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The Sober Revolution:
The Political and Moral Economy of Alcohol in Modern France, 1954-1976

By

Joseph Estle Bohling

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Thomas Laqueur, Chair
Professor Philip Nord
Professor Daniel Sargent
Professor Jonah Levy

Spring 2012
Abstract

The Sober Revolution:
The Political and Moral Economy of Alcohol in Modern France, 1954-1976

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Doctor of Philosophy in History

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This dissertation examines how, after World War Two, the French state and powerful interest groups shifted the debate over drink from an issue of personal morality into a battle of political economy. Contrary to the widely held Tocquevillian assumption that France has had weak and fragmented interest groups with little capacity to influence state policy, this dissertation argues that a relatively weak public health movement became influential when it struck alliances with powerful state and economic interests. Working together, the different and sometimes antagonistic interests of doctors, French and European technocrats, luxury winegrowers, and automobile and insurance groups combined to issue alarms about France’s allegedly rising alcoholism and mobilize public opinion against the country’s alcohol producers and industrial, mono-cropping winegrowers. This movement was abetted by important structural transformations: the fall of the Fourth Republic (1946-1958) and the foundation of the Fifth (1958-), where a strong executive branch circumvented the industrial wine lobby and Parliament; the end of empire, which meant the eventual termination of cheap Algerian wine imports; and the creation of the European Community, which adopted France’s luxury Appellation d’origine contrôlée (AOC) labeling system and discouraged industrial wine production and consumption. In short, I maintain that this anti-alcohol campaign helped prepare appellation wine producers and the state for competition in the world economy.

This dissertation uses drink as a prism through which to understand France’s dramatic economic modernization after World War Two. It contributes to our understanding of France and Europe’s so-called “Economic Miracle,” particularly the role of the state and the wine industry in shaping European market integration. Against the common view that the wine industry has been a conservative force in French society, this dissertation argues that it played an active role in its own modernization in order to compete internationally in the context of European integration and, by the 1970s, globalization.
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In Berkeley, I was among the last to have been fortunate enough to enroll in the Susanna Barrows’ school of French history. She drew me to the wonders of France, helped me develop my scholarly voice, and reminded me to live a life of engagement and great intensity. She also instilled in me the importance of the first and last sentence. After her untimely death, others stepped in to provide criticism and clarity, and even moral support. Tom Laqueur offered incisive feedback and advice. His endless enthusiasm has been infectious. Phil Nord took me in from afar and treated me as his own. At crucial stages, he has contributed key insights to this dissertation and to articles-in-progress. Jonah Levy deepened my knowledge of French politics. Daniel Sargent pushed me to think Big. Venus Bivar, Stanley Brandes, and Ericka Rappaport gave me my dissertation, or parts of it, a close reading, and made my work better. Fellow travelers in European history also offered sound criticism: Eliah Bures, Grahame Foreman, Stephen Gross, and Mark Sawchuk. A special thanks goes to Sarah Farmer, who sparked my
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## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>Appellation d’origine contrôlée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APV</td>
<td>Association de propagande pour le vin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDBN</td>
<td>Comité central de défense des boissons nationales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDDCA</td>
<td>Comité départemental de défense contre l’alcoolisme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGA</td>
<td>Confédération générale de l’agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGB</td>
<td>Confédération générale des betteraviers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>Commissariat général au Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGVM</td>
<td>Confédération générale des vignerons du Midi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVB</td>
<td>Conseil interprofessionnel du vin de Bordeaux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNAO</td>
<td>Comité national des appellations d’origine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDCA</td>
<td>Comité national de défense contre l’alcoolisme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNJA</td>
<td>Centre national des jeunes agriculteurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPFV</td>
<td>Comité national de propagande en faveur du vin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNVS</td>
<td>Confédération nationale des vins et spiritueux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRDBN</td>
<td>Centre des recherches et de documentation sur les boissons nationales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREDOC</td>
<td>Centre de recherches et de documentation sur la consommation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Conseil supérieur des alcools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAV</td>
<td>Fédération des Associations viticoles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNPL</td>
<td>Fédération nationale des producteurs de lait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNSEA</td>
<td>Fédération nationale des syndicats d’exploitants agricoles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCEIA</td>
<td>Haut Comité d’études et d’information sur l’alcoolisme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCP</td>
<td>Haut Comité sur la population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFA</td>
<td>Institut français de l’alcool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOP</td>
<td>Institut français d’opinion publique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INAO</td>
<td>Institut national des appellations contrôlées</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INED</td>
<td>Institut national d’études démographiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INH</td>
<td>Institut national d’hygiène</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSEE</td>
<td>Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVCC</td>
<td>Institut des vins de consommation courante</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAC</td>
<td>Jeunesse agricole catholique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILDT</td>
<td>Mission interministérielle de lutte contre la drogue et la toxicomanie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRP</td>
<td>Mouvement républicain populaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONSER</td>
<td>Organisme national de sécurité routière</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEEF</td>
<td>Service des études économiques et financiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFMAV</td>
<td>Société française des médecins amis du vin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNBA</td>
<td>Syndicat national des bouilleurs ambulants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNBC</td>
<td>Syndicat national des bouilleurs de cru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNCF</td>
<td>Société nationale des chemins de fer français</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOQ</td>
<td>Syndicat des produits d’origine et de qualité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFC</td>
<td>Union fédérale de la consommation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGDA</td>
<td>Union nationale des groupements de distillateurs d’alcool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAT</td>
<td>Value-Added Tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCC</td>
<td>Vins de consommation courante</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDQS</td>
<td>Vins délimités de qualité supérieur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Preface

One of the hallmarks of French civilization can be found in a glass. Along with the baguette, wine is invariably associated with French identity, and for good reason—throughout the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, the French were considered the world’s heaviest consumers of alcohol. Since the early 1960s, however, a quiet yet significant revolution in consumption has been underway. Annual wine consumption dropped from approximately 130 liters per person in 1960 to 58 liters in 2000. More surprisingly, in 1990, more than half the French population declared that it never drank wine.1 While the consumption of *gros rouge*, the workingman’s table wine, has dropped precipitously, the consumption of luxury wine has steadily climbed. At the same time, the consumption of beer, spirits, and non-alcohol beverages has risen.

This dissertation seeks to explain the political and economic forces behind these important changes. Since World War Two, international markets—as well as the statist drive to modernize the economy, anti-alcohol campaigns, and efforts to build a more competitive wine industry—have introduced new aspirations and new drinking practices. Transformations in alcohol production and consumption exemplify France’s transition from a rural, empire-based political economy into one that was increasingly urban, globalized, and sober.

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Introduction

France, the ensemble of all these texts tells us, is a country where the history of the vine and wine casts light upon all of its people.
–Roger Dion, geographer, 1959

While most French revolutions were fought over the barricades, one was fought over the bottle. In the wake of World War Two, newspapers sounded the alarm about France’s allegedly rising alcoholism. Between 1945 and 1952, the number of officially designated alcoholics tripled, from 1,420 for every 100,000 adults to 4,260. The French were putatively the world’s heaviest consumers of alcohol: with 30.5 liters of pure alcohol per year per average adult, the French easily out-drank their closest competitors, the Italians, who consumed 14 liters.

In one year, the total number of workdays lost to alcoholism was estimated at six and a quarter million; alcoholism caused 33 percent of work accidents and 40 percent of driving accidents. Wine—Rabelais’ muse, the source of the poilu’s strength, the nation’s ancestral drink—was reportedly causing a “national scourge.”

After World War Two, French doctors set out to upend the myth that wine was central to the country’s social and economic wellbeing. At a time when the state was

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3 E.M. Jellinek, the eminent alcohol researcher in the United States and at the World Health Organization, came to this conclusion.
4 “Proportionnellement à son revenu, le Français boit dix fois plus d’alcool que l’Américain et cinq fois plus que le Britannique,” *Le Monde*, 20 February 1954. These figures can also be found in Georges Malignac and Robert Colin, *L’Alcoolisme* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), 53-54. Both Malignac and Colin worked for the Institut national d’études démographiques (INED). This book was part of the series “Que sais-je.” Between 1954 and 1992, nine editions were released, with different actors in the anti-alcohol camp prefacing the book. In 1954, for example, the statistician Alfred Sauvy prefaced it; in 1984, the eminent psychiatrist Pierre Fouquet did so.
6 Anti-alcohol activists would consider alcoholism a “national scourge” until the early 1970s, when globalization brought new drinking patterns—the new fear was binge drinking—to France. In 1974, the anti-alcohol lobby debated whether or not they should continue to consider alcoholism as a “national scourge.” See Archives de l’Association nationale de prévention en alcoologie et addictologie (hereafter ANPAA), Statuts. “Observations de MM. les membres du Conseil à la suite de la circulaire 110-74 que leur a adressée M. Legendre, secrétaire général, le 26 septembre 1974.”
7 Psychiatrists had mostly orchestrated temperance activities, but after World War Two, other elite doctors versed in social hygiene joined them. Most of these doctors, including
attempting to carry out major economic reforms, they began to convince technocrats\(^8\) and other public officials that habitual drinking limited the country’s economic potential. Yet a majority of the population still believed, and powerful economic interests bolstered their faith, that wine and alcohol were central to the country’s prestige and economic strength.

In no other modern state, to be sure, were alcohol and governing more intimately connected. France’s drink trade—which included beet, cider, wine, and spirits producers, home brewers, merchants, distributors, and café and other drinking establishment owners—had for centuries carried much political and economic weight. In 1951, \textit{Le Figaro} reported that one out of five French citizens made a living from alcohol.\(^9\) France had more than four million of its citizens involved in the trade. The country counted 588,000 drinking establishments, but only 49,000 bakeries.\(^10\)

Though hardly indivisible, the drink trade was tightly organized. Beet growers, who produced alcohol mostly for the industrial market, grouped up in the Confédération générale des betteraviers (CGB); home distillers in the Syndicat national des bouilleurs de cru (SNBC); and winegrowers in such organizations as the Fédération des associations

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Robert Debré, the postwar anti-alcohol campaign’s chief coordinator, were members of the Academy of Medicine in Paris.

\(^8\) In this dissertation, I am studying two different types of technocrats. The first include those civil servants who come to a new understanding of the relationship between the economy and public health both conceptually and institutionally, especially the economists and statisticians at the INED; the second include the functionaries that received an education at Ponts et Chaussées and who were concerned with building the national infrastructure and preventing traffic accidents. By technocrat, I more generally mean the French functionaries who emerged from such schools as École Polytechnique, who worked in the administration, and who sought various reforms through their economic “expertise” more than through the usually slower process of parliamentary decision-making. They were impatient with public debate and looked to rationalize the state, the economy, and everyday life. In their view, the “general interest” should trump vested interests. Antoine Picon discusses the definition of technocracy in “French Engineers and Social Thought, 18-20\(^{\text{th}}\) Centuries: An Archeology of Technocratic Ideals,” \textit{History and Technology} 23 (September 2007): 197. See also Gabrielle Hecht’s analysis of the notion of the technocrat in \textit{The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War Two} (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998), 28-38. More recently, Philip Nord has discussed the technocracy narrative in \textit{France’s New Deal: From the Thirties to the Postwar Era} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). It should also be noted that the growth of the French technocracy inspired much discussion in postwar France. See, for example, Jean Meynaud, \textit{La technocratie, mythe ou réalite?} (Paris: Payot, 1964).

\(^9\) Jean Claude, “Le coût de l’alcoolisme,” \textit{Le Figaro}, 12 January 1951. Claude borrowed these “serious calculations” from someone named Dessirier. It is likely that this impressive estimation included everyone from a winegrower, to a barrel maker, to a restaurateur.

viticoles (FAV) or the Confédération générale des vigneron du Midi (CGVM). They all had links to the ministries—especially the Ministries of Agriculture and of Finance—and had even more sway in Parliament.

Postwar reformers thus faced a formidable challenge. As Jean-François Brisson explained in Le Figaro: “If alcohol consumption kills a lot of the French, a lot of others make a living from its production; such is the dilemma, and still today, we fight over ‘pastis’.”¹¹ As one student of French alcohol had already phrased it in 1912: “Alcohol: national wealth; alcoholism: national peril.”¹²

Why, then, did the French state try to reduce drinking? How did it go about doing so? This dissertation examines why and how alcoholism—a notion that was defined according to the interests of the different groups addressing it—came onto the political agenda as a public problem.¹³ Unlike in Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries, where alcoholism was typically associated with overt intoxication or binge drinking, in France, where alcohol was a part of one’s daily diet, officials targeted the daily but oftentimes more moderate drinking of the non-commercial types of jug wine or home-distilled alcohol. In other words, they attacked the norm, not deviations from it. Given alcohol’s social significance,¹⁴ and given the broader postwar context of state-led efforts to overhaul the economy, the state tried to regulate alcohol production more efficiently in order to reduce alcoholism and to encourage economic growth, even if this growth meant attacking the supposed core of French identity.

French anxieties about alcoholism were not new. Since the late nineteenth century, temperance societies—consisting of doctors and other social reformers—had

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¹¹ Jean-François Brisson, “Pour ou contre le sport,” Le Figaro, 9 June 1949.
¹² Cited in Patricia E. Prestwich, Drink and the Politics of Social Reform: Antialcoholism in France Since 1870 (Palo Alto, California: The Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship, 1988), 5. This student was Louis Jacquet; see his L’Alcool, étude économique générale, ses rapports avec l’agriculture, l’industrie, le commerce, la législation, l’hygiène individuelle et sociale (Paris, 1912).
sought to reduce French drinking. Only in times of domestic war—in particular, after the Paris Commune (1870-1871) and during the First and Second World Wars—had the state heeded the warning and enacted laws to control the disruptive effects of heavy consumption. During the lifespan of the Third Republic (1870-1940), physicians had viewed alcoholism as a moral and medical problem afflicting the individual, especially the morally depraved and degenerative working classes.

The Vichy regime marked the apotheosis of the moral approach to alcoholism. After the traumatic defeat of 1940, it recalled nineteenth-century theories of degeneration and blamed alcoholism for France’s downfall. With the dissolution of Parliament, the regime had restricted the freedoms of the drink trade in the name of the country’s moral regeneration. In Vichy’s view, men needed to stay home and procreate, not spend their nights carousing on the town. In 1940 and 1941, Vichy limited the privileges of the home distillers, restricted the manufacture, sale, and advertising of aperitifs, clamped down on café life, and requisitioned and rationed wine.

Though the Vichy regime was the apex of the moral concern over alcoholism, it also signaled a divide in how reformers perceived the problem. During the war, doctors and statisticians, both at Vichy and in the Resistance, had noticed a connection between levels of alcohol production and levels of alcohol consumption. Because of the requisition of chemicals and machinery necessary for winegrowing, production levels dropped; at the same time, both alcohol consumption and the reported number of cases of alcoholism declined. Statisticians such as Sully Ledermann pointed to the link between falling production, falling consumption, and falling alcoholism.

This discovery led reformers to the conclusion that alcoholism was a problem of the alcoholic product and the political and economic institutions that had supported it under the late Third Republic. Only a strong state—freed of Parliament and the local property rights that it represented—could make sweeping changes to the alcohol economy. Reformers criticized the leaders of the Third Republic for having yielded to alcohol producers, who, in the face of surpluses and falling prices, had demanded that the state come to their rescue. Because of the alcohol producers’ ability to mobilize and to

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16 For that policy, see Marc Boninchi, Vichy et l’ordre moral (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2005), 225-270; Dargelos, La lutte antialcoolique en France, 224-233; and Prestwich, Drink and the Politics of Social Reform, 243-258.

lobby Parliament, the state had begun to subsidize the surplus at the taxpayers’ expense. As a vent for its new alcohol purchases, the state had tried to convince the population to drink more wine with slogans such as “A Day Without Wine is a Day without Sunshine;” or Louis Pasteur’s dictum, “Wine is the Most Hygienic of Beverages.”

Until the traumatic defeat of 1940, officials rarely drew a connection between levels of production and levels of consumption and their relationship to alcohol-related problems. Alcohol production and alcoholism resided in different mental worlds. Wine, which in France had always been considered the antidote to alcoholism and a dietary staple, in part because of medical evidence but also because of its strong political support in Parliament, was now primarily blamed for the problem. After the war, doctors reported that approximately 70 percent of all alcoholics had acquired their condition from the national drink.

The postwar reformers who seized the anti-alcohol mission in the name of economic efficiency consciously sought to distance themselves from Vichy’s moralizing. Yet they remained committed to Vichy’s strategy of intervening in the private sphere to foster economic growth. To accomplish their task more successfully, they cast their arguments about excessive drinking in economic terms. Stripped of its moral skin, alcoholism became a stark economic fact. In this way, the campaign seemed necessary, a defense of the common good. In 1950, Jacques Sylvain Brunaud, a civil administrator at the Ministry of Finance, alleged that the accidents, crimes, diseases, and loss of productivity caused by alcoholism cost the state roughly 132 billion francs, while the state made but 53 billion 220 million francs from alcohol taxes. The older moral arguments against drink did not disappear, but faded into the background of a new movement that saw alcohol overproduction as a problem of public health and economic stagnation.

With the return of peace in 1946, the old guard of alcohol producers demanded the restitution of their privileges. Through their friends in Parliament, they rescinded Vichy’s anti-alcohol decrees. The Fourth Republic—and its bowing to local notables—looked much like the Third. As Jean Claude asked his countrymen in Le Figaro in 1951: “Must we therefore have the cruel humiliation of owning up to the fact that the regime to which we were subjected during the years of Occupation dared seriously treat the problem of French alcoholism?” Anxieties about alcoholism were deeply embedded in the restructuring of France’s modern state.

This dissertation tells the story of how the French state’s anti-alcohol campaign, in its defense of diffuse interests of consumers, confronted the more consolidated and

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18 For an understanding of Pasteur’s position on wine, see Harry W. Paul, Bacchic Medicine: Wine and Alcohol Therapies from Napoleon to the French Paradox (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2001).
19 Doctor Étienne May, who held a seat at the Economic Council, and who therefore was sensitive to the economic concerns of viticulture, put the number between 55 and 60 percent; see his report, “Problème de l’alcoolisme en France,” Journal officiel de la République française: Avis et rapports du Conseil économique, “Séances des 12 et 14 janvier 1954,” 30 January 1954, 187.
financially powerful alcohol industries.\textsuperscript{22} It argues that the anti-alcohol campaign would have remained insignificant had not doctors allied with other powerful groups. Coalitions were key to the campaign’s success. Each chapter explains how different groups came together to challenge the political power of rural deputies who defended alcohol and local property rights against the state’s encroachment, and how each new alliance reconfigured the alcohol problem to suit its specific agenda.

The story begins with doctors—who since the nineteenth century had orchestrated the anti-alcohol movement, and who knew that campaigns against alcoholism were unpopular—and how they progressively delegated the problem to the technocratic, luxury wine, and road safety movements that picked up steam after World War Two. Doctors used these groups to try to reduce drinking. In turn, technocrats, winegrowers, and the automobile and insurance industries used the doctors’ campaign to get what they wanted: a stronger economy; the elimination of cheaper domestic and international beverages; and a better infrastructure, safer roads, and a thriving transportation industry. Each group successfully staked a claim on the anti-alcohol campaign. For the technocrats involved in building the economy, for the luxury winegrowers bent on eliminating their rivals, and for the transportation industry seeking to free itself from blame for the country’s rising automobile accidents, medical discourse on alcoholism was a powerful weapon to wield: public health spoke on behalf of the “general interest,” which could depoliticize reform and justify the state’s intervention in the economy. In other words, doctors played an important role in diagnosing the causes of France’s economic stagnation and gave credibility to a reform movement that could remove some of the obstacles to economic expansion.

The anti-alcohol campaign exemplifies the shift of the state’s managerial responsibilities, especially in the economic arena, to \textit{dirigisme}. The Haut Comité d’étude et d’information sur l’alcoolisme (HCEIA),\textsuperscript{23} set up by the Pierre Mendès France government in 1954, became the motor of the anti-alcohol movement. Although it did not decide policy, it studied alcoholism from its various perspectives and made suggestions to the government about how to reduce alcohol-related problems. Attached to the offices of the Prime Minister, it resided above the squabbles of the political parties and the interests of any one ministry and its clientele.\textsuperscript{24} Influential doctors and technocrats participated in the HCEIA’s meetings, either as members, experts, or guest speakers. The HCEIA served a similar function to the Commissariat général au plan (CGP)\textsuperscript{25} in that it preferred conciliation to conflict between social groups and sought to create a consensus around the need for economic reform.\textsuperscript{26} The HCEIA, as a producer of


\textsuperscript{23} High Commission of Study and Information on Alcoholism.

\textsuperscript{24} On this type of governmental body, see Edgard Pisani, “Administration de gestion, administration de mission,” \textit{Revue française de science politique} 2 (1956): 315-330.

\textsuperscript{25} Planning Commission.

\textsuperscript{26} On the role of planning in French politics, see Peter A. Hall, \textit{Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 139-163.
knowledge about alcoholism, provided added fuel to the movement in favor of economic modernization.

The postwar anti-alcohol movement focused less upon social control or moral regulation—as scholars usually argue for similar campaigns in other countries—than upon agricultural reform. Scholars have downplayed production in histories of anti-alcohol movements. Postwar French reformers believed that changes to winegrowing and to alcohol production would contribute to the country’s economic and hygienic renewal. The spirits industries received much less attention. Because they were more concentrated and employed fewer citizens, they could modernize more quickly. Anti-alcohol laws directly affected producers more than consumers. The laws ultimately facilitated the extinction of what technocrats believed were the unviable sectors of the alcohol economy—especially home brew and jug wine—and made France’s wine industry more competitive on the international market. Between 1960 and 1991, the state passed no laws on alcoholism; instead, anti-alcohol discourse influenced legislation on winegrowing and road security.

The powerful economic interests in high-end wine became the beneficiaries of the anti-alcohol campaign at the expense of small-time home distillers and amateur winegrowers. The arrival of luxury winegrowers into the anti-alcohol camp was a major coup. The campaign would not have succeeded without the support of this modern wine sector. Anti-alcohol reformers learned a vital lesson from the Pierre Mendès France experiment in 1954-1955: that the anti-alcohol campaign would fail without the support of agricultural interests. Between 1955 and 1958, the HCEIA was mostly confined to studying the effects of drinking, such as cirrhosis of the liver. In 1958, when Parliament was divested of some of its power, the HCEIA entered into discussion with the Confédération nationale des vins et spiritueux (CNVS), a producers’ and merchants’ association that promoted quality wine. Working together, they searched for a strategy to combat alcoholism in a way that protected the people whose primary source of income came from alcohol. At the same time that home distillers and amateur winegrowers became the root cause of alcoholism, luxury wine became the paragon of rational production and consumption.

The luxury winegrowers of the emerging Appellation d’origine contrôlée (AOC) hoped to become more competitive on the international market. Furthermore, given the need for foreign exchange throughout this period, the French state showed much concern for export promotion. The threats and opportunities that international trade presented were a part of the strategic landscape within which commercial winegrowers, anti-alcohol advocates, and the state operated. The people who produced home brew and amateur wine were integrated into a subsistence economy, where they and the members of their

27 For an understanding of the link between alcohol regulation and social control, see Gusfield, Contested Meanings, 75-97; on moral regulation, see Robert A. Campbell, Sit Down and Drink Your Beer: Regulating Vancouver’s Beer Parlours, 1925-1954 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
29 The National Confederation of Wine and Spirits.
communities were also the ones who consumed these beverages. For quality wine, however, both the national and international markets were crucial.\textsuperscript{30} In a broader sense, then, the anti-alcohol campaign sought to eliminate local, autarkic production and consumption and contributed to the state’s efforts to bring all alcohol producers and consumers into the market.

Few scholars have pointed to the importance of institutional change to France’s economic modernization.\textsuperscript{31} Political and economic histories have been too often disconnected.\textsuperscript{32} We still know little about the nature of France’s postwar economic reform. While few would deny that the political institutions of the Fourth Republic resembled in many respects those of the Third,\textsuperscript{33} it is generally held that economic growth accelerated at the Liberation.\textsuperscript{34} It is my contention that political institutions shaped the outcome of both anti-alcohol policies and economic performance.\textsuperscript{35} The political instability of the Fourth Republic prevented major economic change.

The Fifth Republic could implement the kinds of dirigiste economic solutions that political leaders in the Fourth Republic, such as the consummate modernizer Pierre Mendès France, had envisaged but oftentimes struggled to enact amid the resistance of rural deputies. The Pierre Mendès France government exemplified all that was seemingly faulty with the Fourth Republic. When he attacked alcohol and launched his spectacular milk campaign, producers mobilized and allied with the political parties that brought down his government. Under the Fourth Republic, the medical plans of doctors and the economic plans of technocrats—groups that claimed a certain level of political neutrality—were constantly thwarted by the political parties and Parliament. For

\textsuperscript{30} This had been the case for millennia. Wine, after all, is one of the most ancient of traded commodities. On this topic, see Rod Phillips, \textit{A Short History of Wine} (New York: Ecco, 2001).


\textsuperscript{32} With a few notable exceptions; see Douglass C. North, \textit{Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); or Alain Chatriot and Claire Lemercier, “Institutions et histoire économique,” unpublished paper, CNRS, 26 May 2010.


\textsuperscript{34} Kuisel, for example, sees the late 1940 and 1950s as key to France’s economic renovation in \textit{Capitalism & the State in Modern France}.

\textsuperscript{35} As political scientist Ellen M. Immergut has argued for France’s national health insurance, policies succeeded only when the executive could circumvent the legislature; see her chapter on France in \textit{Health Policies: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 80-128.
legislation to pass under the Fourth Republic, the government had to issue decrees. The alcohol lobbies successfully played defense. Economic modernization consequently stalled.

The success of the anti-alcohol campaign hinged upon the more authoritarian political style of the Fifth Republic, established in 1958. The government refused to yield to traditional notables such as winegrowers; it became fully committed to removing the obstacles to economic modernization. Policymaking took place more in the administration and in government commissions, such as the HCEIA or the planning commissions, than in Parliament. After 1958, it was “now better to know two well-placed civil servants than twenty deputies.”

Alcohol producers learned to adapt to the new situation. Like the new generation of farmers, under the leadership of Michel Debatisse and the Centre national des jeunes agriculteurs (CNJA), who sought to collaborate with the state to reform agriculture, the alcohol lobbies hoped to work with the HCEIA. At the same time, the HCEIA wished to harness the momentum of the progressive wine movement. The state was thus able to cut a deal with the modern wine sector. In this way, the history of the anti-alcohol campaign reflects the Fifth Republic’s more general effort to modernize agriculture.

Although scholars have a tendency to ascribe France’s postwar zeal for dirigisme to an ancient infatuation with the state—dating back to Louis XIV—politics under the Fourth Republic exhibited a commitment to local property rights and control that the early Fifth Republic had to overcome. In the view of anti-alcohol reformers, home distillers in Brittany and Normandy and winegrowers in the Languedoc—both of whom were associated with small, scattered properties—and their defenders in Parliament, prevented state-led economic development. Paris officials wished to consolidate the orchards and vineyards in these notoriously recalcitrant regions in order to rationalize

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38 Bernard E. Brown discusses how the alcohol lobbies adapted to the Fifth Republic; see his “Pressure Politics in the Fifth Republic,” *The Journal of Politics* 25 (August, 1963): 509-525.


agriculture and to build the infrastructure for tourism. Statism, and anti-statism, are thus the function of specific constitutional arrangements rather than inherent to national character.

If the institutions of the Fifth Republic were crucial to economic modernization, then our understanding of France’s first thirty postwar years needs revision. A long line of scholars has viewed the Liberation of 1945, or even the crisis of the 1930s or the defeat of 1940, as a ground zero upon which a new society was built. As historian Gordon Wright put it: “One of the sharpest contrasts between pre-1940 and post-1940 France has been the breakdown of the old consensus on socioeconomic issues and the emergence of a powerful urge on the part of many Frenchmen to ‘marry their century’ (the phrase was de Gaulle’s).” The “stalemate society,” as the political scientist Stanley Hoffmann dubbed it, dissolved with the ravages of war. Though World War Two doubtlessly shocked the French out of their immobility, institutions were slower to change. Mentalities and institutions do not necessarily change simultaneously.

Though two French political scientists—Luc Berlivet and Bertrand Dargelos—have recently traced the contours of the state’s postwar anti-alcohol campaign, no one has yet systematically examined the archives of the HCEIA and made the link between this commission’s work and the country’s economic modernization. The place of pressure groups—especially the agricultural and automobile interests—in the creation of the anti-alcohol campaign, and in shaping public health policies more broadly, has also been neglected. This dissertation attempts to fill these gaps. While it draws primarily

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43 Hoffmann, “Paradoxes of the French Political Community,” 1-117.


45 For a discussion of interest group politics in France, see Hélène Michel, “Pour une sociologie des pratiques de défense: le recours au droit par les groupes d’intérêt,”
upon the HCEIA’s archives, it also analyzes the relevant government reports, interest group archives and publications, parliamentary debates, archives of both Pierre Mendès France and Michel Debré, and newspaper articles. In doing so, it offers a more detailed analysis of the array of actors whose political struggles determined the formation and outcome of the state’s postwar anti-alcohol policies.

This dissertation uses the postwar anti-alcohol campaign as a case study to understand several central themes in French history since the Second World War: the transition from the rather closed and protected rural world to the more open and international world of industrial modernity; the place of the nation-state in the European Economic Community and in international politics; the increasing intervention of the state in virtually all spheres of public and private life; changes in citizenship; and finally, the growing tension between individual rights and social rights. This dissertation demonstrates how deeply implicated alcohol has been in French culture, politics, science, and law.

France’s postwar anti-alcohol campaign succeeded because it aligned the interests of the state, public health, high-end viticulture, and the transportation industry against small, autarkic producers and drinkers. With the advent of the Fifth Republic in 1958, the movement in favor of economic modernization accelerated. The state passed laws to improve winegrowing and to criminalize drunken drivers, which contributed to dramatic changes in drinking behaviors and beliefs. At the same time that alcohol producers and the state forged a new relationship in the early 1960s, overall alcohol consumption—and in particular, wine drinking—began to decline. Consumer capitalism expanded, standards of living rose, and new desires were created. Sensibilities changed. People drank better, but less. As peasants left the countryside and as France became increasingly urbanized, wine’s political support was challenged. The daily drinking of home brew and generic wine gradually became a dirty habit of the past. The sober revolution was underway.

Sociétés contemporaines 52 (2003): 5-16. There are several funds in the HCEIA’s archives that have correspondence between this commission and various pressure groups, in particular the alcohol producers.

These are classed in the archives of the Prime Ministry.

On the changing drinking habits in France after World War Two, see Pekka Sulkunen, À la recherche de la modernité: consommation et consommateurs d’alcool en France aujourd’hui: le regard d’un étranger (Helsinki: The Social Research Institute of Alcohol Studies, 1988). For a more general understanding of the revolution in consumption and the rising standard of living, see Fourastié, Les trente glorieuses.
Chapter One:  
The Imperative of Intervention:  
Doctors, Technocrats, and the Plan for a Sober Republic, 1939-1954

Wine, on the contrary, despite the appellation of a hygienic drink that has been tendentiously attached to it, is the great vector of alcoholism in France.  
–Louis-Édouard Lapicque, doctor, 1940

The highly coordinated anti-alcohol campaign that the French state launched in 1954—one that would affect ministries, Parliament, producers’ and consumers’ associations, and a few loudmouthed ideologues—germinated in the collaborative and creative minds of two men. Between the final years of the Third Republic in 1939-1940 and the publication of their Des Français pour la France in 1946, a book that called for the regeneration of the French population, Robert Debré and Alfred Sauvy came to the revolutionary conclusion that alcoholism was far less a vice than a problem of political economy caused primarily by wine. They blamed a political system that had subsidized alcohol production for this so-called “French disease,” “the number one domestic enemy.” Thus from the ashes of defeat, as the nation set about building a new republic, Debré and Sauvy called upon the population to upend one of the more potent and pernicious myths of French identity—that of wine and its centrality to French social and economic wellbeing.

Debré and Sauvy came to this collaboration with conflicting interests. As a pediatrician, Debré had a long interest in public health and in creating a more salubrious environment in which to raise children. Sauvy, on the other hand, was a technocrat who had risen to prominence as a statistician at the Statistique générale de la France and who wished to stem France’s supposed economic stagnation.

Debré expressed anxiety about

49 Robert Debré and Alfred Sauvy, Des Français pour la France (Le problème de la population) (Paris: Gallimard, 1946), 131. They took note of Charrier’s study that revealed that six out of ten alcoholics had contracted their condition through wine.
50 And so they claim: “In a study on the economic, social, and ethnic aspect of the problem of the population in France, a chapter must be reserved for the alcoholic peril, the “mal français...”; see their Des Français pour la France, 129.
51 Archives de l’Association nationale de prevention en alcoologie et addictologie (hereafter ANPAA), A1/1. Léon Faurobert, “A quelque chose malheur est bon,” no date but most likely published right after the war.
54 Sauvy also has an autobiography; see his, La vie en plus: souvenirs (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1981). It is also interesting that Sauvy grew up in a winegrowing family in the Languedoc; see, for example, his article, “Le vin et l’économie française,” La Journée
alcoholism and its ravages upon family life; it was not until the 1940s that Sauvy would discover that the treasury lost more than it earned from alcohol. Working together, they largely shifted the understanding of alcoholism from consumption to production. Alcoholism, as a condition that allegedly stemmed from excess production, became both a symbol and symptom of France’s economic degeneration.

This chapter traces the prehistory of a new institutional campaign against alcohol that the Pierre Mendès France government set in motion in 1954. The movement picked up momentum and began to interest public officials in the context of rising government interventionism in virtually all spheres of social life. Between the late 1930s and 1954, an elite group of doctors versed in social hygiene came to a new understanding of alcoholism and managed to convince a growing group of technocrats, who by the 1940s were gaining more political prestige, that they shared a common problem: alcohol. Between the end of the Third Republic and the beginning of the Fourth, they forged a coalition and set out to combat the drink trade. The new coalition lobbied the state to protect the citizenry from the persuasive power of the alcohol industries, whose cheap beverages and advertising campaigns encouraged high levels of consumption. This chapter, then, is also about how the coalition tried to legitimate the alcohol problem in the political arena. Blaming alcohol production—an agricultural and economic question—for alcoholism—a medical condition—galvanized producers and their parliamentary proponents.

In alcohol, to be sure, Debré and Sauvy saw more than an everyday commodity. Alcohol was not an innocent product merely to be displayed, drunk, and discussed; behind alcohol lay centuries of power, privilege, and prestige. The political classes—whether monarchist, Bonapartist, Pétainist, or republican—had always coveted it as a means and a symbol of power. As much as the state or the people, alcohol was an agent of change. But after World War Two, attacking alcohol became a way to attack a significant segment of rural society held responsible for the “French disease” of alcoholism.

Throughout the Third Republic and the Vichy regime, most elites had perceived peasants as the sturdy roots that fixed French identity. A broad consensus had

Vinicole, 4 September 1953. This article was reproduced in Alcool ou santé 11 (1953): 17-19.

55 Many books demonstrate the importance of wine to French politics. See, for example, Roger Dion’s classic, Histoire de la vigne et du vin en France des origines au XIXe siècle (Paris, 1959); or, more recently, Jean Vigreux and Serge Wolikow, eds. Vignes, vins et pouvoirs (Dijon: Éditions Universitaires de Dijon, 2001); and Andy Smith, Jacques de Maillard, and Olivier Costa, Vin et politique: Bordeaux, la France, la mondialisation (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 2007).

56 For a discussion of the place of the peasantry in French thought in the first half of the twentieth century, see Herman Lebovics, True France: The Wars over Cultural Identity, 1900-1945 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1992); for the second half of the twentieth century, see his Bringing the Empire Back Home: France in the Global Age (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). Michael Bess studies French perceptions of the vanishing peasant of the second half of the twentieth century in, The Light-Green
supported what the great political scientist Stanley Hoffmann deemed a “stalemate society.” Yet after World War Two, a new generation represented agriculture as backward and as the root of the drink problem. The anti-alcohol coalition, which spoke on behalf of this generation, was haunted by France’s recent history: it blamed the rulers of the late Third Republic and the Vichy regime for the country’s present ills. A technocratic elite, comprised of men such as Sauvy, argued that in modern society alcoholism had become an anachronism.

I. The Origins of the Postwar Anti-Alcohol Campaign

Debré’s and Sauvy’s ideas on alcoholism, population growth, and the need for hygienic planning stemmed from the nineteenth century. Between 1849, when the Swedish physician Magnus Huss coined the term alcoholism, and 1939, when state officials gradually began to commit themselves to combating the condition, doctors—and in particular psychiatrists—had spearheaded mostly private and philanthropic movements to reduce French drinking. Doctors perceived alcoholism as a moral and medical problem of the individual and blamed the hereditary degenerate (taré) for the condition. They linked alcoholism to France’s demographic decline. Drinking had reportedly provoked reproductive impotence.

During the Second Empire, psychiatrists began to express anxiety about French depopulation and its causes. In 1857, Bénédict Augustin Morel first expounded his

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58 On page seven in the preface to George Malignac’s and Robert Colin’s book, *L’Alcoolisme* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), Sauvy wrote: “The social scourges pass away in time. A day will come where they will be out of date and out of style. That an active youth rises up against this old and anachronistic malady, it will fall easily into oblivion, opening at the same time, to our country, an unexpected future.” Later, Sauvy claimed that “few historians, even among the more clairvoyant, yet understand well the relationship between cause and effect between the deplorable abuse of alcohol and Malthusianism.” See his, “Un mal anachronique,” *La santé de l’homme*, 171 (January-February 1971).


60 The one exception, as we will see, was state regulation during World War One.

theory of degeneration. Valentin Magnan and his student Paul-Maurice Legrain, two psychiatrists who specialized in alcohol research, further developed the theory. They viewed alcoholism as a hereditary problem inflicting but a minority of the population. Degenerates needed mental asylum, in isolation from the “normal” population.

The view that alcoholism was hereditary and led to degeneration and population decline gained wider acceptance after the humiliating defeat at the hands of the Prussians in 1870 and the subsequent Paris Commune. Alcoholism symbolized both moral and military weakness. If the French population could neither quantitatively nor qualitatively compete with its neighbors, it was because it was too selfish in its pursuit of pleasure: statistics revealed the cold truth that the French drank too much, apparently more than any other country in the world.

In the late nineteenth century, some politicians and social reformers joined doctors in decrying demographic decadence; working together, they launched a crusade to preserve the French “race.” They participated in the temperance, eugenics, pro-natalist, and social hygiene movements, all of which found in alcoholism a cause for reform. This anti-alcohol campaign began to impart upon the medical profession more political power. Doctors sought to educate the masses about alcoholism and to advise degeneration.

Here, see, for example, Daniel Pick, *Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c. 1848-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Bénédict Augustin Morel published his findings as *Traité des dégénérances physiques, intellectuelles, et morales de l’espèce humaine et des causes qui produisent ces variétés maladives* (Paris, 1857).


For some of these figures, see Michael R. Marrus, “Social Drinking in the “Belle Époque,” *Journal of Social History* (Winter, 1974): 115-141; or Bertrand Dargelos, *La lutte antialcoolique en France depuis le XIXe siècle* (Paris: Éditions Dalloz, 2008), 100-102. The reader should take note that national comparisons of drinking are typically faulty because each country employs different methods for conducting its drinking surveys.

public officials about how to take action. Steeped in the Lamarkian idea of acquired heredity, these medical specialists believed that the environment had an effect upon genetics. In their view, alcoholism could be avoided by strengthening the individual’s willpower and by removing temptation. They underlined the importance of the social environment: if the state provided workers with a higher standard of living, and if it made alcohol less available, then fewer workers would fall victim to the bottle.

This medical discourse implied that economic conditions shaped public health policy. Changes to the country’s political economy could have salutary effects. Yet given the prevailing liberal orthodoxy and the individualist frame of mind, this mode of thought had its limitations. The majority of medical professionals still resisted state intervention in their practice, and so combated public health measures.

Most doctors refrained from showing any indignation toward wine. They, like the public at large, distinguished between wine and spirits. Both official and popular discourse had associated wine with a healthy peasantry, and spirits with a diseased working class. Throughout the late nineteenth century, psychiatrists connected spirits—and especially absinthe—to insanity and to the degeneration of the French “race.” Doctors thought in terms of quality, not quantity: they blamed “industrial” alcohol (beet alcohol and other spirits not derived from the grape) and “fraudulent” wine (“mixed” and sugared wines concocted indiscriminately to compensate for the scarcity of grapes) for the problem and confidently averred that “natural” wine was the antidote to alcoholism. Literature reinforced the distinction between wine and alcohol; the reader need only remember that Coupeau, one of the protagonists of Zola’s L’Assommoir, fell victim not to wine but to spirits.

Despite growing scientific evidence that the contents of wine and spirits shared much in common, doctors hesitated to push public officials to take action against a highly organized and volatile wine industry, which between the 1870s and World War One suffered from the ravages of the phylloxera aphid. The state was under the influence of wine. In 1889, it even institutionalized the distinction between wine and “industrial” alcohol with the passing of the Griffe law. Doctors argued that once scientists

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69 It should be noted that this distinction between wine and alcohol is reflected in Émile Zola’s L’Assommoir (1877); for a discussion of Zola and his opinion of alcohol in working-class life, see Susanna Barrows, “After the Commune,” 205-218.

70 In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, a significant part of “industrial” alcohol was derived from the beet.
resolved the phylloxera epidemic, and wine returned to “normal” production levels, alcoholism would disappear.

If doctors had blamed wine for alcoholism, they would have lost their power to council the state. Doctors had a large presence in Parliament.\footnote{For a clearer understanding of this law, see Alessandro Stanziani, \textit{Histoire de la qualité alimentaire, XIXe-XXe siècle} (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2005), especially pp. 135-150; see also, Charles K. Warner, \textit{The Winegrowers of France and the Government since 1875} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 39-40.} During the later Third Republic, between 1898 and 1940, doctors and pharmacists held 10.4 percent of the parliamentary seats; more importantly, these doctors tended to belong to the political parties that were key to forging a governing coalition.\footnote{Jack D. Ellis has demonstrated that doctors, who constituted a large portion of the members of Parliament, were reluctant to fight alcoholism; see his, \textit{The Physician-Legislators of France: Medicine and Politics in the Early Third Republic, 1870-1914} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 208-215.} In order to satisfy their rural constituencies and to maintain their political legitimacy, most doctors continued to view alcoholism as a moral and medical problem besetting the individual. If the product itself was to blame, then all fingers pointed to spirits. Doctors had struggled to combat alcoholism for fear of alienating their constituencies.\footnote{For these figures, see Ellen M. Immergut, \textit{Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 82-83.} Drink was closely linked to republican politics.\footnote{See Ellis, \textit{The Physician-Legislators of France}, 208. For a discussion of alcohol as a detriment to voting rituals and democracy in the late nineteenth century, see Alain Garrigou, \textit{Le vote et la vertu: Comment les Français sont devenus électeurs} (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1992), 265-266.}

While alcohol production symbolized France’s attachment to property rights, alcohol consumption was emblematic of individual rights.

World War One set a precedent for the state’s intervention in the population’s drinking habits. Officials sought to control alcohol production and consumption to meet the demands of a wartime economy. Yet, as sociologist Bertrand Dargelos has shown, the state’s anti-alcohol campaign was largely symbolic.\footnote{See Ellis, \textit{The Physician-Legislators of France}, 208. For a discussion of alcohol as a detriment to voting rituals and democracy in the late nineteenth century, see Alain Garrigou, \textit{Le vote et la vertu: Comment les Français sont devenus électeurs} (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1992), 265-266.} In 1915, the state banned absinthe, but did little else to control the drink trade.\footnote{Didier Nourrisson discusses the link between drink and the French Revolution; see his \textit{Le buveur du XIXe siècle} (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990), 7-10.} The state showed more concern for the effects of drinking, such as public drunkenness, than it did for the product or for the chronic alcoholic condition. Although the state maintained its interdiction of absinthe after the war, it lost its anti-alcohol fervor and awarded new privileges to the wine industry. The experience of the trenches had endowed wine with renewed patriotic symbolism; it reportedly fortified the poilu in battle and helped bring victory to France over Germany.

\footnote{Dargelos, \textit{La lutte antialcoolutique en France}, 165.}

\footnote{For this story, see Dargelos, \textit{La lutte antialcoolutique en France}, 133-173; see also Nourrisson, \textit{Le buveur du XIXe siècle}, 287-301; and Patricia E. Prestwich, “Temperance in France: The Curious Case of Absinth,” \textit{Historical Reflections} 6 (Winter, 1979): 301-319.}
The wine industry profited from the reputed role of wine in World War One. After the war, winegrowers pushed their yields to the point that overproduction became chronic. For the state, the simplest solution was to sell the surplus to its citizens. In 1931, it established the Comité national de propagande en faveur du vin (CNPFV)\(^78\) in order to increase wine consumption.\(^79\) At the same time, in the wine-loving Gironde, some respectable doctors created the Société française des médecins amis du vin,\(^80\) which received financial support from the newly minted CNPFV. Both doctors and politicians advocated the nutritional qualities of wine. In fact, during the entire interwar period, the Academy of Medicine maintained the distinction between wine and spirits. Between 1919 and 1939, the Academy held but one major debate on alcoholism.\(^81\) Moreover, the Ministry of Public Health showed little desire to make alcoholism into an issue.\(^82\) While the British government enacted a school meal service,\(^83\) for example, the French Ministry of Education began allocating wine to its hungry schoolchildren. In the interwar years, then, wine’s grip upon the state and society grew tighter.

II. Alcoholism, the Population Problem, and the Coming of War

Yet with the crisis of the 1930s—the conjuncture of political instability, a suffering economy, population decline, and a swelling Nazi army—came the winds of change. Some state experts recognized that the quality and quantity of the population had an important impact upon the country’s economic power. As the late Third Republic struggled to stay afloat, it sought to palliate the perceived problems of population and productivity. In 1939, alcoholism received official recognition with the creation of the Haut Comité sur la population (HCP).\(^84\) For the HCP’s demographic technocrats, alcohol became a scapegoat for a whole array of ills, be they the low birthrate, political instability, or the so-called “economic Malthusianism” of French business.\(^85\) Alcohol

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\(^78\) The National Committee for Wine Promotion.


\(^80\) French Society of the Medical Friends of Wine.

\(^81\) Patricia Prestwich, Drink and the Politics of Social Reform: Antialcoholism in France since 1870 (Palo Alto, California: The Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship, 1988), 224.

\(^82\) Prestwich makes this issue; see her Drink and the Politics of Social Reform, 216.


\(^85\) Postwar technocrats hoped to remove these “problems” from French public life. On these “problems,” see, for example, Alfred Sauvy, Richesse et population (Paris: Payot,
was a symptom of a dying republic. Both Robert Debré and Alfred Sauvy worked for the HCP, though at different times. In its Family Code of 30 July 1939, the HCP devised plans for fighting alcoholism. It placed restrictions on the number of drinking establishments, enforced heavier taxes on spirits with a 30 percent alcohol volume, and tried to regulate home distillation. Officials did not yet make a move against wine.

In the early months of 1940, however, the Academy of Medicine sent a lightning bolt through the French political sky. Its doctors and scientists observed a recrudescence of alcoholism in the army. They had become alarmed by the fact that the state, returning to its World War One policy, procured large quantities of wine for its soldiers. Before the Academy of Medicine on 27 February 1940, Louis-Édouard Lapicque reprimanded his own profession’s longstanding reticence on wine. He scolded the state for having supported overproduction by cajoling consumers to drink more: in his view, the state had opted for a bandage when the economy needed deep surgery. Lapicque argued that the medical profession’s “prolonged silence has contributed to consolidating in the people the opinion that wine does no harm and has no relationship to alcoholism.” The Academy’s announcement marked the beginning of a transformation in the French medical profession’s perception of alcoholism—these doctors had come to distrust the individual’s discretion and to blame the product for the problem. In this view, citizens were no longer free consumers and therefore responsible for their alcoholism; instead, they had become the victims of the alcohol lobbies. Doctors called upon the state to protect its citizenry.

The bond between the HCP and the Academy of Medicine was tight. Robert Debré participated in both groups, rendering him an important interlocutor between the medical profession and the administration. He took part in the commission created by the Academy to report on the role of wine in French alcoholism. This commission delivered its report to the Academy on 28 May 1940. Its members agreed that “alcohol from wine is as dangerous, at an equal dose, as alcohol from distilled drinks.” They blamed the wine industry for cultivating a belief about the benefits of wine drinking: “…there is in our country an old tradition of wine, salutary drink, legend that, for already numerous years, has been confirmed, developed, and I dare say exploited by an extremely powerful political and commercial association.”


88 This commission consisted of Messieurs Guillain, Laignel-Lavastine, Lapicque, Laubry, Martel, Rist, Vincent, and Robert Debré, all of whom were doctors, hygienists, or physiologists. Robert Debré, it should be added, would become by the middle of the 1950s the central figure in the war on alcoholism.


90 Ibid., 427.
III. The Lessons of the German Occupation and the New Understanding of Alcoholism

The military defeat of 1940 demystified wine. Doctors spoke out about the national drink at a time when Parliament had granted the government emergency powers to rule by decree. With the defeat came the complete dismantling of the republic and its parliamentary system. The alcohol lobbies and Parliament could not impede action. Vichy ruled by fiat. The regime decreed a series of laws that regulated the drink trade and rationed and requisitioned wine. The Vichy period marked the culmination of the idea that alcoholism stemmed from moral degeneration; it was also the final gasps of a dying belief.

The experience of the German Occupation provided doctors and statisticians with seemingly objective evidence that excessive alcohol production led to alcoholism. Research into the links between depopulation and alcoholism on the one hand, and between alcoholism and alcohol production on the other, which had begun in the twilight years of the Third Republic, persisted under and after the Vichy regime. Both the traditionalists and the technocrats at Vichy and the rebels in the Resistance took an interest in alcoholism. While Sauvy served the Vichy regime and built the state’s statistical machinery, Debré joined the Resistance, where he made important political connections that spanned the spectrum from Gaullists to Communists and where he planned a postwar program for public health.

In late 1943, Robert Debré helped create the Medical Committee of the Resistance. For this committee, he, with the help of Sauvy’s statistical skills, devised a postwar plan to combat alcoholism. Debré argued that the rare “degenerate” (taré) that ate away at French society was not at the root of French alcoholism; rather, alcoholism was a social habit caused primarily by wine. These ideas would become the basis for Debré’s and Sauvy’s 1946 book.

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91 For a clearer understanding of Vichy’s anti-alcohol decrees, see Marc Boninchi, Vichy et l’ordre moral (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2005), 225-270; or Prestwich, Drink and the Politics of Social Reform, 244-258.


93 For Robert Debré’s medical role in the Resistance, see his autobiography, L’honneur de vivre: Témoignage (Paris: Hermann et Stock, 1974), 223-244.

94 Archives nationales (hereafter AN), 72AJ/247. “Programme constructif de lutte contre l’alcoolisme,” 1945, 8-9. Auvine and Perrin observed that wine was the main cause of rural alcoholism; and Charrier discovered that wine caused alcoholism in 6 out of 10
Debré’s crucial discoveries came to light as both alcohol production and consumption declined. Statistics revealed that whereas the total annual consumption of pure alcohol per adult was calculated at 27.9 liters in 1941-1942, by 1944-1945 it had dropped to 20.7 liters, and would fall further in the first years of the peace.\textsuperscript{95} Mortality rates for alcoholism and cirrhosis showed an immediate decline, as did the rate of internment for alcoholism in asylums. The decrease was most evident among men aged 35 to 64; in this category there was a 70 percent reduction in chronic alcoholism and a 57 percent reduction in liver disease. Statistics for internments proved to be more controversial, as many patients were either discharged because of a lack of facilities for care\textsuperscript{96} or died for lack of food, but the percentage of alcoholics among those interned dropped from 12.2 percent in 1935 to 3.4 percent in 1943.\textsuperscript{97}

Regional statistics not only confirmed this trend, but also underlined the central role of wine consumption in French alcoholism. In occupied Brittany and Normandy, where food had remained plentiful, but wine, cider, and distilled alcohol were scarce (either because of poor harvests or restrictions), the mortality rate for alcoholism and cirrhosis among men aged 35 to 64 declined even more dramatically than at the national level.\textsuperscript{98} Conversely, in the wine-producing areas of the southwest (and certain distilled-alcohol-producing regions), where consumption of alcohol did not decline drastically, but where there was a notable shortage of food, rates of alcoholism and cirrhosis remained high.

For doctors and demographers, the new diet imposed by the German Occupation demonstrated the link between excessive wine consumption and France’s high mortality rate.\textsuperscript{99} Léon Dérobert considered the wartime decline in morbidity and mortality “transitory but conclusive” evidence.\textsuperscript{100} Ledermann’s wartime experience formed the basis for his later theories, developed in the 1950s, on the relationship between excessive


\textsuperscript{98} Ledermann, \textit{Alcool, alcoolisme, alcoolisation: Mortalité, morbidité, accidents du travail}, 127-139.

\textsuperscript{99} For an understanding of the dietary situation under the Occupation, see Michel Cépède, \textit{Agriculture et alimentation en France durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale} (Paris: Éditions Génin, 1961).

production, excessive consumption, and high rates of alcoholism.\textsuperscript{101} For Alfred Sauvy, the wartime decline in mortality shed light on the role of alcohol in excessive male mortality.\textsuperscript{102} The wartime experience not only provided a new hypothesis for prevention, namely that limitations on consumption and production would result in a decline in national rates of alcoholism, but also increased support for public action.

IV. The New Anti-Alcohol Coalition and its Conquest of the State

The Institut national d’études démographiques (INED),\textsuperscript{103} founded in 1945, which shared the population concerns of the Haut Comité de la population under the late Third Republic and the Fondation Alexis Carrel under the Vichy regime, and which therefore gave a certain continuity to demographic thought, became the headquarters of new research on alcoholism.\textsuperscript{104} Debré had strong political connections, and lobbied the government to place Sauvy at the helm of the INED. The INED became “Sauvy’s institute,” and he and his economic team saw in alcoholism a way to justify their larger concern: the qualitative and quantitative regeneration of the population.\textsuperscript{105} According to the INED’s missionary statement:

The consequences of the qualitative and quantitative weakening of the French population will be painfully felt from here on out. Without even speaking of the two wars 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 (which would have been, if not avoided, then at least finished more rapidly to our advantage, if the French had been more numerous), we see the nation undergo today some particularly heavy burdens, especially when one considers that it wants to ensure its security, the cohesion of its empire, to help its elderly and to maintain its role in modern civilization.\textsuperscript{106}

The government placed the INED under the tutelage of the Ministry of Public Health, Population, and Family, supposedly above the quarrels of the political parties and the

\textsuperscript{101} Sully Ledermann, \textit{Alcool, alcoolisme, alcoolisation: Mortalité, morbidité, accidents du travail}, 139.
\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Alcool ou santé} 36 (1959): 8. Prestwich also makes this observation; see her, \textit{Drink and the Politics of Social Reform}, 257.
\textsuperscript{103} The National Institute for Demographic Studies.
\textsuperscript{104} It should be noted that of the 250 people that worked at the Fondation Carrel in early 1944 under the Vichy regime, approximately 30 continued their work at the INED in 1946. This suggests a remarkable continuity in demographic thought between the late Third Republic, the Vichy regime, and the Fourth Republic. See Andrés Horacio Reggiani and especially his note #50, in “Procreating France,” 750; see also his “Alexis Carrel, the Unknown: Eugenics and Population Research under Vichy,” \textit{French Historical Studies} 25 (Spring 2002): 331-356. Political scientist Luc Berlivet has nicely detailed how the demographers at the INED seized the postwar anti-alcohol campaign; see his article, “Les démographes et l’alcoolisme: du “fléau social” au “risque de santé,” \textit{Vingtième siècle} 3 (2007): 93-113.
\textsuperscript{105} Rosental has written a magisterial study of the emergence and functioning of the INED; see his \textit{L’Intelligence démographique}.
waffling of Parliament. Debré’s decision to assist Sauvy to become the director of the INED is not without significance; in this way, an economist would reside over issues of population and public health.107 With the building of the INED, a new connection between economics and public health, both conceptually and institutionally, emerged.

Sauvy immediately mobilized the economic section of the INED to work on the problem of alcoholism.108 The list included Jacques-Sylvain Brunaud, Sully Ledermann, Georges Létinier, Georges Malignac, and Léon Tabah. These economists not only worked for the INED; they also had links to the Ministries of Finance and of Public Health and to the planning commissions. The medical profession had a quieter voice in this public institute.

The INED set out to quantify the cost of alcoholism to the economy. In 1946, Georges Létinier called for an economic approach to alcoholism:

> This necessary assessment will moreover have to be established not only in terms of public health, but also in economic terms. The reason is obvious: the production and commerce of alcohol are, in France, a source of revenue for several million individuals: producers of wine, cider, beets, distillers, aperitif and spirits makers, owners of drinking establishments. Everyone knows, furthermore, that the taxes on alcohol procure important receipts for the state’s budget. From this observation comes the currently widespread opinion that to fight against alcoholism is to undermine national wealth.109

He went on to say that “the illusion created by the monetary revenues is deep-seated and the particular interests in question are devoted to maintaining it. The best way to destroy this illusion would be to assess, in an as exact and as complete way as possible, the economic loss that alcoholism makes the nation undergo in human life and in wasting productive power.”110

Statistics offered a seemingly objective argument for public action. The notion of degeneration was no longer a medical or moral way of understanding the problem; alcoholism became an economic disease. The economic problem of alcoholism grafted itself onto the old medical approach to the problem, thereby masking any overt display of moral decay. With this ostensibly more objective approach to alcoholism, the anti-alcohol coalition sought to make the campaign seem natural and necessary, a prerequisite to larger economic reforms.

Despite the new economic model of alcoholism, technocrats couched their arguments in the old biological discourse of degeneration. With the beginning of the postwar baby boom, Sauvy and other technocrats feared the persistence of a

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107 Paul-André Rosental discusses the importance of the relationship between Robert Debré and Alfred Sauvy in *L’Intelligence démographique*, especially pp. 118-136.
108 Doctor Paul Perrin mentioned that it was the economic section of the INED that studied alcoholism; see his *L’Alcoolisme: problèmes médico-sociaux, problèmes économiques* (Paris: L’Expansion scientifique française, 1950), 246.
“Malthusian” agricultural and economic policy. The country needed milk and other modern foodstuffs, not alcohol. For Sauvy, “Malthusianism” was a “state of mind” that showed satisfaction with the status quo; it was a “turning away of life,” a “French disease,” “resulting from the secular aging of the population, which atrophies the creative spirit and puts in its place the fear and anxiety of protection.” For modernization to succeed, French mentalities needed to change. As technocrats replaced doctors as the leading voice in the anti-alcohol campaign, alcoholism became less about a physical condition than a state of mind. If France was “the sick man of Europe,” then the medical concern about drinking and demographic decline merged with the technocratic concern about the apparent backwardness of the national economy. Debré and Sauvy hoped to prevent the transmission of this “disease” to the new France that lay ahead.

111 For doctors and technocrats, nothing represented this “Malthusianism” more than the state alcohol monopoly. For a general discussion of “Malthusianism,” see Andrew Shennan, Rethinking France: Plans for Renewal, 1940-1946 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), especially pp. 289-290. On page 100, Shennan cites the Communist Waldeck Rochet, also an agricultural specialist: “…must we confine ourselves to restoring our agriculture to its prewar level? No! Because French agriculture is technically very backward in comparison with that of other countries.” Another good place to learn about the importance of this discourse on “Malthusianism” is Richard F. Kuisel, Capitalism & the State in Modern France: Renovation and Economic Management in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).  


114 Though several doctors took up the new economic approach. The reader need only peruse the pages of Doctor Léon Dérobert’s important book on the medical interest in the economy of alcoholism; see his, L’Économie de l’alcoolisme (Paris: L’Institut national d’hygiène, 1953).  

115 Time gave France this name in an article entitled, “France: The Sick Man,” which dated from 17 August 1953.  

116 In the early 1950s, many technicians wrote about the declining health of the French economy. See, for example, Simon Nora, L’économie française: prospérité ou décadence?, Le Monde, 6-7 and 8-9 June 1953. For a more historical perspective, see also François Bloch-Lainé and Jean Bouvier, La France restaurée, 1944-1954: Dialogue sur les choix d’une modernisation (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1986), 33-56. While Bloch-Lainé was considered a technocrat, Bouvier is an historian. On page 49, Bloch-Lainé, who was a bureaucrat and finance expert, makes an exemplary comment about the technocratic attitude toward the rural past at the war’s end: “Our horror, which can still be felt, of Pétain’s sad slogan: ‘The land does not lie’ without doubt drove us to go back too far and too summarily in the modern period in order to denounce a debilitating apology of the primordial virtues of a protected agriculture; of a rural nation that abandoned the main industrial successes to the English, the Germans, and the Americans.”
The INED’s concern for alcoholism and demographic decadence extended beyond its doors. Other state institutes backed the INED with research and reports. They included the Institut national d’hygiène (INH), which since its founding in 1941 provided the state with statistics on alcoholism; the Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE), home of Claude Gruson, ardent technocrat who would later play a key role in shaping Mendès France’s anti-alcohol policy; and the Institut français d’opinion publique (IFOP), the national polling institute based on the American Gallup polls of the 1930s and headed by Jean Stoetzel, a sociologist and also a mendésiste. All these institutes specialized in statistics, in public opinion, and in developing a clearer understanding of the population and its behaviors. The state had monopolized the production of this information, preferring to integrate the knowledge of the administration and specialized associations in lieu of creating conflicting expertise. These new state institutes gave an image of impartiality to the anti-alcohol campaign. Because their interest lay in productivity and economic growth, these technocrats placed the issue of alcoholism within the framework of the “general interest,” which justified an intervention in any economic sector that allegedly encouraged the condition.

Sauvy’s ideas piqued the interest of the Planning Commission. With his reputation for having developed France’s statistical machinery and for having shaped France’s demographic policies, Sauvy collaborated briefly but importantly with Jean Monnet. In December 1946, Sauvy asked the technical committee of the INED to formulate an official view that the Monnet Plan take into consideration the “human factor” in economic modernization—in other words, the “vital productions for the population,” such as milk or housing. Both Debré and Sauvy participated in the Commission de la consommation et de la modernisation sociale, which called for the rationalization of the French diet as a prerequisite to larger reforms.

In the planning commissions, Sauvy became acquainted with the agronomist René Dumont. Both shared the view that France needed to enhance its agricultural potential,

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117 This National Hygiene Institute would in 1964 change its name to the Institut national de la santé et de la recherche médicale (INSERM).
118 A “mendésiste” is of course a follower of Pierre Mendès France, a “man of action” who supported strong government decision-making through technical expertise instead of through parliamentary waffling.
119 Pierre Rosanvallon discusses this French specificity; see his, L’État en France de 1789 à nos jours (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1990), 254-255.
121 Rosental, L’Intelligence démographique, 318. See note #89.
123 For Dumont’s intriguing story, see Marc Dufumier, Un agronome dans son siècle: Actualité de René Dumont (Paris: Association pour la création de la Fondation René Dumont, Éditions Karthala, 2002).
and both men encouraged the rural exodus, already underway.\textsuperscript{124} Sauvy enlisted Dumont to provide the INED with agricultural expertise.\textsuperscript{125} As an agricultural advisor for the Plan and as a lecturer at the Institut national agronomique and the École supérieure d’application d’agriculture, Dumont would become an important figure in tying agricultural reform to the reduction of alcoholism.

The INED also shook the administration. It slowly began to attract the attention of technocrats within the Ministries of Finance and of Public Health, which furthered the legitimacy of an anti-alcohol campaign. Jacques-Sylvain Brunaud conducted an important study on alcoholism for the Ministry of Finance in 1951,\textsuperscript{126} and Léon Dérobert did the same for the Ministry of Public Health in 1953.\textsuperscript{127} In 1945, Sauvy demonstrated to Jean Lefèvre, General Secretary of Agriculture, that solutions to the economic problems of viticulture had to take into account public hygiene;\textsuperscript{128} by 1952, Camille Laurens, the Minister of Agriculture, showed a willingness to fight alcoholism, so long as the campaign did not threaten quality wine production.

Though he had less success in the National Assembly and in the Senate, Sauvy managed to circulate his ideas at the Economic Council, France’s third representative body that brought together the country’s major interest groups.\textsuperscript{130} The Economic Council

\textsuperscript{124} According to the French census, in 1931, urban folk began to outnumber country dwellers. For some responses to this interwar trend, see Robert O. Paxton, \textit{French Peasant Fascism: Henry Dorgère’s Greenshirts and the Crises of French Agriculture, 1929-1939} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), especially pp. 27-36; for its greater intensity after World War Two, see Henri Mendras, \textit{La Fin des paysans, suivi d’une réflexion sur La fin des paysans vingt ans après} (Le Paradou, Actes Sud, 1992 (1970)).

\textsuperscript{125} For Sauvy’s recollections of this enlistment, see Alfred Sauvy, \textit{La vie en plus: souvenirs} (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1981), 140.

\textsuperscript{126} His study was not published until 1955; see his \textit{Rapport sur le coût annuel et la prévention de l’alcoolisme} (Présidence du Conseil: Comité central d’enquête sur le coût et le rendement des services publics, May 1955). For an understanding of this commission, see \textit{Le Comité d’enquête sur le coût et le rendement des services publics: Soixante ans de dialogue au service de la réforme de l’État}, in \textit{Revue française d’administration publique} 5 (2007).

\textsuperscript{127} Dérobert, \textit{L’Économie de l’alcoolisme}.

\textsuperscript{128} AN, F/10/7126. Jean Lefèvre, “Note à Messieurs les Directeurs et Chefs de Service,” 24 October 1945.

\textsuperscript{129} AN, F/10/7126. Letter from Camille Laurens, Minister of Agriculture, to Henri Rouvillois, president of the CNDCA, 31 October 1952. In 1945, Alfred Sauvy had demonstrated to Jean Lefèvre, General Secretary to Agriculture, that solutions to the economic problems of viticulture had to take into account public hygiene. The economic historian Charles K. Warner also shows that by 1952 the Ministry of Agriculture was committed to quality wine production; see his \textit{The Winegrowers of France and the Government}, 176.

\textsuperscript{130} Alain Chatriot is the expert on the Economic Council; see his, \textit{La Démocratie sociale à la française: L’expérience du Conseil national économique, 1924-1940} (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 2002). For the Economic Council under the Fourth Republic, see his article “Renouveaux et permanence d’une institution représentative. Le Conseil
provided the state with economic expertise. Under the Fourth Republic, as we will see, it directly influenced the government’s alcohol policies. Sauvy, along with doctor Étienne May, Débré’s colleague at the Academy of Medicine, held a seat with Pensée française, a group designated to provide the council with technical advice. Sauvy agreed with May that the first priority of the state alcohol regime should be the problem of alcoholism.

Between 1946 and 1954, the new medical and demographic concern for alcoholism had spread to a fraction of France’s economic experts. And yet we should not overestimate the ability of doctors or the INED to convince all technocrats of the need to consider public health in their economic plans. Technocrats but slowly learned of the utility of an anti-alcohol campaign that could justify their intervention in the economy.

Let us now turn to an examination of this new medical and economic approach to the alcohol problem, the roots of which experts claimed to have found in the political economy of the Third Republic in general, and in its misguided agricultural policy in particular.

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131 French Thought.
133 The state monopolized production, but not consumption. In this dissertation, I will use “state alcohol monopoly,” “state alcohol regime,” and the “state’s alcohol statute” interchangeably, in the same manner as the campaign’s actors.
V. The Economic Problem

In the wake of the war, the new anti-alcohol coalition armed the state with an arsenal of statistics and studies on the burdens of alcohol to the national economy. The problem of alcoholism lay in performance and productivity. The INED wished to inform the state that it lost more than it earned from alcohol. In 1946, Létinier called for a statistical assessment of the costs of alcoholism to the treasury. By 1952, Jacques-Sylvain Brunaud, a civil administrator at the Ministry of Finance, estimated that the direct cost of alcoholism to the state came to approximately 132 billion francs for 1950; against this 152 billion, the treasury received just over 53 billion francs in alcohol taxes in 1950. The state lost 80 billion in 1950 alone. Alcohol, as they argued, had become a parasite on the welfare state. The problem, the coalition claimed, was that the French were too shortsighted, indulging only in the momentary pleasures of drinking, and refused to see the long-term health consequences of habitual drinking to the nation.

The coalition expressed much anxiety about France’s excessive mortality rate and how it allegedly related to the nation’s drinking habits. The state could profit from neither a drunkard nor a dead person. At the Economic Council, Étienne May noted:

> These losses result first of all from the excess of mortality due to alcohol. We have seen, in another place, that the life expectancy of a French person over 20 is weaker by three years than that of a Dutch person. In a more industrialized country than ours, like England, this difference is still one and a half. We could thus increase our lifespan by four percent that, after the calculations of the Institut national d’études démographiques, would represent a gain of 2.5 percent of work hours. Related to a gross production of 13 billion in 1952 and in assuming that the production is exactly proportional to the hours of work, this loss of activity of 2.5 percent corresponds to a material loss of 323 billion.

Citizens needed to learn how their actions affected the collectivity. In the coalition’s calculation, drinking now led less to reproductive impotence than to a sterile economy.

The coalition argued that alcohol had emasculated the economy. In its view, the country could not rebuild itself if its citizens were wasted on alcohol. Malignac noted that the French person consumed ten times more alcohol than an American, Swede, or Dane, five times more than a British citizen, four times more than a Swiss or Belgian;

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only the Italian compared to the French citizen. Both Ledermann and Malignac closely examined the particular case of excessive French male mortality. They showed that French men, between the ages of 40 and 65, died more frequently than their brothers in other countries. Men who spent the productive prime of their lives in a bottle could not best serve the nation.

To arrest this economic disease, the new anti-alcohol coalition traveled to the reputed source: the countryside. It collected data on the number of French alcohol producers and concluded that they were too numerous and their farming practices too inefficient. The Fourth Republic had inherited an ill-advised agricultural policy: both the state’s alcohol monopoly with its protection of alcohol producers and the state’s latitude toward the home distillers’ habit of tax evasion saddled the treasury. Both aspects of this policy apparently caused alcoholism, cost the collectivity, and wasted the country’s productive potential.

The new anti-alcohol coalition portrayed the peasantry as impoverished. Because of the power of agriculture in Parliament, and the French person’s general attachment to the land, into the postwar period, France persisted as a so-called “Peasants’ Republic.” Since the late nineteenth century, most republicans had portrayed peasants as the protectors of family life and the source of stability. As historian Gordon Wright put it as late as 1964, “No other industrialized nation has kept so large a proportion of its total population on the soil; nowhere else do so many city-dwellers regard their peasant ancestry as a mark of distinction.” As we examine the alcohol landscape more closely, we will see that anti-alcohol activists targeted especially the poor apple-growing region of Brittany and the poor winegrowing region of the Languedoc.

The alcohol lobbies, their political supporters in Parliament, and their other ideologue friends exploited the centrality of the peasantry to French national character. They argued that any attack upon alcohol was an attack upon both the peasantry and French agriculture. The notion of the “peasantry,” however, was more a rhetorical device, an appeal to a way of life, than a profession: while anti-alcohol activists targeted the “peasantry,” they were specifically targeting beet growers, most of whom were wealthy, and winegrowers, cider producers, and home distillers, the latter three groups perhaps more deserving of the name. Despite these depictions, the alcohol-producing peasantry was but a small proportion of French farmers. Alcohol producers invoked the “peasantry” in order to mobilize all of French agriculture to their defense.

Beet growers were based in northern France, particularly in the departments of the Aisne, Nord, Oise, Pas-de-Calais, Seine-et-Marne, Seine-et-Oise, and Somme. They

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140 See especially Sully Ledermann, Alcool, alcoolisme, alcoolisation: Mortalité, morbidité, accidents du travail, 19-159; and Malignac and Colin, L’Alcoolisme.
141 For the power of the peasantry in Parliament, see Wright, Rural Revolution in France.
142 I call the reader’s attention to Sarah Farmer’s present project, which treats the place of the peasantry in French memory, politics, and culture.
143 The celebrated Alfred Cobban gave France this name; see his, “France—A Peasants’ Republic,” The Listener, XLI (1949): 429.
144 Wright, Rural Revolution in France, 1.
were a part of the capitalistic and conservative agriculture of the monocultural north. Since the Napoleonic regime, the state had encouraged beet cultivation for industrial purposes, especially in order to provide alcohol to the ammunition industry. Beets also made the soil more fertile. In the middle of the nineteenth century, farmers began to produce beets for the manufacture of both alcohol and sugar. Yet given international treaties, beet farmers found it more lucrative to make alcohol. Not only did the colonies already provide the metropole with sugar, but growers also doubted that the French, who typically did not find sugar pleasing to the palate, would increase their consumption.

To a large extent, the alcohol produced by the beet cultivators ultimately went to the industrial market, for the manufacture of such modern necessities as gasoline. Yet, as we will see, after World War Two, scientists concluded that an alcohol-based gasoline was not sufficiently efficient and was economically wasteful; as a consequence, anti-alcohol activists worried that beet growers would try to sell their alcohol on the consumer market. Growers sold a small part to the aperitif firms; by one account, this amounted to approximately 478,000 hectoliters in 1946-1947, up from 331,000 hectoliters in 1938.

Winegrowers were spread out throughout France, but their largest numbers were to be found in the south, especially in the mass-producing, monocultural region of the Languedoc. We can count at least three types of producers: the wealthier and usually more innovative proprietors who owned the grand estates and who played an important role in the development of the Appellation d’origine contrôlée (AOC) label, located mostly in the celebrated regions of Bordeaux, Burgundy, and Champagne; the small

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145 To a large extent, wheat and the beet dominated in the north and in the Paris basin.
146 The experts at the INED believed that the beet was the key to the problem of economic “Malthusianism;” beet growers were protected at the detriment of the consumer. See Léon Tabah, “Quelques précisions sur le problème sucre-alcool,” Population 4 (1949): especially pp. 511-512.
147 See, for example, Tabah, “Quelques précisions sur le problème sucre-alcool,” 511-522.
148 Ibid., 304.
proprietors who produced generic table wines, almost entirely situated in the Languedoc and in Algeria; and finally, the growers who did not produce wine for a living and for the market, but for tax-free family consumption. Some agronomists and economists argued that the second group often blurred into the third; it was these latter two groups that the anti-alcohol campaign stigmatized.

Unlike growers of AOC wines, who produced mostly for the export market and who were interested in labeling and a guarantee of the wine’s provenance, the winegrowers of the Languedoc generally showed little concern for quality, but like AOC producers, wanted to prevent alcohol fraud and the addition of “impurities” to their wine. Merchants notoriously cut traditionally fine wines that suffered the defects of a bad vintage with Languedoc wines. Even worse from the Languedoc winegrowers’ perspective, their wines were often mixed with wines from Algeria, and later, from Italy.

Farmers in western France—especially in Brittany and Normandy—grew apples to make cider. As anti-alcohol reformers consistently asserted, the apples were of a poor quality and were not to be consumed as fruits. Apple growers distilled any excess production into alcohol and sold it to the state. The state lost approximately two billion francs a year on the apple surplus. Those producing alcohol from apples could be commercial distillers, but also the home and ambulating distillers who lawfully produced ten liters a year without paying taxes. But in the eyes of the anti-alcohol movement and the commercial drink trade, these distillers produced much more and thus cheated the treasury.

Home distillers were more dispersed, but had particularly concentrated pockets in Brittany, Normandy, Alsace, Lorraine, and the Languedoc. Anti-alcohol activists especially associated home distillation with the apple producers of Brittany, in part because they viewed this region as economically backwards and as resistant to national integration. The home distillers’ privilege—the right to produce ten liters of tax-free alcohol a year—had been a product of the French Revolution. Even though the demands of the public finances required the reestablishment of the taxes in the wake of the Revolution, this act of the National Assembly in 1790 became a part of the home distillers’ mythology: to distill fruit at home was not a “privilege,” as anti-alcohol reformers liked to claim, but a “right” earned in revolutionary struggle.

The privilege conferred upon home distillers by statute consisted in having the right to produce ten liters of pure alcohol each year, exempt from tax and also from

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150 Leo A. Loubères discusses the twentieth-century wine crises in the Languedoc and the violence that they induced in The Wine Revolution in France, 232-239.
151 Malignac and Colin, L’Alcoolisme.
153 The Consulate decided to require a license of all distillers for economic and health purposes. Yet 1808, the Napoleonic regime accorded an exemption to the home distillers—the beginning of the “privilege” that has played such an spectacular role in French politics.
supervision by the Service des alcools, the body that ran the state alcohol monopoly, and by the Contributions indirectes of the Ministry of Finance. Those who owned fruit trees or a vineyard could ask the commune for a certificate enabling them to benefit from the statute. According to Sully Ledermann of the INED, the number of home distillers had risen vertiginously from 490,000 in 1877 to 2,580,000 in 1954. World War Two compounded the problem, when the commercial market had to compete with a clandestine practice. After 1954, however, their numbers began to diminish.

The state had struggled to supervise home distillation, particularly in the northwestern regions of Brittany and Normandy, but also in the eastern region of Alsace. Since the nineteenth century, home distillers had built a fort that even an army of bureaucrats and tax collectors could not breach. In 1954, the Economic Council estimated the home distillers’ annual fraudulent production at a minimum of 600,000 hectoliters of pure alcohol. The home distillers’ privilege, originally conceived to permit farmers to consume small quantities of alcohol from their own harvest, progressively became (because of the state’s inability to take action against them), a vast organization that not only cheated the Treasury, but also diffused increasingly greater quantities of alcohol, thereby threatening not only French health and the economy, but also what beet growers and winegrowers considered “honest” commerce. In 1948, the Ministry of Finance estimated that the fraud committed by the home distillers amounted to 9 billion francs.

For the anti-alcohol coalition, the state alcohol regime and its support of overproduction posed the primary problem. Historically, public officials had viewed the regime as the key to all of French agriculture; it protected farmers from both falling prices and foreign competition. In 1939, both Paul Reynaud and Edouard Daladier went so far as to call the Service des alcools “the keystone of French agriculture.” Pierre Miot, a finance inspector, wrote in 1962 of the alcohol regime that “all of agriculture was

154 Ledermann, Alcool, alcoolisme, alcoolisation: Données scientifiques de caractère physiologique, économique et social, 43.
155 For a history of the black market under the Vichy regime, see Fabrice Grenard, La France du marché noir (1940-1949) (Paris: Payot, 2008).
156 At the Economic Council, Étienne May expressed curiosity for the causes of this diminution, which he saw as already underway by 1952; see his report, “Problème de l’alcoolisme,” Journal officiel de la République française: Avis et rapports du Conseil économique, “séances des 20 et 21 janvier 1959,” 19 February 1959, 192.
158 Centre des Archives contemporaines (hereafter CAC), 19940020, art. 11. This file contains a report on the history of home distillation in France; the author and publication date do not appear on the page.
160 Note that the state alcohol regime monopolized production, not consumption, like in some other Western countries.
161 Jean-Raymond Guyon would use this quote in his defense of the alcohol regime; see his, Le Régime économique de l’alcool (Bordeaux: Delmas, 1950), 25.
interested in the maintenance of this system of guarantee, which appears as one of the elements of the policy of agricultural protection practiced since the beginning of the century." The alcohol regime had spearheaded state attempts to protect agriculture. State protection of winegrowing emerged from the phylloxera epidemic, which had devastated vineyards in the late nineteenth century and had consequently forced winegrowers to change their production methods. Many cultivators moved to Algeria and converted large areas of land to viticulture. At the same time, a team of French scientists introduced an American vine capable of resisting the iniquitous insect. In the 1890s, when winegrowers had begun to recover from the phylloxera’s ravages, they converted their more artisanal vineyards into vineyards of mass production so as to receive a quick return on their financial losses. In the twentieth century, overproduction would inundate winegrowers with problems; as a result, they appealed to the government for assistance. Because southern winegrowers were highly organized and a threat to the government in Paris, and because wine held a central place in the

163 But the state protected more than just alcohol; for an understanding of agricultural protectionism more generally, see Michel Augé-Laribé, La politique agricole de la France de 1880 à 1940 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950); and Pierre Barral, Les agrariens français de Méline à Pisani (Paris: Armand Collin, 1968).
165 For a classic study of the Algerian vineyard, see Hildebert Isnard’s La Vigne en Algérie (Gap, 1951 & 1954); for a more general overview, see Susanna Barrows, “Alcohol, France, and Algeria: a case study in the international liquor trade,” in Contemporary Drug Problems (Winter, 1982).
166 For the scientific dimension of the phylloxera epidemic and its aftereffects, see Harry W. Paul, Science, Vine, and Wine in Modern France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
167 For an extensive study of the social ramifications of this vineyard transformation, see Rémy Pech, Entreprise viticole et capitalisme en Languedoc Roussillon: du phylloxera aux crises de mévente (Toulouse: Association des publications de l’Université de Toulouse-Le Mirail, 1975); or G. Galtier, Le vignoble du Languedoc méridional et du Roussillon. Études comparatives d’un vignoble de mass, 3 vols. (Montpellier, 1960). Local studies of this vineyard transformation have also been carried out. See, for example, Laura Levine Frader, Peasants and Protest: Agricultural Workers, Politics, and Unions in the Aude, 1850-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); and J. Harvey Smith, “Work Routine and Social Structure in a French Village: Cruzy in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 5 (1975): 357-382.
168 For the story of this chronic crisis, see Geneviève Gavignaud-Fontaine, Le Languedoc viticole, la Méditerranée et l’Europe au siècle dernier (XXe) (Montpellier: Publications de l’Université Paul-Valéry, 2000).
French person’s daily diet,\textsuperscript{169} politicians proved reluctant to diminish production, and thus they acquiesced to the winegrowers’ demanding requests.\textsuperscript{170} The state purchased the surplus and both doctors and the state pushed consumers to drink more wine. Winegrowing became, as Charles K. Warner described it, the “spoiled child” of agricultural legislation.\textsuperscript{171} The dearth of wine during the phylloxera crisis had encouraged the expansion of other types of alcohol production, especially beet cultivation for the rising aperitif market. Between the late nineteenth century and World War One, beet cultivation competed with wine to win the palates of consumers. The drinker could not absorb all the alcohol on the market. Alcohol from both beets and grapes flooded the state.

The state carried out its protection of alcohol through a body called the Service des alcools, placed under the Ministry of Finance by a law of 30 June 1916. This administrative body became the enabler of what anti-alcohol reformers perceived as excessive production. A decree of 1919 accorded the government the right “provisionally” to maintain the state monopoly. In 1922, beet growers and winegrowers gave their consent to a state monopoly that reserved the industrial market for beet alcohol and the domestic market for wine alcohol; the state would channel beet alcohol into producing gasoline, perfume, pharmaceuticals, and other industrial products, whereas it would hand over the beverage market to the wine industry. In 1931, the state began to buy alcohol distilled from surplus wine. The state soon found itself in possession of huge stocks of alcohol. As a means of providing an outlet for the surplus, the government in 1923 had required oil refineries to add a specified amount of alcohol to gasoline. A decree of 30 July 1935 modified previous legislation and decrees with respect to alcohol and confirmed the state’s monopoly.\textsuperscript{172}

After World War Two, alcohol production spiked.\textsuperscript{173} The acute wine crisis that had beleaguered the late Third Republic returned in the early 1950s. Experts estimated that the domestic needs of France did not exceed 1.8 million hectoliters of alcohol a year; yet since the Liberation, the yearly production had averaged 3.9 million hectoliters. The situation became desperate in 1953, when the state purchased over four million hectoliters of alcohol, more than twice as much as the market could safely absorb. Instead of cutting production, the state continued to purchase alcohol surpluses.

\textsuperscript{169} For the place of wine in the nineteenth-century working-class diet, see Lenard R. Berlanstein, \textit{The Working People of Paris, 1871-1914} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1984).
\textsuperscript{170} During times of crisis in the twentieth century, southern winegrowers, organized in their Comités de salut viticole, rallied local businesspersons and local politicians behind their cause and paralyzed the local economy.
\textsuperscript{172} Centre des Archives économiques et financières (hereafter CAEF), B/55588/1. “Régime du monopole des alcools en France,” December 1959. This document surveys the history of the state’s alcohol regime.
\textsuperscript{173} This had also been the case after the phylloxera crisis and World War One. The reasoning behind this rapid increase in production was the growers, deprived of money during the blight, wanted to receive as quick a return as possible on their product.
For the anti-alcohol coalition, the problem was the persistence of the monocultural farming practices that apple, beet, and wine production seemed to necessitate. The experts at the INED tied the economic problem to a more general dietary disorder. Instead of converting apple, beet, and grape production into more modern and nourishing foodstuffs such as milk, meat, and sugar, the anti-alcohol coalition feared that the state would, as in the 1930s, preserve the status quo by protecting the producer and pushing the consumer to drink more alcohol. Experts at the INED argued that it was not the consumer who under-consumed, but the producer who overproduced. Dumont told the first planning commissions that “It has always been the economy that has been organized for the profit of the producer, and not for the benefit of the consumer, and therefore the general interest: dangerous deviation.” From his perspective, in protecting alcohol, the state distorted the economy, which prevented farmers from growing more profitable products. Seven years later, Jules Milhau, an economist from the winegrowing Hérault, agreed: “In our opinion, of the two factors of the market: the average demand and the average offer, it is the second that is more malleable, and it is by acting on it that we can try to reestablish a balance, whereas demand has become a fact over which the producers have but a little hold.”

Men like Dumont and Milhau argued that monoculture was technically, economically, and socially dangerous. To terminate the “wasteful” practices of apple, beet, and grape production, Dumont believed that France had to choose: either produce alcohol and watch as the country degenerated or produce milk and meat and watch as the country grew. In his view, more could be extracted from a cow than from a grapevine. Changes in agricultural production would not only make France more competitive in the emerging Common Market; producing a wider range of foodstuffs would relieve labor-intensive winegrowing and push people of the land into industry. An agricultural

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176 Ibid., 99-100.


revolution could unleash a dietary revolution that could in turn nourish industrialization.\textsuperscript{180}

While the anti-alcohol coalition’s primary interest was wine and its effects upon public health and the national economy, in the period between 1946 and 1954, it mainly targeted the beet. Unlike apple and grape farming, which required a long-term plan of conversion,\textsuperscript{181} beet farming was linked more closely to the international market and was therefore more receptive to innovation. Instead of sending their beets to the distillery (to be transformed into alcohol for either drinking or industrial purposes), farmers could turn them into sugar. Moreover, beets made the land more fertile, which according to the technocrats at the INED, meant that more cattle could graze the land.

The southern, mass-producing wine industry needed to undergo much deeper and more demanding structural change. For technocrats, the wine monoculture was exemplary of the country’s waste of human and material resources. Milhau showed that the place of viticulture in the value of agricultural production was in constant diminution; he anticipated “inevitable and painful socio-economic transformations.” In 1948-1949, viticulture made up 12.5 percent of that value; in 1949-1950, 12 percent; in 1950-1951, 10 percent; and finally, in 1951-1952, 9 percent.\textsuperscript{182} The devaluation of viticulture resulted from a permanent decline in wine consumption, which he linked to a demographic revolution underway since the war. As before the war, France had 42 million inhabitants, but a million and a half more children than adults. This transformation had an effect upon demand: as family expenses surpassed individual expenses, he predicted that milk consumption would surpass wine consumption.\textsuperscript{183}

With a rising birthrate, demographers feared that the country did not have a sufficient supply of milk. They looked especially to the south, where vineyard monoculture and the poor food supply had a detrimental impact upon the region’s children. For Albert Michot at the INED, “The modernization and equipment plan, in order to respond to its very objective, has to research the means to spark the rejuvenation of the human factor. It must therefore anticipate the necessary effort for an augmentation of production and propose the measures susceptible to develop milk consumption in France, a real product in which to invest.”\textsuperscript{184} The Commission de la consommation et de la modernisation sociale hoped to elevate French milk consumption from 99 liters per person in the 1930s to 127 liters, the same level as England, Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark before the war.\textsuperscript{185} England especially served as a model; during the war,

\textsuperscript{180} Many French technocrats showed concern that France had not followed in the footsteps of England and Germany by industrializing their economy in the nineteenth century.
\textsuperscript{181} The difficulty with converting apple and wine production lay in the large investment of equipment and labor force; experts also claimed that, for winegrowing, the soil was not of a high enough quality for the production of other foods.
\textsuperscript{182} Milhau, “L’Avenir,” 700.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., 724.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
the British government had distributed milk to schoolchildren to defend their health and even to improve the development of their size and weight.186

While a glut of generic wine saturated the French market, the country produced much less of the fine wines of the AOC. For the anti-alcohol coalition, the growers of these quality wines were not a part of the problem because they had low yields and their wines commanded a high price. Fine wines accounted for approximately six to eighteen percent of the wine harvest. In 1954, for example, only 12.8 million hectoliters of “vins à appellation” were declared compared to 46.0 million hectoliters of “vin ordinaire.”187 Developing AOC wines would free up the labor force and lower yields. Dumont argued that the manpower required for winegrowing made the industry inefficient and weakened the national economy. The anti-alcohol coalition lamented that 1,500,000 citizens cultivated 1,500,000 hectares of vines.188 It should also be noted that, although they did not yet see eye-to-eye, anti-alcohol advocates and AOC winegrowers shared an interest in limiting production, driving up prices, and eliminating big viticulture’s cheaper rivals.

To reorient and diversify their production, southern winegrowers would need irrigation to compensate for the region’s arid climate. Philippe Lamour, an important reformer of the postwar wine industry, a member of the agricultural group of the Economic Council, and a future protagonist in the state’s anti-alcohol campaign, devised a plan to build a canal in the Rhône and Languedoc regions.189 La Journée vinicole, France’s progressive winegrowing newspaper, supported the cause of the canal and larger viticultural reforms. On 4 August 1953, Alfred Sauvy penned an article in its pages discussing the need to reform the wine economy, noting that, as an “unrepentant technocrat,” “the defense of private interests pushed to the extreme will lead France to decadence,” and that “The problem of alcohol and winegrowing is one of the most striking examples of this degeneration.”190

This new scientific knowledge struggled to gain political legitimacy in the period between 1946 and 1954. Grafting an economic problem onto a medical one seemed like a long logical leap. How could the anti-alcohol coalition sell this new knowledge to the state? More than alcohol was at stake; its defenders suggested that to question alcohol was to question individual rights, parliamentary democracy, and French identity itself.

VI. The Legislative Problem

In the immediate postwar years, the new anti-alcohol coalition rebuked the state for failing to enact an anti-alcohol policy that would attenuate alcohol’s power. The anti-

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186 For an understanding of the school meal service in interwar Britain, see Vernon, *Hunger*, 161-180.
alcohol coalition sought not only to reduce alcoholism by reforming agriculture, but firstly and most importantly to convince public officials to change their policy on alcohol.191 “…we can say,” wrote Léon Dérobert, a doctor at the Faculty of Medicine of Paris and head of the section on alcoholism at the INH, in 1945, “that alcoholism is no longer a medical question, not more than it is a question of hygiene, but that it is and should have always been a question of government and of authority.”192 The Comité national de défense contre l’alcoolisme (CNDCA), France’s main anti-alcohol lobby, reinforced the point that the state needed to modify its alcohol policy, complaining that in 1951 the Ministry of Agriculture had granted the CNPFV 50 million francs, whereas the Minister of Public Health had given the CNDCA but 500,000 francs.193

Doctors and technocrats struggled to penetrate and reform the vastly diverse countryside, where small proprietors dotted the landscape. The alcohol industries constituted a large electoral bloc. France had one and a half million winegrowers and more than three million home distillers (some of whom were also winegrowers), including the numerous farmers for whom the production of wine, cider, or alcohol was not their principal profession and therefore did not constitute a financial necessity for their existence. Beet growers numbered about 150,000.194 Including the merchants and the owners of drinking establishments, we arrive at nearly 5 million persons who worked in the alcohol industry and who formed a formidable persuasive force upon Parliament.195

193 Alcool ou santé 4 (1952): 33. In a letter of 20 May 1953, Henri Rouvillaïs, President of the CNDCA and member of the Academy of Medicine, wrote to the Minister of Public Health: “It is indeed very bothersome to observe that we only benefit from a subsidy of 500,000 francs, reserved to the functioning of “a sole dispensary,” whereas the Comité national de propagande en faveur du vin obtained a subsidy of 50 million for boasting of the virtues of a product that is responsible for two thirds of the cases of alcoholism.” I found this letter in ANPAA in box labeled “Archives internes.”
The alcohol lobbies dominated the Commission des boissons\textsuperscript{196} and the Commission de l’agriculture\textsuperscript{197} of both the National Assembly and the Senate.\textsuperscript{198} Through the Conseil supérieur des alcools (CSA), they could apply direct pressure upon the Service des alcools at the Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, in 1951, beet growers and distillers established the Institut français de l’alcool (IFA), a research institute that furnished the state with scientific research, searched for new outlets for alcohol, and sought to maintain the state alcohol regime.\textsuperscript{199}

The problem, as the anti-alcohol coalition saw it, was primarily Parliament. Because of their large numbers, alcohol producers had a powerful influence upon the legislature.\textsuperscript{200} The alcohol lobbies had succeeded in courting Parliament and in hindering economic change. Moreover, during the Fourth Republic, Parliament toppled one government after another, which prevented continuity of thought within the ministries. Anti-alcohol activists envisioned a campaign that could transcend party politics and Parliament. The campaign needed to find shelter from the political storm. In the Resistance, Robert Debré had called for a “dictatorship” of anti-alcoholism;\textsuperscript{201} and, in 1954, Étienne May reiterated the need for a planning commission that could coordinate an anti-alcohol campaign and that would ultimately triumph over “particular interests.”\textsuperscript{202}

In the early 1950s, parliamentary supporters of the anti-alcohol campaign were still outnumbered. Industrialization had yet to deplete the countryside and the power of agricultural interests. According to Léon Dérobert, in 1951, Marcel David, the reporter for the Commission des finances of the National Assembly, cried out that “it is not enough to denounce the plague, we have to try to stop it. It is important to pass the necessary legislation. In this respect, we must acknowledge the fact that the fault is more here than in the country.”\textsuperscript{203} But men like David walked alone. When the state needed to balance the budget, Parliament listened more closely to anti-alcohol activists about the

\textsuperscript{196} Drink Commission.
\textsuperscript{197} Agricultural Commission.
\textsuperscript{199} Malignac and Colin showed concern for this new institute; see their, \textit{L’Alcoolisme}, 83.
\textsuperscript{201} AN, 72AJ/247. “Lutte contre l’alcoolisme, Plan de dix ans,” 1945, 4. Debré called for “A dictator for the campaign against alcoholism responsible for a ten-year plan and attached to the Ministry of Health and Population.”
\textsuperscript{202} May, “Problème de l’alcoolisme en France,” 188. Even after Pierre Mendès France would establish the Haut Comité d’études et d’information sur l’alcoolisme (HCEIA) in November 1954, Jacques Sylvain Brunaud, a civil administrator at the Ministry of Finance, argued that it was not enough. He noted that the HCEIA did not have the means to intervene in the economy and that the Service des alcools could contribute more extensively to agricultural reform. See his \textit{Rapport sur le coût annuel}, 91.
\textsuperscript{203} Dérobert, \textit{L’Économie de l’alcoolisme}, 224.
need to raise alcohol taxes; but in more prosperous times, only the lonely Commission de la santé, de la famille et de la population defended the anti-alcohol cause.  

The southern growers of mass wines had particularly impeded political action and economic reform. Whenever a government failed to rescue these growers from overproduction, they took to the streets. The immediate postwar period marked the most crippling crisis that winegrowing had undergone since 1907, when 500,000 strong rallied in the streets of Montpellier demanding that the government come to their aid. In desperate times, the local political elite resigned and commerce closed shop; with the support of the population, winegrowers managed to paralyze the whole of the regional economy. Breaking up the vineyard monoculture of the south could sap the political strength of wine. Rice farmers and winegrowers, for example, would share less of a common interest, given that they produced different foods. It is worth noting that the Radical, Socialist, and Communist parties had a preponderant influence in the region; these parties, typically thought of as the parties of movement, were pegged by technocrats as the parties of the status quo.  

Immediately after World War Two, the agricultural policy of the 1930s that the anti-alcohol coalition abhorred was restored. Although Charles de Gaulle’s provisional government promised to maintain and add to Vichy’s anti-alcohol laws, with its return, Parliament buried the measures in the dirt of the Vichy past. The return of peace reinstated the old problem of alcohol overproduction and producers therefore searched

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204 On the finance commission’s interest in the possibility of raising taxes, see, for example, Journal officiel de la République française: Débats parlementaires, Assemblée nationale, “séance du lundi 18 mai 1953,” 19 May 1953.
205 AN, F/1CI/248. These dossiers contain correspondence between the Ministry of the Interior and local politicians on the wine crisis between 1950 and 1954. On 26 January 1954, the Indépendant noted that a delegation of winegrowers commemorated the victims of the 1907 Midi revolt.
207 Maligac and Colin, L’Alcoolisme, 105.
208 The dismantling of the Vichy decrees elicited the disdain of Vincent Auriol, President of the Republic: “The Chamber has reestablished Pernod, the aperitif with an alcohol base that we had worked so hard to suppress, in order to cover by the tax the state-funded family income supplements (prestations familiales). They say: “Everyone serves it, everyone drinks it, no one says anything; it is preferable to authorize it, thus the taxes will be paid.” It is a crazy way of understanding the duty and also the notion of the state. We no longer apply laws in France. We console ourselves easily. We no longer apply the law on the rise and illicit speculation, we replaced it. We no longer applied the law on Pernod, we suppressed it. Thus we will intoxicate the working class, for it is this group that gets intoxicated, we are going to incite it to spend money and desert family life, we are going to make alcoholics and miserable people. It is dreadful, and I wonder who has led this game. I am going to speak about it to the Council of Ministers. For the suppression of these aperitifs is the one good thing done by Vichy.” See Vincent Auriol, Journal du Septennat 1947-1954, vol. 5 (Paris: Tallandier, 2003), 165. Marc Boninchi also uses this citation in Vichy et l’ordre moral, 260-261.
for outlets instead of cutting production. As in the past, overproduction and the state’s inability to offer a sound solution to the problem led to political protest.\(^\text{209}\) The alcohol lobbies blamed the anti-alcohol campaign for scaring away their customers.

The alcohol lobbies wielded potent arguments. Firstly, they associated anti-alcoholism with the Vichy regime: anti-alcohol campaigns were not only an affront to the individual’s right to drink, but also to free trade and to parliamentary democracy.\(^\text{210}\) After years of deprivation and distress, the population wanted to indulge. Secondly, anti-alcoholism ultimately undermined both prosperity and public health: raising alcohol taxes encouraged “fraudulent” alcohol production, which meant tax evasion and oftentimes the addition of chemicals to the concoctions.

These arguments influenced the state’s decision to return to its 1930s policy of advocating consumption. In 1946, the Constituent Assembly abrogated de Gaulle’s ordinance of 20 October 1945. In 1951, the National Assembly dismantled the anti-alcohol decrees of September 1941. Also in 1951, the advertising of wine-based aperitifs and of all liqueurs was again made legal. Although the prohibition on advertising of industrial-alcohol-based aperitifs remained in force, the law established no penalties for violation. The parliamentarians used a tactic to repeal these laws: the vote by hand. As a result, the abrogation of 1946 and 1951 were not published in *Journal officiel*.\(^\text{211}\) Robert Debré would in retrospect put it bluntly: “Electoral interests prevail over all…Each time that the problem of alcohol is posed before Parliament, the deputies have been placed in an apparently insoluble difficulty: how to satisfy the demands of the alcohol producers—whose influence on the electoral scene is considerable—without however incurring the anger of the anti-alcohol organizations—who represent an important number of electors?”\(^\text{212}\) In May of the same year, the legislation that banned the manufacture of industrial-alcohol-based aperitifs and liqueurs, particularly the anise-flavored ones, was repealed. Later, at the Economic Council, Étienne May demonstrated that since the Liberation taxes on alcohol had favored consumption while making prohibitory the price of non-alcoholic drinks such as mineral water.\(^\text{213}\)

The anti-alcohol coalition claimed that the subtle persuasion of alcohol advertising made citizens into victims.\(^\text{214}\) In 1950-1951, at the Institut d’études

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\(^\text{209}\) By the early 1950s, southern winegrowers staged their largest demonstration since 1907. The Ministry of the Interior kept correspondence with the local prefects. See AN, F/ICI/248.


\(^\text{211}\) I found no discussion of these laws in either the debates in the National Assembly or the Senate.


\(^\text{214}\) Doctors also looked to the 1930s as a bad example in alcohol advertising. On this subject, see Sarah Howard, “The Advertising Industry and Alcohol in Interwar France,” *Historical Journal* 51 (2008): 421-455; or her *Les images de l’alcool en France*. For a
politiques, Sauvy gave a series of lectures on alcohol advertising and its insidious intent. Others showed how in the newspapers, on the streets, and on the highways were advertisements for aperitifs, digestifs, liquors, and wine. A law of 24 May 1951 had prohibited advertisements with an alcohol base, but it was seldom applied. Alcohol companies sponsored sporting events, and children reportedly wore paper hats that familiarized them with the various alcohol brands. In 1952, the wine lobby distributed blotters in the schools indicating that a liter of wine at 12 percent alcohol was the nutritional equivalent of 850 grams of milk, 370 grams of bread, 585 grams of meat, or five eggs. The same bloter had a diagram showing that a liter of wine balanced these foods.

In 1948, the state allowed the reconstitution of CNPFV, which, backed by some influential doctors, edified the population about the grapes of the vine and claimed that consuming wine “remains the best way to fight against alcoholism.” Anthropologist Barbara Gallatin Anderson astutely observed that wine drinking began while the child was still in near-infancy. Drinking wine was already a habit before French children were old enough to reflect about it.

Because of the power of the alcohol lobbies and a constitutional system that still gave great weight to Parliament, in the period between 1946 and 1954, little legislation passed to curb France’s rising alcoholism.

VII. The Anti-Alcohol Coalition Calls the State to Arms

The new anti-alcohol coalition solicited the support of public opinion in its crusade to blacken the reputation of the alcohol lobbies and their parliamentary allies. Between 1946 and 1954, two main forces attempted to mobilize the public: the work of the CNDCA, France’s main anti-alcohol lobby; and the progressive press, with its dramatic portrayal of demon drink.

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215 Georges Malignac and Robert Colin mention this in L’Alcoolisme, 80.
216 In 1948, the issue of alcohol advertising came before the Economic Council, but this representative body voted in favor of advertising, claiming that prohibitory measures promoted fraud. See Charles Bonnet, “Boissons alcooliques,” Journal officiel de la République française: Avis et rapports du Conseil économique, 30 April 1948, 95-98.
218 AN, F/10/5383, “Tract de l’Association de propagande pour le vin financé par le Comité national.”
220 Sauvy believed that statistics would suffice in persuading the public of the need to act. He wrote about the importance of public opinion in L’Opinion publique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1956).
Doctors concerned about the social effects of drinking had a well-designed weapon: the CNDCA. In 1951, the Ligue national contre l’alcoolisme had become the CNDCA. The CNDCA’s leaders repudiated the moral dimension of the earlier temperance movement and developed a more scientific approach to alcoholism that couched the condition in medical observation and in an assessment of the relationship between economic stagnation and alcoholism. They advocated “moderate” drinking, not abstinence. The CNDCA had its own review, Alcool ou santé, that, given its clarity of language, tried to appeal to a mass audience. It kept its readers abreast of the latest medical research on alcoholism, and of any political actions that favored or countered the condition.

Doctors had a strong presence in the CNDCA, but other professionals and politicians joined them, which reveals how anti-alcoholism embraced stakeholders beyond the medical domain. At its founding, the CNDCA’s patronage committee included 10 ministries, the presidents of the Academy of Medicine, the Patronat français, the Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens, and the Confédération générale de l’agriculture. Its scientific committee contained 25 eminent doctors and scientists. The CNDCA appeared to create a united bloc, which technocrats had already deemed necessary for economic modernization.

From 1953, the CNDCA also began to establish departmental committees that, by their decentralized nature, could check the alcohol lobbies’ local propaganda. The departmental committees gradually grew, and by December 1962, 71 departments were represented. It would be an exaggeration, however, to suggest that life in the

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221 It should be noted that the CNDCA’s first president was Henri Rouvillois, who from 1946 was president of the Academy of Medicine.
222 The Ligue national contre l’alcoolisme, founded in 1905, and which would for the most part unify the anti-alcohol market, was the fusion of the Société française de tempérance, established in 1873, and the Union française antialcoolique, created in 1895.
223 In France, the argument was too strong that American Prohibition had created more problems than good.
224 The Employers’ Union.
225 The French Confederation of Christian Workers.
226 The General Confederation of Agriculture.
228 In 1946, Jean Monnet had noted that in order for the Plan to succeed, it would need to create a myth of unity around modernization.
229 This is not unlike the case of cigarettes and local initiatives to ban public smoking; for an example of this in California, see Stanton A. Glantz and Edith D. Balbach, Tobacco War: Inside the California Battles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). Local initiatives had occurred before the 1950s, but with much less ardor. For an understanding of the rural temperance movement in the late nineteenth century, see Prestwich, “The French Temperance Movement and the Problem of Rural Alcoholism,” 182-192.
departmental committees was tranquil. At a screening of an anti-alcohol film down in the winegrowing Hérault, some hecklers reportedly interrupted the film to advise the audience to “drink wine.” Up in the Côtes-du-Nord, Doctor Gautier, the departmental health director, purportedly thwarted the departmental committee’s projects; refused to post the committee’s propaganda; and more generally, attacked the committee’s mission. But these kinds of incidents appeared to be in the minority. It would be difficult to measure the success of the departmental committees, but the fact that most of them were successfully established evinces a new receptivity among local populations.

In order to circumvent the legislature, anti-alcohol activists attempted to sway public opinion. Given the place of alcohol in French sociability, the task would be tough. Anti-alcohol reformers blamed France’s supposedly low standard of living upon the state’s alcohol regime. In 1950, Sauvy dramatically demonstrated that the alcohol that went to making gasoline from beets cost the state 15 billion francs, “the equivalent of 10,000 homes every year, or rather a city the size of Cherbourg.” Two years later, in a debate on the public health budget in the National Assembly, Jean Cayeux, deputy and member of the Commission de la famille, de la population et de la santé publique, in hearing that the state alcohol regime would cost the country 15 billion for the year, replied: “It would be better to build homes and not reduce the money devoted to construction.”

Some of the mainstream press echoed the state’s growing concern for alcoholism. Newspapers such as Le Figaro, Le Monde, and L’Express, Pierre Mendès France’s mouthpiece, supported the cause of reform and tried to persuade the public of its necessity. Ouest France, Brittany’s principal newspaper and a bastion of home distillation, also published the INED’s statistics in a positive light. After the 24th annual International Congress Against Alcoholism in Paris between 8 and 10 September 1952, Le Figaro ran the headline, borrowed from Sauvy: “For every 100 francs spent by were in the winegrowing south. See “Un entretien avec Madeleine Potel sur les Comités départementaux du CNDCA,” Alcool ou santé 3 (1973): 31.

231 Archives du Comité départemental de defense contre l’alcoolisme de l’Hérault (hereafter CDDCA). I found this in an unmarked newspaper, 1957 (?).


233 The departments of the Aude and the Gard were reported to have been the most difficult places to install local committees.


236 Though it should be kept in mind that many newspapers made their money from alcohol advertising.

the French, a little more than 10 francs are devoted to alcoholic drink.”238 In *Le Monde*, M. Chenebois censured the government for wasting money on alcohol when new homes needed building. “If the government hesitates to protect interests that have between them no common interest, if it does not choose for the good of the country, we demand a referendum: “A roof for each family or a drink for each French person?”239 They blamed the state for purchasing alcohol for which it had no use and for creating the conditions for an “alcoholic” lifestyle.

Anti-alcohol reformers and their friends in the press condemned the state and its “vested interests” for preventing the people from enjoying a higher standard of living. In this way, reformers pitted the people against the groups that supposedly supported the status quo. Marcel Niedergang at *Réforme* excoriated the press for being the puppets of the alcohol lobbies and for providing the population with misinformation: “Problem of the formation of public opinion in a democratic regime, therefore a problem of financial or political means, alcoholism is maintained by the powers of money that make a living on it.”240 *L’Aurore* ran an article bluntly entitled: “The true people responsible for alcoholism are the parliamentarians.”241

The INED canvassed public opinion on the gravity of the alcohol problem. According to the INED, since the end of the war, ordinary people had begun to become aware of the dangers of drink. A public opinion poll carried out in 1948 showed that 61 percent of men and 71 percent of women believed that alcoholism posed a danger to the future of France; at the same time, however, few people implicated wine in the problem.242 Popular attitudes had not much changed by the time that the INED conducted another survey in December 1953.243

In trying to counter this alcohol constituency and its interest groups, anti-alcohol reformers looked to a new and potentially progressive political force: women. The coalition considered women as natural political allies.244 In pursuing the female vote,

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242 *Population* (July-September 1948).


244 In fact, many politicians viewed women as key to changing consumer habits. For the role of women in consumption, see, for example, Lisa Tiersten, *Marianne in the Market: Envisioning Consumer Society in Fin-de-Siècle France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); and Marie-Emmanuelle Chessel, “Consommation, action sociale et engagement public fin de siècle, des États-Unis à la France,” in *Au nom du consommateur: Consommation et politique en Europe et aux États-Unis au XXe siècle*, eds. Alain Chatriot, Marie-Emmanuelle Chessel, and Matthew Hilton (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 2004), 247-261.
which represented over half of the population, the anti-alcohol coalition hoped to overcome the alcohol industries’ parliamentary defenders. In *Les informations sociales* of November 1951, Alfred Sauvy noted:

But the political position of the alcohol lobbies is overestimated. The parliamentarians have not yet really seen all the consequences of the female vote instituted in 1945 that doubled the electorate. Women are the biggest victims of alcoholism and can one day defend themselves if we give them the means. This is not a lost cause.\(^{245}\)

His colleague Sully Ledermann had his doubts, suggesting that the home distillers easily influenced the countrywomen’s political decisions.\(^{246}\)

The press printed its news of how alcoholism was linked to the country’s low standard of living at the same moment that discussions began in Parliament on the future of the state alcohol regime. As we have seen, after the war, with the return of overproduction, the state began to show signs of concern for how much it lost in alcohol subsidies and in alcoholism. In 1950, both Parliament and the Economic Council began its investigation of the problem of alcohol overproduction and the role of the state in coping with it.

Barriers immediately went up in the National Assembly to the possibility of reducing state alcohol subsidies. On 31 March 1950, Jean-Raymond Guyon,\(^{247}\) deputy from the winegrowing Gironde, president of the Commission des finances of the National Assembly, and president of the CSA, went before the National Assembly. He scoffed his critics who linked alcoholism to the state’s alcohol regime. In defending his cause, he elicited the sympathy of the entire farm population:\(^{248}\) “The essential and primordial problem of alcohol, it is the problem of French agriculture. When, for various reasons, the state alcohol monopoly is called into question, it is the entirety of the balance of our agriculture that is at stake.”\(^{249}\) Both Guyon and the beet lobby demonstrated that the largest part of beet production served industrial, not commercial, interests.\(^{250}\)

On 4 April 1950, the National Assembly sent its view of the alcohol regime to the Economic Council, arguing that the alcohol statute defended agriculture and that the state

\(^{245}\) Cited in *Alcool ou santé* 2 (1952): 11.

\(^{246}\) Ledermann, *Alcool, alcoolistme, alcoolisation: Données scientifiques de caractère physiologique, économique et social*, 44-45.

\(^{247}\) Guyon was also an adamant defender of Bordeaux wine; see his more historical work on the politics of that region’s wine industry, *Au Service du vin de Bordeaux: un demi-siècle de défense et d’organisation de la vini-viticulture girondine* (Bordeaux: Imprimeries Delmas, 1956).

\(^{248}\) *Journal officiel de la République française: Débats parlementaires, Assemblée nationale*, “2e séance du vendredi 31 mars 1950,” 1 April 1950, 2,727-2,728.


needed to find new outlets for alcohol. Parliamentary resistance did not stop there. With a decree of 15 May 1950, the government created an extra-parliamentary commission to investigate the economic problems created by alcohol overproduction. It concluded in favor of the alcohol monopoly and the support that it gave both to agriculture and to industry. The National Assembly refused to budge.

But the anti-alcohol coalition made headway at the Economic Council. Sauvy successfully circulated the INED’s ideas to most of the council’s interest groups. He urged them to consider public health. In both 1950 and 1953, the council questioned medical experts about the effect that the alcohol statute had upon France’s rising alcoholism. In 1950, Léon Dérobert, representing the Ministry of Public Health, informed the council that statistics showed indisputably that alcohol surpluses led to alcoholism. One need only look, he claimed, at the experience of the war; as production levels dropped, so did consumption. In 1953, public health advocates pushed harder. Monsieur Jean, a civil administrator in the Ministry of Public Health, argued that “the very root of the problem (of alcoholism) is the economic problem” and that the solutions to it would “interest the ensemble of the French economy;” he hoped that “one day we nonetheless manage truly to attack this question of production.”

In both 1950 and 1953, the Economic Council voted largely in favor of a reform to the alcohol statute. Yet the agricultural groups continued to oppose reform. Defenders of alcohol thought that the anti-alcohol campaign reeked of conspiracy. In defending the state alcohol monopoly, Henri Cayre, general secretary of the IFA and leader of the beet lobby, lamented that “the alcohol producer has become the scapegoat who is responsible for all the wounds of the Fourth Republic!” At the General Assembly of the CGB on 14 January 1953, M. Henri said that the alcohol monopoly had become one of the “scapegoats of the Fourth Republic.” Alcohol producers doubted their responsibility in France’s economic and public health problems.

Beet growers, cider producers, and winegrowers refused to leave the land. Given their common interest in the maintenance of the state alcohol regime, to a certain extent, they unified to defend their products from both falling prices and the anti-alcohol

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252 The commission’s work resulted in Guyon’s Le Problème d l’alcool.

253 Sauvy remembered the Economic Council as a place to wage war upon alcohol; he even asked René Dumont to publish an article in Population entitled “Alcool ou lait et viande?” See Sauvy’s, La vie en plus: souvenirs (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1981), 140.


These groups also claimed that the monopoly protected the consumer from “fraudulent” alcohol production, thereby reducing the citizen’s risk of becoming an alcoholic.

Consumer advocates went in two general directions when confronted with the drink question: they followed the Union fédérale de la consommation (UFC), with which Sauvy was affiliated, or they followed the Communist Party. The UFC blamed the state alcohol monopoly for setting the price of alcohol at a higher rate than a free market would allow. It encouraged the state to consider the consumer as much as the producer, and pushed for quality wine production. In general, it supported the anti-alcohol campaign.

The Communists viewed the anti-alcohol campaign as an attack upon the little fellow. The party supported the home distiller, the bistro, and the working-class consumer. It believed in the necessity of wine to the working-class diet. Even François Billaux, Communist Minister of Public Health at the Consultative Assembly, maintained that “when one speaks of alcoholism, it is not a matter of confusing wine with alcohol.” Although the Communists did not deny that alcoholism existed, they viewed it as a symptom of working-class poverty and oppression; the coming revolution would eradicate the condition.

Defenders of the state alcohol regime tried to transfer the alcohol problem onto home distillation and fraud. At the hearings on the state alcohol monopoly at the Economic Council in 1950, doctor J. Denoyes, general secretary of the Fédération des Associations viticoles (FAV), spoke on behalf of the alcohol interests. He showed concern for the fate of the beet: technocrats no longer believed in its contribution to industry, such as in making an alcohol-based gasoline. Denoyes confirmed his total support for an “efficient policy against alcoholism” and believed that this policy would be most effective if production were “centralized and controlled.” Denoyes no doubt pointed his finger at the home distillers. Both the state alcohol regime and AOC wine industry were “centralized and controlled,” which could help protect public health.

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258 Gabriel Taïx, “Étude des problèmes posés par les excédents d’alcool,” Journal officiel de la République française: Avis et rapports du Conseil économique, “séance du 8 juillet 1953,” 21 July 1953, 510. AOC winegrowers were much less willing to join this somewhat united front.

259 The Federal Union of Consumption.


261 UFC, Bulletin d’information (September-October 1952): 17.


263 AN, CE/353. Dr. J. Denoyes, “Régime économique de l’alcool: position prise par les productions agricoles alcooligènes,” no date but sometime in 1950, 22.
through a tighter control of production and strengthen the treasury through taxes. By invoking the problem of fraud, the commercial drink trade had begun to seek allies in the anti-alcohol fold.

For the moment, however, the anti-alcohol coalition continued to view the problem in black and white: one was either pro- or anti-alcohol. In the summer of 1953, a large number of groups—prefects, general councils, the municipalities, the Academy of Medicine, and, as Bernard E. Brown has included, professors and representatives of the automobile, oil, and steel and chemical industries—called for the public powers to take action against alcoholism, a condition that in this case indicted the vested interests of agriculture and a sturdy rural population that had until the Fourth Republic been largely considered the backbone of French society.

After the Economic Council came out with its recommendations to cut alcohol subsidies, the state began cautiously to attempt to reform the wine industry and the alcohol monopoly that protected it. In May 1953, René Mayer placed the reform of the alcohol statute into his larger plan to redress the economy, but the alcohol lobbies mobilized their political friends, branded him the “murderer of French agriculture,” and had a powerful hand in his government’s fall.

The reformers of the state alcohol monopoly have not hesitated to turn upside down the whole state alcohol system and to take away from the agricultural producers the few elementary securities that this system gave them. Alerted by agricultural representatives, our deputies have reacted. And it is probably one of the reasons that motivated the fall of the Mayer Government.

Yet the attack upon alcohol did not come to a crashing halt. Joseph Laniel, who replaced the fallen Mayer, learned from his predecessor: he obtained special powers from Parliament and issued a decree of 9 August 1953 that provided for the gradual reduction

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264 *Alcool ou santé* 9 (1953): 23-27. Among these groups were prefects, general councils, municipalities, and the Academy of Medicine.

265 “Adoption d’un voeu au nom de la Commission de l’alcoolisme,” *Bulletin de l’Académie de Médecine*, “séance du 30 juin 1953.” At this meeting, Henri Rouvillois, member of the Academy of Medicine and head of the CNDCA, urged his colleagues to view alcoholism as primarily a problem of production, not consumption.

266 Brown, “Alcohol and Politics in France,” 993. Alan S. Milward also mentions the importance of the oil-refining industry, along with the Ministry of Finance, in opposing beet policy; see his *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 273-274.


268 *Alcool et dérivés*, June 1953, 5.
of alcohol quotas; by 1958, they would total 2,775,000 hectoliters instead of the 3,770,000 hectoliters in 1954. The government ordered production cuts for beet alcohol distilleries not attached to sugar refineries. The quota price of wine alcohol also fell below cost.\textsuperscript{269} It should be noted, however, that Henri Cayre, general secretary of the CGB, claimed to have contributed to the drafting of the alcohol decrees.\textsuperscript{270} Alcohol legislation passed only when the alcohol interests allowed.

The reformed alcohol statute of 9 August 1953 did not satiate the forces of anti-alcoholism. Georges Malignac, an economic expert at both the INED and the INSEE, feared that the lobbies would find a way to suspend the decrees, and criticized the government for not having gone far enough, noting that in five years the state would still subsidize the distillation of 7,500,000 hectoliters of alcohol that it could have instead invested in 30,000 new homes.\textsuperscript{271} He finished by saying that “An occasion to repress the finances and the economy of the country has been lost;”\textsuperscript{272} “…an outdated agricultural structure will thus be artificially maintained thanks to a protection that is accorded to no other agricultural product.”\textsuperscript{273} During the debates on the alcohol reforms of 1953, few political leaders made mention of alcoholism. The problems of alcohol surpluses and alcoholism still resided in different worlds.

But the early months of 1954 marked a turning point. The anti-alcohol drive accelerated. Discussions at the Economic Council switched from alcohol overproduction to alcoholism. In January, Étienne May, Debré’s associate at the Academy of Medicine and Sauvy’s colleague in the group Pensée française of the Economic Council, delivered a report to the council on French alcoholism. Despite objections from the Groupe des Chefs d’Entreprises,\textsuperscript{274} May called upon the state to attack alcoholism by attacking agriculture:

There is thus a general conclusion to draw from this chapter: it is that an efficient war on alcoholism must be accompanied by a reduction of production. It is vain to search to limit consumption, if the mass of alcoholic drinks is not also diminished, for this mass would quickly destroy the dikes that would have prevented its sale. The war on alcoholism will therefore be accompanied by important changes in the agricultural orientation of France. It is an immense but necessary task, which will be especially efficient if it can be carried out with the accord and sincere collaboration of the interested groups.\textsuperscript{275}

\textsuperscript{271} Georges Malignac, “Le nouveau statut de l’alcool,” \textit{Alcool ou santé} 10 (1953): 11.
\textsuperscript{272} Ibid., 12.
\textsuperscript{273} Malignac and Colin, \textit{L’Alcoolisme}, 49.
\textsuperscript{274} AN, CE/439. “Procès-verbal de la séance du mardi 27 octobre 1953,” 4. This group argued that May had no competence in the agricultural domain.
The campaign to reform agriculture in the name of public health continued. In July, just after Pierre Mendès France took power, the Commission de la famille, de la population et de la santé publique of the National Assembly systematically examined the links between excessive alcohol production and alcoholism.\(^{276}\) In August, while Mendès France pleaded with Parliament to permit his government to rule by decree in order to renovate the country’s economic structure, the commission released its report, arguing that to reduce alcoholism, the country needed to rationalize agriculture.\(^{277}\)

**Conclusion**

This chapter has tried to trace a new institutional and political advance upon alcohol. The movement was conceived in the final moments of the Third Republic, it developed under the Vichy regime, and it found full expression in the first years of the Fourth Republic. This new approach to alcoholism persisted because its original agents persisted. Men such as Debré and Sauvy held important posts in all three political systems.

Between 1939 and 1954, a new view of the political economy of alcohol came into being. The demographic technocrats at the INED, with the help of a part of the medical profession, saw alcohol surpluses as the principal cause of French alcoholism. Unlike in the nineteenth century, the anti-alcohol campaign focused much less upon spirits, which were concocted in concentrated industries, than fermented drinks, which were primarily produced by a widely dispersed and disparate peasantry. By showing peasants the consequences of their farming practices to the nation, the anti-alcohol campaign could help integrate them into the national political system.\(^{278}\)

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\(^{276}\) AN, C/15606. In its séance of 23 June 1954, this commission noted its desire to question Étienne May, who had recently delivered his report on alcoholism to the Economic Council, and also the Minister of Public Health and Alfred Sauvy. On 21 July 1954, a couple of weeks before the commission delivered its own report to the National Assembly, Étienne May spoke to the members of the commission.


blaming the product, instead of the “hereditary degenerate” who drank spirits, suggested that the whole population—this nation of wine drinkers—was at risk. After World War Two, the problem lay no longer with the deviation from the norm, but with the norm itself. As Sully Ledermann, statistician at the INED, put it in his book that would become pivotal to the state’s anti-alcohol policy: “…it would be vain to hope for a reduction of alcoholism in France without diminishing to a large extent the average consumption per person, that is to say, the global consumption and, finally, the French production of wine and alcohol.”\(^{279}\) Through an appeal to the “general interest,” the anti-alcohol coalition justified an intervention in the national economy.

Doctors and technocrats found in each other a common bond. Both groups believed that their respective work in medicine and in economy transcended party politics and served the common good. With the outbreak of the war and the experience of the Occupation, some doctors had come to believe that to reduce alcoholism demanded a check upon the alcohol industries’ unrestrained powers to shape consumer behavior; the availability and cheapness of alcohol ensured high levels of consumption. But precisely because of popular beliefs about drink,\(^ {280}\) and the political strength of an alcohol industry that underpinned those beliefs, doctors knew that they would need both political allies and a change in popular attitudes. Their interests converged with those of the technocrats who sought a structural realignment of the economy to rebuild a France weakened by the woes of economic depression and war. Both groups knew that they faced the daunting task of reforming an agricultural economy and a parliamentary system that had deep roots.\(^ {281}\)

To a certain extent, the apostles of anti-alcoholism had successfully begun to represent their adversaries as backward. The anti-alcohol movement vilified those who frustrated its forward momentum. In the aftermath of foreign occupation and dietary deprivation, as families grew and as people longed for consumer comforts and an easier way of life, alcohol appeared to burn the national budget. Unlike nineteenth-century critics who feared that drink politicized the popular classes in subversive ways,\(^ {282}\) the postwar anti-alcohol coalition viewed drinking as a habit that bred conservatism; or, at

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\(^{279}\) Ledermann, Alcool, alcoolisme, alcoolisation: Données scientifiques de caractère physiologique, économique et social, 159.

\(^{280}\) It should be noted that well into the 1960s a large percentage of the French population believed that wine was nourishing and an indication of their standard of living. See, for example, Roland Sadoun, Giorgio Lolli, and Milton Silverman, Drinking in French Culture (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Center of Alcohol Studies, 1965), 48-66.

\(^{281}\) For an understanding of Parliament and the economic and political problems of the 1930s, see Eugen Weber, The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994). It is worth noting that historian Robert O. Paxton observed a growing antagonism between experts and Parliament in the 1930s; see his Vichy France, 262.

\(^{282}\) For the rebellious role of drink in the early Third Republic, see Susanna Barrows, “‘Parliaments of the People”: The Political Culture of Cafés in the Early Third Republic,” in Drinking: Behavior and Belief in Modern History, eds. Susanna Barrows and Robin Room (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 87-97.
best, complacency. The status quo, in this new view, had to go. In the technocratic order of things, there was but one road to French economic modernization, and alcohol flooded the path. Give up the customary drink, the coalition promised, and a sober and stronger France would be born.

André Monnier of the CNDCA observed that the collective drinking of public men proved problematic in that it prevented the practice of politics: “the intoxication of public meetings does not seduce them very much, for they are more interested in the alcoholic fraternization of the café.” See Alcool ou santé 3 (1951): 12. American anthropologist Laurence Wylie captured this defeatism in his portrayal of the people of Peyrane: “Just as the past war almost wrecked what was already a rather feeble spirit of mutual confidence among the people, fear of the future war has destroyed confidence in the future.” See his Village in the Vaucluse (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 32. Mariana Valverde also views habit as conservative; she says: “Habits are fundamentally conservative, tending to keep us in our place and preserve the status quo...”; see her Diseases of the Will: Alcohol and the Dilemmas of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 35.

In 1956, Alfred Sauvy would say: “Twenty years ago, France was an old nation that, according to all the specialists, was going to disappear like Greece or Rome. Now, despite unbelievable difficulties, France has become a young country, thus bursting with future possibilities, and therefore capable of getting rid of alcoholism.” See “‘La France peut se debarrasser de l’alcoolisme,’ affirme, M. Alfred Sauvy,” Franc tireur, 8 October 1956.
Chapter Two:
The Milk Regime: Pierre Mendès France Mobilizes the State Against Alcohol, 1954-1955

Wishing to reform the tastes of the French public regarding what it drinks, the Government has taken the bull by its horns: but instead of a bull, it is a cow. Milk, until now considered in our country a food, has just been elevated to the title of national drink.

–Les Nouvelles, 1954

The political struggle to sober up France began with a glass of milk. In the months following Pierre Mendès France’s investiture speech on 17 June 1954, in which he had dramatically declared to the National Assembly that he would decolonize Indochina and “reconstruct France into a strong and prosperous nation,” photographs began to appear in the popular press that showed the new French premier drinking milk. “Mendès Lolo,” as the newspapers presented him, was a new kind of man. Premier at 47, Mendès France was sober and dynamic and young. The conservative daily Le Figaro portrayed Mendès France as a milk-drinking cowboy; for the communist L’Humanité, he was superman. Whatever strongman most accurately represented the new French premier, all colors of the political press could agree upon one thing—he was certainly an iconoclastic Frenchmen. Because of his deep attachment to capitalist modernization, the restoration of French power, and milk, they associated him with America.

The press depicted Mendès France’s milk drinking as a symbolic stand against France’s powerful alcohol industries. Since the end of the war, a coalition of doctors and technocrats had been calling upon the state to check France’s allegedly rising alcoholism. In order to reduce alcohol consumption, the coalition claimed, the state

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289 Note that many of these depictions came right after the announcement of his anti-alcohol program and his departure for the United States.
290 The Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE) statistically demonstrated that in the early 1950s the French were on the brink of beating their old record as the world’s heaviest drinkers. See its Annuaire statistique de la France. On the genesis of this institute, see Béatrice Touchelay, “L’INSEE des origins à 1961: évolution
would have to reform French political economy in general, and agriculture in particular. Alcohol producers were numerous and had a significant influence upon the legislature; the privileged position of alcohol in the state had allegedly impaired both public health and economic productivity. Yet between 1946 and 1954, as we have seen, the new anti-alcohol coalition had failed to find a political leader who had the audacity to link alcoholism to alcohol and agriculture.

But in 1954, a parliamentary majority brought Mendès France to power in order to modernize the economy. This chapter examines how, by way of Pierre Mendès France, the postwar anti-alcohol coalition mobilized the state against alcohol and its so-called “feudal elite.” Mendès France had witnessed the difficulties that the Mayer government of May 1953 had faced in trying to reform the state’s alcohol policy without rural consent. In his attempt to modernize farming, Mendès France promised to consult with the influential Chambers of Agriculture and the Fédération nationale des syndicats d’exploitants agricoles (FNSEA), France’s most powerful agricultural association and a close collaborator of two specialized associations: the Confédération générale des betteraviers (CGB), the main beet syndicate, and the Fédération nationale des producteurs de lait (FNPL), the principal dairy union. The government also listened to the Conseil supérieur des alcools (CSA), which represented beet growers, distillers, and the southern producers of ordinary wines within the Service des alcools at the Ministry of Finance. Mendès France hoped to bypass Parliament, the normal channel of decision-making, and to build a consensus around the need for economic change.

As a politician steeped in technocratic ideals of economic efficiency, Mendès France’s primary concern was agriculture, not alcoholism. This chapter argues that Mendès France’s decision to shift the terrain from a war on alcohol into a war on alcoholism was an attempt to depoliticize the discussion on the need to reform agriculture and to boost the industrialization of the country. Encouraging habitual drinkers to mend their ways was an indirect attack upon the power of the rural vote. The anti-alcohol campaign was thus one aspect of a modernizing agenda that pitched technocrats against the defenders of traditional rural life. The attack upon drink became less an attack upon


Other politicians recognized the alcohol lobbies as a “feudal elite.” Vincent Auriol, the President of the Republic, gave them this label in a speech at Pau on 29 June 1953. This quote can be found in Georges Malignac and Robert Colin, L’Alcoolisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), 88.

The FNSEA can be translated as the National Federation of Farmers’ Unions.


The CGB can be translated as the General Confederation of Beet Growers; the FNPL, the National Federation of Milk Producers. On France’s specialized associations in agriculture—in particular those concerning milk and wheat—see Denis Pesche, Le syndicalisme agricole spécialisé en France: Entre spécificité des intérêts et le besoin d’alliances (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000).
consumption than upon production. As a campaign to defend the common good, the war on alcoholism justified a technocratic intervention in the agricultural economy in the name of the “general interest.”

Let us begin by casting some light upon the life of Pierre Mendès France and of the men who worked in his shadow to design an anti-alcohol program capable of removing the obstacles to economic expansion.

I. A New Generation Mobilizes the State Against Alcohol

Among public figures in France, Mendès France had a longstanding reputation as a proponent of economic reform and as a political maverick. Although he had studied traditional political economy in his youth, by the early 1930s, he had begun to participate in the Young Turks and worked to rejuvenate the Radical Party. In the 1930s, he learned Keynesian economics. At the age of 25, he became the county’s youngest deputy, representing the rural department of the Eure. In 1938, Léon Blum appointed him as an undersecretary of the Treasury in his second Popular Front government.

World War Two left a lasting imprint upon Mendès France’s economic thinking. He learned a lot from his years with the government-in-exile in England. He admired the way the British mobilized their wartime economy. In November 1943, Charles de Gaulle made him Commissioner of Finance with the Comité français de libération nationale (CFLN) in Algiers; and when de Gaulle named his first cabinet in September 1944, he asked Mendès France to create a Ministry of National Economy.

As the most vocal spokesman for radical reform, after the war, Mendès France hoped to curb inflation and to move toward a planned economy. He wanted the de Gaulle government to launch a program of renewal that could sweep away old privileges. In his view, the most efficient way to accomplish the task was through ministerial coordination. To carry out effective action, the Ministry of National Economy needed to resolve ministerial conflict. Because his economic policies seemed risky, and because they demanded major political reforms, de Gaulle dismissed Mendès France. In 1953, Mendès France would step back into the political spotlight but would lose his nomination for premier because the majority of politicians in the National Assembly still found his

\[\text{296\ It is worth noting that the Young Turks took an interest in constitutional reform and wished to see a stronger Prime Ministry. Andrew Shennan makes this point in his, Rethinking France: Plans for Renewal, 1940-1946 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 108. For a history of the Young Turks, see Serge Berstein, Histoire du Parti radical: crise du radicalisme, 1926-1939 (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1982), 94-125.} \]


\[\text{298\ For the story of Mendès France’s early life, see, for example, Éric Roussel, Pierre Mendès France (Paris: Gallimard, 2007).} \]

\[\text{299\ French Committee for National Liberation.} \]
economic reforms too radical. Mendès France’s style of economic reform would have divested Parliament of some of its political power.

Yet with Mendès France, a new generation of technocrats concerned with the health of both the population and the economy had found their man. In the 1930s and in London during the war, many technocrats had frequented the same social circles as Mendès France. In the early 1950s, the young, technocratic elite pushed hard to bring Mendès France to power. In 1953, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber founded L’Express, which had the express purpose to promote Mendès France’s policies. Some of France’s brightest intellectuals contributed to the newspaper. Albert Camus, for example, wrote philosophical tracts, while Alfred Sauvy pleaded with the men of power either to act against the economic backwardness of alcohol and agriculture or to watch as the country declined in geopolitical status.

The technocrats at the Institut national d’études démographiques (INED), the Service des études économiques et financières (SEEF), the Planning Commissions, and the Ministry of Finance played a key role in shaping Mendès France’s political outlook. They hoped to use the new premier to legitimate their struggle to reform the

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French political economy. The technocrats who supported Mendès France had gained experience in the Resistance and emerged from the war with a desire to revolutionize public action by employing economic tools to rationalize the state—parliamentary decision-making needed to yield to technical expertise. In his entourage, Mendès France had such technocratic minds as Georges Boris, René de Lacharrière, Simon Nora, Paul Legatte, Claude Gruson, François Bloch-Lainé, and Étienne Hirsch. Several of these figures had worked at the Ministry of Finance. Mendès France recruited the well educated. His team had all graduated from similar schools: Sciences politiques, faculté de Droit, the École nationale d’administration (ENA) when it was established after the war, and the École polytechnique.

Mendès France immediately assembled a working group, under the authority of Claude Gruson, director of the Institut national de la statistique et des études économique (INSEE), that studied the measures necessary to boost productivity. The group focused upon the problem of France’s productive apparatus, the alleviation of which it believed to be the precondition for elevating the standard of living and consequently for eliminating social problems such as alcoholism. Alcohol surpluses dominated the working group’s discussion of agriculture. The group made five key proposals:

1) to further the decrees of 9 August 1953 and 4 September 1953 by reducing the alcohol quotas purchased by the state;

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305 Aude Terray examines the emergence of some of these figures in Des francs-tireurs aux experts.

306 Georges Boris played a key role in introducing Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal Policy to France; see his, La révolution Roosevelt (Paris: Gallimard, 1934). In April 1938, he and Mendès France explained Keynesian thought to the deputies in the National Assembly. For an understanding of Boris’ role in the Mendès France’s government of 1954-1955, see Jean-Louis Créémieux-Brilhac, George Boris, trente ans d’influence (Paris: Gallimard, 2010).


2) to lower the purchasing price of alcohol, and especially for alcohol derived from apples, and to discourage the production of “low-quality” alcohols;
3) to reduce the price of beets used for industrial purposes;
4) to develop forms of replacement farming, notably in guaranteeing an outlet for colza; to eliminate the direct distillation of apples;
5) to favor a policy of promoting high-quality wine by ensuring the re-conversion of a part of the vineyard, through the construction of a canal in the lower Rhône and through indemnities to winegrowers who uprooted their vines.\textsuperscript{311}

As these proposals suggest, the technocrats viewed the state’s protection of apples, the beet, and wine as a crucial hindrance to economic prosperity. But the expert committee also examined the problem of home distillation. It pushed the state either to terminate the home distillers’ privilege in its entirety or to limit it severely to only those entitled to the ten liters of tax-free alcohol. The group recognized the political difficulty in assailing the home distillers, remarking that the question was not exclusively of an “agricultural order.”\textsuperscript{312} As we have seen, at least until 1954, the Ministry of Finance had generally shown a lack of interest in monitoring the bootleggers’ activity.

Given that much of Mendès France’s entourage had held important posts at the Ministry of Finance, they were able to influence that ministry’s general outlook on alcohol. Despite their indecision on home distillation, by 1954, some officials in the Ministry of Finance had come to the conclusion that the home distillers’ privilege was an economic waste upon the country. It reported that while the commercialization of alcohol was in constant diminution, the production of the home distillers was in constant progression. “The production of the home distillers is in progression and the progression of alcoholism is parallel to the increase in taxes (cause of fraud).”\textsuperscript{313} The Ministry of Finance, then, largely exonerated commercial alcohol from the problem of alcoholism. Below, we will see why.

Also in July, the Commissariat général au plan,\textsuperscript{314} which provided the administration with scientific research to help create laws, conducted its own study that reinforced the proposals of Mendès France’s brain trust. It searched for ways to make agriculture more efficient and competitive in the international market. It saw France’s protectionist alcohol policy as the main obstacle to the modernization of French agriculture. In its view, the country needed to find a balance between supply and demand.\textsuperscript{315}

\textsuperscript{313} Centre des Archives économiques et financières (hereafter CAEF) 1A/460/3. “Quelques remarques sur l’alcoolisme en France.”
\textsuperscript{314} The Planning Commission.
In its *Programme d’équilibre financier, d’expansion économique et de progrès social*, Mendès France’s economic team pointed out that alcoholism stemmed from outdated economic structures. For the first time, officials viewed the alcoholic principally in economic terms. On the radio, Mendès France informed the population: “The sums annually wasted, as much on the exaggerated production of alcoholic drinks as for the treatment of the victims of alcoholism, reach an astronomical total, hundreds and hundreds of billions.” Politicians in Parliament who supported the anti-alcohol campaign also employed such rhetoric. The economic discourse on alcoholism officially masked the medical diagnosis.

Because of the difficulties in quickly converting viticulture, Mendès France’s team devised a longer-term plan for the wine industry. Simon Nora and Jean Saint-Geours, with the support of Philippe Lamour, an important if not eccentric agricultural leader, planned to install a canal in the Midi in order to allow farmers to produce goods other than wine. At a press conference on 19 January 1955, Lamour averred that “It is not the free choice of man, but the imperative of natural conditions that have led the monoculture of the vine to establish itself supremely in the Midi and we can escape from it only by proceeding to the irrigation of this region that is the guarantee of its future prosperity.” As he saw it, the only way out of France’s chronic wine crises was through a canal.

Mendès France wanted to make his economic policies transparent to the public. After coming to power, he published an important economic text with Gabriel Ardant. Although Alfred Sauvy participated little in the Mendès France government, since the Liberation, he had worked with Mendès France on economic policy and the INED’s work on alcohol and alcoholism largely informed Mendès France’s anti-alcohol policy. Mendès France asked Sauvy to publish a brochure that would make the government’s economic policy decipherable. Sauvy emphasized the need for economic and cultural development in reducing alcoholism.

Although Mendès France brought to his government a large team of technocrats who shared his values and goals, he still had to convince some of his own ministries of the need to act against alcohol. For good reasons, the Ministries of Agriculture and of Finance generally opposed anti-alcohol campaigns. The Minister of Agriculture had to protect the wine and alcohol interests, whereas the Minister of Finance tended to view the

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alcohol question in the short-term, typically seeing alcohol as a source of tax revenue and as a crucial component of national income accounts.

Mendès France nominated some old faces at the Ministry of Agriculture. Jean Raffarin, farmer, director of a milk cooperative, mayor, general councilor, Peasant deputy from the Vienne, was responsible for maintaining relations with the agricultural associations, and Roger Houdet, agronomist, Independent senator from the Seine-Maritime, and perennial Minister of Agriculture under the Fourth Republic, remained there under Mendès France. Houdet tried to soften the effects of Mendès France’s anti-alcohol policy. Just as the government discussed its anti-alcohol decrees in November 1954, Houdet reassured the Fédération internationale du commerce en gros des vins et spiritueux that the government was hardly intending “to encourage a campaign against the consumption of wine.”\(^{321}\) In December 1954, he went before the Commission des boissons of the National Assembly and promised to protect sweet wines from the tax increases.\(^{322}\) At the municipal council of Paris, André-Yves Breton cited Houdet as saying: “It would particularly not be a question of a war against wine drinking, nor a campaign to convince the French to give up this beverage that makes the mind clear and astute and gives them this light supplement of jubilation without which life would seem dreary.”\(^{323}\)

Mendès France appointed André Monteil as Minister of Public Health. As a member of the Mouvement républicain populaire (MRP) from the Finistère, he expressed concern for population problems\(^{324}\) and knew the economic ills of farming in Brittany, of which cider production and home distillation were no small symptoms.\(^{325}\) As he told the Commission de la famille, de la population et de la santé publique of the National Assembly in January 1955: “…Brittany is a remarkable land for apple trees, but it does not produce eating apples. When you are in Saint-Brieuc, Quimper, Vannes, if you want to consume eating apples, you have to pay a lot of money, for it is necessary to bring them in from afar.”\(^{326}\) For Monteil, too, the antidote to alcoholism was agricultural modernization.\(^{327}\)

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\(^{321}\) Midi vinicole, 13 November 1954.
\(^{322}\) Le Paysan du Midi, 16 December 1954.
\(^{326}\) AN, C/15606. “Audition de M. le ministre de la santé publique et de la population (M. André Monteil),” Commission de la famille, de la population et de la santé publique, National Assembly, 26 January 1955, 10.
\(^{327}\) In this respect, it is interesting to consider the difficulties of integrating rural Brittany in postwar France. On this subject, see Suzanne Berger, Peasants against Politics:
It appears that the various ministries offered little contestation to the design of Mendès France’s anti-alcohol decrees. Pierre Rouanet noted that before Mendès France announced the decrees, he had consulted with Roger Houdet, the Minister of Agriculture, and Edgar Faure, the Minister of Finance. For the moment, at least, the administration had come to a consensus about the role of the state’s alcohol policy in the country’s economic stagnation.

II. Mendès France Confronts the Legislature

In the wake of an expeditious ceasefire in Indochina in July 1954, Mendès France began to focus upon the country’s economic ills. In his plea with Parliament to reform the economy, Mendès France admitted to deputies that “we are sick.” Remedying the economy, from his perspective, was exigent. On 10 August 1954, Parliament approved of the Mendès France government’s economic plans and granted it special powers to rule by decree. The government would have, so long as it did not fall, until 31 March 1955 to undertake its surgery of the economy. For the moment, then, Parliament could not impede economic action.

Though Mendès France’s desire to reform the economy was met by a broad political consensus—361 voted in favor of reform, while but 90 voted against it—the Communists refrained from supporting Mendès France’s economic plans, as did André Liautey and Pierre Hénault, ardent defenders of the home distillers, and Camille Laurens and Jacques Le Roy Ladurie, impassioned agricultural spokesmen. Mendès France hoped to bypass Parliament and to work directly with the FNSEA. Early in August, Mendès France promised this syndicate, which had strong relations with the beet and dairy interests, that he would consult with its leaders before announcing his decrees. At the outset, the agricultural interests showed signs of hope in Mendès France; the government promised to promote the family farm, so long as it modernized and made

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328 AN, 4/AG/8. “Procès-verbal de la séance du Conseil des Ministres tenu le 10 novembre 1954.” It is difficult to know what exactly went on in the Council of the Ministers; only the Secrétariat général du gouvernement was allowed to take notes, and it is these notes to which I am referring.


330 Yet other international dilemmas, such as reconciliation with West Germany, diverted the best part of Mendès France’s attention away from the domestic economy.


itself economically viable. Yet the evidence suggests that the Syndicat national des bouilleurs de cru (SNBC) and the Confédération générale des vignerons du Midi (CGVM), two specialized associations that supported the so-called “small farmer” and that opposed Mendès France’s brand of economic modernization, had little contact with the government. As we will see, both the far right, under the leadership of men like Henry Dorgères or Pierre Poujade, and the socialists and communists, especially supported these associations. Both the far right and the far left defended the small family farm.

When the government passed its first set of decrees against alcohol production in September, it placed them under the category of agriculture. It had no fear of parliamentary uproar, for Parliament was not in session. In early September, Mendès France took measures to clean up the wine market and to encourage the production of quality wines. Then in late September, Mendès France spoke in Annecy about how reforming alcohol was crucial to the country’s economic renovation. He told his audience that “We must first of all, in every case, break with the practices that I have just denounced, with the artificial support given to excessive and impractical productions that waste, by whatever facility or whatever complaisance, the means of production of the country.” On September 30 and October 1, the government dictated that beet alcohol would be converted into sugar. It also announced that the state would distribute sugared milk to students, soldiers, and workers. The government promised to indemnify those distillers who would lose business to the sugar refineries.

In converting beet alcohol into sugar, beet farmers lost apparently no income, as beet prices would be the same. As Mendès France put it himself: “For the producer nothing has changed. For the nation, there is an immense difference: more sugar and less alcohol.” Mendès France did not view his September decrees as a great threat to agricultural interests. As he saw it, everyone won. Les Nouvelles, Ricard’s newspaper,

338 IPMF, Carton 1 (Économie). “Projets et propositions de loi et propositions de résolution intéressant les mesures prises dans le cadre de la loi du 14 août 1954.”
340 Ibid., 352.
which supported the state’s alcohol statute because it most likely received alcohol from it, even congratulated Mendès France for not mixing the alcohol problem with alcoholism: “at no moment was the word “Alcoholism” uttered...The problem of the Service des alcools is not the problem of Alcoholism.”

In November, however, the Mendès France government was forced to change its anti-alcohol strategy given the heated political situation. In October, Parliament had begun a new session, and debates on the budgets of the Ministries of Agriculture and of Public Health were imminent. Direct attacks upon the alcohol industries would be political suicide. Furthermore, by November, rural distress was leading to rural unrest. The government launched its war on alcoholism at the same moment that it attempted fiscal reform. Henry Dorgère, Pierre Poujade, and their respective movements courted the fiscally oppressed. In August, Poujade had begun to sweep across the countryside and mobilize peasants. Moreover, since 1953, southern winegrowers had taken to the streets in explosive scenes reminiscent of the uprisings of 1907, and had paralyzed the regional economy. They demanded that the government act against falling wine prices. France’s colonial crises compounded the sense of political instability in Paris. The November decrees came hot on the heels of the Aurès rebellion, which ignited Algeria’s war of independence. For France’s political elite, the sentiment of national decline was nearly palpable.

Given the country’s political instability, in November, the government placed its war on agriculture under the rubric of a “war on alcoholism.” The government began to conflate the alcohol problem with alcoholism in the hope that it would depoliticize its struggle to reform alcohol. The Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, and Public Health would have to cooperate. On November 13 and 17, Paul Legatte, an economic specialist, and M. Jean, head of the Bureau on alcoholism at the Ministry of Public Health, prepared the anti-alcohol decrees. The Ministries of Agriculture, of Finance, and of Public Health signed them.

Mendès France’s decrees targeted much less the so-called alcoholic than either the producers and drinking establishment owners who reputedly evaded taxes, or the producers who overproduced alcohol and demanded large state subsidies to sustain their existence. Most of the November decrees limited the privileges of the home distillers; but they also reduced the opening hours of drinking establishments, spiked the alcohol taxes, and, perhaps most importantly, established a permanent Haut Comité d’études et

343 In a letter of 2 December 1954 from Pierre Mendès France to the President of the CNDCA, Mendès France noted that his anti-alcohol measures “were largely based on the studies of the “National Committee for the Defense Against Alcoholism.”” See A.R., “La lutte contre l’alcoolisme en France: difficultés et progrès,” Alcool ou santé 1 (1966): 25.
In December 1954 and January 1955, the government presented Parliament with other bills, mostly dealing with new zoning laws for drinking establishments, to be debated and decided upon by members of Parliament.

The implications of the November decrees were far-reaching. Agricultural reform was no longer fully in the hands of agricultural and economic experts; doctors and public health specialists began to have a voice. In 29 December 1954, for example, just before the government presented a new set of anti-alcohol bills to the National Assembly, André Monteil, the Minister of Public Health, went before the Drink Commission of the National Assembly, which was dominated by representatives of alcohol in general and of wine in particular. He explained to its members the government’s reasoning behind its anti-alcohol policy, and assured them that the government did not intend to put the population on a prohibitory regime, nor did it intend to ruin alcohol producers. Yet he encouraged farmers to change their practices to align with the “general interest.”

Public health specialists increasingly became agricultural experts.

Eugène Dubois, President of the Institut français de l’alcool (IFA), vehemently opposed the tactics that the government had used in its anti-alcohol decrees. In the National Assembly on December 31, the government withdrew eight of its decrees from the month before and presented a new text with the intention of “the adoption of measures working toward the protection of public health.”

Mendès France could also bypass Parliament and appeal to the “general interest” by going directly to the public. Days before Mendès France announced his November decrees against alcoholism, he spoke to the Chamber of Commerce of Lille, the center of beet cultivation. He warned the Chamber of the “waste of economic strength” that beets

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345 Journal officiel de la République française: Lois et décrets, 20 November 1954, 10,894-10,899. For the full details of Mendès France’s legislation, see Paul Legatte, La lutte antialcoolique sous le gouvernement de M. Mendès France (Paris, 1955).
348 Journal officiel de la République française: Débats parlementaires, Assemblée nationale, “2e séance du vendredi 31 décembre 1954,” 1 January 1955, 7,057-7,059. I have found no mention at this seance, however, of a new text presented under the rubric of public health.
349 Eugène Dubois, “La Protection de la Santé publique doit-elle être pretexte à des mesures destructives qui n’ont même pas le mérite d’être efficaces?,” Alcool et dérivés, January 1955, 5.
had caused the country, and of the need to convert production.\[350\] He attempted to rally beet growers behind the cause, promising them that they would benefit from the change. He suggested that they focus on foods that the country lacked, such as colza, corn, livestock, and sugar. On November 13, Mendès France gave a fireside chat concerning his plan to crusade against alcoholism. In his talk, he placed the onus upon producers. “It is of course not a question of imposing a type of prohibition upon the French. It is a question of making men free and conscious of the dangers that threaten them and to help them avoid these dangers.”\[351\] Hoping to avoid any moral insults upon the public and its drinking patterns, Mendès France made consumers into the victims of the country’s powerful producers.

III. Commercial Alcohol, Home Brew, and the State

Isabel Boussard has claimed that the September decrees reforming the state’s alcohol statute did not arouse much animosity from the agricultural milieus.\[352\] Though it is true that the leadership of the FNSEA and the CGB generally supported Mendès France,\[353\] for the beet press, the decrees were a cause for concern.  *Le Betteravier français* reproached the government for its “coercive” measures\[354\] and for treating beet growers as “criminals.”\[355\] In the wake of the decrees, the CGB mobilized its allies who had a stake in the state’s alcohol statute: cider producers, distillers, and southern winegrowers.

If commercial alcohol could not beat the government, it hoped to join it. Commercial alcohol already had a powerful position in the state. The Service des alcools belonged to the Ministry of Finance, and had representatives from the Treasury and the Budget. The alcohol groups influenced its decisions through the CSA. According to article four of a 1935 decree, the CSA “must be consulted on all modifications concerning the regime of alcohol.” The CSA could also be called upon to give its opinion on questions submitted by the Minister of Finance, and could make suggestions to the public powers. The CSA consisted of 36 members: 23 representatives of occupational groups (farmers, distillers, and consumers of alcohol), 5 parliamentarians, and 8 delegates from interested ministries. The Minister of Finance formally designated the representatives of these groups as well as the president of the CSA, though actually he

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approved of the choices made by the groups themselves. A decree of 21 April 1939 also permitted 8 representatives of beet growers and distillers to participate in the deliberations of the interdepartmental committee that fixed the price of beets, which in turn served as the basis for the price of alcohol derived from all other sources. The Commission du prix de l’alcool de betterave included the Director of the Service des alcools and representatives of the departments of Agriculture, Finance, and National Defense, and was responsible to the Minister of Agriculture. In practice, the interested representatives were allowed to express their views, but the responsibility for the decision was reserved to the civil servants. Eugène Dubois, president of the IFA, and Jean-Raymond Guyon, president of the CSA, led the alcohol defense and held important positions in the council.

In October, as the government prepared its decrees on alcoholism, the beet lobby, with the support of the CSA, the Ministry of Agriculture, and a group of parliamentarians, proposed a series of measures to Mendès France. The CGB suggested reducing the production of beet alcohol (to a greater extent than the decree of 9 August 1953 had dictated) in return for a guarantee to use alcohol in a ternary high-octane gasoline; to increase sugar production; and to stop lowering the price of beets, which was apparently “one of the lowest in the world agricultural economy.” On October 27, the CSA met in Paris to confirm its solidarity. Paul Roque, vice-president of the CGVM, reiterated the CSA’s position that the state’s stock of alcohol did not encourage alcoholism; the problem lay elsewhere, with the home distillers and fraud. Also in October, the CSA presented suggestions and documentation to the state. The reports were distributed to all members of Parliament and to the appropriate ministries.

Commercial alcohol mobilized and forged alliances. The alcohol groups with a stake in the state’s alcohol statute—beet growers, cider producers, distillers, southern monoculture winegrowers, and the spirits industry—attacked the widely scattered

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358 “Pomme, vin, betterave solidaires,” Le Betteravier français, November 1954.
360 Brown made this observation in “Alcohol and Politics in France,” 985. The reader should take note that Brown based his observation from an article in Alcool et dérivés of January 1957. I have been unable to locate this article.
361 Their newspapers testify to this mobilization; see Le Betteravier français, Alcool et dérivés, La Journée vinicole, and Les Nouvelles respectively.
362 It is worth noting that, in July 1954, the Confédération générale des vignerons du Midi (CGVM) withdrew itself from the Fédération des Associatons viticoles (FAV), France’s main winegrowing association. The CGVM claimed that the FAV, in its quest for a strict control over production methods, failed to take into account the needs of the southern monoculturalists. See Le Midi vinicole, 21 July 1954. It was also in July that the Baron Le Roy, the leading voice for the development of AOC wines, wrote a series of articles in
home distillers. The anti-alcohol campaign forced a tightening of the bonds between producers and distributors. The commercial alcohol groups argued that an increase in the alcohol taxes would only lead to further acts of alcohol fraud. In response to the November decrees, Pierre Vatrons, president of the Confédération nationale des vins et spiritueux (CNVS), declared that the “essential cause of alcoholism must be found in the privileges that the home distillers enjoy, privileges that engender widespread abuses. These abuses are well known and have been periodically denounced for the last several generations, but as long as we do not dare attack them, all the measures that would be taken against alcoholism will not go to the root of the malady.”

Organized alcohol argued that raising the alcohol taxes would only encourage fraud. The IFA used the rhetoric of the Comité national de défense contre l’alcoolisme (CNDCA), the main anti-alcohol lobby, to discourage tax increases.

If regular commerce shows a diminution of taxed consumption that it evaluates at 68 percent in relation to 1901, the number of home distillers does not cease to increase. They numbered 90,000 in 1879. Today, they number 3,650,000 and their untaxed “familial” production amounts, according to the Economic Council, to 600,000 hectoliters, which translates into 120 million liters of brandy to consume as a family. This production that, in fact, is hardly controlled or controllable, represents for the Treasury at least an annual loss of 43 billion without including fraud. It would therefore be vain, under the pretext of an anti-alcohol campaign, to want to surtax commercial alcohol, as long as this “official” and uncontrollable source of fraud and alcoholism does not dry up.

Both the pro- and anti-alcohol lobbies indicted home distillers for French alcoholism.

Home distillers knew which way the wind blew. They refused to be sacrificed on the altar of economic modernization. Rebel rousers such as Henry Dorgères and Pierre Poujade came to the rescue. Their reactionary movements attempted to harness rural

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364 This was a common argument and alluded to the fact the Mendès France raised the alcohol taxes by 20 percent. See, for example, Eugène Dubois, “La lutte contre l’alcoolisme reprend la vedette,” Alcool et dérivés, November 1954.


366 Some solid books have been written on these two men and their respective movements. See, for example, Robert O. Paxton, French Peasant Fascism: Henry Dorgères’s Greenshirts and the Crises of French Agriculture, 1929-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); for a recent history of Poujade and his movement, see
discontent, calling Mendès France “anti-peasant,” “anti-French,” nothing but a “Jew” who conspired with international trusts and who infringed upon individual rights. The SNBC claimed that the technocrats at the Ministry of Finance and the hygienists of the anti-alcohol associations were colluding with the alcohol trusts, the so-called “Kings of Pastis,” who wished to monopolize the alcohol market. Allegedly through their use of the press and the radio, this new alliance had managed to silence the home distillers. Home distillers had neither the financial resources nor the organizational skills to compete with commercial alcohol.  

Though home distillers had a powerful voice in Parliament, they could find few other friends. They tried to work through the channels of Parliament, where André Liautey was a member of the Finance Commission, and put pressure upon Edgar Faure and Gilbert Jules at the Ministry of Finance. An inter-parliamentary commission in support of the home distillers was even established to study the causes of alcoholism, but Mendès France did not grant its representatives a hearing.

The SNBC found a modest ally in the Syndicat national des bouilleurs ambulants (SNBA), the association of ambulating distillers. The SNBA sent letters to their deputies and senators warning them that they needed to support home distillation, or else lose votes at election time. R. Magnien, president of the SNBA, reminded both the government and Pierre Vatron of the conclusions of Étienne May’s report at the Economic Council: 65 percent of French alcoholism was caused by the abuse of wine. By November, when Mendès France launched his war on alcoholism, an alcoholism that a growing number of officials and the commercial drink trade associated with the home distillers, a verdict was emerging that largely blamed home distillation for French alcoholism.

**IV. Alcoholism and the Myth of Consensus**

In attacking alcohol—and in particular the home distillers—Mendès France could attack the political parties that undermined a supposedly stable, technocratic progress—in particular, the far right and the Communist Party. These parties claimed to defend the small landowner, the shopkeeper, and French identity against the Parisian technocrats and

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367 *Bouilleur de France*, August-September 1954.

368 The home distillers’ press constantly solicited financial support from its subscribers. *Bouilleur de France*, August-September 1954.


their international trusts. To a large measure, the right-wing and communist press showed hostility toward Mendès France, as did the provincial press.\textsuperscript{374}

In a style reminiscent of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Mendès France used the radio in order to put pressure upon Parliament to endorse his measures. His appeal to the people made him popular among the public, but increasingly galvanized the legislature against him.\textsuperscript{375} Mendès France hoped to overcome demagogy and the paralysis of parliamentary politics in the name of the “general interest.” Anti-alcoholism served a clear political purpose: it disarmed the critics of agricultural reform and could transcend political debates and divisions in Parliament. In the critical political conjuncture of 1954, health belonged to no single political party. A myth of consensus was being built that conflated the war on alcoholism with economic modernization.

To a certain extent, this strategy worked. Few dared deny the existence of a problem of alcoholism. In the National Assembly on November 25, the Communist deputy Robert Manceau tried to repeal the decrees directed against the home distillers, but the Senate blocked his attempt.\textsuperscript{376} The press immediately vilified the Communist Party for its attempts to repeal an important public health measure. As a result, on 4 December 1954, the French Politburo suggested to the Communist Party to take a more pragmatic approach to the problem. It called for a “note on the problems of alcohol and the government’s measures on this subject;”\textsuperscript{377} at the end of the month, however, Maurice Thorez, leader of the Communist Party, suggested that its members modify their wording to “a note defining the position of the Communist Party on the ravages of alcoholism and the means to combat it, and the latest governmental measures.”\textsuperscript{378} On 5 January 1955, Waldeck Rochet, an agricultural syndicalist and member of the Communist Party,\textsuperscript{379} presented a long report to the members of the Politburo that sought to incite the Communist Party to take action against the problem, for the popular press portrayed the

\textsuperscript{374} After Mendès France’s impressive conclusion of the Indochinese conflict, the right-wing press, such as Le Figaro, approved of the new premier, but this positive opinion rapidly eroded. Not long afterwards, they began to label him the “dissipater of empire.”


\textsuperscript{379} For his biography, see Jean Vigreux, Waldeck Rochet: une biographie politique (Paris: La dispute, 2000).
Party as the “defenders of alcoholism.”380 One month later, on 5 February 1955, the day the Mendès France government fell, France nouvelle, the weekly of the Communist Party, announced its new position to the public.381 Communists recognized the need to jump onto the anti-alcohol bandwagon. The Mendès France government made communists toe the technocratic line.

The far right also had serious doubts about Mendès France’s motives. Dorgères claimed that “The anti-alcohol campaigns that are based upon lies and calumny threaten the entire production of alcohol.”382 Maurice Nicolas, Vice-President of Propaganda for Pierre Poujade’s Union de défense des artisans et commerçants, weighed in by saying that the “average French person, portrayed as a drunk, drinks a liter and a half of (pure) alcohol per year, whereas their ancestors, those who experienced Verdun, drank four and a half liters. And we count in France 20,000 drinking establishments less than in 1913. The law against alcoholism is a great deception.”383

By December 1954, the peasants of the Eure, Mendès France’s home department, showed much hostility toward the government. Officials observed that at a local rally Dorgères had said that “President Mendès-France is the most anti-peasant head of Government that we have had in France up to this point.”384 By late January 1955, the home distillers’ animosity toward Mendès-France became widespread. At a demonstration at Louviers on January 20, M. Fouilleul Louis de St. Hilaire du Harcquouet of the Manche launched into a fiery diatribe against Mendès France. He declared that “there were home distillers before the family of Pierre Mendès-France came from Portugal and there will be some after.”385 Mendès France’s Portugese and Jewish origins had been used against him; his reputed rootlessness was exactly what conservatives opposed.

Supporters of Mendès France and of the progressive political elite associated the communists and the far right with tradition, backwardness, and ignorance. As Georges Malignac and Robert Colin noted: “Politicians must understand that, if they continue to defend the cause of the alcohol lobbies, they will remain behind the times (attardé), even


381 Archives de l’Association nationale de prévention en alcoologie et addictologie (hereafter ANPAA), S7. France nouvelle, 5 February 1955. The CNDCA reproduced Waldeck Rochet’s article for its journal; see the article, “Le Parti communiste et la lutte contre les ravages de l’alcoolisme,” Alcool ou santé (1956).

382 IPMF, Carton 4 (Économie). La Gazette agricole, 8 January 1955.


384 IPMF, Carton 4 (Économie). Letter from J. Nester to Pierre Mendès France, 9 December 1954. It is interesting to note, however, that both Philippe Lamour and Roland Viel supported Mendès France’s agricultural policies. For a brief mention of this topic, see Wright, Rural Revolution in France, 238-239. See note #42.

if they belong to “advanced” parties. They alluded undoubtedly to the Communist Party. In consulting with the FNSEA, France’s main agricultural syndicate, Mendès France no doubt wanted to appeal to the “general interest” of agriculture, and pit the majority of the country’s farmers against specialized associations such as the CGVM, the SNBC, or the SNBA. Nor did representations in the press favor the home distillers and their defenders. The home distillers represented everything that Mendès France hoped to upend: ignorance, poverty, shady politics, and an irretrievable past.

The way that the press defined alcoholism helped shape public opinion. The population supposedly supported the cause of reform. Polls conducted by both the Institut français d’opinion publique (IFOP) and the INED gave Mendès France’s campaign legitimacy. In December 1953 and again in January 1955, these institutes asked the public about the possibility of limiting the home distillers’ privilege.387

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>December 1953</th>
<th>January 1955</th>
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<tr>
<td>Supporters</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>61%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opponents</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Undeclared</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
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It is clear that in both 1953 and 1955 the public deemed the home distillers unnecessary to the country’s wellbeing. Another question interrogated the public about the state’s alcohol monopoly and the subsidies it granted to the beet, cider, and wine industries.388

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>September 1954</th>
<th>January 1955</th>
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<tr>
<td>Opponents of subsidies</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>81%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supporters of subsidies</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Other responses</td>
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<tr>
<td>Undeclared or others</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
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By January 1955, a large majority was in favor of ousting alcohol from the state. The polling institutes went further. In September 1954 and January 1955, the IFOP canvassed public opinion on the popularity of the Mendès France government. The survey revealed that the population backed Mendès France’s anti-alcohol campaign. At the beginning of 1955, only one out of ten persons considered the premier’s anti-alcoholism as unimportant; 67 percent considered it “very important,”389 though less important than other social problems. It is also significant that all the political parties supported the anti-alcohol drive.390

387 *Sondages*, 1 (1955): 20. Opinion polls are difficult to analyze. It should be noted that the IFOP was yet another institute that had members that shared Mendès France’s political views. See Loïc Blondiaux, *La fabrique de l’opinion: une histoire sociale des sondages* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1998).
Public opinion would support a war on alcoholism if it meant an elevation in the standard of living. As Mendès France had noted in his discussion of the beet in September 1954, “Each French citizen will understand that we cannot increase the nation’s standard of living, construct for example 320,000 homes that we must have each year, if the State, if the collectivity, dedicates itself to the mission of encouraging wasteful tasks, of conserving artificial activities, thus slowing the progress that it should facilitate.” As we saw in the last chapter, since the early 1950s, much of the press had blamed alcohol producers for France’s supposedly low standard of living.

V. Milk and the Making of Modern Political Economy

Mendès France’s milk drinking did not belong to the annals of the grotesque; it conveyed deep historical meaning and intent. It should be known that Mendès France hailed from milk-producing Normandy and that he worked closely with the wealthy beet growers’ and dairy farmers’ associations. Annie Collovald has pointed out that though the press focused upon the milk aspect of Mendès France’s campaign, he specifically promoted sugared milk. Mendès France was less radical in his agricultural plans—and less an advocate of the “general interest”—than is sometimes assumed.

Since his time in the Popular Front government in the 1930s, Mendès France had sought to improve the diet of the popular classes. In the interwar period, while the French were reputedly drowning themselves in alcohol, he saw how other countries had taken to milk. He especially looked to England, where the government had sought to correct the nutritional imbalance of its young and its poor by distributing milk. As a deputy of the dairy department of the Eure, Mendès France had become quickly aware of the poor living conditions of the peasantry. He had seen how peasants succumbed to the ravages of alcoholism; furthermore, home distillers in that region were legion. In order to help peasants survive the economic depression, he had launched a project of milk

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393 For an understanding of how and why the state encouraged the population to drink more wine, see Bertrand Dargelos, La lutte antialcoolique en France depuis le XIX siècle (Paris: Éditions Dalloz, 2008), 175-211; and also, Sarah Howard, “Selling Wine to the French: Official Attempts to Increase French Wine Consumption, 1931-1936,” Food & Foodways 12 (2004): 197-224.
distribution in schools, first in Louviers in 1935, then in the rest of France in 1937.\textsuperscript{396} In his decision to distribute milk, he had advanced two main arguments: the financial aid that it would bring to the numerous dairy farmers of Normandy, and the nutrition that it would give to the many undernourished children of the poor and the unemployed.\textsuperscript{397} Yet the German invasion in the summer of 1940 and the dietary deprivation that followed dashed all hopes of regeneration through milk.

After the war, agricultural specialists, demographers, doctors, and economists had greatly encouraged the population to increase its milk consumption.\textsuperscript{398} From their perspective, milk would improve the overall health of the population deprived of nutrition during the war. That Mendès France distributed free milk to soldiers, students, and workers suggests that he sought to inculcate a moral culture of milk with other republican values. Mendès France’s milk campaign accompanied the beginnings of a postwar dietary revolution that brought to the population a greater array of foodstuffs. Furthermore, since the war, a demographic shift had been underway, as the baby boom had made France into a younger country. In promoting sugared milk, Mendès France no doubt had his mind on French children, the future of France.\textsuperscript{399} Sugared milk would supposedly promote the growth of a new generation that would lead France to greatness.

When he became premier, Mendès France sought to enforce his dietary revolution. As early as August, his government discussed the possibility of distributing milk in schools, among sports associations, and at military and work canteens in an attempt “to accustom young French people to consume it in greater and greater quantities.”\textsuperscript{400} Jean Raffarin gave Mendès France the idea to distribute a glass of milk in primary schools.\textsuperscript{401} On September 26, Mendès France decreed that as of 1 January 1955, sugared milk would be distributed in both public and private schools.

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\textsuperscript{398} See the articles in Population, the INED’s journal.


\textsuperscript{400} IPMF, Carton 4 (Discours). “La Rénovation économique et le problème de l’alcool, à Annecy, 26 septembre 1954.”

\textsuperscript{401} Gilles Luneau, La Forteresse agricole: Une histoire de la FNSEA (Paris: Fayard, 2004), 164. See note #2.
The FNSEA, which represented the beet and dairy interests, endorsed Mendès France’s milk program. Jacques Lépicard, who had been president of the CGB, became in 1954 President of the FNSEA, and Jean Achard had played an important role in both the beet and dairy associations. These connections ensured support for Mendès France’s milk policy. As the syndicate stated in August:

These distributions will be salutary for the health of our children, they will help to circulate a part of our milk and sugar production; and they will set off a progressive alteration in the habits of the consumers in our country where rich and energetic foods like milk and sugar are not consumed as much as the health and vigor of the race would like, whereas, in other neighboring countries, which are similar to ours, these foods contribute more importantly to the average intake of the population.

The FNSEA encouraged free milk distributions as a new outlet for overproduced milk. Since the 1930s, dairy producers had been emerging as a highly organized political force, expanding beyond a local clientele and producing milk for the national market. In 1931, the state formed a propaganda committee to encourage consumption. Between 1946 and 1954, the agitation of dairy producers reached a new level, as they became more organized and created a national milk market. By December 1954, milk producers grew hostile to the low price of their product. Days after giving official support to the cause of milk drinking, Jacques Lepicard spoke on a program entitled “French peasants” (“Paysans de France”) for encouraging milk distributions. The FNSEA even publicly defended Mendès France’s milk drinking, despite the reactions such a defense could have on the alcohol interests. René Blondelle reminded his followers that “He (the President of the Council) drinks milk, and one must not welcome this fact with jokes, for it constitutes an excellent propaganda for the increase in the consumption of this product.”

Milk appeared to solve Mendès France’s problem with political economy. It spearheaded the country’s hygienic and economic modernization. In drinking sugared

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402 Brown noted this fact in “Alcohol and Politics in France,” 981.
403 I found this fact in Pesche, Le syndicalisme agricole spécialisé en France, 69.
404 IPMF, Carton 4 (Économie). “Conférence de presse—Lepicard & Génin—La FNSEA (Fédération nationale des syndicats d’exploitants agricoles) estime que le marché rural est le facteur décisive du relèvement de l’économie nationale, 22 août 1954.”
405 For an understanding of the political mobilization of the French dairy industry, see Pesche, Le Syndicalisme agricole spécialisé en France, especially pp. 152-156.
406 IPMF, Carton 4 (Économie). “Conférence de presse—Lepicard et Génin—La FNSEA (Fédération nationale des syndicats d’exploitants agricoles) estime que le marché rural est le facteur décisive du relèvement de l’économie nationale,” 22 August 1954.
milk, he hoped not only to improve public health, but also to reform French political economy by satisfying a dairy profession that had become frustrated by the state’s inability to ensure better prices and to mollify beet growers who could convert their surplus alcohol production into sugar. In providing sugared milk to soldiers, students, and workers, Mendès France could relieve dairy farmers and beet growers, who suffered from overproduction and under-consumption, and combat alcohol producers, who found profit in overproduction and over-consumption. Milk and the beet posed fewer electoral and economic problems than wine and home brew. Beet growers numbered but 150,000, and dairy farming depended more upon cattle than upon manpower, whereas winegrowers and home distillers were numerous and widespread (by some accounts, approximately 1,500,000 winegrowers and 3 million home distillers); through Parliament, they had time and again deflated the wheels of progress. Milk and sugar stimulated industrialization; wine and home brew kept people on the land. Technocrats could not topple the power of alcohol if they did not deplete the countryside. Promoting sugared milk helped solve the beet problem, satisfy dairy farmers, and offered an alternative to the French person’s daily wine. Despite the anti-alcohol coalition’s claims of defending the “general interest,” powerful agricultural lobbies helped shape the technocrats’ policy.

Yet many of the French, to be sure, had difficulty swallowing Mendès France’s milk campaign. Joseph Metral, a local politician in the Eure, reported to Mendès France that “according to the surveys that I have managed to carry out, I must acknowledge that this idea of (milk) distribution is far from gathering a consensus. Everywhere one finds this truly French habit, which consists of ridiculing any new idea, before being able to appreciate the effects of it, whether good or bad.”  

Metral’s observation proved representative of French society’s response to Pierre Mendès France’s milk program.

With her characteristic wit, Janet Flanner remarked that “His announcement that, beginning with the New Year, France’s surplus milk will be distributed to school children and to the boys in the French army has caused consternation among French mothers, for the French think that no drink is as bad for the liver as milk.” A 1947 book on childcare warned that “Milk should never constitute the mealtime drink.” The book also recommended that “the quantity of milk drunk in a day should not exceed half a liter, under risk of digestive troubles such as diarrhea.”

Popular conceptions of milk were not as exalted as those for wine: “Wine before milk is hoped for; milk before wine is venom,” declared one French proverb. French custom dictated that the French drink milk only in infancy, in sickness, and in old age. The celebrated Encyclopédie had given a poor review of milk. It considered milk drinkers as uncouth:

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Milk supplies to entire nations, principally to the inhabitants of the mountains, an ordinary, daily, fundamental food. The men of these countries are fat, heavy, lazy, stupid, or at least serious, pensive, somber. There is no doubt that the habitual use of milk is one of the causes of this common constitution. The gaiety, the strong appearance, the lightness, the easy, lively, vigorous movements of the people who habitually drink wine, makes for the most striking contrast.\textsuperscript{413}

The virulent traditionalist Pierre Poujade, who despised Mendès France’s tax and other economic reforms, berated the French premier: “If you had a drop of Gallic blood in your veins, you would have never dared, as a representative of France, world wine and champagne producer, been served a glass of milk at an international reception!”\textsuperscript{414}

**Conclusion**

After the announcement of the Mendès France decrees against alcoholism, a wave of demonstrations rocked the French countryside. *Le Betteravier français* pointed out that between approximately December 15 and January 15, protest reached fever pitch in the beet departments. In nearly one month, 42,150 demonstrators took to the streets. It should be noted that Louviers, the political home of Mendès France, had the most protestors. The rage against the government’s agricultural policy culminated in Lille in the department of the Nord on 1 February 1955, just four days from Mendès France’s fall. *Le Betteravier français* detailed the events, showed photographs of the violence, and headlined: “President Leclercq seriously wounded by the CRS after a meeting of 15,000 peasants.”\textsuperscript{415}

By the first days of February 1955, Mendès France could no longer take shelter from the oncoming storm. In the debate in the National Assembly on Mendès France’s vote of confidence around the revolts in Algeria, deputy Robert Ballanger, a Communist from the Seine-et-Oise, remarked that the colonial crisis had become the occasion to spell out larger grievances.\textsuperscript{416} Ballanger was at least partially right. An examination of how the deputies voted demonstrates that no clear correlation existed between Mendès France’s anti-alcohol campaign and his downfall. Germaine Poinso-Chapuis and Eugène Claudius-Petit, for example, two stalwarts of the anti-alcohol camp, voted against France’s leading political maverick; but both were members of the MRP, which opposed Mendès France’s overall policy. But many of the alcohol lobbies’ supporters also voted

\textsuperscript{415} *Le Betteravier français*, special edition, February 1955. Pierre Leclercq was president of the Confédération générale des planteurs de betteraves (CGPB).
\textsuperscript{416} *Journal officiel de la République française: Débats parlementaires, Assemblée nationale*, “2e séance du vendredi 4 février 1955,” 5 February 1955, 737. Ballanger precisely said: “But you have posed the question of confidence in terms and in conditions such that the vote that will be carried out will bear also of course on the ensemble of your ministerial activity.”
against Mendès France, such as André Liautey, deputy from the Haute-Saône, member of the Commission des finances of the National Assembly, and General Secretary of the SNBC, Pierre Hénault of the Manche, Paul Coste-Floret of the winegrowing Hérault, Paul Reynaud of the beet growing Nord, and more general agricultural supporters such as Camille Laurens and Waldeck Rochet.\footnote{Journal officiel de la République française: Débats parlementaires, Assemblée nationale, “2e séance du vendredi 4 février 1955,” 5 February 1955, 782-783.}

Given the broad consensus to fight the excesses of drink, the alcohol lobbies could not topple Mendès France over the debate on alcoholism. They could, however, help bring down the government over other issues. A strong majority of the pro-alcohol deputies supported the Algerian lobby around the government’s parliamentary vote of confidence on the crisis in North Africa on 5 February 1955. The Algerian lobby not only had an interest in maintaining the colony as a part of France, but also in protecting Algeria’s vast and profitable wine industry.\footnote{On the rise of the Algerian vineyard, see Hildebert Isnard, La vigne en Algérie: étude géographique (Gap: Ophrys, 1951 & 1954).} Still in 1954 and 1955, the centrality of alcohol and empire to French identity continued to resonate with enough powerful people. Mendès France lost his legitimacy not so much because the French were lactose intolerant as because he could not appease his adversaries, whether from the reactionary right, the Communists, dissidents in his own Radical Party, the MRP, or the large political spectrum supporting the French empire.

On 5 February 1955, the Mendès France government fell, not directly over the alcohol dilemma, but over the crisis in North Africa. Yet some of the press suggested that the alcohol industries had an influence upon the government’s problems.\footnote{See, for example, “Le remaniement ministériel,” Le Figaro of 22-23 January 1955. It is worth noting that other observers believed that the alcohol lobbies had the power to topple the Mendès France government. Alexander Werth credited Jean Legendre, a right-wing deputy from the Oise and supporter of the beet lobby, with helping to smear Mendès France’s reputation; see his Lost Statesman: The Strange Story of Pierre Mendès France (New York and London: Abelard-Schuman, 1958), 138. Georges Malignac and Robert Colin also suggested that, prior to the Mendès France government, both Antoine Pinay’s and René Mayer’s anti-alcohol drives contributed to their downfalls; see their L’Alcoolisme, 90.} The public had a different opinion. On 6 February 1955, however, the IFOP questioned 643 persons on why the Mendès France government fell: 39% responded “rivalries and jealousies;” 8% responded “the fear of his personality;” 2% responded “the fear of the April rendez-vous;” and only 5% responded “the discontent of both the capitalists and the farmers.”\footnote{Cited in Boussard, “Les milieux agricoles et Pierre Mendès France,” 435.} This would suggest, as Isabel Boussard has noted, that agriculture was not perceived as the primary cause of the government’s downfall.\footnote{Ibid.} But the voices of those small farmers who had the most to lose from Mendès France’s modernization plans had been silenced, coerced by a consensus to remedy an ailing agriculture.

The Pierre Mendès France government lasted but a short seven months and seventeen days. Most of his anti-alcohol decrees were barely more enduring. In the
months following Mendès France’s political demise, the alcohol lobbies reversed most of the government’s anti-alcohol measures. According to Bernard E. Brown, in 1955, home distillers managed to delay the termination of their tax-free distillation privileges; deputies repealed the higher license fees for drinking establishments; beet growers persuaded Parliament to reestablish their privileges, and a number of distilleries soon reopened their doors. The influence of the peasant groups and their allies in the succeeding government of Edgar Faure facilitated the alcohol lobbies’ dismantling of the Mendès France decrees. 77 Independents and Peasants had voted no confidence in Mendès France on 5 February 1955; 101 members of the same groups voted for the investiture of the Faure government on 23 February 1955. Jean Sourbet and Paul Antier, two members of the peasant groups, entered the government, respectively as Ministers of Agriculture and of Merchant Marine. 423

Although Pierre Mendès France’s stay at the summit of state was brief, and his anti-alcohol legislation limited, one of his decrees was not without lasting impact. Mendès France had established the HCEIA, a state-sponsored anti-alcohol study group that until 1991 would serve as a bulwark against the ability of the alcohol lobbies to shape agricultural policy. The alcohol industries would increasingly have to think about public health and its responsibility to the nation.

The Mendès France moment taught anti-alcohol activists that their movement could not succeed without forging alliances with other powerful economic interests and without making deals over larger issues such as empire. Mendès France’s failure partially owes to the fact that he did not sufficiently consult agricultural interests. On too many occasions, the FNSEA demanded that its voice be heard; it appears that neither the home distillers’ nor the winegrowers’ associations were consulted. Mendès France did not show a complete commitment to collaborate with agriculture. The diminution of the peasantry was a vital corollary of Mendès France’s vision of a gleaming, industrial France. The anti-alcohol campaign, then, was one facet of the tumultuous transition from agrarianism to industrial modernity.

In fighting agriculture in the name of “anti-alcoholism,” not “agrarian reform,” Mendès France tried to avoid the conflicts involved in reforming agriculture. Fighting alcoholism defended the so-called “general interest,” which helped the government pit public opinion against a reportedly backward agriculture and its extremist supporters that threatened political stability. Without the specter of alcoholism, the government would not have been able to mobilize the country against alcohol producers. The campaign sought to prevent social conflict by masking individual loss with the veneer of the common good. It tied present sacrifice to the brighter future that lay ahead.

The anti-alcohol campaign helped create a consensus to reform the country’s economic structure. For the moment, at least, the anti-alcohol coalition had persuaded the population that alcohol was one source of the country’s ills. Public opinion was a force to reckon with, a wave that could erode the establishment that had been built around

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423 For this analysis, see Brown, “Alcohol and Politics in France,” 990. It should be noted, however, that there was less discussion of these politics in the alcohol newspapers in 1955.
the bottle. Two months after Mendès France had been dismissed from the corridors of power, Jacques Sylvain Brunaud, a civil administrator at the Ministry of Finance, would astutely note that “the merit of Premier Mendès France was to have been the first to understand that anti-alcoholism has become, in respects to public opinion, a politically profitable position.”

Chapter Three:
Winegrowers as Temperance Advocates:
The Crusade against the Home Distillers, 1955-1960

*The senatorial humility has chosen that of the home distillers. Come on, there are still some good days ahead for the politicians of the old stock, republicans through and through who have a tri-colored but patriotically cirrhotic liver.*


After the fall of the Pierre Mendès France government, a cast of unlikely characters arrived at the same dubious conclusion that alcoholism boiled down to a few million hobbyists who distilled the fruits of their own property and who allegedly swindled the state out of precious tax revenues. Between 1955 and 1960, condemnatory eyes turned toward fraud and its deleterious effects upon public health and the nation’s coffers. The supposed toxicity of fraudulent alcohol endangered health, and tax fraud on alcohol aggravated the problem of alcohol surpluses. To curtail tax and alcohol fraud, doctors, technocrats, and commercial alcohol producers closed in on the home distillers.

In the late 1950s, the doctors and technocrats of the anti-alcohol movement forged an alliance with the commercial drink trade in order to put an end to the home distillers’ tax privileges. This new configuration first emerged in the improbable Hérault, France’s largest winegrowing department. In redefining the alcohol problem, Madame Martin-Gros, the general secretary of the Comité départemental de défense contre l’alcoolisme (CDDCA) of the Hérault,\(^{426}\) paved the way. In this local anti-alcohol committee, she enlisted Jules Milhau, an influential economist and wine expert, and Paul Pagès, a doctor and professor at the Faculty of Medicine of Montpellier who worked on the chemical properties of wine and their tentative links to alcoholism. Working together, they lobbied local politicians to act against alcoholism and began to distribute placards throughout the department that declared: “Anti-alcoholism will save viticulture.”\(^{427}\)

This chapter looks at how anti-alcoholism tried to save winegrowing. Activists in the Hérault were part of a new course in the state’s anti-alcohol campaign. The anti-alcohol coalition had learned from the Mendès France experiment that it could not directly challenge the alcohol lobbies. Thus to sustain itself, the coalition preferred conciliation to conflict. *As Le Monde* noted in 1959:

> This dialogue is possible. When the winegrowing organizations do their best to find a remedy to the difficulties of the profession, are they not advocating by

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\(^{426}\) This group could be translated as the departmental committee for the defense against alcoholism.

\(^{427}\) CDDCA de l’Hérault. From correspondence, at least, I gather that they began distributing this placard in 1957; they continued to do so at least through 1959. Those interested can also find mention of this in the press release of the local committees, *Bulletin de Liaison des Comités départementaux et locaux*, May 1957.
various means the orientation toward a quality production to the detriment of quantity, linking themselves up with and even preceding the attitude of the HCEIA? The owners of drinking establishments would they have more interest in selling a greater quantity of non-alcoholic drinks, and certain aperitif makers have they not become dynamic in producing fruit juices? As for the home distillers, it is probable that apart from all preoccupations of public health the solution to their problem will be most surely found in the modernization of their farming techniques and a better use of their fruits.\footnote{428 Le Monde, 25 November 1959.}

From this perspective, both anti-alcohol advocates and the progressive forces within the drink trade would benefit from collaboration. A reduction of alcoholism equated to economic expansion.

Between the fall of the Pierre Mendès France government in February 1955 and Michel Debré’s laws against the “social plagues” in 1960, the anti-alcohol coalition enlisted the support of the commercial drink trade, which consisted of mainly wine but also spirits interests, and which was searching for ways to create a modern alcohol industry that could compete on the domestic and international markets. It should be noted that, by the end of 1955, the beet was no longer a priority of the anti-alcohol campaign.\footnote{429 The last discussion on alcoholism that I have found in Le Betteravier français is in its edition of January 1955. In the December 1955 edition of Le Betteravier français, Henri Cayre could affirm: “After the fight in Lille, after the attack of which the beet growers have been the object even in the agricultural ranks, the CGB is proud to present to its readers a positive assessment for the end of the year.”}

Beet growers had for the most part begun to produce sugar instead of alcohol.

The wine lobbies mobilized mostly country doctors in an attempt to demonstrate that alcoholism had less to do with the quantity than the quality of alcohol consumed. From this perspective, a war on alcohol fraud—which meant both any alcohol that did not have a precise provenance and any non-taxed alcohol—would reduce alcoholism; moreover, fraud vexed technocrats, who wished to strengthen the economy. Because of a successful mobilization of the commercial drink trade, the home distillers and their supposedly fraudulent production became the primary target of public action. By the end of the 1950s, doctors and technocrats had forged a new anti-alcohol coalition with commercial alcohol. And the commercial drink trade largely conducted it.

Three broader developments in the late 1950s weakened the home distillers’ political force: the change from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic, and with it the diminishing power of rural deputies; a public that, in the context of rising standards of living, desired to consume better products; and the emergence of a new generation of farmers, who distanced themselves from the autarkic habits of their fathers and who sought to compete on the international market. We must think about the mobilization of the commercial drink trade—and how it increasingly made itself responsible for the anti-alcohol campaign—in the context of 1950s agriculture.\footnote{430 Few historians have picked up on Gordon Wright’s early cue; see his Rural Revolution in France: The Peasantry in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977).} In that decade, a young
generation of farmers awakened to technocratic ideas and saw advantages in reforming France’s economic structures in order to industrialize agriculture. The new anti-alcohol coalition succeeded in making its movement a spur for rural revolution. The state’s anti-alcohol policy of the late 1950s took shape as much in the countryside among a peasant elite and its plows as in Paris among technocrats and their pens.

I. The Haut Comité d’études et d’information sur l’alcoolisme (HCEIA) and the Modernization of Agriculture

With the creation of the Haut Comité d’études et d’information sur l’alcoolisme (HCEIA) in November 1954, Pierre Mendès France had committed the state to designing an anti-alcohol policy. The HCEIA sought to gather information on alcoholism, to propose measures to the government that could help in reducing alcoholism, and to undertake, with other interested groups, an information campaign in order to educate the public about the dangers of drink. Most importantly, the HCEIA would check the alcohol industry’s monopoly on alcohol knowledge and the ability of the industry to shape consumer behavior. Old, carefree wine slogans such as “A Day Without Wine is Like a Day Without Sunshine” would now have to compete with new, more cautious ones such as “Health, Sobriety,” or “Drink Better, But Less, in order to Drink for a Long Time.”

At its inception, the HCEIA was composed of doctors and other interested professions, which demonstrated that its mission would not rest solely in the domain of medicine. It included ten persons named by decree in the Council of Ministers, and who were supposedly competent and objective on the subject of alcoholism. Its original members included Robert Debré, pediatrician and member of the Academy of Medicine; Marcel Bleustein-Blanchet, publicist; Eugène Forget, farmer and honorary president of the FNSEA; Emmanuel La Gravière, member of the Assembly of the French Union; Paul Mathieu, industrialist; Étienne May, doctor and member of the Academy of Medicine and Press, 1964). In general, historians have lagged behind the work of anthropologists, political scientists, and sociologists on the questions of rural revolution. For some seminal studies, see Pierre Barral, Les agrariants français de Méline à Pisani (Paris: Armand Colin, 1968); Suzanne Berger, Peasants against Politics: Rural Organization in Brittany, 1911-1967 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Michel Gervais, Marcel Jollivet, and Yves Tavernier, Depuis 1914: La Fin de la France paysanne in Histoire de la France rurale, eds. Georges Duby and Wallon Armand vol. 4 (Paris: Le Seuil, 1977); John T. S. Keeler, The Politics of Neocorporatism in France: Farmers, the State, and Agricultural Policy-Making in the Fifth Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Henri Mendras, La fin des paysans, suivi d’une réflexion sur la Fin des paysans vingt ans après (Le Paradou, Actes Sud, 1992, first published 1970); Pierre Muller, Le technocrate et le paysan. Essai sur la politique française de modernization de l’agriculture, de 1945 à nos jours (Paris: Les éditions ouvrières, 1984).

See, for example, Delphine Dulong, Moderniser la politique aux origines de la Ve République (Paris: L’Harmatan, 1997), 118-125.

Centre des Archives contemporaines (hereafter CAC), 20050174. Anti-alcohol posters of the HCEIA.

the Economic Council; Marie Picard, inspector of primary education; Henri Rouvillois, doctor and member of the Academy of Medicine, and president of the CNDCA; and Max Sorre, director of the Center of Sociological Studies at the Centre national de la recherché scientifique (CNRS). Alain Barjot, maître des requêtes at the Conseil d’État, was named the secretary general.434

It is not without significance that Mendès France had placed Debré, a doctor, at the helm of the HCEIA.435 Medical authority helped place the state’s alcohol policy in a more depoliticized context. Rouvillois and May, two of the HCEIA’s other members, were also doctors at the Academy of Medicine, the former also heading the CNDCA and the latter also holding a seat at the Economic Council. The HCEIA also enlisted Forget, an important agricultural syndicalist at the FNSEA.436 As we saw in the last chapter, the FNSEA served less the interests of viticulture than the “general interests” of agriculture.

Attached to the offices of the Prime Minister, Mendès France had hoped that the HCEIA could transcend the political squabbles of the various ministries.437 The ministerial instability of the Fourth Republic had prevented governments from creating coherent policies. With the HCEIA, the “general interest” would trump vested interests. As Jacques Sylvain Brunaud, a civil administrator at the Ministry of Finance, would point

434 Archives de l’Institut Pierre Mendès France (hereafter IPMF), Carton 1 (Économie). “Projets et propositions de loi et propositions de résolution intéressant les mesures prises dans le cadre de la loi du 14 août 1954.” It is noteworthy that Alain Barjot would be vice-president of the HCEIA and director of the social security system in the 1960s.
435 It is interesting to note that at first Debré refused Mendès France’s request to appoint him as president of the HCEIA, claiming that the war on alcoholism was outside of his competence. For this story, see Robert Debré’s autobiography, L’honneur de vivre: Témoignage (Poitiers: Hermann et Stock, 1974), 389. See also CAC, 19940020, art. 3. “Intervention de M. le Professeur Robert Debré, Président du Haut Comité d’Étude et d’Information sur l’Alcoolisme à la séance du 29 octobre 1969,” 2.
436 Forget noted that he only took a seat at the HCEIA so that agriculture would have a voice. See Archives nationales (hereafter AN), CE/645. “Annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du mardi 18 novembre 1958 à 10h15: Audition de M. Forget, Président de l’Association nationale de propagande en faveur des jus de fruits.”
437 The newspaper Vie française of 5 March 1954 had already presented the difficulties in coordinating an efficient plan against alcoholism in France: “Warning the population about the dangers of alcoholism must begin in primary and secondary education (Minister of National Education), be continued during military service (Minister of National Defense), and be pursued by the radio, the cinema, etc. (Minister of Information). The limitation to the profession of home distiller, the suppression of the right to distill at home, the reduction of wine overproduction demands the active assistance of the services of the Ministries of Agriculture and of Finance. The regulations on drinking establishments, their number and their opening hours; the limitation on importing alcohol to France’s overseas possessions; the decrease in taxes on non-alcoholic or lightly alcoholic drinks, etc. assumes the intervention of other authorities.” The HCEIA’s mission was not unlike that of the Commissariat général du plan. For a discussion of administrative reforms, see Edgard Pisani, “Administration de gestion, administration de mission,” Revue française de science politique 2 (1956): 315-330.
out in 1955: “The war against alcoholism could be the occasion for agriculture to free itself from a system of expedients and security.”438 According to this logic, the HCEIA could serve agricultural interests.439

II. The Wine Lobbies Mobilize Doctors to Contest the State’s Anti-Alcohol Campaign

In response to the establishment of the HCEIA, and the brake that it could potentially put on the alcohol industry’s ability to shape popular belief, the wine associations immediately set about mobilizing doctors and scientists to defend their product. The lobbies hoped to create confusion about the etiology of alcoholism and to keep public opinion in favor of wine at the expense of spirits. A public that supported wine would hamper the state’s attack upon it.

Not all doctors agreed upon the urgency of the anti-alcohol campaign. In 1959, the Institut français d’opinion publique (IFOP), at the request of the HCEIA, surveyed medical opinion on alcoholism. A big difference in opinion existed between the medical elite and practitioners. Doctors, for example, in the winegrowing Languedoc, showed less concern for alcoholism than did their counterparts in Brittany or in Paris.440 In fact, most of the leading medical anti-alcohol activists worked at the Academy of Medicine, such as Robert Debré, Étienne May, and Henri Rouvillois;441 a lot of the campaign’s naysayers came from the two poles of French winegrowing: Bordeaux and Montpellier.

In French medicine, wine had legitimacy. For centuries, doctors had administered wine to patients for its positive therapeutic effects. Proverbs had supported the use of

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438 Jacques Sylvain Brunaud, *Rapport sur le coût annuel et la prévention de l’alcoolisme* (Présidence du Conseil: Comité central d’enquête sur le coût et le rendement des services publics, 1955), 91. It should be noted, however, that Brunaud did not believe that the HCEIA had the power to accomplish this task; instead, he called for the enlargement of the responsibilities of the Service des alcools, an agency at his own Ministry of Finance.

439 In many respects, the HCEIA prefigured relations between interest groups and the state during the Fifth Republic. After 1958, agricultural interests would begin to exert more influence in state commissions than in Parliament. For an understanding of the corporative system of agriculture during the Fifth Republic, see John T. S. Keeler, “Corporatism and official union hegemony: the case of French agricultural syndicalism,” in *Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics*, ed. Suzanne Berger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 185-208.


441 It should be noted, however, that wine could confer upon the medical profession much cultural capital. Robert Debré even owned a vineyard in the Loire. Philippe Lamour, a leader of winegrowing associations and a wine representative within the HCEIA, remembered: “At his (Robert Debré’s) jubilee, he received us at his tourangelle estate of which the terrace dominates the beautiful Loire valley; and, at this occasion, some of our colleagues learned with stupor that their president was also a winegrower. With a discreet smile, he offered them a glass of delicious wine.” See Philippe Lamour, *Le Cadran solaire* (Paris: Éditions Robert Laffont, 1980), 418.
wine in popular medicine: “Good wine and a good woman put medicine in the air” or “a glass of wine is worth five francs spent at the doctor.” Wine supposedly prevented colds, cured fevers, killed parasites, and, by drinking white wine with five small nanny goat turds, cured jaundice. Later, scientists even spoke highly of wine; in the nineteenth century, for example, Louis Pasteur had averred that “wine was the most hygienic beverage.” When, in 1960, Jean-Max Eylaud, Secretary General of the Société française des médecins amis du vin, published his book, *Vin et santé: vertus hygièniques et thérapeutiques du vin*, he was writing in the medical tradition of showing the links between “moderate” wine drinking and good health. For Eylaud, as for many French doctors, wine was healthy and downright fun. “Austerity does not prolong life,” Portmann reminded the world in 1956, and he tried to encourage the population to follow the doctor’s orders.

These medical claims about wine’s health benefits had some truth. In the 1950s, many rural areas still did not have piped water. On several occasions, the CNDCA blamed rural poverty for alcoholism: people had no choice but to disinfect polluted water with wine. In an age when hygiene was not assured, wine was certainly the safest and “most hygienic” drink.

Pro-wine doctors even had statistics at their disposal. Both they and the wine lobbies consistently and persistently posed the following question: if wine endangered health, then why did “moderate” wine drinking departments of the south suffer much less from alcohol-related diseases than the “intemperate” alcohol drinking departments of the north. Winegrowers compared deaths in wine departments to deaths in home distilling departments.

**Deaths by alcoholism in 1953 (for every 100,000 individuals)***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Death Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Calvados</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côtes-du-Nord</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finistère</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ille-et-Vilaine</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manche</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayenne</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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442 For a discussion of the role of wine in popular medicine, and for these quotations, see Harry W. Paul, *Bacchic Medicine: Wine and Alcohol Therapies from Napoleon to the French Paradox* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001), 11-13.

443 There was and continues to be much debate about what Pasteur meant by this comment. Anti-alcohol reformers argue that winegrowers have exploited it out of context.

444 Jean-Max Eylaud, *Vin et santé: vertus hygièniques et thérapeutiques du vin* (Soissons (Aisne): La Diffusion Nouvelle du Livre, 1960). Georges Portmann prefaced this book. It is interesting to note that Eylaud’s publisher frequently wrote to him that his book was not selling well.


Medical insouciance about alcoholism in the south no doubt had an impact on the statistics for alcoholism in that region, as doctors likely declared few deaths as directly related to the alcoholic condition. Yet few anti-alcohol activists recognized this potential bias in the numbers. Georges Portmann noted with much pride that, because of its wine drinking tradition, the Gironde had the most nonagenarians and centenarians. With this evidence, the wine lobbies pointed out that the wine drinking in Latin countries had much to teach the alcohol- and binge-drinking north.

Many doctors and scientists who were skeptical of the new technocratic approach to alcoholism rallied to the defense of wine. They pointed out that the results of Brunaud’s study on the cost of alcoholism to the country were inconclusive. In a highly provocative work, Jacques Borel, a psychiatrist in the department of the Seine, argued that the cases of alcoholism and the internments in mental asylums diminished during the German Occupation not because of a reduction in production and consumption, but because the Nazis requisitioned the asylums, or patients were either released or were starved to death.

Some doctors debated the definition of alcoholism with the anti-alcohol coalition. Since the early 1950s, the coalition had argued that alcoholism had much less to do with overt intoxication than with the moderate but daily consumption of ordinary table wine. The problem resided in habitual drinking, not public drunkenness. One of the HCEIA’s slogans in the 1950s, for example, warned: “You can become an alcoholic without ever having been drunk.” The coalition had claimed that tradition and ignorance, and the alcohol lobbies that supported this state of mind, had kept the population drinking. In

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448 Much of the alcohol press derided his statistics. Brunaud himself admitted that his report was delayed in order to test the conclusions; see his Rapport sur le coût annuel, 1.
450 CAC, 20050174. Posters of the HCEIA.
one opinion poll, only seven percent of the population believed that wine could be harmful to health.451

The wine interests contested Sully Ledermann’s seminal study on French alcoholism. The eminent statistician and alcohol researcher at the INED, who played a large part in shaping the state’s anti-alcohol policy, had shown that habitual drinking was at the root of French alcoholism. His notion, “the Ledermann curve,” claimed that the number of alcoholics in a given society could be determined by the total consumption of the population. “If such is really the case, it would appear vain to hope for a reduction of alcoholism in France without diminish ing, in a noticeable way, the average consumption per individual, that is to say the overall consumption and, finally, the French production of wine and alcohol.”452 This meant that in order to reduce alcoholism, state policy would have to be directed at “normal” drinkers and the products that they consumed.

Some doctors and scientists exposed the tenuous link between overall consumption and the number of alcoholics. In 1958, Professor Roger Andrieu of the Fondation scientifique de la recherche anthropologique and the Institut français pour l’étude des problèmes humains noted:

Human biology is quite simply the Science of Good Sense; it is what explains that which is fundamentally very simple, and leaving place neither to complicated matters nor the repression of those who are the Masters of them, it finds few skilled people among the Technocrats. Today, the proof is made that one can in no way link general consumption with deaths due to alcohol. For twelve years, consumption has fallen and mortality climbs and when there is a resumption of consumption the mortality falls.453

Andrieu reminded the coalition that alcoholism should be treated on a case-by-case basis, not in terms of raw numbers. In this view, one person’s problem with alcohol was surely not the same as another’s. “Statistics are indispensable,” the psychiatrist Jacques Borel observed, “in medicine as elsewhere. But they must remain simple, direct, established in a series of elements as homogenous as possible, that is to say identified one by one. Without this condition, they are worth nothing. The mathematical abstractions of the polytechnician Ledermann join the astronomical calculations of the polytechnician Paul Choisnard in an imaginative cloud of the same order.”454

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452 Sully Ledermann, Alcool, alcoolisme, alcoolisation: Données scientifiques de caractère physiologique, économique et social (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1956), 159. It should be noted that Ledermann’s findings were known before this publication date.
454 Borel, Le Vrai Problème de l’alcoolisme, 159. Paul Choisnard (1867-1930) graduated from École polytechnique, and later became an astrologist who wished to demonstrate the validity of astrology through statistics.
Étienne May sided with Andrieu’s view and even saw wine drinking as a possible solution to France’s recurrent wine surpluses. Already in his first report on alcoholism to the Economic Council in 1954, he remarked that the “consumption of alcoholic drinks and alcoholism are not synonymous and what matters to us is not to know about French consumption but to know how many alcoholics are in France.”455 In his second report to the Economic Council in 1959, May would point out that the best way to adapt production to consumption levels would be to “increase reasonable consumption, that is to say to increase the number of consumers.”456 He meant French consumers, but also European consumers in the emerging Common Market.

As we will see, a lot changed in the period between May’s first and second reports. In 1957, May attended a major wine conference organized by the Société française des médecins amis du vin in Bordeaux, and affirmed that wine was an excellent mealtime drink and that the HCEIA had no desire to see it be replaced by mineral waters or fruit juices: “We know that the great majority of the French drink wine and are not “alcoholic.””457 Monsieur Henry, President of the Federation des Associations viticoles de France (FAV), advanced May’s line of reasoning:

For domestic use, France barely consumes 49 million hectoliters of wine. Now, if every French adult—not including women and the elderly—drink daily the liter of wine that is recommended in the subways, consumption would climb to 92 million hectoliters. Our production would not be sufficient. In this way, if the orders of the Haut Comité were followed, winegrowers would have nothing to contest.458

Félix Martin, President of the Association de propagande pour le vin (APV), a private pro-wine propaganda association located in the winegrowing Languedoc, also made the case for how drinking more wine could facilitate the economic modernization of the country. He urged the state to promote wine consumption and to break free of its socio-economic paralysis, turning the technocrats’ rhetoric against them.459

Neither the HCEIA nor the CNDCA ever preached abstinence; instead, they endorsed “moderation” in attempt to appease the wine lobby. The Premier even defended the HCEIA:

The slogans found on the posters and propaganda documents of the Haut Comité such as “Drink good, drink little, in order to drink for a long time” or “Never more than a liter of wine per day” do not seem to me by their nature to discredit French wines abroad. The fact that the government’s propaganda implies that a dose of a liter of French wine per day is not dangerous in itself appears to me on the contrary very favorable from the perspective of foreigners who generally consider that infinitely smaller doses are toxic.  

Foreign countries used the Academy of Medicine’s and the HCEIA’s slogan “never more than a liter of wine a day” in order to promote wine. With such propaganda, some even accused the HCEIA of encouraging alcoholism.

Some believed that the “Ledermann curve” smeared France by giving it the international image of an alcoholic nation. Making French citizens into irresponsible and lazy drunkards was bad for wine’s export business. In 1956, for example, the American magazine LOOK ran an article that showed how alcohol had corrupted the French family and the French political system. The appalling photographs in the magazine showed parents giving alcohol to their children, who then passed out at the dinner table because of their inebriety. Both Robert Debré, president of the HCEIA, and Bing Crosby, perhaps the world’s most celebrated Christmas caroler, came to the rescue of French rectitude.

Gustave Deleau, an influential syndicalist with the Confédération générale des petites et moyennes entreprises (CGPME) and member of the Economic Council, posed the question: “Who could claim that the builders of the fastest trains and commercial planes in the world, and the most modern dams, represent with their technicians, their cadres, their workers, a drunken people?” In his view, France was not a nation of slackers.

While the anti-alcohol coalition largely blamed French political economy and the oversupply of alcohol for alcoholism, many country doctors and the wine lobbies preferred to place the emphasis on immoral behavior and individual psychoses. The

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460 CAC, 19940020, art. 18. Letter from the President of the Council to Félix Martin, President of the APV, 19 April 1957.
463 Robert Debré wrote several letters to LOOK in search of a public apology; he claimed that the photographs were fakes and that American actors were disguised as French people. Bing Crosby remarked that he “had been several times to France, and had been invited into families of all social levels. I found that the French family was a solid institution, not more interested by Folie-Bergères, the French-cancan, and the luxurious nightclubs than the average American who loves Ebbets Field, the Madison Square Garden, or “Copacabana,” Bulletin d’informations du HCEIA, October 1956, 14.
465 Georges Portmann even demonstrated that wine boosted productivity. He made his case in Production française, October 1957. See Portmann, Son activit, 99.
Groupement professionnel des fabricants de liqueurs d’anis du Sud-Est used medical evidence to show that alcoholism was due to a “preexisting mental weakness.” Proponents of wine drinking argued that sitting down to table with family and friends was the best defense against the anxious rhythms of modern life that induced alcoholism. In this view, wine intrinsically moderated drinkers and even protected them from the narcotic effects of alcohol. They reprimanded the drinker on three fronts: for drinking excessively; for drinking on an empty stomach; and for drinking “bad quality” wine. Somehow, “good” wine, wine that was taxed and rooted in terroir, would not cause alcoholism. Doctor J. Fagouet of Château Beauséjour suggested that even the excessive consumption of the grands crus (great wines) would not lead to a drinking problem.

For the defenders of wine, it was a crime to reduce “good” wine to its alcoholic properties. They believed that for technocrats, wine was wine, without nuance, and without distinction from alcohol. Georges Portmann, member of the Academy of Medicine and senator from Bordeaux, declared:

...wine contains alcohol! But the alcohol is part of a complex where one finds glycerine, tartrates, tannins, and vitamins; it is such a particular complex that it is the only product from the soil of France that continues to live when it leaves the soil. And we doctors would be wrong not to use such a precious auxiliary. Mesdames, messieurs, I will not prolong this speech, but I must all the same say that ancestral experience has its value. For centuries we have drunk wine.

Michel Cépède, a well-known agronomist, concurred. He demonstrated that research conducted upon rats had shown that they reacted differently to wine than to alcohol or to eau-de-vie. The latter liquids stunted the rats’ growth and induced liver maladies. Cépède echoed Portmann’s lyricism in observing that wine, given its vitamins, was an antidote to alcoholism.

The wine lobby interpreted the state’s anti-alcohol campaign as a specific attack upon their product. Many doctors supported the wine lobby in claiming that “good” wine should be viewed as an agricultural product, unlike other forms of “industrial” alcohols. They employed the nineteenth-century rhetorical distinction between wine and “industrial” alcohol. Paul Pagès, a member of the medical faculty of Montpellier and president of the CDDCA of the Hérault, agreed with the official statistics concerning the link between wine, alcoholism, and cirrhosis of the liver, but claimed that “industrial” wines were to blame. When doctors and the wine lobby agreed upon a link between

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467 CAC, 19940020, art. 18. Letter from Dr. J. Fagouet, Château Beauséjour, Premier Grand Cru Classé, Saint-Emilion, to the General Secretary of the HCEIA, 14 June 1957.
468 Portmann, Son activité, 77.
469 Michel Cépède, “La question viticole et l’alcoolisme,” Les Cahiers économiques (February 1955). This article does not contain page numbers.
470 Archives de l’Association nationale de prévention en alcoologie et addictologie (hereafter ANPAA), N145. Paul Pagès, “Vin et alcoolisme,” report presented at the
the alcoholic product and alcoholism, they increasingly targeted the toxic qualities of fraudulent alcohol for the problem of alcoholism. As Gilbert Nicaud, General Secretary of Santé de la France lamented: “Wine, yesterday a loyal friend of mankind, is no longer thus because of its industrialization!”

In the late 1950s, existing pro-wine institutions intensified their activity in defense of wine and new ones cropped up. They sought to educate the consumer about how to drink, to rationalize the consumer, thus placing the onus upon the individual and not upon the product. As we have seen, since the 1930s, the Ministry of Agriculture had sponsored the efforts of two groups to edify the population about how to drink wine: the Comité national de propagande en faveur de vin (CNPFV) and the Société française des médecins amis du vin (SFMAV). These two groups would play an important role in defending wine from the HCEIA’s attacks. Georges Portmann, who was an important figure in both groups, was Robert Debré’s colleague at the Academy of Medicine, and no doubt helped open a dialogue between the pro-wine groups and the HCEIA.

The CNPFV sought to counter the anti-alcohol propaganda. The tides in alcohol information had turned since the HCEIA’s inception. Jean Bené, socialist Senator from the Hérault, criticized the state for appointing the publicist Marcel Bleustein-Blanchet to the HCEIA, a man who apparently controlled 80 percent of French advertising. The wine interests claimed that wine advertising appealed to reason and to the cultivation of taste. M. Deramond, director of the CNPFV, noted that “pro-wine propaganda must be reasonable and that is the base of our action. We would never say: ‘Drink wine,’ but we would educate consumers by saying to them: “Know how to drink, know how to taste wine.”

In 1958, the wine interests established Santé de la France (The Health of France), a private association that called for both the good health and well-being of the population and the economy. It received some support from the medical profession and from nutritionists, which gave its campaign more credibility. Numerous supposedly objective scientists, such as Jean Trémolières, an influential postwar French nutritionist, wrote in the pages of its Bulletin de presse. Santé de la France advocated “moderation” and “good sense,” a scientific diet. For the most part, Santé de la France operated in the departments, away from the levers of state power.

Yet, according to one anti-alcohol activist, Santé de la France aimed “to confuse minds and to neutralize the conclusions of the work carried out on alcoholism, which risks hurting the wine business.” André Mignot, General Secretary of the CNDCA, decried the “pseudo-science” of Santé de la France and its attack upon the “extravagant

Congrès international pour l’étude scientifique du vin et du raisin, Bordeaux, 11-13 October 1957, in “Le Centre interdépartemental d’éducation sanitaire démographique et sociale de Montpellier vous invite à prendre connaissance d’une série d’articles et rapports traitant de l’alcoolisme.”

471 CAC, 19940020, art. 32. “Allocution prononcée à Montpellier le 20 juin 1957 par M. Gilbert Nicaud, Secrétaire général de Santé de la France,” 2.


crusade,” the “vain literature,” and the “sectarian spirit” of the anti-alcohol campaign. The HCEIA accused this institute of receiving money from the alcohol interests, and especially from the Fondation scientifique Pierre Ricard.\textsuperscript{475} If the public doubted the harmful effects of wine drinking, then it might continue to drink.

In 1959, the wine interests also created the Comité central de défense des boissons nationales (CCDBN). It sought, among other things, to attack the home distillers, which they blamed for tax and alcohol fraud, to reduce the HCEIA’s budget, and to mobilize the scientific community behind wine. By February 1960, \textit{Le Provençal} counted the existence of fifty Comités départementaux de défense des boissons\textsuperscript{476} These departmental committees attempted to check the advance of anti-alcohol propaganda and offered to collaborate with local anti-alcohol committees.\textsuperscript{477}

Between 1955 and 1960, the wine lobby’s counter-expertise and its endorsement of quality wine consumption appeared to affect both the public and the state. The public’s opinion of wine was slow to evolve. The belief that wine was nourishing was held by 79\% of those surveyed in 1948, by 70\% in 1953, and by 65\% in 1955.\textsuperscript{478} The state, too, was confused by wine’s conflicting qualities. The HCEIA lent an attentive ear to medical treatises on the relationship between wine and health. As we will see in the next section, in 1957, as Robert Debré opened up a dialogue with the wine lobbies as a result of the HCEIA’s shrinking budget, the HCEIA began to subsidize the Station agronomique et oenologique de Bordeaux.\textsuperscript{479} In 1958, it funded research in Bordeaux under the leadership of J. Masquelier and J. Ribereau-Gayon.\textsuperscript{480} The research sought to ascertain the toxicities in wine and how they varied according to the vine variety. Masquelier and his team studied the nutritional value of wine, its vitamins, and its phenolic properties. This research also distinguished between wines, believing that wines from old vines, and not from the toxic Noah or Othello,\textsuperscript{481} were less likely to cause alcoholism.\textsuperscript{482} The research leaned toward the conclusion that quality wines had a lower

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\footnotetext{475} CAC, 19940020, art. 9. “Note pour le Ministre de la Santé publique et de la population,” 19 March 1959.


\footnotetext{477} \textit{Le Moniteur vinicole}, 25 March 1959.

\footnotetext{478} Roland Sadoun, Giorgio Lolli, and Milton Silverman, \textit{Drinking in French Culture} (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Center of Alcohol Studies, 1965), 51.

\footnotetext{479} CAC, 19940020, art. 31. This box includes information on the subsidies that the HCEIA granted to various groups, especially the various anti-alcohol associations.

\footnotetext{480} CAC, 19940020, art. 31. This box includes information on the subsidies that the HCEIA granted to various groups, especially the various anti-alcohol associations.

\footnotetext{481} Both the Noah and Othello are vines that have been prohibited in France since 1935, given their reputation for being strong in alcohol content and for driving the drinker insane.

\footnotetext{482} CAC, 19940020, art. 2. J. Ribereau-Gayon, Professeur at the Faculté des Sciences de Bordeaux, Directeur de la Station oenologique, “Rapport presente au Haut Comité d’étude et d’information sur l’alcoolisme,” 21 October 1957, 1-3.
\end{footnotes}
toxicity level than their inferior counterparts. The HCEIA published the conclusions of this research in its important Rapport au Président du Conseil des ministres of December 1958.

The HCEIA began to fund wine research at Bordeaux at the same moment that the drink trade began to make a claim on the anti-alcohol campaign. A growing number of people came to believe that a more tightly controlled wine industry—one that was monitored more closely from production to consumption, one where provenance was guaranteed—would reduce alcoholism. The fact that a lot of doctors recommended the moderate consumption of quality wine also testified to the weight that medical opinion had on shaping economic policy.

III. The Commercial Drink Trade Joins the Anti-Alcohol Coalition

Medical disputes about the causes of alcoholism and how to remedy it—and about the extent to which wine was the cause or remedy of alcoholism—bolstered the pro-alcohol defense in the political arena. In the months following Pierre Mendès France’s political demise, the alcohol lobbies tried to squash the anti-alcohol campaign. Anti-alcohol activists had to find a way to keep the HCEIA afloat. The Commission des boissons of the National Assembly and other deputies opposed Mendès France’s December 1954 decree—which had dictated that taxes on café licenses would fund the HCEIA—as an unfair measure against France’s shopkeepers.

On 16 March 1955, the National Assembly cut the HCEIA’s budget that Mendès France had set at 500 million francs. Léopold Sédar Senghor, secretary of state for the Prime Minister, thought it shameful that the HCEIA would not have the opportunity to prove itself. For this reason, the secretary of state for the budget proposed giving the HCEIA a sum of 8 million as a start-up fund. The HCEIA wanted more, and would finally receive it by the end of the year.

Yet in the course of the next five years, Parliament still progressively cut the HCEIA’s budget:

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<td>1955</td>
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<td>300</td>
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483 CAC, 19940020, art. 21. Letter from Robert Debré to M. Ribereau-Gayon, Professor at the Faculty of Sciences, Bordeaux, 14 February 1958.
486 Journal officiel de la République française: Débats parlementaires, Assemblée nationale, 1re séance of 16 March 1955, 1,514.
Robert Debré, president of the HCEIA, complained to Paul Reynaud, deputy from the Nord in the National Assembly, about the diminution in the HCEIA’s budget. Debré admitted that “on the one hand these reductions have had some extra-financial reasons...” Alain Barjot, Secretary General of the HCEIA, reinforced the idea that the alcohol industries blocked the path of progress:

The welcome made by Parliament to all the propositions in this domain (pro-alcohol legislation) can only reinforce in the administrations the conviction that alcoholism is taboo and that all action, doomed to inefficiency, will only produce troubles and useless expenses. Here resides the essential reason for the progressive diminution of our budget—that the majority of even those who vote in favor of the budget estimate that they constitute extravagant expenses.

From the outset, then, the HCEIA complained of the state’s inability to act against the alcohol interests. With their large numbers, electoral and financial strength, and ability to mobilize scientific research behind wine, the commercial alcohol groups would be for the HCEIA a force to reckon with.

From the HCEIA’s inception, the commercial drink trade pressured the government to grant it representation at the commission’s meetings. Winegrowers overwhelmed Debré with letters requesting representation. Without buckling under the pressure, Debré refused. Yet relations between the HCEIA and winegrowers existed. The HCEIA wanted to know about scientific developments in the world of wine. J. Branas, of the National School of Agriculture in Montpellier, advised the HCEIA on the vine and how growers could focus upon producing more grape juice instead of undertaking the more difficult task of uprooting their vines. Though the HCEIA had relations with the wine interests, Debré allowed their representatives neither to attend the meetings nor to shape its policy.

But as the HCEIA’s budget continued to diminish, it began to reconsider its relationship with the wine lobbies. In December 1956, the HCEIA had noted with much pessimism that “the huge majority of the leading political and administrative personnel profoundly doubts, whether the utility of the goal assigned the Haut Comité or, more often, the efficiency of its action. It is an almost daily fact of experience that the evocation of the Haut Comité brings to the lips of the parliamentarians or high functionaries a compassionate smile, but one that is disabused or ironic.”

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these threats, Alain Barjot, the HCEIA’s General Secretary, asked Eugène Forget, the HCEIA’s agricultural specialist, to look for a wine representative to sit at the HCEIA’s meetings.\footnote{CAC, 19940020, art. 1. Letter from Eugène Forget to Alain Barjot, 3 January 1957.}

The financial dilemmas facing the HCEIA made Debré rethink the commission’s strategy. He needed to find an acceptable way to work with the winegrowing associations without compromising the HCEIA’s mission. On 28 March 1957, Robert Debré and Alain Barjot went before the Senate’s Commission des boissons, bastion of wine defenders. They defended the HCEIA’s position on wine and alcoholism, and reassured the political friends of wine that the HCEIA had never launched a campaign specifically against wine. After Debré’s exposé, several senators challenged Debré’s use of statistics, calling them undependable and faulty. The senators refused to reduce wine, beer, and other fermented drinks to their alcoholic properties. They pointed out that the map of alcoholism in France showed that the disease had fewer victims in wine-producing regions than in the alcohol-manufacturing north. For Georges Portmann, eloquent doctor and senator from the winegrowing Gironde, and Debré’s colleague at the Academy of Medicine, the civilization of wine deserved defense. He reminded Debré that “it would be unreasonable to promote a type of propaganda that is not based upon the fundamental difference between abuse and use, that, if there are some bad-quality wines, there are also some prohibited vines such as the “Noah,” which are particularly dangerous to health.”\footnote{AS, 33/S7. Commission des boissons, “Séance du jeudi 28 mars 1957.” See also Portmann, \textit{Son activité}, 66.}

The bond between Debré and Portmann would become stronger in the years to come.

Still unable to penetrate the HCEIA, the wine lobby attempted to make the anti-alcohol campaign an agricultural question. A decree of 22 May 1957 dictated that a representative of the Undersecretary of State at the Presidency of the Council, who was responsible for the HCEIA, take part in the meetings of the CNPFV, the wine propaganda committee under the Ministry of Agriculture.\footnote{CAC, 19940020, art. 8. Letter from the Sous-Secrétaire d’État à la Présidence du Conseil, chargé du HCEIA, à M. le Secrétaire d’État à l’Agriculture (Direction generale de la production agricole), 19 September 1957.} Étienne May agreed to take on this position. The Congrès international pour l’étude scientifique du vin et du raisin took place in Bordeaux in 1957, and proved to be an important moment for the winegrower cause. Both May and the Minister of Public Health attended the conference. May even told the medical friends of wine that “The numbers on consumption are not what matter but rather the real number of heavy drinkers.”\footnote{ADG, 69J. Jean Riou, “Bordeaux, Congrès international de médecine pour l’étude scientifique du vin et du raisin: Compte rendu des communications (suite),” \textit{La Feuille vinicole}, 17-18 October 1957.} May placed the onus on the individual rather than on wine and the Mediterranean drinking pattern.\footnote{In its eulogy to Étienne May in 1962, \textit{Alcool ou santé} noted that May had hoped “that wine and alcohol would one day become for everyone a reasonable pleasure of cultivated people, which is the true function of them.” Cited in “Hommage au Dr. Étienne May,” \textit{Alcool ou santé} 4-5 (1962): 3.} Both the HCEIA and the
CNPFV shared some of the same messages, such as “Drink Better, but Less,” and “Never More Than A Liter of Wine A Day.” Citizens could read these recommendations as either pro- or anti-alcohol. Agriculture had begun to stake a claim on public health; it harnessed the anti-alcohol movement.

In 1957 and 1958, Debré began to feel mounting pressure from the wine lobbies to change the HCEIA’s anti-alcohol strategy. Southern winegrowers were suffering from surpluses and falling prices and thus called for tighter surveillance from the Service de repression des fraudes. On 9 December 1957, Jean Bourcier of the Confédération nationale des vins et spiritueux (CNVS) impressed upon the HCEIA the interests that the commercial drink trade and the anti-alcohol campaign shared in common. In his view, both wished to do something about fraud and home distillation. The CNVS argued that there was a close correlation between the rise in the cases of alcoholism and the increase of fraudulent wine on the market. It called upon the state to strengthen the Service de la Repression des Fraudes and that the HCEIA finance it.

The Minister of Public Health warned the Minister of Finances that the anti-alcohol campaign was “strongly attacked by those working in the alcohol industry, who complain about the struggle undertaken against drinks that they estimate are part of honest commerce, whereas no decision has been taken against the production and fraud of the home distillers.” If the government continued to postpone the laws against home distillation, “it will place itself in a difficult situation vis-à-vis those working in the commerce of drinks.” As a result, Debré dropped wine from his immediate agenda and began to zone in on the problems of “fraud” and home distillation. By framing alcoholism as a problem of fraud and home distillation, the wine interests appeared to be in the vanguard of the war on drink. In September 1958, Jean Fraisse, President of the CNVS, told Robert Debré that his “latest letters have sufficiently proven to us that you really have the concern to fight Alcoholism.” In the war on alcoholism, the tables had turned.

Debré hoped to pacify the wine industry by opening up a dialogue with the CNVS and Nicolas, the chain distributor and largest merchant in appellation wines. Though still no winegrowing representative was allowed a seat at the HCEIA’s meetings, in November 1958, the HCEIA created a sub-commission that brought together the HCEIA and leaders of the commercial drink trade. The sub-commission included Jean Bourcier, honorary president of the CNVS, Maurice Seguin, Secretary General of the CNVS, M.

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500 CAC, 19940020, art. 11. Letter from the Minister of Public Health to the Minister of Finances, 1 September 1958.
501 CAC, 19940020, art. 11. Letter from Jean Fraisse, President of the CNVS, to Robert Debré, 16 September 1958.
502 Jaume Bardissa made this claim; see his _Cent ans de guerre du vin_ (Paris: tema-éditions, 1976), 74.
Bertrand, the distributor Nicolas, and Alain Barjot, Secretary General of the HCEIA.\textsuperscript{503} Both the CNVS and Nicolas wanted tighter controls placed upon their trade. They sought to fight against fraud; to limit the privilege of the home distillers; to apply the laws against prohibited vines; to control the circulation of wines coming from family vineyards; to control the commercialization and circulation of alcohol; to modify the wine taxes in order to improve the quality of wine and prevent fraud; and they hoped for the administrative and penal repression of alcoholism, and the education of the public.\textsuperscript{504} In other words, they wanted a responsible alcohol industry and a responsible consumer.

By entering into discussions with the CNVS, Debré grafted the state’s anti-alcohol project onto a program led by progressive winegrowers to improve the quality of their wines. French winegrowers had fought a long battle against the industrialization of their product. Winegrower discourse on fraud harked back to the late nineteenth century, when the phylloxera had besieged vineyards and diminished the nation’s wine supply.\textsuperscript{505} With the short supply of wine, merchants strengthened their wines with sugar, chemicals, and other “unnatural” products. Winegrowers and the government tried to check such practices with the Griffe law of 1889, which defined wine as the product of the natural fermentation of unpreserved grapes, and it required all other wine products to be labeled accordingly.\textsuperscript{506}

As vineyards recovered from the phylloxera in the early twentieth century, and as a lot of winegrowers, particularly in the Languedoc, turned toward the production of mass wines, overproduction became a constant problem. Instead of seeing the problem as a structural one—that they might be producing too much wine for the country’s good—southern winegrowers blamed it upon under-consumption and the “fraudulent” wines flooding the market. While winegrowers of the Languedoc sought to protect the “purity” of their wines from chaptalization and from the merchants’ practice of cutting their wines with stronger Algerian ones, winegrowers from the famous regions such as Bordeaux, Burgundy, and Champagne fought for labeling.\textsuperscript{507} A series of laws beginning in 1905 and ending in 1935, when winegrowers and the government instituted the

\textsuperscript{503} CAC, 19940020, art. 2. See, for example, the meeting between the HCEIA and the drink trade, 3 November 1958.

\textsuperscript{504} CAC, 19940020, art. 2. Meeting between the HCEIA and the CNVS, 3 November 1958.

\textsuperscript{505} For a detailed analysis of this discourse, see Alessandro Stanziani, \textit{Histoire de la qualité alimentaire (XIXe-XXe siècle)} (Paris: Seuil, 2005), especially pp. 73-111 and 153-172.


Appellation d’origine contrôlée (AOC), sought to protect “natural” wine production. In the first half of the twentieth century, then, the wine economy generally had three components: “impure” wines that contained sugar, chemicals, or a mixture of wines with different origins; the generic but “pure” wines of the Languedoc; and, little by little, wine with a strict appellation.

Moreover, by the 1930s, progressive winegrowers began to push for quality production in order to meet the emerging consumer demand for higher-quality wines. After the war, in the context of rising disposable incomes that made it possible for consumers to buy better and better wines, progressive winegrowers’ efforts intensified, as economists such as Jules Milhau predicted that wine consumption would continue to drop, and that winegrowers would need to channel their resources into the AOC label. These growers hoped to circumvent the middlemen and create a direct relationship between the producer and the consumer.

To tighten controls on the wine trade, after the war, winegrower and commercial interests came together in the CNVS. Its mission was to protect “honest” commerce and to promote the AOC label. The collaboration between winegrowers and merchants marked a breakthrough, for most winegrowers had proven greatly suspicious of merchants for their supposedly “fraudulent” and “artificial” manufacturing of wine and alcohol. Winegrowers had pitted their “agricultural” credentials against the merchants’ “industrial” concoctions. From the perspective of the CNVS, four groups committed fraud: the home distillers and small winegrowers who evaded taxes, a fraction of the Languedoc winegrowers who produced “industrial” wine—that is, mixed wines from various provenances and often concocted with sugar to boost alcohol content, and the fraud committed by gangs of mobsters that stole alcohol from the state. In the 1950s, faced by the further industrialization of food, consumers were apparently searching for “authentic” products.

But the wine lobbies were not the only ones to benefit from this collaboration. In allying with the CNVS in its attack upon fraud and home distillation, the HCEIA could use the winegrowers’ power in Parliament and within the administration. In August 1958, Robert Debré asked Monsieur le Baron Le Roy, President of the Institut national des appellations contrôlées (INAO) and Jean Bourcier, President du Syndicat des produits d’origine et de qualité (SPOQ) and Honorary President of the CNVS, to use their influence within the Ministry of Finance to persuade that Ministry to act against the fraud.


511 In its review, the Union fédérale de la consommation demonstrated the increased interest in quality wines in the 1950s; see its *Bulletin d’information*, editions such as September-October 1952, December 1953, and February 1960.
committed by the home distillers. The Ministry of Finance had representatives at the INAO. Earlier, he had encouraged E.-J. Dauphin, editor-in-chief of *Journée vinicole*, a wine newspaper that supported the push toward quality, to launch a press campaign against the home distillers.

The CNDCA, a private anti-alcohol association that received subsidies from the Ministry of Public Health, was slower to accept collaboration with the drink trade. Its change of heart began in the unlikely department of the Hérault, the land of plonk. On 21 April 1959, with winegrowers at her office door, Madame Martin-Gros, Secretary General of the local anti-alcohol committee in the Hérault reported the following to the home office of the CNDCA in Paris:

I rush to send to you the attached articles, cut from the *Midi libre* of yesterday and the day before, and which will give you an idea of the virulence of the campaign that has been unleashed against us. We should not be taken in by the relative moderation M. Claparède’s (senator from the Hérault) tone in the article published today. And yet, given the power of the winegrowing associations in this part of France, it is certain that our sole chance of persuading them is in trying to collaborate with them, alas! *We also need a serious mobilization of the medical profession.* I am sending to you our tract, which has had so much success, and the wish of the Municipal Council of Montpellier, which received unanimous approval—so that you send it on to Professor Monod, for his press conference of April 23. It is now, at the national level, that the discussions must be begun, if at all possible.

It became increasingly clear, at the local level at least, that anti-alcoholism would go nowhere without wine.

Just days later, the CNDCA would make a dramatic change in its position. On April 23, Robert Monod, esteemed member of the Academy of Medicine and newly appointed president of the CNDCA, called a press conference. After a discussion with the CNDCA’s General Assembly, he had decided to divulge the lobby’s new doctrine:

What I insist upon saying is that, with less extremism, we are in favor of the reasonable consumption of natural wine. It is indispensable that consumers know that what we are fighting against (and this with conviction) is above all

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512 CAC, 19940020, art. 18. Letters from Robert Debré to M. le Baron Le Roy, President of the INAO, and to Jean Bourcier, 5 August 1958.

513 CAC, 19940020, art. 18. As early as 9 November 1956, Alain Barjot had asked Jean Riou of *La Journée vinicole* to launch a campaign against the home distillers in the newspaper. “A campaign in your newspaper so that Parliament votes in favor of the text that has been presented to it, and an action on your part with the parliamentarians with which you are in report, appears to me, from this point of view, strongly desirable.” See the letter from Alain Barjot to Jean Riou on 9 November 1956.

adulterated, industrially produced wines, and, above all else, against fraud. There is presently on the market an excessive amount of bad quality table wines. These wines, industrially produced or not, are in effect the most noxious, the most toxic. Furthermore, we advocate the consumption of natural table wines without abusing them, a position which appears to us to be in accord with the interest of the producers.\textsuperscript{515}

Until 1959, the CDNCA resisted winegrower pressure. Typically antagonistic to the wine lobby, it decided to bring it into the anti-alcohol fold. As we have seen, Robert Monod emphasized that the CNDCA would combat the abuse of bad wine. In the CNDCA’s view, the state’s raising of the wine taxes had galvanized winegrowers and so winegrowers needed to be appeased.\textsuperscript{516}

Monod’s declaration caused a stir within the CDNCA’s ranks. Opinion was divided. The departmental committee of the Isère protested against the possibility that the CNDCA would accept financial support from wine producers and merchants.\textsuperscript{517} The Isère also warned of the danger of making an official distinction between “good” and “bad” wine, as if the consumer could drink unrepentantly “good” wine. Pierre Fouquet, a leading psychiatrist in the war on alcoholism and a member of the CNDCA, noted that “the questions relative to the quality of wine, whether trafficked or adulterated with more or less dangerous chemical substances, constitutes a trap.”\textsuperscript{518} Madame Martin-Gros was for wine but against alcoholism. Perhaps more than others, she pushed for bringing together anti-alcohol reformers and winegrowers: “we must elaborate a constructive anti-alcoholism and not be satisfied in denouncing the dangers of wine and alcohol.”\textsuperscript{519}

Other local committees in winegrowing regions followed the Hérault in championing natural wine and denouncing alcoholism. Anti-alcohol committees in the Côte-d’Or, the Gard, the Gironde, and the Haut-Rhin all had contacts with the winegrowers. Much of the rural press delighted at the news of collaboration between the wine and the anti-alcohol lobbies. The journalist under the name of “La Fureur” at Le Bien public in Dijon remarked that “The Comité national de défense contre l’alcoolisme maintains that it is not against wine but against the abuse of wine….I am certain that there is not a single inhabitant of Burgundy deserving of this name who would not approve of such a program. For there is as much difference between a drunkard and a connoisseur of good wine as between a glass of water and a glass of Beaujolais.”\textsuperscript{520}

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\textsuperscript{515} Alcool ou santé 2 (1959): 30.
\textsuperscript{516} ANPAA, N192. “Extrait du procès-verbal de l’Assemblée générale du 12 avril 1959.”
\textsuperscript{517} CAC, 19940020, art. 18. C.M. Bertrand, “Propositions soumises aux administrateurs du CNDCA,” July 1959, 2.
\textsuperscript{518} CAC, 19940020, art. 18. “Déclarations de quelques administrateurs à la reunion du 28/9/1959,” 1 bis. Emphasis in the original.
\textsuperscript{519} CDDCA de l’Hérault. Letter from Madame Martin-Gros to an unspecified person at the CNDCA, 25 January 1959. Emphasis in the original.
\textsuperscript{520} ANPAA, N192. Le Bien public, 25 May 1959.
extremely hard, becomes for a lot of men and women a poison. For helping the winegrowers out, we would really like to be able to say to the French: ‘Drink wine, but observe temperance.’”\textsuperscript{521} In Montpellier, too, the local press was pleased to hear the news of collaboration.\textsuperscript{522}

Some anti-alcohol activists believed that they had been duped and that the anti-alcohol campaign had been derailed. Between 1955 and 1960, both Étienne May and André Mignot lessened their degree of hostility toward the home distillers. The Ministry of Public Health also had its doubts about attacking them. The SNBC apparently lobbied the ministry,\textsuperscript{523} and in the National Assembly, Bernard Chenot, Minister of Public Health, admitted that “it is not exact that the home distillers are principally responsible for alcoholism in France.”\textsuperscript{524} The Ministry of Public Health showed little concern for the continual postponement of the termination of the home distillers’ privilege. Already in 1955, Paul Reynaud, President of the Commission des finances of the National Assembly, even noted that “the Government, which included the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Public Health, was hardly energetic” in fighting the home distillers.\textsuperscript{525} It is possible that the Ministry of Public Health feared that agriculture was getting the better of public health, and that people would assume that French alcoholism would dramatically decline with the termination of the home distillers’ privilege.

But the momentum in favor of terminating home distillers’ privilege was too great for these obstacles. The collaboration between the pro- and anti-alcohol forces and their fight against alcohol fraud intensified at the same moment that de Gaulle and the new republic were given special powers to raise the alcohol taxes so that alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages were sold at an equal price, to pass drinking and driving legislation, and to curb spirits advertising.\textsuperscript{526} Winegrowers responded to this ordinance of 31 December 1958 by referring to American prohibition; in that country, repressive measures had encouraged fraud. The Confédération nationale des Industries et Commerces des vins et autres boissons observed that in the last twenty years taxed consumption had declined by 40 percent,\textsuperscript{527} while non-taxed wine and alcohol were on the rise. In this way, winegrowers could pit the state against the home distiller.

After the tax hike at the end of 1958, the CNVS put serious pressure on the offices of the Prime Minister, to the point that the government considered suppressing the HCEIA.\textsuperscript{528} In May, the CNVS went so far as to claim that the Minister of Agriculture

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{521} ANPAA, N192. \textit{L'Alsace}, 27 May 1959.
\item \textsuperscript{522} ANPAA, N192. \textit{Midi libre}, 28 June 1959.
\item \textsuperscript{523} See \textit{Le Bouilleur de France}.
\item \textsuperscript{524} \textit{Journal officiel de la République française: Débats parlementaires, Assemblée nationale}, “Séance du jeudi 3 décembre 1959,” 4 December 1959, 3,152.
\item \textsuperscript{525} CAC, 19940020, art. 11. Letter from Paul Reynaud, President of the Commission des finances of the National Assembly, to Robert Debré, 21 July 1955.
\item \textsuperscript{526} For the details of this legislation, see the \textit{Bulletin d'informations du HCEIA}, January 1959; or \textit{Alcool ou santé} 1 (1959).
\item \textsuperscript{527} François Barsac, “Visages de l’anti-alcoolisme,” \textit{La Réforme}, 4 July 1959.
\item \textsuperscript{528} CAC, 19940020, art. 18. Alain Barjot, “Note pour M. le Secrétaire général du gouvernement,” 15 April 1959.
\end{itemize}
had been charged with coordinating the activities of the anti-alcohol committees.\textsuperscript{529} The doctors, politicians, and technocrats of the HCEIA were increasingly forced to collaborate with the CNVS.

The HCEIA abandoned its attack upon wine not only because of the immediate tension caused by tax increases, but also because, as we have seen, the wine industry mobilized large sums of money for research on the benefits of moderate wine drinking, because the industry was committed to long-term plans for renovating the vineyard, which fell in line with technocratic thinking, and finally, because the public was still convinced of the innocuousness of wine. Furthermore, for Robert Debré and other doctors, AOC wines did not contribute to the alcohol problem: they commanded a high price, thereby inhibiting their daily consumption. In crusading against the fraud supposedly committed by home distillers, all three groups could win: doctors could curb the population’s alcohol consumption, technocrats could find a solution to the nagging problem of rural tax evasion, and the wine lobbies could eliminate their competitors. Working together, these groups pursued the evasive home distiller.

IV. Bury the Home Distillers

Home distillers did not go gently to their graves. They armed themselves with their own arguments about the causes and remedies of alcoholism, and stressed that the war on alcoholism and the war on home distillation were not one and the same. The problem, in their view, lay elsewhere. Like the CNVS, the SNBC supported public health measures by encouraging the production of “quality” alcohols and the repression of tax and alcohol fraud (they after all claimed that they did not surpass the ten liters of tax-free alcohol that the government allowed); it also defended the inviolability of the home and the right to family alcohol consumption, and the protection of national products against foreign competition.\textsuperscript{530} In 1958, the participants at the home distillers’ national conference declared that it was prepared to fight against alcoholism.\textsuperscript{531} Syndicate leaders also carried out correspondence with the HCEIA, and tried to influence its strategies, but to no avail.

The home distillers’ last line of defense was Parliament. Their parliamentary supporters argued that the anti-alcohol coalition should not direct its policy at their “privilege” but at those who really did commit tax fraud. Home distillers saw their privilege as a natural right; as Louis Briot mentioned at the national conference in June 1959, “We are not defending a privilege but a right that we have inherited from the

\textsuperscript{529} CAC, 19940020, art. 18. 72\textsuperscript{ème} congrès de la Confédération nationale des industries et des commerces en gros des vins, cidres, jus de fruits, sirops, spiritueux et liqueurs de France, Paris, 9, 10, 11 June 1959 (Montpellier: Imprimerie Causse, Graille et Castelnau, 1959), 22. I have found no evidence of this in Journal officiel de la République française: Lois et décrets.

\textsuperscript{530} CAC, 19940020, art. 11. “Appel du Bureau national des bouilleurs de cru,” from the Bureau national du Syndicat national des bouilleurs de cru,” meeting in Paris on 10 February 1957.

\textsuperscript{531} Bulletin d’informations du HCEIA, September-October 1958, 14.
Politicians also argued that the abolition of the privilege would be yet another attack upon agricultural interests. They tried to elicit the concern of the peasantry in its entirety, no doubt in an attempt to mobilize all of agriculture against the so-called Parisian technocrats. Two doctors in the National Assembly, Marcel Roclore of the Côte-d’Or and Raoul Rousseau of the Dordogne, did not understand why the government obsessed over ten liters of tax-free alcohol when gin and whisky entered the country freely. Until 1960, home distiller rhetoric worked in the legislature. Home distillers succeeded in postponing the enactment of the Mendès France decrees that would terminate their privilege.

Like winegrowers, home distillers tried every argument in the book to defend themselves from the anti-alcohol campaign, but nothing ultimately seemed to work. Why had, with the creation of the Fifth Republic in 1958, the home distillers begun to lose their credibility when the winegrowers had not? As political scientist Bernard E. Brown observed, home distillers lacked the financial means to provide the state with expert advice at a time when “expertise” prevailed over parliamentary politics. In 1954, R. Magnien, president of the Syndicat national of the ambulating distillers, had worried about “the state of our financial situation.” Nor did home distillers have the organizational ability or the popularity to counter the official anti-alcohol campaign. Both Le Bouilleur de France and the La Défense des bouilleurs ambulants persistently called upon their subscribers to mobilize, suggesting that home distillers were loosely organized. Furthermore, not only were home distillers notorious for producing “impure” alcohol, but they were also accused of tax fraud, which interested France’s increasingly powerful technocrats.

Three changes brought down the bootleggers: the evolving political system, public opinion, and the coming of age of a new generation of farmers.

At the founding of the Fifth Republic in 1958, the home distiller was portrayed as all that was faulty with past political regimes. At the end of the Fourth Republic, André Mignot, Secretary General of the CNDCA, had published Le Privilège des bouilleurs de cru...ou un scandale qui nous coûte plus de 50 milliards par an. He called the “problem” of the home distiller “the problem-type, which puts in sharp conflict the national interest and the electoral interest.” On 10 December 1959, L’Express noted

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533 This was a common argument made by the home distillers; see their newspaper, Le Bouilleur de France.
536 With the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958, the executive branch was endowed with more power than Parliament, which in turn gave more power to technocrats in the administration.
537 André Mignot, Le Privilège des bouilleurs de cru...ou un scandale qui nous coûte plus de 50 milliards par an (Paris: Allain SICAR Elbeuf, 1958). Mignot published with the CNDCA’s support.
538 Ibid., 4.
“That the Fourth Republic has nearly always capitulated before the alcohol lobbies was proof of its weakness and one of the grand causes of its discredit.”

From the beginning of the Fifth Republic, the HCEIA had convinced enough technocrats, whom the Fifth Republic endowed with more power, to make a decisive move against the home distillers. By 1959, study groups and the Commission des finances of Parliament seriously began to search for solutions to the obstacles of economic expansion. These groups agreed that the home distillers were at the root of the problem. In 1958, Sully Ledermann and his team at the INED published an influential article on the relationship between high rates of alcoholism in home distilling regions that became the grounds for government action.

In 1959, the government established a commission that consisted of representatives of the Prime Minister, of the Direction du Budget, des Impôts, of Public Health, of several members of the HCEIA, and presided over by M. Chatenet, secrétaire d’État in the cabinet of the Prime Minister, and responsible for the HCEIA. It concluded that in order to resolve the home distiller problem, the Direction générale des impôts would actually need to apply the laws that monitored home distillation. This was made possible because a growing number of economic reformers took charge of key duties within the Ministry of Finance. Blot and Charles Frappart, both adherents to the technocratic doctrine, called upon that administration to condemn fraud. Blot also advised his administration more thoroughly to enforce the law in coordination with the Garde des Sceaux.

It should also be noted that, with the founding of the Fifth Republic, the anti-alcohol cause had friends in high places. Michel Debré, Robert Debré’s son, had become

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541 See, for example, the Rapport sur les obstacles à l’expansion économique, Committee established by decree #59-1284 of 13 November 1959 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1960), 59. Pierre Rosanvallon takes note of this report and how it called into question various forms of protection; see his, L’État en France de 1789 à nos jours (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1990), 259.
543 CAC, 19940020, art. 2. Meeting of the HCEIA, 6 May 1959.
544 For a thorough examination of the transformations within the Ministry of Finance, see Aude Terray, Des francs-tireurs aux experts: L’organisation de la prévision économique au ministère des Finances, 1948-1968 (Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, 2002). For a more general discussion, see Dulong, Moderniser la politique, 161-171.
Charles de Gaulle’s Prime Minister. Although his general political outlook differed significantly from that of Pierre Mendès France, the younger Debré had also versed himself in the technocratic school of the 1930s and 1940s.

The Constitution of the Fifth Republic had also deprived Parliament of some of its power. The National Assembly had been a bastion of home distillation. In a dramatic display, André Liautey, former deputy of the Haute-Saône (he lost his seat in 1956) and leader of the home distillers, was spotted giving advice to his political successor in the National Assembly; because he was no longer deputy, security guards immediately escorted Liautey from the premises of the National Assembly.

Liautey’s expulsion from the alcohol fortress marked the end of the beginning. Liautey’s political style belonged to a past that the new republic wished to silence, not to resurrect. In the following months, the home distillers’ privilege would come to an end. Strange thing was, few would be sad to see it go.

Since the middle of the 1950s, the press had increasingly made the home distiller into the scapegoat of France’s political and economic ills. Earlier, intellectual newspapers such as L’Express and Le Monde had given the home distillers bad press, but after 1955, more popular newspapers joined in the attack. They associated home distillation with the poverty of rural life, with the “French desert.” As newspapers portrayed it, by simply removing the home distiller, the standard of living would improve. Public intellectuals such as Albert Camus and François Mauriac became vocal opponents of the home distillers, viewing them as a symptom of France’s unstable political system. University professors also took an interest in the home distillers and the other alcohol lobbies. In the late 1950s, Henri Mendras, Jean Meynaud, Jean Touchard, and the American political scientist Bernard E. Brown all analyzed the place of the alcohol lobbies in the state. Books made for a popular audience also began

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548 Alcool ou santé 6 (1959); and Le Monde, 5 December 1959.

549 The regions of Brittany and the Languedoc especially constituted the “French desert.” On this topic, see, for example, Jean François Gravier, Paris et le désert français: décentralisation, équipement, population (Paris: Le Portulan, 1947).


553 Bernard E. Brown, “Alcohol and Politics in France,” The American Political Science Review (December 1957): 976-994; for the changing strategies of the alcohol lobbies from the Fourth to Fifth Republics, see also by the same author, “Pressure Politics in the Fifth Republic.”
to appear in the 1950s. Colette Coutaz, for example, wrote a book entitled *Bistros, bouilleurs & cie* that blamed these two categories for French backwardness. Marise Querlin also believed that bistros and home distillers poisoned the population. These works tried to stir the population to take action against the drink trade.

Little by little, the country began to look upon the home distiller with a diminishing regard. In May 1955, French television presented a program about alcoholism. It invited Étienne May, André Mignot, Germaine Touquet, municipal councilor of Clichy, Pasteur La Gravière, Council of the French Union, Rachelle Lempereur, deputy from the Nord, and Dauphin, editor of *La Journée vinicole*. André Liautey represented the home distillers. When Liautey took the floor, the cameraman stopped filming in order to change reels. Home distillers’ claims were falling upon deaf ears and blind eyes.

The Parisian and much of the provincial press had convinced public opinion that home distillation translated into ignorance and economic backwardness. It had at least grown tired of hearing about the home distillers and their parliamentary raucousness. In May 1960, the IFOP asked the public for its opinion of the home distillers. Out of ten French persons, five were in favor of abolishing the existing privilege; three were partisans of the status quo; and two were indifferent. Already in 1955, the CNDCA had reportedly obtained eleven million signatures petitioning against the home distillers’ privilege.

But the war on home distillation did not simply represent an urban conquest of the countryside. During the 1950s, the rural world awakened to the chorus of the technocratic creed. The case of Étienne May’s two reports on alcoholism, the first in 1954, the second in 1959, at the Economic Council, revealed a heightened consciousness among the agricultural and small commercial interests: in 1954, the peasant and shopkeeper groups had voted against the report and its plan to combat alcoholism by reforming agriculture; but in 1959, they approved of Economic Council’s slightly revised strategy. In 1959, a fallback by winegrowers in the face of the less hospitable political environment of the Fifth Republic helped create a “consensus” to fight alcoholism—to fight “fraud” and home distillation.

Notorious home distilling departments, such as the Finistère, proved attentive to ways to combat alcoholism. Municipal councils gave substantial financial support to the Comité départemental de défense contre l’alcoolisme du Finistère (CDDCA of the

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557 AHC, 2DE52, Fonds Michel Debré. IFOP, *L’Opinion française et les bouilleurs de cru*, May 1960. This opinion poll can also be found in CAC, 19940020, art. 26.
558 CAC, 19940020, art. 11. Letter from Alain Barjot to Bernard Lafay, Minister of Public Health, 20 July 1955.
Politicians from Brittany in Parliament voted for the termination of the home distillers’ privilege. In the course of the 1950s, the number of home distillers in France diminished:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Home Distillers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>2,883,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>2,576,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>2,490,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>2,369,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>2,118,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1,531,142 (poor wine and fruit harvest)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both rural and urban youth also came out against alcohol. In the emergent consumer democracy, youth had discovered the possibility of making choices in the marketplace. No longer was the liquid of tradition forced down their throats. Much of the young generation looked beyond the mud and the misery of farming. Monsieur Le Houilleur, president of the Association générale des étudiants en médecine de Paris (AGEMP), M. Trocmé, general secretary of the Centre national des jeunes agriculteurs (CNJA), as well as rural youth from western France, spoke at a press conference about the dangers of drink. According to Robert Monod, President of the CNDCA, the young generation of farmers wanted to push for more fruit farming in place of alcohol production. M. Martraire, President of the Union nationale des groupements de distillateurs d’alcool (UNGDA), noted that the mentality of youth had changed and was less attached to the privilege.

At the end of 1959, the CNDCA could note with satisfaction:

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561 CAC, 19940020, art. 11. In this dossier, there is a page with statistics on the home distillers.

562 “Les Jeunes et les bouilleurs de cru,” *Bulletin de liaison des Comités départementaux et locaux*, March-April 1960, 1-2. It should be noted that the Jeunesse agricole catholique (JAC), which since 1929 had sought to improve education and leisure in the countryside, had a strong presence in Brittany. See, for example, M. C. Cleary, *Peasants, Politicians and Producers: The organisation of agriculture in France since 1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), especially pp. 112-117.

563 CAC, 19940020, art. 11. Letter from Robert Monod to Michel Debré, Prime Minister, 2 May 1960.

At last, for finishing on a note of hope, let us put in relief this recognized fact by numerous speakers and with which each day brings us new testimony: the indifference that the young peasant generation, in its entirety, manifests toward a “privilege” that has become the least of its concerns. It has a lot of other of worries, and also other ambitions, more legitimate and more elevated. The Country must do its best to satisfy them if it wants to conserve or give to the countryside the rural elite that will rejuvenate life in the “French desert.”

As this passage, and as others in this chapter, suggest, the anti-alcohol campaign had become less a public health than an economic concern. The wine industry and its allies in the state hoped to build a modern wine sector and a stronger export industry. The state’s anti-alcohol campaign was and would remain one aspect of the economic transformation of the French countryside. The young generation that came into positions of power in the late 1950s marched to the beat of a different drum.

V. Michel Debré and the Laws Against the “Social Plagues”

In the late spring of 1960, the Michel Debré government set out to resolve two related problems: alcoholism and agricultural modernization. The struggle to end the home distillers’ tax privileges linked these two issues. As anti-alcohol activists and technocrats saw it, apple production in Brittany and Normandy—which supported home distillation and fraud—had taken a toll on both the economy and public health. Since the end of World War Two, commercial cider consumption had fallen precipitously and bands of home distillers evaded the state’s control.

In July 1960, Debré asked Parliament to grant him special privileges to attack alcohol in the name of a crusade against the “social scourges.” The Socialist Party immediately labeled Debré as anti-parliamentarian for attempting to circumvent the legislature’s power. Pierre Bourgeois, a doctor and socialist deputy from the Allier, saw the anti-alcohol campaign as a way to discredit Parliament, noting that “the exploitation of anti-parliamentary propaganda is carried out shamelessly against these deputies who wish for the non-screening of cancer, the increase in the number of deaths with a cardio-vascular origin, a spike in tuberculosis, and the rapid extension of alcoholism and prostitution!”

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565 Alcool ou santé, 6 (1959), 2.
566 In this respect, the reader should refer to an exemplary book, written by one of the leaders of the young peasant generation: Michel Debatisse, La Révolution silencieuse; le combat des paysans (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1963).
567 Parliament was discussing an orientation law for agriculture at the same moment that it gave Debré special powers to rule by decree.
569 AHC, 2DE52, Fonds Michel Debré, Libération, 19 July 1960.
Socialists, to be sure, were put in a difficult position. As the traditional defenders of southern winegrowers, they had to support any measure that exonerated their constituency from causing alcoholism; but on the other hand, the party was in the opposition and sought to defend Parliament against the encroachment of the administration. Debré conceded to the socialists in the Senate. Aware that it would spell political suicide to upset the winegrowers who were undergoing yet another crisis of overproduction, he accepted the demands of several senators to protect the Statut viticole of 1953, which set out to uproot low-quality vines in favor of the production of quality wines.

With the support of 323 deputies against 131, and 161 senators against 93, a law of 30 July 1960 authorized the prime minister, like his predecessor Pierre Mendès France, the power to rule by decree. Home distillers wondered why the state counted them among the country’s great “social plagues.” They thought it ridiculous that they would go down with homosexuals and prostitutes. Yet, at first, they did not display much hostility toward the movement against them. The home distillers helped bring themselves down. Many of their parliamentarians voted in favor of the law against home distillation so as to prevent the harsher Mendès France decree from going into effect, which would have taken the privilege away from those who did not claim themselves as farmers who owned the land they tilled. Henri Prêtre, senator and member of the Groupe des Républicains et Indépendants from the Haute-Saône, center of home distillation, had encouraged his friends in the Senate to vote in favor of the law, but now felt that Michel Debré had deceived them.

As the ordinance of 30 August 1960 dictated, the privilege would be stripped from no one but would end with the person who presently held the privilege. In other words, distillers could not transmit their privilege to their offspring. For those who abandoned the privilege, the home distillers and their offspring would receive from the state subsidies to produce fruit for non-alcoholic purposes. De Gaulle, Debré, and the

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575 Michel Debré also waged war upon homosexuality and prostitution.
576 ANPAA, P39/a. See, for example, the article “Dernière heure: l’ordonnance sur les bouilleurs va être promulgué à bref délai,” Le Bouilleur de France, July-August 1960.
Ministries of Finance, Justice, and Public Health signed the bill. A decree of November 29 sought to reduce alcoholism by converting apple orchards, making non-alcoholic beverages cheaper, and by banning alcohol advertising in stadiums and in places frequented by youth. The government did not touch wine; for the moment, it reigned supreme.

This chapter has not discussed drinking establishments, but Debré also attacked these quintessentially “French institutions.” The HCEIA, the CNDCA, Michel Debré, and Pierre Mendès France all failed to explain what they meant by the “drinking establishment” (the French have had many types, be they assommoirs, bars, bistros, or cafés). From their overall arguments about alcohol and a rationalized economy, we can infer that they meant the bistro, the old “Parliament of the people” that encouraged the consumption of “fraudulent” beverages and, as the traditional working classes declined, were no longer economically viable. The bistro smacked of a working-class and revolutionary past that the rising class of “cadres” (French term for “new middle class” based upon the tertiary sector) hoped to forget.

The state sought to decrease the number of drinking establishments from 1 for 180 French denizens to 1 for every 3,000 citizens, to approximately one per village. The new zoning laws prevented the installation of cafés around hospitals, sports terrain, schools, and the new housing developments. It would be wrong to reduce Debré’s law to an attack upon the workers. The newspaper Aux Écoutes du Monde, for example, argued that Debré’s decree against the cafés affected the middle classes more than the working classes. “On the other hand, in other popular neighborhoods—in the Goutte d’Or, in the Charbonnière, for example—the drinking establishments are allowed to be abundant. It is the law: there are no care facilities in the proximity!” In a letter to the café syndicate, Robert Debré even admitted that he had nothing against the café; he simply wanted to modernize them and make them more economically viable. Debré even thought it important to collaborate with the café association to develop the taste of non-alcoholic drinks among the French population.

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Some owners of drinking establishments failed to comprehend why the state had attacked them. They pointed out that the number of cafés had diminished naturally since the beginning of the century: 320,000 licenses in 1913, 250,000 in 1946, and 227,000 in 1959. Roger Bideault, President of the Fédération nationale de l’Industrie hôtelière de France et d’Outre-Mer, could not understand why his profession was blamed for alcoholism. He provided statistics revealing that the French drank increasingly in the home, where there was less social control than in the café.\footnote{CAC, 19940020, art. 11. Letter from Robert Bideault to Robert Debré, 11 July 1959.} Alcoholism, in his mind, was a familial and educational problem, not a problem of the café. The café leadership argued that alcoholism at home was more of a threat to French society and that the war against alcoholism should be situated at the level of production and not of distribution.\footnote{Le Monde, 25 November 1960.}

A 1959 survey revealed that “hygienic drinks” constituted 42.55% of all drinks consumed at the café, beer 37%, wine 16.83%, aperitifs 2.95%, and liquors and other alcohols 0.67%.\footnote{CAC, 19940020, art. 11. Letter from Robert Bideault, President of the FNIH, to Robert Debré, 5 August 1960.} Proprietors of drinking establishments, like merchants and others in distribution, were also blamed for fraud. They apparently had the habit of filling empty bottles with fine labels with fraudulent concoctions.\footnote{ANPAA, P39/b. Letter from Pierre Bories, Secrétaire general administrative du Comité regional interprofessionnel des Eaux-de-Vie du Languedoc, to Professeur Milhau, member of the Economic Council, 17 January 1959.} J. Ricol, president of the Syndicat général des débitants de boissons, restaurateurs et hôteliers du département du Rhône, noted that, regarding the edict of 29 November 1960, “some think that the solution to this problem is a function—not of the effect that the measures criticized could have on public health—but rather of the political influence that their abrogation could have.”\footnote{CAC, 19940020, art. 9. Letter from J. Ricol to Edouard Charret, deputy of the Rhône, 20 July 1962.}

Michel Debré’s anti-alcohol decrees of 1960 marked not the beginning but the end of an era. He attacked only those groups that were exiting the historical stage. As society evolved, much of the elite conceived of its world in different ways. In a similar way to home distillation, drinking establishments threatened new forms of distribution, such as American-style supermarkets. It should come as no surprise, then, that the HCEIA, with its interest in rationalizing the economy in order to improve public health, collaborated with the official drink trade.

Conclusion

The late 1950s marked a major moment in the history of French anti-alcoholism in that pro- and anti-alcohol forces began to collaborate. Instead of waging war upon one another, doctors, technocrats, and the commercial drink trade used one another for their own ends. Doctors wanted a reduction in consumption, technocrats wanted a bigger and better economy, and winegrowers wanted to free themselves of fraud and competition. All this happened, at least with some success, in the state’s anti-alcohol campaign.

The new anti-alcohol coalition of the late 1950s reduced alcoholism, a complex problem, to home distillation. By the government’s simple sleight of hand in terminating
the home distillers’ hereditary privilege, parents would no longer be able to transmit their drinking habits to their children. Other laws were passed that affected the trade, but they elicited much less political debate and public attention. Home distillers became a scapegoat for a whole variety of ills that had beleaguered the Fourth Republic. But because their numbers were already diminishing on their own terms, home distillers were for the state more a specter than a real problem. By ending their privileges, the Fifth Republic, as it invested more power in the presidency, sought a symbolic rupture with France’s supposedly weak parliamentary past. In some respects, the anti-alcohol coalition built a new mythology of a modern republic on the backs of the vanishing home distillers.
Chapter Four:

Wine is better protected than the physically handicapped.
–Eugène Claudius Petit, member of the HCEIA and deputy in the National Assembly, 1969

By the late 1950s, a dramatic transformation had occurred in Western Europe. Officials faced an unprecedented problem: food scarcity was replaced by food surpluses. Since the end of the war, French and other European technocrats had shared the view that higher agricultural yields would lead to greater prosperity and social stability. Yet in the 1950s, supply began to surpass demand. Producers thereby suffered. Prices fell. To quiet its irascible farmers, French officials could either purchase these surpluses or push for free trade in the emerging European Economic Community (EEC). Edgard Pisani, de Gaulle’s Minister of Agriculture between 1961 and 1966, believed that “For French agriculture to envisage no Common Market is to envisage a revolution in France.” De Gaulle agreed: “The fate of our agriculture is from here on out, after the regulation of the Algerian affair, our biggest problem. And if we do not settle it, we might have another Algeria on our own soil.”

In this politically charged context, Robert Debré, president of the HCEIA, called for a new partnership between anti-alcohol advocates and winegrowers and elaborated an alternative agricultural strategy based upon curbing output.\footnote{Little has been written on the politics of French winegrowers in the EEC. For a brief explanation of wine policy in the Common Market, see Andy Smith, Jacques de Maillard, and Olivier Costa, *Vin et politique: Bordeaux, la France, la mondialisation* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 2007), especially pp. 78-87.}

We must obtain that the plans for the future of the nation entail not only the possibility of giving to each farmer a suitable standard of living, an acceptable output of his work and consequently a fair sale of the products of his land, but at the same time, to show that this general policy must be reoriented in such or such a direction, commensurate with the struggle against a scourge that has a dietary origin consequently linked to agriculture...We are searching also to make penetrate in the thought of those who represent us in these meetings [whether in Paris or in Brussels] the necessity of adding to their economic effort an effort of public health by associating them with the action that we are pursuing.\footnote{Archives d’histoire contemporaine (hereafter AHC), 2DE52. “Exposé de Monsieur le Professeur Debré,” “séance du HCEIA du 10 janvier 1962,” 7-8.}

By making alcoholism an agricultural problem, the HCEIA set out to sell its way of thinking to France’s Ministries of Agriculture and of Finance and to the rest of the EEC. It believed that viticulture could not follow the course of industrialization that was taking place in other agricultural sectors. Europeans, the HCEIA argued, could not consume surplus alcohol without potentially falling victim to alcoholism. In Debré’s view, anti-alcohol reformers and luxury winegrowers had a common interest: limiting production could reduce consumption and increase prices. Drinking better but less could serve the interests of public health and economic rationalization.\footnote{French “Europeanists” had been championing quality wine since the immediate postwar period; see Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, 294. For a more recent book that treats the persistence of national protectionist policies in the Common Market, see Knudsen, *Farmers on Welfare*.}

This chapter examines how the state’s anti-alcohol campaign tried to stimulate the modernization of French winegrowing without subscribing to the productivist mentality of the day. In this case, less was better. In the 1960s and 1970s, the HCEIA teamed up with France’s luxury winegrowers who were championing the appellation system and who shared the view that quality was the path to follow. The new anti-alcohol coalition had three goals: to reduce the wine supply by cutting the production of industrial wine and by keeping out Algerian and Italian wines; to raise taxes on wine; and to restrict advertising, which the coalition believed contributed to shaping drinking behavior and which therefore increased wine consumption. The HCEIA, as a provider of medical discourse and as a producer of knowledge about alcoholism, justified the state’s intervention in the wine economy.

Medical discourse on alcoholism bolstered the argument to improve winegrowing in the Languedoc and to protect the country from cheap wine imports. Southern
producers of mass wine, like their Italian counterparts, added to the oversupply of alcohol, thereby allegedly dulling economic growth and endangering public health. Not only did merchants usually buy these cheap, low-alcohol wines of the south and boost their alcohol content with Algerian or Italian wine, but southern growers also undermined the country’s political stability. In the 1960s and 1970s, they still had substantial political power. The winegrowers of the Languedoc typically supported leftist parties—in particular the Socialist Party—which throughout this period were in the opposition; moreover, they also belonged to a revolutionary syndicalist tradition that used direct action when the government did not protect them from falling prices.\footnote{For the important place of the Socialist party in the Hérault between the end of World War Two and the early 1960s, see Olivier Dedieu, “Le ‘rouge’ et le vin. Le socialisme à la conquête du vignoble héraultais,” in \textit{Vignobles du Sud, XVIe-XXe siècle}, eds. Henri Michel and Geneviève Gavignaud-Fontaine (Montpellier: Publications de l’Université Paul-Valéry, 2003), 623-645. For the leftist tradition in the Languedoc and its continuation after World War Two, see Jean-Philippe Martin, “Les gauches vigneronnes contestataires en Languedoc, singularités, différenciations et évolutions (1945-2000),” in \textit{Vignobles du Sud, XVI-XXe siècle}, eds. Henri Michel and Geneviève Gavignaud-Fontaine (Montpellier: Publications de l’Université Paul-Valéry, 2003), 661-679. See also Jean Sagnes, \textit{Le midi rouge, mythe ou réalité: études d’histoire occitane} (Paris: Anthropos, 1982).}

The Fifth Republic’s (1958-present) institutions created the necessary conditions for the modernization of winegrowing and for the anti-alcohol coalition slowly but surely to meet its goals.\footnote{This was true for the rest of agriculture. See, for example, John T.S. Keeler, “The Corporatist Dynamic of Agricultural Modernization,” in \textit{The Fifth Republic at Twenty}, eds. William G. Andrews and Stanley Hoffmann (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981): 271-291; see also his book, \textit{The Politics of Neocorporatism in France: Farmers, the State, and Agricultural Policy-making in the Fifth Republic} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). Other books that demonstrate the transformation in the relationship between agriculture and the state at the founding of the Fifth Republic include Bernard Bruneteau, \textit{Les paysans dans l’État: Le gaullisme et le syndicalisme agricole sous la Ve République} (Paris: Éditions L’Harmattan, 1994); or Édouard Lynch, “Le ‘moment Debré’ et la genèse d’une nouvelle politique agricole,” in \textit{Michel Debré, Premier ministre (1959-1962)}, eds. Serge Berstein, Pierre Milza, and Jean-François Sirinelli (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2005), 335-363.} With the new, more authoritarian republic, policymaking transferred from the legislative to the executive branch. The government was largely freed from the political parties; governmental commissions attempted to launch an \textit{économie concertée} that conciliated the interests of competing groups. The alcohol lobbies had to change their tactics and to adapt to the new political system.\footnote{Bernard E. Brown analyzes how the alcohol groups changed their tactics at the founding of the Fifth Republic; see his “Pressure Politics in the Fifth Republic,” \textit{The Journal of Politics}, 25 (August, 1963): 509-525.}

Although the early Fifth Republic showed a willingness to collaborate with high-end wine, it listened less to the small producers of mass wine in the Languedoc. The state had to convince the wine leadership of the south that the future lay in quality wine.
production. The establishment of the Fifth Republic, then, marked a drastic change in the relationship between winegrowing and the state. Quality wine—but not the mass wines of the Languedoc—was the beneficiary of France’s economic dirigisme.

Yet the struggle to reduce alcohol production and impose new standards of quality now faced a higher power than the French state: EEC officials and their drive for free trade. The HCEIA defended France’s modern wine sector and prepared it for competition in the Common Market. The concern over alcoholism—and the distinction that anti-alcohol advocates made between quality wine and cheap, ordinary wine—offered a means to achieve trade discrimination within the EEC’s common tariff policy. The French state’s anti-alcohol campaign served French interests in the international arena. In this light, the EEC developed more as an intricate reconciliation of national preferences and interests than as a free trade area devoted to the creation of new economies of scale. For France, much was at stake. Without strict wine regulations, other countries could sell a “Bordeaux” or “Burgundy” at a lower price. France’s AOC winegrowers therefore had a profound effect upon the making of the Common Market for viticulture. In invoking the fear of alcoholism, they were able to impose their standards of quality upon the Community, thereby radically reshaping Europe’s wine economy by reducing production and by forcing inefficient growers off the land.

I. The HCEIA Attacks Mass Wine

Between 1962 and 1970, France’s historical struggle to reform its wine economy and to root wine in terroir threatened to come undone, as the member states of the EEC tried to harmonize their wine practices. The Common Market, with its policies of free trade, leveled distinction. A European market of 195 million consumers replaced a French market of 50 million. In the early 1960s, the bureaucrats of the EEC focused upon the new markets that European integration would introduce. For those in search of money, more consumers meant more profit, which in turn would lead to increased production. The Direction générale de l’agriculture, for example, asked the Centre de recherches et de documentation sur la consommation (CREDOC) to carry out a study of the wine drinking habits of the member states. Wine growing countries hoped to win over the beer and spirits drinking countries of the north. As the CREDOC put it in 1961:

Pro-wine propaganda must not be based only upon the wine of superior quality but also upon table wine. It is not a question of inculcating taste in the consumer but to incite non-consumers to consume wine by demonstrating that it is a drink like any other and not a luxury item. Such an action assumes a complete modification of the systems of pro-wine propaganda. The organizers of

599 Milward first advanced this line of reasoning in *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*.
advertising should take an interest in learning from the campaigns led by the fruit
juice and soda drink industries.\footnote{HAEU, BAC 2/1965-15. CREDOC, “Conclusions de l’étude de la demande de vin dans les pays de la communauté,” 13 July 1961, 4.}

Though since the middle of the 1950s, public health specialists had succeeded in
making alcoholism an economic question in France, they struggled to put it on the EEC’s
agenda. The problem was how to insert public health into discussions on the Common
Market. As Robert Debré put it in 1963:

…the HCEIA has already searched a million times by what means it could
introduce itself into the domain of the negotiations of the European community in
order to defend the public health point of view. It is indeed curious that this
preoccupation seems completely foreign to those who establish the economic
plans. Thus one treats the problem of wine, but to the exclusion of the dietary
equilibrium of man. Perhaps the vocation of the Community is economic, but the
effort of the HCEIA in favor of quality wine connects, in every way, with the
desire of the economists and should facilitate its intervention within the EEC.\footnote{CAC, 19940020, art. 2. “Séance du HCEIA du 11 décembre 1963,” 10.}

The productivist mentality of the EEC threatened the modern French wine industry in the
making. Alain Barjot noted “that a certain number of high functionaries of these
ministries are very convinced of the gravity of the problems posed by alcoholism,” but
because of interest groups, “their preoccupations will above all be of an economic
order.”\footnote{CAC, 19940020, art. 2. “Séance du HCEIA du 14 février 1962,” 3.}

According to the anti-alcohol coalition, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
for wine would thwart the state’s efforts to improve wine and reduce consumption.
Consumers would not only be faced with France’s surplus wine supply, but also that of
other European countries—in particular, Italy. Together, France and Italy produced over
half of the world’s wine supply. For Debré and for other members of the HCEIA, public
health needed to temper the crass commercialism of winemaking in the Common
Market.

In 1961, Robert Debré made a strategic decision in asking Philippe Lamour, a
leading agricultural expert, to become a member of the HCEIA. Although born in
northern France and trained as a lawyer, Lamour began to take an interest in agriculture
during his time in the Languedoc under the Occupation. At that time, he acquired the
Mas de la Perdrix, a winegrowing domain just outside of Bellegarde.

Debré brought Lamour to the HCEIA as officials discussed the place of French
agriculture in the Common Market and as the government sought to enact a new
orientation law that would consolidate farmland.\footnote{For an understanding of the orientations laws of 1960 and 1962, see M.C. Cleary, Peasants, Politicians and Producers: The Organization of Agriculture in France since 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 121.} In the immediate postwar years,
Lamour had become one of the more notable voices within agriculture. He helped
establish the Vins délimité de qualité supérieure (VDQS), and in particular the VDQS
label of the Costières du Gard. In 1947, he became general secretary of the Confédération générale de l’agriculture (CGA). His position at the CGA allowed him to become acquainted with Jean Monnet, who was busy coordinating the planning commissions. By 1952, Lamour had become the president of three different groups: the Commission de modernisation du plan, the Société d’études chargée de l’aménagement du territoire, and the Chamber of Agriculture of the Gard. Lamour was also a member of the agricultural group of the Economic Council, where he came into contact with the statistician Alfred Sauvy and the doctor Étienne May.

Lamour especially had ties to the wine economy of the Languedoc. He was editor of Le Paysan du Midi and president of the Société du Bas-Rhône Languedoc. Lamour showed an interest in the economic development of that region, and consulted with Jules Milhau, an influential and locally well-respected economist who knew the problems facing southern wine and who participated in the Comité départemental de defense contre l’alcoolisme de l’Hérault (CDDCA de l’Hérault), based in Montpellier and animated by Madame Martin-Gros, whom we met in Chapter Three. Both local economists and local anti-alcohol activists wanted to improve the region’s wine production, encourage the manufacture of grape juice, and, when necessary, convert the vineyards to the production of other foodstuffs. Lamour’s principal strategy to modernize southern winegrowing was to build a canal so that farmers could grow other products.

Lamour saw vine monoculture as the greatest obstacle to industrial expansion. He wanted to put an end to this wine waste by reducing consumption and by improving the quality and increasing the price. First off, he believed it imperative to eliminate “amateur” winegrowing and the perpetual problem of fraud that stemmed from it. Not only did these growers du dimanche apparently produce poor wine, they, more than professional growers, caused political instability. As Jean Piel, a local agricultural leader, described these “amateur” growers: “It is moreover not these (growers) that shout the softest during demonstrations.” Another set of measures concerned the encouragement of quality production. Finally, a third series of measures entailed the resumption of uprooting vines. Lamour argued that the wine statute of 1953, which had been successful until its dismantling in 1957, needed to be reinforced. He believed that voluntary,

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606 In 1986, the “Costières du Gard” would earn an AOC label and in 1989 would change its name to Costières de Nîmes.”
608 The economists had their own journal, Le Progrès agricole et viticole, led by Jean Branas, who also corresponded with Robert Debré.
610 Cited in Lamour, Le Cadran solaire, 332.
subsidized uprooting and irrigation would allow winegrowers the technical means to convert their vineyards. Lamour spread his ideas to both economic and public health commissions, to the point that the boundaries between wine and public health blurred. Lamour preached the same philosophy at the Commission chargée des mesures à prendre à la suite du rapport du Groupe “viticulture” du Commissariat général au Plan. The Ministry of Agriculture also asked Lamour to preside over a Commission chargée de définir la politique viticole. Though Le progrès agricole et viticole complained that only Jean-Baptiste Bénet represented the producers, the Languedoc had several representatives. The group met on 15 March 1962 and studied four sets of questions: 1) adaptation of the French legislation to the Brussels agreements of that year, which dealt with the selections of vines; 2) the end of surpluses by uprooting and subsidies to reconvert vineyards; 3) quantum to share out between the member states in proportion to the average harvest and to the yearly harvest; 4) modification of the regulations of the AOC and the VDQS.

The coalition further strengthened its bond when, in 1962, the Comité national de défense contre l’alcoolisme (CNDCA), the main anti-alcohol lobby, entered into an alliance with the Confédération nationale des vins et spiritueux (CNVS). This coalition set as its primary goals: to define “natural” wine; to reduce the alcoholic degree of wine so as to curtail the alcoolization of the population; to fight against fraud; to come up with advertisements and propaganda that threatened the interests of neither party; and to conduct research on the chemistry of wine and its biological effects. These goals worked to protect France’s modern wine industry. As we have seen, public health officials showed concern that mixed, “unnatural” wines—low alcohol wines of the south that merchants cut with the high alcohol wines of Algeria or Italy—increased the risk of alcoholism. Furthermore, their assertions benefited the economic interests of French winegrowers over those of other nations. For both public health and economic reasons,

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613 Other members included Jean-Baptiste Bénet, president of the CGVM and influential figure in the Languedoc; Maurice Seguin, president of the CNVS; Bertrand de Casanove, former president of the Syndicat du commerce d’exportation; Emile Claparède, senator and mayor of Béziers; Lalle, deputy from the Côte-d’Or; Valabrègue, deputy from the Hérault; Long, director of the Institut des vins de consommation courante; Mayoux, an inspector of finance; Bonnave, commissaire aux prix; Lajotte, civil administrator at the Ministry of Agriculture.
615 Ibid.
the HCEIA and the CNDCA tried to make the public dissociate “quality” with high alcohol volume.

No decree had yet been passed to stabilize the domestic wine economy. The decree of September 1953, as has been noted, had fallen into disuse. In 1964, the Ministries of Agriculture and of Finance tried to put an end to the vineyards of mass production. In the months leading up to the 1964 decree, the HCEIA was in close communication with Roche, a finance inspector, and Lamour, who worked at the Ministry of Agriculture.\(^\text{617}\) The Prime Minister also consulted with the HCEIA.\(^\text{618}\) Even the Conseil d’État used the HCEIA’s anti-alcohol discourse.\(^\text{619}\) Edgard Pisani, Minister of Agriculture, and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Minister of Finance, signed the decrees of May 26\(^\text{620}\) and August 31\(^\text{621}\) relating to the organization of vineyards and to the amelioration of quality production.\(^\text{622}\) The threat of alcoholism justified an intervention in the wine economy.

On 19 March 1966, just after Charles de Gaulle began his second-term as president, Jean Keilling replaced Robert Monod as president of the CNDCA.\(^\text{623}\) Keilling was an agronomist and a professor at the Institut national d’agronomique and had been one of the three vice-presidents of the CNDCA.\(^\text{624}\) He had for a long time taken an interest in the economic aspects of alcoholism and wrote articles in *Alcool ou santé* on the difficulty of reducing alcoholism in France without a major structural revolution in the countryside.\(^\text{625}\) At this moment, agricultural interests were also offering financial support to the anti-alcohol cause. In 1965, for example, the Caisses centrales de mutualité agricole, on the request of the Ministry of Agriculture, would give the CNDCA

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\(^{617}\) CAC, 19940020, art. 18. M. Roche, “Note à l’attention de M. le Professeur Debré,” May 1963.

\(^{618}\) CAC, 19940020, art. 18. Letter from Robert Debré to the Prime Minister, 16 April 1964.


a subsidy of 5,000 francs. Léon Fleck, general secretary of the HCEIA, noted that "this decision really shows that the qualified representatives of the agricultural professions do not misunderstand the importance of this scourge, and that they are aware that the interest of Agriculture concords with the concern of Public Health."626

Furthermore, the Minister of Agriculture told winegrowers and merchants that the government was fully committed to combating alcoholism.627

It is not my intention to suggest any corruption on the part of the anti-alcohol campaign, but rather that public health and the modern agricultural sector shared the same interests. The anti-alcohol campaign also had to give some ground. It had come under pressure. French wine consumption was abating, and southern growers blamed the anti-alcohol campaign for this development. The winegrowing press expressed the desire "THAT THE YEAR 1966 WITNESSES THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRST CRUSADE FOR THE DEFENSE OF WINE IN FRANCE."628

Although wine had friends in the anti-alcohol camp, it had not yet been invited to attend the HCEIA’s meetings. The Centre des recherches et de documentation sur les boissons nationales (CRDBN) lobbied the Ministry of Agriculture, and consequently, in January 1970, as the Common Market for wine was about to be enacted, Jacques Chaban-Delmas,629 the Prime Minister and also the mayor of Bordeaux, declared himself in favor of a “dialogue between the different professions interested in the production and the commercialization of wine and alcoholic beverages” and the HCEIA. Chaban-Delmas suggested “the creation of a common working organism between the Haut Comité and the different professions...” Two meetings were held in 1970 and it was decided, in March 1971, that a certain frequency should be kept to discuss anti-alcohol propaganda. The HCEIA and the wine interests published a communiqué:

Having come together in a séance of common study, the representatives of the diverse professional organizations of the production and Commerce of wine and other alcoholic drinks and the representatives of the Haut Comité d’étude et d’information sur l’alcoolisme have come to an agreement upon the necessity of a fight against alcoholism and of an action in favor of sobriety. This fight consists in combating the abuse of all alcoholic beverages, distilled or fermented, but does not exclude the moderate use in the maximal limits defined by the Academy of Medicine. It must be accompanied by a policy of the improvement of the quality of products leading necessarily to an increase in their price.630

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630 CAC, 19940020, art. 18. CRDBN, Fascicule d’information, no date (but probably the early 1970s), 5.
Robert Boulin, the Minister of Public Health and a politician from the winegrowing Libourne, near Saint-Emilion, and who had formerly been Minister of Agriculture, also wanted to integrate the wine interests into the HCEIA. In a speech in Libourne in February 1971, he declared: "I am a partisan of an anti-alcohol campaign that condemns abuse and advocates the moderate use of wine. Still, the Winegrowers and all the Interprofession should provide their collaboration, participate in a more active way, in agreeing, for example, as I have already advocated, to be represented in the Haut Comité antialcoolique..."  

Collaboration had been occurring at the local level. The Chamber of Agriculture of the Hérault met with the CNDCA on 31 October 1969, and the Conseil interprofessionnel du vin de Bordeaux (CIVB), which had connections to both Chaban-Delmas and Boulin, did the same on 26 January 1970. Each party agreed that representatives of both sides would attend the meetings of the other. The CNDCA noted that "during the last winegrower demonstrations—and this for the first time in a long time—there were no signs of hostility toward the anti-alcohol action."

The anti-alcohol coalition persisted into the 1970s. In 1974, in the context of free trade in wine, rising Italian imports, domestic overproduction, and the falling consumption of table wine, a broad coalition emerged to support the modern French wine industry. A working group on viti-vinicultral problems resided at the HCEIA, under the presidency of Philippe Lamour, member of the HCEIA and president of the Commission nationale à l’aménagement du territoire.

The HCEIA continued its attempt to lobby the EEC up to 1976, when the EEC finally issued a decree to improve European wine production. Robert Debré lobbied the Comité interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique européenne at the Prime Ministry to heed public health warnings. J.R. Bernard, its general secretary, recommended that M. Taupignon, general secretary of the HCEIA, attend the meetings in order to help define the French position regarding wine and alcohol. Furthermore, M. Plateau, chargé de mission at the Secrétariat général, would assist Taupignon in defining

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631 CAC, 19940020, art. 18. CRDBN, Fascicule d’information, no date (but probably the early 1970s), 5.  
634 The group included officials from the Conseil d’État, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Secrétariat général du Comité interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique européenne, the Compagnie des courtiers gourmets, the Institut national de la recherche agronomique, the Service de la répression des fraudes et du contrôle de la qualité, the Direction générale des impôts, the Union nationale interprofessionnelle des jus de fruits, the INSEE, the Union nationale des oenologues, the Union nationale des producteurs de jus de fruits, the Institut national de la consommation, the Fédération des associations viticoles, and the Institut national des appellations d’origine.
French wine policy. In 1976, Debré noted that the HCEIA’s policy on wine informed the program elaborated in Brussels. The EEC finally recognized that although wine production continued to rise, consumption in traditional wine drinking countries such as France was declining. The EEC’s wine market had approximately 150 million hectoliters. France produced only 11 to 12 million hectoliters of quality wine out of a total production of about 70 million hectoliters.

Prior to each case of viticultural reform—notably in 1962, 1964, 1970, and 1976—the wine industry and the HCEIA forged an alliance. These periods were marked by both discussions in Paris and Brussels on the future of European winegrowing and the push for quality production, and by volatile demonstrations in the Languedoc against falling wine consumption and the “barons of the North” who increasingly refused to come to their rescue. The anti-alcohol campaign became a proxy for the modern wine movement’s struggle against mass wine. Between 1961 and 1976, the state passed no ordinances on alcoholism; instead, the HCEIA’s wine policy permeated legislation that attempted to reform winegrowing.

II. The Persistence of the Old Regime

In the 1960s and 1970s, technocrats submitted a series of gloomy reports to the members of the HCEIA about the persistence of the so-called status quo in the winegrowing Languedoc. The vineyards of mass production not only caused alcoholism, but stalled economic progress. The Languedoc remained more agricultural than other French regions. The change of mentality spotted in the rest of agriculture had not affected this region’s winegrowers. It had yet to find a young generation in search of change.

Vineyard monoculture reigned in the Midi. The three most productive departments were the Hérault, with 10 to 11 million hectoliters; the Aude, with 7 to 8 million hectoliters; and the Gard, 5 to 6 million hectoliters. These departments alone produced 40 percent of France’s total harvest: nearly 24 million hectoliters out of 60 to 65 million. When including the three other big producing departments of the Midi: the Pyrénées-Orientales and the Var, with 2.5 to 3 million hectoliters each, and the Bouches-du-Rhône, with nearly 1.5 million hectoliters, the six biggest producers of the Midi represented 30 million hectoliters, nearly half of the metropolitan harvest and more than

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636 In the early 1950s, per capita wine consumption in France reached approximately 150 liters, in the 1970s it dropped to 110 liters, and by the 1990s it fell to around 60 liters. Similar patterns occurred in Chile, Greece, Italy, and Portugal. For these figures, see Rod Phillips, A Short History of Wine (New York: Ecco, 2002), 308.
638 Emmanuel Maffre-Baugé, a southern winegrower and communist, used this phrase to describe Valéry Giscard d’Estaing; see his Vendanges amères (Paris: J.-P. Ramsay, 1976), 266.
In the years prior to 1961, approximately 60 million hectoliters were produced on 1,300,000 hectares by nearly 1,400,000 declared winegrowers. These producers farmed on average less than a hectare each.

Lamour counted 40,000 professional winegrowers and 347,000 amateur winegrowers who produced “low-quality” wine for clandestine consumption. In 1968, the number of winegrowers who declared their harvest amounted to 1,100,000, but 500,000 of them produced only for familial consumption. Among those who commercialized their harvests, only 40,000 declared more than 300,000 hectoliters, the threshold from which one could consider that the farm sufficed in earning the farmer a living. Those 40,000 who declared produced by themselves half of the harvest.

Government officials demonstrated that the number of winegrowers declined but gradually.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Winegrowers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,269,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,233,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1,210,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1,171,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1,133,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1,087,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,074,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,009,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>973,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>969,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>931,889</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decline in the areas producing wine, however, led to higher yields.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Production (hl)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954-1958</td>
<td>49,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-1963</td>
<td>59,147,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1968</td>
<td>62,836,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1973</td>
<td>65,729,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though peasants slowly left the land, production levels continued to climb.

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The coalition complained that too many growers tilled small plots of land. The average area of wine production in the department of the Gard and in the Béziers region of the Hérault was around three hectares. It would be difficult to force the smallest proprietors to modify their choice of vine plantings or the way they tended their vines; the smallest plots prevented the use of the most modern machinery, thus increasing the disparities between the large and small proprieties.\[646\]

French vineyard plots were atomized. There were generally three types of vineyards: 1) a small property, which was under 5 hectares and from which 80 percent of winegrowers made a living; 2) an intermediary property, from 5 to 20 hectares, primarily worked by the family or with the aid of one or two agricultural workers at the most; 3) a large property, of more than 20 hectares, which demanded at least three permanent workers, and which occupied nearly one-fourth of the vineyard space.\[647\]

At least four factors explain why this winegrowing regime persisted: state subsidies, or the “social price,” that these small farmers continued to fight for and obtain; the Common Market, which meant that a flood of cheaper Italian imports entered France and which therefore provided no incentive to southern winegrowers to quit making jug wine; a strong Occitan identity that winegrowers defended from the technocratic “conquest” of the north; and popular beliefs about daily wine consumption. Since the nineteenth century, a social contract had bound the state to guarantee cheap wine to the people.\[648\] The anti-alcohol movement had yet to revolutionize this contract.

The winegrowers of the Languedoc deemed that the Common Market was too liberal. EEC policy needed to follow the model of the winegrowing statute set up in France in the 1930s. Southern French winegrowers preferred solidarity, and the “social price” of wine, to the rampant individualism of the free market. They saw the EEC as facilitating the “dishonest” commerce of merchants.

The winegrowers of the Languedoc did not see how quality wine production yielded profit. Producers tended to seek high yields and a large part of the wine produced went to state-financed distillation. Wine policy allowed winegrowers to produce in order to destroy.\[649\] They thus continued to produce what they had produced for nearly a century. And they produced even more of it. The irrigation that came to the Midi in the 1960s, and which was supposed to encourage producers to grow other foods, merely served the productivist mentality of the day by increasing wine yields. As long as the population continued to drink generic wines, and as long as the state subsidized surpluses, the southern way of life would be protected.

Because the state offered generous subsidies, southern winegrowers refused to leave the land. Distillation paid. M. Bentata, a bureaucrat at the Ministry of Agriculture,


\[647\] Malignac, “Les problèmes économiques,” 44.

\[648\] This is not unlike the social contract between the state and the people in terms of the bread supply. On this topic, see Steven Laurence Kaplan, Good Bread is Back: A Contemporary History of French Bread, the Way it is Made, and the People Who Make it (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 164-166.

noted that it is “sometimes more interesting for winegrowers to produce wines of an inferior quality, with an elevated productivity, than to care for their vines in order to obtain a better quality.” Distilling the surplus of ordinary wines encouraged the production of inferior wines. It was more profitable to increase the yield of the production of wines destined for distillation, paid at 8.5 francs for each alcoholic degree, than to produce quality wines, of which the yield was limited to 50 or 60 hectoliters per hectare, and of which the market price was 10 to 12 francs per degree. Alain Lamassoure, a technical councilor at the Ministry of Finance, claimed that winegrowers forced the status quo.

The advantages that the winegrowers have obtained from successive distillations have allowed them to obtain in the events a veritable guarantee of revenue. I insist on this point, which is badly understood by the Government. Basically, and whatever they say about it, the winegrowers are very satisfied with the present system that, in return for the periodic ransacking of a few tax receipts guarantees them a remunerative and apparently inexhaustible outlet. The Evian Accords, which freed Algeria from French dominion, stipulated that the French import 7 million hectoliters of Algerian wine a year until 1970. The Italians, on the other hand, had the most liberal—and in the words of French wine experts, “anarchical”—wine policy. Italian wines were more abundant and inexpensive. When harvests were poor, or when wine prices were too high, some merchants in Bordeaux and the Languedoc bought wines from Algeria, Italy, and later, Spain. In 1963, the Minister of Agriculture defended the productivist mentality. With the termination of Algerian wine imports, he claimed that French supply would not meet demand, and so France would have to purchase wine from Italy.

French winegrowing was reportedly closely monitored, whereas Italy’s was not. The Italians depended upon developing consumption in the EEC, as could be seen in the debates of the European Parliament at Strasbourg in February 1970. In responding to a French politician who desired to limit the vineyard area, M. Vetrone, an Italian politician, affirmed: “if winegrowing finds itself threatened, it is not the nightmare of overproduction that is the cause of it, but rather a deficient production that we should certainly confront in the near future, as a result of a growing consumption, if we make the decision today to limit the surface area.” M. Cippola, another Italian representative,

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652 Centre des Archives économiques et financières (hereafter CAEF), 1A/373/1. Alain Lamassoure, “Note pour le Ministre,” 18 June 1975, 3. Emphasis in the original.
653 The French government, however, would continue to import Algerian wine into the 1970s.
654 On this topic, see, for example, René Pijassou, Le Médoc: un grand vignoble de qualité (Paris: J. Tallandier, 1980).
655 CAC, 19940020, art. 18. Letter from the Minister of Agriculture to the Prime Minister, January 1964.
declared: “To accept such a limitation would go against all logic or, if one wants, to adopt a crazy logic.”  As Georges Malignac claimed: “this opinion of Italian viticulture has contaminated...the French winegrowing associations and the responsible ministries: Agriculture and Finance.”

A decree of 9 November 1970 from the Ministry of Agriculture authorized until 31 December 1972 the planting of 20,000 hectares of vines for the production of VDQS and Vins de consommation courante (VCC) wines, which meant an added 1 million hectoliters of wine. The opening of the Common Market for wine in 1970 destroyed the French principle to produce better, but less. The belief that Europe’s wine supply was insufficient prevailed. Ordinary table wines suffered from Italian competition. As a result, producers had no interest in limiting their yields in order to improve quality, given that a reduction in French production would be compensated by imports and that the improvement of quality, in these circumstances, would not lead to a rise in prices for the producer.

Winegrowers suffered from an uncertainty in terms of outlets for their production. Merchants refused to sign multiyear contracts with individual growers, preferring instead to buy wine from various sources, including abroad. For these growers, distillation was safer than running the risk of reconverting vineyards to quality production. Furthermore, the listing price (système de cotation) that priced wine according to its alcoholic richness did not enhance wine’s gustatory qualities. European law made putting the alcoholic content on the label optional, whereas in France it was obligatory for table wines. This system endangered public health, given that popular belief associated quality with alcoholic content. It should also be noted that the most alcoholic wines were those mixed from French and Algerian or Italian grapes.

The winegrowers of the Languedoc also had a strong common identity. Jean-Philippe Martin has claimed that what united all winegrowers in the Languedoc was their belief that winegrowing was the natural vocation of the region and their sentimental

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attachment to their Occitan roots. M. Gabian, mayor of Vestric-et-Candiac in the Gard, wrote in Méridional, a local newspaper:

What kind of inhabitant of Nîmes, what kind of inhabitant of this very Gard could accept the possibility of substituting modern monuments for our Roman monuments?...It is exactly what they propose for our agriculture and viticulture...They propose to change our traditional farming practices, our habitual profession for new farming practices, for professions that are not ours. The only things that escape from the general transformation are the vines of the hillsides and (those) of the controlled appellations.

Léon Fleck, the general secretary of the HCEIA, complained in 1963 that winegrowers used the water from the canal of the Compagnie du Bas-Rhône Langedoc for irrigating vines instead of replacing them with other cultures. The Communist press reported the water for irrigating was downstream from the nuclear factory of Marcoule, and given the radioactivity, children would be born with two heads and six fingers in each hand.

While irrigation and the conversion of some of the vineyard space might bring more opportunity and greater prosperity, in the minds of the locals, it would not necessarily bring a better way of life.

III. The Price of Politics

All these winegrowers and all this wine on the Common Market made the national drink cheap. Because of the wine industry’s political power, and the availability of wine, the state encouraged the population to drink wine before other drinks. One way to boost competition and force the least competitive off the land was to cut state subsidies and raise wine’s price. According to Jean-Marie Roche, an inspector of finance, the Ministry of Finance had to find a way to avoid taxing too heavily a product that represented the only revenue for a large number of winegrowers—perhaps 13 percent of agricultural revenue—at the same time that it increased the taxes to prevent the consumption of a product that had, “in relation to bread or milk, a character of ‘unnecessary consumption.’”

The political power of the winegrowers preserved the cheap price of wine. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, critics reported on how the government gave wine special treatment. On 19 November 1963, for example, Le Monde noted that the reform of indirect taxation would set food prices at ten percent, whereas wine would benefit from a reduced rate of five percent, thereby diminishing the total taxes on ordinary wine.

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661 Martin, Les syndicats de viticulteurs en Languedoc, 15-16.
662 Cited in Pitte, Philippe Lamour, 179.
664 Lamour recounts this story in Le Cadran solaire, 341.
In 1969, budgetary problems of the social security system and the anti-alcohol campaign compelled the state to raise taxes on alcohol, but not wine. Officials wanted to prevent ordinary wine (vin de consommation courante), which was on the list of the 259 articles, beer, and cider from being too expensive for the family budget. On 1 January 1969, taxes and surtaxes on alcohol consumption increased. Doctor Charbonneau, the Directeur général de la santé, responded by inveighing against the shocking fact that a glass of water was more expensive than a glass of wine. In 1974, Eugène Claudius-Petit, deputy and member of the HCEIA, asked the Minister of Economy and Finance why the Value-Added Tax (VAT) was set at 20 percent for a large quantity of indispensable goods, whereas the VAT was set at 17.6 percent for dispensable alcoholic drinks. In 1976, at our story’s end, not much had changed. A working group at the HCEIA, charged with researching replacement drinks, deplored the price inequalities between alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks. In the average café, a 12 centiliter bottle of fruit juice cost 2.80 francs, and 22 centiliter bottle of soda cost 2.40 francs, and a ten centiliter glass of red wine cost but 60 centimes. Wine even became cheaper over time. According to Georges Malignac, an administrator at the INSEE, in 1950, a liter of wine with an alcohol content of 10 percent corresponded to 50 minutes of the salary of an unskilled worker in the metallurgical industry in the Paris region; in 1968, before the wage increases, the same liter of wine only required 22 minutes of the worker’s salary. The diminishing price of wine undermined the anti-alcohol campaign’s mission.

The HCEIA did not give up. It sought to make wine more expensive. Two of the more vocal supporters of this effort interestingly were Lamour, a wine leader, and Brunebarbe, a trade union leader. This fact suggests a transformation in French society: the sacred union between the producer of the cheap gros rouge and the working classes was losing its meaning in French society. Raising prices was a way to force inefficient producers off the land and to urge people to drink less. This effort accompanied the social transformation underway.

Lamour, the wine representative in the HCEIA, was one of the more adamant proponents of increasing wine’s price. He wanted to take action against the presence of wine in the price index. He argued that “we cannot in effect denounce in a constant and official way the abuse of the consumption of alcoholic drinks and at the same time affirm by its presence in the price index that wine represents an essential item in the dietary budget of the French. The consumption of wine, when moderated, constitutes a laudable habit, but it is paradoxical to consider it as a decisive element in the wage policy of this

669 HCEIA, Bulletin d’informations, July-September 1974, 43.
country.ª 672 Earlier, he had hoped that the price index “drinks” would replace the index “wine” in the general cost of living index.ª 673 For Lamour, wine needed to be considered a luxury, not a staple.

Jules Brunebarbe, member of the HCEIA and a representative of the trade unions, complained that the price of wine and alcohol declined as the standard of living rose. On 29 October 1969, he told the members of the HCEIA that “There is thus cause to unfreeze the price of wine and in order to compensate for the effect of the general price index, one must, either scratch wine from the 279 articles, or diminish its weight." 674 He also noted that “One must further reduce the tax on mineral waters and sodas of which the cost is too high, in particular in the cafés and the other drinking establishments." 675

Throughout the “Thirty Glorious Years,” the state failed to increase the price of wine. Opposition came from two principal sources: the winegrowers of the Languedoc, as we have seen, but also a French population that still believed in the dietary necessity of wine. The wine lobby continued to argue that tax hikes led to tax fraud. Félix Martin, president of the Association de propagande pour le vin (APV), a private pro-wine association in the Languedoc, argued that excessive taxation led to the production of clandestine vines, “which destroy the economic balance of the nation." 676 Wine merchants applied direct pressure upon the Direction générale des prix to prevent the price from going up on table wine. 677 When prices went up, they took their business to Algeria or to Italy.

Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, the French continued to have a strong attachment to alcohol. Before the Economic Council in 1954, doctor Étienne May lamented that the French spent more on drink than on health. The Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE) observed that the French only occasionally consumed meat and sugar but were the world’s heaviest consumers of wine. 678 Also in 1954, the writer Jules Romains titled one of his chapters in Examen de conscience des Français “Est-ce que bien manger et bien boire tiennent lieu de tout?” (Does eating and drinking well trump all?) “The idea that a year’s rent could be worth more than a month’s worth of aperitifs or cigarettes would obviously raise indignation.” 679 At the second Congrès national sur l’alcoolisme, Professors H. Gounelle et Mme Pointeau-Pouliquen concluded from their study of the Paris region that “Despite the educative campaigns…alcohol is not only considered by the worker as a drink…but

676 CAC, 19940020, art. 18. Letter from Félix Martin to Léon Fleck, 11 March 1964.
as a respected food all the more indispensable when required work demands more effort." J.-M. Roche showed that in the total budget of the French consumer, the place that represented drinks in 1950 was 9.7 percent of the total budget and, in 1967, approximately 7 percent. In 1969, Jean Ferniot of France Soir could still claim that the French spent, in total, as much on alcohol as on housing. Observations such as these bolstered the belief that France still had one foot in the nineteenth century.

IV. The Battle Over the Consumer

Advertising, which in the postwar world had become big business, allegedly reinforced the centrality of drinking to French identity. Anti-alcohol activists argued that, because of the power and persuasion of advertising, the alcohol industries restricted the citizenry’s freedom. Reformers hoped to curb the alcohol industries’ ability to shape behavior. By working with the leaders of quality wine, they set out to edify citizens on how to make rational, responsible choices in the marketplace that would benefit themselves, their families, and the nation.

The anti-alcohol campaign searched for ways to check alcohol advertising and its ability to shape behavior and beliefs. Men, for example, had for a long time associated drinking with virility. One advertisement hit on a touchy subject: “Was it not the fact that fruit juice was drunk in a rather fermented way that we won a certain battle of the Verdun? For virile actions, we need virile products. In 1915, there were 320,381 drinking establishments selling alcohol. We won the war. In 1939, there was but

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684 Scholars have written little on alcohol advertising in the postwar era. For the case of the United States, see Lori Rotskoff, Love on the Rocks: Men, Women, and Alcohol in Post-World War II America (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002). For the interwar period, the reader can refer to Sarah Howard, Les images de l’alcool en France, 1915-1942 (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2006).
685 The link between masculinity and alcohol seems to be almost universal. For one anthropological study of this link, see David G. Gilmore, Manhood in the Making: Cultural Concepts of Masculinity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).
Advertisements abounded with Louis Pasteur’s dictum: wine was “the most hygienic of beverages.” Others included: “Alcohol kills, not wine;” “Water is Polluted, Drink Wine.”

For technocrats, consumer behavior had become crucial to the welfare of the national economy. Consumer groups, such as the Union fédérale de la consommation (UFC), carried out studies that revealed that the key to boosting industrial productivity was to be found in modifying consumer practices. In this view, citizens needed to spend less money on wine. The UFC noted that “It is thanks to the adoption of small revolutions of this order in daily life that American productivity permits 85 percent of Americans to have a car, telephone, refrigerator, and washing machine, whereas only 15 percent of the French benefit from these things.” The consumer was crucial to creating a strong, industrial nation.

For anti-alcohol reformers, alcohol hobbled the formation of new consumer desires, which in turn hurt France’s economic strength. They pointed out that winegrowers opposed the expansion of consumer capitalism because it threatened to reduce demand for their product. In 1951, *Alcool ou santé*, the CNDCA’s main publication, noted that the Director of Wine Propaganda in Bordeaux deplored the fact that French youth spent more money on camping and sports than on food, wine, and the pleasures of the table. “…wine casks have thus been replaced by the purchase of records and radios,” he disdained. To give another example, after World War Two, when the Americans tried to introduce Coca-Cola to France, Paul Coste-Floret, Minister of Public Health and deputy from the Hérault, France’s largest winegrowing department, had kept Coca-Cola at bay on the grounds that it, not wine, endangered health. What was good for the national economy was apparently good for the citizenry’s health.

The anti-alcohol campaign targeted all able-bodied men. *L’Aurore* depicted the typical French alcoholic as a 40 to 50 year-old-man who drank red wine. M. Pontillon of Vie libre RATP, a recovering alcoholics’ movement in the French railway system, noted that “one must recognize that working-class alcoholism certainly is the most expensive for the country, and firstly for Social Security, due to the multiplicity of

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687 This dictum caused much controversy in postwar France. See ANPAA, N195. There are numerous articles in this dossier that demonstrate this ongoing debate about what Louis Pasteur exactly meant.
688 The Federal Union of Consumption. It should be noted that Alfred Sauvy belonged to this group.
maladies and accidents.” The wealthier classes, however, did not avoid the campaign’s wrath. The rich were associated with spirits, especially whisky. A director of personnel in a company in the Paris region noted that “Our cadres drink three times more than our workers.” Bernard Frey, former head doctor at the psychiatric hospital of Rouffach, argued:

When one evokes the scourge of alcoholism, some are inclined to think that this scourge is the privilege of the working class, and the bourgeoisie has been preserved from it. If the notion of alcoholism is inseparable from that of intoxication [ivresse], one could indeed affirm that alcoholism is a lot less frequent with the bourgeoisie than with workers. In the bourgeois milieu, public drunkenness is considered an absolute lack of manners. It is, in general, avoided, and, if it is not avoided, the intemperate person knows, as a man of the world, to render the signs of it discrete.

The working classes were at greater risk than the rich. As the psychiatrist Paul Perrin put it in 1966: “…we have always affirmed that alcoholism was rife in all the classes of society. But, in admitting that the proportion of alcoholics is the same, all one has to do is note that the privileged classes represent a small percentage of the population, the drinkers belonging to the working class will be necessarily infinitely more numerous than the others.”

The government claimed that 15 percent of French men were alcoholic, and an additional 30 percent consumed enough to put them at risk. Both the Academy of Medicine and the Institut national d’hygiène (INH) advised that manual workers not exceed one liter of wine per day. Other groups were to drink less, but often did not follow the recommendations. In 1970, Robert Debré told Joseph Fontanet, Ministre du travail, de l’emploi et de la population, that alcoholism “went beyond the simple framework of the workers’ safety and called into question, in international competition, the productivity of French businesses and the importance of the burden that they tolerate.” Workingmen were the muscle behind modernization.

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Yet women generally bore the brunt of responsibility for alcohol-related problems. For this reason, the HCEIA financed press campaigns in women’s magazines and newspapers. In 1961, for example, it placed the anti-alcohol message in *Arts ménagers* on February 15 and November 15; *Marie-Claire* in March and August; *Femmes d’aujourd’hui* on March 9 and September 14; *Elle* on July 21 and September 15; *Marie-France* in June and September; *Bonnes soirées* on May 14 and October 15; *Nous deux* on May 19 and October 15; *Confidences* on April 16 and October 1; *Echo de la mode* on May 7 and September 10; *Pour vous, Madame* in April and October; and in *Modes et travaux* in July and September. At the beginning of 1964, a large number of women’s and youth magazines, with the help of famous writers, accepted to make their reader think about the problem of alcoholism. A contest called “Health-Sobriety” allowed readers to tell their stories. A jury, under the presidency of Robert Debré, granted two prizes to the best submissions to each magazine. The jury received 8,000 letters in all, and also granted a prize to the best overall letter. 

In the postwar period, the mass media held an increasingly important place in French society. Popular magazines such as *Elle* and *Marie-Claire* taught women how to be responsible shoppers. As the theory went, shopping would create material comforts capable of distracting men from the temptations of alcohol. Many looked to the United States, where a mass consumer culture was far more developed. As a result of consumer democracy, American workers were more sober than their French counterparts and tended to engage in healthier and more constructive leisure pursuits. Many believed that the emancipatory effects of mass consumption were closely connected to its disciplinary influence: happy citizens were respectable citizens with a stake in an orderly home and a stable society.

Magazines taught women how to be nurturing mothers and wives. Women needed to keep the home fires burning. A tidy, well balanced, and happy home could lure men away from the café. Doctors saw in women a solution to alcoholism: “The married drinker, whose wife makes sure that he receives nourishment, a capable woman with moral action and also with an appropriate kitchen, has a lot more chance of leading him to an effective cure than the drinker alone does.” In *Femmes d’aujourd’hui*, the HCEIA advised “French women to diminish the abusive consumption of alcoholic drinks...”

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702 For a study of the important place of female consumers in the late nineteenth century, see Lisa Tiersten, *Marianne in the Market: Envisioning Consumer Society in Fin-de-Siècle France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). Postwar French Marxists, such as Henri Lefebvre and Guy Debord, also adopted this view.
703 *La Presse médicale*, 11 April 1953.
and rather to improve the quality of wines that they serve.”

Alcoholism preoccupied some women. According to Elle in 1957, among women’s greatest concerns, having a carousing husband came in second, just after having an unfaithful one.

Mothers also transmitted tradition and manners to their children. As the anthropologist Barbara Gallatin Anderson argued, drinking is a learned behavior. Drinking practices are transmitted from one generation to the next. Alcohol prevention began in childhood, which meant that adults needed to clean themselves up and set an example for their children. Marie-Claire reported that French children suffered from calcium deficiency and thus advised women to give them more milk. Maurice Seguin, president of the CRDBN, protested the anti-alcohol propaganda found on the radio station “France Inter”:

Mesdames, it is definitely you who manages the family budget and like us all you have difficulties in making ends meet. You need a blender, for example, but every month you postpone the purchase of it. Do you know what the price of it is? The equivalent of a few bottles...Therefore reduce a little your consumption of alcoholic drinks; you will save money, and what matters more, you will protect the health of your family. Alcohol regularly consumed is dangerous and it is expensive. The faster your dose of alcohol increases, the more it diminishes your budget and the more it diminishes you.

Seguin demanded that the HCEIA consult the alcohol interests.

Anti-alcohol campaigners complained that mothers in western France put too much alcohol in the baby bottle. Doctors reported that children were accustomed to drinking from the earliest age. Thus in the Calvados, we hear that at eighteen months, children already drank cider with and without food; in the rural Nord, parents gave beer to children of six months; in the Lot-et-Garonne, children from the age of three drank pure wine; in the Vendée, children habitually took 50 centiliters of wine with them to school in their lunchbox. The goutte (drop) of alcohol was administered as medication. Teachers, those emissaries of the Republic, had little luck in replacing wine with milk. From the perspective of French reformers, such defects in children would impede progress and economic modernization.

Because of the collaboration between pro- and anti-alcohol forces, the wine industry played a large role in pushing the state to educate the drinker. Félix Martin, president of the APV, reminded older mothers that they “will perhaps remember that

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707 Marie-Claire, October 1954.
709 See reports in Alcool ou santé throughout the 1950s.
formerly one gave to children for their afternoon snack (goûter) some sugared wine in which one dunked a cookie or a piece of bread. Young men and women of that bygone era knew how to expand the patrimony of France and defend it when it was attacked. Can one say as much today?" Even Lamour underscored individual responsibility: “We agree to consider that it is the abuse and not the normal use of wine that must be condemned. It is excess that we must combat and not a habit linked to our morals and our oldest traditions.” At their 25th congress, the winegrowers of the Côtes-du-Rhône sent a stinging criticism to the ORTF and its supposed anti-wine campaign and hoped that it would “cease its attacks upon a widely renowned product of French origin” and that it would “guide the wine consumer in having him or her become aware of all the French wine productions…” As Jeanne Levy-Jacquemin of the HCEIA said herself: “True wine connoisseurs know how to consume in a reasonable way. We are only seeking to habituate the entirety of the French population to do the same.” In this view, a touch of snobbery would go a long way in helping sober up the country. The drinker of a fine Bordeaux or Burgundy traveled the road of appreciation, not of perdition.

In part because of the power of alcohol, in the early 1960s, the CNDCA increasingly focused upon diet, thus exhorting the individual to make sounder eating choices. “The National Committee estimates that, in contemporary life and in the majority of cases, alcoholism results from a disequilibrium imputable to an error of dietetics or a behavioral fault, engendered by ignorance or ennui and sanctioned by habit.” At the Congrès de Rouen in 1963, Robert Monod, president of the CNDCA, noted that dietetics in the classification of the sciences is generally thought of in our country, despite French culinary traditions, as the poor relation—and that it is desirable that it becomes a major science.” By emphasizing a healthy overall diet, the CNDCA could also avoid the controversy over blaming the product.

The wine industry managed to play on the supposed link between wine and rational, responsible consumption. It argued that, unlike other forms of alcohol, wine required skills that tempered the drinker. One apparently savored wine, unlike beverages such as whisky. At an anti-alcohol congress at Versailles in 1969, Albert Lalle, president of the Comité national des vins de France (CNVF), the revised CNPFV, noted with consternation that “A part of today’s youth turns away from a healthy consumption of wine. But it is not worrisome to see it indulge in narcotics, tranquilizers, and other degrading drugs, veritable poisons of body and soul.”

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In the 1960s and 1970s, the HCEIA and the CNDCA tried to prevent wine and alcohol advertising on the radio and the television. As Prime Minister, Michel Debré had prohibited on RTF all advertising in favor of wine. Little by little, with the support of the HCEIA, the wine interests were able to show short films, so long as they reminded the population to consume moderately, within the limits set by the Academy of Medicine. And so the wine industry advertised “NO TO ABUSE—YES TO USE.”

The wine industry appealed to women. During the wine week of 1963, the wine industry composed letters to young housewives, exhorting them to turn youth onto wine. “They should not however forget that for 20 centuries wine has largely contributed to shaping the body and mind of the French.” Wine “distinguished” the French “from other people. And the “Poilus” of the Great War in particular know that the “pinard” was one of the artisans of their victory.

The collaboration between the wine industry and the HCEIA and the CNDCA meant that each side could check the propaganda of the other. A middle ground had to be found. As Georges Malignac, a statistician and an administrator at the INSEE, put it: “It would moreover result from it no damage to public health, if the diminution of the consumption of the abusive drinkers was compensated more or less by the extension of the consumption of wine to those who practically do not consume any.”

In 1969, Robert Boulin, Minister of Public Health, criticized the aggressiveness of the anti-alcohol campaign in targeting the “ordinary person,” which dampened the effect of the message. The wine lobby agreed by calling the war on alcoholism a war on wine. Boulin called for more “balance” in the propaganda, and the way to do this was to consult with the winegrowers. The HCEIA claimed to seek to unify its propaganda with that of the wines of the appellation system. In 1962, it allowed wine advertising on television, claiming that the moderate consumption of appellation wines could be encouraged “without danger.”

French law distinguished between wine and alcohol. The Code des débits de boissons, the drinking code, classed beverages into five groups:

1) Non-alcoholic beverages
2) Non-distilled fermented drinks, such as wine, beer, and cider
3) Natural sweet wines and aperitifs with 18 degrees of alcohol or lower
4) Distilled wine, cider, and other fruits

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5) All other alcoholic beverages, especially whiskey and pastis

According to the drinking code, not only did drinking establishment owners who sold nothing but fermented and non-alcoholic drinks receive tax exemptions, but also wine advertising had more liberty than spirits advertising. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, international alcohol interests and European officials indicted their French counterparts for legislation that protected wine to the detriment of alcohol, especially foreign alcohol such as whiskey. In 1961, for example, Vice-Admiral William J. Marshall of the Bourbon Institute excoriated French legislation for its discrimination in advertising laws. Later, faced with threats from the EEC, French officials argued that their classification system was based upon the noxiousness of the drink, not upon their bias in favor of the French alcohol industries. They claimed that spirits, unlike wine, were consumed on an empty stomach and for the purpose of intoxication, whereas wine was consumed with food and with family and friends. French winegrowers were able to use the anti-alcohol discourse to fend off foreign alcohol. In 1967, the state set about revising the Code des débits de boissons, but the responsible commission could not restrict wine’s freedom to advertise.

The distinction between wine and spirits also pervaded popular belief. In Bordeaux, pro- and anti-alcohol forces agreed upon the “moderate use of alcoholic drinks in the framework of meals, according to the information from the Academy of Medicine, and to advise against their habitual or frequent use on an empty stomach, outside of meals.” Such advice obviously gave an advantage to wine, which was less frequently taken outside of meals than spirits.

During the Thirty Glorious Years, the French state set out to establish a new national drinking norm. The more modern France, the France that was opening up onto international markets, required a new kind of consumer citizen, one that drank rationally and responsibly. In an era when French consumers had greater access to a wider variety of French and foreign goods, the state set about molding consumers in a way that conciliated the needs of the national economy with public health. For political, economic, public health, and cultural reasons, anti-alcohol activists recommended that the citizen drink appellation wines. Members of the HCEIA searched for a message that would offend neither anti-alcohol advocates nor winegrowers, and they found it in “drink better, but less, in order to drink for a long time.”

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724 Centre des Archives économiques et financières (hereafter CAEF), B/61878/2. “Classification des boissons.”
726 CAC, 19940020, art. 10. Letter from the Vice-President of the Commission des Communautés européennes to Jean Sauvagnargues, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, 4 June 1976.
Conclusion: Montredon, 1976

In 1976, violent demonstrations erupted in Montredon, recalling the uprisings of 1907. Volèm viure al païs (Occitan for “We want to live on our land”) was heard throughout the streets. Two persons, a policeman and a winegrower, died. Under pressure from demonstrators, the government in Paris tried to block the entry of Italian imports. It was called to order, however, by the EEC and forced to back down or else Italy would block the importation of French industrial products, thus threatening to undermine both France’s modern economy and the whole principle of the EEC’s existence.

In the wake of the bloody events of Montredon, the EEC awakened to the need to reform Europe’s wine economy; thereafter, its wine policy more closely resembled France’s appellation system that had been promoted since the 1930s, and that the HCEIA had advocated since 1961. After 1976, EEC policy depended increasingly upon uprooting and distilling surpluses. The EEC would have to find outlets other than the consumer.

A concern for both the domestic and international markets contributed to shaping the French state’s anti-alcohol campaign of the 1960s and 1970s. This campaign was part of an effort to bring all wine drinkers into the market, and, so far as possible, to eliminate local, subsistence production. This goal helps explain the decision of technocrats and the modern wine sector to ally with public health specialists in the anti-alcohol offensive. The campaign in favor of high-end wine, waged in conjunction with the adversaries of alcoholism, equipped French viticulture to compete in the global wine economy.

Despite challenges from the New World, France’s AOC wine system remains the gold standard.


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731 For a summary of the historical relationship between wine and the EEC, see Smith, Vin et politique, 78-88.

appellations that appeared in the last quarter of the twentieth century belonged to Languedoc-Roussillon. Yet the events at Montredon left bitter resentment. Some distrust remained among southern winegrowers toward officials in Paris and Brussels. After the demonstrations of 1976, the CNDCA asked a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Agriculture, who was also a winegrower from the south, who was wine’s greatest adversaries. He responded that “First the ‘technocrats’ in Brussels, then the [anti-alcohol] ‘Associations’!” In the course of twenty years, between the 1950s and the 1970s, the gros rouge (“ordinary wine”) of the Midi fell out of favor. Once the drink of everyman, it had become the drink of few. In 1957, the annual consumption of VCC was 140 liters per person; in 1975, it had fallen to 99 liters per person. The Languedoc became increasingly urban. Montpellier became a hub for the tertiary sector. As producers left the land or changed their farming practices, the Languedoc lost some of its volatility. As Olivier Dedieu has claimed to be the case for Raoul Bayou, a deputy from the Hérault, after 1976, the influence of the wine deputy became less and less significant. To a certain extent, wine’s political strength abated. Daily wine drinking was becoming passé.

Though French wines improved, in the 1970s, there was a prevailing sense that the late twentieth century would be no friend of French wine. Globalization, consumer capitalism, and the generally faster pace of life challenged both French wine customs and the French wine industry. The year 1976 marked a broader shift in the way the world perceived wine. In a blind tasting in Paris that year, California wines, and their emphasis on grape variety, shockingly triumphed over their French counterparts and their emphasis on terroir. Increasingly after 1976, New World wines would become a force to reckon with. Moreover, in a more globalized world, many people preferred to drink beer and

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736 Ibid., 139-140.
739 On the battle between grape variety and terroir, see Marie-France Garcia-Parpet, Le marché de l’excellence: Les grands crus à l’épreuve de la mondialisation (Paris: Seuil, 2009).
spirits to wine. Some critics expressed concern that French wine could not survive the shock of the global.

In 1976, as French wine consumption declined and as fears about globalization and consumer capitalism grew, the writer Raymond Dumay predicted the demise of wine. In his view, wine and civilization were inextricably linked. Both were products of the human touch: “Wine is at the stage (of development) of its country…a people that no longer knows how to drink will soon cease to write, to think, to paint…We have written a lot on wine, to praise it more than to understand it. It passes for a product, whereas it is an individual. It is besides a matter more of psychology than of agriculture, of love than of political economy.”

Statistics, for France and for elsewhere, demonstrate this worldwide trend. See the statistics of the World Health Organization.


Ibid., 231.

Ibid., 7.
Chapter Five:
One for the Road:
The Road Safety Coalition Criminalizes the Drinking Driver, 1954-1970

The heavy alcoholization of a nation is no longer compatible with the necessities of modern life. What some call the limit of tolerance is considerably lowered in an industrial and mechanized society: this society could hardly allow of the driver of an automobile or the pilot of a plane the carelessness of the postillion of the nineteenth century. Sobriety is no longer only a virtue but also a social necessity.

–Robert Debré, 1974

In the 1950s and 1960s, French doctors and other powerful interest groups began to dramatize a new kind of killer who traveled French roadways. Allegedly taking “One victim every two minutes,” this “road assassin” had come to cause a large number of automobile deaths, thereby undermining public order and economic progress. “Whereas the majority of economically developed countries (Great Britain, West Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and a large part of the United States, Poland, Yugoslavia, the Scandinavian countries) have set a ‘legal blood alcohol limit,’” the HCEIA informed the readers of Le Nouvel Observateur in 1969, “such a measure does not exist in French law.” In the early years of the road safety movement, anti-alcoholism reformers elided France’s rising automobile accidents to France’s failure to fix a legal blood alcohol limit. The drinking driver, and not the so-called “alcoholic,” they argued, was “public enemy #1.”

In the postwar era, traffic accidents introduced a new problem of governance. With the increasing use of cars and the greater devotion to consumption, the state intervened in new areas of private life and set out to impose new norms in leisure time. The drunk worker who provoked accidents on the job—a category that had plagued social reformers since the nineteenth century—gave way to the everyday drinker who caused carnage on the road. Unlike work accidents, which occurred in confined spaces, road accidents were publicly visible. Doctors who treated accident victims and who were horrified by the growth in automobile accidents began to issue warnings to the government about the problem’s gravity. For doctors, the problem of automobile accidents, like the problem of alcoholism, demonstrated the state’s indulgence and its inability to carry out decisive measures.

The construction of the postwar drinking and driving problem relied upon a change in popular perceptions of the relationship between alcohol and the automobile. In a not so distant past, alcohol had apparently paired well with the wheel. In 1935, for

747 “La police de la route aura-t-elle son sérum de vérité?,” France Dimanche, 28 March 1963.
748 On the relationship between these two in terms of insurance, see François Ewald, L’Accident nous attend au coin de la rue: Les accidents de la circulation, Histoire d’un problème (Paris: La Documentation française, 1982).
example, the spirits manufacturer Cointreau had run an advertisement in *L’Illustration* that admonished French citizens “Never to hit the road immediately after a good meal without a glass of Cointreau.”

French roadways encouraged alcohol consumption with billboards and auberges and gas stations that sold alcoholic beverages. The Michelin guide, too, had supported both automobile and wine tourism. Prior to the postwar era, the fault for accidents seldom lay in the driver who used alcohol moderately, but in faulty automobiles, decrepit roads, or the observably drunk. The alcohol and automobile lobbies had possessed a powerful hand in shaping perceptions about drinking and driving.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, however, old beliefs and practices began to buckle under the pressure of new circumstances. The automobile industry grew. From 1955 to 1970, car ownership increased from 4.4 million to 10.5 million. Not only did the industry itself employ a large number of citizens, but it also generated a large quantity of jobs in related industries. The automobile dramatically altered the geographical and mental landscape and greatly contributed to the political, economic, and cultural modernization of the country. In 1963, the literary theorist Roland Barthes noted that only the automobile could compete with food as the source of French conversation.

Yet the flipside of democratizing the automobile was the social costs of larger numbers of vehicles on the road. As the automobile became a mass commodity, traffic

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750 Didier Nourrisson briefly outlined for me his view of the three principal periods of drinking and driving in “État nerveux et mental de la société française face à l’automobile,” IUFM/University Claude Bernard Lyon 1, unpublished paper. The HCEIA attempted to fight the common practice of selling alcoholic beverages in shops and cafés or restaurants along the roadside.


accidents rose. According to statistics collected by the Ministry of Transportation, the number of motor accidents rose vertiginously: in 1953, it recorded 118,881 accidents; in 1970, 228,050. The horror of motor accidents began to haunt the popular imagination. Newspapers, books, and film reported on the road slaughter. Yet until research convinced the public of the risks of drinking and driving, depictions of accidents seldom indicted alcohol; more often, the public blamed the state of roads and vehicles.

This chapter examines how the drinking driver came to be seen as one of the primary causes of traffic accidents. The link between alcohol and accidents was not natural but the result of political decisions. Doctors, particularly specialists in legal medicine, were central agents in igniting the movement to prevent alcohol-related accidents and in shaping the public image of the drinking driver. Although these doctors were also invested in the broader anti-alcoholism campaign, in time, they would come to learn that drinking and driving was best fought in the more specific framework of road safety.

Making alcohol into a problem of road security introduced a new constellation of interests. In the course of the 1950s, doctors attempted to ally with two dynamic economic sectors—namely, the automobile industry and the insurance companies. Working together, they tried to reduce a complex problem—one that involved an interaction among drivers, the vehicle, the road, and the environment—to the “human factor” in traffic accidents, among which could be found the drinking driver.

The automobile industry and the insurance companies profited from medical discourse on alcohol-related accidents. For the automobile industry, it preempted their incrimination for the problem; for the insurance companies, it justified their need to raise premiums to meet the costs of an ever-growing number of accidents. Public fear of the drunken driver could discourage the consumption of automobiles, thereby dulling economic growth. The threat of accidents could encourage consumers to take the public transport system at a time when the automobile industry was trying to overtake it. Automobiles were deemed more dangerous than airplanes and trains: for every thousand kilometers traveled, the train took the lives of .95 persons; airplanes, 6.8; and automobiles, 42. Alcohol-related accidents occurred less frequently with trains than

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755 The Ministry of Transportation became the Ministry of Equipment in 1966.
757 For automobile accidents in French film, see Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies, 15-70.
758 Centre des Archives contemporaines (hereafter CAC), 19780409, art. 1. In this file, there is a long list of the interested groups in road safety.
with cars. Given strict regulation against drinking at the Société nationale des chemins de fer (SNCF), train conductors were generally more sober and disciplined than automobile drivers. The campaign against drinking and driving targeted the citizen’s behavior instead of the economic interests at stake.

Indicating the drunken driver to a large extent depoliticized the alcohol problem. This new road safety coalition succeeded in shaping public perceptions of the drinking driver because the drink trade and drivers were absent from the policymaking process. The alcohol industry could do little to defend itself in the corridors of power. Road safety commissions and organizations did not include their representatives. The wine business was thus left to voice its opinion through its own newspapers.

In this chapter, I continue to prioritize an analysis of the debates at the HCEIA and the other pressure groups that engaged with the problem of alcoholism. My interest lies in the groups that turned traffic accidents into a public problem worth pursuing and how the anti-drinking and driving campaign ultimately contributed to the broader movement to reduce alcohol consumption.

Other scholars have begun to deal directly with the emergence of the road safety problem. Sociologist Anne Kletzlen, for example, has suggested that in the 1960s the problem of drinking and driving transformed from one of public health to one of road safety, and that state actors largely shaped the problem. While I agree that this transition occurred—and that it is crucial to any understanding of the construction of this public problem—she fails to examine sufficiently the place of the various interest groups in problematizing drinking and driving. In her history, the technocrats of Ponts et Chaussées and the Ministry of Transportation are the motor; the competing and overlapping demands of different interests are largely untold. This chapter, then, focuses upon the opinions, discourses, and mobilizations of the competing interest groups. The medical profession had a direct impact upon the outcome of the law of 1970 that established a legal blood alcohol limit. The automobile and insurance groups that lobbied for the 1970 law wielded medical knowledge about alcohol-related accidents in order to overcome their opposition.

The interest groups that made up the road safety movement refused to accept automobile fatalities as the inevitable price of progress. They went about making the problem visible, arousing public opinion, and inducing the state to educate citizens about their new social responsibilities. Yet for a time they faced the fate of Sisyphus. As Alain Barjot, vice-president of the HCEIA, said of the 70 to 80 deaths and the 200 to 300 wounded each weekend on the road in the so-called “Western world”: “If an earthquake created a similar number of victims, everyone would be roused to action and would cry

761 Numerous studies showed this to be the case.
for help. In our country, it is once a week that this takes place, and people find the occurrence totally natural.”

I. Early Research and the Problem of Public Drunkenness

The postwar road safety movement rested upon an international body of knowledge that had been developing since the late nineteenth century. As automobile accidents first came to public attention, scientists had attempted to establish the extent to which alcohol was responsible. Angelo Mosso, an Italian fatigue expert, proved that even small quantities of alcohol impaired drivers. Around the turn of the century, both Emile Kraepelin, a German psychiatrist, and W.H.R. Rivers, a British psychiatrist, confirmed and extended Mosso’s work.

In the 1910s, scientists began conducting research in laboratories to assess the role of alcohol in road accidents. They used applied psychology to test the driver’s motor skills and time of reaction; they equally explored the driver’s vigilance, attention, memory, and the association of ideas. Tests showed that the person reacted not solely in function to the toxic and the dose ingested, but also in function to personal attributes such as age, gender, health conditions, and weight. In 1915 in the United States, Francis Benedict and Raymond Dodge had published an important work on the extent to which small quantities of alcohol affected reaction time. Later, Erik M. P. Widmark, a Swedish forensic alcohol toxicologist at the University of Lund, developed the method of determining blood alcohol levels in living individuals.

The ability to analyze small amounts of alcohol in the blood had important implications. French officials had held that only observable drunkenness disrupted public order. In 1873, after the unruly Paris Commune, and again in 1917, during World War One, the state had passed legislation against public, or observable, drunkenness, what the French call *ivresse publique*. The government had passed the law with morality in mind. Officials had equated public drunkenness with public danger. The problem in drinking and driving, however, was that alcohol-related accidents most often occurred

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with a level of inebriety far lower than observable drunkenness. Only small doses of alcohol were needed to slow the person’s reaction time, which could provoke an accident. Observers had thus rarely noticed alcohol-related accidents.

The law of 1873—and its revision in 1917—thus shaped the first drinking and driving laws of the interwar period. With the support of the automobile associations, which in the interwar years argued that drinking and driving was direr than speeding and other violations of the law, the state enacted decrees. Article 29 of the decree of 31 December 1922 was the first measure taken against driving “in a state of observable drunkenness (ivresse)”; the decree forced the withdrawal of the driver’s license. The decree of 12 April 1927 gave prefects the option of suspending or canceling the license in the case of manslaughter or injuries. Article 29 of the 1922 decree was abolished by an ordinance of the Conseil d’Etat in 1935, but reinstated by a decree of 1951. Modifications to the driving code (Code de la route) 1958 would go still further. But all of this legislation failed to get at the heart of the problem: the driver who was not observably drunk but whose reflexes were impaired by even a small quantity of alcohol.

International science advanced more quickly than French law. By the mid-1920s, an international scholarly community concerned with the effects of non-inebriating quantities of alcohol on driving ability had become firmly established. Real-world experiments began to reinforce laboratory-based research. By the end of the 1930s, the Americans R.A. Heise and R.L. Holcomb had confirmed the relationship between the moderate consumption of alcohol and road fatalities. Finally, in a research paper in 1943, the Swede Leonard Greenberg published a seminal account of the temporal span within which impairment appeared, peaked, and declined. Scientists had laid the groundwork for the introduction of a judicial procedure based upon analysis of blood, urine, and, by the later 1950s, breath. The invention of devices that measured blood alcohol concentrations provided a scientific basis for determining the point at which the individual became impaired. The risk of an accident could now be related to the driver’s blood alcohol concentration. If researchers could agree upon the limit at which alcohol became dangerous, dependence upon the clinical evidence of drunkenness, and the judge’s verdict, would no longer be required.

As a result of this growing body of scientific research came a first wave of efforts to criminalize drivers who showed no visible signs of drunkenness but who had a certain blood alcohol level. Norway in 1936 and Sweden in 1941, for example, prohibited driving over a certain blood alcohol level and allowed police to draw blood in order to prove that alcohol had caused the accident. The road safety fervor also picked up in France, albeit more slowly. In 1931, Professors Leclerq and Muller of the Institut de médecine légale de Lille found that 22 percent of accident victims were in a state of intoxication. The Société de médecine légale de France in 1936, the XIIe Congrès de
médicine légale et de médecine sociale de langue française in 1939, and finally the Société de médecine légale de France in December 1942 all called upon the state to enforce blood tests after accidents and to criminalize the drunken driver. During the war, Léon Dérobert, a specialist in legal medicine and a protagonist in the war on alcoholism, delivered a report to Vichy’s Inter-ministerial Commission on Alcoholism. During France’s postwar reconstruction, Dérobert would push hard for stricter drinking and driving legislation.

Between the late nineteenth century and the late 1940s, no mass movement emerged in France to pressure the state to establish a legal blood alcohol limit. Firstly, mass automobile use had only just begun; the gravity of accidents was not yet noted. Secondly, certain particularities in French political culture and law slowed the movement. Road safety involved many interests—the ministries of Justice, of Public Health, and of Transportation, as well as the Gendarmerie and the Police—and no central group existed to coordinate policy. The gendarmerie and judges hesitated to enforce the law on drinking and driving and claimed that such laws infringed upon individual rights and their power to interpret drunkenness. Finally, as long as officials viewed driving as a private matter and associated only observable drunkenness with public disorder and danger—and as long as that association was codified in law—the magnitude of alcohol-related accidents in French society would remain underestimated. Jean L’Hoste, a psychologist and contributor to road safety research, retrospectively would put it best: “Perhaps more than any other road security domain, the approach of the alcoholization of drivers appears to be reliant upon socio-economic, political, and even ideological conditions of the societal environment in which it is inscribed.”

The doctors who engaged in the debate over alcoholism after World War Two would go a long way to prove that alcohol and the machine were incompatible in the age of mobility.

II. Doctors Call for Statistical Reform

After World War Two, doctors interested in legal and social medicine set out to soften the social effects of alcoholism—drinking and driving was but one dimension of their larger frustration with alcoholic excess. Doctors hoped to prove that alcohol was a

les alcooliques socialement dangereux, par M. Cordonnier, député,” *Journal officiel de la République française: Documents parlementaires, Assemblée nationale, Annexe #4788* (Session de 1948—3e séance du 30 juin 1948), 1,442.


775 CAC, 19880442, art. 1. See the document “La Répression de l’ivresse par la recherche de l’alcool dans le sang: Rapport présenté par le Dr. Dérobert à la Commission interministérielle contre l’alcoolisme, le 23 juin 1943.”


principal cause of accidents. By keeping abreast of foreign research, they and other scientists had become convinced of the primary role of alcohol in car accidents. They noted, for example, that Heise had shown that 62 percent of yearly accidents in the United States had occurred under the influence of alcohol; Hendsmarch had recorded 41 percent in Sweden.\(^{778}\) At the Academy of Medicine in 1951, Henri Rouvillois, president of the CNDCA, and Léon Dérobert, an alcohol expert at the Ministry of Public Health, deplored that the mainstream press had published statistics that explained the various factors in accidents—increasing number of vehicles, faulty brakes, increased speed of modern vehicles, inattention to the rules—but had said nothing of drunkenness.\(^{779}\) The alcohol industries reportedly had a tight grip on advertising;\(^{780}\) newspapers depended upon their business. For this reason, few newspapers dared implicate alcohol in accidents. The result was public insouciance toward alcohol-related accidents.

Doctors blamed the state’s and the public’s complacency about the role of alcohol in accidents upon statistical imprecision. Without a law that allowed doctors to draw blood from a culprit or victim of an accident or a crime, the gendarmerie and jurists would continue to overlook the real problem. Alcohol would thus continue to play a negligible role in the statistics on the causes of automobile accidents.

This medical and scientific concern over alcohol-related accidents spread to the moralists in the Mouvement républicain populaire (MRP) and the Gaullist political parties. Both the Academy of Medicine and the Society of Legal Medicine fed political anxieties about national degeneration by pushing for legislation that protected society against “dangerous drinkers.”\(^{781}\) In the late 1940s, politicians bent upon preserving family life, mostly coming from the MRP, initiated the debate on drinking and driving in Parliament. The MRP viewed its movement in favor of public safety as a form of social defense. In 1947, Adolphe Landry, an eminent demographer and senator of the Gauche démocratique (GD), presented a bill to the Senate to treat “socially dangerous alcoholics,” who apparently undermined the country’s renewal.\(^{782}\) A parallel movement got underway in the National Assembly when, two years later, Joseph Wasmer, a member of the MRP, presented a bill to the National Assembly to its members.\(^{783}\) For these moralists, alcohol was apparently drowning a nation in search of regeneration.


\(^{779}\) Ibid.

\(^{780}\) Georges Malignac and Robert Colin, L’Alcoolisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), 84. They ask: “What organization, what group would have the sufficient funds for influencing opinion through newspaper articles and advertisements, to the same extent as the magnates of alcohol, the big winegrowing estates, or the spirits firms can?”


\(^{783}\) CAC, 19780364, art. 3. Joseph Wasmer, “Proposition de loi tendant à soumettre les automobilistes auteurs présumés d’un accident à une prise de sang pour examen de la
But majorities in the National Assembly and the Senate shot down bill after bill. When, on 3 March 1953, the Assembly National finally adopted a law on the “treatment of alcoholics who endanger others,” it came six years after the bill had been introduced and after the Assembly’s public health commission had presented 14 reports. When the law came before the Senate, however, a majority resisted on the grounds that Article 11, which treated the legalization of blood tests after accidents, was already under study by a traffic commission. The Ministry of Transportation echoed the Senate’s concern. In their view, the Ministry of Public Health and the medical profession had overstepped its bounds. Since the late 1940s, as we will see, transportation interests had been developing a road policy, and doctors hoped to make drinking and driving a central issue in accident prevention. Yet the problems of alcoholism and road accidents had yet fully to converge.

The MRP members of the public health commission in the National Assembly ultimately succeeded in garnering parliamentary support for their bill. In the context of political instability and decolonization in Indochina, the political elite sought ways to maintain public order at home. The law of 15 April 1954 against “dangerous drinkers” set out to do just that. Article 11 of the law authorized the police to screen for “alcoholics” by drawing blood for those guilty of a crime, misdemeanor, or a road accident; it did not allow the police to conduct random checks. The law overthrew the old association of “public drunkenness” with social disorder. According to the law, those who showed no signs of drunkenness could also endanger society. Yet it did not penalize the drinking driver; instead, it placed “alcoholics” who were considered dangerous under medical surveillance. By framing the problem as one of alcoholism and not road accidents, the law pathologized culprits more than it criminalized them. It placed

786 CAC, 19780364, art. 2. Letter from Rumpler, directeur des routes, to the Minister of Public Health, 8 March 1952.
787 For a discussion of the making of this law, see Bilan et orientation de la lutte contre l’alcoolisme en France (Paris: Présidence du Conseil, Direction de la documentation, 1957), 15-18; for a more recent analysis, see Anne Kletzlen, L’Automobile et la loi: Comment est né le Code de la route? (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000), 121-136.
789 “L’internement et la rééducation des ‘alcooliques dangereux pour autrui’,” Le Monde, 1 August 1955.
alcohol-related accidents in the medical domain, which would prevent their insertion in the reformed Code de la Route of July 1954.

The law of 15 April 1954 proved ineffective. The regulations of 18 June 1955 and 1 January 1956, which put Article 11 into execution, restricted the use of blood tests to cases in which the accident led to injury or death and in which the guilty party appeared to be in an “alcoholic state.” If the accident produced but material damage, the culprit would have to be found in a state of public drunkenness in order to administer the blood test. Moreover, judges based their interpretation upon the observations of the police and doctors that arrived on the scene, and upon the laboratories that examined the blood sample. No standard procedure existed for implementing the law: the police hesitated in indicting alcohol, and country doctors found it burdensome to have to arrive on the scene, and if and when they did, the culprit had already begun to sober up. The courts—in their claim to defend individual rights—thus had little interest in enforcing the law; furthermore, each judge interpreted drunkenness or the dangerous alcoholic state differently. If the law were enforced, the convicted drunken driver would have to be placed in medical care; given social security covered the disease of alcoholism, the measure would saddle the state’s coffers. The system of regulating drinking and driving required serious coordination and a big dose of subjectivity.

As long as the penal system rarely implicated alcohol, doctors committed to road safety would continue to have difficulty persuading the state of the gravity of alcohol-related problems. Elite doctors had to find a way to modernize the public’s definition of “alcoholism” and alcohol-related “problems.” They claimed that “drunkennes,” or ivresse, was no longer valid; even small amounts of alcohol could endanger public health and safety. The rubric “drunkenness” (ivresse) in the statistics did not supply a real idea of the number of persons involved in alcohol-related accidents. Those who were observably drunk were therefore only blamed for three percent of accidents with bodily injury; four percent of drunk pedestrians were blamed; and ten percent of pedestrians were blamed for accidents that involved death. In 1953-1954, the Direction des routes of the Ministry of Transportation had put a stronger statistical system into place. From 1956, it published an annual Les accidents corporels de la circulation routière that informed officials about the state of road security. These statistics, however, failed to gauge the precise role of alcohol in traffic accidents. In the causes of accidents, the Direction des routes employed the general rubric of “Under the effect of drink or drugs.” To complicate matters further, the categories of “drunkenness” and “alcoholic state” had yet to be clearly defined.

793 This would continue to be the case into at least the 1970s. See, for example, “Sécurité routière,” Alcool ou santé 2 (1976). See also Jean Orselli, “Usages et usagers de la route, mobilité et accidents, 1860-2008,” Ph.D. diss., 2009, 164.
During the Fourth Republic, the campaign against drinking and driving was one aspect of the broader campaign against alcoholism. As long as doctors waged their conflict in the domain of alcoholism, they would interest few state actors who either designed the country’s transportation policy or had to budget for medical costs. In the early 1950s, the state did little to reduce accidents. At the end of the Fourth Republic, however, doctors would learn to shift the strategic terrain from the pathological drinker to the criminal driver.

III. The Automobile and Insurance Industries Search for a Scapegoat

In their anxiety over motor accidents, doctors were not alone. After the war, the automobile and insurance industries launched their own crusade against drinking and driving as part of their general effort to reduce accidents so as to promote automobile use. France’s rising automobile accidents had forced the automobile industry to take a position. Accidents were bad for business. Insurance companies, on the other hand, searched for ways to reduce the costs of accidents. Both groups exploited the medical and scientific research on drinking and driving to serve their own economic interests. The drinking driver had become a convenient scapegoat.

After the war, the state had nationalized both Renault and the bulk of the insurance companies and sought to implement rational economic planning. Renault, as well as Peugeot and the Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (RATP), followed in the path of the SNCF, another nationalized group, in regulating drinking on the job. In the public’s care, industries such as Renault and the SNCF had to budget wisely. Alcohol-related accidents would not only cost their business, but all of society.

Between the late 1940s and the late 1950s, however, the state left road safety in the hands of private associations. In 1949, the automobile industry and the insurance companies founded Prévention routière. Georges Gallienne, a former executive at Renault and a vibrant leader of the automobile lobby Union routière, headed this new road safety organization. Prévention routière included: the Association générale des Sociétés d’assurances contre les accidents; French and foreign automobile insurance companies; and the Syndicat Général des Transporteurs Routiers.

It is important to remember that campaigning against alcoholism in France was an unpopular cause. Most doctors even tried to avoid doing anything about it.


companies; the Fédération nationale des Clubs Automobiles de France; the Fédération nationale des Transports routiers; the Oeuvre pour la Sécurité et l’Organisation des secours; and the Union des véhicules de transport privé; and, perhaps most importantly, the powerful Union routière.\textsuperscript{801} The association worked to encourage automobile consumption at the same time that it helped prevent accidents. Importantly, it sought to educate individuals about their responsibilities in driving an automobile. In its review, \textit{Prévention routière}, the organization focused more upon alcohol as a cause of accidents than speeding. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, in fact, the automobile industry vehemently opposed measures to limit speeding; mobility, after all, and the ability to get places fast, was the imperative of economic growth.\textsuperscript{802}

The insurance companies gave Prévention routière its greatest financial backing.\textsuperscript{803} Since the end of World War Two, they had been alerting the state to the fact that accidents saddled the economy. Already in 1951, it was reported that the insurance companies paid over 39 billion francs in damages, whereas they received just over 53 billion francs.\textsuperscript{804} The insurance companies thus looked for the causes of road insecurity. But statistics still did not allow them to condemn drinking and driving. The medical profession was still trying to make a solid connection between alcohol and accidents.

The automobile and touring clubs, which had been so popular in the interwar years,\textsuperscript{805} also championed the anti-drinking and driving cause, though with less vigor. One member of the Academy of Medicine observed that tourists who drank a little wine with their meal on their Sunday stroll were at the greatest risk of causing an accident.\textsuperscript{806} The automobile was intimately linked to France’s culinary tourism and to the discovery of the diverse terroir and regional specialties. The Touring-Club de France was conscious of the challenges of drinking and driving:

\textit{It is precisely because we intend to be able, without our conscience being troubled, to continue to vaunt the quality products of French terroir, because we are not unaware that the pleasures of the table are central to the}


\textsuperscript{802} A part of the appeal of automobiles was, of course, their ability to go fast. See Ross, \textit{Fast Cars, Clean Bodies}, 22-54.


\textsuperscript{804} “Augmentation alarmante des accidents de la circulation,” \textit{Alcool ou santé} 9 (1953): 13.

\textsuperscript{805} See Stephen L. Harp’s interesting chapter on the Michelin guide and automobile and culinary tourism during the interwar period in \textit{Marketing Michelin}, 225-268.

reputation of French hospitality, that we refuse to close our eyes. In order to be free to advocate for the use of alcoholic beverages, we must condemn their abuse.\textsuperscript{807}

In his treatise on driving, François Toché pointed out that the intention of the road safety movement was not “to undermine our national wealth, but one can remind automobilists, motorcyclists, cyclists, and pedestrians also...that France is also the country of measure and that a drink too many is perhaps, on the road, one life less.”\textsuperscript{808} In his view, to master the art of driving, one had to master the art of drinking. Members of touring clubs most often came from the countryside and were thus integrated into the world of the alcohol economy. In the department of the Rhône, for example, the local anti-alcoholism committee regretted that Prévention routière and the local Automobile Club “neglect the danger of alcohol and even appear hostile to our action.”\textsuperscript{809} Touring clubs supported culinary tourism with articles in their reviews. Automobile and touring associations had to negotiate between supporting the local economy and promoting public safety.

The automobile, insurance, and tourism lobbies made their voices heard through the Commission centrale des automobiles et de la circulation of the Ministry of Transportation. The commission included the Vicomte de Rohan, president of the Automobile Club de France, Georges Gallienne, of both Union routière and Prévention routière, and technocrats from Ponts et Chaussées and the Ministry of Transportation. In 1946, the Minister of the Interior, with its interest in maintaining public order, asked the Commission centrale to design legislation to allow police to draw blood from drivers they suspected to be drunk.\textsuperscript{810} Although the Vicomte de Rohan doubted that such a law could be passed in France—given that blood tests required a doctor’s presence and that the test would have to be carried out immediately—the rest of its members called upon the creation of a sub-commission that would include two doctors.\textsuperscript{811} M. Piedelièvre, a professor of legal medicine at the Faculté de médecine, and M. Fabre, a professor of toxicology. Other doctors would also participate in the sub-commission, such as Dérobert, Abbal, and Bugnard. The sub-commission drafted a bill, but it was buried by the legislative move to pass the future law of 15 April 1954.

Though in the 1950s, the automobile and insurance interests echoed the medical concern about drinking and driving, they could do little to persuade the state to implement a coherent road safety policy. The parallel campaigns against alcoholism and road accidents never completely converged. Jurists also wanted to preserve their

\textsuperscript{808} François Toché, L’art de bien conduire (Paris: Flammarion, 1954), 139.
\textsuperscript{810} CAC, 19780364, art. 2. Letter from F. Teissier du Gros, ingénieur en chef des Ponts et Chaussées, to the Minister of the Interior, 20 February 1946.
privileges in determining the line between alcohol use and abuse. The movement against drinking and driving needed better coordination. With the law of 15 April 1954, the war on alcoholism trumped the road safety movement. Jacques Chastellain, the Minister of Transportation, expressed his frustration by asking the Minister of Public Health why he had not been asked to sign the law, given that it concerned road safety. During the Fourth Republic, public health and transportation experts failed to see eye-to-eye.

IV. The Human Factor and the Mobilization of the State

Things began to change in the crisis year of the Fourth Republic. In the regime’s final months, just as the Ministry of Transportation stepped up its interest in road safety, doctors reminded the state of the important role of “human factors” in accidents. Many newspapers had relayed statistics revealing that 80 percent of motor accidents were caused by poor road conditions. Doctors countered with evidence suggesting that 80 percent were the drivers’ fault.

When doctors invoked the “human factors” behind accidents, they particularly meant alcohol. To convince the state of the need to act, Robert Debré, president of both the Academy of Medicine and the HCEIA, invited Édouard Bonnefous, the Ministry of Transportation, to speak to the Academy’s medical elite. Its Commission on Road Safety emphasized to Bonnefous that “road accidents were not especially a problem of the road or the machine, of the engineer or the builder, but above all a problem that concerned the individual’s driving (conduite: also “behavior”), where a whole series of pathological phenomena are at play.” Yet Bonnefous wanted to look at the bigger picture: “Whatever the importance the human factor has in it, it is indeed necessary not to underestimate the environment of the road and the mechanical element.”

Doctors urged road safety advocates and transportation technocrats to emphasize the human factor in traffic accidents. Yet their task was not easy. In his “Safeguard Operation,” Robert Buron called upon drivers to be prudent, be he said nothing of drinking and driving. The wine lobby capitalized on this silence about alcohol. La Journée vinicole reiterated the Minister of Transportation’s councils, discouraging drivers from driving too long and from speeding. The Midi libre, the principal newspaper in the Languedoc, reported in the same manner. As Philippe Cousin put it in the pages of Paris-Journal: “Thus for the three doctors, road accidents are not only an affair of

812 CAC, 19780364, art. 2. Letter from the Procureur général près la Cour d’Appel de Sarrebruck to the Minister of Justice, no date, but probably written in 1948 or 1949.
814 ANPAA, K143/al. P. Jean, “Alcool et sécurité routière,” 1959, 75. Note that there are many other references to these statistics.
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the police. Or read exactly the police could fight efficiently when they have accomplished five years of medical studies and, according to their preference, two years of psychiatric or surgical specialization.\textsuperscript{818} A few years later, André Soubiran, president of the Medical Automobile-Club, remembered the public’s skepticism about the medical contribution to road safety.\textsuperscript{819} Fighting “alcoholism” was certainly out of the Ministry of Transportation’s jurisdiction.

To change opinion, doctors had to lobby hard. Robert Monod, perhaps the most ardent activist in the anti-drinking and driving movement, had friends in high places. By placing road accidents squarely in the country’s crisis environment, he pleaded with de Gaulle, then the President of the Council, to act.

The road kills each year more youth than the Algerian War, and more than cancer. It is presently, in the human, social, and economic domains, the number one national scourge. It annually costs the insurance companies alone some 180 billion without counting the reimbursement of medical charges and without counting several hundreds of thousands of days of lost work.\textsuperscript{820}

To prevent further accidents, Monod called for an interministerial commission, based upon the model of the HCEIA, to issue decrees. Monod hoped to use the political crisis of the Fourth Republic to meet his goals.

The medical profession’s advocacy of the “human factors” behind accidents came at an opportune moment. The government had begun to debate the institution of a new driving code. With a decree in February 1958, the state made automobile insurance mandatory.\textsuperscript{821} On 15 December 1958, after the installation of the Fifth Republic, the government passed an ordinance that reformed the Code de la route.\textsuperscript{822} Article L.1 of the driving code went further than the law of 15 April 1954 by criminalizing driving while intoxicated (ivresse) or in an “alcoholic state,” but it still failed to define the “alcoholic state.”\textsuperscript{823} On 7 January 1959, the government issued a decree that canceled the insurance contracts of those convicted of driving “in a state of intoxication (ivresse).”\textsuperscript{824} That the


\textsuperscript{819} André Soubiran, Des conseils pour l’auto (Paris: Fayard, 1963), 7-8.

\textsuperscript{820} CAC, 19780409, art. 1. Letter from Robert Monod to General de Gaulle, 12 July 1958.


\textsuperscript{822} As Jean Orselli has noted, the 1958 Code did not depart much from that of 1939. The Code de la route stemmed from the Loi sur la police du roulage of 1851.

\textsuperscript{823} For the full details of this 1958 law, see “Ordonnance #58-1216 du 15 décembre 1958 relative à la police de la circulation routière,” Journal officiel de la République française: Lois et décrets, 15-16 December 1958, 11,280.

\textsuperscript{824} “Décret #59-135 du 7 janvier 1959 portant règlement d’administration publique pour l’application de la loi #58-203 du 27 février 1958 instituant une obligation d’assurance en matière de circulation de véhicules terrestres à moteur,” Journal officiel de la République
law required each French citizen to have automobile insurance is not without significance. It forced drivers to behave responsibly or else suffer the consequences of losing their insurance contract. Remember that they would also lose their license. Drinking drivers, according to the state’s logic, cost both the insurance companies and consumers and thus threatened the general welfare. But, because the government still did not define the “alcoholic state,” the police and jurists seldom punished the drinking driver.

From 1958, as France changed political regimes, the anti-drinking and driving movement accelerated. By invoking the “human factor,” doctors hoped to arouse the public and the state to action. On the one hand, the decree ensured that the insurance companies would take an interest in the causes of accidents and to find ways to prevent them; on the other, it compelled drivers to avoid accidents. For its part, the automobile industry hoped to maintain an untarnished image in a developing consumer culture based upon cars.

After 1958, more newspapers began to heed the medical warnings and to reach out to the public. As Pierre Fabre observed in Carrefour: “…there can be no doubt it: alcohol plays, in road accidents, a preponderant role...The peak hours of accidents...are very revealing. 2 o’clock in the afternoon: it is the hour after lunch when one had had alcohol, a full stomach, the tendency for drowsiness. It is moreover crazy to drive at this hour, immediately after having got up from the table. The other time is seven o’clock in the evening.” 826 Seven o’clock, of course, was right after happy hour and before the evening meal.

At the founding of the Fifth Republic, the public health and road safety lobbies began to collaborate more closely. As Robert Monod and Piédelièvre of the Academy of Medicine put it in December 1958: “The public, families, the insurance companies, the automobile industry are all interested in stricter regulations of drinking and driving…” 827 In April 1959, Monod became the head of the CNDCA, which marked a major departure in the way that reformers fought alcoholism and road safety. As we saw in chapter three, anti-alcoholism began to collaborate with the luxury sector of the drink trade. It also began to work with the transportation interests. The CNDCA had a special commission on road safety, which included Doctor Behague, an administrator at the TCF, and representatives of the insurance companies. 828 The Touring Club de France continued its

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campaign against drinking and driving, and called upon the various interest groups to collaborate in order to curtail the problem. Between 1959 and 1965, the HCEIA, the CNDCA, and Prévention routière carried out a number of tests at the local level to educate the public about the dangers of drinking and driving, and about how best to implement the breath test so as to gauge the real gravity of alcohol-related accidents. A coalition of interests emerged that made the state responsible for educating drivers.

For the state, it was financially easier to educate the driver than to build France’s road networks. The medical profession’s attempt to persuade the state of the human factors behind automobile accidents came in the context of heated debates about the future of France’s highway system. With the Fifth Republic came a new impetus to develop French roads. Yet obstacles stood in the way. James A. Dunn, Jr. has demonstrated the difficulty with which the highway lobby—in particular, Union routière, headed by Georges Gallienne—convinced the Ministry of Finance to develop France’s highway system in both the Fourth and early Fifth Republics. Things would only begin to change with Georges Pompidou’s arrival to the presidency in 1969. The CNDCA admitted that “While we wait for the indispensable but long-term improvement of our road network, this action on drivers themselves will be of utmost value.” For the CNDCA, it was easier to act upon the “human factor” than to persuade an “impecunious state” to modernize rapidly the country’s infrastructure. L’Auto-Journal, a consumer magazine that defended drivers, criticized the state for reducing motor accidents to alcohol at the same moment that the budget for road construction had been apparently reduced. In its view, in screening drinking drivers, the state has chosen the easiest path: “A great breach in the most elementary principals of the respect of human dignity has been opened.”

Not only did the railway companies stand in the way, but parts of the agricultural sector also seemed to obstruct the building of a modern highway system. On 22 November 1960, Jean Boucoiran, on behalf of the Section des travaux publics, des transports et du tourisme, went before the Social and Economic Council in order to discuss the obstacles to the development of French highways. The state would have to construct new highways upon old farmland. “The expropriation of 3,500 kilometers of highways with an average width of 50 meters represents an extension of 17,500 hectares

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830 For the history of France’s highway system, see Antonia Jardin and Philippe Fleury, La révolution de l’autoroute: L’autoroute dans la vie quotidienne des Français (Paris: Fayard, 1973). Roads had of course played an important role in nation-building since the nineteenth century; see Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, 195-220.


in the area of public domain.” Winegrowers were the representative obstacles to this modernization, given that they typically produced wine on small, scattered plots of land. Boucoiran noted the difficulties that highways posed for agricultural interests, and used the Yonne, a winegrowing department that produces the elegant, mineral Chablis, as an example of the threats and opportunities that a modern infrastructure brought with it. Down south, the winegrowers of the Languedoc opposed the coming of mass tourism and feared the loss of local identity by the 1970s. Because of the challenges to modernizing the country’s road infrastructure, doctors increasingly interested the Ministry of Transportation in the human factors behind automobile accidents.

Nothing attested to the state’s increasing attention to the “human factors” in road accidents than the creation in 1961 of the Organisme national de sécurité routière (ONSER). The Ministry of Transportation designed the ONSER as a private association whose primary mission was to study ways to make roads safer. Representatives of the competent ministries—Transportation, Interior, Army, Public Health—took part in the administrative council, but so too did important economic groups, such as the Fédération française des sociétés d’assurance, the Caisse nationale de sécurité sociale, the Institut national de sécurité, Prévention routière, Secours routiers, and the Association les droits du piéton, a pedestrians’ group. The state subsidized its activities. The corps of the Ponts et Chaussées had a big influence upon the ONSER. Serge Goldberg, an engineer at Ponts et Chaussées and a functionary at the Direction des routes of the Ministry of Transportation, headed the organization. The ONSER had a review, ONSER Actualités, which provided the public with new road safety knowledge.

By focusing upon driver responsibility, doctors could avoid the wrath of powerful economic interests: the alcohol and automobile industries. Robert Monod would declare in 1963 that “In taking on the problem of alcohol and the road, and in relentlessly pushing its information campaign in this direction, the CNDCA is conscious of not undermining the interests of viticulture, nor those of the automobile industry, not any more than of the reputation of our country.” In February 1963, Prime Minister

836 CAC, 19780409, art. 1. Comité permanent de la sécurité routière, “Procès-verbal de la séance du 11 juillet 1960.” Discussions about the creation of the ONSER began at this meeting.
837 CAC, 19880510, art. 15. Ministère de l’équipement et du logement, “Organismes publics et privés dont l’activité est directement ou indirectement liés à la sécurité routière,” 2. See also Kletzlen, De l’alcool à l’alcool au volant, 127.
Georges Pompidou and Robert Debré agreed to frame the campaign against drinking and driving within L.1 of the driving code, and not within the drink code. The problem, doctors would thereafter underscore time and again, was road safety, not alcoholism. Just as the HCEIA had shifted the terrain from alcoholism to agriculture, it was now moving from alcoholism to road safety. From the early 1960s on, politicians would focus upon reforming the driving code, not the drinking code.

Four factors explain why between 1958 and 1963 doctors and the state transferred the drinking problem to the road safety agenda. Firstly, reformers could appeal to an emerging but solid body of international research that linked alcohol to traffic accidents, and to the European technocrats who were searching for ways to reduce motor accidents. Secondly, it distanced the wine lobbies from the decision-making process. Thirdly, it educated citizens indirectly on how to drink by educating them about how to drive, thereby placing the onus upon the individual, and not the alcohol or automobile interests. This shift also suggested that individuals could control their drinking (that they were not sick), and were not the victims of their social environment. Fourthly, preventing alcohol-related accidents served the “general interest” by promoting public safety.

In the emerging European Economic Community (EEC), the transportation sector had to take into consideration automobile tourism and ever-growing number of automobiles moving across national borders. In May 1964, Robert Debré told Pompidou that “This problem has from all evidence an international dimension. Automobile and transport tourism by road is developing rapidly, in particular between the countries of the European community.” In July 1964, Pompidou called the European Ministries of Transportation to study drinking and driving and to recommend creating a uniform legal blood alcohol limit throughout the EEC. Interestingly, the impetus for harmonizing European traffic legislation came from France. Road safety advocates could elicit the international community in their efforts to convince French interest groups to comply. Pushing legislation in the European community also freed the French government from criticism. By necessity, France would have to conform to European norms.

The campaign against drinking and driving sidelined the wine lobbies. According to Léon Fleck, the government believed that it was “inopportune” to ask Parliament to modify the drink code. It is important to remember that the latter had taken a beating from the anti-alcohol legislation of 1959-1960. New changes to the code might cause protest among the alcohol interests. The driving code criminalized the drunken driver, while the drinking code affected all of the alcohol economy. With drinking and driving, the burden was upon the individual to behave in a rational and responsible way, thus

841 Georges Pompidou was in favor of driver education. On Pompidou’s relationship to the automobile, see Mathieu Flonneau, “Georges Pompidou président conducteur et la première crise urbaine de l’automobile,” Vingtième siècle 61 (January-March 1999): 30-43.
freeing the alcohol lobbies from blame. As long as reformers discussed alcohol in the context of the drinking code, government officials would have to consult the wine lobby, given that winegrowers’ livelihoods would be affected. Road safety, however, did not concern the alcohol economy. At the meetings of the HCEIA, where wine interests had a voice, Philippe Lamour rarely raised his voice in the discussions on road safety. Though Santé de la France, an organization that defended French alcohol, provided road safety commissions with advice about how to educate the driver, 844 alcohol interests were never represented in the road safety commissions.

The government’s strategy worked. The alcohol lobbies had little room to mobilize against drinking and driving. All the wine trade could do was to rally to the defense of its product and blame the campaign for falling wine consumption.845 The Comité interprofessionnel de défense des boissons concurred: “A badly posed problem: to attack the makers and distributors of national drinks does not resolve the problem of alcoholism, for it is to ignore the veritable causes of the disease (mal). It would come to the mind of no one to render the builders and sellers of automobiles responsible for road accidents and to prohibit the advertising of powerful, fast cars.”846 The café and restaurant business, which perhaps had the most to lose, mobilized little against the road safety movement. Until January 1970, Industrie hôtelière, its review, did not report on the matter.847 Oenologists, finally, showed concern for their livelihood, and proposed a study to see how many wines they could taste before getting behind the wheel. “After 20 or 30 tastings, are not tasters more or less significantly under the influence?”848

Though the alcohol lobbies were vocal in their defense of their product, it should be noted that in no direct way did the campaign against drinking and driving attack their trade. To a certain extent, the campaign played into the hands of the luxury wine and café industries. Both groups had for a long time defended their trade by calling upon the state to educate its consumers. “Alcoholics,” in their view, were asocial. Even when wine defenders agreed that drinking and driving was dangerous, they believed that the two were not completely incompatible. In edifying the drinker about how to drink and drive without danger, Jean-Max Eylaud, general secretary of the Société française des médecins amis du vin, recommended that people drink prudently with their meal; if they were to take a digestif at meal’s end, they should wait sixty minutes and exercise before taking the wheel.849 Eylaud recognized the dangers of even small doses of alcohol when

845 See, for example, J.-M.T., “Pour supprimer les alcooliques au volant, faut-il supprimer les automobiles?,” Le Moniteur vinicole, 13 November 1965.
847 L’Industrie hôtelière de France et d’Outre-Mer. This review reported on alcoholism, but not drinking and driving.
849 “Sept conseils du Dr. J.-M. Eylaud pour boire et conduire sans danger,” Alcool ou santé 1 (1964): 10. This article originally appeared in Sud-Ouest, 26 July 1963. Needless to say, the CNDCA was not amused by the doctor’s advice.
driving.\textsuperscript{850} For public health specialists, the automobile, insurance, and touring associations, and the drink trade, education was the name of the game in the movement against drinking and driving.

Road safety advocates appealed to the “general interest.” They no longer placed the emphasis upon the alcoholic but upon the entire population. With alcoholism, the legal solution was treatment; with drinking and driving, however, the proposed solution was a fine and imprisonment. The latter served as a more effective deterrent. It also served the greater good. While citizens had the right to drink, and the right to harm their own bodies, they did not have the right to hurt others. Important anti-alcohol activists and members of the Academy of Medicine, men such as Robert Debré and Robert Monod, time and again reassured the public that they were not waging war upon alcoholism, but alcohol-related traffic accidents. In this way, they hoped to downplay any excessive paternalism and emphasize instead the safety of others. As Debré put it, “children and adolescents are the principal victims of road accidents…,” thus calling attention to the innocence of those in danger.\textsuperscript{851}

V. The HCEIA’s Role in Road Safety

Because of the absence of a central agency in coordinating the movement against drinking and driving, the HCEIA stepped in. Unlike the ONSER, which was under the auspices of the Ministry of Transportation, the HCEIA was administered by the Prime Minister, which gave it more power to coordinate policy. In 1963, representatives of the interested ministries began to attend the HCEIA’s meetings to discuss the controversial issue of establishing a legal blood alcohol limit. Though the alcohol lobbies were not invited to become members of the HCEIA, in the late 1960s, Georges Gallienne and representatives of the insurance companies attended the HCEIA’s meetings for their supposed expertise in road safety. Within the HCEIA, as within other realms of the government, the underlying assumption was that the automobile industry’s opinion was more valuable than the alcohol industry’s.

The HCEIA worked closely with the ONSER to construct an official knowledge about drinking and driving. In 1965, the ONSER began to send representatives to the HCEIA.\textsuperscript{852} The HCEIA also supported the ONSER’s work by funding its research on drinking and driving. Robert Debré represented the HCEIA at the ONSER.\textsuperscript{853} Working together, these two organizations would lobby the government to impose a new driving standard. Throughout the debates in the 1960s on the institution of a legal blood alcohol limit, politicians would use these two groups’ research.

When the HCEIA was not coordinating ministerial debate, it was helping the CNDCA and Prévention routière educate the public about drinking and driving. From

\textsuperscript{850} Jean-Max Eylaud, \textit{Vin et santé: vertus hygiéniques et thérapeutiques du vin} (Soissons (Aisne): La Diffusion nouvelle du livre, 1960), 146. See also S. Tara, “Une opinion médicale: pourquoi une alcoolémie légale?,” \textit{Alcool ou santé} 4/5 (1962): 60.


\textsuperscript{852} CAC, 19940020, art. 3. “Séance du 10 mars 1965.”

\textsuperscript{853} CAC, 19940020, art. 14. At the ONSER, Robert Debré participated in a Comité scientifique.
1955, the HCEIA, as well as the CNDCA and Prévention routière, placed signs along the roadside warning drivers of their responsibility to remain sober at the wheel. Road safety groups also carried out roadside checks to accustom people to the breath test and to persuade people that the idea was to prevent, not repress. The tests were carried out in some of the notoriously more alcoholic departments of France: in the infamously hard-drinking Finistère and Normandy, for example.

VI. The Road Safety Coalition Mobilizes the Government

The movement in favor of a legal blood alcohol limit came from two directions: the insurance companies and the state. At the same moment in 1963 that government officials met at the HCEIA in order to draft a bill to modify the law on drinking and driving, the insurance companies began to take their own course of action. The public had recently protested against the hike in insurance premiums. As a result, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the Minister of Finances, convoked a Round Table of the automobile and insurance associations in order to explain the reasons for the increase and to devise a road safety strategy.

At the Round Table, both automobile and insurance experts primarily blamed irresponsible drivers for making everyone else pay. They indicted citizens who drove under the influence. The insurance companies called for a legal limit of .15. The HCEIA criticized Gallienne and the other participants of the Round Table for not having invited a member of the HCEIA to attend, and pointed out that its members, along with the Ministers of Public Health and of Justice, thought that scientists needed to conduct more research before determining the fairest level and that .15 was far too high. The HCEIA and the government thus removed the establishment of a legal limit from the government’s project of law. The only progress that the 1965 law would make was to allow the police to use a breath test on accident victims. The government postponed the establishment of a legal blood alcohol limit.

Though by 1963-1964 officials accepted alcohol as among the causes of accidents, they still had to determine at what limit to separate legitimate use from abuse. Doctors and state officials had to agree upon the dose at which alcohol went from being harmless to harmful. The stakes were high; such a law would be a new encroachment upon what was perceived to be individual space. The state had passed anti-drinking and driving laws and decrees in 1954, 1958, and 1965, but whereas these measures allowed the police to administer a blood test after an accident and in 1965 to use breath tests, they did little to criminalize drinking and driving. These acts failed to ascertain at what blood alcohol concentration all citizens would pose a danger to society and therefore be penalized.

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854 CAC, 19940020, art. 12. This box deals with Affichage routier.
855 CAC, 19880510, art. 15. “Génèse de la table ronde sur la sécurité routière et ses enseignements,” 1.
Road safety advocates faced an obstacle in setting a legal blood alcohol limit—in standardizing drinking and driving, they would have to standardize the penal process of criminalizing the drinking driver. For jurists, at stake was their power to interpret drunkenness; they would have to yield to the breath test. Defining the “alcoholic state”—and establishing a norm—would allegedly violate the rights of jurists and citizens, and undermine the interests of the alcohol industry.

Opponents of a new driving standard had exploited scientific uncertainty. Medical research in the 1950s and early 1960s had been far from conclusive. Alcohol reportedly affected each individual differently. At the Economic Council in 1959, doctor Étienne May suggested a limit of .15. He argued that this level and above, and regardless of individual variations, would impair drivers’ reflexes. Furthermore, he claimed that public opinion would not agree to a lower limit. Malméjac, as we have seen, showed that even a blood alcohol level of .05 posed a danger to drivers and passengers on the road. Because each individual responded differently to alcohol, scientists could come to no consensus on the legal blood alcohol limit to establish.

Both international developments in research and domestic economic concerns served as an impetus to establish a norm. Several politicians noted that French resistance to a drinking and driving law made France look backwards, and would ultimately hurt French automobile and wine tourism. The circulation of international ideas and political developments gave France’s road safety advocates powerful ammunition. Robert Borkenstein’s massive study of 1962 in Grand Rapids, Michigan forced the skeptics of science into retreat. His work had demonstrated the utility of the breath test and the need to establish a blood alcohol limit. By going beyond the laboratory and clinical trials and by simulating real-life situations, it showed that, over a blood alcohol level of .08, drivers, despite their varying levels of tolerance to alcohol, posed a threat to society. Members of the HCEIA had also studied drinking and driving regulations in other European countries. In 1963, for example, Georges Pequignot of the nutrition department of the INSERM had traveled to West Germany in order to understand the relationship between alcohol and road safety in that country and came away convinced that the breath test was a more effective tool than the blood sample.

By the late 1960s, mentalities in Europe and the United States began to change. Countries were coming around to the idea of setting a legal blood alcohol limit. In Hamburg on 14 June 1967, the European Conference of Ministers of Transport

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called upon member countries to establish a legal blood alcohol level of .08. The ECMT had first met to discuss the issue at Prime Minister Georges Pompidou’s initiative in 1964. It had studied alcoholism as a cause of road accidents, with the aim of harmonizing the preventive and repressive measures in the eighteen countries that were members of the Council of Europe.

England was the first country to follow the Council’s recommendation when it promulgated its Road Safety Act of 1967. In January 1968, Professor Fontan and J. Levy-Jacquemin, both of the HCEIA, traveled to England in order to study the law’s effectiveness. They noted that the various ministries had coordinated their efforts and that, at the beginning of 1968, the law had proven a success. The law reduced road accidents by between 10 and 30 percent, depending upon the period of the year and the geographical region. They credited that success on the government’s ability to inform public opinion.

Public opinion was slower to change in France. For many of the French, a legal blood alcohol limit of .08 apparently insulted their ability to hold their alcohol. French scientists had observed that the “norms…have been established in sober countries (Scandinavia, Anglo-Saxon countries), where the consumption of pure alcohol, per individual, is from five to twenty times inferior to French consumption.” Who was a Swede or an American to tell a seasoned Frenchman that he had had too much to drink? As late as 1969, J. Allain, sous-directeur of Action médico-sociale, had to admit that the French must “wait for the results of the studies being carried out by the ONSER to be known,” because “the findings made abroad risk being little convincing for the French, who, persuaded by the traditional resistance to alcohol, do not feel concerned by the forecasted dangers…”

At the same time, domestic research, conducted by both medical and transportation interests, advanced. In January 1969, the ONSER published its conclusions from a drinking and driving test that it had carried out. In many respects,

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862 For a discussion of the emergence of this forum, see Christian Henrich-Franke, “Mobility and European integration: Politicians, professionals and the foundation of the ECMT,” *Journal of Transport History* 29 (March 2008): 64-82.
Borkenstein’s study had inspired the ONSER’s trial. Researchers at the ONSER compared the blood alcohol level of seven thousand drivers, stopped at random on the road. The study demonstrated that there were three times more accidents when drivers had a blood alcohol level that exceeded .08. The ONSER therefore recommended to the government to set that limit, which, despite individual variations, was the threshold at which no person could apparently drive responsibly. It noted that “The choice of the level must nevertheless not only take into account universal physiological facts, but also national characteristics of the concerned population.”

Elites of the medical profession echoed the ONSER’s call for reform. On 15 January 1969, the HCEIA called upon the Prime Minister to set a legal limit of .08, referring to both domestic and international research to make its case. The Academy of Medicine followed suit on March 4. Medical opinion gave further credibility to the campaign against drinking and driving. In turn, in November 1968, the transportation sector bolstered the medical case by bringing the debate to the Social and Economic Council, where Claude de Peyron, member of the Section on Public Works, Transportation, and Tourism, delivered a report on the problems facing the country’s traffic policy. The Social and Economic Council solicited medical advice from Robert Debré. The Council concluded that the government needed to set a legal limit that conformed to international trends. A blood alcohol concentration of .08 was quickly becoming the level of indisputable science.

Besieged by science and economic arguments, the Ministry of Justice changed its opinion and set out to change the minds of the rest of the judicial system. On June 24, the Chancellerie sent a circular to the Procureurs généraux in order to gauge its opinion about whether or not to establish a legal limit. The results of this consultation were placed in a document of the Chancellerie in January 1969, entitled “Conduite d’un véhicule sous l’empire d’un état alcoolique”. Out of the 31 parquets questioned, 28 were in favor of instituting a blood alcohol level. Yet they were divided on what level to set. 15 wanted a limit of .1; 4 wanted a limit of .08; 4 wanted a limit of between .12 and .15; 1 wanted two limits at .08 and .15; 1 wanted two limits at .08 and .1; one wanted two limits at .05 and .1; and two believed that the decisions rested with medical authorities.
The Ministry of Justice affirmed to the members of the HCEIA its willingness to establish a legal blood alcohol limit.

According to René Capitant, then the Minister of Justice, the magistrates deplored the lack of rigor and unity in enforcing a law on drinking and driving and argued for the need to harmonize French legislation with other European countries. Reformers complained that the “alcoholic state” had remained in the juridical domain instead of a more scientific one. As the ONSER would put it: “Jurisprudence reveals considerable differences in assessing the alcoholic state from one region to the next.” Not only had the police in winegrowing regions taken the law lightly, but also local officials had refused to subsidize the breath tests. Winegrowing departments rarely enforced the law of 1965, given that “the magistrates’ interpretation was largely influenced by local customs. One judge joked that “if it was necessary to condemn in every department all the drivers presenting a blood alcohol level judged excessive by the doctors, ‘there would no longer be any room for thieves in prisons’.”

By late 1969, with the Ministry of Justice on board, the anxiety over drinking and driving made its way to the summit of the state. In December, Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas, who ironically hailed from wine-loving Bordeaux and had good relations with the local wine industry, and whose wife would die in an automobile accident one year later, made road security into a national cause as a part of his program for a “New Society.” He had in his entourage an important group of technocrats—Jacques Delors and Simon Nora, to name but two—that viewed road safety in economic terms. In 1968, Michel Debré, then the Minister of Finance, was carrying out what he called the Rationalisation des choix budgétaires (RCB), modeled upon the management methods of American business and government. It sought to define a cost-effective course of action. The use of the RCB in the traffic safety policy legitimated the movement in favor of a drinking and driving law.

The administration’s concern for road safety came in the context of supposedly dull economic growth. At the end of the 1960s, the Ministry of Public Health changed its...
name to the Ministry of Public Health and Social Security, evincing a new interest in the costs of health care to the national economy. Anti-alcoholism reformers organized conferences, such as that of the CNDCA in 1969, and tried to demonstrate the societal costs of alcohol-related problems. 879

Chaban-Delmas opened the round table on road safety on 3 December 1969, in the name of rationalizing the national budget. 880 The round table had two main goals: to support the government in attempting to stabilize or even reduce automobile accidents; and to heighten public awareness about road safety. 881 The round table, which was composed of representatives of the administration, also included interest groups of the automobile industry: Prévention routière, Union routière, the Assurances générales de France, and the Chambre syndicale du pétrole. So that the Round Table was not “too administrative,” the secretary of state in the offices of the Prime Minister decided to nominate an individual from the private sector. Interestingly, M. Haas-Picard, President of the Union des Chambres syndicales de l’industrie du pétrole, presided over the working group that concerned drivers. While discussions of automobiles and the road infrastructure were not excluded from the discussions, the Round Table emphasized the need of driver education and responsibility. It concluded that road security needed to be placed upon the political agenda, and that the state needed to reform the drinking driver.

Studies conducted by the insurance companies and the technocrats at the Ministry of Transportation gave further credibility to the creation of a drinking and driving law. These groups cast their arguments in economic terms. M. Thiry of the Association générale des sociétés d’assurances, called for the forces of order to enforce the law. 882 The insurance companies decried the expense of automobile accidents; in 1966, for example, they paid 2.8 billion francs in indemnities for bodily harm and 2.4 billion for material damage. 883

As Paul Robillard, the general delegate of the Fédération française des Sociétés d’assurances, put it, insurance companies, in providing statistics, could demonstrate to the public the repercussions of alcoholism. Yet he lamented that, still in 1970, statistics on the role of alcohol in accidents were unreliable. A study carried out by the Groupement technique accidents sur les causes d’accidents showed that in a sample of victims that called for a payment of an indemnity in 1966, exactly one percent was

880 CAC, 19880510, art. 15. “Genèse de la table ronde sur la sécurité routière et ses enseignements,” 3.
883 CAC, 19880510, art. 15. Note générale sur l’action à mener pour améliorer la sécurité routière,” 7 May 1968, 1.
caused by driving while intoxicated. In his view, however, this percentage was an underestimation, as speeding and other road violations that caused accidents were really alcohol-induced. Although it was difficult to pin down the role of alcohol in accidents, there were reliable statistics available on the cost of accidents due to alcoholism in relation to the cost of other accidents. The average cost of a victim of an alcohol-related accident was 35,408 francs, whereas the average cost of the entirety of victims was placed at 12,179. Alcohol-related accidents cost three times more than other accidents.

In March 1970, Michel Ternier of Ponts et Chaussées teamed up with Jean L’Hoste, a psychologist at the ONSER, and Jérôme Lion, an engineer and economist at the Direction de la prévision of the Ministry of Finance, in order to deliver the round table’s conclusions to the public. They estimated that the economic loss for the nation from a death at 230,000 francs, and from a wounded person at 10,000 francs. Enacting a legal blood alcohol limit of .08 would thus save the nation between 300 to 800 million francs.

The report noted that of the four principal interests that a drinking and driving law would impact—alcohol, the automobile, the insurance companies, and public health—only the alcohol industry would be adversely affected:

We do not rule out the thought that the application of this regulation could possibly have a certain influence upon the alcohol production and distribution sectors, although the specific objective of the regulation is less to diminish alcohol consumption per individual than to dissociate the two acts “drink and drive”; we perhaps do not rule out the thought that there will be a slight drop in alcohol consumption.

The law would also have particular consequences for the insurance companies. In the insurance contracts, a clause stipulated the loss of insurance if the insured was condemned for driving while intoxicated. But because such a stipulation was harsh and could ruin the livelihoods of certain people who were not covered, judges hesitated to enforce the clause. A legal blood alcohol limit would mean a practically automatic conviction. These experts suggested that this clause be suppressed by raising premiums for a certain time. They estimated that the diminution of the number of accidents would save the insurance companies between 180 and 470 million francs. Implementing a legal blood alcohol limit, in that it would curb consumption, would also supposedly improve public health.

By the end of the 1960s, the medical profession and the automobile and insurance industries had successfully used international science and law to persuade the...
government of the need to set a blood alcohol limit at .08. The road safety movement still had the public, the Commission des lois of Parliament, and the opposition socialists and wine deputies to win. In its effort to muscle the bill through the legislature, the government had René Pleven, the Minister of Justice, present it to members of Parliament. In this way, one of the jurists’ own would demand that Parliament fall into line.

VII. Parliamentary Mobilization, 1968-1970

State officials wished to give the drinking and driving law a democratic air, a sense of the general will. Instead of using their powers of decree, they sent the bill through the choppy waters of the legislature. To persuade Parliament, they needed public support. In its efforts to win over the public, the road safety coalition had to demonstrate that alcohol-related accidents affected the collectivity, not just the motorists involved in the accident. Road safety advocates stressed that a drinking and driving law would prevent accidents, not repress criminals. As Robert Monod had already put it in 1964, drivers needed to learn to become their “own gendarme.”

In 1968, the HCEIA launched its anti-alcohol propaganda in a number of important newspapers, thus spreading the word about the dangers of drinking and driving. In a survey that took place between 13 and 20 February 1968, the IFOP noted that 55 percent of drivers said that the lack of sobriety was one of the principal causes of accidents. Drivers were apparently somewhat skeptical of alcohol’s ability to affect their behavior. Later, in January 1970, the ONSER questioned 1,267 drivers in 185 locations about whether or not alcohol modified their behavior. 35 percent declared that they never drove after having drunk; 36 percent noticed a change in their behavior and that their general state was less good. For the other 64 percent, 13 percent drove more carefully than usual; 10 percent drove faster; 11 percent thought that they took more risks; 9 percent claimed to take less risks; 8 percent considered themselves more nervous;

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889 This is not unlike the war against second-hand smoke that picked up steam in the 1970s. On this topic, see Alan M. Brandt, The Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of the Product that Defined America (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 279-315.


891 CAC, 19940020, art. 14. In 1968, these newspapers included: Le Figaro; Le Monde; Le Parisien libéré; France soir; L’Aurore; L’Humanité; Paris Normandie; La Voix du Nord; Derniers nouvelles d’Alsace; Républicain lorrain; L’Union de Reims; Le Progrès de Lyon; Nice Matin-Espoir; La Montagne; Nord Éclair; Dauphine libéré; Le Provençal; Nouvelle république centre ouest; République de Centre; Journal du Centre; Sud Ouest La France/Charente Libre; L’Est républicain/Bien public/Contois.

7 percent remarked that their vision was weakened; and 6 percent considered themselves in a state of euphoria. The anti-drinking and driving message divided public opinion.

The road safety coalition was sensitive to the public’s resistance. The ONSER recommended to Robert Debré and the HCEIA to demonstrate to the public the quantity of each alcoholic beverage could be consumed without surpassing the proposed .08 limit. The anti-drinking and driving message did not prohibit drinking; rather, it advised the public to separate the two acts. “Drink or Drive: You Must Choose” was one of the HCEIA’s and the ONSER’s main slogans. Such an admonition carried much weight in a consumer society that was dedicated to the automobile. As Alain Barjot put it in 1969:

Departing also from the principle that the present French people feel inferior if they do not have four wheels and a motor, I think that one of the domains of choice of our anti-alcohol action must be with automobile drivers, for if we manage to convince them that it is very dangerous to drink and that they thus risk the revocation of their driving license (which can sometimes cause for them the total loss of their livelihood), we will inevitably lead to ruptures of habits that could be extremely useful in the struggle against alcoholism.

Road safety advocates built their anti-alcohol campaign upon the citizen’s desire to own and drive a vehicle. Through the automobile, the state pursued a new form of governance over society.

At the same time, the HCEIA mobilized Parliament. In January 1969, Robert Debré named Alain Peyrefitte, a deputy of the Seine-et-Marne and the head of the Commission des Affaires Culturelles, Familiales et Sociales of the National Assembly, a member of the HCEIA in order to have a “tight connection” with that Commission. The HCEIA’s parliamentary allies began to speak out. In March 1968, a tired Frys asked the Minister of the Interior that “if one must explain the official inaction to favors granted in the name of the firmly established winegrowing tradition and if one considers the level of alcohol in the blood that costs each year more deaths and injuries than the wars in

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894 CAC, 19940020, art. 7. Letter from Léon Fleck to M. Frybourg, Director of the ONSER, 20 September 1969.
Indochina and Algeria cost France are going to continue due to a lack of courage.  

The Minister of Justice tried to ease the Senate’s concerns:

Indeed, in a country like France where the production and consumption of wine and alcohol is among the highest in the world and where, moreover, the use of an automobile is so strongly entrenched, it could seem to you difficult to approve measures that, touching two key sectors of the national economy, are susceptible of impeding habits and tastes of a large part of our compatriots. These measures, to tell you the truth, do not directly affect either automobile traffic, or the consumption of alcoholic drinks.

Road safety advocates placed the emphasis upon separating the acts of drinking and driving, instead of prohibiting them.

The lack of consensus among public opinion was matched by a showdown between doctors and lawyers in the legislature. Between April and June 1970, the National Assembly and the Senate debated the institution of a blood alcohol limit. Supporters of the bill bolstered their case with science and international law. René Pleven, the Minister of Justice, called the blood alcohol level of .08 “the level of science...the level of Europe.” The opponents of the bill—those deputies who defended French law and French wine—tried to knock the wind out of the road safety movement’s sails by throwing into doubt the objectivity of the science.

Detractors pointed out that the experts were far from unanimous about what limit would provoke serious perturbations to behavior and reflexes, and that few countries had in fact implemented the .08 level. They exploited the scientific controversy and underscored national differences in legislation. Daniel Benoist, a socialist deputy from the Nièvre, argued that “if the public powers attack at once ten percent of accidents attributed to driving in a state of alcoholism, they neglect on the other hand all the other causes of road accidents, the prevention of which they still have not done much.”

Statistics still showed no link between alcohol and traffic accidents. The statistics of the Minister of Transportation for 1967 revealed that a meager 1.7 percent of drivers involved in a bodily accident were in an “alcoholic state.” The statistics of the Gendarmerie and the Ministry of Interior did little more to flatter the road safety cause. M. Roche, director of the Centre de recherches de Prévention routière, reminded the

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897 CAC, 19880442, art. 2. “Question écrite #7.551, posée le 6 mars 1968, par M. Frys, députe, a/s de l’application plus stricte de l’alcootest aux automobiliste.”
901 Ibid., 1,104.
legislature that the police seldom screened drivers. The government was still looking for ways to fund the use of the breath test; in the meantime, drivers had little concern about being pulled over for drinking. Road safety specialists retaliated with the point that the low attribution of alcohol to accidents was due to the failure of the legal system to convict drinker drivers. Jurists were reluctant to enforce such a harsh penalty, given that drivers would lose their license and potentially also their insurance contract.

Given the scientific uncertainty, Pierre Mazeaud and the Commission des lois proposed establishing a two-tier system. Experts from the HCEIA and the ONSER had reported to the commission that a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or above would impair the driver’s ability to drive; but they also agreed that until drivers reached a blood alcohol concentration of .12 they were not always conscious of the effects that the alcohol was having on their ability to drive. The Commission des lois used their expertise to argue for a two-tier law. The commission would ultimately win out over those who favored a level of .08. The law of July 1970 stipulated that between a blood alcohol concentration of .08 and .12, the driver would be imprisoned for ten days to one month and/or fined from 400 to 3,000 francs; if the drivers exceeded the .12 blood alcohol level, they would be imprisoned for one month to one year and/or fined 500 to 5,000 francs. Police could only administer the breath test after an accident or a road violation. Some of the national press deemed this so-called “French exceptionalism” as downright deplorable. As P. Bridonneau remarked: “The National Assembly, in its constant concern of maintaining the prestige (of drinking a lot) of our country, refused to adopt, without modification, the project of law on the blood alcohol level presented by M. Pleven, Minister of Justice.” Some of the more progressive press blackened the Assembly’s reputation for obstructing the government’s bills that served the “general interest.”

Because of the power of the jurists in the Commission des lois, and the influence of the wine lobbies and the population’s drinking habits in the legal process, the National Assembly ultimately managed to water down the government’s original drinking and driving bill in order to give some leverage to the courts in convicting drunken driving. As Marie-Claire Jayet has rightly claimed, the double blood alcohol level also protected

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the alcohol lobbies.  But one should avoid the facile assumption that Mazeaud and the Commission des lois had the wine lobbies’ interests in mind. On June 24, Mazeaud criticized “a certain press [that] has supported a veritable campaign against the Assembly…[and that] has insinuated that we have been the object of a certain pressure and that we intend to defend the winegrowing regions.” It is more likely that the Commission des lois used the power of wine in public opinion to justify its own position.

The wine lobby doubtlessly had some impact upon the law’s outcome. The CNVS claimed to have lobbied members of Parliament. The Syndicat des négociants en gros des vins, spiritueux et liqueurs de Marseille et des Bouches-du-Rhône doubted the research on drinking and driving and informed its deputy that “there are as many categories of ‘drunkenness’ as there are experts.” None other than René Pléven, the Minister of Justice, promised the National Assembly that it was not the government’s intention “to harm the interests of the winegrowing regions of which Messieurs Leroy-Beaulieu and Couveinhes have been the ardent defenders. We are not waging war upon wine, which (…) is a part of ‘our national art of living’ and which contributes to our reputation. Nor are we waging war upon beer or cider.”

Creating a drinking and driving law, and not a decree, gave the law an air of the public will. The assembly had voted unanimously in favor of the two-tier system in the first reading of the bill, with the exception of one socialist, Raoul Bayou, ardent defender of the vine from the Hérault. But Bayou put his foot down on a changing landscape. Jaume Bardissa, a defender of the Occitan regionalism, noted that by the 1970s the socialist leaders of the Languedoc had begun to abandon their support of viticulture in

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order to develop the region for tourism. Plans for urban development had begun to encourage the uprooting of vines and old ways of living. This evolution in cultural and economic life was in line with the interests of automobile and luxury wine tourism. By 1970, then, disputing the need for a drinking and driving law had become bad politics.

**Conclusion**

With the law establishing a blood alcohol limit, the state chose to criminalize drinkers who failed to conform to the new driving norm, not pathologize them and treat them as “alcoholics.” The law came about but gradually—after half-hearted attempts in 1954, 1958, and 1965—and it drew the line between alcohol use and abuse. The campaign against drinking and driving was exemplary of the state’s greater encroachment upon everyday life, and the individual rights that citizens had inherited from the French Revolution. For the elites who governed the Fifth Republic, social engineering was necessary to the project of economic renewal. The state had to renegotiate its responsibilities—and those of the citizenry—in order to implement a new driving standard. In this project, the automobile was indispensable.

The campaign against drinking and driving bolstered the more general effort to reduce drinking. As early as 1961, the Commission de la sécurité de la circulation within the CNDCA saw the breath test as “an efficient means to reduce the number of accidents by assuring a much more extensive preventive screening and by better contributing to make the general public understand the notion of alcoholization, which is difficult to specify and even more so to prove, without a blood sample…” The campaign against drinking and driving was ultimately more effective than the campaign against alcoholism. It drove home the social consequences of habitual drinking. As Professor Lereboullet, member of the HCEIA, observed at the end of 1970:

> If public opinion is aware of the consequences of alcohol abuse, such as cirrhosis, polynerites, etc…, it seems that it does not feel directly concerned. On the other hand, the recent campaigns against acute alcoholism (alcoolisme aigu), alcoholism at the wheel, the dangers of small doses of alcohol, appear to have had an important impact. They have driven opinion to admit that those who do not believe themselves to be alcoholics, sometimes latently are. It is in this direction that we can hope to act against the alcoholization of the population.

New laws and new drinking norms reinforced one another.

The law of 1970 coincided with an evolution in French morals. The country’s political culture had shifted decisively in favor of consumer democracy. The consumption of automobiles, more than generic wine, symbolized the transformation from neighborly, public drinking to a more individualistic, private culture. As

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916 Keep in mind that individuals could distinguish themselves much more with luxury wine than with generic wine. Wine enthusiasts claimed to prefer to taste, not drink. On
*L'Express* noted, “The 1,200,000 winegrowers and the 350,000 merchants are drowned by the 15 million individuals with driver’s licenses.” In this light, citizens’ driver’s licenses, as well as their insurance contracts, had become powerful tools of government, capable of breaking even the most enjoyably inveterate of habits, the most banal of everyday things. Though the campaign against drinking and driving would continue, by 1970, the automobile and its governance had become a key agent in altering French drinking habits. In France, the history of the sober revolution is bound up in the history of the automobile revolution.

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Epilogue:
The Most Dangerous Drug: Alcohol in Contemporary France

Every country respects the nomenclature of the World Health Organization, which classes alcohol among the drugs. France alone refuses to use this classification.

—François de Closets, journalist, 1977

In the months that followed the publication of his provocative book, La France et ses mensonges (France and its Lies), journalist François de Closets opened his mailbox to find a big dose of vitriol. Winegrowers were offended that he had publicly “condemn[ed] not only the abuse but even the simple use” of alcohol—and worse he had called it a drug—at the same time that they were hoping to reintegrate wine into daily life and remind the public that the southern winegrowing departments had fewer alcoholics than the beer- and spirits-drinking countries of northern Europe. That kind of rhetoric—about the clash of two civilizations, the urban north and agricultural south—was not new. But since the early 1970s, it had taken on a new tone as winegrowers—and a growing number of public health specialists—looked on in horror as French youth preferred hard alcohol and drugs to wine.

Though de Closets may have exaggerated the extent to which other countries complied to the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) standards, he was far from

919 Private Archives of François de Closets (hereafter PAFC). Letter from Vincent Benzi, vice-président, délégué général of the Groupement de défense des fabricants de liqueurs d’anis de la région du sud-est, to François de Closets, 26 August 1977. The authors is grateful to François de Closets for allowing him access to his correspondence with the alcohol lobbies.
920 PAFC. Letter from A. Crouzet, president de l’Association de propaganda pour le vin, vice-président du Conseil regional, conseiller general de l’Hérault, maire de Servian, to François de Closets, 10 August 1977. In the L’Indépendant of 31 March 1978, Jean Auzias wrote: “There is no doubt that a study well-conducted by a few technocrats would permit to determine the best possible cultures in the vineyards. But who knows what best makes up a vineyard? Our problem, we winegrowers of the Midi, is that there are too many people in Paris who speak of our vines without having set foot on the land. There are in France too many intellectuals who handle way more easily ideas and a pen than tools that serve to work the very land that yet allows them to live.”
921 The wine press argued that wine was one antidote to drug use. See, for example, Archives de l’Association nationale de prévention en alcoologie et addictologie (hereafter ANPAA), A6. “Le vin est un remède contre la drogue,” La Journée vinicole, 8 December 1972.
922 There has been much national variation in public health and road safety measures, despite attempts to establish international standards. At least one scholar believes that the differences are beginning to be erased; see Paulette Kurzer, Markets and Moral
alone in his efforts to lift France’s alcohol taboo. The 1970s marked the beginning of a new phase in the official view on alcoholism. While during the period between 1870-1945 the state had linked alcoholism to morality, and between 1945 and the early 1970s to political economy and the social environment, the 1970s witnessed a return to the moral arguments about alcoholism. To be clear, the moral, medical, and political economic arguments about alcoholism were at all times present, but in the 1970s, morality resurfaced with renewed vigor in ideas about prevention. Alcoholism was now generally viewed as less the result of economic backwardness than economic prosperity. In this context, the state scrutinized lifestyles, and warned citizens about excessive drinking and its risks.

This epilogue gives an overview of the debates about alcoholism and the place of wine in French society since the 1970s. These debates have mirrored broader French anxieties about France’s role in today’s more fluid, globalized world. In response to public health campaigns, to falling domestic consumption, and to fiercer international competition, winegrowers have set out to reinvigorate the civilization of wine. Through wine, and the supposed lifestyle attached to it, the state could express resistance to an Anglo-American style of “globalization” and offer an alternative to it. Given that France straddled the civilizations of northern Europe and the Mediterranean, it was the frontline in the battle between those two region’s drinking norms.

I. The Decline of a National Scourge?

Since the early 1960s, the French have witnessed a quiet revolution in their drinking habits. Overall alcohol consumption has steadily fallen. In 1961, the average annual consumption of alcohol per person rested at 18 liters of pure alcohol; in 1980, that number fell to 15 liters, and in 1999, to 10.9 liters. Yearly wine consumption dropped from 130 liters per person in 1960 to 58 liters in 2000. The consumption of non-alcoholic beverages, on the other hand, has risen. In 1965, French citizens consumed 11 liters per person, and in 1998, this volume had increased to 44 liters. Whereas wine represented 56 percent of drinks in household consumption in 1960, it represented but 10 percent in 1998. Today, France is the leading consumer of mineral water.

The quantitative shift in French alcohol consumption has been accompanied by a qualitative change. Wine has been largely responsible for this reduction in overall

925 For the history of Perrier, for example, see Nicolas Marty, Perrier, c’est nous! Histoire de la source Perrier et de son personnel (Paris: Editions de l’Atelier/Editions Ouvrières, 2005).
926 On this topic, see Pekka Sulkunen, A la recherche de la modernité: consommation et consommateurs d’alcool en France aujourd’hui: le regard d’un étranger, (Helsinki: Reports from the Social Research Institute of Alcohol Studies, 1988); see also Marion Demossier, “Consuming Wine in France: The ‘Wandering’ Drinker and the Vin-
alcohol consumption. According to one survey carried out by the INRA and the ONIVINS, in 1990, more than half the French population declared that it never drank wine.\textsuperscript{927} While the consumption of \textit{gros rouge}, or the workingman’s plonk, has dropped precipitously, the consumption of AOC wines has steadily climbed. Beer and spirits consumption has also been on the rise. Sociologist Pekka Sulkunen has pointed out that the development of the European Community has brought with it a rise in foreign alcohol consumption to the detriment of the French wine industry.\textsuperscript{928} Both public health specialists and luxury winegrowers express fear that weekend binge drinking has replaced daily wine drinking. They had inadvertently created a monster.

The population’s changing drinking habits have sparked debates that resemble those of the late nineteenth century between wine and spirits or “industrial” alcohol. Today, wine is less the enemy, as it had been between the 1940s and 1970s, than spirits. In this context, public health advocates rethought their cause. They began to consider more closely the standards established by the WHO and other international agencies. A closer look at the WHO’s research made sense: it was dominated by the same Anglo-Saxon and Nordic norms that seemed to be infiltrating France. In 1974, Maurice Robert of the CNDCA posed the question:

The term “scourge” resumed in the Statutes and Interior Rules shocks me, for it appears to me to present a most unfortunately moralizing connotation, since this “scourge” does not have a physical and natural origin, but proceeds essentially from human, individual or collective, causes. Dictionaries give the word the sense of a “grand calamity” or of a “person who is the cause or the instrument of grand calamities” and cites as examples of calamities: famine and war…Would it not be at once more just and more opportune to speak of a “social malady” or of a “drug addiction” (\textit{toxicomanie}) for example?\textsuperscript{929}

Robert’s new definition of the alcoholism problem was not unlike that of E.M. Jellinek’s, the American alcohol specialist who established the “disease concept” of alcoholism in the 1940s and who heavily influenced the WHO’s research.\textsuperscript{930}

Observers noted neurosis and unhappiness were driving the French to drink—in a way not unlike the Anglo-Americans—more than ancestral habit. Increasingly, as drinking habits began to look alarmingly like those in Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries, reformers adopted Anglo-American notions of alcoholism. More and more reformers

\textsuperscript{928} Sulkunen, \textit{A la recherche de la modernité}, 21.
began to see alcoholism as a disease, along the lines of Jellinek’s definition at the Yale Center of Alcohol Studies and the World Health Organization. New institutions began to support this view. In 1979, Pierre Fouquet, a psychiatrist and longtime advocate of the disease model of alcoholism, helped found the Société française d’alcoologie, which published a regular review.931 In more recent years, the “Ledermann curve”—that populationist model of alcoholism that was so prevalent during the “Economic Miracle” and which targeted both the availability of the product and the “normal” drinker who was its victim—has also come under challenge by those who believe that “informed” citizens have the freedom the make responsible decisions about drink.932

The “civilizing process,” as Norbert Elias would put it, was having an effect.933 Changing drinking habits led to new attitudes toward alcohol. Jacques Godard, a psychiatrist at the CNDCA, observed that “The alcoholic hides his drinking instead of bragging about it.”934 Journalists were also aware of the changes occurring around them.

The French, taken in their entirety, are not an alcoholic people. But alcohol is a national drug. The rural exodus has emptied the countryside. The privilege of the home distillers has fallen into abeyance. The sons of peasants who were raised on brandy [goutte], who have been stupefied with drink, now live in the city. They have other possibilities, other ambitions. Other difficulties also. A passive and collective alcohol of ignorance and destitution is being transformed into an individual and deliberate alcoholism, as escape from reality. The French drinker increasingly resembles an Anglo-Saxon or Nordic drinker.935

As daily wine drinking was gradually being displaced, it became easier for public health specialists to pathologize those who continued the habit. Deviations from the “norm” were once again problematized and made the focus of reform, in lieu of the “norm” itself. In this changed climate, new social groups were viewed as especially at risk. By the late 1970s, the state took a growing interest in edifying these groups about the risks of excessive drinking.

II. The Patrimony in Peril: Women and Youth

One of the biggest shifts in the anti-alcoholism campaign since the 1970s has been the greater concern about women and youth. They have become, reformers worry, high-risk groups. Whereas the “problem drinker” of the 1950s and 1950s was predominantly depicted as an adult male who drank out of social necessity, the “problem

932 Jacques Weill, Pour une lecture critique de la “Loi de Ledermann” (Paris: IREB, 1993). Note however that politicians still very much employed the populationist model in the debates of 1990.
“drinker” since the 1970s has been portrayed either as female or as a young person who drinks to escape social life.

This shift in perceptions of alcoholism—from the product to comp­  ortment—assumed the freedom and ability to make rational, responsible choices about drinking. Whereas custom allegedly coerced men into drinking, women and children simply make bad choices. By the 1970s, society no longer created and victimized the alcoholic; each individual needed to be aware of the risks and to know how to prevent alcohol-related problems. This shift also assumed that the state needed to play a larger role in the population’s moral education.

The new focus upon women and youth was tied up in their larger presence in the public sphere. During the 1950s and 1960s, anti-alcohol campaigners had praised women and children for their sobriety and for their important role in rebuilding society. But as each group gained new social liberties, reformers feared that they lacked the rationality and responsibility to be good citizens and to resist the temptations of alcohol advertising. Moreover, unlike the average middle-aged male who drank jug wine, these new groups were reputed to drink spirits, and to drink a lot. They allegedly sought in­ toxica­tion.

In the 1970s, as women increasingly moved into the public sphere, reformers noticed that they also began to drink more. Some newspapers reported that women could not withstand the pressures of their new work duties. Eight of ten alcoholic women allegedly drank alone, their drinking being supposedly less “convivial” than that of men. “Women,” Jean Bernard noted, “for biological and psychological reasons are weaker before alcohol than men.” El­ le, the feminine magazine, warned women of how alcohol ravaged beauty; it put “bags under the eyes,” gave them a “muddy complexion,” and made them gain weight.

Women also apparently ran a high risk of endangering others. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, scientists in several countries had discovered fetal alcohol syndrome. By the 1980s, this new “problem” became the object of public concern. Fetal alcohol

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937 CAC, 19880355, art. 5. Panorama du Médecin, 28 janvier 1983.
syndrome, like the parallel campaign against drinking and driving, demonstrated the new emphasis upon individual comportment.

By the 1970s, youth had become the other problem category. They were perceived as the victims of the new demographic scene. Daily life reportedly became less structured. With mothers in the workforce, and more money to spend, adolescents were left to their own devises and susceptible to aggressive advertising campaigns. For public health specialists, education was failing children, whether at home or in school. In 1974, Joseph Fontanet, the Minister of National Education, demanded that schools do a better job of educating youth about the ravages of alcoholism, and of giving them “the taste for life and a sense of responsibility…”942 Young people began substituting spirits for wine, and thus the “problem” of binge drinking—well-known in the Anglo-American world—infected France. Already in 1967, M. Basdevant, the Inspecteur général à la jeunesse et aux sports, observed that “the alcoholization of youth is no longer an alcoholization of habit in the traditional way; it rather assumes an occasional aspect against which one must find some new arms of combat.”943

Reformers associated binge drinking with Anglo-American youth cultures. Statistics from the ONIVIT, a key wine association, showed that seventy percent of the consumers of ordinary wine were over the age of sixty. For youth, wine was passé. “Everything today,” Catherine Pierre observed in L’Express, “pushes them to ignore this drink, notably in fast-food restaurants, sixty percent of whose clientele was apparently between the ages of sixteen and twenty.”944 Winegrowers wondered how youth could do otherwise with so many damaging public health campaigns. On one television station, three schoolchildren declared that “drugs were less dangerous than a glass of wine!!”945

Already in the early 1970s, the HCEIA and the wine and alcohol lobbies collectively made a public announcement, warning that “under the pretext of advising against wine to all of youth, we risk to have these youth search for in drugs a compensation to their anxiety, quite frequent at their age.”946

III. The Évin Law and National Protection, 1991

Anti-alcoholism reformers, the alcohol lobbies, and scholars alike have treated the Évin Law, which banned cigarette ads and severely restricted alcohol advertising, as a point of departure in the history of French anti-alcoholism.947 As we have seen, however,
this history has deeper roots. The build-up to the Évin Law began in 1978, when the Cour de Justice of the European Community condemned France for its discriminatory policies on alcohol advertising and for not conforming to the Treaty of Rome.948 The European Commission indicted France for protecting armaganc, cognac, and rum at the same time that it prohibited the advertising of mainly foreign spirits such as whisky, but also anise-based aperitifs such as pastis.

When France lost its battle against the European Commission, public health specialists mobilized to protect the country—and particularly youth—from the new advertising push. Their biggest obstacle came less from winegrowers or the alcohol lobbies than advertising firms.949 In 1986, just as new television states were being created, the government allowed advertising for alcohol under nine percent. Michèle Barzach, the Minister of Public Health, criticized the bill and pointed out that it favored foreign alcohols to the detriment of French youth,950 thus trying to rally the support of both winegrowers and moralists. Yet their efforts failed. To express his disappointment, Claude Got, who became France’s leading anti-alcoholism advocate shortly after the death of Robert Debré, resigned from the HCEIA.951 The Prime Minister called for a parliamentary debate on the matter. In 1987, Parliament debated the Barrot amendment, which aimed to prohibit advertising that was directed at everyone on the radio, television, movies, and billboards, and also to define more clearly the contents of advertising in the adult press. The law of 31 July 1987 only prohibited alcohol advertising and sponsorship on television; other forms of advertising had to recommend to consumers to drink “moderately” and could not valorize certain associations, such as sports and alcohol, sexuality and alcohol, and famous people and alcohol.

Public health experts refused to surrender. In 1989, Claude Évin, the Minister of Public Health, asked the so-called cinq sages—or “five experts”—to develop a plan to ban alcohol advertising.952 The group included Gérard Dubois, Claude Got, François Grémy, Albert Hirsh, and Maurice Tubiana, all of whom were professors and public health advocates. These “five experts” released their report at a time of great concern

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948 Archives nationales (hereafter AN), 5AG/3/2177.
951 CAC, 19940020, art. 4. “Séance du HCEIA du 19 février 1987.”
952 CAC, 20040358, art. 34. “Contexte en 1989—Politique de santé publique,” “Séance du 30 avril 1997.” This dossier concerns the work of the Berger commission of the late 1990s, which had the mission of evaluating the effectiveness of the Évin law. The minutes of this meeting include the letter that Claude Évin sent to the cinq sages in 1989. For this story, see also, Claude Évin and Jean Legastelois, À Votre Santé (Paris: Les Éditions de l’Atelier/Éditions Ouvrières, 2006).
about consumer protection and public health. They succeeded in mobilizing the press. *Le Monde*, for example, published extracts from the report. As we have seen time and again, the rhetoric of the “five experts” was couched in terms of the “general interest:” *“We have a duty to protect children and adolescents.”*

The legislative campaign threatened advertising, alcohol, and wine interests, but unlike advertising and alcohol, winegrowers were able to insert their trade into the “general interest.” Jean-Paul Fuchs, Union pour la démocratie française of the Haut-Rhin and a principal of a junior high school, argued:

Moreover, can one have the same strategy, make the same interdictions for products as varied as AOC wine, beer, and spirits? Does not one favor the already well-established brands that focus upon quantity and penalize those who try to improve quality? Can one prohibit in the same way a poster vaunting Alsacian conviviality around a glass a wine from Alsace and such and such an advertising message that targets youth, uses their language, and can be dangerous in boasting drinks that alters body and mind? And how does one conciliate the action of the Minister of Agriculture who, last week, urged in this very place the development of the AOC, and that of the Minister of Public Health who slows today this development?

Defenders of wine were able to point out that discussions of a law on alcohol advertising followed on the heels of a big legislative push to improve the AOC wine label. Others argued that the government threatened an industry that brought it 85 billion francs, of which 35 billion came from exportation and 11 billion went to the state. They claimed, in an competitive international environment, the law would be to the detriment of French agriculture and industry.

Yet lobbying the legislature did not pay off. The “five experts” had skillfully crafted their campaign. They proposed their law at the end of a parliamentary session; their opponents had little time to mobilize.

Promulgated on 10 January 1991, the Évin law prohibited all tobacco advertising and instituted “restricted regime” for alcohol advertising. Access to television and the movie theaters was interdicted. It was permitted on the radio but during the hours least listened to by youth. As for the contents of the advertising message, it could not urge the person to consume, nor associate alcohol with parties, sex, or evasion. Alone the most purely informative elements—such as

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origin, denomination, alcohol volume, and the ingredients of the product or information on how it was produced and how it should be consumed were acceptable.\textsuperscript{957}

It could be argued that the law—in its defense of origin, denomination, alcohol volume, and ingredients—protected youth as well as AOC wine. The Minister of Agriculture apparently showed little resistance to Évin’s project of law. And some deputies pointed out that the law would actually \textit{support} the development of AOC wines, for, as Julien Dray put it, “…never have they been able to have access to the grand means of advertising in multimedia campaigns….I am persuaded that, for our producers who bank on quality, the new legislative framework is beneficial….For competition will no longer exert itself through an advertising presence; it will concern quality. Producers will be in this respect advantaged.”\textsuperscript{958}

The “five experts” looked to ally with luxury winegrowers in their crusade against alcohol advertising. In \textit{Le Monde}, they pointed out that wine represented 63 percent of the duty-free alcohol market and less than 20 percent of advertising; moreover, wine consumption was decreasing, while whisky, pastis, and vodka were increasing. “If wine loses parts of the market to the profit of financially more powerful products, it should have an interest in limiting their advertising! For viticulture, the enemy is not the Évin law, but other alcohols.” To a certain extent, the \textit{cinq sages} were right. Winegrowing is extremely diversified, which makes it difficult to advertise. Most of its advertising, as the \textit{cinq sages} indicated, came from agricultural fairs, mailings, and the written press. They argued that such advertising did not pose a problem from the public health perspective because it did not condition children and adolescents through images. They affirmed that the consumption of “good” wine could still be dangerous, but that “One must however differentiate alcoholization by wine during meals from that which has for its principal aim the obtaining of psychic alterations.”\textsuperscript{959}

Winegrowers have succeeded, at least partially, in making the Évin law into a law to protect the luxury wine industry. It is not my claim that the French have reached a consensus about AOC wines; on several occasions, the main anti-alcohol lobby has sued luxury wine associations for illegal advertising.\textsuperscript{960} Nor is it my claim that the wine lobbies have publicly declared themselves in favor of the Évin law. They have behaved quite to the contrary, helping to undercut the Évin law in 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2004. Claude Got failed to understand the wine lobby’s reasoning:

…an objective alliance could be found between the interests of public health and those of the wine sector: we are seeing develop in France, under the influence of the “cowboy” culture, the consumption of strong alcohol (whisky) outside of the context of meals. Now, the wine sector does not have the means to compete in


\textsuperscript{960} See, for example, “Les vins de Bourgogne ne sont pas au-dessus des lois,” \textit{Addictions} (March 2004).
terms of advertising strategies. It therefore has an interest in “blocking” the advertising carried out by the spirits industry.\footnote{CAC, 20040358, art. 35. “Réunion du 30 avril 1997: Compte-rendu,” 8.}

In 1998, Anheuser Bush lobbied the French government to advertise for the World Cup in France, but was denied. The Internet, however, with its porous boundaries, has been one domain in which the French government has failed to protect youth from advertising.\footnote{Alain Rigaud and Michel Craplet, “The ‘Loi Evin’: A French Exception,” 20 May 2004. Accessed at www.ias.org.uk/btg/conf0604/papers/ragaud_craplet.pdf.}

### IV. The Most Dangerous Drug

Another movement challenged alcohol. As drinking patterns changed, so too did the institutions that worked to resolve alcohol-related problems. The solidification of new knowledge in the 1970s had begun to throw the existing institutions into doubt. Questions about the HCEIA’s purpose emerged. For some observers, the HCEIA was beginning to show its age. Writing in Le Monde in 1973, Pierre Viansson-Ponté noted France needed an organization that was “better adapted, endowed with a light but permanent structure.”\footnote{Pierre Viansson-Ponté, “L’alcool encore,” Le Monde, 7 May 1973.} Michel Lagrave, an important figure in the social security system, thought that the HCEIA served but a “philosophical” purpose.\footnote{5AG3/2177. Michel Lagrave, “Note pour M. le Directeur de Cabinet,” 13 September 1974, 3.}

In the years to come, the HCEIA fared no better. On 23 June 1977, Robert Debré, having become ill, missed his first meeting of the HCEIA and immediately resigned.\footnote{CAC, 19940020, art. 4. “Séance du HCEIA du 23 juin 1977.”} Thereafter, the HCEIA struggled to define its mission. It therefore waned in political influence. In 1977, Simone Veil, the Minister of Public Health, called for the creation of an inter-ministerial committee to complement the HCEIA’s work.\footnote{AN, 5AG3/2177. Letter from Simone Veil, Minister of Public Health, to Raymond Barre, Prime Minister and Minister of Finances, 8 November 1977. Interestingly, a note that had been handwritten on the front of the letter to Olivier Fouquet, a bureaucrat, read: “Would it not be better ___ the Haut Comite (recently modernized) in attaching it to Madame Veil and adjoining to it a full-time general reporter ________?”} The presence of the Bernard Commission, established in 1980 by President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, also challenged the HCEIA’s mission.\footnote{CAC, 19880355, art. 1. HCEIA, “Perspectives budgétaires pour 1982,” 6 January 1981. For the conclusions of the Bernard Commission, see its Rapport à M. le Président de la République. Nothing original really came from the Bernard Commission; its influence quickly fell out of favor.}

In October 1986, the government placed the HCEIA in the care of the Minister of Public Health. This detachment from the services of the Prime Minister had long been under discussion and was justified on the grounds of rationalizing the budget. Members of the HCEIA wondered whether or not their relations with the agricultural sector would
remain intact in the new “public health” context. Their concern did not pester them for long. On 28 March 1990, the Council of Ministers decided to transform the HCEIA into a Haut Comité de la santé publique, which would ultimately do little to combat alcoholism. The suppression of the HCEIA marked the symbolic end of an era. The anti-alcoholism campaign was left without a forum where doctors, academics, and technocrats could strategize ways to combat the problem.

The CNDCA shared a similar fate, though it successfully reinvented itself. In the early 1970s, the departmental committees of the CNDCA began to put pressure upon its Paris offices to include alcohol with the war on drugs. For the moment, however, the main offices responded that any action taken against drugs should come from “new and specific financing.” The CNDCA’s fear was that the focus on drugs would turn attention away from alcohol. In 1983, the Directeur général de la santé at the Ministry of Public Health told the CNDCA to exclude drugs from its mission, for alcoholism “has in our country...socio-cultural, psychological, and regulatory dimensions that are totally specific, surely a lot more determining that the psychopathological and individual factors that revolve around dependence.”

At the beginning of 2003, its review went from *Alcool ou santé* to *Addictions*, “addiction” being an English word that did not even enter the French language until 1979. Back in September 2003, the ANPA (which had been the CNDCA until the change in denomination in 1984) changed its name to the Association nationale de prévention en alcoologie et addictologie (ANPAA). The Société française d’alcoologie’s journal, which in 1989 became *Alcoologie*, changed again in 2000 to *Alcoologie et addictologie*. Between 1970s and the new century, a new way of thinking about alcohol crystallized in new institutions.

At the same time that the anti-alcoholism campaign was losing its momentum, the anti-drug movement picked up steam. Since the 1970s, officials had begun to express anxiety about drug use. In 1982, in an effort to check this new leisure activity, the government formed the Mission permanente de lutte contre la toxicomanie (it had several names before coming the MILDT in 1996). Like the HCEIA, it was attached to the offices of the Prime Minister. The state charged the MILDT with coordinating governmental action against drugs and addiction.

In the late 1990s, French scientists began to view alcohol not as an integral part of everyday life but as a drug. Two reports transformed French thinking on alcohol: the

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969 CAC, 19940020, art. 4. “Séance du HCEIA du 22 octobre 1990.”
first came from Philippe Jean Parquet, a psychiatrist, and the second from Bernard Roques, a pharmacologist. The significance of the Parquet report, as Nicole Maestracci, head of the MILDT, pointed out in the preface, was to reorient prevention toward the individual and not the product, and to treat behavior toward licit and illicit drugs in their entirety so as to arrive at a better understanding of the psychology behind what the French coined as “poly-consumption”—the problematic use of several drugs at once.977 The din of controversy grew louder the following year when Bernard Roques proposed a new classification for drugs, including heroine, cocaine, and alcohol in the most toxic group.978 In a provocative response to Roques, Bernard Kouchner, the Minister of Public Health, asked whether or not “an alcoholic and a heroin addict present the same danger for themselves, their families, and their entourage?”979

The state put an official stamp on this new paradigm when, in 1999, it officially brought alcohol into the orbit of the anti-drugs campaign. That year, the MILDT devised a triennial plan to study and prevent drug dependence.980 Despite the emphasis upon comportment, the wine lobby rebuked the state for reducing wine to alcohol—and now worse, a drug—and demanded that it have representation at the MILDT.981 Winegrowers failed to notice publicly, however, that the target was less the product than behavior, and that the reports assimilated alcohol with drugs. Significantly, the reports never used the word “wine.”

V. Winegrowers Mobilize Science and Culture

Since 1991, winegrowers have responded to their detractors by mobilizing three tried-and-true scientific and cultural arguments. First, they claim that the “moderate” use of wine poses no threat to public health or road safety. Second, they recall the late nineteenth-century distinction between wine and “industrial” alcohol. They argue, not unsuccessfully, that an education in taste would prevent binge drinking. Third, in response to the cutthroat international competition that has undermined France’s global winegrowing supremacy, they have re-summoned the French notion of terroir, which has resonated with a French and a global population that demands to know where food comes from, and how it is produced.982

The wine industry has garnered medical research in its favor. On 17 November 1991—just eleven months after French politicians promulgated the Évin law—scientists

978 Bernard Roques, Rapport au secrétariat d’État à la santé: La Dangerosité des drogues Preface by Bernard Kouchner (Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob/La Documentation française, 1999), 296.
979 Ibid., II.
982 The French have played an important role in the localization of food; see, for example, José Bové and François Dufour, The World is not for Sale: Farmers Against Junk Food, interviewed by Gilles Luneau, trans. Anna de Casparis (London: Verso, 2001).
revealed on *Sixty Minutes* the notion of the “French Paradox.”983 The “French Paradox” extolled the healthful benefits of moderate—here meaning two to three glasses of red wine per day for men, and one to two for women—wine drinking in protecting a person against cardiovascular disease. It seemed to explain why the French could consume high levels of fat while living happily into old age. The “French Paradox” gave French wine international credibility, which French winegrowers have been quick to exploit.

Some French scientists and politicians have borrowed this international research to defend wine from domestic attacks. The ANPA lamented that the Société de vente de produits agricoles et alimentaires (SOPEXA), a group that promotes agricultural products, had run a campaign that revealed that among the French, “whose fat consumption is 30 percent higher than that of the Americans, who smoke more and play fewer sports, the frequency of heart troubles is significantly inferior.”984 Nathalie Vivas de Gauléjac, a chemist at the University of Bordeaux, has added to the long literature review on the relationship between wine drinking and good health.985 Even more recently, parliamentary commissions have reported on the links between health and wine,986 and have even suggested that French schoolchildren should get in the habit of tasting wine.987

As a response to the rise of binge drinking and drug use, winegrowers have called for an education in taste. Already in 1983, the eminent and no-less-snobby oenologist Émile Peynaud disparaged his fellow citizens for their lack of refinement: “If you are French you are possibly an advocate of drinking in quantity with traditional Rabelaisian extravagance, but statistically you are not a connoisseur…it is well known in the wine trade that as a Frenchman your general knowledge of wine is below average and that you are a provincial drinker.”988 Some of the stars of French gastronomy started a petition, which allegedly had twenty thousand signatories, denouncing a decree that would assimilate wine and alcohol with drugs. They regretted that the wine and alcohol trades had been reduced to drug dealers.989 The best way to fight drug abuse, winegrowers have argued, is to drink wine. This line of reasoning goes far in a country whose officials believe that le binge drinking is depraving French civilization. Unlike alcopops and other spirits, wine supposedly has the stamp of *terroir*—that untranslatable and alchemic French word that combines climate, geography, soil, grape varieties, and vine-growing

983 To see this report, go to www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4750380n.
and winemaking techniques. Furthermore, apparently unlike spirits, wine bottles are shared and can thus build community around a common language.

New institutions have cropped up in wine’s defense. Vin et société, established in 1995 to unify and represent the heterogeneous interests of wine, has attempted to reestablish the centrality of wine in French society, in part by teaching the population about “moderation” and the perils of excessive drinking. With the creation in 2005 of a Conseil de modération et de prévention, the wine lobby reasserted its voice in advertising and public health matters. Attached to the Ministry of Agriculture, the wine lobby, public health specialists, road safety advocates, parliamentarians, and representatives of interested ministries were to participate in the meetings. Except for Roger Nordmann, a member of the Academy of Medicine, public health specialists have refused to participate in it. Some feared that the existence of the Council called into question the jurisdiction of public health. In Le Monde, Sandrine Blanchard asked “Why not, for example, create a Council of “Moderation and Prevention” with agribusiness, which would control the campaigns against obesity?”

French winegrowers have tried to use the specificity of their products and their AOC brand names to reverse falling consumption, relieve overproduction, and combat foreign competition. Amid international competition and the industrialization of agriculture, AOC winegrowers have emphasized the importance of the local. To help, some café servers across Paris have begun to wear aprons that admonish the French “to learn the gesture that will save our winegrowers.” The image on the apron is that of a caricatured Frenchmen, with his beret, baguette, and bottle of wine.

While the AOC is being challenged from abroad, it is also experiencing new competition at home. Just as AOC winegrowers exploited the notion of terroir in their struggle against ordinary wine producers and spirits manufacturers in the 1940s and 1950s, in recent years, the radicals of the “natural” wine movement have appropriated that language and have claimed that AOC winegrowers, on their way to the top, have lost their soul. The AOC label has no doubt begun to proliferate—wines under this label have in recent years accounted for approximately 45 percent of French wine production.

Terroir has also been adopted in foreign countries, including the United States. On the American case, see Amy B. Trubek, The Taste of Place: A Cultural Journey into Terroir (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

See its website, www.vinetesociete.fr. It should be noted that the IREB, a research group established by the alcohol industries in 1971, has criticized the wine lobby for its claims about the specificity of wine.


There has always been and still is much debate about what constitutes “natural” wine, which includes, but is not limited to, no chemical use in the vineyards, low yields, no foreign yeasts or added sugars or sulfites in the winemaking process. The “father” of the natural wine movement is Jules Chauvet, the Beaujolais winemaker and researcher. See his Études scientifiques et autres communications (1949-1988) (Paris: Jean-Paul Rocher, 2007); and L’esthétique du vin (Paris: Jean-Paul Rocher, 2008).
whereas in 1966 they were only sixteen percent of production.¹⁹⁴—which calls into question the “artisanal” and distinctive qualities of these wines.

Among a sufficient number of powerful personalities, not even the most conclusive medical evidence or statistics can shake the idea that good wine symbolizes the patrimony. They consider wine a timeless artifact that anchors the country in fast-changing times.¹⁹⁵ In reflecting on wine, Hervé Gaymard, the Minister of Agriculture, suggested that it “is in itself a world, charged with a very strong cultural and patrimonial distinction. It has traced our history, formed our landscapes, shaped our geography, and it continues to make our economic and social heart beat in countless regions; it is a part of our history, our identity, and our future.”¹⁹⁶ History, it seems, still matters. As Jean-Pierre Poulain, a sociology professor at the University of Toulouse, amusingly phrased it: “Remove drunkenness [ivresse] from French culture and you will empty the Bibliothèque nationale!”¹⁹⁷

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Since the 1940s, the French state has tried to establish a new national drinking norm as part of its larger project to modernize the country. While the wine and alcohol lobbies criticize anti-alcoholism advocates for their supposed Anglo-American or Nordic influences, the war on alcoholism has been conceived as a Franco-French affair. Reforms have been mostly homegrown. Not only were the laws of 1954, 1959-1960, 1970, and 1991 specific to France, but France’s legal blood alcohol limit—today set at .05—is one of the world’s lowest. France, in contrast to most countries, has strict anti-alcohol legislation at the same time that it has witnessed a dramatic decline in its drinking.¹⁹⁸

France’s war on alcoholism has served national interests. The French state has had to reconcile the needs of opening its economy to the world with the needs of defending public health, the needs of the free market with civic responsibility. To carry out public health measures, French governments have depended upon the goodwill of the wine lobby. Luxury winegrowers have not only succeeded in playing the economic and public health cards, but they have also recently struck a chord with a population in search of roots and a collective identity.¹⁹⁹ Wine, however, might polarize more than it unifies. Since the 1950s, in its most extreme and clearest form, wine has divided France into two

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¹⁹⁸ In most countries, alcohol consumption is on the rise.
¹⁹⁹ “Authenticity” has been a big debate in anthropology. For an introduction, see Charles Lindholm, *Culture and Authenticity* (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2008).
camps: those who see it as integral to France’s gastronomic traditions and a healthy lifestyle; and those who associate it more bluntly with death. The job of the French state has been to reconcile these competing views—to reduce the risks of excessive drinking at the same time that it promotes a culture of quality wine based upon the tenets of moderation and terroir.

While France’s war on alcoholism has benefited French economic interests and public health, it has also sought to achieve something more. It has been a part of the postwar French state’s efforts to launch a sort of cultural renaissance amid the prevailing fear that the coming consumer democracy might not only endanger health; worse, it might deaden souls. In promoting wines with a controlled origin, the French state has tried to revalorize the land and wine in a more urban world. The French state, through the conflicts and compromises of the interests groups that we have followed, has called for nothing short of a new world order that repositions the local in the global.

\[1000\] I would add wine to the list of cultural projects that the state undertook in the wake of the Second World War; see Philip Nord, *France's New Deal: From the Thirties to the Postwar Era* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), especially pp. 215-359.
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