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States and Their Expatriates: Explaining the Development of Tunisian and Moroccan Emigration-Related Institutions

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Abstract: Although immigration obviously requires prior emigration, very little work in migration studies examines states of origin. In addition, most research that is concerned with a labor-exporting country generally examines either social networks or the impact of remittances and worker absence on families or home communities. Brand argues that just as immigration policy should be understood as more than simply the nature of border controls and visas, emigration policy should also be analyzed from a broad perspective. This includes political, economic, and cultural policies and practices of the home state that deliberately target some aspect of its expatriates' lives. To better understand the bases of emigration policy, Brand explores the establishment and development of several state institutions in Morocco (a separate ministry for Moroccans abroad and the Foundation Hassan II) and Tunisia (l'Office des Tunisiens a l'Etranger). She examines various traditional explanations for the formation of immigration policy in receiving states (the economy, security, changing global norms) in order to determine their relevance to the emigration policies of migrant-sending countries.

The questions of why, when, how, where, and to what effect people move from farm to city, town to town, or country to country have received increasing scholarly and policy attention in the last ten years. Researchers across disciplines have sought to answer these and related questions, focusing on a variety of levels and units of analysis, and constructing or drawing upon myriad theoretical frameworks and empirical tools. While some have focused on the more micro level questions of individual decisions to migrate and their impact, often focusing on the economic cost-benefit calculations or push-pull factors, others have posed community- or societal-level questions, as they have sought to understand the cultural impact of immigration, historical aspects of the immigrant experience, and the possibilities for integration or assimilation in the new host country. In the fields of political science, international relations and the law, the focus has generally been on state response to immigration, with some locating their analyses at the level of the state and others seeking explanations in broad international political economy or normative changes.(1)

1 This paper was prepared for presentation at the Third Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence, Italy, March 20–24, 2002, Mediterranean Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute. No part of this paper may be distributed, quoted or reproduced in any form without permission by the author. For authorized quotation(s) please acknowledge the Mediterranean Programme.
If migration or immigration studies have been remarkable in terms of the diversity of treatment and disciplinary interest noted above, they have been conversely, in their majority, surprisingly limited geographically. Most of the work that has been done on the question of the permeability of borders, border controls, citizenship and migration or immigration (as opposed to work solely on citizenship) has focused on Western Europe and the United States. This has meant that not only has the work dealt overwhelmingly with the receiving countries, but also that the category of receiving countries has been that of, with variations, liberal democracies. This raises questions about the degree of generalizability of many of the findings of these studies, especially those regarding changes in the notions of citizenship and sovereignty.

The other striking conclusion that follows from this is that although immigration obviously requires a prior emigration, very little work of the total has in fact focused on the state of origin. There are some exceptions in the anthropological literature in which we find examples of studies of the impact of emigration on the families and communities left behind. With the increasing observation of and writing on transnationalism and globalization, there has also been increased attention to social networks that link sending and receiving countries. There are also economic or political economy studies that discuss the importance of remittances, as well as a few international relations or political science works that discuss questions of border control from both the sending and receiving sides. Nevertheless, the lack of more attention to the sending states, across disciplines, is striking.

In the field of international relations, one can assume that the traditional bias in favor of studying the super and great powers, the US and its western European allies, goes a long way toward explaining why there has been so little attention to the more recent sending states, the majority of which are part of the global economic “south.” The larger point here, however, is that even with the attention that a handful of scholars has devoted to various aspects of the sending countries’ economy, social structure, and culture, one cannot really talk about a developed literature on sending state emigration policy in the way one can clearly talk about myriad works on receiving state immigration policy.

Just as immigration policy can and should be understood as more than simply the nature of border controls and visas, so, too, should emigration policy be understood as far broader than considerations of whether states allow their own citizens freedom of exit. Emigration policy, as understood here, includes policies and practices of the home state in any arena -- legal, political,
economic, cultural, religious -- that deliberately affect or target some aspect of its expatriates’ lives. This should also be construed as policies potentially affecting dual citizens, former nationals, and even those of the second or third generation who are not citizens, but remain of interest to the country of origin. (4)

Joppke talks about the need to see the state not as a passive receiver of voluntary immigrants, but as a set of institutions that play a “constitutive role” in international migration. Here, in arguing that some states have consciously created cross-border movement, he is referring to “nationalizing states that expel unwanted religious, ethnic or political groups, ...colonizing states that set up dependencies overseas, or, in reverse, ...labor-recruiting states that either force or invite foreigners to fill jobs for which domestic workers cannot be found.” (5) Nevertheless, there is no theoretical or empirical reason to argue that we should limit our thinking regarding such constitutive policies of sending states only to policies of expulsion or forced migration. A much broader range of policies and practices should be included so that rather than viewing the sending states as largely passive exit points, they, too, may be understood as a set of institutions whose policies and practices play “constitutive role” in international migration.

In thinking about the receiving states Joppke argues that modern nation states are political communities with the right to self-determination, and that part of this right is the admission or rejection of new members. (6) It is worth considering what this means in the context of the sending state as well: under what conditions and using what sorts of policies may a state attempt either to maintain the membership of its expatriate citizens abroad or to break or reject those ties? Under what conditions may a state seek to let go, and under what conditions may it assert, reassert or reconfigure the nature of its relationship with its citizens, dual nationals or those who are no longer citizens but may still identify culturally or socially with the original home country?

One of the first arguments that no doubt comes to mind in thinking about home state interest in expatriates is an economic one. A structural, political economy framework is often used in studies of international migration. While there are numerous variations ranging from the neoclassical to the neomarxist, all share the understanding that the economic inequalities between states will lead to labor migration. Whether one views the triggering of such population movement as a rather simple supply and demand response in which both parties benefit, or as part of a more complicated set of unequal
relations in which emigration/immigration is both a symptom and manifestation of recurring and reinforcing patterns of unequal or dependent development, in both cases, the importance of the level (if perhaps not the use) of expatriate remittances to the sending economy is uncontested. Hence, economic analyses and common sense would suggest that sending states have a vested interest in implementing policies intend to ensure that remittances levels remain high. Programs that provide information and facilities to potential expatriate investors can, therefore, be fairly easily explained by rational actor model of a state acting in its economic self-interest. Institutions and programs involved in labor recruitment for foreign placement may be understood in the same way. One may even argue that cultural programs that seek to maintain ties of the emigrant generation and develop ties with the so-called second and third generation are really at base forms of cultivating continued attachment to the homeland that will keep the remittance and investment moneys flowing.

But can economic considerations explain fully the contours of emigration policy? Weiner reminds us “that international population movements are often impelled, encouraged or prevented by governments or political forces for reasons that may have little to do with economic conditions”. Moreover, “even when economic conditions create inducements for people to leave one country for another, it is governments that decide whether their citizens should be allowed to leave and governments that decide whether immigrants should be allowed to enter, and their decisions are frequently based on non-economic considerations.”(7)

Weiner’s emphases on the state and security are a welcome corrective to the international political economy literatures that downplay or ignore the state’s role in the context of globalizing economic trends and pressures. Nevertheless, they are insufficient. A decision by a state to expel citizens suggests (and often is) a final step in the state-citizen relationship. At this point, we begin talking about refugees, asylum, etc. (and, again, Weiner’s analysis focuses overwhelmingly on the impact on receiving, not sending, countries.) But as we are arguing here, emigration policy should be understood as having components far more extensive and lasting that an episodic expulsion decision. A consideration of emigration policy should not be limited to those cases in which the state-citizen or state-subject bond is completely severed. A focus on refugee-creating acts or policies, however important in increasing our understanding of conflict and security, nonetheless obscures or ignores the much more extensive processes of many states’ continuing involvement in their expatriates lives.
Indeed, as much of the recent migration/immigration literature now shows and the surge in diaspora studies indicates, the more common relationship is one of continuing, if reconstructed, ties between the emigrant and the homeland. Most of this literature, however, deals only in passing with the home state and its role, preferring instead to focus on the family, community, village level or immigration association level. The argument here is that the perpetuation or reconfiguration of ties between the expatriate and his/her homeland takes place in the context, not only of unequal international political economy relations or international security concerns, but also in the context of a state with a range of economic, political/security, legal, social, and cultural concerns.

A thorough exploration of what may be called emigration policy is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, here, one particular aspect of this policy will be explored: state institutions specifically designed and established to play a role in expatriate communities. Across the Middle East and North Africa and, indeed, well beyond, one finds examples over the past ten to fifteen years of new or restructured state institutions that are responsible for some aspect of emigrant affairs. In Jordan, expatriate conferences began to be held in the mid-1980s, were discontinued in 1989, and have recently been reinitiated in a different form and under mixed state-private sector, rather than solely governmental, auspices. In Lebanon, a Bureau of Expatriate Affairs that had been part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became a ministry in its own right in early 1990s. In this paper the focus will be on two North African countries and their institutions: in the case of Morocco, the Fondation Hassan II and the Ministry of Moroccans Resident Abroad (1990); and in Tunisia, the Office des Tunisiens à l’Etranger (1988).

This paper seeks to do the following. First as this section has set out, it problematizes the notion of immigration policy by outlining in at least a preliminary way the case for a much more full-fledged concept of “emigration” policy. Second, it focuses on one aspect of emigration policy -- formal state institutions designed to deal with expatriate affairs -- in Tunisia and Morocco. Third, through the exposition of the origins and development of these institutions it begins to develop an argument to explain their differential origins and evolution. We turn first to the background to these two cases.
Tunisia and Morocco: Setting the Stage and Posing the Question

Tunisia and Morocco are former French protectorates that both came to independence in 1956. Unlike their oil- and gas-endowed Algerian and Libyan neighbors, both were largely agriculturally-based and relatively resource poor. While significant differences did and do exist between the two, not the least of which are geographic area, population size and form of government (on which, more later) both began to experience significant outmigration for work in the late 1950s. Although Moroccan departures targeted a somewhat more diverse set of destinations, the majority of both communities’ expatriates went to France, a natural outcome of the former colonial relationship, as many former colonials who reintegrated themselves into European markets sought cheap and dependable labor from the sources with which they were most familiar. (9) This trend in outmigration to Europe accelerated in the 1960s and continued until the European states themselves placed brakes on the movement in 1974.

From independence until the slowdown in the 1970s, both governments used official bureaus to address the emigration question, largely in order to fill orders from abroad for qualified labor. In Tunisia it was the Emigration Direction Office under the Office of Professional Formation and Employment of the Ministry of Social Affairs. In the case of Morocco, these affairs were simply handled as a part of the Ministry of Labor. In both cases, the governments also negotiated labor and social security arrangements for their expatriate workers. Tunisia went a step further by sending abroad representatives charged with contacting employers and soliciting requests for Tunisian workers.(10)

Hence, what existed were in effect labor offices, whether at home or abroad, seeking to place and, at least minimally economically, protect expatriates. The states’ interests may be understood in direct economic and indirect economic security terms: the existing and potential economic contribution of the remittances to the developing economies were clearly understood, as was the role such emigration could play in reducing domestic unemployment. Thus the worker at home was a potential commodity and the expatriate a source of income. The contracts into which these states entered with various European states were meant to formalize and secure these interests.

Statistics placed the numbers of Tunisians resident abroad (TREs--Tunisiens residant à l’Etranger) at 610,000, about 7% of the total population in 1994. About 75% were in Europe, the majority in France. About 133,000 were in Arab countries, 73% of them in the Maghreb (most in
(11) In 1998, the picture had not changed much, as the numbers were estimated at 660,272 abroad (7.4% of the total population). (12) For Tunisia, remittances covered 42% of its trade deficit, 1986-93, and 24.8 % of its 1993 trade deficit.(13).

As for Morocco, going back to the 1968-72 five year plan, the regime set a goal of exporting the largest number of Moroccans possible in order to reduce unemployment at home, receive the highest possible levels of remittances, and constitute an important group of nationals with professional qualifications and entrepreneurial spirit.(14) Until the late 1970s, the vast majority of Moroccan emigrants lived in France. From 33,320 in 1962, their numbers jumped to 84,236 in 1968, 260,025 in 1975, and 431,120 in 1982.(15) In 1994, they numbered 1,344,421 in the EU member states, with just under 50% of them living in France.(16) And as for remittances, from 2,159.6 million dirhams in 1975, the level had climbed to 6,515.4 million Dr in 1982, and 16,537.2 million Dr in 1989. (17)

The importance of remittances only increased with the growing economic crises the two countries faced as they entered the 1980s. Morocco in 1983 and Tunisia in 1986 were forced to implement Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). The budget imperatives of such programs combined with their emphases on trade liberalization and attracting foreign investment should be seen as factors further driving the states to stimulate the flows of emigrant remittances and savings. In fact, with a view to attracting additional amounts of such savings, exchange controls in Morocco and Tunisia were relaxed and laws were changed to permit expatriates to open bank accounts in convertible Moroccan Dirhams or Tunisian Dinars. (18)

Hence, it is clear that economic considerations played a major role in both regimes’ approaches to their communities abroad. Yet, while such considerations may explain the labor recruitment offices and changes in certain banking and investment policies, there are other key institutions of the period that also must be considered. These were the Amicales or “friendship societies,” in both cases closely tied to the home regimes. While they did not necessarily reinforce the notion of expatriate as commodity, they certainly only superficially strengthened the notion of expatriate as citizen. Algerian institutions seem to have been at least the putative model for both the Tunisian and Moroccan amicales, although the Tunisian and Moroccan amicales seem never to have achieved the same weight or power as their Algerian counterparts.(19) While there is little written specifically about the amicales, the brief mentions they do receive indicate that their primary role was that of monitoring the communities in Europe.(19a)
Hence, it would seem that Weiner’s focus on security is more appropriate in understanding the role of these institutions.

In the case of Morocco, the regime was on guard against both anti-monarchist activity as well as any labor union activity. To fight against labor organizing efforts among its citizens in France, the Moroccan government created the Amicale des Travailleurs et Commerçants, with the support of big business. (20) Run by those close to the Makhzen -- the Moroccan state -- thereby replicating abroad the same patrimonial ties that alienated (when then did not frighten) Moroccans at home, the various branches of this official association carefully monitored Moroccan nationals. Concerned with the image of the country abroad, the regime sought to discourage social agitation by or among its nationals. There was no desire to complicate relations with the European host states, nor was there a desire to potentially import via returning expatriates ideologies and forms of activism that were not tolerated at home. And, in fact, Moroccans who were active in labor union struggles in Europe often encountered difficulties upon returning to the kingdom, having been denounced either by consular authorities or by members of the Amicales. Thus these institutions were in large part an extension of the Moroccan state’s repressive domestic policy during what have been called the “années de plomb.” (21) Information on the Tunisian amicales is sketchier, but they were also clearly extensions of the ruling party, the Parti socialiste destourien (PSD), and hence were viewed warily by non-PSD members of the Tunisian communities abroad. (22) Their primary functions appear to resemble those of their Moroccan counterparts: to penetrate and surveil the community abroad as an extension of the authoritarian state apparatus at home.

This, in brief, describes the nature of the Moroccan and Tunisian emigration-related state institutions in place until the late 1980s. Their economic functions are clear and would have been anticipated by the literature that focuses on the economic/structural elements that underpin or drive international migration. However, the existence of the amicales makes clear that political/security concerns were also key. Neither Tunisia nor Morocco viewed the expatriates as mere commodities or devisards. They clearly saw these communities as extensions of their home populations and hence included them as targets of security monitoring.

However, by the late 1980s, political changes were underway, as both countries appeared to be entering new eras. In the case of Tunisia, November 1987 brought the changement, the so-called constitutional coup that retired President-for-Life Habib Bourguiba and put in his place Zine Al-`Abdine
Ben ‘Ali. Ben ‘Ali quickly moved to reinvigorate and restructure a host of state institutions, including the sclerotic PSD. His regime also gradually changed the state discourse to one that emphasized citoyennete (citizenship) and partenariat (cooperation or partnership) between state and civil society. Hence, at least initially, it appeared that Tunisia might be on a new path, one that would offer a more politically liberal future. Similar, if less dramatic, developments were underway in Morocco, as by the late 1980s numerous indicators pointed to a gradual retreat of the worst elements of Hassan II’s previous repressive policies and a small but growing political opening that manifested itself in various organizational and expressional ways. It is at this juncture that both states instituted marked changes in the institutions with responsibility for the expatriate communities.

How may one explain these apparent departures? Given the timing of the occurrence of the changes, can their development be linked to broader international trends? Should one, for example, look into the realm of changing international norms regarding citizenship, human rights and democratization for the impetus to (at least ostensibly) take a renewed interest in their nationals abroad? May the domestic political processes -- apparent political liberalizations -- explain the developments? Should one instead look to the economic sphere, where concern over domestic economic crisis from which both countries continued to suffer meant that new measures needed to be taken if continued remittance flows were to be ensured? Or may the explanation lie in the security realm, as Islamist challenges across the region grew and these states sought to more carefully monitor their expatriates living beyond the direct reach of internal security?

A second but clearly related question is, whatever the impetus for founding a new institution or reconfiguring an existing one, how may one explain the subsequent course it takes? Are the same factors listed above likely accountable, or may there be more specifically domestic elements that have shaped institutional evolution? The discussion now moves to a brief discussion of several institutions and their evolution in order to answer these questions.

**Morocco: A Ministry for MREs and the Fondation Hassan II**

Remain Moroccan. Remain Moroccan because one day either I or he who comes after me will need to undertake another Green March. In the name of all those Moroccans living abroad, not only in France or in Paris, I want you to take an oath that all the young Moroccans who will be born abroad will be dedicated, from their cradles,
to the demands that history will make of them. If this is your response, I will be able to be at peace.” Hassan II (taken from his speech of 29 November 1985 in Paris to representatives of the Moroccan community resident in France.) (23)

“We are not responsible solely for our subjects here in Morocco; we are linked in the same way by the Beia to Moroccans living abroad, in whatever situation they find themselves, whether they are workers, students, or businessmen...” Hassan II (from a speech of 16 June 1997). (24)

**A Ministry for Moroccans Resident Abroad**

As noted earlier, following independence, the portfolio for the expatriate community (MREs, Marocains resident a l’étranger) was handled largely by the Ministry of Labor, as a simple question of exporting labor power. Other aspects of relations with the expatriates were handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) or, by the early 1970s, by the amicales, which coordinated closely with the embassies. The early 1980s witnessed an institutional innovation in the form of the designation of parliamentary seats for the expatriate communities, with the first representatives elected in 1984. In 1989, the Istiqlal, Morocco’s oldest political party and the one with the strongest nationalist-traditionalist credentials, presented a proposal to the parliament for a law to create a higher council of Moroccan communities resident abroad. This initiative was supported at the time by the other opposition parties, as well as by the MRE parliamentarians, but the parliament as a whole, dominated by centrist and pro-regime representatives rejected the proposal. (25)

Nonetheless, at the end of April 1990 not a council, but a ministry charged with the affairs of the Moroccan communities abroad was created. On 31 July, addressing himself to the new minister, Rafiq Haddaoui, King Hassan explained the origins of the decision to establish the new ministry thus:

“the representatives of the Moroccan community asked Us to put in place a governmental organ that would be charged with dealing with their affairs outside the realm of employment. Given that the problems of our Moroccan communities have nothing to do with the Ministry of Labor, that We are linked by the act of allegiance to our subjects abroad in the same way as we are to their brothers in Morocco, that we have a paternal, religious and a moral responsibility to them, Our citizens abroad deserve more interest than their fellow citizens living in Morocco whose needs are looked into day and night. We charge you with the interests of these sons who are ours... The objective of the mission is to safeguard these ties and the act of allegiance...”(26)

This new institution and the naming of a minister-delegate to the prime minister (something less than a full-fledged minister) charged with the affairs of the Moroccan Community Resident Abroad (Communaute Marocaine Resident a l’Etranger - CMRE) signified that the role of both the Ministry of
Labor and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in managing various aspects of the expatriate portfolio had been judged ineffective or insufficient. The establishment of a separate ministry appeared to indicate the government’s realization that the administrative problems, and the multiplicity of government bureaus in Morocco itself that were concerned with the MREs because of the complexity of the questions they faced (legal, housing, education, customs, personal status, investment projects, etc.) needed rationalization in the form of a single ministry.

In cooperation with other ministries, the new ministry was charged with the following: promoting economic, social, cultural, and educational programs for the MRE community; contributing to safeguarding the moral and material interests of the MREs as much in the host countries as in Morocco; studying the migratory movements of Moroccans, in order better to understand them; participating in the negotiation of bilateral and international accords concerning the MRE communities and ensuring that they were followed; participating in representing the government at international and regional conferences dealing with emigration and questions concerning Moroccans abroad; and overseeing the implementation of actions to ensure the best conditions for the reintegration of Moroccans upon their definitive return.(27)

Despite the king’s clear, initial support for the ministry, its activities never fully developed to meet the ambitious goals set for it, and its existence was ultimately terminated. As alluded to above, the MFA had considered the MREs as its own preserve; indeed, it had an office that dealt with MRE affairs. Hence, some MFA officials had objected to the establishment of the new ministry from the beginning. The official justification for rejecting it was the need to have a coherent foreign policy, which could be accomplished only if one bureau were responsible for MRE affairs. In practice, it seems that some Moroccan ambassadors were irritated by the rights CMRE ministry officials had regarding certain aspects of the dossier with which diplomats (MFA employees) theoretically were charged. They were especially annoyed by the fact that another member of the government would make statements in public judging the situation of MREs, statements that could call into question the responsibility and effectiveness of diplomatic authorities abroad by showing that matters were being badly managed. Moreover, many consuls did not appreciate that the MCMRE received complaints from MREs calling into question the functioning or behavior of the consular services. In the eyes of these diplomats such
actions were either personally embarrassing or could prejudice the high politics with which they were charged. (28)

The beginning of the end for the ministry came at the end of February 1995, in the second Filali cabinet, when the title of the MCMRE head was downgraded from minister delegated to the Prime Minister, to undersecretary of state attached to the MFA, and all of its activities were in effect frozen. This new policy of laisser aller was apparently encouraged by the authorities at the MFA in order to weaken the MCMRE, to give the impression that its structures were useless and would be better dissolved. (29) At the same time, it appears that financial considerations may have played a role as well, as the overall economic climate led to cutbacks in other ministries, and the sources of support for the Fondation Hassan II, which had funded some ministry activities (see next section) declined precipitously. (30)

In the third Filali government of 13 August 1997, the prime minister, at the suggestion of the MFA, in effect completed the process of dismantlement by ordering the transfer of all MCMRE responsibilities to the MFA, thereby effectively abolishing the new ministry. This was done without study and apparently simply to please the minister. It was carried out by a decree that was never even published in the Bulletin Officiel. (31) Some of the functions of the ministry were integrated in to the office at the MFA concerned with MREs. Many of the people who had worked for the ministry ended up going to the MFA as well, including the researchers and many of the mid-level employees.

Fondation Hassan II

At the foundation, we are not seeking to obstruct the integration of Moroccans abroad. To the contrary, we know that their integration in the host country affects their development. We want our compatriots abroad to live in harmony in their host state and to feel as much at ease outside as inside Morocco. This is how they can avoid the suffering of exile, the distress and the loss of bearings. It is in this way that our community abroad becomes a potential resource capable of contributing to the development and the modernization of Morocco. Omar Azziman (34)

It was as early as December 1985 that King Hassan, at a reception for the Moroccan community in France, addressed the question of the amicales and declared himself disappointed with the favoritism and nepotism that had characterized their operation. He stated that as a result a royal initiative had been undertaken to place the amicales on a truly democratic foundation. To that end, a
conference was to be held to define a new basis for the relationship in accordance with the desire of each Moroccan worker. The conference was held in Rabat in July 1986, organized by the Ministry of Labor, but the results in terms of seriousness and transparency were disappointing. (35)

Instead, ultimately, a different type of initiative was undertaken: the establishment of the Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains résidant à l’étranger (FHII). Established by royal decree on July 13, 1990, it is a “non-profit institution with a social vocation, endowed with a moral personality and financial autonomy.” Its main mission is the promotion and protection of the Moroccan community abroad. Its founding document (Law no. 19-89) listed the following principal missions as being in the “cultural, religious and social domains” (article 2): to participate in teaching Arabic, national culture, and religion to the children of Moroccans abroad; to contribute to vacation camps for MRE children during the summer; to provide financial assistance to needy MREs; and to organize and finance cultural, associative and sports activities to benefit MREs.(36) There is no mention of a direct political or an economic beneficiary role (remittance channel) for the state.

The FHII was supposed to be administered by an executive committee composed of 27 members designated by the MCMRE minister according to suggestions of the concerned ministries, each of which (thirteen) were to have a representative. In addition, there was to be a representative of the Professional Association of Moroccan Banks (Groupement Professionnel des banques du Maroc) and thirteen members chosen from the members of the offices of the Federation of Amicales. It was also envisaged at the beginning that there would be regional committees in the host countries, each to be composed of six members designated by the comité directeur from among the members of the Amicales of the country or the relevant region.(37)

According to its informational material the Fondation:

wishes to be a bridge between the Moroccan citizens living abroad and their home country, Morocco. It is, par excellence, a link between cultures and civilizations. It aims at cultivating a sense of communication with and for the Moroccan community abroad. It is in charge of promoting social, economic, cultural and educational relationships with countries concerned with immigration issues. Hassan II Foundation incarnates the permanent presence and care for the Moroccans residing abroad. It ensures and facilitates their reintegration once they come back to Morocco. The Foundation seeks to be a federation that gathers all the Moroccans residing abroad around their country and its institutions. It defends their rights and interests. It is open to all forms of cooperation with private and public
institutions in the countries of residence. Its vocation is to provide a link between all the Moroccan community abroad. The Foundation seeks to be a link and an inevitable reference for those who have chosen or have been compelled to live abroad. (38)

Why was it founded when it was? This remains unclear, but requires an answer given that it came at almost the same time as the MCMRE. It has been argued that the same forces – the voices of the representatives of the communities abroad – that led to the establishment of the ministry may well have played a major role. It is certainly clear from Hassan’s desire to see the amicales reorganized that there was an understanding that something had to change in the nature of the relationship between the state and the communities. It is possible that this became more urgent in the context of the regional climate; that is, the evolving political liberalization in Algeria and the prominent role played in it by the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) may have raised concerns in the Moroccan government about possible contagion, thus increasing the imperative to more thoroughly penetrate and carefully monitor the MRE communities. It may have felt that new means or institutions were required to do so successfully. Or, it may have thought more broadly and concluded that not only monitoring but different religio-cultural socialization was required to “vaccinate” Moroccans abroad against the infection of militant Islamism. Lopez-Garcia argues that the establishment of both the FHII and the MCMRE was a response to the importance of remittances which, in 1990, represented 48% of total exports(39); however, the lack of any mention of financial considerations in the founding legislation calls this conclusion into question.

The particularity of FHII is that it is not a ministry, but its orientations are set by the government. In an interview, the Director-General of the FHII, Abderrahman Zahi, said that a foundation was preferable to a ministry because it if intervened on behalf of immigrants it would not provoke the same sensibilities, but that as more than association or an NGO, it has a stronger voice with host governments. It does appear that when it was created it was intended to complement the MCMRE. Indeed, and this is interesting from an institutional point of view, they were run by the same person, with the MCMRE minister delegated to the Foundation. This kind of dualism led, apparently, to a financial dualism as well, summed up for me by an FHII employee in the phrase, “Le ministere pense, la fondation depense” (40), suggesting that the foundation became the cash cow of the ministry. While some of the foundation’s budget came from the state, the FHII also received funds from several banks -
the most importance remittance channeling institutions -- which contributed a percentage of their profits.

Whatever the reasons behind the establishment of the FHII, for a long time its mission was largely viewed as limited to providing periodic assistance to the émigrés during their periods of return to Morocco for summer vacation, to the point where the FHII was identified almost exclusively with the transit operation (although it was really the RAF, the Moroccan Army, that took primary responsibility, certainly after 1996, for the bulk of the work and logistical support. Nevertheless, the FHII was involved in other activities during this period. With its funds, in 1994-95, 484 teachers of language and Moroccan culture taught 70,600 MRE children, of whom 41,500 were in France. In the religious domain, 63 preachers were sent for Ramadan. And nearly 900 MRE children were received in 1994 in vacation camps, as compared with 1,200 in 1993.

Given the close relationship between the MCMRE and FHII (they were also housed in the same building), it should not be surprising that the gradual demise of the former had implications for the latter. As we have seen, in February 1995 the MCMRE became a sous-ministere, although even as early as 1994, al-Ouardi had demanded an audit owing to serious weaknesses of management and hiring up to that point. At about the same time, there was a severe drop in the contributions from the banks that were paying a part of the foundation’s budget. The FHII’s publications, Rivage and La Tribune de Maroc, were closed, there was a cutback in cultural activities, and people were let go. What followed was a retrenchment of FHII activities in the context of the downgrading and freezing of the MCMRE’s work. Ultimately, it was decided that the existing arrangement between the Foundation and the now sous-ministere was not working and that the two should be separated. However, the malaise continued until 1997, when the sous-ministere was completely abolished and there was a complete reorganization of the Foundation. Since then, there have continued to be pressures to integrate the FHII into the MFA. As in the case of the MCMRE, these are turf battles rather than the result of disagreement over policy on issues of salience to MREs.

In a 7 May 1996 speech, in addressing the problems of the Foundation, King Hassan announced that he had decided to entrust its presidency to his elder daughter, Lalla (Princess) Meryem. “Thus our ties will not only be those of allegiance, but also ties of kinship, since you will be like my sons and daughters.” The king followed this appointment with the designation of a respected human rights
activist and Minister of Justice, Omar Azziman, as the new President-Designate of the foundation. In outlining the qualities he sought in the holder of such a position in a 16 June 1997 speech he mentioned: a global vision and a deep understanding of the allegiance ties between the Throne and the Moroccan subjects wherever they may be…”(45)

The reorganization brought major changes. While, the foundation continues to be an autonomous entity, Azziman reports to the princess, not to the Prime Minister. (Although this has its advantages, it is also a problem because it means that the Foundation has no relation with any ministry, no representative in the cabinet and therefore it is not always involved in meetings concerned with MREs.) Audits and new forms of oversight were introduced, intended first to be applied to the teaching (Arabic language and Moroccan culture) missions attached to the foundation. This aspect of the foundation’s work had been consuming 75% of the budget, but the teachers involved had not been specially trained. Most had come from the Ministry of National Education or the Ministry of Habous (Religious Endowments) and Islamic Affairs. (47) Another reform concerned recruitment and salaries. Because of the unusual situation of the foundation -- neither a ministry, nor a private sector institution -- the workers had been recruited at salary levels that did not correspond to those of regular government employees. This was reformed, to the consternation of many workers who saw their salaries drop. Also on the financial side, as noted earlier, until 1994, the FHII had benefited from an accord according to which banks involved in MRE remittance transfers contributed a percentage of their profits to the FHII budget. The expiration of the accord was an important factor in the retrenchment of Foundation (and MCMRE) activities. Since the restructuring, the foundation is no longer a coffer for activities conceived of and initiated by other organizations.(48) In mid-1998 work was initiated, supported by the power of the princess, to secure a new agreement with the banks that would give the foundation the possibility to finance its activities with its own funds in the medium term. (49)

A new structure for FHII work was also introduced in 1997. The Foundation now has six operational divisions: education, cultural exchange, sports and youth (which is in charge of educational and cultural programming; social assistance, which offers support and protection to the Moroccan community; communication, which deals with information and documentation issues; legal studies and assistance, which is charged with the defense of rights and interests of the Moroccans residing abroad; cooperation and partnership, which works with public bodies, private corporations and NGOs; and
economic promotion, which is in charge of providing information and assistance to Moroccan investors living abroad.

FHII also has a structure devoted to studies and analysis. This is associated with what is called the Observatoire of the Moroccan Community Abroad, which is intended to make regular and reliable studies of developments among MREs. Work on this front began at the Salon Marocain a Paris (SMAP) and Contact 98 in Brussels (50) in May 1998 with several surveys intended to produce an objective picture of the community abroad in all its facets. Teams of researchers were used to administer questionnaires to the thousands of visitors to these two exhibitions. Azziman has also indicated the desire to put in place a scientific council composed of Moroccans and others known for their knowledge of emigration. The hope is that by using both such a council and the Observatoire sound strategies for the various MRE communities and their needs can be formulated.(51) It is worth noting, however, that as of summer 2000, the Foundation had a small library, but had not yet equipped itself to become the primary national repository of information on MREs.

One of the emphases since the restructuring has been to clean up or reform certain areas, especially the partenariat/cooperation with NGOs and amicales. The FHII has demanded more transparency, and required full project proposals and accountability. Apparently, prior to 1997, funds were disbursed in less than transparent ways and for dubious or unsound projects. Azziman said in July 1998 that it had taken months of work, evaluation and reflection to extricate the fondation from its previous state and make it a functional and operational instrument in the service of MREs.(52) It should be noted here that Azziman was an excellent choice for FHII in that he is well-respected and a man of integrity. Nevertheless, the fact that he was already Minister of Justice, and that everything requires his signature (thanks to the overcentralization) means that things cannot happen quickly.(53)

Much of the restructured foundation’s work is along the lines of the activities it had begun to carry out in the early 1990s. For example, in 1991 the FHII began organizing summer camps for children, but the program did not really develop until after the 1997 reorganization.(54) In 2000 they expected about 1000 children in two camps, each of 15 days, one at Agadir and the other at Bouznika (between Casablanca and Rabat).(55) Another major program is during Ramadan. As one part of the program, the FHII sends boxes of traditional sweets to Moroccans who are in prison abroad. Another part of the Ramadan program involves sending preachers to oversee and lead special religious services
and functions. (This is in addition to some 13 preachers permanently based in Europe as of summer 2000.) They are all graduates of faculties in the large universities of Morocco, and hence approved by the Moroccan government to teach responsibility to God, Islam, family, children, and home.(56)

The Foundation’s resources are limited; hence it has focused its activities in the regions with largest concentrations of Moroccans -- western Europe, certain Arab countries, and secondarily Canada and the US. It will be remembered that when the foundation was created it had envisaged establishing regional delegations in each country that hosts Moroccans. Like many other plans of the early 1990s, this has yet to be realized. Azziman was keen to revive this project, since it is clear that one cannot serve MREs effectively solely from Rabat. Ideally these offices would be run by MREs, but at this point the FHII does not have the resources to pay for this.(57)

The current priorities were outlined by FHII Director-General Zahi as the following. First, to reinforce the ties between the emigrant and his/her country both for those who want to return and for those who do not: for those who will return, so that they will not feel marginalized, and for those who will not so that they can maintain their culture, religion, etc. Second, to aid the Moroccan in his “projet immigratoire,” whatever that may be. Third, to work on programs that were part of the original statute as well as others that have been added subsequently, in particular, promoting Arabic language and culture, and religious education.(58)

In maintaining this relationship with the MRE, the cultural element is decisive, according to Zahi. Those abroad need to be conscious of their identity and their origins. Here Arabic language and Moroccan culture instruction (ELCM) is critical, yet these programs have been widely criticized. After the restructuring, the FHII sent experts to Europe to evaluate what was being done in terms of Arabic language instruction. It also launched a study in France and Belgium to establish the broad lines of an integrated program of reform, taking into consideration the education system of the host countries. This study pointed out numerous, clear weaknesses, one of the most important of which was the gap between the ELCM and the education system in the host country on the one hand and the needs of the Moroccan community on the other. (59) As a result, the FHII began working with the Ministry of National Education so that new language and culture programs could be implemented with a new philosophy and precise objectives.(60)
Investment is another focus, although not part of the original statute, and Azziman held a meeting with the principle groups concerned with MRE investment on 15 December 1997. It had become clear that when people return definitively, they discover a changed Morocco, and if they do not receive proper assistance and information, their investments may begin badly. The FHII also learned that it is also necessary to work to change the conception that those abroad have from past experiences of the state administration and overcome the obstacles. To address this set of problems, the FHII published a guide (one of several it produces) to investment, with nine different versions according to sector. It is published in all the languages of host countries, and in 1998, 88 projects were presented to the foundation, 55% of French origin.

The FHII also provides administrative and legal counsel and assistance. Over the years many MREs complained of having to spend their entire “vacation” trying to address some administrative, legal or investment problem. In 1999, the FHII looked into some 7000 files of such problems. Further, in 1988 in collaboration with the Customs administration the FHII edited a “Guide Douanier des Marocains residant a l’etranger” which explains clearly in several languages all the categories of émigrés, the procedures to follow, and the customs regime for each case.

Despite the restructuring initiated in 1997, a 2000 evaluation of FHII was very critical. It claimed that whatever the initial objectives were, they had been quickly forgotten. With the passage of time, the mission of the foundation, it argued, had been reduced to support for MREs at the time of the summer return, and even this is with the support of the OSFAR (social work branch of the Moroccan army, of which, perhaps not coincidentally, Lalla Meryem is also the president). The article attributes the problems to a number of sources. One is the absence of a clearly defined mission. “Like many ‘administrations publiques’ even though that is not its statute, it seems to have no visibility, and each year it undertakes the same activities, with the same brochures, the same communiqués sent to the press. No action of any breadth is organized, there is no involvement of MREs, and to top it all no measures are adopted to improve the conditions of its personnel, who have no work, but also no statute.”

In another La Vie Economique article, an interview with a young Moroccan abroad involved in youth activities, the interviewee contended that the foundation made great use, if not abuse, of its association with Lalla Meryem. The foundation serves only a few people, while it ignores the rights of its
personnel and the proposals of Moroccans abroad. He and many other Moroccans have sent letters, he insisted, but have never received responses. Instead of recognizing their position as subject and actor in their own fates, the FHII has turned MREs into objects of study. This institution is not subject to any constitutional institution. Its authorities are -- unique in Morocco -- at one and the same time administrators and controllers. His conclusion was that the FHII should either disappear or be led by people those with emigration experience under the supervision of a council.(64)

**Tunisia: The OTE and the long Reach of the RCD**

As noted above, for a number of years following independence, several European states ran employment offices in Tunisia to recruit labor. Subsequently, Tunisian offices specializing in emigration opened, paving the way for Tunisians to go to the Gulf and Africa. By the end of the 1970s, with the economic crisis in the Arab world and the visa systems imposed in Europe, illegal emigration or random (i.e., not recruited) emigration surged in importance. In the meantime, Tunisia languished under its increasingly unpredictable and isolated president Habib Bourguiba. A qualitative shift came with the changement, the November 1987 forced retirement of Bourguiba. The assumption of the reins of power by Zine el-`Abdin Ben `Ali meant, most immediately, the arrival of someone intent upon taking forceful charge and directing Tunisia out of its political malaise. Whatever the evolving reality, the discourse of the so-called “New Era” stressed the values and institutional manifestations of pluralism, tolerance, civil society and partnership between the state and the citizen.

_The Office des Tunisiens a l’Etranger_

According to the view of the New Era, the Tunisian community abroad constitutes an inseparable part of Tunisian society. Wherever a Tunisian may be, he is always Tunisian in terms of identity. (65)

Soon after Ben `Ali’s assumption of power, the focus on reinvigorating and reinventing the sclerotic institutions of both party and state extended to touch the expatriate community. A presidential decision in April 1988 gave Tunisians abroad the right to vote in presidential elections. In June 1990, the new president created the Higher Council for Tunisians Abroad. It was also Ben `Ali who changed the
designation of émigrés from al-muhajir al-tunisi (the Tunisian emigrant) to al-tunisi f-il-kharij (the Tunisian abroad) (66)

Perhaps most important, however, in June 1988, the Emigration Office (Direction de l’Emigration) was replaced/restructured as the Office des Tunisiens a l’Etranger (OTE), and was charged with a range of goals and programs: undertaking the development and implementation of programs overseeing TREs; defining and putting in place a program of assistance for TREs and for their families in their country of residence or in Tunisia; elaborating and carrying out a cultural program intended to develop and reinforce the attachment of the children of TREs to their country; facilitating the reinsertion of émigrés returning to Tunis into the national economy; and instituting a continuing system of providing information to TREs. (67)

The OTE depends upon a central administration and a decentralized network in Tunisia and abroad. As of 1995, it had in-country offices (delegations) in Ariana, Ben Arous, Bizerte, Nabeul, Kasserine, Sousse, Sfax, Medenine, Gafsa, Tatouine, and Kebili. These regional delegations have as their task organizing and coordinating all the activities dictated in the office’s mission as well as putting in place programs at the level of the territorial entity that they cover. Outside of the country, the OTE operates as a structure of coordination, information and support vis-a-vis the Tunisian organizations concerned with emigration. It provides logistical assistance to Tunisian amicales, associations and clubs abroad. It publishes a legal guide which deals with legislation relating to work, residence and social security in the host countries, and edits the “Guide for the Tunisian Abroad,” a source of information on measures taken with regard to investment, savings and the reintegration of Tunisians back home. (68)

In terms of the economy, the OTE’s task is to martial the support of Tunisian emigrants for the development of the country. To do so it works to inform non-resident citizens of the possibilities for domestic saving and investment, to assist those who want to launch economic projects, and to try to organize the benefits of emigration so as to broaden their positive impact on the country. As part of this function the OTE organizes special development support days (journées d’appui au développement) for Tunisian businessmen resident abroad to familiarize them with the country’s investment needs.

In the social realm, the OTE is charged with assisting TREs and their families, aiding Tunisians and their families who have returned to Tunisia, and supporting families of non-resident Tunisians who have stayed behind in Tunisia. On the cultural front, the OTE is engaged in activities aimed at developing
the community life of TREs, and at deepening the sense of belonging to Tunisia, especially among the younger generation. To that end, in the realm of the media, it edits a variety of publications (guides, brochures, magazines) and participates in the programs of Channel 7 targeting Tunisians abroad.

The OTE’s more concrete community development strategy is directed at two target populations: the first generation of emigrants, composed essentially of workers and their wives, and the new generation, made up of the young who are born abroad or who joined their parents at an early age. Here, the stated goal is the creation and enrichment of ties between non-resident citizens and between these same citizens and their country. To that end, beyond its network of social attaches posted to Tunisian embassies and consulates in Europe and the Arab world whose essential role is to furnish necessary assistance to nationals abroad, the OTE organizes informational campaigns and specialized seminars. It has also created a network of offices called espaces femme, whose objective is to facilitate the cohesion of the community and of the family. These are targeted primarily at young women of the second generation of emigrants whose cultural referents are, naturally, no longer those of their mothers. As of late 1998, four of these offices were already functional in France - in Paris, Lyon, Marseilles, and Grenoble, and others were soon to be opened in Nice and Nanterre -- as well as in five other major European cities: Dusseldorf, Rome, Palermo, Brussels, and Hamburg. (69)

The OTE also finances a program of Arabic language instruction intended for the young generation of emigrants. At least some of these students take classes at the Bourguiba Institute in Tunis. In 1997 there were 133 students, in 1998, 247. The OTE pays for the major part of their round-trip airplane ticket as well as for student lodging in Tunis.(70) In the same vein, it sponsors excursions, study trips, and vacation camps in Tunisia for the younger generation. It also organizes and finances programs of religious supervision and cultural awareness, as well as the sport activities of numerous amicales and associations abroad. The office further organizes annual sports tournaments bringing together young non-residents, as well as the 7 November Football (Soccer) Cup.

The collection of information has also been viewed as critical to OTE work. Hence, as in the case of the FHII’s Observatoire, the OTE has established a Center for Specialized Documentation charged with assembling statistics relative to Tunisian emigration, determining the impact of emigration on economic and social development, and devising programs appropriate for assistance and training. (71)
A final piece of its work relates to “the return.” For many Tunisians, this simply means the annual pilgrimage home during the summertime, but for others it is the permanent return. Whichever the case, the OTE has established a series of posts to orient the returnees and to provide travel assistance. The OTE has permanent offices at: the Tunis-Carthage international airport; the Tunis-Carthage Freight airport; the Djerba-Zarzis international airport; the Port of Goulette; the Port of Rade’s, the regional Customs administration (al-Qubbah); the border point of Ras Jadir. The special summer season offices are at: the airport of Skanes-Monastir; the international airport of Sfax; the port of la Goulette (terminal); the port of Sousse (ferry arrivals); the port of Sfax ferry arrivals; the port of Bizerte, ferry arrivals; the border crossing at the Babouche Center (Jandouba governorate); and the border crossing at Bouchabka (governorate of Kasserine).(73) The OTE’s various regional offices facilitate the academic reintegration of returning children as well as the professional reintegration of parents. And, like their counterparts overseas, the OTE’s domestic offices are in place to inform and orient Tunisian émigrés interested in launching investment projects. Their job is to intervene on the TREs’ behalf with the concerned administrations to aid them with the required procedures.(72)

Such a broad mandate would be impossible for a single government bureau to carry out. To assist it, the OTE has established direct relations of cooperation with the amicales and other TRE associations. However, the most important institution through which the OTE works, both at home and abroad, is the government political party, the Rassemblement constitutionnel democratique (RCD).

The RCD

Just as the Parti socialiste destourien (PSD) and its extension through Tunisian amicales was the primary means of reaching and penetrating the community abroad under Bourguiba, so the post-changement regime has sought to use the renewed PSD turned RCD to carry out similar, if more expanded or ambitious, functions. As Ben `Ali himself argued: “We were convinced of the importance of these structures [the amicales] and hence we got to work to promote the associative fabric to aid and supervise Tunisian émigrés. Thus we have overseen a generalization of these structures and a diversification of their domains so that they would be in harmony with the social, demographic and professional evolution of the Tunisian communities.”(74) As of the summer 1999, there were 395 RCD associations and cells abroad.(75)
The post-1987 era also saw a change in the treatment of TREs in the press, as emigrants began to receive positive coverage in the media (all of which is official or semi-official), with special emphasis on what their contribution to national development could be. Other evidence of the change in perception of the emigrant entrepreneurs may also be found in myriad other programs in which the RCD is involved. Information centers have been set up in Tunisian consulates and embassies in European cities that have concentrations of Tunisian immigrant entrepreneurship with the aim of promoting investment back home. To that end economic and investment briefings are coordinated by the Tunisian Embassy in Paris and by the political bureau of the RCD. (76)

The RCD has special responsibility for organizing and following up the schedule of activities for and about TREs during the summer return season. In August 1995 an annual *Journee nationale des Tunisiens a l’etranger* was instituted, and from that meeting on, Tunisian emigrants have been referred to as “ambassadors of the ‘New Era’ abroad.”(77) The party also sponsors an annual, summer meeting of its cadres abroad in Tunisia as well as an annual meeting for RCD students studying abroad. For such students special university scholarships and grants have been made available by presidential decree.(78) RCD women have organized numerous, annual programs as well. There is the National Seminar for Emigré Women held during the summer in Tunisia and a National Conference of the Tunisian Family and Women Abroad. Such events tend to stress the importance of women in educating and in the evolution of the second and third generations. The Tunisian woman is presented as a stabilizing factor in the family and in society and a guarantor of authenticity and original values.(79) She is charged by the state with the responsibility of infusing her children with attachment to the homeland: for, “nothing is more dangerous for our children abroad than the phenomena of acculturation, marginalization, and becoming rootless.”(80) Such conferences have similar themes: the contribution of the TRE communities to the development effort; Tunisian associations abroad and their ties with the RCD structures; and the role of the community in propagating the orientations of this new era. (81)

In his speech on the occasion of the *Journee nationale* in 1999, Ben ‘Ali summarized the varied activities of the RCD [for all practical purposes inseparable from those of the government] in support of the TREs and the mission of the OTE in the following terms:

We are working to make emigration one of the points of convergence of economic cooperation and civilizational exchange between the North and the South. In this we are relying on our conviction
that partial and temporary solutions, like measures and administrative formalities, cannot constitute a solution to the problem of immigration. The most effective means to contain it consist of joint action toward the establishment of sustainable development in the country of origin and the establishment of relations based on balanced cooperation between the north and south shores of the Mediterranean. (82)

Hence as in the case of Morocco, potential economic benefit and security control are quite clear in the goals and activities of the OTE. The political opening that appeared to arrive with the changement may have sounded quite promising, but in fact, the discourse and renewed “interest” of the state in its citizens was less a part of a new international wave of democratization than a facade covering a renewal and deepening of authoritarianism. The word used may have been partenariat, but it was clear that the channel of communication and orders went overwhelmingly in the direction of state to citizen. Hence, the newly restructured OTE was intended to develop a more efficient and effective mobilization of both finances and allegiance along the lines envisaged by the regime. In conjunction with the RCD, the amicales and other associations, the OTE emphasized the responsibility of the Tunisian to his/her heritage and the country’s development. As Cassarino contends, such institutions “may be viewed as efficient instruments of control that allow the GoT and the RCD to keep a constant watch over a potential political opposition or counter-power abroad.” While it is difficult to evaluate the actual impact of the state’s rhetoric of patriotism on the individual TREs, such language certainly sought to legitimate interference by the government of Tunisia in expatriate community affairs. (83) Such surveillance of the community became increasingly important as, with the deterioration of conditions in Algeria, the Tunisian state ultimately moved to repress its own Islamist opposition.

Conclusions

While brief, the presentation above should at least suggest that numerous factors have been at work shaping the institutional policy response of the Moroccan and Tunisian states to the presence and development of substantial expatriate communities. As Belguendouz has argued for the Moroccan case, the numbers of those abroad, their proximity to their country of origin and the levels of their remittances, would all have argued for treating the MREs as a strategic sector. However, from the beginning, he argues, the migration question was treated in a very traditional and instrumental way, as a
transitory and conjunctural phenomenon, by both Morocco and the European countries. (84) Do the institutional developments detailed above indicate any change in state approach?

As discussed in the introduction, the variable most often cited to explain labor-exporting state interest in the communities abroad is that of the economy. Concern over maintaining or increasing the level of remittances as these moneys have come to figure among the top two or three sources of national income is certainly clear in both these cases. That such concerns would grow in the context of periods in which both countries have struggled with implementing structural adjustment programs is natural and could go a long way toward explaining state institutional response. Add to this the fact that the emigration has now begun to produce a third generation, a generation that often is at best (from the country of origin’s point of view) of dual nationality, although it is often solely European. The consequent growing likelihood that the new generations will be alienated from or simply not interested in the homeland raises new threats of remittance drops -- not because of economic conditions or exigencies or loss of work, but precisely because of the success of the emigrants in integrating into the foreign environment. Hence, again, one could argue that even the whole range of cultural programs that both of these states’ institutions offer have, at base, an economic goal of maintaining ties with the hope of attracting financial interest. With these considerations in mind, there is no question that both Morocco and Tunisia have gradually come to view their expatriates in a different light. According to Cassarino,

As economic liberalization became their common credo, the Maghreb countries have reconsidered the profile of migrants. In fact, it could be argued that migrants are no longer viewed as foreign-owned income bearers who return home after a certain period of time but, above all, as potential investors (e.g. in the field of private enterprise), who, by law, and despite their permanent settlement in European receiving countries, may participate in the development of their origin countries’ private sectors.” (85)

However, as the evidence has suggested, economic concerns cannot explain fully the founding nor the evolution of these institutions. Here, the political and, in particular, the security needs of the state need to be raised again. In 1985, King Hassan had noted that the amicales were not performing effectively. While many Moroccans did encounter problems from the state as a result of the surveillance of the amicales, clearly, for some reason, Hassan perceived that they were in need of reform. It is possible that the gradual political opening in which the monarchy was involved played a role. In light of
the monarchy’s deplorable past human rights record, a focus on the needs of the expatriate communities, on addressing their problems and better serving them could only have played well in Brussels and Strasbourg in the context of Hassan’s attempts to secure greater Moroccan entree in the evolving European Community. Another concern, however, would have been a shared security concern of both Rabat and the Europeans: the growth of politicized Islamist groups around the Mediterranean basin. By late 1988, all eyes were on Algeria, which then for the next two years, engaged in a political experiment with the legal participation of the Front Islamique du Salut. The military coup against President Chadli Ben Jadid and the outbreak of civil war reverberated throughout the region. The FHII’s focus of an inordinate amount of resources on religious and cultural instruction may be best accounted for by the regime’s desire to make sure that it was its brand and message of Islam that was being propagated among the MREs.

In the case of Tunisia, one cannot explain the restructuring of a department into the OTE outside the context of the changement. But it is worth considering what this coup meant in somewhat broader terms in order to place emigration policy within it. Ben `Ali inherited an authoritarian regime (indeed he was a product of the state security apparatus), but as part of his initial move to consolidate power, he attempted to coopt/reach out to broad sectors of the Tunisian population, including the Islamists, who had been alienated by Bourguiba’s program of state modernization. A National Pact was negotiated and signed by groups across the political spectrum in what was supposed to be a first step toward the construction of a more pluralistic era-- in contrast to the one-party state of Bourguiba. The story of how and why that did not happen is too long to be recounted here. Suffice it to say that instead, Ben ‘Ali transformed the PSD into the RCD with the goal of greater, not less, penetration and control of Tunisian society. Whatever pluralism was encouraged ultimately became mere window dressing. As the discussion of the RCD’s role in expatriate policy suggests, TRE communities were viewed as extensions of the polity, to be watched and “guided” just as were Tunisians at home. And the highly touted tolerance and promotion of “civilizational values” came to be code words for brutal repression of members of the Mouvance de la Tendance Islamique, subsequently al-Nahdah, Tunisia’s main Islamist political grouping. Here again, the desire to control how religion and culture were learned abroad would have figured prominently into the regime’s desire to prevent radicalism from affecting (if not infecting) its
expatriates, while at the same time monitoring those abroad for any activities deemed threatening or subversive.

Finally, a few words on how the political systems themselves shaped the evolution of these institutions, for it is one thing to respond to a perceived economic or political/security need, and quite another to watch how the institutional response takes form.

In the case of Morocco, to evaluate the experience of the MCMRE one must take several things into consideration, not the least of which is the fact that there were four governments (cabinets) in four years, thus creating an atmosphere of instability in which maintaining continuity in institutional development would have been quite difficult. Although several elements were put in place under Haddaoui and were continued by his successor Ahmad al-Ouardi before being completely frozen with the arrival of Lahcen Aboune at the end of February 1995, the ministry simply did not have much time to fully develop. Belgendouz argues that the reason the ministry was closed was because of its total failure, but as he notes, if that is a reason for closure, many existing institutions in Morocco should be closed.(32) Instead, turf wars, particularly from the powerful MFA, combined with the termination of the experiments in MRE representation in 1992 to in effect freeze and ultimately return primary responsibility for the MRE portfolio to the MFA.

The fate of the FHII was closely tied to, but not coincident with the ministry’s. That a monarchy would produce an institution named after the sovereign is not surprising. Nor is it surprising, given the apparent disdain which Hassan had for most Moroccans -- proclamations of his responsibilities according to the bay‘a notwithstanding -- that serious, sustained financial resources were never committed to the institution. A further example of the degree to which the FHII was the product of its political context was the fact that it was created as neither a governmental nor a private institution. It occupied a kind of legal limbo that exists easily only in a country in which the rule of law is largely irrelevant. People were appointed at salaries that followed no government schedule, and most had no real work to do. In short, through the first seven years of its existence it was a shell with little content, its only real programs the participation in the summer return (which had to be turned over to the FAR in 1966) and culture, language and religion programs which appear to be have been woefully out of touch with the realities and needs of the MRE communities.
In Tunisia, the strategy of the New Era was to revive what had been the mobilizational calling of the PSD, but in a new guise of state-society partnership. There is no question that from the point of view of the state/regime the *changement* invested Tunisians with new duties and responsibilities. In the context of economic restructuring, this meant that they participate through remittance transfer and investment in the economic march of the country. However, and here is where the specificities of the Tunisian polity are clearest, such a mobilization of investment could have been carried out in a variety of ways. In the Tunisian case, although the emphasis is on the role of the private sector, it is the state, through the OTE and the RCD, that seeks to play the major role, defining priorities, channeling interest.

“[T]he GoT has redefined the roles and duties of Tunisian citizens in the context of the restructuring programme, which is officially presented as requiring the mobilization of social, economic and political forces. Tunisian entrepreneurs are a case in point. While being presented as the paragons of participatory citizenship, they have been invested with duties and responsibilities which delineate the Government of Tunisia’s understanding of liberalization. The new orientations of the reforms make them ‘accountable for economic and social progress’ in Tunisia.”(86)

This paper represents an attempt based on preliminary field and archival work to tell the story and explain the evolution of institutional state emigration policy. More work needs to be done to determine with greater certainty the motivations of state actors in proposing and directing institutional responses. What the research to this point does show, however, is that as in immigration policy, a great deal of emigration policy and its institutions is clearly shaped by and responsive to domestic policy concerns. Broader structures of the international economy play a key role, but the specifics of state response, as well as the underlying balance between economic and security concerns become clear only in the context of the particularities of domestic politics.

Notes


1a. The most notable exception to this is the growing body of work being produced on the relationship between the Mexican state and its emigrants in the United States. For an discussion of this literature as well as a brief history of the relationship between the Mexican state and Mexicans in the United States see David Fitzgerald, *Negotiating Extra-Territorial Citizenship: Mexican Migration and the*


3. As Hollifield has clearly stated, “Very little has been written about the politics of control from the standpoint of the sending countries.” From “The Politics of International Migration: How Can we ‘Bring the State Back In?’”, p. 143.


6. Ibid., p. 2.


8. This paper is part of a larger book project in progress that seeks to more fully explore the various aspects and determinants of state emigration policy. As a work in progress, it requires confirmation of certain information and further exploration of certain topics.


10. Michalak, p. 5.


19. In the Algerian case, the Amicales des Algériens en Europe, an association based on law # 1901, succeeded the Federation de France du FLN. The FFFLN was intended, in principle, to organize the depart of migrants, but in fact was devoted to tasks of social integration, control, and defense of the Algerian population. See Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, Les Immigres et la Politique (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1988) p. 138.

19a. Amicales were not limited to the North African communities, as there were similar Spanish and Portuguese institutions that predated the Tunisian and Moroccan structures. See Jacques Katuszewski and Ruwen Ogien, Reseau d’immigres (1981). I am grateful to Laurence Michalak for this information.


22. Michalak, p. 15.

23. Abdelkrim Belguendouz, La Communauté Marocaine a l’Etranger et la Nouvelle Marche Marocaine (Boukili Impression, October 1999), frontispiece.
24. Belguendouz, Les Marocains, p. 278. The beia or bay`ah is the oath of allegiance taken by Moroccans to the sovereign, but which implies the monarch’s responsibilities for his people as well.

25. Ibid., p. 276.

26. Ibid., pp. 56-7.

27. Fallat, p. 987.


29. Ibid., p. 58.

30. Interview of Djelal Messaouden of the FHHI, Rabat, 30 June 2000. This contention about cutbacks in other ministries needs to be verified.


32. Ibid., pp. 249-250.

33. During the 84-92 legislature the MREs were represented by 5 districts abroad. France was divided into 2 districts -- that of Paris and surroundings and the north (Akka Ghazi, USFP); that of Lyon for the south of France (Brahim Berbache, Parti Centre Social). The man elected from Brussels (Marzouk Ahaidar -- Union Constitutionelle) was located in Rabat in the name of those in Belgium, Holland, Germany, Scandinavia, and even the USSR). From the Arab world there was Abdalahamid Naim of the RNI (Tunis district). Rachid Lahou of the Istiqlal had a larger area of representation: Spain, Portugal, England, Italy, all of American, and sub-Saharan Africa. Belguendouz, Les Marocains, p.63. For more on why the experiment was terminated, see p. 64.

34. As quoted in Ibid., p. 280.

35. Ibid., p. 260. Nevertheless, by 1999, the amicales were still in existence. Even the same amicale members of the FHHI board were in place, p.261


37. Loi no. 19-89 portant creation de la Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains resident a l’etranger, photocopy.

38. Informational brochure of the Fondation Hassan II.


41. La Vie Economique, SMAP 99 supplement, p. 40.

42. Fellat, p. 989.


44. In his March 2000 visit to France Mohammed VI reaffirmed the importance of the role of the FHII. This in effect put rumors of an integration into the MFA to rest. Messaouden interview.

45. See Discours et interviews de S.M. le Roi Hassan II (Rabat: Ministere de la Communication, 1998), p. 147.

46. Messaouden interview.


50. These are both annual exhibitions intended to attract Moroccans resident in France and Belgium as well as those (French or North African) interested in expanding their business in Morocco. Although conceived with largely business/financial goals in mind, both large, multi-day meetings feature a variety of cultural events and displays as well. SMAP was first held in 1997.


52. Ibid., p. 37.

53. Messaouden interview.

54. Messaouden interview.
55. How is participation determined? D-G Zahi said that the consulates propose the children. They then mix children of different host country communities. In addition, there are summer camp programs other than those of FHII, and they try to arrange for the children from their programs to meet with children in others. Zahi interview.

56. Zahi stated that those who are chosen are those who are truly capable of “passer le message” by which he seemed to be saying that they were better and more capable than preachers from the communities themselves. Zahi interview.


58. Zahi interview. He did draw a stark contrast with their Tunisian counterpart, saying that the FHII has much more modest activities.


63. La Vie Economique, 2 June 2000, p. 58.

64. La Vie Economique, 2 June 2000, p. 58.


68. Office des Tunisiens a l’Etranger, pp. 4 and 7.


72. Ibid., p. 10

73. Ibid., p. 11.

74. *Le Renouveau*, 8 August 1999


77. Ibid., p. 9, note 11.


85. Cassarino, p.5.

86. Ibid., p. 101.