Race and Racism: British Responses to Civilian Prison Camps in the Boer War and the Kenya Emergency

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Speaking at a Kenya Legislative Council Debate in 1953, European settler Shirley Cooke criticized British policy during the Kenya Emergency (1952–1960), noting that the colonial administration’s transit camps for prisoners “will probably get the reputation of the concentration camps after the Boer War, memories of which live even today.” When she made her statement, Cooke could not have known just how apt her allusion to the Boer War (1899–1902) would be. The following year, in 1954, the colonial administration in Kenya would implement its policy of “villagization,” which—with its forced resettlement of more than one million people into barbed-wire villages—closely resembled the civilian concentration camps that the British employed during the Boer War.

Delving further into the nature of the camps during both conflicts reveals additional similarities. In response to Boer and Kenyan nationalist movements’ use of guerrilla tactics during these conflicts, the British authorities adopted a policy of total war; they imprisoned suspected conspirators and civilians alike in overcrowded detention camps with inadequate facilities and high mortality rates. During both conflicts, women activists, such as Emily Hobhouse in 1901 and Barbara Castle in 1955, spearheaded campaigns that demanded official, independent inquiries into camp conditions and detainees’ treatment. However, the British authorities’ responses to the two campaigns differed significantly. After Hobhouse first raised her concerns, a large public outcry led the War Department to establish an independent commission of inquiry to investigate
prison conditions for the imprisoned Boers within one month.² Fifty-four years later, Castle’s revelations regarding atrocious prison conditions in Kenya also raised public outrage, but no independent, public investigation of the entire camp system ever occurred.³

Historians, including M.P.K. Sorrenson, David M. Anderson, and Caroline Elkins, have noted the similarities between the imprisonment of civilians during the Boer War and the Kenya Emergency, yet none of them has explored the reasons for the British authorities’ differing policy responses to the public outcry against the camps.⁴ Why did the British government act swiftly to investigate and address prison conditions during the Boer War, yet repeatedly stonewall an independent investigation into the Kenyan camps fifty years later? This article argues that, while the conflicts’ differing lengths, the political connections of the women activists who raised the alarm, and the Empire’s decline all influenced British policy on camp conditions in both cases, ultimately, the British authorities’ willingness to address atrocities occurring in civilian prison camps during the Boer War—and its failure to do so in Kenya—was determined largely by the race of the detainees.

The Conflicts and Civilian Camps

In order to compare the British authorities’ responses to civilian prison camps during the Boer War and the Kenya Emergency, it is first important to understand the contexts in which the conflicts occurred, as well as the camp conditions, and policymakers’ reactions to calls for investigation in each situation.

**The Boer War (1899–1902)**

Tension between the Boers and the British escalated towards the end of the nineteenth century in two independent republics: Transvaal and Orange Free State, located in present-day South Africa. Though the Boers, a group of white settlers descended from Dutch colonists, were responsible for the republics’ day-to-day administration, the British were officially in charge of the republics’ foreign policy.⁵ When discussions broke down regarding the republics’ territorial integrity and the location of British troops near the Transvaal border in October 1899, the Boers declared war on the British.⁶ At the onset of the war, British officials anticipated a short conflict, but within the first four months of fighting, the British army suffered a series of humiliating losses that took it by surprise.⁷ As the battle continued, the Boers adapted their tactics, increasingly employing guerrilla warfare. Realizing that the conflict was not going to be resolved as easily as anticipated, the British military employed a policy of total war, burning Boer farms, and erecting 3,700 miles of barbed wire across Boer territory.⁸

With their farms gone, many civilians became displaced and the British military established relocation camps both to provide for the civilians and to prevent them from furnishing Boer guerrillas with food and supplies.⁹ The British military began to round up families in September 1900 and the camps quickly became
overcrowded with women, children, and the elderly. The conditions in the camps were severe, and prisoners lacked access to basic necessities, such as food and potable water. When Emily Hobhouse, an upper-class Englishwoman, arrived in the South African camps in January 1901, she was horrified by camp conditions, noting that “disease and death were stamped on [the prisoners’] faces.”

Hobhouse started writing regular updates for the *Manchester Guardian* and published her first report highlighting the starvation and high mortality rates in camps in June 1901. In response to public outrage raised by Hobhouse’s June report on camp conditions, the War Department appointed an all-women commission led by prominent women’s rights activist Millicent Fawcett in July 1901 to investigate camp conditions. The Fawcett Commission traveled to South Africa to investigate prison conditions in August 1901 and visited nearly every Boer concentration camp in South Africa, offering recommendations to improve the health and safety of the people within the camps.

Unlike Hobhouse, Fawcett was a proponent of the Boer War and of the camp system. In her final report, Fawcett noted that the committee held a generally “favourable opinion” of the camps, emphasized that the South African prisoners were complicit in the war, and actually argued for stricter measures, including enclosing all of the camps with fences and armed guards. Despite her pro-government leanings, Fawcett still suggested many of the same remedies as Hobhouse – boilers for drinking water, increased food and fuel rations, access to washing facilities, and the quarantine of sick individuals – to alleviate immediate suffering in the camps. The Fawcett Commission issued recommendations in September and November 1901, and British authorities began the process of implementing nearly all of the recommendations within a few weeks of having received them, “grudging nothing. . .which was calculated to improve the health of the camps.”

Writing in December 1901, the Fawcett Commission listed the concrete improvements achieved by their inquiry; they had highlighted many of the key problems in the Boer camps and the authorities had listened. As conditions in the South African camps improved, public interest in the camps waned. It was only after the end of the war, in 1902, that British authorities completely eradicated the camps.


Fifty years later, the institution of civilian camps in Kenya followed a similar pattern to the establishment of the South African camps. The conflict in Kenya began in October 1952 with the assassination of a Kikuyu leader who was loyal to the British administration. Mau Mau, a nationalist rebel movement comprised primarily of members of the Kikuyu ethnic group, carried out the assassination. British colonial authorities then instituted emergency regulations, which included provisions allowing for arrests and detainment without probable cause, the seizure of assets, additional taxation, and the eradication of all Kenyan political parties. They also used British troops and loyalist Kenyan soldiers to fight Mau
Mau. Like the Boers, Mau Mau used guerrilla tactics to frustrate the efforts of British forces. As the conflict escalated, the Kenyan colonial administration also implemented a policy of total war, evicting suspected Mau Mau sympathizers from British settler farms, burning settlements, and forcibly relocating 1,050,899 members of the Kikuyu ethnic group into enclosed villages surrounded by barbed wire and encircled by trenches filled with sharpened pikes.\(^{21}\)

Like the South African camps, the Kenyan camps were overcrowded and lacked adequate food and shelter. The British authorities also officially touted both camps as a means to protect and “civilize” their inhabitants.\(^{22}\) However, there were also some key distinctions that differentiated the Boer civilian camps from those of the Kenya Emergency. Historian Caroline Elkins documented policies of systematized forced labor, torture, sexual violence, and starvation in the Kenyan camps that differed from the more passive criminal neglect of prisoners in the Boer camps.\(^{23}\)

After hearing reports of abuses in the camps, Labour Member of Parliament (MP) Barbara Castle called for an independent investigation of the Kenyan prison system in the fall of 1955. However, colonial officials in London and Kenya dismissed her concerns and attempted to discredit her.\(^{24}\) Others – including missionaries, activists, MPs, and even colonial officials – also raised concerns about conditions in the Kenyan camps and villages.

Unable to quash rumors of abuse, yet hoping to avoid a completely independent investigation into the camps that the authorities viewed as essential in combatting Mau Mau, Governor of Kenya Sir Evelyn Baring requested that a parliamentary delegation, consisting of three Labour MPs and four Conservative MPs, travel to Kenya in 1957 to investigate the matter.\(^{25}\) The delegation provided a private report of their findings. However, because the delegation had been under the close watch of colonial officials while in Kenya and contained none of the Labour MPs most concerned about camp conditions, few were satisfied that the inquiry had been fair and independent.\(^{26}\)

Castle continued to advocate for an independent investigation of the camps. Throughout 1957 and 1958, increasing numbers of witnesses publicly denounced the conditions in the Kenyan camps. However, despite growing public knowledge of the atrocities, British colonial authorities dismissed the concerns and justified the system as a means of controlling the still-existent Mau Mau threat. The British authorities never established a fully independent commission of inquiry into the camp and village systems. Instead of investigating or improving camp conditions, the authorities simply began to release detainees and close camps prior to Kenyan independence in 1963.\(^{27}\)

**Reasons for Differing Responses**

Considering the parallels between British imprisonment of civilians during the Boer War and the Kenya Emergency, it is perplexing that the authorities reacted to public outcry in 1901, while they actively and repeatedly refused to address
camp conditions in Kenya during the 1950s. Of the possible reasons for the authorities’ differing responses, the four most likely explanations are the lengths of the conflicts, the activists’ connections and the domestic political environment in which they were operating, the relative strength of the British Empire, and the races of the detainees.

**Duration of the Conflicts**

The duration of the conflicts explains, in part, the British authorities’ more immediate response to concerns in the South African camps. The Boer War lasted for three and a half years, with guerrilla warfare dominating only the second half of the war.\(^{28}\) While British authorities responded to public pressure to address the high mortality rate in the Boer camps, their actions focused on improving camp conditions, not on closing the camps entirely. Indeed, historian Paula M. Krebs underscored that even the most prominent anti-war activists never questioned the legitimacy of the camps’ existence during the Boer War.\(^{29}\) Instead, the activists merely requested that conditions be improved. British authorities only completely closed the South African camps at the end of the Boer War in May 1902. Similarly, the authorities in Kenya placed suspected Mau Mau sympathizers in camps as early as 1954 and only closed the camps following the official end of the Emergency in 1960. The timing of the camp closures with the end of the conflicts suggests that the detention camps’ existences were merely a function of their role in the conflicts themselves.

However, though the camps’ periods of existence were tied to the lengths of the conflicts, the conflicts’ durations do not explain the British authorities’ willingness to investigate and reform camp conditions during the Boer War and their refusal to do so during the Kenya Emergency. As the Boer War itself demonstrated, an independent investigation did not automatically result in the closure of the camps. Rather, the Boer War investigation actually quelled the public’s fears and enabled the authorities to continue with their policies of imprisoning civilians until the conflict’s end. Therefore, if the British colonial authorities truly were acting on pragmatic security concerns related to the Kenya Emergency, they would have allowed an independent investigation and reforms of camp conditions. By doing so, they would have dispelled public concern and have been able to maintain support for their continued fight against Mau Mau. Instead, the authorities’ inaction suggested that their reluctance to investigate was rooted in something other than the duration of the conflict.

**Activists’ Political Connections**

The political beliefs and connections of the women activists who raised the alarm over the treatment of detainees offer another possible explanation for the government’s differing responses to concerns over civilian prison camps during the Boer War and Kenya Emergency.
As the sister of prominent Liberal political theorist and journalist L.T. Hobhouse, Emily Hobhouse was well-connected within the Liberal Party. Liberal MP Leonard Courtney appointed Hobhouse as a representative for the anti-war South African Conciliation Committee, and when she traveled to South Africa, she had a letter of introduction to Lord Alfred Milner, the British High Commissioner for South Africa. Hobhouse’s personal connections facilitated her ability to conduct research in the South African camps and to publish her findings in her brother’s newspaper. However, during the Boer War, the Liberal Party was in the political opposition, and both Hobhouse and her brother L.T. were active in the anti-imperialist and anti-war movements. In fact, pro-war activists, such as Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, dismissed Hobhouse’s revelations about camp conditions because “her political prejudices were known to be against the Government.” Nevertheless, despite her opposition to the war and her support for the opposition party, Hobhouse still managed to pressure the government into sponsoring an independent investigation that led to reforms of the Boer camp system.

Similarly, Barbara Castle—a member of the Labour Party—was in the political opposition during the Kenya Emergency and was thought to believe that “the remnants of the Empire should be dismantled quickly, cleanly and with dignity.” As with Hobhouse, many critics dismissed Castle’s concerns over the Kenyan camps as nothing more than a political tool for disgracing the Conservative government. However, unlike Hobhouse, Castle was an established politician who occupied an official and public station in the government. When Castle first raised concerns over the Kenya Emergency in 1955, she already had been a Member of Parliament for ten years. Given her position, one would think that Castle’s public remonstrations about camp conditions in Kenya would have pushed the government into establishing an independent investigation. However, her concerns received even less notice than Hobhouse’s. The fact that Hobhouse, whom society considered a spinster and who did not have the right to vote, was more successful in obtaining an official investigation than a tenured member of parliament suggests that the differing policy responses were not related to the activists’ connections or the domestic political context in which they were operating.

State of the British Empire

The relative health of the British Empire serves as another possible explanation for the difference in British authorities’ responses to accusations of mistreatment. In her history of the Kenya Emergency, Elkins cites the British desire to hold on to its declining empire as a reason for its reluctance to address camp abuse. She notes that “the findings of any independent judicial inquiry” would “shatter a carefully cultivated colonial image” and ultimately would undermine belief in “the superiority of British colonial rule.” This motivation to retain the Empire certainly influenced the authorities’ response, but it still did not provide a complete justification for the differing policies regarding camp conditions during
the two conflicts. To obtain a more complete picture, it is necessary to consider not just the strength of the British Empire, but also the perception of its strength to the British people. In the early 1900s, the Boer War shocked the British by highlighting the weakness of the Empire and, during the Kenyan crisis, the rapid decline of the Empire was not as apparent to the British population as it may seem in retrospect.

The Boer War and the ability of a relatively small number of farmers to deter the might of the British Empire sobered many Britons. Great Britain entered the war without support from other European powers, and its policy of total war and the accompanying atrocities also caused the British public to question the very claims of morality that the government employed to justify its imperial project. Even a young Winston Churchill—who served as a correspondent during the Boer War—predicted that the war would be “the beginning of the end” for the Empire. Though the British eventually won the war against the Boers, the Boers gained independence a few years later in 1906. As British historian Piers Brendon noted, the Boer War “provided humiliating evidence of physical decrepitude as well as moral turpitude.” The war signaled a shift in the way British citizens understood the Empire; it was no longer invincible. Yet, if the Boer War were a moment of perceived imperial weakness as contemporary accounts suggest, then—following Elkins’ logic that any investigation would undermine colonial authority—the British should have cracked down harder on the Boer civilian camps, not permitting an independent investigation and not improving conditions in the camps.

Conversely, despite the decline of the British Empire in the 1950s, many Britons did not believe the Empire was crumbling. To the contrary, in the early 1950s, the Conservative government developed plans to rebuild the Empire, in which Kenya played a key role. The British viewed Kenya as a strategic colonial outpost in the Cold War, one that could protect its assets in the Middle East and prevent Soviet forces from gaining a foothold in Africa. Even though the Suez crisis in 1956 “ended British aspirations to imperial dominance in the Middle East,” the British government redoubled its efforts to build a military base in Kenya in order to strengthen its regional control and to protect the white settlers in Kenya. In 1960, the British government spent the largest amount of its budget to expand its military base in Kenya, suggesting that it expected to retain power in Kenya for the foreseeable future. Additionally, the British public did not perceive the Empire in Kenya to be disintegrating, as the statistics surrounding British immigrants to Kenya indicate. Indeed, during this period of instability, the number of white settlers in Kenya increased from 42,000 in 1953 to 61,000 in 1960, representing the largest wave of European migration in Kenya’s colonial history. This influx of settlers—which occurred precisely during the period of the Kenya Emergency and when the Empire, in reality, was in decline—suggests that Britons were not terribly concerned about the severity of the conflict and did not anticipate that Kenya would gain independence by 1963.
Even if the British authorities were concerned with clinging to power in Kenya, this reasoning does not wholly explain their reluctance to allow an independent inquiry into the Kenyan camp system. Historian John Darwin noted that British authorities employed different tactics in response to different nationalist movements; in India and Nigeria, for example, they did not respond with the same force as they did during the Mau Mau rebellion.\(^\text{46}\) While the threat of the Empire’s decline certainly played a role in the authorities’ determination to hold on to power in their colonies, British authorities were not obligated to employ the tactics that they used in Kenya. The length of the conflicts, the activists’ political connections, and the declining Empire do not provide a complete picture of the reasons for the authorities’ differing responses during the Boer War and the Kenya Emergency. British determination to prevent an independent investigation into the Kenyan camp system was also a product of the white settler population, the portrayal of Mau Mau, and the employment of racial rhetoric to justify the detainment camps.

“‘Backward Races’ have Human Rights!”\(^\text{47}\)

Race and racial superiority were important factors in the prison camps during both conflicts. During the Boer War, the British made an effort to separate themselves from the Boers, casting the Boers as “the Other” to justify their policies. Although the Boers were white, the British press and society described them as lesser beings, noting that they were “a half-nomad people, of sullen and unsocial temperament... ignorant to an almost inconceivable degree of ignorance”\(^\text{48}\) and claiming that they possessed an “ingrained disregard of truth,” lack of morality, hospitality, education, and even lack of a desire to care for their children. Writing in The North American Review, one Englishman described the Boers as “the dirtiest white people in the world,” with “debased” intellects, and who could “never rise very high among white races.”\(^\text{50}\) Creating this distinction between the colonizers and colonized was not unique to the British endeavor in South Africa, but was a key element of imperial projects more generally. In his 1902 critique of imperialism, British journalist John A. Hobson noted that “the moral defence of Imperialism is generally based upon the assertion that... the political and economic control forcibly assumed by ‘higher’ over ‘lower races’ does promote at once the civilization of the world and the special good of the subject races.”\(^\text{51}\) By placing the Boers in such opposition to the British, British media and society attempted to justify the brutal treatment of the Boers.

Even those who wished to “remedy” the high mortality rates in Boer civilian camps reflected this prejudice.\(^\text{52}\) The British Medical Journal noted that the Boers were “dirty in their personal habits,” suggesting that their hygiene likely contributed to the outbreak of measles, pneumonia, and enteric fever in the camps.\(^\text{53}\) The Fawcett Commission report reflected similar views, placing the greatest blame for the high mortality rate in the prison camps on the Boers’ lack of hygienic practices.\(^\text{54}\) As historian Paula M. Krebs noted, this dehumanization of the Boers
was a means of connecting them with Africans “as uncivilized peoples destined to be raised out of ignorance by the British.” By classifying the Boers as an “inferior humanity,” Great Britain could then claim “the steady improvement in the condition, character, and custom of primitives [in this case the Boers] as a result of their contact with European civilization.” Separating the Boers from other white races and connecting them with the Africans reflected the racial nature of Great Britain’s imperialist policies.

Despite their deeply racist views of the Boers, the British still considered the Boers to be better than their native South African countrymen. Hobhouse enlisted the help of the media and used photographs of Boer prisoners and their emaciated children to elicit public support for reforming camp conditions. The pictures of white children suffering produced a strong public reaction, and even Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, a proponent of the war, noted that the high mortality rate among imprisoned Boer children “lies heavy... upon the heart of our nation.” However, the nation was only touched by the fate of white children and their families. Hobhouse and the public barely considered the fate of 115,000 Africans imprisoned at the same time, even though the mortality rate in African camps was higher than in Boer camps. This dismissal of imprisoned Africans is evident in The British Medical Journal’s analysis of camp conditions: “the [mortality] figures for white persons are alone given, those for the coloured inhabitants of the camps being left for later consideration if necessary.” In short, the imprisoned Africans were non-persons, not meriting the attention of the British establishment even in death.

Likewise, the Fawcett Commission report noted that it had visited “every camp in South Africa,” yet it only discussed the conditions for imprisoned Boers. In fact, the Commission did not visit any of the camps with African prisoners, indicating that its references to “every camp” really meant “every camp with white prisoners.” The Commission reinforced African prisoners’ status as non-people by focusing solely on a remedy for white prisoners. The stark contrast between the attention drawn to the white prisoners’ plight and the dismissal of African detainees highlighted a fundamental difference: the British public and authorities sympathized with Boer prisoners because they were white, while Africans did not merit such sympathy or assistance.

Fifty years later, race continued to play an important role in British policy toward its detention camps in Kenya. While the British public would, this time, stand up on behalf of African detainees, the political influence of white Kenyan settlers and the refusal of British authorities to investigate meant that the situation in the camps and prisons was not addressed until four detainees sued the British government for reparations in 2011.

When the Mau Mau uprising began in 1952, the murders of several white settlers instigated panic among the Kenyan white settler community, which feared that the uprising was the start of a race war. In reality, Mau Mau directed the majority of its violence toward fellow Kikuyu who were loyal to the colonial
authorities, as is evidenced by the fact 32 white settlers and 1,800 Kikuyu civilians were killed during the conflict.64 However, the white settlers still believed that Mau Mau threatened their lives and livelihoods. Since many of the Kenyan settlers were descended from aristocratic English families and still had relatives in Parliament and the Colonial Office, they used these connections to lobby the British government and the media for support.65 One British journalist in Kenya noted, “If I opened my shirt and showed you my breastbone, you would see it was black and blue from settlers making their points.”66 The settlers’ campaign to portray the uprising as a race war was relatively successful. Even General Sir George Erskine—the commander of the British troops in Kenya who held the settlers’ racism in contempt—described the Mau Mau uprising as a “violent action to exterminate the European and later the Asian.”67 Erskine’s comment highlights the importance that the British authorities attached to race. While Mau Mau focused on reclaiming land seized by its colonizers, the British believed that Mau Mau defined its enemies by race (targeting first white Europeans and then Asians). Because of British perceptions of Mau Mau aims, the British responded by identifying all Africans as potential Mau Mau supporters and therefore potential enemies.

Just as the British had dehumanized the Boers at the beginning of the Boer War, the Kenyan settlers and then the British authorities dehumanized both Mau Mau and the Kikuyu ethnic group as a whole. One settler told Time Magazine, “Some bastards still think Kukes [Kikuyu] are human. . . .They aren’t.”68 Another settler added that the Kikuyu were “only 50 years out of the trees.”69 For the settlers, the Kikuyu—whether loyalists or not—were not human, so any Kikuyu people who took the Mau Mau oath were less than animals to the settlers. Even Michael Blundell, a relatively liberal politician in the Kenyan settler community, saw Mau Mau as a return to “primitive ways.”70 The British media and authorities drew from the settlers’ rhetoric and emphasized the titillating rumors of Mau Mau oathing rituals, rather than describing the social and economic reasons for the uprising.71 As Elkins noted, the British portrayal of Mau Mau as a “primitive” and brutal movement made it seem as if the Empire were “fighting a moral war for Western civilization over the forces of dark savagery.”72 Theorist Edward Said noted that this process of “separating the natives. . . .from the white man on racial and religious grounds” is common throughout imperial efforts because it is used to justify “reconstituting them as people requiring a European presence.”73 By dehumanizing Mau Mau adherents and juxtaposing them with British values and culture, the British turned a conflict over land and self-determination into an issue of race. Anderson also emphasized this separation, noting that the British treated Mau Mau as a disease that needed to be cured.74 This view of Mau Mau and their sympathizers as the antithesis of Britishness—as primitive, uncivilized, and black—was both the source and the justification for the brutal policy of forcibly relocating and imprisoning civilians in guarded villages surrounded by barbed wire.
As they had done during the Boer War, the British imprisoned Kikuyu civilians in order to prevent them from providing Mau Mau guerrillas with supplies. However, unlike the Boer War, the British justified villagization as a “great new factor and opportunity” for civilizing the Kikuyu, remaking them in the image of their colonizers. British military commander General Sir George Erskine extolled the lasting virtues of forced villagization, noting, “Austere and squalid to start with, these villages rapidly improved as schools, churches, first aid centres, and sports grounds were added. This revolution is one which may have lasting and beneficial results and a civilizing influence over the whole tribe.” This alleged progress from “squalid” to “civilized” reflected the colonial idea that the Africans were incapable of improving themselves without the assistance of enlightened British benefactors. Indeed, while touring a Kenyan women’s prison, Barbara Castle was told, “These conditions are probably better than those they enjoy outside.” The Kikuyu prisoners were understood to be sub-human, so anything the British provided for them—no matter how overcrowded, dirty, and brutal—was perceived by the British as better than what the Kenyans could ever achieve for themselves.

Both Castle and Quaker activist Eileen Fletcher recognized the racism inherent in these arguments, and fought against it. In the words of Castle, “Let us face it. . . . Europeans tend to become hardened, and to say of the Africans, ‘They live like animals. They are better off inside [the camps].’” Ultimately, the British conception of Africans as poor, uncivilized, and sub-human eventually triumphed over human rights. Despite raising the issue of the camp conditions at the highest government levels for four years, Castle, Fletcher, and other activists never succeeded in getting British authorities to agree to an independent investigation of camp conditions.

Conclusion

More than sixty years after the Kenya Emergency began, the once-sought official, independent investigation is finally occurring as the British government currently sits on trial for its policies in Kenya. While the evidence of abuses during the Kenya Emergency is horrifying enough, British policy in Kenya is even more damning when compared with its response fifty years earlier. Though the reforms during the Boer War were flawed at best—completely ignoring more than 100,000 African prisoners and allowing the continuation of civilian imprisonment until the end of the war—the British authorities proved they were capable of implementing an independent investigation into prison conditions and acting on the Commission’s recommendations during a nationalist conflict. In Kenya, they simply (and repeatedly) chose not to do so. A comparison of British policy responses during the Boer War and Kenya Emergency highlights the pivotal role that race and racism played in British colonial policy. As the British government, the public, and its former colonies come to terms with their colonial pasts, understanding how race and racism affected British policies will be crucial both in addressing its wrongs and moving forward.
NOTES


8 Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, 348.


11 Krebs, “‘The Last of the Gentlemen’s Wars,’” 40.

12 Ibid., 46.

13 Ibid., 40–41.


21 Ibid., 235 and 238.


24 Ibid., 284.

25 Ibid., 296.

26 Ibid., 296-297.

27 Ibid., 353.


29 Krebs, “‘The Last of the Gentlemen’s Wars,’” 51.

43 Ibid., 829.
44 Ibid., 824.
52 “The Rates of Mortality In The Concentration Camps In South Africa,” *The British Medical Journal* 2:2132 (November 9, 1901), 1420.
53 Ibid.
60 “The Rates of Mortality In The Concentration Camps In South African,” 1418.
69 Ibid.
To join Mau Mau, members had to go through an oathing ceremony during which they swore their allegiance to Mau Mau and pledged, among other things, “to fight for . . . the lands which were taken by the Europeans.” British media falsely reported that the oathing ceremony included bestiality, menstrual blood, and the sacrifice of unborn children. Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, *Mau Mau’ Detainee: An Account by a Kenya African of His Experiences in Detention Camps, 1953-1960* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 26 and 33.


“Kenya (Situation),” 1171–1172.

Paula M. Krebs, “‘The Last of the Gentlemen’s Wars,’” 41.