Title
Democracy and self-organization : the systemic foundation for the democratic peace

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0d8673p3

Author
diZerega, Gus

Publication Date
1991
DEMOCRACY AND SELF-ORGANIZATION:
THE SYSTEMIC FOUNDATION FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Gus díZerega
Institute of Governmental Studies
Berkeley, California

Working Paper 91-17
DEMOCRACY AND SELF-ORGANIZATION:
The Systemic Foundation for the Democratic Peace

Gus diZerega
Institute of Governmental Studies
Berkeley, California

Working Paper 91-17
DEMOCRACIES AND SELF-ORGANIZATION:
The Systemic Foundation for the Democratic Peace

The prevailing view among international relations scholars appears to be that a polity's internal political characteristics have no significant influence upon the broad characteristics of international behavior (Weede, 1984, Rummel, 1968. Small and Singer, 1976, Waltz, 1979). Recently this argument has been challenged. R. J. Rummel, who had once held to the former position has come to argue that democracies do in fact behave differently than undemocratic states in the international arena (1983, 1985). Michael W. Doyle has argued that liberal states, which include all democracies but are not limited to them, have never waged war upon one another, quite unlike other forms of government (1983a, 1987). While I find both Prof. Rummel's and Prof. Doyle's arguments to be convincing, not everyone has been similarly persuaded (Weede, 1984). While by no means absent from their discussions, these earlier papers on democratic states' relative peacefulness towards one another have not gone deeply into the internal structural characteristics which account for this peacefulness. In this paper I will explore this aspect of the matter.

Such an approach is useful in part because it enables us to come to grips with perhaps the most sophisticated systemic analysis of international relations, that developed by Kenneth Waltz (1979). In Prof. Waltz's analysis the structure of the international system itself is a primary determinant of the behavior of nation states. Because this international system affects all states regardless of their internal political structure, on their own governments are unable to change the rules of international politics and still survive for long as sovereign states. Prof. Waltz's analysis stands as a powerful theoretical objection to the significance of Prof. Rummel's and Prof. Doyle's arguments. If it is true, democratic and liberal states' pacific record towards one another is due not so much to their internal political structure as it is to fortunate but probably temporary conditions obtaining within the international system itself.

I shall argue that Prof. Waltz's analysis does not apply to democratic polities because they are
structurally very distinct from undemocratic states. Consequently, the type of international system which develops between democracies is not anarchical in Prof. Waltz's sense, but something quite different. Therefore, while democratic states may play balance of power politics with regard to undemocratic states for the reasons Prof. Waltz describes, but they will not do so with one another.

The International System

Prof. Waltz finds the primary determinant for international behavior in the structure of the international political system as a whole. War has been a constant of human existence. He notes that "[M]any different sorts of organizations fight wars, whether these organizations be tribes, petty principalities, empires, nations, or street gangs. . . . Variations in the quality of the units are not linked directly to the outcomes their behaviors produce, nor are variations in patterns of interaction" (1979, p. 67). The reason for this lack of variation rests with the anarchic character of international relations, a Hobbesian anarchy where each state exists under circumstances of perpetual insecurity.

Anarchy in this sense of the term does not imply chaos. "While states retain their autonomy, each stands in a specifiable relation to others. They form some sort of an order. We can use the term "organization" to cover this preinstitutional condition if we think of an organization as simply a constraint. . . . Because states constrain and limit each other, international politics can be viewed in rudimentary organizational terms. Structure is the concept that makes it possible to say what the expected organizational effects are and how structures and units interact and affect each other." The structure of international relations is anarchical rather than hierarchical and to move from one to the other "is to move from one system to another " (1979, p. 100).

Systemic structures, such as anarchy and hierarchy, are also defined by the character of their units. "Hierarchic systems change if functions are differently defined and allotted. For anarchic systems [this does not happen] since the system is composed of like units." Finally, changes in "the distribution of capabilities across units . . . . are changes of system" (1979, p. 101).

Writing in the tradition of Hobbes, Prof. Waltz argues that "Among states, the state of nature
is a state of war" (p. 102). As with Hobbes, his point is not that states are always at war, but that they suffer from perpetual insecurity due to each nation's ability to decide for itself whether or not it wishes to go to war. Therefore no state can rationally allow any state to grow too powerful.

This system of international insecurity compels states to engage in a perpetual creation and recreation of shifting balances of power sometimes quite independently of the desires of those involved. The international system conditions its members' behavior quite as effectively and as much as it itself is an outgrowth of that behavior.

Prof. Waltz readily agrees that in a strict sense states are not Hobbesian rational actors. This is only an operating assumption. But, he argues, "A theory contains assumptions that are theoretical, not factual" (p. 119). The value of a theory is its explanatory power, not the realism of its assumptions. (This methodological position is developed in depth in Friedman, 1953, pp. 1-43).

Prof. Waltz argues that in fact "Balance-of-power politics prevail whenever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive" (p. 121). Nevertheless, it does follow from Prof. Waltz's arguments that a state must be sufficiently like a rational actor for it continually to be concerned about the actions of its neighbour. For an anarchic order in the Hobbesian sense to exist, a state must suffer from perceived insecurity with regard to the actions of others.

It is here that our argument commences. I will be arguing that while Prof. Waltz's conditions are reasonable, they do not apply to democratic states. Specifically, the democratic international order is not a Hobbesian anarchy, and this fact grows out of democracies' systemic characteristics. These characteristics make them far removed from being able to be considered as rational actors most of the time. Nor are they irrational actors. Most of the time they are not actors at all. Prof. Waltz distinguished between anarchic and hierarchical systems, but democracies are neither anarchic nor hierarchical, either as individual political systems or as international systems of democracies.

Types of Systems-Hierarchies
Hierarchies are able to be understood in teleological terms. Their parts are organized to serve some specifiable purpose. Corporations, labor unions, armies, political parties, research organizations and public interest groups are all hierarchical in this sense. So also are authoritarian and totalitarian states. In all these cases leadership seeks to organize the organization's constituent parts so as better to attain their objectives. They may or may not be successful, but their objective gives them a specifiable goal and a concrete standard by which to measure success. Obviously members of organizations will also have goals, sometimes at variance with those pursued by the leadership. But effective leadership depends upon either incorporating or co-opting these subsidiary goals so that those pursuing them nevertheless contribute to the organization's overarching ends, or, failing that, of keeping antagonistic interests unorganized and ineffective. The ideally efficient organization is able to subject all relevant potential resources under its authority or power towards contributing to the most effective and least costly (in organizational terms) pursuit of its goals.

To be sure many organizations fail at this task. But that we can speak of them as failing demonstrates their teleological character. Since organizations, or at least their leadership, possess specifiable goals, use their resources to attain those goals, it makes good sense to speak of organizations as rational actors.

Anarchies in Prof. Waltz's sense are made up of hierarchies, each pursuing its goal under conditions of uncertainty for no rules exist which are binding upon all. Consequently, organizations seeking to survive will operate under principles of rational self-interest. This principle forces an organization to treat everything as a potential resource or threat or both. Hence, the rationality exhibited by such organizations is instrumental rationality. Hierarchies act as instrumental organizations under conditions of Waltzian anarchy, or they operate at a disadvantage in terms of survival, all else being equal.

Self-Organizing Systems
Waltzian anarchies and the hierarchies which generate them are not the only types of systems important for understanding international politics. I want to introduce a specific type of system, variously termed a self-organizing system (Dobuzinskis, 1984) or spontaneous order (Hayek, 1973). Self-organizing systems are quite different from hierarchies or from the international system Prof. Waltz describes. Modern democracies are self-organizing systems.

Self-organizing systems are able to generate their own internal structures, that is, to reproduce themselves in terms of their fundamental pattern of interaction, even though every particular element within the system may change. They do this without being oriented towards specifiable ends, as are interest groups. Such a system is autonomous in the sense that it maintains itself within a process of continual interaction with its environment.

At first glance, Prof. Waltz's international system appears to be a self-organizing system whose internal structures are hierarchies existing together under conditions of uncertainty. However, as I understand Prof. Waltz's model, the international system tends towards a state of dynamic equilibrium, that is, of stable balance between the various powers. Disruptions of that balance come from without the system itself, such as with economic growth, technological breakthroughs, and the like, which create renewed uncertainty and therefore compel weaker states to establish a new balance of power or suffer the risk of extinction.

Self-organizing systems do not simply tend towards equilibrium, although they have equilibrating or (in the social sciences a better term) coordinating tendencies. These systems also have internally generated disequilibrating features, and so the self-organizing process always takes place far from equilibrium. In systems theory terms, positive feedback, or destabilization, is as important as negative feedback, or stabilization (Jantsch, 1980, p. 5, see also 1975, p. 37 and Dobuzinskis, pp. 52-3).

When the components of the international system are themselves self-organizing, rather than hierarchical systems, the greater system generated from their interactions is quite different from that
produced by a Waltzian anarchy. Presumably Prof. Waltz would agree for he has written that changes in the basic character of a system's components will also change the character of the system within which they interact.

Modern society has developed three self-organizing systems which exist at about the same level of society: democracy, science, and the market. They interpenetrate, of course, but the principles which allow them to be self-organizing are sufficiently distinct that each can be considered independently of the others for many purposes, including the purposes pursued in this paper.

I shall treat of all three, though my major focus is democracy. By comparing political democracy briefly with two other self-organizing systems a deeper understanding of its characteristics will be made clear. Secondly, by demonstrating its systemic similarities with science and the market, my categorizing democracy as systemically distinct from undemocratic polities will appear less an *ad hoc* solution to reconciling the uniqueness of democratic international behavior with the general requirements of Prof. Waltz's systems theory. In fact a rather unusual conclusion will follow: that as a system, political democracy has more in common with science and the market than it does with undemocratic states or with democratic instrumental organizations.

All self-organizing systems are characterized by a *process of mutual adjustment* among participating members. A framework of abstract rules defines the proper way in which participants can act within the system, but whether they act, and the specific character of what they do if they choose to act, is left to the independent judgement of each eligible participant. All self-organizing systems therefore are constituted by a set of abstract rules which, when followed, are capable of generating a coherent order among the system's members.

Such an order has three characteristics. First, it makes coherent use of a far greater volume and variety of information than any single person or group could comprehend. In systems theory terms, such systems are characterized by having ordered complexity. While the system is too
intricate to be grasped by human minds, nevertheless it possesses a determinable order. This point is easily grasped in the cases of science and the market. No scientist or group of scientists can comprehend scientific information as a whole. The market enables system-wide coordination of resource allocation far in excess of that possible by central planning, as even many marxists now acknowledge.

Science and the market have to solve what might be generically termed the "coordination problem". Like democracy, they need to be able to order scattered information, judgements, and preferences into coherent and usable patterns without an overarching authority capable of performing that task. Ideally democracies pursue coherent policies, science generates coherent theories and the market produces coherent prices. In each the coordination process is rooted in how information is created, disseminated, and evaluated.

A self-organizing system tends to order this information in such a way that any randomly selected participant will be able to discover the information most relevant to his or her purposes. This should hold true for any citizen, yet the specific characteristics of this information will vary from person to person. Since the total information within the system exceeds anyone's ability to comprehend, obviously a information filtering process must take place. This process partly arises out of the system of rules which generate a particular order. The abstract rules of scientific procedure and evaluation generate different types of information from the rules of contract which generate a market and of democratic rights which generate a democracy. In addition, different organizations existing within the order itself will also perform filtering tasks. The press in a democracy, the advertising industry in the market, and scientific journals in science are examples of this (for the market, see O'Driscoll, 1977; Hayek, 1948, 92-106; 1978, pp. 179-190; Lachmann, 1986; for science see Ziman, 1969; for democracy, see diZerega, 1989).

Finally, participants are free to seek whatever information they desire, and utilize it for whatever purpose they desire, consonant with the structure of abstract rules within which they act.
Scientists are largely free to pursue what research they desire. Consumers, entrepreneurs, and workers are free to take advantage of any expectations they may have, so long as these are harmonious with the rules generating the market (Polanyi, 1951; 1969, pp. 49-72; Hayek 1973, pp. 35-71).

**Rules, Order and Biases**

The self-organizing systems of democracy, the market, and science are generated by very different rules, although they share the abstract characteristics of being able to be defined in purely procedural terms, saying nothing about the particular ends pursued by those participating. The market is generated out of people following the general rules of contract. Science arises from scientists employing a mix of procedures within their subfields. Taken as a whole, these procedures in their most abstract sense comprise the scientific method. Democracies are generated out of citizens following the equally abstract rules of freedom of political speech and organization and equality of voting.

Not all abstract rules can generate a self-organizing order. For example, a rule always to act deceitfully in a scientific, economic, or political encounter is certainly abstract and procedural, for it says nothing about the actions' specific content. However, such a rule is unlikely to generate a system of ordered complexity. Abstract rules capable of generating a self-organizing system must increase the capacity of unknown people to cooperate in attaining goals which we can never foresee with any specificity. It is not coincidental that the rules capable of generating a self-organizing system are also those capable of easing the problems standing in the way of freely given cooperation.

**Democracy as a Self-Organizing System**

A democracy is minimally constituted by certain abstract procedural criteria. In a pure democratic model, all adult residents possess an equal vote in choosing representatives or policies, and enjoy freedom of speech, press and assembly in discussing, advocating, and choosing public
policies. The more abstract the criteria for political membership and participation, the less those criteria can be linked with specifiable interests. A pure democracy employs the most abstract criteria for determining membership of any political system. The criteria for democratic citizenship and participation are completely divorced from citizens' substantive views and values. Age and birthplace tell us next to nothing about a person's specific views and values. The more closely a polity approaches these criteria, the more it can be considered a democracy.

Not only are criteria for democratic membership completely abstract, so also are the procedures by which members participate. Political leaders are elected and measures voted on by balloting in which every citizen's vote counts equally, and in which purely procedural and reasonably open criteria determine who runs for office. Civil liberties safeguard an indefinite and unpredictable variety of political opinions and programs. This is true within both winner-take-all and proportional representative varieties of democracies. In all democracies the dominant political group can maintain its position only insofar as it can maintain the active support of a majority of the citizens who choose to participate.

The central practical problem confronting a democracy is how coherent public policies may be formulated and pursued within a polity lacking any clearly ordered set of policy requirements. How can political order arise out of citizens' unpredictable initiatives and beliefs? How might policy coordination take place without a policy coordinator? A satisfactory answer to this problem in its various aspects must be concerned with understanding how information is disseminated within a polity, and with the types of institutions capable of molding this information into support or opposition to various policies.

Information and Its Dissemination

Science, the market, and democracy are all characterized by any participant's right to initiate discussion with other participants concerning any subject which falls within the realm of discussion encompassed by that system. Every qualified participant therefore enjoys a formal equality in
procedural rights. Any scientist may make any scientific proposal and have it submitted to the
scientific community's scrutiny. Any entrepreneur may seek any potential buyer of whatever goods
or services they have to offer. Any citizen may seek to convince any other citizen of his or her
views about appropriate political issues and their resolution. Information may thus enter into any of
these systems at any time from any participant. We can not reliably predict in advance what this
information will be, how useful it may or may not be, or whether or not it will be accepted by other
participants.

Spontaneous orders require institutions which filter information as well as disseminate it.
Due to their complexity, the body of information generated within such a system is too vast to be
comprehended by a single person or organization. Therefore means must exist by which
information relevant to particular participants can be made available to them without their having to
encounter most of the unnecessary (to their purposes) information which also is generated and
which may be useful to others. This filtering task must be achieved even though no one can know
what information will be useful to any particular participant.

In science the dissemination and filtering of information is performed largely by a wide
variety of professional organizations, conferences, journals, and reputations. A scientist relies upon
differentiations in all these areas inorder to decide where to submit new work for professional
appraisal, or where to find information relevant to his or her own interests. Without these
institutions s/he would be swamped.

The more successful a scientist is in making contributions which are accepted by the scientific
community, the more his or her reputation increases. That person's judgment increasingly is relied
upon by others. Scientific success is rewarded and failure is penalized. The resulting inequalities in
all standards of evaluation are integral to maintaining the coherence of a scientific enterprise too vast
for any one group to be able to oversee (Ziman, 1969; Toulmin, 1972, pp. 270-71; Polanyi, 1969,
pp. 73-86).
In the market information is disseminated by the price system. Prices tend to reflect the relative anticipated demand existing for different resources, providing easily compared information to those desiring to make market exchanges. Any entrepreneur can offer any resource at his or her disposal for any price. In this way the enormous variety of tastes, expectations, beliefs, and preferences of millions of people are more or less differentiated, filtered, and coordinated so as to increase the likelihood of willing buyers and sellers making contact with one another. In Robert Nozick's delightful phrase, increasing the number of "capitalist acts among consenting adults" (Nozick, 1974; Hayek, 1948, pp. 77-147; 1978, pp. 179-90; Lachmann, 1986).

The more successful a participant is in anticipating changing demands, and in taking advantage of this, the more market resources he or she commands. Again, the resulting inequality tends to increase the speed with which the coordinating process operates since rewards go to the successful and penalties to the unsuccessful. As in science, success and failure are defined in terms of control over resources relevant to the functioning of the system as a whole. People handling those systemically defined resources successfully acquire more. Those who do not find their resources diminishing. However, as in science, even those who are less successful will on balance in most cases be beneficiaries of the spontaneous order in which they participate.

Political information is as volatile as market information and as difficult to reduce to a single measure as scientific information. Indeed, politically relevant information incorporates both scientific and market information, and much more as well. It potentially includes everything relevant to the community within which we live.

Political information necessarily includes judgments about a community's values, a matter much less central, though not absent, in science and the market (Beiner, 1983). The scientific community's values are relatively well defined and broadly accepted. Minimally, theories should be independently testable and quantifiable if possible, they should unify a wide range of phenomena through the application of a single problem solving strategy, and they should open up new areas of
inquiry. (Kitcher, pp. 45-48 Polanyi, 1951 pp. 54-55). Different sciences weigh these values differently, but all acknowledge them. In the market basic values are even simpler: freedom of contract, inviolability of property, and the duty to compensate another for damages done. Nothing more is required. Obviously, community values are much more subject to revision and balancing them a more difficult task. However, in a democracy the prime value must be the legitimacy of democratic political discussion and decision-making. In this sense a key value in all three systems is voluntary discussion and persuasion (For an interesting discussion of voluntary and honest communication as an implicit value in speech as such see Habermas, 1979, pp. 1-68; McCarthy, 1978, pp. 272-357).

Political information is available through a wide variety of media and persons, gains or loses in credibility with the disseminators' reputations, and relies upon countless differentiations to help voters know where to look and whom to believe when examining political questions. Again, the more successful a participant is in convincing the community, or a part thereof, of the sagacity of his or her judgement, the greater their political resources will become. Up to a point, this political inequality will both simplify and improve the functioning of a democratic polity. Only when the inequality undermines the vitality of debate and discussion does a problem arise. Unfortunately this is frequently a problem, but its frequency should not blind us to the importance of the other side of the coin (diZerega, 1988).

Democratic politics is always constituting and reconstituting the community. As with the market and science, it constitutes a never-ending process of discovery (Crick, 1964, p. 147). In the case of democracy, it is a process of determining the terms by which we shall live together (Pitkin, 1972, p. 332). For this process to work within a nation-state, multiple independent centers of political power and resources must exist. This has great importance for understanding democracies' peacefulness towards one another.

Persuasion, Compromise and Agreement
A common feature in science, the market, and democracy is their reliance upon persuasion and agreement. Because the rules generating these orders are themselves free from any specific directives as to what to do, and because these rules apply equally to all participants, any systemic coordination which arises does so through participants agreeing as to what they believe or shall do. This agreement takes place in most instances among small groups although, especially in science and democracy, their goal is to win the agreement of all or as many participants as possible. Rules generating self-organizing systems are rules encouraging voluntary cooperation.

Scientific agreement is always aimed at establishing a rational consensus as to what constitutes scientific knowledge (Ziman, 1968, p. 9 1984, p. 10). This consensus is never complete, and even much of the consensual core of science changes over time. But however varied the interests, judgements, and perspectives of scientists, it is their ongoing attempt to obtain a scientific consensus for their views that tends to hold the scientific enterprise together. A theory moves to center place only by its ability to elicit agreement among the bulk of scientists in the relevant field, and it loses that place when agreement is withdrawn.

The role of persuasion and agreement in the market is more straightforward. Adam Smith put the matter with great clarity (1978, 9. 352)

If we should enquire into the principle in the human mind on which this disposition of trucking is founded, it is clearly the natural inclination everyone has to persuade.

The offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have so plain and simple a meaning, is in reality offering an argument to persuade one to do so and so as it is for his interest.

At the time they are making the exchange each person believes that by doing so he or she will be better off than if the exchange were not made. The point of marketing is to increase the likelihood of mutually agreeable exchanges taking place. Of course, none of these considerations deny the existence of manipulation or error within the market (or in science for that matter).
Nevertheless, in both cases, overall the vast majority of transactions are both formally and subjectively voluntary.

Persuasion and agreement are also fundamental to the democratic order. The democratic political process is different from analogous processes in science or the market, but is no less based upon persuasion. Unlike in the market or in science, we are deciding collectively and at specific times. In the market we come to agreements piecemeal and individually. In science we come to agreements collectively, but time is no limitation and each person's act of agreement can take place without regard to how or when others are deciding. Further, democratic politics is oriented towards action, and therefore operates within more demanding time constraints than science. Science is in no hurry. Democracies often have to be. In addition, the range of positions advocated is usually very broad while the criteria for preferring one over another are vague and sometimes contradictory.

These considerations suggest that in most cases political agreement over specific policies will be more tentative and less universal than agreement in science or the market. The necessity to decide something while facing these strong constraints on clarity and definitiveness help explain why the coercive component present in democratic politics is absent in science, which does not need to act, and the market, which does not require its participants to make collective judgements (Tussman, 1960, pp. 25-27). Nevertheless, the essence of a democratic polity is to persuade citizens, not to compel them (Aristotle, 1958, pp. 4-7; Crick, 1964, pp. 140-61; Pitkin, 1972, pp. 328-32).

The character of political persuasion helps explain why, unlike science, compromise is so central and why, unlike the market, some will feel they are losers through being forced to abide by public policies with which they strongly disagree. Regardless of how the abortion issue is decided there will be strongly dissatisfied citizens. The democratic coordinating process normally works through a continual balancing and accommodation of interests, both within and between political parties. Compromise, the discovery of a middle ground within which all parties can live, is the life blood of democratic politics. (Crick, 1964 p. 146) The rules of the game are biased to reward those
most able to create successful compromises.

Sovereignty of the State and of the "People"

Unlike other modern polities, democratic states are not sovereign. I am using sovereignty in a particular, although hardly unusual, sense, that deriving from Locke and the Founding Fathers (Locke, 1965. pp. 374-83; Madison, Federalist 39, 46; also 1981. pp. 361-2). A democratic government is not sovereign because ultimate authority lies with the people as manifested actively through their voting and the influence of the organizations with which they are involved. This is different from passive obedience or even passive approval which is often true for very undemocratic governments. Democracies institutionalize sovereignty outside the state. Hence the state as an organization of rule is not able to determine the polity's systemic boundaries. It cannot hope to control all major external influences.

The closest resemblance to a sovereign state in a democracy is the dominant party or coalition and the administrative apparatus over which it presides. In a more than rhetorical sense, however, sovereignty resides in the community of citizens as a whole, and not in the government (contrast with Huntington, 1968. pp. 105-106). This point is important for understanding why modern democracies do not wage war upon one another.

A sovereign state is characterized by the open ended rule of a party, clique, faction, junta, clergy, or other identifiable group which organizes government to serve its perceived interests. The state is sovereign because no other social institution or group may legitimately (according to the state's leading officials) challenge its claim to be the ultimate decision-making power in society or seek to join in governing without its permission (Weber, 1964, p. 156). This model of the state conceives it as an instrumental organization. Within this framework there can be a great variety of sovereign states, but democracy in the sense I am developing it is not one of them.

Democracies and Democratic Organizations

Democracies have more in common structurally with science and the market than they do
with democratic instrumental organizations such as cooperatives or some political parties. A democratic organization, like any instrumental organization, exists to accomplish a particular purpose: winning elections, selling groceries, or whatever. Its active membership is in general agreement as to the specific concrete goals the organization seeks to accomplish. Indeed, since an organization is created to pursue a particular purpose, only those people who agree with the purpose or who think that their own ends can be achieved in the context of pursuing that purpose will join. If an organization's democratic procedures interfere with its ability to pursue its goals, either the procedures are modified or the organization disbands. If the goals are regarded as important enough, democratic procedures could be abolished. Such organizations can be evaluated in terms of how rational their decisions are in pursuing their goals and how efficiently they utilize their resources because their goals exist "outside" the organization, and independently of it.

In a democracy all specific goals are subordinated to democratic procedures, with the partial exception of wartime. Even here, any suspension of democratic procedures is justified as necessary inorder to win the war and *return to democratic procedures*. No general agreement as to the polity's specific goals (beyond survival) need exist. To phrase this point differently, the "goal" of a democracy is democracy, and its specific activities are solely determined by whatever policies arise out of the democratic political process. Those political scientists which seek to study democracies by lumping them with democratic instrumental organizations are making an error in logical typing (Dahl, 1956 p. 63; on logical typing see Bateson, 1979, pp. 127-140).

We may now see how democracies are systemically different from undemocratic states. The anthropomorphization of state behavior so common in the literature of international relations, and of political science generally, is radically misleading when applied to democratic polities.

Prof. Waltz treats all states as instrumental organizations. Like people, states have purposes, specific interests, can feel insecurity, must calculate profit and loss, and otherwise (ideally) pursue rational behavior (Waltz,1954, p. 220; 1979, pp. 112-113). In using such terminology he has
plenty of company (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981, p. 159; James D. Morrow, 1986; Kissinger, 1969, p. 46; Sullivan, 1978, p. 328; Nettl, 1971, p. 56; Morgenthau, 1965, pp. 25-26, 76-77; Etzioni, 1965, p. 329). This way of speaking can be a convenient shorthand so long as it does not introduce significant analytical confusion. But in the field of international politics this is not the case.

Democracy and Peace: Internal Factors

Democratic nations have fought wars, sometimes long ones. But democracies have never fought wars with one another. The reasons for this grow out of their basic character as self-organizing systems. The self-organizing features characterizing internal democratic politics carry over into their external relations. Therefore democracies will act in ways significantly different from undemocratic states in the international arena. We would expect to find a readiness to compromise and a difficulty in pursuing unified plans on the part of democratic governments. If compromise is unfeasible, they will tend to isolate their differences, so as not to allow these disagreements to poison the overall pattern of mutual involvement. This pattern of response will be different from that prevailing in states comprehensible as instrumental organizations.

Case studies comparing the crisis in U.S. - French relations when deGualle pulled France out of NATO and the development of the Sino-Soviet split demonstrate the strength of the systemically rooted differences in democratic and undemocratic state relationships. In both the United States and France, according to Profs. Holsti and Sullivan, "multiple internal and external channels of communication, relative freedom of divergent interests to make political demands, and a limited ability of top leaders to mobilize all politically relevant groups and institutions in support of their policies" prevented the rupture from seriously undermining a wide variety of U.S. - French relations (Holsti and Sullivan, 1969, p. 158).

The openness of debate characterizing democratic polities influences their international behavior. Profs. Brzezinski and Huntington observed of the U.S. - French crisis that "The openness of the debate tended to inhibit sudden unilateral moves by either Washington or Paris,
with their exacerbating effect." Indeed, when American and French executives did act unilaterally, as in the Kennedy - Macmillan Nassau agreement and deGualle's press conference excluding Great Britain from the Common Market, the impact of their actions "had precisely that negative effect in the dispute" (Brzezinski and Huntington, 1963, p. 406).

French and American elites maintained many independent channels of communication and influence through their joint involvement in international and national organizations. "The structure of the Western international system requires reliance on many multilateral bodies with special common interests. These provide additional arenas for the articulation of one's point of view without precipitating a head - on confrontation" (p. 406). In both countries different elites through mutual involvement with other common interests that brought them together, were able to help isolate the dispute. Because these people had significant political influence in their own nations, their outlook had consequences in how the two governments interacted. Because these elites were largely independent from official policy, they served to undercut any attempts by their nations' executives further to polarize relations between the two nations.

Elite and average citizens alike maintained strong economic, scientific, cultural, and social connections with their peers abroad. As attempts by American Presidents to eliminate independent private American trade and travel with Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya and other states in official disfavor suggest, these relationships can undercut the President's attempt to build and maintain a unified hostile front. Democratic citizens act as if their borders were porus, and in so acting make them so. It is an ambitious and pugnacious executive's nightmare, but it helps to maintain the peace.

Even within the executive power itself, the ability of democratic executives to mobilize and control their resources is limited, generally much more than in an undemocratic state. In democratic polities the bulk of public officials owe their positions in significant part to technical expertise rather than to political loyalty (Allison, 1971). Such officials occasionally operate at cross purposes to the incentives of elected officials and, when in different bureaus, even independently from one another.
They can build bases of support outside of the executive, either in other branches of government, or in society at large. Their actions add to the advantages of isolating or compromising international disagreements. Such independence within the executive branch also adds to the difficulties of mobilizing the nation to act in accordance with the executive’s vision. This is true for undemocratic systems as well, but in such instances the number and variety of powerful independent allies is much smaller.

Internal political factors making for compromising and isolating conflicts are weaker or absent in undemocratic states. Precisely to the degree that they are organized to achieve specific ends, such states lack the inherent safeguards which assist in maintaining peace. Institutions enabling leaders to maintain control by restricting or eliminating independent initiatives also restrict independent efforts towards defusing potential conflict. Channels of communication, both internal and external, are fewer and more subject to political domination. Independent political initiatives, demands, and criticisms are strongly circumscribed. Borders are less porous. Leaders’ power to mobilize resources in pursuit of their aims is greater, and the importance of correct political loyalty within government is stronger. In the most thoroughly organized states, even initiatives which, when taken in isolation, might please the leadership must be discouraged because their advocates could acquire independent political status, constituting a focus for potential future opposition (Brzezinski & Huntington, 1963, pp. 405-407; Holsti & Sullivan, 1969, pp. 160-61).

Undemocratic states depend more than do democratic states on the qualities of their leadership to maintain the peace. Since any international dispute can be perceived as a challenge to the leadership, this is a risky safeguard indeed. Leaders, democratic and undemocratic alike, do not like to back down. Additionally, leaders in most undemocratic states usually hold office for life, unless they are ousted in an unpredictable coup. (Mexico is an unusual exception.) By contrast, democratic leadership is predictable in its duration and routine in its rotation. Since turnover in leadership makes new initiatives for good (or ill) more possible, democratic governments with
serious disagreements among themselves can more patiently await a change in leadership than can undemocratic ones. Hoping for a future environment more congenial for negotiations can help defuse the immediacy of a crisis.

The International Environment

To the extent that the international environment consists of relationships among democracies, it cannot be analyzed in Hobbesian terms. Not only are its constituent states not rational actors, in addition relationships between democratic states are significantly influenced by the same self-organizing dynamics as is the case within them. Therefore, democracies do not have much pressure to act as if they were rational actors - as they have to do in the presence of strong undemocratic states. Citizens do not usually define their interests solely, or perhaps even mostly, in terms of the "national interest." The leader may think of the nation as being in some sense a unitary organization or machine to be used to achieve his or her aims. The citizens usually do not. Rather, citizens' conscious interests will spill across borders to include people and organizations in other polities. These international interests come to influence the domestic political environment, thereby influencing the international options available to an elected leader. *Processes of mutual accommodation are thereby encouraged by the international environment itself.* Indeed, there is no longer a sharp distinction between the national and the international environment. I believe that this accounts for the finding that democracies are more predisposed towards ventures in international cooperation than are undemocratic states (Haas, 1965).

The more complex and extensive citizens' dealings with people in other democracies become, the more peacekeeping tendencies are strengthened. Accordingly, among democracies close economic, cultural, social, and scientific ties strengthen the bonds maintaining international peace. These happy consequences are not so assured among instrumentally organized states because economic, social, scientific, and cultural connections are then subordinated to the leadership's policy goals, which may or may not be peaceful. Trade between Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Union continued up to the day of Hitler’s invasion. It did nothing to keep the peace. In undemocratic polities the state is much more capable of controlling the systems boundaries, thereby subordinating extrasystemic influences to national policy.

Democratic states' predilection to seek to compromise conflicts away, or to isolate them, is of mixed utility in dealing with aggressive undemocratic states. The Rhineland capitulation a famous example of democratic wishful thinking, but hardly the only one. On the other hand, these systemic predilections will be all the more valuable in dealing with nonaggressive states.

I do not mean to imply that democracies are always the innocent victims in warfare. Would that this were true. The United States' past and present record in Central America suffices to bury such a smug thesis. But I am arguing that when both potential antagonists are democracies, the systemically generated impetus for peace has thus far been powerful enough to avoid conflict. This does not mean that a war between two democracies is impossible. The record of human folly, greed, vanity, and egoism is too extensive to allow such a forecast. But such a war would be very unlikely. Moreover, in such a hypothetical war, the factors making for peace which I have enumerated would tend to keep other democracies neutral and offering to mediate, thereby isolating or compromising the conflict. Since each democracy will have a complex network of relationships with others, the democratic international system serves to contain conflict if it ever did arise. In short, the democratic international system can probably function peacefully because it would possess a goodly measure of the same self-organizing dynamics that exist internally within democratic polities. In addition, the increasing interdependence of democratic states substantially strengthens these peace-keeping factors.

These structural predispositions towards peace have their roots in the self-organizing characteristics of democratic politics, that is, in the significant sense in which the people and not the state are sovereign. Democracies as such do not have interests beyond that of simple survival. Only then will citizens usually unite behind a single specifiable interest with sufficient commitment to
render discussion of alternatives all but futile. Except when that minimal interest is threatened, democracies do not act rationally, nor do they act irrationally. They do not "act" at all.

Relations between democratic polities are not the only area where a self-organizing systems analysis sheds light upon international relations. Guilio Gallarotti has developed a self-organizing systems analysis of the international gold standard, which lasted from about 1880 to WW I without being the deliberately constructed policy of any state or group of states (Gallarotti, 1988).

**Democracy and Liberalism**

My analysis complements and extends Michael W. Doyle's recent work analyzing the relationship between liberal states and peace (Doyle: 1983a, 1987). Prof. Doyle attributes the peaceful record of constitutionally secure liberal states, not just democracies, to the influence of liberal ideology and institutions which, taken together, have created a "Pacific Union" lasting over 150 years. My focus has emphasized the underlying systemic framework within which liberal political institutions exist, clarifying why liberal polities achieve such pacific results in their relationships with one another. The more closely liberal states adopted democratic institutions, the more would self-organizing characteristics predominate over those of hierarchy and instrumental organization.

Western liberalism nurtured institutions and practices which marked a radical break with traditional society. What characterizes peculiarly liberal institutions of science, democracy and the market is what I term the primacy of abstract rules as their principle of organization or perhaps a better term, generation (diZerega, 1989). Liberal institutions are self-organizing systems maintained by participants acting within a framework of general abstract procedural rules or organizations which developed within these institutions.

To be sure, liberalism is not an explicitly democratic ideology, and liberal theorists were often distrustful of political democracy (Mill, 1972; Gray, 1986, p. 74; Hayek, 1960, pp. 103-117). *But liberalism is intrinsically democratic.* An ideology respectful of individuality, as is
liberalism, must focus upon abstract rules of cooperation to maintain social order: only then can individuals be permitted to operate by their own lights. Political democracy arises from the consistent application of abstract rules for cooperation to the political order, just as the market is comprised of people following abstract rules for cooperation in the economic realm and science of people following abstract rules for cooperation in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. Liberalism thus served, albeit only partially consciously, as the incubator for the self-organizing institutions which have done more to preserve peace than all previous prophets, philosophers, movements, and leaders.

The case of Japan suggests that liberal political institutions can be transplanted into societies which are not themselves liberal. One does not need to be a liberal to be successful in science, the market, or politics, precisely because the rules are abstract. I can be a Pagan or Buddhist, Christian or atheist, it does not matter. In the process of choosing and pursuing my goals within the framework of these procedural rules I tend to harmonize them into the ongoing order in which I participate. In East Asia, Neo-Confucian and Buddhist traditions of communal solidarity have been easily adapted to the rules of market production (Berger 1986, pp. 165-169, but see 170). Japanese political practices also reflect its less individualistic culture as adapted to a democratic framework (Stockwin, 1982, c. 3; Almond and Powell, 1966 p.62). Communal values are usually held to be distinct from liberal individualism, but they apparently can find successful expression within the framework of a self-organizing system, and even help to maintain it. This is why I would argue that however critical liberalism was in enabling science, the market, and democracy to develop, they themselves are not intrinsically liberal in the Western individualist sense, although they are in profound harmony with liberalism.

I strongly question Doyle's more critical remarks about the democratic state's supposed proneness towards attacking small non-liberal ones and supposed paranoid distrust of powerful nonliberal regimes (1983b, 1987, pp. 1162-1163). Imperialism of the strong against the weak is
nothing new. European colonialism began long before liberal democracy's triumph. Perhaps more to the point, colonialism did not long survive democracy's triumph in Europe, and most European colonies were granted independence without the need for violent rebellion by their people. These developments, and not colonialism, are unique and directly tied to the ideological and institutional characteristics of democratic states.

Distrust of powerful illiberal states is hardly unique to democracies. Large states have long distrusted one another. Again, what appears unique to me is the relative willingness of democratic states to seek accommodation with illiberal regimes. Taken to extremes, this can lead to a Munich. But any illiberal state of note which seeks genuine accommodation with the liberal world would not find it difficult to do so, as is evidenced by the example of China which only a few years ago was widely regarded as implacably hostile to the West. The Soviet Union has been so ambiguous in its actions and its offensive military capacity is so great that, Prof. Doyle to the contrary, caution and distrust seem well justified.

In regard to these points, Prof. Doyle's criticisms of democratic states appear to boil down to the claim that in some respects democracies are like other sorts of states. If the failings in democratic behavior which Prof. Doyle highlights are due more to their similarities with other states than to their differences, then the problems are unlikely to be alleviated by increasing democracies' similarities with other states. I shall argue that this is the case. Prof. Doyle's (somewhat pessimistic) prescription necessitates strengthening the chief executive's independence from the factors I have discussed above (1986, p. 1163). However, Prof. Doyle's argument for more executive flexibility in foreign policy does not appear warranted. It need not improve long term strategic planning and almost certainly will exacerbate the problems with foreign intervention which he deplores.

**The Executive and War**

The executive power is that democratic institution which stands in the greatest tension with
democracy's basic self-organizing structural characteristics. This is due to the executive's instrumental organizational character. Domestically, in ideal terms but not necessarily in practice, it is the executive's task to enforce the policies arrived at democratically. When policies change, the executive enforces the new as faithfully as s/he did the old. The executive organizes the state to accomplish these tasks.

As is well known, again practice has always differed. Agencies and officials charged with enforcing the law develop their own agendas, agendas not always in harmony with their mandated tasks. Sometimes they are called upon to make law as well. Further, these agencies often come to possess significant political resources of their own, giving them a measure of independence from democratic oversight. Often enforcing the law requires interpreting the law, and those wielding executive power, like everyone else, will seek to interpret the law to their own advantage. These deviations from the ideal need not seriously undermine the government's democratic character, especially in the realm of domestic politics.

However, even if popular checks and controls on a powerful executive are strong, (and especially if they are not) a problem exists relevant to our discussion of peace and war. It is in the realm of international politics that institutionalized checks on the executive power are weakest. Additionally, patriotism and the general sense that we need to stand together in the international arena help to create a relatively uncritical trust and support for the executive, especially in times of crisis. It is in the chief executive's political advantage to be in charge during times of international crisis, so long as s/he can appear to be "in charge" (Lowi, 1985).

Stephen D. Krasner introduces an important analytical distinction between state and society in his analysis of American foreign policy. The state, he argues, consists of "a set of roles and institutions having peculiar drives, compulsions, and aims of their own that are distinct from the interests of any particular societal group" (1978, p. 10). Prof. Krasner's conception of the state as separate from society is in agreement with my description of the state as an instrumental
organization. While I differ considerably from Prof. Krasner in my analysis of the democratic state, this disagreement is not so important in regard to certain foreign policy concerns because here "Central decision-makers have been able to carry out their own policies over the opposition of private corporations [and other societal interests] providing that policy implementation only required resources that were under the control of the executive branch" (pp. 18, 89, my emphasis).

Foreign policy as a whole is not free from the self-organizing features I have described above, else this paper would be pointless. However, certain areas of foreign policy are relatively free from such pressures, especially relations with small or unstable states who are therefore vulnerable to covert or small scale overt military pressure. It is here that the executive's resources enable it to act relatively independently over the short run. It is also within this area of foreign policy that we find cases of violent intervention by the U. S. government into small quasi-democratic states, often with results fatal to their democratic institutions. In 1954 under President Eisenhower's authority, the U.S. was involved in the violent overthrow of the constitutionally elected Guatemalan government, leading to years of dictatorship and civil war. President Johnson ordered the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965. Although Dominican democracy's health was certainly highly debateable, the invasion's purpose was in part to prevent a democratically elected President from attaining power. In the early 1970s President Nixon encouraged the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile. These actions were not isolated, for executive inspired military actions took place in Iran, Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, and more recently in Grenada and Nicaragua. What distinguishes the Guatemalan, Dominican, and Chilean interventions was their apparent contempt for democratic institutions and practices abroad.

These apparent exceptions to my argument about democracies' peaceful relations with one another are in fact evidence in support of the argument. The structural features of government which are farthest removed from the basic self-organizing characteristics of democratic government are those most responsible for its belligerent behavior. It is not democracy as such which creates peace,
It is the systemic relationships between democracies generated by their self-organizing political processes which are conducive to lasting peace. When these processes are absent or stifled, the record of democratic governments is no better than that of undemocratic governments. Had U.S. presidents been required to get specific congressional approval for their military adventures, of course it is possible that the interventions against democratic or quasidemocratic governments would still have taken place. However, the systemic factors which would have then been brought into play would have decreased the likelihood of this happening. The fact that so many actions were secret, and that the public and Congress were misled, suggests that these presidents felt there might be effective domestic opposition to their plans. President Reagan's difficulty in obtaining support for his campaign against Nicaragua is an example of the sort of barriers against precipitate action which democratic polities generate. This is a source of executive frustration, but it also is conducive to maintaining the peace.

Policy Implications: Differences in Self-Organizing and Hobbesian Analysis

This analysis leads to policy implications importantly different from those suggested by considering the international system as only a Waltzian anarchy. I shall discuss two issues raised by Prof. Waltz: the advisability of encouraging the creation of a third European superpower and foreign policy towards non-superpowers.

Prof. Waltz questions the desirability for the United States of promoting a united Europe (Waltz, 1979, pp. 201-202)

Although many Americans have hoped for a united Europe, few have considered its unfavorable implications. The United States need worry little about wayward movements and unwanted events in weak states. We do have to be concerned with the implications of great power wherever it may exist. . . . The emergence of a united Europe would shift the structure of international relations from bi- to tripolarity. For reasons of tradition, of political
compatibility, and of ideologioal preference, a new Europe might well pull westward; but we know that the internal characteristics and preferences of nations do not provide sufficient grounds for predicting behavior. A newly united Europe and the Soviet Union would be the weaker of the three great powers. In self-help systems, external forces propel the weaker parties toward one another. Weaker parties, our theory predicts, incline to combine to offset the strength of the stronger... the Soviet Union and the new Europe would cooperate in ways we would find unpleasant.

Prof. Waltz observes that "... students of international politics, who do not agree on much else, have always suspected that a world of three great powers would be the least stable of all" (p. 202).

My analysis suggests the opposite conclusion insofar as a united Europe is a democratic one. With two of the three great powers being democratic, the democratic powers would not have to fear one another. Their inevitable disagreements would tend to be compartmentalized, as was the case with the United States and France. On the other hand, whereas it is barely conceivable that the Soviet Union could contemplate a first strike against one superpower, it is less conceivable that it could contemplate such a strike against two. The overall international security of such a system thus would tend to be enhanced.

One of Prof. Waltz's statements in the long quotation above leads me to my second point about this analysis' implications. He argues that the "United States need worry little about wayward movements and unwanted events in weak states." I am not convinced that this is so, and to the extent it is not so, we should actively promote democracies in other states rather than settling, as is usually the case today, for stability. The example of World War One illustrates how events in weak states, such as Serbia, can initiate the most catastrophic events. (In this instance a "bipolar" balance of power such as Prof. Waltz advocates existed.) As nuclear proliferation spreads to more and smaller states their capacity to cause unforeseen trouble leading to unpredictable difficulties grows.
To the degree that democracies are structurally disposed towards peace in their mutual relations, it is in the long run interest of the United States to promote democratization. That nations can be successfully democratized is clear from the post war experience of Germany, Austria, Italy and Japan. This argument does not imply an aggressive American program towards reforming other countries, for this would require strengthening the executive branch when in my view the need in this area is to weaken it. The argument does imply providing privileged treatment for democracies, and also invoking extremely strong sanctions against leaders who destroy either democratic governments or the infrastructure required for democratic governments to evolve. Under such a policy we would treat the world’s Marcoses, Pinochets, and Papadupolises very differently than we have, for in a systemic sense they are enemies of world peace.

Conclusion

The argument I have presented attempts to harmonize the findings of scholars such as Profs. Rummel and Doyle with the systems theory of international relations developed by Prof. Waltz. In so far as the international system is comprised of undemocratic states. Prof. Waltz’s analysis appears adequate. It is only when democratic states are involved, and only when they are involved with one another, that the international system changes in a significant degree.

In their relations with one another democratic states do not exist under conditions of Hobbesian uncertainty, and so are not compelled to play balance of power politics. The system generated between democracies is not anarchic, but rather itself possesses strong self-organizing characteristics. Within such a system the uncertainties compelling self-interested behavior do not exist, or at least are not strong enough to compel democracies to act as if they were rational actors. Prof. Waltz’s conclusions therefore do not apply to this partial, but very important, part of international relations.

Far from refuting Prof. Waltz’s basic argument, this analysis helps to further develop it. The systems approach to international politics has much to recommend it. What we have is not one but
two international systems, existing in uneasy proximity and encouraging its democratic members to respond in two very different fashions, often to the confusion of those seeking overall patterns of international behavior.

Notes


Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce & David Lalman. "Reason and War" APSR 80:1113-30


Waltz, Kenneth N. 1954. Man, the State and War. New York: Columbia University Press


IGS Working Papers

$3.50 each plus 20% for shipping and handling, tax where applicable

1991

91-18 Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Bureaucratic Responses to Presidential Control During the Reagan Administration Marissa Martino Golden

91-17 Democracy and Self-Organization: The Systemic Foundation for the Democratic Party Gus diZerega

91-16 The Myth of the Independent Voter Raymond E. Wolfinger

91-15 Bureaucratic Responses to the Administrative Presidency: The Civil Rights Division Under Reagan Marissa Martino Golden

91-14 The Emergence of Strong Leadership in the 1980's House of Representatives Barbara Sinclair


91-12 Elites and Democratic Theory: Insights From the Self-Organizing Model Gus diZerega

91-11 Indispensable Framework or Just Another Ideology? The Prisoner's Dilemma as an Anti-Hierarchical Game Aaron Wildavsky

91-10 Intra-Party Preferences, Heterogeneity, and the Origins of the Modern Congress: Progressive Reformers in the House and Senate, 1890-1920 David W. Brady

91-9 The Information-Seeking Behavior of Local Government Officials Marc A. Levin


91-7 Pork and Votes: The Effect of Military Base Closings on the Vote in Ensuing Congressional Elections David Hadwiger

91-6 Designing an Interactive, Intelligent, Spatial Information System for International Disaster Assistance Louise K. Comfort

91-5 Constitutional Mischief: What's Wrong with Term Limitations Nelson W. Polsby

91-4 Thermidor in Land Use Control? Paul van Seters

91-3 Parchment Barriers and the Politics of Rights Jack N. Rakove


91-1 The Revision of California's Constitution: A Brief Summary Eugene C. Lee

1990

90-34 Recent Developments in Disease Prevention/Health Promotion in the Federal Republic of Germany, Rolf Rosenbrock

90-33 Recent Developments and Reform Proposals in the Politics of Pharmaceutical Supply in the Federal Republic of Germany, Rolf Rosenbrock

90-32 Speech Before the Meeting of Texas Public Interest Organizations, David Cohen

90-31 A Curious Life—The Pursuit of an Understanding of Public Administration, James W. Fesler

90-30 The Cultural Conquest of the Presidency: Incorporation and the Transformation of American Political Life, 1890-1916, Peter Schwartz

90-29 The Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung: Is the Tax Revolt Over? Randy H. Hamilton

90-28 A Tightrope Walk Between Two Spheres of Logic: Observations—and Self-Observations—of a Social Scientist in Parliamentary Politics, Rolf Rosenbrock

90-27 Iran Air Flight 655 and the USS Vincennes: Complex, Large-Scale Military Systems and the Failure of Control, Gene I. Rochlin

90-26 Political Leadership and Value Change: Reagan, Thatcher and the Conservative Revolution? Pippa Norris


90-24 Political Cultures, Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky

90-22 The San Jose Metropolitan Area: A Region in Transition, Donald N. Rothblatt

90-21 The Demand for Referendums in West Germany “Bringing The People Back In?” Wolfgang Luthardt

90-20 Sunset As Oversight: Establishing Realistic Objectives, Cynthia Opheim, Landon Curry, and Pat Shields

90-19 Government Expenditure Levels: Alternative Procedures for Computing Measures, Brian Stipak

90-18 Transformation of American Liberalism, 1940s-1980s: An Analysis of Liberal Policy Change and the ADA, Ichiro Sunada

90-17 The Politics of Policy: “Political Think Tanks” and Their Makers in the U.S.-Institutional Environment, Winand Gellner

90-16 CAUTION: Excessive Use of Government Statistics May be Injurious to the Health of the Body Politic, Randy H. Hamilton

90-15 Thermidor In Land Use Control? Paul van Seters

90-14 Taxation For a Strong and Virtuous Republic: A Bicentennial Retrospective, W. Elliot Brownlee

90-13 How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics, Barbara Geddes

90-12 Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science, James D. Fearon

90-11 Pat Crashes The Party: Reform, Republicans, and Robertson, Duane M. Oldfield

90-10 The Acquisition of Partisanship by Latinos and Asian-Americans: Immigrants and Native-Born Citizens, Bruce E. Cain, D. Roderick Kiewiet, and Carole J. Uhlaner

90-9 New Perspective on the Comparative Method, David Collier

90-8 California Agency Reconnaissance Project: Teaching Public Administration Through Field Research, Todd R. La Porte and David Hadwiger

90-7 Earthquake Safety For New Structures: A Comprehensive Approach, Stanley Scott

90-6 Government Policies And Higher Education: a Comparison of Britain and the United States 1630 to 1860, Sheldon Rothblatt and Martin Trow

90-5 Dominance and Attention: Images of Leaders in German, French, and American TV News, Roger D. Masters, Siegfried Frey, and Gary Bente

90-4 Nonverbal Behavior and Leadership: Emotion and Cognition in Political Information Processing, Roger D. Masters and Denis G. Sullivan

90-3 The Dredging Dilemma: How Not to Balance Economic Development and Environmental Protection, Robert A. Kagan

90-2 Turning Conflict Into Cooperation: Organizational Designs for Community Response in Disaster, Louise K. Comfort

90-1 The Effect of Campaign Spending, Turnout, and Dropoff on Local Ballot Measure Outcomes and The Initiative and California's Slow Growth Movement, David Hadwiger

1989

89-27 On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, Daniel Hays Lowenstein

89-26 Toward A Dispersed Electrical System: Challenges to the Grid, Jane Summerton and Ted K. Bradshaw

89-25 Top Bureaucrats and the Distribution of Influence in Reagan's Executive Branch, Steven D. Stehr


89-23 Learning From Risk: Organizational Interaction Following the Armenian Earthquakes, Louise K. Comfort

89-22 The Elusiveness of Rural Development Theory and Practice: Domestic and Third World Perspectives Joined, Ted K. Bradshaw

89-21 Saints and Cardinals in Appropriations Subcommittees: Academic Pork Barreling and Distributive Politics in an Era of Reistributive Budgeting, James D. Savage
SEND ORDER TO:
Institute of Governmental Studies
102 Moses Hall
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720
(415) 642-5537

PLEASE PRE-PAY ALL ORDERS UNDER $30: checks payable to The Regents of the University of California.
SALES TAX: California residents add sales tax.
HANDLING AND SHIPPING: add 20% of sales price. Allow 4 weeks for delivery.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>QUANTITY/COST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBTOTAL</th>
<th>SALES TAX</th>
<th>HANDLING (20%)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NAME
ADDRESS
CITY STATE ZIP