Title
Interpreting Chicano History: The World-System Approach to 19th Century California

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0cw3q5x9

Author
Almaguer, Tomás

Publication Date
1977
INTERPRETING CHICANO HISTORY: THE "WORLD-SYSTEM APPROACH TO 19th CENTURY CALIFORNIA*

by

Tomás Almaguer

Department of Sociology
University of California, Berkeley

© 1977

* Special thanks to Clementina Durón, Mario Barrera, Harry Chortiner, David Plotke, Michael Burawoy, Wally Goldfrank, and members of the Chicano Political Economy Collective (David Montejano, Phillip Gonzales, Larry Trujillo, Andrés Jimenez, Regino Chavez, Patricia Chavez, Jorge Chapa, and Elena Flores). Their comments on an earlier draft of this paper were very useful. The shortcomings that remain, however, are my own. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute for the Study of Social Change or the Chicano Political Economy Collective (ChPEC).
INTRODUCTION

In the past eight years we have seen work in Chicano Studies quickly pass through three fairly discernible stages. In the first period, from 1969 to about 1972, we saw social science work in Chicano Studies primarily focussing on much needed critical "reviews of the literature." Reacting to pre-1969 social science work on the Chicano done primarily by Anglo-American anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists, reviewers like Octavio Romano, Nicolás Vaca, Deluvina Hernandez, Miguel Montiel, Raymond Rocco, and others undertook the important work of squarely challenging past characterizations of the Chicano in the social sciences.1 This "review of the literature" phase was the logical starting point in the historical development of contemporary Chicano Studies research.

This formative period was also noteworthy in marking the time when such Chicano journals as Actlán and El Grito first began publishing Chicano social science materials. It was also in this stage that we saw a plethora of Chicano bibliographies being rapidly compiled and distributed.2

The second stage through which Chicano Studies research quickly passed was roughly the period from 1972-75. What was characteristic of this phase was the emergence of a body of literature on the Chicano experience to be done by Chicanos themselves. Of particular importance was the appearance of a number of books in the area of Chicano history. The publication of Rudolfo Acuña's Occupied America, Juan Gomez's influential historical essays and Sembradores monograph, Pedro Castillo and Alberto Camaño's Furia y Muerte, and perhaps Matt Meier and Feliciano Rivera's The Chicanos all pointed to a stage in which Chicanos were beginning to do a type of revisionist history that enabled us to move away from our uncomfortable reliance on Carey McWilliams' sacred text--North From Mexico.3

Also noteworthy is the fact that this period marked the time when Chicanos began to move away from reviews of the literature and began producing the countless articles which contained such terms in their title as "Toward," "Tentative," "Preliminary Remarks" and a variety of other terms that reflected the inchoate nature of our research efforts.4 It was here that we began to develop such alternative theoretical approaches to Chicano Studies research as the internal colonial model and began to experiment...
with such methodological techniques as oral history. The more self-conscious attempts to develop a theoretical approach to Chicano Studies research, again primarily through the use of the internal colonial model, was carried out by such authors as Carlos Muñoz, Mario Barrera, Carlos Ornelas, Tomás Almaguer, and Guillermo Flores. Early efforts in this direction, while useful advances, have by and large been increasingly open to serious criticism and further work in this area has been slowly abandoned.

In the past two years, we have seen a tremendous new rise in activity on the part of Chicano researchers in developing a more comprehensive theoretical framework that will guide our future work in Chicano Studies. The realization of the hasty and speculative nature of our first efforts at developing a critical perspective from which to analyze the Chicano experience has led many Chicanos to retrace the broad outlines of our history within a more clearly defined theoretical framework.

In this regard, one very important part of work being done in the development of Chicano Studies research has centered on an intensive search for a more useful approach to interpretive history. As Chicano Studies begins to develop as a distinct area of study—or, as some have argued, as a discipline—we have increasingly come to realize the importance of examining our present-day situation with a clear understanding and reference to the past. One notable result has been the increase in the number of Chicano social scientists from such fields as political science, sociology, economics and anthropology who have begun to use historical materials to develop a more integrated, "historically conscious" social science. As one of many Chicano social scientists involved in examining historical materials on the Chicano experience, I have come to share this growing concern with the issue of theory.

Engaged in a study of the development of the Chicano working class in Southern California, I have been struck by the need to couch what could otherwise become a narrative account of this history within both a broader historical context and a more clearly defined theoretical orientation. Through the course of my research on Chicano labor in Ventura County, it has become clear to me that the task of writing Chicano history is not merely a matter of unearthing historical facts and letting them speak for themselves. The historian's penchant for relying on primary sources to recount history is, in and of itself, not enough to clarify the broader historical processes which have played an important part in shaping Chicano history.
In order to do a revisionist Chicano history of different communities, states, or even regions like the Southwest, we must take into account and explain how these broader historical patterns have related with our own unique history. For researchers working with historical data this issue of historical interpretation invariably becomes a theoretical question. The question of theory is not merely one of trying to neatly collapse Chicano history into some pre-conceived framework but one of using theory as a heuristic device to draw out the salient features and distinctive qualities of the Chicano historical experience.

With these issues in mind, the focus of this working paper will be to suggest the outlines of an alternative theoretical approach to Chicano history. In doing so I will summarize Immanuel Wallerstein's "world-system perspective" and propose ways in which this approach might prove useful in interpreting our past history. 10

The arguments presented in the application of the "world-system" approach to Chicano history are still speculative in nature. Much of the historical sketch that I will present here is yet to be fully developed. Needless to say, the primary purpose of this working paper is not to present a completely detailed study but merely to suggest one new approach to the question of theory in Chicano historical interpretation.

In approaching the issue of interpretation in Chicano history, I will focus my discussion on 19th century California. This historical period is particularly important since the entire Southwest was to undergo during this century the political and economic dominance of three different countries: Spain, Mexico, and the United States. Analyzing the distinctive features of economic life in these political "periods" raises a number of vexing questions for one doing Marxist historiography in this century. In focussing on this century-long history of California I will show that one of the most crucial problems that arises in defining the type of society that existed during the "Spanish", "Mexican", and "American" periods is whether the social and economic organization of California was basically "feudal" or "capitalist." In examining this issue in the last part of this paper, I will tie my interpretive discussion of 19th century California into the broader Marxist debate on the "transition from feudalism to capitalism."
THE "WORLD-SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE"

Wallerstein's formulation of the "world-system perspective" is a neo-Marxist approach to social change. In his book, The Modern World-System and in a number of important articles on the same theme, Wallerstein has outlined a provocative theory of capitalist development and the historical basis for world inequality. To put his work into some context, it is important to note that he sees his formulation as a clear alternative to evolutionary modernization theory. This modernization theory, which Wallerstein strongly criticizes, has assumed that all countries or nation-states progressively pass through a single path of evolutionary development, moving from an undeveloped "traditional" stage toward "modernity."

In contrast to this approach, Wallerstein's work rests squarely within the Marxist tradition that views national "development" and "underdevelopment" as being integrally linked to the same process, i.e., the rise and global expansion of capitalism. In this sense, Wallerstein's The Modern World-System builds upon and draws from the work of Paul Baran, André Gunder Frank, and the more recent writings of Arghiri Emmanuel and Samir Amin. His main contribution to this Marxist approach to the historical study of economic development is to advance a variation of this "underdevelopmentalist" position.

In essence, Wallerstein maintains that any explanation of world historical development must begin with a clear understanding of the development of capitalism as a single, world-wide economic system. It is only through an understanding of how capitalism merged and has globally expanded that we can make sense of the particular history of nations and groups of people within these political boundaries. The mainstay of Wallerstein's "world-system perspective" is the position that the

...modern world comprises a single capitalist world-economy, which has emerged historically since the sixteenth century and which still exists today. It follows...that national states are not societies that have separate, parallel, histories, but parts of a whole reflecting that whole. To the extent that stages exist, they exist for the system as a whole...[D]ifferent parts of the world play and have played differing roles in the capitalist world-economy, they have dramatically different internal socio-economic profiles and hence distinctive politics. But to understand the internal class contradictions and political struggles of a particular state, we must first situate it in the world-economy.

In other words, since the 16th century there have not existed separate modes of production in different geographical regions of the world. Once capitalism emerged in
Northwest Europe, we have lived in a world that has increasingly been drawn into the orbit of a single world-economy whose mode of production is exclusively capitalist. One can speak of changes within the capitalist mode of production only as it has developed as a single world-economy. According to Wallerstein, "Capitalism and a world-economy (that is, a single division of labor but multiple polities and cultures) are obverse sides of the same coin. One does not cause the other. We are mainly defining the same indivisible phenomenon by different characteristics." Thus Wallerstein is able to maintain that the central unit of analysis for charting long-term historical change, and the particular histories of "nation-states" and groups therein, is the "world-system."

It is within this global setting that Wallerstein argues that capitalist development since the 16th century has created "a world-economy with a single division of labor."

For Wallerstein, the development of capitalism, and the system of wage-labor in Western Europe, was also accompanied by the use of "serfs", "tenant farmers," as well as slavery and other forms of coerced labor within this single capitalist economy. It is important to stress that the emergence of these varied forms of labor control and exploitation in different parts of the world does not represent different modes of production. Rather, they all reflect variations within one world economic order which is essentially capitalist. In this sense Wallerstein does not define capitalism as solely being based on the existence of the capital-wage labor relationship. In its most basic form, capitalism is ultimately defined by Wallerstein as a world-economy in which production is geared for sale in a market and in which the maximization of profit is central. He does not believe that we can use "the pervasiveness of wage-labor as a defining characteristic of capitalism." Accordingly, "slavery and so-called 'second serfdom' are not to be regarded as anomalies in a capitalist system." While capitalism does most certainly entail the transformation of labor into a commodity, "wage-labor is only one of the modes in which labor is recruited and recompensed in the labor market."

Wallerstein argues in *The Modern World-System* that the development of the world-economy into a single global division of labor meant that a number of variegated "systems of labor control" fell into dominance in different parts of the world. Central to his framework is the idea that the establishment of this capitalist world-system
gave rise to three structural positions in the world-economy, each having its own specific economic role, state formation, class structure, and distinctive form of labor exploitation. 21

Viewed from its origin in the "long" sixteenth century, this trimodal world-system includes: the core areas (such as England, the Netherlands, and parts of Northern France), which specialized in capitalist agriculture and industrial production and used forms of tenancy and a wage-labor system; the periphery areas (such as Hispanic America and Eastern Europe), which specialized in the export of grains, bullion, and sugar and made use of various forms of "coerced cash-crop labor" or slavery; and finally the semi-periphery states (such as Spain, Portugal and Mediterranean Europe), in which share-cropping in agriculture became the principal method of labor control. 22

Thus, there are essentially three basic elements to this capitalist world-economy: first, it consists of a single market in which profit maximization is the preeminent goal; second, it consists of a series of competing state-structures which serve to distort the "free" market and increase profits for private capitalists; and third, it consists of three basic spheres of surplus labor expropriation. These tri-modal economic regions being the core, the semi-periphery and the periphery. 23

One feature of Wallerstein's approach to charting historical change is to view it in terms of "long cycles" of development within the world-economy. Viewed in these terms, his "periodization" is largely based on using important shifts in the development of the global political economy as historical benchmarks. What Wallerstein does is focus on the internal developments of the capitalist mode of production since the 16th century and use it to explain the changes in the international placement of nations within the economy's tri-modal structure. Using this method Wallerstein argues that the capitalist world-economy has historically passed through four distinct phases of development. The first formal phase through which the world-economy evolved was the so-called "long" sixteenth century (1450-1640). This period was the result of a "historical conjuncture" whereby the "crisis of feudalism" paved the way for the development of capitalist relations of production in Western Europe. 24

Following this initial period, with its geographical expansion of a European division of labor, the world-economy moved into its second stage. This period was marked by "the system-wide recession of 1650-1730 which consolidated the European
world economy..."25 In this period mercantilist struggles between England, France, and the Netherlands raged, the result of which saw England eventually reign as the leader of the new world system.26 This period dates from 1640-1815.

The third stage witnessed the triumph of Industrial capitalism over agricultural capitalism and the increased absorption of remote parts of the globe into a single European-based world economic order.27 The colonization of Africa was an important part of this stage which ran roughly from 1815-1917.28

The fourth stage of the capitalist world-system begins with the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the attempt to, paradoxically, once again consolidate the industrial capitalist world economy.29 This period is highlighted by the decline of Britain, which dates from 1873, and the rise if the United States as the hegemonic power in the world.

One of the immediate advantages that this "world-system perspective" provides for research in Chicano history is a useful way of confronting the issue of "periodization." From Wallerstein's general approach one can see that any discussion of periodization in 19th century California must be done in terms of shifts that the broader political economy has had on the area. Traditional interpretive histories of California--and for that matter on the entire Southwest--have usually approached such discussions in strict socio-political terms. This approach has usually characterized different historical time frames in California in terms of the so-called "Spanish", "Mexican", and "American" periods.

The more recent approach at periodization by Chicano historians and political scientists has been to view historical time spans in terms of Chicano reactions to various forms of Anglo domination. This approach has tended to see Chicano history in the Southwest in narrowly conceived periods such as the era of "resistance", "immigration", or "accomodation."30 Although this may be a view of history "from below," this type of approach shares with traditional historiography the predilection for seeing history in strict socio-political terms.

While in some ways useful, these "periodization" approaches obfuscate the important underlying economic factors that have shaped the nature of social and political life in this area. By merely characterizing California society from 1769-1821 as the "Spanish" period, for example, one could easily miss the important ways in which the fate of this area was less in the hands of the Spanish than in those of Anglo-American
merchants. As will be discussed below, the economic ties that California developed with the New England market during this time span was to become one of the most important features of the period.

What I am suggesting here is that any periodization of 19th century California should also be discussed in terms of the development of capitalism in the area. In highlighting this important economic variable, I will show that the 50 year span of Spanish political control, from 1769-1821, was the period in which California was firmly established as part of the "periphery". It is during this period that we see the first U.S. commercial capitalist penetration of the area. As a result of the independence of Mexico from Spain in 1821, California was to then pass to Mexican political control. During this period, which ends in 1848, California is increasingly integrated into the U.S. economy and begins moving toward "semi-periphery" status. Finally, as a result of the Mexican-U.S. War, California was to become politically annexed to the United States. The half-century from 1848 to 1900 saw California, as a political and economic unit of the U.S. become a fully integrated part of the "semi-periphery." While moving into this status in the world-economy, three very important processes were to unfold in California: (1) the transfer of privately-owned Mexican land into Anglo-American hands; (2) the development of capitalist agriculture in the region; and (3) the formation of a racially stratified working class in which Indian and Mexican workers remained an exploitable form of "restricted" or "coerced" labor.

THE SPANISH SETTLEMENT OF ALTA CALIFORNIA

Wallerstein's discussion of the historical evolution of the capitalist world-economy provides us with an important historical backdrop from which to view the international factors at work in the initial Spanish settlement of California in the late 18th century. By this time Spain had already long since declined as an important European power and had become a "semi-periphery" area of the developing capitalist world-economy.31 This colonial settlement of California by Spain took place in a period in which global mercantilist activities by a host of nations were increasingly making inroads into Spanish territorial claims north of "New Spain."

By the 1760s, the English and Dutch were known to be actively in search of trade
along the Spanish Pacific coast. Before then the French too were encroaching on the New Mexico settlement through their activity along the Mississippi. The Russians, however, were to become the most real and immediate threat to the northern fringe of the Spanish Empire. During the closing decades of the 18th century, the Russians began to explore and develop their commercial interests on the Pacific coast of North America. Shortly after the Bering expedition in 1741, Russian fur hunters began trapping activities all along the Alaskan coast and in nearby islands. By 1744, the Russians had established a number of trading stations and forts as far south as Fort Ross just north of San Francisco Bay. It was news of this feverish fur hunting activity that generated a new flurry of activity by France, Holland, and England into the scarcely explored area of the Pacific coast.

Against this historical setting Spain began to renew her interest in the territorial claim she had to California. (Spain had explored and laid claim to California as early as the 16th century.) Even though news of the Russian activity had reached Spain around the middle of the century, her movement into California was not begun until 1765. After a brief delay, largely the result of the Spanish participation in the Seven Years War, King Carlos III charged José Gálvez with the task of thwarting any further Russian activity into the Spanish territorial claim of California. In 1769 Gálvez sent out a series of five land and sea expeditions to establish a line of missions and presidios along the coast of Alta California in order to forestall the Russian expansion.

Thus it was this increased presence of rival European mercantilist powers in North America that finally prompted Spain into a "defensive" posture in its borderland areas. The early presence of the French on the Gulf coast also spurred the Spanish in moving into Texas and fortifying its "eastern corridor." Later this northward movement edged into Nuevo León and Coahuila. In the far eastern border area of Florida, the Spanish were forced to pull back and hold their strategic position from the encroaching English of the Carolinas. In this way, Spanish protection of her northernmost territorial claims caused her to thrust out a number of "defensive salients." By the late eighteenth century, the establishment of outposts in Florida, Texas, Louisiana and California were to all become part of this overall defensive strategy. It should be noted that in all of these areas Spain made heavy use of two of her most successful colonization institutions: the presidios and the missions. The soldiers stationed
at the Spanish garrison or presidio and the priests who overlooked the mission acted as the primary agents in carrying out this task for the Spanish Empire.\textsuperscript{42}

In this manner, we see how California was to become part of the "periphery." Considering elements of Wallerstein's approach, we also find clues as to the international market factors which contributed to the demise of Spanish influence and the rise of U.S. influence in the area. This change in political control of California from Spanish to Mexican and finally to the U.S. was to all occur in the third phase of the development of the world-economy.\textsuperscript{43} Once again, what was characteristic of this phase is the increased absorption of remote parts of the globe in the European-based world-economy. The latter part of this phase, which runs from 1815-1917, also witnesses the triumph of industrial capitalism over agricultural capitalism.

In the Southwest, and in California in particular, we can see that by the first decade of the 19th century Spanish control over California was already beginning to wane. Though she was to hold formal political control until 1821, economically Spain saw California slip from control some time before then. In fact, it was as early as the closing decades of the 18th century that the illegal foreign trade between California and the United States led to the slow integration of California into another sphere of the capitalist world-economy.

UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL CAPITALIST PENETRATION

One of the earliest Anglo-American overland ventures into the Spanish Southwest was that undertaken by Jedediah Pike in 1806. Pike's establishment of a fort at Pueblo, Colorado and one near the Rio Grande, some 75 miles north of Taos, was one of the first recorded Anglo intrusions into Spanish territory.\textsuperscript{44} The publication of Pike's journal, after his arrest and subsequent release from Spanish imprisonment, was to ignite further trade interest on the part of Anglo-Americans in the Southwest. A number of trading expeditions, such as that of Manuel Lisa and Jacques Clamorgan, made their way from St. Louis to Santa Fe and even further to Chihuahua where they were to sell their goods.\textsuperscript{45} By 1810 a growing interest in trade down the "Santa Fe Trail" had taken place in St. Louis. Though treatment of American traders was not always cordial, profits to be gained from this trade continued to lure numbers of Easterners into the Southwest throughout the early decades of the 19th century.\textsuperscript{46}
The first sea trade with California by private U.S. interests began in the late 18th century. The forms of trade which were to develop through the first half of the 19th century up to the formal annexation of California were: the sea otter, hide and tallow, and whaling supply trade. While some early trade and exchange did occur when California was still part of the Spanish Empire, principally with the port in San Blas (Mexico) and within the territory among the missions, it was this illicit trade with foreign sea merchants that marked the region's first real contact with private commercial capitalist interests. Among the first of such foreign interests which made inroads into the Spanish mission and later ranch economy were the New England merchants of the United States. As will be briefly shown, the extent of this early trade was to have a significant impact on the future course of California history.

It was at the turn of the 19th century that New England merchants began their first active excursions into the sea otter fields along the Southern California coastal region. These ventures in the California market were, of course, not at all welcomed by the Spanish crown whose mercantilist trade laws prohibited such foreign trade. Using whatever excuse they could devise, these traders nonetheless found it difficult to resist the profits to be gained by these smuggling expeditions. Beginning with the first known fur trade activity by Captain Ebenezer Dorr of the Otter in 1796 at Monterey, an estimated dozen such excursions took place up into the first few years of the next century.

By the early 1800s, travelers to California were well aware of the tremendous wealth that could be made from the illegal fur trade that was taking place between California and visiting American trading ships. Captain William Shaler, who was among the early participants in this trade, was to log the following description of this trade in a voyage to California in 1804:

For several years past, the American trading ships have frequented this coast in search of furs, for which they have left in the country about 25,000 dollars annual, in specie and merchandise. The government has used all their endeavors to prevent this intercourse, but without effect, and the consequence has been a great increase of wealth and industry among the inhabitants. The missionaries are the principal monopolizers of the fur trade, but this intercourse has enabled the inhabitants to take part in it. At present, a person acquainted with the coast may always procure abundant supplies of provisions. All these circumstances prove, that, under a good government, the Californias would soon rise to ease and affluence.

The penetration of American and other foreign ships became so great that by 1815 one mission father was to note that Anglo-American, Portuguese, Russian, Mexican and
Peruvian currency was all circulating in the province and being freely exchanged for Spanish pesos. It was the immediate presence of the American ships, however, that grew alarmingly. The presence of American ships grew to such proportions that by mid-November 1822, Father José Señán of Mission San Buenaventura was to note that seven were to be found anchored off the coast of nearby Santa Barbara. Of these, five were identified as being American vessels and two as English. In the week following the departure of these vessels, two other American vessels came to anchor off the same coast. At the same time, up north in the port of San Francisco five foreign ships were to be found trading. In Monterey, two American and two Russian frigates were also sighted.

Once the Spanish tightened the enforcement of their trade laws, these ingenious merchants soon devised alternative methods to secure this precious cargo. Collusion with the Russians for a time provided such a solution. This joint venture of Yankee merchant vessels and Russian sea otter hunters led to the extensive search of sea otter pelts all along the small islands off the Southern California coast. The Farallon Islands, the Lower California islands of Tandas Santos, Cerros, Gualadalupe, and Benito were to all serve as bases from which seal skins and otter pelts were collected.

Such isolated harbors as San Quintín in Lower California and Bodega Bay and Drake's Bay in the north also served as anchoring points for these sea otter excursions. The extent of this activity reached tremendous proportions. In the spring of 1811, for example, from three vessels anchored in Drake's Bay some one hundred and thirty bidarkas (canoes) were busily collecting pelts between the Golden Gate and Bodega Bay some forty miles to the north. Inside the San Francisco harbor more than one hundred such canoes were operating during the same period.

Between 1803 and 1812 more than twenty New England vessels were known to have come to California under joint Russian contract. Such prominent Boston merchants as the Winship Brothers, Benjamin Lamb, J. and T.H. Perkins, Boardman and Pope and John Dorr were initiators of such trade. Through the course of the War of 1812 between England and the United States and until the end of formal Spanish control in California in 1821, these smuggling activities by New England merchants continued. Even after the joint contract agreement with the Russians had been cast off and the Pacific became an arena of conflict as a result of the 1812 War, Yankee trading activity was briskly
carried out all along the Spanish coast and between the mainland and the Hawaiian Islands.\textsuperscript{59}

The direct value of the illicit smuggling traffic that was carried out between the Spanish missions, the presidios and foreign merchants during the Spanish control of California is impossible to calculate. Official records of this trade were, understandably, not regularly recorded.

It is important to note that the development of this smuggling activity was, in part, the result of the curtailment of mission supplies from San Blas after the 1810 revolt in Mexico. In a very important way this trade with foreign vessels helped augment the limited supplies that the San Blas trade provided the missions. Once the missions began to develop surplus goods—goods that lacked an adequate market outlet—they understandably looked for alternative avenues for trade.\textsuperscript{60} Despite the conservative mercantilist trade restrictions placed on California, the arrival of foreign vessels was in time to inextricably tie California to the capitalist world market. In the final analysis it was the combination of Spain's inability to totally provide the missions with needed goods, the missions' need to find an outlet for their developing surpluses, and the ready availability of foreigners to carry out trade that finally opened up California to private commercial capitalist interests.

**THE INTEGRATION OF CALIFORNIA INTO THE U.S. ECONOMY**

Once California passed into the hands of the newly independent Mexican nation, old barriers to foreign trade were removed. The lowering of these restrictions spurred New England merchant interest in California and two commercial trade routes, one from the Hawaiian Islands, the other directly from Boston, were set up to continue the sea otter trade.\textsuperscript{61} By 1826, New England merchants began to turn their interest to a new line of business, the hide and tallow trade. Boston companies working from their Pacific base in the Hawaiian Islands began actively exploiting the profitable trade potential of the California mission cattle industry. Among the products taken from California in a typical cargo vessel to Hawaii in the 1830s contained "from 2,000 to 15,000 dry and salted hides, 6,000 to 7,000 arrobas of tallow (one arroba being equivalent to twenty-five pounds), 15 to 25 horses..." and upward to 300 otter furs.\textsuperscript{62} Large quantities of beaver furs, land otter skins, deerskins, sealskins, soap, and lumber
also became important trade items. From here, many of these goods made their way to the profitable China market. From 1822 to 1846 more than one hundred ships are known to have sailed with cargo between Hawaii and Mexican California.\textsuperscript{63} Countless other non-recorded voyages undoubtedly also took place.

From Boston, around Cape Horn, New England merchants came for products that were to be chiefly used in manufacturing. From 30,000 to 40,000 cowhides were stored in each returning American vessel and were transported to Boston and New York where they were sold to tanneries and made into shoes and assorted leather articles.\textsuperscript{64} The Boston-based firm of Bryant, Sturgis and Company, which had earlier been actively engaged in the sea otter trade, became the principal participant of this trade activity from 1821 to 1841.\textsuperscript{65} After 1840, the Boston firms of William Appleton and Company and Joseph B. Eaton and Company became the main transporters of California hides.\textsuperscript{66} In exchange for these hides the Boston merchants brought with them a variety of items such as wearing apparel, household necessities, tools and assorted building materials. This trade in both directions proved to be extremely profitable for these New England merchants. Profits from the sale of California hides on the Eastern market brought a good price, while the profits from the goods sold in California returned double or better the cost of the original purchase price.\textsuperscript{67}

Another of the important commercial activities which New England interests found in California was the whaling supply trade. Each year a large number of whaling ships on their return from Japan and the Pacific Northwest made whaling excursions along the California coast. The areas around Monterey, Santa Barbara, San Diego, and particularly San Francisco became important stops for these whalers.\textsuperscript{68} While active during the early decades of the 19th century, this trade escalated dramatically after 1840. After that date, an increased number of diverse New England private interests from whaling towns along the coastal fringe of Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut sent ships to roam the California coast.\textsuperscript{69} Many would stop to make needed repairs and replenish their fresh supplies at California towns all along the coast. As these visits increased in frequency, regular trade for the much needed New England manufactured goods brought over by these whalers was firmly established with the inhabitants of Monterey and San Francisco.\textsuperscript{70}

From this we can see that the enormity of the trade between California and New
England did prove advantageous to both parties. As trade increased throughout the first half of the 19th century, California's need for manufactured goods, and an outlet for her burgeoning surpluses, was opportunely filled by commercial capitalist interests in the United States. While there is still much controversy as to whether these commercial interests were ultimately instrumental in precipitating the war with Mexico, it cannot be denied that they did have strong material interest in seeing that this favorable trade with the area was continued.\footnote{71} While it is beyond the limits of this paper to comment on the many reasons that have been put forward as to why the war with Mexico was initiated, one important point should be made. The historical facts seem to clearly show that unlike other regional interests in the United States, the East Coast maritime industry was already directly benefitting from economic trade with the Southwest well before the war with Mexico was ever begun. In this regard, the hypothesis is suggested that Eastern maritime interests were influential and very supportive of the annexation of California by the United States.\footnote{72} Evidence is found in a letter written on November 9, 1845, nearly a year before the Bear Flag Revolt, by an eastern merchant to Thomas Larkin advising him to take advantage of the impending move to capture California. S.J. Hasting, captain of the Tasso which had actively engaged in California trade from 1841 to 1843, offered Larkin the following advice:

> I am now going to give you some advice and to begin with I have good grounds to go on. You can take it or not. Carry on your business exactly as you would if you had been in Texas 10 years since and knew at that time things would turn out as they have. There is some considerable capital that will be expended in filling up the country round San Francisco with Americans and that I know and eventually you will have another revolution like 1836. With this exception, instead of setting the Mexican ensign it will either be an American one or a new one and American Agents and American capital will be at the bottom of it. You have no idea what feeling there is here with regard to California and Oregon which bye and bye is only used as a blind for the settlement of San Francisco.\footnote{73}

Two months later this same Boston merchant wrote Larkin again noting that "California must belong to the Americans. So say the knowing ones in Washington, and even Mr. Polk thinks it may come to pass, whether in his time or not he did not say. I was in company with him and he questioned me closely..."\footnote{74}

It was only after the U.S.-Mexican War that California was to become a formal political possession of the United States. Once annexation was complete, the road was clear for California to be both a politically and economically integrated unit of the American political economy. Once legal ownership of land was transferred to Anglo
control in the 1860s and 1870s, an entirely new set of labor relationships was to be established in the region with the development of agricultural capitalism.

In charting the tremendous political and economic shifts that were to affect California during the entire 19th century, the categories that Wallerstein provides us do seem to shed some light on this process. In one way it can be seen that while California was under Spanish political control, she was part of the "periphery" and her social, political and economic structure largely reflected the basic features of that status in the world-economy. The form of "labor control" of the neophyte Indians who toiled in the mission economy was maintained by religious and physical forms of "extra-economic coercion." Like other regions of the periphery, the products produced by the mission economy were to increasingly become export commodities for the world market. While other periphery areas exported grains, bullion and sugar, California's sea otter trade, hide and tallow trade and whaling industry were to increasingly become the principal items which linked it to commercial capitalist interests in the U.S.

The basic position of California in the world-economy was to quickly change as political control of this region passed into Mexican hands. From this point up to the U.S.-Mexican War, California was to become increasingly integrated into the U.S. economy. Once under United States control, California became an integrated unit of the "semi-periphery" and was to later ascend into "core" status after the turn of the century. In no small way, the magnitude of the early economic trade carried out between California and New England maritime interests was to help lay the basis for its later political incorporation into the U.S. and formal integration as a "semi-periphery" and then "core" strata of the capitalist world-economy.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF LABOR EXPLOITATION IN CALIFORNIA

California's 19th century movement from "periphery" to "semi-periphery" status in the world-economy was to be accompanied by a changing pattern of labor exploitation in the region. During each of the three political regimes, different forms of "labor control" were to predominate. While under Spanish control, the subjugation of Indian laborers on the California missions and small ranches was to take on a forced quality. The use of both religious and physical methods of coercion enforced their exploitation during this period. Once California passed under Mexican control the use of Indian
labor on the large ranchos continued to take on a forced quality and, in fact, was often used as a form of slave labor.

After California was annexed to the United States, a number of forms of labor control were established in the area. Indian, Mestizo and Anglo laborers were each subjected to different forms of labor surplus extraction. There developed, during this period, a "racial division of labor" in which racial statuses were to play a crucial role in the placement of these groups in the labor force. It was not uncommon that legal-juridic restrictions were placed on the type of work which Indian, Mexican, and later Chinese laborers could be used for. Though not always legislated, there did develop an area of work that made disproportionate use of restricted, socially-defined "racial" labor.

In this way, one of the most important features of the use of exploitable labor in 19th century California was the clear development of forms of "extra-economic coercion," which were to be used to force or restrict Indian, Mexican, and later, Chinese labor. (This brief discussion will not be able to take up the variety of ways in which Asian workers were used as less than "free" wage-labor.) As will be discussed below, Indian labor was particularly subjected to the use of various forms of religious, legal-juridic, and physical coercion. Somewhat more "free" were Mexican mestizo workers who toiled on the ranchos, in the pueblos, and in commercial agriculture after the U.S. annexation of California. It was only white immigrant laborers who were largely to become an ostensibly free, wage-laboring class in California.

This unfolding pattern of the differential use and proletarianization of laboring groups is an important part of California's 19th century history. It is an area of study that has not received the type of careful analysis that it deserves. In what follows, I will only begin to briefly sketch some of the key features of this history.

I. SPANISH MISSION LABOR

The initial source of labor for the California missions came from the work of soldiers, who were assigned in groups to each of the newly founded missions, and from Neophyte Indians, who had journeyed northward from Lower California with the Spanish. These two groups, plus the missionaries themselves, were largely responsible for laying out the first fields of agricultural products and for construction of the mission
and presidio buildings.

After 1792, this early task of establishing the mission system and making it become self-sufficient was tremendously aided by the use of skilled artisan labor, which was sent northward from New Spain to train the local Indian workforce that was slowly being recruited.77

In the early mission period, Father Serra had gone to Mexico to solicit the government to provide the fledgling mission with such skilled artisans as blacksmiths and carpenters.78 Salaries for these workers were initially paid for by the government and later partially supported by the individual missions themselves.79 These artisans worked with the mission mayordomo, whose job it was to oversee the mission livestock and agriculture and assign daily work tasks to the recruited Indian workforce. Like the artisan, the mayordomo was paid in kind and also received a modest cash salary.80

By the mid 1790s a large number of neophytes had themselves already become skilled enough craftsmen to be able to in turn teach other Indian workers these trades.81 By the time the initial contracts of the first fully-subsidized artisans had expired, many of the newly-trained neophytes were themselves ready to carry on these skilled tasks for the missions.

The use of these artisan workers from Mexico proved to be only temporary and primarily designed to transmit the basic skill trades needed to initially establish the mission and prepare it for self-sufficiency. Once most of these initial artisans had returned to Mexico, the bulk of both the skilled and unskilled labor needed on the mission fell totally on the Indian population. Those Spanish artisan workers who stayed on after their contract had expired, or those few Irish and Anglo-American craftsmen occasionally hired by the mission, were largely an insignificant part of the labor force during Spanish political control.82

Agriculture and livestock production proved to be the mainstay of the mission economy. In the production of these two means of mission livelihood, the use of a labor-intensive system of Indian exploitation was the key to the prodigious success of the mission economy. In order to insure that the Indians recruited from nearby rancherías (villages) would continue to work on the mission, at least two coercive mechanisms were employed by the Franciscan missionaries.83 One of these was the use of "moral suasion." In using this method the mission fathers relied on heavy doses of
religious ideology to keep the neophytes tied to the mission. If this failed, then physical means of coercion were commonly resorted to. The flogging and imprisonment of runaway Indians was the most often prescribed method of dealing with those who fled the custody of the mission.84

During Spanish control of California, some Indian laborers were also "loaned" or "rented" to the local presidio. The mission fathers would frequently send their Indian charges to work as manual laborers and domestic servants in the nearby presidio. Compensation to the Indian for his/her labor sometimes took the form of food and clothing. At other times direct credit was given to the mission account at the presidio storehouse.85 Through this arrangement the Indian worker did not receive a direct wage. Instead, the mission to whom he/she was tied would receive remuneration for the labor expended. This use of Indian labor at the presidio occurred throughout the Spanish reign of California. Particularly high rates of outside mission use of neophyte labor took place during the peak years of 1800-1810.86

One of the interesting features of the mission was the fact that marked improvements in the technical level of its production were not to take place throughout the period. There is no evidence of attempts by the Spanish to improve yieldage or quality of seed sown, the quality of the soil or farming implements used in the yearly working of the land.87 In their agricultural production, the missions made use of crude plows, which necessitated replowing the fields many times over. Beyond this,

[s]owing was done by hand and seed was covered using a bushy branch, dragging a log or, as in the case of corn, with the foot. Reaping was done with knives and sickles after which grain was stacked and removed to the mission proper for threshing. Here it was spread on a floor and horses and oxen were sent in to trample it. Chaff was afterwards removed by winnowing with forks and shovels.88

The widespread possibilities of animal or water powered mills or even windmills was never adopted by the Spanish. It seemed that the ready supply of labor-intensive Indian workforces made the need to introduce these unnecessary. In part, the continued use of exploitable Indian workers, who received only room and board and religious training in return, was the method best suited to carry out the ultimate purpose of the Spanish missions. In a very real way, the decision not to introduce technological innovations in agricultural production can be seen as an additional feature of the mission's use of Indians in a forced labor-system. Commenting on this situation in the diary of his voyage to California in 1806, G.H. von Langsdorff wrote:
When we consider that there is no country in the world where wind mills are more numerous than in Spain, it seems incomprehensible why these very useful machines have never been introduced here; I learnt however, that in preferring the very indifferent meal produced by the mode of grinding above mentioned, the good fathers are actuated by political motives. As they have more men and women under their care than they could keep constantly employed the whole year, if labor were too much facilitated, they are afraid of making them idle by the introduction of mills.\textsuperscript{89}

II. MEXICAN RANCHO LABOR

Some time after California passed into Mexican political control, the former Spanish mission lands were to be "secularized" and parcelled into land tracts from one to eleven leagues (nearly 4,500 acres to the league).\textsuperscript{90} Beginning in 1834, nearly 8 million acres of this prime California land would be granted or sold to a newly formed ranchero class.\textsuperscript{91} These ranchero grantees were, in large part, former Spanish officials, soldiers, or civilians to whom the missions were financially indebted. A few of the grantees and purchasers of secularized mission property were also Anglo-Americans like William Hartnell and Abel Stearns who had settled in California in the early 19th century.

By 1849, some two hundred prominent ranchero families were to have amassed the lion's share of the best land in California.\textsuperscript{92} At the height of this Mexican rancho period an even smaller group of forty-six rancheros were to become the formal power brokers in the region.\textsuperscript{93} An example of the holdings of just one of these ranchero elite can be seen in the immense rancho owned by Captain José de la Guerra y Noriega of Santa Bárbara. A former commander of the presidio there, and earlier a sindico or treasurer for the Franciscan mission of California, had at one time six ranchos totaling over 300,000 acres and stocked with over 50,000 head of cattle.\textsuperscript{94}

It was during this secularization period that the neophyte Indians were to be "freed" from mission life and released to fend for themselves as best they could. Some were to return to their native rancherias or re-settle on the outskirts of nearby pueblos where they lived out a meagre existence.\textsuperscript{95} A good many, however, went to work for the new ranchero class.

The demand for labor on these immense rancho estates was tremendous. When a sufficient number of workers failed to voluntarily attach themselves to the rancho, the ranchero turned to other methods to secure this labor force. Many sources have documented
the fact that, when more Indian labor was needed, these rancheros would often buy Indians who had been seized or jailed. Others went so far as to make hunting forays to capture Indian labor. This blatant use of local Indians as conscript labor was, however, not unique to this period. It had been universally used as early as 1790 by the few civilian colonists (pobladores) who had settled land alongside the California missions.

Those conscript Indians, who would later attempt to leave the rancho, were most often forcibly re-captured and returned in chains. In this way, Indian workers were both "voluntarily" recruited or outrightly enslaved and forced to toil on the rancho. It would not be until after 1848 that laws were passed to stop "the practice of capturing masses of natives" and using "punishment by severe corporal methods" and "military means to prevent escape." (As will be seen later, however, this legislation would hardly improve the overall enforced nature of Indian labor in California.)

Forced to live in full-scale villages, the Indians who worked on the large ranchos were to receive little more than food and basic shelter for their labor. The number of Indians who toiled on these ranchos varied. One authority has noted that by 1840 there were some dozens of these feudal establishments, each maintaining from twenty to several hundred Indians—men, women, and children—in all, perhaps from two to four thousand persons. The existence of these larger concentrations of Indian workers was not uncommon. In the early 1840s, for example, General Mariano Vallejo had an entire tribe of 300 Indians working on his rancho near Sonoma. Later in this decade, Captain John A. Sutter was reported to have kept from 600 to 800 Indians at his fort.

There is general agreement that the Indian workers who toiled on the ranchos lived an extremely pathetic existence. There is, however, surprisingly little agreement as to how to term the type of labor exploitation which took place on the ranchos. Most often, the rancho has been described as "a system of peonage" or a form of "serfdom." One authority, for example, has referred to it as both a "hacienda-peon society" and a "feudal establishment." Interestingly enough, travel accounts by visitors at the time were to most often liken the rancho system to plantation slavery.

The terms "peonage" and "serfdom" are, however, poor descriptions for the actual way in which Indian labor was used at the time. Only on very rare occasions were Indian laborers ever remunerated in cash for their services. As a rule, they were usually only supplied with small amounts of food and scanty clothing. The general
discussions of Indians being treated as peons should not be taken at face value, for these laborers were not working on the rancho in order to pay off a previously accumulated debt. Most discussions of Indians being treated as "peons" seem to refer to the paternalistic ties which were to develop between the Indian worker and the ranchero. In more than superficial ways, the rancho Indians were both seen and treated as "wards" of the ranchero. Dependent Indians provided labor for the ranchero and the ranchero in turn provided them with a meagre existence.

One vivid example of the type of paternalistic relationship which was to develop on the rancho has been drawn by Salvador Vallejo, himself a ranchero:

...Many of the rich men of the country had twenty to sixty Indian servants whom they dressed and fed...our friendly Indians tilled our soil, pastured our cattle, sheared our sheep, cut our lumber, built our houses, paddled our boats, made tile for our homes, ground our grain, slaughtered our cattle, dressed their hides for the market, and made our unburnt bricks; while the Indian women made excellent servants, took good care of our children, made every one of our meals .....Those people we considered as members of our families. We loved them and they loved us; our intercourse was always pleasant...

This ranchero's characterization of life on the rancho has little in common with life on a feudal estate or with a condition of peonage. If imprecise analogies must be drawn, then the picture presented here is strikingly more similar to that of life on an American Southern plantation. Surely the paternalism expressed by Vallejo is not unlike that which Eugene Genovese has attributed to the slavemaster.

Final mention should be made of the fact that Indian laborers were not the only group to be extensively used on these huge ranchos. A good number of mestizo workers were also found working on them during this period. Some made their livelihood by tending rancho cattle as vaqueros or serving as mayordomos who supervised the large Indian workforce. Other non-rancho mestizos who lived in local pueblos earned their living as small farmers, tradesmen, craftsmen and teamsters. A fair number also worked in a host of occupations related to the ranch cattle industry, such as saddlemakers, harness makers, and blacksmiths.

III. VARIATIONS IN LABOR USE IN U.S. CONTROLLED CALIFORNIA

As was discussed earlier, one important feature of California history before the Mexican War was the tremendous development of economic ties between the region and the United States. Northeastern capitalist interest in California had begun with the sea
otter trade in the closing decade of the 18th century. The economic ties between California and New England were to intensify with the development of the hide and tallow trade of the Mexican period. Well before the U.S.-Mexican War, Northeastern commercial capitalists had begun the process of formally integrating California into the American economy. What is important to note here is that the political events which led to the annexation of the Southwest were to follow the extensive economic penetration of New England commercial interests in the area. This expansion into California, and the eventual military conquest of the whole Southwest, were part of a larger series of events that these interests were forging in the United States.

The first half of the 19th century can be seen as a period in which the United States was to undergo a tremendous territorial and economic expansion. In that early period the U.S. was to move beyond its east coast base and increase its territorial size tenfold. The usurpation of one half of Mexico's territory was just one part of this process. The last half of the century was to become one marked by increased efforts to politically consolidate this expanded Union and to establish an economic order dominated by Northeastern commercial and industrial capitalists. The transcontinental expansion and the successful economic and political integration of the Southwest and South were important elements of this history. It was only after the U.S. had formally integrated its various regions under a strong, unified state-structure that it was able to move from "semi-periphery" to "core" status in the world-economy.

The changes that this movement to "core" status was to have on the class structure in the Northeast and Slave South have been well documented. Less, however, is known of the effect that this process had on the Southwest. In the case of California, we do know that the combination of the political annexation of the region, the gold rush, the Federal Land Act of 1851, and the development of capitalist agriculture were to all have a tremendous impact on the rancho-based society which existed before the war.

Surprisingly, some of this initial impact would be beneficial. The first waves of immigrants into the area created a tremendous demand for food which the ranchero class was to largely provide. The early sale of meat was to become an extremely profitable venture for the Mexican ranchero. This windfall, however, was soon undermined when the Land Act of 1851 was passed. This act was to establish a Land Commission whose responsibility it was to authenticate Spanish and Mexican land claims in the Southwest.
Much of the rancheros' profits from the gold rush trade and the lucrative hide and tallow trade was to ultimately go to the legal costs of proving land ownership. Proof of legal title to the satisfaction of the Land Commission and U.S. courts became an extremely difficult task. Even when strong evidence of ownership was presented, the ranchero class found it nearly impossible to retain their immense holdings.

The period from 1860-1870 was to become in California a period in which tremendous changes in property ownership would occur. During this decade, literally thousands of acres of California passed from Mexican into Anglo hands. This transfer took place in both "legal" and surreptitious ways. Among these were: the outright squatting of land; buying into rancho land, then "easing out" co-owners; engaging in moneylending schemes, then accepting land as recompense; and, more often than not, merely gaining legal control of "disputed" land through the courts.116

This transfer in property ownership brought with it a change in the use of land from one of cattle grazing to capitalist agriculture. The result of this new commercialization of land was to have a dramatic effect on the lives of those workers who had previously labored in the ranchos. One of the groups to be most brutally affected by the changing social structure were the rancho Indians. Of the scattered information we have, we know that the overall condition of the Indian population was not to improve with the transfer of California into Anglo-American control.

Even with the new government's passage of laws that were to ostensibly help the Indian population, the general restricted or forced nature of Indian labor was to remain unchanged. Almost immediately after statehood was granted to California, a number of other laws were also passed which had the effect of legally sanctioning the enforced labor status of the Indian. One authority has noted that the California legislature was to pass three statutes which were to not only legitimize the "second citizen" status of the Indian but also to insure that he would not become a free wage-laborer.

It was during the 1850s that the California Indians were to be legally denied the right to testify in court and, in effect, denied equal status before the law.117 Equally insidious, however, was the new law which stated that declared Indian vagrants could be put up at auction and have their services sold to the highest bidder for upward to four months.118 A third law was also passed which came to be known as the so-called "indentured law."119 Through this legislation any Indian adult or child, with parental consent, could be legally bound to a private U.S. citizen for an extended
number of years. During this period the "indentured" Indian was required to freely labor for his legal guardian. As was the case with those Indians who were sold at auction, the "indentured" Indians were to only receive a few subsistence provisions and lodging in return for their labor. Historical evidence suggests that a number of people in the state were to make use of this legislated and juridically sanctioned labor status of the California Indian.  

If this were not enough, there also developed in post-War California a renewed activity in the Indian "slave traffic." The earlier history of raiding Indian rancherias and selling the captured as laborers was to be carried over into the early decades of American political control. This sale of Indians was not restricted to adults, for a good many children were to be put on the market and sold as servants. In 1861, for example, a number of Indian children (three to four years of age) were being sold at a price ranging from $50 to $80 apiece in Marysville. This was to be only one of many such cases of young Indian children being forcibly taken from their parents, who were often killed, and being privately sold on a slave market.

The final fate of the California Indians is a well documented history. Even as they continued to face an intensified assault with the coming of the Americans, they were to wage another battle which they were also to ultimately lose, that of group survival. During the last half of the 19th century their total population was to decline staggeringly. By the beginning of the 20th century the Indian population, which had numbered in the tens of thousands before the Spanish had arrived, was to be reduced to only a few thousand.

Those few Indians who did survive and successfully avoid enslavement were to be found in miscellaneous, unskilled jobs. In the closing decades of the 19th century, some were able to find work in agriculture where they planted, cultivated and harvested crops. They were also used as vaqueros, stock tenders, sheep shearers, muleteers, and packers. Those who could not find jobs in local pueblos sought work in the mining fields. Others sold animal pelts, fish and game or sold such handicraft items as woven baskets. Indian women who were able to find employment usually served as domestic servants.

This post-Mexican War period was to also have a tremendous impact on the type of employment that was to be opened up to Mexican mestizo workers. During the early period of the gold rush, for example, we know that thousands of Mexicanos were to flock to
the mining areas where they engaged in direct mining activities or ran pack trains. Occasionally a few Mexicanos were able to operate small restaurants, saloons, or gambling houses. These activities were, of course, to be short-lived. The “Foreign Miners Tax” and the general persecution of Mexicanos drove most of them out of the mining regions in the 1850s.

One result of these virulent racist attacks was the return of a good many mestizos to Mexico. Most, however, found jobs in a variety of unskilled, laboring tasks. The Los Angeles city directory of 1875, for example, shows that the Mexicanos in that city were largely identified as “laborers.” One source notes that in this city Mexican workers continued to be disproportionately employed as unskilled labor from the pre-War period to the closing decades of the 19th century. Reaching figures near 73 per cent in 1844 and as high as 79 per cent in 1870, Mexicanos chiefly remained unskilled laborers and were also to be highly used as servants, fieldworkers, and shepherders.

The number of Mexicans who filled skilled, craftsman jobs in Los Angeles during the decades after the war was small and stayed around 10-15 per cent of the total Mexican workforce. Some of these skilled workers were barbers, carpenters, shoemakers, tailors, blacksmiths, and bakers. The number of Mexicanos in the service related skills area was to actually increase during the period. In particular, those working as barbers, blacksmiths and carpenters showed a slight increase as the century wore on. Overall, however, the trend of Mexican workers above the unskilled level was to move downward. One Chicano historian has documented that the decrease in occupational status of Mexicanos in Los Angeles was to double from 7 per cent in the period from 1844-1860 to 14 per cent in the period from 1860-1880. The number of Mexicanos in such skilled jobs as cigar makers, shoemakers, and hatmakers was to decline in the closing decades of the 19th century. This was, in part, due to the increased inability of these skilled craftsmen to successfully compete with the new Anglo merchants who would bring in similar eastern manufactured goods. The decline in Mexican workers in these trades is but one example of the overall steady decline of Mexican labor into the lower levels of the unskilled working class.

In contrast to this general pattern of Mexican mestizos being used as unskilled laborers, we find that Anglo-American immigrants into the state were able to avoid a
heavy concentration in this occupational area. Looking once again at the case of Los Angeles, we find that only 25 per cent of the total Anglo-American workforce was to be found in such jobs.138 By the 1880s there were already as many Anglo workers in skilled jobs as there were in unskilled ones.139

A similar pattern of differential concentration of white and Mexican labor was to be found in nearby Santa Bárbara. Historian Alberto Camarillo has noted that "by 1870 Anglo occupational structure no longer conformed exactly to the Spanish-surname structure. The increase in commercialism in the town and the concomitant need for store clerks, sales people, delivery personnel and tourist trade service workers opened up new...job opportunities for Anglos."140 In his Santa Bárbara study, Camarillo found that in 1860, 25 per cent of employed Anglo-Americans were to be found in skilled jobs.141 This percentage was to increase to 33 per cent in 1870.142 There were also similar increases in the number of Anglos who became farmers, professionals or local proprietors.143 In contrast to this overall increase in the number of Anglo immigrants in skilled and semiskilled jobs (nearly 44 per cent), the total percentage of Anglos in unskilled laboring jobs was to actually decline from over 21 per cent in 1860 to about 12 per cent in 1870.144

As was the case in Los Angeles, the movement of Mexican workers was a steady one into the unskilled sector of the working class. According to Camarillo:

By the late 1890s, the Spanish-surname occupational structure had stabilized since the low point reached in 1880. The Chicano workers in Anglo Santa Bárbara society were fixed into occupational classifications in which they remained for several decades...(T)he Chicano or Spanish-speaking working class was primarily an unskilled and semi-skilled laboring group (58.6 per cent) in 1897. Over 62 per cent of the entire work force was located in the two lowest occupational levels; only 25.8 per cent were in the categories of skilled or above (11.7 per cent unknown).145

By this period Mexicanos were largely dependent upon seasonal and migratory employment in capitalist agriculture. When the construction building-trades industry developed in the late 1890s, this too was to provide a good source of employment for Chicano workers.146

One of the interesting features of this placement of Chicanos in the working class was their concerted attempt to avoid falling victim to the developing Anglo-controlled economy. Even though the fate of the Mexican-controlled ranchos was clear, Mexicanos avoided employment to Anglo overseers and sought what few jobs were left in pastoral-
related work. It was only because of the worsening economic conditions of the late 1870s and early 1880s that Mexican workers in Santa Barbara were to be lured into the Anglo labor market.\textsuperscript{147}

Also noteworthy in the case of Santa Barbara was the fact that Chicanas and their children were the first to be integrated into the new labor market. Of this process, Camarillo writes:

As the number of traditional occupations for men slowly disappeared, the Chicanas (Chicano women) and children were the first to enter the Anglo labor market as agricultural workers and domestics during the 1880s. The women and children were later joined by the men when they could no longer rely on seasonal pastoral-related work. Thus, all family members contributed to the economic survival of the Chicano family in the 1890s.\textsuperscript{148}

In this way, a pretty clear pattern was cast for Mexican workers in the southern part of California. Their use as unskilled labor was to remain the principal form of employment for these workers through the last half of the 19th century. Driven from the mines in the immediate post-war period and subjected to increasing racist attacks, Mexican workers became a "restricted" laboring class. Though not as subjected to forms of "extra-economic coercion" to the same degree as Indian workers, they were nonetheless treated as less than "free" wage-laborers. It was only the Anglo-American immigrant who could in this period be seen as a wage-laborer in the classic sense of the term. In many ways Anglos were to be disproportionately found in semi-skilled jobs and in better paying skilled occupations. Even in cases where Anglos were employed in the same work as Mexican laborers, the chances were very good that they received appreciably higher wages.

In this way, then, what developed in the post-War period was a "racial division of labor." The formal proletarianization of wage labor that followed the Anglo commercialization of land and the rise in small business did not affect all workers equally. Racial statuses were to continue, throughout the first five decades of Anglo control of California, to play a very important part in the way in which different groups came to fill jobs in the labor market. This process unfolded and solidified in this period; it was later to be carried over into the twentieth century.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

The focus of the previous section was to outline the ways in which the nature of
labor exploitation changed in 19th century California. I attempted to show that these changes were largely effected by the movement of California from "periphery" to "semi-periphery" and later to "core" status in the world-economy. My historical sketch showed that Mexican workers on the ranchos and Indian workers on both the ranchos and missions has been subjected to various forms of "extra-economic coercion" which forced or restricted their labor.

This discussion of the changing forms of labor exploitation has been raised in order to help clarify the larger issue of how one should approach the study of 19th century California. In raising this issue of theory in Chicano historical interpretation, the question of how one defines the Spanish and Mexican eras of California has been a central focus. Most scholars of this historical period have defined the period before Anglo-American annexation as "feudal." Their use of the term "feudal" has usually been used to draw an "analogy" between life on the rancho and that in medieval Europe. Others have likened the use of labor on the rancho to a "system of peonage" or a form of "slavery." As was noted earlier, the problem with the use of these appellations is that they are never clearly defined and always inconsistently used. In the final analysis, they end up being little more than poorly used residual categories.

We also find that such references to the Spanish mission as an "agricultural society" or the Mexican rancho as a "pastoral economy" are equally unsatisfactory. While the description of the dominant form of production in these periods is useful, it does not tell us much about how the constellation of social, political, and economic factors interrelate. It is, for example, too simple to merely say that California has developed from an agricultural or pastoral-related society to an "industrial" society. Similarly, to say that the industrialization of the Southwest has transformed it from a "traditional" or "folk" society to a "modern" one is also not very helpful.

As an alternative to these static, "ideal type" dichotomies, I have attempted to show ways in which Immanuel Wallerstein's approach can be useful in examining these issues in Chicano history. The application of "world-system" concepts to the history of the California missions and ranchos has shown that they are not social formations which are essentially based on a pre-capitalist mode of production. Instead, what I have highlighted are the ways in which market relations between New England and California reinforced the integration of these "periphery" economic formations into the capital-
ist world-economy.

Using this "world-system perspective" we can see that the forced nature of Indian labor on the missions does not mean that a slave-based, "ancient" mode of production was established in 1769. Instead, it has been argued that the enforced nature of Indian labor on the missions was consistent with the type of systems of labor control that were being developed in other parts of the "periphery."

Similarly, the "world-system perspective" helps us see that the use of Indian and mestizo labor on the ranchos was not feudal in nature. Rather, it too reflected yet another variation in the form of "extra-economic coercion" that one found in other regions of the periphery. To define what occurred on the rancho as feudal would be to rip this concept from its historical setting and mechanically use it to describe any labor relationship which is not strictly based on wage-labor. By blindly focusing an analysis on the social relations of production, one is likely to slight the more important effect that market relations can have in transforming society. Wallerstein himself has best expressed this point:

...the progressive proletarianization of labor and commercialization of land should in no sense be confused with the historically unique 'transition from feudalism to capitalism.' If we utilize a 'formal' definition of feudalism, we can believe that areas within a capitalist world-economy still exhibit a feudal 'mode of production.' However, the formal relations of land-controller to productive worker are not in fact what matters. The so-called reciprocal nexus we identify with feudalism, the exchange of protection for labor services, constitutes a feudal mode of production only when it is determinative of other social relations. But once such a 'nexus' is contained within a capitalist world-economy, its autonomous reality disappears. It becomes rather one of the many forms of bourgeois employment of proletarian labor to be found in a capitalist mode of production, a form that is maintained, expanded or diminished in relation to its profitability on the market.

In introducing Wallerstein's approach to the interpretation of Chicano history, I have tried to show how this capitalist world-economy has shaped the contours of our history in California. By viewing capitalism as a system of production for the world-market, we can avoid making some of the more careless errors that a Marxist historian could make. It would be, for example, a mistake to begin our analysis with formalistic definitions of various modes of production and then mechanically compare patterns of labor use in California with these definitions. The use of such an approach would invariably lead us to problems. Consider, for example, the problem of trying to define the post-Mexican War period in California from such a formalistic approach. What is the mode of production in 1850 California when Indians are used as "forced" labor,
Mexicanos as "restricted" and Anglos as "free" wage-labor? Is it possible to have three, co-existing modes of production in one region like California? If so, how does one set them off from one another? Expanding the setting, could one say that there existed in the territorial U.S. during the 1850s three regional modes of production: a slave-based one in the South; a capitalist one in the North; and a feudal one in the Southwest? As is apparent, the combination and proliferation of modes of production would be endless.

As an alternative to this approach, the approach outlined here makes it possible to see that a variety of forms of "labor control" can simultaneously exist in a capitalist world-economy. By extending Wallerstein's basic argument, we can see that variations in labor use between the structural spheres of the world-economy (i.e., the core, semi-periphery, and periphery) can also appear within the political boundaries of a nation-state. This "combined" use of labor within national boundaries is most likely to occur in societies which are in transition from one sphere of the world-economy to another.

That the "restricted" and "forced" nature of Indian and Mexican rancho workers should be carried over into the period when California (a periphery area) is being politically integrated into the U.S. (an ascending core area) should not be seen as anachronous. This is all the more true given the history of the forced nature of Indian-mestizo labor and the fact that the integration of various states and localities in the Southwest was an uneven process. Even in territories like California, which had a long history of economic trade with New England and was quickly granted state-hood, the inferior nature of nonwhite labor would persist, even after all labor was to be bought at a wage. In this way, the establishment of a "racial division of labor," based on socially-defined racial statuses, was to play an important part in the organization of the labor force in the closing decades of the 19th century in California.

Until we can test and closely scrutinize more detailed historical research which uses "world-system" concepts, any final evaluation of their usefulness remains open to a great deal of discussion and debate. The true test of such an analysis, as the one suggested here, will ultimately rest on whether or not it solves some of the problems we confront in studying Chicano history and whether it helps provide us with a more useful way of interpreting our historical experience in the Southwest.
NOTES


Some fine examples of the type of work being done in this area include the theoretical expositions by Mario Barrera, "Class Segmentation and the Political Economy of the Chicano, 1900-1930;" Andrés Jiménez, "Industrial Development in the Southwest and the Formation of a Chicano National Class;" and David Montejano, "White Class Interest and the South Texas Racial Order: A Note Based on the 1920s;" all presented at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the National Association of Chicano Social Scientists, University of California at Berkeley, April 30, 1977. For the use of Harold Baron's "dual labor market theory" in one case study, see Mario T. García, "Racial Dualism in the El Paso Labor Market, 1880-1920," Aztlan, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Summer 1975): pp. 197-218.


For example, of those mentioned in note 8, two are political scientists and one is a sociologist. Another non-historian doing work in Chicano history is a criminologist, see Larry Trujillo, "Chicano Community Control: Parlier, A Case Study," (D. Crim., University of California at Berkeley, in progress). I am also doing historical work on the Chicano experience in California, "Studies in the Political Economy of Racism: The Case of 19th Century California," (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, in progress) [tentative title].


12. See, for example, Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise," pp. 387-389 and his introduction to The Modern World-System, pp. 3-11. Theda Skocpol has made this same point in her recent review of Wallerstein's The Modern World-System. In her piece Skocpol notes that modernization theory has been criticized in the past "...for reifying the nation-state as the sole unit of analysis, for assuming that all countries can potentially follow a single path (or converging paths) of evolutionary development from 'tradition' to 'modernity', and for disregarding the world-historical development of transnational structures that constrain and prompt national or local developments along diverse as well as parallel paths. Moreover, modernization theorists have been criticized for the method of explanation they frequently employ: ahistorical ideal types of 'tradition' versus 'modernity' are elaborated and then applied to national cases; if the evidence seems to fit, one assumes that a particular historical instance is adequately explained; if not, one looks for the 'chance' factors that account for its deviation." Theda Skocpol, "Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, No. 5 (March 1977): pp. 1075-1090.

Relatively, Wallerstein's work also represents a break with what Michael Hechter has referred to as "ontogenetic theories of development." Like more contemporary modernization theory, the work of such sociological giants as Weber, Durkheim and Toennies stressed that the causes of social-historical development were located within social units defined by political boundaries, such as sovereign states. Drawing from theories of biological evolution and employing analysis of society functioning as an "organism", most 19th century thinkers felt that "society had to pass through a series of stages, and undergo, as it were, a certain kind of societal ontogeny." (p. 217) Thus, for example, Durkheim offered us a dichotomous scheme in which society developed from one "ideal type" stage of "mechanical solidarity" to "organic solidarity." Similarly Toennies saw society moving from a Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft form of social organization. See Michael Hechter's review essay on The Modern World-System in Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 4, No. 3 (May 1975): pp. 217-272.


14. For an excellent discussion of Wallerstein's work within the backdrop of these "underdevelopmentalist" writings and the debate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism, see the review essay by Martin Murray, "Recent Views on the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism," Socialist Revolution, Vol. 7, No. 4 (July-August 1977): pp. 64-91.


17. Ibid., p. 399 (emphasis added).

18. Wallerstein's position is in sharp contrast to the classic definition of capitalism...
as outlined by Maurice Dobb in his Studies in the Development of Capitalism, (New York: International Publishers, 1963). In his treatise Dobb defines capitalism as "not simply a system of production for the market—a system of commodity production as Marx termed it—but a system under which labour-power had 'itself become a commodity' and was bought and sold on the market like any other object of exchange. Its historical prerequisite was the concentration of ownership of the means of production in the hands of a class, consisting of only a minor section of society, and the consequent emergence of a propertyless class for whom the sale of their labour-power was the only source of livelihood. Productive activity was furnished, accordingly, by the latter, not by virtue of legal compulsion, but on the basis of wage-contract." (p. 7)

Thus, for Dobb, capitalism is defined on the basis of the existence of the capital-wage labor relationship. A relationship in which producers of the social product are separated from ownership of the means of production and transformed into a class which is forced to sell its labor for a wage. Opposed to this propertyless class stands a small capitalist class which lays claim to private ownership and control of the means of economic production in society, i.e., the private ownership of productive property. Also see Ernesto Laclau(h), "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America," New Left Review, Vol. 67 (May–June 1971): pp. 19-38; and R.H. Hilton, "Capitalism—What's in a Name?" Past and Present, No. 1 (February 1982): pp. 32-43.

20. Ibid., pp. 399-400.
22. Ibid., p. 87. Also see Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise," p. 401.
24. Wallerstein has noted that it was: "By a series of accidents—historical, ecological, geographical—that northwest Europe was better situated in the sixteenth century to diversify its agricultural specialization and add to it certain industries (such as textiles, shipbuilding, and metal wares) than were other parts of Europe." Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise," p. 400.
26. Ibid., p. 408.
27. Ibid.
30. These efforts at such "periodization" have, once again, all tended to focus on Chicano reaction to various external pressures which have impinged on our people. In suggesting such an approach, these authors have not seriously integrated an analysis of these external forces in their recounting of Chicano history. The result of this is, of course, a very one-sided view of the Chicano experience in the United States. See, for example, the early work of Juan Gómez-Quiñones, "Notes on Periodization: 1900-1965," Aztlán, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1970): pp. 115-116; Jesús Chavarria, "A Précis and a Tentative Bibliography on Chicano History," Aztlán, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1970): pp. 133-141; Armando Navarro, "The Evolution of Chicano Politics," Aztlán, Vol. 5, Nos. 1 & 2 (Spring and Fall 1974): pp. 57-84; and Alfredo Cuéllar, "Perspectives on Politics," Ch. 8 in Joan Moore, Mexican-Americans, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970): pp. 137-160.
31. For a discussion of the demise of Spain in "world-system" terms, see Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, Ch. 4, "From Seville to Amsterdam: The Failure of Empire,"
pp. 164-221.


35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.


39. Ibid., p. 99

40. Ibid., pp. 102-107.


45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., pp. 219-220.


54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., p. 398.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid., p. 399.


62. Ibid., p. 401.

63. Ibid., p. 403.

64. Ibid., p. 405.

65. Ibid., p. 401.

66. Ibid., pp. 405-406.

67. Ibid., p. 407.

68. Ibid., p. 408.

69. Ibid., p. 409.

70. Ibid.


72. The most cogent presentation of this view has been made by Norman A. Graebner, Empire on the Pacific, (New York: The Ronald Press, 1955).


74. Ibid.


77. Ibid., p. 237.

78. Ibid., pp. 233-234.


80. Ibid., p. 235-236.

81. Ibid., p. 241.

82. Ibid., p. 246-247.


84. Ibid., pp. 113-134.


86. Ibid., p. 170.

87. Ibid., p. 291.

88. Ibid., p. 292.


90. Pitt, The Decline, p. 86.

91. Ibid., p. 10.

92. Ibid., p. 86.

93. Ibid., p. 10.


96. Heizer and Almquist, The Other, p. 19; and Pitt, The Decline, p. 113.
98. Cook, Ibid., p. 98.
99. Ibid., pp. 303, 457; and Pitt, The Decline, p. 113.
100. Cook, Ibid., p. 306.
101. Ibid., p. 304; Pitt, The Decline, pp. 15-16; and Heizer and Almquist, The Other, p. 18.
102. Cook, Ibid., p. 304.
103. Ibid., p. 304, 457; Heizer and Almquist, The Other, p. 19.
104. Ibid. (both)
118. Ibid., pp. 308-309.
119. Ibid., p. 309.
120. Ibid., pp. 309-310. Also see Heizer and Almquist, The Other, pp. 46-48.
122. Cook, Ibid., p. 313.
125. Ibid.,
126. Ibid., p. 320.
127. Ibid., pp. 317, 466.
128. Ibid., p. 317.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid., p. 46.
132. Ibid., p. 47.
134. Ibid., pp. 85-86.
135. Ibid., p. 85.
136. Ibid., p. 112.
137. Ibid., p. 89.
138. Ibid., p. 92.
139. Ibid., p. 95.
141. Ibid., p. 160.
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid., p. 159.
144. Ibid., p. 160.
145. Ibid., p. 181.
146. Ibid., p. 186.
147. Ibid., p. 155.
148. Ibid., p. xv.
149. On this point see Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State.
150. For the classic debate on this point see, The Transition From Feudalism to Capitalism, (New York: Science & Society, 1967) 3rd printing. Also see Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America" for a discussion of these issues as they pertain to Latin America.