Multiculturalism and the Imagined Community: Diversity, Policy, and National Identity in Public Opinion

By

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by

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Abstract

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Developed democracies in Europe and elsewhere are experiencing an unprecedented influx of culturally diverse immigrants and asylum seekers into their national communities. For the study of political psychology, a critical issue is how the pattern of ethnic group relations affects process of identity formation and change and, derivatively, the pattern of public support for a range of public policies with implications for social inclusion and equality. While there has been extensive commentary on the issue of multiculturalism both in America and abroad, the specific question of how the perceived threat of heightened immigrant diversity on the normative content of national identity (that is, the question of “who are we”) has only recently begun to receive systematic attention in the scholarly literature.

Multiculturalism has both a purely demographic and a political meaning. The politics of diversity also refers to specific policies governments enact in order to either encourage or discourage cultural pluralism. The specific policies at issue typically refer to the representation and recognition of minority groups and may encompass affirmative action, language policies, border control, access to welfare state programs, and citizenship laws. Debate has raged for years among political philosophers of multiculturalism over the desirability of such policies. Some suggest that government policies devoted to “cultural recognition” and minority group representation ease political tensions in these increasingly diverse communities and promote national loyalty. Others suggest the reverse: government attempts to promote cultural recognition through multiculturalism policy harden barriers among groups, foster prejudice and hostility to immigration, and erode the overall sense of national attachment in a country. This debate, too, has only now begun to receive rigorous empirical scrutiny.

The present study examines three main questions: first, how can we think about what the social boundaries of the national community might be, and why do they matter? Are narrower, more bounded notions of the nation in-group related to mass preferences on
immigration, immigrants, and cultural diversity more generally? More centrally, this study examines how immigrant diversity and policies of cultural recognition shape mainstream citizens’ conceptions of normative national identity. Is it indeed the case that ethnic diversity and political multiculturalism undermine social harmony, by provoking – via cultural threat – the desire among mainstream citizens to adhere to a more “ascriptive” and exclusionary definition of who truly belongs on their soil? Finally, I go to the heart of the philosophical debates on cultural recognition, by asking whether immigrants’ allegiance to the nation is in indeed undermined in “multicultural” nations. Are they less willing to participate in the political process? Do they have less faith in the political system and governing institutions? Are they less trusting and/or socially engaged?

Merging aggregate level economic and demographic measures with cross-national public opinion data, I argue that mass publics do indeed seem to have reacted to increased levels of immigrant diversity by constraining their notion of who truly belongs to the national community along more “ethnic” lines. Furthermore, this backlash has been heightened in the countries that have more fully committed themselves to cultural recognition, versus those that have favored minority integration; this finding provides empirical support for many of the philosophical critiques of multiculturalism that have emerged vociferously in recent years. On the other hand, immigrants themselves appear to benefit from political multiculturalism, all else equal; they exhibit higher levels of satisfaction with politics and politicians in their adoptive nation, and perceive substantially less discrimination against them along ethnic, racial, linguistic, and religious lines.
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Chapter 1: The Imagined Community Imperiled

From fears of Hispanic “unassimilability” in the U.S., to growing backlash against Muslim immigrants in Western Europe, the integration of cultural minorities into their host societies has become a critical issue in the past several decades. In most of these countries, ethnic diversity itself has become a fact of life (if it wasn’t already), and the general assumption is that – predominantly driven by immigration from poorer and more diverse countries – these broad-based demographic shifts will only continue as time goes on.

Both growing cultural diversity and the associated demand for the greater recognition of this fact are especially sensitive problems among liberal democracies, because of their usual emphasis on individual rights, which espouse universality and impartiality, while at the same time downplaying the importance of cultural pluralism in favor of national unity. In the words of one observer of this phenomenon:

It is hard to find a democratic or democratizing society these days that is not the site of some significant controversy over whether and how its public institutions should better recognize the identities of cultural and disadvantaged minorities […] The challenge is endemic to liberal democracies because they are committed in principle to equal representation of all (Gutmann 1994: 3).

Despite this inherent tension, some proponents of policies designed to recognize and encourage cultural diversity now declare that their view has won the day, in the sense that the tradition of liberal “difference-blindness” has largely been discredited. These proponents of what is known as “multiculturalism” have, they argue:

successfully redefined the terms of public debate in two profound ways: (a) few thoughtful people continue to think that justice can simply be defined in terms of difference-blind rules or institutions. […] (b) as a result, the burden of proof has shifted. The burden of proof no longer falls solely on defenders of multiculturalism to show that their proposed reforms would not create injustices; the burden of proof equally falls on defenders of difference-blind institutions to show that the status quo does not create injustices for minority groups (Kymlicka 1999: 113, italics in original).

This victory has not been confined to discourse among political philosophers. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, forces trumpeting the ignominious end of liberalism and difference-blindness stormed through the academy, paving the way for a greater devotion to cultural studies and the promotion of minority voices in higher education. Regardless of whether one views this development as being for good or for ill, its influence has been incalculable (e.g. Brubaker 2001; Bloom 1987; Gitlin 1995; Glazer 1997). Nor did it end at the university gate; indeed, beginning in the 1970s, countries all over the world began re-defining themselves as “multicultural” nations. Not only did
they begin paying lip service to the value of the cultural differences within their borders, but they went even further by enacting policies designed to preserve and promote them. Of course, even if one accepts the fall of difference-blindness as a true “consensus” (and many do not), important questions remain unanswered. Key among these is the issue of social cohesion within the broader nation-state as its ethnic diversity increases. Much recent scholarship has characterized ethno-linguistic diversity as a threat to social harmony, in that it suppresses levels of trust, civic engagement, and social cohesion more generally.¹ Some go so far as to blame immigrants and their presumed “unassimilable” characteristics for this (e.g. Huntington 2004). More often, however, these accounts draw upon well-established theories of social identity and social trust, in which increasing diversity is seen as triggering a sense of threat among majority group members, with the outcome being an ethnocentric reaction. This backlash is thought to undermine the ability of majority-group citizens to see immigrants and minorities as “one of us,” which in turn manifests itself in decreased social trust and harmony more generally.

Beyond the simple fact of ethno-cultural diversity, a number of critics have taken aim at policies promoting cultural recognition, for much the same reason. Namely, they argue that such rights will tend to heighten the salience of group differences in society, and thus undermine patriotism, loyalty, and a sense of belonging to an “imagined community” – to borrow Benedict Anderson’s (1991) term – that transcends ethno-cultural differences. From this standpoint, critics have claimed that multicultural policies have increased divisiveness, retarded immigrants’ integration and even undermined liberal democratic values.² On the other hand, proponents of multiculturalism have argued that recognition of group differences should have precisely the opposite effect: by respecting the cultures of immigrants and minorities, national governments are creating a situation whereby members of these groups feel appreciated by the larger polity. This should, in turn, lead to more of an allegiance to the state, not less.³

Potential problems are not limited to the integration and allegiance of immigrants themselves. Indeed, concerns abound about the harmful effects on social cohesion caused by cultural pluralism extend to mainstream society as well. To put it broadly, a wealth of theoretical work has suggested that both immigrant diversity and government attempts to promote cultural recognition through multiculturalism policy may have negative ramifications on non-immigrant mainstream populations, in terms of a more restricted sense of who belongs in the national community.

There are policy implications to this debate. In democratic societies, official choices on these matters are constrained by public opinion, and to the extent that the latter is linked to deeper normative conceptions about who belongs to the nation and on what terms, developing an understanding of these dynamics is of paramount importance. If it is the case that government policies promoting multiculturalism exacerbate the tensions inherent in the political identities of diverse national communities, then the

¹ For a general discussion of this issue, see Harell and Stolle (2010).
implication is that these policies should be reduced or eliminated altogether in favor of cultural assimilation. By contrast, if those who hold a more sanguine view of cultural recognition are correct, it is possible that these policies actually mitigate the potentially negative effects of diversity on national identity. In other words, if mainstream populations are wary of cultural diversity, perhaps attempts to promote and protect this diversity can help ease the threat to the benefit of all.

National Identity, Diversity, and Multiculturalism: Brief Definitions

The scholarship examining issues of political identity is unsurveyably vast. It draws inspiration from political philosophy, history, anthropology, race/ethnic studies, and the social sciences. Indeed, much of the landmark work in this area has been produced by scholars not easily categorized by academic discipline (Brubaker 2009). While this has no doubt been of enormous benefit, it has also fostered a great deal of terminological confusion and debate (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). What follows in this section are brief definitions of the key concepts employed throughout this study.

National Identity

There are almost as many definitions the terms “nation,” “nationalism,” and “national identity” as there are scholars writing about them. Across this vast literature, however, references to nations as “imagined communities” are common. They are groups of people with a common “we-feeling,” a sense of mutual belonging and obligation (Anderson 1991; Deutsch 1966); nationhood is “a claim on people’s loyalty, on their attention, on their solidarity” (Brubaker 2004: 116). Nationalism, on this view, tends to resemble kinship, and it is common to refer to one’s motherland, fatherland or home country. What is more, nations, or rather the individuals that comprise them, seek political autonomy. Indeed, the principle of national self-determination emerged in the twentieth century as the predominant principle for both statehood and democracy.

It is often pointed out, of course, that there are nations without states. The present work, however, takes individuals’ conceptions of their home country as the predominant identity of interest, and uses of the terms “nation,” “nationalism,” and “national identity” throughout refer specifically to nation-states. This does not reflect the desire to treat them as internally homogenous and externally bounded entities, a tendency in the literature that Brubaker calls “groupism” (1998; 2004; 2009). Rather, the aim is to examine questions about how people living within the boundaries of a geographically and politically fixed territory think about its social contours: to what extent do they consider their country a “central” identity in their political selves? What types of criteria do they use in separating compatriots from foreigners? What are the implications of these

4 This is the heart of Jacob Levy’s suggestion that diversity should be taken as a fact, and not as a positive goal endorsed and enshrined by state policy; cultural recognition may be necessary in some cases, but only on pragmatic rather than ideological grounds (2000).

5 For broad reviews see: Alonso (1994); Brubaker (2009); Calhoun (1993); Foster (1991); Hutchinson and Smith (1994).
conceptions for policy support in the domains of immigration, cultural pluralism, and other related attitudes? How do they change over time, and in response to what?

*Diversity and Multiculturalism*

As noted above, a vast scholarly literature now addresses the problem of diversity for democratic governance. In this literature, the highly ambiguous term “multiculturalism” is everywhere. Since its first appearance in the journal *Hispania* (Medina 1957: 349), and later in the Canadian Government’s *Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in Canada* (1965: 46), the term has appeared in many guises. It is frequently used in a purely descriptive sense, often associated with a mouth-watering array of food metaphors. It has been invoked as a set of best (or worst) practices, as an ideology, and as a call to arms. Any attempt to understand its effects must therefore begin with a clear statement of what is meant by the word.

Multiculturalism as a sociological fact simply refers to the demographic composition of society. In surveying the American academy, Nathan Glazer famously claimed “we are all multiculturalists now” (1997). This has certainly been the case outside the ivory tower as well. Diversity itself is now a fact of life, and it is only likely to increase in most advanced democracies. One critical distinction to make, to which I return in more detail below, is between ethno-linguistic diversity in the general sense, and diversity stemming directly from increases in immigrant populations. While the former includes such cleavages as the black/white divide in the United States or the Dutch/French linguistic divide in Belgium, the latter pertains specifically to the dynamics of immigration. Given that most of the recent literature on the “problems” of diversity and multiculturalism are centered on immigrants, as well as the general assumption that levels of immigrant diversity in Europe and elsewhere will only increase in the future (Castles and Miller 2003; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Hooghe et al 2008), this is the principal focus of the present study.

Defining political multiculturalism is trickier. In general, it represents a set of principles defending difference-conscious notions of justice and concomitant laws and policies in the liberal state, and group recognition and representation are its driving purposes (Joppke 2004). Kymlicka (1995: 27-33) usefully distinguishes between three forms of group-differentiated rights: first, there are “self-government” rights, which entail some form political autonomy from majority institutions, usually in the form of territorial sovereignty. For example, in some states federalism has been employed to offer minority national cultures jurisdiction over areas where they are regionally concentrated, an obvious case being Quebec in Canada. While the study of federalism from the perspective of social conflict and irredentism is an established tradition in political science (e.g. Gurr 1993; Hechter 2000; Snyder 2000), very little cross-national empirical

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6 Beyond the traditional reference to America as a “melting pot” coined by Israel Zangwill in 1908, even a cursory review of writing on multiculturalism unearths the terms “ethnic stew,” “tossed salad,” “gumbo soup,” and “tomato soup.” One author goes so far as to envision “a sort of pan-Hungarian goulash where the pieces of different kinds of meat still keep their solid structure” (Laubeová 2000).
work to date has examined the issue from the point of view of multiculturalism and social unity.

The second category that Kymlicka distinguishes falls under the rubric of “special representation rights,” which are meant to ensure that minorities are adequately represented in the political process. One means of doing so is to adopt a system of proportional representation, which should allow for greater minority representation in national legislatures; a second, more direct, guarantee involves specific provisions on minimum quotas of ethno-cultural or linguistic minorities in legislatures.

Kymlicka’s third category, “polyethnic rights,” encompasses specific government policies designed to help minorities maintain their specific cultures and practices while at the same time integrating them into public life. This includes anti-racism legislation, the public funding of cultural practices, and exemptions from laws and regulations that disadvantage cultural groups. Since his defense of immigrant multiculturalism – discussed much more thoroughly in Chapter 5 – is solely based on this type of cultural recognition, these are the focus of the present study. Herein, I refer to Kymlicka’s notion of “polyethnic rights” as either “multiculturalism policies,” “political multiculturalism,” or “policies of cultural recognition.”

Signs of Backlash

In recent years, many countries have encountered a series of problems associated with immigrant diversity and political multiculturalism. Chiefly, this has been driven by the perception that migrants have become overly ghettoized, and have lacked either the willingness or ability to assimilate into their host societies (e.g. Kymlicka 1998: 16). Some immigrant groups have garnered reputations of “unassimilability” into the broader nation because they are assumed to hold and espouse ideologies that are flatly incompatible with even loosely drawn notions of liberal citizenship. In other words, they have been cast as exploiters of “an open, liberal society to reach illiberal ends” (Carlyle 2006: 69).

In Europe, the debate has chiefly centered on the perceived conflict between Muslims and Christian majorities. Examples of this are numerous: In the Netherlands, public discontent with the predominantly Muslim immigrant population has long smoldered, periodically exacerbated by political events such as the brutal slaying in 2004 of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in 2004 – retribution for a film he had produced that sharply criticized fundamentalist Islam. In 2006, violent protests erupted across numerous Muslim countries in response to political cartoons – published in September, 2005 by the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* – blatantly connoting the links between the Prophet Muhammad and terrorism. In 2007, France experienced a tide of anti-immigrant sentiment in response to prolonged and violent riots in its poor, immigrant-dense *banlieues* (Murray 2006). In 2001, Great Britain experienced a series of race riots across several Northern cities the likes of which it had not experienced in decades (Joppke 2004). And, in a 2009 referendum, Swiss residents echoed the concerns of the
extreme-right People’s Party by voting 57.5% to 42.5% in favor of a referendum banning construction of new minarets.7

Importantly, however, the problems associated with cultural diversity do not appear to be limited to concerns about Islam. Rather, the debate in the United States has largely centered on the composition of the most recent “wave” of immigrants arriving in America since the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, and in particular the mass migration of Latin Americans (both legally and illegally) north of the border (Alba and Nee 2003; Zolberg and Woon 1999). Concerns about the “assimilability” of immigrants from Latin America have prompted worries about the overall impact of mass migration on American national identity (e.g. Huntington 2004).

Significantly, the debate in American case does not surround the problematic incorporation of “illiberal” groups into a liberal mainstream as it does in Europe; instead, the argument is over a perceived disjuncture between the values of Catholic, Mexican-speaking migrants and their allegiance to American norms and values. And, whether or not the claims made about Latinos and their willingness to assimilate are empirically true, at least in terms of mainstream public opinion Americans are substantially less favorable to new immigrant groups (particularly if they are in the country illegally) than they are to historical ones (e.g. Citrin and Sides 2008; Schuck 2007).8

As immigrant diversity has proven problematic, so have policies of cultural recognition, and the sense that political multiculturalism has “failed” is widespread both in policy circles and in scholarly discussions of the subject. In 2008, the Council of Europe, speaking on behalf of its 47 member states, concluded that multiculturalism has been at least as harmful as the assimilation approach it replaced, and a recent UNESCO World Report on Cultural Diversity takes it for granted that we are now in a “post-multicultural” age (Kymlicka 2010).

Part of the problem has been the lack of clear public support for the enterprise (Joppke 2004). Indeed, with the exception of Canada, where multiculturalism is favored by majority members (Berry and Kalin 1995), a number of empirical studies have indicated only moderate support in Australia (Ho 1990), Britain (Evans 2006) and the United States (Citrin et al 2001; Schuck 2007), and weak support in Germany, Switzerland and Slovakia (Piontkowski et al 2000; Zick et al 2001). Moreover, a series of public opinion studies in the Netherlands have shown neutrality for multiculturalism and preference for assimilation on the part of the majority group.9

In some cases, the suggestion has been made that this apparent lack of public support results from dilution of the “national identity” into a set of empty bromides. For example, Joppke argues that in Australia official multiculturalism robbed the nation of

8 Most research on both Islamic minorities in Europe and Latinos in the U.S. indicates a willingness to assimilate rather than a stubborn refusal to do so. Modood, for example, concludes on the basis of interviews with Muslim political elites in several European countries that they are trying to do so within the bounds of their religious commitment (2005). Similarly, Citrin et al (2007) find that Latino immigrants do assimilate quite effectively into American society over time.
9 See, e.g.: Arends-Toth and Van de Vijver (2003); Breugelmans and Van de Vijver (2004); Van Oudenoven et al., (1998).
what made it truly “Australian”: “without a separate Australian core, all talk of a ‘primary loyalty to Australia’ that had permeated Australian multiculturalism statements since the early 1980s had to remain hollow” (2004: 246). The point, from this perspective, is that without being able to point to fundamental characteristics that define a nation – beyond simply saying that it is “multicultural” – the social glue that binds nationals together is doubly threatened: there is not only little to identify with, but there is also precious little to distinguish what makes “multicultural” Australia different from, say, “multicultural” Canada (ibid.: 246). Dusting off the shopworn reference to multiculturalism as a “tossed salad,” one author cuts to the heart of the issue, asking: “/w]here is the dressing to cover it all?”

For the most part, however, concerns have stemmed less from the issue of “who we are,” and more about “who we are not,” largely as a product of perceived threats from the “outsider” immigrant cultures mentioned above. The case is most evident in the Netherlands, Europe’s strongest exemplar of political multiculturalism. Starting in the mid-1990s, and culminating in the publication of Paul Scheffer’s influential article “The Multicultural Tragedy” in 2000, a consensus began to emerge among Dutch political elites that the “pillarisation” strategy extended to Muslims immigrants a decade before had backfired. Rather than aiding the process of immigrant social and economic integration, it had fostered ghettoization, which in turn had led to social unrest among both the immigrants themselves and their counterparts in the mainstream (e.g. Entzinger 2003, 2006). Pim Fortuyn’s rise in national electoral politics – based largely on anti-immigrant sentiment coupled with a bellicose reassertion of Dutch values – reflected these concerns in public opinion as well as among elites. As a result of all this, the Dutch case has become something of a cautionary tale about the perils of cultural recognition in the academic discourse on the subject (Koopmans 2010; Sniderman and Hagedoorn 2007).

This pattern has been evident in Britain as well, where cracks in the façade appeared only one year after the British government’s devotion to multiculturalism had been firmly restated in a report titled The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain. The Cantle report, prepared in response to the race riots wracking Northern England in 2001:

[S]truck an entirely new chord: there had to be a ‘greater sense of ‘citizenship’, ‘common elements of ‘nationhood’ had to be agreed upon, the ‘use of the English language had to be strengthened in the minority communities, and overall ‘the non-white community (had) to develop a greater acceptance of, and engagement with, the principal national insititutions (Joppke 2004: 251).

Strains on policies of cultural recognition have not been limited to Europe. In the U.S., recent public opinion data shows that while a majority of Americans agree that diversity strengthens society, “they overwhelmingly resist any conception of

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11 But, see Kymlicka (2008, forthcoming) for a critical assessment of this argument.
multiculturalism that discourages immigrants from learning and using the English language” (Schuck 2007: 19). Even in Canada, long considered a bastion of tolerance and respect for cultural diversity (Harell and Stolle 2010; Kymlicka 1989), the stresses immigrant multiculturalism place on social solidarity have emerged in recent years (Bibby 1990; Bissoondath 1994; Gwyn 1995). The starkest examples of this conflict has been the increasing demand on the Ontario provincial government from Muslims for the right to use shari’a law in family disputes and, more generally, a growing resistance against “reasonable accommodation” for immigrants’ poly-ethnic rights.

As a result of these perceived failures, the policy pendulum has begun to swing back towards cultural assimilation in many countries. In May 2007, the Sarkozy government in France inaugurated the “Ministry of Immigration, Integration, Co-Development and National Identity,” with one of its key aims being immigrants’ assimilation to the secular values of the republic (Parquet 2007). To be sure, this was at least partly in response to the growing backlash against rioting immigrants, but Brubaker argues that the shift away from “differentialism” and toward “assimilationism” among French political elites had roots tracing to the rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen and the constellation of scholars associated with him in the late 1980s (2001). In America, this has translated to the adoption of what Hero and Preuhs (2006) call “anti-multiculturalism policies” (such as laws making English the official language) across a number of states in the 1980s and 1990s. This, too, occurred partly in response to the widespread perception among politicians and the general public in these states that the Federal government’s attempts to promote multiculturalism were offensive to the “melting pot” model of acculturation and American culture more generally (ibid.; also see Citrin et al 1990).

While the U.S. and France are not usually treated as “multicultural” countries in the political sense, the same process has been evident in countries more strongly devoted to cultural recognition. The Dutch, for example, have begun to expect more in the way of “integration” from their immigrants, as a 1998 law requiring 600 hours of language and civics lesson attests (Entzinger 2003, 2006; Favell 2001). As of this writing, proposals are in circulation in both the Netherlands and Belgium for legislation banning the Muslim burqa in public places. In Australia, the government has sought to re-emphasize its British heritage through official government pronouncements on multiculturalism and national identity (Joppke 2004: 246). For their part, the British have also recently reasserted the importance of “common elements of nationhood” and engagement with national institutions (ibid: 251). One example of this, and part of a larger effort by the Brown government to reform immigration rules, is a 2008 rule requiring foreign-born spouses of British nationals to pass an English test before obtaining a visa (Ford 2008).

In summary, what is striking about all of this is the importance placed on a meaningful and shared national culture, and how this culture is threatened by both

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12 See also: Citrin and Sides (2008); Citrin and Sears (2009); Schildkraut (2005).
13 Recently, issues have included accommodation for Muslim females wearing the niqab or burkha while voting or otherwise interacting with government officials, and Sikhs’ right to wear a Turban in uniformed federal government jobs.
14 See, e.g.: Ireland (2004); Joppke (2004); Joppke and Morawska (2003); Koopmans (2010).
increasing immigrant diversity and cultural recognition. Problems with immigrant assimilation and multiculturalism have prompted highly “nationalistic” responses from political elites in various countries, all aimed at reasserting core national values in response to an existential struggle writ large. This has occurred either in response to the perception that simply being “multicultural” is not enough to engender loyalty to the nation and social cohesion, or because of threats caused by the culture and ideology of immigrant groups in society. Quebec Premier Jean Charest, in his defense of a March 2010 law banning the Muslim veil during interactions with provincial government officials, captures the sentiment well: “This is not about making our home less welcoming, but about stressing the values that unite us. ... An accommodation cannot be granted unless it respects the principle of equality between men and women, and the religious neutrality of the state.”

Major Questions

These concerns lead to three main questions that are within the purview of the present study: first, how can we think about what the social boundaries of the national community might be, and why do they matter? Are narrower, more bounded notions of the nation in-group related to mass preferences on immigration, immigrants, and cultural diversity more generally? Presumably, individuals exhibiting more constricted sense of who is “one of us” should be more keen to restrict immigration levels, more negative about the effects of immigration on the country’s economy and culture, less likely to favor extending citizenship rights to immigrants and refugees, and more hostile to cultural diversity more generally. More centrally, this study examines how immigrant diversity and policies of cultural recognition shape mainstream citizens’ conceptions of normative national identity. Is it indeed the case that ethnic diversity and political multiculturalism undermine social harmony, by provoking – via cultural threat – the desire among mainstream citizens to adhere to a more “ethnic” and exclusionary definition of who truly belongs on their soil? Finally, I go to the heart of the philosophical debates on cultural recognition, by asking whether immigrants’ allegiance to the nation is in indeed undermined in “multicultural” nations. Are they less willing to participate in the political process? Do they have less faith in the political system and governing institutions? Are they less trusting and/or socially engaged?

Review of Empirical Literature on Diversity and the Contribution of This Study

A number of recent studies have engaged, to varying degrees, the concerns presented above, with respect to mass public opinion in a cross-national setting. One line of research has taken the negative relationship between ethnic fractionalization and measures of social capital evident in the United States and sought to investigate it in

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17 For examples, see: Alesina and La Ferrara (2000, 2002); Hero (2003); Putnam (2007); Rice and Steele (2001).
other countries. Several studies working from an explicitly comparative framework have also picked up on this finding, and unearthed either little or qualified support for it either across Europe (e.g. Costa and Kahn 2003; Hooghe et al 2007; 2009) or even broader samples of countries.

This literature presupposes that social capital – usually in the guise of “generalized trust,” but also referring to organizational memberships and other measures of social networks – is a good measure of “a certain amount of fellow feeling, a caring about other people’s life chances, and a sense of belonging to a community of fate” (Crepaz 2006: 93). This general approach seems to reflect the understanding of national identity as an “imaged community” espoused in the literature on nationalism quite closely. That said, while the concept of trust (discussed in further in Chapter 3) is both theoretically and empirically important, it is not enough to simply assess whether people in multicultural countries are more willing to “trust most people.” Not only is the very meaning of the question itself is ambiguous (Nannestad 2008), but its ties to what concerns the literature on diversity and multiculturalism above all else – the sense of national community felt by immigrants and mainstream citizens alike – are plausible but far from self-evident.

There is also a growing movement in the literature toward acknowledging that political institutions can mediate the relationship between diversity and outcomes (Harell and Stolle 2010). Along these lines, the various linkages between immigrant diversity, political institutions designed to deal with it, and other outcomes in the political sphere have received much scrutiny of late. Recent comparative scholarship, for example, has explored the question of whether political multiculturalism erodes the welfare state (e.g. Banting et al 2006), as well as its effect on immigrant incorporation more generally (e.g. Bloemraad 2006; Koopmans et al 2005; Koopmans 2010).

Emphasis on how institutions mediate the relationship between diversity and public opinion, however, has been scarce. One cross-national study has argued that liberal, multicultural citizenship regimes (ideal-typically defined) tend to discourage ethnocentrism (Weldon 2006; but, see Hjerm 1998 for a differing perspective on a smaller set of four countries). Others, meanwhile, have explored the links between policy regimes and social capital (Crepaz 2008; Kesler and Bloemraad 2010). None of these

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18 Scholars have studied this and related issues in Belgium (Billiet et al 2003), Canada (Harell forthcoming; Reitz 2010; Soroka et al 2007), Australia (Leigh 2006), the U.K. (Letki 2008), and the Netherlands (Lancee and Dronkers 2008), with generally mixed findings.
19 Anderson and Paskeviciute (2006); Fieldhouse and Cutts (forthcoming); Gesthuizen et al (2008); Kesler and Bloemraad (forthcoming); but, see Crepaz (2006, 2008); Delhey and Newton (2005); Fieldhouse and Cutts (forthcoming).
20 For example, as it is usually operationalized in surveys, it does not in and of itself establish how survey respondents interpret the meaning of the word “trust.” Indeed, it is possible to trust somebody without liking them or feeling any common sense of fellowship with them. Nor does it provide clues as to how respondents interpret the “most people” part of the question; “most people” could represent the national community, as the literature tends to assume, but it could also mean people within a much smaller segment of society, such as the respondent’s ethnic or religious group, people in her city or neighborhood, or people she has known in her lifetime. The fairly weak and conflicting relationships found in cross-national studies could, therefore, be at least in part a reflection of this ambiguity.
studies considers consider how policy regimes influence mass conceptions of the nation, and even less is known about how they shape attitudes and behaviors of immigrants themselves. Given that identification with the nation tends to be the focus, either implicitly or explicitly, of the theoretical literature on institutions (explored at length in Chapter 5), this is a glaring omission.

The present study contributes to the literature on diversity and multiculturalism in several important ways. First, it addresses the questions above, but with respect to a broader conception of national identity than has been adopted in recent work on social capital and ethnocentrism. That scholars would emphasize these types of attitudes is of course understandable. Nevertheless, the larger point in the philosophical critique of multiculturalism is, as David Miller points out, an ideological one: “multiculturalism is criticized not only for its alleged direct effects on policy, but also for the way it shapes political identities, and therefore the relationships that will exist between citizens who belong to different cultural groups” (2006: 326). Thus, we cannot fully answer the broader issue without trying to understand how the ideology of nationalism in public opinion – most importantly the question of who is “in” and who is “out,” and on what terms – is influenced by diversity and the policies of cultural recognition.

A second major contribution is in the specific focus on immigrant diversity rather than ethnic diversity more generally. Most studies in this area have tended to conflate this distinction, either in terms of the diversity measures employed (e.g. Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Putnam 2007) or the outcomes being studied (Weldon 2006). This is a critical issue given the theoretical distinction between minority groups of long historical standing and more recent immigrants. For example, some have suggested that negative relationships between ethnic diversity and social capital apparent in the American case are the product of the historical conflict between African-Americans and the white majority (Hooghe et al 2009; Kesler and Bloemraad 2010).

That this might be true is hardly surprising, not only because of the long and tortured history of race relations in the U.S., but also because studies specifically framed around the issue of racial diversity rather than immigration have shown similar findings (Giles and Buckner 1993; Quillian 1996; Oliver and Wong 2003). That being the case, studies employing more general measures of “fractionalization” on the right side of the equation may be telling us very little about how measures of community and identity respond to diversity that is immigrant-driven, or policies that are specifically targeted at promoting the culture of immigrant groups. Similarly, studies that explore racial prejudice broadly construed may not be telling us very much about how influxes of new immigrants and policies designed to incorporate them shape more specific forms of prejudice against them. It is imperative, therefore, that any pronouncement about the relationship between diversity, identity, and social cohesion considers this distinction, and this study is one of few that does so.

21 In the former sense, any of the myriad studies using so-called “fractionalization” measures do so at least implicitly. In the latter, Weldon’s analysis focuses on prejudice against racial minorities, which, while useful, is conceptually distinct from prejudice against immigrant minorities.
Third, while there as been a great deal of work recently on how government policy regimes have changed in response to diversity, either in an ideal-typic sense or in more concrete terms,\(^{22}\) relatively little of this has considered their relationship to public opinion (either majority or immigrant) in a comparative setting.\(^{23}\) This work, on the other hand, theorizes explicitly about the relationship between policy and public opinion, and tests these arguments cross-nationally. What is more, I consider the confounding effects of different types of policy regime – specifically, the distinctions between cultural recognition, access to citizenship, and social welfare redistribution much more thoroughly than studies in this area have done to date (Crepaz 2008; Weldon 2006).

A fourth contribution of the present research is its emphasis on over-time survey data. The vast majority of the empirical studies in this field rely on analyses of single surveys.\(^{24}\) There is no doubt that this approach can be highly informative, even despite the inherent difficulties in making inferences from cross-sectional data. That said, such studies can raise as many questions as they answer. Assuming one accepts the general finding – espoused by both Crepaz (2008) and Weldon (2006) – that social solidarity is higher in “multicultural” countries than it is elsewhere, this still leaves open the possibility that it is not as high as it used to be, or that it has decreased more rapidly than in other countries over time. In the present work, I take the much-needed step of augmenting cross-sectional analysis with over-time surveys where they are available; this allows for a much richer understanding of all the dynamics at play than has been put forward to date.

Finally, while the bulk of this study is devoted to an understanding of how mainstream populations are responding to heightened ethnic diversity, I also (as noted above) make some effort to analyze the opinions of immigrants themselves. While the philosophical debates on multiculturalism have centered on the allegiance – or lack thereof – that immigrants feel to the broader nation, there has been relatively little cross-national empirical research on this question.\(^{25}\) Thus, the present study examines immigrant minorities’ identity, allegiance, and political engagement, in order to see analyze how policy regimes help or impede the assimilation process.

### Chapter Outline

The current research is an attempt to address this general debate, from the standpoint of mass public opinion, and with respect to the advanced democracies of Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom), North America (Canada and the United States), as well as Australia and New Zealand.

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\(^{22}\) Examples include: Castles (1995); Castles and Miller (1993); Entzinger (2003), (2006); Favell (2001); Joppke (2004); Joppke and Morawska (2003); Koopmans et al (2005); Safran (1997).

\(^{23}\) Exceptions dealing with mainstream public opinion include: Crepaz (2008), Hjerm (1998), Kesler and Bloemraad (2008), and Weldon (2006).

\(^{24}\) The lone exception in all of the work cited above is Kesler and Bloemraad (forthcoming).

\(^{25}\) Elkins’ and Sides’ work on minority-group patriotism as a response to different electoral systems (2007) is one notable exception, though they focus on “minorities” more generally rather than immigrants.
Chapter 2 develops more fully the notion of normative national identity in mass public opinion. Its core argument is that the widespread premise that strong sense of allegiance to an “imagined community” can serve to promote cultural and political harmony between disparate groups in society is contingent on where the boundaries of that identity are drawn. Using the well-established literature on the distinction between “ethnic” and “civic” markers of belonging as a starting point, I develop measures based on individuals’ prioritization of “ascriptive” versus “achievable” traits on two conceptually distinct dimensions: qualifications for immigration to the country, and full membership in the national community. I also demonstrate empirically that these conceptions tend to be quite stable over time, and also linked in predictable ways to a variety of other attitudes in the domain of immigration and immigrants’ rights, cultural pluralism, and prejudice.

Chapter 3 examines the theoretical premises underlying the argument that immigrant diversity may threaten inclusive conceptions of nationhood, drawing on theories of social capital, social contact, social identity, and material group conflict. In synthesizing the insights of these various approaches, I tease out more nuanced hypotheses about how contextual- and individual-level factors might shape the normative conceptions of the nation outlined in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 also contains a detailed discussion of how diversity is measured in this study, and a discussion of potentially confounding relationships. Chapter 4 empirically tests the hypotheses put forward in Chapter 3, in a comparative, large-n setting. While cross-sectional analyses feature heavily here, the heart of this Chapter is the exploration of these dynamics in a longitudinal setting.

Chapter 5 is devoted to theories about the specific effects of policy on these outcomes. It tackles in-depth the effects of three different types of regimes: policies of cultural recognition, citizenship (along the jus sanguinis/jus soli dimension), and social welfare spending. These different policy areas are discussed in terms of how they might shape the attitudes of mainstream citizens about the normative boundaries of their nation, as well as how they might shape the political allegiance of the immigrants themselves. This chapter also contains a discussion of how these policy regimes are operationalized for the purposes of the empirical analyses that follow.

Chapter 6 combines these policy measures with the survey data used in Chapters 2 and 4, in order to address these theoretical debates and explore the relationships between policy and mainstream national identity empirically. Chapter 7 examines their effect on immigrant attitudes and behaviors, with a focus on social trust, perceived discrimination, political engagement, and faith in the national government. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the findings and suggests avenues for further research.
Chapter 2: Measuring the Boundaries of the Nation in Mainstream Public Opinion

In the previous chapter, I introduced the notion that diversity and multiculturalism might cause an ethnocentric backlash in terms of mainstream citizens’ national identity. The present chapter is devoted to an explanation of how national identity – with respect to mainstream opinion – is defined and measured in this study. First, I define national identity in conceptual terms, making distinctions between its different facets and zeroing on the key dimension of interest: the normative boundaries of inclusion in the national community. Second, I tackle the issue of measurement, and discuss the survey measures employed. Finally, I explore the “so what?” question, demonstrating the linkages between the measures I develop and a variety of other attitudes related to ethnocentrism and xenophobia.

Exploring the Facets of National Identity

While people carry multiple, overlapping identities that can interact in meaningful ways,¹ the focus in the present work is on mass conceptions of the nation-state. This is not to suggest that other forms of identification are unimportant; indeed, many have argued for the increasing prevalence and power of post-national or transnational identities,² a trend usually explained using some variant of modernization or globalization theory.³ Nevertheless, the cardinal role of the nation-state in peoples’ political self-definition remains secure even today; it is the source of both intense group loyalty and identity, and it remains the dominant object of democratic political legitimacy (e.g. Brubaker 2004).

Beyond the continued relevance of nations in organizing political life, the focus on national identity in the present work also stems from the widely held view that as democracies become increasingly diverse, social harmony will only obtain when disparate groups share a broader, common identity. Common identity increases the likelihood that citizens will place trust in both their fellow citizens and institutions of government (Kaase 1999; Steinmo 1994; Miller 1995). A sense of collective identity also engenders the prioritization of group welfare over individualism in decision-making: “inclusion within a common social boundary acts to reduce social distance among group members, making it less likely that they will make sharp distinctions between their own and others’ welfare” (Kramer and Brewer 1984: 1045; also Doosje et al 1999). Finally, from the perspective of inter-group relations, the existence of a strong over-arching national identity can help mitigate competition between societal subgroups (e.g. Gaertner et al 1999; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Smith and Tyler 1996).

Philosophers in the cosmopolitan tradition argue that this common bond should be a general sense of humanity (e.g. Bok 2002; Nussbaum 1996; Waldron 1992), but empirical work has suggested that such a universalistic identity is “too thin a gruel” to

¹ See, e.g.: Citrin and Sears (2009); Deaux (1996); Rocca and Brewer (2002); Stryker and Statham (1985); Tajfel (1978).
² See, e.g.: Baubock (1994); Jacobson (1996); Glick Schiller (2005); Joppke (2005); Soysal (1994).
³ See, e.g.: Falk (1994); Dower (2003); Inglehart (1997); Norris (2000); Vertovec and Cohen (2002).
create a meaningful sense of one’s political self beyond powerful and more narrowly defined group interests (e.g. Citrin 2001). The nation-state, by contrast, is in a better position to override particularistic commitments. Nationhood, in short, serves as a powerful “centripetal” identity that helps attenuate “centrifugal” group interests within its borders (Joppke 2004). As Miller puts it, “trust requires solidarity not merely within groups but across them, and this in turn depends upon a common identification of the kind that nationality alone can provide” (1995:140).

National identity is a multifaceted concept, including cognitive, affective, and normative dimensions (Citrin and Sears 2009; Druckman 1994; Theiss-Morse 2009). Like any meaningful social identity, it begins with cognitive self-categorization, the answer to the “who am I” question. Given the multiple and overlapping nature of most peoples’ political identities, this is obviously not an either/or proposition; in order to categorize oneself as “British,” for example, one does not have to explicitly deny membership in other social groups. Rather, it reflects the relative priority of the nation as a salient identity relative to other politically relevant ones, whether they be more narrowly defined (such as those stemming from ethnic group memberships, regional, or even local interests), or more broadly (such as being “European” or even simply “human”).

Usually, national identity in the affective sense is defined as a deeply felt emotional attachment, or the degree of love for and pride, in one’s nation. Simple national “attachment” – or, in other words, how “close” one feels to their country – is perhaps the purest form of affective allegiance, and is thought to be non-ideological in nature. Symbolic patriotism (which is closely related to what others call “national pride”) generally involves positive feelings about national symbols and achievements (e.g. DeFiguereido and Elkins 2003; Smith and Jarrko 1998; Smith and Kim 2006). As distinct from pride, national chauvinism is its outward manifestation at the expense of other countries, and generally includes sentiments of superiority over other nation in terms of national achievements, and so on.

The Normative Boundaries of the National Community

Finally, and most importantly for the purposes of the present study, the normative content of a national identity refers to the criteria individuals use for establishing the subjective and legal boundaries between themselves outsiders; in other words, the criteria employed to distinguish “us” from “them.” The importance of this distinction cannot be overstated, the reason being that if strong cognitive and affective attachments to the nation can serve to generate fellow-feeling and loyalty within a diverse society, it is imperative to know where the social boundaries of that identity lie (Thiess-Morse 2009).

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4 See, e.g.: Conover and Feldman (1987); Huddy and Khatib (2007); Kosterman and Feshbach (1989).
6 This concept has been also been referred to as “blind patriotism” (e.g. Adorno et al 1950; Schatz, Staub and Levine 1999) and simply “nationalism” (Feshbach 1994; Kosterman & Feshbach 1989; Sidanius et al 1997; de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003).
If history tells us anything, they are varied, malleable, and contested. Scholars of nationalism have constructed models of nationalist types from the study of laws and institutions, texts of popular culture, official speeches and celebrations, and the content of public education. A long lineage of studies culminating in the work of Greenfeld (1992) and Brubaker (1992) distinguishes between two historical models of nationhood, the ethnic and the civic. The ethnic type, exemplified by Germany and Japan, defines itself on the principle of descent; the nation is a marriage of blood and soil. Objective and ascriptive criteria define whether one is considered a “national” or not, and citizenship is in turn accorded along *jus sanguinis* principles.

By contrast, the boundaries of the civic nation are permeable; anyone can belong provided he or she accepts certain fundamental values and institutions. Civic nations thus are often characterized as voluntarist and inclusive, and citizenship is accorded based on *jus soli* principles. In terms of American identity, Richard Hofstadter’s claim that “it has been our fate not to have ideologies, but to be one” is oft-recited, and references to the “American Creed” are ubiquitous in historical accounts tracing back to the country’s founding. France, the other leading exemplar of the civic nation, defines itself by its republicanism and secularism (Brubaker 1992). That said, ethnic and civic models of national identity must be viewed as ideal-types rather than accurate descriptions of historical cases, as rhetoric and reality have often diverged.

A vast and growing body of empirical literature has sought to assess whether or not this distinction exists in mass public opinion. Early forays centered on the American case (Citrin et al 1990; Citrin et al 1994; Citrin et al 2001), and, more recently, researchers have measured Americans’ definitions of nationhood in ever richer and more nuanced ways (Schildkraut 2005, 2007; Theiss-Morse 2009). Outside the American case, analysis has remained concentrated on the ethnic/civic distinction, both within individual countries and across them. A growing body of work has also examined the macro-level foundations of such attitudes, with particular emphasis on the question of whether economic globalization is eroding “ethnic” nationalism (e.g. Jones and Smith 2001b; Kunovich 2009).

Brubaker (2004: 118) points out that both the ethnic and civic categories of nationhood rest on a conception of separateness, so whatever the contemporary normative prestige of the seemingly tolerant civic nation, the dividing line between nationals and aliens still powerfully affects individual life chances. However, even if civic nationalism

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7 See, e.g.: Brubaker (1992); Greenfeld (1992, 1998); Haas (1964); Huntington (2004); Smith (1991); Smith (1997).
8 Though never, interestingly enough, traced back to its original source, irrespective of whether it is brought up in academic work (e.g. Kohn 1955; Lipset 1979, 1996) or elsewhere.
9 For general discussion, see: Joppke (1999); Joppke and Morawska (2003); Medrano and Koenig (2005). For work on the American case in particular see, e.g.: Feagin (1997); Jaret (1999); Huntington (2004); Smith (1997).
too can be exclusionary, self-conceptions of nationhood along ethnic lines appear to be more so. Indeed, a growing body of work has shown that ethnically-defined national identities are associated with ethnocentrism, national chauvinism, xenophobia, and preference for policies that promote cultural conformity over diversity. Given all this, it seems certain that answers to the question of what it means to be considered a part of the national community have far-reaching implications.

In this study, I explore the normative boundaries of the national community by looking at two broad questions: first, what types of factors are important in determining whether a prospective immigrant should be allowed to settle in the country? Second, which elements are important in determining whether or not someone is “truly” a member of the national community? These are similar in character, in that they both define the specific radius of the social in-group in question as the nation-state, rather focusing on ambiguous references to “most people” that are the hallmark of the literature on social trust.

There are important differences between them, however. While the normative immigration qualification measures are more akin to conceptions of anti-immigrant sentiment and xenophobia, asking respondents what it takes to be considered a member of the national in-group is much closer to the conceptions of social cohesion that are emphasized in literature on trust, social capital, and the radius of in-group identity. Rather than asking “who should we let in,” the question here becomes “who is truly ‘one of us’”? This second question is subtly distinct from the former, as one could be more or less willing to let certain types of people into the country and yet never really consider them truly “British,” “German,” or whatever the case may be. While both are potentially important, the latter is a higher bar for immigrants to leap, and it presumably comes closer to what pessimists about diversity and critics of multiculturalism are concerned about.

**Measuring the Normative Boundaries of National Identity**

*Surveys, Items, and Dimensions*

In reference to the first question, the European Social Survey’s first round (fielded in 2002/2003) contains a battery that asks how important various characteristics are in determining whether prospective immigrants should be allowed to settle in the respondent’s country. Table 2.1, below, shows country level mean scores on the importance of the following items: whether the prospective immigrant is white, Christian, is educated, has good work skills, and has good language ability.

[Table 2.1 About Here]

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11 See, e.g.: Arts and Halman (2006); Citrin and Wright (2008); Hjerm (1998); Kunovich (2009); Rusciano (2003); Theiss-Morse (2009); Schildkraut (2007).

12 For outstanding reviews of this literature, see Levi and Stoker (2000); Nannestad (2008).
Following the basic distinction mentioned above, others analyzing these items have distinguished between ethnic characteristics (skin color or religion) and civic ones (such as education, language skills, and work skills) in evaluating which immigrants a country should accept or reject (Green 2007, 2008). The analyses herein focus on five items, two of which are clearly “ascriptive” (“white” and “Christian,”) and three of which are clearly “achievable” (work skills, language ability, and education). Factor analysis on this set of items, shown in Table 2.2 below, tends to support this distinction rather strongly; not only do the pooled-sample results confirm that each of the five items corresponds to its hypothesized factor, but also that the same basic pattern is evident in every single country except Greece, where the structure is identical but the “ascribed” factor is more dominant.

[Table 2.2 About Here]

For the second broad question about normative national identity put forth above, the emphasis is on the characteristics that define full membership in the national community rather than qualifications for immigration. In the field of public opinion, researchers have asked whether survey respondents feel that there is something about their country that makes it different from any other (e.g. Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Citrin et al 1994), and whether they agree or disagree that certain characteristics are required to make one “truly” of a given nationality. Much of this research has focused on the International Social Survey Program’s National Identity Module, which fielded a battery of items asking about the importance of a series of traits on this latter dimension. In the 2003 version of this survey, these included: “[country] ancestry,” “being born in [country],” having “lived [country] for most of one’s life,” “being [country’s] majority religion,” “having [country] citizenship,” “speaking [country’s] principal language,” “having respect for [country’s] institutions and laws,” and “feeling’ like a [nationality].”

On theoretical grounds, it makes sense to assume that ancestry and nativity fall into the “ascripted” category, since they are ascriptive by nature and exclude immigrants by definition. On the other hand, both respect for a country’s institutions and laws and “feeling” like a national can be easily achieved the moment an immigrant arrives on new shores; they constitute the core of what “civic” citizenship is really about.

The case for the other items being in one category or the other is not nearly so neat. Many of them appear to have “ethnic” connotations at face value but are not necessarily so (e.g. “living in [country] for most of one’s life”, language ability, and even...
Christianity). Even the putatively civic notion of “having [country] citizenship” cannot reasonably be assumed to mean the same thing across nations with vastly different citizenship regimes. Not surprisingly, empirical explorations of the ethnic/civic distinction do not neatly place these items in either category on a consistent basis (e.g. Citrin and Wright 2008; Jones and Smith 2001; Kunovich 2009), and the cross-cultural equivalence of factor scores derived from all the items has been challenged (Reesken et al 2008).

Factor analysis on both individual countries and the pooled sample, depicted in Table 2.3, does tend to support the general distinction between ascribed and achievable characteristics. There appear to be two main underlying factors, the first corresponding to the “ascribed” dimension and the second being the “achievable.” Furthermore, the basic distinction holds in almost every country under analysis, even though the fit is less perfect for others, such as Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and the United States.

Importantly, the theoretical ambiguities surrounding several of these measures (notably language and citizenship) appear in full force. While the overall picture tends to favor the ascribed/achievable distinction as theorized above, the inherent muddiness of criteria such as citizenship, language, and even religion suggests narrowing the list to measures that clearly and unambiguously exclude immigrants, and those that can clearly and unambiguously include them. As a result, the analyses that follow take ancestry and being born in the country as being “ascribed” characteristics, and respect for the nation’s institutions and laws and “feeling like a [nationality]” as “achievable” ones.

There is another important advantage to these ISSP measures. Unlike the ESS measures of desired immigration qualifications, the measures of “true” membership in the national community appear in both ISSP National Identity modules (1995 and 2003). Addressing the issues raised here with over-time data is vital, given that the literature on normative national identity tends to assume that conceptions of who is “in” or “out” of the national community are grounded in history and culture (e.g. Brubaker 1992; Greenfeld 1992). For example, the fact that French, Swedish, and Norwegian respondents tend to score much lower in terms of “ascriptiveness” may have more to do with the political and cultural histories of those countries than it does with recent influxes of immigrants.15

For analyzing over-time variation, the ISSP surveys are less than ideal in several respects: first, the span between these surveys is only eight years. On the one hand the period between 1995 and 2003 is a propitious one to analyze, given that it bookends the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and, more generally, immigrant diversity became an especially contentious issue among the elites of many countries during this period (e.g. Brubaker 2001; Joppke 2004). On the other, however, this makes it impossible to generalize beyond that relatively brief era. Second, only 11 countries are surveyed in both years.

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15 This reasoning is reminiscent of Crepaz’ study of trust (2008), where it is theorized as a “trait” rather than a “state”; it is, in other words, a strong and stable predisposition that shapes other attitudes.
Third, the 1995 version of the ISSP does not include the ancestry item; from the
categorization suggested above, only the item tapping the importance of nativity remains
in the “ascribed” category. Finally, the surveys are independent cross-sections and not
panel data, which compromises our ability to look at over-time variation at the individual
level.

*Ratings, Rankings, and “Relativization”*

On a methodological note, a further possible criticism of both the ESS and ISSP
batteries is that the individual items within each are asked sequentially and independently
of each other, without any constraint. People can say that several traits (or all of them)
are very important for making one truly French or worthy of immigration to France, for
example, but have no opportunity to say which of these is the most important. True, it is
possible that people think about each trait’s importance relative to those already queried.
But it also is possible that a tendency to give a common, positive response to each item
significantly influence the pattern of answers. What is more, even if we believe that the
substance of the responses is meaningful, they tend to be significantly inter-correlated,
both within and across broader domains (Citrin and Wright 2009; Schildkraut 2007).

The “end-piling” of responses to these types of ratings batteries can mask an
underlying unidimensionality (Green and Citrin 1994); or, it may be an artifact that
conceals multidimensionality, and obfuscates relationships between the measures in
question and other variables (Greenleaf, Bickart, and Yorkston 1999; McCarty and
Shrum 2000). In short, then, if the aim is to capture a meaningful sense of what different
normative definitions of national identity imply for policy attitudes in other domains, the
ratings approach may be a less-than-ideal way of doing so.

Asking people to rank a set of attributes from most to least important rather than
simply rating each independently forces attention to tradeoffs and arguably results in
more thoughtful responses by making it impossible to give a reflexive or consistent
reaction to diverse content (Kamakura and Mazzaon 1991; Kohn 1977; Rokeach 1973).
Obviously, the data are what they are for present purposes, and rankings are out of the
question. What I can do, though, is try to ascertain how respondents would have
ranked the items, given the chance to do so.

In order to capture – using extant ratings measures – a better sense of the weights
that respondents assign to different factors, I “relativize” the importance of items in one
category (ascribed or achievable) by subtracting from them the mean importance
assigned to all of the characteristics in the other. For example, to capture the relative
importance of British ancestry in being “truly” British, defined here as an ascribed
characteristic, one can subtract the mean level of importance the respondent attaches to
items in the achievable category. The resulting score is, in effect, a post-hoc tradeoff,

---

16 See, e.g.: Alwin and Krosnick (1985); Green and Citrin (1994); Krosnick and Alwin (1988); McCarty
and Shrum (2000); Reynolds and Jolly (1980).
17 Assuming the respondent claims that ancestry is “not very important” (corresponding to a score of 0.33
when the variable is scaled from 0 = “not at all important” to 1 = “very important”) and the average value
of the importance assigned to “achievable” criteria is .75, his or her relativized ancestry score will be -0.42.
since different characteristics are weighed directly against each other in terms of assigned importance; in this example, the respondent attaches relatively less importance to ancestry than to achievable characteristics. Other work on the ratings versus rankings issue has demonstrated that this is an effective way to derive quasi-rankings from ratings scales (Wright and Citrin 2009). Scores produced from this method of standardization are depicted below in Table 2.4 (for the immigration qualification measures) and Table 2.5 (for the “truly” items); the latter table also includes the raw scores for comparison purposes.

[Tables 2.4 and 2.5 About Here]

In general, two things stand out from these tables: first, there appears to be a relatively sharp divide between ascribed and achievable criteria, both with respect to the “immigration qualifications” and the “truly” items; this pattern is strikingly consistent for all countries in Table 2.4, with the “ascribed” qualifications being outweighed by the “achievable” ones in every country. Table 2.5 paints a very similar picture, with the importance of achievable factors on average tending to outweigh ascribed ones in every country except Ireland. Second, while there is variation across countries in terms of homogeneity within both the achievable and ascribed categories, there does appear to be a strong overall pattern of “what goes with what,” in the sense that items within each category tend to resemble each other more than they resemble those in the opposite group. This pair of findings attests to both the general validity of the achievable/ascribed distinction put forward above, and the categorization of items in one or the other category.\(^\text{18}\)

Why Should We Care?

In a sense, scholars approaching the threats that diversity pose to social solidarity from the perspective of social capital or generalized trust are working from something of an advantage. While the specific meaning of and theoretical mechanisms undergirding the effects of generalized trust or civic engagement are still somewhat mysterious, their correlates are not. As a result, studies of social capital are long past the point of having to justify the usefulness of the measures they employ. By contrast, much less is known about the consequences of different conceptions of national identity as I define them here. And, though I have attempted to define these outcomes rigorously enough to mitigate some of the more pointed criticisms levied against “identity” research (Brubaker and Cooper 2000), the obvious question is why should we care?

The underlying assumption is that these types of attitudes matter because they mean something; in other words, they are more or less stable, on the one hand, and tied together in a way that is both politically meaningful and at least potentially responsive to contextual-level diversity and governmental policy regimes, on the other. The substantial body of literature that has mapped the normative boundaries of identity by analyzing laws,

\[^{18}\text{For further measurement discussion, please see the Appendix to Chapter 2.}\]
founding documents, and elite discourse from a historical perspective certainly suggests that they should be.\textsuperscript{19}

Whether this assumption holds true at the mass level, however – as plausible as it may seem – could be overstating the truth of the matter, especially given a general characterization of most citizens in America and elsewhere as “ideological innocents” (e.g. Converse 1964; 2000). While many of those who make this objection are generally more concerned with the use of identity as an independent variable, the concern still remains that I am treating it as a far more stable and meaningful concept than it actually is (Abdelal et al 2009). On the other hand, studies have repeatedly shown that issues of strong emotional importance to individuals are likely more accessible in people’s minds, more stable, and more explicitly linked to other, related concerns (e.g. Krosnick 1990). Moreover, social identity theory (and, relatedly, the “symbolic politics” approach) suggest that the innate tendency towards in-group favoritism is much stronger when the group in question has strong emotional significance (Tajfel 1981; Sears 1996). National identity, in short, is about more than knowledge of obscure political issues and how they link together; rather, it concerns deeply-held notions of the nation – its culture, its insiders, and its outsiders – that are likely to be both strong and stable, on the one hand, and responsive to threat on the other.

Clearly, however, if the present study is to be of any relevance at all it is necessary to see if these assumptions hold up empirically. While the “responsiveness to threat” issue is explored extensively in subsequent chapters, here I assess these measures’ stability over time and their links with other presumably relevant attitudes. In terms of the former, while panel data are unavailable for these measures, the fact that the ISSP “National Identity” module was fielded in 1995 and 2003 does allow us to explore their aggregate-level stability over time. Table 2.6, below, observes this in two ways: rank-order correlations between country-level mean scores in 1995 and 2003, as well as the estimated coefficient produced when 2003 scores are regressed on their lagged 1995 values in a bivariate OLS model.\textsuperscript{20}

![Table 2.6 About Here](image)

Clearly, these measures are characterized by a high level of aggregate stability over this relatively short period. For one thing, there is almost no change in the rank-order of countries on these measures; indeed, the lowest rank-order correlation between years occurs is .904, on the “feel” item. In other words, countries that were more “ascriptive” in 1995 remained so in 2003, and vice versa. What is more, as is evident from the bottom row of the table, mean scores in 2003 are strongly predicted by their 1995 values on every measure. Both of these findings support the argument that – at least in the aggregate – self-conceptions of who is “in” or “out” of the national

\textsuperscript{19} See note 6.

\textsuperscript{20} Unfortunately, the “ancestry” item was not asked in 1995. All over-time analysis here and in subsequent chapters relies on an “ascribed” index that includes only nativity, standardized against “respect for laws” and “feel like a national.” Using this reduced measure does not substantively change the findings of analyses (based on the 2003 cross-section) on indices that include the ancestry measure.
community are grounded in history and culture not only with respect to laws (e.g. Brubaker 1992; Greenfeld 1992), but have some degree of stability in terms of public opinion as well.

As in the debate on generalized trust, pointing to aggregate-level stability within countries helps show that these measures probably “mean something,” but that alone does little to tell us what they mean exactly (Nannestad 2008). In theory, one would expect that weighing “ascribed” traits more heavily – either in terms of immigration qualifications or “true” membership in the national community – should be related to a desire for tighter restrictions on immigration, less willingness to extend political rights to immigrants and refugees, the preference for cultural unity (rather than diversity), and prejudice against immigrants and minorities. Figures 2.1(a)-(d) show the relationships, both within countries and for the entire pooled sample, between more ascriptive notions of the national community and the desire to reduce immigration. The specific measures in the ESS are a 6-item additive index of respondents’ desired immigration level, and agreement with the notion that in order to reduce tensions in the country, immigration should be stopped. For the ISSP, outcomes include a single item measure of desired immigration level, and agreement that measures to control illegal immigration should be increased. On all four measures, ascriptive definitions of identity are positively correlated with anti-immigrant sentiment in the pooled samples. Some of these relationships are not statistically significant within certain countries (especially on the ESS measures), but overall it seems fair to say that the ascribed identity measures behave as one would expect them to.

[Figures 2.1(a)-(d) About Here]

The expected relationships emerge much more strongly when considering outcomes related to immigrants’ rights, shown in Figures 2.2(a)-(d). In the pooled sample and within virtually every country available for analysis, ascriptive definitions of identity are associated with the belief that legal immigrants should not have the same rights as “everybody else,” that government spending on aid to immigrants should be decreased, and that even legitimately persecuted refugees should not be allowed to stay in the country permanently.

[Figures 2.2(a)-(d)] About Here]

As one would expect, ascriptive definitions of identity are also tied to the preference for cultural unity rather than pluralism (Figures 2.3a-d). Respondents who prioritize nativity, ancestry, “whiteness,” or Christianity over more civic traits tend to agree that a country is better off if most people share customs and traditions, disagree that

21 The six items are identically worded but ask about the desired level of different groups, namely: same race/ethnic group as majority, different race/ethnic group as majority, from richer countries in Europe, from poorer countries in Europe, from richer countries outside Europe, and from poorer countries outside Europe. Though these measures are conceptually distinct, factor analysis reveals one overwhelming factor. As a result, they are indexed for ease of presentation.
having a variety of religions is a good thing, do not believe that government should help minorities preserve their culture, and agree that it is impossible to become fully a member of the national community without embracing its cultures and traditions. Once again, the pattern is common to virtually all countries and not just the pooled samples. The only real outlier in any of these estimates appears to be the U.S. in Figure 2.3(c); it appears that in that case, more ascriptive definitions of identity are actually tied to the increased preference for a government role in protecting culture. Apart from this lone (and curious) exception, the relationships are strong and as predicted.

[Figures 2.3(a)-(d) About Here]

Finally, ascriptive conceptions of national community are tied to attitudes closer to what scholars typically call “old-fashioned prejudice” (e.g. Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears et al 2000). These are tapped by two ESS measures: a two-item index on support for anti-discrimination laws (in public and in the workplace), and a four-item index that assesses respondents’ level of discomfort about social contact with immigrants. As Figures 2.4(a) and 2.4(b) demonstrate, the relationship tends to be quite powerful, both in the pooled sample and within almost every single country available for analysis.

[Figures 2.4(a) and 2.4(b) About Here]

In all, the measures developed in this chapter appear to be substantively meaningful in predictable ways. Not only are they stable over time (at least in the aggregate), but they are powerfully related to a number of related political attitudes in sensible ways. What is more, while the strength of these relationships tends to vary to some extent by country, the overwhelming tendency is in the predicted direction: respondents who score high on these “ascriptive” measures also want to tighten restrictions on immigration, are less willing to extend political rights to immigrants and refugees, prefer cultural monism, and score higher on indices of prejudice against immigrants and minorities. It also appears from these results that the “true national” items are more strongly related to the outcomes than the “immigrant qualifications” items, which indicates that the conceptual difference between the two (with the former being theorized as a “stronger test” of the dividing line between the national in-group and outsiders) has merit. Finally, in addition to general predispositions about immigrants and culture, many of the strongest links demonstrated here are between the identity measures and attitudes that tap specific policy preferences.

Summary

22 Respondents are asked how much they would “mind” about each of the following: having an immigrant of the same race/ethnic group as a boss, having an immigrant of a different race/ethnic group as a boss, having an immigrant of the same race/ethnic group marry a close family member, and having an immigrant of a different race/ethnic group marry a close family member. Once again, even though there are conceptual differences between these items, they do not appear do be reflected in the responses.
In this section, I defined the elements that constitute the principle outcomes of this study, namely the terms by which mainstream populations distinguish “good” from “bad” immigrants, and the characteristics they prioritize in defining their national community. I also showed that these attitudes tend to be stable over time, linked to other predispositions broadly related to ethnocentrism, and, perhaps most importantly, connected with policy preferences. What remains to be seen is the extent to which these attitudes respond to the dual processes of increased immigrant diversity and political multiculturalism, and it is to this that I now turn.
### Chapter 2 Tables and Figures

Table 2.1: Country-Level Means on the Importance of Various Qualifications For Immigration

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All measures scored from 0=not at all important to 1=extremely important. Data are weighted. Source: ESS 2002/2003
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Entries are rotated factor loadings (Varimax with Kaiser normalization), based on unweighted responses. In general, two-factor solutions arose spontaneously (based on the standard criterion of extracting factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.00), but in the cases of Italy, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and Spain this method produced only one factor. For comparability with other countries, a two-factor solution was specified in these instances. Source: ESS 2002/2003.
Table 2.3: Dimensionality of “True National” Items By Country

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Entries are rotated factor loadings (Varimax with Kaiser normalization) on unweighted responses. In general, two-factor solutions arose spontaneously (based on the standard criterion of extracting factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.00), but in the cases of Spain and Portugal this method produced only one factor. For comparability with other countries, a two-factor solution was specified in these instances. Source: ISSP 2003
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>-.43</td>
<td>-.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-.43</td>
<td>-.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All items scored from -1 (individual item completely outweighs average of items in opposite category) to 1 (average of items in opposite category completely outweighs importance of individual item). Data are weighted. Source: ESS 2002/2003.
Table 2.5: Raw and Standardized Scores For Each “True National” Item By Country, 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ascribed Traits RAW Scores (0-1)</th>
<th>Standardized Scores (-1 to 1)</th>
<th>Achievable Traits RAW Scores (0-1)</th>
<th>Standardized Scores (-1 to 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country Ancestry</td>
<td>Born In Country</td>
<td>Country Ancestry</td>
<td>Born In Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>-.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>-.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>-.48</td>
<td>-.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Zealand</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>-.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>-.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>-.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>-.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Variables in “raw scores” columns are coded from 0 = “not at all important” to 1 = “very important.” Standardized scores are constructed by taking the respondent’s raw score on each item, respectively, and subtracting their average score on all of the items in the other domain (e.g. Ascribed or Achievable). For example, to get the standardized version of “Country Ancestry,” I take that score and subtract the respondent’s mean score on the four Achievable factors. Scores range from -1 = average of all factors in the other category completely outweighs relevant factor to 1 = relevant factor completely outweighs the average of the other measures in the opposite category. Data are weighted. Source: ISSP 2003.
Table 2.6: Aggregate Stability and Change in “True National” Measures By Country, 1995-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ascribed</th>
<th>Achievable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Born in Country</td>
<td>Respect For Country’s Institutions and Laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation</td>
<td>.927**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLS Coefficient, 2003 Regressed on 1995</td>
<td>.733**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# p < .10  * p < .05 ** p < .01. Cells represent either rank-order correlations or regression coefficients, where the cases represent the aggregate, country-level mean scores on each measure. Data are weighted. Source: 1995 and 2003 ISSP.
Figures 2.1(a)-(d): Ascriptive Nationalism Indices and Controlling Borders

Notes: Points represent estimates produced by regressing Ascribed Immigration Qualifications/Ascribed “Truly” Item Indices on the outcome measures specified in the figure headings. For individual countries, these are estimated using OLS regression, and for the “Total” sample they are estimated using a mixed-effects, random intercept model. Range plots represent 95% confidence intervals using OLS robust standard errors. Ascribed indices are scored from -1 = “lowest” to +1 = “highest,” and all outcome measures are scored from 0 = “pro-immigration” to 1 = “anti-immigration.” Figures (a) and (b) are based on the ESS; (c) and (d) are based on an ISSP sample that pools both 1995 and 2003 respondents. Data are weighted. Source: ESS 2002/2003, ISSP 1995 and 2003.
Notes: Points represent estimates produced by regressing Ascribed Immigration Qualifications/Ascribed “Truly” Item Indices on the outcome measures specified in the figure headings. For individual countries, these are estimated using OLS regression, and for the “Total” sample they are estimated using a mixed-effects, random intercept model. Range plots represent the 95% confidence intervals, using OLS robust standard errors. Ascribed indices are scored from -1 = “lowest” to +1 = “highest,” and all outcome measures are scored from 0 = “pro-immigrant rights” to 1 = “anti-immigrant rights.” (a) is based on the ESS; (b) and (c) are based on the 2003 ISSP. (d) is based on an ISSP item that was asked only in 1995. The only criteria that influenced which ISSP was used was item availability. Data are weighted. Source: ESS 2002/2003, ISSP 1995 and 2003.
Figures 2.3(a)-(d): Ascriptive Nationalism Indices and Cultural Pluralism

A. Better if Everyone Shares Customs/Traditions

B. Bad For Country to Have Variety of Religions

C. Government Should Not Help Minorities Preserve Tradition

D. Impossible to Be National Without Adopting Cultural/Traditions

Notes: Points represent estimates produced by regressing Ascribed Immigration Qualifications/Ascribed “Truly” Item Indices on the outcome measures specified in the figure headings. For individual countries, these are estimated using OLS regression, and for the “Total” sample they are estimated using a mixed-effects, random intercept model. Range plots represent the 95% confidence intervals, using OLS robust standard errors. Ascribed indices are scored from -1 = “lowest” to +1 = “highest,” and all outcome measures are scored from 0 = “pro-multiculturalism” to 1 = “anti-multiculturalism.” Figures (a) and (b) are based on the ESS; (c) and (d) are based on an ISSP sample that pools both 1995 and 2003 respondents. Data are weighted. Source: ESS 2002/2003, ISSP 1995 and 2003.
Figures 2.4(a) and (b): Ascriptive Nationalism Indices and Prejudice/Discrimination

Notes: Points represent estimates produced by regressing Ascribed Immigration Qualifications/Ascribed “Truly” Item Indices on the outcome measures specified in the figure headings. For individual countries, these are estimated using OLS regression, and for the “Total” sample they are estimated using a mixed-effects, random intercept model. Range plots represent the 95% confidence intervals, using OLS robust standard errors. Ascribed indices are scored from -1 = “lowest” to +1 = “highest,” and all outcome measures are scored from 0 = “least prejudiced” to 1 = “most prejudiced.” Both figures (a) and (b) are based on the ESS. Data are weighted. Source: ESS 2002/2003, ISSP 1995 and 2003.
Chapter 3: Immigrant Diversity and Mainstream Response, Theory and Measurement

The idea that social heterogeneity influences patterns of group relations, economic development, and democratic governance is deeply rooted in the literature on social conflict.¹ A wealth of scholarship, produced under the auspices of a number of social-scientific theories, has tackled the question of how measures of community and identity such as those developed in the previous chapter should respond to heightened levels of immigrant diversity. The purpose of this chapter is to survey this literature, in order to tease out hypotheses more specifically for the empirical analysis that follows. I discuss four approaches in turn: social capital/social trust, social contact theory, social identity theory, and material group conflict. I also discuss the measurement of key hypothesis variables, as well as the conceptualization and measurement of confounding influences.

Social Trust/Social Capital

One strand of theory, which usually falls under the rubric of “social trust/social capital,” emphasizes the role of interpersonal trust in fostering positive social outcomes. From the perspective of the individual, trust is the belief that he or she will not be taken advantage by another in the course of an economic or social transaction. As Hardin puts it, “you trust someone if you have an adequate reason to believe it will be in the person’s interest to be trustworthy in the relevant way at the relevant time. It is encapsulated in one’s judgment of those interests” (Hardin 1993: 505). Trust is thought to be crucial to all social relations, because of its ability to help solve collective problems. Without trust, society suffers because individuals are unwilling to put themselves “at the mercy” of others (e.g. Baier 1986; Hardin 1993). Importantly, the variety of trust that receives the most attention in the literature is not the interpersonal trust (or distrust) fostered by through repeated transactions among individuals. Instead, most scholarship has focused on a broader definition of the term, variously called “generalized,” “social,” or “moralistic” trust.² The key to generalized trust is not the question of “does x trust y to do z,” but rather “does x trust most people.” Taken to their logical extreme, such conceptions barely involve trust at all, in the specific sense that one will not be taken advantage of by others. Crepaz, for instance, invokes the term to include not only the idea that one generally “trusts” other people, but that one exhibits a sense of concern or fellow-feeling for the well-being of others in society (2008; also Uslaner 2002). While there is substantial debate about what generalized trust really is (e.g. Nannestad 2008), it almost certainly matters. Indeed, declines in trust have been linked to reduced political participation and civic engagement (Putnam 1993; 2000),

¹ See, e.g.: Blalock (1967); Blumer (1958); Dahl (1971); Key (1949); Hibbs (1973); Horowitz (1985); Liphart (1968).
² See, e.g.: Brewer (1981); Crepaz (2008); Nannestad (2008); Uslaner (2002); Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994).
declines in economic performance (Fukuyama 1995) and reduced support for social welfare programs (Miller 1995).

There are two primary reasons why trust of the generalized sort is seen to be crucial for the functioning of democratic societies. First, some suggest that trust based on intimate knowledge, direct connection, and particularism are inherently at odds with political liberalism: “if the only people we can trust are those with whom we have a direct and personal tie, then it makes no sense to claim that trust is important to facilitating cooperation within liberal democratic states. Trust of this affective sort, would appear to be a civic virtue appropriate to feudal or tribal, not liberal societies” (Eisenberg 2002: 7). Second, the scale of modern society is simply too large and too complex. If trust is an important lubricant for social interaction, trusting only those known to us cannot sustain our support for collective goods and services that modern societies provide, such as public education and social welfare, which are destined to be used for the most part by individuals we will never encounter (e.g. Crepaz 2008; Uslaner 2002).

It has also been suggested that generalized trust is linked to social and economic equality in society (e.g. Banfield 1958, Putnam 1993). Eric Uslaner, for example, claims that generalized trust is harmed where societies are divided by economic inequality (2002). The reason for this is that those in positions of power can enforce their will against the less fortunate, and, conversely, the less fortunate have little reason to believe that they are afforded an equal chance in society (ibid; also Banfield 1958; Eisenberg 2002; Seligman 1997). And, indeed, studies have not only shown that increasing insecurity and inequality may account for part of the decline in social trust apparent in the United States since the Second World War (Arneil 2006; Uslaner 1999), but also predicts it cross-nationally (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005).

Theorists in the social capital tradition have long argued that social networks, much like generalized trust, can be a valuable resource in generating positive outcomes (e.g. Bourdieu 1977; Coleman 1990; Granovetter 1973). Indeed, social capital has been linked to a variety of macro-level outcomes, such as economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1997), lower crime rates (Jacobs 1961), and responsive government (Putnam 1993). The link between social networks and norms such as generalized trust has been a prevalent one in the literature. Putnam’s Making Democracy Work, for example, draws upon James Coleman’s definition of social capital, coupled with an admiration of civic associations drawn principally from Tocqueville and Condorcet, to argue that higher levels of participation in civic associations evident in certain regions of Italy are linked to higher levels of generalized trust in those areas. More generally, a number of scholars have made the case that declines in social networks such as voluntary associations have been either the cause or consequence (depending on the interpretation) of declining trust and increased social anomie (e.g. Bellah et al 1985; Lane 2000; Putnam 2000; Putnam and Feldstein 2003).

While criticisms of Putnam’s approach to social capital abound in the literature (for a review, see Stolle and Hooghe 2005), one point in particular is especially relevant to the present discussion. Namely, in response to the blanket claim in Putnam’s earlier work that civic associations were beneficial to generalized trust and democratic efficacy (1993), some responded that associational participation could pry people apart as easily
as it could bring them together. Civic associations and social networks, on this view, are only as harmful or beneficial as their intended purpose, and not all are as innocuous as bird-watching societies and bowling leagues. What matters, in other words is not necessarily the \textit{extent} of organizational participation, but its nature.\(^3\)

In response, Putnam later distinguished more explicitly between “bridging” and “bonding” social capital. The former is largely concerned with social networks between homogenous individuals: “Bonding social capital is good for undergirding specific reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity. Dense networks in ethnic enclaves, for example, provide crucial social and psychological support for less fortunate members of the community, while furnishing start-up financing, markets, and reliable labor for local entrepreneurs” (2000: 22). On the other hand, bridging networks lead to positive and trusting relationships with those who do not share the same interests based on ethno-linguistic, religious, or other longstanding identities: “[they] are better for linkage to external assets and for information diffusion. […] Moreover, [they] can generate broader identities and reciprocity, whereas bonding social capital bolsters our narrower selves” (ibid: 22-23). Putnam’s account emphasizes the importance of bridging ties in fostering and sustaining norms of generalized trust and reciprocity across large societies.\(^4\)

The point of raising this at all, in the present context, is to consider what theories of generalized trust and social capital might suggest about the relationships between diversity, on one hand, and national identity on the other. Greater ethnic diversity may make generalized trust and bridging ties more difficult to sustain, as it is easier to trust those who are like oneself then those who are significantly different (Abrams et al 2005; Messick and Kramer 2001; Uslaner 2002). And, indeed, a number of studies in the United States have shown that high ethnic diversity is associated with lower levels of social capital and trust, not only among minorities but in the mainstream as well.\(^5\) In general, scholars making this argument have relied on the concept of social threat. Citizens feel threatened by community members who are unlike themselves, and – in Putnam’s words – “hunker down” by refusing to trust others or participate in social networks that bridge across these differences.

As noted in Chapter 1, some have criticized this literature’s U.S.-centric nature, and comparative findings have been mixed.\(^6\) If it is the case that generalized trust is negatively associated with ethnic diversity, an issue which has yet to be empirically settled, it is not much of a conceptual leap to assume that this possibility also exists with respect to how narrowly or broadly individuals define the “in-group” of their national community in more direct terms.

\textbf{Social Contact Theory}

\(^3\) See, e.g.: Bowler, Donovan and Hanneman (2003); Fiorina (1999); Levi (1996); Stolle and Rochon (1998); Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005).
\(^4\) See also: Cigler and Joslyn (2002); Harell (forthcoming); Marschall and Stolle (2004); Mutz (2002); Stolle et al (2008).
\(^5\) For example, see: Campbell (2007); Cheong et al (2007); Hero (2003); Putnam (2007).
\(^6\) See, e.g.: Crepaz (2006, 2008); Fieldhouse and Cutts (forthcoming); Kesler and Bloemraad (forthcoming); Hooghe et al (2008, 2009)
Much like theories of social capital, scholars in the “social contact” tradition argue that social interaction cutting across the boundaries of groups in society can lessen the prejudice and enhance friendly attitudes and behaviors between them. While the origins of the field lie in the study of whites/black relations in America, researchers have extended the contact hypothesis (with generally positive results) to a variety of countries and ethnic cleavages. What is more, positive contact effects have been found with respect to a wide variety of targets beyond ethnic minorities, including the elderly, homosexuals, the mentally ill, the disabled, and AIDS victims. Finally, in a further encouraging sign, positive results have been obtained through a diversity of research methods, including archival and field research, cross-sectional surveys, and laboratory experiments (see Pettigrew 1998 for a review; also Pettigrew and Tropp 2004 for a meta-analytic evaluation of the theory).

That said, however, the positive effect of social contact is not self-evident, but rather mediated by its nature (e.g. Allport 1954; Amir 1969; Brown 1995). In what has been the most influential formulation of this theory, Gordon Allport (1954) argued that prejudice could be mitigated through social contact, so long as four key conditions were met: first, group within the situation had to view each other as being of equal status, though the definition of what constitutes “equality” in this respect is defined only in vague terms. Without equal status, social contact may actually exacerbate prejudice, rather than mitigating it (e.g. Jackman and Crane 1986). Second, the parties in question must engage in cooperative activity toward a super-ordinate goal, the idea here being that such a goal both encourages and requires individuals within groups to minimize their own differences. Members of interracial sports teams, for example, need to learn how to work together in order to be successful, and success in turn further reinforces the positive effect of this type of contact (e.g. Chu and Griffey 1985). Third, the attainment of common goals must entail interdependent efforts, and within this context inter-group division and conflict must be minimized; this condition was strikingly illustrated by Sherif’s well-known “Robber’s Cave” experiment (1966). Finally, intergroup contact must occur under the auspices of explicit social sanction on the part of authorities, law, or custom; such sanction is thought to be important because it legitimates norms of acceptance and therefore reinforces the positive effects of social contact (Pettigrew 1998: 67).

Pettigrew’s (1998) reformulation of the contact hypothesis builds upon Allport’s original theory by theorizing more explicitly about the social-psychological processes involved in prejudice reduction through social contact. Optimal social contact begins, he argues, when out-group members come into contact with members of an in-group in a “decategorized” setting. In other words, in the salience of what makes in-group members different from out-group members must initially be played down (see also Brewer and Miller 1984). From here, further contact leads to the increased salience of group differences, a second step Pettigrew claims is essential if in-group members are to generalize their positive feelings about the specific out-group member they are in contact with to the out-group in general (1998: 75). Finally, after extended positive contact, “recategorization” of both in-groups and out-groups becomes possible: “people can begin to think of themselves in a larger group perspective. Recategorization adopts an inclusive
category that highlights similarities among the interactants and obscures the ‘we’ and ‘they’ boundary’ (ibid.; also Perdue et al 1990). More recently, Pettigrew has suggested that the positive effects of social contact with members of one ethnic group may even have positive benefits on how individuals view members of other ethnic minorities more generally, through what he calls “secondary transfer effects” (2009).

What insights might social contact theory provide with respect to the relationship to the relationship between diversity and normative conceptions of national identity? A superficial reading might lead one to expect a positive effect: exposure to higher levels of diversity could lead to greater social contact between mainstream citizens and immigrant minorities. In turn, racial prejudice will be disarmed, and people of all different backgrounds will eventually view each other as part of the same overarching community. For example, studies in the Netherlands have suggested that social contact between majority members and immigrant groups leads to the reduction of differences in attitudes between them; moreover, majorities and minorities in contact tend to perceive each other’s attitudes on culture and society more accurately (Schalk-Soekar et al 2004; Van Oudenhoven et al 2002).

Heartwarming though it may be, however, this prediction is oversimplified. Indeed, given the heavily qualified nature of social contact’s role in both Allport’s and Pettigrew’s formulations, immigrant diversity and political multiculturalism could lead to precisely the reverse outcome of what a naïve reading of contact theory would predict. The key insight in this respect is the fact that institutional context plays an important role in shaping the prevalence, form, and ultimately the effect of social contact between groups (Kinloch 1981; 1991; Pettigrew 1998).

Pettigrew makes the point with reference to inter-group conflicts in Northern Ireland, Quebec, and South Africa: “these societal contexts severely limit all forms of intergroup contact. Moreover, they render the contact that does occur less than optimal. Allport’s equal-status condition is equivalent group power in the situation. This is difficult to achieve when a struggle over power fuels the larger intergroup conflict” (1998: 78). While Northern Ireland and Quebec are extreme cases, this argument may apply to immigrant diversity as well. Immigrants are usually not equals (in the socio-economic sense) when they arrive on new shores, and they disproportionately tend to occupy the lower end of the economic totem pole. Both ethnic and cultural factors (such as race, religion, or linguistic ability) may also impede contact on an equal basis. This lack of both economic and cultural equality may serve to reduce contact between immigrant and majority individuals, and it may also lead what contact does occur to reinforce immigrants’ “outsider” status, rather than ameliorate it.

Scholars in the “contact” tradition have also raised the role of social threat. Studies have shown that a high level of perceived threat on the part from out-group members tends to impede both contact and its positive effects.⁷ What is more, researchers have demonstrated clear links between immigration and a sense of cultural

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⁷ See, e.g.: Islam and Hewstone (1993); Stephan and Stephan (1985); Wilder (1993a, b); Wilder and Shapiro (1989).
To the extent that immigrant diversity is perceived as somehow threatening from the perspective of the majority, then, it seems reasonable to conclude on the basis of the contact literature that social interaction between immigrants and majority members may be more limited and also less beneficial in terms of prejudice reduction, tolerance, and overall sense of community.

**Social Identity Theory**

Work under the rubric of “social identity theory” (SIT) has consistently demonstrated that identification with a social group has both attitudinal and behavioral implications. On one hand, people are more likely to help other members of the same group, more likely to feel empathy towards them, and more likely to feel a sense of responsibility for their well-being. The notion of what constitutes a “group” is not rigorously defined in this literature; indeed, even within the boundaries of “minimal” groups formed on a random and ad-hoc basis, subjects will evaluate in-group members more positively than out-group members, and tend to distribute rewards disproportionately in favor of their own group (e.g. Tajfel 1978; 1981; see Brewer 1979 for a summary of the minimal group paradigm). Not only has this general finding been found to hold across several nations and cultures, but there has not been a single culture in which it has not been evident (Mullen et al 1992; Sidanius and Kurzban 2003). Building on this approach, researchers under the banner of self-categorization theory have amassed considerable evidence that individuals classify themselves as members of an in-group, use this to stereotype themselves, expect to agree with other in-group members, and strive for intra-group consensus.

Once again, the role of symbolic and cultural threat to in-group values, norms, and beliefs posed by “outsiders” in fostering shaping out-group prejudice has been supported by a wide variety of theoretical approaches related to the social identity literature. Though their work predated the advent of SIT, theorists of “status politics,” argued that support for culturally conservative political movements can be traced to the perception that formerly prevalent group norms are in decline, and that groups holding competing worldviews are on the rise (Bell 1963; Gusfield 1963; Lipset and Raab 1973). Similarly, Rokeach and his colleagues have suggested that prejudice stems from the perceived lack of “belief congruence” between social groups (Rokeach et al 1960). Yet another example of this type of reasoning is “terror management theory,” which proposes that people rely upon their cultural worldview to insulate them against the anxieties associated with human insignificance and mortality; confrontation with individuals and groups that espouse different norms, attitudes, and beliefs, leads people to develop prejudicial attitudes in response (Solomon, Greenberg and Pyszczynski 1991).

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Meanwhile, researchers more explicitly associated with SIT have argued that threat raises the salience of in-group/out-group distinctions, and triggers exclusionary sentiment along the salient dimension.\(^{11}\) Importantly, perceived threats need not be to an individual’s own safety or well-being in order to trigger a negative response; for instance, Huddy and her colleagues (2002) demonstrate that terrorism’s threat to the nation is a more powerful predictor of negative economic assessments than more personal concerns. In any event, the consensus underlying these different approaches is straightforward: individuals derive psychological benefits from in-group membership, and threats (either symbolic or material) to that in-group can induce a prejudicial response.

In terms of the relationship between immigrant diversity and national identity, this literature suggests that it should be inherently more difficult to sustain a sense of national community as ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity increases. For one thing, if people find it harder to identify and empathize with those unlike themselves,\(^{12}\) then increased numbers in society of those who are clearly unlike themselves in fundamental ways should make overall social cohesion more difficult. What is more, the incursion of “outsider” cultures could be perceived as threatening to mainstream cultural values; as a result, this confrontation with ethnic or cultural diversity causes feelings of threat, and result in prejudice against the threatening group or groups.\(^{13}\) If indeed diversity is identity-threatening to the majority, as this literature suggests, we can expect this sense of threat to cause a backlash in terms of social cohesion and normative conceptions of national identity.

**Material Group Conflict**

Whereas the focus of the social identity literature tends to be on threats against mainstream cultural norms and values, scholarly work on generalized trust, ethnocentrism, and anti-immigrant sentiment has also established the importance of material group interests. Realistic interest approaches, comprising theories of group deprivation (Blumer 1958), relative group deprivation (Simon and Klandermans 2001), realistic group conflict (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; LeVine and Campbell 1972), and social dominance orientation (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) are predominantly interested in the role of economic competition. While these approaches differ in important respects, they all agree on the primacy of group-based conflicts over society’s allocation of scarce material resources in driving attitudes related ethnocentrism as well as anti-immigrant sentiment.\(^{14}\)

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\(^{11}\) See, e.g.: Branscombe (1999); Feldman and Stenner (1997); Huddy et al (2002); Huddy et al (2005); Kam and Kinder (2007); Marcus et al (1995); Reynolds and Turner (2001).

\(^{12}\) See, e.g.: Brewer and Brown (1998); Dovidio and Morris (1975); Flippen et al (1996); Hayden, Jackson, and Guydish (1984).

\(^{13}\) For examples of work in the SIT tradition that make the “threat” argument with respect to cultural differences, see: Arends-Toth and Van de Vijver (2003); Blalock (1967); Breugelmans and Van de Vijver (2004); Brewer (1999); Brown (2000); Kam and Kinder (2009); Sniderman and Hagedoorn (2007); Sniderman et al (2000; 2004); Taylor (1998); Van Oudenoven et al (1998).

As in the literature on social identity, threat is key to these accounts: if one group in society is perceived to be impinging on another’s access to what its members perceive to be its fair share of material resources, this will trigger out-group prejudice. The implication, from this standpoint, is that mainstream definitions of the national “in-group” should be more narrowly defined – to the exclusion of immigrants – in societies that are less economically prosperous.

Common Themes and Hypotheses

Researchers working out of these three traditions are in some respects at loggerheads with one another about the effects of diversity. For example, Putnam’s finding that people living in diverse areas trust everyone less contrasts with the general expectation from SIT that they should trust their own group members more (Harell and Stolle 2010). The suggestion has also been made that heterogeneity may actually lead to increased levels of civic behavior and political participation, largely because the heightened salience of ethnic divisions in such an environment casts group interests – as well as the threats other groups pose to them – in a clearer light (e.g. Anderson and Paskeviciute 2005, 2006; Oliver and Wong 2003). And, of course, there is a long-standing dispute between scholars in the SIT tradition and those approaching the issue from a material group conflict perspective over whether the real threat of diversity stems more from cultural differences or from the sense of threat to majority group interests.

Even so, they would appear to agree more than they disagree on a variety of key issues, which is unsurprising given the deep roots of all of them in the social-psychological literature on identity and group relations. For the most part, this literature is pessimistic about the prospects for broad social harmony in ethnically diverse societies, at least insofar as tolerance, inclusion, and mutual recognition are concerned. A few common themes emerge: first, there is a recurring notion that social cohesion is important to solving collective problems; the case is made most explicitly in the arguments about social trust and social capital, but it is easily extended to notions of societal disharmony and ethnic conflict emphasized by the social identity and contact literatures. Second, there is a common emphasis on cross-cultural (or bridging) contact between group members as a means of reducing prejudice and increasing overall social cohesion. Third, social interaction is more “difficult” between individuals (and groups) that are highly different from one another than it is if they are highly similar; in the argot of social capital, “bonding” forms of social contact are easier to initiate than “bridging” ones. A fourth point of similarity, related to the third, is that this difficulty is enhanced when the salience of ethnic and cultural differences is high: if ethnic identities are salient, intercultural contact becomes less likely, and the outcomes of what contact there are will tend to undermine, rather than foster, mutual understanding and respect. Fifth, the concept of threat as a trigger for out-group prejudice and hostility (even if there is some debate about reactions towards in-group members) extends to all four theories. Finally,

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15 See, e.g.: Blake and Mouton (1979); Branton and Jones (2005); Brown et al (2001); Huddy and Sears (1995); Struck and Schwartz (1989) for attempts to demonstrate this effect empirically.
scholars working in all of these traditions agree that, from the standpoint of the majority, immigration does represent a potent source of perceived threat.

From this synthesis, it is possible to draw out the following hypotheses with respect to the effect of diversity on the normative boundaries of national identity: first, the level of threat individuals perceive from immigrants and immigration (both cultural and economic) should be related to a more ascribed sense of national community. Second, increased levels of immigrant diversity at the contextual level should have the same effect. Third, positive social contact with immigrants (or “bridging networks” in the social capital parlance) should encourage the opposite outcome; in other words, among mainstream members who have positive relationships with immigrants, their normative conceptions of nationality should tilt more towards “achievable” characteristics (such as education, work skills, and respect for institutions and laws) and away from ascriptive ones.

**Measuring the Hypothesis Variables**

To capture ethnic and immigrant diversity at the context level, this study relies on a number of different measures. One of these is an index of ethnic, linguistic, and religious “fractionalization” developed by Alesina and his colleagues (2002). This measure (and others like it) have been used fruitfully across a number of studies assessing questions similar to those examined here (Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Hooghe et al 2009; Kesler and Bloemraad 2008).

That said, given the criticism (noted in Chapter 1) that indicators of fractionalization do not adequately distinguish between long-standing heterogeneity and diversity that is the product of recent immigration, the bulk of the analysis here focuses on measures that specifically tap the presence, makeup, and growth of each country’s immigrant population. For analysis of the immigration qualifications items in the ESS, I rely on a series of indicators developed by Hooghe et al (2009) using OECD data. These include the stock of foreigners in 2002, the inflow rate of foreigners in 2002 for every 1,000 citizens, and the inflow rate in 2002 of foreigners from both developing countries and predominantly Islamic countries. I also include average growth (between 1996 and 2002) of inflows, both in general and specifically from Muslim countries.

Unfortunately, the OECD has not collected the data necessary to develop such fine-grained measures of diversity outside of Europe. As a result, when analyzing the ISSP data (which includes the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in addition to a number of European countries), I rely on the OECD’s more general estimates of the proportion of foreign-born migrants (relative to general population size) in the relevant year. The rate of immigrant inflows is the estimated annualized growth rate over the previous three years; both measures, for the analysis of the 2003 ISSP dataset, are taken from the statistical annex of the OECD’s 2008 SOPEMI report.16 Since OECD estimates of foreign-born population exist for fewer countries in 1995 and prior, analyses of the

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ISSP’s first “National Identity” module employ estimates from the U.N.’s *World Migrant Stock* database.\(^{17}\)

One important caveat with respect to the latter set of immigration measures is that they estimate the total proportion of a country’s population that is foreign-born, and no attempt is made to distinguish the “cultural distance” of the immigrant population from the mainstream. This is less than ideal, given the distinction in the literature between cultural and economic threat. While it is difficult (though not impossible) to conceptualize what constitutes “cultural difference” in a manner that is substantively meaningful and comparable across such a diverse range of countries, the key problem in the present instance is data availability.\(^ {18}\) Namely, though recent SOPEMI reports do track the national origins of foreign-born residents for many countries under consideration here, a number of cases are missing for the immediate period surrounding the year 2003.\(^ {19}\) It still remains the case that – in almost every country presently under analysis where data are available – that a majority of immigrants were born in a non-OECD country (plus Mexico and Eastern Europe), and in most cases the majority is substantial.\(^ {20}\) A more general point is that even finer-grained measures of immigrant diversity distinguishing “cultural distance” cannot necessarily be assumed to “filter out” the notion of economic threat, even though many studies claim (or at least assume) that it does. While it is certainly a step in the right direction, even minority immigrants can be perceived as representing economic threat, and thus tapping their presence (versus more general measures of immigrant stocks and flows) does not guarantee that they represent a purely cultural threat.\(^ {21}\)

In sum, then, even though estimates of “total foreign-born population” the measures are perhaps imperfect, they are still reasonable proxies for the notion of contextual-level immigrant threat, even if it would be imprudent to assume that they tap cultural threat alone. They have been employed in that capacity in other studies of attitudes related to immigration (e.g. Kesler and Bloemraad 2010; Sides and Citrin 2007),

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\(^ {17}\) Available from: [http://esa.un.org/migration/](http://esa.un.org/migration/) [Accessed on August 15, 2009]. Trends in the 2008 SOPEMI only extend backwards to 1997; the 2006 SOPEMI report, which does include 1995 figures, lacks proportion of foreign-born estimates for Austria, France, Ireland, and Spain, all of which figure into the present analysis (see Table A.1.4.). OECD and UN figures are almost perfectly correlated where country and year estimates overlap, and analyses using either data source on the 2003 ISSP cross-section produce virtually identical results.

\(^ {18}\) Studies that have attempted to do so (e.g. Hooghe et al 2009; Quillian 1995; Schneider 2008; Semyonov 2006, 2008) have generally been concerned only with Europe, where this is somewhat easier and data are more readily available.

\(^ {19}\) For example, per the 2008 SOPEMI (Table B.1.4.), foreign-born population breakdowns are not available for Germany, the U.K., Canada, New Zealand, Portugal, and Denmark within a reasonable distance of the year 2003. Other studies have used OECD estimates of “foreign” rather than “foreign-born” population (e.g. Hooghe et al 2009), the former being theoretically distinct from the latter (depending to a much greater extent on citizenship laws) and not available for countries outside of Europe.

\(^ {20}\) The lone exception is Ireland, where 74% of the foreign-born population was born in other OECD countries. Other countries where similar patterns occur (such as Belgium and Luxembourg) are not included in either the wave of the ISSP survey.

\(^ {21}\) For example, in the United States (where immigration flows are predominantly characterized by “culturally distant” Latinos), the general concern is both cultural and economic.
and studies that have compared them directly with more detailed measures tend to come up with very similar results (e.g. Kesler and Bloemraad 2010).

The notion that diversity is potentially threatening does not, of course, apply only to actual, real-world indicators of how diverse a given society is. Indeed, given that misperceptions about the actual number of immigrants living in a country are widespread and estimates are almost universally exaggerated,\(^{22}\) it also makes sense to consider how diverse respondents perceive their country to be, in addition to the contextual indicators discussed above (Semyonov et al 2008; Sides and Citrin 2007). While measures of this do not exist in the ISSP, the ESS does ask respondents questions related to how they perceive the stocks and flows of their nation’s immigrant population. To capture the former, I use an item asking how many immigrants live in the country (for every 100 people), and, for the latter, I use an item asking whether they think more people immigrate to their country than emigrate or vice versa.

Given that the literature surveyed to this point almost universally relies on the concept of cultural threat as a driver of ethnocentric attitudes, it makes sense to try to capture perceived immigrant threat at the individual level. Fortunately, both surveys contain good measures of this: ESS respondents were asked about whether or not their country’s cultural life was undermined by immigrants, and respondents to the ISSP were asked about whether or not immigrants improve society by bringing in new ideas and cultures.

I also employ predictors related to material group conflict at both levels of analysis. In accordance with previous literature in the fields of both immigration attitudes and generalized trust, this work uses harmonized yearly national unemployment rates, again taken from the OECD’s statistical database, to tap contextual-level economic prosperity.\(^{23}\) I also include the rate-of-change of each country’s unemployment level over the previous two years. At the individual level, it is of course important to consider socio-economic characteristics that contribute to a heightened sense of economic insecurity. These include measures such as whether or not the individual is unemployed, and education (e.g. Fetzer 2000; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Beyond these background characteristics, I also include measures of the perceived economic threats immigrants pose to the nation (Sides and Citrin 2007). For the ESS analysis, I index responses to whether or not immigrants bring down average wages, take jobs, take out more (in terms of government services) than they put in through taxes, and impact the economy negatively in general. For the ISSP, the economic threat index includes responses to the following pair of items: whether or not respondents agreed that immigration is bad for the economy, and whether or not it takes jobs away from natives.

Finally, I explore individual-level hypotheses broadly related to the contact hypothesis. To questions here are worth exploring: first, to what extent does ethnic diversity in one’s immediate area (as opposed to their nation as a whole) impact attitudes about national identity? Second, does social contact under “optimal conditions” promote

\(^{22}\) See, e.g.: Nadeau, Niemi and Levine (1993); Sides and Citrin (2007); Sigelman and Niemi (2001); Theiss-Morse (2003)  
a less exclusionary attitudes about the national community? The ESS has excellent measures that allow us to examine both of these questions. Respondents are not only asked about how diverse their neighborhood is, but also how many friends and colleagues they have that are immigrants. Unfortunately, the ISSP survey does not include measures of either positive social contact with immigrants or the ethnic diversity of R’s living area; as such, it is impossible directly capture the effects of variables related to the “contact hypothesis” in these models. Instead, I include a measure of how “urban” or “rural” a respondent’s living area is unemployed as a rough proxy for local diversity, on the assumption that more urban settings tend to be more ethnically diverse. This is obviously an imperfect solution, but hopefully a workable one just the same.

Competing Explanations: Socialization and Ideology

Of course, any attempt to test these hypotheses needs to account for confounding relationships, and, when it comes to the normative boundaries of national identity there are several. One broad category of possible confounds stems from work on socialization theory, which suggests that many political attitudes of emotional significance are formed early in life and remain largely stable thereafter (e.g. Newcomb 1943; Sears 1975). With respect to national identity, some have suggested that younger generations are more “cosmopolitan” in their attitudes and attachments than are older people; depending on the account, this effect has been attributed to socialization in a more ethnically diverse context, and also a more economically secure one. The case has been most strongly made by researchers studying the development of supranational identities in place of attachment to the nation (Inglehart 1997; Norris 2000). The socialization hypothesis has also appeared in literature related to more normative forms of national identity, the idea being that the young should be generally more tolerant and inclusive – though evidence on this latter point is decidedly mixed (e.g. Schuman et al 1997; Citrin et al 2001; Breugelmans and Van de Vijver 2004).

Expressed political ideology is also an important influence on national identity. Anti-immigrant and pro-nationalist parties have emerged almost exclusively from the right end of the political spectrum (Betz 1993; 1994; Fennema 1997; Kitschelt 1995). And, unsurprisingly, they tend to draw their support from those show high respect for law and order and are culturally traditional, both of which are associated with self-identification as right-wing.24 Beyond support for anti-immigrant parties, studies of specific attitudes related to xenophobia, disapproval of multiculturalism, and affective nationalism are all strongly and positively predicted by right-wing self-identification across countries (e.g. Sides and Citrin 2007; Citrin and Wright 2008). All of this suggests that incorporating political ideology to the model is important.

As a result of these arguments based on socialization and ideology, I also include individual-level controls tapping age and education, as well as respondents’ self-

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placement on a left-right ideological scale, and their level of religiosity.\textsuperscript{25} I also control for whether the respondent is a member of an ethnic minority or has parents who are immigrants,\textsuperscript{26} and, following the trust literature (e.g. Hooghe et al 2009), whether the respondent is female.

\textbf{Summary}

The present chapter went to some length to describe and synthesize theoretical approaches that addressed the question of how ethnic diversity might shape normative conceptions of national identity, and address potentially confounding explanations. A great deal of commonality is evident, and all suggest the general expectation as that ethno-linguistic diversity increases, mainstream conceptions nationhood should become more ascriptive along lines that exclude immigrants. Assessment of whether or not this appears to be empirically “true” is the task of the following chapter.

\textsuperscript{25} It is true that the theoretical mechanisms in these literature are hotly debated. The effects of education, for example, have been interpreted as the product of socialization as well as the economic security that comes with it. Similarly, the strong relationships between partisanship/ideology and ethnocentrism have been variously interpreted as driven by economic considerations, cultural issues, political socialization (Jennings and Niemi 1974; 1981; Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 1999), or even basic personality traits (Altemeyer 1988; 1998; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). I cannot address these question here, but suffice it to say that regardless of the “cause,” the effects of both are strong and consistent, and virtually all agree that they are important even if there is debate as to why.

\textsuperscript{26} In the ESS, ethnicity is tapped via self-identification is such in response to a single item. In the ISSP analysis, minority status is coded from the “ethnic background” variable. Both surveys ask respondents if at least one of their parents was not born in the country.
Chapter 4: The Empirical Relationship Between Normative National Identity and Diversity

The previous chapter drew upon four broad theories of inter-group relations, teasing from each of them a set of common hypotheses. The most general prediction is that in the presence of heightened ethnic diversity we can expect an ethnocentric reaction from mainstream populations. This reaction should also occur in the presence of perceived immigrant threat at the individual level, and be attenuated to the extent that one has positive social relations with immigrants. The present chapter is an empirical exploration of this question, using the two conceptions of normative national identity proposed in Chapter 2 as dependent variables.¹

Both the fact that these data are nested by country, and the desire to estimate the effects of country-level variables on individual attitudes – while, at the same time, taking into account confounds at both levels – suggest multi-level regression analysis, one possible approach to the ecological differences between variables of interest (e.g. Diprete and Forristal 1994; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Recent work has demonstrated the application of multi-level methods to cross-national data on public opinion.² That said, these methods cannot be used uncritically, given that the country sample is non-random and that the relatively small number of countries does not ensure that the asymptotic properties of the typical maximum-likelihood estimators will “kick in” at the context level (e.g. Bowers and Drake 2005; Sides and Citrin 2007; Meuleman et al 2009). To address this, I complement multi-level regression estimates with two-step visualization techniques (Bowers and Drake 2005). I also present estimates based on both individual- and aggregate-level models, and supplemented cross-sectional analyses with over-time survey data wherever this is possible.

Immigration Criteria and Diversity

Does heightened immigrant diversity lead to a “tightening” of immigration criteria along more ethnic lines? The first step is to estimate a baseline model that incorporates all of the individual-level factors that might potentially play a role in shaping the relative balance between the importance of ascribed and achievable factors. Dependent variables include each of the five importance items and the additive indices of both ascribed and achievable characteristics summarized in Table 3.4. Coefficients and standard errors based on multi-level, random intercept models are presented below in Table 4.1.

[Table 4.1 About Here]

¹ The relevant sample for all analyses in this chapter is native-born respondents. Unfortunately, the ISSP only asks about citizenship status and not nativity, so only non-citizens (rather than non-immigrants) can be excluded from the sample.
² See, e.g.: Crepaz (2008); Hooghe et al (2009); Kessler and Bloemraad (forthcoming); Weldon (2006).
These models provide substantial support for the individual-level hypotheses set forward in the previous chapter. The perception that immigration is threatening to the nation (Panel A) is strongly associated with more “ascribed” conceptions of national identity, thought the effect appears to be much more powerful in the realm of cultural threat than it is with economics. And, while the perceived number of immigrants living in one’s country is unrelated to most of the outcomes, higher perceived immigrant inflows are quite strongly associated with narrower definitions of national identity (Panel B). The contact hypothesis also finds support: namely, positive social contact with immigrants appears to have the opposite effect to the above measures, as expected (Panel C). Whereas the simple measure of perceived neighborhood ethnic diversity does not appear to be related to any of the outcomes, respondents’ number of immigrant friends and colleagues at work is strongly and positively related to more “achievable” definitions as the contact hypothesis suggests.

In terms of the control variables, those with at least one parent not born in the country tend to lean more in favor of “achievable” qualifications, as expected, though (all else equal) ethnic minority status does not appear to matter. Gender is not consistently related to the outcomes in any significant or meaningful way. Higher levels of education are negatively associated with “ascribed” definitions and being currently unemployed is positively so, both of which tend to confirm interest-based accounts of ethnocentrism. Accounts of prejudice based on socialization also find some support here, as both age and religiosity are strongly and positively correlated with an increased emphasis on ascribed factors; in the latter case, however, the relationship seems to be predominantly driven by the much greater importance of “Christianity” over all other factors, which is not terribly surprising. Finally, political ideology does not appear to be related to any of the outcomes.

Of course, estimating these models based on a pooled sample of countries might be masking a substantial level of variation at the country level. Looking at Figures 4.1(a)-(c) – which map the coefficients from the individual-level model estimated for each country individually – this does appear to be the case. That said, the overall tendency on almost every country does reflect the results of the pooled model. In general, perceived cultural threat and the sense that inflows of immigrants (all else equal) substantially outweigh outflows do predict a more ascriptive vision of desired immigrant in every country (with the exception of Greece on the latter measure), and these relationships are almost always statistically significant. What is more, individuals having positive relationships with immigrants tend to view the boundaries of their nation less ascriptively in almost every country, and most of the time in statistically significant way.

In order to test hypotheses about the contextual effects of diversity on these outcomes, each of the diversity measures detailed above is added to the models from Table 4.1 one at a time. Since the opinion data used here is cross-sectional in nature, following previous literature the effect on measures of normative national identity of each contextual measure (including those capturing rates of change) is modeled as the slope of
a random-intercepts multi-level regression model predicting attitudes in 2002/2003 (Hooghe et al 2009). The results are depicted below, in Table 4.2.

[Table 4.2 About Here]

The first thing that stands out from this table is that none of the context-level measures related to overall diversity are substantially related to the outcomes, net of the individual-level predictors in the model. It does appear, however, that higher proportions of foreign-born migrants living in a country (relative to general population size) leads to a somewhat greater emphasis on achievable characteristics over ascribed ones, though the relationships are fairly weak and only marginally significant. Most of the measures tapping inflows and rates of change from 1996-2002 are in the predicted direction, but almost never achieve statistical significance; the exception is the inflow of Muslims in 2002, which appears to be related to a heightened emphasis on Christianity and correspondingly less emphasis on work skills and education. Finally, none of the measures of economic prosperity (either static or rates of change) appear to be consistently related to these outcomes in any kind of meaningful way, indicating that there is little or no direct relationship between these measures and the outcomes in question.\(^3\) So, while there are some relationships evident here in the predicted direction, they do not appear to be very strong, consistent, or statistically significant in most cases.

**Diversity and “True” Membership in the National Community in 2003**

The analysis to this point, based on the ESS immigration qualification items, has demonstrated strong evidence for the individual-level hypothesis and fairly weak relationships at the context level. What about requirements for “true” membership in the national community? As above, I begin by estimating individual-level baseline models predicting all of the standardized dependent measures, in this case the “truly” items illustrated in Table 3.5. For the time being, analyses are limited to the 2003 cross-section of the ISSP. The independent variables comprising these model are as similar to those in the ESS the data allows: the equations include measures of immigrant threat, whether at least one of the respondent’s parents were born outside the country, whether he or she is part of a visible ethnic minority group, gender, age, education, religiosity, unemployment status, and political ideology.

[Table 4.3 About Here]

As with the ESS measures, there is strong evidence that individual-level perceptions of threat (both economic and cultural) are powerfully associated with more ascribed conceptions of national identity (Panel A); not only are the relationships positive, but they dominate all other variables in the analysis. Furthermore, while the test of contact theory is necessarily weaker than here than it was with the ESS, there is evidence

\(^3\) They were excluded to save space, but are available upon request.
that living in urban (and presumably more diverse) areas has a similar – though much weaker – effect. In terms of the controls, “ascribed” definitions of the national community are associated positively associated with age, and the reverse appears to be true with respect to education and having immigrant parents. None of the other controls are statistically significant.

Once again, it is worthwhile to break down these estimates by country, in order to see if the effects are consistent across them or driven by outliers. Figures 4.2(a) and (b), below, show the coefficients and confidence intervals for each country for the estimated relationship between both types of threat, on the one hand, and ascriptive definitions of the national community on the other. Again, while there is substantial country-level variation and the relationships are not statistically significant in a few cases, the overall general tendency is a consistent one. As in the pooled model, both types of threat are related to the index of ascriptive national identity in every single country, all else being equal.

[Figures 4.2(a) and (b) About Here]

As before, to test context-level hypotheses I add the relevant measures (one at a time) to the individual-level models specified in Table 4.3. The results, presented in Table 4.4, demonstrate that the effects of overall ethno-linguistic fractionalization and proportion of foreign-born are largely non-existent, as are any relationships between the outcomes and the national unemployment rate. However, there does appear to be a consistent and strong relationship between foreign born growth and ascribed definitions of identity, as predicted.

[Table 4.4 About Here]

One way of depicting these context effects visually involves taking the additive index of the relativized “ascribed” items as the dependent variable, estimating the individual-level model specified in Table 4.3 above by country, and plotting the intercept values against the context-level measures of interest. Beyond simply providing visual illustration, this method also makes it easy to spot critical outliers that may not be evident when only regression coefficients are considered. The plots produced by this strategy, with respect to overall fractionalization, foreign born population, and foreign-born growth are depicted below in Figures 4.3(a)-(d).

[Figures 4.3(a)-(d) About Here]

The picture presented here is essentially identical to that in Table 4.4; there does not appear to be any significant relationship between a country’s overall level of fractionalization or proportion of foreign-born migrants (in 2003) and the ascribed factor

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4 Plots of contextual variables based on unemployment data demonstrate no consistent relationship. They were excluded to save space, but are available upon request.
index. However, there does appear to be strong evidence in support of the argument that growth in foreign-born populations has an impact: according to Figure 4.3(c), heightened levels of immigrant inflows appear to be quite strongly associated with more “ascripted” notions of nationhood. What is more, this relationship is strengthened if Spain, which is an obvious outlier in that it had more than double the estimated inflow rate of the next-fastest growing country, is excluded from the linear fit (Figure 4.3d).

Table 4.5 depicts estimated coefficients when context-level measures of diversity and economic prosperity are considered in combination. Because of Spain’s status as an outlier in terms of foreign-born growth, they are also estimated without Spanish respondents in the sample. Both contextual diversity measures are positively related to more “ascripted” definitions of national identity, though the overall proportion of foreign-born only attains marginal levels of statistical significance once Spain is excluded. This is, at best, only limited support for the notion that overall proportion of foreign born is related to narrower definitions of nationhood.

[Table 4.5 About Here]

However, as in Figures 4.3(c) and (d), the immigrant inflows hypothesis once again finds support: higher foreign-born growth rates remain strongly and significantly related to more ascribed notions of citizenship – even when contextual-level economic indicators are controlled – and this relationship increases substantially when Spain is excluded from the analysis. Contextual-level economics are not statistically significant in any of the models.\(^5\)


As noted in Chapter 2, unlike the ESS measures of desired immigration qualifications, the measures of “true” membership in the national community appear in both ISSP National Identity modules (1995 and 2003), which allows for the addition of over-time analysis to the cross-sectional results presented above. In addition to the general argument that definitions of national identity should be “sticky” over time, there is the possibility that the findings reported above with respect to diversity levels and growth are spurious, and driven by more ascriptive definitions of nationhood that are grounded in history and culture. In other words, the foreign-born populations of historically “ascriptive” countries (e.g. Spain and Ireland) are likely to grow much faster in percentage terms simply because the starting point was so low to begin with, and this could be responsible for the relationships noted above.

Before proceeding, it is worthwhile to reiterate the shortcomings to these surveys: namely, the span between them is only eight years, there is no panel component, only 11 of the 16 countries figuring into the 2003 analyses above appear in both, and the lack of

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\(^5\) To test for robustness, these models were also estimated using OLS, with standard errors estimated by a jackknife that drops countries one by one. See Appendix to Chapter 4.
the “ancestry” measure in 1995. In practical terms, the latter of these necessitates re-standardizing all of the measures based on a single “ascribed” item, nativity. Fortunately, limiting the analysis to this single measure (rather than the index comprising both ancestry and nativity) does not substantively alter the findings presented to date.

One way to look at these data involves re-estimating the multi-level model from the previous section for a sample that pools 1995 and 2003 respondents, and models 1995-2003 changes as interactions between each predictor and a dummy toggling the year 2003. Because the 1995 survey lacked the “ancestry” item, the dependent variable for these analyses is the relative importance of nativity, versus respect for institutions and laws and “feeling” like a national. The model includes all relevant countries from both years; in addition to the 16 countries in the 2003 cross-sectional analysis, I add 1995-only respondents from Italy and the Netherlands. The pooled sample yields 18 countries and 29 country-years. The advantage of modeling the outcomes in this way is that it allows us to observe, simultaneously, what the estimated coefficients are based on 1995 respondents alone (the “1995 Coefficients” column), how the estimated effect of each predictor changed between 1995 and 2003 (the “2003 Interaction Coefficients” column), and whether or not these changes were statistically significant.

The results, depicted in Table 4.6 below, show virtually no change between the two time periods insofar as the individual-level predictors are concerned. However, the relationships between macro-level predictors and individual attitudes change substantially. In 1995, both the absolute size of the immigrant population and its rate of growth were negatively associated with ascribed definitions of identity, in a strong and statistically significant way; in other words, in the earlier period immigrant diversity was actually a “good thing” in terms of mainstream respondents’ normative conceptions of nationhood. By contrast, the interaction terms modeling over-time change between both diversity measures and the standardized importance of nativity are positive and statistically significant at better than the p<.01 level, and the magnitude of the change is substantial in both cases. These estimates seem to illustrate two separate (but related) changes over time: first, at least among these countries, the sensitivity of mass publics to high levels of growth in immigrant populations (in terms of exclusionary forms of national identity) appears to have grown substantially over time, and; second, this sensitivity seems to have also increased sharply in countries that were more diverse to begin with, net of how fast the immigrant population is growing.

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6 The countries surveyed in both years are: Australia, Germany, the U.K., the U.S.A., Austria, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, Canada, and Spain.
7 Comparison tables available upon request.
8 Unemployment rates and changes show no significant patterns, either apart from or in tandem with diversity measures. Regressions were excluded to save space, but are available upon request.
9 Importantly, the substantive findings presented here are identical whether or not analyses include all country-years available or are limited only to the 11 countries surveyed in both periods (available upon request). Furthermore, they are generally quite robust even under alternative specifications. The Appendix to Chapter 4 shows replications of Tables 4.5 and 4.6, using OLS and estimating standard errors via a country-level jackknife.
While the lack of panel data makes it impossible to compare changes over time at the individual level, another way of exploring these data is by seeing if aggregate shifts over time correspond with the dynamics of interest. Table 4.7 below illustrates the country-level means on the standardized importance measures in both years, and how these changed between 1995 and 2003 on the 11 countries in which received both modules. As noted in Chapter 2, these scores tend to be stable over time, and the rank-order of countries does not change in any significant way. That being said, in almost every country where over-time comparisons are possible the relative importance of nativity all increased notably; Sweden and the U.K. appear to be the only exceptions. By contrast, the opposite pattern is clearly visible with respect to the two “achievable” items individually as well as the “achievable” index. In general, then, it appears that for the populations of every country except for Sweden and Great Britain, the importance of nativity (relative to respect for institutions and laws and “feeling” like a national) had increased by 2003, even when the earlier reference point is only eight years prior.

Of course, there is variation in how much these means changed from one country to the next; the question becomes, therefore, whether or not this can be explained by contextual-level changes in terms of diversity and economic prosperity. Table 4.8 addresses this question using aggregate-level OLS regressions that predict the mean country-level values of the dependent variables in 2003. The dynamic element is captured by including the dependent variable’s lagged (1995) value as a regressor. Since, according to Table 4.6, the relative importance of nativity apparently increased both as a function of both foreign-born population levels and recent growth, I include measure a measure of lagged diversity (foreign-born population in 1995) as well as a measure tapping changes between 1995-2003. This same logic is applied in this table to explore the apparent effects of the unemployment rate.

Given the overall stability in normative definitions of national identity noted above, it is unsurprising that the dominant factor driving the 2003 mean scores on these measures are their lagged (1995) values. That said, the coefficients in this table also provide further evidence that growth in the proportion of foreign born migrants (relative to overall population size) is associated with a shift in favor of ascribed criteria at better than the p<.10 level. Moreover, the measure of immigrant diversity in 1995 also appears to be positively related to the dependent variables (e.g. countries that were more diverse to begin with also shifted in favor of ascribed criteria versus those that were not, net of estimated growth over this time period) in a statistically significant way. This implies, as did the coefficient changes in Table 4.6’s pooled individual-level model, that citizens in already-diverse countries may have become less “inclusive” than they were in the past, independently of how much the foreign born population grew in the interim. Finally, the apparent effects of economic prosperity are signed as expected (e.g. higher levels of
unemployment and unemployment growth are associated with more “ascriptive” conceptions of national identity), but do not come close to attaining statistical significance.

Given the small number of countries available for aggregate-level analysis, it makes sense to try to look at these data in as many ways as possible before drawing conclusions. The apparent influence of increases in foreign-born population on the relative importance of these measures is depicted visually in Figures 4.4(a)-(d). To produce these graphs, I re-estimate the aggregate level models in Table 4.8 excluding the measure tapping 1995-2003 foreign-born population growth. The residuals of these estimates are then plotted against the excluded measure.

What emerges from these plots once again tends to support the argument that growth in foreign-born populations engenders a more “ascriptive” definition of national identity. The slopes of the fitted lines are positive in the case of nativity and negative in the cases of the “achievable” items, which echoes the findings presented in Table 4.8. Moreover, they appear to do so in a relatively neat fashion. The only strong outliers in the sample appears to be Canada, and to a lesser extent Sweden; the former became substantially more “ascriptive” than expected based on foreign-born growth rates, and the latter somewhat less so. Similar plots based on unemployment rate changes, excluded for reasons of space, produced no noteworthy patterns.

Conclusions

The previous chapter laid out several broad theories, all of which suggested that increasing levels of immigrant diversity might elicit a backlash from mainstream populations. Whether one approaches the issue from the standpoint of social trust/social capital, contact theory, social identity theory, or material group conflict, the underlying reasoning was the same: the heightened presence of immigrant “outsiders” in society can very easily trigger a sense of perceived threat, and this is likely to result in an exclusionary reaction.

All of the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3 find support at the individual level. The relationships between the perceived size of the immigrant population does not appear to be related to how ascriptively mainstream citizens define their desired qualifications for immigration, but a heightened perception of immigrant inflows does, clearly and consistently. What is more, positive social contact with immigrants appears to have the opposite effect. Finally, the extent to which respondents perceive immigrants as being a cultural threat are strongly related to ascriptive definitions of both immigration qualifications and “true” membership in the national community. All of these relationships appear not only in the pooled individual-level models, but also quite consistently across countries.

At the context level, most of the relationships between measures of diversity and desired immigration qualifications are fairly weak and inconsistent; this accords well
with other studies that have analyzed such measures of anti-immigrant sentiment and trust using the ESS (Sides and Citrin 2007; Hooghe et al 2009). However, mainstream citizens do seem to reshape their definition of “true” membership in the national community along narrower lines in response to heightened immigrant inflows, a pattern that emerges both in the cross-sectional analysis of the 2003 ISSP, and over time analyses that incorporate responses from both waves.

Whether or not this has stemmed from immigrants’ economic threat or their cultural threat is less clear. Individual-level indicators on both dimensions are strongly related to the outcome measures in the ISSP (though cultural concerns seemed to dominate the ESS analysis), and the diversity measures used in the ISSP analysis do not distinguish the “cultural distance” of the immigrant population from the mainstream. Nevertheless, the fact that individual-level indicators of economic prosperity are controlled in all the models, and the utter lack of relationships between measures of context-level economic prosperity and every outcome studied here indicates that even if both may play a role, it is cultural threats that are more relevant here.

Whatever the reason, however, the overall patterns – especially in the ISSP analysis – are unmistakable. And, given the strong linkages presented in Chapter 2 between these normative conceptions of national identity and other measures of ethnocentrism and xenophobia, such as the preference for decreased immigration levels, tighter citizenship laws, and cultural homogeneity rather than pluralism (see also: Citrin and Wright 2008; Kunovich 2009), this finding by is sobering if not unexpected. What remains to be seen is the extent to which policy regimes might mediate this relationship, and it is to this issue that the subsequent chapters turn.
### Chapter 4 Tables and Figures

#### Table 4.1: Individual-Level Predictors: Immigration Qualifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ascribed Factors</th>
<th>Achievable Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A) Immigrant Threat</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Culture</td>
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<td>.09**</td>
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<td>National Economy</td>
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<td><strong>B) Perceived Stocks and Flows</strong></td>
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<td>.04**</td>
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<td><strong>C) Contact</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-.01</td>
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<td>Immigrant Contact</td>
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<td>.02**</td>
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<td>Female</td>
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<td>.00</td>
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<td>-.001*</td>
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<td>Religiosity</td>
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<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>.02#</td>
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<td>Ideology</td>
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<td>.01</td>
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**p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.10. Each column represents a separate multi-level random-intercepts model, on the ESS sample pooling all relevant countries (but excluding non-native born respondents). Source: ESS 2002/2003.**
Figures 4.1(a)-(c): Cultural Threat, Perceived Inflows, Positive Social Contact, and the Ascribed Immigration Qualification Index

Notes: Figures depict coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for each independent variable by country, estimated using the complete individual-level model in Table 4.1 and OLS robust standard errors. The “Total” figure is the estimate produced in Table 4.1 across the pooled ESS sample. The sample excludes immigrants to the country. For complete country-by-country models, see Appendix to Chapter 4.
Table 4.2: Modelling Context Effects on Ascriptive Nationalism: Immigration Qualifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Ascribed Factors</th>
<th>Achievable Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fractionalization Index</td>
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<td>-.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.103)</td>
<td>(.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock of Foreign Population</td>
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<td>-.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.38)</td>
<td>(.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflow of Foreigners, 2002</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>-.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflow of Foreigners from</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Countries, 2002</td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflow of Foreigners from</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.056#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Countries, 2002</td>
<td>(.034)</td>
<td>(.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in Inflows, 1996-2002</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>(.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in Inflows From</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Countries, 1996-2002</td>
<td>(.135)</td>
<td>(1.43)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.10. Each cell represents the coefficients of a separate multi-level model, with column variables regressed on rows and the individual-level characteristics from Table 4.1 controlled. Standard errors are in parentheses. Fractionalization measures are scored from 0=least fractionalized to 1=most fractionalized. Source for survey data: ESS Round 1 2002/2003.
Table 4.3: Individual-Level Predictors of “True National” Items

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Ascribed Factors</th>
<th>Achievable Factors</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country Ancestry</td>
<td>Born in Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A) Immigrant Threat</td>
<td>National Culture</td>
<td>.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Economy</td>
<td>.25**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B) Contact</td>
<td>Urban/Rural</td>
<td>.03**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                  | Controls         | Minority           | .00          | .00                      | .00                  | .00           |
|                  | Parents Non-Citizens at Birth | -.17** | -.22** | -.19** | .25** | .25** | .25** |
|                  | Female           | .00                | -.01         | .00                      | -.01                 | .01           |
|                  | Age              | .09**              | .02**        | .06**                    | -.06**               | -.05**        | -.06**       |
|                  | Education        | -.14**             | -.13**       | -.14**                   | .15**                | .12**         | .14**        |
|                  | Religiosity      | .00                | -.01         | -.01                     | .01                  | .01           |
|                  | Unemployed       | .01                | .00          | .01                      | .00                  | .00           |
|                  | Ideology         | -.01               | .00          | .01                      | .01                  | .01           |
|                  | Intercept        | -.45**             | -.26**       | -.35**                   | .40*                 | .31*          | .35*         |
|                  | Clusters         | 16                 | 16           | 16                       | 16                   | 16            |

n 12,255 12,512 12,172 12,269 12,256 12,172

** p<.01, * p<.05. Each row represents a separate multi-level random-intercepts model; entries are estimated coefficients. Non-citizens are excluded from the sample. Cultural and economic threat measures coded from 0 = not at all threatened to 1 = highly threatened. “Parents born…” “Female,” and “Unemployed” are all dummy variables. Education is scored 0=least to 1=most, Age is a five category measure scored from 0 = 16-29 to 1=60+, urban/rural is scored from 0=rural to 1=urban, and ideology is scored from 0=extreme left to 1=extreme right. Source: ISSP 2003.
Figures 4.2(a) and (b): Perceived Cultural and Economic Threat, Ascribed “Truly” Index

Notes: Figures depict coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for each independent variable by country, estimated using the complete individual-level model in Table 4.3. Sample excludes non-citizen respondents. The “Total” figure is the estimate produced in Table 4.3 across the pooled ISSP 2003 sample. For complete country-by-country models, see Appendix to Chapter 4.
Table 4.4: Contextual-Level Measures and “True” Membership in the National Community

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</thead>
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<td>Country Ancestry</td>
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<td>Fractionalization Index</td>
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<td>.130 (.132)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Foreign Born, 2003</td>
<td>-.002 (.005)</td>
<td>.002 (.004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annualized</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth Rate of</td>
<td>.015** (.004)</td>
<td>.010* (.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FB Population,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Harmonized</td>
<td>-.001 (.014)</td>
<td>-.004 (.012)</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Unemployment Rate, 2003</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Growth in Unemployment Rate, 2000-2003</td>
<td>.000 (.001)</td>
<td>.000 (.001)</td>
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** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.10. Each cell represents the coefficients of a separate multi-level model, with column variables regressed on rows and the individual-level characteristics from Table 4.3 controlled. The sample excludes non-citizen respondents. Standard errors are in parentheses. Fractionalization measures are scored from 0=least fractionalized to 1=most fractionalized. Source for survey data: ESS Round 1 2002/2003.
Figures 4.3(a)-(d): Contextual Factors and Ascriptive Nationalism, “True National” Items

Notes to Figures 4.3(a)-(d): Country scores on the dependent variable are intercept values produced in country-specific individual level OLS regressions. These regressions employ the same individual level model used in Table 4.3. Non-citizens are excluded from the sample. For complete country-by-country models, see Appendix to Chapter 4. Source for survey data: ISSP 2003.

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Table 4.5: Contextual and Individual-Level Predictors of Ascribed Factor Score, 2003

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<th></th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
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<th>Without Spain</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Model I</td>
<td>Model II</td>
<td>Model III</td>
<td>Model I</td>
<td>Model II</td>
<td>Model III</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Foreign Born</td>
<td>.003 (.004)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.002 (.004)</td>
<td>.005# (.003)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.006# (.004)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>% FB Growth</td>
<td>.014** (.005)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.017** (.005)</td>
<td>.036** (.009)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.038** (.100)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>-- (.013)</td>
<td>.002 (.011)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.017 (1.14)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.003 (.100)</td>
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<td>Unemployment Rate Change</td>
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<td>.000 (.001)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.000 (.001)</td>
<td>-.001 (.001)</td>
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<td>.20**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
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<td>.22**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
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<td>.00</td>
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<td>Citizens at Birth</td>
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<td>-.14**</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
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<td>.01</td>
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<td>.00</td>
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<td>.02**</td>
<td>.02**</td>
<td>.02**</td>
<td>.02**</td>
<td>.02**</td>
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<td>-.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
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<td>.00</td>
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<td>.00</td>
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<td>11,404</td>
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# p <.10 * p<.05 ** p<.01. Standard errors for context effects are in parentheses. Each column represents a separate mixed-effects, random-intercepts regression model predicting individual attitudes. Non-citizens are excluded from the sample. “% Foreign Born” is in the year 2003; “% Foreign Born Growth” is the annualized percent growth rate from 2000-2003; “Unemployment Rate” is from 2003, “Unemployment Rate Change” is the % change in unemployment from 2000-2003. Individual-level Cultural and economic threat measures coded from 0 = not at all threatened to 1 = highly threatened. “Parents born…” “Female,” and “Unemployed” are all dummy variables. Education is scored 0=least to 1=most, Age is a five category measure scored from 0 = 16-29 to 1=60+, urban/rural is scored from 0=rural to 1=urban, and ideology is scored from 0=extreme left to 1=extreme right. Source for survey data: ISSP 2003.
Table 4.6: Multi-level Model Predicting the Relative Importance of Nativity for Being a “True National”, 1995 and 2003

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>% Foreign-Born</td>
<td>% Foreign Born Growth</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contextual Threat</td>
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<td>-0.009** (.003)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>0.22** (.02)</td>
<td>0.03** (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>0.24** (.02)</td>
<td>0.03** (.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual-Level Controls</td>
<td>Minority</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Parents Non-Citizens at Birth</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.01 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.01 (.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religiosity</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>Unempl.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2003 Dummy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.26** (.03)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05 ** p<.01. Cells depict coefficients of a single mixed-effects, random intercepts model pooling 1995 and 2003 ISSP respondents. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample excludes non-citizens. % Foreign Born and % Foreign-Born growth are in the relevant year and annualized growth rates over the previous 3 years. “Urban/rural” setting and “income” are excluded from the individual level predictors, because comparable measures do not appear in the 1995 ISSP. Ideology is excluded because it was not asked in Italy; re-running the model excluding Italy, in order to include ideology, yields virtually identical results. Contextual diversity measures taken from the UN World Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision Population Database. Source for survey data: ISSP 1995, 2003.
Table 4.7: Aggregate Change in “True National” Items, 1995-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ascribed</th>
<th>Achievable</th>
<th>2-Item Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Born in Country</td>
<td>Respect For Country’s Institutions and Laws</td>
<td>“Feel” Like [Nationality]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>+.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>+.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>+.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>+.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>+.06**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>+.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-.34</td>
<td>-.33</td>
<td>+.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Zeal</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>+.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>+.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.03*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>+.05**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01. Cell values for each year are means at the country level (with non-citizens excluded), and values for “Δ” columns are mean differences from 1995-2003. Significance tests are based on two-group mean comparison t-tests (assuming equal variances), with year being the grouping variable. Scores range from -1 = average of all factors in the other category completely outweighs relevant factor to 1 = relevant factor completely outweighs the average of the other measures in the opposite category. Source: 1995 and 2003 ISSP.
Table 4.8: Predicting Aggregate Mean Changes in the “True National” Items, 1995-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(A) Immigrant Diversity</th>
<th>Relative Importance of Ascribed Criteria</th>
<th>Relative Importance of Achievable Criteria</th>
<th>2-Item Achievable Factor Index, 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Foreign Born, 1995</td>
<td>.006# (0.3)</td>
<td>-.009* (0.003)</td>
<td>-.002 (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Foreign Born, 1995-2003</td>
<td>.019# (0.003)</td>
<td>-.016 (0.12)</td>
<td>-.017# (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged (1995) Dependent Variable</td>
<td>.78** (0.17)</td>
<td>.90** (0.15)</td>
<td>.66** (0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r²</td>
<td></td>
<td>.78** (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(B) Economic Prosperity</th>
<th>Relative Importance of Ascribed Criteria</th>
<th>Relative Importance of Achievable Criteria</th>
<th>2-Item Achievable Factor Index, 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate, 1995</td>
<td>.005 (0.008)</td>
<td>-.005 (0.010)</td>
<td>-.005 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Unemployment Rate, 1995-2003</td>
<td>.004 (0.012)</td>
<td>-.009 (0.016)</td>
<td>-.004 (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged (1995) Dependent Variable</td>
<td>.77** (0.17)</td>
<td>.89** (0.19)</td>
<td>.72** (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>r²</td>
<td></td>
<td>.77** (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# p <.10 * p<.05 ** p<.01. Results for each panel (A or B) show the results of aggregate-level OLS estimates of the relevant column variable regressed on the variables within that panel. Standard errors in parentheses. Diversity data from the UN World Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision Population Database, and economic data from OECD online statistics database: [http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx](http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx). Standard errors in parentheses.
Figures 4.4(a)-(d): Foreign Born Growth v. Residuals of Aggregate-Level Equations

Chapter 5: The Role of Policy Regimes, Theory and Measurement

Ethnic diversity does not exist in a vacuum, and, indeed, scholars and pundits alike have long been engaged in discussions about the best way for societies to deal with it. Ultimately, nearly everyone pursuing this subject agrees that social harmony in an ethnically diverse context will only obtain if group members recognize that they all have a legitimate and equitable stake in society, and do not see out-group members as threats to their own or their group’s interests.

The disagreement in this area is less over the issue of whether or not political institutions “matter” for such outcomes; indeed, a wealth of scholarship has demonstrated that institutional arrangements can have a powerful role in fostering democratic allegiance and political efficacy (e.g. Almond and Verba 1963; Lijphart 1968; Rae 1967).1 Rather, the main issue has been over what types of institutions foster this sentiment, and why. Some argue that in an ethnically diverse milieu, social harmony will only obtain if governments enact policies of cultural recognition; others feel that such efforts will undermine allegiance to the broader nation, and that instead governments should emphasize minority integration into the mainstream. The present chapter outlines these arguments in detail, links them to the theories outlined in Chapter 3, and discusses issues of measurement.

Beyond the issue of political multiculturalism, this chapter also discusses competing policy-based theories related to the related issues of immigrant incorporation and mainstream ethnocentrism. These include the potential role of citizenship policy (namely the distinction between jus soli and jus sanguinis regimes), and government spending on social welfare. Herein, I link these broad theoretical approaches to the normative conceptions of national identity defined in Chapter 2, and discuss how they are measured for the purposes of the empirical analyses that follow.

Multiculturalism in Theory

Liberalism versus Recognition

Scholars of democratic politics have increasingly been coming to grips with the notion that the freedoms at the core of classical liberalism, universally applied to all citizens, may be insufficient in and of themselves to guarantee equality. From the communitarian standpoint, the interests of communities, key in forming our conceptions of social relationships and notions of the “good life,” cannot be reduced to the individual interests promoted by classical liberals. The result, from this perspective, is that any attempt to privilege individual rights at the expense of group rights will serve to destroy these vital communities.2

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1 A competing perspective, drawn primarily from economics, suggests that institutions are purely endogenous to the social forces that created them (e.g. Alesina and Glaeser 2004). For a strong rebuttal of this argument, see Crepaz (2008: 134-135).

2 See, e.g.: Garet (1983); Johnston (1989); Van Dyke (1977, 1982).
A number of scholars more favorable to a broadly “liberal” conception of human rights have recently picked up on this critique of the classical liberal approach, claiming that social groups are essential to forming our identities and as such are worthy of “recognition” to a much greater extent than that usually assumed in classical liberalism. For example, Charles Taylor, who often straddles the line between liberal and communitarian arguments, argues:

[W]e become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression. […] People do not acquire the languages needed for self-definition on their own. Rather, we are introduced to them through interaction with others who matter to us. […] The genesis of the human mind is in this sense not monological, not something each person accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical (1994: 32).

The conclusions he draws from this are as follows: first, the “recognition” of the groups that help form our identity is a fundamental part of liberal freedom and equality, above and beyond traditional liberal deference to freedoms of speech and association; “due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need.” (ibid.: 26). Second, the demand for recognition, animated by the ideal of human dignity, points in at least two directions, both to the protection of the basic rights of individuals as human beings and to the acknowledgment of the particular needs of individuals as members of specific cultural groups. Third, public institutions should not – indeed cannot – simply refuse to respond to the demand for recognition by citizens.

Kymlicka: Recognition Within a Liberal Framework

Taylor is not alone in recognizing the difficulty of simultaneously promoting the protection of basic human rights in addition to the recognition of their cultural groups; indeed, many thinkers arguing from purely liberal (Barry 2002) or communitarian (Parekh 2006) perspectives see the two as being irreconcilable. Nevertheless, since the publication of his essay a number of scholars have tried to make space for the “recognition” argument within a broadly liberal framework. Since the most prominent version of this argument is Will Kymlicka’s (1995; 1999; 2001), his case is worth presenting in depth. Before proceeding, though, it is necessary to explain three key conceptual distinctions that appear in his work. First, his focus is mainly on “societal cultures,” that is, cultures that provide their members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, and encompassing both public and private spheres. This line is drawn largely to exclude other relevant identity-forming groups (e.g. gender, sexual orientation, and so on), from his main argument. Under the broad rubric of societal culture, he also makes a critical distinction between national minority cultures (e.g. the Quebecois in Canada, or Scots in Great Britain) on the one hand, and immigrant minority cultures on the other. Finally, in discussing group rights he distinguishes between internal and
external protections; the former involves the enforcement of norms and practices within groups, and the latter governs the protection of a group’s way of life from outside interference (say, from the majority culture).

Kymlicka claims that two major premises underlie a liberal defense of minority rights. The first of these, which echoes Taylor and others, is that identification with one’s given societal culture is essential to preserving individual freedom: “put simply, freedom involves making choices amongst various options, and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes them meaningful to us” (1995: 83). Kymlicka’s second argument is that liberal states simply are not and cannot be neutral arbiters between majority and minority societal cultures, as proponents of “difference-blind” liberalism claim. Rather, they tend to be reflections of majority preferences and norms, which may in turn be inimical to minority interests. As a result, and in order to ensure that the liberal ideal of equal treatment is met, minority cultures must be afforded special protections to allow them to deal “equitably” with the majority group and thus facilitate individual freedoms (Kymlicka 1995; also see: Baubock 1999; Spinner 1994; Tamir 1993).

Based on these claims, Kymlicka derives a number of conclusions about minority rights that are, he claims, compatible with a broadly liberal approach to human rights. First, he argues that national minorities within “multination states” should have access to self-government rights, special representation rights, and what he calls “polyethnic” rights, the latter (as noted above) referring to exceptions from mainstream laws such as public holidays, dress-code requirements, and other such areas where cultural differences might prevent full integration of minorities into mainstream society.

On the other hand, immigrant minorities – who have voluntarily given up their right to recreate their society culture in toto by moving to a new country – are not entitled to the former two concessions but do require the respect of their polyethnic rights. To take one well-known example, Sikhs immigrating to Canada should not have the right to self-government or special representation, but should be entitled to wear a turban even in dress-code regulated jobs such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Kymlicka argues that furnishing rights to national and immigrant minorities in this way are justified in a liberal society so long as they concern only rights of “external protection” – that is, the protection of minority culture against majority dominance. By contrast, “internal protections,” which by Kymlicka’s definition compromise the ability of individuals to “opt out” of their societal cultures or work for reform from the inside, do not merit protection (Kymlicka 1995; 1999; 2001).

The Solidarity Critique (and Response)

Kymlicka’s liberal approach to group rights has been questioned on a number of fronts. Some argue that by privileging ethnicity over other forms of community that are not in large measure biologically ascribed, we are risking a return to a world where

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3 The notion of cultural groups as the basis of self-esteem and other critical components of identity also appears in works by Baubock (1999), Joseph Raz (1994), Yael Tamir (1993), and David Miller (1995).
physical difference guide our thinking about ourselves and others in society; the very essence of liberalism, on this view, is the appeal to common characteristics of humanity transcending ethnicity, gender, and other ascribed differences. By contrast, according to many critics, “multicultural” regimes are unable to do this on normative grounds. Others question the validity of Kymlicka’s distinction between national minorities and immigrant minorities, on the one hand, and internal and external protections on the other.

The most important critique of Kymlicka’s approach for my purposes here, however, concerns the nature of citizenship and political allegiance in multicultural societies. Both he and others (e.g. Berry 2001; Berry and Kalin 1995; Bourhis et al 1997) suggest that social harmony in multicultural societies requires low levels of inter-group prejudice, on the one hand, and also a degree of attachment to the larger society without derogation of its constituent groups. Critics have argued, however, that attempts to promote cultural recognition through multiculturalism policies imperil the common sense of “we” that is critical if society is to function smoothly. The key threat, on this view, has been that the increased focus on ethnic identities and the group-differentiation it entails will encourage individuals to consider their ethnicity as their principle identity. This, in turn, places limits on the ability of both majority and minority citizens to think in inclusive transcending the boundaries of ethnicity; in short, “multicultural” rights falsely represent the nature of groups in society as fixed, immutable, and mutually exclusive, and heighten the salience of inter-group distinctions.

This general argument has been made both by philosophers in the cosmopolitan tradition as well as those who are more concerned about nation-states as the primary unit of analysis. From the former perspective, it makes little sense to accord rights to specific groups when our identities stem from a wealth of cultural influences (e.g. Benhabib 1999; Waldron 1992). Moreover, Steven D. Rockefeller, in his critique of Taylor’s recognition argument, worries about the abuse of the demand for respect as they identify with particular cultural groups. If people identify with the dominant characteristics, practices, and values derived from ethnicity, or are perceived from the outside as doing so, these identities could take public precedence over more universal bonds, such as the deserving of mutual respect, civil and political liberties, and decent life chances afforded by the virtue of shared humanity (1994). He and other cosmopolitans argue that a common appeal to such universal values is the only way to transcend cultural differences.

While those who attack political multiculturalism from the cosmopolitan standpoint are generally interested in fostering a sense of common humanity beyond ethnicity and, for that matter, nationalism (Nussbaum 1996), many writing on the subject are particularly interested in the nation-state as an integrative actor. The “we-feeling” that interests them, in other words, is not one’s common sense of humanity, but rather a more constrained identity defined by the boundaries of the nation. As discussed in

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4 Variants of this argument appear in: Barry (2002); Hollis (1999); Joppke (2004); Levy (2000)
5 See, e.g.: Carens (1997); Sachar (1999); Spinner-Halev (1999); Tamir (1999); Young (1997).
6 See, e.g.: Bok (2002); Hall (2003); Nussbaum (1996); Waldron (1992).
Chapter 2, this view typically arises from the pragmatic consideration that – as noble as considerations of “common humanity” might be – the world which we inhabit is still politically defined (globalization and sub-national movements notwithstanding) by nation-states, and nationhood is the dominant object of political legitimacy. More broadly, this focus also stems from the view that only the state has the power to create an identity capable of transcending ethno-linguistic differences. In reference to religious strife, for example, Joppke argues that: “liberal states have learned to accommodate these conflicts long before ‘multiculturalism’ came along – in fact, this is precisely what has made them ‘liberal’ in the first place” (2004: 240).

Despite its different emphasis, the “liberal-nationalist” view closely tracks the arguments espoused by cosmopolitans, namely that cultural recognition will serve only to promote the salience of “difference” in society rather than “sameness.” As a result, strife between ethnic groups within the bounds of the nation will increase, and the common bonds shared by all citizens within its borders will erode. Indeed, a number of scholars have pointed to the risks posed by any form of group-differentiated citizenship, in terms of the state’s ability to guarantee equal status, foster trust and reciprocity, and create a common sense of purpose.\(^7\) Todd Gitlin puts it thusly:

“democracy is more than a license to celebrate (and exaggerate) difference. […] It is a political system of mutual reliance and common moral obligations. […] If multiculturalism is not tempered by a stake in the commons, then centrifugal energy overwhelms any commitment to a larger good. This is where multiculturalism has proved a trap even – or especially – for people in the name of whom the partisans of identity politics purport to speak” (1995: 236).

Considerations such as these led Ernest Gellner to dismiss multi-ethnic states as “oxymorons” (1983), and Kymlicka is the first to acknowledge the potential seriousness of the threat. In response, however, he takes the opposite position: the failure to recognize a minority culture is more likely to antagonize and alienate its members from mainstream society than any attempt to promote cultural diversity. With respect to immigrant minorities he claims that the desire for polyethnic rights stems from an impulse to participate fully in society, rather than the goal of cultural or even political secession (1995; 2001):

[I]t is the absence of minority rights which erodes the bonds of civic solidarity. After all, if we accept the two central claims made by defenders of minority rights – namely, that mainstream institutions are biased in favour of the majority, and that the effect of this bias is to harm important interests related to personal agency and identity – then we might

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\(^7\) For examples of this reasoning, see: Barone (2004); Barry (2002); Brubaker (2004); Glazer (1997); Heater (1990); Koopmans (2010); Kukathas (1993); Kristeva (1993); Miller (1995); Rorty (1998); Schlesinger (1998); Wolfe and Klausen (1997).
expect minorities to feel excluded from ‘difference-blind’ mainstream institutions, and to feel alienated from, and distrustful of, the political process. We could predict, then, that recognizing minority rights would actually strengthen solidarity and promote political stability, by removing the barriers and exclusions which prevent minorities from whole heartedly embracing political institutions. This hypothesis is surely at least as plausible as the contrary hypothesis that minority rights erode social unity” (2001: 36; also 2002).

From the standpoint of society as a whole, Kymlicka is also quite explicit that policies of cultural recognition should not threaten either basic liberal-democratic values, or social solidarity: “A commitment to liberal multiculturalism is not a commitment to ‘justice for minorities even if the heavens will fall,’ but rather ‘justice for minorities because the heavens won’t fall’” (2010).

Though he promotes much stronger forms of multiculturalism than Kymlicka, Bhiku Parekh largely agrees with this conclusion. For one thing, he is in full agreement that by withholding official recognition of diversity, and pressuring minorities to assimilate, the only result will be ethno-cultural backlash and distrust. Previously innocuous symbols such as the Sikh turban, he argues, become tools of the politicization and “religionization” of culture; this in turn leads not only to a cultural backlash among threatened minorities, but also a negative response from the mainstream. “Liberal society,” he claims, “throws up its own brand of secular militancy, and the consequent polarization of society takes its toll on the normal political process of deliberation and compromise” (2006: 198). By contrast, Parekh (like Kymlicka) argues that a multicultural society can help to sustain a strong and vibrant national identity: “by including minorities in the community’s self-definition and giving them official recognition, such a definition legitimizes and values their presence and makes it possible for them to accept it with enthusiasm. It also protects the state against nativist or majoritarian pressures, and it does not undermine the inescapably dominant status of the majority which is bound to assert itself in the normal political process anyway” (ibid: 234).

**Links With Social Capital, Contact Theory, and Social Identity**

These arguments dovetail nicely with the theoretical literature on diversity discussed in Chapter 3. Its proponents have suggested that the recognition of minority cultures within the bounds of a broadly liberal state will ultimately facilitate both more inclusive attitudes on the part of the mainstream, and a stronger sense of allegiance to the national community on the part of ethnic minorities. By acknowledging culture on an equal basis, the argument goes, the threat potentially posed by ethnic pluralism should decrease. By contrast, the failure to do so with the aim of “forcing” assimilation to a prevailing national identity will only serve to alienate minorities and provoke nativism and intolerance from the majority (Gleason 1980; Hollinger 2000; Kymlicka 1995; Taylor 1992).
While the philosophical arguments are well-developed, the specific social-psychological processes by which multiculturalism might facilitate a more tolerant and inclusive mainstream population are less so. Some have put forward a democratic learning model along the lines of Almond and Verba’s original Civic Culture study (1963): “citizenship regimes are the legal institutionalization of prevailing understandings about the rights, duties, and expectations of legitimate members of a nation-state. Individuals learn these values through socialization processes in the family, education system, and workplace” (Weldon 2006: 335). Another potential mechanism is social contact with immigrant minorities under optimal conditions. Considering Allport’s four criteria, supporters of multiculturalism might make the argument that cultural recognition is aimed explicitly at fostering and sanctioning norms that support respect, interaction, cooperation, and cultural equality. To the extent that such policies are successful, they should reduce boundaries that exist between ethnic groups in society, and thus promote increased contact and, eventually, social harmony through the “re-categorization” of all into a broader common identity.

By contrast, the general concern from the standpoint of those making the “solidarity critique” is that political multiculturalism will have precisely the opposite effect. While not all of the theoretical critiques are conversant with the social-psychological literature on identity, this link has been acknowledged in several recent treatments of the “recognition” argument and national identity more generally. Specifically, one coming at the issue of multiculturalism from a critical perspective might see policies based on cultural recognition and cultural differences as emphasizing, by their very nature, bonding networks over the bridging ones that are the aim of more assimilationist regimes. And, as Putnam claims, “bonding social capital, by creating strong in-group loyalty, may also create strong out-group antagonism” (2000: 23). For example, some have argued that religious fundamentalists tend to volunteer within their own churches, thereby exacerbating conflicts among different groups in society (Uslaner 2001). The same thing might well be true for multiculturalism: the emphasis on group recognition and group rights could discourage the formation of bridging social networks in favor of bonding ones.

Further, from within the ambit of SIT, multiculturalism has been conceptualized as identity-threatening for the majority group, as it involves the de-emphasis of established “national values” broadly concordant with majority cultural norms, in favor of cultural recognition with respect to minorities. If this is indeed the case, then policies promoting cultural recognition (rather than cultural assimilation) could help bring about a backlash in terms of various facets of national identity, such as narrower, more ascribed notions of who qualifies as a member of the national in-group.

A related point is that multiculturalism policies officially sanction group boundaries, which may in turn foster negative stereotyping and prejudice and impede the creation of an over-arching identity that transcends group differences (e.g. Brewer 1997).

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8 See, e.g.: Hjerm (2004); Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse (2003); Theiss-Morse (2009).
9 Examples of this reasoning include: Arends-Toth and Van de Vijver (2003); Sides and Citrin (2007); Van Oudenhoven, Prins, and Bruunk (1998); Verkuyten (2005); Van Oudenhoven et al (2002); Verkuyten and Thijs (1999).
For example, studies under the aegis of the “Common In-Group Identity Model,” which draws heavily on SIT and self-categorization theory, has shown that “priming” individuals to think about broader, more inclusive (or “superordinate”) identities – which encourages the re-categorization and inclusion of former out-group members – will lead them to direct positive evaluations towards these new members:

When the salience of the categorized boundary is reduced but members are left with a superordinate or one-group representation, the cognitive and motivational processes that initially brought in-group members closer to the self could be redirected toward the establishment of more positive relations with the former out-group members. With a one-group representation, bias should be reduced primarily because the social distance with former out-group members has decreased and the social distance with former in-group members has remained relatively close (Gaertner et al 1989: 240).  

Importantly, some argue that heightening the salience of a superordinate national identity will also influence specific policy positions beyond broad and symbolic allegiance to the broader group. For example, work on “policy particularism” within the American context has consistently demonstrated that individuals primed to think in more inclusive terms (usually by invoking a broader common group) are more generous in their views on redistribution (Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Transue 2007). Though the argument is almost always framed the other way around, by implication the reverse should also be true: particularism in terms of identity, potentially “primed” by multiculturalism, could also lead to a more limited willingness to sacrifice for fellow citizens, if they are seen as out-group members.

Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that, from the point of view of this literature, there are theoretical reasons to believe that political multiculturalism may either ease or exacerbate the inherent difficulties already present in ethnically diverse societies. Majority citizens may become more tolerant through processes of social learning and positive social contact, or they may become less so because of the increased salience of cultural distinctions and threat.

**Capturing Multiculturalism in Policy**

In terms of measurement, there has been a good deal of work organizing countries into different typologies with respect to immigration and multiculturalism, and in turn

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11 Some research experiments conducted on American undergraduates find, however, that ideological primes based on multiculturalism reduce prejudice versus those based on color-blindness. (Wolsko et al 2000; Richeson and Nussbaum 2004)

12 See, e.g.: Castles (1995); Castles and Miller (1993); Koopmans et al (2005); Safran (1997); Weldon (2006).
linking these typologies to mass political attitudes such as xenophobia and prejudice (e.g. Hjerm 1998; Weldon 2006). Most of this research, however, is limited because it defines multiculturalism in an ideal-typic sense, or looks at only a few countries. By far the most comprehensive and advanced efforts to measure the level of “multiculturalism” expressed in national policy regimes comes from recent work by Banting and his colleagues (2006). These authors have developed summary measures that directly tap policies vis a vis immigrant, national, and indigenous minorities at the country level. Since the cultural threat posed by immigrant diversity is the key question posed by this study, I focus on their measure of “poly-ethnic rights” with respect to immigrant minorities, which includes the following policies:

1. Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism, at the central and/or regional and municipal levels
2. The adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum;
3. The inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing;
4. Exemptions from dress codes, Sunday closing legislation etc. (either by statute or by court cases);
5. Allowing dual citizenship;
6. The funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities;
7. The funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction, and;
8. Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.

Banting and his colleagues build their country-level measure of poly-ethnic multiculturalism by assigning, for each domain, one point to a country if it had fully adopted and implemented policies related to it for much of the period between 1980 and 2000, half a point if it had done so but only in a token manner, and zero if it had not done so at all. These are then summed to create a multiculturalism policy score ranging from 0 to 8, which they further classify into “weak” (0-2.5), “moderate” (3.0-5.5), and “strong” (6.0-8.0) categories. Their typology is presented below in Table 5.1.

The approach to measurement set out above reflects the desire to capture multiculturalism as a policy “fact” rather than, as others have done, to look at the concept more discursively through reliance on media content analysis, elite opinion, and so on. Importantly, these approaches do not always agree; indeed, some have argued that while political rhetoric in many countries has turned strongly against multiculturalism, many of the policies emphasized by Banting et al’s measure have remained intact, at least for the time period under investigation here (e.g. Entzinger 2006; Kraus and Schönwälder 2006; Miller 2006). A key concern, then, is that mass attitudes related to national identity may be driven to a much greater degree by political discourse than they are to specific government policies.
While the disjuncture between fact and rhetoric is one that should be kept in mind, the focus on policy-based measures can be justified for two reasons: first, one might argue that given the vastly different styles of discourse that permeate the multiculturalism debate from country to country, a strict focus on policies defined a priori allows for the most objective comparison of “multiculturalism” possible in a cross-national setting. Moreover, as long as the policy measure is treated with caution (for example, by aggregating specific policy scores into broader categories such as weak, moderate, and strong), it is unlikely that the gap between rhetoric and policy will be significant enough to undermine it. Banting et al, for instance, argue that hypothesis testing based on “multiculturalism rhetoric” would likely not be significantly different from any results produced by their policy-based measure: “while multicultural policies and multicultural political rhetoric are not the same, they are likely to be highly correlated, and testing the former is arguably a good proxy for testing the latter” (2006: 53).

Competing/Confounding Policy Influences: Citizenship and Social Welfare

Citizenship Regime

A competing view of immigrant incorporation, distinct from the question of cultural recognition, concerns the legal means by which immigrants become a part of the national community. One of the foundational expositions of this perspective, T.H. Marshall’s *Citizenship and Social Class* (1950), suggests that a vital means of bringing about social solidarity is the provision of civil rights, which in turn lead to political and ultimately social rights. On this view, then, providing immigrants with the legal and political rights associated with citizenship should lead to a faster and more complete integration into mainstream society. By contrast, the failure to do so leads to less willingness on the part of immigrants to identify with the nation that refuses to accept them as equals. From this perspective, the failure to accord equal citizenship to immigrants also reduces willingness on the part of mainstream citizens to include them as “insiders” with respect to the nation community: “the ultimate outsiders are foreigners without political rights. In that sense, incorporation regimes based on *jus sanguinis*, where citizenship is conferred on the basis of descent, should demonstrate more prejudice and resentment than regimes that are more liberal” (Crepaz 2008: 171).

This is, of course, a very different argument than that put forward by proponents of multiculturalism; it is one thing to allow access to citizenship through legalistic means, and quite another to promote cultural recognition. Indeed, many critics of Marshall’s citizenship model have charged – in much the same way that Kymlicka and other proponents of multiculturalism attack the liberal state – that such legalistic approaches to citizenship and solidarity do not take important subjectivities and cultural differences, such as gender or ethnic minority status, into account (e.g. Baubock 2003; Benhabib 2002). The philosophical assault on political multiculturalism, however, does not usually extend to the citizenship argument. Indeed, arguments denying the importance of citizenship to immigrant incorporation and social solidarity are altogether non-existent in the scholarly literature, and many of those against multiculturalism on principle are in
favor of quick access to citizenship, provided there is an expectation that new immigrants
suborn their cultural practices to those of the liberal regime they are joining.

Markus Crepaz’ recent study exploring the relationships between multiculturalism
and citizenship policy on generalized trust and welfare state support makes plain this
conceptual distinction (2008: 174). And yet, his empirical analyses elide the issue
altogether – he presents regressions based on citizenship and multiculturalism policy
scores individually, and notes the positive relationships for both in terms of the
aforementioned outcomes. He summarizes these findings by trumpeting a victory for
Kymlicka and other proponents of multiculturalism: “multiculturalism policies appear to
reduce prejudice and welfare chauvinism, in addition to establishing support for the
welfare state. The widespread notion that multiculturalism policies heighten the
difference between natives and newcomers, and thereby create tensions between the in-
and out-groups, does not appear to be true” (ibid: 198).

This is not to say that he is necessarily wrong in his conclusions; multiculturalism
policy may indeed be an engine of tolerance, as its proponents suggest. However, his
preceding (and analytically separate) finding – that increased tolerance is also linked to
more liberal citizenship regimes – indicates that multiculturalism policies per se may not
be driving the results he obtains. Rather, the effects of citizenship policies could
confound them; in other words, there is no way to directly address the multiculturalism
argument, as Crepaz intends to do, without also accounting for the possibility that
citizenship policies may play a role.

At the very least, doing so suggests that we pay close attention to instances where
countries have adopted liberal citizenship policies but not political multiculturalism or
vice versa. In practice, this is not easy to do, since, as Crepaz points out, while the two
are conceptually distinct they also tend to be highly correlated in practice. Table 5.2
below lists the multiculturalism policy measures in tandem with whether the country has
jus soli versus jus sanguinis models of citizenship acquisition, measured over a similar
time horizon.\footnote{Crepaz (2008) points out that Germany moved toward jus soli after 2000. That said, it is unlikely that
any of the dynamics under investigation here (either with respect to mainstream immigrants) would be
substantially altered here, given the theoretical mechanisms generally attributed to policy institutions tend
to be of the “long-lasting” rather than “fast acting” variety.}

Evidently, there is a very high degree of intercorrelation between these
variables; there are no jus sanguinis citizenship regimes that have adopted strong
immigrant multicultural policy regimes, and only Belgium has instituted “moderate” ones
during this time period. Conversely, most of the jus soli countries have instituted policies
related to immigrant multiculturalism at least to a “moderate” extent.\footnote{This distinction also suggests that “dual citizenship” be removed from the multiculturalism measure,
since it has more to do with citizenship policies than it does with “cultural recognition.” Doing so,
however, leaves the distinction between weak, moderate and strong MC countries completely intact.}

On the surface, this does not augur well for any analysis that means to disentangle
the effects of these policy regimes on national identity measures. There is, however,
useful variation between the extent to which *jus soli* countries have adopted political multiculturalism; whereas Australia and Canada have done so the most strongly, New Zealand, the U.K., the United States and Sweden have done so to a lesser extent, and France has done little enough to qualify it as only “weakly” multicultural on these measures. Moreover, as mentioned above, Belgium (a *jus sanguinis* country) has adopted “moderate” immigrant multiculturalism policies. While these minor variations are hardly a “magic bullet” that solves all the problems of collinearity, it is possible that they will allow us to make meaningful inferences about the effects of one type of policy over another. Given that the theoretical bases of the arguments over multiculturalism and citizenship regimes are so different, it is necessary to at least try.

*Government Social Welfare Spending*

Another broad type of policy regime that may play a role in this process involves government redistribution in the form of social welfare. The notion that social welfare might serve an integrative function has a long lineage (e.g. Titmuss 1968). More recently, empirical scholarship has proliferated on the ways in which redistribution constructs and shapes political and social identity (Crepaz 2008; Ireland 2004; Schneider and Ingram 1997).

As with the citizenship argument, the notion that social welfare provisions should have a positive impact on the allegiance of immigrant minorities to their host countries seems relatively uncontroversial. Since most immigrants arrive in their new countries relatively less economically well-off, welfare benefits can provide a bridge that facilitates a more rapid social integration into the mainstream (Bloemraad 2006; Crepaz 2008; Van Hook et al 2006). It is not entirely uncontested, however; Koopmans, for example, couples his critique of multiculturalism with the suggestion that social welfare benefits provide a crutch that allows immigrants to survive without adapting to the mainstream, thus hindering their long-term social and economic prospects (2010).

In terms of *mainstream* attitudes in the broad realms of social capital, community, and ethnocentrism, social spending is also thought to have a largely positive effect. The argument from this perspective is that the salience of group conflicts in society over material interests is reduced in the presence of a welfare safety net. This logic undergirds both the findings that the relationship between the number of asylum-seekers and anti-immigrant party support is weakened in more redistributive countries (Swank and Betz 2003), and the positive relationship between social spending and generalized trust (Crepaz 2008).

It is not a great conceptual leap to extend these arguments – largely focused on generalized trust and support for the welfare state – to the issues raised here regarding the normative boundaries of national identity. Indeed, the measures employed here are similar to Crepaz’ measures of trust (which categorizes respondents based on how “concerned” they are about the living conditions of different types of people15), in that

15 The target groups are “your immediate family,” “people in your neighborhood,” “people of the region you live in,” “your fellow countrymen,” “Europeans,” and “humankind.”
both aim to measure the boundaries of individuals’ attachments to others. The only real distinction is that instead of measuring level of concern, the measures developed in Chapter 2 demarcate the boundaries of the national in-group. Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that mainstream populations of countries that redistribute wealth to a larger extent should be less likely to emphasize ascriptive characteristics than those in countries that redistribute less.

For present purposes, I measure the level of redistribution using the OECD’s aggregate indices of total public expenditures, as a percentage of GDP; they are available for every country under consideration here, generally considered to be reliable, and have been widely used in cross-national empirical analysis on this topic (e.g. Banting et al 2006; Crepaz 2008). While there is a theoretical distinction between “total expenditures” measures such as these and more nuanced indices – such as the “decommodification” indices originally developed by Esping-Andersen (1990) and later refined by Scruggs (2004) – in practice, they tend to be highly correlated (Crepaz 2008). And, unsurprisingly, they also tend to be highly associated with “equality of outcomes” measures such as country-level GINI scores. Scores for the spending measures by for each relevant year and, for comparison purposes, the Esping-Anderson and Scruggs indices of decommodification and GINI coefficients are presented below in Table 5.3.

**[Table 5.3 About Here]**

In theory, it would also make sense to distinguish between countries where immigrants are eligible for social welfare and countries where they are not, above and beyond the more basic “overall spending” measure. This is especially true from the standpoint of analyses on the effect of redistribution on immigrant public opinion, though it also – at least in theory – applies to mainstream attitudes. While some scholars (e.g. Fix and Laglagaron 2002) have developed indicators along these lines, their data cover relatively few of the countries that are of interest here and are not available over time. As a further complication, these measures are not – strictly speaking – comparable across countries, since the specific policies detailed are different from one country to the next. As such, the present analysis relies on the more general social redistribution measures.

**Summary**

A vast scholarship exists on how various types of policy regimes can either help or hinder the quest for social harmony in ever-more diverse societies. In this chapter, I have surveyed the debate among political philosophers of diversity and multiculturalism (both “pro” and “anti”), with special emphasis on the concern that policies of cultural recognition could undermine social cohesion within the boundaries of the nation-state. Largely, such arguments have been based on political philosophy, analysis of elite-level

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16 For example, they list recognized immigrants as having universal access to parenting payments in Australia, but do not specify whether or not these benefits are available to immigrants in the other seven countries comprising their analysis.
discourse (government reports, political campaigns, newspaper editorials), and analysis of specific social movements. That said, they dovetail nicely with the theoretical perspectives surveyed in Chapter 3, as this review makes clear. I also explored theories about how other types of policy regimes – namely citizenship practices and social welfare redistribution – might also play a role in these dynamics.

Questions about all three policy areas in this respect are inherently two-sided: how do they shape the attitudes of mainstream respondents, on the one hand, and those of immigrant minorities on the other? Chapter 6 explores the former question, extending the empirical analyses presented in Chapter 4 to include the measures of political multiculturalism, citizenship regime, and government spending described above. As before, the focus is on the “ascriptivity” of mainstream conceptions of national identity. Chapter 7 examines the latter, examining the relationship between these policy regimes and immigrant incorporation more holistically.
### Chapter 5 Tables

Table 5.1: Immigrant Multiculturalism Policy Scores By Country, 1980-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MC Policy Score</th>
<th>MC Policy Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Banting et al 2006.
Table 5.2: Multiculturalism Policy and Citizenship Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MC Policy Classification</th>
<th>Citizenship Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Jus Soli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Jus Soli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Jus Soli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Jus Sanguinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Jus Sanguinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Jus Sanguinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Jus Sanguinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Jus Sanguinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Jus Sanguinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>Jus Sanguinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>Jus Sanguinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>Jus Sanguinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>Jus Sanguinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>Jus Sanguinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>Jus Sanguinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>Jus Sanguinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>Jus Sanguinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>Jus Sanguinis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*For both Italy and Greece there appears to be some disagreement in the literature. Lahav (2004: 259) calls Italy a *jus soli* country, but birth in Italy (from foreign parents) does not automatically confer Italian citizenship; rather, Crepaz’ characterization of it as “half and half” seems closer to the mark. As for Greece, Lahav (2004) and other scholars employing her typology (Weldon 2006) treat it as *jus soli*, which it clearly is not in the strict sense; citizenship is predominantly acquired by blood, and not birthplace. In order to prevent terminological confusion from impacting the results, these cases are excluded from empirical analyses of immigration/multiculturalism regimes, though they are included in analyses of social spending.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Social Expenditures (% GDP, OECD)</th>
<th>De-commodification Indices</th>
<th>GINI Coefficient (After Taxes/Transfers, OECD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>27.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>19.9</td>
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<td>15.7</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
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<td>19.9</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>19.2</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>20.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Total Social Expenditures data from OECD statistics portal (OECDstat.org). The 1980 Commodification scores are based on Esping-Andersen (1990), but the numbers displayed are calculations revised by Bambra (2006). GINI coefficients are scored from 0 = full equality to 1 = full inequality.
Chapter 6: The Empirical Relationship Between National Identity and Policy Regimes

This chapter extends the empirical approach applied in Chapter 4 beyond the basic hypotheses about diversity, threat, and contact, to the questions of policy impact raised in the previous chapter. As noted, the “effect” of these policies on mainstream definitions of the national community has been hotly debated, with strong arguments to be made on either side. I begin by analyzing the relationships between the three policy measures to the ESS’ immigration qualification items, and then move on to consider their influence on mass definitions of the “true national” from the ISSP, both cross-sectionally and over time.\(^1\)

**Immigration Criteria and Policy Regimes**

To gauge the impact of policy regimes on desired immigration qualifications, a sensible first step is to simply look at how the country-level means vary according to policy. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 depict the mean scores on the ascribed qualifications index at the country level, subdivided by both Banting et al.’s multiculturalism index and the immigration policy regime score. In the former case, the categories are “weak” versus “moderate” multiculturalism, whereas in the latter the categories are “jus sanguinis” versus “jus soli” citizenship regimes.

Looking at the means by multiculturalism regime, it does appear that countries in the “moderate” category are slightly less ascriptive (on average) than those in the “weak” one. This general difference appears to be attenuated somewhat by the existence of two outliers in the latter category, Germany and Austria; indeed, virtually every other country in the “weak” group scores higher than the mean score in the opposing category. Figure 6.2 tells the same tale, but with respect to citizenship category; residents of *jus soli* countries appear to be slightly less willing to prioritize ascribed qualifications on average while those in *jus sanguinis* regimes tend to be more so, and again the notable outliers appear to be Germans and Austrians. That said, the cross-category differences in both cases are quite small in both cases, and there is little here to suggest that these relationships are particularly strong or noteworthy.

Figure 6.3 combines multiculturalism and citizenship regimes, placing countries into one of the following four categories: weak multiculturalism/*jus sanguinis*, weak multiculturalism/*jus soli*, moderate multiculturalism/*jus sanguinis*, and moderate multiculturalism/*jus soli*. Comparison of countries that fit in the first and last of these categories once again seems to demonstrate that respondents in countries that are more favorable to immigration and culture on both dimensions appear to be less willing to...

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\(^1\) As in Chapter 4, the emphasis here is on the attitudes mainstream citizens; immigrants (or non-citizens, the case of the ISSP) are excluded from the samples.
prioritize ascribed qualifications, though again these differences are quite trivial. The two high-leverage cases that actually distinguish between the different types of policies (France and Belgium) tend to fall somewhere in between, and, more importantly, there is virtually no difference between them. All in all, there is little to suggest here that policy regimes matter a great deal to this outcome.

Figure 6.3 About Here

Figure 6.4 gauges the relationship between the ascribed qualifications index and social spending, by plotting mean scores on the former against the latter. The slope of the fitted line is negative, in line with the expectation that citizens in more redistributive states tend to view the desirability of immigrants in less heavily “ascriptive” terms. However, the overall level of scatter around it indicates that there is not much of a real relationship here to speak of.

Figure 6.4 About Here

Of course, simple mean difference might be telling us very little, as a number of factors appear to predict these attitudes at the individual-level (Table 4.1 and Figures 4.1-4.3) and are not taken into account by this strategy. It is possible that the hypothesized relationships will better reveal themselves once potential confounds are controlled. Table 6.1 assesses this issue by adding the policy measures to the individual-level model shown in Table 4.1, both individually (Panel A) and simultaneously (Panel B). Since none of the aggregate measures of diversity or economic prosperity appeared to be a factor (Table 4.2), they are excluded from consideration here. What emerges is further evidence that policy does not appear to play a strong role in these outcomes either way, irrespective of whether they are considered separately or together. Not only are the relationships generally inconsistent, but in no case do they come anywhere close to statistical significance. The only one that even comes close to doing so is the redistribution measure, which is consistently related to more “achievable” definitions of citizenship but not in a particularly strong way.

Table 6.1 About Here

In sum, then, there is no strong evidence whatsoever to suggest that any of the three policy regimes matter one way or the other to individuals’ conceptions of desirable immigrant characteristics, at least along the ascribed/achievable dimension captured here. Whether or not the hypothesized effects materialize with respect to definitions of the “true” national is an issue to which I now turn.

Definitions of the “True” National and Policy Regimes, 2003 ISSP Cross-Section

Once again, I begin by considering the simple mean differences between groups of countries divided into policy categories. Figures 6.5 and 6.6 divide countries by
“weak”/“moderate”/“strong” multiculturalism, and jus sanguinis/jus soli citizenship categories, respectively. What is immediately apparent from these graphs is that policy categories tend to matter much more for ascribed definitions of “true” nationhood than they did for ascribed immigration qualifications. On average, the level of multiculturalism is strongly (and monotonically) related to the decreased priority of ascribed characteristics across the three categories, and the only real outliers appear to be France in the “weak” category and “Sweden” in the moderate one. In terms of citizenship regime, residents of jus soli countries appear to be much more willing to downplay the ascribed traits than those in jus sanguinis ones, and there are few (if any) obvious outliers on this dimension.

The picture is somewhat less clear when the two policy categories are combined (Figure 6.7). While it remains the case that a jus soli citizenship regime considered in tandem with stronger multiculturalism tends to be associated with less ascriptive definitions of nationhood, there is some evidence here in favor of the “backlash” argument with respect to multiculturalism. Namely, the two countries scoring by far the lowest on this measure (Sweden and France) have adopted multiculturalism either only “moderately” or not at all. Also noteworthy from this perspective is the fact that both Sweden and the United States (each of which is on the low end of the 3.0-5.0 range typically defined as “moderate” in the literature using these measures) are the lowest-scoring countries within that category. At the same time, it is true that the most strongly multiculturalist countries (Canada and Australia) seem to be less ascriptive than their slightly less multicultural brethren (the U.K. and New Zealand). Nonetheless, leaving aside the distinction between the borderline moderate/strong countries and the strong ones, it does seem reasonable to conclude (at least for now) that within jus soli countries, ascriptive definitions of nationhood appear to increase in tandem with higher scores on the multiculturalism policy measure.

Figure 6.8 plots the mean scores on the ascribed “truly” index against government spending. As in the analyses presented about on immigration qualifications, the relationship appears to be a negative one. In this case, however, the relationship is much stronger: not only is the slope estimate twice as steep, but the dispersion around the line is substantially reduced. Here, then, we see the beginnings of real evidence that in more redistributive countries, mainstream citizens tend to view their “true” co-nationals in less ascriptive terms.

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2 Canada and Australia score 7.5 and 7.0, respectively, whereas New Zealand and the U.K. both score 5.0.
3 .004 versus .002, according to a bivariate OLS regression.
Table 6.2 considers the policy measures along with the other relevant covariates from Chapter 4 (Figures 4.6-4.9 and Table 4.5) in the context of multi-level regression; unlike the ESS analysis above, since contextual-level measures of immigrant diversity do appear to be related to narrower definitions of nationhood, they are also controlled. According to Panel A, which enters the policy measures separately, the “effect” of multiculturalism appears to be inconsistent, and jus soli citizenship regimes appear to be negatively related to ascriptive conceptions of the “true” national; the estimates are not statistically significant in either case. Government spending on social welfare appears to be quite strongly related to less ascriptive definitions of the true national, and this relationship is statistically significant at better than the p < .01 level on every outcome.

The fact that the spending measure is scalar rather than categorical makes it easy to illustrate its relationship with ascriptive identity in graphical form, in order to check for possible outliers. As in Figures 4.6-4.9, Figure 6.9 plots the country-level intercept values produced when the individual-level model is estimated for each country against the independent measure of interest, in this case social spending. As in Figure 6.8, the relationship is strongly negative; if anything, once the individual-level predictors are taken into account the dispersion of points around the fitted line is actually reduced.

When all three measures are considered at once (Panel B of Table 4), the relationship between multiculturalism policy and these outcomes remains weak. By contrast, both jus sanguinis citizenship regimes and elevated levels of social welfare spending remain negatively associated with ascriptive national identity in a statistically significant way, and the association is particularly strong with the latter measure. The take away point from these cross-sectional analyses appears to be the following: whereas both liberal citizenship regimes and high levels of government spending are negatively associated with ascriptive conceptions even when the effects of all three policy regimes are estimated simultaneously, and multiculturalism appears unrelated to this outcome either way.

**Definitions of the “True” National and Policy Regimes Over Time, 1995-2003**

The empirical analyses presented in Chapter 4 showed that attention to the development of these attitudes over time yielded substantially more insight than simply looking at survey cross-sections. One way to observe this dynamic is to graph the mean differences between 1995 and 2003, for the 11 countries appearing in both waves of the

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4 Coefficients for all predictors in the country-level OLS models used to estimated these intercepts are in the Appendix to Chapter 4.

5 The robustness of the estimated standard errors were verified by re-estimating the models using a country-level jackknife routine (see Appendix to Chapter 6).
ISSP survey. Figure 6.10, below, divides these countries into three categories: weak multiculturalism/jus sanguinis, moderate multiculturalism/jus soli, and strong multiculturalism/jus soli.\(^6\) While there is a substantial amount of inter-category variation – particularly in the “moderate” group – a couple of general patterns are worth noting. For one thing, not only is the average increase among the “strongly multicultural” countries larger than it is anywhere else, but both Australia and Canada increased at least as much as any other if not more so. Second, the increases are less pronounced among “moderately multicultural” countries than they are in either of the other two categories, and the only exception is the borderline case of New Zealand.

Table 6.3 examines the policy variables in the context of a multi-level regression. To capture the over-time dimension, the sample includes respondents in all countries surveyed either in 1995 or in 2003, yielding (as in Chapter 4) 18 countries and 29 country-years. The baseline model in Table 6.3 is identical to that in Table 4.6; it includes contextual-level measures of foreign-born population and foreign-born growth, as well as individual-level measures tapping threat, the nativity of both respondents’ and their parents, gender, age, education, religiosity, and unemployment.\(^7\) In addition to this baseline, I include the policy measures as predictors separately (Models I-III) and simultaneously (Model IV). The model also includes a dummy variable toggling the year 2003, and interactions between all predictors in the model and that dummy.

Considered by itself, citizenship policy is weakly related to a lower emphasis on nativity in the earlier time period, and this relationship had not changed at all by 2003 (Model I). The effect of political multiculturalism (Model II) displays a similarly weak negative relationship with the outcome in 1995, but, in contrast to citizenship, the relationship had moved in positive direction by 2003, and the year-to-year change is significant at better than the p < .01 level. Finally, social spending is strongly and negatively associated with ascribed conceptions of nationality in both periods, and this relationship only grows from one period to the next (significant at better than the p < .01 level).

When entered in the models together (Model IV), the story becomes even more interesting. In the earlier period, there appears to be a negative relationship between multiculturalism policy and the ascribed definition of nationhood, marginally significant at the p < .10 level. The effect of a jus soli citizenship regime – all else equal – is essentially zero, and the strong negative relationship between social welfare spending and ascriptivity remains. By 2003, the magnitude of the relationship between

\(^6\) France and Belgium are not available for this, which is unfortunate given that (by these measures) they are the only ISSP examples of weak multiculturalism/jus soli and moderate multiculturalism/jus sanguinis countries.

\(^7\) Estimated effects of the individual-level predictors are not shown, in order to reduce clutter.
multiculturalism and ascribed definitions of nationhood grows considerably, and the sign of the relationship changes in the process. By contrast, the apparent effect of being in a *jus soli* citizenship regime moves significantly in the opposite direction. Both of the year-to-year changes are statistically significant at better than the $p < .01$ level. The changes with respect to the effect of social spending remain as in Model III, with the already-negative relationship growing even further.\(^8\)

**Summary**

Whereas Chapter 4 was predominantly concerned with the effects of diversity, threat, and contact on normative definitions of the nation, the present chapter focused on the role of government policy. It considered the relationships between political multiculturalism, citizenship policy (*jus soli* versus *jus sanguinis*), and government spending on social welfare, on the one hand, and “ascriptivity” of national identity in the mainstream on the other.

In general, the relationships between these policy measures and qualifications for immigration were weak and inconsistent. Of the three, the closest thing to a meaningful relationship appears with respect to government spending, which is negatively (though weakly) related the preference for ascribed qualifications for immigration.

However, analysis of the “true” national items in the ISSP demonstrated strong and significant effects for all three policy regimes that address many of the general debates alluded to in the previous chapter. In cross-sectional terms, both citizenship and multiculturalism regimes – when considered independently of each other – are associated with broader conceptions of the national community along the ascribed-achievable dimension; this finding tends to confirm previous research on other measures of social cohesion (Crepaz 2008). However, results of analyses that take into account the confounding nature of these policies also supports my critique of Crepaz’ study in the previous chapter; namely, when both types of policies are considered together the effect of *jus soli* (versus *jus sanguinis*) citizenship policies remains positive and statistically significant, whereas the positive effect of multiculturalism disappears.

While this finding alone is hardly ammunition for multiculturalism’s critics, the over-time analysis supports a more pessimistic view. Whether or not one examines multiculturalism policy in tandem with the other policy regimes, the individual-level pooled models in Table 6.3 demonstrated that ascriptive definitions of nationhood became much more prevalent between 1995 and 2003 in multicultural countries than they did elsewhere. By contrast, net of multiculturalism and social welfare spending, the effect of a *jus soli* citizenship appears to be precisely the opposite. Furthermore, the aggregate level analysis in Figure 6.10 demonstrated the same basic point: citizens in multicultural countries shifted in an “ascriptive” direction more than citizens of any other country. By contrast, this shift appears to have been much more muted in *jus soli* countries that have adopted multiculturalism to a lesser extent.

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\(^8\) Once again, re-running these models using OLS and country-level jackknife standard errors does not change the substance of these findings (See Appendix to Chapter 6).
While the analyses here challenge Crepaz’ buoyant conclusions about the role of multiculturalism in fostering social tolerance, another one of his arguments finds substantial support here. Namely, policies of social redistribution are powerfully associated with less ascriptive definitions of the “true national.” The inclusion of over-time analysis only provides further support for this view: the negative relationship between social welfare provisions and “ascriptivity” is significant in both years and actually grows in absolute terms from one period to the next. What is more, the results are essentially unchanged whether or not other policy regimes are included in the analysis. Clearly, then, there is absolutely no indication here that mainstream citizens are becoming more xenophobic as a means of defending their social welfare spending against immigrants’ “leeching”; on the other hand, these findings lend credence to the general argument that social welfare provisions insulate mainstream citizens from the threats posed by immigrant diversity.

All in all, these analyses seem to suggest that liberal citizenship regimes coupled with a high levels of social welfare redistribution have a “widening” effect on the radius of national community and, by contrast, that there may indeed be something to the critiques of multiculturalism – along the lines of social cohesion – that have appeared in recent literature.
Chapter 6 Tables and Figures
Figures 6.1 and 6.2: Ascribed Qualifications Index By Incorporation Policy

6.1: Multiculturalism Policy

Notes: Bars represent mean scores on the Ascribed Qualifications Index, scored from 0 = Lowest to 1 = Highest. Source: ESS 2002.

6.2 Citizenship Regime

Notes: Bars represent mean scores on the Ascribed Qualifications Index, scored from 0 = Lowest to 1 = Highest. Source: ESS 2002.
Figure 6.3: Ascribed Immigration Qualifications, Combined Policy Categories

Notes: Bars represent mean scores on the Ascribed Qualifications Index, scored from 0 = Lowest to 1 = Highest. Source: ESS 2002.

Notes: Bars represent mean scores on the Ascribed Qualifications Index, scored from 0 = Lowest to 1 = Highest. Source: ESS 2002.
Figure 6.4: Ascribed Immigration Qualifications and Social Expenditures

Notes: Points represent mean scores on the Ascribed Qualifications Index, scored from 0 = Lowest to 1 = Highest. The line represents the linear fit. Source for social spending is the OECD. Source for survey data: ESS 2002.
Table 6.1: Multiculturalism and Citizenship Policy Against Immigration Qualification Items and Indices

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<td>.002 (.005)</td>
</tr>
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Clusters 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
n 17,494 17,472 17,451 17,515 17,524 17,522 17,451

Notes: ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.10. Entries are coefficients estimate by adding policy variables to the random intercepts multi-level model in the previous chapter, including all predictors at the individual level. Since none were found to be significant (Table 4.2), context level predictors are excluded. The sample excludes non-citizens. Panel A shows coefficients when policy variables are entered separately, and Panel B shows coefficients when policy variables are entered simultaneously. Standard errors are in parentheses. “Multiculturalism” is scored 0 = “weak” and 0.5 = “moderate,” and there are no “strong” countries in the ESS. Citizenship is scored 0 = jus sanguinis and 1 = jus soli. Countries are classified on the basis of Table 5.2. Social spending is measured as a proportion of GDP. Measures of spending come from the OECD. Source: ESS 2002/2003.
Figures 6.5 and 6.6: Ascribed “Truly” Index By Multiculturalism and Citizenship

Notes: Bars represent mean scores on the Ascribed “Truly National” Index, scored from 0 = Lowest to 1 = Highest. Source: ISSP 2003.
Figure 6.7: Ascribed “Truly” Index, Combined Policy Categories

Notes: Bars represent mean scores on the Ascribed “Truly National” Index, scored from 0 = Lowest to 1 = Highest. Source: ISSP 2003.
Figure 6.8: Mean Ascribed “Truly” Index and Social Expenditures

Notes: Points represent mean scores on the Ascribed Qualifications Index, scored from 0 = Lowest to 1 = Highest. The line represents the linear fit. Source for social spending is the OECD. Source for survey data: ISSP 2003.
Table 6.2: Multiculturalism, Citizenship and Welfare Policy Against “Truly” Items and Indices, 2003

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<td>-.03 (.05)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Spending</td>
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|                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
|----------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| B (Simultaneously)   | Multiculturalism Policy | -.03 (.07)       | .06 (.08)       | .01 (.07)   | -.01 (.11)       | -.01 (.06)       | -.01 (.07) |
| Citizenship Regime   | -.10* (.04)      | -.08# (.05)      | -.09* (.04)   | .10 (.07)   | .08* (.04)      | .09* (.04)   |
| Social Spending      | -.018** (.004)   | -.016** (.004)   | -.017** (.003) | .022** (.006) | .013** (.03)   | .017** (.003) |
| Countries            | 16                      | 16                      | 16                      | 16                      | 16                      | 16                      |
| n                    | 12,255                   | 12,265                   | 12,172                   | 12,269                   | 12,256                   | 12,172                   |

# p<.10 * p<.05 ** p<.01. Entries are coefficients estimate by adding policy variables to the random intercepts multi-level model in the previous chapter, including all individual-level predictors, as well as foreign born population and growth at the context level (measured by OECD estimates). Panel A shows coefficients when policy variables are entered separately, and Panel B shows coefficients when policy variables are entered simultaneously. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample excludes non-citizens. “Multiculturalism” is scored 0 = “weak,” 0.5 = “moderate,” and 1 = “strong.” Citizenship is scored 0 = *jus sanguinis* and 1 = *jus soli*. Countries are classified on the basis of Table 5.2. Social spending is measured as a proportion of GDP. Measures of spending come from the OECD. Source: ISSP 2003.
Figure 6.9: Country-Level Intercepts on Ascribed “Truly” Index and Social Expenditures

Notes: Points represent the intercept values when the individual-level model from Table 4.3 is estimated (using OLS) separately for each country. The models are based on a version of the dependent variable that is scored from $-1 = \text{least ascriptive}$ to $+1 = \text{most ascriptive}$. Source for social spending is the OECD. Source for survey data: ISSP 2003.
Figure 6.10: Mean Change in Ascribed “Truly” Index 1995-2003, By Combined Policy Categories

Table 6.3: Multiculturalism, Citizenship Policy and the Ascribed “Truly” Index, 1995-2003

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<td>-.006** (.001)</td>
<td>-.007** (.002)</td>
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<td>% Foreign Born</td>
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# p<.10 * p<.05 ** p<.01. Each primary column (I-IV) depicts coefficients of a single mixed-effects, random intercepts model pooling 1995 and 2003 ISSP respondents. Standard errors are in parentheses. Social Spending is as % GDP. % Foreign Born and % F-B growth are in the relevant year and annualized growth rates over the previous 3 years. Individual level control variables are included but not shown, for reasons of space. Sample excludes non-citizens. Individual-level predictors are identical to those in Table 4.6. Countries are classified on the basis of Table 5.2. Social spending is measured as a proportion of GDP. Measures of spending come from the OECD. Contextual diversity measures taken from the UN World Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision Population Database. Source for survey data: ISSP 1995, 2003.
Chapter 7: Policy Regimes and Immigrant Public Opinion

To this point, empirical analyses have been entirely devoted to assessing the relationships between de facto immigrant diversity, policy regimes, and the normative conceptions of national identity held by mainstream citizens. Given that the theorizing about the effects of policies discussed in Chapter 5—especially in regards to citizenship and multiculturalism—is overwhelmingly devoted to the issue of immigrants’ sense of identification with their adoptive nation, however, the present undertaking would be remiss without considering the attitudes of immigrants themselves. Can policy regimes influence the level of discrimination they perceive and their willingness to “trust most people”? Can they shape immigrants’ faith in the political system and governing institutions and, concomitantly, their willingness to participate in it?

A growing number of studies has examined immigrant attitudes and behaviors on these and related questions. One area of interest has been Latino political mobilization in the United States, predominantly in terms of voting participation. Others, meanwhile, have explored immigrant minority attitudes on acculturation and national identity. Finally, a spate of recent work has emphasized immigrants’ civic engagement and protest behavior.

Most of this research has been conducted within countries, and only a few studies have studied this issue with respect to the attitudes of minorities and/or immigrant minorities in a large-n comparative setting. Furthermore, what little comparative work there is has tended to focus on individual-level explanations of integration, “origin” effects, and aspects of the receiving countries including labor market conditions, political party structures. The role of the types of integration policies discussed in the present work, hotly debated in the theoretical literature for many years, and has only recently begun to receive serious empirical attention (e.g. Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007; Koopmans 2010). The purpose of the present chapter is to assess the extent to which these policy regimes shape the attitudes and behaviors of immigrant minorities, in terms of trust, political participation, and faith in the political system.

Data

More than anything else, what has impeded the study of immigrant public opinion in a large-scale comparative setting is the limitation of available data. The ISSP surveys

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1 For examples, see: Arvizu and Garcia (1996); Bass and Casper (2001a, 2001b); Cassel (2002); Cho (1999); Citrin et al (2007); DeSipio (1996); Highton and Burris (2002); Jackson (2003); Pantoja et al (2001).
3 For example, see: DeSipio (2010); Ramakrishnan and Baldassare (2004); Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008); Stepick and Stepick (2002); Voss and Bloemraad (forthcoming).
4 Aleksynska (2008); Dowley and Silver (2002); Elkins and Sides (2004); Fleischmann and Dronkers (2007); Paskeviciute and Anderson (2007); Van Tubergen et al (2004).
employed to this point are a poor candidate, mainly because they do not directly ascertain whether respondents are foreign-born. On the other hand, the European Social Survey does so quite thoroughly, and the three-wave cumulative file (2002-2006) contains both a number of relevant outcome measures and a relatively large number of foreign-born respondents in each country. As an added bonus, we can add U.S. respondents (surveyed in 2005 as part of the “Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy” Survey) to this sample, as much of the questionnaire was designed to replicate the ESS.

One of the problems with this merged dataset (for present purposes) is that – since there is only one wave of the CID – it is relatively light on immigrants to the United States. A more serious issue is that it does not include the countries scoring the highest on political multiculturalism, Canada and Australia. As a result, I supplement analyzes of the merged ESS/CID dataset with several additional surveys of Americans, Canadians, and Australians. The World Values Survey is of some use here since it covers all three, though adequate measures of nativity are unfortunately only available on an irregular basis. In addition, I look at results from two other single-nation surveys with both comparable outcome measures and sizable immigrant sub-samples: the Canadian “Equality, Security, Community” survey fielded in 2003, and the American “Social Capital Benchmark Study” fielded in 2000.

There are numerous reasons why – in addition to a “large-n” analysis of European countries – a special focus on Canada, the U.S., and Australia is of particular value. The key is their essential similarity in a number of respects. All three are highly diverse, immigrant nations originally under the British crown, and they all have jus soli citizenship regimes (Castles and Miller 1993). All three have attained a high level of economic development, and, in terms of redistribution, all three fall under the “liberal” welfare category in Esping-Andersen’s original typology (1990); while there are important differences between them, they are much closer to each other in terms of welfare expenditure and “decommodification” than they are to most European countries (see Table 5.3). Their most relevant difference – for present purposes – is in how they approach multiculturalism. Unlike European countries, where its manifestations are much more ambiguous (e.g. Joppke 1999), there is little doubt that both Canada and Australia are substantially more “multicultural” than the U.S., both in the ideological sense and in terms of the measures used to this point.

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5 They do ask whether respondents have citizenship, but one obviously cannot assume that being a citizen of a country is synonymous with having been born there. And, on a more practical level, even if one did want to limit the analysis to non-citizens, the number of such respondents to these surveys is far too small for rigorous cross-country analysis.

6 See Appendix to Chapter 7 for a country-level breakdown.

7 For the three countries mentioned, data that allows for the distinction between foreign- and native-born are only available in Australia and the U.S. in Wave 3 (1995), and Canada in Wave 5 (2006). Other countries have data on these measures (also infrequently), but there tend to be far too few immigrants for detailed study.

8 Foreign-born population breakdowns of these surveys and the World Values survey are available in the Appendix.

9 The point is made most directly by Bloemraad (2006, 2010), but Black (2010) and DeSipio (2010) make similar arguments with reference to Canada-U.S. comparisons.
Analytic Approach

Engagement in the political system is to a substantial degree the product of individual-level factors related to demographics (such as age, race, and gender) as well as “human capital”-related determinants (such as education) across a wide variety of countries (e.g. Almond and Verba 1963; Barnes and Kaase 1979; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). When the target population is immigrants, it also becomes necessary to take into account whether or not they have citizenship, which confers not only political rights but also a sense of duty that may spur greater engagement in political life (e.g. Paskeviciute and Anderson 2007). The duration of their stay in the host country is also important, since as time goes by familiarity with the political system, integration into local social networks, and the sense of having a “stake” in the system should all increase (e.g. Bass and Casper 2001a, 2001b; Liang 1994).

Table 7.1 estimates the relationships between these individual-level characteristics on both generalized trust, as well as whether or not respondents claim to be discriminated against based on ethnicity, nationality, language, or religion. Table 7.2 considers their role on a series of “political engagement” variables including political interest, an index of “traditional” political participation,10 trust in the country’s parliament and its politicians, the sense that “politicians care about people like me,” and satisfaction with the national government. Estimates are based on a pooled sample consisting of all foreign-born respondents in the merged ESS/CID dataset.11

[Tables 7.1 and 7.2 About Here]

In general, the socio-economic background variables behave as expected. Both generalized trust and the “political engagement” variables are strongly and positively related to both education and subjective financial security across the board, and these variables are negatively related to perceived discrimination. Older respondents tend to trust “most people” more, perceive less discrimination, and are more interested in politics; that said, they appear to be less participatory, and the relationships between age and political trust, politicians “caring,” and satisfaction with government are weak and inconsistent. Women do not appear to trust – either “most people” or politicians – any more or less than men do, and, while they appear to be less interested in politics, they do not seem to participate less.

10 This is a 6-item additive index of political acts in the past 12 months. Because voting behavior is legally tied to citizenship, I exclude it from this measure. It adds together whether respondents’ have: contacted a politician, worked in a political party, worked in another political organization, wore a campaign badge or displayed a sticker, signed a petition, and taken part in a lawful demonstration/protest. Some may object to the inclusion of protest in a measure of “traditional politics,” since it constitutes participation along more contentious lines; while immigrants’ level of protest behavior is an interesting area of study unto itself (e.g. Voss and Bloemraad forthcoming), I elide this distinction here, and results do not substantially changed if protest behavior is excluded from the index.

11 Country-level regressions on this model are in the Appendix to Chapter 7.
Interestingly, self-identification as a majority (rather than minority) member is not strongly related to any of these outcomes on average; the lone exception is the strongly negative relationship between being of “majority” status and perceived discrimination. Citizenship status is not related to trust, and only weakly (and negatively) to perceived discrimination. Having citizenship does translate to slightly higher levels of political interest, and a somewhat greater sense that “politicians care.” On the other hand, it is only weakly associated with higher levels political participation, which echoes similar findings in previous work (e.g. Barretto and Munoz 2003; Lien 2004; Togeby 2004). Finally, the length of time an immigrant has lived in the country is negatively related to their level of perceived discrimination, and, consistent with previous work, higher levels of political interest and participation (Bass and Casper 2001a, 2001b; Wong 2000). That said, longer-term migrants tend to also trust “most people” somewhat less, and appear to be substantially more jaded about politicians and national government than their more recently-arrived peers.

Largely because socio-economic characteristics matter for these outcomes, the unique demographic profile of each nation’s immigrant population complicates cross-national comparisons. Even superficially, it makes little sense to compare mean scores between overall immigrant populations in Belgium or Ireland – where immigrants tend to be white and of Western European origin – to France or the United States. Compositional differences in immigrant populations are also to some extent endogenous to policy regimes. For example, because of specific differences in citizenship laws, some countries may be more accessible to less-educated and less-skilled migrants. Social spending figures into this picture as well, given that immigrants of lower socio-economic standing tend to flock to more redistributive countries (Borjas 1988; Van Tubergen 2004). These compositional differences could in turn be reflected in cross-national comparisons by policy regime type.

To account for this, the present analysis compares the intercept values produced when outcomes are regressed on the predictors in the baseline model depicted in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 within each country. The way the predictors are coded, what this amounts to is estimating the outcome for a hypothetical immigrant who is an ethnic minority member, has just arrived in the country, lacks citizenship, and is less-educated, young, and not financially well-off. In other words, precisely the sort of immigrant that is least integrated into society, and that citizenship, multiculturalism policy, and social welfare would presumably help the most.

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12 This does not appear to be the result of pooling countries together; indeed the predicted relationships emerge occasionally in country-level regressions, but there is nothing like a consistent pattern and they are uniformly weak.

13 Even relatively similar jus soli countries admit immigrants on different grounds – Canada and Australia use a “points system” that rewards education and skills, unlike the U.S.’s system of prioritizing family reunification.

14 From this point forward, whenever I refer to “immigrants” I am referring to this estimated intercept and not “all immigrants” unless otherwise specified. This is done to obviate having to repeatedly refer to the “estimated score for young, male, uneducated, recently-arrived, visible minority immigrants who lack citizenship and financial security.”
An important point worth making here is my approach, emphasizing as it does the cross-country comparison of immigrant populations, differs from the growing body of work analyzing immigrant-mainstream gaps (e.g. Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007; Hooghe and Dinesen forthcoming). While it is true that gap analysis may in some sense better reflect the concept of “integration” with prevailing mainstream norms in a given country, there is real value in making a simpler, more direct comparison of immigrant attitudes that is not conditioned by or contingent on the mainstream. One advantage of this approach, above and beyond its greater simplicity, lies in estimation. Whereas most gap analysis focuses on interactions between, say, policy regimes and a dummy variable toggling immigrant status – it is easier to incorporate a fine-grained model of immigrant attitudes incorporating citizenship status, length of residence, and all the predictors in Table 2 into the models. While this is not impossible in gap-based research, these subtleties are far easier to observe using an immigrants-only approach. I do not wish to argue that my strategy is inherently superior however, as either choice involves tradeoffs and both are of substantial use toward understanding the policy questions posed in the literature.

Country-Level Analysis

Social Trust and Perceived Discrimination

Figure 7.1 examines the mean intercept values on both generalized trust and perceived discrimination in the merged ESS/CID sample, broken down by integration regime. In terms of the former measure, there are no substantial differences between three of the four regime types; however, immigrants in France (the only jus soli country that qualifies as “weakly” multicultural on these measures) trust “most people” substantially less. Stronger differences are visible on the perceived discrimination measure; namely, immigrants perceive less and less discrimination as the strength of political multiculturalism policies increase. Once again, French respondents appear to be the outlier, perceiving substantially more discrimination against them than immigrants in any other category.

Figures 7.2(a) and (b) plot country-level intercepts against total social expenditures. Interestingly, immigrants’ generalized trust appears to decrease and perceived discrimination appears to increase as a function of social welfare redistribution, which is the opposite of what was expected. That said, neither slope is particularly steep, and the spread around the line is substantial, indicating that there is most likely little to these relationships that is of real substance.

15 Following the analysis to this point, “Weak Sanguinis” countries include: Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Norway, and Portugal. France is the only “Weak Soli” country, and Belgium is the only “Moderate Sanguinis” country. “Moderate Soli” includes the U.K., the U.S., Sweden, and the Netherlands. Greece is excluded, as Lahav’s citizenship regime measure does not include it.
Figures 7.3(a) and (b) compare generalized trust intercepts between American, Australian, and Canadian immigrants; for reference, I also include mean scores for all immigrants and “visible minority” immigrants within each country. Figure 7.4 breaks down the concept of “generalized trust” even further, by looking at respondents’ expressed level of trust in “people of a different ethnicity” and “people of a different religion,” asked in the American CID and Canadian ESC surveys.

What emerges from this comparison is further support for the notion that political multiculturalism does not appear to negatively impact immigrants’ levels of social trust. While the lack of Canadian data for the 1995 Wave of the WVS is something of an irritant, in no case are either the mean or intercept scores lower in the “multicultural” countries than they are in the United States, and the intercept for Australian respondents is actually much higher. The same pattern is evident in the U.S./Canada comparisons. Non-citizens in Canada are more likely to trust “most people” (in terms of both overall mean and estimated intercept values) then the comparable group in the United States (Table 7.3b). Furthermore, Canadian immigrants actually trust people of a different or ethnicity and religion substantially more than American immigrants, though these differences disappear once socio-demographics are taken into account (Table 7.4).

**Political Interest and Participation**

Figure 7.5 maps intercept scores on interest in politics and political participation across integration policy regime in the ESS/CID sample. In terms of the former, immigrants in Moderate/Soli countries are much more engaged then those in Weak/Sanguinis countries, though scores on French (Weak/Soli) and Beligium (Moderate Sanguinis) would seem to indicate that this has nothing really to do with multiculturalism per se. Furthermore, what variation does exist does not translate to increased political participation, as the differences across regimes are only trivial. Figure 7.6, which plots these outcomes against social spending, tell essentially the same story; there does appear to be a weakly positive relationship between social spending and political interest, but there is no evident relationship when it comes to political behavior.

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16 Because the Social Capital Benchmark survey does not ask about nativity or duration of stay in the country, SCB/ESC comparisons are limited to non-citizen residents, and the individual-level model used for both excludes the “duration of stay” measure.
Notable differences do emerge, however, if we limit the focus to measures of interest and participation in the U.S., Canada, and Australia. Not only are intercepts on outcomes related to political interest (frequency of political discussion and newspaper readership) substantially higher in the latter two countries, regardless of whether the sample is “all immigrants” or “immigrant non-citizens” (Figures 7.7a and 7.7b). Furthermore, there do appear to be similar differences in terms of political behavior as well; according to Figure 7.8, political participation scores are higher by every metric—overall means, minority means, and estimated intercept—among immigrants to Canada and Australia than they are among immigrants to the U.S.\textsuperscript{17}

[Figures 7.7(a) and (b) and Figure 7.8 About Here]

\textit{Trust in and Satisfaction With the National Political System}

Figure 7.9 returns to the ESS/CID dataset and explores immigrants’ levels of trust in parliament and politicians by incorporation regime. And, indeed, political trust among immigrants is higher in the Moderate/Soli countries than it is anywhere else by a substantial margin, with the next-highest being the Belgian immigrants, who represent the lone Moderate/Sanguinis country. As on the measures of generalized trust and perceived discrimination, France stands out as the country with the least-trusting immigrant population, all else being equal. And, as on most of the other measures considered here, its relationship to country-level measures of social spending is essentially insignificant (Figure 7.10). Finally, data from Canada and the United States (Figure 7.11) on resident non-citizens also appears to paint a complementary picture to multiculturalism: both in terms of means and estimated intercepts, political trust scores are substantially higher in the former country than in the latter.

[Figures 7.9-7.11 About Here]

Differences based on incorporation regime become even more stark when considering the extent to which immigrants feel that politicians care about people like them, or their overall level of satisfaction with the national government (Figure 7.12). What emerges in the case of the former is that immigrants feel that “politicians care” substantially more in “moderately” multicultural countries than they do in “weak” ones, this emphatically does not appear to be the product of citizenship regime alone; French respondents are far more pessimistic about this than even immigrants in \textit{jus sanguinis} countries. The same general finding with respect to multiculturalism is apparent in terms of satisfaction with democracy as well, though French immigrants are far less of an

\textsuperscript{17} The WVS has a somewhat different approach to political participation than the ESS; for one thing, the political acts are different, and the only “traditional” political acts that in the WVS that are common to the ESS are “signing a petition” and “participating in a lawful demonstration/protest.” As a result, only those two variables are indexed for use here. The other difference is that instead of asking whether or not a respondent has done each in the past 12 months (ESS), the WVS asks whether one “has done” it, “might do” it, or “would never do” it.
“outlier” on this measure. Finally, these attitudes do not appear to be the product of the total level of social spending in these countries.

[Figures 7.12, 7.13(a) and (b) About Here]

Summary and Discussion

In order to empirically assess the policy debates from the perspective of immigrants themselves, this chapter examined their responses to numerous different questions across a wide variety of surveys cross-national surveys, and covering every country studied in previous chapters. I assessed the extent to which policy regimes shaped their political and social trust, their sense of perceived discrimination, and their engagement in the political system.

Given the wide scope of the analysis here, over-simplification is inevitable. For one thing, simply controlling for the individual-level indicators and observing country-level intercept values is a relatively limited way of putting all countries on an “equal footing” for comparative purposes. For one thing, there is the reliance on separating in respondents into “visible minority” rather than “majority” status. My argument here is that this distinction is both necessary and empirically useful in order to address the broadly-framed criticisms of multiculturalism in the literature. That said, an easy (and valid) objection is that not all “visible minorities” are treated equally; even controlling for other socio-demographics, there are likely to remain important distinctions between, say, Muslim immigrants in Tours, Chinese immigrants in Toronto, and Latino immigrants in Tampa. More generally, it is possible that the baseline individual-level model in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 is under-specified. For instance, many have argued that in addition to the variables included here, immigrant incorporation (in terms of the outcomes examined here) may also depend on other factors such as country of birth, or political socialization (e.g. Luttmer and Singhal 2008; Paskeviciute and Anderson 2007; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008).

In terms of policy, there are certainly distinctions elided here that are worth making. In terms of social welfare, for example, one might argue that the measures of overall spending employed here are too crude – namely, countries that redistribute wealth more or less equivalently (such as Canada, Australia, and the U.S.) may allow or restrict immigrants’ access to these programs along different lines. Unfortunately, few comprehensive measures presently exist that tap this across countries, but it does seem to be the case that, for example, Australia and Canada offer more of a “warm embrace” than the U.S. with respect to refugees and asylum seekers, but the differences are much less pronounced for permanent residents.18

18 Fix and Laglagron (2002) do so for 7 countries that are relevant here (8 total), but their data is difficult to compare from country to country. On policies where data are available for Australia, Canada and the U.S. (access to social assistance, rental assistance, public housing, health care, education grants, and job training), the U.S. scores the lowest of the three on measure that combines permanent residents, refugees, asylum seekers, and temporary workers. From a possible score of 0 (most restricted) to 2 (universal), the scores are 1.43, 1.36, and 1.14, respectively. On the other hand, if one only considers the rights accorded to
It is also true that while I examine a wide variety of social and political engagement variables, important pieces of the picture are missing from this account. For example, cross-national studies have demonstrated that immigrants in politically “multicultural” countries acquire majority language at lower levels and engage in less frequent social contact with the mainstream than those in more “assimilationist” countries (e.g. Ersanilli and Koopmans 2007). Other studies have argued that immigrants in “assimilationist” countries do better in terms of education and employment prospects (Koopmans 2010; Thränhardt 2000). It is difficult to address these issue directly here, since these dimensions are not well-tapped by the surveys employed. Even if they were, however, the more general possibility exists that only respondents who are more integrated to begin with (especially in terms of language) are taking time out of their day to participate in these surveys.  

Despite these reservations, the analyses presented here do provide a general sense that is favorable – from the immigrant’s perspective – to political multiculturalism. While the picture is sharper on some dimensions than others, what stands out above all is that the widespread notion that immigrants in countries that engage in policies of cultural recognition will be somehow less engaged in the political system appears to be unfounded. In fact, the reality appears to be more along the lines of what its proponents suggest: immigrants in multicultural countries score higher on a number of different dimensions (particularly perceived discrimination and measures associated with “democratic satisfaction” (political trust, politicians “caring,” and satisfaction with national government).  

What is more, the potentially confounding effects of citizenship regime and social spending do not appear to be driving these relationships. With respect to the former, the lowest scores on many of these measures (or highest, in the case of perceived discrimination) came from respondents in France, the only Weak/Soli country in the sample. Nor do overall levels of social spending appear to play much of a role on immigrant attitudes in any of these domains. In sum, then, whereas Chapter 6 demonstrated that multiculturalism is associated with narrowing radius of national identity (along more ascriptive lines) in the mainstream, its effects on immigrants appear to be both positive and robust.

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permanent residents, Australia becomes the most restrictive country (respective scores are 1.29, 1.86, and 1.71).

19 It is not clear, however, that such a bias would necessarily differ from one country to the next, compromising cross-country comparisons. In other words, it seems reasonable to assume that better-integrated respondents (at least in terms of the socio-demographics examined here, plus language ability) will be over-represented in every country.

20 This finding (and the interpretation of it) also echoes more focused comparative work, e.g.: Bloemraad’s (2006) comparison of Vietnamese immigrants in the U.S. and Canada.
Table 7.1: Individual-Level Predictors of Immigrants’ Social Capital and Perceived Discrimination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social Trust</th>
<th>Perceived Discrimination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Minority</td>
<td>.01 (.01)</td>
<td>-.24** (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>-.01 (.01)</td>
<td>-.03** (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Residence</td>
<td>-.03* (.01)</td>
<td>-.06** (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.03** (.01)</td>
<td>-.05** (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>-.02** (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction With Finances</td>
<td>.09** (.01)</td>
<td>-.13** (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.06** (.01)</td>
<td>-.01 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clusters</td>
<td>17 (.01)</td>
<td>17 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>6,458</td>
<td>6,341</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p < .01 * p < .05 # p < .10. Coefficients estimated by random-intercepts multilevel models, with standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes only non-native born respondents. Dependent: “Generalized Trust” is a three-item index tapping respondents’ view that “most people can be trusted,” “most people try to be fair,” and “most people try to help others.” “Perceived discrimination” is scored “1” if the respondent claims that he/she is a member of a group that is discriminated against in country on the basis of either nationality, ethnicity, race, language, or religion and “0” otherwise. Independent: “Non-Minority” is a dummy indicating that the respondent does not claim to be a member of an ethnic minority in the country. “Citizenship” is a dummy indicating that R has citizenship in the host country. “Length of residence” is a four-category measure scored from 0 = within the last year to 1 = more than 20 years ago. Age and education 5- and 7-category measures scored from 0 = youngest/least educated to 1 = oldest/most educated. “Satisfaction With Household Finances” is a 4-category measure ranging from 0 = “very difficult on present income” to 1 = “living comfortably on present income.” Source: ESS 2002/US CID 2005 merged file.
Table 7.2: Individual-Level Predictors of Immigrants’ Political Interest, Participation, and Satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Interest</th>
<th>Traditional Participation Index</th>
<th>Trust in Parliament / Politicians</th>
<th>Politicians Care</th>
<th>Satisfaction With National Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Minority</td>
<td>.01 (.01)</td>
<td>.01 (01)</td>
<td>-.02** (.01)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>-.02** (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>.03** (.01)</td>
<td>.01* (.00)</td>
<td>.01 (.01)</td>
<td>.02* (.00)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Residence</td>
<td>.03* (.01)</td>
<td>.10** (.01)</td>
<td>-.07** (.01)</td>
<td>-.04* (.01)</td>
<td>-.12** (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.09** (.01)</td>
<td>-.02* (.00)</td>
<td>.02* (.01)</td>
<td>-.03# (.00)</td>
<td>.01 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.09** (.01)</td>
<td>-.01# (.00)</td>
<td>-.01* (.01)</td>
<td>-.01 (.01)</td>
<td>-.01# (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction With Finances</td>
<td>.07** (.01)</td>
<td>.00 (.01)</td>
<td>.05** (.01)</td>
<td>.09** (.01)</td>
<td>.08** (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.35** (.01)</td>
<td>.15** (.01)</td>
<td>.04** (.01)</td>
<td>.12** (.01)</td>
<td>-.04** (.01)</td>
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<td>6,029</td>
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<td>5,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clusters</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p < .01 * p < .05 # p < .10. Coefficients estimated by random-intercepts multilevel models, with standard errors in parentheses. The sample includes only non-native born respondents. “Political interest” is scored from 0 = “not at all interested” to 1 = “very interested,” and the “Traditional participation index” is a 6-item additive index – scored from 0 = least participatory to 1 = most participatory – comprising respondents’ having done the following over the past 12 months: contacted a politician, worked in a political party, worked in another political organization, wore a campaign badge or displayed a sticker, signed a petition, and taken part in a lawful demonstration/protest. “Politicians care” is scored from 0 = “hardly any politicians care” to 1 = “most politicians care.” “Trust in legal system…” measure is a two-item index comprising respondents’ trust of the relevant targets, scored from 0 = no trust to 1 = complete trust. “Satisfaction” measure is scored from 0 = extremely dissatisfied to 1 = extremely satisfied. Independent variables are scored as in Table 7.1. Source: ESS 2002/US CID merged file.
Figure 7.1: Incorporation Regime and Immigrants’ Generalized Trust/Perceived Discrimination

Notes: Sample includes only foreign-born respondents. Bars represent mean intercept value – when the full model in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 is estimated – within each regime type. Dependent variables are scored as in Table 7.1. “Weak Sanguinis” countries include: Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Norway, and Portugal. France is the only “Weak Soli” country, and Belgium is the only “Moderate Sanguinis” country. “Moderate Soli” includes the U.K., the U.S., Sweden, and the Netherlands. Greece is excluded, as Lahav’s citizenship regime measure does not include it. Source: ESS 3-Wave Cumulative/CID 2005 survey.
Figure 7.2(a) and (b): Social Spending and Immigrants’ Generalized Trust/Perceived Discrimination

Notes: Points represent intercept values for each country based on the individual-level model specified in Table 7.1. The coding for both dependent variables is identical to Table 7.1. Source for survey data: ESS 3-Wave Cumulative/CID 2005 survey.
Figure 7.3(a) and (b): Generalized Trust, By Country and Immigrant Category

A. World Values Survey

- United States (1995):
  - All Immigrants (Mean): 0.32
  - Minority Immigrants (Mean): 0.27
  - Intercept: 0.08

- Australia (1995):
  - All Immigrants (Mean): 0.43
  - Minority Immigrants (Mean): 0.42
  - Intercept: 0.20

- Canada (2006):
  - All Immigrants (Mean): 0.43
  - Minority Immigrants (Mean): 0.41
  - Intercept: 0.07

B. SCBS and ECS Surveys

- United States (2000):
  - Minority Mon-Citizen (Mean): 0.22
  - Intercept: 0.10

- Canada (2003):
  - Minority Mon-Citizen (Mean): 0.53
  - Intercept: 0.15

Notes: “Intercept” is estimated by an OLS model – for each country – on samples that include only non-citizen immigrants identifying as non-white minority members. The model in (b) does not include “duration of residence,” since this is unavailable in the Social Capital Benchmark Survey. The SCBS also does not include subject assessments of household income, so a measure of reported income is used instead for both countries. The dependent variable is the standard dichotomous generalized trust item, scored 0 = “can’t be too careful” and 1 = “most people can be trusted.” Source: (a) Merged 5-Wave WVS, (b) Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000 (U.S.), Equality, Security, Community Survey 2003 (Canada).
Figure 7.4: Trust in People of Other Ethnicity/Religion, By Immigrant Category

Notes: “Intercept” is estimated by an OLS model – for each country – on samples that include all immigrants. For model specification see Figure 7.9 Notes. The dependent variables are respondents’ level of trust in people of different “ethnicity” (in the ESC survey)/ “race” (in the CID survey), and trust in people “of a different religion.” Both are scored from 0 = “lowest” to 1 = “highest,” though the response options are different. In the CID, respondents are allowed five options ranging from “cannot be trusted” to “can be trusted,” whereas the ESC items run from “a lot” to “none at all.” Source: Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy Survey 2005 (U.S.), Equality, Security, Community Survey 2003 (Canada).
Figure 7.5: Incorporation Regime and Immigrants’ Political Interest/Participation

Notes: Sample includes only foreign-born respondents. Bars represent mean intercept value – when the full model in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 is estimated – within each regime type. Dependent variables are scored as in Table 7.1. See Figure 7.1 for country categorizations. Source: ESS 3-Wave Cumulative/CID 2005 survey.
Figure 7.6: Social Spending and Immigrants’ Political Interest/Participation

A. Interest in Politics

B. Political Participation

Notes: Points represent intercept values for each country based on the individual-level model specified in Table 7.2. The coding for both dependent variables is identical to Table 7.2. Source: ESS 3-Wave Cumulative/CID 2005 survey.
Figure 7.7(a) and (b): Immigrants’ Political Interest

**A. Frequency of Political Discussion**

- **United States (1995)**
  - All Immigrants (Mean): 0.43
  - Minority Immigrants (Mean): 0.40
  - Intercept: 0.15

- **Australia (1995)**
  - All Immigrants (Mean): 0.44
  - Minority Immigrants (Mean): 0.44
  - Intercept: 0.19

- **Canada (2006)**
  - All Immigrants (Mean): 0.40
  - Minority Immigrants (Mean): 0.36
  - Intercept: 0.40

**B. Frequency of Newspaper Reading**

  - Minority Non-Citizen (Mean): 0.17
  - Intercept: 0.14

- **Canada (2003)**
  - Minority Non-Citizen (Mean): 0.51
  - Intercept: 0.56

Notes: “ Intercept” is estimated by an OLS model – for each country – on samples that include all immigrants (a) or non-citizen minorities (b). For model specification see notes to Figures 7.3(a) and (b). For (a), the dependent variable is how often R engages in political discussion, scored from 0 = “never” to 1 = “frequently.” For (b), it is the number of days per week that the respondent reads a newspaper, scored 0 = 0 days to 1 = 7 days. Data for (a) from merged 5-Wave WVS, data for (b) from the SCBS 2000, ESC 2003.
Figure 7.8: Immigrants’ Political Participation

Notes: “Intercept” is estimated by an OLS model – for each country – on samples that include all immigrants. For model specification see Figure 7.4. The dependent variables is a two-item political participation index, including signing petitions and participating in lawful demonstrations/protest, scored 0 = least to 1 = most active. Source: Merged 5-Wave WVS.
Figure 7.9: Incorporation Regime and Immigrants’ Political Trust

Notes: Sample includes only foreign-born respondents. Bars represent mean intercept value – when the full model in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 is estimated – within each regime type. Dependent variables are scored as in Table 7.1. See Figure 7.1 for country categorizations. Source: ESS 3-Wave Cumulative/CID 2005 survey.
Figure 7.10: Social Spending and Political Trust

Notes: Points represent intercept values for each country based on the individual-level model specified in Table 7.1. The coding for both dependent variables is identical to Table 7.1. Source: ESS 3-Wave Cumulative/CID 2005 survey.
Figure 7.11: Immigrants’ Political Trust

Notes: “Intercept” is estimated by an OLS model – for each country – on samples that include only non-citizen immigrants identifying as non-white minority members. The model does not include “duration of residence,” since this is unavailable in the Social Capital Benchmark Survey. The SCBS also does not include subject assessments of household income, so a measure of reported income is used instead for both countries. The dependent variable is respondents’ opinion on how often the national government will “do what is right,” scored from 0 = “hardly ever” to 1 = “just about always”; Source: SCBS 2000, ESC 2003.
Figure 7.12: Incorporation Regime and Immigrants’ Democratic Satisfaction

Notes: Sample includes only foreign-born respondents. Bars represent mean intercept value – when the full model in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 is estimated – within each regime type. Dependent variables are scored as in Table 7.1. See Figure 7.1 for country categorizations. Source: ESS 3-Wave Cumulative/CID 2005 survey.
Figure 7.13(a) and (b): Social Spending and Immigrants’ Democratic Satisfaction

A. Politicians Care

B. Satisfaction With National Government

Notes: Points represent intercept values for each country based on the individual-level model specified in Table 7.1. The coding for both dependent variables is identical to Table 7.1. Source: ESS 3-Wave Cumulative/CID 2005 survey.
Chapter 8: Conclusions

The present work addresses questions that are of fundamental importance to democratic governance in nations that are becoming increasingly diverse through immigration: what are the linkages between normative conceptions of national identity and mass preferences on immigration, immigrants, and diversity more generally? How are they shaped by increases in immigrant-driven diversity and, relatedly, government policies aimed at promoting and preserving it? Do such policies undermine or enhance immigrants’ allegiance to the nation and fellow nationals, their engagement and faith in the political system, and their social integration into their new society?

Drawing upon well-established philosophical arguments and social-scientific theories of group relations, and building on a growing empirical literature, the present study speaks to these question in novel and, one hopes, persuasive ways. From the standpoint of mainstream response, it builds new measures that meaningfully capture the specific criteria demarcating exclusion from the national community, tests these measures against rigorous and detailed measures of immigrant diversity and policy, and, analyzes the hypothesized dynamics both cross-sectionally and over time. From the immigrants’ perspective, it examines the effect of policy regimes on a series of measures related to both social and political integration, using a variety of national and cross-national surveys.

It should be acknowledged once again that while the findings presented herein are based on analyses of virtually every developed, immigrant-receiving society in the world, from a methodological standpoint the “samples” employed are non-random at the context-level. As a result, I have sought throughout to complement multi-level regression estimates with two-step visualization techniques (Bowers and Drake 2005). I have also presented estimates based on both individual- and aggregate-level models, and supplemented cross-sectional analyses with over-time survey data wherever this is possible. This diversity of analytic approaches, and the remarkable extent to which they converge in regards to the common themes discussed throughout, should provide some reassurance that the results presented here are not merely artifactual.

Summarizing and Interpretation: Macro-Economics and Diversity

In terms of mainstream reactions to immigrant diversity and policies of cultural recognition, the analyses in this work suggest the following: first, ascriptive definitions of the national community are strongly linked to the desire to reduce immigration and limit the citizenship rights of immigrants and refugees, the notion that cultural conformity is preferable to cultural pluralism, and ethnic prejudice. Second, these conceptions are powerfully shaped by individual-level perceptions; both how individuals perceive the size and growth of the immigrant population, as well as the extent to which they find immigration threatening are powerful predictors of narrower, more ascriptively-bounded definitions of nationhood. On the other hand, positive social contact with immigrants has the opposite effect.

At the context-level, this analysis failed to turn up any evidence that either measure of normative national was in any way linked with economic indicators. While
my focus here was on the national unemployment rate, measures of GDP/capita do not perform any differently in this respect.¹ This is not to say that arguments based on economic interests find no support here, as “ascriptivity” appears to be powerfully related to a perceived sense of economic threat, as well as socio-demographic characteristics in that general area (such as education level). Rather, to the extent that economic considerations matter, it does not appear to be objective indicators of macro-economic prosperity that are driving these relationships.

Analysis of the ESS also failed to find much in the way of a relationship between context-level measures of fractionalization and immigrant diversity, on the one hand, and ascriptivity on the other, in agreement with research on generalized trust using the same measures (Hooghe et al 2009). That said, quite strong relationships appeared when the focus shifted to normative definitions of the “true national” rather than qualifications for immigration. For one thing, the extent to which countries’ immigrant population is growing in the short-term appears to be consistently associated with more ascriptive definitions of nationhood, a result that was evident from both the 2003 cross-section, as well as the individual- and aggregate-level analyses spanning 1995-2003. What is more, the same adverse reaction also appears to have occurred in countries that were highly diverse to begin with, net of diversity growth in the interim. In short, then, the story in Chapter 4 was largely in support of the idea that immigrant diversity has negative consequences in terms of the “scope” of the markers mainstream citizens use to demarcate fellow co-nationals from “outsiders.”

Given that the links between these outcomes and other measures tapping ethnocentrism and xenophobia, such as the preference for decreased immigration levels, tighter citizenship laws, and cultural homogeneity rather than pluralism, this is by itself a sobering finding. It is also true, however, that the central tendency in most of these countries is still heavily in favor of achievable over ascribed criteria, and, as the over-time analyses showed, normative conceptions of national identity appear to be quite “sticky” over time. This indicates that the trends demonstrated are both meaningful important, but also that the erosion of “inclusive” definitions of nationality is by no means a quick or cataclysmic development.

**Summarizing and Interpretation: The Role of Policy**

*Multiculturalism*

The analysis in Chapters 6 and 7 also underscore the fact that government policy in these domains matters. With respect to the role of multiculturalism on mainstream attitudes, substantially different conclusions arise whether we consider the hypothesized relationships by looking at them only cross-sectionally, or whether we incorporate an over-time dimension. In the former sense, the findings here (based on the 2002/2003 ESS and 2003 ISSP) largely agree that with previous empirical analyses suggesting that multiculturalism does not encourage ethnocentrism (Crepaz 2008; Weldon 2006). Once empirical analyses attempt to control for the confounding nature of citizenship regime,

¹ These were excluded to save space, but are available upon request.
multiculturalism does not appear to have a *positive* effect either, but this is hardly a strong indictment of it. One might read these cross-sectional results, by themselves, as evidence in favor of Kymlicka’s proposition that the “heavens will not fall” because of cultural recognition.

The same benign conclusions cannot be drawn once over-time trends are brought into the picture. What emerges there, clearly and consistently, is that mainstream respondents in the most diverse and politically multicultural countries became much more “ascriptive” in their definitions of the national community between 1995 and 2003 than did those in less-multicultural ones, whether or not the relationship is considered in isolation or together with the other regime-level characteristics examined here. What this means – at least in terms of the outcomes studied here – is that the ubiquitous critiques of multiculturalism as a catalyst to an ethnocentric backlash from mainstream populations and as an erosive force on the bases for social solidarity may have some teeth after all.

By contrast, the “effect” of multiculturalism from the perspective of immigrants themselves seems to be positive, at least in terms of the measures of trust, perceived discrimination, and political engagement studied here. These positive effects show up both in the large-n analysis based on ESS data as well as more limited comparisons between Canada, Australia, and the United States, and they do not appear to be solely the product of “compositional” differences from one country to the next. Across both types of analysis, higher levels of cultural recognition are associated with immigrants having greater interest in politics, espousing more trust in national government and politicians, and much stronger sense that politicians actually care about “people like them.” Results on political participation are more mixed, with no real differences emerging in the ESS analysis but substantial (and positive) differences emerging in the three-country comparison. Multiculturalism’s effect on various dimensions of social trust is both weak and inconsistent, but the very least there is no evidence here to suggest that it leads to immigrants trusting other people *less*.

Given all this, how we address the question of whether or not cultural recognition has “failed” depends largely on one’s point of view. Clearly, the trend towards ascriptivity in mainstream populations of politically multicultural countries apparent between 1995 and 2003 is evidence for this argument. That said, while the present analysis put forward the general hypothesis that political multiculturalism might increase the salience of ethnicity in society, this outcome does not appear to be an inevitable one. For example, an examination of estimates based on the 1995 ISSP cross-section (Table 6.3) actually demonstrates a *negative* (and significant) relationship between multiculturalism and ascriptivity, even when examined in an “all else equal” framework that controls for citizenship regime, social spending, *de facto* diversity measures, and individual-level predictors. This suggests that the negative over-time effects demonstrated here with respect to multiculturalism need to be qualified, and may be conditional on events that occurred between 1995 and 2003 (an issue I return to below).

From the perspective of the immigrants themselves, the widespread notion among political elites that the multiculturalism project has been a failure, recently echoed in
academic debates on the subject,\(^2\) does not find support in the present analysis, and, if anything, the reverse appears to be the case. Of course, it is impossible to summarily reject these arguments, given that most of this literature emphasizes the failure of immigrants to assimilate linguistically and economically, and largely ignore the attitudinal measures of social trust and political engagement that I examine here.

*Citizenship Policy and Social Welfare Redistribution*

In terms of mainstream attitudes on the outcomes studied here, the “effects” of a *jus soli* citizenship regime and social welfare redistribution seem to be unambiguously positive, and this appears to be the case whether they are considered individually or together with other policy variables, and cross-sectionally or over time. Put another way, citizens living in *jus soli* countries tend to prioritize “achievable” markers of the “true national” – such as respect for institutions and laws and “feeling” like a national over nativity and ancestry – more than those living in *jus sanguinis* ones, and this relationship (all else being equal) has actually become stronger over time.

The same can be said about social welfare redistribution; higher levels of spending are associated with much more “inclusive” definitions of the national community, either alone or “all else equal,” and this relationship too actually grows between 1995 and 2003. This generally supports the growing body of empirical work suggesting that social welfare acts as a buffer against the economic threats posed by influxes of new immigrants (e.g. Crepaz 2008), and is inconsistent with the idea that ethnocentrism will increase in response to immigrants “leeching” off of more universal benefits.

With respect to overall social spending, few relationships were evident in terms of the attitudes and engagement of immigrants. However, interesting findings did emerge with respect to the role of citizenship regimes; namely, from the analyses in Chapter 7 it appears that *jus soli* citizenship in the absence of cultural recognition may actually hurt immigrant incorporation more than it helps. For instance, immigrants to France – the only country in the analysis that is both clearly *jus soli* and lacks multiculturalism – score substantially lower on social trust, political trust, and the sense that “politicians care,” and much higher in terms of perceived discrimination, than immigrants to countries in any other citizenship category. Even more remarkably, this difference is evident when French immigrants are compared to those in *jus sanguinis* countries as well as other *jus soli* ones. While it would be imprudent to make broad generalizations on the basis of a single case, the evidence here certainly suggests that merely having a *jus soli* citizenship regime alone is not sufficient to guarantee a more trusting and engaged immigrant population.

*Further Research*

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\(^2\) See, e.g.: Entzinger (2003, 2006); Ersanilli and Koopmans (2007); Joppke (2004); Joppke and Morawska (2003); Koopmans (2010); Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007); Thränhardt (2000).
As noted throughout, the analyses here were carried out to address a set of fundamental questions about diversity and policy in an empirical, cross-national setting. While the findings I present provide interesting “broad-strokes” answers to these questions, a great deal of further research is needed before we can truly appreciate all of the dynamics at work in a more nuanced way. In closing, I suggest six ways in which the findings presented here can be refined, improved and extended.

For one thing, the strong links between ascriptive definitions of identity and other outcomes related to xenophobia, prejudice, and the preference for cultural monoism rather than pluralism, indicate that the measures developed here are certainly worth studying in their own right. That said, their relationship to measures of social capital (and indeed the more nebulous notions of “social solidarity” and “social cohesion” prevalent in the diversity literature) are not altogether clear. The assumption underlying the present work is that more “ascribed” definitions of nationality indicate that respondents feel less of a social bond with those members of the national community who do not share the country’s ancestry, have not lived in the country for most of their lives, are not Christian, and are not white. In other words, it seems reasonable to assume that an ascriptive definition of membership in the national community – as defined and measured here – serves as a barrier to the formation of social bonds that would indicate social solidarity across a diverse society. Thus, while the relative priority of ascribed versus achievable criteria may not say anything directly about how cohesive a society is, it does tell us something about how cohesive it is likely to be or can potentially be.

It is not necessarily the case, however, that those who prioritize “achievable” characteristics in relative terms feel more of a bond with immigrants of diverse origins. If the findings presented here are to address more fully the broader issue of social cohesion that is the focus of much of the diversity literature, more work is needed toward linking public opinion about the normative boundaries of nationalism and social capital. Are individuals who think of their nation in ascriptive terms less likely to “trust others”? Are they less civically engaged, and are their patterns of associational memberships and social networks of the “bonding” rather than “bridging” variety? And, in the event that there is a relationship between ascriptive nationalism and social capital, which is the “cause” and which is the “effect”?

A second broad question for future research to address is how the dynamics studied here shape not just national identity but the interface between it and ethnic ties, especially among minority group members. After all, one of the key challenges raised by multiculturalism’s critics is that it encourages immigrants to prioritize their ethnic ties over loyalties – such as the nation – that putatively transcend them. Assessing minority immigrants’ political engagement, as I have done here, is one way of looking at this. However, the present analyses provide no direct answer to the question of whether – when push comes to shove – immigrants care more about their ethnic identity in a multicultural setting than they do living in more assimilationist regimes. In other words, are immigrants in more diverse societies more likely to identify with their ethnicity than their nation? Does political multiculturalism encourage this, as many suggest that it should? And, most importantly, does it really matter if they do?
Answering these questions requires moving beyond consideration of national identity alone, and appreciating more explicitly the interplay between this and ethnic ties. While there has been work on how multiple categorizations effect the perception of both in-group members (Crisp and Hewstone 1998; Urban and Miller 1992) and “outsiders” (Stangor et al 1992), what is still missing is in-depth research on how identity choice influences individuals’ self-categorization, and, in turn, when and how this goes on to shape important political attitudes and behaviors. A useful framework for thinking about this issue is offered by Roccas and Brewer (2003), who draw upon a classic typology of strategies for dealing with cognitive dissonance (e.g. Abelson 1959; Kelman and Baron 1968). They argue that when faced with a choice between multiple identities individuals can choose among different “strategies,” all essentially aimed at reducing a potentially complex social situation to a simpler in-group/out-group dimension. The choices people make in this regard have powerful implications for how they evaluate other groups in society, their willingness to tolerate cultural pluralism, and, presumably, a whole host of other politically relevant attitudes.\(^3\)

A third area worthy of further study involves extending the arguments presented here to both higher and lower levels of analysis, as many in the literature have argued that a focus on the nation-state is problematic. This objection is made most strenuously with respect to arguments about the relationship between de facto diversity levels and outcomes related to social capital and solidarity. Putnam and his associates, for example, have criticized the assumptions made by others claiming to “replicate” their community-level analysis at the country-level, since nation-wide diversity is too “noisy” a measure to be of much use (Sander 2008).\(^4\) A related concern from this perspective is that country-level comparisons may be misleading, when “gateway cities” in Canada, the U.S., or Europe may resemble each other far more than overall national differences would indicate (e.g. Bloemraad 2010: 5).

The potential importance of this issue is not limited to questions about the influence of diversity per se; indeed, a strong argument exists that we need to observe these dynamics with the role of both supra- and sub-national political actors in mind. In the former case, many argue that the role of transnational actors is growing in terms of policy-making in this area.\(^5\) At the same time, others focus more closely on policy-making in cities and states, who are likely to play an especially strong role within nations that accord them (through, say, federalism), some autonomy in these matters.\(^6\) What is

\(^3\) Citrin and Sides (2004) assess this issue in the context of “National” versus “European” identities. Other work that assess similar questions about identity choice in a multicultural context include: Berry (1990); Birman (1994); Citrin and Sears (2009); LaFramboise et al (1993); Oyserman et al (1998); Phinney and Devich-Navarro (1997); Sussman (2000).

\(^4\) While this is certainly an important issue when looking at country-level cross-sections, it is less clear that the concern is as warranted when examining country level changes over time.

\(^5\) One example of this, raised by Givens (2007), is the “Racial Equality Directive” passed by the E.U. in 2000, largely in response to the electoral success of the extreme-right FPO in Austria.

\(^6\) For example, Hero and Preuh’s analysis of the American case (2006) reveals that the genesis of “assimilationist” political responses to diversity (such as official language laws) lies at the state-level. In the Canadian case, much of controversy over “reasonable accommodation” as occurred at the provincial rather than the national level, especially Ontario and Quebec.
more, the extent to which even national-level policies are actually carried out often depends more on local- and regional political actors than it does on the national government (Ireland 2004). While my contention here is that a focus on the national level does not necessarily compromise the findings demonstrated, further analysis at sub-national levels is certainly warranted, and it appears to be on the rise (e.g. Andrews et al 2008; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Jones-Correa 2001).

A fourth avenue for further research involves the continuing effort to refine extant measures of “immigrant diversity” by ethno-cultural and/or religious origin. From the standpoint of mainstream attitudes, most of the noteworthy results obtained here surfaced from the ISSP analysis, which employed rather crude measures derived from country-level estimates of the proportion of residents who are foreign-born. While interesting relationships did emerge along predicted lines, what is not directly evident is the extent to which de facto immigrant diversity should be characterized primarily as an economic threat, a cultural one, or both. And, on the immigrant side, analysis here is largely limited to the distinction between “visible” and “non-visible” immigrants. Largely, this has stemmed not from the notion that such distinctions are unimportant, but more from data limitations. In the former case, finer-grained measures of immigrant diversity that are directly comparable are extremely difficult to come by outside of Europe, and the surveys used to tap immigrant sentiment in the latter tend to include few enough respondents that further sub-division by ethnic group is a dicey proposition.

Nevertheless, the inability to do so leaves important questions either answered only indirectly or completely elided. Are Americans’ reactions to Latino immigrants comparable to anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe? Are Asians “model-minorities” distinct from Muslims and Latinos, not only in terms of social and political integration but also in how they are perceived by majority members? Relatedly, do “immigrant minorities” appear to be more engaged in Canada and Australia than in the U.S. precisely because most of them are Asian (e.g. Bloemraad 2010)? While it is possible to use “cruder” measures to address general questions about immigrant incorporation in a valuable way, without better measures of immigrant diversity, and without more surveys that oversample immigrant minorities and are directly comparable cross-nationally, these questions are difficult to address directly.

A fifth area very much in need of further research is the mediating link between immigrant diversity, policies of cultural recognition, the increased ethnocentrism with respect to mainstream normative conceptions of national identity. On the one hand, the present study demonstrates that “ascriptivity” increased between 1995 and 2003 more sharply in countries that were already highly diverse, and devoted the most strongly to multiculturalism. On the other, however, both de facto immigrant diversity and political multiculturalism appear to have been linked to more inclusive mass-level definitions of the nation as early as 1995. This presents something of a puzzle: if multiculturalism is “bad” for an inclusionary sense of national identity in the mainstream, then why was this not apparent before?

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7 See also: Kesler and Bloemraad (forthcoming) on this issue.
One possibility is that the 8-year period examined here is part of a much longer secular trend in this direction that began long before the earliest period under consideration here, and will only continue as long as these policies (and the ideology that undergirds them) remain prevalent. It is also possible, however, that there is nothing inherent about immigrant diversity or multiculturalism that produces this outcome. Rather, as some analysts phrase it, they may serve as “predisposing factors,” only producing an ethnocentric reaction when combined with “situational triggers” (Sniderman et al 2004). The list of suspects for such triggers is numerous: the 1995-2003 period witnessed the 9/11 attacks, the electoral apogee of anti-immigrant political parties in Europe, and an increasing hostility toward multiculturalism in many of the countries that had adopted in most strongly (e.g. Joppke 2004). The extent and tone of media coverage almost certainly play a role, and a recent Canadian study has shown that coverage on issues related to “reasonable accommodation” for immigrants tend to frame the issue in a negative light, fuelling a more general perspective that the conflict had attained “crisis-like” proportions (Giasson et al 2009). Whether or not this is true in other countries has not been studied systematically, but there seems no reason to suspect that suggests that the Canadian media are exceptional in this regard; indeed, some have suggested that – given the general tendency in favor of sensationalism and negative news – media coverage elsewhere is likely to be similar (Harell and Stolle 2010).

Regardless of the specific causal process involved, and indeed whether or not multiculturalism actually benefits immigrants, political elites in most of the countries under study here have “voted with their feet” on the issue, abandoning their ideological defense of cultural pluralism and re-affirming immigrant assimilation and integration. Thus, a sixth topic of future research concerns both the extent to which the specific policies addressed here will disappear, and whether or not this new emphasis on integration will reverse the trends observed with respect to mainstream public opinion on national identity. On the former question, Banting et al have suggested as recently as 2006 that many of the policies observed in constructing their measures have remained intact despite this ideological sea-change (2006; see also: Kraus and Schönwälder 2006; Miller 2006), though how long this remains true is an open question. On the latter, only time will tell if the re-emphasis of national values and integration will pay dividends in terms of both immigrant assimilation and mainstream attitudes about who belongs to the national community.
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Appendices

Appendix to Chapter 2

*Variable Wording and Coding: European Social Survey*

**Immigration Qualifications**

“Please tell me how important you think each of these things should be in deciding whether someone born, brought up and living outside [country] should be able to come and live here. Firstly, how important should it be for them to….” (0-10 scale for each)

- come from a Christian background? (ASCRIBED)
- be white? (ASCRIBED)
- have good educational qualifications? (ACQUIRED)
- be able to speak [country’s] official language[s]? (ACQUIRED)
- have work skills that the country needs? (ACQUIRED)

To build each dependent variable, I take the respondents score (re-scaled from 0 = extremely unimportant to 1 = extremely important) and subtract his/her mean score on the items in the opposing category. The resulting measure is scored from -1 = trait is extremely important, mean importance of other categories is extremely important to +1 = trait is extremely important, mean importance of other category is zero.

**Related Attitudes**

**Controlling the Borders**

1. “To what extent do you think [country] should allow […] to come and live here?”
   (“allow many to come and live here,” “allow some,” “allow a few,” and “allow none.”)
   - “people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people”
   - “How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?”
   - “people from the richer countries in Europe to come and live here?”
   - “people from the poorer countries in Europe?”
   - “people from the richer countries outside Europe to come and live here?”
   - “people from the poorer countries outside Europe?”

Responses to the six items were indexed, and re-scored from 0 = most pro-immigration to 1 = most anti-immigration.

2. “If a country wants to reduce tension, it should stop immigration.” (Agree/Disagree)

Recoded from 0 = disagree strongly to 1 = agree strongly
Immigrants Rights

1. “People who have come to live here should be given the same rights as everyone else” (Agree/Disagree)

Cultural Pluralism

1. “It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions” (Agree/Disagree)

Re-scored from 0 = disagree strongly to 1 = disagree strongly

2. “It is better for a country if there are a variety of different religions” (Agree/Disagree)

Re-scored from 0 = agree strongly to 1 = disagree strongly

Prejudice and Discrimination

1. “How good or bad are each of these things for a country?” (11-point scales scored from 0 = “extremely bad” to 10 = “extremely good”
   - “A law against racial or ethnic discrimination in the workplace”
   - “A law against promoting racial or ethnic hatred”

Both are indexed together and re-scored from 0 = extremely good to 1 = extremely bad.

2. “Now thinking again of people who have come to live in [country] from another country who are of the [same race or ethnic group as most [country] people/different race or ethnic group as most [country] people], how much would you mind or not mind if someone like this…. (11-point scales scored from 0 = “not mind at all” to 10 = “mind a lot”)
   - “was appointed as your boss?”
   - “married a close relative of yours?”

The four items are indexed together, and re-scored from 0=least prejudiced against immigrants to 1 = most prejudiced against immigrants
“True” National Measures

“Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is…” (“very important,” “fairly important,” “not very important,” “not important at all”)
- “to have been born in [country]” (ASCRIBED)
- “to have [country] ancestry” (2003 Only, ASCRIBED)
- “to respect [country nationality] political institutions and laws” (ACQUIRED)
- “to feel [country nationality]” (ACQUIRED)

To build each dependent variable, I take the respondents score (re-scaled from 0 = extremely unimportant to 1 = extremely important) and subtract his/her mean score on the items in the opposing category. The resulting measure is scored from -1 = trait is extremely important, mean importance of other categories is extremely important to +1 = trait is extremely important, mean importance of other category is zero.

Related Variables

Controlling the Borders

1. “Do you think the number of immigrants coming to [country] nowadays should be…” (5-category, from “increased a lot” to “reduced a lot”)

Re-scored from 0 = increased a lot to 1 = reduced a lot

2. “[Country] should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants?” (Agree/disagree)

Re-scored from 0 = disagree strongly to 1 = agree strongly

Immigrants’ Rights

1. “Government spends too much money assisting immigrants.” (agree/disagree)

Re-scored from 0 = disagree strongly to 1 = agree strongly

1. “How much do you agree or disagree that refugees who have suffered political repression in their own country should be allowed to stay in (R’s country)?”

Re-scored from 0 = agree strongly to 1 = disagree strongly
Cultural Pluralism

1. “It is impossible for people who do not share [country’] customs and traditions to become fully [country’s nationality].” (Agree/disagree)

Re-scored from 0 = disagree strongly to 1 = agree strongly

2. “Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions.” (Agree/disagree)

Re-scored from 0 = agree strongly to 1 = disagree strongly

3. “Some people say that it is better for a country if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say that it is better if these groups adapt and blend into the larger society. Which of these views comes closer to your own?”

Re-scored 0 = maintain, 1 = blend.
Further Discussion of the Ascribed v. Acquired Measurement Strategy

1. Does it Obfuscate “Absolute” Differences in Important Ways?

One potential concern with these measures’ construction elided in the main text is that respondents with similar relativized scores may assign quite different levels of importance to these criteria in absolute terms. To take an extreme example, a person who thinks that all criteria are “very important” will have scores of “0” on all items, as would another who thinks that they are all “not at all important.” Certainly, these two individuals have very different views on what constitutes their nation, despite being scored equivalently on the relativized measures.

That being said, there is little reason to believe that one of these individuals will be more “ascriptive” in their conception of the national community than the other; it is still reasonable to assume that both of these individuals conceive of their nation more “ascriptively” than someone who considers ascribed criteria to be less important than acquired ones, and less “ascriptively” than someone who thinks that ascribed criteria are more important than acquired ones. In other words, relativization in the manner described necessarily throws away interesting information about respondents’ conceptions of national identity, but it does not do so in a way that seriously undermines an attempt to explore how the balance between ascribed and acquired criteria changes in the face of diversity.

2. Can One Become More “Ascriptive” On These Measures in Counter-Intuitive Ways?

Another possible concern pertains to whether or not we are considering potential changes in these measures correctly. A stylized model of dynamic change should illustrate the point. The relativized ascribed item scores will increase if: (a) the importance of ascribed factors goes up and that of the acquired ones stays the same, or; (b) the importance of acquired ones decreases and that of the ascribed items remains constant. They will decrease, if: (c) the importance of the ascribed factors decreases, with acquired factors remaining constant, or; (d) the importance of acquired items increases, while the importance of ascribed items remains constant. In examples (a)-(c), the interpretation is straightforward, and it is a relatively safe assumption that the measures capture what we want them to; increased scores on the ascribed items produced by (a) or (b) would “correctly” indicate that she has become more “ascriptive” in her definition of the national community, whereas decreased scores through (c) would indicate that she has become less so. The interpretation of (d) is somewhat more problematic, however: is it fair to assume that she has become less “ascriptive,” when the importance of ascribed factors has not decreased in absolute terms?

Without panel data it is impossible to know how often (d) happens in practice, but a look at the marginals on both the importance of acquired and ascribed items indicates that it is, if not impossible, at least unlikely. For example, in the 2003 pooled ISSP sample the proportion of respondents claiming that the acquired criteria are at least
“somewhat important” range from 87%-92% depending on the item, and the corresponding values on the ascribed items are much lower (56% for ancestry, 70% for being born in the country). What is more, 88% of respondents score more highly on an additive index of the acquired criteria than they do on an additive index of the ascribed ones. Both of these patterns are consistent across individual countries as well as the pooled sample. The same general pattern exists in 1995 as well as 2003. They are also evident in the ESS measures of immigration qualifications. Tables were excluded to save space, but are available upon request.

The overall picture, then, seems to indicate that the importance of the acquired criteria is more or less consensual, and the importance of ascribed criteria is somewhat less so. As a result, it is reasonable to assume that – to the extent that scores on the relativized ascribed measures decrease – it is far more likely to be a result of process (c) than process (d).

3. Issues With Classification as Ascribed or Acquired

This method of relativization implicitly assumes that the items are appropriately classified as either “ascribed” or “acquired,” the reason being that the mean score which is subtracted from the individual item score should, if accurate, contain all relevant factors in that category. This is a valid criticism, but I do not view it as being terribly damaging to the main idea. Had I decided to include measures that were more ambiguous on the “ascribed/acquired” distinction (either theoretically or in terms of the exploratory factor analyses shown), this could certainly have become an issue. With a stripped-down set of measures, however, it is less likely to compromise the analysis.

That said, a simple way to address this criticism would be to relativize based on the respondent’s mean score on all the items – in effect, a brute force method of removing any trace of positivity bias. Taking ancestry, for example, this would entail subtracting the mean importance of all items (including ancestry itself) from its expressed importance; instead of asking how important ancestry is to a respondent compared to the set of “acquired” items, the issue becomes how important it is compared to the entire set of factors. This method has the advantage of not relying on assumptions about which item belongs where, since all of them are included in the mean subtracted from the item of interest. However, it muddies the picture by “subtracting out” variance from similar factors; in the case of ancestry, the importance of being born in the country (not to mention ancestry itself) will figure into the mean subtracted from the ancestry score.

This method was explored extensively over the course of the present work, and all of the results shown in the main text are verified using both methods in order to account

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1 Such as “wealth” or following the country’s “way of life” in the ESS, or “citizenship,” “language,” and “having lived in the country for most of one’s life” in the ISSP.
for the possibility that they are an artifact of measurement. Tables were excluded for space reasons, but are available upon request.
Appendix to Chapter 4

Independent Variable Wording and Coding (ESS)

Immigrant Threat

Immigrants’ Threat to National Culture

“Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?” (11-point scale, scored from “cultural life undermined” to “cultural life enriched”)

This variable is reversed coded and scored from 0 = enriched to 1 = undermined.

Immigrants’ Threat to the National Economy

1. “Average wages and salaries are generally brought down by people coming to live and work here” (agree/disagree)

2. “Would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help to create new jobs?” (11-point scale, scored from “take away jobs” to “create new jobs”)

3. “Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?” (11-point scale, scored from “generally take out more” to “generally put in more”)

4. Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?” (11-point scale, scored from “bad for the economy” to “good for the economy”)

The four items are all re-scored in an anti-immigrant direction, and indexed such that 0 = least perceived threat to the national economy and 1 = most perceived threat to the national economy.

Perceived Stocks and Flows of Immigrant Population

Perceived Stock

“Out of every 100 people living in [country], how many do you think were born outside [country]?”

This measure is re-scored from 0 = 0 to 1 = 100.
**Perceived Flows**

“How do you think the number of people leaving [country] nowadays compares to the number coming to live in [country]? (scored from “many more people leaving” to “many more people coming in”)

This measure is re-scored from 0 = many more people leaving to 1 = many more people coming in.

**Contact With Immigrants**

**Neighborhood Diversity**

“How would you describe the area where you currently live?” (response categories included “an area where almost nobody is of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people,” “some people are of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people,” and “many people are of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people,”

Responses are re-scored from 0 = almost nobody to 1 = many people.

**Positive Social Contact With Immigrants**

1. “Do you have any friends who have come to live in [country] from another country?” (response categories include “no, none at all,” “yes, a few,” and “yes, several”).

2. “Do you have any colleagues at work who have come to live in [country] from another country?” (response categories include “no, none at all,” “yes, a few,” and “yes, several”).

Responses to both are re-scored from 0 = no, none at all to 1 = yes, several and indexed together.

**Other Demographics**

*Parents Not Born in Country* is scored 1 if either parent was born outside the the country and 0 otherwise.

*Ethnic Minority* is scored 1 if respondent claims to be an ethnic minority member in the country, 0 otherwise.

*Age* is scored by category, 0 = 17-29, .33 = 30-39, .67 = 40-54, and 1 = 55+

*Education* is an 8-category variable, standardized across countries, re-scored from 0 = “not completed primary education” to 1 = “second stage of tertiary education.”
Female is coded 1 if respondent is female, 0 if respondent is male.

Religiosity is a 3-item index, scored from 0 = least religious to 1 = most religious, comprising the following:

“Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?” (11-point scale scored from “not at all religious to” to “very religious”)

“Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays?” (scored from “every day” to “never”)

“Apart from when you are at religious services, how often, if at all, do you pray?” (scored from “every day” to “never”)

Unemployed is scored 1 if the respondent, over the past 7 days, claimed to be either “unemployed and actively looking for a job” or “unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job” and 0 otherwise.

Ideology is tapped by an 11-point scale, which is re-scored here from 0 = left to 1 = right.

Independent Variable Wording and Coding (ISSP)

Immigrant Threat

Immigrants’ Threat to National Culture

“Immigrants improve [country nationality] society by bringing in new ideas and cultures” (agree/disagree)

Re-scored from 0 = agree strongly to 1 = disagree strongly

Immigrants’ Threat to National Economy

1. “Immigrants are generally good for [country’s] economy” (agree/disagree)
2. “Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [country]” (agree/disagree)

The second item is reverse-coded, and both are indexed such that 0 = least economic threat to 1 = most economic threat.

Immigrant Contact

Urban/Rural Living Area
Respondents in the ISSP are allowed to choose from the following: “urban,” “suburb, city, town,” “town or small city,” “country village,” “farm or home in the country.”

The variable is re-scored from $0 = \text{farm or home in the country}$ to $1 = \text{urban}$.

**Other Demographics**

*Ethnic Minority* is scored $1$ if respondent claims to be an ethnic minority member in the country, $0$ otherwise. Membership in a minority group is ascertained through the “ethnic origin” background variable rather than, as in the ESS case, a direct question.

*Parents Non-Citizens at Birth* is scored $1$ if *either* parent was born outside the the country and $0$ otherwise.

*Female* is coded $1$ if respondent is female, $0$ if respondent is male.

*Age* is scored by category, $0 = 17-29$, $.33 = 30-39$, $.67 = 40-54$, and $1 = 55+$

*Education* is simply the number of years of formal education, in its raw form (excluding missing data)

*Religiosity* is tapped by a single item assessing the frequency at which the respondent attends religious services, scored from “several times a week” to “never”

It is re-scored here from $0 = \text{never}$ to $1 = \text{several times a week}$.

*Unemployed* is scored $1$ if respondent claims to be so according to the ISSP work status variable, and $0$ otherwise.

*Ideology* is tapped by a 5-point scale, which is re-scored here from $0 = \text{far left}$ to $1 = \text{far right}$.
### OLS Models By Country

**Ascribed Immigrant Qualifications Index (ESS)**

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<th>Cultural Threat</th>
<th>AT</th>
<th>BE</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>DE</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>ES</th>
<th>FI</th>
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<th>UK</th>
<th>GR</th>
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*p<.05, # p<.10. Each column represents a separate OLS model, on country samples that exclude non-native born respondents. Data are weighted, and robust OLS standard errors are estimated. Source: ESS 2002/2003.*
Ascribed “True National” Index, OLS Models By Country (ISSP)

|                     | AU  | DE  | UK  | US  | AT  | IR  | NO  | SE  | NZ  | CA  | ES  | FR  | PO  | DK  | CH  | FI  |
|---------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Cultural Threat     | .20*| .24*| .31*| .18*| .40*| .05 | .22*| .21*| .27*| .05 | .02 | .19*| .10*| .25*| .26*| .21*|
| National Economy    | .37*| .16*| .16*| .28*| .18*| .20*| .35*| .42*| .15*| .41*| .00 | .30*| -.04| .17*| .14*| .41*|
| Urban/Rural         | .04 | .02 | -.06| -.09*| .04 | .00 | -.01| -.03| -.03| .14*| .05*| .01 | .00 | .00 | .23*| -.03|
| Minority            | --  | .03 | --  | .01 | .02 | -.03| .01 | -.01| .00 | -.04| -.03| -.01| .02 | -.02| .02 | --  |
| Parents Non-Citizens at Birth | -.19*| -.05 | -.19*| -.13*| -.29*| -.25*| -.03| -.08#| -.38*|-.24*|-.16  |-.19*|-.21*|-.15*|-.20*|-.25*|
| Female              | .02 | -.01| .04  | -.02| -.04#| .07*| -.05| -.05| .03 | .00 | .00 | .01 | .04*| .02 | .02 | -.07*|
| Age                 | .08*| .10*| .03  | -.02| .04  | -.03| .11*| .17*| .00 | .11*| .02 | .01 | .01 | .22*| .05#| .13*|
| Education           | -.14*| -.06 | -.17*| -.28*| -.15*| -.06| -.16*| -.18*|-.08 |-.10*| .00 | -.15*| -.06| -.14*| -.07| -.15*|
| Religiosity         | .02 | .00 | .05  | .03 | -.02 | .01 | -.01| .03 | .00 | .00 | -.06*| -.03| .04 | .02 | -.10*| .04 |
| Unemployed          | .11#| -.02 | -.08 | -.01| .02  | .11 | -.06| -.02| .14 | .02 | -.06*| .00 | -.07 | .01 | .13 | .04 |
| Ideology            | -.02| .10#| -.12#| -.16*| -.02 | -.02| .01  | .05 | .06 | .01 | -.04 | .07 | -.03 | .01 | -.14*| .07 |
| Intercept           | -.47*| -.47*| -.28*| -.11*| -.41*| -.09 | -.46*| -.67*| -.22*| -.43*| -.03 | -.52*| -.10*| -.48*| -.48*| -.48*|
| n                   | 1,405| 536  | 551 | 973 | 455 | 696 | 926 | 722 | 494 | 716 | 601 | 1,024 | 849 | 755 | 701 |

*p<.05, # p<.10. Each column represents a separate OLS model, on country samples that exclude non-citizen respondents. Data are weighted, and robust OLS standard errors are estimated. The “ethnicity” variable used to code “minority” was not asked in Australia, the U.K., or Finland. Source: ISSP 2003.
Robustness Checks

Replication of Table 4.5 (Contextual and Individual-Level Predictors of Ascribed Factor Score, 2003), Using Jackknife Standard Errors.

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<th>Full Sample</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Model I</td>
<td>Model II</td>
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<tr>
<td>% FB Growth</td>
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<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate Change</td>
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<td>.000 (.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Threat</strong></td>
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<td>.30**</td>
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<td>Minority</td>
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<td>.01</td>
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# p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01. Standard errors for context effects are in parentheses. Estimation is through OLS. All standard errors are obtained using a jackknife routine that drops countries from the analysis one at a time. The final estimates, therefore, are based on n re-samples (where n = the total number of countries) of a pool including n-1 countries. Non-citizens are excluded from the sample. “% Foreign Born” is in the year 2003; “% Foreign Born Growth” is the annualized percent growth rate from 2000-2003; “Unemployment Rate” is from 2003, “Unemployment Rate Change” is the % change in unemployment from 2000-2003. Individual-level Cultural and economic threat measures coded from 0 = not at all threatened to 1 = highly threatened. “Parents born…” “Female,” and “Unemployed” are all dummy variables. Education is scored 0=least to 1=most, Age is a five category measure scored from 0 = 16-29 to 1=60+, urban/rural is scored from 0=ural to 1=urban, and ideology is scored from 0=extreme left to 1=extreme right. Source for survey data: ISSP 2003.
Replication of Table 4.6 (Multi-level Model Predicting the Standardized Importance of Being Born in the Country, 1995 and 2003) Using Jackknife Standard Errors

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<td>Individual Threat</td>
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* p<.05  ** p<.01. Cells depict coefficients of a single OLS model pooling 1995 and 2003 ISSP respondents. Standard errors are in parentheses. All standard errors are obtained using a jackknife routine that drops countries from the analysis one at a time. The final estimates, therefore, are based on n re-samples (where n = the total number of countries) of a pool including n-1 countries. Sample excludes non-citizens. % Foreign Born and % Foreign-Born growth are in the relevant year and annualized growth rates over the previous 3 years. “Urban/rural” setting and “income” are excluded from the individual level predictors, because comparable measures do not appear in the 1995 ISSP. Ideology is excluded because it was not asked in Italy; re-running the model excluding Italy, in order to include ideology, yields virtually identical results. Contextual diversity measures taken from the UN World Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision Population Database. Source for survey data: ISSP 1995, 2003.
Replication of Table 4.6 (Multi-level Model Predicting the Standardized Importance of Being Born in the Country, 1995 and 2003) Using Jackknife Standard Errors

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<td>Education</td>
<td>-.15** (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unempl.</td>
<td>.04# (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003 Dummy</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country-Years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05 ** p<.01. Cells depict coefficients of a single OLS model pooling 1995 and 2003 ISSP respondents. Standard errors are in parentheses. All standard errors are obtained using a jackknife routine that drops countries from the analysis one at a time. The final estimates, therefore, are based on n re-samples (where n = the total number of countries) of a pool including n-1 countries. Sample excludes non-citizens. % Foreign Born and % Foreign-Born growth are in the relevant year and annualized growth rates over the previous 3 years. “Urban/rural” setting and “income” are excluded from the individual level predictors, because comparable measures do not appear in the 1995 ISSP. Ideology is excluded because it was not asked in Italy; re-running the model excluding Italy, in order to include ideology, yields virtually identical results. Contextual diversity measures taken from the UN World Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision Population Database. Source for survey data: ISSP 1995, 2003.
Appendix to Chapter 6

Replication of Table 6.2 (Multiculturalism, Citizenship and Welfare Policy Against “Truly” Items and Indices, 2003) Using Jackknife Standard Errors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ascribed</th>
<th>Achievable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country Ancestry</td>
<td>Born In Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (Individually)</td>
<td>-0.06 (.09)</td>
<td>0.04 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>-.08 (.05)</td>
<td>-0.02 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship Regime</td>
<td>-0.14 (.008)</td>
<td>-0.015** (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Spending</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (Simultaneously)</td>
<td>-0.01 (.13)</td>
<td>0.07 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>-0.10 (.06)</td>
<td>-0.07# (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship Regime</td>
<td>-0.016** (.005)</td>
<td>-0.015** (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Spending</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>12,255</td>
<td>12,265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# p<.10 * p<.05 ** p<.01. Entries are coefficients estimate by adding policy variables to the random intercepts multi-level model in the previous chapter, including all individual-level predictors, as well as foreign born population and growth at the context level (measured by OECD estimates). Standard errors for context effects are in parentheses. All standard errors are obtained using a jackknife routine that drops countries from the analysis one at a time. The final estimates, therefore, are based on n re-samples (where n = the total number of countries) of a pool including n-1 countries. Panel A shows coefficients when policy variables are entered separately, and Panel B shows coefficients when policy variables are entered simultaneously. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample excludes non-citizens. “Multiculturalism” is scored 0 = “weak,” 0.5 = “moderate,” and 1 = “strong.” Citizenship is scored 0 = *jus sanguinis* and 1 = *jus soli*. Countries are classified on the basis of Table 5.2. Social spending is measured as a proportion of GDP. Measures of spending come from the OECD. Source: ISSP 2003.
Replication of Table 6.3 (Multiculturalism, Citizenship Policy and the Ascribed “Truly” Index, 1995-2003) Using Jackknife SE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.20 (.12)</td>
<td>-0.23# (.12)</td>
<td>-0.26# (.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>-0.09 (.09)</td>
<td>0.06 (.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.05 (.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Spending</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.010# (.005)</td>
<td>-0.005 (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Foreign-Born</td>
<td>-0.005 (.006)</td>
<td>0.010 (.007)</td>
<td>0.000 (.007)</td>
<td>0.002 (.006)</td>
<td>-0.008 (.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Foreign Born</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.004 (.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.011 (.022)</td>
<td>0.018 (.026)</td>
<td>-0.013 (.019)</td>
<td>0.020 (.024)</td>
<td>-0.002 (.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.006 (.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.009 (.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.011 (.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Dummy</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.19 (.19)</td>
<td>-0.16 (.15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.15 (.19)</td>
<td>-0.18 (.15)</td>
<td>-0.22 (.15)</td>
<td>-0.02 (.18)</td>
<td>-0.04 (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country-Years</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>27,818</td>
<td>27,818</td>
<td>27,818</td>
<td>27,818</td>
<td>27,818</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# p<.10 * p<.05 ** p<.01. Each primary column (I-IV) depicts coefficients of a single OLS model pooling 1995 and 2003 ISSP respondents. Standard errors for context effects are in parentheses. All standard errors are obtained using a jackknife routine that drops countries from the analysis one at a time. The final estimates, therefore, are based on n re-samples (where n = the total number of countries) of a pool including n-1 countries. Social Spending is as % GDP. % Foreign Born and % F-B growth are in the relevant year and annualized growth rates over the previous 3 years. Individual level control variables are included but not shown, for reasons of space. Sample excludes non-citizens. Individual-level predictors are identical to those in Table 4.6. Countries are classified on the basis of Table 5.2. Social spending is measured as a proportion of GDP. Measures of spending come from the OECD. Contextual diversity measures taken from the UN World Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision Population Database. Source for survey data: ISSP 1995, 2003.
Appendix to Chapter 7

Native and Immigrant Populations, Merged ESS-CID Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>Non-Citizen Immigrants</th>
<th>Ethnic Minority Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>6,918</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>5,475</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>5,985</td>
<td>1,077</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8,705</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4,498</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>5,268</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>5,918</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5,295</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>6,343</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>4,972</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>6,132</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,736</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>6,134</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>5,546</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>5,785</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5,874</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>92,585</td>
<td>7,586</td>
<td>3,260</td>
<td>1,825</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: In this survey, “ethnic minority” status was coded based on a single item that asked respondents if they consider themselves a member of an ethnic minority in the country.
Native and Immigrant Population, Other Datasets Employed in Chapter 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World Values Survey</th>
<th>Social Capital Benchmark*</th>
<th>Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy</th>
<th>Equality, Security, and Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>1,611</td>
<td>1,787</td>
<td>1,414</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Immigrants</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Non-Citizens</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,048</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>1,534</td>
<td>3,003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Citizenship, where available, is always coded based on whether or not the respondent claims to have it. Minority status is coded on the basis of “ethnic background” variables in these surveys.

*While this dataset has a sizable community-level sample, I only use the nationally-representative cross-section here. “Natives,” “Immigrants,” and “Minority Immigrants” categories are necessarily omitted, since the questionnaire asks about citizenship status but not nativity.
Variable Wording and Coding: ESS

Dependent

Generalized Trust

“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted”

“Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?” (0-10)

“Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?” (0-10)

The generalized trust index is respondents’ mean score on all three items, re-scored from 0 = “least trusting” to 1 = “most trusting.”

Perceived Discrimination

“Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?” (yes/no)

If “yes,” “On what grounds is your group discriminated against?”
  - Color or race
  - Nationality
  - Religion
  - Language
  - Ethnic Group

Respondents are scored “1” if they answered “no” to the first question, and “0” if they answered “yes” and subsequently claimed discrimination on the basis of any of the above traits.

Political Interest

“How interested would you say you are in politics – are you…” (“very interested,” “quite interested,” “hardly interest,” or “not at all interested?”)

Respondents are re-scored from 0 = “not at all” to 1 = “very”

Political Participation
“There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?”

- Contacted a politician, government, or local government official?
- Worked in a political party or action group?
- Worked in another association or organization?
- Worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker?
- Signed a petition?
- Taken part in a lawful public demonstration?

Scores on the six items (“yes” or “no”) are added together, and re-scored from 0 = “none” to 1 = “all six.”

**Trust in Parliament/Politicians**

“Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust.”

- [country’s] parliament?
- Politicians?

The two responses are indexed together, and re-scored from 0 = “no trust at all” to 1 = “complete trust”

**Politicians Care**

“Do you think that politicians in general care what people like you think?” (“Hardly any politicians care what people like me think, “very few care,” “some care,” “many care,” and “most politicians care what people like me think.”

Re-scored from 0 = hardly any to 1 = most

**Satisfaction With National Government**

“Now thinking about the [country] government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?” (0-10 scale)

Rescored from 0 = “completely dissatisfied” to 1 = “completely satisfied”

**Independent**

“Non-Minority” is a dummy indicating that the respondent DOES NOT identify him/herself as a member of a minority ethnic group in the country.

“Citizenship” is a dummy indicating that R has citizenship in the host country.
“Length of residence” is a four-category measure scored from 0 = within the last year to 1 = more than 20 years ago.

“Female” is scored 1 if the respondent is female and 0 if the respondent is male.

Age and education 5- and 7-category measures scored from 0 = youngest/least educated to 1 = oldest/most educated.

“Satisfaction With Household Finances” is a 4-category measure ranging from 0 = “very difficult on present income” to 1 = “living comfortably on present income.”
Country-Level Individual-Level Models Used In Chapter 7, By Country and Incorporation Regime (ESS)

Cross-Country Comparability on Subjective Financial Well-Being

The subjective satisfaction with finances item was not asked of French respondents in either Round 1 or 2 of the ESS. Therefore, the models shown below are not directly comparable strictly speaking in the case of France. However, given the difficulty in comparing more objective measures of financial well-being (e.g. income) across a diverse set of countries, and the fact that the subjective measure is conceptually much closer to what I am after anyway, I stuck with the latter and simply excluded it in the French case.

Since what I really care about here is the effect of excluding it on the estimated intercepts, it worth showing whether or not this actually matters in the French case. The table directly below shows intercept values obtained by estimating the model on the French sample that does include the subjective income measure (Round 3), both with and without it:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept (excluding subjective finances)</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept (including subjective finances)</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Full model is estimated, even though all predictors are not shown. I cannot do this with the “politicians care” measure, since it does not appear in Wave 3 of the ESS or the Cumulative File.

In general, the effect of excluding subjective finances is quite small. To the extent that there is one, excluding it uniformly biases the estimated intercepts downwards on all the measures that are scored from 0 = “bad” to 1 = “good” and upwards on the discrimination measure. So, in short, the bias is small and consistent. As far as the analysis in Chapter 7 goes, what this means is that the positive “effect” of moderate multiculturalism (versus jus soli and weak multiculturalism) is actually underestimated slightly. In other words, had the subjective finance measure been available for analysis in all three waves the difference between France and the multicultural countries would appear even larger than it presently does. In any event, if any readers of this remain unconvinced, then alternate tables for Chapter 7 that are limited to the Round 3 French cases are available upon request.
Weighting

All individual-level models are run with the ESS/CID design weight – which is used to generate an equal probability of selection within each country – switched “on.” Population weights (also available in the ESS) are not employed, since all of the estimates are derived from single-country regressions.

Running the models without weights does not notably change the coefficients presented here, though many of the relationships become statistically significant since this allows for the use of non-robust standard errors.
### Outcome: Generalized Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weak Multiculturalism, Jus Sanguinis</th>
<th>Moderate Multiculturalism, Soli</th>
<th>Weak, Soli M, Sang</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>AT CH DE DK ES FI IR NO PT NL SE US UK FR GR IT BE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.05# .04* .02 .01 .01 .04 -.02 -..04 -..08* -..05* -.02 -..05 -.01 .01 -.02 .04 -.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Minority</td>
<td>-.02 .00 .00 .02 .02 -.03 -..02 .05* .04 .03# .00 -.05 .01 .04* -.01 .03 -.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Residence</td>
<td>.08 -.06* -.03 -.01 -.01 -.09 -.03 -.01 .09 .04 .00 .08 -.06# -.03 -.10* -.15# -.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.01 .01 .00 .00 .00 .08* .11* .03 -.05 .00 .04 .04 .07* .07* .06* -.08 -.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.01 .01 .02 .02 .02 -.01 .02 -.05# .00 .01 -.01 -.01 .03# .00 -.04 .01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction With Finances</td>
<td>.12* .08* .09* .12* .12* .07 .02 .03 .06 .04 .14* -.02 .04 -- .09* -.04 .11*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.03 .12* .05 .21* -.02 .01 .07* .12* .05 .09* .07* -.02 .08* .11* .02 .16 .02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>.43* .47* .44* .39* .40* .61* .52 .50* .38* .47* .43* .54* .47* .34* .40* .47* .44*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>296 1,040 634 223 312 151 468 357 307 484 575 63 404 454 464 61 439</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05 # p < .10. Each model is estimated by OLS, on weighted samples and with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is three-item index tapping respondents’ view that “most people can be trusted,” “most people try to be fair,” and “most people try to help others.”
Outcome: Perceived Discrimination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weak Multiculturalism, Jus Sanguinis</th>
<th>Moderate Multiculturalism, Soli</th>
<th>Weak, Soli</th>
<th>M, Sang</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AT         CH     DE     DK     ES     FI     IR     NO     PT     NL     SE     US     UK     FR     GR     IT     BE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>.01        -.02    -.01    .05    .15*    -.07    -.05    .01    -.17*   .04    .02    -.04    .03    .03    -.19*   -.23    .00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Minority</td>
<td>-.40*      -.19*   -.19*   -.23*   -.42*   -.14    -.05    -.17*   -.27*   -.24*   -.17*   -.02    -.16*   -.30*   -.48*   -.31    -.25*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Residence</td>
<td>-.38*      -.12*   -.06    .14     -.28*   -.09    -.03    .10#    -.15    -.14    -.06    -.01    .05    -.13    -.05    .00     .00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.04       .00     -.06    -.01   -.03    -.20*   -.08    -.14*   .06     -.11    -.04    -.18    -.05    -.17*   .02     .03    -.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-.01       .02     .00     -.01   -.04   -.00    -.00    -.02    -.05   -.01    -.05#   -.09    -.03   -.01    -.12*   .10#    -.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction With Finances</td>
<td>-.45*   -.07*   -.15*   -.23*   -.26*   .10     -.16*   .07     -.11   -.12    -.26*   .15     -.11   --      -.03    -.13    -.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.10        .02     .02     .08    .03     -.05    -.02    .10     -.10   .10     -.05    -.04    .30*    -.08    -.18*   .04     -.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.11*      .36*    .44     .30     .78     .36     .37     .12     .72     .50     .52     .24     .15     .65*    .91     .58     .38*</td>
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<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>284        1,032   627    216    307    147    462    350    309    468    562    63     .396    433    456    60     430</td>
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</table>

*p <.05 # p<.10. Each model is estimated by OLS, on weighted samples and with robust standard errors. “Perceived discrimination” is scored “1” if the respondent claims that he/she is a member of a group that is discriminated against in country on the basis of either nationality, ethnicity, race, language, or religion and “0” otherwise. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, I also ran them using logit regression, but substantive differences are minimal.
Outcome: Political Interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weak Multiculturalism, Jus Sanguinis</th>
<th>Moderate Multiculturalism, Soli</th>
<th>Weak, Soli</th>
<th>M, Sang</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>DK</td>
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<td>.09*</td>
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*p < .05 # p < .10. Each model is estimated by OLS, on weighted samples and with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is respondents’ expressed level of political interest, scored 0 = not at all interested to 1 = very interested.
### Outcome: Political Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weak Multiculturalism, Jus Sanguinis</th>
<th>Moderate Multiculturalism, Soli</th>
<th>Weak, Soli</th>
<th>M, Sang</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</table>

*p <.05 # p<.10. Each model is estimated by OLS, on weighted samples and with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is a 6-item additive index – scored from 0 = least participatory to 1 = most participatory – comprising respondents’ having done the following over the past 12 months: contacted a politician, worked in a political party, worked in another political organization, wore a campaign badge or displayed a sticker, signed a petition, and taken part in a lawful demonstration/protest.
## Outcome: Trust in Parliament/Politicians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weak Multiculturalism, Jus Sanguinis</th>
<th>Moderate Multiculturalism, Soli</th>
<th>Weak, Soli</th>
<th>M, Sang</th>
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<tr>
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<td>909</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>206</td>
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</table>

*p <.05 # p<.10. Each model is estimated by OLS, on weighted samples and with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is a two-item index comprising trust in the country’s parliament and politicians, scored from 0 = least trusting to 1 = most trusting.
Outcome: Politicians Care

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Non-Minority</th>
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<th>CH</th>
<th>DE</th>
<th>DK</th>
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<td>-.16#</td>
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<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.06</td>
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<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
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<td>.07</td>
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<td>-.01</td>
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<td>.43**</td>
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<td>-.01</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.32**</td>
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<td>.08</td>
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<td>189</td>
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** p < .01 * p < .05 # p< .10. Each model is estimated by OLS, on weighted samples and with robust standard errors. “Politicians Care” is scored from 0 = “hardly any politicians care” to 1 = “most politicians care.” It is only available in Round 1 of the ESS, which is why there are fewer respondents than on other outcomes. Italian respondents are excluded, since there are only 26 immigrants in the Italy sample.
## Outcome: Satisfaction With National Government

### Variables and Coefficients

|                     | AT  | CH  | DE  | DK  | ES  | FI  | IR  | NO  | PT  | NL  | SE  | US  | UK  | FR  | GR  | IT  | BE  |
|---------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Citizenship         | .07 | -.02| -.03| .00 | -.04| -.02| -.03| .04 | .01 | -.03| -.02| --  | .05 | -.04| -.05| .00 | .04#|
| Non-Minority        | .04 | -.03| -.06*| .00 | .03 | -.09| -.04| -.04| -.01| -.02| -.01| --  | -.01| -.04| -.04| -.01| -.01|
| Length of Residence | -.19*| -.05| -.10*| -.03| -.15*| -.12*| -.19*| -.08| -.13*| -.19*| --  | -.22*| -.11*| -.14*| -.17#| -.09#|
| Age                 | .05 | -.01| .01  | .09 | .01 | -.03| -.04| .01 | -.05| .01 | .00 | --  | .04 | .07#| .06 | .08 | .00 |
| Female              | -.06#| .00 | -.01 | .04 | -.01| -.01| -.02| .03 | .00 | -.01| -.04*| --  | -.03| .00 | .00 | -.05 | -.02|
| Satisfaction        | .25*| .10*| .10* | .17*| .16*| .16*| .01 | -.05| .09 | .07#| .04 | --  | -.07 | --  | .15*| .19  | .04 |
| With Finances       |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Education           | -.05| -.04| -.02 | -.02| -.07 | .00 | -.05| -.01| .11 | -.07| -.04| --  | -.07 | -.01| -.09#| -.13 | -.05|
| Intercept           | .41*| .64*| .48* | .38*| .55*| .79*| .68*| .68*| .36*| .61*| .72*| --  | .72*| .56*| .57*| .38*| .59*|
| n                   | 278 | 968 | 593 | 207 | 289 | 145 | 306 | 347 | 295 | 466 | 533 | --  | 400 | 457 | 428 | 57  | 416 |

*p < .05 # p < .10. Each model is estimated by OLS, on weighted samples and with robust standard errors. “Satisfaction” measure is scored from 0 = extremely dissatisfied to 1 = extremely satisfied.