Generating the Nation:
Memory, Family, and Citizenship in Post-Dictatorship Chile

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree Master of Arts

in

Anthropology

by

Madelyn Claire Boots

Committee in charge:
Professor Nancy Postero, Chair
Professor Joseph Hankins
Professor David Pedersen

2017
The Thesis of Madelyn Claire Boots is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

Chair

University of California, San Diego

2017
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the Chilean *detenidos desaparecidos*, who are not forgotten, and to the survivors of torture and the families of victims, who labor in memory work to resolve injustices and build a better collective future using the past.
EPIGRAPH

The past is gone, it is already de-termin(at)ed; it cannot be changed.
The future, by contrast, is open, uncertain, and indeterminate.
What can change about the past is its meaning, which is subject to reinterpretations, anchored in intentions and expectations toward the future.

Elizabeth Jelin
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signature Page</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epigraph</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract of the Thesis</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chilean Politics: The Past 50 Years</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaped &amp; Shaping Structures</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affective Agents</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Compromise: Loosely Structured Actors</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Family Politic</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiating Memory</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Framework in Use</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the great amounts of work contributed toward this thesis by many invaluable people: my advisor, Nancy Postero; my reader, Joe Hankins; my writing cohort in the Anthropology department at UCSD; my dear friends and family; and my Chilean friends and informants. Thank you. I am immensely grateful for your guidance, support, and knowledge; producing this thesis was not only possible but enjoyable thanks to you.
ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

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by

Madelyn Claire Boots

Master of Arts in Anthropology

University of California, San Diego, 2017

Professor Nancy Postero, Chair

Members of the post-dictatorship generation in Chile have been the first to organize large-scale political protest since Augusto Pinochet’s military authoritarian regime ended in 1990. How do these individuals interpret this recent past, and how does it influence their conceptions of politics? How is their political action shaped by discourse and vice versa? Ethnographic data collected from interviews with Chilean university students is analyzed using a practice theory approach adapted from Sherry Ortner’s concept of the loosely structured actor. This analysis reveals the family to be a primary source of information and affect guiding young adults’ interpretation of meaning, with regard to both the past and the present. I argue that there exists
currently a discourse of memory according to which Chilean citizens are shaped to remember the past in certain ways and not in others, and the political action of post-dictatorship actors is shaped by this discourse but also challenges it. Further ethnographic research must attend to the family as a site of political consciousness, and to the dialectical processes by which Chile’s historical narrative and its present political climate are mutually shaped.
INTRODUCTION

On August 21, 2016, I joined around 400,000 Chileans in a march down the main boulevard in Santiago. This was one of several family marches that year for the “No + AFP” movement, urging reform of the privatized and highly unequal pension system (it translates to “no more Pension Funds Administrators,” the system installed under Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship). This movement was capitalizing on the renewed high levels of mobilization and social consciousness achieved by the student movement for education reform, which began in 2006 but is still ongoing. At its height in 2011, this movement of high school and university students organized large-scale, nationally visible, peaceful protests events (several with over a million participants), which not only convinced legislators to negotiate reform packages but also began to re-normalize protest action as a safe and effective form of political expression. This was the first large social movement since Chile’s transition from an authoritarian military regime to democracy in 1990. After 17 years of violently repressive dictatorship and two decades of democratic reconstruction, large-scale activism is once again a significant element of the political process in Chile.

Young adults, namely high school and college students, are largely the motor driving this social change, and while the majority of Chileans have come around to their cause, many--including many young adults--do not support their methods. As Laura, a 22-year old student, explained to me, she is afraid to join the student marches. Though she wishes she could support them, she feels that this kind of political action is “a little bit dangerous.” Though it is true that news media occasionally reports police brutality against student protesters, these days police violence is largely confined to the sectors of encapuchados (wearing hoods), who cover their faces to vandalize the streets and antagonize police at the end of the marches. Tear gas and water cannons are also used to prevent marchers from veering off of their approved route, but otherwise the mobilizations are notably nonviolent, earning praise for their creative and attention-grabbing stunts such as music.
and art performances. So I pressed Laura to explain why she thought participation was dangerous, and she admitted, “My mom used to tell me about how her brother was in [an extremist leftist group organizing under the dictatorship] and […] they were protesting against the regime, and my mom always told me about how my uncle would come home with black eyes, how they would beat him, how one time he was missing for three days. […] She told me about that when I was little so that I wouldn’t get involved in politics or social movements.” How does this memory, of something that happened before Laura’s birth and which is no longer the case, guide Laura’s political decision-making?

Ever since Durkheim identified what he called “collective effervescence” leading to social change, scholars have attempted to pinpoint the sources of social consciousness and motivations for political engagement. As Laura demonstrates, these conceptions are not uniform, even within generations. So what accounts for the variety of affective responses and decisions to act? Where do these post-dictatorship political actors pull their inspiration, and what conditions make their actions possible? The student movement has quieted, morphed, expanded, and blended into other movements over the past ten years, and its evolution, as well as the dynamic perspectives of individuals within and outside of this movement, can reveal much about the state of politics today in Chile. What are effective politics, according to the post-dictatorship generation, and how does discourse intersect with these conceptions? In this piece I seek to discern the discursive and affective contours of political effectiveness.

This is an important question to ask in Chile, because its unique national relationship to democracy, neoliberalism, and the recent past of violent state repression provide a dynamic setting in which to examine the discourses of each. I use “post-dictatorship generation” to refer to those young adults born around or after 1990, with no personal memories of life under the dictatorship. A stark generational divide separates today’s university students, who grew up in a liberal capitalist
democracy, from their parents, who grew up in a military dictatorship surrounded by censorship and repression. This past itself is very much up for debate in Chile; there is no consensus regarding Pinochet’s legacy or how to frame the past into Chile’s national narrative. These factors, combined with high levels of political mobilization and social consciousness, create a rich environment for an examination of political meaning-making.

Literature has addressed Chile’s changing citizenship formations over time, as well as the social dynamics of the current student movement, yet few investigations have bridged the two to show how Chile’s political systems have both shaped Chilean subjects and been shaped by them. Even fewer have provided a satisfying analysis of the unique discursive forces which engage post-dictatorship political actors today. A practice theory approach, with an intergenerational scope, can make visible the importance of family and memory as sources of discourse and affect in motivating actors to navigate politics in the present.

To understand the context of these negotiations, I will provide a brief historical review. Political scientists and sociologists have examined Chile’s citizenship practices and changing political field over the years, providing an important understanding of the structural elements that shape Chilean citizens and are in turn shaped by them. Literature concerning affect and social movements can complement this understanding, by helping to explain the motivations and mobilization processes by which many Chilean citizens act in civil society. To bring these two perspectives together I will use Sherry Ortner’s concept of the loosely structured actor, who is shaped by but also shapes their surrounding structures both consciously and unconsciously, through practice. I believe such an approach to this case will reveal the importance of considering memory as a contested and dynamic structure, and of actors as members of affectively-charged family units. This framework will then be considered alongside ethnographic data from other authors and from interviews collected by myself. I argue that there exists in the contemporary Chilean moment a
discourse of memory, meaning institutionalized narratives and social scripts which provoke citizens
to remember the past--more specifically, to remember certain things, in certain ways, and to act on
these memories in certain ways. This discourse shapes, and is also shaped by, both actors and
history itself. I intend to explore the sites and mechanisms of this discourse, specifically as it
intersects with kinship, affect, and politics.
Before giving a brief overview of Chilean political history, it is important to note that there exists no social consensus regarding the significance of certain events, nor how to arrange them in a coherent narrative. Current events and discourses (including, in part, insistent curiosity from the post-dictatorship generation) have evoked seemingly incompatible memories and narratives, therefore the history of this past is still being drafted. The dynamic dialectical relationship between current events and interpretations of history makes the past hard to pin down.

Over the past half-century, Chile has transitioned through a variety of ideological projects that oriented the political and economic systems. In the mid-1960s, Salvador Allende, a Senator from the Socialist party, drew support from the working class by championing a “true democracy” based on popular power. After several unsuccessful presidential campaigns, he was finally elected in 1970 thanks to a Unidad Popular (UP) coalition campaign which promised to carry Chile to socialism; once in office he began nationalizing the mining and banking industries. Despite the jubilant support of the working classes, the economic policies meant to orchestrate the socialist transition via existing institutions fell short, and hyperinflation coupled with industry shortages resulted in the now infamous ration lines and scarcities, particularly in the metropolitan capital of Santiago.

Discontent brewed among the upper class, who saw their quality of life decrease drastically, and among the right-wing middle class, who opposed the socialist project. Concern was also growing internationally, particularly in the Cold War United States, which feared the precedent that might be set by a peaceful and successful socialist transition in Latin America. The CIA financed a national transport strike to further unsettle Allende’s economy, sent U.S. military advisors to consult with Chilean generals, and reserved spots for Chilean officials in training programs at the notorious School of the Americas (O’Brien 1976; Gill 2004).

After three contentious years in office, Allende was unable to push through many of the
changes he had envisioned due to poor policy planning and an oppositional legislature. The economy continued in its downward spiral, and discontent and unrest grew among both the right and the left; scholars such as van der Ree and Winn have pointed out that this moment was the height of political mobilization in Chile. Unfortunately, Allende was incapable of reconciling public demands with the limitations of his office. Civilian and military pressure grew, and on September 11, 1973 a military coalition attacked the presidential palace. Allende dismissed his advisors and committed suicide inside La Moneda rather than cede defeat, and a military junta took control of the country. This junta consisted of the heads of the army, navy, air force, and carabineros (police), but power was soon consolidated under the Commander in Chief of the Army, General Augusto Pinochet.

The new military regime immediately suspended the constitution and national legislature, and set about its project of “rescuing” Chile from the brink of economic and moral disaster, which entailed a complete restructuring of the government and the economy as well as a systematic elimination of political opposition. While the masses adjusted to strict censorship and a military curfew, Allende supporters and their families, along with other leftist mobilizers, found themselves the objects of a reign of terror which seized loved ones in broad daylight. Investigations have since estimated that Pinochet’s secret police force, the DINA (la Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional), detained and tortured around 28,000 civilians, and “disappeared” (executed without leaving a trace) around 3,500 more. Hundreds of detention and torture centers were established across the country, and the government collaborated with neighbor regimes to track down Allendistas who had fled for safety.

At the same time, Pinochet and his cabinet were constructing a new economic model for the country. A group of scholars known as the Chicago Boys, who had studied economics with Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago, instituted their vision of a neoliberal state well
before the rest of Latin America was forced to adopt neoliberal policies via the so-called “Washington Consensus”.¹ This model established the free market, not the state, as the primary source of goods and services that would satisfy citizens’ needs. Part of this system included privatizing education and pension systems—the former was consolidated in a law called the LOCE (Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Enseñanza) which Pinochet passed immediately before leaving office in 1990, and the latter took the form of the AFP (Pension Funds Administrators) system installed in 1980. Beyond policies to privatize industries and regulate the market, the reforms necessitated a moral restructuring of Chilean society. Individuals would be expected to participate in the market as rational individuals in order to meet their own needs and those of their family (Schild 2000). This model succeeded in correcting the hyperinflation and scarcity of the Allende years, and set Chile on track for solid economic growth, yet it also relied on a cycle of increasing inequality (Winn 2004). The human rights abuses and drastic disparity of Pinochet’s Chile eventually caught international attention, and foreign states and organizations began to pressure the administration towards more legitimate rule. Partially as a result of this pressure, Pinochet’s administration drafted a new constitution that would provisionally limit his term to eight more years. The Constitution was ratified by a national referendum (of questionable democratic legitimacy) in 1980, with a second referendum set for 1988 to decide whether or not the regime would continue.

The Latin American debt crisis ushered in by the 1982 recession shook Pinochet’s neoliberal success story, and cracks in the regime began to show. As was the case throughout much of Latin America, the economic hardship of the mid-80s mobilized many political protests, and resistance to the dictatorship grew stronger and more public. His place in the international spotlight

¹ The Washington Consensus refers to conditions set by the U.S. and other IMF leaders dictating economic reform to Latin American countries that were to receive IMF aid in the wake of the 1982 debt crisis.
prevented Pinochet from enforcing violent repression tactics on the same scale as he had a decade prior, and the organized resistance movements continued to grow. These included student groups, women’s groups, unions, and partisan organizations. By 1988, when the time arrived for Pinochet’s promised referendum, opposition movements had gained a significant foothold in Chilean social consciousness. Following the constitutional protocol, Chilean citizens voted on whether or not to extend Pinochet’s presidency, and the NO campaign, mounted by a coalition of opposition parties called the Concertación, won with approximately 56% of the national vote. True to his word, Pinochet allowed for free elections to take place the following year, and he lost the presidency to Patricio Aylwin, the Concertación candidate. In 1990 there was a peaceful transition of power and Chile embarked on a new democratic project.

In remarkable contrast to the mid- to late-1980s, civil society virtually dissolved during the democratization in the 90s. Political parties allowed their bases to atrophy and grassroots organizing decreased dramatically (Winn 2004). This has been attributed to several factors, a central one being the sense of betrayal and disillusionment with politics that many Chileans felt when the Concertación’s beautiful democratic vision did not bear fruit. Due to the uniquely peaceful transition of office, Pinochet was able to determine the conditions of his own removal; he remained in position as Commander in Chief of the army and a Senator for life, and the Constitution remained in place as well. On top of this, the new Concertación government was wary to attempt any economic restructuring, for fear of impeding Chile’s successful growth or alienating elites and foreign investors. As a result, for many Chileans the only major difference between dictatorship and democracy was free and fair elections; the neoliberal model and high levels of socioeconomic inequality continued. Many of those who had mobilized to bring down Pinochet in exchange for a better life under democracy were dismayed by this lack of change, and they became disillusioned with the parties who had made false promises and with the deceptive hope of social movements in
general (Paley 2001:88; Winn 2004).

Civil society continued in this subdued state until the first major resurgence of social movement activity in 2006, when high school students organized nation-wide protests and school occupations. The demands of this so-called Penguin Revolution (for the students marching in black and white uniforms) ranged from free bus passes to legislative reform of the Pinochet-era education policies. Then-President Michelle Bachelet met with student leaders for negotiation, consistent with her apparent celebration of citizen participation. When she had first taken office, she announced:

I want to establish a dialogue based on openness and participation; a great pact between the citizenry and the government… A new way of seeing and doing politics, a more inclusive form of politics, more participative, more open, more transparent. Politics for, by, and with the citizens. (speech by Michelle Bachelet on 11 March 2006, quoted in van der Ree 2011:35)

Though this participation was limited to civil consultations, in this case it did result in policy change; the new Ley General de Educación (LGE) was implemented in 2009 to replace Pinochet’s LOCE. However, many students were not satisfied with the reform measures (which included new curriculum standards for primary and secondary school, and new institutional bodies to monitor education quality), and they felt that Bachelet had not taken their demands seriously. After a few years, these students entered university settings where they continued to organize, and in 2011 another wave of student protests broke out.

These 2011 protests, known as the Chilean Winter, reached a level of mobilization and visibility that had not occurred since the mid-80s under Pinochet. This movement narrowed its focus to ending for-profit education in Chile, and used many creative non-violent protest techniques to garner attention and generate consciousness. These included dance mobs, kiss-ins, zombie and superhero demonstrations, puppets and floats, as well as more traditional marches and school occupations. The occasional violent confrontations with police received much media attention, eliciting condemnation of both student and police actions. President Piñera and Education Minister
Joaquín Lavín attempted to negotiate with student leaders, proposing a new education policy that students rejected as a condescending restatement of previous existing legislation. Frustrations boiled over into violent street clashes on August 4th, 2011; Chileans in Santiago and across the country witnessed students burn down a department store and police assault protesters with tear gas, water cannons, and rubber bullets. In the end 874 students were arrested, and many irate Chileans made comparisons to Pinochet-era police repression.

In 2013, Michelle Bachelet ran for president a second time, largely on a platform promising education reform, and was elected. Protests died down in response to this perceived accomplishment, yet when her new policy plan was revealed, many were unhappy with the actual concessions granted. Additionally, economic difficulties and bureaucratic opposition meant that Bachelet could not follow through on all her campaign promises on a timeline that would satisfy the student movement. Protesters found a second wind. On May 24th 2016, a group of 20 university students, pretending to be tourists, were able to shove their way past security guards into the courtyard of La Moneda (the presidential palace in Santiago), where they unfurled a banner that read “Notifíquese: hoy comenzamos la ofensiva” (“Be advised: our offensive begins today”) (Aburto 2016). Following a decision from la Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile (Confech), a nation-wide university student association, university students at schools across the country went on strike for several months.

Today mobilized student bodies have expanded their protest actions beyond demands for education reform. Pension reform and healthcare reform have also come to the forefront as issues demanding urgent attention, and parents, grandparents, and entire families have mobilized alongside students in the streets. This past year the “No + AFP” kicked off and specifically recruited families to protest together. Human rights have also surged to the forefront of public debate; as investigations publicize testimonies of dictatorship-era abuses, the clamor for justice grows. The
original federal investigation of these abuses, which resulted in the Rettig Report in 1991, proved unsatisfactory; a much more in-depth collection of witness testimony in 2004 produced the Valech Report, which was reopened in 2010. Yet the Chilean government has maintained a pact of silence, refusing to disclose the identities of perpetrators and thus allowing many torturers to continue unpunished. President Bachelet—herself a torture survivor—unveiled the highly acclaimed Museum of Memory and Human Rights in 2010, yet survivors and family members of disappeared detainees demand an end to impunity in annual memorial marches every September 11. On this day, they wear around their necks the black-and-white ID photos of their missing loved ones, and ask “¿Dónde están?” (where are they?).

A little over ten years ago, high school students interrupted the relatively stable and unquestioned public quiescence by demanding change. They introduced an alternative to the status quo of citizenship practice, and today this practice has expanded in both its targets and its base. What is the best way to understand these changes in concepts of citizenship and political practice? The question of whether historical outcomes should be attributed to individual actors or to the structures which organize and contain them (be they material, political, social, economic, cognitive, etc.) has long plagued social scientists, and has perpetuated a somewhat unproductive conceptualization of actors and structures as discrete entities—they are, in fact, mutually dependent processes. But for the purposes of reviewing past literature I will present the structuralist and actor-based approaches separately, before offering a more productive framework incorporating them both.
SHAPED & SHAPING STRUCTURES

Scholars have examined historical patterns of citizenship formulations and political and economic systems in Chile, and the ways these systems shape how people understand their roles, responsibilities, and the possibilities available to them. While this approach allows us to identify the ideal citizen and how people are shaped into this mold, it cannot explain how young adults respond to this shaping or change the mold itself; it makes visible the structural possibilities but obscures agency and affective experience.

Before turning to Chile, it is necessary to understand more broadly how structures exert forces that shape actors (though they are also shaped by actors themselves, as will be discussed later). Social structures have been understood to function as a kind of grammar, sets of rules and resources which program social behavior by providing standard frameworks which individuals utilize as they navigate society. Structures could be political and economic systems, such as democracy or capitalism, which provide institutionalized pathways for individuals to act according to certain rules for proper behavior, and which also make alternative behaviors more difficult. These structural limits and opportunities for action involve projects of subject formation, intentioned to shape individuals to act in prescribed ways. This is an oversimplification, because individuals still have agency to act outside of the prescribed ways and to change the subject formation structures, but it is a helpful starting point.

These shaping structures are abstract in that they are invisible, in their entirety, to any one individual--but they are grounded in institutions and in language, as can be seen in Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of discourse (one kind of social structure). As he defines it, a discourse is a group of statements, a prescribed way of speaking and doing things, which establishes a regime of truth and subject positions within broader power relations. That is, it prioritizes certain forms of knowing over others, and grants power to those with appropriate knowledge to wield other those without it. This ‘power-knowledge’ is exercised by individuals but is institutionally situated.
So while a discourse may be pioneered initially by individuals engaging in a political project of a certain subject formation, it can be institutionalized to increase its power over other individuals. Foucault expanded his concept of power-knowledge into ‘governmentality’--a form of power which governs conduct discursively, via both state and nonstate actors, creating self-regulating subjects (1991). Meaning that citizens behave properly (in support of state projects) not because the state forces them to, but because they want to, because those behaviors are normalized, valued, or rewarded in society.

Citizenship and memory can be understood as structuring discourses, in that certain options for practice are institutionalized and encouraged. Beginning with the former, it will be helpful to understand different citizenship projects over time, and their intersection with subject formation. The introduction of liberalism during the Enlightenment necessitated a model for political subjects based on freedom and equality. According to this model, the needs of the public may be satisfied at the least cost of liberty if private individuals compete against one another in the market, with only minimal (regulatory) intervention by the state. The liberal citizen is ideally a rational individual actor, politically equal to all others before the state--though in practice there are usually stipulations and exceptions to this equality (in the U.S., for example, minors and felons have no right to vote). Yet even on top of this political inequality exists an economic hierarchy determined by market processes. Michael Ignatieff points out that the contradiction between “economic processes ceaselessly generating inequality, and political processes requiring equality among citizens” leads to citizenship becoming an “empty formality” (1995:56, 65). An equal vote loses much of its significance when certain sectors of society cannot access the goods and services they need. Liberal theory posits that formal political equality is enough to equalize all citizens, ignoring the unequal conditions that affect citizens’ ability to claim and exercise their ‘equal’ rights. This not only creates subjects who value rational thinking and economic efficiency, but places them in
competition with one another. It also leads them to believe the illusion of political equality, and to view socioeconomic class differences as the result of individual character, rather than structurally programmed.

It was upon this foundation of liberalism that Pinochet (and leaders in other parts of the world) advanced a new neoliberal philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s, which introduced twists in citizens’ participation in both market activities and state institutions. To understand this new conceptualization of citizenship, it is helpful to first distinguish, as James Holston does, between formal citizenship (political membership) and substantive citizenship (the “distribution of rights, duties, and resources...people actually exercise”) (2008:22). He defines citizenship as the “foundational means by which nation-states recognize and manage some differences as systematically salient,” in a system which “always simultaneously expands and erodes in uneven ways” (Holston 2008:7,15). In fact, Holston argues that modern democracy is necessarily plagued by dynamic (or, in his words, “disjunctive”) negotiations of citizenship, both formal and substantive. Neoliberalism brought changes to the substantive formulations of citizenship in that it altered the expected duties and resources allocated to citizens, as demonstrated by Verónica Schild.

Schild observes that the neoliberal state has replaced “social citizenship” (or, in Holston’s model, substantive citizenship) with “market citizenship,” in which citizens are understood to be “capable of enhancing their lives through judicious, responsible choices as consumers of services and other goods. These citizens are ‘enterprising’ agents, consumers and producers, whose aim is to maximize their quality of life as individuals within small communities” (Schild 2000:276). In this model, citizens as subjects become agents implicated in their own subjectivities, thereby releasing the state from blame in the face of inequality (ibid.:277). To get away with this, the neoliberal project must entail not only economic transformations but also moral ones; “in its interventionist and socially ameliorative form neoliberalism also relies on… pedagogic/moral
projects of individual transformation, or of making people over, that rely on distinctive discourses and practices” which will be elaborated later (Schild 2007:183). This market citizenship generates a new understanding of rights, in which the government is not expected to bestow entitlements, but rather social services must be accessed through the market by active individuals. As one of Schild’s interlocutor’s put it, as a citizen you have “the right to work for what you want” (Schild 2000:294). This, I believe, is the most accurate model of citizenship in Chile today, and the one I will reference for this project.

To better understand contemporary citizen-state relations in Chile, we can start with the Constitution of 1980, which was drafted under Pinochet and is still in effect today (although Michelle Bachelet’s current administration is attempting to draft a new one). The Constitution of 1980 institutionalized a citizenship model based on 1) military authority and the “depoliticization of society,” 2) a conservative social order, and 3) a neoliberal economic order, “which transformed traditional collective understandings of citizenship into individualist market-oriented societal roles” (van der Ree 2011:29). This fit perfectly with the economic restructuring engineered by the Chicago Boys, a group of US-trained economists, whose vision van der Ree explains as follows:

> [P]olitical citizenship should be abolished, as the market would now come to fulfill the needs of the population. The functions of political and social citizenship would be provided through consumption, job markets, and other market mechanisms. Citizenship would come from consumption, and the state would remain subsidiary to the market. Only civil rights and, in the case of extreme poverty, social support were to be granted by the state, as a means of providing a level playing field (van der Ree 2011:30).

In this situation, the regime could justify granting no political or social rights by arguing that it was up to the market to meet all civilian needs. A citizenship model such as this shaped citizens to be self-reliant and apolitical--as I will discuss later.

In 1990, President Aylwin’s democratic administration (and the Concertación coalition) kept and even expanded many of Pinochet’s policies; in fact, Winn insists that “there was more continuity than change in economic policy and labor relations…[T]he Concertación did more to
legitimate and consolidate Pinochet’s economic and social ‘revolution’ than to reverse it” (2004:51). He observes that the preservation of the neoliberal system functioned to neutralize opposition from business elites and to encourage private investment, both of which were necessary for protecting the new democratic project (ibid.:53).

In this newly legitimized neoliberal model, citizenship was characterized by “formal democratic rights, an elitist political culture that allowed for practically no political participation, and social rights in the form of poverty reduction policies for the poorest sectors” (van der Ree 2011:32). van der Ree cites scholars Alfredo Riquelme and Gonzalo de la Maza for their characterizations of the resulting civil society as a ‘social void’ of ‘apathy’ (ibid.:33). Winn reports that “the Socialist party allowed its mass base to atrophy…[W]hat Pinochet had not succeeded in imposing with state terror, the Concertación accomplished with its neoliberal democracy” (Winn 2004:60). This governing structure enabled and encouraged certain forms of practice, such as responsible market participation and self-reliance, and stymied others, such as political protest. Julia Paley has examined some of the institutional sites of this discourse.

Paley observes that while hegemonic mechanisms of democracy such as election campaigns, opinion polls, and exhortations of participation can be “accepted or resisted, these practices are powerful to the degree that they produce particular types of subjects, in this case citizen-consumers constituted as individuals through the mutually reinforcing mechanisms of the market and contemporary politics” (2001:5-6). Of these mechanisms, Paley examines public opinion polls, which were used frequently by the Concertación government not only as a sensor to civil society (so as to address political demands before they were mobilized), but also as a tool to strengthen capitalist-democratic subject formation, wherein individuals are responsible for actively making choices (Paley 2001:136). Specifically, multiple-choice surveys “construct respondents as choice makers” (ibid.:135).
This actor-shaping requires the exercise of power, and can be understood as a form of
governmentality. In encouraging certain forms of participation, the government was delegitimizing
alternate forms, and citizens were subtly cued to feel as though they were participating on their own
terms all the while being trained to participate only on the state’s terms. The discourse of
participation “activates respondents as agents in their own subjection,” making citizens feel
“complicit in the outcome” of government and thus less likely to mobilize against it, regardless of
their political satisfaction (ibid.:136,138). In this way, Paley insists that participation operates as a
control mechanism, creating “self-regulating subjects [...] who will volunteer their time and energy
in the name of democracy and citizenship” (ibid.:146). This benefits the Concertación project of
democratic state formation because “rather than make claims against the government, the role of
citizens was to support it and provide their own services” as responsible, self-reliant individuals
(ibid.:172).

This self-provision of services is what others have referred to as the responsibilization of
society, a form of governmentality which deflects the onus of rights from the state onto the
individual, shaping citizens who would not blame the state if they were unable to satisfy their needs
(Foucault 1991; Postero 2007). Nancy Postero describes how this governmentality operates through
non-governmental organizations in Bolivia which educate individuals and communities in
“techniques of the self” by which they may conduct themselves as proper, responsible citizens
(2007:179). Similarly, Schild has observed the emergence of two new values promoted by
neoliberal social programs in Chile: “a capacity (and expectation) for choice; and a responsibility
for the individual self” (Schild 2007:182). These programs aim to educate citizens in *desarrollo
personal* (personal development) by teaching them to be “autonomous, assertive beings, subjects
of their own lives, impelled by an awareness of their own rights”-- encouraging agency but only
towards those activities deemed appropriate, thereby strengthening structural limitations on
political practice (Schild 2007:196).

The Foucauldian approach makes visible the ways that Chilean citizens are shaped to be responsible market actors who make no claims on the government. But these shaping forces are dynamic, and they are always resisted. As Patricia Richards insists, “the process of subject formation entailed by citizenship is never complete; subjects may participate in their own formation, but they also resist, imagining and actively seeking alternatives to the neoliberal model” (2013:171). Some individuals, such as student activists, embrace an alternative praxis, demanding from the government that which the market does not offer them (such as affordable, high-quality education). Their practice in turn creates new possibilities for other individuals, altering the forces shaping social actors.

I believe that memory is utilized as part of a similar governing discourse in the contemporary moment, possibly beyond Chile. Scholars have noted that beginning in the 1990s, the subject of memory began to pop up in significant debates as nation-states around the world transitioned to democracy and/or launched Truth and Reconciliation Commissions to investigate past wrongs committed by state agents (Olick 1999:333). This process has only intensified in the decades since; the United Nations declared 2009 the International Year of Reconciliation. Chile is a wonderful case through which to glimpse this phenomenon, as I will demonstrate further in later sections.

An understanding of structural forces can reveal mechanisms of subject formation and significant limitations on agency. But what is the experience of being shaped by these structures? How do people understand their own structuring, how do they feel about it, and how can their reactions affect the structure itself? While the structural approach is a valuable tool, it does not take into account agency and the subjective experience, which are also important to my analysis.
AFFECTIVE AGENTS

One central motivation for action—particularly political action—is affect (or emotion, depending on the definition in use). This is because, as one scholar has pointed out, “Cognitive agreement alone does not result in action. [...] This would be fine for rational automatons, not human beings” (Jasper 1998:413). Work from psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists who examine affect and subjectivity can make visible the important factors contributing to an individual’s decision to participate in politics, and how. While considerations of agency and subjectivity are necessary additions to my investigation, they still fall short of explaining social change such as the policy reform achieved by the student movement in Chile.

First, it is necessary to clarify what we mean when we discuss “affect,” and to distinguish it from emotion. Social theorist Brian Massumi defines an emotion as “a subjective content, the socio-linguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward defined as personal” (1995:88). Robert Levy similarly characterized emotions as ‘cognized’ feelings—some more cognized than others. These are the culturally-constructed concepts we use to categorize and name our bodily sensations, such as anger, sadness, happiness, love, fear, etc. Affect is slightly different; it is most simply described as the intensity of emotion. Massumi maintains that emotion is intensity (affect) qualified into “semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognized” (ibid.) Scholars appear to struggle with defining affect outside of emotion; there are many vague attempts such as, that which “informs our general sensibility towards the world surrounding us” (Papacharissi 2014:15). James Jasper distinguishes emotion from affect as follows: emotion is “an action or state of mind that makes sense only in particular circumstances” whereas affect is a deeper, more permanent feeling such as “love for one’s family… a sense of identification with a group…[or] fondness for places and objects, perhaps based on memories” (Jasper
1998:400,401). Though this definition does not line up with other uses of affect, Jasper also observes that “all actions, actors, and settings have an affective component[...] Much political activity, no doubt, involves the reference to or creation of positive and negative affects towards groups, policies, and activities,” so we can understand his definition of affect as including motivation to action (ibid.:402).

Perhaps definitions vary widely because affect is too liminal a concept to easily pin down in words. Yet communications scholar Zizi Papacharissi manages to paint a clear picture. She identifies affect as “intensity that has not yet been cognitively processed as feeling, emotion, or thought,” and distinguishes it neatly:

> While affect contains a particular energy, mood, or movement that may lead to particular feeling, and possibly the subsequent expression of emotion, it both precedes and sustains or possibly annuls feeling and emotion. We might think of affect as the force that drives the unconscious tap of the foot to music, the bob of the head as we listen along to conversation, the rhythm of our pace as we walk. (Papacharissi 2014:21)

This affect not only motivates us emotionally, but also mobilizes us physically, as Papacharissi illustrates. It provides the impetus for desiring a certain outcome or state of being, whether or not we are conscious of this motivation, and then mobilizes us to make the change necessary to bring about that outcome. This motivation to create change relies on two affective responses: anger towards ‘what is,’ and hope that a different ‘what is’ is even possible. These are both necessary; neither anger at an inevitable present, nor hope without urgency, result in political action.

Other attempts at investigating subjective interpretations of disadvantage, such as Sara Ahmed’s work in *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (2008), point also to anger as an important motivator, particularly in connection with both disgust and pain. In a chapter titled, “The Performativity of Disgust,” she explains that “bodies that are disgusted are also bodies that feel a certain rage, a rage that the object has got close enough to sicken” (Ahmed 2008:86). She identifies this “feeling of being disgusted,” or rage at that which disgusts you, as “an element in a politics that seeks to challenge ‘what is,’” because the ‘what is’ is disgusting and you are compelled to
eliminate it (ibid.:99). In a section on feminist politics, she notes that though feminist collectivity
(and other collectivities) may be formed through shared pain,

The response to pain, as a call for action, also requires anger; an interpretation that this
pain is wrong, that it is an outrage, and that something must be done about it. [...] Crucially,
anger is not simply defined in relationship to a past, but as opening up the future. In other
words, being against something does not end with ‘that which one is against.’ [...] Being
against something is also being for something, but something that has yet to be articulated
or is not yet. (ibid.:175)

Ahmed points out that, “Politics without hope is impossible [...] hope is what allows us to feel that
what angers us is not inevitable” (ibid.:184). This feeling of hope creates the possibility of another
way of being in the future than the present ‘what is.’ “The moment of hope is when the ‘not yet’
impresses upon us in the present, such that we must act, politically, to make it our future” (ibid.).
In other words, affective responses of anger will get us nowhere without affective responses of
hope as well. The source of hope for Chilean student activists may be the discourses of democracy
and citizenship that tell them that an alternative is possible, and that they have the efficacious power
to make that alternative reality. Unlike their parents’ generation, young adults today in Chile have
never experienced the severe betrayal by their government that many of their parents and
grandparents did (as a result of the Concertación transition or the military coup, respectively). For
this reason it will be important to examine the unique sources of both anger and hope, and the
discourses or narratives associated with these emotions, for the post-dictatorship adults.

The importance of emotion in social movements has been revisited by scholars in recent
years. James Jasper’s 1998 article, “The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions In
and Around Social Movements,” urged social movement scholars to take emotions seriously. He
insists that emotion and affective reactions are “integral” to explaining social movements, both in
terms of why individuals join them and also the progress of the movement itself--in fact, “there
would be no social movements if we did not have emotional responses to developments near and
far… It is affects and emotional responses that political organizers appeal to, arouse, manipulate,
and sustain” (ibid.:404, 405). Jasper’s discussion of what he calls moral shocks can be useful in understanding the motivations of Chilean young adults for joining in protest activity. He explains, “Moral shocks,” often the first step toward recruitment into social movements, occur when an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political action. [...] The triggers may be highly publicized public events such as a nuclear accident, or personal experiences such as the death of a child. They may be sudden, like an accident or public announcement, or they may unfold gradually over time. [...] Similarly, the shock may come from a plan for something new or from new information about something existing, which has already done unseen damage. [...] Most people, in most cases, resign themselves to unpleasant changes [...] But others, through complex emotional processes that few researchers have described, channel their ire and anger into righteous indignation and political activity. (Jasper 1998:409)

Jasper’s work reveals the necessity of incorporating an understanding of emotion and affect as legitimate and rational factors motivating action, and many scholars have since attempted to answer his call.

Sociologist Jacquelien van Stekelenberg and psychologist Bert Klandermans identified several factors which are in play when people decide to participate in protest (2013). They point out initially that “grievances abound while protest does not,” indicating that the proper structural and/or circumstantial conditions must be in place in order for motivation to coalesce into action (Stekelenberg and Klandermans 2013: 4). In a vague nod to discourse, the authors affirm that, “the more effective an individual believes protest is, the more likely she or he is to participate. [...] while normative forms of protest like petitioning and demonstrations tend to attract highly efficacious people, non-normative forms of protest [such as violence] are more likely to attract low efficacious people,” though they do not address why an individual may or may not believe that protest is effective (ibid.). This is the question that I want to ask: why do young Chilean adults believe that certain protest actions are effective? How do different discourses, from family memory or official narratives, inform these conceptions?

Collective identity is also identified as an important psychological factor by van Stekelenberg and Klandermans, though they qualify that it must be politicized in order to motivate
action. This politicization occurs when a shared grievance is blamed on an external enemy, against which claims can be launched. If these claims are not satisfied, “the underlying power struggle unfold[s] as a sequence of politicizing events that gradually transforms the group’s relationship to its social environment, whereby the tactical choices are again shaped by identity” (van Stekelenberg and Klandermans 2013:7). In the Chilean case, this collective identity could be generational, particularly since group identities are often formed in contrast to outsiders, and many differences separate the life experiences of the current post-dictatorship generation from their parents. The student identity may also be a powerful unifier.

When these group identities are amplified by a shared emotion, particularly anger, they are more likely to result in collective action. The authors explain, “Anger moves people to adopt a more challenging relationship with authorities than subordinate emotions such as shame and despair [...] or fear,” and observe that there are “two emotional routes to protest: an anger route based on efficacy leading to normative action and a contempt route when legitimate channels are closed [...] and the situation is seen as hopeless invoking a ‘nothing to lose’ strategy leading to non-normative protest” (ibid.:8). In our case, Chilean students mobilize for both normative and non-normative protest, and some don’t mobilize at all. The difference between these, then, would be the individual’s understanding of the efficacy of their own actions in the existing political system, which brings us back to discourses of effective politics. van Stekelenberg and Klandermans cannot address these discourses because their work is removed from any specific case or field data. They do, however, recognize this weakness: their final paragraph is a plea for social psychologists to consider “the sociopolitical context affecting people’s routes to protest,” because “the decision to protest is not taken in a social vacuum, [...] the dynamics of participation are created and limited by characteristics of the national contexts in which people are embedded” (ibid.:14). They conclude that future research must investigate the variables “affecting people’s subjective interpretations of
their collective disadvantages” (ibid., italics in original). This points to the need to combine a structural perspective with an investigation of affect, which is precisely what I shall attempt to do shortly.
A COMPROMISE: LOOSELY STRUCTURED ACTORS

While both of these approaches make visible important elements of what is happening in Chile, neither is fully adequate for understanding the reasons that young adults today participate in politics in the ways that they do, and their effects on Chile’s dynamic political structures. A better framework would combine these two considerations for structure and agency, such as Ortner’s framework of loosely structured actors. In this case I believe such an approach will make visible the important role of memory and family as sources of discourse guiding both interpretations and motivations, as well as the dynamic negotiations of memory and affect which blur the boundaries of “the political.”

A practice approach to ethnographic analysis seeks to uncover “the configuration of cultural forms, social relations, and historical processes that move people to act in ways that produce the effects in question” (Ortner 1989:12). Sherry Ortner used this approach to examine the historical innovation of Sherpa monasteries in Nepal, whereas I will use it to examine the re-normalization of political mobilization among young Chilean adults. Expanding upon Pierre Bourdieu’s *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977), Ortner explains practice theory as, “a theory of the relationship between the structures of society and culture on the one hand, and the nature of human action on the other” and dissects its four elements: practice, structure, actor, and history (Ortner 1989:11). Her first task is to define practice, and she does so in three parts:

Any form of human action or interaction would be an instance of “practice” insofar as the analyst recognized it as reverberating with features of asymmetry, inequality, domination, and the like in its particular historical and cultural setting. [...] Thus human activity regarded as taking place in a world of politically neutral relations is not “practice.” To this minimal definition I would add the following: Practice is action considered in relation to structure [...] Practice emerges from structure, it reproduces structure, and it has the capacity to transform structure. Human action considered apart from its structural contexts and its structural implications is not “practice.” And finally I would add an optional third dimension: history. [...] [I]t is only in historical contexts that one can see the relationship between practice and structure fully played out. (ibid.:12)

The meaning of practice implied here encompasses three separate usages: routine or ordinary activity, which is internalized and reproduced consistently; intentional action towards a goal or
project, the desire for which is often structurally constituted; and praxis, a conscious alternative to everyday routine (ibid.:194-195). This is the broad definition of practice I also utilize.

As for structure, Ortner emphasizes that—in a practice approach—it must take inherently dynamic forms. Bourdieu’s habitus is a clear example of this, as is Foucault’s discourse, because they inherently include space for agency and mechanisms for structural change (ibid.:13). For her examination, Ortner utilizes two notions of structure: contradictions (“conflicting discourses and conflicting patterns of practice—that recurrently pose problems to actors”) and cultural schemas (“plot structures that recur throughout many cultural stories and rituals, that depict actors responding to the contradictions of their culture and dealing with them in appropriate” ways) (ibid.:14). Contradiction is important because it allows us to “place a significant part of the historical dynamic within a society’s own organization” (ibid.:19). This idea comes largely from Marx, who believed that inherent contradictions render society “implicitly unstable” and allow for evolutionary change and even revolutionary transformation—though Ortner argues that Marx does not give the actor adequate analytical consideration (ibid.:20). Ortner insists that “Ultimately, contradictions are only analytically significant insofar as one can show how they impinge on actors’ experience, and force actors to respond to the problems they pose” (ibid.:21). This same understanding of structure as contradictions will be used for my investigation as well, along with political discourse. Though Ortner examined texts in order to identify the structural contradictions and schemas she utilized, I will be using personal narratives gathered from interviews.

The third element necessary for understanding practice theory, as defined by Ortner, is the actor. “The actor is not viewed as a free agent, engaged in unconstrained creativity on the one hand or manipulation on the other. Rather, the actor is recognized as being heavily constrained by both internalized cultural parameters and external material and social limits” (Ortner 1989:14). Central to Ortner’s inquiry are two questions: what do actors want? (because the structural contradictions
she identifies generate needs or desires for actors); and, what is the relationship between an actor and his or her culture? (ibid.:197;199). History is also crucial to Ortner’s approach, because it can be used to understand how “the impact of external forces is internally mediated” (ibid.:17). In the case of the Chilean post-dictatorship generation, actors may be constrained by their limited (and heavily filtered) knowledge of the past, by external and internalized discourse regarding what is appropriate politics, and by their social relations, among other things. What forces mediate young Chilean adults? What cultural parameters and social limits constrain them? What structural contradictions generate which needs for them?

In wrapping up her definition of practice theory, Ortner points out its dual nature, insisting that practice theory “is in itself a theory of translation between an objective world and a subjective one, between a world constituted by logics beyond actors’ perceptions, and a world constituted by logics spun by thinking and acting agents,” and “its special contribution lies in the ways in which it operates on the surface between them, examining those processes by which the one side is converted into the other “(ibid.:18). This points exactly to the previous sets of literature which I have identified: the one which attempts to trace the citizenship formations over time in Chile and the other which analyzes how actors respond to politics affectively. Just as Ortner locates her practice approach as bridge between these two worlds, I use her approach to build a similarly bridging framework for my own investigation and explain how the post-dictatorship generation has been uniquely positioned to create change.

Ortner’s greatest contribution, however, was to explain how structures structure actors. She insists, “If one wishes to argue […] that such patterning is not only ‘out there,’ but that it may have a kind of historical force of its own[…] then one must show that there is a comprehensible mechanism by means of which cultural patterning comes to manifest itself in events” (Ortner 1989:127). She identifies two distinct but equally unsatisfying resolutions offered (or implied) by
the literature: one, the soft position, which sees structures as “models” or “symbolic resources”
external to actors, on which actors may “draw,” and another, the hard position, according to which
structures “become deeply embedded in actors’ identities, as a result of actors growing up within a
particular cultural milieu” (ibid.). The first of these paints a picture of overly rational actors; the
second paints them as merely pre-programmed (ibid.). Ortner’s own position combines elements
of both of these explanations:

[П]eople may act for a variety of motives—rational self-interest, genuine spiritual desires,
and the like—with no particular intentions (or compulsions) to enact a cultural schema, and
no particular tendency to assume that others are doing so either. They may simply be going
about their business. Yet even if actors are not themselves enacting a cultural schema, given
the fact that the schema is a widely held and pervasively grounded frame of interpretation,
others will tend to interpret events as if the actors had in fact been following the schema.
But—and this is the key point of this middle position—if observers would tend to interpret
events in that way, so of course would at least some of the participants. Thus the schema
may not begin as part of the events, but insofar as it becomes part of a participant’s
interpretation, then it enters the event and begins to shape it. (Ortner 1989:128)

This would be her loosely structured actor, one that is “prepared—but no more than that—to find
most of his or her culture intelligible and meaningful, but who does not necessarily find all parts of
it equally meaningful in all times and places” (ibid.:198). This is the analytical tool I borrow to
understand young adults in Chile.

Analyses of actor-structure negotiation have been applied to varying extents to the cases
of Chilean citizenship and grassroots organizing in the 1990s, but not yet to contemporary social
movements. Gerard van der Ree has examined the actor-structure negotiation of citizenship over
the past half-century, and Julia Paley’s ethnography of a healthcare organization analyzes
community leaders’ interpretations and strategies through the neoliberal democratization process.

In “Citizenship ‘from Above’? The Case of Chile, 1964-2010” (2011), Van der Ree begins
by lamenting that approaches to Latin American citizenship have tended to “overemphasize either
its top-down implementation or bottom-up contestation” and hopes to find a middle ground using
a structure-agent approach that takes as its starting point the mutual, dialectical constitution of the
state and civil society (2011:23). To define citizenship, he argues that it “includes, in a very significant way, elements of renegotiation and redefinition. [It] should therefore not be understood in terms of social order, but rather in terms of social practice that is embedded in discursive negotiations between civil society and the state” (ibid.:24). Neither the granting and revoking of rights by the state, nor the petitioning and contesting of rights by civil society alone satisfy his search to understand “the dynamics of citizenship formation”. Instead, the structure-agent approach (which he adapts from Anthony Giddens, but which corresponds also to Bourdieu’s theory of practice) not only allows him to analyze how “the state and civil society mutually constitute each other in the struggle over citizenship,” but also adds a historical dimension to his examination (ibid.:25). He explains,

From this perspective, the state acts as a structure which imposes a certain formation of citizenship (either expansive or restrictive) that produces certain social identities and meanings for different sectors of the population. However, agents (civil society) are not completely determined by these new social identities, and can play out different kinds of responsive strategies: passivity, petitioning for more citizen rights, or contestation of citizenship. These responses, in turn, give meaning to new state-level initiatives in the formation of citizenship, and so the circle continues (van der Ree 2011:25).

This is a dialectical process; just as structures and agents are mutually constituted through dynamic practice, so state and civil society are mutually constituted through dynamic citizenship. Armed with this mode of analysis, he approaches four distinct ideological projects in Chile: communitarian reform under the Christian Democrat government (1964-’70), a democratic-socialist experiment under Salvador Allende (1970-’73), “an authoritarian neoliberal scheme” under Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973-1990), and a democratic market-oriented model under Concertación governments (1990-2010) (ibid.:24).

Locating the spaces for agency within these projects, van der Ree represents Allende’s poder popular model as an attempt to bring the working class into all political decision-making, by replacing the existing bicameral legislative system with a new unicameral popular assembly and including worker’s unions in all administrative bodies (van der Ree 2011:27-28). These initiatives
were met with much opposition from the Right, and many were never realized, which led radical Leftist sectors to mobilize, both against opposition and to pressure the government into keeping its word. In the resulting political climate, “the entire population was mobilized by the Popular Unity and its opponents...all political views were represented. Allende’s Chile was striking for its political pluralism and both representative and direct democracy” (Winn 2004:19). However, rising unrest and pressure from all sides, combined with a collapsing economy, soon forced the political system to a breaking point. Military actors, encouraged by the vocalized support of the Right, enacted regime change. In this analysis, van der Ree (partially) credits the agency of civil society for pushing Allende’s government beyond its structural capabilities, leading to massive structural change.

Van der Ree contends that the dictatorship government wielded the extant popular association between citizenship expansion and societal breakdown as a tool to justify repression and minimize opposition--in fact, during the 1988 referendum (which would decide on 10 more years of Pinochet’s regime), the SÍ campaign broadcast images of chaos to deter voters from democracy (ibid.:31). Voters, however, were not convinced, and the peaceful regime change resulting from the 1989 referendum is perhaps the best example of citizen agency changing the political structure.

Julia Paley, in her 2002 ethnography, examined discourses of democracy in Chile to understand the new forms of power exercised during democratization in the 1990s, as well as the changing social movement strategies in response to these conditions. Her title, *Marketing Democracy*, refers to two concepts: both “the infusion and shaping of democracy by free market economics, and the production of political images that promote democracy as a positive value,” while its subtitle, *Power and Social Movements in Post-Dictatorship Chile*, hints at her structure-actor approach (ibid.:6). She explores the way this structure structures, meaning the mechanisms
by which the Chilean project of “democracy” shapes actors, and also the ways actors experience, interpret, and navigate this structure—or, using Ortner’s terms, the ways they “creatively position themselves to maximize their profits from [externally]-generated opportunities” (Ortner 1989:108). She also seeks to uncover the ways in which certain actors used practice to alter their structures. For example, Paley observes that, “In the 1990s, as politicians promoted the ideas of consensus and democracy, poblador community leaders used the images and history of the población to create heroic narratives that could contest official representations and motivate social movements’ revival” (Paley 2002:26). This language sounds more like the ‘soft’ interpretation of structuring, as recognized by Ortner, because it portrays the community organizers as rationally drawing upon external structural elements—however, community members and other actors contributed their practice to this process as well, without the same conscious strategizing as their organizers.

Because Paley’s primary subject is power and governmentality, she devotes more time and theoretical clarification to the ways that structures shape actors than vice versa. In fact, her argument contends that what may appear at first glance as agency is, in fact, a structural element of governmental power. Central to her concept of democracy as a structure is what she calls the paradox of participation: democratic participation “acts as powerful discourse to limit the oppositional activity of social movements” (2002:12). Her broad argument can be summarized as follows:

[B]y the 1990s change had occurred, but it was a change embedded less in a simple movement from dictatorship to democracy than in changing forms of power through which elements of the military’s own economic and—to a degree—political project could be maintained. Sustaining that project required the demobilization of social movements, something that, ironically enough, could be accomplished more effectively by political democracy. (Paley 2002:105)

The changing forms of power through which the economic and political projects were (and are) maintained are the structures that shapes actors, and are shaped by them. These mechanisms of democracy, such as elections, opinion surveys, and market participation (as discussed earlier),
shape the role of the appropriate Chilean citizen as a rational individual who participates in these sanctioned ways and does not participate in protest movements.

Within this system of control, however, some actors did (and do) find spaces from which to contest the participatory structure. Paley contributes a unique insight in identifying forms of contestation where other scholars saw only apathy. She posits, for example, that citizens did not choose to resist the Concertación opinion polls through active protest, because this was itself still a form of participation (which is what the polls were designed to encourage). Rather, the opposite of participation is disengagement; citizens merely did not respond. They would leave survey answers blank or not turn them in at all (Paley 2001:137). During the many years of mandatory voting laws (1925-2012), citizens would find ways to avoid casting any actual votes-- in the 1997 congressional elections, a whopping 40% of eligible voters “annulled their ballots, left them blank, or were themselves absent from the polls” (ibid.:138). Paley observes that at least some of this “lost vote” can be owed to the distribution (by some unnamed civil groups) of flyers urging voters to annul their ballots (ibid.). With this in mind we may understand that some of the demobilization in the post-dictatorship period may not have been “apathy,” but rather an exercise of agency to contest participatory schemes. When the state asks for citizens to voice themselves, perhaps the most antagonistic form of protest is to remain silent.

If we apply the loosely structured actor framework to the student movement in post-dictatorship Chile, what might it make visible? The student movement can be seen as a response to the social consequences of neoliberalism--specifically the continued class inequality generated by a largely privatized higher education system. Left to pursue their own education as a commodity in the market, low-income and middle class families and students are forced to choose between taking on massive amounts of debt for a chance at a profitable career, or resigning themselves to a blue collar salary. Their choice to strike is a refusal of the participatory scheme which assigns them the
responsibility of fulfilling their own needs; their public demonstrations and marches, often down the large central avenue past la Moneda in Santiago, are an attempt to claim their social rights as citizens. As Judith Butler observes, “Simply put, the bodies on the street redeploy the space of appearance in order to contest and negate the existing forms of political legitimacy” (2015:85). In other words, the performance of appearing together in public creates the political space that students are otherwise denied, from which they can make demands upon the state. Whether or not their rights will be recognized by the state remains to be seen; Bachelet’s formal recognition of their legitimacy has yet to create any satisfying long-term changes.

But what other elements are missing from this interpretation that would be necessary to explain the case of young Chilean adults? What is unique about their specific relationship to their structures? While it is useful to look for sites of negotiation within dynamic political structures, this framework does not account for the experience of negotiation. How does the post-dictatorship generation choose what to believe as fact, and what guides their affective reactions to that information? Discourses influence both of these aspects of the political decision-making process (interpretation of meaning and subjective reaction to that interpretation). Official narratives, cultural productions, and family legacies shape the meaning which young adults attribute to the past and therefore also to the present. I believe that family and memory are both prominent sources of discourse for the post-dictatorship generation’s understanding of social structures and their affective motivations, which have not been adequately examined. When these are considered, data reveal that often, political actors are not merely responsible rational individuals, as assumed and promised by the neoliberal model, but rather affective groups--be it families or social collectivities. Together, many individuals of the post-dictatorship generation are also challenging the boundaries of what politics can be: by framing their education, retirement, and healthcare movements in extremely personal and familial terms, they are politicizing the affective family home life.
THE FAMILY POLITIC

Gwynn Thomas has shown that the discourses of family identities and family values have long been used towards political ends in Chile. Beliefs about the family and family relationships have been employed, she observes, by both men and women, from all points along the political spectrum, in all variety of political climates (2011). Her central argument is that, throughout Chilean history, “political leaders and mobilized citizens turned to familial beliefs to provide the language, metaphors, symbols, and images that framed their political appeals, justified their political actions, and made sense of larger political events” (Thomas 2011:5). Her guiding question, therefore, which she attempts to answer using discourse analysis, is as follows: “How do normative ideals about the relationship between the familial and the political shape the strategies of individuals and groups engaged in political struggle?” (ibid.:22). Though she stresses the importance of considering how political conflicts are interpreted and understood by individuals, her investigation is not an ethnography but rather a textual analysis of political propaganda campaigns, which I believe undermines her intentions (ibid.:91). Regardless, her work is a valuable contribution to my argument, in that she demonstrates ways in which “familial identities serve to justify political claims and to legitimate public action” (ibid.:99).

For example, Thomas devotes the better part of a chapter to the Agrupación de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos (AFDD, or the Association of Family Members to Disappeared Detainees), a group formed under Pinochet’s reign of terror to seek out their missing loved ones. She writes, “The AFDD used the family to carve out a space to speak out against the Pinochet regime. It was as family members that they had gone searching; it was as family members that they had organized the AFDD; it was as family members that they had approached the government and the public” (Thomas 2011:175). This is an extremely important point to make, but Thomas does not follow it all the way through--it was a strategic choice to approach the government and the public as family members. The family was one of the only safe spaces from which to speak out
against the government, because it was considered to be personal, affective, and apolitical and therefore did not represent a threat or target for repression by the Pinochet regime.² Nor does Thomas consider that her argument implies a critique of the individualized neoliberal model. In fact, her language in phrases such as, “Individual citizens continue to be drawn into politics because of their familial identities and to use these identities to claim the right to speak and participate,” suggests that she still situates her examination within a neoliberal framework (ibid.:254).

The greatest contribution of Thomas’ work for my investigation is her identification of the family as an entry point into politics. She summarizes her argument by insisting:

People’s understandings of politics rely in part on their experiences, beliefs, and desires about the family. Our family lives are not simply shaped by politics; often we seek to understand our engagement in politics through familial beliefs… We also turn to familial beliefs as citizens when we craft strategies to justify our political dissent and create public spaces for our ideas… Family is a powerful resource in the process of creating social mobilization and justifying dissent, especially in times of political repression.” (Thomas 2011:241).

Setting aside the problematic fact that this very generalized argument is based on no ethnographic data, I believe that my own ethnographic experience in Chile supports her claim. In fact, I believe that my framework of examining the loosely structured actor in a discursive field will reveal that this discursive field is dominated by familial beliefs—though by that I mean not beliefs about the ideal family relationship, but the beliefs that are shared and passed down among familial generations. What Thomas did not account for, in all her discussion of family ideals, was memory and variation.

Because the lived experiences of Pinochet’s dictatorship varied so widely, and because family relationships themselves also vary so widely, the memories of this experience—and the affect attached to these recounts—are not uniform. In fact, they may be directly contradictory, and

² This was also the case in Argentina, where the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo (Plazo de Mayo Mothers) organized under the military regime. Diana Taylor (1997) describes the ways that their performance of motherhood simultaneously fit and challenged gender roles.
young adults must navigate these memories and their meanings in contentious spheres. Thomas shows her ethnographic weakness when she observes, after Pinochet’s death in 2006, that, “Perhaps for the last time, rival groups of protesters took to the streets to give voice and witness to competing versions of Pinochet’s legacy” (ibid.:248). Pinochet’s death did not resolve any contradictions, because it was not his being alive that caused them—the contradictions are rooted in affective memories. No consensus has been reached, and whether or not a consensus is ever possible, memory will continue to be negotiated.

If we understand the family unit as the first and most immediate social system into which children are assimilated, we can see that parents stand in the unique position of being able to transmit discourse, meaning, and critical thinking skills before individuals are introduced into the public sphere of competing discourses and meanings. For this reason, Donna Chovanec refers to parents as ‘organic intellectuals.’ In her work in Arica, Chile, she identified familial connections between three generations of female activists; some of the most active student leaders of the Penguin Revolution in 2006 were the daughters and granddaughters of women who organized or participated in feminist activism under the dictatorship (Chovanec and Benitez 2008).

The oldest generation in Chovanec’s ethnographic investigation, women who were married adults during the dictatorship period, had grown up in the strong partisan tradition pre-Pinochet, and therefore had received a solid ideological education from their parties, which stayed with them and motivated them to act against the dictatorship (Chovanec and Benitez 2008:47). The middle generation includes individuals who were children or teenagers during the dictatorship, and were involved in anti-regime protest movements but did not receive ideological training from strong parties, and the youngest generation is those individuals born either immediately before or during the democratic period (what I refer to as the post-dictatorship generation) (ibid.) The authors observe that these youth were “born amidst the disillusionment and despair of the early transition
years after the dictatorship,... raised by a generation of adults/parents who were themselves raised amidst the repression and resistance of the dictatorship years,” and they ask, “What effect does a system based on fear and suspicion have on trust and communication at micro and macro levels in subsequent generations?” (ibid.:48). It is important to keep in mind that the authors were examining generations of activists specifically, and not generations of the population as a whole, but their examination is a valuable contribution to understanding the motivations of student protesters.

They identify two important elements that they believe were passed down between generations, that may explain what motivates the young actors today: critical social consciousness and social movement continuity. Regarding the first, they argue:

[A]cquiring such a consciousness organically occurs during the early years as we learn values and beliefs from the [family] collective that makes up our social world… The idea of ‘taking’ critical consciousness ['tomar conciencia'] implies an intentional commitment made by women whose own lived experiences resonate with their already acquired consciousness. As they entered their youth, many women...made deliberate choices to act upon their consciousness. (ibid.:49).

In the Chilean case, perhaps the suspicion of politics which disillusioned adults passed on to their post-dictatorship children (explicitly or not) led that younger generation to view their surrounding political and economic systems through an already-critical lens. Regarding the second intergenerational element, the authors reference feminist scholar Verta Taylor, who uncovered the ‘abeyance structures’ through which social movements (specifically the womens’ rights movement in the U.S.) are kept in “a holding process” between periods of activism (ibid.:50). Women from the previous generations kept in close contact with their activist cohorts and introduced their daughters to the ideas of solidarity and resistance, often bringing them along to annual commemorative events or protests. This is reinforced by ethnographic work from other authors, including Julia Paley--one of her informants, a young adult woman at the time of the democratic transition, explained her motivations for joining the street protests in her población in the 80s: “I did it because my mom and various neighbors were there, so we were all the same… if something
happened--all of us united” (Paley 2001:89).

If we incorporate intergenerational learning into our framework for understanding the political motivations of young adults today, it will make visible the connections between the protest movements under the dictatorship and today, and also the affective value of discourse among family members. What values or critiques, what social and political discourses, have members of the post-dictatorship generation learned from their parents? How have they accepted, questioned, or adapted them? How does their familial source contribute to their affective value? How are the motivational affects of anger and hope shared or transmitted between family members?
NEGOTIATING MEMORY

Memory can be an extremely important, if not the most important, source of affect motivating political actors. At the same time, affect can shape what is remembered, creating a perpetual cycle of memory, action, and reaction through which the past and present are mutually constituted. In Chile, this cycle carries the added weight of trauma from the dictatorship era that has yet to be resolved at the social or state level. It is important to note that memory has only recently, in the past decade, been brought forth as a legitimate topic of public discussion in Chile. During the democratization process, the discourse of progress urged citizens to sweep their painful and possibly antagonistic memories under the rug and focus on their new collective future. As Paley points out, “suppression of memory was needed to symbolically disconnect democracy from dictatorship” (2001:126). This is yet another example of the structure of democracy shaping its actors: citizens were discouraged from engaging with memory. In a way, this can be understood as another form of governmentality, creating self-regulating subjects who only remember in ways which support the state project of democracy.

Now the discourse has changed, partly as a result of resistance from the post-dictatorship generation, who face the challenge of deciding who and what to believe about the past. Their questions and insistence, along with governmental attempts to forge a coherent progressive narrative (via, for instance, the Valech and Rettig Reports), have created a new discourse of memory, which prompts individuals to remember their past and express these memories with their families and in public in response (often in comparison) to current events. Remembering and commemorating the past are encouraged--within limits. Individuals may provide testimony and honor victims, but should neither expect nor demand punitive justice. In this way, today’s affective discourses also shape memory of the past; they are dialectically formed. Citizens who process the past in this way contribute to the state project of forming a coherent democratic narrative by filtering out which parts of the past are okay to remember and express, and which are not. Survivors
and family members challenge this discourse with their persistent question of “¿Dónde están?” which demands recognition of certain elements of the past which are impeded by current discourse (victims’ whereabouts). Such contentious negotiation of memory has been examined by various literature scholars and sociologists.

Marianne Hirsch and Michael Rothberg have both investigated memory’s fluid and adaptive nature, emphasizing that memory exists beyond the boundaries of individuals remembering their own experiences. Rothberg urges us to consider memory as “multidirectional: as subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing; as productive and not privative,” meaning that, rather than thinking of memory as coming to us from the past through individuals, we ought to think of it as also influencing the past from the present, and as mediated laterally among individuals and across places (2009:3, emphasis in original). Consequently, the public sphere in which this mediation and negotiation takes place is “a malleable discursive space in which groups do not simply articulate established positions but actually come into being through their dialogical interactions with others; both the subjects and spaces of the public are open to continual reconstruction” (ibid.:5). Just as actors and structures are in constant mutual formation via practice, social subjects and public spheres constantly re-shape each other through dialogue. Regarding the intersection of memory in this public sphere, Rothberg explains: “the borders of memory and identity are jagged [...] Memory’s anachronistic quality--its bringing together of now and then, here and there--is actually the source of its powerful creativity, its ability to build new worlds out of the materials of older ones” (ibid.). I believe this speaks to its affective power, which is also the source of its powerful motivation for political action. In fact, Rothberg makes this connection explicit: “If memory is as susceptible as any other human faculty to abuse[...] memory is at least as often a spur to unexpected acts of empathy and solidarity; indeed multidirectional memory is often the very grounds on which people construct and act upon visions of justice”
Refuting a widespread conception of memory as competitive—meaning that “the articulation of the past in collective memory [is] a struggle for recognition in which there can only be winners and losers,” Rothberg insists that “memory is not a zero-sum game” (ibid.:3,11). As evidence of this, he refers to the “convoluted, sometimes historically unjustified, back-and-forth movement of seemingly distant collective memories in and out of public consciousness” (ibid.:17). He ends his book with a powerful conclusion: “[W]e cannot stem the structural multidirectionality of memory. [...] Memories are mobile; histories are implicated in each other. Thus, finally, understanding political conflict entails understanding the interlacing of memories in the force field of public space. The only way forward is through their entanglement” (ibid.:313). This unraveling of memories in the public space, in order to disentangle them and move forward, is the challenge currently facing Chilean society. Those who experienced the dictatorship have a different relationship to this process than their children do. How do these differences create different conceptions of what politics should be? Or, to borrow from Rothberg, how does the post-dictatorship perspective affect the dictatorship survivors’ understanding of what politics can be, and vice versa?

Marianne Hirsch asks this same question. She begins her investigation with her own experience as the child of Holocaust survivors. Though she had not lived the same traumatic experiences as her parents had, she still remembered them in her mind—with great affect—because her parents had passed their own narratives and affect onto her. She coins her own term for this phenomenon:

“Postmemory” describes the relationship that the “generation after” bears to the personal, collective, and cultural trauma of those who came before—to experiences they “remember” only by means of the stories, images, and behaviors among which they grew up. But these experiences were transmitted to them so deeply and affectively as to seem to constitute memories in their own right. Postmemory’s connection to the past is thus actually mediated not by recall but by imaginative investment, projection, and creation. (Hirsch 2012:5)
Hirsch conceives of postmemory as “a structure of inter- and transgenerational return of traumatic knowledge and embodied experience” (ibid.:6, emphasis in original). As a structure, this postmemory shapes actors (those who experienced trauma, their children, as well as those who did not experience trauma, and their children), providing affective motivation for political action, and is shaped by actors who recall or contest what is being remembered. It is not the same thing, of course; “it is ‘post’; but, at the same time, [she] argue[s], it approximates memory in its affective force and its psychic effects” (ibid.:31). Though this concept is borne of Holocaust studies, she points out that it would be applicable elsewhere, including in the wake of Latin American dictatorships (ibid.:18). Hirsch and Rothberg make overlapping arguments about memory, and in fact they both cite one another (approvingly). Rothberg suggests that, “What Hirsch does not say--although her account does not exclude the possibility--is that postmemory may well constitute a particular version of memory’s multidirectionality” (Rothberg 2009:271).

German scholars Jan and Aleida Assmann categorize collective memory into several types, including communicative memory: that which is “‘biographical’ and ‘factual,’ and is located within a generation of contemporaries who witness an event as adults and who can pass on their bodily and affective connection to that event to their descendants,” and for which “the family is a crucial unit of transmission” (Hirsch 2012:32). Central to their concept, as related by Hirsch, is the notion that expressed memories become part of an “inter-subjective symbolic system” and are no longer exclusive property of the individual who expressed them but rather part of a collective sphere in which they may be “exchanged, shared, corroborated, confirmed, corrected, disputed” (ibid.). In many cases, this means that memories can be diluted or lost, but Hirsch insists that postmemory “strives to reactivate and re-embody more distant political and cultural memorial structures by reinvesting them with resonant individual and familial forms of mediation and aesthetic expression” (ibid.:33). This is different than history, because it is “an affective link to the past,”
and family is the most important site of transmission because “nonverbal and precognitive acts of transfer occur most clearly within a familial space” (ibid.:33,34). Much as Thomas points out the versatility of the family identity as a political tool, Hirsch observes that “the idiom of family can become an accessible lingua franca easing identification and projection, recognition and misrecognition, across distance and difference” (ibid.:39). It is a universally-recognizable frame that can easily convey subjective experience.

“For survivors of trauma, the gap between generations is the breach between a memory located in the body and the mediated knowledge of those who were born after,” though this is complicated by the fact that this knowledge is mediated by other external discourses as well (Hirsch 2012:80). In Chile, these discourses can be directly contradictory: ‘Thank God Pinochet saved us’ vs. ‘Pinochet was a fascist murderer who escaped justice.’ Unlike other South American states, the proportion of human rights victims in the Chilean population is just big enough to maintain a vocal minority but not great enough to build a consensus among the rest of society. This means that negotiations of memory in Chile are hard fought, and there is much at stake. For assistance in understanding this process we turn to scholars Elizabeth Jelin and Ana Ros.

Jelin focuses her attention on the ways in which, as she says, the past refuses to pass (2003). Her investigation relies on three premises: first, memory is a subjective process anchored in symbolic and material markers; second, it is a site of conflict and struggle involving participants who produce meanings of the past “framed by the power relations in which their actions are embedded in the present,” and third, that memory is historical in that “the meanings attached to the past change over time and are part of larger, complex social and political scenarios” (Jelin 2003:xv). Conflicting interpretations of the past are inevitable, and often debate over memory arises in times of political change and democratization, when actors attempt to forge plans for the future which

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3 These are paraphrased approximations based on many conversations.
make sense of, or at least acknowledge in a coherent way, their past (ibid.:3). When they do, the social face of memory is emphasized, but Jelin insists that all memory is both individual and collective: “Insofar as words and the community of discourse are collective, experience is as well. Individual lived-through occurrences are not transformed into experiences with meaning without the presence of cultural discourses, and these are always collective” (ibid.:24).

Her title, *State Repression and the Labors of Memory*, reveals Jelin’s attention to memory as an intentional process involving productive actors. She defines memory as “the process of giving meaning to the past,” and for those who did not experience the event in question, memory is “a representation of the past constructed as cultural knowledge shared by successive generations and by different ‘others’” (ibid.:21). Both of these involve action, or labor, and the actor is central to Jelin’s exploration of memory because “The person is an agent of transformation, and in the process transforms him or herself and the world. Activity adds value. Thus, to assert that memory involves ‘labor’ is to incorporate it into the activity that generates and transforms the social world” (ibid.:5). This approach considers the ways in which memory is practiced by actors. She explains: “It is in human agency that the past, embodied in cultural contents (discourses in the broad sense), is activated. Memory, then, is produced whenever and wherever there are subjects who share a culture, social agents who try to ‘materialize’ the meanings of the past in different cultural products” (ibid.:25). Notice that she does not restrict these subjects to just those that experienced the past in question; all members of society contribute to the process of constructing meaning of that past.

In fact, actors who did *not* experience the specific past are often major contributors to this process, because they have the social distance to inquire and think critically about what happened (ibid.:101). Ana Ros points out that “the emergence of actors from a new generation is often decisive in establishing new meanings. Their questions and observations contribute to the
emergence of a more complex image of the past that allows them and others to draw lessons for the sake of present” (2012:10). This complicates the transmission of memory, because rather than passively receive and accept narratives of the past, the post-dictatorship generation often interprets those narratives in different ways. Not only are they independent actors immersed in their own narratives and discourses, but “there is no way to prevent or block reinterpretations, resignifications, and new readings of the past, because the ‘same’ history and the ‘same’ truth inevitably acquire alternative meanings when the context has changed” (Jelin 2003:96). Jelin would agree with Hirsch that post-dictatorship youth often absorb the subjective symptoms of memory from family members, but she insists:

Cultural transmission between one generation and the next, however, cannot be reduced to the reproduction of patterns of action... With modernity and the demands for cultural democratization, the expectation and presupposition of the socialization process are that what is to be developed are reflexive subjects, who have gained the ability to choose and organize their own lives. This means that there will always be discontinuities and endogenous innovations, along with those generated by historical dynamics itself, since the transmission of reflexivity undermines the automatic transmission of the social models for explicit behavior. (ibid.)

This reflexivity can be a source of conflict not only amongst family members but in the public spheres in which the meanings of the past are negotiated.

This is important for understanding Chilean young adults as loosely structured actors if we think about memory as “an open-ended and inclusive process that can be used to orient action in the present” (Ros 2012:5). Narratives of the dictatorship era both shape and are shaped by actors, be they survivors or post-dictatorship adults. If we include this consideration in an investigation of political mobilization today, it will prompt us to ask: what narratives of the past are these actors employing or contesting? How does the source of these narratives influence their affective reaction to the past and to the present? Where might memory be a source of anger or hope? How do their interpretations of the past shape the hopes for their future according to which they direct their political action?
THE FRAMEWORK IN USE

Using this model to make sense of ethnographic data, then, we should direct our attention to elements such as: who are the actors, and which discourses or political structures do they engage? How is their relative position within these structures unique? What are the sources of affect motivating the actors, and how are these mediated by memory, family, and other social discourses? What new discourse of politics do the actors wish to generate? I have conducted interviews with Chilean subjects, which will be complemented by data gathered by other authors in order to demonstrate the advantages produced by an analysis which seeks to make visible the intersections of family, memory, affect, and political practice.

As part of her work in Santiago during the democratic transition, Julia Paley conducted workshops in the La Bandera neighborhood (a historically mobilized sector), in which she facilitated a group of teenage community members researching and writing a history of their own community. Though this was not necessarily part of her theoretical investigation, her ethnographic method involved encouraging subjects to produce their own knowledge--resulting in a second ethnographic account which Paley includes at the back of her book. Transcribed tidbits of these workshop sessions are interwoven throughout her analysis in order to provide a face for the actors and their subjective practice. The following long excerpt is a transcription of these individuals debating a historical timeline amongst themselves:

_Gordon_: We heard yesterday that there was a dispute about...the beginning of La Bandera.
_Serena_: The first land seizure was on January 26 [of 1970].
_Julia_: But they say that there were at least two land seizures before January 26. In La Bandera.
_Diego_: [Reading out loud from a newspaper article we had brought]... It says in this document..., “five hundred families without housing...illegally occupied the lands that are next to the poblaclón La Bandera.”... [So] we are reading here that there already was a poblaclón La Bandera... [The people from the land seizure] didn’t create it... According to what it says here, it already existed.
_Julia_:... Diego, I think that your family arrived in ’69. Or ’68. Your mom said so.
_Diego_: Yes...when my parents arrived here there wasn’t anything...there was nothing but yards. Land. But...my parents arrived through Operación Sitio...they didn’t arrive in a seizure illegal[ly]...They arrived to nothing but sites...marked with chalk...So they had to put up their tent and guard the site because...from the very same land
seizure there were people who could come and see that the site was empty...and take it... I’m going to have to ask my parents...if they know of the land seizure..., what is was like here before, [and what] was here already. [...] What we are saying here is that the población was not born on January 26 of ‘70.

*Gordon:* But they say that it was! [laughs]

*Diego:* They say so. But...I ask my old lady and [she] says that the población was not born on that day.

*Serena:* That day was the land seizure.

*Diego:*... What we want to know is the history of the población… Not [the history] of the land seizure.

*Gordon:* The histories of the población.

*Diego:* What we are seeing is that the población did not start on January 26.

*Gordon:* But it is possible that for many people it does begin on January 26… What is the población? It’s the physical terrain, but it’s also the attitude. And if year after year they have the celebration on January 26--...It’s a question.

*Diego:* We have to look for people. We can try to make a questionnaire...^4

Paley relates this excerpt to demonstrate her point that “the creation of historical narratives and the construction of identity are both contested and intertwined,” and that--particularly because narratives and identities relating to collective action were repressed and silenced during the dictatorship-- their recovery, or re-creation, is a necessary condition for collective organization in the democratic era (Paley 2001:37). I believe a loosely structured actor approach can be applied to this same data to make visible other elements that are not part of Paley’s investigation. Though these individuals are neither members of the post-dictatorship generation nor student activists, and the memory in question does not pertain to the Pinochet era, this transcription still presents a group of actors attempting to make meaning of a past they did not experience themselves, negotiating contradictory narratives from sources with different affective associations.

As the subject identified as Diego demonstrates, there are inconsistent sources of history in conflict: the official narrative of a newspaper report versus the personal memories passed down from his parents. Diego seems to defer to his mother’s account, because he insists, “the población was not born on January 26 of ‘70. [...] They [the newspaper] say so. But… I ask my old lady and [she] says that the población was not born on that day.” Nothing is revealed about Diego’s

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^4 This comes from (Paley 2001:32-33) and the “[...]” is my own consolidation--all other bracketed content is original from Paley.
relationship with his mother, because it is not within the scope of Paley’s project—in fact, Paley does not even acknowledge this as his source of history. But other participants do not defer to Diego’s mother’s account in the same way. Gordon, for example, recognizes that there are multiple “histories” and “it is possible that for many people [the población] does begin on January 26.” It is presumably Diego’s affective tie to his mother that leads him to trust her memory over others, though both Diego and Gordon reject the discourse of news media as the one objective narrative of the past—they question this narrative and instead choose to believe the personal memories of individuals in their community (as demonstrated by their plan for a questionnaire). Once they resolve this discrepancy and decide which narrative of the origins of the población to include in the document they are producing (in Paley’s workshop), then this document will be a source of history for future actors—actors who may not have personal acquaintances to consult who experienced this past themselves. They are adding to the repertoire of meanings of the past, altering the significance of collective memory.

Paley also relates the transcript of another conversation at the history workshop, once the group had advanced their timeline to the point of the democratic transition (2001:84). She uses this excerpt to introduce her argument about the demobilization of the post-transition era, though again it speaks to the themes of my investigation as well.

Serena: I think the people...now are more calm. [They] think that with the government of Aylwin [[the first democratically-elected president, who had taken office the year prior to this conversation]] everything was solved. So now there aren’t so many demonstrations...now there is only work for the organized people.

Diego: It’s...mostly the people of the población whom the dictatorship didn’t affect, they [feel] relaxed, understand? My very own parents, we have never had problems...a brother held prisoner, a brother dead, or me, or my dad, nothing, understand? So...my old man and old lady are pacified... They go along with...the changes. [[...]] There are still a lot of problems. And above all for the people that the dictatorship really affected. That is, those who have compañeros who are dead, those who have compañeros who are arrested, disappeared, executed, all of that. All these people are the ones that still continue fighting. So [you] speak with people that couldn’t care less (no están ni ahi) and you say to them, “What do you think of those who are dead that they found in some place [wrapped in] plastic?” [here he is referring to the corpses of the executed and disappeared found in mass graves]. “Ayyyy, no estoy ni ahi, they go around making nothing but trouble in the city
center those people,” [they say]. And now that we are in the government of Aylwin, and now that we have everything, it’s like they’ve covered their eyes. That [with] Aylwin everything is beautiful. It’s over.

Laura: It’s as if they all go around fighting to get rid of the dictatorship, and now it’s like we’re left with nothing but this.

Diego: One begins to ask oneself, What happens from here on out? We are in a government of transition to democracy and everything. But what happened before this? You can’t forget what happened… On paper the truth is written, in the Rettig Report. An official truth. But…they died and you [can’t] forget. We have to, I don’t know—we have to do something for those persons.

In this transcript we see, again, the family as a source of affect and discourse for practice. Diego says, “My very own parents, we have never had problems…a brother held prisoner, a brother dead, or me, or my dad, nothing, understand? So… my old man and old lady are pacified… They go along with…the changes.” His parents’ practice is then a source of affect—specifically of frustration or anger—for Diego himself, which undoubtedly guides his own practice (though Paley does not show us how).

This exchange also reflects several of the discourses contributing to the general apathy (or silence) of civil society post-transition, such as: democracy as a resolution in itself, victims as deserving of abuse, the transition as a disappointing betrayal, bureaucratic review (via the Rettig Report) as a resolution in itself, and the connection between the past and the future as disjointed and incomprehensible. The actors here respond to those discourses in ways that reflect their own positionality, as individuals whose families were not personally affected by Pinochet but who know and care for others who were more directly affected. Young adults today would engage these discourses in a different way, having witnessed nothing of the dictatorship but many failures of Chilean democracy and many public debates regarding how to resolve the past.

Though Paley does not make explicit connections to citizenship here, we see the effects of social responsibilization: only those residents who personally lost family members continue the political fight, while everyone else covers their eyes (conforming to the individualist neoliberal citizen model). Diego, rather than expecting the state to serve justice, seems to feel that it is up to
individuals in the community to take action to right this wrong. He says, “On paper the truth is written, in the Rettig Report,” as though that is all one can expect from the state, and insists that “we have to do something for those persons--” implying that grassroots action is the only way to expect a resolution. Diego subscribes to the same citizenship discourse as Schild’s informant who said you have the right to work for what you want, though in this case the desired outcome is proper reparations for state abuse.

In between the history workshops in la Bandera, the investigative focus of Paley’s ethnography is a community-organized health group, Llareta. Her goal is to demonstrate how “the group’s characteristics—whom it attracts, its methods of organization, its enduring principles and shifting tactics—express the pressures community groups were under and the options they faced” in the moment of democratic transition (Paley 2001:9). This approach is similar to that of the loosely structured actor (if we allow for collective actors, which we must), but Paley focuses more on the ways that structures structured the group than the ways in which this group as an actor was able to affect the structure. Perhaps she did not find that they were able to change the structure after all; it was a small group with limited impact. Because the student movement, on the other hand, has been able to create so much change in the political system and social consciousness, any investigation of the post-dictatorship generation’s political action must necessarily examine the subversive outcomes of their practice.

Paley largely focuses her attention on the ways in which actors attempt to navigate structures with an eye towards the future, rather than the past--perhaps because, at the time of her fieldwork in the 1990s, the discourse of progress was emphasized by the state and many of the citizens in Chile (or, at least, the most vocal citizens). In the previous excerpt, Diego demonstrates concern at this silence of memory, saying, “what happened before this? You can’t forget what happened. [...] they died and you [can’t] forget.” It was not until the mid- to late-2000s that Chile
began to look to the past more seriously, allowing painful memory to be voiced, acknowledged, and processed—or in other words, acted upon in meaningful ways. The creation of the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in 2010 and the Valech Report of human rights abuses were attempts to create spaces of discussion of memory, within the limits of a state narrative of progress. Because this was not on the horizon during her research, Paley does not afford memory much consideration (and perhaps I am similarly a product of my time). For the young adults of today, however, their attempts to make meaning of the past, and their mountains of unanswered questions, have pulled discourses of memory into the public sphere, challenging the ways that state projects like the commissions and museum direct people to remember only certain things in certain ways and not others. These discourses, because they engage family memories and have important consequences for the present, can generate much motivational affect.

The centrality of questioning narratives of the past, and the motivational capacity of this curiosity, is evidenced by my own ethnographic research with Chilean university students in 2016. Catita, a student in Santiago, explained to me her family situation and the changes in her own social consciousness that led her to participate in her (all girls’) high school’s strike and the broader student movement in 2011.

Maddie: Do your parents or your grandparents talk about life, either here or in the South, under Allende or under Pinochet or under the Concertación?
Catita: Umm no, they don’t talk about it. But I… I ask! There was one time, I think it was at school, when we were going through Chilean history and we got to the dictatorship period—all these questions came to me. For example, the school was around [back then], so I said [to myself], how did the girls who were at school experience it? Like my schoolmates from that year, what would they have done? How would they have felt? All that. I always had that question, and I shared it with my friends, and they said the same: What would have happened? How would it have been? Would the girls have mobilized or not? I remember I was also interested in trying to start a project to salvage that memory, to add it to our school’s history. It was going to be like a tool [un motor], too, to be able to say the students fought before, we also have to do the same now, just like the history of our political fight... And then afterwards I kept thinking about it, like what would my life in the countryside have been like? What would have happened there? And I was asking my parents, but my parents at that time didn’t…—my mom always tells the same story, that […] she didn’t really experience it like a lot of other people […] No, she saw it more from the outside, like she was in another
area. She knew that something was happening, but she didn’t know exactly what it was. It was very hazy. [...] And my dad’s case always made me curious, because at that time he was doing his military service. So I said—when I found out, I was like ‘woah! and you--what was that experience? What was it like being in military service?’ with everything about the soldiers detaining people and all that. He said, ‘no, it’s that I wasn’t—I just did my service and I never experienced that. I was just there, doing my work.’

Catita and her family are members of the Mapuche indigenous community, and like many Mapuche, she rejects a Chilean identity and challenges the authority of state institutions, contesting the citizenship model imposed upon her. Therefore it is likely that Catita views Chilean social practices through a more inquisitive and/or critical lens than most people her age do. In another part of our interview, she told me about how her uncles have spent time in jail for their activism against the Chilean state. So not only is the rejection of citizenship passed down through family and community members, but so is the political practice of protesting the state. Using a loosely structured actor approach, we might understand that this positionality has shaped Catita into an actor who carefully and consciously examines her surroundings before acting, and one who often acts in intentionally subversive ways. For example, she wanted to use memory to motivate her group of classmates to take political action and join the strike movement (“It was going to be like a tool... to be able to say the students fought before, we also have to do the same now”). Catita and her classmates were successfully able to occupy their school for eight months in 2011, joining thousands of other students and drawing the attention of the nation (and of policy makers) to their reform cause. Thus her practice, informed by memory and family, had implications for systemic change.

In contrast, other members of the post-dictatorship generation with different identities and family backgrounds employ different discourses of memory. For example, Cristian (who was, at

5 Mapuche, the largest indigenous community in Chile, have consistently protested for autonomy, only to be met with violent police repression and public condemnation. They continue to be subject to great amounts of racial discrimination, both socially and legally, and as a result many Mapuche are extremely critical and antagonistic towards the Chilean state. See Patricia Richards (2013).
the time of our interview, two months away from graduating high school in a small town) and his brother Fernando (a university student in Santiago) were raised in an upper-middle class household; their father is a police officer and their family is known by other community members to lean right politically. I asked them a similar question and received a much different answer.

Maddie: Have your parents or relatives or teachers or I don’t know who, told you stories or accounts of what they were doing during the Allende and Pinochet governments? What have they told you?

Cristian: Um, occasionally [they talk about] the brutality on both sides. The confrontations, the people who died for thinking differently, for doing their jobs sometimes—because the police were just doing their job, and lots of police […] died doing that. But also the people who died defending their ideas. So, like, a wide range of things, that’s what they all tell us. And also about the bad things going on under Allende, like waiting in line to buy bread…

Fernando: --and the limited resources--

Cristian: --yeah.

Maddie: Your parents experienced that? [nods] […] How do you think those experiences have influenced the country today?

Cristian: In short, like… the sector of people who experienced that influence the younger people, but in a bad way, like they incite resentment. I mean[…] I think it’s social resentment like that, that’s a fundamental reason that the country isn’t able to grow like it should. Because there’s so much rivalry…between people who defend Pinochet and people who defend Allende. So if a consensus could be reached, the country would grow much more than it is right now with so much resentment about something that’s already over— nobody should forget it, but they should get over it [nadie debería olvidarse, pero si superarse].

To Cristian, there is no value in debating the past; here we see the discourse that what’s done is done, that dwelling in affective memory prevents progress. Throughout the interview, neither boy related any personal anecdotes that family members may have shared with them, and both repeatedly lamented that “something that happened 30 years ago” should still require so much attention. These boys would have been perfect Concertación citizens, supporting the state narrative which prioritized progress over memory. They recognize that the past still has a great effect on the present, but see this as an obstruction. Their role as the sons of a police officer clearly influences their interpretation of events (“police were just doing their job, and lots of police died”), though it is not yet clear how the discourse of progress guides their practice. They do express concern, however, with finding ways to translate their ideas into action:
Maddie: So how do you guys participate in politics?
Fernando: Well, not that much before, because we couldn’t vote [because we weren’t 18 years old at the last presidential election], but now we can vote, so that’s one way.
Cristian: I mean, now—I mean we don’t really participate so directly, like going to marches or whatever, but now that I can vote—now that we can both...exercise our right to vote, participating in responsible voting is a good way to—
Fernando: Now that we’re citizens! [laughs] [...] I have participated in some assemblies at my university, through the student center, but they talk more about internal stuff, not really… like student movements and all that, there’s not much of that.
Maddie: But do you feel like the student center, or the student assembly, is a space—do you think that’s a form of democracy too?
Fernando: Uhh yeah, but whether or not that influences…like…real policies, I don’t know if it does, but yes it’s a space for open conversation. The thing is, in my view, most of what politics is, is just lots of analysis. Everyone has their analysis. But then, when the time comes to act, no one knows how to act. So everyone has their analysis: “well we should do this, or we should do that other thing,” but in the moment of, “ok, so what do we do?”—no one knows.

From Cristian’s response we see that he has internalized the Concertación’s paradoxical encouragement of participation via electoral voting, though Fernando expresses awareness of the limitations of democratic citizenship by joking that they weren’t citizens until they were old enough to vote. He (Fernando) has attempted other forms of political action, such as participating in student assemblies, though he was disillusioned by the outcome (or lack thereof) of their discussions. Fernando appears to associate citizenship with action: being a citizen means being able to make things happen (again, the right to work for what you want). Yet his concept of “politics” fails in this sense; it does not enable action. To use a loosely structured actor approach, it would be important to find out what motivated Fernando to attend the student assembly, and why Cristian thinks that voting is a good way to participate. What are their sources of discourse and affect? How might Fernando envision the action he seeks outside of practicing “politics?”

Fernando’s disillusionment with university politics mirrored complaints I heard from almost all of my informants; most of them had joined a political student group at their university and then left the group because they found that the discussions produced nothing meaningful to them. Other than Catita, none expressed contempt for the boundaries of formal citizenship (membership in the state), but rather focused their complaints on the neoliberal formulation of
market citizenship which relieves the state of any duty to attend to citizens’ needs (though they did not use this language). They sought alternative opportunities for fulfillment but were not satisfied with the spaces for political practice available to them.

Other major sources of frustration or discontent seemed to be political corruption and socioeconomic inequality. Several informants referenced observing the experiences of their family members as turning points in their social consciousness, and the source of their sense of injustice. For example, one student, Francisca, explained to me how much growing up with her family had shaped her outlook on politics and society in general:

I used to feel like a very fortunate person, especially in my adolescence, in my childhood—well so my grandparents always instilled a consciousness of others. And I always saw, for example, in other countries there was—I don’t know—war, things like that, so I felt very relaxed to be in a country where you didn’t see those kinds of problems. But I got older and I’ve realized that everything—especially the legal system [can work against you]—for example something very personal happened to me. Umm I have a cousin, distantly related—she went to a [public] municipal school. It was the municipal school most packed with students, like 50 students per classroom. And so, I don’t know, in the freshmen class there was Class A, B, C, D, all the way to H. So I mean it was a school that was very… in construction and technology also, very precarious. [...] I was [also] in school, it was a private school… and we would study together. I mean, she had the same abilities as I did, and I’d say [to myself], “but wow, the outlook she has on her life and her future are so much worse than mine,” so I mean I said to her, “look, you can do whatever you want.” And she always limited herself because she went to a public school. And I would say, “but no, it’s the same—look, if you—you can do what you want to do.” And I could tell from that, that it was the system itself that was leaving her out. Because it’s not that there was anything wrong with her, it was just the pure fact of being in a municipal [school]—they wouldn’t prepare her well for the PSU (that’s the test to get into university), and she didn’t have the resources anyway to get into university or come live in Santiago, being from Constitución [a small port town south of the capital]—because that’s a really big expense. So you start to ask yourself… what is Chile after all?

Francisca’s grandparents, who were active Allende supporters, had passed along a discourse of social awareness that shaped her interpretation of what was going on around her. We can see how her practice has changed as this interpretation was revised by the new understanding she gained when she compared her cousin’s situation to her own (an extension of the same philosophy imparted from her grandparents, applied in the context of the neoliberal education system). Francisca’s experience with her cousin has revealed to her the fallacy of the market citizenship
model which places responsibility upon individuals; she sees that not everyone can succeed by working for what they want, after all. Another student, Laura, told me that she believes the healthcare system requires the most urgent reform, because her brother once had to wait 12 years to see a medical specialist on public insurance. Any approach to this ethnographic data must therefore account for the ways in which discourse engages the life experiences of not only the subject, but also of those people close to the subject’s life (with high affective value), to shape social consciousness and practice.

But if frustration (or negative affect) is so common among the post-dictatorship students, where is the positive affect that motivates them to other kinds of political action? Most expressed optimism for the future rooted in either the possibility of a new Constitution, or in the promising careers of fresh politicians (specifically Giorgio Jackson and Gabriel Boric, former leaders of the 2011 student movement who have been elected to the national legislature). In both cases, this element provided a glimpse of an alternative to the political norms which these students disliked. At the moment of my fieldwork, President Bachelet’s attempt to incorporate the public into drafting a new constitution was heading downhill; participation in local town hall meetings was lower than expected, and the process was less transparent than many partisan opponents wished. As a result, most Chileans I spoke with believed that the new Constitution was unlikely, or at least undesired if produced in this way (even though Constitutional reform has been a popular political demand since the transition to democracy). Suspicion of politicians, the electoral process, and neoliberal institutions has dissuaded many citizens from placing their hopes in Bachelet’s possible new Constitution. Ironically, the governing discourse of neoliberal citizenship (which shapes subjects to put their heads down and expect nothing from their state) functions to ensure its own perpetuation—even when there is a chance to re-formulate citizenship, citizens do not engage it out of lack of confidence in state procedures.
Instead, reflecting this same suspicion and disillusionment, many young adults expressed excitement about young politicians, who would replace the corrupt and old-fashioned representatives who have been in office for so long. Almost all of them indicated that in order to achieve the change they sought, they needed to get new politicians in office. Cristian and Fernando explained:

Fernando: You can see that Boric--Deputy Boric and Deputy Jackson, they want the same political changes for the country--they’re objective, too. But you have to understand that most deputies today were raised in another era… They were raised in the time of the military regime or the beginning of democracy or before--lots of them were around in Allende’s time, I don’t know. So that’s what Congress needs, a renovation of members…who have been born, born and raised in this time of democracy, instead of older people. […]

Cristian: In order for it to get better we need politicians who are…younger politicians, updated politicians. And the modern politicians you can only get with… with new minds. With younger deputies and senators who have better ideas.

Fernando: That is, ideas from today, not ideas from the past. [Such as the idea] that politics not be just a business, about what can I give you to get something myself—that it be more about… changing the country.

Maddie: And are you hopeful that it’s possible for politics to be more than just a business? that there are enough good people [in politics] to—

Fernando: I mean, there’s hope but it’s in the long term, like 30 years [out].

Cristian: Although I think I get hopeful when I see and hear the new politicians like Boric and Jackson--for me they are the ones who bring hope for politics because they themselves are the ones supporting a decrease in parliamentary salaries—so right there you can already tell that their spirit is about helping the citizens, [they want] for politicians to be better and not just out for their own gain.

It is unclear from my fieldwork where the discourse that young politicians are incorruptible originates (possibly from young politicians...). But if Fernando and Cristian find a unique source of hope in electoral turnover, then it makes sense that their preferred method of political action would be voting. This discourse guides their practice--which could presumably then lead to new legislators in office, changing the political structure which necessitated the discourse of turnover as progress in the first place. Their hope for structural change still fits within the limits of political practice espoused by the market citizenship model: vote in elections and hope that it works out, because the rest is up to you. Ironically, Fernando predicted that a satisfying resolution is only possible over the course of 30 years--the same length of time that he repeatedly dismissed as a
distant past which deserves no bearing on the present.

I return, finally, to Laura, whose justification for avoiding student marches I included in the introduction. Like many of the other students I got to know, Laura expressed a general dissatisfaction with the political options available to her. When I asked her how she identifies herself politically, she told me, “I feel like I’m not represented.[...] I’m not on the left or the right but I’m not in the center either,” because she agrees with elements of both the left (the urgency of addressing inequality) and the right (the valuation of ambitious work ethic), but disagrees with the religious stances of the Chilean center parties (regarding abortion, for example). Laura’s hesitancy to pick a side or align herself with any partisan identity may reflect her divided and contentious family upbringing. As she explained to me, she grew up in a split household: her parents divorced when she was young, and from then on she lived with her maternal grandmother on one floor of a house, with her mother, stepfather, brother, and step-siblings living apart upstairs. Her mother was—in her words—cold and distant with her, and Laura acknowledged that this is probably because her grandmother raised her mother the same way (though she is an affectionate grandmother to Laura). Politics was a common, but thorny, topic of conversation at home, because—as Laura explained—everyone had a very different position:

Maddie: Has your grandma or your mom told you stories about their youth or life back then [under dictatorship]? [...]  
Laura: Yes—and they’re completely opposite dialogues. Um… my mom was born in ’75—so right in the dictatorship—but my mom doesn’t…when she tells her story she doesn’t… she doesn’t talk about the process of the dictatorship. For her… actually she always says the past is always better, and… she’s even a Pinochet supporter, she really likes the right. Sometimes she contradicts herself but she defines herself as right-wing. And she always… says, “no, if my General were here, this wouldn’t be happening.” Like the delinquency, for example. That’s something she says a lot. And she says that when she was young she would go out partying a lot, that it wasn’t as dangerous as it is now, even though it was the middle of the dictatorship, with everything about the disappeared detainees and everything—since she didn’t experience it. It’s very weird, like she was living in a bubble. I don’t know.  
Maddie: She was here in Santiago?  
Laura: Yeah! She was here in Santiago. And…on the other hand, my grandma—my grandma was the complete opposite. My grandma, even though she was the daughter of a General, she didn’t—she hates the regime, she says it did a lot of
harm, and that she… she suffered a lot because…[...] because she had lots of friends, since she identified as communist—not even just left[-wing], she says “I am communist.” So… she suffered a lot, for example, when Allende died. [...] So… when we talk about politics in my house, it gets really out of hand… because everyone has a totally different position. And well… my mom… she gets upset, and she says “no no, my General…” and my grandma has even started crying, she says “how could you say those things[?]” and all that…

Coming from such an affectively-charged environment of conflicting political discourses and personal narratives, Laura has rejected all partisan discourse. Her mother and grandmother are both important sources of memory and affect, and Laura’s position in the crossfire shapes her practice of partisan disengagement. However, this did not translate into political disinterest; Laura still cared about politics and was eager to discuss her experiences with me. When I asked if she was involved in any student organizations or political activities outside of school, she explained:

Laura: When I was in high school, I was part of this group called Confluencia [Convergence]. It was at school but it was people with all kinds of party backgrounds and different ideas who just wanted to debate…But beyond that, no. Because I also feel like it’s a little bit dangerous. Like since the dictatorship, there’s this idea that, I don’t know, if you go to a march, the police are going to beat you, the water cannons are going to blast you, and all that. And… I mean I don’t know, one time I was going somewhere, and there was a march but I didn’t even know, and on my way this guy--a policeman--shoved me, and I wasn’t part of the march so I was like, ‘hey what the hell? Like, why would you do that if I’m not protesting, I’m not doing anything, I’m just trying to get past.’ So, but I wish I could--I’d like to support these events, but because of… out of fear, I don’t risk joining in with that kind of organizing.

Maddie: And that fear, do you think that comes from what’s on the news, or from stories your grandma tells about things before, or…?
Laura: Um… no… You know, my grandma doesn’t… she hasn’t really told me that many stories about the political groups, but my mom has. My mom used to tell me about how her brother was in [an extreme leftist group organizing under the dictatorship]. [...] And the [group], um… so… they were like protesting against the regime, and my mom always told me about how my cousin—my uncle—would come home with black eyes, how they would beat him, how one time he was missing for three days. But she tells it… She told me about that when I was little so that I wouldn’t get involved in politics or social movements.

Though Laura rejects much of her mother’s partisan discourse, the discourse that engagement with social movements is dangerous (born out of the dictatorship experience) has apparently stuck. This discourse itself is rooted in familial affect: Laura’s mother cared for her brother and feared for him, and does not want the same to happen to her daughter. At another point in our interview, Laura
explained to me that her grandmother is still very active in social movements, participating in marches and even once making the news for joining a demonstration in which protestors took turns running the Chilean flag in circles around la Moneda for 1,800 hours (symbolizing the 1,800 million pesos that would be required for education reform annually). This discourse of associating activism with danger and fear, then, is not shared by Laura’s grandmother—though, paradoxically, the grandmother’s experiences as a Communist under the dictatorship and a mother to a persecuted militant (complemented by Laura’s own experience passing a march) may support Laura’s mother’s argument in Laura’s eyes. Laura specified to me that she does not join her grandmother in her activism, because she has a different political position (interestingly, she did not expressly attribute her own views to the influence of her mother or grandmother). Here we see that while familial relationships may affect beliefs of political effectiveness, the reverse is also true: having established her own stance on political action, Laura misses out on sharing experiences of affective significance with her grandmother.

It is worth noting Laura’s mention of fear, since one of the common insights offered by students who do protest is that they are no longer afraid. They are referring to the possible violent repercussions of state repression, which their parents still fear as a result of their experience under Pinochet. In an ethnographic analysis of interviews conducted with high school students who were occupying their schools in 2011, Michèle Arrué reported that students identified their lack of fear as the main difference between their generation and their parents’ (2012). He quotes several of them saying, “Ya no tenemos miedo” and “El miedo ya se perdió” (we’re not afraid anymore, there is no more fear) (ibid.). One student explained, “We didn’t live through what the dictatorship was like. And that really changes your outlook, on Chile and on the world. Because the adults are afraid that the same thing will happen again [...] We aren’t as afraid” (ibid., my translation). This sentiment was captured in song by Liliana Felipe, an Argentinian who escaped to Mexico before
her sister was disappeared in the Dirty War. Her 2008 song “Nos tienen miedo porque no tenemos miedo” (They fear us because we have no fear) has become a protest song throughout Latin America and this phrase is scrawled in street graffiti and on march banners. Yet, as Laura makes clear, this sentiment is not shared across all segments of the new generation. Her unique family situation takes precedence well before her collective generational identity in terms of direct discursive influence on Laura.

Therefore the key to any ethnographic analysis of post-dictatorship politics must be to consider actors’ unique positions not only within political structures but also familial ones—both shape the actor and provide sources of memory and affect, and both can be shaped by these actors’ practice. For example, Catita told me about a disagreement she had with her father, who she described as very individualistic and materialistic (in other words, a good neoliberal citizen):

My aunt, in the countryside, they [in her community] started up the process--like the formation of a co-op, that was called [X]. So all the people in the communities put in a certain amount of money and then if they needed to, they could go and ask for it, and they get a certain percent interest added in order to make profit—but it could be just a thousand pesos [about $1.50 USD], two thousand pesos at the most. So not very much. But it seemed good to me because really it's like everyone comes together for a common cause. [...] So I talked with my aunt, and I liked the project, I said “ok I want to be part of this too,” [...] So I told my dad, “Hey I’m going to join this. To save my money, without—I won’t put it in the bank, because they’re paying me interest too.” And he said to me, “ok, but how much will you earn from that?” [I said,] “it’ll be minimal, maybe—I don’t know—like a thousand pesos.” And he laughed, [and said,] “that’s absurd, why would you invest in that if you’re not…?” and I said “but things have to change, I can’t always be thinking about how to earn the most right away!”

On one level, we see here Catita as a young adult trying to make financial decisions in a neoliberal economic system that would urge her to put her money in a bank or invest it so that she can earn more for herself. But as we have already seen, Catita rejects the discourse of market citizenship; she will not engage her practice with the institutional sites of this discourse (in this case, banks). She expects and desires more than this individualistic responsibility. On another level, she is a young adult deciding what kind of person she wants to be, taking adults in her life as models (whether positive or negative). In the end she rejects the neoliberal discourse of maximizing
individual profit, espoused by her father, in favor of an alternative discourse of working together in solidarity, which Catita sees in her aunt. Her actions, in deciding to put her money in a co-op and in justifying this to her father, may affect (in albeit small ways) both the banking system and her father’s personal reasoning and his own practice. Catita’s practice outside the limits and sites of market citizenship work to erode this neoliberal discourse.
CONCLUSION

It is clear that existing literature has neither addressed the ethnographic case of post-dictatorship actors nor provided adequate theoretical tools for doing so. Previous literature, from a variety of disciplines, has tended to examine the political motivations of individuals either in terms of their surrounding structures or their internal affect. While both are valuable, neither is adequate on its own. Instead, a loosely structured actor approach, developed by Sherry Ortner but based on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice, considers the actor’s unique positionality in order to understand how their practice is shaped by, but also shapes in turn, these structures.

Previous ethnographies frame actors as either individual or collective, however, I argue that it is more productive to consider actors as members of small social units, to attend to the subtle ways in which their practice is shaped not only by their own positionality, life experience, and affect, but by those of their close family members as well. Rather than analytically gather all social interaction into one plane of influence, it may be helpful to prioritize relations of high affective value, which often mediate the wider discourses that engage actors. Familial structures are often more immediate than the wider social, political, or economic structures that have most often been the focus of ethnographic analyses using a practice theory approach. Actors may be loosely structured by these social forces and discourses, but they are, in some cases, more tightly structured by interpersonal forces and affects. Rather than consider this merely an element of their positionality, I believe it deserves attention as a primary source of motivation for their political action. After all, the wider social discourses often only arrive to actors via their mediation by these more personal structures. It is not just that Catita rejects neoliberalism, but she specifically rejects the neoliberal citizenship practiced by her father. Laura largely avoided marches not purely out of ideological disagreement, but because her mother had planted the seed of fear of protest as a form of care for loved ones.

While I believe this will be the most productive approach to an examination of political
engagement among post-dictatorship Chileans, it raises several questions. Namely, why has this approach been overlooked so far? Would this framework be equally productive in other cases? What would such an approach imply for our understanding of politics? Regarding the first of these, it is possible that social researchers have fallen into the trap of adopting neoliberal assumptions such as the individual actor. Ethnographies often treat individuals as the primary units of agency and practice; family relationships are seen as accessories, often excluded from analytical consideration unless it is specifically an investigation of gender or family. The impact of communal discourses and familial affect must not be taken for granted. As actors who are often themselves positioned with a neoliberal framework, researchers may be blind to this bias. We must be conscious of the ways in which our own practice either upholds or challenges this neoliberal expectation.

Secondly, it is possible that this approach may not be equally fitting in other cases. Given the strong Catholic tradition in Chile, the institution of family is regarded with relative reverence. Children often live at home until they are married, and in my experience much socializing outside the house still involves family members. It follows, then, that family members would have prevalent influence upon the social consciousness of young Chilean adults. Given also the uniquely recent and traumatic political history in Chile, questions of memory interpretation and appropriate reaction abound, and young adults necessarily rely on the accounts of their parents’ generation to form their own meanings and practice. The past in question is often most accessible through immediate family. In a context without these elements (an intentional preservation of the family institution, and an antagonistic history removed one generation), it may not hold that highly motivational discourses are mediated through family relationships. In the U.S., for example, where children are generally more independent earlier in life, and traumatic human rights abuses did not sweep widely through our parents’ lives, it may be that discourses are mediated through an actor’s
friend group, work team, or other small unit more so than through the family. If that were the case, there is still value in addressing these as primary sources of discourse and affect--though verifying this would require directed ethnographic attention.

Lastly, this approach does indeed make visible other kinds of political practice. If we understand that actors are immersed in family units, we see that political evaluations and decisions to act are often made within this unit. As demonstrated by Catita, her action of joining her aunt’s co-op was practiced because of, and through, her family. This practice rejected a prevailing discourse, the market citizenship model which principally gives subjects the right to work for what they want. Catita’s practice reflects a desire for things to be different; by rejecting the primary options for action available and finding alternative praxis, she acts in ways that will hopefully change the system to which she objects. If the motivations for this praxis are often found at home, the family becomes political. And leaders of the student movement are aware of this; I saw and heard many protesters reference their family members as the reason for their actions, and the reason that reform is necessary (not just in education, but also in the healthcare and pension systems, which all lend themselves well to mediation through familial relationships). As Gwynn Thomas observed, politicians in Chile have often used familial metaphors to appear part of a more natural (a-political) order, and some protesters under the dictatorship used the justification of family motivations as a way to create a safe, a-political space from which to speak without fear of repression. This illusion of the family as a space separate from politics has been shattered by the social movements and political engagement of the post-dictatorship generation. The model of the responsible citizen who acts alone, in their own best interest, is challenged. These individuals strategize their practice together, motivated by the memories and emotions of family members. The fact that Laura’s brother had to wait 12 years to see a doctor is political to Laura. The fact that--as one poster proclaimed at a march I attended--a grandfather cannot retire to spend time with his grandchildren,
is political. And in their practice, the student protesters have re-shaped the discourse and motivations for other members of society: parents commonly support their children in striking, because they see that the fact that their child cannot receive a high-quality education to prepare them for their future, is political.

As actors contest the neoliberal discourse of market citizenship by making demands upon the state together, they erode the authority of this discourse. It remains to be seen what new formulations of citizenship may emerge as a result. Further analysis of post-dictatorship politics must incorporate the loosely structured actor approach and consider these actors as family members themselves. Such a framework will, I believe, reveal the centrality of family and memory in the positionality of young Chilean adults today.
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67


