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Author
Rothe, Johanna

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PSYCHOANALYSIS, SEXUALITY, AND NATIONALITY
IN LATE HABSBURG AUSTRIA

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with an emphasis in FEMINIST STUDIES

by

Johanna Rothe

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The Dissertation of Johanna Rothe
is approved:

__________________________
Professor Carla Freccero, Chair

__________________________
Associate Professor Anjali Arondekar

__________________________
Distinguished Professor Wlad Godzich

__________________________
Tyrus Miller
Vice Provost and Dean of Graduate Studies
Psychoanalysis, Sexuality, and Nationality in Late Habsburg Austria

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Abstract

Johanna Rothe

Psychoanalysis, Sexuality, and Nationality in Late Habsburg Austria

How does one grasp, historically and conceptually, the relatively recent phenomenon that gay identity politics is systematically mobilized to support racism and imperialism, a phenomenon theorized as “homonationalism” (Puar) and “gay imperialism” (Haritaworn, Erdem & Tauqir)? This dissertation examines psychoanalysis, sexuality, and nationality in late Habsburg Austria in the light of recent analyses of homonationalism and gay imperialism in order to contribute to a better understanding of the long intertwined histories of sexuality, individual selfhood, and racial modernity.

Sigmund Freud’s theories of sexuality and gender—especially the theories of castration, sexual difference, and Oedipus—form the core of a psychoanalytic understanding of the self. Despite, and in some cases precisely through, their alleged universal character, these theories participate in a battle over the meanings of Czech, European, German, Jewish, and Christian identities brought on by drastic changes in the social and political organization of late Habsburg Austria: industrialization, mass migrations, competing nationalisms, and the rise of the antisemitic movement.

In four chapters, titled “Coming Out, Castration, and the Biopolitics of Parental Narcissism,” “Sexuality, Antiquity, and the Embodiment of European
culture, “ritual murder and sexuality in the hilsner affair,” and “suggestion and certainty: two approaches to a critique of antisemitic knowledge,” i read freud’s theories of sexuality and gender together with documents of contemporary social, political, and cultural events: the state’s establishment of a social welfare program in 1917; the badeni affair of 1897 and the politics of czech and german language rights; the production of king oedipus at the viennese burgtheater in 1886; the hilsner affair of 1899/1900 and the antisemitic ritual murder discourse.

psychoanalysis, sexuality, and nationality in late habsburg austria suggests that psychoanalytic accounts of gender and sexuality normalize and justify racialized notions of individuality.
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Alexandria Wright, Alix Johnson, Hsuan Hsu, and many others surrounded me with friendship, love, and comradery. Peter Harrow and Cookie Segelstein let me into their lives and shared their warm home with me as I raced towards the finish line. Barbara and Mareike Rothe cheered for me from afar and managed to stay close. Günter Rote was always there to support me. Special thanks to Alexandria Wright, who was by my side as I wrote this dissertation and never stopped cheering for me.
Introduction

This dissertation examines psychoanalysis, sexuality, and nationality in late Habsburg Austria, extending into studies of the political management of language, religion, culture, and race. These studies have a kinship through their shared thematic and geohistorical focus, but they do not form one consecutive narrative. They are instead held together by a methodological approach and theoretical orientation that are grounded in the political stakes of my project: to assist efforts to resist racism and imperialism through a better understanding of the workings of hegemonic sexual and gender identities.

The politics of sexuality in the current period focus intensively on gay identity and homophobia. Over the past two decades, claims about gay rights and equality have moved from the margins to become a political rallying point of global import, mobilizing masses of supporters as well as opponents. Gay rights have been negotiated under the universalizing sign of human rights, and the availability of “gay marriage” has been treated as a hallmark of a polity's commitment to its gay constituents. This growing visibility has been accompanied by a mobilization of racism and imperialism that has produced an artificial divide between “gay” interests and “Black,” “immigrant,” “Muslim,” “African,” “Iraqi,” “Palestinian” or otherwise racially othered communities and populations.¹ In Germany, for instance, the major...

¹ With the term “racial othering,” I describe the outcome of a process of racialization that renders persons fundamentally other, inhuman, subhuman, or out of place in a given polity. Another outcome of the same process of racialization is the production of a racial self,
gay and lesbian organizations have capitalized on racist attitudes and cast “homophobic migrants” as the main problem for lesbians and gas, prompting U.S. queer theorist Judith Butler to reject the 2010 Berlin gay pride award in protest (SUSPECT 2010).^2^ The frivolous remark with which Seth Meyers on the American TV show *Saturday Night Live* greeted U.S. president Obama's endorsement of gay marriage in May 2012—“We get it, Obama. You're not a Muslim”—is an example of the way anti-gay sentiment is associated with Muslims in the popular liberal imagination in the U.S.^3^ These instances of “homonationalism” (Puar) and “gay imperialism” (Haritaworn, Erdem, and Tauqir) mobilize sexual identities to negotiate much more than the relations between gay and heterosexual people.

I contend that the notions of sexuality that are deployed in contemporary gay identity discourses, including homonationalism and gay imperialism, are closely related to Freudian articulations of sexuality. Freud’s writings on castration and Oedipus provide perhaps the most detailed ethnography available of the built-in logic of gender and sexualized identities that are experienced and presented as universal even though they are actively managing the racial, religious, and class fracturing that

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inheres in them. Articulations of sexual identities have, of course, changed substantially since Freud’s time, but the logic that fits them into imperialism and racism has not. I arrive at this conclusion by reading Freud’s theories of sexuality as part of and interwoven with the drastic changes in social and political organization in late Habsburg Austria. In doing so, I aspire to contribute to a better understanding of the role that psychoanalytic and other accounts of gender and sexuality play in the normalization and justification of racialized notions of individuality, sociality, and political organization.

Late Habsburg Austria was a site of major political change. Starting around 1880, competing nationalisms became influential on the Austrian political scene. The antisemitic movement, which gained popularity in the 1890s, had its political stronghold in Vienna, where the Christian Social Karl Lueger was elected mayor from 1897 to 1910. The political events that I study along with Freudian and other articulations of sexuality—the controversy over the Badeni language ordinances, the Hilsner ritual murder affair, the creation of a ministry for social welfare—are clustered between 1897 and 1918. This is also the period in which those psychoanalytic texts which are most central to my analysis were published. However, these texts, as well as the political events, are not firmly contained in this period. For instance, Freud’s turn-of-the-century texts negotiate memories of events that happened during his early childhood in the mid-nineteenth century and even include

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4 (Judson, Exclusive Revolutionaries; Stourzh; Sutter, Die Badenischen Sprachenverordnungen I; King)
events that happened before his birth. Late Habsburg Austria hence describes the time period that forms the center of gravity for my analyses—roughly 1897 to 1918—but it is not an absolute demarcation.

Habsburg Austria was not a nation state. Different nationalisms assumed different relationships towards the state, but none ever completely coincided with it. The meaning of nation and nationality was highly unstable and shifted over the last four decades of the Austrian empire. While my work studies intertwined negotiations of nationality in relation to religion, language, culture, class, and race, I give special recognition to the category of nationality. What is nationality? What are its relationships to language, religion, culture, and race? Does one get it from one’s parents? What does the state have to do with it? Even within the short two decades from 1897 and 1918, the answers that the state and other political actors gave to these questions changed significantly. There is furthermore no equivalent in a nation state for the category of nationality as it operates in a non-national state. For these reasons, it is particularly important to analyze carefully how nationality works in the context of Habsburg Austria.

The heuristic primacy of nationality (next to sexuality) as a category of analysis has led me to approach antisemitism differently from most Freud scholars. Discussions of Freud, Jewishness, and antisemitism have often taken Freud’s experience of antisemitism as the definitive experience of Viennese Jews, or analysed it through a one-dimensional axis where antisemitism introduces a divide between Jews and Germans. Freud explained in 1926:
My language is German. My culture, my attainments are German. I considered myself German intellectually, until I noticed the growth of anti-Semitic prejudice in Germany and German Austria. Since that time, I prefer to call myself a Jew. (as qtd. in Yerushalmi 41)

“My language is German.” This statement by Freud appears to simply assert a truth that is self-evident. It is frequently taken as evidence that, were it not for antisemitism, Freud would of course be German.\(^5\)

Yet, one lesson that the history of “nationality” in Habsburg Austria teaches is that language, especially if used with a possessive pronoun in a way that normalizes the idea that each individual has one language, is much more than merely a descriptive fact. In 1910 the Austrian Supreme Administrative Court ruled that language proficiency was, as a rule, indicative of a child’s nationality.\(^6\) Because many people were bi- or multilingual, the decennial census became occasion for nationalists to mobilize as many people as possible to register their respective nation’s language as “language of interaction” (\textit{Umgangssprache}). This data was widely interpreted as providing information about the relative population strengths of national communities.\(^7\) My impulse to agitate Freud’s Germanness, then, is not to disagree with him about his identities but, rather, to situate them in a multidimensional representational field where overlapping linguistic, national, regional, and class stratifications mediate and differentiate Jewish identity and antisemitism alike.

\(^5\) (Gay; other discussions that participate in this trend are Yerushalmi; Gilman, \textit{The Jew’s Body} and Ernest Jones’ Freud biography)

\(^6\) See the verdict of the Supreme Administrative Court of December 11, 1910 on the interpretation of Lex Perek (Budwinski; for a discussion, see Zahra, \textit{Kidnapped Souls} 39–48).

\(^7\) (Zahra, \textit{Kidnapped Souls}; Judson, \textit{Guardians of the Nation}; King; Brix; Stourzh)
For analyzing the volatile political and social transformations of late Habsburg Austria, I have found theoretical and methodological inspiration in the works of Jin Haritaworn, Jasbir K. Puar, Roderick Ferguson, and several others who provide analyses of shifting social formations that center queer and trans of color identities. These works have developed important analytics for understanding the production of normative and non-normative selfhood as a flexible process. In moments of intense economic, social, and cultural change, the relative marginalization of mutually interrelated groups can be especially unpredictable. Just as “queer” can be a dehumanizing sexual epithet in one moment, a dehumanizing racial epithet in the next, and an alibi for imperialism in yet another moment, the discursive production of national, religious, and racial identity in late Habsburg Austria is full of overlapping, contradictory, and shifting political and epistemic claims on national, linguistic, cultural, and religious identities.

Michel Foucault’s *The History of Sexuality Volume 1* has been another source of methodological inspiration and relevant conceptual-historical framework alike, especially as I read it together with feminist and queer critical race scholarship that builds on it. I concur with Rey Chow that one of the most valuable things that Foucault’s *History of Sexuality* has to offer is that it frames sexuality in the light of biopower, where it is “no longer clearly distinguishable from the entire problematic of the reproduction of human life that is, in modern times, always racially and ethnically

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8 (Haritaworn, Erdem, and Tauqir; Puar; Ferguson)
9 Especially (Stoler; Chow; Puar)
inflected” (7). Biopower is a type of power that operates and legitimates itself through the maximization and optimization of life itself, and as Chow’s comment points out, the definition of the “life” that biopower seeks to maximize and optimize is racially and ethnically inflected. Sexuality, theorized in the light of biopower, is not simply a distinct domain of human social behavior or individual make-up but a privileged target and mediating point of a racially and ethnically inflected power. While I critique aspects of Foucault’s framework, I nevertheless find his mode of analysis generative, first, because he provides a framework of thinking sexuality as a target of power that mediates transformations of social and political orders and that is not primarily subordinated to a general imperative to heterosexual biological reproduction, and, second, because he models a methodological sensibility for grasping the simultaneity of continuity and change. The latter is very welcome, as I seek to articulate the continuity in difference between social and political developments contemporaneous to Freud and the present.

My analyses include readings of fiction, journalistic texts, letters, psychoanalytic theory, court documents, and political speeches. I frequently focus on short textual passages that strike me through their affective or dramatic tension, through a particular constellation of rhetorical tropes, through an unexpected resonance with other textual passages, or through their referential content. I understand the historical difference that separates me from, but also connects me to, these affectively or otherwise striking textual passages through Walter Benjamin's notion of historical materialism. For Benjamin, the historical materialist's relation to
the past is created in such haphazard encounters as in the flitting by of an image or the flashing up of a memory. The task of the historical materialist is to “[grasp] the constellation which his [sic] own era has formed with a definite earlier one” (Benjamin Th. 5, 6, 13a).

My first chapter, “Castration, Coming Out, and the Biopolitics of Parental Narcissism,” analyses the connections between two seemingly distinct scenes—one stemming from Freudian psychoanalysis, the other from twenty-first-century gay fiction—that have been taken as paradigmatic origin moments of male/female and hetero/gay sexual difference, respectively. Freud’s scene of castration, in which a little boy grapples with the perceived absence of a penis in a girl, is part of his theory of the psychic recognition of male/female difference. I analyze this scene together with the coming-out scene, in which a presumably heterosexual mother grapples with the recognition of her daughter’s gay identity, as it is represented in the novel Keeping You a Secret by U.S. author Julie Anne Peters. I argue that the narratively rendered scenes of castration and coming out are structurally homologous, in that they are both driven by a subject’s cognitive-psychic breakdown at the sight of something that he or she can only fathom as loss (the loss of a penis, in Freud, and the loss of heterosexuality, in Peters). The recognition of difference resolves this experience of loss. I further argue that parental narcissism—a parent’s love for his or her child as a better, happier, and more accomplished version of him- or herself—sets the stage for the drama of loss and recognition to unfold. Parental narcissism, however, is not only an individual affect, but also a discursive trope through which biopower infuses the
subject whose life it seeks to maximize and optimize. Because parental narcissism is an important component of the scenes of coming out and castration, I argue that the categorical difference between male/female and heterosexual/gay that is articulated through these scenes should be seen as discursive tropes of biopower as well.

In my second chapter, I turn my attention to another foundational theory of sexuality: the Oedipus complex. “Sexuality, Antiquity, and the Embodiment of European Culture: Freud’s Hannibal and Oedipus in the Shadow of the Badeni Language Ordinances” presents the argument that Freud’s “universal” theory of Oedipus and his self-consciously “Jewish” fantasy of Hannibal build on institutionalized practices of cultivating an educated subject of European culture through the consumption of Roman and Greek antiquity in the Gymnasium (where Freud read about Hannibal in Livy) and the stage (where the success of King Oedipus is taken up by Freud to support his Oedipus theory). The exclusivity of the prevailing definition of European culture is particularly evident in the way German liberal and nationalist voices rallied against the Badeni language ordinances, which coincided temporally with Freud’s first formulation of his ideas on Oedipus and Hannibal.

With the Badeni language ordinances of 1897, the Austrian government intended to equalize the status of German and Czech in the bureaucracy of Bohemia and Moravia. When pushed to rationalize their opposition to the idea that German bureaucrats should be required to learn Czech, German liberals asserted the superiority of the German language through its allegedly exclusive relationship to the cultures of classical antiquity and the cradle of European culture. This larger political
context comes to bear on my analysis of Freud’s writings, because it spells out certain stakes of the German practices of cultivating “European culture” that are not immediately apparent from reading Freud.

My reading also contributes to a debate about the meaning of “universality” in Freud’s claim that Oedipus is universal. Rather than ask in what sense the Oedipus theory can be said to be valid cross-culturally, as the question of universality is often posed, my analysis unearths the resonance of Freud’s argument for the universality of Oedipal feeling with contemporary theater criticism on the production of Sophocles’ *King Oedipus* in Vienna. Freud’s argument about the universality of Oedipal feelings, I argue, operates as an intellectualized surface of an unquestioned affective gendered and ethical delineation of the “modern human.” The figure that most unequivocally occupies the constitutive outside of Freud’s “universal” Oedipal subject is the “pious Christian woman” whose weak morality (in Freud’s assessment) is inseparable from her deviance from the heteropatriarchal gender order represented by Oedipus.

A second analytic strand of this chapter juxtaposes Freud’s “universal” theory of Oedipus with his self-consciously “Jewish” fantasy of Hannibal. This juxtaposition reveals that the gendered-ethical affect motivating Freud’s Oedipus theory and Hannibal fantasy are the same: repulsion in the face of a deviant gendered and ethical embodiment. In the case of the Hannibal fantasy, the repulsive figure is the “unmanly Eastern Jew.” The antipathy towards religiosity (religiosity as an embodied practice rather than religion as a cultural tradition) is foundational to Freud’s “universal” Oedipal subject, which emblematizes the shift from a self-consciously exclusive
discourse of European culture to a “universal” discourse of sexuality.

The first and second chapter take sexual theories of the individual sexual subject as their primary objects of analysis. The third and fourth chapter continue to analyze sexual theories, but the angle is different: Here, sexuality will appear as a counter-discourse to the antisemitic construction of “the Jews.” The production of individuality through the discourse of sexuality can now, in a way, be taken better into focus because the methodological frame is no longer governed by a sexual theory of the individual subject.

The contrasting ways how chapters two and three engage religion helps illustrate this methodological difference. Chapters two and three both describe an antagonism between sexuality and a certain inflection of the religious. While the second chapter arrives at the theme of religion as a marginal, yet animating, constitutive outside of the universal Oedipal modern human, the third chapter, “Ritual Murder and Sexuality in the Hilsner Affair,” analyses the contrast between the antisemitic invention of “the Jews” and discourse of sexuality and individuality.10 The antisemitic fantasy of “Jewish ritual murder,” which circulated widely in late nineteenth century Central and Eastern Europe, epitomizes the characteristic that antisemitic knowledge of “the Jews” conceives of “the Jews” as an entity that stands

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10 I do not follow the popular distinction in modern antisemitism between religious and racial antisemitism. These demarcations were first made by the self-consciously racial antisemitic German nationalist movement, and it appears that they stem to a considerable extent from the exigencies of mass politics where Christian Social antisemites and German nationalist antisemites competed for the same votes. They thus sought simultaneously to specialize their brands and to make sure that whatever ideological demands their opponents created, they would meet too. I treat antisemitism as religious and racial at the same time.
in opposition to the individual self. Accusing Jewry of murdering Christian children or virgins for ritual needs, antisemites imagined “the Jews” as an inherently murderous entity fundamentally antagonistic to “human society.”

The Hilsner trials of 1899 and 1900 are the result of a trans-regional antisemitic cooperation in framing the Jewish day laborer and beggar Leopold Hilsner for the alleged ritual murder of a Christian seamstress, Anežka Hrůzová. Liberal critics of antisemitism sought to exonerate Hilsner and discredit the ritual murder accusation with a counter-framework for explaining the murder, namely that it was the act of a sexual pervert who was driven by sadism, fetishism, necrophilia, or an unspecified sexual perversion. Contrary to the ritual murder allegation, this hypothesis imagines the murderer fundamentally as an individual self—even if the notion of perversion means that it is an abnormal self. By exhibiting how the antisemitic concept of “the Jews” contrasts with the concept of sexual perversion, the Hilsner affair is a particularly illustrative case for understanding the racial-religious particularity of the notion of individuality that is attached to the discourse of sexuality.

The fourth chapter, “Suggestion and Certainty: Two Approaches to a Critique of Antisemitic Knowledge,” analyses the politics of knowledge in the Hilsner affair. Liberal critics used the theory of suggestion to produce a sophisticated critique of antisemitic knowledge production about the alleged ritual murder. Drawing from criminal-psychological and neurological debates, the concept of suggestion explains how individuals come to believe in the reality of Jewish ritual murder as a result of antisemitic dissemination of speeches, images, and flyers that vividly represent the
scene of a ritual murder. In the first part of this chapter, I trace the genealogical links between the concept of suggestion and the psychoanalytic discourse of sexuality via neurological debates about hysteria and hypnosis and I demonstrate that the concept of suggestion, very similar to the psychoanalytic discourse of sexuality, presupposes an individual self with a complex interiority that is capable of holding true as well as false knowledge.

In the second part of this chapter, I analyze several documented instances of how antisemitic power plays out in the Hilsner affair and argue that, while the discourse of suggestion provides a useful account of why individuals come to believe in ritual murder, it is limited as a strategy of anti-antisemitic resistance because it is caught up in the psychology of the individual self and the racialized conceptions of selfhood that are built into it. I propose an alternative approach to politics of antisemitic knowledge, truth, and belief that does not start from the psychology of the individual but from the performative fact of racial power. My approach highlights the performance of certainty as a collective embodied practice that forms a continuity with racial violence.

This final chapter demonstrates that the production of the racialized individual self through discourses of sexuality (and its sibling discourses of neurology, psychiatry, and criminal psychology) also takes place in contexts and domains that, at first sight, have nothing to do with sexuality—not directly, at least. Even liberal efforts to oppose antisemitism via exposure of its mode of operation during the Hilsner affair were tied up and invested in the production of the racialized individual
self. This analysis can inspire us to push for different modes of resistance that do not merely legitimate anew the structures and fantasies of the racialized individual self.
1) Coming out, Castration, and the Biopolitics of Parental Narcissism

The culturally dominant scenario for the assertion and (aspired) recognition of gay difference involves a heterosexual parent and their gay child who “comes out” to them. In particular, the recognition of gay difference is negotiated as a challenge to the parent's love. Many critical-race analyses of homogenizing definitions of gay identity have persuasively critiqued the racial assumptions that come with taking coming out as a definitive marker for a unified gay experience.\textsuperscript{11} I seek to add to contribute to this collective critique by examining what it means that the most dramatic representations of coming-out scenes that circulate in popular culture tend to take place in the intimate family setting and pivot around the possibility of the loss of parental love. It is my contention that if one wants to understand the racial subtext of coming out tropes in particular and the imbrication of race and sexuality more generally, coming-out tropes needs to be studied together with the discursive production of the family.

To be more specific, I present a multi-step argument that the narrative scene of coming out is tied to the affective regime of narcissistic parental love, where the parents’ social self is affirmed through fantasies about their child’s life, health, and happiness. Narcissistic parental love is characterized by Sigmund Freud as a parent’s love for his or her child as a better, happier, and more accomplished version of him-

\textsuperscript{11} (See for example Ross; Meza and Mitchell; Jivraj and Jong)
or herself, where the self is figured in heteronormative terms. Narcissistic parental love, or short parental narcissism, however, is not only an individual affect but also a discursive trope that mediates different constituencies’ becoming a biopolitical subject, that is, a subject whose life and wellbeing are considered a political imperative. The figuration of gay identity through coming-out tropes that take parental narcissism as their unspoken background is then also a manifestation of biopolitics.

Insisting on the link between coming-out tropes and parental narcissism is not to assert the parent-child relationship as a pre-political relationship and deny that coming-out tropes structure the imagination of gay ascension to citizenship. On the contrary, looking at the close relationship between coming-out discourse and narcissistic parental love is an opportunity to get a more robust understanding of the racial-sexual sociality that undergirds the space of social citizenship to which political and historical deployments of coming-out tropes lay claim. Sexuality and race shape social life not only as historically grown boundaries and exclusions but also as mediators of sociality.

I analyze the coming-out scenes in Julie Anne Peters’ novel *Keeping You a Secret* (2003). The novel is set in the United States and deals with a teenager first gay love and her rejection by her homophobic mother. The novel contains multiple coming-out scenes which are all animated by the tension between parental narcissism,

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12 (Freud, “On Narcissism”)
13 Marlon Ross argues that a coming-our imagination, or a “closet paradigm,” as he terms it, structure the imaginary ascension of gay subjects to full citizenship.
which fantasizes a heterosexual future for the daughter, and the daughter’s gay identity. This tension is played out in a dramatic narrative that involves an assumption of sameness, the perception of loss, and the (failed) recognition of difference. The mother’s investment in her daughter’s heterosexuality is part of a fantasy that the daughter is virtually like herself. Narcissistic parental love and the implicit fantasy of sameness between parent and child set the stage for the drama of the gay child’s coming out. Parental narcissism therefore cannot be dismissed as inessential background, because the negotiation of gay difference takes place against the presumption of sameness, and this sameness is constituted by the fantasy of narcissistic parental love.

To do justice to Peters’ nuanced representation of such experiences of sameness and difference, I had to think about them through another scene: Sigmund Freud’s scene of castration where a little boy reckons with the presumed castration of a little girl—a defining scene of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of sexual difference. Both Peters’ representation of a mother’s reaction to the information that her daughter is gay, and Freud’s representation of the boy’s reaction to the little girl’s presumed castration, make relatively strong claims to being realistic representations of cognitive-affective-psychic breakdown in the face of an unfathomable something that is then managed as a binarily sealed-off sexual difference. Peters reports that she received letters from young readers by the hundreds who found their lives “closely (…)
paralleled” in the book (Peters 251). While the particular characters and concatenations of events are fictive, its account of coming out is socially resonant. As Freud’s theories...
of castration are built in interaction with patients, from attentive observations that offered themselves to Freud in his family life, and appreciation of literary and visual culture, so too Peter’s novelistic account makes a reasonable claim to be a realistic representation of a common experience. To recognize this is not to gloss over the ideological constraints that shape both of these attempts at realistic representations. On the contrary, their ability to move people, to resonate with their lives, and to make people assent to them only makes these constructions interesting as objects of ideological critique. Freud’s account of castration is particularly interesting because it complements the dramatic novelistic rendition of the castration scene with elaborate theoretical reflection. These theoretical reflections also carry over to Peters’ rendition of coming out.

My argument combines not only different objects of analysis but also different scales, or different kinds of objects of analysis. Part I of this chapter, “Sameness, Loss, and Difference in Castration and Coming Out” is driven by an analysis of the figural, narrative, dynamic organization of the castration scene in Freud’s “The Infantile Organization of the Libido” and the coming-out scene in Peters’ Keeping You a Secret. I refer to my objects of study as scenes because they are highly dramatized representations of interpersonal encounters. Even though bound up in a longer narrative development, their climatic force congeals in an emblematized stand-off of (mis)recognition between two bodies. My analysis is geared at unearthing the structural homology between the two narratively produced scenes of coming out and castration. These are an assumption of sameness, a perception of loss, and the
(aspired) recognition of sexual difference: these structure the coming-out scene and the castration scene. In the second part of this chapter, titled “Parental Narcissism,” I expose the structuring role of narcissistic parental love in both of the scenes.

Part II of this chapter shifts scale from the textual analysis of the scenes itself to an analysis of the conditions that produces the resonance between the two scenes. The concept of narcissistic parental love around which part II is organized extends across these different scales of analysis. It is a direct component of Peters’ coming-out scene, analyzable through a straightforward textual analysis. It is an indirect component of Freud’s castration scene, which becomes evident through a mode of reading that puts together unspoken connections between different strands of Freud’s oeuvre.

Because the figural depiction of narcissistic parental love suggests that this affect is a particularly irresistible trigger for empathy. This turns narcissistic parental love into an object that can no longer be adequately studied in its narrative textual unfolding alone. To study the allegedly irresistible trigger of empathy that inheres in the affect of narcissistic parental love, I turn to a broader-scale analysis that draws from Michel Foucault’s *History of Sexuality* and Tara Zahra’s and other scholarship on the history of nationality in Austria, which allows me to study the different channels of empathy (and their limits) that are historically made available through the shifting biopolitical deployment of the trope of narcissistic parental love.

Parental narcissism, I argue, appears with a certain level of continuity in a variety of different constellations of historical forces. I will demonstrate this
exemplarily for two different such constellations: First, the cultivation of a bourgeois ethos in Freud’s personal life, and second, in the Austrian government’s move during the social near-collapse during World War One to bring nations into the state. The particular strength of parental narcissism as a category of analysis is that it has enough historical specificity to articulate the discourses of coming out, castration and binary sexual difference as part of a coherent historical paradigm without having to downplay the shifting social and political formations to which these discourses have contributed.

**Part I: Sameness, Loss, and Difference in Castration and Coming Out**

**The Castration Scene**

I use the term castration scene to refer to a narrated scene in which a “little boy,” as the protagonist of Freud's narrative of castration, construes the perceived lack of a penis on a girl as the result of a castration. Variations of this scene are dispersed throughout Freud's work and other psychoanalytic writings. Freud's “The Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido” (1923) serves as my main text. By many standards this text is an unusual choice for reading Freud on “castration” because it represents a moment of Freud's theorizing in which “castration” has no relation to the Oedipus complex, another central invention of Freud's which I discuss in more detail in the next chapter. Only in “The Passing of the Oedipus Complex” (1924) did Freud propose a complex structural link between these major theoretical cornerstones of
classical psychoanalysis.\textsuperscript{14} While the link enabled many new psychoanalytic constructions, its proposition that the “castration complex” explained why a boy starts repressing his Oedipal love for his mother also created new incentives for Freud to elide the tension between the experience of an unsignifiable dissonance, also theorized in psychoanalysis as “loss,” “lack,” or “absence,” and the psychic-epistemic construct of “femaleness” as a way to impose meaning on the perceived cause of this dissonance. In “The Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido” ("Infantile") however, this tension is more readily visible to the attentive reader. By paying attention to this tension it is possible to disrupt the gender-binaristic epistemology that thoroughly structures psychoanalysis.

To explain what it would mean to disrupt the gender-binaristic epistemology of psychoanalysis, I shall stage a comparison between common notions about the epistemic status of hetero/homosexual difference and male/female difference. Freud regularly critiqued the hypothesis that there is a stable truth of sexual identity connected to “sexual orientation” or, in his own idiom, gender of “object choice.” His insistence on the malleability and precariousness of sexual desire has made Freud a valuable theoretical resource for lesbian, queer, and gay theorists of desire. Teresa de Lauretis, Tim Dean, and others have demonstrated how Freudian theory can be used to argue that sexual desire is dynamic, complex, and multiple, and that an identity as “gay” or “heterosexual” can never do justice to the complexities of a subject's sexual

\textsuperscript{14} For a succinct account of the shifts in Freud’s theorization of the Oedipus complex, primarily with regards to the positive, negative, and complete Oedipus complex, bisexuality, and identification see (Simon and Blass).
In his *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, Freud positions himself as “most decidedly opposed to any attempt at separating off homosexuals from the rest of mankind as a group of a special character” (SE 7: 145). He further writes that “all human beings are capable of making a homosexual object-choice and have in fact made one in their unconscious” (SE 7:145). Freud, then, offers a critique of the budding formation of heterosexual and homosexual identity as mutually exclusive identities.

With his knowledge about “the differences between the sexes” however, Freud performs a belief in the truth of maleness and femaleness that is similar to an essentialist understanding of sexual identity. This is why, for Freud, the normative trajectory after the experience of the castration scene is to “recognize” the putative difference “between the sexes.” This is also why, as critical readers of Freud, we need to mark where Freud resorts to a common-sense notion of “the difference between the sexes” in order to fit the castration scene into a normative rite of passage to masculinity. Those moments that mark the contradiction between the experience of unsignifiable cognitive dissonance and this rite of passage are among the most interesting places in psychoanalysis for understanding the interrelated constructions of sexual difference and abjection. “Infantile” offers more such places than Freud’s other writings that also deal with castration.

An important element of the narrative of castration in “Infantile” is that the

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15 (de Lauretis, *Freud's Drive: Psychoanalysis, Literature and Film*; de Lauretis, *The Practice of Love*; Dean)
“little boy” and his “penis-lacking” sister or playmate are represented as being “like” one another in all matters except the penis. Freud does not explicitly theorize the significance of this likeness. He does not even use this trope when he first sets up the background to the castration scene.

Soon Freud gets to the castration scene and introduces the word Ähnlichkeit, which means “likeness” or “resemblance.”

The little boy hence does research aimed at finding a penis in human and animal beings and even inanimate objects, but when Freud narrates how the frustration of the boy's research becomes psychically significant for him, he represents the research
object much more specifically as a creature like himself or a creature resembling himself (ein ihm ähnliches Wesen). While it is not clear what this “likeness” is about, Freud's representation of the scene that follows suggests how this “likeness” shapes the boy's psychic response.

Es ist bekannt, wie sie auf die ersten Eindrücke des Penismangels reagieren. Sie leugnen diesen Mangel, glauben doch ein Glied zu sehen, beschönigen den Widerspruch zwischen Beobachtung und Vorurteil durch die Auskunft, es sei noch klein und werde erst wachsen und kommen dann langsam zu dem affektiv bedeutsamen Schluss, es sei doch wenigstens vorhanden gewesen und dann weggenommen worden. Der Penismangel wird als Ergebnis einer Kastration erfasst und das Kind steht nun vor der Aufgabe, sich mit der Beziehung des Kastration zu seiner eigenen Person auseinanderzusetzen. (“Infantile Genitalorganisation” 296)

We know how children react to their first impression of the absence of a penis. They disavow the fact and believe that they do see a penis, all the same. They gloss over the contradiction between observation and preconception by telling themselves that the penis is still small and will grow bigger presently; and they then slowly come to the emotionally significant conclusion that after all the penis had at least been there before and been taken away afterwards. The lack of a penis is regarded as a result of castration, and so now the child is faced with the task of coming to terms with castration in relation to his own person. (“Infantile Genital” 143 modified)

It takes a penisless creature that is like himself to face the child “with the task of coming to terms with castration in relation to his own person.” The logic of this narrative, as I read it, is that because she is like him, her penis is like his penis and her imagined castration settles him with the task of coming to term with his castration, or “the relation of castration to his own person.” The representation of the girl as like the boy is a structurally necessary part of the narrative in which a boy's construction of a sister or playmate as “lacking” a penis and as “castrated” makes him deal with his
own “castration.”

It is this assumption of being “like” each other that constitutes the psychic need on the part of the “little boy” to construct the temporal theories about the girl’s imagined penis as, at first, “not yet there,” and then “no longer there” or “castrated.” Samuel Weber emphasizes the psychic significance of such temporal imagination when he translates beschönigen (translated as “gloss over” in the quote above) as “temporize.” Weber puns that the boy’s psyche “temporalizes to temporize” the unwanted impression. To temporize, in this usage, means to lessen the negative impact of something. Temporalizing the (absent) penis by imagining that there is still the promise of a future penis allows the boy to temporize, or gloss over, the absence of a penis. If the child “sees” a penis that will be there in the future, no matter how infinitely small “it” is at the moment, it effectively amounts to seeing a penis. This shows that the significance of the penis is bound up in what it promises for the future. Only when the fantasy of a penis-that-will-be shifts into a fantasy of a penis-that-once-was-but-is-no-more, or “castration,” does the perception become psychically significant for the “little boy” in an acknowledgment that there is no penis.

Weber’s reading also insists that the boy’s investment in the girl’s being “like himself” is a structurally necessary part of Freud’s narrative of castration. He reads the “likeness” as a reference to narcissism and writes:

Freud’s description of castration, in distinction to later views (such as

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16 (Weber, Legend of Freud 22–24)
17 And even then, Weber suggests, the temporal fantasy built into the idea of castration, would serve as a mitigating factor that ultimately reaffirms the universality of the possession of the penis.
Lacan's and those following Lacan), never failed to emphasize its origin in narcissism. Only this could explain why the child should be incapable of “imagining a personality similar to the Ego without this essential component [the penis].” The narcissist structure of the ego forces him to it.” (Weber, *Freudlegende* 42 my translation)\(^{18}\)

Weber's decision to read the likeness or similarity as an indicator of the work of narcissism reflects that there has to be a conception (however unspoken) of, and a libidinal investment in, the self when there is so much significance in the recognition of another as being like oneself or similar to oneself.

To sum up, I have argued that the “likeness” of the figure of the girl to the male subject is a structurally decisive factor in the narrative. In addition, my reading of the castration scene has emphasized the construction of temporal theories to gloss over or “temporize” the psychic significance of the (would-be) observation of the girl's “lack” of a penis. These constructions are spurred by a cognitive-affective configuration of a sameness or likeness that is integrated into the structure of the self. That sameness/likeness is not explicitly theorized by Freud with any specific social-historical-symbolic content.

It is also important to note that Freud's narrative of castration hinges on the assumption that the “little boy” does at first not associate genital difference with gender or sexual difference. If he did, a sister's or playmate's missing penis would not

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\(^{18}\) Weber quotes another article of Freud's, “On the Sexual Theories of Children” (1908), which however used the same trope of similarity or likeness as it sets the stage for the little boy's psychic construction of castration. See also (Weber, *Legend of Freud* especially footnote on p. 169). *Freudlegende* and *The Legend of Freud* engage similar ideas but are structured differently. They present as two drafts of an evolving intellectual project rather than as a direct translation.
have the described effect of forcing him to deal with the possibility of his own
castration. Her femaleness would account for the difference between her “missing”
penis and his (present) penis. Freud acknowledges the contradiction between
castration and femaleness as alternative accounts for a “lack of a penis,” even though
he neutralizes it through signs of temporal difference. In “The Infantile Genital
Organization of the Libido” (1923), Freud wanders from the image of the penis-
lacking sister or playmate to the image of Medusa’s head as a symbol of the boy’s
penis-“lacking” mother, but he interrupts this line of thought with this important
caveat:

Doch darf man nicht glauben, dass das Kind seine Beobachtung,
manche weibliche Personen besitzen keinen Penis, so rasch und
bereitwillig verallgemeinert; dem steht schon die Annahme, dass die
Penislosigkeit die Folge der Kastration als einer Strafe sei, im Wege.
Im Gegenteile, das Kind meint, nur unwürdige weiblicher Personen,
die sich wahrscheinlich ähnlicher unerlaubter Regungen schuldig
gemacht haben wie es selbst, hätten das Genitale eingebüßt.
Respektierte Frauen aber wie die Mutter behalten den Penis noch
lange. Weibsein fällt eben für das Kind noch nicht mit Penismangel
zusammen. (“Infantile Genitalorganisation” 296–7)\(^{19}\)

One must not think, however, that the child generalizes the perception that some female people possess no penis so quickly and willingly; this is obstructed by the assumption that the penislessness is the result of a castration as punishment. On the contrary, the child imagines that only unworthy female persons have thus sacrificed their genital organ, such persons as have probably been guilty of the same forbidden impulses as he himself. Women who are respected, such as the mother, retain the penis long after this date. Being female simply does not yet coincide for the child with lack of penis. (“Infantile Genital” 144–5 modified)\(^{20}\)

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\(^{19}\) The “unerlaubte Regungen” refer to masturbation.

\(^{20}\) The “forbidden impulses” refer to masturbation.
Freud starts with temporal difference (the child does not generalize so quickly and readily), he ends with temporal difference (being female does not yet coincide with lack of penis). Sandwiched between these indicators of temporal difference, Freud spells out a contradiction that cannot be resolved by time: a contradiction between two alternative accounts of penislessness: castration-as-punishment (the assumption that the penislessness is the result of a castration as punishment) and being-female or being *Weib* (the generalization that “being female” coincides with lack of penis).

The relationship between femaleness/femininity (*Weiblichkeit*) and “being *Weib*” (*Weibsein*) is ambivalent, and cross-cut with contradictions between the categories *Weib*—a historically very prevalent but nevertheless vulgar term for a female person—and “women who are respected.” On the one hand, Freud clearly uses the term *Weib* as a generic category that includes respected women. The imagined penis of the respected woman prevents the generalization that “lack of penis” coincides with being *Weib*; thus the respectable woman is presented as an indispensable part of the overarching generalization “being *Weib*.” This is the “being *Weib*” that slides into the idea of *Weiblichkeit* (femaleness/femininity) as an all-encompassing category based on an imagined identity of a sexed body. On the other hand, *Weib* has a vulgar quality that makes it antithetical to the construct of “respectable women.” This vulgar term makes the thought of theorizing her as a subject very difficult. Psychoanalytic theories of *Weiblichkeit* inevitably coalesce around the image of the “respectable woman.”

To highlight the chasm between “castration” and “femaleness,” one can also
ask rhetorically: why would the boy's discovery of a sister's or playmate's “lack of penis” reflect on his fantasy-knowledge about his mother's penis any more than it would reflect on his fantasy-knowledge about any other person's penis—regardless of their gender—if, as Freud put it earlier in “The Infantile Genital Organization of The Libido” (1923), “[t]he little boy certainly perceives the difference of men and women, but he has at first no need to connect it with a variation of their genitals”?

Freud says “at first” but contrary to idiomatic narrative convention, there is no “but then” that follows. The story of “but then” is never told because it has always already been told. It is bracketed just long enough to tell the story of castration, and it remains bracketed throughout “Infantile” to the extent that Freud says “not yet” as soon as he elides the difference between the (missing) penis of a girl and the (missing) penis of the mother or a generic Weib. But its suspension is not genuine enough to enable Freud to present the equation of “lack of penis” with “being Weib” as a contingent psychic construct.

In a footnote, however, Freud offers a glimpse of acknowledgment that this equation is not inevitable.

Aus der Analyse einer jungen Frau erfuhr ich, daß sie, die keinen Vater und mehrere Tanten hatte, bis weit in die Latenzzeit an dem Penis der Mutter und einiger Tanten festhielt. Eine schwachsinnige Tante aber hielt sie für kastriert, wie sie sich selbst empfand. (“Infantile Genitalorganisation” 297)

I learnt from the analysis of a young married woman who had no

21 Note how Strachey translates “junge Frau,” as “young married woman” even though it does not explicitly contain the information that she would have been married. Strachey’s translation takes this information to be implied in the category “Frau” (woman, also the equivalent of the English “Mrs.”).
father but several aunts that she clung, until quite far on in the latency period, to the belief that her mother and her aunts had a penis. One of her aunts, however, was feeble-minded; and she regarded this aunt as castrated, like she felt herself to be. (“Infantile Genital” 145)

Freud did not use this footnote as a springboard for further theorizing. The appearance of feeblemindedness is only a stumbling block, a sidenote that exemplifies and illustrates the “not yet” status of the psychic equation between penislessness and femaleness but leads nowhere. I emphasize this stumbling block, both as a way to flag the field of disability as a category that is imbued in Freud’s normative account of binary male/female difference, and to highlight the non-identity between an unsettling construction of loss (no penis, “castration”) that is not (yet) structured by any discourse of socially meaningful difference (such as “femaleness,” “feeblemindedness”) and the management of this “loss” by subsuming (and neutralizing) it into an account of a binarily organized “sexual” difference.

To understand the construction of an overarching unified concept of “femaleness” in contradistinction from that of “castration,” I have found a useful resource in Freud’s theorization of the fetish. While the concept of the fetish merits its own critical genealogy within psychoanalysis and beyond, I shall here work with it simply as a theoretical tool that can help make sense, not just of the non-normative cultivation of what is usually understood as sexual “fetishes,” but also of the normative construction of sexual difference itself. 22 A body’s “being female” (Weibsein) or femaleness/femininity (Weiblichkeit) could be understood as a fetish, for important contributions to a critical genealogy of the fetish in psychoanalysis and beyond, see (Apter; McClintock).
following Sigmund Freud's theorization of the fetish as a “substitute for the missing penis of the “Weib (mother).”

Freud's “Fetishism” (1927) serves in a way as a counterpart to “The Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido” (1923). While I used the latter article to approach castration through the scene of an encounter between a little boy and a sister or playmate, “Fetishism” casts the scene of castration as an encounter of a male subject (no variation here) with a Weib and/or “mother.” This difference could be said to be insignificant, because the Weib or mother and the sister or playmate merely represent one identical figure in Freud's identical narrative of “castration.” This would seem borne out in the following passage from “Fetishism”:

Nein, das kann nicht wahr sein, denn wenn das Weib kastriert ist, ist sein eigener Penisbesitz bedroht, und dagegen sträubt sich das Stück Narzissmus, mit dem die Natur vorsorglich gerade dieses Organ ausgestattet hat. (“Fetischismus” 312)

No, that could not be true: for if a Weib had been castrated, then his own possession of a penis was in danger; and against that there rose in rebellion the portion of his narcissism which Nature has, as a precaution, attached to that particular organ. (“Fetishism” 153 modified)

The curious construction of Nature’s agency aside, the logic propelling the psychic process described here is the same logic of narcissistic identification that undergirds the castration scene in “Infantile,” where “castration” makes its appearance in the male subject's encounter with a sister or playmate.

However, whereas Freud described the little sister or playmate as a creature that is “like himself” or “similar to himself” in “Infantile,” Freud puts no effort into making the logic of narcissistic identification plausible in “Fetishism.” With rather
contrary effects, he plasters “Fetishism” with the vulgar term Weib. With the exception of a single use of the term “mother,” Freud's only word to refer to a female person in this seven-page-long article is Weib. At times the term Weib is used three or four times in relatively brief succession over the course of half a page, like an incantation. For example:

Es ist nicht richtig, daß das Kind sich nach seiner Beobachtung am Weibe den Glauben an den Phallus des Weibes unverändert gerettet hat. Es hat ihn bewahrt, aber auch aufgegeben; im Konflikt zwischen dem Gewicht der unerwünschten Wahrnehmung und der Stärke des Gegenwunsches ist es zu einem Kompromiß gekommen, wie es nur unter der Herrschaft der unbewußten Denkgesetze — der Primärvorgänge — möglich ist. Ja, das Weib hat im Psychischen dennoch einen Penis, aber dieser Penis ist nicht mehr dasselbe, das er früher war. (Freud, “Fetischismus” 313)

It is not true that, after the child has made his observation of the Weib, he has preserved unaltered his belief in the phallus of the Weib. He has retained that belief, but he has also given it up. In the conflict between the weight of the unwelcome perception and the force of his counter-wish, a compromise has been reached as it is only possible under the dominance of the laws of unconscious thought—the primary processes. Yes, psychically the Weib has got a penis, in spite of everything; but this penis is no longer the same as it was before. (“Fetischism” 154)

The repetition of this vulgar term does the opposite of representing the assumption that the Weib is a creature similar to the boy's self. It rather elicits as an objection: “No, [the little boy’s] own possession of a penis is not threatened, because she is a Weib and he is not!” Freud's insistence in “Infantile” that “being Weib simply does not yet coincide for the child with lack of penis” is nowhere to be detected in “Fetishism.”

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23 The two articles are separated by the article “The Passing of the Oedipus Complex” and
One can comprehend the work of being female, *Weibsein*, through the logic of fetishism itself: “Being female” is the fetish that substitutes for the “missing penis.”

One may object that it is a characteristic of the “fetishist,” as he is theorized by Freud, that he does not properly recognize the sexual difference between male and female, but Freud's writings suggest otherwise. In “The Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence” (1938/1940), he explains the logic of a displacement of value in the psychic creation of a fetish:

> The boy did not simply contradict his perceptions and hallucinate a penis where there was none to be seen; he effected no more than a displacement of value—he transferred the importance of the penis to another part of the body (...). (“Splitting” 277)

As he elaborates, he makes clear that such a displacement implies the recognition of male/female difference: “This displacement, it is true, related only to the female body; as regards his own penis nothing was changed” (277). This statement implies logically that the “fetishist” recognizes females as different. My proposed reading of

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with it the theories of castration and the Oedipus complex got joined together. (Sigmund Freud, “The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex” (1924) in S.E. XIX. “Der Untergang des Ödipuskomplexes,” Gesammelte Werke V. XIII.) For a male subject, Freud argues there, the castration complex puts an end to the Oedipus complex: “So far [the male child] had had no occasion for doubt about women's penis. But now his acceptance of the possibility of castration, his recognition that the female is castrated, made an end to both possible ways of obtaining satisfaction from the Oedipus complex. For both of them entail the loss of his penis – the masculine one as a resulting punishment and the feminine one as a precondition” (176).

The way these two theories get joined together requires the management of the contradiction between the generalization that penislessness equals femaleness and the simultaneous disavowal of that generalization that is presupposed by the construction that penislessness is the result of a castration (as punishment) that could be inflicted on the male subject as well. In the quoted passage the discrepancy between these assessments of penislessness is managed through a simple paraphrase. The child’s “acceptance of the possibility of castration” is paraphrased as “his recognition that the female is castrated” as if these are the same. Yet the fact that Freud needed to paraphrase in order to have both scenarios covered also reveals that they are not already identical.

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“being female” as a fetish is hence not out of line with Freud's own theorization of “fetishism.” The construct that she is female negates and preserves the construct that she is castrated and thereby serves the same function as a “fetish”: to effect “a displacement of value” where “the importance of the penis [is transferred] to another part of the body;” namely to the body's femaleness (277).

Without explicitly thinking in terms of the logic of fetishism, Sarah Kofman suggests a similar reading, drawing on Freud's construct “penis envy.” Freud theorizes penis envy as important to female sexual development. In a symptomatic reading that treats the scene of Freud theorizing about “woman” as equivalent to the scene of a little boy coming to terms with “woman's genitals,” Kofman proposes to read “penis envy” as a construction that the little boy's psyche locates in a woman's body.24 It is, she suggests, “as if 'penis envy' restored woman's value as sexual object by exhibiting—negatively, as it were—man's still intact and complete sexuality” (Kofman 85).

Such a symptomatic reading is plausible because Freud often describes his theories about femaleness in terms similar to the description of female genitals: incomplete, insufficient, not beautiful.25 My theorization of being-female as fetish is quite similar to Kofman's theorization of penis-envy because we both reckon with a psychic construction of female difference as something that is of value to the male

24 Kofman does not pay much attention to the difference between “woman” and “girl.”
25 Mary Jacobus shows this for Freud's “The Taboo Of Virginity” (Jacobus). Another article with remarkable imagery of phallic completeness and lack to describe his theories of male and female sexual development is Freud's “The Passing of The Oedipus Complex” (1924).
subject and that he locates in the female body. For Kofman, this is “penis envy.” I am proposing that a more generic theory of “being female” can be built on this logic. In my reading the construct that she is a Weib dialectically negates and preserves the construct that she is castrated (or that everybody has a penis) and thereby serves the same function as a “fetish”: it effects “a displacement of value” where “the importance of the penis [is transferred] to another part of the body,” namely to the body's “being Weib,” its being-female, which is not a body part in the anatomical sense but rather a fantasmatic essence that is imagined to diffusely permeate the whole body.

I have thus argued that the castration scene be understood as an account of a psychic or affective-cognitive dissonance in the subject of a “little boy.” The boy subject’s attempt to not see the absence or loss of the penis in a girl is an affective struggle that involves this subject so heavily because there is an understanding that the girl is like him. This spurs the formation of temporalizing fantasies to “temporize” the sight of the unfathomable absence. The generalization that all females do not possess a penis stands in contradiction to the boy’s experience of “absence” in the castration scene. Even though Freud does not pay attention to this moment, presumably because of an a priori investment in a binary gender order, the adoption by the boy of the belief that all females don’t have penises must logically work to undo, at least partially, the perception of “absence.” This work of undoing can be theorized through Freud’s concept of the fetish, along the lines that a body’s “femaleness,” a fantasmatic identity that is ascribed to it, serves the male subject as
its normative resolution to what would otherwise be the perception of loss.

Is the much-emphasized “likeness” between the boy and the girl a hint that their relationship is structured by the assumption of racial sameness? All of psychoanalysis is bound up in a racial framework, evident not least by Freud’s treatment of “primitives” as a completely separate category of people that stands in opposition to the categories of “child,” “Weiblichkeit” (femaleness/femininity), men and women, boy and girl, etc. All these seemingly unmarked categories are therefore implicitly produced as European. But I am reading the castration scene as a constellation of meanings, narrative arches, tensions, and energies that don’t firmly inhere only in the particular personages that populate Freud’s castration scene but instead, for instance, reappears in the coming-out scene, as I will discuss next. I am therefore asking to what extent we can understand the role of racial sameness and/or difference to inhere in this constellation itself (as opposed to the larger theoretical framework that creates the personages for it.) This distinction is a distinction of emphasis, not of absolute difference.

So far I have not been able to gain a deeper understanding of how race structures the constellation of the castration scene. We are however able to gain a better understanding if we stop looking at the castration scene in isolation and as a unique event and instead start thinking about its relationship to the scene of gay coming out. The following sub-section analyzes coming-out scenes from in Julie Anne Peters’ lesbian young adult-novel *Keeping You a Secret*. It starts by highlighting the structural similarities between this coming-out scene and the castration scene—
notably the tension stemming from the representational discrepancy between loss and
difference, the description of the two main subjects as “like” one another, and the
resort to temporalize to temporize. From there I move to theorize the relationship of
castration and coming out scenes to parental narcissism, biopolitics, and race.

The Coming-out Scene

*Keeping You A Secret* is a novel set in the United States. Its teenaged protagonist
Holland is president of her high-school student council and is dating the good-looking
Seth. Her school's career advisor and her mother expect her to compete for admission
to some of the nation’s best colleges. Then Holland falls in love with a girl named
Cece, enters a relationship with her, begins to self-identify as gay, and negotiates her
new place in the world after her disapproving mother throws her out of the house. All
main characters are ostensibly racially unmarked and implicitly characterized as
white.²⁶ Holland’s family appears lower-middle-class to middle-class and Cece’s
family’s class is also somewhere in the middle-class spectrum.

Because Holland initially conceals her new gay life from her mother, the
coming-out encounter ensues when the mother, after being tipped off, confronts her
daughter, who then admits that she is gay. This initial confrontation is dominated by
the mother’s physical attack of her daughter. Verbal exchange is limited but includes

²⁶ An accumulation of cultural references (such as a stepsister’s participation in Goth culture)
in their totality contribute to a characterization of the novel’s cast and setting as white and
white-dominated, respectively, which is reinforced by the seeming insignificance of race to
all of the main character’s relationships.
the mother’s yells, “I didn’t raise you to be a lesbian!” The confrontation ends with the mother throwing Holland out of the house. Several weeks later, Holland and her mother meet again for the first time and attempt another conversation.

“I promised myself I’d never do to you that my parents did to me. That I’d love you no matter what. But this –” Mom raised her head and met my eyes. “I won’t let you throw your life away on that girl.”

A burning sensation streaked through my gut. “Her name is Cece. And what makes you think –”

“Let me finish,” Mom interrupted. “You have so much talent. So much potential. I’d like to believe I had something to do with that. You can do anything you want, Holland. You have your whole life ahead of you.”

“Yeah, I do,” I said. “With Cece in it.”

Mom exhaled irritation. (Peters 243)

In this scene the mother equates her daughter’s lesbian relationship with the negation of her life. Holland insists that her relationship can be part of her “life.” But for the mother her daughter’s gayness only registers in terms of negation or loss: of life, of talent, of potential, even of “being able to do anything [she] want[s].” We see here, embodied in the two figures of Holland and her mother, two poles of a representational battle that is very similar to the representational discrepancy between “castration” or the perceived “absence” or “loss” of a penis and the “recognition” of femaleness in Freud’s castration scene. The castration scene manages the discrepancy between castration and femaleness through a narrative of temporal development (even as Freud renders the narrative blurry): the initial absence of a concept of female difference sets the stage for the experience of loss and thoughts of castration, which eventually settles into a fetish-like “recognition” of femaleness, if everything follows the normative path. Even though Peters’ scene stages the two poles in direct
confrontation, each represented by a different figure, there is nevertheless an unspoken overarching understanding that the daughter speaks the truth and that in order for there to be a solution to the conflict, the mother will have to come around and acknowledge or “accept” her daughter’s being gay.

We can also observe the representational battle between loss and difference very pointedly in the subsequent exchange: The mother pleads: “I know you, Holland. You’re not ... that way” (243). Countering the mother's negation and the negative connotations of the designation “that way,” Holland, the novel's sympathetic voice, counters that she is gay. “Yes, Mother, I am. I’m gay” (243). Holland’s framework is backed up by the novel as a whole, by the coming-out genre which knows that despite the mother’s refusal or inability to accept Holland’s sexual identity, Holland speaks the truth, and that she is gay rather than “not ... that way.” The ellipsis between “not” and “that way” underscores that the mother is at a loss for words to describe what her daughter is not. “Not” and “that way” are thus not simply operating by their grammatical logical connection where “not” negates “that way.” “Not” and “that way” are reinforcing each other as expressions of the mother’s attempts to ward off the idea that is pushed to the horizon of her consciousness. The daughter accordingly objects with two emphases: one on the word “am” and another on “gay.”

In addition to the representational battle between a construct of loss and difference, another feature of Peters’ coming-out scene that I have previously highlighted in Freud’s castration scene lies in the mother’s resort to temporize the daughter’s deviance by temporalizing it. Akin to Freud’s little boy, who theorizes that
the girl’s penis will still grow, Holland’s mother comes up with this: “I suppose it’s some kind of phase you’re going through, or an identity crisis. I don’t know. It never happened to me” (243). The mother resorts to the construct that her daughter’s (heterosexually-coded) “life” is still going to arrive, that it is merely deferred. After the daughter’s declaration that she is gay, the mother screams: “She did this to you!” (243). “I don’t know what she did, but I told her mother to keep her sick daughter away from you” (243). “This” is of course a rather generic signifier, but as the mother presents it as something that was “done” to her daughter, it again insists on a framework where the daughter’s gay identity appears as nothing but negation and loss akin to an injury – mentionable if at all only as “this.” Here Holland’s mother still follows the trajectory of Freud’s little boy who also shifts from a construct of “not yet” to a construct of “no longer” in his assessment of the girl’s expected penis, where the construction of “no longer” finally coincides with the construction of “castration.”

One can also detect a prior assumption of a likeness in the utterances of Cece’s mother, for instance in her comment that I quoted above: “It never happened to me.” But in the detailed articulation of this “alikeness,” the coming-out scene begins to diverge from the castration scene, because the assumption of alikeness is quite tightly embedded in the parent-child relationship and in the proprietary claim that the parent derives from this relationship. The exclamation “I didn’t raise you to be a lesbian” performs such a proprietary claim, and so does the interjection “I’d like to believe I had something to do with that” in the midst of the praise for the daughter’s talents, potential, and limitless possibilities. The claim, “I promised myself to never do to you
what my parents did to me, that I’d love you no matter what” also leaves no doubt that the specific set-up of mother-daughter love is an important reference point for the mother’s experience of her daughter’s gayness. When the mother ventures that it might be a phase, her comment “I don’t know. It never happened to me” furthermore spells out how the daughter’s identity immediately impacts the mother’s own identity. While in the castration scene the “likeness” of the sexually different subject is presented as the likeness of a peer, as it is in Ross’ elaboration on the encounter between the sexologist and the homosexual, Peters’ coming-out encounter between mother and daughter incorporates a strong assumption of sameness on the part of the maternal subject but mediates this assumption of sameness through a specifically maternal claim on her daughter’s life.

We have an opportunity to think through this specifically maternal and parental claim on the child with an additional passage from Peters’ novel: an utterance by the mother of Holland’s girlfriend Cece. Cece’s mother is “accepting” of her daughter’s gayness and she agrees to temporarily let Holland stay at their house after Holland’s eviction. Despite ostensibly wanting to offer consolation and support to Holland, Cece’s mother nevertheless takes the news of Holland’s eviction as an occasion to share her own latent disappointment in her daughter’s sexual identity.

I want her to be happy. That’s all Tom and I ever wanted for our kids. I am sure your mother feels the same way, Holland. We want so much for our kids to grow up and have things we never had. We have high hopes for you. Expectations, dreams. Then, something like this. (190)

That also the “accepting” mother engages in a statement like this demonstrates that the two poles between loss and difference are not absolute oppositions but have much
potential for overlap and simultaneity. Even though Cece’s mother “accepts” that her daughter is gay, even though she thus seems to have moved to the level of “accepting” sexual difference rather than holding on to the construction of loss, all it takes is the news of another disappointed parent to reactivate the feeling of loss (of happiness, expectations, dreams) in the face of “something like this.”

The “expectations, dreams” and the wish for nothing but the child’s happiness form a continuity with Holland’s mother’s fantasies of life, talents, potential, and limitless possibilities. As Sara Ahmed notes in *The Promise of Happiness*,

> wanting the happiness of a loved one often hesitates with the signifier “just”. “I just want you to be happy.” What does it mean to want “just” happiness? What does it mean for a parent to say this to a child? The “just” might reveal something: as if wanting happiness is not to want other things that might demand more from the child. In a way, the desire for the child’s happiness seems to offer a certain kind of freedom, as if to say: “I don't want you to be this, or to do that; I just want you to be or to do ‘whatever’ makes you happy.” (92)

Ahmed, who also discusses these utterances in the context of parental disappointment or at least ambivalence at their child’s homosexuality, articulates a red thread between the desire for “just happiness” and the comment that the daughter can do “anything” or “whatever” she wants (in the statements of Cece’s mother, Holland’s mother, and the hypothetical parent in Ahmed’s reflection, respectively). All of these seemingly open-ended wishes are predicated or at least primarily associated with heterosexuality.27

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27 As Ahmed’s subsequent discussion underscores, the phrase “I just want x to be happy” can embody ambiguity with regards to the child’s gay identity, offering acceptance that is conditional on the child’s happiness. While it thus does not construct the antagonism between gay identity and happiness as absolute, it nevertheless asserts an ideal of happiness that is in
The utterances of Holland’s and Cece’s mothers are also linked by how they express disappointment in the “loss” of their only seemingly completely open-ended desires for their children. Cece’s mother’s phrase “something like this” smoothly extends the utterances of “this” and “that way” with which Holland’s mother too gives names to what appears to her only as loss, absence, and negation.

Cece’s mother’s statement deploys the particular trope of maternal and parental love in a way that mediates a sociality that extends beyond specific parent-child relationships. Consider how this plays out: The mother starts with a statement about her desire for her daughter. "I want her to be happy." Then she gradually assimilates more people into her desire, starting with her other children and presumably her husband and father of the children. "That's all Tom and I ever wanted for our kids." Then she extends the reach of parental narcissism to include Holland and her mother: “I’m sure your mother feels the same way, Holland.” In the end, the various parental figures and the various child figures are all merged into one exemplary parental subject and one exemplary child fantasy: “We have high hopes for you.” Even though all she knows about Holland's mother is that she just put her gay daughter on the street, she thinks of her and herself as one collective subject, a subject that is mediated through a the collectivized fantasy that is articulated in a particular trope of parental love.28

tension with gay identity and imposes the burden to proof that gay people can be happy on the child. As in the case of Cece’s mother, it serves as a perfect screen for ambivalence about the child’s gay identity.
28 This easily triggered empathy with a parent about whom the empathizing person knows nothing but that he or she has just inflicted harm on his or her child for reasons related to the
This effectiveness of this particular parental affect in demanding empathy and
identification is remarkable. At least in the coming-out scene in Peters, it constitutes
the relationship between mother and daughter as one of “likeness,” but by being
clearly entangled in a larger discourse of sociality, we have a useful starting point for
trying to grasp the social meaning of this “likeness” including potentially its
relationship to race and class. The following analysis speaks to the coming-out scene
in Peters specifically, but subsequently it will also link us back to the castration scene.

Part II Narcissistic Parental Love

Lauren Berlant (1997) argues that the seemingly non-political, privatized, and
intimate sphere of family life has been the terrain where membership in the national
collective of the U.S. has been imagined since Reagon. The desire for one's children
to be happy is one of the most sanctioned rhetorics of morality in the contemporary
U.S. When Cece's mother states that her wish for her daughter's happiness is “all” she
and her husband ever wanted for her children, the “that's all” does not so much
suggest that it is a very limited wish as it reflects the entitlement that comes from
knowing that one's desire is normative and sanctioned. It insists on a certain
narcissistic consolation—by demanding moral vindication for one’s desires—at the
moment of reckoning with the disappointment of not getting what one desired. As

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child's sexual identity once again demonstrates an affinity between the discourse of sexuality
and disability. Disability activists have long decried the automatic outpouring in the media of
public empathy for parents who murder their disabled children.
Berlant suggests, a statement such as “I want her to be happy. That's all [we] ever wanted for our kids” is not only a renunciation of any more overtly political desires, but also the prototypical way of performing oneself as a worthy moral subject of the national citizenry.

Berlant persuasively theorizes the (post-)Reagonite moment of intimate citizenship as a response to the radical movements of the 1960s. This is a reminder that U.S. representations of gay identity in the post-Reagon era are specific to a geo-historical national moment. However, there are also important continuities in the way intimate, “national” and state matters have been intertwined, not only in the (post-)Reagonite United States, but also in a transnationally formed racial modernity. While the representation of intimate feelings of parents towards their children assumes a distinct significance in Reagonite America, it is at least worth asking if these representations are in fact part of a geographically and temporally larger episteme. The resonance and continuity between the narratives of Freudian psychoanalysis from early twentieth-century Austria with the contemporary coming-out discourse as exemplified by Peters’ novel have animated the inquiry in this chapter so far. What is at stake is the question of whether the particular rhetoric of parental affect, as we see it in Peters, forms part of Freud’s scene of a little boy’s “discovery” of the “castration” of a little girl as well. Or is the specific discourse of parental love, as we find it in Peters, precisely a differentiating feature between these scenes that weakens my claim about the inherent interrelatedness?

Some observations would seem to affirm the latter question and deny the
former. The boy/girl setup of Freud’s castration scene may invoke the domestic, familial sphere, but their relationship is nevertheless quite distinct from any tropes of parental love as we have seen them in Peters. If anything, Freud’s later writings increasingly argue that the boy-girl encounter is only a stand-in for an encounter between a boy and his mother, but with the boy as the subject who experiences a cognitive/affective/psychic breakdown, not the mother. All this could suggest that the particular tropes of parental love are germane to the twenty-first-century coming-out scene. However, the following considerations complicate this quick conclusion and support the argument that the particular figuration of parental affect that we have seen in Peters ties the coming-out scene closer to the castration scene.

In a somewhat ad hoc passage at the end of the second part of his famous essay “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914), Freud offers a theorization of narcissistic parental love that approximates the maternal affect that we have seen in Peters. Freud basically proposes that a parent’s love for his or her child, notably a child of the same gender, is love and expectation of a better, happier, and more accomplished version of him- or herself.29

Wenn man die Einstellung zärtlicher Eltern gegen ihre Kinder ins Auge faßt, muß man sie als Wiederaufleben und Reproduktion des eigenen, längst aufgegebenen Narzißmus erkennen. Das gute Kennzeichen der Überschätzung, welches wir als narzißtisches Stigma schon bei der Objektwahl gewürdigt haben, beherrscht, wie allbekannt, diese Gefühlsbeziehung. So besteht ein Zwang, dem Kinde alle

29 Lee Edelman articulates his own critique of a contemporary paradigm of the child’s “reproductive futurism,” investment in a futurity that is always already modeled upon the past. Edelman’s argument however is intellectually and politically opposed to studying how race permeates theoretical concepts, political structures and subjectivities (Edelman 157–8 fn. 19). For a critique that includes a generous reading, see (Smith).

If we look at the attitude of affectionate parents towards their children, we have to recognize that it is a revival and reproduction of their own narcissism, which they have long since abandoned. The trustworthy pointer constituted by overvaluation, which we have already recognized as a narcissistic stigma in the case of object-choice, dominates, as we all know, their emotional attitude. Thus they are under a compulsion to ascribe every perfection to the child—which sober observation would find no occasion to do—and to conceal and forget all his shortcomings. (Incidentally, the denial of sexuality in children is connected with this.) Moreover, they are inclined to suspend in the child's favor the operation of all the cultural acquisitions which their own narcissism has been forced to respect, and to renew on his behalf the claims to privileges which were long ago given up by themselves. The child shall have a better time than his parents; he shall not be subject to the necessities which they have recognized as paramount in life. Illness, death, renunciation of enjoyment, restrictions on his own will, shall not touch him; the laws of nature and of society shall be abrogated in his favour; he shall once more really be the centre and core of creation—'His Majesty the Baby', as we once fancied ourselves. The child shall fulfill those wishful
dreams of the parents which they never carried out—the boy shall become a great man and a hero in his father's place, and he girl shall marry a prince as a tardy compensation for the mother. At the most touchy point in the narcissistic system, the immortality of the ego, which is so hard pressed by reality, security is achieved by taking refuge in the child. Parental love, which is so moving and at bottom so childish, is nothing but the parents’ narcissism born again, which, transformed into object-love, unmistakably reveals its former nature. (Freud, “On Narcissism” 90–1)

With some minor differences, this characterization of narcissistic parental love, published in 1914, is quite in line with the rendition of parental (especially maternal) love in Peters’ 2003 novel and offers an analysis of the latter. What stands out is an intense investment in the child’s “life” which is figured through a future-directed fantasy. Claims about the child’s limitless opportunities furthermore coincide with gendered and, in the case of the girl, heterosexualized, fantasies of becoming a hero and great man, or marrying a prince, respectively.

One should not be misled by the pronoun “he” that is used for the generic child in the English translation, since Freud refers to the child (Kind) by its grammatical neuter gender. In fact, the child is very explicitly cast in a dualistic way, following a binary gender order, where femaleness is signified through the fantasy of marriage to a prince, and maleness through the fantasy of “becoming a great man and hero.”

Another important continuity between Freud’s account of narcissistic parental love and Peters’ is that the parental affect motivates empathy by third-party observers of this parental affect. In Peters, I pointed this out in Cece’s mother’s spontaneous display of empathy, with an unknown disappointed mother of a gay child. In Freud’s
account, Freud himself acknowledges the emotional power of narcissistic parental love even as he breaks it down analytically. Narcissistic parental love, he writes, is “so rührend” – so moving, touching, stirring, heart-warming.

Freud’s account, of course, does not—could not—include the articulation of gay difference. Despite the existence of homosexual self-advocacy organizations at the time of Freud’s writing, there was no public gay discourse about the experience of “coming out” that would have put the scenario of a gay child (or any other queer child) who disappoints his or her parents’ love highly visible on Freud’s agenda, as something that needed to be discussed in relation to his account of narcissistic parental love. I am arguing, however, that Freud presents the castration scene as an approximation for what would happen if narcissistic parental love is disappointed. This argument consists of two steps. The first step is to read across the section break in Freud’s essay and tie the description of parental narcissism at the end of section two to Freud’s theoretical comment at the beginning of section three. The second step involves parsing out the complicated role plaid by “parental narcissism” in Freud’s

In a letter, Freud does, however, counsel a mother not to be ashamed of her son’s homosexuality (Freud, “Letter to an American Mother (1935)”). The homosexual woman who is documented in his paper “The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman” (1920) was also only brought to Freud as a patient by her distressed parents. Parental distress about a child’s homosexuality was thus not completely unfamiliar to Freud. But the phenomenon was not nearly as widely represented and politicized as it is in the early twenty-first century. For a series of critical essays on Freud’s paper, as well as the paper itself, see (Lesser and Schoenberg). For Freud’s discussions of male homosexuality, see (Freud, Leonardo Da Vinci; Freud, “Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account”). Some of Freud’s accounts of male homosexuality in fact tell a different story. Particularly in Leonardo da Vinci, Freud suggests that a male child becomes a homosexual in order to fulfill maternal desire. But it is significant that Leonardo da Vinci was, as Freud calls it, only a “passive” homosexual. He was not marked as a homosexual subject in the eyes of his mother or other contemporaries, as far as it is known.
larger theory of narcissism.

I start with step one. The theorization and thick description of narcissistic parental love concludes the second section of the essay “On Narcissism.” A horizontal line marks the end of that section, the Roman numeral “III” marks the beginning of the next section, which starts:

Welchen Störungen der ursprüngliche Narzißmus des Kindes ausgesetzt ist, und mit welchen Reaktionen er sich derselben erwehrt, auch auf welche Bahnen er dabei gedrängt wird, das möchte ich als einen wichtigen Arbeitsstoff, welcher noch der Erledigung harrt, beiseite stellen; das bedeutsamste Stück desselben kann man als „Kastrationskomplex“ (Penisangst beim Knaben, Penisneid beim Mädchen) herausheben und im Zusammenhange mit dem Einfluß der frühzeitigen Sexualeinschüchterung behandeln. (“Narzißmus” 159)

The disturbances to which a child’s original narcissism is exposed, the reactions with which he seeks to protect himself from them and the paths into which he is forced in doing so—these are themes which I propose to leave on one side, as an important field of work which still awaits exploration. The most significant portion of it, however, can be singled out in the shape of the ‘castration complex (in boys, anxiety about the penis—in girls, envy for the penis) and treated in connection with the effect of early deterrence from sexual activity. (“On Narcissism” 92)

Freud flags certain research concerns that he is bracketing at this point and deferring to the future, namely the disturbances to, and defense reactions of, the original narcissism of the child. Despite the general gesture of bracketing and deferral, he briefly acknowledges that the castration complex is the most important piece of this area of research. The psychic/epistemic struggle to account for a missing penis is the most significant event in the disappointment of the child’s narcissism, according to Freud. In the framework of the narcissistic investment in the penis, the figure of femaleness performs only loss, absence, or negation. The description of narcissistic
parental love, on the other hand, actually suggests a dual articulation of narcissism where maleness/masculinity (which, in the context of Freud is unquestioningly tied to the penis) frames one set of narcissistic investments while female/feminine heterosexuality serves as another object of narcissistic investment.

This contradiction may seem spurious because narcissistic parental love is a complex that characterized the psyche of a parent, whereas the castration complex is lived and negotiated by the subject of the “little boy.” However, if one looks at the place of “narcissistic parental love” in Freud’s theory of narcissism, this distinction between the parental psyche and the child’s psyche becomes muddled right away. To demonstrate that this is the case is the second part of my argument about the structural link between parental narcissism (and its disappointment) and the castration scene, which necessitates an analysis of Freud’s account of narcissistic parental love in relation to his larger theory of narcissism, particularly the concept of a primary or original narcissism.

Freud’s essay “On Narcissism” consists of three untitled parts. In part one, Freud posits the existence of a “primary,” or “normal” narcissism which is the libidinal addition to the “egoisms of the drive for self-preservation,” in contradistinction to “secondary” narcissism, a conversion of object love that is connected to various pathological conditions.31 Freud posits that in normal

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31 This is slightly ambiguous because the ego is only formed gradually in children, so narcissism can only appear once there is an ego, since the ego is the object of narcissistic love. Freud says so much when in the first section he clarifies the distinction between autoeroticism, which is there from the start, and narcissism, which is not, but this does not seem to create problems for the concept of primary narcissism for Freud.
individuals the original or primary narcissism is partially “given up” with increased maturity and the libido that is originally bound narcissistically in the self is either extended towards other persons, thus turned into object libido (as he discusses in the first section of the article), or directed at the ego ideal (as discussed in the third section).

Freud offers two sets of “observations and views” in support of the theoretical postulation of such a primary narcissism, namely “[our] observations and views of the mental life of children and primitive peoples” (“On Narcissism” 75). Freud claims observational knowledge of the narcissism of primitive people, which, according to him, manifests in

\[\text{eine[r] Überschätzung der Macht ihrer Wünsche und psychischen Akte, die „Allmacht der Gedanken”, einen Glauben an die Zauberkraft der Worte, eine Technik gegen die Außenwelt, die „Magie”, welche als konsequente Anwendung dieser größensüchtigen Voraussetzungen erscheint. (”Narzißmus” 140)}\]

an overestimation of the power of their wishes and mental acts, the 'omnipotence of thoughts', a belief in the thaumaturgic force of words, and a technique for dealing with the external world--'magic'--which appears to be a logical application of these grandiose premises. (“On Narcissism” 75)

Freud refers to his recent publication *Totem and Taboo* to back up these observations which are, of course, not Freud’s own but those of the ethnographic literature (primarily based in Australia) that informs *Totem and Taboo.*

32 After this treatment of primitive people, Freud shifts to “children,” but despite his earlier promise of

\[\text{For an analysis of Freud’s relationship to anthropological discourse in “Totem and Taboo,” see (Frederickson).} \]
“observations and views on the mental life of children and primitive peoples,” he now claims to not actually have adequate knowledge—certainly no observations—of the “analogical” situation of the European child. 33 Freud suggests that his views about European children are a deduction of the available observations of primitive peoples.

Wir erwarten eine ganz analoge Einstellung zur Außenwelt beim Kinde unserer Zeit, dessen Entwicklung für uns weit undurchsichtig ist. (“Narzißmus” 140)

In the children of to-day, whose development is much less transparent to us, we expect to find an exactly analogous attitude towards the external world. (“On Narcissism” 75 modified)

The original narcissism of (European) children is modeled after the allegedly observed and putatively more transparent behavior of “primitive peoples.” At this point, thus, we are invited to believe that European children have an attitude of narcissism that also manifests in an overestimation of the power of their thoughts and words, akin to the attitude that Freud ascribes to primitive peoples.

But later in the article, Freud offers another indirect approach to the allusive primary narcissism of children, namely in the observation of parental narcissism:

The primary narcissism of children which we have assumed and which forms one of the postulates of our theories of the libido, is less easy to grasp by direct observation than to confirm by inference from elsewhere. If we look at the attitude of affectionate parents towards their children, we have to recognize that it is the revival and reproduction of their own narcissism, which they have long since abandoned. (Freud, “On Narcissism” 90)

This is how Freud transitions into the account of narcissistic parental love. He thus

33 Given how common anecdotal reports about European children are in Freud’s psychoanalytic writings—next to clinical evidence this is probably Freud’s most important empirical data, this claim is surprising.
proposes that parental narcissism offers another indirect way to observe the primary
narcissism of children.

It would be hard to imagine that the specific narcissistic parental fantasies that
Freud renders so evocatively would also constitute any sort of “original” infantile
narcissism and to reconcile this imagination with Freudian psychoanalytic theories
more generally. Elsewhere when Freud theorizes the psychic life of infants and
children, he is adamant about his conviction that a desire for heterosexual coupling is
the result of a complex psychic process and certainly not in any way primary. His
central theoretical cornerstones, the castration complex and the Oedipus complex,
both dispel the notion that gender identity or heterosexuality are by any definition
“primary,” and Freud frequently insisted on this point.

So, given that the fantasies of parental narcissism are steeped in norms of
binary gender identity and, in the case of the girl, heterosexuality, what is one to make
of Freud’s claim that parental narcissism is but a revival of an original infantile
narcissism? One might try to grant a distinction between form and content: Maybe
those contents of parental narcissism are later acquisitions of the parent, while the
reactivation of love of self in the guise of love of the child is a revival of the parents’
own primary narcissism. But even if one could successfully construct such a
separation between content and form, Freud’s description blurs such a hypothetical
distinction. His phrase “his majesty the baby, as we once fancied ourselves” suggests
that the fantasy of being “his majesty the baby” is part of the original narcissism of
children. The theoretical concept of an original or primary narcissism (of children) is conceptually intermeshed and cannot be conclusively separated out from “narcissistic parental love.”

With this in mind, it is no longer difficult to see that Freud refers us to the theory of the castration complex as his best approximation of an answer to the question: what happens if the fantasy of parental narcissism is disturbed? The two scenes—castration and coming out—and their associated regimes of sexual identity and difference, are thus fundamentally connected: not only through the resonance between their respective figurations of likeness, lack, temporizing temporalizations, and difference, but also through the way they are set up as alternative accounts of the disturbance of parental narcissism (and self,) and the “defense” of this narcissism through the construction of a binary structure of sexual difference that serves to

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34 James Strachey, the editor of the Standard Edition of Freud's works in English, suggests that this phrase might be a reference to “a well-known Royal Academy picture of the Edwardian age, which bore that title and showed two London policemen holding up the crowded traffic to allow a nursery-maid to wheel a perambulator across the street” (91). Even though there is a slight discrepancy to his description, it nevertheless appears that Strachey is referring to a work by Arthur Drummond. Drummond's work was exhibited at the Royal Academy of Arts since 1890, and one of his painting is titled “His Majesty the Baby.” The image shows a young white woman, clad in a red dress and quite possibly the nursemaid that Strachey remembered, guiding a white infant (wearing a light blue coat with two collars, hemmed by white fur, matching light blue hat and white shoes) across Piccadilly Circus. Surrounding them are several carriages and horses that have been stopped by at least one policeman to let the woman and the child pass. The bustling male-dominated street life of London has come to a stop, and the white female body of the nursemaid forms a unit with the infant in her care, and captures the onlooker's gaze. The fact that this painting and hence the phrase “his majesty the baby” are so clearly a child of nineteenth-century Europe makes the suggestion that it represents an original narcissism of children so much more tenuous/implausible.

35 The contradiction between Freud’s theory of primary/parental narcissism and his explicit contention elsewhere that normative gender and heterosexuality cannot be presumed can be explained as the result of the tension between conceptual innovation and ingrained habits of mind. For a theorization of this tension, see (Davidson).
neutralize the impact of loss and negation.

On the level of narrative-historical content, Freud’s theorization of the castration complex also smoothly inserts itself into, and extends, Freud’s rendition of narcissistic parental love. The ethnographic-empirical basis of Freud’s theory of the castration complex consists of parental experiments in anti-masturbation pedagogy, which include threats to punish masturbation with castration. Masturbation was widely considered an impediment to a boy child’s future health, vigor, and virility. Parental discouragements against masturbation are therefore part of a parental effort to ensure that the male child turns into a man, in line with the male-gendered fantasy of narcissistic parental love, as Freud describes it, where parents wish for the boy to grow up and become a hero.

In addition to articulating the castration scene with the coming-out scene, the theorization of narcissism offers more insight into how race is inscribed, through the framing tropes of parental narcissism, in the narratives of castration and coming out. We saw above that Freud presents primitive narcissism and parental narcissism as two empirical phenomena from which one can infer the original narcissism of the child. This opposition exemplifies the production of psychoanalytic subjects as European: the “child” is marked as European or civilized through the semiotic practice of analogizing it to “primitive peoples.” This juxtaposition of children and primitives pays homage to Ernst Haeckel’s recapitulation hypothesis (1879), that the development of the modern individual recapitulates the life of the species.\(^\text{36}\) The

\(^{36}\) For a discussion of the recapitulation thesis in scientific and popular discourses, see
categories of the individual and the species are both racialized in this formulation: the individual is racialized as European, and the category of the species is racialized in a way that adheres to the colonial trope of “panoptical time,” where people indigenous to the Americas, Australia, the Pacific islands, and much of Africa and Asia are temporalized as representatives of past stages of civilizational development, as “anachronistic people,” available for consumption at a glance, by the unmarked European subject of knowledge who alone represents “the species” in its latest and highest stage of development (McClintock). This reveals the deeply racialized common sense that underlies the theorization of all racially unmarked psychoanalytic categories—be it woman, man, mother, boy, girl, or child.

In the framework of the recapitulation hypothesis, one would indeed expect the narcissism of (ageless) primitives to have its correspondence in the narcissism of (European) children. But then Freud also proposes that the narcissism of (European) parents offers an indirect chance to see what the narcissism of children is like. Freud presents parental narcissism and primitive narcissism as if they both equally approximate the narcissism of children that, for an unspoken reason, cannot be observed directly.

The descriptions of these two observed phenomena, however, could hardly be more different. While Freud describes the narcissism of primitive peoples as their

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37 For a related analysis, see Johannes Fabian’s discussion of the temporalization of spatial difference (Fabian).
38 Arguably this is not unequivocally true for the category Weib, which can be seen as a reference to the indigenous European (female) Other, the witch.
belief in the potency of their thoughts and actions, the narcissism of “children,” as it is mediated through the parents (as I discussed above) is a fantasy of their perfections and entitlements to life, health, pleasure, and liberty. The juxtaposition between primitive narcissism and parental narcissism thus not only constructs a semiotic difference between them but also underlines the difference between potency and entitlement. In fact, in the name of the original narcissism of the child, parental narcissism is an ideological fantasy of entitlements and special privileges that were systematically co-constructed in opposition to the rightlessness of so-called primitive peoples.39

The contrast between the ideological fantasy of parental narcissism and the figure of the primitive resonates strongly with analyses of critical race scholarship about Foucault’s theorization of biopolitics.40 Foucault places his writings on sexuality within the context of the emergence of biopolitics, a politics that pursues and appeals to the maximization of life and health as legitimating anchor of its own doings, even if this politics is one of genocide. Many scholars have argued that race constitutes the boundary between those whose lives are fostered and those who are killed, enslaved, imprisoned, and hyper-exploited with impunity and in the name of protecting the “life” and “health” of others.41

39 On the concept ideological fantasy see (Freccero).
40 In privileging Foucault as my historical-theoretical framework, this chapter is repeating a problematic erasure of radical Black writing and other racially minoritized theorizations of racial modernity (Weheliye).
41 (Stoler; Chow; Puar). Stoler argues that in his last lecture at the College de France Foucault also articulated this connection himself.
It is not a coincidence that the trope of parental narcissism serves as an interface through which biopolitical fantasies of entitlement are articulated as the affect of an individual in relation to a normative nuclear family. Foucault theorizes that the saturation of the normative family with intense affect is part of the “deployment of sexuality.” More specifically, he observes that starting in the eighteenth century the (normative European) family has become “an obligatory locus of affect, feelings, love” (108). He explains this, in part, with the superimposition of the deployment of sexuality on the deployment of alliance (108).

The deployment of alliance is composed of a system of rules governing marriage and kinship, whereas the deployment of sexuality targets the individual body and its capacities for sensation, pleasure, and knowledge. Foucault theorizes the deployment of sexuality as a novel conglomeration of techniques of power that encompass several local power relations organized around sex and a thoroughly sexualized body, including the “psychiatrization of the perversions,” among which the medico-scientific specification of the homosexual figures prominently. But as Stoler emphasizes, Foucault does not claim that the deployment of sexuality simply obliterated the deployment of alliance or relegated it to second place. Rather, kinship structures and relationships became themselves produced anew as relationships constituted by affect.42 The discourse of narcissistic parental love exemplifies this superimposition of the deployment of sexuality onto the field of kinship relationships in an exemplary fashion.

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42 (Stoler 38)
As Rey Chow insists, it is important to “read the history of biopower that Foucault was attempting to write by writing about sexuality” (Chow 6). Too much of a focus on sexuality “in the narrow sense” (sex acts) has prevented many scholars from seeing sexuality in the light of biopower, where it is “no longer clearly distinguishable from the entire problematic of the reproduction of human life that is, in modern times, always racially and ethnically inflected” (7). Jasbir Puar points out the problematic how this formulation of Chow, by associating sexuality with reproduction, may privilege a heteronormative framing of sexuality even as sexuality is opened up to become coterminous with race and ethnicity, and may even unwittingly underwrite the implicit heterosexualization of racial and ethnic minority identity in liberal multiculturalist representational regimes (Puar 34). This cautionary note is well taken, but I think the potential problematic can be avoided by insisting that the “reproduction of human life” is only a political problematic to the extent that it enfold the production and re-production of social life which in turn must be disassociated from any privileged link to heterosexuality and biological reproduction.

The trope of narcissistic parental love is an important example for such an analysis. It is not merely the description of a privately experienced affect. It has a social and political function—in fact different functions. It epitomizes the enfolding of the biopolitical subject—the subject whose life’s protection and fostering is the strategic goal of biopower—into the biopolitical polity. The regimes of castration, coming out, and male/female as well as hetero/homo sexual difference are, through their imbrication in the tropes of narcissistic parental love, also bound up in the
biopolitical paradigm. A broad concept such as biopolitics has the attraction that it is poignant and can account for different geopolitical constellations and historical moments throughout the eighteenth, but especially the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. The function of race, class, criminality, coloniality, and other rubrics of social difference is not always the same in these different biopolitical constellations. Since narcissistic parental love, as a trope, can help normalize new biopolitical projects, its putative focus on “reproducing” the same is perhaps misleading. It is a trope that exists with sufficient continuity over a longer stretch of time and in different geopolitical spaces to be recognizable and to merit identification as historical-conceptual form that shapes social and political formations. It operates with a certain continuity to make subjects legible, often newly legible, as constituents of the state, even as the social meaning given to the formation that in engenders varies between race, class, criminality, and other boundaries to “civility.”

I shall highlight two social constellations, partially overlapping, that are managed through the tropes of narcissistic parental love: the formation of a bourgeois ethos, and nation-state making. The brief sketches of how narcissistic parental love manages these two constellations do not proclaim to be an exhaustive analysis or history of narcissistic parental love. Their purpose is to demonstrate how a certain level of continuity in the trope of parental narcissism is not contradicted by the fact that this trope articulates changing social formations. It is my hope that the analysis presented in the first part of this chapter allows for the narratives of castration and of coming out, and the associated regimes of sexual difference, to be seen in their
relationship to the history of biopower whose continuity-in-change is so well 
illustrated through the deployment of the trope of narcissistic parental love.

**Bourgeois Ethos**

Foucault argues that the turn to one's children as a source of affirmation of the self is 
part of the techniques through which the bourgeoisie in nineteenth-century Europe 
distinguished itself. This construction of the bourgeois body as a special body, 
Foucault suggests, was different from but at the same time modeled after techniques 
for aristocratic distinction. The nobility, he explains,

> had also asserted the special character of its body, but this was in the 
> form of *blood*, that is, in the form of the antiquity of its ancestry and of 
> the value of its alliances; the bourgeoisie on the contrary looked at its 
> progeny and the health of its organism when it laid claim to a special 
> body. The bourgeoisie's “blood” was its sex. (Foucault 124)

Foucault suggests that this practice of proudly gazing at one's progeny is not only a 
practice of lovingly affirming the individual self of a parent, but also a practice of 
distinguishing a collective self, and constituting this self differentially as a bourgeois 
self.

Scattered throughout his writings, Freud makes many statements that 
exemplify the operation of such a bourgeois anti-aristocratic ethos. In *The 
Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), several dream analyses give occasion to affirmations 
of parental pride and denunciations of ancestral pride. For instance, the following is 
Freud’s pithy summary of the latent dream thoughts—that is, the unconscious wish 
that is expressed and distorted—of one particular dream:
Es ist ein Unsinn, auf seine Vorfahren stolz zu sein. Lieber bin ich selber ein Vorfahr, ein Ahnherr. (Freud, Traumdeutung 436)

It is absurd to be proud of one's ancestry; it is better to be an ancestor oneself. (Freud, Interpretation of Dreams 2 434)

The manifest dream content of the respective dream is that Freud is driving in a one-horse carriage and requests to be driven to the train station. This scene elicits in Freud a chain of associations that lead him to the notion of the aristocracy and the aristocracy’s pride in ancestors. A brief “absurd” exchange he has with the driver becomes, in Freud’s analysis, the dream’s way of expressing the judgment that ancestral pride is “absurd” or Unsinn (nonsense).

Freud then counters the absurdity of ancestral pride with an axiomatic parental pride. Being an ancestor oneself is simply “better” than being proud of one’s ancestors—no argument or explanation needed. Freud’s ascription to the truth of this axiom appears part of a firm bourgeois anti-aristocratic ethos, which perfectly aligns with Foucault’s argument of the bourgeois re-deployment and re-definition of aristocratic discourses of distinction. This is apparent in his dream analysis. As part of the “day residue,” events from the day before the dream took place, Freud remembers standing on a railway platform and seeing Count Thun board a train. The aristocratic

43 Freud renders the dream content as follows: “Ich fahre in einem Einspänner und gebe Auftrag, zu einem Bahnhof zu fahren. ‘Auf der Bahnstrecke selbst kann ich natürlich nicht mit Ihnen fahren,’ sage ich, nachdem er einen Einwand gemacht, als ob ich ihn übermüdet hätte) dabei ist es so, als wäre ich schon eine Strecke mit ihm gefahren, die man sonst mit der Bahn fährt’ (Freud, Traumdeutung 434). “I was driving in a cab and ordered the driver to drive me to a station. ‘Of course I can’t drive with you along the railway line itself,’ I said, after he had raised some objection, as though I had overtired him. It was as if I had already driven with him for some of the distance one normally travels by train” (Freud, Interpretation of Dreams 2 432).
government member simply told off the train station worker who, not recognizing him, asked to see his ticket. As he analyzes the dream, Freud reminisces in the bourgeois revolutionary attitude which this scene evoked in him, full of resentment of the special privileges afforded to the Count.

In the dream analysis, Freud also remembers a puzzle that he had recently encountered. A good English translation goes as follows:

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With the master’s request
The driver complies
By all men possessed
In the Graveyard it lies
(…)
With the master’s request
The Driver Complies
Not by all men possessed
In the cradle it lies. (Freud, *Interpretation of Dreams* 2 433–434)
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The solution to the first riddle is “Vorfahren.” As a noun, it means ancestors: ancestors lie in the grave and are by all men possessed. As a verb, it means to drive up or ahead and is thus a command that a master could give to his driver. The solution to the second riddle is “Nachkommen.” In the meaning of “descendants,” they lie in the cradle and are not by all men possessed. In the meaning of “to come after,” it is another typical command to a driver. These two puzzles subtly make the point that since everybody has ancestors, there is nothing to be proud of in them. Descendants, on the other hand are “not by all men possessed,” a formulation which underscores the claims to distinction, even as the distinction did not primarily differentiate those

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44 The German version of the puzzle, as Freud renders it, goes: “Der Herr befiehlt’s, Der Kutscher tut’s. Ein jeder hat’s, Im Grabe ruht’s,” and „Der Herr befiehlt’s, Der Kutscher tut’s. Nicht jeder hat’s, In der Wiege ruht’s“ (Freud, Traumdeutung 435).
who have children from those who don’t but rather those who self-identify through such projected fantasies of parental pride and those who, absurdly, take pride in their ancestors—aristocrats. Going along with this anti-aristocratic take on ancestry and descent, Freud scoffs sarcastically at “the merits of the high lords, that they went through the trouble of being born” (“das Verdienst der hohen Herren […] daß sie sich die Mühe gegeben haben, geboren zu warden”) (Freud, *Traumdeutung* 436). This sarcastic joke re-articulates the aristocratic relationality to ancestry in the framework of the bourgeois gaze at the child and, not surprisingly, the resulting mocking praise for the infant’s efforts in having been born strikes Freud’s bourgeois sensibility as absurd.

Usually the dream thoughts are wishes that are foreign and unacceptable to the dreaming subject’s conscious self. Freud theorizes that these wishes are unconscious because they are repressed from consciousness. In this particular dream, the dream thoughts are a judgment, and one that is utterly acceptable to Freud’s conscious self. Freud fully embraces the notion that it is absurd to be proud of one’s ancestors and better to be an ancestor oneself. Despite the rhetoric of bourgeois rebellion against the aristocracy and despite the reality of aristocratic privileges, Freud’s bourgeois anti-aristocratic ethos did not have to undergo repression and resort to the complex mechanisms of a dream in order to find expression or fulfillment. Freud openly identifies with this rather normative message. Why then does the dream exist?

Nicholas Rand and Maria Torok offer an analysis that takes this dream beyond simple bourgeois common sense and further than Freud’s own interpretation.
Drawing from historical information that Freud’s uncle Josef was convicted of forgery in 1865 and that this event was widely reported, they conjecture that the scandal and shame traumatized the nine-year-old Sigmund Freud. Through an analysis of Freud’s dreams they develop this conjecture into an argument that Freud’s desire for recognition, success, and respectability is spurred by an attempt to escape from the unconscious stigma of Freud’s “family secret.” Freud’s dislike for ancestral pride, which they also notice as a recurrent theme, thus is not only a way to settle score and assert his bourgeois self against the aristocratic Thun but also an expression of the desire to be free from the stigma of association with his ancestor, the “criminal” uncle.45

The so-called “Dream of the Uncle” from Spring 1897 is Freud’s only publicly discussed dream that explicitly deals with his uncle. The uncle appears in the manifest dream content, in the knowledge that Freud's friend R. is his uncle.46 Relevant background to the dream is that Freud had reason to hope to be awarded the title of extraordinary professor. His senior colleagues had submitted the necessary recommendations to the minister of education. But the minister had stalled moving forward with the appointment, and Freud suspected that this was due to the minister’s reverence to the powerful antisemitic movement. Two of Freud’s colleagues, N. and

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45 To engage in additional dream analysis after the fact, on the basis of the textual documentation of Freud's analysis, is not to try to invalidate or override Freud's own analysis. Freud himself suggests that a dream's knot—the place where multiple lines of associations converge—is overdetermined by multiple significations. It is therefore not implausible that even a thorough compelling analysis can be incomplete. See also the discussion in (Rand and Torok 172–3).
46 (Freud, *Interpretation of Dreams* 1 137-145)
R., also Jews, had been recommended for professorships too but had never been appointed, which strengthened Freud’s suspicions. One of his friends had even elicited a personal confession from the minister that confirmed the antisemitism hypothesis.

In the dream analysis, Freud finds that his uncle represents both of his colleagues N. and R. Freud interprets the dream to express his unconscious wish that his two friends who are represented by the uncle were not given the professorship because they are a “criminal” and a “simpleton,” respectively. These epithets connect to his memory of his uncle Josef. Recounting the “unhappy story,” he remembers:

Mein Vater, der damals aus Kummer in wenigen Tagen grau wurde, pflegte immer zu sagen, Onkel Josef sei nie ein schlechter Mensch gewesen, wohl aber ein Schwachkopf; so drückte er sich aus. (Freud, Traumdeutung 144)

My father, whose hair turned gray from grief in a few days, used always to say that Uncle Josef was not a bad man but only a simpleton; those were his words. (quoyed in Rand and Torok 175; Freud, Interpretation of Dreams 138)

Freud finds occasion to associate one of his friends with the epithet “criminal” and the other “simpleton,” and he thereby arranged a perfect logic for the failures of their recommendations for professorship, as clearly the minister would not appoint a criminal or a simpleton. Freud’s dream then triumphantly concludes that the considerations that disqualify his friends from the professorship do not apply to him, he may thus look forward to a speedy appointment.

Torok and Rand’s re-reading of Freud’s analysis casts doubt on whether the triumphant affect that Freud identifies with the dream thoughts really tells the whole
truth of this dream. They argue instead that the dream wrestles with the stigma of being deemed a criminal or a simpleton, that Freud’s triumphant rejection of any relationship to being a “criminal” or a “simpleton” is in fact the agency of a repression of this stigma. A further detail that supports this interpretation is that Freud himself states that his interpretation so far does not fully satisfy him, as he does not consider his desire for the professorship to be so big that it would warrant such defaming representations of his dear colleagues. This supports Rand and Torok’s argument that there is more to the dream than Freud was able to analyze.

Freud did provide an additional layer of interpretation to account for what otherwise seems like an excessive desire for the professor title. Freud associates the following childhood memories:


At the time of my birth and old peasant-woman had prophesied to my proud mother that with her first-born child she had brought a great man into the world. Prophecies of this kind must be very common: there are so many mothers filled with happy expectations and so many old peasant-women and others of the kind who make up for their loss of their power to control things in the present world by concentrating it on the future. Nor can the prophetess have lost anything by her words. Could this have been the source of my thirst for grandeur? But that reminded me of another experience, dating from my later childhood, which provided a still better explanation. My parents had been in the habit, when I was a boy of eleven or twelve, of taking me with them to the Prater. One evening, while we were sitting in a restaurant there, our attention had been attracted by a small man who was moving from one table to another and, for a small consideration, improvising a verse upon any topic presented to him. I was despatched to bring the poet to our table and he showed his gratitude to the messenger. Before inquiring what the chosen topic was to be, he had dedicated a few lines to myself; and he had been inspired to declare that I should probably grow up to be a Cabinet Minister. I still remember quite well what an impression this second prophecy had made on me. Those were the days of the ‘Bürger’ Ministry. Shortly before my father had brought home portraits of these middle-class professional men—Herbst,

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47 James Strachey, Freud’s translator, explains: “The ‘Middle-class Ministry’—a government of liberal complexion, elected after the new Austrian constitution was established in 1867” (footnote on p. 193).
Giskra, Unger, Berger and the rest—and we had illuminated the house in their honour. There had even been some Jews among them. So henceforth every industrious Jewish schoolboy carried a Cabinet Minister’s portfolio in his satchel. The events of that period no doubt had some bearing on the fact that up to a time shortly before I entered the University it had been my intention to study Law; it was only at the last moment that I changed my mind. A ministerial career is definitely barred to a medical man. But now to return to my dream. It began to dawn on me that my dream was carrying me back from the dreary present to the cheerful hopes of the days of the ‘Bürger’ Ministry, and that the wish that it had done its best to fulfil was one dating back to those times. In mishandling my two learned and eminent colleagues because they were Jews, and in treating the one as a simpleton and the other as a criminal, I was behaving as though I were the Minister, I had put myself in the Minister’s place. Turning the tables on His Excellency with a vengeance! He had refuses to appoint me professor extraordinarius and I had retaliated in the dream by stepping into his shoes. (Interpretation of Dreams I 192–3)

A free-standing ambition for recognition is implausible to Freud. But once he re-routes his ambition through childhood scenes in which predictions for his great future are mediated by the proud maternal and parental gazes, under the reinforcement from the old peasant woman and the poetry artist, the resulting ambition finally makes sense.

But even this aspect of the story feeds back into the specifically bourgeois, anti-aristocratic, ethos of parental narcissism. As Freud notes, the prediction that he would become a minister made a strong impression on him in conjunction with the liberal political era of the late 1860s and 1870s, when the government included “bürgerliche[] Doktoren,” literally bourgeois men, as opposed to nobles, with doctoral degrees. Freud and his family evidently were strong supporters of this government. Freud emphasizes that it even included Jews—certainly a strong contrast to the political climate at the turn of the century where the minister does not even
unflinchingly appoint Jewish professors.

Freud’s desire then is not for recognition by the aristocratic-dominated government at the time but rather to be himself part of a government composed of Bürger, members of the bourgeois class. Freud accepts his ambition once he can understand it as a bourgeois revolutionary gesture against aristocracy,—a gesture which is once again articulated through or together with the tropes of parental narcissism that predict a great future to the child. Rand and Torok’s analysis adds that there is an underbelly to this proud embrace of a bourgeois anti-aristocratic ethos, namely Freud’s strife to dissociate from the scandal of his uncle’s conviction and imprisonment.

Both “others” of Freud’s bourgeois ambition appear as a deviations from the ideal of narcissistic parental love. The exemplary aristocratic baby whose merit lies in having gone through the trouble of having been born appears ridiculous if seen through the normative structure of bourgeois parental affect. Tellingly, the narcissistic-parental bourgeois vision of the infant, which sees only fantasies of a future adult, has no place for a flesh-and-blood creature that has emerged from another’s body. The scoffing remark that the merit of the aristocratic high lords is that they “have gone through the trouble of being born” plays with the idea that the toil of birth demands respect. Suppressed by sarcasm, the shadow of this idea operates to add joke-value to the aristocratic baby. The aristocrat thus looks so bad in Freud’s assessment, not least because represented as nothing but a toiling baby, he violates
the ideal of parental narcissism where the child is idealized through its projected futurity.

The criminal/simpleton does not even appear at any place through the trope of narcissistic parental love, not even as a misfit or joke. The criminal’s Otherness is even more fundamental: it represents all that from which the trajectories of narcissistic parental love move away. This is not surprising given that Freud’s ridicule of the aristocracy does not actually correspond to an abject social status of the latter, whereas the severe punishment of the criminal means that his social life is over. Still, in both instances tropes of narcissistic parental love operate to mediate dividing lines between the subject that can lay claim to the state (even as the state may discriminate against the subject by delaying an appointment as professor) and the criminal subject. In this instance these dividing lines are articulated through a distinctly bourgeois deployment of narcissistic parental love.

**Nations Into State**

In another social-historical constellation, tropes of narcissistic parental love operated on a larger scale. The figure of the aristocrat had disappeared from the scene, but the opposition of the child who constitutes the epitome of his or her parents’ happiness to the figure of the social outcast and “criminal” was deployed again. In 1916 and 1917, war-produced chronic food shortages and the social unrest that followed were met by Austria’s political and cultural elites with a discursive explosion about the breakup of the family: absent fathers, neglectful or weak mothers, and “wayward” (*verwahrlost*)
and “brutalized” (verroht) children and youth, always on the brink of criminality, populated the imagination of social commentators.48

Maureen Healy’s analysis of the discourse of waywardness concludes that the anxiety responded to increased visibility of youth and children, unaccompanied by adults, in public spaces.49 The concept of waywardness linked the material deprivation of proletarian children and youth to emotional and moral decay, and a general proclivity to crime and lawlessness. An adjective that is originally a past participle, “verwahrlost” suggests a state of having become inhuman or liminally human as a result of lack of basic care.

The discourse of wayward youth could hardly be in a starker contrast to the discourse of parental narcissism, both in the affect with which they relate to the child or youth and in the family constellation (or lack thereof) with which they framed said child or youth. The contrast to “the pretty picture of the family” was explicitly acknowledged in commentator’s statements about their perception of wartime realities (quoted in Zahra, Kidnapped Souls 92). In 1917 state censors, whose job included reporting to the government about the attitudes of the population, wrote about overhearing mothers talk about killing themselves along with their children, and they were not the only ones who expressed concern that “motherly instincts” had gone amiss (ibid).

With state legitimacy increasingly hinging on the state’s failure to meet basic

48 (Healy especially chapters 1, 5, 6, for statistics on starvation-related deaths see p. 41 ff. Zahra, Kidnapped Souls chapter 3)
49 (Healy 251)
food needs, the government eventually sought to alleviate the material deprivation by founding a new ministry—the Ministry for Social Welfare, and the Imperial Widows and Orphans Fund (k. k. Witwen und Waisenfond). The new state interest in social welfare was tied to the politics of the war, and so efforts to alleviate the destitution of the masses were justified partly as the duty to provide for the children and, for less prominent in the rhetoric, widows of their heroic soldier-fathers and –husbands. The second major rhetorical strategy in presenting the necessity of the fund was to explain the need to recover the forces of youth and to prevent complete lawlessness, for the purpose of the future survival of the state. Since the soldiers were also officially fighting for the survival of the state, these two rhetorical strategies formed a coherent whole.

Prince Eduard von und zu Liechtenstein, head of the Youth Division of the Interior Ministry, explained in a speech:

The great majority of the fallen heroes are men of good standing. They are dutiful workers, farmers, small businessmen and members of the higher professions. The child was for them the pivotal point of their lives, their happiness, their hope. (quoted in Healy 221–2)

By enlisting “workers, farmers, small businessmen and members of the higher professions,” the official deploys the trope of parental narcissism—in the wider sense as a trope in which the child is the happiness and “pivotal point” of the parent’s life—in a gesture of unity across class boundaries. In fact, the government appealed specifically to the solidarity of the better-off because its welfare program covered a

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50 (Healy 221; for an exemplary text see Liechtenstein and Peerz)
large share of its expenses through private donations.\textsuperscript{51}

This deployment of parental narcissism in a gesture of cross-class solidarity falls in line with a narrative that Foucault tells about the deployment of sexuality. First articulated as a bourgeois practice in distinction from the proletariat (even if its ostensible antagonist is the aristocracy, as it is in Freud’s utterances), the deployment of sexuality eventually becomes targeted at the proletariat, but only once there are multiple institutions of regulation and surveillance in place for the control of its body and its sexuality. These institutions include “schooling, the politics of housing, public hygiene, institutions of relief and insurance, the general medicalization of the population” (126). We can see such a shift being completed in the Austrian introduction of welfare (“institutions of relief”).

What needs to be added is that this cross-class deployment of sexuality was mediated by a turn to nationalism. Here it is crucial to realize that in 1917 Austria, the state, did not coincide with any nation. But in the midst of the growing impact of nationalist movements that gradually increased after 1880, most influential among them German and Czech nationalisms, child and youth welfare associations were very prominent. They discovered the terrain of child and youth welfare long before the state did and operated under the rationale of strengthening their respective nations.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{51} (Zahra, \textit{Kidnapped Souls} 101)
\textsuperscript{52} In the early 1900s, German and Czech nationalist associations in Bohemia and Moravia (which are the nationalisms and regions that shaped the meaning of nationality in Austria most significantly) organized on behalf of orphans and proposed nationalist definitions of the child, according to which it was important to ensure that no child would be lost to the nation. Tara Zahra argues: “Although the number of children who grew up in nationalist orphanages was relatively modest,
When the state belatedly entered this field, it did not build its own regional offices but instead outsourced the provision of services (and to a significant extent also fundraising) to existing nationalist welfare associations, thereby enfolding these nationalist associations into the state.\footnote{Zahra, Kidnapped Souls 79–105; Zahra, “‘Each Nation Only Cares for Its Own’”}

The deployment of sexuality, and in particular the trope of narcissistic parental love then performed a cross-class unity that at the same time meant a strengthening of the category of nationality as an organizing principle for the state. The trope of narcissistic parental love in this instance operated to present the inhuman “wayward” parentless youth as biopolitical subjects of the state. In response to the moral panic about wayward youth and the breakdown of the family, the announcement of the welfare program rhetorically scoops up said fatherless wayward youth and children and brushes them up rhetorically to fit into the template of the child as the happiness, hope and pivotal point in the lives of their heroic fathers. This discursive re-imagining preceded any material assistance by the state. The material assistance that was then provided fell back on an infrastructure the explicit point of which was to provide for the children of the nation in order to strengthen the nation.

This reinforces and gives an important twist to a point made by Anne Stoler. In response to Foucault’s point about the original class character of the deployment of sexuality, she insists:

Discourses of sexuality do more than define the distinctions of the orphan welfare programs figured prominently in the propaganda arsenal of early-twentieth-century nationalist associations and ultimately emboldened nationalists to develop far more expansive child welfare programs” (\textit{Kidnapped Souls} 68). \footnote{Zahra, \textit{Kidnapped Souls} 79–105; Zahra, “‘Each Nation Only Cares for Its Own’”}
bourgeois self; in identifying marginal members of the body politic, they have mapped the moral parameters of European nations. (Stoler 7)

Stoler further argues that discourses of sexuality have reinforced “a racialized notion of civility” that brought the tension between racial and class membership into sharp relief (ibid). Her argument is built from the study of sexuality, race, class, and gender in colonial Dutch Indonesia but it also speaks to the discourse of waywardness, which put wayward youths outside the bounds of the “civil.” Civility was re-claimed for the formerly-deemed “wayward” children and youth by representing them through the “civil” order of the normative family structure where absent fathers turn into heroic symbolically present fathers and wayward children are re-imagined as their fathers’ happiness.54 In the instance of the inauguration of social welfare in Habsburg Austria, we furthermore observe a different function of discourses of sexuality, namely of bringing nations more deeply into the body politic.55

Conclusion

I believe that many other such twisting points can be narrated. But my point is not to write a history of parental narcissism. My aim with these two sketches of parental narcissism in bourgeois self-affirmation and parental narcissism in the joint embrace

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54 This notion of civility could be called racialized because its role in techniques of dehumanizing through alleged nonnormative family order are principle technologies of racial Othering, but the particular shape that it took in this instance is nevertheless more in continuity with longer arches of class formations and the construction of criminality rather than racial Othering. Classic studies of racial Othering through discourses of allegedly nonnormative family structures are (Spillers; Ferguson).

55 In the different nationalisms in Habsburg Austria, the Europeanness of these nations cannot be presumed in advance. The question of Europeanness is central in the next chapter.
of nationalism and social welfare is different. It is to show that parental narcissism, a biopolitical discourse of sexuality, operates with a certain continuity to mediate claims to state protections, provisions and social citizenship, even as the specific social formations that parental narcissism participates in, re-codes, and legitimates take on different meanings, including race, class, and criminality.

In the first part of this chapter I demonstrated how the scenes of castration and coming out are structurally embedded in the trope of narcissistic parental love. This structural embeddedness takes different forms: In the coming-out narrative in Peters, parental narcissism is a theme that is centrally present in the coming-out scene; it is in the narrative as content. In the Freudian narrative of castration and sexual difference, the relationship to parental narcissism is not as apparent, but I demonstrated through an analysis of Freud’s theorization of narcissism that parental narcissism dominates the empirical-ethnographic basis of Freud’s theorization of “original narcissism” and of the castration narrative, that Freud refers to the castration complex as his best answer to the scenario of disappointed (parental) narcissism, and further that the account of parental narcissism actually sets up not only the castration scene but also the coming-out scene and thereby connects these scenes more firmly than my initial analogical framing suggested.

With parental narcissism now re-thought through the concepts of biopolitics and the deployment of sexuality, as a discourse that articulates biopolitical imperatives across shifting social and political constellations, the forms of sexual difference that are embedded in the castration and coming-out narratives need to be
re-thought and re-seen in their relationship to the biopolitical deployment of parental narcissism as well. Parental narcissism, to me, operates as a liminally historical and liminally theoretical category: It involves ethnographic-historical particularity and it anchors psychoanalytic and literary-semiotic discussions of sexual difference, lack, and sameness. It could draw the forms of knowledge that are entertained in this different discourses closer together. My primary point is that normative binary articulations of sexual difference, to the extent that they are committed to the castration and coming-out frameworks, are given shape by the biopolitical deployment of parental narcissism.

The next chapter will take on the other foundational psychoanalytic theory of sex/gender: the theory of Oedipus. In his later writings, Freud argues that the theories of castration and Oedipus belong together in one joint theory of the gendered psyche. I have in this chapter defied the link between castration and Oedipus and examined the theory of castration as a narrative unit in its own right, or rather: as a narrative unit that is connected to the coming-out narrative and the biopolitical discourse of parental narcissism. These connections would likely not have become apparent if I had not dared to neglect the imperative to keep castration and Oedipus as one theoretical unit. My methodological interest in the work of ideological narratives and tropes rather than primarily in the psyche justifies this approach, since the main question is not, in fact, how the psyche works, but rather how accounts of “the self” work that are ideologically relevant. As I engage with Freud’s theory of Oedipus, I will once again center writings that precede Freud’s most “complete” articulation of
his theory: Freud’s 1897 letters to Wilhelm Fließ. I will read these writings through a contemporary political event, the Badeni affair, that brings out how the Oedipus theory is as much about what it means to be European as it is about what it means to be a man.
2) Sexuality, Antiquity, and the Embodiment of European Culture: Freud’s Hannibal and Oedipus in the Shadow of the Badeni Language Ordinances

The Badeni controversy erupted after Austrian Ministerpräsident Casimir Badeni issued new language ordinances in April 1897. Badeni ordered the bureaucratic institutions in Bohemia and Moravia to be bilingual in German and Czech. German nationalist and liberal constituencies throughout Austria were up in arms against the Badeni ordinances. Their street demonstrations and parliamentary obstruction lead to the dismissal of the Badeni government. In Prague, Czech nationalist protests against Badeni’s dismissal followed suit which soon evolved into anti-Jewish riots in late November and early December 1897 that are sometimes remembered as “Dezembersturm” (December storm). These events coincided temporally with the pivotal moment in the history of psychoanalysis that is documented in the letters of Sigmund Freud to his Berlin friend Wilhelm Fließ. Over spring, summer, and fall of 1897, Freud pursued a self-analysis, began writing *Traumdeutung (The Interpretation of Dreams)*, the book he considered his masterpiece. He also began to detach himself from the theory that hysteria is originated by a trauma of sexual abuse (the so-called “seduction theory”), and he first voiced the conviction that Sophocles’ drama *Oedipus Rex* captures a fundamental psychic reality—a moment which has therefore been dubbed the discovery or invention of the Oedipus complex. The dismissal of the

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56 Among the vast scholarship that studies Freud’s letters from 1897, see (Swan; Masson; St. John; McClintock; McGrath; Fletcher; Robbins; Krüll; Anzieu).
seduction theory and the discovery of the Oedipus complex are generally thought to be a crucial stepping-stone for Freud’s theories of fantasy and sexuality.\textsuperscript{57}

Mere temporal coincidence is not a strong argument for thematic, conceptual, or historical connection, but is there anything to be said about this coincidence? This question is particularly pertinent because language is a persistent psychoanalytic-theoretical interest.\textsuperscript{58} If psychoanalysis has theorized a sexual subject, it has also theorized a subject-in-language. This makes more plausible the call for a close analysis of the politics of language that surround the emergence of psychoanalysis, not unlike the call to consider psychoanalysis and its relationship to contemporary politics of gender and sexuality, which has been taken up with a wide range of methodologies and framing questions.

I am interested in the conceptual convergences, divergences, resonances, and contradictions between Freud’s mobilization of sex, gender, and sexuality in his emergent theory of the psyche and contemporary discourses of the language-using subject as they are mobilized and negotiated in the politics of language and nationality. To better understand the relationships between these seemingly separate discourses, it is necessary to treat psychoanalysis and the debates about language rights and nationality as part of one shared archive of constructions of subjectivity, sociality, embodiment, identity and culture. This chapter begins to assemble such an

\textsuperscript{57} For a detailed overview, see Masson. For a recent argument for a more complicated history of the seduction theory and psychoanalysis, see Fletcher.

\textsuperscript{58} Jaques Lacan’s dictum that the unconscious is structured like a language only exemplifies this interest. See (Bjelic, especially the introduction).
archive from on examination of Freud’s letters to Fließ of fall 1897, together with select documents of the German opposition to the Badeni ordinances. The temporal coincidence of the Badeni crisis and Freud’s pivotal psychoanalytic breakthroughs thus serves as a point of departure for thinking through a larger historical-theoretical problematic.\textsuperscript{59}

Analysing Freudian psychoanalysis together with select examples of German national and liberal opposition to the Badeni ordinances, I argue in this chapter that the field of sex/gender/sexuality (in psychoanalysis) and the field of language/nationality (in contemporary nationalist and liberal discourse) both exhibit constructions of a “modern” and “European” subject that straddles claims to universality and distinction. Freud’s theorization of Oedipus in particular turns the scene of a heteropatriarchally-embedded infant into an emblem of universal human subjectivity, but his argument relies on a prior, unabashedly exclusive, discourse on Greek and Roman antiquity as the cradle of European culture. My critique of universalism, then, is not an anthropological one, based on the inapplicability of the Oedipus theory to certain contexts, but rather an examination of how Freud’s claim to universality operates as an epistemic strategy for the subject that characterizes itself through it.\textsuperscript{60}

This argument becomes more apparent after considering German nationalist

\textsuperscript{59} The concept “point of departure” as a methodological necessity is theorized by Erich Auerbach (13–16).

\textsuperscript{60} On the difference between anthropological and epistemological critiques of the alleged universality of a “modern,” European, white, Western, or otherwise imagined racial subject of modernity, see (Thomas).
and liberal statements during the Badeni controversy. The political battle over the Badeni ordinances forced the explicit articulation of a hierarchical understanding of languages and, by extension, cultures that found anchorage in a colonial imagination of “European culture,” education, and civilization. The widespread German opposition to the Badeni ordinances was fueled in part by the perception of injured cultural and racial status. One way how liberal German voices justified the superior cultural value and racial status of German was through the argument that German, but not Czech, has a relationship to the classical languages of antiquity. This argument resonates in Freud with the construction of the “modern human” who is tied to antiquity in a relationship that is not merely genealogical-historical but also affective: antiquity is constructed as part of the life-world of and is thus contemporaneous to the educated German subject. It is out of this experience of contemporaneity, as produced in the Latin class of the Gymnasium and on the theater stage, that Freud theorizes the allegedly universal character of the Oedipus complex.

In addition, this chapter argues that with the figure of the “Semitic hero” Hannibal, Freud articulated a specifically Jewish variation within his construct of a universal masculine subject as theorized through Oedipus. This variation, however, shares much with the Oedipal subject: a normatively masculine relationship between father and son, an educated German relationship to antiquity, and an aversion to a religiosity that is rendered as deviant gendered behavior and moral sentiment. I elaborate on this moral consensus that is upheld through Freud’s theory of Oedipus and his more personal fantasy of Hannibal by examining two respective figures that
emerge as the structural outside of these theories: the figure of the Eastern Jew in Freud’s Hannibal fantasy and the figure of the pious Christian woman in his Oedipus theory. I also show how Freud legitimizes the tropes of destiny and fate in his discourse of gender and sexuality while he has nothing but contempt for the same concepts when they are deployed in a religious discourse. Developed out of a prior German bourgeois ethos of cultivating a relationship to “classical antiquity” in the Gymnasium and the theater, Freud’s theory of Oedipus and his fantasy of Hannibal newly articulate the question of differential belonging to a racial modernity as a question of a “universal” gender and kinship organization.

The Badeni controversy: an introduction

A brief introduction to the politics of language and nationality in Habsburg Austria is necessary to understand the controversy about the Badeni ordinances. Since 1880, the decennial Austrian census recorded its subjects’ *Umgangssprache* or “language of interaction.” At this point the government did not wish to strengthen national identities and therefore resisted demands to record nationality instead of “language of interaction.” But the figures about languages of interaction were widely used to measure the changing demographics of national development. The category

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61 Alternative English translations common in the English literature are “language of everyday use” and “language of daily use.” None of these however reflect the meaning of *Umgang*, interaction or intercourse, even though contemporary debates about *Umgangssprache* frequently involved claims about who a particular subject interacts with, which interactions are decisive, etc. Emil Brix’s monograph is the most thorough study of the category *Umgangssprache* in Habsburg Austria (Brix).
“language of interaction” also exists in (fragile) contrast to the alternative concept of the native language or “mother tongue” (*Muttersprache*). In cases of conflict, it was geared to record the language of the workplace rather than the language of one’s upbringing. This is because, at least for the poor, peasant-turned-working classes, which accounted for the bulk of migration-related national shifts recorded in the census, interactions were largely governed by the rules of the workplace. With regards to the effects of migration, the category “language of interaction” thus tended toward static descriptions of the arrangement of institutions of commerce, labor, and public life, rather than dynamic renderings of migrations and the linguistic and/or regional backgrounds of migrant populations.62

In predominantly German regions that had an influx of Czech workers, such as Vienna and North-Western Bohemia, the category “language of interaction” thus favored German.63 While different regional centers, notably Prague, developed different dynamics, the predominantly German communities in Bohemia, which had become the destination of Czech labor migration, stimulated linguistic and national controversies in Bohemia and Austria most. Competing imaginaries of the regional organization of the polity played an important role here: While Czech-nationalist discourse typically emphasized the historic unity of Bohemia (and frequently a unity

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62 On the census, “language of everyday use,” and nationality, see (Brix; Stourzh; also Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*; Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*)

63 This was observed by many Czech nationalists (Brix). An example of this assessment is also recorded in Stourzh, with lawyer Josef Seifert who argues in a case where he represents a claim for Czech elementary schools in Vienna that “the category of ‘language of interaction’ in itself already acts to the disadvantage of the non-Germans” (Stourzh 282).
of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia) and the minority status of German populations within it, German national and liberal discourse tended to defend a “geschlossenes deutsches Sprachgebiet” (“cohesive German language area”) in Bohemia as its own regional entity whose superregional reference point was Austria as a whole, bypassing the provincial organization as much as possible.

These different regional imaginaries also mattered in the controversy about the Badeni language ordinances. The Badeni ordinances of April 5 1897 reflected the Czech nationalist tendency to treat Bohemia as a political and administrative unit. The ordinances were a result of Badeni’s cooperation with the Young Czech Party, then the most influential Czech nationalist party. The ordinances consist of two parts. The first concerns the use of German and Czech in the bureaucratic offices of the courts and the state attorney, as well as those subordinated to the ministries of the interior, finance, and trade and agriculture; the second concerns the linguistic qualifications required of civil servants employed in any of these offices in Bohemia. The main provision of the first ordinance was that each issuance made at a bureaucratic office in Bohemia in either German or Czech would be processed in the language of the issuance. The second ordinance ruled that newly employed bureaucrats needed to demonstrate oral and written knowledge of both German and Czech within the first three years of their employment (Badeni). A parallel set of ordinances was issued for

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64 This cooperation took place as part of Badeni’s formation of a government that was backed by the Reichsrat (Imperial Council). Badeni’s government included other Slavic and clerical parties. Badeni also relied on the anticipated support of the party of the German constitution-loyal large land holdings (Verfassungstreuer Großgrundbesitz) but this party in the end withdrew its support (Mommsen).
Moravia on April 22.\textsuperscript{65}

The ordinances met with strong opposition from German nationalist and German liberal forces, who protested against the requirement of bilingualism.\textsuperscript{66} Days after the publication of the Badeni ordinances, German municipalities and cities in Bohemia submitted written protests against the ordinances, followed by similar protest by the municipal councils of Klagenfurt (Carinthia), Graz (Styria), and Vienna (Lower Austria). The latter were not directly affected but protested on behalf of an inter-regional Germanness.\textsuperscript{67}

A relatively small minority of representatives of the Reichsrat, the Austrian parliament, who belonged to different German nationalist and liberal parties, began the systematic obstruction of all regular parliamentary activities. The obstruction shook the government particularly strongly because it was due to pass the decennial renewal of Austria’s fiscal relations with Hungary, the Ausgleich. Because of the obstruction, Badeni closed the legislative session early on June 2, 1897.\textsuperscript{68} When Badeni opened the next parliamentary session in September, nothing had changed. A minority of German obstructionists heckled systematically, demolished the tables, and used the rules of procedures to filibuster. It came to physical fights, and personal insults were the order of the day. To restore his honor after being personally insulted,

\textsuperscript{65} (Sutter, \textit{Die Badenischen Sprachenverordnungen I} 274, 277)
\textsuperscript{66} Up until this point, arrangements in these linguistically heterogeneous provinces differed by region. Because German dominated secondary and higher education, civil servant generally knew German, regardless of their national identity. But German civil servants in predominantly German regions rarely knew Czech.
\textsuperscript{67} (Sutter, \textit{Die Badenischen Sprachenverordnungen I} 245–247)
\textsuperscript{68} (Sutter, \textit{Die Badenischen Sprachenverordnungen I} 258–64)
Badeni asked the Pan-German Karl Hermann Wolf for a pistol duel in which Badeni was shot in the arm. On October 28 and 29, Otto Lecher, German progressive representative from Brünn/Brno in Moravia achieved fame for his twelve-hour-long speech which extended the session into the mid-morning of the next day before the president of the house dismissed the session in defeat, as once again no regular parliamentary activity had been accomplished. For Lecher and the obstruction, this was a victory in their fight against the Badeni ordinances and, by extension, the government.

On November 25, the government tricked the parliament into passing the *Lex Falkenheyn* which authorized the *Reichsrat*’s president to have disruptive parliamentarians removed from the room. The German nationalists Georg Schönerer and K.H. Wolf were soon forcefully removed, as well as eleven Social Democrats. Christian-Social representatives, who had so far kept a low profile or opposed the obstruction, now took up obstruction in protest against the removal of their German compatriots, and Badeni closed this parliamentary session as well.

The *Lex Falkenheyn* and subsequent forcible exclusions were denounced as a “violation” by the obstruction and its supporters and frequently cast as a repetition of the alleged violation inflicted by the Badeni ordinances themselves. Major German demonstrations in Vienna and Graz (Czech Štýrský Hradec, Slovenian Gradec), with significant participation of German-nationalist student associations, led the emperor

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69 The law was voted on in the midst of chaos and many representatives did not understand what was voted on until after their standing bodies had already been counted as yes votes.
Franz Joseph to dismiss the Badeni government.\footnote{Before the dismissal was publicized, street demonstrations escalated in Graz and two protesters were fatally shot by the military. The protests in Graz responded to the events surrounding the Badeni-ordinances but also to the fatal shooting of a Social-Democratic worker by the military that was sent to a clash between Social-Democratic and Christian-Socials at an election event. Many smaller German and mixed towns in Bohemia had German protests that reverted into anti-Czech and anti-Jewish riots, among which Saaz was the most widely discussed case. For a general narration of the Badeni demonstrations, riots, and general crisis, I rely strongly on (Sutter, \textit{Die Badenischen Sprachenverordnungen I}; Sutter, \textit{Die Badenischen Sprachenverordnungen II}) but for overviews see also (King 92–97; Mommsen).}

With Badeni’s dismissal, Prague became the center of protest after November 29. The protests demolished buildings representing institutions of German cultural life; soon it escalated into a riot where Jewish- and German-appearing individuals were attacked on the street and their homes and stores were systematically demolished and looted. The violence escalated for several days, targeting shops and houses of Jews or those perceived as Jews in Prague and its suburbs.\footnote{According to \textit{Dr. Bloch’s Oesterreichische Wochenschrift}, a Jewish Austrian weekly newspaper, eight hundred Jewish houses and businesses in Prague had their windows smashed and forty-four Jewish stores were looted (Bloch, “Jahrmarkt des Lebens” 1001).} Massive military was deployed, several people killed, and on December 2 martial law was imposed on Prague and several suburbs.

The ease with which Czech nationalist protest could revert into or double as an antisemitic pogrom deserves historical explanation, especially given that the protest was ostensibly directed against a German movement whose leading force, German nationalism, was itself antisemitic. An affinity between Jews and the German language (which, as Martha Rozenblit emphasizes, does not equate to an affinity with German nationalism) had been actively produced by the Habsburg State since the
eighteenth century. Emperor Joseph II’s Edict of Toleration of 1781/82, which ordered the emancipation of the Jews, went hand in hand with a series of measures to “make the Jews more useful to the state,” as Joseph II put it. Joseph II ordered Jews to either send their children to Christian schools or create new German Jewish schools. Rabbis in Bohemia and Moravia supported a trend to German Jewish schools. These schools had a large impact on creating a German-speaking Jewish population (from formerly Western Yiddish) in Bohemia and Moravia. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, an affinity between Bohemian and Moravian Jews and the German language seems to be operative across the spectrum of class difference, but more pronouncedly among bourgeois and elite classes.

In Bohemia, there was a countermovement to the Germanization of Bohemian Jews that started in the later nineteenth century. Czech nationalism campaigned against German Jewish schools as “outposts” of Germanism. The Czech Jewish movement formed in response, and allied itself with the Young Czech Party to close down these schools and generally articulate and promote Czech-Jewish identity. As Čapková argues, the Czech Jewish movement that began in the late 1870s was spearheaded by Jewish students in Prague who came from working-class families in Czech environments in rural or small town Bohemia. The established Jewish community in Prague ranged from middle-class to elite, and its cultural, intellectual and political life was closely integrated with non-Jewish German culture. The

72 (Kuděla; Rozenblit, “Assimilation and Affirmation”; Decker; Krüll)
73 (Rozenblit, “Creating Jewish Space”)
74 (Čapková; Cohen) When the walls of the large Jewish ghetto in Prague came down after
German Jewish community in Prague and the emergent Czech Jewish movement had little overlap. A major driving force in the rhetoric of the Czech Jewish movement was the project of countering the claim that Jews are allies of the Germans and therefore enemies to the Czech nation. The Czech Jewish movement instead highlighted its loyalty to the Czech nation. The activities of Czech nationalist and Czech Jewish organizations contributed to a significant shift in the aggregate view of linguistic commitments among Jews in Bohemia. While two thirds of Bohemian Jews declared German their language of interaction on the census of 1890, the next census of 1900 recorded 45% of Bohemian Jews with German language of interaction, 55% with Czech. The ten-year gap thus produced a difference of over twenty percentage points. In Prague the rates for registering Czech as language of interaction were even higher.

Nationalist riots and “excesses,” as the official terms went, by German and of Czech nationalist protest and celebration alike frequently targeted Jews in addition to Czechs and Germans. The records of the imperial government, systematically organized in two folders titled “Excesses of the Germans” and “Excesses of the Czechs,” reflect the degree to which such excesses did not always have a single

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75 Rozenblit, “Creating Jewish Space” 109). See also K. k. Statistische Central-Commission, Oesterreichische Statistik 63, 1 (1902) and 63, 3 (1903); Oesterreichische Statistik, N. F. 1, 1 (1912).

76 This formulation should not obscure the overlap and instability of these categories. It characterizes the rhetoric of the violence and not the ontology of its victims.
meaning or an unequivocally defined target. In addition to actions that targeted Czechs, Germans, or Czech- or German-owned property, rioters threatened Jews, smashed windows in synagogues and Jewish houses, inflicted damage on Jewish cemeteries, and looted Jewish stores. “Windows smashed at the houses of some Jews respectively Germans” reads an entry for December 2 for Beraun in the folder “Excesses of the Czechs.” The formulation “Jews respectively Germans” presumably reflects the data-collecting government official’s perception that the target of this “excess” could not be described unequivocally as either “Jews” or “Germans.” Similarly, a note about demonstrations in Königgrätz/Hradec Kralove on December 2 and 3 states: “These excesses had a predominantly antisemitic character but there were also excesses committed against Germans.”

The assessment of the character of the riots in recent scholarship diverges. Berthold von Sutter, in his two-volume monograph on the Badeni language ordinances and their consequences, simply characterizes them as “anti-German.” Among the list of targeted buildings, he includes mention of the “Israelite Temple” but does not acknowledge a distinct anti-Jewish dimension that compounded, mediated and eventually refocused the riots. Most writers however agree broadly that, at least once the riots shifted from targeting representative institutions to targeting

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77 Austrian State Archives, AVA – Inneres Mdl Praesidium Varia, Reichsratswahlen Excesse Boehmen, Karton 47, 1897
78 “(…) bei einigen Juden bzw. Deutschen Fenster eingeschlagen (…)”
79 “Diese Exzesse hatten einen vorwiegend antisemitischen Charakter doch wurden auch gegen Deutsche Ausschreitungen begangen“
homes and stores in Prague’s suburbs, Jews were explicitly targeted as Jews.\textsuperscript{80}

Christoph Stölzl sums up his characterization of the “December storm” by saying that it started as an attack of German institutions, which, however, quickly reverted into antisemitic terror. He emphasizes that the primary victims of this terror were lower middle-class Jews of the Prague suburbs who had long presented as Czech.\textsuperscript{81}

**Sigmund Freud, in the mean time**

Looking at Freud’s letters to Fließ during these months in 1897, after reading about the Badeni controversy, one may be struck by the relative absence of commentary on these political events. Freud’s letters to Fließ exhibit a completely different temporality of struggle. A persistent theme throughout the letters is Freud’s desire to see Fließ. Freud and Fließ regularly traveled to different towns to spend a few days in

\textsuperscript{80} It appears that Czech nationalist leaders rationalized the targeting of Jews by presenting Jews as the prototype of the figure of the Czech-oppressing and Czech-betraying German. Bloch reports that the \textit{Národní listy}, the Young Czech daily newspaper, alleged that among the German students who marched through Prague in celebration of Badeni’s dismissal, there were especially many Jews. Bloch counters that most of the marching students wore “Couleur” and were thus members of the German nationalist student associations which were themselves antisemitic (primarily serving German students who came to Prague from the German regions of Bohemia in which antisemitism is more commonly part of German identity and politics at this time than in the established German community in Prague, which opposed antisemitism in all its newspapers and institutions. Among the few students who did not display their Couleur, Bloch argues, it is unlikely that there were many Jewish students, and even if there were, the important point is that they marched “as Germans.” (Bloch, “Aus Prag” 1040).

\textsuperscript{81} (Stölzl 62–3). See also (Krejčová and Mišková 56). Mark Twain’s “Stirring Times in Austria” also observes that both Czech and German nationalist riots target Jews. Twain’s journalistic account of the Badeni crisis, during which he was in Vienna, makes the significant factual error that the Badeni language ordinances sought to substitute Czech for German as the official language. This is false in that the ordinances equalized the status of both languages. Furthermore, neither Austria as a whole nor Bohemia had an “official language,” the privileged status of German notwithstanding.
each other’s company. These “congresses,” as Freud called them, involved long conversations about their work and brought invaluable intellectual stimulation to Freud. Starting in the summer of 1897, another theme in the letters is Freud’s total immersion in his self-analysis. For instance, in the letter from October 27 he writes:

Von mir berichte ich dir nichts als Analyse, die, mein’ ich, auch für Dich das Interessanteste an mir sein wird. (Freud, *Briefe an Fliess* 295)

As for myself, I have nothing to tell you about except analysis, which I think will be the most interesting thing about me for you as well. (Freud, *Complete Letters* 272)

Freud’s self-analysis gains momentum through memories of his nursemaid from his first years in Freiberg (Czech *Příbor*) in Moravia, partly evoked by dreams, partly brought to his knowledge by his mother. Interwoven with his self-analysis are Freud’s announcement that he no longer believes in his “seduction theory” (the theory that neurosis is caused by child sexual abuse) and his first formulation of his Oedipus theory: he hypothesizes that “love of the mother and hatred of the father” are a universal predicament rendered artistically in Sophocles’ drama *King Oedipus*.

Carl Schorske, cultural historian of fin-de-siècle Vienna, argues that Freud, like so many intellectuals and artists of his generation and his liberal German milieu, was alienated from politics and hence turned his energies inward to theorize the psyche. Freud’s immersion in his self-analysis and key psychoanalytic theoretical milestones, juxtaposed with his apparent relative disinterest in the Badeni controversy, supports Schorske’s theory on the superficial level. However, Schorske’s

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82 (Schorske)
separation between politics and the psyche (which he subsumes in a larger binary of politics versus culture, and of history versus science) is itself a product of the ideological investment in a coherent “German liberal” milieu and the claim of its exclusion from politics. While it is true that the German liberal party was not involved in government since the 1880s, the thesis of a coherent alienation from politics glosses over the significant collaborations between German liberal and German nationalist forces in the opposition to the Badeni ordinances, which exerted enough power to overthrow the Badeni government. Schorske’s thesis is furthermore problematic because the claim to have a rich cultural, intellectual, and artistic life was itself part of the construction of German superiority over the allegedly “culture-less” Czechs.  

William McGrath builds on Schorske’s analysis but in lieu of arguing that Freud escaped from politics, he finds that Freud had a serious interest in politics. Freud’s theories are strongly and directly reflecting his experience of the politics of the day, McGrath claims. McGrath also argues that Freud harbored deep and lasting, though repressed, sympathies for the German nationalist perspective in the Badeni crisis. He supports this argument with an analysis of Freud’s dream that uses the figure of Otto Lecher, famous for his twelve-hour-long obstruction speech, to represent Freud’s own self. Freud’s brief discussion of the dream goes as follows:  

I dreamt one night that I saw in the window of a book-shop a new volume in one of the series of monographs for connoisseurs which I am in the habit of buying—monographs on great artists, on world history, on famous cities, etc. The new series was called ‘Famous

83 (Spector)
Speakers’ or ‘Speeches’ and its first volume bore the name of Dr. Lecher.

When I came to analyse this, it seemed to me improbable that I should be concerned in my dreams with the fame of Dr. Lecher, the non-stop speaker of the German Nationalist obstructionists in Parliament. The position was that a few days earlier I had taken on some new patients for psychological treatment, and was now obliged to talk for ten or eleven hours every day. So it was I myself who was a non-stop speaker. (Freud, *Interpretation of Dreams* I 268–9)

Freud suggests that Lecher does not intrigue him much, either positively or negatively. Freud presents this dream to support his argument that all dreams are egoistic; the dream illustrates this claim because Freud himself is at the center (disguised as Lecher, with whom he shares the quality of being a perpetual speaker).

According to Freud’s interpretation, Lecher is merely incidental, used by the dream work as a disguise for Freud’s own self. This dream fits a pattern of minimal commentary and restraint by Freud on matters of heightened national politics in Austria, even if they vaguely point in a pro-German direction.

McGrath, however, claims that Freud plausibly identified with Otto Lecher on a more sustained level. “[It] is difficult to imagine a politician who could more fully have represented the range of personal values and political views that Freud admired,” he claims (224). He further argues that Lecher’s speech would have struck Freud as particularly resonant with psychoanalysis, since its significance lay not in the words Lecher spoke and which, due to the noise made by other parliamentarians, could at times barely be heard except by the minute takers who hovered right by him. Instead, Lecher’s speech erupts as the illegible but unrelenting emotional opposition

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84 For the German version, see (Freud, *Traumdeutung* 275).
from “the Germans” and is therefore analogous to the speech of the unconscious.

McGrath elaborates:

Because Lecher’s filibuster aimed at thwarting the government’s attempt to stifle discussion of the Ausgleich, Freud’s identification with him aligned psychoanalysis with freedom of speech, thereby recapitulating an associative pattern which appeared often in his images and dream life. (225)

While McGrath’s analysis raises important questions concerning the resonance of German nationalism in Freud’s psychoanalytic work, there are problems with its more particular claims. Jaques Rancière’s distinction between “the two forms of mute speech” is helpful for clarifying that an inaudible performance of a speech bears little resemblance with the function of speech in Freudian psychoanalysis, in which any word, any pause, and any repetition is meaningful (31–42). In his discussion of aesthetic paradigms and their relationship to psychoanalysis, Rancière argues that two forms of “mute speech” counter the assumption of self-identity and transparent meaning of speech, but in quite different ways. Freud was interested in the mute speech of ubiquitous encrypted signs. “[Freud] poses that nothing is insignificant, that the prosaic details that positivist thought disdains or attributes to a mere physiological rationality are in fact signs encrypting a history” (37). Rancière contrasts this to another form of mute speech.

In place of the hieroglyph inscribed on the body and subject to deciphering we encounter speech as soliloquy, speaking to no one and saying nothing but the impersonal and unconscious conditions of speech itself. (39)

With Lecher’s speech, there is at least a superficial affinity to the second model: is within the terms of Rancière’s second model that McGrath seeks to argue for a
commonality between Lecher’s speech and psychoanalytic speech. Freud’s psychoanalysis, however, does not fall under this second model of “mute speech.”

McGrath’s claim that Lecher was fighting for free speech is also problematic. Even Lecher’s most ardent admirers agreed that the purpose of his speech was to obstruct parliament and thereby exert pressure to rescind the language ordinances.85 “Freedom of speech” was not a significant rallying cry at this particular political moment.

There is one other dream analysis that contains a direct reference to the Badeni crisis, as the drawn-out protests against the language ordinances and counter-protests against Badeni’s dismissal were summarily called. In the dream, Freud is in Rome and is surprised that there are so many German street and business plaques. Freud discusses the dream briefly in a letter to Fließ from early December 3 and 5, 1897, even though he dreamt it several months earlier.86 The immediate context in the letter is the eternal question where Freud and Fließ will meet. Ida Fließ, Wilhelm’s wife, suggests Breslau (Polish Wroclaw) to Freud, and Freud now suggests this (back) to Wilhelm Fließ. The subsequent passage reads as follows:

You do know that what happened in Prague proved I was right. When we decided on Prague last time, dreams played a big part. You did not want to come to Prague, and you still know why, and at the same time I dreamed that I was in Rome, walking about the streets, and feeling surprised at the large number of German street and shop signs. I awoke and immediately thought: so this was Prague (where such German

85 For detailed descriptions of the obstruction see (Sutter, Die Badenischen Sprachenverordnungen I 262 ff). For a contemporary journalistic report in English, see (Twain).
86 The letter is dated December 3, 1897, but the relevant passage is from a supplement to the letter dated December 5.
signs, as is well known, are called for). Thus the dream had fulfilled my wish to meet you in Rome rather than in Prague. My longing for Rome is, by the way, deeply neurotic. It is connected with my high school hero worship of the Semitic Hannibal, and this year in fact I did not reach Rome any more than he did from Lake Trasimeno. (Freud, Complete Letters 284–5)87

Freud wrote this letter only a few days after the Prague riots over Badeni’s dismissal; the phrase “what happened in Prague” almost certainly refers to them. It “proved [he] was right,” he claims. It is not clear what exactly Freud had said or written that had been proven right, but the letter implies that it has to do with nationalist politics and that these make it advisable for Freud and Fließ to avoid Prague.

While the letter is dated December 3 and 5, thus immediately following the Prague riots, Freud reports having dreamt this dream several months earlier, when he and Fließ were planning their Easter congress in Prague (in March or earlier) or at least around the time when they changed these plans in favor of Nuremberg (April). McGrath in fact believes that he can date Freud’s dream to the night of April 6, immediately after the promulgation of the Badeni language ordinances (McGrath 182, 181). This gives him occasion once again to assert a straightforwardly German political desire as the repressed truth of Freud’s unconscious. McGrath interprets Freud’s desire for more toleration of the German language in Prague into the immediate present (of April 6 1897) and claims: “In effect, his dream repealed the language ordinances by giving German new prominence on the streets of Prague” (McGrath 181).

87 For the German original, see (Freud, Briefe an Fliess 309–10).
Freud’s own commentary is countering the interpretation that his dream is a response to current events, even though the point that the events in Prague proved Freud right suggests that Freud’s initial negative inclination against meeting Flied in Prague was based on current conditions. Nevertheless, in his analysis of the dream, Freud gives his attraction towards Rome more psychic significance than he does to his push away from Prague, which he arguably presents as a pragmatic response to current events without deeper significance.88 In his letter, the nexus of German/Prague only receives the parenthetical comment that it is well-known that German signs in Prague are called for. The need for more German signs in Prague is as self-evident as it is incidental. Freud’s presentation suggests that he is merely spelling out step-by-step how the language of the dream operates to equate Rome and Prague, concluding “thus the dream fulfilled my wish to meet you in Rome rather than in Prague.” From there on the chain of associations is again with Rome, not Prague.

The editor of the German edition of Freud’s complete letters to Fließ, Michael Schröter, does not make as bold a claim as McGrath, but he also conjectures that Freud took great interest in the Badeni crisis:

Freud mag aufgrund seiner böhmischen [sic] Geburt an diesen langwierigen Streitigkeiten, die das österreichische Staatswesen von Grund auf erschütterten, besonderen Anteil genommen haben. Gelegentlich erzählt er selbst (...), daß er sich wahrscheinlich aus seiner Studentenzzeit ein betentes Interesse an der Duldung der deutschen Sprache in Prag erhalten habe. (in Freud, Briefe an Fliess 309, fn. 1)

Because of his Bohemian [sic] birth, Freud may have taken particular interest in these lengthy difficulties, which shattered the Austrian

88 While I do not take Freud’s own analysis as definitive, I take it seriously as a starting point.
political system fundamentally. Occasionally he himself said that has maintained a pronounced interest, probably from his student days, in the toleration of the German language in Prague. (my translation)

While Freud may indeed have taken a pronounced interest in these events because of his birth in Moravia (not Bohemia), it would be similarly plausible that his acculturation in Vienna meant that he considered the linguistic intricacies of bureaucratic organization in Bohemia and Moravia of no immediate concern. At least his comment does not reveal any interest in Prague that goes beyond its convenient location between Vienna and Berlin and its anticipated agreeability (or lack thereof) for the travelers from the two nearby imperial capitals.

What Schröter takes as a first-hand account of Freud’s “pronounced interest” in the events of the Badeni crisis also looks different to me. Schröter rightly points out that Freud elaborates on the dream in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, published in 1900. Freud’s account of Rome and Prague in *The Interpretation of Dreams* shares many common features with his description of those cities in the earlier letter. In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, though, F adds a slightly different qualification on the aspect of the dream that seems to wish for more German in Prague.

A fourth dream, which occurred soon after the last one, took me to Rome once more. I saw a street-corner before me and was surprised to find so many posters in German stuck up there. I had written to my friend with prophetic foresight the day before to say that I thought Prague might not be an agreeable place for a German to walk about in. Thus the dream expressed at the same time a wish to meet him in Rome instead of a Bohemian town, and a desire, probably dating back to my student days, that the German language might be better tolerated

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89 This comment is not part of the English edition of Freud’s complete letters to Fließ. I am not aware of any published translation into English.
Here Freud documents an interest on his part for more toleration of German in Prague, but he distances himself from this interest by explaining that it probably stems from his student days. He does not unequivocally date it in the past, but he talks about it with the gesture of the self-consciously mature adult who reminisces on a youthful infatuation that is neither as forceful as a childhood wish, nor a newly arisen passion. At another discussion of the same dream in *Interpretation*, Freud specifies as much when he says that “the wish itself may stem from a German-national period, now overcome, of my youth” (328). He explicitly asserts that his German nationalism is no longer active. If anything, these qualifications downplay the recent battles about language rights. Given the general anti-Czech attitude that extended from German national parties into the German liberal clientele, Freud’s comment arguably has a moderating tone.

Regarding his relationship to German nationalist politics in Austria, Freud’s various comments are quite consistent with the following broad message: Freud was sympathetic to and involved with German nationalism as a student at the university of Vienna, but he soon turned away from it intentionally. Occasional (public) comments that “all nationalism is foreign to me” find their elaboration in the more nuanced (often private) message that acknowledge a past involvement with German nationalism or his present attraction to it while he intentionally, one could say, politically, disaffiliates from it. In a letter from Paris to his fiancée Martha Barney, for

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90 For the German original, see (Freud, *Briefe an Fliess* 201).
instance, Freud writes in 1886 about a conversation with a French interlocutor who predicted the most ferocious war with Germany. I promptly explained that I am a Jew, adhering neither to Germany nor Austria. But such conversations are always very embarrassing to me, for I feel stirring within me something German which I long ago decided to suppress. (quoted in McGrath 160–1)

Statements like this suggest that McGrath’s argument about the lasting appeal of German nationalism to Freud is not completely wrong, even though I am not convinced by his more detailed arguments that locate the manifestations of this appeal in Freud’s unconscious identification with heroes of the German obstruction or his unconscious opposition to certain policies that then manifest themselves in his dreams.91

Rather than theorize Freud’s complicated relationship to German nationalism as a straightforward, albeit repressed, identification with German obstructionist politicians or a straightforward, albeit repressed, opposition to certain politics, I think it is more productive to think about it in terms of the structure and shape of his gendered, sexualized theories of the psyche. Freud’s affinity with German nationalism and liberalism then manifests less as a commitment to certain specific political figures, events, and programs, and more as a philosophical commitment that speaks to

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91 German nationalism also appears in other dreams with a somewhat positive valence, for instance the so-called “revolutionary dream” in which Freud is in a German-nationalist meeting and is (in the dream itself) surprised at his own German nationalism (Freud, Traumdeutung 218). I do not think that one can so quickly extrapolate a straightforward political position from these dreams. For instance, the sentiment of surprise (which also shows up in Freud’s surprise at the number of German street plaques in Rome) would have to be probed further. Yet I do not deny that the antisemitic Christian Socials and their leader Karl Lueger, for whom Freud’s abhorrence is well established, never show up with even the slightest positive valence in Freud’s published dreams.
and through the form and content of Freud’s theories of the psyche as much as it speaks to and through Freud’s decision to consider certain details of early childhood theoretically irrelevant, his knowledge of the Czech language, for example.

In his discussion of the same dream in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud provides more associations to Prague, even though he still does not pursue them beyond a brief throw-away note that digresses from his comment about the “Bohemian city” Prague.

Thus the dream expressed at the same time a wish to meet him in Rome instead of a Bohemian town, and a desire, probably dating back to my student days, that the German language might be better tolerated in Prague. Incidentally, I must have understood Czech in my earliest childhood, for I was born in a small town in Moravia which has a Slav population. A Czech nursery rhyme, which I heard in my seventeenth year, printed itself on my memory so easily that I can repeat it to this day, though I have no notion what it means. Thus there was no lack of connections with my early childhood in these dreams either. (Freud, *Interpretation of Dreams* 195–6)

By describing Prague as “a Bohemian city,” Freud emphasizes his dream’s linguistic/national content. The term “Bohemian” could designate the historic region of Bohemia independent of any national identity. Any city in Bohemia would thus conceivably be a Bohemian city. But the term Bohemian was also increasingly used alongside German, Magyar, Pole/Polish etc. to describe a national identity and a language. The expression “böhmisch sprechen” (to speak Bohemian) was not uncommon either, and the language that one could register in the census was not

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92 This meaning is evident in František Palacký’s famous decline of his invitation to the German national assembly in Frankfurt in 1848 with the explanation that he is a “Bohemian of the Slavic tribe” (*Böhme slawischen Stammes*).
called Czech but Bohemian-Moravian-Slovak.\textsuperscript{93} It appears that Freud here uses the term Bohemian as the politically correct, less overtly nationalist, term for a linguistic/national attribute. This is not only a more plausible attribute with which to characterize a city (as opposed to by its location in a province), but it also spells out the red thread between his (past) desire for more toleration of German in Prague, and his subsequent throw-away comment that, “by the way,” he must have known Czech as a child. It is the Czech character of the Bohemian city Prague that connects it to the Czech that Freud must have understood as a child growing up in a “small-town in Moravia, with Slavic population.”

The anecdote about the Czech nursery rhyme in many ways exemplifies Freud’s understanding of the unconscious, namely that the unconscious stores memory traces from early childhood events that conscious memory only remembers in special circumstances.\textsuperscript{94} As an infant, Freud could understand Czech; he later forgot it, but when he heard a certain nursery rhyme in his seventeenth year, he remembered it so effortlessly that he knew that he had to have previously heard it. Despite his forgetting, it still had left a trace in his Unconscious. This trace allowed Freud to immediately retain the words of the nursery rhyme when he heard it again in his youth, even though he did not know its linguistic meaning.

What is the significance of the fact that Freud once understood Czech? Freud

\textsuperscript{93} The Czech word for Bohemia is Čechy, which is etymologically related to Czech. The emergent German word “czechišch” and “Czechen” (before the “cz” became Germanized into “tsch”) were even considered denigrating by both Old Czech and Young Czech leaders (Stourzh 282).

\textsuperscript{94} See (Freud, \textit{Traumdeutung} 194–197)
seems to not give it particular significance. His sympathies certainly are not with the type of German nationalism for which early exposure to a Slavic language, for instance through a nursemaid, is anathema. But from a psychoanalytic rather than nationalist point of view, would Freud’s early exposure to and familiarity with Czech not be of significance? It would seem that Freud’s self-analysis would need a (self-)analyst who knows Czech. This seems especially pertinent because Freud’s self-analysis established that his nursemaid, who according to all records spoke to him in Czech, was a significant figure in Freud’s early childhood: she was, as Freud put it, “my prime originator” and “my teacher in sexual matters.” For many scenes and specifically many things heard from his earliest childhood, it would be hard if not impossible for the (self-)analyst who does not know Czech to discern their distorted reemergence.

In analyses with patients other than himself, Freud affirms the need for multilinguality as a matter of course. Freud’s exemplary case of fetishism involves a patient who

had been brought up in an English nursery but had later come to Germany, where he forgot his mother-tongue almost completely. The fetish, which originated from his earliest childhood, had to be

95 Freud’s memories of his nursemaid and their relationship to his theory of the Oedipus complex have generated a large body of scholarship. See especially (Swan; Fletcher; St. John), also (McClintock; Stoler; Robbins; Stallybrass and White; Krüll; Gicklhorn; Sajner; Anzieu). Concerning the actual identity of Freud’s nursemaid, there are two competing theories about the identity of Freud’s nursemaid. One theory is that she is Monika Zajícová (or Monika Zajíc, as most English scholarship refers to her), the 40-year-old daughter of the family in whose house the Freud family rented a room (Anzieu, Fletcher, Swan). The competing theory is that she is Resi Wittek (Krüll). All accounts presuppose that Freud’s nursemaid spoke to him in Czech. Given her later characterization is Christian, this also is historically most plausible, as by all accounts Freiberg/Příbor did not have a German Christian population.
understood in English, not in German. The ‘shine on the nose’ [in German ‘Glanz auf der Nase’]—was in reality a “glance at the nose. (Freud, “Fetishism” 152)96

This analysis crucially depends on the analyst’s knowledge of the patient’s forgotten language. Pointing to this exemplary account of fetishism and a related role of multilingualism in the case history Freud’s other most famous patient, the so-called Wolf Man, Anne Dwyer observes that “it is hard to imagine psychoanalysis coming into being without these emphatically multinational and multilingual case histories and without an analyst attuned to their complexities” (Dwyer 155). So what does it means that Freud was not attuned to the complexities of his own multilingual “earliest childhood” even though he was working through his early childhood in his self-analysis and attributed significance to his relationship with his Czech-speaking nursemaid?97

One approach to dealing with this question is to mourn the loss in psychoanalytic knowledge due to Freud’s linguistic limitations as a self-analyst. This

96 For the German original, see (Freud, “Fetischismus” 311).
97 One could also question whether Freud’s comment that he had forgotten all knowledge of Czech is truthful. Showing off one’s ignorance of Czech, in fact, was a common German nationalist gesture (Sutter, Die Badenischen Sprachenverordnungen I). It is not inconceivable that Freud could have adopted the same gesture. I am nevertheless inclined to treat Freud’s statement about having forgotten all Czech as truthful because his anecdote about having been able to memorize a Czech nursery rhyme immediately, without knowing its meaning, is compelling, original, and sufficiently unique to make it seem unlikely that it was anything else than a curious experience that Freud indeed had and about which he did not think about too hard. Freud’s claim that he understood Czech as a child is not a direct memory but an induction from the experience of being able to instantly memorize a nursery rhyme as a young adult, and it is plausible that this experience was made possible by prior familiarity with it. It is also possible that even as a small child, Freud never knew the meaning of the Czech nursery rhyme, so he technically would not necessarily have “known” Czech. The point however is that Czech language phrases made a distinct impression on him.
approach emphasizes that we will never know what Freud’s self-analysis was missing and what psychoanalytic insights he failed to generate as a result of this incomplete self-analysis. Freud performed his self-analysis not only to come to better terms with his psyche but also as a crucial step towards better psychoanalytic theories. His self-analysis is therefore significant as a stumbling block on the way to formulating adequate psychoanalytic theories. Perhaps subsequent re-readings of Freud’s letters and publications by critics who are proficient in Czech can recuperate some interpretations which may shed light on some theoretical limitations of psychoanalysis.

While I am interested in such re-readings of Freud’s dreams, symptoms, fantasies, and memories, I do not imagine that simply adding Czech to the multilingual interpretive horizon will by itself lead to a different set of psychoanalytic theories or a different understanding of these theories, if it is not part of a more encompassing project to challenge the epistemic-political commitments that made Freud’s infantile knowledge of Czech negligible in the first place. In the midst of a self-analysis built on the premise of the importance of early childhood memories, the non-issue of what Freud’s nurse (and others) said to him in Czech is a story that calls for analysis in its own right. Freud’s elaboration on his desire for Rome as well as his theorization of the Oedipus drama can point us in the right direction if we read them alongside the fantasies of Roman and Greek antiquity that informed theories of the superiority of German culture and language.
Ulrich Thaner on Europe, culture, and antiquity

Before continuing with a close reading of Freud’s letter to Fließ and related writings, I will look at an important speech given by Ulrich Thaner because this speech is instructive for understanding Freud’s articulation of sexuality and the psyche through a discourse of antiquity. Ulrich Thaner was professor of canonical law and director of the University of Graz. He played a significant role in the Badeni crisis because German nationalist students were a driving force in the opposition to the Badeni ordinances, especially in Graz. They were active in the mass demonstrations leading up to Badeni’s dismissal in late November 1897 and had a prominent role again in early 1898: After the Statthalter of Bohemia prohibited German nationalist students from wearing their Couleur (the hat and ribbon that demonstrate membership in a nationalist student association), German students across Austria organized a university strike. In Graz, they shut down lecture halls against the opposition of Slovene students and effected an early closure of the semester. Thaner was repeatedly called upon by the Imperial government to exert a moderating influence on student activities and discipline individual students. Thaner’s responses typically balanced formal compliance with covert encouragement of student action for a cause with which he evidently sympathized.

His pro-German, anti-Slav position is also apparent in his speech from February 1898 in the Styrian parliament, where he had a guaranteed seat due to his position as director of the university. For Thaner’s speech, I rely on the accounts by
von Sutter and Rudolf Vrba. Thaner distinguishes between two measures for the value of a language.

To each nation, to each human his own mother tongue is the most precious, in this respect the Czech language is as valuable as the German, but also as the language of the Asante and the Congo-Negroes. (Great amusement.) But there is another measure for the value of a language, namely the significance of the language as a means of intercourse and communication. In this respect the Czechs, Slovenes, Poles will certainly not be able to claim that their languages are equal (gleichberechtigt, with equal rights) to the German language, will they? A juridical formula for the language ordinance cannot be found. The Czechs learn German and now demand that the Germans learn Czech: they say, this is equality, but from this comes coercion and the trick is done. There is a great difference between the languages. The European culture-languages (Kultursprachen) are related with the classical languages, with the roots of European education (Bildung). For the Slavic languages this is not the case. When the German has to learn a Slavic language, he is pushed down from his mental height. (Thaner as qtd. in Vrba 173)

The distinction places on one side a language’s value as somebody’s mother tongue. One might call this its subjective value. In this respect, Thaner proposes Czech to be of equal value as German. He immediately ridicules this limited equality through the hypothetical, jesting abolition (yet simultaneous affirmation) of a European colonial racial hierarchy. The joking invocation of a subverted order of racial value is met by

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98 Vrba renders Thaner’s speech in his 1900 publication Der Nationalitäten- und Verfassungsconflict in Oesterreich [The Nationalities’ and Constitutional Conflict in Austria] in which he promoted Czech language rights as promised by the Badeni language ordinances and denounced Thaner’s speech. Vrba’s critique of anti-Czech German supremacism is formulated through antisemitism, as he blames what he calls “the Jew-press” for inciting anti-Czech sentiment among Germans. Since Sutter’s rendition of Thaner’s speech switches back and forth between quotation and paraphrase, the following quotation is taken from Vrba. I will however discuss where the two accounts diverge.
“great amusement,” as Vrba’s parenthetical note states. This parenthetical note is likely taken directly from the official protocol, as it was common to include audience reactions. Another testimony to the reception of Thaner’s comment about Asanti and Congo-Negroes, if indeed he made such a comment, lies in the combined record by Vrba and Sutter. In Sutter’s report, Thaner speaks not of the languages of the “Asante and Congo-Negroes” as Vrba has it, but instead of “the language of the Indian tribes as of the Ashanti-Negroes” (Sutter, Die Badenischen Sprachenverordnungen I 86). Between Sutter and Vrba, at least one of them must have erred in the transcription, memory, or excerption from the minutes of Thaner’s speech; collectively, they perform an interchangeability of the languages of “Indian tribes and Ashanti-Negroes” and “Asante and Congo-Negroes” that concurs with Thaner’s assessment of their utter insignificance.

In neither account is there any further comment on any of the racial categories invoked. This brevity supports the work of these categories to function as an affirmation of European supremacy and as a bedrock for negotiating consent to the claims to German linguistic and cultural supremacy over Czech language and culture. Thaner does not in actuality extend the limited egalitarian commitment to recognize the equal subjective value of all languages to the groups mentioned here. Most drastic is the contrast between Thaner’s hypothetical affirmation of the “preciousness” of the languages of “Indian tribes” to the politics of the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, which at the time was setting up Indian Boarding schools with the express purpose of retraining Native American children to speak English instead of their native
The alleged limited equality between the languages of the “Congo-Negroes,” the Asante/Ashanti, and Indian tribes, as well as Czech, Polish, Slovene, and German is only affirmed at a distance, in a moment that does nothing to challenge European and U.S. colonial power in Africa and America. The notion of the limited subjective equality of all nations’ valuation of their mother tongue is only a joke en route to Thaner’s argument that German is superior to Czech because measured on a different value scale.

According to Thaner, the superior value of German lies in its function as a “means of intercourse and communication” and its relationship to the “classical languages.” It should be presumed that the function of a mother tongue also includes communication. But because Thaner previously racialized and dismissed a language’s value as purely mother tongue, and because he now opposes it to “European culture languages,” it is indirectly conveyed that the intercourse and communication that concerns him is that which takes place within “European culture.” The idea that classical antiquity provides a unique foundation for European culture, here articulated as a linguistic argument, is inherently bound up in the imperialist construction of “Europe” as the most valuable entity in the world. Thaner’s invocation of the nexus

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99 The pretense to acknowledge the subjective value of the languages of the Asante and Congolese or to understand these groups as “nations” that hold their own mother tongue “precious” is also disingenuous. The indigenous population of King Leopold II’s Congo Free State was systematically killed for not meeting rubber production quotas. The Asante/Ashanti were discursively highly present as in Vienna due to a 1896/1897 “people’s exhibition” where an “Ashanti village” including inhabitants was on display in Vienna’s zoo (Schwarz; Besser).

100 For accounts of the ideological construction of antiquity and its role in European imperialisms, especially in the colonies of Britain, Germany, and France, see (Bernal, Black Athena, or for a shorter introduction Bernal, “The Image of Ancient Greece as a Tool for
of antiquity, the classical languages, and European Bildung reasserts once again the European superiority that he had already affirmed in his earlier joke. According to Sutter, Thaner claims that “[the] Germans, by learning a Slavic language, would be catapulted out from the path which the European civilization (Gesittung) has taken” (Sutter, Die Badenischen Sprachenverordnungen I 86).101

Despite his initial argumentative move to locate the superior value of German in the public domain of Europe, and in the relationship with the classical languages, Thaner subsequently attaches this “objective” value of German back to the “subjective” personal experience of “the German-(speaker)” of “his” language. This is apparent in the claim that “[when] the German has to learn a Slavic language, he is pushed down from his mental height.” The individual, whose relationship to his language was previously cast in a universalizing discourse of languages as mother tongues, reappears in the discourse of European culture-language as the “German” whose Germanness is less dependent on his relationship to the German language than it is to his negative relationship to the Czech language and the special value of German as a “culture-language.” German, in other words, is cast as a cultural artefact and an embodied part of the German self in a way that blends these two dimensions

Colonialism and European Hegemony”; also Dyson; Thomas). For the entanglement of fantasies of antiquity in the involvement of the European Great Powers in the Ottoman Empire and other areas of the Balkan, the Mediterranean, and West Asia, see (Rodogno; also Gere; Bjelic).

101 Vrba also paraphrases after the quotation of the excerpted speech that “in the end Dr. Thaner demanded the incorporation of Austria into the Hohenzollern monarchy” thus the German empire (Vrba 174). The discrepancy between Vrba’s report and Sutter’s silence about this alleged comment is striking since, as a call for the end of the Austrian empire, it would have been considered high treason.
inseparably together in a Germanness that is threatened by a policy that requires “Germans” to learn Czech.

Apparently in opposition to the special cultural value of the German language, the explicitly universal discourse where each “each nation, […] each human” loves his or her mother tongue equally is articulated through an imaginary heteropatriarchal family setting – here only subtly referenced through the concept of the “mother tongue.” The concept of the mother tongue imagines the language-using subject through the figure of the child who acquires knowledge of his or her language through the mother. In the context of Thaner’s speech, this figure comes with an implicit heteropatriarchal framing because nationalist discourses in Austria treated the mother tongue as the outward manifestation of national identity, which in turn was imagined and regulated as something that is determined by the father in a heteropatrarchal family setting. Thaner’s speech references this nationalist framing of the mother tongue when he discusses its value “to each nation, to each human.”

Thaner presents this framework of the heteropatriarchally anchored individual who is subtly imagined as a child as explicitly universal in the sense of cross-racial: Germans, Negroes, Indians, and Czechs, he alleges, have in common that they love their respective mother tongues. They are furthermore all be “humans” and “nations,” Thaner affirms. While Thaner’s argument capitalizes on the assumed racial difference between Europeans and non-Europeans to put Czech, whose European status is

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102 On the judicial treatment of language and nationality of children, see (Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*; Budwinski).
subject to contestation, in its place, he pretends to recognize a universal family of
nations where each human, each nation loves his or her mother tongue.\textsuperscript{103}

This universal equality of nations and humans notwithstanding, Thaner also
elevates the German subject. Thaner constructs a German subject that has grand
concepts such as an allegedly exclusive “European” relationship to the classical
languages packed into its allegedly universal heteropatriarchally embedded human
individuality. Thaner articulates language as simultaneously one of the most banal,
individually embodied, heteropatriarchally anchored, and allegedly universal feature
of human existence, and, in the case of “European culture languages,” as a reified
special value that stems from its supposedly exclusive relationship to “antiquity.”

\textbf{Hannibal, Oedipus, and the Modern Human}

How does this analysis help elucidate the insignificance of Freud’s early knowledge
of Czech to Freud’s self-analysis? In what follows, I return to Freud’s elaboration on
his desire for Rome in his letter to Fließ and related writings, including Freud’s
readings of the Oedipus drama. In Freud’s theories of sexuality and normative
masculinity, built out of an engagement with antiquity, I see an articulation of the
“modern human” that, in important respects, parallels and overlaps with Thaner’s
construction of the subject of a “European culture language.” Furthermore, in his
fantasy of Hannibal, Freud articulates a Jewish variation on the “modern human” that

\textsuperscript{103} Not explicitly apparent in Thaner’s speech, in European and U.S. colonial discourses the
same ideal of heteropatriarchal filiation is seen as the hallmark of civilization, while its
(perceived) absence is asserted as a rationalization of imperialism.
is as defiantly anti-antisemitic as it is a normative subject of “European culture.”

We have seen in his letters to Fließ that Freud considers his desire for Rome “deeply neurotic.” He further explains that it ties in with his Gymnasium passion for “the Semitic hero Hannibal,” with whom he shared an inability to reach Rome after having come already to the Lake Trasimene area (Briefe an Fliess 309). In the Interpretation of Dreams, Freud elaborates:

It was on my last journey to Italy, which, among other places, took me past Lake Trasimene, that finally—after having seen the Tiber and sadly turned back when I was only fifty miles from Rome—I discovered the way in which my longing for the eternal city had been reinforced by impressions from my youth. I was in the act of making a plan to by-pass Rome next year and travel to Naples, when a sentence occurred to me which I must have read in one of our classic authors: ‘Which of the two, it may be debated, walked up and down his study with the greater impatience after he had formed his plan of going to Rome—Winckelmann, the Vice-Principal, or Hannibal, the Commander-in-Chief?’ I had actually been following in Hannibal’s footsteps. Like him, I had been fated not to see Rome; and he too had moved into the Campania when everyone had expected him in Rome. But Hannibal, whom I had come to resemble in these respects, had been my favourite hero of my Gymnasium years. Like so many boys of that age, I had sympathized during the Punic Wars not with the Romans but with the Carthaginians. And when in the higher classes I began to understand for the first time what it meant to belong to an alien (landesfremd) race, and anti-semitic feelings among the other boys warned me that I must take up a definite position, the figure of the semitic general rose still higher in my esteem. To my youthful mind Hannibal and Rome symbolized the conflict between the tenacity of Jewry and the organization of the Catholic church. And the increasing importance of the effects of the antisemitic movement upon our emotional life helped to fix the thoughts and feelings of those early days. Thus the wish to go to Rome had become in my dream-life a cloak and symbol for a number of other passionate wishes. Their realization was to be pursued with all the perseverance and single-mindedness of the Carthaginian, though their fulfilment seemed at the moment just as little favored by destiny as was Hannibal’s lifelong wish to enter Rome. (Freud, Interpretation of Dreams I 196–7)

The dream about seeing German street plaques in Rome here becomes occasion for a discussion of Freud’s desire for Rome. This desire is tied to a desire for Hannibal, the Carthaginian general who battled against Rome and famously marched via the Iberian peninsula across the Pyrenees and the Alps, accompanied by elephants. In Freud’s fantasies, Hannibal’s march against Rome merges with his own trip to Rome, which in turn assumes the valence of defying antisemitism: Rome qua center of the Catholic
church represents to Freud the antisemitic movement (whose real center was Vienna), and Hannibal, who can be understood thanks to racial philological science as a “Semit,” represents to Freud’s fantasy the defiant Jew.

Hannibal understandably provides a seductive figure of anti-antisemitic resistance, not least because he comes right out of the signature event of the highly regarded rite of passage into German culture, the Latin classroom of the Gymnasium. The Punic wars are both a historical event and the subject matter of a text by Livy, and it is in the form of the reading and translation of the text by Livy that they become an event in Freud’s Gymnasium education. According to McGrath’s researches into the yearly reports of the Leopoldstaedter Communal-Realgymnasium in Wien, Freud’s Latin class began reading Livy in the school year 1869-70, in their fifth Gymnasium year (81). This information factually corroborates Freud’s memories of experiencing the Punic wars in the Gymnasium. In addition, the fact that this information is included in the semi-public record of the school’s yearly report gives a taste of the systematic nature of the transmission of Latin texts in the Gymnasium.

In The Interpretation of Dreams, the Punic wars are framed as an event contemporaneous to Freud so that Freud can have an affective reaction “during” the Punic wars. The phrase “during the Punic wars” suggests the contemporaneity of the Punic wars. Crystallized in this expression, I see an affective construction of antiquity as part of the life-world of the classically educated subject, a construction that shapes debates about national, cultural and civilizational identity: At stake are the affective constitution of the subject in relation to the event of antiquity and the constitution of a
collectivity out of the shared consumption of antiquity.

In the subsequent passage, Freud elaborates on Hannibal’s significance as a Semitic and anti-antisemitic hero.


At that point I was brought up against the event in my youth whose power was still being shown in all these emotions and dreams. I may have been ten or twelve years old, when my father began to take me with him on his walks and reveal to me in his talk his views upon things in the world we live in. Thus it was, on one such occasion, that he told me a story to show me how much better things were now than they had been in his days. ‘When I was a young person’, he said, ‘I went for a walk one Saturday in the streets of your birthplace; I was nicely dressed, and had a new fur cap on my head. A Christian came up to me and with a single blow knocked off my cap into the mud and shouted: ‘Jew, get off the pavement!’ ‘And what did you do?’ I asked. ‘I went onto the roadway and picked up the cap,’ was his placid response. This struck me as unheroic conduct on the part of the big, strong man who was holding the little boy by the hand. I this situation with another which fitted my feelings better: the scene in which Hannibal’s father, Hamilcar Barca, made his boy swear before the household altar to take vengeance on the Romans. Ever since that time Hannibal had had a place in my phantasies. (Freud, Interpretation of
Freud continues this chain of associations to even earlier childhood experiences, namely his admiration of Napoleon. “Napoleon himself lines up with Hannibal owing to their both having crossed the Alps,” he writes (198).

In this passage, Hannibal’s heroism is bound up in a particular ideal of a father-son relationship that is attractive to Freud. Richard H. Armstrong, in his in-depth study of psychoanalysis and “the ancient world,” points out that the heroism of Hannibal that attracts Freud lies in the structure of the father-son encounter as a fantasmatic origin of a normative masculinity, and not, for instance, in any independent scene of heroic fighting. He clarifies:

Hannibal is not to replace Jakob Freud, but rather the young Sigmund Freud; the father’s failure is retained in that it must be rectified by filial agency, giving room for the son to be and be rid of the Father. In other words, young Sigmund does not re-imagine the scene in Freiberg, but rather the scene in Vienna, wishing his father had imparted to him the sacred task of revenge. He nowhere states that his wish was for his father to have slain the offending goy of yore. The failure of the Jewish father in this tale is a failure to impart a proper pattern of masculine agency to his son; he failed to give his son the proper mission. (Armstrong, Compulsion 222)

The heroic image of Hannibal, then, is not determined chiefly by Hannibal’s military achievements. In fact, if judged by those along, Hannibal would be a failure, as he never succeeded in his goal to conquer Rome. Hannibal’s heroism is an affective quality of filial masculinity, exemplified in his determination to avenge his father by stepping into his shoes and succeeding on behalf of the father. That the concrete goal of success never materializes is insignificant in comparison to the affective determination to pursue it in the name of avenging the father.
The theme of properly transmitted masculine agency links Freud’s Hannibal fantasies to his reading of Sophocles’ *King Oedipus*. The scene of Freud’s father’s being pushed off the sidewalk likewise links to a crucial scene from Sophocles’ drama. In this scene, Oedipus, traveling on the road to Thebes, encounters a man who attacks him and attempts to push him off the road. Unbeknownst to Oedipus, the man is his father and King of Thebes. Defending himself against the attack, Oedipus kills him (and his herald). Despite the seeming contrast between killing one’s father and avenging him, a fantasy of righteous filial vindication bridges Hannibal, Oedipus, and Freud’s memories of the scene with his father.

For the oedipal hero definitely will not let himself be thrown off his path, even by one who clearly has a superior social status. We could even entertain the idea that there is a symbolic condensation in Oedipus for Freud, such that through the Theban’s patricidal encounter Freud kills off both his father’s goy adversary and his unheroic father, asserting through this filial hero the proper role of the male. (Armstrong, *Compulsion* 227)

By condensing Hannibal and Oedipus, Freud gets to symbolically kill his father and avenge him too. While it is widely acknowledged that Freud’s theory of Oedipus is about fitting a masculine subject into a heteropatriarchal social order, Freud’s Hannibal fantasy deals with normative masculinity too, even though it is less self-evident because its ostensible subject is antisemitism and Jewish identity. However, the question of normative masculinity cannot be separated from Freud’s discussion of Jewish identity in the context of antisemitism.
The Eastern Jew

Daniel Boyarin argues that the scene of Freud’s father and its subsequent Hannibalean, not-quite-not-Oedipal resolution are emblematic of a clash between competing ideals of Jewish masculinity; on the one hand the normatively masculine, belligerent, heroic masculinity that signifies assimilation, on the other hand the religiously practicing Jew whose normative code of behavior includes delicacy and gentleness, which Boyarin sums up with the Yiddish *Edelkayt* (Boyarin 34–6).

Freud’s father’s behavior, Boyarin argues, is exemplary if measured by the standard of *Edelkayt*, which finds dignity in not letting oneself be provoked, especially not by a goy. Jacob Freud’s behavior is only deficient if measured against the norm of masculinity of the assimilated German-Jewish Austrian subject. By finding his father’s behavior unheroic, and by fantasizing about Hannibal instead, Sigmund Freud evidently evaluates his father against this norm.

At the turn of the century in Austria, the clash between different ideals of Jewish masculinity is inscribed in the racially inflected opposition between the assimilated German Jew and the figure of the Eastern Jew or “Ostjude.”¹⁰⁴ Jacob Freud’s fur hat, Boyarin contends, is a common head covering to wear on the Sabbath and mostly associated with Eastern Jews and in particular Polish Jews. Freud’s Galician-born father in this story is thus clearly marked as a different kind of Jew than

¹⁰⁴ “[T]here is an indication that Freud’s father had been, at that time [of the incident where a Christion knocked off his hat] a very traditional Jew. He was wearing the Shtreimel, the Sabbath fur hat of the East European Hasid, an emblem in Freud’s world of the unreconstructed primitive Ostjude, the eastern or, particularly, Polish Jew” (Boyarin 34).
Freud, both through dress and behavior.\textsuperscript{105}

The actions of Hannibal, on the other hand, align this “Semitic” hero with the masculinity that is normative to the assimilated German Jewish subject.

Hannibal was in every important way not a Jew (not the stereotypical Ostjude who gets his shtreimel knocked off and does nothing about it), but a pugnacious Semite of a different order. (Armstrong 223)

Armstrong, building on Boyarin, thus clarifies the opposition between two paradigms of Jewishness: Eastern Jew versus Semite. The Semite, who was born in German scientific discourses of Jewish racial difference, is rendered in Freud’s discussion is a gender and racially normative subject. The heroic Jewish identity that Freud constructs via Hannibal then not only substitutes a more heroic behavior for an unheroic one but it also exemplifies the adherence to a racially-normativizing masculinity.

The fact that Hannibal came towards Rome via the Iberian peninsula and crossed the Pyrenees and (like Napoleon) the Alps—that he, in other words, came from the West—also helps to distinguish this “Semitic” hero from figure of the Eastern Jew. The latter has an ascribed origin in the East written in its name and invokes a very different geographic imagination: a Westward migration from Galicia, Romania and Russia.

With Hannibal, the “Semite,” and perhaps also Oedipus, the hero of a “Greek tragedy,” Freud counters his father’s “unheroic” Eastern Jewish behavior, in a way that is as defiantly Jewish-oppositional (to antisemitism) as it is normatively

\textsuperscript{105} (Krüll)
European. The fantasy of Hannibal’s heroic masculinity enables defiance to antisemitism and denigration of the Eastern Jew at the same time. This exemplifies that Jewish responses to antisemitism do not line up on a single axis with complete defiance on one end and complete submission on the other. By combining defiance to antisemitism with adherence to antisemitic antipathies, Freud demonstrates that resistance does not occur from a position of complete externality but from re-working the discourses that exist.106 While a different re-working could have challenged the denigration of the Eastern Jew, Freud’s fantasy of a Hannibal who supersedes the markers of the unmanly Eastern Jew through a patrilineal, heroic masculinity holds up the denigration of the Eastern Jew. His denigration of the Eastern Jew is no longer in the name of antisemitism but now in the name of the modern human, but he does not challenge the gendered-racialized standard of masculinity by which the Eastern Jew is found deficient.

The Consumption of Antiquity in the Gymnasium and the Theater

To situate and assess the function of the gendered-racialized fantasies of the masculine heroes Hannibal and Oedipus, it is important to pay close attention to the institutional set-up that not only provides the material occasion to inspire the fantasies but also shapes how Freud writes about them and argues with them. In the case of Hannibal, I have already pointed out Freud’s reference to the Punic Wars as part of his life world and suggested that the institution of the Gymnasium, including its Latin

106 This understanding of resistance is theorized in (Foucault).
class, cultivates this experience. In the case of Oedipus, it is the Viennese stage that needs to be considered more closely. Both the Gymnasium and the theater are sites where the “modern human” is formed through the aesthetic and affective consumption of antiquity.

Freud’s use of Hannibal in his fantasy makes a place for antiquity in Freud’s own psyche in a way that is in line with the German liberal-turned-nationalist discourse exemplified by Thaner. Thaner, as we saw above, places German’s relationship to the classical languages at the center of the intimate/public German subject. Freud’s affective relationship to “the Punic wars,” are materially rooted in the study of Livy in the Gymnasium, but this affective relationship also provides him with a model of father-son relationship that he elevates to the ideal for his own relationship to his father. Even though the Gymnasium experiences take place when Freud is already a teenager, Freud associates them with the somewhat earlier experience where his father took him on a walk.  

Freud’s use of Oedipus to theorize a “universal” male infantile desire for his mother and jealousy and hatred toward his father creates an even stronger affinity between the allegedly universal realm of “early childhood” in its nuclear-familial

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107 The scene where Sigmund Freud accompanies his father on a walk takes place, according to Freud, when he was ten or twelve years old. As such, it does not constitute an example of the subject’s infantile placement in heteropatriarchal structures. Freud provides further associations that lead to his early childhood, but these involve his relationship to his playmate and not his father: “And maybe one could follow the development of this warrior ideal even further back in childhood up to wishes which the intercourse—soon friendly, soon warring—during the first three years with a boy who is one year older, was bound to evoke in the weaker of the two playmates” (Freud, Traumdeutung 203–4).
heteropatriarchal setting, and the “cultured” practice of the German-language cultural
elite of Austria to consume antiquity aesthetically and affectively. When Freud first
proposes that the legend of Oedipus Rex encapsulates a truth of a universal original
mother-love and father-hatred in his letter to Fließ of October 15 1897, he appeals to
the affective experience of the theater-goer.

If this is so [that love of the mother and jealousy towards the father is a
universal event of early childhood], we can understand the gripping
power of Oedipus Rex, in spite of all the objections that reason raises
against the presupposition of fate; and we can understand why the later
"drama of fate” was bound to fail so miserably. Our sentiment rebels
against any arbitrary individual compulsion, such as is presupposed in
Die Ahnfrau and the like; but the Greek legend seizes upon a
compulsion which everyone recognizes because he senses its existence
within himself. Everyone in the audience was once a budding Oedipus
in fantasy and each recoils in horror from the dream fulfillment here
transplanted into reality, with the full quantity of repression which
separates his infantile state from his present one. (Freud, Complete
Letters 272 translation modified)

As the setting of Freud’s Hannibal in the Latin class in the Gymnasium provides a key
identity-founding institution of the liberal German Austrian bourgeoisie and elite, so
does the theater, the setting of Freud’s Oedipus. Freud’s object of analysis is not Sophocles’ drama itself but rather the allegedly universal reaction of the theater audience: the visceral affective reaction of shuddering back (zurückschaudern). According to Freud, this strong visceral reaction is directed at the gendered plotline and has nothing to do with the tension between human will and destiny.

In Die Traumdeuting (The Interpretation of Dreams), Freud affirms the points that the drama is extremely effective in leaving a strong impact on its viewer and that the reason must lie in the particularity of the plot.

Wenn der Königs Ödipus den modernen Menschen nicht minder zu erschüttern weiß wie den zeitgenössischen Griechen, so kann die Lösung wohl nur darin liegen, daß die Wirkung der griechischen Tragödie nicht auf dem Gegensatz zwischen Schicksal und Menschenwillen ruht, sondern in der Besonderheit des Stoffes zu suchen ist, an welchem dieser Gegensatz erwiesen wird. (Freud, Traumdeutung 269)

If Oedipus Rex moves the modern human no less than it did the contemporary Greek, the explanation can only be that its effect does not lie in the contrast between destiny and human will, but is to be looked for in the particular nature of the material on which that contrast is demonstrated. (Freud, Interpretation of Dreams 1 262)

Freud presents an antagonism between Sophocles’ contemporary Greek and the modern human to highlight the trans-historical effectiveness of the play, as if these two figures adequately demonstrate the range of human experience. Greg Thomas critiques the argumentative move of pointing to a commonality between a “modern

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108 See (McGrath)
109 For two different production histories of Oedipus Rex in different periods in Europe, with two different arguments about the relevance of these histories to Freud’s argument, see (Rancière; Armstrong, “Oedipus as Evidence”), Compulsion 47–52, 226–8; Armstrong, “Oedipus as Evidence.”
human” subject and an “ancient Greek” and taking it as evidence for the universality of the commonality in question. Thomas points out that this argumentative move has a racial subtext. Produced ideologically as the cradle of “European culture,” ancient Greece is invoked to prove Europe’s distinction and its universality at the same time (Thomas 6).

Freud’s argument about the universality of Oedipal feeling is intertwined with a discourse of distinction as well. Freud refers to a particular affective reaction to the theater performance of *King Oedipus* and uses this affective reaction of the theater audience as the springboard for an argument that mother-love and father-hatred are universal. The same affective reaction, however, is also considered a sign of the cultural distinction of the particular theater audience. Consider the words of Vienna’s most influential cultural critic, Ludwig Speidel, the Feuilleton editor of Vienna’s leading liberal newspaper, the *Neue Freue Presse*. In anticipation of the 1886 premiere at the Viennese *Burgtheater*, Speidel spells out that the production of *King Oedipus* is a challenge—but not only, as one might assume, for the director Adolf Wilbrandt and his team but especially for the audience!

Morgen (Mittwoch) wird das Burgtheater die Tragödie „König Oedipus“ von Sophokles in der Bühnenbearbeitung Wilbrandt’s zum erstenmale zur Aufführung bringen. Damit tritt an das Burgtheater und namentlich an das Publicum eine große Aufgabe heran. Die Zuschauer werden eine ästhetische Prüfung, ein wahres Rigorosum, zu bestehen haben. (Speidel 7)

Tomorrow (Wednesday) the Burgtheater will bring on the performance of the tragedy “King Oedipus,” edited for the stage by Wilbrandt, for the first time. With this the Burgtheater and especially the audience is faced with a great task. The audience will have to undergo an aesthetic examination, a veritable Rigorosum. (my translation)
By attending and enjoying the performance of *King Oedipus*, the members of the audience qualify themselves with an honorary academic title of sorts. The *Rigorosum* is an oral examination that accompanies the completion of a doctoral degree. Its Latin name reflects the classical inspiration of an education that runs from the *Gymnasium* through the university and has its outposts in the theater. Speidel points out that the preconditions of the drama are gruesome, that Sophocles’ artistic rendition, however, is splendid. He concludes:


> To be able to endure and enjoy such a work of art is evidence of naturally great sentiment or a high aesthetic culture. Both these elements are amply represented in the Vienna audience, thus we can certainly look forward to a pleasurable evening. (my translation)

Post production, his review likewise includes a congratulatory comment for the audience:

> The success of the production, which had been prepared with the greatest care, was outstanding. The spectators, who confronted the tragedy’s alien style of composition with refined understanding and who lost no moment of the action, truly deserve the highest praise. Vienna has at last come of age for grand tragedy. (quoted in Armstrong, “Oedipus as Evidence”)

Rather than seeing the play’s success as evidence of its universal effectiveness among “modern humans,” as Freud does, Speidel sees in it the evidence of distinction: the audience is distinguished by its “naturally great sentiment” or “high aesthetic culture” and proudly represents a Vienna that has “come of age.” These characterizations
mobilize modernist binaries between backwardness/primitivity on the one hand and maturity/culture on the other.

While one could argue that Freud and Speidel propose opposing interpretations of the audience’s favorable evaluation of *King Oedipus*, I argue that Freud’s comments about the effectiveness of the Greek tragedy builds upon Speidel’s assessment of the affective or cultural distinction of the Viennese theater audience and reconfigures this alleged distinction as a purported universality. The assertion of distinction is built into Freud’s claim to universality.

I understand Freud’s claim to universality in relation to his emphasis on the sexual content of the play. The triangulation of the male child between mother and father and the competitive, emulating relationship with the father in particular insert the play into the imagination of the life of an infant surrounded by a heteropatriarchal nuclear family, in which mother and father exert the determinative influences on the child’s psyche. This fantasized scene of an infant in the surrounding of a heteropatriarchal nuclear family is coded as ordinary and universal, even though it is precisely this gender and family organization that is also in other instances taken as the mark of modernity or Europeanness.¹¹₀

With Freud’s and Speidel’s comments considered together, the discourse about the success of *King Oedipus* achieves a construction of the audience that is akin to the

¹¹₀ Psychoanalytic discourse regularly theorizes racial difference through and as deviance from normative Oedipal gender and sexual organization. For instance Owen Berkeley-Hill, psychiatrist and psychoanalyst in colonial India, theorized that the Muslim psyche was insufficiently Oedipal (Hartnack; Bjelic). For a critique of more contemporary forms, see Puar, especially “The Sexuality of Terrorism”; Puar and Rai.
curious construction of the German in Thaner’s speech: the subject is distinctive and elevated (through its relationship to culture/antiquity) and universal and ordinary (through its heteropatriarchally ordered sexuality and language). The ordinariness is indexed through the imagined scene of infancy and through the heteropatriarchal family setting that provides the frame for sexuality and language acquisition respectively. This ordinariness is furthermore claimed to be universal. Thaner also explicitly articulates this universality as cross-racial, including German, Czech, American Indian, and Congo and Asante Negroes as examples of “all humans, all nations” who love their mother tongue.

At the same time, this alleged ordinariness and cross-racial universality is embedded in a discourse of an exclusive relationship of “European culture” to “antiquity.” Thaner asserts this relationship explicitly. In Freud it can be seen in the institutionalized set-up of the theater production of Greek tragedy, including its discursive production as a mark of distinction for the subject of the audience. The subject of European culture (Thaner) or “modern human” (Freud) who is mediated by the infantile, heteropatriarchal imagination of possessing and loving a mother tongue or having Oedipal desire and hatred is thus produced as a distinguished subject through the wider social meanings (of Europeanness, of education, or Germanness, and of civilization) that are attached to the institutionalized practices of consuming antiquity. The distinguished status of the individual modern human is normalized by inscribing the grandness of classical antiquity into the alleged commonness of his or her embodied, affective life: into his appreciation of his mother tongue (which he, in
the abstract, is said to have in common with “primitive people), and into his most “infantile” sentiments of loving his mother and hating his father.

The organic language of the *Keim* (germ) in the letter (“Jeder der Hörer war einmal im Keime und in der Phantasie ein solcher Ödipus”) even figures the affective, psychic material of Oedipus in a biologically embodied, sexually reproductive way, since from the word *Keim* it is not far to *Keimzelle* or gamete. Jeffrey Masson’s idiomatic translation, “Everyone in the audience was once a budding Oedipus in fantasy” captures the organic imagination that Freud evokes here (Freud, *Complete Letters* 272). John Fletcher points out that at this particular juncture, Freud theorizes sexuality to move from the inside out, unfolding like a bud, developing like a germ, rather than to be implanted by an original trauma or seduction.\textsuperscript{111} In addition, my point is that the interior-generated sexuality is nevertheless parasitic upon the fantasy of European culture. Freud’s reading of *King Oedipus* re-articulates a discourse about the cultural distinction represented by Greek tragedy and “European culture” and finds a place for the Greek hero inside and inherently part of the sexual body-with-a psyche of the modern human.

Against this backdrop, the fact that Freud has no interest in and no questions about his infantile knowledge of Czech, other than presenting it as a curiosity on the side, appears not an unfortunate oversight but rather embedded in the particular delineation of “European culture” and aesthetic distinction in which Freud found the ingredients and also a rationale for his theory of Oedipal sexuality. While it was

\footnote{Fletcher builds on the work of Jean Laplanche and Teresa de Lauretis for this distinction.}
imaginable to have once been a budding Oedipus, and to have the trace of this “budding Oedipus” inside oneself, it was less conceivable that there be any traces of Czech in Freud’s psyche which would have any significant hold on his identity.

Fate and God: The Pious Christian Woman

Looking more closely at the overlapping theorizations of the success of King Oedipus in Freud’s writings and in contemporary theater criticism, I observe another dimension that is woven into the normative masculinity of the “modern human” in Freud’s Oedipus theory and in a different way into Freud’s Jewish fantasy of the Semitic hero Hannibal: an aversion to certain forms of religiosity. Freud routinely presents the fatalistic-tragedy explanation as the one and only alternative explanation for the success of King Oedipus. By pointing to a different fatalistic tragedy, typically Franz Grillparzer’s Die Ahnfrau, and asserting that it fails to inspire or impress, Freud quickly discards with this explanation.112

Es muß eine Stimme in unserm Innern geben, welche die zwingende Gewalt im Schicksal des Oedipus anzuerkennen bereit ist, während wir Verfügungen wie in der „Ahnfrau“ oder in anderen Schicksalstragödien als willkürliche zurückweisen können. (Freud, Traumdeutung 269)

There must be something which makes a voice within us ready to recognize the compelling force of Oedipus’ destiny, while we can dismiss as merely arbitrary such dispositions as are laid down in [Grillparzer’s] Die Ahnfrau or other modern tragedies of destiny. (Freud, Interpretation of Dreams 1 262 translation modified)

112 The assertion, as Armstrong points out, does not have a solid empirical foundation. Grillparzer’s “Die Ahnfrau” was successful on the Viennese stage.
In his later *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, he rehearses the same fatalistic-tragedy hypothesis, only to dismiss it again—this time as weak morality:


[The tragedy of Sophocles] is fundamentally an amoral work: it absolves men from moral responsibility, exhibits the gods as promoters of crime and shows the impotence of the moral impulses of men which struggle against crime. It might easily be supposed that the material of the legend had in view an indictment of the gods and of fate; and in the hands of Euripides, the critic and enemy of the gods, it would probably have become such an indictment. But with the devout Sophocles there is no question of an application of that kind. The difficulty is overcome by the pious sophistry that to bow to the will of the gods is the highest morality even when it promotes crime. I cannot think that this morality is a strong point of the play, but it has no influence on its effect. It is not to it that the auditor reacts but to the secret sense and content of the legend. (Freud, *Introductory Lectures* 331)

The play shows “the Gods of promoters of crime.” Even though this would be the perfect material for an indictment of the Gods, the intended morality of the playwright is pro-Gods. Freud does not mince words when he denounces this morality, he calls it a “pious sophistry” (*fromme Spitzfindigkeit*) and simply asserts that it has no part in the effect of the play on its audience. Not only does he refute the
fatalistic-tragedy hypothesis, he puts it down with a vengeance. Armstrong remarks pointedly: “Freud rather likes to make us feel like idiots if we accept the work’s apparent concerns with anything less than contempt” (“Oedipus as Evidence,” n.p.). Armstrong also points to yet another example in which Freud dismisses the play’s concern with the conflict between the hero and the Gods as the result of “a misconceived secondary revision of the material, which has sought to exploit it for theological purposes” (ibid, compare SE 4:264). The theological concern of the play is thus nothing but a false superimposition.

Certainly, the “mature” Viennese audience with great sentiment or high aesthetic culture, as Speidel praised Oedipus-loving Vienna, would not be showered with praise in Vienna’s eminent liberal newspaper if it were seen to simply have fallen for a “pious sophistry.” But Freud does not even raise the possibility that there may be such a pious outlier among the fans of Oedipus. The morality of the pious sophistry is so weak that the possibility that it could have moved Viennese theater-goers is treated as non-existent. The unacceptability of the “pious sophistry” is simply axiomatic—weak morality turns into empirical impossibility.

The overlaps and continuities between Freud’s and Speidel’s writings suggest that Freud’s attack of the fatalistic-tragedy hypothesis is going after a straw man. Richard Armstrong reminds us “that many people shared Freud’s disinterest in the theological drift of the play” (“Oedipus as Evidence,” n.p.). The theological drift was predicted to be an obstacle to the play’s effectiveness in its modern production. On the day before the premiere, while Speidel swore in the Viennese theater audience for
its upcoming “aesthetic examination,” another critic at the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* expressed skepticism.

Not the trimeter [of the Greek original] and the choruses, but rather fate, oracles, belief in the gods, and the power of priests are the great hindrances which thwart the universal effectiveness of tragedy.¹¹³

Freud’s claim that the play’s effectiveness is *despite* its apparent membership in the genre of fatalistic tragedy is clearly part of a wider discourse. By refuting it, Freud appeals to a common antipathy to piousness in his liberal audience.

Freud’s contemporary, the influential philologist and scholar of antiquity Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, critiqued the imposition of a “destiny versus free will” framework on Sophocles’ *King Oedipus*. But he too discussed the religiosity of Sophocles and makes a remarkable link, in the present time, to the religiosity of a *christliches Mütterlein* (Christian old mother).

Vermuthlich wird den Sophokles heut zu Tage am besten ein christliches Mütterlein verstehen, das in all den unbegreiflichen und ungerechten Lebensschicksalen, die sie gesehen hat, die Hand des persönlichen in alles eingreifenden gerechten Gottes findet, und sie hat nicht unrecht, wenn sie dann den armen Heiden bedauert, dem die Gewissheit der (potentiellen) Erlösung gefehlt hätte, so sehr auch Sophokles dieses Bedauern abzulehnen berechtigt wäre. (Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 57)

Presumably the one who will understand Sophocles best in our days is a Christian old mother who sees the hand of the personal and everywhere-intervening God in all the unfathomable and unjust life fates that she has seen, and she is not wrong when she then pities the poor heathen who lacked the certainty of a (potential) salvation, as much as Sophocles would be right to reject this pity.

Even though Wilamowitz-Möllendorff’s assessment of Sophocles’ *King Oedipus*

parts ways with Freud’s in significant ways, his comment does point us to the
gendered construction of a certain Christian piousness and the “weak” morality that is
involved in submitting to the Gods, as opposed to the normative masculinity of
Oedipus’ competitive relationship with his father and sexual relationship with his
mother

The word Mütterlein is a diminutive of the word Mutter (mother) and does not
literally denote “old.” The word is frequently used in the phrase “altes (old)
Mütterlein” and, especially in combination with Christian piety as it is sketched by
Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, it does not come with the social valuation that is tied to the
idealized mother figure. While the idealized mother is represented through her
relationship to her child, as is Oedipus’ mother, the term Mütterlein can describe an
aging woman whose children, if she has any, have long grown up and do not need her
any more. Childless in one way or another, she is imagined to extend her old-
motherly care indiscriminately. She is thus a counter-figure to the Oedipal “modern
human” on various accounts: her religious sensibility makes her unimaginable as an
audience member to the performance of King Oedipus, and her motherly affect has no
place in the idealized heteropatriarchal mother-father-child constellation of Freud’s
Oedipus. Her religiosity and her old-motherly gendered sociality are in fact linked
through the imagination that she will impart her “pious” views together with her
indiscriminate old-motherly care and affection. This imagination is subtly referenced
in Wilamowitz-Möllendorff through the phrase of the “poor heathen”: This phrase has
pity built into it and therefore imitates the speech of the “old mother.”
This figure of the Christian old mother also points us to the figure of Freud’s nursemaid. Freud’s nursemaid, too, is embedded negatively in Freud’s theorization of the modern human through the Oedipus complex.\textsuperscript{114} He describes her during his self-analysis, in his letters to Fließ of October 3, 1897. He calls her

\begin{quote}
\textit{ein häßliches, älteres, aber kluges Weib [...]}, das mir viel vom lieben Gott und der Hölle erzählt (...) hat. (\textit{Briefe an Fliess} 288)
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
an ugly, elderly, but very clever woman, who told me a great deal about God Almighty and about hell. (Freud, \textit{Complete Letters} 268 translation modified)
\end{quote}

This description has a mild tinge of irony in the phrase “vom lieben Gott” (literally “dear God”) or “God Almighty.” The phrase has reverence built in, akin to the built-in pity of the phrase “poor heathen,” and thereby takes on a subtly irony if used by a professed non-believer. The same irony is manifest in a passage from Freud’s next letter of October 15, which is the letter in which Freud also shares for the first time his analysis of King Oedipus.

Ich fragte meine Mutter, ob sie sich noch der Kinderfrau erinnert. „Natürlich,“ sagte sie, „eine ältliche Person, sehr gescheit, sie hat Dich in alle Kirchen getragen; wenn du dann nach Hause gekommen bist, hast du gepredigt und erzählt, wie der liebe Gott macht.“ (Freud, \textit{Briefe an Fliess} 291)

I asked my mother whether she still remembered the nurse. “Of course,” she said, “an elderly person somewhat old person, very clever, she was always carrying you off to some church; when you returned home, you preached and told us all about God Almighty.” (Freud, \textit{Complete Letters} 272)

\textsuperscript{114} Freud’s memories of his nursemaid and their relationship to his theory of the Oedipus complex have generated a large body of scholarship, but the gendered religiousity has not been adequately appreciated yet. See especially Swan; Fletcher; St. John, also McClintock; Stoler; Robbins; Stallybrass and White; Krüll; Gicklhorn; Sajner; Anzieu.
In its performance by the nursemaid, Christianity involves orally transmitted knowledge of God and hell as well as the physical practice of going to church. In fact, the description of going to church is more distinctive: she was carrying Freud off to some church. The verb carry emphasizes the bodily exertion that is involved in taking a small child to church. It calls up images of the physical interior space of the church as a gathering point for old women and small children (as well as others) and thereby contrasts with a more masculine image of the church as institution that could be evoked with phrases such as “she took you to church” or “she made you attend church.”

Freud’s nursemaid’s focus on hell suggests a religious-moral outlook where human abstention from sin is more central than faith and submission to God’s will as is emphasized in Wilamowitz-Möllendorff’s Christian old mother. As such, her religiosity is thus arguably not as offensive to Freud as the one ostensibly conveyed by Sophocles’ tragedy: the acceptance of the futility of human struggle against the will of the Gods. The overarching gendered construction of the pious old woman, in a motherly role but not “mother,” nevertheless subsumes these traces of theological difference in a common gendered-religious outside to Freud’s “modern human.”

Freud’s nursemaid, who engages in religious talk while performing maternalized care to a child that is not her own, exemplifies the combination of feminized religiosity

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115 This difference could be correlated to different Christian denominations. There is a scholarly consensus to assume that Freud’s nursemaid was Catholic. The greater emphasis on faith in Wilamowitz-Möllendorff’s figure of the “christliches Mütterlein” suggests a possibly greater influence of protestantism.
and marginality to the ideal of the heteropatriarchal family that I explored in Wilamowitz-Möllendorff’s figure of the Christian old mother.

The gendered religious/non-religious difference that is negotiated in Freud’s letters is mediated by a Jewish/Christian difference and therefore not as apparent as it otherwise would be. But keeping in mind the construction of Vienna’s educated public and Freud’s “modern human” as having an aversion to religious piousness, and given that Freud constructed “sexuality” out of the practices, institutions, and narratives that differentially produce this educated public, Freud’s nursemaid’s distinct type of religiosity adds another explanation to the fact that Freud did not consider his infantile knowledge of Czech (for which she is after all most likely the most significant source) in his self-analysis. She would, after all, be unimaginable in the theater audience of *King Oedipus*.

With this in mind, let us look back once more at Freud’s Hannibal fantasy. I had not so far named the relation between the defiant Jew Sigmund Freud, with his fantasy of the Semitic herol, and the “unmanly” Eastern Jew, as indexed by the “unheroic” submission of Sigmund Freud’s Galician-born father, as a religious difference. But the latter figure is inscribed with a religiosity into his gendered appearance that is completely absent in Hannibal, and this (ascribed) religiosity is intrinsically bound up in this figure’s failure to embody normative masculinity. The particular religiosity inscribed in the (male) Eastern Jew differs of course in important ways from that of the pious Christian woman and is not as directly linked to the Oedipus theory. But if Hannibal provides a benign variation with a Jewish face to the
universal Oedipus theory of the modern human (as European), coalescing around the
same normative masculinity, then the figures of the unmanly Eastern Jew and the
pious Christian old woman are supplementing the Hannibal and Oedipus figures
respectively in their religiously inflected deviance from that normative Europeanness.

Freud treats the aversion to the behaviors and morals represented by the
Eastern Jew and the pious Christian old mother as extra-theoretical. Freud’s Hannibal
fantasy, admittedly, is not a theory, but the point here is that he treats his
disappointment in his father’s unheroic behavior as psychoanalytically uninteresting.
Freud shows no interest in questioning the origins of his desire for his father’s
heroism.

Freud’s treatment of the piousness in his Oedipus theory is even more
remarkable. Consider once more the language Freud uses in his letter to Fließ.

Gegen jeden willkürlichen Einzelzwang, wie er in der Ahnfrau etc.
Voraussetzung ist, bäumt sich unsere Empfindung, aber die griechische
Sage greift einen Zwang auf, den jeder anerkennt, weil er dessen
Existenz in sich verspürt hat. Jeder der Hörer war einmal im Keime
und in der Phantasie ein solcher Ödipus, und vor der hier in die
Realität gezogenen Traumerfüllung schaudert jeder zurück mit dem
ganzen Betrag der Verdrängung, der seinen infantilen Zustand von
seinem heutigen trennt. (Freud, Briefe an Fließ 293, emphasis mine)

Our sentiment rebels [rears up] against any arbitrary single
compulsion, such as is presupposed in Die Ahnfrau and the like; but
the Greek legend seizes upon a compulsion which everyone recognizes
because he senses its existence within himself. Everyone in the
audience was once a budding Oedipus in fantasy and each recoils in
horror from the dream fulfillment here transplanted into reality, with
the full quantity of repression which separates his infantile state from
his present one. (Freud, Complete Letters 272 emphasis mine)

Rejecting the appeal of the fatalistic tragedy, Freud uses language of bodily revulsion
that can compete with the bodily revulsion evoked by Oedipus’ crimes. The passage that says “our sentiment rebels” translates a metaphorical use of an expression (*sich aufbäumen*) that describes strong convulsive bodily movement such as the rearing up of a horse. Freud thus presumes a reaction to the idea of fate among the collectivity of his readers akin to that of a rearing-up horse. This is quite similar to the “shuddering back” that he claims is the normative reaction to the idea of mother-incest and father-murder. But whereas the “shuddering back” is explained as the expression of repressed desire, the “rearing up” of the sentiment is left untheorized, as axiomatic and theoretically uninteresting religious-moral orientation. No psychoanalytic explanation rehabilitates the pious morality or attempts to provide insight into the origin of the sentiment’s “rearing up.” This visceral bodily reaction brings the subject into psychoanalytic focus, it is not subject to psychoanalytic analysis itself.

The different valences of the rearing-up (against the idea of fate) and the shuddering-back (from the idea of mother-incest and father-murder) have their correlation in the contrasting assessments of a “compulsion” brought by destiny or God and a “compulsion” rooted in sexuality. Freud uses the same word (*Zwang*) for both instances of compulsion. The idea that one may be compelled by divine force or fate gives the sentiment of the “modern human” convulsions (without psychoanalytic relief), but being compelled by Oedipal desire and hatred characterizes this same modern human to the psychoanalytically informed person.

In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, when Freud renders his associations with Hannibal, he casually evokes ideas of fate as well. “[Es] war mir so wenig wie ihm

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beschieden, Rom zu sehen” (*Traumdeutung* 202). In the first published English translation, Brill translates, “like him I was destined never to see Rome.” James Strachey, in the Standard Edition went for: “Like him, I had been fated not to see Rome.” Despite Freud’s invective against notions of fate and destiny that are bound up with Gods, the fantasy of Hannibal, bound up in a fantasy of filial masculinity, allows for such notions to pass without being questioned. Re-formulated as heteropatriarchally anchored gender and sexuality, the stories of Hannibal and Oedipus take on a substitute-religious valence. Such sexuality, imbued with the aura of classical antiquity, appears as the only form in which the notion of being compelled by something beyond one’s control is compatible with the idea of being a modern human.

**Conclusion**

The affective relationship to Oedipus and Hannibal that informs Freud’s theorizing and fantasizing is built in the cultivation of distinction in the Latin class of the *Gymnasium* and the Viennese theater production of Greek tragedy. Both of these sites cultivate a sense of European culture that is in an exclusive relationship with Roman and Greek antiquity. Freud emphasizes the sexual and gendered content of the Oedipus myth and drama and, bypassing the overt discourse of European cultural distinction, asserts the universality of mother-love and father-hatred. Still bypassing the discourse of cultural distinction, he presents this heteropatriarchal scaffolding as the setting in which the universal infant takes shape as a psychic subject. Sexuality
and its gendered scripts, whether inspired by Oedipus or Hannibal, thus becomes the scene where fantasies of European culture and antiquity become embodied. Antiquity, in the wider discourse produced as a secular rationale for the specialness of Europe, inflects this “sexuality” with a differential meaning. In sexuality, the aura of antiquity as a source of European culture finds a place in the individual body of the “modern human.”

Figures such as the unmanly Eastern Jew or the pious Christian old mother not only exist in a deviant or marginal relationship to this heteropatriarchal gender order, but they are also not interpellated as “modern humans” at the Gymnasium or the elite theater. The figure of the pious Christian old mother in particular represents a gendered religiosity that Freud emphatically puts down on his way to defend his theory of Oedipal sexuality as universal. The antipathy towards religiosity (religiosity as an embodied practice rather than religion as a cultural tradition) is foundational to Freud’s “universal” Oedipal subject, which emblematizes the shift from a self-consciously exclusive discourse of European culture to a “universal” discourse of sexuality.

The next two chapters, will continue to engage with a certain antagonism between sexuality, race, and religion, but from a different angle. The first two chapters have both taken as their starting point narrative articulations of a sexual self (coming out, castration, Oedipus) and then analyzed what form of subjectivity it legitimates. In the third and fourth chapters, which are closely linked and related, I continue to analyze the notions of subjectivity that are legitimated through discourse
of sexuality and psychoanalysis in particular. But rather than center sexual theories as my starting point and primary object of analysis, I examine how the discourse of sexuality comes to play a role in one of Austria’s major antisemitic mobilizations at the turn of the nineteenth century: the Hilsner affair.
3) Ritual Murder and Sexuality in the Hilsner Affair

With the growth of the antisemitic movement in the 1890s, there was a wave of ritual murder allegations in Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia. These allegations, variously framed “ritual murder” or “blood murder,” accuse Jews of murdering Christian virgins, youths, or children to procure blood that is needed for Jewish rituals. Several high-profile murder trials ensued from this antisemitic fantasy, also called “blood libel” by its critics. Among them is the trial of Leopold Hilsner, a young Jewish day laborer and beggar who was framed for the ritual murder of the young Christian seamstress Anežka Hrůzová. Overlapping with the Dreyfus affair in France, Hilsner’s trials in 1899 and 1900 were a high point for antisemitism. Antisemites celebrated Hilsner’s arrest, trial, and conviction with pogroms and street violence.

The Hilsner affair, as the events that surrounded the ritual murder accusations against Hilsner were called, is a particularly relevant object of study for scholars of the intertwined histories of sexuality and racism. Debates about sexual perversion—

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116 Alternative German or Germanized versions of Anežka Hrůzová’s name that are frequently used in German-language publications are “Agnes and Anna for the first name and Hruza and occasionally Hruza for the last name. The name Hrůzová includes the ending that indicates a female status in the Czech language. Since German does not modify last names in this way, German authors frequently refer to the murder victim by the standard or male version of her family name: Hruza or Germanized Hruza. In referring to names of people and places that have German and Czech names, I will either use both names or use the name that the person or the inhabitants of a place appear to have used themselves, if there is a tendency. In quoted material or discussions that engage closely with a particular text, I tend to use the name that is used in the text that I work with. I also use common English names (Prague, Vienna) where such names exist.
lust murder, fetishism, necrophilia, sadism—played an important role during the trial and in the media debates surrounding it. Anežka Hrůzová’s dead body was found with several wounds to her head and throat, partially undressed in the woods by Polná in Bohemia. Aside from the antisemitic blood libel, which honed in on her wounded throat, the most widely endorsed alternative account for her murder emphasized that her corpse was partially undressed and hypothesized that the murder was driven by a sexual perversion. In court, the difference between the ritual murder framework and the sexual perversion framework was discussed as the question of motive but the difference between these two discourses extends beyond these specifics. Each invoked different conceptions of selfhood and agency. Understanding the wider presumptions that are embedded in the ritual murder and sexual perversion frameworks helps clarify the techniques of power that are invoked through the discourse of sexuality and through blood libel, respectively.

The accusation of ritual murder propagated the idea of “the Jews” as a collective entity, inherently murderous because of an alleged religious ritual requiring Christian blood. The exact details of this ritual were imagined to be so secret that only Jews, insiders to this (imaginary) quasi-terrorist organization of Judaism, knew about it. Blood libel thus ultimately implicates all Jews in a given crime. The agency of ritual murder is accordingly also imagined to be inherently collective. The person who commits the ritual murder is only the executing arm of a larger conspiracy.

Liberal critics of antisemitism opposed the blood libel and endorsed the belief that Anežka Hrůzová’s murderer was driven by sadism, necrophilia, fetishism, or
some further unspecified sexual perversion. Drawing on the then emergent sciences of sexology and psychiatry, this “sexual perversion” framework located intentionality firmly in the individual. While the discourse of sexual perversion was at first deployed in opposition to the antisemitic scapegoating and with the intention to exonerate Hilsner, the accusation against Hilsner was soon adapted and haphazardly translated in court into terms compatible with the sexual perversion framework. Hilsner was thus framed as a Jewish ritual murderer but convicted as an individual sexual murderer.

In the first part of this chapter, I set up a study of the relationship between blood murder discourse and sexuality discourse through Foucault’s theory of the relationship between sexuality, blood, and modern racism. Even though Foucault productively theorizes sexuality as a privileged target of a distinctive technique of power that infuses the individual body, not least by relying on a contrast to blood as the privileged metaphor for another technique of power, his assessment of the relationship between blood and sexuality in the end generates a theory of modern racism that is misleading in that it only considers racial regimes characterized by fantasies of racial purity. Other forms of racism such as those galvanized by ritual murder discourse are bracketed by it.

In the second part of the chapter, I shift to approach the relationship between blood murder discourse and sexuality differently. I consider Paul Kieval’s argument that modern ritual murder discourse is itself sexualized. I go through Kieval’s evidence for this argument and accumulate material from the Hilsner affair that also
raises the question if blood murder discourse is itself sexualized. While Kieval’s claim is right in the sense that ritual murder discourse, as it was deployed on the ground, built upon and negotiated a social order structured by gender, class, religion, nationality, and ideals of female sexual morality, there is also an independent discursive production of sexuality as a distinct sphere of motivation of an individual self that is abstracted from its status in the social world. This notion of sexuality, with all its implied ideas of individual selfhood and individual agency, was decisively not part of ritual murder discourse.

In the third and final part of the chapter, I elaborate on a theorization of sexuality and ritual murder that builds on my readings of Foucault and Kieval but is grounded specifically in the analysis of the unfolding of and the relationship between ritual murder and sexual perversion frameworks in the Hilsner affair. The framework of sexuality (which extends into the framework of psychopathology) is part of the discursive production of individual selfhood. It provides a language for theorizing the abnormality of the individual. The framework of ritual murder, on the other hand, produces “the Jews” as a collective entity at odds with human society. While the discourse of sexuality enables a liberal critique of antisemitism, it also provided a language through which to accommodate antisemitism with the institutions of liberal statehood.

Part I: Sex, Blood and “Modern Racism” in The History of Sexuality

Foucault organizes one of his central arguments in The History of Sexuality Volume 1
with a binary between “blood” and “sex” Foucault famously argues that, with the advent of medical-scientific theorizations of “sexuality” such as sexology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and national political economy and population studies, “sexuality” emerged as an object and target of power/knowledge. Combining disciplinary effects on individual bodies and large-scale population-management projects, the deployment of sexuality was a central feature in the emergence of biopower: a form of power organized around fostering, managing, and optimizing life and health.

Foucault first introduces a binary between blood and sex when he contrasts the deployment of sexuality with the deployment of alliance. As discussed in the chapter “Coming out, Castration, and the Biopolitics of Parental Narcissism,” the deployment of alliance is composed of a system of rules governing marriage and kinship status, whereas the deployment of sexuality targets the individual body and its capacities for sensation, pleasures, and knowledge. There is already an intimation that “sex” supplanted “blood” in Foucault’s argument that the bourgeoisie borrowed from aristocratic practices of distinction: while claims to aristocratic distinction are based in the putative specialness of their noble “blood” and ancestry, the emergent bourgeoisie transplanted and recoded these practices into claims to bourgeois distinctions that are based in the specialness of its “sex,” which also meant its body, its health and its children (124). We thus find blood associated with the dominance of an aristocracy and sex with the emergent bourgeoisie.

In the final part of his book, Foucault discusses the relationship between the deployment of sexuality and biopower and elaborates on the latter as a regime of
power organized around the management of life rather than the menace of death.

There he develops the dualism between sex and blood on a more general level.

Namely, he proposes the terms “a society of blood” or “of sanguinity” in opposition to “a society of sexuality.” “Blood” gets associated with the (highly symbolic) idea of “blood relations” (as he had already done earlier in his argument about the nobility) and hence alliance but also with death, which he argues is not any more the central principle of power under the aegis of biopower in the era of “sexuality.” There is thus, on one side: death, blood, alliance (with an emphasis on ancestry) and on the other life, sex, sexuality (with an emphasis on descent and procreation).

The blood relation long remained an important element in the mechanism of power, its manifestations, and its rituals. For a society in which the system of alliance, the political form of the sovereign, the differentiation into orders and castes, and the value of descent lines were predominant; for a society in which famine, epidemics, and violence made death imminent, blood constituted one of the fundamental values. It owed its high value to the ability to its instrumental role (the ability to shed blood), to the way it functioned in the order of signs (to have a certain blood, to be of the same blood, to be prepared to risk one’s blood), and also to its precariousness (easily spilled, subject to drying up, too readily mixed, capable of being quickly corrupted. A society of blood—I was tempted to say, of “sanguinity”—where power spoke through blood: the honor of war, the fear of famine, the triumph of death, the sovereign with his sword, executioners, and tortures; blood was a reality with a symbolic function. (147)

In this passage, the notion of “blood” holds various different phenomena together: blood stands in for death caused by famines and epidemics, social orders determined by descent lines and differentiation into orders and castes, and precariousness and

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117 While he does not mention feudalism explicitly, this is what he seems to talk about.
violence. He directly contrasts this principle of blood to a principle of sex/sexuality in what he calls “our” society:

We, on the other hand, are in a society of “sex,” or rather a society “with a sexuality”: the mechanisms of power are addressed to the body, to life, to what causes it to proliferate, to what reinforces the species, its stamina, its ability to dominate, or its capacity for being used. Through the themes of health, progeny, race, the future of the species, the vitality of the social body, power spoke of sexuality and to sexuality, the latter was not a mark or a symbol, it was an object and a target. Moreover, its importance was due less to its rarity or its precariousness than to its insistence, its insidious presence, the fact that it was everywhere an object of excitement and fear at the same time. Power delineated it, aroused it, and employed it as the proliferating meaning that had always to be taken control of again lest it escape; it was an effect with a meaning-value. (Foucault 147–8)

Evident in these passages is that the difference between blood and sex, for Foucault, is a difference not just in objects, content, or themes but also in form or method, or as Foucault calls it, “technique” of power. Blood, in Foucault’s account, symbolizes, reflects, and expresses power, whereas sex is the target and effect of power. Blood and sex epitomize different kinds of power.

Foucault’s analysis of the “society of sexuality” extends his argument that sexuality is constituted as an object and site of truth, and that a discursive explosion about sexuality was and is incited through tropes that depict sexuality as elusive, repressed, or taboo. He argues that knowledge about sexuality is constructed as indispensable for knowledge about the self, that an industry of experts and highly developed procedures of analysis and interpretation was and is legitimated by the perceived need to get at the truth of sexuality, and finally that there is pleasure in the economy of sexual knowledge and power.
Foucault’s analysis of blood is less developed. This may be because, for Foucault, blood represents a type of power whose mechanisms are more easily understood and, in fact, tend to be taken as the model for how power works, especially in relation to sexuality. Foucault’s reference to blood thus serves to elaborate on the distinctiveness of the workings of power in a society of sexuality.

When Ann Laura Stoler reads Foucault’s theorization of societies of sanguinity and sexuality, she cautions against reading Foucault as a “modernization theorist in disguise” (38). She suggests that “[o]ne could read Foucault as a master of the art of crafting bold dichotomies that he recants as quickly as he sets them up” (38). And indeed, Foucault also warns against being misread as proposing two distinct forms of social organization and makes the following statement regarding the relationship between sanguinity and sexuality:

I do not mean to say that a substitution of sex for blood was by itself responsible for all the transformations that marked the threshold of our modernity. It is not the soul of two civilizations or the organizing principle of two cultural forms that I am attempting to express; I am looking for the reasons for which sexuality, far from being repressed in the society of that period, on the contrary was constantly aroused. The new procedures of power that were devised during the classical age and employed in the nineteenth century were what caused our society to go from a *symbols of blood* to an *analytics of sexuality*. Clearly, nothing was more on the side of the law, death, transgression, the symbolic, and sovereignty than blood; just as sexuality was on the side of the norm, knowledge, life, meaning, the disciplines, and regulations. (148)

This is an interesting passage. It begins with the denunciation of a misreading that blood and sex constitute the organizing principles of two cultural forms, that the substitution of sex for blood is responsible for modernity. What he denounces,
however, is only the particular understanding of causality, not the correlation. In other words, I think this passage supports the claim that Foucault is theorizing modernity, since it suggests that sexuality corresponds to modernity and sanguinity to premodernity. Yet, sexuality cannot be the cause for such a shift, given that it is not a foundational entity but rather itself what Foucault seeks to explain: more specifically, he is looking to explain why sexuality was constantly put into discourse in the period in question. The answer given in this passage is that sexuality simply constituted the appropriate object for the “procedures of power” of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, those being “the norm, knowledge, life, meaning, the disciplines, and regulations.”

What Stoler’s critique points out to me is that Foucault theorizes modernization not as a radical break but rather as a strategic reorganization of certain nodes of power. She points out that the deployment of sexuality is superimposed on the deployment of alliance rather than replacing it entirely (38). For the sexuality / blood binary, Foucault clarifies that “the passage from [the symbolics of blood] to [the analytics of sexuality] did not come about (any more than did these powers themselves) without overlappings, interactions, and echoes,” and mentions two noteworthy “interferences” between these two powers, in which blood or the deployment of alliance are reconstituted and newly significant in a society with a sexuality (149).

Foucault’s first example of interference between the symbolics of blood and the analytics of sexuality concerns the use of kinship in theories of sexuality. Under
the power of sexuality, the laws and positions of kinship organization became not less significant but differently so; they became strategically recoded as relationships of affective intensity that shape the individual’s sexuality. Psychoanalysis, with its theories of the Oedipus complex as the major factor influencing any individual’s sexuality exemplifies this trend. Parental narcissism, which I discuss in chapter one, falls under this rubric as well.

Foucault’s other example is racism. He specifies that he is concerned with “racism in its modern, ‘biologizing,’ statist form” (149). It manages family, marriage, and education and justifies itself by “the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race” (149). In other words, “blood” has a new significance in a society of sexuality through a distinctly “modern” racism with ideas about racial inheritance or bloodlines determining race, and hence the need to regulate procreative sex in order to produce a racially pure population. Blood serves as a metaphor for an imaginary racial essence that is transmitted through heterosexual biological reproduction. The state is the enforcer of racial purity and the planner of racial improvement, or eugenics. Foucault cites Nazism as his prime example for this type of racism.

Does this theorization of modern racism speak to the effectiveness of blood murder discourse in late nineteenth-century Austria? Blood, it seems, is part of modern racism as a metaphor for a racial essence that is grounded in ideas of racial descent (and hence procreative sexuality) but not through its centrality to the blood murder discourse. Blood murder discourse has no particular stake in ideals of racial
purity and any racial essence that is passed down through heterosexual reproduction. Instead, it is invested in generating fear of an organized Jewish collectivity with secret teachings that necessitates murder. Even the main synonym of blood murder, ritual murder, seems to be referenced only in Foucault’s characterization of the “society of blood”: “The blood relation long remained an important element in the mechanism of power, its manifestations, and its rituals” (147, emphasis added). Foucault’s use of “rituals” in this context conjures up rituals surrounding marriage, birth, and death, not “ritual murders,” but it nevertheless supports the suspicion that ritual murder discourse has no place in a “society with a sexuality,” is not a manifestation of “modern racism,” and may in fact be a remnant of a “society of blood.”

This impression is further corroborated by the received evaluation of different types of antisemitism. The discourse about blood murder was the ideological specialty of the antisemites of the Christian Social Party. The Christian Social Party had its political base in German-speaking lower-middle-class Christian Vienna, including significant numbers of women, who were often represented as a rabble composed of those who lost out on modernization: primarily artisans. It ruled Vienna from 1897 to 1910 with Karl Lueger as its mayor. Christian Social antisemites were the leading force behind the blood murder discourse, in cooperation with Czech nationalist antisemites and supported by clerical Catholic voices, yet without significant involvement of the German national camp.118

118 The cooperation with the Czech nationalist movement would also have been a greater
The German national (deutschnational or deutsch-völkisch) and pan-German (alldeutsch) movement prided itself in practicing a racist, as opposed to religious, antisemitism. Its leader Georg von Schönerer is famous for saying that blood, not religion determines the essence of “the Jews.” This is the metaphorical use of blood for an imagined racial essence grounded in heterosexual lines of descent which, in Foucault’s narrative, makes “blood” significant in modern racism. Schönerer is also regarded as the ideological forefather of Adolf Hitler, who was Schönerer’s “self-confessed disciple” (Arendt 233). With Nazism being Foucault’s main example for this modern racism, everything speaks for understanding Schönerer and his German nationalist brand of antisemitism within the framework Foucault offers us here.

Along with this assessment, it is tempting to dismiss the blood murder discourse and its version of antisemitism as an atavistic rupture at the turn of the century, a curiosity, out of sync with modernity. But the contemporaneity of political movements and epistemic investments is not very satisfactorily explained by simply declaring one of them atavistic. The challenge is to understand how ritual murder discourse operates in relation to “a society with a sexuality.” In order to better understand this relation, the contradiction for the German nationalist movement, which had built its profile through the fight against Czech nationalism.

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119 These terms can describe slightly different moments, wings, or factions of a highly volatile political movement. Schönerer’s Los-von-Rom (Away-from-Rome) movement, which campaigned for a German national orientation away from the Catholic church and, indeed, precipitated a wave of conversions from Catholicism to Protestantism, divided the broader German national and Pan-German camp, especially because Schönerer demanded strict party discipline and unconditional acceptance of his leadership (Wladika). Despite these differences and fractures, there is a significant ideological consensus and common voter base that justifies treating them as one movement. I use the English term “German nationalism” to describe this joint movement.
next section considers Paul Kieval’s argument that modern ritual murder discourse in Bohemia is itself sexualized.

**Part II: Is ritual murder discourse sexualized?**

Kieval argues that the modern ritual murder discourse in Bohemia integrated figures of sexual predation into the ritual murder imagination. He refers us to the documented lyrics of a song about the alleged ritual murder of Josefa Urbanová and points out how “the themes of sexual predacity and ritual murder are starkly juxtaposed, with the kosher butcher acting simultaneously as rapist and ritual leader” (“Death” 84).

The lyrics of the song in question, in Kieval’s translation from Czech, are as follows:

> When a girl is sixteen every Jew will grab for her, but once she is old no Jew will have her.  
> 2) They must have Christian blood, and if they don’t get it, they’ll stink a lot.  
> 3) Josefa Urbanova was a proper girl, she never did anything bad.  
> 4) Then all of a sudden the Jews ran up to her and tied her up; on the spot the butcher rose up and kosher-slaughtered Josefa.  
> 5) And if they got enough blood, the Jews bring out a skin (?); they quickly poor it in and at night take it away.  
> […] (quoted and translated by Kieval, “Death” 84)

The first line can be read to be about sexual predation. The verbs “grab” and “have” frequently function to describe sexual acts or fantasies. Yet is sexuality, or even sexual violence, the only or most plausible interpretive framework here?

The same question of interpretation arises in the murder case of Anežka Hrůzová. During the investigation, Hrůzová’s guardian Novak claimed that his charge had told him that “a nasty Jew, the cobbler Hilsner” had a habit of following her when
she walked home from Polná, that he watched her, and that she was afraid of him.¹²⁰ He later added that Hrůzová complained about Hilsner: “Who knows what he finds in me?” (Nussbaum 129). These statements also found their way into the illustrated book-length account of Hrůzová’s murder and Hilsner’s first trial (published in Czech and German) by Gustav Toužil.¹²¹ “He is such a despicable Jew and looks at me so strangely, who knows what he finds in me? … I am afraid of him” (Toužil 8).

This sentence could be read as part of a racialized discourse of sexual predation. Perhaps its effectiveness was indeed increased by its resonance with such a discourse. But its main anchor is a discourse of blood murder that integrates allegations of meaningful gazes of male Jews at Christian virgins in its own distinctive way. Arthur Nussbaum categorizes statements such as the one Novak attributes to Hrůzová as strange premonitions. In his study of criminal psychology, he writes that ritual murder witnesses regularly intersperse their memories with such strange premonitions: witnesses “remember” courses of action in which they went considerably out of their way to observe or follow a person (later accused of ritual murder) for no apparent reason except that something struck them as suspicious (47–8). Here, he suggests, it is a case where Novak retroactively constructs Hrůzová herself to have had one of these premonitions about Hilsner. In this reading, the

¹²⁰ Novak initially testified that Hrůzová had made these statements at the beginning of February; when it was later brought to his attention that this was impossible as she only started her most recent employment in Polná on March 9, he adjusted his statement accordingly.

¹²¹ Toužil was editor of the antisemitic clerical newspaper Katolické Listy in Prague. The book referred to here was a mix of information, propaganda, and entertainment. The title translates as “Polna, March 29 1899: The Murder of Agnes Hruza and the sensationalist Hilsner trial at the Kuttenberg jury court.”
questioning “I wonder what he finds in me” is not about unwanted sexual attention but rather a premonition about being targeted for a ritual murder.

The intentionality that is attributed to Hilsner’s alleged gaze is thus not sexual desire but rather the selecting agency of a Jewish plot. While sexual desire is grounded in the individual sexual subject, the intentionality that is attributed to Hilsner’s gaze is anchored in the imagined ritual requirements of a conspiratorial Judaism of which any individual perpetrator is but one arm. This intentionality, which is integral to the antisemitic construct of the ritual murder, is not individual and thus not very amenable to the framework of sexuality.

Perhaps there is something about the image of the ritual murder itself that makes sexual abuse and particularly rape a point of reference: a forceful violation of the victim’s body for the sake of an action that is very intentionally aimed at this body. Its aim is not to kill but rather to extract something. Not least because of these highly specialized needs from the victim’s body, the ritual murder imagination usually involves several collaborators who assist one another in overpowering the victim, bringing her or him into the appropriate position without killing him or her and finally skillfully slashing the victim’s throat in accordance with ritual slaughter requirements, while making sure to collect the blood. The victim’s body is made to perform, forced to collaborate in some form even though the victim her- or himself does not collaborate. This bears a resemblance to accounts of rape. Yet, it is the physical violation involved in rape that resonates and not the sexual aspect of the violation. The ritual murder targets a body that is specified in its gendered-sexual-moral-social-
religious standing, as I will discuss below, but the targeting is not primarily a sexual targeting of this body.

In other words, perhaps the scene of the ritual murder is best theorized as following a script of violation that relies on a set of specific positionalities with regards to age, gender and sexual history, religion, social class, social/moral status, and a concept of the victim’s body that includes these characteristics yet whose embodiment is not primarily refracted through a sexual lens. The image of ritual murder, in particular the drawing of blood from young Christian virgins and youths, is “sexualized” only in the sense that it is part of a fabric of social relations fundamentally shaped by a heteropatriarchal organization. The ritual murder belief envisions the victims as Christian children, (male) youths and (female) virgins, and the imagined murderers are virtually always Jewish males.

To discuss this fabric of social relations a bit more, let us return to the song that Kieval presents us: The third line (“Josefa Urbanová was a proper girl”) is part of Urbanová’s characterization as a Christian virgin. In cases where the alleged ritual murder victim is a young unmarried women who has gone missing or whose dead body is found in a state where little can be reconstructed about the likely cause of death, the insistence on the woman’s impeccable sexual behavior serves the dual function of establishing the plausibility of a ritual murder (since allegedly only the blood of virgins, youths, and children is of use in the ritual) and refuting the main alternative explanation for her death or disappearance, namely that the woman had committed suicide out of desperation over an illegitimate pregnancy. The suicide of
an unmarried woman carries the specter of a tragic pregnancy. A dimension of the sexual is thus negotiated in this line as well, to the extent that the status definition of a virgin is sexual. But this notion of the sexual or of sexualization should not be confused with the discourse of sexuality, which posits sexuality as a distinct sphere of motivation and desire, and which frames the individual body as an entity capable of sensation and pleasure. The category of the virgin is not defined through the virgin’s pleasures or sensation or her affective relationships to others but rather as an externally imposed status.

The ritual murder discourse also intersects with a discourse about the dangers of urban life, especially for young single women who migrated in great numbers from the countryside to the cities and worked as servants. Some documented ritual murder allegations are testimony to the regional and class stratification of consumer culture and hygiene that came to a clash with the institution of the maidservant who was housed with her employers and thus intimately confronted with the consumption and hygienic practices of her employers. Following Hilsner’s conviction in September 1899 a maidservant at Nassaberg close to Chrudim (in Bohemia) reported to the authorities that her employers consumed blood every morning. The

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122 (See for instance Kieval, “Death” 81; the thematic is also important in the final section of Spivak)
123 The populations of Prague and Vienna reflected this trend. For Vienna, only a minority of its inhabitants at the turn of the century were born in Vienna, and many of those newly settling in Vienna came from Bohemia, following an industrialization-driven push for migration from the countryside to the cities. Most of the servants in Vienna were descendants of small farmers or agricultural workers. Only 13% of female servants in Vienna at 1900 were born in Vienna, an additional 19% were born in the surrounding Lower Austria, and 54% in other parts of the monarchy. 14% of Vienna’s female servants were born in another country (Ofner; Winter 585).
investigation found that they brushed their teeth with the reddish Hypermangan (Potassium permanganate). In a different case of April 1902, the eighteen-year-old Therese Jedlicka and Auguste Hruska, maidservants at a Jewish employer in Vienna and “just arrived from Czech Bohemia,” alleged that their blood was tapped at night (Hellwig 43). It was soon reported that the servants had been living in fear of blood tappings after observing the use of “Maggi” soup extract in their employer’s kitchen, which they construed as human blood.

Albert Hellwig discusses many other ritual murder allegations made by maidservants or on behalf of disappeared maidservants. There is also a distinctly Czech nationalist deployment of the servant girl in the ritual murder script where the ritual murder victim is a Christian Czech maidservant working for a Jewish German household. Referring to the death of the maidservant Havlinová (her corpse was recovered from the river), Jaromír Hušek, editor with the Czech antisemitic paper České Zajmě in Prague, called on the Czech nation to no longer send its daughters to work for Jewish families. “Our nation should not allow its daughters to serve among Jews” (as quoted in Kieval, “Death” 85). This, he suggests, would most effectively prevent any ritual murders and, for that matter, ritual murder rumors.

124 (Wolf, “Jahrmart des Lebens”)
125 (Hellwig 43–4; Nussbaum 23–4, see 206 n. 34 for references to press coverage)
126 In January 1900, a maidservant at a Jewish master disappears in Nachod, she was later found drowned (“Nachod-Polna”). In another case a maidservant disappears in village in of the “Bihar Comitates” in Hungary, she had gone visit her daughter, also January 1900 (“Das Blutmärchen in Ungarn”).
127 Hušek was punished in 1893 with fourteen days of strict dungeon (verschärfeter Kerker) for accusing a shochet of tapping Christian blood (Nussbaum 8). He also played an important role in the Hilsner affair, as I discuss in part III of this chapter.
Kieval again sees this as an example for the enmeshment of ritual murder discourses with sexual discourses. He comments on Hušek’s position observing: “Economic and sexual exploitation went hand in hand with national and religious enmity, and all four themes combined to deepen the suspicion of Jewish implication in a new wave of criminality” (85). In this statement, it is not completely clear what Kieval presents as objective fact and what as a theme in Hušek’s discourse. I find no indication that Hušek was concerned with maidservants’ direct sexual exploitation, frequently euphemized as “seduction” in the contemporary idiom, by their employers. The combination of economic dependence and household immersion that made maidservants a likely victim in the ritual murder imagination also made them vulnerable to sexual abuse by their employers in actuality. Yet Hušek does not demonstrate any concern with this; his plea merely extends the nationalist trope to protect the nation’s women or daughters (Kieval). Hušek’s rhetoric mobilizes a gendered antisemitic Czech nationalism and a certain nationalist analysis of gendered economic exploitation but does not exhibit concern with sexual (as opposed to gendered) exploitation.

Even though the allegations that Hilsner ritual murdered Hrůzová did not

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128 On the state-sanctioned vulnerability of maidservants to sexual abuse by their employer, see (Eckstein; Ofner).
129 The Prager Tagblatt, Prague’s leading liberal German daily newspaper, reported after Hilsner’s first conviction: “From the milieu of our readers we receive the message that in the wake of the trial about the maid murder (Maedchenmord) in Polna many maids who served at Israelite families left immediately, without observing the legal minimum notice period” (“Eine Folge des Polnaer Mordprozesses”).
follow this common script of “poor maidservant taken advantage of by her employer,” Hrůzová, a young rural single woman who switched between helping her mother and brother with farming their small plot and working in the neighboring town as a seamstress, shares the same social profile as the typical maidservant. According to Toužil, her sister Veronica served as a maid in Prague (7, 78). It further appears that Anežka too was preparing to leave to work as a servant in the city. She had bought fabric to make herself a new dress for this purpose and got an employment book. In the days between her disappearance and the discovery of her corpse the local police officer Klenovec apparently assumed that she had left for the city (Nussbaum 86; Masaryk, Bedeutung 59).

Hrůzová’s impeccable morality was also a major antisemitic trope; she was described as a virgin, a dutiful daughter who supported her mother and brother as best as she could, a good Catholic who honored her dead father and did not entertain any relations with men, and—after her death—a martyr. Toužil, for example, has a whole section of his book that is titled “The Martyr Agnes Hrůza” (Toužil 6–10).

The proximity of Hrůzová to the social profile of the maidservant

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130 That she was allegedly on bad terms with her family and that, shortly before her murder, she had a fight with her brother about the money that would pay for this fabric is occasionally discussed together with a murder suspicion against her brother Johann, amongst others by Nussbaum and T. G. Masaryk and (Wolff). For a report that Johann Hrůza confessed to the murder on his deathbed, see (Červinka).

131 Marie Klímová, a woman whose presumed murder was added to the accusation against Hilsner in his second trial, was in fact a maidservant. Her sexual morality became a topic of severe scrutiny in court because several witnesses claimed that she liked men and had many “acquaintances” (“Der zweite Prozeß Hilsner. Pisek, 3. November” 10). Opponents to the ritual murder allegations made the point that her sexual behavior disproves the allegations because ritual murders target virgins. In the public discourse, however, the figure of Marie Klímová was circulated significantly less than that of Anežka Hrůzová.
notwithstanding, Hilsner certainly did not fit the profile of the rich employer. He was produced as a work-shy vagabond. It was widely agreed upon that he was a "beggar," a "vagrant," and "work-shy," and that all of these made him a despicable person. Even the most committed critics of the antisemitic construction of ritual murder went out of their way to emphasize their alignment with a generalized dislike of Hilsner. Even some semi-recent scholars replicate this dislike, for example František Červinka:

Not one of those who disputed the strange procedure of the court did so to defend Hilsner as an individual. Hilsner was rightly described to the court as a man of poor morals, an idler and vagabond who allowed himself to be maintained by his mother, a poor widow who herself depended on alms from other Jews. He had already received a twenty-four-hour sentence for once concealing his real name from a policeman. (Červinka 142–143)

Contemporary critics of the ritual murder allegations who participated to denounce Hilsner as an individual include Joseph Samuel Bloch. Rabbi in Floridsdorf (then an industrial suburb of Vienna), deputy in the Reichsrat from 1884 to 1895, and editor of the weekly Jewish Austrian newspaper Dr. Bloch's Österreichische Wochenschrift, Bloch was the earliest outspoken opponent on an Austria-wide platform to the antisemitic movement.132 He characterized Leopold Hilsner as

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132 Bloch advocated for an independent Jewish identity that was organized independently from but alongside (other) nationalities in Austria. His Österreichische Wochenschrift has the subtitle “Centralorgan für die gesammten Interessen des Judenthums” (Central organ for the collective interests of Judaism). Bloch became famous for taking to task the antisemitic Catholic theologian August Rohling, author of Der Talmudjude (Münster 1871) and professor at Prague. Rohling appeared as an expert witness at the Tisza-Eszlár blood murder trial in Hungary and testified under oath that Jews murdered Christian children and consumed their blood (Reifowitz; Kieval, “Place”). Bloch publicly accused Rohling that he had testified falsely about the Talmud and that he could not even read Hebrew. He offered 3,000 florins if Rohling successfully translated a randomly selected passage of the Talmud.
a feeble-minded, work-shy human, described as immoral and violent, who was a burden to his mother who depended on pittances. He is said to have threatened his lover with murder when she did not comply with his will, he is said to have mugged a married woman and the murdered Agnes Hruza is said to have complained that he was after her. (Bloch, “Der Frauenmord in Polna” 677)

While it is undisputed that Hilsner threatened his former girlfriend Anna Benesová in writing that he would shoot her if she got involved with another man (Přelíčení s Hilsnerem 76, 287–90), the rumors that Hilsner attacked a married woman and that Hřízová complained about him reflect questionable testimony that is the result of several rounds of revision by a committed antisemitic “witness” and an antisemitic distortion of a more innocuous testimony, respectively. For context, it is important that Bloch was defending the Austrian Israelite Union’s move to hire Hilsner’s lawyer, a move that was attacked from the antisemitic side as evidence of a Jewish conspiracy that closes ranks to cover up for its murderers. He explained that the purpose was not to cover up Hilsner’s guilt if he was guilty but to prevent the defamation of Judaism. As if to establish more credibility for his impartiality, he

Rohling in turn accused Bloch of defamation and set out to bring the case to court. Shortly before the trial was to begin, he dropped the case, which was celebrated as a victory for Bloch. As an indication for Bloch’s influence and popularity, Ian Reifowitz reports that a special edition containing a compilation of Bloch’s writings on the subject of Rohling, published by the Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung, sold 300,000 copies in one day (Reifowitz 96–97).

133 The respective article is unsigned. Bloch, however, wrote most of the news articles as well as editorials and edited each edition. Even if the article was not written by him, the content printed in his newspaper reflected his views, which is confirmed by the fact that he listed himself as the editor responsible for the newspaper’s content (Reifowitz 99).

134 Zdenko Auředníček even exceeded this task and represented Hilsner’s interest in court beyond only refuting the ritual murder thesis. When the idea of a sadistic or similarly perverse murder became more prominent, he argued against the allegation that Hilsner had committed this murder out of a sexual perversion, which he would not have had to do if he were only interested in defending Judaism.
then performs his accordance with a generalized antipathy towards Hilsner.

Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk did not face the same antisemitic construal of his actions as yet further proof of Jewish murder conspiracy, since he was not himself Jewish. But he also performed the same gesture of moral disapproval of Hilsner. The philosopher, politician, and professor of sociology was the most prominent defender of Hilsner’s innocence. Going with the Dreyfus/Hilsner analogy that the state persecutor at Kutná Hora/ Kutenberg evoked, Larry Wolff calls Masaryk “the Zola of the Hilsner affair” (Wolff 104). Unlike Bloch, who—perhaps to lend emphasis to his commitment to an independent judicial investigation—repeatedly refused to take a stand on Hilsner’s guilt, Masaryk defended Hilsner’s innocence (Notwendigkeit; Bedeutung). But Masaryk also expressed the utmost disdain for the person whose innocence he defended:

Leopold Hilsner is a downright good-for-nothing who should long have been put into a correctional institution. The existence and unimpeded dawdling of such individuals points in clear language to our unhealthy social and moral circumstances. Hilsner’s behavior during and after the trial are not capable to raise sympathies for the defendant either. It is a gemeine Flinte [literally “mean gun”] of the antisemitic press when they attribute to me an interest let alone sympathies for the defendant; in their dishonesty they use the general and legitimate antipathy against the defendant in such a way. (Bedeutung 56)

Like Bloch, Masaryk thus also underscores that he has nothing but antipathy toward

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135 He was nevertheless insulted and called names such as “Jew-vassal,” and he had his university lectures boycotted and cancelled (Čapek, Hovory s T. G. Masarykem 116–117; Nussbaum 25–26).
136 He was a deputy to the Reichsrath for the Young Czechs from 1891-93 but left the party in 1893. In 1900, he founded the Realist party. He later became the first president of the Czechoslovak Republic.
Hilsner. He even explicitly says that this antipathy is legitimate and suggests that Hilsner should have been put into a correctional institution.

Masaryk’s comment points to the institutional dimension of the widespread generalized antipathy towards Hilsner. Correctional institutions combined education and forced labor for boys and girls under eighteen and were the juvenile counterpart to the adult forced-labor institutions. Both institutionalized individuals for up to three additional years after completion of a prison sentence for any of six delicts including vagrancy (Landstreicherei), begging, workshyness (Arbeitsscheue), and commercial fornication (gewerbliche Unzucht). Correctional institutions could also house youths between ten and fourteen years’ old (who are not criminally responsible) on initiative of the police (Winckler).

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137 This makes for a significant difference between the figure of the “work-shy vagabond” and the figure of the “rich employer.” While the script of the “rich employer who ritual murders a poor maidservant” tapped into populist class resentment, members of the servant holding class by and large only felt the repercussion of this discourse when antisemitism or nationalism were added to it.

138 These provisions were specified in the law of May 24, 1885, Nr 89. Paragraphs 1 to 6 define the six delicts. Vagrancy (Landstreicherei): “Whoever tramps around without business and work and cannot prove that he possesses the means to his subsistence or seeks to acquire them honestly, is to be punished as a vagrant (Landstreicher).” Workshyness (Arbeitsscheu): “People capable of working who have no income and no licit trade (Erwerb) and who endanger the security of person or property can be instructed by the security agency to demonstrate within a time frame set by them that they feed themselves in a licit way. If they, out of workshyness (Arbeitsscheu), do not comply with this order they are to be punished with strict detention (strenger Arrest) of 8 days to 3 months.” Commercial fornication (gewerbliche Unzucht): “The punishment of women-persons (Frauenpersonen) who use their bodies for commercial fornication is at the discretion of the police. If such women-persons 1) notwithstanding the police punishment continue their trade or 2) insofar as there are police instructions thereby contravene them or 3) engage in their obscene (unzüchtiges) trade despite knowing that they are affected with a venereal disease or 4) cause a striking annoyance through the public or 5) seduce youths, they are to be punished with harsh arrest, namely of 8 days to 3 months in the cases listed under 1 and 2; in the cases listed under number 3, 4, and 5 however for a duration of 1 to 6 months. (…)” (Winckler 16–17 and 20–21).
The policies towards vagrancy and workshyness certainly impacted Hilsner’s life and mediated his role as the main suspect in the ritual murder trial. Hilsner repeatedly claimed that his poverty, and the fact that he had no regularized work, were the reasons why he was targeted, even though he was well aware of the anti-Jewish character of the ritual murder allegation as well. He is quoted predicting, following Hrůzová’s murder: “Now all who don’t work, like me, will be locked up” (Paul-Schiff 40). This assessment is echoed in statements he made in the courtroom.

The following is a translated excerpt from the trial transcript:

Hilsner: … I come from a poor family. My family goes through the world as beggars, and for murders and robberies and thievishness we had nothing going. That is my misfortune, that I was without work, that I haven’t learned anything, and the people had a hatred against me.
Judge: You went around the world and didn’t do anything.
Hilsner: … didn’t do anything. (Přelíčení s Hilsnerem 66)

Though it is impossible to decisively know about pacing and affect in this dialogue, it is still possible that this excerpt transcribes a moment in which the judge interrupts Hilsner and adds to his speech as if clarifying the reasons for and legitimacy of the people’s hatred. Hilsner does not deny any of this; on the contrary, he repeats the judge’s words, as if they were a useful addition to his explanation.139 If this

139 This interpretation is supported in Toužil’s rendition of the exchange. Toužil generally edited witness statements as he included passages from the trial in his book, or perhaps he simply produced them from his own memory or notes from the trial. Touzil’s version presents the dialogue explicitly as an interruption from the judge followed by Hilsner’s agreement.

Defendant: (…) My family, my mother was poor and my father was poor. But our family never had anything to do with bad things. I don’t have any nature at all for murder and robbery; my whole misery was that I was very poor …
Judge (interrupting): That you haven’t learned anything …
interpretation is correct, then this dialogue from the courtroom in Kuttenberg/Kutná Hora shows to what extent hatred of the “work-shy” is completely normalized.

Together with gender and religion, the discourse of vagrancy and workshyness shapes the kind of relationships that Hilsner and his murder victims are imagined to have had. It creates a strict moral binarism between the innocence and moral upstanding of Hrůzová and the moral depravity of Hilsner. One must keep in mind that the female offence of commercial fornication is among the crimes that can bring one into the correctional or forced-labor facility and is thus on a par with the workshyness, vagrancy and begging of Hilsner. But Hrůzová has an impeccable sexual morality and therefore occupies the opposite end of the moral spectrum, in the antisemitic imagination.¹⁴⁰

This difference of moral status structured many witness statements against Hilsner, for example Anton Lang’s. Lang testified that he overheard an incriminating conversation in Hilsner’s house involving several Polná Jews. In the Pisek trial, a second murder was added to the accusation against Hilsner—the presumed murder of Marie Klímová, and Lang also testified against Hilsner in the Klímová case.¹⁴¹ he claimed that he saw Hilsner with Klímová on the day of her disappearance, in the

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¹⁴⁰ The scrutiny afforded to Klímová’s relationships with men demonstrates the tenuousness of this status for any poor young unmarried woman.

¹⁴¹ Twenty-three-year-old Marie Klímová, a servant in another village in the surroundings of Polná had disappeared in July of 1898. Over a year after her disappearance and under the impression of the first Hilsner trial, witnesses began to come forward claiming that they had seen Hilsner with Klímová on the day of her disappearance, and so the case against Hilsner for Klímová’s murder was built.
company of three other male Jews. Lang’s testimony was clearly aligned with the ritual murder idea. When asked why he remembered seeing Hilsner and Klímová two years ago, especially given that Lang did not know Klímová, he claimed that it was their unlikeliness and ill-suitedness as a couple that made him pay attention. “It had struck me that such a decent girl goes with a vagabond like Hilsner so I wanted to see who that actually was” (Paul-Schiff 87). He reportedly followed them until they entered an inn, at which point he decided to wait for them outside because he “didn’t know her and assumed that Hilsner’s companion must probably be a maidservant and would soon have to return to her master” (87). These witness statements have been debated by the defense and other commentators extensively regarding their implausibility and contradictions.\textsuperscript{142} My purpose in bringing them up here is to serve as examples for the moral assessment of the vagabond Hilsner, who is so far at the bottom of the moral hierarchy that even a young woman who is unknown to Lang and assumed to be a maidservant becomes a girl much too decent to be accompanied by Hilsner.

On the ground, the blood libel operated in a social order where positions with respect to gender, sexual and moral status, religion, nationality, and class mediated identities and relationships. The discourse of vagrancy, beggary and workshyness accompanied Catholic and antisemitic concerns about religious difference: for

\textsuperscript{142} Lang’s alleged decision to have waited for the Hilsner and Klímová without any plausible reason is a perfect example for Nussbaum’s category of “strange premonitions.” It was only a strange premonition that brought Lang to the right place at the right time for witnessing things that he believes indicate preparations for a ritual murder.
instance, a friend of Klímová claimed that Hilsner and Klímová had an
“acquaintance” and elaborated that she remembers advising her friend against it,
pointing out the difference in religion. Another witness claimed that Hilsner had told
him that he had a new girl in Věžnice, and the prosecution argued that he must have
referred to Hrůzová. These constructions, however, never extended into
imaginations where the murder was coming out of a sexual attraction or desire; rather,
the framework of “acquaintance,” modestly desexualized but clearly within the
scripts of heterosexual courtship, was simply the most plausible framework for
imagining any relationship between Hilsner and Hrůzová and Klímová. In the ritual
murder imagination, Hilsner was frequently cast as the procurer of the victim, while
his accomplices were imagined not to be local to Polná. The idea that Hilsner knew
his victims was therefore important for the accusation.

The question of whether ritual murder discourse is sexualized pushes one to
conceptual precision about what one means by sexualization. As I am going to
demonstrate in this section, ritual murder discourse constructs its personages and
scenarios out of a social fabric shaped through gender, religion, class, nationality and
associated hierarchies of moral status, including those pertaining to female sexual
morality. One can, on this bases, call ritual murder discourse sexualized, but should
also add that it was inflected by class, nationality, and morality. The integration of
gender and matters pertaining to sexual morality with formations of class, nationality,
religion, and other vectors of social morality in these categories of social status could

143 (Přelíčení s Hilsnerem 69–70; Schneider-Swoboda 18)
hardly be more distinct from the invocation of a (perverse) sexuality that refers to a separated-out sphere of sexuality that resides in the perpetrator and provides a motive. This conceptual distinction is important because it helps us see more clearly that the discourse of sexuality does so much more than sort the abnormal from the normal, not least by what it does not do: it provides a conception of the individual self that does not transpire into the antisemitic figure of “the Jews” who are guilty of ritual murder; on the contrary, this figure of “the Jews” is constructed as an entity that is structured fundamentally different from the individual self of the discourse of sexuality. In the following section, I examine how these competing constructions of selfhood and agency unfolded in the Hilsner affair.

**Part III: Sex and Blood in the Hilsner Affair: Blood murder versus Sexual Perversion**

Nearly two weeks after Anežka Hrůzová’s corpse was found in April 1899 Jaromír Hušek in Prague brought the murder to the attention of antisemitic leaders in Vienna. Hušek wrote to the renowned antisemitic deputy Ernst Schneider of the Christian Social party that “the Jew Leopold Hilsner” was the murderer and that the “Jewish judge” let Hilsner go free.144 According to Arthur Nussbaum, “with the writing by Hušek local and central antisemitism were connected and the snowball began to roll” (9). Benno Wagner adds that the connection was not only between local and central antisemites but also between “Czech” and “German” ones (n.p., section II). He

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144 (Nussbaum 8–9; Paul-Schiff 2)
suggests that the connection between Hušek and Schneider marks the “birth” of the Hilsner affair as a media event (n.p., section II).

Schneider saw to it that the letter was published in the *Deutsches Volksblatt* and the *Deutsche Zeitung*, two Viennese antisemitic newspapers. The *Deutsches Volksblatt* (abbreviated *DV*) quickly dispatched its own representative to Polná, where he joined with the mayor and other local officials to form an investigative Committee. This committee not only produced new content for the *DV* but also worked directly into the hands of the judiciary. Schneider furthermore sent a copy of the Hušek’s letter to the minister of Justice, Ignaz Edler v. Ruber, and asked for his intervention. According to Joseph Samuel Bloch, Schneider boasted in the regional parliament that his intervention with the minister led to the re-arrest of Leopold Hilsner, after his initial arrest by popular demand and his subsequent release for lack of evidence.

By alleging that a Jewish murderer had been set free by a Jewish judge, Hušek's letter mobilized the popular antisemitic trope of a Jewish conspiracy that is so strong that it does not even shy away from covering up murder. More specific allegations of blood murder were not part of the published version of the letter. Soon, however, the trope of the “missing blood” crystallized in the antisemitic media. It was aften accompanied by the rumor that the murder was done by a several

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145 The *Deutsches Volksblatt*, published by radical antisemite and Christian Social Ernst Vergani, was ideologically very close to the Christian Social party. (Bloch, *Erinnerungen* 304)
146 It is possible that they were part of the original letter. Its publication in the *DV* is prefaced with the explanation that certain passages have been blocked out in order to avoid government confiscation.
perpetrators and that one of them carried the blood away.

A fairly typical article was originally published in the Prague newspaper Vercerní Listy and reprinted in the DV on April 14. The article estimates that the murdered woman's blood would have amounted to about seven liters. It further reasons that all of the blood must have left the body due to the deep jugular cut but that not very much blood was found at the site. In widely spaced font, it concludes “the question thus arises to where all the blood disappeared?” In the end, the DV alleges to have received another unspecified message that “it is the general opinion that the murder was committed by two people: one who disappeared with the blood and one who remained at the murder site” (9). The only direct allegation of a Jew or Jews is in the subtitle, which goes, “a Jew arrested under suspicion of girl's murder.” These themes – arrest of a Jew, missing blood, multiple people at the murder scene – created a certain imagination that was reproduced and referenced, often elliptically, across media to the extent that even firm opponents recognized “the ritual murder” as an internally consistent imagination that could be described, argued with, and analyzed, even if they did not believe in its existence.

In response to the wide circulation of the “missing blood” trope, the investigative judge Baudyš from the circuit court at Kutná Hora / Kuttenberg ordered the district court in Polná to ask the forensic doctors who had performed Hrůzová’s autopsy for their expert opinion on the amount of blood. In his letter, the polarity between the two main frameworks for the murder—blood murder versus a murder motivated by sexual perversion—is already set up.
Considering that the view continues to hold in the daily newspapers that during the dissection of the corpse of Agnes Hruza so little blood was found in the dissected body and surrounding the locality of the corpse that this circumstance appears conspicuous and gives rise to the opinion as if the blood was collected, carried away, or hidden by the perpetrator—which opinion apparently contributes only to the perturbation of the wide popular strata, the experts Dr. Michalek and Dr. Prokes shall be consulted—while being pointed to the circumstances which they themselves perceived at the dissection and at the local inspection and in consideration of the fact that parts of the clothes and further the place where the murder likely was committed (the depression near the locality) were saturated with blood, and in continuation with their dissection report—whether actually conspicuously little blood was found. (Baudys 7 emphasis added)

The ungrammatical use of “as if” suggests that Baudyš is not a believer of the blood murder accusations. As the rest of the letter clarifies, he rather believes that the opinion that the blood was collected by the perpetrator (which is part of the ritual murder imagination) only contributes to worrying the masses. His instructions to make sure that the judges take into consideration that clothes and the presumed murder site were saturated with blood further support this impression that Baudyš is hoping to have the blood murder accusations refuted.

In the second half of his letter, Baudyš then directs the local investigators of the murder in a different direction, namely the hypothesis that the murder was motivated by a sexual perversion such as sadism, fetishism, or necrophilia.

The suspicion is not unfounded that the murder of Agnes Hruza is the result of a sexual perversion of a hitherto unknown perpetrator. One

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148 My English translation from German. I work with Paul-Schiff’s compendium of documents from the Hilsner trials, compiled by Maximilian Paul-Schiff in a German translation controlled by Hilsner’s defense lawyer Zdenko Auředniček (see Paul-Schiff’s non-paginated “Vorwort”). My spelling of proper names thus reflects the German spelling used by Paul-Schiff even though the original letter would have been in Czech and used Czech names.
Baudyš expertly imparts the definitions and syndromes associated with “sadism” to his colleagues with technical terms interjected in parenthesis, such as stabbing (Stechen), as a reference to Krafft-Ebing’s Mädchenstecher, “men who were sexually excited by wounding women” (Oosterhuis 137). Unconvinced by the ritual murder framework, sexual perversion is Baudyš’s alternative framework for provisionally making sense of the murder.

How did this dual intervention (skepticism over ritual murder, hypothesis of sexual perversion) further unfold? Instead of refuting the ritual murder allegations, as Baudyš evidently hoped, the local forensic doctors pressed the stamp of medical authority on the trope of the “missing blood.” On April 19, they claimed “that the corpse of Agnes Hruza was almost entirely exsanguinated” (Prokes and Michalek 219). They further detail that the bleeding to death must have resulted in an enormous amount of blood and argue:

Considering that the murder probably took place in the aforementioned pit by the path where the exiting blood must have stayed together and considering that the clothes and the two places where the murder...
probably took place and where the corpse was found are only a little drenched with blood, rather only sprinkled, we can with certainty conclude that the found traces of blood do not correspond to the amount that we could expect in the surroundings of the corpse that died in such a manner. (219-220)

This testimony became the official medical endorsement of the “missing blood” trope.

The alternative framework of sexual perversion, however, remained effective as well. Baudyš’s orders to discreetly pursue people with a reputation for being oddballs were realized in the actions of the police in Prague against Karl Janda. The suspicions against Janda were momentarily discussed in the media as a new turn in the investigation but eventually subsided in oblivion. Karl Janda was in Polná at the time of the murder and is said to have had a “bout of insanity” following the murder where he obsessed about gathering and imparting information about the murder. The case against Janda was built on a combination of insanity and a conspicuous sexuality as incriminating evidence. Among the reasons that warrant suspicion, the Prague police notes that he was sexually passionate and kissed the female warden in the presence of other patients (thus going against the thesis that the sexually perverse murderer has an abhorrence of the female but nevertheless going for a sexual characterization of the murder suspect) and that he had read Emīl Zola’s La Bête Humaine “which describes a human who has a demonic passion to see a naked body” (Olic 9–10). The suspicion against Janda is thus part of the more general framework that the murder was sexually motivated.

Another example for the embrace of a framework of sexual perversion and/or
insanity by opponents of the ritual murder allegations is *Dr. Bloch’s Oesterreichische Wochenschrift*. This Jewish Austrian weekly newspaper was consistent platform for critique and analysis of the antisemitic movement. Robert Wolf, a regular member of the newspaper’s small editorial staff, wrote on May 12 of 1899 that a perverse disposition on the murderer’s part seems to have led to the crime (Wolf, “Jahrmarkt des Lebens” 362).

On the antisemitic side, with only few exceptions, all speculations about the murderer’s sexual perversion or insanity were categorically rejected as attempts to distract from the “truth” of ritual murder. The *Deutsches Volksblatt*, for instance, suggested that the involvement of police from Prague was a threat to the truth of the ritual murder. It claimed that Prague policemen were dispatched onto Polna only once it was clear that a Jew had become the main suspect, that they studied the case through what it calls the “Jew-press” and that they achievements lay in pursuing a trace after the “Christian” Janda (“Der Mord in Polna”). In the duality blood murder versus sexual perversion, sexual perversion was closely associated with insanity, and insanity and perversion were frequently conceptualized as overlapping. Hence the *DV* also expressed cynicism when Hilsner was subjected to a psychiatric examination:

“As is reported [in the *Hlas Naroda*], Hilsner shall be transported to Prague for monitoring on his state of mind, the integrity of which is not doubted here!” (“Zum Mädchenmorde in Polna” emphasis spaced in the original). The *Deutsches Volksblatt* was as opposed to the idea that Carl Janda is the murderer as it was to the idea that
Hilsner is insane.\textsuperscript{149}

A similar assessment is given by Gustav Toužil, editor of the antisemitic clerical newspaper \textit{Katolické Listy} in Prague. Mixing information, propaganda, and entertainment Toužil published an illustrated book-length account of Hrůzová’s murder and Hilsner’s first trial (in two versions, Czech and German), the title of which translates as “Polna, March 29 1899: The Murder of Agnes Hruza and the sensationalist Hilsner trial at the Kuttenberg jury court.” According to this book’s narrative, an initial request by the Polna mayor for additional investigative police or detectives from Prague was declined. Only once the judge Baudysch\textsuperscript{150} requested them three weeks later a group of “secret police” was dispatched from Prague who, in this account, did not achieve much before the left again two weeks later. Toužil further writes:

At this time in Prague there were apparently indications for giving the Polna affair a different direction i.e. the purpose of the murder should be portrayed differently from how everybody understood it. Thus the report about necrophilia emerged and was given to us journalists at the \textit{Journalistenbörse}.\textsuperscript{151} Necrophilia means the love of an insane for a dead woman, and thus one wanted to prove that Hilsner, if he committed the murder, committed the same with insanity. And indeed Hilsner was examined in this direction by a doctor. The Prague secret police brought up the version about necrophilia, because of the alleged sperm that was found at Agnes Hruza's corpse. (Toužil 83–84)

In this paragraph he contrasts the agency that comes from Prague with “everybody's”

\textsuperscript{149} See also (Vyleta 187).
\textsuperscript{150} “Baudysch” is a more phonetic Germanized spelling of ‘Baudys’. ‘Baudys’, the most graphically oriented form of the three, is commonly used by Paul-Schiff.
\textsuperscript{151} Presumably a press conference. I have not been able to confirm anything about this \textit{Journalistenbörse} elsewhere.
understanding, and while he refrains from the invective style of the DV he nevertheless makes it clear how little he thinks of the theories that were generated by the Prague police. Here, he still talks about Hilsner’s guilt in the conditional; but as he continues, it becomes clear that the sexual murder motive, for him, is but a variation on the already committed-to knowledge that Hilsner is the murderer. He concludes:

But the forensic doctors Prof. Dr. Reinsberg and the Docent Dr. Slavík determined and also testified to it in court that this was not so. As already said, Agnes was a virgo intacta, and Hilsner, who had many love affairs, was no friend of corpses. (84)

Here, thus, the claim that Hilsner “was no friend of corpses” served as part of the refutation that Hruza could have been murdered by a necrophile, since in his story the fact that Hilsner had committed the murder was already decided. For Toužil the hypothesis of necrophilia was a manipulative ploy imposed from Prague on the true understanding of “everybody,” and he was opposed to the possibility that Hilsner, nor anybody else accused of the murder, could be diagnosed as insane or necrophilic, the two being only loosely distinguished.

The competition between the ritual murder framework and the sexual perversion (and insanity) framework continued to structure the Hilsner affair when it came to Hilsner’s trials. Hilsner was first tried in September 1899 for participation in the assassination (Meuchelmord) of Anežka Hrůzová in front of a jury in Kutná Hora/Kuttenberg in Central Bohemia. The official trial records state that Zdenko Auředniček, Hilsner’s defense lawyer, said that the murder was “possibly a case of
sadism” (*Přeličení s Hilsnerem* 432). But this viewpoint remained extremely marginal during the trial, which was dominated by the ritual murder theme. At the end the jury unanimously found Hilsner guilty and the court sentenced him to death by the gallows. By imperial pardon the punishment was converted to life imprisonment.

The sexual murder framework become more prominent in Hilsner’s second trial. After Auředníček’s appeal of the Kutná Hora/Kuttenberg verdict, the Supreme Court and Court of Cassation commissioned a deciding medical report from the Czech medical faculty in Prague. The new assessment in the faculty report, together with other considerations that “evidence ha[d] been presented in a wrong light,” moved the court to order a new trial (K. k. Oberster Gerichtshof). This second trial took place in Pisek, another Central Bohemian city, over two weeks in October and November 1900.

The report of the Czech medical faculty countered much of the alleged “evidence” for the ritual murder framework. It recalibrated the various amounts of blood and concluded that the blood found on and surrounding the corpse, including

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152 Toužil’s version is that Auředníček said: “as for the motive, for every criminalist there is here a case of sadism” (Toužil 114). The official trial transcript was not taken or published routinely. In this trial, it occurred only at the request and at the expense of the defense. No official trial transcript exists from the second trial in Pisek.

153 The Charles Ferdinand University in Prague was divided in 1882 into a Czech and a German university. The descriptor “Czech medical faculty” therefore served to disambiguate between the two linguistically/nationally defined faculties.

154 In addition to a second murder charge, the charge of defamation was added to the accusation against Hilsner. After his conviction in Kutná Hora, apparently while hazed by fellow prisoners and under the assumption that this would spare him from the gallows, he made a confession and named two alleged accomplices, two Jews named Erbmann and Wassermann. Their perfect alibis, however, exposed the falsity of Hilsner’s confession. Hilsner was found guilty on all counts in a unanimous verdict, sentenced to death, and again pardoned to life-long imprisonment.
on her clothes and hair, added up to the expected amount. It thereby invalidated the “missing blood” claim. It also affirmed the view that the murder appears to have been motivated by a sexual perversion. It developed the hypothesis of sexual perversion from the (inconclusive) reports that Hrůzová’s corpse was partially undressed and that various pieces of her clothes were distributed in the vicinity of her corpse. By disproving the “missing blood” trope and affirming the sexual perversion hypothesis, the Czech medical faculty offered a belated confirmation of the dual shift that Baudyš had articulated at the beginning of the investigation.

In addition, the faculty report tackled another issue that divided opinions between adherents to the ritual murder versus sexual perversion framework. The ritual murder idea typically includes several perpetrators who act together, while the typical sexually perverse murderer is imagined to act individually. After presenting the possibility that the murderer acted out of his perversion the faculty report continues by

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155 In a section titled “Striking circumstances” the report groups together a series of observations:

The following circumstances related to the murder are striking and hard to explain: 1) the partial undressing of the corpse 2) the carrying away and hiding of the remaining parts of her clothes 3) the putting up and apart of the yarns in the little trees in the surrounding of the place (Prague Czech Medical Faculty 237–239).

Several pieces of Hrůzová’s clothes, some of them folded, some hidden, were found in the vicinity of the corpse, and small pieces of yarn were described hanging from the trees surrounding the presumed locality of the murder. The available descriptions of the corpse, furthermore, suggest that it was partially naked and partially clad. The report of the facts of April 1, 1899, when the corpse was first discovered, describes many different pieces of clothing that are said to be “wrapped around” or “covering” different parts of the body. Part of the torso and the left hip are reported to be “completely naked” (Reichenbach 211). But, as the faculty report notes, these descriptions are so confusing and contradictory that it is “not possible to envision clearly of how these pieces of clothes covered the body” (Prague Czech Medical Faculty 237).
asking: “Was the deed committed by one or several perpetrators?” (239). This section states that the complicated manipulation of the corpse could suggest that there were several perpetrators but then argues that it is also possible that the murder was committed by only one person. In the concluding summary, it is even said simply, “The deed could also be executed by a single person,” thus simply taking the other possibility, that it was committed by several people, as the default that did not even need to be stated (241). By claiming that the murder could have been committed by a sole perpetrator, the report refutes the antisemitic argument that the murder was necessarily a collaboration between several perpetrators and lends more plausibility to the “sexual perversion” framework which is more easily applied to an individual perpetrator.

All in all, the faculty statement challenged the antisemitic construction of ritual murder and supported the main alternative framework: sexual perversion. It did so by countering the claim that blood was missing, by highlighting the possibility of a sexually perverse murderer, and by arguing that the murder could have been perpetrated by one single individual. Unsurprisingly, this earned the Czech medical faculty the respect of those who fought against the ritual murder allegations and the antagonism of antisemites. A few examples shall illustrate this.

On the antisemitic side, Karel Baxa denounced the faculty report as a “phantastic formation” and claimed:  

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156 Baxa represented the Hrůza family in the trial. He was also leading antisemitic Czech nationalist politician. In his role as representative of the Hrůza family, he was juxtaposed to the state attorney, the persecutor who represented the public interest in finding the murderer,
The faculty wanted to induce a certain pacification of the public so that the latter is guided from the motive of the ritual murder to that of the sexual murder. ("Aus dem Gerichtssaale: Der zweite Prozeß Hilsner. Pisek, 12. November" 8)

Baxa explicitly added that this pacification attempt is reason for him to oppose the statement strongly.\textsuperscript{157} Baxa’s opposition to the faculty report was echoed in popular brochures that were distributed in Pisek, Polná, and surroundings.

On the other side, Auředníček requested that the report be put in print so jurors could re-read it. The leading Viennese liberal newspaper \textit{Neue Freie Presse}, likewise opposed to the ritual murder allegations, could hardly have been more enthusiastic in its assessment of the faculty report, which it describes as “a significant work of great seriousness which conveys the results of thorough, in-depth investigations” ("Der zweite Prozeß Hilsner. Pisek, 2. November" 8). Writing about the faculty report, it even exaggerates its findings and suggests certainty where the report had suggested possibility. The relevant passage in the faculty report is held throughout in conditional form:

According to the investigation files there is no apparent motive for the murder. But probably the motive is to be looked for in some sexual arousal; it would be possible that a – mentally normal – perpetrator numbed Agnes Hruza, wanted to abuse her sexually, and if she perhaps

\textsuperscript{157} Baxa argued that the faculty must be wrong because Hilsner had been medically found to be sexually normal. He thus precluded the possibility of Hilsner’s innocence in his reasoning.
regained consciousness and resisted him, he killed her, or, enraged by her resistance, ended her life; but it would be hard to explain that a completely normal person would then execute such a bizarre manipulation. The motives for this manipulation are hard to explain.

One also has to consider the possibility that we could be dealing with a perpetrator here whose imagination and feelings were not normal and that these could lead him to an initiative which had its motive in the quest to disport (sexually arouse) himself.

Such conjecture would also support the circumstance that the bottom part of the shirt was missing.

Experience teaches that people who are affected by contrary (perverse) sexual feeling sometimes find sexual satisfaction by injuring a female person or by killing her; a manifestation of perversity that we call sadism, where we are dealing either only with injury, possibly killing, or with a combination with necrophilia.

The bottom part of the shirt could be removed either because the perpetrator, after he made himself guilty of necrophilia, wanted to remove the traces of the sexual act with the dying or already dead person (traces of semen), or because he carried it away in order to commit fetishism with it, that is, so that he could later still find sexual satisfaction by viewing and touching it. (Prague Czech Medical Faculty 239)

The murderer’s “sexual perversion” is the only scenario the Czech medical faculty entertains, but it is nevertheless only presented as a possibility. The report’s summary turns this possibility into probability, pointing out that “according to the files of the investigation there is no evident motivation for the murder. Probably, however, the motivation needs to be searched in some sexual excitement” (Prague Czech Medical Faculty 241).\(^{158}\)

The *Neue Freue Presse* turns this into the following:

The detailed, so far not yet entirely published description of the state in which the clothes on the body of the murdered Agnes Hruza found

\(^{158}\) Another relevant passage from the report speaks about possibility: “The motivations could be various. The possibility is to be considered that the murder and the manipulation of the corpse and the carrying-apart and hiding of the clothes is the deed of a human who is persecuted by sexual perversion” (Prague Czech Medical Faculty 241).
themselves, and of the surroundings of the corpse in the woods. From this there emerges such a strangely phantastic and morbidly erotic character of the perpetrator that no unbiased person can ward off the notion that this was a mentally ill person or in any case somebody who through his perversity touches on insanity. And indeed the faculty vocalizes this opinion in a definitive manner; and it does not doubt that the motive for the murder was degenerate sensual passion. (“Der zweite Prozeß Hilsner. Pisek, 2. November” 8)

The Neue Freue Presse (abbreviated NFP) is so positive about the faculty report that it exaggerates the certainty of its findings.

The more or less pronounced endorsement of the framework of sexual perversion and psychopathology underwrote an anti-antisemitic consensus that ranged from Baudyš’s instructions to the actions of the Prague police against Janda, Dr. Bloch’s Oesterreichische Wochenschrift, Hilsner’s defense attorney, the Prague medical faculty, the Neue Freie Presse, and many others. Antisemitic ritual murder believers ranging from Toužil to Baxa and the Deutsches Volksblatt, on the other hand, vehemently opposed ideas of sexual perversion and psychopathology.

Why did antisemites, in the main, oppose all ideas of sexual perversion and psychopathology? Daniel Vyleta argues that the antisemitism that was held in common by the Christian Social and Czech nationalist parties were uninterested in incorporating discourses of sexual perversion and mental abnormality into their stereotypes of “the Jews.” They specialized in an antisemitism about a Jewish conspiracy, about Jews as winners of modernization, and about naïve Christian victims of Jewish cunning. They were thus highly invested in the rationality and
mental capacity of Jews. They were also highly invested in the collectivity of “the Jews.” This explains why they were not interested in the individualizing discourse of sexual perversion and psychopathology.

In the framework of sexual perversion, sexuality is invoked as a sphere of motivation. The fact of “sexual perversion” is supposed to take care of the judicial quest for a “motive.” As such it is directly opposed to the ritual murder allegation where a ritual need for blood is understood as the “motive” of the crime. These two competing “motives” come with diametrically opposed conceptions of the type of entity responsible for the murder. In the framework of sexuality, the murder emerges from the individual self, its internal organization, its desires. In the framework of ritual murder, the murder emerges from the collective ritual requirements of Judaism and from an imagined secret doctrine that is only known to insiders. In the ritual murder imagination any individual murderer therefore does not harbor the “motivation” for the murder himself, he is only an executing arm.

While most positions in the Hilsner affair lined up behind the ritual murder framework or the sexual perversion and psychopathology framework, there were few positions that straddled them. They are instructive objects of study because by

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159 This position may seem surprising in light of Sander Gilman’s argument that there was a distinct narrative about Jewish criminality furnished with tropes of physical and mental difference (Gilman, Case of Sigmund Freud). Vyleta argues that these constructions were not part of the household staples of antisemitic (or other) knowledge that was widely disseminated through the antisemitic or other media, nor very influential in the legal field either. Even where they existed, for instance in certain texts by Lombroso, they were largely analogous narratives about “the Jew” and “the criminal” and did not actually articulate a coherent figure of the Jewish criminal (Vyleta 40 ff).
observing where they struggled to achieve plausibility, we can deepen our understanding of the investments in different conceptions of agency, sociality, individuality, and intentionality that are negotiated through the respective frameworks. I will consider three such straddling accounts: one of the state, as represented by the state attorney Malijovský; one of Hans Gross, professor of criminalistics; and one of the German nationalist politician Karl Hermann Wolf.\footnote{Hans Gross, first name is also spelled Hanns and his last name has the alternative spelling Groß.}

Among the narratives that combined the perversion framework with Hilsner’s guilt, the one presented by the state attorney Malijovský in the Pisek trial is most immediately influential, since it provided the official rationale for Hilsner’s second and definitive conviction by the state. Because Hilsner had been found medically healthy and sexually normal in an official examination, Malijovský could not attribute a sexual perversion to him. In order to prevent Hilsner from being considered guilty under the sadistic, necrophilic or fetishistic murder framework pushed by the faculty report, Auředníček even requested that another faculty report be ordered to clarify whether a “normal” person, as Hilsner is attested to be, is capable of committing a “sadistic” murder, and whether a multiplicity of perpetrators is possible in a sadistic murder (“Der zweite Prozeß Hilsner: Pisek, 4. November” 3). But the persecutor argued against this request by constructing a scenario in which Hilsner is not himself sexually perverse but in which he had sexually perverse accomplices. This construction allowed him to honor several witness statements that claimed to have
seen Hilsner in proximity to the presumed murder sites in the company of two or three other men. These witness statements were steeped in ritual murder imagination, in fact they alleged that they saw Hilsner and two other Jews and described figures that followed antisemitic iconographies of the Jew: limping, ugly, cigarettes in their mouths. The prosecutor’s construction that Hilsner had one or more sexually perverse accomplice(s) thus makes creative use of this testimony; it reinterprets the multiplicity of the perpetrators away from the blood murder thematic into a construction in which Hilsner’s attested normality is compatible with his guilt for a sexually perverse murder.

This creative reassembly of fragments that belong to different conceptual frameworks was rather implausible. Richard von Krafft-Ebing, psychiatrist in Vienna and generally accepted scientific authority on lust murders, had written in *Psychopathia Sexualis* that “the lust murderer from psychopathic conditions seems to never have accomplices” (Krafft-Ebing 323). The German construction in this sentence, “Der Lustmörder aus psychopathischen Bedingungen dürfte niemals Complicen haben,” has a subjunctive construction that I translated as “seems to.” The construction combines a strong, absolute statement (“never has accomplices”) with a cautious attitude that, like all empirical observations that conclude with “never,” it is

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only an inference (“it must be so,” “it seems so”).

Malijovský interpreted Krafft-Ebing in such a way that a psychopathic lust murderer with accomplices is unusual but not impossible. His position is reported in the Neue Freie Presse:

Concerning the perversity of Hilsner, the public prosecutor says, I refer to the examination in Kuttenberg according to which Hilsner is to be called completely normal. The tearing of the clothes does indicate perversity, but I must point out that the actual perpetrator is not known. Krafft-Ebing says explicitly: “A lust murderer should have accomplices in the rarest of cases.” Thus the possibility that he has some is not excluded. (“Der zweite Prozeß Hilsner: Pisek, 5. November” 7)

The exact sentence with which Malijovský quotes Krafft-Ebing varies slightly from the one that I have found in all relevant editions of the Psychopathia Sexualis. There, the relevant adverb is “never” (niemals), compared to “in the rarest of cases” (in den seltensten Fällen), as Malijovský puts it in a sentence that is otherwise identical. Of course, Krafft-Ebing’s use of the subjunctive would already have given the persecutor the option to point out that Krafft-Ebing did not definitively rule out the possibility of a sexually perverse lust murder with accomplices. But by citing Krafft-Ebing (rightly or wrongly) the way he reportedly did, Malijovský creates space for his particular construction while leaving a belief in the authoritative knowledge of science intact.  

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163 Whether Krafft-Ebing played an active role in the use of his scholarship in the Hilsner trial, I do not know conclusively. But according to a brief note in the Czech nationalist Národní Listy on November 15, the day after the verdict, the Wiener Tagblatt published a conversation with Prof. Dr. Krafft-Ebing and Prof. Dr. Wagner of Jauregg (the director of the psychiatric clinic in Vienna) in which “they regret the unanimous verdict of the court and try to defend Hilsner” (‘Z Vídne, 14. listopadu”) (p.3). However, I have not been able to find said interview in the Wiener Tagblatt nor any other trace of Krafft-Ebing actively engaging with the Hilsner trial. Harry Oosterhuis does not mention anything about the Hilsner Affair in his book Stepchildren of Nature: Krafft-Ebing, Psychiatry, and the Making
The prosecutor thus provides a mixed construction that allows him to incorporate testimony that is steeped in the ritual murder imagination, even though he has to ignore some crucial details of this testimony. But he could reinterpret testimony about Hilsner in the company of others to create the scenario where Hilsner collaborated with multiple perpetrators among whom at least one, but not Hilsner, suffered from a sexual perversion. Auředníček objected to this ad-hoc construction by arguing that the scientific literature knows not a single case of a lust murderer with accomplices but ultimately this was to no avail. The prosecutor’s narrative was an ad-hoc creation that combined elements of different discourses into an unlikely whole. But it ultimately did not have to stand any test of plausibility, only the test of whether it violated any laws, and, as the Supreme Court found in response to Auředníček’s second appeal, it did not.

The narratives of Hans Gross and Karl Hermann Wolf speak of psychopathology rather than of sexual perversion. The discourse of psychopathology, however, overlapped significantly with the discourse of sexual perversion. We already saw this in the statement in the Neue Freue Presse, which alleges that all evidence suggests that the murderer was “a mentally ill person or in any case somebody who through his perversity touches on insanity.” The discourse of psychopathology further has in common with the discourse of sexuality that it applies to an individual. Sexuality and psychopathology participate in a multifaceted discursive framework

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of Sexual Identity, which is based on his work with the private archive of Richard von Krafft-Ebing’s manuscripts, patient files, correspondences and notes (Oosterhuis).
that grounds motivation and behavior in the interiority of the individual self. As such it stands in opposition to the ritual murder framework which locates the source of action not in the individual but in a Jewish collectivity and its secret teachings.

Hans Gross started his career as an investigative judge. He later entered the university as the founder of the field of criminalistics. He published two highly successful books, the *Handbuch für Untersuchungsrichter* (1893) (Handbook for investigative judges) and *Criminalpsychologie* (1898) (Criminal Psychology) and edited the journal *Archiv für Kriminal-Anthropologie und Kriminalistik* (Archive for Criminal Anthropology and Criminalistics). In the introductory volume of the *Archiv für Kriminal-Anthropologie und Kriminalistik* (henceforth abbreviated *Archiv*), he objects to the a-priori assumption of criminal anthropology (and criminology) to date, namely that there is a physical and mental distinctiveness of the criminal: “We know today what constitutes a crime. What, however, one is to understand under the heading ‘criminal’ nobody has as of yet explained” (as quoted in Vyleta 17). Gross approached criminals, suspects, and witnesses alike as rational agents interested to varying degrees in covering up their crimes. The study of criminalistics, for Gross, rests firstly on the expertise of reading clues (with the goal to be able to move past unreliable witness statements) and secondly on an understanding of human psychology that allows the investigator to see through deception and dissimulation.

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164 This critique is targeted at Cesare Lombroso and other criminologists who, for Gross’ taste, were too invested in the idea of a criminal as a distinct type. On occasion, Gross also mentioned a criminal’s or a suspect’s degenerate ancestry, history of deviant behavior, etc., which demonstrates that there is overlap between Gross’ criminalistics and Lombroso’s criminology, but these considerations were always only ancillary for Gross (Vyleta)
In two articles, “Psychopathischer Aberglaube” (Psychopathic Superstition) and “Zur Frage vom psychopathischen Aberglauben” (On the Question of Psychopathic Superstition), both published in the Archiv, Gross conjectures that Hilsner may have murdered Hruza out of a pathologically driven “blood superstition.” He does not go into the Hilsner case very much. In fact, the argument is almost only by association. Gross groups at least eight murder cases together which have in common that clothes or body parts were carried around or left in different places. He suggests that all these actions may have been motivated by a superstition. While superstition is very common, only psychopathic individuals will let themselves be moved by it to actions as extreme and socially sanctioned as murder, he conjectures.

All of the cases Gross discusses have female victims except one, the murder case of Ernst Winter in Konitz/Chojnice (in Western Prussia) in 1900. The case is famous as another ritual murder trial. Without commenting on the ritual murder theme in this case or in either of the murders for which Hilsner was found guilty, Gross highlights the gender of the murder victim Ernst Winter and suggests that, if the murderer was a man, there may have been a homosexual component to the crime, in addition to the psychopathologically reinforced superstition: “the conjecture is plausible that in this single case there were also sexually perverse drives that played a role on the side of the perpetrator, next to superstition and psychopathology” (Hanns Gross 167).

165 For a scathing critique, see Nussbaum, who concludes that Gross “apparently does not have a clue of the facts of the case” (Nussbaum 119, note 119).
Gross’ construction is thus one that reframes the “blood murder” from a ritual into a psychopathically driven superstition. This is a significant shift because the discourse of psychopathology seeks the source of motivation for a murder in the individual. The idea of ritual murder, on the other hand, is essentially bound up in a group process, hence the countless witnesses who claimed to have seen Hilsner with a group of Jews, and who claim to have overheard other Jews discuss the murder as if they were obviously part of a conspiracy. Thus, even though Gross does not suggest that the murders of Hruza and Klima were themselves “sexually perverse,” his tentative reframing of them as motivated by a combination of superstition and psychopathy participates in a closely related discourse of the abnormal individual. Gross’ comment on the homosexual component in the Winter case furthermore suggests that for him there is also a presumed sexual dimension built into the murderer’s relationship to the murder victim even if, in the presumed scenario of a male murderer, the heterosexuality of this dimension makes it too inconspicuous to trigger any explicit comments at all. While the faculty report in the Hilsner trial considered the acts of spreading the victim’s clothes as themselves part of a sexual realm and hence by themselves sexually perverse (no “homosexual” dimension was needed for the diagnosis “perversion”), Gross theorizes the spreading of clothes (and in other cases body parts) as a sign of pathologically reinforced superstition whose sexual dimension only becomes marked once it is homosexual.

Gross’ conjecture, ingenious as it is in combining different elements that were popular with different constituencies, seems not to have had much impact on the
investigation of the case or its media coverage. This is similar to the construction by Malijovský except that the latter was of great significance in the judicial process. Without it, the verdict would quite possibly have been voided by the court of appeals. But this is not the case for Gross, despite his high standing as an authority in criminalistics. The specialized antisemitic investment in a rational Jewish enemy was not compatible with the version proposed by Gross, and hence Gross’ narrative was without much appeal to committed antisemites. To Auředniček and Nussbaum, on the other hand, it appeared as an insignificant variation on the ritual murder discourse. Nussbaum finds a purely sexual framework more compelling: “The alleged examples cited by Gross are evidently cases of sadism.” He claims that Gross’ thesis about “psychopathic blood superstition” is just as unfounded as the ritual murder doctrine to which it is factually related and “with which it must be confused by the crowd that discerns less finely (Nussbaum 209 n. 119)." Gross’ construction thus is most closely aligned with the state that also abstained from directly endorsing the ritual murder

166 Even scholar Sander Gilman simply references Gross’ hypothesis that Hilsner murdered Hruza out of pathological blood superstition as a general example of the ritual murder discourse without pausing to discuss how “psychopathology” introduces a unique twist to it. Gross and Nussbaum staged an intellectual battle over the Hilsner trial. Nussbaum strongly critiqued Gross’s hypothesis that Hilsner murdered Hruza and Klima out of a psychopathically reinforced superstition. In turn, Gross wrote a review of Nussbaum’s Der Polnaer Ritualmordprozess that condemned it as a tendentious attack. He rejects Nussbaum’s various statements about the poor credibility of many witnesses as out of hand and insulting, claims that an argument solely based on a study of the documents has no legitimacy and even asserts patriotic prerogatives and national distinction: He claims that “these are Czech judiciary employees, Czech experts, Czech witnesses; I as an ur-German have no incentive to concern myself very much with them,” but he is nevertheless offended by many of Nussbaum’s words that dismiss the credibility of key witnesses and denounce this verdict as a horrible judicial error. Gross advises Nussbaum, the Berliner, to moderate his criticism of the Austrian criminal justice system which, he implies, is not really his to critique.
accusation, yet lacked any critical stance towards the knowledge produced by the antisemitic agitation and provided legal reasoning that post-facto legitimated it.

Anticipating Gross’ construction of the pathologically-sexually driven excessive superstition, Karl Hermann Wolf also weighed in on the ritual murder debate with a remarkable position. Wolf, the German national politician who had achieved fame and notoriety for his intransigent opposition to the Badeni ordinances, wrote the following commentary following Hilsner’s first conviction in the German nationalist *Ostdeutsche Rundschau*:

> What for god’s sake would be to it if the called representatives of Judaism were to declare, yes, there are mentally and ethically low-standing individuals among us who, afflicted with a delusional and superstitious belief stemming from Judaism’s ancient times, succumb to their supposedly religious drive and commit crimes of the described kind, but Judaism as such, the Mosaic law, is not to blame for it. We rather take great pains to eradicate the terrible superstition which after all vegetates only in the *Hefe* (literally: yeast) of our fellow nationals, and even there only leanly. Such a declaration would of course not be taken up with complete indifference by the Aryan world, a certain reaction in the Aryan people’s masses would not hold off, but that would pass after a while, and Judaism would be freed once and for all from the horrible suspicion of having, cultivating, and protecting a recognized blood ritual. (as quoted in Wolf, “Jahrmarkt des Lebens” 712)

Acting as a self-appointed “benevolent” judge and spokesman for the “Aryan world” at the same time, Wolf offers the accused Judaism a settlement of sorts that constructs an idiosyncratic mix of discourses of ritual murder and discourses of mental-ethical abnormality and individual superstition. As we have seen, the antisemitism that dominated the Hilsner affair rejected suggestions that Hilsner’s mental state was in any way abnormal or connected to his putative guilt. It had no interest in locating
culpability in the deviance of individual bodies, minds, or psyches because it was invested in a conspiratorial Jewish murder organization.

But Wolf and the Ostdeutsche Rundschau belong to the German nationalist movement. Unlike the Christian Socials, they legitimated their antisemitism through racist ideas about bloodlines and inborn mental, physical and ethical superiority. German nationalism was able to incorporate the discourse of individual psychopathology (not very different from the discourse of sexual perversion) into its brand of antisemitism because its ideology of inherent mental and bodily difference was amenable to it. German nationalist antisemitism, furthermore, was less firmly tied to constructions of Jewish collectivity. But Wolf’s statement also deploys the trope of collective Jewish culpability by addressing himself to a collectivized Judaism and asking Jewish leaders to “admit” the culpability of Jewish individuals. By “admitting” to the existence of ritual murder superstitions among Jews, Wolf suggests, Jews could “liberate” themselves from being held collectively responsible for it.

These different narratives by Malijovský, Gross and Wolf demonstrate that the ritual murder framework and the sexual perversion and psychopathology framework were not always kept completely separate. At the same time, they highlight the difficulties of combining these frameworks: Malijovský’s narrative had to come to

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167 These demarcations may stem to a significant extent from the exigencies of mass politics where Christian Socials and the German nationalists competed for the same votes. These parties thus sought simultaneously to specialize their brands and to ensure that they met any ideological demands created by their competitors.
terms with the unlikely figure of a lust murderer with accomplices; Gross essentially solved the “problem” of ritual murder discourse, namely that it has no basis in reality, by declaring it a “superstition” of the individual mentally disturbed perpetrator; and Wolf’s narrative holds in tension the claim that Jews, too, are evaluated as individuals among whom some may be “delusional” and “superstitious,” even while he addresses Jews as a collective that is guilty for not “admitting” what he asserts is truth. These tensions in the narratives of Malijovský, Gross, and Wolf reflect the fundamental tension between the ritual murder framework, as a collectivizing framework, and the individualizing discourses of sexuality and psychopathology.

**Conclusion**

Sexuality was explicitly debated in the Hilsner affair through the hypothesis that the murderer of Hrůzová was motivated by a sexual perversion. This suggestion placed the murderer within a framework of the human self that is produced among others by discourses of sexuality, including psychoanalytic, sexological and criminalistics discourses that share a concept of the individual self as having a psychic interiority, having motivations for his or her actions that lie somewhere in this interiority and are not purely rational. Countering the view that the ritual murder imagination is inherently sexualized, I emphasized the larger theoretical difference between the kind of intentionality that is assumed in the discourse of sexuality and the kind of intentionality that ritual murder discourse constructs for “the Jews.” The former locates motivation in the interiority of the individual self, whereas the latter imagines
a secret Jewish conspiracy with its own laws and dynamics of causing actions. This analysis suggests that as part of analyzing “a society with a sexuality,” to use Foucault’s term, we need to pay attention not only to the processes of normalization and marginalization that occur through the discourse of sexuality but also to the differential application of this discourse.

In the next chapter, I will continue the analysis of the discourse of sexuality in the Hilsner affair but shift to an area where the presence of this discourse is not as apparent. Critics of antisemitism not only countered the ritual murder framework by proposing the sexual perversion framework as a better explanation of the murder; they also developed a critique of the belief in the truth of the ritual murder. This critique of a belief in a (false) truth drew largely on discourses of hysteria, hypnosis, and suggestion. How does this critique extend the “sexual perversion” hypothesis discussed in this chapter? And how do we assess its potential and limitations?
4) Suggestion and Certainty:  
Two Approaches to a Critique of Antisemitic Knowledge

In the Hilsner affair, critiques of the antisemitic blood libel were not confined to providing alternative explanations for the murder of Anežka Hrůzová. They also included critiques of antisemitic knowledge production about the alleged ritual murder. These critiques took place in criminal psychological scholarship, newspapers, and courtrooms; they generally concurred that ordinary people could come to believe in the reality of Jewish ritual murder; that, in some instances, they could even be convinced that they have witnessed such murder from mere suggestion of antisemitic propaganda. In the first part of this chapter, I argue that the criminal-psychological discourse of suggestion is closely tied to the psychoanalytic discourse of sexuality through a shared genealogy in the neurological discourses of hysteria and hypnosis and through active intellectual exchange and collaboration. The subject that is implicitly invoked through the discourse of suggestion overlaps with the conception of the self that is produced through discourses of sexuality: an individual self with a complex interiority who is capable of holding true as well as false knowledge.

The discourse of suggestion provides an insightful account of ordinary people’s professed convictions of Hilsner’s guilt. But as a strategy of anti-antisemitic resistance it was limited because it was caught up in the psychology of the individual self and the racialized conceptions of selfhood that are built into it. In the second part of this chapter I therefore analyze several documented instances of how antisemitic power plays out in the Hilsner affair. From this analysis I develop a critique of the
mass politics of knowledge, truth, and belief that does not start from the psychology of the individual but instead from the performative fact of racial power. The concepts of truth and positive knowledge and the embedded ideas of individuality become less central in this analysis, which instead highlights the performance of certainty as a collective embodied practice in continuity with racial violence.

A Genealogy of the Subject of Suggestion

The lead article on Leopold Hilsner’s first conviction in the *Neue Freie Presse* contains the following critique of antisemitic knowledge production.

Of course it is possible that despite all the accused is guilty, well that one could perhaps have discovered a more natural and reasonable motive, if the investigation, accusation and procedure of taking evidence had not from the beginning been controlled by the insane assumption of ritual murder. But that a jury bench, a court, a whole town and its surroundings judge virtually under the hypnosis that emanates from a legend that originates from a dark time—that is shameful for our time, for our education and civilization. (“Wien, 16. September” 2 emphasis mine)

The analysis that the wide acceptance of the blood libel is the result of a hypnosis-like influence was shared by a broad range of actors, though many understood that modern media contributed to such hypnotic results, and thereby challenging the assertion that this phenomenon was out of sync with modernity.

For instance, consider Joseph Samuel Bloch’s analysis:

The excitation always only shows up once it is pointed out by the antisemites that the murdered was a Christian and when at the same time the suspicion is directed not just towards one or several Jews as such, but simultaneously the belief is created in the people that once again a murder was committed because the Jews need the Christian blood for ritual purposes (...) This infamous agitation is practiced
especially in Polna and surroundings, and with the most infamous means: There is a mass dissemination of flyers which describe the occurred kosher-slaughtering etc. with details as if the writer had been there and image presentations on which one sees the crooked-nosed Jews slaughter the girl and catch the blood in a ready-at-hand receptacle. (514)

Bloch highlights the vividness of the mass-disseminated linguistic and visual description of the alleged ritual murder. For Franz Kafka, the technology of mass-produced visual media distinguishes the ritual murder belief surrounding the Hilsner affair as a distinctly modern phenomenon. The following reflection is from a letter to Milena Jesenská:

I cannot fathom how the peoples could come upon the thought of ritual murder before it came to such phenomena as of recent times (earlier it was at best a general fear and jealousy, here however there is the unequivocal sight, here one views 'Hilsner' do the deed step by step; that the virgin is hugging him while he does it, what does that mean). (Kafka 68)

The letter is part of a conversation that extends beyond it, not written to be transparent to a third-party reader. The reference to the hugging virgin is presumably a reference to an image or possibly a textual description.\(^{168}\) Benno Wagner, who analyses this passage en route to making a fascinating argument that Kafka evaded some of the traps of the ritual murder discourse by recycling key themes of the Hilsner affair and scattering them through his works, offers the interpretation that

\(^{168}\) In the next paragraph, which seems somewhat connected, it is unclear whether it’s commentary on the Hilsner case or a related phenomenon about which Kafka and Jesenská have an ongoing conversation. “When one speaks of the innocence of the girl, this does not mean the ordinary physical one but the innocence of her sacrifice, which is no less physical” (68). This could be read as similar to the argument that I made earlier, when I attempted to separate out the bodily or physical quality of the “ritual murder” from the framework of sexual predation.
Kafka here reverses the “enlightened” incomprehension about the persistence or reemergence of ritual murder belief. “Not the modern, national mass delusion appears incomprehensible here, but conversely the premodern superstition of the ‘people’” (Wagner n.p., section 3). Wagner explains further:

[The] “phenomena as of recent times” apparently consist in a mediatic bringing-in-line (Gleichschaltung) of “the people’s” imaginary in the creation of a collective, locationless and timeless mental film: “here one views ‘Hilsner’ do the deed step by step.” (Wagner n.p., section 3)

The references to mass media and film point to the power of various antisemitic media to produce a visual narrative of how “Hilsner” commits a ritual murder. Kafka’s inverted commas emphasize that this is the Hilsner fantasized by the antisemites, not the actual person.

There are indeed countless statements to the effect that flyers and image postcards with ritual murder scenes were disseminated widely, especially in Polná, Kutná Hora, Pisek and their respective surroundings. Picture postcards were also a

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169 The term Gleichschaltung was used by the Nazis to describe the process of bringing all aspects of political and social life under totalitarian control and included the abolition of federalism and of all parties except the NSDAP and the creation of National Socialist professional and youth organizations.

170 Hušek sold postcards which depict and elucidate Hrůzová’s autopsy. The postcards were confiscated, but Hušek successfully appealed the confiscation (“Eine confiscierte Ansichtskarte”). Another image depicts three men as they hold “Anežka Hrůzová” upside down and apply a knife to her throat, while a thick stream of blood runs from her throat into a bucket. This image (unknown) is presented by the internet research program www.hilsneriade.net without further information about its circulation or current storage (last accessed 2/18, 2014). Her body forms the shape of an upside-down crucified Jesus. She is produced as a Christian martyr. Another set of images, produced by Antonín Dvořák of Polná, include photographs of the mourning mother and sister at the grave, the congregated crown surrounding Hrůzová’s dead body in the forest, and landscape pictures with solemn inscriptions such as “‘Březina’ forest by Polná where Aněžka Hrůzová of Malá Věžnička was murdered March 19 1899.” (Dvořák, Matka a sestra Aněžky Hrůzové; Dvořák, Les “Březina”
fairly new phenomenon at the time. As a new consumer item which did not yet have an established economy and an established market, these postcards offered themselves as an interesting commercial opportunity at the crossroads of antisemitic agitation and business enterprise. Arthur Nussbaum reports that one postcard producer was based in Berlin and circulated his cards also in Konitz/Chojnice.

Visual representations of the ritual murder were not limited to images. Nussbaum further reports that Hilsner busts were exhibited at fairs. In Pardubice/Pardubitz, an optician exhibited a display of a ritual murder in a *Pantoskop*, which appears to be an early film technology. An apparatus for displaying moving images, it created a sort of animated film. Other ritual murder-themed commodities included matchboxes with an image of the murdered Hrůzová with a butcher’s knife above her head. It was through such instances of popular media that...

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171 The *Deutsches Volksblatt* devotes a feuilleton to the “new sports” of collecting picture postcards in September 1899 (Feigl). See also (Wolff).

172 (Nussbaum 17)

173 The limited scholarship on the pantoscope includes studies of the (missing) “Pantoscope of California” (Jones). See (Sandweiss) about photography and other visual techniques for exhibiting the American West in New England. More comparative research on the nexus of race/nationhood, visual technologies, and capitalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is called for.

174 (Bloch, “Aus dem czechisch-jüdischen Lager” 717)
the allegation of ritual murder was produced as a visual and narrative reality.
Referring to circulating images of ritual murder, Nussbaum writes: “The view that
these images offer is truly horrid. Memory cannot free itself from the repugnant sight
any more” (16).

He elaborates on the success of antisemitic agitation in convincing many
people that Hilsner committed a Jewish ritual murder in a criminal-psychological
framework. He theorizes the psychological effect of antisemitic agitation, also
acknowledged by Kafka, in the Neue Freue Presse and in Dr. Bloch’s
Oesterreichische Wochenschrift, through the concept of suggestion.
This discourse of suggestion circulates widely among critics of the blood libel, but it
is particularly insightful to analyze how it is articulated in an explicitly scholarly
platform because we can more easily trace the genealogical connections between the
discourse of suggestion and the discourse of sexuality, which expose that the subject
of suggestion (the ritual murder witnesses and the proponents of ritual murder
accusation) overlaps conceptually with the psychoanalytic subject of sexuality.

Nussbaum’s book Der Polnaer Ritualmordprozess (The Polna ritual murder
trial) carries a subtitle that translates as “a criminal-psychological investigation on the
basis of documents.” As Franz von Liszt, Nussbaum’s teacher and law professor at
Berlin, states in the preface, the book has a dual aim: to document the historically
significant Polna ritual murder trial and to contribute to the criminal-psychological
theory of suggestion. Nussbaum argues that most ritual murder witnesses neither lie
nor speak the truth about their alleged observations and memories but are under the
influence of suggestion, that is, they produce false memories and false assessments as a result of the influence of a third party (Nussbaum 6). He argues:

Suggestion, i.e. the production of said disturbances through the influence of third parties, thus does absolutely not require the induction of a hypnotic (dream-like) state or an intervention by the other side that is purposely aiming for suggestion, as has also been demonstrated experimentally. On the contrary, just the existence of a psychic excitation already offers to suggestion an adequate soil (...). (6-7)

Nussbaum argues that excitement can create the conditions for a subject’s suggestibility without any need for hypnosis. This is why, in sensationalist murder cases, where the populace is by definition “excited,” the conditions are ripe for suggestion. Nussbaum’s argument gains particular strength from his close analysis of how witnesses in the Hilsner trials changed their statements between the pre-trial investigative interrogations and the trials in Kuttenberg and Pisek. Often, witnesses added more details and proclaimed more certainty about their observations as time passed and they adjusted their “memories” to align with new information that became available.

Nussbaum’s clarification that suggestion does not require the induction of a hypnotic state references a longer neurological debate. Suggestion and hypnosis are both theorized as procedures that can induce false memories that appear deceivingly vivid and sensual to the hypnotized or suggested subject. Coming out of the interest in hypnosis characteristic of the 1870s and 80s, there was a vast literature on suggestion that emerged in the last decade of the nineteenth century. This reflected a resolution to ongoing quarrels and debates about the function and applicability of...
hypnosis. The main opposing schools were those of Jean-Martin Charcot at *La Salpêtrière* in Paris who considered hypnosis a treatment that only worked on hysterics and Hyppolite Bernheim in Nancy who held that everyone was in principle amenable to hypnosis.\(^{175}\) Bernheim’s position eventually won the debate, and interest in hypnosis shifted from its application in the clinical setting for the treatment of hysters to its occurrence in non-clinical settings where fully conscious and awake individuals act against their will or recall memories that they have not experienced. Sigmund Freud, who translated Bernheim’s *De La Suggestion et de ses applications à la thérapeutique* (On Suggestion and its Therapeutic Applications) into German, explained in his translator’s preface:

> The main value of this book seems to me to lie in the proof of the relationships that connect hypnotic phenomena to ordinary processes of awakeness and sleep, in the discovery of the psychological laws that are valid for both sets of manifestations. The problem of hypnosis thereby comes within the purview of psychology; and “suggestion” is presented as the kernel and key of hypnoticism—besides, in the last chapters its significance is explored also in areas other than hypnosis. (Freud, “Vorrede des Uebersetzers” iii)

The concept of suggestion reflects the shift in the discourse on hypnosis towards more applicability and relevance for ordinary psychological phenomena.\(^{176}\) [where are you going?]  

In this book, which was first published in 1886, Bernheim discusses the crown witness of the Tisza-Eszlár ritual murder trial of 1882 under “General Applications of the Study of Suggestion.” The crown witness was the thirteen-year-old son of one of

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\(^{175}\) See for example (Pérez-Rincón).

\(^{176}\) On Bernheim see also (Vyleta 20-24).
the accused Jews. The investigative judge separated him from his family for months before the trial and housed him with a police officer. At the trial, he testified unwaveringly that he had seen the ritual murder with his own eyes. Bernheim entertains the scenario that the boy was coerced to lie, but he thinks it more plausible that the boy was under the suggestion of the policeman into whose house he was essentially abducted. Bernheim envisions the scenario:

The words of the man make a deep impression on [the boy’s] weak mind and this impression, more and more reinforced, gradually transposes into a sense perception. Under the influence of this overpowering suggestion the poor hypnotized brain works out the whole course of events that the official described, now nothing is missing; the child sees the victim lie on the ground, held by three people, sees the shochet lower his knife into the victim’s throat and the blood emanate. The child saw it all, the retroactive hallucination as it can be produced experimentally in deep sleep is developed and the memory of the delusion is so vivid that the child cannot free itself from its command. Suggestion, like a dramatic scene drawn in strong strokes by the poet, affixes itself in fantasy with all the focus of real experience. (Bernheim 153–4 emphasis mine)

This understanding of suggestion is echoed in Nussbaum’s later study, which even uses the same image of an oppressed memory in the phrase that “memory cannot free itself from the repugnant sight any more” (16).

There is thus a genealogical link between the neurological work on hypnosis and suggestion, particularly Bernheim’s, and the later criminal-psychological work of Nussbaum: through their shared understanding that suggestion is, in certain circumstances, a normal psychic dynamic and through their respective discussions of the suggestion of ritual murder witnesses. For Bernheim, the Tisza-Eszlár ritual murder affair serves as an illustrative example of suggestion; for Nussbaum, the
documentation of the Hilsner ritual murder trial doubles as an in-depth engagement with the criminal-psychological theory of suggestion. Nussbaum’s book is not a radical departure from previous scholarship in criminal psychology and criminalistics; rather, he synthesizes insights that are acknowledged by many legal scholars and law practitioners alike. Occasionally, the Charcot/Bernheim debate on hypnosis shines through in commentaries on the unreliability of those who make ritual murder accusations. He mentions “hysteria” as a factor that can increase one’s susceptibility to suggestion (Nussbaum 33).  

Two figures who mediate this connection between neurology and criminal psychology and criminalistics are Hans Gross and Freud. In the previous chapter, “Ritual Murder and Sexuality in the Hilsner Affair,” I mentioned that Gross conjectured that Hilsner murdered Hruza out of a psychopathically reinforced superstition. Without providing a more concrete account of what this superstition should have entailed exactly, he hypothesized that Hilsner harbored a superstition that motivated him to murder Hruza. This puts Gross in disagreement with Nussbaum, who understands all evidence against Hilsner to be completely false and considers him innocent. Gross’ and Nussbaum’s assessments of the Hilsner trials thus diverged significantly, and they clarified their divergences in a published intellectual battle. Nussbaum criticized Gross’s speculations about psychopathic superstition. Gross, in

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177 In another publication, discussing a case in which a police investigation was conducted against a maidservant who falsely accused her employer of tapping her blood, Albert Hellwig too muses: “Whether this was called for or whether the girl, maybe of hysterical disposition, made the phantastic accusations in her best faith, may appear doubtful” (51).
turn, wrote a review of Nussbaum’s *Der Polnaer Ritualmordprozess* that condemned it as a tendentious attack. He rejects Nussbaum’s various statements about the poor credibility of many witnesses as out of hand and insulting, claims that an argument solely based on a study of the documents has no legitimacy, and even asserts patriotic prerogatives and national distinction.\(^{178}\)

Despite this antagonism over the assessment of Hilsner’s trials, Nussbaum and Gross share a basic epistemological framework of criminalistics and criminal psychology. Gross’ *Criminalpsychologie* deals extensively with the problem of perception and memory. It discusses the dangers of false memories, hallucinations, and misperceptions in detail.\(^{179}\) Gross’ *Archiv für Kriminal-Anthropologie und Kriminalistik* likewise contains many articles on these subjects. Nussbaum also acknowledges Gross’ influence in *Der Polnaer Ritualmordprozess*. He cites Gross favorably as he sets up his conceptual framework about the unreliability of witness statements and he frequently quotes articles from the *Archiv*.\(^{180}\)

Gross’ refusal to engage Nussbaum’s main thesis, namely that many witnesses were under the influence of “suggestion,” is thus not completely expected. Daniel Vyleta speculates that Gross’ lack of openness towards Nussbaum could be because Gross believed that superstition was a common and overlooked cause of crime. The

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\(^{178}\) Referring to the people involved in the Hilsner trial, he asserts that “these are Czech judiciary employees, Czech experts, Czech witnesses; I as an ur-German have no incentive to concern myself very much with them,” but he is nevertheless offended by many of Nussbaum’s dismissals of the credibility of key witnesses and denunciations of the verdict as a judicial error. Gross advises Nussbaum, the Berliner, to moderate his criticism of the Austrian criminal justice system which he implies is not really his to critique.\(^{179}\) (Vyleta 20)  
\(^{180}\)(Nussbaum 5)
conjecture that Hilsner had committed murder out of a pathologically reinforced blood superstition would then be corroborated by a larger framework in which Gross is invested and that would not be easily abandoned, even if in favor of an argument that had a fairly established theoretical framework to corroborate it as well (namely, the unreliability of witness statements and the existence of suggestion). Nussbaum also argued that Gross was himself under the influence of the antisemitic suggestion. Whatever the reasons for Gross’ strong negative attitude to Nussbaum, it is not reflective of a general programmatic methodological difference. Despite disagreement about Hilsner’s guilt, they share a conceptual framework that acknowledges witness statements to be highly unreliable and open to suggestion by third parties.

Freud and his early formulations in psychoanalysis are another connecting thread in this web of overlapping discourses. Freud’s translation of Bernheim continues an intellectual exchange that goes back to his travels in France, where he visited Bernheim in Nancy after seeing Charcot at La Salpêtrière. The discourse of suggestion also has a connection with psychoanalysis because the latter emerged from a concern with hysteria and its aetiology. In his so-called seduction theory, Freud conjectured that hysteria is caused by a trauma of sexual violence experienced at an early age. Many of his patients told Freud about being sexually abused (‘seduced’ in the contemporary parlance) in their childhood, usually by family members. Freud was unsure for a long time whether he wanted to believe these accounts or not. He finally settled his ambivalence by dismissing the seduction theory in favor of the theory that

181 (Pérez-Rincón). See also (Gilman, Franz Kafka: The Jewish Patient 119).
most of these stories were not memories of actual experiences but fabrications of fantasy.

Bernheim and the scholars of criminalistics and criminal psychology (such as Gross and Nussbaum) universalized the hysteria/hypnosis nexus by moving away from hysteria and towards the idea that anyone can be subject to suggestion and thus produce testimony that, despite their most honest intentions, is not true. Freud stayed with the problem of hysteria a bit longer and questioned the veracity of the memories recollected by his hysterical patients, but in the end, when he turned to the concept of fantasy, he also opened up his insights and proposed fantasy as a general mechanism of the psyche. Suggestion and fantasy are thus two alternative examples of how the problematic of hysteria/hypnosis led to more generally applicable and non-clinical insights and applications. While these two concepts—suggestion and fantasy—and their attendant discourses could productively bring each other into relief, my interest here is to grapple with and thereby come to understand the overarching epistemic framework that they share.\textsuperscript{182}

So far I have argued that the theory of hypnosis, with its later articulations as a possible experience for everyone and its applicability to non-therapeutic settings, is tied genealogically to psychoanalysis and criminal psychology. Psychoanalysis and criminal psychology and criminalistics were also connected through material intellectual collaborations. In the \textit{Archiv}, Gross published a very favorable review of

\textsuperscript{182} The discourses of sexuality and of suggestion could bring each other into relief by considering the questions of truth, belief, and third party influence that are central to the discourse of suggestion together with questions of desire, sexuality, pleasure, and fantasy.
Freud’s *Traumdeutung* (The Interpretation of Dreams) by Paul Näcke, who called the book “ingeniously thought-through” and acknowledged its importance for criminalistics (168). Gross himself reviewed Freud’s *Ueber den Traum* (On Dreams), an abridged version of *Traumdeutung*. The review expresses some hesitations and, while not as enthusiastic, is, nevertheless, generally positive. In 1905 Gross reviewed Freud’s *Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens* (Psychopathology of Everyday Life), calling it an “extremely interesting” study that one must read. While he finds that Freud goes too far in some discussions, he finds that they are, nevertheless, “verbatim applicable to the work of the criminalist and of the utmost significance.” He concludes:

> The whole explanatory system still has to be further developed but I forecast very positive things to the ingenious idea. It has by the way a certain relation to the works of Wertheimer and Klein (see this Archiv, volume XV P. 72). (Hans Gross, “Review of Freud. Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens” 272)

Max Wertheimer and Julius Klein, two students of Gross’ in Prague, developed a criminalistic procedure that indeed resembles psychoanalysis. Their *Psychologische Tatbestandsdiagnostik* (“Psychological Diagnostics of Facts”) works with free associations that are solicited from suspects with a series of words that serve as cues. Based on the time lapse between cue and association and the content of the associations, the investigative judge-turned-diagnostician then diagnoses what a suspect knows but is trying to hide. Freud acknowledged the relatedness in his

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183 (Hans Gross, “Freud. Ueber den Traum (Review)”)
184 (Wertheimer and Klein)
185 See (Vyleta 25 ff). For a literary account of the realization of such an experiment, see
article “Tatbestandsdiagnostik und Psychoanalyse” (Diagnostics of Facts and Psychoanalysis), published in 1906/07 in Gross’ Archiv. In this article Freud relates his insights to the work of Wertheimer and Klein and constructs an analogy between the psychoanalyst’s work with patients and the investigative judge’s work with suspects. The article is based on a guest lecture in a class on criminalistics with professor Loeffler. It is thus part of an active collaboration between representatives of different disciplines with reciprocal interests and an acknowledgment of their commonalities.

This series of active intellectual collaborations between criminalistics and criminal psychology and psychoanalysis is grounded in a shared interest in theorizing the un-true speech of their subjects and in interpreting the details in their speech and action, such as pauses, slips on the tongue, and sudden changes of demeanor and affect. Practitioners of criminalistics and criminal psychology and psychoanalysis all confront their subjects with a determination not to be deceived by their surface performance and not to take their words at face value. The shared conception of the human that informed these practices is one of depth and interiority which, nevertheless, gives itself, not to any onlooker, but only to the trained expert who knows how to read the signs correctly.  

Jeffrey Masson argues that Freud’s decision to not believe his patients’ (Čapek, “Experiment profesora Rousse”). I thank Ellen Langer for bringing this story to my attention.  

186 (Freud, “Tatbestandsdiagnostik und Psychoanalyse”)
accounts of sexual abuse comes from his interest in upholding the image of the morally upstanding bourgeois family father (since the familial and class circumstances of his patients were such that these were the abusers in most accounts). Vyleta makes a related argument about the widespread interest in theorizing “suggestation” in popular and professional discourses of crime, trials, and witness reliability. Vyleta argues that the widely published concern about the reliability of witness testimony reflects bourgeois worries about the political agency and power of the working classes, who were demanding voting rights. By worrying about the manipulability of the masses, the discourse of suggestion served to delegitimize the words and actions of these “unruly” masses and was therefore also a tool in the bourgeois battle against working class power. Nussbaum exemplifies this tendency when he mentions “lacking intellectual or ethical development” as a factor that increases susceptibility to suggestion and adds that “almost always the witnesses belong to the lower strata of the rural and small-town population,” thus making it explicit that ascribed lack of intellectual and ethical development is part of a class discourse (33).

Masson’s critique highlights gender first and class second, whereas Vyleta’s foregrounds class primarily as factors that made the respective discourses of fantasy and suggestion serve hegemonic interests: Freud’s theory is building on the dismissal of bourgeois female speech, whereas the popularity of the (criminalistic) account of suggestion is boosted by bourgeois distrust of the agency of working class and peasant men. Vyleta’s and Masson’s critiques that the discourses of fantasy and
suggestion were linked to bourgeois-patriarchal efforts to counter the political power of bourgeois “women” and male “workers” are plausible, but how do we make sense of the fact that these discourses were also driving new conceptions of the human in fields as diverse as psychoanalysis and criminalistics and criminal psychology?

Perhaps the fact that theoretical frameworks of the self were fashioned in an engagement with (bourgeois) women and workers reflects the fact that these were the constituencies whose emergent political subjecthood was contested in battles for citizenship rights at the time. The elaboration of epistemologies of psychic interiority and the dynamic complexity of the self in relation to bourgeois women and male workers harbors contradictory tendencies: It denigrates the political speech and agency of these subjects, but it also renders them subjectively complex and humanizes them by according them a prominent place in emergent theories of the human self.

Given the antisemitic agitation that was invested in ritual murder fantasy and the many witnesses who insisted upon having seen Hilsner in incriminating circumstances, it was important for opponents of antisemitism to produce a counterdiscourse about the unreliability of witness testimony. However, there is a certain irony in that the discourses of the self that were deployed in this counterdiscourse also affirmed the humanity of those engaged in making ritual murder accusations and strengthened the protocols of the individual, psychically complex, and dynamic self as the definition of humanity. At the same time, antisemitism, as I discussed in the previous chapter, produced “the Jews” as an
intruding presence that threatened human society, and did so in part by depicting “the Jews” as out of sync with the human. In the remainder of this chapter, I sketch a different approach for a critique of antisemitic knowledge. This approach does not start from the psychology of the individual but instead from the performative fact of racial power.

**Certainty, Violence, and the Performance of Racial Power**

I will start this section with a speech by the Christian Social deputy Bielohlawek in the Musikvereinssaal, a large concert hall in Vienna, on September 27 1899. The speech was delivered at a large convention, one of many that took place in connection to the Hilsner trial. This particular convention was held shortly after Hilsner’s conviction in Kuttenberg/Kutná Hora. It was chaired by Ernst Vergani, publisher of the antisemitic Deutsche Volkszeitung (DV), and attended by the mayor Karl Lueger, both fellow Christian Socials of Bielohlawek. The Zionist Die Welt published a summary of Bielohlawek’s speech, including the following scene: “Speaker bemoans that that which lies on everybody’s tongue cannot be said. (interruption by the government representative)” (“Die Ausschrotung von Polna” 13). According to this report, Bielohlawek anticipates the government censorship and incorporates in into his speech, letting it serve as a contrast to the truth that lies on “everybody’s” tongue.

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188 In these conventions, which existed in antisemitic and anti-antisemitic versions, there was typically a series of speakers sometimes followed by a resolution.
189 (Wolf, “Jahrmarkt des Lebens” 713)
The government official then dutifully performs his interruption.\(^{190}\)

Bielohlawek’s speech was printed in its entirety and distributed as a booklet insert to the *Deutsche Volkszeitung*. The passage from his speech is rendered in the following way:

> For us the matter is whether proof that there are fanatical Jews who procure Christian blood for ritual or other purposes, that is to say procure through murder, has been established or not. (Roaring applause. The government representative interrupts the speaker again.) The answer, even though it is on everybody’s tongue, I cannot speak here. (Rapturous applause.) (Bielohlawek 6)

By way of a (rhetorical) question, this version records the topic of ritual murder even more explicitly while still making use of the gesture of censorship for further dramatic effect, alongside the roaring applause of the audience.

That the *DV* chooses to print the parenthetical descriptions of the goings-on in the convention shows that it is not only the content of the speech that matters but also the dramatic event, including the government official’s interruption and the applause by the audience. The description honors the event’s function as a site of entertainment and bodily activation, a dramatic stand-off perhaps also between the antisemitic show of force and the government official. The description of the applause works to dramatize (and likely exaggerate) the numeric power and ideological unity and commitment of the antisemitic movement.

These details give a taste of the collective bodily activation that is cultivated in an antisemitic event. In the theory of suggestion, the people’s roaring applause is

\(^{190}\) For a report and commentary on the event from *Dr. Bloch’s Oesterreichische Wochenschrift*, see (Wolf, “Jahrmarkt des Lebens” 713).
taken into consideration as a kind of “excitement” that makes people more susceptible to suggestion. It matters because it makes them susceptible to the suggestion that a ritual murder happened. What the theory of suggestion neglects, in my opinion, is the dimension of collective identity formation that is bound up in the process: the moment of collective affirmation of being the “everybody” that Bielohlawek talks about, the lateral connection between the attendees of the antisemitic convention, and the performance of antisemitic power that this collective event stages.

Implicit in this instantiation of “everybody” is the understanding that Jews, blamed for ritual murder and for the suppression of talk about ritual murder, are no one. This understanding, however, is less fruitfully imagined at the level of people’s beliefs than as the result—or, perhaps, the external manifestation—of a performance of antisemitic collectivity. Likewise, sentences such as “the Jews need Christian blood” or “Hilsner will be hanged” or any other shorthand description of ritual murder are better imagined primarily as cues that establish one’s membership in an antisemitic collectivity than as expressions of a personally-held belief. This is not to say that the people who clapped in the Musikvereinssaal or who, in other situations, responded favorably or even participated in ritual murder propaganda “did not believe” in the content of the allegations. It is rather to question what it means to “believe” or “not believe” and de-emphasize questions of “belief” in favor of questions of collective subject formation through the performance of certain tropes.

We can study similar instances of collective antisemitic instantiations of ritual-murder belief in the book Polna 29.3.1899 (Polna 3/29/1899) by the clerical-
antisemitic journalist Gustav Toužil of Prague. Subtitled *Ermordung der Agnes Hruza und der sensationelle Prozess Hilsner vor dem Kuttenberger Schwurgerichte* (Murder of Agnes Hruza, and the Sensational Hilsner Trial at the Kuttenberg Jury Court), the book covers Hruza’s disappearance, the discovery of her corpse, the emergence of ritual murder allegations against Hilsner, anti-Jewish riots, the trial, and the conviction. It also contains background information on Hruza’s character and her favorite pastimes, which Toužil apparently gathered personally from her mother.\(^{191}\)

The book is firmly in the service of the ritual murder allegations against Hilsner. It could be described as a sort of propagandistic infotainment.

In *Polna 29.3.1899* the truth of the belief in ritual murder is tied to the visual image of the slashed throat, and this tie is mediated and authorized by “the people.” The following excerpt is from a scene that takes place in the woods. A young boy has just found Hruza’s corpse.

Up until now the opinion had prevailed that either the brother Johann or even Agnes’ mother took a hand in the bloody deed.

Only, soon this suspicion was averted. When instructed to turn the corpse the worker Horáček took the snow-white lifeless body and turned it face up, and now the commission, which had been joined by the mayor Rudolf Sadil, the municipal council member Sedlak, and a large crowd of people, was gripped by such a shock and astonishment of such kind that individual attendees almost fainted with fright.

When the body was turned the head fell to the ground and a gaping wound at the throat became visible which went from one side to the other so that the inside of the throat came out. In this moment the suspicion fell off the mother and the brother, and the one conviction thrust itself onto the lips of all in attendance: “*The girl was kosher-slaughtered!*” (Toužil 19, emphasis spaced in the original)

\(^{191}\) The visit is referenced in the book and furthermore documented in photographs that were included in the book.
Toužil creates an epistemic triad between the visual image of the slashed throat, the onlooking crowd, and the unshatterable knowledge that it was a Jewish ritual murder, referenced here through the phrase, “kosher-slaughtered” (*koscheriert*). Toužil does not create any difference between the conviction of the crowd, the sight of the slashed throat, and the truth. The crowd is the vehicle through which the truth is perceived, just as the slashed throat is the unequivocal evidence for this truth. The knowledge of the crowd is depicted through the embodied act of speaking and is described as *Überzeugung* (certainty), a term that emphasizes the emotive-embodied dimension of holding a certain truth. It contains the word “Zeuge” (witness) and thus suggests a knowledge that overcomes one like one might be overcome by the certainty of events that one witnessed. The passage is also highly dramatized. An image that accompanies the text in the book depicts the general setup of a crowd and court commission gathered around the corpse, further adding to the visually dramatic quality of the scene of witnesses collectively seeing the slashed body and experiencing the certainty that it was a ritual murder.192

After the passage just described, Toužil shifts into a different style of narrating. “But let us follow with the court report” he writes, and he presents in swift succession the information that was recorded in the report by the court commission: the identification of the corpse and the autopsy. Toužil thus interweaves the state’s truth-finding procedures into his narrative. He does not create a completely

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192 For the image, see http://www.geocaching.com/geocache/GC1TV23_anezka-hruzova-hilsneriada.
alternative standard of truth-production from that of the judicial process of the state. He will later claim that the state’s procedures proved unequivocally that Hilsner was the murderer. But the more dramatic passages in his book are about the immediate knowledge of the people, which is presented as at least as, if not more, profound. The next highly dramatized scene is the following:

The transfer of Agnes Hruza’s corpse to Polna resembled a funeral cortege. The populace flocked from far and wide and joined the funeral procession. And already the voice of the people resounded: Hilsner, Hilsner is the culprit! (24, emphasis spaced in the original)

Just as his narration associates the sight of the slashed throat with the conviction that Hruza was “kosher-slaughtered,” so he now juxtaposes the bucolic scene of the flocking populace—feeding into the popular antisemitic image of Agnes Hruza as a Christian martyr—with the accusation against Hilsner, as if the physical flocking of the populace grounded the truth of Hilsner’s guilt. While no visual depiction of this scene is included in the book, the description is highly evocative of a rural hilly landscape that is, in fact, reproduced on many images that are included as illustrations in the book and circulated independently as postcards. The description joins forces with the production of Hruza as a martyr through the language of the flocking populace, which evokes a certain religious sensibility and, in particular, the veneration of saints that is often practiced through pilgrimages to sites that (are said to) contain the saint’s relics. The landscape itself is produced as part of the antisemitic imagination by providing the setting for the sensuously described experiences of certainty and conviction that “the girl was kosher-slaughtered” and “Hilsner, Hilsner
is the murderer.” The latter certainty, like the first, is produced by Toužil as the voice of the people. Unlike the first, its acoustic dimension is underlined for greater sensuous and dramatic effect.

Later in the book, Toužil once again invokes this voice of the people in an overtly dramatic way. Toužil titles a short section with the question “Why Agnes was murdered?” The question is rhetorical because Toužil has already repeatedly asserted that it was a ritual murder. His answer to the rhetorical question is a drawn-out performance of hyperbolic emphasis on the sheer inescapability of the conviction that it was a ritual murder. Considering common murder motivations one by one, he points out that it was not a robbery-murder (Agnes was poor and it was known that she didn’t carry money), nor was it passion (the autopsy confirmed that she was not dishonored), nor revenge (Agnes had not done any harm to anybody) nor jealousy (no indication thereof). His argument culminates in this remarkable sentence:

Thus in the end it remains that the whole world knows no other cause as the one about which nobody has a different conviction than what the voice of the people now heralds like a resounding bell through the Christian world. (Toužil 75)

One notices the series of negations, almost to the point of meaninglessness, with which Toužil circles around the resounding voice of the people. The motive “ritual murder” is kept unmentioned yet also affirmed as impossible-not-to-be-known or, rather, impossible-not-to-be-convinced-of. The endless chain of negations has the effect of deferring longer and longer the moment when the text reveals, or—by only referring to the heralding voice of the people without rendering its content—reveals that it will not reveal the open secret that is the answer to the question that was
always already rhetorical. This sentence, one should remember, is only the culminations of the whole section which, structured by the step-by-step ruling-out of alternative motives, already performs a deferral.

This multiplicity of negations and deferrals, and the ultimate reference to the heralding, bell-like voice of the people, create a hyperbolic emphasis. The text performs certainty—an affective gesture in relation to something like knowledge, which does not, however, get detailed through the content of the knowledge but rather through the inescapability of its hold. Toužil presents the bell-like voice of the people as a measure of the people’s conviction, not necessarily as a messenger of the alluded-to ritual murder. In other words, if one had to give words to the voice of the people in accordance with Toužil’s description, the voice would say something like “it is true!” rather than “it was a ritual murder.” Powerful images and sounds of the people’s certainty dispel the need for words on the content of this alleged certainty.

The dispensability of content connects Toužil’s book to Bielohlawek’s speech: in both instances, there are performative instantiations not so much of the content of the ritual murder but rather of the alleged certainty of the people of such a ritual murder. This certainty in turn is described as a bodily ecstasy, expressed through rapturous applause, through a truth that sits on everyone’s tongue, and through a resounding, bell-like voice. This certainty is also performed textually through the emphatic deferral and repeated negation of any alternative belief. The willingly enacted censorship in Bielohlawek has its correspondence in the deferral and chain of
negations in Toužil: both add yet more emphasis.\textsuperscript{193}

Certainty of the ritual murder is turned into a touchstone of a collective antisemitic identity, enacted in a highly dramatized performance of experiential ecstasy. Through the tropes of censorship and deferral, and through descriptions of collective sensual knowledge, certainty about the ritual murder gets staged as a collective embodied performance of antisemitic power. Tropes of censorship and deferral, especially when likened to “the voice of the people” as the agency that is supposedly censored or performatively deferred, become gestures of hyperbolic emphasis and participate in a truth production that is less about typologies, descriptions, and a rich “content” than it is about an increasingly contentless “truth of the Jews.” This “truth of the Jews” is effectively being spoken as it is being censored, deferred, alluded to, or recognized in the heralding voice of the people, because its point is not to elaborate positive content but, rather, to serve as a gesture of emphasis that produces the antisemitic subject in an absolute-yet-intimate difference from “the Jews.” This difference has nothing to do with different practices of worship, diet, language, or any related sphere of cultural practice. It is an absolute-yet-intimate difference in the sense that it categorically opposes the antisemitic subject to “the Jews” while also making the antisemitic subject intimately dependent on its own fantasy of “the Jews.” An emphatic affirmation that “it is true!” represents this

\textsuperscript{193} This should not obscure the ideological differences between Toužil and Bielohlawek. Touzil’s clerical antisemitism, which is full of Catholic vernacular theological resonances, is quite distinct from Bielohlawek’s Christian Social antisemitism, despite the suffix Christian in the latter’s party name. The “Christian” in Christian Social names the social identity of not being Jewish.
certainty better than any descriptive statements about ritual murder, but even seemingly descriptive statements such as “the girl was kosher-slaughtered” or “Hilsner is the culprit” operate indexically to affirm the gesture of absolute-intimate difference between antisemites and “Jews.”

In Bohemia at the time of the Hilsner affair, the Zionist Die Welt reports that a gesture that signifies the shochet came to simultaneously signify “Jew” and “antisemite.”

The marking of the shochet cut with the finger on the neck, originally only practiced for the derision of the Jews on encountering them on the street, today counts as a mimic sign and substitution for the word “Jew” and is further already used for the mutual greeting of antisemites among each other. (Dr. K. 4)

Implicit in this substitutive semiotic process is that “Jews” are an object of derision. This equation between the meaning of “Jews” and the attitude of derision in turn serves as a sign of mutual recognition for antisemites. It is a semiotics where Jews are made to equal ritual murder. The shochet cut gesture is a reference to the already established antisemitic construction of “the Jews” and it indicates that in its pragmatic function the message “Jews commit ritual murders” is roughly equivalent to derision of Jews and a cheer for the antisemitic movement. The shochet cut gesture is without content in the sense that it can simultaneously signify “Jew” and “anti-Semite,” but in its contentlessness it functions to create an antagonism that is as absolute as it is intimate.

The phrase “Jews need Christian blood” functions in the same way. One sees it surface in a statement that Hilsner makes in the trial in Kutná Hora/Kuttenberg:
Dr. Baxa. Proto jste říkal, že máte svátky a co dale?
Hilsner. Že lidé si myslí, že potřebujeme židovskou (opravuje se) křesťanskou krev. (Přeličení s Hilsnerem 76)\(^{194}\)

Dr. Baxa. Why did you say that you had holidays and so forth?
Hilsner: Because people thought that we need Jewish (corrects himself) Christian blood. (my translation)

Hilsner misspeaks and then corrects himself when he renders the content of the ritual murder accusation. This misspeaking speaks quite insightfully to the type of substitutive relationship between “Jews need Christian blood,” one of the many shorthand versions of the ritual murder accusation, and a plain gesture of derision of “Jews.” The phrase “need Christian blood” is simply not meant to go with “we” as the subject. It is overdetermined by a deriding definition of “Jews” to the extent that when Hilsner tries to report on the antisemitic imagination in the first person plural, recognizing himself as part of the Jews whom “people” think need Christian blood, the word “Jew” (or “Jewish”) interrupts him. It is as if the logical point that Hilsner is making—people accused Jews of needing Christian blood for the Passover holidays—is accompanied by a second voice that knows that what people did by affirming their belief that “Jews need Christian blood” was to deride “Jews.”

This logic of antisemitic derision against Jews, simultaneously intimate and absolutely antagonistic, also characterizes antisemitic physical violence. In fact, derision and physical violence frequently operated together. According to Nussbaum, the Jewish community in Polná used to comprise about five hundred people before

\(^{194}\) The same dialog is printed and commented on in (Masaryk, *Notwendigkeit* 18–19; see also Toužil).
the Hilsner affair. As a consequence of antisemitic “excesses” only half of them still remained in Polná, the other half seeking refuge elsewhere. Anti-Jewish riots took place in Polná following Hilsner’s detention in April 1899 and spread across Bohemia and Moravia from mid-October to early December of the same year. In the fall of 1899, it was rare that a day would pass without antisemitic rallies or riots somewhere. Some of these riots had a combined anti-German and antisemitic orientation and responded not only to the ongoing Hilsner affair but also to a new defeat in the Czech battle for language rights in the aftermath of the Badeni language ordinances. Krejčová and Mišková count that out of 265 “incidents” in Bohemia and Moravia, 160 were “purely anti-Jewish” and only 43 actions were not at all directed against Jews. While these distinctions, presumably reflecting government records, cannot always be made perfectly, they are nevertheless informative as a broad measure of antisemitic violence. An incident typically involved a demonstration, frequently combined with smashed windows and songs. Some reports include looting, Jewish houses smeared with blood or red paint, clashes, police, military, injuries and deaths.

According to Toužil, the initial riots in Polná in the spring of 1899 were done by a group of about 300 people who smashed the windows of Jewish houses. He narrates:

When the Jews became afraid of the riots, the tanner Schiller came to

195 According to Poiman, the number of Jews recorded by the 1890 census for Polná was only 239 (5). Toužil reports the number of Jews living in Polná at the time of the Hilsner affair as 270 (80-81). Helena Krejčová and Alena Mišková list the population of Polna as 4871 Czechs, 51 Germans, and 39 Jews, without clarifying the time of this count (Krejčová and Mišková 78). I do not know if the discrepancy in numbers reflects the flight of Jews out of Polna and/or what their source or method for getting at these numbers is.
Dean Schimek at Polna and asked him to calm down the people from the pulpit or from the ramp in front of the church, to help the Jews, and to refute the rumor of the ritual murder. Dean Schimek however replied that he was not competent in this issue, he did not intend to preach in the open air, because now was not the appropriate moment to speak about ritual murder. (Toužil 91–82)

Apart from demonstrating how strategic silence can also form part of the ritual murder agitation, and from suggesting that an engaged counterdiscourse seemed promising to those directly threatened in their physical safety, this story also demonstrates that antisemitic propagandists such as Toužil chose to re-tell stories of antisemitic violence without any euphemisms. On the contrary, there seems to be triumph in his narration of the unrequited Jewish plea for help.

This impression is reinforced as Toužil’s narration continues. Two Jewish merchants of Polna, he tells, requested permission to carry weapons for self-defense. Their request was denied on the ground that they were considered “not trustworthy.” Toužil then adds: “Both did, however, after a few days receive from an unknown person children's guns and wooden pistols such as are sold at fairs” (83). Here the unsafety of Jews, produced by ongoing violence, is emphasized and turned into an occasion for amusement by means of a spoof. Toužil reports on another very similar incident. For the May 1st labor holiday, Polna Jews requested the presence of the military to ensure their safety. This request was denied, and again it was “fulfilled” by means of a spoof:

[unknown jokers complied with this wish very early Sunday morning by gluing soldiers onto the windows and doors of Jewish houses, but they were painted. They were lurking as towards the morning the]

196 See also (Nussbaum 21) and (Paul-Schiff 3).
gendarme patrol retired into their barracks (…) and in this manner provided the Polna audience with an entertainment. A general staff on horse was glued to the house of the rabbi Dr. Goldberger, artillery to the house of the tanner Schiller, and infantry and cavalry to other houses, not just of our state but also of the neighboring states. (Toužil 88)

The pursuit of protection in these two cases, in one case by legally carrying arms for self-defense and in the other by recruiting the military, is turned into a mockery of such protection: in one case with toy weapons and the other with painted military figures that are glued to Jewish houses. These “jokester” actions emphasize and celebrate the unsafety of Polna Jews; Toužil’s sympathetic report on it conveys a sentiment of being smitten by these jokesters and thus wanting to share the joke with his readers.

In the case of the painted soldiers, the action also serves to target Jewish spaces and mark them as such. It extends other practices such as the occasional marking of Jewish houses with (animal) blood or red paint, in which the red color or blood (similar to the gesture that stylizes a shochet cut) is an index of the blood murder accusation that doubles as a signifier for “Jew” and triples as an ecstatic activation of an embodied, collective, antisemitic self. As an intervention in the space of the city or small town, red paint, paper soldiers, and smashed windows mark the affected houses and their inhabitants as targets of entertainment and violence against the “Polna audience” who is supposed to be entertained. Marking and smashing Jewish houses as targets of entertainment and violence removes these spaces and their inhabitants from the community of the town; it creates and symbolizes their absolute difference from the antisemitic community in the spatiality of the town. Yet despite
this violent removal of Jews from the antisemitic community, houses with smashed windows, red markings, or painted soldiers are still physically present in the middle of the town, and every smashed window has been created by somebody who ecstatically engaged the space and sometimes its inhabitants with his or her bodily presence: the absolute difference is therefore also intimate.

Emphatic assertions of certainty about ritual murder differ qualitatively from one another and from the different forms of physical violence, but their significance for antisemitism is best understood if they are analyzed through the shadow of such physical violence. The red paint that signals blood murder and the paper soldiers that celebrate the fact that the state is not protecting Jews marks the absolute-intimate antisemitic difference onto the space of the town. Because of their context, one can easily see the continuity between these antisemitic installations and antisemitic street violence. But the installations also link up with the bodily performance of the antisemitic greeting, the shochet cut gesture that produces “Jews” as an object of derision. Likewise this greeting, the Jewish houses with paper soldiers, blood marks, or smashed windows create an absolute difference between “the Jews” and the antisemitic subject. The performance of certainty, a collective bodily act, is but one part of an attempt to order space and material infrastructure that shapes who can live here and who cannot.

**Conclusion**

The discourse of suggestion provides a critique of the reliability of individually-held
beliefs and memories of ritual murder that is useful as a direct, if limited, intervention in the individual-focused epistemology of the trial. But its focus on the individual subject of knowledge and suggestion obscures the fundamentally collective and performative dimension of racial power. My discussion offers an alternative analysis of antisemitic knowledge production, focused on the emphatic gesture of certainty. Gestures of certainty operate alongside derision and physical violence to produce an embodied collective antisemitic subject in absolute and intimate difference from “the Jews.”

Whether one approaches a critique of the belief in ritual murder through the individual psychology of suggestion or through the alternative framework of certainty that I have outlined in this chapter shapes how one envisions anti-antisemitic resistance. The discourse of suggestion envisions a trajectory of resistance where the suggestion is stopped or countered so that “the mind” can free itself from its imposition. Hope is invested in the possibility that the blood libel will be publicly exposed for its falsity by the authoritative word of the judge. A related hopeful scenario is that individual jury members will consider the evidence against Hilsner critically and conclude that it does not hold. This trajectory of resistance treats the blood libel as positive knowledge that can be dealt with by using arguments and truth.

If one approaches antisemitic knowledge production as a collective instantiation of antisemitic power, where assertions of certainty function alongside antisemitic violence and derision of “the Jews,” no well-defined trajectory of resistance comes into view. But a guiging idea can be formulated. Rather than (only)
hope that jury members will see through the blood libel, one should ask what it would
take for it to not matter whether a potential juror “believes” in ritual murder, because
there is no organized infrastructure (whether it is the state or a political movement)
that extends this belief into antisemitic racial terror.


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