A BIBLIOGRAPHY ON AMIN'SUGANDA

by

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I. Government Documents


Also called the Jones Commission which in 1972 investigated the "disappearance" of two Americans. It is a testament to the fragile state of justice in Uganda. Jones feared for his own life and did not file his report until he was safely out of Uganda. Amin and the army tried to obstruct the work of the Commission, but Jones pursued his work with diligence, and revealed that a number of top army officers were responsible for the deaths of Stroh and Sidel (journalist and teacher) in June, 1971. Africa Today 20, 2 (Spring 1973), p. 17.

Uganda. Evidence and findings of the Commission of Inquiry into the allegations made by the late Daudi Opong on 4th February 1966 (against Obote, Amin et al.). Kampala:

This Commission had in 1966 investigated the allegations of the late D. O. against Obote and Amin of corruption and sedition. Amin has in the early months of his regime released its evidence and findings. See Africa Today, 21, 1 (Winter 1974), pp. 75-76.


The "Eighteen Points" are reproduced herein. See also Glentworth and Hancock. "Obote and Amin" African Affairs 72, 288 (July 1973), p. 250.


II. Articles


"Milton Obote's style of leadership, characterized to a high degree by his tendency to mediate, and reconcile the many interests in pluralistic Uganda had however since 1956 been in part his response to the existing institutions that linked the centre to locality in Uganda. In the beginning of the new state, the leader makes the institutions; later the institutions directly influence his style of leadership. But in Obote's case it is possible to argue that his style of reconciliation leadership,
so characteristic of his first ten years in national Ugandan politics, was determined by the institutions in existence, themselves a compromise with Uganda's plural society." International Political Science Abstracts XXIV, 1 (1974), p. 784.

Ghai, Y. P. "Constitutions and the political order in East Africa." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 21, 3 (July 1972), pp. 403-34. "Studies of African constitutions tend to focus on the legal rules, but as constitutions change rapidly, are suspended or overthrown, there is little interest in such studies. A more fruitful approach to the study of constitutions is through an exploration of the relationship between constitutions and politics. The theory of the constitution is that it sets out the framework within which political activity and competition take place; the constitution is both supreme and constant. A number of devices, like judicial review, entrenchment, second chambers, are established to maintain this role of the constitution. In practice, the constitution is neither supreme nor constant. It is the development of political factors which dictates the form of the constitution. A group in power uses, amends or disregards the constitution as it suits it; its basic fidelity seems to be its continuing power to rule. This thesis is demonstrated through an extensive examination of the relationship between politics and constitutions in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zanzibar, since their independence, about ten years ago. An attempt is made, however, to distinguish between the different long term objectives of constitution of constitutions, especially as regards institutionalization, as between these countries." International Political Science Abstracts XXIII, 4 (1973), 2979.


"In spite of his personal unpredictability Amin has in many ways conformed to the system he inherited; indeed his internal policies can be understood, and only understood, in relation to the past. The crucial point is
that he is no revolutionary; instead he has pushed the existing system to its extreme limit. This argument is developed in three stages: by trying to pinpoint Uganda's main political problems as illustrated by the events of 1962-1966; by examining Obote's efforts to solve these problems through the "Move to the Left", a programme which emerged out of the 1966 crisis; and by looking at Amin's activities to show how, in place of the Obote "revolution", the military government has become almost exclusively concerned with the extension and exploitation of the existing system." International Political Science Abstracts. XXIV, 3 (1974), 2744.


"The state of Uganda is dominated by one of its components, the kingdom of Buganda. Older-established, more politically and culturally sophisticated and more powerful than the other components of the nation, the influence of Buganda in the central government following independence was very great. Inevitably, a split developed between southerners (Bantu) and Buganda. The situation, however, was further complicated by the attachment of Buganda to their monarchy: an attachment which led to reluctance to accept the power of the State. Finally, in February, 1966, Obote, the Prime Minister, suspended and arrested a number of members of his cabinet and put down a rebellion in Buganda with considerable bloodshed. The Kabaka (king) fled into exile." International Political Science Abstracts. XVII, 2 (1967), p. 826.


Jacob, B. L. "The Autumn of Our Discontent: The Uganda Scene" Africa Today, 21, 1 (Winter 1974), pp. 73-82. An up-dating of the earlier article in ibid., 20, 2 (1973), pp. 47-57; Also important.

Jacobs, B. L. "Uganda's Second Republic: The First Two Years." Africa Today. 20, 2 (Spring 1973), pp. 47-57. This is an important source because Jacobs, who is Director of Studies at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, England; was formerly Director of Studies in Public Administration at Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda.


Kiwanuka, M. S. M."MAWAZO and Obote." MAWAZO. 3, 2 (1971), pp. 45-46. MAWAZO is published by Department of History, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda.


"Le coup d'Etat du general Amin de janvier 1971 a mis en lumiere le mecontentement populaire a l'egard de la radicalisation du pouvoir precedent et de ses nationalisations abusives. Depuis la prise du pouvoir, le general Amin s'efforce de reconstituer une armee solide, de reconstruire une economie liberale et de combattre la corruption. Ses plus grandes difficultes sont cependant venues de l'exterieur: Soudan et Tanzanie particulièrement, mais aujourd'hui, le general Amin
a pratiquement réglé une situation extérieure difficile."

International Political Science Abstracts XXII, 3 (1972), 2517.

Legum, Colin. (ed.) Africa Contemporary Record. Refer to volumes III (1972) to VI (1974) for information on
a) "Uganda's Coup D'Etat: African Reactions;"
b) "Uganda Armed Forces Statement" (issued on taking power);
c) "Text proclaiming the Suspension of the Uganda Constitution;"
d) "Uganda Crisis I: Foreign and military Affairs;" and
e) "Uganda Crisis II: Expulsions of Asians."

Every year, the Africa Contemporary Record publishes Current Affairs Series as separate monographs of a number of studies from the above volumes. Among the 1973-74 additions, Current Affairs Series No. 12 is General Amin's Uganda.

Lofchie, M. F. "The Uganda coup - Class action by the military." Journal of Modern African Studies 10,1 (May 1972), pp. 19-35. "The Uganda army can be best understood as a kind of economic class, an elite stratum with a set of economic interests to protect. The coup of January, 1971, was the army's political response to an increasingly socialist regime whose egalitarian domestic policies posed more and more of a threat to the military's economic privileges. No other explanation accounts adequately for two paradoxical aspects of the coup. Why should an army whose officers and rank and file were drawn overwhelmingly from sections of the society loyal to the regime, and which had in fact constituted one of the Government's principal bases of support, turn against political authorities with whom it had been closely identified? Secondly, how is it possible to understand the new social basis of political power in Uganda? - a coalition which joins an officer corps drawn from the economically less developed northern section of the country with a southern coffee-growing elite drawn from the most wealthy region of Uganda, the districts of Buganda. The class character of the Uganda military helps to answer both questions. Both groups (officers and wealthy coffee farmers) had one powerful interest in common - preservation of their high income status in a generally poor agricultural society. They shared a common interest in opposing a government intent

Low, D. A. "Uganda Unhinged." International Affairs. 49, 2 (April 1973), pp. 219-28. "The direct relationship between the expulsion of the Asians from Uganda and the insidious collapse of the fundamental authority of Uganda's central government becomes pulpable if the decision is set within the context of the political history of independent Uganda. Amin, like his predecessor was faced by the fundamental problem of the tenuousness of the political authority of the central government and the need for a new basis for its legitimacy." International Political Science Abstracts. XXIII, 6 (1973), p. 4537.

"Malice or immaturity?" Africa. 26 (Oct. 1973), pp. 29-31. Quotation: "In Uganda the question that haunts many of us now is where we are heading. Amin's caprice is real; whether it is from malice or mere political immaturity, it is confusing normally loyal Ugandans."


FRONASA was organised by Yoweri Museveni, is now the leading guerilla group. Its Manifesto is concerned with regime violence and economic dislocation, the demise of good government and religious persecution. Its remedy is mass armed struggle to restore order, development and national status. That is why FRONASA has been founded, an organisation dedicated to do away with fascism, misgovernment, religious bigotry and corruption, and to ensure peace, security, dignity and enlightened government for the people of Uganda through armed struggle and any other necessary means.


Leadership in Africa might be said to fall into four major styles - intimidatory, patriarchal, reconciliatory,
and mobilizational. In East Africa Jomo Kenyatta has been a patriarchal leader, Julius Nyerere a mobilization leader, and Obote a reconciliation leader. Obote's initial policy on emerging into Independence was to retain some link with the residual pre-eminence of the Baganda. He concluded an alliance with the Kabaka Yekka party. But by August 1964, Obote felt strong enough to terminate his alliance with Kabaka Yekka. Yet, Obote's overall control within his own party started to decline in the succeeding months. Obote was about to be ousted from the leadership of the party - but he turned the tables on his opponents, detaining five of his Cabinet Ministers, suspending the Constitution, and declaring himself Executive President. In 1967 he introduced a new Constitution for Uganda, and abolished the kings. The succeeding period called forth from Obote skills of reconciliation not only between one political faction and another, but also between the soldiers and the politicians. But this also coincided with increasing intimidation in the political system of Uganda. On December 19, 1969, there was an attempt on Obote's life. If the attempt was by an ethnic opponent then the task of national survival was far from complete. If, however, the assassination attempt was the work of an ideological opponent, it could mean that Ugandans were beginning to feel passionately about political issues above and beyond tribal loyalties - and that political violence was moving from issues of national survival to issues of ideological preference. Meanwhile, Obote had begun to feel that a reconciliation style of leadership was not enough. He wanted to become a mobilization leader, aspiring towards national transformation rather than system maintenance. His National Service scheme, his Common Man's Charter, the partial nationalization of the industries in May 1970, and the proposed single party system for Uganda were all indications of an Obote who wanted to move from the conciliation to mobilization. Was Obote to be equal to the new task? Is the country ready to be led in that style? Only the future can reveal the full contribution of Milton Obote to the historical evolution of his nation. Mazzrui, Ali A. "The lumpen proletariat and the lumpen militarist: African soldiers as a new political class (Uganda)." Political Studies. 21, 1 (March 1973), p.1-12.
"The history of modernization in independent Africa might well be a gradual transition from a political supremacy of those who hold the means of destruction to a future political supremacy of those who control the means of production. Modern military technology in a relatively backward society tends to widen the gap of power between the unarmed citizenry on one side and those who hold control over the new means of war, on the other. It is only after the society has become more technologically complex that the means of production become critical enough to the survival of national systems to provide a countervailing balance to the power exercised by the military. Those who control the means of production - workers, managers and owners - are at their most powerful in relations to the soldiers in situations of technological complexity. They are at their weakest in relation to the soldiers in situations of rudimentary technology. Political analysts so far have focused on the politicization of African armies. What needs to be observed from now on is the economicization of those armies. The consequences of soldiers becoming political animals are different from the consequences of their becoming significant economic agents. Specially instructive in this regard might be the aftermath of Amin's expulsion of the Asians from Uganda. When African soldiers become businessmen, an important process is initiated. It is this particular form of the economicization of African soldiers which constitutes the gradual embourgeoisement of the old lumpen militariat. In Uganda it is almost certain that one important consequence of the de-Indianization of the economy will be the rapid embourgeoisement of a significant section of the armed forces. If the politicization of an African army aggravates the crisis of professionalism, the economicization of that same army could gradually help to restore the balance. As soldiers become part of the bourgeoisie, the control of the means of destruction becomes coextensive with participation in the means of production." International Political Science Abstracts, XXIII, 6 (1973), p. 4322.

This article contains a significant revision of Chapter 16 in Mazrui's Cultural engineering and nation-building in East Africa, see Africa Today. 20, 2 (Spring 1973), p. 43, footnote 28.

Mazrui, A. A. "On Amin and Obote." East Africa Journal, 8, 6 (June 1971), pp. 3-5.


"There are two levels of sovereignty operating within African political thought - state sovereignty and racial sovereignty. By the criterion of state sovereignty, the Sultan Jamshid was a native of Zanzibar while Okello, the man who led a revolution against him, was a foreigner. But by the criterion of racial sovereignty, it was the other way round. Also, in their own way, the army mutinies of 1964 presented each East African government with a dilemma over the nature of sovereignty. What was supposed to be an implement of East African sovereignty could only be disciplined by a partial East African retreat from sovereignty itself, by calling in foreign troops. Such foreign military intervention was legitimate to the extent that it maintained law and order but morally suspect when it frustrated genuine political aspirations. In helping the East African governments in their hour of mutinous peril, British authorities might have done the right thing - but seemingly for the wrong reasons." International Political Science Abstracts. XVII, 3 (1967), p. 995. This mutiny phenomenon was approached clearly along political lines by Mazrui and Rotherchild, says Michel L. Martin in UFAHAMU 2, 3 (Winter 1972), p. 117, note 25.

Important. Gives also a good background in modern sociological and political terms. And Idi Amin's records on page 121.

Ali A. Mazrui, Professor and Head of Political Science Department, Makerere University, in a letter to Ufahamu. 3, 2 (Fall 1972) p. 7:

"I read the article by Michel L. Martin, "The Uganda Military Coup of 1971: A Study of Protest with great interest. Apart from one or two errors, it is an article based on substantial research and sensitivity to the important issues in Uganda politics. It is so good that it is bound to feature in our reading lists at Makerere University from now on. I am grateful to you for drawing my attention to the article, and to the quality of your journal.


A thousand copies of this paper were distributed in Kampala in August, 1972 as a mimeographed circular and more copies were "pirated" and reduplicated


"Whereas 25 January 1971 marks the occasion with the foremost military significance in Ugandan history, it is a date which is symbolic of the failures and achievements of Africa at large. What are the immediate circumstances and events leading to this coup? What are the deeper socio-political causes responsible for the coup? Prescriptions are advanced concerning the future of military rule in Uganda, particularly in terms
of choices of action open to the military. The legacy of the civilian regime is the dilemma of how to provide firm control from the top in managing the tasks of development and, at the same time disperse participation in governmental responsibility without increasing the potential for disruption. The most viable course of action for the military is to establish a vanguard party which exercises strong control while gradually expanding its base of power. "International Political Science Abstracts. XXIV, i (1974), p. 819.


O'Brien, J. "General Amin and the Uganda Asians: doing the unthinkable." Round Table. 249 (January 1973), pp. 91-104.

"As pseudonymous Justin O'Brien has suggested, their (the Asians) superordinate position relative to most Africans meant that "The Asian demise was inevitable". Compared to their status in Kenya and Tanzania, "it was in Uganda that the Asians were most strongly entrenched." See Shaw, Timothy M. "Uganda under Amin: The Costs of Confronting Dependence." Africa Today. 20, 2 (Spring 1973), pp. 35 and 36.


"Africanists have often asserted that the concept of collaboration was a crucial apparatus in the process of colonization, but have tended to paint a rather simple image of the actual individuals that were involved. In Uganda the variety of personalities was quite impressive. What united them all was self-interest. The British used various sets of collaborators according to their needs, dropping alliance with those who had outlived their usefulness. The first collaborators were Sudanese soldiers then the Christian Baganda, and after them the generation of Kakungulul, Awich and Odora. By the 1920s and 1930s the educated elites were fast becoming the collaborators. All this array of men were wrestling with the fundamental problems of privilege in a changing world; they thus were not the simple collaborators that they appeared to be:


"Obote, the former President of Uganda, showed himself to be adept in the art of orchestrating civilian political forces by delicately applying his consummate knowledge of tribal or ethnic calculus: but he was naive in his grasp of military-civil relationships and much too old-fashioned in his approach to realise the importance of effective control of the instruments of force. His successor, Amin, has demonstrated a capacity to bring the army, at least for some time to come, under his personal control by changing its ethnic composition and increasing its responsibilities. Will he also be able to develop the political skills necessary to contain the resurgent political tendencies within Ugandan society which are working towards a return to traditionalism and a dilution of national identity by a reassertion of tribal or ethnic particularities? Uganda needs a leadership which is capable of combining the skills of both Obote and Amin. It may well be that these types of skills cannot be combined in a single individual. In that case, Uganda may be in for a further political crisis out of which a suitable national political ideology may yet be born."


This article is a review of the goals and cost of Amin's economic strategy. It seeks to explain the "Economic war" of the Amin regime as a case study of an unplanned demolition of dependency, ibid., pp. 32-33.

This essay has been, in part, a comment on the established literature on international linkages and stratification. Its main theoretical point is that the structure of dependence between highly unequal international actors is perpetuated because incumbent elites in new states are able to extract status and resources from the relation. Until the distribution of resources in the international system is made more equal, changes or regimes in the Third World will lead to different sets of dependent relationships, not to their final elimination. The national development of new states takes place within the structure of an hierarchical international system. Any strategy designed to maximize national interest
and foreign policy choices requires a simultaneous attack on the interdependent domestic and external interests perpetuated by the structure of dependence. National self-reliance in Africa may be of the Tanzanian socialist of Ugandan populist varieties. It remains to be seen whether other African regimes will perceive these strategies to be real alternatives. The Ugandan guerillas have already made their choice. *Ibid.* , 45 (the conclusion of the article). See also 32, note 1.


Tandon, Yash. "The expulsions from Uganda - the Asians' role in East Africa." *Patterns of Prejudice.* 6, 6 (Nov./Dec. 1972). (See also *Africa Today.* 20, 2 (Spring 1973), pp. 35-36)


"M. T. convincingly shows the lack of tribal and political (let alone economic) cohesiveness of the Uganda armed forces at the time of the coup." Clentiworth and Hancock. "Obote and Amin" *African Affairs.* 72, 288 (July 1973), p. 249, note 19.

"To theorists of the British right the military coup of January 25, 1971, seemed part of a general pattern in post-colonial Africa: uneasy parliament corrupt and repressive dictatorship to cleaning army rule. To theorists of the left, it was a "Latin American" phenomenon that changed nothing. But in fact both theories are found wanting. The Amin coup is best understood not as a military takeover of civilian government, but as an internal war led by an army general whose network of followers managed to seize the national armour before anyone else." *International Political Science Abstracts.* XXIII, 3 (1974), p. 2757.

"The key to President Amin's actions since seizing power probably lies in the political culture of the lower-income urban groups from which the bulk of his support appears to be drawn." *International Political Science Abstracts.* XXIV, 2 (1974), p. 1925.


"Uganda under Military Rule." *Africa Today.* 20, 2 (Spring 1973), pp. 11-31. Important source by a Special Correspondent. The writer of this article, for reasons which become apparent in the text, cannot at present be identified, but has a long, intimate and continuing relationship with the Ugandan scene.


III. Books and Pamphlets


"This revised edition has been brought out to incorporate "contemporary issues and dilemmas facing the Asian community", and to examine the consequences of the latest developments in East Africa and elsewhere, this minority. Since 1967-8, events in Britain and East Africa have been periodic reminders of the "Asian problem", as Yash Ghai calls it (p. 227). The Asians' extreme unpopularity, the East African governments' Africanization policies and most Asians' preference for Britain over India for settlement - these are some of the many pertinent questions usefully tackled by the seven contributors. The editors have greatly improved the historical introduction..." From the review by Nizar A. Motani, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine, in *African Affairs,* 287 (April 1973), pp. 215-16.


"The best things in this book are the stories about East Africa that Lady Listowel obtained from British army officers whom Idi Amin befriended at earlier stages of his career. These are mostly tales of athletic prowess - this powerful chest, those incredible eyes - but there are also several references to the Ugandan army mutiny
of January 1964 (pp. 30-41), and a poignant story about that abortive embassy to Idi Amin by Geoffrey Rippon in August last year: so different were the sorts of English employed by the two men in this exercise that Amin did not understand anything of consequence said by Rippon (p. 152). Otherwise this book is not worth serious attention as a political biography. There are too many errors of fact...... As an example of contemporary ephemera, this book reveals more about its author than it does about its subject and is worth reading for that reason, if for none other." Review by Michæl Twaddle (Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London) in African Affairs. 72, 286 (July 1973), pp. 344-45.

Luttwak, E. Coup d'etat: A Practical Handbook. London: Penguin Press, 1968. "As far as the process of infiltration is concerned, see 62-63. The plot against Amin failed, because the officers loyal to Amin who infiltrated the different battalions, could alert Amin." Michel L. Martin In UFAHAMU. 2, 3 (Winter 1972), 112 and 121


"It claims to be the first historical study in depth on the subject. Dr. Nangat has consulted a wide range of primary sources and declares that the "result has been a study that is largely sympathetic towards the Asian community". But in this the author seems to have overreached himself, as reflected in the narrative, which suffers from repetition and poor organisation of valuable material...." From the review by Sukhi Singh in Journal of Modern African Studies. 7, 4 (Dec. 1969), p. 763. See also the review by James S. Read, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, in African Affairs, 71, 282 (January 1972), pp. 98-100.


"The book is based on research carried out between 1952 and 1955. Although the study ends historically in 1955, it will be relevant for a long time to come, for it is mainly concerned with the problem of the Asians' place in the newly emergent society of Uganda. The book is written in a lucid style and deals with each aspect systematically. The summaries and conclusions at the end of most chapters are of immense help, particularly concerning the complex subjects of caste, sect, and religion. What emerges clearly from this study is that any discussion on the Asian minority presupposes a thorough knowledge and understanding of the sociological relationships among the various "communities" within the Asian population. It also follows that the larger issues concerning the place of Asians in the new societies will be determined by the degree of transformation that occurs in intercommunal relationships among the Asians. It is questionable whether the melting-pot of schools and universities will produce a new generation of Ugandans free from ethnic and cultural barriers so long as existing family, kinship, and communal ties remain undiminished...."


Parson, J. "Africanization of trade in Uganda: background and perspectives on government policy." Makerere
University, Political Science Department, 1971. 37 pp. (Cyclostyled)


The study deals with the events since the military coup on January 25, 1971, when General Amin came to power. Part I deals with the expulsion of the Asians from Uganda; Part II deals with the political and legal structure within which the violation of human rights have occurred; Part III presents a chronological account of the reign of terror that has taken place in Uganda since January 1971.


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