Paper Money and Palimpsests:
Thomas De Quincey and Representational Crisis

Matthew Schneider

Generative Anthropology explains why language is tragically precarious at its core: though the best means devised for forestalling intra-specific violence, language and the forms of representation derived from it are after all only temporary solutions to the problems continually created by the extraordinary level of human mimeticism. On the one hand, as Eric Gans has shown, language—especially in its highest evolved form, the declarative sentence—"substitutes a predicate for a desired act of presentification," thereby providing "not a gratuitous affirmation of 'what is the case,' but a reply to an expression of worldly desire that constitutes at the same time a deferral of this desire." On the other hand, René Girard has demonstrated how the alternative to such a deferral—the violent unanimity of the "sacrificial crisis"—represents so dire an outcome that cultures the world over protect against it with the double safeguard of language coupled with objects that have an historic, material connection to the originary scene: sacred amulets, ritual masks, etc. In other words, although language is continually relied upon to produce peaceful communal presence, there is always a lingering mistrust of its capability to meet future mimetic challenges, since individual desire always threatens to outstrip society's ability to satisfy that desire. During peaceful periods cultures test the limits of representation and evolve increasingly symbolic and abstract cultural forms which, in turn, multiply the means a society has for satisfying the desires of
all its members. In times of crisis however men return to representations whose connections with the originary scene are intrinsic or more self-evident, in the hope that doing so will re-create the universal harmony which was the origin's preeminent social benefit—in fact, the very reason for its existence.

One representational system—indeed, cultural institution—illustrates this tendency particularly well. Money, like language, substitutes deferral for immediate gratification by offering a representation in place of that which is desired. Unlike language, however, money is meta-representational: its twofold status as both object and text grants it a credibility normally inaccessible to other written tokens of exchange. Money's exchangeability makes it, in effect, an "international language." But if money is in essence symbolic or representational, then it will be undermined by the same precariousness which inheres in all verbal representations. From an anthropological point of view, what does money stand for? Is it a sign of, or a creator of value? And which is most important in facilitating exchange, money's object status (its preciousness) or its representational status?

Answering these questions became one of the most pressing social concerns of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century England. This century which increasingly used paper money culminated in 1797 with the suspension of the convertibility of bank notes, a step which effectively changed England's legal currency from gold and silver to paper. The nearly fifty years of debate over what was called the "currency question" which followed this step culminated in interesting inquiries concerning the role played by representation in economic exchange. The result of these inquiries was a nascent recognition of representation as a precondition of both linguistic and economic exchange, a recognition which assumed a strikingly schematic form in the palimpsest image of Thomas De Quincey's Suspiria de Profundis.

Paper money—or promissory notes issued by banks and exchangeable for gold coin upon demand of the bearer—was in Adam Smith's view a convenience of the marketplace, the replacement of "a very expensive instrument of commerce with one much less costly, and sometimes equally convenient." The concept of bank notes probably grew out of the inland bills of exchange and promissory notes through which goods were often circulated; legislation that passed during the reign of William III repealed the old English statutes prohibiting assignment of debts. This allowed bills and promis-
sory notes to be passed from hand to hand by endorsement. During
the reign of Queen Anne banks began to cash these instruments,
practically making them a species of legal tender; from this practice
it was a short step for banks to begin issuing their own "promissory
notes" exchangeable for the legal coin of the realm.

Some early nineteenth century defenders of paper money consi-
dered its development and use to have been almost more natural
than that of precious metals as a circulating medium of exchange. Paper money was possibly as old as writing, a guarantee of the
"commercial credit" which Henry Thornton defined in 1802 as "that
confidence which subsists among commercial men in respect to their
mercantile affairs" and which may be assumed to have existed "even
in that early and rude state of society, in which neither bills nor
money are as yet known." This line of reasoning held that paper
credit, which expressed in written form confidence and trust as the
basis of any system of exchange, both allowed the creditor to avoid
"the insecurity, that attend[ed] verbal obligations," and granted the
advantage to the debtor of "having that confidence, which [was] en-
tertained both of his funds and of his prudence, expressed in a regular
and transmissible document."

Those who opposed the spread of bank notes and other forms of
paper credit however defined money not as a symbol or memorializa-
tion of trust, but as a source of trust: while it substituted for other
commodities, money at the same time had to retain enough desira-
bility in and for itself to overcome the suspicion and mistrust which
inhered in all symbolic exchange between men. Opponents of paper
credit—called "bullionists" at the time—considered that money re-
quired more than merely imputed or consensus value, since such a
value was ultimately representational and therefore impermanent
and subject to the whims of human fancy. To the bullionists, the
problem with paper money was essentially the problem of all money
pushed to its limit: even gold and silver currency had at least a
twofold nature—a coin was both an object and a text. This kind of
duality, as Marc Shell has observed, generally tends to precipitate
"awareness of quandaries about the relationship between face value
(intellectual currency) and substantial value (material currency)."
Since paper money had no "material currency," its credit or ability
to represent persuasively other objects which do have substantial
value rested solely on what bullionists saw as the shifting, precari-
ous, even capricious ground of human belief.
For many in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, then, the spread of paper money became an avenue for exploring the part played by representation in producing and/or safeguarding economic, and by extension, cultural exchange. This was especially the case after February 1797, when the convertibility of bank notes was suspended by the Bank Restriction act, a step which effectively gave England a fiduciary currency until cash payments were resumed in 1819. Even before that fateful event, however, political commentators, governmental officials, and men of letters expressed alarm at the increasing acceptance of paper money, a development which to some eighteenth century minds represented a regressive step away from enlightenment empiricism toward, at best, irrationality, and, at worst, primitive superstition or religious delusion. To David Hume, for example, paper money was a contradiction in terms, an impossible confusion of things separated by elemental and categorical differences. Calling bank notes “counterfeit money” which “foreigners [would] not accept in any payment, and which any great disorder in the state [would] reduce to nothing,” Hume argued that paper money necessarily cheapened the gold which it ostensibly represented by flooding the channels of circulation; prices of commodities rose because the paper through which exchanges were effected floated as it were above the gold it had replaced. The reason for this however stemmed not so much from any intrinsic quality of money as it did from the fact that the human understanding was capable of symbolically equating two such elementally different things only by devaluing one to the level of the other—by imputing, in other words, the essence of paper (its cheapness) to the essence of gold (its dearness).

Thomas Paine’s enlightenment mind, in the same manner as Hume’s, opposed paper money on epistemological grounds. Paine however went beyond Hume in portraying some of the specific social dangers of paper currency. In 1787 Paine wrote Prospects on the Rubicon in order to challenge Pitt’s armament against Holland; he republished the pamphlet in 1793 when the inevitability of war with France seemed to have produced yet another English commercial crisis. Although he addressed a number of financial and political issues in the pamphlet, Paine focused on the role which the nation’s reckless reliance on paper money might have played in creating the impression of sufficient national wealth to support a war:
Nothing is more common than for people to mistake one thing for another. Do not those who are crying up the wealth of the nation mistake a paper currency for riches? . . . Certainly no man can be so unwise as to suppose that increasing the quantity of bank notes, which is done with as little trouble as printing of newspapers, is national wealth.9

Mistaking paper for riches by virtue of its potentially unlimited profitability was no more than a siren’s song, especially when public acceptance and governmental encouragement of such a delusion created, as Paine put it, a “rage” for paper money (209). But belief in illusion could lead only to economic ruin: increasing the quantity of paper money ultimately resulted in the banishment of “real money,” which in turn allowed “the shadow” to take “the place of the substance till the country [was] left with only shadows in its hands” (210). To those who, like Pitt, argued that the nation’s wealth was not the sum of its gold, but the “credit” which its productive capacity could create, Paine replied that potential was not the same as actual. Credit, after all, “[could] be founded on ignorance or a false belief, as well as on real ability” and was, therefore, “often no more than an opinion.” And “the difference between credit and money,” said Paine, “[was] that money requires no opinion to support it” (210).

Since it could be based as easily on irrational as on rational grounds, opinion could not stand as a reliable guide from which to draw rules for governing the relations among men. There was one human institution, however, which historically drew such rules from opinion; and paper money’s affinities with this institution represented for Paine its most disturbing drawbacks. Like religion, paper money required for its functioning a leap of faith, and faith could have no legitimate place in the rigorously empirical economic realm. The social consequences of this economic leap of faith were generally analogous to those which resulted in the religious arena: paper money relied on a community of believers, and therefore set up potential conflict between the initiated and the uninitiated. Though promoted as nurturers of human unity and equality, in actuality, Paine argued, religion and paper money were analogous to both sources of strife and a more rigid economic hierarchy.

In order to overcome this strife, Paine found that both religion and paper money sought to enlarge their communities of believers. In
religion, this was accomplished through the persuasive power of the miracle. Paine defines miracles in Part I of The Age of Reason as "astonishing appearances," making the miraculous a perceptual rather than an essential category. Astonishment, after all, can be the result of ignorance or intentional delusion: "as, therefore, we know not the extent to which either nature or art can go, there is no positive criterion to determine what a miracle is, and mankind, in giving credit to appearances, under the idea of their being miracles, are subject to be continually imposed upon." Like a magic lantern spectacle or a miraculous touch of a faith healer, paper money invites the inevitably devaluing scrutiny of the skeptic, and therefore continually undermines the very confidence without which it cannot function:

Credulity is wealth while credulity lasts, and credit is, in a thousand instances, the child of credulity. It requires no more faith to believe paper to be money, than to believe a man could go into a quart bottle; and the nation whose credulity can be imposed upon by bottle conjuring can, for a time, be imposed upon by paper conjuring. (214)

Had the social consequences of such paper conjuring been limited to the swindling of a few scattered gudgeons, Paine might not have seen it as so evil. Unfortunately, however, Paine found that paper money accommodated men deluding their own understanding, and producing in turn the dangerous mental tendency of overriding the hard data of sense experience with ideal conceptions of what should be. The phenomenon of credit offered him a good example of how this bad intellectual habit ignored the natural correspondence between appearance and actuality:

the progression of natural life age cannot counterfeit youth, nor conceal the departure of juvenile abilities. But it is otherwise with respect to the death of credit; for though all the approaches to bankruptcy may actually exist in circumstances, they admit of being concealed by appearances. Nothing is more common than to see the bankrupt of to-day a man in credit but the day before; yet no sooner is the real state of his affairs known, than everybody can see he had been insolvent long before.11

In other words, credit is actually nothing more than credulity, a relaxation of the skepticism or natural mistrust which, to Paine's mind, guarantees equality or fairness in the market. For this reason, Paine finds that credit and its offspring, paper money, represent not
the attribution or memorialization of trust, but, in his words, mark only the dangerous mental state of "suspicion asleep" (301).

Paine's criticism would be repeated many times in the nearly fifty year period between the Bank Restriction Act of 1797 and the Bank Charter Act of 1844 when the currency question was more or less settled by Parliamentary legislation. This ruling effectively prohibited the Bank from using issues of bank notes as a means of financial speculation. Prior to that, however, the controversy had prompted scores of pamphlets, newspaper articles, and even books which, while documenting the level of outrage on both sides, had accomplished little to elaborate the issues spelled out by Paine. The central concern remained that of determining the extent to which paper currency would be capable of maintaining its face value in the market. Each disputant's determination greatly depended on the relative importance granted to exchange's representational element. Optimism about language's sufficiency for accurately representing reality coupled with a belief in the principles of free trade generally translated into an acceptance of paper money. For example, pamphleteer Frances Percival Eliot thought that free trade's spirit of liberty should extend to society's choice of its circulating medium: since "commerce, generally speaking, should be left as free and as unfettered as the streamers of the bark on which she wafts her rich productions from one climate to another," money could be "that circulating medium, of whatever sort or kind, whether paper or metallic, or partly both, which, by the common consent and common confidence of any society, was generally and lawfully received as the common measure and as the equivalent of all interchangeable articles." The bullionists' insistence that nothing less than the intrinsic and self-evident value of gold could reliably inspire such confidence, observed Charles Callis Western in 1822, itself amounted to a "superstitious veneration" for an "ancient standard of value" by its very nature unfitted "to the present state and condition of the country." In fact, argued Western, gold's "intrinsicicality" made it "subject to variation under the universal principle of the relative proportions of product and demand," and therefore unreliable as a "standard of value." Only money which did not possess an "embodied form" could be stable, "because it [was] not formed of substantial, and therefore, variable materials" (31-32).

Opponents of paper money, on the other hand, continued to
parole its insubstantiality as a threat to the nation’s economic health. William Frend, for example, saw the Restriction Act as having created a nationwide delirium. The Act, Frend observed, had rendered England’s currency fraudulent: before the 1797 suspension of payments, “notes were the representatives of the coin, and could be exchanged for coin on demand. Both wore an honest front, and represented labour and property.” Then, although the Bank stopped payments,

[it] continued to issue paper; paper as much like the paper previous to this fatal event as the Chairman of the Bank is to Hercules! Without life, without energy, the notes proceed from the recesses of the bank, like dreams from the fabled elm of Tartarus. Like dreams they act upon the distempered mind of the nation: they bear on their fronts the words I promise to pay on demand; but how are these words accomplished? . . . I think I have read somewhere of a famous magician who came to a wealthy town, where he gave the most superb entertainments, raised to himself a name, paid ready money for everything, and that money was so very beautiful that every person was desirous of exchanging his old dirty-looking gold and silver for these charming pieces. The crafty sorcerer filled his bags with good coin and left the place; and the deluded citizens, on recovering their senses, found their coffers filled with leaves. Why do we read the Tales of the Genii, when real life furnishes us with more striking instances of the wonderful than fiction can invent? (12-13)

In many respects, then, the currency question marked what we might call a “representational crisis,” or a period in which the role of—and confidence in—representation in bringing about non-violent human relations was explored and debated. Underlying debate on the currency question were assumptions concerning representation’s effectiveness in mediating nonviolent human relations, about, in other words, the role and reliability of symbolism in effecting economic exchange. For bullionists, paper money’s reliance on the unquantifiable human qualities of belief, trust, and confidence made it fundamentally unstable since it had to derive its value entirely from individual will and collective agreement. Moreover, paper money’s intrinsic cheapness represented an unsurmountable obstacle to such an agreement, since man’s natural suspicion of representation extended even to the symbolic exchange required to ascribe potentially infinite value to the materially valueless. Proponents of paper money, on the other hand, saw it as a memorialization of an inher-
ent or originary trust which offered something more permanent than the mere material durability of gold or silver.

The most commonly suggested solution to the dilemma of how to ascribe value to the valueless was the one which became law with the passage of the Bank Charter Act of 1844: it was a matter of simply setting aside a fixed quantity of coin to serve as security for all circulating bank notes. Yet there were some solutions offered which were more philosophical than fiscal; one of the most striking of these can be discerned in Thomas De Quincey's "palimpsest of the human brain" in Suspiria de Profundis.

Though best known for the impassioned prose and vivid dream narratives of autobiographical works like his first and most famous book, the Confession of an English Opium-Eater, De Quincey spent most of his life as a periodical journalist, regularly churning out articles on subjects as diverse as literary criticism, science, philosophy, politics, and history. His favorite subject, however, was political economy, and in particular that of David Ricardo. Though by no means an original thinker on the subject, De Quincey was reputed in his day as an expositor and exponent of Ricardo's theories: John Stuart Mill's Political Economy, for example, credits De Quincey with having clarified some of the ambiguities of Smith's and Ricardo's uses of the term "value." ¹⁰

In spite of his passion for the subject, however, De Quincey rarely remarked on the connection between political economy and the social concerns of his age. Like most nineteenth century devotees of political economy, De Quincey considered its principles to be algebraic, with the science comprising a self-contained and self-sustaining system. In fact, De Quincey specifically discussed the currency question only once, in an 1819 newspaper editorial; his opinion was a rehash of the Ricardian view that bank notes secured by gold could not provoke a rise in the prices of provisions. ¹⁷

If however political economy and the currency question were conspicuously absent from De Quincey's journalism, they have made their presence known in his autobiographical writings, though often in idiosyncratic or oblique ways. In the Confessions, for example, the narrative of De Quincey's drawn-out and ultimately unsuccessful efforts to secure a loan against his expected inheritance surrounds an account of a different kind of debt he incurred: a London prostitute depleted her meager resources to save him from starvation. Having lost track of this savior when his fortunes improved, De Quincey
ended the book with an account of a dream in which he did achieve, in effect, "a final reconciliation" with his creditor. De Quincey often linked dream and memory with notions of value of the self and the debts the present owes the past. And the model for the relationship between present and past in his works is often economic.

Some twenty-four years after having written the *Confessions, Suspiria De Profundis* was projected as a four-part sequel. The *Suspiria* would, according to its "introductory notice," express the "tone of grandeur in the reproductive faculty of dreaming." De Quincey's intention was not, however, to produce merely an autobiography of his dreamlife. Present day England, he wrote, found itself in a sort of philosophic crisis which threatened the dreaming faculty:

Habitually to dream magnificently, a man must have a constitutional determination to reverie. This in the first place, and even this, where it exists strongly, is too much liable to disturbance from the gathering agitation of our present English life. Already, in this year 1845, what by the procession through fifty years of mighty revolutions amongst the kingdoms of the earth, what by the continual development of vast physical agencies—steam in all its applications, light getting under harness as a slave for man, powers from heaven descending upon education and accelerations of the press, powers from hell (as it might seem but these also celestial) coming round upon artillery and the forces of destruction—the eye of the calmest observer is troubled; the brain is haunted as if by some jealousy of ghostly beings moving amongst us. (113)

The identities of these "ghostly beings" are discernible through examinations of both individual memory and collective history. Following the introductory notice is a long autobiographical remembrance entitled "The Affliction of Childhood." A specific event, the sudden death of an older sister when De Quincey was six, determined his childhood as afflicted. As a result of this experience he claimed never to have lost the conviction that "all men come into this world alone; all leave it alone" and thus, life is freighted with a "burden of solitude, that cleaves to man through every stage of his being!" (140).

De Quincey seems, however, uncomfortable with the solipsistic implications of this assertion; and in the next section he considers in turn the mechanism of memory only to arrive at the opposite conclusion. Replacing his mournful tone with a genial, journalistic patronage, De Quincey launches into "the Palimpsest" by helpfully defining the term for the benefit of any "female reader who honors
these papers with her notice" (164): a palimpsest is, he says, "a membrane or roll cleansed of its manuscript by reiterated successions" (165). The reason for the existence of these Greek and Roman artifacts is not, as most believe, that the "mystery of printing was not then discovered." Printing, De Quincey observes,

must have been known to every nation that struck coins and medals. Not, therefore, any want of a printing art—that is an art of multiplying impressions—but the want of a cheap material for receiving such impressions was obstacle to an introduction of printed books, even as early as Pisistratus.

The palimpsest serves De Quincey primarily as a reassurance that nothing, either individually or collectively, is ever fully lost to time. Hence, the palimpsest tends to conflict with the lesson of childhood affliction by portraying life and history not as haphazard and distinct, but as a succession of stages which, despite appearances, are always recoverable. The apparently accidental connections between the palimpsest's successive inscriptions is actually purposive and determined: though "each succession has seemed to bury all that went before . . . in reality, none has been extinguished" just as "in our own heaven-created palimpsests, the deep memorial palimpsests of the brain, there are not and cannot be such incoherencies" (169). The necessary stages and their succession imply for De Quincey a contextualization of the apparently meaningless events of history and individual life within a universal order. In turn, the context renders the apparently insignificant significant by granting small events an economic value based on their contribution to the universal order. And finally, since each event in effect re-presents the unity of the whole, each recapitulates the value of the whole. At the center of the palimpsest stands not some intrinsic or substantial value, but the shifting human imitations of value which make it a palimpsest in the first place. From De Quincey's point of view, the palimpsest's present value derives from its ability to stand as an archaeology not just of individual life or history, but also of the economics of representation:

Once it had been the impress of a human mind which stamped its value upon the vellum; the vellum, though costly, had contributed but a secondary element of value to the total result. At length, however, this relation between the vehicle and its freight has gradually been undermined. The vellum, from having been the setting of the jewel, has risen at length to be the jewel itself; and the burden of thought, from having
given the chief value of the vellum, has now become the chief obstacle to its value, nay, has totally extinguished its value, unless it can be dis-associated from the connection. Yet, if this unlinking can be effected, then, fast as the inscription upon the membrane is sinking into rubbish, the membrane itself is reviving in its separate importance; and, from bearing a ministerial value, the vellum has come at last to absorb the whole value.

To the man of bullionist sensibilities, the palimpsest illustrates paper money's essential problem; as a memorialization of the impermanence of "human" notions of value, the palimpsest demonstrates the very necessity of grounding value in some substance which by its nature is able to resist the capricious vibrations of opinion and taste. On the contrary, for De Quincey, the palimpsest first of all demonstrates that value is only apparently lost, and history's tendency is always toward the recovery of lost value. Second, society's wish to preserve the valuable prompts both the writings with which the palimpsest has been impressed in the first place and each successive erasure and reiteration. The palimpsest therefore proves that value is essentially context-specific and has been created at the behest of a community:

The Greek tragedy, the monkish legend, the knightly romance—each has ruled its own period. One harvest after another has been gathered into the garners of man through ages far apart. And the same hydraulic machinery has distributed, through the same marble fountains, water, milk, or wine, according to the habits and training of the generations that come to quench their thirst.

Finally, the palimpsest is more an identification of this "hydraulic machinery" than merely a chronicle of changing tastes. The machinery of culture is representation, and axiomatic in as much as "in some potent convulsion of the system all wheels back into its elementary stage" (171). It follows that the best response to cultural crisis is to inspect the machinery—to test not the limits, but the capabilities of representation. It would be impossible of course to prove that De Quincey had the currency question explicitly in mind when he lighted on the palimpsest as an illustration of the societal uses and benefits of representation, nonetheless the parallels between the two are too striking to ignore. The currency question, as we have seen, focuses on the ability of representation to effect orderly and fair economic exchange. Opponents of paper money feared that an increas-
ingly representational or fiduciary currency would be incapable of sustaining, in the terms outlined by Generative Anthropology, the dangerously uneasy accord of the originary scene—that gold offered a better guarantee against originary resentment than paper. The champions of paper money, on the other hand, saw representation as the possible means of creating peaceful and fair exchange as conditioned by the symbolizing faculty born in the originary scene. Both paper and gold are symbols not of value, but of what we can call an originary trust, since, like language, they defer immediate for promised gratification of desire. By demonstrating that representation both precedes and creates the possibility of accumulating value, De Quincey's palimpsest seems to echo the anti-bullionist faith in paper money, a faith which trusts representation because the origin of representation is trust.

Matthew Schneider is a doctoral student in English at UCLA.

Notes

2. Gans identifies the tension between individual desire and the constraints imposed by society's ethical order as the "resentment" which is the motive for cultural evolution. See *The End of Culture*, especially chapters 9-10.
12. By separating the Bank of England's deposit and note issue departments, the Act was intended to curb fluctuation in bank-note values by setting aside at least 14,000,000 in gold as security for notes. Any note issue in excess of 14,000,000 had


Ce serait le moment de philosopher et de rechercher si, par hasard, se trouverait ici l'endroit où de telles paroles dégèlent.

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Paul Merrill


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