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The cultural bases of linguistic form:
The development of Nanti quotative evidentials*

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1 Introduction

There can be little doubt that social practices and culture affect language; the interesting question is: in what concrete ways is linguistic form and structure shaped by culture, and what are the processes by which culture does so? One approach, culture-driven grammaticalization theory (Simpson 2002, Evans 2003), suggests that cultural influence on linguistic form is mediated by the development of conventionalized communicative practices that increase the frequency of particular lexical items, constructions, and pragmatic inferences in discourse, thereby putting in place a crucial pre-condition for their grammaticalization.

The goal of this chapter is to contribute to the development of culture-driven grammaticalization theory by developing an account of the cultural basis for the grammaticalization of quotative evidentials in Nanti, an Arawak language of lowland southeastern Peru. In particular, I argue that Nanti quotative evidentials grammaticalized from inflected verbs of speaking that achieved high discourse frequencies due to the emergence of communicative practices that link respectful communicative conduct towards others with the avoidance of speculation about others’ actions and internal states. As part of this communicative practice, Nantis largely restrict their discussion of others’ actions and internal states to two domains: reported speech regarding others’ actions and internal states, and actions that they witnessed themselves, which can also serve to index internal states.

1.1 Culture and linguistic form

Even linguists committed to treating language as an autonomous cognitive faculty acknowledge that the lexicon of a language is influenced by the culture of its speakers (e.g. Pullum 1989), and one does not have to look far to find grammatical phenomena in particular languages that appear related to aspects of social interaction, cultural belief, and the local particularities of lived

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*This chapter is dedicated to Migero, the leader of the community of Montetoni, who died unexpectedly in 2010. I am grateful to all of the residents of the Nanti community of Montetoni for their good will and inexhaustible patience in teaching me about their language and their lives. I owe special thanks to Migero, Bikotoro, and Tekori, for the special interest they took in me and my work. Christine Beier has been my research partner in the Nanti communities since the beginning, and has contributed much to my understanding of Nanti language and society. Part of this work was carried out in affiliation with the Centro de Investigación de Lingüística Aplicada (CILA), at the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos (Lima, Perú), and I thank Gustavo Solís and Elsa Vilchez, the center’s directors at the time, for their support. The fieldwork on which this is based was funded in part by a Fulbright-Hays DDRA Fellowship, and an NSF DDRI grant.
experience in the societies in which those languages are spoken. We briefly consider examples of how each of these aspects of culture can come to be expressed in the grammars of particular languages.

To take a well-studied example, systems of honorifics (Agha 1994, 2007: 301-339) are reported for numerous societies organized on the basis of castes and social classes, but they appear to be quite rare among small-scale ‘egalitarian’ societies. Among systems of this type are the comparatively simple European T/V systems (Brown and Gilman 1960) and the considerably more elaborate honorific systems of east Asia and parts of Oceania (e.g. Errington 1988, Keating 1998). As an example of the latter type, consider the honorific system of Korean, which has been described as expressing six ‘levels’ of politeness distinctions by means of a system of verbal suffixes; these levels are also reflected in the pronominal system, sets of address terms, particular lexical alternations, and vocative suffixes (Sohn 1999, Strauss and Eun 2005). It is presumably not a coincidence that honorific systems are found in languages spoken in societies that are hierarchically organized into explicitly-recognized groups, and which display language ideologies that link respect for others in this social order with particular patterns of language use (Irvine 1998: 62).

In other cases, aspects of religious and cosmological beliefs may come to be encoded in grammar, as in the case of the productive ‘demonic’ nominal suffix, -niro, in Matsigenka (Arawak, Peru). Demons that take the form of common animals play an important role in Matsigenka oral traditions and modern beliefs (see e.g. Johnson 2001: 208-212), and the names for several important classes of demons are formed with the endocentric derivational suffix in question. Thus, in addition to demons that take the form of neotropical species which are well-integrated into Matsigenka oral tradition, like _osheto-niro_ (spider.monkey-DEMON) ‘spider monkey demon’ and _pantyo-niro_ (duck-DEMON) ‘duck demon’, one also finds that modern Matsigenkas speak of demons that take the form of relatively recently introduced species of domestic animals such as _waka-niro_ (cow-DEMON; _waka_ < _vaca_ ‘cow’, Sp.) ‘cow demon’ and _ovisha-niro_ (sheep-DEMON; _ovisha_ < _oveja_ ‘sheep’, Sp.) ‘sheep demon’ (Michael field notes). Once again, it hardly seems an unlikely coincidence that demons constitute a central aspect of Matsigenka cosmology, and that the language exhibits a dedicated morpheme for deriving names of types of demons from nouns with non-demonic referents.

The local particulars of lived experience also come to be encoded in grammar, as in the case of the productive ‘demonic’ nominal suffix, -niro, in Matsigenka (Arawak, Peru). Demons that take the form of common animals play an important role in Matsigenka oral traditions and modern beliefs (see e.g. Johnson 2001: 208-212), and the names for several important classes of demons are formed with the endocentric derivational suffix in question. Thus, in addition to demons that take the form of neotropical species which are well-integrated into Matsigenka oral tradition, like _osheto-niro_ (spider.monkey-DEMON) ‘spider monkey demon’ and _pantyo-niro_ (duck-DEMON) ‘duck demon’, one also finds that modern Matsigenkas speak of demons that take the form of relatively recently introduced species of domestic animals such as _waka-niro_ (cow-DEMON; _waka_ < _vaca_ ‘cow’, Sp.) ‘cow demon’ and _ovisha-niro_ (sheep-DEMON; _ovisha_ < _oveja_ ‘sheep’, Sp.) ‘sheep demon’ (Michael field notes). Once again, it hardly seems an unlikely coincidence that demons constitute a central aspect of Matsigenka cosmology, and that the language exhibits a dedicated morpheme for deriving names of types of demons from nouns with non-demonic referents.

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(1) a. *Nu-maki-wii-kura*
   3sg-sleep-ASSOC.MOT:UPRIVER-REC.PAST
   ‘S/he slept upriver (and has since returned).’

b. *Nu-maki-kʷaa-kura*
   3sg-sleep-ASSOC.MOT:DOWNRIVER-REC.PAST
   ‘S/he slept downriver (and has since returned).’

Examples like these strongly suggest that locally-situated experience and other social and cultural factors affect linguistic structure, but progress beyond this basic observation depends on the development of theoretical frameworks that allow linguists to develop explicit accounts of how social and cultural factors are implicated in linguistic structure. Perhaps the most promising approach of this type, the **culture-driven grammaticalization** (CDG) framework, relates linguistic form to social and cultural factors via processes of grammaticalization. The basic insight of CDG is that culture and social processes shape discourse (i.e. actual language use), and in doing so, affect the token frequency (and contingent syntagmatic relationships) of particular linguistic forms, both of which play major roles in processes of grammaticalization (Simpson 2002). In this way, culture indirectly affects linguistic form and structure by its capacity to affect grammaticalization processes.

In this chapter I aim to build on previous work in culture-driven grammaticalization theory (CDG) in two ways. First, I first seek to better ground the CDG framework in social theory by explicitly linking grammaticalization theory (GT) to practice theory, a major social theory which is congruent with grammaticalization theory. Both GT and practice theory are grounded in accounts of conventionalization and automatization of behavior, and rendering this common ground explicit provides a basis for a common framework for theorizing social and linguistic phenomena within CDG. Second, I present a detailed case study of CDG, the grammaticalization of quotative evidentials in Nanti, cast in this common framework. In particular, I shall argue that local ideologies regarding the appropriateness of making claims about the actions and subjective stances of others serve as perduring structuring factors that favor communicative practices with a particularly high density of reported speech constructions. Specifically, Nantis generally consider direct reference to others’ internal states and speculation about others’ actions to be inappropriate in most circumstances, motivating the use of reported speech to talk about others’ intentions, emotional states, and evaluative stances, and the use of evidential strategies, including reported speech, to talk about their actions. The resulting high frequency of reported speech constructions in turn drives the grammaticalization of verbs of speaking into quotatives. In this way, Nanti communicative practices that disfavor direct reference to the internal states of others, or speculation about their actions, indirectly drive the grammaticalization of linguistic resources that facilitate indirect reference to these crucial dimensions of Nantis’ social worlds. Nanti society and language present an especially valuable context for studying the social factors behind the grammaticalization of evidentials because Nanti quotatives and reportives are currently undergoing grammaticalization. As such, we can be optimistic that the broader communicative practices that gave rise to their grammaticalization are still present in the society, and further, that the social factors driving the conventionalization of those communicative practices are still present.
1.2 Linguistic and ethnographic background

Nanti is an Arawak language of the Kampan branch, a group of group of head-marking agglutinative languages spoken in the Andean foothills of southeastern Peru, and in the adjacent lowlands of Peru and Brazil. Nanti is spoken by approximately 450 individuals who live in some ten settlements on the upper Camisea and Timpía Rivers. The Kampan branch presents a complex situation of multiple dialect chains which poses difficulties for classification (Michael 2008: 212-219). Nanti itself is sometimes treated as a distinct language (e.g. Payne 2001), and sometimes as a dialect of Matsigenka. Matsigenka itself is dialectally diverse, and I believe that Nanti may most accurately be thought of as an extreme point in a dialect chain linking the following dialects of Matsigenka: Upper Urubamba – Lower Urubamba – Manu – Nanti, where neighbors in the chain are more similar than non-neighbors. Mutual intelligibility between the Manu Matsigenka and Nanti varieties is relatively high, especially when speakers of these different varieties speak slowly and employ relatively simple grammatical structures, but is relatively low between Nantis and speakers of the Upper Urubamba River dialect. Crucially, however, Nantis tend to think of themselves as socially and politically distinct from their Matsigenka neighbors. Nantis are overwhelmingly monolingual, although a handful of young men have developed a basic knowledge of Spanish in recent years.

Present day Nantis are hunter-horticulturalists, much as their parents were, although contact with non-Nantis has resulted in significant changes to Nanti material culture and social organization. According to Nanti oral history, significant interaction with non-Nantis dates to the 1970s (for details, see Michael 2008: 24-26). At that time, Nantis lived entirely on the upper Timpía river, in a dispersed settlement pattern of small communities of 10-30 individuals, which were typically separated by at least half-a-day’s walk from their nearest neighbors. In the mid-1980s, Nantis began to migrate from the Timpía River basin, where they had lived until then, to the neighboring Camisea River basin, drawn partially by the richer land in the Camisea basin, and partially in search of metal tools. Not long after, Nantis initiated contact with Matsigenkas and in the early 1990s, and the community of Montetoni was formed, which at its peak, had 250 inhabitants – over half of the entire Nanti population. Since then, most of the Nantis living in the Camisea River basin have experienced a completely novel degree of contact with relative non-intimates (i.e. individuals who do not form part of their own extended families). I have argued elsewhere (Michael 2008, Michael 2010) that two new social institutions emerged in this context as social solutions to some of the challenges posed by the large, multi-family settlements: the position of community chief and large-scale manioc beer feasts. Nantis have avidly incorporated metal tools into their subsistence practices, but there is considerable continuity with pre-contact practices: bow-and-arrow hunting, and small-scale horticulture of manioc, other tubers, plantains, and corn, remain important.

This talk is based on twenty months of monolingual ethnographic and linguistic fieldwork between 1998 and 2006. I carried out the vast majority of this work in Montetoni, the largest of the Nanti communities. My work in these communities focused on the analysis of recordings of naturally-occurring conversation (~ 300 hours) and on systematic ethnographic observation grounded in intensive participant observation. During each of my visits, which generally lasted about three months, I lived with my wife and research partner, Christine Beier, in one of the residence groups (clusters of huts whose residents tend to cooperate in subsistence activities) in the village, usually in the residence group of the community leader, Migero, but sometimes in a different residence group. As members of the residence group, we participated in subsistence activities with other members of the group, and I exchanged daily inter-household visits both within the residence group and with households in other residence groups, as male heads of households are expected
to do. My wife and I had a number of good friends in other residence groups, whom we visited regularly, but our most intense social experiences were the weekly manioc beer feasts, which also served Nantis themselves as the most important context for social interactions beyond the bounds of their residence groups. In this intense monolingual environment we had little alternative but to develop a reasonable mastery of Nanti grammar, but also of Nanti communicative norms, my understanding of which underlies much of my description of Nanti communicative practices, below.

2 Towards a sociocultural theory of linguistic form

The significant empirical and theoretical successes of linguistics over the last century are due in large part to the adoption of structuralist perspectives on linguistic phenomena, from the level of speech sounds (phonology) to that of the meaning and organization of utterances (syntax and semantics). The key structuralist insight responsible for these successes is that many linguistic phenomena can be fruitfully analyzed solely in terms of relationships of alternation between, and combination of, linguistic elements, without reference to the social contexts in which they are used, the motivations of the people who employ the elements, or the historical trajectories in which communicative activity is embedded. This structuralist move made possible an intense and productive focus on linguistic form as an analytical object, but structuralist theories provide no tools, or even theoretically-grounded vocabulary, for theorizing how patterns of social action and culture can influence linguistic form. My goal in this section is to show that the groundwork has already been laid in both social and linguistic theory for a socially-grounded theory of linguistic form that is able to incorporate the very real strengths of linguistic structuralism without being committed to the asocial and ahistoric presuppositions of that tradition.

One of the principal challenges in developing a theory of the social and cultural influences on linguistic form is the basic lack of congruence between the phenomena, units of analysis, and explanatory mechanisms of concern to social theory and linguistic theory. In speaking of its object, social theories tend to refer to phenomena such as gender, totemism, and social conflict; units such as families, clans, social classes, and nations; and explanatory mechanisms such as material and symbolic exchange, social power, and ideology. Linguistics, in contrast, is concerned with phenomena such as speech sounds, word structure, and word order, and units such as phonemes, phrasal constituents, and sentences, whose structures are explained by references to processes such as interaction between phonological features, morpheme-ordering principles, and long-range syntactic dependencies. Despite this significant gulf, an opportunity for reconciling social and linguistic theory emerged in the 1970s, with the parallel development of practice theory in the social sciences and grammaticalization theory in linguistics. This opportunity rests on the fact that both practice theory and grammaticalization theory are concerned with the diachronic development of structures – social and linguistic, respectively – as a result of the ‘structuration’ of high frequency everyday activity.

Although the roots of practice theory can be traced back to the ordinary language philosophy of the late Wittgenstein and the phenomenology of Heidegger (Reckwitz 2002), the emergence practice theory (PT) is typically associated with Pierre Bourdieu (1977) and Anthony Giddens (1979, 1984), both social theorists who sought to overcome a number of dichotomies that persistently

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4I mean the term ‘structuralist’ to be interpreted broadly here, to include self-identified forms of structuralist linguistics as well as those later schools, especially the generative tradition, which further developed the mechanisms of structuralist analysis and reified the structuralist insight into an autonomous language faculty.
bedeviled social theory. Among them, the paradox of individual agency against the backdrop of overdetermining social structure, the distinction between intellectual and meta-discursive knowledge versus practical knowledge and action, the difficulties in theorizing the relationship between micro- and macro-social organization, and between social synchrony and diachrony. The formulation of practice theory I sketch here springs from Bourdieu’s and Giddens’ original work, but is significantly informed by Schatzki’s (1996) modern synthesis of PT, and Reckwitz’s (2002) critical overview of PT.

Two ideas are key to practice theory, that of practices themselves, and that of habitus. Practices are understood to be routinized ways of acting in the world, where ‘action’ encompass both the physical and cognitive dimensions of action. Practice theory is thus anti-Cartesian (unlike, e.g. anthropological structuralism), in seeing mind and body to be unified in action. PT posits that practices emerge through the interaction of an individual’s predispositions to act in certain ways, and that individual’s socially situated, interested, and agentic pursuit of individual goals under the material and social circumstances in which they find themselves. In PT, these predispositions are called the habitus, which is understood to be comprised of sets of flexible, schematic dispositions, a ‘sense of the game’ that guides individual’s action in given social and material contexts:

...habitus [consists of] systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively “regulated” and “regular” without in any way being the product of obedience to rules. (Bourdieu, 1977: 72)

Several writers have compared the habitus to grammar – and even to generative grammars – as a set of productive schemas that underpin regularities in behavior, while at the same time permitting creativity and flexibility (e.g. Wacquant 2004). Practice theorists have been hesitant to describe the habitus, or even parts of the habitus, to the degree of explicitness with which linguists are used to treating their subject matter, but I believe that the notion of scripts and schemas developed by artificial intelligence researchers, such as Schank and Abelson (1977), give some idea of how the notion of habitus could be cashed out.

Crucially, practice theorists understand the habitus to develop or accrete through practice itself, that is, as a result of repeated experience with particular trajectories of actions in concrete material and social contexts, thereby introducing a diachronic dimension to the reproduction and transformation of social practices. The fact that habitus sediments through an interaction of individual agency and external constraints likewise makes social change, and the role of individuals in actuating that change, central to practice theory.

In the relationship between habitus, practice, and the sedimentation of practice in the habitus, PT provides a striking reconciliation of (anthropological) structuralism, (social) functionalism, methodological individualism, and materialist approaches to society. The habitus is essentially the locus of most phenomena of interest to structuralist theory, while the social and spatial patterning of practices overlap with the ‘social structure’ of concern to functionalist theories. At the same time, the fact that PT sees habitus as a guide to improvised action leaves space for individual agency, resonating with certain aspects of methodological individualism, while recognizing that habitus is significantly shaped by objective material and social conditions, as materialist theories like political economic and Marxist theories argue. And crucially, it is the diachronic dimension of PT, namely, that habitus both generates practices in concrete social and material contexts, and results from the
sedimentation of those practices, that allows PT to bridge a number of these thorny theoretical divides.

With respect to language, the fact that speakers attempt to achieve similar socio-communicative goals in recurring social situations means that particular communicative practices (Hanks 1996) consisting of discursive routines and conventionalized communicative strategies sediment as parts of speakers’ communicative habitus. The communicative practices generated by the interaction of (multiple) speakers’ communicative habitus in concrete social and material settings vary considerably in scale, from discourse genres (Hanks 1987, Urban 1991), to interactional routines such as commercial interactions (Clark 1992) and ritual greetings (Beier et al. 2002), to micro-interactional practices such as reference (Hanks 1990). It is important to understand that these communicative practices are not to be understood merely as types of ‘language use’ in ‘social context’, but rather as integrated practices in which the deployment of linguistic form forms a piece with practical modes of social action, perception, and judgment aimed at achieving the interested goals of social agents.

At the level of communicative practice then, ‘culture’ affects ‘language’ through the practical integration of linguistic resources with social action in pursuit of social goals, which sediments in the habitus in a manner that links particular dispositions for social action to deployment of particular linguistic resources. The parallels between PT and grammaticalization theory (GT) are probably clear at this point: both PT and GT treat the emergence of ‘structure’, be it social (habitus) or linguistic (grammar), as a consequence of accumulated effects of repeated action and experience (i.e. practice), a parallel noted both by Bybee and Hopper (2001:2) and Evans (2003:16). GT theory is, in a certain sense, a special case of PT, albeit a more substantively theorized and empirically grounded special case than PT as a whole tends to be.

The final step in linking ‘culture’ to ‘grammar’ is based on recognizing that from the conventionalization characteristic of practice, and communicative practice in particular, follows the relatively high frequencies of particular lexical items, lexical collocations, and grammatical constructions associated with particular practices. At this point, frequency effects of the type that concern grammaticalization theory may manifest themselves, including phonological reduction, loss of prosodic or morphosyntactic independence, semantic bleaching, and the like (Hopper and Traugott 2003). In summary, then, the shaping effect of ‘culture’ on grammar is mediated by communicative practices, which are both generated by, and sedimented into, individuals’ habitus in the course of their agentive and goal-directed social activity under the social and material constraints of the settings in which they act.

3 Quotatives evidentials and reported speech constructions

This section is devoted to the Nanti quotative evidential and the lexical reported speech constructions from which it grammaticalized. I describe the basic grammatical and pragmatic properties of these constructions, and discuss how the evidential quotative grammaticalized from the lexical quotative construction.

Lexical quotative construction Nanti lexical quotative constructions are complement clause constructions in which the matrix verb kant ‘say’ takes reported speech complements that can

5Since the term ‘quotative’ is employed somewhat inconsistently in the literature, I here define quotative evidentials as reported speech constructions that provide information about the source of the reported speech but not its recipient (see Michael 2012 for further discussions).
either precede the verb, as in (2), or follow it, as in (3). The matrix verb typically appears in the minimally inflected realiz imperfective form, as in (2) and (3), but can also bear additional morphology, as in (4). All deictic elements in lexical quotative constructions reflect the indexical parameters of the reported situation, which is characteristic of direct speech reporting (but see Munro et al. (2012) for a subtle evaluation of putatively direct speech reporting in Matsés, another Amazonian language).

(2) Ikanti tsame, tsame, namanakempi.

| i= | kant -Ø -i tsame tsame no= n- am -an -ak -e =mpi |
| 3mS= | say | -IMPF -REAL.1 lets.go lets.go 1S= IRR bring -ABL -PERF -IRREAL.1 =2O |

‘He said, “Let’s go, let’s go, I will bring you there.”’

(3) Aka pimporohake ikanti maika.

| aka pi= N- poroh -ak -e i= kant -Ø -i maika |
| here 2S= IRREAL - clear.land -PERF -IRREAL.1 3mS= say | -IMPF -REAL.1 now |

“Please clear land here,” he said now.’

(4) Ikantahigakera hara tsinane apahiri.

| i= | kant -hig -ak -i =ra hara tsinane a= p -ah |
| 3mS= | say | -PL -PERF -REAL.1 =TEMP NEG IRREAL woman 1.PL.INCL= give -REG |
| -i | =ri. |
| -REAL.1 =3mO |

‘At that point they said, “We will not give him a woman.”’

Quotative evidentials Nanti quotative evidentials are transparently grammaticalized from inflected forms of the verb kant ‘say’, as evident in Table 1. These evidentials retain in frozen form the person prefixes borne by the inflected verb from which they grammaticalized; this person information indexes the source of quoted utterance, as in (5) and (6). Quotative evidentials are clausal proclitics that immediately precede the speech report with which they are associated, and unlike the verb of saying from which they grammaticalized, they cannot follow the speech report.

(5) Oka ipokahi.

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The orthography employed in the examples in this chapter is phonemic and largely self explanatory; coda nasals assimilate to the place of articulation of the following voiceless stop, and the i-class realiz suffix -i surfaces as -e following the perfective -ak. The first line of interlinearized examples shows surface morphophonological changes; the epenthetic consonant t and epenthetic vowel a are included in this line but are not segmented or glossed in other lines. The following morpheme abbreviations are used: 1S, 1st person subject; 1O, 1st person object; 2S, 2nd person subject; 2O, 2nd person object; 3mS, 3rd person masculine subject; 3mO, 3rd person masculine object; 3fS, 3rd person feminine subject; 3fO, 3rd person feminine object; 1P, 1st person possessor; 2P, 2nd person possessor; 3mP, 3rd person masculine possessor; 3fP, 3rd person feminine possessor; ABL, ablative; ADL, adiative; APPL:PURP, purposive applicative; CAUS, causative; CL, classifier; CNTF, counterfactual; COND, conditional; DEONT, deontic; DIRREAL.1, doubly irrealis, i-class verb; DSTR, distributive; FRUS, frustrative; HAB, habitual; IMPF, imperfective; IRREAL.A, irrealis, A-class verb; IRREAL.I, irrealis, I-class verb; LOC, locative; MAL:REP, malefactive repetitive; NEG:IRREAL, irrealis negation; NEG:REAL, realiz negation; PASS:IRREAL, irrealis passive; PASS:REAL, realiz passive; PERF, perfective; PL, verbal plural; REAL.A, realis, A-class verb; REAL.I, realis, I-class verb; REG, regressive; SUB, subordinator.
Table 1: Nanti quotatives and their lexical sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUOTATIVE</th>
<th>GLOSS</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>GLOSS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nôka</td>
<td>quot.1</td>
<td>nokânti</td>
<td>‘I say’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pîka</td>
<td>quot.2</td>
<td>pikânti</td>
<td>‘you say’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>íka</td>
<td>quot.3m</td>
<td>ikânti</td>
<td>‘he says’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>óka</td>
<td>quot.3f</td>
<td>okânti</td>
<td>‘she says’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\text{oka} \quad i= \quad \text{pok} - \text{ah} - i \\
\text{QUOT.3nm} \quad 3\text{mS}= \quad \text{come} - \text{REG} - \text{REAL.1}
\]

‘She says, “He has returned.”’

(6) Ika tera nogote.

\[
\text{íka} \quad \text{tera} \quad \text{na=} \quad \text{ogo} \quad \text{-e} \\
\text{QUOT.3m} \quad \text{NEG.REAL} \quad 1\text{S}= \quad \text{know} - \text{IRREAL.1}
\]

‘He said, “I don’t know.”’

Nanti quotatives evidentials so closely resemble the verbs from which they grammaticalized that it is important to clarify the ways in which they differ from their lexical sources. There are two related reasons for doing so. First, one might wonder if what I here call quotative evidentials might not simply be truncated fast speech forms of the corresponding inflected verbs. Second, it is important to identify the semantic and syntactic evidence for grammaticalization of these elements.

The evidence that Nanti quotatives are not truncated fast speech forms comes from the stress pattern of quotatives. The crucial generalization in this regard is that truncated fast speech forms, which do occur in naturally-occurring Nanti discourse, preserve the stress pattern of the non-truncated forms. Quotatives, however, exhibit the stress pattern of disyllabic words, and not the stress pattern we would expect of truncated disyllabic forms of the verbs from which they lexicalized.

Nanti exhibits a stress system of default left-to-right iambs with final extrametricality (Crowhurst and Michael 2005), as exhibited in the non-truncated form in (7a). Truncated fast speech forms generally involve the deletion of unfooted syllables, as in (7b), and as evident in the this example, truncated forms retain the stress of the untruncated forms from which they are derived. Note that were stress assigned to the truncated form on the basis of its segmental structure, the unattested stress pattern given in (7c) would result.

(7) a. (non.ká)(mo.sò)<te> ‘I will visit’
   b. nonkámosò
   c. *(non.ká)mo<so>

\[\text{In following examples, parentheses indicate foot boundaries, while angle brackets indicate extrametrical syllables.}\]
Turning now to the stress patterns exhibited by quotatives and inflected verbs of saying, we see that the truncated form of the first person inflected form, given in (8b), exhibits final stress, as expected from the full form given in (8a), while the quotative form exhibits the initial stress pattern in (8c) characteristic of disyllabic words in Nanti. Quotatives thus exhibit the prosodic characteristics of free disyllabic forms, rather than that of a disyllabic truncated form of a longer word, suggesting that they are now distinct from the verbs of saying from which they grammaticalized.

(8) a. (no.kán)<ti> ‘I say’
b. noká
c. (nó)<ka> QUOT.1

It should also be noted, with respect to the prosodic consequences of grammaticalization, that in fast speech, quotatives and reportives are often completely destressed, as in (9), suggesting that these evidentials are on their way to becoming phonologically dependent on adjacent elements.

(9) Ika tera. [ikatéra]

"He says “No.”"

Nanti quotatives also differ semantically and syntactically from the lexical items from which they grammaticalized. One such difference lies in the scopal properties of quotatives with respect to negation. Briefly, verbs of saying can scope under negation, as in (10), but quotatives cannot, as in (11). Since evidentials typically cannot scope under negation (Aikhenvald 2004, Willett 1988) but lexical verbs of saying can, this lends support to the notion that quotatives are evidentials and are grammatically distinct from their lexical sources. Note that negation can scope under quotatives as one would expect, as in (12).

(10) Tera nonkante nohate.

"I do not say “I will go.”"

(11) *Tera noka nohate.

INTENDED: ‘I did not say “I will go.”’

(12) Noka tera nohate.

‘I say “I will not go.”’
Further evidence of the grammaticalization of quotatives comes from the fact that they are developing complementizer functions. Quotative clitics also appear in constructions where they precede reported speech complements of verbs of communication, as in (13) and (14). Most of the verbs of communication which serve as matrix verbs in this construction cannot take reported speech complements without a quotative, suggesting that the quotative licenses the report speech complement. This is the case with the verb kenkitsa ‘narrate’ in (13) and kahem ‘yell’ in (14), which cannot take ‘bare’ reported speech complements.

(13) Nokenkitsatake noka nogonkehata Shampinkihari.

    no= kenkitsa -ak -i noka no= gonke -ha -Ø -a Shampinkihari
    1S tell.story -PERF -REAL.1 QUOT.1 1S= arrive CL:water -IMPF REAL.A place.name

   ‘I narrated, “I arrived in Shampinkihari by river.”’

(14) Ikahemake ika tahena aka.

    i= kahem -ak -i ika tahena aka
    3mS= yell -PERF -REAL.1 QUOT.3m come.IMP here

   ‘He yelled, “Come here!”’

Interestingly, one also finds occasional naturally-occurring instances of kant ‘say’ taking quotative-marked reported speech complements, as in (15), suggesting that the reported speech complement licensing function may be generalizing to all verbs of communication.

(15) Tera nonkante noka nohate.

    tera no= n- kant -e noka no= ha -e
    NEG.REAL 1S= IRREAL- say -IRREAL.1 QUOT.1 1S= go -IRREAL

   ‘I did not say “I will go.”’

A small number of verbs appear to exhibit an extension of the complementizer function to verbs of cognition, such as pintsa ‘decide’, as in (16).

(16) Nopintsatake noka nontime aka.

    no= pintsa -ak -i noka no= n- tim -e aka
    1S= decide -PERF -REAL.1 QUOT.1 1S= IRREAL- live -IRREAL.1 here

   ‘I decided to live here.’ (lit. ‘I decided ‘I will live here.”’)

It is worth noting it is ungrammatical to replace the quotative with an inflected form of lexical verb kant ‘say’ in its complementizer function, further indicating that the quotative is not simply a phonologically truncated form of the corresponding inflected verb.

Finally, we can note that quotatives and inflected forms of kant ‘say’ have differentiated in terms of their illocutionary properties, with the inflected verb now yielding implicatures of illocutionary assertiveness, as in instances of taking moral stands (Michael 2012).

Having argued that what I have analyzed as quotatives and reportives are not simply fast speech forms of the inflected verbs from which they inflected, it is important to point out that these...
evidential clitics have clearly grammaticalized recently. First, Nanti quotatives show relatively little sign of phonological erosion, even retaining in frozen form the person marking borne by the verbs from which they grammaticalized. Second, and perhaps most tellingly, the closely-related Matsigenka dialects do not exhibit the quotative evidentials (Mary Ruth Wise, p.c.; Lev Michael, field notes). Since Nanti and the Manu dialect of Matsigenka (the Matsigenka dialect most closely-related to Nanti), separated at most 200-300 years ago, the emergence of Nanti quotatives must be assumed to post-date that split.

4 Reported speech in Nanti communicative practice

In this section I discuss some of the major social considerations influencing Nantis’ use of reported speech constructions, and argue that these constructions play a crucial role in Nanti communicative practice by allowing speakers to talk about others in socially appropriate ways. In particular, I argue that an important organizing principle of Nanti communicative practice is the maintenance of a respectful stance towards others, which in Nanti terms centrally involves avoiding the imputation of actions and internal states to others on the basis of speculation, and instead prioritizes letting others’ actions and speech speak for them. This practical understanding of appropriate communicative practice manifests in two related tendencies: first, Nantis avoid explicit speculation about others’ actions and internal states; and second, Nantis explicitly indicate the means by which one knows about others’ actions and internal states. The latter tendency is one of the principal contributors to the ‘evidential ethic’ found in Nanti communicative practice, which leads to a significant reliance on reported speech when talking about others’ actions and others’ internal states, since speech reports are one of the principal means by which Nanti individuals learn about happenings in the wider social sphere. It is important to note, however, that it is not the case that Nantis never speculate about others, or never directly attribute internal states to others; the communicative practices I describe here are not a set of rigid rules, but rather a set of guidelines or principles for respectful social conduct in a social field structured by asymmetrical relationships and intimacy. In fact, as I will show below, the circumstances in which the typical evidential ethic breaks down give us insight into the social motivations behind the ethic.

I begin by describing the Nanti evidential ethic as it applies to talking about others’ actions. A rich source of everyday examples of Nantis’ reliance on reported speech as a means for talking about others’ actions are conversations about subsistence activities, a conversational staple of Nanti verbal life. Crucially, it is rare in such conversations for anyone to talk about the subsistence activities of others without explicitly indicating the basis of their knowledge about that person’s activities, which they typically do by reporting speech.

In (17) I present a brief interaction that took place between me and Maroha, one of my nearest neighbors, when I dropped by one afternoon to visit Bikotoro, her brother and one of my closest friends in the community. Maroha responds not by attributing any action to Bikotoro, but by reporting his speech as he left the household. It is important to note that Maroha is not being cagey or evasive by Nanti communicative standards – this is an example of a very mundane conversational exchange in the Nanti communities.

(17)  
   a. Lev: Ainyo Bikotoro?  
      ‘Is Bikotoro (here)?’
   b. Maroha: Ma, ikena [gesturing downriver].
‘He isn’t (here), he headed (down there).’

c. Lev: Tya ihati?
‘Where did he go?’

d. Maroha: Ika kara nontsagate.
‘He said, “I'm going fishing over there.”’

e. Lev: Ari ihatake?
‘So, he went off?’

f. Maroha: Hee, ika nontsagate. ‘Yes, he said, “I will fish.”’

A similar reliance on reported speech can be found in most discussions of already realized activities. In the following exchange an elder man in my residence group, Hoshi, and a young man from a neighboring residence group, Saoro, briefly discuss the young man’s father, Hosukaro, who is known as one of the best hunters in Montetoni. Saoro reports on his father’s newsworthy killing of a tapir exclusively through reported speech, first of his father, and then of his mother, Hororinta, who was his father when they chanced upon the tapir.

(18) a. Hoshi: Pokahi piri?
‘Is your father back?’

b. Saoro: Hee, ika nonehanake kemari.
‘Yes, he said, “I saw a tapir.”’

c. Saoro: Impo nonehake ina, oka ikentakero kemari.
‘Then I saw my mother, she said, “He shot the tapir.”’

When Nantis have not seen a person engaging in the relevant subsistence activity, and have no speech report to rely on, they generally respond by indicating that they have no speech report on which basis they can respond to an inquiry, as in the brief interaction given in (19). In this interaction, Migero, the chief of the settlement of Montetoni, asks a young woman, Marota, about the location of her husband. Marota responds by saying that her husband did not indicate where he was going, and she does not speculate about where he went. This lack of speculation is typical of interactions like this one in Nanti society, as is the fact that her interlocutor does not prompt her to speculate.

(19) a. Migero: Yoga pikoriti?
‘Your husband?’

b. Marota: Ma.
‘He’s not around.’

c. Migero: Tya ihati?
‘Where did he go?’

d. Marota: Te inkante.
‘He didn’t say.’

e. Migero: Te inkante? Te pinehe?
‘He didn’t say? You didn’t see (him) ?’

*It might seem surprising that Hosukaro himself did not tell his son that he had shot the tapir, but as part of certain taboos surrounding hunting, it is typical for Nanti hunters, having made a kill, to distance themselves from it, by not carrying it back and avoiding speaking directly about it until at least a day or so has passed.
f. **Marota:** Te nonehe. Te inkante. Nokamosotake kara.
   ‘I didn’t see. He didn’t say. I was visiting over there.’

During my fieldwork in the Nanti communities, I encountered little metadiscursive commentary on the (in)appropriateness of speculation regarding others’ actions (other than critiques of *parikoti* speech, as discussed below), but one experience revealed how strong Nantis’ typically unexpressed attitudes towards this issue are. Early in my fieldwork I noticed that speculation was rare in Nanti discourse and I sought to better understand the phenomenon by inviting people to speculate. An opportunity to do so arose in a conversation with my friend Teherina in which we were discussing the subsistence activities of his various relatives on that day. Teherina remarked that his brother Berene, and his brother’s wife and children, were not at home, which led me to ask where they were. He indicated that he did not see them off, nor had anyone else told him what they were doing, and I – still not fully attuned to appropriate communicative conduct under those circumstances – encouraged him to speculate on where they might have gone by asking if Berene might be off doing one activity or another, cycling through a number of possible – indeed probable – candidate activities. Teherina responded to each of the question by repeating that he did not know what Berene was doing, that he had not seen the family leave, and that no one had told him where they had gone. Teherina displayed mounting impatience as I continued to make my inquiries and he finally, and quite uncharacteristically, snapped that he couldn’t tell me what Berene and his family had gone off to do until they returned and told him what they had done, and that he would tell me as soon as he knew. It became clear to me that my efforts to encourage Teherina to speculate were not welcome or appropriate. It is important to mention that I generally found Nanti individuals to be extremely patient in responding to my inquiries on a wide range of topics, and this is one of the small number of instances in which a Nanti individual lost patience with me.

It is worth noting, in light of this discussion of the Nanti evidential ethic, that just as Nanti individuals are typically careful in properly indicating the source of their knowledge about a given state of affairs, they are also careful not to mislead others into believing that they have more direct knowledge than they in fact do. This is evident in a conversation I had with Habihero, a young man who lived on the far side of the residential group of which I was a member, in which I brought up the fact that I had seen his classificatory brother Pasotoro fletching arrows with eagle feather arrows. The conversation that ensued is given in (20).

(20)  
   a. **Lev:** Chapi nonehake hanta Pasotoroku oga chakopi yoga . . . yotugatakero.  
      ‘Yesterday I saw over there at Pasotoro’s he was . . . fletching an arrow.’
   b. **Habihero:** Yotugataje, pinehake chapi Pasotoro yotugatake. Pinehahi?  
      ‘Fletching, yesterday you saw Pasotoro fletching. Did you see (well)’?
   c. **Lev:** Hehe. Onti ashi oga pakitsa ibanki.  
      ‘Yes. They were eagle feathers.’
   d. **Habihero:** Pakitsa oga, omarane kara [gesturing].  
      ‘It was an eagle, big, here (gesture indicating wingspan).’
   e. Ikentake, ikentahigake aka [gesturing].  
      He shot, they shot (it) here (gesture indicating where in the body the eagle was wounded).
      It came here (gesturing towards the river) yesterday.
It turns out that the eagle had been killed the day before, near the village, and that Habihero had not seen Pasotoro kill the eagle, but had arrived on the scene shortly thereafter, and had seen the dead eagle. Note that in this strip of talk, Habihero at no point reports anything other than what he could assert by virtue of seeing the eagle’s body, but he nevertheless seeks to clarify that he did not witness Pasotoro shooting the eagle.

I now turn to Nantis’ discussion of others’ internal states, which is characterized by the extreme rarity with which they directly attribute internal states to others, relying instead on reports of actions which index internal states, or on speech reports by which individuals reveal their internal states to others.

A brief example nicely illustrates this phenomenon, in which I was talking with Esekera, inquiring as to whether his brother, who had recently moved from the adjacent Timpía River basin, intended to live in Montetoni, or in the much smaller upriver settlement of Pirihasanteni. In his response, Esekera communicates his brother’s intentions and desires but at no time directly attributes them to his brother. His brother’s intentions are indexed by his commitment to particular courses of action, and his desires are communicated through reported speech in which his brother had explicitly expressed his own desires.

(21) a. **Esekera:** Ikanti ika aka noka nokogantaka aka maika.
   ‘He (i.e. Esekera’s brother) says, “Here (i.e. in Pirihasanteni) I say is where I want (to live) now.”’

b. **Nokanti** yonta ainyo peresetente.
   ‘I say, there (in Montetoni) there is a leader.’

c. **Ika**, ika, hara notimi aka.
   ‘He says, he says, I will not live there.’

d. **Ika** nokantatsi Pirihasanteni.
   ‘He says, ‘I will remain in Pirihasanteni.’

e. **Ari** ikanti.
   ‘Indeed he says (that).’

f. **Hee**, ari ikanti nontime Pirihasanteni.
   ‘Yes, indeed he says, “I will live in Pirihasanteni.”’

g. **Ari** maika nontimake Pirihasanteni.
   ‘Indeed, now I will live in Pirihasanteni.’

One could easily imagine that in a speech community in which direct reference to internal states is more common, the desires and competing beliefs about the preferred courses of action would have been described as ‘wanting’, ‘preferring’, or ‘believing’, but as is typical of Nanti communicative interactions, these internal states were indexed by reported speech. Note that means do exist in Nanti for expressing internal states, principally the verbs *kog* ‘want’, *pintsa* ‘decide’, and, *sure* ‘think, believe’. An example of the first person use of *sure* ‘think, believe’ is given in (22).

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9Esekera’s response here is to be understood as an argument in favor of living Montetoni, rather than in Pirihasanteni.
(22) a. **Tekori**: Pere ikanti tyatika kutagiteri nonkamosote Kirigeti.
   ‘Pere said, “Someday soon I will visit Kirigeti.”’

b. Impo nokantake nonkamosote, nosuretapahi nohate nonkamosote.
   ‘Then I said, “I’ll visit (too),” I had the idea that I would go and visit.’

c. Nosuretapahi ariorika nagabehake nonkamosote.
   ‘I had the idea that perhaps I could visit.’

Thus far I have focused on the strong tendency in Nanti communicative practice to avoid speculation about others’ actions and internal states, and the related evidential ethic that motivates indicating the source of one’s knowledge about those actions and internal states. It is important to realize that communicative practices, like practices more generally, are not rigid rules, however, but are instead embodied, practical senses of how the (social) game is played. As such, communicative practices serve as the basis for strategic manipulation in improvised action in the social field. Part of understanding communicative practices, then, lies in understanding how speakers strategically subvert the values they embody. Understanding how, and under what circumstances, Nantis deviate from the normative picture I have sketched thus far is crucial for developing an adequate analysis of the communicative practices described in this section.

There are two kinds of socio-interactional configurations that account for most of the cases in which the manner in which Nantis speak about others’ actions and internal states diverges from the account presented thus far. The first such configuration involves contentious or adversarial interactions, in which one participant is considerably more socially powerful than the other.

We now consider an interaction of this type involving Migero, the leader of Montetoni, and Ariponso, a visitor from another community who had arrived with the goal of obtaining valuable metal trade goods and then leaving. In this interaction, Migero was very critical of Ariponso’s behavior, since it contravenes one of the central political philosophies that Migero developed (and explicitly articulated) as a leader, namely, that the material benefits of living in Montetoni (e.g. metal trade goods) are intrinsically tied to a moral commitment to the community as a joint social project. In the strip of interaction in (23), Migero not only directly refers to Ariponso’s thoughts (*pisure-takaro* ‘you thought it’), but he also actually overtly attributes to Ariponso thoughts that the latter never revealed as such, a striking divergence from typical Nanti communicative practice.

(23) a. **Migero**: Chichata birompatyo *pisure-takaro* chichata pimpokake. ...
   ‘Of your own will, be it on your head, you thought by yourself to come (here).’ ...

b. Biro nonehake pipokake aka.
   ‘I see that you have come here.’

c. Oka *pisure-takaro*, *pisure-taka* aka pashikarontsi, hacha, kotsiro.
   ‘You thought of it, you thought of the blankets, axes, and knives here.’

d. Iro nokantake.
   ‘That’s what I say.’

A social and interactional configuration associated with a different loosening of the evidential ethic involves reporting on mundane activities (typically subsistence activities) of very close social intimates, especially spouses, and to a lesser degree, parents and children, providing that they are living in the same household. In the overwhelming majority of cases in which individuals in these types of intimate relationships report on the actions of their spouses, parents or children, the typical
evidential ethic obtains, but in a minority of cases, speakers employ the inferential evidential clitic \(=ka\).\(^{10}\) This is the case in (24), where a man asks his daughter about his wife’s whereabouts.

(24)  
a. **Hoshi**: Tya ohatake piniro?  
‘Where did your mother go?’

b. **Marota**: Ohatake\(=ka\) onkigera.  
‘She presumably went to dig (i.e. harvest manioc).’

The two interactional configurations in which the evidential ethic characteristic of Nanti communicative practice is either contravened or relaxed are both ones in which we might expect speakers to be more willing to infringe on another person’s autonomy – in one configuration because it involves socially more powerful individuals exerting social power in the context of interpersonal conflict, and in the other because social intimates can be understood as having a greater right to speak for one each other than non-intimates do. In slightly different terms, both of these interactional configurations are ones in which normal considerations regarding ‘negative face threats’ fail to hold. These observations suggest that the evidential ethic represents, in significant measure, a communicative stance that seeks to respect others’ autonomy and negative face.

Evidence in favor of this conclusion can be drawn from contexts in which the use of reported speech constructions is strikingly high in comparison to normal use of these resources. These include interactions in which an individual is talking about the actions of a high-status third party in their presence; and ones in which an individual is reporting on an event or state of affairs that is significantly removed from their own recognized sphere of expertise or responsibility, such as women repeating men’s hunting stories. In such cases, it is common for almost every clause to bear a quotative; in contrast, in typical speech reports it is common for several sentences to pass between explicit uses of the quotative. The result, in the cases we are considering, is an extremely elaborated attribution of actions, involvement, or knowledge to a third party that makes it clear that the reported state of affairs or knowledge pertains to the ‘territory of information’ (Kamio 1994) of the quoted party.

We now consider an example of this type in which Bikotoro reports some recently-acquired information from Pebero, a Nanti visitor to Montetoni, about Pebero’s brother, whom none of the Montetoni Nantis had seen since they migrated to the Camisea River basin in the mid-1980s. The information thus lies solidly in Pebero’s ‘territory of information’, and we see that the Bikotoro’s use of quotatives is very dense as he relates this information.

(25)  
a. **Lev**: Ainyo maika?  
‘Is he there now?’

b. **Bikotoro**: Chapi noke ikanti ainyo irirenti.  
‘Yesterday I heard he said, “His brother is (there).”’

c. Ika ainyo.  
‘He said, “He is (there).”’

d. Hee, chapi ikanti ainyo.  
‘Yes, he said, “He is (there).”’

\(^{10}\)Interestingly, I found that in many cases when I subsequently probed for the evidential basis of the assertion about the other person’s activities, the speaker was actually in a position to report speech that would have supported their claim.
Although most of the communicative practices I have described here do not rise to the level of explicitly formulated social principles or ideologies regarding social and communicative conduct, it is worth noting that there is one form of explicit meta-discourse in the Nanti communities regarding talk that is deemed to contravene the principles of proper communicative conduct described above; that is, parikoti talk that is characterized as. Construing utterances as parikoti – what we might call ‘loose talk’ – is to assert that they rest on evidentially unsourced attributions of actions, speech, or internal states to others, thereby constituting a breakdown of proper relations of respect between individuals. Significantly, speaking parikoti is quite distinct from lying (tsoheg ‘lie’), and while a speaker may also criticize parikoti speech as factually inaccurate, inaccuracy is not the defining feature of parikoti speech.

The strip of talk in (26) provides an example of an evaluation of talk as parikoti. This strip is drawn from a longer conversation on a two-way communications radio between Migero and the leader of another community about the events surrounding a visit by a young Nanti man from the community of Marankehari, Erobakin, to the community of Migero’s interlocutor. Erobakin’s presence in the latter community led to some social discord, which led the leader of that community to contact the leader of Marankehari by radio and criticize him for allowing Erobakin to visit his community. The leader of Marankehari disavowed knowledge of Erobakin’s visit and speculated that Migero must have approved the visit, since Erobakin’s route would have taken him by Montetoni, where Migero lives. In defending himself, Migero both denies that he gave Erobakin permission and criticizes the residents of Marankehari for their evidentially unsources speculation, i.e. their parikoti talk.

11The adverb parikoti indicates that the state of affairs that it modifies is outside of the typical, expected, or desired space for that state of affairs. Thus, if a piece of manioc falls outside of a pot, as manioc roots are being chunked for cooking, instead of inside the pot, it is said to have fallen parikoti. Likewise, someone who has gone somewhere, or lives somewhere, completely outside of the realm of experience of their interlocutors can appropriately speak of going or living parikoti.
Assessment of talk as *parikoti* is, in my experience, most often made by men about the speech of women, but not exclusively so. Nevertheless, there is an overwhelming tendency for criticism of speech as *parikoti* to flow in the direction of social asymmetries: from men to women, from more socially prominent men to less socially prominent men, and from mature adults to younger adults. One could say, then, that *parikoti* talk is speech that contravenes the evidential ethic of Nanti discourse, but is not justified either by intimacy or appropriate social asymmetry, as discussed above.

In this section I have argued that Nanti communicative habitus embodies a practical understanding that respectful communicative conduct towards others is grounded in not infringing on others’ autonomy, which crucially relies on not imputing actions or internal states to them without an explicit evidential basis. This understanding of respectful communicative conduct underlies the ‘evidential ethic’ characteristic of Nanti communicative practice, and is one of the major factors responsible for the high frequency of reported speech in Nanti discourse.

5 A practice-based account of the grammaticalization of Nanti quotatives and reportives

I now turn to an account relating the aspects of the Nanti communicative habitus described in the previous section to the grammaticalization of Nanti quotative evidentials. Before doing so, however, it is important to note that, in the general case, it is not plausible to equate the social and cultural factors that influence the present-day distribution and frequency of grammatical morphemes in a language with those that governed the distribution of the elements from which those morphemes grammaticalized. In other words, it is not plausible to simply project modern communicative habitus into the past. It seems unlikely, for example, that the social and cultural factors that govern the use of T/V deference indexicals in European languages in the early 21st century are the same as those that influenced their development between the 12th and 14th centuries (Brown and Gilman 1960: 255). In this light, it is crucial for the account that I develop in this section to recognize that Nanti quotative evidentials appear to have grammaticalized in Nanti from inflected verbs quite recently, as I argued in §3. The recent grammaticalization of Nanti quotative evidentials means that it is likely that the social and cultural factors responsible for the high frequency of reported
speech constructions in present-day Nanti discourse do not differ greatly from those responsible for their high frequency in the initial stages of their grammaticalization.

If this assertion is correct, the following culture-driven grammaticalization account emerges for the development of quotative evidentials in Nanti. We first assume that prior to the split between the ancestral groups that became the modern Manú Matsigenkas and the Nantis, the ‘evidential ethic’ that we find in modern Nanti society was not a particularly salient aspect of communicative habitus in that ancestral group. Indirect evidence that this first assumption is correct comes from the extensive body of ethnographic research on modern Matsigenka society (Baer 1984, Johnson 1999). In the first place, there are no mentions in the Matsigenka ethnographic literature of anything resembling the ‘evidential ethic’ that I describe for modern Nanti society. Secondly, speculation about others’ internal states (e.g. attributing desire and envy to others) appears to be central to witchcraft accusations in Matsigenka society (Izquierdo and Johnson 2007). Likewise, in my personal experience, I have found Matsigenkas perfectly willing to talk about others’ actions and internal states in a manner strikingly different from that of the Nantis I know.

We then assume that at some point following the split between the ancestral groups, which subsequently became the Manú Matsigenka and the Nantis, Nanti communicative habitus changed such that Nanti communicative practices came to restrict the respectful ways of talking about the actions and internal states of others to those involving reporting their speech or witnessed actions, as described in §4. This change in Nanti communicative habitus resulted in a significant increase in frequency of reported speech constructions, which involved inflected forms of the verb kant ‘say’, as they still do (although with a slight shift in the pragmatics of the construction). This increase in frequency then led to the grammaticalization of the Nanti verbs of saying into the set of quotative evidentials described in §3, which are still transparently related to the verbs from which they grammaticalized.

It must be acknowledged that this account does not address the ‘social actuation’ question, namely, why did Nanti attitudes about respectful communicative conduct change? I doubt that it will ever be possible to answer this question with certainty, but I suggest that the practical Nanti concern with respectful communicative conduct forms a piece with broader, explicitly articulated social ideologies that are highly critical of social discord, conflict, and violence. It is evident from public discourses surrounding manioc beer feasts, for example, that Nantis are often anxious about the possibility of ill will or violence emerging in those social settings, and it is not unusual for socially prominent individuals to intercede in escalating social interactions to ameliorate any

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12 Izquierdo and Johnson (2007) argue that there has been a sharp rise in witchcraft accusations in recent decades as a result of social strife and cultural changes resulting from colonization and modernization in most Matsigenka areas. This may very well be the case, but it should be noted that belief in witchcraft is also documented among Matsigenkas in the 19th and early 20th century (e.g. Eberhardt 1910: 187; Ferrero 1966: 356-360), and among neighboring Kampan peoples (Santos-Granero 2004), suggesting that belief in witchcraft is not a modern innovation among the Matsigenkas.

13 It is worth noting in this regard that Nantis did not have any beliefs regarding witchcraft prior to their encounters with Matsigenkas in the early 1990s, and I have been witness to a number of interactions in which Nantis reacted to Matsigenka ideas about witchcraft with incredulity and mirth, apparently finding the notion of witchcraft difficult to believe.

14 Although I have not carried out intensive ethnographic work in Matsigenka communities, I have made numerous visits to several of the Matsigenka communities nearest to the Nanti communities between 1993 and 2010, and also worked closely with several Matsigenka linguistic consultants over a three-month period in 2010.

15 It is also worth noting that Johnson (1999:91, 101, 226) emphasizes the importance of autonomy and individualism in Matsigenka society (which also holds for Nanti society), which likely reflects the shared historical origin basis for the Nanti communicative practices with which we are concerned here.
conflict. Likewise, the term *matsigenka*, which at one level can be simply glossed as ‘person’ (in both Nanti and Matsigenka), can also be understood in common Nanti usage as ‘moral person’, and individuals who are guilty of displays of anger and rare instances of physical violence are typically chastised as not behaving like a *matsigenka*. Even more radically, murderers are talked about by Nantis as considering other people to be game animals, with murderers being identified with cannibals. In short, there are explicit discourses that strongly critique anger, disputation, and violence in the Nanti communities, which clearly reflect a concern with, and active preventative monitoring of, these social ills. If I am correct in identifying the Nanti concern with respectful communicative conduct as part of a wider set of practices aimed at maintaining peaceful social relations, it is plausible that the changes in Nanti communicative practice we are concerned with here emerged as part of a broader shift in Nanti society that not only rejects violence but also works to head off its emotional and interactional antecedents.

6 Discussion and Conclusion

The culture-driven grammaticalization theoretic account for the development of Nanti quotative evidentials presented in this chapter relates the emergence of an evidential category to norms of respectful communicative conduct embodied in Nanti communicative habitus. In particular, I have argued that Nantis demonstrate respect for others by avoiding speculation about others’ actions and, especially, their internal states. The result is an ‘evidential ethic’ that restricts discussions of others’ actions to those that the speaker has witnessed themselves, or via reported speech, actions which was reported to them by witnesses. Likewise Nantis discussion of others’ internal states are largely restricted to quoting speech that reports on those internal states – generally reports by those experiencing those states – or reporting on actions that index those states.

These observations suggest that evidentials, and quotative evidentials in particular, are likely to arise in societies in which communicative practices are informed by attitudes towards respectful communicative conduct similar to that found in Nanti society. Data relevant for for evaluating this claim – and especially, the relevant information about communicative practices in particular societies – is scarce, but there are cases of correlations between communicative practice and grammatical structure similar to the Nanti case to be found in the literature.

Perhaps the most striking parallel to Nanti communicative practices and evidentials is de Reuse’s (2003: 95-96) discussion of evidentials in Western Apache (WA). De Reuse suggests that the high frequency grammaticalized, but non-obligatory, evidentials in WA stems from “. . . Athabaskan attitudes about the autonomy of the person . . . resulting in a reluctance to speak for another person, or to impute feelings to another person.” Like Nanti, WA exhibits a quotative grammaticalized from an inflected verb of speaking.

We find an Amazonian parallel to Nanti in Basso’s (1995: 295-296) discussion of the remarkably high frequency of reported speech in Kalapalo (Carib, Brazil) narratives, which she attributes to the fact that “in all Kalapalo stories . . . the emotions and motives of the speakers . . . are realized through their quoted speech, rather than through labels or a narrator’s more direct description of feelings and motives.” Likewise Basso remarks that “[a] character’s subjective version of reality emerges from an interactive, interpersonal field of interpretation, planning, and formulation of goals . . . Such interpretations are constituted as speech-centered events . . . rather than, for example, “thought”

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16The most recent incident of which I am aware, in which one Nanti murdered another, dates to the 1960s (Michael 2008: 23-24).
...” As in Nanti interaction, then, Kalapalo narrators do not generally attribute internal states to others, and although Basso does not report a grammaticalized quotative per se for the language, she does describe a large set of evidential, epistemic modal, and intersubjective markers (Basso 2008), supporting the proposed relationship between communicative practices that avoid reference to others’ internal states and the grammaticalization of evidentials.

These cases in the Americas suggest that it may be fruitful to cast a broader net that examines the relationship between evidentiality and communicative practices informed opacity of mind ‘doctrines’ (Robbins and Rumsey 2008). Described for a number of societies in New Guinea and Oceania, opacity of mind doctrines are explicit articulations that others’ internal states are, to varying degrees, unknowable. Stasch’s (2011) description of Korowai (Trans-New Guinea, Irian Jaya) understandings of opacity of mind, for example, as a “moral emphasis on respecting others’ mental autonomy” is reminiscent of my characterization of Nanti communicative practice. Scheiffelein’s (2008) description of Kaluli (Trans-New Guinea, Papua New Guinea) communicative practices indicates that similar principles are at play in Kaluli society, and we also find that Kaluli exhibits an elaborate evidential system (Schiefelein 1996).

A handful of comparative cases exemplifying an association between grammaticalized evidentials and communicative practices informed by a dispreference for attributing internal states to others is merely suggestive, of course. Nevertheless, they are consistent with the CDG account of Nanti quotatives and indicate a possibly fruitful direction for future comparative research.

It is important to point out, in this light, that there is no reason the believe that all evidentials, or even all evidential systems, arise for the same reasons. Aikhenvald (2004: 358) and Fortescue (2003: 301), for example, suggest that the emergence of evidentials may be related to culture-specific understandings about the assignment of responsibility for communicative activity or events in the world. In a similar vein, I have argued that one of the interactional uses of evidentials in Nanti society, especially inferentials, is to distance speakers from mishaps and other unfortunate states of affairs (Michael 2008:115-156).

The formulation of CDG articulated in this chapter builds on the theoretical continuity between practice theory (PT) and grammaticalization theory (GT), which together provide a common framework for discussing the conventionalization of social practices and communicative ones. From this perspective, grammaticalization constitutes a particular extreme of conventionalization and structuration, but one that is embedded in broader social practices by virtue of the mediating role of communicative practices. This formulation suggests that there is much to be gained by the integrated study of grammar, communicative interaction, and social action, and not least, a better understanding of the cultural and social basis of linguistic form.

7 References


