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Author
Davies, Sarah

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146 BCE: the year in which Roman generals destroyed Carthage and then Corinth, within the space of only a few months. Over the centuries, it has evolved as a boundary that is at once temporal, spatial, and ideological. As a perceived turning point, it has been identified by generations of Romans and Rome’s neighbors, and even by modern historians as heralding Rome’s advent to pan-Mediterranean empire. As an imposition of military authority over an east-west pair of maritime cities, its place in history has developed alongside changing perceptions of Roman imperium itself. For this reason, an unpacking of the various facets of 146 BCE can grant special access to the processes of Roman power and its redefinition over the centuries.

Consult almost any modern textbook on the history of ancient Rome, and 146 BCE will be represented as the culmination of mid-Republican imperial expansion. As a perceived turning point, it often transitions to discussion of the late Republic and new, internal challenges. Such a simplified picture is itself legacy of a particular sort of Roman ideology and rhetoric of empire, first discernable among authors of the first-century BCE. Representative are the thoughts of Sallust, in his ‘theorem’ of moral decline. For Sallust, 146 BCE, and the removal of Carthage in particular, represented a critical point in Republican history, since once “all seas and lands were open, then Fortune began to grow cruel and bring confusion into all our affairs.”¹ In the absence of serious foreign challenges, fear of the enemy (metus hostilis) no longer held together Rome’s citizenry in the practice of virtue.² Instead, avarice and ambition spread like a plague, splitting the fabric of Roman society into factions, as leisure and wealth took a hold over a once rigorous and just people.³ Though Sallust’s theorem may be highly rhetorical, its standards for judgment are revealing, for it assumes that 146 BCE was the moment in which Rome achieved ‘world’ dominion, over all seas and lands. It also assumes that such achievement marked a moral juncture, a beginning of an end for Rome.⁴ But when, and how, did such assumptions develop? And what was the significance of events surrounding 146 BCE at the time? How were they presented?

In order to approach these questions, it is first necessary to gain some picture of the contemporary international environment. The second-century BCE Mediterranean was a heavily militarized international system, nevertheless characterized by a complex web of personal networks between kings and leading members of poleis, tribes, and leagues.⁵ “Diplomacy” in the modern sense did not exist, but individual representatives, or ‘embassies’ played a crucial role, addressing issues on an ad hoc basis.⁶ Rome had long been in contact with this evolved ‘Hellenistic’ system, granting senatorial audience to legati via personal introduction and ties of friendship and/or kinship.⁷ It was an elaborate, even performative system, colored by histories of amity and enmity. And

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¹ Sall. Cat. 10. See discussions in Conley (1981); Wood (1995); and Kapust (2008).
² Sall. Jug. 41.
³ Sall. Cat. 10-11.
⁴ E.g. Lintott (1972); Levick (1982).
⁵ Cf. Eckstein (2006; 2008); Ager (2009); Malkin et al. (2009).
⁶ On the evolution of such diplomacy during the earliest centuries of Roman expansion, see Auliard (2006). On the interaction of Greek embassies with Rome, see Erskine (1994).
though Rome was generally adapted to interstate norms, this did not preclude a culturally unique outlook. Epigraphic evidence reveals that Roman behavior, while fitted within the matrix of interstate politics, did not always align with certain Greek-speaking practices. Typical third-party advances that suggested that Rome could be in the wrong – that Rome should compromise, hand over jurisdiction of a dispute, or consider their enemy as an equal – received hostile responses. Greek embassies may have wondered at such behavior, which may at times have appeared arrogant and aggressive. From such miscommunications, it becomes apparent that Romans held fast to the principle of always waging ‘just wars,’ displaying stubborn confidence that in going to war, the proper practice and debate had confirmed rightful cause – *iusta causa*, in Cicero’s phraseology. Injustice had been inflicted upon Rome, via attack, breach of treaty, enemy collusion, or insult, injury, or other breakdown of diplomatic embassy. As a result, divine justice was on their side, for as long as the wars were properly waged. It was for these reasons that the war-debate between Cato and Nasica regarding Carthage became so prominent in Roman memory. Wrapped in the rhetoric of later generations, which made a catchphrase out of “*Carthago delenda est!*,” and was fastened onto notions of *metus hostilis* and moral decline, this debate really focused on *iusta causa*.

Though the exact diplomatic history prior to the war remains up for debate, it is at least clear that long-standing territorial disputes between Numidia and Carthage had erupted in open conflict by late 151 BCE. The timing was significant, since this was the final year of Carthage’s fifty-year indemnity owed to Rome in the ‘treaty of Zama.’ Whether or not this fifty-year term applied to all other conditions of the treaty requires further comparative study. Nevertheless, one clause in particular remained significant: that Carthage had been expressly forbidden to wage war in Africa without Rome’s permission. By engaging in independent, unsanctioned military conflict with Numidia, a Roman ally, Carthage had failed to comply with the treaty, and had opened up debate in Rome regarding *iusta causa*. Cato famously argued in favor, while Nasica denied that proper cause yet existed, perhaps pointing to a recent change in Carthaginian leadership and possible conciliatory gestures. Our surviving contemporary source (and friend of Scipio Aemilianus), Polybius, made the following observation regarding the controversy: “[the Romans] were looking for a suitable opportunity and a pretext that would appeal to foreign nations... their disputes with each other about the effect on foreign opinion very

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8 See Ager (1996; 2009).
9 E.g. Erskine (1994), who notes that Greek embassies experienced some difficulty identifying the exact source of Roman power for addressing their diplomatic missions. For other Greek responses to Roman behavior, see Gruen (1984: 337ff.).
10 The earliest extant use of the term *iusta causa* is in Cicero (*De Re Pub.* 2.17, 3.23; *De Off.* 1.11, 34-35, *De Rege Alex.* fr. 6). However, there is ample evidence regarding fetial law and the practice of *res repetere* to support the existence of a parallel notion during the ‘mid-Republic’. See Santangelo (2008), Ager (2009), and Yakobson (2009), all with extensive citations.
11 The earliest use of the slogan can be found in Pliny (*HN* 15.18.74). For other versions, see Cic. *De Senec.* 6.18; Nepos *Hamilcar* 2.1; Livy *Per.* 49.3; Vell. 1.13.1; App. 10.10.69; Florus 1.13.4 (echoing Pliny); Aur. *Vit.* *De Vir. Ill.* 47.8. Cf. Little (1934).
12 The fifty-year term for the indemnity is mentioned by Livy, 30.37 – see also Strabo 17.3.15. Unfortunately, the text in which Polybius described the final treaty has not survived.
13 Polyb. 15.18.8; see also Livy 30.37.4; App. *Pun.* 54; Dio 17.82.
nearly made them desist from going to war.” To Polybius as to other contemporary Greeks, an extended *iusta causa* debate may indeed have appeared strange, looking very much like a sham manipulation of their favor, rather than a sincere debate over whether to go to war. The former, Polybian assessment has since guided modern attitudes in a tendency to express distaste for Rome’s subsequent behavior as exceedingly aggressive and Machiavellian. Scholars have emphasized that Rome showed no signs of backing down, and may even have manipulated or been encouraged by Carthage’s surrender of arms and hostages in 150 BCE. The issuing of escalating demands, ending in “Censorinus’ ultimatum” that Carthage be completely relocated inland, are thus construed as diplomatic hyperbola, only thinly veiling a long-held plan to annihilate the city.

However, this reconstruction glosses over contemporary Roman practice and the very real difference between Greek *prophasis* (“pretext”) and Roman *iusta causa*. On the one hand, the issuing of demands reflected the well-worn practice of *res repetere*, through which Rome let it be known that injustice had been done to her by another state, and which remained crucial for establishing proper recourse to armed conflict. Disarmament and delivery of hostages was also standard practice in second-century BCE interstate relations, among Greek states and Rome alike. Both disarmament and hostages worked to confirm one state’s promise of adherence to, and honest intentions within an ongoing diplomatic exchange, and assurance against taking armed action. On the other hand, the end-result, that *iusta causa* discourse could win foreign favor, was for the Romans merely symptomatic of its truth, its legality confirmed through victory. Hatred of Carthage had long been a factor, but it did not blind Rome to the obstacles of ‘removing’ the enemy, or to the multiple options for doing so, including relocation. *Iusta causa* was more than a “pretext” for a single, predetermined goal. It was the root of divine sanction, and involved a process identifying what needed to be done, beyond playacting for the public sphere. Polybius’ account, though affected by his cultural perspective, nevertheless supports this reconstruction. Trying to find support for Rome, he argues that the Carthaginians made a foolhardy decision in submitting to Rome’s initial demands for *deditio*, with the thinking that handing over arms and hostages would prevent war. Instead, they had not only weakened their city, but had submitted it to the “sovereignty” of Rome. From this account, it is evident that the diplomatic steps

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15 Polyb. 36.2.
16 For more on Roman conceptions of *bellum iustum* see Albert (1980) and list of sources in Ager (2009: 15-16). For a comparison of Roman *bellum iustum* with Greek *polemos dikaios*, see Clavadetscher-Thürlemann (1985: 185ff.). For the existence of a Hellenistic discourse focused on recording the just cause(s) for war, see Chaniotis (2005: 177ff.).
17 E.g. Flower (2009: 70-71), in one of the most recent interpretations of 146 BCE, assessed Roman behavior as part of a “strikingly harsh and imperialistic new foreign policy” in which Carthage and Corinth “were completely razed to the ground”, though “neither posed a credible threat to Rome.” Other examples include Adcock (1946); Badian (1958: 125ff.); Hoffmann (1960); Harris (1979); Baronowski (1995: 31).
18 For Censorinus’ ultimatum, see Polyb. 36.7.1-5; Diod. 32.6.2-4; Livy Per. 49, Epit. 49.91-93; Flor. 1.31.8-9; App. Pun. 80-93; Oros. 4.22.3; Suda B320; Zon. 9.26. Astin (1967: 274) is one of the few modern scholars to suggest that the ultimatum could have been intended literally.
21 Polyb. 36.5/9.
leading toward possible war had already been decided, for in demanding deditio, the Senate must have determined iusta causa, with a state of war only confirmed by Carthage’s refusal to obey all demands and relocate. In the case of Corinth, the outbreak of war has been consistently portrayed as a tragic error, too harshly punished by Rome. This assessment, though correct in its emphasis on miscommunication, has nevertheless ignored the extent to which Rome’s international diplomacy was a matter of building precedents, concern over enemies amassing regional allies, and of warfare founded on iusta causa. Though lacking an extended or bloodied history of hatred, Corinth’s friendship with Rome had not run the smoothest course over the past half-century, and Rome remained wary of the possibility of Achaean aid to Macedon. Following the Third Macedonian War, the Achaean League had been asked to send hostages to Rome, as a diplomatic guarantee. In the meantime, issues over territory and governance within the League had persisted, and the Senate had repeatedly referred arbitration back to various Greek institutions, insisting on affirming Greek autonomy and on keeping their hands clean of Peloponnesian squabbles. Problems had continued, however, even after return of the ‘exiles’ in 150 BCE, and even as another Roman war with Macedon emerged. Embassies were sent to Corinth in 147 BCE to address disputes with Sparta. The first embassy warned of disbanding the League, and was met with angry demonstrations. The second issued a moderate rebuke, but failed to achieve any agreement. In the following year, the assembly at Corinth sidestepped Roman suggestions, and decided to enforce League governance with troops sent against Sparta and other rogue poleis. By leading the gathering of arms against the wishes of Rome, Corinth thus established the first grounds for a Roman bellum iustum. By marching these troops northward, bumping into Roman forces assigned with the task of re-organizing Macedon, and resisting these forces, the Achaens sealed the deal. As in the case of Carthage, the final transgression pushed Rome’s diplomatic line too far, and involved the unsanctioned use of military forces in a region of political concern. Mummius was assigned to the bellum Achaicum in spring 146 BCE.

Mummius’ appointment occurred at about the same time that Scipio was preparing his final assault on Carthage. Though these were separate occasions building at different junctures, their final duality could not have escaped notice. The allotment of Scipio’s command in the western political arena had been directed at removing one of Rome’s greatest enemies. Its ‘un-founding’ perhaps inspired the sanctioning of Mummius

22 E.g. Walbank (1949).
23 E.g. Gruen (1976: 46-48) and (1984: 523), originating in Polybius’ own emphasis on åtuxia (38.3.6-11). Harris (1979: 243) has even observed that, “the [Achaean] League could cause the Roman Senate no more anxiety than a wasp on a warm afternoon.”
24 Livy 45.35.1-2; Paus. 7.10.5-12; Just. 33.2.8; Zon. 9.31; cf. Gruen (1976: 49); Allen (2006).
26 Gruen (1976, 1984: 520ff.).
27 First embassy: Paus. 7.14; Just. 34.1.5; Flor. 1.32.2. Second embassy, and assessment: Polyb. 38.9. Collection of sources and discussion available in Ager (1996: 405-409 = no. 147).
28 On Achaean surprise, see Polyb. 38.16.11-12 (where the Achaean army is compared to a non-swimmer jumping into the sea, and only then considering how to get back onto dry land). See Gruen (1976: 65).
29 Gruen (1976: 66, n. 168), with brief analysis of the available sources (Paus. 7.15.1; Justin 34.2.1; Vell. 1.12.1; Vir. Ill. 60.1; Zon. 9.31)
and his decommissioning of the Achaean League’s leading city, in a symbolic gesture in the east. Both events were key moments in the transformation of Rome’s international political networks. For during this period, the term *imperium* did not refer to “empire” in the sense of a collective territorial entity. Instead, it denoted the individual authority—specifically the right to command troops—held by a magistrate on behalf of the Senate and people. This was because Rome’s international power was then a mixture of varied diplomatic and military relations, from incorporated Latin cities to treated allies to former combatants, all with different obligations and degrees of closeness to Rome. It was an adaptable set of structures, with a center, but no singular defined boundary delimiting its “holdings” within a coherent “state.” Furthermore, the term *provincia*—“province”—did not refer to an administrative territory, as it did in later generations. Instead, it referred to the allotted task for a magistrate with *imperium*, and was only tangentially geographical. More specifically, it was assigned with particular goals for asserting or confirming Roman authority, in relation to some diplomatic exchange, and possibly, to some injury or injustice earlier determined. Only gradually, then, over centuries, did the unified notion of a Roman “empire” coalesce. And within this process, the ‘un-founding’ of Carthage and Corinth (and creation of Roman *ager publicus* out of their lands) was recognized, even at the time, as a significant juncture.

Polybius is the key witness, and for him, the period from the 140th Olympiad onward (i.e. from the 2nd Punic War) was momentous in bringing together once disparate regions of the world. Polybius uses the term *symplókē*, or “weaving together,” to refer to this phenomenon fundamental to his “universal” history. He posits that, during his lifetime, the arenas of Italy and Africa, Greece and Asia had begun to interlock, ultimately inclining toward a single end (*telos*). The great histories of east and west had thus become “globalized” into one great body (*somatoeides*). Wars no longer broke out separately and unrelatedly, but were becoming “common to all” (*tas synteleias koinas*), and embassies, both peaceful and warlike, of Greece and Asia were looking to the west, to Rome and Carthage, and vice versa. It is for this reason that Polybius also interpreted Roman debates over *iusta causa* as closely connected with foreign opinion. In many ways, internal “domestic” debate was in the process of becoming international discourse. And in Polybius’ conceptual scheme, 146 BCE itself became a new end-point, and an opportunity for him to assess a newly minted “universal rule.” Leading Romans could not have missed these implications (Scipio, for example, was a close friend of Polybius), especially as the siege of Carthage reached its final climax and Mummius received his appointment to fight down the Achaean League, led by Corinth. Delayed celebration of

30 On the symbolic significance (especially among later authors) of removing the *polis*-status of Carthage and Corinth, see Purcell (1995).
32 E.g. regarding Roman Italy during this period, see articles in Jehne and Pfeilschifter, eds. (2006).
33 See Erdkamp (2007), and Richardson (2008).
34 For the creation of *ager publicus* from the territories of Carthage and Corinth, see *Lex agraria* 81, 89, 96; Cic. *Leg. Agr*. 1.5-6; Strabo 8.6.23. Thorough discussion of the relatively limited amount of Roman public lands acquired outside Italy during the Republic is available in Frank (1927: pp. 146-7 on Carthage).
35 Polyb. 1.3.3-4, 1.4.10-11.
36 Polyb. 1.3.4.
37 Polyb. 3.32.2/7, 2.12.7, 5.105.4; Walbank (1985): Ch. 20.
38 Polyb. 3.4, specifically 3.4.6.
the ludi saeculares in 146 BCE, celebrating the end of one age and the beginning of another, must have held special significance.\footnote{On the games held in 146 BCE, see Censorinus 17.11, citing the second-century BCE sources of Piso, Gellius, and Cassius Hemina.}

Here, then, was the first formulation of 146 BCE as a historical marker, in the words of a contemporary. For Polybius, it was the definitive moment of symploke, in which the cycle of world history, or anacyclosis, had reached a new climax. Using this latter model of constitutional growth and decay, he introduced a moral element to the fall of Carthage and Corinth, presenting them as tragic collapses from within as much as Roman triumphs. He described Carthaginian irrationality in the wake of unstable, even decadent and cowardly leadership, as ultimately caricatured by Hasdrubal.\footnote{On Hasdrubal, see Polyb. 38.7-8. These moralizing themes, regarding the decay of Carthage, are taken up with gusto by Livy and Appian: see Livy 33.45.7; App. Pun. 68ff., 86-89, 131.} And for the Achaeans he reserves the strongest criticisms, reviling the sheer madness of their mob-mentality, stirred up by corrupt, power-hungry demagogues.\footnote{Polyb. 38.12.4-5: themes espoused in Diod. 32.26.2-3; Strabo 8.6.23 (381-2). Cf. Eckstein (1995).} An entire book of the Histories (Bk. 6) is even devoted to investigating the current “mixed” constitution of Rome, as the foundation for her success, potentially able to escape the moral decline of anacyclosis. However, by presenting comparisons with the mixed constitutions of Carthage and Sparta, Polybius also leaves open the possibility that Rome as well become subject to Fate. He even hints at potential seeds of decline among the young Romans of his day, with their decadence, lust, and even shameful cowardice.\footnote{Polyb. 6.57: Polybius makes general prognostications here, though with Rome as the implied subject.} Only virtuous nobles like Scipio, a shining hero of the Histories, could hold back the latent tide of corruption and decay.\footnote{Polyb. 31.25.4-5; 35.4.} For these reasons, Polybius’ final scene of Carthage’s destruction was deeply charged with meaning.\footnote{Polyb. 38.21-22.} It dramatically presented Scipio shedding tears while watching the city burn, remarking that the moment made him dread “that some day the same doom will be pronounced on my own country.” Lines from the Iliad were then recited, presumably connecting the fated fall of Troy, not only with that of Carthage, but also with the one eventually awaiting Rome.\footnote{Iliad 6.448ff. See discussion of the relevant source fragments in Astin (1967), Appendices II and IV.} It was a theatrical flourish, at least on Polybius’ part, and it played well into current literary predilections for highly emotional, tragic reversal, and for theories of cyclical world history.\footnote{Possible contemporaneous epigrams making similar laments, regarding the fall of Corinth: Polystratus, Anth. Pal. 7.297; and Antipater of Sidon, Anth. Pal. 9.151. On the cycle of world empires, see the gloss of the early second-century BCE author, Aemilius Sura, in Vell. 1.6.6 (see below).} At the same time, it conveyed the notions that this moment was crucial to the cycles (and their moral grounding) of now fully interlocked histories of east and west.

Roman actions in 146 BCE were thus rooted in cultural attitudes of superiority and legal, divinely sanctioned support, but at the same time played to Hellenistic networks, establishing Rome as international arbiter by appealing to notions of cyclical history and polis identity. As such, the level of destruction – evident today in the archaeological record – shows that while both cities were legally ‘unfounded’, Carthage was subjected to large-scale, violent devastation, leaving behind meters-thick layers of
rubble, ash, and bone across the city. Corinth, on the other hand, was left with different physical remains: burning in a military storage building, removal of civic statues or commemorative monuments, possible damage to the central archaic temple, and demolition of at least one portion of the outer city walls. The former city was afflicted by all the fiery punishment repeated in Hellenistic histories, of urban capture after long siege (Alexander the Great being the main exemplar). The latter was punished in a manner commensurate with its less serious military opposition to Rome. In Polybius’ opinion, the main violence was done to looted artworks, as Roman soldiers played board games on the backs of renowned paintings. Physical enactment of destruction thus matched the legal, moralizing, and historizing rhetoric of Romans and the negotiated response of Greek literary circles.

Second-century BCE notions of cyclical history and moral decline thus fed into later, first century discourse, as conceptions of imperium and provinciae gathered more abstract, territorial, and administrative associations. Intellectuals looked to the topoi of imperial power, foreign influence, and moral decline and used them in their battles against each other. The Gracchan period in particular appears to have been transitional, shaping the concept of metus hostilis later espoused by Sallust. In the turmoil of 133 BCE and rivalry between Scipio Aemilianus and Tiberius Gracchus, notions that the elimination of Carthage had indeed given rise to ambitious demagogues and would-be tyrants surely became more prevalent. Scipio defended his name by transferring blame to Gracchus’ annexation of Pergamon, as bringing the evils of Greek luxury and effeminacy too close to the city. And about a decade later, following Gaius Gracchus’ failed attempt to establish a colony at Carthage, political opposition fomented and encouraged beliefs that a curse existed on the site—a subject that captured the imaginations of later Romans and moderns alike. By the first half of the first-century BCE, the destructions of Carthage and Corinth had achieved legendary status. For Cicero (who blamed Sulla for the moral decline of his day), Scipio and Mummius represented shining exemplars of

47 See Delattre (1896: 77-80) [mass grave of several hundred stacked bodies, found on Byrsa hill, second-century BCE date from coinage, cf. Lancel (1979: 21)]; Hurst (1979: 24ff.) [burning of military harbor ship-sheds]; Chelbi (1980: 34ff.) [burning of military harbor quarter on Byrsa, rue Astarte]; Rakob (1997: 56ff., 63) [burned rubble and debris of Late Punic period used as Augustan fill, up to 3.5m thick, over coastal district, rue Ibn Chabaat, with possible skeleton from destruction layer]; and Bechtold (2010: 48ff.) [Late Punic debris used as Augustan fill in coastal district, Bir Messouada].

48 See Scranton (1951: 175) [sling bullets and large stone catapult balls found in debris of North Stoa]; Edwards (1975: 190ff.) [wells filled-in during the early Roman period with debris, incl. ‘Mummian’ from second-century BCE, and ‘interim’ from first-century BCE]; Robinson (1976: 237) [rather inconclusive evidence for damage to Archaic Temple]; Williams (1977: 56-58, 73-77, no. 30 [S-3356], pl. 27) [burn-layer and abandonment of ‘strategion’ west of South Stoa, with a trophy erected nearby, reusing earlier Greek statue base]; Mattusch (2003: 223-224) [removal and discarding of two Greek victory monument bases from South Stoa]; and Romano (2003) [on possible dismantled section of city wall].

49 On the siege, capture, and destruction of cities in the Hellenistic historiographical tradition, see Kern (1999); Chaniotis (2005).

50 On this pattern of punishment commensurate with perceived injustice, see Burton (2011).

51 Polyb. 39.2.1-3, quoted by Strabo 8.6.28.

52 On this evolution, see Richardson (2008).

53 See Astin (1967); Lintott (1972).


55 For a general discussion of the evolved ‘rhetoric of destruction,’ see Purcell (1995).
the ‘former’ Roman virtues, of fides, mansuetudo, aequitas, and humanitas. Like his contemporary, Sallust, Cicero also amplified the notion of Carthage as “rival to empire” (aemula imperii), presenting the pair of Carthage and Corinth as insignia et infilae imperii. The two are also described as “eyes of the maritime face,” a rare pair capable of sustaining “the burden and reputation of world-empire.” Cicero also breathed new life into earlier Hellenistic themes of tragic reversal, romanticizing the elegiac gloom and emptiness of once-great cities. It was in the Augustan age, however, that the greatest transformations in 146 BCE’s legacy took place, as all of Rome’s various power-networks were channeled in the direction of one man. The Mediterranean system developed into a singular imperium Romanum, and for the first time, this term referenced a collective territorial entity. Geographical, administrative provinciae were linked to Rome via newly founded colonies across the Mediterranean, including Carthage and Corinth. Just over a hundred years (a saeculum) after 146 BCE, the tragedies and politically charged rhetoric associated with the pair was re-forged as part of the rebirth of Rome itself. It was at this point that 146 BCE truly crystallized as a temporal boundary. Exultant in Rome’s newly re-conceptualized imperium, Vergil’s Aeneid in particular connected world history to the saga of Rome, from the fall of Troy to the foundations of Carthage and Rome, to the fall of Carthage and Corinth, and to the rebirth of all three under a new golden age. Other writers of the period further amplified the scale and grandeur of 146 BCE: Strabo, for example, doubled the circuit-length of Carthage’s walls to equate them with legendary Babylon. Most importantly, however, intellectuals delved into world chronology and determined new synchronisms. Corinth had been destroyed in its 952nd year, while Carthage had been destroyed in its 672nd year, or its seventh saeculum, an age now surpassed by Rome in her celebration of the ludi saeculares in 17 BCE. These notices

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56 E.g. Cic. 2 Verr. 4; Pro Mur. 58, 66; De Off. 1.108; Vir.ill. 60.3; De Orat. 2.154; Verr. 2.2.86.
57 Sallust Cat. 10.1; see also Strabo 17.3.5 (832); Velleius 1.12.5-6; Appian 51. The topic is taken up by later authors – cf. Livy, Per. 52; Strabo 8.23; Dio fr.76 (regarding Mummius).
58 Cic. Leg.Agr. 1.5-6.
59 Cic. ND 3.91.
60 Cic. Leg.Agr. 2.87.
61 Cic. Leg.Agr. 1.2.5; 2.5; 2.87: Corinthi vesitigium vix relictum est; cf. Appian Pun. 135-6; also Plut. Mar. 40, on the imagery of Gaius Marius “amid the ruins of Carthage.”
62 Cic. Fam. 4.5.4
63 Diod. 32. 27, and 32.36-37, respectively.
64 Richardson (2008).
65 Cf. Diod. 32.37; Plutarch Caes. 57; Dio 43.50.3-5; Paus. 7.16.7-8; cf. Strabo 17.3.1.
66 E.g. Aen. 6.836ff. (Anchises’ revelation of Rome’s future, including both Mummius and Scipio in the procession of heroes); building of Carthage in Book1, followed by Aeneas’ tale of the burning of Troy in Bk. 2; Dido’s curse of hatred, of her (Carthaginian) people upon those of (Roman) Aeneas, in Bk. 4.
67 Strabo 17.3.14 (to a length of 365 stades!); compare Livy Per. 51; Appian Iber.15.98; and Dio’s description of Corinth’s epic scale (fr. 72).
68 Vell. 1.12.5-6; Livy Per. 51.
of age upon destruction made key connections with a theory popular during the Augustan era, of a succession of five world empires, from Assyria to Media, to Persia, Macedon, and ending in Rome. The concept was rooted in second-century BCE ideas, but it had become a leading principle for Augustan court-historians. Pompeius Trogus’ *Philippic Histories* was completely framed by it, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus opened his *Roman Antiquities* with it, adding that Carthage and Rome, as rivals for the west, had been founded in the same year.\(^{69}\) Velleius also structured his *History* around the principle, beginning with the fall of Assyria, and closing book I of II with Roman ascendancy in 146 BCE.\(^{70}\) And Livy, perhaps more subtly, placed the theory in the rhetorically prophetic words of Antiochus, noting that the ordained rise of Rome would involve the fall of the eastern kingdoms.\(^{71}\) Less subtle, however, was Livy’s use of 146 BCE as the endpoint for his first fifty books, which had begun with Aeneas’ landing in Italy.

East and west; foundation and destruction; justice and fate; cycles of decline and renewal: these were all ideas rooted in the original context of events in 146 BCE. Over time, however, this dual moment solidified into a major crux for Roman, even world history. What had begun as a perceived culmination in Mediterranean interconnectivity, of individual expressions of Roman diplomacy and magistrate-*imperium* becoming linked, had evolved into the accession of Rome to world kingdom. Its legal and moral issues continued as a sticking point for discussions of Roman power and its place in the scheme of decay and collapse. And its re-elevation alongside the ‘rebirth’ of Rome as a singular imperial entity, granted new life to Carthage and Corinth as ‘sister-colonies,’ sharing (at least on Roman terms) in the *imperium Romanum*. Thus, as the physical and conceptual boundaries of “Rome” as an “empire” shifted, so did (and so continues) the evaluation and rhetoric of coercive power at Carthage and Corinth.

Sarah Davies
University of Texas at Austin
Department of Classics

\(^{69}\) Dion. Hal. 1.2-4.1, 1.74.1 = FGH 566F60 (38yrs before 1\(^{st}\) Olympiad = 814 BCE). Cf. Kramer (2005); Purcell (1995).
\(^{70}\) Vell. 1.6.6-13, and 2.1ff.; Kramer (2005).
\(^{71}\) Livy 37.25.5-7 (cf. Polyb. 21.11.1-2).
Bibliography

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