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Collier, Ruth Berins

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Ruth Berins Collier


Abstract

This article analyzes Latin American politics in the 1940s with reference to two different explanatory perspectives as they bear on labor politics and regime change. The first focuses on the impact of international historical conjunctures, the second on internal trajectories and a path dependent model of change. The analysis reveals that, although international events left a strong imprint, they did not determine or deflect the unfolding of internal trajectories; indeed, internal dynamics seemed to be a stronger causal factor. However, international factors did help explain the distinctive coloration of the internal patterns, filling in some of the details and helping to account for the timing and intensity of the steps as they unfolded in each country.
Combining Alternative Perspectives

Internal Trajectories versus External Influences as Explanations of Latin American Politics in the 1940s

Ruth Berins Collier

This article analyzes labor politics and regime change in Latin America in the 1940s, paying central attention to major shifts in political coalitions that include or exclude labor, episodes of mobilization and demobilization, and patterns of regime opening and closing. The analysis considers two different perspectives for explaining changes in domestic politics. The first concerns the impact of international conjunctures, specifically factors surrounding World War II, the international campaign against fascism, and the beginnings of the Cold War. The second focuses on internal trajectories of change set into motion by the different ways countries experienced a major period of reform and state building earlier in this century. The study thus juxtaposes two perspectives: the analysis of historical conjunctures and a path dependent model of change.¹

The effort to juxtapose these alternative perspectives is motivated in part by a concern with the problem of dealing with multiple explanations in comparative analysis. Causation in the social world is complex, and it is a particularly difficult issue in the more qualitative, sociohistorical tradition of research. Statistical methods explicitly recognize the problem of multicausality and offer a number of techniques for analyzing and distinguishing rival versus complementary, or partial, causation. However, qualitative approaches in the social sciences have had a harder time coming to grips with these issues. Often such approaches present an overdetermined analysis, in which many plausible factors are seen as contributing to a particular outcome; these analyses offer no basis for eliminating some factors and advancing a particular hypothesis. On the other hand, those qualitative approaches that systematically attempt to advance a particular causal claim may acknowledge other explanations as competing theories, but they typically lack a satisfactory way of considering the possibility of complementarity in which more than one explanatory perspective help to account for the outcomes under study. This tendency has inhibited cumulative theory building in the subfields where qualitative and case study methods predominate.

Small-N comparison is often seen as a way to bring rigor to the causal claims of case studies.² Yet the usual approach of systematically comparing cases through the method of agreement or the method of difference does not take us very far with the problem of multicausality and the consideration of complementary causation, as opposed to rival claims. The purpose of the methods of agreement and difference is precisely to allow the analyst to eliminate what are seen as rival hypotheses, rather than to incorporate them as complementary causes.

The handling of complementary causes is further complicated by the fact that small-N
comparison runs the risk of eliminating other causes for erroneous reasons. The logic of the methods of agreement and difference inherently assumes that no cases included in the analysis are "exceptions." According to this logic, all of the chosen cases must conform to the causal explanation being developed or advanced. Hence, in its classical formulation, small-N comparison does not deal well with either multicausality or probabilistic causality. Since for these reasons small-N comparison tends to advance a single explanation from a fairly weak basis, it is particularly important to devise ways to counteract these problems and to combine perspectives and consider multiple explanations.

In this article, I will try to deal jointly with two different perspectives, not necessarily with the goal of rejecting one, but in an attempt to combine them and to see what each can add to the other. The study is based on a comparative analysis of four Latin American countries during the 1940s: Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela. These four countries represent an interesting set for comparison because, as will become evident, they represent polar types within the argument regarding internal trajectories.

The Two Perspectives

The first perspective views international factors and the relations among the major powers as having a decisive impact on the course of events and political change in Latin America. The 1940s is a particularly appropriate decade for exploring the relative importance of this argument, as it constituted a kind of microcosm of the clash among the century's three great "isms", when the issues of war, international leadership, and global projection of power were central and when the content of and alignments surrounding the issues changed dramatically. From this perspective Latin American developments in the 1940s are seen in terms of the politics of the major powers as they waged World War II, then realigned themselves for the ensuing Cold War and established what became known as the postwar order. Of primary importance are the international political campaign to hasten the defeat of fascism and the subsequent effort to enlist supporters in the different alignments of the Cold War. Through a combination of diffusion, persuasion through the use of incentives or constraints, and imposition, these international developments are seen as having had a dramatic impact within Latin America on domestic coalitions (particularly involving the inclusion or exclusion of the left), patterns of political mobilization and demobilization, and the transformation of national regimes.

During the war, both the United States government and the Moscow-led Communist International sought to line up national governments and domestic political groups in Latin America as part of a larger effort to build an international movement under the antifascist banner. The international signals pointed to the possible creation within Latin American countries of broad antifascist coalitions that would put conflicts over domestic political agendas on the back burner. Once the war was over and the Cold War began, one might expect that the break-up of the Allied coalition would be mirrored in the break-up of the broad domestic coalitions in Latin America and that the domestic political agenda would reflect the new international issues of democracy versus revolution and capitalism versus socialism.

The second perspective focuses on the causal importance of a historic and multifaceted
transformation that occurred in Latin American countries earlier in the twentieth century in the course of economic growth. This transformation involved the development of new or greatly expanded commercial and often industrial activities accompanied by the growth of new classes and social groups employed in the new economic sectors. Along with these socioeconomic changes came a set of political changes: the emergence of capital-labor relations as a major social cleavage and, with it, new forms of social protest; the change from a laissez-faire to an activist state; the emergence of a formal sector of the economy, regulated by the state; the development of corporatism as an important form of social control; and the beginnings of the change to mass society and, sooner or later, mass politics. Collier and Collier have argued that within this common framework an important source of variation among Latin American countries was the different terms on which a newly organizing labor movement was initially incorporated into the political system, which in turn sent countries down different paths of political change.8

These two lines of argument are particularly interesting for analyzing the 1940s in Latin America because, in the one case, the international conjuncture of the 1940s was so momentous and, in the other, the initial incorporation of labor was a contemporary, or very recent, central issue of domestic politics. It may be noted that in general terms these same lines of argument appear especially relevant today. Arguments about the international conjuncture seem particularly intriguing for the present period, as a new international order unfolds in the 1990s and the postwar world that was established in the 1940s is replaced by the post-postwar world. Similarly, arguments about socioeconomic and political transformations and the role of labor may again be timely as the technological revolution and the global reorganization of capital in the late twentieth century may constitute another branching point, another socioeconomic transformation and period of political discontinuity or reorientation in which the earlier established role of labor undergoes a basic change and in which new political structures, coalitions, and institutions are founded.

The two perspectives not only represent different substantive hypotheses, but they differ in a number of other ways, which though obvious may merit some further comment. First of all, they differ in their treatment of time. Part of what is involved here is the distinction between diachronic versus synchronic analysis, or a historical, over-time analysis versus one that focuses on a slice of time. Beyond that, the internal paths perspective is oriented around analytic time, whereas the international events perspective is oriented around real time. That is, the former compares cases at different historical times but at comparable analytical periods as they undergo similar transitions; the latter examines cases in the same years.

Figure 1 schematically presents these two perspectives. The skeleton of the internal trajectories argument is laid out across the figure. It focuses on a key historical transition, the period of the initial incorporation of the labor movement by the state, which set into motion distinct trajectories of change that unfolded during what is called the aftermath and the heritage periods. The international perspective focuses on the historical conjuncture of the 1940s, which is indicated on the time line. The intersection of the two perspectives, which is of present concern, thus corresponds to the long box in the middle of the figure.

In considering a second difference, the emphasis on internal versus external, or domestic versus international, causes, one must remember that the internal causes are not necessarily unique, idiosyncratic, or idiosyncratic factors but can be generic and structural. The argument considered here, for instance, emphasizes the causal importance of a general social
transformation, more specifically the common need at some point in the process of economic growth to regularize labor-capital relations and to integrate the working class into the political system. It therefore focuses on an internally generated agenda, but one that is similar in country after country.

An international perspective may focus on different types of causes. One is diffusion or contagion of models or ideas from abroad: for instance, the international appeal of fascism, democracy, and communism. A second is common, repeated, or parallel causation in a number of countries: for example, American and Soviet foreign policy toward a number of Latin American countries. A third entails features of the international system that present opportunities for or constraints on the behavior of individual countries. This refers to the most general sort of common external cause, one that affects not just a subset of cases, as in the other types, but potentially has an impact on countries throughout the world system. For the present purpose of examining the 1940s in Latin America, what is considered here is the establishment of the postwar order: a bipolar international system, world hegemonic leadership of a hemispheric power, the salience of the Cold War with its competing ideologies, and the dominance of a world capitalist order characterized by a Keynesian compromise between labor and capital.

These two perspectives are in some sense mirror images of each other as each focuses on one set of causal factors (domestic or international) but recognizes the importance of rounding out the explanation with the other. Neither one would assume or advance a position of monocausality, and it is here, of course, that there is room to explore the issue of ways to combine the two perspectives as something other than rival hypotheses.

A further word may be added about this point. Collier and Collier quite explicitly reject monocausal claims. They trace the unfolding consequences of a particular historic transition.
but at the same time insist on two points. First, common causes do not produce similar political "regimes" but rather common component features of those larger regimes; that is, one can not conclude from these common features that in some more aggregate or global sense politics in these cases are simply similar. Second, though similar outcomes can be identified, they are not identical, for many factors will contribute to the particular shape of the outcome in any given instance. Therefore, cases within any particular pattern will exhibit substantial variation, though a general resemblance will distinguish them from other patterns.

In a similar fashion, there is no reason why an explanatory framework that focuses on the impact of international events should be monocausal in nature. Analysts in this tradition, like Bethell and Roxborough, are also explicit on this point, noting the importance of the interplay between domestic and international factors. What one perspective pursues systematically, the other also considers, but in a more supplementary, ad hoc manner.

We have, then, two quite different frameworks of analysis and two quite different sets of causal factors. One explores the possibility that some very important international forces powerfully influenced patterns of change in Latin America in the 1940s. The other emphasizes the importance of internal factors and the unfolding of internal trajectories of change over time. It will be argued here that these are not "rival" hypotheses, each of which has the potential to make the other spurious, so much as complementary explanations which can be usefully combined. Before assessing the nature of this complementarity, let us begin by treating each one separately.

The International Conjuncture of the 1940s

From the perspective of the international historical conjuncture of the 1940s, one might expect that external events would be reflected across a broad range of political and economic outcomes in Latin America. With respect to the subset of outcomes that concern us here, two separate but related dimensions might be distinguished. The first refers to coalitions and patterns of political and class collaboration or conflict. More specifically, we might consider whether or not labor unions and left parties were collaborating with other political and economic actors and the degree to which they were engaging in strikes and other forms of protest and confrontation. The second refers to regime traits, particularly democratization, political opening and closing, and reformist initiatives. More specifically at issue are the advance or retreat of an unrestricted competitive electoral arena, the legalization or banning of Communist parties, the expansion or contraction of labor rights, government support of or hostility to union organization, mobilization, and protest, and a change in policymaking toward greater or lesser benefit to the lower classes.

One might expect a number of external events to have an impact on these outcomes. The most important of these are presented in Table 1. Concerning the first dimension of anticipated change—patterns of political and class collaboration—an obvious hypothesis would point to the causal role of the Comintern's popular front policy, first adopted in the mid 1930s. This policy was abandoned following the German-Soviet pact of 1939. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, however, the popular front policy was renewed in a more extreme form which advocated the formation of broad antifascist
alliances, including cooperation with bourgeois parties, antifascist governments, and noncommunist groups within the labor movement. It advocated class collaboration, moderation of labor demands, and, at its most extreme, the dissolution of the Communist party and no-strike pledges for the duration of the war. In 1943 the Comintern was disbanded in a move that represented a dissolution of the international revolutionary alliance in favor of an antifascist alliance. Because Communist parties were influential in labor movements throughout Latin America, we would expect to see reverberations of Comintern policy throughout the region.

The spirit of multiclass solidarity and the advocacy of a reordered coalition to oppose fascism were not limited to the Communists. Equally evident, but often given less attention, is the parallel sentiment among the western democracies. The advanced capitalist countries—particularly the United States—exerted a corresponding influence on capitalist classes and political organizations in Latin America. The same year that the German invasion brought the Soviet Union into the war, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor provoked the United States to join the Allies. U.S. sentiment toward collaboration with Communists changed accordingly. This flip-flop was reflected in *Time* magazine's two descriptions of Lombardo Toledano, the Marxist leader of Mexican labor. The first, published in 1940 before the United States entered the war, refers to him as "large-eared, hot-eyed, Communistic little Vicente Lombardo Toledano" and goes on to ridicule his "screaming" and "unblushing" shift of policy following the change in the Comintern line after the Soviet-German pact.\(^{10}\) However, in 1942, just a year and a half later, impressed with Lombardo's work throughout Latin America on behalf of the antifascist campaign, *Time* described him as "the brilliant, aggressive and fluid leader of Mexican labor. . . . A slight, gentle little man with big ears and dreamy eyes . . . a Puritan in his personal life, abstemious, logical in argument, part Indian, part Italian, philosopher, archaeologist, scientist, scholar."\(^{11}\)

One might expect that at least by the beginning of 1942 this change in U.S. attitude would be reflected in the recognition among a wide variety of groups in Latin America that the struggle against fascism was of paramount importance. International influences created a context in which noncommunist factions within the labor movement may have also been under pressure to pursue a more moderate course during the war effort, and Latin American governments and bourgeois parties may have been receptive to the Communist policy of collaboration.

The end of the war in 1945 brought an end to the rationale for political and class collaboration. European alliances were quickly reordered with the onset and deepening of the Cold War. To the extent these changes were reflected within Latin American countries, one might further postulate the reemergence of a postponed reformist or radical political agenda, ideological polarization, and a renewal of class conflict and labor protest.

The second dimension has to do with democratization and with political openings and closings. Here, the widely held hypothesis concerning the impact of international forces is that the approaching and then actual victory of the allies was seen throughout the world as ushering in a democratic era. The triumph of democracy over fascism in Europe led to a diffusion of democratic and reformist values throughout the world, a process which was reinforced by the U.N. charter. It ushered in a period marked by antiimperialist struggles
and the onset of decolonization in other parts of the Third World. The hypothesis, then, is that the spread of democracy also extended to Latin America.

In addition to diffusion, direct pressure was exerted by the United States for political liberalization and democratization. This effort began as early as 1943 and was sustained throughout 1944. By 1945 and the beginning of Cold War hostilities over the issue of democracy in eastern Europe, "it became even more imperative that the allies of the United States in Latin America were seen to be democratic." Starting in about 1944, then, one might predict a pattern of democratization and political opening in Latin America. In addition, one might expect a period of reformist initiatives, both because popular demands could be expressed in the more open structures and because in terms of policymaking the model of social democracy, the welfare state, and a Keynesian class compromise was held up by the United States and Europe.

Though reformist democracy was sustained in the industrialized West, it might be hypothesized that it would not be sustained in Latin America because of other international developments. The turning point, presumably, occurred in the second half of 1946 or 1947 with the intensification of the Cold War and the replacement of the opposition of democracy to fascism as the main international cleavage with the cleavage of capitalism versus communism. If during the war the Communists subordinated class struggle abroad to the antifascist fight, it may not be too much of an exaggeration to suggest that after the war the western democracies—and particularly the United States—subordinated the prodemocracy struggle to the fight against communism. It is hard to know when to date the onset of this period. Many analysts would surely say the Cold War began earlier. But, especially for our purposes of understanding regime change and state-labor relations in Latin America, any ambiguities seem to have been resolved by 1947. In that year, the Soviet Union established the Cominform to replace the dissolved Comintern and reinstate Moscow’s discipline, and the United States announced the Truman Doctrine to contain communism and aid other governments in the anticommunist fight. Also, 1947 was the year of the Rio Treaty, a pact of hemispheric solidarity and mutual assistance, which in a sense brought the Cold War to the western hemisphere. In addition, it was the year in which the anticommunist battle was clearly brought into the labor arena, with the Taft-Hartley Act barring Communists from union leadership within the United States and the formation of a hemispheric, anticommunist labor confederation (ORIT) under the auspices of the AFL.

This discussion of events in Europe would lead us to hypothesize the existence in Latin America of four partially overlapping periods based on these two dimensions. These periods, which are presented in the top of Figure 2, are hypothesized to be the following.

H1. 1941–45: After the greater level of class conflict and strikes that may have accompanied the German-Soviet pact, a renewal of the popular front strategy, class cooperation, decline in strikes, and labor peace.

H2. 1944–46: Democratization, political opening, and reformist initiatives.

H3. 1945–48 (or beyond): Ideological polarization, greater class conflict, labor protest, and political opposition.

H4. From 1946–47 on: Political closing, restored labor discipline, and a retreat from reformist politics.
Figure 2 International Influences in Relation to Internal Trajectories of Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hypothesized Effects of International Influences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Labor/Left Collaboration: ↓↓↓YES↓↓↓ | ↓↓↓NO↓↓↓

Regime Opening and Closing: <OPENING> | <CLOSING>↓

Phases of Internal Trajectory

Brazil: <!INCORP-> | <AFT->

Chile: <AFT->

Mexico: <!AFT->

Venezuela: <!INCORP-> | <!AFT->

Table 1 Key Events in the 1940s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>German-Soviet Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>German invasion of Soviet Union, Popular Front policy of Comintern restored, Pearl Harbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Comintern disbanded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>D-Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>V-E Day, V-J Day, UN Charter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Iron Curtain speech, Communist governments installed in Bulgaria and Rumania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Cominform founded, Communist governments installed in Hungary and Poland, Truman Doctrine, Rio Treaty, Taft-Hartley Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>CIT/ORIT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These, then, are the core hypotheses that derive from the perspective of the international conjuncture of the 1940s. An interesting feature of the causal status of these four phases or
periods might be noted. On the one hand, each is a hypothesized outcome of events in Europe; the phases respond consecutively to the unfolding of events on another continent. On the other hand, a coincidental internal logic among the phases potentially reinforces this external logic. To the extent that the external causes make themselves felt within any Latin American country, the particular outcome of each phase itself sets up a dynamic that could potentially lead to the next phase. For instance, the first phase of class collaboration could encourage a democratic opening by making it seem less threatening. This second phase, a democratic opening, could provide space for greater labor protest and militancy, which also comes into the analysis as an outcome of the postwar abandonment of the popular front policy of international communism. This third phase of greater labor protest and class conflict itself could produce a domestic reaction in the direction of closing the political arena, quite aside from the international influence of Cold War antagonisms. Thus, as we proceed with the analysis, it might be borne in mind that it is difficult to sort out these different logics, though the impact of international events would suggest a particular and more simultaneous timing across countries that could not otherwise be accounted for.

To what extent, then, did these hypothesized phases actually occur in the four Latin American countries which concern us here?

**H1: Multiclass Collaboration and Political Cooperation by the Left and Labor (1941–45)** This hypothesized outcome in fact occurred in all four countries. The popular front policy of the Comintern had an important effect throughout Latin America. In each of the four cases the Communist party was influential among organized labor. It pursued a policy of cooperation with the government and generally brought about a period of labor moderation in terms of industrial conflict.

The influence of the popular front policy was clearest in Chile. Following the Comintern line in the mid 1930s, the Communist, Socialist, and Radical parties established a Popular Front that unified large segments of the working and middle classes. A Popular Front government under Radical leadership was elected in 1938, and the coalition held together despite the German-Soviet pact. The next Chilean elections were held in 1942, after the Comintern renewed the popular front policy, now in a more extreme form. Though the Chilean Popular Front as a particular form of coalition was not renewed at this time, the Communists and Socialists continued to collaborate with the Radical party, supporting its more conservative presidential candidate and subsequently his government.

The effects of popular front policy were also clear in Brazil during the 1940s. At first, in 1941–42, the policy had little impact, since Brazil had an authoritarian regime under Getulio Vargas, who had developed an elaborate corporative system to control the working class and who, especially in the absence of elections and party politics, did not seek popular support. Indeed, the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) was suppressed, and many of its leaders, including Luís Carlos Prestes, were imprisoned. However, these circumstances changed in 1943 when (to anticipate the next overlapping period) it began to be clear that the authoritarian regime would yield to a democratic regime and Vargas began to prepare for the transition. By 1945, a coalition of the Vargas forces, the working class, and the Communist Party began to form. The Vargas forces took the initiative by founding the PTB, a political party that would mobilize labor support, and by striking a deal with the Communists, which
led to a political amnesty in which Prestes was released from prison and the PCB was legalized. Both the PTB and the PCB participated in the queremista movement, promoting Vargas' candidacy for president, and in 1945 the PCB organized the MUT as a political vehicle for channeling workers' support.

Like Chile, Mexico was also a particularly clear case of popular front collaboration. In the second half of the 1930s the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) turned about-face, from an anticollaborationist stance to one which supported the Cárdenas government (1934–40). Moreover, this support for the government continued for the duration of the war, even during the subsequent more conservative government of Manuel Ávila Camacho in the first half of the 1940s. Under Lázaro Cárdenas the Communists promoted the reorganization of the governing party (PNR) in a way that would embody a popular front coalition. In the 1940 election, the PCM withheld its support from a reformist successor to Cárdenas in favor of Ávila Camacho, for whom it declared it would play the role of a “shock brigade.” After the German invasion of the Soviet Union the CTM, the major national labor confederation, entered into pacts with business to promote labor peace, and in 1942 it renounced the use of the strike for the duration of the war.

Venezuela constitutes only a partial exception to the pattern. During the popular front period of the 1930s the Communists collaborated with the reformist opposition in an antigovernment front, which broke up with the Hitler-Stalin pact. With the renewed popular front policy in 1941, the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) began to collaborate with the government in a “marriage of convenience,” emphasizing class harmony and political stability. The following year it supported the congressional candidates loyal to President Isaías Medina Angarita. Until 1944, the Communist Party was the dominant influence in the organized labor movement. Thus, it was able to bring most of the organized working class into the coalition. Medina, for his part, initiated a more open atmosphere with respect to political freedoms, party activities, and union formation. During this period, however, the reformist opposition under Acción Democrática (AD) rejected collaboration and remained in the opposition. AD had considerable popular sector support. It was the dominant influence among the peasantry, and after 1944 it became the most important force in the working class as well. Because of the continued opposition of AD and its affiliated popular sector groups to the government, Venezuela constitutes a partial exception to the hypothesized pattern of broad antifascist collaboration.

H2: Political Opening and Reformist Initiatives (1944–46) Evidence for the hypothesized outcome during this second period is more mixed. Brazil and Venezuela both installed new democratic regimes and undertook reforms during this brief period. On the other hand, Mexico and to some extent Chile do not conform to the prediction.

In Brazil, a combination of international diffusion and direct pressure from the United States contributed to the downfall of the Vargas government and the subsequent elections which inaugurated a new republic. In addition to the more open, competitive regime, a number of labor reforms was initiated during this transition. These began in 1943 when Vargas, anticipating the impending regime change, sought to formulate a new political strategy by building a constituency among the working class. Concessions to labor, which continued to approximately 1946, included greater toleration of strikes, wage increases, the
cancellation of the ideological oath (which had been a vehicle for barring political activists from union leadership), and the introduction of union elections, as well as the legalization of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) and political amnesty mentioned earlier.

Similarly, in 1945 Venezuela witnessed the advent of a more democratic government led by Acción Democrática. Though the party achieved power via a coup, it clearly had a democratic agenda, developed during the preceding decade in opposition. Although a reformist opening had begun under Medina, 1945 marked a deepening of the commitment to reform, with respect to both the regime and labor policy. The AD government was substantially prolabor and undertook a number of labor reforms, including a new, much more favorable labor law, labor participation in government, increased wages, and the spread of collective bargaining.

Chile and Mexico fit the hypothesized pattern less well. While democratic rule had already prevailed in Chile for more than a decade, the 1944–46 period under discussion was generally an antireformist period with respect to labor. The interim Duhalde government (1945–46) was hostile to labor and repressed strikes and demonstrations led by the Communists. This changed briefly in 1946, at the very end of this period, however, when a new government under Gabriel González Videla started out more closely aligned to labor and the Communist Party than previous governments and was not only elected with the support of the Communists, but also included them in the government. Mexico’s nonconformity to the expected pattern was considerably more marked, as the country moved in a consistently antireformist direction. This period was characterized by greater control of labor and the tightening of authoritarian one-party dominance. Real wages fell steeply, especially in the unionized industrial sectors, despite a record of economic growth. Unionization stagnated, and a change in labor law made it easier to dismiss workers and restricted the right to strike. The government also used a new law establishing a “crime of social dissolution” to persecute dissident union leaders. In addition, changes in the party structure decreased the relative weight and influence of labor, culminating in the reorganization of the PNR into the PRI in January 1946, which further subordinated labor (as well as the other organized “sectors” of the party) and concentrated power in central party organs. Finally, also in the beginning of 1946, a change in the electoral law raised the requirements for the registration of political parties, insulating the dominant PRI from opposition challenges.

H3: New Combative Posture of Labor and the Left (Immediate Postwar Years) On the whole, events in all four countries corresponded substantially to the prediction that heightened class conflict and political opposition would occur in the immediate postwar period as a result of the end of the Comintern’s popular front policy and the onset of Cold War antagonisms.

This pattern was particularly evident in Brazil and Mexico. In the former, the period corresponded to the opening years of the Dutra government, which saw an intensification of the repoliticization of the working class that had begun in the last years of the Vargas presidency. This development occurred both in the party system and in the sphere of industrial relations. In the newly opened political arena, parties with a base in the working class burst on to the scene with surprising electoral success. In the presidential and
congressional elections of December 1945, the Communists won 10 percent of the national vote and pluralities in major industrial cities and a number of state capitals. They also did well in the supplementary elections in January 1947. The PTB fared comparably well, winning another 10 percent of the national vote, so that the two parties based in the union movement together received approximately 20 percent of the vote. This electoral mobilization was accompanied by a more militant political posture on the part of not only the Communists, but also the PTB. As John French has argued, during this period the working class achieved a new level of consciousness which marked a radical break with the past. He suggests that even in this early period, shortly after its founding, the PTB could not be seen simply as an instrument created from above by the Vargas forces. Rather, it came to represent, at least to some extent, an independent working class voice, as competition from the Communist Party put the PTB under pressure to be responsive to the rank and file.\textsuperscript{16} This new militancy of the Brazilian working class was also evident within the unions, which underwent a process of democratization and reactivation. A major leadership change took place as PCB and PTB militants came to occupy prominent positions in the unions, which as a consequence began to slip from government control. In 1945 an attempt to institute plural unionism, in order to nip this trend in the bud, failed because of workers' opposition. In 1946 Communist leaders organized a major wave of strikes affecting many rural as well as urban areas.

Mexico also experienced heightened political and class conflict during this period. With the end of the war, the CTM split over the issue of continued collaboration with the government. Dissidents, under Communist influence, saw collaboration as a wartime expedient and were ready to resume a more militant, aggressive posture. Two major splits occurred as a result, the first when a number of national unions left the CTM and formed the rival CUT, and the second somewhat later, when the same conflict led to the expulsion from the CTM of Lombardo, who went on to form the AOCP (which was later replaced by the UGOCM). The two dissident confederations favored a more combative and independent position, and at their height they probably constituted about 40 percent of the organized labor movement. This split was mirrored in the political sphere, when Lombardo founded the PPS as an opposition party based in the working class. In the long run, the PPS did not fare very well, but the split of Lombardo from both the CTM and PRI is consistent with the hypothesis of greater working class combative ness in the immediate postwar period.

The two qualifications to the prediction about growing conflict in the immediate postwar period concern Chile and Venezuela, where political collaboration continued along with a rise in class conflict. Chile thus presents a somewhat mixed picture. In the new postwar atmosphere the Communist Party did resume a more combative posture, and labor conflict rose significantly under its leadership, including a dramatic rise in strikes in the countryside. The growth of the Communist left could also be seen in the party's increased share of the vote in the 1947 municipal elections. Yet at the same time, despite this greater combativeness and opposition, the Communists supported the Radical Party candidate in the presidential elections of 1946. Furthermore, the Communist Party even participated in the new Radical government, although it had rejected actual participation in Radical-led governments throughout the period of popular front policy.

In Venezuela the hypothesized pattern was evident, but with a particular twist: the greater combativeness of labor took place with the blessing of the government. During the Trienio
of 1945–48, AD was in power, and AD-affiliated unions strongly supported and collaborated with the government. The Communist Party also commanded influence in the labor movement, and it too decided to support what it considered the progressive acts of the government, though a dissident Communist group, the Machamiques, did not go along with this policy.

**H4: Collapse of Reformist Initiative and Political Closing (from 1946–47 on)** The hypothesis that the onset of the Cold War would reverberate in Latin America in the latter part of the 1940s is well corroborated by the evidence. In all four countries the Communist Party was banned, and strong antilabor measures were adopted. In addition, the reformist tide was reversed, and in some cases democratic regimes were overthrown.

In Chile, the democratic regime remained intact. Nevertheless, there was a substantial closing down of political space for reformist initiatives in the political arena. This occurred as a government response both to the increased labor activity and to the new Cold War, anticommunist atmosphere. In 1947 a new law drastically restricted rural unionization and outlawed strikes in the rural sector. The government embarked on a vigorous anticommunist campaign under President González Videla, who had come to power the year before. Initially representing the left wing of the Radical Party, he suddenly saw Communist subversion behind every strike. In short order the Communists were ousted from the cabinet, and in 1948 a new Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy proscribed the party.

In Brazil, as in Chile, the electoral regime was maintained, but starting in mid 1946 the government reasserted control over the unions and oversaw a period of even greater retrenchment with respect to labor reforms. The government intervened in union elections and placed many unions under the direct control of the labor ministry. It hardened its position on strikes, changing the law to restrict their use substantially and frequently repressing them by force. At the same time the government moved directly against the Communists, reinstating the ideological oath to prevent them from assuming union leadership and ultimately banning the MUT (the Communist labor front), the CTB (a new labor central), and finally, in 1947, the Communist Party itself.

Mexico also experienced an antireformist period in the late 1940s. In 1946, as we have seen, the government moved to limit political opposition and strengthen one party dominance. The party sphere was further restricted in 1949, when the Communist Party lost its registration. A parallel development took place in state-labor relations. From 1947 to 1949, the government responded to the new independence of labor with a series of interventions in union elections, adopting a pattern of action that came to be known as *Charrismo*. In addition, Lombardo’s new labor central, the UGOCM, was denied official recognition. Once voluntary wartime collaboration had been superseded, therefore, the government employed coercive control where necessary to keep the unions in line and prevent the emergence of a more combative organized labor movement. The result, by the end of the decade, was a much more subordinated union movement, from which leftists had been purged.

Venezuela represents the most dramatic case of political closing in the second half of the 1940s. In 1948 the coup by Pérez Jiménez and his coconspirators overthrew the electoral regime and brought about an abrupt end to the period of reform under AD. The military
regime, in power from 1948 to 1958, ushered in a period of severe political and labor repression. The initial years under Delgado Chalbaud were milder than the dictatorship subsequently established by Pérez Jiménez in 1950. Nevertheless, the initial junta moved quickly against AD and thereby against labor.

Table 2 presents a kind of "score card" for the hypotheses derived from this first perspective focusing on the impact of the international forces on domestic politics in Latin America. It is evident that the hypotheses appear to be substantially supported; few of the predicted outcomes did not occur. At this broad "correlational" level, the general hypothesis about the causal importance of the international conjuncture seems to hold up quite well, and events in Latin America demonstrate substantial fit with the cross-sectional explanation focusing on external causes. Let us turn now to the second perspective.

The Initial Incorporation of Labor as a Critical Juncture

Like the perspective focusing on international forces in the 1940s, the second perspective, concerned with the incorporation of labor, also makes a set of predictions about labor protest, state-labor relations, political coalitions, government reform initiatives, and political openings and closings. Unlike the first perspective, it examines the unfolding of a path-dependent pattern of causation.

According to this perspective, the type of initial incorporation of labor marks a critical juncture that sets countries on a particular trajectory. The argument thus centers around an important transition in the historical evolution of the relations between the state and the working class, specifically, the constellation of domestic political forces at the time when the labor movement was first incorporated as a legitimate social actor and typically given

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesized Outcomes</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor/Left Collaboration (1941-45)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Opening and Reformist Initiatives (1944-46)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No**</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Labor Protest and Class Conflict (1945-)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse of Reformist Initiatives and Political Closing (1946/47)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Did not involve AD.
**A brief reformist opening occurred in 1946.
***With major government support.
legal recognition. In the course of capitalist industrialization, the growth of the working class gave rise to new issues and new political cleavages, and the initial period of labor incorporation is seen as constituting a critical juncture when new coalitions were formed around these issues and cleavages. This political reorientation left an enduring legacy: it influenced the political affiliation of organized labor, the particular class and sectoral coalitions that emerged, and the party structures that were consolidated. These factors in turn influenced future patterns of political change, affecting whether politics were integrative or polarizing and whether and how party systems came to channel social conflict; they ultimately affected patterns of political legitimacy and stability.

The argument proceeds in terms of three sequential analytic phases: incorporation, aftermath, and heritage. In the first, different types of incorporation experiences are distinguished. It is argued that each type of labor incorporation had particular dynamics or contradictions that were addressed in the following period, the aftermath. These two phases together, the incorporation period and its aftermath, produced a particular political heritage.

**Incorporation Period** Throughout Latin America the incorporation of labor was undertaken by the state to address what became known as the “social question”: how the state should respond to the rising level of workers’ protest and the issue of the dismal work conditions and exploitation of the laboring classes. The initial incorporation of labor refers to the historical transition when political leaders first attempted a shift in the relationship between the state and labor, from one in which state control over labor was centrally based on repression, to one in which state control was primarily exercised through the legitimation, usually accompanied by formal legalization, of a state-sanctioned labor movement. The initial incorporation period can thus be defined as a transition in which political leaders used the state to undertake the first sustained attempt to legitimate and shape an institutionalized labor movement. It represents a change in the orientation of state policy from exclusion to incorporation, in which the state established institutionalized channels for resolving labor conflicts in order to supersede the ad hoc use of repression and came to assume a major role in institutionalizing a new system of class bargaining.

The initial incorporation period does not refer to an enduring outcome of a particular pattern of labor incorporation but rather to a critical transition, the specific features of which may or may not have been durable. It is not the case that as a result of the incorporation experience the labor movement was incorporated “once and for all,” or that the particular pattern of labor incorporation remained unchanged. Rather, the incorporation period was a transition when political coalitions and structures changed around new political cleavages. The new coalitions may have later undergone internal reordering, but this was a critical time when crucial choices were made about whether or not the labor movement would participate in multiclass political coalitions and become affiliated to new populist parties. It is argued that future patterns of political change can not be understood without reference to these differences in coalitions and party systems.

These initial incorporation experiences emerged out of a major period of economic growth and social change. The rapid expansion of Latin American economies that began in the late nineteenth century led to urbanization and new economic activity in commerce and manufacturing. These new economic sectors spawned two new social groups: a working
class and a broad range of middle sector groups, including owners and managers of industrial or commercial concerns, professionals, and a new white collar middle class. These emerging social actors put new items on the political agenda, including the resolution of industrial conflict and the transformation or reform of the oligarchic state demanded by the middle sectors.

The incorporation project did not take place until the oligarchy lost monopolistic control of the state and representatives of the middle sector reformers came to share power. This change represented a transition from a laissez-faire state controlled by the traditional oligarchy to a more activist and interventionist state, more responsive to the urban middle sectors. Even though the oligarchy itself had in some countries put forth an incorporation proposal of its own, no such project was carried out while the oligarchy retained power. Rather, it occurred only as part of a larger transformation in which, while continuing to embody liberal notions of property rights, the state took on expanded social, welfare, and economic responsibilities.

The initial incorporation period occurred in most of Latin America during the first half of the twentieth century. In Brazil, it took place during the first Vargas presidency, starting in 1930 and reaching its height with the Estado Novo, initiated in 1937. In Chile it occurred in the Alessandri/Ibáñez period, starting with the election of Alessandri in 1920 and reaching its height after Ibáñez formally assumed power in 1927. Mexico experienced the most extended period of initial incorporation, beginning in 1917 and culminating in the Cárdenas presidency in the 1930s. In Venezuela it occurred in the post-Gómez period, beginning in 1935 and culminating in the period, known as the Trienio (1945–48), when AD came to power. These periods are indicated on the time lines in Figure 1.

Labor incorporation contained many common features, yet important differences existed among the countries in the terms of labor incorporation and in the politics that produced it. Everywhere, one goal on the side of the state was to control what was typically seen as a radical and threatening new social force, the working class. But in some cases there was a second goal: the mobilization of labor support. Labor, in turn, had a separate calculation regarding whether or not to seek legal recognition, to accept or participate in the new institutional channels, and to enter political coalitions. The resolution of these different goals and strategies produced different types of incorporation experiences, some of which were more control-oriented and some more mobilizational. Correspondingly, the coalitional position of labor varied.

Though the middle sectors were generally successful in challenging oligarchic hegemony, they had difficulty in establishing their own political dominance and consolidating a more activist, interventionist state. Oligarchic interests remained powerful to varying degrees in the new, "postoligarchic" state. Hence a major issue was the relationship—or cleavage—between the traditional oligarchy and the middle sectors seeking to reform the state. It is in connection with this issue that we may understand the different types of incorporation projects that emerged.

In each of the four cases considered here, political stalemate between the older and newer dominant classes prevented or stymied the adoption of the reform agenda. Two solutions to the deadlock emerged and led to different incorporation projects. In Brazil and Chile, the military played a key role in breaking the political impasse and intervened to oversee the introduction of the new state. In Brazil this occurred in 1937 when, with military support,
Vargas abandoned the electoral regime and installed the authoritarian Estado Novo. In Chile this process began in 1924 when army officers, including Carlos Ibáñez, intervened in the political arena, and it took a more definitive form in 1927 when Ibáñez formally assumed power. In these cases the authoritarian regime coercively maintained a modus vivendi between the traditional oligarchy and the reformist middle sectors. The middle sectors were able to complete the transformation to an activist state, while the material interests of the traditional oligarchy, despite its loss of political control, were largely protected.

In Mexico and Venezuela the traditional oligarchies were relatively weak, and clientelist relations were eroding in their rural societies. Here an alternative strategy to overcome the deadlock was available in the form of labor and peasant mobilization. In Mexico, the stalemate that existed during and after the Revolution (1910–1920) was resolved through government mobilization of popular sector support throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The height of the incorporation period in Mexico was the reformist government of Cárdenas (1934–40). In Venezuela, following the death of Gómez in 1935, the government haltingly and indecisively embarked on reforms, but these did not go far enough for the reformist middle sector groups, which remained in opposition. During the decade 1935–45, they mobilized popular support, and in 1945 Acción Democrática, the political party which emerged out of the period of opposition politics, gained power.

The political mobilization of popular sector, and particularly working class, support is the crucial factor that distinguishes the two major types of incorporation experiences, which may be called state incorporation and party incorporation, respectively. In both types of incorporation projects political leaders sought to use the resources of the state to respond to the rise in strikes and class conflict by controlling working class unions and their activities. However, in cases of party incorporation, political leaders sought not only to control labor, but also to win the political support of the working class—and, in Mexico and Venezuela, the peasantry as well—and to mobilize this political support the political party became an important instrument. State and party incorporation are thus distinguished by this difference in the balance between labor control and mobilization, as well as by the role of the political party in the incorporation project. The main characteristics of these two types are outlined in Table 3.

In the cases of party incorporation, sufficient benefits were offered to induce a major sector of the labor movement to cooperate with the state. In these cases, labor became politically incorporated in a multiclass alliance. In cases of state incorporation, where mobilization of support was not pursued, organized labor retained greater political autonomy, in the specific sense that it was not affiliated to governing multiclass parties, even as it was subjected to the greater constraints of a more control-oriented, corporative labor law. This difference in the political position of labor had important and enduring consequences.

Thus, the two types of incorporation produced quite different political alliances. State incorporation, in Brazil and Chile, was based on an accommodationist alliance consisting of an uneasy truce between the reformers and the oligarchy. The emphasis lay on the depoliticization of the working class and the control of the union movement. In Brazil, a highly elaborated labor law structured the system of trade union representation and provided explicit controls over unions with respect to demand-making (particularly the use of the strike), internal governance, and leadership selection. Independent and leftist unions were
Table 3 Party versus State Incorporation: Contrasting Patterns of Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCORPORATION PERIOD</th>
<th>PARTY INCORPORATION (Mexico and Venezuela)</th>
<th>STATE INCORPORATION (Brazil and Chile)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INCORPORATION</td>
<td>[------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERIOD</td>
<td>Electoral Regime v. Authoritarian Regime</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Populist Alliance v. Accommodationist Alliance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Political Mobilization v. Depoliticization</td>
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<td>Major Concessions to Labor v. Paternalistic Benefits</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Populist Party v. No Party or Minimal Party Role</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[------------------------------------------| Dynamics at End of Incorporation---------]

| AFTERMATH               | Polarization and Alienation of Right v. Absence of Polarization | Working-class Participation and Partisan Identities |
|                        | Conservative Reaction                                          | Regime Terminated in Democratic Opening |

| HERITAGE               | Transformation of Majority Coalition v. Failure to Establish Centrist Majority Bloc |                                       |
|                        | Reintegration of Right                                           |                                       |
|                       | 2. Exclusion of Left from Coalition v. 2. Creation of Populist Party & Center-Left Coalition Politics |
|                       | 3. Retention of Working Class in Coalition v. 3. Failure & discrediting of Populism and Coalition Politics: Radicalization and Polarization |

|                   | Integrative Party System v. Polarizing Multi-Party System | Opposition and Conflict |
| HERITAGE           | Hegemonic, Stable Regime v. 1. Reactivation and Re-politicization of Labor | Coup and Long Term |
|                    |                                                            | Military Rule |

repressed and replaced with a state-sponsored and state-penetrated labor movement. With the emphasis on control, little or no political mobilization of either the urban or rural popular sectors occurred. Consequently, little effort was made to incorporate the popular sectors into a populist political party. Chile, in the Ibáñez period, represents a variation on this theme. There, a corporative labor law was not as fully elaborated (coming a decade earlier than the laws of both Vargas and Mussolini it was, however, something of a worldwide innovation as
an approach to control labor through legalizing and simultaneously shaping and constraining unions), nor was the government as successful in its effort to establish an alternative state-sponsored labor movement. State-sponsored unions were never as widespread, and they did not survive the end of Ibáñez’s presidency, though in the subsequent period unions did seek legal recognition under the terms of the labor law, which was, at the same time, further elaborated along corporative lines. Nevertheless, in broad outline the project was surprisingly similar to that in Brazil, and quite different from that in other countries.

Mexico and Venezuela are examples of the second type of incorporation, party incorporation. In these cases the mobilization of popular support was central to the strategy of political leaders, and the incorporation project was based on a populist alliance of elements of the new urban middle sectors and the working class, and sometimes, as in the two countries analyzed here, the peasantry as well. Unlike the attempt to depoliticize the labor movement characteristic of the state incorporation projects of Vargas and Ibáñez, an essential and inherent aspect of the government’s strategy of support mobilization was the politicization of the working class. Incorporation involved as a first priority not only the integration of the labor movement as a functional group but also its integration as a political movement. The result was the creation of a broad multic阶级 coalition that found expression in a political party, what would become the PRI in Mexico and AD in Venezuela. These parties institutionalized the populist alliance and channeled working class political activity into support for the government. In addition to attracting the working class vote, these parties established organizational links with labor unions.

The dynamics or logic of support mobilization meant that, compared to state incorporation, party incorporation involved more concessions and a stronger political position for the labor movement. Instead of being repressed, leftist and independent unions were tolerated (though not necessarily favored) or even became part of the governing coalition. A corporative labor code was promulgated, but it imposed fewer constraints on unions and union activity. The same kind of officialist, state-penetrated union movement was not established, even though mobilization induced the labor movement to support the government and, in receiving benefits from it, to become dependent on the state. In general, the adoption of a mobilization strategy entailed an increase in the political power of labor, since its very utility to the political leadership as a political resource depended on labor’s strength.

Party incorporation and the political mobilization of labor did not threaten the basic capitalist orientation of the state, but rather did much to coopt the working class. Nevertheless, working class mobilization threatened important sectors of society. As a consequence, the incorporation period was characterized by political polarization, a situation in which a progressive coalition in power was opposed by the dominant economic sectors, which in reaction formed a counterrevolutionary or counterreform alliance.

**Aftermath of Incorporation** The incorporation project did not establish a pattern of state-labor relations that would simply endure. Some of its features were indeed institutionalized in a way that established an enduring legacy. At the same time, each type of incorporation experience contained certain contradictions and an internal dynamic that established a distinctive political agenda for the following period, the aftermath. During this
subsequent period, some features of the incorporation project unraveled or were transformed in line with this dynamic. The combination of durable features of the incorporation period plus the changes in the aftermath led to quite different regime outcomes in what can be called the heritage period. For present purposes, as can be seen in Figure 1, it is only the former that is of interest since the heritage period does not fall in the 1940s. Hence issues concerning the broader regime that results as the legacy of incorporation and its aftermath will be mentioned only briefly.

The aftermath of state incorporation unfolded in three steps: the emergence of conservative governments which protected established interests at the same time that labor became a new participant in the reopened, democratic regime; the attempt to establish populist coalitions both through the formation of a populist party and through multiclass alliances of parties with working class support and parties based in the middle sectors; and the collapse of the populist experiments.

The aftermath began when the authoritarian regimes which oversaw state incorporation became discredited and were terminated through democratic openings. State incorporation, with its emphasis on political demobilization, failed to address the issue of the political participation of the working class, which once again became relevant with the restoration of a more open regime. By the end of the incorporation period, the absence of a populist party meant that “political space” had not been filled in the same way it had in cases of party incorporation: with the attempt to depoliticize labor, institutional channels for workers' political participation had not been established, partisan identifies among workers had not been consolidated, coalitions had not been formed between labor and other classes or political actors, and in relative terms the working class was politically autonomous from governing parties, at the same time that it was highly constrained in the sphere of industrial relations.

The political agenda in the aftermath of state incorporation therefore contained two broad items. Labor had a new opportunity to enter the political arena and participate in partisan politics. The aftermath was characterized by a rapid reactivation and politicization of the labor movement. Middle sector leaders, for their part, sought to fill the void left by state incorporation. They did this through what, from a comparative perspective, might be called a “belated” attempt to establish a populist party in order to mobilize and channel working class political participation and to address the issue of the partisan affiliation of the labor movement, as well as to enlist labor’s support and enlarge their coalition. Interestingly, these attempts were made by the original leaders of the middle class reformers. In Brazil, Vargas, at the end of his presidency, took the initiative to set up the PTB, the Brazilian Labor Party, as the vehicle for labor representation and participation. In Chile, Marmaduke Grove, Ibáñez's original coconspirator of 1924, and other reformers sought to mobilize working class support, primarily through the populist Socialist Party.

However, this attempt to establish populist parties was not successful. The middle sectors were not united around them but were primarily associated with other centrist or center-right parties that did not have a large working class base of support. As a result, they never came to power and were never in a position to win sufficient concessions to satisfy their labor constituency.

Instead, the aftermath of state incorporation was a period of coalitional politics in which center or center-right parties, the PSD in Brazil and the Radical Party in Chile, came to
power on the basis of electoral coalitions with the populist parties (and, in the case of Chile, with the Communist Party as well). However, given the continued influence of the oligarchy and its strength in parliament, the centrist parties were oriented toward an accommodationist coalition with conservative oligarchic groups at least as much as toward a populist coalition with the working class. Therefore, though the populist parties were key components of a winning electoral coalition, they remained junior partners in the subsequent governing coalitions. As such, they were unable to extract enough for their collaboration to satisfy the working class. As a result, an increasingly radicalized, noncollaborationist tendency emerged within the populist parties and within the trade union movements. In both Brazil and Chile, this trend was reinforced by a relatively powerful Communist party that competed for working class loyalty and support (though in Brazil it had to do this from an underground position). Disappointed with coalition politics and influenced by the Communists, the populist parties developed important left-wing factions. A process of polarization began, and the period ended with the abandonment of the now discredited pattern of coalition politics. By 1952 in Chile and by 1960 in Brazil, the labor movement and those parties or tendencies that had attracted working class support abandoned collaboration with the centrist parties. The aftermath periods ended with the collapse and discrediting of populism and center-left coalition politics.

The outcome of state incorporation and its aftermath was thus a failure to create a strong, stable political center. The weakness or instability of the political center is one of the most widely noted features of the party systems of Brazil and Chile. The larger heritage of state incorporation may be labeled multiparty polarizing politics. This is not to say that Brazil and Chile were identical cases. Obviously, Chile had a much stronger civil society, including a stronger labor movement and much stronger political parties; it had a deeper level of politicization; and polarization went much further than in Brazil. Yet, compared to other Latin American countries, these two regimes shared a distinctive dynamic. They had highly fragmented party systems with a built-in tendency toward polarization. Polarization intensified until a broad coalition favoring a coup emerged. In 1964 in Brazil and 1973 in Chile the military intervened and inaugurated the longest periods of bureaucratic-authoritarian rule (twenty-one and seventeen years, respectively) in South America.

In cases of party incorporation, the main feature at the end of the incorporation period was the conservative reaction triggered by the mobilization of labor, the progressive reforms, and the sense of more conservative sectors that they had been cut out of the governing coalition. In Venezuela the conservative reaction culminated in a military coup which deposed the AD government in 1948 and introduced a decade of repressive, counterreformist rule. In Mexico the same polarization and rightist opposition occurred, but the party managed to stay in power, electing in 1940 a more conservative successor to Cárdenas. In an effort to later regain power, as in Venezuela, or retain power, as in Mexico, the main item on the agenda of the populist parties was to constitute a new centrist bloc that could bring to an end the political polarization provoked by the populist coalition.

The postincorporation dynamic in Mexico and Venezuela presented a striking contrast to that of Brazil and Chile. In Mexico and Venezuela, the conservative reaction signaled the political limits of reform within the context of a capitalist state, pointing to the need to avoid the kind of polarization that had occurred, to include the bourgeoisie and middle sectors in the dominant political coalition, and to reconstitute a new multiclass coalition, but one more
heavily weighted this time to the center-right. This effort to reintegrate the right and create a new governing coalition had four components: a programmatic turn to the right; the exclusion of the left from the alliance; the retention of the labor movement (urban and rural) within the alliance by maintaining union-party linkages and labor support; and the establishment of conflict-limiting mechanisms that would help avoid the polarization that had led to the toppling of the AD regime in 1948 and threatened the dominance of the Mexican party in 1940. In Mexico, the mechanism employed was the strengthening of the one-party-dominant system. In Venezuela, the mechanism was the functional equivalent, the party pact.

The heritage of party incorporation in Mexico and Venezuela was very different from that of state incorporation in Brazil and Chile. It consisted of a party-political system that was integrative rather than polarizing and that institutionalized something approaching a coalition of the whole, rather than unstable coalitions. These regimes contained important conflict-limiting mechanisms that facilitated the formation of consistent policy with some gradual, pendular swings, rather than the accelerating, zero-sum conflict that led to policy vacillation and immobility and became hallmark features in Brazil and Chile. In addition, Mexico and Venezuela were characterized by the predominance of centrist, multiclass parties that had an important base of support in the working class, rather than by a fragmented, multiparty system that relegated parties with substantial working class support to a position of nearly permanent opposition. The heritage, therefore, was a stable, hegemonic regime that weathered the economic crises and political challenges that confronted Latin American countries throughout the 1960s and 1970s without the extended and repressive military rule of Brazil and Chile.

Combining Perspectives

The discussion above summarizes the argument of two quite different accounts, two different analytic frameworks, two sets of explanations of labor politics and regime change in Latin America in the 1940s. The first sees Latin American politics during the 1940s as outcomes of powerful international factors reflecting the changing relationships among the major world powers. The second focuses on a formative internal transition that in most instances occurred earlier in the century, not in the 1940s. It explains different paths or trajectories of change followed by Latin American countries during periods that do not necessarily coincide and at rates that vary considerably among them. From this point of view, the 1940s is a rather arbitrary decade that catches countries in different phases in the unfolding of their trajectories. How do these two explanatory schemes intersect? How might they be combined or juxtaposed?

One may begin by noting which of the internal phases occur in the 1940s. As is evident from Figure 1, the decade corresponds to the incorporation and/or aftermath periods in all four countries. During this decade, two countries, one an example of state incorporation and the other of party incorporation, underwent the transition from the incorporation period to its aftermath. In the other two cases, the entire decade corresponds to the aftermath. Figure 2 presents a more detailed chart of the intersection of the two perspectives and the correspondence between the incorporation and aftermath periods, on the one hand, and the
four periods hypothesized from the perspective of the international conjuncture of the 1940s, on the other.

In an attempt to link the two perspectives one might ask three questions (see Table 4). The first considers the two strands of analysis as rival hypotheses and asks to what extent the international events of the 1940s are really the causes of the outcomes attributed to internal dynamics. It asks, in other words, if the internal logic is spurious. The answer seems to be negative because of the contrasts in timing between the two cases of state incorporation and between the two cases of party incorporation. As Table 4 indicates, within each pair of cases, similar or parallel internal dynamics and steps unfolded in different decades; that is, they did not occur in the same international context. This is true not only of the incorporation and aftermath periods as a whole, but also of the phases or subperiods of each. Because of this difference in timing, it can not be the case that international factors caused events ascribed to the unfolding of an internal political logic. In answer to the first question, then, the impact of the historical conjuncture does not make the internal explanation spurious.

The second question considers the impact of the international factors as complementary to the perspective focusing on internal trajectories. Did the international events of the 1940s affect the timing, intensity, and variation of the outcomes that were part of the internal dynamic? The dates given in Figure 1 show which phases of the internal trajectory fall in the 1940s and might have been affected by international events. Let us consider each of the four cases in turn.

In Brazil there would seem to be little doubt that the end of the incorporation period and the timing of the transition to the aftermath period was affected by the international events of

Table 4 Role of External versus Internal Factors in Explaining Political Phases in the 1940s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases of Party Incorporation</th>
<th>Cases of State Incorporation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height of Incorporation</td>
<td>1934-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to Aftermath</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation of Populist Party</td>
<td>1940-1957/85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict-Limitation Measures</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion of Left</td>
<td>1947-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retention of Labor Support</td>
<td>1940-1958</td>
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<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Chile</th>
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<td>Transition to Aftermath</td>
<td>1943-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Reactivation Under Conservative Government</td>
<td>1946-50</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Populism&quot;</td>
<td>1950-55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coalition Government</td>
<td>1955-60</td>
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<td>Ultimate Failure of Populist</td>
<td>1960</td>
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<td>Attempt</td>
<td>1948</td>
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2. **EXTERNAL EVENTS AS COMPLEMENTARY EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SAME OUTCOMES.**

Where external and internal factors appear to push political dynamics in the same direction, do the international events affect the timing, intensity, or variation of phases associated with internal trajectories of change?

Conclusion: Often.

3. **RELATIVE EXPLANATORY POWER OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL FACTORS.**

Where external and internal factors appear to push political outcomes in different directions, do the internal dynamics deflect the international influence?

Conclusion: Yes.
the 1940s. The authoritarian regime of the incorporation period was certainly not going to last forever, and in Latin America the typical pattern is for authoritarian regimes to be replaced by electoral regimes. Nevertheless, standard accounts of the period refer to the impact of the international climate favoring democratic opening, as well as to the impact of direct, even if perhaps not decisive, pressure from the United States. The international factors would also seem to account for the particular intensity with which Brazil experienced certain phases of the aftermath period. The end of the popular front policy of international communism and the new international context of class confrontation help explain why Brazilian labor experienced an unprecedented and almost explosive reactivation and repoliticization during the immediate aftermath period (1945–47). It would also seem to be the case that the intensity of the conservative orientation of the government in the early aftermath period was affected by the international conjuncture. The onset of the international conjuncture of antireformism and political closing that occurred by 1947 was clearly reflected in Brazil. Conservative from the beginning, the Dutra government in 1947 cracked down on labor, reintroduced a number of Estado Novo controls, and restored the ban on the newly legalized Communist Party. This conservative reaction was stronger than that in the analytically comparable period in Chile in the 1930s. Though country-specific reasons help explain this difference, there is no doubt that the international context also played an important role.

The international factors also affected the distinct features of Chile’s aftermath period, in particular, the timing, duration, and specific character of the coalition governments. In Chile, the coalitions of the aftermath period included the Communists and took the form of the Chilean Popular Front, a direct reflection of Comintern policy and the general international context of antifascist collaboration. Though the Chilean Popular Front itself was not sustained, subsequent broad, antifascist coalitions were continually reconstituted until the period of relative political closing in the last half of the 1940s, coinciding with the onset of the Cold War. In Brazil, by contrast, the entire coalitional period corresponded to the Cold War so that Communist Party participation was precluded from the beginning. The timing not only of wartime collaboration but also of the Cold War is significant in Chilean politics. According to the internal trajectories thesis, the attempt during the aftermath of state incorporation to create a viable, multiclass political center ultimately failed. The vantage point of the international conjuncture leads to new perspectives on the degree of this failure. In Chile, in contrast to Brazil, the onset of the Cold War and the regionwide move to proscribe the Communist Party came at the end of the aftermath period, when coalition politics were breaking down anyway under their own weight, rather than at the beginning of the period, as in Brazil. This contrast in timing may have contributed to the fact that from the point of view of the Chilean left and the labor movement collaboration and coalition politics were discredited even more decisively than in Brazil. This in turn may have contributed to the stronger process of radicalization and polarization that subsequently occurred in Chile compared to Brazil.

In Mexico international factors may also help explain some of the distinctive aspects of the aftermath period, in particular, why the conservative reaction to party incorporation was relatively mild, that is, why unlike in most countries the incorporating party was not ousted in a military coup but managed to stay in power. These distinctive features may have reflected the timing of the initial aftermath period during the Comintern’s second and more
extreme popular front policy favoring multiclass collaboration. During this period, as we have seen, most sectors were more open to collaboration in broad antifascist fronts, and the potential threat that labor seemed to pose was diminished by the policy of self-restraint in support of the war effort. Under these circumstances, labor proved more willing to acquiesce in the politically conservative trend and the unfavorable labor policies typical of the aftermath of party incorporation. Hence in Mexico international factors promoted political conservatism within the framework of institutional continuity, whereas in countries like Venezuela the aftermath period tended to coincide with the onset of the Cold War and the international period of political closing in the late 1940s. In these cases, international factors may have encouraged a harsher, more repressive conservative reaction. More typically, in these countries a military coup overthrew the incorporating regime and banned the incorporating party. This timing of internally unfolding steps relative to international factors illuminates another aspect of Mexican politics in the 1940s. With the greater institutional continuity just mentioned, a populist party rather than a counterreformist, antipopulist military government was in power during the internationally defined phase of political closing that accompanied the Cold War. The existence of a governing populist party may have contributed to the development of an alternative to conventional labor repression in the form of the distinctive Mexican institution of *charrismo*: the “informal” coercive control exercised by the party over unions to eliminate leftist or independent leadership. In this way the transition to Cold War politics in the late 1940s may help explain the particular coloration that state-labor relations took in Mexico.

In Venezuela, the internal trajectory of regime change did not seem to be strongly influenced by the international conjuncture despite the obvious impact of Comintern policy on the Venezuelan Communist Party and despite a nearly perfect coincidence of timing between the periods that derive from the two perspectives. The high point of party incorporation began in 1945, when a democratic, reformist period was ushered in, coinciding with the complementary pressures deriving from international factors. Yet the international context does not seem to have been significant in determining either the timing or the type of labor incorporation in Venezuela. The timing itself seems more closely related to the particular situation within Venezuela, specifically, the breakdown of negotiations over the candidates for the upcoming elections, an episode which provoked the military coup that carried AD to power and initiated the *Trienio*. Nor did international factors influence the type of incorporation overseen by AD starting in 1945. The mobilization of the popular sectors began earlier, in the mid 1930s, when the mobilizing parties were still in opposition to the government. Similarly, it was also in the 1930s that AD adopted a democratic and reformist project. Hence, when AD gained power in 1945, its populist coalition and its commitment to democracy and reform were already in place. Therefore, the nature of the incorporation project that would emerge under AD leadership by and large seems to have been set earlier. The termination of the incorporation period in Venezuela in 1948 also owed little to international forces. In that year a military coup brought about an abrupt closing of the democratic, reformist *Trienio*, an event that again appeared predictable in light of prevailing international conditions. Accounts of Venezuelan politics do not refer to the impact of international forces, and other considerations cast doubt on their importance. One might expect that the flare-up of the Cold War and anticommunism in the West would explain the political closing in Latin America in the second half of the 1940s. Yet in
Venezuela the post-1948 period was more antipopulist than anticommmunist. Repression under the military government was much more clearly directed against AD than against the Communists, and indeed one of the Communist factions continued to collaborate with the government for a number of years. This evidence points in the direction of the stronger impact of internal factors (the conservative reaction to party incorporation) than of international factors (the anticommunism of the Cold War).

International factors obviously had important consequences for Latin America. Yet in terms of particular outcomes the international conjuncture does not seem to constitute a more powerful explanation than the dynamics of the internal trajectory, nor does it render them spurious. In a number of instances the international factors did, however, affect the timing and intensity of the stages following labor incorporation. International factors help to round out the picture and explain some of the variation within patterns of change for which the internal argument does not systematically account.

Finally, the third question raises the issue of how the influence of the internal dynamics may explain the differential impact of international events. As Table 2 showed, sometimes the expected outcomes of the 1940s did not occur, and the deviation can often be explained in light of internal trends. That is, when the two logics contradicted one another and pointed toward different outcomes, the internal dynamic took precedence.

Among the four countries considered, Brazil appeared to follow most closely the periodization suggested by international forces. Yet even in Brazil the deviations can be explained by the internally driven logic. An example is the political opening that occurred at a time when the Cold War might have suggested a political closing. In 1950 a reformist opening began that could only be understood as an integral part of the aftermath of state incorporation—as part of the attempt to establish acceptable channels for the political participation of labor.

Mexico likewise generally conformed to the phases suggested by the international conjuncture of the 1940s, but with one exception: the period of political opening and reform in 1944–46 did not occur. Instead, as we have seen, this was a period when Mexico was moving in the opposite direction, toward political closing, the strengthening of one party dominance, and the marginalization of labor. This exception is quite easily explained by the internal dynamics. These years corresponded to the aftermath of party incorporation and hence constituted a period of conservative reaction to the prior reformist period. In this case, the logics of the two perspectives are contradictory—the international conjuncture points to a period of reformism while the internal trajectory points to a period of antireformism—and of the two, the latter was more important in shaping politics in Mexico.

In Chile international influences became most visible in the relationship between the policy of the Comintern and the formation of the Chilean Popular Front in the mid 1930s and in the subsequent coalitions among the Communist, Socialist, and Radical parties in the 1940s. Though the formation of the Popular Front can not be understood without reference to international factors, these factors seem insufficient in explaining the persistence of these coalitions during the 1940s. Contrary to what would have been predicted, the Chilean Popular Front survived the German-Soviet pact, and similar coalitions were reestablished for some time beyond the end of World War II, when international factors pointed to increased class conflict and protest. A wave of labor actions did occur after 1945, yet in some ways the shift to the politics of confrontation was limited, despite strong ties between a relatively
strong, class-conscious labor movement and Marxist parties that might have suggested particular receptivity to the influence of international communism. In 1946, when Communist parties elsewhere in the region were returning to a confrontational posture, the Chilean party not only once again joined the governing coalition, but for the first time formally joined and participated in the government, something it had declined to do during the years of the Comintern’s popular front policy. The various deviations from the expected patterns of the 1940s reflected the playing out of the attempts at coalition politics typical of the aftermath of state incorporation. At the end of World War II the possibilities and drawbacks of collaboration were still being explored, the issues remained unresolved, and all parties continued to vacillate. In prior years, both the Communist and Socialist parties had withdrawn and reentered coalitions with the Radicals; the Radical party for its part had alternatively approached and distanced itself from the left and labor. It might be suggested, then, that although this type of center-left coalitional politics would ultimately be discredited, the final throes of this coalitional phase were still approaching by the end of the war, and the pattern continued, despite the international conjuncture of renewed political confrontation.

Venezuela, too, generally conforms to the periods predicted by the 1940s perspective, with one main variation. In line with the hypothesized effects, labor protest increased dramatically in the immediate postwar years. However, the “correlational” fit with the hypothesis must be supplemented with more contextual analysis. The heightened protest was less a result of the end of popular front collaboration on the part of the Communist-influenced labor movement than a reflection of the new activism of AD unions, undertaken with the support of the Trienio government. This outcome must be understood in terms of the pattern of party incorporation and the mobilization of labor support that characterized it.

Conclusion

It has become commonplace to acknowledge faddism in the social sciences. Yet, like the English weather, despite all the talk nobody actually does anything about it. In this analysis I have tried to look jointly at two explanatory perspectives. Perhaps this kind of exercise can provide an example of how one might proceed, so that instead of moving lock, stock, and barrel from one perspective or analytic framework to another, from today’s favored explanatory approach to tomorrow’s, we might try to preserve the insights of earlier perspectives as we move toward new ones by explicitly combining perspectives. Such an exercise is an important step toward more cumulative understandings.

That said, it should be immediately acknowledged that, when one is working with historical data and case study methods, it is difficult to sort out explanations when they are juxtaposed in this way. It is not as if one can use a partial correlation to assess if the “real” cause is one variable or another or do a regression analysis to evaluate how much each factor contributes to the explanation. What is required is a much more difficult and painstaking kind of contextual analysis and teasing out of complex explanations.

This analysis has attempted to juxtapose two different analytic perspectives as they relate to labor politics and regime change in Latin America during the 1940s. Both the international and the internal perspectives contribute to our understanding; hence they should
be viewed as complementary, not as rival, explanations. There is no question that the international events of the 1940s left a strong imprint on the political landscape of Latin America. Yet these events did not determine or deflect the unfolding of internal trajectories that were set in motion by the initial incorporation of labor; indeed, overall these internal dynamics seemed to be stronger causal factors. However, the international factors help explain the distinctive coloration of the internal patterns by filling in some of the details and accounting in part for the timing and intensity of the steps as they unfolded in each country.

NOTES

This article was originally prepared for a project organized by David Rock on Latin America in the 1940s. I would like to thank David Rock, Brian Loveman, and David Collier for their helpful comments.


13. On these last two periods, see ibid.


18. Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*, also examined party incorporation in Colombia, Uruguay, Peru, and Argentina, where the mobilization project was limited to organized labor.


20. It may be noted that in the larger study, Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*, Uruguay was the only other case of party incorporation in which the initial incorporation period was not brought to an end by a military coup (although a coup did occur several years later), and it was also the only other country in which the transition from party incorporation to the aftermath period was made prior to the onset of Cold War antagonisms in the late 1940s.