Twin Cities Metro Council Heading for a Fall?' Planning 50, 4-10


TABLE 1  SAMPLE CANADIAN AND UNITED STATES METROPOLITAN PLANNING INSTITUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>METROPOLITAN AREA</th>
<th>REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY (year created)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CANADA</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>Metropolitan Toronto (1953)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>Montreal Urban Community (1970)1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>Greater Vancouver Regional District (1968)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>Edmonton Metropolitan Reg’l Planning Comm. (1981)2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNITED STATES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission (1957)3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>Metropolitan Area Planning Council (1963)3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>Association of Bay Area Governments (1961)3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>Houston-Galveston Area Council (1966)3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis-St. Paul</td>
<td>Twin Cities Metropolitan Council (1967)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The Montreal Urban Community replaced the Montreal Metropolitan Corporation which in turn replaced the Montreal Metropolitan Commission which was established in 1921.

2. The Edmonton Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission replaced the Edmonton Regional Planning Commission which was created in 1950.

3. Voluntary association of local governments.
### Table 2: Sample Canadian and United States Metropolitan Area Characteristics: 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metropolitan Area</th>
<th>Population (Thousands)</th>
<th>Area (SQ.MILES)</th>
<th>Pop Density (POP/SQ.MILE)</th>
<th>Local Govt. (Municipalities and Counties)</th>
<th>Special Districts</th>
<th>(GOVT./MPOP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>3,569.9</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>2,470</td>
<td>348.5</td>
<td>24,350</td>
<td>1,099.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>2,984.4</td>
<td>1,354</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>181.2</td>
<td>11,780</td>
<td>870.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>794.2</td>
<td>1,599</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>111.5</td>
<td>10,720</td>
<td>900.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis-St. Paul</td>
<td>2,387.5</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>1,920</td>
<td>715.5</td>
<td>11,330</td>
<td>900.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>6,041.8</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>441.5</td>
<td>15,240</td>
<td>930.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>4,109.9</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>418.2</td>
<td>13,920</td>
<td>900.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>8,180.9</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>1439</td>
<td>409.8</td>
<td>17,760</td>
<td>900.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>2,033.3</td>
<td>2,027</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>367.4</td>
<td>17,990</td>
<td>900.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Average:**
- Population: 2,203.3
- Area: 1,354
- Pop Density: 1,627
- Local Govt.: 431
- Special Districts: 157
- (GOVT./MPOP): 19.5

TABLE 3 GOVERNMENTAL UNITS IN U.S.
METROPOLITAN AREAS: 1977-1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Units In Metropolitan Area</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Government</td>
<td>11,069</td>
<td>13,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Districts</td>
<td>9,580</td>
<td>12,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Districts</td>
<td>5,220</td>
<td>5,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>25,869</td>
<td>31,924</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Change Characteristics</th>
<th>Type Stage</th>
<th>Metropolitan Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Core Ring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Centralization</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Change Characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Centralization</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Decentralization</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Decentralization</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**