In most aspects of government policy, history matters. This is especially important in programs involving lumpy and costly investments with long, useful lives and where political consensus is difficult to achieve. The importance of history—or the path dependency of policy—is nowhere more apparent than in federal housing policy. John Weicher observed in 1980 that housing programs “can only be understood from a historical perspective” (Weicher 1980, p. 3). A quarter century later, having served in managerial and policy positions in three national administrations, Weicher was even more convinced of the importance of historical accident in understanding current policies (Weicher 2006).

In this chapter, I deliberately ignore this path dependence. Instead, I ask, What housing policies would we create if we were starting from scratch? I concentrate on subsidies for rental housing. Rental housing represents a small fraction (about a third) of federal government support for housing, and the configuration of current policy is less dependent upon the political choices reflected in the original income tax statutes passed by the Congress in 1913. Of course, even in rental housing, one cannot completely ignore history in thinking about or advocating good policy, so a brief history of federal subsidy policy toward rental housing is in order.
Background

Programs

Direct federal expenditures on housing began with the Public Housing Act of 1937. The law, which was intended to “remedy the acute shortage” of decent housing through a federally financed construction program, sought the “elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing.” Infrastructure investment in big cities was good fiscal policy in an economy with 17 percent of its workers unemployed, and the program provided shelter for some of those “temporarily” unemployed in the Great Depression. By some accounts, public housing was thought to be transitional housing, to be occupied by households for short periods of time until they could enter the economic mainstream.

For the next quarter century, low-rent public housing was the only federal program providing housing assistance for the poor. The dwellings built under the public housing program are financed by the federal government but are owned and managed by local housing authorities. The rental terms for public housing specified by the federal government (in return for financing) ensure occupancy by low-income households, currently at rents no greater than 30 percent of household incomes.

This program of government construction of dwellings reserved for occupancy by low-income households was supplemented by a variety of programs inviting the participation of limited-dividend and nonprofit corporations in the 1960s. These latter programs directly increased the supply of “affordable” housing but not the stock of government-owned housing. A series of programs offering loans at below-market interest rates to nonprofit and cooperative builders (in 1968), rent supplements on behalf of selected households (in 1969), and rental assistance (Section 236 of the National Housing Act of 1970) provided funds to developers to amortize investments in new housing while charging low-income tenants no more than a fifth or a quarter of their incomes in rent. These capital subsidy programs, designed for a low-interest-rate environment, proved unworkable as interest rates increased, and the programs were suspended in the early 1970s. But housing capital is long lived, and near the turn of this century the nation’s housing stock still included more than half a million units subsidized by these programs (HUD 1998).

Section 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 increased participation by private for-profit entities in the provision of housing for the poor. The law provides for federal funds for the “new construction or substantial rehabilitation” of dwellings for occupancy by low-income households. The federal government entered into long-term contracts with private housing developers, guaranteeing a stream of payments of fair market rents for the dwellings. Low-income households paid 25 (now 30) percent of their incomes on rent, and the difference between tenant payments and the contractual fair market rent was made up by direct federal payments to the owners of the properties.
Crucial modifications to housing assistance policy were introduced in the Section 8 housing program: the restriction that subsidies are paid only to owners of new or rehabilitated dwellings was weakened and ultimately removed, and payments were permitted to a landlord on behalf of a specific tenant (rather than by a long-term contract with the landlord). This tenant-based assistance program grew into the more flexible voucher program introduced in 1987. Households in possession of vouchers receive the difference between a locality’s “fair market rent” and 30 percent of their incomes. Households in possession of a voucher may choose to pay more than the fair market rent (estimated regularly for each metropolitan area by the Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD]) for any particular dwelling, up to 40 percent of their incomes, making up the difference themselves. They may also pocket the difference if they can rent a HUD-approved dwelling for less than the fair market rent.

In 1998 legislation made vouchers and certificates portable, thereby increasing household choice and facilitating movement across regions in response to employment opportunities. Local authorities were also permitted to vary their payment standards between 90 and 110 percent of fair market rent. The 1998 legislation renamed the Section 8 program the Housing Choice Voucher program.

In thinking about current housing policy choices, it is important to recognize that until thirty years ago, housing assistance to low-income renters was inextricably tied to investment in the construction of new dwellings. The voucher and certificate programs drastically reduced HUD’s role in building housing for occupancy by low-income renters. It also reduced direct federal expenditures in building new dwellings for low-income households. But other forces increased the indirect subsidies provided to the construction of new housing to be occupied at low rents.

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 limited the power of state governments to issue tax-exempt debt to finance infrastructure investments for private purposes. Accordingly, state bonds issued for multifamily housing construction were limited in the legislation. However, the law also established the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program to provide direct subsidies for the construction or acquisition of new or substantially rehabilitated rental housing for occupancy by lower-income households. The LIHTC program permits states to issue federal tax credits that can be used by property owners to offset taxes on other income or can be sold to outside investors to raise initial development funds for a project. To qualify, a specific proportion of a project’s dwelling units must be set aside for lower-income households, and rents for these dwellings are limited to 30 percent of the tenant household’s income. Qualifying owners may elect instead to set aside 20 percent of units for households with incomes below 50 percent of the median income in the local area, or they may set aside 40 percent of units for households with incomes below 60 percent of the area median. Qualification requires that these units be earmarked for occupancy by lower-income households for a period of thirty years.
The aggregate amount of tax credits authorized by the LIHTC program has been increased several times since its inception, to $1.75 a person in 2002, with automatic adjustments for inflation annually since 2003. With these adjustments, LIHTC credits increased to $1.95 per capita in 2006. Federal tax-credit authority is transmitted to each state, on a per capita basis, for subsequent distribution to developers of qualified projects.

The amount of tax credit that can be allocated to a specific project is a function of its (nonland) development costs, the proportion of units set aside for lower-income households, and its credit rate (4 percent for projects that are also financed by tax-exempt state bonds and 9 percent for other projects.) The credits are provided annually for ten years, so a dollar of tax-credit authority issued today has a present value of six to eight dollars.

The Home Investment Partnership (HOME) program, authorized by the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, provide some additional funds for supply-side rental programs. Funding through the HOME program comes as a formula block grant to local governments for the construction and renovation of rental housing and for tenant-based assistance (as well as the construction and renovation of owner-occupied housing and assistance to home buyers). The HOME block grant provides great flexibility to local governments in choice of programs, requiring a set-aside of funds for nonprofit community housing development organizations (see O'Regan and Quigley 2000).

Since funding began in 1992, jurisdictions participating in the HOME partnership have chosen to allocate about half of their grant proceeds to rental housing, but allocations to rental housing have been systematically reduced over time (to about 40 percent in 2002). Only 1 percent of grant proceeds are used for tenant-based rental assistance. Annual funding for the HOME program was $1.4 billion in 2004 (Turnham and others 2004).

Expenditures

Direct expenditures, tax expenditures, and guarantee costs are all public subsidies and thus liabilities of the federal treasury. However, only direct expenditures are observable in the annual budget adopted by the federal government. The budget reports government outlays (that is, actual expenditures) in any fiscal as well as budget authority (that is, the aggregate federal commitment of public funds available for expenditures in current and future years).

Table 9-1 reports the net budget authority and federal outlays for low-income rental assistance administered by HUD during the past three decades. As indicated in the table, federal expenditures on low-income rental housing (public housing, project-based assistance, and vouchers) since 1976 have more than quadrupled in constant dollars—from $7.9 billion to $31.5 billion. Despite this large increase in expenditures, net budget authority issued by Congress has declined substantially, by about 40 percent during the period, from $62.3 billion...
in 1976 to $24.7 billion in 2007. This reflects the gradual shift in low-income housing assistance from project-oriented to tenant-oriented subsidies. New long-term commitments under production-oriented approaches were sharply curtailed in the early 1970s, but preexisting commitments under the public housing and Section 8 new-construction programs continue to provide shelter for a substantial number of low-income households.

Table 9-2 illustrates the evolution of new federal commitments for subsidized rental housing through the late 1990s using dwellings as the units of observation. Two trends are apparent. First, the distribution of subsidy commitments between newly constructed and existing dwellings has changed markedly. In 1977 two-thirds of new funding commitments went to new construction. By 1997, almost three-quarters of new federal commitments were made to preexisting units. Second, the net number of new federal commitments for housing has plummeted—by more than two-thirds from 1981 to 1997.

1. For some reason, data on subsidized units are no longer regularly published by the Department of Housing and Urban Development or by the House Ways and Means Committee.
The legacy of previous program commitments, of course, means that the current mix of subsidized dwellings includes a larger fraction of dwellings newly constructed for occupancy by subsidized low-income households. Table 9-2 also reports these trends through the late 1990s. During the period covered, the number of subsidized renter households living in preexisting housing increased more than tenfold, to more than two million, but in 1997 more than 60 percent of subsidized renters lived in dwellings that had involved new construction at the time subsidized occupancy began.

For the more recent period, the available data reflect the growing importance of the voucher and certificate programs using the existing stock of housing. Table 9-3 reports trends since the turn of the century. During the past seven years, reliance upon vouchers and certificates increased from two-thirds to three-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>New construction</th>
<th>Existing housing</th>
<th>New construction</th>
<th>Existing housing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>247,667</td>
<td>127,581</td>
<td>1825</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>214,503</td>
<td>126,472</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>231,156</td>
<td>102,669</td>
<td>2,052</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>155,001</td>
<td>58,402</td>
<td>2,189</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>94,914</td>
<td>83,520</td>
<td>2,379</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>48,157</td>
<td>37,818</td>
<td>2,559</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>23,861</td>
<td>54,071</td>
<td>2,702</td>
<td>955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>36,719</td>
<td>78,648</td>
<td>2,836</td>
<td>1,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>42,667</td>
<td>85,741</td>
<td>2,931</td>
<td>1,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>37,375</td>
<td>85,476</td>
<td>2,986</td>
<td>1,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>37,247</td>
<td>72,788</td>
<td>3,047</td>
<td>1,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>36,456</td>
<td>65,295</td>
<td>3,085</td>
<td>1,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>30,049</td>
<td>68,858</td>
<td>3,117</td>
<td>1,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>23,491</td>
<td>61,309</td>
<td>3,141</td>
<td>1,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>28,478</td>
<td>55,900</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td>1,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>38,324</td>
<td>62,595</td>
<td>3,204</td>
<td>1,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>34,065</td>
<td>50,593</td>
<td>3,196</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>29,194</td>
<td>66,907</td>
<td>3,213</td>
<td>1,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>19,440</td>
<td>25,822</td>
<td>3,242</td>
<td>2,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>16,259</td>
<td>36,696</td>
<td>3,293</td>
<td>2,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>14,027</td>
<td>36,134</td>
<td>3,305</td>
<td>2,051</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

quarters of HUD outlays. In real terms, voucher outlays increased by almost 30 percent, while outlays for public housing and project-based assistance declined by 20 percent. Table 9-3 also shows a marked decline in the growth of renter subsidies in the recent past. Since 2000, rental housing subsidies have increased by about $3.5 billion in real terms, or about 1.7 percent a year.

Table 9-4 summarizes comparable information on federal government tax expenditures for rental housing. Tax expenditures for low-income households include tax credits distributed for the construction of low-income housing under the LIHTC and the foregone revenue on tax-exempt multifamily housing bonds. The LIHTC program has grown from $1.2 billion in 1991 to $4.1 billion in 2006 (in 2006 dollars). Multifamily housing bond programs adopted by the states are smaller and declined from about a billion dollars to half that over the same period. In part, this reflects cyclical declines in interest rates, which have reduced spreads, making these bonds less attractive to investors.

For comparison, the table also presents the tax expenditures arising from the special treatment of capital gains on owner-occupied housing. This tax expenditure (which reflects the fact that capital gains on owner-occupied housing are accorded a special exclusion provision) is many times larger than the tax expenditures on rental housing reported in the table. Tax expenditures associated with capital gains for owner-occupied housing are estimated to be $39.8 billion in 2006, as compared with tax expenditures of $4.5 billion for rental housing. Tax expenditures for capital gains on owner-occupied housing are currently about 25 percent larger than federal outlays on all HUD subsidy programs.

2. The table does not report the tax expenditures attributable to the exemption accorded to the imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing (an additional $26.3 billion in 2004) or the costs of federal guarantees arising from secondary market activities in support of owner-occupied housing ($25.2 billion in 2004); see Jaffee and Quigley (2006).

Table 9-3. Federal Outlays for HUD Supply and Demand Side Programs, Fiscal Years 2000–07

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Supply side</th>
<th>Demand side</th>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Supply side</th>
<th>Demand side</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9,285</td>
<td>18,696</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8,625</td>
<td>23,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>9,370</td>
<td>19,143</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>8,259</td>
<td>24,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>9,967</td>
<td>20,780</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>7,908</td>
<td>24,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>9,278</td>
<td>22,959</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7,428</td>
<td>24,097</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a. Supply-side programs include public housing and project-based assistance; demand-side programs include certificates and vouchers.
Why Subsidize Rental Housing?

Why should the federal government take an active role in devising policy for rental housing? As noted above, the initial rationale for the provision of public housing was the “acute shortage” of decent housing coupled with the “recurring unemployment” of the time. A combination of idle resources in the economy and a lack of effective demand arising from a calamitous recession launched a program of government-sponsored housing production.

With the postwar boom in the American economy, the comprehensive Housing Act of 1949 emphasized the goal of providing “a decent home and a suitable living environment” and “decent, safe and sanitary housing” for all Americans. Improved housing conditions formed the rationale for subsidy policies, and progress could be measured by noting the extent to which inadequate housing was eradicated. In 1975 about 2.8 million renter households lived in “severely inadequate housing,” representing almost 11 percent of renter households. By 2001, the last year for which comparable data are available (see Quigley and Raphael 2004), the number of inadequately housed households by this standard had declined by 60 percent, and the fraction of renters living in severely inadequate housing was less than 3.5 percent of the population. Among dwellings affordable to the poorest households (those earning less than 30 percent of the local area median income),
the fraction of severely inadequate housing was about 5.3 percent in 1999, according to the Millennial Housing Commission (2002, p. 93). Among dwellings affordable to low-income households (those earning 50–80 percent of local median income), the fraction classified as severely inadequate was 2.9 percent. Physically inadequate housing is certainly a concern for some households, especially the poorest renters. But among the very poorest households, only 5 percent of those who pay less than 30 percent of their incomes on rent live in severely inadequate conditions.

Until quite recently, it was widely presumed that the external effects of housing and bad neighborhoods were large and that neighborhoods with high poverty concentrations where housing was derelict were themselves a cause of social problems. Well-known studies, by John Kain (1968) and William Julius Wilson (1997) among many others, strongly suggest that unemployment, crime, and social disorder are causally related to bad neighborhoods and inadequate housing conditions.

However, this confident consensus has been disrupted by three developments. First, a series of careful studies of specific outcomes (for example, Mayer and Jencks 1990; Oreopoulos 2003) has failed to find strong and systematic empirical evidence of a causal nature. Although some detailed studies of public housing have documented statistical relationships between program participation and individual outcomes, they have not distinguished between effects of household income (arising because resources are transferred to the beneficiaries of housing programs) and the influence of housing or neighborhood conditions (see Newman and Harkness 2002, for a discussion). Second, methodological research by statisticians and econometricians suggests that a causal link would be quite hard to establish scientifically, if indeed it existed. Third, extensive analysis of a real experiment in exposing households to better neighborhoods has failed to find much evidence of neighborhood effects.

In any case, neither numbers nor quality provide a convincing rationale for public subsidies of rental housing in this century, and the results of the Moving to Opportunity experiments underscore the advantages of demand-side housing subsidies, which facilitate dispersed residences. Indeed, this all seems well recognized now by politicians, scholars, advocates, and interest groups. For example, in its 2000 report to Congress, HUD emphasized high rent burdens as the source of “worst-case housing need” (HUD 2000). Since 2000, the Senate has directed

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3. This has been termed the “reflection problem;” see Manski (1995) and Durlauf (2002).
4. These Moving to Opportunity experiments, conducted in five cities from 1994 to 2002, are reviewed by John Goering and Judith Feins (2002). Jeffrey Kling, Jeffrey Liebman, and Lawrence Katz (2007) provide detailed evaluations: they review fifteen primary outcomes for adults and fifteen primary outcomes for youth and conclude that the experimental treatment had no effect upon the economic self-sufficiency of adults (in terms of earnings, welfare participation, and reliance on government assistance), little effect upon the physical health of adults, and quite mixed effects upon youth outcomes. In contrast, the effects upon the mental health of adults were consistently positive.
HUD to compile and report the extent of worst-case housing needs annually. Because the extent of substandard housing is so small, these reports are essentially estimates of the fraction of households in various demographic groups paying in excess of half of their incomes on rent (see, for example, HUD 2005). “Worst-case housing need” has evolved into another way of describing poverty.

Affordability is clearly the most compelling rationale for policies subsidizing rental housing. The high cost of rental housing, relative to the ability of low-income households to pay for housing, means that these households have few resources left over for expenditures on other goods—food, clothing, medicine—that are also necessities. Because housing represents a large share of household expenditures in market-based economies—for the middle class as well as the poor—small changes in the rent burdens faced by households can have large effects on their levels of well-being. Improved outcomes in a variety of dimensions almost certainly arise if housing programs provide increased discretionary resources to recipients by reducing rent burdens. The affordability of housing is a legitimate rationale for housing subsidy policies. Indeed, as noted above, it seems to be the only surviving rationale for a large-scale subsidy program for rental housing in the United States. This suggests that rental housing programs for low-income households ought to be thought of as a part of the U.S. welfare system—in the same way that we think of income transfers, food stamps, and the earned income tax credit as components of that system.

This perspective highlights the egregious failure of the current system of historically evolving housing subsidy programs—the horizontal inequity accorded to similarly situated, otherwise identical, households. Under current programs, qualifying households obtain rental housing subsidies through some random process. Households apply for housing assistance through local housing authorities. Despite widespread presumptions to the contrary, virtually all local authorities have long waiting lists—eleven months, on average, in U.S. metropolitan areas (HUD 1999). Gary Painter (1997) reports that, for the largest public housing authorities, waiting times average almost three years. Indeed, in some housing authorities, waiting lists themselves are often closed. This means that qualifying households can wait years before obtaining rental assistance. Some may wait years before receiving permission to join the waiting list. Independent housing authorities have their own systems for ranking eligible households. Most authorities adopt some sensible procedure for granting priorities, but selection onto the waiting list and selection from the waiting list have many of the characteristics of winning the sweepstakes.

Compare this with the process of obtaining food stamps or medical assistance under Medicaid. Households are deemed eligible on the basis of income, household size, and other demographics (such as disability), and all eligible households qualify for assistance. The only form of welfare assistance that is awarded under the sweepstakes model, rather than the entitlement model, is rental housing. Given that housing expenses represent a large fraction of the incomes of low-
income households, the inequity is even more glaring. Some fraction of eligible households receives a large subsidy; a larger fraction receive nothing. The distribution is capricious. For example, under current rental subsidy policies, more than 70 percent of households below the poverty line are not served, and more than 40 percent of the households who are served are not in poverty (Currie 2006; Olson 2003). This is indefensible.

For 2003, it was reported that 32.8 percent of renters with reported earnings of less than 30 percent of local median income (roughly $18,500 for a family of four) received housing assistance, and 19.3 percent of renters earning 31–50 percent of local median income (up to about $32,000) received housing assistance (HUD 2005, pp. 50–55; also see table 9-5). Among the lowest-income households, that is, the 9.1 million renters with incomes below 30 percent of the local median, more than 6 million receive no housing assistance. Of those 6 million who are unserved, almost 5 million pay more than half of their incomes on rent.

Viewing rental housing subsidies as a part of the modern welfare system is very different from conceptualizing these subsidies as a part of an infrastructure investment program—the rationale for the program seventy years ago. Ensuring equal treatment of eligible households as part of a national welfare program is inconsistent with a policy of using rental subsidy funds to build innovatively designed new

### Table 9-5. Rent Burdens and Subsidies for Low-Income Renters, 1978–2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Poor&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Very poor&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renter households (n)</td>
<td>10,682</td>
<td>13,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter households spending &gt; 50% of income on rent (n)</td>
<td>3,226</td>
<td>5,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisted households (n)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income below cutoff</td>
<td>2,094</td>
<td>3,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisted households (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If targeted</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisted households spending &gt; 50% of income on rent (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If targeted</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, 
dwellings to be rented at below-market rents—at any conceivable budget. And the reason is obvious.

The cost of providing decent-quality housing through new construction is obviously much greater than the cost of providing it by using the existing depreciated stock of housing. This fact is well known to builders and developers, who almost never target new construction of rental units to the bottom half of the income distribution. (And this fact is also quite well known to slumlords, who offer small quantities of housing services to the poor, using the oldest and most obsolete portion of the housing stock.)

These cost differences in shelter provision for low-income households were thoroughly documented in conjunction with the Experimental Housing Allowance program a quarter century ago (see, for example, Mayo and others 1980). More recent analyses by the Government Accountability Office (2001, 2002) suggest that the first-year costs of subsidizing rental households through new construction programs are from 49 to 65 percent more than the costs of subsidizing the same households using vouchers, and the present-value life-cycle costs are from 19 to 38 percent more than the costs of voucher programs for comparable housing.5 No conceivable budget that sought to cover all renters below some low-income cutoff could make provisions for the expenditures required to provide newly constructed housing for assisted households.

A New Rental Housing Policy?

It is not clear that a rental housing subsidy program faithful to the analysis in the previous section could be implemented. In starting from scratch, there are many changes to existing programs to be considered.

First, eligibility rules for rental housing assistance would need to be tightened. Under current law, households with incomes below 80 percent of the area median income adjusted for household composition are eligible for rental housing subsidies. In 2006 this was an average cutoff income of $52,075 for a family of four. In contrast, current eligibility for food stamps for four-person households is confined to those with incomes less than half as large ($25,164). Eligibility for the earned income tax credit is limited to households (with one or more children) earning a third less a year ($37,263). Eligibility for rental assistance would have to be tightened considerably to replace a national lottery program with an entitlement program for housing assistance for very low income renters.

Second, passage of an entitlement program would require considerable support outside the policy community, and the continuity of the program would be prob-

5. Indeed, the recent analysis by Kling, Lieberman, and Katz of the Moving to Opportunity experiments concludes that these treatments pass the cost-benefit criterion because “the intervention[s] produced large mental health improvements and because other research suggests that it is cheaper to provide a unit of subsidized housing with vouchers than in a public housing project” (2007, p. 108).
lematic. One way to increase support, and to reduce administrative costs as well, would be to follow the politically successful program of subsidy for homeownership by using the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to determine eligibility and to distribute the benefits.

Currently, the multibillion dollar subsidies to homeownership in the United States are distributed largely by the IRS. Individual taxpayers need not report the dividend (that is, the imputed rent) on owner-occupied housing at all, and capital gains on sales are accorded special treatment in the computation of tax liability (on schedule D, by following the instructions on worksheet 2). The distribution of these large subsidies ($29.7 billion in 2006 from the imputed rent exclusion and $39.8 billion from the capital gains exclusion) is relatively painless. However, the subsidies provided under the tax laws for owner-occupants are not refundable to the taxpayer. Instead, the subsidy is paid implicitly as a credit against other tax liability.

In contrast, the earned income tax credit is fully refundable to the taxpayer. Eligibility for the credit can be established online. Alternatively, the IRS will establish eligibility and will compute the credit due—and they will also send along a check—to any qualifying taxpayer. A refundable credit is not hard to administer.

In fact, there is already a housing program administered by the IRS that could be the template for this low-income housing subsidy program. The Mortgage Credit Certificate program authorized by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 entitles selected homeowners to claim a tax credit for some portion of the mortgage interest paid in any year, rather than the tax deduction afforded other homeowners. A taxpayer in possession of a mortgage credit certificate issued by a unit of state or local government merely checks a box on his or her tax return (on line 54 of form 1040) and submits a brief form (form 8396, eleven lines long) to claim the non-refundable credit.

To claim the low-income housing subsidy under the program proposed here, the taxpayer would need to submit a form issued by a local housing authority and check a box added to the current IRS form 1040. The form would simply certify that the household was renting a dwelling that met the minimum habitation standards imposed by the current voucher program. That form, together with the income reported by the household, the number of dependents in the household, and the postal address of the household, would be sufficient to compute the credit due any household. The computation could be made by any taxpayer (online) or by the IRS, as is the case with the earned income tax credit. Of course, the computations could also be made by any commercial tax preparer. The private sector would have an incentive to help in the administration of the program. The appro-

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7. See Greulich and Quigley (2003) for a detailed discussion.
appropriate credit could be mailed in monthly installments to the low-income household or to its landlord (or to the local housing authority, for that matter).

Details

Of course, myriad details would need to be addressed before this sort of reform could be implemented. Households move during the year, and a changed postal code might entail a different fair market rent and area median income. Children are born; dependents are added. This means that settling up the monthly rent entitlement on an annual basis requires careful administration and attention to detail.

Then there is a question of costs. The precise costs to the Treasury depend upon two factors: the income cutoff for assistance and the payment standard employed. The income cutoff is conventionally represented as the ratio of household income to area median income (both adjusted for family size). The payment standard under the current voucher program is the HUD-computed fair market minus 30 percent of income.

Table 9-5 presents historical data from the worst-case housing needs reports for poor and very poor renter households. As the table indicates, from 1978 to 1989 there was an increase in the percentage of poor households (that is, those with incomes of less that half the local median) paying more than half of their incomes in rent, from 30 to 38 percent. The percentage of poor households spending more than half of their incomes on rent has remained roughly constant, averaging about 40 percent, since the late 1980s. For 2001 and 2003, these worst-case reports also indicate that rent expenditures among very poor households (earning less than 30 percent of the area median) are about 55 percent of income.

The table also reports the fraction of these households assisted by low-income housing programs. This fraction increased from 1978 to 1989 and then remained roughly constant at 26–28 percent until 2003. The table also reports the fraction of these low-income households who could have been assisted if all rental housing assistance had been targeted to them. As the table indicates, targeting would have increased the population of assisted households, among those with less than half of local median income, by 6 percentage points in 1995 and by about 12 percentage points in 2003. Finally, the table reports the fraction of households in this category spending more than half their incomes on rent and the estimated fraction if housing assistance had been targeted to the class. The portion of income spent on rent by these households would have been reduced by about 6 percent in 1995 and about 12 percent in 2003. If this targeting had been directed toward the very poorest of renters—those with incomes below 30 percent of area median—the fraction

8. These trends are confirmed using census data for renter households with incomes below the poverty line; see Quigley and Raphael (2004).
spending more than half of their incomes on rent could have been reduced from about 55 percent to less than 20 percent in both 2001 and 2003.

Greater precision in the targeting of subsidies would increase program costs for the same number of households served, since lower-income households receive more assistance. Without detailed information on the distribution of households by income across housing markets, it is not possible to reliably estimate the costs for any expansion of a more targeted program. However, some crude information is available from the 2000 census that may provide a rough estimate of costs. The census provides a national tabulation of household incomes and rents paid (HCT56, from the SF4 sample data). Household incomes of less than $20,000 were below 32 percent of the national median income (in 2000, for a family of four), and households in the lowest reported class, earning less than $10,000, had incomes below 16 percent of the median.

If a tax credit were introduced to subsidize households with annual incomes below $20,000 by paying them the difference between their reported rents and 30 percent of their incomes, and if this voucher payment were made by the IRS to all qualifying low-income households, the cost would be about $22 billion (in 2006 dollars) for the households who received subsidies. (Of course, this is an overestimate, since many households voluntarily pay more than 30 percent of their income on rent in order to receive more or better housing.) If housing prices increased by 10 percent as a consequence of the program, the cost would be about $26.2 billion in 2006.9

The rent subsidy program would provide assistance to about 8.0 million households with incomes below 32 percent of median household income, as against the assistance to 3.0 million households with incomes below 30 percent provided under the current programs (in 2003). The additional 5 million very poor households served would cost about $4,400 each. But savings could be achieved by withdrawing subsidies (slowly, to be sure) from the 3.2 million higher-income households currently subsidized by rental assistance programs and by redirecting costly rental construction programs (for example, the LIHTC, which costs $4.0 billion a year).

Of course, there is nothing sacred about a cutoff of 32 percent (or 30 or 16 percent) of median income. Nor is there any particular normative significance in the definition or computation of fair market rent.10 The budget (any budget) can be accommodated—as an entitlement, beginning with the poorest households.

The introduction of the rental housing subsidy program outlined above would not be sufficient to replace all existing rental housing programs or the collateral

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9. If, instead, the credit were introduced for households with incomes below $10,000, it would cost $10.7 billion ($13.0 billion if rents increased by 10 percent).

10. Indeed, fair market rent was originally an estimate of monthly rent at the fortieth percentile of the rent distribution. It is now an estimate at the fiftieth percentile.
functions of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The vigorous enforcement of equal opportunity in housing, for example, is a precondition to the functioning of an expanded voucher system as an entitlement program for low-income renters. Low-income disabled households have special needs that could not be satisfied by participation in an expanded voucher program. Some fraction of the homeless is not only poor but disabled as well. These individuals require housing in a supportive environment that can best be provided collectively by government. These considerations flow from recognizing that housing subsidies are better considered as a part of a welfare system, not an infrastructure investment program.

One aspect of current HUD activities would have to be increased substantially for this reform to be successful. Currently, HUD devotes some resources to the removal of regulatory barriers to the construction of new housing. Much of this activity consists of the identification of regulations and practices that increase housing costs, including zoning, building codes, and administrative processes. More federal resources would have to be devoted to removing local regulation that drives up the cost of new construction.11

Conclusion

Is this proposed reform a big change, or just a minor tweak, to existing rental subsidy policy? Under current law, local authorities are required to provide three-quarters of new rental subsidies to households earning less than 30 percent of local median income. This suggested reform would target a specific income cutoff and provide national entitlement to households of lower income. Under current policy, about three-quarters of HUD housing outlays are for demand-side subsidies, and the long-term trend has been to reduce systematically the importance of construction and supply-side subsidies. The proposed reform would accelerate this trend and would eliminate construction subsidies, but perhaps not tomorrow. Current policy uses local housing authorities as the rationing agents for housing subsidy, a legacy of the public housing initiative of seven decades ago. This reform would apply a national standard to determine eligibility and to award the subsidy. Local authorities would continue to inspect dwellings and certify compliance.

The device of achieving this through the IRS and a refundable tax credit is clearly a gimmick, employed, in part, to place the subsidy off-budget and to avoid the annual appropriations cycle. But the gimmick has proved to be successful and effective for other interest groups, even in the allocation of subsidies for housing.

11. See Quigley (2007) for a discussion.
It has worked quite well for upper-income homeowners and for builders.\textsuperscript{12} It is worth trying for the poor.\textsuperscript{13}

The major barrier to this kind of reform would be the interests that could be offended by a simple and streamlined program providing vouchers as an entitlement. This is, of course, a major reason why history matters in the real world. Some builders might not immediately see such a program as really in their interest. Some local governments that currently use rental housing subsidy money to build ambitious urban monuments would object to such a program, and, of course, some government servants who would be made redundant might object to the program. All these interests are important players in the world of housing policy, and their potential objections are to be taken seriously.

However, the economic problem is that housing is unaffordable to low-income households, and they face extremely high rent burdens. We should transfer resources to those households so they can live in decent housing at expenditure levels they can afford.

References


\textsuperscript{12} Of the 46,335,237 individual tax returns filed in 2004, for example, 617,728 reported incomes in excess of $500,000. Of these, 421,141 reported home mortgage interest deductions totaling $11,245,360,000 (IRS 2006, table 2.1) At prevailing federal tax rates, the home mortgage interest deduction for the richest 1.3 percent of taxpayers yielded a revenue loss of $7.3 billion. This is between a quarter and a third of the total cost of the entitlement described above for all renter households with incomes below $20,000.

\textsuperscript{13} This device might also lead to a closer integration of housing subsidy policies and other parts of the welfare and income transfer system; see Fischer (2000).


