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with an introduction by
Susan L. Shirk and Christopher P. Twomey

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THE NORTHEAST ASIA COOPERATION DIALOGUE: INTRODUCTION

Susan L. Shirk and Christopher Twomey

Northeast Asia differs from other regions in a number of ways: numerous ideological and territorial conflicts initiated before and during the Cold War have yet to be resolved; four of the world’s most powerful nations—the United States, Russia, China, and Japan—have important interests in Northeast Asia and on the Korean peninsula; the region lacks an institutionalized structure—or even an informal consultative process—with which to address these conflicts. All of these factors raise the risk of military conflict, or destructive instability in Northeast Asia.

However, within the broader Asia-Pacific area there is a new appreciation for the potential value of multilateralism to supplement the bilateral relations that have traditionally characterized the security politics of this region. Through a variety of statements the Clinton Administration has expressed its strong support for such multilateral discussion. Asian governments have also shown enthusiasm for such regional dialogue. A number of current examples of such multilateral discussions exist, ranging in their complexity and scope. Broad cooperation in the economic sphere is occurring through APEC (the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum); cooperation on a more narrow geographic basis is seen in the Southeast Asia security sphere through ASEAN’s PMC (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ post-ministerial conference); and finally, region-wide security cooperation is beginning to assume a concrete form through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This leaves one major gap in the developing network of multilateral fora for discussion of security issues—Northeast Asia.

The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) was conceived to address this deficiency. It opened high-level consultations between the nations of Russia, China, both Koreas, the United States, and Japan. The goal for this “track two” forum is to identify issues that will benefit from regional cooperation and to do so with the active participation of each of the nations in the region. While the intent has been to focus on security issues, the participants realize that cooperation on less confrontational issues, such as economics or environmental problems, might build the trust needed to tackle more sensitive security issues.

Based on this assessment of the regional situation and of the potential value coming from the NEACD, the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) founded this project in early 1993 and continues its organizing role. The NEACD project is among our most exciting and promising efforts in exploring  

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1In track two fora academic and business participants join with government members for informal, off-the-record discussions. All government members participate in their private capacities and do not represent the official views of their governments.
opportunities to promote international economic, security, and environmental cooperation. It complements our track two work in other regions, as well as our academic research comparing different regional approaches to preventing and managing conflict.

IGCC views this project as a cooperative venture, our partners being the participants themselves. The dialogue is not an attempt to impose a set of rules, an institutional framework, or a structure of relations on nations within the region. It is an attempt to bring together nations so that a frank discussion of the future security uncertainties in the region can proceed and ideas for reducing this uncertainty can emerge. We believe this can be best done through a multilateral forum where all players have an equal voice, and where each view is fully respected by the other participants.\(^2\)

With regard to the dialogue’s geographic boundaries, IGCC and the individual participants are committed to maintaining the current set of six nations. There are other processes, most notably the ARF, that deal with a broader selection of nations and their security concerns. The goal of the dialogue is to supplement this broad regional forum, and others like it, with a subregional approach: a group representing the six countries with the most direct stakes in the security situation in Northeast Asia.

Generally, four representatives from each country participate in the NEACD meetings: one each from the foreign ministry and the defense ministry, plus two from private research facilities, think-tanks, or universities. Participants from the United States included deputy assistant secretaries for East Asia and the Pacific from both the U.S. Defense and State Departments; government participants from other countries have been of similar rank.

Turning to the actual history of the process, the NEACD began in July 1993 with a La Jolla, California planning meeting attended by participants from all six countries, who set the agenda and level of participation for the subsequent Dialogue sessions. Agreed topics for future discussions included: the national perspective of each country on its regional relations in Northeast Asia; economics; environmental issues; and confidence-building measures (CBMs). After circulating background papers on economics and environmental issues (available as IGCC Policy Papers numbers 6 and 7), IGCC held the first full session of the dialogue in La Jolla in October of 1993, bringing together some 20 participants from five of the nations in the region. While the participants in the October meeting found the discussion of economic and environmental issues worthwhile, they focused on issues of security cooperation. The participants agreed that a number of specific CBMs deserved continued discussion in the future, including: maritime, nuclear, and land-based CBMs; crisis prevention centers; and issues of transparency.

The second meeting of Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue was held in Tokyo in May 1994 under the co-sponsorship of IGCC and the Japanese National Institute of Research Advancement. At this May meeting, each country’s perspectives on Northeast Asian security, opinions about measures to improve a sense of trust, specific CBMs (as listed above), and how to proceed at future meetings were discussed. Background papers were prepared on a number of these topics. In addition to the usual four participants, the May meeting for the first time also included a uniformed defense officer from each country. (See agenda, page 65 and participant list, page 66).

North Korea is a founding member of the dialogue, has been involved in all stages of the project, and actively participated in the May 1993 planning meeting. Unfortunately and despite our best efforts, no North Korean attended the subsequent working sessions in October 1993 and May 1994, although North Korea sent supportive notes to both these later sessions and continues to communicate regularly with IGCC about the progress of the dialogue. North Korean participation is indispensable if this process is to make a valuable contribution to the security of the region; all dialogue members, therefore, share a strong desire to see the North Koreans resume their active participation in the process.

Through these various sessions two main conclusions have emerged. First, a consensus has arisen among the dialogue participants about the need for mutual reassurance among Northeast Asian nations. Each shares a general understanding that military confidence building measures appear to be conceptually too narrow for this region. CBMs carry a strong connotation of European institutions and experiences that might not be applicable to Northeast Asia; participants, instead, expressed support for Mutual Reassurance Measures, or MRMs, as a better-suited concept. MRMs’s are designed to promote a base of mutual confidence and reassurance and encompass not only military CBMs, but broader meas-

\(^2\)The dialogue process, as well as each of its meetings, operates strictly by the rule of consensus.
ures as well. This kind of reassurance seems more appropriate than CBMs for the security situation in Asia which is uncertain, but without overt threats of conflict.

Second, a unanimous understanding exists among the participants concerning the desirability of continuing the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue process. There currently exists no other channel, formal or informal, for this particular set of nations to come together in a multilateral setting. While in the long run this process may move toward an official multilateral grouping among the nations of the region, it is clear that this would be premature for the near term. Thus, we hope to continue with the track-two process.

The advantages of off-the-record contact between officials and senior academics will continue to be a valuable complement to the multitude of other bilateral and multilateral contacts that exist throughout the broader Asian region.

The following chapters were prepared as background papers for the May 1994 meeting of the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue in Tokyo. They neither represent a consensus of the participants nor a summary of any part of the discussions at any of the Dialogue meetings. They are presented here in the hopes that other readers outside of the Dialogue process will find them to be as useful and thought-provoking as did the hosts and participants of the NEACD.
We are living in an era of intriguing contradictions: power among nations is increasingly diffuse, yet nations are more interdependent than ever; ancient rivalries are being played out by small and medium powers, yet with all of the destructive potential of modern weaponry. Northeast Asia is not an exception. There are various sources of conflicts and threats among the Northeast Asian states. Most Northeast Asian states are spending more on defense and modernizing their armed forces.

Given the contextual and procedural characteristics of Northeast Asia, so-called structural arms control measures seem premature, whereas there seems to be much that can be achieved through CBMs. Given the geographical characteristics of Northeast Asia, the applicability of land-based CBMs might seem very limited in scope, however, we can identify at least four areas for their use the Korean peninsula, Sino-Russian border, Sino-Vietnamese border, and, to a certain degree, the “Northern Territories.” Among these areas, the Korean peninsula stands out immediately. The stabilization of the situation in the Korean peninsula is the most urgent issue we must tackle.

The resolution of North Korean nuclear problem is a precondition for South and North Korean arms control. Without satisfactory resolution of North Korean nuclear issues, we cannot proceed with arms control negotiations including CBMs. Thus, right now, we should do our best to solve the North Korean nuclear problem. Then we can introduce CBMs as an intermediate arms control measure.

Since the two Koreas have already agreed on most declaratory CBMs and the guiding principles for arms control, they should try to introduce and implement “transparency measures” with some minor constraint measures. These include: 1) exchange of military information; 2) notification of military movements, maneuvers, and exercises; 3) operation of hot line; 4) demilitarization and conversion of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) into a peace zone; and 4) relocation of offensive weapons. By making each side’s military capabilities and intention transparent, we can reduce the chance of misunderstanding and surprise attack.

Cha Young-Koo is the Director of the Arms Control Research Center at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis. Dr. Choi Kang is an Associate Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis. This paper was prepared for delivery at the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue, co-sponsored by the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation and the National Institute for Research Advancement, 16–17 May 1994 in Tokyo. The views expressed here are those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of KIDA or any of its sponsoring agencies.
On the Sino-Russian front, some forms of CBMs have already been introduced and implemented. However, the content and details of those CBMs remain secret. It is necessary for China and Russia to institutionalize CBMs by opening up the contents. Along with the Sino-Russian border, China should engage in talks for introducing CBMs to overcome imbalance of its own approach toward other bordering countries such as Vietnam.

Further, the normalization of Russo-Japanese relations by solving their respective territorial disputes is required to enhance the stability and peace in Northeast Asia. The implementation of the Joint Declaration of 1956 may be considered as a good starting point. In the meantime, Russia can reduce the size of troops and military instabillity deployed in the Northern Territories.

We should avoid any wishful thinking. CBMs are not a panacea and they are incremental in nature. The utility of CBMs may be very limited in scope. The most important fact to bear in mind is that the effectiveness of any arms control measures, including CBMs, is determined by the political will of the concerned states. Political detente is required prior to military detente. Arms control is the military currency of politics.

Introduction

With the eclipse of the Cold War East-West conflict, many policy-makers and ordinary citizens around the world initially thought that there would be no place in the new world for a major power conflict, and that the end of the Cold War would usher in a new era when resources wasted in East-West confrontation would be diverted to more constructive engagements such as welfare, national development, and regional cooperation. However, it is ironic to see the world teeming with uncertainties and challenges of historic proportions. This is a period of transition in which the old form is gone and the new form has yet to emerge. This transitional period may in fact be more threatening to international security and economic prosperity than was the relative stability of the bi-polar standoff. Nationalism, regional and ethnic antagonisms and conflicts within states pose an increasing source of international tension and instability. In other words, new forms of threat to global and regional security have been unleashed, joining more traditional sources of conflict and confrontation. Consequently, more nations feel less secure now than during the Cold War. Despite the virtual decimation of superpower rivalry, the breakout of small-scale conflicts looms large. Notwithstanding the overall shrinkage of the global arms market and the success of arms control talks such as Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) I and II, several conflict-ridden areas (notably the Middle East and East Asia) have recently significantly increased arms imports.

This is an era, therefore, of intriguing contradictions: power among nations is increasingly diffuse, yet nations are more interdependent than ever; ancient rivalries are being played out by small and medium powers, yet with all of the destructive potential of modern weaponry.

We, however, cannot allow the new but unstable security environment and the potential for conflicts between nations to dictate our future and jeopardize the newly emerged opportunities for security cooperation by allowing ourselves to become the victims of uncertainty. We must manage this transitional period by devising and implementing proper measures to stabilize relations between states and to enhance cooperation. From the perspective of military strategy, two kinds of security measures that can help manage this transition come to mind: structural arms control measures and operational arms control measures (or confidence-building measures—CBMs). Given the contextual and procedural characteristics of Northeast Asia, the so-called structural arms control measures seem premature, whereas there seems to be much that CBMs can achieve in Northeast Asia. However, CBMs are incremental in nature and involve painstaking negotiations. Furthermore, we cannot import European CBMs without modification. Northeast Asia is not Europe. It has a different set of security issues and has its own distinctive security environment. Thus, security perceptions of the concerned states, security issues at stake, and the specific features and situation in the region must be taken into account in any attempt to develop and implement CBMs.

Thus, at the outset, it seems necessary to discuss major developments in Northeast Asia and the nature of the security climate in the post-Cold War era. After that, we will identify potential sources of threats and conflicts in the region. Then we will review measures—especially land-based CBMs—and assess their prospects for effectively harnessing those threats and potential for conflict. Finally, we will suggest a strategy for introducing and implementing those CBMs.
In order to clarify our approach, it is necessary to define the concept of land-based CBMs. CBM is a loosely defined term and that can mean different things to different people. However, James Macintosh’s definition, which is a hybrid construction, encompasses the essence of CBMs. According to him, CBMs are:

- a variety of arms control measures
- entailing state actions
- that can be unilateral but which are more often either bilateral or multilateral
- that attempt to reduce or eliminate misperceptions about specific military threats or concerns (very often having to do with surprise attack)
- by communicating adequately verifiable evidence of acceptable reliability to the effect that those concerns are groundless
- often (but not always) by demonstrating that military and political intentions are not aggressive
- and/or by providing early warning indicators to create confidence that surprise would be very difficult to achieve
- and/or by restricting the opportunities available for the use of military forces by adopting restrictions on the activities and deployments of those forces (or crucial components of them) within sensitive areas.1

Land-based CBMs are perceived as measures to reduce or eliminate misperceptions and misjudgement of ground military activities of states, and/or to constrain the capability of surprise attack on the ground. However, it is possible to include some naval and air activities which may enable states to engage in a surprise ground attack or raise suspicions over the consequences of such activities of ground military activities.

The Changing Security Climate in Northeast Asia and Possible Sources of Conflict

Northeast Asia is unique in many important scores. As one of Asia’s three subregions, Northeast Asia is probably the most heavily militarized area in the world. Until recently no multilateral security regime proposal has received enthusiastic response in this part of world. The Cold War in Northeast Asia was conducted through a set of bilateral relationships such as U.S.-China, U.S.-Soviet Union/Russia, U.S.-Japan, U.S.-ROK, China-Russia, Japan-Russia, Japan-China, etc. The resulting absence of a European-style alliance has left the region with few building blocks to reorient itself in the post-Cold War environment.2 And there exist no formal arms control agreements among the Asian countries comparable to those in Europe.3 Furthermore, despite the recent worldwide relaxation of tensions, defense expenditures have tended to grow faster in both Northeast and Southeast Asia than in other regions, something made possible by the region’s economic dynamism and vitality.4

Among recent trends and influences that have far-reaching security implications for Northeast Asia, at least three stand out.5

First and foremost is the relative decline of the influence and security role of the United States and Russia in the post-Cold War era. The United States is trying to retain its traditional political-military leadership as the balancer in the region and is determined to prevent the emergence of any other regional hegemon. However, in order to meet the new security environment of the post-Cold War period and to cope with domestic problems, the United States is modifying its overall military strategy and reducing its scope of military involvement. For the

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last four decades, to deter Soviet expansion and to promote regional as well as international stability, the United States has played the role of security guarantor with military and economic power. However, the disappearance of the Soviet threat, which united the United States and its regional allies, now requires a change in traditional security relationships. Consequently, the United States is trying to modify its strategy toward East Asia. Most importantly, re-emphasizing the new U.S. overseas deployment principle—“from a leading to a supporting role” in regional defense—the United States envisages a continued but reduced U.S. naval and air presence in the Asia-Pacific for the remainder of the decade.6

While Russia continues to have impressive military capabilities, the relative influence of Russia has declined substantially and is expected to continue this trend in the foreseeable future due to its internal political, social, and economic problems. While we cannot rule out the possibility of the country regaining its strength and influence, Russia will take at least twenty to thirty years to overcome internal problems and to regain superpower status. Until that time, Russia is expected to play a limited role in Northeast Asian affairs.

The second major trend is that Japan and China are likely to wield greater influence in determining the strategic environment in Northeast Asia. Japan, as the world’s largest creditor nation, has emerged as the second largest economy next only to that of the United States. It has the world’s third largest defense expenditure.7 In this regard, Japan is already a potential major military power to be reckoned with in any strategic calculation of Northeast Asia. However, its specific role in the political, security and diplomatic arenas will depend upon the prospects for change in U.S.-Japanese security relations, the degree of progress in Russo-Japanese relations, and the reaction of its neighboring countries to the rise in its regional profile. But, at least, Japan will take on more defense responsibilities and political roles in regional affairs than ever before.

The prospective decline of the U.S. and Russian presence in the region will also increase the strategic importance of China. China is the only Asian nation with strategic nuclear forces, and it maintains the world’s largest military of 3.2 million troops, thus standing in a position to effect a major change in the strategic environment in the region. Even if China poses no direct security threat to the U.S. or Russia, it can wield enormous influence on nearly every country in Asia.

These trends in regional politics will bring about a fundamental change in the regional systemic structure of Northeast Asia: that is, transition from bipolarity to multipolarity as the consequence of the relative decline of U.S. and Russian power and influence on one hand and the relative increase of the influence of Japan and China on the other. It is very difficult to judge which system is more stable.8 What is certain now is that Northeast Asia is experiencing a systemic structural change and that the old form is gone and a new one has not fully settled down.9

Whereas, the first and the second trends suggest the issue of adjustment in the regional structure and configuration of power, the third trend is related to national level changes with some regional implications: that is, the increasingly self-reliant defense posture of Northeast Asian states. Throughout the mid-and late 1980s, regional defense expenditure increased at an unprecedented rate. This trend is likely to continue

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7 Japan’s 1994 defense expenditure is approximately $45 billion. It recorded the lowest defense spending growth rate since 1960. However it allows Japan to acquire advanced weapons such as AWACS, Aegis, helicopter carrier, nine Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems (MLRSs), twenty-nine Type-90 battle tanks, eight F-15s, and improvements to P3C anti-submarine aircraft. See Chosun Ilbo, 11 April 1994; and Bilveer Singh, “Redefining Japan’s Defense Policy in the Post Cold War Era: Inner to Outer Perimeter Defense?” Asian Defence Journal, (February 1992): 22–30.


9 For further discussion on this point, see Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International Security 18, 3 (winter 1993/94): 5–33.
given the economic dynamism of Northeast Asia.

What is more important than increases in defense expenditure is that most Northeast Asian states, along with Southeast Asian states, are importing advanced weapons and technologies which will definitely enhance their power projection capabilities. The more particular enhancements include:

- national command, control, and communications systems
- national strategic and tactical intelligence systems;
- multi-role fighter aircraft such as F-16, F-15, and Su-27
- maritime surveillance aircraft
- anti-ship missiles
- modern surface combatants
- submarines
- electronic warfare systems
- rapid deployment forces.10

To a certain degree, it may be desirable and inevitable to have such a self-reliant defense posture and weapons acquisition programs. However, such programs of the Northeast Asian states are proceeding in an atmosphere of uncertainty and flexibility and in the absence of a common threat.11 Thus, given the newly emerged sources of conflict which we will discuss later, we can simply conclude that such an arms spree among the Northeast Asian states may increase the possibility of armed clashes and become one of the sources of conflict in itself since the acquisition of such weapon systems enable states to materialize their political-military claims by providing the means to achieve them. This final point leads us to a review of possible sources of conflict and threat in Northeast Asia.

The Probable Sources of Threats and Conflicts

The most urgent and threatening point in Northeast Asia is the tension on the Korean peninsula with respect to denuclearization, arms reduction, and reunification. To be sure, North Korea’s nuclear bomb and Rodong missile generate considerable anxiety in South Korea and Japan which are within the range of that missile.12 Without a clear resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, there will be no progress in security cooperation, and Northeast Asia will suffer from a lingering nuclear cloud. Or, in the worst case, we may have a kind of chain reaction of nuclear proliferation. Right now, it is unclear how, in which direction, and when the North Korean nuclear issue can be resolved. But, it requires multilateral cooperation and coordination among the concerned countries and should also take into account South Korea’s legitimate security concerns.

The second source, briefly mentioned above, is the arms build-up in the region. Several factors have facilitated this phenomenon. First, the Northeast Asian states, along with the Southeast Asian states, perceive a need to anticipate instability. The larger regional powers want to consolidate their power position and increase their influence while small powers want to play a more active role in the region. Second, a widespread need to replace aging equipment is coupled with the economic resources to permit doing so with modern high-tech weapons.13 Third is the supply-side problem: that is, the leading weapon manufacturers in the United States, Western Europe, and Russia are competing for a contracting arms market to overcome their own financial difficulties.14

In Northeast Asia, not only has China significantly beefed up its air and naval forces in recent years, but it is on a shopping spree for advanced weapons systems. The well-publicized purchase of seventy-two Su-27 FLANKER fighter from Russia will significantly shore up Chinese power projection capability.15

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11 Desmond Ball identified 12 reasons for regional acquisition programs in the Asia-Pacific region: economic growth and increasing resources for defense; the requirements of enhanced self-reliance; the drawdown of US presence and capabilities in the region; fears of the dragons; the increasing salience of regional conflict; the requirements for EEZ surveillance and protection; the broadening of regional security concerns; prestige; technology acquisition and reverse engineering; corruption; supply-side pressures; and, action-reaction. See Desmond Ball, “Arms and Alluence,” 81–94.
12 It is reported that North Korea is developing Rodong 2 whose range is well beyond the current Rodong 1 whose range is from 1,000 km to 1,500 km. Rodong 2’s range is expected to be 2,500 km.
14 Desmond Ball, “Arms and Alluence,” 81–94.
15 FEER, April 11, 1991, September 3, and November 12, 1992; and Paul Godwin and John J. Schultz,
China’s shopping spree for advanced weapons has brought about an immediate Taiwanese reaction. To check any possible aggression by China as it upgrades its armed forces, Taiwan has launched its own arms build-up to match its Chinese counterpart and to deny the achievement of reunification of the two Chinas by force. In the past, Taiwan has had serious difficulties in procuring advanced weapons from the United States and Western European countries due to Chinese pressure. In a rapidly-changing post-Cold War security environment, however, Taiwan’s capability to purchase advanced weaponry and technology has been significantly enhanced. Perceiving that the Taiwan Strait has been peaceful because Taiwan is able to maintain air supremacy over China, the Taiwanese government is not likely to fall behind the Chinese military build-up and modernization programs in any way.

The new Sino-Taiwanese rearmament programs, if unchecked, are likely to touch off a spiraling arms build-up that could involve the whole of Northeast Asia. Limited in resources and manpower, a re-armed and resurgent Taiwan will end up provoking China into a more intensified weapons procurement spree with the help of Russia and the Ukraine. This will, in turn, provoke a Japanese arms build-up Japan is becoming very wary of China’s increasing military power and the dangers of competition between the two countries. While it recognizes the dangers of competition, Japan is likely to match the Chinese military build-up. The grand strategy of Japan calls for maintaining control of the seas around Japan’s islands, dominating the land mass abutting this area of control, being a reliable naval power in the region, securing and maintaining control of access to Japan’s mineral sources in Southwest and Southeast Asia by dominating the entire Western Pacific and excluding all foreign navies, and possessing reliable defense capabilities commensurate with Japanese economic power. Japan’s arms build-up will be directed mainly toward the air and naval components to defend its Sea Lines of-Communication (SLOCs). This grand strategy has not fully materialized due to the presence of U.S. troops in the region. However, the expected reduction of total U.S. forces and the imperative of burden and defense responsibility sharing will lead Japan to assume a greater role in regional military affairs under the auspices of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. It seems that Japan is ready to assume a greater defense role.

In sum, nowadays Northeast Asia faces the danger of arms races in every single dimension which might foster mutual suspicion. Enhancing each nation’s capability to materialize its respective security claims increases the possibility of clashes between Northeast Asian states.

The third source is lingering territorial disputes among Northeast Asian states which may lead states to acquire more advanced weapons and to use them in those disputes. Contending states are:

- the PRC, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines, over the resources of and sovereignty over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea;
- Russia and Japan, over the Northern Territories;
- Japan and South Korea, over the Liancourt Rock in the East Sea;
- China and Vietnam, over their mutual border;
- Japan and South Korea, with respect to North Korea’s declared military zone of fifty nautical miles; and
- the PRC and Japan, over the Diaoyudao (Senkaku) Islands in the East China Sea.  

Among these lingering territorial disputes, one requires special attention: that is, China’s territorial claims. China carries the baggage of territorial claims against virtually all its neighboring countries. China’s forcible seizure of the Paracel Islands and unilateral inclusion in 1992 of the Spratly and Senkaku Islands within its territorial waters lead us to believe that China is one of the key security concerns, just next to North Korea’s nuclear ambition. However, as long as China’s imperative of economic development dictates a peaceful, stable, and benign external environment, it is likely to abstain from committing itself to any renewed local conflicts.

More ominous from a longer-term perspective is the possibility of economic failure in China, which would lead to a more highly centralized leadership in Beijing and the adoption of

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11. Desmond Ball, ibid., 88–89.


a more assertive and hostile foreign policy. A financially crippled and anti-Western China would be more likely to reassert its sovereignty and its interests along disputed border and territorial waters such as Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.19

This point leads us to another source of instability: that is, the internal stability of the residual socialist states—China and North Korea. Both states are faced with the issue of generational change of leadership. It is uncertain how and when generational change will occur. It is also very difficult to assess the impact of generational change on domestic stability of both states. However, we can at least expect that domestic unrest in these countries will affect the future stability of the region.

The Prospect for Land-Based CBMs in Northeast Asia

Against the backdrop of the above described security climate and pending security issues in Northeast Asia, many policymakers and scholars have been suggesting confidence-building measures as a means to stabilize the regional security environment and to solve security issues. They have also emphasized the experience and lessons of European CBMs as a model to follow. In principle, their claims have merit. However, given the maritime nature of the geographical setting and the pending security issues, the lessons and experience of the European approach might not be appropriate for Northeast Asia as a whole. Region-wide CBMs should be more maritime-oriented than ground-oriented.20

On the other hand, if we look carefully into the regional setting of Northeast Asia, we can easily identify some areas to which the European experience and lessons can be applied: the Korean peninsula; the Sino-Russian border area; and Sino-Vietnamese border area.21 The geographical setting of these areas are quite similar to that of Europe. Thus European CBMs, which are distinctively land-oriented, can be applied with some modification.

The stabilization of these areas is very important in promoting region-wide stability and can serve as a way to lay a firm ground for multilateral security dialogue and cooperation. Without resolution of these bilateral issues, we cannot expect too much from multilateral security cooperation and these can become obstacles in introducing a multilateral security cooperation regime in Northeast Asia. Among these bilateral security issues, the Korean peninsula is pre-eminent. Thus, let us begin with the discussion of land-based CBMs in the Korean peninsula.

The Korean Peninsula

The Korean peninsula, in which 1.8 million troops are deployed along the 155-mile long Demilitarized Zone, constitutes the most ominous security problem in Northeast Asia. The north and south division of Korea with two large military establishments confronting each other in a concentrated area makes the DMZ the most dangerous border in the world. Stability on the Korean peninsula is not only a Korean concern. The Korean peninsula is the sole place in Northeast Asia where the vital interests of three nuclear powers and one economic superpower intersect. Until recently, inter-Korean relations have appeared to be. The two Koreas signed the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North in December 13, 1991 and the Provisions in September 17, 1992. Both contain some confidence-building measures. Article 12 of the Basic Agreement states:

“To implement and guarantee non-aggression, the two sides shall set up a South-North Joint Military Commission within three months of the coming into force of this Agreement. In the said Commission, the two sides shall discuss and carry out steps to build military confidence and realize arms reduction, including the mutual notification and control of major movements of military units and exercises, the peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and surprise attack capabilities, etc.”

21We can add Russo-Japanese territorial dispute over the Northern Territories.
Table 1. Comparison of CBMs Proposals of the Two Koreas

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<th>South Korean Proposal</th>
<th>North Korean Proposal</th>
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<td>Mutual visits and exchanges of military personnel</td>
<td>Notification of military exercises in advance</td>
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<td>Mutual disclosure and exchanges of military information</td>
<td>Operation of a hot line for the prevention of accidental</td>
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<td>Restriction of military exercise</td>
<td>conflicts and possible escalation</td>
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<td>Notification in advance of all maneuvers or movements by</td>
<td>Declaration of nonaggression currently with arms control</td>
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<td>Conversion of the DMZ into a peace zone</td>
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<td>of military force after restoration of politico-military</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territories subject to non-aggression are those that have</td>
<td>Demarcation line of non-aggression is the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>been respectively controlled by the South and the North</td>
<td>demarcation line established in the Military Armistice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>under the Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953</td>
<td>Agreement signed on July 27, 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation of the Military Armistice Agreement and the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transformation of the DMZ into an effective buffer zone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as well as a peace zone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and verifications thereof. [Emphasis added.]\(^{22}\)

And, in the Provisions on Nonaggression, both sides agreed on:
- Renunciation of the use of force against each other;
- Peaceful resolution of conflicts and prevention of accidental armed conflicts;
- Demarcation line of Nonaggression; and
- Establishment of a Hot Line between the two Defense Ministers.\(^{23}\)

Both sides agreed to further negotiate issues such as:
- Freezing the military build-up in and near the DMZ;
- Suspending mutual reconnaissance activities;
- Renouncing air and naval blockade; and
- Granting security guarantees for Pyongyang and Seoul.\(^{24}\)

The Basic Agreement and the Provisions actually reflect many aspects of military CBMs proposed by the two Koreas. (See Table 1.)

It seemed that arms control negotiation talks were on the right track. However, as the resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem has become very complicated and difficult, the tension in the Korean peninsula has increased and not all agreements between the two Koreas have been implemented. By raising suspicions about its intentions, the North Korean nuclear program inhibits serious arms control progress—that is, any actual arrangements to diffuse the military confrontation between the two Koreas. No serious military confidence-building measures seem likely to be introduced and implemented (or even considered in detail) until the prospect of North Korean nuclear weapons is actually seen to decline.\(^{23}\) Thus, we can say that the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue is a precondition for inter-Korean arms control.

Based upon satisfactory resolution of the nuclear issue, we can introduce and implement arms control measures including CBMs. As already mentioned, the Basic Agreement and the Provisions have some CBMs. With the exception of agreement on a Hot Line, most CBMs contained in the Basic Agreement and the Provisions are declaratory in nature and serve as guiding principles for future CBMs. What is required from now on is the development of more concrete and detailed CBM and of a step-by-step approach and strategy.


\(^{24}\)The first three were raised by North Korea, and the fourth was raised by South Korea.

Table 2. Types of Confidence-Building Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transparency Measures</th>
<th>Constraint Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information Measures</td>
<td>Inspection Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>force composition</td>
<td>observers during military movements, exercises, and maneuvers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defense industry</td>
<td>observers in sensitive areas and constrained facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defense budget data</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>personnel exchange</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>force deployment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Inspection Measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>observers during military movements,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exercises, and maneuvers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>observers in sensitive areas and</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>constrained facilities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Communication Measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hot line</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>crisis management</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Notification Measures</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>military maneuvers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>military movements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mobilization</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Physical Constraint Measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personnel constraint</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maneuver and movement constraint</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limitations or bans on specific types of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weapon test equipment constraint</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>limiting or prohibiting specified types</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and/or offensive equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation and Verification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>observation of military exercises,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maneuvers, and movements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>code of conduct for provision of</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>adequate opportunities to observe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to accomplish such tasks, it seems necessary to take into account the character of each CBM, the security concerns of each side, and to assess the probable effects of each CBM on inter-Korean relations. Then we must prioritize CBMs implementation.

We can divide CBMs into two categories: transparency measures and constraint measures. Constraint measures are intended to limit a state’s ability to launch a surprise attack. Transparency measures are designed to make hostile purposes hard to conceal by adopting measures to clarify the intent, purposes, and capabilities of the concerned states. Even if we divide CBMs into two categories, they are not completely mutually exclusive. Rather they can mutually support and reinforce each one’s effectiveness.

In addition to these two categories of CBMs, we can think of the so-called “declaratory CBMs” such as non-use of forces and peaceful settlement of disputes as a separate category of CBMs. Such measures are rather political and symbolic in nature since these measures do not require any concrete action. And they can be considered as guiding principles for future CBMs. In order to make such declaratory measures meaningful, it is necessary to introduce more concrete and substantive CBMs as soon as possible as we have seen in Sino-Soviet/Russian case. Otherwise these measures can become meaningless political and diplomatic propaganda. (See Table 2.)

Since both Koreas have agreed on most declaratory measures, such as renunciation of use of force and peaceful resolution of disputes and prevention of escalation in crisis, in the Basic Agreement and the Provisions, we can say that we are now at the stage of introducing and implementing more concrete and substantive measures.

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Then we must ask what kind of measures are required to stabilize and manage inter-Korean relations carefully at the initial stage of inter-Korean arms control talks, and to provide a firm ground for future arms reduction.

It seems that at the initial stage of building military confidence between the South and the North, transparency measures accompanied by some constraint measures should be applied first. The reason that transparency measures should be introduced first is that excessive secrecy can damage relations between states by fostering ever greater suspicions, hostility and worst-case assumptions. Measures to promote transparency in certain areas of military affairs can be considered as a useful corrective tool to this kind of problem by providing opportunities for communicating non-hostile intentions and for allaying unwarranted suspicions.28

Transparency, of course, is not a cure-all, nor does it change military realities. Some forms of transparency may tend to create instability and feelings of vulnerability.29 Thus, what we try to do is to obtain a better balance between secrecy and transparency in the interest of fostering common security and mutual respect for each other’s legitimate security concerns.

Keeping these facts in mind, let us review land-based CBMs in the first stage. The first group of CBMs can be limited in scope, less intrusive, and, to a certain degree, voluntary in nature. This includes:

- exchanges of military information,30
- notification of military movements, maneuvers, and exercises;
- operation of a hot line;
- demilitarization and conversion of the DMZ into a peace zone; and
- relocation of offensive weapons.

Among these land-based CBMs, the exchange of military information and the operation of a hot line between the high military authorities may be the easiest thing to achieve. In order to prevent accidental armed clashes and to avoid their escalation, both sides have agreed to establish a hot line between military authorities.31 However, until now, the agreement on the establishment of the hot line has not been fully implemented and the details of operation have not yet been discussed. So, we can expect that if inter-Korean dialogue resumes after the resolution of North Korean nuclear issue, the issue of operation of a hot line will become the first agenda item to be dealt with; it seems to have high feasibility. However, based upon our previous experience,32 using communications confidently and properly will be hard, especially between antagonists that have not communicated in any routine way for nearly four decades (since the end of the Korean War).33 Furthermore, the intrinsic value of hot line lies in allowing national leaders to deal directly with each other in emergencies, in a final effort to avoid conflict. Thus, we can say that hot lines in Korea may be of value once conflict has begun and one party or both wish to terminate it without further escalation.34 In a word, the value of a hot line lies in crisis management and termination. We can conclude that the establishment and operation of a hot line between military authorities has limited value in crisis prevention: that is, it has political and symbolic meaning and significance rather than purely military utility. Pre-arranged, routinized, and reliable communications between military authorities are likely to enhance confidence between the two parties by providing the opportunities for indirect contact until the exchange of military personnel is implemented.

Second, the exchange of military information should be included in the first stage of CBMs. However, regarding this measure, there is a fundamental difference between South and North Korea. North Korea has been very reluc-

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30The exchange of military information and the exchange of military personnel are usually paired. However, North Korea seems very reluctant to accept a personnel exchange measure. Initially, we might start with the exchange of military information only.
31According to Article 12, 13, 14 and 15, the two Koreas agreed to open the hot line within 50 days of the coming into force of the Provisions, and agreed to set up a steering working group of five people. Chosun Ilbo, 18 September 1992.
32Based on the July 4th Joint Communiqué, the two Koreas established a direct telephone line. However, whenever there were conflicts and tensions, North Korea cut off the line without prior notification.
34Ibid., 32.
tant in this regard. North Korea may fear that revealing military information could jeopardize its own security, and may perceive that manipulating secrecy in this area against South Korea may work for its own interests. On the other hand, South Korea cannot trust North Korea as long as North Korea does not respond to the information exchange measures. Difference on this issue can be overcome by limiting the range and scope of information. For example, at the initial stage, we can start with an exchange of, not detailed information, but simple aggregate number of troops, specific weapons, and defense budget. Since such information is already available through Military Balance or SIPRI Yearbook, the exchange of such information does not undermine each other’s security posture. Rather it is likely to enhance military confidence between the two Koreas. From the South Korean perspective, if North Korea adopts this kind of measure, it can be perceived as a sign of North Korea’s genuine willingness and sincerity to reduce tension and to build confidence between the two Koreas. Furthermore, by restricting the scope and range of information, we can overcome North Korea’s suspicion that this kind of measure is to be used as an intelligence activity.

Or we can utilize the UN Register of Conventional Arms which invites members to submit information on import/export of seven categories of weapons, and background information regarding military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies on a voluntary base by April 30th of each year. Among the Northeast Asian states, only North Korea has failed to file its report. Further delay or inaction by North Korea may undermine its own credibility. Thus, first of all, it seems necessary for North Korea to take proper measures regarding the UN Register. And, before the submission of the requested information to the UN, both Koreas can exchange its report as a way to build confidence.

Based upon successful utilization and implementation of the UN Register and simple/aggregate forms of information exchange, both sides can expand the scope of information exchanged and then introduce militarily significant detailed information exchange measures.

In order to prevent either side from engaging in a surprise attack, and to reduce the chance of misunderstanding and misjudgment, it is necessary to adopt notification measures. Notification measures should be of interest to both sides. Increments of effective and timely warning are very important for South Korea, whose capital is only 45km away from the DMZ. On the other hand, North Korea has considerable interest in reducing exercises in scope and content, and knowing about them far in advance.

Since Article 12 of the Basic Agreement only makes reference to “major” movements of “military units” and exercises, what is required is to determine the notification parameters. Given the differences in the composition of military units under the two governments, it could prove difficult to predetermine the size of units requiring notification. For example, North Korea is likely to insist that this size be set at the division level. On the other hand, South Korea would most likely insist on pre-specification at the brigade level, as the brigade is the unit most frequently used by the North Koreans. One possible way to overcome such a difference is to set up different notification dates for different sizes of military maneuvers, movements, and exercises involving different sets of military equipment.

By setting up different prior notification dates for different sizes of military activities, we can include various kinds of military activities in Table 3. Notification Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number/Size of Troops</th>
<th>Date for Notification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers shown in this table are arbitrary and hypothetical. They can change depending upon the result of negotiations between the two Koreas.

35On specific weapons, we can include: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, and attack helicopters which are four out of seven categories used in the UN Register of Conventional Arms.


38Thomas Hirschfeld, 30–31.
notification. It is very comprehensive, and would benefit both Koreas.

Demilitarization and conversion of the DMZ into a peace zone is another important confidence-building measure. The most important objectives for the peaceful utilization of the DMZ are the strengthening of its original function as a buffer zone (as described in the Military Armistice Agreement), and the improvement of confidence and cooperation, in essence making it a “field of confidence.”

Achievement of this objective would require both sides to suspend hostile activities in the DMZ and to correct armistice violations. Especially, from the South Korean perspective, underground tunnels which pass the DMZ should be identified and then destroyed. Another measure we can apply here is to clear up visual obstructions.

Unlike other measures, measures for demilitarization and conversion of the DMZ into a peace zone require mutual inspection and it seems possible to do so. Both Koreas can jointly inspect and verify the corrective measures. Or, if it is not possible, we can utilize either UN Peace Keeping Operations or the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. However, it is desirable to have representatives of both Koreas in any case.

Along with the demilitarization of the DMZ, we can employ some constraint measures: that is, relocation of offensive weapons, such as river-crossing equipment, long-range large calibre artillery systems, battle tanks, and armored combat vehicles, away from the DMZ. If not all of these are possible, North Korea should relocate its longer range large, calibre artillery systems whose range is well beyond Seoul. If North Korea would guarantee the security of Seoul by pulling its artillery systems away from their current locations, it would enhance greatly South Korea’s confidence. It may be the most effective land-based CBM we can expect.

We have reviewed the first set of land-based CBMs we can apply to the Korean peninsula. They are: a) establishment and operation of a hot line; b) notification of military movements, maneuvers, and exercises; c) exchange of military information; d) demilitarization and conversion of the DMZ into a peace zone; and e) relocation of offensive weapons. Based upon successful implementation of these measures in the first place, we can introduce other CBMs which may be more intrusive and constraining.

Other Areas for Land-based CBMs: Sino-Russian Border, Sino-Vietnamese Border, and the Northern Territories

Previously, we have identified some other areas which contain some potential for conflict: the Sino-Russian border, Sino-Vietnamese border, and the Northern Territories. Among these other areas of concern, the Sino-Russian front is the core, since stability and peace in other areas depend upon the fluctuation of Sino-Russian relations in general.

On the Sino-Soviet/Russian front, arms reductions and some form of CBMs have already been introduced and implemented since the late 1980s. In April 1990, China and the former Soviet Union signed an agreement on guiding principles for the reduction of armed forces and the strengthening of mutual confidence in the military field including routine military exchange. Since then, the two sides have conducted negotiations on the concrete measures to implement the principles. In May 1991 Dimitri Yazov, when he visited Beijing, acknowledged that China and the Soviet Union no longer perceived a threat from each other. The two sides have by now reached agreement on most issues. The Joint Declaration issued by China and Russia in December 1992 stated that the two sides should reduce their armed forces in the border region to the lowest level commensurate with the friendly relations between the two countries. The two sides also agreed to take concrete measures to strengthen mutual confidence and maintain tranquility in the border region. They reaffirmed their commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons or to threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon-free zones under any circumstance. They also stated that neither side would seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or any other region in the world, and that both sides were opposed to any form of hegemony and power politics.


40It is believed that North Korea has dug several underground tunnels. Up to now, three have been detected.

The Sino-Soviet/Russian conflict, which was once regarded inevitable and/or unavoidable, seems gone permanently. However, it is too early to say that Sino-Russian relations will continue to improve and become fully institutionalized as for the case of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The problem is closely related to the domestic political situation of both countries: that is, the political leadership change. It is uncertain how and when leadership change would occur and to assess the character of the succeeding leaders. If the next generation of political leaders in both countries is more nationalistic and assertive, political and military detente between the two giants would not last long. In order to prevent such things from happening, the current leadership of both countries should strengthen and expand CBMs they have already taken. What is more important is that they formalize and publicize what they have agreed to. We are very curious about the content and details of Sino-Soviet/Russian arms control measures. Opening up the secrecy of Sino-Russian arms control agreements would enhance other neighbors’ confidence in China and Russia. Furthermore, making these Agreements public will enable other neighbors to predict and assess their own security environment and to be prepared for it. Such behavior would lessen international suspicions and ambiguity over Sino-Russian detente. Now is the time for China and Russia to strengthen mutual, regional, and international confidence in their non-aggressive intentions and military capabilities by making the contents of their CBMs public and internationalized.

To a lesser extent, China and Vietnam should engage in extensive negotiations for measures to stabilize the situation along their borders. It is necessary for China to apply to Vietnam the same kind of land-based CBMs that are adopted between Russia and China. By striking a balance between the different border areas, China could enhance its peace image and soothe the fears of its neighbors. Consequently, China could really contribute to regional stability and peace. Furthermore, by stabilizing the situation along the Sino-Vietnamese border, China can eliminate this potential source of conflict between Russia and China. This kind of measure is likely to strengthen Sino-Russian detente. In a word, CBMs which are already adopted and implemented along the Sino-Russian border should be expanded toward other border areas. If not, China may raise the concerns of small states.

Finally, it is important to have stable and cooperative relations between Russia and Japan by solving the issue of “the Northern Territories.” From all aspects, improved Russo-Japanese relations are essential for the stability of the region. Without normalization of Russo-Japanese relations, we can hardly expect a truly cooperative concert of powers in Northeast Asia. The discussion between Russia and Japan on how to implement the Joint Declaration of 1956 is required. In the mean time, Russia should reduce the size of troops and equipment deployed there. Such Russian behavior can be perceived by the Japanese as a sign of Russian willingness to solve the territorial dispute with Japan.

In sum, all the bilateral issues such as the Korean peninsula, Sino-Russian border, Chinese-Vietnamese border and Russo-Japanese territorial dispute should be resolved between the concerned parties. As we mentioned before, the scope of applicability of land-based CBMs may be limited but is very important to secure stability on lands which can be direct and urgent flashpoints for conflict. Land-based CBMs should be accompanied by other CBMs, such as maritime and nuclear CBMs. In a word, we should adopt a synergistic approach.

**Conclusion**

Right now, the situation on the Korean peninsula is unstable and unpredictable because of the pending issue of the North Korean nuclear problem. It is very uncertain when both Koreas will resume their talks in general and have the first meeting of the Joint Military Commission in which arms control measures, including CBMs, will be discussed in detail. The resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem is required for introducing and implementing land-based CBMs. Initial hopes and expectations for CBMs applied to the Korean peninsula will probably have to remain limited for some time to come. CBMs are incremental and require patience. And, in other areas of concern, we should en-

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encourage the concerned parties to take a more active stance with respect to CBMs.

In most cases, the increased openness in military information is crucial to build confidence. Secrecy cannot guarantee national security. Rather we should try to achieve a balance between secrecy and openness. In this regard, we should try either to utilize the UN Register of Conventional Arms or to create a regional register of conventional arms. This kind of action will increase predictability, assurance and certainty which can, in turn, enhance confidence.

Verification is very important. One of the defects of the UN Register is the absence of verification mechanisms. Of course, it is understandable that in order to encourage members to participate the UN Register intentionally deletes verification mechanisms. However, without verification measures, information exchange has a danger of becoming a cheating device. Thus, we should adopt a minimum level of verification measures. We have to make it clear that this is not intended to replace intelligence activities, only to enhance mutual trust and confidence. The watchword must be: “Trust but verify.”

Notification of military activities is also important. Especially if these activities take place near the border areas, it is crucial to have notification far in advance. Along with notification measures, it is necessary to reduce the size of troops and withdraw some offensive military equipment from the borders either unilaterally or through bilateral negotiations. This kind of measure can be a sign of the introduction of “defensive defense” and will reduce surprise attack capabilities and provide longer warning times.

By applying these kinds of measures in bilateral relations, we can lay a firm ground for multilateral region-wide CBM regime. The resolution of bilateral issues can be considered as a precondition for introducing multilateral security cooperation. Otherwise, even if we establish a multilateral security cooperation regime, the effectiveness of such a regime will be constrained by the presence of bilateral disputes such as the Korean peninsula, Sino-Russian border, Sino-Vietnamese border, and Russo-Japanese territorial disputes. Rather this will become a place for political propaganda and will complicate the situation.

Finally, we should avoid wishful thinking. CBMs are not a panacea. The utility of CBMs may be very limited in scope. We should clearly recognize the limits and the effectiveness of CBMs. The most important fact that we have to keep in mind is that the effectiveness of any arms control measure, including CBMs, is determined by the political will of the concerned states. As many strategists and academics argue, political detente is required prior to military detente. Arms control is the military currency of politics.
Support for Maritime Cooperative Security

With the significant changes in the Asian-Pacific security environment in the post-Cold War era, cooperative security in the region becomes both attainable and necessary. Countries in the Asia Pacific have come to realize that apart from the traditional bilateral security arrangements, multilateral efforts are needed for dealing with common issues facing them so as to lay the foundation for a new balance of regional security. “The conditions generated by the dissolution of the Soviet Union require the rethinking of strategic issues in every capital. The general trend is to build constructive cooperation among countries, especially on security issues, and to foster the restructuring of global and regional international institutions.”¹ The reluctance shown by the minority countries to participate in cooperative security arrangements might change.

Russia, China, North Korea, Japan and the U.S. share an interest in seeing conditions of peace, progress and stability in Northeast Asia, especially on the Korean peninsula. “The four (Russia, China, Japan and the U.S.) also share an interest in avoiding inadvertent incidents and preventing activities that could bring them into unintended conflict with one another.”² The existence in Northeast Asia of countries with different social systems and paths of development is an objective reality formed in history; yet there are advances in communications, transportation, and commercial transaction that serve to integrate these disparate nations. The establishment of a cooperative relationship among the six looks hopeful. The Pacific Ocean is a shared medium, used by all and vitally important to all. It is at sea that economic, political and security interests of regional countries intersect. This intersection further suggests that the timing might now be right to examine forms of maritime cooperation inconceivable before the Cold War’s thaw.

Maritime activities might increase or reduce conflicts of interests between countries. At present, except for a few bilateral treaties, no broadly recognized procedures provide guidelines for the conduct of maritime activities within the region. Maintenance of the status quo in Northeast Asian maritime affairs "ignores manifold signals of approaching danger and invites mistrust, miscalculation, and miscre in the evolving regional security environment."

As the idea of a Northeast Asian security regime has been generally acceptable, maritime security, an important dimension of security, could act as a catalyst for establishing a security regime. As some forms of maritime cooperation could serve to overcome difficulties and improve overall relationships, addressing maritime security offers realistic prospects for viable and meaningful regional security measures. "Despite differences in cultures, religions, and political persuasions, there is much in our common experience at sea that binds seafaring men and woman together. In raging seas and Taifun winds, there are no enemies, only survivors;" "Professional sailors share a common maritime heritage and unique way of life that provide fertile ground for achieving broader international goals." Building on this shared background, maritime cooperation can serve as a bridge to broader security cooperation among nations.

Due to their predominant naval presence in the Pacific Ocean, the U.S. and Russia assume the main responsibility in maritime cooperative security in Northeast Asia. It is encouraging that the U.S., which opposed maritime CBMs (Confidence-Building Measures) and naval arms control in the past in order to keep maritime superiority, emphasizes now international cooperative approaches to regional and global problems. An American commander says, "The U.S. Navy’s deployability, sustainability, and ability to operate in tandem with the forces of many other nations make it a particularly suitable instrument to achieve longer policy goals through cooperative engagement."

Maritime Security: A Topic High on the Agenda

The Importance of the Sea in Northeast Asia

The sea occupies an important position in Northeast Asia, and is the central component of the region. The shores of Northeast Asian countries are washed by the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea, and Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Bering Sea, and in a broad sense by the Pacific Ocean. Of strategic importance are the straits of Tsushima, Tsugaru, and La Perouse, and the Catherine, Osumi and Bering Straits. In terms of ship movement, the seas and straits are among the busiest in the world. In the Sea of Japan, a significant volume of commercial and military traffic is involved. According to a 1990 study by the Washington-based Stimson Center, there are more incidents in the Sea of Japan than any other theater world-wide. Despite the end of the Cold War, risk-prone "old practices" have continued. In February 1992, for example, there was a potentially dangerous incident involving the U.S. submarine USS Baton Rouge and a Russian Sierra-class SSN. In March 1993, there was a collision between the U.S. Grayling and a Russian Delta-class SSBN. In August 1993, there was an incident between the Chinese navy and Russian merchant ships in the East China Sea. Countries in the region rely on the sea to develop trade and foreign trade is still transported by the sea. U.S. trade with Asia eclipsed that with Europe 12 years ago, and 50 percent more crosses the Pacific than the Atlantic. Japan is a major trading nation depending heavily on the sea for resources and shipping of its manufactured goods. Russia also has important SLOCs linking the Russian Far East with the western part of the country, and fifty percent of the trade between the two regions travels by sea. Great powers in the region defend their interests mainly with their navies. American power in the Pacific is primarily maritime. U.S. naval forces in the Pacific consist of 76 ships (including six carriers, 23 combatants, 11 amphibious vessels, 21 submarines, and 15 support units), 25 percent of which remain in the Western Pacific, homeported mainly in Japan. U.S.

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4Ibid., 10, 22.
5Ibid., 11.
capabilities in the Asia Pacific will decrease some 20 percent over the next few years, including one or two aircraft carriers. The capabilities of the Russian Pacific Fleet have not been reduced, although the fleet is increasingly bound to home waters. According to an international group of naval officers gathered at Stanford University in 1993 to consider naval cooperation in the Pacific, “The United States and Russia are maritime powers both in the Pacific and worldwide, based on their maritime heritage, and the size and capability of their navies. Although the current size of their navies is largely the result of Cold War competition, and both navies are being reduced, yet both will retain sufficient naval forces to support their future national interests.”

A Russian captain says, “Based on historical precedents, Russia as an independent state will rise above today’s difficult internal economic situation to maintain an effective combat-ready fleet with the potential to accomplish its tasks in all regions of the world.” Russia “is mostly concerned with the security implications of the American naval presence in the region adjacent to the Kurile Islands and Kamchatka Peninsula,” in which the major source of perceived threats lies not so much in naval facilities as such, but rather with naval-based American aviation which may intrude into Russian airspace. On the other hand, the larger part of Russian Pacific Fleet is concentrated in the Sea of Japan which objectively represents a threat to Japanese territory. The outstanding Northern Territories disputes between Russia and Japan involve control of the Catherine Strait. In November 1991, the Soviet Defense Ministry noted that giving up the two most important islands (Kunashir and Iturup) would give Japan control over the strategic strait. This in turn would give both Japanese and American submarines free access of the Sea of Okhotsk. An Australian scholar Andrew Mack wrote, “Access of U.S. hunter-killer submarines (SSNs) to the Sea of Okhotsk has long been a sensitive issue for Moscow since the Sea of Okhotsk is a major deployment area for Russian missile-firing submarine (SSBNs) which were targeted for destruction by the U.S. Navy in the event of even a conventional war.”

Disputes over Maritime Rights and Interests

Countries in Northeast Asia are going to pay increasing attention to the exploration of marine resources such as oil, gas, and fishery in the process of developing their economies. The defense of maritime rights and interests has become a major task of Northeast Asian countries, who will not easily make concessions in this regard. The Proclamation of the UN convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982 has exacerbated the competing claims for maritime jurisdictional zones in the region. Apart from disputes in the application of straight baselines, overlapping jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and the continental shelf is an inevitable outcome of this new ocean regime. The political and security dimensions of interstate relations in Northeast Asia have serious maritime ramifications as a result. The EEZs of most bordering states overlap with adjacent neighbors, thus giving rise to boundary-delimitation problems. Up till now, some fragmentary agreements regarding delimitation of the continental shelf are in force in Northeast Asia, but there even exist disputes over some of these agreements among relevant parties. For example, in 1974 Japan and South Korea signed an agreement defining their continental shelf boundary throughout the Korea Strait and the western entrance of the Yellow Sea. China has protested against it, warning Japan and South Korea against “infringing on China’s sovereignty,” when “it stood to reason that the question of how to divide those parts of the continental shelf in the East China Sea involving other countries should be decided by China and the related countries through consultations.” Besides, there are no accepted solutions regarding the delimitation of economic zones in the region (except U.S.-Russian delimitation of maritime zones in the Bering Sea circa 1990). The situation is further complicated by existing territorial disputes that have direct relevance to maritime jurisdiction. Firstly, there is the contention between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Dao (Senkaku) Islands. The total size of the area is about 7 square kilometers. China says the islands have

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9Skaridov et. al. 1994, 5.
been administered by China since the Ming Dynasty (14th to 17th century), while Japan says the islands were “occupied and administered” by Japan in the Late 19 century. The Controversy involves two dimensions: the sovereignty over the islands and the relevant maritime jurisdictional rights and interests. The disputes are closely related with oil resources. They have been intensified since the reported oil reserves in its water areas in the late 1960s. Possession of islands would confer title over about 11,700 square nautical miles of the continental shelf landwards of the 200-meter isobath (depth-line). “For Japan the Senkaku Islands represents access to a potentially valuable section of the continental shelf of the East China Sea.” 13 Then there is the contention between Japan and South Korea over Liancourt Rocks (called Take Shima by the Japanese and TOK-Do by the South Koreans), causing the impossibility of delimiting the continental shelf boundary between them in the Sea of Japan. “If South Korea or Japan were able to gain exclusive title to these islets, they would also secure title to surrounding seas measuring 18,545 nm.” 14 The conflict between Japan and Russia over the Northern Islands is noteworthy. Japanese regard them as an integral part of the Japanese homeland. “In addition to sentimental satisfaction, Japan would gain waters and seabed extending for about 57,000nm.” 15 For Russia, retaining all the Kuril Islands makes the Sea of Okhotsk a Soviet Sea. There exists also the contention between China and Korea over the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Yellow Sea, as they apply a different principal of international law (the natural prolongation of land territory principle or the median-line principle.)

**Ongoing Naval Arms Acquisition**

Northeast Asia has become one of the most heavily militarized regions in the world. Regional maritime capabilities are not only large, but also are expanding rapidly. In the near future, there will be more navies of consequence on the maritime scene. Regional maritime strike capabilities will be significantly augmented by the acquisition of new submarines during the course of next several years. With the increase of naval strike capabilities which tend, in general, to be more inflammatory than other more defensive capabilities, the risk of local misunderstanding and miscalculation will be much higher than it is at present.

Apart from the U.S. and Russia, Japan already has a substantial and very modern naval force, ranking seventh in the world. Japan owns some 120 maritime aircraft, 56 major surface combatants (39 destroyers and 17 frigates), and 16 submarines. Japan will have some 15 new Yuushino and Harushio submarines by the mid-1990s. Moreover, as Australian defense scholars Desmond Ball and Commodore W.S.G. Bateman write (in a paper for the 1991 workshop “Naval Confidence-and Security-Building Regimes for the Asian-Pacific Region”), “[Japan] is planning to acquire tanker aircraft to extend the range of its air coverage, and is considering the acquisition of ‘defensive’ aircraft carriers.” 16 Japan recently launched the first of at least three U.S. $1.0 billion destroyers equipped with U.S. Aegis radar surveillance and tracking systems.

The PRC’s navy is growing. It is improving the amphibious capability of its fleets, acquiring an air-to-air refueling capability for its naval air forces, and upgrading its craft. China currently has 92 non-strategic submarines (many of them are in fact nonoperational), including four nuclear-powered Han-class and three improved Ming-class submarines, and has 19 type 0-51 destroyers armed with two triple HY-2 SSM, and 37 type O-53J frigates carrying two twin HQ-61 SAM. China has been equipped with SU-27 Flanker fighters, the only truly modern fighter in China’s air force.

South Korea now has 38 destroyers and frigates, and four submarines. South Korea’s Navy is acquiring 67 German-built T-209-1400 submarines and may acquire a further six oceangoing submarines. South Korea plans to increase its surface fleet significantly over the next decade by acquiring up to 17 new destroyers, more frigates, and boosting its corvette inventory to 50. It also plans to build up to 68 fast patrol boats. 17

North Korea has 22 Soviet-built submarines (18 Romeo class and 4 Whiskey class) plus some 40 midget submarines. It has one single frigate

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14 Ibid., 47.
15 Ibid., 60.
as well. It has plans for naval arms acquisition, but the resources are probably lacking for such acquisition in the near future.

Maritime Security Measures

Transparency

The new security environment has provided possibilities for regional maritime cooperative security. The measures include transparency, CBMs, and naval arms control. These measures may be developed both progressively and alternatively, depending on concrete conditions. Actually the measures are overlapping to a certain extent, and can complement and promote each other. “A basic source of insecurity appears to be an underlying mistrust, not the nature of a state’s forces or intentions,” according to an international group of naval officers, and mistrust is usually fueled by a lack of transparency. While there exist potential causes of conflict in Northeast Asian waters, there is a real risk of misunderstanding between maritime forces operating in similar areas. The risk is heightened by the presence of submarines and long-range missile systems which require well-developed procedures and effective command and control systems. To avoid errors and miscalculations and to overcome mistrust, transparency is evidently necessary. Some Northeast Asian countries have no habit of transparency. They do not publish defense white papers, and there is little transparency with regard to the motivations and intentions of military buildup, especially current acquisition programs. Maritime security will be based on mutual understanding of the naval aims of each country and their mutual involvement in the process of safeguarding regional peace and security. Broad dissemination of official naval policy would facilitate cooperative dialogue. Transparency measures through open exchanges of information could include:

- defense policy
- military doctrine and strategy
- security concerns
- military organization
- force structure
- military expenditure
- military deployments
- prior notification of large-scale transfers of combatants

Maritime Confidence-Building Measures

An important component of maritime cooperative security is the establishment of maritime confidence-building measures (MCBMs). This is an effective step to reduce the risks of maritime conflicts and misunderstanding of maritime activities at sea. Naval operations above, on, and below the sea, even in support of routine peacetime missions, have become increasingly sophisticated and complex. The underwater environment is particularly opaque, and underwater operations are particularly subject to uncertainty, confusion, loss of control, accidents, and inadvertent escalation. MCBMs exactly meet the requirements, and the introduction of submarines and long-range and anti-ship missiles is best accompanied by MCBMs. The unique role of peacetime naval activities will figure prominently in these measures.

MCBMs consist of two types: information MCBMs and constraint MCBMs. The term usually refers to information MCBMs, which may include:

- reduction of the size and frequency of exercises
- exchange of observers for exercises
- intelligence exchanges including oceanographic, hydrographic, and meteorological data
- exchanges of data on force levels and weapons platform building programs
- “hotlines,” and direct communications between all Northeast Asian naval headquarters
- dialogs on naval doctrines and strategy
- peacetime joint naval exercises and exchange of liaison officers
- cooperative maritime surveillance and oceanographic research
- cooperative protection of shipping and disaster assistance
- the settlement of territorial disputes and other issues by peaceful means
- creation of international standards for modern ship-to-ship direct teletype communications and a naval traffic control regime
- creation of uniform standard operating procedures (SOP) to coordinate basic peacetime missions and to limit the possibility of inadvertent combat or dangerous military activities. “SOP should be predicated on principles of equality and mutual benefit so that all nations and all navies are accorded the
formal respect due any sovereign nation, regardless of size.”

- organization of naval conferences and professional seminars on issues pertaining to UNCLOS 111, firstly on the rules governing the demarcation of baselines and the transit rights of warships through the territorial seas of another state.
- the establishment of a forum for senior-ranking officers of every navy to address maritime security issues. Development of personal and professional relationships helps lay the foundation for increased understanding.

Constraint MCBMs refer to agreements not to conduct particular types of maritime operations in a particular area or not to acquire certain technologies of maritime warfare. In this sense, they overlap with naval arms control measures (see next section).

**Naval Arms Control**

For guaranteeing maritime security, naval arms control has to be taken eventually. Due to the high mobility of naval forces that can be easily moved from theater to theater, naval arms control is ideally accomplished on a global basis; but owing to the difficulty of global process, regional naval arms control in Northeast Asia should be encouraged to take the lead for global naval arms control. The aim would be to initiate a process of substantial reductions of both nuclear and conventional forces, involving all regional countries that have acquired or are on the verge of acquiring significant naval capabilities. Naval arms control includes structural measures to limit or reduce the quantity and capability of naval equipment, as well as operational measures to restrict particular types of naval activity to particular geographical areas. It suggests that each country feels a need to place constraints on the other’s force structure and/or operations. For example, transferring all the Russia Far Eastern Fleets missile-firing submarines (SSBNs) to the Atlantic seaboard of Russia would provide an incentive for U.S. naval reduction in the region—since the main threat of U.S. (and Japanese) anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operation is directed at the Russian SSBNs. “In the absence of the Russian SSBNs there would be no need for the current high level of U.S. and Japanese ASW capabilities in the region.” Besides, the nuclear issue in Northeast Asia is one of concern to all regional countries. “All Northeast Asian states are potential nuclear states— all have nuclear power or research programs which could, relatively quickly, serve as the basis for nuclear weapons programs.”

In seeking to ban, limit or otherwise control naval equipment and operations, naval arms control may include:

- regulation of naval arms trade
- limits on naval operations near international shipping lanes and international straits
- bans on naval activities in areas of conflict or tension
- limits on anti-ship missile acquisition
- limits on naval aviation and naval aircraft acquisition
- restrictions on the number, operation areas, equipment, and nuclear warheads of submarines
- a negotiated reduction of nuclear attack submarine (SSNs) numbers
- the control of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological)
- “a standard set of Rules of Engagement (ROE) must be developed and agreed upon before embarking on any naval operations where the threat of combat is involved.”
- maritime nuclear weapon-free zones.

**Maritime Non-Conventional Cooperation**

Many non-conventional threats to regional security come from the sea. Such transitional threats are impossible for a single country to resolve; thus multilateral maritime cooperative activities are necessary. These activities may include agreements for handling piracy, smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal migration and refugee movements, illegal fishing, international terrorism and international criminal activity, and environmentally damaging activities, including maritime pollution and the depletion of maritime mammal stocks. In cases of humanitarian operations or natural disaster recovery operations, multilateral naval cooperation is crucial. For example, the U.S. and Russian navies may “Conduct joint disaster relief operations in Alaska. ... Invite participation by Canadian and Japanese forces. ... Conduct Joint Sail Pacific. This operation is en-
visioned as a small scale U.S.-Russian Navy force that would circumnavigate the Pacific Rim conducting both humanitarian and small-scale exercises with Pacific states. Other countries could participate in selected portions of the trip as desired.24

Present Feasible Measures

Measures Already Achieved

The CBMs currently applicable to Northeast Asia are mostly the result of global agreements between the former Soviet Union and the United States. These agreements are not insignificant, and in some cases they have their great relevance in Northeast Asia. Though the U.S. was particularly skeptical about ex-Soviet proposals for naval CBMs, these proposals clearly include Maritime CBMs, which constrain the navy’s ability to conduct certain types of operations.

Such bilateral agreements include:

• The 1972 Soviet-United States Incidents-at-Sea Agreement (INCSEA). Since geographically Northeast Asia is mostly ocean, the agreement is extremely important for regional confidence building, especially in confined sea areas such as the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk.

• The 1988 Soviet-United States Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles. “This Agreement is more relevant to Asia-Pacific than to any other region in the world since both super-powers use the Pacific Ocean as a missile splashdown site.”25

• The 1989 Soviet-United States Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, which seeks to extend the Incidents-at-Sea Agreement to land activities.

• The 1989 Soviet-United States Bering Straits Region Commission, which is empowered to deal with unintentional border crossings and minor incidents in the area.

What is heartening is that there are some proposals and negotiations now for establishing CBMs in the region. The two Koreas are now both proposing classic CBMs, such as making the demilitarized zone truly demilitarized and establishing formal government-to-government hot lines. Russia and China are holding talks to establish, in effect, a demilitarized zone between them. However, Northeast Asian states have made little headway with maritime CBMs, which are much needed there. “While South Korea has invited the North to observe its military exercises, including naval exercises, this has been declined on the grounds that it would help legitimize the division of the Korean peninsula.”26

The ex-Soviet proposals for an “open seas” agreement, including the exchange of information about the movements and armaments of naval vessels and submarines,27 for anti-submarine-warfare-zones, for withdrawal of nuclear-armed ships from parts of the Pacific, etc., are yet to be discussed.

Measures to Be Taken at Present

Maritime security cooperation is a gradual and incremental process. Those areas where confluent interests evidently exist may serve as first steps, and maritime CBMs just meet the needs in this regard. As Northeast Asian countries are heavily dependent on seaborne trade, and the security of shipping is of primary importance, the following three regimes might be taken first in the process of establishing regional MCBMs.

The first regime would cover regional avoidance of incidents at sea. This would reduce the potential for incidents or accidents involving naval forces operating in Northeast Asian waters. The 1972 agreement (INSCEA) between the United States and the Soviet Union to prevent incidents on and over the high seas is an excellent example of a practical MCBM. A review of that agreement has identified several reasons for its success: mutuality of interests; involvement of professional naval officers; consistency with agreed customary international law; a working and workable agreement; and a bilateral forum.

Incidents-at-sea agreements between regional navies would constitute a desirable MCBM in Northeast Asia. Maritime activities that could be covered by the agreement include:

• Entry into the national territory (internal waters and territorial sea and the airspace

26 Ibid., 134.
above) of the other party unintentionally, or through force majeure.

- The restriction of maritime exercises to particular areas.
- Minimum approach distances for naval ships and maritime aircraft.
- The potentially harmful use of lasers.
- Potentially harmful interference with command and control networks.
- Communications procedures to avoid or resolve peacefully any activity covered by the agreements.\(^{28}\)

Countries in the region have shown more or less enthusiasm toward such measures, as the need for such North Pacific INCSEA-type agreements is clear. In October 1991, the Japanese and Soviet foreign ministers agreed to begin a bilateral dialogue on security involving military and foreign officials. From the point of view of maritime security, the most important aspect of the agreement was that negotiations would begin on a treaty aimed at the prevention of accidents between naval ships, modeled on the 1972 U.S.-Soviet INCSEA agreement. Though the negotiation was stranded for more than two years, it has been lately resumed between Russia and Japan. Once signed, this would be another significant incidents-at-sea agreement in the region. Further, it was said that the South Korean government has also moved in that direction, by agreeing to negotiate an INCSEA agreement with the Russians.

The second regime would cover regional maritime surveillance and safety regime. This would provide a useful peacetime mechanism for enhancing maritime safety along the busy shipping routes in the area. An initial step in the establishment of the regime should be the delimitation and acceptance of the objectives of the regime and of the geographic area it would cover. Initially, operations would still be conducted on a national basis, with a relatively unregulated exchange of maritime surveillance information—probably through a regional surveillance coordination center staffed by personnel from participating countries. The establishment of such a regime would be a clear demonstration of the preparedness of regional countries to act together to ensure the security of the region and to prevent threats. The Australian defense analysts Ball and Bateman conclude

\(^{28}\)Ball and Bateman 1991, 39.

It is unlikely that, at least in the first instance, any regional country would agree to the regime extending into sovereign waters. This may be possible in the longer term as countries develop joint operating procedures and gain confidence in the region. But in the shorter term, countries should at least perceive benefit in the regime providing data to national surveillance centers on the movements of vessels entering and leaving archipelagic waters and territorial seas.\(^{29}\)

The third mechanism would be a peacetime maritime non-conventional regime to deal with humanitarian operations, disaster relief recovery operations, counternarcotics and antipiracy operations, fisheries patrols, and oceanographic research. It is in this realm that naval forces interact most frequently, and where the imperative for closer naval cooperation is likely to be most evident.

The three regimes outlined above provide opportunities to strengthen ties between all countries and serve a longer positive goal for the region.

China and Maritime Cooperative Security

China’s Interest in a Maritime Security Regime

China is a big country bordering the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas. China will never forget that it suffered maritime invasion by foreign troops seven times during the 18th and 19th centuries. Concerned with its maritime security, China has full interest in regional cooperative security. The view that China “has almost no interest in maritime confidence-building regimes,”\(^{30}\) is not in conformity with the facts.

With a total coastline of 18,400 kilometers, some 6,000 coastal islands, and more than 3 million square kilometers of territorial waters, contiguous zones, EEZ, and continental shelf in its maritime jurisdictional zone, estimated to encompass 10 billion tons of oil reserves, 1,000 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, 0.44 billion tons of offshore mineral deposits, 1 billion kilowatts of marine energy reserved, and an annual turnover of 5 million tons of fishery products, China has important maritime interests. The bulk of its for-

\(^{29}\)Ibid., 32.
\(^{30}\)Mack 1993, 136, 140.
eign trade is realized through maritime transportation, including more than 600 oceangoing vessels with a total tonnage of 17 million tons; the country has also developed large-scale seaborne oil survey and exploitation from Bo Hai in the north to the south China Sea in the south.

Safeguarding China’s maritime interests depends firstly on its naval forces, secondly on regional maritime cooperative security arrangements. There is a growing recognition that regional maritime cooperative security arrangements are the most effective and the least expensive means to defend national maritime interests. The situation now is different from the 18th and 19th centuries when a naval power practicing “gunboat diplomacy” could reign over others; and also from the bipolar Cold War period when the two superpowers could readily assert their wills. Under the new conditions of multipolarity, maritime cooperative arrangements stand a better chance of enhancing security.

There are disputes within China’s maritime jurisdictional zone. The Chinese government is committed to a peaceful settlement of all boundary issues and territorial disputes, and will endeavor to seek a satisfactory solution to them with the countries concerned. At a press conference during his visit to Vietnam in early December 1992, Le Peng said in regard to the territorial disputes between the two countries:

The two sides have agreed to reach understanding first on the principles for the settlement of these issues. As to issues comparatively easier to be solved, the Chinese side puts forth the principle of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, fairness and equity. As to more difficult issues such as the Nansha Islands, we put forth the proposition of shelving the disputes and of joint exploitation. Both agree to the peaceful settlement of the territorial disputes. Before the settlement, both sides agree to adopt a positive attitude to speed up the process of negotiated settlement. Both sides agree to start as early as possible governmental-level talks simultaneously with the continuance of expert-level talks.

The Gulf of Beibu (Tonkin) is the gulf shared by China and Vietnam. Both sides agree to hold delimitation talks, and before the settlement of the delimitation, either side will not be engaged in exploitation activities in disputed areas. As to the oil contract issue at Wan’an Tan of the Nansha Islands, both sides will endeavor to seek certain provisional solutions acceptable to them.31

What Li Peng says embraces maritime CBMs and naval arms control elements, and the guiding principles are applicable to other disputed sea areas. It reflects China’s sincerity and enthusiasm in participating in regional maritime cooperative security arrangements.

The Chinese chief delegate to the Bandung meeting on the Nansha (Spratly) Islands in 1991 was a signatory to the workshop’s Joint Statement, issued by participants on July 1, 1991 and calling for: “Cooperation to promote safety of navigation and communication, to coordinate search and rescue, to combat piracy and armed robbery, to promote the rational utilization of living resources, to protect and preserve the marine environment, to conduct marine scientific research, and to eliminate illicit traffic in drugs in the south China Sea.”

**China’s Offshore Defense Maritime Strategy**

In terms of the number of craft, the Chinese navy is big. China has atomic submarines with sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and it is the Asian nation with the largest conventional submarine flotilla. However, on the whole, it is still an obsolescent force, limited in size, scope, endurance, and sophistication. There are two options open to the Chinese navy. The first is to modernize the navy in a limited scale for defense needs, and the other is to preserve the status quo. In consideration of China’s role in Northeast Asia and in the whole Asia Pacific and its anticipated participation in regional maritime security, the first option is evidently conducive to regional peace and stability. The Chinese navy’s maritime strategy has changed its emphasis from coastal defense (Jinan Fangyu) to offshore defense (Jinhai Fangyu) since the 1980s. In 1979, Deng Xiaoping pointed out, “The Chinese navy should be able to fight in offshore areas. The Chinese navy is for defense, and defense certainly needs combat capabilities.”32 Deng Xiaoping clearly mentions here “to fight in offshore areas,” but regretfully it has been misinterpreted as Deng’s redefinition of the navy’s missions “from primarily coastal defense duties to becoming a blue-

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water navy.” Recently, it is even reported that the maritime strategy of the Chinese navy “will be evolved from offshore defense strategy to oceangoing defense strategy.” Offshore defense means the defense of China’s maritime rights and interests in its maritime jurisdictional zone. As defined in 1989 by Admiral Zhang Xushan, Vice-Commander of the Navy, its scope covers China’s entire sea territories and the islands scattered in these waters. The offshore defense strategy calls for preventing incursions by defending as far forward of the 200-km limit as possible ... as the 200-km defensive perimeter provides some depth in defense.” The offshore defense strategy means “that the Chinese navy is a defensive regional navy, and that is is neither an oceangoing offensive navy nor a coastal patrol navy.” For effective offshore defense, the Chinese Central Military Commission has made the improvement of submarine fighting capabilities its priority consideration. China’s limited naval buildup will prove in the years to come to be conducive to regional security. The assertion that “In the 1990s the rise of the Chinese navy may prove to be more of a negative than a positive influence on regional security” is misconceived.

China: a Blue-Water Power?
The prevalent view that China is embarking on “a transition to a blue-water power” is pure conjecture. China has neither the intention nor the necessity to develop a blue-water navy—not to mention that China is not economically qualified to do so. China has no military bases on foreign soil and has no interest in seeking “spheres of influence.” This biased view more or less exaggerates China’s abilities, and misinterprets China’s purposes. Personal views, which do not reflect official policy, are often taken for fact. For instance, Chinese magazines have set forth an alleged three-stage development strategy for China’s navy (saying that the first stage to the year 2000 emphasizes the construction of major warships; the second stage, between 2001 and 2020, calls for the building of several light aircraft carriers; and in the third stage, from 2020 to 2040, the Chinese navy is expected to “be able to conduct operations anywhere around the world,” and “China’s naval capability [is] to be that of a major sea power”). When there occasionally appears in some Chinese military publication the term “oceangoing capability,” the term actually refers to naval operations in China’s adjacent three seas. When Liu Huaqing, the then-naval commander-in-chief, made known in 1987 the navy’s modernization plan, which included “the transformation of the Chinese navy from a coastal defense force into a force capable of limited oceangoing operations,” the term “limited oceangoing operations” referred to operations in offshore seas. According to Liu’s plan, “The outermost defense approaches of the Chinese navy will be spanned around the China seas: to the Korean Strait in the north, to Liuqiu islands in the east, and to the Nansha islands in the south.” These outermost defense approaches are what “oceangoing capability refers to. Admiral Zhang Xushan made clear that “offshore defense shows China will not build a global offensive navy. The Chinese navy will only operate in offshore seas within the requirements of China’s security and defense. Even if the Chinese navy is modernized in the future, the defensive nature of Chinese naval strategy will not change.” As to the Chinese acquisition of an aircraft carrier, it must be pointed out here that this issue has been widely discussed among Chinese naval circles for years, but it is still under study. Given China’s lack of expertise in this area and the huge monetary sum involved, the navy is likely to proceed cautiously. The call for an aircraft carrier reflects the long-cherished feelings of naval officers and men for a stronger navy to defend national maritime interests, but again they refer only to an offshore naval capability within China’s adjacent seas. China’s limited economic interests in the world do not justify the need for an oceangoing aircraft carrier, and China’s lim-

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36 Tai 1990, 38.
37 Xu 1990, 73.
38 Tai 1990, 43.
42 Ibid., 26.
43 Huang 1989, 2–3.
ited economic ability cannot sustain the main-
tenance of a carrier group. The disintegration of
the Soviet Union was due to its economy, not to
its lack of oceangoing fleets. This is a sufficient
lesson for China. Given the carrier’s vulnerabil-
ity to submarines, surface ships, and missiles, a
carrier would require substantial protection. The
backwardness of the Chinese navy’s missile de-
fense and antisubmarine capabilities would leave
a carrier dangerously exposed. “While the local
shipbuilding industry (of China) is capable of
building capital ships upwards of 130,000 tons, it
lacks such crucial sophisticated technology as
catapult launchers and suitable aircraft.”44
China’s Defense Minister Chi Haotian, in his
visit to Malaysia in May 1993, said, “China has
no intention of purchasing Russian or Ukrainian
aircraft carriers for expanding the scope of its
naval activities. ... The Chinese officers’ visit to
their carriers has been misinterpreted. ... There
isn’t such an allocation for the purchase in
China’s defense budget.”45 The Chinese navy is
enthusiastic about increasing contacts and ex-
changes with other navies in Northeast Asia. It is
anticipated that with the promotion of mutual
understanding and confidence, the Chinese navy
will actively participate in regional maritime
security dialogues and arrangements, making its
due contribution to maintaining together with
other regional navies a secure and peaceful re-
gional maritime environment.

44Ibid., 27. 45World Journal (United States), 26 May 1993.
A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE FOR NORTHEAST ASIA

Andrew Mack

Introduction

Northeast Asia is the only region in the world in which the technological potential to make nuclear weapons is combined with deep-seated (though currently attenuated) historical animosities. In Western Europe and North America the nuclear capabilities exist but not the enmity; in other regions, enmity is not matched by capability. In South Asia the technical potential to go nuclear has already been realised and curbing vertical proliferation in India and Pakistan has become the name of the game.

It is a commonplace of strategic analysis that when political relationships deteriorate, perceived threats become a function of the capabilities of adversaries. Thus the technical capabilities of regional states to make nuclear weapons must be a concern of regional security planners in an uncertain strategic environment. This concern will exist notwithstanding the fact that all regional states are now members of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). There are two reason for this.

First, NPT states can perfectly legally stockpile separated plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU)—as long as it is under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. But, as North Korea’s announcement that it intended to quit the NPT last March reminds us, there is no serious legal barrier to any NPT state stockpiling enough fissionable material to build a sizeable arsenal of nuclear weapons and then withdrawing from the Treaty. The plutonium can then, quite legally, be used to make nuclear weapons. It is essentially for this reason that the U.S., Japan and South Korea have long demanded the dismantling rather than the mere safeguarding, of the North Korean nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at Yongbyon. The UN Security Council has prohibited Iraq from acquiring reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities and the U.S. has ‘dissuaded’ Taiwan and South Korea from going down the enrichment/reprocessing track for essentially the same reason.

Second, proliferation concerns inevitably increase when very large amounts of spent fuel from power reactors are reprocessed, since it is difficult to verify with a high degree of certainty that no significant quantities of plutonium are diverted during the separation.

Andrew Mack is Professor in the Department of International Relations, Australian National University.

1 Taiwan’s position is anomalous. It has signed the NPT but is often not treated as a state party to the Treaty since it is not considered by many to be a state. Taiwan’s nuclear facilities are, however, under IAEA safeguards though Taiwan is not a member of the IAEA.
In 1994, Japanese officials were quick to point out, the plutonium in question was neither “unaccounted for” nor “missing” as some media reports suggested. Both the IAEA and the plant operator were aware that the plutonium—in dust form—had accumulated in the plant. It has been suggested that the IAEA had become increasingly irritated with the failure of the plant operator to recover the accumulated plutonium and that IAEA officials may have leaked the story to the press. The plant operator, according to the IAEA, had failed to recover the plutonium because it wished to “minimise radiation exposure to its maintenance personnel.” See “Japanese Nuclear Material Under Full Safeguards,” IAEA Press Release, 25 May 1994.

South Korea is bound by a 1991 Denuclearisation Declaration between North and South Korea not to reprocess spent fuel, but this agreement may not hold.

According to an authoritative recent study of global plutonium stocks, Japan will produce in excess of 9,000 tonnes of spent power reactor fuel containing more than 80 tonnes of weapons-useable plutonium (Pu) during the 1990s. (This compares with approximately 100 tonnes of weapons grade plutonium in the U.S. military fissile material inventory at the end of 1990.) Just under 50 tonnes of Pu was produced in Japan in the 1980s. Plutonium-containing spent reactor fuel is exported and is currently being separated overseas and returned to Japan either in its pure form, or as MOX (mixed uranium/plutonium oxide). On current projections some 49 tonnes of plutonium will be exported from the UK and France to Japan by the year 2000.

By way of contrast, South Korea’s power reactors are expected to produce some 23 tonnes of (unseparated) plutonium between 1991 and 2000; Taiwan 11 tonnes; China 5.1 tonnes and Russia 50 tonnes. North Korea has no power reactors but if its nuclear program is not stopped, its graphite-moderated reactors could have several hundred kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium by the end of the decade.

There is no evidence that Japan’s present government has any intention of producing nuclear weapons—and there are many reasons why it should not wish to do so. Yet there is no doubt that Japan’s commitment to the plutonium economy causes real concern in the region, and not just in North Korea. The concern arises in part because of the sheer amounts of plutonium which will be imported into Japan or produced indigenously over the next two decades, and in part because there does not appear to be any compelling economic or energy security rationale for Japan’s continuing embrace of the plutonium economy. U.S. officials admit that Japan’s reprocessing program ‘complicates’ U.S. anti-proliferation policies in the region.

Some supporters of the plutonium economy argue that there is no reason for concern since the plutonium which is produced in power reactors (as against dedicated weapons-grade plutonium-producing reactors) cannot be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. This is not so. Reactor-grade plutonium is a more hazardous
and less reliable material than weapons-grade plutonium (93% Pu 239). It also has a lower yield, but it can be used to make bombs in the kiloton (Hiroshima) range. Even mixed oxide fuel can be processed to make nuclear weapons as the U.S. Department of Energy has admitted.7

Regional concern about Japan’s involvement in the plutonium economy is rarely voiced publicly except by the North Koreans who routinely and bitterly denounce Japan for making nuclear weapons. The North argues that the Japanese have fabricated claims about a DPRK bomb program to divert attention from their own nuclear weapons program. Although the North’s statements are predictably hypocritical, there is no doubt that Japan’s involvement in the plutonium economy provides the DPRK with a legitimating argument for its nuclear weapons program. In April 1994, a senior DPRK diplomat stated that the 1991 inter-Korean agreement for a de-nuclearised Korean peninsula would become ‘meaningless’ if Japan chose the nuclear option.8 If this happened, he said, North Korea would have to pursue its own nuclear weapons program. This was the first time that the DPRK had suggested that it was technically capable of making nuclear weapons—previously former DPRK leader, Kim Il Sung, had repeatedly denied that the North had such a capability. Second, this and other DPRK statements routinely allege not that Japan may seek to acquire nuclear weapons, but that it is already embarked on a nuclear weapons program. In other words, the North appeared to be rehearsing its excuses for quitting the 1991 North/South denuclearisation agreement should it feel that this were necessary—it had already reiterated its threats to ‘unsuspend’ its ‘suspended’ 1993 withdrawal from the NPT.

North Korea’s self-serving accusations against Japan lack credibility, but there is also real concern in South Korea. In 1993, Proliferation Issues noted that the ROK Ministry of Science and Technology had produced a secret report which claimed that Japan had acquired the capability to make nuclear weapons as early as 1980, and that Japanese nuclear policy was intended to strengthen the country’s position ‘in defence and diplomacy as a potential nuclear state’.9 The South Korean media has frequently raised the issue of Japan’s involvement in the plutonium economy and its possible nuclear ambitions. In January 1992, for example, an editorial in the Korea Herald argued that Japan’s plutonium plans, ‘... deserve concern for all who are anxious to see the post-Cold War era free from nuclear proliferation’.10 The editorial noted that any prospect of a nuclear-armed Japan would mean that ‘ongoing efforts to make the [Korean] peninsula nuclear-free would turn out to be less than wise’.11 In other words there was an implied warning that Japanese moves towards acquiring nuclear weapons would require a similar Korean response. South Korean security analysts frequently reiterate both their concerns about Japan’s plutonium program and their resentment that South Korea has been prevented by the U.S. from acquiring its own plutonium via reprocessing while Japan is free to do so.

From discussions in Japan and around the region, as well as published sources, it seems that concerns about Japan’s nuclear program may be summarised as follows:

Although the Japanese government regularly stresses its commitment to the NPT and disavows any intent to acquire nuclear weapons, past statements by leading Japanese politicians and officials have suggested that these views have not always been universally shared. For example, Prime Ministers Kishi (in 1957), Ohira ((1979), Nakasone (1984) and the Japanese Defence Agency have all stated that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is not prohibited by Japan’s constitution—providing they are used for defence not offence. Prime Minister Sato stated in 1967 that the three non-nuclear principles—which commit Japan not to produce or possess nuclear weapons, or allow them to be deployed on Japanese soil—were not immutable and could be changed. And a Defence Agency study produced in the 1970s said that Japan could not rely indefinitely on the U.S. ‘nuclear umbrella’ given America’s continued economic decline, and recommended that Japan arm itself with tactical nuclear weapons.12 In June 1993,

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8 KCNA broadcast monitored by the BBC and reported in Reuters “North Korea: Envoy Says DPRK Will Go Nuclear if Japan Does,” Reuters, 11 April 1994.


10 Citations for these statements are found in “The Plutonium Trade: a Troubling New Era of Proliferation,” Greenpeace International, 1 March 1 1993.
Japanese Foreign Ministry officials resisted U.S. pressure for an indefinite extension of the NPT when it came up for renewal in 1995 on the grounds that so doing would ‘tie the hands of future governments in Tokyo if new security threats arise’. Tokyo later changed its line, but in the meantime the region had once more been presented with evidence that sections of Japan’s foreign affairs bureaucracy—which had long been critical of the NPT regime—appeared reluctant to forego the nuclear option. In June 1994, then Japanese Prime Minister, Tsutomu Hata, declared in question time in Japan’s parliament that Japan already had the capability to make nuclear weapons. It is politically difficult to persuade states like North Korea—and indeed South Korea and Taiwan—that involvement in the plutonium economy is illegitimate and inappropriate for them, but right and appropriate for their historic enemy, Japan.

Regional concern about Japan’s involvement with the plutonium economy was evident in the response to the 1992 shipment of a 1.7 tonnes of plutonium from France to Japan. Quite apart from accidents, some regional security analysts worry about the long term risks of a terrorist or renegade state attempt to attack a shipment. A Pentagon report on the security of sea shipments in 1986 reported that:

> no one can guarantee the safety of the cargo from a security accident, such as an attack on the vessel by a small fast craft, especially if armed with modern anti-ship missiles.15

The energy security argument which has provided the central justification for Japanese involvement in the plutonium/fast breeder reactor economy no longer seems compelling to outside observers. This is not least because ‘uranium prices have plunged making the breeder reactors 5 to 15 times more expensive to run than conventional nuclear power plants’.16 There is currently a glut in the world uranium market—and there is nothing to prevent the Japanese stockpiling uranium if energy security is a major concern. Quantities of the 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium, which will be released by dismantling nuclear weapons in the former USSR, could, for example, be diluted to safe levels and exported to Japan.

When questions are raised about the dangers of stockpiling large amounts of plutonium, Japanese officials have responded by claiming that they will not stockpile in large quantities, but rather will import little more plutonium than is necessary for current energy needs. Insofar as this argument is true, it negates the whole energy security argument. Stockpiling is the only way of insuring against interruptions in supply—at least until Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) become commercially viable, which will not be for many years, if ever. FBRs produce more plutonium than they burn. Regional observers wonder why Japan should be the last OECD country to persist with FBRs. Britain, America and Germany have all abandoned their FBR programs, France’s program is on hold.

Regional scepticism about Japan’s energy security argument for the plutonium economy can only have been increased by a 1992 statement by Takao Ishiwatari, President of Japan’s Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation. Ishiwatari argued that given the global over-supply of plutonium, Japan should focus on ‘burning’ plutonium in its FBRs, not breeding it. But breeding plutonium was the key energy security rationale for Japan’s involvement in the plutonium economy. Breeding plutonium could, in principle, go a long way to addressing Japan’s concern for energy security; creating plutonium simply to ‘burn’ cannot achieve this end.19

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19Other Japanese officials, including Toichi Sakata, the Science and Technology Agency’s nuclear fuel division director, claimed that the change indicated by Ishiwatari was not as dramatic as press reports had indicated, but did not deny that the reactor in question “also could consume plutonium.” See “Monju Will Start Up as Breeder But Could Later Burn Plutonium,” Nucleonics Week, 4 June 1992, 3.
The economics of using plutonium in mixed oxide fuel for Light Water Reactors, which Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission plans to do, is also regarded with scepticism. It is simply not cost-effective in either today’s or likely future market conditions and, according to one recent report, ‘Today even if the plutonium is free, mixed oxide fuel costs $500 per kg more than conventional uranium fuel, which costs around $1,000 per kg.’ Such sceptical views have wide support. Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, William Dircks, stated in April 1992 that, ‘the economic justification for the use of recycled plutonium has severely eroded’. A senior official in the Clinton Administration stated in May 1994, that the economics of ‘burning’ plutonium are such that ‘...if you look at the numbers, there’s no way to justify going ahead.’

If the energy security and economic arguments for Japan’s involvement in the plutonium economy are even less compelling today than ever before, then it is hardly surprising if regional states should ask what other motives Japan may have for creating so much plutonium.

There is no reason to believe that the present Japanese government has any intention of making nuclear weapons, and much of the scepticism about Japan’s commitment to the plutonium economy would be reduced if critics understood the time horizons of Japan’s energy planners. Arguments about the economic unviability of MOX and FBRs may or may not be persuasive today, but for at least some of Japan’s energy planners they simply miss the point. As Satsuki Eda, Director of the Science and Technology Agency argues, ‘We have to look at the distant future, at the 21st and even the 22nd century, and think of the economics in these terms.’

There is little doubt, however, that the Japanese government has become increasingly sensitive to regional—and domestic—concerns about its plutonium program. In May 1994, in response to these concerns the Japanese government announced that it was scaling back its plutonium program considerably.

I have argued that there is no evidence to suggest that Japan’s security planners wish to acquire nuclear weapons. They may, however, believe that demonstrating certain technical capabilities can serve a useful security purpose. It is possible for nuclear deterrence (sometimes called ‘recessive deterrence’) to exist without nuclear weapons actually being produced. Japan has demonstrated to the region that it has the technology to make and deliver nuclear weapons quickly, even though it has stopped well short of actually acquiring them. Such capabilities can in themselves be an effective deterrent and one intended function of acquiring large stocks of plutonium may be to reinforce this message in the region. No one doubts the ability of Japan’s nuclear scientists, and estimates of the time it would take the Japanese to actually produce nuclear weapons vary from a few months to a year. Japan’s highly sophisticated space-launch program could swiftly be retooled to build intermediate-range ballistic missiles to carry nuclear warheads.

The logic of ‘recessive deterrence’ is clear enough—but so too are the risks. If ‘recessive deterrence’ makes sense for Japan, it makes sense for other near-nuclear states too. Indeed South Korean security planners and analysts are demanding that South Korea acquire plutonium separation capabilities for essentially the same reason. The danger arises because in a climate of deteriorating political relationships pressures to realise nuclear potentials could become acute.

As long as it remains enmeshed in the U.S. security relationship, Japan will have no need for offensive weapons systems—including nuclear weapons. But if the U.S. commitment to the region were to become increasingly questionable, elements within the Japanese political and security establishments would push hard for Japan to become a ‘normal’ military power, like Britain and France, and to acquire military forces with an offensive as well as a defensive arm. Such a force posture might include nuclear weapons—a course long advocated by the so-called ‘Japanese Gaullists’. This risk would be considerably increased if Japan were concerned that other regional powers, most obviously Korea, might also be seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Herein lie the risks of ‘recessive deterrence’.

South Korea

South Korea, which is rapidly overhauling the North militarily as well as economically, and which is also ‘protected’ by the U.S. ‘nuclear

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23 The only additional technology is that required for the re-entry vehicle.
umbrella’, has a clear interest in a denuclearised Korean peninsula, providing the North does not go nuclear and providing Seoul retains confidence in its alliance relationship with the U.S.

The South sought to acquire the capability to build nuclear weapons in the 1970s, but was dissuaded from doing so by threats of sanctions from the U.S. In 1984, Seoul again sought to acquire reprocessing technology, this time from Canada. But Ottawa was dissuaded from proceeding with the deal by Washington, causing considerable resentment in Seoul.24 In the future such pressures might not be so effective—especially if Seoul believed that vital national security interests were at stake. Indeed South Korea has for some time been discussing the possibility of reprocessing some of its growing spent fuel stockpile offshore—in the UK and France.25 Today, South Korea is militarily and economically more self-confident than previously—in part because of the extraordinary growth of the ROK economy, in part because Moscow and Beijing are no longer seen as threats and the U.S. is therefore needed less as an ally, and in part because the conventional military balance on the peninsula increasingly favours Seoul.

But it now seems increasingly likely that within the next few years North Korea will emerge as a nuclear power and Leonard Spector of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is not alone in thinking that, if Pyongyang goes nuclear, ‘the pressure for Seoul to follow suit will be intense’.26

There is also a real possibility that at some stage the regime in the North will collapse and be absorbed by the South—the German model of reunification. In this case the South would inherit whatever clandestine nuclear weapons program the North had been running—and would have a huge stockpile of spent reactor fuel which could be separated in the North’s reprocessing plant. Seoul would come under intense pressure to destroy the North’s nuclear weapons facilities if it did inherit them. But there would also be reasons for wishing to keep them intact, including:

• concern about the long term status of the Korean-Japanese relationship;
• concern about Japan’s massive involvement in the plutonium economy;
• concern about the long term reliability of the U.S. as an ally;
• concern about the long term security future of a united Korea surrounded by two major nuclear powers (Russia, China) and confronting a near-nuclear power (Japan).

Nuclear weapons are relatively low cost ‘strategic equalisers’ for small/medium powers, their acquisition entails political and security benefits which have to be weighed against the perceived costs. The costs could include a rupture in the alliance relationship with the U.S. and the possibility, as a Japanese intelligence official told the Far Eastern Economic Review in 1992, that ‘If South Korea has nuclear weapons, then Japan has to have such arms too’.27 This may not be a consensual official view in Japan at the present time, but it is one which could become mainstream if Korean proliferation took place in a context of deteriorating political relationships between Seoul and Tokyo.

**North Korea**

Given North Korea’s somewhat paranoid threat perceptions, there is little doubt that its security planners believe that acquiring nuclear weapons is a vital national security interest. The North perceives itself to be under constant nuclear threat from the U.S. The military balance on the peninsula is shifting inexorably in favour of the South and Pyongyang understands that it has effectively been abandoned by its traditional allies in Moscow and—to a lesser degree—Beijing.

Nuclear weapons offer the North a countervailing deterrent against the perceived threat of U.S. nuclear weapons, a ‘strategic equaliser’ to balance the growing military power of the South, and strategic compensation for the effective loss of its Russian and Chinese allies. The nuclear controversy is also the only issue which makes the international community take North Korea seriously. Without the bomb the North would rank little higher in the world’s attention than Albania.

Almost no analysts today doubt that the North is seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons, although Pyongyang’s motives for so doing

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27Ibid., 5.
remain subject to conjecture. For more than three years the North has stalled and hedged on the vital issue of inspecting its nuclear facilities. Optimists, whose number still includes much of official Washington, have argued that Pyongyang has been "playing the nuclear card", that once it has extracted the maximum concessions from the international community it will concede to IAEA demands to inspect suspect nuclear facilities. The optimists are almost certainly wrong. Neither economic—or political—incentives are likely to prove tempting enough to persuade the North to give up a nuclear program which it sees as vital to its security.

If positive inducements are unlikely to persuade the North to give up its nuclear ambitions, pressure is also a policy fraught with problems. The much-discussed sanctions option, for example, would likely fail—even if China could be persuaded to go along, which seems most unlikely. Sanctions will not affect the North Korean ruling elite; they will hurt ordinary North Koreans who have no power and who may well believe the relentless message of a state propaganda machine which blames all of the nation’s troubles on the machinations of the ‘imperialists and their lackeys.’

Current estimates are that the North may have diverted enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons. The spent fuel unloaded in early 1994 from the research reactor at Yongbyon would, once reprocessed, provide enough fissile material for four or five additional bombs. In 1995/6, a new nuclear reactor will become operational which will produce enough fissile material for an additional ten or twelve bombs a year. Herein lies the central problem with the sanctions option. Sanctions take years to work against totalitarian regimes—Iraq has been under a tough sanctions regime since 1990 and has been defeated in war, but shows no signs of being willing to agree to outstanding UN demands. The fact that sanctions are so slow to work against totalitarian regimes means that the North could produce a sizeable nuclear arsenal long before it reached breaking point. This prospect gives rise to two scenarios which deeply worry the U.S. First, that once the North has enough nuclear weapons for its own perceived security requirements it will start selling the excess production—as well as the missiles to deliver them—to ‘pariah’ states like Iran, Iraq and Libya. Second, that a North Korean bomb will impel South Korea and possibly Japan to go nuclear too. It is to forestall these possibilities that some hawks in Washington and Seoul have advocated bombing the North’s nuclear facilities before it is too late.

However, quite apart from being a gross violation of international law, the bombing option is no more likely to succeed than sanctions and would almost certainly catalyse a war on the peninsula in which hundreds of thousands of Koreans on both sides could be killed. While military strikes could certainly destroy the North’s declared above-ground nuclear facilities, they could not, by definition, hit any secret underground facilities which might exist—nor could they destroy hidden stockpiles of already-produced plutonium.

Moreover, it would be politically impossible to resort to military strikes until all other options had been tried and failed. But by then the North might already have, not just plutonium, but deliverable nuclear weapons—or at least a nuclear device assembled in a tunnel under the Demilitarised Zone. Under these circumstances conventional military strikes could trigger a nuclear war on the peninsula.

In the immediate aftermath of Kim Il Sung’s death it is difficult to know what the response of the new regime will be to the nuclear problem. It does, however, seem highly likely that the U.S. will in future be willing to cut a deal whereby the North is permitted to keep whatever fissile material it has already required in exchange for an agreement to freeze plutonium production at current levels. This would mean halting construction of the second, large, reactor in the North and stopping reprocessing of any spent fuel. Evidence that the U.S. is thinking along these lines came from U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry, who stated earlier this year that U.S. policy towards the DPRK ‘... has been oriented to try to keep North Korea from getting a significant nuclear-weapon capability’.

Such a ‘capping’ deal would prevent the North acquiring a sizeable nuclear arsenal and getting into the fissile material export business—thus meeting Washington’s major concerns. It would allow the North to keep enough fissile material for a very few nuclear weapons—sufficient to be a minimum deterrent which is all the DPRK needs. Pyongyang would also be able to bargain for a range of other concessions—economic and political.

The idea of offering concessions to a state to freeze rather than destroy a nuclear program is not without precedent—the U.S. has offered just such a deal to Pakistan. The DPRK case is different from that of Pakistan in that North Korea is a member of the NPT. A ‘capping’ deal would require either that the North quit the NPT—since it would clearly have reneged on its NPT commitments by acquiring even one nuclear weapon, or that the U.S. turn a blind eye to what the North has produced thus far. Such a strategy would be facilitated by the fact that in early 1994 the North destroyed what was almost certainly ‘smoking gun’ evidence of fissile material diversion at Yongbyon. It is however difficult to see how the IAEA could possibly countenance a ‘capping’ deal since it would confer legitimacy onto a gross breach of the North’s legal NPT commitments.

Taiwan
Taiwan sought to acquire technologies necessary for the manufacture of nuclear weapons in the past but was dissuaded from proceeding by strong U.S. pressure. There is some concern in the region that Taiwan may still be pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons research program. In 1988, a Taiwanese nuclear scientist, Colonel Chang Hsien-Yi, who had been Deputy-Director of the military’s Chungsan Institute of Science and Technology, defected and informed the U.S. that Taiwan was continuing to seek to make nuclear weapons. U.S. officials later said that Taiwan had been secretly building a plutonium extraction facility but had closed it down. A 40MW research reactor capable of producing high quality plutonium was closed down in 1988, and since 1985 Taiwan had been obliged to return the plutonium-containing spent fuel to the U.S.. Since Taiwan does not have access to enriched uranium, concerns that the nation’s security planners might be seeking to make nuclear weapons have abated since 1988.

However, the emergence of a democracy movement in Taiwan which may push for independence has greatly alarmed Beijing. The Chinese government has made it clear that an attempt by Taipei to seek independence would be one of four grounds for Beijing to use force against Taiwan. Recognising that this is a possibility and that Taiwan could not count on assistance from the U.S., it would not be surprising if Taipei’s security planners should again be giving serious consideration to the nuclear option.

China
As both a nuclear and the biggest conventional military power in Northeast Asia, China has a clear strategic interest in regional non-proliferation. China’s nuclear weapons were acquired not because of regional security concerns, but as a countervailing deterrent to the U.S. and, later, Soviet threats. The only reason China might have felt impelled to use nuclear weapons against regional states would have been to strike U.S. military bases on their territory during the Cold War.

The international community has understandably been concerned during the past four years about the possibility that North Korea may acquire a few nuclear weapons. There is also increasing concern, again wholly understandable, about the horizontal proliferation consequences of a North Korean bomb. There has by contrast been almost no attention paid to the vertical proliferation of China’s nuclear arsenal despite the fact that China’s nuclear inventory has risen to an estimated 450 nuclear weapons (300 of them deployed) and may grow even bigger. A number of official sources have suggested that China’s nuclear arsenal has grown rapidly over the past two decades—and one recent study suggests that it could easily be ‘two or three times larger than estimated’. China, which today is the only state in the world not observing a nuclear test moratorium, has also been accused of transferring nuclear technology to countries of proliferation concern—Pakistan, Iran, Algeria. The fact that almost all of China’s nuclear weapons, including its submarine-launched ballistic missiles, have relatively short ranges means that they can only strike at regional targets—a source of obvious concern to regional states.

It is also both remarkable and unfortunate that China has negotiated no nuclear confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) with the other nuclear powers—in contrast to the considerable number of such agreements negotiated between the U.S. and USSR during the Cold War.

26 This happened when DPRK officials refused to allow IAEA inspectors to monitor the withdrawal of nuclear fuel rods during the unfueling of the research reactor that has been the focus of all of the recent controversy.
War. Nor have the Chinese revealed very much information about their nuclear weapons inventory—again in contrast to the U.S. and former Soviet Union. Greater transparency on China’s behalf with respect to a range of military activities would be an important regional confidence-building measure.

The Security Functions of Nuclear-Free Zones

The security functions of NFZs as envisaged by the UN are: “... the establishment of regional barriers against the outbreak of nuclear war...; the prevention of nuclear attack or blackmail of regional states from outside the region; and the prevention of nuclear competition among zone states. Beyond these immediate objectives, the important global security contributions of NFZs lay in the step-by-step process towards the complete abolition of nuclear weapons and in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.”

All the potential signatory states (Russia, China, the U.S., North and South Korea, Taiwan and Japan) to a Northeast Asian Nuclear-Free Zone (NEANFZ) would already be members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This raises an obvious question. What can a NFZ do that the NPT cannot? While both seek to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, there are in fact a number of important differences between the NPT and actual and potential NFZs as the various existing (South Pacific and Latin America) and proposed (Southeast Asia, Africa) zone precedents indicate. These include:

• NFZs may prevent geographical proliferation. Unlike the NPT, NFZs may ban the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of member states.
• NFZs may go beyond the NPT in requesting the nuclear weapons states (NWS) to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the zonal states.
• Following the South Pacific precedent, NFZs may go beyond the NPT in banning nuclear dumping in the oceans bounded by the zone.
• Following the precedent of the 1991 Denuclearisation Agreement between North and South Korea, NFZs may ban the production of fissile material in the zone.
• NFZs may be treaties of unlimited duration from which it is difficult to withdraw, while the NPT confronts a renewal conference in 1995 and withdrawal can be undertaken on a mere 3 months notice.
• Unlike the NPT, NFZs are regional confidence-building measures, not simply in the obvious sense of being a legal mechanism for member states to assure each other of their peaceful intentions, but because the very process of creating a NFZ necessitates mutual regional cooperation. Such processes may help create the ‘habit of dialogue’ and multilateral cooperation which are necessary conditions for resolving other regional security issues.

The December 1991 ‘Joint Declaration for Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula’

In Northeast Asia there is already an NFZ in place: ‘The Joint Declaration for Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula’ which was signed by North and South Korea in December 1991 and which commits both sides to ‘not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons’. The agreement is both stronger and weaker than other NFZs. It is weaker than the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone treaty (SPNFZ), for example, in that it does not call on external powers to refrain from using, or threatening to use, nuclear weapons against the signatory states. It is stronger than any other zone agreement in that the parties make an unprecedented commitment not to ‘possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment’. This proscription is important because it establishes that both reprocessing and uranium enrichment may be a real proliferation concern—even when they are subject to IAEA safeguards. The agreement does not in fact ban the states from acquiring either plutonium or enriched uranium—simply from producing these substances on the peninsula. This leaves open the possibility that South Korea, like Japan, could seek to have its spent fuel processed overseas and the resulting plutonium shipped back home.

The 1991 agreement was also unprecedented in that it provided for mutual national—not

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32 China and Russia have, however, signed a mutual No-First Use Agreement.
34 Taiwan’s position, as noted earlier, is somewhat anomalous.
IAEA—inspections of nuclear facilities. It is, of course, the failure to agree to inspections of suspect facilities which has precipitated the current crisis. In mid-1994 the North/South agreement is moribund and the North has been threatening to withdraw from it.

Analysis of the negotiations which led to the South Pacific and Latin America NFZs and the ongoing negotiations for an African and Southeast Asian NFZ, suggests that the following conditions may need to be met if a zone is to be successfully negotiated and implemented:

- having a model and precedent to follow
- a working group of experts with the time and experience to work out a detailed and relatively foolproof zone proposal
- propitious political circumstances
- no looming proliferation concerns
- a regional organisation to initiate and coordinate the zone proposal

In the case of the 1991 North/South agreement we can see that none of these conditions existed. The negotiators did not follow precedent or use any of the pre-existing agreements as a model—by contrast the SPNFZ treaty was used as a working text in negotiating the African zone. There was no working group of experts to work out a detailed and foolproof proposal—with the consequence that a number of serious mistakes were made. Political circumstances were not propitious. There were looming proliferation concerns—in the African zone case proliferation concerns had been assuaged by South Africa’s accession to the NPT. Finally there is no regional organisation in Northeast Asia comparable to the Pacific Forum (SPNFZ) or ASEAN (SEANFZ) which could provide a forum for the negotiations.

The Korean case illustrates just how difficult it is to successfully implement a NFZ when proliferation risks are high, political relationships are strained, verification procedures are both critically important and difficult to agree on, and no patient process of treaty negotiation has been undertaken by an expert working group. What this means is that progress towards a NEANFZ will require the resolution of the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. How this might be achieved is beyond the scope of this paper and may not come about before the Kim regime in the North collapses. It is, however, worth thinking about what form a future NEANFZ treaty might take since, as argued earlier, even if the DPRK nuclear issue is resolved, the proliferation risks in the region will remain and a NEANFZ would be one means of seeking to reduce them.

**A Northeast Asian Nuclear-Free Zone (NEANFZ)**

Perhaps the most obvious NEANFZ would be one which encompassed the two Koreas, Japan and Taiwan. As with other NFZs the nuclear powers would be required to sign certain protocols and areas of their territory could be subject to particular restraints—on the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons for example.

I noted above the utility of building on precedents when negotiating NFZs. The South Pacific Nuclear-free zone and elements of the 1991 Denuclearisation Agreement between North and South Korea could provide useful models for a Northeast Asian Nuclear-Free Zone. Thus a NEANFZ might include the following proscriptions:

1. A prohibition of the acquisition, testing, use, etc., of nuclear weapons by the zonal states. As with SPNFZ this is simply a reaffirmation of NPT obligations. All states in the proposed NEANFZ are parties to the NPT.
2. A ban on the stationing of nuclear weapons within the territories of zonal states. This requirement would mean the U.S. giving up the option of redeploying nuclear weapons to South Korea. It would also raise the issue of the possible storage of nuclear weapons at U.S. bases in Japan.
3. An undertaking by the nuclear weapons states not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against the zonal states. This is identical to the SPNFZ requirement. It would require the U.S. to change its current policy and would mean that South Korea and Japan would lose the protection of the U.S. ‘nuclear umbrella’. This would be politically difficult for all three countries—and could have the perverse consequence

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36Negotiations which sought to include Taiwan could be complicated by the sovereignty issue. But creative ways have been found around this issue—e.g., Taiwan’s involvement with APEC. China, of course, has a clear interest in a nuclear-free Taiwan.
of pushing Seoul and Tokyo towards acquiring their own nuclear deterrent to replace that of the U.S.

4. A ban on dumping of nuclear wastes within the zone. (The demarcation of the maritime boundaries of the zone, which is beyond the scope of this article, would not be easy given the territorial disputes which still exist.) This proscription would again follow the SPNFZ precedent. A ban on dumping is particularly important in Northeast Asia since this is a region where Japan, South Korea and Russia are known to have dumped nuclear waste. Russian dumping has been the most serious with liquid radioactive waste being dumped in nine sites in the Pacific and solid radioactive waste—including two decommissioned submarine reactors—dumped in four sites. Total Soviet/Russian dumping has been twice the combined total of 12 other nuclear nations and is said by the Russians to equal about 2.5 million curies of radioactive waste. This compares with around 1.8 million curies of residual radiation from the Chernobyl disaster. The Russian Navy continues to dump liquid radioactive waste in defiance of the 1983 ban imposed by the London Dumping Convention—of which Russia is a member.

An additional waste hazard exists in Pacific Russia due to the huge delays in decommissioning obsolete nuclear-powered submarines. In the Pacific Fleet only half of the 35 nuclear submarines now withdrawn from service have had the fuel elements in their reactors removed. Russia simply lacks the capability to decommission its nuclear ships and submarines effectively. One hundred and forty reactor cores from decommissioned Russian submarines have already accumulated; 20 more are generated each year by retirements.

5. A ban on the production or importation of fissionable materials. Following the precedent of the ‘Joint Declaration for Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula’ the parties could agree not to ‘possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment’. But a NEANFZ ban could go beyond the Joint Declaration by also banning reprocessing offshore. Currently such a ban would be unacceptable to Japan, but there is growing opposition to the plutonium economy in Japan and eventually Japan may decide that the non-proliferation benefits of giving up reprocessing are more important than the increasingly dubious energy-security benefits.

It is obvious from the most cursory glance at this list that some of the proscriptions of the proposed zone agreement will be far more controversial than others. But there would be nothing to prevent a NEANFZ agreement being initially little more than a regional reaffirmation of existing NPT obligations and of the particular dangers of proliferation in Northeast Asia. Even a modest and uncontroversial zonal agreement based on the proscriptions outlined in point 1 above (i.e. reiterating NPT proscriptions) could be valuable for both of the above reasons, and as a ‘building block’ to a more far-reaching zone. Indeed the treaty itself could include a range of optional protocols embodying the sorts of measures outlined in points 2 to 5 which parties would be invited, but not required, to sign. The ‘bare-bones’ core of the NEANFZ Treaty could be made slightly tougher than the NPT if, like SPNFZ, it had a withdrawal clause requiring a year or more notice of withdrawal. This would give far greater opportunities for diplomatic action to try and prevent the withdrawal of a state from the treaty than is the case with the NPT, which only requires 3 months notice of withdrawal. North Korea’s announced intent to withdraw from the Treaty in March 1993 offers a graphic recent reminder of the seriousness of this issue.

The modest ‘bare-bones’ NEANFZ proposal outlined above has two advantages. First, regional willingness to accede to it should not be too difficult to achieve since it does little more than affirm NPT requirements to which all regional states have agreed anyway. Second, via the optional protocols, it enables those states which wish to go further to do so unilaterally, while creating an agenda for further steps which may be discussed with other states.

Initiatives by Nuclear Weapons States to Support Non-Proliferation

The nuclear-weapons states, together or separately, could encourage and complement the process of regional denuclearisation in Northeast Asia, while still retaining a minimum strategic nuclear deterrent, by negotiating the following:

1. A Comprehensive Test Ban. Nuclear testing programs have long been a driving force of nu-
clear modernisation programs—and hence the arms race. The traditional arguments for nuclear testing—that they are necessary for the modernisation, reliability and safety of nuclear weapons—are today either irrelevant or unconvincing. Whatever residual deterrent needs remain in the post-Cold War world are more than adequately met by the large nuclear stockpiles which will remain in place even after the current strategic arms cuts are in place.

A comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) would be a further step towards the delegitimisation of nuclear weapons—a process which should be encouraged if the spread of nuclear weapons is to be contained. There now seems to be a real chance that a CTBT will be negotiated, with France and even China indicating that they will sign. The Chinese may carry out a few more tests before doing so, however.

2. Deployment Restrictions on Tactical Nuclear Weapons. U.S. tactical nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from Korea, and both U.S. and Russian naval tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from ships and submarines following the Bush/Gorbachev initiatives of September 1991. In both the U.S. and Russia, tactical nuclear weapons are now kept in ‘central storage’ locations. China’s estimated 150 tactical nuclear weapons are not deployed at all according to a recent study. However, the U.S. has reserved the right to redeploy its tactical nuclear weapons to its ships and overseas bases if it perceives the need to do so. There is a strong case for the former superpowers to eradicate their stocks of tactical nuclear weapons altogether—a measure which, like the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, would remove an entire class of nuclear weapons. Low-yield ‘battlefield’ nuclear weapons, which are quite unnecessary for a minimum deterrent posture, have long been criticised as destabilising. They erode the ‘firebreak’ between nuclear and high-yield conventional weapons and have been perceived by some military planners as being more ‘usable’. Critics have argued that they were more likely to be used for this reason.

While eradication of all tactical nuclear weapons is not likely in the near future, an interim confidence-building measure would be for China, Russia and the U.S. to undertake not to deploy, or redeploy, their tactical nuclear weapons within striking range of the NEANFZ states. This would have the effect of creating tactical nuclear weapon-free zones bordering those states.

3. Dealing With the Coming Fissile Material Glut. There is a very real potential proliferation associated with the large stocks of fissile materials which will be released by the ongoing strategic arms reductions—up to 150 tonnes of plutonium and 500 tonnes of weapons-grade uranium could eventually be released as part of this process. In Russia, where the economic crisis is intensifying, where law and order is breaking down and where smuggling is rife, there are real grounds for concern that fissile material might be exported to states like North Korea. Stealing and smuggling fissile material is a proliferation risk which is being taken increasingly seriously in the West. Russian authorities report that there were some 900 attempts to gain illegal entry into nuclear installations in 1993 alone; there were a further 700 cases of workers caught trying to smuggle nuclear material out of these installations. The potential profits involved in such operations are huge and well organised criminal elements have already developed sophisticated smuggling networks to transport stolen goods out of Russia. High-ranking individuals in foreign and other ministries in the former communist states are said to be involved in the traffic, as are senior business figures.

To monitor possible diversion, particularly from Russia, where military reprocessing plants and uranium enrichment facilities are not subject to IAEA safeguards, the IAEA’s mandate should now be extended to include monitoring of all stored fissile material. Nuclear weapons states (NWS) should be required to provide inventories of the military Highly Enriched Uranium and plutonium stocks and these should be subject to regular IAEA inspections. Instituting such inspections would eliminate a major inequity in the NPT since NWS signatories to the NPT, unlike other signatories, do not have their nuclear facilities monitored by the IAEA. As noted above, fissile material stockpiles will grow rapidly as the process of nuclear weapon dismantling accelerates. In the Asia-Pacific, an agreement to produce inventories of military fissile material, and to permit IAEA monitoring of those inventories...

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39See Norris et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 5. “Tactical” here refers to very short range nuclear weapons. Most of China’s nuclear weapons are mounted on medium-range delivery platforms capable of striking most Asia-Pacific states and Eastern Russia but not Europe or the U.S.

41Ibid.
ries, would require China to be far more transparent about its nuclear weapons program than is currently the case.

Given that a NEANZ ban on reprocessing and HEU production is unlikely to be acceptable for the near future, additional, less intrusive, measures should be considered to safeguard the growing global fissile material inventories. The various proposals for internationally monitored and controlled storage of plutonium/HEU stocks should certainly be revisited. Japan raised this issue at the 1993 G-7 summit, but according to Nucleonics Week, Tokyo was only interested in control over stockpiles of military fissile material—not of civilian stockpiles like Japan’s.42 Finally the problem of disposing of plutonium released from dismantled nuclear weapons which cannot be absorbed in commercial power reactors needs to be addressed.

4. Nuclear CSBMs. As noted above, no nuclear confidence-building measures have been negotiated between China and the U.S. and Russia. There are no nuclear ‘hotlines’ or equivalents to any of the other nuclear CSBMs negotiated during the Cold War between Washington and Moscow. The impetus to negotiate such agreements is currently weak because political relationships between Beijing, Moscow and Washington are no longer characterised by fear and hostility. Such agreements are most useful in times of crisis—but then the conditions are not propitious for negotiations. It is precisely when CSBMs are not needed that they should be negotiated. Once negotiated they will be in place when needed.

Moreover, since ‘bolt out of the blue’ nuclear wars are almost inconceivable, the most important nuclear CSBMs are those which reduce the risks of conventional war—since nuclear wars are most likely to erupt from conventional wars. Preventing conventional war helps prevent nuclear war. Once again the picture is not encouraging—with the important exception of the CSBMs negotiated between Beijing and Moscow regarding troop deployments along their common border. The only other discussions of military CSBMs in Northeast Asia have been those between North and South Korea. These are currently stalled because of the nuclear issue.

5. Redeployment of Russian Missile-Firing Submarines. During the Cold War, a key strategic target of the U.S. Navy were the Pacific-based missile-firing submarines (SSBNs) of the Soviet/Russian Navy.43 The U.S. anti-SSBN mission was seen by many analysts as highly provocative and creating a considerable risk of nuclear escalation. The permanent elimination of the U.S. Navy’s anti-SSBN mission and a reduction of risk of nuclear escalation in any possible future conflict between the U.S. and Russia could be achieved by the redeployment of Russian SSBNs from the Pacific to Russia’s Western seaboard. It may be argued that such measures are unnecessary in view of the non-antagonistic relationship which now exists between Moscow and Washington. This is not a compelling argument. If one assumes that relationships will remain benign for ever then Russia’s Pacific SSBNs can be redeployed—or scrapped—anyway. If, on the other hand, one assumes that there is a finite, albeit small, risk that relationships could again deteriorate, and possibly even lead to war, then the crisis stability argument for SSBN redeployments remains relevant.

The removal of Russian SSBNs from the Pacific would not only eliminate a central rationale of traditional U.S. Pacific strategy, it would also mean that there was no longer a need for the specialised forces which fulfilled this mission. In other words, relocating Russian SSBNs would contribute to the demilitarisation of Northeast Asia. And if the U.S. no longer had an SSBN mission to pursue this would deprive much of Russia’s traditional defensive strategy in the region of its rationale—again permitting significant force level reductions. An SSBN ban could thus have positive arms reduction spin-offs, in addition to its own intrinsic security benefits.

For the Russians, the security rationale for retaining control over the so-called ‘Northern Territories’—islands just to the North of Hokkaido which are occupied by Russia but also claimed by Japan—would largely disappear if Russian SSBNs were redeployed out of the Pacific. The Soviet/Russian military have rejected demands for these territories to be ‘returned’ to Japan since the two main islands in contention control one of a number of straits which provide access to the Sea of Okhotsk from the East. If the islands were returned to Japan it would be more


43 The anti-SSBN mission of the Navy was intended (a) to shift the nuclear correlations of forces in America’s favour, and (b) ‘pin down’ Soviet attack submarines—by forcing them to seek to protect the threatened SSBNs. This in turn would prevent those submarines from attacking allied sea lines of communication.
difficult for the Russians to control the ingress of U.S. nuclear attack submarines into Russian SSBN patrol areas in the Sea of Okhotsk.\textsuperscript{44} Thus the removal of the security rationale for keeping the islands would remove one impediment to a solution of the territorial issue—which is the major factor preventing a real normalisation of relations between Moscow and Tokyo.

This proposal also makes a virtue out of necessity since block obsolescence of many of Russia’s SSBNs will mean large reductions in the Pacific fleet anyway. As Geoffrey Jukes has pointed out in a recent study, a combination of retirements due to obsolescence and to the requirements of the START-2 agreement will mean that by 2003 Russia’s entire seaborne nuclear deterrent will be carried on twenty SSBNs compared with some sixty-two in 1992. The most modern Russian SSBNs—six Typhoons and twelve Delta-IVs—are based in the Murmansk area in the East of Russia. None of them are based in the Pacific. The Pacific SSBN fleet is made up of ageing submarines, most of which will be retired by the end of the decade.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The traditional—and mostly American—argument against nuclear-free zones was that they encouraged the ‘nuclear allergy’ and in so doing undermined deterrence. In the post-Cold War era this argument is no longer relevant. The instruments of deterrence—the still huge nuclear arsenals of Russia and America—remain largely in place, yet the fear of aggression which provided their only justification has almost completely disappeared. The case for NWFZs today relates to the modest role they may play in the global campaign against nuclear proliferation. Ideally, as suggested in the NEANFZ proposal outlined above, the zones should be broad in scope with the various elements acting synergistically to reinforce each other.

While each of the technical provisions of an NFZ is important in its own right, and while the total effect should be greater than the sum of the parts, the most important consequence of creating such regimes is ultimately political. It is the enhancement of what the U.S. and its allies sought throughout the Cold War to suppress—namely ‘the nuclear allergy’. NFZs are, above all, about creating norms which delegitimise nuclearism. The promotion of a NEANFZ, initially modest in scope but with optional protocols outlining an agenda for expansion, should be supported not least as a means of generating public debate on the dangers of proliferation in the region. The anti-proliferation debate is too important to be left to the arms control experts who have too great a predilection for technical supply-side solutions. In the last analysis ‘nuclear allergy’—the political mood which derives from the belief that reliance on nuclear weapons to promote national security in the post-Cold War world is neither wise nor morally appropriate—may ultimately prove a more effective weapon against nuclear proliferation than a dozen treaties.

\textsuperscript{44}The strategic importance of the straits in question is queried in Geoffrey Jukes’ valuable study, ‘Russia’s Military and the Northern Territories Issue’, Working Paper No. 277, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, October 1993.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
APPENDIX I: Nuclear Test-Limitation and Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties

1959 **Antarctic Treaty:** prohibiting, inter alia, nuclear explosions in the Antarctic area. (Entered into force: 1961)

1963 **Partial Test Ban Treaty:** banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. (Entered into force: 1963)

1967 **Outer Space Treaty** and 1979 **Moon Agreement:** both prohibiting, inter alia, the testing of any type of weapon on the moon and other celestial bodies. (Outer Space Treaty entered into force 1967 and Moon Agreement in 1984)

1967 **Treaty of Tlatelolco:** establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in Latin America; subsequent accession to Protocol II by all five nuclear weapon states. (The Treaty is not completely in force, although states which have ratified it have waived article 28(1), thus bringing it into force for those states.)

1968 **Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT):** prohibiting the manufacture of nuclear weapons and, by implication, the testing of such weapons by non-nuclear weapon states. (Entered into force: 1970)

1971 Seabed Treaty: banning, inter alia, the emplacement of any facility designed for testing nuclear weapons on the seabed. (Entered into force: 1972)

1974 U.S.-USSR **Threshold Test Ban Treaty:** limiting underground nuclear weapon tests to a yield of 150 kilotons. (Entered into force: 1990)

1976 U.S.-USSR **Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty:** limiting underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes to a yield of 150 kilotons. (Entered into force: 1990)

1985 **Treaty of Rarotonga:** establishing a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific; subsequent accession to its Protocols II and III by China and the Russian Federation. (Entered into force: 1986)

1991 **Cartegna Agreement** by the Andean States: to renounce weapons of mass destruction.

Now Negotiations on an **African Nuclear Weapon–Free Zone** are well advanced and negotiations are also underway on a **South East Asia Nuclear Weapon–Free Zone.**
Summary

Functions of a Crisis Prevention Center

Relationships between countries normally lie somewhere in the grey area between war and peace. Crisis prevention activities will be particularly important in this area, and should have two goals: (1) stabilizing tense situations that could push countries toward war and (2) supporting or re-enforcing efforts to move countries toward a state of peace. A Crisis Prevention Center (CPC) will facilitate efforts to achieve these goals and its functions can be grouped into three broad, inter-related categories: (1) establishing and facilitating communication among participating countries, (2) supporting negotiations and consensus-building on regional security issues, and (3) supporting implementation of agreed confidence- and security building measures. Appropriate activities in each of these categories will depend on the relations among participating countries. Between hostile states, a CPC may have the very restricted role of preventing unintentional war, much like the “Hot Line” communication system between the United States and the former Soviet Union. For states struggling to stabilize relations, the CPC should facilitate resolution of a broad range of contentious issues. As states enter into cooperative arrangements, a much broader role could be expected, including the implementation of systems for acquiring, analyzing, and sharing information obtained under the terms of confidence building agreements or treaties.

The Role of Technology

Technology will play a critical role in a CPC. Technology is required for establishing communication systems to ensure the timely flow of information between countries and to provide the means for organizing and analyzing this information. Technically-based cooperative monitoring can provide an objective source of information on mutually agreed issues, thereby supporting the implementation of confidence-building measures.

Arian L. Pregenzer is in Verification and Monitoring Analysis Department 9241 at Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185-0567. This work was supported by the United States Department of Energy under Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.
Functions of a Crisis Prevention Center

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First Steps for a Northeast Asian CPC

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and treaties. In addition, technology itself can be a neutral subject of interaction and collaboration between technical communities from different countries, thereby providing an important channel for improving relationships.

Crisis Prevention in Northeast Asia

Establishing a CPC in Northeast Asia does not require the existence of an Asian security regime. Indeed, activities that occur under the auspices of a CPC, even highly formalized exchanges of agreed information, can increase transparency, and thereby pave the way for future regional cooperation. Major players in Northeast Asian security are Japan, Russia, China, North and South Korea, and the United States.

Potential first steps for a CPC in Northeast Asia should include establishing communication channels and a dedicated communications center in each country, together with an agreement to use the system as a “Hot Line” in bilateral and multilateral emergency situations. A central CPC could also be established as a regional communications hub. The central CPC could coordinate a number of functions aimed stabilizing regional tensions and supporting confidence-building activities, perhaps initially in an unofficial capacity.

If Northeast Asia moves in the direction of regional cooperation on security issues, the number of activities supported by a CPC would increase. Planning for such activities, and establishing an architecture for their ultimate implementation will be critical.

Introduction

While the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist block has reduced the likelihood of global war, it has increased the likelihood of regional conflicts. Without the stability provided by a system of states dominated by two superpowers, local conflicts over resources, disputed territory, mass immigration, and ethnic and political antagonisms can escalate into regional wars. Regional wars can have global consequences, particularly if the countries involved possess weapons of mass destruction. Relationships between countries lie on a spectrum ranging from outright war to peace. Some degree of
tension between countries is normal, and most relationships lie somewhere in the grey area between the two extremes. Crisis prevention activities will be particularly important in this grey area, and should have two goals: (1) stabilizing tense situations that could push countries toward war and (2) supporting or reinforcing efforts to move countries toward a state of peace.

Knowledge of, and information about, potential adversaries are key elements of successful crisis prevention. Tensions are reduced between potential adversaries when they have adequate information about each other and understand each other well enough to accurately interpret the information they obtain. Lack of understanding of “the other,” regarding military capabilities, threat perceptions, intentions, and values, has been a major contributor to decisions leading to unplanned war or escalation of war in this century. An understanding of the potential adversary is important for government officials, who are directly responsible for critical decisions that can lead to war or peace, and for citizens, whose opinions often influence the behavior of decision-makers. Communication is an important means of improving understanding and providing information, and can range from a very limited and formal information exchange about jointly perceived major threats, to extensive contact between countries. Two concepts closely related to crisis prevention are “crisis management” and “peace management.” Crisis management will be required when tensions escalate uncontrollably, and war seems imminent. Although stabilizing tensions will remain a primary goal of crisis management, activities will occur on a more rapid time scale and a different set of tools will be employed, possibly including military threats or coercion. On the other end of the spectrum, peace management will focus on enforcing and supporting the state of peace, with the goal of making peace irreversible. Figure 1 shows the relationship of crisis management, crisis prevention, and peace management.

**Functions of a Crisis Prevention Center**

A Crisis Prevention Center (CPC) will facilitate efforts to reduce tension and to reinforce peace. Functions for a CPC can be grouped into three broad, inter-related categories: (1) establishing and facilitating communication among participating countries, (2) supporting negotiations and consensus-building on regional security issues, and (3) supporting implementation of agreed confidence and security building measures.

Appropriate activities in each of these categories will depend on the relations among participating countries. Among hostile states, a CPC may have the very restricted role of preventing unintentional war, much like the “Hot Line” communication system between the United States and the Soviet Union. For states struggling to achieve more stable relations, the CPC should facilitate resolution of a broad range of contentious issues. As states enter into cooperative arrangements, a much broader role could be expected, including the implementation of systems for acquiring, analyzing, and sharing information obtained under the terms of confidence building agreements or treaties. Figure 2 shows the association of these functions and their derivative activities with different stages of a regional security process.

Establishing a CPC requires only that states have a mutual desire to prevent the unintentional escalation of events to the stage of conflict and that they accept the tenet that better communication, even if it only entails sharing a limited set of information, can enhance their security. It does not require that states enter into a cooperative security arrangement, nor does it preclude war. Ample evidence of the value of crisis prevention activities between inimical states is provided by agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1960s and 1970s aimed at preventing accidental war. These agreements established direct communications between the capitals of the two countries, established commitments to improving security and control of nuclear arsenals, and established procedures to prevent provocations. Implementation was extremely formal, and involved little human contact. They represent one end of the spectrum of crisis prevention: establishment of communication channels and the exchange of a limited set of agreed information.

Although the existence of a cooperative security arrangement is not a prerequisite for a CPC, crisis prevention and cooperative security

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2 See “Hot Line” Agreements in Appendix A.

3 Appendix A summarizes several of these agreements.
have overlapping goals. One goal of a cooperative security regime is to prevent threats from arising by preventing the accumulation of the means for serious, deliberate, organized aggression. By providing the infrastructure for exchanging information on potentially threatening activities, and thereby preventing accidental escalation of tense situations, a CPC could be seen as a first step toward meeting the conditions for a cooperative security regime. The cooperative security regime in Europe, known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and its associated Conflict Prevention Center are summarized in Appendix B as an illustrative example.

Incorporating both official and unofficial, or “track two,” activities under the auspices of a single Crisis Prevention Center would have several advantages. Prior to initiating an official security dialogue, or during times when the official dialogue is stalled, “track two” efforts can provide an important forum for continuing discussion. Unofficial discussions can provide a source of new ideas to the official dialogue and proximity of the two “tracks” will facilitate the exchange of ideas and reduce the possibility of interference of “track two” efforts with the official process. An unofficial forum also provides an opportunity for government officials, acting in an unofficial capacity, to experiment with new approaches. Finally, including a second “track” enhances the ability for building confidence among the citizens of the participating countries, as well as among the governments, which is an important element of the security process.

Technology will play a critical role in the CPC, as shown in Figure 3. In the first place, technology is required for establishing communication systems to ensure the timely flow of information between countries and to provide the means for organizing and analyzing this information. Second, technically-based cooperative monitoring can provide an objective source of information on mutually agreed issues, thereby supporting the implementation of confidence building measures and treaties. In addition, technology itself can be a neutral subject of interaction and collaboration between technical communities from different countries, thereby providing an important channel for improving understanding. The following paragraphs pro-

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5 Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in International Regimes, ed. Krasner, 177. According to Jervis, a cooperative security regime has a good chance of forming if three conditions are satisfied: all states accept the status quo and modifications to it that can be achieved by peaceful means; states believe that other parties to the regime value mutual security and cooperation; and bilateral or unilateral pursuit of security is seen as prohibitively expensive.
Figure 3: Roles of Technology in CPC

Roles of Technology

communication and information management

source of objective information

neutral basis for collaboration

provide a discussion of activities that support one or more of the functions of a CPC and a brief explanation, where appropriate, of the technical requirements.

Communication Network
A communication network will be a central element of the CPC. Although a central communications hub is not required, one could be established to act as a point through which all communications could be routed and to provide a center for regional crisis prevention activities. However, a first step would be to establish local CPCs in each participating country, each with agreed communications equipment and interconnected by satellite and wire communication links. Each country will require identical equipment and capabilities to assure equal access to all participants.

Relatively little equipment is required to support the exchange of routine, formalized information. For example, equipment at the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in the United States and Russia consists of computer monitors, word processors, facsimile machines, phone lines and printers; communication links are provided by satellite. Data transmission rates are relatively slow: approximately one page of text in thirty seconds. More sophisticated capabilities would be required to collect and transmit data from remote monitoring systems associated with confidence building measures or other agreements.

Topics for Information Exchange
The establishment of a communication network implies that the participants have agreed to some limited form of communication, perhaps only for emergency situations. Deciding a larger set of issues on which to exchange information could be the next step. A centrally located CPC could be the forum for these discussions, or they could occur on an ad hoc basis at a series of meetings in individual countries, as did initial discussions of confidence building measures in Europe. Information exchange on a wide-ranging set of issues would encourage developing a “basket approach” to regional security. Such exchanges would both increase understanding and serve a confidence-building function even in the absence of formal agreements. If formal agreements are attained, the CPC would be involved in transmitting any agreed information, such as notifications and declarations.

The number of communication channels at the CPC will depend on the number of different categories of exchanged information. Separate channels would be needed to support bilateral and multilateral communications, official and unofficial communications, and emergency and routine communications. The number of required staff will depend on the amount of information exchanged and the urgency of the communications.

Countries should not conclude that use of the communication network is a sign of weakness of imminent threat. Establishing procedures for routine use of the system will help prevent this from occurring. Weekly routine communication, rotating among the participating countries, would enforce the habit of consultation and communication. Continuous test communication patterns would also be required to provide confidence about the state of health of the system.

To support unofficial dialogue, the network could also be used by the academic and research communities of the participating countries, both for communication and as a research tool. This communication could increase productivity and invite new ideas about areas for cooperation.

Information Management and Analysis
An organized system for providing access to exchanged information is highly recommended.

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6This lesson was learned during the tense period between India and Pakistan in 1990, according to knowledgeable participants in a recent discussion held at the Stimson Center; Michael Krepon, private communication.
Data bases with text search and retrieval capabilities will be required for organizing basic information, such as points of contact in participating countries, the text of any mutual agreements, and reports on inspections or fact finding missions. If the CPC is involved in implementation of treaties or confidence building agreements, it could need data acquisition, integration, and analysis capabilities, which will require more sophisticated communication and software capabilities. Depending on the nature of the confidence building measures and the regional monitoring network, the CPC could receive data directly from the sensors deployed for cooperative monitoring applications, or such data could be transmitted to the CPC after being initially processed at local data acquisition centers. The communication network, already established as a first step for the CPC, could provide the basis for data transmission and communication of analytic results to local data centers in each country.

**Education and Training**

Negotiators and decision-makers need adequate knowledge about procedures and technologies that could facilitate implementation of confidence building measures or treaties. A CPC could support educational efforts by providing a forum for experienced countries and organizations to share their expertise, including practical experience with basic monitoring hardware and software systems. The CPC could also arrange trips to other countries to facilitate the transfer of this experience base. Where possible, education should include hands-on experience with monitoring hardware and data, computer modeling and simulations, and information management and analysis techniques.

The CPC could also organize trial confidence-building measures or exercises to increase regional familiarity with procedures and technologies that might be used during a transition to peaceful relations. Such exercises could be conducted outside the region, perhaps in conjunction with exercises taking place in other regions or countries, to alleviate political concerns. Another option would be to simulate such exercises at the CPC, using either scripted procedures or computer simulations.

**Collaborative Efforts**

Collaborations among technical, military and cultural communities emphasize commonalities within these communities and encourage cooperation. Any neutral subject, such as sports, the arts, or science and technology, can be the basis of confidence-building collaboration. Because technology plays an important role in crisis prevention, it can be a particularly fruitful area for collaboration. Not only do technical collaborations provide neutral ground for interaction among scientific communities, they may also produce results that will aid in the implementation of future agreements. The work of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva illustrates this point. Long before there was a negotiating mandate for a nuclear test ban at the CD, scientists from all participating countries collaborated on the technical issues associated with sharing seismic data internationally. Now that a comprehensive test ban is being negotiated in Geneva, the work of the GSE will provide valuable information about the structure of the verification system of this treaty. Collegial relationships that developed among participating scientists during previous collaborations will ease implementation of any agreed system.

Laboratory and office space will be required at the CPC to support technical collaborations. Laboratory equipment will depend on the specific application, whether it be the development of new sensor hardware, the development of more efficient algorithms for analyzing data, or the development of better data display capabilities. Computer and electronics laboratories would almost certainly be required.

**Conferences and Symposia**

An important function of the CPC would be to sponsor conferences and symposia to increase understanding of a broad range of issues that could affect present and future regional security, and to provide an intellectually stimulating environment for their serious consideration. As stated previously, the issues for discussion should not be restricted to the politico-military arena. Some analysts believe that tensions over environmental and resource issues may be at the top of the security agenda in the coming decades. Terrorism, uncontrolled immigration, and human rights abuses are also appropriate candidates for discussion at a CPC.

A natural outcome of collaborative efforts and joint conferences will be suggestions for

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regional confidence building measures. Where appropriate, the suggestions could also include technical details for effective implementation that evolved from collaborations and symposia. The right mix of governmental, academic and technical expertise in the discussions would be essential for a viable set of recommendations. Suggestions arising from an unofficial track could lay the groundwork for subsequent official discussions.

Since technology can be expected to play a role in implementing agreements in both the arms control and environmental areas some conference activities should seek to promote communication between the political and technical communities. Such communication is important for two reasons: (1) awareness of the capabilities and limitations of monitoring technology can influence the attitude of decision-makers toward particular agreements and (2) knowledge about the specific issues under discussion helps steer technology down relevant paths.

**Anticipating Future Needs**

A shift to peace could bring a new set of regional problems, or draw attention to existing problems whose solution requires cooperation. For example, when relations in a region improve, increased economic activity could stress the already fragile environment. Similarly, when people are no longer preoccupied with defending their borders against military attack, they may open their eyes to other potential crises, such as illegal migration and environmental degradation. Anticipating such problems and outlining a regional framework for preventing them from attaining crisis proportions, could be an important forward-looking function of the CPC. Managing the peace could be its ultimate role. To do this effectively, the infrastructure needs to be carefully planned to allow for communication and storage of relevant quantities and types of data, as well as its integration, analysis, and presentation to participants in a form that assists them make rational decisions.

**Staffing of the CPC**

Staffing requirements become more complex with an increasing number of functions at the CPC. Computer hardware and software experts, data processing and analysis experts, and communications specialists will probably all be required. Staff with political and technical expertise about multilateral negotiations across a spectrum of issues will also be needed, and could have either permanent or rotating assignments at the CPC. Technical experts in monitoring technologies for arms control, environmental, and other applications will be required to support technical collaborations, as well as education and training. Technical expertise could be supplied by permanent residents of the center, sabbatical programs, or association with local laboratories. Representation of all participating countries would be expected.

**Crisis Prevention for Northeast Asia**

There is no established multilateral security regime in Northeast Asia, and great skepticism among all major players about the usefulness of such a regime. Several issues complicate the multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia. Andrew Mack points out that Northeast Asian security policy is heavily skewed toward deterrence, rather than reassurance which is a major objective of a cooperative security regime. Next, cooperative security stresses the need for military transparency and openness, rather than secrecy, as a means of providing reassurance, and there is no tradition of military openness in the region. In addition, he notes that rather than being warm, relations among the countries in the region range from cool to hostile. He also points out that key Northeast Asian security issues are bilateral, rather than multilateral, for example: reunification of the Koreas, tensions between China and Taiwan, border disputes between the former Soviet Union and China, and the disagreement between Japan and Russia over the “Northern Territories.”

It is worth noting, however, that crises resulting from any of these bilateral disputes would almost certainly have grave consequences for the entire region. In addition, there are a growing number of regional security and environmental issues whose solution may require multilateral collaboration. These include non-proliferation issues such as the current crisis over North Korea’s alleged nuclear weapons program, and environmental issues, such as disposal of radioactive waste in the Sea of Japan, air pollution across frontiers, depletion of fish in the North Pacific and East Asian seas, and the inte-

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8For a good discussion, see Andrew Mack, “Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects,” *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, summer 1992, 21–34. It is worth noting that many of these issues also complicated East West relations in the previous two decades.
Proposals for an Asian Security Regime

As early as the 1970s the Soviet Union proposed the establishment of an Asian security regime, modeled loosely on the CSCE and termed a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA).\(^9\) Early Soviet proposals were vague in terms of the charter of the organization, details of implementation and membership. The United States and pro-Western Asian countries rejected these proposals, primarily because United States military presence was considered to be the most important stabilizing influence in the region, and the Soviet proposals were aimed in part at reducing the influence of United States. Asian reactions emphasized the distinction between Asia and Europe and voiced indignation over the implication that Western ideas could be imported into their region, which they saw as implicit in the Soviet proposals.

Since the end of the Cold War, Russian proposals have become more specific. In 1990 and 1991, Gorbachev suggested that the Conflict Prevention Center at the CSCE could be adapted for the Asia-Pacific region.\(^11\) Gorbachev also argued that a CSCA could help solve regional conflicts, and would have value in resolving regional economic, ethnic, social, and ecological problems, all of which are tied to resolving regional security dilemmas. He emphasized an informal approach as a first step. In summer 1993, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev called for creating a conflict prevention center within the Asia-Pacific region to provide a mechanism for preventing crisis situations. Such a center would presuppose exchanges of military information, cooperation in settling dangerous incidents, and consultation in the event of unusual military activity.\(^12\)

Canada, Australia, South Korea, and Mongolia have also proposed Asian security regimes of one kind or another. All proposals included, as appropriate functions of a cooperative regime, discussions of regional confidence building measures and arms control and security issues. They also emphasized the importance of establishing informal security dialogues, or “track two” approaches, as the first step. The Mongolian and South Korean proposals both emphasized the importance and precedence of bilateral, relative to multilateral, discussions.

The United States, Japan, China and North Korea have continued to reject proposals for a CSCA. The United States has not wanted its regional influence eroded and sees this as a probable consequence of any multilateral regime. Since the Gulf War, however, where a multilateral approach proved valuable, the United States has expressed the willingness to participate in multilateral forums for specific issues on an ad hoc basis.

As an ally of the United States, Japan has not embraced proposals for a CSCA. Japan also rejects comparisons between Asia and Europe and has expressed the view that Asia is too complex for a security regime. Japan’s security policy has been heavily focused on hostility to Russia, especially over the “Northern Territories.” It has played a role in regional economic forums, however, and has lately emphasized “economic security” as an important dimension of “comprehensive security,” which could signal its readiness to expand the multilateral dimension of its security policy.

China maintains official skepticism on the issue of a CSCA, and is thought to be particularly skeptical about Russian intentions. China has preferred bilateral channels to resolve its territorial disputes, and emphasizes that there is no simple East/West divide in Asia, as there is in Europe. However, China is concerned about the Korean peninsula and has recently participated in multi-power consultations with the United States, Russia, North and South Korea, China, and Japan regarding the Korean problem. In spite of its sensitivity to foreign interventions into its

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\(^11\) See Appendix B for a discussion of the Conflict Prevention Center of the CSCE.

\(^12\) Russia-CIS Intelligence Report, “Options of Asia-Pacific Security System Eyed” 5 August 1993, International Intelligence Report, Inc.
internal affairs, China could become more open to discussions about cooperative security.

**First Steps for Crisis Prevention Centers in Northeast Asia**

As discussed previously, establishing a CPC in Northeast Asia does not require the existence of an Asian security regime. Indeed, activities that occur under the auspices of a CPC, even highly formalized exchanges of agreed information, can increase transparency, and thereby pave the way for future regional cooperation. One primary objective of any crisis prevention activity in the foreseeable future should be reducing the alienation of North Korea.

Major players in Northeast Asian security are Japan, Russia, China, the two Koreas, and the United States, and their participation in a regional CPC would be critical, even if only on an ad hoc basis, or initially in an unofficial capacity. Other countries could be invited to participate, but limiting membership will prevent excessive bureaucratization and improve chances for an effective organization in its early stages.

**Establishing a Communication Network**

Establishing a dedicated communications center as local CPCs in each country would be a first step. Because of the bilateral nature of many concerns in the region, restricting communication to bilateral channels should be an option. A central communications hub also could be established to permit communication on issues of importance to more than two countries and to set the stage for more multilateral communication in the future. Establishing a central CPC would also emphasize and promote multilateral cooperative efforts.

Although the United States and Russia would likely be participants, a central Northeast Asian CPC should be located in an Asian country. Clearly, it would also be important to locate center in a relatively open society that does not unduly restrict the activities of either its citizens or foreign visitors. Technical sophistication of the host country would facilitate smooth functioning of the center. Other considerations might include whether or not the host country possesses nuclear weapons and the degree to which it is a proactive player in international politics. Locating the CPC in a non-participating, relatively neutral country, such as Singapore, might also be considered.

**Agreeing on Topics for Information Exchange**

First steps might involve sharing information on reports of movements of troops and military equipment in potentially unstable regions, such as the border between North and South Korea. Similarly, notification of large regional military exercises would help reduce the possibility of misinterpretation of these events as offensive developments. Other candidates for information exchange include: notification of regional disasters, advance notification of radioactive waste dumping in oceans and seas, information about indigenous export control infrastructure, and advance notification of civilian space launch testing activities. Not every country would necessarily be required to participate in such information sharing. Indeed, some exchanges might be purely bilateral in nature. However, to promote regional openness, attempts should be made to provide all countries with access to the data, wherever possible.

**Forum for Discussion of Security Concerns**

Since many problems in the region are bilateral in nature, discussion of bilateral problems at the CPC should be a goal. Since some countries have bilateral problems with more than one country in the region, a central CPC could ease access to multiple partners. Again, where possible, reports on the results of bilateral discussions could be made available to the larger group as a sign of openness.

Inviting multilateral discussion of bilateral issues in an unofficial forum could also be a fruitful source of solutions. Details for implementing the agreed confidence building measures between North and South Korea is an example, as are possible solutions to the territorial disputes between China and the former Soviet Union or between Japan and Russia.

**Exploring Areas of Common Ground**

The CPC could support activities required by existing or future treaties and agreements to which more than one of the Northeast Asian countries are party. The Transparency in Armaments Agreement, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and a Comprehensive Test Ban fall into this category. In addition to encouraging regional cooperation, centralizing such activities could reduce costs and improve efficiency for all members by taking advantage of economies of scale.

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13Continued United States military presence in the region seems to be desirable to most countries and makes United States participation in any regional security forum an important element.
In some cases, countries might want to engage in joint planning for the implementation of a treaty. For example, China, Japan, Russia, the United States, and South Korea all have legitimate concerns about protecting proprietary information during inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention. They could engage in joint trial inspections at a chemical plant in preparation for official inspections and explore the efficacy of certain procedures for protecting privacy. The CPC could provide logistical support to such trial inspections, capitalizing on United States and Russian experience.

Another example where countries could benefit from collaborative approaches to existing agreements is the enforcement of export controls. Several export control issues have caused regional tensions in the last year, including accusations that a Chinese ship was illegally carrying chemical weapons precursors, and the allegation that Japanese citizens had supplied financial resources to aid in the North Korean nuclear program. Many countries have agreed to control the export of sensitive technologies or materials but lack the legal and physical infrastructure needed for implementation and enforcement. A CPC could provide a forum for discussing a coordinated approach and providing technical support to any agreed system.

Scientific, Military, and Cultural Collaborations

Collaborations among the military communities are particularly recommended as a means of increasing trust between potential adversaries. Joint planning or training for extra-regional peacekeeping activities, and joint training for emergency response activities, such as the clean up of oil spills, that could involve the military, are possible first steps.

Collaborative efforts among the press could promote balanced reporting of regional issues and discourage rhetorical and sensational reporting. This is especially important for tense situations such as that resulting from developments in North Korea.

Collaborations on technical monitoring systems could focus on areas outside the politico-military regime as a first step. There already exist several regional initiatives for cooperation on environmental issues, and the CPC could provide technical and logistical support for recommended activities. For example, the CPC could coordinate the development of common monitoring methodologies and techniques and could support data acquisition and analysis for baseline monitoring for acid rain and ecosystem impact studies in the region.

Future Steps for a Northeast Asian CPC

If Northeast Asia moves in the direction of regional cooperation, the emphasis of the security regime will shift from deterrence to reassurance. To provide such reassurance, there will be a push for military transparency and openness, for confidence and security building measures to reduce the risk of dangerous misunderstandings, for arms control, and possibly for a reconfiguration of armed forces to emphasize defense rather than offense. Perhaps China will join Russia and the United States in nuclear arms control treaties and nuclear weapon dismantlement activities. Ground forces might be relocated to reduce the chances for border misunderstandings. Limitations could be imposed on ballistic missile testing. Greater military-to-military contacts and planning dialogues could be expected, possibly including common warning and intelligence functions. All these activities could be supported by a CPC. Planning for these activities and establishing an architecture for their ultimate implementation will be critical.

Appendix A: Crisis Prevention Agreements Between the United States and the Soviet Union During the Cold War

The “Hot Line” Agreement

The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 underscored the importance of prompt, direct communication between heads of state of the United States and the Soviet Union in times of crisis to reduce the risk that accident or miscalculation might trigger a nuclear war. In June 1963, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding, known as the “Hot Line” Agreement, agreeing to establish a direct communications link between Moscow and Washington to be used in times of emergency. Because its use is restricted to emergencies, the

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14 Refer to Hayes and Zarsky, op. cit.

“Hot Line” is regarded as being a tool for managing crises, rather than preventing them. The original agreement established a full-time duplex wire telegraph circuit (Washington-London-Copenhagen-Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow) and a full-time duplex radiotelegraph circuit (Washington-Tanger-Moscow) between the two capitals. The agreement was modernized in 1971, by establishing provisions for satellite communication links to replace the radio circuit. Such modernization was intended to increase the reliability and reduce the vulnerability of the communication system. In 1984, the system was upgraded to include facsimile equipment at the terminals, in addition to the teletype equipment stipulated in the original agreement. This increased the speed of communications and allowed for the transmission of graphic material such as maps and drawings.

In the United States, the Hot Line is located in the Pentagon, whereas in the former Soviet Union it is located in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its use is restricted to the heads of state of the two governments. Although details are kept highly confidential, the “Hot Line” has been used on several occasions. For example, during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars it was used to prevent misunderstandings about United States fleet movements in the Mediterranean.

“Accidents Measures” Agreement

In recognition of the dire consequences of accidents involving nuclear weapon systems, both in terms of accidental detonations and in terms of unauthorized use of weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement aimed at reducing such risks in 1971. The “Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War” addresses three primary areas: (1) a commitment to improve organizational and technical safeguards against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; (2) arrangements for immediate notification if such incidents should occur and pose a risk of nuclear war, if unidentified objects are observed on early warning systems, or in case of any unauthorized or accidental incident involving possible detonation of a nuclear weapon; and (3) agreement to notify in advance any planned missile launches beyond the territory of the launching party and in the direction of the other. Originally, the “Hot Line” was designated as the vehicle for communication, but the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) was given this responsibility upon its establishment in 1988. The only information under this agreement that has been transmitted from the NRRC is the notification of strategic ballistic missile launches.

Incidents at Sea Agreement

During the 1960s the U.S. and Soviet navies had several confrontations that raised concerns on both sides about the need for measures to prevent the escalation of such incidents. An agreement on naval confidence building measures, known as the Incidents at Sea Agreement, was reached in May 1972, and provided for measures to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding of military activities; to reduce the possibility of conflict by accident, miscalculation, or the failure of communication; and to increase stability in times of both calm and crisis. Among the provisions in the agreement are specific steps to avoid collisions between ships; the requirement that surveillance ships maintain a safe distance from the object under investigation; and prohibitions against simulating attacks at or launching objects toward ships belonging to the other party. The agreement also provides for advance notice of planned activities that might represent a danger to ships or aircraft, and annual meetings to review implementation of the agreement. Since its establishment, notifications have been transmitted through the NRRC.

This accord was promptly credited with improving relations between the Soviets and Americans and greatly reducing the number of naval incidents. Before this agreement, dangerous incidents occurred at the rate of tens per year. By 1990, the annual meetings between the United States and the Soviet Union treated only half as many. Both navies saw the Incidents at Sea Agreement as being in their best interest, which is a major reason for its success.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

After a series of discussions on reducing the risks of nuclear war in the mid-1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to establish a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) in each capital and to establish special communication links between these centers. The equipment and

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16Ibid., 118–21.
17Ibid., 142–49.
18Ibid., 336–44; and Harold Kowalski, Staff Director of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in the United States, private communication.
communication lines utilized by the NRRC in both countries are identical to those of the “Hot Lines.” In the United States, the NRRC is located in the State Department; in Russia, it is located in the Ministry of Defense.

The centers became operational in 1988 and are intended to supplement existing means of communication (such as the “Hot Line” and diplomatic channels) and to provide direct, reliable, high-speed systems for transmission of notifications and communications required under existing and possible future arms control and confidence-building agreements. At their initiation, there were no arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union and the NRRCs were used only to notify ballistic missile launches required under the Accidents Measures Agreement and the Incidents at Sea Agreement. Now they are used to transmit information required under twelve different bilateral and multilateral arms control treaties, including the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the nuclear testing treaties. They will also be used to transmit information required under START, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Open Skies Treaty. Separate communication channels and work areas within the NRRC are used for bilateral and multilateral agreements. Bilateral communications also require a higher degree of confidentiality. The center employs one watch officer for bilateral communications with the Russians, two watch officers for CSCE-related communications, and a technical support person. The center is staffed twenty-four hours a day.

The NRRCs may also be used to transmit “good-will” messages as a confidence building measure. The conditions under which such good-will messages are appropriate are vaguely defined, and neither the United States nor the Soviet Union transmitted any such messages for the first couple of years of operation. Such messages have been transmitted on a few occasions in the last few years, however. Although the nature of the actual messages is regarded as confidential, examples of appropriate subjects for good will messages include notification of a large disaster, such as the Chernobyl disaster, that affects the international community, or notification of the sinking of a nuclear submarine near the territory of another party.

The NRRCs have a narrowly defined role and are not intended to replace formal diplomatic channels of communication or the “Hot Line”; nor do they have a crisis management role. There is no provision for voice communication; and all routine written information is transmitted according to exact, negotiated formats. Formalized communications were favored because they lessen the probability of misinterpretation and remove personal bias from the system. Since communications are in multiple languages, exact formatting also makes possible computerized translation of notifications and other information.

In recognition of the importance of fostering understanding the United States and the Soviet Union, original planning for establishing the NRRC included provisions for research and discussion centers, in addition to the technical communication centers. At the time, out of mutual distrust, neither side was prepared to staff a center with a broader mandate and Geneva became the forum for discussions and consultations relating to mutual security. As relations between the two countries improved, the idea of a center for joint research on security issues re-emerged, but because of other existing forums neither side has seen it as a matter of particular importance or urgency.

Appendix B: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its Conflict Prevention Center

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), whose current membership includes 52 Atlantic, European, and Eurasian countries, developed in the 1970s and is an example of a cooperative security regime. The goal of the CSCE is to reduce the risk of armed conflict by promoting dialogue and decreasing tensions between the East and West. It provides a political context for European cooperation in four major areas, or “Baskets:” (1) security issues and confidence building measures; (2) science, technology and economics; (3) humanitarian and other fields; and (4) implementation of current steps and additional negotiations. The Helsinki Final Act, a political commitment to make progress in the first three of these areas, was signed in August 1975. This broad security

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agenda, which recognizes the value to regional security of cooperation across a wide range of issues, became known as the “Helsinki Process.” In recent years, several significant arms control agreements have been negotiated in the context of the CSCE in Vienna, including the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Open Skies Treaty.

The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) is a subgroup of the CSCE devoted to issues in “Basket One.” A major achievement of the CDE occurred in September 1986 with agreement on a set of politically binding confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), designed to increase openness and predictability about military activities in Europe. The principle measures call for states to: (1) refrain from the threat or use of force; (2) provide prior notification of certain military activities; (3) allow observation of certain military activities; (4) provide annual forecasts of notifiable military activities; and (5) allow on-site inspections from either the air or ground to verify compliance with the agreed measures. The underlying premise is that such openness will reduce the risk of armed conflict by providing reassurance to all parties about the non-offensive character of military activities in the region.

The CSCE Conflict Prevention Center

The CSCE Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) was established in November 1990, and located in Vienna, Austria. Initially, it was envisioned as playing a large role in conflict prevention, which included technical activities such as establishing a communications network, and supporting implementation of CSBMs, as well as political activities such as providing a mechanism for consultation and cooperation regarding unusual military activities. In January 1992, the political role of the CPC was enhanced: it was named as the forum where CSCE States would hold regular consultations on security issues with politico-military implications and as the forum for consultation and implementation of decisions on crisis management. The CPC was also given the authority to initiate, execute, and monitor fact-finding missions as instruments of conflict prevention and crisis management.

As with most large bureaucratic organizations, the CSCE has many sub-organizations who compete for responsibilities and power. The broad and independent mandate given to the CPC in 1992 duplicated the efforts of other organizations and interfered with their authority. Some argued that the CPC removed conflict prevention activities from the broader political context and that it prescribed an unrealistic, mechanistic process for dealing with conflict. Such considerations led to a marked reduction in the CPC’s mandate in December 1993. It now functions as a logistics support unit for other CSCE activities, such as the six preventive diplomacy missions that have been established in regions of conflict: Georgia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Estonia, Latvia, and Tajikistan. The CPC is responsible for purchasing, transporting, and maintaining equipment for the support missions.

It is under the auspices of these six CSCE missions that much crisis prevention actually occurs. Each mission resembles a small embassy, with between four and six staff officers, and a few local support personnel. Staff officers promote regional confidence building, with an emphasis on human rights. They travel the country and poll ordinary citizens, using the information to make policy recommendations to governments. For example, recent activities in Latvia have focused on the Latvian government’s policy of sending expulsion notices to ethnic Russians. Although Latvia apparently has no intention of acting on these notices, the practice has produced great tension with Russia, where it is regarded as ethnic apartheid. Mission staff officers have gone before the Latvian government and recommended the termination of the practice, warning of the possibility of armed conflict with Russia. Their recommendations are influential, as they represent the views of the 52 CSCE member states.

In addition, the CPC prepares annual statistical surveys about the implementation of agreed CSBMs, takes part in CSBM-related activities such as observation of military activities or visits to airbases, and has established a data bank in which CSBM-related information is stored and easily retrieved. It also keeps up-to-date lists of points of contacts to be used in cases of hazardous military incidents and is connected to the CSCE Communications Network which allows for the quick transmission of all CSBM-related information to CSCE capitals. It circulates this information to participating states not connected to the network.

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20 John Borawski and Bruce George, MP, Arms Control Today, Oct. 1993, 13–16; and private communications with William Wood and Jonathon Cohen of the United States Department of State.
A CRISIS PREVENTION CENTER AND CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Vassili Dobrovolski

Motives: Pros and Cons

The Russian proposal to explore possibilities of creating a crisis prevention center and/or a center for strategic studies for the Asia-Pacific region was motivated by the following considerations:

- the Asia-Pacific region (APR) is undergoing rapid changes in the balance of national strengths, interests—and in the very configuration of the system of international relations. As the history of diplomacy amply demonstrates, such processes are almost inevitably accompanied by tensions, conflicts and (in the worst case) even wars.

- the countries of the region belong to different cultures and civilizations. This makes accommodation to new situations, adjustments of policy vis-a-vis partners, and adaptation of international standards of behavior in this area (such as the UN Charter) uneasy and uncertain.

- different stages of development can be attributed to the countries belonging to the Asia-Pacific Region; accordingly, they view the international environment in different (and sometimes conflicting) ways. They possess different grades of maturity in their foreign politics. An overview of foreign policy instincts and reflexes reveals a wide variety—ranging from well-versed politicians who have behind them a millennia-old tradition of skilled power diplomacy and multilateral alliances, to newcomers with “friend-or-foe” schemes and perceptions. The various shades across this range add even more color to the multifaceted picture considered characteristic of the political situation in Asia.

- the end of cold war realities deprived a number of states of the very basis and rationale of their ‘opposing camp’ foreign policy strategies. Their lack of experience in multipolar balances of interests may give rise to irrational suspicions and fears that a new structure is being designed to manipulate them.

Vassili Dobrovolski is Deputy Director, Second Asia Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
the international situation in the region is burdened by the heritage of the past. Some actors historically have resorted immediately to force any time they believed that such action would go unpunished. Some with newly acquired might seek (consciously or subconsciously) to show it—bordering on a “trigger-happy” approach that applies equally well to economics and trade.

- an additional obstacle to working out rules formalizing and institutionalizing cooperation among the Asian-Pacific states lies in newly-emerging feelings of “asianness” and self-identification as “Asian-Pacific” countries. Only forty years ago Indonesia and Malaysia felt respectively closer to Dutch and British cultures than to the “Asia-Pacific Region,” “Southeast Asia” or “the Malay world.” A reversionary fragmentation of the Asia-Pacific region into sub-regions could at any given juncture work as a brake on any pan-regional drive.

- newly acquired self-confidence of Asia-Pacific peoples, underlaid with memories of former humiliations to national dignity, guarantee immense difficulties for any attempts to adapt or transplant the CSCE model to the Asia-Pacific region. All these difficulties notwithstanding, the situation calls for some way to appease tensions, create a framework for confidence-building, and formulate a new means of tackling international crises and hot spots in the region. As an integral part of this process, it is essential to address the task of bettering conditions for military information exchanges. Too important things are now at stake and too promising prospects can be lost.

In exploring possible ways of providing a more secure peace for the Asia-Pacific region one should always have in mind dangers of neglecting the problem of control and prevention of crisis situations. A crisis we fail to manage is unpredictable. Due to the military potentials deployed, an inadequate mechanism to regulate a possible crisis creates a credible danger. Such a crisis may have many starting reasons that serve to trigger a chain reaction; such an eventuality must be effectively averted.

The climate to contemplate and discuss possible models of Asia-Pacific cooperation and security is relatively favorable. The end of the Cold War brought up the necessity of an active quest for adequate security mechanisms, not only in a global but also in a regional context. It is no coincidence that quite a number of far-reaching proposals have been made nearly simultaneously—there are initiatives from Canada, Australia, and the ASEAN countries, among others. One must also point out that the U.S. administration has pronounced in favor of “collective security” for the Asia-Pacific region in the future.

Description

The Russian proposal outlines a low-key information exchange medium which would not demand anything law-binding of the participant states. The idea was to create a mechanism that would serve as a kind of data base for all interested countries. This small mechanism (analogous to the European crisis prevention center) would be a modest, cost-effective, unambitious project. The main parameters and levels of information to be submitted to the proposed crisis prevention center by participating countries, as well as the timing of such submission, would be discussed and decided in the process of creating such a center.

Meanwhile, in a strategic studies center, a small team of experts and technical personnel dealing with collecting, sorting, verifying and distributing information concerning military potentials, armaments (including arms transfers), strategies and military doctrines could play an important confidence-building role by providing a necessary degree of transparency.

An important built-in feature of our proposal was its high adaptability to different counterproposals and modifications. If the idea is adopted by several states, the project could be started in the first stages as data-collecting common enterprise. Then, after a reasonable probation period, with the consent of all the participants the project could be expanded horizontally (geographically) and vertically (assuming significant new functions: analysis and prognosis, recommendations, venue for consultations, etc.). Thus, the center would constitute a nucleus which at any moment of need could be “unfolded” and “deployed” to exercise new duties.

Thus the proposed institution would be something for all seasons. It could equally be a modest library of national appropriations bills and data on military forces; and an integral part of cooperative security system in the Asia-Pacific region in which the behavior of states is regulated by a certain code of conduct.
Specifics: From First Try to Reaffirmation

The idea of an Asia-Pacific regional crisis prevention center and center for strategic studies was originally put forward during Mr. Yeltsin’s visit to Seoul in 1992. It clearly demonstrated Russian adherence to multilateralist ways of dealing with problems in the Far East.

In July 1993 the proposal to establish an APR crisis prevention center and a center for strategic studies was repeated by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Mr. Kozyrev at the ASEAN annual post-ministerial dialogues. There it was further defined and elaborated. The Russian minister, when speaking about his vision of the CPC, explained that it could be instrumental in the stage-by-stage process of forming a mechanism of Intergovernmental dialogue to prevent possible crisis situations in the region. Thus the invitation to ASEAN to work together on this project was accompanied by a statement that further on this institution would deal with much wider area than the geographical scope of Southeast Asia.

The proposed functions of the crisis prevention center at the initial stages were described as: promotion of military information exchanges for better transparency and predictability, consultations in cases of unusual military activities, cooperation to settle military incidents endangering peace, and provision of conclusions and recommendations for governments based upon analyses of the factual data.

Further, the idea of a center for strategic studies was formulated in a very general way, to set the ball rolling. It was said that possibly, one of the strategic/international studies institutes in the countries of the region could try to rally the efforts of numerous scientific institutions in the region. Even technically, such an attempt is worth pondering. Dozens of institutes in many countries are duplicating each other in their research work. (The number of regular seminars and round tables that discuss virtually the same topics seem to be over twenty.) Ideally, a future “crown” of the process would be to have an institute like we Europeans have in London and Stockholm—but with a more distinctly pronounced “international” feature.

Recent developments in the sub-region show that a multilateral approach to new challenges may prove to be the reasonable one. In its statement dated March 24, 1994, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for a multilateral conference on a Korean settlement with participation by the two Koreas, the Russian Federation, the United States of America, the People’s Republic of China, and Japan; plus representatives of the UN Secretary General and the IAEA Director General. This demonstrates that Russia clearly stands for a comprehensive settlement of the situation there. It may come only as a result of painstaking, purposeful and concerted actions on all sides involved—including their capacities as guarantors, sponsors, offerers of good offices etc.

So, the idea is still there. If positive changes in the Korean settlement follow, and if the countries involved start to seriously contemplate ways and means of pacifying the sub-region by creating institutional frameworks of crisscrossing obligations, guarantees and force reductions, a center may prove to be a good option.

Conclusion

Analysis of the first reactions to the Russian proposals show that the attitude is more or less positive. No country has rejected the idea outright; many have pointed out that it runs in the same direction as their own concepts. There is even suggestion that some institutions in the ASEAN states (including governmental bodies) are contemplating the idea and thinking about how they could “assimilate” it and adapt it to pre-existing research bodies.

By putting forth proposals that may sound somewhat vague, the Russian side is far from being interested in imposing any worked out formula on any participant of the dialogue on peace and security in Asia. Rather, it hopes to help start free discussion aimed at elaborating the idea by joint efforts in ways acceptable to all sides concerned.

It goes without saying that possible agreement on the problem of creating crisis prevention centers among interested countries and institutions should be made in full accordance with the national security interests and laws of each participating side, as well as with international law and other international regulations and obligations (including existing treaties dealing with disarmament and strengthening of global and regional peace and security).

Regarding a sub-regional approach to this task (which in the course of time may prove to be the most effective one), the exchange of views on the problem of crisis prevention centers held under the framework of the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue (having in mind its structure
with participation of both government officials and private individuals) may contribute largely to preserving a more secure state of affairs as well as more military confidence in this part of the world.

Therefore, one may expect that depending upon the course of discussion and routine consultations this proposal will be jointly elaborated and contain more specific ideas concerning the structure, the duties and the proceedings of a crisis prevention center and a center for strategic studies.
NORTHEAST ASIA COOPERATION
DIALOGUE MEETING AGENDA

Tokyo, Japan; May 16–17, 1994

Co-hosted by the National Institute for Research Advancement
and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation

Monday, May 16

9:00-12:00 National Perspectives on Northeast Asian Security
   China, Republic of Korea, Russia, United States, Japan, and Democratic People’s Republic
   of Korea

12:00-1:00 Lunch

1:00-4:00 Measures for Enhancing a Mutual State of Security
   What needs to be done to promote regional cooperation in Northeast Asia?
   How to think about a broader definition of CBMs, especially the inclusion of economic issues,
   and how to put this broader definition into practice (including transparency?).

7:00-10:00 Dinner

Tuesday, May 17

9:00-12:00 Military Confidence Building Measures
   Crisis Prevention Centers
   Maritime CBMs

12:00-1:00 Lunch

1:00-3:00 Military Confidence Building Measures (continued)
   Nuclear CBMs
   Land-Based CBMs

3:00-4:30 Conclusion and Plans for Future Dialogue Meetings

7:00-10:00 Dinner

   The chairperson will rotate for each session among the participating countries, other than Japan)
NORTHEAST ASIA COOPERATION
DIALOGUE PARTICIPANT LIST

Tokyo, Japan; May 16–17, 1994

People’s Republic of China

Mr. GUAN Dengming
Counselor, Asia Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
[Mr. HAO Yinbiao will attend as interpreter for Mr. Guan]

Commander GUAN Youfei
Asian Division
Bureau of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of National Defense

Professor LIU Liping
Deputy Director Division for International Exchange
China Institute for Contemporary International Relations

Professor JI Guoxing
Director, Asian-Pacific Department
Shanghai Institute for International Studies

Japan

Mr. NOGAMI Yoshiji
Deputy Director General, Foreign Policy Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. MORIMOTO Satoshi
Senior Researcher, Center for Policy Research
NRI Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.

Professor SATO Seizaburo
International Institute for Global Peace

Mr. YAMAZAKI Shinshiro
Director
Second Defense Intelligence Division
Bureau of Defense Agency
Japan Defense Agency

Colonel YAMAGUCHI Noboru
Joint Staff Office
Colonel Chief of Arms Control Section J5
Japan Defense Agency
People’s Republic of Korea
( awaiting confirmation)

Republic of Korea
Mr. SONG Young-oh
Senior Coordinator for Policy Planning
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Major General KIM Yong-Koo
Director, Arms Control
Office Ministry of National Defense

Brigadier General PARK Sung-Boo
Deputy Director of C5
Combined Forces Command

Professor AHN Byung Joon
Department of Political Science
Yonsei University

Dr. LEE Chung Min
Fellow
The Sejong Institute

Russia
Mr. Vassili Dobrovolski
Deputy Director, Second Asia Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Lieutenant General D.K. Kharchenko
Chief of the International Legal Department
General Staff of the Armed Forces

Major General A.N. Lukianov
Deputy Chief of the International Legal Department
General Staff of the Armed Forces

Dr. Alexander Saveliev
Vice President
Institute for National Security and Strategic Studies
Russian Academy of Sciences

Dr. Konstantin O. Sarkisov
Head of Center for Japanese Studies
Vice Director, Institute of Oriental Studies
Russian Academy of Sciences

United States
Ambassador Peter Tomsen
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Mr. Kent Wiedemann  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
The Pentagon

Major General Arthur C. Blades  
Deputy Commander, Chief Of Staff  
U.S. Forces In Japan  
United States Marine Corps  
Yokota Air Force Base, Japan

Professor Robert Scalapino  
Robson Research Professor of Government Emeritus  
Institute of East Asian Studies  
University of California, Berkeley

Professor Susan L. Shirk  
Director, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation  
University of California, San Diego

Dr. Edward T. Fei (observer)  
Director Office of Nonproliferation Policy  
U.S. Department of Energy

Additional Presenters

Dr. Cha Young-koo  
Director, Arms Control Research Centre  
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses

Dr. Choi Kang  
Associate Research Fellow  
Arms Control Research Centre  
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses

Dr. Arian Pregenzer  
Physicist/Monitoring Analyst  
Sandia National Laboratories