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Robert L. Sinsheimer: The University of California, Santa Cruz During a Critical Decade, 1977-1987

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INTRODUCTION

The Regional History Project conducted five interviews with UCSC Chancellor Robert L. Sinsheimer from August, 1990, to April, 1991, as part of its University History interview series. Sinsheimer was appointed the campus’s fourth chancellor in June, 1977, by UC President David Saxon. Prior to his appointment Sinsheimer had served as chairman of the division of biology at the California Institute of Technology where his work as a molecular biologist had earned him a distinguished international reputation. When he was approached with an invitation to consider the chancellorship at UCSC he had come to the end of a long period of research and was receptive to new professional possibilities. His involvement since the mid-1960s in thinking and writing about the social implications and potential hazards of recombinant DNA technology and cloning methods in biology had also deepened his concern about the necessity for educating and promoting scientific literacy among non-scientists. Among a number of reasons, his acceptance of the chancellorship appealed to him as another way in which he could address these concerns in a public institution.

Sinsheimer was the small campus’s fourth chancellor. Dean E. McHenry, UCSC’s founding chancellor oversaw the planning and building of the innovative campus and served from July, 1961, until his retirement in June, 1974. He was succeeded in July, 1974, by Mark Christensen, a professor of geology
from UC Berkeley, whose brief and troubled tenure was concluded by his
resignation in January, 1976, after barely a year and a half as chancellor. Angus
Taylor, a professor of mathematics and a veteran University of California
administrator, was appointed acting chancellor in February, 1976, and during his
tenure stabilized the fledgling campus while a permanent chancellor was
selected.

Sinsheimer was the first chancellor from outside the UC system to take
the helm at UCSC. When he arrived he was unfamiliar with the thick
bureaucracy of the University of California system and knew little about how
the campus worked administratively. As an outsider he soon became aware that
there were what he termed serious systemic problems plaguing the institution,
intrinsic contradictions between what he came to characterize as the
“anomalous” UCSC campus and its relationship to the larger system of which it
was a small and rather insignificant member.

UCSC’s bucolic identity in its first years was publicized in numerous
articles in national magazines; its clustered residential colleges, magnificent
natural setting, emphasis on undergraduate education, and absence of letter
grades made it sought after among applicants to the UC system. UCSC’s small
colleges and human scale gave it the feel of a private school while it retained the
imprimatur of a great public research university. However its promising
reputation had substantially deteriorated by the time Sinsheimer arrived, and
gave way to the notion that UCSC was a hippie school, its reputation tarnished
by Vietnam War demonstrations, negative publicity engendered by the campus
youth culture, and increasingly strained town and gown relations with the Santa
Cruz community. By 1977 enrollment figures were down, and there were
rumors (unfounded) that the campus would be closed.

In these interviews Sinsheimer’s discussion of his tenure focuses on four
basic areas. He provides a detailed critique of the institution’s genesis and his
interpretation of it as an intrinsically anomalous campus within the context of the
UC system. He analyses the problems he faced when he arrived: decreasing
enrollment figures, an institution whose identity and sense of direction were
ambiguous, and whose reputation within the UC system and in the outside
world needed serious attention. He outlines the many changes and reforms he
initiated to solve these problems and to bring the campus more into line with the
way other UC campuses operated. And finally, he describes his role as chancellor and the contributions he made to the campus’s growth and development, highlighting the initiatives he promoted to enrich and enlarge the campus’s mission.

The tape-recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim and edited for continuity and clarity, organized into chapters, and the transcript returned to Sinsheimer for his editing. He carefully perused the manuscript, clarified inaudible passages or ambiguities and made numerous small changes and additions, all of which have been incorporated into the finished manuscript. He also kindly provided the frontispiece photograph. Copies of this volume are on deposit in the Bancroft Library at the University of California, Berkeley; and in Special Collections, McHenry Library, University of California, Santa Cruz. The Regional History Project is supported administratively by Alan Ritch, head of Collection Planning, and University Librarian Allan J. Dyson.

Randall Jarrell

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Regional History Project
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California Institute of Technology

Jarrell: Well, to start this morning, could you tell me about the circumstances surrounding your appointment as chancellor, and what you were doing immediately before you were appointed?

Sinsheimer: Well, most immediately I was at Cal Tech [California Institute of Technology]. I had been at Cal Tech for twenty years actually. I came as a professor in biology and had been doing research and teaching, and then I became chairman of the division of biology. Cal Tech is organized a little differently because it is a small institution composed of six divisions, of which biology is one. I had been a chairman for nine years. In a sense, because it is a small institution, the chairman’s role is a little different than let’s say a department head, in that the administration of the institution is very thin. There’s a president, a provost, and six division chairmen, and basically that’s the administration. As division chairmen you are involved in questions of institutional policy as well as questions of policy with respect to your particular division. While I was division chairman I was continuing to be engaged in research and teaching. Also I think it’s fair to say as division chairman of biology at Cal Tech, that has a certain national status. This was one of the leading biology departments, programs, in the country, and one way to cite that is to list some of my predecessors . . . Thomas Morgan founded the department; and he was succeeded by George Beadle, a very famous geneticist. Both of them won Nobel prizes. He was succeeded by Ray Owen, a distinguished geneticist. The point I’m trying to make is that as a result of that I was involved in matters on the national scene, the National Academy, the National Institutes of Health . . . committees, agencies and so forth.

Jarrell: So were you also involved in policy decisions in terms of the whole institution?

Sinsheimer: Yes, right. But to return to the immediate circumstances for Santa Cruz. I had been acquainted with Santa Cruz. My daughter had been a student at Santa Cruz.

Jarrell: I didn’t know that.
Appointment as Chancellor

Sinsheimer: Yes, she came in 1968 . . . to Cowell College. So I had some acquaintance with the institution. But of course she had left and then quite out of the blue I got a phone call one morning from David Saxon, the President of UC. Now, there’s a history to that, which is that David Saxon and I were classmates at MIT, many years before. He was a physics major and I was a biology major . . . we had had some classes together and so I had some acquaintance with him. I can’t say we were close friends. But then over the years I had had relatively little interaction with him. I knew he had gone to UCLA and then I knew of course that he had become the president of the University of California. But I’d probably only seen him a couple of times in all those years.

So I received this telephone call from David saying that they were looking for a chancellor at UC Santa Cruz, that my name had been proposed and would I be interested. Actually my first reaction was pretty dubious. Well, I need to go back because . . . I had been at Cal Tech, as I said, for twenty years, and over that time, probably almost every year I had had a couple of offers to go somewhere else—in the earlier years as a faculty member, and then in later years as an administrator for this place or that place. I had at one time or another considered these and then came to the conclusion that they really offered nothing better than I had, and so why should I move? So I had sort of reached a mind-set where my automatic reaction was sort of negative to proposals to move. Because, quite frankly, if you start to consider them seriously it’s disruptive, it distracts your mind; the thought of moving is very disruptive. And you can get torn and so forth. So it’s better not to get started.

But anyway . . . for several reasons, this [proposal] did have some appeal to me. One reason was, as I say, my daughter had gone [to UCSC] and so I had some modest acquaintance with the institution and of course I knew it was a lovely place. Second I knew it was a new campus and my assumption was that it was still a growing campus and so the idea of being able to play a role in designing the campus was attractive as compared to just taking over an ongoing institution.

Thirdly, for reasons that I have yet to get into at all, I had become involved in what you might call the more social aspects of science and I had come to the conclusion that the public understanding of science was dismal. Science and
technology were becoming more and more important in the country and major efforts were needed to develop a more scientifically literate population. I had some hope that maybe at [this] institution, which was not yet completely formulated, efforts could be made to develop curriculum which would provide a broader base in science for people who weren’t science majors . . . science as part of a liberal education. So that notion was attractive to me.

I did agree to . . . I was still pretty dubious about it, frankly, but David [Saxon] sort of kept . . . well, he used the issue of [inaudible] . . . and urged me to come up and be interviewed, to visit the campus and be interviewed and so forth. So I said okay and made that commitment. I came up, was interviewed. I met with faculty, administrators, and students, but actually I don’t think I got a very accurate impression of the place, but that’s another matter.

Then I met with David [Saxon] and his chief aides and they were very positive. A week or two later, David called and said that they’d decided they wanted me for the job. I said I’d have to think about it and agreed to a reasonable length of time.

I suppose another factor that entered into my mind at the time was that I was then 57 [at a point] where you’ve got enough time to do one more major thing (laughter) in your career. In other words, if you’re thinking about doing anything different you don’t want to put it off much longer than that. Also, and this undoubtedly was a factor as well, I was at a transition point in my research. I had been working on a particular set of problems for the past twenty-three years or so, even before coming to Cal Tech. [The work was] pretty much complete, that is, the interesting results had been obtained. There’s always mopping up to do but I had come to the decision it was time to move on to another kind of problem; in fact I had decided what I was going to do, and had started to move in that direction. But as a result of that I was in transition. I didn’t have this new program really under way. I had been cutting back on taking post-doctoral fellows and so forth because I wanted to wait until I got the new program going . . . so that in a sense made it easier to leave than if I had a full-steam, so to speak.

In other words, it probably would have been much more difficult two years later or two years earlier. So the net result was I said okay and accepted the offer. I think I went up again and talked to Saxon and he agreed to free up some money
to help ease . . . my coming. I don't mean just personally, but to increase the allocation of the campus, a sort of dowry, I guess you'd say.

**Jarrell:** Yes. So you'd have a little more freedom, some authority to put things in place?

**Sinsheimer:** Right. He wanted me to come up, I remember July 1 [inaudible]. By this time it was probably . . . my impression was that it was probably late April. I couldn’t leave that quickly, so I agreed to September 1. And Angus Taylor . . .

**Jarrell:** . . . who was the acting chancellor.

**Sinsheimer:** . . . he agreed to stay on until September 1. So those are, as you wish, the immediate details.

**Jarrell:** In your conversations with David Saxon and the Search Committee what sense of your role was conveyed to you? Were you given any particular interpretations or understandings about the status of UC Santa Cruz at that time, since we had Angus Taylor as acting chancellor subsequent to the rather short-lived chancellorship of Mark Christensen . . .

**Sinsheimer:** Well, my answer to that has to be yes and no. Sure, it was obvious, it was made clear to me that Angus had only been there for a year as an acting chancellor and that he succeeded Christensen, who had had a very brief tenure. But I’d say the impression conveyed was simply that Christensen had been a failure. There had been a mistake . . . they had just come to realize that he couldn’t do the job and had had to be removed. That was the impression they had given me. In other words, it was given in terms of the person, rather than the problem. No, I was certainly not given any sense it seems to me, of the problems that were confronting the campus. It was interesting, well one of the things that I found after I took this position, which you can say I should have been aware of, but I wasn’t, I had been at Cal Tech for twenty years, a small private institution.

**Learning the Ropes in the UC System**

**Sinsheimer:** I really had no idea of the UC system, of the extent to which the campus is in fact simply a small part of a huge public institution, and the extent to which it’s constrained by the policies and goodwill and whatever else you
want, of the central administration. I didn’t understand that. To give you one
cue on that, I remember, it was probably not more than a couple of weeks after I
got here. We had a staff meeting. The question that came up was that we had to
submit our expected enrollment to the central administration. What should we
send in? I said, “Well, you must have an expected enrollment, so send it in.”
They said the enrollment was going to be down! I asked, by how much and they
said it would probably be 150 to 200 students less than last year. I said only two
percent, what difference did it make? It must fluctuate about three percent each
year? They looked at me in disbelief and I looked at them in disbelief. I learned
later what a difference it made; it made all the difference in the world to the UC
system and to the state—if your enrollment went down, somehow that was
interpreted as you were doing a lousy job.

**Jarrell:** The public perception of that small dip.

**Sinsheimer:** Right, that you were doing a bad job. I remember the campus had
submitted some capital requests earlier in the year, before I was here. They
always made a capital request, and a minor capital request. Some of those were
in the president’s proposed budget which the regents had approved. This was in
the fall now, before it gets into the Governor’s budget. The procedure for capital
requests includes what’s called a SCOPE visit, which involves people from the
Governor’s Office and the Legislative Analyst’s office. They come down and
inquire into these capital requests—why you need them, what you are
proposing, why you need a building that big etcetera.

Well, we were getting ready for this SCOPE visit and found out that there wasn’t
going to be any SCOPE visit; that it was perfectly clear that a campus with
decreasing enrollment didn’t need any more capital construction. So they weren’t
going to bother to come down. Well I only cite this as an example of things which
I was quite completely unprepared for. First of all, I didn’t realize that the
enrollments were declining. In fact when I looked into it, it was clear that
applications had been declining for several years for two reasons. Since
enrollment is a four-year enrollment, it takes a couple of years before that shows
up in the total enrollment. Second, for a period of time they had been able to
compensate for declining freshmen enrollment by taking in more transfer
students, but then that leveled off. So that this trend which actually began in 1972
or 1973, I’ve forgotten exactly, was only now showing up in the overall
enrollment figures. But my point, to answer your question, no one ever said, “Gee, you’ve got an enrollment problem at Santa Cruz. You have to work on that.” Something like that.

Jarrell: Or politically how . . .

Sinsheimer: Or how important that was. I later came to the conclusion that in some ways the ideal situation would be to grow by one student a year, it’s the derivative that’s important, you see—just so you can say you’re growing.

Jarrell: You realized the enormity of this institution of which you were a part and that this was one small campus of a much greater whole.

Sinsheimer: Right. And a not terribly influential one.

Jarrell: Yes. Well, as these insights came to you, such as a seemingly trivial enrollment figure and how it had all kinds of implications, how did you go about educating yourself in terms of understanding Santa Cruz’s influence, or lack of influence? How did you start to find out what you needed to know? Were there any people who were particularly important?

Sinsheimer: Of course you learn on the job. As a chancellor you go to monthly chancellor’s meetings, meet the other chancellors, find out what their problems are, how they solve them. You talk to the president, systemwide issues come up.

Jarrell: I guess I meant . . .

Sinsheimer: You mean, is there anybody I talked to?

Jarrell: Yes, in terms of University Hall systemwide politics? And also the process of educating yourself about the strengths and weaknesses of your own campus.

Sinsheimer: Well, of course, as far as the campus goes, I talked with faculty. Some you seek out, others seek you out. I remember, well Sig Puknat, for example, he had continually good ideas. Paul Niebanck . . . lots of people had their own ideas, of course, as to what needed to be done. John Dizikes . . . a lot of people on the staff of course, particularly people like Dan McFadden, had lots of ideas. I remember back in the early years we had some administrative problems.
Well, of course Gene Cota-Robles was the Vice-Chancellor when I came. Let me think here. Among the provosts at that time, there was Sig and there was John Dizikes and there was . . . John Marcum. He was provost of Merrill at that time.

These [are the] people who came to mind. People in the administration would be natural, but I came to realize that there were some real weaknesses, as far as I was concerned in the administration. We had a problem, with the man who was director of planning and I soon became quite dissatisfied with him . . . he was incompetent as far as I was concerned. Of course later I got Wendell Brase to replace him. Gene Cota-Robles was a lovely man, but painfully indecisive. You’ve got to have a vice-chancellor who can make decisions and stick with them. So all of this had to be resolved. Then I started a gradual emphasis towards . . . well, I had to get a replacement . . . Gene was very good and said, “Well, I’ll serve for a year but I think probably you’d like somebody else.” And I said, “Fine.” I had sort of decided (laughter) that I did want somebody else. And after I’d been here a few months . . . well, there’s another aspect of all this . . . that’s part of my education.

**Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs**

_Sinsheimer:_ The faculty has much more administrative responsibility in the UC system than it does in almost any other system. Whether that’s good or bad, we can argue, but the fact is that it does, and I had to become acquainted with that. So when it came to selecting a vice-chancellor, I just assumed that that was the chancellor’s prerogative, right? The person he’s got to work with. By this time I’d met a number of faculty and since I was a scientist I thought it was desirable to have a vice chancellor who was not a scientist, to get a different perspective on things. Cota-Robles was also a scientist. And . . . to make a long story short, I asked Paul Niebanck if he would be vice chancellor. He thought about it, and he said yes, he would. He was the chair of the [Academic] Senate. I thought the faculty would like that. Hah! The faculty revolted! All kinds of people came to me and said this [choice was] terrible. They didn’t want him for vice-chancellor. I said he was chair of the senate; how could he be chair of the senate if they didn’t like him? They said the chair of the senate was unimportant. It became obvious, very honestly, that it wouldn’t work. There’s no way he was going to be able to work with the faculty as vice chancellor. I had to ask him to withdraw. In that
sense it was a mistake, but it taught me something about the faculty and a certain amount of cynicism about the senate and so forth. Here’s a guy they had elected chair of the senate but they couldn’t stand him as vice-chancellor.

Jarrell: And they came to you and let you know that.

Sinsheimer: Oh, yes. Whole delegations came to me. Not just one or two. I did not want to back down, but it became clear that he would not be able to fulfill the job in those circumstances.

Enrollment Problems

Sinsheimer: So, as I said, you learn on the job; sometimes by mistakes, sometimes by discussion, sometimes by observation, sometimes by being a doer. Another faculty member who seemed to have some influential things to say at that time was [Bruce] Rosenblum, in physics. He had come to me very early to point out the enrollment problem and how dire it was. At first I didn’t believe him. But then it became very clear to me that something had to be done about the enrollment problem. I came to realize also that part of the problem was that we had no outreach program to speak of; outreach is a euphemism for recruiting. It was critical that we initiate one.

When the campus started it was immensely popular. I think for a few years there it had the highest ratio of applicants to students of any UC campus. There were several reasons for that. One was that we couldn’t take very many students because there were only a couple of colleges. Another reason which I think was not recognized was that in the late Sixties there were riots and whatnot at UC Berkeley and a lot of parents didn’t want to send their kids to [UC] Berkeley. So here was their chance to send them to Santa Cruz instead. So they chose Santa Cruz.

Jarrell: Were you a father like that too?

Sinsheimer: No. My daughter had never particularly thought of going to Berkeley. She liked Santa Cruz; she was taken by the beauty of the campus. We visited several campuses. So that was clearly a factor. Since UCSC had this great surplus of applicants initially, they’d never bothered to build up an outreach program. When things started to fall off, I don’t know whether they just didn’t
pay attention to it, or whether . . . well, of course McHenry retired, and then there was Christensen, and so forth . . . So there was nothing. It became clear to me I really had to build that up, which of course created its own problem, since we needed money to do it. But again we were fortunate in getting Dick Moll, and he did an outstanding job building it up and training Joe Allen in time. Unfortunately the campus had acquired a very bad image . . .

Jarrell: How did you come to realize that? Aside from the figures . . .

Sinsheimer: Talking. Talking to students who had come and students who didn’t come and parents. When I came here I went around to meet people in the San Francisco Bay Area. I went up to meet the head of Bank of America and I met a number of important people in the Bay Area. They conveyed this impression to me. Parents, friends I knew, friends I knew in the Santa Cruz community, whose children were of college age. Things of this kind. It became clear that UCSC’s image was really very bad; it was not thought of as a serious school; it was thought of as a hippie school with students flaking out under the redwoods and smoking pot, and taking drugs . . . that there was a lot of drug use; and that the college system left students with a very inadequate education. I’m not saying how much of this is true either, I’m just saying that that was the image. Dick Moll was a real pro. He had a tough job. It took several years to turn around. I think he did manage . . . two things. I think he managed to get out some good literature; he managed to get some other things out that gave a different image. He visited many high schools around the state, cultivating people, arranged visitors in the spring and fall. I remember we had a program where we invited science majors from a lot of high schools in the Bay Area to come and spend the day with the National Academy members . . . things like that, to get the impression over that there was [inaudible] some serious work done here. So that . . . all that had to be done.

Jarrell: How did you find Dick Moll? Were you actively involved in that recruitment, or had you heard of him from elsewhere? Because he had quite a reputation prior to coming to Santa Cruz.

Sinsheimer: Yes he did. Well, he had been at Bowdoin and at Vassar. My impression is that I had heard of him and then was delighted to learn that he might be interested. When Dick Moll [Director of Admissions] came some people
on campus were quite put out because they thought he was this Ivy League, preppy type who didn’t belong here. Academics don’t particularly like the idea of recruiting. I understand the ideal if you didn’t have to do that, but in the real world you do. Because everybody else is doing it. If you’re not out there . . . I mean, we’re not Harvard. We all have to sell. So, well again that was just one of the problems I learned about.

My education was to be a problem solver. I went to MIT, and one thing you learn at MIT is to solve problems. You are given problems from day one. If you don’t learn anything else at MIT, if you finish, you learn how to solve problems, how to approach solving problems. They give you the impression, I think, that all problems are solvable. When I perceived that there was a crucial enrollment problem, I set out to solve it, although it took longer than I would have liked. In general one of the things you learn in the UC system is how long it takes to get anything done. Also there were, as I’m sure you are aware, some very serious intracampus problems. The so-called college/board dispute.

Jarrell: When you became aware of these serious institutional problems were you discouraged?

Sinsheimer: Well, I’d felt I’d made a commitment. I also felt obviously that the campus had suffered enough. In other words, if I were to pull up stakes after two years that would just be another heavy trauma to the campus, not just because of me, but because the chancellor had given up after two years. Here they had an acting chancellor for a year, and a chancellor for a year and a half before that, and McHenry retired early and . . . as you know, there were persistent rumors that the campus might be closed.

Jarrell: Yes.

Sinsheimer: Now, I don’t think there was ever any real truth in that. To my knowledge, the central administration never seriously considered closing Santa Cruz. But the rumors existed. And the rumors were deadly. Who wants to come to a campus that might be closed? Who wants to give any money to a campus that might be closed? I know one case where it had a very real effect. When I came here in 1977, the NSF [National Science Foundation] was soliciting bids for the Institute of Theoretical Physics. The physicists here were very eager to have it
at Santa Cruz. I thought that’d be great too. I supported their proposal. We made it as strong as we could, with the resources we had available. Obviously other places wanted it, and in the end it came down to a choice between us and [UC] Santa Barbara. I’m not saying it was the only factor, but I know one of the deciding factors was exactly this rumor that was floating around the NSF that Santa Cruz might be closed. I even got David Saxon to write a letter to NSF saying that UC had no intention of closing UC Santa Cruz. But they didn’t take that seriously. I know it didn’t quench the hypothesis. So it ended up at Santa Barbara. Typical. Of course, they weren’t going to locate a national institution costing millions of dollars at a campus that might be closed. Why would they take that chance? You see, I think that it probably is true that Saxon might have thought or even said, not publicly I’m sure, that if worst came to worst (as you know those were terrible budget years) if worst came to worst the system would have shut down the two smallest campuses, Santa Cruz and Riverside. I think that he may have used that as kind of a threat in a way, because of the budget. There’s another aspect to all that. It’s interesting . . . there’s a book called Great Planning Disasters, on how planners sometimes make terrible mistakes. It has a number of these things including Heathrow airport. The book also mentions the UC plan to add three new campuses because the UC expansion was based on enrollment projections which were nonsense.

Jarrell: Which never panned out?

Sinsheimer: Which never panned out. They somehow assumed the baby boom would go on forever, and it never panned out. They didn’t need three new campuses in the ‘70s. They most certainly did not.

They said in the ‘60s that they did and they did not. The reality was they didn’t. They do now, but this is twenty-five years later. In other words they really didn’t need Santa Cruz in 1975. They could have easily accommodated all the applicants at other campuses . . . Riverside was starting; San Diego and Irvine were barely growing. So, it is true that at that time, they had more campuses than they needed. But obviously that’s not a reason to shut them down. You have a commitment to the people you brought there. You have a huge investment in plant . . . it was not unreasonable to think that at some future time you would need them, like now. I am worried that they may be doing the same thing about adding three more campuses.
Jarrell: Now?

Sinsheimer: Now. I think that they’ve overestimated their projections. There are some big ifs in their projections. But I will say this, I think . . . I always felt that David Saxon, in particular, felt a real commitment to support the newer campuses, that having fathered them, so to speak, the University could not let them down, to the extent that he had the resources to do that. At the same time, of course, he recognized that Berkeley and UCLA were the so-called flagships of the system and that their quality had to be protected. But I think he did feel a real obligation to do what he could for the little campuses. So I don’t think those rumors were ever serious, but it had its own effect, which was to make it negative, of course. One other factor that I had no way to prove or not, that a number of people thought had contributed to the decline in enrollment, and you remember during the early ’70s Santa Cruz was the murder capital of the world, several murders took place right on campus. Some people thought that it could have been a factor because of people not wanting to send their children here.

Jarrell: Yes, it’s hard to know. In the time we have left today, could you start discussing your immediate staff, and whom did you bring here with you?

Key Staff Relationships

Sinsheimer: Well, I only brought one person with me. I brought [Eugene] Gene Bollt, who had been my executive assistant at Cal Tech and I brought him here to play the same role. It was interesting, we worked very well at Cal Tech, very well. I had hired him at Cal Tech and worked with him and I thought he had done extremely well. To the extent that he had trained his replacement and everything . . . he was a good man. But I have to be honest and say he did not work out as well here. There are a couple of reasons for that which have to do with the difference in the institutions. First, UC is just much more bureaucratic and he couldn’t quite adapt to that. Second, UC, at the faculty and the staff levels is more, shall I use the word democratic, than private institutions, and he wasn’t used to that. He was used to telling people what to do, rather than persuading them what to do. And then third, and I have to concede that there was some truth in it, he had some antiquated ideas about women’s roles and it got him into some trouble. So after a few years I had to find another job for him [inaudible].
Well, of course when you come in like that it’s enormously helpful to have some people that already know how things are done, and who does what and you’re at a loss. You don’t even know who to call to get something accomplished. [Now] Barbara Sheriff was there; she had been Dean McHenry’s assistant and took early retirement. Then Evelyn [Smith] was the secretary. She was there for a couple of years and Georgia Hamel was there too. She was a secretary. They were very helpful. The woman who ran University House, whose name I can’t remember, she was enormously helpful too, because she knew how to run the house. You move in and there you are. You don’t even know who to call to do anything. Shirley Cameron, if I remember her name, was very, very good. Then after a couple of years, Evelyn felt that the chancellor’s office was too pressured and she moved over to biology and Judy Bandtell became my secretary. I thought she was very good. And after Gene Bollt left . . .

Jarrell: About when did he leave?

Sinsheimer: I think he served for about four or five years. Then Dick Pierce took over and there may have been somebody in between, I can’t remember. I was very pleased with Dick, but not everybody was. I thought he did very well. After Barbara left we got Susan Burcaw. Then of course Wendell Brase was a real help to me. I don’t like to brag about MIT, but Wendell went to MIT and he is a problem-solver, too, so we got along well. Then John Marcum, well after the . . . let’s see what happened there?

Jarrell: You said that you had to have Paul Niebanck withdraw for the AVC position.

Vice-Chancellors

Sinsheimer: Yes. And I’m trying to remember who replaced Paul. I guess it was John Marcum. We had a search committee. At that point I didn’t want to get hung out to dry again, so I had a faculty search committee for a vice-chancellor. Fortunately John was available. Actually, I had thought about John when I was trying to make a decision which ended up with Niebanck, but John wasn’t available because he was going off for a year. But that fell through. But at that point John was available and the search committee recommended him and he took the job. Now, John and I got along, I thought, very well. John, I have to say,
also had difficulty making tough decisions. It’s true. Not as much as Gene Cota-Robles, but he did have difficulty. I know some faculty felt that he was not a strong enough academic vice-chancellor, that somehow he was supposed to stand up for the faculty against the chancellor, or something like that. I think they misunderstood the role. But (inaudible) he was vice chancellor for five or six years. When he felt he didn’t want to do it anymore they had another search committee and this time they went outside and got Kivie Moldave.

I have to admit I was surprised at that because, partly because he was another biologist, and I was surprised that they would want another biologist; secondly I had some concerns because he came from a medical school. I know that medical schools are far more authoritatively run than general campuses. That got to be a lot of trouble. By the end of his second or third year here, the faculty were demanding he be removed. The problem was it was my last year; it really created a dilemma for me. I thought it should really be up to the new chancellor to pick a vice-chancellor. I also felt that it was very awkward to have both a new chancellor and new vice-chancellor at the same time. You need some continuity. So, what to do? I mean, I could fire Kivie. Then they would have had to put somebody in there but as I say I felt that was sort of saddling the new chancellor with somebody . . . so in essence I did discuss this whole problem with [Robert] Stevens, after he was appointed. But my decision was that it was better to leave Kivie in there for however long Stevens was going to have him than to try to put somebody new in there who Stevens was going to have to change or something. So that’s the way it was left. It really was a major problem in my last year.

**Student Affairs**

Sinsheimer: The yearly uprising in the psychological counseling department was a constant problem. In general it was a built-in problem with student affairs because on the one hand, obviously some student affairs functions cross the whole campus and on the other hand, the colleges were very jealous of their prerogatives in student affairs. So there was a built-in struggle which was sort of analogous to the college-board conflict. I think that that persisted until Bruce [Moore] took over. He was enough of a diplomat . . . we brought Bruce here from [UC] Davis. I think originally he was the registrar, if I remember correctly. But then it was clear he had other talents. I can’t remember who was in charge of student affairs. But we needed somebody. He took that over and I think he did
very well with that . . . managed his relationships with the colleges very well, and finally seemed to have settled down the counseling program and the health program and so forth. To my recollection all these things were in disarray. I think the place had drifted for a number of years. In fact, I wasn’t here, but I sort of had the impression that it must have drifted the last few years of McHenry’s tenure. I’m not sure but it seemed like the chaos wasn’t generated even in three or four years.

Well, two things became clear to me from the system as a whole, from reading the Chronicle of Higher Education. First, affirmative action problems were becoming a major thorn on every campus and had to be dealt with at a higher level. Second, it became clear to me, regrettably in a way, that it wasn’t going to work, particularly at the faculty level, to just exhort the department. It just didn’t work. You had to do two things. You had to give them a carrot, the Target of Opportunity Program, and then you had to monitor what they did. So we had to have somebody in charge of all that and Julia Armstrong was brought in to do that. She was a great find because she did an excellent job. I mean she really has a systemwide reputation. She . . . and I must say so does Wendell [Brase]. The man who’s planning the construction is recognized throughout the system. That’s very important. Because when he goes up to University Hall and he talks to Trudis Heinecke or Bill Baker or the people that are involved in the capital planning he has credibility. He says, this is what we need and we know we need it. That’s crucial. Because those people are very hard-boiled. They have to be because they are besieged with requests. They can’t please everybody and it’s crucial that you have people who are persuasive and believed and Wendell did very, very well. You really needed somebody very good.

Now, another thing we did was about that same time was bring in the ombudsperson because it became clear to me that there were a number of personal conflicts within the staff. There were two types of problems. One was just personal conflicts which had to be resolved which the chancellor didn’t have time to resolve. Plus, while there were formal personnel procedures it was always very cumbersome and many of them undoubtedly could be resolved by informal negotiation which involved the ombudsperson. Since a bureaucracy has all kinds of rules and regulations which sometimes create more problems than they’re solving, it’s important for the administration to know about them and it’s
possible to change them. The ombudsperson is a person who can serve to recognize those kinds of situations. This reminds me of something I also learned very early, that you have to learn to work with the bureaucracy. Well, comparing my previous experience at Cal Tech, if I saw a problem as division chairman I’d reach in and fix it. Well naturally my tendency when I came to UCSC was to do the same thing. Is there a problem? Oh, well I’ll fix that. But you can’t do that. If you do, you’ve by-passed three people in the chain of command, so now they’re mad. You’ve created a precedent you can’t live with. You’ve got to work through the chain of command. You simply have to, or you destroy the whole system. In a way that was one of the most vexing aspects of being chancellor that . . . you sometimes have to make decisions that you’d rather not make because you can’t live with the precedent. If you do that for person x you’ve got to do it for y and z and you know you aren’t going to be able to do it. You don’t have the resources. You don’t have the time to devote to it. Even though it seems like that would be the desirable thing to do in case x . . . and so you have to let the system take care of it as best as it can.

**UC Bureaucracy**

**Jarrell:** Did you realize that you’d be working with such a thick bureaucracy as chancellor on this campus?

**Sinsheimer:** Well, yes and no. One thing I didn’t realize is that each of these layers of bureaucracy, if you wish, components of the bureaucracy, thinks of itself as a profession. In other words, all the business managers from the UC system get together periodically, as do the personnel managers and the physical plant managers. In one sense that’s good because they can exchange ideas. On the other hand they create their own institution, a sense of their own importance. I’m not putting this very well. One of the things I kept having to do here, not always successfully I’m sure, was to point out to the staff and the administration that the business of the university is education and research, it’s not administration. We’re not here to do administration. We’re here to foster the important things—education and research! It is a fact that there are many things you can do that make the lives of the administrators easy, but make carrying on education and research more difficult, so you shouldn’t do them. But you have to point that out all the time. I think at Cal Tech, partly because it’s smaller I’m sure, we were able to maintain, among the staff at least, a better perception that their
role was a service role to foster the science and educational programs, not just to build a physical plant or something.

Jarrell: That does tend to be an outcome.

Sinsheimer: In bureaucracy. That’s true. It really is. It was and is a problem, as far as I’m concerned. My only point is that the fact that you do have all these groups meeting systemwide, which while it has obviously some merit, does also reinforce the sense that the administration is a thing apart and exists for itself. Then of course you have University Hall, which is another whole matter, which isn’t even on our campus. (inaudible)

Overview of Campus Problems

Jarrell: During our first interview you said that there were very serious internal systemic problems at UCSC that you began to recognize. I would like you to indicate what were those systemic problems were.

Sinsheimer: Well, there was a whole congerie of problems which were subsumed under the heading college/board conflicts, by which I mean conflicts between the colleges and the boards of studies. When the campus was originally set up the faculty appointments were made in this . . . I guess because originally they were all in Cowell College and then, but then when there was more than one college they had to decide what to do about the disciplines because you were going to have people, biologists or chemists in more than one college, and we created the boards of study, which as I understand it were originally only somehow supposed to be coordinating bodies. But then appointments were made half in the colleges and half in the boards of study. Somehow that was supposed to represent some partition of faculty time; faculty would devote half of their effort to the college and half to the board of studies. Questions came up when there were new appointments to be made, when there were advancements to be made, how were these decisions to be made. As you can imagine, it wasn’t very long before the boards of studies and the colleges could be seen as having quite different objectives, and therefore quite different criteria for both appointments or promotions.

The colleges were primarily interested in undergraduate teaching; they were interested in what they called service to the college, that is interactions with
undergraduates, participation in counseling, participation in college nights. The boards of studies were interested as, you might imagine, as most departments would be, in teaching the courses in the discipline, in research, seminars, the usual kinds of disciplinary activities. Faculty were obviously torn by this. When appointments were to be made and the candidates would be interviewed, it would not infrequently happen that the number one candidate of the board was not the number one candidate of the college, because they were looking for different things. In the very early days, as I gather, they sometimes resolved that by making two appointments. But later on, of course, that became impossible. You didn’t have the appointments. And my impression is, frankly, that they would sometimes compromise on a third candidate who probably wasn’t as good as either of the other two, but was at least acceptable.

**Jarrell:** To both camps?

**Sinsheimer:** To both. Exactly. Then with regard to promotions, particularly of course, tenure issues, both bodies voted and provided judgments on promotions and advancements, that is the board did and the college did. And again since the criteria were quite disparate it wouldn’t be surprising that the results were often different. That is the board would say yes and the college would say no, or vice versa. In fact, I’m told that it even reached the point where an individual faculty member who might happen to be in the same board and the college, as the person under consideration, would vote one way in one and on in the other.

**Jarrell:** I wasn’t aware of that. Interesting.

**Sinsheimer:** They were wearing two different hats in different circumstances. It sounds ludicrous but . . .

**Jarrell:** Yes, that the same person would vote yay or nay.

**Sinsheimer:** Yes. And . . . so these split recommendations would then come up through the channels and they would go to the [Academic] Senate Committee on Privilege and Tenure and they would likewise be confused about the criteria and they would often come up with a split vote, so it would end up in the chancellor’s office. In fact this happened my first year here. So then the chancellor would somehow have to decide the tenure decision, leaving one group or the other very unhappy. The colleges, in a certain sense, and I don’t
want this to sound too derogatory, almost came to be, sort of clubs. If you were a
good guy and you did a lot of work in the college they didn’t care that much
about your scholarly contribution. Of course the boards were the other way
around. They were primarily concerned about your scholarship. So there was
this element of dispute.

Then there was the teaching element, that is, the faculty were expected to
provide courses in the colleges. But these courses weren’t the equivalent of
disciplinary courses because they were offered with an interdisciplinary
approach. I think the classic example was the chicken course,¹ which brought
together people from several different disciplines and that’s a good thing to do. It
became clear as time went on that it was hard to sustain interdisciplinary
programs; they go well for a few years and then people start to lose their
enthusiasm. Within a discipline there is a lot of support from outside, from the
whole chemistry fraternity, the whole English literature fraternity; there are
journals, meetings, new activity. Whereas in an interdisciplinary program you
are usually largely on your own. It’s unique and you don’t have anybody to talk
to about it and the momentum rarely gets sustained.

Well then, my impression frankly is that with time these courses kind of
deteriorate. People felt they were obliged to give them, so they would give a
chemistry course [focusing on] the chemistry of wine making. Now that’s
somewhat interesting but hardly a major academic subject except maybe in the
oenology department. There were even courses given in chess, or things of that
kind. This meant that the faculty weren’t teaching as much in their discipline.
This meant that the disciplinary education was recognizably thin. In other words
the students weren’t able to get all the courses they should be getting; the
offerings were weak, too limited. There was an increasing resentment on the part
of the people who thought about the boards of studies, about the time that they
had to spend teaching what they regarded increasingly as Mickey Mouse courses
in the colleges. This was another source of constant tug of war. By the time I
came, some faculty had actually simply refused to teach any college courses.
They felt it wasn’t worth their time and that they were needed in the disciplines.

¹Historian Page Smith and biologist Charles Daniels taught a course on the chicken in Cowell
College in the spring of 1972. In 1975 they published The Chicken Book (Boston: Little, Brown), on
the biology, history and folklore of the chicken.—Editor.
Then there was another set of problems which falls in the category of structure, except for the sciences, where the faculty, from the beginning had their offices adjacent to their laboratories in the science buildings. You see that in itself tells you something, because it says that the sciences which are clearly an important part of the campus, a third of the campus, let us say, didn’t really fit into the college idea where life was to be centered at the college. But here were the sciences, they were off over there. But in the humanities, the social sciences and the arts, to some degree, the faculty had their offices in the colleges, in several colleges. In one sense this was fine because it allowed much closer contact with the students, but this had a terrible cost, since it meant that the faculty in any one discipline were strewn all over the campus. As you know, it’s a pretty dispersed campus. So in economics, you’d have two economists in one college and one in another and then three there and one there . . . if you were the one economist in Kresge College, you didn’t get to see the other economists. It was just deadly to the intellectual vitality of the discipline. I honestly believe that we destroyed some younger faculty by putting them out in a college where they had no contact with other people in their discipline, no contact, no mentoring from senior members of the discipline, and they just floundered.

**Jarrell:** Because of their isolation?

**Sinsheimer:** Yes, they floundered; they were lost. It had an obvious effect on the intellectual vitality of the discipline. That again was a consequence of this idea that each of the colleges, with its 35 or whatever faculty was somehow supposed to be a small liberal arts institution with representatives of every discipline. Now you might say well what do they do at Cambridge and Oxford where they have this arrangement? Well, they have that but then they also have offices in the central part of the university, where you do have an area, as most universities do, where there is a department of economics.

**Jarrell:** So you cluster the disciplines.

**Sinsheimer:** Exactly. So . . . these were all in a sense structural problems. Another related problem is that it’s costly to run these colleges; there’s a whole apparatus of provosts and preceptors and bursars and whatnot. [Originally Chancellor] Dean McHenry had to agree that it would cost no more than any other campus per student, and so the money to run the colleges had to come out
of the campus budget, which meant it wasn’t available for the disciplines which hampered them, clearly. It was exacerbated by the fact that small campuses are at a disadvantage; they simply lack economies of scale that you have on large campuses, which save some money. A second problem within the UC system is that the allocation of resources clearly favors the campuses that have graduate programs. It’s just set up that way. We had a minimum of graduate programs so that again was an exacerbation of the resource problem. So there was this fundamental structural problem. How do you reconcile the idea of colleges as centers of academic life with the idea of being a University of California campus with its research orientation, and its professional motivations? I think myself that the problem was never thought through. Clark Kerr never thought it through. Clark Kerr somehow had the notion . . . I hate to say it . . . it’s just so simplistic—a set of Swarthmores dotted around, but [each college] without the resources of a Swarthmore.

**Jarrell:** With the same budget as a more centralized UC campus.

**Sinsheimer:** Exactly. I mean Swarthmore runs on a student/faculty ratio of 9 or 10 to 1. We had, I don’t know what we started at, but by the time I came here it was more like 20 to 1. You just can’t do it. My first year here I really spent trying to understand all these problems and how the campus stood in relation to the whole system. I noticed in reading the interviews with Ken Thimann, for whom I have immense regard, that he never understood that. Because he wouldn’t. There’s no reason he should have. He never understood how the system operated and how the campus could not, as it were, be exempt from the strictures and ethos of the UC system. Now, you know Clark Kerr may have thought [that as] president, he could make it exempt. But he wasn’t president for more than one year after the campus was started. None of the other presidents was interested in making this campus exempt from the whole pattern of the UC system. So here was this oddball [campus]. Well, it became clear to me that this college/board conflict had produced in effect a stalemate on the campus, a stagnation. There was really only one way to go within the UC system with the resources available. That was to go toward a more disciplinary oriented campus, of the kind that the other UC campuses are and for which the whole reward system within UC is structured and preserve as much of the college concept as you could. But that was all you could do unless somehow you could get other
resources. At that point it seemed like an enormous task because the campus was sliding downhill fast. The enrollments were falling. There were all these rumors that the campus was going to be closed. It was going to be very hard to get other resources.

Jarrell: And we had Proposition 13 and . . .

Sinsheimer: Right, Prop 13 came along, the budget was cut repeatedly and everything was negative.

Jarrell: So this leads inevitably to how you conceived of the reorganization plan?

Campus Reorganization

Sinsheimer: Yes, right. So I thought the campus certainly had to be reorganized. We had to deal with several problems at once. We had to get the colleges to solve this stalemate over appointments and promotions. I had [wanted] to get the colleges out of the promotion business. Because, quite frankly, it seemed to me that in terms of academic quality the boards had the right idea and the colleges didn’t. The colleges had become in a sense clubs. Now this doesn’t mean that I didn’t think teaching should be valued. Of course. But I couldn’t see promoting people who were doing no scholarly research at all, which many of the colleges were willing to do. In part maybe that’s my scientific bias. Because as a scientist I think if you are not engaged in scholarly activity you are going to be hopelessly obsolete in ten years. Maybe that’s not as true in some of the other disciplines, I don’t know. But it seems to me that you do expect a University of California professor to be an active scholar.

Jarrell: That’s the UC system.

Sinsheimer: That’s the UC system. And you can’t be this total oddball in this system.

Jarrell: You are saying that you don’t think this relationship was ever really thought through, the consequences of it.

Sinsheimer: I don’t think it was, no.

Jarrell: And so when you came, you saw a stalemate.
Sinsheimer: Yes. It was clearly a stalemate. [There’s] another point to this. You can’t be an oddball in the [UC] system. There was a little bit of an attitude here that I would almost call precious—we can forget the rest of the world and build this city on a hill, right? [UCSC could] just select faculty who spent their lives in the colleges teaching and so on, but the obvious consequence of that would be you’d have no academic reputation, although UCSC was part of the University of California. People come to the University of California expecting a certain academic status on the campuses. We’re not all the same as Berkeley but we’re supposed to be pretty good. UC is considered one of the best public universities. People expect a certain academic status. We didn’t have it. Students wouldn’t come and they weren’t coming. By ’77 they weren’t coming in droves, you might say. You have to maintain a certain level, and as far as I’m concerned, as high a level as possible, of academic stature in order to attract good students. I mean it feeds on itself. It’s the same as athletics or whatever. Somehow the campus acted as if they didn’t have to worry about that.

Jarrell: And they didn’t at first.

Sinsheimer: At first they didn’t, no. But of course that was an odd time. The Sixties were an unusual time, so they could coast. I mean everybody assumed, this is a University of California campus, of course it’s going to have academic stature. But then it wasn’t being fulfilled. Another reason for opting the way I did was we had to go in a direction which would improve the academic standing of the campus, which we have accomplished. I don’t know if you saw those numbers that came out a couple of weeks ago from the Institute of Scientific Information.

Oh, well this is fascinating. I’m so delighted. I have to tell you about it. The Institute for Scientific Information puts out what they call *The Science Citation Index* where they summarize, analyze all of the published papers that are cited.

Jarrell: Oh I read that in an article in the newspaper.

Sinsheimer: Let me tell you what they did. They took all the published papers let’s say in the physical sciences, in the last three years; they took all the citations. When you publish an article you always have certain citations of previous work. They took the papers from Harvard, from UC Santa Cruz, from Berkeley, that
were cited, and they produced what they call a citation impact; counting how many times a paper was cited in all the papers in the physical sciences in the last few years; and here’s some previous paper, how many times was that cited? Then they averaged that for each institution to give the average citation impact for each institution. In the physical sciences, the papers from Santa Cruz had highest citation impact in the world, higher than Harvard, than Cal Tech, MIT. We don’t publish as many papers as Harvard, of course.

**Jarrell:** Yes, but the impact. The quality.

**Sinsheimer:** But the impact, the quality of those papers. You can quarrel with the analysis but it’s a relatively objective way of measuring impact.

**Jarrell:** The influence of that work.

**Sinsheimer:** Yes, the influence of that work. Santa Cruz was the number one in the world in the physical sciences. We were twelfth in the biological sciences. I think that’s fantastic. I really do. So it says maybe we did something right. Anyway, I did feel that that it was essential to improve the academic standing of the campus. That would not have happened had we tilted, if we’d gone the other way . . . In other words, what I’m trying to say is that I think some people felt that I was antithetic to the colleges and I wasn’t antithetic to the colleges. It was that a choice had to be made and I had to go one way or the other and I chose the way that made sense to me. I still think there are a lot of good things one could do in the colleges if you had the resources to do them. But you can’t do that by stealing them from the rest of the campus.

**Jarrell:** And that’s what was happening?

**Sinsheimer:** Exactly.

**Jarrell:** The resources were divided.

**Sinsheimer:** Then neither was doing well.

**Jarrell:** And then that diluted both of them?

**Sinsheimer:** Exactly.
Jarrell: Yes. So how did you decide to solve this?

Sinsheimer: Well I solved it by what has come to be known as the [campus] reorganization. We took the colleges out of the promotion business and did appointments wholly in the disciplines. I felt we really had to solve this dispersion problem because I really felt it was sapping the vitality of the disciplines. I didn’t want to simply group economists in one college. I wanted each college to have a mix of people by creating clusters. So you could have economists in two or three colleges; you could have the literary scholars likewise; maybe have the French scholars here and the German scholars there. So we had a major physical relocation of people. I think about a third of the faculty had to move from where they were to other colleges. There was some resistance to that but in the end everybody acquiesced.

Jarrell: Did anyone else think this through with you?

Sinsheimer: There were people who helped make clear to me what the problems were. I remember Sig Puknat was one. Bruce Rosenblum was another. He was the one who really first emphasized to me the enrollment problem. I think Ken Thimann was another. But I have to say none of them seemed to know what to do about it. Harry Beevers was certainly another one. John Dizikes . . . Everybody sort of recognized the problem but nobody knew what to do about it. They weren’t . . . well in a way they had to bite the bullet and they didn’t want to bite the bullet.

Jarrell: You bit the bullet.

Sinsheimer: I bit the bullet you might say. I hate to say it, but most of the ideas came from me as to what to do. Even after the general outline was put out a faculty committee or a chancellorial committee was to sort of flesh out the details, as it were. But they would repeatedly bog down and I would have to come in and . . . you know, what group should go where and how should we do this?

Jarrell: They were stuck in trying to figure out how to implement the reorganization?

Sinsheimer: They would be stuck and I would have to come in and resolve it half the time. It was a difficult time for me. I felt under an immense amount of
pressure. Because in the end of course the faculty had to approve it or it wouldn’t go. In the end they did and the final faculty vote was 75 or 80 percent in favor, which was very good, but that also meant that there was twenty or twenty-five percent who were dead set against it.

**Jarrell:** Very vocal critics.

**Sinsheimer:** Very vocal, yes. They were dead set against the reorganization and probably still are if they’re still around. I think some felt it was a sort of betrayal of the original idea. The only answer to that would be that the original idea was impractical in real terms. But second, and in a way more to me . . . well, a gloss on what I just said. I said and I remember saying at the time, “Look, you did an experiment. Not every experiment works. All scientists know that.” But people who aren’t scientists don’t know that. It seems to me that when you do an experiment you have to evaluate it and see if it works or not. If it didn’t work what do we keep, what do we throw out? But non-scientists don’t think that way. So they couldn’t look at it that way.

A lot of these people had invested five or ten years of their life in this and worked very, very hard at it. When you’ve done that it’s very, very hard to admit that you made all that effort for something that wasn’t worth it. It reminds me, some years ago there was an initiative that said no more nuclear plants should be built in California. The side which wanted to continue building nuclear plants brought out some nuclear engineers who of course said how safe they were and how valuable they were. Disregarding the logic of the argument, there was no way on earth you were going to get three people who had each spent twenty-five years designing nuclear plants to come out and say they weren’t any good. You can’t do that. You can’t say I wasted my life. This was the same sort of thing but to a lesser degree. They couldn’t say I’ve wasted the last seven years of my life on a thankless enterprise.

In preparation for writing my memoirs, I went through the minutes of all the UC Regents meetings, starting in 1960, relevant to Santa Cruz. I wanted to see what was said in the regents meetings, what was said in regents committees, about Santa Cruz. It comes to mind because there was a report that they had

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asked that the University create a committee to review the academic plan. [Robert] Tschirgi, I think he was dean of something at Berkeley,³ said, “This is a nostalgic plan. But it might work.” But his view was that this was a nostalgic plan to an earlier era in education. It was obvious that he was very skeptical that this could work in the University of California.

The third aspect of [the reorganization] was that it did away with college courses except the core courses. That’s an interesting point because I was astonished that when I came there were only two core courses left. Only Cowell and Stevenson. Cowell was down to a one-quarter course. They were thinking of abolishing that. I thought that the core courses were really valuable for several reasons. One, they provided a broad interdisciplinary introduction to some theme. Second, they had a socializing effect; all the freshmen in the college take the same course. It gives them something to talk about to each other, something to think about with each other. Third, the core course should introduce them to the level of a University education. Part of the reorganization was my insistence that every college should offer a core course. There weren’t going to be any other college courses but . . . I didn’t say there weren’t going to be any. There would be none of the previous college courses. Colleges could propose courses. And not just one or two. And that has happened.

Jarrell: In terms of taking away from the colleges their power to share in appointments, tenure, decision making, was that given up reluctantly?

Sinsheimer: Oh yes. Well the colleges felt that without that power they would no longer be able to sustain what they thought of as their part of the original vision that the colleges would be academic (inaudible).

The Role of Provosts

Jarrell: How did you redefine or conceptualize the role of provosts in terms of reorganization?

Sinsheimer: That’s a good question. I considered for a time actually doing away, not with the position, but the name provost. Because there is a problem. The term provost has another definition in the University of California. There’s a provost

³Robert D. Tschirgi, Dean of Planning and Professor of Physiology and Anatomy, UC Los Angeles.—Editor.
at Berkeley and the provost at Berkeley is the second in command. There’s a provost at Cal Tech, too . . . if you look, somewhere in the UC system there is a set of definitions and . . .

Jarrell: Of all these titles?

Sinsheimer: Titles, yes. Provost does not correspond to what we use it for at UCSC. But in the end I thought, obviously there was a lot of attachment to the name and it wasn’t worth the hassle.

But your question is what role did I perceive for them? I foresaw a role more like I would say the master of a Harvard college, a senior person who is there, who is a symbolic figure of course, with whom students can talk, but who also tries to make the college, while it’s not an academic setting, an intellectual and cultural setting. The provost would sponsor visiting lecturers, student programs of this and that, debates, whatever. I think Peggy Musgrave [Crown College Provost] came as close as anything to my view of how a provost could and should function. Dennis McElrath, I also think has done a good job in that sense . . .

I really do believe a college can be an exciting intellectual and cultural place without being a place that is trying to offer academic courses. I did allow for a college to sponsor certain kinds of small interdisciplinary programs which simply didn’t fit elsewhere. For instance Stevenson College had its program on nuclear proliferation. They offered a couple of courses and I provided funding for that. It didn’t fit anywhere in the academic [categories].

Jarrell: It was an issue-oriented interdisciplinary program addressing contemporary problems with scientists and social scientists together, thinking together on a problem, but that’s a much more short-lived enterprise.

Sinsheimer: Right. And it should be.

Jarrell: In terms of reorganization my general impression from reading old City on the Hill Press articles and letters to the editor is that it was perceived in light of what you are saying today as you not caring about the colleges, perhaps not caring about undergraduate education. You just contradicted those criticisms. You do care. But you saw the roles of the colleges in a different light.
Sinsheimer: Well I saw them in a necessarily curtailed light given the resources.

City on a Hill Press

Sinsheimer: Well you know . . . go ahead. I was just going to say something about City on a Hill but . . . (inaudible).

Jarrell: No go ahead, because this must have been part of the difficulty.

Sinsheimer: City on a Hill is not a newspaper; it’s a polemic. I don’t know what it is now but all the time I was there it was a polemic. My impression frankly would have been that if I had opted for the opposite direction, they would have opposed it. Anything the administration did was automatically wrong. I’m serious. Anything the administration did had to be wrong. If you thought it was right you must have been thinking wrong. If they thought it was right.

Jarrell: So there was an oppositional tendency?

Sinsheimer: A reflex. Whatever the administration wanted to do, it was wrong. I noticed that in [UC] Santa Barbara now they have, of course, a student newspaper. And again the administration is usually wrong. But at least once in a while they do something right. I never saw that here. It’s interesting. It’s too bad. I think it creates a false impression because in all honesty I don’t think City on a Hill is representative of the student body. Unfortunately it’s a self-perpetuating enterprise, which I thought was wrong. Another problem of much lesser magnitude is that for a long time there was no central student organization. There were college organizations, but there was no central student organization. This was a problem in the sense that when you wanted to talk to students, when you wanted to find out what students felt about something, there was no group to talk to. There were eight groups to talk to, which made life difficult. Or there were self-appointed representatives who didn’t necessarily represent anyone. I actually encouraged the formation of a campus-wide student organization because I thought it would be desirable for the student body plus there were already a number of student groups, particularly ethnic groups and so on, that were campus-wide but were all sort of ad hoc, there was no organization, no structure for it.
Just to get back to where, why I went off on that. I do think it would make much more sense at some point now that there is a campus-wide student government, if they were to select the editorship and so on, of *City on a Hill*, rather than it being a constantly self-perpetuating group, that perpetuates a particular line of thought.

**Administrative Appointments**

**Jarrell:** From the campus reorganization to some of your more significant administrative appointees, the people . . . we could start with the academic vice-chancellor and three people held that position. Cota-Robles was at the very end of his tenure in that position when you came. How closely did you work with the AVC, with John Marcum, and how did that relationship evolve?

**John Marcum**

**Sinsheimer:** We worked very closely together, I would say. We discussed all major policy questions and in terms of advancements and promotions, I’d delegated all that to him except tenure decisions at step 5 or step 6 advancement, where the candidate is supposed to have international distinction. I retained those myself. I did expect him to look at them and I wanted his opinion but I made the final decision, whereas the others I delegated to him. One of the reasons for appointing John was, I respected him and secondly as I think I may have mentioned before, I didn’t want two scientists, I wanted a humanist or a social scientist. I always felt it was unfortunate that he was subject to a lot of criticism because people felt that he was a weak vice-chancellor who always as it were, simply echoed my opinions. That wasn’t the truth as I perceived it. The point was more that we agreed. It wasn’t that I forced my opinion on him. It was that as we discussed it we agreed on what should be done almost all the time. But somehow he came to be perceived as . . .

**Jarrell:** A yes man?

**Sinsheimer:** A yes man. But that really wasn’t the case. I do think John had some difficulty. . . there were some occasions where he would change his mind. That is, he would say he was meeting with some senate committee and he would express an opinion and then he would change his mind on it, but actually the point I want to make is that he would have changed his mind before we talked.
about it. It wasn’t that I persuaded him he was wrong. He would have just thought better of it, in the interim. He’s always had that tendency. He gives a quick opinion and then he continues to reflect on the problem and he may or may not sustain that opinion. I’m a little bit the other way. I tend not to give any comment at all until I’ve thought about it. Once I give it, I usually stick with it. I’ve decided that’s the solution, that’s the answer. So I think that helped to give rise to this impression that, “Oh he changed his mind. It must be because the chancellor twisted his arm or something like that.” But really I can hardly think of such a thing happening. You can talk to John and see how he remembers it. I thought we got along very well, actually. Particularly in the social sciences I very much respected his judgment, both of people and how things should be done.

Jarrell: It seems to have evolved since that position was created that that’s the number two person on the campus.

Sinsheimer: Yes it is.

Jarrell: Because it wasn’t always that way. There wasn’t a number two person when McHenry was here, really.

Sinsheimer: There was only McHenry. Well, when it’s smaller it’s easier to do that.

Kivie Moldave

Sinsheimer: Now Kivie Moldave was another problem. There was a search committee. I had come to realize fairly early that it virtually had to be somebody from within the UC system because the UC system is so idiosyncratic. If you brought anybody in they would spend a year or more just learning how the budgets are handled and how the academic personnel process operates and so on. So it had to be somebody who had some familiarity with that. So we did a search within the UC system. If it had been just up to me I probably wouldn’t have picked Kivie. Not that I disliked Kivie at all. But I didn’t think it should be another scientist again. He was a biologist, not even a different kind of scientist.

Second, I know how things work in a medical school; they are much more hierarchical than this campus ever imagined. I feared that that would be difficult, and it was. Because I delegated specifically and openly a number of things to
Kivie, budget-wise. So it was clear he had that authority. But I have to say we disagreed on a number of matters. Things were now opening up. The campus was growing and it was getting a lot more appointments and so forth, which we hadn’t had before. Particularly the last year I felt that it was really more appropriate to save some of these [appointments] for the next chancellor. But he was insisting on going ahead with them. As you know he ran into a great deal of difficulty with the [Academic] Senate. The day came when they wanted me to get rid of him. So they were very unhappy about it. I was then in a very awkward position because it was my last year. And I was perfectly willing to act. I mean I really did feel he had to be changed because his relationship with the senate got to be impossible. Again I think primarily because he was not used to the ethos here. But at the same time I felt, gosh here’s a new chancellor coming in. I know how valuable it was for me to have Cota-Robles here during my first year, who knew how this place ran. The new chancellor could well have come from outside the system frankly, very likely. This was before he was chosen. It would be very hard, it seemed to me, if he had to come in and suddenly find himself an academic vice chancellor. So I actually discussed this problem with [UC President David] Gardner. I think his advice was to see if we couldn’t let it ride. I didn’t do anything about it. If I had been staying on another year I’m sure I would have. Then when [Robert] Stevens came in, the faculty came to him with their unhappiness and he (inaudible). Let me comment on that. I’m not criticizing so much what Kivie wanted to do, as simply the fact that he didn’t do it in the right way vis à vis the [Academic] Senate. I did feel that he really should hold back and . . . I felt a great obligation to give the next chancellor as much leeway as possible. Partly because of my own experience. Because when I came in I found that the previous chancellor had used up all the appointments and all the discretionary money for the year. So he’d left me the first year in a real box.

Jarrell: I’d like you to discuss the divisions and your appointments of deans.

Graduate Division

Sinsheimer: Well, in the graduate division, I appointed John Ellis. John is a controversial figure on the campus and I know that. But as far as I’m concerned, he was an excellent graduate dean. He worked hard at it. He ran the office well. It requires a certain amount of bookkeeping that has to be done correctly. He did
a lot to try to build up the graduate programs, which I thought was very important. When I came I think we had about three hundred graduate students. It was pitiful. For several reasons. I can expand on that. Because, first of all I think a university should have a graduate program. I mean that’s part of the University of California. We had programs in all the sciences but we had very few outside the sciences and I felt that that again tended to diminish our academic quality. I think graduate students stimulate faculty; they are excellent mentors for undergraduates also because they are closer in age. There are much freer interactions with undergraduates. They enliven the intellectual atmosphere in the department. Second, I felt that even when we had graduate programs they were too small. You need a critical mass involved here. You have to have enough graduate students to talk to each other and so on, interact with each other and in many cases our programs were too small. So I felt it was very important to try to build up the graduate programs and John really worked with the departments to do that.

He mounted new programs, got departments that didn’t have programs to start programs, or enlarge already existing programs. As far as I was concerned he did a good job on that. I know he tends sometimes to be a little too Teutonic perhaps, dictatorial, and that irritates some people.

**Natural Sciences Division**

**Sinsheimer:** The Division of Natural Sciences was a continuous problem. It seemed it was very difficult to get anybody who was a good natural scientist to take the time out to do the job. George Gaspari I thought did a good job, but he quit after two years. He just didn’t want to spend any more time at it. I thought he was good at it because he had good judgments and he was able to handle people well. Bill Doyle did it for three years. Bill . . . I’m sorry to say was not good at it. He just didn’t have the right way to handle people, and from my point of view, unfortunately you would ask him for information and you never got it, or you got it three months late. I mean it was just very dilatory. Third, I have to assume my administrative role here. One of the worst things that you want to hear from an administrator is that he’s overspent his budget. That’s what I would hear from Bill Doyle every year. So that wasn’t too happy. Then I made one appointment, Ted Foster, who I think is an excellent scientist, but who simply grated on everybody. And then Frank Drake was wonderful, as far as I was
concerned. I thought he was an outstanding dean and why Stevens didn’t continue him I have never understood. I really thought he made excellent judgments. Obviously he made some people unhappy, any administrator does; he’s only got so many resources. But I think he did a first-rate job.

**Social Sciences Division**

**Sinsheimer:** In the social sciences, I guess Bob Adams was dean for a long time. He was dean when I came. The social sciences departments always seemed to me rather fractious. And it’s sort of a complicated amalgam, ranging from economics to anthropology to politics, to sociology, community studies, psychology . . . it’s a curious amalgam of people who don’t think alike at all. I mean you contrast community studies on one hand and economics on the other . . . and so the dean does have a difficult time and Bob seemed to manage it. I think he’s . . . I don’t want to use the word devious, but he is a bit devious. (Laughter) But at the same time he didn’t have any strong vision of where he wanted the division to go. Then we did a search, as you know. We brought in a fellow from Davis.

Frank Child for Dean of Social Sciences. It was same old problem. UC Davis is an ag[ricultural] school. He was an agricultural economist, and a good one, I might say. UC had a cooperative program with Egypt for about a decade and he was in charge of that and he did it very well. But Davis, again it’s a more hierarchical, particularly in agriculture, type of institution. He had trouble then adapting to the very egalitarian ethos at Santa Cruz. I think his judgments were good but he did ruffle faculty in the end. At his five-year-review they were not interested in his continuing. I told him that and he was, of course, upset and he decided to retire in the middle of his fourth year.

**Jarrell:** How do you make a determination on whether you’re going to have a wider search or a smaller search? Do you decide that?

**Sinsheimer:** The chancellor decides that. It depends on whether you think there are at least a few obvious internal candidates, or not.

**Jarrell:** I see.

**Sinsheimer:** Now for example, if we can go back to the science search for a moment, it was obvious we had no decent internal candidate. Nobody wanted to
take the job. In the social sciences I think again nobody . . . I’ve forgotten all the
details at this point but, generally you probably make a few internal, informal
inquiries and when you find that none of the people whom you would like to
have the job will take it, then you say, let’s do a search. Then you decide you
have to do an external search.

Jarrell: What’s the charm of a job like Dean of Natural Sciences? Why would
somebody take that job? What’s the appeal? What are the possibilities?

Sinsheimer: That’s part of the problem. If the place is growing then it has an
appeal in that you play a significant role in selecting new faculty and the new
directions. So you have some satisfaction out of doing that. You can play a role in
helping to build up and strengthen programs. I have to tell you I was very
delighted that Drake was willing to come, because he’s a very distinguished
astronomer. In his case also it gave him the opportunity to become affiliated with
Lick [Observatory] which is an outstanding place.

But I think as you say, the other thing has to be that you have a role in building
something. Because otherwise you are asking somebody to take on this
administrative chore, which means that they have to leave their science, in effect.

Jarrell: Exactly.

Sinsheimer: They didn’t want to do that. So we had this succession . . . that was
a problem in the social sciences you see. We had Bob Adams, but he didn’t have
any research program to speak of that he was leaving. Then we brought in Frank
Child and I think Frank at that point was thinking that he had done his research
and he could spend his last half dozen years or so in helping to build up this
program, which would be a sort of fitting end to his career. Then he would retire.
That was on his mind, I think. What you have to worry about, of course is that
you bring on somebody who then retires on the job and that’s disaster. You bring
somebody who comes in as dean and then looks on it as . . . sinecure (inaudible)
and pushes papers for five years.
Humanities Division

Jarrell: Right. Because I think that position as the head of one of these divisions, it can be just a paper pushing, administrative job. Or it’s an opportunity to mount new programs, to exercise imagination.

Sinsheimer: Right. When the place is growing you have that opportunity. Now in the humanities I brought in Helene Moglen. She was very impressive. She came from SUNY. She obviously had a lot of energy, a lot of ideas and the humanities division seemed to me sort of stagnant at the time. We had done a national search. She was clearly the most impressive. As I remember I recruited her before Prop. 13, her first year . . . but I may be wrong about that.

Jarrell: Yes. Her appointment was effective July 1, 1978.

Sinsheimer: My first year. But that was before Prop. 13 and then of course she ran into all the financial crises. She was provost of Kresge. That’s another whole disaster area that we can get into. But we’re talking about the role of dean. Of course Helene had a very forceful personality and once again it irritated some people, particularly John Ellis. She and John Ellis got on like cats and dogs. But by and large I liked Helene and I thought she did a reasonably good job. I think being dean and provost is very difficult. I didn’t realize that initially. I think it’s probably too much. I think she kind of wore herself out, frankly, doing both. But I thought if it could be done it was a good idea because as you commented earlier, the campus seemed to be sprouting administration. It does because you’ve got the whole normal administration and then you’ve got the whole collegiate structure on top of that, which almost doubles the number of administrators.

Jarrell: That’s something that the founders never thought of. They were wanting to not have so much administration, wanting to be more human-scale. And they had twice as many . . .

Sinsheimer: Twice as many administrators.

Jarrell: Yes.
**Sinsheimer:** You’d like to have at least your provosts and your other top deans and so on be academics. Then if you’ve got a limited ratio of faculty to students, you’ve got to pull them out of that pool, which further reduces the number of faculty you have available to teach. Anyway, I’m trying to remember. Did Michael Cowan succeed Helene as dean in the humanities?

**Jarrell:** Yes, he came in 1983. So Moglen was dean for five years, from 1978 to 1983.

**Sinsheimer:** Then Michael Cowan took over. And Michael is a good man. I thought he did an excellent job. The arts were a disaster. Initially it was the Division of Arts and Humanities. The arts were under the humanities. They hated that; I got weekly delegations. They felt that the dean, who was always a humanist, was never adequately representing the arts at the higher level. But I couldn’t just automatically create a division of the arts. That requires ultimately, I think, regental approval. I did make an arrangement with Helene that we would have a director of the arts. Helene would delegate to that director in effect the dean’s role for the arts. The dean would report to the humanities dean but de facto he would have the same kind of role. We recruited Phillip Nelson, who was the first director of the arts. Phillip Nelson had been head of the Yale Music School, or something like that, and he came with glowing recommendations. He wanted to spread music throughout the campus; he wanted to have music playing in every college. He had all the right ideas, he really did. To make a long story short, Yale palmed him off on us. That’s the truth. He [seemed to] alienate everybody in the arts. I talked to him repeatedly to try to tell him, but could not get through to him. Finally there was an absolute rebellion in the arts and I had to remove him as director. He had tenure so we continued him on for a year as a faculty member. I had brought him here as provost, so we had to remove him as provost also. I remember we housed him in the Carriage House and gave him a year hopefully to find something else.

**Jarrell:** Well what was the nature of the criticism?

**Sinsheimer:** He just alienated everybody. He would listen to nobody. You just can’t do that here. But as I remember David Cope was acting director for a year, while we did another search. We got Lieberman, the ethnomusicologist from
Seattle. He came with glowing recommendations. I was a little more suspicious by this time.

**Jarrell:** Of glowing recommendations?

**Sinsheimer:** Originally I had interviewed Nelson and had frankly been taken in by him. I was a little more dubious about Lieberman, but the search committee was very enthused and he did have some academic reputation. But then he came and there were all kinds of problems.

**Jarrell:** And he was the provost of the college as well.

**Sinsheimer:** Yes, he was the provost. Anyway, it was a second disaster. Then we then we had David Cope and (inaudible). So after the Lieberman thing we didn’t have the heart to go through another outside search.

**Jarrell:** It was really rather terrible luck?

**Sinsheimer:** Horrible luck. Terrible.

**Jarrell:** I mean you do the best you can in a search.

**Sinsheimer:** Right.

**Jarrell:** But people can run paper by you sometimes.

**Sinsheimer:** Nelson certainly did. With Lieberman I was a little more dubious from the beginning but the search committee was very happy.

The Betrayal of Santa Cruz

**Sinsheimer:** I feel [UC] Santa Cruz was betrayed in three ways. It was betrayed by Kerr and McHenry because they didn’t think it through; they had this great vision and they simply did not think through how they could do this within the University of California. They had an idea, and they hadn’t thought it through and for all the factors I mentioned earlier, that people are going to invest years of their life in it and so on, you can’t launch that kind of an experiment without having thought it through. In an experimental lab, the E coli aren’t going to complain if there is a fault in the experiment and they are wasted. But people are. UCSC was betrayed by the community which invited it here and then turned on
them. It did. And third, in a sense it got betrayed by the system in that after Kerr left it seems clear nobody in the system felt any obligation to foster this experiment.

**Jarrell:** Adopt it.

**Sinsheimer:** Adopt it, however you want to put it. And quite the contrary, I mean when [President Charles] Hitch killed [the] engineering [school] here he practically killed the campus, as far as I’m concerned, robbed it of its only professional school, distorted the composition of the campus. It was a disaster. He did it without thinking about it, as far as I can tell. I’ve talked to Francis Clauser about it. He [Hitch] did it just on fiscal grounds.

**Jarrell:** Without any appreciation of the meaning of it in terms of the entire campus?

**Sinsheimer:** Exactly.

**Jarrell:** I’ve never heard anyone put it so strongly as you.

**Sinsheimer:** Well I feel strongly about it.

**Jarrell:** I mean in terms of its impact for the subsequent development of the campus.

**Sinsheimer:** Oh it would have made a huge difference at that stage if we’d had an engineering cadre, an engineering school, a professional school . . .

**Jarrell:** You characterize these three as betrayals. How long were you at Santa Cruz before you started understanding this?

**Sinsheimer:** Well I didn’t understand it in that sense until much later.

**Jarrell:** No, you were in the middle of it.

**Sinsheimer:** I was in the middle of it. I came here and fell into all these structural problems, as you’ve described them. Then I found out to my astonishment that the [Santa Cruz] community was unhappy with the campus being here. Then I came to realize that in the central UC administration, not at the presidential level, not at that level, but I’d say at the second and third level,
there was no sympathy for this campus, at all. They thought it was an aberration, a mistake, probably doomed to fail. I’m serious. They didn’t understand, had no conception of what it was supposed to be doing, that whatever it was doing it wasn’t doing real well. You can look at that in various ways, but after all most of the people at central administration are the products of UC. They’d naturally think of a conventional UC as a great place. So why would you want to change it? If it should, for heavens sake, turn out that Santa Cruz was a great improvement that would in a way diminish the other campuses. I’m not saying they think this overtly.

Santa Cruz was going downhill. Enrollments were falling, and that’s simplistic but if your enrollments are falling, students don’t like you. You’re doing a lousy job. The Christensen episode, which as I say, I don’t think I fully understand, but in any case the fact that he came down here from UC Berkeley and the campus revolted, did not leave a great image of the campus. I have to say I suspect that [Chancellor] Stevens’ resignation isn’t going to improve the image of the campus at the central administration either. I can only surmise. I don’t know.

**University Development**

**Jarrell:** I’d like you to talk about University Relations, Colette Seiple, fundraising, and your emphasis on university development.

**Sinsheimer:** Well, I always recognized university relations were really important. Remember I came from a private institution which lives by what you would call university relations, by raising money all the time. So, I recognize the importance of it. But I would say it was also obvious to me, from the beginning, that UC Santa Cruz had some major handicaps in this regard. UC gets money from the state. That’s the major part of its income. It gets money, it has some significant endowment, although a lot of that is specifically directed, understandably, for one purpose or another. It gets money for specific projects in the form of grants and it gets gift money. This is not a small item at the large campuses like UC Berkeley and UCLA; they are able to raise on the order of a 100 million dollars a year in gifts. That’s more than the whole Santa Cruz budget. That gives them an extra leeway, not only as a supplemental, since in many cases it is less specifically directed than the state money which comes with lots of strings on it. So it gives them a lot of leeway, an opportunity to do a lot of things.
That would be desirable to do on any campus. But these supplemental funds have come primarily from two sources—from alumni, or from the surrounding community which has a particular interest in this campus. Berkeley in particular obviously has a hundred years of alumni, however many are living. It’s been a big school so it has lots of alumni, and they’re very loyal. It’s in the Bay Area which of course is a large and wealthy part of California. UCLA also has lots of alumni, being a large school and it’s located in a place as we used to say, so that so that [Chancellor] Chuck Young just had to hold out his hands and let the money fall in. There’s Beverly Hills, Bel Air and Brentwood and some of the wealthiest communities in the country. In addition he had a medical school which is also a great source of income.

Santa Cruz, a very young institution, had only alumni who were out ten years when I came here, and it takes a while both to build up a large number of alumni and for them to get older and wealthier. So alumni were not going to be a great source of money. On the other hand, you had to look ahead to the fact that ultimately the alumni could be expected to be a source of gifts to the campus. So you had to keep track of them and keep them interested in the institution and not just decide twenty years later to start an alumni organization. You could recognize that unlike an alumni organization at Berkeley which is a great source of income, it was probably going to be a negative source of income for awhile. You weren’t going to raise enough money to even support the operation. Then the other problem, as far as the community goes, is that Santa Cruz is simply not comparable to San Francisco or Los Angeles as a source of revenue.

That brings up another topic. If you look around, the nearest locale of real wealth is Silicon Valley. But in order to interest Silicon Valley in UC Santa Cruz we have to be doing things of interest to them. That made the lack of an engineering program all the more deplorable. I mean that’s not the only reason to have an engineering program, obviously, but it did seem to me that among the other reasons for trying to get an engineering program going here was to have something that would be of interest to that community, and therefore a potential source of resources.

When I came here we did have a very low key alumni enterprise. Barbara Sutton, who was an alumna herself, in the first class, was in charge of it. The alumni organization was largely dominated by members of that first class, who had a
kind of a special cachet and because Barbara herself was part of that class. It was a very low-key enterprise, and, to my disappointment at that time the alumni were very much college-oriented. They thought of themselves as Cowell alumni, or Stevenson alumni. They didn’t think of themselves as UCSC alumni, which is interesting. That’s changed, I think. Then in the fundraising . . . well Gurden Mooser was still here. Of course he had worked with Dean [McHenry] and they had been relatively successful in raising money for some of the colleges, pretty much on a very ad hoc basis. It wasn’t an organized fundraising kind of operation. It was . . . who did you happen to know. Dean had a lot of acquaintances and Gurden seemed to know a lot of people. But Gurden wanted to retire.

Then also there was the aspect of public relations—putting out news items, getting the campus in the newspaper, so people know that there is a campus here and we’re doing some interesting things. Also at that time there was already the UCSC affiliates, which was local people who try to get funding, and they did a few things. They weren’t terribly active. There was also the UCSC Foundation, that still exists. It expanded. And that brings up a problem, in a way. Because we get good people on the foundation, people who are interested in the University and would like to be helpful to the University. We try to get, as you would expect, people who either themselves have means, or know people who have means. They are helpful in raising money, but there’s a basic problem.

I go back to my experience in a private institution. A private institution has a board of trustees; the board is the legal owner of the institution. A board is usually made up of people of means or influence with a lot of experience in the world of commerce or public affairs, who both themselves contribute handsomely to the institution, and who have many contacts, people who have potential sources of income. But this group becomes interested in the institution because they have some real authority. They are the board of trustees. My experience was particularly with the board at Cal Tech, which is an extraordinary group of people. It’s a national board and there are some very, very remarkable people on it. They recognize that their main job is to pick the president and let him run the institution. That’s obviously very important. But also they are there as a resource to whom the president can talk, to whom he can turn to for advice if he wants it. He can discuss the general problems of the institution, and often
get valuable counsel. Let me give an example. One of the trustees at Cal Tech was Shirley Hufstedler, who was a judge and then the Secretary of Education in the Carter Administration and then after that she returned to a very large law firm. But I know she gave enormous valuable advice about the question you want to talk about later, about affirmative action issues and things of this kind.

Jarrell: To Cal Tech. She was your in-house consultant/expert.

Sinsheimer: If you wanted financial advice we had all kinds of experts on that. I don’t know how far you want to go into this but Tom Watson from IBM was on the board and Fred Hartley, the president of Union Oil was on the board and Rueben Mettler the head of TRW was on the board, and of course Arnold Beckman was chairman of the board for many years . . . Mary Scranton, the wife of Governor Scranton, a distinguished person in her own right, was on the board.

Jarrell: Very high powered.

Sinsheimer: Very high-powered people. Robert McNamara was on the board. Very capable and widely informed people who had all kinds of contacts in government and internationally. So that you really could get, if you wanted it, very substantive advice. They were willing to do this because they felt that they had a responsibility in the continued success of what they regarded as a very valuable institution. Now the problem with the University is its board of regents is kind of remote. So the campus has nothing comparable, is my point.

Jarrell: They have the authority. They are decision makers, vis à vis the shape, the overall direction whereas the board of regents are way up there, removed.

Sinsheimer: They’re way up there. They are the decision makers for the whole university, true, but they have no particular concern or knowledge or interest in Santa Cruz, and so there’s nothing comparable for this campus.

Sinsheimer: That’s right. So here we are and we’re trying to get people on the foundation. They’re not of the same stature as Cal Tech trustees but they are certainly capable people in the local scene. We don’t have anything for them to do really, except raise money. There’s no way we can give them a policy role because the regents have the policy role. To my mind it’s a continuing dilemma. I felt at times as chancellor that I would like to have such a group comparable to
the Cal Tech trustees that I could have discussed some problems with. There wasn’t any.

**Jarrell:** How did you address this dilemma?

**Sinsheimer:** Well, I never found a solution to it. I tried to get good people on the foundation. I tried to get them interested. Some of them were interested in things we were doing, such as the Marine Lab or the Seismic Lab or astronomy. We’d try to put on interesting events for them. But that’s all I could do. No, I never found a solution to it. Anyway, those were the things that existed. It did seem to me we needed a more professional organization. I got an assistant to the chancellor to address this area.

**Jarrell:** Right. Colette Seiple was Assistant Chancellor for University Relations.

**Sinsheimer:** We did a search and Colette was, I think at the time Alumni Director at Berkeley, if I’m correct. She seemed to know a good deal about how to handle alumni things, fundraising. She was quite active in this organization called CASE, and I forget what that’s an acronym for, but CASE is a national organization of development people. We selected her and we brought her here to be head of development in which we included alumni fundraising and publicity. Given the constraints, she did a good job. She never raised quite as much money as we had set as a goal, but that was understandable. I mean she gradually got ahold of the alumni enterprise and made that into something meaningful.

There was another problem: it takes money to raise money. We were getting enough alumni that we could begin to set up alumni organizations, in Sacramento, in Los Angeles, and one in Washington, D.C. I would go out and talk to them . . . I usually wouldn’t make a specific trip but if I was going East I would go to Washington D.C., or New York or Boston. But this always cost money and the state will not fund development, which meant that the funding for this had to come from the rather limited discretionary funds that the chancellor has at his disposal, which comes partly from overhead money and partly from endowment money. One kept putting more and more money into this development operation and that just spawned more ideas for more . . . At the same time, we were not in the kind of position that Berkeley and UCLA are. We were still on the negative side of this; it was costing more than it brought in in
unspecified funds. It didn’t do us any good if it brought in a million dollars for the agroecology project. I mean it did the institution good, but it didn’t pay for the operation of the development fund.

Jarrell: Right. And I would imagine that there’s always some kind of a tension between trying to obtain designated funds versus discretionary funds?

Sinsheimer: Exactly. Undesignated funds. But the truth is most funds come in designated. Donors have something they want to support. Alumni are among the few, once we got beyond designating the money for a college, who tend to be willing to give you undesignated funds. So this was a problem of how to get enough . . . it was a constant problem, really of how to get enough undesignated funds to run the operation. It still is a problem as far as I know.

Another problem which I had just mentioned in passing, I for some reason hadn’t realized. As I said, I came from a private institution, and many foundations will not give money to a public institution. They figure the state’s taking care of you and they’ll give their money to a private institution. Now, in recent years that’s changed a little bit. But when I first came as chancellor, I hadn’t been aware of that. I was surprised. I started visiting some foundations and found this out. It was very disappointing. Even though it’s changed somewhat, I think they find that the public institution has to make a stronger case than the private university. Then Colette was offered another job in Kentucky so we had to replace her. Again we did a search and that was educational for me since I found out how much money these people make, which is quite a lot. But the state will not pay the salary at all. Second, I realized that these high-powered people who run development offices at private institutions earn a lot of money. They are used to running large operations and they are very dynamic people. I found that they weren’t interested in coming to Santa Cruz. They didn’t see the potential here. I figured we needed to get someone who was on the way up, but who was very good. We weren’t going to lure somebody from Stanford obviously. But they didn’t see this as a place to come because they didn’t see the potential to really run a big campaign and make their name and get up to the top level. We made an offer to a guy who in the end turned us down for just the reason I said. In a way I couldn’t blame him.
But then we were very fortunate to get Terry [Jones] who I thought was quite good, and while Terry’s not the most gung-ho development director I’ve ever run into, I thought he knew the business well and he had a good personality and he made a lot of friends around here. I kept thinking that we had to look ahead, that it’s going to be a lot easier for this place to raise money in ten years than it is now. We’ll have many more alumni and the place will be bigger and hopefully we’ll have an engineering program and we can really make some sense of it, so it can balance out. I thought he was the kind of person who could do that. He and Dan Aldrich greatly expanded our alumni giving with this telethon type program, and increased that by an order of magnitude. They did reasonably well. Colette and I had set a goal when she came that she hopefully would be able to build up to five million dollars a year in gifts. We never quite made it.

At our level we can’t compare year to year because you may get your two big years this year and none of them next. It’s too stochastic. It doesn’t average out. But the overall level has gone up. Of course again going back to the early days, I think I mentioned, I realized in the beginning I had to do something about the image of the campus in order to get people to give money. You had to first of all get past the perception that the campus might close. Nobody wants to give any money to an institution that has a chance of getting closed. You had to get past the impression that this was a flaky institution that wasn’t turning out good academic work. I think we did get past all of that and now we’ve got it much more favorable. But we still lack a large elderly alumni base. We’re still sitting in a community which has probably even less potential since the earthquake. We still don’t have an engineering program, which really would be appealing over the hill.

**Engineering Program**

**Jarrell:** Do you think that the computer engineering program . . .

**Sinsheimer:** That helps. But we needed to develop the whole engineering school. Absolutely. I have always regarded the abortion of the engineering school as a disaster for this campus which simply has to be reversed.
Jarrell: You know I haven’t ever appreciated the long-range consequences of that abortion until you drew out the big picture; that we couldn’t tap a base of capital and wealth, of common interests with the Silicon Valley.

Sinsheimer: Of course.

Jarrell: I knew it was a disaster. But I never . . .

Sinsheimer: You never worked out that aspect of it.

Jarrell: I never conceived of that part of it.

Sinsheimer: You see corporations have their own agendas necessarily. They can’t just give money; they have to justify whatever they give to their stockholders. You have to realize that and therefore you have to understand that if they were to give some money for, let’s say Santa Cruz, they have to explain why. Either they are getting engineers from this institution or work on research that’s germane to their interests.

Jarrell: So that there’s a payoff of some kind?

Sinsheimer: Exactly. So that the stockholders can understand that there’s some logic in doing this. They are not just doing it. They are really giving away the stockholders’ money, so why are they doing it. So, that is critical. I think it was critical in other aspects. I think I mentioned it unbalanced the campus and I feel it was demoralizing to the campus because here the campus had started the program and it was just chopped off like that. It robbed us of any professional school, all of these things.

Well, is there anything that you want to add about development?

Jarrell: Well, how closely did you work with Terry Jones in articulating initiatives, directions, special projects?

Sinsheimer: Oh we met weekly. I had a kind of meeting of vice-chancellors and assistants and so on every week, but in addition I met with Terry weekly. We would establish programs, priorities, what were the most important things to try to raise money for. How to go about it. Also in the area of public relations, how
we could get more things out into the newspapers, into the press and we talked about . . . for example *Science Notes*.

**Jarrell:** A wonderful publication.

**Sinsheimer:** Sending that to all the high schools in the state, for example.

**Jarrell:** So that would be two birds with one stone. That would be a recruitment device and it would also enhance and publicize activities on this campus.

**Sinsheimer:** Right, exactly. Yes. So there were lots of little things that we talked about. Obviously I could make suggestions but Terry had to do them and Terry had his own ideas and . . . so yes, I was actively involved. And then of course we had countless events at University House.

**Jarrell:** I was going to ask you about the social side . . .

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**Donors**

**Sinsheimer:** Which were in that sense, you didn’t go around with a brown paper bag. They were “cultivation,” it’s called.

**Jarrell:** Donor cultivation.

**Sinsheimer:** Yes. Karen played an important role in that. She cultivated some people particularly (inaudible) . . .

**Jarrell:** How did you feel personally about the social obligations as chancellor, in terms of the cultivation and the care and feeding of donors? What’s your temperament in light of that?

**Sinsheimer:** Let me give you a somewhat complicated answer. I’ve never, for whatever reason, been wholly comfortable with fundraising. The cultivation is one thing but somehow when it gets to the actual asking . . . the ask as it were. I’d do it; I mean I did it. Some people love it, you know. [UCLA Chancellor] Chuck Young is a master at it. I’ve seen him operate. He really likes it. But I never felt wholly comfortable with it. Even though I fully believed in the merit of the cause, obviously. The interactions with people . . . there were always a few people who were obnoxious, but mostly I really enjoyed that. I do have to say, make a
comment that, I mean we used to add it up, for no particular reason. But we were typically having 150 events a year at University House. An event being a lunch, a reception, a dinner. That’s a lot.

Jarrell: Yes, that’s half the year. One every other day.

Sinsheimer: Well, and this was mostly during the school year.

Jarrell: Nine months.

Sinsheimer: Nine months so it was like five a week, typically. I won’t even say that’s too much. This brings me to a different topic, and that is that many of those events one would elsewhere have had at the faculty club. We had them at University House because there was no faculty club. There was no other place to have them. You can’t expect much privacy as a chancellor but this seemed to get out of hand. (Laughter) There was always somebody in the house.

Jarrell: Karen talked about that in her interview, that there was always something happening, morning, noon and . . .

Sinsheimer: Among other reasons, I’ve always felt this place desperately needs a faculty club. I tried to get one going, to raise money for it. I still believe it. That was a personal reason but it’s just that I’ve been on many other campuses and well sure, there are always some events at the president’s house, and that gets to be a little special, that you are invited to the president’s house. But many of the events are held in a nice faculty club and that’s perfectly fine. It elevates the president’s house to a little higher status, which is appreciated by those who are so invited.

Jarrell: Yes, to have a little cachet.

Sinsheimer: Exactly. After a while you get to the point where you almost always have to say something at these events and you develop a repertoire of pleasant things to say.

Jarrell: How would you evaluate fundraising that took place under Colette Seiple and then under Terry Jones.
**Sinsheimer:** Well I think it gradually professionalized. I mean this is a profession, fundraising. It has to be. Before you go into a big fundraising campaign you have to scope it out and do preliminary surveys. You don’t want to fall flat on your face. That’s the worst thing you can do. So it is a professional activity with its own skills. I think we moved it onto that level. We weren’t up at the level of a Stanford, which literally has three hundred people in its development [effort]. Literally. But you know when you’re going to raise a billion bucks you’ve got to have a big enterprise. So we weren’t anything like that. But at least I think what we were doing by the time I left was a much more sophisticated, professional type of operation.

**UCSC Foundation**

**Jarrell:** I know that you sit on the UCSC Foundation and come up from UC Santa Barbara for meetings.

**Sinsheimer:** Yes, as an emeritus faculty, chancellor, I sit on that.

**Jarrell:** What is it like for you now to be sitting on that foundation and the dilemma that you outlined at the beginning? Do you feel that you have some special areas that you pursue, or . . .

**Sinsheimer:** No, I feel that I should be careful, in fact, not to be seen as the old chancellor talking to the new chancellor about what to do. I sort of feel that I’m there and if I can be helpful I’ll be glad to. I don’t, unless the chancellor wants me to specifically do something. I don’t have access to many people of real means who can be very helpful to the institution. If I can be helpful I certainly am willing to. I have to say something in this regard and I have to say that I felt that Dean McHenry at times was a thorn to me in his role on the foundation. The other campuses do better than we do but they still have a problem raising enough undesignated funds to run the development operation. So it has seemed not unreasonable to take the position that, look it costs money to raise money, everybody knows that so when we get gifts, we’ll put a tax on it. Many of the other campuses apply a five percent tax on any gift. They may get it in various ways. They may take it right off the top or they may say well we’ll put this gift in an interest-bearing fund until we raise five percent. There are various ways of doing it. We tried to do that. Colette tried to put that through, and Dean
McHenry was just infuriated. You would think he could understand that, but he was infuriated. He fought it. He said that if we did this he wouldn’t give a cent to the University. So we didn’t want to put it through over his dead body, you might say. So it was dropped. Well it’s come back up again, I noticed. Maybe this time it will go through. It seems to me a perfectly reasonable thing to do. You’ve got to support the operation somehow and if the state won’t do it, then it’s got to support itself. Well, I don’t want to pick on this but . . . there were occasions when former chancellors weren’t very helpful to me.

**Affirmative Action**

Jarrell: I’d like to get started on affirmative action, and that’s going to touch a lot of different people and aspects of the campus. But you said in our first interview that affirmative action emerged in the United States on all campuses as a major theme. Here at Santa Cruz in particular you said you thought it had to be dealt with at a higher level. So as a jumping-off point, can you explain what you meant by that, that affirmative action had to be dealt with at a higher level.

Sinsheimer: Okay. I meant that mere exhortation didn’t work. Putting out statements saying affirmative action is important, putting out statements saying the campus has got to employ affirmative action in its appointments, even verbally going around and making this kind of statement had limited effect. Therefore in order to improve the situation, we had to develop, install, what you might crudely say the carrot and the stick, both. The carrot that the faculty would have is the Target of Opportunity program, whereby we specifically would make a certain number of faculty positions available, undesignated as to field, to departments, boards, or whatever that would come up with able minority candidates. So that’s the carrot.

Jarrell: Whose idea was the Target of Opportunity?

Sinsheimer: On this campus it was mine, but I don’t think it was original to me. I’d read of it or heard of it at some other institution. But I put it in here. The stick was to develop procedures and have a person to make sure those procedures were rigorously followed in all searches; to make sure that they really made an effort to secure applications from minorities and to make sure that these were honestly looked at. I’m thinking particularly of faculty, since this is where the
real problem was. The faculty in all honesty . . . I don’t think they were opposed to affirmative action per se, they just operated in the old boy network mode. That was the easy way to operate. How do you get a new faculty member? You call up your buddies at six or seven institutions that you know turn out good people and get somebody. It was easy. It was effective. It usually produced results. But it didn’t produce minorities or women, necessarily. So we had to set up procedures where they had to advertise; we developed lists of other institutions that were more likely to produce minority applicants, that had to be solicited. We had to have check lists to make sure they had done this. Then when they got down to their short lists, these had to be surveyed and if there were no women or minorities on them, why not? In the final selection if there was not a woman or a minority, and there didn’t have to be, then they had to provide a written justification . . .

**Jarrell:** For them not being there.

**Sinsheimer:** That’s right. We obviously had to have a capable person, frankly someone who was both firm but tactful. We were very fortunate to get Julia [Armstrong] to do this. I think it has gradually succeeded. It was frankly a little dismaying to me to have to do this.

**Jarrell:** Why?

**Sinsheimer:** Well, because you would like to think that you talk to the boards and they would understand the problem and then they would do it themselves. But it didn’t work that way. So we went to these other things out of sheer experience.

**Jarrell:** I’m interested to know what kind of intellectual, cultural assumptions or understandings you brought with you from a private institution, Cal Tech. I know affirmative action in appointments has permeated all of higher education. What was your awareness, your sensitivity to this, your thinking on this when you were at Cal Tech?

**Sinsheimer:** Quite different, but it’s a very different institution.

**Jarrell:** But as a general question. A private institution might deal with it differently than a public institution.
Sinsheimer: Cal Tech is not just a private institution in that sense. Cal Tech is an ultra elitist institution. I have to say, and this may sound Neanderthal, but I think there is a role for ultra-elitist institutions, where the only criterion that should be applied is merit and forget all the others. And I think there’s a role for that. I think that once you deviate from that for a place like Cal Tech you are on a very slippery slope.

Jarrell: What if I were to say I hear a double standard being explicated here—that an elite institution like Cal Tech can afford to evaluate on the basis of merit only and the public institution like UC Santa Cruz, or any UC campus for that matter, why can’t they also be operating on the basis of merit and merit alone?

Sinsheimer: Because Cal Tech chooses its students on the basis of merit and merit alone and UC does not, and cannot, as a public institution.

Jarrell: Do you feel a contradiction here?

Sinsheimer: No. UC does the best it can in that sense, the most it can. But as a public institution, UC has to represent the populace of the state.

Jarrell: The demographics of the state ought to be reflected in the student body, or the faculty body?

Sinsheimer: Exactly, yes. If it doesn’t, it’s going to lose its political support; it’s going to lose its funding; it’s going to lose the whole ball of wax.

Jarrell: I want to hear you lay it all out . . . So ultimately this is a political question as well.

Sinsheimer: Of course. What isn’t in the public sector? But that’s not to say, obviously that one shouldn’t do everything you can to provide a high quality education to all sectors of society, of course you should. But the University, it seems to me, has been driven by the political necessity to go well beyond its, I won’t say it’s proper role, because that’s arbitrary, but its natural role. I mean, I’m not saying it’s wrong. I don’t know who else could do it. But for example the Early Outreach Program where we go into the junior high schools and counsel minority students; we have to do it because if they don’t take the right courses obviously they’ll never get into the University. But that isn’t something the
University of California ought, it seems to me naturally, to be doing. That should be a function of the public school system. But they’re not doing it so we had to do it. We do it all the way on up through. Then they’re still not well prepared so we have bridge programs that take minority students after they get out of high school and bring them here in the summer time so they’ll be better prepared. Then we have EOP and tutorial programs and so forth, and I think it’s a political necessity and probably socially desirable. But it’s not, none of those seem to me to be a natural function of the University. (inaudible) Then at the faculty level, again it becomes a political issue because the simple fact is that in many areas there simply are not sufficient numbers of minority Ph.D’s being produced. We can beat the bushes and bring them here but then we’re just taking them from somewhere else, is the truth of the matter.

Jarrell: Right, there’s raiding going on?

Sinsheimer: All the time. On the other hand I perfectly well understand that minority students want to have some minority role models on the faculty, of course they do. I understand that. How are you going to get them? So I think it’s a difficult problem. You know you can question the whole philosophy of affirmative action, why do we have affirmative action. Affirmative action is discrimination, I don’t think there’s any . . . as far as I’m concerned it is. It gets you into some really complicated contradictions. I think you can justify it, certainly let us say for Blacks, on the basis that you are trying to remedy what were the early centuries of discrimination against Blacks. We did discriminate. There’s no question about it. We were enslaving people, for God’s sake. Even if they weren’t enslaved, they were discriminated against, and still are in many sectors. So you can justify affirmative action as a compensation. But then you get into inevitable snarls, because, okay you are going to favor the Blacks, and maybe the Chicanos and then the Asians say, well you are discriminating against us, and we didn’t discriminate against the Blacks so why are we being penalized? So you kind of have to say, well, what’s the lesser evil.

Well the Bakke decision⁴ was a classical weasel. It said discrimination’s bad but you can justify diversity as a criterion. It’s not only a balance. It’s worse. It’s a

⁴In the controversial Bakke case (Regents of the University of California v. Allan Bakke) the United States Supreme Court decision on June 28, 1978, found that the UC Davis Medical School’s special admissions program was illegal and ordered that Bakke, a white applicant, be
hypocrisy. Because you don’t ever dare say this. But I don’t . . . I mean I understand the political constraints, I think we understand that it has done the best it can in those constraints. To try to find, hopefully, a long-range way out of this. I mean hopefully at some point you work your way out of compensatory discrimination, and so on, toward a so called “color blind” society, which it seems to me that you ultimately would like to have. But I felt that given the needs of the undergraduate student body, given the legal constraints, affirmative action was both right and necessary. So if it was going to work we had to put in these kinds of measures, which I think are working.

Jarrell: Do you think that gradually the faculty at UCSC as a group, let’s say, or as a sector of the campus, that this has become more and more internalized, these assumptions . . .

Sinsheimer: Well as you get more and more minorities and women on the faculty, that in itself will internalize the program. They themselves will insist that affirmative action be carried out. I’d like to come back a moment because you were talking about a double standard. You see, it really relates to the fact that Cal Tech and UC are very different institutions and UC has to serve the people of the state. Cal Tech’s a private institution. It serves who it pleases. Well obviously it has to obey the laws of the country. When I came here I realized these differences. At Cal Tech let’s say when an assistant professor comes up for tenure, we have, or I should say we had (I think they’ve had to dilute it, unfortunately) a standard when I was there where basically you would get evaluations from other people in the individual’s field as well as your own faculty. I would say the operative criterion was that if that person should be perceived to be in the top five in the country in their age bracket, that they were eligible. Then they would get tenure. Well that’s an ultra-elitist institution. That’s fine, as far as I’m concerned. But obviously you don’t apply that at a UC campus.

Jarrell: Why?

Sinsheimer: Several reasons why. Cal Tech and a few other places operate in a different mode. Cal Tech limits its enrollment. It provides a very high ratio of faculty to students, compared to UC. Its policy has been and is to put a lot of

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admitted. At the same time the decision acknowledged that race or the goal of creating diversity may be criteria used in admissions decisions under some circumstances.—Editor.
resources behind each faculty member. Resources in terms of salary, laboratory space, financial assistance for research; general academic resources to bring in outside speakers, to have symposia, all kinds of things. UC doesn’t have those kinds of resources. Cal Tech is extremely selective with regard to its freshmen applicants; year after year Cal Tech freshmen have the highest SAT scores in the country. So I guess what I’m trying to come to is that UC can’t do that; it can’t offer the backing in the student body and the ancillary ambiance, if you want, to justify that high degree of selection.

Jarrell: So in terms of the selection of students, it’s going to be a different procedure at a UC campus. What about in promotion and tenure. Do you think UC likewise has to dilute or alter its standards?

Sinsheimer: Okay. Yes. Because, first, I don’t think you could attract enough faculty of that caliber, because it doesn’t have enough resources to put behind them. UC has a different problem. Cal Tech takes in so many freshmen a year, period. UC has to accept everybody who is eligible, right? If you are going to accept them you’ve got to have the bodies in the classroom to teach them. You’ve got to have enough faculty to do that. If they used the Cal Tech standard I don’t think they would have enough faculty and they couldn’t get enough because they couldn’t put enough resources behind them to attract them, at that level. Now in certain areas they can. Berkeley, as you know is outstanding because they have a lot of endowment; because they have this large amount of private money that comes in every year; because they have the Lawrence Berkeley Lab, which is like having 200 million dollar income every year. That’s the budget of Lawrence Berkeley. Purely for research. Having such a high ratio of faculty to students at Cal Tech means that the faculty is really expected to be putting the bulk of their time into research. They are doing much less teaching. Since they have that luxury, if you will, then you can expect them to be in the top, viewed as in the very top rank of their profession. How could you expect that of somebody who comes here . . . starting as an assistant professor and is doing two or three times as much teaching as they are at Cal Tech. How do you expect them . . .

Jarrell: So the ultimate mission of the institution . . .

Sinsheimer: . . . is different. Now, that’s not to say that there aren’t very good students in UC. You may be amused because I lost a bet with Mike Heyman,
chancellor at Berkeley. Cal Tech takes in 220 freshmen, that’s all. That’s how small it is. He bet me that the top 220 freshmen at Berkeley had a higher SAT average than Cal Tech. He was right. Now obviously, Berkeley takes 4000 freshmen. So their overall average is much lower. But if you took the top 220 he was right, which was interesting.

I’m trying to justify, rationalize why the tenure criteria are very different, and I think should be different. Now, I think Cal Tech frankly has not been able to sustain that policy because of problems with affirmative action. I know in fact of at least one case where the woman was denied tenure and she threatened to bring suit and they had to back down. Because if you’re going to court here’s an institution which probably doesn’t have 2% women faculty, or something like that. And of course there are a very small number of minority people, excluding Asian . . . Well, I would make one other point too. If you really want to go into this topic . . .

Jarrell: I do.

Sinsheimer: Cal Tech students of course are interested in science and engineering. You don’t go there if you’re not interested in one of those [fields]. I would say that of all the areas of knowledge, if you want, those are the least affected by issues of race or gender. Physics doesn’t have anything to do with whether you’re Black, or a woman . . . UC is much broader, including areas of sociology or politics, or literature, areas of art in which there does seem to be more divergence depending on your ethnic origins or your gender. So it therefore becomes far more important to have faculty that are more diversified with respects to those characteristics than it is in science. Biochemistry isn’t going to differ depending on who teaches it.

Jarrell: Do you mean there’s no such thing as an African-American point of view about physics?

Sinsheimer: Exactly.

Jarrell: Whereas there might be an African-American point of view about American history?
Sinsheimer: Exactly. Exactly. So it’s more important in a certain sense that the faculty be diversified. It’s more important to the undergraduates that they have those role models on the faculty. Obviously it would be desirable for a Black chemistry major to see a Black chemistry professor if there were some available. But they aren’t going to be taught any differently.

Jarrell: Exactly. And there has certainly been at Santa Cruz, as well as in other UC campuses, for instance, a real call for ethnic role models in the sciences, in biology. There has been an awareness that mentorship programs would help attract minority undergraduates to those fields where maybe they have felt excluded or . . . that there isn’t any kind of space for them in those fields.

Sinsheimer: I really agree with you. But that’s a perception. Some people were saying Frank Talamantes was one. Frank’s great. But I’m sure Frank Talamantes’ course in biochemistry is no different than anybody else’s course in biochemistry, because he happened to be Chicano.

Jarrell: Exactly. And that is not the case in social sciences and humanities?

Sinsheimer: No. And . . . I think it’s great when we get some Hispanic freshmen who can see Frank as a nice role model. There really does seem to be a major problem in getting women, in particular, into the more mathematical sciences. I’m sort of amused because I’m at UC Santa Barbara now, as you know. If I go to a seminar in biology I would say perhaps even half of the audience are women. If I go over to a seminar in physics, it’s 2% maybe.

Jarrell: Of women.

Sinsheimer: Yes. They just don’t go into physics.

Jarrell: But I think that at the elementary and high school levels that educators are starting to address the particular problem that young girls experience in math and science education.

Sinsheimer: Yes, I’m not saying what the cause is.

Jarrell: Right, but I’m saying that the fact that you’re saying maybe only 2% of the audience at a physics symposium are women, I think that that has been
identified now as a problem, as something to be addressed in terms of the educational process of young girls.

**Sinsheimer:** I’m making the point that it is the case now and therefore, while there is a pool of women, a significant and growing pool of women to become faculty members in biology, it is still not true in physics.

**The Western Canon Controversy**

**Jarrell:** Something else that occurs to me as we’re talking about science as distinct from other disciplines, is an emerging trend in higher education, in the social sciences and the humanities in the eighties. This is the process of redefining the so-called western canon of works that are studied by undergraduates. What I perceive as an increasing politicization of knowledge in these disciplines, such as gender-based or ethnic-based entities within disciplines, such as gay studies, women’s studies, Mexican-American studies, Native American studies. On our campus you faced the whole issue and the student demonstrations centering around the Native American studies program. I’d like to know what your perspective is on that development and that experience.

**Sinsheimer:** Well . . . my thoughts on that are sort of complex. I’m a little cynical on the whole subject, because I have the feeling that a lot of the student protests and so on saying Native American studies, are not spontaneous. It is stirred up by the faculty, who if you can get a program, in let us say, African-American studies, that produces faculty positions which will almost surely hire Black faculty, let us say. I see the Black faculty, therefore, promoting this kind of thing, let us say, as a means of in effect creating more positions and more influence for people of color. In other words I don’t see it as disinterested. That’s not bad, necessarily; most of us act in self-interest, but looking at it from the top down point of view, I see it as having an element of self-interest. Which does not necessarily coincide with the interests of the overall institution. That’s quite different from saying I’d love to have a Black biochemist . . . that’s quite different.

So I’m a little cynical about it. Then I have to ask myself . . . four years is not enough time to learn everything in the university. How can the students best use that four years? It seems to me that that’s a question you should always be
asking. Is American Indian studies something of sufficient breadth and general interest that every student should have that or most students should have that? What fraction of a rather limited number of faculty should we devote to a subject like that? You have to ask that question all the time. We teach some languages. We don’t teach Norwegian. Now there is a Norwegian program up at Berkeley, that’s fine. If you want to study Norwegian go up to Berkeley and take it. But we don’t teach Norwegian. We can’t. We’ve only got so many faculty . . . we can’t teach a hundred languages. Frankly that was my idea on American Indian Studies, to be honest. Yes, it’s probably would be desirable somewhere in a system the size of UC to have a strong program in American Indian studies, on one campus. But it made no sense to me to have programs on all campuses. To have a weak program was wasteful. I also felt that it would be much better, and I still feel, that instead of having separate programs . . . you can go on forever . . . you can have American Indian studies, you can have Black studies, you can have Chicano studies . . . you can have Asian studies, you can have Filipino studies, I don’t know where you stop.

Gay studies. Lesbian studies. Bisexual studies. I think that these, instead of being separate domains of inquiry should be part of broader programs in sociology and literature and so on. Rather than having each one as a distinct program . . . I understand the people in them somehow want the cachet. But I don’t think it makes sense pedagogically or intellectually. I know that’s not a popular idea, but at least on this campus I’m sure they have resisted all these various ethnic subdivisions.

Jarrell: Yes, kind of the balkanization within each discipline.

The Nancy Shaw Tenure Case

Jarrell: Something else I’d like you to discuss is the Nancy Shaw tenure case.

Sinsheimer: Yes.

Jarrell: What happened with the Nancy Shaw case\textsuperscript{5} in terms of your role?

Sinsheimer: Well, my role was simple. It came to me as a tenure case; it came with a divided opinion both from the board of studies and from the community

\textsuperscript{5}Nancy Shaw has subsequently changed her name and is now Nancy Stoller.—Editor.
it represented. I went over it. It was hard to tell. I read about everything she’d written. I concluded that this was not work of the caliber that merited tenure. I think I remember saying somewhere that I thought any skilled investigative reporter could have done this [work]. And I still think it’s true. I didn’t see anything that required much scholarship, that required a Ph.D., which we ask of all our faculty, that tied in to what she found to broader themes in social science. I just felt it wasn’t qualified for tenure. She of course appealed that to the Committee on Privilege and Tenure. This was in my view one of the sorrier episodes of my term. Because I felt the Committee on Tenure acted in a very unprofessional way. They clearly had an ax to grind, the chairman did.

Jarrell: Who was the chairman?

Sinsheimer: [Richard] Wasserstrom. In the end they in effect claimed that I had acted on political grounds. It was interesting because they raised several issues in their final report which they had never raised during the hearing and therefore we had never had any opportunity to respond to. Which I thought was outrageous. Well, to resolve this I refused to accept their conclusion. I offered, which I didn’t have to, to let this be decided at the systemwide level, let them review it.

Jarrell: And who would that be?

Sinsheimer: Well, it would be the president. Now of course he wasn’t going to do it himself. He would delegate it to one of his people. P & T accepted that. It was reviewed at the president’s level. P & T had made three charges, in effect, against me. [President] Saxon’s office concluded that those charges were not justified.

In the meantime of course this had gone on beyond the usual time. We had to offer Nancy Shaw another year, her ninth year, because you have to give a year’s notice before you can dismiss anybody and we had gone beyond that. As far as we were concerned that was the end of it. But then she filed suit. From then on it was out of our hands; it was in the hands of the general counsel. There was some legal skirmishing because the lawyer didn’t file suit properly. But finally she did, she filed suit in the federal court and it got thrown out there and then she . . . that’s another whole aspect of affirmative action we can discuss, is the legal
aspect, which is outrageous in my view. But anyway she filed suit in the state courts and she did get a hearing. The suit at this point was not against me, it was against the University so it was heard in the Superior Court in Alameda county. This too was outrageous. I have to tell you I’m not the only person who’s had this experience. I used to think the courts in this country provided “justice” but I don’t believe that. Sometimes they do. But there are an increasing number of judges who are not, in my view, interpreting the law. They are expressing their ideologies. In the Shaw case, the judge came in and of course both sides had filed briefs and then they were supposed to make oral argument. I’ve read the whole transcript. To make a long story short it was perfectly clear that [the judge] had never read the argument, but he had decided in his mind that this was a case of discrimination, he’d just come to that conclusion.

**Jarrell:** What kind of discrimination?

**Sinsheimer:** Oh, on gender. She claimed that she was being denied tenure on the grounds she was a woman. So he basically announced this and recommended that the University and Nancy Shaw’s lawyer should work this out and if they couldn’t work it out he said he would . . . continue the trial and if they couldn’t work it out he would work it out for them. What I found shocking in reading the transcript is that it was perfectly clear he had never looked at the arguments pro or con. He had just made up his mind. To be perfectly honest I would have preferred to let him continue it, let him make his ruling, and appeal it. But the general counsel didn’t want to do that. There were various reasons why he didn’t want to do that, primarily [inaudible] . . . If you went to the appellate court and UC lost, it was a precedent.

**Jarrell:** Yes.

**Sinsheimer:** Whereas if it were just settled, there was no precedent. This [case] is by no means the only time I was quite unhappy with the general counsel of the University but that’s another whole issue we can get into if you want to. So then the decision was to settle and we had to come to some agreement with Nancy Shaw. This was all out of my hands now, well, this gets complicated. I’m going to have to go back.

**Jarrell:** Okay.
Sinsheimer: In the academic personnel process at tenure, there is an ad hoc committee formed to review the case, before it goes to the committee on academic personnel, and they make a recommendation. This generally consists of three faculty members, including usually one from the board of studies and two from outside. It may involve people from off campus or it may not. In the Shaw case, there was an ad hoc group which recommended favorably. But when it came up to me it seemed to me, and I have to say that this was not the first such instance, where an ad hoc group . . . well, it’s three people and sometimes they do an excellent job of analysis and sometimes they do it in a wholly perfunctory manner. I felt it was wholly perfunctory. I had read the file. There were all kinds of questions I had which the ad hoc committee had not commented on. I should also say that neither I or the vice-chancellor named the ad hoc committees, CAP names the committees. Now this had happened before. This was not the first time this had ever happened. In fact it had happened before I ever became chancellor. It’s just there are times when you feel that this committee report is . . .

Jarrell: Inadequate?

Sinsheimer: Inadequate. So I requested that CAP appoint a second ad hoc committee. The second report in my mind was much more analytical and was much more negative. One of the issues with the committee on academic personnel was that it was illegal for me to request a second committee; that it was a violation of University procedures. One of the things that Saxon’s office had said is, no, it was not illegal. It is not common but it is done and has been done on other campuses. It’s done on this campus when it seems appropriate. Now the reason why that’s important is because now what the general counsel agreed to is that the file would go to the academic vice-chancellors on either two or three [campuses], and I can’t remember . . . not including Santa Cruz who would review it and say [whether she] would get tenure on their campus. But, and I felt this was the crucial matter, they agreed the file would not include the second ad hoc report. Because what Nancy Shaw was objecting to, was in the sort of formal sense, the inclusion of this [report], even though obviously, as I say, Saxon’s office had agreed that it was perfectly legitimate. Anyway, that’s what happened. It went to these three vice-chancellors, absent the second ad hoc report. The outcome was that they recommended that she get tenure. I never saw
. . . I was not permitted to see their written recommendations and conclusions but that wasn’t included. So she was granted tenure.

**Jarrell:** I’m a little confused about the timing? When did these three academic chancellors . . . were they sitting like a committee? Or were they independently evaluating . . .

**Sinsheimer:** My impression was that they were independent.

**Jarrell:** Independently. At what point in this whole chronology did they come in with the affirmative?

**Sinsheimer:** After the settlement which the general counsel agreed to with Shaw’s lawyer; and that was then brought to the court and the court said fine, we’ll abide by this. It was then after that that it went to these three vice-chancellors. As I say it was out of my hands because the general counsel took it over. Obviously I feel I was correct in my judgment although these are judgment matters, I understand that. Secondly, I feel that the committee on academic personnel behaved outrageously. I have to say that a couple of members of the committee came to me much later and said that they regretted their participation in that judgment. I also feel the judge behaved outrageously, [although] he might have come to the same conclusion if he’d read the file, but he so obviously hadn’t.

**Jarrell:** Well there is a certain degree of subjectivity in evaluating work in sociology, in community studies, that is very different from the physical sciences, let us say. What was the gist of your assessment of her work?

**Sinsheimer:** Well, that it didn’t merit tenure. I said that it could be written by any skilled investigative reporter. I couldn’t see there was anything in it that required that you had done the study to merit . . . I mean we insist that a professor have a Ph.D. because that implies a certain standard of knowledge and competence. I couldn’t see that there was anything which she wrote that required that you needed a Ph.D. Any skilled reporter could have written it.

**Jarrell:** Was the content of the subject matter also germane in your thinking?
Sinsheimer: The subject matter was appropriate to her field. No, that wasn’t the problem. It was the level of the investigation and the level of inquiry, the level of analysis. The extent to which, as I said earlier, that you would tie in these conclusions to broader issues in sociology, broader theories. There was no theoretical framework. It was sort of like a reporter from the Santa Cruz Sentinel who could go out and collect some statistics and that was about it. There was a lot of broo-ha about it because it had to do with women’s issues, lower-class economic issues and . . . I understand that obviously some groups feel that these issues were not being given enough attention by academics, and that therefore this was very meritorious, simply because she looked at them. But, I mean we had the right to expect a higher quality of research from somebody we were going to give tenure to.

Jarrell: The whole issue became intensely debated among the students, and there was a support group that was formed and accusations were rife, accusing you of not approving of the subject matter of her inquiries. You’re saying, no that wasn’t the case at all, you thought that those were worthy research subjects but they had not been handled with enough complexity or rigor?

Sinsheimer: That would be correct. It was a terrible problem in this situation because these kinds of personnel actions are technically confidential. I understand you say these impressions developed but these people had no idea what was in the file, no knowledge of what sort of comments or criticisms had been made. They didn’t understand the basis for them because even my denial was confidential. Of course in a certain sense it was a helpless situation because Nancy Shaw’s associates—I don’t want to say it was her personally—could release whatever sections they wanted from this confidential material, but I couldn’t say a word. Even though people were taking things out of context.

Jarrell: But you were obliged to maintain confidentiality of the records.

Sinsheimer: I had to . . . absolutely.

Jarrell: But she and or her supporters or whoever could selectively release whatever they wanted because she had the right to do that?

Sinsheimer: Of course.
Jarrell: It became a cause célèbre, in the sense of a way to publicize and disseminate a point of view about the arbitrariness of academic standards. There was a lot of heavy duty criticism of you and what you represented, ostensibly; a lot of noise and publicity.

Sinsheimer: Oh yes. It wasn’t the only noisy case. There was a bulletin board with my phone number on it. Call this number. No really. Downtown.

Jarrell: Really. To phone the chancellor . . .

Sinsheimer: To phone the chancellor and let him know what you think about the Nancy Shaw case (inaudible).

Jarrell: Now there was the Sable case, which came very early in 1978. But the Nancy Shaw case certainly generated the most publicity.

Sinsheimer: Yes, well I think in some ways people had a little bit of a problem. I mean I had appointed a woman dean, Helene Moglen, who was clearly a feminist. I appointed after that a gay man as dean, Michael Cowan.

Jarrell: Yes. The subtext with the Nancy Shaw case was that she was being denied tenure not because she was a woman but because she was a lesbian? The idea was abroad that you were prejudiced . . . but you couldn’t even speak on your own behalf because really your hands were tied?

Sinsheimer: That was in a way the most frustrating part. I have to tell you in all honesty I did not know until long after the decision that Shaw was lesbian. I didn’t even know that; there was no reason I should know that.

Jarrell: You mentioned last time, your unhappiness with UC’s general counsel and the way that they handled the Shaw case, and just to kind of mop up . . .

Sinsheimer: Well the UC general counsel is in a peculiar position which most people don’t understand. UC’s general counsel reports directly to the regents. He does not report to the President of the University.

Jarrell: I didn’t know that.
Sinsheimer: I don’t know of any other case where that’s true. It may be but I don’t know. So he does not report to the president. Therefore his primary obligation is to defend the regents as he and the regents see it, and while one might a priori suppose that the interests of the regents and the academic interests of the University would be congruent, and normally they are, that’s certainly not always true. In that case he will side with and defend the regents, even if it is not perhaps the best thing academically. In particular he will seek to defend the fiscal resources of the regents and in circumstances where I would have thought it would be better to go ahead and defend the academic quality and the principle involved because he does not report to the president [of UC] who represents the academic side. I don’t mean that this comes up all the time but there certainly have been instances where he has taken a position that I understand is defending the regents but it doesn’t make sense to me from the point of view of academia. Second, another problem is, and it’s understandable since in general a campus is not sued, it’s the University of California that’s sued, you don’t have a campus attorney. They will tend to assign a particular member of the general counsel’s office to service the campus, part-time. You don’t have somebody at hand to give you legal advice. Well, I guess I have to say it seemed to me in general the general counsel’s office was reactive. It was not very imaginative in thinking up possible defenses or certainly not very pro-active. I used to joke that we would be far better off to hire Melvin Belli, or somebody like that. I don’t mean obviously somebody as flamboyant as Melvin Belli, but somebody who is much more active and creative and imaginative in approaching these problems.

Jarrell: So it was a very conservative approach?

Sinsheimer: A very conservative approach and, as I say, biased toward defense of the regents per se.

Jarrell: So that the decision to not mount a defense in that case set a precedent for this?

Sinsheimer: [It would have] set a precedent for the whole University, plus the cost of an appeal, etc. That’s an instance. It isn’t the only instance in which it would come up where I felt we were being pressured. There were other cases where we were pressured to settle, where I felt the case had no merit. They would agree the case had no merit but that they didn’t want the hassle. It’s hard
to describe. They should be used to hassle. Maybe they thought it would cost more just to prosecute the case than to settle it.

(Inaudible) It’s a huge enterprise. People don’t understand. There’re probably sixty lawyers in the general counsel’s office. The University gets sued all the time. Because it’s a deep pocket, right? It just struck me as sort of bureaucratic and conservative and without casting any aspersion on anybody, because most of the people were competent . . . there were a few turkeys. But I’m not sure that they are what one would consider top flight lawyers. I don’t want to be cynical, but they’re earning probably a quarter of what they could earn if they were first class lawyers out in private practice. So I think [UC] tends to attract a certain type of person. They have the [job] security, to be sure.

**Discrimination and the Tenure/Review Process**

**Sinsheimer:** If a minority or woman is denied tenure, they can file a discrimination claim. The first thing they do is they go to EEOC. EEOC conducts what I consider the most cursory examination. It’s a joke. I don’t know if they ever don’t give a cause of action. Now once they have a cause of action they can go to court. They can file in federal court, they can file in state court; they can file for discrimination under three or four different laws and clauses. It’s like beating down an octopus. I mean, the lawyers will take these cases purely on contingency. So they don’t have any trouble getting lawyers. Then when you do get into the courts, and I can back this up with the experience, again, of other chancellors and so on, because we’ve discussed it, that it’s completely idiosyncratic.

The judges aren’t interpreting the law, they are expressing their whole ideology. The University’s general counsel office doesn’t want to go to court, if they can possibly avoid it. If the person is willing to settle, even for some only mildly outrageous sum, they’ll prefer to do that. So what I’m getting at, is that the legal system as far as I’m concerned totally fails in these cases. I’m sure there are people who approach it differently. The old saw that it’s better that 99 guilty people go free than one innocent person be imprisoned. I mean, it certainly seems like it sort of gets applied here. It’s better that 99 inadequate people get tenure than one adequate person is denied tenure. (Laughter) That’s to me just backwards. I mean all universities, in a tenure case it’s not, that you are doing
this on some personal ground; that you don’t want that individual. You are doing to try to preserve some sense of standards at the University. Some sense of quality.

**Jarrell:** There’s a quite prevalent counterargument to that today that states just the opposite, saying that some tenure decisions are often made on a wholly subjective basis among an old boy network, and that there are no real objective criteria for assessing the quality of scholarly work. In fact there’s a whole movement now, which I’m sure you are aware of, of no longer having these personnel files be confidential.

**Sinsheimer:** I know.

**Jarrell:** Where do you come down on that?

**Sinsheimer:** I think it’s disastrous. I think the files have to be confidential because the University is a collegial institution. Let’s suppose you are a full professor and a person is coming up for tenure. You don’t think their work is very good. You want to be free to say that. But if the file isn’t confidential, and if that person does get tenure, then that person is going to hate your guts. You are going to destroy collegiality quickly if you do that. That’s a different thing from a corporation, it seems to me, or a bureaucracy. By which I mean that there is this collegial concept in the University . . . And I don’t think you can preserve it unless you also have confidentiality. But the situation is even worse. I mean, God . . . we have these outside reviews of departments. We had an outside review of the music department. Do you know the case I’m talking about? One of the outside reviewers in this report referred to one faculty member, not by name, as dysfunctional. It was pretty obvious who it was. Do you know that person sued?

**Jarrell:** I know.

**Sinsheimer:** Now how are you going to get people to come and give an objective review of the department . . . an honest review of the department, if they think they are going to get sued if they say anything bad. Now we won that suit but this guy had to come out here and testify and it was a pain in the neck. He’ll never do it again. So I think you have to have confidentiality. Now you know, the argument is that it can be abused. Now I don’t think so because, especially in the UC system, you have so many safeguards that when I came here I found it
excessive, although I came to realize with time that the checks and accountability had been put in because of the legal concerns. Because it does take a great deal of time. Then, in fact, I mean, it reminds me of the legal system as a whole almost; that you put in so many checks and safeguards that it’s almost impossible to get through it without fouling up. Do you know what I’m saying?

**Jarrell:** Yes. Of making a technical or procedural error where the whole thing gets thrown out . . .

**Sinsheimer:** Then the whole thing gets thrown out because of that one procedure. You see it in the courts all the time. Almost any sharp lawyer can get you out and you see the same thing happening in the academic personnel cases. You have to start over again. The Committee on Privilege and Tenure jumps on you because somebody down in the department didn’t do this quite right, so the result is we have to have people like Julia Armstrong, and so on, monitoring every step to make sure that it is done right. And even then sometimes if there’s a slip-up it has nothing to do with the merits of the case, it’s purely procedural. If you consider all the checks and balances and all the levels that it has to go through, and all the people involved, it’s hard for me to support or believe that a lot of injustice is being done. Now you are right, quality is difficult to measure objectively. It always is.

**Jarrell:** You said the other day about Cal Tech, that a candidate for tenure there had to be one of the top five in the country. How do you arrive at that . . . this candidate is one of a handful of the best in the field?

**Sinsheimer:** You write to twenty people in the field and ask where they would rank this person, in the top ten, the top half dozen, top thirty? That’s how you do it. You question practically all the peers; all the people you can think of who are really knowledgeable in that field and qualified to judge. It’s interesting, and I think I may have mentioned this, that in the sciences, when you get these evaluations, it’s a distribution, but it’s a narrow distribution . . . in the social sciences it’s much broader. In the humanities it’s bimodal often, but that’s a different issue.

**Jarrell:** Well, shall we call it a day?

**Sinsheimer:** I think we should call it a day.
Relations with UC Systemwide

Jarrell: I’d like you to discuss UCSC’s relations with UC systemwide. You mentioned last time that there were some very important points that you’d never seen discussed elsewhere, in terms of systemwide and University Hall. Could you elaborate?

Sinsheimer: Well, I’ve touched on this but I want to say it explicitly. The University of California is about 120 years old. Granted, for a large part of that time it was only UC Berkeley, but then UCLA’s been around awhile, and UC Davis, and so on. It’s developed a whole body of traditions, an academic ethos and it’s done this somewhat in isolation so it’s a rather idiosyncratic institution. Also, as I’ve indicated before, it’s a huge enterprise and it is, probably out of necessity, bureaucratic. A big bureaucracy. But I’d never really been involved with UC in an intimate way. I was unprepared for the extent of this bureaucracy, and the fact that, I would say a quarter of my time was consumed with dealing with systemwide, the rest of the system. I didn’t realize how much time it was going to take. There were chancellors meetings, regents meetings, systemwide committee meetings. You have to deal with the capital budget, capital construction. There are all kinds of systemwide policies which you have to know about it and implement . . . You have to know and work with the people at University Hall. The way the system works, by and large, is that budget proposals, policy proposals, whatever, originate at the top. But the actual proposal originates at a third level or a second level and works its way up to the top. As I’ve said before, most of those people at the third or second level are themselves UC graduates. They are by training and then subsequent work, steeped, if you want, in what I would call the ethos of the University of California. Now suddenly you create this Santa Cruz campus which, depending on your point of view you can say is distinctive, or aberrant. (Laughter) Without in any sense being punitive or intentional even, these policies as they came out from the second and third level were by people adapted to the conventional University of California and they would often not be appropriate to the Santa Cruz campus as it was intended or thought to be. These [proposals] would be fine for the rest of the system. Well, this doesn’t mean they can’t be changed but it means I was constantly starting from a defensive position. Having to change something.
Jarrell: Do you mean they had to make exceptions for UCSC?

Sinsheimer: Yes . . . to make exceptions. Lots of times they couldn’t do it; they weren’t about to make that exception, or to make that exception would be too complex. How are they going to justify this exception, especially if it would result in some different distribution of resources. How are they going to justify that to the rest of UC? This kept coming up again and again.

Master Plan for Higher Education

Sinsheimer: If you go back to the original description of the campus, and as you pointed out yourself, it is a lot of rhetoric and not a lot of plan. But if you really believe that rhetoric, and this is really curious, it’s not a UC campus; UCSC doesn’t belong in the University of California under the California Master Plan. Yet who were the people that made the California Master Plan? Kerr and McHenry. In fact there are quotes where Kerr and McHenry point out that the Master Plan hangs together; you can’t start making exceptions here and there, that’s it’s an integrated whole; and it only works as an integrated whole. Here they were setting out to make [UCSC] a major exception, and apparently quite unconscious of the fact, or quite willing to overlook it. UCSC breaks the spirit of the Master Plan, which they themselves invented. You remember Al Capp’s cartoons, those little figures that always had a dark cloud over them? It’s sort of like that with this campus. It was out of place; it didn’t fit, either in the UC system or in the Master Plan. It’s had to struggle with that ever since. As I say, that’s got nothing to do with whether it was a good idea in and of itself.

Jarrell: In particular, why do you perceive that UCSC is so anomalous?

Sinsheimer: Well, it was to be primarily an undergraduate campus. That’s not part of the UC system. That’s a CSU [California State University] campus. Right off the bat. Secondly—I mean I was fascinated in reading Thimann’s oral history, that McHenry originally conceived of having the faculty not doing research except during the summer. Thimann of course pointed out to him that you are not going to get anybody any good if you ever do that. Of course it started out as purely undergraduate with the idea that later they would add graduate programs. Thimann pointed out that you couldn’t do that either, you want to
have graduate students. In a sense whatever McHenry had in his mind, and I
don’t want to try to read his mind, but it sounds like it was a collection of
Swarthmores. Now how is that a UC campus? It’s not.

**Jarrell:** But at the same time the rhetoric was, “We’re going to have an array of
small-scale colleges, but at the same time they will be part of a research
university.”

**Sinsheimer:** Well that apparently got tacked on a little later, because originally
he wasn’t going to have research. Except during the summer time, which of
course (inaudible) . . . So it was in that sense a mish-mash of ideas. But under the
Master Plan the University specifically has the prerogative for graduate study,
professional study.

**Jarrell:** Granting the doctorate.

**Sinsheimer:** Granting the doctorate. Under the Master Plan it was supposed to
be sixty percent upper division, forty percent lower division. Somewhere else it
says the University is the research arm of the state [education system]. Within the
system, that policy is quantitatively adhered to. The University gets resources
from the state on a per student basis—so many dollars. But it doesn’t allocate
them that money. The University weights its allocation. Graduate students are
weighted far more heavily than undergraduate students. If you are going to set
up a campus that’s just going to be primarily undergraduate students, if that’s
what your aim is, you ought to change that allocation. At least for that campus.
But systemwide was never prepared to do that. I tried to get that done. Year after
year, I tried to get that done. Because it was a terrible disadvantage. When this
campus was growing, we would be adding undergraduates.

**Jarrell:** They were weighting it in terms of graduate students. Sure.

**Sinsheimer:** Because of graduate students. That seemed ridiculous to me. Then
you would get these arguments that it costs more to train graduate students and
I would make the point that it does the way you do it, but you obviously can
spend as much on an undergraduate as you spend on a graduate. A place like
Swarthmore spends a lot more on an undergraduate than we do. I’ve got the
numbers, by a factor of two, something like that. But the system wasn’t about to
do that. It never had any intention of doing that. You see, if it did, sooner or later
the legislature would figure this out and they would say why are we supporting this undergraduate campus at twice the level we’re supporting a CSU campus, per student? Why are we doing this? So that’s what I’m trying to say, that there is a fundamental contradiction.

Jarrell: In the whole funding mechanism?

Sinsheimer: . . . In the conception of how they were going to do this. Which puzzles me in a way because as I say the people who proposed it were the people who had a major hand in developing the master plan.

Jarrell: It’s very confounding, it really is.

Sinsheimer: Well, that’s I think the point I was trying to make.

The Council of Chancellors

Jarrell: Could you discuss your participation in the Council of Chancellors and what is its purpose?

Sinsheimer: What is the purpose of the Council of Chancellors? The purpose of the Council of Chancellors is clear; it’s to get the nine chancellors together with the president and the vice president and discuss common problems and come up with whatever ideas and so on you have to deal with these problems and develop the policies that permit you some opportunity to discuss budget allocations. I just mentioned a case where I kept losing. It has aspects of a kind of a special club . . . the club of chancellors, if you want. You can commiserate with each other and buoy each other up at times. But I have to tell you, and it would be no surprise. The Council was dominated by the Berkeley and LA chancellors. It was, we used to joke privately that it’s the UC system but there are the two giants and the seven dwarfs. And that was true. Ultimately that will change. Clearly it has to change.

Jarrell: I think it’s changing already.

Sinsheimer: It’s beginning to change. But you see during my period those two campuses comprised over half of the system in student body, or just about half, more than half in resources, more than half in graduate students, certainly. They really dominated the system. Mike Heyman and Chuck [Charles] Young are big
physically, you know they are sort of physically powerful people. That’s a coincidence, if you want. But there’s no question . . . let me put it this way . . . they couldn’t get everything they wanted. But nothing could occur if they were opposed to it. They clearly had a veto power. And now of course the president is the president and he’s in charge. But there’s another element here. Most of the regents come from Los Angeles or the [San Francisco] Bay Area. The chancellors of those campuses had direct ties to those regents. In fact many of the regents are alumni of those campuses. So the president, although he’s the boss, he could not, if you want, trample on the wishes of those campuses.

**Jarrell:** Because they had powerful allies?

**Sinsheimer:** They had powerful allies on the board of regents and elsewhere in the state. Now that’s a situation that some people handle better than others and [President] Gardner is a very skilled politician; he handled that much better than David Saxon. But that’s a reality, is all I’m saying. Now of course within the Council of Chancellors—chancellors are chancellors; they are people; they have all kinds of different personalities and interactions. Some were interested in some topics, some were interested in other topics, some were more vocal than others and some preferred to work behind the scenes, as it were. Bowker, I would say, Heyman’s predecessor was like that.

We met every month at the president’s house up in Berkeley and then we’d usually meet in the evening, for dinner before the regents meeting. Sometimes when there were crises of one kind or another we would have extra meetings.

**Jarrell:** Would there be an issue that would definitely be hitting all the campuses, such as the divestiture issue. Would that be something that would be on the agenda?

**Sinsheimer:** Definitely.

**Jarrell:** Would you all be consulting together on an approach to this, for instance?

**Sinsheimer:** We would all be consulting together on an approach to this, although clearly in a case like that the president would establish a University position that he would present to the regents. Particularly with something like
divestiture, it’s strictly a regental issue. Because they determine all investment policy. I mean, it’s really an investment policy issue.

**Jarrell:** Right. And a chancellor has no power to act at all in an issue like this. However, there are all kinds of . . .

**Sinsheimer:** But the chancellor bears the brunt of the criticism, of course, although he has no power. (Laughter)

**Jarrell:** He takes the hit.

**Sinsheimer:** This was certainly discussed at more than one [Council of] Chancellors meeting and the council would express their views and Gardner would express his view and he would come to a conclusion as to what position he would recommend to the regents. But in fact, in that particular issue, in the end the regents overrode Gardner. It was one of the few times they did. I don’t think that bothered him. If they overrode him on an academic matter that would really bother him. But on an investment matter, that’s clearly the regents’ prerogative. So far as that kind of issue is concerned he’s just one regent.

**Jarrell:** Would an issue such as the whole controversy over the University’s participation in nuclear research . . . would that be discussed?

**Sinsheimer:** Yes, definitely, definitely. That’s a little closer. That was discussed and originally I was by myself, but then some of the other chancellors came around to my position . . . I was very much opposed to the University’s role in this. There’s an interesting difference there, if you want. Saxon, as we said earlier, was an academic. I mean he had his own opinion.

**Jarrell:** Right, and he was a physicist, too.

**Sinsheimer:** He was a physicist and he was in favor of continuing. He recommended that to the regents. But as an academic he was willing to allow chancellors to have their own opinions on this subject and to express that opinion. He wouldn’t like it if you got out and actively lobbied . . . But you could state what you thought and he had no quarrel with my objective. Gardner took a different view of the thing. Gardner’s view was more of the chancellor as an agent of the University and that once the decision was made you should back it,
support it. Or if you couldn’t back it, you should keep quiet, not express an opinion in opposition. It was a more corporate view, if you want.

**Jarrell:** Yes, kind of like the president and the cabinet, that even if you disagree you are supposed to keep mum or resign.

**Sinsheimer:** Yes. That’s right. That was his view on divestiture, where again, I disagreed with him. I think my views were fairly well known but I didn’t feel that I could make public statements, which I had done on the weapons issue, the nuclear issue. But sure, that would be discussed.

As far as the question of how do you deal with student activism . . . that . . . was sort of left up to the individual chancellors. I mean there are University policies of course, but how you choose to interpret or apply them . . . the tone you took was left up to the individual chancellors, who it was felt had the best sense of the local situation. You were supposed to, of course, keep University Hall informed because when there was student activism on any campus obviously that would get in the newspapers, and reporters would come to the president’s office as well as to you and they would like to at least know what the heck was going on. Tactics, strategies or techniques for dealing with activism which seemed effective, chancellors would discuss these among themselves, and the role of the University police. There was another thing. You could call on police from other campuses if it was thought necessary and it was preferable to do that than bringing in outside police.

**Jarrell:** Oh, I didn’t know that.

**Sinsheimer:** . . . because the University police are trained in dealing with students.

**Jarrell:** But I wasn’t aware of that, that you could call on the police force, if necessary, of another campus.

**Sinsheimer:** Right. To aid you.

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**UC President David Saxon**

**Jarrell:** In terms of your relationships with two presidents of the University, what kind of a relationship did you have with David Saxon?
Sinsheimer: Well, as you mentioned, we were classmates. But the truth is that over many of the intervening years we had had rather little contact. I mean I’d seen him once every five years, or something like that, but in a sense I would have to say that the fact that we were classmates had less impact than the fact that we had gone to the same institution at a similar time. We were both scientists; we thought about things in very much the same way. The incident I want to mention is there was a very nice dinner once at Blake house, where there were four of us who were in the same class at MIT—Saxon, myself, Bowker, the chancellor at Berkeley, and George Vineyard, who was then the director of the Berkeley Laboratory. It was kind of a special occasion, because we had all known each other. The fact that we were classmates wasn’t nearly as important as that we had shared a common . . . that MIT was a very shaping influence in all of our lives. It had a very definite mode of thought that impressed us very much. I never had any hesitation in saying anything to David [Saxon] and vice versa. I’m not saying this is as it should be, but I think it is a statement of reality that a president may tend to feel somewhat more responsibility for people he has appointed than those he has inherited. In Gardner’s case obviously I was an inheritee. Gardner and I certainly got along. I can’t recall any serious argument with him. He thought differently than I did. He’s a very political person, and I don’t mean that perjoratively at all.

Jarrell: But you’ve got to be a political animal.

Sinsheimer: In that job you’ve got to be. In fact, I would have to make the statement that I think he was more effective than Saxon in the job, primarily because he is a very political person, he thinks politically. Once you think that way and you weigh things politically, Santa Cruz doesn’t have a lot of political weight anyplace. So that doesn’t do us a lot of good. We don’t have any regents; it’s a little community, it’s a small part of the system, etc. etc. I don’t mean that it’s going to get neglected, but I do mean it’s not going to stand out very much. Whereas, again I’d say Saxon, as an academic, and maybe because he had been at UCLA when it was small and growing, I got the feeling he felt more of a responsibility to the small campuses. He tried to do what he could to compensate for their . . .

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6Blake House, in El Cerrito, California, is the official residence of the President of the University of California.—Editor.
Jarrell: Youth?

Sinsheimer: Immaturity and youth and lack of resources, etc. Gardner was perfectly accessible to me. Take another instance, I was quite involved with the Keck Telescope because the idea for that originated here at Lick. I took it to Saxon, in fact. Then Saxon called together the chancellors of the four campuses in UC that had astronomy programs and asked for their opinions. I think it’s fair to say I was the really strongest advocate, and helped to carry that day. But what I want to say is Saxon was clearly fairly disposed and understood the significance of it right off the bat. You didn’t have to sell him on it. He wouldn’t have wanted to go ahead because it was going to require, for a few years at least, an expenditure of discretionary funds . . . so he didn’t want to go ahead if everybody else was opposed to it, but it wasn’t a matter of having to persuade him. When Gardner became president, before he actually took office he tried to meet with all the chancellors. He went to some of the campuses, but he didn’t come to Santa Cruz. He asked me to Utah, where I visited him and one of my missions there was to inform him about this project. In fairness, he committed to continuing this.

Jarrell: What year was this?

Sinsheimer: This was 1983. I just have to say he didn’t have the appreciation of it that Saxon did. How can I put it? He wouldn’t make the kind of commitment of University resources that Saxon probably would have been willing to do, had we continued at the rate we had been going. He was at the end willing to participate, certainly to participate in meeting with Mrs. Hoffman and arranging for that money, and so on . . . Certainly he was more distant from it than Saxon was; I don’t know if that’s a fair comment . . . I’m not at all sure that if we’d brought it to him in the first place it would have flown. I’m a little skeptical over whether he would have seen this as a great priority.

Jarrell: I understand that you were a prime figure in two major big science initiatives—the Human Genome Project, and the Keck Telescope, coming from this little campus. I assumed, maybe wrongly, that the President of UC would immediately appreciate the real significance and cachet of such endeavors, but I guess that’s not true.
The Keck Telescope and the Human Genome Project

Sinsheimer: Not true. Let me make it a little more explicit. As you know with respect to the Keck Telescope . . . well let’s have a little bit of a detour here . . . we did get a bequest of 36 million dollars from the Hoffman estate. It wasn’t enough but it was more than half of what we projected at that time. Originally it was to be the Hoffman Telescope. That was the (inaudible). But that left us short 36 million dollars and where was that going to come from? My suggestion was that we approach Cal Tech, since it’s the other major astronomy program in the state.

Jarrell: And you had a rather a personal relationship with that institution . . .

(Laughter)

Sinsheimer: Yes. I knew the people there. Actually I had suggested this earlier, but the Lick [Observatory] people were not too keen about it, maybe we can go into that later. By this point they wanted the telescope pretty badly and so they were willing to go along with it. The idea was that Cal Tech would raise a certain amount of money in exchange for which they would get a portion of observing time; the arrangement with Cal Tech was that they would try to raise 25 million dollars for it. I figured we [UC] could scrape up the rest. Well, to make a long story short, I want to skip a heck of a lot of detail here, then Keck came up and offered to put up 70 million dollars and of course there was no way we could reject that. So in the end we had to return the money to the Hoffman estate. But then what was going to happen to it? This was in the fall of 1984 and I wrote a letter to [President] Gardner suggesting the Human Genome Project that might be of interest to them. I outlined what I thought the project would be and what historic importance it would be, that maybe they’d like to have the Hoffman Institute for Human Genome Research at Santa Cruz. Maybe that would appeal to them as a unique scientific enterprise like the telescope. Well he never took it to the Hoffmans. It was clear he never . . . in other words the significance of it never dawned on him. It didn’t come true. Well, he’s not a scientist.

Jarrell: I’m not a scientist.

Sinsheimer: Well you heard my lecture.7 I was a little taken aback because I thought anybody would see [its significance].

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7 Chancellor Sinsheimer gave the annual Delphasus Lecture on March 6, 1991, at UCSC.—Editor.
Jarrell: I’m really kind of surprised that the significance of this wouldn’t be immediately apparent . . . he’s a political creature also, and I think politically there’s great significance in this too. Politicians are interested in things like this.

Sinsheimer: I don’t disagree. But I don’t think he saw the political benefit, especially to him as President of the University of California. But if you talk to 90 percent of the humanists on this campus they wouldn’t know what you were talking about, certainly wouldn’t understand (inaudible) . . .

Jarrell: Okay.

Sinsheimer: Did you see any humanists at that lecture?

Jarrell: A few.

Sinsheimer: A few, yes.

Jarrell: At your lecture the other night, you said something along the lines of making UC Santa Cruz a jewel.

Sinsheimer: Yes.

Jarrell: I think that the Keck Telescope and the Human Genome Project and other things that we haven’t even talked about are all steps in that direction.

Sinsheimer: I don’t think David Gardner ever thought of Santa Cruz as a jewel.

Jarrell: But you did. And you were moving in that direction . . .

Sinsheimer: Yes. I’m sure he doesn’t today.

Jarrell: Do you think that the article you quoted from Science Citation Index documenting UCSC’s influence in physics and biology would impress the President of the University?

Sinsheimer: I’m going to make sure it does.

Jarrell: Oh, well I would imagine. Yes.

Sinsheimer: But I don’t think a priori it would. It might. It would have to be brought to his attention and explained.
Jarrell: Because this brings great honor to the whole campus.

Sinsheimer: Of course it does! But it would have to be brought to his attention. And to the whole system. Now, Frazer would understand, the Vice-President. He would understand right off. Hopefully it will come to his attention. I’ll make sure it does. But he’s a physicist.

Jarrell: Do you think during your tenure that the negative perceptions about UCSC were somewhat mitigated?

Sinsheimer: Oh I think they definitely were changed. For a variety of reasons. One, just a kind of a tone. Secondly, and it’s sort of primitive, but enrollments started going up, right? So [they think] you’ve done something right; you must be doing something right. Thirdly, and I would like to give some credit to Wendell Brase, because Wendell’s very effective in working with people at systemwide and he’s very competent, so then they got a feeling that the place was competent, and so on. Then the fact that there was some stability here; I was here for ten years and that helped. Well we didn’t have anything quite as nice as that report you just referred to, but whenever anything good happened to a Santa Cruz faculty person we would try to make sure it got known, both to systemwide and to the regents. The regents get monthly what is called the “A Report.” The “A Report” is sort of an account of important doings or honors that have accrued to a person or groups or whatever, within the University. I simply made sure that whenever anything happened of that kind to somebody at Santa Cruz, that it got in the “A Report.” Little things like that. So I think there’s no question that the image of Santa Cruz significantly improved in the time I was here. I’m sorry to say I think it’s probably deteriorated. I think Stevens’ somewhat untimely retirement will not improve the image of the campus. It creates an image of instability and an image of . . . you know, why is he doing this?

Jarrell: Why is he leaving?

Sinsheimer: What’s the problem?

Jarrell: Yes. But over . . . maybe in the short term his announced retirement/resignation indicates an instability. But also in the longer haul the flakiness perception, don’t you think that’s dissipated?
Sinsheimer: Oh, I think it’s largely dissipated.

Jarrell: Is there anything else that I haven’t mentioned or don’t know about in terms of your work with systemwide, your relationship with the presidents that we should cover?

Sinsheimer: No, except I would just emphasize the importance of that interaction because there’s a sort of a bottom line which you get to in the capital budget allocations. They always got far more requests from the campuses than the system can provide. How those requests then are prioritized is critical. They can put you up or down on that priority list.

Jarrell: And during your tenure UCSC did very well in that department.

Sinsheimer: It went up. Certainly, especially in capital and somewhat in other areas. But my point is that how they viewed the campus obviously had a significant influence on their prioritization and then that in turn it feeds back on how well the campus thrives.

Jarrell: All the groundwork was done . . . for the Sinsheimer Labs, the Science Library . . .

Sinsheimer: The groundwork was done but again I want to give Wendell a lot of credit because he worked well with those people to make those decisions and they respect him. They knew he’d get it done well and get it done within budget and come up with something good. He was very persuasive.

Jarrell: So cultivating that relationship is critical.

Sinsheimer: And not just at the chancellorial level, but at the secondary levels, too.

Jarrell: Were there any key figures at University Hall with whom you had a really helpful rapport, or with whom you worked particularly well?

Sinsheimer: Well, I always thought I had a good rapport with all of them. With the academic vice presidents. I thought I had a good rapport with Ron Brady, who is the financial vice president, I don’t know if it was finance and administration or whatever. He was a very smart guy. . . . I always got along with
the general counsel. I had differences with him. For example, my tenure was
during the period when they started having staff unions. The University really
didn’t want to do this. There was a fellow Kleinfelter. . . Saxon had brought him
from UCLA, and he was out of his depth. But we had brought Bob Bickal here
and Bickal’s a pro. So we loaned him half-time to systemwide to help them out.

They could get these contracts and so on set up in a rational manner; they just
didn’t know how to go about it. So he was very helpful to them. Bill Baker was
very helpful. He’s been the Regional Director of Capital Projects and then he’s
sort of a budget director. His understudy, Herschner, Wendell has a very good
relationship with both of them. Baker had kind of a fond spot for the campus
because he was involved in some of the original physical planning here. The
secretary of the regents, Bonnie Smetony, was an important person, in her own
quiet way; although I had very few direct relationships, I enjoyed the treasurer,
Herb Gordon . . . if you want to talk about conservative, there’s a conservative
person. All you really want is competence, because the regents determine the
policy. He has to carry it out. But he has to carry it out intelligently. It isn’t just
that he’s conservative in his fiscal approaches.

But, I hate to tell you, I’m trying to think of the name of his predecessor, who
retired after I was there about two years. This was a guy out of the 1890s, I’ll tell
you. Wow.

Admissions Office and Policies

Jarrell: I’d like you to discuss the Admissions Office and admissions policies,
and developments in this area during your decade here.

Sinsheimer: Well, as I think I’ve mentioned, not long after I came here I became
aware of the dire admissions situation. In fact, after I’d been here about two or
three weeks, there were weekly meetings of some of the chancellor’s assistants
and Pat Sullivan at that time had what’s now Wendell’s job. There was sort of a
Crisis meeting at which we decided the enrollment projections we should send to
systemwide for 1978. Well, first of all this took me aback. We were just starting
1977, why were we even worrying about the enrollment projection for 1978?
Well, it turns out there’s a reason for that; that UC Systemwide has to put
together a budget which they present to the regents in November, and if the
regents approve it, then that goes to the governor and he has to work on it and put it in his budget address for January to the legislature and so forth. So they did have to have an enrollment projection for 1978. Okay.

The problem was that an honest projection said that the enrollment was going to go down for the first time. How much was it going to go down? Oh, probably one, maybe two hundred students. Well here I was. I’d come from Cal Tech and enrollment had never been a problem whatsoever. I said, “One or two hundred students out of 5700, that’s less than two percent, surely nobody’s going to get upset if the enrollment drops by two percent.” They said, “Oh yes they are.” I couldn’t believe it. So I said, “Look, you have to be honest. I don’t see any merit in putting forward a projection that we don’t believe. So send it in as it is.” I found out pretty fast.

systemwide accepted it but then we had some capital requests, you know the campus had more students than we had the allotted building areas. We had very legitimate campus capital requests. Some of these got put into the University budget and then what happens to capital requests? Well they go up to the governor and then the governor has a person who specifically worries about capital requests for the University and then so does the legislative analyst. So they get together and form a team and go around each campus to . . . what they call the SCOPE visit. It’s to evaluate these requests to determine if they’ve been well thought through and are they putting too much glitz on the building . . . they’re nitpicky to the nth degree. They come around and you have to defend your request. Hah. This year we got a note saying they would not be coming to our campus. Obviously a campus that’s declining in enrollment doesn’t need any more space. They didn’t come. So I learned about enrollment the hard way so I started looking into this and found out that in fact freshman applications had been falling off since 1971. Now for a time that had little effect on the enrollment growth, because first of all they’d had a surplus in 1971. Second, they significantly increased the numbers of transfer students over the years. Third, even if you have a fall-off in freshmen, it takes time for that to work through the four or five years you’ll carry over a time on your larger entering classes, from before. So by one means or another the enrollment had not actually begun to decline until 1978. But the numbers of freshmen applications had been falling precipitously. It was down to less than a quarter of what it had been in 1971. So
obviously something had to be done. So I had to learn how is this done in the University of California.

Now the University of California, of course officially frowns upon recruiting students. This is a public university. Why should we be recruiting students? But you can have outreach programs to inform students about the merits of the campus. A rose by any other name. But you see the problem was that the campus had been so oversubscribed from day one, in the early years, that they never bothered to develop any significant outreach program. In reading some of the things from the Christensen era, he was aware of the problem but then he got so caught up in other things that he never dealt with it. So I realized especially after the SCOPE meeting business that this was crucial. Unless something was done the enrollment was just going to continue to fall.

We had to get a first-class outreach person. I was very fortunate that we were able to get Dick Moll. He’d been the Dean of Admissions at Bowdoin and turned their admissions problem around. He’d been dean of admissions at Vassar and seen them through that very difficult period when they went from being a woman’s college to being a co-educational college. Happily he was looking for a new challenge and was particularly interested in the challenge of a small public university. So we brought him out here and he put the program into gear. He put out brochures and set up hundreds of visits to high schools and I give him a great deal of credit for at least initially stopping the decline and then turning it around. Then we had to do some interim measures. We made an arrangement with Mike Heyman. Berkeley was of course always being oversubscribed. Berkeley wanted to move toward the Master Plan mandated 40-60 lower/upper division ratio. They were much more like 50-50. So we worked out an arrangement whereby two hundred freshmen, whom they could not accept, would be referred to Santa Cruz. This was the re-direct program in which these students were guaranteed that if they did well here for two years they could go back to Berkeley as juniors. That worked quite well, and helped us during the period we were turning it around. It was interesting because actually, as you might imagine, about half of them after the two years would choose to stay here. They’d make friends and liked it here. But it was a very helpful thing to us and it helped Berkeley too.
**Jarrell:** Right. Did you participate with Dick Moll at all in thinking through what UCSC should emphasize in terms of drawing entering students?

**Sinsheimer:** Well it was clearly an image problem and we both saw eye to eye that what was needed was to emphasize the image of this place as a serious academic institution. Here was this flaky image, which may have been attractive during the 1960s. But by the late 1970s it was no longer attracting people. We always had the beauty of the place to sell and the collegiate concept and the small campus as opposed to Berkeley or Los Angeles. But people had to be convinced they were going to get a good education here. So that was where the emphasis was put.

**Minority Recruitment and Retention**

**Jarrell:** Yes, and after you had turned around the decline in enrollments, then there’s the other aspect of who was responsible for identifying target groups . . .

**Sinsheimer:** Well that gets back to affirmative action and the whole system was constantly being urged to do everything we could to increase the proportions of minority students. The Office of the President would do comparisons of campuses; they would send out memos with all kinds of statistical data . . . since the regents were interested in those questions. Dick Moll understood the problem and he would visit high schools with minority students. We would try to make known that there were EOP programs and financial aid programs and things of this nature. I was particularly keen on the Early Outreach Program, the one that goes into the junior high schools. The state was divided up and so each campus operated an early outreach program in a certain geographical area and of course Santa Cruz was operating its early outreach program and . . . fortunately that had been started by Saxon. So by the early Eighties . . . I mean that was a long lead time, to start in 7th grade when it’s still six years before these students apply to college.

But by the early ‘80s they were coming out the end of the pipeline and the payoff was becoming clear that it really worked. I kept pushing for more money for this program since I knew that we weren’t reaching probably half of the high schools where it could be useful. Another thing is that the University of California has
this [admissions policy] exception which allows six percent of the freshmen class to be students who do not meet the admission standard.

Jarrell: Special admit?

Sinsheimer: Special admits. Of course we use that, and it was originally put in for athletes but we used it exclusively for minorities. Then we did what we could on campus of course through EOP, through [Provost] Herman Blake at Oakes College.

Jarrell: Who, if anyone, or what office coordinated admissions, ancillary programs, EOP . . . the bridge programs, remedial tutoring assistance . . . who was the overseer?

Sinsheimer: Bruce Moore. EOP fell under his . . .

Jarrell: So there was somebody coordinating all these programs.

Sinsheimer: Yes. It took coordination. Because I kept admissions directly under me because I thought it was so crucial.

Jarrell: I see.

Sinsheimer: Maybe logically it didn’t but I wanted . . .

Jarrell: But after you learned how important admissions figures were . . .

Sinsheimer: After I learned how important it was I kept them directly reporting to me and I would meet with Dick Moll weekly.

Jarrell: During your tenure how would you assess UCSC’s effectiveness in recruiting its share, let’s say, of ethnic minorities, in terms of the statistics, numbers?

Sinsheimer: Medium. We had some serious problems, of course. We’re not in an urban area which has a large minority population. Berkeley has Oakland right next door, it has Chinatown across the Bay; UCLA likewise has large minority populations in Los Angeles. Not next door, to be sure, but that gives them a real advantage in the sense that the students can live at home and go to the University since minority students are often financially strapped anyway, that’s a
way to manage. Secondly, if they do come here they are quite isolated. I used to feel rather badly, particularly for the black students. There is no black community in Santa Cruz. There’s nobody to relate to. At least there are Hispanics here, but no black community. It’s very isolating. Thirdly, we think the redwoods are great but if you’ve been raised in an urban ghetto they’re kind of forbidding probably, quite alien. Maybe not at all comforting. So I think there are all those problems. In a sense, it’s a critical mass problem; if you’ve got enough minorities on campus they can form their own communities. But I see the same thing in Santa Barbara to be truthful; there’s no Black community to speak of in Santa Barbara, but there is a Hispanic community. The only thing I can say is we’re medium. I don’t think we’ve done as well as Berkeley or Los Angeles or Irvine, for that matter. Historically it’s not a long period of time, but typically we’re, as they say, the second whitest campus in the system. Santa Barbara being the whitest. That seems to hold on. But the numbers are going up. I mean they are well over 25% now at both of those campuses.

Jarrell: Another aspect of affirmative action and special admits . . . I’ve been reading several conservative black scholars, notably Thomas Soule and Shelby Steele, among the many works I’ve perused on this subject. Both of them have some rather interesting critiques of affirmative action and of compensatory programs in American higher education. They basically say that it’s a politically expedient mechanism that really begs the question of the ill preparation or the deprivation that some of these ethnic students experience at the very youngest ages in the elementary grades. So that, Soule for instance says that there is often a mismatch between, let’s say, Black students in many elite colleges, so that for instance at Berkeley, and he doesn’t cite the year, but he says at UC Berkeley that more than 70 percent of those special admit Black students never graduate. Are there outcome studies in terms of the graduation rates of special admit students?

Sinsheimer: Well, that’s a real problem. I certainly saw that here. They had a significantly lower retention. In a way that surprised me, frankly, because the admissions criteria have an element of arbitrariness. They go down to a certain point and then anything below that you say is a special admit. But what sort of startled me is how rapidly the retention would fall off as you went below that admit point. In other words if you said the admit point was three on some scale, if you went to 2.9 there would be less retention. If you got to 2.8 you got still less
retention, and so on. Obviously what that’s telling you is that the courses, the requirements, the expectations at the University, are remarkably closely geared to those entrance standards. We expect that and if they don’t meet that then they don’t make it. Now, and I was frankly surprised that that would be so obvious. I would have thought it would be a looser coupling.

**Jarrell:** Because you said originally you characterized the admissions standards as somewhat arbitrary to begin with.

**Sinsheimer:** They’re somewhat arbitrary, of course they are.

**Jarrell:** So there is this correlation?

**Sinsheimer:** Right. And obviously we try as best as we can to adapt to that by providing tutorial programs and remedial assistance such as at Oakes and special courses. In some cases that works and in some cases it doesn’t. At least you can say that it gives those students an opportunity they wouldn’t otherwise have had. Now, what the impact of their failing to make it has on their psyches I’m not sure. I think there is a benefit to the campus in general in having a more diverse student body. I know the criticisms of it but I’m not sure what alternatives there are. I don’t think it’s just a question, if you will, of poor elementary and secondary schools. That’s clearly contributory but there has to be a major home element.

**Jarrell:** It’s a profound dilemma, not just for this campus, but for higher education. This critical problem of retaining, not just special admits, but students who are clearly coming into the system disadvantaged. To what degree can the University provide compensatory, ancillary services to help these students adjust and be able to function in this academic system?

**Sinsheimer:** I don’t think there is any simple solution. I think you sort of have to do the best you can. Two things I do want to say. One is I don’t think I deserve a huge amount of credit. I mean, I hope I deserve some, for the turn-around in enrollment. There’s no question that demography helped. Secondly, I don’t know . . . what’s the overall retention rate at UCSC? It may be like fifty or sixty percent, which struck me as kind of low. But some people aren’t concerned about that. They think it’s all right just to get a couple of years of education. We don’t have good statistics. Because some of those probably go somewhere else and . . .
Jarrell: . . . else and get a degree?

Sinsheimer:  We don’t even know that. Of course, you know it really extends beyond minorities. As I recall, something like 60 percent of the freshmen failed the English Subject A exam . . . and had to make up for that. One of my pet gripes. If there were a quantitative Subject A examination, a parallel examination in mathematics, I think you would have more than 60 percent failing.

The Colleges in an Era of Reorganization

Jarrell:  To start today, I’d like to ask you about the provosts and the colleges in light of the reorganization which substantially changed the role of the colleges at UCSC. In light of those changes, how did you envision the colleges and the role of the provosts. And then I have a list here of provosts at the different colleges, and I don’t mean for you to have to comment on all of these people, but those who really stood out or with whom you had a really close working relationship or . . . who are notable in some way, either positive or negative.

Sinsheimer:  Well, as you can imagine since I think most people, to some degree correctly, saw the reorganization as taking some authority away from the colleges, vis-à-vis the boards of study, those people who particularly liked or favored the collegiate concept, and that included, as you might suspect, most of the provosts, were not enthused about it. Some of them, to be fair saw it rather reluctantly as a necessity. In other words they didn’t oppose it. They thought it was necessary and desirable, but others certainly felt that it was not the way they would prefer to go. It was very individual. I was looking at the lists of provosts at that time and probably Sig Puknat and Michael Cowan were the most favorably inclined. They recognized the necessity of it and I think were positive. I would say that John Dizikes at Cowell and . . . McElrath at Stevenson, Pavel Machotka at Porter, were very much opposed to it. May Diaz at Kresge was probably neutral. Of course Herman Blake was the provost at Oakes at the time and my sense is he sort of kept out of it, but was supportive. I think Jim Pepper was provost at College Eight and I think (inaudible) . . . they were working against it, they just didn’t like it. Well, understandably I think at some level most of them recognized that something had to be done. They didn’t necessarily like things about my proposal but they didn’t have a good alternative either.
If you want me to comment on some of these provosts, I think John Dizikes was an exceptionally good provost. I appointed him as the chair of the Council of Provosts. Incidentally, that was one thing I found when I got here. That there was no effective organization of the colleges; they were each going their own way. It seemed to me that there ought to be some more coherence as to what they did, and to be honest I can’t remember whether there was a council of provosts or not, but it seemed to me it wasn’t effective.

**Jarrell:** There had been a council of provosts for years.

**Sinsheimer:** But I don’t think they’d been doing much. I asked John [Dizikes] to be the chair and I thought he was quite effective in coordinating their policies with regard to students and things of this kind. Also it was useful for me to have someone to talk to who represented the provosts. I also thought following Dizikes, John Lynch was a particularly effective provost. Both of them took their responsibilities as provosts as a kind of symbol of the college, as father figures to the students, seriously, including opening up the provost’s house and having events for students . . . Some provosts take that much more seriously than others.

Going back, just looking over the names on the list—Joe Silverman I thought was a capable provost and also of course a very fine scholar. David Kaun was not a very successful provost, to be honest. He tried hard, I think, but he’s sort of idiosyncratic. He rubbed a lot of people the wrong way. [Dennis] McElrath . . . it’s hard for me to say anything about Dennis. I think from the point of view of Stevenson college he’s probably been a good provost. Stevenson has been in many ways the most coherent college. From the beginning they’ve managed to continue a three-quarter core course, and other programs which I supported, like the nuclear program. On the other hand, I have to say honestly, and frankly. I found Dennis devious. I felt I couldn’t always trust what he said. Crown of course is one of the least coherent colleges as a college, because it’s mostly populated by scientists, who don’t do a lot there, and that puts more of a burden on the provost, actually, to operate the college. I think Sig Puknat did a very good job of it. Gene Cota-Robles I think really . . . if anyone tried to be a father figure, he did a good job. I thought Peggy Musgrave was outstanding, of course. Michael Cowan did a good job and then I’ve forgotten why he only did it for one year, at this point. Then George Von der Muhll served for a year and that was rather ineffective. John Isbister was a very strong provost. He’s been chair of the
council of provosts also. John is quite effective, I think. Porter [College], has had a long succession of provosts who have had great problems. I thought for awhile the problem was they didn’t have a provost’s house. Then we finally got the money to do that. But that didn’t seem to solve it.

Kresge of course was a disaster after Bob Edgar gave up and then May Diaz took over and May couldn’t revive it, is about what I would have to say. Then Helene [Moglen] I thought did revive it. The reorganization plan also relocated faculty to Kresge and I thought it really came alive. Helene probably couldn’t give it as much attention as it needed, because she was also a dean. Then I thought Ellen Suckiel, although I know that not everyone was too happy with her, I thought she really did a lot. Certainly she did a lot of things at the provost’s house and sponsored a lot of activities and various efforts. At Oakes [College], of course Herman [Blake] was unique. He ran it virtually single-handedly and was very much a father figure to the minority students, a very charismatic person. After he left we found out that things weren’t running very well there. There were major budgetary problems, and personnel problems popped up and Sucheng [Chan] had a very difficult time. I think she deserves a lot of credit for what she was able to do to straighten things out. It made some people very unhappy but it had to be done. And as I understand there were really grievous budgetary problems.

**Jarrell:** Why would she have made people unhappy? Because of decisions she had to make to straighten things out?

**Sinsheimer:** That plus I think anybody who followed Herman would have had a hard time.

**Jarrell:** Oh, right. It was so shaped around his vision.

**Sinsheimer:** Right, the comparison would always be there, plus the fact that she had to make decisions that made people unhappy and she had to solve some personnel problems which were very difficult; to get rid of some people who were simply not functioning, or were clawing at each other’s throats, and this kind of thing. College Eight was another problem; it has always had a problem and I felt it in part was because it wasn’t a college; it didn’t have buildings; it was just sitting there in the social sciences building. It had a series of provosts who
were continually having difficulties with the students and I hope now that it has its own site (inaudible) That’s kind of a thumbnail sketch . . .

Another thing is that I think to be a good provost takes a certain kind of character. I’m not sure there are enough faculty around to do it. You have those who can do it well, especially if you say they are only going to do it for five years or something like that. It takes a lot of their time . . . it should be a fairly senior person. So I see a problem in finding enough faculty, in finding competent people who would do it. And I suspect that continues.

Jarrell: What is the place of the colleges in the system here because it’s still extremely ambiguous, even after reorganization . . .

Sinsheimer: Well, it certainly is. I’m not saying reorganization solved it at all; reorganization took care of some pressing problems but it didn’t solve the long-term role of the colleges. Well, maybe it did de facto but it didn’t in principle.

**Perspectives on the College System**

Sinsheimer: The question is how to implement the original concept of having a group of four-year liberal arts colleges—a cluster of colleges. Quite aside from the question of how you would integrate such a structure internally, how do you do this within the UC system and under the Master Plan which says the UC system is a research university, which has quite different demands on its faculty than the demands made on the faculty at Swarthmore or Haverford. How do you do this within a system which is geared to kind of large, mass undergraduate education with the economies that that provides, again compared to a good first-rate liberal arts college which operates at a much higher cost per student? You don’t have the money. So where is that money supposed to come from? To illustrate, again, it doesn’t square with the Master Plan. There was an article in the LA Times just the other day which made the following suggestion. You know the state has got this huge budget deficit. It costs the state six times as much per lower division student at UC as it does in a community college, three times as much as a CSU college. Why don’t we take 50,000 students from UC and 50,000 students from CSU, and put them in the community colleges and we’ll save a billion dollars. Well, I can see that from the point of view of the state. But what
does that do to the conception of a four year liberal arts college here? Shoots it right in the head.

**Jarrell:** You know, among all the UCSC administrators I’ve interviewed over the years, in their discussions of the college system, you are the only person who has ever put this in the context of the Master Plan. Almost everyone I’ve interviewed has dealt with Santa Cruz as *sui generis*, as if it weren’t a part of a larger system.

**Sinsheimer:** Of course. But this is my point. That’s what I meant when I said I don’t think you can solve it on this campus. You either have to go back and re-draft the Master Plan, and invent a fourth category . . .

**Jarrell:** In terms of the way faculty tenure and promotion work, research is rewarded; research criteria are the basis used for advancement. College building or college service are not one of the criteria.

**Sinsheimer:** Right. Nobody has ever changed the criteria for Santa Cruz.

**Jarrell:** One of the authors of the Master Plan was the founder of this anomalous campus.

**Sinsheimer:** I think there are virtues to the college plan. There are problems such as how do you integrate that with the criteria for research and so on. I think it could be done but it would take a lot of money; it would take a revision of, or at least a much greater flexibility, with regard to the criteria that are used. This immediately raises the question of why should the state do this? I mean, why would the state be willing, assuming somehow UC was willing to give Santa Cruz more money, which it never has been, why would the state be willing to do this? I’ve gone through all the early regents [meetings] minutes, they were suspicious that you could do this without more money. They didn’t believe it. They required that it be a provision in the acceptance of the plan for UCSC that there be no more cost per student than at other UC campuses. Somebody sent me some articles from the recent *Santa Cruz Sentinel*. Apparently they had some articles on the campus and its problems. There was an interview with McHenry in which he said well they had thought that so called weighted-student average wouldn’t be applied to Santa Cruz. But of course it has been. So I don’t know where he got that idea. Or whether Kerr said it wouldn’t and then Kerr wasn’t there.
So absent some resolution of these questions which can’t be done on this campus, then I think all we can do is in a sort of makeshift way to allow the colleges to do what they can. I think they can be excellent social and cultural units. In fact one of the things that I felt was a beneficial aspect of reorganization is the colleges all produced core courses again. It had gotten down to only two college core courses. I think that’s something which is valuable. I have to say I tried while I was chancellor to encourage the colleges to come forward with ideas for interdisciplinary programs, that I would try to fund. And a few did. I mentioned the nuclear program at Stevenson. And we did fund that. To the extent that they can come forward with those kinds of programs, that’s something colleges can do. I don’t want to denigrate the concept of colleges as providing a potential for a cross-disciplinary dimension on campus. The disciplines don’t do that. That is a real problem in all universities as to how to provide cross-disciplinary education and research. It’s always done in an ad hoc manner. You set up an institute for this or that and these usually thrive for a little while and then die. Often they don’t provide much educational influence. The colleges could do that. But you have to have the resources and we don’t have them. One of the concepts apparently in the early colleges, because of people like [Glenn] Willson, [Kenneth] Thimann and [Jasper] Rose was to model things after Cambridge and Oxford. But they forgot that all those colleges have their own endowments. They don’t have to take the money from the university.

Jarrell: And so they have a much freer hand.

Sinsheimer: Much freer. What was set up here immediately put the colleges and the disciplines in a tug of war. I don’t see it being resolved on this campus.

The Research and Development Park Initiative

Jarrell: Well, to switch topics here. I’d like you to talk about your long range plans for the campus as they were expressed in the Research and Development Park proposal. I’ve gone back and read the contemporary accounts of that whole issue. Where did this idea came from? Was it yours?

Sinsheimer: It was mine.

Jarrell: How did you start thinking about it? What came to mind? What problem were you working on?
**Sinsheimer:** Two problems. One was the isolation of the campus. There wasn’t a critical mass of scientists to interact with and we needed some way to get them here. The obvious contrast is with Stanford which is surrounded by a whole variety of science, biotech, electronics and other kinds of industries. There’s a lot of interaction. Secondly, money. The date was 1982. We’d been through four years of post Prop. 13 with budgets being cut every year and things didn’t look as if they were going to get any better. How could we get some money? What could the campus do? The one asset the campus had was land, that was valuable. Could we use that land for something useful? You could see what Stanford did with their research park. Could we make use of the land in such a way as to do something worthwhile, generate income for the campus and also solve the isolation? We were in a recession. Unemployment was around 12, 15 percent in Santa Cruz. Was there some way to bring in something that could relieve that? Well all of these things coalesced in this idea for an R&D Park. Now it wasn’t unique. Other schools have similar parks—Stanford I already mentioned; Utah has a research park. There’s a whole research triangle in North Carolina.

**Jarrell:** Right. And also you can think of Boston and Cambridge and that whole area.

**Sinsheimer:** That whole area and even in England there is some connection with Cambridge. So that’s where the idea came from and we looked at the campus and figured out a reasonable place, a reasonable area.

**Jarrell:** Who is “we?”

**Sinsheimer:** Wendell [Brase] and I. He was familiar with the topography and the requirements and he actually went and looked at some of these other research parks to get a feel of what they had. How they tied in to universities. He thought it was a good idea. Since I realized this was a novel idea, I went around and met with faculty and as I recall, the student councils of the eight colleges, one at a time, to tell them what it was we had in mind and what the benefits and disadvantages would be. I should also say, we commissioned a firm to do a feasibility study; they went to a number of technologically oriented businesses, primarily in the [San Francisco] Bay area, but they went to Southern California as well...
Jarrell: Does a chancellor have the discretion to initiate this or do you have to bring it before the board of regents?

Sinsheimer: Well, ultimately it would have to go to the board of regents. I had mentioned it to [UC President] David Saxon but it was in rudimentary form. Yes. He was encouraging. So, we had commissioned this feasibility study and the consultants came back and said, yes it looked like it would fly. There was sufficient interest on the part of the firms they’d talked with and one could sort of project a kind of build-up of this research park over four or five years. We had a scale in mind, but I’ve forgotten the details. While it would require some initial investment, that would all be recouped and after a period of time it looked like it could generate for the campus certainly a few million dollars a year. For the community it would provide, I think we estimated 2,000 jobs. It would bring in I think we estimated about 750 scientists and technically trained people into the area. It would provide, even though it was on University ground, it was understood that this would be what we call inclusionary, and so it would be a tax-base for the community. It would not be a smoke-stack industry. Clean industry.

Jarrell: And the land would be rented or leased, long term leased?


There is provision for this; UC has what we call inclusion areas and you can use those for community-based enterprises. We had once talked about building an auditorium . . . Well, as you know, of course, once this came out some of the local politicians didn’t like it.

Jarrell: Did you have any idea when you were thinking about this in the early planning stages that this was going to turn into such a huge controversy and generate so much opposition?

Sinsheimer: No. I thought the prospects of jobs and tax base and so on would be attractive, in fact. But of course to people like [County Supervisor] Gary Patton and so on, it was a threat. I was really naive. It was an eye-opener. Because I remember having a discussion at University House specifically with Gary Patton. It became very clear to me, and he said it in so many words, that what he didn’t like about it was that he didn’t think the scientists and engineers who would
come and work at the R&D Park and the technically trained people would vote for him. It was that blunt; they weren’t his kind of people. But they would be in his district. So what happened? Well as you know there was Measure A. I didn’t say that that necessarily applied to the University. The University is not legally bound by local ordinances. I discussed this with the general counsel and there was a potential legal problem in the sense that, yes the University is not bound by local ordinances because it is a state educational institution but they could claim that this was not an educational use, this was a . . .

Jarrell: Profit?

Sinsheimer: Profit-oriented use or business use. We could claim on the other hand it did have educational benefits. There were a lot of other benefits I haven’t mentioned. It seemed to me that graduate students could get employment; it could be summer employment for undergraduate students; there were opportunities so these people could have adjunct appointments; and some of the researchers there could teach courses. These were all facets of the University’s educational mission. This would enhance that. Some very expensive kinds of equipment that we couldn’t afford would be accessible to us because they would be available, on the campus. So I thought, and I have to say the general counsel agreed, that we could make a strong case that it did enhance the educational base if they would try to bring a suit on that basis, we could fight it. But of course it would take time. I spoke with Lowell Page, who was the University’s representative in Sacramento about it. He liked the idea and thought the legislature would like it as well. So I wasn’t worried about that. To go ahead anyway I’d have to have the president’s or the regents’ approval, and particularly to go ahead if it were to be done with the likelihood of legal action against the University by the City of Santa Cruz. At this point, by now we are in late 1983, and it’s pretty well scoped out and so on. Then I raised the issue with [President] Gardner, who had replaced Saxon. Well, Gardner wasn’t enthused at all. There is a research park at Utah which is generally regarded as a successful one, right adjacent to the campus. My impression is that he felt it didn’t add a lot to the University of Utah and was sort of a headache. There were problems of interactions between university faculty and private enterprises that caused him problems there and that he wasn’t terribly enthused about it. I found this surprising. When I pursued it further with him, and in particular raised the issue
of the community concern I told him that I would have to have the University’s backing in this, if it came to a lawsuit and so on. He simply discouraged going ahead with it. I’ve never been entirely clear about David’s conception of Santa Cruz. But whatever it is I’m not sure that he thought a research park fit in with it. When I say whatever it is, I think somehow he was . . . he was at the University at the time Santa Cruz was started. And I know he thinks of himself as a protégé of Kerr.

**Jarrell:** I wasn’t aware of that.

**Sinsheimer:** Oh yes. When we had the dedication for the telescope on Mauna Kea, it just ended up that Karen and I went up in the car with David. We chatted about a number of things and I remember Karen asked if he had had anyone he regarded as a mentor, a guide. He said, “Oh yes, Clark Kerr.” I think he had learned a great deal working under Clark Kerr . . . an apprenticeship, if you will. So he must have been there when Kerr was developing his conceptions, whatever they were, for Santa Cruz. At the same time I don’t think David ever was, you know, wasn’t directly involved with Santa Cruz. And so he may have sort of got the concept without ever having to worry about the details. So I’m not sure that David, today, has a clear conception of what had evolved at Santa Cruz. Some other comments he made which were in the paper that UCSC seemed to be peculiarly ungovernable and so forth, reflect his ignorance. I think he is puzzled, but he’s puzzled because he’s ignorant about the situation. I think that was a factor. Well, I couldn’t go ahead with the Research Park without his backing, so I had to let it slide.

**Jarrell:** There were a number of faculty members who were actively opposed. Another very important aspect of the opposition was the idea of defense contractors and the sort of monolithic military industrial complex which could sprout here in the R&D Park.

**Sinsheimer:** Well, some of this is red herring. I mean, we made it clear we wouldn’t allow any secret work to be done because that would defeat the purpose of this interrelation with the research on the campus. That couldn’t happen if we did secret work. Ken Norris was primarily concerned with that part of the campus being available as a natural reserve. We could take care of that; that wasn’t going to be a problem because we set apart what portions of the
campus we felt were particularly important to the natural reserve. I have a real problem, as you can sense, with some of this. Because Santa Cruz was purchased by the regents to be a campus, not to be a state park. There is a huge state park, Wilder State Park, right next door. That ought to provide enough natural reserve and whatever hiking trails people want. The campus doesn’t have to be preserved as a park. It’s built . . . that doesn’t mean you can bulldoze it, pave the whole thing over but you do use it for a campus . . . as sensibly as you can.

Another thing that happened in that time, and continues to happen, is that the University was squeezed and that meant that the state funds were squeezed, that those campuses that could raise their own funds were better off, and relatively much better off. Because the state funding was being cut back. Therefore private funding was becoming more significant. The fact is UCLA and Berkeley raise 100 million dollars each a year in private gifts. That’s more than all of UC Santa Cruz gets. Leaving aside just the economies of scale and so on, and the historical accumulations which give those campuses a distinct advantage, their ability to generate this outside revenue gives them a still greater advantage. You know, in some sense you have to be able to say, look, Santa Cruz is part of the system and we can offer the same educational quality as the other parts of the system. And we can’t do that if we don’t have the resources. We’re not in a big urban area; we don’t have great wealth to draw upon. We don’t have local industries to draw upon. We don’t have a large alumni body to draw upon; our alumni are all young. So we needed to do everything we could to generate additional revenue.

Jarrell:  It seemed to me at the time that your administration’s message somehow didn’t get through. I didn’t get that message. I wasn’t prejudiced against that message at all but somehow the communication of that, the educating of the public, not just the University community but the Santa Cruz community, that an educational process was needed, so that the message of what you were trying to do in terms of the R&D Park would have been received in a different way. I don’t think the message got through.

Sinsheimer:  Well, let me ask . . . obviously your perspective is personally valid, but what message did get through? From your point of view at that time, what reasons did you think I put forward for doing this?
Jarrell: Well the financial part of it got through, all right. But the larger context of UCSC’s financial situation, I wasn’t really aware of it in the larger context, and also the opponents of the R&D Park said, “Oh the revenues which will be generated are just trivial.” I did get the part about the cross-fertilization. So I wasn’t adverse to that. I thought providing the jobs was great. Because we don’t have any jobs in Santa Cruz.

Sinsheimer: No.

Jarrell: But somehow the benefits . . . I just didn’t think that they were communicated in a powerful enough way.

Sinsheimer: Well probably not, and . . . as I’ve indicated that’s not what stopped it. It got stopped up at University Hall.

Jarrell: Yes, and that’s very surprising to me that President Gardner would not be appreciative, but you’re saying that he’s really ignorant about the real state of UC Santa Cruz.

Sinsheimer: I think he is. I really do. I’ve tried to educate him but I don’t know whether he . . . well he may have thought it was just my idea of secrecy. And of course [Chancellor] Robert Stevens has now educated him further . . .

Jarrell: Yes. I heard this morning on the radio, just on another subject on President Gardner, that . . . Bill Domhoff who is the President of the [UCSC] Academic Senate apparently came back from Berkeley and he reported that he had talked to President Gardner, and it was likely that he would appoint an acting chancellor for Santa Cruz because he wanted to take a long time in selecting a permanent chancellor because of the particular problems of Santa Cruz.

Sinsheimer: Well, I think Robert’s [Stevens] experience . . . see, it comes back to something I think I mentioned once before. Certainly my sense is that [President] Gardner feels and maybe any president would feel differently towards the chancellors he’s appointed than the ones he’s inherited. Since he appointed Stevens he feels some responsibility. Of course he didn’t appoint me and he didn’t feel any responsibility towards me. Since he deliberately appointed Stevens and since it hasn’t worked he probably does wonder, why didn’t it
work? And he’ll have to look further. He really doesn’t have much choice, it
seems to me. He can’t get a new chancellor for the fall, it’s too late, so he’s got to
have an interim chancellor. Now how long is another question. I had a chance to
see him just very briefly and I told him I thought he should get an interim
chancellor as soon as possible because you’ve got a situation that’s very
awkward, obviously. But secondly I felt that you don’t want an interim
chancellor too long. An interim chancellor is a lame duck from the day he takes
office. It perpetuates stagnation; it’s just a stagnant situation. Can’t make long
term . . .

Jarrell: It kind of revives that whole public perception of Santa Cruz as this sort
of quirky, ungovernable, difficult problem campus.

Sinsheimer: Yes, well it is! There’s some truth to it, I’m sorry to say. Well, I’m
sorry the R&D Park idea didn’t happen. I think it would have been a good thing
for the University and a good thing for the community. It was a good idea but it
didn’t work.

Town and Gown Relations

Jarrell: The whole issue of the University’s autonomy . . . It was interesting how
immediately that got raised. Some people perceived the University like another
country so to speak and . . . and I think that raised a lot of hackles.

Sinsheimer: Well, . . . it may raise hackles because people don’t understand the
structure of governments in the state. There is the state, then the counties, cities
and then there’s the University of California, well not just the University of
California. There are many other state institutions as well. And they are not
subordinate . . . since they are state entities they are not subordinate to local
entities. UCSC is not Santa Cruz City College. It’s the University of California
and it doesn’t serve the Santa Cruz community in the same way that Cabrillo
College does. It serves the people of the state. It seems to me quite properly not
subject to local ordinances. It would make no sense to me if it were. Of course
historically, as you know, the people of this community eagerly solicited its
presence here and I continue to find and found that the present attitude toward
UCSC is very benighted, I might put it. There isn’t any other word for it. They
should be so proud of having it here and pleased to have it here and instead they begrudge it.

**Jarrell:** It’s so interesting, as that has emerged, that difficulty . . . that, you know David and Goliath—the big University and little Santa Cruz and all that. At the same time the regents have been involved in the process of selecting a new site for a new campus and I’ve been watching in the *San Francisco Chronicle* as various towns and municipalities mount these expensive campaigns . . .

**Sinsheimer:** They tumble all over themselves trying to get a UC campus. Well, so did Santa Cruz.

**Jarrell:** That leads me into town and gown relations during your decade. How did UCSC and Santa Cruz get along?

**Sinsheimer:** Well . . . you can take two points of view about that. One is that they deteriorated, or that they were terrible when I came and it took me a while to realize it. Obviously as long as the campus wasn’t growing, there were no issues. Although I have to say when I first came here I learned about the promise by the county to build the eastern access road. I raised this issue, and I got brushed off by the local officials. You know I couldn’t make a strong case for it as long as the campus wasn’t growing at that time.

**Jarrell:** But just to clarify something. Is it true that the county in fact, in writing promised the University that it would build the eastern access road?

**Sinsheimer:** Of course it did. It would build a six-lane road. To the junction of Highway 9 and River Street. It’s in writing. But, you see that’s an interesting point, and I hope when UC eventually builds a new campus they will have learned something. At that time relations with the community and the county and everything were so happy they never put a date; they didn’t say when they would build it. Obviously they should have said it would be built by 19—X. But they never did. I discussed this with the general counsel’s office . . . in theory the University could take the county to court but first, it’s not going to do that for political reasons. Second, even if you did, by the time you got this thing dragged out through the county planning commission and so forth, the county would have to build the road but they could drag this out forever, if they didn’t want to do it. Because it’s an impractical solution.
But anyway, then I guess the next time I really came up against the local opposition was the R&D Park and Measure A.\textsuperscript{8} And it’s interesting, I was still naive . . . Then it became clear that the campus really had turned the corner and was really growing, and one could project that we would really exceed 10,000 students and we could reach 15,000 in a foreseeable time, I went down and I remember talking to [Mayor] Mardi Wormhoudt. I thought I ought to apprise her of this. I remember saying to her that this was a real opportunity for this town; that Santa Cruz could become something absolutely unique in California, which was a real university town, like Cambridge, like Oxford, like Princeton. Which none of the others can do. I mean, San Diego is part of San Diego.

Well, she was non-committal and then of course as you well know . . . I said the same thing to [Supervisor] Gary Patton. It soon became clear that they were mighty unhappy about the University growing. They didn’t want any more people here. This in a way struck me as perverse, because their biggest supporters were the students. If they had more students they’d have more voters, but they just had this anti-growth ideology; they [had on] total blinders as far as I’m concerned. Then they started using the [Long Range Development Plan] LRDP and the [Environmental Impact Report] EIR as threats; they would sue if we didn’t provide enough mitigation, whatever that was supposed to be.

I have to say that at this same time, the University ran into problems in San Francisco. UCSF had purchased that Fireman’s Fund Building and they were going to make it into a laboratory building.

\textbf{Jarrell:} Yes.

\textbf{Sinsheimer:} I’m afraid, to be honest, they weren’t entirely candid with the people of the neighborhood. When the plans became known, and they filed an EIR and so forth, the neighbors really got upset. I’ve forgotten the exact details but my impression was that the neighbors brought suit saying that the EIR was inadequate. I think the University won that suit but then they lost on the appeal. This got the University very cautious about EIRS; they realized they really had to be very careful . . . they could lose in the courts if they weren’t really candid and

\textsuperscript{8} Measure A was a ballot referendum in November, 1983, asking that UCSC submit its proposed Industrial Complex to municipal planning procedures—Editor.
really detailed in regard to mitigations and so forth. So that caused the University to pay a lot more attention to EIRS.

Now in the development of the one for UCSC they placed a big stress on demonstrating, which you could certainly do, that the campus simply had to grow for educational reasons. I remember going through some calculations before I left that suggested the number of boards, departments and so on that you would want to have in any well-rounded University. These should be adequately staffed so you had some breadth and depth in each department. When we added all that up that we came out—and these are rough numbers—that you had to have on the order of 800 to 1000 faculty. That meant that you had to have 15 to 20,000 students. That’s a sound kind of educational logic and is certainly a legitimate base for them proposing a certain size and . . . you might say, what’s that got to do with an EIR, but it does, the way they contort it. And then of course I wasn’t here when Robert [Stevens] struggled through all this with the City of Santa Cruz to arrive at some kind of orderly growth. I was not happy that he settled at 15,000. I don’t think the City should have the right; it’s entirely arbitrary. But they did the same thing at UC Santa Barbara. They settled for a 20,000 limit, which I think was a bad mistake. I don’t know about here, but certainly for UC Santa Barbara, the mandate came from University Hall.

Jarrell: No one could have fathomed twenty-five years ago that these local governing bodies would be scrutinizing the enrollment figures of a UC campus which they originally courted, and . . .

Sinsheimer: And which everybody understood would be 27,500. Well, it’s a totally different . . . well, you see it’s a wholly different set of people governing now. Well, several things happened. Many of the people who live here now—Gary Patton is certainly one, Mardi Wormhourdt is another . . . are refugees. They are refugees from the Silicon Valley or Los Angeles or wherever and they are determined that Santa Cruz shall not grow. They saw it happen in these other places and they are not going to allow a repeat. Then the students vote, which was not anticipated when that came in 1970. Most of the students here come from urban areas, that’s where people live.

They see all this and they think, “Oh, this [town] should stay this way.” It’s sort of ironic. I remember when we were discussing the growth of the campus and
the students were unhappy about it. In fact that goes back a long ways, as you may know. When there were just two colleges they were opposed to building Crown and Merrill, and that’s continued. It’s an extremely selfish position. Now that we’re here, nobody else should come. Now of course they believe in democracy and of course they want more minority students and so forth, but they don’t want to have any more students. It’s not a consistent attitude. So the no-growth people here have been able to count on the support of the students, which has helped them. I have a very ambivalent attitude; I don’t think students should vote at the University. I think they should vote where they live, at their home because here they are transients. They don’t have any long-term stake in this community. The long-term future welfare of the community doesn’t matter to them. If there’re bond issues, they don’t have to pay; they won’t be here to pay them off. Obviously when the vote was given to 18-year-olds people weren’t thinking about university towns. In many other towns it doesn’t matter. I mean if 25,000 students at UCLA vote in Los Angeles, what difference does it make?

Jarrell: But here it has weight.

Sinsheimer: But here it has huge weight. But there’s no way you are going to change that.

Jarrell: So the reality of student political clout, and its tendency to be liberal, anti-growth, environmentalist, certainly exacerbated tension between the University and these municipalities, not in terms of Gary Patton and Mardi Wormhoudt but in terms of the larger community.

Sinsheimer: Yes. Also when I first came here at least, there was a certain kind of hippie element in the community and the University was blamed . . . people didn’t think they were students, but they thought the University had attracted them. Also there’s the fact, frankly, that the University, in addition to its financial impact is the biggest employer and the biggest source of income. For many people it doesn’t provide that much in the way of benefit, I guess you’d say. I tried while I was here to generate things for Santa Cruz, to develop more things, to make the art programs at least more accessible and have more of them in the community. That was one way we could interact with the community. I think a number of people here thought when the University came that there would be big football games and so on (laughter) and that we don’t have. There’s no
question that that is an attraction at other campuses. I’ve seen this at UC Santa Barbara. The townspeople really come to the basketball games there. They really have adopted the Gauchos. You could say, well what’s that got to do with an educational institution? Not a lot, but it does provide one kind of tie to the community.

Jarrell: That’s right. And it’s an emotional connection also and it can kind of smooth over some of the other natural tensions that are going to exist between these two groups.

Sinsheimer: Yes, it gives a different group of people a reason to value having the University there.

Jarrell: Yes. So certainly Shakespeare Santa Cruz was one way to kind of establish a commonality, to transcend this . . .

Sinsheimer: For instance I . . . arranged that the conductor of the Santa Cruz Symphony would have an appointment on the campus so that we could put together a much better package and get a better person. I think the relationship between music and the campus has improved town/gown relations. I really worked at that. I served on the board of the symphony. So that there are ways, particularly through the arts, of trying to tie into the campus. Things like that to some extent, I guess, can mitigate the unhappiness that I know part of the community felt with the University for the reasons you’ve already indicated. That the students now dominate the voting and introduced a political machine . . . certainly the business community isn’t terribly sympathetic to those aspects of UCSC’s presence.

Jarrell: But the business community thrives by virtue of the University being here.

Sinsheimer: But you see what’s happening in this community is Santa Cruz per se has been so anti-growth and anti-business that many businesses moved to Capitola and Scotts Valley and . . .

Jarrell: Yes, and Santa Cruz post-University and now post-earthquake, the City of Santa Cruz . . .
Sinsheimer: Is a disaster.

Jarrell: It’s very, very unclear if there’s going to be any way to restore it to health.

Sinsheimer: It’s not clear to me given the [anti-growth] policy.

Student Activism

Jarrell: Well to continue from yesterday, we’ve talked about town-gown relations, which now leads me to student activism, which was quite active during your tenure.

Sinsheimer: It certainly was.

Jarrell: What comes to my mind right away is the student anti-apartheid movement, which impacted UC in the issue of divestiture. How did student activism affect town-gown relations and your tenure?

Sinsheimer: Well, student activism was an ongoing matter (laughter). Every year you could almost make a short list, one of these would be a cause for student unrest, sit-ins, what have you. I remember, when I hadn’t been here more than a couple of weeks, school had started, and there was this rally in the [Library] courtyard outside. What was it about? Well there was a professor who had been denied tenure the previous spring. He was gay and the students were upset because they thought that was why he had been denied tenure. Of course I didn’t know anything about it. I wasn’t even here then and they wanted me to reverse it. I finally agreed that I would look into it. I did look into it and I was satisfied that there was nothing wrong. The tenure was denied on proper grounds and I announced that. That triggered the first sit-in. It took awhile to go through all this and by that time it was about December and then I had to say well, what was I going to do about the sit-in. I was sure this wasn’t going to be the last sit-in. There are two things you can do. You can adhere to the letter of the law if you want, that the students are trespassing after 5 p.m. or whatever, and have them arrested. That has its own consequences. One is that of course then generally there is a lot of student sympathy for the arrestees. By now the students are more involved and the whole thing can snowball. Secondly, I was aware of the fact that the previous spring there had been a major sit-in over, I guess, an
institutional racism issue of some kind and Chancellor [Angus] Taylor had had several hundred of them arrested. If you arrest these people they are entitled, if they wish, to individual trials and that would have clogged up the courts in Santa Cruz for months and cost hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars so, of course it was all dropped. The prosecutor didn’t prosecute. So I was well aware of this, which made me realize I had no real authority here. The chancellor is responsible for all this but he can’t really do anything about it. I mean the students really have virtual impunity, unless they do something really drastic. So anyway, I adopted the policy that I would tolerate the sit-in as long as it did not disrupt the functioning of the chancellor’s office.

In effect it was symbolic, and a little bit of a nuisance but as long as it didn’t disrupt the working of the office, okay. That worked in the sense that as I expected the students were soon tired of just sitting there and I remember one day, we had the usual Christmas party for the staff at University House and I brought some leftover cookies to the sit-in and that ended it. Of course the students had to go home for Christmas. I adopted that policy pretty much throughout. In fact there was only one occasion where I ever had students arrested. That was when they blockaded the entrance to the campus I had told them if they did that I couldn’t tolerate it; you can’t allow students to prevent the entrance of other students and visitors and whatever. But they went ahead and so I had them arrested and then I expected of course that they wouldn’t be prosecuted. But it was the only way it had to be . . . the blockade had to be broken.

The Anti-Apartheid and Divestiture Movement

The divestiture issue was a difficult one for me because in principle I was in favor of divestiture, personally. But it’s not my decision. It’s the regents’ decision. I didn’t have any influence with the regents on an issue like that. It’s purely an investment decision on their part. So the students were sitting in and I don’t know, I guess they thought somehow through me they would be putting pressure on the regents, but I didn’t have any pressure to put on the regents. So I just sort of went along with it. Let me say that although I was in favor of divestiture, I was not necessarily in favor of exactly what they wanted which was “Divest Now.” It seemed to me it had to be a phased operation. You can’t just dump all that stock on the market. But in principle I thought the University
should divest. There are some other cases where they carried it to extremes, where we had this Wells Fargo Bank automatic teller machine on campus, as a convenience to students. Then they were objecting because Wells Fargo was doing business in South Africa. Then I looked into it and it turned out there were some eight to nine hundred students and staff on the campus who used this teller. And didn’t they have any rights? It wasn’t that I was supporting Wells Fargo or not; all I was doing was letting them put this teller up. So I refused to take it down. What we did do was bring in another one from the credit union so if people really objected to Wells Fargo they had an alternative. I don’t think anybody switched that I know of. So it was a matter of one group of students trying to take away, I don’t want to call it a right, but a privilege of other students. The divestiture thing, the sit-in in McHenry Library of course got really out of hand. It just went on and on.

**Jarrell:** The students lived in the library lobby for weeks.

**Sinsheimer:** Part of the problem was that the student leadership kept changing and we would meet with the leadership and come to an agreement. They’d agree to end the sit-in in a given period and by that time there was new leadership. This happened about three or four times; every time we worked out an arrangement. I have to say I was about ready to have them arrested when they finally did move out. I mean just to get them out of there. It couldn’t go on forever. It was by far the most protracted sit-in. At that point I was kind of locked into a pattern of not having students arrested. But it was inconvenient and highly unsanitary. They did not block the entrance to the library; they did not block the entrance to the chancellor’s office. They knew that was off-limits. They could not interfere with what other students were doing. That wouldn’t be allowed.

**Jarrell:** With a big demonstration like that, whom would you work with in terms of maintaining order?

**Sinsheimer:** I usually worked through Bruce Moore, the Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs.

**Jarrell:** And then he would talk to the students, and you together would talk to the students?

**Sinsheimer:** Yes.
Jarrell: And you made clear to them that you had no authority in this matter [of divestiture] at all.

Sinsheimer: Oh yes. But they were trying to make a symbolic point or something.

Jarrell: Did you feel impatient or frustrated by this?

Sinsheimer: Well, I didn’t feel it was a very intellectual way of dealing with the problem. It was a purely kind of emotional response. It doesn’t really get the problem discussed and in the case of divestiture it was an issue over which I had no control anyway. A tenure decision you could say, well I did have some, obviously I had made or supported the decision. So that you could argue that their inconveniencing me, that’s what it was, might have had some effect. But obviously it was not going to have any effect and they should know that. I don’t know, I guess I’d have to say a priori, I’m not one that’s particularly sympathetic with that form of student activism. I think students certainly have the right to express their opinions and have rallies and speeches and discussion and what have you, but I don’t think it should take the form of what is actually trespassing.

Jarrell: When you were at Cal Tech were there student protests or sit-ins or anything like that down there?

Sinsheimer: Never. I say never and that’s . . . certainly as far as a sit-in. The one time students really became agitated there was during Cambodia. That was the only time things got to the point of real disruption and what we did was sort of cancel classes for a day and had a teach-in and things of that kind. But, it’s a different group of students . . . they are much more, I would have to say more serious-minded. They’re more science and engineering oriented. They are very much absorbed in their studies. They work harder. I have to say I always took the student activism here, from one point of view as an opportunity to try to teach, to educate. It does provide that opportunity. Again, I say I don’t think it’s the best way of going about it. But you can try . . . for example in the divestiture thing, you can not only discuss the issue of divestiture, but teach them how the University operates and who has the authority to make these kinds of decisions. As you know that whole thing got settled politically by the governor.
Jarrell: It certainly was the biggest controversy to hit the University since the Free Speech Movement and the Vietnam demonstrations.

Sinsheimer: I think in terms of numbers of students it probably was. I went to several regents meetings during that time and the students really besieged the regents. They had to have hundreds of police around.

Jarrell: They televised this. I remember watching the regents meetings on the television. Around how they were going to decide on this issue.

Sinsheimer: Yes, they had hundreds of police around. There was one regents meeting that was going to be here at UCSC that got moved because the police felt they couldn’t contain it here. It was too open.

Jarrell: I didn’t know that. Or I’d forgotten that. So they decided against meeting here.

Sinsheimer: Yes. Because they just felt that they could not guarantee the safety of the regents.

Relationships with Students

Jarrell: Also I’m interested in how you conducted your relationships with students, the way you held office hours and just some of your experiences and your feeling about how effective you felt you were in dealing with student concerns and issues.

Sinsheimer: Well, as you’ve indicated, I did have open office hours. I started them when I came here and I continued them. To be honest I found I was a little disappointed with them in the sense that I had thought students might come in and want to discuss divestiture or something like that.

Instead, it turned out that most students came in either because they had a gripe, which was usually some specific gripe, or because they wanted support for some activity. Over time I institutionalized my responses to those. As you know we finally decided we needed an ombudsman, and I could refer a lot of complaints and so on, some of which were legitimate for the ombudsman to handle. There was no need for the chancellor to get involved. The requests for support from the chancellor’s discretionary funds were often legitimate, but again it wasn’t a
matter I could deal with personally so I set up a committee and formalized it and you could make requests by a certain date to the committee and the committee would evaluate the requests and decide which to fund. So those things were institutionalized. But beyond that there weren’t very many students who came in and wanted to really discuss . . . an important matter.

Jarrell: So the way the students made use of the time you made available was perhaps not too effective?

Sinsheimer: That’s what I wanted to say. But I continued that because I thought the opportunity should exist.

Student Government

Sinsheimer: As I think I’ve mentioned before, I felt there was a serious problem in contact between the chancellor and the students in part because there was no student government. There was nobody who spoke for the students. City on a Hill did not speak for the students. It spoke for one small sector. Each college had sort of a student council, but to meet with eight student councils was really very difficult. There was nobody who could speak for the whole student body, no elected student president or whatever. I encouraged the formation of a student government and I did that not long after I came, and that didn’t fly. Then finally again later on. I mean a chancellor couldn’t initiate it but I would encourage it. Once there were students who wanted to initiate it I encouraged it and gave them money to do what they had to do.

Jarrell: Why didn’t it work out?

Sinsheimer: I think the problem was that the individual colleges didn’t want to give over their authority, as they saw it, to a central student body. What finally got worked out was a political compromise where the central student union has some authority but a lot of things still have to be referred to a student on a particular college council. But at least there is now a central body and my suspicion is that over time it will become more potent. Also another thing that was coming forward at the time was that we were beginning to get campus-wide student organizations—the Black Student Organization, the Asian American students, and so on, which were not college-based but were campus-wide. But they had no home. They had nobody to report to. They had to find a college that
would house them . . . Again, we needed this campus-wide student entity which could sponsor, if you wish, those organizations, provide them with offices and so on. That is now solved by the existence of the Student Center. So I thought all those things were desirable to have. Now I would try to meet regularly with the officers of the student associations. Keep each other informed.

**Jarrell:** So that maybe eventually there could evolve at Santa Cruz a more conventional student government for the whole campus?

**Sinsheimer:** Yes.

**Jarrell:** Yes. I am curious. Do you remember Aaron Peskin who was a visible student activist during some of your tenure here?

**Sinsheimer:** Yes, I remember Aaron Peskin. (Laughter) Pesky.

**Jarrell:** Would you say something about Aaron Peskin. Aaron Pesky?

**Sinsheimer:** Aaron Pesky we used to call him. Well, Aaron . . . he was not the only one. I always marvel, frankly, at some of the students who came here right out of high school with a firm belief that they knew how the University should be organized and run. A lot better than the chancellor, a lot better than the faculty, a lot better than UC. They just had their own ideas . . . He wasn’t the only one. So Aaron really wanted to change everything. No matter what the issue was he was against it.

**Jarrell:** Against the administration?

**Sinsheimer:** Against the administration’s position on it, and usually the faculty’s position on it. For a little while I think he had some success with some of the students. But after a while I think some of the students got tired . . . and he became very belligerent. He got in a fight with one of the campus police one time. It was silly. I mean the campus police here are very docile, gentle people with the students. I think they do very well. I don’t know whatever finally happened with Peskin but . . .

**Jarrell:** He graduated.
**Sinsheimer:** Well that’s what usually happens ultimately and they probably become lawyers and . . .

**Jarrell:** I think I read an article about him, that he was an advocate in behalf of preserving land up in one of the Northern California counties. But I believe he has a sibling.

**Sinsheimer:** Victor Peskin. Who is still here. But Victor I thought was more reasonable than Aaron. Aaron was just . . . belligerent and he was completely dogmatic. You couldn’t talk, discuss with Aaron. But he wasn’t the only one. He had predecessors. I remember one student, and I can’t think of his name but he had been very outspoken about narrative evaluations and grades and so on and the faculty finally voted in a way he didn’t like. He was so upset. I remember Brewster Smith was the chair of the faculty at the time. This student came up to Brewster and was just so distraught. And Brewster said, “Look, you’ve got to learn. You win some. You lose some.” I mean this kid just . . . he couldn’t bear that he didn’t get his way. Jeff Ringel was his name. But Peskin wasn’t the only one.

**Jarrell:** Yes. They were just notable.

**Sinsheimer:** Well I always had a feeling that some of them . . . particularly the students in sociology or political science regarded activism as kind of a student laboratory, to try out some of the organizing ideas. And I have to also say, the activists were aided and abetted by some of the faculty. I mean people like Michael Rotkin and a couple of others were really behind the scenes; almost invariably every time there was a sit-in or something there were faculty behind the scenes. I don’t mean they were giving them direct orders but they were guiding . . .

**A Month in the Life of a Chancellor**

**Jarrell:** I’d like you to give a really impressionistic, typical month in your life as chancellor, the meetings, travel, etc.

**Sinsheimer:** Okay. Well a typical month would involve at the beginning of the month usually chancellor’s meetings. When I first came here I started going up to Berkeley in the morning and returning in the evening and I found that
exhausting. So I started going up the night before so I was fresher in the morning. I didn’t have to drive through two hours of rush hour traffic to get there. But that was an important meeting. It had an agenda and policy issues sometimes and upcoming issues were discussed. The chancellors could compare what was going on on the different campuses.

Then, toward the middle of the month there would be a regents meeting and the chancellors were expected to attend all regents meetings. In the early days they were all either in San Francisco or Los Angeles and then they started moving around on the campuses. Those were generally for a day and a half. They would be all day Thursday and Friday morning. We got in the habit of having a chancellors meeting with the president during the evening before where we would go over matters, discuss what was coming up at the regents meeting. One’s involvement in the regents meeting was very valuable even though the chancellors don’t talk. You’re not a member of the regents but you may be called upon if there is some issue that concerns your campus or if you . . . are presenting something about your campus. But it is an opportunity to meet the regents, to see them, to discuss policy and understand the basis for their views. You get to know some of them personally, to have lunch with them. Usually there was a dinner, almost always a dinner, and often the chancellors’ wives would be invited and so you got to know them socially. I think that’s important, particularly for a place like Santa Cruz where . . . I was a strong advocate of the regents returning to meeting on the different campuses because it was very clear to me that a clear majority of the regents had never seen this campus. They’d never been here. You know . . . it’s very different. You’d have a very different sense if you’d been here than if it’s just a name, a dot on the map. I felt that was disadvantageous to the UCSC campus. There would usually be one or two other meetings during the month where I would have to go to Berkeley because I was on some systemwide committee or I might need to meet with one of the vice presidents about some issue.

Then on the campus, of course, well as I think I’ve told you. Typically we would have four or five events at University House a week. I tried to arrange every Monday to have lunch with six or eight faculty. We would just pick or six or eight . . . kind of go around and in that way get to meet and talk with all the faculty and find out what was going on, what was on their minds. Usually the
academic vice chancellor and I would meet with them for lunch. Then there would usually be at least a couple of dinners during the week, friends of the campus, potential donors, foundation members . . . visiting firemen, (laughter) whatever. Then probably there would be one or two, it seemed like an infinite number of receptions. Of course at the beginning of the year we had receptions for all the new students. There would be receptions for the graduate students, for new faculty, for special awards.

Jarrell: Who was overseeing your social calendar? . . .

Sinsheimer: Karen had some hand in it but my secretary did a lot.

Jarrell: Yes. And who was that?

Sinsheimer: Judy Bandtell was my secretary for a long time. After she left, Carol Brock assisted in this. We had somebody at University House who organized things for our social events.

I would usually be at my desk before eight in the morning. I usually tried to work in my study . . . if I could do it I would work at my study till about ten and not make any appointments before ten. The day was spent with appointments. There was always somebody who wanted to see me about something. There were regular meetings. I would have a regular meeting for two or three hours with the chancellor’s staff, with the vice chancellor and immediate staff. There would be fairly regular meetings with one or another [Academic] Senate committee. Usually there were a number of ad hoc committees going on at any given time. Then there would of course be individual faculty or staff. I met with the academic vice chancellor nearly every day. After I came back from the regents meeting I would, of course I would report to the chancellor’s staff and vice chancellor.

Then there was a lot of correspondence; there’s an endless flow of paper, things that have to be signed, things that have to be answered, things that have to be read. The regents meetings produced an enormous amount of paper. Plus all these committees would produce reports and (laughter) they had to be read. Then of course the budget, I mean . . . I had to meet with Wendell [Brase] a couple of times a week or so on budget matters, particularly in the early years when the budget was in a dire situation. Then there were community events. As I
mentioned, I was on the Santa Cruz Symphony board. But there were other community events; I went to dinners honoring this or that; I would give talks to the Rotary, to the Elks, to the Lions, to the Chamber of Commerce. Sometimes I’d try to go to the Rotary lunch, just to get out and meet people.

**Jarrell:** Did you personally enjoy this very enormous social dimension of being a chancellor?

**Sinsheimer:** How can I put it? I didn’t dislike it. But it’s not something I would have chosen. I mean it’s not my natural tendency . . . to this degree. I’m not a hermit but at University House you’re not only involved, you’re up front and . . . not just a passive bystander. I most always made some remarks at these gatherings. If you’re having a dinner you’re circulating among the guests beforehand. We realized that round tables work much better than rectangular tables so we really tried to do round tables, eight or ten at each table. Karen would get one and I’d get the other and we keep the conversation flowing and switch tables in the middle and all that kind of thing. That way everybody got a chance to talk with us.

As you can guess, I realized very early on that I couldn’t do it all. There’s constantly more to do than you can possibly do given a twenty-four hour day. There’s almost no time off. I came to realize that one of the things I’d always enjoyed at Cal Tech was the coming of commencement, the summer was always yours. You weren’t teaching, you were doing research, but you were really a free person. Here at UCSC’s commencement the other day . . . I went to work the Monday after commencement and it was as if nothing had happened. In fact July was one of the busiest months because that’s when you got your budget. The only quiet month was August, and that was about the only month you could take any vacation. Then it seemed like the day after Labor Day everything went back in gear.

I had very good health. I think I hardly ever missed a day. If you did you’d just get so far behind I don’t know what you’d do. You asked me if I enjoyed it? I have to admit that toward the end it began to get repetitious. We were going through the same cycle all the time. The sixth time you do it it gets a little cut and dried. (laugh) It’s new for them, of course. As you know we had nine
commencements. I used to try to get to four or five or them. I couldn’t get to nine because they were overlapping. And I always did the graduate commencement.

Jarrell: Yes. Did you have any idea that the chancellor has so many ceremonal and symbolic responsibilities?

Sinsheimer: I realized that clearly there would be ceremony and symbolism but I must confess I didn’t appreciate the magnitude. Some of it was very enjoyable like entertaining some of the visitors where it was quite interesting. Harold Wilson, the former British Prime Minister, the Dalai Lama, Carl Sagan, Tom Wolfe, George McGovern, I mean, yes it was very interesting. Gore Vidal, I remember. (inaudible)

Jarrell: How did Karen participate and help you in all of this?

Sinsheimer: She’s very sociable. She’s very good at making people feel at ease, at keeping conversation going; she was very good at that. She became very much involved with the community and did a great deal to improve the relationship between the campus and the community. Especially in the arts. She started Shakespeare Santa Cruz and got it off to a good start, and was involved with the arts council and the historical society and I can’t remember what all . . . I think her participation in the community surprised and pleased people. She really got involved in a very significant way, in a very helping way and I think people do appreciate that. She really enjoyed herself, and thrived on it.

Jarrell: Is there anything more you want to say about a typical month in your life? It got a little tedious at the end but you kept up with it.

Sinsheimer: Oh yes. In a way it was always interesting. Of course often it was very difficult. Either because there were student issues or faculty issues or budget issues. There were always issues that had to be dealt with and usually you didn’t have the resources or the authority to resolve them. Or some of them were unresolvable. All you could do was patch it. Some of them were in a way, intrinsically difficult issues that had to be thought through carefully. Since this campus is somewhat younger than the others, some things you could solve because in effect they’d been solved before at another campus as part of systemwide policies. But they didn’t always apply too well to this campus.
(inaudible). Of course a lot of things come down to personnel. I found personnel issues one of the most vexing.

**Jarrell:** In terms of your own staff?

**Sinsheimer:** Well in terms of my staff and the campus’s, I mean dealing with personnel problems. There were always personnel problems. People weren’t doing their job or didn’t fit in the job or had various difficulties and they’re hard to deal with. You have to be fair and at the same time recognize the institution has to have a priority. I’m sure it’s not just at the University but to me the Peter Principle seemed to apply quite a bit—people rise to the level of their mediocrity, or something like that. Then you have to solve these problems within a lot of constraints. Your authority is very limited. For somebody to be . . . actually dismissed you have to have an incredible paper trail. I guess what I’m saying is that these problems were difficult, they were vexing, there was no particularly good outcome and it took a huge amount of time and effort.

**Revising General Education Requirements**

**Sinsheimer:** I’ve made a number of proposals. One thing I tried to do was to get them to reform the general education code. The general education requirements had become very loose, very vague. They had set up a certain number of requirements and then Course A would be set up which met this requirement and then another course met that requirement and then there were more and more. It reached the point where a student could take a total hodge-podge of stuff and it would meet the requirement. I wanted the number greatly pared down and a much better codification so that it achieved some breadth of education, but also some depth and not just a complete random mish-mash of courses. So this proposal got taken up in the [Academic Senate] education committee and they modified it and came forward with a proposal which was something like what I wanted but not really what I wanted. It got voted down. It wasn’t accepted by the senate. Some years later they came back to it and put in their own which I’m not sure was much better. The chancellor’s view was just one more view as far as they were concerned.

Another matter that I proposed a number of times that got nowhere was to use the colleges to introduce [academic] diversity. Why couldn’t different colleges
have different graduation requirements, so that all the students in, let’s say Crown College had to have a year of calculus, for example. They didn’t buy that. The senate didn’t want that . . . I just think there’s a lot of inertia and a lot of just division on this campus, that makes it hard to get a consensus on much of anything.

The Semester System

Sinsheimer: Another matter, almost trivial, if you want . . . I don’t feel strongly about it one way or another, but as you know the campus is on the quarter system. I thought we ought to at least consider returning to the semester system since Berkeley was on it once again. I think for two or three years I sent a letter to the chair of the senate, asking if the senate would please consider this issue. They wouldn’t even take it up. But let me be clear, I don’t have any strong brief one way or the other. If you look around the country, half the schools run one way and half run the other.

Jarrell: Yes, I always thought that that would be a good idea for Santa Cruz because of, for instance, the narrative evaluation system. That means that you are going to have three sets of narrative evaluations instead of two. It’s an enormous amount of labor.

Sinsheimer: Well, there are a lot of reasons. Administratively, I think there are clear advantages to a semester system. There’re two starts, two stops. Academically, the humanities people seem to prefer the longer semester. They think it takes longer to do the subject. The science people seem to prefer the quarter system. They can cover more topics. As I say, I don’t think it’s a big issue but I couldn’t even get a hearing. The faculty didn’t want to waste the time to discuss it. Obviously I don’t think the chancellor should have the right to go to a semester system. I do think the chancellor should have the right to propose new initiatives. We did finally, for example, get that program in computer engineering through but it took probably two years of discussion in the senate and so on to get it through.

Jarrell: How did that initiative begin in terms of your participation?

Sinsheimer: Well I kept pushing it. Fortunately the dean [of Natural Sciences] was in favor of it and we had a program in computer and information science
and . . . while they would probably have preferred to see augmentation of their particular program, they couldn’t really make a strong argument against computer engineering, since they were getting enormous enrollments at that time in that field and it was obvious that this was becoming a hot field and something we should be into with Silicon Valley nearby. I shouldn’t complain in the sense that we did get it through. On the other hand it always seemed to me something that was almost so obvious you should have been able to do it in a few months. My feeling is that the University has tied itself up in very Baroque procedures. For example we have all these six levels of assistant professors and six levels of associate professors. These levels are (inaudible). Nonsense why . . . Harvard and Stanford can get along with three levels of faculty, so why do we need twenty? Why do we need that sort of nonsense? Well, those are minor gripes. Except I do think the chancellor needs more authority. For instance, it’s almost impossible to expel a student.

Jarrell: Really?

Sinsheimer: Oh, unless they’ve murdered somebody. The procedural requirements are just horrendous. Again, I don’t think the chancellor should be completely arbitrary, but he does need more authority to impose discipline. People think the chancellor has this authority. When there’s a bunch of student sit-ins people downtown are saying well why can’t that chancellor just kick them all out? Exactly. Hah! He doesn’t have a chance to kick them out.

Jarrell: Right, I mean it’s rhetorical but that’s their perception.

Sinsheimer: I’m saying there’s a difference between expectation and responsibility even in authority. If a student gets raped on campus, the campus has failed in its responsibility to protect the student. I don’t know what they would expect, that we would have policemen on every floor of the dormitory? I am raising the issue of public expectations.

Jarrell: To return to something you said earlier, that this campus will become more like the other research campuses in the University system, less a stepchild?

Sinsheimer: I think it will become less anomalous. The fact that we have no professional school is another problem and hopefully that will change. Someday
we’ll get one. That would add balance to the campus, make it a little more practical.

Jarrell: Do you think the fact that you’re a scientist has been an ingredient in the faculty opposition to you?

Sinsheimer: To some degree, perhaps in the sense that . . . scientists do not play a large role in the [Academic] Senate, because they don’t bother with it. So the senate then becomes dominated by the humanists and the social scientists. To some degree I suppose that they may have felt that I was one of “them” or . . . I don’t think all of them felt that way, certainly, but that may have been a factor.

But I don’t want to convey some impression that I was always at odds with the senate, because certainly that wasn’t true and I think I was able to work well with most of the senate committees. The senate . . . when the senate itself gets together then an awful lot of speech making . . .

Jarrell: No, I’m just interested in those areas where you were saying for instance that the chancellor does not have authority in curriculum matters and that you nonetheless made initiatives that were not well received.

Sinsheimer: Sometimes. A few of them were. There were cases we did start something fresh . . . (inaudible) economics. So I don’t mean to say they weren’t always well received but I do feel that the chancellor really . . . it would be much better if he in some way, with some checks and balances, could take initiatives on his own. Even if he . . . he probably wouldn’t have to do it very often if the senate knew he could do it. Because they would be more . . . attentive. (Laugh)

Jarrell: Yes, they’d take it more seriously.

Sinsheimer: I think you may hear similar things if you get to talk to Robert Stevens. I think some of his frustrations were the same.

Jarrell: Well in terms of any other academic developments, or achievements or initiatives . . . there’s the computer and information science program developed when you were there . . .

Sinsheimer: What other things did we do?
Jarrell: Yes.

Sinsheimer: Well we went through a period of much growth, as you know. In addition to the computer science program, I think we really greatly strengthened the seismology program, the linguistics program. I think we made some major improvements in anthropology, and in economics. We made some strong appointments in physics, and got some good young people started in biology, I believe. I think the Shakespeare Santa Cruz program was a shot in the arm for the theater arts program. Having the Baskin Arts building was a big help for the whole arts program which had been pretty scattered all over the campus. I don’t think I should take the credit, but I think History of Consciousness was developed very well during that time due to Hayden White.

Jarrell: It had been pretty moribund.

Sinsheimer: It had been pretty moribund. Psychology was good when I came and they made some good changes too.

The Chancellor’s Role

Sinsheimer: Well there’s a lot of conflict. I tended to view the chancellor’s role [as] the one person who is charged with the welfare of the whole campus. Everybody else has their piece—a college, a division, a discipline, an athletic program. The chancellor is the one person whose responsibility is everything. That means he needs to try, both to be informed about everything but also to achieve a balance, he’s responsible for achieving some kind of balance. It seems to me that each person is concerned with their little piece or big piece; the chancellor needs to provide some leadership, some larger vision or goal. If there’s to be any major innovation—and obviously each discipline should provide its own innovation—it has to come from the chancellor. Now, as you say, how could [the role] be changed or should it be changed? As I see it, the chancellor of course has the symbolic and the articulation roles and all that other stuff.

Fundamentally the basic problem with the job is I think the chancellor has far more responsibility than he has authority. And this to a degree that is close to being unworkable, more so perhaps on this campus than on some others. We can go into why that’s so. But if you were to ask me how would I change it, I know
what I would like to see done but I don’t know how to begin to get it done. See, what’s happened is that the so-called shared governance which the University prides itself on . . .

**Jarrell:** Between the administration and the faculty?

**Sinsheimer:** The administration and the faculty is a recipe for stalemate. It’s a little bit like the checks and balances between the president and Congress, if you want, but that often results in a stalemate, too. The chancellor can veto if he’s got control of the money; he can propose, but he can’t implement unless the faculty agrees with him. You can say well that’s the job of leadership to persuade the faculty to agree with him. Then that gets back to the question of can you do that, and particularly on a campus like this which is very fractured. I think it’s easier on a campus like Berkeley, let’s say, which has a long tradition and has sort of evolved ways of getting along helped by accepted standards, accepted criteria. Even there I think there are dangers, it does periodically fall into stagnation in different areas. It’s not as good as it could be, given the money (inaudible).

I think this campus is much worse because given its curious origins, you have a segment of faculty that were brought here in the early years who really bought the collegiate idea, who came here and are still here, believing that their mission was exclusively, or almost exclusively, to do undergraduate teaching. Of course that’s not the mission of the University of California as we’ve discussed. Well that’s an incredible conflict. I think that with time that’s dwindling. Their numbers are dwindling in some ways, but I felt when I was here maybe a quarter of the faculty had that view. For example, I was very surprised when I came here that many of the boards, probably a majority, didn’t have graduate programs. I thought that was a temporary matter, but I soon found out they didn’t want them. That’s certainly not true at Berkeley or at Irvine, for example. That makes it much harder to achieve any kind of consensus or agreement. How would I change it? I don’t know how you could pragmatically, but I think it was a bad mistake when the regents, many years ago, gave the Academic Senate control of curriculum. I think the chancellor needs to have the authority, with some checks, you know, not just willy-nilly, but ultimately the authority, for example to initiate a new program. Even if the [Academic] Senate says it doesn’t care for it. The chancellor needs to have that kind of authority. I just cite that as an example.
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