Hijacked Identities: Silicon Valley Pakistanis and Tactics of Belonging

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In this paper, I ask how Pakistanis have been interpreting and responding to the post-9/11 construction of Muslim identities, or more broadly, how a transnational community responds when it has been marked as hostile. Looking primarily at two Pakistani community organizations in the technology region known as Silicon Valley in Northern California, I seek to answer this question with evidence from document analysis, participant observation, and in-depth interviews. I argue that the bright boundaries that exclude Pakistanis from acceptance, and which categorize them as a suspicious other, have been a catalyst for community identity construction and management. If assimilation is the decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences, then the examination of the ways by which an excluded community seeks to belong can help expose the boundaries of membership that a state erects against immigrant communities. Through such an examination, I have found that the Pakistani community in Silicon Valley has used performative tropes to contest racialized boundaries and to re-define their community (and any of its transnational endeavors or inclinations) as being within acceptable limits. Representations of themselves as “business-developers” and “secular-pluralists” show that their community is sincere about assimilating, and that any transnationalism is within the realm of assistance towards American geopolitical goals. Thus, one of the implications of my research is that a government, its media, and the public can influence an immigrant population to shape itself in ways that are friendly and amenable to (in this case) US ideologies.

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Introduction

For immigrants in the US, the current era of international tension has made homeland loyalties a hazardous endeavor. The possibility of transnational ties or attachments to shadowy “enemies of freedom” has meant that Muslims in the US, recent immigrants or not, and other “questionables” have faced scrutiny as being “with us or against us,” and have been bifurcated into “good Muslims” or “bad Muslims.” Mahmood Mamdani (2004) has described this emergent language as a “new round of culture talk” that joins terrorism and Islam and equates political tendencies with entire communities, which then require collective discipline and punishment. Rather than a terrorist-civilian distinction, “good Muslims” are differentiated from “bad Muslims,” creating a low threshold for seditious acts. For Pakistanis and other Muslim groups, this culture talk also includes a conflation of Pakistanis “here” (in the US) with a problematic conception of Pakistanis “there” (in Pakistan or the space of the Middle East identified as dangerous) – a conflation that identifies all Pakistanis as uneducated, reactionary fundamentalists that are anti-modernity. Culture talk creates an essentialized image of Muslims, where a group of people, in the broadest sense of membership, are understood as having a singular, static, categorical sameness – one that is negative, maleficent, and the binary opposite of the normal and good.

What are the effects of culture talk on immigrant communities? In this paper, I ask how have Pakistanis been interpreting and responding to the post-9/11 construction of Muslim identities? And, more broadly, how does a transnational community respond when it has been marked as hostile? Looking primarily at two Pakistani community organizations in the Northern California area encompassing the technology region known as Silicon Valley (aka South Bay), I
seek to answer these questions with evidence from participant observation, in-depth interviews, and document analysis. I argue that the Silicon Valley Pakistani community has been using specific identity tactics that challenge the dichotomizing discourses that have essentialized and vilified Muslims. By enacting overlapping business-capitalist and secular-pluralist identities, the community seeks belonging and traverses exclusionary boundaries to have their assimilatory and transnational claims accepted.

Representations

The US state has been erecting thorny boundaries around what it means to be an American. These boundaries evoke a sense of threat and the need to discriminate. Consequently, the state has been able to justify continued imperialism with the claim that civilizing projects are needed for protection. One mechanism of boundary creation is when the state and media essentialize the identities of some immigrants and make them hypervisible. These representations have induced among “normal” Americans a fear that lurking behind the façade of a “good Muslim” could be a terrorist intent on blowing them up in the name of “jihad.” For example, in 2006 the Editor-in-Chief of the U.S. News and World Report asserted, “The most insidious threat, of course is that of Muslims living in the West who decide to put religious fanaticism ahead of loyalty to their host country. None of us can assume we are not at risk from some alienated American-born Muslim male inflamed by the Internet or brainwashed in prison or by a radical mosque” (Sept. 25, 2006).

Interestingly, the above quote conflates the situation of Muslim immigrants in the US with those issues that are perhaps more salient to countries in Europe, where there are much more sizeable second-generation Muslim populations. Such a portrayal betrays the ignorance of
the US popular media about the Muslim population in the US, largely recent immigrants.

Moreover, the warning puts even the American-born into the category of terrorist. This is, in fact, the most insidious threat. Intensifying the sense of danger is the explicit reference to gender: the invocation focuses on a particular kind of man – one who is irrational, obsessive, and vengeful.¹

Similarly, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, Stephen Cohen (2003) writes:

> It will only be a matter of time before upper-class, educated Pakistanis living abroad will come to share the belief held by all extremist Pakistani Muslims that there is a conflict of civilizations between Islam and the West, or at least between Pakistani Muslims and U.S. citizens and their allies, including the Pakistani government itself.

Cohen evokes Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* thesis and the inevitability that “upper-class, educated Pakistanis” could support terrorists, if not become extremists themselves. Even those Pakistani immigrants who might appear to have assimilated will always harbor ulterior motives. Sleeper-cell narratives evoke the imagery of the lurking terrorist hiding behind shirt and tie ready to blow (invariably) himself – and “us” – up.

Despite having gone to the best schools and working for the best corporations, middle-upper class Pakistanis in the US have found themselves targeted and painted as potential terrorists. Many of these transnational elites have attended Western educational institutions, and work for high-profile multi-national corporations (MNCs), but find their class attainment is not enough to keep them safe from being grouped with the more stereotypical understanding of a Pakistani Muslim extremist: someone poor, uneducated, and against the American way of life.

While this specific archetype is troublesome in its own right, the collapse of all Pakistanis into an oversimplified portrayal is another example of the way discourses construct oversimplified notions that allow surveillance and control.

¹ This example also associates the idea of a Muslim terrorist (popularly understood as Arab or South Asian) with the African-American Muslim population, which plays upon fears of black males and draws a line around “us” and “them”: those afraid of blacks, Muslims, and immigrants, and those in the fear-causing categories.
Background on Pakistanis in the US

Since late 2001, the US government has been detaining people – mainly immigrants – as possible terrorists and resorting to extraordinary rendition to escape charges of illegality. Very little is known about the detainees, but in the first eleven months after 9/11 the Office of the Inspector General (the internal watchdog of the Department of Justice) reviewed the cases of 762 individuals and found that although all of the hijackers were Saudi Arabian in nationality, the largest number of those detained were Pakistani, equaling about 33 percent of detainees, or more than double the number of those from any other country (Office of the Inspector General 2003).²

Figure 1, to the right, provides a visual for the different nationalities detained, where “all other” includes such nationalities as Moroccan, Tunisian, Syrian and Guyanese.

While much of the post-9/11 research in the US has focused on Muslims or Arabs, little has been written about specific immigrant nationalities.³

Pakistanis make up the single largest national immigrant contingent of American Muslims, comprising 17 percent of all Muslims in the US⁴ (Nimer 2002, CAIR 2005).

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² The investigation revealed that the FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) “made little attempt to distinguish” between immigrants who had potential ties to terrorism and those who were merely swept up by chance in the course of the federal investigations. Detainees were taken and held as a result of private citizens’ tips to the authorities. These tips were frequently based solely on appearance.

³ In contrast to what many Americans assume, Pakistanis are not Arabs or Middle Eastern.

⁴ If the category was “South Asian,” the percentage would increase to one third of US Muslims.
number of Pakistanis in the US is estimated to be no more than half a million (estimates range from 212,471 [2005-07 American Community Survey]\(^5\) to 480,000 or more [Pakistan Embassy]). They are a young and relatively new community of immigrants. The majority (70 to 77 percent) are under the age of 44 (2005-07 ACS) and have been in the US for less than two decades; nearly half have resided in the US for slightly more than a decade (Najam 2006). Pakistani immigrants are also by and large extraordinarily well-educated and wealthy: over 50 percent of those 25 years of age or older have at least a college degree\(^6\) and almost a fourth have a graduate or professional degree (2000 Census, 2005-07 American Community Survey). Estimates of the aggregate annual income of Pakistanis in North America is at around $25 billion, their accumulated wealth is around $100 billion, and their combined savings is more than $6 billion (Burki 2005).

It is by now obvious that portrayals of and policies directed at a particular group as being poor, resentful, and fanatical, stand in stark contrast to the actual community comprised largely of well-educated, resourceful, and cosmopolitan individuals. The incongruity between these dichotomous representations leads us to ask how it developed and whose purposes it serves.

**Theory**

According to scholars such as Saba Mahmood (2005), Western epistemology is dichotomizing and has too often characterized other societies as “premodern.” While Western culture is represented as dynamic, modern, creative, and expressive of what it means to be human, Muslim culture is painted as habitual, instinctive, and as activity emanating from a

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\(^5\) This is for the category “Pakistani alone or in any combination.” The ancestry question lists 263,458 individuals as having been born in Pakistan.

\(^6\) Including those with associate degrees and “some college” accounts for nearly 70 percent of those over age 25.
mummified religion. According to the culture talk about Islam, Muslims – rather than making culture – conform to and are shaped by an unchanging set of practices and beliefs into which they have been born. The identification and analysis of dualisms such as these, an analytical framework generated perhaps most famously by Edward Said (1978), provides a fruitful starting point for understanding the processes of immigrant racialization. Dualisms are co-constituting – one is defined against the other – and in this case, good Muslims are situated against bad Muslims; suspicious, Middle-Eastern appearing, foreigners against loyal Americans.

This dichotomizing culture talk conflates the representation of Pakistanis here (in the United States) and there (an ambiguous amalgamation of terrorist harboring states including Pakistan and the Middle East). The representation of Pakistanis there diminishes the diversity of identities and multi-layered citizenship\(^7\) to a singular narrative that creates an image of Muslims who are, as discussed above, fundamentalist traditionalists set against change. These cultural constructions create an all-encompassing feeling of threat for Americans, and solidify exclusionary boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable immigrants.

Alba and Nee (2003) argue that ethnicity must be recognized as a social boundary in a viable definition of assimilation; the boundary should feel concrete, and assimilation occurs on both sides of the boundary. That concreteness is embedded in a variety of social and cultural differences between groups and is based on distinctions individuals make, those that shape their actions and mental orientations towards others. Alba and Nee define assimilation as the decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences; thus “assimilation” occurs as the salience of these distinctions becomes attenuated, and the occurrence of distinction becomes fewer and increasingly irrelevant. Alba (2005) goes on to hypothesize that associated

\(^7\) Yuval-Davis (1999) defines multi-layered citizenship as the way “citizenship in collectivities—local, ethnic, national, state, cross or trans-state and supra-state—is affected and often at least partly constructed by the relationships and positionings of each layer” (119).
with the prospects and processes of assimilation and exclusion, are the differences between “bright” and “blurred” boundaries. Bright boundaries are defined as having an unambiguous distinction; individuals always know on which side they stand. In contrast, blurry boundaries have an ambiguous boundary location, and thus self-presentation and social representations are involved. Alba contends that different histories of minority groups and receiving societies carry over into boundary construction. Boundaries are path dependent, and the nature of the boundaries affects the likelihood and nature of assimilation— but specificity about those processes is lacking.

Despite this theorizing, there is in general a lack of knowledge around the mechanisms of boundary activation, maintenance, dispute, crossing, dissolution, etc. (Lamont and Molnár 2002). This conversation is missing a detailed understanding of how institutional and political constraints affect immigrant groups; how groups respond to being conceived of as different and other and the implications of that othering.

Through such moves as detentions, special registration, and the Patriot Act, the US state has shaped the representation of Arabs and Muslims here to include all Muslims, anyone from the Middle East, and many from South Asia, irrespective of class and at times, even of US-citizenship. That is to say, the often parallel discourses of the government, media, and public, operate to draw a bright boundary between “them” and “us” by defining a transnational identity or multi-layered citizenship as dangerous for Pakistanis. State suspicions are allowed to take on larger dimensions because having these hyphenated identities (Pakistani-American, Muslim-American) are underlined and identified as threatening. Understanding how a community deals with the double-bind—of, on the one hand, hostile treatment from the receiving country, and, on
the other, restraint on relationships with their home country – is needed to more fully flesh out
the immigration literature and the research on boundaries.

My research shows how immigrants encounter and grapple with confining boundaries, providing evidence to advance and add to immigration theory. I center my research on the Pakistani community in and around Silicon Valley, and on the question, how does this elite group in particular work to create a community identity? How have Pakistani immigrants in the US been experiencing and responding to the bright boundaries drawn to distinguish them as others? And how have they been managing their identities in the context of negative portrayals of immigrants and changing geopolitics?

**Methods**

The site of my research is the Silicon Valley area, where 14 percent of the world’s venture capital flows (equal in size to the UK), and where one of the largest foreign-born populations in the US lives and works (SV Index 2007). Fourteen percent of science and engineering employees in the area are South Asian (2000 Census), thus the area accounts for a large percentage of the Pakistanis in the US, many of whom are H-1B visa workers in the high-tech industry (South Asian American Policy & Research Institute 2005). While they are not representative of the Pakistani population in the US writ large – these immigrants are wealthy, educated, and cosmopolitan – they still make up an estimated half of the Pakistanis in the US. This group is part of a technology-oriented “brain circulation,” courted by the Pakistani government and others for expertise, representation abroad, and remittances.

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8 Over half of these jobs are filled by immigrants.
To tap into this population, my research focused on two of the leading South Bay Pakistani organizations, notable for their recognition amongst the Pakistani community and for their extensive organizing: The Organization for Pakistani Entrepreneurs (OPEN) and The Pakistani-American Cultural Center (PACC). These are the only enduring Pakistani-named organizations in the Bay Area with an active membership and regular events. OPEN, founded in the late 1990’s, has chapters across the globe (many located in the US), and the Silicon Valley chapter (OPEN-SV) is the largest and strongest. The second organization, the PACC (founded in 2005) claims status as the first Pakistani American cultural center in the US with a mission “To educate and promote Pakistani languages, literature, history, and culture to all Americans irrespective of country of origin, with a specific emphasis to Americans of Pakistani descent” (PACC website 2008). I have also “virtually observed” two other Pakistani organizations: Developments in Literacy (DIL, which means “heart” in Urdu) and Pakistani Professionals for Peace. DIL is a US-based educational non-profit, and its substantive position in Silicon Valley is social, centered around fundraising efforts. There is significant overlap between these three organizations (OPEN, PACC, DIL), particularly in terms of class. Pakistani Professionals for Peace seems to only exist as a discussion-based list-serve and is part of The Association for Pakistani Professionals (AOPP), whose goal is to dispel negative media about Pakistan.

At these sites, the methodology for my research project consists of several parts: participant observation (of OPEN SV Chapter, and PACC meetings and events), in-depth interviews (a snowball sample of mostly professional Pakistanis in the Bay Area using OPEN and the PACC as launch points), and discourse analysis (of documents and media from OPEN, PACC, AOPP, and DIL). Besides offering me an opportunity to meet people to interview or talk

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9 By virtual observation, I mean that I have studied their websites, publicity materials, newsletters, and other materials that can be obtained online.
about my project in the moment, participant observation via attending various events provided insight into how people discuss the Pakistani community amongst themselves and in relation to the broader public. The in-depth interviews helped me more fully understand the mechanisms by which a community identity is created, and whether and how a community deals with contestation – both externally and internally. The interviews also illuminated the different types of discrimination or pressures people have faced, particularly with respect to their individual or community identity. Through discourse analysis I unpacked the language the various organizations used to describe their events, activities, mission, and other aspects of their organization, providing further insight into how the community conceives of itself, its roles and responsibilities, and its relationship to the US and Pakistan. In addition to websites, list-serves, and multimedia resources, my analysis includes a 30 page document, titled “Re:Present: Blueprint for Recasting Pakistan’s Image in the US” (hereafter referred to as the “Blueprint”). The OPEN leadership wrote this in 2005 and it is, in essence, an outline of the perceived assimilatory challenges their community faces and how they plan to address these challenges. Given the stature of the authors and their involvement in the Pakistani community here (and there – in Pakistan), the document serves as a useful framework for understanding the agendas of transnational elites for their immediate community (and perhaps even their homeland).

**Situating Pakistani Identity / Identity Tactics Overview**

Scholars discuss identity as fluid, layered, and changeable (Nagel 1994, Soysal 1994, Lie 2004, Waters 1999), but an individual does not simply “put [it] out into the world”: they have to deal with identities imputed upon them (Taylor 1994). For Muslim Americans, their most

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10 For this paper, I have conducted 18 interviews, at about two hours each, with OPEN and PACC leadership, general members, and individuals of limited involvement in either organization.
important problems are “discrimination,” “being viewed as terrorists,” “ignorance about Islam,” and “stereotyping” (Pew Research Center 2007).11 The authors of the Blueprint have recognized those boundaries that transitively link “Pakistan” with “terrorist”: “Due to association with largely negative public perceptions of Pakistan and Muslims, Pakistani Americans are also perceived negatively in the US and in the West in general” (Blueprint, Introduction, 3).

Questioning the mechanisms of boundary creation, the authors suggest that interests drive the negative imagery of Pakistan: “Pakistan is self-identified as a Muslim country, and most Pakistani Americans are Muslim-named. The ‘war on terror’ is targeted against radical militants associated with Islam, and the well-funded PR connected with the war effort therefore supports a negative view of Pakistan” (Blueprint, Special Considerations, 5). The authors voice the feeling that the boundaries around Muslims are calculated and serve the purposes of those at the helm of the “war on terror.” Stressing that “prejudices, racism, and Islamophobia are tangible expressions of the hard reality of Western societies,” Ramadan (2004) asserts that “increasingly, and for a considerable period, [US Muslims] will have to become accustomed to facing political security measures, discrimination, accusations of ‘double-talk,’ menacing, malevolent looks, and acts of surveillance and control” (226). One of the mechanisms of control is the battle over Muslim representation, where Muslims are “pressed to find a spokesperson for Muslims lest something should emerge not to the liking of authorities” (251-2). Indeed, this tension finds itself in OPEN and PACC’s mobilization, where one of the motivating reasons for action is the feeling of having bright boundaries placed around their community:

[T]he increased spotlight, post 9-11 on Pakistan and on Muslim nations has given rise to new stereotypes and accentuated existing stereotypes. Pakistan’s image is now a very direct issue for Pakistan-born immigrants in the US, as civil rights and freedoms look more vulnerable than ever before. Standing on the sidelines is no longer an option. While there are plenty of instances of success among Pakistani expatriates, there is a severe dearth of published accounts of these stories.

11 Problems that dominate the concerns of the public at large barely make the list: less than 2 percent volunteer “economic and job worries.”
What we need is “positive” relationship building based on balanced information and understanding of the potential and actual contributions to American society by Pakistani-Americans (Blueprint, Background, 4).

This excerpt demonstrates that for Pakistanis in the US, the “spotlight” on their community has been a call to action in respect to group representation. The group in need of representation is on “Pakistan-born immigrants,” though the spotlight is on their country of origin, not themselves. This, in addition to the “expatriate” word choice (implying they still belong to Pakistan), suggests both their awareness of outsider status based on nationality and place of origin, and that their primary sense of belonging is to Pakistan. Their solution for dealing with Pakistan’s image is to point out the contributions their community makes and could make, and to emphasize their attachment to America.

To signal belonging and wishes of inclusion, the founder of the PACC, Farhad, very consciously included “American” in the naming of the community center. When I asked him why he started the center and, in particular, why he included “American” in the title, he responded with a narrative about his father’s death shortly before 9/11. Farhad’s father had been claustrophobic, and Farhad (also claustrophobic) compared his nightmares (his father trapped in his coffin) with the feeling he experienced as a Muslim immigrant in the US after 9/11. Farhad had felt enclosed, anxious and afraid: “After September 11, the Muslim picture… on the community there was huge pressure. Everyone who was Muslim was suddenly suspect. Before that it was totally opposite, people could say whatever was on their mind. So there was a big shift. … Personally, I started feeling a lot of pressure.” I asked him to elaborate and before responding, he remarked that he had been a software engineer at the time: “If I see a cop behind me… if I am sitting in my workplace and people are walking around with their walkie-talkies… I’ll feel that somebody is coming to get me. Those types of feelings were there. Not sure how
many people were feeling it, but it was a very intense experience for me. And I haven’t done anything (laughs)!”

After being detained and interrogated at an airport in Florida, Farhad felt frustrated and paralyzed – an attitude he said was shared within the Pakistani community – “that feeling that somebody isn’t letting you do something.” Such experiences led to anger, which motivated him to “instead of staying in hiding, to go out and do a very public thing.” To show a “different face” of the community, Farhad switched careers to produce a television program featuring business and tech-savvy Pakistanis. The success of the show empowered him to “keep doing bigger things,” something that would be even more effective in shaping a positive Pakistani community identity. This led to the creation of the PACC, conceived of as a “launch pad for new Pakistanis” and serving the function of assimilatory training: immigrants could join a community actively participating in American culture, still celebrate Pakistani heritage and cultural traditions, and learn how to secure their stay in the US (e.g., investing and retirement seminars).

Belonging is more than just social locations, constructions of identities, and attachments. It is also about the ways an individual’s or a group’s positionality and identity assertions are valued and judged (Yuval-Davis 2006, 203). As such, contesting terrorist connotations involves allies outside of the group; as an example, the incoming president of OPEN, Adil, gave an introductory talk to volunteers in February 2007, and encouraged them to try and get more people involved in OPEN:

OPEN is first and foremost, a networking organization. Sure, we have Pakistani in our name, but that does not mean this should be a club exclusive to only Pakistanis. It will be better for us as a community to get more people involved in our events – they’re valuable! Bring your co-workers and friends to a meeting. We have a lot of success in our community and we need to show that off, and show to people we are driven and work in the best companies and are very entrepreneurial, educated, nice, (sardonically, and with great emphasis) NORMAL people.
Through a variety of ways, Adil was suggesting the means by which boundaries can be relocated. Not only are Pakistanis “normal” (implying that they are perceived as abnormal), they are “nice” and smart. They are people one would want to know, especially for business-related reasons. The quote above provides a window into how Pakistanis wish to be portrayed versus how they have been portrayed – not normal or modern, but fanatical and dangerous.

As the above examples demonstrate, Pakistanis in Silicon Valley are creating a collective identity of their own constituted by a dialectical interplay of internal and external definitions (Jenkins 1996). The bright, exclusionary boundaries marking Pakistanis as dangerous have been a catalyst for community identity construction and management. If assimilation is the decline of an ethnic distinction (and its corollary cultural and social differences), then the examination of the ways an excluded community seeks to belong can help expose what characteristics membership and belonging supposedly entail.

Through such an examination, I have found that the Pakistani community in Silicon Valley has engaged in a performative discourse to counter the dominant, but misrecognized definition of their community, and instead get people to know and recognize a new, legitimate definition. The performative discourse has two core tropes, and I am using the term “identity tactics” to help explain the narratives a group tells about itself to achieve specific means. Using Spivak’s concept of strategic essentialism and de Certeau’s conceptual differentiation between a strategy and a tactic,12 I argue that identity tactics can be understood as the temporal maneuvers people (individuals, groups, or communities) use to represent themselves and to contend with

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12 Modifying the “strategic essentialism” term (Guha and Spivak 1988; Spivak, Landry, and MacLean 1996) with tactics (de Certeau 1984) results in “tactical essentialism”: varying types of central identities groups highlight about themselves. Strategic essentialism is a sort of political tool groups can use to temporarly represent themselves to achieve a short term goal. In contrast to essentialism’s permanent linking of essences to a group, what marks strategic essentialism is that the “essential attributes” are self-consciously defined by the group itself rather than outside oppressors. “Tactics” are the calculated actions of the subordinated; they “play on a terrain imposed on it and organized by the law of a foreign power.” Strategies are the technocratic rationalizations associated with institutional forces (de Certeau 1984: 36-7).
boundaries confining them to portrayals not of their own creation. The climate of suspicion has pressured the Pakistani community to respond to “good Muslim” / “bad Muslim” state-constructed discourses, and they have done so by deploying “business-developer” and “secular-pluralist” identity tactics. People use them individually and at the community level, and respondents have indicated that they feel a certain pressure to take on these identities and that there is a reward for doing so. These identity tactics are overlapping, not mutually exclusive, and are used to demonstrate that this immigrant population is dedicated to assimilation and that any transnational activity is helpful (or at the very least, not hazardous) for American security.

**Business-Developer Identity Tactic**

In contestation of the boundaries situating the stereotyped Muslim as irrational, pre-modern, and anti-development, Pakistanis in the Bay Area have employed the “business-developer” identity to be perceived as successful professionals and rational capitalists who advocate developing Pakistan in a way that is friendly to US interests. To convey their eagerness to assimilate, Silicon Valley Pakistanis have “marketed” themselves (expanding their community exposure) as having mastered the language and techniques of business. Similarly, those with relationships to and in Pakistan have sought to demonstrate that attachment to Pakistan is good for their new home: contrary to the accusation of disloyalty, they have shown how their developmental desires have translated to efforts to improve and reform Pakistan to be a neoliberal partner in global capitalism. In both instances, the emphasis is on how members of the Pakistani community have represented and re-presented themselves to US society, how they seek to demonstrate their belonging through identity tactics.
Members and especially leaders of both organizations (OPEN and PACC), in interviews and during public events, spoke about “marketing” Pakistan or the Pakistani community. The community needed a different “brand,” they argued, because the current brand of the community was the essentialized portrayal of Pakistan (and Pakistanis) as hostile to America. As the authors of the Blueprint noted: “Certain current realities must be acknowledged upfront. In particular there are PR and Marketing efforts underway that are in opposition to the goal of the Re:Present project to improve Pakistan’s image” (Blueprint, Special Considerations, 5). The use of business language – particularly the use of the term “marketing” – indicates that the authors think someone may be profiting from Pakistan having a bad image. Discussing dueling PR campaigns creates sides – professional Pakistanis on the one hand, and the US administration and neoconservatives on the other. As to who the leaders of the Re:Present project are, the Blueprint reveals them as: “[A] group of Pakistanis and Pakistani Americans with strong business leadership experience. The NSG has a board of directors as well as a board of advisors. The executive and operating teams that shall be put in place for the Re:Present Project as a whole and for the individual initiatives, will report to the NSG which will provide governance and oversight” (Blueprint, Neo-Strategy Group, 6).

When I asked Maqil, the president in early 2007, what or who the NSG was, he laughed and said it was an inside joke; it stood for “Neo-Strategy Group” and was a play on the term “neo-con.” Despite the punning, naming the group indicates that Maqil and other OPEN Charter members see themselves as community leaders capable of garnering wide support. As community organizers, to “best represent the community,” they structure themselves like a typical corporation with a board of directors, board of advisors, and executive and operating

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13 The OPEN Charter group is invite-only. Their members tend to be high-profile and well off; members pay an annual $500 membership fee in addition to providing funding for events and outreach.
teams. Not only is the community delineated as those who have strong business experience; leading the community is treated like a business plan. In the manner of soliciting venture capital, Maqil asked various Charter members to chip in a few thousand dollars to get the Re:Present project off the ground, raising about $60,000.

The types of stereotypes the NSG seeks to counter are the ideas that Pakistanis or Muslims are “against the American way of life” and anti-development, especially with regard to institutions of the West. To question or disagree with neoliberal development would render an immigrant suspect, especially one from such a frontier of “underdevelopment” like Pakistan, and it would demonstrate they are pre-modern, knowingly or not, rejecting what would be good for them and their people. So it is an assimilatory advantage of Pakistanis to emphasize that they do wish to contribute towards a certain type of development, one perceived to benefit all involved.

These capitalists, using the business-developer identity tactic, try to make clear the message that assimilation to American values is not mutually exclusive from maintaining transnational connections to Pakistan. This is so because wanting to “improve” Pakistan through corporate development and introducing freedoms of the market and consumption, demonstrates not a disavowal of attachment to the US, but an appreciation for and immersion in the American way of life. Being a harbinger of capitalist development distinguishes the transmigrant as someone who consents to and seeks the transmission of knowledge and way of life from the North to the South. Rather than being a threat to security, the Pakistanis try to prove through the business-developer identity tactic that their connection to Pakistan is acceptable, preferred, and even strategic for geopolitical reasons. While many Pakistanis have attested to some of the difficulties of maintaining a physical connection to Pakistan (such as being stopped and searched in airports, especially), doing so with the clear intention of contributing to a future Pakistan
compatible with US interests argues for the recognition that transnational Pakistanis can be an asset to American businesses and thus, American security.

By employing this development framework, Pakistani migrants demonstrate how their role in developing Pakistan can potentially shift US-Pakistani relations. For example, at the 2007 OPEN Forum, the founder of Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), Syed Babar Ali,14 gave the keynote address on the importance of entrepreneurship to philanthropic work, advocating the creation of Western-style schools and technical universities in Pakistan. Telling the audience to use their location in Silicon Valley to their advantage, Babar Ali urged, “Go make not a million dollars, but a billion dollars!” This was met with chuckles, and Dr. Ali’s quick and gleeful rejoinder, “And then write [LUMS] a fat check!” was met with more appreciative laughter.

In the Blueprint, two motives drive community organizing: the threat to civil liberties and the lost offshore outsourcing opportunities. Pakistani-American organizations and individuals, because of their access to Pakistani labor markets, need to be “marketed as viable business partners to the West…. The impact of our poor image in the US has not been tackled head on: until this is done, it will undermine our ability to benefit from the outsourcing phenomenon” (Blueprint, Background, 4). Hamid, a microchip engineer in his early thirties, further explained that organizing the community would help create positive recognition of entrepreneurial Pakistanis, so access to industry could be translated into development in Pakistan: “We need to build up Pakistan’s image in terms of business. China, India – the big companies have established major design centers there. But Pakistan isn’t a part of that. So we are trying to establish trust so we can replicate it in our own country. That’s how industry was built up in

14 Besides LUMS, Babar Ali is a serial entrepreneur and has served as the President of the World Wildlife Federation and as Pakistan’s Minister of Finance, Economic Affairs, and Planning. Source: http://www.tie.org/
China and India – the people and immigrants here established that trust” (Interview, August 2007).

Besides refuting the notion that Pakistanis are “bad Muslims,” this kind of exposure benefits an exclusive cadre of the community who use the business-developer identity tactic to simultaneously further capitalistic and philanthropic goals. For example, expressing interest in and promoting “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) is a way that Pakistanis can show they belong to the places they work. Corporations perceive CSR as a priority to pursue for economic and social reasons (Lee 2007), and the case of Pakistan offers both the potential of profit and developing a “troubled” part of the world. For many Pakistanis, there is a wish, if not active commitment, to “give back” to Pakistan, which works in partnership with a more selfishly oriented profit motive.

An OPEN volunteer meeting in February of 2008, held at one of the glass and steel buildings on the SAP campus in Palo Alto, California, featured the types of conversations underlining this point. On a gray Saturday, about 20 people (mostly men, ranging in age from early thirties to early sixties) wearing business casual discussed the importance of creating a perception of Pakistan as being a good place to invest and how the tumultuous politics there made it difficult to do business. Standing at the front of a bright and airy “classroom,” populated with about 40 modern black leather chairs on hidden wheels (with ergonomic, adjustable pullout desks), a Charter member stood in front of the group and complained, “How many weekends have we all spent worrying about the future of Pakistan? I have a business there with 15 employees, but my wife won’t let me go – I am not allowed to go there!” In response, a chic woman in her late twenties said, “Faiz, you have a business there because you want to help…”
but she was quickly interrupted by Faiz shaking his head no with a mischievous smile on his face. He then exclaimed impishly, “It’s cheap!” and everyone laughed.

Before the escalation of violence in Pakistan, marked by bombings at the Islamabad Marriott and the assassination of Benazair Bhutto, those with transnational ties to Pakistan hoped to deflect the negative reputation that some of them thought Pakistan unfairly had. The assumption then, was that through the deployment of the business-developer identity tactic, the American public could be manipulated and, with effort, the Pakistani community could reframe the representation of themselves and their country. This was not so much of a pipedream considering that an elite transnational Pakistani diaspora can call the shots in their country of origin to quite an extent. According to the Blueprint:

This project will not defend, explain, or be an apologist for Government of Pakistan policies. However, we start with a commitment to (and support of) our home country that is unequivocal, and a desire to improve it in any way we can. As Pakistan struggles with its “business model,” an effective Image makeover plan will have the beneficiary side effect of giving Pakistan PR cover, under which to improve the reality on the ground (Blueprint, Guiding Principles, 5).

As the planners of a makeover, these Pakistanis saw themselves as leading Pakistan’s development, “marketing it,” and being in charge of representing the positive aspects of Pakistan to the rest of the world, especially the US. Similarly, the Blueprint authors saw themselves, and those the project was intended for, as conduits for neoliberal globalization in so far as “PR cover” would allow Pakistan to improve their “business model” – a curious coding of Pakistan’s civil instability.

However, the way the community has dealt with the flashpoint of Pakistan’s well-publicized downfall illustrates the rapidity with which identity tactics can rework themselves, 

15 During a conference, the “danger” in Pakistan was compared to that of India – people complained that the US media covered events in Pakistan with more drama than events in India.
and the impact that geopolitical events can have on an immigrant community. One of the authors of the Blueprint, Siraj, talked frankly about the change in tactics:

This plan, it’s not applicable anymore! We have to face the facts that Pakistan is going to hell, and we have to do something about that. We can’t pretend that with just a little fixing, it will be a good business environment. Pakistan has always had problems, but from an immigrant’s perspective – my perspective – we need to do more politically. Use our connections in Washington and take a more hands-on approach – contribute more to the building blocks that Pakistan so desperately needs, education, basic infrastructure (Interview, August 2007).

The community feels no choice but to deal openly and vocally with the center stage Pakistan has taken in global power struggles. Events that take on a geopolitical significance have an effect on an immigrant community, their means of assimilating, and how transnationalism is sustained. Identity tactics are just that, tactics – the art of finding and implementing means to achieve particular immediate or short-term aims. The renunciation of certain parts of the Blueprint – particularly the “re-branding” aspect – is an example of how immigrants maneuver the changing situations from the reverberations of states’ affairs.

**Secular –Pluralist Identity Tactic**

The Pakistani organizations I observed have worked on bringing middle-class transnational people together and creating a community identity based around pro-secularism and pluralism. Articulating these orientations, the secular-pluralist identity tactic is an attempt to blur or erase the boundary of unacceptability, and instead mark themselves as “good Muslims.” The details of doing so have involved distancing themselves from Islam religiously – though accepting it culturally – emphasizing their secularity, enthusiasm for pluralism and diversity, and championing women’s equality in the public sphere. The outcome of using the secular-pluralist
identity tactic in their transnational encounters (and representations of them) is demonstrative of how “bad Muslim” boundaries inform this immigrant group’s actions.

Secularity as a key aspect of people’s identities was something I heard over and over again; many of the Pakistanis I spoke with identify as secular, some strongly so. Some explained being secular as being agnostic, or not being religious, and expressed their religious preferences and practices within the context of pluralism – that what and how they chose to worship should not matter to anyone else because spirituality is something personal. Respondents said they never went to masjid even when they were in Pakistan; going to mosque or being religious was not something they grew up doing. These answers hinted at a constructed distinction between these Pakistanis and the broader Muslim category – those from upper-class families eschewed Islam and its accompanying negative stereotypes – and subtly or not, secularity was linked to class status.

This internal boundary drawing was a goal of the Re:Present project and for the organization as a whole. Not long after he sent me the Blueprint, I had a phone conversation with Siraj, OPEN’s president in early 2007, as he was waiting for a flight. I asked him why the Blueprint was created and what the Re:Present project was about, and he clarified: “A group is emerging among the organization that realizes that Pakistani-Americans need to take charge of our destinies and create our own image in the US. The Pakistani-American identity is getting hijacked in various ways by other Muslims, and while these well-meaning individuals have good intentions, they are just not the best faces the community has to offer. OPEN can deliver better results than these well-meaning organizations” (Interview, January 2007). Siraj went on to talk about how people had the wrong idea about Pakistanis, because of their misinterpretations about Muslims. He said the Pakistani community needed to distinguish itself, both for American
society and for itself. That is, “people need to know more about the successes within the Pakistani community and realize they have a lot to be proud of”; Pakistanis are productive members of society and have made many positive contributions to the US. Pakistanis should be proud to tell people they are Pakistani and that “being Pakistani means more than just being Muslim.” Siraj continued, “Yes, of course, many Pakistanis are Muslim, but that does not mean that all are. And certainly there are many Pakistanis who are quite secular, myself included, who are far from strict adherents to Islam.” According to Siraj, the US media had picked up on a few voices who claim to speak for Pakistanis in the US, and groups such as OPEN had a responsibility to show another, “better” side of the community. Showing that a group of “affluent, educated and successful” Pakistanis exists would help to continue developing a critical mass of “similarly minded people who have disassociated themselves with community because of the way it’s been represented.” This is an example of a purposeful community division, with the definition of Pakistani at stake.

The PACC similarly shies away from any sort of religious identity, instead trying to shape and show a community diverse in its interests and activities. Many classes are offered at the Community Center, for students and adults, centered on Pakistani culture, or just things the community has expressed interest in. They hold Urdu immersion classes, chess classes, martial arts classes, family music night, and “homework helpers.” The founder, Farhad, sees the Center as key to helping the Pakistani community become more comfortable with and participatory in American culture and traditions, and, similarly, to facilitating their own cultural events in such a way as to make Americans feel more comfortable with Pakistani events. In this respect, keeping their involvement strictly non-religious and non-political was important because,

Religion and politics… there are just so many things to fight over and people get heated about what they think is right. I want to just focus on the fun things – music, dancing, singing, these things cannot be held at the masajid – and things that will help our community grow stronger –
speaking classes, math, career workshops for women, poetry… Pakistan has a very rich cultural background and it will be good to showcase those things and celebrate them so many people can come and experience it (Interview, March 2008).

The emphasis is on a mode of upper-middle class cultural authenticity. Artists, poets, classically trained singers, (and more recently, those skilled performers of Bollywood and Pakistani pop music) are the types of people the PACC brings to share with the community, the subtext being that Pakistani denotes people who are not reactive and repressive, but self-assured, open-minded, and refined. (Or in the pop instance, people who are modern, light-hearted, and fun.) But such events and classes come at a cost: classes usually start at around $80, and events cost at minimum $60 for a family of four – not unreasonable, but exclusive as to who could take advantage of such offerings. In March of 2008, the PACC hosted a celebration of Pakistan Day in a fancily decorated hall – everyone was well dressed – and had a full line-up of performers of all ages. In a conspicuous effort to achieve recognition for the Pakistani community’s assimilatory efforts, mayors from cities in the region were asked to partake in the festivities, and give a short talk to those in attendance. This PACC event sought to showcase a cosmopolitan community, made up of individuals who are very interested in Pakistani culture and maintaining ties to Pakistan, if not for business and development goals, then because they wanted their children to “learn Urdu and experience Pakistani culture.” The Fremont and Milpitas mayors responded, remarking how “important” the Pakistani community was to their respective cities, how accomplished the community is, and also what “nice, warm people” they are.

A so-called “guiding principle” of the Blueprint is a pluralist endeavor: “This project will be inclusive rather than exclusive, working with non-Pakistani groups and individuals wherever possible.” Efforts to include outsiders – such as the mayors – is a means of addressing negative

16 This event would cost a family of four $100 (student tickets were $25) in return for a nice buffet-style dinner, an evening of entertainment, and an extensive social and networking event. (At times, you could barely hear the speakers because people were talking to each other with such enthusiasm.)
imagery of Pakistan and Pakistanis in several ways. By drawing others into a somewhat self-enclosed group, certain leaders and members are able to serve as spokespeople, representing their community and interests. There is the hope the outsider will advertise the Pakistanis’ high-achievements and their good (or normal) qualities, and the Pakistani community can also point to the outsider as evidence for how they are assimilated, nice minorities.

The tropes of liberal feminism have become commonplace and expected in various domains, significant enough that new immigrant populations see the espousal of Western gender-equity paradigms as a means of blurring the line that makes the Pakistani community seem distinct. Both organizations and their male members emphasized the need to have more women get involved in their organizations, and have provided events geared specifically towards women, offering insight into what Pakistani women should aspire to become. That is to say, the male leadership of the PACC and OPEN has worked hard on trying to get Pakistani women into more public arenas to show that the community is, if not assimilated, then assimilating. Farhad, the PACC founder talked about the PACC being a “first stop shop to get help on financials” among other things: “We want to provide career workshops for women because there’s a weakness there for the Pakistani community. We want to encourage women to understand there’s a different culture here. It’s good for the family and community. They should be taking jobs and…” When I asked why “should” and not “could,” Farhad provided the metaphor of learning to breathe in air after a lifetime spent in the water: “If you keep acting like you’re in the old environment, the adjustment will impact the community, the species. Those who adjusted first will survive – who get lungs out of gills. That’s the way I see it, we’re in different environment and culture. The values we carried with us were good there in Pakistan, but here
we need different mindset. You need to volunteer, take part in some part-time thing” (Interview, March 2008).

Despite the general absence of women in leadership roles in OPEN or the PACC, the women I spoke with in interviews talked about themselves in very strong terms. They said that they “weren’t silent or oppressed,” and that “most Pakistani women are very loud and will have their way. It’s not like the media portrays it.” Shireen, a tech saleswoman in her mid-twenties, said she was a “proud Pakistani” who would always point out her country of origin because “Pakistan is not just terrorists, or uneducated women covering their head.” Other women talked about working for more pragmatic reasons; they needed to work because “the area is so expensive, and what with college and everything (for children), you just can’t survive without two incomes.” Two stay-at-home moms I spoke with told me with great vigor they wanted to work and that they expected to work, once their children got a little older. Sabina, a stylish woman in her late twenties, pulled her toddler, Haroun, away from a tall pyramid of Starbucks coffee for the third time during our interview – “(laughing) he’s a handful! I just want to wait until he’s a little older before I start really looking for a job.” All of the women talked about the men in their lives – husbands, brothers, fathers, fiancés – not only being supportive of them getting education or working, but even expecting it. Mahirah, who has been living in the US for nearly twenty years (and from a “family that is not religious at all”), said she was confused about why so many Americans thought that Pakistani women were subjugated or did not have any options:

You know for me, my family was quite wealthy, we knew Jinnah and that sort of thing – and I always knew I could do whatever I wanted. My father and uncles even, it was very important to them – and my mother – that I get a really good education. I’ve had tons and tons of support from my family. I think this whole oppressed women thing is just a stereotype. I mean, it happens sure, but I don’t know anyone like that. It’s just politics, you know. Why does the US want everyone to think that Pakistani women are like that? It’s just stupid (Interview, March 2008).
Shireen’s (the tech saleswoman) relationship to education is shaped by her middle-class positionality. Her background influenced her understanding of women’s situations in Pakistan and her developmental goals for Pakistan; it was important to Shireen to help women in Pakistan become more “professional and know how to get involved in business and, you know, put themselves out there”:

I come from a middle-class family, and middle class in Pakistan is not the same thing as middle class in the states. Middle class in Pakistan is like ten people sharing two rooms, and maybe you have a car. It’s not like Benazair or other women like that who grew up with drivers and eight servants. I didn’t have that. I was lucky to come to the states because my dad worked for PIA [Pakistani International Airlines], so we were able to travel. But once I got here, I have had to work so hard. It’s been stressful, you know working every summer and over breaks so I can pay for tuition. And I just feel like more women in Pakistan need to know what it’s like and how they can get educated and get jobs and be independent (Interview, February 2008).

Shireen’s ambitions of bringing transnational attention to women like herself are marked by her experiences in the US, and in particular, how she distinguishes between herself and other immigrant Pakistani women: there are those who need to work (such as herself), and those who “work if they want to, not because they have to.” However, other Pakistanis, in particular some members of the organizations, drew more distinctions between themselves and the Pakistanis back home. DIL, an organization with annual fundraiser galas conceives of its mission and vision as follows:

DIL is dedicated to providing quality education to disadvantaged children, especially girls, by establishing and operating schools in the underdeveloped regions of Pakistan, with a strong focus on gender equality and community participation. No child in Pakistan, no matter how poor or underprivileged, should be denied access to quality education. All children should have equal opportunity to reach their full potential and contribute toward the socio-economic betterment of their communities (Mission and Vision, DIL website).

The wording of DIL’s mission statement has the effect of not only signaling to the US public that they are seeking to combat the roots of terror, but also draws a line between themselves and the Pakistanis over “there.” Interviewees were generally frank about what they perceived to be the situation in Pakistan; as Sara said, “It’s sad because, there are these crazy mullahs exploiting all of the poor, uneducated people in Pakistan who have no opportunity in their lives and don’t
know any better.” If it is the boundary of foreign-ness that marks Pakistanis as different, and attachment to their country of origin (a “haven for terrorists”) that positions them as disloyal, the ways Pakistanis are transnational are of special interest.

Transnational organizations such as DIL that seek to help Pakistanis over “there,” have to acknowledge the fundamentalist threat from abroad and show they are not affiliated with it in any way. Under the FAQs section of the DIL website, tellingly, the first question addressed is “What is a ‘madrasa’ and are DIL schools related to madrasas?” The response is a definition of madrassa\(^\text{17}\) and the sentence: “Some madaris (the plural of madrasa) have become extremist, promoting violent practices. DIL schools are not in any way associated with madaris.” Elsewhere on their site, DIL again deals with the media-informed image Americans have about madaris: “DIL actively engages in student-centered teaching at its schools. This approach is an alternative to the traditional system of repetitive memorization and has been shown to improve student achievement. Child-centered education emphasizes creativity as well as social skills and critical thinking skills” (FAQs, DIL website). In contrast to the imagery of rows of boys reciting passages of the Koran while they rock, DIL must prove they are using Western methods and in particular, are helping to create Pakistanis who can be “social” and think critically. These types of representations bear out the claim that immigrants’ transnational activities are constrained or at least contingent on political and institutional restraints.

The secular-pluralist identity tactic helps alleviate the pressures of being involved with the home country in that the values of secularism and pluralism are seemingly transported to Pakistan. As one respondent said, when asked whether she felt like people in the Pakistani community were very secular, “Yeah, that’s the new thing that’s developing among Pakistanis…

\(^{17}\) From their website: “The word ‘madrasa’ is derived from Arabic -- and refers to a Muslim school, college, or university that is often part of a mosque (Merriam Webster dictionary).”
people feel like, here and even in Pakistan, that people relate Islam with terrorism, and they want to go away from that. They want to say, okay, we’re just Pakistanis and not terrorists. They’re trying to say, we’re not religious, we’re so liberal, and just normal people” (Interview, March 2008). Distancing themselves from Islam and focusing on what they pitch as a positive or neutral cultural attachment, Pakistani immigrants can be transnational if they extol Western-defined notions of secularism and pluralism. The underlining of their distance and differences with Islam reinscribes the dichotomy between the “good” and “bad” Muslim, making the negative character of the essentialized Pakistani seemingly more real. Specific ideologies about how it is that people should be socialized, what their values are, and how they should relate to their community and the world are imbued with the “secular myths of American individualism” (Roof and McKinney 1987, 85), rendering tolerable involvement with the home country.

Discussion and Conclusion

The immigration literature can be criticized for multiple reasons, increasingly so because it assumes the container-ness of states – that immigrant experiences are only analyzed and discussed within the confines of the nation-state (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994; Beck 2000; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). However, the supposedly rectifying transnationalism literature has gone the other way and failed to interrogate how state actions affect immigrant lives and outcomes (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). Over and above this discussion are the broader questions of boundaries: How is it that immigrants are assimilated or not? What are the roles of symbolic, social, and physical boundaries? And how are those boundaries created, maintained, disputed, and reconstructed? Many immigrants have had to deal with exclusions, and the process of assimilation requires the excluded immigrant group to show
they are not all that different from the receiving population (or that their differences are not threatening and can co-exist with existing traditions and understandings). However, immigrants such as Pakistanis in the US have faced particular challenges in trying to demonstrate their capability and willingness to assimilate, and these instances provide a means for understanding, in stark relief, how groups are marked as outsiders and how immigrant communities interpret and respond to this.

My research on the Pakistani community in the Silicon Valley area shows the ways that individuals and groups have felt and responded to the types of boundaries drawn around them. Middle-upper class Pakistanis have been mobilizing to create a community identity that refutes the racialization of Muslims, but in so doing, upholds the “good Muslim” / “bad Muslim” binary and re-inscribes the boundaries of exclusion according to class and ideological orientation. The overlapping identity tactics emerging from government, media, and public pressure include business-developer and secular-pluralist identity tactics. By utilizing identity tactics, these Pakistanis work to create representations of themselves that show their community is sincere about assimilating, and that any transnationalism would be within the realm of assistance towards American geopolitical goals.

The specific contributions I make to the immigration literature are: (1) A demonstration of the flexible and changing identity processes an immigrant community undertakes to refute, blur and re-construct the boundaries around their community to present themselves as eager to assimilate (with helpful or at least non-threatening developmental goals for their home country), and (2) A recognition and explication (via a post-colonial framework) of how states and geopolitics can influence immigrant opportunities and activities both in the US and abroad.
One of the implications of my research is that a government, its media and the public can influence how an immigrant population defines and understands itself in ways that are friendly and amenable to the state’s ideologies. In doing so, the government is able to exert control over the population – both at home and abroad. As this discussion of the identity tactics adopted by Silicon Valley Pakistanis shows, immigrant adoption of US ideologies in an effort not to be branded a threat to the state can affect how development and politics get carried out not only in the immigrant community but in their home country. In a move reminiscent of policies of indirect rule,\textsuperscript{18} the “other” with power is rewarded by the state for cooperation and subdued for dissidence.

\textsuperscript{18} Indirect rule is the European colonial technique of including traditional, local forms of governing within the colonial administrative structure.
References


