Title
Where the Heart Is? A Geographic Analysis of Working-class Cultures in Detroit Neighborhoods, 1953

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There have been many attempts to understand how urban residence and factory organization lead groups of workers to realize and act upon their political interests (Gordon 1977; Katznelson 1981; Thompson 1966; Guttman 1987). Marx and Engels suggested that the physical concentration of workers in cities and large factories contributed to their ability to realize class (as opposed to individual) interests (Marx 1977, pp. 455-457). In addition, students of political behavior (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Caudet [1944] 1968; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Tingsten [1937] 1963; Huckfeldt 1986) have identified a clustering or concentration effect of workers' residential patterns on patterns of neighborhood voting: the higher the concentration of workers, the more likely the geographical area is to produce a strong left vote. The higher left vote is not attributed solely to workers' individual propensity to vote left, but also to their collective ability to shape the political views of others living in their neighborhoods.

Still, despite often militant clashes between workers and owners on the shop floor of American factories, historians of the American labor movement have noted the general tendency of working-class actions to be restricted to the workplace, isolated from the communities in which workers live (Taft and Ross 1969; Shefter 1986; Bridges 1986). For example, actions such as strikes and sit-ins at work put workers in direct conflict with managerial authority. Such conflicts at work might have led American workers to question conventional views of political power and to support socialist or other left-wing parties, as they have elsewhere. But this has not generally been the case in the United States. In the period after World War II, the workplace-based actions of the American working class have not translated into radical action in the political arena; American workers have, as indicated by the studies of political behavior noted above, generally voted for the Democratic Party. While this is not an indication of radical politics, it is, as Lipset (1963) argued, a political position that is more in line with U.S. workers' class interests.

Researchers have identified a pattern of class voting among union members within the two-party system (Campbell, Gurin and Miller 1954; Berelson et. al. 1954). Workers in general, and unionized workers in particular, tend to vote for the Democratic Party, and are more likely to vote for smaller, left-wing third parties, than non-working-class voters. According to Berelson et al. (1954, p.50), "the more "unionized the member -- or the more integrated in the plant the non-member -- the stronger the predisposition leaning to the Democrats is expressed." Even though some have claimed that class voting is a thing of the past, a recent empirical analysis of post-war voting in the U.S. found that "class continues to matter for U.S. politics" (Hout, Brooks and Manza 1995, p. 824).

Berelson et al. also note that the union vote was not equally strong across all unions: they found the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) members to be the most inclined towards the Democrats, followed by the machinists (IAM members) and the American Federation of Labor (AFL) members. Although they do not seriously analyze this relationship, they surmise this effect to be related to "job status and partly the political traditions of the different unions -- and maybe, even, organizational activity to a slight extent" (1954, p. 47).
Tingsten ([1937] 1963, p. 180), in attempting to explain his findings for higher levels of socialist votes in certain Swedish working-class districts, focused on the role of the social environment but added that in such regions "it is probable that the party or parties appealing to the strongest social groups in the area, carry on the incomparably strongest propaganda." We emphasize here that it is not only unionization that matters, but also the nature of the political messages that unions transmit to their members. Unions that emphasize the class struggle and prioritize left-wing political activity are more likely to have an impact on their memberships' left-wing voting practices than those that do not. Highly politicized union members may serve as informal campaign workers for left-wing parties. And, as Berelson et al. indicate, we should look to unions' political traditions (which vary greatly, especially in particular periods of American history), and the political content of unions' organizational activity in order to understand unions' effect on left voting. We propose that this effect is not only relevant for union members themselves, but also for the voters in the communities in which they live. In this study, we assess the role of concentrations of workers from a radical union on the overall voting patterns in their neighborhoods.

This paper takes up the question of if and how left-wing political ideas in the post-war period spread from the workplace to the community in the context of a left-wing union at the largest automotive plant in the world, the Ford River Rouge. We focus on the intersection between work and neighborhoods in an industrial city, Detroit, Michigan. Many of the factors that are hypothesized to enhance workers' left-wing voting were present here: the city was heavily populated with manufacturing workers, especially relatively lower status automobile workers; union membership was high (60% of the Detroit adult population belonging to a union family), and the unions, mainly the United Automobile Workers (UAW), were active in Democratic Party politics.

The strength of the labor vote in Detroit has already been documented (Kornhauser et al. 1956) and the positive effect of workers' concentration into specific regions of Detroit has also been noted (Huckfeldt 1986). We plan to build upon these studies to demonstrate a further source of differentiation that is related to types of unions. We hypothesize that a radicalized local union will produce effects on left voting over and above these other effects. The case we select to examine, UAW Local 600 at Ford Motor Company, was strongly influenced by Communist Party USA members and sympathizers within its ranks. Local 600 was part of an international union that was progressive and stood out as a strongly political and class-conscious local union. This situation permits us to investigate the independent effects of left-wing political leadership in the plant on the political patterns of left-wing voting in working-class neighborhoods, while holding the more general concentration effect and labor vote effect constant.

To this end, we examine the 1952 presidential election and the political campaign of UAW Local 600 at the River Rouge plant. We try to show that not only were there worker concentration and labor vote effects, but also that left politics and political strategy led to more pointedly leftist voting patterns within Rouge workers' neighborhoods. By studying left voting, we hope to learn more about the general lack of such a connection between home and work, particularly in anti-labor political environments such as the conservatism of the 1950s.

The central research questions are: What kind of worker concentrations matter? Were workers at the Ford River Rouge plant able to spread the left-wing politics of their union into their neighborhoods? Was the political impact of Ford Local 600 more than the individual effect of union members voting for their candidates and the concentration effect of worker neighborhoods? Were Ford workers able to win the hearts and minds of their families, friends,
and neighbors for the candidates endorsed by labor? More technically, was there an observable "radical union context effect" in Ford workers' neighborhoods beyond the "labor vote"? Was the effect significant net of concentration effects expected given the concentration of Ford and other union members living there?

Whether or not highly politicized unions in the United States contribute to left-wing voting is a question that has not been examined systematically in the literature. Our argument, in brief, is that concentrations of unionized workers in Detroit neighborhoods, and especially concentrations of workers from a highly politicized local union with radical political leadership, enhanced left voting in those neighborhoods. We begin our discussion by considering existing ideas about how workers' geographic concentrations might enhance their propensity to develop class consciousness and vote left.

The Spread of Political Influence

Inter-Class and Intra-Class Contact and Left Voting

Many researchers have contended that isolated groups of workers are predisposed to left-wing politics, and that it is intra-class communication, especially exposure to middle-class values, that moderates workers' political views. Kerr and Siegel (1954, p. 111) developed the idea that isolated masses of workers are more prone to engage in both strikes and in working class political activity. Lipset (1963) argued that because workers in working-class communities experience little inter-class contact and heightened levels of intra-class communication, they are more likely to vote for left candidates (Chapter 7, especially p. 263).

Yet Kimeldorf (1988) reminds us that "the mere fact that a group of workers is isolated tells us next to nothing about the content of their politics. Whether isolation makes them radical or conservative depends ultimately on whether the values being screened out are of a 'proletarian' or a 'bourgeois' nature" (p. 13, italics in original). Lenin argued that radical political ideas may not "naturally" develop in isolated working class communities. In "company towns," for example, workers' may be dominated by paternalistic employers and sheltered from potentially radicalizing influences. "Class consciousness was more than the unmediated product of daily experience. It was also a project. Working-class activists... sought to foster a sense of unity and purposiveness among their fellow workers" (Montgomery 1987, p. 2, italics added).

Our task here is not, however, identification of the origin of class consciousness, but rather the specification of mechanisms through which ideologies are spread to the communities in which workers live. Although Marx hinted at factors that would bring workers together around a common set of struggles and which would unite them in collective action around their interests, many of his successors "have had less faith in the direct efficacy of the social being of workers and have introduced the radical mediation of the Leninist party" (Calhoun 1982, p. 217). This line of thinking does not altogether dismiss the effect of certain factors inherent in the work process and the relations between capitalists and workers for the development of workers' consciousness, but it does stress the importance of organizing work by working-class political parties or what twentieth-century syndicalists called the "militant minority" (Montgomery 1987) for nurturing and developing workers' class consciousness. Hence, we might consider progressive political leadership in the workplace to be a critical factor in support of a context favoring class voting in neighborhoods.
Petras and Zeitlin (1967), in their study of Chilean miners, provided one such example of how radical ideology was spread once it took hold in a working class community. They demonstrated that radical Chilean miners were able to influence the political consciousness of peasants who came into contact with them in and around the mining camps. In the regions where radical miners interacted with peasants, "a distinct political culture, radical and socialist in content" developed that resulted in higher levels of left voting (Petras and Zeitlin 1967, p. 585).

Their research demonstrates the transmission of radical political culture in a working class/peasant society with an established Socialist Party. It suggests that political consciousness first arises among certain groups and then spreads outward through contact. Likewise, Thompson argued that it was not just the conditions of factory work and urban concentration that lead to radicalization amongst the English working class, but the exposure of that class to the more radical ideas of petty merchants and guild members (Thompson 1966). So if we were to look into intra-class contacts, we expect to find congregations of radicalized workers to have a specific role in increasing left voting among workers with whom they come into contact.

Realizing the importance of spatial concentration of groups of workers does not necessarily imply support for theories which highlight the importance of isolation for the development of radical politics. In his studies of the Paris Commune, Gould (1995) finds that the salient identity for workers most likely to participate in the uprising was created "not, as many have argued, by segregating workers from the bourgeoisie and thereby forming a universal class identity but by integrating some workers into strongly residential neighborhoods while leaving others firmly tied to their craft enclaves and the world of work.... [I]t was the former group that predominated in the ranks of the insurrection..." (pp. 28-29). This, we will show, was precisely the situation at the Ford River Rouge plant, where the strength of the union and size of the formal organization helped to forge collective identities and convince workers to participate in political campaigns. While Ford workers never constituted the majority in their neighborhoods, their attachment to the plant, as Gould says of formal organizations in his general introduction, "should be considered as pivotal not only to the mobilization of resources but to the formation of collective identities on a larger scale than would otherwise obtain" (1995, p. 18).

How does this translate into left politics within neighborhoods? Studies have demonstrated that geographic concentration of workers in general have a positive effect upon left-wing voting (Foladare 1968; Prysby 1975; Butler and Stokes 1974; Tingsten [1937] 1963; Weatherford 1980). When workers live in working class neighborhoods, they are more likely to join in the neighborhoods' more left-wing political sentiments. Huckfeldt (1986, p. 19-21) summarizes three potential mechanisms through which this effect materializes: First, the effect of the context upon the content of informal social relations (primary groups and interpersonal contacts persuade individuals to adopt certain political ideas). Putman (1966) and others have shown that the individual's configuration of personal contacts varies as a function of population composition. Second, the environment shapes loyalties, which influence political perceptions, and thereby political behavior. Here, the social context can be influential even if the content of interaction is not explicitly political. "People who frequently encounter workers, for example, develop ideas regarding the working class, and structure their own social loyalties, identities, and perspectives accordingly" (Huckfeldt 1986, p. 21). Third, political information and guidance is transmitted through social interaction. This includes explicit political discussions as well as yard signs, bumper stickers, and the like. We assume that each of these mechanisms contributed to the left context, but that explicit political discussions were most important.
**Why Examine the 1952 Presidential Election in Detroit?**

The 1952 presidential election was the first Democratic Party loss since the Great Depression. Whereas workers and their families had voted heavily Democratic (and sometimes for other more left-wing parties) during the 1930s and 1940s, in 1952 the labor vote generally failed to spill over into the voting behavior of non-union voters in the same neighborhoods (Harris 1954, p.189). According to Harris (1954), this suggests that unions' influence was shop- rather than community-based, and while unions held their members' loyalty on the basis of economic self-interest, they did not influence wives and children of trade unionists (p.189).

Key (1964) notes that "the factors making for labor voting solidarity -- the exertions of labor leadership and other factors as well -- may be of most effect when questions of concern to workers as workers are salient. In 1948, with memories of the Taft-Hartley Act fresh and with anxieties about a possible economic let down, labor leadership probably had far greater influence than it did in 1952 when non-labor questions were to the fore" (1964, p. 67). According to the Socialist Workers' Party's paper, *The Militant* (November 17, 1952, p. 4), "the general political atmosphere [in 1952] ... was unfavorable to all parties considered radical." Finally, the fact that the Democratic Party candidate was pitted against General Eisenhower, a popular war hero, who was previously wavering between the Republican and Democratic Parties, meant that fewer people voted for the Democrats because an attractive and centrist alternative existed.

We expect the impact of class on politics to vary in the post-war period, and that studies conducted in different years might have different results. Why, then, examine the 1952 election, when scholars suggest that our central relationship would be diminished if not absent? As described below, we are constrained due to the date of data collection on our primary independent variable, the home locations of the Ford Rouge workers. We are examining this effect at a time when labor and UAW Local 600 in particular, were relatively weak and therefore, our findings underestimate the effects.

**Political Terrain in the Motor City**

In order to put this election in its proper context, we will briefly describe the relevant history of Detroit politics and the parties involved in the 1952 political campaign and next address the issue of why Detroit is an appropriate site for our study. Then we will introduce the roles of the relevant unions and their leaderships. The United Automobile Workers (UAW), which was affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), dominated the labor scene in Detroit. One particular UAW local, Ford Local 600, stood out as the largest UAW local (bigger than most international unions) and was considerably more to the left than other UAW locals. We will make a case for Local 600's ability to create a context effect within Detroit neighborhoods where its workers were concentrated. This is an effect above and beyond the context created by the presence of UAW and other manufacturing workers in general.

**Detroit Politics and the 1952 Presidential Election**

The auto industry's steady campaigns to recruit workers made Detroit a city of immigrants. These migrations changed the political landscape of Detroit and Michigan. They created a vast, unskilled and semi-skilled auto industry labor force, concerned with union rights, wages, working conditions and the rights of the foreign born. Detroit became a Democratic city by the
time of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and has maintained an environment in which left and minority politics thrived ever since (Eldersveld 1957, p. 11).

A number of specific issues and political parties defined the political landscape for November 1952. On the ballot were, of course, the Democrat and Republican Parties. The Democratic candidate was Adali Stevenson; the Republican, General Dwight Eisenhower. Four other parties -- the Prohibitionist Party, the Progressive Party, the Socialist Labor Party and the Socialist Workers Party -- were also on the ballot.3

Many issues from the Democratic Party platform resonated in Detroit. The slogan "peace with honor" and promises to stop communism's advances in Korea and Europe struck a patriotic chord. This was also crucial to guarantee thousands of jobs at Ford, General Motors and Chrysler which all produced the major heavy equipment of the growing U.S. and Western European armies. The promise to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act -- a 1947 act which increased government control of unions, outlawed jurisdictional strikes and secondary boycotts, ended closed shop policies and empowered the National Labor Relations Board to end strikes which threatened national health or safety -- was also popular (Stevenson 1952, p. 48).

The Democrat's pro-labor rhetoric was also augmented with xenophobic anti-communism. The Democratic Party platform railed against the spreading red menace and promised careful screening of future immigrants (Johnson 1978; Stevenson 1952, pp. 214, 218). Although the Democrat's rhetoric advocated civil rights, their position suffered with the nomination of conservative southern Democrat John Sparkman for the vice-presidential candidate. So the Democratic appeal was based on security of income, patriotism, the value system of the white middle-class family, and an absolute condemnation of communism and the foreigners who might be carrying the disease.

The Republican Party platform attacked communism at home and abroad in much the same fashion as the Democrats, additionally accusing the Truman administration of being soft on communism. On labor issues, the Republican platform justified Taft-Hartley as in the interest of unions and working people despite its being overwhelmingly opposed by organized labor (Johnson 1978), and received the support of the automobile elite, including the president of the Ford Motor Company, Henry Ford II. For Detroit, these were the central differences between the two parties, ones which caused almost all labor unions to endorse Stevenson.

The Progressive Party, formed in 1948, was endorsed by the Communist Party, which sent many of its cadres into the new party to work on the campaign. After its presidential candidate, Henry Wallace, was defeated in 1948, communists and non-communists battled for control of the party, and in 1950, Wallace resigned from the party in protest of its pro-Soviet position on the Korean War (Key 1964, pp. 272-73). In 1952, the Progressive Party made an appeal for an immediate end to the Korean War (Johnson 1978) and argued that the only sane policy to address the issue of communism was mutual understanding among the United States, China, and Soviet Union. The Progressive Party also opposed the Smith, McCarran (Internal Security Act) and McCarran-Walter Acts -- legislation which permitted the deportation of foreigners deemed subversive and criminalized anti-government activities of the Communist Party and other left parties. And it is platform strongly supported the rights of the foreign born, "Equal Rights for the Negro," and an "Economic Bill of Rights." According to the Socialist Workers' Party's paper, The Militant, "even the unions expelled from the CIO as Stalinist-led, which endorsed Wallace in 1948, hedged on Hallinan [the Progressive Party candidate] this year" (September 17, 1952, p. 1).4
The UAW and CIO in Michigan Politics and the 1952 Presidential Election

In Michigan, the CIO had more members than the AFL in 1952, and its largest member union, the UAW, constituted a dominant force within the Democratic Party. The CIO Political Action Committee (CIO-PAC), which sought to influence the Democratic Party from the left, stated that "it is our objective to remold the Democratic Party into a real liberal and progressive political party, which can be subscribed to by members of the CIO and other liberals" (Calkins 1952, p. 116). Table 1 shows that the CIO-PAC and UAW intensive activities around the 1952 presidential election contributed to a quite different set of results in Detroit compared to the nation as a whole.

TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF THE UNION AND NON-UNION VOTERS FOR STEVENSON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Voters</th>
<th>Union Members</th>
<th>Union Spouses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>68%</td>
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</tbody>
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Data are from Harris (1954, p. 147) and Kornhauser, Mayer and Sheppard 1956, pp. 31-32). The percentage of Detroit "Union Members" voting for Stevenson includes only UAW members.

The table compares the percentage of voters and union voters who voted for Stevenson nationwide to the percentages in Detroit. The higher proportion of union members in Detroit (roughly 30% of the working-age population) than in the nation at large (24%) and the relatively left-wing UAW-CIO political orientation of the majority of those workers would appear to be important determinants of the 16-point difference between the Detroit and national rates of voting for Stevenson. While the table does not control for the multitude of differences between Detroit and the nation which might account for this difference, there is a residual difference in voting for the Democratic Party which cannot be accounted for by greater population of union members in Detroit. If 45% of the non-union population of Detroit -- i.e. voted at the national rate -- favored Stevenson, and 75% of UAW members in Detroit voted for Stevenson, then the resulting average for all voters in Detroit would be 54% of the vote not the 61% Stevenson actually received in 1952. This suggests that there was some residual effect on Democratic voting not explained by union membership. We will argue that net of the control for other known determinants of voting for the Democratic Party (especially important is the racial makeup of the city), that a crucial difference was the political context which some of these unions created in Detroit neighborhoods, a context that made left voting more likely among other non-unionized groups.

The high physical concentration of autoworkers within Detroit partly enabled this context, in which union political efforts were highly coordinated. More common in American cities during the 1950s, "workers [were] grouped into unions formed along craft, shop, plant, or industry lines, a structure ideal for bargaining with employers. Such an organization cannot readily be focused on union members in precincts, districts, or other geographical areas for the purpose of agitation and stimulation of voting" (Key 1964, p. 66). The nature of Detroit is
political geography appeared to contain the recipe for a workplace-community synthesis: Effective labor politics requires the articulation of four units that may be spatially separated: residence, workplace, union, and political party. The more physically dispersed, the greater the coordination costs" (Form 1996, p. 60).

The Michigan CIO-PAC was able to make a strong presence in the state Democratic Party because of the physical concentration of its members. "Ward leaders traditionally had access to dense neighborhood-networks based on work, kinship, ethnicity, and religion" (Form 1996, p. 61; see also Greenstone 1977). The CIO-PAC decided to try to remold the Democratic Party into a real liberal and progressive political party by forming a liberal coalition. The coalition succeeded in moving the party to the left. The Michigan party's 1950 platform favored a corporate profits tax, improved social security, a fair employment practices act, workers' education and public housing, and stated: "For the record of indifference and hostility to labor's interests the Republican Party stands condemned. The Democratic Party believes that the prosperity of the whole state depends on the health, security, and dignity of the working man" (Michigan CIO News, Oct. 5, 1950, p. 4, cited in Calkins 1952, p. 126). By the 1950s, Michigan politics had become a reflection of the basic economic struggle within the state: "contests for control of both parties during the 1940s and 1950s have seen the gradual weakening of attempts by the older-type leaders to stave off the swiftly approaching dominance of organized automotive management in the Republican party and of organized automotive labor in the Democrat party" (Sarason and Sarason 1957, p. 26).

Labor unions campaigned heavily for the Democratic Party in 1952: they put money into radio programs, leaflet distributions and telephone campaigns. "Up to its neck in these activities, especially, is Walter P. Reuther's UAW-CIO in the Detroit area" (Detroit News 1952, p. 11). UAW President Walter Reuther himself played a highly prominent role in the Stevenson campaign (New York Times 1952, p. 1; Detroit News 1952, p. 11), and the international union worked "in close cooperation with the Democratic Party" (Kornhauser et al. 1956, p. 18). Kornhauser et al. stress the importance of UAW members in the ranks of precinct delegates, the union's role as consultant in the process of considering which candidates to support, its ability to obtain necessary signatures (many times numbering in the thousands), and its ability to campaign with sound trucks, billboards, mass meetings, radio and TV programs (Kornhauser et al. 1956, p. 19). PAC asked all of its union stewards and officers to run for precinct positions, and all "PAC precinct workers were asked to contact all Democrats in their neighborhoods, not just CIO members" (Calkins 1952, p. 132). With all of this concerted political activity in support of the Democratic party, we expect that neighborhoods where union workers were concentrated were less likely to vote for the Republican and more likely to vote for the Democratic Party. Detroit provided a context for left voting because the union's effort on behalf of the Democratic Party had a higher degree of coordination and because the CIO-PAC was able to make a significant contribution to the Democratic Party, and the Stevenson campaign in particular.

UAW Local 600 in Michigan Politics and the 1952 Presidential Campaign

What were the activities of our "left-wing" local union? The Ford River Rouge plant in Dearborn, Michigan, with its roughly 50,000 workers (in 1952), constituted an example of a radicalized workplace. UAW Local 600 fostered a progressive and democratic work place culture, consistently concerned with left political causes and influenced by the Communist Party and its fellow travelers through the local's Progressive Caucus (STEPAN-NORRISX 1996,
While workers in most Detroit workplaces supported conventional Democratic Party politics, Local 600's political system was one that strongly challenged the status quo.

The Communist Party initiated its involvement in the plant during the 1920s, when it selected the Rouge as its primary target for agitation. It organized a successful Unemployed Council movement in the city, and, in 1932, along with the Auto Workers Union -- Trade Union Unity League, staged an impressive Hunger March on the Ford plant, which mobilized considerable community support for the Ford workers (see Stepan-Norris 1997).

Once the local won recognition from Ford in 1941, workers created one of the most radical and multi-ethnic unions in the country (Meier and Rudwick 1979; Andrew 1979; Stepan-Norris 1988). The workforce at Ford regularly voted for Communist Party and party-influenced local union leaders, supported left-wing political candidates, and worked for progressive causes in the UAW and the greater Detroit area (Stepan-Norris 1988). The plan of work for the Dearborn section of the Communist Party emphasized the importance of community activity: "Communists in the Rouge shall be obligated to carry on community activity, particularly in the 16th Congressional District, helping to build the Progressive Party, Civil Rights Congress, NAACP, etc." (Plan n.d.).

Notwithstanding the arguments of Katznelson (1981) and others that suggest that regions and ethnic and religious distinctions define workers' lives at home while class consciousness defines their work lives, we argue that Ford Rouge workers' political identities were likely to span the work-home divide for two main reasons. First, in the pre-union days prior to 1941, Henry Ford I and his representatives reached deep into workers' communities in order to maintain worker discipline in the plants. These intrusions began with the creation of the Ford Sociology Department, a division of the firm which inspected workers' homes to ensure that they were living "moral" lives (Meyer 1981), and was followed by the invasions of the notorious Ford Service Department, an armed security force, which spied on Ford workers in the plants and in their homes and neighborhoods (see Stepan-Norris 1997). The company was also known to use its trusted community leaders to hire workers, particularly from immigrant and ethnic groups.

Second, Ford's strategies to keep the union and communists from gaining a base of support in the plant resulted in labor activists being more deeply integrated into the working-class communities. In the early organizing drive, union literature was distributed in the communities and meetings were held in workers' homes. An early communist organizer recalled: "We put out leaflets. We used to distribute them at night. And on the streets. We were working on a territorial basis" (Katana n.d., p. 1-2). If one were to read the history of union organizing in the U.S., s/he would see that these company and union strategies were not altogether unusual.

The Ford organizing drive of 1940 incorporated community involvement and originated in years of communist efforts both inside and outside the plant and drew support from various political parties, labor unions, progressive churches, blacks, ethnic workers, and women (Stepan-Norris 1997, pp.21-22). In the Ford drive, "the entire union movement in Detroit pitched in. Local unions formed volunteer organizing committees, which canvassed neighborhoods and talked to Ford workers. A CIO dairy workers' union supplied the names of Ford workers living on the routes of its members. Special groups were set up to contact foreign-language workers" (Howe and Widick 1949, p. 98). All of this work-community integration enhanced the ability of Ford workers to call upon their class-based work ideologies when negotiating their roles as citizens, and, we suggest, when deciding how to vote.

Our analysis of the 1952 election concentrates on a time period more than a decade after the organizing drive, when the local was in full operation and had established a tradition of...
radical and militant unionism. It was a period when the local was under attack for its left-leanings. Nationwide, the McCarthy period hysteria was in full bloom. In March 1952, the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) held a hearing in Detroit and called 23 Local 600 leaders, questioning them about possible membership in the CP and the role of the CP in their union. On the witness stand, leader after leader from the local took the Fifth Amendment and read statements condemning the committee. The hearing was front-page news in Detroit. In Michigan, the legislature had just passed the Trucks Act (which would have banned subversive parties from the Michigan ballot). The day after HUAC left Detroit, the UAW began the process of putting Local 600 under administratorship for failing to remove local communist leaders from office. Between April and mid-September, during the height of the presidential campaign, the national UAW board of administrators ran the local and controlled its newspaper.

Despite the UAW administratorship over Local 600 and the McCarthy hysteria, the combination of left-wing leadership within the local and a high degree of work-community integration reinforced class politics both at the Ford plant and in workers' neighborhoods; we expect that this is particularly true where workers were concentrated geographically.

**Local 600's Activities Around the 1952 Presidential Campaign**

In 1948, Local 600 played "a key role in the formation of the Progressive Party, and most of the officers at the local attended the founding convention in [the state capital] Lansing, Michigan, for the formation of the State Progressive Party" (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1996, p. 195). The local's Progressive Caucus endorsed Wallace in 1948, although, according to former Local 600 president Walter Dorosh, "it kind of split the local.... The right wing was 100 percent behind Truman, of course. They just thought it [supporting Wallace] was the wrong thing. A lot of Progressives changed their minds and went with Truman" (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1996, pp. 196-7). In 1952, the Progressive Caucus endorsed the Progressive Party candidate, Vincent Hallinan, albeit with less enthusiasm and energy than in 1948 due to its preoccupation with its own internal union affairs. In both elections, the local itself endorsed the Democratic candidates.

Compared with 1948, there was less activism around the 1952 Progressive Party campaign within the local. Much of the energy and resources the Progressive Caucus would normally have spent on the Progressive Party campaign was diverted to its own defense before HUAC and the UAW's board of administrators. The UAW replaced the local's leadership with a board of administrators, which took control of its weekly paper, *Ford Facts*, until new local elections were allowed to be held in mid-September. So for most of the 1952 campaign, the International UAW controlled the local's main source of communication with its members. During this period, *Ford Facts* had a considerable amount of discussion concerning the presidential election, the vast majority of which was anti-Republican and pro-Democratic. In the meantime, Local 600 officers initiated an alternative local paper *Local 600 Union Facts*, and several of the local's building units also had independent papers. But the issue of ending the international's administratorship dominated the discussions in those pages. Only when the local regained control of *Ford Facts* in late September, did it begin its own intensive discussions of the upcoming elections. Anti-Republican rhetoric was the dominant theme in the discussion of the election, along with the top officers' recommendation to vote Democratic. Some articles urging the formation of a third party also appeared during this period.
Local 600 officers, the local newspaper, campaign speeches and literature encouraged Rouge workers to spread their political knowledge and commitments beyond the plants and into their neighborhoods. *Ford Facts* was full of information on the candidates and issues, and emphasized class distinctions in voting choice. The Republican Party, it was argued, was the party of the auto companies, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of Commerce, and the bankers, while the Democrats represented those who labor, the common people. The depression years occurred while "America's government was owned and bossed by the industrialists and financiers, through the Republican Party" (*Ford Facts* October 25, 1952, p. 1). The Ford Motor Company, *Ford Facts* pointed out, understood its stake in the presidential election: at a meeting of the Midwest Ford auto dealers on October 10, dealers were told that a "political emergency faced the nation and that each dealer would be expected to contribute to the Republican National Committee in the current political campaign period" (October 25, 1952, p. 4).

Both Local 600 officers and the building unit leaders emphasized that workers had the responsibility to get the Democratic vote out. The stamping unit is column in the local's paper, for example, urged workers this way: "let's all accept our responsibility of talking to our fellow workers, relatives, neighbors, friends -- and tell them the facts in this election" (*Ford Facts*, November 1, 1951, p. 3). Some members of the Progressive Caucus maintained that it should be an explicit responsibility of all elected union officials to campaign and participate in neighborhood politics. In the aftermath of the election, local officers diagnosed the problem behind the Democratic defeat and offered a solution: "instead of spending time and money on political action a few days of the year, immediate steps be taken to organize a new and stronger political movement of Labor-Farmer-Liberal-Small Business.... But we must be united and we must start organizing precinct by precinct without delay" (*Ford Facts* November 15, 1952, p. 3).

Despite the limitation due to external political control and a general conservative atmosphere, Ford rank-and-file workers responded to the call to integrate community and work-based political sentiments. One worker's letter to *Ford Facts* shows the common sentiment: "I live in a community [Melvindale] that is made of intelligent people and I hate to think of what those people would do to me if I voted Republican. I believe in children having enough to eat and a home to live in, therefore, I will cast my vote for the Democrats" (November 1, 1952, p. 3). The day after the 1952 presidential election results reported Eisenhower the winner, *Ford Facts* portrayed the atmosphere at the plant as a regrouping: "At the change of shift Wednesday morning, workers had long faces and worried looks. Little groups formed. Everywhere -- questions, opinions, analysis, discussion" (*Ford Facts* November 8, 1952, p. 1). A week later, the local's highest governing body (the General Council), unanimously voted to call a political action conference to discuss the formation of a new party (*Ford Facts* November 15, 1952, p. 1). The following week, the local's officers put their support behind the third party option (*Ford Facts* November 29, 1952, p. 5). Several of the local's subunits also voiced agreement with the General Council's call for a third party (*Ford Facts* November 15, 1952, p. 3; November 29, p. 3).

During the 1940s, and even in the midst of the conservative McCarthy era, Local 600 members were exposed to considerable left-wing political campaigning and were encouraged to spread left-wing sentiments into their neighborhoods and communities. During 1952 in particular, they were exposed to considerable pro-Democratic campaigning and to some activities in support of the Progressive Party. With progressive politics at work and greater integration of home and work spheres, we suggest that neighborhoods where Local 600 members
were concentrated were less likely to vote Republican, and more likely to vote for the Democratic and Progressive parties.

Data and Methods

A note about the representativeness of our case is in order here. We argued above that Michigan was a unique state, in the sense that the more progressive CIO was numerically and politically dominant over the AFL. Although we do not have AFL and CIO membership numbers broken down by city, it is very likely that there were several heavily industrial cities where CIO members and leaders were dominant and successful in influencing politics in a progressive direction. Although UAW Local 600 at the Ford River Rouge plant stood out as a progressive force, it is representative of a number of "communist-dominated" unions in the CIO, which during the 1940s constituted almost half of all CIO unions (Kampelman 1957). In our study, UAW Local 600 represents the left-wing of the CIO (what we call radical unionism), and the UAW and other manufacturing workers in Detroit represent a more mild form of "social unionism" that is likely to be associated with producing a "labor vote" and the general effect of workers' concentration. The political difficulties of the McCarthy Era, ever present in 1952, mitigate against the possibility that such left-wing unions were more politically successful than their less activist and more centrist counterparts.

Our data on where the workers live comes from the 1953 Detroit Metropolitan Area Traffic Study (DMATS 1955), a study commissioned by the Michigan State Highway Commission for the planning of highways and public transportation. We were fortunate, after an arduous search for records believed to be destroyed, to recover two sets of the punch card images from this study. DMATS drew 4% and 10% random samples of households within the 1950 Census tracts and interviewed each household about the transportation habits of everyone living there. The survey covered 30,457 households and recorded information on 42,691 different individuals who made trips to work. Importantly, DMATS surveyed each respondent's occupation, industry, and recorded identifying information about their trips to work, including the precise tract, block and coordinates of their employer. This permitted us to determine where populations, working at particular factories in the greater Detroit area, lived.

The 1950 Census of Detroit provides the basic demographic information on the population (US Department of Commerce 1952). Census data describe tracts, groups of blocks, which in 1950 in Detroit contained approximately 5,000 people or 1,300 families, and give aggregated measures of population size, median income, foreign-born population, and race.

Our dependent variables were developed from precinct-level, presidential election returns from the City of Detroit for 1952 (City of Detroit Election Commission 1952). The DMATS data were weighted to represent the population and matched with political and census data for the 366 census tracts units in Detroit (see Appendix 1). We use the conventional test of left voting, the vote for the Democratic Party, along with a more difficult test, the vote for the Progressive Party. The Democratic Party vote is generally more illuminating in our statistical models because a large proportion of the voting population cast their votes for that party, whereas only a fraction of 1% voted in support of the Progressive Party.
Spatial Relationships between Working Class Residence and Left Voting

Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the distribution of Democratic and Progressive Party votes in Detroit. The Democratic Party vote is strongest in the central city, and along the boarders of Hamtramck (the diagonally hashed areas in the center of Detroit) in the north and the eastern boarder of Dearborn in the west. The Republican vote is strongest on the outskirts of the city, with important centers in the southeast, northeast, and northwest. Because the Republican Party vote is the obverse of the Democratic Party, its areas of strength are the lightest in Figure 1. Progressive Party strength (indicated by stars in Figure 1) lies mostly on the southwestern side of Detroit, to the east of the Dearborn city limits.

Figure 2 gives a visual representation of concentrations of Ford Rouge workers' home locations. Many of the Ford workers lived in Dearborn, Melvindale, and downriver communities -- outside the city limits -- not represented on our maps. Still, it is clear that they tend to live near the plant, with the highest concentrations downtown and in the areas nearest to Dearborn where the plant is located.

A look at the maps gives an indication of the correlation between our variables. Ford Rouge workers were heavily concentrated in the Southwest regions of Detroit closest to Dearborn; Democratic votes are high to the east of Dearborn, but low to its north. The census tracts with moderate-to-high concentrations of Ford workers in the inner city also tend to have high proportions of Democratic votes (see Figures 1 and 2). A comparison of the starred census tracts in Figure 1 with Figure 2 gives the spatial picture of the importance of Ford Rouge workers' concentrations on the Progressive Party vote: of the 40 tracts with high proportions of Progressive votes, 13 (32.5% of those tracts) also have high concentrations of Ford Rouge workers. Our subsequent models provide refinements on these visual associations.

How does the concentration of Ford Rouge workers impact Democratic-voting patterns? The analysis contained in Table 2 is a first look at the relationships under examination. It does not control for known correlates of left voting. Instead, it offers us a chance to visualize the bivariate relationships before complicating the analysis with control variables. The boldface rows in Table 2 show the levels of Democratic and Progressive Party voting for Low Ford (those tracts less than 3.7%, the mean percentage of Ford workers), Medium Ford (3.7 - 5.9%), and High Ford (6% or more) neighborhoods. Within these categories, the rows "No Adjacent Ford Tracts" and "Adjacent Ford Tract" dichotomize the surrounding neighborhoods into sets without High Ford tracts (No Adjacent Ford Tracts) or sets with such tracts (Adjacent Ford Tracts). The columns show the percent vote to the Democratic and Progressive Parties and the percentage of Ford workers within the tract. The boldface rows show that higher concentrations of Ford workers are associated with higher percentages of Democratic vote. For the Progressive Party vote, the distinction is between High Ford and the lower categories.

It is our contention that patterns of left voting in the 1952 presidential election reflect the diffusion of left-wing political ideas originating in the Rouge workplace setting. These workplace-based political ideas were diffused within neighborhood settings when there were high concentrations of Rouge workers in the neighborhoods. If this is in fact the case, then we should also be able to show that the effects operate beyond the somewhat artificial boundaries of the census tract. Hence, we expect that high concentrations of Ford workers not only impacted voting in the census tracts themselves, but also voting in adjacent census tracts.\textsuperscript{17} This contention is tested by comparing the percentage of census tracts with and without adjacent "Ford Rouge Neighborhoods" that returned a high left vote.
Figure 1. Percent Votes to the Democratic Party and Tracts with the Top Ten Percent Progressive Vote.
Figure 2. Neighborhoods of Ford River Rouge Workers.
Table 2 shows that adjacency to Ford Rouge Worker tracts matters. The first column shows that the categories Low and Medium Ford and no adjacent Ford tracts had the lowest percentage of tracts above the median Democratic vote (26.7% and 26.1%, respectively). When such neighborhoods are adjacent to one or more Ford neighborhoods -- those with 6% or greater population of Ford Rouge workers -- they have significantly higher vote totals (52.7% and 70.6%, respectively). Adjacency does not appear to matter in the High Ford neighborhoods, where the neighborhoods themselves already have a population of radicalized workers to represent the political campaign of Local 600.

**TABLE 2. PERCENT ABOVE THE MEDIAN VOTE FOR DEMOCRATIC AND PROGRESSIVE PARTY CLASSIFIED BY SPATIALLY ADJACENT 'FORD NEIGHBORHOODS.'**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composition and Location</th>
<th>% Above Median Democrat</th>
<th>% Above Median Progressives</th>
<th>%FordWorkers</th>
<th>(n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Ford</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Ford</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Adjacent Ford Tracts</td>
<td>26.7^a</td>
<td>36.3^a</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Ford; Adjacent Ford Tracts</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium Ford</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Ford</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Adjacent Ford Tracts</td>
<td>26.1^a</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Ford; Adjacent Ford Tracts</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Ford</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Ford</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Adjacent Ford Tracts</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>40.0^a</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Ford; Adjacent Ford Tracts</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^aOne-tailed t-test of this mean and the next one in the next category (same column) is significant at the 95% confidence level. Significance tests are reported between each mean within groups. Between groups, the Democratic means for Low, Medium and High are all significantly different; the Progressive, Low and Medium are not significantly different, but Low differs from High.

Ford concentrations effect the Progressive vote in the same general way. High Ford neighborhoods, in contrast to Low or Medium, were associated with greater average Progressive Party voting. Within tracts, the Low and High Ford categories exhibit a spatial effect: where neighborhoods have adjacent High Ford tracts the percentage of those above the median Progressive Party vote is significantly greater.

That such high vote totals occur within tracts with the same proportion of Ford Workers suggests that it is not simply the Ford Workers themselves voting for the left parties, but instead that they influence those in the adjacent communities. These may be people within the same social unit, the neighborhood, which is bisected by the census tract boundary lines. Such findings motivate multivariate models to control for other confounding influences.

**Control Variables for the Regression Models**

Studies show that certain characteristics of the population are systematically related to vote outcomes. Income, employment status and education locate voters in terms of their economic position in the community. Others, like foreign versus native born and race identify groups with
Foreign-born workers embody different currents of interest and lingering traditions which originated in their past experiences. "Ethnic minority-group members, particularly blue-collarites who retain old-country ties and look backward, vote 'flag ties' with impressive regularity....blue-collar voters may follow the advice of foreign-language newspapers, radio shows, and fraternal organizations in choosing among state and national candidates and issues" (Shostak 1969, p. 225). Litchfield (1941, pp. 28-32) found that Detroit's precincts with the largest concentrations of foreign born (especially Polish) shifted towards the Democrats in the 1930s. By 1951, about 81% of the foreign born in Detroit were Democrats as compared to 69% of those born in Detroit (Eldersveld 1957, p. 64). Moreover, the foreign born tended to have higher degrees of partisan loyalty which suggests that "loyalty to the Democrats is related to the background, interests, attitudes, or ethnic associations of the foreign-born migrants" (Eldersveld 1957, p. 64). But it is also true that ethnic groups from the "newer" migrations, that is, immigrants from southern, central and eastern Europe, voted more heavily Democratic than the "older" ethnic groups from northern and western Europe and from Germany (Eldersveld 1957, pp. 62-3).

Besides this, the Communist Party was very active in the newer immigrant communities in Detroit, through the foreign language federations and the International Workers' Order (see Stepan-Norris 1988). Hence, we expect higher rates of votes for both the Democratic Party and the Progressive Party in neighborhoods with high concentrations of the newer foreign-born. The older ethnic groups tended to be more conservative. Where there are high concentrations of the latter group, we expect a lower proportion of the vote to go to the Democrats and the Progressives.

Black voting patterns in Detroit shifted drastically to the left between 1930 and 1936. In 1930, black precincts were 20% Democratic; by 1936, they were 63.5% Democratic (Litchfield 1941, p. 28). By 1952, about 88% of blacks in the Detroit area could be classified as Democratic partisans, whereas only 69% of white Detroiters could be so classified (Eldersveld 1957, pp. 61-2). But in 1952, the black community was not enthusiastically behind Stevenson (New York Times October 7, 1952, p.1): the Party's nomination of a vice-presidential candidate caused considerable dissatisfaction in the black community. Sparkman, it was argued by an important black leader at a Detroit rally, had an unfavorable record on civil rights (Detroit News October 31, 1952, p. 23). Still, we expect black precincts to have voted heavily Democratic.

In addition, the Rouge was a major employer of Detroit blacks who in turn played an important role in the local's politics and especially in the local's Progressive Caucus. The co-chairman of the national Progressive Party in 1952 was Paul Robeson, an important black leader and CP ally. Hence, we expect a higher rate of votes for the Progressive Party in tracts with relatively higher proportions of black workers.

As discussed above, class position is an important determinant of left voting. This analysis seeks to investigate the relevance of intra-class divisions on left voting and concentrates on the manufacturing work force. In order to capture the influence of middle and upper class individuals on neighborhood politics, we include income and employment status as controls. In general, higher income groups vote more Republican. A national study of the 1952 election found that "the Eisenhower vote in 1952 was directly and progressively related to social class: the higher the social class, the greater the concentration percentage-wise of the Republican vote" (Janowitz and Marvick 1956, p. 26).

In Detroit, too, lower-income background is associated with a more Democratic vote (Eldersveld 1957, p. 49). We hypothesize that high income neighborhoods will vote more Republican, less Democratic and less for the Progressive Party. Education was also part of the
story in political partisanship. Republican voters tended to be more highly educated (Eldersveld 1957). We have no expectation about the relationship between education and the Progressive Party vote.

The studies considered here to establish basic hypotheses about factors influencing voting in Detroit are taken from individual-level survey data, and the question at hand is an aggregate one about neighborhoods. Hence, we must be careful to recast our expectations in terms of averaging or summing the effects of different groups into political communities, which are, after all, the units in which "contexts" are formed and elections won or lost. Our point is not that a class-conscious working class determined the course of elections, but rather that class and workplace identities appear as significant and distinct additions to locally rooted concerns.

**Measures for the Regression Models**

Table 3 shows the variables included in our regression analysis, with their means and standard deviations for all tracts. We focus here on the patterns of votes for the Democratic and Progressive parties. The equation for the Republican Party is not presented since it is the opposite of the equation for the Democratic Party. The Democrats won 63.5% of the vote, followed by the Republicans with 36.1% and the remaining parties combined with less than 1%. The measures are created by dividing the vote for each party by total votes. The dependent variables -- Percent Vote Democrat and Percent Vote Progressive -- capture the entirety of this variation.

**TABLE 3. MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Vote Democrat</td>
<td>63.60</td>
<td>17.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Vote Progressive</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Black</td>
<td>17.26</td>
<td>29.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent New Immigrants(^b)</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>5.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Old Immigrants(^c)</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income</td>
<td>3607.67</td>
<td>961.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Total Manufacturing Workers (Including Ford Rouge Workers)</td>
<td>30.23</td>
<td>11.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Ford Rouge Workers</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>3.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Manufacturing Workers (Excluding Ford Rouge Workers)</td>
<td>26.52</td>
<td>11.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Adjacent Ford Neighborhoods (6% or greater population Ford Workers)</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Precincts</td>
<td>1847</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Tracts Units</td>
<td>366</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)All variables are aggregate for census tracts. Two pairs of two tracts were aggregated together because of lack of data. See appendix 1 for details.

\(^b\)Percent New Immigrants is the percentage of foreign born people from Poland, Czechoslovakia, USSR, Lithuania, Romania, Italy and Other East European, as defined in the 1950 Census of the Population.

\(^c\)Percent Old Immigrant is the percentage of foreign born people from Germany, Ireland, England and Scotland.

Non-constant error variance (heteroscedasticity) and influential cases (cases with a large residual) are two common problems that arise in regression analysis of aggregate data such as
counties, countries, metropolitan areas and census tracts (Kassab 1990; Dietz, Kalof and Frey 1991; Dietz, Frey and Kalof 1987). Under such conditions -- both of which are present in our data -- ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is not resistant (one case can radically change the results) and is inefficient (has high sample-to-sample variation) undermining confidence in standard errors and the coefficient of determination (Berk 1990; Hamilton 1992). To guard against these problems we use robust regression with its White-adjusted standard errors and more conservative measures of significance.

Independent variables derived from the census include Percent Black, which is calculated by dividing the black population by the total population. Percent New Immigrants represents our attempt to use the census data to obtain some coherent group of immigrants who, for radically different historical reasons, shared common voting patterns in U.S. elections. It includes the sum population of foreign-born Italian, Polish, Czech, Lithuanian, Romanian, and peoples from the USSR divided by the total population. Percent Old Immigrants includes the sum of the foreign-born population from England, Scotland, Ireland, and Germany divided by the total population. Detroit census tracts are, on average, 17% black, 6% new immigrants, and 3% old immigrants.

Median Income is the median family income of households in the tract. Median household income was $3607 per year.

The data from the traffic study provided more precise measures of occupation than the general ones included in the census. All manufacturing workers taken together and those from other industries than auto make the variable Percent Total Manufacturing Workers when divided by the active labor force. We code manufacturing workers as employed in either the Ford Rouge plant or in other manufacturing plants, Percent Ford Rouge Workers and Percent Manufacturing Workers, respectively. In Detroit, these are large categories: Ford Rouge workers account for roughly 3.7% of the total workforce and 6.5% of all Detroit families (assuming only one Rouge worker in any given family); other manufacturing workers account for 26.5% of the total workforce and 48% of Detroit families. Because DMATS contains information about trips to and from work and home, we were able to code for the Ford Rouge plant by locating it on a large-scale 1952 precinct map (located in the Detroit Public Library Map Room) and identifying the destination codes. The Rouge workforce is determined by adding all skilled workers, operatives and laborers that worked in manufacturing of transportation equipment, all other manufacturing, construction, transportation, communication and public utilities or wholesale trade, and who listed the Rouge as their work trip destination. Other manufacturing workers are defined as workers whose occupations were craftsmen, operatives or laborers and did not have the Rouge as their destination (DMATS Codebook n.d.). So these two variables measure the percent of the civilian labor force that is blue-collar Rouge and other manufacturing workers, respectively. This allows us to compare the variance explained by concentrations of all manufacturing workers versus concentrations of Rouge workers.

To test the influence of surrounding neighborhoods and spatial concentration, a spatial lag variable is computed for the Percent Ford Workers measures. First, using a geographic information system (ARC/View) the queen matrix of contiguous tracts is generated (Anselin and Smirnov 1998). Second, a count of the number of adjacent tracts with greater than 6% Percent Ford Workers is calculated. This lag variable is called Number of Adjacent Ford Neighborhoods; Table 3 shows that each tract has on average 1.25 High Ford neighborhoods adjacent; there are 157 cases having a value of zero.
Results of the Regression Models

Table 4 presents the results of the Robust Regression models for Percent Vote Democratic and Percent Vote Progressive on the set of independent variables. Our initial model distinguished between concentrations of Manufacturing workers, UAW members (minus Local 600 members), and Local 600 members. We found that there is no significant difference between manufacturing workers' and UAW members' concentrations on left wing voting. So we combined them in the models presented. The first column for each party's votes assesses the effect of Percent Total Manufacturing Workers; the second column disaggregates that variable into Percent Ford Rouge Workers and Percent Manufacturing Workers, and the third column show the additional effect of the Number of Adjacent Ford Tracts, a measure of the influence of surrounding neighborhoods.

Examining the first three models of Table 4, the control variables work in the expected direction. A tract with a ten percentage point higher black population, adds 2.6 percentage points to the Democratic vote; a ten percentage point greater new immigrant population, 9.8 to the Democratic vote. With mean substitution, the percent change can be calculated as well. Median Income and Percent Old Immigrants both have negative effects on Percent Vote Democrat. A $1000 increase in median income leads to a 9% decrease in the predicted Percent Vote Democrat from the mean level reported in Table 3. Percent Old Immigrants is likewise significant and negative. An increase of ten percentage points in their population makes the Democratic vote 16 points less.

The variable Percent Total Manufacturing Workers shows, as expected, that neighborhoods with higher working-class concentrations have a higher percentage Democratic vote. When this variable is disaggregated (in the models labeled "Ford Effect") into Percent Manufacturing Workers and Percent Ford Rouge Workers, both of its component parts are significantly related to the Democratic Vote. This indicates that the presence of Ford workers, even where not highly concentrated, contributed to higher levels of left voting, net of controls for working-class composition, ethnicity, race and income. We have evidence here that the radical politics of the Local 600 shop floor translated into more left-wing politics in the neighborhoods where they lived.

A separate test of a quadratic term for Percent Ford Rouge Workers was not significant. This indicates Ford workers' concentrations did not have a multiplicative effect. Still, the size of the area of concentration did matter: the third column of Table 4 tests Number of Adjacent Ford Tracts; it is positive and significant. The more adjacent tracts with high concentrations of Ford workers, the higher the Democratic vote in that tract. Each additional Adjacent Ford Tract adds almost 1 percentage point to the vote total. This testifies to the importance of a concentration effect. When neighborhoods are surrounded by other neighborhoods with large concentrations of Ford Rouge workers, those neighborhoods tend to vote more Democratic.

So we find that concentrations of manufacturing workers in certain neighborhoods enhanced Democratic Party voting, and that concentrations of workers from a left-wing local union had an effect over and above the general effect. This finding is certainly the main story of the 1952 election and explains, in part, how Stevenson won in Detroit despite General Eisenhower's landslide victory in Michigan and the country as a whole. What is novel about our finding is that we are able to isolate the contribution of a particular workplace-based political context for left voting in neighborhoods, and even in adjacent neighborhoods. In effect, this
radicalized workplace had consequences for neighborhood politics when workers from that plant were concentrated there.

TABLE 4. ROBUST REGRESSION MODELS OF POLITICAL OUTCOMES, 1952 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, DETROIT, MICHIGAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Percent Vote</th>
<th>Democ. Percent Vote</th>
<th>Prog. Percent Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>Ford Effect</td>
<td>Combined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income</td>
<td>-0.06 (.01)</td>
<td>-0.05 (.01)</td>
<td>-0.0003 (.00001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent New Immigrants</td>
<td>1.20 (.07)</td>
<td>1.20 (.07)</td>
<td>0.0107 (.0002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Old Immigrants</td>
<td>-1.60 (.30)</td>
<td>-1.55 (.30)</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Black</td>
<td>0.26 (.02)</td>
<td>0.24 (.02)</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Total Manufacturing Workers</td>
<td>0.30 (.30)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Manufacturing Workers</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.29 (.03)</td>
<td>0.32 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Ford Rouge Workers</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.47 (.10)</td>
<td>0.41 (.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Adjacent Ford Tracts</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.92 (.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>67.88 (2.80)</td>
<td>67.62 (2.81)</td>
<td>65.18 (2.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>424.17 (5360)</td>
<td>352.78 (6359)</td>
<td>309.23 (7358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted-R²</td>
<td>.853</td>
<td>.853</td>
<td>.855</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only coefficients significant at the p<.05 level appear: "..." indicates "not entered"; "ns" indicates "not significant."
Coefficients are metric; number in parentheses are standard errors. All significance tests are one-tailed.

We go beyond Democratic Party voting in the next set of models (columns 4-6) to assess the effect on Progressive Party voting. Percent Vote Progressive shows that neighborhoods leaned toward the Progressive Party when there were higher proportions of new immigrants. They lean against the Progressives when Median Income is greater. Concentrations of manufacturing workers make no difference.

In terms of our major hypotheses, an analysis of Progressive Party votes provides an important test: it measures whether or not radical workplace politics impact third party voting in neighborhoods where those workers live. Were Local 600's campaigns on behalf of the Progressive Party enough to inspire a neighborhood effect? We find in column 5 that they were: higher concentrations of Ford Rouge workers added to the Progressive Party vote. This singles out the Ford worker neighborhoods as particularly distinct, in line with our description of the plant and its activities on behalf of the Party, especially in an electoral environment where most tracts registered less than 1% of the votes for the Progressive Party. Here, we find that concentrations of workers from the workplace that maintained a left-oriented political culture was associated with higher proportions of votes to a left third party in an U.S. presidential campaign, whereas concentrations of other manufacturing workers are not associated with the proportion of such votes.
The final column of Table 4 shows that tracts with more adjacent tracts with high concentrations of Ford workers produced a higher Progressive vote. This indicates that not only did the presence of Ford workers affect left voting within the census tracts, but that their high concentrations outside the tract, in adjacent regions, magnifies the effect as well. Our hypothesis about the pattern of dissemination is confirmed: the higher the concentrations of Ford workers in the immediate and surrounding areas, the higher the left vote. This holds for rates of both Democratic and Progressive voting.

In the regression context, the spatial association between political outcomes and neighborhood characteristics, such as working class composition, is analyzed with a contiguity matrix that indicates the adjacency of census tracts in the city. Spatial autocorrelation can then be treated as noise, to be factored out with other sources of error. Alternatively, the relationship between a given locale and its neighbors may be of substantive interest, in which case spatial autocorrelation is treated as a lag variable. This second alternative is our case and we enter the spatial lag of High Ford neighborhoods into the model. A more conventional assessment of spatial lag would enter only the lag, i.e. the average level in the surrounding cases, of variables hypothesized to be responsible for the spatial distortion. We have performed such an analysis and found that the spatial lag of Percent Ford Workers and Percent Manufacturing Workers is similarly significant for the Democratic Party outcome. For the Progressive Party, the lag of Percent Manufacturing Workers is significant, a result not present in our current model, and the main effect of Percent Ford Workers drops below significance while the spatial lag is significant and of similar magnitude as our Number of Adjacent Ford Neighborhoods. Two factors account for these differences: First, while Ford neighborhoods themselves are spatially correlated, this correlation is weak and weaker still for High Ford neighborhoods. Percent Ford Workers has a Moran Index of 0.317, High Ford 0.189, compared to 0.426 for other manufacturing workers. Second, the dispersed units have a skewed distribution with a heavy tail of Percent Ford Workers. This means that being next to even one High Ford neighborhood affords the opportunity for contact with substantial numbers of people from the Ford Rouge plant. The spatial lag, on the other hand, dilutes that concentration with many cases of zero or few Ford workers. While all of the permutations of the spatial model point to the importance of Ford workers for political outcomes, our hypotheses are specifically about the role of concentrations of workers in creating a context, which supports a climate of radical politics.

How do the effects of working-class composition vary across different kinds of neighborhoods? One strong contrast is between Republican and Democratic neighborhoods, given the well-known association of the parties with class and other demographic factors. Figure 3 presents unweighted local specifications of the robust regression model from Table 4 with the 70 nearest cases. Here we see that Percent Manufacturing Workers has a slightly positive slope in the Republican neighborhoods (where Percent Democratic Vote is low). In contrast, the dashed line for Percent Ford Workers has a stronger effect on Democratic voting in those areas. Where Ford workers come into contact with regions of the city different from their own, they have more of an effect than in those heavily Democratic areas where there are fewer votes to swing. A line (not drawn for clarity) for Percent New Immigrant indicates an effect similar to the Ford effect: it is high in the Republican areas and has lower slopes in the Democratic regions, but at approximately 75% Democrat Vote, the Percent New Immigrant line departs upward (positively) from that of Ford and manufacturing workers.
We might wonder, given the set of results reported above, about the magnitude of the effect of highly concentrated Rouge neighborhoods on left voting. We find that it is statistically significant, but a more important question is: Is it meaningful? Did Rouge workers in highly concentrated Rouge neighborhoods themselves vote left, but not influence others in the neighborhood to do so? Did they influence another family member (most likely their spouse)? Or did they, in line with our idea of a neighborhood effect, influence at least one neighbor? We can think of this as a hierarchy; the weakest effect is when the workers themselves voted left; the next, somewhat stronger effect, is when the workers influenced their spouses (in which case we would expect that the workers themselves also voted left), and the strongest effect is when they actually influenced their neighbors (in which case we assume that the worker and most likely the spouse also voted left). For the weakest effect we would expect one additional vote per Rouge
worker, for the second, two additional left votes per Rouge worker and for the strongest, three or more additional left votes per Rouge worker.

To assess the magnitude of the effect of Ford Rouge workers on votes for the Democratic Party we use the algebra of expectations and compare that result to a regression of votes for the Democratic Party on Ford workers and the voting-age population (see Appendix 2). While it might seem reasonable that if Ford Rouge workers influenced voting that their coefficient should be higher than one -- their own vote plus one or more other votes -- this does not take into account the turnout or the voting rates for a given party of the different groups of voters. It also postulates the unreasonable assumption that Ford workers would have been 100 percent successful in their efforts to influence their friends and neighbors in voting for particular candidates. Once these assumption are adjusted, as in the models presented in Appendix 2, we find the proper coefficients for Ford workers influencing two, three or four other people to vote for the Democratic Party are 0.913, 1.306, and 1.698, respectively. Modeling the same relationship in our data yields a coefficient of 1.126 and the conclusion that each Ford Rouge worker influence almost three others to vote for the Democratic Party.

Discussion and Conclusion

What kind of workers' concentrations matter for left voting? Huckfeldt and others have convincingly shown that concentrations of workers in neighborhoods matter for electoral outcomes. Berelson et al. and others observed the effect of a labor or union vote and suggested that different unions may encourage left voting with varying intensity. We put these ideas together to show how concentrations of workers from radical unions matter in the creation of working class contexts, which in turn affect neighborhood voting patterns. In other words, our data demonstrate that net of other social and demographic influences and worker concentrations in general, specific concentrations of workers from radical workplaces matter for left voting. While previous research expected concentrations of workers to lead to a political context in that neighborhood, a finding we empirically demonstrate, we go one step further and show that there is a spatial effect from neighboring concentrations of workers who have a link to a left-wing union.

Political unions impact voting patterns in distinct ways: First, they create an individual-level effect, or a higher propensity for left voting among its members. Second, and more importantly for this study, they encourage workers to talk with family and neighbors about politics, and thereby spread left-wing sentiments in their neighborhoods. UAW Local 600, through its membership, impacted a substantial number of voters in members' neighborhoods (we estimate 2-3 people) to change their vote to the left in the 1952 presidential election. A much smaller (but statistically significant) number influenced neighbors to vote for the Progressive Party. Moreover, the spatial proximity of communities with 6% or greater population of Ford workers influenced Detroit neighborhoods on average to vote left.

Where Rouge workers congregated in neighborhoods, these neighborhoods voted more left wing. While our findings do not negate the importance of community identities based in ethnic or religious solidarity, they do show that the political culture of the workplace has a significant effect on left voting and that the connections between home and work may be sustained, and political ideas transmitted from work to neighborhoods when high residential concentrations of certain workers nurture them.
We have described the size and importance of the Ford River Rouge plant and its placement in a city with a heavy concentration of autoworkers was somewhat unique. UAW Local 600 was most certainly towards the end of the spectrum in terms of its radicalism. But this should not lead us to believe that it was the only radical union with a potential to make an impact on left voting. During the 1940s, approximately half of all CIO unions with about one third of its membership were led by communists or their sympathizers. In addition, several locals in so-called "shifting" unions like the UAW had large and powerful left-wing locals. Some of these may also have constituted major political forces in their locales, and made impacts on national and local politics.

We do not claim that the prevailing view of Katznelson, Bridges and others that ethnic mobilization was primarily achieved through political machines in ethnic residential neighborhoods is wrong. Rather, we suggest that not only did concentrations of workers in geographical space matter, but that radical unionism in particular had a potent effect on left-wing voting, when its workers were concentrated in neighborhoods. So union's political efforts, especially those that challenge the status quo, have the potential to counteract conservative ethnic and religious mobilizations. We demonstrate one successful case of such radical mobilization where the union politicized the work force and encouraged its workers to pursue working-class politics in their neighborhoods, despite the simultaneous pull of ethnic and religious politics.

We predict that further research across a wider spectrum of settings would reveal a good number of other unions that did the same: for example, in the hard-rock mines, where Mine Mill and Smelter Workers operated, in electrical manufacturing towns where the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers organized workers, and on the west coast docks where the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union politicized workers, we would expect a similar pattern. While such unions may have dominated particular regions, they were never in the majority among CIO unions, where social unionism prevailed. This brand of unionism was more socially conscious than AFL "pure and simple" unionism, but not nearly as aggressive and progressive as that of the CIO's left wing unions. With the expulsion of eleven "communist dominated" unions in 1949-50, the CIO drifted towards the AFL model.

If the CIO left had been more successful in winning more unions and members to its fold in the 1940s and if it had been able to weather the expulsion and subsequent raiding of its unions by the CIO, it might have been the norm for unions to be the primary source of influence among American workers, encouraging them to vote for left parties in greater numbers, despite the simultaneous pull of ethnic and religious politics. That the American labor movement took the more conservative track, and attempted to purge all forms of left-wing unionism, accounts for the contemporary paucity of such cases. But we suspect that a careful examination of the 1940s and 1950s will bring to light a substantial number of instances in which unions did make a difference.

In the years since the 1952 elections, much has changed. Significantly, employers themselves have become more concerned about the contagiousness of central city labor unrest, and capital flight has characterized many former industrial cities, including Detroit. Decentralization of the Ford Rouge plant began in the early 1950s. Beginning with the portions of the plant with the most progressive and militant leadership, the Ford Motor Company decentralized operations to outlying areas and to other states. Employment dropped precipitously, and Ford neighborhoods declined. However, Local 600 did not passively accept this company mandate. Rather, it initiated an innovative court case challenging the company's
right to remove its operations while under a binding labor contract with the union. But the
Local's legal strategy was undermined by the unwillingness of the international UAW to join in
the legal case (see Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1996, p. 20-25).29

More recent AFL-CIO political campaigns, according to Form (1996), have been
relatively ineffective because they tend not to be coordinated with party organizations nor have
they emphasized class and welfare issues. We would add that they have not been politically
charged with left-wing ideas, and have not targeted workers who share certain life circumstances
within specific neighborhoods. However, the recent infusion of left-of-center politics into the
AFL-CIO and its rekindled interest in political campaigns.30 may again produce situations
whereby radical workplace politics effects voting in workers neighborhoods even when ethnic,
racial or other cleavages exist.
Appendix 1

From the DMATS Survey, we first selected all the cards that pertained to trips from home to work. There were 35,033 4% sample cards and 7,658 10% sample cards, which were weighted for analysis by a factor of 25 and 10, respectively, to match the population in the 1950 Census. The weighting yields 927,370 individuals who made work trips (approximately 73% of the Detroit population over age 21), 25,035 of whom had two jobs. The destination tracts and coordinates are then used to identify the employer. Information on occupation and industry also comes from DMATS. These cards are then aggregated, taking the sum of individuals in each of the 372 tracts within Detroit.

The presidential election returns in the City of Detroit are recorded by precinct. Precincts and census tracts do not match. Precincts are usually smaller and contained within tracts, but some precincts are bisected by tract boundaries. Here we made use of a transparent map of the census tract boundaries, overlaying a map of precincts, to code each one to a tract or set of tracts. Those precincts which had to be divided between tracts were coded so that the number of votes in a tract was made proportion to the area of the precinct it covered. For example, if Precinct A were 75% in Tract 1 and 25% in Tract 2, then Tract 1 would receive 75% of the votes; Tract 2, 25%. That makes the (unlikely) assumption that votes are equally distributed within precincts, but our ecological units could be decomposed no further due to the limitations of the census. This is one important source of measurement error which tends to be exacerbated as units are aggregated.

Three sets of tracts were aggregated because of missing data on key variables. This makes them slightly larger than the original, but no larger than the largest tracts on the map. This preserved data about Detroit and maintains contiguity for the spatial weights matrix. Dropping cases in spatial analysis has the added problem of removing their influence from their neighbors, even if that influence is slight.
Appendix 2

What is the expected value for the number of Democratic votes or the proportion of votes to the Democratic Party? On the surface, it might appear that, without other controls, a model of the regression of the number of Democratic votes on the number of Ford workers should estimate the coefficient for Ford workers to be greater than one. Anything less would mean that Ford workers were not influencing the votes of others but rather simply voting Democrat themselves. In the same vein, without estimating a coefficient of at least two, the influence of Ford workers might appear substantively unimportant. Perhaps they only influenced their spouse or roommate to vote and no further. That is, such a finding would hardly challenge an alternative hypothesis that no working class organizing occurred on the community level.

These expectations, however, rely on several unreasonable assumptions: (1) that 100 percent of the population over 21 (the voting age in 1952) voted, (2) that 100 percent of Ford workers voted and that they all voted for the Democratic Party, and (3) that all of those Ford workers voting for the Democratic Party undertake the task of influencing their neighbors. If we adjust these assumptions to match the historical reality of Detroit in 1952, the set of expectations turns out much differently.

The following variables are necessary to estimate the effect of Ford Workers on the number of Democratic votes:

- \( P \) = number of possible eligible voters, i.e. the population over 21
- \( F \) = number of Ford Workers
- \( T_1 \) = proportion that voted in notF
- \( T_2 \) = proportion that voted in F
- \( R_1 \) = average rate that notF voted for the Democratic Party
- \( R_2 \) = average rate that F voted for the Democratic Party

The question is, given that \( P \) and \( F \) are known, if reasonable assumptions are made about the rates \( T \) and \( R \), what is the dependence of \( D \) on \( F \)? (Or, in English, being that we know the number of eligible voters and number of Ford Workers, if we can make better assumptions about the turnout of those groups, how does the number of Ford workers in each tract influence the number of votes for the Democratic Party from that tract?) This can be restated using the historical situation: First, assume that the rate of turnout among nonFord people to be 64 percent (the average in the City of Detroit) and the rate among Ford workers to be 67 percent (the average for the UAW in Wayne County). This rate of turnout among Ford workers was considered a political victory for organizers as working-class turnout is typically much lower than that of professional, managerial, and more highly educated socio-economic groups. Second, assume that nonFord voters chose the Democratic Party 61 percent of the time (the city average) and Ford voters chose the Democratic Party 78 percent of the time (three points higher than the UAW average) (Kornhauser, Meyer and Sheppard 1956, p. 31). This means that

- \( T_1 = .646 \)
- \( T_2 = .670 \)
- \( R_1 = .610 \)
- \( R_2 = .780 \)

and that the estimate of the number of Democratic votes, without assessing the hypothesis that Ford workers influence their neighbors to vote in a particular way, is generally

- \( D = T_1 \times R_1 \times (P - F) + T_2 \times R_2 \times F \) \[1\]
- \( D = .646 \times .61 \times (P - F) + .67 \times .78 \times F \)
- \( D = .394 \times P + .129 \times F \)
In other words, if we accept the above levels of turnout and voting for the Democratic Party, we expect a coefficient of .129 for Ford workers when controlling for population. But that leaves out the crucial hypothesis of this paper, that Ford workers do indeed influence their neighbors. If we assume that some portion (Q) of the Ford workers who voted and chose the Democratic Party attempted to influence their friends and neighbors, and that each such worker influenced some number of voters (N) to choose the Democratic Party, then

\[ Q = \text{proportion of Ford workers who successfully undertook political influence} \]
\[ N = \text{number of people Ford voter influences} \]
\[ D = (T_1 \times R_1 \times (PF)) + (T_2 \times R_2 \times F) + (T_2 \times R_2 \times F \times N \times Q) \] [2]

where the first quantity is the number of Democratic votes contributed by the nonFord population, the second quantity is the proportion of Ford workers themselves who vote Democratic, and the third is the additional number of votes those Ford workers contributed to the total. To set up a difficult test for our hypothesis, we will assume that 75% of Ford Rouge workers successfully undertook the task of convincing their unpersuaded friends and neighbors as the union urged them to do. We will consider the prospect of each worker bringing an additional two, three or four voters for the Democratic Party. Thus:

\[ N = 2, 3, 4 \]
\[ Q = 0.750 \]

After simplification of equation 2, this yields the expected value for the number of Democratic votes as

\[ D = 0.394 \times P + 0.913 \times F, \text{N}=2 \]
\[ D = 0.394 \times P + 1.306 \times F, \text{N}=3 \]
\[ D = 0.394 \times P + 1.698 \times F, \text{N}=4 \]

When we model the equation 2 in our data we find

\[ D = 0.360 \times P + 1.126 \times F, R^2=0.915, \text{both coefficients significant (p<.001)} \]

This result shows that each Democratic voting Ford worker influences approximately three other people to vote for the Democratic party.
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1. Hereafter referred to as the Communist Party (CP).
2. They indicate that in such communities, "The union becomes a kind of working-class party or even government for these employees, rather than just another association among many" (Kerr and Siegel 1954, p.111).
3. Two national parties, which ran candidates in many states, were not on the 1952 ballot in Michigan: the Christian Nationalist Party of General Douglas MacArthur and the Socialist Party of Samuel H. Friedman.
4. The Socialist Party differed with the CP; neither it nor The Militant supported the Progressive Party or its candidates. The campaign of the Progressive Party's presidential nominee, Vincent Hallinan, began slowly, given that he was in jail for contempt of court (Key 1964, p. 273), in connection with his defense of longshore union President Harry Bridges. The Vice Presidential candidate had been an active leader in the NAACP (New York Times March 24, 1952, p. 17). During the last weeks of the campaign, several strong Progressive Party supporters defected to the Democratic camp, thereby weakening the Party's bid for the Presidency.
5. The estimate of 54% of the vote for Stevenson is obtained because we know that Percent Vote for the Democratic Party = (National Rate) (Non-Union Working-Age Population of Detroit)(Non-Union Turnout in Detroit) + (Detroit Union Rate)(Detroit Union Working-Age Population)(Detroit-UAW Turnout) / (Detroit Working-Age Population)(Average Turnout). See Appendix 2 for the rates used in estimation of this equation.
6. Although Detroit was particularly well suited for such a synthesis, we would argue that there were probably a good number of other cities in which the CIO was relatively strong, if not dominant, and where workplace-community synthesis was likely
7. The Automobile Workers Union was an affiliate of the Trade Union Unity League, set up by the Communist Party to organize unskilled workers at a time when the AFL was only interested in organizing skilled labor.
8. The 16th Congressional District on the western boarder of Detroit in the Dearborn and downriver communities and includes the Ford River Rouge plant.
9. Local 600 represented the far-left wing within the UAW and CIO in 1952, since the latter expelled eleven "communist-dominated" international unions in 1949-50.
10. The UAW constitution specified that the international union had the power to take over a local union's administration if it failed to abide by the international constitution. The international constitution included a passage barring communists from holding office in the union. With the revelations of HUAC, the UAW charged, among other things, that the local failed to uphold the constitution because it allowed communists to hold office. This seizure of control was known as "an administratorship" of the local.
11. Local 600 had a multi-party system. Two caucuses were dominant: the Progressive Caucus, in which the communists and their fellow travelers were active, had an activist left-wing agenda, and the Right-Wing Caucus, in which the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists were active, had a more moderate left orientation (e.g., it supported the Democratic Party).

12. After more than 6 months, the UAW allowed new elections at Local 600, but it stipulated that 5 popular communist leaders could not run for office. These five were banned from participating in the local's elections until the early 1960 (except for one who was allowed to run in the late 1950s). Once allowed to run, they all did so, and re-won their local positions.

13. The production foundry, the motor building, and the maintenance and construction unit all had their own newspapers.

14. This was related in an interview with the first author, 1997.

15. Melvindale is adjacent to the Ford plant, and consisted of a high concentration of Rouge workers, but it lies outside of the Detroit city limits, and therefore, is not included in our analysis.

16. This compares to 22% of overall tracts that have a high concentration of Rouge workers.

17. This was a strategy used by Petras and Zeitlin (1967) to measure the influence of the Chilean miners on the peasantry.

18. Some demographic factors such as sex and age are related to voting patterns. If workers integrate their working class consciousness and politics into their homes and neighborhoods, then it is important to consider how women are involved in this process and how they develop their political consciousness. Through the UAW Women's Auxiliary, women participated in many of the UAW organizing drives, including the drive at Ford during 1940-41. In Detroit in 1952, women turned out to vote in record numbers (but still in slightly smaller numbers than men), but tended to vote more Democratic than men (77% vs. 68%) (Eldersveld 1957, p. 71). While we are unable to assess women's role in our aggregate data, the way in which women received and acted upon political information brought from the workplace to the home is central to Ford workers' creation of a neighborhood context effect.

19. These terms "newer" and "older" refer to the relative timing of the most prevalent waves of immigration for these ethnic groups, rather than actual time of arrival in the U.S. of individuals within those groups.

20. During this period, Ford employed ten to twelve thousand blacks in the Rouge plant, who made up approximately 10% of its workforce. "Together with their families [these workers] comprised about one-fourth of the local black community" as of the late 1930s (Meier and Rudwick 1979, pp. 6,16).

21. While there might appear to be a relationship between education, religion and political participation -- 62% of white Protestants having finished high school, 55% of white Catholics, 51% of Jews and 50% blacks -- these differences were likely bound up with race and class issues (Lenski 1963).

22. "As a matter of fact, in cross-sectional data involving heterogeneous units, heteroscedasticity may be the rule rather than the exception. Thus, in a cross-sectional analysis involving the investment expenditure in relation to sales, rate of interests, etc., heteroscedasticity is generally expected if small, medium, and large-size firms are sampled together" (Gujarati 1988, p. 327). Here, households and precincts are the medium and small units aggregated to the larger census tracts.

23. This and all other proportions constructed for analysis are multiplied by 100 to give percentages.

24. A factor analysis (not reported) of the immigrant groups included in the variables Old Immigrants and New Immigrants confirms the cohesiveness of these groups with the exception of Italians, who are not significantly correlated with either.

25. It would be reasonable to expect that other manufacturing workers were a diverse group, particularly that the politics of UAW workers differed from other unions and both from non-unionized workers. We tested alternative specification with automobile workers (other than Ford Rouge), manufacturing workers, and Ford workers. These measures were positively associated with Democratic Party voting and significant. However, a t-test of the coefficients showed that auto workers and other manufacturing workers were not significantly different from each other, and that inclusion of the separate measures does not improve the fit of the model. As we do not propose specific hypotheses about differences between UAW and manufacturing workers, for reasons of parsimony we combine the two categories.
26. Results for the Republican vote are available upon request; they are substantively the obverse of the Democratic results.

27. This illustrates that many of the coefficients are small because of the scale of the variables measured; their effects need to be considered at points that exist in the distribution of Detroit neighborhoods.

28. We do not claim that the effect demonstrated here influenced the outcome of the election. Clearly, the Progressive Party not only failed to constitute a real challenge to either of the two major parties in 1952, but also failed to match its performance of 1948. But on the other hand, this election took place in an extremely repressive atmosphere that stacked the odds against all third parties, especially those of the left. Any effect demonstrates that the political culture of the Ford Rouge workplace influenced some workers, even in this negative atmosphere, to cast their votes for an alternate to the conventional choices (and maybe even encourage some of their friends and neighbors to do the same). One possible criticism of these findings is that there is a problem with the causal direction of workers' interests which stems from the use of aggregate data. As we do not directly measure the mechanism through which workers put their political outlook and organization into action in their communities, we must look for our hypothesis to be validated by other supporting evidence of what happened in these neighborhoods. Although we have no evidence to suggest this, it might be the case that some selection criteria of the Ford Motor Company made these employers more likely to hire from neighborhoods which were predisposed to favor these particular parties. A phenomenon known as spatial-autocorrelation in the political geography literature, the correlation of some of the error terms in particular regions.

29. The local's legal strategy, as put by then Local 600 President Carl Stellato, suggested that "no member of our union or any union would consciously sign a 5-year contract which would leave him helpless while his employer moved his job from under him" (quoted in Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1996, p. 23). The local filed a legal complaint to obtain an injunction to stop the decentralization of the Rouge complex. But because the courts determined that the international union's participation in the action would have been necessary in order to continue, and the international refused, the case was never heard.


31. Tracts 22 and 23, 55 and 56, and 555 and 556 were aggregated to make slightly larger units.

32. We adjust the turnout of the non-Ford population slightly downward to factor out the higher rate of turnout among Ford workers included in that average. This makes turnout 64.6% instead of the unadjusted rate of 64.9%.

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