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Artificial Borders and Mass Violence:
How Colonial Legacies Fuel Ethnic and Religious Strife

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Artificial Borders and Mass Violence:
How Colonial Legacies Fuel Ethnic and Religious Strife

by

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Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of California, Los Angeles, 2014
Professor Steven L. Spiegel, Chair

The Arab Spring demonstrations varied in size and efficacy across the Middle East and North Africa, but the demands were similar: Protesters generally sought economic and political change. The government repression that ensued was also comparable throughout the region, with states responding with a combination of low-level violence and reforms. The two glaring exceptions were Libya and Syria, where government brutality was severe, and the conflicts escalated into full-blown civil wars.

The Arab Spring case is consistent with this dissertation’s conclusion: That countries such as Syria and Libya, whose foreign-drawn borders gave way to the forced cohabitation of politically relevant ethnic groups, are more likely to descend into the kind
of large-scale organized violence we would expect to witness during periods of state formation.

For some time scholars and policy observers alike have suggested that “artificial,” or foreign-drawn borders, are in fact to blame for ethnic conflicts in postcolonial states. So far, however, there has been no empirical evidence to support this assertion. This dissertation’s contributions are twofold. First, I provide the first empirical evidence linking foreign-drawn borders with ethnic civil war outbreak, one-sided government violence against civilians, and foreign military intervention. Second, the dissertation provides a refined theory of forced cohabitation as a framework for understanding the relationships between these seemingly unconnected correlations.
The dissertation of Nathan Gonzalez is approved.

David C. Rapoport

Richard H. Dekmejian

Steven L. Spiegel, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2014
For Tamara and Sofia
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Nathan Gonzalez earned his Bachelor of Arts in political science from the University of California, Los Angeles, in 2004. In 2007 he received his Master of International Affairs from the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University in New York. In 2008 he joined the doctoral program in political science at the University of California, Los Angeles.

While pursuing his doctoral degree, Nathan Gonzalez has served as a part-time lecturer of political science and international studies at California State University, Long Beach, and at other local universities and community colleges. He has given several panel and lecture presentations on Middle Eastern politics, and is the author of two published books on the Middle East.

1.

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THE STATE

The first day, a messenger from the municipal judge went house to house summoning us to a meeting right away. There the judge announced that the reason for the meeting was the killing of every Tutsi without exception. It was simply said, and it was simple to understand. … There were some guys who asked if there were any priorities. The judge answered sternly: “There is no need to ask how to begin. The only worthwhile plan is to start straight ahead into the bush, and right now, without hanging back anymore behind questions.”

From *Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak* (Hatzeld 2006, 11)

The Rwandan genocide involved the killing of anywhere between half a million and eight hundred thousand members of the Tutsi ethnic group. The violence in Rwanda, like all examples of genocide, is as incomprehensible as it is rare. Seldom does ethnic, racial, or religious conflict culminate in the efforts to completely eradicate a people. But what the Rwandan experience teaches us is that many of these tragedies are perpetrated by governments that couch their actions in the language of defense, however hollow such justifications may ring.

Leading up to the genocide Tutsi rebels based in neighboring Uganda had fought against the majority Hutu-led government. Although a fragile peace was brokered, Hutu intellectual and political circles began to coalesce around the idea that Tutsis should be sidelined and excluded from both political and social influence. Through what was most
likely a well-orchestrated coup by hardline members of the Rwandan military,\(^1\) the president’s airplane was shot down, and this was blamed on Tutsi rebels before the killings began.

Although the genocide was marked by intimate violence against neighbors, it was planned. Pre-killing meetings took place in soccer fields every morning, and money was raised to pay for faraway killing expeditions, particularly those carried out by the paramilitary *Interahawme* (Hetzfeld 2006, 12). The radio blared libelous material against Tutsis—referring to them as cockroaches—and government officials would gather groups of Hutus with simple directions: kill everyone, loot everything.

As unique as the Rwandan genocide is, its background is not so rare among theaters of ethnic- and religious-based violence. What Rwanda has that Myanmar, Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Syria and Sierra Leone, all have in common, is a legacy of foreign-drawn, or “artificial borders,” which forced ethnic groups to remain in the same country, often in an environment marked by mutual fear and hostility.

As such, artificial borders may very well have been the reason for the Tutsi insurgency based in Uganda, just as they were the main reason for the horrific government reprisals that sought to stamp it out along with the Tutsis. Artificial borders, as drawn by colonial powers, have been and continue to be one of the most important factors contributing to the outbreak of ethnic-based violence around the world.

Here, ethnicity is defined as any politically salient identity form that is inherited from birth, can be externally perceived without much difficulty, and has limited

\(^1\) The long-suspected allegations were confirmed by a French investigation. “Report: Rebels Cleared in Plane Crash That Sparked Rwandan Genocide.” CNN (January 11, 2012)
malleability. As such, ethnolinguistic identity, as well as religion, race, and in some cases tribe (see next chapter on tribe caveats) can be thought of as “ethnicity,” assuming the category is politically relevant in the country studied. For this reason, I use the adjectives “ethnic,” “religious,” and “ethnosectarian” interchangeably in cases where sect plays a major role in the formation of political identity.

BOUNDARIES AND THE STATE

In the field of political science, the year 1648 AD is theoretically considered the beginning of our international system of sovereign states. That year, representatives from various kingdoms, republics and principalities gathered in the Westphalia region of western Germany to sign two treaties that would formally end the Thirty Years War.

Like the 1919 Versailles Treaty after World War I, or the 1815 Congress of Vienna following the devastating Napoleonic wars, the Peace of Westphalia was meant to rein in the kind of violence that had gotten out of control in the continent. In the infamous Siege of Magdeburg alone, Catholic troops raped and killed an estimated 20,000 - 30,000 people. And if one adds the killing to the famine and pestilence, up to one quarter of Germany’s population perished during those thirty years—compared with 12 percent of the country in World War II.

Westphalia did not end the bad blood between Catholic and Protestant states, and in fact the reason that two treaties had to be signed—one in the city of Osnabrück and one in Münster—was that the delegations wanted to avoid being in the same room with each other. But the Peace of Westphalia set guidelines that would eventually end religious-based intervention across borders. Countries were to no longer gang up on each
other on the basis of religious affiliation, and Protestant and Catholic rulers, including the Pope himself, would no longer interfere to stoke unrest in others’ domains. For political scientists, the concept of a sovereign state, meaning an independent political community governed by a single entity, does not begin to take form until the game-changing Peace of Westphalia is signed.

Today, such is the perception of strong borders that political science has found it convenient to maintain two separate fields dealing with global politics: comparative politics, dealing with the internal characteristics of states, and international relations, focused on the interactions between these states at the international level. Some scholarship takes into account areas of overlapping interest, such as the connection between democracy (an internal phenomenon) and war (an interaction). But in general the two fields converge only on a few topics.

In practice, however, the world is much more complicated. While borders have come to demarcate official lines of authority, they are not impenetrable, as the constant and large-scale movement of goods, people, and ideas, show. Borders are also porous when we consider the creation of political communities. Border areas create border cultures, and some ethnic groups straddle both sides of a line, as anyone who has ever been to the French-German border can attest.

Not all of this straddling over borders has an equal effect. Some crossborder identities are nonthreatening, as the kind found between Mexico and the southwestern United States. Some expressions of crossborder identities carry with them irredentism, meaning the claim of outside territory as one’s own. This is the case with many
Hungarians who seek to join coethnics living in neighboring Slovakia and Romania. For the most part, most irredentism expresses itself without incident.

But some of these transnational identities do lead to violence. This often comes in the form of crossborder insurgencies that seek separation from their current state, such as in the Pashtun region straddling the Afghan-Pakistani border, where members of the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban work to destabilize countries on either side of the border. The same is true in Baluchistan, the region on the Iranian-Pakistani border whose insurgent separatist fighters have targeted the governments of both countries. In Central Africa, Rwandan fighters of different political and ethnic persuasions have been active in the neighboring Congo seeking to target the government there.

What all these more troubling geographic settings have in common is a story of borders that came suddenly, often at the behest of colonial powers seeking to create nations out of thin air. What results is forced cohabitation born from “artificial borders.” The story is not only one of ethnic groups living under the same roof that happen to disagree on visions of national identity, political access, or economic opportunity; it is also about the identities that spill over onto adjacent states. These crossborder identities become politically mobile, with stakeholders from one state able to mobilize political actors in another, at times generating ethnic conflict in the target state. In this manner borders can prove feeble in stopping a determined, organized ethnic-based movement, and the line between civil war and international conflict fades in a manner that political science has yet to adequately address.

Many scholars and opinion-makers have insisted for some time that the forced cohabitation of ethnic groups owed to so-called “artificial borders” can invite civil war.
Although not referring to it as a theory of forced cohabitation, David C. Rapoport laid out six fundamental challenges of ethnic conflict in his chapter “The Role of External Forces in Supporting Ethno-Religious War” (1994):

1. “Boundaries of existing states never coincide with those of religious and ethnic communities, and therefore ethno-religious conflicts can result in the dismemberment of one or more neighboring states.”

2. “Ethno-religious conflicts in the 20th century last a long time” since they tend to “suck in outsiders more easily, and this outside involvement tends to be more extensive and irrevocable.”

3. “Issues of identity which resist compromise lie at the heart of ethno-religious struggles, making them most difficult to resolve permanently.”

4. “Successful multi-ethnic states can and do break down or become sectarian; Lebanon and Yugoslavia, once admired as models of ethnic harmony, have become synonymous with the most ugly kind of ethnic nightmare.”

5. “Ethno-religious conflict most often culminates in struggles for exclusive control of space by contending groups. ‘Ethnic cleansing’ is to be expected.”

6. “Contemporary ethno-religious struggles have a distinctive pattern of geographic dispersion.”

Each of these six challenges represents separate phenomena, but each is tied to a fundamental problem that emerges in states that have not developed a dominant political identity. In some countries, a common identity has been achieved through ethnic cleansing over time, or through the assimilation of newcomers; or in the case of France and the United States, through both. But relatively newer countries have had to contend with a lack of unifying identity, and more important, with neighboring countries that seek to exploit this perceived weakness. The result is a dual challenge of internal and external proportions. While the vast majority of governments seek to hone a peaceful indoctrination of nationalism that binds the disparate societal groups, and most are successful in using political and economic tools to incentivize stability; there are also failures. This dissertation focuses mainly on the failures, and presents a theory of forced
cohabitation as a tool for understanding them. The theory posits that the forced cohabitation of ethnicities leads to the kinds of violent conditions one would find during early periods of state formation—that is, when nations have not yet managed to successfully establish a unifying national identity; a period when both internal and external challenges are at their most acute. It is the reaction to, and interaction with, such insecurity, that takes the form of civil wars, chronic foreign interventions, and government atrocities, and other episodes of mass violence we observe around the world.

The forced cohabitation theory makes three important assumptions. First, that artificial borders are real. This is perhaps the most contentious statement, since all political borders that do not follow natural boundaries such as rivers or mountains are by nature “artificial.” What we really mean by artificial borders is those that were drawn by colonialists or other outside governments, and are not a result of actions by those living in the affected domains. The second proposition is that there are artificial borders that force ethnic groups together in a manner that they may not have chosen themselves. And finally, that borders cannot effectively stop the transfer of people, ideas, weapons and political agenda from one side of a border to another. Putting these three assumptions together we begin to paint a harrowing picture.

Scholars have rarely attempted to measure, let alone study, forced cohabitation in toto. But they have tried to tackle the three assumptions separately. Harvard University’s Alberto Alesina (2011) was part of team of coauthors that tried to study artificial borders by looking at countries with straight lines and which had members of the same ethnic group living across state lines. They found no link between such border characteristics and the outbreak of ethnic conflict. Unfortunately, they did not focus on how artificial
borders may lead to ethnic cohabitation, and whether there is a difference between artificial borders that generate such diversity and those that do not.

Stanford’s James Fearon and David Laitin (2003), among many others, have looked at ethnic diversity itself, and interestingly have found no connection between the diverse societies and ethnic conflict. But scholars who look at ethnic cohabitation do not take into account the difference between forced ethnic cohabitation and the kind that results from centuries of migration and assimilation.

More recently, a group of scholars that includes Kristian Gleditsch (2007) and Idean Salehyan (2010) has come up with several important findings linking transnational mobilization and ethnic conflict. But again, they do not take into account the difference between the kinds of transnational ethnic groups that are a result of artificial borders and those that are not.

In this dissertation, I propose Forced cohabitation as a single variable to understand the phenomenon that links artificial borders with ethnic diversity and transnational ethnic groups. Using this variable I make some important findings. First, forced cohabitation is in fact correlated with the kinds of mass violence episodes we would expect to witness in periods of early state formation. Second, other variables previously linked to civil war outbreak prove to be less relevant when we introduce forced cohabitation into the analysis.

Aside from the empirical support for the forced cohabitation theory, the dissertation offers several more nuanced findings. One is that artificial borders alone are not the cause of the problems; in fact, artificial borders are often associated with a lower likelihood of violence. It is rather artificial borders that forced the cohabitation of
ethnicities which is powerfully linked to violence. Second, and in direct contradiction to much of the qualitative critical literature, the institutions of colonialism (oppressive and tragic as they were) did not in and of themselves set up nations on a path to chronic violence. It is rather artificial borders that led to forced cohabitation which are to blame. And third, forced cohabitation expresses itself differently in different regions, and this is owed to the manner in which ethnic groups are dispersed across states.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: I offer a brief summary of the civil war literature, followed by a historically based introduction to the forced cohabitation theory, and end a conclusion and roadmap for the rest of this dissertation.

EXPLAINING ETHNIC-BASED CONFLICT

Following the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars began to perceive an increase in ethnic-based violence. These “centrifugal” forces of change, as they were dubbed, seemed to unmask dormant ethnic hatreds that, once unleashed, appeared to undermine national identities and split up formerly united countries along ethnic lines. The 1990s saw violence emerge not only along the periphery of communism, in Yugoslavia and Central Asia, but also in Africa and Southeast Asia. Civil wars and separatist campaigns were often accompanied by intimately violent episodes of communal violence, ethnic cleansing and genocidal atrocities, which came to preoccupy world leaders, international institutions and scholars alike.

One of the earliest and most impressive articulations of this problem came from MIT’s Barry Posen (1993), who explained ethnic conflict as a security dilemma. The term comes from the realist and liberal schools of international relations theory, which
assume the world is anarchic; that is, it lacks a global state that can keep order the way a local police force can do at the domestic level. According to these two schools of thought, a world plagued by such anarchy invites mistrust and miscommunication, which can often lead to disaster. A security dilemma occurs when one state takes steps to improve its own security (such as by building up an army) and surrounding nations are forced to assume aggressive intentions. Because there is no global police to protect one from aggressors, neighboring states are better off making the worst assumptions about a neighbor’s actions. Hence, they might be tempted to arm themselves in return, or even attack first.

For Posen, the lessons of the security dilemma are clear. If a state’s internal mechanisms of authority—its police force, its courts, its army—break down, what is left to prevent the kind of anarchy that leads to security dilemmas at the international level? As a country’s government begins to disintegrate, much like it did in Yugoslavia following the end of the Cold War, members of one ethnic group may not want to sit by calmly and assume friendly intentions on the part of members of another ethnic group. This is especially the case for those who were once oppressors under the old order. They must at some level assume that they will be targeted once their protectors are no longer in charge. Thus, they may be tempted to attack a rival ethnic group before succumbing to the real or imagined threat posed by those with clear incentives to attack. According to Posen, ethnic conflict may be a perfectly rational, fear-based defensive mechanism, one that escalates and becomes much more aberrant as the conflict continues.

But Posen’s security dilemma analogy, even if persuasive, tells us little about the environments that facilitate ethnic violence. After all, there are plenty of nations with
strong governments that still manage to experience ethnic-based violence; as there are weak or failing states that do not. What variables facilitate ethnic conflict?

**Material Factors**

One of the most important contributions to the study of ethnic conflict came in 2003, with a paper from James Fearon and David Laitin, titled “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” In the paper Fearon and Laitin analyze variables associated with the outbreak of ethnic civil war. The authors find that material factors such as GDP per capita and population size, and to a lesser degree oil production and mountainous terrain, are among those most clearly linked with the outbreak of ethnic conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) later supported this with research that showed how economic grievances were clearly correlated with civil war onset, while the link between political grievances and civil war was less clear.

Throughout the decade, many more works confirmed the connection between material factors and conflict. Englebert (2000) persuasively showed that ethnic conflict was prevalent in Africa because lack of economic development was prevalent there. And in 2005 Fearon argued that the link he had found between oil production in civil war might be that high income allows states to govern without establishing a formidable “state capacity,” or strong security services, thus inviting rival groups to seek the prize that oil represents. That year, Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Elisabeth Gilmore (2005) found that alluvial, or “secondary” diamond deposits, which are found in large quantities along bodies of water, are correlated with ethnic civil war.
Michael Ross confirmed (2004) that the presence of oil, diamonds and drugs are in fact associated with civil war outbreak, but that nonnarcotic agricultural products are not. As for oil and diamonds, he finds (2006) the association strongest starting in the 1970s. He suggests that price shocks in these volatile commodities tend to trigger separatist and nationalist movements, and that the value of independence increases as the cost of the commodity goes up.

Fearon (2004) had observed that contraband has played an important role in some of the longest running civil wars, including the decades-long conflict in coca-rich Colombia, in diamond-rich Angola, and in opium-rich Burma. He linked this to conflict funding—without contraband sources of income, rebels would not be able to sustain their fight. Looking at 128 cases of civil war, the 17 that included contraband funding lasted an average of 48 years, whereas the rest lasted fewer than $9^2$ (284). Like Fearon (2004), Ross finds that the presence of contraband resources such as gemstones, timber and drugs, tend to be associated with longer civil wars; although Ross does not find enough evidence to suggest that it is the funding of rebel groups that results in the longer conflicts (267). Importantly, Humphreys (2005) showed that civil conflicts that specifically concern natural resources, and not other reasons, are less likely to last long, probably because outside actors have an incentive to help end a conflict where natural resources are at stake.

Some theorists have sought to explain what may on the surface appear obvious, but isn’t. Casaeli (2006) provides a creative explanation of the manner in which ethnic conflict relates to material wealth. He suggests that individuals in every society have an

\[\text{Median } = 28.1 \text{ and } 6, \text{ respectively.}\]
incentive to work in groups to capture material wealth. Once the wealth has been captured and they are in power, they have a difficult time stopping “infiltrators” from claiming to be members of the group that deserves a share of the spoils. Ethnic-based coalitions, then, provide a useful tool to tell the members of the in-group from those outside of it. This makes it easier to keep too many latecomers from trying to take over once power has been achieved.³

Jeremy Weinstein (2005) seeks to explain why, despite the clear link between exploitable natural resources and insurgency, some rebel movements have emerged in places that lack such evident funding sources. He finds that, while resources help in quick recruitment, they actually lower the quality of rebel forces, since the incentives shift from the ideological to the economic. Instead, resource-poor insurgencies are able to claim the more committed followers, who are recruited on the basis of strong social ties.

Yet if ethnic conflict is a product of material factors, can it merely be dealt with through development initiatives and a more equitable distribution of available public goods? And is Casaeli is right, is ethnic identity merely an economic shortcut to figuring out how to distribute wealth in a desired manner? Even if one accepts the centrality of economics, this still leaves us with a broader question about the source of economic and material challenges. For example, are bad economic outcomes the product of faulty institutions, or are faulty institutions the product of bad economic outcomes? For this we

³ Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) had similarly (but less convincingly) theorized that following a successful anticolonial struggle, coalitions between ethnic groups would in fact break up, seeking to form the smaller coalition necessary to govern. This was related to the assumption that ethnic groups would hold distinctly different preferences for how a government and society should function (84).
turn to scholars who study ethnic conflict from the perspective of the mechanisms for
distributing political access and power.

**Institutions**

Social scientists and even economists have often honed in on institutions—put simply,
how regimes govern—as some of the primary vehicles of cause and effect within a
society. Influential scholars have argued for some time that economic development itself
is linked, not to culture or even resources, but to institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson
2012) or bad governance (Krasner 2004). Yet the link between institution types and
ethnic conflict has been anything but convincing. For one, Miguel, Satyanath and
Sergenti (2004) found that economics trumps even institutions. They found that a
negative economic growth shock of five percentage points increased the likelihood of war
outbreak by one half the following year regardless of the economic status, or importantly,
the political system of the country in question.

Making the case against institutions more strongly, Vreeland (2008) found that
the link between the institutional failure called anocracy and civil conflict is spurious.
Anocracy is a type of system that occurs when there are no functioning institutions to
moderate between various social forces. ⁴ Although Fearon and Laitin (2003) had found a
link between anocracy and civil war, the term itself had been an amalgamation of several
variables. For a state to be classified as an anocracy, it had to contain various different
characteristics, including some level of political violence. By isolating these variables,

⁴ Examples are coup-prone Egypt in the 1950s and following the Arab Spring, as
well as Argentina during the 1970s. Rapoport (1960) and Huntington (1968) termed these
societies “praetorian.”
Vreeland found that it was political violence *itself*, and not the other variables for anocracy, that was correlated with civil war. Hence, the link was useless, since it essentially showed that civil war is correlated with violence!

None of this is to claim that institutions cannot tell us anything of value about ethnic conflict. The question of democracy and ethnic conflict has long captured the attention of scholars. Cohen (1997) found that among democratic states, proportional representation systems (often expressed as multi-party democracies such as those found in Italy and Sweden) are better than U.S.-style majoritarian democracies at managing ethnic conflict. The theoretical explanation for this was summed up in a simple sentence: “Proportional regimes are sensitive to proportions; majoritarian regimes are sensitive to majorities” (610).\(^5\)

Donald Horowitz (1998) supports this, claiming that in majoritarian systems there is no incentive to form a winning, ruling coalition of more than a simple majority; that is, 50 percent plus one of the electorate. Thus, there is a tendency for exclusion, rather than inclusion. And yet, Selway and Templeman (2012) later showed how proportional representation systems were in fact *more likely* to lead to ethnic violence in highly diverse societies. Another critical finding comes from Easterly (2000), who shows that that while greater ethnic diversity was statistically linked to greater genocide likelihood, this effect dropped off in institutionally advanced countries.

Regime types aside, certain institutional policies tend to affect the type of political activity that individuals and groups adopt. For example, Nagel (1994) discusses the

\(^5\) Cohen also found that while the diffuse regional authority found under federal systems increases the likelihood of low-level ethnic conflict, it is not associated with large-scale ethnic conflict.
manner in which ethnicity can be constructed and reconstructed in response to political changes, such as voting access rights as well as the official categorization of ethnicities by authorities, which form important ethnic boundaries distinguishing members and nonmembers. The institutional factor is especially important in the realm of migration, where official policies, which may reflect patterns of discrimination, impact who assimilates and who doesn’t (Hechter and Okamoto 2001). The Serbian ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, which began as a result of mass Albanian migration into the then-Serbian region, is indicative of institutions that simply cannot handle ethnic diversity and channel assimilation.

It is difficult to exclude institutions from the debate about the causes of ethnic civil war, or most any other expression of political action. After all, every aspect related to governance, from economic vibrancy, to the distribution of goods in a society, to political rights and questions of discrimination, must pass through some kind of political institution. At the same time, the evidence linking institutions to ethnic conflict is for the most part either inconclusive or contradictory. The fact that institutions and wealth are highly correlated complicates matters further, and takes us back to the chicken-egg scenario: What is first, good institutions, or good economics? Rather than focus on economics and institutions, the most useful place to begin the exploration of ethnic conflict should be ethnicity itself.

**Ethnic Diversity**

Scholars have linked ethnic diversity with a variety of economic ills. The idea has been that the division of public goods—roads, hospitals, etc.—is made difficult under a diverse
system. Taking newspaper data from the United States, Olzak (1992) showed how competition for scarce resources such as jobs tended to result in greater violence between members of different ethnic and racial groups in America.

Easterly and Levine (1997) found that ethnic diversity helps explain some of the growth deficits in Subsaharan Africa, while Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) showed that spending on public goods is negatively correlated with ethnic diversity. For their part, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) found that the more racially diverse a community is in the United States, the less trust social trust there is. Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner and Weinstein (2007) suggest the reason for this may be that common ethnicity increases cooperation. And yet, the same authors (Habyarimana, et al., 2009) later write that while ethnic diversity is statistically linked to the inequitable or improper distribution of collective goods, they could not find any evidence that diversity itself is the cause of this.

The authors employed a series of lab experiments in which they asked members of one ethnic group to decide whether they would give goods to members of a different one, using subtle clues such as names or appearance to tip off the participants. Contrary to expectations, the authors found that their subjects were not more likely to distribute goods to their coethnics than they were to those outside their group.

In their formative study, Fearon and Laitin (2003) found no link between ethnic diversity, as measured by ethnic fractionalization (the likelihood that when randomly picking two members of a population they would be of different ethnic groups), and ethnic civil war. Yet Fearon and Laitin did not tackle the question of what type of ethnic diversity was present. This is the difference between diversity achieved over time through migration, annexation, or political alliance (such as that found in Iran), and the kind of
diversity that European colonialists imposed on new countries (such as that found in Iraq). The latter points to a forced cohabitation of ethnic or religious groups.

In hopes of getting a better handle of the subject, Cederman and Girardin (2007) developed a new index of ethnic fractionalization, focusing on the relationships between “peripheral” ethnic groups and those central to the state. Ethnic diversity is not symmetrical, argued the authors, so they began to map out the power relationships. The authors found that the larger the ethnic groups excluded from the state, the greater the likelihood of ethnic conflict. Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) later found that ethnic diversity itself does not result in an increase likelihood of ethnic civil war onset, the authors to conclude that ethnic exclusion, segmentation and lack of cohesion do lead to greater likelihood of civil conflict—pointing to some of the effects of asymmetric relationships that Cederman and Giardin had previously found.\(^6\)

As the ethnic conflict scholarship has developed more sophisticated tools to address to the topic of diversity, it has been stymied by an almost exclusive focus on internal factors—the wall separating comparative politics from international relations. When David Rapoport laid out the six challenges of ethnic conflict, his focus was on the external factors that facilitate ethnic conflict. In the last few years scholarship published largely in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* and the *Journal of Peace Studies* has sought to address the gap between the internal and external points of focus.

\(^6\) Hechter, Friedman and Appelbaum (1982) had already suggested that individuals may not join ethnic collective action, even if they are disadvantaged within the society. Instead, the strength of ethnic organizations would determine the likelihood of ethnic political action. Fearon and Laitin (2004) similarly suggested that ethnic grievances might be so common that they fail to predict any kind of mobilization outcome, let alone the outbreak of civil war.
International Dimensions

In 2001, Nicholas Sambanis found that lack of economic development is associated with the outbreak of civil war, but he also found that civil wars are more likely to occur in “countries that have land borders with countries at war” (275). That decade, several scholars focused on a set of pressing questions related to intervention? Does it help end, or does it prolong civil wars? (e.g., Collier and Sambanis 2002; Balch-Lindsey, et al. 2008, etc.).

In 2006 Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch began to formally show through statistical analyses what scholars such as Rapoport had long predicted—that international factors are critical to understanding civil war. They showed that in the period between 1951 and 2000 states that absorbed large numbers of refugees were more likely to experience civil war. Later (2007), in an article published by the *Journal of Peace Research*, Gleditsch found that ethnic dispersion across state lines is related to an increased likelihood of civil war. Finally, Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz (2008) showed how civil wars increase the likelihood of interstate conflict.

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7 As did Collier (2003) and Collier and Sambanis (2005).

8 In their seminal study Fearon and Laitin (2003) take up Sambanis’s assertion but find no link. Unfortunately, Fearon and Laitin focus merely on the “availability” of foreign support for civil war factions, which they measure using as a proxy variable “the number of civil wars ongoing in neighboring countries in the previous year, which might increase the availability of arms, support and seasoned guerrillas” (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 86). What this approach fails to capture is the incentive that stable governments (rather than war-ravaged ones) might have to support a particular faction in a neighboring state. To merely focus on those neighbors that are undergoing a civil war of their own, scholars make the mistake of assuming that stable states have no stake in helping a friendly faction stoke, and achieve victory in, a nearby civil conflict.
Forced Cohabitation Theory

The purpose of this dissertation is to build upon the recent scholarship on the international factors that contribute to ethnic conflict, and formally explore the challenges that Rapoport posed back in 1994. Here, I argue that artificial borders and the forced cohabitation they generate are not the only catalysts for large-scale ethnic-based violence, but they among the most important catalysts. They trump diversity, the politics of excluded ethnic groups, and even questions of access to material wealth, as measured by gross domestic product per capita, population size and oil reserves. The reason is that in forced cohabitation states resemble the conditions of early state formation. That is, when heterogeneity is imposed on a state by foreign-imposed borders, this generates a real or imagined threat to state formation, and the use of force increases: on the part of the state seeking inoculate itself against revolt, or rebels or foreign powers seeking to exploit the perceived weakness.

THE VIOLENT ORIGINS OF THE STATE

In Europe two important developments began on the eve of the modern era, around the turn of the sixteenth century. One was the Protestant Reformation, which helped spread thanks to the printing press (see Anderson 1982). This development shattered the universality of the Catholic church, providing believers with competing avenues of religious affiliation.

The second development was the strengthening of state power. During the Middle Ages, authority in Europe had been relatively decentralized. Under a feudal system, the peasantry would work the land on behalf of vassals, who in turn swore complete
allegiance to a landowning lord (“to love what his lord loved and loathe what he loathed”) and provided a cut of production from the lands they administered on the lord’s behalf. For their part, lords made political alliances with kings, and together vast kingdoms could muster the combined forces and monetary power of all the lords and vassals under their domains, should war come about (Bishop 2001, 109-110). Nowhere in this social contract was common language or culture required. Communication was simple and limited, and illiteracy rampant.

As the printing press gained traction, the written word more easily linked communities, and as defensive efforts required a more sophisticated military organization, kingdoms began to require the level of administration that can only come with states. War was a critical instrument in this endeavor. Without developing the tools for war, states would perish. But more important, the creation of those instruments required the kind of bureaucratic organization that ultimately allowed these states to govern more effectively. As Charles Tilly writes, “war made the state, and the state made war” (1975, 42).

Both of the Protestant Reformation and the bureaucratization of the state increased social unrest, which in turn forced ruling elites to crack down. As the state became evermore present in the affairs of the people, the chances for revolt increased. Complicating matters was that now people were able to unify on the basis of competing religious identities, thus creating a market of believers—fought for between Protestant and Catholic rulers and rising political entrepreneurs waiting to enter the fray.

Between the early modern period and our contemporary era, most European states ceased to exist altogether. The failure to bureaucratize (or the failure to contain those
revolts that were inspired by the bureaucratization itself) proved fatal for most. Those that survived engaged in often brutal forms of social engineering to stamp out diversity in a manner that insured for their longevity. Tilly described the process in this way:

Almost all European governments eventually took steps which homogenized their populations: the adoption of state religions, expulsion of minorities like the Moors and the Jews, institution of a national language, eventually the organization of mass public instruction. ... The failure to homogenize increased the likelihood that a state existing at a given point in time would fragment into its cultural subdivisions at some time in the future. (Tilly 1975, 44)

This cycle of ethnic and religious cleansing helped to reinforce state authority over the people and thus lower the costs of governance (Herbst 1990); by speaking a common tongue and worshipping at the altar of a common church, states were able to eventually become nations.

The first project of forced homogenization came prior to the Reformation. But it followed a similar goal: stamping out religious diversity for the purpose of maintaining order and minimizing the probability of revolt. Spain’s Christian monarchs Ferdinand of Aragón and Isabel of Castile fought the Reconquista, successful in 1492, and in the process turned back centuries of religious and ethnic diversity on the Iberian Peninsula. Perhaps the most infamous of these tools of governance was the Holy Office of the Inquisition (1480-1834), which served as a board to try heretics whose crimes varied from blasphemy against the church to witchcraft. Public autos da fe were carried out, including burnings at the stake. In the realm of speech, Isabel’s Castilian became the preferred language throughout the peninsula, and in the conquered realms beyond.

If a Castilian queen was interested in establishing power through the primacy of Catholic identity over Muslim and Jewish belief, the Christian world itself would soon become divided along Catholic-Protestant lines. The sectarian conflicts of Europe were
felt immediately, and the largest revolt in European history took place in 1524, barely seven years into the Reformation. The Peasants’ War, fought largely in Germany, was the stuff of tragic legends. Radical Protestant preacher Thomas Müntzer led a revolt that left tens of thousands dead. If European leaders were unsure about the need to homogenize their populations following the Reformation, the Peasants’ War was proof that they better do so quickly.

The religious wars continued. In the Spanish Netherlands the Reformation inspired popular support against Catholic rule. While many of the disputes centered around commercial interests—not unlike America’s later “No taxation without representation” movement—, conversion itself helped to rally people around the cause of independence. The Protestant movement grew rapidly, and in response Spain’s Philip II (1527-1598) sent troops (and the Inquisition) to the Low Countries. War eventually led to the Netherlands’ independence, showing again that the failure to homogenize facilitated popular revolt.

Successful nations learned the lesson. In France, the 1598 Edict of Nantes, which had brought peace between Catholics and Protestants, was rescinded under Louis XIV (1638-1714). He forced the mass conversion and expulsion of Protestants in France, officially revoking their rights in 1685. Protestant adherence fell by one third between 1638 and 1685, leading to the predominantly Catholic identity we associate with France today.

But no test was greater than the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). The war had been expected. It came at the end of an uneasy truce following the Dutch-Spanish war, and states the region over had begun forming alliances in anticipation to the next sectarian
conflict. In the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, a mass of land comprising several kingdoms and principalities stretching from Germany to northern Italy, Frederick of Palatine was seeking to become the first Protestant emperor. He and others helped stoke tensions in neighboring Bohemia, where Ferdinand, his challenger to the throne was taking office (Wedgwood 1938).

Soon, the Catholic League was formed comprising states such as Bavaria in southern Germany, Habsburg lands in Vienna, and Spain. The Protestant Union included northern countries who joined with Palatine, along with France, which would rather join the Protestants it demonized at home than help a neighboring geopolitical rival. (Several centuries later, in 1972, China would open up relations with the United States to isolate fellow communists in the neighboring USSR—ideology tends to serve at the pleasure of politics, not the other way around.)

After three decades of war the Peace of Westphalia set into motion our theoretical understanding of sovereignty; the concept that one should not intervene in the affairs of others for the sake of stability. To live in a “Westphalian world,” as a political scientist might put it, is to respect others’ right to self-rule, and to not interfere into their internal issues or their fights with others. It is the principle enshrined in the United Nations Organization, whose charter refers to the “sovereign equality of all its Members” (Article 2).

In religious terms, Westphalia signified an end to Vatican meddling, and an end to the kind of religious stoking by Protestants across state boundaries—the kind that Frederick pursued on the eve of the Thirty Years War. On the issue of individual rights, it was left to their rulers, and not others, to decide:
that all and every one of [the Towns], with their Citizens and Inhabitants, shall enjoy as well the general Benefit of the Amnesty, as the rest of this Pacification. And for the Remainder of their Rights and Privileges, Ecclesiastical and Secular, which they enjoy'd before these Troubles, they shall be maintain'd therein; save, nevertheless the Rights of Sovereignty, and what depends thereon, for the Lords to whom they belong. (Avalon Project, Treaty of Westphalia, CXVII)

Several developments spurred the creation of national states—political entities based on a common identity (Germany for Germans, France for the French). The post-Reformation efforts to homogenize populations was one dark chapter in the process. The fatigue of transnational religious mobilization, and the subsequent push to respect the sovereignty of each state was another. The bureaucratization that hardened the power of states over their citizens was also critical. By the nineteenth century, national consciousness was further strengthened through universal education and the granting of greater rights (as well as responsibilities, such as military service). Now to be a free person, one had to consider him- or herself a citizen of a nation. Nationalism became the preferred and only path.

As Benedict Anderson reminds us in his classic *Imagined Communities*, even kingdoms that had staked their identities on a royal house, such as the Habsburgs in Austria or the Romanovs in Russia, moved to adopt local ethnic-based identities in the nineteenth century as they adjusted to a nationalized world. The people in turn rooted for, and fought for, their national homeland. In the New World creole intellectuals who were themselves products of Europe but sons of the new soil, took the lead in the creation of national identities as well.

The experience of nationalism in Europe and the Americas was different from that of Middle East and Africa. For one, in the West nationalism never overlapped with the religious wars of centuries past. Until 1945 Europe had been extremely violent, in large
part because of the continent’s military technology and high political stakes. But the
sources of European violence had been relatively clear at every stage. In the early modern
era, Europeans fought on the basis of religious alliances. Later, they fought over balance
of power between monarchies, such as in the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748).
Finally, nations fought one another, with little care over religion or royalty, and instead
national interest—the interest of all the citizens—was at stake. Consequently, the first
and second world wars were brutal endeavors in which noncombatant citizens were
considered “strategic targets.”

In contrast, Middle Eastern conflicts may take on several layers of meaning, with
nationalism, sectarianism, and other sources of conflict overlapping and coexisting in the
present day. Some fights, such as the Sunni-Shi‘i conflict, are sectarian in nature and
reminiscent of Early Modern Europe. Other fights are clearly nationalistic, tribal or the
product of foreign-power meddling. Some have elements of all of these. For example, can
one say for certain whether the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a religious one, fought
between mostly Muslim Palestinians and mostly Jewish Israelis; or whether it is an ethnic
conflict pitting Arabic-speaking peoples against Hebrew-speaking inhabitants? Is it a
nationalistic conflict between the nations of Palestine and Israel, regardless of religion or
tongue? Or is it a proxy war between those who support Israel and those who support
Palestinian national claims; perhaps it is a product of the Cold War that was never
resolved? The conflict could in fact be perceived as an “all of the above” proposition,
with different iterations of it carrying different weight for each of the sources of discord.
What is evident is that each of these plays a mutually reinforcing role, thus making the
conflict more difficult to resolve.
Another conflict is the longstanding cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which has played out through proxy battles in Bahrain, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Could this be part of a Sunni (Saudi) vs. Shi‘i (Iran) movement, or is it a geopolitical competition between two powerful nations of the Persian Gulf? Is it an extension of foreign-power manipulation, with the United States supporting the Saudis and the Russians and Chinese supporting Iran? Or is it an ethnic fight between Arabs and Persian-speaking Iranians? Again, all of the above, in a mutually reinforcing context, is the best explanation.

Part of the challenge in the Middle East and other regions has been the imperfect reach of nationalism. As a European ideology, nationalism is almost necessarily secular. For it to be the undisputed identity of its citizens, nationalism must rise above religion in importance. But in other regions secularism has not been fully integrated. For one, in the Middle East secularism has been associated with regimes who came to power in the 1950s and 60s and ruled in undisputed fashion until the Arab Spring protests of 2011. Some of the most brutal dictators of the twentieth century—men such as Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qadhafi—were also rather progressive and secular in their social policies.

Prior to 2011, then, most citizens came to associate religious activism with legitimate and often democratic opposition. Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, it was the Shi‘i Islamic parties (not the secular ones) that fared better. And after the revolts of the Arab Spring, Islamist parties swept elections in Tunisia and Egypt. While religion cannot be considered as inimical to nationalism, it often competes with it.

Religious divisions continue to exist in Africa, namely along the 10th parallel north, where nations such as Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria, are divided
between a Muslim north and a Christian south (Griswold 2010). In addition to religion, there are also many more subnational ethnic identities in Africa than just about everywhere—some countries, such as Nigeria, house well over ten important ethnic groups each—and these groups coexist, and often compete, with both nationalist and religious sources of identity.

While European-style nationalism has reached every corner of the Earth, its exportation has been “as shallow as it was wide,” in the words of Lisa Anderson (2004, 13). Further, in exporting this model of nations, European powers often created borders that separated some communities, and forced others into a common state. This phenomenon of “artificial border creation” has been most pronounced in Africa. John McCauley and Daniel Posner describe the African landscape thus:

A clear indication of the arbitrary nature of Africa’s borders is the fact that 44% of them follow meridians or parallels; another 30% follow other rectilinear or curved lines; and the remaining 26% follow geographical features such as rivers and watersheds. Their disregard for the populations they bisect is reflected in Asiwaju’s (1985) estimate that Africa’s 104 distinct borders divide 177 cultural or ethnic groups. With a handful of exceptions, Africa’s borders can thus be taken as exogenous to all the potentially relevant sociological, cultural and historical facts on the ground. (McCauley and Posner 2007, 3)

Such artificial borders would have had little meaning in environments lacking a sense of ethnic, religious or some other relevant form of identity. And a smorgasbord of identities would by itself not have been fatal in political realms where diversity had been accommodated, absorbed, or violently eliminated over time. But if diversity is imposed on a country, it may generate a real or imagined threats to state formation, and the use of force may become attractive: to states seeking to guard themselves against revolt, or to rebelling leaders, fellow members of their ethnic group living on the other side of the border, or foreign powers seeking to exploit a perceived weakness in the diverse nation.
Thus, artificial borders may inspire an array of seemingly disconnected expressions of conflict, ranging from discrimination at the workplace, to war.

In the era that followed the French Revolution, some of the most tragic episodes of organized violence have involved campaigns to homogenize the population. These included the systematic killing of the natives in the Americas during the nineteenth century (e.g., United States, Argentina, etc.); the mass killing of creoles by natives in Mexico in the 1800s; the state persecution and ultimate near-elimination of the political active Bahai faith in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Iran (Cole 1992); the organized anti-Armenian campaigns of the late Ottoman era, culminating in the Armenian genocide of 1919; the ethnic cleansing of Poles from the Ukraine in 1943 (Snyder 2003); the systematic killing of Haitians living in the Dominican Republic in 1937 (Turits 2002); and of unprecedented scale, the Holocaust, which took place during a broader ethnic-German unification and state expansion process.


But if these are among the most infamous periods of violence in modern history, there have been innumerable examples of low-level ethnic tensions, from the ongoing Casamance separatist movement in Senegal, to the anti-Tutsi insurgency along the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, to the Kurdish autonomous movement in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. These represent seemingly perpetual claims that exist even during the years where no civil war outbreak or campaign of state repression is recorded.
Our understanding of ethnic tensions should therefore not only be informed by the triggers that move events past a particular threshold (e.g., 1,000 deaths for a civil war). Rather, research must focus intently on the environments that nurture the conflicts in the first place.

It would also be a mistake to claim that ethnic conflicts necessarily translate to visceral hatred at the individual level. We know, for example, that marriage between ethnic and religious groups was not uncommon in the former Yugoslavia or Iraq prior to the start of ethnic conflict in those places; coexistence was certainly the norm. Instead, ethnic conflict appears to follow a process that is triggered by ambitious political goals, rather than emotion. In fact, the greatest tragedy of ethnic conflict is that it is often as rational as it is harrowing.

CONCLUSION

The literature on ethnic conflict and civil war is vast and rich. Explanations for the outbreak of conflict range from the lack (or abundance) of material factors, to a deficit of institutions, to ethnic diversity abound. But so far the quantitative literature has failed to adequately address a question that policy analysts and qualitative scholars have called attention to for some time: The notion that artificial borders that generate a forced cohabitation of ethnic groups are to blame for many of the world’s civil conflicts. This dissertation seeks to serve as the first systematic attempt to tackle this question, both through empirical tests and case studies. As I will show, artificial borders are in fact correlated with several expression of ethnic conflict, and this is owed to the mimicking of
state-formation processes that takes place in countries that suffer from forced cohabitation.

The following chapter provides the first statistical evidence supporting the existence of a forced cohabitation phenomenon. I show that artificial borders that result in forced cohabitation are robustly correlated with several manifestations of ethnic conflict. These violent manifestations include civil war, foreign intervention, and one-sided government violence against civilians. Just as important, the chapter offers a clear refutation of some commonly held beliefs regarding the role of both colonialism and natural resource wealth in conflict.

Chapter 3 offers an explanation of the processes by which crossborder ethnic mobilization takes place in forced cohabitation countries—countries that often split ethnic and religious groups across two or more national territories. This chapter also contains some information on the way that some island nations possess the characteristics of forced cohabitation and transnational mobilization in the manner that continental states do.

Chapter 4 goes on to offer a discussion on what I term ethnopolitical dispersion, and the manner that it is affected by artificial borders. I compare the reach of ethnic and religious groups across states in two regions—the Middle East/North Africa and Subsaharan Africa—and use this distinction to draw lessons about the way that historical path dependencies trigger qualitatively different forms of ethnoreligious conflict. I go on to provide a broad analysis of the last century of crossborder mobilization in the MENA region, in the context of the universalist calls to political action that can work there better than in other regions, given the ethnic dispersion there.
Chapter 5 focuses on the politics of minority rule, especially how this arrangement affects the likelihood of a foreign intervention. Because minority rule often takes place in forced cohabitation states, and is predicated upon some legacy of colonial or other form of foreign interference—and because such states often share ethnic affiliations across state lines—they pose especially fragile political environments.

Chapter 6 is a brief concluding chapter that seeks to recapitulate the main themes and findings of this dissertation, and seeks to answer the question of why partition, or the redrawing of boundaries more generally, has not become a norm.
If states seek a homogenous identity in order to lower the costs of governance, and if they are willing to fight and kill to achieve such a sense of uniformity, then it would follow that an arrangement that creates instant diversity of political identities would trigger violence. Such a sudden development can be witnessed in countries whose boundaries were drawn by outside powers with little regard to demographics. The present chapter is an exploration of the links between artificial borders and the outbreak of mass violence.

In late 2010, the self-immolation of a young, college educated fruit vendor named Muhammad Bouazizi in the rural Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid touched off a wave of protest in the country and ultimately led to the ouster of longtime dictator Zayn al-Abidin Ben Ali. This improbable ouster in a region considered immune to revolution inspired a wave of protests throughout the Arab world in 2011, which came to be called the Arab Spring. Protests varied in size and efficacy, but the demands were similar. People sought
political and economic reforms following decades of failed and inequitable economic policies, corrupt governance, and lack of freedom.

Those countries that enjoyed relatively high oil exports per capita, such as Saudi Arabia and Oman, were able to placate demands through limited reforms, and in some instances by granting a larger share of oil revenues to disaffected portions of the population. In Algeria, another oil-rich country, the government increased state employees’ salaries by one third, and allocated a total of 25 percent of the budget to pay for both salaries and subsidies on basic goods (BBC 2011), and as a result Algeria was largely absent from the headlines in 2011.

But several countries without much oil were able to hang on with varying degrees of reform. In Morocco, Jordan, and Yemen, the governmental elites were able to preempt some political unrest through conciliatory political gestures. In Yemen, the president stepped down in an organized transition of power to someone within his inner circle in early 2012. Tunisia suffered a larger setback, and so did Egypt, where Hosni Mubarak, who had been in power since 1981, was forced out once the military pulled its support in the face of massive protests. While the military establishment was able to hang on to power in Egypt, both states were significantly transformed.

What all of these cases have in common—both the ones that lost presidents and the ones who remained intact—is the relatively low death toll they incurred, at least considering the immensity of the political challenges. By July 2011, most of these countries had suffered fewer than three hundred fatalities each, with Egypt leading with a little over 800 (Economist 2011). In contrast to these countries, Libya and Syria became bloodbaths of unprecedented scale. By the end of 2011, nearly 10,000 had died in Libya
(Black 2013), and by the late summer of 2013 over 100,000 people had died as a result of the Syrian conflict, with several million displaced both internally and as refugees fleeing the country. In perspective, Libya had as many as ten times the fatalities as Egypt, the most violent country in the Arab Spring outside of these two countries; Syria has had over 100 times the number.

Without exception, the Arab Spring played out in countries ruled by iron-fisted dictatorships, and for the most part began as peaceful expressions of dissent. Libya and Syria had been no exception. In Libya, supporters of arrested human rights lawyer Fathi Tarbel rallied in Benghazi and were met with water canons and gunfire, and soon Muammar Qadhafi’s son promised “rivers of blood” for the protesters. In Syria, a group of children had tagged anti-regime slogans on the school walls, only to be picked up by security forces and tortured. Parents who protested did so peacefully, but were met with force. By March large-scale peaceful protests were organized in Damascus and the rural city of Dara‘, and the regime cracked down with gunfire. By 2013 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees had called Syria the “worst humanitarian disaster since the end of the cold war” (LaFranchi 2013).

If there were no substantive difference between the regimes of Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen on the one hand, and those of Syria and Libya on the other; and if the quality of protests did not differ either, it may be tempting to think that the presence of al-Qaeda in hotbeds such as Benghazi, eastern Libya, were the main factor driving the government crackdowns. But that would not be wholly accurate. To gauge the relative strength of al-Qaeda in the various countries we can look at the case of the Iraqi civil war (2004-2011) and see how many al-Qaeda fighters came from each country. While Libya was a major
recruiting center for fighters traveling to Iraq, and Syria acted as a conduit for operatives from across the region, al-Qaeda conscripts came from several other countries, and studies continuously place Saudis at or near the top of the list of suicide bombers going to Iraq (Bernstein-Wax 2007). Why then, were Libya and Syria different from the countries that were spared large-scale civil wars?

The answer lies partly with demographics. Libya is a tribal nation, and former dictator Qadhafi supported by western tribes such as the Qadhafa and Al Awaqir, with anti-government tribes based around the eastern city of Benghazi and including the Misrata (Kurczy and Hinshaw 2011). In Syria, demographics are split along religious sect—with the minority Alawites (a faith related to Shi‘i Islam) being the powerful minority, sharing the country with a majority Sunni population and a sizable Christian community.

But diversity itself is only part of the story. Diversity is often achieved through migration, as with the sizable Palestinian population in Jordan, or for that matter, the Hispanic population in the United States. Often, those who enter the country either culturally or politically assimilate, or at least engage in a slow process of constructive interaction with the ruling ethnic groups. The process takes time, and is not without setbacks, but it could ultimately result in a shared sense of purpose, however fragile it may be in so many countries.

But there is a different kind of diversity that is achieved suddenly, through the creation of artificial borders. Both Libya and Syria share this history of forced cohabitation. The French created Greater Syria, splitting Lebanon from it in 1920, and the Italians formed Libya in 1934 out of three provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The most
important were Tripolitania, with its capital Tripoli in the west, and Cyrenaica, with its capital Benghazi in the east.

The manner in which artificial borders forced the cohabitation of ethnic, tribal and religious identities is the most important reason why Libya and Syria erupted in the kind of violence the world witnessed starting in 2011. While al-Qaeda was not a greater threat in these countries than in others, and while rulers were no more uneasy with public expressions of democracy than were the others; while protests were no more violent than the others; the leadership of both Libya and Syria could simply not afford to let any kind of unrest surface. This is because to them the kind of diversity that was forced upon the country by colonial powers resulted in a perpetual state of insecurity, which threatened not only the sitting government, but the survival of the state itself.

This chapter seeks to systematically test a refined theory of forced cohabitation. This theory posits that states that suffer from the forced cohabitation of ethnic groups due to artificial borders are more likely to experience mass violence episodes that mimic the conditions of early state formation. I do this by testing the degree to which forced cohabitation is correlated with civil war, foreign intervention and one-sided government violence against civilians. Civil war is used as an explanation of ethnic discord under forced cohabitation, while foreign intervention is a proxy, not only for the internationalization of domestic conflicts, but for the perceived weakness and malleability that neighbors and outside actors seek to exploit in ethnically divided postcolonial states. Finally, one-sided government repression tests the manner in which states seek to guard against the perceived threat of insurrection among out-groups in forced cohabitation states. As I show, even when controlling for those variables which
the quantitative literature has previously linked to these types of mass violence episodes, forced cohabitation arguably remains the best predictor for civil war and mass atrocities, and to a lesser degree, foreign intervention.

Just as important as the link between forced cohabitation and mass violence episodes are the links that are not found. Among the most important are as follows: Contrary to what is often discussed among area studies specialists, past experience with colonialism does not appear to set up a country on a path toward further atrocities. Second, states with artificial borders that did not generate forced ethnic cohabitation are in fact less likely to generate mass violence. This, again, tells us that it isn’t foreign political imposition per se that creates violence, it is the quality and type of ethnic arrangement that colonialists left behind that place a country on a either a path to relative peace or to endemic violence. Finally, oil does not seem to be correlated with foreign military intervention—quite the opposite. The presence of large oil reserves has a tendency to repel military intervention. In short, many of the answers as to why the postcolonial world is replete with violence do not lie in the greed and past war crimes of Western actors; rather, they are the result of particular policies that Western states pursued in some countries they colonized, but not in all of them.

I conclude the chapter with a case study of South Asia.

LINES IN THE SAND

The notion that countries with artificial borders has been the source of many policy and journalistic discussions. In 2013 alone, several pieces surfaced that brought the issue to the forefront. Joshua Keating, editor of Foreign Policy, wrote of artificial borders in the
context of Syria, while the controversial Pat Buchanan wrote of the Sykes-Picot Agreement unraveling, and new “natural borders” being redrawn with blood. Robin Wright even offered an interactive map on the New York Times website that reimagined the Middle East’s borders along more coherent ethnic and sectarian lines. Thought-up names like Wahhabistan and Shitestan were shown, along with the more probable Kurdistan in northern Iraq and Syria.

For the most part, the academic world has reacted with relative silence, and at times skepticism. A New York Times piece by Pulitzer-prize winner Jeffrey Gettleman, which linked African separatism to badly drawn colonial borders, was met by Stanford’s James Fearon with frustration, as expressed in a guest post on academic blog The Monkey Cage. Fearon was “doubtful that bad borders are really ‘a prime reason’ for weak states in Africa” (Voetten/Fearon 2011). Nick Danforth, a doctoral candidate from Georgetown University, wrote a piece on The Atlantic criticizing the idea that borders were more artificial in the Middle East than elsewhere, and that different borders could have been drawn, for that matter. The distinction between Syria and Lebanon, he writes, was part of a compromise going back to the 1860s; the line dividing Iraq and Iran, he writes, goes back to the Ottoman-Iranian wars of the sixteenth century (Danforth 2013).

Works such as Saadia Touval’s The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa (2013) have made the argument that Africa had not experienced many conflicts based on the desire to redraw boundaries. As I show below, however, in modern times borders have a tendency not to be challenged (e.g., see Zacher 2001; Fazal 2007, inter alia), but that does not in and of itself mean that borders, as they were drawn, are not a facilitator of conflict.
The biggest obstacle to finding an academically valid way to study the artificial borders hypothesis has been relative lack of interest. Prior to this dissertation, no paper other than Alesina, et al.’s 2011 work has tackled the issue head-on. This in large part stems from the nature of the discipline. In the last few decades social science has moved away from broad theoretical discussions and toward quantitative, or numbers-based research. This works well when analyzing voting trends in the British parliament, but on broader issues of war and peace the methodology gets trickier, and trends become harder to neatly classify, let alone quantify.

One way around this roadblock has been to use so-called proxy variables. These are phenomena that can essentially “stand in” for the kind of issue we are actually trying to observe. For example, one academic has looked at food stocks as a proxy for hunger (since hunger itself cannot be quantified, but food stocks can be). In the case of artificial borders, the main approach has been to find proxy variables such as straight lines, ethnic groups living across borders, and colonial history. Yet to learn about the origin of a country’s borders, the answer lies in history, not geography. We have to classify borders individually and accept some room for disputed classifications, something that authors of quantitative studies often try too hard to avoid. Following is the first attempt to directly and systematically classify borders according to their historical development.

Borders are often changing, and their status may be disputed for long stretches of time. It is therefore impossible to arrive at perfect categories of “artificial” and “nonartificial” borders. That said, there are some characteristics that clearly fall into the category of “artificial.” For a country to be considered as having artificial borders it must meet the following four criteria. First, its borders were drawn outside the country. That is,
someone based in a foreign capital (usually Paris or London) had the power to veto any final decision on the shape of that country’s borders.

A second and important criterion is that whatever country we are analyzing should not have seen significant change in its borders since colonial times. A country may start off with artificial borders, and then shake them off, either through a union with another country, or as a result of loss of territory in a war of secession. Finally, if it is an island country, at least one island must be shared with another country, and the border separating the two should fit the previous criteria. Countries made up of whole islands that are not shared with others, such as Sri Lanka and the Philippines, cannot be considered as “artificial border” countries, even if their creation is owed in large part to the influence of colonial administrators.

Out of about 200 countries in the world today, there are approximately 66 that fit this description of having artificial borders. Most are clustered in Subsaharan Africa (there are 31) and the Middle East/North Africa (11). Eleven others are formerly parts of the USSR, including the “stans” in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), the Caucasus (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan), and Eastern European countries formerly inside the Soviet Union (Moldova, Belarus, and the Ukraine). Afghanistan, India, and the Pakistan (prior to the secession of Bangladesh in 1971), are also artificial border countries, as are the East Asian countries of North and South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam (until its unification in 1975), and Myanmar (formerly called Burma). In Oceania both Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have artificial borders, and in Europe Austria, Hungary and Poland do as well. During the Cold War East and West Germany had artificial borders, though united Germany does not. In
the Americas only Brazil is an artificial border state, since its borders were arranged between Spain and Portugal in the Treaty of San Ildefonso of 1777.

The reason that Western European countries were spared this artificial border fate has to do with the fact that these were the countries doing most of the colonizing. Spain, Germany, France—these nations had swallowed up others to become the relatively large countries they became, and they used their material wealth to conquer others far and wide.

In the Americas, the story is more complicated. The Western hemisphere was thoroughly colonized, from the northern provinces of Canada all the way down to the far reaches of Patagonia. But unlike so many countries in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, American nations became independent early on, and have had time to secede from political unions. Originally, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Belize and Costa Rica were part of New Spain, a massive administrative unit set up by the Spanish crown. As revolution came to New Spain the smaller countries split from Mexico, so that starting in 1821 there was not a single country, but a collection of countries, each with a budding national identity. In South America the story was similar. The viceroyalties of New Granada and Peru broke up into several countries not long after independence.

Those countries that were artificial share a different story. The simplest explanation for their difference is also the most persuasive. Most of the artificial border countries hail not from the 1800s, but from the twentieth century. As such, they have not had time to arrange their own destinies through successful secession movements. For example, Syria and Lebanon did not become countries until 1920. The borders of India
and Pakistan were not set until the British-led partition of 1947. We could assume that secession is as possible and attainable now as it was in the early nineteenth century, but that would not be accurate, since today a government’s military, even among weak states, has the kind of reach that nineteenth century militaries simply did not. Even a secessionist movement in a remote jungle will be met with a harsh response.

But artificial borders per se should not generate ethnic-based violence, if only because having artificial borders does not automatically lead to increased diversity. Some countries, in fact, achieved greater homogeneity following the drawing of borders by foreign powers. The Treaty of Trianon of 1920 split up the Austro-Hungarian empire following its defeat in World War I. While many Hungarians remained split between Romania, Slovakia and Hungary proper, for the most part the result of this treaty was a set of coherent countries. Austria became predominantly ethnic German, while Hungary became predominantly ethnic Hungarian.

But what happens when the drawing of boundaries does not follow such coherent patterns? In the Middle East, the British and the French secretly divided up territories of the crumbling Ottoman Empire while World War I was still raging in 1916, and by 1920 they formalized their agreements with the San Remo Conference, which officially drew the lines of many of the countries we know today: Syria and Lebanon would belong to France, while Iraq and Jordan would fall under British influence. British-controlled Palestine was to eventually allow for a Jewish state, as Lord Balfour famously declared in 1917.

In Jordan, the effect was fairly homogenizing, with predominantly Sunni Arab Muslims of various tribes inhabiting the territory. But not so in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq.
In these countries demographics seemed to play a minor role in Europeans’ plans. For one, the territory of Iraq was born out of a combination of three Ottoman provinces, the predominantly Shi‘i southern province of Basra, the largely Sunni central province of Baghdad, and the Kurdish province of Mosul. The British decided to make a single political entity called Iraq that would comprise these three territories. Today, the effect is a highly divided political society, which includes a majority but previously outcast Shi‘i community making up about 65 percent of the country, a Sunni minority of about 20 percent, and a Kurdish one of about 15 percent. Iraq was made a divided nation from day one.

A large number of artificial border countries can be thought of as suffering from forced cohabitation. For the sake of analysis, I label countries as having forced cohabitation if they met two criteria: One, they are artificial border states, and two, the majority ethnic or religious group must not total more than 80 percent of the entire population. The 80 percent figure is necessarily imperfect. Middle Eastern societies such as Bahrain and Iraq have majority groups hovering at around 65-70 percent, while Egypt is normally considered homogenous with a 90 percent majority. A state with an 80 percent majority group appears to be conceptually the most homogenous state a state can be while still remaining arguably “diverse.” For the purpose of the statistical analysis I did not classify tribes as ethnic groups, and therefore Libya does not fall into the category of a forced cohabitation state, despite its clearly relevant characteristics. The reason for excluding tribes was a practical one. There are simply too many tribes, both in Africa and the Middle East region, to realistically and accurately code. I do, however, include tribes
as part of the larger qualitative analysis and reflection of the case studies. In some
societies, particularly Libya, tribal affiliation does constitute a kind of ethnic identity.

Forty-six countries did make the list as artificial border states. Afghanistan, Azerbaidjan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and the Ukraine, are among those formerly in or near the Soviet sphere of influence. In East Asia and Oceania, Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea and Thailand made the list. India does as well, as did Pakistan prior to 1971, In the Middle East and in Africa several countries are forced cohabitation states, and in Americas Brazil is the only one.

Table 1. Countries Having Artificial Borders and Forced Cohabitation (in Bold), 1946-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Germany (West)</th>
<th>Pakistan (until 1971)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Indonesia (until 2002)</td>
<td>S. Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaidjan</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Dem. Rep.)</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Rep.)</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>N. Korea</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Vietnam (until 1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (East)</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are states which experienced notable civil conflicts in recent history, and which using looser definitions would have clearly qualified as forced cohabitation states, as they contained the familiar elements. For example, Sri Lanka was a product of colonial legacies and included crossborder mobilization of ethnic Tamils residing across the Laccadive Sea in India—but Sri Lanka is an island not shared with another country, and therefore it did not qualify as an forced cohabitation state according to the strict coding criteria. The Philippines is also a country teeming with ethnic conflict episodes and one whose geographic composition is a product of colonial intrigue, but it does not share any islands with neighbors (see coding rules above).

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia were products of the foreign creation of Yugoslavia, but in the datasets they are coded only once they become independent states, making it impossible to code them as artificial border states according to the rules I set out.

Finally, while Libya was coded as an artificial border state, it was not identified as a *forced cohabitation* state for the purposes of the dataset. This is because tribal affiliations were not included in the coding, despite their political relevance in many of the countries studied, and particularly in Libya.

Conceptually speaking all of the above-mentioned countries are forced cohabitation states that have generated ethnic violence in recent years. Their absence from the dataset only sets the bar higher for any findings linking forced cohabitation with the outbreak of violence.
MEASURING THE IMPACT

The forced cohabitation theory presented here, which proposes that artificial borders which lead to ethnic diversity can exacerbate a rational but highly destructive impulse that governments have to homogenize their populations and which is most evident during periods of state formation, can be tested in several ways. One is by looking at whether there is a correlation between countries that suffer from forced cohabitation and the outbreak of civil war. This builds upon the rich literature on ethnic conflict and civil war discussed in the previous chapter, and it is essential to understanding the degree to which artificial borders may generate the kind of unrest we would expect it to.

A second hypothesis would posit that forced cohabitation is more likely to “internationalize” disputes through a process of crossborder mobilization, whereby ethnic-based political groups in one country can mobilize those in an adjacent state. This would be owed to the dispersion of identities that was created by a colonial border.

Finally, a third hypothesis would posit that states that experience forced cohabitation will witness a greater rate of one-sided government violence against civilians, even when accounting for periods of civil war. That is, that even during “peacetime” we would expect a greater propensity for state atrocities, as these would represent a reaction to a perceived unresolved heterogeneity. These three hypotheses are linked to the forced cohabitation theory in that they offer a snapshot of a contemporary state in the midst of violent state-formation mechanisms, as were witnessed in Western states during and prior to the nineteenth century.
Below, I provide results for the tests of each hypothesis. More details on the statistical tests can be found in the Appendix.

**Hypothesis 1: Forced cohabitation leads to ethnic civil war**

Testing whether civil wars are more likely in states that fit a particular description is a matter of finding whether a correlation exists between the variable one thinks is having an impact (that is, the independent variable), and the outcome which one is trying to study (the dependent variable). In this case the independent variable I am interested in is *Forced cohabitation* and the dependent variable is *Civil war onset*. I want to find out if there is in fact a statistical correlation between one and the other. If there is, it does not necessarily mean that forced cohabitation per se causes civil war, but it does tell us that it potentially could. At the very least, it tells us that it tends to be present in places where civil wars tend to take place, even if a different independent variable is actually causing the civil war itself. Finally, even if forced cohabitation is correlated with civil war outbreak, it is necessary to add “control variables,” that is, to have the analysis take into account
account other independent variables that may have a stronger effect on civil war outbreak than the variable we are interested in.

To test whether this first hypothesis holds true, I made use of the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset by Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009). This was a list of most every country in the world with data for the years 1946 to 2005 for each. The data included several useful variables, such as GDP, population size, whether a country was a democracy or not during that year, among several dozen other factual points. Civil wars are also included, and these are defined according to the Uppsala Data on Armed Conflict, that is, 25 battle deaths per year. The dataset also includes so-called “high-intensity” civil wars, which refer to wars with over 1,000 battle deaths in the first month of hostilities. Finally, there are ethnic civil wars and high-intensity ethnic civil wars, which refer to wars that were considered have been fought largely along ethnic lines.

For each of the country years I added the artificial borders and forced cohabitation, and went on to analyze the results.

Of those country years that resulted in new civil war outbreak, about 57 percent took place in forced cohabitation countries, while about 53 percent of high-intensity civil war years took place in these states. This despite the fact that forced cohabitation only accounts for less than one quarter of all country-years in the dataset. This would lead us to believe that while forced cohabitation is not the only factor correlated with ethnic conflict and only accounts for about half of all instances, countries experiencing this condition are more likely to break out into ethnic civil wars than those that do not.

Because forced cohabitation assumes the interaction of artificial borders, ethnic diversity, and crossborder mobilization, I test forced cohabitation alongside three relevant
controls. This is to ensure that the observed effect comes from something inherent to borders themselves, rather than these other observable phenomena that are in a sense included within the forced cohabitation variable. For artificial borders I use the artificial border variable explained above, and test diversity using the *ethnic fractionalization* variable included in the EPR dataset. Here ethnic fractionalization refers to the probability that two randomly chosen individuals in that country are of different ethnicities.

The presence of crossborder ethnic groups is tested using the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset (Davenport 2003), which Gleditsch (2007) consults when showing the positive correlation between the presence of crossborder ethnic groups and ethnic conflict. The MAR dataset is imperfectly suited for this specific task, and on four occasions I removed codings because the ethnic groups were not inhabiting adjacent countries in any meaningful way (Jews in Argentina, Turks in Germany, Koreans in Japan, and Chinese in Malaysia). Nevertheless, the data proved to be useful as a list of vulnerable minority groups that have kinships across state boundaries. This became the proxy variable *Crossborder ethnicity*.

In addition to these three variables, I control for those that Fearon and Laitin (2003) had already found to be significantly correlated with ethnic civil war. Among these were *GDP per capita* and *Population size*. Also included is *Mountainous terrain*, which Fearon and Laitin base in large part on geographer A. J. Gerrard’s dataset, and which is used as a proxy for the kind of “rough environment” that might facilitate guerrilla fighting. As Fearon and Laitin state, this measure “does not pick up other sorts of rough terrain that can be favorable to guerrillas such as swamps and jungles, and it
takes no account of population distributions or food availability in relation to mountains”
(p. 81).

*Noncontiguity* is a variable which Fearon and Laitin code themselves for countries
whose territories hold at least 10,000 people and are separate from the land mass that
holds the capital city by 100km of water, or by a different state’s land. Like mountainous
terrain, noncontiguity could conceptually provide protection to insurgencies.

The *New state* variable occurs on the country-year of independence only. *Oil* is an
additional dichotomous variable, which Fearon and Laitin code as states whose oil
exports exceed one third of total export revenues. The idea behind this variable is that oil-
producing countries are able to gain income without the kind of bureaucratic intrusion
that taxing states must develop. This relative lack of “stateness” can potentially provide
space for rebels to operate (Fearon 2005).

To control for democracy I consulted Fearon and Laitin’s dataset, which uses
Polity IV data. This variable is included because we would expect that greater civil
liberties as well as appropriate legal channels for airing grievances would reduce the
likelihood that a minority group would take up arms against the state. *Religious
fractionalization*, which captures religious diversity, is another variable that Fearon and
Laitin found to be significantly correlated with civil war outbreak. As an additional
demographic control, I added the log of *excluded ethnic populations* (members of an
ethnic group excluded from the decision-making bodies of the state), which Wimmer,
Cederman and Min (2009) found to be significantly correlated with ethnic war.

Additionally, I included the *former French colony* and *former British colony*
variables from the Fearon and Laitin dataset to control for potential institutional
discrepancies arising from different colonial experiences. Finally, I included the Subsaharan Africa and Middle East/North Africa variables to control for any unique regional characteristics that may be present. I used these two specifically because they are generally associated with high levels of intrastate conflict, though as part of the robustness tests I include additional regions for study.

In testing the reliability, or robustness of the model (see Appendix for details), I added even more variables to ensure that the forced cohabitation variable was thoroughly tested against all other potential explanations. The additional variables are as follows: (1) the Muslim variable, for the percentage of Muslim inhabitants. This was added given the recent prevalence of internal conflicts in the Middle East and parts of greater North Africa; (2) the Instability variable, to denote political instability for that country year; (3) Excluded groups, for number of ethnic groups outside the ruling coalition; (4) Dislocated population; (5) the Anocracy dichotomous variable to denote potential institution failure, based on Polity IV data; (6) the dichotomous Regime change variable, to denote some kind of revolutionary or coup process that leads to the fall of the regime; (7) log of Years since independence, which I calculated based on Wimmer and Min’s dataset on national-state foundations; and (8) additional regional/cultural units, which I added one at a time in this order: Western, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia.

As dependent variables I tested the four civil war variables mentioned above: Civil war onset, Ethnic civil war onset, High-intensity civil war onset, and High-intensity ethnic civil war onset. (Here “onset,” or “outbreak” refers to conflicts that were not continuations of a war ongoing from the previous year.)
Of the country years coded as having a new ethnic civil war outbreak, 57 percent took place in states also coded with the forced cohabitation variable, while of the high-intensity ethnic wars that took place 53 percent occurred in forced cohabitation states; this despite the fact that the forced cohabitation codings account for fewer than 25 percent of all country years listed.

In the test, forced cohabitation shows to be statistically significantly correlated with all four civil war types that I observed: civil war onset, ethnic civil war onset, and high-intensity civil war and ethnic civil war onset. This means that the presence of this forced cohabitation variable was linked to the outbreak of civil war in a manner that does not appear to be random. For example, for civil war or ethnic civil war outbreak, there is less than a 1 percent probability that the apparent relationship between forced cohabitation and either of those variables was due to chance.9

Ethnic fractionalization and population size are correlated with both ethnic civil war and high-intensity ethnic civil war outbreak, but not with the others, something that should not be surprising and may carry little meaning. After all, ethnic diversity is a precondition for ethnic civil war. The fact that it is not correlated with other civil wars (i.e., as ethnic diversity increases it does not become more likely that a state will experience civil war) only confirms previous findings by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and others, which show that ethnic diversity in and of itself does not lead to civil war.

Interestingly, the artificial borders variable is negatively correlated with civil war, ethnic civil war, and high-intensity civil war outbreak. That is, whenever the variable is present there appears to be a lower likelihood that civil war will break out. This is an

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9 See the Appendix for a regression table and robustness tests.
important finding for a couple of reasons. First, it reminds us that artificial borders often homogenized populations, either ethnically and/or politically, which means they did not lead to the kind of unresolved diversity that forced cohabitation states experience. An example would be the relatively homogenous Hungary and Austria following the end of World War I.

Second, colonial history does not necessarily set up a state for cycles of violence. Since artificial borders are, by the criteria used here, foreign imposed, then it follows that most artificial borders are former colonies or possessions of sorts. Yet it appears that certain outcomes that came from colonialism, which are tied to forced cohabitation and not to the colonial institutions themselves, is behind the high incidences of conflict. This contradicts aspects of the qualitative literature on violence, in particular the work of Satre on the manner in which the oppressed tend to oppress others in postcolonial periods, generating cyclical violence (1983). In this sense it is a promising finding, as it suggests that postcolonial states are not bound to be locked in cycles of conflict by nature of their past.

In addition, results further challenge the importance of institutional factors as predictors of civil war, with neither democracy nor French or British colonial history being significantly correlated with any of the civil war outcomes.\(^\text{10}\)

\(^{10}\) I ran the regression again twice, using the \textit{Prior war} variable that Fearon and Laitin (2003) consult, that is, the variable that shows that in the preceding year war took place. I ran it once as a dependent variable and once as an independent variable. The variable codes for years of ongoing conflict, and is therefore not useful in determining civil war outbreak. As a dependent variable it is also of limited use, since most of the independent variables appear statistically significant when tested. This is more a problem of confounding, whereby practically the most meaningful determinant of ongoing war is a war in a previous year, with the other variables merely appearing to have an effect.
Table 3 provides a user-friendly explanation of the important variables from this test, and includes a brief explanation of the significance for each important finding.

Table 3. Hypothesis 1 Test Results at a Glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CORRELATED WITH CIVIL WAR</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forced cohabitation</td>
<td>Suggests the hypothesis is correct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size (only for ethnic civil war)</td>
<td>Material factors <em>do</em> matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New state</td>
<td>As expected, new states <em>do</em> tend to suffer from civil conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEGATIVELY CORRELATED WITH CIVIL WAR</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artificial borders</td>
<td>Colonialism and borders itself not the critical factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>Material factors <em>do</em> matter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NOT CORRELATED WITH CIVIL WAR</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic diversity and transnational ethnic identities</td>
<td>The mere presence of ethnically diverse groups does not spell trouble; and more important, there may be ways to reconcile unresolved ethnic conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountainous terrain</td>
<td>While it would theoretically facilitate insurgency, it does not seem to have an effect when forced cohabitation is included in the analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncontiguity</td>
<td>Separated states need not necessarily fuel ethnic conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>While the literature has shown that oil can fuel insurgency (or be an incentive to rebel), once forced cohabitation is taken into account oil does not appear to matter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious fractionalization (only correlated with high-intensity ethnic civil war)</td>
<td>Religious diversity need not lead to violent conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Democracy promotion may not inoculate states from civil war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial history</td>
<td>Violence in postcolonial states may not be a local response to having been colonized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (except Western, which is negatively correlated with civil war)</td>
<td>Neither the Middle East nor Africa, for example, seemed to be “doomed” to fight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Islam does not appear to be associated with more civil war, which lends credence to the notion that political problems, and not cultural or religious legacies, are to blame for civil war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Change</td>
<td>A change in regime may not appear to generate more violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Since Independence</td>
<td>Once a state is past the new state threshold (which is associated with greater likelihood of civil war), a state’s age does not appear to play a factor in the likelihood of civil war.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Given the powerfully consistent link between forced cohabitation and civil war, and given the relative unimportance of most other variables once forced cohabitation is included in the analysis, it is difficult to ignore the argument that policy analysts have been making for some time, often without acknowledgment from much of the academic community. Artificial borders that force ethnic groups to cohabitate do tend to promote the outbreak of civil war.

**Hypothesis 2: Forced cohabitation spreads conflict across borders**

A critical part of the forced cohabitation theory is the assumption that ethnic conflicts contain an international dimension. This pertains to the third dimension of the theory, as explained in the previous chapter: “Borders cannot effectively stop the transfer of people, ideas, weapons and political agendas from one side of a border to another.” If governments that fear diversity are right, politically excluded ethnic groups should be able to muster support from coethnics living across borders, and thus threaten the authority of the state. Just as important, neighboring countries will sense weakness in force cohabitation states, and either support rebel groups (or the governments they want to prop up), or in more extreme cases, intervene militarily in domestic disputes. This would be exactly the kind of behavior that prompted the Spanish and the French to homogenize their populations in centuries past—as a way to guard against this kind of threat. Is such behavior observed today, and is it linked to forced cohabitation?

I tackled the question in two parts. First, by looking at whether conflicts that included crossborder activity tended to be fought by forced cohabitation states, and second by looking at military intervention trends. For the first part, I gathered all of the
ethnic conflicts listed in my dataset between 1946 and 2005, and studied their histories referring mainly to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia (www.ucdp.uu.se), with supporting materials gathered from the Library of Congress Country Studies website (lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/), as well as the UNHCR website (www.unhcr.org). I classified countries according to two criteria: Separatism and ethnic discrimination. Separatism here refers to violence initiated by separatist groups or by the government as a result of separatist activity, while ethnic discrimination involves violence that was initiated as part of an ethnic cleansing campaign, or more commonly, as a less severe but visible persecution effort. It can also include violence initiated by rioters or rebels in response to perceived discrimination. For crossborder mobilization I classified each conflict according to one or more of the following criteria:

**Neighboring support for one of the factions:**

a. Support to rebels from a neighboring government  
b. Support to rebels from a neighboring organization (nonstate)  
c. Support to government from a neighboring government  
d. Support to government from a neighboring organization (nonstate)

**Non-neighbor support for one of the factions:**

e. Support to rebels from a great power outside the region  
f. Support to government from a great power outside the region

**No visible outside support:**

g. Not clearly linked to foreign intervention

The triggers separatism and ethnic discrimination yielded no clear pattern—all conflicts classified fit neatly into one or both of these categories, with no difference
between forced cohabitation states or others.\textsuperscript{11} Yet when looking at the crossborder mobilization characteristics, the data present compelling evidence for a connection between forced cohabitation and international support for warring factions (see Figure 1). The greatest number of ethnic civil wars with neighboring involvement are fought in forced cohabitation states that have two or more forced cohabitation neighbors (a total of 27 wars), followed by forced cohabitation states that only have one fellow forced cohabitation neighbor (9), then non-forced cohabitation states with two or more forced cohabitation neighbors (8). One war occurred in a non-forced cohabitation state with only one forced cohabitation neighbor, and two occurred in a non-forced cohabitation state with no forced cohabitation neighbors. This pattern lends support to the idea that forced cohabitation may help to internationalize conflicts that would otherwise have remained a domestic affair. Or potentially, these conflicts would not have started at all in the absence of meddling from political actors living on the other side of the border.

One additional way of analyzing whether forced cohabitation internationalizes domestic ethnic conflicts is to look at the rates of military interventions. Commonly interventions take place during civil wars, and the best predictor of whether a country will face a foreign military intervention is to look at whether it is currently experiencing a civil war. But there are exceptions. One such example is Cuban’s military infiltration in Angola in 1975, immediately following the country’s independence. Cuban was seeking to establish training camps in support of likeminded Marxist groups in the context of both the Cold War and Cuban’s aim to export its revolution. In 1991 France sent 300 troops to

\textsuperscript{11} I did not have a high degree of confidence in my classification of the wars listed for Russia in 1946 and 1997, and Ethiopia in 1996, so I omitted these cases from the list.
Benin to safeguard election results, but also to send a warning to neighboring Togo over a recent coup (Pickering and Peceny 2006, 552).

Figure 1. Foreign Involvement in Ethnic Civil Wars, 1946-2005

A statistical analysis shows that when controlling for the usual suspects—GDP per capita, population, democracy, excluded populations, new states, ethnic and religious division, mountainous terrain, lack of contiguity, artificial borders without forced cohabitation, and the presence of ethnic groups across state lines; Subsaharan Africa, the Middle East/North Africa, and French vs. British colonial history—, and more important, when taking into account both civil wars and non-civil war years, countries that suffer
from forced cohabitation are significantly more likely to experience foreign military intervention.

The case of Mali helps illustrate this hypothesis. In late 1985 France had intervened militarily when its former colonies Mali and Burkina Faso engaged in a low-level border conflict. Mali had claims over the resource-rich Agacher Strip in Burkina Faso, and it justified these claims on the basis of ethnic Bellahs and the Tuaregs, an ethnic group that historically controlled caravan routes along the Sahara, and who make up approximately ten percent of Mali’s ethnic canvas. Burkina Faso had sent officials to take a census in the disputed territory, which prompted Mali to attack (Uppsala, n.d.).

Figure 2. Dispersion of Ethnic Tuaregs across North Africa

![Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Copyright free.](image-url)
Since then, several conflicts have erupted in Mali involving Tuaregs. In 1990, Tuaregs and Arabs launched a separatist campaign, based out of Libya and with the support of Muammar Qadhafi and coethnics in Niger. When the Qadhafi regime fell in Libya, Tuareg groups returned to Mali, stoking violence and separatist activity back home (Stewart 2012).

Since independence in 1960, Tuaregs have rebelled in Mali a total of four times, including the recent violence by Islamist fighters who had fought during the Algerian civil war of the 1990s, and were now part of the larger umbrella group Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Flood 2012).

To see whether forced states are common targets of intervention when we control for civil war, I added the variables target for each country in which a state was a target of intervention. To code for these interventions I used data from the International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset (Pearson and Baumann 1993; Kisangani and Pickering 2008).

In this analysis I added two additional independent variables: ongoing war and civil war onset. This is because we would expect civil war itself to invite foreign interference, so we do not want that to cloud our observations of the effect of forced cohabitation. We are therefore largely interested in the cases where no civil war is occurring and yet intervention still takes place. One such example is Cuban’s military infiltration in Angola in 1975, immediately following the country’s independence. Cuban was seeking to establish training camps in support of likeminded Marxist groups in the context of both the Cold War and Cuban’s aim of exporting its revolution. Another comes in 1991, when France sent 300 troops to Benin to safeguard election results, but
also to send a warning to neighboring Togo over a recent coup (Pickering and Peceny 2006, 552).

Forced is significantly correlated with being a target of military intervention, and this effect becomes more pronounced in the post-Cold War period. This may be owed to the restraints placed on the system by the superpower competition, which limited interventions by all actors—superpower or otherwise.

As was the case with the first hypothesis testing, artificial borders is negatively correlated, meaning it was associated with less military intervention.

While forced cohabitation does show that it is linked with intervention, a few differences exist between the outcomes of this series of tests and the previous one. First, the new state variable tends to lose its effect, as it does not show to be reliably correlated. On the other hand the following variables tend to matter in this test, whereas they weren’t correlated in the previous one: Religious diversity, the Middle East/North Africa and the presence of transnational ethnic groups. One potential explanation for this is related to the propensity for intervention on behalf of correligionists that is observed in the Middle East/North Africa region. As I show in Chapter 4, this phenomenon is owed to ethnic dispersion, as well as the unique sociopolitical history of the region.

There is another important finding: Despite what one might assume about the region’s material attractiveness to outsiders, oil is negatively correlated with intervention—meaning that, according to the results presented here, if a state has significant oil reserves that state is less likely to experience foreign military intervention. This, of course, does not preclude other forms of intervention, including the economic and political kind, but it does lead us to question some commonly held assumptions about
the links between natural resource wealth and foreign military intervention, including those widely held among subscribers to Marxist (i.e., materialist) interpretations of conflict.

Finally, democracy is also negatively correlated with foreign military intervention. This lends further proof to the Democracy Peace Theory, which posits that two states that are democracies are not likely to go to war with one another.¹² Unlike in the last test, neither population size and artificial borders are found to be significantly correlated with foreign intervention.

Table 4. Hypothesis 2 Test Results at a Glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CORRELATED WITH MILITARY INTERVENTION</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forced cohabitation</td>
<td>Suggests the hypothesis is correct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East/North Africa</td>
<td>See Ch. 4 for a treatment on the Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossborder ethnicity</td>
<td>See Ch. 4 for a treatment on the Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious diversity</td>
<td>See Ch. 4 for a treatment on the Middle East</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEGATIVELY CORRELATED WITH CIVIL WAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOT CORRELATED WITH CIVIL WAR</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artificial borders</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior colonialism</td>
<td>Having been colonized does not necessarily set up a state for a cycle of future military intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountainous terrain</td>
<td>Intervention may occur (or not occur) regardless of terrain.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹² For one plausible explanation of the mechanism behind Democratic Peace Theory, see Schultz (2001).
The internationalization of conflict—through crossborder mobilization during civil war, and through foreign military interventions, corroborates a central fear of governments pursuing state-formation: built-in instability is recognized and exploited by hostile outsiders. Consequently, friendly and neutral states seeking to prop up nations that have not yet coalesced around a unifying political process may also be tempted to intervene.

*Hypothesis 3: Government atrocities are more likely in forced cohabitation countries*

If ethnic conflict is a result of unresolved diversity, then we can imagine that forced cohabitation would trigger the kinds of state-organized atrocities we associate with homogenization campaigns in the early stages of a nation’s history. To find out whether there is a link between the forced cohabitation variable and one-sided state violence, I combined observations from Uppsala University’s One-Sided Violence dataset (Eck and Hultman 2007) with the EPR dataset used above. Because Uppsala only covers the years 1989-2011, I was only able to analyze the years 1989 to 2005 with the new combined data.

Uppsala provides three categories of fatality counts: low estimates, high estimates, and “best” estimates. I only used the best estimates column. As a dependent variable I specifically looked at government-instigated one-sided violence, since other cases include terrorist and rebel attacks, which while potentially relevant, do not directly capture state-led homogenization efforts. Out of the 188 total instances of one-sided violence for this time period, 130 (69 percent) took place in forced cohabitation states.
This was despite the fact that within this time period forced cohabitation states account for only 31 percent of all country years.

I added the same control variables used when testing the first hypothesis. To distinguish between government-applied violence that results from a civil war campaign from the kinds of atrocities that would be expected as part of an identity formation effort, I controlled for ongoing civil war, as well as both ethnic and non-ethnic civil war onset.

In addition to testing whether one-sided violence took place or not, I also looked at the fatality counts to gauge whether forced cohabitation would result in greater atrocities than states without this environment. As hypothesized, forced cohabitation is correlated with instances of one-sided government violence and it tends to lead to higher fatality counts when these events happen.

The Rwandan genocide of 1994 lists 500,000 fatalities as a best estimate, and in several country years Rwanda lists fatalities well above the average (that is the case in 1990, 1991, 1992, 1995, and 1997). To ensure that Rwanda did not skew the results, I ran the test again without Rwanda. The forced cohabitation variable remained correlated with high fatality counts, such that there is only a 0.01 percent probability that the correlation is a result of chance.

As one might suspect, democracy is negatively correlated with this kind of government atrocity, but so is noncontiguity. This latter finding may have to do with the fact that states that are not connected can help to provide some kind of space between state and discontented populations, thus decreasing pressure on the government to engage in oppressive violence. More practically, separation may also hamper a state’s ability to engage in large scale violence against a target population. (One glaring exception for this
observation is the violence committed by Pakistan in the run-up to Bangladesh’s independence. During that time Bangladesh was still a noncontiguous portion of Pakistan.) Both ongoing war and Subsaharan Africa are positively correlated. Ongoing war is also correlated, as would be expected, given the manner in which governments are prone to engaging in collective punishment during counterinsurgency campaigns. Subsaharan Africa’s correlation may be a result of path dependence, regional practice, or the presence of some other variable that is associated with both the region and ongoing war (i.e., a lurking variable).

I expected to observe a negative correlation between oil production and one-sided government violence and fatalities. This would have lent support to the rentier state theory, which posits that resource-rich states can essentially buy popular support and avoid some of the more coercive aspects of authoritarianism (Mahdavi 1970). If the theory were correct, then it would follow that oil-rich states would be less likely to pursue violent homogenization campaigns, since they would be less likely to fear heterogeneity as a challenge to the state. I ran the test again using oil per capita instead of the dichotomous oil exporter variable (i.e., labeled as either a 1 or a 0) in order to account for oil exporting states that must cope with large populations (e.g., Iran) and would therefore have fewer resources available to “buy off” the populace. Yet neither the dichotomous oil variable nor oil per capita showed to be significantly correlated in any way to one-sided government violence, and thus, this test failed to lend any empirical support to rentier state theory.
There is one important caveat about this test: because the dataset only spans between 1989 and 2005, we cannot conclude anything about a link between forced cohabitation and one-sided government violence during the Cold War period.

Table 5. Hypothesis 3 Test Results at a Glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlated With Fatalities in Government Violence</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forced cohabitation</td>
<td>Suggests the hypothesis is correct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size</td>
<td>A state’s perceived threat may be amplified if the population is large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsaharan Africa</td>
<td>No obvious explanation for the link; a potential area of future study.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negatively Correlated With Government Violence</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artificial borders</td>
<td>Once again, it appears that many artificial borders generated homogeneity and stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/capita</td>
<td>Absence of wealth is again a powerful predictor of violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncontiguity</td>
<td>Separation may provide needed respite and lessen the desire (or ability) by a state to engage in atrocities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>As expected, governments do not tend to kill their voting constituents.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not Correlated With Government Violence</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crossborder ethnicities</td>
<td>States may not use violence simply because an ethnic group has coethnics living in neighboring states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New states</td>
<td>New states are prone to civil war (see above) but do not seem to be more prone to one-sided government atrocities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>This seems to contradict the rentier state theory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior colonialism</td>
<td>Again, violence as inherited from colonial practice, may not be an actual phenomenon.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CASE STUDY: SOUTH ASIA

The Durand Line, demarcating the border between colonial India (originally including modern-day Pakistan and Bangladesh), was drawn in 1893 in order to limit the territory of Afghanistan in the north. Russia had attempted to reach further south in campaigns of 1838 and 1878, during the peak of the so-called Great Game between the Russian Empire and the United Kingdom. But not three years after the British drew the Durand Line, troubles began, with separated Pashtun communities crossing from Afghanistan into Waziristan to wage jihad on the colonial authorities. The British responded with a semi-autonomous designation for the people living along what would later become the AfPak border, resulting in a chronic limitation of state authority ever since (Rose 2011).

Today, this northern boundary continues to house dual-state actors, most notably in the form of the ethnic Pashtun groups often referred to collectively as the Taliban (more below). Yet the creation of these organizations, as well as many others housed in Kashmir, are directly attributable to the dispute with India, Pakistan’s southern neighbor. That political enmity was born from the Radclyffe Line, which partitioned colonial India into two states in 1947. Understanding the interplay between the southern and northern borders of Pakistan—both foreign-created—, we can gain a better grasp of the Pakistan effect.

Partition was a result of growing Hindu nationalism and an assertive Muslim communal identity in India. This process had not become entrenched until the late 1920s, though it was salient enough that Mahatma Gandhi claimed that the problem was beyond human control (Bandyopādhyāya 2004).
In the process of partitioning the country, the British organized commissions and popular referenda to decide the fate of border regions and ultimately split up Bengal and Punjab. The infamous population transfers and the communal violence that led up to the partition left emotional scars on both sides of the border, and irredentist sentiment in Pakistan led to various conflicts over the majority-Muslim but largely Indian-controlled Kashmir region. Irredentism can affect an entire neighborhood, as Miller writes:

The influx of Muslim refugees from Hindu-dominated areas during the partition of the subcontinent and the subsequent demographic and geostrategic changes created strong secessionist and irredentist sentiments all over the region, which constantly spill over to adjacent states. Since Muslims and the large Pashtun tribe transcend Pakistan’s border, Pakistan was the subject of irredentist aspirations on the part of the Afghans who desired to annex the Pashtun areas on the Pakistani side of the Mortimer-Durand line. (Miller 2010, 83)

Starting in 1947, the two states have fought four wars, all connected to questions of secession and unresolved border disputes in Kashmir and/or Bangladesh. In Kashmir, where the ruling Maharaja agreed to join India in the partition process. Pakistan responded with a military attack. Following UN intervention Kashmir was divided between the Pakistani and Indian regions along the line of control.

The second Indo-Pakistani war, in 1965, was also triggered by Pakistani moves into Kashmir. Pakistan had infiltrated with the aim of mobilizing rebel groups against Indian rule. When India discovered this movement of troops, it mounted a ground invasion of Pakistan. The 1971 war was fought over Bangladesh’s independence aims, which India backed, while the 1999 Kargil war was a much smaller conflict led by then-rogue general and future president Pervez Musharraf.

While all Indo-Pakistani wars are amplifications of those unresolved issues from 1947, it is the 1971 war which most clearly serves as a case study of forced cohabitation
theory, as it contains: transnational ethnic conflict, invasion, and genocide. The tragedies stem from the noncontiguous nature of Pakistan prior to 1971.

Following partition the country lay divided by Indian territory into a politically dominant West Pakistan and a disenfranchised Bengali-majority East Pakistan. While majority-Muslim East Bengal (that is, the future East Pakistan, and ultimately, the future Bangladesh) had been partitioned from majority-Hindu West Bengal (in India), the social link between East Pakistan and dominant West Pakistan was fragile from the get-go. In East Pakistan Bengali was the dominant language, and some 23 percent of the population was religiously Hindu (Ahmed 2002). When Urdu was introduced as the official language of all of Pakistan in the late 1940s, widespread protests in Bengal erupted. Things came to a head when the Awami League Party won a majority in the 1970 national elections, which resulted in the president, General Yahya Khan, based in West Pakistan, to apply military force rather than cede power to the east (Haider 2009).

The military intervention into East Pakistan was swift and brutal. Large-scale targeted killings and rape, especially against students and political activists, were witnessed. The death toll is often discussed in the context of genocide studies, and estimates range from 58,000 to several million (see Obermeyer, Murray, and Gakidou 2008, and paper responses). A cable from U.S. Consul General Archer Blood from March 7, 1971 comes down as an unfiltered expression of anger and horror at the atrocities associated with the military operation. He writes:

Here in Dacca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the PAK military. Evidence continues to mount that the MLA authorities have a list of Awami League supporters whom they are systematically eliminating by seeking them out in their homes and shooting them down. … Moreover, with support of Pak military, non-Bengali Muslims are systematically attacking poor people’s quarters and murdering Bengalis and Hindus. … Full horror of Pak military
atrocities will come to light sooner or later. (National Security Archive Electronic Briefing 79(1) 2002)

As the flow of refugees streamed into India, the government of Indira Gandhi saw an opportunity to mobilize members of the resistance—broadly referred to as the Mukti Bahini—and ultimately interve directly to defeat Pakistan in battle and help form an independent state of Bangladesh.

The partition of India in 1947 and the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 represent the large-scale devastation that foreign-imposed borders can bring about. While there was a genuine effort—both in London and among local political leaders—to generate borders that would reflect demographic realities (including through plebiscites), the borders were not able to reconcile the divisions that had been brewing in an already divided Indian colony. Ishtiaq Ahmed (2002) describes this process as “pathological politics,” whereby a cycle of action and reaction creates, not only in-group solidarity, but insistent hostility toward the out-group. He writes: “Typically minorities—ethnic, religious, sectarian or linguistic—become the main targets of state-tolerated or state-sanctioned discrimination and violence. In terms of relations between two or more hostile states, pathological politics manifest itself in state-sanction ultra-nationalism, promotion of terrorism across borders, and bellicose postures” (10). Hence, the legacies of colonialism may remain unresolved even following partition; with ethnic animosity and competition expressing itself, not merely as an internal factor, but as a source of international conflict. This connection between interstate war and ethnicity will be tackled further in Chapters 4 and 5.
CONCLUSION

Forced cohabitation is a phenomenon that can have a lasting impact on a polity. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the roots of forced cohabitation are based upon a colonial imposition of power relationships, which at times manifest themselves as ruling, or “superior” groups—ethnic, familial, tribal, or otherwise—which by their presence establish sharp cleavages among the members of the society. Non unlike the manner in which local Arab leaders were empowered by Britain, or Tutsis were empowered by Belgium, such hand-picked leaders set up a paradigm of hierarchical behavior that defines ethnic relationships as essentially conflict-prone, as these become entrenched zero-sum games.

Ethnic politics thus comes to the forefront while the forced cohabitation of ethnic groups means pitting groups against one another in this competition. There are few blueprints for the successful and peaceful resolution of interethnic rivalries that are perceived as threatening to the core. In Europe and Latin America, genocidal horrors were often pursued as a “solution” for such real or perceived threats. In Africa, the Middle and Asia, such horrid paths have only relatively recently manifested themselves, often only as new states began to achieve the capacity to engage in campaigns of suppression. But the likelihood of war, government atrocities and interstate conflict, including the intervention campaigns that seek to exploit (or keep together) fractuous states, always lurk in states whose ethnic compositions are a product of colonial intrigue. The evidence is clear—so-called “artificial borders” make various manifestations of ethnic conflict far more likely.
Ethnic civil wars are rare events, even in political climates born from artificial borders. As discussed in Chapter 1, the literature on ethnic conflict has reliably shown that states with small economies are more likely to break out in ethnic civil war. And as I’ve demonstrated in Chapter 2, an ethnically diverse society whose borders were outside-drawn is arguably the best predictor that a state will break out in ethnic civil war at some point in its history. But what mechanism is at play? Why should diversity in these particular states be different from diversity that is found in states circled by “organic,” or self-made borders? The answers lie in the international dimensions of ethnic competition.

In the Middle East, countries such as Iraq, Syria and Jordan—all created by British and French leaders following World War I-era negotiations—betray similarly straight lines. And despite the greater ethnic and religious uniformity of the Middle East, these “artificial borders” nonetheless manage to divide politicized religious and ethnic groups with harrowing consequences. Iraq’s largely straight lines, which Great Britain
created in 1920, combined three provinces that the Ottoman Empire lost in its implosion: Basra, a largely Arab Sh’i southern province, Baghdad, a largely Arab Sunni one, and Mosul, an ethnic Kurdish one. The consistent sectarian warfare—at low levels during the reign of dictators such as Saddam Hussein (1979-2003) and at high pitch during the post-US invasion and subsequent civil war—is a story of artificial boundaries that bred forced cohabitation and the clash of ethnoreligious identities (Sluglett 2007).

In the early years of the Iraq War, Joe Biden, then an influential U.S. Senator on the Foreign Relations Committee, suggested that Iraq would be best partitioned into three states—one Shi‘i, one Sunni, and one Kurdish—as a way of limiting sectarian violence in the country. But the idea did not gain traction. Iraqis, like most countries experiencing cohabitation, have bought into a broader nationalism for too long for them to envision separation (Biden and Gelb 2006).

It is impossible to discuss the negative consequences of ethnic identification and mobilization without acknowledging the power that nationalism has in maintaining (or forcing) disparate communities together. Thus, Sunni, Shi‘i and Kurdish political elites have often disagreed on what constituted a just Iraq, but they have agreed on the concept that an Iraq has to exist. This is the same for states across Africa and other regions: artificial borders do not automatically result in higher rates of secession (Englebert and Hummel 2005, 3).13

But violence within the state is often preventable, and prevented. This is especially true in communities where one ethnic group does not have undisputed power,

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13 In fact, in Africa ethnic-based political groups often find weak states provide them with ample space to maintain independent bases of authority, as Pierre Englebert and Rebecca Hummel of Pomona College have shown (2005).
and violence between ethnic groups could be costly to all sides. In such communities there is a tendency to “self-police,” so that individual feuds do not escalate into interethnic battles (Fearon and Laitin 2004).

The presence of antagonistic identity groups therefore does not in and of itself explain ethnic civil war any more than divergent interests explains conflict between states. What, then, is triggering the application of violence to pursue ethnic-based political goals? Why would members of an organization, oppressed or otherwise, engage in the highly lethal and society-shattering exercise of civil conflict? Why would this be the case among populations that not only tolerate, but embrace a nationalism that includes non-coethnics as an essential part of the story?

One potential explanation for ethnic civil-war is that conflict tends to occur in states that were not only created in arbitrary fashion, but also those that enjoyed national or religious affiliations that cut across those made-to-order boundaries. Examples of such states include Rwanda, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone—their archetypal battlegrounds of recent conflict. The story of conflicts in these five states is one in which political leaders residing outside of a particular country mobilized fellow members of an ethnic group in an adjacent state. This stoking of crossborder tensions may help explain the puzzle of ethnic conflict: It isn’t just that mobilized self-interested groups pursue a risky and often self-defeating strategy of ethnic conflict, it is that neighboring states, pursuing their own international agenda and largely immune from the full consequences of ethnic war, are likely to view civil conflict in neighboring states as a rational strategy for achieving regional goals.
In this chapter I provide a review of the recent scholarship of the connection between transnational factors and conflict, and go on to offer three models of crossborder mobilization. I show that it is this crossborder mobilization that is instrumental to our understanding of the manner in which forced cohabitation facilitates conflict. It isn’t then, that singular groups are forced together in a single state, but rather that each of these groups maintains communal and political ties to coethnics based across international borders.

After going over the theoretical models of crossborder mobilization I provide a case study for each in order to illustrate the manner in which borders are crossed during, or in anticipation of, civil conflicts. I conclude with a brief foray into the question of ethnically divided island states that contain some of the same crossborder mobilization characteristics of continental, forced cohabitation states.

EXPLAINING TRANSNATIONAL MOBILIZATION

Recent scholarship, and in particular the work of Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan, has persuasively challenged the notion that civil wars can be adequately studied by merely observing the internal dynamics of the state—i.e., GDP per capita, population size, and domestic ethnic composition. They’ve successfully shown that transnational linkages are critical for understanding the phenomenon of civil conflict.

This scholarship can be conveniently grouped into two broad explanations: transnational movement, and the transnational kinship. The first relates to the manner in which the movement of people can destabilize states, as is the case with refugee flows and longterm migration patterns. The latter refers to the comingling and mutually
reinforcing identity narratives that can be fostered across state lines. Such is the case with politically disenfranchised minorities such as Kurds, Tuaregs, Basques, and many others, who find *companions de misère* on the other side of a national boundary. The two concepts are sometimes related, but they need not be.

In an article about the link between civil war and refugee flows Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) provided a thorough articulation of the transnational movement explanation of civil conflict. They showed that one important reason that civil wars tend to appear in region clusters is the manner in which civil wars generate refugees, who in turn destabilize neighboring countries. The authors posited that the destabilization is linked to the establishment of rebel organizations in-exile, as well as the spread of other negative externalities, including economic problems and disease. They found a statistical link between refugee presence and civil war outbreak, and found that predicted probabilities of conflict rose when refugees were theoretically added to a case, and even more so when neighboring civil war was taking place.

The cases they offered were the KLA fighters in Macedonia from neighboring Albania and Kosovo, as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization during exile, active in Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia. But more recent examples only lend further support to Salehyan and Gleditsch’s argument. In Jordan, the Za’atari refugee camp hosts approximately 130,000 Syrians displaced from the civil war there (BBC News 2013), and this makes the camp one of the largest in the world. The camp’s use as a rebel recruitment source for both the Free Syrian Army and more radical Islamist groups has been amply documented (Halaby 2013). It is also increasing health concerns, with observed outbreaks of otherwise preventable diseases such as polio (Snyderman 2013). A
further negative externality affect the host country Jordan is the massive influx of foreign workers, many of whom leave Za’atari for the capital Amman in search of low-paid wages in a country already mired in economic challenges. This has generated visible resentment among Jordanian citizens and has led to decreasing wages and social conflicts between Jordanians and Syrians.

In neighboring Iraq, the security challenges have been most pronounced. Because Iraq is a sectarian system that is Shi‘i led, some of the more radicalized Sunni rebels in Syria have mobilized and established a formidable al-Qaeda presence in western Iraq. As of late 2013, al-Qaeda had captured key parts of restive Fallujah and Ramadi.

While refugees are first and foremost victims of war, and the vast majority of the over six million displaced Syrians are not responsible for the violence in neighboring Iraq or the destabilization of neighboring countries—most are internal refugees—, as Salehyan and Gleditsch note, it is important to understand the manner in which refugee flows can affect the security situation in a neighboring state.

In addition to the refugee flows and other expressions of physical migration, existing transnational ethnic linkages are a critical part of the story. Gleditsch (2007) identifies three such types of linkages, which he shows are related to civil war outbreak. These are transnational ethnic linkages, political regime types in neighboring states, and economic integration. He finds that when controlling for usual culprits of civil war, including GDP per capita and population size, these three are correlated with such conflicts (transnational ethnic linkages being positively correlated, whereas neighboring democracy and economic integration are negatively correlated).

Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz (2008) built upon this notion of
interconnectability of conflicts to provide a framework for understanding the manner in which civil wars can lead to international disputes. Often, the intersection between domestic and international disputes has been treated as a product of diversionary wars (such as the alleged manner in which both Margaret Thatcher and the Argentine military junta had domestic political incentives to engage in the Falklands War), as well as wars of opportunity (such as Iraq’s Saddam Hussein invading Iran in the middle of the latter’s postrevolutionary power struggle and military purges). But the authors suggest that rather than treating domestic issues as potential “sparks” of international conflict, they should be viewed as a more dynamic process, whereby civil wars may spillover and initiate international conflict, or international disputes may be the source of new civil wars.

The authors find empirical support for this domestic-international nexus, showing that the percentage of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), meaning low-level conflicts that include military action or a threat of force, are more likely when a country is experiencing civil war.

The authors identify two vehicles for this: intervention and externalization impulses. The former includes five broad and familiar categories of reasons why a state might support rebels in an adjacent territory: proxy wars, regime disputes, irredentism, protection of ethnic kin, and tit-for-tat. The latter is consistent with the literature on transnational migration, particularly in regards to rebels who flee a conflict zone, only to set up operations in an adjacent territory.

Salehyan (2007) has focused on the role that transnational mobility of rebels plays in the scope of civil war. For one, he identifies rebel sanctuary across borders as a phenomenon that alters the state-rebel bargaining climate, given that borders limit
jurisdictionally-valid actions of states in a way that they do not limit rebels. When states do choose to intervene, it is often costly, in the form of a long-term presence, as Israel took on in Lebanon from 1982 until 2000.

As Salehyan notes (2010), there is “no simple dichotomy between civil and international war … One of the most common strategies that states employ when confronting their international enemies is funding, harboring and sponsoring rebel organizations or ‘terrorist’ groups” (p. 494). He analyzes the costs and benefits of rebel support from a principal-agent theory perspective.

Salehyan identifies cost-saving as an important reason that states delegate their conflicts to rebel. There are not only material costs, but also political ones—there is often plausible deniability or a lack of impetus to bear the full costs of an attack if such an attack is carried out by proxy. The costs come with agency loss, or “slack,” whereby the agent’s actions may be inconsistent with the principal’s wishes.

In order to increase control over the agent, the principal may opt to find coethnics, or gather information on the rebels ahead of funding and training, as Ché Guevara famously did with Congo rebels. They can also monitor the agent once operations begin, and impose sanctions, such as threat of abandonment. Consistent with principal-agent theory, Salehyan identifies “fire alarm” mechanisms, such as NGO reports and civilian protests, as a means of understanding when agency slack is taking place.

Following are three models of crossborder mobilization, which aim to explain the mechanisms through which coethnic mobilization may take place.
MODELS OF CROSSBORDER MOBILIZATION

When discussing ethnic conflict, it is important not to overstate the number of people involved in the violence. Communities are not monolithic, and political activity is an exercise in critical mass, not mass involvement. It only takes a relatively small number of actors to trigger political activity, and even war,\(^{14}\) so any discussion of mobilization campaigns should be framed in terms of key actors with access to resources, and not necessarily the manipulation of mass public opinion within an ethnic group.

Specifically, we are concerned here with the international aspects of ethnic mobilization—how elites in one state can move resources and to varying degrees direct, coordinate or facilitate political activities among allies in other states. I propose three models to describe the basic processes at play in crossborder ethnic mobilization. These are (1) the Stoking Model, (2) the Self-Perpetuating Model, and (3) the Boomerang Model. Each presents unique challenges for states, and each can generate varying types and degrees of political action.

**Model 1: The Stoking Model**

In an environment of international competition, states benefit from allies. Coethnics residing across state lines can therefore be viewed as natural and lasting partners. As such, a group or state may benefit from supporting the mobilization efforts of coethnics in neighboring states. This not only helps a state project its power beyond its borders and increase its security, but it provides some level of insurance against the loss of power of

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\(^{14}\) See for example Sambanis and Shayo (2013). They show that “small groups of radicals can pull moderates into the fray if these groups are not well integrated and have sufficient resources” (319).
those natural allies in the event that a civil conflict emerges and threatens the coethnics’ standings. This process of arming and otherwise supporting fellow members of an ethnic group across state lines can itself be a trigger for civil conflict.

An example of the Stoking Model is Rwandan and Ugandan support for coethnic Tutsis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the late 1990s. Starting in 1997, Hutus and other ethnic groups under Laurent Kabila began a systematic attack on Tutsis, who had previously supported the uprising that brought Kabila to power. Mirroring the work of Tutsi-ruled Rwanda and Uganda, Hutu-ruled Burundi sent Hutu fighters in an attempt to mobilize coethnics in neighboring Congo (Byman 2001).

Figure 1 shows a theoretical grouping of two ethnic or sectarian groups spanning three states. *State A* is the potential host of an ethnic conflict, with *Neighbor a* directly to its west and *Neighbor b* to the east. Assuming artificial borders, *Ethnic Groups 1* and *2* would be divided into two states each: Ethnic Group 1 would span parts of both State A and Neighbor a, and Ethnic Group 2 would inhabit sections of State A and Neighbor b.

**Figure 1: The Stoking Model**

- State A’s borders
- Neighbor state headquarters
- Direction of political mobilization
In terms of politics, we assume that Ethnic Group 1 is dominant in Neighbor a, and Ethnic Group b is dominant in Neighbor b. Further, we can assume that Neighbors a and b are locked in regional competition, with State A acting as a geographic buffer between them. Assuming no significant political or economic impediments (which will be covered later), we can assume that Ethnic Groups 1 and 2 would seek to prop up their respective coethnics living in State A. First, each side would be aware that it would gain from “flipping” State A into a friendly state, and having a state ruled by coethnics may be one way to achieve this. Second, and most important, is the defensive calculus: If Neighbor a does not preemptively support coethnics in State A, what is to keep Neighbor b from doing exactly that and making Neighbor a weaker in the process? The inability to arm and mobilize coethnics could leave an ally vulnerable to a better organized ethnic group rival in the event of a civil war.

We can better understand the incentives at play by recalling the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma, a theoretical scenario that social scientists use to depict a collective action problem—a situation in which cooperative behavior is difficult to achieve because of a perverse set of incentives. In this exercise, we imagine two prisoners caught in a crime (say, a break-in), each facing an interrogator separately. The interrogator asks Prisoner A what she would prefer to do: confess and rat on her partner, or stay silent. Because Prisoner A had previously agreed with Prisoner B that there would be no ratting, if she were to rat it would be considered “defecting.” If she were to stay silent it would mean “cooperating” (with her partner that is, not with authorities).

Here is where the perverse incentives come in. The interrogator tells Prisoner A that if she rats on her partner, she will get a light sentence of three years, but her partner
will get 15 years in jail. If her partner rats on her, the opposite will happen: Prisoner B will get a light sentence, but she will get 15 years. If they rat on each other, it also means they helped authorities, so both sentences will be moderate—say, six years in prison. Prisoner A knows that if they both stay quiet the cops won’t have much on them except for a parole violation—they’ll each get off with one year at most.

Ideally, both Prisoner A and Prisoner B would stay quiet. That would lead to the best possible outcome. But this requires that both prisoners have total trust that the other won’t rat on them. Because if Prisoner A stays quiet (that is, if she “cooperates” with her partner) but her partner “defects” (he rats on her), then Prisoner A will spend 15 years in prison. Prisoner A knows that the worst that can happen if she stays quiet (15 years in prison) is much less desirable than the worst possible outcome she would get if she rats (six years). As such, Prisoner A may decide to rat—to defect from her previous agreement with Prisoner B.

Such an imagined outcome is both perfectly rational and disturbing. If we can apply it to international relations, we can see how under similar circumstances, whereby two states do not trust each other to cooperate, aggressive action may ensue. In the case of Neighbors a and b, both would ideally want to save the cost of helping insurgents in adjacent State A, but both would fear that by ceding the initiative the other would exploit the opening and leave them worse off than if they had initiated a political mobilization campaign. But what exacerbates the Stoking Model is that, unlike in the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma, neither Neighbor a nor Neighbor b would lose that much in stoking tensions in State A. As such, “defecting” would be an even more attractive strategy than it would be in a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma.
This is not to say stoking tensions is without danger. The mere act of intervention could invite conflicts with third-party actors concerned with either neighbor’s behavior. Worse yet, arming rebels could itself trigger a civil war, which in turn could lead to refugee flows from State A into neighboring states. But civil war also presents an opportunity to change the political balance in favor of either Neighbor a or b. As such, even a costly civil war could invite critical, longterm political gains for either neighbor.

It is worth noting that this model does not assume secession is the ultimate goal of the ethnic mobilization. As David C. Rapoport (1994) has shown ethnic conflicts that lead to secession tend to put off neighboring countries, who will place a bigger premium on maintaining current borders over pursuing other goals. The simple reason is that splitting borders can destabilize entire region, and can bring about unintended consequences, along with fears that rising secessionist feelings could spread to the homeland. Chances are that both Neighbors a and b have their own restive minority populations, and as such they wish to keep secessionism a taboo option. Further, they gain from State A being unified and controlled by a friendly ethnic group. This would present a gain in territory for either neighbor. The secession alternative merely redistributes power to both sides, and thus theoretically balances any gains that either side would have: Neighbor a would gain part of State A, but so would Neighbor b.

Examples of the Stoking Model of crossborder mobilization include Iran’s arming and mobilizing of Iraqi and Lebanese Shi‘i political actors. In Lebanon the shah helped organize the underclass Shi‘i south in the 1970s, and supported Kurdish and Shi‘i resistance groups aiming their fire at neighboring Iraq. With the revolution of 1978-79, Iran only stepped up its involvement. In the early 1980s Iran created Hezbollah in
Lebanon, and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), both of which rose to greater prominence after the millennium, and both applied sectarian-focused violence with relative success to achieve their respective aims.

Model 2: The Self-Perpetuating Model

Most situations of crossborder mobilization involve less overt forms of intervention. A proverbial seed of support might be planted, after which point an ethnic-based group may turn into a bona fide political mobilizer. Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2007) has aptly noted that one would not expect foreign ethnic intervention to always be overt, since attracting attention as an insurgent-supporting state is usually unhelpful. As such, direct intervention in conflicts in other states, especially on the side of the rebels, constitutes a serious violation of that state’s sovereignty and often entails significant costs to the intervening state. States often intervene in more indirect ways in disputes in other states, for example through covert support to one of the parties, not interfering in arms transactions, or permitting rebels to operate on their territory. (296)

This discreet approach is illustrated in Figure 2, wherein resources are sent into the proxy theater, without directing operations or even providing safe haven for coethnics. Examples of this kind of crossborder mobilization include Saudi Arabia’s passive approach to stemming the flow of suicide bombing recruits during the Iraqi civil war, as well as its longstanding support for Salafi Sunni fighters in Northern Lebanon and Syria.

Once the cycle of ethnosectarian competition is set, we would expect a self-perpetuating cycle of mobilization within the proxy state itself; that is, without the mobilization of an outside actor. But, as illustrated in Figure 2, this internal mobilization
would also benefit from financial and material sources from coethnics outside the immediate borders of the civil war-prone state.

**Figure 2: The Self-Perpetuating Model**

These two models would negate James Fearon and David Latin’s (2003) assumption that *only* other civil war-prone neighbors, and not stable regimes, are likely to provide support for a local insurgency—something that defies common expectations about the manner in which strong states (“patrons”) and subservient ones (“clients”) behave.

**Model 3: The Boomerang Model**

The expected role division between stable patrons and unstable clients notwithstanding, we also observe that the cyclical and escalating nature of ethnic strife could come back to haunt a patron state. In the aftermath of the Pashtun Taliban insurgency in the border
regions straddling Afghanistan and Pakistan, we may call this curious phenomenon the Boomerang Model, which is illustrated in Figure 3. In the case of the Boomerang Model, the patron entity in Neighbor a would not be able to limit the scope of the coethnic insurgency in State A, and would therefore suffer a backlash of emboldened coethnics who seek to enact a regime change in Neighbor a.

*Figure 3: The Boomerang Model*

Pakistan’s creation of the Taliban in 1994 and its subsequent battles with the version of the movement aiming to topple the Pakistani government itself, presents a study in unintended consequences. Part of the problem for Pakistan has been that the formation of the Taliban movement presented a logical opportunity to help stabilize Afghanistan in its civil war, which raged not long after the Soviet Union’s withdrawal in 1989. At the same time, mobilizing an ethnic Pashtun movement with fundamentalist streaks could serve as a pressure release valve for Pakistan’s domestic separatist
sentiment. At the same time, ensuring a friendly Afghan regime would allow Pakistan to focus its military on the southern border with India. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the military thus helped arm and in some cases fought alongside Taliban fighters, who captured much of Afghanistan and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 1996.

The day of reckoning for Pakistan came with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, against the United States, which had been orchestrated by al-Qaeda, then working from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. As the United States planned the invasion of Afghanistan as a response to the attacks, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage allegedly called officials in Pakistan on the phone and threatened to bomb them unless Pakistan helped in the fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. “[Be] prepared to go back to the Stone Age,” Armitage is to have said (BBC 2006).

With the help of Pakistani supply routes and intelligence, the United States was able to wrest control from the Taliban, many of whose fighters fled across the border into Pakistan. It is early in the millennium when the groups comprising the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban) were formed in order to establish fundamentalist religious rule over the tribal regions of northern Pakistan. They have gone on to engage in assassination campaigns, school bombings, and other acts of violence against Pakistani civilians and the state, and in 2009 captured Buner District, fewer than 200 km from the capital Islamabad (Time 2009). Although the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban remain separate groups, they share a common set of roots: the creation and honing of the Taliban movement by the government of Pakistan.
The boomerang effect need not be the result of state action. It may work as it did when the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) group crossed over from Syria into Iraq in 2014. The Islamic State began as The Base in the Land of the Two Rivers, or al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (often referred to as al-Qaeda in Iraq—AQI). AQI was led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born jihadist who was rebuffed by an intermediary of Osama bin Laden, then in Pakistan, for targeting Shi’ites and sowing discord in Iraq during the civil war that followed the US invasion in 2003 (Combatting Terrorism Center, n.d.).

After the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, and years after Zarqawi’s death in 2006, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi moved the group’s headquarters to Syria. Al-Baghdadi (a nom de guerre of Ibrahim ibn Awwad) built up the organization by enlisting the support of Iraqis with whom he had been imprisoned during the Iraqi conflict. Because the government of Syria, led by Bashar al-Assad, was focusing on defeating Western-backed rebels rather than the likes of al-Baghdadi, the organization (renamed as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham [the Levant], or ISIS), was able to grow—via extortion, ransom money, and through oil proceeds from wells it captured (Chulov 2014). In 2014 al-Baghdadi returned to western Iraqi triumphantly and proclaimed himself Caliph of the Islamic State. This action not only underscores the main argument about the manner in which crossborder mobilization takes place in artificial border states, but it offers a useful illustration of the Boomerang Model: An insurgent group that was created in Iraq moved to Syria, and ultimately returned to Iraq.
THE STOKING MODEL: IRAQ

Iraq is a useful case to illustrate the Stoking Model of crossborder ethnic mobilization. Great Britain fashioned the borders of Iraq in 1920, combining the Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. When created, Iraq was already toxic with ethnic and sectarian divisions: There was a sizable Kurdish population in the north, an elite, Ottoman-favored Sunni Arab bureaucracy in Baghdad, and a poor, detached Shi‘i Arab population in the south. Iraq had acted as a battlefield for countless sectarian struggles in Middle Eastern history, from wars between Zoroastrian Iran and Christian Rome in late antiquity, to those between Ottoman Sunni Turks and Shi‘i Safavid Iranians in the early modern era. Even during Baghdad’s cultural peak in the ninth century, during the “Golden Age of Islam,” religious street battles were common occurrences in the city (e.g., Lapidus 1975; Kennedy 1981).

After changing hands four times in one century, the Ottomans finally took Baghdad from Iran in 1638. It is then that the Turkish Empire established a Sunni-dominant colonial structure that the British would inherit after World War I. As demographics shifted in favor of the Shi‘a in the nineteenth century (Nakash 2003), the region of Mesopotamia became a minority-ruled enclave comprising an educated, bureaucratic Sunni elite, and a majority and largely religious and withdrawn Shi‘i population which had strong cultural and religious ties to Shi‘i Iran.

The constant narrative of sectarian strife was not unknown to the British, and for one, civil commissioner Arnold Wilson warned as early as 1919 that ceding too much power to the Iraqis would perpetuate Sunni domination. Wilson wrote that granting autonomy to Iraq “would involve the concentration of power in the hands of a few
persons whose ambitions and methods would rapidly bring about the collapse of organized government. The results would be the antithesis of democratic government” (Sluglett 2007, 46). Nevertheless, the British continued with plans to establish Iraq as a nation led by the minority Sunni elites, who at the time were most capable of running the state.

Iran’s involvement in Iraq was mostly religious and cultural in nature, the main reason being Iran’s predominantly Shi‘i population. The Iranian state therefore made it a priority to help maintain the religious scholarly interaction between Shi‘i communities in both countries, as well as mutual access to important pilgrimage sites, which included the holy Shi‘i cities of Najaf, Karbala, and Samarra in Iraq, and Mashhad and Qom in Iran. To this day, such is the interaction of religious scholarship that Iraqi clerics routinely work in Iran, and Iranian ones in Iraq, so that many of the seminal social movements of the last two countries have been marked by the influence of clerics based in adjacent countries. As it were, religious seminaries were already dominated by non-Iraqis, so that up to “75 percent of the population of Karbala was Iranian” around the time that Iraq became a modern state” (Nasr 2006, 108).

During the Tobacco Protest (1891-92), arguably the first major Iranian uprising of the modern era, Ayatollah Mirza Hasan Shirazi was reported (falsely, it turns out) to have sent a religious edict (fatwa) calling for the boycott of tobacco in Iran while housed in the city of Karbala (Moaddel 1994). In 1925, Iran’s commander-in-chief and de facto leader, Reza Khan, took on “Pahlavi” as the name for his future dynasty while on pilgrimage in Najaf (Keddie 2003, 86). And when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran at the climax of the Iranian Revolution in February 1979, it was the writings of Iraqi cleric
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, popularized via translation in the streets of Tehran, which arguably helped influence the more politically representative aspects found in the new Iranian constitution (Malla 1993, 69-73).

By the time the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, Iranian influence on Iraqi Shi‘i militant and political groups had already been a longstanding reality. Iran had supported Iraq’s Shi‘i Da‘wa Party during the reign of Saddam Hussein, hosting some of its leaders in exile; and the SCIRI had fought alongside Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). Such support only increased after democratization. The Da‘wa Party, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, was part of an electoral block that received up to $11 million per month from Iran in the run-up to the January 2005 parliamentary elections (Ignatius 2007). In postwar Iraq, Iran provided around $20 million per year to its military wing (Felter and Fishman 2008, 21). During the sectarian civil war, which peaked in 2006-07, SCIRI, the Iraqi Hezbollah, the Mehdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr, and anti-American co-called “Special Groups,” were all Iranian-funded and trained Shi‘i organizations responsible for much of the anti-Sunni sectarian violence during the war.

In Baghdad, the Mehdi Army alone was responsible for around thirty Sunni deaths per day during the height of the sectarian cleansing campaigns. One fighter described the targeting thus: “It was very simple, we were ethnically cleansing. Anyone Sunni was guilty. If you were called Omar, Uthman, Zayed, Sufian or something like that, then you would be killed. These are Sunni names and they were killed according to identity” (Cordesman 2007, 104). Arabic-speaking veterans of the Iranian-created and funded Lebanese Hezbollah were also active in the training of such groups prior to the U.S. troop surge (Jones 2007).
On the Sunni side, the Iraq War coincided with incendiary rhetoric in the Arab world aimed at the Shi‘a and Iran. As early as 2004 Jordan’s King Abdullah II had warned of an Iranian-led “Shi’a Crescent” rising in the Middle East,\(^\text{15}\) and Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak made a xenophobic but widely embraced remark on the Al-Arabiyya news station that, “Most of the Shias are loyal to Iran, and not to the countries they are living in” (\textit{Iraqi News} 2006). Importantly, the sectarian war in Iraq was largely fought between Iraqi Shi‘is and non-Iraqi Sunnis. While there was a sizable, homegrown Sunni insurgency in Iraq since 2003, this was largely a secular movement comprising leftover elements of Saddam Hussein’s Ba‘ath Party, and it aimed most of its firepower against U.S. forces, rather than Shi‘i civilians. On the other hand, during the height of the sectarian violence foreigners engaged in around 80 percent of suicide bombing attacks, which were largely against Shi‘i soft targets: markets, places of worship and police recruiting stations (Jones 2007, 28). According to the Brooking Institution’s Iraq Index, over 61 percent of civilian bombing fatalities between January 2007 and January 2008 were a result of anti-Shi‘a attacks; only 13 percent of such casualties resulted from anti-Sunni bombings (O’Hanlon and Livingston 2009\(^\text{16}\)). In 2005, nearly one in four prisoners in the now-infamous Abu Ghraib prison complex were foreigners (Pirnie and O’Connell 2008, 29). At the same time, non-suicide recruits and ordinary footsoldiers were commonly local, making extremist Sunni movements in Iraq an ideal representation of foreign interests mobilizing coethnics within a proxy battleground.

\(^{15}\) The Shi’a Crescent comment was from an interview with Chris Matthews on MSNBC on December 12, 2004.

\(^{16}\) Calculated using the top four rows of the table on page 9.
Consistently, the first and second countries accounting for fighters in Iraq were neighboring Saudi Arabia and non-adjacent Libya, with neighboring Syria providing the main physical conduit for entrance into Iraq. A U.S. Military Academy study interprets the influx of foreign fighters from Saudi Arabia this way:

As long as the Saudi government views foreign Sunni militants in Iraq as a bulwark against the dominance of Iranian-influenced Iraqi leaders, it is unlikely to invest heavily in stemming the flow of Saudis traveling to fight in Iraq. Limiting the real and perceived influence of Iran in Iraq’s domestic political and security situation may therefore be a necessary first step to gaining greater cooperation from Saudi authorities. A similar logic applies to gaining Syrian cooperation for interdicting or co-opting smuggling networks. (Felter and Fishman 2008)

The Iraq case is a quintessential, if unusually obvious candidate for the Stoking Model for two reasons: First, Iraq has a history of outside actors mobilizing its ethnic and sectarian fault lines. This history spans millennia, and it ranges from the first Islamic civil war (656-661), which brought factions of Arabia into the country to fight, to the Abbasid Revolution (747-750), which brought Arabo-Iranian militants to fight in Iraq; to the Iranian-backed Kurdish insurrections of 1974-75, along with countless other conflicts dating back to late antiquity. As has been established by the literature (e.g., McCauley and Posner 2007; Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010), ethnic mobilization may set up a state for further cycles of antagonism, so it is no surprise that the region of Iraq has replayed the role of ethnosectarian battleground countless times in its history. Second, outside actors created Iraq’s national boundaries without remedy for the built-in internal mechanisms of ethnoreligious strife—the British Foreign Office was aware of these social cleavages, but the United Kingdom created the modern borders of Iraq all the same.
Because we are dealing with crossborder sources of ethnic civil conflict, we expect any states in the immediate surroundings to be cognizant of the international implications of domestic conflict in the target states. In the case of Iraq, Sunni and Shi’i states were well aware, and acted upon, the concern that a competing sect would gain a leg up on the country.

THE SELF-PERPETUATING MODEL: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

History of Brutality

Among those explanations for continued conflict in the postcolonial world are those that make the claim that the brutal history of colonialism itself put these societies on a path dependent course of further brutality. That is, that we should look, not at artificial borders or even GDP per capita to understand violence, but instead we should look to the manner in which violence, and the superior-inferior model was institutionalized in the colonies. Among those who argued this was Jean-Paul Sartre (1983), who explained how the oppressed tend to become the oppressors.

If there is a perfect former colony to test these alternative theories of conflict, it is the Democratic Republic of Congo (DCR), whose population experienced some of the most horrific atrocities at the hands of European colonialists. The modern history of the area now known as the DCR began, not as a colony, but as the private plantation of Belgium’s King Leopold II. The current borders of the DRC correspond to those of the Congo Free State, which King Leopold officially founded in 1885 during the Conference of Berlin, which established Africa’s colonial borders.
Initially, King Leopold had established the Free Congo State to serve as a center for humanitarian development, to be called the African International Association (AIA) (Yale, n.d.). Instead, Leopold took personal control of the state, using it as a private commercial enterprise created for the exploitation of the Congo’s vast natural resources, chiefly rubber, which the state began to export by 1890.

Between 1891 and 1892, Leopold established decrees to make serfs out of the population, and trade was heavily taxed and regulated to maximize profit for the State’s coffers. Rubber trapping was the source of much of the atrocities, which later turned into a worldwide scandal. The families of rubber trappers would be held as hostage, lest the men did not come back with their quota. Rebels who hid in the jungle would be shot, their limbs cut off as proof. Because of strict inventory control, if soldiers wasted bullets on hunting, target practice or if they missed their mark, they would routinely find random individuals to cut their limbs. The death toll of the Free Congo State, now considered a genocide, numbered between ten and thirteen million (Yale, n.d.).

Even after the Free State was abolished in exchange for a more typical colonial experience in 1908, local agents were given excessive power and made to dominate those subservient to them, not unlike the British did in the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia—empowering tribal leaders and inflating their authority from that of a traditional leader to an undisputed tyrant.

After independence and the Belgian-supported killing of democratically elected Patrice Lumumba, President Mobutu took power. In his long reign (1965 - 1997) Mobutu moved to homogenize the Congo’s identity under a more “authentic” African image. He renamed the country Zaire, and eliminated Western symbols, including the necktie and
common Western names. This was in large part a process of homogenizing the diverse population under a singular anticolonial ideology.

The conflicts that have plagued the Congo since independence—vast in scope and number—could be attributed to a variety of causal mechanisms. Satre’s path dependency argument is certainly persuasive in the excessive violence of the Mobutu regime. The regime’s kleptocratic practices, economic mismanagement, and the country’s large population, are all consistent with material explanations of ethnic civil conflict. Its resources are also an important part of the story, and can help to explain many of the incentives for conflict, as well as the sources of financing for militant operations.

And yet, the various facilitating factors of conflict do not account for the central role that crossborder mobilization has played in the DCR’s many civil conflicts. What can perhaps best explain the consistency of war is the self-perpetuating model of crossborder ethnic mobilization.

**Crossborder Mobilization in the Congo**

The history of crossborder mobilization and intervention in the Congo is substantial. One such conflict was the Shaba unrest in 1977, which began as a result of Angola based ethnic Ketanga fighters infiltrating into the Congo. For its part, Morocco sent troops to aid the government. In 1983, the government sent 2,000 troops to Chad to help the government against one in a series of Libyan interventions in the country. In 1990, France and Belgium sent troops to the capital of Kinshasa to curb ethnic unrest.

The most destructive of the crossborder conflicts was the 1998 Second Congo War, called the Great African War. It began after unrest brought Laurent Kabila to power
in Kinshasa, and in the aftermath the new government began a crackdown on Tutsi rebels with the aid of Burundi-based Hutus. In many ways, this anti-Tutsi campaign was a continuation of the atrocities that had occurred during the Rwandan Genocide of 1994.

By 1998, the war escalated into a coalition between DCR, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, pitted against Uganda and Rwanda-backed Tutsi rebels, as well as troops from these countries that established themselves into the restive eastern Congo until the United Nations replaced them in 2003. As of this writing, foreign-backed Hutu and Tutsi rebel groups operate in the eastern Congo, free of state control.

Table 1. Armed Groups in Eastern Congo, Present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>ETHNIC IDENTITY</th>
<th>FOREIGN BACKERS</th>
<th>GOALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M23</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>Rwanda; Uganda</td>
<td>To expand Tutsi/Rwandan influence in the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda</td>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Hutu Diaspora</td>
<td>To dislodge post-genocide Tutsi government in Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Congress for the Defense of the People</td>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>To protect Tutsis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
<td>Ugandan Muslim</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Islamic resistance in Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mai Mai Militias</td>
<td>various</td>
<td>N/A (indigenous)</td>
<td>To displace foreign (Hutu and Tutsi) elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
<td>Ugandan Christian</td>
<td>Ugandan Diaspora</td>
<td>Cult-like behavior and war crimes. Goals unclear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Raise Hope for Congo, Enough Campaign. Online: http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/armed-groups

Table 1 illustrates the diverse foreign interests present in the Congo. Actors from Rwanda and Uganda remain the most active. Because of the nature of artificial borders, however, it is less useful to think of domestic and foreign actors, and instead recognize that ethnic Hutus and Tutsis represent a local population, regardless of the exact placement of colonial area borders.
The legacies of colonialism and artificial borders continue to plague the Congo and neighboring countries, particularly in the east. Among those is the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR, by French acronym), which comprise Hutu elements that were formerly leading Rwanda, and are now seeking to overthrow the post-genocide Tutsi leadership. In this manner the FDLR are a type of expression of the Boomerang Model: a type of mobilization that occurs when a state foments militant activity that ultimately returns to haunt it.

THE BOOMERANG MODEL: SOUTH ASIA

Pakistan has been affected by a dual crisis of artificial borders, with the northern Durand Line and the Southern Radclyffe Line providing mutually reinforcing avenues for ethnic-based competition and violence conflict. Moreover, the lines have left Pakistan in a destabilizing cycle of mobilization and countermobilization: On the one hand, successive Pakistani governments has made use of nonstate actors in pursuit of geopolitical motives, and on the other hand, it is exactly these types of nonstate actors that have come to represent the greatest threat to the state in recent decades.

In present times, Pakistani irredentism has manifested itself in the funding of several armed political organizations, among them Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (Army of the Pure, LeT), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), Harakat ul-Mujahideen (Holy Warrior Movement, HUM), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Jaysh-i-Muhammad (Muhammad’s Army, JEM), and the Haqqani Network.

LeT is a Kashmir-focused militant group that formed in the 1990s under Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (Center for Ministry and Guidance). Founded in the 1980s with the
goal of opposing the Afghani Soviets, Markaz is an Islamic fundamentalist missionary organization with its base in Pakistan. The LeT has been involved in a large number of attacks in India, in the Jammu and Kashmir state. The LeT is thought to be a large group with several thousand members, most of which are probably Pakistani nationals who are looking for a united Kashmir (NCTC). According to Katzman, LeT has also been increasingly present in Afghanistan and could rival Al Qaeda in the future (Katzman, 22). The number of members in the LeT is not known, but it is known that the group has members in Azad Kashmir and Punjab in India, several Pakistani provinces, as well as Jammu, Kashmir, and Doda. Most of the LeT members are Pakistani, Afghani, and veterans of the Afghan wars (U.S. Department of State).

In the early 2000s, the IJU formed from a split with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The IJU is a Sunni extremist group currently based in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, like many of the other active Pakistani groups. Uzbekistan appears to be one of the main focuses of the IJU, with the goal being to topple the government, but the group is also active in Afghanistan. The group works with the Haqqani Network, a Taliban-affiliated group in the area (U.S. Department of State).

This HUM’s goal is the annexation of Indian Kashmir, as well as the expulsion of Afghani Coalition Forces. The long-time leader of the group, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, had to step down after facing pressure from the Pakistani government in 2005. Dr. Badr Munir was his replacement, and became the new head of the HUM. Most of the support for the HUM is from Pakistanis and Kahmiris, but the group also has some support from Afghans (U.S. Department of State).
The IMU formed in the 1990s and is also currently based in the Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The IMU’s goal is to overthrow the Uzbekistani government. They want to create an Islamist caliphate, in the Central Asian area spanning from the Caspian Sea to Xinjiang. However, in Northern Afghanistan, this group has become more prominent, becoming more involved in the Taliban-led insurgency (NCTC). The group’s support is rather small, with only 200 to 300 members (U.S. Department of State).

The JEM was founded in the early 2000s, and is based mainly in Pakistan. The group’s main goal is to bring together Kashmir and Pakistan. In Afghanistan, the JEM also wants to push out foreign troops. The Pakistani government has banned the JEM’s activities, but the group continues to openly operate out of Pakistan. JEM has quite a large number of supporters, in Pakistan, Kashmir, Doda, as well as the Kashmir Valley. In addition, they have supporters who are former members of Harakat ul-Mujahideen. These JEM supporters are armed, and use a variety of weapons like machine guns, assault rifles, and mortars among others (NCTC).

The Haqqani Network was formed in the 1970s by Jalaluddin Haqqani, near the time of the Afghanistan invasion by the former Soviet Union. In the mid-1980s, the leader of the Haqqani Network formed a relationship with Osama bin Laden. Later, in 1995, the Haqqani Network joined the Taliban and is now considered part of the umbrella organization, which the Pakistani Interservices Intelligence Agency (ISI) created during the Afghan civil war. After the fall of the Afghanistan Taliban, the Haqqani Network moved to Pakistan, where it began to participate in local insurgencies in the restive Waziristan and Northwest Frontier Provinces.
While the group is thought to have only a few hundred members, they are still quite powerful in the numbers that can call to action when necessary. The strength that the Haqqani Network possesses stems mostly from its affiliation with other groups, such as the Afghan Taliban, al-Qa’ida, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and Jaish-i-Mohammad (U.S. Department of State).

It is the Tehrik-i-Taliban that is most emblematic of the boomerang effect that the Taliban umbrella brought upon the Pakistani state. While the Taliban had been formed by Pakistan’s ISI to take over Afghanistan during the civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the Taliban came to inspire homegrown movements in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), including North and South Waziristan. It is this region that had been a cause for concern ever since the Radcliffe line had been drawn, and the Pashtun homeland had been separated between two states.

What brought about the creation of an anti-Pakistani Taliban was the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Because al-Qaeda, as an Arab organization that was then housed in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, was responsible for the attacks, the administration of President George W. Bush went on to invade and transform Afghanistan in a manner that led to a large-scale tactical retreat by Taliban fighters and sympathizers, into Pakistan. Two developments occurred in the immediate aftermath: First, there was significant ideological cross-pollination between Afghan Taliban members and their Pakistani supporters in the FATA. Second, Pakistan itself underwent a period of intense radicalization and growing anti-American sentiment, largely as a response of heavy-handed tactics by the United
States inside Pakistan proper in an effort to route al-Qaeda cells and thwart further attacks against the United States.

CROSSBORDER MOBILIZATION IN ISLAND STATES

According to the strict coding laid out in Chapter 2, states that comprise entire islands that are not shared with other states do not have “artificial borders.” This limitation was imposed with the purpose of maintaining uniformity and limiting coding bias. However, there is no doubt that a handful of island states do in fact retain the characteristics of colonial-imposed forced cohabitation. Among these are countries like Bahrain, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. I conclude this chapter with a brief exploration of the manner in which ethnic conflict has surfaced in these three states in a manner consistent with the forced cohabitation theory, using Bahrain as the case study.

Bahrain

Despite its coherent island make-up, and despite the absence of an official European-imposed colonial history, Bahrain has suffered from some of the pitfalls of postcolonial forced cohabitation. These pitfalls have manifested in two important ways: First, Bahrain has had to bear the burden of imposing foreign influence, which over the last two centuries has held up and empowered one group at the expense of another—namely the Sunnis over the Shi’is. This is similar to the experience of Tutsis being empowered at the expense of Hutus under Belgian rule in central Africa. And second, Bahrain shares its main sectarian identities with neighboring states, most importantly Iran and Saudi Arabia (and less importantly, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates).
Baharain is a Sunni-ruled but Shi‘i majority island state. Over the last few decades it has come increasingly under the influence of Saudi Arabia, in large part because of the latter’s desire to keep Bahrain away from neighboring Iran. Thus Bahrain, with a diminutive population of 700,000 citizens, and with only limited natural resource wealth, has become an unlikely battleground of Saudi-Iranian competition in the Persian Gulf.

With a population of over 70 million, about 90 percent of whom are self-identified Shi‘i Muslims, Iran is a natural leader of Shi‘i political and social dispossession throughout the region. This leadership role predates the current Islamic Republic, which immediately after the 1979 revolution was vocal in its grand strategy of expanding its influence by “exporting the revolution” to neighboring countries. With over three decades of isolation behind it, Iran has diminished its prospects to avoiding encirclement, but its desire to influence neighboring states through soft power and material assistance has been remarkable. While Iran has provided support for Sunni movements such as HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the lower barrier to entry for Iranian influence has been in Lebanon, where it created, armed and continuously supported Hezbollah, as well as among political Shi‘i actors in Iraq. Thus, in a region wary of Iranian influence, and naturally inclined toward a majority Sunni cultural disposition, Shi‘is have often been unfairly painted as foreign agents of Iran.

For their part, the Saudis have made themselves into de facto leaders of an uncompromising brand of Sunni Islam that has often placed Shi‘is at the very bottom of their religious ladder. Thus, the concept of Bahrain, a nation boasting a 70 percent Shi‘i majority, becoming independent of Saudi-Sunni influence, and coming into the arms of a
perceived Iranian sphere, is enough to rattle nerves in Riyadh and inspire a robust embrace of the Sunni minority in the archipelago state.

Bahrain came under the domain of the House of Khalifa in 1783, when the family captured it from a Sunni Persian state dominant in parts of the Persian Gulf at the time. Since then, both Iran and the House of Saud, established in the Arabian Peninsula since 1744, have made territorial claims over Bahrain. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the Saudis succeeded in subverting the Khalifa’s independence and establishing a semi-colonial relationship with the Sunni ruling family. As Nakash (2006) recounts, this led “the British political resident in the Persian Gulf to observe in 1927 that Iran did not pose a significant threat to Bahrain, and that the real danger lay in the growth of Saudi power” (55).

In anticipation to Britain’s formal withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971, two important developments occurred. First, Iran dropped its official claims to Bahrain in 1970. And second, in response to Saudi requests, the British granted both Bahrain and Qatar independent status, rather than have them join with the Trucial States (the future United Arab Emirates) to create a nine-emirate confederation. These two developments helped ensure Bahrain would remain firmly within the Saudi sphere of influence.

Since its inception, the ruling family of Bahrain has found it difficult to reconcile its two sectarian identities, often leading to the kind of divisions that were witnessed in Iraq prior to the US invasion. Just as the legacies of Ottoman Sunni favoritism led to the path dependence of Sunni rule in Iraq, in Bahrain one’s sect has often been a socioeconomic marker. Shi’is traditionally occupied the dangerous, low-paying and exploitative jobs in the pearl diving trade. After the discovery of oil, many of these Shi’is
transitioned to manual labor with the U.S.-owned Bahrain Petroleum Company, which originally refused to grant workers a living wage or paid religious holidays. Because of the overlap between sect identity and socioeconomic standing, strikes that came as a result of unfair labor practices often took on sectarian overtones, with the ruling Sheikh of Bahrain blaming Shi‘is and Iranians as the “instigators” of a strike that overtook the oil industry in 1943 (Nakahs 2006, 61-2).

By way of a self-fulfilling prophecy, the disempowerment of Bahrain’s Shi‘i community provided an opening for Iranian and other foreign influence to mobilize coreligionists. This vacuum resulted in a coup attempt by the Shi‘i Islamic Front in 1981, which was supported by Iraqi and Iranian Shi‘is, including by a representative of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini in the country (for more on the reported links, see Alhasan 2011).

The next great upheaval came in 1994, when the government jailed three Shi‘i clerics following a mass petition that called for the restoration of the constitution—which had been suspended in 1975. Although the ensuing uprising was non-sectarian in character, the regime sought to drive a wedge between the communities by jailing Shi‘is almost exclusively (Nakash 2006, 67).

The state has been able to further institutionalize the Sunni-Shi‘i that were built into the Khalifa-led state. For one, Shi‘is cannot serve in the military, with relative newcomer migrants of Saudi origin granted full citizenship rights, while Shi‘is of Iranian origin are denied this honor after generations of living on the archipelago. This persistent exclusion of Shi‘is is part of a worldview that views Shi‘i empowerment as inherently favoring Iran, and therefore embraces Saudi Arabia’s anti-Shi‘i posture.
Saudi Arabia has solidified the Bahraini Sunni elite in several ways. First, it established the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 as a way to repel Iranian influence and create greater interdependence among the states of the Arabian Peninsula (excluding Yemen). Also in 1981, the connection between the two countries began to be physical as well as political, with the construction of the King Fahd Causeway linking the archipelago with Saudi Arabia.

Second, Saudi has provided Bahrain with an enviable profit sharing arrangement of the Abu Saffah oil field, which lies in Saudi waters and is operated by Saudi ARAMCO, but which prior to 2004 had all revenues go to Bahrain (currently the figure is 50 percent) (Mills 2012).

The biggest test in the Saudi-Bahraini relationship came with the Arab Spring protests of 2011. Inspired by revolutionary activity all over the Arab world, Bahrainis began to call for democratic change. The main slogan, “No Shiites, no Sunnis, only Bahrainis” (Coates Ulrichsen 2013), was emblematic of other broad-based, cross-sectarian protest movements that marked the early days of the Arab Spring. Yet the protests were initially concentrated in Shi’i villages outside the capital Manama, very much in line with the urban-rural division that marked the origins of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Syria.

During the Arab Spring activists accused Western and Arab media organizations of a news “blackout” of Bahrain (e.g., Hashem 2013). Despite the relative silence, up to 200,000 activists descended on Manama at the peak of the protests—an astounding one in every three Bahrainis (Coates Ulrichsen 2013). The authorities responded with a lethal

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17 One “viral” image from the protests featured a group of Christians linking hands to protect Muslims prostrating in prayer during the Tahrir Square protests in Cairo.
crackdown as well as massive layoffs for public and private employees. For their part, fellow GCC members Saudi Arabia and the UAE intervened with 1,000 and 800 units respectively. This presence of foreign elements to crack down on a local protest was symbolic of the geopolitical importance that Bahrain came to represent for its neighbors.

The question about the compatibility of Bahrain with the models of crossborder mobilization hinges partly on the extent to which Iran did or did not have a role in Shi‘i political activity over the years. While the answer is clearly affirmative in the 1981 coup, the 2011 uprisings are marked by a lack of evidence of Iranian meddling. In fact, an independent commission established by the government of Bahrain found no evidence of Iranian involvement in the protests (Bahrain News Agency 2011). Only rhetorical support, such as Iran’s Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati calling for action in support of Bahrain during Friday prayers, is evident (Nourian 2011). The explanation for this absence may have been a calculation by Iran not to make opposition to the revolution, whose success would clearly benefit Iranian regional interests, even more fierce than it already was.

Iranian involvement notwithstanding, the Saudi and GCC neighborly roles in the political development of Bahrain are essential and consistent with the theory of forced cohabitation. That is, one community has been politically supported by neighboring coreligionists seeking a particular political outcome in the internal divisions of the country.

CONCLUSION

The manner in which artificial borders affect mobilization of ethnic groups across borders is critical to our understanding of how forced cohabitation can generate patterns of
conflict. The preceding models and examples are by no means exhaustive, but they paint a picture of possible strategies by which coethnic, in-group solidarity may serve to move resources and people across state lines in a manner that can destabilize a target state. But as the Boomerang Model shows, engaging in crossborder mobilization can come back to weaken the instigator, as theories of principal-actor relationships tell us: Once mobilization takes place across state lines, control may be lost, and the consequences may fall outside of the principal’s control.

Although the preceding chapter dealt with empirical testing, which necessitated inherently limited definitions of artificial border states, there is something to be learned about the manner in which island states such as Bahrain and Sri Lanka mobilize people and resources across bodies of water. While not separated by artificial borders, forced cohabitation in these states does abound, and it is a forced cohabitation that is a result of colonial intrigue, much in the way that artificial borders generated throughout Africa and the Middle East.

The following two chapters will focus more intently on regional dynamics, with emphasis on the Middle East. The Middle East is important in several ways, not the least of which is the combined presence of several important and interrelated phenomena: artificial borders, forced cohabitation, vast reach for political entrepreneurs, and patterns of minority rule. Thus, the domestic and interstate conflicts of the Middle East provide a special context for our understanding of the manner in which artificial borders affect the political structures of regions.
4.

ARTIFICIAL BORDERS AND ETHNIC DISPERSION

*We are now on the border between the Land of al-Sham [the Syria/Levant] and the Land of the Two Rivers [Iraq]... We brought bulldozers to open the way for Muslims.... We don’t believe in the infidels’ Sykes-Picot Agreement.*

—Islamic State (IS) fighter during the destruction of barriers along the Iraq-Syria border, 2014 (Vice News, *The Islamic State*, 2014)

Because artificial borders can essentially “disperse” ethnic groups across two or more states, it is important to understand the manner in which such dispersion of ethnic groups can affect conflicts within a given artificial border state. This chapter seeks to answer a central question: Are states that share common ethnic groups with several (as opposed to few) neighbors more likely to engage in hostilities with their neighbors? As I show below, the answer to this question is affirmative: Interstate conflict is in fact more likely in regions that house multiple states with common ethnic groups. This is related to a concept I refer to as *ethnic dispersion*.

This chapter begins with a definitional and empirical basis for the ethnic dispersion concept, and is followed by an extensive case study of the Middle East region, starting with the formation of modern states in the first half of the twentieth century. The Middle East serves as useful study of the manner in which forced cohabitation generates a particularly confrontational set of interactions within a region that houses relatively few
ethnosectarian identities across a relatively large number of states. As I show, this kind of dispersion lowers the barrier to foreign agitation and leads to cycles of offensive and preemptive political and military interventions. Further, this chapter offers a practical a historical explanation of the hypothesis test results from Chapter 2: namely, that it is only in the Middle East region that religious diversity and the presence of crossborder ethnicities are positively correlated with foreign military intervention. As I show in the extended case study, the results of the statistical analysis closely mirror the historical narrative of the Middle East region: a region steeped in the politics of religion and political interconnectivity across state lines.

ETHNOPOLITICAL DISPERSION

For the purposes of this dissertation I define ethnopolitical dispersion as the physical-geographic and geopolitical reach of salient ethnic identities over a region. In crudest terms, we can calculate ethnopolitical dispersion by taking the number of salient ethnic identities in a region and dividing them by the number of countries in that region to obtain an *ethnic dispersion score*. The reason that dispersion, in this context, deals with state boundaries rather than geographic area alone is because we are concerned with the crossborder mobilization capabilities of organized groups that base themselves on ethnic kin, rather than the sheer number of members of an identity group.

It is also important to focus on the question of saliency. If we consider ethnolinguistic identity to be unit of analysis in Subsaharan Africa, we are left with hundreds of ethnic identities of arguable political saliency. We could, instead, focus on sectarian identity as the ethnic marker, in which case we could arguably be left with only
two groups: Muslim (broadly speaking) and Christian. The test for whether to use ethnolinguistic or sectarian identity as the ethnic marker is therefore a critical, albeit necessarily crude, exercise. Here I propose the following: In the event of a civil war, which of the two ethnic markers—linguistic or sectarian—would be more likely to lead to alignment? While in different countries and at different times the answer would vary, regional knowledge allows us to make broad generalizations about what type of saliency to ascribe to which region. In the predominantly Arab Middle East, there is no doubt that, with the exception of the periphery of Kurdistan, sectarian identity would be most salient.

In Subaharan Africa, ethnic identity would play a significant role outside of the critical North-South (Muslim-Christian) junctures at and near the 10th Parallel North. That is, outside of Nigeria, Chad, the Central African Republic, and Sudan, the Muslim-Christian conflict would be less prevalent, and ethnic groups would matter most.

If we accept this premise, then Africa has very low ethnic dispersion scores, since each country contains several salient ethnic groups within it, and more important, each ethnic group covers only limited geographic space. Figure 1 shows a map of African ethnolinguistic groups by Steve Huffman (Ethnologue, 15th ed.). Two important observations can be made from the map. First, there are numerous ethnic groupings in Africa, particularly in the central part of the continent. Second, and most relevant to our present concerns, most ethnic groups in Africa cover a very limited area, and consequently, carry limited political reach.
In contrast to Africa, the Middle East/North Africa is dominated by the Arab ethnolinguistic group, with Berbers making up a sizable minority in North Africa, and Turkish, Kurdish, Iranian (of various ethnicities) and Hebrew-speaking peoples making up significant exceptions to the Arab rule. Cantori and Spiegel (1970) have described this in terms of an Arab center and a non-Arab periphery, and thus consider the region to have a great degree of “social cohesion” in comparison to others (p. 407).

A second effect of dispersion is on the general compatibility of the national statehood model over a region. While highly heterogenous states undermine national statehood by generating too many contestable lines of legitimacy, in a region with a large dispersion score (such as the Middle East/North Africa), the problem is one of sharing
legitimizing identities with neighbors. Following, I explore conflict in the Middle East/North Africa region through a dispersion score lens.

ETHNIC DISPERSION AND CONFLICT TYPES

I calculate a region’s ethnic dispersion score as the number of salient ethnic groups divided by the number of internationally recognized states. The critical question is whether scores area above or below the threshold of an ethnic dispersion score equal to 1. A score of 1, if only theoretically, pertains to the idealized notion of national-statehood and ethnic self-determination, whereby each “nation” fully and exclusively inhabits its own state within a region.

In Subsaharan Africa ethnolinguistic units are dispersed with a score of <1; that is, there are more ethnic groups than there are numbers of states. In the Middle East/North Africa, the dispersion score is greater than 1, with salient ethnic groups numbering fewer than the total number of countries. Even if we were to count the multiplicity of ethnic groups in the MENA region (rather than the number of sectarian identities), we would still be left with EDS > 1. This even if we counted, not only Arab, Iranian, and Kurdish ethnicities, but also Berber, Turkish/Azeri, Hebrew, Baluch, Turkomen, and Assyrian groups. There are still fewer transnational identities than there are states.\(^\text{18}\)

Ethnopolitical dispersion carries important implications with it. First, ethnopolitical dispersion affects how artificial borders map the conflict terrain. Assuming

\(^{18}\) While Iran has a multiplicity of ethnic groups, the study here is concerned with ethnic groups that carry relevance beyond the borders of a state. As such, most Iranian groupings would only carry relevance inside the borders of the state.
Ethnicity is a cleavage that can generate conflict, then civil wars should be more likely to occur in countries that have a small dispersion score. In countries with a large dispersion score, on the other hand, it is international disputes (i.e., not exclusive to war, but including campaigns of coethnic agitation) that reach across borders that should be most common.

In contrast to both regions with dispersion scores of either >1 or <1, the theoretical score of EDS = 1 should yield fewer conflicts overall, whether inter- or intrastate in nature. Civil wars would theoretically be more rare in this homogenized region, since there would not be the kind of unresolved ethnic diversity that may attract the civil conflict. Conflicts would be political in nature, and politics, by its nature, assumes surmountable obstacles to identity “conversion,” which can be achieved through persuasion campaigns. Interstate wars would still exist, but these would be triggered by essential reasons of state, such as a desire for conquest, resource acquisition and other clear goals. Wars would be less likely to be a byproduct of suspected coethnic intervention and other preemptive efforts at expelling or limiting “foreign influences” over a population. Practically, however, we would also expect that the absence of the forced cohabitation phenomenon described in the previous chapters would inherently limit both the need and the avenues for conflict stoking within the homogenized regions, making war of any kind all the more rare.

Table 1 provides an overview of the expected characteristics of regions based on an ethnopolitical dispersion score. A score of 1, which represents the theoretical convergence of salient political identities with national states, is the most stable, with scores greater than and lesser than 1 providing instability.
Table 1. Ethnic Dispersion Scores and Regional Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISPERSION SCORE</th>
<th>REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS</th>
<th>CONFLICT TYPES</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 1</td>
<td>Far-reaching transnational identities</td>
<td>International disputes</td>
<td>Common</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= 1</td>
<td>Homogenized nation-states</td>
<td>State vs. state international wars</td>
<td>Rare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
<td>Highly heterogenous states</td>
<td>Civil wars</td>
<td>Common</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The actual relationship between ethnic dispersion scores and conflict quality can be easily tested by looking at empirical data regarding the frequency of conflict types by region. To test whether in fact regions with a dispersion score of >1 leads to more international disputes I looked at Militarized Interstate Dispute (MIDs) data. To see whether regions with a dispersion score of < 1 led to ethnic civil wars, I looked at the same dataset used to test civil war frequency in Chapter 2.

Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) are low-level disputes between countries, including armed conflicts, which amount to fewer than 1,000 battle fatalities. Taking available MID data for the years 1945 to 2001 from the Correlates of War (COW) project we find there have been 402 instances of MIDs in the Middle East and North Africa, or nearly 20 per country for that period. In Latin America there have been 156, or 7.8 per country, while in Subsaharan Africa there have been 213 MIDs, or 5.3 per country. The difference is glaring, and as I show below, dispersion is one important explanation for this.

As for ethnic civil wars by region, the numbers are greatest in Africa: 40, or one per country for that period. In Asia they were 35, or 0.7 per country, in the Middle East there were 14, or 0.7 per country, and in Latin America there were only 5, or 0.2 per country.
The rest of the chapter will serve as an extended case study of the Middle East region, starting at the foundation of modern states in the early half of the twentieth century. The focus is on the manner in which forced cohabitation in a state with a high ethnic dispersion score can lower the barrier to crossborder agitation and thus invite cycles of offensive and preemptive political and military intervention campaigns.

DISPERSION AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In this chapter I propose that the greater number of MIDs in the Middle East/North Africa, and the greater number of civil wars in Subsaharan Africa are both attributed to the concept of ethnopolitical dispersion, a phenomenon without which the impact of artificial borders cannot be fully understood. I begin the chapter with a brief introduction to the concept of ethnopolitical dispersion and its connection to regional political culture and practice, and how this affects the divergent histories of the Middle East/North Africa and Subsaharan African regions. I go on to provide a detailed narrative of the manner in which the MENA region adopted a path dependent approach to transnational disputes, fueled in large part by universalist ideologies that proved salient across borders and helped to mobilize political action across various states.

Even in a world with no foreign-drawn “artificial borders,” it is difficult to imagine a single ethnic group encompassing the major part of an average sized nation-state in Subsaharan Africa. There are simply too many ethnolinguistic groups to generate the kinds of seemingly unified linguistic entities we have come to associate with national statehood. In fact, we can consider North Africa to be a separate geopolitical unit not only because of its Arab-Muslim heritage, but because of its Middle East-like dispersion:
it contains large multi-state clusters of Arabs, Berbers, and Tuaregs. In North Africa, like in the Middle East, artificial borders led to the scattering of ethnic groups over various countries.

But artificial borders did not touch all in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, as well as Iran, Turkey, and Israel, were spared; and out of those the last three—the non-Arab states—have arguably maintained the most robust expressions of nationalism in the region. In the case of Iran, the homogenization is tied to the early modern Safavid Empire, which consciously and forcefully “Iranicized” the country and forced the conversion of its inhabitants into the Twelver brand of Shi’ism. In Ottoman Turkey, the nineteenth- and twentieth centuries hosted particularly violent ethnic cleansing episodes, culminating in the 1915 Armenian Genocide on the eve of the creation of modern Turkey. In Israel, the Jewish-Arab tensions that came as a result of aliyot (waves of migration to Israel) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, led to large episodes of communal violence and large-scale dislocation of Arabs.

In the three non-Arab states their borders (in the case of Israel, the pre-1967 “Green Line”) mark the official end of their ethnic reach. As such, the kind of spillover we expect in artificial border regions is mitigated—crossborder mobilization exists on the basis of sect, but with the exception of Kurdish communities, it hardly exists on the basis of etholinguistic identity.

Saudi Arabia is different, and more closely characterizes the instability of the region. In Saudi Arabia the Al Sa’ud’s consolidation of power starting in the late eighteenth century led to the victory of one clan over another; but it did not establish the borders of either the religious (Sunni) or linguistic (Arab) identity of the inhabitants. It
merely established one nation-state among many Sunni-Arab ones. As such, the faultlines of sect and language lay beyond any one country’s borders, making each of the in-group states a de facto participant in a broader geopolitical contestation for the heart and soul of the Sunni-Arab world.

**Historical Roots**

The history of far-reaching identities is nothing new in the Middle East, and it owes much to the long imperial traditions of the pre-nation-state period. Competing universalist political claims were often used to inspire unrest among neighboring populations. Since the earliest years of the caliphate, or Muslim empire, oppositional ideologies aimed at toppling existing governing structures sprang up across the empire and took on varying forms of popular appeal, with governing authorities responding with their own counterinsurgent orthodoxy. Islam was universal, but which Islam to follow never ceased to be in dispute.

The Abbasids (750-1258) remain one of the most important early examples of effective ideological entrepreneurialism. Their early incarnation, as a largely Iranian insurgency against the Umayyad Caliphate (661-750), highlights the appeal of Imami, or saint-like leadership positions associated with what later became the Shi‘i realm. These Imami movements often adopted norms grounded in some form of social justice and were attractive to early convert populations seeking to break the Arab monopoly of the emerging empire. Imamis, as proto-Shi‘is, believed in the quasi-divinity of individuals within the Prophet Muhammad’s clan. Their commitment to particular leaders was so strong that the oft-repeated story comes down to us of extremist Imamis (*ghulāt*)
circumambulating Caliph Mansur’s palace as if he were the Ka’ba in Mecca, and they were performing the pilgrimage ritual around him (Crone 2005, 94-5). The application of charismatic power, as a mobilization force across vast expanses of land, became a stal

Once the Abbasid family was firmly in power, and in an effort to stave off the Imamis’ zeal, however, the new caliphate abandoned Imamism and accepted the proto-Sunni belief in the four so-called Rightly Guided Caliphs (al-Khulafā‘ al-Rāshidūn). Ideology was malleable and was put to the service of the state.

In Egypt, where the empire had broken off after the fall of the Umayyads, the Fatimid dynasty (909-1171) rose up to fill the vacuum in the early tenth century. As official state policy, they sent missionaries far and wide to preach the Shi‘i Isma‘ili faith and promote the newly-built Cairo as a proverbial shining city on a hill. In the capital, weekly lectures were written up to be disseminated across Fatimid realms (Walker 2002, 43). The following century the Seljuk dynasty was engineering a Sunni revival from Iraq, and with that came the establishment of a madrasa system promoting the Sunni sect as a counter to Fatimid state propaganda across the Middle East (Madelung 1971). In the early modern world, the Ottomans (1299) and Safavids (1501) each developed their respective orthodoxies—one Sunni the other Shi‘i—as extensions of state building enterprises, the ideologies of which they sought to actively export.

This spread of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary propaganda was based on the simple political calculus of mobilization. The closest analogy in Christendom is found in Early Modern Europe, with the various movements initiated by mainstream (e.g., Luther, Calvin) and “extremist” (e.g., Müntzer) Reformation leaders, as well as

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19 For a systematic analyses of Weberian charismatic authority in the context of Islam, see Dekmejian and Wyszomirski 1972, and Dabashi 1989.
Counterreformation ones (e.g., Louis XIV). The European Wars of Religion were sparked by the universalist appeal of Christianity, which, when lacking a perfect monopoly by a single sect, could be shaped and reshaped as an instrument of political entrepreneurship.

Back when being Christian had been most important to a French-speaking subject, a German could appeal to their shared sense of faith and mobilize a French population on the basis of this common bond. Yet once the national state became the dominant source of sociopolitical identity in Europe, clear barriers to interstate mobilization emerged: the French cared more about being French than anything else, and the German could gain no such access to the French heart.

In the Middle East religious universalism did not fade, as we see with the influential Wahhabi movement of the Arabian Peninsula, and the Sanussi one in North Africa, starting in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, respectively. When modern states finally took hold, they only invited a new form of universalist mobilization: Arab nationalism. The new ideologies were equally transferrable and destabilizing in the new Middle East as they have been in previous centuries, and religious mobilization coexisted with both local and ethnic concepts of secular national pride. More important, the artificial borders and their perceived illegitimacy did little to stop leaders from framing their ideologies as universally applicable.

As easily transferrable universalist ideologies were exported with vigor, conflict only escalated. But paradigms changed over time, as new generations fomented new ideologies to replace those that had been discredited or had otherwise lost their ability to galvanize the masses. Each universalist phase came with a new set of political entities—
first independent kingdoms, then secular republics, and finally nonstate religious groups. Each also came with a leading figure, a towering personality that did more to enact political change than perhaps anyone else of that generation. And finally, each phase is presumed to have come to an end because of an incident that eroded the legitimacy of the dominant universalist claims of the day (see Table 2). As was the case with vast empires in the premodern era, it is the large states that dominate the transitions from one era to another. Egypt and Iran emerge as the vanguard, while Syria, Iraq, Jordan and the wealthy Gulf monar chies tend to join political trends once they have been established.

Universalism became all the more important because, unlike nineteenth century Europe, states in the Middle East region were limited by their ability to extinguish threats posed by neighboring countries. Lustik (1997) writes: “[The] system of colonial subordination and externally enforced norms to which the nineteenth and twentieth century Middle East was subjected did not allow cross-border warfare by local rulers to effect substantial change in the number, size, or internal regimes of states” (p. 657).

The combination of universalism and artificial borders generated a potent outcome: Not only are identity groups able to transfer ideological and mobilization efforts across states more easily, given the vast dispersion of common ethnic groups, but the very demarcation of states is consciously questioned on a regular basis, and thus allows for the acceptance of crossborder ideas, not as mere foreign propaganda, but as potentially valuable and equally legitimate information. This is because borders were never fully recognized by everyone, and in particular by many in the political and
intellectual class. In fact, the disparaging of the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), which separated the region between French and British influences, is common in the region.20

Following, I dissect the manner in which the Middle East, with its high ethnic dispersion score, generated a large number of small-scale militarized interstate disputes. One important point to clarify is that, even when disputes were of a secular nature (i.e., Arab nationalism), this did not mean that the vehicle through which the ideologies were transferred (i.e., common ethnic and/or sectarian ties) was void of ethnic or religious considerations. It is through a common ethnic and/or linguistic identity that secular or otherwise non-ethnic ideologies have been able to traverse space in the Middle East and North Africa.

I divide the history into four “universalist phases,” that is, four distinct periods in which a dominant paradigm was attempted in order to citizens of various states under one ideational roof. Each phase includes a discussion on the main actors and the manner in which conflicts were ignited. The connection between these phases and the constant absence of “legitimate” state boundaries is a consistent theme, if in the background of the discussion. The aims at uniting Arabs under one roof under the likes of Gamal Abdel Nasser, or the aims at uniting Muslims under one roof under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and many others, assumes an acceptance of the notion that the borders in the region are a foreign-imposed mistake. (The important question of why borders have not been changed will be addressed in Chapter 6.)

20 This assertion is made based on unprompted comments made to the author by people of the region over the years. Also see, Robert Fisk, “Militant Advance Makes Mockery of Sykes-Picot Plan,” *Dawn.com* (June 14, 2014).
The First Universalist Phase (1920-1948)

The first universalist phase came with the rise of national states in the immediate aftermath of World War I. At the time, Woodrow Wilson’s name still inspired reverence among those elites who sought to shape new futures, and self-determination, as a political movement, was employed by political entrepreneurs in the revolts of the 1920s to soften British and French rule the way it had been used against the Ottomans just a handful of years prior. At this early stage, self-determination was hardly “nationalist” in character, as we understand the term today: It was tribal, familial, and sectarian in scope.

As independent kingdoms emerged out of the League of Nations Mandate system, it was promises of self-determination that coincided with efforts to modernize. Modernization itself was viewed as the key to achieving independence and ultimately, regime legitimacy. This process introduced bureaucratization and militarization to the region. In Iraq, the military grew from 7,500 men in 1925, to over 20,000 in 1936 (Dawisha 2009, 37). In Jordan, a mere 400 armed men in 1921 grew to 1,500 by 1926, and 8,000 by the end of World War II (Vatikiotis 1967, 58, 69 and 75).

Access to public school education also increased and illiteracy began a slow decline.21 While there was a shift in focus that eventually brought the people into the cities, in this phase rural life was still dominant. In Egypt, 80 percent of the population lived in the countryside at the turn of the century, but landownership had begun falling into the hands of a smaller clique—in 1914 less than one percent of land owners held 43.9 percent of the land (Abdel-Malek, 1968, 9). This created resentment that, along with increasing nationalist fervor, generated the beginnings of mass political organization.

21 In Egypt, the illiteracy rate went from over 98 percent in 1907, to 83 percent in 1960 (Faksh 1980).
In the early part of this phase, Sharif Husayn of Mecca, father of Iraq’s King Faisal (1921-1933) and Jordan’s King Abdullah (1921-1951), was the closest to a leading figure. He named himself caliph in 1924 and became a spokesperson for a fusion of Islamic religious thought and Arab-ethnic pride—an earlier form of pan-Arabism. In doing so his political rhetoric began to employ such terms as waṭaniyya (patriotism) and qawm (nation) (Dawn 1973, 80), paving the way for modern nationalism and its quarrelsome side effects. Those states with longer histories—Turkey and Iran in particular—took on more ambitious modernization programs, forcing upon their respective populations laïcité in the name of nation-building and rapid progress.22

In Iran, where nation-building and mass protest had been underway since the nineteenth century, the 1920s saw a significant uptick in urbanization and bureaucratization. The increased exploitation of oil, along with the entrance of a new dynasty, generated many of these changes. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company went from fewer than 2,000 employees in 1911, to over 27,000 in 1930. Many came from rural backgrounds and moved to the city for work in a high-turnover industry. Not only did urbanization help break down rural authority where it still existed, but it brought social dislocation on a grand scale. Cities proved inadequate to house the new workers, and resentment grew over the better pay afforded to foreign laborers (Cronin 2010, 210-11). By the late 1920s dress code laws began, and did universal conscription, all of which sought to move individuals away from the tight bonds of familial groupings to the mass organization that nationalist politics required (Ansari 2003, 49).

22 The most visible examples of assertive secularism were the dress code reforms of the first half of the twentieth century, e.g., Atatürk’s ban of the fez in 1925, and Reza Shah’s ban of the veil in 1935.
Parallel to the economic changes was the political consolidation at the hands of the new leader Reza Khan. As he aimed to bring the country’s provinces under state authority, he engaged in systematic attacks against traditionalist figures, from members of the clergy to tribal leaders, whom he depicted as reactionary British pawns. The bureaucracy grew at this time from a collection of traditional offices at the local level, to 90,000 full-time employees working for the state (Abrahamian 1982, 136).

In Egypt changes came as elites began to compete for power amidst a similar move toward stateness and urbanization. Among these competing factions were the landed aristocracy, the liberal nationalists from the Wafd Party, and the technocratic modernists. As Adel Rifaat and Bahgat Elnadi claim, this open clash of elites led to institutional paralysis, which was unable to contain popular dissatisfaction:

That the paralysis of the ruling class was irremediable was evident from the rapid decline of the king’s prestige and the disintegration of the traditional values which had supported the regime until the war. This represented a growing challenge to the entire aristocratic structure of hierarchies, loyalties, and customs, which the postwar mass movement was in the process of seeping away by revealing the general crisis of the ruling class and particularly its servility and impotence with respect to the British. … The Palace first subjected the mass movements to a repressive dictatorship… and then attempted to divert the movement from its patriotic and democratic objectives by channeling its energies into war against Israel. (Hussein 1973, 65-72)

The end of the first phase can in fact be traced to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and the stunning defeat it dealt the monarchies of the newly created states. Many regimes would go on to be overthrown in the subsequent years, inviting a realignment of dominant paradigms in the region, as new political entrepreneurs emerged to take the place of those discredited by defeat.

23 “Mahmoud Hussein” is a pseudonym for Rifaat and Elnadi.
### Table 2: Universalist Phases

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<td>Duration (in approx. decades)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Main universalist paradigm</td>
<td>Self-determination</td>
<td>Pan-Arabism</td>
<td>Islamism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading figure</td>
<td>Sharif Husayn</td>
<td>Gamal Abdel Nasser</td>
<td>Ruhollah Khomeini</td>
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<td>Emerging political entities</td>
<td>New independent kingdoms</td>
<td>New independent republics</td>
<td>New nonstate Islamists</td>
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<td>Major incidents</td>
<td>1920-1 revolts, 1948 war</td>
<td>1956 Suez crisis, 1967 war</td>
<td>Iran-Iraq War</td>
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<td>Fatal incident</td>
<td>1948 war</td>
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**The Second Universalist Phase (1952-1967)**

The second universalist phase, beginning in the 1950s, marked the end of many conservative regimes and the start of secular nationalism in the Arab world—a movement that mimicked the Turkish and Iranian models, but which nevertheless took on unique, and much more aggressive foreign policy dimensions. This second phase included successful independence movements in North Africa, while coups in Syria (1940s-1960s), Egypt (1952), and Iraq (1958) established new, often competing pan-Arab regimes bent on mobilizing the masses for their globally-focused projects.

Second-phase politicians sought moderate secularism and a focus on modernization. It was during this period that secular Arab states implemented large-scale agrarian reform, further tipping the balance away from landed elites in favor of urbanization and industrialization. Youth and other regime-affiliated organizations were formed to fan populist causes, sometimes surpassing the regime’s rhetoric and inviting government intervention to quell out-of-control agitation (Ayubi 1996, 202). The push for massive public instruction, already underway in the first universalist phase, also continued. (The Egyptian state went so far as to turn the historic al-Azhar madrasa,
founded in the seventh century, into a modern university, complete with science and humanities degree-granting programs.) (Faksh 1980, 44.)

Greater focus fell on a diversionary international politics, which included calls for pan-Arabism (i.e., transnational Arab unification), trade protectionism as an anticolonial development strategy, a firm commitment to the downfall of the State of Israel, and opposition to the traditionalist states of the Arabian Peninsula. This opposition centered on two important premises. First, that the traditionalist states were resistant to republican and pan-Arab ideals that were sweeping the region; and two that they were (not unreasonably) depicted as client states of reactionary West. None of this is to state that royal families leading Gulf monarchies were immune from the pan-Arab craze or liberal ideology (see Dekmejian 2003; Nehme 1994). It is rather that these were more firmly entrenched and arguably had the economic wherewithal to withstand the revolutionary impulses that would galvanize the rest of the region.

The nature of artificial borders and their perceived illegitimacy was such that pan-Arabism developed a ready-made constituency. As such, ethnic Arabs, spread across various artificial-border states, proved receptive to the call for unification. Had ethnic dispersion been different, it is difficult to imagine a secular ethnic-based movement having such a profound impact on the discourse and political direction of the region, as pan-Arabism did in the 1950s and 60s.

Among the leaders of this phase, the towering figure of Gamal Abdel Nasser became the chief propagator of change. Like his contemporaries, Nasser faced enemies at home. He survived an assassination attempt two years after his successful 1952 coup, as would Iraq’s Abd al-Karim Qasim, who faced several attempts on his life following his
1958 coup, including one in 1959 at the hands of future president Saddam Hussein. Between 1949 and 1970, Syria underwent at least ten successful and attempted coups. Leaders of these pan-Arab republics had to devise external enmities in order to redirect the same kind of domestic political instability that had facilitated their own ascendance to power.

Nasser focused on his opposition to Zionism and the West, and he fostered divisions in the Arab world by challenging leaders who did not embrace his claims to regional pan-Arab leadership. In Nasser’s arsenal was the gift for rhetorical prowess, which made use of careful shifts between the bookish Modern Standard Arabic and the widely understood but colloquial Cairene dialect\(^{24}\) to connect on a visceral level with the masses within and beyond his nation’s borders.

Throughout this period, Nasser was able to amplify his message through the Sawt al-Arab (Voice of the Arabs), a radio station inaugurated in 1953 that was so far-reaching that at the time it helped place Arabic “second only to English as an international broadcasting language” (Boyd 1999; quoted in James 2006). Sawt al-Arab’s crossborder appeals can be partly credited with fanning the flames of anti-monarchy sentiment in Iraq leading up to the 1958 coup, as well as with the overthrow of North Yemen’s Imam in 1962 through a program called *Secrets of Yemen* (James 2006).\(^{25}\)

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\(^{24}\) Cairene was made understandable through the popularity of Egyptian films. Nasser tended to employ Modern Standard Arabic when citing figures and other policy details, while the switch to Cairene would be associated with more direct emotional appeals. (See Banahi 2013.)

\(^{25}\) The program began to air only two months prior to the coup. According to its host, Dr. Abdel Rahman al-Baydani, he signaled for the start of the revolution to start using a cryptic phrase understood by Yemenis from their folk literature.
Following a period of ethnographic research in the early 1960s, Abdalla S. Bujra writes of the effect that pan-Arab radio had on the local political consciousness of South Yemen. He stresses the breakdown of respect suffered by the traditionally honored House of ‘Attas. As Arab nationalist programs began to voice support for the “masses” against their “oppressors,” South Yemeni locals began to interpret this as a call to rebel against the ‘Attas. Thus, a model for societal reconfiguration could be exported and applied to even remote parts of the Arab world (Bujra 1971, 171-2).

Nasser’s peak of influence coincided with broad social and political change in the region, universalist coups d’état, universalist appeals for transnational unity, and constant military interventions. Starting in early 1956, Cairo became host to Tunisian, Algerian, and Moroccan anti-French organizations, and in 1957 Nasser’s government began negotiating for the purchase of weapons on behalf of the these revolutionaries (Al Dib 1985, 117). Nasser’s catapulting to regional greatness, however, began in July 1956, when he nationalized the Suez Canal, inspiring a joint military response by Great Britain, France, and Israel. Not two years later, Egypt and Syria merged into a single state: the United Arab Republic (UAR). The new state became a launching pad for threats against Lebanon over its president’s lack of support for Nasser during the Suez crisis, as well as because of Syria’s longstanding irredentist claims over the country.

Tensions ran high across the region at this time, as pan-Arabism threatened to engulf the remaining monarchies. Fearing the spread of Nasser’s influence, Iraq’s King Faisal II sent troops to bolster the monarchy in Jordan, while back home in Iraq, a group of free officers, led by ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, staged a coup that led to the formation of a

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26 Fathi was privy to the weapons purchases in Czechoslovakia, as he was directly involved in the negotiations. (See Al Dib 1985, pp. 226-232.)
pan-Arab republic there. The day after the coup, on July 15, 1958, the United States landed Marines in Lebanon to help prop up the Western-friendly president there, and days later the British followed suit with paratroopers in Jordan.

In the 1960s, the trans-Arab conflicts only escalated. In 1961, after a falling out with Nasser, Qasim threatened newly independent Kuwait by claiming it as a province of Iraq, thus prompting, first a British presence in Kuwait, and then a joint defense force comprising United Arab Republic troops and UAR foes Jordan and Saudi Arabia. That year, the UAR separated following a coup in Damascus, which sparked bitter rivalries between Egypt and Syria.²⁷

The conservative monarchies in the region, and naturally Israel, served as perfect targets for the dominant universalist appeals of this universalist phase. Before being dissuaded by Great Britain, Jordan flirted with the idea of invading Iraq once the split between Qasim and Nasser became clear. When the UAR began a terrorist campaign against Jordanian officials in 1960, King Hussein’s focus shifted to a planned attack on Syria, which again, the British intervened to stop (Shlaim 2007, 174-9). But it was Israel, which began making plans for the invasion of Egypt and its neighbors since the early 1960s, that brought the universalist campaign of the day to a close, just as it had in 1948.

The Six-Day War of 1967, which resulted in Egypt’s crushing military defeat, signaled the beginning of the end of pan-Arabism as the most salient political dynamic in

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²⁷ It is worth noting that Gamal Abdel Nasser was one vehicle for, and not a lone master conspirator of, Arab social change. As Malcolm Kerr notes, his union with Syria was more a product of Syria’s own weaknesses and proneness to external manipulation than Nasser’s own abilities; and his influence in Iraq was short-lived. The overthrow of the monarchy there reflected an “explosion of the discontent of many political and social elements of Iraq’s fragmented society against the old oligarchy,” rather than Nasser’s sheer charismatic appeal. (See Kerr 1971, 17.)
the region. And while pan-Arabism predates the second phase and would continue to exist into the third, it never regained the same kind of destabilizing crossborder appeal that it enjoyed in the 1950s and 60s.

Unlike the pan-Arab regimes, Iran began the second universalist phase playing a less aggressive role, focusing instead on a vision of positive nationalism (nāsīūnālīsm-i musbat). The last shah of Iran enacted large-scale land reform, literacy drives and the women’s vote in the White Revolution of 1963, attempting a modernization that was both ambitious and nonconfrontational. The assertiveness came only later, and included Iran’s landing on the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tombs, disputed with the UAE, as well as the shah’s support for Kurdish rebels fighting against the regime in Iraq, and Iran’s organization of the militant organization ’AMAL in Lebanon. But these moves came only in the 1970s, when the shah was facing what would turn out to be fatal levels of instability. Following nearly two decades of intermittent protest, the revolution began in earnest in early 1978 and ended a year later with the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran.

The Third Universalist Phase (1979 - present)

While religious-based mobilization had existed through the first two universalist phases, it was not until the Islamic Revival of 1979 (e.g., Rapoport 2004) that three events forever transformed the political landscape: The Iranian Revolution (successful in January), the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty (March), and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December). It was in this third phase that universalism returned to mimic the vehicle that had originally driven region-wide paradigmatic convergence: Islam.
Modern Political Islam united much of the Middle East, often splitting along sectarian lines—with Lebanese Shiites and Syria’s post-1970 Alawite regime moving closer to Iran and Sunni Salafis converging along opposition to a secular pan-Arab leadership. While sectarianism had not reached the levels that it would take following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, it was nevertheless present and manifested itself to some degree in Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, and elsewhere. Artificial borders, which forced the cohabitation of Sunnis and Shi‘is, eventually turned this religious-based identity focus into a region-wide contestation for power.

The entities that emerged out of this third universalist phase were largely nonstate actors. Extreme repression and the lack of a resounding defeat the likes of 1948 and 1967 had allowed the pan-Arab regimes to stay in power long after their message had lost its power to galvanize. It was therefore not until the Arab Spring of 2011 that secular universalist states began to fall. But the state has been not altogether absent from the third phase. Through its revolution, Iran helped to propagate a renewed confidence in political Islam as an organizing force, and Sunni Salafi movements have often been funded by wealthy Gulf monarchies seeking to counteract pan-Arab nationalism.

As the leader to come out of the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini quickly turned into the embodiment of his own universalist phase, not unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser had in the previous one. Unlike Nasser, however, Khomeini faced a steeper climb to regional acceptance, if only because the Islamic Republic’s largely Shi‘i and Iranian identity posed barriers to entry into a largely Sunni and Arab Middle East. Nevertheless, Khomeini tried to de-emphasize Iran’s national brand in favor of an Islamic one. Ministries and other institutions changed names, often swapping the word
“National” (millī) for the more universalist “Islamic” (Islami).\textsuperscript{28} When confronted with the prospect of regime isolation, Iran funded groups in various theaters of conflict—in Lebanon during its civil war, in Iraq following its invasion of Iran, and later in Palestine, just as Iran was seeking to brand itself as the alternative to the now capitulating pan-Arab opposition to Zionism.

“Today we need to strengthen and export Islam everywhere,” Khomeini told a youth gathering in 1982 (Ramazani 1983, 19).\textsuperscript{29} He argued that Islam should be propagated, not by the sword, but by media: “Such journals should be promotive and their contents and pictures should be consistent with the Islamic Republic, so that by proper publicity campaigns you may pave the way for the spread of Islam…”

Ali Khamenei, then-president of the republic, referred to foreign ministry officials as “apostles of the revolution,” (p. 20) and speaking to the Tehran Journal in 1981, then-foreign minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi stated that, while the new Islamic Republic had no plans to interfere in other states’ affairs, “what is shaking the Islamic world is a movement springing from this revolution among the Moslem masses of the world and,

\textsuperscript{28} Most prominent was the Iranian legislature, whose name was changed from Majlis-i Shūrā-i Millī (National Consultative Assembly) to the Majlis-i Shūrā-i Islami (Islamic Consultative Assembly). That said, Khomeini was careful to balance his citizens’ sense of national pride with his necessary international appeals to neighboring states. In his speeches, he was careful to employ the word “nation” (millat) so consistently that it almost appears repetitive in his official statements. Lawrence Rubin distinguishes what he terms as Iran’s revolutionary soft-power following the revolution, from the more recent “revisionist soft-power” of the Ahmadinejad era. (Rubin 2010.)

\textsuperscript{29} It should be noted that Ramazani, quoting these passages shortly after the revolution, believed then that some of these statements reflected a disjointed foreign policy and postrevolutionary vision, rather than a concretely aggressive push toward the exportation of the revolution. Nevertheless, these are consistent with an assertive Iranian foreign policy that, despite some moderation, continues to exist three decades after the fall of the shah.
naturally, each people will shape their movement according to their own peculiar circumstances” (Ibid.).

Like Nasser’s, Khomeini’s speeches were often acerbic and castigatory toward neighboring states, which Iran came to term “reactionary Arab regimes” (rijīmhā-i murtaje’-i ‘Arab). During a meeting with Sudan’s president in July 1980, for example, Khomeini spoke of his wish of Islamic nations to “return” to Islam, and to “follow the line of Islam to the point of escaping from Western domination” (Teyban, n.d.) a dig at foreign entities that did not display a full commitment to his policy of “negative equilibrium” (muważinizh-i manfī)—a take on nonalignment much more aggressive than what the shah had adopted.

There was a swift response to the Iranian Revolution, first with Iraq’s invasion of the country in 1980, which was supported by most Arab regimes in the region; then in 1981 with the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in the Arabian Peninsula, which was aimed at bolstering the internal stability of traditionalist regimes. And while Iran was pursuing its version of revolutionary exportation, a new element comprising extremist Sunni-Salafi activists—so-called “mujahidin”—was mobilizing from across the region to campaign against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

In Egypt the political climate was also undergoing a transformation. The Muslim Brotherhood, an older entity that by now had renounced violence, began to significantly expand its role in public life. As Peter Mandaville writes, “the Brotherhood decided from the late 1970s to make Egyptian society—rather than state political institutions—the target of its reform and mobilization efforts,” filling the social welfare gap where the regime’s post-Nasser reforms had been shrinking the state (Mandaville 2007, 109). Those
that did not abide by the Brothers’ nonviolence broke away, as did the Islamists responsible for the assassination of Anwar Sadat just two years following his peace accord with Israel. Throughout the 1980s the proliferation of violent Islamic political actors skyrocketed, and included well known groups such as the Islamic Jihad in Palestine (1979) and Egypt (1980), Hizbullah (1982), HAMAS (1987), and finally al-Qaeda (1989).

Largely in response to the constant onslaught from competing universalist appeals, Saudi Arabia stepped up its own funding of soft power institutions during this time. Its Muslim World League, which promotes Wahhabi ideology abroad, went form receiving a quarter of a million dollars in the early 1960s, to around $13 million by 1980 (Pew Forum 2010).

One of the most important changes to take place during this third universalist phase has been Turkey’s move away from universalism. The religious National Order Party had been deemed illegal shortly after its formation in 1970. Its subsequent incarnations were oppressed by military coups (1980) and other decrees (1998, 2001) (Taşpınar 2012), but its re-emergence as the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001 has changed Turkish politics in fundamental ways. Importantly, the AKP orchestrated the detention of hundreds of members of the military, going so far as arresting the former chief of the army’s general staff in 2012—a significant development in the chronically coup-prone state (Arsu 2012).

Yet while the AKP is a more politically able incarnation than its predecessors, the real driving force behind change in Turkey may have been its economy. In the early 2000s Turkey entered an era of sound management, in large part because of the country’s
bid to enter the European Union, which attracted large-scale foreign direct investment. Real GDP grew by nearly 300 percent in the first decade of the twenty-first century alone (Google.com/PublicData).

Unlike Turkey, Egypt, which is also governed by an Islamist group in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, will likely remain a universalist state so long as it does not have the adequate resources to provide opportunities for its large population. The military in Egypt continues to be a force, and unrelenting mass political activity has been so difficult to quell that the army chief warned in early 2013 of the potential for state collapse (CBS News 2013).

CONCLUSION

The dispersion of salient identities is critical to our understanding of artificial borders. Subsaharan African conflicts can simply not spread in the same manner as Middle Eastern ones. This is because in both regions ethnosectarian identities are crucial levers of alignment, but only in the Middle East do such identities spread across the same number of states. Thus, a powerful charismatic voice can carry a message from one corner of the Middle East to another, as figures like Gamal Abdel Nasser have done, and as pre-modern charismatic figures of authority did, even in the early days of Islam.

The unique history of Middle Eastern sociopolitical movements helps us understand the correlation between three variables—Middle East region, religious diversity, and crossborder ethnicities—and military intervention. But this is not a story of great power intervention in pursuit of oil, something that Chapter 2 data shows is less prevalent than one might expect. Rather, it is the narrative of competing states in a region
where interference and agitation of neighboring populations, much as it occurred in Europe during the wars of religion, may be perceived as the best way for states to defend against their own vulnerabilities to agitation, disruption, and political disunity.

We have seen the destructive outcomes of such widely dispersed identities in forced cohabitation states: Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, have all been torn apart, suffering from chronic and acute intervention from neighboring states that support one coethnic group or another. While Iran supports Shi‘i and Alawite political actors in all three countries, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, and Egypt tend to support Sunnis.

Keeping with the topic of the Middle East, the next chapter explores the region with a focus on minority rule in artificial-border states, and their propensity to invite foreign military intervention.
The previous chapter showed how universalist ideologies, be they secular or sectarian, can more readily navigate across state lines in artificial border regions. The example given was the Middle East because of its wide dispersion of ethnic identities. In this chapter, I explore the implications that such crossborder mobilization has on states in which a minority ethnic group holds power.

As Harris Mylonas points out in his award-winning work on nation-building, a set of ruling elites (a “core group,” as he terms them) represent the dominant force within a state. To this core group, Mylonas argues, “nation-building is not considered complete until there are no threatening non-core groups within their state” (Mylonas 2013, 24). This means that assimilation, in whatever form it takes, is a key ingredient of successful nation-building. But what if the core-group constitutes a numerical minority? While in his study of the Balkans Mylonas found no clear difference between states with minority
rule and others, the Middle East offers some important illustrations of the mechanisms by which minority rule can generate conflict.

The lesson from this chapter is as follows: In the Middle East minority rule is associated with greater instances of foreign intervention, with minority-ruled countries being ideal targets as well as more frequent aggressors. The explanation is that countries with minority rule suffer a crisis of legitimacy, which, on the hand invite foreign involvement and exploitation, and on the other, generate highly aggressive, legitimacy-seeking foreign policies. The result is countries that are at once more vulnerable and more threatening those that do not cope with minority rule.

I begin this chapter with a theoretical framework for analyzing majority-minority relationships in the context of artificial borders, and go on to analyze the Middle East region, including with a case study of Lebanon and Syria.

MINORITY RULE AND WAR

It is not uncommon for minority populations to be targets of libel as “foreigners” or of having split allegiances. Historically, Jews in Europe, Shi‘ites in the Middle East, and Chinese in Malaysia, have at various times been targeted with such accusations. The “foreigner” label carries unique implications, however, when the minority groups in question are associated with a majority group in an adjacent or nearby territory. This is because the “foreign” element is in the immediate vicinity, and is thus expected to have mobilization capabilities in the local country.

In the classic anti-Semitic libels, Jews were accused of having split loyalties, while no such reasonable split loyalty existed. In the case of communities separated by
artificial borders, however, the question of split political loyalties can not only be used to justify institutional discrimination, but in some cases it may be a legitimate security concern for weak regimes concerned with the prospects of crossborder mobilization. Such concerns could turn into self-fulfilling prophecies, whereby states that fear split loyalties could strike out against neighbors whom they suspect of fomenting such identity crises at home.

In a study on culture and identity-based conflict, Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2006) found that pairs of countries where one’s majority was another’s minority tended to invite conflict. An example of this would be the Iran-Iraq pairing, with minority Sunnis being in charge of Iraq prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion, and sharing a common Sunni identity with other states in the neighborhood.

Naturally, regions that are split along artificial borders are more likely to have such minority-majority arraignments. Horowitz describes the claims that often surface on the Asian continent

...that the Sri Lankan Tamils really belong in South India, that the Bengalis are illegitimately in Assam, that the Southeast Asian Chinese are immigrants, that the Muslim Arakanese in Burma are actually Bangladeshis, that the Mohajirs in Karachi are not proper Sindhis. (Horowitz 1993, 23)

At the heart of this phenomenon is a two-way crisis of legitimacy generated in minority-rulled states that reside in an environment with two predominant characteristics: The first characteristic is multipolarity, meaning there is no clear leading regional power, or Cold War-style pair of regional powers. The second is the presence of competing, salient supranational sources of legitimacy, much as those that were covered in Chapter 4.
In such an environment of multipolar universality, potential aggressors are more likely to perceive the “conversion” of a neighboring state from an unfavorable regime to a favorable one to be possible, given the nature of shared transnational identities. Second, those states that are not only multisectarian, but specifically minority-rulled, constitute the “lowest-hanging fruit” in this system, and are therefore more likely to be targeted for such regime “conversion.” Thus, states are more likely to target minority-rulled states for hostile military action. Conversely, states that are burdened by the insecurity of minority rule are more likely to engage in revisionist expansionism as a defense mechanism, should the opportunity present itself (see Van Evera 2001). This dual dynamic increases the likelihood that any given state neighboring one will be engaged in military conflict at some point in its history.

This theoretical framework assumes that states perceive mobilization against minority-rulled states to be the path of least resistance for increasing security in a region that comprises rival universalist ideologies (as explained in Chapter 4). While much has been written about intergroup competition (e.g., Wederman and Min, 2006) and ethnosectarian cleansing (e.g., Tilly, 1975) as processes of state formation, such theories only tell us about the manner in which states lower their governing costs. They do not make the connection between destabilizing demographics and the regional balance of power. Here I seek to fill that void while offering important policy-relevant lessons: First, the theoretical framework offers an ability to predict the likelihood for, and potential location of, interstate violence. This information can be used to help buttress nations against potential conflict. Second, the framework presented here sheds light on the relatively high incidences of interstate violence found in the Middle East/North Africa,
while remaining applicable to other regions where countries ruled by minority ethnic groups may coexist with the presence of transnational ethnic groups.

As a caveat, this approach to the study of minority-majority ethnic relations is only clearly relevant to artificial border regions, as these generate the kinds of ethnic-based conflicts that allow for such “conversion” between state identities. In countries where ethnic diversity has been reconciled in some way, it is political differences, rather than a real or perceived ethnic or sectarian balance of power, that is the source of social division and mobilization.

MINORITY RULE AND WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Middle East is steeped in the politics of minority rule born from artificial borders. In fact, out of eighteen states in the Middle East/North Africa region, 30 ten have artificial borders. Of those, three have been minority-rulled at some point, and one non-artificial state (Bahrain) has minority rule firmly embedded in its system.

Minority rule is not unique to the Middle East, but the implications of minority rule in that region are worth highlighting. In Africa, where a multiplicity of groups does not easily allow for a majority dominant group, minority rule is often expected, as no alternative is possible. This is not the case in the Middle East, where ethnopolitical dispersion is high (see Chapter 4). In the Middle East minorities and majorities share identities with a broader number of neighboring states. This allows for an automatic perceived alignment between groups in one nation, and neighboring populations.

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30 Mauritania and Sudan are excluded from this analysis, though both also have artificial borders.
More often than not, given the near-universality of the written Arabic language, the question rests upon sectarian identity between Sunnis and Shi‘ites (with Alawites moving closer to the Shi‘ite sphere over time). In an area roughly 1,000 miles\(^2\) ranging from Lebanon to the UAE lie six Sunni-majority countries (one of which, Syria, is controlled by an Alawite government), and four plurality- or majority-Shi‘i countries (one of which, Bahrain, is controlled by Sunnis).

Put in perspective, this is an area smaller than the western United States, and only slightly larger than the Democratic Republic of Congo. Geographically, the Middle East is also much flatter and less obstructed by topography than these two examples, and is reachable from one extreme point to the other by roads laid since ancient times and short-wave radio (and more recently Satellite TV) broadcasting on a mutually intelligible and often politicized language. Thus, the Middle East region offers the kind of political vulnerabilities that make minority rule particularly troubling for those states that pursue it.

**Foreign Intervention in the Middle East**

As the previous chapter showed, incidences of low-level conflict have been hallmarks of the region over the past century. Per state, the Middle East hosts more militarized interstate disputes than any other region. Large-scale wars are a different story, given that many of the militaries are not equipped to fight and win large conflicts. Instead, they are focused on internal political control, and often the diversification of power via direct commercial enterprises.
As we saw in Chapter 2, the Middle East region is associated with a greater likelihood of military intervention. In Chapter 4 this propensity for intervention and low-level international disputes was linked to an ethnic dispersion that is exacerbated by a history of trends that cover vast swaths of territory. Here, I offer further detail of this military intervention propensity, focusing on the sectarian mix of the different countries on either side of a given military intervention.

Excluding the Arab-Israeli conflicts, since the advent of modern nation-states in the Middle East only those states with either substantial non-Sunni Muslim populations (over 30% of the total) have invited foreign military intervention on their soil. Put more clearly, predominantly Sunni Muslim countries only tend to invade countries that are not predominantly Sunni. Further, in every one of those cases, either the state hosting foreign military actors, or the foreign actor itself, has been a minority-ruled regime. I term this phenomenon the “Minority Effect.”

Given the political implications of communal balances, accurate demographic data is difficult to find for the Middle East/North Africa region. Despite this challenge, there is an agreed-upon “textbook” set of states with significant Shi‘i populations. These are Iran (ca. 90%), Bahrain (ca. 70%), Iraq (ca. 65%), Yemen (ca. 40%), Lebanon (ca. 40%), and Kuwait (ca. 30%).

The case of Syria is at times included due to the political understanding between Alawite Syrians and the Iranian-backed Shi‘i clergy. I exclude the Alawites and Syria from the “Shi‘i” classification for two reasons: First, and most obviously, they are not Shi‘i; and second, for our present purposes sectarian identities matter only in as much as they carry transnational saliency, and the Syria-specific Alawi faith does not. The actual Shi‘is account for slightly more than 10% of the population, less than in the United Arab Emirates (ca. 15%).

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Table 1 presents an important snapshot about the patterns of large-scale foreign intervention. The first pattern is most noticeable to anyone who studies the region: the Arab-Israeli conflicts comprise a large number of these foreign interventions. However, if we exclude the Arab-Israeli conflicts, which have drawn most of the actors in the region at some point in the last half century, we find a much more distinct pattern of military action, which centers near the oil-rich Persian Gulf, and specifically involves Shi‘I countries. In fact, every single case of large-scale foreign-state commandeered ground troops engaging in combat since the advent of modern nation-states in the region has occurred in one of these Shi‘i states (see Columns C and D). And further, in every single case, either the state sending troops, or the state serving as a host for foreign troops in action, has been a minority-led regime (see Columns E and F).

In order, these conflicts are:

(1) “Egypt’s Vietnam” (1962-1967). This the Egyptian involvement in minority Shi‘i-led North Yemen in 1962-67. The debacle, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, turned into a quagmire for Republican Egypt, which led to retroactive comparisons to America’s involvement in Vietnam;

(2) The foreign presence in Lebanon (1976 – 2006). This period began during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), which invited an increasing number of foreign actors into the fractured country. While the borders of Lebanon had been drawn to create a Christian-majority state, and Christians had come to be the institutionalized political and economic elite, by the time of the civil war Christians represented a minority in the country. The foreign presence began with the incursion of minority-led, Alawite-ruled Syrian military, which did not end until it was officially forced out in 2006;
(3) The Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). The minority-ruled, Sunni-led Iraqi state under Saddam Hussein invading neighboring, Shi‘i-majority Iran in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution and its destabilizing purges and revolutionary rhetoric. The new Iranian government threatened neighbors with the exportation of the revolution, and as a result Iraq enjoyed the support of many neighbors and extra-regional actors, including both superpowers;

(4) The invasion of Kuwait (1990) and the Persian Gulf War (1991). Saddam Hussein’s next military incursion into foreign territory came not two years after the 1988 cease-fire with Iran. Iraq had long held irredentist ambitions vis-à-vis Kuwait, claiming it as a “nineteenth province” of Iraq. The subsequent foreign military response, led by the United States and carried under a UN mandate, culminated in the Persian Gulf War of 1991.

(5) The invasion of Iraq (2003). Once again, Iraq played a central role in the conflicts of the region, though this time it did not initiate hostilities. War cries in the United States following the attacks of September 11, 2001, disputed intelligence regarding Iraq’s possession of unconventional weapons, and an overall weakness and lack of deterrent capabilities in Iraq resulted in an invasion and occupation of the country that lasted until 2011. Iraq’s status as a minority-ruled state facilitated the toppling of the government. Disputed reports of an edict (fatwa) by leading Shi‘i cleric Ali al-Sistani forbidding Iraqis from attacking U.S. troops, along with the confirmed statement by Muahmmad Bakr al-Hakim to remain neutral but not attack anyone (Kurzman 2003), were manifestations of the factors that facilitated what may have been an even stronger resistance to the occupation of Iraq.
Table 1: Cases of major foreign military action, by country (1920-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(B) Foreign troops in action</th>
<th>(C) Foreign troops in action (excluding Arab-Israeli conflict)</th>
<th>(D) Shi'i state</th>
<th>(E) Minority-rulled state</th>
<th>(F) Minority-rulled foreign troops</th>
<th>(G) Military actions that fit “Minority Effect” expectations (excluding Arab-Israeli conflict)</th>
<th>(H) Military actions that do not fit “Minority Effect” expectations (excluding Arab-Israeli conflict)</th>
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(6) The Arab Spring in Bahrain (2011). Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates moved troops and police forces into the majority Shi'i but Sunni-led island state of Bahrain. They did so to quell protests which, proportional to the country’s small population, were the largest of the Arab Spring.
In all of these cases, minority-rulled states played leading roles. Outside of these conflicts, no other significant presence of foreign troops (outside of the Arab-Israeli wars) is recorded. This is more than a pattern—it suggests a phenomenon in which minority rule—a product of forced cohabitation—could be construed to be among the most destabilizing of all phenomena in the region.

CASE STUDY: LEBANON AND SYRIA

Lebanon is a country that has embraced democratic power-sharing among its various sects since its founding 1920. Lebanon’s tragedy, however, is that the same consociational power-sharing arrangement that ensured adequate representation for minority groups proved too inflexible to handle the massive demographic shifts over the past century. This inflexibility led to a minority-rule arrangement that Lebanese founders had never planned, and which the nation proved unable to peacefully resolve.

Over twenty years following the end of the 1975-1990 sectarian civil war, Lebanon remains a country on the brink—host to violent episodes with international implications, themselves often a result of crossborder mobilization and agitation on the basis of common sectarian identity.

In the 1932 census (the only one ever taken), Christians comprised over 50 percent of the total population (31 percent of whom were Maronites), compared with 20 percent for the Sunnis, 18 percent for the Shia, and a mere 6.5 percent for the Druze (Firro 2003, 120). This consociational arrangement, which Dekmejian aptly refers to as an “elite cartel” system (Dekmejian 1978), has concurrently stood for the strength (i.e.,
the inter-sectarian cooperation) and we weakness (i.e., the rigidity and anachronism) of the system.

By 1975, the demographics had changed drastically. Muslims outnumbered Christians, and a sizable population of displaced Palestinians was seeking greater influence over the political affairs of the divided nation. Under the National Pact, an unwritten rule that had shaped Lebanese politics since 1943 and which was aimed at institutionalizing power-sharing between the various communities, Maronites were to control the presidency, Sunnis the prime minister’s office, and the relatively poor and politically weak Shias the post of speaker of the parliament.

As demographics changed, Muslims became uneasy with the Christians’ dominant position. By the time of the civil war, Christians had shrunk to “a little more than one-third of the population,” with Muslims and Druze combined representing two-thirds (Friedman 1995, 13). A sectarian arms race ensued, with militias competing for foreign military support in their quest to defend themselves against one another. As often happens in such conflicts, it was the mistrust—the arms race itself—which led to a devastating civil war. By 1975 tensions between Palestinians (and their Sunni and Druze backers) on the one side and the various Christian militias on the other had reached fever pitch. Israel and America supported the Christian militias, and Syria in large part supplied Palestinian Sunni communities within the country.

The event that ignited the war took place on April 13, 1975, when a drive-by shooting in front of a church in East Beirut killed four congregants. The Kata’ib (Phalanges) militia, a working-class Maronite movement, struck back against the presumed culprits. Its members attacked a bus carrying twenty-seven Palestinians, killing
the riders inside. The army soon disintegrated into sectarian camps, and the civil war began.

By November 1975 the Kata’ib moved into downtown and West Beirut—the Sunni Muslim side of town—overtaking several hotels, including the iconic Holiday Inn Tower in the seaside neighborhood of Ayn al-Mreisseh. A coalition of Muslim groups, going by the name of the National Movement, reprised by taking the nearby Murr Tower, from which they launched an attack of heavy machine guns and rocket launchers on the luxury hotels. The onslaught destroyed “bastions of the moneyed elite whose roots ran back to the creation of Greater Lebanon” (Mackey 2006, 24).

The fighting escalated. By December of that year, the brutality of sectarian conflict had reached new heights. Four Christians were found shot in a car in East Beirut, and in reprisal Bashir Gemayel, son of Pierre and heir to his father’s mantle of leadership, ordered an attack on the first forty Muslims the Kata’ib could find. It wasn’t long before the victims arrived at a checkpoint on the Christian side of town, “some of them traveling with their wives and children in their family cars to homes in East Beirut.” Members of these unsuspecting families were taken away at once to have their throats slashed (Fisk 2002, 79).

One of the important legacies of the civil war was the establishment of Hezbollah (“Party of God”) by Iran in 1982, and has grown over the years to act as a “state within a state”—a powerful entity that controls part of the country and has its own military and intelligence service. Ever since its creation, Iran has offered a bulk of the organization’s funding. Yet Lebanoese-Iranian cooperation was nothing new. Ever since the Safavids sought clerics from the Jabal Amil region of southern Lebanon to help them convert Iran
into Shi‘ism in the 1500s, cultural and religious ties have been strong between the two countries. The shah of Iran, for one, is known to have sent members of his security services, the SAVAK, to train and arm Shia militants to fight back against the Soviet-backed PLO. And the Shia Amal Movement was founded by Musa al-Sadr—a middle-ranking Iranian cleric and cousin of Iraq’s Muqtada, former leader of the occupation-era Mehdi Army.

It is important to note that while Hezbollah is often viewed as an extension of Iranian power, the conduit through which Iran often chooses to send weapons and money to the organization is Syria. In this sense the Syria-Lebanon border, Syrian irredentist claims over Lebanon, and Syrian (Alawite) minority rule, have all played an integral part in the growth of Hezbollah over the years. The border allows for the consistent transfer of weaponry and personnel between the two countries.32

If Hezbollah has depended on Syrian material support, it has also given back by sending fighters into Syria following the start of the civil war (2011). That armed insurrection has aimed to topple the government of Bashar al-Assad, who belongs to the minority Alawite sect in Syria and is part of a dynasty that Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad, established in 1970. Since Hafez took power Syria has been minority-rulled and has strengthened its ties to Iran; and starting in the 1980s, to Hezbollah as well. Religiously, the Alawites are neither Shi‘ite nor Muslim, but some doctrinal differences, along with what are arguably aims to establish political unity between Iran and Syria,

32 For example, see “Syria says Israeli airstrike destroyed military facility,” The Los Angeles Times (January 30, 2013).
have led Shi‘i clerics (most notably Musa al-Sadr in 1970) to proclaim Alawites as members of the Shi‘i community (USIP 2013).

To be sure, minority rule in Syria and Lebanon is qualitatively different. In Lebanon, minority rule has come about following massive demographic shifts and has only led to conflict because the country’s unwritten constitutional arrangement has not been adapted to account for these changing population statistics. In Syria, a country that has seen a succession of coups since its independence in 1936 became minority-ruled in one fell swoop, when the Assad family took power.

Institutionally, they are also very different. Because Lebanon is a democracy, it maintains some institutional mechanisms for settling disputes among representatives of sectarian interests, including through voting rules that force voters to vote for members of a different sect, and thus increase politicians’ cross-sectarian appeal. In Syria, the non-democratic system has led the state to maintain, and in some cases, expand establish tight limits on all citizen activity—political and economic.

One of the most infamous episodes of government overreach in modern Syrian history was the massacre in the city of Hama. Using artillery and air power, the government of Hafez al-Assad razed the town to quell a Sunni Muslim insurrection. The death toll is disputed but figures range, but they “may have reached 25,000 on both sides” according to Amnesty International (Amnesty 2012).

Fear of a wave of Sunni discontent has carried the classic ethnic security dilemma in recent years: Since the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, it has been the Alawite militias

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that have committed most of the visible atrocities against Sunni protesters, in large part because of the fear of retribution for the years of political and economic favoritism their community has enjoyed (Alexander and Sherlock 2012). The so-called Shabiha (ghosts) are Alawite militias that routinely engage in mass organized rape and door-to-door execution campaigns against communities suspected of being loyal to Sunni rebels.

In neighboring Lebanon, Alawite communities living in the northern city of Tripoli have been in a decades-long struggle against Saudi-backed Sunnis. Starting with the 2011 conflict in Syria, these divisions have only become more pronounced. Reporting for the New York Times, Josh Wood wrote in 2012:

As some Tripoli residents begin to see themselves as part of the Syrian conflict — to the dismay of the Lebanese government, which fears being dragged into the war—the intensity and frequency of fighting has increased dramatically, with clashes sometimes ignited by events in Syria. Scores have been killed here this year.

The latest conflict began after a number of Sunni fighters from northern Lebanon were killed in an ambush by pro-government forces as they tried to enter Syria to join opposition fighters. (Wood 2012)

If Lebanon’s minority-rulled arrangement has led to a simmering sectarian hostility, Syria’s own experience (reminiscent of pre-2003 Sunni minority rule over Iraq), has left it locked in a sectarian conflict that as of this writing is in its third year and sees no end in sight. More important, the political legacies of both states are intertwined, so that a conflict in one state feeds that of the other—this is a product of artificial borders, but also of the chronic insecurity that minority rule brings.

CONCLUSION

Minority rule, one byproduct of forced cohabitation, is a phenomenon associated with intense conflict in the Middle East. It was associated with at least one actor (the invader
or the invaded) in most of the military interventions we have witnessed since the creation of modern states in the region.

The explanation I offer for the pervasiveness of this pattern is that minority-rule countries are easier to “convert” from one regime to another. In the Middle East region, where universal ideology and ethnic dispersion already invites intervention, the insecurity of minority-rulled states is exacerbated. Sunnis join a Saudi- or Egyptian-led order, while Shi‘is join with Iran. Most actors get involved to some degree in the politics of neighboring states, and minority ruled ones are the ones with the most to fear.

Forced cohabitation states that experience minority rule should therefore hold a place of special concern for policymakers interested in preventing and/or managing international conflict.
For years, policy analysts and area studies scholars have written about a phenomenon by which “artificial” or foreign-drawn borders lead to undesirable outcomes, such as ethnic conflict and civil war, and other mass violence episodes. The idea behind this is that borders that are drawn under colonial frameworks tend to ignore natural demographic and political separations in a manner than sets up future postcolonial nations for some level of dysfunction. Ethnic groups a split between different states, and others are forced to cohabitate. I term this oft-discussed concept the forced cohabitation theory.

The logic behind forced cohabitation assumes some saliency of ethnic identity—in particular when it is shaped by political entrepreneurship in weak or emerging states. As such, the theory has been widely accepted as feasible among policy observers and media analysts, but it has garnered little attention (most of it negative) from the increasingly empirical academic community. But previous lack of evidence does not negate the existence of the phenomenon. In this dissertation, I hope to have convincingly
presented, not only that this phenomenon is real, but that it is founded upon a very basic logic of governance costs that is widely accepted in the political science literature. And even as the academe consciously and correctly attempts to avoid overemphasizing ethnic identity as a causal mechanism for societal phenomena, the importance of forced cohabitation cannot be ignored.

In investigating this phenomenon, I tested the forced cohabitation variable, defined as a state with foreign-drawn borders that possesses no more than an 80 percent salient ethnic majority. I find that this variable—which seeks to capture both the artificial nation of borders as well as the forced diversity the theory implies—is positively and robustly associated with various types of civil war outbreak, as well as foreign intervention, and government atrocities against civilians.

Correlation does not imply causation, and borders and static phenomena that do not change. They therefore can act only as facilitating environments, not triggers of conflict themselves. That is, just like GDP per capita or the presence of natural resources or size of a population, forced cohabitation can only tell us where conflicts are more likely to take place, but not necessarily when they will break out. To refine our understanding of the actual triggers of civil war—something the literature has thus far had limited success in achieving—we may need to look more closely into the role of political entrepreneurs and social movement theory.

But there is still an explanation to be had about the manner in which artificial borders that increase ethnic heterogeneity can facilitate various forms of mass violence that on the surface may seem disconnected. In this forced cohabitation theory, I propose that such unresolved diversity mimics the environments of early state formation, as
experienced in Europe and Latin America. These flashpoints of violence, starting around the cusp of modernity, often took place on sectarian grounds, with Protestant and Catholic mobilization serving as powerful vehicles for adjudicating old peasant-master and similar cleavages in European society.

Theories of national state formation, from Benedict Anderson’s emphasis on the printing press during the early Reformation, to Charles Tilly’s focus on state-led bureaucratization and concurrent social response, tend to agree on the manner in which ideational cleavages hurt emerging states and provided avenues for revolt. Homogenization campaigns, be they violent (e.g., the expulsion of Protestants from France) or nonviolent (e.g., the establishment of mass public instruction) where central state strategies for managing such vast social change. It was through this interactive process that we arrived at national state formation.

But for those countries thrust into statehood on the basis of artificial, foreign-drawn borders, there has been no opportunity to “homogenize.” Nor is there an acceptable political climate for emerging nations to engage in the kind of large-scale brutality that marked the Early Modern era. What results is a heterogeneity that is somehow unresolved, coupled with a state that lacks the essential legitimacy of that older states enjoy. This makes ethnic or sectarian-based mobilization possible, and it makes the state response to it more limited. Cycles of violence are thus to be expected.

Another important point of discussion related to the forced cohabitation theory is related to the intersection of international and domestic political forces. In the traditional civil war literature, states are often treated as a unit of analysis, with limited emphasis on the interactivity that states and mobilized groups have with their neighbors. Recent
literature has sought to change this, and the forced cohabitation theory provides further support for the notion that civil war can hardly be understood if the state is viewed in a vacuum.

In the realm of foreign intervention, forced cohabitation also proves to be correlated. Countries divided along ethnic or sectarian lines may invite foreign intervention, either in the name of upholding weak states, or for the purpose of exploiting such divisions. In the Middle East, forced cohabitation is particularly prone to generating foreign intervention, military and otherwise, because of three reasons: First, the Middle East has a sociopolitical history that hones universalist paradigms that can be easily accessible in neighboring states. Second, the vast dispersion of relatively few ethnic and sectarian groups make these universalist claims all the more effective in mobilizing neighboring populations. And third, minority rule, which is not uncommon in the region, increases the chance that regional competitors may try to “flip” a country toward a different sectarian leadership structure.

Borders by themselves do not have agency. They do not move and they do not by themselves compel leaders to leadership, or masses to action. But they provide a boundary for state identity. If and when state identity sharply contradicts local notions of in-group solidarity, the state may suffer from a crisis of legitimacy. Thus, the doors to domestic and international political mobilization on the basis of perceived ethnic solidarity may open to tragic consequences.
WHY NOT PARTITION?

Chapter 3 discusses the failed calls for partition in Iraq in the aftermath of the 2003 U.S. invasion and subsequent civil war. In fact, despite the perception of a destabilizing forced cohabitation (if by other names), partition has often been met with skepticism. Why is this the case? A less cynical interpretation is that people believe in nationalism, and in fact, Jackson and Rosenberg (1982) persuasively argue that there is a sovereignty norm that has taken hold, which goes hand in hand with an unwillingness to redraw borders. But even if we avoid discussion of norms and take into account the interests of political actors, there are several potential explanations for the “stickiness” of colonial-era borders. Here, I offer five distilled explanations: (1) the power of local interests, (2) the power of extraregional interests, (3) the lack of local capabilities to carry out partition, (4) the geographic dispersion of ethnic groups, and (5) the post-secession distribution of resources.

The first is tied to the most obvious concern: regimes not wanting to lose land, and thus power. They are willing to fight vigorously to maintain sovereignty over all of their present territories. Recent examples such as the Mexican government’s quelling of the southern Zapatista movement, or more classic examples, such as the U.S. government’s determination to win the civil war and keep the southern states from seceding, are illustrations of this. In some cases, however, local disinterest in partition extends to rebel groups themselves. Englebert and Hummel (2005) show that many ethnic elites are able to develop independent authority bases within a state and do not actually seek external recognition—which comes with costs, responsibilities and dangers that may not be worth taking on.
Local interests also extend to a target country’s neighbors. As Rapoport (1994) argues, even unfriendly neighbors lack an interest in seeing partition become an accepted norm within a region. Of even greater immediate concern is the question of shared coethnics across state lines. Turkey has long resisted the independence of Iraqi Kurds, lest they pull in Turkey’s vast Kurdish population into a greater Kurdistan.

But extraregional interests cannot be discounted. Hironaka (2008) points to Western material support in propping up weak states (and weak borders). In fact, many of the current borders in the Middle East (Jordan, Syria, UAE, etc.) were made possible by French and British support for hand-picked families, who were provided weaponry and money to quell potential insurrections and establish a monopoly of violence (to paraphrase Webber’s definition of the state). The reasons for outside support can range from practical concerns, such as wanting to only deal with one regime and not many, to fears of opening the floodgates of self-determination in a way that would disrupt the global status quo.

There is also the question of ethnic dispersion. Maps of ethnic groups often depict particular communities as inhabiting coherent masses of territory. But in effect cities tend to host most of a given country’s population, and cities tend to be ethnically mixed. While Baghdad has experienced sectarian cleansing in support of Shi‘is, it is still a city with vast Sunni populations and many mixed neighborhoods (Beauchamp, et al. 2014). As the example of India’s partition shows (see Chapter 2), separation can carry with it brutal humanitarian consequences and set up the partitioned entities for continued fighting in the form of interstate conflicts.
The final point, that of the equitable distribution of resources, is also linked to the question of post-secession fighting. The question of who gains what resources through a partition can have a critical impact on post-independence relations between states. As CNN reported on the partition of Sudan into two countries 2011, “there are no agreements on the borders, the oil, or even the status of their respective citizens” (Elbagir 2011). In Iraq, the western part of the country is the most poor, and also the region most inhabited by Sunnis. This means that an independent Sunni state would have a difficult time providing for itself in lieu of strong international financial support. In Saudi Arabia, the opposite situation is observed.

These five phenomena appear to work in concert with each other to make secession of ethnic groups an often insurmountable challenge. For this reason, the legacy of artificial borders and the forced cohabitation of ethnic groups will continue to leave their violent mark upon the world. Ultimately, the answer as to why some conflicts are commonly associated with Africa and the Middle East than Latin America may be owed to changing practices and perceptions about the sanctity of borders. Atzili (2011) convincingly shows that during the nineteenth century, when many Latin American states became independent, boundary redrawing did not inspire the same kind of opposition that it did in the twentieth century—hence, the redrawing of states may have helped Latin America escape some of the more harrowing aspects of the postcolonial experience.

FURTHER AREAS OF RESEARCH

There are several lines of inquiry that could emanate from the forced cohabitation theory. For one, important work has already tackled the issue of public goods distribution in
ethnically divided states (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Habyarimana, et al. 2007; 2009, etc.), but more research could be done to broaden our understanding of the manner in which forced cohabitation interacts with economic variables. For example, do forced cohabitation states suffer from greater income inequality on the basis of salient ethnic grouping? Is lack of access to education and employment opportunities more common in forced cohabitation states, as has been the case with Iraq?

The role of institutions under forced cohabitation also requires further examination, in particular the question of whether institutions can serve as mechanisms for managing the effects of forced cohabitation—or whether forced cohabitation dooms the institution-building process to begin with. This chicken-egg question is essential to our understanding of how the impacts of forced cohabitation may be mitigated through political reforms.

In the realm of international relations, the crossborder mobilization dynamic deserves study within a broader framework of proxy and client states, and particularly the degree to which extra-regional powers may play a role in instigating or facilitating neighborhood-level disputes. On the policy front, more work on forced cohabitation may help us identify which forced cohabitation states may pose the greatest likelihood of war outbreak in the coming years.

These are just a few areas of exploration that may prove to be fruitful next steps in developing a more systematic and empirically sound exploration of artificial borders and their effects on the postcolonial experience.
APPENDIX

HYPOTHESIS 1 TESTS

Despite the relative rarity of ethnic civil war onset, the results from a Firth logistic regression (penalized maximum likelihood estimator for rare events) yielded results that were nearly identical to the more conventional maximum likelihood estimator in coefficients, p values, and confidence intervals. As such, I report here only the conventional logistic regression outcomes, as these are easier to compute and replicate.

I then tested the model for robustness (i.e., reliability) to ensure that it wasn’t being significantly affected by a handful of unique cases. To do this I ran several logistic regressions, employing civil war onset as the dependent variable. I began with the FC variable as the only independent variable to see if it showed a correlation without the other variables being accounted for. I then ran multiple further regressions, each time adding a new independent variable from those listed above. In every instance that I ran the regression the FC variable remained positively and significantly correlated with the onset of civil war.

Testing further, I added even more control variables, one at a time, and keeping the previous ones in place: (1) the Muslim variable, for the percentage of Muslim inhabitants. This was added given the recent prevalence of internal conflicts in the Middle East and parts of greater North Africa; (2) the Instability variable, to denote political instability for that country year; (3) Excluded groups, for number of ethnic groups outside the ruling coalition; (4) Dislocated population; (5) the Anocracy dichotomous variable to denote potential institution failure, based on Polity IV data; (6)
the dichotomous *Regime change* variable, to denote some kind of revolutionary or coup process that leads to the fall of the regime; (7) log of *Years since independence*, which I calculated based on Wimmer and Min’s dataset on national-state foundations; and (8) additional regional/cultural units, which I added one at a time in this order: *Western, Eastern Europe, Latin America*, and *Asia*. FC remains positively and statistically significant at the p<0.01 level at every step—that is, its correlation has less than a 0.01 probability of being there by chance.

One important note relates to the material factors. Population stops being significant as soon as the first region (Subsaharan Africa) is introduced, while GDP per capita ceases to be significant once the Western region is introduced. Once artificial borders are taken into account, it appears to be *region-specific*, rather than material factors, that begin to show their importance (more on this below).

The New state variable continues to be significantly correlated with civil war onset once all the controls are introduced, as is anocracy. This latter finding should be taken with a grain of salt. Anocracy is a type of system that occurs when there are no functioning institutions to moderate between various social forces. Although Fearon and Laitin (2003) had found a link between anocracy and civil war, the term itself is an amalgamation of several variables, including violence. By isolating these internal variables Vreeland (2008) finds that it is political violence *itself*, and not the other variables in Anocracy, that is correlated with civil war.

It is difficult, then, to deny the strong correlation of forced cohabitation with civil war outbreak. Furthermore, it appears to be a more important variable than most other variables that have been previously identified in the literature.
To observe whether the Cold War had any specific impact on these conflicts, I ran the regression again (using the original number of independent variables) for both the Cold War (1946-1989) and post-Cold War (1990-2005) periods. A logit model did not fit well with the data for the post-Cold War, but a probit model did. FC was significant for civil war onset in the Cold War period (p = 0.002), as well as ethnic civil war onset in the post-Cold War period (p = 0.030). It was not significant for the others. This may tell us more about the types of conflicts that were salient during these periods of time than anything else. In fact, the association of artificial borders with ethnic-specific conflicts may have to do more with the types of conflicts that were relevant in artificial border states in the post-Cold War era, something that would not be surprising given the centrifugal dynamics that emerged following the break-up of the Soviet Union.

HYPOTHESIS 2 TESTS

I employed a probit regression, which fit the data better than a logistic regression. I used the same control variables as the ones listed on Table 2. This time I added two additional independent variables: ongoing war and civil war onset. This is because we would expect civil war itself to invite foreign interference, but we are interested in the cases where no civil war is occurring and intervention still takes place. One such example is Cuban’s military infiltration in Angola in 1975, immediately following the country’s independence. Cuban was seeking to establish training camps in support of likeminded Marxist groups in the context of both the Cold War and Cuban’s aim of exporting its revolution. Another comes in 1991, when France sent 300 troops to Benin to safeguard
election results, but also to send a warning to neighboring Togo over a recent coup (Pickering and Peceny 2006, 552).

FC is significantly correlated with being a target of military intervention only at the 0.10 level, though when observing only the post-Cold War period, forced cohabitation is positively correlated with the target variable, significant at the p<0.01 level. AB is negatively correlated, significant at the p<0.05 level. This discrepancy between the two periods may be owed to the restraints placed on the system by the superpower competition.

The internationalization of conflict—through crossborder mobilization during civil war, and through foreign military interventions, corroborates a central fear of governments pursuing state-formation. As Tilly suggested, heterogeneity that has not been adequately managed can in fact destabilize countries. And as the forced cohabitation theory posits, such instability invites homogenization impulses among states that seek to establish their longterm survival.

HYPOTHESIS 3 TESTS

I ran a multivariate regression to test whether one-sided government violence is more likely to occur in states that experience forced cohabitation. In addition to controlling for artificial borders, ethnic fractionalization and the presence of transnational ethnic groups, I also controlled for GDP per capita, population size; new state, oil exporter, and democracy status. I also added religious fractionalization, excluded populations, and Subsaharan Africa and North Africa/Middle East variables. To separate violence that
results from civil war campaigns from the kinds of atrocities that would be expected as part of an identity homogenization effort, I controlled for ongoing civil war, as well as both ethnic and non-ethnic civil war onset.

I then tested whether the FC variable is correlated with fatality counts. One could surmise that homogenization campaigns, if indeed they are a product of forced cohabitation, would inspire atrocities on a larger scale than other measures of autocratic repression. I ran a negative binomial regression including the same independent variables and found that FC is positively and significantly correlated with fatality count (Table 3).

The Rwandan genocide of 1994 lists 500,000 fatalities as a best estimate, and in several country years it lists fatalities well above the mean (1990, 1991, 1992, 1995, and 1997). To ensure that Rwanda did not skew the results, I ran the test again without Rwanda. The FC variable retained its significant results for fatality counts, at the p<0.001 level.

As one might suspect, democracy is negatively correlated with this kind of government atrocity, as is noncontiguity. The latter variable may help to provide some kind of space between state and rebel populations, which may lead to lessened direct confrontation, and thus decreased pressure on the government to engage in oppressive violence (with one glaring exception being the violence committed by Pakistan in the run-up to Bangladesh’s independence). Both ongoing war and Subsaharan Africa are positively correlated in all three models. Ongoing war is expected, given the manner in which governments are prone to engaging in collective punishment, particularly during counterinsurgency campaigns. Subsaharan Africa’s correlation may be a result of path
dependence, regional practice, or the presence of some other variable that is associated with both the region and ongoing war (i.e., a lurking variable).

To check for robustness, I tested one-sided government violence again as a dependent variable and without the case of Rwanda, this time starting with just forced cohabitation as the independent variable and adding the additional independent variables, one at a time. I then continued by including the following, also one at a time: anocracy, regime change, excluded groups, dislocated population, instability, British and French colonial history, and the additional regions (Western, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia). The FC variable remains significant at every step and ends with a coefficient of 2.561 at the p<0.01 level. Because the dataset only spans 1989 to 2005, we cannot conclude anything about a link between forced cohabitation and one-sided government violence during the Cold War period.
Appendix Table 1. Multivariate Logistic Regression Outcomes Employing Forced Cohabitation, Artificial Borders, and Other Common Determinants of Civil War Onset, 1946 – 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forced cohabitation</strong></td>
<td>1.266**</td>
<td>2.495**</td>
<td>2.134*</td>
<td>2.731°</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
<td>(0.85)</td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-1.791*</td>
<td>-1.876*</td>
<td>-2.067</td>
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<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.86)</td>
<td>(0.83)</td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-0.063</td>
<td>0.216</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossborder ethnicities</td>
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<td>0.273</td>
<td>-0.173</td>
<td>-0.310</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP per capita</strong></td>
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<td>-0.122**</td>
<td>-0.231***</td>
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<td>(0.04)</td>
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<td>(0.08)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.072</td>
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<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountainous terrain</td>
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<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.279°</td>
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<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncontiguity</td>
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<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Newstate</strong></td>
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<td>1.692***</td>
<td>1.679***</td>
<td>2.026***</td>
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<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
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<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.488</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious fractionalization</td>
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<td>0.906</td>
<td>0.864</td>
<td>2.371*</td>
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<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(0.66)</td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
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<td>0.101</td>
<td>-0.492</td>
<td>-0.515</td>
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<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluded population</td>
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<td>0.071*</td>
<td>0.106**</td>
<td>0.163*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
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<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
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<tr>
<td>French colonialism</td>
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<td>0.184</td>
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<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
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<td>-0.170</td>
<td>-0.437</td>
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<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East/North Africa</td>
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<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.552</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-4.125***</td>
<td>7.704***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
<td>(0.98)</td>
<td>(1.43)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Models:** (1) Civil war onset; (2) Ethnic war onset; (3) High-intensity civil war onset; (4) High-intensity ethnic war onset; Estimations performed in STATA; ° p <0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; a log; b lagged; c dichotomous; Variables that are significant for all models appear in Italics

N = 6899
Appendix Table 2. Probit and Logit Regressions for Targets of Military Intervention

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Variable</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forced cohabitation</td>
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<td>(0.19)</td>
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<td>Religious fractionalization</td>
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<td>-0.248*</td>
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<td>0.580***</td>
<td>0.554***</td>
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<td>0.395*</td>
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<td>(0.39)</td>
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</table>

N: 6899 4651 2248

Models: (1) 1946-2005 (probit); (2) Cold War only (probit); (3) Post-Cold War only (logit)

Estimations performed in STATA; °p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

Variables that are significant for all models appear in Italics
Appendix Table 3. One-Sided Government Violence Incident and Fatality Counts, 1989 – 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forced cohabitation</td>
<td>2.625***</td>
<td>3.569***</td>
<td>3.031**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.78)</td>
<td>(0.91)</td>
<td>(0.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artificial borders</td>
<td>-1.694*</td>
<td>-3.468***</td>
<td>-3.499***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
<td>(0.862)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>-3.422***</td>
<td>-0.939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.89)</td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossborder ethnicity</td>
<td>-0.715*</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.090*</td>
<td>-0.107*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size</td>
<td>0.445***</td>
<td>1.177***</td>
<td>1.279***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountainous terrain</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>-0.252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncontiguity</td>
<td>-0.726*</td>
<td>-1.538*</td>
<td>-2.044**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New state</td>
<td>1.167</td>
<td>1.938</td>
<td>1.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.81)</td>
<td>(1.97)</td>
<td>(1.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>-0.302</td>
<td>1.237</td>
<td>1.265°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
<td>(0.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious fractionalization</td>
<td>-0.419</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>-0.047*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
<td>(1.47)</td>
<td>(1.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-1.154***</td>
<td>-2.671***</td>
<td>-2.337***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluded population</td>
<td>0.139***</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>-0.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British colonialism</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French colonialism</td>
<td>-0.572</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>1.117°</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsaharan Africa</td>
<td>1.054***</td>
<td>3.908***</td>
<td>2.035**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East/North Africa</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>-0.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
<td>(1.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing war</td>
<td>2.428***</td>
<td>5.326***</td>
<td>5.351***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war onset</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>-1.869</td>
<td>-1.937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(1.39)</td>
<td>(1.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic war onset</td>
<td>-0.195</td>
<td>-0.589</td>
<td>0.436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(1.70)</td>
<td>(1.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-6.968***</td>
<td>-10.693***</td>
<td>-11.664***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.05)</td>
<td>(2.30)</td>
<td>(2.17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Models:** (1) Logistic regression of one-sided government violence incidents; (2) Negative binomial regression of one-sided government violence fatality counts (3) Model 2 excluding Rwanda case.

Estimations performed in STATA; \(^p<0.10; \ast p<0.05; \ast\ast p<0.01; \ast\ast\ast p<0.001\)

\(a \) log; \(b \) lagged; \(c \) dichotomous. **Variables that are significant for all models appear in Italics**

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