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What People Say They Do With Words

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DISSERTATION

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After writing a dissertation it is not easy to take one's pen again to express some acknowledgments -- however sincerely they are meant -- in view of the fact that a list of the people who contributed directly or indirectly to the creative process is bound to remain as hopelessly incomplete and unfinished as the dissertation itself. Let me, therefore, restrict myself to the absolute essentials.

First of all I should thank Charles Fillmore, Louis Goossens, George Lakoff and John Searle who have all witnessed and guided, each in his own way, the growth of my ideas. I am convinced that the shortcomings of this work can all be traced to failures to follow their advice; ever so often when I thought I knew what I was doing I chose a direction different from the one they indicated only to find out much later that they were right to begin with; such experiences make it quite clear to me that if I had not followed (or had) any of their advice the work for this thesis, from conception to birth, would have taken a decade instead of just two years -- or, more probably, I would not have written it at all.

(i)
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I. THE COMPARATIVE LEXICAL APPROACH TO LINGUISTIC ACTION

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The best known theory of linguistic action is no doubt speech act theory which entered its incubation period with the late J.L. Austin's *How to Do Things with Words* and finally hatched when J.R. Searle's *Speech Acts* was published. Since then dozens of scholars have been engaged in refining the theory, applying it to non-literal and non-serious uses of language and indirect speech acts, extending it to speech act sequences and incorporating it in a wider speech activity theory (what the Germans call *Sprechtätigkeitslehre* as opposed to *Sprechhandlungstheorie*) or in the theory of action in general. In this chapter I shall argue that in spite of the bulk and diversity of the resulting literature\(^1\) nearly all speech act scholars, whether linguists or philosophers, approach linguistic action from an essentially theoretical point of view. Empirical studies are rare. It is not my intention to repudiate this approach. However, I am about to present one of the possible alternatives, the comparative lexical approach which I will present as an example of what I call the empirical-

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\(^1\) To get an idea of the voluminous and diverse literature on the subject, the reader should have a look at Verschueren (1978a).
conceptual method. This alternative should be regarded as a necessary supplement rather than as a replacement.

2. The point of this introductory chapter is to elucidate the foregoing obscurities. First I shall point out some of the current threats to speech act theory. Then their origins will be discussed with reference to some reflections on the study of social action in general; in this context the contrast between theoretical and empirical-conceptual methods will be explained. Finally, the comparative lexical approach will be proposed to divert the threats and to give a new impulse to the study of linguistic action. As said in the previous paragraph, the proposal in question is not intended as a self-sufficient way of describing linguistic action: it is a one-sided approach meant to counterbalance the diagonally opposed methodology embodied in almost all inquiries into speech act phenomena — with a couple of rare exceptions to be mentioned later.

B. SPEECH ACT THEORY AT THE BREAKING POINT?

3. For the sake of the uninitiated reader I pass the basic concepts of speech act theory, as they are habitually used, in review. A speech act is an act performed in or by using language; the intentional utterance of any sentence constitutes a speech act. Its main components are a propositional content (consisting of a reference and a predication) and an illocutionary force (i.e. its role as a statement, a request, an order, a promise, a question, etc.). The effect produced in a hearer by performing a speech act is its perlocutionary effect (e.g. convincing,
persuading, pleasing, annoying, etc.). A speech act viewed under the aspect of its illocutionary force is called an *illocutionary act*; viewed under the aspect of the perlocutionary effect it produces it is a *perlocutionary act*.

Illocutionary acts are analyzed by means of formulating the constitutive rules for their felicitous performance: propositional content rules (specifying restrictions with respect to reference and predication; e.g. when making a promise the speaker predicates a future action to be carried out by himself); preparatory rules (expressing what the act implies or the conditions without which the act has no point; e.g. a promise only makes sense if the speaker believes that the hearer would prefer his doing the promised act over his not doing it); sincerity rules (formulating the psychological state of the speaker; e.g. a promise expresses the speaker's intention to carry out the action in question); essential rules (specifying the essence of the act; e.g. a promise counts as the speaker's undertaking of an obligation to do something). Often such rules are offered in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions or *felicity conditions*.

Most -- if not all -- languages possess a number of verbs such as **TO PROMISE** and **TO ORDER** which describe types of illocutionary acts but which can also be used to perform the act in question as in "I order you to leave the room" and "I promise not to forget the book". These are called *performative verbs*, and the two utterances presented are *explicit performatives*. Verbs which cannot be used performatively but which can also describe types of illocutionary acts form, together with the performative verbs, the class of *speech act verbs*.

Some speech acts such as "Can you pass the salt?" have a double illocutionary layering: the ultimately intended force (i.e. the primary illo-
cutionary force) is that of a request to pass the salt; but this is
achieved indirectly by means of a secondary force (which is the force
typically associated with the grammatical form of the utterance), namely
that of a question. Hence these are called indirect speech acts.
Another example is "The door is still open" which is a plain statement
but which, in certain situations (e.g. if the hearer is the speaker's
servant), can take the function of a request or even an order to close
the door.

4. In less than a decade, speech act theory has become a prodigious
excrecence from the body of language studies -- and it is still growing
every day. The continued attraction it exerts does not mean that it is
in good health. On the contrary, I am about to present some problems
which could soon prove to be fatal if no cure is found. I discuss them
under the following captions: the meaning/force controversy, the perlo-
cution controversy, the seriousness/literalness controversy, the sequencing
controversy, the classification controversy and the indirectness contro-
versy. Of course the controversies themselves do not constitute threats
to the theory of speech acts. The trouble is in one of the solutions pro-
posed in each case, which menace some of the basic insights which made
speech act theory appealing in the first place.

5. The meaning/force controversy is the least harmful of the lot. It
caused an early childhood ailment from which speech act theory seems to
have recovered. But unlike with measles there is no guarantee that it will
not recur.
Austin paraphrased the perlocutionary act as an act performed by saying something and the illocutionary act as an act performed in saying something. The act of saying something he dubs the locutionary act. Apart from its phonetic-phonological and its grammatical properties a locutionary act is also characterized by a certain meaning (which Austin defines, in Frege's terms, as its sense and reference). In that way the term meaning acquired a technical sense (even though Austin did not intend it as such) in opposition to the force of an utterance which is its status as an illocutionary act of some type.

Quite early in the development of speech act theory some scholars pointed out correctly that in the ordinary language sense of the word 'meaning' illocutionary force is part of meaning and cannot be placed in contrast with it. Though this argument, as it stands, cannot be exploited to refute Austin who, as any other scholar, is free to posit his own terminological conventions, the remark is not futile. Its justification is the underlying question of whether illocutionary force can be distinguished from other aspects of meaning in any clear and consistent way. Usually such a distinction is taken for granted. Hence the controversy between those who give a negative reply to the question and those who answer it in the positive is virtually absent from the literature. At first sight this absence of an overt controversy conceals its potentially dangerous implications. But at a deeper level it reveals the extreme acuteness of the problem. The few who believed that there was no clear distinction between illocutionary force and other aspects of meaning have concluded that therefore illocutionary forces do not exist or at least that the concept is utterly useless (e.g. L.J. Cohen 1964). Such a conclusion is completely logical if one adheres to the principle...
that terminological clarity is an absolute prerequisite for fruitful thinking. And yet it deprives us of a way of talking about basic semantic phenomena such as the difference between "He opened the door" and "Did he open the door?". In other words, it deprives us of a notion which carried the promise of opening completely new horizons of understanding when it was first introduced and which has gone a long way by now in trying to fulfil that promise.

With the acceptance or rejection of the notion of illocutionary force speech act theory stands or falls. Therefore, the threat radiating from this controversy is not felt immediately: those who reject the notion disappear from the speech act camp without leaving a trace. The real trouble starts when speech act theorists themselves begin to doubt the validity of the notion. It is hard to predict when this will happen. But sooner or later it may, because illocutionary force is not clearly distinguishable from other aspects of meaning. Explicit performatives should suffice to demonstrate this non-discreteness: in such utterances force the illocutionary is also indicated in the propositional content and it is mainly due to this presence in the proposition that the utterances get their force; in other words, part of the propositional content functions as an illocutionary force indicating device.

6. Next in line is the perlocution controversy. Remember that perlocutionary acts were defined as the production, by saying something, of any consequential effect in the hearer. By ordering somebody to leave the room you can make him leave the room; but you can also make him laugh, annoy him, anger him, make him commit suicide, etc. All of these are perlocution-
ary effects -- enough to drive any law-and-order-loving mind to despair. The contingent and capricious nature of perlocutionary effects has prompted most speech act theorists to apply the time-honored practice of avoiding trouble; in other words, the perlocutionary aspect of linguistic acts was omitted from most accounts. Some intended effects such as the intention to make the hearer do something, which is inherent in the act of commanding, could not be shunned (but got relabeled as the *illocutionary point*, which is not to say that there is a one-to-one correspondence between intended perlocutionary effects and illocutionary points). But no systematic investigation has ever been made of all the effects that are typically associated with particular types of illocutionary acts -- let alone the less typical ones.

Whereas the meaning/force controversy only threatens speech act theory from without, the perlocution controversy is a menace from within. Not all perlocutionary effects (even those typically associated with certain types of illocutionary acts) can be given an equally prominent place. Consider the subtle pragmatic difference between "I tell you that P but I'm not trying to make you believe that P" and "I order you to do P but I'm not trying to get you to do P": both are deviations from a standard situation, but this is more so for the order than for the statement. Yet the absence of a systematic investigation is a gap that no bridge can span. This is where I disagree with Searle (personal communication) who would not deny that all illocutionary act types have an intended effect typically associated with them, but who regards these as *necessary by definition* for some illocutionary acts and as optional for others; according to him only the necessary ones are worth considering in a theory of speech acts.
Though the perlocution-phobia is founded on the basically sound urge for controllable data, it veils fundamental aspects of linguistic action such as the speaker's intention to make something known to the hearer when making a statement.

7. The felicity conditions formulated for the performance of illocutionary acts usually bear on their performance in literal and serious discourse. In the so-called parasitic forms of discourse, i.e. in the non-literal ones (irony, metaphor, etc.) and in the non-serious ones (play acting, language teaching, etc.), these conditions are usually violated. A common and acceptable procedure is to describe such violations in terms of deviations from a standard. Recently, however, voices have been raised against this line of thought. It is argued that if a promise that the speaker does not intend to keep still counts as a promise, that then it is wrong to regard the intention to carry out the promised action as a condition on the felicitous performance of the act of promising. If this conclusion is correct -- which I think it is not -- then it is no longer possible to formulate felicity conditions at all: I am not aware of the existence of any that are immune against similar criticism. Therefore the seriousness/literalness controversy is capable of undermining the apparatus to describe speech acts.

8. A similar worry arises from the sequencing controversy. It is argued, quite correctly, that speech acts rarely occur in isolation and that the sequence to which they belong influences their semantic properties. Again, trying to incorporate such influences in the description of speech act
types instead of departing from a standard analysis which is allowed to change depending on the context is a maneuver which menaces the very possibility of speech act analysis. Therefore some scholars have recently proposed to supplant speech act theory with a totally new speech activity theory rather than to supplement it.

The attacks on speech act theory presented in this and the previous paragraphs are based on the practice of criticizing a theory for what it does not do; such criticism is usually misguided unless the theory criticized is intended to do what it does not do. Felicity conditions on speech acts are not meant (at least not in Searle's proposal) to cover cases of non-literal and non-serious language, nor to explain the interaction of individual speech acts with their context. The conscious -- and valid -- policy is to describe standard forms. By failing to realize this, those who reject speech act theory on those grounds make the age-old mistake of throwing out the child with the bath-water: the very fact that speech act theory concentrates on standard forms enables it to shed light on all 'deviations'. It should be kept in mind that the term 'deviation' is not meant to imply 'inferiority' nor 'rarity'.

9. Both Austin and Searle proposed a five-fold classification of illocutionary acts. Searle (1976) comes up with the following classes: representatives (the point of which is to represent a state of affairs; which have a word-to-world direction of fit, i.e. the intention is to make the words fit the world; in which a belief is expressed; and in which any proposition can occur), e.g. statements; directives (the point of which is to direct the hearer towards doing something; which have a world-to-
word direction of fit; in which a wish is expressed; in which the proposition is a future act done by the hearer), e.g. orders; commissives (the point of which is that the speaker commits himself to doing something; which have a world-to-word direction of fit; in which an intention is expressed; in which the proposition is a future act done by the speaker), e.g. promises; expressives (the point of which is that a certain psychological state is expressed; which have no direction of fit; in which a wide range of psychological states can be expressed; in which the proposition ascribes a property or act to the speaker or the hearer), e.g. congratulations; declarations (the point of which is to bring something about in the world; which have both a word-to-world and a world-to-word direction of fit; in which no psychological state is expressed; in which any proposition can occur), e.g. an excommunication.

Apart from those who present slightly modified versions of this classification there are linguists who maintain seriously that the number of distinct classes is somewhere between five hundred and six hundred, and others who contend that there are exactly three basic speech acts from which all the others can be derived. Let us call them the splitters and the lumpers, respectively. The splitters' attitude is based on some postulated principles of scientific taxonomies such as absolute discreteness (i.e. the unacceptability of overlap between categories) and on the use of the speech act verb vocabulary of a natural language as one's point of reference. What the lumpers are doing is not really classifying speech acts but trying to determine the basic function of a couple of grammatical forms in such a way that the other uses can be derived from it. The illocutionary character of such functions is doubtful. Therefore it is not surprising that they use
terms such as 'indicative', 'interrogative' and 'imperative' as names for
the categories they propose.

Both for splitting and for lumping theoretical justifications can be
adduced. Yet these two poles of the classification controversy, but es-
pecially the second one, seem to move away from the central tenet of
speech act theory, namely an understanding of the phenomenon of illocu-
tionary force.

10. The lumper attitude, i.e. a strong preoccupation with grammatical
forms, inevitably leads us to the indirectness controversy. The intuitive
relevance of the notion of an indirect speech act is the following: in
some cases people mean more than what they say; this is not only true
with respect to the propositional content of utterances, but also with
respect to their illocutionary force; such indirectness needs to be
accounted for, which can be done in connection with the propositional
content in terms of irony, metaphor, presupposition, some types of impli-
cature, etc. and in connection with the illocutionary force in terms of
indirect speech acts (which does not mean that indirect speech acts do not
often involve 'unsaid' propositional meaning as well). However, if one
adopts the grammar-based lumper position one is not only forced to des-
cribe the request "Can you pass me the salt?" as an indirect speech act
because it is an imperative subtype disguised as an interrogative, but also
the explicit performative "I order you to leave the room" because it
functions as an imperative though its structure is indicative.

Leaving aside the issue of whether one should not regard certain pro-
positional features (such as 'I order') as linguistic indicators of illo-
cutionary force on a par with syntactic features (such as grammatical mood), we can regard the conclusion as logically correct. However, the claim of the indirectness (or, for that matter, the non-directness) of explicit performatives is intuitively vacuous since the speaker does not mean more than what he says. If you say "I promise to bring the book" but you do not bring it, you cannot reply to my accusation of your breaking your promise by saying "I did not promise, I only stated that I promised to bring the book". However troublesome vagueness may be, it is less harmful to scholarship than vacuity: though one can fill an empty bottle, no one has ever succeeded as yet in substantiating a vacuous claim.

The main argument in favor of the lump-view of explicit performatives is based on the notion of literal meaning: the literal meaning of "I order you to leave the room" is said to be a statement-meaning. The argument can easily be turned against this claim. The idea of literal meaning as a context-free meaning has long been abandoned as a fiction and replaced by the meaning a word or an utterance has in some kind of neutral, unmarked or minimal context. Neutrality and markedness in this sense are basically cognitive notions. A simple test to discover the typically associated minimal context for "I order you to leave the room" would be to present the sentence to a number of informants and to ask them to construct a typical context for it. I am convinced that practically all of them would come up with a context in which "I order you to leave the room" is an order instead of a context in which it is a reply to a question such as "What do you do if I make too much noise?". Hence, the psychologically basic force of the utterance, i.e. the force it has in a maximally neutral context and which can thus be regarded as (one of) its literal force(s), is
that of an order. Therefore no indirectness is involved. I am not advocate the promotion of such tests to the single (or even the main) decision procedure to decide whether an illocutionary force is directly or indirectly conveyed, because it is quite clear that the statement-meaning of "I order you to leave the room" as a reply to "What do you do if I make too much noise?" is also quite literal and direct. Moreover, a strict adherence to the test might prove "Can you pass me the salt?" to be literally and directly a request the pass the salt rather than an indirect speech act. Trying to solve these problems would lead us to a discussion of the different types of conventions involved in language and language use. All I am interested in here is demonstrating that the notion of literal meaning cannot be relied upon to support the lumpers view of indirectness in language.

11. We are confronted with a veritably paradoxical situation. With respect to each of the controversies discussed I have drawn the attention to one or two possible solutions which have been proposed at some point in the philosophical or linguistic literature. The paradox is the following: though each of these solutions is logically sound (at least from some theoretical point of view), they are not compatible with the fascinating and intuitively correct premises of speech act theory. Let me recapitulate: (i) Illocutionary force, the fundamental concept of speech act theory, can be rejected as a valid notion if one believes that it would only be valid if it could be clearly distinguished from other types of meaning. (See paragraph 5.)
(ii) The need for studying the perlocutionary aspect of linguistic action can be opposed by those who want to restrict scholarship to the investigation of more controllable data. (See paragraph 6.)

(iii) Felicity conditions can be discarded if one adheres to the principle that such conditions are only acceptable if they describe all occurrences of speech acts of a certain type (no matter whether they are serious and literal or not, and no matter what sequence they occur in). (See paragraphs 7 and 8.)

(iv) Searle's insightful classification of illocutionary acts can be refuted if one believes (as do the splitters) in the absolute discreteness of classes in a taxonomy, or if one takes grammatical forms rather than meaning categories as one's starting-point (as do the lumpers). (See paragraph 9.)

(v) The lumpers' strong preoccupation with grammatical forms also leads to a rebuttal of the contention that explicit performatives are direct rather than indirect or non-direct representatives of the speech act type they belong to. (See paragraph 10.)

If they attitudes listed would get too many advocates, speech act theory would collapse like a house of cards, though not all of them would play an equally important role in the process: leaving perlocutionary effects untouched only makes the theory incomplete; but abstaining from a basically semantic or pragmatic approach to the classification of speech acts and the problem of indirectness makes the theory less relevant; and the theory is not possible at all without the notion of illocutionary force and the formulation of felicity conditions.
In the following paragraphs I shall inquire into the origins of these threats to speech act theory, with direct reference to some reflections on the study of social action in general (of which linguistic action is one instantiation).

C. REFLECTIONS ON THE STUDY OF SOCIAL ACTION

12. Most -- if not all -- social practices show both universal and particular aspects. Therefore there is a need for generalization and for dealing with the here-and-now in studies of social behavior. Generalizations can be made soon if a researcher acts as an observer operating with a preconceived framework of abstract and general concepts; the here-and-now can be grasped if an attempt is made to capture the culture-specific understanding of an action that the participants themselves have, in other words, if one tries to penetrate the conceptual space associated with an action by the participants themselves. Ideally these two methodological components should be blended into one coherent approach. In practice, they always are blended: thus the framework of abstract and general concepts with which the object of investigation can be approached is, consciously or unconsciously, based on some researcher's previous observations of concrete and particular phenomena; conversely, it is hard for a scholar to give up his habits of generalization and probably he will never succeed completely in abstracting from the abstract and general concepts he has been confronted with. But rarely are the two components in balance. Hence the methodological spectrum of the social sciences is a continuum ranging from studies with a high degree of generality to investi-
gations with a high degree of particularity, but with absolutely nothing at the two extremes of the continuum and hardly anything in the middle.

It is usually agreed upon that the ultimate aim of scholarship is to be able to make generalizations. Therefore those studies tending more towards the use of a preconceived framework of abstract and general concepts somehow seem to go more straight to the point; hence it is not surprising that this approach seems to be favored in the social sciences. Of these investigations I shall say that they use the theoretical approach. If the balance leans more towards the culture-specific understanding of some kind of behavior, I shall say that an empirical-conceptual method is used. I realize that my usage of the term 'empirical' deviates from common practice; many so-called empirical investigations (e.g. most statistic, data-oriented studies) apply a purely theoretical method in my terminology. That is why I prefer to introduce the more complex term 'empirical-conceptual'.

13. Earlier (in paragraph 1) I claimed that nearly all speech act scholars, whether linguists or philosophers, approach linguistic action from an essentially theoretical point of view. In other words, they are rarely interested in the speech acts performed in a particular language -- not to mention the way in which speakers of a particular natural language conceptualize and understand their own acts -- but mainly in speech act universals, i.e. traits of linguistic action which are expected to be traceable in all languages. Even when universals are not directly envisaged the approach is usually theoretical, i.e. based on a preconceived framework of abstract and general concepts.
In order to prevent misunderstandings I want to repeat my point about the impossibility of absolute generality of universality, with direct reference to speech act theory. The point is especially clear with respect to existing classifications of speech act types or, in the professional jargon, of illocutionary acts or illocutionary forces. Though both Austin (1962) and Searle (1976), to cite the two best known examples, are explicitly interested in classifying the types of speech acts that can be performed in natural language as such -- not in one particular language -- they cannot avoid taking as their points of reference the English verbs used to perform those acts or to describe them. Thus, though an attempt is made to detach the universal claims from concrete data, they are at least partly based on them.

14. The uniformly theoretical and generalizing approach is the underlying cause of the problems of speech act theory. A natural outcome of such a lopsided approach is the relentless growth of mutually independent and often contradictory 'theories'. There is nothing wrong with the existence of those theories as such: most of them can be successfully defended from some theoretical point of view. But because of their mutual independence, which results from differences in the theoretical points of departure (i.e. differences in the preconceived frameworks of abstract and general concepts) most issues remain unresolved.

I believe that the issues can be settled only by introducing a counter-balancing empirical-conceptual approach, i.e. by examining the way in which linguistic action is conceptualized by speakers of different natural languages. For instance, what is their notion of indirectness in language,
and how do they classify (in a 'folk taxonomy' sense) speech acts? The similarities and differences with respect to such notions discovered between natural languages can constitute the basis for a reappraisal of the universals proposed by theorists. Incidentally, the particularity-oriented approach which I am about to propose should be thought of as a possible empirical basis for the study of universals of linguistic action.

The crucial question is now: Why should we not settle the unresolved issues by theorizing even more -- and more carefully? Why do we have to cataract down into the pre-theoretical world of facts? Does this not mean an intolerable regression of the scientific enterprise? In the next paragraphs the need for supplementing the theoretical method will be explained.

15. There is no denying that some universals of behavior must exist; therefore the theoretical approach is intrinsically justified and necessary. It seems that the vast majority of social studies have been conducted from this point of view. There are, however, some problems with it as pointed out by Winch (1958) and re-emphasized by McDaniel (1978).

One obvious restriction is the fact that abstract and general concepts can never capture the full meaning of social phenomena which are themselves concrete, particular and constantly subject to change. Deductive theorists would not really regard this as a problem. It is not so obvious why anyone would want to capture the particularity of social phenomena. The dispute is not necessarily an epistemological one. The main issue is: What kind of knowledge is most appropriate? The answer depends very much on what type of behavior one is trying to understand. The empirical-conceptual approach
works on the assumption that what people say and think should be taken seriously, which is not always the case, as with some types of schizophrenic behavior; in such cases the theoretical approach is particularly appropriate. Moreover, a theory-based method is needed to unmask motives of behavior which may be hidden to the agents themselves. But even so, an epistemological aspect comes in. Though ultimately the search for universals may be our task, universals are intolerable if they are based on poorly understood particular facts -- or if they do not have any correspondence with particularities at all.

16. A stronger plea for supplementing theoretical approaches with the empirical-conceptual method is rooted in the meaningfulness of social action. Social action is by definition meaningful in the sense that the participants in the action perceive it in terms of a background of shared meanings. A quote from Schuetz (1967:468) may clarify this idea of shared meanings.

I posit meaningful acts in the expectation that Others will interpret them meaningfully, and my schema of positing is oriented with respect to the Other's schema of interpretation. On the other hand, I can examine everything which, as a product of Others, presents itself to me for meaningful interpretation as to the meaning which the Other who has produced it may have connected with it. Thus, in these reciprocal acts of positing meaning, and of interpretation of meaning, my social world of mundane intersubjectivity is built; it is also the social world of Others, and all other social and cultural phenomena are founded upon it.

In that way there is a fundamental unity between the actor's concepts and the practices they serve to conceptualize. (Notice that this formulation implies the non-unity of the entities of which I claim that they are one;
I have not found a way to avoid this problem in English; therefore I would like the reader to condone further manifestations of the same linguistic flabbiness.) Action is always interpreted action. It was Gotthold Ephraim Lessing who remarked that it is unjust to give any action a different name from that which it used to bear in its own time and amongst its own people, even though it may be true that the actions are always the same in themselves however different the times and the societies in which they occur.\(^2\) This is because all actions have an 'understood context'. If there is such a strong unity between actions and concepts, then a full understanding of social phenomena can only be reached if studies based on a preconceived framework of abstract and general concepts are supplemented with an attempt to penetrate the conceptual world of the participants in the action to be described.

17. At this point it is certainly useful to illustrate the unity between concepts and practices. My examples, some of which are based on illustrations given by Winch and McDaniel, show at the same time the failure of the theoretical approach to capture the particularity of social phenomena.

Consider, for example, the fixed rules of interaction between members of different castes in India. Employing his framework of comparative concepts, a theory-oriented researcher would characterize a 'caste' as a 'class without

\(^2\) Actually, Winch (1958) starts his book with the following quote from Lessing (1778:423): "Denn wenn es schon wahr ist, dass moralische Handlungen, sie mögen zu noch so verschiedenen Zeiten, bei noch so verschiedenen Völkern vorkommen, in sich betrachtet immer die nämlichen bleiben, so haben doch darum die nämlichen Handlungen nicht immer die nämlichen Benennungen, und es ist ungerecht, irgendeiner eine andere Benennung zu geben als die, welche sie zu ihren Zeiten und bei ihrem Volk zu haben pflegte."
mobility'. There is nothing wrong with this description as such. But in that way the real cultural meaning which the caste system has for people in India would get lost: it is a hierarchical ranking of men and groups in terms of religious criteria of purity of which the hierarchy, the strict separation and the division of labor are overt manifestations. (McDaniel quotes Dumont (1970) as an excellent attempt to penetrate this meaning of the caste system.)

To take an easier example, consider the practice of bathing. Bathing is not just a matter of cleaning oneself with water. In the United States it is associated with an obsession with hygiene and sex appeal. In other cultures it may be a means of reaching the purification of the soul.

Or take the conceptual apparatus that Freud developed to explain neuroses. If a psychiatrist wants to reveal the origin of neuroses among, say, the Trobrianders it would be unwise for him to apply Freud's ideas without further reflection. First he would have to grasp many of their own culture-specific concepts, such as their concept of fatherhood.

Similarly, it is wrong for an anthropologist operating with Western standards of rationality and observing the frequent recourse to magic by a primitive culture, to conclude that these people's behavior is basically irrational. The fact that the Azande, as pointed out by Winch (1964), blame all instances of bad fortune on witchcraft does not mean that they do not perceive reality clearly: they see as well as we do that the woman was not killed by a witch but by the roof of her hut which collapsed because of a tree which fell on top of it because of the strong wind. Or again, the constant use of magic by the Melanesian tribes studied by Malinowski (1954) does not prevent their minds from working with scientific accuracy: they
know that rich crops depend mainly on precise and hard work and that safe sailing is in the first place a function of the application of certain principles of stability and hydrodynamics. So, why magic? Here is Malinowski's reply (1954:29):

Thus there is a clear-cut division: there is first the well-known set of conditions, the natural course of growth, as well as the ordinary pests and dangers to be warded off by fencing and weeding. On the other hand there is the domain of the unaccountable and adverse influences, as well as the great unearned increment of fortunate coincidence. The first conditions are coped with by knowledge and work, the second by magic.

If scientific experiments do not work the experimenter's conclusion is usually that there was something wrong with the setup. Likewise with magic. The fact that it often does not work does not destroy the belief in it: if a ritual does not have the expected effect, its performance must have been improper somehow. Witherspoon (1977) reports that every time when he witnessed the Navajos' rain dance it started raining within twenty-four hours but only once was the precipitation enough to be of any help. The Navajos' reaction was to smile and say "How feeble-minded we've become".

It should be clear from such examples that detaching social behavior from the participants' own interpretation of it, though useful for certain purposes, is in general an unwarranted reduction.

18. It may be interesting to point out, in passing, that the idea of the unity between concept and practice is in keeping with one of the fundamental principles of phenomenology. Instead of departing from one single basic principle, such as Descartes' cogito, phenomenology takes as its starting
point an entire field of original experiences, basic acts of consciousness. such acts are always intentional: consciousness is always consciousness of something.

If, then, an act of a certain structure is present, then by that very fact a certain object is also present; moreover, the character of this object is co-determined by the character of the act in which the object appears. The character, therefore, of the known object depends on the character of the act by which it is grasped. (Kockelmanns 1967:32-33.)

Applied to the topic of this paper this can be translated as follows: if social actors conceptualize their own practices, as they certainly do, the character of those practices must be partly determined by their own way of perceiving them.3

Another field of scholarship which brings out how intricately concepts and actions are related is ethnomethodology. Probably it suffices to refer to some student experiments reported by Garfinkel (1972). Garfinkel asked his students to go home and try to give up some of their basic assumptions, for instance by imagining that they were paying boarders instead of part of the family. In that way even the most common everyday actions can be shown to get a radically different meaning -- i.e. to be radically different -- if the background assumptions, the ideas of the participants, are changed.

3 The reader should resist the temptation to conclude from this digression that what I am advocating is a phenomenological approach to language. In spite of some similarity with respect to basic principles any phenomenology of language will look substantially different from what I have in mind. Indeed, Husserl seems to have defended the idea of a general and a priori grammar, which would be an extremely theoretical approach (see Jakobson 1970:13).
19. Once we have accepted as a necessity the attempt to understand the social agent's own views of what he is doing, we are confronted with a technical question: How can we achieve such understanding?

An apparent impediment is the impossibility for a scholar of abstracting from the general conceptual framework he has acquired. Following Gadamer's (1960) hermeneutical line of thought we can say that such a 'limitation' is no impediment at all, but the very prerequisite for understanding. Understanding results from a dialogue between one's beliefs and the observation of new phenomena.

There are, however, a couple of real problems. For one thing, as far as I can tell, there is no direct way of studying a person's conceptualization of his own actions. But it can be studied indirectly if one accepts that there is some kind of relationship between words and concepts. The existence of such a relationship is taken for granted by many scholars. Winch (1958:123) for instance, after discussing the link between the actor's concepts and his actions, changes his topic to the link between words and social behavior:

To give an account of the meaning of a word is to describe how it is used; and to describe how it is used is to describe the social intercourse into which it enters.

Winch illustrates this contention by quoting a book on social services in which it is claimed that it is the duty of a social worker to establish a relationship of friendship with her clients but that she must never forget that her first duty is to the policy of the agency by which she is employed. The notion of friendship used to exclude this sort of divided loyalty. According to Winch, this change in the notion of friendship reflects a
change in social relationships. Indeed, a society in which one no longer makes a distinction between a friend and an acquaintance is probably a society which, because of its extreme mobility, is in need of instant friendship: make friends fast, otherwise the people you meet will be gone before you get around to knowing them.

If, then, there is a relationship between words and concepts, it should be possible to learn something about the conceptual space associated with certain practices by examining the words (and expressions) that the participants in the action have at their disposal to talk about those practices. The hermeneutic circle is playing us tricks: it is not really possible to understand the one without understanding the other, and vice versa. But if we do not take this circle as an evil spirit haunting our intellectual enterprise but as one of its inevitable structural features, then the word-oriented procedure proposed provides us with an indirect way of approaching the practices we want to comprehend in an empirical-conceptual way.

20. If the empirical-conceptual method is limited in the sense that the social agent's conceptual world can only be approached indirectly, we are now confronted with a second problem. My claim that an agent's conceptualization of his own behavior can be indirectly investigated by scrutinizing the words and expressions he has at his disposal to talk about the actions in question was predicated on the assumption that there is "some kind of relationship between words and concepts". But what kind of a relationship is it? To come back to Winch's example, it is clear that a person's belonging to a society with a changed notion of friendship does not mean
that he is not capable of old-style friendship or of conceiving it. We would not want to make the Whorfian mistake -- which Alford (1978) has convincingly shown not to have been Whorf's error but the brainchild of his critics -- of positing a one-to-one correspondence between words and concepts and claiming that language completely determines thought.

In order to clarify the relationship between language and thought, one could compare language with Kuhn's notion of a scientific paradigm.\(^4\) Though a language, in particular its lexicon, by no means determines the capacity of its speakers to draw distinctions, it does reflect the distinctions they habitually draw. The reflection, moreover, is not perfect: it is like the reflection on the surface of a pond rather than in a mirror. Though there will be some distortions, the 'Gestalt' is recognizable.

Reformulating the end of the previous paragraph in those terms we can say: Since the lexicon of a language (conceived here as a collection of words and expressions) reflects the conceptual distinctions that its speakers habitually draw, it becomes possible to penetrate the conceptual space that the participants in an action associate with it by scrutinizing the words and expressions that their language provides for talking about the action in question. When doing this type of research, however, one should never lose sight of the limitations we specified.

\section*{D. ADVOCATING UNORTHODOX SCHOLARSHIP}

21. The aspiration of most scholars is to embody the higher stages of truth, namely syntheses. The formulation of strong theses and antitheses is generally shunned which, in practice, often results in the disruption

\footnote{4 The comparison was first made by Van Valin (1976).}
of the normal development of thought and hence in the very rare emergence of real syntheses. The proposal I am about to make clashes with this common cautious practice. Therefore most readers will regard it as an instance of unorthodox scholarship though I propose it for the sake of scholarship itself, that is, with the intention of pushing the limits of our knowledge just a little bit further.

22. Verbalizations of many aspects of social life have been investigated by cultural, especially linguistic, anthropologists. Linguistic action, however, has mainly been theorized about. It is true that verbs used in the performance and description of speech acts have been studied, but such studies were usually undertaken in view of the advancement of the theory (which is also one of my ultimate aims) but also with strong theoretical prejudices; remember the attempts to classify speech act types. To counterbalance the existing theoretical approaches a systematic study of the words and expressions used to describe linguistic action is needed in order to lift the veil that is covering the language user's culture-specific and language-specific experience or conceptualization of his own speech activity. In other words, I am advocating one type of empirical-conceptual approach to linguistic action, namely a lexical approach. By undertaking this type of research, a significant though not totally new contribution to the study of linguistic action will be made. My hope is that thrusting the methodological balance to the opposite extreme may provide us with revealing data on the basis of which the many unresolved theoretical issues can be tackled.
Briefly, whereas theorists of linguistic action have been trying to explain how people do things with words, I propose to undertake a supplementary study of what people say they do with words. Notice, however, that we are less interested in what people actually say than in what they can say about their verbal behavior; trying to reveal the concepts they have at their disposal is no doubt the more basic question of the two in view of the fact that people do not always say what they mean.

Let me formulate the enterprise in one more different way. Trying to leave speech act theory behind us -- an attempt in which we can at best be partly successful -- we can take a guided tour through linguistic action with language itself as our guide.

23. Some additional remarks are called for. First, linguistic action provides us with an area in which the unity between action and concept is particularly clear, so clear in fact that it is almost tempting to postulate a complete overlap between words, concepts and actions. The area I am thinking of is that particular subfield of the set of lexical items used to describe linguistic action which contains the truly performative verbs, i.e. the verbs which, if used in the first person singular simple present indicative active, are devices for the performance of the very same acts as the ones they describe when used differently. Since, in most contexts, saying seriously and literally "I promise that P" constitutes an act of promising, the verb TO PROMISE is more than just a reflection of a conceptual category that happens to be associated with some type of verbal behavior. Somehow the word, the concept and the action seem to be co-extensive; no doubt most speech act theorists would hotly deny this
because it shows the weakness of their universal claims based on concrete mono-linguistic data. This strong link can probably be generalized to non-performative speech act verbs (i.e., all other verbs describing speech act types) since, as I have shown elsewhere (see the first chapter of Verschueren 1977), the two classes are not strictly separable; rather, there is a performativity continuum running through the complete set of speech act verbs. The further a verb is removed from the truly performative type, the weaker the word-concept-action overlap may be expected to become. Without pressing the point too strongly, I'd like to suggest that this is an area in which the limitations of the lexical approach are themselves limited.

Second, the investigation I propose will lead us not only into the domain of linguistic activity covered by speech act theory. Obviously, words and expressions describing linguistic action can focus on any of a large number of its aspects, not only on the speech act type.

Third, the relevance of the investigation can be expected to increase dramatically as soon as a comparative perspective is brought in. The enterprise is essentially open-ended because of the infinite possibilities of historical, cross-cultural and cross-linguistic comparison, but also because of the possibility of significant differentiation within one culture and one language at one particular point in time. What I am advocating is a comparative lexical approach to linguistic action: the comparative study of the set of words (not only verbs but also nouns and maybe even adjectives and adverbs), idioms and other fixed formulae and expressions used to describe linguistic action.
24. I do not want to create the impression that similar investigations have never been advocated or attempted before. After all, Austin is said to have defended a strongly verb-oriented approach himself though he never got around to applying it extensively. Here are some more examples to the contrary.

After arguing that speech act descriptions have no place in linguistics -- a position which I would certainly not want to support -- L.J. Cohen (1974), for instance, contends that linguists could shed light on the problem of speech acts by discussing the terms used in describing speech acts and by surveying the empirically detectable varieties of ways in which these terms function and the empirically detectable varieties of conditions for applying them. He even lists a number of relevant semantic dimensions of the words and phrases used in describing what people do with words. Unfortunately, his proposal has gone largely unnoticed so that further reflections on its relevance are hard to find.

Nevertheless, some attempts have been made, for instance by D. Lehmann (1976) and the Berliner Gruppe which prepared a lengthy -- still unpublished -- manuscript on German speech act verbs. Other scholars such as J. Allwood (see 1976 and 1978) have a definite interest in this kind of research but do not want to embark on it until they have constructed a satisfactory theory of linguistic action which can be taken as their point of departure. As far as I can tell none of these researchers derive their interest from a methodological commitment similar to mine.

One scholar whose attitude is much closer to mine is R. Meyer-Hermann. His recent work (e.g. 1978) shows an interest in what people say about linguistic activity for the sake of a better understanding of what lin-
guistic action is. However, he concentrates on what they actually say rather than on the lexical expression of the concepts they have at their disposal to talk about verbal behavior. Though I believe that the latter is the more basic of the two enterprises, they are both necessary and, in practice, mutually dependent.

Inquiries in which an inference is drawn from the mere presence of certain lexical items to the way in which verbal behavior is conceptualized or experienced in a particular language community are rare. A marginal example is Kernan, Sodergren and French's (1977) brief account of Belizian City Creole in which it is claimed that "the proliferation of metalinguistic terms for types of speech acts is indicative of the cultural emphasis on speech and cultural appreciation of talented and elegant speech behavior" (p.36).

More to the point is M. Reddy's (1977) insightful paper called "The conduit metaphor -- A case of frame conflict in our language about language". Here is how he announces the theme of his article:

In this paper, I am going to present evidence that the stories English speakers tell about communication are largely determined by semantic structures of the language itself. This evidence suggests that English has a preferred framework for conceptualizing about communication, and can bias thought process towards this framework, even though nothing more than common sense is necessary to devise a different, more accurate framework. (p.3)

Reddy claims that the basic view of linguistic communication that emerges from the English words and expressions used to describe it could be called the 'conduit metaphor': language is a channel through which thoughts are conveyed; the speaker puts his thoughts in at one end and at the other the hearer catches them; the thoughts are really in the words. He gives
dozens of illustrations such as "Try to GET your THOUGHTS ACROSS better", "None of Mary's FEELINGS CAME THROUGH TO ME with any clarity", "You still haven't GIVEN ME any IDEA of what you mean", "Try to PACK more THOUGHT INTO fewer words" and "That THOUGHT IS IN practically every other WORD". Reddy claims that this metaphor distorts reality: a hearer never simply receives thoughts; instead, understanding results from an active process of interpretation, i.e. from hard work. In terms of the conduit metaphor failure to communicate seems impossible as long as the speaker uses the 'right' words; success appears to be automatic. Reddy also elaborates on the dangerous impact such a distorted view can have. I believe that he overstates his point a little bit in that he loses sight of the partial truth on which the conduit metaphor is based. If it were not true that somehow language is responsible for thought processes (in other words, that there are ideas in the words) then there would be no basis for him to contend that the metaphor can be perilous. But this does not undermine the importance of Reddy's claims.

The research project that I am advocating is more ambitious than Reddy's because of its wider scope, but at the same time it is less ambitious in that I am not immediately looking for comparable sweeping statements.

25. The set of words and phrases to describe linguistic action is such a vast expanse that any attempt to give a complete description even for a single language within the scope of a single essay would be doomed to failure. Therefore the topic of this text will be narrowed to a small number of relatively small subfields each of which will be representative of a particular level of linguistic action. A first chapter will deal with
the most marginal aspect of verbal behavior imaginable, namely the semantics of silence, the absence of speech. The semantics of lying will be next, because of its relation to propositional content. Illocutionary force will be represented in a chapter of directing. Then there is a chapter on conversational routines, concentrating on those for which at least some languages do not provide a descriptive term.

Because of the suspected relevance of a comparative lexical approach these subfields will be studied contrastively in English and in Dutch. A comparison between two less related languages might have been more revealing, but I believe that if interesting conclusions can be drawn from a comparison between two languages which are so closely related, the same must a fortiori be true for all other confrontations.

Before starting the actual work, some methodological and terminological considerations are needed. They will be provided in the next chapter. Before moving on I want to repeat my point that this study, though evidently particularity-oriented, should be regarded as an exercise preparing a potentially infinite series of wide-ranging comparative investigations which could be the empirical basis for reflections on universals of linguistic action.
II. RESEARCH PRINCIPLES AND TERMINOLOGY

A. INTRODUCTION

1. In the previous chapter I issued a manifesto professing my belief that the existing theories of linguistic action suffer from some kind of anemia due to the lack of an acceptable decision procedure to settle unresolved issues, and that investigations of what people say they do with words could furnish us with such a procedure and hence increase the vitality and viability of the theory. I also announced that this essay would be restricted to the comparative study of some relatively small subfields of the English and Dutch words and phrases used to describe linguistic action. In this chapter I shall first present a further specification of my object of investigation and introduce some terminological conventions. Then some principles of lexical semantics will be proposed. Further, a methodology will be propounded to elude the impending danger of circularity in the semantic analysis of lexical items. Finally I shall bring into focus the problem of how to represent the findings of this type of research; in this context the notion of a semantic dimension (as opposed to a semantic class) will be brought in.
B. THE OBJECT OF INVESTIGATION

2. What I advocated in the first chapter was a comparative study of the set of words, idioms and other fixed formulae or expressions used to describe linguistic action. Groups of words such as TO BEAT AROUND THE BUSH (i.e. 'talking without coming to the point') or the Dutch IEMAND IETS IN DE SCHOENEN SCHUIVEN (literally 'to shove something into somebody's shoes', meaning 'to accuse somebody unjustly of something'), the meaning of which cannot easily be derived from the sense of the component elements we call idioms. The other fixed formulae are expressions with a more transparent meaning such as TO PRONOUNCE X+Y HUSBAND AND WIFE (i.e. to marry X+Y). In that way idioms and other fixed formulae are by no means two completely separate classes of linguistic entities. Together they constitute what I shall henceforth refer to as complex lexicalizations. They are contrasted with words (i.e. monomorphemic words, derived words and many compounds) which I call simple lexicalizations. Both simple and complex lexicalizations are lexical items.

The coining of new terms may seem to be superfluous since we have the perfectly clear English term collocation at our disposal to refer to most cases of what I call complex lexicalizations. Indeed, but groups of words such as TO BE SILENT (which is the most commonly used lexical item to describe the absence of speech in English; its status as a lexical item will be clarified later) can hardly be called collocations; yet they are no words either; in my classification they are complex lexicalizations.
3. Again, there is no clear-cut boundary between simple and complex lexicalizations. Most compounds are borderline cases. TO BAD-MOUTH is often characterized as an idiom; yet I am inclined to include it in the class of simple lexicalizations. On the other hand, a DEAR JOHN LETTER is prone to be described as a word because it forms such a strong unity that even men can be said to write a Dear John letter to a woman, and because its formation seems to be getting productive in the sense that it is no longer unusual to hear a woman say, rather sarcastically, to a man "Thank you very much for that nice Dear John phone call of yours"; yet I am inclined to regard a DEAR JOHN LETTER as a complex lexicalization. To justify these inclinations I propose a rather arbitrary rule: lexicalizations are simple if they form an orthographical unity, if not, then they are complex. Note, however, that this rule will not be applied in the case of prepositional verbs such as TO TALK ABOUT (SOMETHING) and phrasal verbs such as TO ORDER (SOMEONE) ABOUT which are simple lexicalizations.

Apart from the fact that what I want to talk about cannot be dealt with in terms of the contrast between words and collocations, the new terminology has the advantage of that a lexical item is not just a linguistic entity but a lexicalized (i.e. linguistically processed) form of something else, namely of part of the conceptual space constructed by a particular language community.

4. However vague the distinction may be between classes of lexical items, the boundary between lexical items and groups of words which do not form a lexical unity is even fuzzier. The decision to treat a word group as a lexical item (a complex lexicalization) will always be based on a judgment of how strong a unity the group forms. But 'strength of unity' can be
viewed from two angles: the encoder's and the decoder's. The criterion I generally use is the following: if someone encoding his thoughts would be able to produce the group of words in question without having learnt it as a unity, then we have to do with a simple word group; if previous learning can be expected to be required, then the combination of words is a lexical item even if someone decoding the message would have no trouble at all to interpret it without having come across it before.

There are only a couple of cases in which it could be claimed that I deviate from this criterion. For instance, I often treat the combination of an adjective with an auxiliary (e.g. TO BE SILENT), or the combination of a verb with the negative adverb 'not' (e.g. NOT TALK) as lexical items. This procedure seems to be justifiable (in view of our search for the lexical reflection of conceptualization habits) on the ground that these combinations are such conventional ways of verbalizing an adjective and of turning a positive verb into a negative one that they often make the creation of a separate verb superfluous to express the state or action referred to. If we refrained from treating them as lexical items we would be confronted with a whole lot of lexical gaps which are not really gaps at all.

5. The question of why we want to study complex as well as simple lexicalizations cannot be avoided. Bolinger (1975) couches the problem in the following terms:

Since the lexicon purports to record all the pre-set meaning-bearing units of a language, ideally it would have to include every collocation as well as every word. In practice this is impossible — and probably in theory too. Practically, there would be no room. Theo-
retically, one would not know where to stop, because collocations shade off into more or less freely formed constructions and fluctuate too much from place to place and from individual to individual. Furthermore, there is no reliable way to test them, at least at the borders between collocations and constructions. (p.105)

To counter Bolinger's objection I contend that it would be suspicious to find only categories with clear boundaries in the description of a phenomenon which is itself in constant fluctuation. An immediate corollary of this stance is the commitment to undertaking an intrinsically endless job. Note, however, that the apparent finiteness of different approaches is rarely more than an illusion.

The necessity to take complex lexicalizations into account is quite clear if we do not just think about our enterprise in terms of the study of part of the lexicon as such but as a reflection of the underlying conceptualizations. Every lexicalization of reality or experience, whether simple or complex, is a unique reflection of some conceptualization habit. We have shown this in connection with a DEAR JOHN LETTER. Further illustrations are not hard to find.

6. While further demonstrating the unique conceptualization habits reflected in the complex (as well as simple) lexicalizations, we can at the same time point out some different types of relationships between the lexical forms and the object or event they are applicable to.

First, there is the exemplifying relation. An illustration is, once more, our DEAR JOHN LETTER. A letter in which a wife asks for a divorce or a girlfriend breaks off an engagement is not likely to start with "Darling" or "Honey", but rather a distant mode of address will be chosen, such as "Dear John" or, more general "Dear X" where X stands for the
hearer's Christian name. The term is exemplifying in two ways: it represents a particular mode of address (which is not the only one possible) and it picks out the name 'John' as an example.

Second, the relationship can be *analytical* as when the expression TO RAISE ONE'S BLOOD SUGAR LEVEL is used instead of the verb TO EAT. The activity of eating is analyzed in terms of what it does for the body. Thus, as a matter of course, the expression is mainly used in circles where there is a strong (though often simply fashionable) preoccupation or obsession with health. There is a comparable formula in Dutch, namely CALORIEËN SLIKKEN (lit. 'to swallow calories'). Here the eating substance is analyzed. Saying "I think it is about time for me to go and raise my blood sugar level" or "Ik denk dat het tijd wordt nog eens wat calorieën te gaan slikken" (lit. "I think it is about time again to go and swallow some calories") is somehow a euphemistic denial of the fact that what one is about to do is satisfying some primary bodily need or indulging in some earthly delights; it almost sounds like "I am sorry, I simply have to, otherwise I wouldn't do such a thing".

Third, there are *metaphorical* relations. A clear example of a metaphor is TO CASH IN ONE'S CHIPS meaning TO DIE. Even dead metaphors such as TO KICK THE BUCKET seem to preserve their metaphorical character (i.e. their relationship to literal meaning) to some extent. Though "Harry's been dying for weeks now" ia an acceptable sentence, "Harry's been kicking the bucket for weeks now" is not, because of the association of abruptness carried by the verb TO KICK.

This list is no doubt incomplete. There are also complex lexicalizations in which there seems to be no relationship whatsoever between their lexical
forms and the objects or events they describe. As far as I can tell there is nothing in TO DO A COLD TURKEY which makes it inherently suitable to express someone's withdrawing, without medical help, from an addictive habit such as drugs, alcohol or cigarette smoking.

7. After setting up a terminological framework and explaining why we want to investigate complex as well as simple lexicalizations, another question crops up: What classes of lexical items (in the sense of the traditional word classes) are used to describe linguistic action and are thus relevant to the type of investigation proposed?

Not only *verbs* are used to describe linguistic action, but also *nouns*. Though for many of the verbs in question (e.g. TO PROMISE) there is a corresponding noun (e.g. PROMISE), this is not always the case. For the verb TO URGE there is no corresponding noun URGE which describes the same linguistic act (though that gap would be at least partially covered by the noun EXHORTATION). Conversely, the Dutch noun ORDER has no one-to-one correspondence to any verb, but it describes linguistic acts which form a subclass of the acts described by the verb BEVELEN ('to order'). Therefore both nouns and verbs are relevant to the study of what people say they do with words.

*Adjectives* provide us with pertinent information about the nature of certain linguistic actions through their combination possibilities with the nouns describing those actions. Note, for instance, that one can talk about A TRUE STATEMENT but not *A TRUE ORDER (unless TRUE is used in a different sense); A SOUND ARGUMENT but not *A SOUND PROMISE; A SOLID OFFER but not *A SOLID QUESTION; A BASIC QUESTION but not *A BASIC OFFER; or in
Dutch EEN GAVE BEKENTENIS ('an unconditional confession') or EEN GAVE TOESTEMMING ('an unconditional permission') but not *EEN GAVE VRAAG ('an unconditional question'); EEN VAST AANBOD ('a solid offer') or EEN VASTE BELOFTE ('a firm promise') but not *EEN VAST BEVEL (lit. 'a solid order'). Adjectives always reveal a semantic dimension of the nouns they modify: the acceptability of the phrase THE TALL TREE exposes the fact that there is a tallness dimension to trees. Therefore, investigating such combination possibilities could yield some insights into the nature of certain types of verbal behavior.

Similarly, adverbs may prove useful in disclosing the most important dimensions of the acts described by the verbs or verb-like expressions they can be used to qualify.

8. Though verbs, nouns, adjectives and adverbs all deserve a place in the examination of what people say they do with words, there is no denying that when it comes to describing action (in this case linguistic action) verbs and verb-like expressions occupy a key position. This essay is not more than a pilot study on which severe limitations have to be imposed. The discussion in the subsequent chapters will therefore be confined to verbs and verb-like expressions. Nouns, adjectives and adverbs will only occasionally be treated when they are part of a complex verb-like lexicalization.

Another terminological remark is needed. In order to avoid the stylistically tiresome recurrence of the phrase 'verbs and verb-like expressions' or 'verbs or verb-like expressions' I create the term verbials on the analogy of the word 'adverbial' which covers both adverbs and adverb-like expressions. If a need arises to distinguish the two, I shall talk about
simple verbials (or simply verbs) and complex verbials on the basis of my earlier distinction between simple and complex lexicalizations. (Notice that the term 'verbal' would not have been suitable because it indicates words combining properties of verbs with those of adjectives and nouns, such as gerunds, infinitives and participles.)

The verbials used to describe linguistic action under one aspect or another, i.e. the objects for investigation in this essay, I call linguistic action verbials.

9. Now that we have confined our task to the Dutch-English comparative study of the verbials covering the small subfields of linguistic action specified at the end of the first chapter, we ought to look for a criterion to decide on when a verbal can be rightfully included in the set of lexical items used to describe the action in question. As with most of the distinctions drawn so far, this criterion is going to be a hazy one too.

Some verbs such as TO ASK have a type of verbal behavior as their primary meaning (though the meaning can be metaphorically extended as in "He is asking for trouble"). Evidently, these have to be accounted for.

Other verbs such as TO THREATEN denote actions which are not necessarily linguistic. Still the linguistic part of their meaning is prominent enough to warrant unqualified inclusion.

Yet another class of verbs such as TO PUT FORWARD have an originally non-linguistic sense. But the metaphorical extension of their use to kinds of linguistic action has become so widespread and conventional that we can
talk about dead or lexicalized metaphors. Hence they should be dealt with.

Finally we have verbs such as TO KILL which can only be used to describe verbal behavior if their meaning is very widely and actively extended metaphorically as in the following sentence from a song: "Killing me softly with his words". Since the meaning of nearly all words can be extended in a similar fashion, the investigation would get totally out of hand if these were incorporated into the set of lexical items used in saying what one does with words.

Fuzziness will be inevitable when it comes to making decisions about lexical items which are situated on the borderline between the third and last categories listed. Notice that the distinctions we made here with reference to verbs are also applicable to complex verbials.

10. A final remark about the object of investigation is needed. I announced a comparison between English and Dutch. It happens that the varieties of these two languages that I have been confronted with most are American English and the Flemish variety of Standard Dutch (spoken in the northern provinces of Belgium). Consequently the subsequent discussion will contain some lexical items and judgments of usage peculiar to these varieties. But they are so close to British English and the Standard Dutch spoken in the Netherlands that there is no harm in using the brief names English and Dutch, as long as the above remark is kept in mind whenever necessary.

There is, however, a minor problem involved in any lexical comparison between American English and Flemish Standard Dutch, which has to do with the history of the two languages and the societies in which they are spoken. Mobility is maybe the basic structuring force in American society, re-
sulting in a kind of cultural uniformity which, given the vast geographical, racial and occupational differences, would be hard to imagine in the less mobile European cultures. Apart from the language used by previously segregated groups such as the American Blacks, there is also a quite impressive linguistic uniformity. Though the English spoken in the deep South sound quite different from New York Jewish English -- they are, after all, more than a thousand miles apart -- they are still mutually intelligible, whereas people in Limburg (the easternmost province of Flanders) do not understand the people in West Vlaanderen (the westernmost province of Flanders) if they speak their local dialect, and vice versa, though the two places are less than a hundred miles apart (that is, less than the distance between New York and Philadelphia or between Los Angeles and San Diego). Because of the linguistic uniformity (and supported by a vague but strong principle of liberty) Americans can speak the same variety of English on all occasions: at home, at work, addressing a friend, or addressing the whole nation. Their language is not just a means of communication scrupulously adapted to the circumstances, but a means of expression with which they have become fused. As a result, though an American will not fail to respond when asked to make judgments about the formality or informality of linguistic expressions, in actual usage this contrast is getting less and less relevant. Thus, the same Americans who euphemize about a basic activity such as eating by talking about RAISING THEIR BLOOD SUGAR LEVEL, are likely to use a nice collection of four-letter words in the same conversation. Or again, the use of an expression such as TO PUT THE LID ON (which some dictionaries, even recent ones, characterize
as slang) will cause no surprise at all in the discussion of the gross national product in a televised presidential campaign debate.

In Flanders, on the other hand, there was until recently a complete lack of linguistic uniformity. Even after Belgium became an independent country in 1830 the spontaneous growth of a standard language was prevented by the fact that for all purposes for which a standard language is needed, such as government, the press, science and higher education, French was used (or, indeed, French was the only legally accepted language). Though a standard Flemish variety of Dutch has been used for all official purposes for several decades now, and though everybody understands it, most people have considerable difficulty speaking it: their language at home, and often at work, remains a regional dialect (which is maintained because of the still limited mobility of the society). The consequence is linguistic insecurity and an over-anxiousness to use the right register and the right degree of formality in the right circumstances. Moreover, many speakers find it absolutely impossible to reach any degree of informality when using the standard language.

In the subsequent treatment of the English and Dutch expressions used to describe linguistic action also informal lexical items and slang expressions are dealt with. Since the patterns of usage of formal versus informal lexical items in American English and Flemish Standard Dutch differ considerably, the overall comparison (in which labels such as 'formal', 'informal' and 'slang' will be used) is intrinsically distorted. This fact, which could be a fascinating topic for further sociolinguistic research, should be kept in mind throughout. A comparison between British
English and the Standard Dutch spoken in the Netherlands would not present such a problem.

C. PRINCIPLES OF LEXICAL SEMANTICS

11. How should the meaning of verbials be described? The question can be broken up in two parts. First, how can the internal semantic structure of verbials be brought to light? Second, how should the semantic relationships between the verbials covering a particular conceptual field be identified?

In the following paragraphs lexical decomposition, which is one of the possible responses to the first question, and the structuralist study of lexical fields, which was for a long time the favored solution to the second problem, will be discussed briefly. Their limitations will be considered and an alternative approach will be proposed.

12. Saussure's distinction between langue and parole induced linguists such as Trubetzkoy to postulating abstract 'phonemes' which can be realized in different ways and which can be characterized in terms of a universal set of distinctive features such as + voice, + dental, etc. On the analogy of these structuralistic phonological notions L. Hjelmslev and R. Jakobson proposed to analyze the meaning of words in terms of a set of universal meaning components or semantic features. In that way the meaning of MAN could be analyzed as + male, + adult, + human, and the meaning of WOMAN as - male, + adult and + human. This semantic procedure is called componential analysis.
Componential analysis labors under a number of more or less serious difficulties. First, it is not too clear which pole of a binary contrast such as male/female should be taken as the descriptive point of departure. This problem is not too serious because the proponents of componential analysis can easily get away with a decision by declaring that the semantic features used should be regarded as atomic concepts which can but need not be lexicalized in individual languages; hence a semantic feature such as + adult must not be identified with the word ADULT. Nevertheless componential analysts try to motivate their decisions by relying on the notion of markedness: since one normally asks "How tall is John" and not "How short is John" when making inquiries about John's size, 'tall' is regarded as the unmarked pole of the tall/short contrast and therefore it is taken as the point of departure if the contrast is needed in semantic analysis.

But how can the meaning of semantic features be grasped if it is so objectionable to identify them with the corresponding words in natural languages? Especially if the components are atomic in the sense that they resist further decomposition it is hard to see how their meaning can be explicated other than by means of such an identification. Obviously this second problem cannot be smothered under terminological trickery.

A third, equally serious, problem is the dubitable existence of a universal set of semantic features belonging to some universal mental language from which speaking is always a translation to a particular natural language. Consider the rather random list of thirteen fundamental concepts proposed by A. Wierzbicka (1977): I, you, someone, something, world, this, want, don't want, think of, say, imagine, be part of, become. It is
hard to detect any logic in this series any any scholar will be able to think of concepts which are not readily analyzable in terms of Wierzbicka's Fundamental Thirteen. One concept which most scholars would spontaneously add to the list is TO BE. But then we remember Witherspoon's (1977) claim that in Navajo TO GO appears to be a much more basic concept than TO BE. Maybe we ought to attribute the failure to construct an acceptable set of universal semantic primitives to the fact that, as Fortescue (1979) points out, the language of thought, if conceived in terms of the view underlying the search for universal meaning components, is no language at all.

13. When attempts were made to apply componential analysis to verbs, it was soon realized that the meaning components (which are then called atomic predicates) should be viewed as constituting a hierarchic semantic structure instead of a simple sum. A verb such as TO KILL, for instance, was thought to be analyzable as

\[
\text{kill}(x,y) : \text{CAUSE}(x, \text{BECOME}(y, \text{NOT ALIVE}))
\]

(where \(x\) is the agent of TO KILL and \(y\) is the patient). This further extension of componential analysis is called lexical decomposition.

One common criticism is that, for instance, TO KILL and CAUSE TO DIE cannot be substituted for each other: one can say "Yesterday John caused Jim to die" even if Jim did not die until today; this is impossible with "Yesterday John killed Jim". Such criticism may reveal the need for time indexes in some lexical decomposition formulae, but scholars who maintain that atomic predicates, just like other semantic features, should not be confused with the corresponding words are of course immune to it.
If we abstract for a moment from the opacity and the dubious universality of the semantic primitives, which is a problem for lexical decomposition as well as for other types of componential analysis, then we may ask the question whether the verbials used to describe linguistic action are also susceptible to the type of analysis under discussion.

14. The semantic complexity of notions such as promising, ordering, etc. is such that it cannot be captured in a lexical decomposition formula for the corresponding verbs (which is not to say that analyzing into components is impossible, but simply that the formalism does not work). Elsewhere (see Verschueren 1977) I used the decomposition paradigm to illustrate this complexity. Compare the following two formulae; the first one is a variation of the one given earlier for the verb TO KILL.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{kill}(x,y) & : \text{CAUSE } (x, \text{COME ABOUT } (\text{DIE } (y))) \\
\text{order}(x,y,P) & : \text{CAUSE } (x, \text{COME ABOUT } (\text{DO } (y,P)))
\end{align*}
\]

(In the second formula \(x\) is the speaker, \(y\) is the hearer, and \(P\) stands for a proposition which, in this case, specifies a future act on the part of the hearer.) Obviously the second formula is not complete as a description of the meaning of TO ORDER. At least the following elements need to be added: unlike the dying associated with killing, the doing associated with ordering is not a necessary outcome of the action but merely an intended one; the intention is carried out by means of uttering a sentence; it is the speaker's intention that his uttering that sentence will make the hearer do a certain action. Inserting all this additional information results in the following formula (in which \(Se\) stands for a sentence).
order\( (x,y,P)\): \(\text{SAY} (x,y,Se) \land \text{INTEND} (x, \text{CAUSE} ([\text{SAY} (x,y,Se)]), \text{COME ABOUT} (\text{DO} (y,P)))\)

Put in plain words this is: 'x orders y to do P' means that 'x utters a sentence Se to y and x intends his uttering Se to y to cause it to come about that y does P'. However complex the formula is, it is not yet explicit with respect to several points: first, the two conjoined parts of the formula are part of the same act; second, the two occurrences of \(\text{SAY} (x,y,Se)\) are identical; third, the Se may be the surface expression of order\( (x,y,P)\); fourth, P is part of what Se expresses. But let us for a while expect a cooperative attitude from everybody so that making these points explicit in the formula would be redundant.

So far so good. But what happens if we try to construct comparable formulae for different speech act verbs? Here is an attempt for TO REQUEST, TO STATE, and TO ARGUE.

request\( (x,y,P)\): \(\text{SAY} (x,y,Se) \land \text{INTEND} (x, \text{CAUSE} ([\text{SAY} (x,y,Se)]), \text{COME ABOUT} (\text{DO} (y,P)))\)

state\( (x,y,P)\): \(\text{SAY} (x,y,Se) \land \text{INTEND} (x, \text{CAUSE} ([\text{SAY} (x,y,Se)]), \text{COME ABOUT} (\text{KNOW} (y,P)))\)

argue\( (x,y,P)\): \(\text{SAY} (x,y,Se) \land \text{INTEND} (x, \text{CAUSE} ([\text{SAY} (x,y,Se)]), \text{COME ABOUT} (\text{KNOW} (y,P)))\)

A serious problem emerges immediately. The formulae do not provide for any differentiation in meaning between TO ORDER and TO REQUEST and between TO STATE and TO ARGUE; yet TO ORDER is not a synonym of TO REQUEST, and TO STATE and TO ARGUE are not synonyms either. There is no obvious way
in which the authority implied by TO ORDER and the expectation of the hearer's resistance against believing P in the case of TO ARGUE can be formalized in such a way as to obtain sufficiently differentiated decomposition formulae.

Lexical decomposition of speech act verbs (by means of the formalism illustrated) does not lead us any further than the construction of a more or less general formula of the following kind, in which some basic semantic components of all speech act verbs are brought together.

\[
\text{SAV}(x,y,(P)) : \text{SAY}(x,y,Se) \ \text{INTEND}(x, \text{CAUSE}(\text{SAY}(x,y,Se), \text{COME ABOUT}(\text{ACCEPT}(y,SA'))) )
\]

Note that SAV stands for speech act verb and SA' for all the aspects of the speech act in question, except (i) the effects x typically intends to bring about, for which ACCEPT (y,SA') stands (which should be read as 'y accepts or appropriately reacts to the speech act'), and (ii) the fact that x utters a sentence Se by means of which he intends to bring about those effects, for which the rest of the formula stands. It should be clear that such formulae cannot make explicit the full meaning of individual speech act verbs. First, in most cases it will not be possible to replace ACCEPT (y,SA') by a single word such as KNOW, DO or TELL; though there is certainly an effect typically associated with acts such as promising (e.g. gratifying the hearer in one way or another), it is not always easy to describe, let alone to formalize. Second, a complete representation of SA' requires the formulation of most of the felicity conditions on the act in question, which is hardly feasible within the
scope of a lexical decomposition formula.

The conclusion is simple. We must look for a different way of describing the internal semantic structure of the verbials used to describe linguistic action (of which the speech act verbs referred to in this paragraph constitute a subset.

15. How should the semantic relationships between the linguistic action verbials be identified? An obvious place to start looking for an answer is in the structuralist theory of lexical fields.

Saussurean structuralism regards a language as a unique system or network of functionally related elements within which each separate element derives its essence from its functional relation with the other elements. With respect to the vocabulary of a language this means that the meaning of each word depends on the existence of other words. This position inevitably leads to the conclusion that it does not make sense to try to define the meaning of one word separately. The meaning of each word covers a relatively small conceptual area which is part of a wider conceptual field. The collection of words which together cover a complete conceptual field is called a semantic field, a lexical field or lexical domain. Within such a lexical field the size of the conceptual area associated with a particular word is determined by the size of the conceptual areas of the surrounding words.

Since conceptual fields can be lexicalized, i.e. split up into conceptual areas, in different ways, the structure of the lexical fields to which certain words belong has to be taken into account when semantically comparing those words with their equivalents in different languages.
Figure 1 visualizes this state of affairs.

There are three different types of lexical fields (see Vassilyev 1974). First, fields consisting of words belonging to the same part of speech, such as TOWER, STEEPLE, TURRET, Pinnacle, etc., are called paradigmatic fields. Second, we are confronted with a syntagmatic field if it consists of syntagmatically related words from different parts of speech; the syntagmatic relationships are based on essential semantic connections such as between BARK and DOG, HEAR and EAR, BITE and TOOTH, BLOND and HAIR. A complex field, finally, includes words from different parts of speech (i.e. the syntagmatic dimension) along with their paradigmatic correlates. It is exemplified in Figure 2.
Semantic field theorists have also drawn the attention to the existence of *lexical gaps*. We can talk about a lexical gap whenever a particular language lacks a word to cover a certain conceptual area within a conceptual field which belongs to the experiential world of the language community involved. An example is to be found in Figure 3.

![Figure 3](image)

Though a Dutch equivalent to SLEET may exist, it is absent from the competence of most speakers and in most cases as paraphrase such as SMELTENDE SNEEUW ('melting snow'), which does not fit our criterion for lexical unity (see paragraph 4), will be used. Figure 3 also reveals the hierarchical structure of the lexicon.

16. The problems of the structuralist approach to lexical fields are manifold. The simple fact that semantic field theorists usually exclude complex lexicalizations and even compounds from their accounts should already arouse our suspicion. Let us pass some of the trouble spots in review.
First, if the conclusion that it does not make sense to try to define the meaning of one word separately is so inevitable, how is it that people do it all the time? Second, how can the theory of lexical fields account for the semantic difference between two words covering an identical conceptual area, such as ANIMAL and BEAST? Third, does the absolute arbitrariness of the way in which conceptual fields can be lexicalized or split up into conceptual areas, which is implied in the theory of lexical fields, reflect reality? Fourth, the practicability of semantic field theory depends on the possibility of defining the boundaries of word meanings; whether such strict boundaries exist is an extremely doubtful matter.

The four problems mentioned can all be reduced to an inconsistency characterizing structuralism. On the one hand it is postulated that every element within a linguistic system derives its essence from its functional relationships with other elements, and that every individual element can only be described as a junction of relationships. On the other hand, orthodox structuralists believe that the language system is an independent being which can be described as such without making reference to extra-linguistic reality. The inconsistency should be clear: the structuralist mode of thinking is not applied to language as a phenomenon among other phenomena. How the four trouble spots mentioned result from this lack of consistency will be easy to understand after reading through the rest of this chapter.

To put my criticism in one sentence, as far as lexical semantics is concerned, structuralism ignores the internal structure of extra-linguistic
reality, human cognitive processes, the expression of social reality, and linguistic context.

17. Insofar as componential analysis is an outgrowth of structuralism it shares the latter's problems. One attitude which the two usually have in common is the belief that an adequate description of the meaning of a word must be such that it covers the meaning that word has in all of its literal occurrences. In the case of semantic field theory this attitude was identified in terms of the requirement to define the boundaries of word meanings. Fillmore (1975) dubs it the checklist approach to meaning: a word meaning is represented as a list of semantic features; if an object or event satisfies all the features in the list, the word can be used to refer to it; otherwise it cannot. The absurdity of such an approach will be demonstrated soon.

18. So far it was claimed that lexical decomposition was inadequate to account for the internal structure of the verbials we want to describe, and that the structuralist approach to lexical fields cannot be expected to yield sufficient insight into the semantic relationships among those verbials.

Psychologists such as E. Rosch, sociologists such as E. Goffman, linguistic anthropologists such as B. Berlin and P. Kay, computational linguists such as M. Minsky, R. Schank and R. Abelson, and semanticists such as C. Fillmore have created numerous concepts by means of which structuralist reductionism can be avoided: scene, frame, schema, description, template, scenario, prototype, module, model, plan, script, basic level
term. As in most innovative areas of research there is considerable terminological confusion and conflict. In my search for an adequate methodology to analyze linguistic action verbials I shall only handle the terms prototype, basic level term, scene, frame and linguistic frame.

19. The lexicalization of the potentially infinite diversity of reality looks like a mission impossible for language. How then, can we explain its relative success?

Though the boundaries between categories of objects are mostly diffuse, yet reality is no undifferentiated continuum of phenomena. Flying animals are nearly always feathered and only rarely furred. An object which looks like a chair is more frequently used to sit on than an object which looks like a pig. Such considerations led E. Rosch (1977a, 1977b) to believe that 'intrinsically separate things' exist in the world. If the conclusion is correct then this fact may grease the wheels of the lexicalization process considerably.

Not only is reality structured, but moreover human perception operates according to some strict mechanisms. After an age-old belief in the arbitrariness of the color terminology, for instance, B. Berlin and P. Kay (1969) have demonstrated quite convincingly that different languages show a strong conformity with respect to the focal point of the area of the color spectrum covered by a particular basic color term (whereas the boundaries of the area are always vague), and that there is a universal evolutionary pattern governing the acquisition of basic color terms by a language. Though the original study called for several modifications, it remains an example of the interaction between the internal structure of reality and
the laws determining the human perceptual apparatus, in this case the uneven color sensitivity of the eye (which is discussed at length in P. Kay and C.K. McDaniel 1978).

20. Both phenomena, i.e. the internal structure of reality and the laws governing the perceptual apparatus, lead us to the notion of a prototype. The formation of prototypes, 'ideal' instances of a particular category, is one of the cognitive processes enabling man to grasp the diversity of the world with his mind. This process is partly determined by the laws of perception and the structure of reality. An example of the first influence was mentioned with reference to the color terminology. The second influence can be illustrated by saying that a pigeon or a sparrow are more typical or 'better' examples of a bird than a chicken or an ostrich, and that a dog or a cow is a more typical example of a mammal than a whale. Briefly, for each lexicalized category human cognition contains a prototypical example (which does not have to be an actual member of the category itself, but which is a kind of 'mental image') which is used as a yardstick to decide whether a particular object can or cannot be referred to by means of the lexical item in question. If the deviation from the standard is too big, the word cannot be used.

This brief exposition may create the false impression that the prototype idea is only valid for nouns. But remember that color adjectives were adduced as examples already; the 'focal points' referred to are the prototypical examples of the colors denoted by the terms. To show that a similar analysis is feasible for verbs I adopt an example given by C. Fillmore (1978): the verb TO CLimb typically describes an ascending motion in a clambering
fashion. I quote:

A monkey climbing up a flagpole satisfies both of these conditions. The monkey climbing down the flagpole satisfies the clambering component only, but is nevertheless engaged in an action that can be properly called climbing. A snail climbing up the flagpole satisfies the ascending condition and can still be said to be climbing. But the snail is not privileged to climb down the flagpole, since that activity would involve neither clambering nor ascending. (p.153)

So there is a clear prototype, deviations from which are possible. But if the meaning strays too far away from the standard, the word can no longer be used appropriately. Also more abstract verbials can be approached in a similar fashion. Consider the speech act verb TO CONGRATULATE. A typical congratulation is an expression of the speaker's being pleased about the hearer's success in doing or obtaining something important. The first aspect of this prototypical meaning is completely absent from many formal acts of congratulating. The second aspect is being tampered with in the following headline from the International Herald Tribune: "Begin congratulates Sadat on their Nobel".

21. Such a prototype approach to meaning, which takes the internal structure of reality, the laws of perception and human cognitive strategies into account, immediately solves three of the problems pointed out in connection with the structuralistic semantic field theory.

First, it demonstrates that there is no absolute arbitrariness in the lexicalization of conceptual fields. Second, it explains the age-old habit of defining the meaning of many words without direct reference to the surrounding lexical items in the same field: when doing so, the definer restricts himself to the prototypical meaning. Third, the non-existence
of sharp boundaries between the conceptual areas covered by related words in a particular lexical field is no longer a problem for lexical semantics. The main preoccupation of structuralist semantic field theorists was to determine those boundaries, which turn out to be subject to strong interpersonal variation (within one language community as well as between different languages). With respect to the prototypical examples there is a much greater consistency in the word use of a speaker, a much greater correspondence between the uses made of a lexical item by different speakers of the same language, and a striking similarity in the use of equivalent words in different languages. Evidently we have encountered a fundamental property of word meaning, namely a psychological structure which is imposed on it (which might be represented as in Figure 4).

![Conceptual Field Diagram](image)

Figure 4

This figure is not meant to be usable for the representation of the overall structure of complete lexical fields. As we shall see later, it can only be used to depict the patterning of lexical fields along a single (or at best a few) 'semantic dimensions' --- a term to be explained later.

22. The prototype idea also reveals the absurdity of the checklist view which is still held by many linguists (most of those practicing lexical field theory and/or componential analysis). To repeat, the checklist approach is based on the view that an adequate description of the meaning of a word must present the complete list of conditions under which the
word can be appropriately used. The alternative is to give only the 'typical' conditions, i.e. the prototype approach.

In trying to determine the meaning of the word BOAT one could come up with a definition such as "a man-made object which can be used for traveling on water". A defender of the checklist approach, coming across a boat with a hole in it and deciding that he still wants to call it a BOAT (though it cannot be used for traveling on water any more), would have to revise his definition: "a man-made object which can normally be used for traveling on water, but in which there can also be a hole". Further, he would have to determine how big the hole can be before the object in question is no BOAT any more, but simply a WRECK. The impracticability of the checklist approach appears from the fact that not even its proponents would want to be guilty of the absurdities mentioned. A defender of the alternative theory could simply stick to his definition and describe a boat with a hole in terms of deviations from the prototypical boat. It should be kept in mind that such 'deviations' are not necessarily 'defects'; for that reason the example is a bit misleading. Probably the best argument for the prototype approach is that, in practice, most analyses of word meanings are based on it, though often unconsciously.

23. It is this prototype approach to meaning that I shall make use of. Though the standard or typical uses of semantic units are more stable than the borders of their applicability which can be expected to change very much from speaker to speaker, even the prototypes are subject to some interpersonal variability. This should not be surprising at all given that prototypes are products of cognitive processes which serve to make perceived
reality mentally manageable and given the fact that the world surrounding a member of a particular linguistic community is not necessarily identical to that of other members. Such variability does not make the specification of prototypes impossible. My judgments about prototypical meanings, however, must be regarded as hypotheses because I have not had any opportunity to verify them by means of extensive psychological testing. Not everybody will agree with my judgments, but the important thing is that such judgments can be made.

Since prototypes are basic tools in human categorization, this approach to the meaning of linguistic action verbials will lead us closer to what we are ultimately interested in, namely people's conceptualization of linguistic behavior.

24. Just as there is a psychological structure imposed on the semantic structure of lexical items (as visualized in Figure 4), there is also a psychological structure imposed on lexical fields. Not all classificatory levels in the hierarchic structure of the lexicon play an equally important role in the cognitive processing of reality. The existence of a cognitively basic level emerges from simple tests of the following kind: if you show a guitar to someone and ask him "What is this?", the reply is more likely to be 'a guitar' than 'a musical instrument' or 'a folk guitar'; if you present an apple to someone, the answer to the same question is more likely to be 'an apple' than 'fruit' or 'a golden delicious'. Therefore APPLE and GUITAR are called basic level terms: the others are superordinate or subordinate terms. More examples are given in Table 1 (part of which is adopted from Rosch 1977a).
25. Though it may be possible to discover the basic levels for the average member of a language community, they are, just as prototypes, subject to interpersonal differences. The variability, however, is not arbitrary: it depends on the degree of specialization or the knowledge someone obtains in a particular field. For instance, an aircraft engineer is likely to have DC 10 and 747 as their basic level terms rather than AIRPLANE. On the other
hand, my limited knowledge of that field does not even allow me to fill in subordinates for HELICOPTER except for HUEY which I accidentally got to know by reading about the Vietnam war. Conversely, a life-long city-dweller is not unlikely to have BIRD as a basic level term rather than SPARROW and ROBIN. Differences may even be more subtle: inhabitants of some pigeon-infested European cities may be expected to have PIGEON as a basic level term for pigeons and BIRD for all other birds (see Table 2). In this case there is no simple correspondence between cognitive structure and biological hierarchy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>superordinate</th>
<th>basic level</th>
<th>subordinate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>animal</td>
<td>bird</td>
<td>robin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>animal</td>
<td>bird</td>
<td>sparrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>animal</td>
<td>bird</td>
<td>pigeon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California robin</td>
<td>field sparrow</td>
<td>fancy pigeon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

26. The applicability of the notion of a basic level term is not restricted to nouns. Its application to adjectives is implicit in Berlin and Kay's color term studies: they restricted their investigations to basic color terms which, though they were not defined on a purely cognitive basis, might be regarded as the basic level adjectives in the color lexicon.

As for verbs, there is probably a high degree of correspondence between basic level terms and what R.M.W. Dixon (1971) calls nuclear verbs, i.e.
verbs which cannot be defined in terms of other verbs; non-nuclear verbs are those that can be defined in terms of nuclear ones. Though this definitional criterion differs considerably from the cognitive criteria adduced to single out basic level terms, there seems to be a correlation. The cognitive salience of nuclear verbs appears from the fact that the mother-in-law variety of Dyirbal (i.e. Dyalŋuy, which is only spoken in the presence of certain taboo-relatives, and which is characterized by the restriction of the number of lexical items to an absolute minimum) contains mainly nuclear verbs and hardly any non-nuclear ones.

But what about the relevance of basic levels to linguistic action verb-ials? No doubt some similar judgments can be made, but extreme caution is called for. Since the hierarchic structure of the lexicon is less clear for abstract concepts than for concrete objects, also the psychological structure imposed on the hierarchy will be more difficult to detect. Whereas my judgments about prototypes will be merely hypotheses due to the lack of psychological testing, the judgments that I will occasionally make about basic level terms have to be regarded as extremely tentative hypotheses. Such judgments will be made, however, whenever it seems appropriate and relevant. But because of their tentative character I shall sometimes talk about the most neutral terms instead of basic level terms (which is too much associated with Rosch's experimental methods).

27. Words are not isolated entities. Not only are they related to other words, but also to extra-linguistic reality. The verb TO SELL, for instance, immediately evokes a commercial scene consisting of a buyer, a seller, money and goods, between all of which there are relationships which are changed
throughout the interaction. (For a detailed analysis see Fillmore 1977.) Just as the human mind is forced to create prototypes to process the infinitude of stimuli presented by reality, so man is also obliged to construct prototypical instances of scenes in order to be able to handle social reality cognitively. Such a prototypical instance of a scene I call a frame. Hence, to be precise, we would say that the verb TO SELL evokes a commercial frame, if we are interested in describing its prototypical meaning.

28. Lexical meanings are always partly determined by an association with such frames and/or non-prototypical scenes. Here is an example adapted from Fillmore (1977). We can say about John "He spent three hours on land" and about Dick "He spent three hours on the ground". Though these sentences may be used to describe the nearly identical behavior of John and Dick in Antwerp on a rainy afternoon, yet they do not mean the same. The only reason is that ON LAND evokes the frame of navigation whereas ON THE GROUND is associated with the frame of aviation.

Not only words with a clear lexical meaning such as LAND, GROUND and TO SELL are connected with frames. Also lexically empty items such as WHAT carry such associations. Consider the question "What are you?". The interrogative pronoun in this sentence used to be associated with the world of professions, the appropriate answer being 'a doctor', 'a teacher', 'a student' etc. But nowadays it is ambiguous in some social circles since it may either evoke the professional world or the practice of astrology (in which case the appropriate answer is 'a Taurus', 'an
Aquarius', etc.)

The notion of a frame provides us with a solution to the problem of how to account for the semantic difference between two words covering an identical conceptual area, such as ANIMAL and BEAST. In many contexts the two nouns simply evoke different frames.

Needless to add that also scenes and frames are subject to interpersonal variation,

29. The set of linguistic choices -- textual as well as grammatical and lexical -- which is associated with a particular frame I call a linguistic frame. Its lexical part is a lexical frame. It will be clear that the latter is not independent of the rest of the linguistic frame. To give a simple illustration (again borrowed from Fillmore 1977), even the choice of a determiner may influence the frame with which a noun is associated. Compare "He did not give me a tip" with "He did not give me my tip". The indefinite article in the first sentence places TIP in the frame of generosity, whereas the possessive pronoun in the second sentence transposes it into a frame of obligatory payment. Hence "He did not give me a tip" is an accusation of bad manners, whereas "He did not give me my tip" is an accusation of doing an illegal thing. By connecting lexical meaning in that way with other linguistic entities (on every level of structure) lexical semantics transcends yet another limitation of the structuralistic approach to semantic fields.

One might be tempted to identify lexical frames with what the structuralists called semantic or lexical fields. Such an identification would be wrong. Lexical frames are even more complex than complex lexical fields.
The set of lexical choices associated with the commercial frame, for instance, does not only include TO BUY, TO PURCHASE, TO PROCURE, etc., but also TO SELL, TO PAY, TO CHARGE, etc. (As a complex field, it does, of course, not only include verbs.) It is impossible to force all of these into a paradigmatic-syntagmatic scheme such as Figure 2.

30. Summarizing, I am about to undertake a comparative study of a number of subsets of the verbials belonging to the lexical frame associated with linguistic action. When it comes to semantic analyses the notions of frame, basic level and prototype will be made use of.

In the foregoing discussion of these concepts I repeatedly drew the attention to interpersonal variability. Such variability is bound to make the job endless. An approach which obliges you to keep working forever is likely to be regarded as problematic. But frankly, I have never seen a phenomenon described completely, even with the most reductionistic approach imaginable. So where is the advantage?

Furthermore, the fact that success in communication is not automatic even if the speaker uses the 'right' words to express his thoughts, but that it depends crucially upon a laborious interpretation process, is not only veiled by the conduit metaphor (remember M. Reddy 1977) but also by all linguistic investigations based on the view that it is justified to abstract from the human (cognitive and social) aspects of a basically human phenomenon such as language. Such investigations actively support the conduit metaphor and may thus impede efficient communication. Not only are they out of touch with the actual character of the object of investigation (which makes them scientifically irrelevant) but they are
also misleading in an acutely dangerous way (which could almost be said to make them socially irresponsible). The approach sketched above cannot be blamed on either of these two counts. I believe that we should not try to construct troubleproof theories; rather, we should institutionalize he troubles which reflect actual interpretation processes -- for the sake of both the theory and the people who are confronted with it.

D. CIRCULARITY AND HOW TO AVOID IT

31. There is always a danger of circularity in the attempt to describe the meaning of linguistic units: one can hardly avoid using language for it, i.e. using paraphrases every part of which is as much in need of an explanation as the element described. But this investigation runs the risk of double circularity: language will have to be used to describe the way in which language is described by means of language. I believe, however, that the risk of being circular can be minimized.

First, there is no circularity in ostensive definitions such as "That is a tower" pronounced while pointing at a tower. Since we are concerned with lexical items used to describe linguistic actions we can usually present some ostensive definitions simply by reproducing examples of the verbal acts described by means of the words and expressions in question. Of course this cannot work with respect to those lexical items focusing on an aspect of verbal behavior which cannot be reproduced on paper. In those cases a circumscription will have to replace the illustration. Needless to say that ostensive definitions do not provide real clarity. It suffices to be reminded of the story about Captain Cook who, when he...
landed in Australia, saw kangaroos jumping around, asked some aborigines "What is that?" while pointing at them, and got as a reply something like "Kangaroo", which (again according to the story) is supposed to mean "What do you say?".

32. Though adducing illustrations or ostensive definitions can be regarded as a non-circular way of clarifying the meaning of the verbials we are interested in, it is by no means a full-fledged semantic procedure.

The main component of the approach to meaning which I shall take is implicit in writings as divergent as Wittgenstein (1953) and Leisi (1973). The meaning of the semantic units referring to (an aspect of) a linguistic action can be presented by formulating the conditions to be satisfied in order for the description to be appropriate. Again there can be no circularity involved since no paraphrases are needed. This approach is clearly pragmatic. Linguistic pragmatics is, after all, the study of the appropriateness conditions on the use of natural language.

We are talking about the appropriateness conditions on the use of the verbials we are investigating. But remembering the double linguistic layering of the enterprise (analyzing lexical items which are used to describe linguistic behavior) most -- though not all -- of them can be formulated in terms of conditions on or characteristics of the acts described by means of the verbials in question. The general form of the analysis will be this: a verbal V can be appropriately used in a description D of a linguistic action A if A satisfies condition C (or possesses characteristic C). The symbols D (for the describing act), A (for the act described) and C (for
the conditions on or charateristics of A necessary for D to be an appro-
 priate description of A) will be used throughout. Because we shall have
to talk about many describing acts, acts described and conditions, they
will be numbered consecutively (D1, D2, etc.) per section (where a 'section'
is any part of a chapter with a title preceded by a capital letter). In
the few cases in which an appropriateness condition on the use of a
linguistic action verbal cannot be formulated in terms of conditions on
the act described, the symbol Cv will be used for it if it can be formulated
in terms of conditions on the use of the verbal as such or Cd if a formu-
lation in terms of conditions on or properties of the describing act is
needed. A few more symbols: S stands for speaker and H for hearer; the
speaker and the hearer of A are abbreviated as Sa and Ha, and those of D
as Sd and Hd.

In the following paragraph a brief overview of appropriateness conditions
will be given which I use as a heuristic procedure. For a further justi-
fication of the distinctions I make, see Verschueren (1978).

33. Appropriateness conditions are not just attached to utterances as such,
but to different levels of linguistic structure. At the highest level of
generality we find a number of conditions attached to the use of language
as such: if a speaker S tries to communicate with a hearer H by means of
a language L, he must assume that H understands L, that H is not deaf,
or that he can read, etc. This is part of what Searle (1969) includes in
his 'normal input and output conditions'. As with many other conditions

1 Searle's formulation of his 'normal input and output conditions': "To-
their importance is only felt in case they do not obtain.

The next level is that of the communication type. Different types of communication are, for instance, conversation, literary writing, scholarly writing, advertising, etc. The maxims of quantity, quality, relation and manner specified by Grice (1975) were intended as conditions attached to a particular communication type, namely conversation (though they can be generalized to some other types of communication as well, and though they are not equally valid for all types of conversation).

Next is the style or code. A language is not an absolutely homogeneous instrument. Rather, closely related intentions can get very different expressions as in "Hi, Joe" versus "Good morning, Professor Carruthers" both of which can be addressed to the same person. Different appropriateness conditions are attached to these different styles.

2 For the sake of convenience I list Grice's (1975) maxims of conversation: Cooperative Principle: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged"; Maxims of Quantity: "Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)" and "Do not make your contribution more informative than is required"; Maxims of Quality: supermaxim: "Try to make your contribution one that is true", plus "Do not say what you believe to be false" and "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence"; Maxim of Relation: "Be relevant"; Maxims of Manner: supermaxim: "Be perspicuous", plus "Avoid obscurity of expression", "Avoid ambiguity", "Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)", and "Be orderly".

Together they include such things as that the speaker and hearer both know how to speak the language; both are conscious of what they are doing; they have no physical impediments to communication, such as deafness, aphasia, or laryngitis; and they are not acting in a play or telling jokes, etc. It should be noted that this condition excludes both impediments to communication such as deafness and also parasitic forms of communication such as telling jokes or acting in a play." (1969:57) The problem of seriousness and literalness (which is referred to in this quote by means of the term 'parasitic forms of discourse' as opposed to serious and literal types of communication) is not to be situated at the level of language as such.
With the level of the text there is, for instance, a condition of coherence associated.

At the level of the speech act type we have to situate the whole apparatus of conditions on illocutionary acts worked out by Searle (1969). Many of these are specific applications of Grice's maxims of conversation.

Then comes the occasion-specific speech act. This level is separate from the previous one for the following reason. Whereas, for instance, the speaker's intention to do a future act is a condition on the performance of a promise in general, the speaker's intention to come tomorrow is a condition on the occasion-specific utterance of the promise "I promise to come tomorrow".

In order for certain sentence structures to be appropriate, certain facts have to obtain. The wh-question "When did George come back?" presupposes that George came back. Similarly, the cleft "It was John who murdered the grocer" presupposes that someone murdered the grocer, and the pseudo-cleft "What Henry did was to burn down the garage" presupposes that Henry did something.

Appropriateness conditions are also associated with smaller linguistic units. For some noun phrases such as definite descriptions to be appropriate the object referred to has to be identifiable. Many words carry presuppositions (which constitute one type of appropriateness conditions): a verb of transition such as TO AWAKE is only appropriate if the person who is said to awake was asleep before; a factive predicate such as TO REGRET presupposes that the regretted state of affairs obtains; similarly, many adverbials such as AGAIN, etc. presuppose something. Even sound features such as a particular intonation pattern are only appropriate
under certain circumstances.

A word of caution is called for. The foregoing illustrations may be misleading in that all the conditions presented were somehow conditions on standard forms of language. Needless to say that linguistic behavior deviates from this standard all the time. But there is a serious danger of confusion here. I claimed before that what I was mainly interested in was the prototypical or standard meaning of linguistic action verbials because I believe that the prototype approach to lexical meaning is the only tenable one. But what should be kept in mind is that a deviation from the standard conditions, specified in this paragraph, attached to some level of the linguistic structure of A may be a standard condition on the appropriate use of a verbal V in a description D of act A.

34. The reader should be warned against interpreting the attempt to formulate 'appropriateness conditions' as a return to linguistics as a prescriptive rather than a descriptive enterprise. Such an interpretation completely misses the point. I hope this statement is not in need of further clarification.

35. The conditions we are talking about are a matter of contextual appropriateness. Thus a condition attached to a particular level of linguistic structure may be related to features of a different level of the same linguistic act, but also to features of the extra-linguistic context including the speaker's intentions and the effects produced in the hearer. All these aspects of linguistic action are represented in Table 3.
As I have said before, the previous overview of appropriateness conditions on the basis of the different levels of linguistic structure to which they are attached mainly serves as a heuristic procedure and will not be immediately reflected in the ensuing expositions. Thus it may happen that, when specifying a condition C on the appropriate use of a verbal V is a description D of an act A, I shall be talking only about an aspect of the extra-linguistic context of A or of the communication type to which A belongs though in fact C is attached to the speech act type or the propositional content of A. For instance, consider the condition that a speaker S must have authority over the hearer H in order for the verb TO COMMAND to be appropriately used in the description "S commanded H to leave" of the act of uttering "Leave!". This condition is completely formulated in terms of an extra-linguistic relationship between
the speaker and the hearer, though it is a condition attached to the speech act type.

In most cases conditions will be attached to several of the levels of linguistic structure of the act to be described. But usually not all of those conditions will be equally salient. These degrees of salience provide us with one criterion for identifying subfields within the vast lexical frame under investigation. Actually, this criterion was used in my selection of the subfields I am going to concentrate on in this essay.

E. PROBLEMS OF REPRESENTATION

36. In the first chapter of this essay I have advanced my view of this enterprise as an attempt to map the conceptual space associated with linguistic action as reflected in the words and expressions used in different languages to describe it. But how can such a 'geography of the mind' be undertaken? Consider Figures 5 and 6 (both of which I borrowed from Bolinger 1975). Such mappings are quite straightforward. But notice that in Figure 6 there is only a dimension of moistness at work. In Figure 5 there are three such dimensions, namely humanness, age and sex; yet the diagram retains a high degree of simplicity. But what can we do with words which are much more complex and cannot be adequately accounted for in terms of a couple of features, such as our linguistic action verbials? Clearly, a comparable graphic representation is impracticable if its purpose is to be a satisfactory account of the differences in meaning between those verbials, and, in that way, to split them up into semantic classes.
Figure 5

Figure 6
37. As mentioned before, attempts have been made to distinguish *semantic classes* of linguistic action verbials. Remember the attempts to classify speech act verbs or the illocutionary forces they describe. Though the number of semantic dimensions that have to be taken into account makes graphic representations of the type illustrated impossible, such classifications are feasible. There is, however, one condition: a decision has to be made as to the relative importance of the dimensions involved. Several different decisions can be made, depending on one's theoretical point of departure. Since the purpose of this investigation is to abandon theoretical biases as much as possible, I will not engage in the construction of classifications as all. I am only interested in discovering the *semantic dimensions* along which linguistic action verbials can be compared. Not only does this enable us to remain faithful to the original intentions, it also makes graphic representations possible again. Most verbials under investigation will be presented in diagrams which I call *semantic dimension comparison tables* (henceforth SDC-Tables).

38. The SDC-Tables will have the following general form. At the center the semantic dimension will be represented by a list of acts (numbered A1, A2, etc.; those numbers will be substantiated in the text) and the relevant conditions (numbered C1, C2, etc.; again those numbers occur in the text) under which they are performed, i.e. those conditions relevant to the semantic dimension in question. To the left the Dutch verbials will be listed in such a way that it will be clear which acts performed under which conditions can be appropriately described by them; whenever necessary also the description D (also numbered as in the text) in which
Figure 7
they are so used may be indicated; moreover, large dots will often indicate (as in Figure 4) the prototypical uses of the verbials. To the right the same will be done for English. As a result we get a visualized comparison of the relevant Dutch and English verbials with respect to a particular semantic dimension. The general form of these diagrams is depicted in Figure 7. Such diagrams will be presented for most dimensions along which appropriateness conditions are formulated and compared. Needless to say that often there will be several layers of overlapping words on each side of a single SDC-Table, and that the area covered by a particular word does not have to be a continuous part of the dimension.

39. Occasionally it will happen that a particular semantic dimension is relevant to the meaning of so many verbials that including them in the SDC-Table in question is physically impossible. In such cases the different semantic patterns (abbreviated SP) to which the verbials conform will often be numbered in the SDC-Table and a complete or representative list of the verbs an phrases belonging to each of the patterns distinguished will be given in the text. Thus a semantic pattern is defined as the way in which a word (or group of words) relates to a particular dimension of its meaning. Figure 8 depicts the general form of such simplified SDC-Tables.

Another way out when the number of relevant verbials is too large to squeeze into the tables is to simply give one or two examples. It will always be clear from the text which other verbials show the same semantic pattern as the examples given in the SDC-Table.
40. In this chapter I hope to have succeeded in defining the object of investigation more precisely, in explaining the principles of lexical semantics underlying my approach, and in clarifying the way in which the analyses will be formulated and the results will be presented. Thus we should be ready now to take language as our guide for the tour through linguistic action. In view of the inevitable limitations of the investigation some readers might be prompted to abandon the adventure altogether. But after all, curtailed insights are better than no insights at all.

There is one aspect of the investigation that I have neglected to mention so far. One of the ways to pursue my ultimate interest in the conceptual-
ization of linguistic action would be to study the metaphors revealed in its Dutch and English lexicalizations. However, considerations to that effect will only sporadically be found in the following chapters.
III. THE SEMANTICS OF SILENCE

A. INTRODUCTION

1. In the introductory chapter we announced that we are going to make a guided tour through linguistic action with language, in particular the verbials it furnishes to describe what one does with words, as our guide. A good guide does not only take you to the obvious places which can be seen and recognized from miles away. Language fits that definition of a good guide. Immediately it draws our attention to an aspect of linguistic action which all theoreticians have ignored: the many ways of being silent. There is more to silence than the absence of speech. Silence can be golden, deathlike, tomblike, solemn, and even pregnant; but it is rarely neutral. That is, when silence is neutral it is rarely talked about or even noticed.

One can legitimately wonder whether silence is a linguistically significant category. Let us make a comparison. Though for a geographer the complete set of holes in the surface of the earth does not form a natural category, it consists of a number of subsets (e.g. vulcanic craters, holes caused by the impact of meteorites, those caused by earthquakes, etc.)
which do. Similarly, though all instances of linguistic silence, taken together, do not constitute a natural linguistic category, it is linguistically significant to get an overview of the complete set because it consists of a number of subsets the 'natural category' status of which would be hard to deny.

2. For the sake of brevity I baptize all the verbials describing a person's being silent *verba tacendi* (Latin *TACERE* means 'to be silent'). And instead of having recourse to the quite informal OYSTER or CLAM, the silent person will be dubbed the *tacens*.

Due to the marginal position of the verba tacendi among the linguistic action verbials, this chapter differs from the others in two important respects. First, some negations of non-silence linguistic action verbals such as NOT SPEAK and NOT TALK (the lexical status of which was discussed in paragraph 4 of the preceding chapter) will be regarded as complex lexicalizations because they are conventional means for talking about the absence of speech. Almost no comparable lexicalizations will occur in the following chapters. Second, ostensive definitions will be impossible here: acts of being silent cannot be reproduced on paper. Therefore the acts referred to by means of the lexical items under investigation can only be described, whereas illustrations can be adduced when we come to the study of the other lexical subfields singled out in this essay.

**B. THE FRAME OF SILENCE**

3. Silence is no doubt the most marginal aspect of linguistic action imaginable. Yet in our talking about linguistic action it is certainly
part of it. One would never make an assertion about someone's being silent unless he could have been expected to speak. Whereas the marginal character of silence within the frame of linguistic action is the reason why theorists of communication have usually neglected to talk about it, it provides me with two arguments to treat the verba tacendi in this essay which, as announced, is intended to concentrate only on some representative subfields of the linguistic action verbials.

First, no matter what phenomenon one is trying to account for, the account is hopelessly inadequate if only its 'spectacular' aspects are dealt with and nothing is said about the unspectacular ones. Let me try to clarify the relevance of this general statement for the problem at hand by carrying the metaphors of this undertaking as a kind of 'geography of the mind' and as a 'guided tour' a bit further. Someone who has visited Yellowstone National Park and the Grand Canyon but has no idea of the less impressive Midwestern landscape, or someone who has only seen New York City or San Francisco but has no idea of the kind of life going on in a less exciting small Midwestern town, cannot be said to know the United States. Silence is the usually unnoticed and rarely appreciated Midwest of linguistic action. The area has to be included in any sample which purports to be representative.

Second, because of its marginality, silence is a reflection of all the major aspects of linguistic action. This is especially clear after a survey of the verba tacendi. Silence is not just the absence of linguistic sounds. There is also a meaning to it. It shows contextual links. There are social value judgments attached to silence. There is a speaker and a hearer involved -- however strange this may sound. And so on. Briefly,
the frame of silence is the frame of linguistic action itself. Whereas all other subfields of linguistic action verbials studied in this essay are centred around a few heavily emphasized aspects of verbal behavior, no such emphasis is clear with the verba tacendi. But let us now start listening to what the words have to say; in other words, let us start investigating what the lexical frame of silence has to teach us.

C. SILENCE, MEANING, CONTEXT AND COMMUNICATION TYPE

4. Though I am more interested in the semantic dimensions along which linguistic action verbials can be compared than in the semantic classes into which it is possible to group them, it may be helpful to observe that the set of verba tacendi seems to fall apart in three quite natural categories (which can themselves be regarded as points of a semantic dimension). The contrast between the first two classes reflects the distinction between the form and the content of utterances or between the act of speaking as such and what one says. Let us call the lexical tools to describe the absence of acts as speaking as such verba silendi. The basic ones in English are probably TO BE SILENT, NOT TALK, NOT SPEAK, and TO SAY NOTHING. Many other verba tacendi mean that the tacens refrained from talking about a particular subject (in which case he may either be completely silent or talking about something else): these I call verba reticendi (Latin RETICERE is synonymous with the transitive form of TACEREE); the object in question will be referred to as the tacendum, pl. tacea. The basic English examples are TO BE SILENT ABOUT, NOT TALK ABOUT, NOT SPEAK ABOUT and TO SAY NOTHING ABOUT. In addition to the verba silendi
and the verba reticendi there is a third category of words and expressions by means of which a person's being silent can be described. With the verba silendi they share the property of designating the absence of speech as such; a specification of what it is that is not being talked about is not necessary, though many of the verbials in question can get or even require a complement. I am talking about what could be called the *verba cessandi*, verbals denoting a person's silence after he has been speaking (or writing) and sometimes implying that he will resume his linguistic activity after a brief interval. The complements they can get may specify the nature of the preceding discourse.

Observe that there is another set of verbals which describe linguistic actions related to silence. I am thinking of TO SILENCE, TO PUT TO SILENCE, etc. These, however, are not verba tacendi: they describe (usually linguistic) acts performed in order to cause somebody else to be silent. Therefore they do not belong to my object of investigation in this chapter.

Remember that the purpose of this paragraph is not to set up a taxonomy of verba tacendi, which would be in contradiction with the overall aim of this work. Rather, I present the distinctions in order to demonstrate the kinds of verbals that I am about to analyze, and in order to set up a terminology which will make the discussion easier. Moreover, and this is the main reason, the distinctions provide us with a kind of semantic dimension along which the basic verba tacendi can be usefully compared, as will soon become clear.

With *basic verba tacendi* I mean those which are somehow neutral, un-marked; that is, those verba tacendi the applicability of which is governed by the least specific appropriateness conditions. If my linguistic intuit-
ions had been backed by elaborate psychological testing, I would probably have dared to call them basic level terms. Notice that I have not given an example of a basic verbum cessandi; it seems to me that there is no such thing in English; TO STOP TALKING is not a lexical item (according to the criterion put forward in paragraph 4 of the previous chapter) and TO FALL SILENT is not neutral as will be shown later.

5. From the few examples adduced so far two facts about English verba tacendi emerge. First, the basic verba tacendi are always complex lexicalizations. Many simple lexicalizations will be encountered in the following discussion, but their meaning is always more specialized.

Second, English lacks a general term for the absence of speech. TO BE SILENT (which will only be studied in its absence-of-an-act-of-speaking sense, not in the sense of being habitually reluctant to speak) does not necessarily mean that no words were uttered at all, though this is no doubt its central meaning; it is a more relative notion. If Mr. Smith refrained from speaking on a certain occasion, the absolute absence of his speech activity would be accurately described by saying

\[ \text{(D1) Mr. Smith was silent} \]

But the same sentence could be used if Mr. Smith had indeed been talking but if he had been more taciturn than he used to be or than was expected of him on such an occasion. In other words, TO BE SILENT is applicable to (A1) and (A2).

\[ \text{(A1) Sa utters no words at all} \]
\[ \text{(A2) Sa utters few words (or fewer than usual under comparable circumstances} \]
Consequently, TO BE SILENT is not only applicable to situations in which a person abstains from using language.

Moreover, not all silence acts can be described with it. In order to show this we distinguish two more possible types of such acts.

(A3) S_a utters no words about a particular topic
(A4) S_a discontinues his uttering of words

The attentive reader will have noticed that (A1) specifies the domain of the verba silendi, (A3) that of the verba reticendi and (A4) the domain of the verba cessandi. TO BE SILENT, as it stands, can only be used in some marked descriptions of (A3) and (A4). I regard a description of (A3) as marked when (Cd2) instead of (Cd1) obtains, and a description of (A4) when (Cd4) instead of (Cd3) obtains.

(Cd1) The tacendum is expressed in the propositional content of D
(Cd2) The tacendum is not expressed in the propositional content of D
(Cd3) The discontinued discourse is not overtly indicated in D
(Cd4) The discontinued discourse is overtly indicated in D

Since the tacendum of a silence act can be anything, (D1) cannot be considered an adequate account of (A3) except, for instance, if (D1) is uttered in reply to a question such as "Did Mr. Smith say anything about his forthcoming divorce?". Because such a special context is required to avoid an expression of the tacendum in the propositional content of a description of (A3), any D describing (A3) and conforming to (Cd2) is marked whereas it would be unmarked or neutral when conforming to (Cd1). TO BE SILENT can only be used in such a marked description of (A3). How-
ever, only a small adaptation is needed to make TO BE SILENT applicable in D describing (A3) and conforming to (Cd1), namely the addition of the preposition ABOUT. But what about (A4)? It seems that verba cessandi such as TO FALL SILENT do not require an overt specification of the discontinued discourse in the D in which they are used to describe (A4): the fact that the silence act follows speech is clear from the verbal itself. Hence D is unmarked if it conforms to (Cd3) but marked if (Cd4) is satisfied. Again, TO BE SILENT can only be used to describe (A4) in a marked D: (D1) does not mean that the utterance of words was discontinued. But in (D2), which satisfied (Cd4), TO BE SILENT is a verbum cessandi.

(D2) He was silent for a couple of seconds (before he resumed the thread of his discourse)

Notice that even the addition of 'for a couple of seconds' may be sufficient as an overt indication of preceding discourse. In this case a small adaptation cannot make TO BE SILENT applicable in D describing (A4) and conforming to (Cd3). The verbal TO FALL SILENT can be used in an unmarked D of (A4), but it will be shown later that for other reasons it cannot be regarded as a basic verbum cessandi.

6. Another verbal, TO SAY NOTHING (or NOT SAY ANYTHING), has two advantages over TO BE SILENT when it comes to deciding which term for the absence of speech is the most general. First, it excludes acts of type (A2) except in strongly hyperbolic speech; hence it is a more absolute notion than TO BE SILENT. The relative character of TO BE SILENT is easy to understand if we realize that in one of its senses SILENT is synonymous
with TACITURN, which is predicated of a person who is temperamentally disinclined to talk (though, of course, he talks whenever talking is inevitable).

Second, TO SAY NOTHING covers more acts of type (A3) than TO BE SILENT. The restriction to descriptions conforming to (Cd2), as well as the possibility of extending its use to descriptions satisfying (Cd1) by adding the preposition ABOUT, are identical. But imagine two ruffians torturing Mr. Smith to force some secrets out of him. If one of those brutes returns after having gone out for a while and asks the other one "Did he say anything?", the answer could be (D3).

(D3) No, he didn't (say anything); he was just begging for mercy.

In (D3) "he didn't (say anything)" cannot possibly be replaced by "he was silent" because it would be incompatible with "he was just begging for mercy". Thus TO BE SILENT can only be used in D describing (A3) and conforming to (Cd2) if condition (C1) is satisfied by (A3). TO SAY NOTHING on the other hand, is applicable no matter whether (C1) or (C2) obtains.

(C1) Sa utters no words at all.

(C2) Sa utters only words unrelated to the tacendum in question.

(Notice the identity between (C1) as a property of (A3) and my previous formulation of (A1).) Here TO BE SILENT turns out to be a more absolute notion than TO SAY NOTHING. Is this not in contradiction with the difference in applicability of the two verbials to (A2)? The possibility of using TO SAY NOTHING in D describing (A3) and conforming to (Cd2) no matter whether (C1) or (C2) is satisfied by (A3) is due to the ambiguity
of TO SAY SOMETHING between 'making an utterance' and 'stating something'. Its meaning can be even more specific: 'stating something about a specific subject'. Thus, for the ruffian's purposes

(D4) He did not say anything

would still be accurate if Mr. Smith had been making all kinds of statements such as

(A5) The weather is gorgeous today

or

(A6) I love peanut butter and jelly sandwiches

Sentence (D1) could not possibly replace (D4) with reference to the same acts. However, it might be possible to use (D5).

(D5) He kept silent

But just as TO FALL SILENT, the verbal TO KEEP SILENT is no basic verbum tacendi. Once more, this will be clarified later.

7. The negations of TO SPEAK and TO TALK cover (A1), and also (A3) in conformity with (Cd2) whether (A3) satisfies (C1) or (C2). Notice that, unlike TO SAY SOMETHING, the verbs TO SPEAK and TO TALK are not ambiguous between 'making an utterance' and 'stating something'. Yet they are ambiguous between 'making an utterance' and 'stating something about a specific subject'. That is why
(D6) He did not speak (talk)

can replace (D4) in the torture-situation sketched.

NOT SPEAK and NOT TALK pose an additional problem because of the ambiguity of TO SPEAK and TO TALK between 'to utter words', 'to conduct a conversation', and 'to deliver a speech, give a talk'. The second and third meanings explain why it is possible to say (D7) and (D8), respectively.

(D7) During the last five years of his life he never spoke (talked) to anyone; only occasionally did he shout a greeting from inside his car

(D8) Because he did not speak (talk) at the conference he had some time for a nice private conversation

Thus NOT SPEAK and NOT TALK cover (A7) and (A8), neither of which can be included in any of the major types of silence acts distinguished so far: here the tacens abstains from engaging in a particular communication type.

(A7) Sa does not conduct a conversation

(A8) Sa does not deliver a speech (give a talk)

None of the other verba tacendi discussed so far can be used in any way similar to (D7) and (D8).

Observe, finally, that adding ABOUT to NOT SPEAK and NOT TALK restricts their use to descriptions of (A3) conforming to (Cdl), In this respect they are similar to both TO BE SILENT and TO SAY NOTHING.
8. Whereas English only possesses complex lexicalizations to express somebody's being silent in a more or less neutral way, many languages have \textit{simple lexicalizations} at their disposal: Dutch \textsc{Zwijgen}, German \textsc{Schweigen}, French \textsc{S'étaire}, Latin \textsc{Tacere} and \textsc{Silere}, Greek ἔμενε and ἔγνω, etc. As announced, I only concentrate on the contrast between Dutch and English. \textsc{Zwijgen} is not only a simple lexicalization, its meaning is also \textit{more general} than any of the English equivalents: it covers the three major areas of the conceptual domain of the verba tacendi, i.e. the absence of speech as such, the absence of speech about a certain topic as in

\begin{center}
(D9) Hij kon het niet langer \textsc{Zwijgen}
\end{center}

(He couldn't \textit{KEEP SILENT ABOUT} it any longer)

and the act of discontinuing one's discourse. English simply lacks such a general term. Moreover, unlike \textit{To be silent}, \textsc{Zwijgen} does not cover (A2), which I regard as outside the proper scope of the verba tacendi.

\textsc{Niet spreken} ('not speak'), \textsc{Niet praten} ('not talk') and \textsc{Niet zegggen} ('to say nothing') have the same scope as their English counterparts. The meaning of these three verbials, as well as the meaning of \textsc{Zwijgen}, can be restricted, as with the English verbials, to descriptions of (A3) conforming to (Cd1) by adding the preposition \textit{over}. For the description of (A3) conforming to (Cd1) Dutch provides another simple lexicalization, namely \textsc{verzwijgen} as in (D10).

\begin{center}
(D10) Hij \textsc{verzweeg} zijn communistisch verleden
\end{center}

(He \textit{kept silent about} his communist past)

9. The differences between the basic verba tacendi in English and in Dutch are represented in SDC-Table 1. A striking fact which emerges from
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUTCH</th>
<th>SEMANTIC DIMENSION</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>niet spreken, niet praten</td>
<td>zwijgen</td>
<td>to be silent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>niets zeggen</td>
<td></td>
<td>to say nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zwijgen over verzijgen etc.</td>
<td>-Cd1</td>
<td>to be silent about, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Cd2 -Cd3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Cd4</td>
<td>to be silent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>niet spreken</td>
<td></td>
<td>not speak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>niet praten</td>
<td></td>
<td>not talk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SDC-Table 1
the table is that for all the verbials which have (A1) as part of their meaning, (A1) is at the same time the focus of their meaning. The asymmetries between Dutch and English are no doubt clear.

How can A1-3-4-7-8 be regarded as a semantic dimension of the verba tacendi? I said earlier that due to the marginality of silence in the frame of linguistic action, the lexical frame associated with it is bound to reflect the whole spectrum of linguistic action itself. Thus there is an important language dimension to the verba tacendi. Since the verbials discussed so far were all said to be somehow basic in the lexical frame of silence, (A1), (A3) and (A4) -- and maybe also (A7) and (A8) -- can be regarded as focal points in that language dimension of the verba tacendi: the simple absence of language, the absence of speech about a particular topic (which is related to the meaning aspect of linguistic action), the absence of speech in the context of surrounding utterances, and the absence of utterances belonging to a particular communication type.

Though the importance of (A1), (A3) and (A4) might have been realized by any theoretician studying acts of being silent, the importance of (A7) and (A8) would probably have been overlooked. Indeed, it appears arbitrary to single out the communication type within the realm of the different aspects of linguistic action, and within the realm of the different communication types it seems even more arbitrary to single out the conversation type and the 'speech'. Yet (A7) and (A8) occupy a salient place in our western experience of linguistic action: they are our prototypes of dialogue and monologue, respectively. It would not cause too much surprise to find a highly ritual culture or subculture in which the equivalent of NOT SPEAK indicated the non-performance of a particular ritual.
10. The previous paragraphs provide us with an additional argument for not trying to make a taxonomy of verba tacendi or, for that matter, of linguistic action verbials in general. No doubt the boundaries between the verba silendi, verba reticendi and verba cessandi are fuzzy. A high percentage of the verbials to be investigated belong to more than one of these categories. Indeed, the meaning of the few basic verba tacendi discussed so far was always spread out over more than one of the three types and often extended beyond the scope of all three. In some cases one could claim that the verbials in question have several different meanings. But there are obvious cases of mixed meanings. A typical example is the Dutch AFSAPPEN VAN (lit. 'to step down from [a topic]') which indicates at once silence about a particular topic and the discontinuation of speech about that topic (as well as the taking up of another topic).

Moreover, also the boundary between the verba tacendi and the verbials describing acts of putting someone to silence is vague; consider in this respect the verbs TO CENSOR and TO HUSH UP. Furthermore, there are probably borderline cases between the verba tacendi and the verbials of lying to be discussed in the next chapter: there may be occasions on which acts of keeping back information (i.e. the domain of the verba reticendi) should be considered acts of lying.

D. THE CODES OF SILENCE

11. The reader's attention should be drawn to the fact that all the verbials in the foregoing paragraphs explicitly concentrate on the absence of speech as an oral manifestation of language, and not on the absence of linguistic
behavior as such. With respect to oral versus written communication we can distinguish (A1) and (A2).

(A1) S abstains from speaking
(A2) S abstains from writing

Though all the basic verba tacendi represented in SDC-Table 1 have (A1) as the focus of their meaning, some -- if not most -- of them can be applied metaphorically to (A2) as in (D1).

(D1) The novelist kept silent for almost a decade before publishing his last masterpiece

But this application is metaphorical. The only basic verba tacendi centering on and restricted to (A2) are the negations of English TO WRITE and Dutch SCHRIJVEN. With respect to the codes of silence we get the quite symmetrical situation depicted in SDC-Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>DUTCH</th>
<th>SEMANTIC DIMENSION</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>zwijgen</td>
<td>[A1] to be silent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>niet schrijven</td>
<td>[A2] not write</td>
<td>to be silent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SDC-Table 2

12. With respect to the distinction between the absence of spoken versus written communication, the verba tacendi might be expected to show five different semantic patterns.
(SP1) The meaning is restricted to (A1)
(SP2) The meaning is restricted to (A2)
(SP3) The focus of the meaning is (A1), but it can be extended to (A2)
(SP4) The focus of the meaning is (A2), but it can be extended to (A1)
(SP5) The meaning includes (A1) and (A2) on an equal basis

These patterns are depicted in SDC-Table 3.

SDC-Table 3

How are the verba tacendi distributed across these patterns?

13. An overview of the verba tacendi shows that the numerically best represented pattern is (SP5). The group includes, amongst many other verbials, TO BURY, TO CEASE, TO COME TO AN END, TO CONCEAL, TO END, NOT GIVE AWAY, TO KEEP BACK, TO KEEP UNDER ONE'S HAT, TO KEEP SECRET, TO MAKE NO SIGN, TO SECRETE, TO STOP, TO VEIL. Notice that in this group there are only verba reticendi and verba cessandi, with the possible exception of TO MAKE NO SIGN.

Also on Dutch the majority of verba tacendi show pattern (SP5). Some examples: AFSTAPPEN VAN (lit. 'to step down from'), EINDIGEN ('to end'), GEHEIMHOUDEN ('to keep secret'), ACHTERHOUDEN ('to keep back'), etc.
Also in Dutch the list only includes clear cases of verba reticendi and verba cessandi. I called TO MAKE NO SIGN a possible exception to this regularity. Consider its use in (D2) and its Dutch equivalent NIET VAN ZICH LATEN HOREN (lit. 'not let [somebody] hear about oneself') in (D3).

(D2) I don't know his whereabouts; he's made no sign during the past three years

(D3) Hij heeft al drie jaar niet meer van zich laten horen
(lit. 'he has not let [us] hear about himself for three years already')

The context in (D2), as well as the reflexive VAN ZICH ('about oneself') in the Dutch verbal, show that it maybe necessary to interpret the phrases as indicating the absence of (oral or written) communication about oneself rather than the absence of communication as such. This hypothesis may be further supported by the rough equivalence of (D2) with (D4) and of (D3) with (D5).

(D4) I don't know his whereabouts; he's given no sign of life during the past three years

(D5) Hij heeft al drie jaar geen teken van leven meer gegeven
(He has given no sign of life for three years already)

But the rough equivalence of TO MAKE NO SIGN and NIET VAN ZICH LATEN HOREN with TO GIVE NO SIGN OF LIFE and GEEN TEKEN VAN LEVEN GEVEN could also be adduced as evidence to disprove the hypothesis: one might regard an act of 'giving no sign of life' as an act of refraining from communicating as such so that 'hearer' cannot infer the tacens' being alive, rather than as
an act of not communicating about oneself (or one's being alive). Hence the four verbials in question are to be situated somewhere along the border-line between verba silendi and verba reticendi. That is, we have one more argument for not yielding to the temptation to make hasty taxonomic judgments.

But why the nearly absolute restriction of pattern (SP5) to verba reticendi and verba cessand i in both languages? Why are the verba silendi not normally neutral with respect to the oral versus the written code of silence? We are not yet in a position to venture upon a generalizing explanation -- and we won't be within the scope of this essay. More comparative work is needed first in order to discover the universality or non-universality of the phenomenon. Only then will it be possible to decide where an explanation has to be found: in the nature of language as such, or in the cultural traits of particular linguistic communities.

14. Next on the scale of the number of representatives in the lexicon comes pattern (SP1). Some examples: NOT BREATHE A WORD, TO BUTTON ONE'S LIP, TO CLOSE ONE'S MOUTH, TO HOLD ONE'S TONGUE, TO KEEP QUIET, NOT SAY 'BOO', TO KNOCK IT OFF, TO SHUT ONE'S BAZOO, NOT UTTER A WORD. Dutch: BOE NOCH BA ZEGGEN (lit. 'to say neither boo nor ba'), GEEN BEK/MOND OPENDOEN (lit. 'not open a beak/mouth'), ZIJN BAKKES HOU DEN (lit. 'to hold one's trap'), etc. Two remarks ought to be made.

First, there is a clear correlation between the formation of most (SP1) verbials and the restriction of their meaning to (A1). Most of them contain an explicit reference to part of the oral communication process (e.g. breathing, opening one's mouth, uttering sounds) or am instrument of oral
communication (e.g. lips, tongue, mouth, etc.).

Second, the (SP1) verbials form the only set of verba tacendi which contains many slang expressions such as TO KNOCK IT OFF, TO SHUT ONE'S BAZOO, etc. Slang also occurs in verbials the meaning of which is patterned differently, but much less frequently. Hence there is an interesting correlation between the oral code of the acts of silence to be described and the informal, slangy code of the appropriate describing acts. But again, an explanation will have to be based on further comparative data and on the observation of the existence or non-existence of a comparable correlation with respect to non-silence aspects of linguistic action.

15. Pattern (SP3) comes next. Its representatives in the lexicon constitute the only remaining large group of verba tacendi. An example is the basic verbum tacendi TO BE SILENT and its Dutch equivalent ZWIJGEN, as will have appeared from SDC-Table 2. I shall discuss some other examples in contrast with closely related (SP1) verbials. Consider the following two columns of verbials.

| to fall silent   | -- to be silent            |
| to stand mute    | -- to be mute               |
| to button up     | -- to keep buttoned up     |
| not utter a word | -- not say a word           |
| not say 'boo'    | -- not say a word           |
| to shut one's face/mouth/head | -- to shut up |
| to hem and haw   | -- to beat around the bush |

If I am not mistaken, the left column contains (SP1) verbials whereas those in the right column all conform to (SP3). The meaning of TO BE SILENT has already been shown to be extendable to (A2). No such extension seems
to be possible for TO FALL SILENT the typical use of which is illustrated in (D6).

(D6) The politician made a desperate attempt to answer the press agent's question, but he soon fell silent

TO BE MUTE usually refers to (A1), but in (D7), uttered in response to "I know you wrote to him about the irregularities you discovered, but did you get a reply?", the act described may be of the (A2) type.

(D7) No, he is still mute on the subject

An (A2) interpretation of TO STAND MUTE as used in (D8) is not possible.

(D8) He stood mute upon hearing about his superior's resignation

The next verbal, TO KEEP BUTTONED UP can be used with reference to the absence of written communication, as in (D9) which is a reply to "Did he answer your letter?".

(D9) Yes, but he keeps buttoned up about the irregularities I discovered

TO BUTTON UP, on the other hand, is restricted to (A1). The (SP3) pattern of NOT SAY A WORD and the (SP1) pattern of the corresponding verbials NOT UTTER A WORD and NOT SAY 'BOO' will be clear from the fact that the latter two cannot replace the former in (D10).

(D10) In his letter he did not say a word about the irregularities I discovered

Also TO SHUT UP can be extended to (A2) as in (D11).
(D11) I want this letter to be mailed today, so I must shut up in a minute

Similar extensions are not possible for TO SHUT ONE'S FACE/MOUTH/HEAD. Finally, one can BEAT AROUND THE BUSH both orally and in writing, but one can only hem and haw orally, though both verbials designate the same kind of silence about a particular topic brought about by talking about vaguely related but irrelevant things.

The interaction of three quite distinct parameters seems to be responsible for the differences in semantic pattern shown in the above pairs of verbials. First, there is the degree of immediacy of the linguistic action to be described. The immediacy of oral communication as opposed to the delayed interaction mediated by writing might explain why TO FALL SILENT, which implies the abrupt character of the silence described, is not normally used to describe 'silence in its written form'; there are exceptional cases such as "After writing one novel after the other for more than thirty years he suddenly fell silent, in which the abruptness is preserved. A second factor involved is the formation of the verbials (see also the previous paragraph). NOT UTTER A WORD and NOT SAY 'BOO' carry an explicit reference to the production of sounds, just as the imitative TO HEM AND HAW, whereas TO SHUT ONE'S FACE/MOUTH/HEAD and TO STAND MUTE focus on the instruments of oral communication. Therefore, their being restricted to (A1) is not surprising. The same factor may explain why TO BE SILENT, TO BE MUTE and NOT SAY A WORD are in the first place concerned with the absence of speech instead of being neutral as to the (A1) or (A2) type of silence. Third, the degree of formality of the description is involved.
TO BUTTON UP, NOT SAY 'BOO', TO SHUT ONE'S FACE/MOUTH/HEAD and TO HEM AND HAW are all slangy. Also the relation between slangy verba tacendi and the oral code of acts of silence has already been observed in the previous paragraph. The restriction of the four verbials enumerated to (A1) is entirely in keeping with it. Moreover, the same correlation may explain why the pretty informal expressions TO KEEP BUTTONED UP, TO SHUT UP and TO BEAT AROUND THE BUSH are in the first place concerned with the absence of speech rather than being neutral as to the (A1) or (A2) type of silence. This follow-up remark, as well as the one attached to the comments on verbal formation, indicates that none of the parameters discussed is self-sufficient to assign a particular semantic pattern to a verbal; rather, an intricate intercation of these seems to be responsible. Again, a specification of this interaction will require a lot of further research. Quite similar arguments could be made for the equivalent Dutch verbals discussed in this paragraph.

16. Pattern (SP2) is extremely sparsely populated. We have already mentioned NOT WRITE, which is the only basic verbal belonging here. I had to stretch my imagination to find a second and, admittedly, marginal example, namely TO DISCONTINUE in the sense of 'stopping the publication of' as in (D12). (But in practically the same sense one can talk about discontinuing a series of radio talks.)

(D12) The publishing company discontinued the unprofitable journal

One might be tempted to include verbals such as TO CLASSIFY and TO FILE AND FORGET in the list of (SP2) verba tacendi, but they do not belong here
at all: they do not indicate the absence of written communication, but the use of writing as a medium to secrete information.

In Dutch there is only NIET SCHRIJVEN ('not write'). Including the Dutch equivalent to TO DISCONTINUE, namely DE PUBLIKATIE STOPZETTEN VAN ('stop the publication of') requires an even stronger stretching of the amigination because its semantic unity is so weak that I would not be inclined to regard it as a lexical item (however complex).

17. Finally, pattern (SP4) is, as far as I can see, completely empty, both in English and in Dutch. In this respect another interesting question arises. How is it that there is such an asymmetrical relationship between (A1) and (A2) that basic (A1) verbials such as TO BE SILENT can be extended to (A2), whereas the reverse is not true? I am not going to answer the question. Some readers may believe that it would be absurd even to assume that there might be a language in which the meaning of NOT WRITE would get extended to (A1). Yet there is no logical necessity in the restriction of NOT WRITE to (A2), as appears from the fact that words describing the reception and reproduction poles of written communication, such as TO READ and TO COPY, do get extended to the reception of oral language (transmitted by radio) as in "Do you read me?" and "I copy you".

18. In connection with (SP2) we hinted at a totally different aspect of the code of some acts of being silent. Some verba reticendi describe acts of withholding information or of being silent about a particular topic
which may be essentially brought about by linguistic means. I am thinking of verbials such as TO CONCEAL, TO COVER UP, TO HIDE, TO KEEP UNDER WRAPS, TO PUT THE LID ON, TO VEIL, and two mentioned already, namely TO CLASSIFY and TO FILE AND FORGET. If language is used to hide information, that language has to appear either or in a written form as well. Most of the verbials in question are neutral as to the code of the secreting language. Only TO CLASSIFY and TO FILE AND FORGET focus of the written code, though they may be metaphorically extended. Surprising enough, I have not been able to find any which focus specifically on the oral code of communication. So here the relationship between the two codes is reversed. Again the situation in Dutch seems to be completely analogous.

E. THE SOUND OF SILENCE

19. Absolute concepts are not susceptible to comparison or gradation. Thus, if two people are absent from a meeting it makes no sense to say that the one is more absent than the other or that both are very absent. Yet the absence of speech, just as speech itself, can be perceived as more or less intense or 'loud'. Moreover, as to speaking, there is an essentially temporal dimension to not speaking. Therefore it should not surprise us that most of the expressions used to describe it contain some indication of duration. Intensity and duration are what I call the two sound-related dimensions of silence. Their relevance to an understanding of the verba tacendi will be discussed in this section.
20. In theory, it should be possible to distinguish between acts of being silent with a high, average and low intensity, and between long, average and short ones. The following semantic patterns of the verba tacendi might be expected to correspond to these degrees. They are represented in SDC-Tables 4 and 5.

(SP1) The verbal describes a highly intense silence act
(SP2) The verbal describes a silence act of average intensity
(SP3) The verbal describes a silence act of low intensity
(SP4) The verbal indicates a long silence
(SP5) The verbal indicates a silence act with average length
(SP6) The verbal indicates a short silence

However, only one of these degrees of comparison, the superlative, is reflected in the verba tacendi. In other words, patterns (SP2), (SP3), (SP5) and (SP6) in SDC-Tables 4 and 5 characterize empty classes. All verbials which do not indicate highly intense silence acts are completely neutral with respect to intensity, i.e. they conform to (SP7).

(SP7) The verbal is applicable to a silence act with any degree of intensity

And those which do not indicate a long duration are neutral as to the temporal dimension, i.e. they conform to (SP8).

(SP8) The verbal is applicable to a silence act with any duration

Strictly speaking, the neutral (SP7) and (SP8) verbials are outside the scope of the two sound-realted dimensions of silence. Therefore, only the
(SP1) and (SP4) verbials, i.e. those verba tacendi emphasizing the intensity and duration of the acts of being silent, will be reviewed in the following paragraphs.

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<tr>
<th>DUTCH</th>
<th>SEMANTIC DIMENSION</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SP7</td>
<td>SP1 [high intensity]</td>
<td>SP1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SP2 [average intensity]</td>
<td>SP2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SP3 [low intensity]</td>
<td>SP3</td>
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</tbody>
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SDC-Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUTCH</th>
<th>SEMANTIC DIMENSION</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SP8</td>
<td>SP4 [long]</td>
<td>SP4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SP5 [average]</td>
<td>SP5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SP6 [short]</td>
<td>SP6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SDC-Table 5

21. Some of the most common verbials for describing extreme cases of being silent contain a reference to death and the symbols of 'closedness'. In English the reference to death is present in TO MAINTAIN A DEATHLIKE/TOMB-LIKE SILENCE and the the metaphorical verbum reticendi TO BURY. Dutch, however, does not only possess the direct equivalents of these two (EEN DODSE STILTE BEWAREN and BEGRAVEN), but in addition there are ZO GESLOTEN ZIJN ALS EEN GRAF (lit. 'to be as closed a a grave'), ZWIJGEN ALS VERMOORD (lit. 'to be silent as if [one had been] murdered'), EEN GEHEIM MEE ONDER
DE AARDE/IN HET GRAF NEMEN (lit. 'to take a secret under the earth/into the grave'), and IETS DOODZWIJGEN (lit. 'to be silent about something until it is dead'). In all of these the death referred to is purely metaphorical, except in EEN GEHEIM MEE IN HET GRAF NEMEN. One can only say

(D1) Hij neemt heel wat geheimen mee in het graf

(He takes quite a few secrets with him into the grave)

if the person talked about has died. This again shows the marginality of the verba tacendi: here we are confronted with what is probably the only example of a linguistic action verbal which can be predicated of a deceased person. Notice that the literal equivalents of ZWIJGEN ALS HET GRAF, namely TO BE SILENT AS THE GRAVE and TO BE SILENT AS THE TOMB, as predicated of a conversational tacens are not acceptable to many American speakers of English. Whereas the Dutch sentence

(D2) Hij zwijgt als het graf

(lit. 'he is silent as the grave')

is not at all uncommon, the English literal equivalents of the Dutch verbal are mainly used to describe silence as such as in "It's as silent as a tomb in here", though I remember reading the following sentence in a British novel: "During the taxi drive she remained as silent as the tomb".

22. Also with respect to the symbols of 'closedness' there are a couple of differences between English and Dutch. The most important English verb-  

ials in question are TO BE/BECOME MUM AS AN OYSTER, TO CLOSE UP LIKE A
ILL CLAM/AN OYSTER, and TO CLAM UP. In Dutch there is the comparable expression ZO GESLOTEN ZIJN ALS EEN OESTER (lit. 'to be as closed as an oyster'), but clams do not enter the picture and they are not even replaced by mussels which are more common in the Dutch-speaking region of the world (maybe because the use of the word for mussel as a symbol for a weakling -- for which one uses a jellyfish in English -- is too strong a convention). However, Dutch extends its symbols well beyond the world of bivalve mollusks: ZO DICHT ZIJN ALS EEN POT/BRIEF (lit. 'to be as closed as a pot/letter'), POTDICHT ZIJN (lit. 'to be pot-closed'), ZO GESLOTEN ZIJN ALS EEN POT/PEPERDOOS/BRANDKAST (lit. 'to be as closed as a pot/pepper-box/safe'). Finally there is the less transparent image ZWIJGEN ALS EEN MOF (lit. 'to be a silent as a German'); MOF is a quite contemptuous term for 'German' (comparable to the American KRAUT), but it is hard to see an essential relationship between taciturnity and a German (whether he is a contemptible one or not).

23. TO BE SILENT AS A POST and TO BE SILENT AS A STONE, in which the intensity of silence is emphasized by the reference to typically inanimate and therefore silent objects do not find, contrary to what one could have expected, any counterparts in Dutch.

24. So far we have presented an overview of those verba tacendi which derive the expression of intensity from the symbolic relationship between silence and death, 'closed' and inanimate objects. A second important series expresses highly intense silence by referring to the
absence of basic speaking processes or the inactivation of certain organs of speech. The absence of basic speaking processes will be clear in most of the examples given in Table 1. The processes referred to are the production of words, as in NOT BREATHE A WORD, and the production of sounds as in NOT LET OUT A PEEP, with somewhere in between NOT SAY 'BOO'. In this respect there is a complete parallelism between English and Dutch. The underlying rationale is no doubt that if higher-level processes would be referred to the intensity of the silence could not possibly be highlighted: descriptions such as "During the cocktail party, Smith did not utter a single full sentence" or "He was not able to sustain a prolonged conversation" imply that there was not a complete absence of speech on Smith's part.

Closely related verbials which were not entered into the table are the following: TO FORSWEAR SPEAKING/SPEECH, NOT HAVE A WORD TO SAY, GEEN WOORDEN VOOR IETS HEBBEN (lit.'not have any words for something'), HET EERSTE WOORD OVER IETS NOG MOETEN ZEGGEN (lit. 'still have to say the first word about something') and the quite colorful DE WOORDEN BLEVEN HEM IN DE KEEL STEKEN (lit. 'the words remained stuck in his throat') and HET WOORD STIERF OP ZIJN LIPPEN (lit. 'the word died on his lips').
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
<th>DUTCH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>not breathe a word</td>
<td>geen woord over zijn lippen laten komen (lit. 'not let a word pass through one's lips')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not let a word escape one</td>
<td>geen woord lossen(over iets) (lit. 'not let loose a word (about something')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not utter/say a word</td>
<td>geen (stom) woord (meer) zeggen (lit. 'not say a (dumb) word (any more)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not say 'boo'</td>
<td>boe noch ba zeggen (lit. 'to say neither boo nor ba')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not let out a peep</td>
<td>geen geluid uitbrengen (lit. 'not produce a sound')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>geen piep (meer) geven/laten (lit. 'not give/let out a peep (any more)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>geen kik geven/laten (lit. 'not give/let out a sound'; KIK is a word for a very faint noise, which is only used in expressions such as these)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>kik noch mik geven (lit. 'to give neither KIK nor MIK'; MIK is semantically completely empty; its only function is to intensify the already intense GEEN KIK GEVEN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>niet kikken (van iets) (lit. 'not produce any sounds (about something')</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. On the other hand, the inactivation of speech organs (the favorite ones being the lips, the tongue and the mouth as a whole) is involved is all the examples given in Table 2. Again the parallelism between English and Dutch (except for TO MUZZLE ONESELF), which has no direct
counterpart) is striking, though not surprising. About the only difference is that the button-and-zip-symbolism is missing is Dutch.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
<th>DUTCH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>to seal one's lips</td>
<td>de lippen op elkaar drukken/klemmen (lit. 'to press the lips together')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to button one's lip</td>
<td>zich op de lippen bijten (lit. 'to bite one's lips')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to zip one's lip</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to bite one's lips</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to bite one's tongue</td>
<td>op zijn tong bijten ('to bite one's tongue')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to put a bridle on one's</td>
<td>zijn tong in bedwang/toom houden ('to keep one's tongue in check/bridled')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to keep one's tongue in check</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not open one's mouth</td>
<td>geen mond/bek opendoen (lit. 'not open a mouth/trap')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to keep one's trap/yap shut</td>
<td>zijn mond/bek/bakkes niet opendoen ('not open one's mouth/trap/yap')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to shut one's bazoo/face/head</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to muzzle oneself</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

In contrast to the verbials in Table 2, there are also some which involve an unintentional inactivation of some organ of speech or the organs of speech altogether. Surprisingly, however, one of these, TO HAVE LOST ONE'S TONGUE and the Dutch translation ZIJN TONG VERLOREN HEBBEN, is used typically in description such as (D3) and (D4) which are necessarily ironical
and imply that the silence is quite voluntary.

(D3) He must have lost his tongue

(D4) Hij heeft zeker zijn tong verloren

The others, which do not carry such implications at all, are: TO STAND MUTE, MET VERSTIJFDE TONG STAAN (lit. 'to stand with a stiffened tongue'), VERSTOMD STAAN VAN (lit.'to stand struck dumb because of'), SPRAKELOOS STAAN (lit. 'to be struck with dumbness'). A picturesque Dutch verbal which is in the same line of business is MET DE MOND VOL TANDEN STAAN (lit. 'to stand with the mouth full of teeth'): having teeth everywhere in one's mouth is a rather farfetched but unquestionable effective image for the inactivation of the organs of speech and thus for being silent.

26. We are still left with a miscellaneous set of verbials describing intense acts of being silent, which do not fit the schemes presented in the previous five paragraphs. First, there are some verba cessandi: TO BUTTON UP, TO CLOSE UP, TO DRY UP, TO DUMMY UP, TO FALL SILENT and the Dutch DICHTKLAPPEN (lit. 'to smack closed') and STILVALLEN ('to fall silent'). In the case of verba cessandi intensity is often associated with the sudden character of the discontinuation of speech. It is because of the intensity of the silence act described by TO FALL SILENT that we did not want to regard the verbal as a basic verbum tacendi.

Further, there are several verba reticendi such as NEVER LET ON, TO REFUSE COMMENT, TO REPRESS, TO SMOTHER, TO STIFLE, TO SUPPRESS and the Dutch NIETS LOSLATEN (lit. 'not let anything loose'), OPKROPPEN (lit.
to pile up in one's gizzard'), and EEN DIEP/GROOT GEHEIM VAN IETS MAKEN (lit. 'to make something into a deep/big secret').

Finally, there are a couple of additional Dutch verba silendi: IN ALLE/ZEVEN TALEN ZWIJGEN (lit. 'to be silent in all/seven languages'), and the less common GEEN SLAG AAN DE BAK KRIJGEN (the BAK referred to is a wooden container which was used to get hot food for the sailors from the ship's kitchen; the expression means 'not be able to reach the BAK' because of the pushing of the others so that one does not obtain food; its figurative meaning is 'not be able to say anything because of the excessive talking of others').

27. The intensity expressed by the verbials that we have just discussed is not merely a matter of intensity. It can be related to different aspects of being silent: the duration of the silence, the obstinacy of the person who keeps silent, the reason for being silent, and the meaning with which the silence is imbued. Explicit links will not always be made when we come to the investigation of these other dimensions, but let us not forget that such interrelationships exist.

28. The second sound-related dimension to be dealt with is the duration of the silence. It should be noted at once that acts of being silent always have some duration. But whereas one can say "He was silent for a second", it would be pretty weird to tell "He did not utter a word for a second", "He did not open his mouth for a minute" or even "He sealed his lips for five minutes" unless one wanted to joke about an excessively talkative person. The longer duration associated with NOT UTTER A WORD,
NOT OPEN ONE'S MOUTH and TO SEAL ONE'S LIPS becomes apparent through the incompatibility of the expressions with adverbials indicating a short period of time. Notice that these three verbials were included among those which express intense acts of being silent. As a matter of fact, silence cannot be intense unless it is relatively long. Therefore all the verbials discussed with reference to the intensity dimension belong here as well. However, it is not true that all long acts of being silent are also intense: TO KEEP ONE'S MOUTH SHUT is, but TO KEEP QUIET is not.

In the following paragraphs we shall only concentrate on verba tacendi the form of which draws explicit attention to a longer duration. As a result, most of those discussed with reference to the intensity dimension will be left out. The same principle would also exclude those verbials which derive their association with a longer duration only from their incompatibility with adverbials indicating a brief period of time. However, I have not been able to discover any verba tacendi which describe long silence acts and which neither carry an explicit reference to duration nor belong to those emphasizing the intensity of silence.

29. The most common indication of duration in English is the presence of the verb TO KEEP as in: TO KEEP BACK, TO KEEP BETWEEN US, TO KEEP BUTTONED UP, TO KEEP CLOSE, TO KEEP DARK, TO KEEP FROM, TO KEEP IN, TO KEEP IN IGNORANCE, TO KEEP IN PETTO, TO KEEP IN THE DARK, TO KEEP IT A DEEP DARK SECRET, TO KEEP IT UNDER ONE'S HAT, TO KEEP MUM, TO KEEP ONESELF TO ONESELF, TO KEEP ONE'S MOUTH SHUT, TO KEEP ONE'S OWN COUNSEL, TO KEEP ONE'S TONGUE BETWEEN ONES CHEEK, TO KEEP ONE'S TRAP/YAP SHUT, TO KEEP QUIET, TO KEEP SECRET, TO KEEP SILENCE, TO KEEP SILENT (the long duration of
which was our reason not to regard it as a basic *verbum tacendi*), TO KEEP SOMEBODY OUT OF SOMETHING, TO KEEP STILL, TO KEEP TO ONESELF, TO KEEP UNDER WRAPS, TO KEEP WITHIN THE BOSOM OF THE LODGE, TO KEEP WITHIN THESE WALLS.

Some other indicators are TO MAINTAIN, TO LEAVE, TO REMAIN and TO SIT: TO MAINTAIN A SECRET, TO MAINTAIN (A DEATHLIKE/TOMBLIKE) SILENCE, TO LEAVE IN THE DARK (ABOUT), TO REMAIN SILENT (ABOUT/AS TO), TO SIT MUM, TO SIT ON. And finally there is the morpheme HOLD in TO WITHHOLD, and the verb TO HOLD in: TO HOLD ONE'S PEACE, TO HOLD ONE'S TONGUE, TO HOLD OUT ON.

30. In Dutch there are three comparable indicators of duration, namely HOUDEN ('to keep, hold'), LATEN ('leave') and BEWAREN ('to maintain, keep') as in: DE HANDEN IN DE MOUW HOUDEN (lit. 'to keep one's hands in one's sleeve'), IEMAND ERGENS BUITEN HOUDEN/LATEN (lit. 'to keep/leave someone out of something'), IETS ACHTER DE ELLEBOOG HOUDEN (lit. 'to keep something behind one's elbow'), IETS ACHTER DE HAND HOUDEN (lit. 'to keep something behind one's hand'), IETS ACHTER HOUDEN ('to keep something back'), IETS IN PETTO HOUDEN ('to keep something in petto'), IETS TUSSEN DE TANDEN HOUDEN (lit. 'to keep something between one's teeth'), IETS VOOR ZICH HOUDEN ('to keep something to oneself'), IETS IN DE MOUW HOUDEN (lit. 'to keep something in one's sleeve'), STILHOUDEN ('to keep still'), DE TONG VOOR DE TANDEN HOUDEN (lit. 'to keep the tongue in front of one's teeth'), IETS BEDEKT HOUDEN ('to keep something covered'), ZICH ERGENS BUITEN HOUDEN ('to keep out of something'), ZICH KOETHOUDEN ('to keep mum'), ZIJN MOND/BEK/BAKKES/BABBEL/RAMMEL/SNATER/SNOET/SNUIT/TOET HOUDEN (lit. 'to hold one's mouth/ trap/yap etc.'), ZIJN TONG IN BEDWANG/TOOM HOUDEN (lit. 'to keep one's tongue in check/bridled'), ZIJN PIJPEN
IN DE ZAK HOUDEN (lit. 'to keep one's pipes in one's pocket'); IEMAND VAN IETS ONKUNDIG LATEN (lit. 'to leave somebody ignorant about something'), IETS BUITEN BESCHOUWING LATEN ('to leave something out of account'), IETS MAAR BLAUWBLAUW LATEN (lit. 'to leave something blueblue'), TERZIJDE LATEN (lit. 'to leave something aside'), IETS IN DE DOOPPOT LATEN (lit. 'to leave something in the extinguishing-pot'); DE STILTE BEWAREN (lit. to maintain the silence'), EEN DODSE STILTE BEWAREN ('to maintain a deathlike silence'), HET STILZWIJGEN BEWAREN (lit. 'to maintain the [act of] being silent'), EEN GEHEIM BEWAREN ('to keep a secret').

F. SILENCE AND ITS CAUSES

31. In the vast majority of cases the act of being silent is deliberate. But the set of linguistic action verbials in English and in Dutch leaves room for instances of silence which lack this willful character. Thus silence acts can be distinguished into those corresponding to (A1) and those describable in terms of (A2).

(A1) Sa is silent, but not deliberately
(A2) Sa is silent deliberately

What are the causes of the silence in case that (A1) obtains? It is this question which will occupy me in the next couple of paragraphs. Silence can only be involuntary if an inability to speak is involved. But this general cause needs further analysis: the inability itself can be caused by many different circumstances.
When we move from deliberate to non-deliberate silence, we find just across the border the acts of being silent which satisfy (C1), i.e. which are due to a general, temperamentally determined, disposition not to talk.

(C1) Sa is temperamentally disinclined to talk

There are no verba tacendi which draw exclusive attention to this type of act. The verbials which can be used to describe it are ambiguous between an (A1)-(C1) act and an (A2) act of some kind. Consider, for instance, (D1).

(D1) Sally's pride was wounded, but she suppressed her feelings

The suppression of Sally's feelings can either be a conscious act performed for a particular reason or a temperamentally determined reflex. In the first case (D1) describes an act of the (A2) type; in the second case an (A1)-(C1) act is involved. The association of TO SUPPRESS with (C1) is probably due to the fact that the verb does not only mean 'to refrain from expressing' but also 'to exclude from consciousness' and excluding something from consciousness is, according to our heavily freudianized twentieth-century world view, mainly an unconscious activity (in spite of Webster's definition of SUPPRESSION as "the conscious intentional exclusion from consciousness of a thought or feeling"). The association with (C1) is even stronger in (D2) so that the ambiguity between (A1) and (A2) is almost -- though not completely -- resolved.

(D2) Sally's pride was wounded, but, as always, she suppressed her feelings
On the other hand, in (D3) the balance tips completely towards (A2).

(D3) Sally's pride was wounded, but somehow she managed to suppress her feelings

Notice that not only linguistic elements in the description can influence the deliberateness-balance. Also the nature of the feeling to be expressed is important. Consider (D4).

(D4) Sally was on the verge of getting as cross as two sticks, but she suppressed her feelings

In this case the suppression is almost necessarily deliberate, which implies that anger is regarded as a feeling which is easier to express or more difficult to control than, say, being hurt. In fact, anger and its expression are so firmly united in our western mind that it would be hard to say (at least for most of the speakers of English I consulted) "Sally was really pissed-off, but she didn't show her feelings", whereas "Sally was really hurt, but she didn't show her feelings is quite likely to occur.

Similar verbs on the border between (A1) and (A2) are: TO REPRESS, TO SMOTHER, TO STIFLE, and in Dutch ONDERDRUKKEN, VERSMOREN and OPKROPPEN. I have the feeling that OPKROPPEN (lit. 'to pile up in one's gizzard') is more strongly associated with (C1) than any of the others.

33. Another source of involuntary silence is the tacens' indecision, as described in (C2).

(C2) Sa is unable to decide what to say (next)
Again the most common verbal belonging here is ambiguous between (A1) and (A2), but (A1) is its central meaning: TO HESITATE, as used in (D5)

(D5) Mr. Smith hesitated before continuing his talk
typically describes a silence due to indecision (which is no voluntary state of mind); if the act described is willful, there is pretense involved. The same holds for the Dutch equivalent AARZELEN, but the meaning of a second equivalent, WEIFELEN, is completely restricted to (A1).

34. The inability to talk may also result from astonishment, grief, shock, or other strong emotion.

(C3) S is unable to talk because of some strong emotion

The verbials TO BE MUTE and TO STAND MUTE belong here, as used in (D6) and (D7), respectively.

(D6) After hearing the news of his wife's death, he was mute for several minutes

(D7) The news was so unexpected that he stood mute for several minutes

These two verbials, however, can also be used to describe deliberate acts of being silent. Consider (D8).

(D8) The mayor is still mute on the subject

And TO STAND MUTE may be predicated of a person arraigned by law who makes no answer, maintains silence, or refuses to plead directly or stand trial.
The Dutch expressions which use muteness as a metaphor exclude (A2) completely from their meaning: VERSTOMMEN (lit. 'to become mute'), VERSTOMD STAAN VAN (lit. 'to stand mute because of'), MET STOMHEID GESLAGEN ZIJN (lit. 'to be struck with muteness'), MET VERSTIJFDE TONG STAAN (lit. 'to stand with a stiffened tongue'), SPRAKELOOS STAAN (lit. 'to stand speechless').

Some more verbials satisfy (C3): TO DRY UP, which again is ambiguous between (A1) and (A2) as appears from the command "Dry up!", TO FALL SILENT and its Dutch equivalent STILVALLEN, both of which are restricted to (A1), and the expression EEN KIKKER/ROGGENSTAART IN DE KEEL HEBBEN (lit. 'to have a frog/ray-tail in one's throat'), which is ambiguous between the inability to speak because of hoarseness or because of some strong emotion, DE WOORDEN BLEVEN HEM IN DE KEEL STEKEN (lit. 'the words remained stuck in his throat') and HET WOORD STIERF HEM OP DE LIPPEN (lit. 'the word died on his lips').

An interesting question is what kinds of emotions are involved in producing the tacens' inability to speak. For one thing, all the (A1)-(C3) verbials imply that the emotion was caused by something unexpected; in other words, there is always surprise involved. Moreover, the surprise is almost necessarily of an unpleasant kind. If someone 'stood mute' or 'fell silent' upon hearing a piece of good news, bystanders would soon infer that the person in question was not glad at all; he or she is expected to say at least "I can't believe it" (and to make some additional funny noises). Jumping to a conclusion, one might say that the vision underlying the Dutch and English lexical systems does not allow for the existence of joy unless it is expressed whereas grief and sorrow are not in need of
expression in order to exist. Joy is not the only emotion with which TO STAND MUTE, TO FALL SILENT, etc. are not generally associated. Another one is anger, which is also firmly connected with its expression because of what we referred to before as the relative ease with which it can be expressed or the effort it takes to control (see paragraph 32). A further explanation may be that unlike grief or shock, which may arise suddenly due to an unexpected piece of unpleasant news (remember the element of surprise), intense feelings of anger or wrath are considered to need more time to generate.

35. A further cause of the inability to speak may be a lack of anything to say.

(C4) Sa is unable to speak because he does not know what to say

This cause may be involved in an act described by means of TO DRY UP, TO FALL SILENT and STILVALLEN. More specialized (A1)-(C4) verbials are NOT HAVE A WORD TO SAY, TO HAVE LITTLE TO SAY, and the Dutch GEEN WOORDEN VOOR IET HEBBEN (lit. 'not have words for something') and MET DE MOND VOL TANDEN STAAN (lit. 'to stand with one's mouth full of teeth'). The last one of these indicates the tacnes' defeat; metaphorically speaking, his conversational partners have checkmated him so that he is at a loss for things to say; of course, this does not yet make the image transparent.

36. A special case of not knowing what to say is the occasion on which one has forgotten what one was going to say.

(C5) Sa is unable to speak because he has forgotten what he was going to say
The verbials which can be used to express this quite specialized but not uncommon state of affairs are the same as for (C4): TO DRY UP, TO FALL SILENT and STILVALLEN. This type of occasion is exemplified in (D9).

(D9) The play could have been good. It's a pity that one of the debuting actresses dried up in the second act and lacked the necessary presence of mind to improvise.

In the example TO DRY UP simply means 'to forget one's lines' (which Webster even lists separately as one of the meanings of TO DRY UP).

37. The next cause of silence to which explicit attention is drawn by some verbials is the talking of others.

(C6) Sa is unable to talk because of the excessive talking of others.

Examples are NOT GET A WORD IN EDGEWAYS, Dutch ER GEEN WOORD TUSSEN KRIJGEN and GEEN SLAG AAN DE BAK KRIJGEN (the formation of which was explained before; see paragraph 26).

38. The final— not to say terminal — cause of silence which is manifested in the verba tacendi is death.

(C7) Sa is unable to talk because he is dead.

This cause of silence is clear in TO TAKE A SECRET INTO THE GRAVE and its Dutch equivalent EEN GEHEIM MEE IN HET GRAF NEMEN. The same cause is often implied by GEEN PIEP/KIK (MEER) GEVEN/LATEN (lit. 'not give/let out a peep/sound (any more)').

The causal dimension of silence is represented in SDC-Table 6. In the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUTCH</th>
<th>SEMANTIC DIMENSION</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(opkroppen, etc.)</td>
<td>[ (A1)-(C1) ]</td>
<td>(to suppress, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(aarzelen), weifelen</td>
<td>[ (A1)-(C2) ]</td>
<td>(to hesitate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verstommen, etc.</td>
<td>[ (A1)-(C3) ]</td>
<td>(to be/stand mute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>geen woorden voor iets hebben, met de mond vol tanden staan</td>
<td>[ (A1)-(C4) ]</td>
<td>not have a word to say, to have little to say</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ (A1)-(C5) ]</td>
<td>∅</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>geen slag aan de bak krijgen</td>
<td>[ (A1)-(C6) ]</td>
<td>not get a word in edgeways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>een geheim mee in het graf nemen</td>
<td>[ (A1)-(C7) ]</td>
<td>to take a secret into the grave</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SDC-Table 6**
table round brackets are used for the verbials which do not only show an (A1) meaning, but an (A2) meaning as well.

G. THE TACENS AND HIS MOTIVES

39. This section deals with the second pole in the contrast between acts describable in terms of (A1) and those representing (A2).

(A1) Sa is silent, but not deliberately
(A2) Sa is silent deliberately

As said before, in the cast majority of cases the acts of being silent are deliberate. Thus the question to ask is this: What are the tacens' motives or reasons for being silent? Whereas inability to speak was the one basic cause of all involuntary acts of being silent, it is hard to find a basic reason or motive for the willful ones. Not only is there a greater differentiation, often several reasons are intertwined.

Before giving an overview of the motives singled out by the verba tacendi it is important to notice that the border between (A1) and (A2) is not a clear one. A troublesome case is TO FAIL TO MENTION: the presuppositions of TO FAIL and those often carried by the expression as a whole are contradictory. TO FAIL denotes an involuntary non-performance of a certain activity because it presupposes a deliberate attempt to perform it. However, TO FAIL TO MENTION, as used in (D1) and (D2)

(D1) In his speech about American foreign policy he failed to mention the CIA's involvement in Chile
(D2) He told the police that he had been home at the moment of the
crime. But he failed to mention that he had been at the scene
of the crime fifteen minutes earlier and that he had seen the
suspect

usually carries the implication that the silence act was conscious
or even planned though it was performed as if through forgetfulness.

40. A second preliminary remark is that there are quite a lot of verba
tacendi belonging to the (A2) category which do not single out any par­
ticular reason for the act of silence they describe: TO BECOME MUM, TO
CLOSE, TO COME TO AN END, TO SAY NOTHING, TO MAINTAIN
SILENCE, and the Dutch AFSTAPPEN VAN (lit. 'to step down from'), EINDI-
GEN ('to end'), NIETS ZEGGEN ('to say nothing'), HET STILZWIJGEN BEWAREN
('to maintain silence') and many others are used to describe acts of
being silent which can be performed for any reason. On the other hand,
I have not been able to discover any (A1) verba tacendi which do not
single out a particular cause for the involuntary silence described. The
obvious rationale underlying the contrast is this: as any other activity,
being silent is typically a willful act; therefore, if the act is not
voluntary, an explanation is always needed.

Along the lines of this contrast we could distinguish the following
properties of the verba tacendi.

(Cv1) The verbal does not single out a particular cause of the
silence
(Cv2) The verbal singles out a particular cause of the silence
(Cv3) The verbal does not single out a particular motive for the silence
(Cv4) The verbal singles out a particular motive for the silence

Correspondingly, (A1) verbials could theoretically show patterns (SP1) or (SP2).

(SP1) The verbal satisfies (Cv1)
(SP2) The verbal satisfies (Cv2)

And (A2) verbials can show either (SP3) or (SP4).

(SP3) The verbal satisfies (Cv3)
(SP4) The verbal satisfies (Cv4)

These four patterns are represented in SDC-Table 7. According to what we said above (SP1) is a completely empty pattern. (SP2) verbials were discussed in the previous section on the causal nature of silence. This section on the tacens' motives will be mainly concerned with (SP4) verbials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUTCH</th>
<th>SEMANTIC DIMENSION</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ø</td>
<td>SP1</td>
<td>(A1)-(Cv1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>see par. 32-38</td>
<td>SP2</td>
<td>(A2)-(Cv3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>see par. 40-41</td>
<td>SP3</td>
<td>(A2)-(Cv4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>see par. 42-49</td>
<td>SP4</td>
<td>(A2)-(Cv4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SDC-Table 7
41. A few more words need to be said about (SP3) verbials. Though they do not indicate any particular reason for the tacens to be or become silent, many of them refer to a strong determination, a refusal to speak or, in the case of verba silendi and reticendi, even obstinacy. (Probably the reader does not have to be reminded of the possible interrelationships between different semantic dimensions; in this case it is clear that verbials implying a strong determination will often indicate a long duration and a high intensity as well.) Some examples are TO BE MUM AS AN OYSTER, NOT BREATHE A WORD, GEEN STOM WOORD ZEGGEN (lit. 'not say a dumb word'), IN ALLE TALEN ZWIJGEN (lit. 'to be silent in all languages'), etc. It is clear that often some strong emotion will be responsible for the generation of the determination or obstinacy. The nature of the emotion is never specified. But one may assume that, contrary to what we discovered for the emotions involved in some of the involuntary acts of being silent, anger is one of the favorites here. On the other hand, joy is even more unlikely to underlie an (A2) act than an (A1) act.

Some (SP3) verbials do not draw the attention to a strong determination as such, but to a determination not to speak in spite of one's inclination to the opposite. I am thinking of TO BITE ONE'S LIP/TONGUE, TO MUZZLE ONESELF, TO PUT A BRIDLE ON ONE'S TONGUE, TO BUTTON/ZIP ONE'S LIP and in Dutch OP ZIJN TONG BIJTEN ('to bite one's tongue'), ZICH OP DE LIPPEN BIJTEN ('to bite one's lips'), ZIJN TONG IN BEDWANG/TOOM HOUDEN ('to keep one's tongue in check/bridled'). Another example is ZIJN TONG GEWELD AANDOEN (lit. 'to do violence to one's tongue'). I present this one separately not only because it is an extremely clear case in point but also because it manifests very plainly the talkative character of western
culture: moving from non-action to action certainly takes more effort than remaining in a state of rest; therefore one could an expression which means literally 'to do violence to one's tongue' to describe the action of moving, against one's inclination, from not speaking to speaking; but quite the opposite is true: ZIJN TONG GEWELD AANDOEN is fighting one's inclination to talk in order to remain in a state of silence.

42. One of the most common reasons for being silent, which is manifested by many verba reticendi, is *concealment*.

(C1) Sa wants to conceal something

Some obvious examples: TO KEEP SECRET, TO CONCEAL, TO VEIL; GEHEIMHOUDEN ('to keep secret'), VERZWIJGEN ('to be silent about'), VERBERGEN ('to conceal'); etc. Concealment is often associated with subsidiary reasons or motives such as deception, solidarity, etc. However, the vast majority of (A2)-(C1) verbials do not restrict their meaning to a particular one of these. But a few of them do. Let us pass those in review.

The following four subsidiary motives (which often interact) play a role in at least some verba tacendi:

(C1a) Sa wants to conceal something in order to deceive somebody
(C1b) Sa wants to conceal something out of solidarity
(C1c) Sa wants to conceal something out of discretion
(C1d) Sa wants to conceal something out of mercy

Though the intention to deceive can be supposed to be a very common reason for being silent about something, I have not been able to dis-
cover more than one verbal with which it is very strongly (though not even necessarily) associated: TO HOLD OUT ON as used in (D3), Dutch IETS ACHTERHOUDEN.

(D3) Ever since we married she's been holding out on me

The association with deception results from the fact that TO HOLD OUT ON means 'to withhold information to which someone has a right'; but even so, other reasons, such as fear, may be at work. How is it that for a common action such as withholding information with the intention to deceive, there are almost no verbals? Two phenomena may be responsible for this situation. First, our rules of politeness may curb our inclination to openly accuse a conversational tacens of deception. Second, and more importantly, our generally accepted rules of conversation dictate us not to make any claims for which there is no sufficient evidence; since silence is a completely intangible phenomenon it is not possible to adduce it as evidence of any kind; in other words, the tacens can always get away with it by taking refuge to arguments based on forgetfulness and the like. Therefore one usually does not have the courage to go any further than making insinuations as with TO FAIL TO MENTION which, as said before, literally describes the involuntary non-performance of certain acts of speaking though it is often used in such a way that it implies the conscious and purposeful performance of an act of not mentioning something.

43. The three remaining subsidiary reasons for concealment which are manifested in some verba tacendi might be regarded as 'good reasons': they transform the acts described into cases of 'white silence' (if we
are allowed to use the formation of a 'white lie' productively).

*Solidarity* is the underlying reason in *NOT GIVE AWAY* as used in (D4).

(D4) She did not give John away

Some other examples are *NEVER LET ON*, *TO KEEP BETWEEN US/ THEM*, *TO KEEP WITHIN THE BOSOM OF THE LODGE*, *TO KEEP WITHIN THESE WALLS*, *NOT LET IT GO FURTHER*, and the Dutch *NIET VERKLAPPEN* and *NIET VERRADEN* (both of which are more or less equivalent to *NOT GIVE AWAY*).

*Discretion* is apparent as a motive only in *TO BE THE SOULD OF DISCRE­TION* and *DE DISCRE­TIE IN PERSOON ZIJN* (lit. 'to be discretion in person'). These verbials, however, are mainly used to describe a general disposition. If applied to a specific occasion as in (D5)

(D5) He was the soul of discretion last night

the implication is that the tacens talked about is not normally the soul of discretion.

Finally, there is one Dutch verbal, *IETS MET DE MANTEL DER LIEFE BE­ DEKKEN* (lit. 'to coversomething with the coat of love') which reveals *mercifulness* as the tacens' reason to be silent about something; the tacens conceals some fact or event because the person(s) it is related to might be hurt if it were brought to light.

We have seen that bad intentions underlying acts of conceiling are rarely focussed on because of the difficulty of obtaining evidence for them and the generally accepted principle that one should not make accusations unless there is sufficient evidence. But when one praises someone, evidence is rarely asked for unless there is a strong suspicion that the person in question does not deserve the praise at all. Therefore, no such
principles can be relied on to explain why there are so few verba tacendi focusing on good intentions underlying concealments. On the contrary, the following argument could be made. Since there are no such principles restricting the occasions on which one is allowed to ascribe 'good' properties or acts to someone, one could conclude from the small number of lexical tools at our disposal to describe cases of benevolent silence, either that in our society 'white silence' is considered to occur once in a blue moon, or that being silent because of solidarity, discretion or mercy is not regarded as a really praiseworthy activity; in either case the importance attached to speech is emphasized once more.

44. Next to concealment there are two types of avoidance in the spectrum of motives for being silent.

(C2) Sa wants to avoid a topic

(C3) Sa wants to avoid a confrontation

The most important (A2)-(C2) verbials are: TO BEAT AROUND THE BUSH, TO HEM AND HAW; ROND DE POT DRAAIEN (lit. 'to turn around the pot'), and EEN SNAAR NIET AANROEREN (lit. 'not touch a [particular] string'). Close-ly related are TO SAY NEITHER YES NOR NO and ABRAHAMMETJE SPELEN (lit. 'to play little Abraham', which means 'to try to escape by telling half the truth'). The attempt to avoid a confrontation is implied by TO CHECK ONE'S SPEECH, TO HOLD ONE'S PEACE as in (D6) and (D7).

(D6) From the moment the supervisor entered, all employees checked their speech

(D7) I did not agree with the teacher but held my peace as he was rather angry
The Dutch verbials OP ZIJN MOND PASSEN (lit. 'to guard one's mouth'), OP ZIJN WOORDEN PASSEN (lit. 'to guard one's words') and ZIJN WOORDEN AFMETEN (lit. 'to measure one's words') are comparable to TO CHECK ONE'S SPEECH; on the other hand, ZICH KOEST HOUDEN (lit. 'to keep quiet'; the adjective KOEST is a contracted form of the French "Couche-toi!") and apart from its use in ZICH KOEST HOUDEN it is mainly used as an imperative addressed to a dog and meaning "Lie down!" or "Stop barking!") is closer to TO HOLD ONE'S PEACE.

45. Another reason for being silent or for being silent about something is the tacens' indifference.

(C4) Sa is silent (about something) because he regards the matter at hand as too unimportant

Both TO SAVE ONE'S BREATH and TO WASTE NO WORDS draw explicit attention to such indifference: the tacens regards talking as a waste of energy. TO SAVE ONE'S BREATH may suggest that the deeper reason for not talking about unimportant matters is to build up energy for later talking. Comparable Dutch verbials are NIET VEEL WOORDEN VERSPILEN ('not waste many words') and NIET VEEL WOORDEN AAN IETS VUILMAKEN (lit. 'not dirty many words at something').

46. The expectancy of disappointment may induce a speaker to believe that a particular matter is not worth wasting any words on. Disappointment itself can also be the reason for willful silence.

(C5) Sa is silent because he feels disappointed
A feeling of disappointment presupposes a prior attempt to achieve something. Therefore, in the context of language it presupposes prior speech. As a result, the few verbials which fit (C5) are all verba cessandi. The verbials I am thinking of are TO ABANDON and TO QUIT as used in (D8) to (D10).

(D8) The reporter abandoned asking questions after realizing that he would never get a reply
(D9) He abandoned trying to convince his friend
(D10) The senator quit speaking after the audience's rude reactions

The Dutch equivalent, OPGEVEN, may be more exclusively associated with disappointment, but its use is more restricted.

47. TO BREAK OFF, as used in (D11) and (D12), generally reveals a sudden impulse as the tacens' reason for discontinuing his speech.

(C6) Sa stops talking because of a sudden impulse to do so
(D11) The senator broke off in the middle of a sentence
(D12) The speaker was interrupted so often that he broke off and sat down

The impulse in question may be generated by any kind of emotion, such as surprise, anger, fear, and others. Similar verbials in Dutch are AFBREKEN ('to break off') and BOT STILZIJGEN ('to stop talking abruptly').

48. The postponement of divulging a certain piece of information is yet another motive for keeping silent.
(C7) Sa wants to postpone divulging some information

It is revealed in TO KEEP IN PETTO, Dutch IETS IN PETTO HOUDEN. The tacens keeps something in petto if he wants to reserve the tacendum in order to convey it at a more appropriate time or, in the case of an argument, to be able to use it more forcefully later on. (Originally 'in petto' was predicated of a cardinal appointed by the pope but not named in consistory.)

49. The final, and probably most trivial, reason for being silent revealed by the verba tacendi is the tacens' wish to catch his breath.

(C8) Sa wants some breathing-time

This motive is manifested in TO TAKE A BREAK and its Dutch equivalent PAUZEREN (which does not mean that this is the only reason for taking a break). The implication is that the speaking will be resumed after a brief interval.

Both TO TAKE A BREAK and PAUZEREN are verba cessandi describing a break in a speech activity belonging to a particular communication type; in an everyday conversation, for instance, one does not 'take a break'. There is an additional (A2)-(C8) verbal in Dutch which is also a verbum cessandi but at the same time a verbum reticendi; moreover, it is not restricted with respect to communication type, but it implies that the suspension of the speech activity is of a considerable longer duration. The verbal in question is ERGENS EEN SPELDJE BIJ STEKEN; a SPELD(JE) is a (little) pin; the pin referred to here is an object attached to a par-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUTCH</th>
<th>SEMANTIC DIMENSION</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>geheimhouden etc.</td>
<td>(A2)-(C1)</td>
<td>to hold out on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>niet verklappen, etc.</td>
<td>(C1a)</td>
<td>not give away, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(de discreetie in persoon zijn)</td>
<td>(C1b)</td>
<td>(to be the soul of discretion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iets met de mantel der liefde bedekken</td>
<td>(C1c)</td>
<td>to keep secret etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rond de pot draaien, etc.</td>
<td>(A2)-(C2)</td>
<td>to beat around the bush, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>op zijn woorden passen, etc.</td>
<td>(A2)-(C3)</td>
<td>to check one's speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>niet veel woorden aan iets vuil maken</td>
<td>(A2)-(C4)</td>
<td>to waste no words, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opgeven</td>
<td>(A2)-(C5)</td>
<td>to abandon, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>afbreken, etc.</td>
<td>(A2)-(C6)</td>
<td>to break off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in petto houden</td>
<td>(A2)-(C7)</td>
<td>to keep in petto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pauzeren, etc.</td>
<td>(A2)-(C8)</td>
<td>to take a break</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

SDC-Table 8
ticular page of a book to indicate how far one has gotten; the expression means literally 'to attach a pin to something'; within the domain of the verba tacendi it means 'to suspend talking about a particular topic'.

The motivational dimension of silence discussed in this section is represented in SDC-Table 8.

H. SILENCE AND ITS INTERLOCUTORs

50. Not only do the verba tacendi inform us about the codes of silence, its sound properties, its causes and the tacens' motives. Some of them even give away the nature of the tacens and his audience. There are several verba tacendi which describe acts of being silent directed at the public in general. I am thinking of TO COVER UP, TO SIT ON, TO BLACK OUT, TO CLASSIFY and TO FILE AND FORGET as used in (D1) to (D6).

(D1) The banker tried to cover up his stealing some of the bank's money
(D2) The senator kept sitting on the plans until he knew for certain which way winds were blowing
(D3) The wartime government blacked out all news
(D4) Dictators usually black out all criticism of the government
(D5) CIA officials classified all the information about their involvement in Chile
(D6) All the information about the CIA's involvement in Chile was filed and forgotten

All of these examples conform to (C1).
(C1) The audience is the public in general

(C1) appears to be the only audience-oriented condition attached to any verbum tacendi.

51. There are two corollaries following from (C1). First, there would be no need to specify that the audience envisaged in the acts described in (D1) to (D6) is the public in general unless the tacendum is of general public interest and hence the tacens holds some kind of official function. Thus the (C1) verbials also furnish information about the tacens. Depending on the character of the tacens they can be divided into those satisfying (C1a) and those conforming to (C1b).

(C1a) The tacens is usually an impersonal official body

(C1b) The tacens may either be an individual holding an official function or an impersonal official body

TO COVER UP and TO SIT ON are of the (C1b) type, whereas TO BLACK OUT, TO CLASSIFY and TO FILE AND FORGET satisfy (C1a). The anonymity of the tacens is especially clear in the case of TO FILE AND FORGET which cannot even be used in the active voice as a verbum tacendi.

A second corollary of the special relationship between tacens and audience implied by (C1) verbials is that a certain motive, which was not yet mentioned in the previous section, seems to be involved: the tacens withholds information from the general public because he believes that divulging it might weaken his own position in public life.
Sometimes (Clb) verbials may also be used to describe acts of being silent performed by an individual without the kind of official function referred to before, as in (D7) which conforms to (Clc).

(D7) The journalist kept sitting on some information that could have produced a second Watergate

(C1c) The tacens is an individual without official function

In this case also the motivational structure of the act is transformed: the tacens withholds information from the general public because he believes that divulging it might either harm himself or weaken someone else's position in public life.

52. As far as I can tell Dutch only possesses a single verbal which indicates that the audience is the public in general. The verbal in question is IETS IN DE DOOPOT STOPPEN (lit. 'to put something into the extinguishing-pot') which means TO HUSH UP. These two verba tacendi presuppose previous discourse about the tacendum and neither of them gives any further information about the character of the tacens. (Note that an act of hushing up is not necessarily directed at the public in general, though usually it is.)

53. There is only one more verbal relevant to the interlocutor-dimension of the verba tacendi. TO DISCONTINUE, as used in (D8) and (D9) necessarily conforms to (C2).

(D8) The publishing company discontinued the unprofitable journal
(D9) The BBC discontinued the series of political debates

(C2) The tacens is a publisher or a broadcasting service

Its Dutch translations DE PUBLICATIE STOPZETTEN VAN (lit. 'to stop the publication of') and DE UITZENDING STOPZETTEN VAN (lit. 'to stop the broadcasting of'), as said before, cannot be regarded as lexical items.

54. SDC-Table 9 represents the interlocutor-dimension, which is clearly marginal, and even more so for Dutch than for English. It is noteworthy that the only important manifestation of the dimension emphasizes public acts of being silent.

It should be noted, before going on to a next semantic dimension, that a number of verba tacendi require a complement specifying the person from whom a tacendum is withheld. They are: TO KEEP FROM, TO KEEP IN IGNORANCE (ABOUT), TO KEEP IN THE DARK (ABOUT), TO LEAVE IN THE DARK (ABOUT), and a few others. But nothing about the person in question is predictable from the verbials themselves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUTCH</th>
<th>SEMANTIC DIMENSION</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>iets in de doofpot stoppen</td>
<td>(Cl)</td>
<td>to black out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Ø]</td>
<td>(ClA)</td>
<td>(to hush up)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Ø]</td>
<td>(ClB)</td>
<td>to sit on, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Ø]</td>
<td>(Clc)</td>
<td>to discontinue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SDC-Table 9
55. The next semantic dimension to be discussed takes us into the realm of the propositional content of acts of being silent. In other words, we shall be concerned with the tacenda, i.e. that which is not being talked about. As a result, only verba reticendi will be studied in this section.

According to whether a tacendum, which may be either predictable of unpredictable from a given verbum reticendi, is to be specified as a complement to the verbal or not, we can distinguish four sets of verba reticendi.

(Cd1) The tacendum has to be specified; it is not predictable from the verbal

(Cd2) The tacendum has to be specified though it is more or less predictable from the verbal

(Cd3) The tacendum is not further specified because it is clear from the verbal

(Cd4) The tacendum cannot be specified though it is not predictable from the verbal

TO KEEP SECRET, TO BE SILENT ABOUT, TO WITHHOLD, NOT GIVE AWAY and many others belong to the (Cd1) category which constitutes the largest part of the verba reticendi, both in English and in Dutch. The (Cd4) category is probably, and quite predictably, empty in both Dutch and English. Since only (Cd2) and (Cd3) verbals provide us with information about the tacendum, they are the only ones to be investigated in this section.
The variety of topics that can be talked about is without limit. And so is the variety of topics that one can choose not to talk about. The choice reflected in the lexicalization of the absence of speech, i.e. in the verba tacendi, can be expected to further our understanding of the nature of linguistic silence, as perceived in our linguistic communities, considerably.

56. The topics to which (Cd2) verbials draw our attention are all situated at either one of the two extremes of what could be called the 'privacy continuum' of talking matter. On the one hand there are matters of general public interest and on the other there are completely private ones.

(A1) Sa is silent about a private matter
(A2) Sa is silent about a matter of general public interest

The membership in the (Cd2)-(A2) category provides us with another example of the relationships between different semantic dimensions. In the previous section it was claimed that TO COVER UP, TO SIT ON, TO BLACK OUT, TO CLASSIFY, TO FILE AND FORGET, TO HUSH UP and the latter's Dutch equivalent IETS IN DE DOOFPOT STOPPEN all describe acts of being silent directed at the public in general. There is no need for being so specific about the audience unless the tacendum itself is of public interest. Therefore the same verbials belong to the (Cd2)-(A2) category.

The phrase 'matters of general public interest' covers a wide range of possible topics of speech; this is no doubt the reason why the verbials enumerated require a complement. Most (Cd2)-(A1) verbials are slightly
more specific. They do not just indicate that the topic is a 'private matter', but most of them require some kind of feeling or emotion as a tacendum. The verbials TO REPRESS, TO STIFLE, TO MUFFLE, TO SUPPRESS and TO SMOTHER, as well as their Dutch counterparts OPKROPPEN and VERSMOREN all indicate that the tacens is silent about some feeling or emotion. Of course, a further specification is still necessary in the description because of the many sorts of emotion. Thus one can smother one's rage, repress one's worries, stifle one's anger etc. Notice that the range of tacenda is limited to unpleasant feelings. Apart from these emotional verbials, which describe acts of the (Ala) type, there is probably only one verbal, namely the Dutch IETS NIET AAN IEMANDS NEUS HANGEN (lit. 'not hang something on someone's nose'), which includes both (Ala) and (Alb) in its meaning, and there are none at all with a sense restricted to (Alb).

(Ala) Sa is silent about some (unpleasant)emotion or feeling
(Alb) Sa is silent about a non-emotional private matter

IETS NIET AAN IEMANDS NEUS HANGEN can be used for any act of not communicating something which the tacens regards as his own private business. Thus, "Dat ga ik niet aan je neus hangen" (lit. "I'm not going to hang that on your nose") is synonymous with "That's none of your business".

Notice that the (Cd2)-(Ala) verbials also get non-emotional complements as in 'to smother a secret' and 'to muffle gossip'. It seems that in these cases the tacendum has to be a matter of general public interest as well. Thus TO STIFLE, TO SMOTHER, etc. seem to incorporate both extremes of the 'privacy continuum'. It is hard to tell whether their
(A1a) and (A2) meanings are on a par with each other or whether one is a derivative of the other.

57. Though the private-public contrast is still detectable in the (Cd3) verba tacendi, it only plays a role in some modified forms. For one thing, since (Cd3) verbials do not allow further specifications of the tacendum in the form of a complement, the verbal itself should give more precise information: it should be possible to calculate the nature of the tacendum on the basis of the verbal itself, combined with some contextual information. The most important topics of silence revealed by (Cd3) verba tacendi are presented in (A3) through (A7b).

(A3) Sa is silent about everything that he regards as personal
(A4) Sa is silent about other people's private matters (which may or may not be of public interest)
(A5) Sa is silent about his ideas or plans (which are of potential interest to the hearer)
(A6) Sa refrains from voicing his disagreement or disapproval
(A7a) Sa is silent about a matter which is of interest to the hearer because it is the topic of conversation
(A7b) Sa is silent about a matter which is of interest to the hearer because the latter has a right to know about it

A brief overview of the verbials in question follows.

58. Act (A3) differs from (A1) in that the former is an act of being silent about everything that the tacens regards as personal or private,
whereas the latter is an act of being silent about one particular private matter. This fact can be reconciled with our previous statement that (Cd3) verbials should give more precise information about the topic of silence than (Cd2) verbials because they do not allow further specifications of the tacendum in the form of a complement. The tacendum of a (Cd3)-(A3) verbal, being 'every personal matter', is linguistically more specific than 'a personal matter', though at the same time it is more general. The set of (Cd3)-(A3) verbials includes: TO KEEP ONE'S DISTANCE, TO KEEP AT A DISTANCE, TO KEEP ONESELF TO ONESELF, TO STAND ALOOF, TO HOLD ONESELF ALOOF, and the Dutch OP EEN AFSTAND BLIJVEN ('to keep at a distance'), ZICH OP EEN AFSTAND HOUDEN (idem), GERESERVEERD BLIJVEN ('to remain reserved'). One of the ways in which the tacens may succeed in keeping his distance is by talking about non-personal things; this observation shows one of the many bridges between silence and non-silence.

Observe that TO KEEP AT A DISTANCE and all three Dutch verbials may also describe acts of type (A8).

(A8) Sa is silent about a certain topic of conversation which he regards as the other speaker's private business

Again it is hard to decide whether the (A3) or (A8) meaning of these verba tacendi is derived from the other, or whether they are on a par.

59. Silence acts of the (A4) type are described by one verbal only, namely TO BE THE SOUL OF DISCRETION, Dutch DE DISCRETIE IN PERSOON ZIJN (lit. 'to be discretion in person'). However, these two are marginal in the set of verba tacendi because they are not normally used to describe
a particular act of being silent, but rather to indicate a general attitude or inclination.

A (Cd3)-(A5) verbal, reporting the tacens' silence about plans or ideas which are of potential interest to the hearer, is TO KEEP ONE'S OWN COUNSEL. Its Dutch equivalent is DE KAARTEN DUIKEN (meaning more or less 'not show one's cards') or NIET IN ZIJN KAARTEN LATEN KIJKEN (lit. 'not show one's cards').

Both (Cd3)-(A6) and (Cd3)-(A7b) are empty classes in Dutch. In English they are represented by TO HOLD ONE'S PEACE and TO HOLD OUT ON, respectively.

Finally, (A7a) is described in English by means of TO BEAT AROUND THE BUSH and TO HEM AND HAW, and in Dutch by means of ROND DE POT DRAAIEN (lit. 'to turn around the pot').

60. Two additional verbials which satisfy (Cd3) marginally are TO REFUSE COMMENT and TO SAY NEITHER YES NOR NO. Since the contextual information that they carry is more important (and certainly less vague) than the propositional information, we shall come back to them in the section on silence and context.

The propositional dimension of the verba tacendi is visualized in SDC-Table 10. Again, apart from some minor differences, The English and Dutch lexicon are quite symmetrical.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dutch</th>
<th>Semantic Dimension</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>iets niet aan iemands neus hangen</td>
<td>(Cd2) - (Ala)</td>
<td>to stifle, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iets in de doop pot stoppen</td>
<td>(Cd3) - (A3)</td>
<td>to keep oneself to oneself etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>op een afstand blijven, etc.</td>
<td>(Cd3) - (A3)</td>
<td>to keep at a distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(de discreetie in persoon zijn)</td>
<td>(Cd3) - (A3)</td>
<td>to be the soul of discretion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de kaarten duiken</td>
<td>(Cd3) - (A3)</td>
<td>to keep one's own counsel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rond de pot draaien</td>
<td>(Cd3) - (A3)</td>
<td>to beat around the bush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Cd3) - (A3)</td>
<td>to hold out on</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SDC-Table 10
61. A person's silence may be imbued with a kind of meaning other than the topics or the propositions that the tacens is being silent about. This non-propositional meaningfulness is generally indicated by means of adjectives as in TO MAINTAIN A DEATHLIKE/TOMBLIKE/GOLDEN/SOLEMN/PREGNANT SILENCE. DEATHLIKE and TOMBLIKE do not only mark intensity; in addition they stress the sinister or ominous character of the silence. The absence of speech can be SOLEMN only when something serious happened, is happening or is going to happen, usually as part of a (religious or secular) ceremony. Just as the 'calm before the storm' silence is PREGNANT when the silent people realize that a lot of (usually unpleasant) things could be said and are probably going to be said before long. When the silence is highly desirable to all parties, it may be said to be GOLDEN.

The same types of adjectives can be combined with STILTE ('silence') in Dutch: DOODS ('deathlike), PLECHTIG ('solemn'), GELADEN (lit. 'loaded', equivalent to 'pregnant' in this context), etc. It is significant that there is almost no limit to the negatively-colored adjectives which can be combined with 'silence' in both languages. Here are some more: OMINOUS and its equivalent ONHEILSPELLEND; THREATENING and its Dutch counterpart DREIGEND; etc. On the other hand, it is hard to find any positive adjectives apart from GOLDEN and SOLEMN (which is only semi-positive since silence at a funeral is even more likely to be solemn than silence at a wedding ceremony). Moreover, the meaning of an inherently positive ad-
jective such as PREGNANT (pregnancy being associated with 'joyful expec-
tation' which is the literal translation of one of its Dutch lexical-
izations) gets perverted in its combination with 'silence'. These facts
emphasize once again our repeated conjecture that for Anglo-Americans
and speakers of Dutch there is no such thing as joyful or pleasant
silence -- at least in the sense of silence as the absence of speech

K. SILENCE AND CONTEXT

62. The contextual dimension of the verba tacendi was first introduced
when the verba cessandi were defined (see paragraph 4). All verba
cessandi presuppose preceding discourse. However, the nature of that
discourse is rarely specified. Observe (D1) to (D9).

(D1) He abandoned stuttering, realizing it provoked ridicule
    rather than pity
(D2) He abandoned asking questions after realizing that he would
    never get a reply
(D3) He abandoned speaking after the audience's rude reactions
(D4) He abandoned his impolite speech after his father punished him
(D5) He abandoned writing poetry
(D6) He abandoned speech for several days
(D7) He abandoned his native speech and adopted the French tongue
(D8) He abandoned trying to convince his friends
(D9) He abandoned the subject when he did not get any response

The examples show that TO ABANDON, which denotes the discontinuation
of previous speech, may focus on particular sound features, a certain
speech act type, a certain type of text, a particular style, a particular communication type, language in general, one individual language, a certain intention and a particular intended effect, and a particular subject. Thus the verb is maximally general and does not carry information about the nature of the discourse the discontinuation of which it describes. Most verba cessandi are similar in this respect. The number of exceptions is extremely small.

63. An example of a verbum cessandi which carries specific information about the discontinued discourse is TO KNOCK IT OFF as used in (D10).

(D10) John finally knocked it off

The use of TO KNOCK IT OFF presupposes that its user (e.g. the person uttering (D10) regards the preceding discourse either as nonsensical or as inappropriate. In other words, condition (Cd1) obtains.

(Cd1) Sd regards the discontinued discourse as nonsensical or inappropriate

Consider (D11) and (D12).

(D11) After talking nonsense for hours, John finally knocked it off
(D12) John had been rude all night, but he finally knocked it off

In these two descriptions the possibilities are exemplified explicitly.

A Dutch verbum cessandi which provides specific information about the nature of the discontinued discourse is STAKEN (lit. 'to strike') which can only be used to describe the discontinuation of conversations or other dialogic forms of communication.
The information carried by TO KNOCK IT OFF is mainly contained in its presuppositions. In the case of STAKEN the information about the nature of the preceding discourse is supported by the valence of the verb: the subject is necessarily plural and the object has to be a substantive denoting a dialogic form of discourse.

64. Following discourse is as much a matter of context as preceding discourse. These two aspects of context combined yield three subclasses of contextualized acts of being silent.

(A1) Sa discontinues discourse

(A2) Sa discontinues discourse which is to be continued

(A3) Sa is silent before starting discourse

These three acts create several possible semantic patterns for verba tacendi. Not only are there three patterns corresponding to (A1), (A2) and (A3), respectively, but also the following ones: (A1) or (A2); (A1) or (A3); (A2) or (A3); (A1) or (A2) or (A3). But surprisingly only (A1), (A2) and ((A2) or (A3)) are lexicalized. An obvious (A1) verb is TO FINISH, Dutch OPHOUDEN (MET SPREKEN). Most verba cessandi belong to this type. The (A2) pattern is only represented by TO PAUSE, Dutch PAUZEREN. The most striking gap in the lexical frame is the absence of (A3) verbials, which would form the logical counterpart to the verba cessandi. (A3) is only represented as one possible meaning of the ((A2) or (A3)) verb TO HESITATE, Dutch AARZELLEN. The absence of (A3) verbials reflects the fact that pre-discourse silence is not noticed unless the hearer is waiting
for the conversational tacens to talk, whereas post-discourse silence is always noticed, whether more discourse is expected to follow or not. The lexical frame under discussion is represented in SDC-Table 11.

65. Not only verba cessandi provide us with information about preceding discourse. For instance, both TO REFUSE COMMENT and TO SAY NEITHER YES NOR NO presuppose preceding discourse. One cannot 'refuse comment' unless somebody asked to comment on some statement of state of affairs. And one cannot 'say neither yes nor no' unless somebody asked a question or made a proposal. Note, however, that in contrast with the verba cessandi, these two verba reticendi do not presuppose discourse on the part of the conversational tacens himself, but on the part of somebody else.

More examples are hard to find. Thus it seems that there are no verba silendi which carry contextual information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUTCH</th>
<th>SEMANTIC DIMENSION</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ophouden</td>
<td>(A1) to finish</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pauzeren</td>
<td>(A2) to pause</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aarzelen</td>
<td>(A3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SDC-Table 11
L. THE ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE OF SILENCE

66. A last, quite marginal, dimension of the verba tacendi is the information they carry about the illocutionary force of the absent speech. Both TO FAIL TO MENTION and TO REFUSE COMMENT are clearly concerned with statement-like acts. The verbials TO REFUSE COMMENT and TO SAY NEITHER YES NOR NO also provide information about the illocutionary force of the preceding discourse. In the case of TO REFUSE COMMENT, a comment must have been asked for. In the case of TO SAY NEITHER YES NOR NO the illocutionary force of the absent speech described even depends on the force of the preceding discourse: if a question precedes, then the absent speech is statement-like; if a proposal precedes, then acceptance and non-acceptance is referred to by means of the 'yes' and the 'no'.

Once again, more examples are really hard to find, which justifies our claim about the marginality of this dimension of the verba tacendi.

M. CONCLUSIONS

67. The discussions in this chapter should enable us to make detailed semantic comparisons between 'equivalent' verba tacendi in English and in Dutch (and probably in many other languages as well) by comparing their positions with respect to each of the semantic dimensions investigated. In most cases additional dimensions of meaning will have to be taken into account. But I trust that the most important ones for the characterization of the contrasts and similarities between the sets
of verba tacendi in English and in Dutch have been dealt with.

68. It is high time we wondered about the overall significance of this chapter on the semantics of silence. Undoubtedly it has revealed the importance of silence as an aspect of linguistic action (and hence I hope it may function as an incentive for further silence-research): the whole structure of language and linguistic action, from its sound properties via its meaning to its contextual architecture, is reflected in linguistic silence. In the process of uncovering the linguistic structure of the absence of speech we have made numerous noteworthy observations, some of which were merely confirmations of pre-theoretical intuitions, others being quite surprising, and still others being downright mysterious. Here is a partial list.

(i) The language dimension of the basic verba tacendi reveals the conducting of a conversation and the delivering of a speech as the two fundamental communication types in the experience of linguistic action. (Paragraph 7)

(ii) The absence of speech as such (i.e. the domain of the verba silendi) occupies the central position in our conceptualization of linguistic silence (as appears from SDC-Table 1). (Paragraph 9)

(iii) The verba tacendi reveal the primacy of the oral mode of communication. (Paragraphs 11 to 18)

(iv) The verba tacendi which are neutral between oral and written communication are never verba silendi. (Paragraph 13)

(v) The metaphorical extension of the meaning of verba tacendi from the oral to the written code is irreversible. (Paragraph 17)
(vi) There is a correlation between the code of the acts to be described and the code of the describing acts. (Paragraph 14)

(vii) The formation of verbials can determine their applicability. (Paragraph 15)

(viii) The absence of speech is gradable along the two sound-related dimensions of intensity and duration, but the superlative is the only point of the gradation scale that is really emphasized. (Paragraph 20)

(ix) The verba tacendi reveal attitudes towards the expression of pleasant versus unpleasant feelings or emotions. (Paragraphs 32 and 34)

(x) The talkative character of western culture is demonstrated repeatedly and in various ways.

The list is completely random and most attentive readers will be able to supplement it.

69. Apart from the fact that English does not whereas Dutch does possess simple lexicalizations as basic verba tacendi and a quite general basic term to cover the domain of linguistic silence, most of the differences between the English and the Dutch sets of verba tacendi are of minor importance, though not uninteresting. The strong parallelism was, of course, predictable. It is necessary to carry out further comparative investigations in order to find out which ones of our conclusions are language-specific and which ones stand a good chance of being universal.
IV. THE SEMANTICS OF LYING

A. INTRODUCTION

1. After surveying the marginal area of silence, we shall now attempt to penetrate one of the cores of linguistic action, namely the domain of the propositional content. We shall do so by way of analyzing the verbials describing linguistic actions performed by a speaker who presents the propositional content of his speech act as reflecting a true state of affairs but who knows or believes that it deviates from the truth.

Though no further arguments are needed for our decision not to engage in an endeavor to classify linguistic actions or linguistic action verbials, we are now confronted with a particularly compelling one which we should not neglect to mention. Even between the extremely marginal domain of silence and the quite central area of propositional content there is no sharp boundary. Not only can acts of being silent about something be occasionally regarded as lying, but there are also a number of linguistic action verbials which clearly cover portions of both domains without being ambiguous between two completely distinct senses. TO DIS-
GUise, for instance, is not only a verbum reticendi describing an act of being silent about some particular topic or fact, but disguising can be done by lying. Suppose there is a politico-religious movement called Communists for Christ, which people are so suspicious of that it is forced to start operating through cover organizations, one of them being the Creative Thought Project. If a communist for Christ introduces himself as a member of the Creative Thought Project, then he is not lying, but he is simply disguising his identity by being silent about it (which he can keep doing by assuming a different identity which he hopes will not be associated with the 'real' one). Suppose, furthermore, that it is a well-known fact that Communists for Christ do not accept the authority of the Pope. If, then, our Communist for Christ claims that he accepts the authority of the Pope, then he is disguising his real convictions by lying. And if he makes the same claim after being asked whether he is a Communist for Christ, then he is disguising his identity by being silent about it and by telling a lie. Similarly, TO COVER UP describes acts which often combine silence about a particular tacendum (e.g. a crime) with a lie (e.g. a false alibi). Such marginal cases will be left out of the subsequent account.

2. Not all linguistic actions in which the truth is distorted would be called lies. Within the scope of this chapter we shall not only discuss lying proper, but also exaggerating, understating, distorting, blackening, coloring, etc. Given this scope it would be misleading to talk about 'verbials of lying'. Therefore we introduce the term verba mentiendi (from Latin MENTIRI meaning 'to lie') to cover the complete domain under
investigation. The 'liar' will be called the mentiens. And what is being 'lied' about will be referred to as the mentiendum, plural mentienda. Notice that in a case such as "Yesterday I went to the moon" the mentiendum includes, strictly speaking, both the trip to the moon and yesterday's activities. Which one of the two aspects is focused on will depend on the context.

Remember that the set of verba tacendi included some negations of non-silence linguistic action verbials such as NOT SPEAK and NOT TALK. One similar formation will be encountered in this chapter, namely NOT TELL THE TRUTH, which will be regarded as a complex lexicalization because it is a conventional means of talking about untruthful linguistic acts. No comparable lexicalizations will occur in the following chapters.

Whereas ostensive definitions were impossible in the previous chapter because acts of being silent cannot be reproduced on paper, they will be used from now onwards.

B. THE FRAME OF LYING

3. The linguistic actions described by the verba mentiendi involve a conscious distortion of the truth. The notion of truth is ambiguous between truth as such (if it exists) and what the speaker knows, believes or thinks to be true. Given our lexical approach, a more tangible contrast is that between what is true for the user of a verbum mentiendi and what is true for the performer of the act described. If John believes that the earth is round and Jim believes that it is flat, and John is aware of
Jim's belief, then John will not describe Jim's claim that the earth is round as a lie (even though the propositional content deviates from Jim's beliefs); instead, John will have to say that Jim told the truth (even though John realizes that Jim was trying to convey misleading information about his own world of beliefs). Such attempts at making an untrue statement are not describable in terms of a verbum mentiendi. Thus, a verbum mentiendi is appropriately used only if the describing act $D$ satisfies conditions (Cd1) and (Cd2), and if $A$, the act described, satisfies (Cl).

(Cl) $S_a$ believes that what he presents as a true state of affairs is a distortion of the truth

(Cd1) $S_d$ believes that what is presented in $A$ as a true state of affairs, is a distortion of the truth

(Cd2) $S_d$ believes that (Cl) obtains

These three conditions define the lexical frame of lying. As a result, the verba mentiendi do not include verbs such as TO ERR which denote untruthfulness for which the speaker is not (completely) responsible, nor verbs such as TO FLATTER and TO BOAST which may but need not imply deviations from the truth.

4. In the previous chapter we claimed that the verba tacendi, because of the marginality of silence as an aspect of linguistic action, reflected all the major aspects of linguistic action. In other words, the frame of silence was said to be the frame of linguistic action itself. This emerged very clearly from the salient role of what was called the language dimension of silence. Thus studying the semantics of silence proved to
be relevant as a way of gaining insight into our experience of language. In a similar way, studying the semantics of lying may yield insight into truth as an aspect of language (or as an aspect of the propositional content of utterances). The most important semantic dimension of the verba mentiendi will be shown to be the truth dimension. In other words, the frame of lying is the frame of truth itself.

C. LYING AND TRUTH

5. A natural expectation of what a truth dimension would look like could be in terms of the gradability of the notion of truth. One could expect there to be a continuum of verba mentiendi ranging from those indicating a flat falsehood to those indicating a minor deviation from the truth. Of course such gradability is reflected in the set of verba mentiendi as appears from the contrast between TO LIE and TO COLOR (and the corresponding Dutch verbs LIEGEN and KLEUREN). However, the contrast is rarely this clear since in most cases totally different semantic features play an important role. For instance, the fact that TO FIB appears to be weaker than TO LIE is not due to the gradability of the notion of truth; rather, it results from the type of falsehood involved: in the case of TO FIB, a trivial falsehood is referred to. On the other hand, TO LIE LIKE A TROOPER appears to be stronger than TO LIE, but this strength usually derives from the frequency implied rather than from the kind of gradability under discussion. Consequently, if there were only the gradability of truth, there would be very little to say about the truth dimension of lying.
Nevertheless, it is worth comparing, in passing, the sets of verbials available in English and in Dutch to describe highly intense acts of lying. Whereas the English repertoire does not go much further than TO LIE FLATLY and TO LIE LIKE A TROOPER, in Dutch we find considerable variation: LIEGEN ALS EEN KETTER (lit.'to lie like a heretic'), LIEGEN ALS EEN ALMANAK (lit. 'to lie like an almanac'), TEGEN DE KLIPPEN/STERREN OP LIEGEN (lit. 'to lie up against the cliffs/stars'), LIEGEN ALSOF HET GEDRUKT STAAT (lit. 'to lie as if it were printed'), LIEGEN DAT MEN HET ZELF GELOOF (lit. 'to lie so that one believes it oneself'), LIEGEN DAT MEN ZWART/SCHEEL ZIET (lit. 'to lie so that one looks black/cross-eyed').

6. Apart from verbials such as TO LIE, TO COLOR, TO FIB, TO LIE LIKE A TROOPER and many others, all of which simply indicate that the truth is being distorted, there are verba mentiendi which give information about how the truth is being distorted. The latter can be placed at the extremes of two scales, the quantity scale and the quality scale.

The set of verba mentiendi reflects four ways of distorting the truth. First, it is possible to make something look 'smaller' than it is. Second, one can make something look 'bigger' than it is. The basic verba mentiendi situated at these two poles of what I call the quantity scale of truth are TO UNDERSTATE (which does not always describe the figure of speech 'understatement') and TO EXAGGERATE. We shall call the first one a quantity diminishing verb, the second one a quantity increasing verb. It is interesting to note that Dutch lacks a basic equivalent to TO UNDERSTATE though there is a quantity diminishing verb such as VERKLEINEN (the adjective KLEIN means 'small'); however, we refrain from regarding this one as a
quantity diminishing verbum mentiendi because it is often quality diminishing. Consequently, we seem to be confronted with a quite surprising lexical gap in the Dutch set of basic verba mentiendi. The Dutch equivalent of TO EXAGGERATE is OVERDRIJVEN.

The two remaining ways of distorting the truth consist in making something look 'better' than it is and making something look 'worse' than it is. The basic verba mentiendi situated at these two poles of the quality scale of truth are TO WHITEWASH and TO SLANDER (Dutch GOEDPRATEN and (BE)LASTEREN); We shall call the first one a quality increasing verb and the second one a quality diminishing verb.

The five types of verba mentiendi discussed so far are presented in Figure 1. TO LIE, TO COLOR, etc. are situated in the middle, with arrows directed at the two poles of the quality and quantity scales because some instances of distorting the truth along these scales can be described in terms of lying, coloring, etc.

7. The quality and quality scales of truth seem to show a curious one-directional interdependence relationship (indicated by means of the broken arrow in Figure 1). It is possible to whitewash somebody's 'bad' behavior by making an understatement about it or even by exaggerating its positive aspects. Similarly, one can slander someone by exaggerating his vices (though not as easily by making understatements about his virtues). But one cannot make an understatement by whitewashing, nor exaggerate by slandering. Why is the quality scale dependent on the quantity scale and not vice versa? Probably because it is not possible
Figure 1

Quantity scale of truth ←---------------------- Quality scale of truth

Eng. to lie
to color etc.
Du. liegen kleuren etc.

Eng. to exaggerate
Du. overdrijven

Eng. to slander
Du. (be)lasteren

Eng. to whitewash
Du. goedpraten
to take quality as a criterion for quantity, whereas in our culture quanti-
ty is continuously taken as a criterion for quality. This explanation
would be entirely in keeping with the MORE IS BETTER value judgment
which Lakoff and Johnson (1979) discover in some chains of metaphors
permeating the English language.

8. Once we leave the domain of the basic verba mentiendi we discover a
relationship between the like poles of the scales which the opposite
poles do not have. Indeed, the sets of quality diminishing and quantity
diminishing verbs share one member in Dutch, VERKLEINEN, though none in
English. Similarly, TO DRESS UP and TO EMBROIDER, as well as the Dutch
BORDUREN ('to embroider') belong to the quantity increasing and quality
increasing verbs.

Just as the directionality of the dependence relationship discussed
in the previous paragraph, the verba mentiendi enumerated here show that
quantity is regularly taken as a criterion for quality. This state of
affairs is reflected even more clearly in the verbs TO BELITTLE and
KLEINEREN which mean literally 'to make small' (the adjective KLEIN
meaning 'small') but which can only be used as quality diminishing verbs.

9. After indicating the main lines of force of the truth dimension of
lying, our next task is to make a more detailed study of the English and
Dutch verba mentiendi along this dimension. There are a number of gene-
ral conditions on the standard appropriate use of the verba mentiendi
which will be not be repeated for each verbal in the rest of this chapter.
The conditions in question are (Cl), (Cd1) and (Cd2), which have already been mentioned in the previous section to define the lexical frame of lying.

(Cl) Sa believes that what he presents as a true state of affairs is a distortion of the truth
(Cd1) Sd believes that what is presented in A as a true state of affairs, is a distortion of the truth
(Cd2) Sd believes that (Cl) obtains

Consequently, when we talk about an act (A) conforming to (C) and described by means of (D), we mean that also (Cl'), (Cd1') and (Cd2') obtain.

(A) The earth is flat
(C) The earth is round
(D) Sa lied
(Cl') Sa believes that the earth is round
(Cd1') Sd believes that the earth is round
(Cd2') Sd believes that (Cl') obtains

In that way redundant repetitions can be avoided.

One may be inclined to believe that (Cl) and (Cd2) do not have to obtain in order for a distortion of the truth to be appropriately described by means of certain verba mentiendi such as TO EXAGGERATE. However, the validity of my general claim is probably sufficiently demonstrated by pointing out that an adequate response to the accusation "You are exaggerating" is "No, I really believe what I am saying".
10. A simple case of deviating from the truth is (A1) if uttered in circumstances in which (C2) obtains.

(A1) John was home at the time of the robbery

(C2) In fact, John was not home at the time of the robbery

In any D describing (A1) conforming to (C2) one could use the verba mentiendi TO LIE, TO LIE FLATLY, TO TELL A LIE, NOT TELL THE TRUTH, TO SPEAK FALSELY, and in Dutch LIEGEN ('to lie'), LEUGENS VERKOPEN (lit. 'to sell lies'), LEUGENS VERTELLEN ('to tell lies'), DE WAARHEID GEWELD AANDOEN (lit. 'to violate the truth'), DE WAARHEID NIET ZEGGEN ('not tell the truth'). Let us call these verbials of lying.

All the (A1)-(C2) verbials mentioned, except TO LIE FLATLY, are also applicable to (A1) when it conforms to (C3).

(C3) John was almost home at the time of the robbery (in fact close enough to be sure that he could not have been at the scene of the crime when the crime was committed)

In addition to the (A1)-(C2) verbials, a large subset of the verba mentiendi, which cannot be applied to (A1) when (C2) obtains, are perfectly fit to describe (A1) when (C3) applies, or at least to acts of a similar type: TO DISTORT, TO COLOR, TO BEND THE TRUTH, TO DEVIATE FROM THE TRUTH, TO GIVE A COLOR TO, TO GIVE A FALSE COLORING, TO MISREPRESENT, TO PREVARICATE, TO PUT A FALSE APPEARANCE UPON, TO PUT IN A FALSE LIGHT, TO SLANT, TO STRAIN THE TRUTH, TO STRETCH THE TRUTH, TO TWIST, TO WARP; and in Dutch KLEUREN ('to color'), IN EEN VALS DAGLICHT STELLEN (lit. 'to put in a false daylight'), VERDRAAIEN ('to twist'), VERKEERD VOORSTELLEN ('to misrepresent'), VERWRINGEN ('to twist'), EEN VERWRONGEN VOORSTELLING
GEVEN VAN (lit. 'to give a distorted representation of'), VAN DE WAARHEID AFWIJKEN ('to deviate from the truth'), DE WAARHEID TE KORT DOEN (lit. 'to wrong the truth'), DE WAARHEID VERDRAAIEN/VERWRINGEN/VERKRACHTEN (lit. 'to twist/warp/rape the truth'). These are called the *verbials of distorting*.

In addition to the verbials of lying and distorting, there are all the quality and quantity diminishing and increasing verbials which I shall now go on to list and illustrate.

11. To start with the quality diminishing verba mentiendi, consider (A2) uttered in a context which satisfies (C4).

(A2) Mr. Kohl was a member of the Nazi party

(C4) Mr. Kohl was never a member of the Nazi party (though, perhaps, he had some Nazi friends)

This act can be adequately described by means of TO SLANDER as in (D1) or (D2).

(D1) Sa is slandering

(D2) Sa is trying to slander Mr. Kohl's good name

Similar quality diminishing verbials (not all of which necessarily involve a distortion of the truth though they are usually associated with it) are TO ASPERSE, TO BACKBITE, TO BAD-MOUTH, TO BESMEAR, TO BESMIRCH, TO BLACKEN, TO CALUMNiate, TO CAST A SLUR ON, TO CAST ASPERSIONS ON, TO DEFAME, TO DEFILE, TO DENIGRATE, TO DISPARAGE, TO DRAG THROUGH THE MUD, TO GIVE A BAD NAME, TO LIBEL, TO MALIGN, TO RUN DOWN, TO SLUR, TO SMIRCH,
TO SPEAK ILL OF, TO SPEAK SLIGHTLY OF, TO SULLY, TO TARNISH, TO TRA­DUCE, TO VILIFY; and in Dutch ACHTERKLAPPEN ('to backbite'), BEKLADDEN ('to besmirch'), (BE)LASTEREN ('to slander'), BEZWALKEN ('to besmear'), DENIGREREN ('to denigrate'), IEMAND IN ZIJN EER/GOEDE NAAM AANTASTEN (lit. 'to injure a person in his honor/good name'), IEMAND OVER DE HEKEL HALEN (lit. 'to pull someone across the hackle'; a hackle is a board with long metal teeth for dressing flax or hemp; the expression means 'to talk about and judge a person in a very sharp, merciless and male­volent manner'), KWAADSPREKEN (lit. 'to speak ill'), VAN IEMAND KWAAD STOKEN (lit. 'to brew ill about someone'), IEMAND LElijk/SLECHT MAKEN (lit. 'to make someone ugly/bad'), DOOR DE MODDER SLEUREN ('to drag through the mud'), DOOR HET SLIJK HALEN ('to drag through the mud'), IEMAND ZWART MAKEN ('to balcken someone').

There are two aspects of the lexical frame associated with acts of the (A2)-(C4) type which reflect one of the profoundest, though often un­conscious, value judgments inherent in our linguistic culture. First, apart from TO CRITICIZE (Dutch BEKRITISEREN) I cannot think of any ling­uistic action verbal, neither in English nor in Dutch, which contains the meaning 'to say something bad or unfavorable about someone or some­thing', and which is not, in all or most of its uses, associated with untruthfulness. This is in sharp contrast with the large set of verbials meaning 'to say something good of favorable about someone or something' without being associated with a lack of truthfulness (such as TO PRAISE, TO LAUD, TO GLORIFY, and many others). Second, whereas the verbials of distorting can be used to cover the domains of the quality and quantity diminishing and increasing verbials (as will be clear from what follows),
the verbials of lying can be easily extended to the conceptual domain of
the quality diminishing verbials (i.e. the acts of the (A2)-(C4) type)
but not so easily -- and in most cases not at all -- to the area of the
quality increasing and the quantity diminishing and increasing linguistic
action verbials. Both of these facts reveal a strong association of
'saying bad things about' with 'saying untrue things about'. Thus the
lexicon reflects a usually unconscious value judgment which is entirely
in keeping with Freud's (1917:48) observation that "society makes what
is disagreeable into what is untrue". How else can we explain that an
expression such as TO DISH THE DIRT has come to assume the meaning of
gossiping, which is strongly associated with untruthfulness? Dishing
the dirt, even if the dirt is very real, is rarely appreciated, and
therefore the truth is branded as untrue.

12. The quantity diminishing verb TO UNDERSTATE can be used to describe
such acts as (A3) conforming to (C5).

(A3) Once or twice a year Jim sends some money to the World Health
Organization

(C5) In fact, at least twice a year Jim sends a complete monthly
allowance to the World Health Organization

Another quantity diminishing verb, with a quite specific meaning, it TO
UNDERREPORT in the sense of reporting (e.g. to the Internal Revenue Ser­
vice) an amount (e.g. as one's income) less than the actual one. In
Dutch there seem to be no purely quantity diminishing linguistic action
verbials. There is, however, the verb VERKLEINEN, which is quantity diminishing in form but which can be used either as a quantity diminishing verb as in (D3) describing (A3)-(C5) or as a quality diminishing verb as in (D4) describing (A2)-(C4).

(D3) Sa tracht Jims bijdrage te verkleinen
(Sa is trying to make Jim's contribution [look] smaller')

(D4) Sa tracht Mr. Kohls verdiensten als na-oorlogs socialist te verkleinen
('Sa is trying to belittle Mr. Kohl's merits as a post-war socialist')

Apparently English lacks a verbal which can either be quantity or quality diminishing. TO BELITTLE can be used to describe some acts of the (A3)-(C5) type, as in (D5).

(D5) Sa is trying to belittle Jim's contribution

But in such cases it is a quantity and quality diminishing verb at the same time.

13. Quantity increasing verbs such as TO EXAGGERATE and its Dutch equivalent OVERDRIJVEN can be applied to acts such as (A4) conforming to (C6).

(A4) Jim donates half his income to UNESCO

(C6) In fact, Jim sends a small contribution to UNESCO twice a year

Other quantity increasing verbials are TO AGGRANDIZE, TO BLOW UP, TO DRAW THE LONGBOW, TO HYPERBOLIZE, TO MAGNIFY, TO TALK IN SUPERLATIVES,
TO OVERLAUD, TO OVERPRAISE, TO OVERSTATE, TO OVERSTRESS; and in Dutch
AANDIKKEN (lit. 'to thicken'), CHARGEREN ('to exaggerate in order to
ridicule'), EXAGEREREN ('to exaggerate'; rarely used), OPBLAZEN ('to
blow up'), OPSNIJDEN (lit. 'to cut up'), OPSCHROEVEN (lit. 'to screw
up'), ER EEN SCHEPJE OP DOEN (lit. 'to add a little scoop'), MET SPEK
SCHIETEN (lit. 'to shoot with bacon'), VERGROTHEN (lit. 'to enlarge'),
VAN EEN SCHEET EEN DONDERSLAG MAKEN (lit. 'to make a fart into a thun-
derbolt'), VAN EEN VLEEG/MUG/MUIS EEN OLIFANT MAKEN (lit. 'to make a
fly/mosquito/mouse into an elephant').

Notice that it is possible to 'make something look bigger', i.e. to
exaggerate something, by making it look numerically smaller. An example
would be the utterance "In Belgium the sun shines once or twice a year".

14. There are two different types of quality increasing verba mentiendi.
The first type, represented by TO EMBELLISH in English and its Dutch
counterparts VERFRAAIEEN and AANKLEDEN (lit. 'to dress'), is used to
describe acts such as (A5)-(C7).

(A5) We arrived in Los Angeles in the morning. The same day we
visited Hollywood where we happened to see Peter Falk and
Jane Fonda walking around

(C7) Sa visited Hollywood, but he did not manage to see any well-
known moviestar

About Sa, who is inventing details to make his story nicer, one can say
(D6) As usual, Sa is embellishing the story of his vacation.

TO EMBELLISH, VERFRAAIEN and AANKLEDEN describe acts of making something look nicer or better which may already have been good or nice to begin with.

A second type of quality increasing verba mentiendi is used to describe acts of making something look better which was not good at all to start with. Consider (A6)-(C8).

(A6) Jack's stealing is just a natural outcome of the deprivation he suffered during his childhood.

(C8) Jack is a thief (who may or may not have suffered deprivation during his childhood).

This type of act is described by means of TO WHITEWASH, TO DEODORIZE, TO GILD, TO GLOSS (OVER), TO MAKE SMELL LIKE ROSES, TO VARNISH and the Dutch GOEDPRATEN (lit. 'to good-talk'), BEWIMPELEN (lit. 'to cover with a flag'), MOOIPRATEN (lit. 'to nice-talk'), VERGULDEN ('to gild'), VERBLOEMEN (lit. 'to turn into a flower'), VERGOELIJKEN (lit. 'to make good'), and WIT WASSEN (lit. 'to wash white'; not to be confused with 'to whitewash').

We have mentioned before that TO DRESS UP, TO EMBROIDER and the Dutch BORDUREN ('to embroider') are quantity and quality increasing verba mentiendi. Notice, however, that they do not cover the complete domain of the quality increasing verbials but only the area of the (A5)-(C7) subtype. Also notice the curious fact that the Dutch verb AANKLEDEN (lit. 'to dress') is mainly quality increasing and not both quality and
quantity increasing as its literal English equivalent TO DRESS UP.

The fact that a distinction had to be made between (A5)-(C7) and (A6)-(C8) whereas no similar split was to be found in the set of quality diminishing verbials (though it is quite conceivable to distinguish between making good things look bad and making bad things look worse) is another linguistic reflection of the habit to regard unpleasant things as untrue.

The preceding observations on the truth dimension of lying are summarized in SDC-Table 1.

**D. THE ILOCUTIONARY FORCE OF LYING**

15. The title of this section is misleading in the sense that lying cannot be said to possess an illocutionary force of its own, Lying is simply a matter of performing speech acts the propositional content of which deviates from the truth in any of several possible ways. However, all examples of verba mentiendi mentioned so far described acts of the illocutionary type (A1).

\[(A1) \text{Sa makes a statement}\]

Therefore, though they cannot be said to have an illocutionary force of their own, they are not neutral with respect to illocutionary force: in Searle's terminology, the point of the acts described is always to represent a certain state of affairs. This restriction to statement-like speech acts is not surprising. Though sincerity plays an important part with respect to other types of speech acts such as directives, commissives
and expressives, questions of truth, i.e. questions of the correspondence between 'reality' and propositional content, are less relevant.

Yet there is another set of linguistic action verbinals which are closely related to the verba mentiendi mentioned so far but which describe acts of the type (A2), i.e. there is no illocutionary type specified by the verbinals themselves.

(A2) Sa performs (a) speech act(s) with any illocutionary force

They can be regarded as verba mentiendi in so far as they can be used to describe statement-like utterances deviating from the truth; when they refer to acts of a different illocutionary type they cease to be verba mentiendi because no deviation from the truth is involved though sincerity is trifled with in some other way. Here is a partial list: TO PUT ON AN ACT, TO PUT UP A FRONT, TO PUT ON A (FALSE)FRONT, TO ACT, TO ACT/PLAY A PART, TO ACT/PLAY THE HYPOCRITE, TO CANT, TO AFFECT, TI ASSUME, TO SHAM, TO SIMULATE, TO DISSEMBLE, TO DISSIMULATE, TO FAKE, TO FEIGN, TO GAMMON, TO LET ON, TO MAKE A PRETENSE, TO MAKE A SHOW OF, TO MAKE FALSE PRETENSES, TO POSSUM, TO PRETEND; and in Dutch AFFEchteren ('to affect'), DOEN ALSOF ('to act as if'), ZICHER VAN DE DOMME HOUDEN (lit.'to hold oneself stupid', meaning 'to act as if one does not know about something'), GEBAREN (lit. 'to gesture', meaning 'to let on'), HUCHELEN ('to feign', often 'to dissemble'), ONTVEINZEN ('to dissemble'), IN ZIJS ROL BLIJVEN (lit. 'to stay in one's role'), EEN ROL SPELEN ('to act a part'), SIMuleren ('to simulate'), VEINZEN ('to feign'), VOORGEVEN ('to pretend'), VOORWENDEN ('to pretend'), FEMELEN ('to cant'), KWEZELEN ('to cant'), DE HYPOCRiet UITHANGEN ('to play the hypocrite'), etc. Whenever these
verbials are discussed further on, only their (A1) meaning will be referred to.

16. A number of verba mentiendi are applicable to certain specific subtypes of statement-like acts. One of these subtypes is the act of accusing which is of the type (A1) conforming to (Cl)

(C1) the propositional content of Sa's utterance ascribes an act or property, which is generally regarded as 'bad' or 'wrong', to a person

An (A1)-(C1) verbal would be TO IMPUTE (something to a person); in Dutch there are the verbials AANWRIJVEN, AANTIJGEN and IEMAND IETS IN DE SCHOENEN SCHUIVEN (lit. 'to shove something into somebody's shoes', meaning 'to accuse unjustly'). About all quality diminishing verbals, though their meaning is wider, can be used in the sense of accusing unjustly.

17. The opposite of accusing is praising. There are two types of praising which are covered by specific verba mentiendi. The first type is (A1) conforming to (C2)

(C2) the propositional content of Sa's utterance ascribes an act or property, which is generally regarded as 'good' or 'right', to a person or object

Some (A1)-(C2) verba mentiendi are TO OVERLAUD, TO OVERCOMMEND, TO OVERPRAISE and the Dutch OVERROEPEN (lit. 'to overshout'). The second type of praising unjustly is (A1) conforming to (C2) plus (C3).
(C3) the person about whom something 'good' is said or who has an immediate interest in the state of affairs talked about, is (one of) Sa's hearer(s)

Relevant verbials here are TO PLAY UP TO and the Dutch IEMAND NAAR DEMOND PRATEN (lit. 'to talk to someone's mouth' meaning 'to say what he likes to hear, which makes you wonder why the expression is not 'to talk to someone's ear'). Verba mentiendi which are neutral between (A1)-(C2) and (A1)-(C2+C3) are TO GIVE MOUTH HONOR TO, TO RENDER/GIVE/PAY LIP SERVICE and the Dutch EEN LIPPENDIENST BEWIJZEN ('to render lip service').

It is worth noting that whereas most quality diminishing verbials such as TO CAST ASPERSIONS ON can be extended from a neutral (A1) to (A1)-(C1), it is not possible to extend the basic (A1) meaning of quality increasing verbials such as TO WHITENASH into the domain of praising unjustly. On the other hand, the quality increasing verb TO EMBELLISH as well as most quantity increasing verbs such as TO EXAGGERATE can be extended from (A1) to (A1)-(C2) and even (A1)-(C2+C3). But the quantity diminishing verb TO UNDERSTATE, just as TO WHITENASH, sticks to the neutral (A1) meaning. The interaction between the truth dimension and the illocutionary dimension in Dutch is completely analogous.

18. The third statement-like illocutionary force type which some verba mentiendi draw explicit attention to is *swearing*. In other words, (A1) conforms to (C4) or (C5).

    (C4) Sa is taking an oath
    (C5) Sa is under oath
The Dutch EEN MEINEED AFLEGGEN ('to commit perjury') is restricted to (A1)-(C4). TO BEAR FALSE WITNESS and its equivalent EEN FALSE GETUIGENIS AFLEGGEN seem to be confined to (A1)-(C5); in some cases they do not belong to the domain of swearing at all. The English verbials TO PERJURE ONESELF and TO COMMIT PERJURY are neutral between (A1)-(C4) and (A1)-(C5): they can either be used to describe an act of swearing as such or an act of making an untruthful statement under oath (i.e. a statement made after swearing that what was to follow would be true).

19. The illocutionary dimension of the verba mentiendi, which is represented in SDC-Table 2, shows that the question of truth is most relevant with respect to statement-like speech acts or representatives. Among the representatives, acts of accusing, praising and swearing are focused on individually, which shows their salience. Praising untruthfully is salient because because of its frequent occurrence in social interaction. Accusing and swearing are salient because the question of truth is absolutely central to these two acts. This is why the verb TO LIE and the other verbials of lying can be easily applied to acts of accusing unjustly and swearing falsely, but not to overlauding or rendering lip service.

20. The centrality of the question of truth to representative speech acts also emerges from the fact that the basic Dutch verb in this conceptual area, BEWEREN, is often associated with untruthfulness. BEWEREN means 'to state without proof or to maintain in spite of evidence to the contrary'. In that sense the Dutch verb is much closer to TO CLAIM than to TO STATE. There seems to be no Dutch representative the meaning of which
SDC-Table 2
is as general and as neutral as the meaning of TO STATE and which is not associated with untruthfulness. Though the claim that this shows something about the credibility of Dutch statements would be hardly credible itself, we are at least confronted with a curious lexical gap. In practice, the gap is usually filled by the statement-specific use of the more general linguistic action verb ZEGGEN ('to say'), a use to which also the English TO SAY can be put; another common way out is to use VERKLAREN (English 'to declare'), but this is clearly not as basic a word as TO STATE.

21. Lying is a domain without explicit performatives. This does not only result from the fact that lying has no illocutionary force of its own (though its domain is restricted to the representative illocutionary act type), but also from some simple pragmatic constraints on the use of the verba mentiendi. Elsewhere (Verschueren 1977:13-14) I have shown that an act of boasting would destroy itself if the performative formula 'I boast' were to be used, and that a moral judgment would be passed on an act of threatening by using the performative formula 'I threaten'. Similarly, Grice (1978:125) draws our attention to the fact that prefixing the phrase "to speak ironically" to an ironical statement would destroy the irony (whereas "to speak metaphorically" can be prefixed to metaphorical utterances). In the same way, adding 'I lie' to an untrue statement would turn it into a true statement, or at least it would destroy the possibility of deceiving the hearer. This final remark leads us toward the perlocutionary intent of lying.
E. LYING AND PERLOCUTIONARY INTENT

22. The intended perlocutionary effect which is typically associated with statements is to make the hearer believe something or to inform him about something. Thus, if one lies, one typically intends to bring it about that the hearer believes something which is untrue. In other words, there is an intention to deceive involved. The verb TO DECEIVE was itself excluded from the realm of the verba mentiendi because it focuses completely on a particular perlocutionary effect which is, moreover, necessarily achieved. If one were to describe (A1) by means of (D1) in circumstances in which (C1) obtains, also (C2) has to be fulfilled in order for TO DECEIVE to be used appropriately in (D1) as a description of (A1).

(A1) John was home at the time of the robbery
(D1) S a deceived the police
(C1) In fact, John was not home at the time of the robbery
(C2) The police came to believe that John was home at the time of the robbery

Similarly, TO FLATTER was also excluded from the set of verba mentiendi though it may be used to describe untruthful statements, because just as TO DECEIVE it really focuses on a particular perlocutionary effect which in this case may or may not be achieved. About the verba mentiendi such as TO LIE we can only say that they have a strong association with a typically intended perlocutionary effect which could generally be called deception or the creation of false beliefs.
Though there is this one basic effect which is typically intended, there is considerable variation among the verba mentiendi along the perlocutionary dimension. There are mainly two parameters for the differentiation. First, the type of false belief may be further specified. Second, different types of further effects may be aimed at via the false belief induced. These two parameters will now be considered.

23. Most verba mentiendi give no further specification of the false belief that the speaker is trying to induce in the hearer. Consequently, most of them are neutral with respect to this part of the perlocutionary dimension. Probably there is only one class of exceptions constituted by verbials such as TO CANT, TO ACT/PLAY THE HYPOCRITE and the Dutch KWEZELEN ('to cant'), FEMELEN ('to cant') and DE HYPOCRIT UITHANGEN ('to play the hypocrite'). As an illustration of their use, consider (D2) and (D3) as descriptions of (A2)-(C3) and (D4) and (D5) as descriptions of (A3)-(C4).

(A2) It is hard to understand why so many young people should die, but I think we should not try to judge God's decisions
(D2) Sa is canting again
(D3) Sa is playing the hypocrite again

(C3) Sa does not believe that God exists, or at least he thinks that if God exists he must be a super-cruel being in order to let so many young people die

The second example:

(A3) Let this incident not be a reason for declaring war; they are, after all, our brothers
(D4) Sa was canting about brotherly love
(D5) Sa was playing the hypocrite again
(C4) Sa wants vengeance, he is only waiting for a better moment

These two examples show that the kind of belief which is typically intended to be generated by means of canting and playing the hypocrite is the hearer's belief that the speaker is a virtuous or pious person. In other words, (C5) should be a characteristic of (A2) in order for (D2) and (D3) to be appropriate descriptions of A2), and (C6) should be a characteristic of (A3) in order for (D4) and (D5) to be appropriate descriptions of (A3).

(C5) Sa wants Ha to believe that he is a pious, God-fearing person
(C6) Sa wants Ha to believe that he is a virtuous, peace-loving person

I have not found other verba mentiendi which gave equally specific information on the perlocutionary intent at the level of the beliefs which the speaker wants to arouse.

24. There is a perlocutionary level beyond the beliefs which the speaker wants to arouse when making an untruthful statement. The intention may be to produce a further effect by means of generating a certain false belief. Also at that level many verba mentiendi do not provide any specific information. But this parameter yields a somewhat stronger variation than the previous one.

For one thing, the four types of verba mentiendi specifying the way in which the truth is being distorted (quality increasing, quality diminishing, etc.) also single out, as a direct corollary, different intended
effects. Thus, the typically intended effect of an act describable in terms of a quality increasing verbal such as TO WHITEN is to create a favorable attitude towards something or someone by making the hearer believe that it or he is 'better' than it or he is in reality. The typically intended effect of an act describable in terms of a quality diminishing verbal such as TO SLANDER is to create an unfavorable attitude towards something or someone by means of making the hearer believe it or him to be 'worse' than it or he is in reality. Similarly, the typically intended effect of an act describable in terms of a quantity increasing verbal such as TO EXAGGERATE is to impress the hearer by making him believe that the blown up representation given matches reality. Conversely, acts describable by means of quantity diminishing verbals such as TO UNDERSTATE are typically intended to yield the reverse effect of impressing.

It should be noted that understating, in actual discourse, is very often not intended to make the hearer believe the propositional content. Thus "He is full of understatement" may mean that the person in question is full of humor and that he achieves his humoristic effects by means of understatements (as figures of speech). Does this invalidate our analysis? By no means. This observation simply points to a more general problem. Making a statement the propositional content of which does not match reality or the 'truth' is not necessarily lying. Consider (A4) uttered in circumstances to which (C7) obtains.

(A4) John is a genius
(C7) In fact, John can hardly produce two coherent sentences
(A4) can either be an instance of lying or an instance of irony. What distinguishes the two is the speaker's perlocutionary intent. In the case of irony it is not the speaker's intention to make the hearer believe that John is a genius; quite the opposite is true. Humoristic understatements differ from lie-like understatements in the same way. This observation shows the necessity of formulating the typically intended perlocutionary effect of acts within the domain of the verba mentiendi.

25. There are a couple of quantity increasing verbs the intended effect of which deviates from the general intention of 'impressing' formulated in the previous paragraph. Not only are their effects different in type, they are also much more specific.

First, the Dutch verb CHARGEREN means 'to give an exaggerated representation of something in order to make it ridiculous'. I have not found an exact equivalent in English, though TO CARICATURE is close.

Second, the verb TO OVERCHARGE denotes acts which are intended to make someone pay more for something than it is really worth, by making him believe that the charged price reflects its real value. In Dutch only circumscriptions such as TEVEEL AANREKENEN ('to charge too much'), which can hardly be regarded as lexical items, can be used to describe such acts.

26. There are also some verbials which do not belong to any of the four sets of verba mentiendi singling out the way in which the truth is being distorted, which specify an intended effect to be achieved via the arousing of false beliefs in the hearer.
First, verbials such as TO PLAY UP TO and its equivalent IEMAND NAAR DEMOND PRATEN (lit. 'to talk to someone's mouth') describe acts typically intended to gratify or flatter the hearer by making him believe that the speaker holds beliefs which the hearer would want him to hold.

Second, TO BEAR FALSE WITNESS and its equivalent FALSE GETUIGENIS AF-LEGGEN describe acts typically intended to influence judgments (in or out of court) by inducing false beliefs in the hearer.

Finally, the Dutch ABRAHAMMETJE SPELEN (lit. 'to play little Abraham') is used to talk about acts of telling part of the truth (and thus holding back the other part or lying about it) in order to escape from further questioning, which may be achieved if the hearer comes to believe that what the speaker says is the whole truth.

These remarks conclude our overview of the salient points on the perlocutionary dimension of acts of lying.

F. THE TEXTUAL DIMENSION OF LYING

27. There are several ways in which the verba mentiendi reflect the textual dimension of lying. For one thing, there are quite a few verba mentiendi which denote linguistic actions which almost necessarily consist of more than one speech act.

Many of the verbials which were said not to give any information about the illocutionary type of the acts described belong here. Acts described by means of TO PUT ON AN ACT, TO PUT UP A FRONT, TO MAKE FALSE PRETENSES, and the Dutch DOEN ALSOF ('to act as if'), EEN ROL SPELEN ('to act a part'),
etc. will rarely be restricted to one single speech act. Usually a whole
text, of any kind, is involved.

Similarly TO DRESS UP, TO EMBELLISH and TO EMBROIDER often require
a suprasentential segment of linguistic action, as will be clear from
their usage in (D1) to (D3).

(D1) He dressed up the story of what he did on vacation
(D2) He kept inventing details to embellish his story
(D3) He embroidered the story of his adventures in Hollywood

The Dutch equivalents BORDUREN ('to embroider'), VERFRAAIEN ('to em-
bellish') and AANKLEDEN ('to dress up') behave in a similar fashion.

The verb TO STORY can also be used as a verbum mentiendi. But it is
quite remarkable that this verb can be used to refer to one single un-
true statement in spite of the fact that a story normally consists of
a sequence of speech acts as appears from (D1) to (D3). Thus, TO STORY
is used quite appropriately in (D4) as a description of (A1) given that
(C1) obtains.

(A1) I am nearly 30 years old
(C1) Sa is over 40
(D4) Sa storied about his age

A comparable Dutch verbal, SPROOKJES VERTELLEN (lit. 'to tell fairy-tales'),
can also be used as a verbum mentiendi. But unlike TO STORY it rarely re-
fers to a single speech act.
28. A second group of text-sensitive verba mentiendi does not only require that the linguistic action described consists of more than one speech act, but also that these speech acts could be separately characterized as lies. Most of the intensified verba mentiendi such as TO LIE LIKE A TROOPER and the Dutch TEGEN DE STERREN OP LIEGEN (lit. 'to lie up against the stars') belong here. It would be hard to predicate of a certain speaker that he lied like a trooper if he only uttered one untrue statement.

There are a couple of Dutch verbials which basically indicate a person's general inclination towards lying. They are WAT AFLIEGEN ('to lie a lot'; we are really concerned with a lexical item here since AFLIEGEN has no meaning of its own when in isolation) and VAN ALLE KATTEN KWAAAD WETEN (lit. 'to know something bad about all cats'). But just as TO LIE LIKE A TROOPER and other intensified verba mentiendi they can also be used to describe multiple acts of lying. This will not be hard to understand for WAT AFLIEGEN, but the use of the second verbal in its act-sense instead of its inclination-sense requires an illustration; Consider (D5).

(D5) Hij wist weer van alle katten kwaad

(lit. 'Again he knew something bad about all cats')

(D5) is an adequate description of a speaker's linguistic activity during a tea-time conversation in which he or she claimed, without proof or evidence, that Jane was about to get her third divorce, that Jim passed his exam because his father paid a large sum of money to the professor in question, that Kate had an affair with an official of the Internal Revenue Service so that she did not have to pay any taxes, etc.
29. Some verba mentiendi may presuppose discourse preceding the untruthful statement described. For instance, the use of ZICHT VAN DE DOMME HOUDEN (lit. 'to hold oneself dumb') which means 'pretending not to know anything about a certain matter', often implies previous questioning about that matter by the hearer. In this case even the type of preceding speech act is made explicit.

Others may presuppose either preceding or following discourse. One can only describe the taking of an oath by means of EEN MEINEED AFLEGEN (lit. 'to take a false oath') if the oath in question bears on a lie uttered before or after the oath was taken. Again the nature of the preceding discourse or the following discourse, which in this case must contain a lie, is made explicit.

30. A final set of verba mentiendi which relate acts of distorting the truth to other linguistic action includes TO MISQUOTE, TO FALSIFY, TO TWIST ONE'S WORDS and the Dutch VERVERSEN ('to falsify') and IEMANDS WOORDEN VERDRAAIEN /VERWRINGEN/VERVSEN ('to twist someone's words'). In this case previous linguistic utterances (usually by someone else) are misrepresented. Needless to say that TO MISQUOTE is only a verbum mentiendi in case it refers to a voluntary action with the intention to deceive.

G. LYING AND VALUE JUDGMENTS

31. Though there are supposed to be such things as WHITE LIES (in Dutch LEUGENS OM BESTWIL, lit. 'lies for the best') negative value judgments
are attached to practically all verba mentiendi. That is to say, neither Dutch nor English provides us with instruments for talking favorably about distorting the truth. The only verbials which present distortions of the truth as excusable acts include TO FIB, TO KID, TO PULL SOMEONE'S LEG and the Dutch JOKKEN ('to fib') and IEMAND BIJ DE NEUS NEMEN (lit. 'to grab someone's nose', meaning 'to pull someone's leg'). TO FIB and JOKKEN describe acts which are excusable because of the unimportance or triviality of the facts lied about. The acts referred to by means of TO KID, TO PULL SOMEONE'S LEG and IEMAND BIJ DE NEUS NEMEN are excusable because of the humor involved. But the very fact that these few exceptions merely present some acts of lying as excusable stresses the general negative attitude towards distortions of the truth.

32. Two more indicators of these value judgments may be adduced. First, there are a couple of fixed expressions used to describe acts of saying something in favor of a distortion of the truth, namely TO COLOR A LIE, and TO GILD A LIE. Now, TO COLOR and TO GILD imply distortions of the truth themselves. Since I know of no other fixed verbials describing acts of saying something favorable about a lie and not carrying the same implication, we might risk to formulate the conclusion that whenever something favorable is said about a lie this is generally regarded as a distortion of the truth and therefore that lies are generally regarded as inherently 'bad' and lacking praiseworthy features.

Second, the lexical items available for describing the end of a lying-sequence (i.e. admitting that what was said before were all lies) imply that lying is an activity that one usually does not stop deliberately.
(Here we disregard the neutral phrase TO STOP LYING because it is not a lexical item, and because it does not necessarily imply that the truth was revealed at the end of the lying-sequence.) I am thinking of verbials such as UIT ZIJN ROL VALLEN (lit. 'to fall out of one's role') and DOOR DE MAND VALLEN (lit. 'to fall through the basket') both of which refer to a failure to uphold one's lies or pretenses. Again the explanation is to be found in a negative attitude towards lying. A mentiens tries to maintain his false representation of the truth in order to avoid being judged and losing face.

33. Together with the importance of questions of truth for statements, which was revealed in the section on the illocutionary force of lying, the overwhelming prominence of negative value judgments attached to distortions of the truth supports the relevance of Grice's (1975) conversational maxim of quality "Try to make your contribution one that is true". Though under innumerable circumstances the question of truth becomes irrelevant, as several authors have shown and as Grice certainly realizes, the verba mentiendi show beyond any doubt that truth is one of the basic parameters in terms of which statement-like utterances are conceptualized.

H. NOTE ON HUMAN IMAGINATION

34. The propositional content of linguistic actions describable in terms of verba mentiendi is always a product of the human mind or human imagination since the speaker knows or thinks it does not match reality. There
is, however, a set of lexical items which strongly emphasize this imagination aspect of lying; in other words, they explicitly present the mentiendum as a product of the human mind. They are: TO CONCOCT, TO COOK UP, TO FABRICATE, TO FANTASIZE (ABOUT), TO INVENT, TO MAKE UP, TO MANUFACTURE, and TO TRUMP UP. Here are some illustrative sentences showing their use as verba mentiendi.

(D1) They concocted an alibi for their friend
(D2) Whenever he arrived late he cooked up an elegant excuse
(D3) He fabricated a complicated explanation for his being late
(D4) At tea-time she always keeps fantasizing about her neighbours
(D5) What he did not know, he invented
(D6) He made up most of the story
(D7) The historian was evidently manufacturing all the evidence he adduced
(D8) Whenever he was late he trumped up a new excuse

Notice that these verbs are often ambiguous between a purely mental activity and the linguistic activity of putting creations of the mind into words. Though imagination or mental activity is much appreciated in our society, a pejorative connotation gets attached to the verbs mentioned as soon as they are used as verba mentiendi. This phenomenon provides us with additional support for the thesis that strong negative value judgments are attached to lying in our culture and that Grice's maxim of quality shows a strong factual salience in our experience of linguistic activity.

Similar verbials are to be found in Dutch: FABRICEREN ('to fabricate'), FANTASEREN ('to fantasize'), FINGEREN (lit. 'to produce fiction', meaning
to make up'), VERZINNEN ('to make up'), UITVINDEN ('to invent'), VERDICHTEN (lit. 'to turn into poetry', meaning 'to invent') and the picturesque expression UIT ZIJN DUIM ZUIGEN (lit. 'to suck from one's thumb', meaning 'to invent').

Notice that most of these imagination-oriented verbs belong to the set of verba mentiendi which usually refer to more than one single speech act. On the truth dimension they are to be situated among the verbials of lying proper.

I. CONCLUSIONS

35. In this chapter we have touched upon the most important semantic dimensions along which English and Dutch verba mentiendi seem to be comparable: the truth dimension (which is no doubt the basic one), the illocutionary dimension, the perlocutionary dimension, the textual dimension, and finally the dimension of value judgments and of the role of imagination. This is not to say that no additional semantic dimensions will have to be taken into account when further comparing the meaning of individual verbials within the domain of lying.

36. As I did at the end of the previous chapter, I shall now give a relatively small and random list of noteworthy observations which forced themselves upon us in the process of scrutinizing the lexical field associated with linguistic acts of distorting the truth.

(i) The gradability of the notion of truth is a relatively unimportant parameter of the truth dimension of the verba mentiendi. (Paragraphs 5 and 6)
(ii) From the set of verba mentiendi it appears that the different ways in which the truth can be deviated from are conceived in terms of a fourfold contrast: quality increasing, quantity increasing, quality diminishing, quantity diminishing. (Paragraph 6)

(iii) There is a one-directional dependence relationship between the quantity scale of truth and the quality scale. (Paragraph 7)

(iv) The lexicon reflects the general habit of taking quantity as a criterion for quality. (Paragraph 7)

(v) Only the like poles of the two truth scales share descriptive verbials. (Paragraph 8)

(vi) The verba mentiendi reflect the following attitude prevailing in our culture: what is disagreeable is regarded as untrue. (Paragraph 11).

(vii) Questions of truth are most relevant in connection with representative speech acts. (Paragraphs 15 ff.)

(viii) The acts of praising, accusing and swearing are salient points in the area of the representative speech acts when it comes to the question of truth. (Paragraphs 16 to 19)

(ix) Deceiving is an effect typically intended by utterers of untrue statements; this reinforces the independent claim that there is a typically intended effect associated with all representatives, namely making the hearer know or believe something. (Paragraphs 22 ff.)

(x) It is shown that usually negative value judgments are attached to distortions of the truth; together with (vii) this strengthens the linguistic relevance of Grice's conversational maxim of quality with respect to statement-like utterances. (Paragraphs 31 ff.)
37. Apart from the quite surprising gap for a basic quantity diminishing verb in Dutch, differences between the sets of Dutch and English verba mentiendi are minimal. Of course all the generalizations summed up in the previous paragraph should be subjected to further comparative research. An especially promising topic for further investigation would be the universality or non-universality of the two scales of truth (the quantity scale and the quality scale) in terms of which different types of deviations from the truth are conceptualized, and of their interrelationships.
V. THE SEMANTICS OF DIRECTING

A. INTRODUCTION

1. We are now entering a second central area of linguistic meaning, the realm of illocutionary force. Within this vast area we single out speech acts of a directive kind. What types of acts are encompassed by the general term 'directive' will be elucidated in the following paragraphs. The verbs and expressions used to describe linguistic actions of a directive kind will be referred to as verbials of directing.

One aspect of the subsequent treatment of the verbials of directing will no doubt arrest the reader's thoughts. Though this chapter is supposed to explore a subfield of the vast area of illocutionary force, we shall not explicitly discuss an illocutionary dimension of the verbials of directing. The reason is that illocutionary force itself is the criterion for including a verbal in the subject matter of this chapter. The different shades in force which will present themselves depend on a large variety of factors which have to be dealt with in terms of different semantic dimensions. The overview of directive speech act types in the next few paragraphs could be regarded as an outline of the illocutionary
dimension in question. The individual discussion of other dimensions afterwards will clarify the different shades of illocutionary force pointed out.

Though primarily a matter of illocutionary force is at stake, some of the linguistic action verbals to be investigated do not describe what would traditionally have been called an 'illocutionary act'. Instead, many of them refer to larger configurations of linguistic acts such as text-level structures. These configurations of speech acts, however, can be said to possess a force similar to individual directive speech acts. It should be kept in mind that when I use 'a directive act' in this chapter, this phrase can frequently be replaced by 'a set of directive acts' or 'a series of acts with a directive force'. Its permeating different levels of linguistic structure shows how fundamental directing is as a function of language.

2. According to Searle's (1976) classical definition of directive speech acts the point of a directive is to get the hearer to do something; there is a world-to-word direction of fit; the speaker expresses a wish; and the proposition specifies a future act to be done by the hearer. This definition is, not surprisingly, geared to the central instances of directing, namely commands and requests. This means that it would be wrong to adopt it as a rigid criterion for including or excluding a verb or expression in or from the set of verbials of directing. The result would be the exclusion of many verbials about which our intuition maintains that they refer to linguistic actions which possess a directive aspect of some kind; we would be left with TO COMMAND, TO REQUEST, TO BEG and their
synonyms. It would be equally wrong, after using our intuition to round up the verbials of directing, to force their meaning into the mold of Searle's definition. For instance, it will not be possible to describe every directive speech act as an attempt to get the hearer to do something. But how can a linguistic action which is not, strictly speaking, an attempt to get the hearer to do something, be regarded as an act of directing? The answer will, hopefully, reveal itself in the course of the following introductory and sketchy overview of directives which deviate somehow from the central instances of commanding and requesting. The overview is meant to shape the reader's expectations as to the lexical domain covered by this chapter.

3. A first type of directive which departs from the central cases outlined by Searle's definition is commonly described by means of TO PROHIBIT and its synonyms. Prohibitions direct the hearer to not doing something instead of doing something. In this case the deviation is minimal. The act is clearly directive.

A second deviant type: TO ASK, when used to describe the asking of a question (instead of as an equivalent of TO REQUEST), refers to acts the propositional content of which does not specify the future act to be done by the hearer. What is expected from the hearer is a response to the question. This is clear from the verb itself.

TO DARE, in the sense of to challenge to do something requiring boldness and skill, stands apart from the central directives in that it does not usually imply the speaker's belief that the hearer is able (or bold enough) to do what he is trying to get him to do. Such an implication is
traditionally assigned (as a 'preparatory condition') to acts of commanding and requesting.

4. Also acts of threatening can be directive. I am not thinking about unconditional threats such as "I'll kill you" but about conditional ones such as "If I ever see you with my sister again, I'll kill you". The latter is clearly an attempt to keep the hearer away from the speaker's sister, and the act as a whole can be described by means of TO THREATEN as in "S threatened H into staying away from S's sister" or "S threatened to kill H if he ever saw H with S's sister again".

Also in this case the future act to be performed by the hearer is not specified in the propositional content. Moreover, threatening is never purely directive. In its unconditional form it is simply commissive and lacks directive aspects. In its conditional form it is at the same time commissive (though not as strongly as a promise since the 'obligation' it creates to inflict harm is unlikely to lead towards the speaker's being reproached in case he does not act in accordance with his commitment).

Notice that a description such as "S threatened H" focuses completely and exclusively on the commissive aspect of threatening. This means that a complement is needed to bring out the directive character of the act. This is also true for the Dutch equivalent DREIGEN or BEDREIGEN. The form BEDREIGEN can only be used in a structure such as "S threatened H". Dreigen is used in descriptions of the type "S threatened to kill H if he ever saw H with S's sister again". Neither of them can be used in a structure such as "S threatened H into staying away from his sister. Thus TO THREATEN and DREIGEN can focus both on the directive and the commissive
aspects of conditional threats whereas BEDREIGEN does not allow for a
directive aspect at all. Therefore BEDREIGEN will be left out of account
in this chapter. There is another closely related verb in Dutch, namely
AFDREIGEN which is one of the Dutch equivalents of TO BLACKMAIL: it means
'trying to get the hearer to give something by means of threatening'. In
this verb both aspects of the conditional threat are united.

There are two more types of directives which are in fact mixtures between
directives and some other type of linguistic action. Both of them derive
their lack of centrality in the area of directives from their being
mixed classes and from the fact that they cannot really be paraphrased
as 'attempts to get the hearer to do something'.

5. The first of these mixed classes is represented by TO ADVISE and TO
WARN. Usually acts of advising and warning are partly -- if not primari­
ly -- representative. In what sense can they be said to be directive?
A piece of advice is an indication of a preferable course of action.
Its directive force does not necessarily derive from a wish on the part
of the speaker -- though in some circumstances it may -- but rather from
the fact that a particular course of action is presented as preferable
because it is to the hearer's benefit. On the other hand, warning is
an indication of an event or course of action to be avoided because it could
be detrimental to the hearer.

6. A second mixed class is more troublesome. Not because it is less clearly
directive than advising and warning, but simply because of recent attempts
to declare it a monolithic commissive. The acts in question can be des­
cribed by means of TO PERMIT and its equivalents. The argument goes like
this: when giving his permission to do something the speaker commits him-
self to not obstructing a particular action on the part of the hearer;

hence a permission is a kind of promise; therefore it is a commissive
rather than a directive. This is a decent argument in favor of the claim
that a permission is commissive. But it presents no evidence against
classifying permissions as directives. Unless one accepts that every
type of speech act can only belong to one class. But that is one of the
main errors this essay will hopefully help to abolish.

Yet permitting is not a central type of directing. It cannot be de-
scribed as an 'attempt to get the hearer to do something'. What, then,
makes it directive at all?

Just as advising, a permission is an indication of a certain course of
action. Unlike advising, permitting does not imply that the speaker pre-
sents that course of action as preferable to the hearer. But permitting
implies that the hearer himself prefers his doing the action over his not
doing it. Moreover, the speaker does not only indicate a course of action
which the hearer regards as desirable, but he also uses his authority
over the hearer to open the way to that course of action. The latter aspect
emerges very clearly from some equivalents of TO PERMIT such as TO GIVE
THE GO-AHEAD (which can be used to describe a speaker's permitting to
start with the execution of a plan). Thus, in a very real sense, a person
giving the permission to do something is regulating another person's
behavior and using his authority to do so. In other words, permitting
might even be said to be more strongly directive than advising or warning.

What about the wish on the part of the speaker, which is characteristic
of the central instances of directing? It was not necessarily present in
advising and warning. In contrast, a weak form of wishing is always present in permissions: if S did not want H to do P at all, he would simply forbid him to, which he can do by virtue of the same authority which he applies when permitting. This type of wanting is, admittedly, quite weak because it does not even require the speaker's belief that the course of action in question is advantageous to anyone. But what it boils down to is that the speaker, just as when he is commanding (with authority), is willing to take the responsibility for an act to be performed by the hearer. Since S has power over H's doing of not doing P, he can be held responsible if H does P. This willingness to take responsibility, or this weak form of wanting H to do P, makes permitting directive. But at the same time it is the very basis of the commissive aspect involved. The same kind of commitment characterizes all authoritative acts of directing. Recalling Nürnberg where officers were convicted of ordering soldiers to shoot people, should convince anyone of the truth of this claim. And if it is true that both commanding and permitting share this type of commitment, its presence in permissions is certainly no adequate ground for excluding acts of permitting from the realm of the directives. This paragraph probably contains the strongest indication given so far of the dangers of theoretical classifications of speech acts.

Just as with commanding and requesting, the propositional content of a linguistic act of permitting specifies a future act to be done by the hearer. This fact pulls permissions away from other commissives which usually contain a proposition specifying an act to be done by the speaker. Thus one could say that the directive aspect of permissions is quite explicit whereas the commissive aspect remains largely implicit. One could object that an utterance such as "You may go to the movies tonight" is
quite explicitly and overtly commissive because it means -- due to the presence of 'may' -- "I commit myself to not obstructing your going to the movies tonight". But such a claim would already be based on a semantic analysis which uses as a premise the belief that permissions are primarily commissive.

7. The discussion in the foregoing paragraph should not be misinterpreted as an attempt to decide whether acts of permitting are primarily commissive or primarily directive. In this, as in many cases, I regard such attempts as irrelevant. The important thing to realize is that permissions have both a directive and a commissive aspect. The classes of speech acts proposed in the literature are rarely mutually exclusive since they are based on criteria of classification which are always arbitrary to a certain extent and since there is no logical impediment to the occurrence of several different functions of language. The reader will recall that this realization was the very incentive to the investigations reported in this essay and it vindicates our decision to study semantic dimensions rather than semantic classes. There are two reasons, one theoretical and one practical, why in spite of this decision some class-terminology is still being used. First, it links this essay with earlier research. Second, an uncompromising inquiry directed at semantic dimensions would have to take as its point of departure the complete set of linguistic action verb- ials; practical considerations dictate me to limit the object of investi- gation; in this chapter a subfield is singled out on the basis of what has been regarded up to now as a major class on illocutionary acts.
B. THE FRAME OF DIRECTING

8. The introductory overview of some directive speech act types leads us towards the following definition of verbials of directing: all verbs and verb-like expressions which describe linguistic action by means of which a speaker typically directs or influences a hearer's subsequent behavior. Directing is not only one of the fundamental functions of language, it is also one of the vital roles in social life; for the performance of this role the directive function of language is usually put into action.

Whereas silence was to be situated in the frame of language and lying in the frame of truth, directing belongs in one of the most basic frames of social interaction in general. It involves parameters such as authority and wishing, which will be reflected as semantic dimensions in the verbials of directing. The verbials can also be expected to reveal the specific areas of social interaction in which directing is a major function. Let us go ahead and find out what the words have to say.

C. THE DIRECTIVITY OF DIRECTING

9. It will be clear from the introduction that not all acts denoted by verbials of directing are equally strong as directives. I would like to call these differences in strength degrees of directivity. Though there is some interaction with other dimensions, such as the authority involved, these degrees of directivity depend mainly on the strength of the wish or wanting expressed by the speaker. As with all other dimensions involving similar types of gradability it is not possible to mark off
really discrete points. What we can do, however, is to indicate the two extremes of the scale and try to arrange some basic verbials of directing with respect to these. The extremes are, of course, (A1) and (A2).

(A1) Sa expresses a strong wish for Ha to do or not do P
(A2) Sa expresses a weak wish for Ha to do or not do P

Though it is clear that TO COMMAND, TO ORDER and TO PROHIBIT are quite high up on the scale, there are directives expressing even stronger wishes, namely TO BEG and TO PLEAD. At the other end of the scale we approach a zero wish with TO ACQUIESCE (in the sense of permitting) as used in (D1) describing (A3) conforming to (C1), (C2) and (C3).

(A3) O.K., you can go to medical school
(C1) Sa is Ha's father
(C2) Sa has been trying to get his son to take over his business
(C3) Ha has been trying for months to get his father's permission to go to medical school instead of taking over his business
(D1) Sa finally acquiesced in his son's going to medical school

In this instance, the speaker's wish for the hearer to do P is even weaker than with regular permissions. But though it is clear from the context that his son's going to medical school was originally against Sa's wishes, for (A3) the argument holds that if Sa did not want his son to go at all, he would keep resisting the decision (which he could do on the basis of some kind of parental authority which Ha accepts because otherwise he would not have asked his father's permission in the first place.)
10. Before discussing the degree of directivity of any further individual cases briefly, I submit a tentative picture of the scale in question, namely SDC-Table 1. Needless to say that the elusive character inherent to matters of gradability is responsible for the tentativeness of the picture. There are no claims attached to the actual sequence of verbs on the scale; I do not even want to contend that the sequence is an accurate representation of my own judgment and intuition. All that counts is the approximate placement of the verbs on the scale.

In the following paragraphs I shall draw the attention to some of the more striking aspects of the SDC-Table.

11. What may strike the reader first is the position of TO ASK in the sense of TO ASK A QUESTION, Dutch VRAGEN or EEN VRAAG STELLEN. Asking a question is high up in the scale. But is its directivity so strong that it warrants its placement as high up as TO DEMAND and considerably higher up than TO INSIST and TO REQUEST? I believe that asking a question always involves a strong wish to get a reply. This is even true in the course of cocktail conversations in which both the topic of conversation and the truth of the statements made are irrelevant to a large extent. Not answering a question is always a rupture in the social interaction between two interlocutors; usually it will be taken as a lack of consideration or even as an insult. In this sense asking a question is comparable to demanding. Both imply the speaker's belief that he has a right to what he wants the hearer to do (which is an unspecified kind of act in the case of TO DEMAND and a linguistic act in the case of TO ASK A QUESTION).

TO INSIST is less strongly directive and so is TO REQUEST: the wish im-
### DUTCH - SEMANTIC DIMENSION - ENGLISH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dutch Phrases</th>
<th>English Phrases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>smeken, bepleiten</td>
<td>to beg, to plead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bevelen, gebieden, verbieden</td>
<td>to command, to order, to prohibit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oproepen</td>
<td>to summon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vragen, een vraag stellen</td>
<td>to ask (a question)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eisen</td>
<td>to demand</td>
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<tr>
<td>dreigen</td>
<td>to threaten</td>
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<tr>
<td>aandringen</td>
<td>to insist</td>
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<td>Ø</td>
<td>to tell</td>
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<tr>
<td>uitdagen</td>
<td>to dare</td>
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<tr>
<td>verzoeken</td>
<td>to request</td>
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<tr>
<td>vragen</td>
<td>to ask</td>
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<tr>
<td>uitnodigen</td>
<td>to invite</td>
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<tr>
<td>aansporen</td>
<td>to exhort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aanmoedigen</td>
<td>to encourage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aanbevelen</td>
<td>to recommend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voorstellen, suggereren</td>
<td>to propose, to suggest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aanraden, waarschuwen</td>
<td>to advise, to warn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>toelaten</td>
<td>to permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instemmen met</td>
<td>to acquiesce</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SDC-Table 1**
plied is still strong but not necessarily based on a right and not strong enough to cause a disruption of the social interaction if the acts of insisting and requesting are not acted upon.

12. TO SUMMON and TO INVITE both describe acts of a speaker trying to get a hearer to go or come to some place. In spite of the near-synonymy they are quite far apart in SDC-Table 1. The difference in the degree of directivity is probably the main difference between them: summoning is 'ordering to come' while inviting is 'asking to come'.

13. There are many ways to translate TO TELL, as used in (D2) describing (A4) conforming to (C4).

(A4) If you wait a minute, I'll find you a table
(C4) Sa and Ha are in a restaurant; Sa is the waiter, Ha is the customer
(D2) The waiter told the customer to wait until he'd find a table for him

But there is no Dutch verbal available with exactly the same degree of directivity, which is somewhere between requesting or asking and ordering.

D. DIRECTING AND ITS SOCIAL SETTINGS

14. Directing was said to be one of the basic functions in social interaction. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the majority of
verbials of directing contain strong clues as to the social setting or settings in which the acts they describe occur. Such clues are absent from many of the basic verbs such as TO COMMAND, TO ASK, TO TELL, TO INVITE, TO SUGGEST, TO ADVISE, etc.; after all, it is because of their not being specific or of their being 'neutral' with respect to a number of semantic dimensions that they can be said to be more 'basic' than the others. It is certainly not too bold to assume that the ensuing overview of the less neutral verbials of directing will single out some areas of social interaction in which directing other people's behavior is a prominent activity. The semantic dimension under investigation in this section deals with the different frames of action with which linguistic acts of directing are associated.

15. A large number of verbials situate the act described in a vaguely 'official' setting, without further specifications. In other words, (C1) applies to the act described.

(C1) The social setting is of an unspecified 'official' nature

Some examples are: TO ACCREDIT (in the sense of 'to authorize'), TO APPLY FOR, TO APPOINT, TO ASSIGN, TO AUTHORIZE, TO BLACKLIST, TO CERTIFY (in the sense of 'to license', which is a type of permission), TO CHARGE (in the sense of imposing a certain duty or task), TO COMMISSION, TO CONVENE (in the sense of causing to come together), TO CONVOKE, TO GIVE CARTE BLANCHE, TO GIVE FULL POWER, TO GIVE AN OPEN MANDATE, TO GIVE OFFICIAL SANCTION, TO LICENSE, TO MEMORIALIZE (in the sense of 'to petition'), TO PETITION,
TO POST (in the sense of assigning to a specific position or station),
TO PRESENT A PETITION, TO QUALIFY, TO SUSPEND, TO VOUCHSAFE (in the sense of granting as a privilege, allowing, permitting), TO WARRANT (in the sense of 'to authorize'); Dutch: AANSTELLEN ('to appoint), EEN AANVRAAG INDIENEN ('to make an application'), AANVRAGEN ('to apply for'), AANZEGGEN ('to announce as an official order'), AUTORISEREN ('to authorize'), BEKRACHTIGEN ('to give official sanction'), BELASTEN MET ('to charge'), BENOEMEN TOT ('to appoint'), BIJEENROEPEN ('to convene'), CARTE BLANCHE GEVEN ('to give carte blanche'), CONVOCEREN ('to convene, to convoke'), GELASTEN ('to order officially and solemnly'), MACHTIGEN ('to authorize'), ONSBIEDELEN ('to invite officially and authoritatively'), OPDRAGEN ('to charge'), ORDONNEREN (equivalent to GELASTEN but rarely used), PETITIONEREN ('to petition'), SCHORSEN ('to suspend from membership or from duty'), SOLLISCITEREN NAAR ('to apply for'), VEROORLOVEN ('to allow officially'), EEN VERZOEKSCHRIFT INDIENEN (lit. 'to hand in a written request' meaning 'to petition' or 'to memorialize'), VOLMACHT GEVEREN ('to authorize'), EEN VOORSTEL INDIENEN (lit. 'to hand in a proposal').

The Dutch and the English lists presented are quite parallel. One of the finer differences, however, is the following. GELASTEN and ONSBIEDELEN describe orders and invitations, respectively, of an unspecified official nature. No comparable English verbials seem to exist: all the English verbials of directing which describe official acts of ordering and inviting situate the act in a more specific official context; examples of these will be adduced in the next few paragraphs.
16. Many verbials of directing situate the act described in a specific official setting. The most frequently specified official contexts are listed in (C2) through (C6).

(C2) The act is performed in a 'legal' setting
(C3) The act is performed in a 'religious' setting
(C4) The act is performed in a 'commercial' setting
(C5) The act is performed in a 'military' setting
(C6) The act is performed in a 'political' setting

We shall supply an overview of the verbials focusing on linguistic actions of a directive kind conforming to each of these five conditions. The reader is advised to keep in mind that classifying a verb or verb-like expression as, for instance, a (C2) verbal does not mean that it can only be applied to a directive linguistic action performed in a legal context. It only means that the verbal in question is strongly associated with that context.

17. By far the largest group is the set of (C2) verbials which situate the acts described in a *legal* setting. The prominence of this frame of action in the domain of directing is not surprising. After all, regulating people's behavior is what the law is all about.

Here is a list of verbials focusing on legally directive linguistic acts: TO APPEAL, TO ASSERT/VINDICATE A CLAIM/RIGHT/TITLE TO, TO BAN, TO CITE (in the sense of calling upon to appear before a court), TO CLAIM, TO CROSS-EXAMINE, TO CROSS-INTERROGATE, TO CROSS-QUESTION, TO DECREE,
TO ENJOIN, TO ECAMINE (in the sense of interrogating closely), TO INTERDICT, TO ISSUE A WRIT/INJUNCTION, TO LAY CLAIM TO, TO LAY DOWN THE LAW, TO LEGALIZE, TO LEVY, TO MAKE MANDATORY, TO MAKE REQUISITION, TO MANDATE, TO NEGATIVE, TO OBTEST (in the sense of invoking as a witness), TO ORDAIN, TO OUTLAW, TO PROSCRIBE, TO PUT ONE'S VETO UPON, TO PUT UNDER AN INJUNCTION, TO PUT UNDER AN INTERDICT, TO PUT UNDER THE BAN, TO READ THE RIOT ACT (in the sense of ordering a mob to disperse), TO RECLAIM, TO REGULATE, TO REQUISITION, TO RULE, TO RULE AGAINST, TO SANCTION, TO STIPULATE, TO SUBPOENA, TO SUMMON, TO TRY (in the sense of interrogating an accused person) and TO VETO.

18. Some members of the foregoing list call for further comments. TO SUMMON can be used to illustrate my earlier observation that inclusion of a verbal in the list does not imply that it cannot be used to account for acts performed outside the legal frame of action. The verb refers to an official and authoritative invitation which can be either issued by a court or not. Thus, its uses in (D1) as a description of (A1) and in (D2) as a description of (A2) are both acceptable.

(A1) You are requested to appear in court as a witness in the Cutler murder trial

(D1) Sa summoned Ha (as a witness)

(A2) You are requested to appear before Mr. Allworthy at 9:00 A.M.

(D2) Sa summoned Ha to appear before Mr. Allworthy

But since summoning is strongly associated with the court-room situation one can hardly regard TO SUMMON as neutral with respect to the type of
official setting in which the acts it can be used to describe are performed. In Dutch DAGVAARDEN would be used in (D1) and ONTBIEDEN in (D2); hence the former requires an act satisfying (C2) whereas the latter only specifies that (C1) obtains. Though ONTBIEDEN is quite neutral with respect to the type of official setting, it may be interesting to point out that, most probably because of the existence of DAGVAARDEN, ONTBIEDEN is hard to apply to acts of the (A1) type. In English there is, of course, also the verb TO SUBPOENA which is completely restricted to acts of the (A1) type. The minute portion of the social-setting dimension of directing which is under consideration here, is visualized in SDC-Table 2.

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
\text{DUTCH} & \text{SEMANTIC DIMENSION} & \text{ENGLISH} \\
\hline
\emptyset & \text{ontbieden} & \emptyset \\
\text{dagvaarden} & \text{(C2)} & \text{to subpoena} \\
\end{array}
\]

SDC-Table 2

19. The reader may have wondered why TO CLAIM, and TO REQUISITION were included among the (C2) verbials. Consider (D3) and (D4).

(D3) He claimed his bags at the station
(D4) During the war the army requisitioned most hotels

The acts of demanding denoted by these two verbs are based on the speaker's belief that he has a right to what he asks. Such belief can only be based on laws, written or unwritten. That is how a legal setting comes in.
TO READ THE RIOT ACT, in its original sense of ordering (a mob) to disperse, is only obliquely related to a legal frame of action: the speaker must be a person invested with the authority to execute the law. Needless to say that its extended meaning of giving a strong warning, which is more prominent now, is not related to a legal setting.

Finally, the directive verbal is most explicitly related to a legal context, TO LAY DOWN THE LAW, is more commonly used in its metaphorically extended sense of giving strict orders (as a teacher, a father, etc.) than as a description of a directive act to which (C2) obtains.

20. The main (C2) verbials in Dutch are: AANSPRAAK MAKEN OP ('to claim'), IN DE BAN DOEN ('to ban'), BUITEN DE WET STELLEN ('to outlaw'), DAGVAARDEN ('to subpoena'), DECRETEREN ('to decree'), EEN EIS INSTELLEN ('to demand'), HEFFEN ('to levy'), INVORDEREN ('to claim'), AAN EEN KRIJSVERHOOR ONDERWERPEN ('to cross-examine'), LEGALISEREN ('to legalize'), MANDATEREN ('to mandate'), SANCTIONEREN ('to sanction'), SOMMEREN ('to admonish'), STIPULEREN ('to stipulate'), TERUGVORDEREN ('to reclaim'), TOEWIJZEN ('to assign'), VERBANNEN ('to ban'), VERHOREN ('to try'), VERORDENEN ('to ordain, to decree'), ZIJN VETO UITSPREKEN OVER ('to veto', lit. 'to pronounce one's veto upon'), VORDEREN ('to claim'), and WETTIGEN ('to legalize').

21. When comparing the Dutch list with the English one a number of conspicuous facts emerge. For instance, why are EEN EIS INSTELLEN, SOMMEREN and TOEWIJZEN listed as (C2) verbials whereas their translations, namely, TO DEMAND, TO ADMONISH and TO ASSIGN are not considered to focus on a
legal setting for the acts they describe? The answer is simply that they refer to acts of demanding, admonishing and assigning in a legal context, for which no direct English equivalents can be given. The Dutch equivalent of TO DEMAND is EISEN, which only differs from EEN EIS INSTELLEN (lit. 'to institute a demand') in that the latter refers to an official judicial way of demanding.

SOMMEREN, as used in (D5) and (D6), is an act of admonishing to fulfill a certain duty or to comply with a request; the act is based on judicial authority on the part of the speaker or on a legal right.

(D5) De politie sommeerde de menigte uit elkaar te gaan
   (The police administered the mob to disperse)
(D6) De winkelier sommeerde zijn klanten tot betaling
   (The shopkeeper admonished his customers to pay)

If the more common equivalent to TO ADMONISH, namely AANMANEN TOT, had been used, there would not have been direct legal implications.

TOEWIJZEN is used to refer to judicial acts of assigning as appears from description (D7).

(D7) Na de scheiding wees het gerecht haar de kinderen toe
   (lit. "After the divorce the court assigned the children to her")

This sentence means that "After the divorce the court granted her the custody of the children". TOEWIJZEN draws the attention to both the rights and the duties involved, whereas 'granting custody' emphasizes the rights.
22. The verbials of directing focusing on the legal setting of the act described are abundant. This would probably not be the case in languages spoken in societies which lack an elaborate legal system. However, there are no societies without laws. But in more 'primitive' societies behavior is regulated by religious-ethical codes rather than by what we would call 'civil law'. Indeed, in many cases it may be impossible to separate these two types of regulating institutions. The traces of such a situation are still to be found in the English and Dutch verbials of directing: a considerable number of them are ambiguous between an emphasis on the frame of civil law or the frame of ecclesiastical law. Nevertheless civil law clearly dominates, which is no doubt in keeping with regular observations of the directing forces in our western societies. My hunch is that in the directive verbal section of the lexicon of every language a prominent place will be occupied by verbials situating linguistic acts of directing in a legal or religious setting, depending on the nature of the society. This is a hypothesis to be tested by further cross-cultural and cross-linguistic research on linguistic action verbials.

23. These observations lead us to the verbials of directing implying a religious context; in other words, (C3) obtains.

   (C3) The act is performed in a religious setting

Among those which are clearly ambiguous between (C2) and (C3) we find TO ENJOIN (which is especially strongly associated with the legal and ecclesiastical context in its prohibition sense), TO INTERDICT (which
describes ecclesiastical or judicial prohibitions), **TO ISSUE AN INJUNCTION** (which refers to an ecclesiastical or judicial order or prohibition), and **TO ORDAIN** (which denotes an order or appointment based on a court decision or on the authority of the church). For all of these, except for TI INTERDICT (Du. EEN INTERDICT UITSPREKEN OVER, lit. 'to pronounce an interdict on'), it is hard to find Dutch equivalents carrying the same implications with respect to the social setting.

Notice that we have only listed clearly ambiguous cases in this paragraph. There are, in addition, many (C2) verbials the use of which can be extended without difficulties to (C3) contexts.

24. Some verbials focusing on (C3) contexts are **TO CATECHIZE** (i.e. giving systematic religious instruction by means of asking questions, receiving answers and offering explanations or corrections), **TO CENSURE** (the meaning of which can be easily extended to non-religious and non-ethical settings), **TO EXCOMMUNICATE** (i.e. to shut off by an ecclesiastical sentence from communion with the church), **TO PRECONIZE** (i.e. to approve a high ecclesiastical appointment publicly by papal proclamation in consistory), **TO PUT ON THE INDEX** and **TO TABOO**. Dutch: CATECHISEREN ('to catechize'), CENSUREREN ('to censure'), EXCOMMUNICEREN ('to excommunicate'), PRECONISEREN ('to preconize'), OP DE INDEX PLAATSEN ('to put on the index') and TABOE VER- KLAREN (lit. 'to declare taboo', i.e. 'to taboo'). Here the parallelism between Dutch and English is complete.

Apart from **TO ORDAIN**, **TO CATECHIZE** and **TO PRECONIZE** all the verbials listed in this and the previous paragraph refer to acts which are or can be prohibitive in nature. The predominance of negative directives is
certainly not unrelated to the prohibitive nature of Christian ethics. After all, eight of the Ten Commandments are prohibitions.

25. The (C3) verbials discussed so far describe acts of directing the behavior of people. Within a religious or semi-religious frame of action people also try (or used to try) to direct the behavior of supernatural beings, i.e. gods, devils or spirits. Thus acts of directing situated in a religious context can either conform to (C3a) or (C3b).

(C3a) Ha is/are (a) human being(s)
(C3b) Ha is/are (a) supernatural being(s)

Whereas (C3)-(C3a) defines a religious or religious-ethical context, (C3)-(C3b) points at a religious-magical setting. Some (C3)-(C3b) verbs are TO CONJURE (in the sense of summoning a supernatural being to appear or to disappear; Dutch BEZWEREN), TO CONJURE UP, TO EXORCISE (Dutch UIT-DRIJVEN). Also TO INVOKE (Dutch OPROEPEN) is often used in a (C3)-(C3b) sense but can hardly be said to imply a religious-magical setting as part of its central meaning.

26. Next in line is the world of commerce. (C4) verbials describe attempts to get money, goods or services, to get someone to use or buy something, or to make someone accept a particular price or condition for a commercial transaction.

(C4) The act is performed in a 'commercial' setting

Some relevant verbials are: TO ADVERTIZE, TO BARGAIN, TO BOOK, TO CANVASS
(in the sense of seeking orders, contributions or subscriptions), TO CHARGE (in the sense of asking as a fee or payment), TO COMMISSION (as used in (D8)), TO HAGGLE, TO HIGGLE, TO INDENT, TO MAKE RESERVATIONS, TO ORDER (as used in (D9)), TO PROMOTE, TO PUBLICIZE, TO PUT IN AN ORDER FOR, TO RESERVE.

(D8) Most of his prominent contemporaries commissioned Rubens to paint their portraits

(D9) He ordered a cheeseburger and a coke

The Dutch set of (C4) verbials is quite analogous: ADVERTEREN ('to advertise'), AFDINGEN ('to bargain'), AFPINGELEN ('to haggle'), BESTELLEN ('to order'), BESPREKEN ('to book, reserve'; the original sense of this verb, in which it is still currently used, is 'to talk about'; another one of its derived but prominent meanings is 'to review'), RECLAME MAKEN VOOR ('to advertise'), RESERVEREN ('to reserve'), WERVEN ('to canvass'). A (C4) verb without a parallel in English is AANPRATEN which means 'to talk into buying or using'.

27. When asked to sketch a prototypical directing or commanding situation, informants can be expected to call attention to a military frame of action. Yet there are almost no (C5) verbials of directing.

(C5) The act is performed in a 'military' setting

Indeed, the Dutch verb COMMANDEREN which must originally have been associated with military commands, has come to be used almost exclusively in a semi-ironical sense to describe directing behavior based on assumed
-- as opposed to real -- authority; in many cases it can be translated by means of 'to order about'.

There seem to be only a couple of verbs focusing on (C5) contexts, but even the use of these few can be easily extended outside the military world: TO CONSCRIPT (i.e. to enroll into service by compulsion) and TO DRAFT; in Dutch: INLIJVEN ('to conscript, draft'). TO CALL UP (Dutch OPROEPEN) is frequently used in the same sense but it is less strongly associated with the military.

Curiously enough, these typically military commands are directed at non-soldiers. The (C5) situation could be subdivided into (C5)-(C5a) and (C5)-(C5b).

(C5a) Ha is not a soldier
(C5b) Ha is a soldier

In Dutch I have not been able to discover verbials describing military commands directed at soldiers. As far as English is concerned I am only aware of the existence of one, namely TO ORDER UP (which also has the non-military meaning of ordering someone to go or come upstairs). Its military sense is illustrated in (D10).

(D10) The general ordered two battalions up to strengthen a weak point in the line

It means 'to order from a position in the rear to the front line'.

Is there any explanation for the discrepancy between the conceptualization of the military world as a prototypical directing situation and the lack of verbials of directing focusing on a military setting? The
solution is probably to be found in the very fact that the situation is so prototypical: if a military command is a command *par excellence*, there is no need to call it differently.

28. Some verbials focus on *political* acts of directing, i.e. (C6) obtains.

(C6) The act is performed in a 'political' setting

It is not surprising that the (C4) and (C6) sets share a member, namely TO CANVASS (Dutch WERVEN) which means, in the (C6) setting, 'to solicit votes or seek political support in an election campaign'.

A typical (C6) verb is TO INTERPELLATE (Dutch INTERPELLEREN), meaning 'to question formally about a governmental policy or decision'. A couple of other verbials of directing situate the act described in even more precise social contexts, namely those specified in (C6a) and (C6b), the specificity of which increases progressively.

(C6a) The act is performed in a 'diplomatic' setting

(C6b) The act is performed in a frame of 'international political-economical diplomacy'

A (C6)-(C6a) verb is TO ACCREDIT in the sense of appointing as ambassador; there is no Dutch counterpart. The (C6)-(C6b) verbials I am thinking of are TO EMBARGO and TO LAY AN EMBARGO ON (Dutch EEN EMBARGO LEGGEN OP) in the sense of a governmental prohibition for the departure or entry of foreign ships or for importing or exporting.
29. We are still left with a wastebasket of verbials of directing specifying different social contexts. Another more or less official setting is mentioned in (C7).

(C7) The act is performed in an 'educational' setting

The Dutch verb EXAMINEREN ('to examine') is restricted to acts satisfying (C7). The English equivalent TO EXAMINE is ambiguous between a legal and an educational context. TO INTERROGATE (as well as its Dutch equivalent ONDERVRAGEN) is even wider in usage. Remember that the exclusively legal counterpart to EXAMINEREN was VERHOREN (English TO TRY).

A number of verbs situate the directive act described in the world of crime.

(C8) The act is performed in a 'criminal' setting

The examples are: TO BLACKMAIL, TO EXTORT and TO SCREW (in the sense of practising extortion upon). Dutch: AFDREIGEN ('to blackmail'), AFPERSEN ('to extort'), CHANTAGE PLEGEN and CHANTEREN (both 'to blackmail').

A few isolated cases remain: TO INTERVIEW (Dutch INTERVIEWEN) points at the world of the medía; a medical setting is often focused upon by TO PRESCRIBE (Dutch VOORSCHRIJVEN); and TO CALL OUT as used in (D11) is to be situated in the world of industrial relations.

(D11) The union called out all bus drivers

In such a context TO CALL OUT means 'to order or authorize workers to go on strike'; there is no obvious Dutch counterpart (unless one would regard TOT STAKING OPROEPEN as a lexical unity, which I am not inclined to
### SDC-Table 3

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<td>opdragen</td>
<td>(C1)</td>
<td>to assign</td>
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<tr>
<td>een interdict uit spreken over</td>
<td>(C2)</td>
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<td>dagvaarden verhoren</td>
<td>(C3)-(C3a)</td>
<td>to summon</td>
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<td>censureren</td>
<td>(C3)-(C3b)</td>
<td>to try</td>
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<td>bezweren</td>
<td>(C4)</td>
<td>to censure</td>
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<tr>
<td>bestellen</td>
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<td>to conjure</td>
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<td>interpelleren</td>
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<td>to order up</td>
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<td>een embargo leggen op</td>
<td>(C6)-(C6a)</td>
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<td>examineren</td>
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<td>to accredit</td>
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<td>chanteren</td>
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<td>to canvass</td>
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<td>to blackmail</td>
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do). No doubt some additional isolated cases could be found in the world of sports (e.g. TO CALL has a very specialized directive meaning in card-games).

The results of the discussion in this section are summarized in SDC-Table 3.

**E. DIRECTING AND ITS GOALS**

30. Directing can be conceived as orienting somebody to some course of action. Only in cases with a high degree of directivity can such activity be paraphrased as an attempt to get the hearer to do something. The course of action towards which the hearer is oriented, i.e. the goal of the directing activity, is specified in many verbials of directing. There is a strong correlation between the verbials situating the act described in a particular social setting and those specifying its goal. In other words, there will be a significant overlap between the sets of verbials discussed in this section and those in the previous one.

31. The most commonly emphasized goals of directing are specified in (A1) through (A3).

(A1) Sa directs Ha towards an act of responding (i.e. of performing a linguistic act)
(A2) Sa directs Ha towards an act of coming or going somewhere
(A3) Sa directs Ha towards an act of giving or granting (Sa) something
The set of (A1) verbials includes: TO ANGLE FOR, TO ASK (ABOUT), TO ASK A QUESTION, TO CATECHIZE, TO CROSS-EXAMINE, TO CROSS-INTERROGATE, TO CROSS-QUESTION, TO ELICIT, TO EXTRACTION INFORMATION, TO EXAMINE, TO FISH FOR, TO GRILL, TO INQUIRE, TO INQUISITION, TO INTERPELLATE, TO INTERROGATE, TO INTERVIEW, TO MAKE INQUIRY, TO MAKE INQUISITION, TO PICK THE BRAINS OF, TO POSE A QUESTION, TO PRY/PRIZE OUT, TO PUMP, TO PUMP FOR INFORMATION, TO PUT A QUESTION TO, TO PUT ON THE GRILL, TO PUT QUERIES, TO QUERY, TO QUESTION, TO QUESTIONNAIRE, TO QUIZ, TO ROAST, TO SHOOT QUESTIONS AT, TO TAKE UP/CARRY ON AN INQUIRY, TO TRY, TO WORM OUT OF. Dutch: EXAMINEREN ('to examine', in the educational setting), INFORMEREN ('to ask for information'), INTERPELLEREN ('to interpellate'), INTERVIEWEN ('to interview'), AAN EEN KRUISVERHOOR ONDERWERPEN (lit. 'to subject to a cross-examination'), ONDERVRAGEN ('to interrogate'), ONTLOKKEN ('to elicit'), ONTWRINGEN (lit. 'to wrench out of'), OP DE ROOSTER LEGGEN ('to put on the grill'), UITHOREN (lit. 'to hear out', i.e. 'to pump'), UITVRAKEN (lit. 'to ask out', i.e. to interrogate), VERHOREN ('to examine', in the legal setting), VISSEN NAAR ('to fish for'), EEN VRAAG STELLEN ('to ask a question'), VRAGEN ('to ask'), VRAGEN AFVUREN OP ('to shoot questions at').

This whole chapter deals with linguistic acts of directing. The foregoing list of (A1) verbials represents a subclass of such acts aimed at the production of other linguistic acts. They differ from most of the others in that their propositional content does not specify or even hint at the actions to be carried out by the hearer. Such specification is not necessary because of the interrogative mood and other markers which signal the type of directive behavior under investigation. If this type of directive behavior is important enough to justify the emergence of a special grammatical mood,
it should not surprise us that (A1) verbials occupy an important place among the verbials of directing. Moreover, ethnomethodologists have shown us clearly enough that eliciting responses is the most salient type of control the speaker usually tries to exert over the course of linguistic interaction.

32. The (A2) verbials, describing acts of trying to get the hearer to come or go somewhere, include: TO BAN, TO BEG LEAVE, TO BID (in the sense of inviting), TO BID COME, TO CALL, TO CALL AWAY, TO CALL BACK, TO CALL IN, TO CALL OUT, TO CALL TOGETHER, TO CALL UP, TO CITE (in the sense of summoning), TO CONJURE, TO CONJURE UP, TO CONVENE, TO CONVOKE, TO DEMAND (in the sense of asking to see as in "The crowd demanded the star", or summoning to court), TO DRAFT, TO EVOKE, TO EXORCIZE, TO EXTEND AN INVITATION, TO GIVE LEAVE, TO INVITE, TO INVOKE, TO MUSTER (as in "They did not muster much of a crowd"), TO OBTEST (in the sense of invoking as a witness), TO ORDER UP, TO RECALL, TO REQUEST THE PLEASURE OF SOMEONE'S COMPANY, TO REQUEST THE PRESENCE OF, TO SEND AFTER, TO SEND FOR, TO SUBPOENA, TO SUMMON, TO WARN OFF. Dutch: BEZWEREN ('to exorcize'), BIJEENROEPEN ('to call together'), BINNENROEPEN ('to call in'), CONVOCEREN ('to convocate'), DAGVAARDEN ('to summon'), INROEPEN ('to call in'), INVITEREN ('to invite'), LATEN HALEN ('to send for'), MEELOKKEN ('to entice someone to come along'), MEETRONEN ('to entice someone to come along'), ONTBIEDEN ('to invite'), OPROEPEN ('to draft' or 'to call up'), TERUGROEPEN ('to call back'), TE VOORSCHIJN ROEPEN (lit. 'to call/order to appear'), TRONEN ('to entice someone to go or come somewhere'), UITDRIJVEN ('to exorcize'), UITNODIGEN ('to invite'), VERBANNEN ('to ban'), VERZOEKEN
The prominence of the (A2) verbials among the verbials of directing may be surprising. What makes coming and going into such an important activity that it is the focus of so many verbials of directing? The fact itself is interesting to observe even though the answer to the question may be relatively simple. Not only is movement a basic category of voluntary action (voluntary action being the only reasonable object for acts of directing), it is such a salient cognitive category in general that for some languages such as Navajo (according to G. Witherspoon 1977) the principal verb is 'to go' rather than 'to be' (which is commonly regarded as the principal verb of so many other languages).

33. The third prominent area in the goal dimension of the verbials of directing is the set of (A3) verbials describing acts of trying to get the hearer to give or grant (the speaker) something. The set includes: TO APPEAL TO ONE FOR, TO APPLY FOR, TO ASK FOR, TO BEG, TO BLACKMAIL, TO CLAIM, TO DEMAND, TO EXACT, TO EXTORT, TO LAY CLAIM TO, TO MAKE DEMANDS/A DEMAND, TO MAKE REQUISITION, TO PRAY FOR, TO PUT IN A CLAIM, TO PUT THE BITE ON (which means 'to ask for money, favors, etc.' as in "John put the bite on his friend for several tickets to the dance"), TO REQUEST, TO REQUIRE, TO REQUISITION, TO SCREW, TO SOLICIT, TO STIPULATE FOR, TO SUE FOR, TO SUPPlicate, TO WHEEDELE SOMETHING OUT OF A PERSON. Dutch: AANSPRAAK NAKEN OP ('to lay claim to'), EEN AANVRAAG INDIENEN (lit. 'to submit an application'), AANVRAGEN ('to apply for'), AFBEDELEN (lit. 'to beg off'), AFDREIGEN ('to extort by means of threatening'), AFDWINGEN ('to extort'), APERSEN ('to extort'), AFSEMeken (lit. 'to beg
off'), AFTROGELEN ('to wheedle something out of a person'), BEDELEN ('to beg'), BEDINGEN ('to stipulate for'), BIDDEN OM ('to pray for'), CHANTAGE PLEGEN (lit. 'to commit blackmail'), CHANTEREN ('to blackmail'), EISEN ('to demand'), EEN EIS INSTELLEN ('to put in a claim'), OPEISEN ('to claim, demand'), OPVRAKEN ('to claim'), RECLAIMEREN ('to claim'), SCHOOIEN ('to beg', but a derogatory term), SOLLICITEREN NAAR ('to apply for'), TERUGIESEN (lit. 'to demand the return of'), TERUGVORDEREN ('to demand the return of'), VORDEREN ('to demand'), VRAGEN OM ('to ask for').

What the (A3) verbials describe is probably central in the area of directing other people's behavior. This cannot be concluded from a comparison of the three sets of goal-specific verbials listed so far. However, a close look at the remaining goal-specific verbials of directing reveals that about half of them refer to acts of the (A3) type with an even further specified goal. They will be presented in the next paragraph.

34. (A3a) though (A3g) can all be paraphrased as attempts to get Ha to undertake an action from which Sa will profit in some tangible material way, i.e. to engage in an activity of 'giving' or 'granting' in a broad sense.

(A3a) Sa directs Ha towards buying Sa's product
(A3b) Sa directs Ha towards paying something
(A3c) Sa directs Ha towards making or keeping something for Sa
(A3d) Sa directs Ha towards voting for Sa
(A3e) Sa directs Ha towards mailing something to Sa
(A3f) Sa directs Ha towards marrying Sa
(A3g) Sa directs Ha towards having sexual intercourse with Sa

The principal (A3a) verbials are: TO ADVERTISE, TO CANVASS, TO PROMOTE, TO PUBLICIZE and TO RECOMMEND; Dutch: AANBEVELEN ('to recommend'), AANPRATEN (lit. 'to talk a person into buying something'), AANPRIJZEN (to recommend'), ADVERTEREN ('to advertise'), RECLAME MAKEN VOOR ('to advertise'), WERVEN ('to canvass').

(A3b) verbials are: TO CHARGE, TO DUN and TO LEVY; Dutch HEFFEN ('to levy') and AANREKENEN ('to charge'). There seems to be no obvious Dutch equivalent for TO DUN in the sense of making persistent demands for money as used in "The grocer dunned the customer monthly by mail for payment of his bill" or in "dunning for contributions".

The (A3c) verbials include: TO BESPEAK, TO BOOK, TO COMMISSION, TO INDENT (in the chiefly British sense of 'to order by an indent, i.e. an official requisition as for supplies'), TO MAKE RESERVATIONS, TO ORDER, TO RESERVE, TO PUT IN AN ORDER FOR; Dutch: BESPREKEN ('to book, reserve'), BESTELLEN ('to order'), RESERVEREN ('to reserve'). The actual 'giving' towards which Sa's utterance is directed is of course delayed in acts of the (A3c) type.

Attempts to get someone's vote can be described by means of the (A3d) verb TO CANVASS, Dutch WERVEN. Note that the same word applies to seeking political support and trying to attract buyers.

Whereas (A3c) verbials refer to acts of 'giving' which are delayed, the 'giving' indicated by (A3e) verbials is indirect, namely through the mail. The relevant lexical items are TO SEND FOR and TO ORDER, Dutch AANVRAAGEN and BESTELLEN.
In the remaining two sets the object of the 'giving' is quite specific. In the case of (A3g) verbials such as TO IMPORTUNE (in the sense of making advances towards), TO SEDUCE and TO SOLICIT, Dutch EEN AANZOEK DOEN ('to solicit') and VERLEIDEN ('to seduce'), Sa is after Ha's body. In the case of (A3f) verbials such as TO POP THE QUESTION and TO PROPOSE, Dutch EEN AANZOEK DOEN and IEMANDS HAND VRAGEN (lit. 'to ask someone's hand') Ha's whole life is at stake.

35. The remaining sets of goal-specific verbials of directing are all relatively small. The acts they describe are listed in (A4) through (A16).

(A4) Sa directs Ha towards not buying, using, etc. something
(A5) Sa directs Ha towards taking on a certain duty
(A6) Sa directs Ha towards going on strike
(A7) Sa directs Ha towards making war
(A8) Sa directs Ha towards writing something down
(A9) Sa directs Ha towards keeping something where it is
(A10) Sa directs Ha (a mob) towards dispersing
(A11) Sa directs Ha towards attacking somebody
(A12) Sa directs Ha towards accepting a lower price than he wanted originally
(A13) Sa directs Ha towards changing his party or opinions
(A14) Sa directs Ha towards hurrying up
(A15) Sa directs Ha towards stopping his (professional) activities temporarily
(A16) Sa directs Ha towards a rebellion of some kind
We can briefly list the most important lexical representatives.

(A4) verbials: TO BAN, TO BAR, TO BLACKLIST, TO CENSURE, TO OUTLAW, TO PROSCRIBE, TO PUT ON THE INDEX, TO TABOO; Dutch: BUITEN DE WET STELLEN ('to outlaw', lit. 'to place outside the law'), CENSUREREN ('to censure'), OP DE INDEX ZETTEN ('to put on the index'), TABOE VERKLAREN (lit. 'to declare taboo'). Notice that in acts of the (A4) type Ha is never an individual, but a large group of people; the objects the verbials take refer to what the group of people in question is not supposed to buy, use, etc.

The (A5) verbials: TO ACCREDIT (in the sense of 'to order to proceed on an official mission'), TO APPOINT, TO ASSIGN, TO CHARGE, TO COMMISSION, TO MANDATE, TO ORDAIN, TO POST, TO PRECONIZE, TO SET and TO STATION; Dutch: AANSTELLEN ('to appoint'), BELASTEN MET ('to charge'), BENOEMEN TOT ('to appoint'), MANDATEREN ('to mandate'), OPDRAGEN ('to charge'), OPLEGGEN ('to charge'), TOEWIJZEN ('to assign').

I only know of one (A6) verb, namely TO CALL OUT as in "Bus-drivers may be called out in support of their recent wage-claim". The Dutch equivalent TOT STAKING OPROEPEN cannot be regarded as a lexical item.

Another one without an obvious Dutch counterpart is the (A7) verb TO DEFY in its quite specific meaning of 'to challenge to combat'.

The main (A8) verb is TO DICTATE, Dutch DICTEREN, in the sense of 'to speak or read for a person to write down or transcribe'.

TO EMBARGO and TO PUT AN EMBARGO ON, Dutch EEN EMBARGO LEGGEN OP, are (A9) verbials.

TO READ THE RIOT ACT in the sense of ordering Ha (which cannot be an individual but which is generally a mob) to disperse is an (A10) verbal.
Apparently, a Dutch counterpart is lacking.

The set of (A11) verbs is again a one-member class. The verb TO SIC, Dutch AANHITSEN, means 'to incite to an attack'. The Ha of an (A11) act is typically Sa's dog.

(A12) verbs: TO BARGAIN, TO HAGGLE and TO HIGGLE; Dutch: AFBIEDEN ('to bargain'), AFDINGEN ('to bargain'), AFPINGELEN ('to haggle, higgle').

TO TALK OVER as in "Fred is trying to talk Bill over to our side" is clearly an (A13) verbal; its Dutch equivalent in OMPRATEN.

OPJAGEN in the sense of 'to incite to excessive haste' is an (A14) verb. The same verb is used to describe acts of starting or rousing game. In its (A14) meaning it is hard to find a good English equivalent.

An (A15) verb: TO SUSPEND as in "He was suspended from the army for a year", Dutch SCHORSEN.

Finally, a Dutch (A16) verb without a clear English equivalent is OPRUIEN which always describes an act of inciting Ha to a rebellion of some kind. Similar, at least in one of its senses, is the verb OPZETTEN.

36. The goal dimension of linguistic acts of directing is represented in SDC-Table 4. In the table some comparisons are indicated which have not been mentioned so far. By far the most important one is the following. Though in English acts of the (A1) and (A3) types are joined by the common verb TO ASK, the lexical link is not as strong as in Dutch. TO ASK in its (A3) sense requires the preposition FOR whenever the object of the asking is indicated; as a result, the (A3) verbal is TO ASK FOR rather than TO ASK. Though in Dutch there is also a prepositional (A3) verb VRAGEN OM, the verb VRAGEN can itself be used in the (A3) sense with-
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<tr>
<td>uitnodigen</td>
<td>(A2) to invite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vragen om</td>
<td>(A3) to ask for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adverteren</td>
<td>(A3a) to advertise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aanrekenen</td>
<td>(A3b) to charge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reserveren</td>
<td>(A3c) to reserve</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aanvragen</td>
<td>(A3d) to order</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heemands hand vragen</td>
<td>(A3e) to send for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verleiden</td>
<td>(A3f) to propose</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taboe verklaren</td>
<td>(A4) to taboo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>benoemen tot</td>
<td>(A5) to appoint</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(A6) to call out</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(A7) to defy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dicteren</td>
<td>(A8) to dictate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>een embargo leggen op</td>
<td>(A9) to embargo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(A10) to read the riot act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aanhitsen</td>
<td>(A11) to sic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>afdingen</td>
<td>(A12) to bargain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ompraten</td>
<td>(A13) to talk over</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opruagen</td>
<td>(A14) to suspend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>schorsen</td>
<td>(A15) to suspend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opruien</td>
<td>(A16) to suspend</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SDC-Table 4
out adding a presposition, even when the object of the asking needs to be made explicit.

**F. THE DIRECTIONALITY OF DIRECTING**

37. In the introduction to this chapter we remarked that it would not be possible to regard every directive speech act describable in terms of the verbials of directing as an attempt to get the hearer to do something. Indeed, in some cases the speaker even tries to make the hearer not do something. Such cases can be accounted for by means of verbs such as TO PROHIBIT. In this section speech acts directing the hearer towards not doing something will be said to display a *negative directionality* as opposed to the *positive directionality* of attempts to make the hearer do something. Thus directive speech acts can be divided into two types, (A1) and (A2).

(A1) Sa tries to get Ha to do something

(A2) Sa tries to get Ha not to do something

At first sight one could expect the verbials of directing to fall into two corresponding categories with TO COMMAND in the (A1) category and TO PROHIBIT in the (A2) category. But an attempt to place all our verbials in one of the categories soon turned out to be in vain. The lexicon is patterned in a much more intricate way which I am about to sketch.

38. With respect to the directionality dimension all verbials of directing can be placed on a nine-point scale. At the two extremes there are
the exclusively positive and exclusively negative ones. Next are those which are intrinsically positive and those which are intrinsically negative. I regard a verbal of directing as intrinsically positive if it shows positive directionality whenever combined with a positive propositional content, and negative directionality whenever the propositional content of the description in which it is used is negative. Conversely, a verbal of directing is intrinsically negative if it signals negative directionality when combined with a positive propositional content and positive directionality when the propositional content of the description in which it is used is negative. As a result, the first set nearly always indicates a positive directive whereas the second set nearly always describes a negative one. Examples will be given soon.

Further towards the center of the scale we should find verbials tending towards the positive side and some tending towards the negative side. The remaining sets can be expected to be: those that can be either positive or negative, with equal probability; those that can be positive and negative simultaneously; those that are neither negative nor positive.

The nine-point scale of the dimension under discussion should be formulated directly in terms of conditions on the use of the verbials (since an act of directing can itself only be positive or negative):

\( (Cv1) \) The verbal describes \((A1)\) exclusively
\( (Cv2) \) The verbal describes nearly always \((A1)\)
\( (Cv3) \) The verbal describes usually \((A1)\)
\( (Cv4) \) The verbal describes either \((A1)\) or \((A2)\)
\( (Cv5) \) The verbal describes \((A1)\) and \((A2)\) simultaneously
\( (Cv6) \) The verbal describes neither \((A1)\) nor \((A2)\)
The verbial describes usually (A2)

(Cv8) The verbial describes nearly always (A2)

(Cv9) The verbial describes (A2) exclusively

The relevant verbials can now be listed systematically. But before doing so, some preliminary remarks will be made.

39. An intuitively plausible expectation would be to find TO COMMAND at the positive extreme of the scale and TO PROHIBIT at the negative one. However, these verbials are not exclusively positive and negative, respectively. Consider (D1) through (D4).

(D1) He commanded the soldier to scrub the floor

(D2) He commanded the soldier not to leave the building

(D3) He prohibited the soldier to leave the building

(D4) He prohibited the soldier not to scrub the floor

Of these descriptions, (D2) and (D4) are less likely to occur than the others; indeed, (D4) will probably only be found in a logic handbook. But the point is that both are possible: (D2), with TO COMMAND, describes a negative directive and (D4), with TO PROHIBIT, a positive one. Thus TO COMMAND and TO PROHIBIT fir our definition (in the previous paragraph) of intrinsically positive and intrinsically negative verbs of directing.

At this point one question crops up immediately: if TO COMMAND and TO PROHIBIT are not exclusively positive and negative, respectively, are there any (Cv1) and (Cv9) verbials at all? In fact, there are as many exclusively positive and negative verbials of directing as there are intrinsically positive and negative ones. But the acts describable in
terms of the exclusively positive and negative ones have rarely been regarded as central cases of linguistic directing. An exclusively positive verb is, for instance, TO INVITE in its original sense of requesting Ha's presence or participation. Someone's being present or his participating is always a positive act. In its derivative sense of requesting formally or politely, TO INVITE is of course a (Cv2) verb. Another (Cv1) verb is TO ORDER as in "He ordered a meal"; in its other, non-commercial, senses also TO ORDER belongs to the (Cv2) set. A (Cv9) verb would be TO BAN in the sense of prohibiting (by legal means or social pressure) the performance of some activities or the dissemination or use of something: an act of banning in this meaning can only be directed at a non-action.

40. By far the most numerous sets are the (Cv1) and (Cv2) verbials. This means that the lexicon reflects a definite tendency towards focusing on the positive aspect of directive behavior. The main English (Cv1) verbials are: TO ADVERTISE, TO ANGLE FOR, TO APPLY FOR, TO APPOINT, TO APPROVE, TO ASK (A QUESTION), TO ASK FOR, TO ASSIGN, TO BESPEAK, TO BID (COME), TO BLACKMAIL, TO CALL (in the sense of commanding or requesting to come), TO CALL AWAY, TO CALL BACK, TO CALL FOR, TO CALL FORTH, TO CALL IN, TO CALL ON, TO CALL OUT, TO CALL TOGETHER, TO CALL UP, TO CANVASS, TO CATECHIZE, TO CERTIFY (in the sense of licensing to do something as in "to certify a teacher"), TO CHARGE, TO CITE (in the sense of calling upon officially or authoritatively to appear before a court), TO CLAIM, TO CLAMOR FOR, TO COMMISION, TO CONJURE (UP), TO CONVENE, TO CONVOLVE, TO CROSS-EXAMINE, TO CROSS-INTERROGATE, TO CROSS-QUESTION, TO DEMAND (in the sense of claiming), TO DICTATE (in the sense of speaking or read-
ing for someone to write down), TO DRAFT, TO ELICIT, TO EXTRACT INFORMATION, TO EVOKE, TO EXACT, TO EXAMINE, TO EXTEND AN INVITATION, TO EXTORT, TO FISH FOR, TO FOMENT (in the sense of inciting as in "to foment riots, revolutions"), TO GIVE A FREE HAND, TO GIVE THE GO-AHEAD, TO GIVE THE GREEN LIGHT, TO GRILL, TO IMPORTUNE (in the sense of making advances towards), TO IMPOSE, TO IMPOSE ON ONE FOR, TO INQUIRE (AFTER), TO INQUISITION, TO INTERPELLATE, TO INTERROGATE, TO INTERVIEW, TO INVITE (in the sense of asking to come over), TO INVOKE, TO LAY CLAIM TO, TO LEVY, TO MAKE INQUIRY, TO MAKE INQUISITION, TO MAKE REQUISITION, TO MAKE RESERVATIONS, TO MANDATE, TO MUSTER, TO OBTEST (in the sense of invoking as a witness), TO ORDER (as in "to order a meal"), TO ORDER UP, TO PICK THE BRAINS OF, TO POP THE QUESTION, TO POSE A QUESTION, TO POST, TO PRECONIZE, TO PROMOTE, TO PROPOSE (in the sense of asking to marry), TO PRY OUT, TO PUBLICIZE, TO PUMP (FOR INFORMATION), TO PUT A QUESTION TO, TO PUT IN AN ORDER FOR, TO PUT ON THE GRILL, TO PUT QUERIES, TO QUERY, TO QUESTION, TO QUESTIONNAIRE, TO QUIZ, TO READ THE RIOT ACT (in the sense of ordering to disperse), TO RECALL, TO REQUEST THE PLEASURE OF SOMEONE'S COMPANY, TO REQUEST THE PRESENCE OF, TO REQUISITION, TO ROAST, TO SCREW, TO SEDUCE (in the sense of enticing into partnership in sexual intercourse), TO SEND AFTER, TO SEND FOR, TO SET (in the sense of appointing or assigning to an office or duty as in "to set pickets around the camp"), TO SHOOT QUESTIONS AT, TO SIC, TO SOLICIT (in the sense of offering sexual intercourse), TO STATION, TO SUBMIT, YO SUBPOENA, TO SUMMON, TO TAKE UP AN INQUIRY, and TO WORM OUT OF.

Notice that the (Cv1) verbials include all those describing acts directed at Ha's responding verbally, such as TO ASK A QUESTION. No need to explain why these are exclusively positive. Another goal-specific category which is completely represented at the positive extreme of the directionality
scale is the one encompassing the lexical items used to account for acts of directing H a towards coming or going somewhere. The same is true for the category of verbials describing attempts to make H a give or grant (Sa) something.

41. The Dutch set of (Cvi) verbials: AANPRATEN ('to talk a person into buying, doing soething'), AANSPRAAK MAKEN OP ('to claim'), AANSTELLEN TOT ('to appoint'), AANVRAGEN ('to apply for' or 'to send for'), EEN AANZOEK DOEN (in the sense of 'to pop the question' of trying to seduce), ADVERTEREN ('to advertise'), AFBEDENEL (lit. 'to beg off'), AFDREIGEN ('to extort by means of threatening'), ADDWINGEN ('to extort'), AFERSEN ('to extort'), AFPIEGEL ('to haggle, giggle'), AFSEMEN (lit. to beg off'), AFTROGGELEN ('to wheedle out of a person'), BEDELEN ('to beg'), BELASTEN MET ('to charge with'), BEMOELEN ('to appoint'), EEN BEROEP DOEN OP ('to call on'), BESPREKEN ('to book'), BESTELLEN ('to order as in "to order a meal"'), BEZWEREN (in the sense of 'to conjure up'), BIJEENROEPEN ('to call together'), BINNENROEPEN ('to call in'), CHANTAGE PLEGEN ('to blackmail'), CHANTEREN ('to blackmail'), CONCOGEREN ('to convoke'), DAGVAARDEN ('to subpoena'), DICTEREN ('to dictate in the sense of reading or speaking for someone to write down'), EISEN (in the sense of 'to claim'), EEN EIS INSTELLEN ('to put in a claim'), EXAMINEREN ('to examine in the sense of 'to subject to an examination', in the educational setting'), HEFFEN ('to levy'), INFORMEREN ('to ask for information'), INROEPEN (both in the sense of 'to call in and 'to call on'), INTERPELLEREN ('to interpellate'), INTERVIEWEN ('to interview'), INVITEREN ('to invite in the sense of asking to come over'), INVORDEREN ('to claim'), AAN EEN KRUISVERHOOR ONDERWERPEN ('to subject to
a cross-examination'), LATEN HALEN ('to send for'), MANDATEREN ('to mandate'), MEELOKKEN ('to entice to come along'), MEETRONEN ('to entice to come along'), ONDERVRAGEN ('to interrogate'), ONTBIEDEN ('to invite officially'), ONTLOKKEN ('to elicit'), ONTWRINGEN (lit. 'to wrench out of'), OPEISEN ('to claim'), OPGEVEN ('to assign'), OPJAGEN ('to entice to hurry up'), OPROEPEN (in the sense of 'to draft'), OPRUIEN ('to incite to rebellion'), OPVRAGEN ('to claim'), PRECONISEREN ('to preconize'), RECLAME MAKEN VOOR ('to advertise'), RECLAMEREN ('to claim'), RESERVEREN ('to reserve'), SCHOOIEN (pejorative for 'to beg'), SOLLICITEREN NAAR ('to apply for'), TERUGEISEN ('to demand the return of'), TERUGROEPEN ('to call back'), TERUGVORDEREN ('to demand the return of'), TE VOORSCHIJN ROEPEN (lit. 'to call, order to appear'), TOEWIJZEN ('to assign'), TRONEN ('to entice to come or go somewhere'), UITDRIJVEN ('to exorcise'), UITHOREN (lit. 'to hear out', i.e. 'to pump for information'), UITNODIGEN (in the sense of asking to come over, 'to invite'), UITVRAGEN (lit. 'to ask out', i.e. 'to interrogate'), VERHOREN ('to examine', in the legal setting), VERLEIDEN ('to seduce'), VERLOKKEN ('to entice, seduce'), IN VERZOEKING BREGEN (to seduce'), VISSEN NAAR ('to angle for'), VORDEREN ('to demand' in the sense of asking to give), EEN VRAAG STELLEN ('to ask a question'), VRAGEN (in the sense of asking a question), VRAGEN AFVUREN OP ('to shoot questions at'), WEGTRONEN ('to entice to go away'), DE WEG WIJZEN (lit. 'to show the way', i.e. 'to give directions'), WERVEN ('to canvass').

42. The intrinsically positive (Cv2) verbials are equally numerous, but it is harder to relate them to categories specified previously in the dis-
cussion of different semantic dimensions. In this class all the traditional central examples of directive linguistic action verbs will be encountered (but not only those). The English set: TO ACCEDE, TO ACCREDIT, TO BLACKMAIL, TO BRIEF, TO ACQUIESCE, TO ADJURE, TO ADMINISH, TO ADVISE, TO ADVOCATE, TO AGREE, TO ALLOW, TO ALLURE, TO APPEAL TO ONE FOR, TO APPLY PRESSURE, TO APPROVE, TO ASK (in the sense of requesting), TO ASSENT, TO AUTHORIZE, TO BEG, TO BESEECH, TO BULLY (SOMEONE INTO DOING SOMETHING), TO CAJOLE, TO CALL (in the sense of requesting as in "He called for an investigation of the facts"), TO CALL ON (or UPON), TO CAHLENGE, TO COACH, TO COAX, TO COMMAND, TO CONJURE (in the sense of entreating earnestly or solemnly as in "I conjure you to weigh my case well"), TO CONSENT, TO COUNSEL, TO CRAVE (in the sense of asking earnestly as in "He craved his superior's pardon"), TO DARE, TO DECREE, TO DEFY, TO DELIVER AN ULTIMATUM, TO DEMAND, TO DICTATE (in the general sense of speaking commandingly and imposing orders), TO DIRECT, TO DROP A HINT, TO EGG (ON) (in the sense of provoking to action as in "They egged their governments on to spend hundreds of millions"), TO ENCOURAGE, TO ENDORSE (in the sense of expressing definite approval of), TO ENTICE, TO ENTREAT, TO EXHORT, TO GIVE CARTE BLANCHE, TO GIVE FULL POWER, TO GIVE AN OPEN MANDATE, TO GIVE AN ORDER, TO GIVE A PIECE OF ADVICE, TO GIVE LEAVE, TO GIVE OFFICIAL SANCTION, TO GIVE PERMISSION, TO GIVE THE WORD (OF COMMAND), TO GOAD, TO GRANT, TO HINT, TO IMPETRATE, TO IMPLORE, TO IMPORTUNE (in its general sense of making frequent and troublesome requests or begging), TO INCITE, TO INDUCE, TO INSIST ON, TO INSTIGATE, TO INSTRUCT, TO INVEIGLE (as in "He used the most subtle means to inveigle the author into the office"),
TO INVITE (in the general sense of requesting politely), TO ISSUE A
COMMAND, TO LAY DOWN (THE LAW), TO LEGALIZE, TO LICENSE, TO LURE, TO MAKE
A DEMAND, TO MAKE A REQUEST, TO MAKE OBLIGATORY (MANDATORY), TO MANI-
PULATE, TO OBTEST (in the sense of beseeching), TO OKAY, TO ORDAIN,
TO ORDER, TO PERMIT, TO PERSIST, TO PERSUADE, TO PETITION, TO PLEAD,
TO PRAY, TO PRESCRIBE, TO PRESENT A PETITION, TO PRESS, TO PRICK, TO
PROD, TO PROMPT, TO PROPOSE, TO PUT A FLEA (BUG) IN SOMEONE'S EAR (i.e.
to give a hint or secret information to make someone act as in "He saw
Mary at the jeweler's admiring the diamond pin; so he was able to put
a bug in Henry's ear"), TO PUT THE PRESSURE ON, TO PUT THE SCREWS TO,
TO QUALIFY (in the sense of licensing), TO RECOMMEND, TO REGULATE,
TO REQUEST, TO REQUIRE (in the sense of asking authoritatively), TO RULE,
TO SANCTION, TO SAY THE WORD, TO SEDUCE (in the sense of persuading into
disobedience, disloyalty, etc.), TO SET (in the sense of 'to decree'),
TO SET CONDITIONS, TO SOLICIT (in the sense of inciting or strongly
urging), TO SPUR, TO STAND ON, TO STIPULATE, TO SUBSCRIBE, TO SUE, TO
SUGGEST, TO SUPPLICATE, TO TELL, TO TEMPT, TO TROUBLE SOMEONE FOR, TO
URGE, TO VOUCHSAFE, and TO WHEEDLE.

43. No doubt there is enough to surprise the reader when going through
these lists. For instance, how can we explain that TO GIVE A FREE HAND,
TO GIVE THE GO-AHEAD and TO GIVE THE GREEN LIGHT seem to be exclusively
applicable to positive directives, whereas a very similar verbal such
as TO GIVE CARTE BLANCHE, though intrinsically positive, seems to allow
for negative directionality as well? And, to take another example, why
is the Dutch EEN BEROEP DOEN OP definitely a (Cv1) verbal whereas the English equivalent most commonly used to translate it, namely TO CALL ON, had to be listed in the (Cv2) set? We have hardly started to make any systematic observation of this kind. It is quite natural, therefore, that explanations are still far off in the future.

44. The Dutch (Cv2) verbials include: AANBEVELEN ('to recommend'), AANDRINGEN ('to urge'), AANHITSEN ('to egg on'), AANMANEN ('to urge'), AANMOEDIGEN ('to encourage'), AANPORREN ('to incite'), AANPREKEN ('to recommend strongly'), AANPRIJZEN ('to recommend'), AANRADEN ('to advise'), AANSPOREN ('to incite'), AANSTICHTEN ('to instigate'), AANSTOKEN ('to foment, instigate'), EEN AANVRAAG DOEN/INDIENEN ('to make an application'), AANVUREN ('to incite'), AANWAKKEREN ('to foment'), AANWIJZINGEN GEVEN ('to give directions'), AANZEGGEN ('to order officially', a sense in which the verb is rarely used), AANZETTEN ('to incite'), EEN AANZOEK DOEN (OM) (in the sense of making a solemn, serious request), VAN ADVIES DIE-NEN ('to counsel'), ADVISEREN ('to advise'), AUTORISEREN ('to authorize'), BEKRACHTIGEN ('to sanction'), BEPALEN ('to rule'), BEPLEITEN ('to plead for'), BEPRATEN ('to persuade'), EEN BEVEL GEVEN ('to give an order'), BEVELEN ('to order'), BEWEGEN TOT ('to incite'), BEZWEREN ('to adjure'), BIDDEN (OM) ('to pray for'), BILLIJKEN ('to approve of'), BRENGEN TOT ('to incite'), CARTE BLANCHE GEVEN ('to give carte blanche'), COMMANDEREN ('to command'), DECREETEREN ('to decree'), DICTEREN ('to dictate in its general sense of speaking commandingly or imposing orders'), DRUK UITOE-FENEN OP ('to put pressure on'), EISEN ('to demand'), EEN EIS STELLEN
('to make a demand'), GEBIEDEN ('to order'), GOEDKEUREN ('to approve'), IEMAND HET MES OP DE KEEL ZETTEN (lit. 'to put the knofe on someone's throat', meaning 'to put the screws to'), IEMAND IETS IN HET HOOFD PRATEN (lit. 'to talk something into someone's head'), IEMAND IETS OP HET HART DRUKKEN (lit. 'to press something on to someone's heart', i.e. to urge a person to), IEMAND LASTIG Vallen MET ('to importune' in the sense of urging with frequent or unreasonable requests), IEMAND VOOR IETS WINNEN (lit. 'to win someone for something'), INBLAZEN ('to suggest', lit. 'to blow in'), INGEVEN ('to suggest'), INSTEMMEN MET ('to accede'), INSTRUIEREN ('to instruct'), INWILLIGEN ('to accede to'), LEGALISEREN ('to legalize'), Machtigen ('to authorize'), MACHTIGING GEVEN TOT ('to authorize'), MANIPULEREN ('to manipulate'), MISRADEN ('to advise wrongly'), OPDRAGEN ('to order'), OPFITSEN ('to instigate'), OPLEGGEN ('to charge with'), OPPELEN ('to suggest'), OPROEPEN (in the sense of calling on), OPSTOKEN ('to instigate'), OPZEPPELEN ('to incite', lit. 'to whip up'), ORDONNEREN ('to order', rarely used), OVERHALEN TOT ('to persuade'), OVERREDEN ('to persuade'), PETITIONEREN ('to petition'), PLEITEN VOOR ('to plead for'), RAAD GEVEN ('to advise'), OP ZIJN RECHTEN STAAN ('to assert one's rights'), REGLEMENTEREN ('to regulate'), SANCTIONEREN ('to sanction'), SMEKEN ('to beg'), SOMMEREN ('to demand authoritatively'), STAAN OP ('to insist', lit. 'to stand on'), STIPULEREN ('to stipulate'), SUGGEREREN ('to suggest'), TARTEN ('to dare'), TOEGEVEN ('to accede'), TOELATEN ('to permit'), TOELATING GEVEN ('to give permission'), TOESTAAN ('to permit'), TOESTEMMEN IN ('to accede'), TOESTEMMING GEVEN ('to give permission'), UITDAGEN ('to challenge'), EEN ULTIMATUM STELLEN ('to de-
liver an ultimatum'), VASTLEGGEN ('to set'), VERGUNNEN ('to permit'),
VERGUNNING GEVEN/VERLENEN ('to give permission'), VEROORLOVEN ('to per-
mit'), VERORDENEN ('to decree, ordain'), VERZOEKEN ('to request'),
EEN VERZOEKSCHRIFT INDIENEN ('to request formally and in writing'),
VOET BIJ STUK ZETTEN ('to insist'), VOLMACHT GEVEN ('to authorize'),
VOORSCHRIJVEN ('to prescribe'), VOORSLAAN ('to suggest, propose'), EEN
VOORSTEL INDIENEN ('to make a proposition'), VOORSTELLEN ('to suggest,
propose'), VOORWAARDEN STELLEN ('to make conditions'), VRAGEN ('to ask'),
ZICH WENDEN TOT ('to call on'), WETTIGEN ('to legalize').

45. Again we can ask a number of questions to which we do not know any
answer. For instance, why is OPLEGGEN a (Cv2) verb whereas its most common
English equivalent TO CHARGE is exclusively positive? The trivial answer
is, of course, that their meanings do not overlap completely. But is this
purely accidental, or is there a deeper rationale? Though I am unable to
answer the question, the intuitive similarity in meaning makes me re­
luctant to accept the accident-hypothesis without further scrutiny.

Another potentially interesting fact is the difference in semantic
patterning between TO ASK and Dutch VRAGEN. When discussing the goal
dimension of the verbials of directing we were forced to distinguish be­
tween two types of asking: TO ASK in the sense of ASKING A QUESTION as in
(D5), and TO ASK FOR in the sense of requesting Ha to give or grant (Sa)
something, as in (D6). The directionality dimension of directing imposes
a third type on us: TO ASK simply in the sense of requesting, as in (D7).

(D5) He asked where the station was
(D6) He asked for money

(D7) He asked me to go home

In all three cases Dutch VRAGEN could be used though in the case of (D6) the preposition OM may be added. Both TO ASK in the (D5) sense and TO ASK FOR are (Cv1) verbials, whereas TO ASK, as well as VRAGEN, in the (D7) sense is a (Cv2) verb.

46. Let us jump immediately to the opposite pole of the scale, i.e. the exclusively and intrinsically negative verbials of directing. Both sets are much smaller than the corresponding positive ones. Some English (Cv9) verbials are: TO BAN (as in "to ban a political party, a book", implying a categorical civil or ecclesiatical prohibition), TO BAR (as in "barring the use of poison gas in war"), TO BLACKLIST, TO CENSURE, TO EMBARGO, TO EXPOSTULATE (in the sense of reasoning earnestly with a person for purposes of dissuasion), TO INTERDICT, TO LAY AN EMBARGO ON, TO REMONSTRATE (in the sense of expostulating), TO NEGATIVE (in the sense of refusing assent to), TO PROSCRIBE, TO PUT ONE'S VETO UPON, TO PUT ON THE INDEX, TO PUT UNDER AN INTERDICT, TO PUT UNDER THE BAN, TO READ THE RIOT ACT (in the sense of issuing a peremptory warning to cease doing something or not to do something again, as in "Three boys were late to class and the teacher read the riot act to them"), TO SUSPEND, TO TABOO, TO VETO.

The reader may have noticed that almost all the verbials of directing specifying the act (not) to be performed belong either to the (Cv1) or the (Cv9) category. This is hardly surprising since the behavior towards which Ha is directed is either a positive or an negative act; as a result, if the
act in question is specified also its being positive or negative is likely to be specified and hence the directionality of the verb is fixed.

Some Dutch (Cv9) verbials are: CENSUREREN ('to censure'), OP DE INDEX PLAATSEN ('to put on the index'), EEN INTERDICUT UITSPREKEN OVER (lit. 'to pronounce an interdict about'), SCHORSEN ('to suspend'), TABOE VERKLAREN (lit. 'to declare: taboo'), UITSLUITEN (in the sense of not admitting), ZIJN VETO UITSPREKEN OVER ('to veto').

47. The list of intrinsically negative (Cv8) verbials can be equally short: TO DISALLOW, TO DISCOURAGE, TO FORBID, TO INHIBIT (in the sense of prohibiting from doing something), TO OUTLAW, TO PROHIBIT, TO RULE AGAINST, TO RULE OUT (notice that TO RULE was listed as a (Cv2) verb), TO DISSUADE; Dutch: AFBRENGEN VAN ('to dissuade'), AFRADEN ('to advise against'), BUITEN DE WET STELLEN ('to outlaw'), IEMAND IETS UIT HET HOOFD PRATEN (lit. 'to talk something out of a person's head', i.e. to dissuade), ONTMOEDIGEN ('to discourage'), ONTRADEN ('to advise against'), VERBIEDEN ('to prohibit').

Whereas the central instances of positive directives such as TO ORDER and TO COMMAND were found to be (Cv2) verbs, The central negative example, TO PROHIBIT, turns out to be a (Cv8) verb. So far, the symmetry is complete.

48. Moving in the direction of the center of the directionality scale we come across the (Cv3) and (Cv7) slots. In those slots we should find verbials which are not intrinsically negative or positive, but which, in a vague probability-of-occurrence sense, tend towards the negative or
positive poles. At the negative side we find (Cv7) verbials such as TO ADDRESS A WARNING TO, TO CAUTION, TO GIVE FAIR WARNING, TO ISSUE A CAVEAT, TO UTTER A CAVEAT, and TO WARN; Dutch: WAARSCHUWEN ('to warn') and EEN WAARSCHUWING GEVEN ('to give a warning'). No doubt a description such as (D8) is more likely to occur than (D9) though both are acceptable.

(D8) I warned him not to stay there
(D9) I warned him to go home

Therefore warning, as a directive, tends towards the negative pole of the directionality scale. But TO WARN is not intrinsically negative because its directionality is not negative, but positive, when it is followed by a positive complement, and negative when a negative propositional content signals the act towards which Ha is directed.

To preserve the symmetry of the scale one would expect TO ADVISE to fill the (Cv3) slot. But TO ADVISE was, quite correctly, listed as an intrinsically positive directive. Thus the (Cv3) slot remains empty. This shows that there must be more to warning than (usually) negative advising; the Dutch lexicon shows, moreover, that negative advising (reflected in the verb AFRADEN as opposed to AANRADEN) belongs in the (Cv8) rather than the (Cv7) set. How, then, can we explain that TO WARN tends towards the negative pole of the scale though it does not behave like intrinsically negative directive verbials but rather like intrinsically positive ones? The question will remain unanswered in this essay.

49. Every act of directing pushes Ha to either doing or not doing something. Thus it comes as no surprise to find that there are no (Cv6) verbals either.
This leaves us with (Cv4) and (Cv5). There are some English verbials which can be used to describe either positive or negative acts of directing, with equal probability: TO ENJOIN, TO ISSUE A WRIT/AN INJUNCTION, TO MENACE, TO PUT ONE'S FOOT DOWN, TO PUT UNDER AN INJUNCTION, TO THREATEN, and TO WARRANT (in the sense of giving authority or power for doing or forbearing to do something). Dutch: DREIGEN ('to threaten') and OMPRATEN (which can be either 'to persuade' or 'to dissuade'). Notice that apart from the pair TO THREATEN-DREIGEN, the English and Dutch sets of (Cv4) verbials do not contain equivalents.

50. I have not been able to discover any verbials of directing which are necessarily of the (Cv5) type. However, there are quite a few which can either satisfy (Cv4) or (Cv5), depending on the context. All of them indicate series of directive acts (which, in the case of the (Cv5) interpretation, are a mixture of positive and negative ones) rather than a single one. The English examples: TO CALL THE SHOTS, TO CALL THE SIGNALS, TO PLAY/CALL THE TUNE, TO MAKE THE RULES and TO ORDER ABOUT/AROUND. Dutch: COMMANDEREN (which is often used more or less in the sense of 'to order about'), IEMAND DE WET STELLEN (more or less equivalent to 'to make the rules'), and RINGELOREN (similar to 'to order about').

The directionality dimension of directing is summarized in SDC-Table 5. Keep in mind that, in the case of the (Cv4) slot, the verbials on both sides of the dimension are not necessarily each other's equivalents.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUTCH</th>
<th>SEMANTIC DIMENSION</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>vragen</td>
<td></td>
<td>to ask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vragen</td>
<td>(Cv1)</td>
<td>(a question)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uitnodigen</td>
<td></td>
<td>to ask for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vragen</td>
<td>(Cv2)</td>
<td>to invite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verzoeken</td>
<td></td>
<td>to ask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bevelen</td>
<td></td>
<td>to request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Cv3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Cv4)</td>
<td>to enjoin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ompraten</td>
<td></td>
<td>to order about</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Cv5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Cv6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>waarschuwen</td>
<td>(Cv7)</td>
<td>to warn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verbieden</td>
<td>(Cv8)</td>
<td>to prohibit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>een interdict uitspreken over</td>
<td>(Cv9)</td>
<td>to put under an interdict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SDC—Table 5**

**G. DIRECTING AND AUTHORITY**

51. Though authority can be expected to be one of the major phenomena involved in acts of directing and to understand in order to grasp the nature of such behavior, its discussion in the literature on speech acts is restricted to some cursory statements such as J.R. Searle's claim that the
distinction between a request and a command is simply that the latter implies authority on the part of the speaker whereas the former lacks such an implication. The purpose of this section is not to provide support for these cursory statements, nor to refute them. My intention is simply to show that authority really constitutes a complex semantic dimension in the lexical frame of directing. Authority is not just either absent or present. Nor is the authority dimension simply a matter of gradability. The verbials of directing force us to distinguish a whole range of different types of authority.

52. Very clear cases of directive verbials implying authority of some kind are TO ORDER (Dutch BEVELEN) and TO COMMAND (Dutch BEVELEN). They can be used to describe linguistic acts of type (A1) conforming to condition (C1).

(A1) Sa directs Ha towards some action
(C1) Sa has authority over Ha

A less salient but equally clear example is TO TELL as used in (D1).

(D1) The waiter told us to wait

The main difference between TO TELL and TO ORDER or TO COMMAND seems to be that the former implies authority of a weaker kind, though essentially of the same type. Also TO PERMIT (Dutch TOELATEN) belongs in the (C1) category.

The reader may have noticed that both TO ORDER and TO COMMAND have BEVELEN as a Dutch equivalent. Also TO TELL can be translated by means of
BEVELEN under certain conditions, but in the case of (D1) it is hard to find any good Dutch equivalent at all. The most likely translation for (D1) would be (D2)

(D2) De kelner deed ons wachten

which means literally "The waiter made us wait"; a good lexical equivalent seems to be lacking.

53. The number of verbials applicable to directive acts conforming to (C1) is extremely large. But what about all the others? Do they all imply a simple negation of (C1)? Take, for instance, TO ADVISE (Dutch AANRADEN) and TO WARN (Dutch WAARSCHUWEN). It is clear that a piece of advice and a warning also involve a type of authority, which could be called knowledge authority as opposed to the power authority underlying orders and commands. In other words, in the case of advising and warning Sa has authority over Ha as a result of knowing more. Therefore (C1) has to be made more specific.

(C1a) Sa has power authority over Ha

(C1b) Sa has knowledge authority over Ha

(It is by virtue of the concept of 'knowledge authority' that an expert in a particular field can be called an 'authority' in that field.) Directive acts conforming to (C1a) are describable in terms of TO ORDER etc., whereas those satisfying (C1b) can be accounted for by means of TO ADVISE etc.
So far so good. But are there also mixed categories of acts, conforming both to (Cla) and (Clb), or are these two mutually exclusive? And if they are not mutually exclusive, are these mixtures also reflected in the lexicon? In other words, are there any (Clc) verbials?

(Clc) Sa has both power and knowledge authority over Ha

A clear case seems to be TO INSTRUCT (Dutch INSTRUIEREN).

54. A next question to ask is the following: Should all directive acts which are not describable in terms of (Cla), (Clb) or (Clc) verbials be regarded as conforming to (C2)?

(C2) The act involves no authority

There are no doubt a large number of (C2) verbials including TO HINT, TO SUGGEST, TO INSIST, TO ASK (in its requesting sense), and maybe even TO REQUEST. There is no need to list them all here.

But we have not yet reached the end of the authority story. Not only are there different kinds of authority which the speaker may have over the hearer. The lexicon imposes a fact on us the formulation of which might have been regarded as contradictory in a purely theoretical approach to directive linguistic behavior. It turns out that in some cases of directing the hearer has authority over the speaker. How can a speaker, who holds a subordinate position, direct the hearer, his 'superior'? In other words, how can there be any acts of directing satisfying (C3)?

(C3) Ha has authority over (Sa)
The mystery disappears when looking at some obvious (C3) verbs such as TO PETITION (Dutch EEN VERZOEKSCHRIFT INDIENEN) and even TO BEG (Dutch SMEKEN). Both verbs are used to describe acts of trying to get the hearer to do (or allow) something, and in both cases the decision to perform the act or not is completely in the hearer's hands. There is a clear reversal of authority and still the speaker's behavior remains directive.

55. Is there also a distinction between power and knowledge authority when the authority is on the hearer's side? In other words, is there a distinction between (C3a) and (C3b) verbials?

(C3a) Ha has power authority over Sa
(C3b) Ha has knowledge authority over Sa

The examples given so far, TO PETITION and TO BEG, are no doubt of the (C3a) type. But there are, indeed, (C3b) verbials as well. Consider TO ASK (in the sense of asking a question, Dutch VRAGEN), for instance. When asking a question the speaker's attempt to get an answer (at least a helpful or correct answer) fails unless the hearer has what we call knowledge authority over the speaker: with respect to the subject matter of the question he is supposed to know more than the speaker. The same holds for TÖ CONSULT (in the sense of asking for advice, Dutch RAADPLEGEN) and many others.

There seems to be only one point where there is no symmetry between speaker and hearer authority, namely (C3c).
(C3c) Ha has both power and knowledge authority over Sa

I have not been able to find any (C3c) verbials, neither in English nor in Dutch.

In this section we have refrained from giving extensive lists of examples. But no doubt the reader will be able to select lots of additional examples for the six points on the authority dimension from the long lists provided in previous sections. The authority dimension is visualized in SDC-Table 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUTCH</th>
<th>SEMANTIC DIMENSION</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bevelen</td>
<td>(C1a)</td>
<td>to order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verbieden</td>
<td></td>
<td>to prohibit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aanraden</td>
<td>(C1b)</td>
<td>to advise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>waarschuwen</td>
<td></td>
<td>to warn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instrueren</td>
<td>(C1c)</td>
<td>to instruct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voorstellen</td>
<td>(C2)</td>
<td>to suggest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aandringen</td>
<td></td>
<td>to insist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verzoeken</td>
<td></td>
<td>to request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>een verzoekschrift</td>
<td>(C3a)</td>
<td>to petition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indie-nen, smeken</td>
<td></td>
<td>to beg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vragen</td>
<td>(C3b)</td>
<td>to ask (a question)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>raadplegen</td>
<td></td>
<td>to consult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ø</td>
<td>(C3c)</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SDC-Table 6
56. The five semantic dimensions discussed so far are certainly not the only ones we need to understand the patterning of directive verbials in the English and Dutch lexicons. But no doubt they are among the most important ones. In this section I want to draw the attention to a couple of additional dimensions which deserve further research.

A quite relevant dimension for further investigation could be the specification of -he hearer of the directive utterances (or, if you wish, the *directee*). The hearer can not only be an individual, but also a mob (as implied by TO READ THE RIOT ACT in one of its senses) or the public in general (as in TO DECREE), or even spirits (as in TO CONJURE UP). Of course such hearer-specifications are often connected with, for instance, the social setting in which the directive act is situated. Along the hearer dimension a particularly interesting case is TO SEND FOR as used in (D1) as a description of (A1).

(A1) Go and get the doctor, quickly!

(D1) Sa sent for the doctor

In this case there is, in addition to the immediate hearer Ha who is told to go and get the doctor, a second or *delayed hearer*, namely the doctor who is requested to come. Unlike in other cases where there is more than one hearer, the different status of the two directees of (A1) turns the utterance into a *double directive*.
57. A second neglected but potentially relevant line of research is the study of the value judgment dimension. For one thing, many verbials of directing pass value judgments on the act towards which Ha is directed. For instance, both AANSTOKEN and AANVUREN mean TO INCITE, but the former implies that the act towards which Ha is directed is questionable, whereas the second implies that it is praiseworthy. In this respect Dutch seems to show sharper contrasts than English; the questionable character of the act is often implied by TO INSTIGATE but not always; and I have not been able to find an English directive verbal implying the unquestionably praiseworthy character of the act.

Value judgments are also passed on the linguistic act of directing itself. Verbs such as AFTROGGELEN (i.e. TO WHEEDE SOMETHING OUT OF A PERSON), AFDWINGEN (i.e. TO EXERT), AFDREIGEN (lit. 'to extort by threatening', i.e. TO BLACKMAIL) and TO SCREW (in the sense of practising extortion upon) all imply disapproval, with judgments ranging from 'blameworthy' to 'criminal'.

I. CONCLUSION

58. Nothing in this chapter can be regarded as conclusive; it merely scratches the surface of the semantics of directing. Let us recapitulate, in the same random and cryptic way as in the previous chapters, some of the main points made

(i) This chapter, as a whole, reveals how fundamental directing is as a function of language.
(ii) The dangers of purely theoretical classifications were demonstrated even more clearly than before; directive meaning is shown to spill over into the domains of the representatives and commissives. (Paragraphs 2 to 7)

(iii) Commanding and ordering turn out not to be the strongest types of directives. (Paragraph 9)

(iv) Asking a question is shown to be more strongly directive than insisting and requesting. (Paragraph 11)

(v) The verbials of directing single out a number of areas of social interaction in which directive behavior is prominent. (Paragraphs 14 ff.)

(vi) A discrepancy is noted between the conceptualization of the military world as a prototypical directing situation and a lack of verbinals focusing on the military setting. (Paragraph 27)

(vii) The verbials indicate that 'responding,' 'moving to or from a place' and 'granting or giving something' are the basic types of acts towards which people direct each other linguistically. (Paragraphs 30 ff.)

(viii) Though the act towards which a hearer is directed can only be positive or negative (i.e. doing something or not doing something) this two-sided directionality is reflected in a sixfold distinction which is required to understand the semantic patterning of the verbials of directing. (Paragraphs 37 ff.)

(ix) The lexicon shows that warnings are not just negative pieces of advice. (Paragraph 48)

(x) The verbials of directing shed light on the nature of the authority which is often involved in directive behavior; for one thing, they show that a distinction is necessary between different types of
Contrary to what one would expect, it turns out that even cases in which the hearer has authority over the speaker with respect to the action to be performed, can be genuine cases of directing. (Paragraph 54)

Each of these observations can be taken as the point of departure for extensive further investigations.
VI. THE SEMANTICS OF FORGOTTEN ROUTINES

A. INTRODUCTION

1. So far we have already used the comparative lexical approach to further our understanding of the linguistically marginal area of conversational silence. We also tried to penetrate the experience of truth, a central feature of propositional meaning, by way of studying the verbials used to describe representative speech acts in which the propositional content distorts the truth in one way or another. In the previous chapter we scratched the surface of the vast area of illocutionary meaning by canvassing the verbials describing speech acts of the directive type.

This final sample study enters an area which is marginal in some respect, but very central in another. The topic of investigation is the area of conversational routines. I am not only referring to formulaic expressions (as described by Tannen and Öztek 1977) and politeness formulas (Ferguson 1976), but also to routine utterances of a less fixed nature and with different social functions. Thus I shall not only (not even mainly) be talking about expressions such as "God bless you" (uttered when someone sneezes) which is formulaic in nature and which constitutes a form
of linguistic politeness, but I shall also pay attention to a number of quite flexible, non-formulaic responses to acts of insisting, giving permission, requesting, advising, etc. which are not necessarily induced by politeness.

2. The centrality of conversational routines in linguistic action is beyond doubt. Without them, conversation would cease to exist. Further, the occurrence of formulaic expressions and politeness formulas appears to be a universal phenomenon, though their actual shapes vary cross-linguistically and cross-culturally. Moreover, their importance emerges from the fact that omitting them (e.g. by neglecting to greet a person one knows) or failing to acknowledge them (e.g. by not responding to a greeting) inevitably creates tensions in interpersonal relationships. These observations lead naturally towards the following question: In what sense could we say that conversational routines (including formulaic expressions and politeness formulas) are marginal?

3. The reproduction of conversational routines involves a high degree of automaticity. Whereas lying requires a conscious messing around with the propositional content of a statement-like utterance, and whereas commanding involves a conscious act of the will, replying "You're welcome" to "Thank you" is largely automatic. Therefore, if we agree that a human action typically results from a conscious impulse of the will, we have to conclude that routine utterances are less central instances of linguistic action than, say, lies or commands or even many acts of being silent.
This observation is not meant to detract from the importance, emphasized in the previous paragraph, of routine utterances as aspects of conversational interaction. But it may help us understand why, as Ferguson (1976:137) puts it, "this universal phenomenon has been very little studied by linguists or anthorpologists or other students of human behavior". It may also explain why, for a number of these routines, many languages lack descriptive verbials. If, for instance, John says "God bless you" when Jane sneezes, there is no easy way for speakers of English to describe what John did or, in other words, what type of linguistic act he performed. A description such as "John wished that God would bless Jane" would be hopelessly inadequate; a native speaker of English would not take it seriously. The problem remains the same for the alternative and equivalent formula "Gesundheit" which could not be accounted for by claiming that "John wished Jane health". One would have to take refuge in the phrase "John said 'God bless you'" or "John said 'Gesundheit'" which does not yield any insight into the type of act performed because the linguistic action verb TO SAY is so general that it can be prefixed to any utterance (in directly or indirectly reported speech). The automaticity with which routine acts are performed may explain why there are many gaps in the lexical frame associated with them: their being performed more or less unthinkingly diminishes their cognitive salience, which is reflected in the absence of a lexicalization.

4. It is the set of non-lexicalized conversational routines that I call forgotten routines. This chapter is an overview of some major lexical gaps in this area in English and in Dutch.
The foregoing tentative explanation (in terms of the automaticity involved) of why some types of routine utterances are easily 'forgotten', however attractive it may be, still leaves us with mysteries. Indeed, it might even make some facts harder to comprehend. For instance, how is it that certain types of routines (e.g. greetings) are so salient that they get their own descriptive verbials, whereas others can hardly be described at all in a given natural language? Sometimes it will be possible to present a hypothetical answer to this question; sometimes it will not. But in all cases the question will be relevant.

There is something peculiar about a semantic discussion of lexical gaps. What I hope this chapter will lead to is a partial understanding of the type of conversational routines which are easily 'forgotten' in the sense mentioned and which, therefore, require special study. We will be skimming through a semi-conscious area of linguistic action in which some of its most fundamental properties may be hidden.

B. THE EXPRESSION OF EMOTIONS AND ATTITUDES

5. A large proportion of linguistic routine acts can be situated in the domain of what Searle (1976) called expressives, i.e. the class of speech acts the illocutionary point of which is that a certain psychological state, emotion or attitude is expressed. Of course this area shades off into the other traditional classes because the speech acts of which the expression of a psychological state is not a prominent aspect (e.g. Searle's declarations) are rare.
In English and in Dutch, as in many other languages, there are specialized linguistic action verbials to describe the expression of some emotions. For others, there are no such lexical items. This first contrast between lexicalized and non-lexicalized linguistic actions, which is amply illustrated in the following paragraphs, will lead us to some interesting conclusions as to why expressives were made into a separate class of speech acts.

6. Let us first consider some of the ways in which sorrow (or regret) and pleasure can be expressed.

(A1) I am sorry that you could not come over for a visit
(A2) I regret that you could not come over for a visit
(A3) I am sorry for being so rude to you
(A4) I regret that I have been so rude to you
(A5) I am sorry that your father died
(A6) I am glad that I have gotten the fellowship
(A7) I am glad you've gotten the fellowship
(A8) (I am) glad/pleased to meet you

Descriptions (D1) to (D8) correspond to acts (A1) to (A8), in the same order.

(D1) Sa said/stated/claimed that he was sorry that...
     or: Sa expressed his regret that...
(D2) Sa said/stated/claimed that he regretted that...
(D3) Sa apologized for being rude
(D4) Sa apologized for being rude
(D5) Sa commiserated/consoled Ha's father's death
(D6) Sa said/stated/claimed that he was glad that he...
(D7) Sa congratulated Ha on getting...
(D8) Sa greeted Ha

It will be clear that the phrase "Sa said/claimed/stated ..." could have been employed in all of the above descriptive acts. Notice, however, that this phrase, which can introduce any type of reported statement-like utterance, would not normally be used by a speaker of English who was asked to tell what Sa did when uttering (A3), (A4), (A5), (A7) and (A8). Instead, the specialized expressive linguistic action verbials TO APOLOGIZE, TO COMMISERATE, TO CONDOLE, TO CONGRATULATE and TO GREET would be used. Notice, moreover, that English lacks such specialized verbials for the description of (A1), (A2) and (A6). In other words, there is no verbal available for describing (A1), (A2) and (A6) as expressions of emotions, i.e. verbials which focus on the emotion-expressive aspect of these acts. Thus, some expressions of psychological states are lexicalized whereas others are not. The discrepancy is striking because sometimes identical formulas are used for the lexicalized and the non-lexicalized expression of identical emotions. A case in point is the formula "I am sorry" which always expresses a feeling of regret but which introduces what would be described as a simple statement in (A1) whereas it triggers the descriptive verbials TO APOLOGIZE and TO COMMISERATE in (D3) and (D5). Similar things happen with "I regret" and "I am glad".
7. A completely analogous picture emerges in Dutch. The formula "I am sorry" can be replaced by the impersonal phrase "Het spijt me" (lit. 'it sorrows me') in (A1), (A3) and (A5); "I regret" can be translated as "ik betreur" in (A2) and (A4); and "I am glad" is equivalent to "Ik ben blij". In (D1), (D2) and (D6) the phrase "Sa zei/beweerde..." ('Sa said/claimed...'), which can introduce any type of reported statement-like utterance, would be used, whereas the verbials ZICH VERONTSCHUDIGEN ('to apologize'), ZIJN DEELNEMING BETUIGEN ('to commiserate'), GELUKWENSEN ('to congratulate') and GROETEN ('to greet') would be used in the remaining describing acts.

This complete parallelism shows that probably we are not dealing with one of the whimsical features of natural language. But before attempting to formulate an explanation we shall take a look at some more comparable data.

8. Consider the following acts in which liking and disliking is expressed.

(A9) I (don't) like working late
(A10) I like your plan very much
(A11) I don't like the way you dress

Act (A9) can be described as in (D9).

(D9) Sa said/stated/claimed that he liked (did not like) working late

Though the same statement-formula "Sa said/stated/claimed..." could be used to account for (A10) and (A11) in all circumstances, there is another
possibility as well. Imagine that Sa is Ha's employer. Thus condition (C1) applies to (A10) and (A11).

(C1) Sa has authority over Ha (with respect to the topic of Sa's utterance)

In such circumstances we are likely to get (D10) and (D11) as descriptions.

(D10) Sa approved of Ha's plan
(D11) Sa disapproved of the way Ha dressed

Again we are confronted with linguistic actions in which identical psychological states are expressed by means of identical formulas, though for only some of them English provides us with descriptive verbials.

Once more the parallelism with Dutch is striking. The verbs GOEDKEUREN (lit. 'to judge good', i.e. 'to approve') and AFKEUREN ('to disapprove') would be used in (D10) and (D11). Moreover, the distinction between (A9) on the one hand and (A10) and (A11) on the other, is reinforced by the fact that the verb HOUĐEN VAN ('to like') can be replaced by GOEDVINDEN (lit. 'to find good'), which is ambiguous between liking and approving, in (A10) and (A11), but not in (A9).

A minor difference between English and Dutch is the following: whereas TO APPROVE and TO DISAPPROVE are not necessarily linguistic action verbials (i.e. they can be used to express the attitudes rather than their expression), GOEDKEUREN and AFKEUREN can only be used to describe the expression of approval and disapproval.

9. The divergence of human emotions and attitudes is limited. So is the number of their linguistic forms of expression. In this paragraph
I shall offer a random selection of the remaining ones. Unlike those discussed so far, the following ones will not constitute pairs of lexicalized and non-lexicalized forms of expression. Yet they will present exactly the same problem in the sense that, for no obvious reason, some of them are lexicalized whereas others are not. The expression of a wish, and the expression of gratitude are two examples of lexicalized expressives. Consider (A12) and (A13).

(A12) I wish I could go
(A13) I'm truly grateful for your hospitality

These two can be described by means of the linguistic action verbs TO WISH and TO THANK as in (D12) and (D13).

(D12) Sa wished he could go
(D13) Sa thanked Ha for his hospitality

In contrast, there are no emotion or attitude-oriented verbials associated with the expression of a hope as in (A14), the anticipation of pleasure as in (A15), disappointment as in (A16), surprise as in (A17) and concern or worry as in (A18).

(A14) I hope he arrives on time
(A15) I am looking forward to receiving your reply
(A16) I am disappointed that he did not come after all
(A17) I am surprised that he came
(A18) I am concerned/worried that/about...
Both in English and in Dutch these can only be described as statements. (A12) and (A13) are also lexicalized in Dutch: the verbs WENSEN ('to wish') and (BE)DANKEN ('to thank') would be used in (D12) and (D13).

Notice that TO WISH (Dutch WENSEN) is a borderline case in the sense that its use as a linguistic action verbal is extremely limited. An act such as (A12) is likely to be described by means of "Sa expressed the wish that he could go" rather than by means of (D12). But in the case of (A14) through (A18) similar paraphrases are the only way out.

The data presented so far are summarized in SDC-Table 1 (with TO WISH and WENSEN between brackets because of their marginal character). We should now start looking for explanations.

10. What needs explaining is the fact that some linguistic expressions of emotions or attitudes can only be described as statements whereas others are lexicalized in such a way that they seem to take on a totally different speech act status. In other words, the problem is that some of these expressions, as expressions of emotions or attitudes, are simply forgotten in the conceptualization underlying the sets of linguistic action verbials in English and in Dutch. The best place to look for an explanation is in the pairs of identical formulas expressing identical emotions, which are sometimes lexicalized and sometimes not, i.e. in (A1) through (A11).

Let us take, for instance, the formula "I am sorry". What distinguishes its use in (A1) from (A3) and (A5)?

(A1) I am sorry that you could not come over for a visit
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dutch</th>
<th>Semantic Dimension</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A1)</td>
<td>(A1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A2)</td>
<td>(A2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>(A3)</td>
<td>(A3)</td>
<td>to apologize</td>
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<td>(A4)</td>
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<td>(A5)</td>
<td>(A5)</td>
<td>to commiserate, to condole</td>
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<td>(A7)</td>
<td>(A7)</td>
<td>to congratulate</td>
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<td>to greet</td>
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<td>(A10)-(C1)</td>
<td>(A10)-(C1)</td>
<td>to approve</td>
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<td>(A11)-(C1)</td>
<td>(A11)-(C1)</td>
<td>to disapprove</td>
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<td>(A12)</td>
<td>(A12)</td>
<td>(to wish)</td>
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<td>(A13)</td>
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SDC-Table 1
(A3) I am sorry for being so rude to you

(A5) I am sorry that your father died

I believe that the major difference is the following. Whereas in (A1) Sa is simply conveying information about himself which may or may not interest Ha, in both (A3) and (A5) the speaker's psychological state expressed is of crucial importance to the hearer. (A3) presupposes that Sa has been rude to Ha; therefore, all further interaction between the two interlocutors depends crucially on Ha's coming to know whether Sa feels sorry about his previous behavior or whether he can expect similar behavior in the future. Similarly, (A5) presupposes that Ha's father died; whether Sa feels sorry (for Ha) about this unfortunate event partly defines Sa's attitudes towards Ha, and therefore it is important for Ha to know Sa's feelings. My hypothesis is that the importance of the emotions expressed in (A3) and (A5) for the relationship between Sa and Ha and for their social interaction increases the cognitive salience of these expressions within the domain of linguistic activity to such an extent that their conceptualization and lexicalization as expressions of emotions become inevitable. An act such as (A1) lacks this cognitive salience and is therefore 'forgotten' in the lexicalization process, though both the emotion expressed and the formula used are identical with (A3) and (A5).

In Searle's typology of speech acts (A1) would simply be described as a statement (a representative) whereas (A3) and (A5) would be said to be expressive. Thus, if my hypothesis is correct, the distinguishing trait of expressives is not the expression of a psychological state as such
(because also the point of (A1) is to express a psychological state) but the expression of a psychological state important to the hearer. Our lexical data support the validity of the distinction between representatives and expressives while enabling us to formulate the distinction more accurately.

11. We still have to check the validity of our explanation for the rest of our data. The contrast between (A2) and (A4) can be put in the same terms as that between (A1) and (A3). Also the congratulation (A7) and the greeting (A8) differ from the statement (A6) in that the attitudes expressed are important to the hearer. Exactly the same holds for the difference between the approval (A10)-(C1), the disapproval (A11)-(C1), and the simple statement (A9).

But what about the non-paired examples (A12) through (A18)? The importance to Hα of the gratitude expressed in an act of thanking as in (A13) is evident. On the other hand, the hope in (A14), the disappointment in (A16), the surprise in (A17) and the concern in (A18) do not show the same kind of relevance to the hearer. This does not mean that sentences starting "I hope..." etc. are always just statements. Consider (A19).

(A19) I'm giving a party tomorrow. I hope you can come

In this case "I hope you can come" is clearly an act of inviting Hα to come to the party; an invitation is a directive speech act. The only points I want to make are that sentences starting with "I hope ..." etc., though they clearly constitute the expression of a psychological state, cannot be described by means of a linguistic action verbal focusing on
the psychological state expressed, because no such verbials are available, and that the lexical gaps in question result from the fact that the expression of the feelings expressed lacks an inherent importance for the relationship between speaker and hearer.

So far the hypothesis seems to work. There are, however, two troublesome cases, namely (A12) and (A15).

12. The first problematic case is (A15), which is a widely used phrase to end a letter.

(A15) I am looking forward to receiving your reply

One might want to argue that the anticipation of pleasure expressed in (A15) is important to the reader of the letter. Of course it is. But upon closer investigation the problem turns out to be imaginary. The anticipation of pleasure is only important to Ha in the same way as the hope expressed in "I hope you can come" as in (A19). That is, the verbalized psychological state does not matter as such. What really counts for Ha is its implication. The expression of Sa's hope that Ha would be able to come implies that Sa wants Ha to come, and therefore the sentence "I hope you can come" counts as an invitation. Similarly, Sa's looking forward to receiving Ha's reply implies that Sa wants Ha to reply, and therefore (A15) counts as a polite request to reply. The directive overtone of (A15) and (A19) dominate so strongly that it would be surprising to get a description emphasizing the expressive aspect of these acts.
13. The only real problem is (A12), which can be described by means of TO WISH used as a linguistic action verbal (though, as said before, such usage is extremely marginal).

(A12) I wish I could go

What makes wishing so different from hoping that (D12), as a description of (A12), can be interpreted as an account of the linguistic action performed, whereas (D14), as a description of (A20), can only be regarded as an account of the psychological state expressed in the act?

(A20) I hope I can go
(D12) Sa wished he could go
(D14) Sa hoped he could go

In other words, what makes TO WISH into a linguistic action verbal (in one of its marginal senses), whereas TO HOPE can only refer to a state of mind? Obviously, there is no difference in importance to the hearer between the expression of a wish and the expression of a hope. It is even hard to see any difference between a wish and a hope as states of mind. I want to suggest that in this case the hearer-oriented principle I formulated is overcome by a second principle which is idiosyncratic to acts of wishing. What made TO WISH into a linguistic action verb may have been the belief that a state of affairs can be created by putting one's wishes into a linguistic form (e.g. a magical formula, a prayer, etc.). As a result, the meaning of the verb TO WISH got extended from a state of mind to the linguistic expression of that state of mind.
14. The belief that verbalizing one's wishes may bring about the desired state of affairs, and the resulting strong association of wishes (as mental acts) with their expression (as linguistic acts) and with the desired state of affairs itself (brought about by the formulation of the wish), might explain another peculiarity of the verb TO WISH. Wishing normally concerns a state of affairs which does not yet obtain, as in "wishing someone a happy New Year", which is done at the beginning of a year. However, "wishing someone a happy birthday", though not entirely synonymous with "congratulating someone on his birthday", has as its object a state of affairs which in most cases does already obtain. This extension of the meaning of TO WISH could be explained as follows. Take t1 to be the time at which a wish is uttered and t2 as the time at which the state of affairs which is the object of the wish obtains. In the paradigm case of "wishing someone a happy New Year" t2 is later in time than t1. Now, imagine someone wishing that it would stop raining. If one believes that uttering a wish can bring about the desired state of affairs, then t1 and t2 could nearly coincide: immediately after someone's wish that it would stop raining, it might indeed stop raining. This quasi-identification of the act with its object makes it possible to understand how wishing got extended to circumstances in which its object is already present. This extension is very nicely reflected in the fact that the Dutch verb for TO CONGRATULATE, in all its occurrences, is GELUKWENSEN (lit. 'to wish happiness').

But whatever the explanation for its behavior, TO WISH remains marginal as a linguistic action verb. Due to its marginal character it does not present a real threat to our hypothesis about the lexicalization of
expressions of emotion.

C. NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE RESPONSES

15. The subject matter of the previous section could be called the expressive dimension of forgotten routines. We discussed the types of psychological states for the linguistic expression of which languages such as English and Dutch do not provide descriptive verbials. Now we are going into the textual dimension of forgotten routines. We shall present an overview of the gaps in the lexical apparatus to describe responses to diverse types of speech acts. In this section the overview will be limited to responses to speech acts of a directive nature. All of the responses can be negative or positive. Thus, we are concerned with two types of acts, (A1) and (A2).

(A1) Sa responds positively to a speech act performed by Ha

(A2) Sa responds negatively to a speech act performed by Ha

The nature of the preceding discourse can be specified in the form of conditions on these acts. Consider (C1).

(C1) The act performed by Ha is a suggestion such as "I suggest we take the night train"

Examples of responses can be given as follows: (A3) is a response of the (A1)-(C1) type; (A4) is a response of the (A2)-(C1) type.

(A3) Let's do that

(A4) I don't feel like it
These two responses could be described as in (D1) and (D2).

(D1) Sa agreed to take the night train
(D2) Sa disagreed about taking the night train

Thus, the verb TO AGREE can refer to positive responses to suggestions, whereas TO DISAGREE denotes, amongst other things, negative responses to suggestions. Consequently, if (C1) obtains, both types of responses are lexicalized in English. Dutch provides the verbal AKKOORD GAAN ('to agree') for (A3); however, its negation NIET AKKOORD GAAN ('to disagree') would be rarely used for (A4); instead, the verb AFWIJZEN (more or less equivalent to 'to decline') would be more likely to occur as in (D3).

(D3) Sa wees het voorstel af
       (lit. 'Sa declined the suggestion')

16. Let us go on to a second type of preceding discourse.

(C2) The act performed by Ha is an act of insisting such as "I insist that you come home with me"

A possible (A1)-(C2) act is (A5), whereas (A6) represents the (A2)-(C2) type.

(A5) O.K. Fine with me
(A6) No, I won't

A quite natural way of describing (A5) would be to use the verb TO GIVE IN (Dutch TOEGEVEN, which is ambiguous between 'to give in' and 'to admit) as in (D4). For (A6) one might use TO REFUSE (Dutch WEIGEREN) as in (D5).
(D4) Sa gave in (and went home with Ha)

(D5) Sa refused (to go home with Sa)

As with suggesting, there are no lexical gaps here.

17. In the case of advising, an additional complication arises.

(C3) The act performed by Ha is an act of advising such as "You'd better take your medicine"

To a piece of advice two types of positive and negative responses can be given: one can either concentrate on the representative aspect of advice as in the responses (A7) and (A9), or on its directive aspect as in (A8) and (A10).

(A7) I think you're right

(A8) O.K. I will

(A9) I don't think so; it's still too early

(A10) No, I won't

The verbs TO AGREE and TO DISAGREE can be used to account for (A7) and (A9), as in (D6) and (D7).

(D6) Sa agreed (with Hs on taking his medicine)

(D7) Sa disagreed (with Ha on taking his medicine)

In Dutch the comparable verbials AKKOORD GAAN ('to agree') and NIET AKKOORD GAAN ('to disagree') could be used. The directive-oriented negative reply (A10) can be described by means of TO REFUSE (Dutch WEIGEREN) as in (D8).
(D8) Sa refused (to take the medicine)

A problem arises with the directive-oriented positive response: I did not succeed in finding a linguistic action verbal (apart from the passe-partout verb TO SAY) suited for the description of (A8). Here we seem to be confronted with a first gap.

18. Next in line is the speech act of inviting.

(C4) The act performed by Ha is an act of inviting such as "Would you like to come to my party tomorrow night?"

The positive (A1)-(C4) response could simply be (A11), and (A12) could be the negative (A2)-(C4) reply.

(A11) Yes, I would
(A12) No, I can't

To describe these two acts the verbs TO ACCEPT (Dutch AANNEMEN) and TO DECLINE (Dutch AFSLAAN) might be used as in (D9) and (D10).

(D9) Sa accepted (Ha's invitation to come to the party)
(D19) Sa declined (Ha's invitation to come to the party)

Again, all lexical slots are filled. (Notice that "No, I wouldn't" cannot be regarded as an appropriate negative response to an invitation; it would count as an insult rather than as an act of declining the invitation.)
19. What about responses to requests?

(C5) The act performed by Ha is an act of requesting such as
"Can you possibly give me a lift?"

Acts (A13) and (A14) are adequate replies of the (A1)-(C5) and the (A2)-(C5) types, respectively.

(A13) Sure
(A14) No, I'm afraid not

The negative response (A14) can be described as a refusal (using the verb TO REFUSE, Dutch WEIGEREN) as in (D11).

(D11) Sa refused (to give Ha a lift)

For the positive response, however, no adequate linguistic action verbal presents itself. Thus, (A1)-(C5) is our second lexical gap. Notice that the gap cannot be filled by means of such phrases as "to comply with the request"; this phrase, just as "to follow someone's advice" or "to obey someone's order", indicates a positive behavioral response, not a positive linguistic response.

20. Similar to requests are orders and commands. According to the traditional accounts they mainly differ from requests in that they require authority on the part of the speaker over the hearer. As far as the set of descriptive linguistic action verbals is concerned, the responses to both types of acts show an identical pattern. Consider (C6).
(C6) The act performed by Ha is an act of ordering such as
"Come here, Michael!"

Acts (A15) and (A16) are possible responses of the (A1)-(C6) and the
(A2)-(C6) types, respectively.

(A15) O.K.
(A16) No, I won't

(A16) could be described by means of the verb TO REFUSE, Dutch WEIGEREN.
Once more, an adequate linguistic action verbal does not present itself
for the positive reply (A15).

21. At least two more types of directives deserve our attention: permis­
missions and prohibitions.

(C7) The act performed by Ha is an act of giving permission such as
"You can go home now"
(C8) The act performed by Ha is an act of prohibiting such as
"You mustn't leave this early"

(A17) is an appropriate positive response to the permission; (A18) is
a possible negative one.

(A17) Thank you
(A18) I'm not going now

The prohibition can be replied to positively as in (A19) and negatively
as in (A20).
(A19) Fine with me

(A20) I'll do it anyway

(A17) is simply an act of thanking for the description of which we have the verb TO THANK, Dutch(BE)DANKEN, available. As a result, (D12) is an adequate account of (A17).

(D12) Sa thanked Ha (for the permission to go home)

But for (A18) through (A20) no descriptive verbials seem to be available.

22. SDC-Table 2 summarizes the verbials available for the description of positive and negative responses to a number of directive speech acts. How can we explain the gaps? How can we explain the fact that some response types were 'forgotten' in the lexicalization process? I believe that a vague principle of harmony of interaction can show us why some responses to particular types of directives are cognitively less salient and, therefore, do not need to be lexicalized.

Acts of inviting, suggesting and even insisting leave the hearer completely free to do as he chooses. These acts clearly indicate the speaker's preference with respect to the hearer's actions. But no matter what course of action the hearer takes there is nothing disharmonious about the interaction. Therefore, both positive and negative responses can be expected with equal probability. As a result, both options got lexicalized.

The same reasoning applies to advising when its representative aspect is focused upon. But what happens if its directive component is envisaged? It seems to me that advising may be stronger as a directive than insist-
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<tr>
<td>akkoord gaan</td>
<td>(A1)-(C2)</td>
<td>to agree</td>
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<tr>
<td>afwijzen</td>
<td>(A2)-(C1)</td>
<td>to disagree</td>
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<td>toegeven</td>
<td>(A1)-(C2)</td>
<td>to give in</td>
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<tr>
<td>weigeren</td>
<td>(A2)-(C2)</td>
<td>to refuse</td>
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**SDC-Table 2**

...ing because it implies some kind of authority (the kind that we called 'knowledge authority' in the previous chapter). It is assumed that the speaker giving the advice knows what the best course of action is.
As a result, the hearer is expected to respond positively and not to disregard the advice. Since harmony of interaction can only be obtained if the response is positive, the positive response itself is taken for granted to such an extent that it loses its cognitive salience. This explains the absence of a verbal to describe (A8). On the other hand, the negative response is cognitively salient because it disrupts the harmony of interaction.

Completely analogous accounts can be given for the gaps in connection with requests and orders. Complying with a request and obeying an order are the harmonious reactions expected. In the case of orders the expectation results from the 'power authority' involved. Requests are quite compelling in spite of the absence of such authority.

What about permissions and prohibitions? Why are the negative responses to these types of acts not lexicalized, though they no doubt disrupt interactional harmony? A possible explanation is that in the case of prohibitions negative responses are not only unexpected and disruptive but also rare because of the high degree of authority involved: a speaker who prohibits something is often in a position to actively prevent the hearer from doing what he prohibits him to do (whereas in the case of an order such active intervention is usually harder since it is much more difficult to make somebody do something than to prevent him from doing it). On the other hand, permissions imply that the hearer wants to do what he is allowed to do; therefore, negative responses to permissions are rare as well. The scarcity of negative responses to acts of permitting and prohibiting deprives them of the cognitive salience which they gained
by being disruptive. Therefore, they are 'forgotten' in the lexicalization process.

A final question has to be answered. How is it that there is a verbal to describe the positive response to acts of permitting, even though that response is certainly the expected and harmonious one? Since permissions imply that the hearer wants to do what he is allowed to do, and since the speaker has authority over the hearer with respect to the act in question, the positive response is, not surprisingly, an expression of gratitude. And since expressions of gratitude also occur in other contexts and are generally called acts of thanking, it is only logical that the same name is given to the expression of gratitude following a permission. (It is quite possible that in an imaginary language in which gratitude would only be expressed after obtaining a permission, there would be no word equivalent to TO THANK.)

D. FIXED ROUTINE RESPONSES

23. The responses studied in the previous section could be either positive or negative. There are also routine responses of a fixed formulaic nature which lack the positive-negative option. Some of these are easy to describe in English and in Dutch. Consider the response act (A1) uttered in the contexts specified by (C1) through (C3).

(A1) Thank you

(C1) The act performed by Ha is an act of congratulating such as "Congratulations on your birthday"
(C2) The act performed by Ha is an act of condoling such as 
"I'm terribly sorry that your father died"

(C3) The act performed by Ha is an act of welcoming such as 
"Welcome home"

In all of these contexts (A1) can be described by means of TO THANK, 
Dutch (BE)DANKEN, as in (D1).

(D1) Sa thanked Ha

Sa expresses his gratitude for Ha's kind attitude towards him. Hence 
(A1), in response to acts of congratulating, condoling and welcoming, 
is not an obscure or empty routine. Its conversational meaning coincides 
with the lexical meaning of the words used.

24. A bit more complicated are the responses to greetings. In the context 
specified by (C4), several replies are possible, some of which are listed 
as (A2) to (A4).

(C4) The act performed by Ha is an act of greeting such as 
"How are you ?"

(A2) Very well, thank you
(A3) Fine. How are YOU ?
(A4) Very well, thank you. And you ?

Though in (A2) the same formula, "thank you", is used as in (A1), and 
though (A2) could be said to express appreciation (if not gratitude) 
for Ha's interest in Sa or for his polite display of recognition (which 
is probably the essence of every greeting), (A2) can hardly be described 
as an act of thanking. Nor do we have any other linguistic action verbal
at our disposal to describe the reponse act. Acts (A3) and (A4) are return greetings, describable by means of TO GREET, Dutch (BE)GROETEN.

25. Finally, there are a number of fixed routine responses for which no descriptive verbials exist at all. First, consider (A5) through (A9), uttered when (C5) obtains.

(C5) The act performed by Ha is an act of apologizing such as "I am sorry for being so rude to you"

(A5) No harm done
(A6) Never mind
(A7) That's quite all right
(A8) Please don't worry
(A9) Forget it

For none of these acts do we have descriptive verbials.

Second, consider (A10) through (A14) uttered in a context in which (C6) obtains.

(C6) The act performed by Ha is an act of thanking such as "Thank you very much"

(A10) You're welcome
(A11) That's quite all right
(A12) Not at all
(A13) Forget it
(A14) Don't mention it

Again, no descriptive verbials seem to be available in English and in
Dutch. Just as "thank you" as a response to a certain type of greeting, "you're welcome" as a response to an act of thanking is a forgotten routine, though TO THANK and TO WELCOME are linguistic action verbials. The reason is that the conversational meaning of the formulas does not coincide with the lexical meaning of the words used. Similarly, in many languages there are fixed routine responses to acts of thanking which include an equivalent of the verbs TO PRAY, TO BEG, TO ASK: German BITTE, French JE VOUS EN PRIE, Italian PREGO, Hungarian KÉREM (BITTEN, PRIER and PREGARE mean 'to pray, to beg, to ask; KÉRNI means 'to ask (for something)'). Yet these acts would never be described as acts of praying, begging or asking.

Notice that (A7) is identical with (A11) and that (A9) is identical with (A13). This is possible by virtue of the fact that both apologizing and thanking express the speaker's feeling that he owes something to the hearer.

26. The material presented in this section is visualized in SDC-Table 3 which is, so to speak, filled with gaps. The acts surveyed are all responses to expressive speech acts. The high proportion of lexical gaps should not surprise us given the fixed, formulaic nature of these acts. The automaticity involved in their performance is extremely high, and therefore their cognitive salience can be expected to be low. It is only when the routine responses are not made with the expected accuracy and speed (as in the speech of a foreigner) that they come to mind.

The presence of a verb, TO THANK, to describe responses to acts of congratulating, condoling and welcoming is due to their formal and semantic
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<td>(be)danken</td>
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<td>to thank</td>
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<td>(be)groeten</td>
<td>(A4)-(C4)</td>
<td>to greet</td>
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**SDC-Table 3**

similarity to independent (i.e. non-response) expressions of gratitude.

Responses to greetings are no less automatic than replies to apologies and thanks. But they can often be described by means of TO GREET because of the frequent reciprocity of acts of greeting.
In the previous section it was suggested that the normal, expected, harmonious responses to speech acts are cognitively less salient and are, therefore, likely to escape lexicalization. This hypothesis may explain the many gaps in the area covered by this section. The routine responses under investigation, lacking the positive-negative option, are so compelling that they form part of a strong expectation pattern of harmonious interaction. One could almost say that acts of apologizing, thanking, and the like are not complete unless an appropriate routine response follows. The responses are part of the act and hence, as separate speech acts, they tend to escape our attention.

E. CONCLUSIONS

27. This chapter is certainly not a complete overview of the gaps in the lexical frame associated with linguistic action. Its purpose was to draw the attention to certain types of acts which, because of their routine character, are easily overlooked and which, therefore, require special study.

The complete parallelism between Dutch and English, which will be hard to find in other areas of linguistic action, shows that language, in particular the lexicon, does not even make forgetting into a totally whimsical activity. Such adherence to a kind of cross-linguistic systematicity lends our hypothetical explanations some strength. This is not to say that there is any universality to the findings of the extremely limited investigation presented. However, the apparent strength of the lexicalization principles involved, reflected in the complete parallelism
between English and Dutch, makes the search for universals in this domain of the linguistic action verbials particularly tempting and compelling.

28. All the hypothetical explanations presented for the phenomena under investigation boil down to one basic principle: the gaps in the lexical frame associated with linguistic action are due to the low cognitive salience of the corresponding acts. This principle, if it is correct, proves that there is a relationship between the lexicon, or the lexicalization process, and habits of conceptualization. Hence, this chapter confirms our belief that studying and comparing the verbials available in different natural languages for the description of linguistic action may yield insights into people's language-specific and culture-specific conceptualization and experience of linguistic behavior and, therefore, into the nature of linguistic behavior itself.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Not a single portion of this essay can be regarded as conclusive. The comparative lexical approach advocated in the first chapter is a line of research which will require investigations on a large scale before its feasibility and fruitfulness can be shown to be beyond doubt. Even the methodology proposed in the second chapter is merely tentative and will have to be refined. The remainder of this essay is no more than a bunch of pilot studies. But I believe that they already hint at the feasibility and fruitfulness of a comparative lexical approach to linguistic action. Its comparative aspect has remained extremely limited: there was only a comparison between two closely related languages. Yet we have reached a number of more or less important insights. Silence was shown to be an integral part of linguistic interaction; we learnt about the nature of truth and the ways in which it can be deviated from; the verbials of directing have helped us to understand the directive function of language better; and even the absence of lexical items to describe certain types of routine utterances has turned out to be revealing in several ways (for instance, by laying bare the reasons why the members of the traditional class of expressive speech acts can be regarded as different
from representative expressions of emotions or attitudes.

To make another comparison, the approach is like a psychoanalysis of language: put language on a sofa and let it talk to get its unconscious out into the open. A belief in the sensibility of the same kind of approach underlies the work on metaphor by Lakoff and Johnson (1979): metaphorical lexicalizations are taken as evidence for conceptualization habits.

Most detailed linguistic investigations display some tediousness. Therefore I hope the monotonous nature of this essay can be forgiven. My sincerest wish is that, however closely form and content may be related, the stylistic impediments have not made the reader stumble over the meaning I was trying to convey.
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