Deporting Fathers: Involuntary Transnational Families and Intent to Remigrate among Salvadoran Deportees

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One-fourth of deportees from the United States are parents of US-citizen children. We do not know how separation from families affects remigration among deportees, who face high penalties given unlawful reentry. We examined how family separation affects intent to remigrate among Salvadoran deportees. The majority of deportees with children in the United States were also separated from their spouse, and the vast majority had US-citizen children. Family separation was the single most important factor affecting intent to remigrate. We interpret these findings in light of immigration policy debates.

1We gratefully acknowledge the help of Holly Cooper, Cassandra Lopez, and Geoff Hoffman, who counseled us on the immigration law reviewed in the paper. Any errors in interpretation are our own.

[Minor typographical changes have been made to this article since it was first published.]
INTRODUCTION

In the two-year period between July 2010 and September 2012, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deported 204,810 parents of US-citizen children, who made up one-fourth of all removals (Colorlines 2012). The forced separation of these parents from their children — the creation of involuntary transnational families — has multiple negative consequences on children, parents, and other family members (Capps et al. 2007; Chaudry et al. 2010; Dreby 2012). Recent policy changes in the administration of President Obama recognize the hardships that immigration policy imposes on mixed-status families (i.e., families where parents and children hold different immigration status). For example, the I-601A provisional waiver, an administrative provision of the federal law governing US immigration, effective March 2013, allows unlawful entrants who are immediate relatives of US citizens and who are in the process of obtaining a legal visa to apply for a waiver to complete the process in the United States rather than in their country of origin. However, this new rule does not protect the majority of undocumented migrants, including those who do not have means to adjust their status and those who are deported and reenter the United States.

In the United States, as in many other countries, deportees face harsh penalties if they reenter without authorization; in the United States, these “repeat violators” are classified by DHS as second priority for deportation behind criminal offenders. Furthermore, US federal immigration law classifies a second-time violation of illegal entry as a felony subject to up to two years in prison; if the deportee has a prior criminal record, the maximum penalty for reentry is 10 years in prison. Because a second violation of illegal entry is classified as a felony, the 10-year sentence applies to third-time violators. These criminal penalties mean that repeat violators are

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2 This count was obtained by Colorlines via a Freedom of Information Act request. It includes voluntary removals. It underrepresents the number of deportees with children in the United States, as parents of non-US-citizen children in the United States are not recorded (Colorlines 2012).

3 The I-601A waiver allows entrants to adjust their status in the United States without having to return to their country of origin, which would invoke a three- to 10-year bar on reentry. This provision is only for entrants who have US-citizen spouses, children, or parents. For more information about this waiver, and changes in the implementation of I-610A provisional waivers, consult with US Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) website, http://www.uscis.gov/i-601.
inadmissible under US federal immigration law and thus cannot qualify for legal status in the United States.

In spite of the severe penalties associated with repeat migration among deportees, studies have shown that a substantial portion of deportees—more than a third—intend to remigrate to the United States (Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez 2008), which is similar to the rates of intended and actual remigration among deportees elsewhere (Collyer 2012). This rate may vary by transnational family structure and be especially strong when deportation splits families across countries. DHS data, which are limited to migrants apprehended by the agency and may therefore undercount repeat migration (given that some portions of undocumented migrants are not apprehended), show that while 21 percent of all deportees in the United States are repeat violators, more than a third of deportee parents of US-citizen children are repeat violators (DHS 2009; ICE 2012). The fact that a greater percentage of deportee parents are repeat violators suggests that parents of dependent children in the United States may be especially motivated to remigrate, presumably to rejoin their families.

While the DHS data are suggestive that parents of dependent children are more likely than other deportees to remigrate to the United States, and research has suggested that transnational ties are an important motivation for remigration among deportees in the United States and elsewhere, there is limited empirical evidence on the post-deportation experience, including on how dependent children or other family members in the destination country influence the decision to remigrate following deportation (Schuster and Majidi 2013). This is especially pertinent for studies of deportees from the United States, where judges no longer have discretionary authority to consider dependent family members in deportation hearings. To our knowledge, there is no empirical research on the decision to remigrate among US deportees, who, given their forced repatriation and the penalties imposed upon reentry, are a unique and policy-relevant group.

Although the I-601A provisional waiver would allow some parents of US-citizen children protection from deportation, adjustment of status is a costly, difficult, and uncertain process even without having to return to the country of origin. Moreover, this protection is not afforded to undocumented immigrants with a previous deportation record, nor does it apply to undocumented parents who are arrested for misdemeanors and put into deportation proceedings on the basis of their undocumented
status, as per President Obama’s Secure Communities program. Given the large number of parents being deported by the US government, the impacts of these deportations on children, the appearance in DHS data that a large number of these parents remigrate, and the current policy attention to this issue, research is sorely needed to understand the intentions and behaviors of deported parents.

To this end, this study investigated the impact of involuntary transnational family structure — families split across countries by deportation — on male Salvadoran deportees’ intent to remigrate without legal documents to the United States. Because penalties for reentry increase with prior criminal records, we also examined variation in intent to remigrate by deportees’ reported reason for deportation (criminal offense versus immigration violation), and because the policy discussion tends to focus on hardship to US-citizen children, we examined variation in intent to remigrate by the citizenship status of deportees’ children. First, we describe the policy background and research literature that frames our study.

BACKGROUND

US Immigration Policy and Deportation

US immigration policy, especially with regard to deportation, changed dramatically in the second half of the 1990s. In 1996, President Clinton signed two laws into place that increased the federal government’s ability to deport immigrants. The first law was the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). IIRIRA increased government spending for large-scale removals and border control efforts, as well as expanded the list of deportable crimes to include 28 offenses, including non-violent theft, fraud or deceit, perjury, forgery, and tax evasion. Under this new law, legal permanent residents convicted of these crimes are subject to mandatory removal, even when they had served time for their offense many years prior to the passage of the law. According to Human Rights Watch (2009), nearly 68 percent of legal permanent residents who were removed from the United States following this law were removed for non-violent, minor crimes. The second law passed in 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), significantly limited prosecutorial discretion as well as the individual right to judicial review prior to removal. Before AEDPA and IIRIRA, immigrants could request a hearing and a judge had the discre-
tionary power to suspend a deportation. However, the elimination of prosecutorial discretion prohibited US judges from canceling deportation orders or making decisions in the best interest of the child (Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez 2008).

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, brought about a new immigration enforcement regime that greatly increased the risk of detention and deportation for immigrants in the United States (Coleman 2007; Kanstroom 2007). Passage of the USA PATRIOT Act by Congress less than six weeks after the terrorist attacks demonstrated the forceful response by the US federal government as the new law provided special powers to investigate, apprehend, and detain immigrants thought to be a national security risk. More fundamental change in immigration enforcement after 9/11, however, came in the reorganization of the long-existent Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) into the DHS, established in March 2003. While the Border Patrol enforcement branch of the INS concentrated mainly on border regions, the new bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in DHS operated as a nationwide deportation police force, in addition to investigating criminal activity entering the boundaries of the country. Within just a few months after its establishment, ICE produced a strategic plan, titled “Endgame,” for deporting all “removable aliens” by the year 2012 (ICE 2003).

In its pursuit of a new regime of immigration enforcement, ICE undertook a series of special operations to apprehend, detain, and deport immigrants, in addition to conducting workplace raids (Wessler 2011). For example, ICE initiated the Criminal Alien Program to search for convicted criminal immigrants in local jails and state prisons and place them in deportation proceedings, accounting for 164,296 deportations in FY2007 and 221,085 in FY2008, as the program got off the ground (ICE 2008). Another special operation occurred in 2006–2007, when ICE implemented Operation Return to Sender to apprehend dangerous immigrant criminals, including convicted immigrants and gang members, arresting over 23,000 immigrants (McKinley 2007). Secure Communities became the most comprehensive ICE enforcement program as it required all state and local police agencies to forward the fingerprint data of all arrested persons to DHS to check against a biometric database. Between 2008 and 2012, Secure Communities resulted in more than 166,000 deportations of immigrants identified through biometric data (ICE 2013a). To add to its Endgame programs, ICE also took over the federal program of training state and local police in immigration
enforcement, as authorized by Section 287(g) of IIRIRA, resulting in the identification of 309,283 “potentially removable aliens” between 2006 and 2013 through collaboration with state and local authorities (ICE 2013b).

The cumulative effect of these laws on immigration enforcement is unprecedented; its impact is reflected in the growing number of removals each year, as illustrated in Figure I. From 1993 to 1996, an average of 52,000 migrants were removed from the United States each year (DHS 1998, Table 66). Between 1996 and 2011, the average number of removals increased to roughly 213,000 per year, reaching a high of nearly 400,000 removals in 2011, the most recent year for which there are data (DHS 2012a, 2012b, Table 41).

Much of the growth in removals has involved migrants from Mexico and Central and South America. In 2011, these migrants represented 96 percent of all removals from the United States (DHS 2012a, 2012b, Table 41). Migrants from El Salvador comprised the third largest group of removals from Central America, next to migrants from Honduras and Guatemala; migrants of Mexican origin were the largest group (Blanchard et al. 2011; DHS 2012a, 2012b, Table 41). In 1996, 2,472 Salvadorans were removed from the United States (DHS 1998, Table 66); by 2011, this number had reached nearly 20,000 (DHS 2012a, 2012b, Table 41).

![Figure I. Formal Removals from the United States](source: 2011 DHS Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.)
Transnational Families via Split-family Deportation

In the United States, studies suggest that the deportation of parents largely occurs within mixed-status families, which are defined as families with at least one non-citizen parent and one or more citizen children (Fix and Zimmerman 1999). One in five children in the United States lives in an immigrant family, and a third of these children live in mixed-status families (Fortuny and Chaudry 2009). Nearly five million children live with one or more undocumented parents (Capps et al. 2007). However, many parents deported from the United States are legal permanent residents deported for criminal or non-criminal offenses. Roughly 100,000 children experienced the removal of a parent who was a legal permanent resident during 1997–2007, and nearly 88 percent of these removals involved parents of US-citizen children (Baum, Jones, and Barry 2010).

The forced separation of parents from their children through deportation creates a transnational family (Dreby 2006). The vast majority of research on transnational families has focused on families formed through the voluntary (if constrained) decisions of parents to migrate. For example, Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila (1997) studied the meaning of motherhood among domestic workers in Southern California who had migrated to support children left behind with relatives in origin countries. Children in these “voluntary” transnational families are left behind for a multitude of reasons, including the planned finite duration of migrations, the relatively more affordable cost of living in the origin country, the inability of migrant parents (especially live-in domestic workers) to care for children when working in the destination country, and parents’ belief that children will be better off at home.

In the case of families separated by deportation, transnational families take the form of children left behind in the destination country, rather than the country of origin, and, as reviewed above, the migrant parents’ destination country is often the child’s country of citizenship. These families are “involuntary” transnational families insofar as the separation between country of origin and country of destination was due to arrest and deportation in a policy context where no consideration is given to the welfare of children and spouses who remain in the destination country. However, in drawing a distinction between “voluntary” and “involuntary,” we do not mean to suggest greater agency on the part of parents who leave their children in the sending country; they too are severely constrained by the economic and political conditions they face.
both in the origin and in destination countries (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997).

Parents in involuntary transnational families face the decision of whether children should move to their parents’ country of origin, whether children should remain in the destination country with the other parent or extended family, or whether the deportee should remigrate without documents to the country of destination, facing harsh penalties if caught. Precise data on the number of families with US-citizen children living in the parents’ country of origin are not available. Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barerra (2012) indicated that the best estimates range between 5 percent and 35 percent of the 1.4 million Mexicans who returned to Mexico between 2005 and 2010, including 300,000 US-born children, likely did so because of (parents’) deportation. However, these returnees involve only a minority of all children whose parents are deported. Several studies have found that the majority of children whose parents are deported remain in the United States with the other parent or extended family (Capps et al. 2007; Chaudry et al. 2010). These decisions may be made in part because deportees intend to remigrate rather than remaining separated from their children.

**Impact of Deportation on Families**

The creation of involuntary transnational families through deportation has profound and deleterious effects on children, their parents, and other family members. Even without the trauma of deportation, research has found that aggressive immigration enforcement and deportation policy significantly impacts mixed-status (as well as legal immigrant) families by increasing anxiety, stress, depression, and fear; reinforcing social isolation; and generating mistrust of government in immigrant communities (Rodriguez and Hagan 2004; Chaudry et al. 2010; Hagan, Rodriguez, and Castro 2011; Dreby 2012). Most research has focused on the direct effects of deportation, including economic and psychological impacts, on US children. Next, we describe the state of this research in the US context.4

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4We were unable to find research studies of the effects of deportation on children in destination countries other than the United States. This may reflect the fact that the United States is unique among countries of immigration for deporting large numbers of parents whose children remain in the country of destination. However, research has found similar effects of family separation in other contexts, including the tremendous impact of separation from parents on children as a result of war, terrorist attacks, and incarceration (Boss 2002, 2004).
Parental deportation has large negative consequences for family economic stability (Capps et al. 2007; Chaudry et al. 2010; First Focus, 2010; Dreby 2012). Families typically experience significant economic hardship after the arrest of a family member — this is particularly true when the breadwinner is detained or deported. Changes in family structure are eminent, with families usually changing from a two-parent, two-income household to single-parent — most female-headed — household (Dreby 2012). These families are often vulnerable to begin with; for example, families affected by workforce raids in Iowa and Massachusetts did not have significant savings or assets at the time of detention (Capps et al. 2007). Following deportation, existing family assets and resources diminished quickly, and as a consequence, extended family or kin networks often assumed significant financial and caretaking responsibilities (Capps et al. 2007). Families affected by deportation may be afraid to seek resources, especially from governmental agencies, even when children are eligible for these resources (Hagan, Rodriguez, and Castro 2011).

Similarly, the short- and long-term psychological consequences of family separation on child well-being have been well documented (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; García Coll and Magnuson 2005; Chaudry et al. 2010; Suárez-Orozco, Bang, and Kim 2011; Dreby 2012). In a survey of US children affected by parental deportation, initial symptoms of family separation on children included eating and sleeping problems, social withdrawal, separation anxiety, and declining academic performance (Chaudry et al. 2010; Suárez-Orozco, Bang, and Kim 2011). According to one study (Chaudry et al. 2010), nine months following the removal of a family member, 36 percent of children experienced three or more behavioral and psychological symptoms. These symptoms were most severe among children whose parents were arrested in the home, children who were separated from their parent for more than one month, and in cases where the child’s primary caregiver was deported (Chaudry et al. 2010).

Research on Return and Repeat Migration

The economic and emotional hardships endured by involuntary transnational families are likely a strong motivation for deported parents to reunite with their children. As already described, we do not know how common this reunion is. This study attempts to shed some light on this process by focusing on how involuntary transnational family structure
influences intent to remigrate among deported Salvadoran men. However, other factors despite transnational family structure likely affect remigration — indeed, some portions of repeat violators do not have US-citizen children (DHS 2009). For example, experiences of stigma and displacement in the country of origin are difficult social and psychological barriers facing deportees that may encourage remigration, and deportees may hold debts that they cannot pay through wages earned in their home countries (Brotherton and Barrios 2009; Schuster and Majidi 2013). However, research on the post-deportation experience is limited, so we draw from central findings from sociological and demographic research on return and repeat migration to inform our understanding of these more general processes.

Return and repeat migration are common, although estimates vary widely and are not reported for specific immigrant groups other than Mexicans (Van Hook et al. 2006). Recent estimates suggest that 3 percent of all immigrants departed the United States per year between 1996 and 2009, which means that one-fourth of immigrants arriving in a given year leave within 10 years (Van Hook and Zhang 2011). Repeat migration to the United States among these returned migrants is harder to measure, and current estimates are not available. Older data from Mexico suggest that one-third of return migrants remigrated to the United States between 1965 and 1985 (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002), although the number remigrating from countries that are farther away (such as El Salvador) is likely smaller. While one may expect that increasing enforcement in the post-1985 period would arguably deter remigration, a recent study finds that increases in the number of annual deportations actually increase the likelihood of repeat migration among Latin American migrants (Riosmena and Massey 2010). Repeat migration may be even more common among deportees, as suggested by several studies from a variety of international settings (Peutz 2006; Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez 2008; Brotherton and Barrios 2009; Schuster and Majidi 2013).

Determinants of repeat migration include social networks, economic incentives, and cultural and linguistic ties (Massey and Espinosa 1997; Reagan and Olsen 2000; Constant and Zimmermann 2012). In a study of US–Mexico migration, Massey and Espinosa (1997) found that the characteristics of migrants who initiate multiple trips are different from those making a first trip. Not surprisingly, migrants with a history of repeat migration had greater social and human capital specific to the destination, such as more migrant work experience, a spouse in the United
States, and US-citizen children. Social factors, such as spouse and children in the United States, were more strongly related to repeat migration for both documented and unauthorized migrants than were economic and human capital indicators. These findings are consistent with research using panel data from Germany, which found that migrants with a spouse and child in Germany were more likely to remain rather than returning to their home country (Constant and Zimmermann 2012).

Repeat migration among deportees may be even more common than repeat migration among so-called voluntary migrants for at least two reasons (Schuster and Majidi 2013). One is that deportees face stigma associated with the experience of deportation. In a study of Dominican deportees, stigma upon arrival to the Dominican Republic created tremendous social and psychological strain (Brotherton and Barrios 2009). Feelings of depression and suicide were present, especially among deportees with spouses and children who remained in the United States (Brotherton and Barrios 2009). Similar experiences of stigma and displacement were reported among Salvadorans deported from the United States (Hagan 2009). Second, deportees may face greater economic barriers than other returned migrants (Schuster and Majidi 2013). Deportees may not have paid off migration-related debts or reached their target earnings. Among Dominican deportees, the record of incarceration in the United States tarnished their name and prevented them from obtaining jobs in Santo Domingo. Yet, despite having some understanding of how stigma and economic displacement impact individuals who are forced to repatriate to their country of origin, how these factors influence return migration, or whether this is a central and/or distinct motivation underlying remigration among those separated from family, is unknown, an issue that we return to in the discussion.

While the studies above highlight the importance of family in migrants’ decision to remigrate, this research does not examine specifically how forced repatriation to one’s country of origin — as in the case of deportation — affects the likelihood of repeat migration. Individuals who are removed from the United States face the heavy legal penalty of incarceration for undocumented repeat migration. In this paper, we examine intent to remigrate among a sample of deportees and the effect that involuntary transnational family structure, as well as other measures of social and economic integration into the destination country, has on that intention. We describe the methods of our analysis next, before turning to our results.
METHODS

Deportee Survey and Sample

The data for this study come from a survey of deportees conducted by the Salvadoran deportee reintegration program, “Bienvenido a Casa” (“Welcome Home,” or BAC). BAC provides information and assistance, including transportation, temporary housing, legal services, and medical care, to deportees in El Salvador (for more information about the survey, see Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez 2008). Salvadoran deportees register with BAC immediately upon deboarding ICE planes at the airport in San Salvador. In the summer of 2002, BAC started a job training and placement program to supplement existing services. Deportees who had been registered by BAC when they arrived at the airport were contacted for participation in the program, and a random sample of 300 deportees who attended meetings about the program were selected for inclusion in the survey (Rodriguez and Hagan 2004). Although the sample was not selected from the entire population of Salvadoran deportees, Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez (2008) compared the survey sample to the full census of deportees registered with BAC and found that they were similar in terms of sex, age, years in the United States, English ability, and reason for deportation. We use the BAC sample data rather than the BAC census because the sample data include information about location of spouse and children and intention to remigrate.

We limit our sample to male deportees because the small number of female deportees in the BAC sample precluded our ability to say anything meaningful about gender. Men are far more likely to be deported than women (Golash-Boza 2012); indeed, only 5 percent of all BAC census deportees are female (Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez 2008), and in our analytical sample, there were a total of only 16 women. Remigration intentions and the effect of family structure on those intentions are likely different for men and women (e.g., see studies on gender and other aspects of the migration experience, including on the decision to migrate, 5A commission of Salvadoran business, religious, and governmental organizations initially created BAC, acting with support from USAID (Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez 2008). In 2004, the Salvadoran government assumed the responsibilities of BAC. The program is currently under Servicio de Atención a Repatriados, or Services for the Repatriated, which is part of the Ministerio de la Dirección General De Migración y Extranjería (2012) in El Salvador.
Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; on remittances, Abrego 2009; on transnational parenting, Dreby 2006; and on citizenship, Glenn 2002). Given the small sample of women in the BAC data, we could not examine this hypothesis. Results including women did not significantly differ from those excluding women; however, we could not include sex as a covariate in multivariate analyses because it fully predicted the dependent variable. We decided to omit women from the analysis to keep our findings specific to men, rather than including women but be unable to address whether and how they are different.

A significant portion of the male deportees ($n = 98; 34\%$) were missing data on one or more of the variables we used in the analysis. Using casewise deletion, this leaves a final analytic sample of 186 cases with complete data. This large amount of missing data is not surprising given that men who have been deported are a vulnerable group who may not be willing to share information, particularly as it relates to the location of their children and spouse. We conducted several sets of analyses to assess the extent and influence of non-response bias. To begin, we examined the characteristics of those with complete data on all covariates to those who have complete data on each covariate but are missing data on one or more of the others (results are reported in Appendix A). Those with missing data had less human and social capital. Specifically, they had spent fewer years in the United States, had fewer years of education, were less likely to speak English, and were less likely to have children or a spouse in the United States. Correspondingly, given our expectations about how these factors affect intention to remigrate, respondents’ missing data were less likely to intend to remigrate to the United States. Excluding these deportees means that we overestimate intention to remigrate: In the sample with non-missing data on remigration, 39 percent stated they intended to remigrate, compared to 44 percent in our analytic sample. We are careful to interpret our estimates of intent to remigrate accordingly.

Given that the pattern of non-response is not random, we conducted three additional sets of analyses to test the sensitivity of our multivariate results to the exclusion of cases with missing data. First, we examined the relationship between transnational family structure and intent to return for those with complete data on those variables (results in Appendix A). These results replicated the bivariate relationship observed between our key independent and dependent variables in the sample with complete data. Second, we mean imputed missing data on continuous covariates, and we included dummy variables for missing data on categorical covari-
ates but excluded cases with missing data on transnational family structure. These results, for a sample of 207 cases, were no different from those on the sample with complete data (key results shown in Appendix A; full results available upon request). Third, we used Stata’s multiple imputation techniques to impute all missing data, including missing data on the key independent variables, for a multiply imputed sample of 284 cases (StataCorp 2009). Again, these results were consistent with those presented below (key results shown in Appendix A; full results available upon request). These analyses give us confidence that the results reported below in the sample with complete data are not biased by non-response.

Measures

The dependent variable, intent to remigrate, was assessed with the question, “Do you plan to return to the United States?” The response categories included, “No, I plan to stay in El Salvador,” “I am undecided about returning to the United States,” and “Yes, I am planning on re-migrating to the United States.” In the original BAC sample of male deportees, 34 percent of deportees indicated that they planned to remain in El Salvador, 28 percent reported they were undecided about remigrating, and 38 percent stated they would remigrate to the United States. As described above, in our analytic sample with complete data on all covariates, a larger proportion, 44 percent, stated that they intend to remigrate.

While measuring behavior is preferable to intentions, to our knowledge DHS data are the only existing data source on observed repeat migration among deportees, and as described in the introduction, DHS data omit repeat migrants who are not apprehended by the agency and DHS data do not include those who may but do not remigrate, the key comparison group for determining what influences remigration. Research shows that migration intentions are strongly predictive of migration behavior, although some portion of those who intend to migrate do not and some portion of those who do not intend to migrate do (Card 1982; de Jong et al. 1985; Lu 1999). We return to the relationship between intentions and behavior, and its effect on our results, in the discussion.

We grouped those who do not plan to remigrate and those who are undecided together. Research shows that those who intend to remigrate are most likely to do so (Card 1982; Lu 1999). We compared those who were undecided to those who said they did not intend to remigrate and those who said they did intend to remigrate, and we found that they were
more similar to those who did not intend to remigrate in terms of family structure, years in the United States, level of education, employment prior to deportation, and English-language ability. Finally, we estimated the analysis omitting the undecided group, and our results did not differ in meaningful ways from those we present below.6

Our key independent variables measure the deportee’s transnational family structure. Transnational families can be defined in a number of ways, but key considerations include the location of family members in distinct nation-states, whether families are defined as nuclear or extended, and the degree of interaction between family members across international borders. Here, we limit our definition to nuclear families—parents and children—split between the United States and El Salvador as a result of deportation. This reflects both the limits of the questions asked on the deportee survey—that is, we do not know about extended family members or regular interaction—and the intent of our research question. We are interested in whether the existence of a transnational family structure impacts intent to remigrate among deportees, not in differences between transnational families in the content of their interactions or exchanges, an important but distinct research question that we leave for future studies.

We draw on current scholarship on transnational family structure to define three unique measures of transnational families. This scholarship emphasizes the location of children and spouses, recognizing that even with a narrow focus on nuclear families, complex arrangements result (Dreby 2006). Thus, we first examine the presence and location of dependent children, or children under the age of 18 (hereafter referred to as children). We differentiated between deportees with no children or children in El Salvador \(n = 85\) and deportees with dependent children in the United States \(n = 101\). We grouped deportees with no children with deportees with children in El Salvador because of the small number of deportees with children only in El Salvador \(n = 10\). Deportees who had children in both El Salvador and the United States \(n = 6\) were coded as having children in the United States; this group was too small to analyze separately.

We next examined marital status and location of the spouse, differentiating between unmarried deportees \(n = 85\), deportees whose spouse was in El Salvador \(n = 27\), and deportees whose spouse was in the United States \(n = 74\). We analyzed these family structure variables sepa-

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6Standard errors were larger, with significance levels for some key variables dropping below 0.05.
rately to assess the separate impacts of children and spouse on intent to remigrate, and then we combined them to assess differences in intent to remigrate based on the combined family structure. This combined family structure variable has six categories: not married and no children or children in El Salvador only \((n = 61)\); not married with children in the United States \((n = 24)\); spouse is in El Salvador with no children or children in El Salvador only \((n = 13)\); spouse is in El Salvador and children are in the United States \((n = 14)\); spouse is in the United States and no children or children in El Salvador only \((n = 11)\); and spouse is in the United States and children are in the United States \((n = 63)\). Most of these groups are too small to make meaningful inferences about their intent to remigrate; however, rather than collapsing them into a heterogeneous and incoherent grouping, we simply note that the estimates of intent to remigrate for these groups are unreliable.

In addition to our primary analysis of the relationship between transnational family structure and intent to remigrate, we considered two key characteristics that might affect this relationship. First, we considered the difference between US-citizen and non-US-citizen children because policy discussions typically focus on the latter, giving preference to the family members of US-citizen children. Because deportees may have more than one child in the United States, and children may hold different statuses from each other, this variable measures whether deportees have at least one US-citizen child in the United States. Second, we examined the reason for deportation, which will affect penalties upon remigration and therefore may affect intent to remigrate. We differentiated between deportations for criminal offenses and for immigration violations.

Drawing from the sociological and demographic literature on return and repeat migration, we controlled for factors that have been shown to be associated with repeat migration, namely age (in years), time in the United States prior to deportation (in years), whether the deportee was employed prior to deportation \((1 = \text{employed}, \text{versus} \ 0 = \text{not employed})\), whether the deportee speaks English \((1 = \text{speaks English a little, well, or fluently}, \text{versus} \ 0 = \text{not at all})\), and the deportee’s level of education (in years of completed schooling).

**Analysis**

We began the analysis by examining the average characteristics of our sample of deportees as well as differences in those characteristics between those who have children in the United States and those who do not. We
then estimated a series of multivariate logistic regression models predicting the log odds of intent to remigrate as a function of our three measures of involuntary transnational family structure and the full set of control variables. In subsequent analysis, we differentiated between deportees with US-citizen and non-US-citizen children in the United States. Finally, we estimated the full model predicting intent to remigrate separately for deportees who were deported for criminal offenses and for deportees who were deported for immigration violations. Stata 11 was used for all analyses.

RESULTS

Table 1 presents the characteristics of our full sample of male Salvadoran deportees and separately by transnational family structure (here, by children). Deportees with children in the United States are more likely to intend to remigrate than deportees without children: 52.5 percent compared to 32.9 percent. Among deportees with children in the United States, the majority (89.1%) had at least one US-citizen child and was also separated from their spouse via deportation (62.4%). In contrast, among deportees without children in the United States, none had US-citizen children and only 12.9 percent were separated from their spouse via deportation.

| TABLE 1 |
| CHARACTERISTICS OF MALE SALVADORAN DEPORTEES BY TRANSNATIONAL FAMILY STRUCTURE |
| | All | No Children or Children in El Salvador | Children in the United States |
| Intends to remigrate (%)** | 43.6 | 32.9 | 52.5 |
| Reason for deportation (%)** | | | |
| Immigration violation | 44.6 | 57.7 | 33.7 |
| Criminal offense | 55.4 | 42.4 | 66.3 |
| US-citizen children (%)*** | 48.4 | 0 | 89.1 |
| Marital status/location of spouse (%)*** | | | |
| Unmarried | 45.7 | 71.8 | 23.8 |
| Married and spouse in El Salvador | 14.5 | 15.3 | 13.9 |
| Married and spouse in the US | 39.8 | 12.9 | 62.4 |
| Age (mean years)** | 30.8 | 29.1 | 32.3 |
| Time in the US (mean years)*** | 10.7 | 7.6 | 13.3 |
| Education (mean years) | 8.7 | 8.6 | 8.8 |
| Employed prior to deportation (%)** | 76.9 | 67.1 | 85.2 |
| Speaks English (%)** | 83.9 | 74.1 | 92.1 |
| Sample size | 186 | 85 | 101 |

Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 based on chi-square tests of equal distributions or t-tests of equal means.
The majority of deportees in our analytical sample were deported for a criminal offense. In additional analyses not shown, we found that one-third of men deported for criminal offenses were deported for a violent crime, while another third of the sample reported non-violent crimes (e.g., property crime, substance use, public disorder). The latter are criminal offenses that were not considered deportable prior to the 1996 passing of IIRIRA. The final one-third of the sample did not answer, or refused to answer, the question. The percentage of deportations involving a criminal offense was slightly higher in the current sample compared with the proportion in the original BAC sample (Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez 2008). This may reflect the nature of missing data in the data set, that is, those missing data were less connected to the United States and therefore more likely to be deported for an immigration violation rather than be documented and deported for a criminal offense. Criminal offenses were slightly more common among parents of children in the US, again reflecting the fact that more integrated migrants — or those with children — are more likely to be documented and therefore at risk of deportation for reasons other than an immigration violation.

Indeed, deportees with children in the United States have greater US-specific human capital than deportees without children in the United States. They have spent, on average, six years longer in the United States prior to deportation, they were more likely to be employed, and they were more likely to speak English. Each of these variables is significantly associated with family structure in the bivariate analysis. Because these US connections likely also affect intent to remigrate, it is important to control for their influence in examining the relationship between transnational family structure and intent to remigrate. We turn to these results next.

Table 2 presents results showing the relationship between transnational family structure and intent to remigrate, net of the full set of control variables. Models 1–4 each present a different measure of transnational family structure, and Models 5 and 6 present results for the combined family structure variable separately for men deported for criminal offenses (Model 5) and for immigration violations (Model 6). The results across all models show that all measures of transnational family structure are consistently and strongly associated with intent to remigrate, net of measured covariates. Deportees with children in the United States have 2.6 greater odds than deportees without children or with children in El Salvador of intending to remigrate. Deportees whose spouses are in the United States have 2.7 greater odds of intending to remigrate than
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transnational family structure</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children (ref = no children or children in ES)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children in the US</td>
<td>2.61 (0.90)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-US-citizen children</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.32 (0.36)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-citizen children</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.20 (1.15)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status/location of spouse (ref = unmarried)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married and spouse in ES</td>
<td>1.27 (0.64)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married and spouse in US</td>
<td>2.73 (1.01)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined family structure (ref= unmarried and no children/children in E.S.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried and children in US</td>
<td>0.95 (0.73)</td>
<td>1.76 (1.60)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse in ES and no children/children in ES</td>
<td>2.71 (1.89)</td>
<td>2.47 (2.99)</td>
<td>3.18 (2.90)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse in ES and children in US</td>
<td>2.28 (1.17)</td>
<td>3.42 (2.79)</td>
<td>1.56 (1.11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse in US and no children/children in ES</td>
<td>2.32 (1.48)</td>
<td>1.71 (1.69)</td>
<td>3.48 (3.25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse in US and children in US</td>
<td>3.86 (1.68)**</td>
<td>3.67 (2.64)†</td>
<td>4.44 (2.60)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age in years</td>
<td>0.94 (0.02)**</td>
<td>0.93 (0.02)**</td>
<td>0.93 (0.02)**</td>
<td>0.94 (0.02)*</td>
<td>0.94 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.92 (0.03)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in US prior to deportation</td>
<td>1.00 (0.03)</td>
<td>1.02 (0.03)</td>
<td>1.00 (0.02)</td>
<td>1.00 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.98 (0.05)</td>
<td>1.02 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education in years</td>
<td>1.03 (0.05)</td>
<td>1.03 (0.05)</td>
<td>1.04 (0.05)</td>
<td>1.01 (0.05)</td>
<td>1.07 (0.09)</td>
<td>1.01 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed prior to deportation</td>
<td>0.95 (0.44)</td>
<td>0.95 (0.44)</td>
<td>0.97 (0.45)</td>
<td>1.09 (0.50)</td>
<td>1.97 (1.22)</td>
<td>0.35 (0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaks English</td>
<td>1.32 (0.74)</td>
<td>1.32 (0.74)</td>
<td>1.30 (0.75)</td>
<td>1.24 (0.70)</td>
<td>0.97 (0.68)</td>
<td>2.61 (4.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-(R^2)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Standard errors (SE) are in parentheses. †\(p < 0.10\), *\(p < 0.05\), **\(p < 0.01\), ***\(p < 0.001\), based on two-sided \(z\)-tests.

†There was no variation in intent to remigrate among the four unmarried deportees who have children in the US and who were deported for a criminal offense. They were dropped from the analysis, reducing the sample size for Model 6–99 from 103.
deportees who are unmarried. Deportees whose spouse and children are both in the United States have the greatest odds of intending to remigrate: They are 3.8 times more likely to intend to remigrate than unmarried and childless deportees. Model 4 shows that deportees with US-citizen children have greater odds of intending to remigrate than deportees with non-citizen children in the United States; however, the odds ratio on deportees with non-citizen children in the United States is based on a very small sample of only 11 deportees and therefore should be interpreted with caution.

In Models 5 and 6, we examined whether the effect of family structure varied for deportees who were deported for criminal offenses versus those deported for immigration violations. The large positive association between one’s spouse and children being in the United States and intent to remigrate is observed for both groups, but it is larger and more significant for men deported for criminal offenses. This is despite the fact that these men face greater potential penalties if caught remigrating. We found similar results (not shown) for our two other measures of transnational family structure.

With the exception of age, the associations between our control variables and intent to remigrate are not statistically significant in the multivariate models. Age is consistently related to intent to remigrate, with younger men more likely to intend to remigrate than older men. Non-significant results may be due to the small sample size.

In sum, our findings show that the majority of deportees with dependent children in the United States intended to remigrate, the majority of deportees with dependent children in the United States were also separated from their spouse, and the vast majority — nearly 90 percent — of Salvadoran deportees with children in the United States had at least one US-citizen child. Compared to other social and economic connections to the United States, transnational family structure is the most significant factor influencing intent to remigrate. Salvadoran deportees whose spouse and children are both in the United States, and whose children are US citizens, were especially likely to intend to remigrate. These patterns do not vary for men who were deported for immigration violations or criminal offenses. In the next section, we interpret these findings in light of the current migration literature and immigration debate.

**DISCUSSION**

Current US deportation policies threaten immigrant families in the United States, as both unauthorized migrants and legal permanent
residents are at risk of deportation. Although the US Department of Homeland Security has reduced worksite raids to apprehend unauthorized migrant workers, the number of deportations continues to increase, partly through the collaboration between state and local police departments and federal immigration agencies, such as through the Secure Communities program or 287(g) collaborations. The number of annual immigrant removals during President Obama’s administration is the highest in history (refer back to Figure I). Yet, despite these and other significant efforts to deter unauthorized immigration, repeat migration among deportees is common, and this appears to be especially so among parents of US-citizen children. Empirical research identifying the negative impact of parental separation and unauthorized status on children has fueled great criticism of current immigration policy. Findings from our study contribute to this policy discussion by focusing on how family structure affects Salvadoran deportees’ intentions to remigrate.

The key finding from our study is that in spite of severe penalties associated with the remigration of deportees to the United States, the majority of Salvadoran men who were separated from their families through deportation intend to remigrate. More than half of deportees in our sample were separated from children and spouses in the United States as a result of deportation, forming “involuntary” transnational families in the process. This involuntary transnational family structure is the most important factor influencing the intent to remigrate among Salvadoran deportees, and this is true regardless of the reason for deportation, including men who were deported for criminal offenses and face especially severe penalties if apprehended upon reentry.

To our knowledge, this is the first study to document how transnational family structure influences Salvadoran migrants’ intentions to remigrate to the United States following removal, and it also contributes to a small but growing body of research on what happens post-deportation (Schuster and Majidi 2013). We argue that transnational families formed through deportation are involuntary, and they differ from voluntary transnational families in that children are left behind in the destination country, which is the child’s country of citizenship in the vast majority of cases. Deportees in these families face no good solutions to the problem of separation from their spouses and children — either they remove their children from their country of citizenship, or they remigrate to a hostile environment. Not surprisingly, we find that male Salvadoran deportees with children and spouses in the United States are more likely than their
counterparts without those family ties to intend to remigrate. Indeed, we estimated that more than half of these men intend to remigrate, although the true rate may be slightly lower given that men with fewer ties to the United States were less likely to complete the survey.

These intentions could reflect the fact that deportees with families in the United States have substantial US-specific human capital, including English-language ability and US work experience, factors that past research highlights as important determinants of remigration among both documented and undocumented migrants (Massey and Espinosa 1997). In our data, Salvadoran deportees with children in the United States had spent a greater number of years in the United States before deportation, had higher levels of English-language ability, had higher levels of education, and were more likely to be employed in the United States prior to deportation than their counterparts without children in the United States. The accumulation of human capital in the United States, rather than in their home country, may make it difficult for deportees to support themselves and their families in El Salvador. Although US-specific human capital may motivate deportees to remigrate, we found that it was inconsequential in comparison transnational family structure. That is, our regression results showed that time in the United States, English-language ability, education, and employment were not significantly associated with intent to remigrate to the United States, whereas family was. This is a slight twist on the research literature’s emphasis on social capital; for example, in Massey and Espinosa’s (1997) groundbreaking study of the multiple determinants of international migration from Mexico, they found that migrant networks were one of three engines driving that flow (cf. Constant and Zimmermann 2012). In this case, we do not believe that deportees are benefitting from lower costs and information provided through migrant networks; rather, our findings speak to the fact that deportees are primarily motivated to rejoin their families in the United States.

Salvadoran men may be better able to support themselves and their families working in the United States than in El Salvador, regardless of their language and work experience. Deportees may choose to remigrate to the United States and face the risk of severe penalties if apprehended because this is likely the best choice in terms of not just reuniting with, but also providing for, one’s family. In this way, deportees in involuntary transnational families are following the paths of mothers and fathers in “voluntary” transnational families — migrating despite the penalties and hardships to provide for their families (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Dreby...
However, in this case they are reuniting with children left behind in the country of migration — which for most of their children is their country of birth — and facing especially severe legal penalties in doing so.

Indeed, the high rate of intent to remigrate among these deportees is in spite of severe penalties associated with unlawful reentry among prior deportees. These penalties increase if deportees were previously convicted of crimes. A little more than half of the migrants (55.4%) in our sample were deported for criminal offenses, and one-third of those deportees were deported for violent offenses (i.e., a small minority of all Salvadoran deportees in our sample were deported for violent offenses). Given the harsh penalties associated with remigration among these deportees, we would expect to find remigration intentions are different in this group. However, we found that transnational family structure is at least as motivating for these men to remigrate. Among migrants deported for a criminal offense, those with a spouse and dependent child were four times more likely to intend to remigrate than their counterparts without families in the United States. These findings suggest that the penalties associated with detection are not a significant deterrent for deportees with criminal records who have immediate family in the United States.

Our findings also speak to the intersections between states and their policies, on the one hand, and migrants and their transnational families, on the other. Our study underscores the tension in scholarship on transnationalism between the perspective that migrants are “transnationalists from below,” breaking the bounds of the nation-state through individual acts of mobility (particularly via migration without legal documents), and the nevertheless imposing structure of the nation-state system, which remains firmly ensconced if occasionally transcended (Glick Schiller 1999). It resonates with a similar tension in scholarship on migration policy, which has often called into question the effectiveness of migration policy at controlling international movement (e.g., Castles 2004). Indeed, the harsh penalties imposed by US immigration policy aimed to deter remigration of deportees are largely ineffective in the face of social pressures for remigration (namely family reunion). On the other hand, it is the effectiveness of US immigration policies, such as Secure Communities and other measures to deport large numbers of migrants, that creates involuntary transnational families in the first place (Zolberg 1999). Thus, our study resonates with others from Europe and elsewhere arguing that while state migration policies cannot effectively control human mobility, they can nevertheless have devastating effects, and the United States is no
exception in this matter (Peutz 2006; Schuster and Majidi 2013). Migrants and their families, often spread across national boundaries, seek some semblance of family life despite and in spite of these policies.

It is important to note that the current study examined intentions to remigrate rather than actual behavior. Measuring behavior is preferable to intent, as some individuals who intend to remigrate do not move while others who did not intend to migrate may eventually take the journey (Card 1982; Lu 1999). In the context of violence and insecurity related to travel through Mexico, heavy border enforcement, and severe penalties for reentry, it is possible that deportees state intentions to remigrate but in fact do not. But the opposite is also possible — the risks associated with remigration may mean deportees do not intend to migrate, but, despite their best intentions, do in fact remigrate to the United States. Intentions may reflect the “common sense” appraisal of the risks of remigration, but ultimately, the psychological stress associated with long-term separation for children and spouses, threats of family dissolution, experiences of stigma in the home country, repayment of debt, and/or economic deprivation may influence deportees to face those risks and return to the United States (Brotherton and Barrios 2009; Chaudry et al. 2010; Dreby 2012; Schuster and Majidi 2013).

Past research on US and international migration intentions and behavior gives upper and lower bounds on the percentage of those intending to migrate who actually do: in Lu’s (1999) study of American migration, 45 percent who said they intended to migrate did; in Card’s (1982) study of Filipino migration, 75 percent who said they intended to migrate did. If between 45 percent and 75 percent of the deportees in our sample who intended to remigrate actually do, then given a rate of 43.6 percent of deportees who intend to migrate, we might expect that between 20 percent and 32.7 percent actually do. The upper bound on this rate is similar to the rate of remigration reported in a sample of documented and undocumented migrants in Mexico between 1965 and 1985 (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). Overall, this suggests that while remigration among deportees is likely lower than it is among migrants who return voluntarily, it is nevertheless a significant portion of deportees who remigrate.

Using these figures, results from our study, and DHS data on deportations, we can estimate rough upper and lower bounds of the number of Salvadoran deportee parents who will remigrate. In 2011, 17,308 Salvadorans were deported from the United States (DHS 2012a, 2012b). In our data, 54 percent of Salvadoran deportees were parents of children
in the United States, and 52.5 percent of them intended to return. Applying these numbers to the count of Salvadoran deportees in the DHS data, an estimated 9,346 Salvadoran parents were separated from their children in 2011, and 4,906 of them will intend to remigrate. Using the upper and lower bounds established in the literature, between 2,208 and 3,679 actually will. Applying this same logic to all parents of US-citizen children deported in 2011 (79,052), between 18,676 and 31,126 deported parents will remigrate to the United States. These are sizable numbers of deportees who could plausibly reenter the United States without documentation to rejoin their families. However, the number of deportees who reenter is arguably much larger if one considers that remigration is easier from Mexico than it is from El Salvador because of shorter distance and a history of circular migration between Mexico and the United States. By far the majority of deportees are Mexican immigrants, and studies of Central American and Mexican transnational families show that remigration is more common among Mexicans than Central Americans (cf. Dreby 2010 versus Menjívar and Abrego 2012).

In addition to family, there may be other reasons why deportees return to the United States. As mentioned earlier, experiences of stigma and economic displacement could be significant barriers to reintegration in the country of origin (Brotherton and Barrios 2009; Schuster and Majidi 2013). Social and economic isolation also likely contributes to an individual’s desire to remigrate. However, because measures of stigma and displacement were not included in the survey tool, we were unable to test this hypothesis. It is likely that stigma, economic hardship, and family reunification influence an individual’s decision to repeat migration to the United States. Future research in this area should include measures of family structure, economic displacement, and stigma to assess the individual contribution of each of these in predicting the likelihood of repeat migration.

Our study raises questions about the logic and cost-effectiveness of deportation of parents of children in the United States, especially given the psychological and financial consequences of deportation on families. Even in families where deportees remigrate to the United States, “the emotional and economic fallout is long-reaching” (Dreby 2012, 842). In addition to the consequences of deportation on family members, immigration detention and removal operations are highly costly, with roughly $2.55 billion spent annually. Given that deportees with family members in the United States are highly likely to remigrate, it is important, if not
urgent, to reconsider the deportation and detention policy surrounding parents of dependent children (Baum, Jones, and Barry 2010).

Several bills have been introduced in the US Senate and House of Representatives to address issues of family separation following detention and/or deportation. US Representative Lynn Woolsey (D-California) introduced the Humane Enforcement and Legal Protections (HELP) for Separated Children Act in 2009 and again in 2011 (H.R. 0.2607; First Focus 2011). This act would provide national procedures for immigrant enforcement activities that apprehend parents, guardians, or primary caregivers of citizen children. In addition, it would provide the courts with an opportunity to consider the best interest of the child and child’s family prior to deportation. Similarly, US Representative Jose Serrano (D-NY) introduced the Child Citizen Protections Act (H.R. 182) in 2009 and then again in 2011. This bill would reinstate prosecutorial discretion for judges in deportation cases involving parents of citizen children. These bills have yet to pass in US Congress.

In the United States, immigration policy is largely handled at the federal level, but states have been increasingly taking measures to both control and, less frequently, accommodate migrants. In California, for example, Governor Jerry Brown recently signed two bills (AB2015 and SB1064) that can be seen as models for other states. The first, AB2015, or Calls for Kids, mandates that detained parents be given the right to call home and arrange childcare; the second, SB1064, Reuniting Immigrant Families, authorizes juvenile court judges to provide detained and deported parents additional time to reunify with their children. Both of these bills were in response to the report, *Shattered Families: The Perilous Intersection of Immigrant Enforcement and Child Welfare System* (see Wessler 2011), which details stories of parents losing custody of their children (i.e., children placed in the public child welfare system) after they were detained and deported by DHS.

As described in the introduction, the most recent change in US immigration regulation is related to a waiver of unlawful presence (the I-601A provisional waiver). After March 4, 2013, unauthorized migrants who have applications to adjust their legal status can apply for a waiver that, if granted, will allow the individual to remain in the United States while they complete the immigration process rather than waiting for the process to unfold in their country of origin. It is important to emphasize that this change in regulation is not an amnesty program and will affect only unauthorized immigrants who have a legal way to adjust their status, such as through immediate family ties to US citizens. US-citizen children
can only sponsor their parents for legal status if the children are adults, and for this reason and others, this change in regulation will not protect all, or even most, US-citizen children against the hardship of family separation and forced repatriation. What is missing from this change in regulation is a mechanism that will protect all children against potential separation from their parents through forced repatriation.

US immigration policy has explicitly recognized the importance of family unification since the landmark amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act passed in 1965. Deportation for the sake of public safety or security should be weighed on balance with the state’s interest in family unity and well-being (Baum, Jones, and Barry 2010). Our study shows that deportees with a spouse and children in the United States are highly likely to remigrate, and thus, the typical policy means for addressing migrants’ unlawful presence in the United States — detention, deportation, and severe penalties for remigration — are clearly ineffective. Meaningful exceptions to these policies should be provided to this population.
### TABLE A1
**Characteristics of the Analytic Sample (N = 186) Compared to the Sample with Non-missing Data on Each Covariate (N Varies by Covariate)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample with Full Data on All Covariates (Analytic Sample)</th>
<th>Sample with Non-missing Data on Each Covariate but Missing on One or More of the Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (mean years)</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time in the US (mean years)***</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (mean years)**</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed in US (%)</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaks English (%)***</td>
<td>83.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children in US (%)*</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse (%)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not married</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse in ES</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse in US</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans to return (%)</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: The sample size in the second column varies according to the amount of missing data on each covariate.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ based on chi-square tests of equal distributions or $t$-tests of equal means.

### TABLE A2
**Percent of Sample Who Intends to Remigrate by Transnational Family Structure Comparing Analytic Sample to Sample with Complete Data on Both Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Analytic Sample (Sample with Complete Data on All Covariates)</th>
<th>Sample with Non-missing Data on DV and IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children in the US</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No children/children in ES</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status/location of spouse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married and spouse in El Salvador</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married and spouse in United States</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M/D Imputation</th>
<th>Multiple Imputation</th>
<th>M/D Imputation</th>
<th>Multiple Imputation</th>
<th>M/D Imputation</th>
<th>Multiple Imputation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Children (ref = no children or children in US)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children in the US</td>
<td>2.30 (0.76)*</td>
<td>1.93 (0.33)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marital status/location of spouse (ref = unmarried)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married and spouse in ES</td>
<td>1.54 (0.72)</td>
<td>1.08 (0.36)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married and spouse in US</td>
<td>2.65 (0.94)**</td>
<td>2.05 (0.32)*</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combined family structure (ref = unmarried and no children/children in E.S.)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried and children in US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.37 (0.86)</td>
<td>0.81 (0.48)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse in ES and no children/children in ES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.15 (1.43)</td>
<td>1.70 (0.38)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse in ES and children in US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.72 (0.84)</td>
<td>1.63 (0.51)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse in US and no children/children in ES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.36 (1.50)</td>
<td>1.43 (0.55)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse in US and children in US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.59 (1.52)**</td>
<td>2.75 (0.39)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sample size</strong></td>
<td>207</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: All models control for age, years in the US prior to deportation, education, employed prior to deportation, and English-language ability. Odds ratios on covariates were similar to those presented in Table 2. Standard errors (SE) are in parentheses.

†p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 based on two-sided z-tests.
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