Nonprofits in Production: Race, Place, and the Politics of Care

By

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In the contemporary United States, nonprofits serve as central conduits of urban reform and welfare provision including legal, health and job assistance for racialized neighborhoods. Despite the salience of nonprofit organizations in urban politics, few academic analyses investigate their crucial political work. My work critiques normative academic and popular understandings of nonprofit organizations as ahistorical and nonpolitical service providers fundamentally delinked from the state. In contrast, my dissertation examines how nonprofits operated as a critical technology that intensified the state’s relationship to urban racialized communities in the mid 20th century. Based on over two years of ethnographic fieldwork in the Fruitvale district of Oakland, CA and archival research in four different sites, I argue that nonprofit organizations are a powerful vehicle in the remaking of contemporary racial subjectivities and citizenship. As critical community-routed organizations, they negotiate how urban racial subjects relate to the state and social movements.

This project probes the material and political consequences of discourses of benevolence in state, nonprofit, and social movement projects. By focusing on projects professing compassion, I unsettle dominant academic frameworks that overwhelmingly focus on two problematics regarding race making: 1) the state as a monolithic entity monopolizing all modes of power; and 2) the attribution of intentional violence to projects of race making. I advance the “politics of care” as an analytic for understanding contentious projects of urban improvement normalized as benevolent acts of kindness. Academic debates typically construct welfare as the privileged site of state projects. In contrast, my conceptualization of the “politics of care” attends to the role of the state and the work of non-state actors such as nonprofit health clinics, legal-aid centers, and community development corporations. Far more than mere service providers, nonprofits enact diverse techniques of government that target specific racial identities and populations.

My findings reveal that nonprofit organizations are a productive site of power in contemporary urban racialized communities like Fruitvale. Nonprofits engaged in multiple sites/acts of production that have spatial, demographic, as well as political effects. First, they build extensive patronage networks that cohere Fruitvale residents as a united Latino “community” despite the existence of diverse and often competing factions along class and nationality. By producing this community as a target of projects of improvement and care, nonprofits also link Fruitvale with
fiscal patrons outside the geographical confines of the neighborhood. Second, they market the neighborhood as Latino and produce representations of Latinidad that are architecturally and aesthetically visible in the urban form. Third, nonprofit-mediated projects demarcate Latinos from other racial groups and politicize the neighborhood as a haven for immigrant rights and in so doing link residents with constricted citizenship to alternative avenues of belonging. My study fills an important gap in the social movement literature by demonstrating the diversity of 1960s Chicano mobilizations, how they related to African American movements, Asian American experiences, and how this translated into contemporary political formations. Furthermore, my dissertation troubles academic and popular conceptions of Oakland as a Black/White city. This move remaps Latino Studies scholarship into less traditional areas of inquiry outside the metropoles of Los Angeles and Chicago.
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I am the first of my family to attend and graduate from a four-year university. I am also the first to complete a graduate program. I thank my family for understanding and valuing the difficult
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Introduction
Nonprofits in Production: Race, Place and the Politics of Care

On a busy and uncharacteristically sunny January morning in 2007 in the Fruitvale district of Oakland, California, I watched as a boisterous and excited group of residents filled the gym of the local high school. My voice competed with the mariachi music playing in the background as I helped guide the crowd to colorfully decorated tables. Attendees wore their best clothing and represented the neighborhood’s diversity in terms of nationality, class, immigration status, and length of residency. Children played between tables as families greeted one another while youth prepared for their Mexican folkloric dance performance. This joyous crowd gathered to celebrate the successful election of Ron Dellums, an African American mayoral candidate with a strong history of social justice work. Attendees transformed a high school gym into a colorful exhilarating hall filled with Mexican papel-picado banners, Spanish-speaking music playing in the background, and a banquet of different Mexican dishes. Though Fruitvale is a pan-ethnic Latino neighborhood comprised of different nationalities including migrants from Guatemala and El Salvador, and African American residents, it has a history of being a predominantly Mexican American neighborhood. Therefore it was not surprising that the music, entertainment, and food at the event all signaled the powerful role of Mexicanidad or Mexican-ness in shaping this neighborhood. This aesthetic even permeated the soft red, orange, and yellow color palate and contemporary mission-style architecture of the school aptly named the César Chavez Learning Center.

Despite the seeming chaos of the room, residents were assembled in a specific order: by the various nonprofit and political action groups they represented. One group clustered around Centro Legal de la Raza, a neighborhood legal clinic. Another group assembled under the banner for Clinica de la Raza, a federally qualified neighborhood health center. I was among a group of 30 members who rallied behind Bienestar Project, a health center primarily serving day laborers. The attendees, most of whom were undocumented migrants and therefore ineligible to vote, had not been personally invested in electing Mayor Dellums. Nor were they exceptionally vocal at

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1 In this dissertation I use Latino as a pan-ethnic term to draw attention to the racialized experiences of this group. I also use Mexican American, Spanish-speaking, and Chicano/a interchangeably as terms used to describe people of Mexican descent either by the neighborhood residents themselves or by outsiders. These terms are contextual and used differently by different people and also vary by historical times. Therefore, I respect the integrity of how individuals and groups chose to describe themselves in archival sources, interviews, and in their day-to-day lives. Of all the categories, Chicana/o is by far the more politicized term more closely related to the 1960s social movement activism, and linked with broad race-based mobilizations throughout the entire U.S. Southwest. I also employ Mexican and Guatemalan following transnational migrants’ own situated practices of differentiating themselves by nationality. In addition, I utilize language specific identities such as Mam-speaking and Quiche-speaking to differentiate between indigenous and non-indigenous migrants.

2 The term “nonprofit” has a broad and heterogeneous definition and is often used to refer to a non-state organization. According to Roelofs (2003) nonprofits belong to what is termed as the “third sector,” “voluntary sector,” “independent sector,” and “civil society.” As she defines it, these various terms identify “most organizations outside of business, government, and the family: churches, social welfare agencies, trade associations, sports and arts clubs, character-building groups such as the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, private schools and universities, cultural institutions, advocacy groups, political movements and parties, research institutes, charities, hospitals, unions, foundations, and others” (2003:13). This dissertation focuses on 501 (c) 3 race-based organizations that are designated as “tax-exempt” organizations by the IRS. Furthermore, this dissertation focuses on nonprofit organizations created by Latino leaders and whose primarily target population is Latino.
the event by giving speeches or making demands from the new mayor. Instead, they rendered themselves visible by the sheer numbers they comprised in the overcrowded gym. They proudly united behind large-size banners of their neighborhood nonprofit organizations, an image that profoundly demonstrated the rich patron-client relationships these agencies built with residents. Furthermore, this arrangement revealed how these organizations served as guardians of the neighborhood and its residents. This was especially true for the undocumented residents who would otherwise avoid highly publicized gatherings filled with state officials and police due to fear of contact with authorities.

Though these nonprofit organizations can be easily characterized as mere service-provision agencies, the event revealed the powerful role they play in animating neighborhood politics. This connection between nonprofit organizations and politics is surprising given that 501(c)3 tax-exempt organizations are forbidden by a strict federal mandate from engaging in formal electoral politics. Yet, the fact that these organizations mobilized mainly undocumented migrants and linked them with a state electoral processes exclusively for citizens, reveals how these agencies are ripe with politics. These agencies brokered proximity between elected officials and residents and reified their role in representing the neighborhood. These nonprofit organizations have historically marshaled their commitment to the care and wellbeing of neighborhood residents and asserted themselves as efficient and powerful stewards of the Fruitvale district. In so doing, they have set in place a complex network of power relations that challenge state claims to absolute authority.

This moment raises one of the central questions that animates this dissertation: How can we understand the range of seeming paradoxes through which nonprofits in this neighborhood operate, such as their cooperative and contrary relationship to the state, and their practices of visibility and discretion? And why are these organizations so dynamically connected with different state agencies and social movement mandates that cohere around community care? To answer these questions, I critically analyze the historical emergence of four Latino nonprofit organizations in Fruitvale: the Unity Council, a community development corporation; Centro Legal de la Raza, a neighborhood legal center; Clinica de la Raza, a federally qualified health center; and Bienestar Project, a community resource center and health clinic for day laborers. As this dissertation shows, this entanglement of actors and agencies engineered projects that shaped this neighborhood as Latino. The race-based 501(c)3 nonprofit organizations that I follow emerged out of an important historical engagement between different 1960s social movements and the expansion of state regulatory and welfare agencies into racialized neighborhoods. The result is that in Fruitvale, nonprofits have served as central conduits of urban reform and welfare provision including legal, health and job assistance for neighborhood residents.

This dissertation critically analyzes the historical development of Fruitvale’s Latino nonprofit sector to show the power-laden process through which these organizations enact different forms of production. As the title of the dissertation suggests, I critically examine two facets of production: 1) the historical processes through which nonprofits are produced, and 2) the vital role these agencies perform in the production of space, race, and politics. As I argue, nonprofits engaged in multiple sites/acts of production that have spatial, demographic, as well as political effects. First, they build extensive patronage networks that cohere Fruitvale residents as a united Latino “community” despite the existence of diverse and often competing factions.
along class and nationality. By producing this community as a target of projects of improvement and care, nonprofits also link Fruitvale with fiscal patrons outside the geographical confines of the neighborhood. Second, they market the neighborhood as Latino and produce representations of Latinidad that are architecturally and aesthetically visible in the urban form. Nonprofit organizations, for example, helped to build the César Chavez Learning Center which held Mayor Dellums’ welcoming reception. Third, nonprofit-mediated projects demarcate Latinos from other racial groups and politicize the neighborhood as a haven for immigrant rights and in so doing link residents with constricted citizenship to alternative avenues of belonging. Nonprofit organizations are thus a productive site of power in contemporary urban racialized communities like Fruitvale.

Nonprofit productive powers are clearly visible in how Fruitvale fashions itself as a Latino district vis-à-vis other Oakland neighborhoods. Fruitvale is situated in Oakland’s flatlands, located between San Antonio’s Chinatown, East Oakland, and the more affluent communities like the Oakland Hills. In 2000, Latinos represented approximately 49% of Fruitvale’s population; Asians 19%; African Americans 20%; and Whites 8%. Though the district does have the highest concentration of Latinos in Oakland, it also actively markets itself as Latino. This is visible through its built environment: from the colorful signs that mark community parks and transportation systems, to the small grocery stores and panaderías that dot its commercial avenues. These representations of a Latino aesthetic appear quite natural given neighborhood demographics. However, this physical environment—the murals on the walls and the colorful signage—were all produced primarily through nonprofit-mediated mobilizations. Even the district’s most prized architectural site—the Fruitvale Transit Village complex which consists of a subway station, shopping plaza, and state of the art apartments—was built by the Unity Council, a nonprofit, community development corporation (see chapter 3). As Henri Lefebvre argues, space is socially produced and is a constitutive factor in relations of power. For Lefebvre, space is produced to secure or enhance a mode of power embodied by the wills and demands of capital (and by extension of the state), and ultimately to generate profit (Lefebvre 1991). I critically analyze how nonprofit organizations, as non-state agencies federally recognized as tax-exempt and therefore prohibited from creating profit, ironically engender multiple productions of space that are also fundamentally racialized. Race, argues anthropologist Jaqueline Nassey Brown, is not autonomous but mediated by other forms of power—including place (2005).

This study centers upon the development and projects of four race-based nonprofit organizations seeking to understand specific historical practices and uncover a larger political and economic shift from a welfare state period to a more recent era of neoliberalism. In the homogenizing impulse of “community” and the way this implied unison actually enacted forms of violence against women and sexual minorities (Anzaldúa 1999[1987]; Lorde 2007[1984]). I thank the participants of the Rethinking Social Movement and Intersectionality Working Group at UCLA on April 12th 2013 for the important reminder of this earlier critique of the fetishized “community” in both academic literature and social movement practices.

My analysis of nonprofit patronage networks and their relationship to state and philanthropic institutions is highly influenced by anthropologist Janet Roitman’s (2005) analysis of economic practices in the Chad Basin of Africa. Contrary to depictions of the African state as “weak” or “failed,” Roitman demonstrates how the state in Africa manages to reconstitute its authority through networks developed in the interstices of the state system. She finds that while underground economic activities challenge state authority, they do not necessarily undermine state power. In a similar fashion nonprofit patronage networks with state institutions and philanthropic organizations serve to challenge claims to exclusive state authority. These nonprofit mediated patronage networks, however, do not delimit state power.
United States, this transition coincided with a changing configuration of race and anti-racist movements. It signified an epochal transformation from a 1950s and 1960s Civil Rights period driven by explicit mobilization around racial inequality to a current period of “post-racial” neoliberal multiculturalism in which racial inequality continues yet claims against racism are more difficult to make (Bonilla-Silva 2003; Ferguson 2012; Melamed 2006, 2011). In this transition from the 1960s to the today, nonprofits played a pivotal role in reshaping urban governance. Nonprofit projects targeted racial subjects often overlooked by state agencies. They also mediated state responses to 1960s social movement mobilizations by incorporating grassroots leaders into institutionalized nonprofit agencies. Nonprofit organizations thus have a complex relationship to various state agencies, and are in fact constituted by the state: through their recognition as tax-exempt organizations. This relationship to the state, and the shifting national terrain around race, constricts nonprofit organizations’ political possibilities because they must eschew overly political action to retain nonprofit status. In a “post-racial” neoliberal era, many nonprofits explicitly skirt claims against racism in their organizing. Instead, they are encouraged to channel their concerns through “safer” and “race-neutral” forms of lobbying and community development projects.

The interconnection between different scales of state institutions and nonprofit organizations was prominently featured in Fruitvale’s welcoming of Mayor Dellums. At the event, nonprofit and community leaders shook hands and shared a meal with various state officials, some of whom were long-term friends. These friendly and often intimate relationships challenge scholarly tendencies to draw a firm division between “civil society” nonprofit organizations and state representatives and agencies. Centro Legal de la Raza and other nonprofit organizations had in fact planned the mayor’s welcome reception in partnership with city councilman Ignacio de la Fuente, who at the time represented Oakland’s 5th district which includes Fruitvale. Even before his election as Mayor, Dellums was a long-term supporter of Oakland organizations. He had often worked with Fruitvale-based nonprofits during his thirteen-term tenure as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Northern California’s 9th Congressional District. He had also consulted with community leaders at various stages of his campaign. Mayor Dellums’ election, and his visit to Fruitvale, was already routed through existing patronage networks that pivoted on the central role nonprofit organizations have historically played in politically representing this neighborhood.

Dellums’ illustrious political career also puts forth the multiple scales of state power that operate within Fruitvale. As a Bay Area native, Dellums’ campaign positively marketed his ability to leverage federal patrons to help channel much-needed resources and administrative expertise to Oakland. Critics of Dellums’ campaign equally questioned his association with federal agencies, claiming that his expertise and allegiance was in Washington, and not in Oakland. As this dissertation and Fruitvale’s welcoming of Mayor Dellums reveal, the federal government, local state agencies, and municipal bureaucracies exert competing claims to power in this neighborhood which must contend with nonprofit organizations that broker these relationships.

Rethinking State Centrism in Racial Formations

*Nonprofits in Production* argues that nonprofit organizations are a powerful vehicle in the remaking of contemporary racial subjectivities and citizenship. Furthermore, I demonstrate that

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5 See Ferguson and Gupta (2002) for an elaboration on this scholarly tendency to differentiate between the state that sits above and therefore is mutually exclusive from a “grounded” civil society.
racialization fundamentally relies on transformations of the built environment. This argument counters the prevailing trend in race and ethnicity literature that centers on the state as the sole player in racial formations. Most analyses of racial formation focus on broad macro-historical institutional analyses devoid of ethnographic or historical specificity.

Omi and Winant’s (1994) seminal work, *Racial Formation in the United States*, argues that race is constructed in the process of clash and compromise between racial movements and the racial state. For Omi and Winant, the state is the preeminent site for racial contestation and “composed of institutions, the policies they carry out, the conditions and rules which support and justify them, and the social relations in which they are imbedded” (83, emphasis original). Following a Weberian bureaucratic analysis, they uncover how the racial order is equilibrated by the state—encoded in law, organized through policy-making, and enforced by a repressive apparatus (84).

This state-centric institutional analysis of racial formation has led to broad macro-interpretations of processes of racial categorization. Less appreciated has been the role of space and spatiality in this process. Moreover, such a framework has not paid adequate attention to how the state itself is spatialized. Thus without specificity of how the state operates and through which actors it works, the state remains a monolith and perhaps even a highly effective mechanism of power. This process creates what anthropologist Ana Maria Alonso coins as a “misplaced concreteness” of the state, which ultimately “conceals the workings of relations of rule and forms of discipline in everyday life” (Alonso 1994: 380-382).

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6 I thank sociologist Cristina Mora for her clear elaboration of alternative actors in processes of racial formations. See Mora (2011) for a cogent elaboration of this critique.


8 Philosopher Linda Alcoff (2006) refers to this type of analysis as an objectivist approach “that define race by invoking metanarratives of historical experience, cultural traditions, or processes of colonization are not attentive to microinteractions in which racialization operates, is reproduced, and is sometimes resignified” (183). Against the totalizing imperative that she critiques of objectivists studies, she contends that subjectivist approaches begin with the lived experience of racialization, which for Alcoff, “can reveal how race is constitutive of bodily experience, subjectivity, judgment and epistemic relationships” (183). Thus, whereas objectivist accounts are concerned with how racial positioning materializes in different forms of inequalities, subjectivist approaches argue that racialized identities affect ones experience of selfhood as well. As an ethnographer, I am completely invested in understanding how racialization is experienced, how it is lived, yet how such an experience operates within broader structural and cultural domains. For this reason, I consider how the subjectivist and objectivist approaches together can offer a more nuanced and complex rendering of racial formations.

9 I draw on the concept of the spatialization of the state from Ferguson and Gupta (2002) who argue that the state is often conceived through two principle geographic concepts: vertically (or the idea that the state is “above” society) and encompassment (or the idea that the state “encompasses” its localities). They argue that these ideas are maintained through routine bureaucratic practices which are spatial in nature. Their idea of spatialization of the state relates to an analysis of state practices that operate by setting forth certain forms of spatial practices (see also Mitchell 1991; Scott 1998).

10 For an analogous analysis of state power see also Ferguson and Gupta (2002).
State centrism in racial formations scholarship has obscured other sites of power in race formation and has rendered invisible the subjective process of race-making. In affirming the role of the state as operating within a particular racial logic centered on the disempowerment and general oppression of racial subjects, the literature has also fundamentally tethered race formation with violence—and in the production of zones of abjection spatialized as the urban ghetto or immigrant enclave. At best seen as a theaters of violence, these spaces and the racialized subjects that inhabit them have been stripped of agency and politics (see Gregory 1998; Kelley 1994).

Despite the reality of poverty and crime in Oakland and the different forms of violence that shape so much of urban experiences, in Fruitvale I was surrounded by a diverse constellation of people and agencies that genuinely cared for the wellbeing of the community and its residents.\(^{11}\) Throughout my fieldwork, I was able to see how care enveloped the work of a number of different actors including nonprofit workers, state public health nurses, and immigration attorneys. Nonprofit leaders also described many Fruitvale redevelopment plans as fundamentally about caring for the neighborhood and its future. This act of care was so profoundly present that it was productive of different forms of social relations, urban improvement plans, and shaped process of racial formations.

Instead of understanding racial formation as relying on intentional state violence of racism, I locate other actors at play and center projects of professed benevolence. State and nonprofit mediated projects of benevolence shaped the political possibilities of the neighborhood and Latino politics in Oakland. As this dissertation reveals, projects of benevolence can ultimately have violent effects (with or without intentionality).\(^{12}\) The expansion of state welfare programs for racialized communities, for example, served to construct an imaginary of deficient Black subjects (see chapter 2). Within these constructions, Latino racial identity coupled with the expansion of a nonprofit care network centered in Fruitvale, rendered Latinos as “safer” and even more deserving than African Americans.\(^{13}\) This shift to a state-mandated politics of benevolence and access to opportunities stifled critiques of racism and discrimination so central to the mobilizing strategies of 1960s social movements.\(^{14}\) This had spatial effects, and translated

\(^{11}\) The January 1 2009 killing of Oscar Grant III by BART police officer Johannes Mehserle is perhaps one of the most recent highly publicized reminders of the forms of violence that shape urban experiences in Oakland. This is specially the case for African American and Latino youth who are most often the targets of police violence and racial profiling.

\(^{12}\) Native American scholars have elaborated some of the most productive understandings of U.S. state sponsored projects of benevolence. These studies have analyzed the assimilation period in American Indian history, between 1879-1934. This period saw a dramatic shift in the federal government’s treatment of indigenous people, mainly in ending formal strategies of warfare and instituting more intimate and domestic forms of control. As Native American scholar Beth Piatote argues “Indians as a population were no longer targeted for extinction…Indian economies, lands, kinship systems, languages, and family relations—in short, all that constituted the Indian home—became the primarily site of struggle” (2013: 2). As Piatote brilliantly demonstrates, these policies stemmed from claims of professed benevolence that had violent and cathartic impacts on indigenous communities and cultures.

\(^{13}\) In Latino Spin, Arlene Dávila explores the production and circulation of what she calls more “marketable” representations of U.S. Latinos. She contends that such marketable portrayals of Latinos help to consolidate polarities between Latinos and other minorities—most specifically with Blacks, who are the unnamed reference against which these representations are made. Furthermore, by advancing and marketing these success stories, the U.S. media as well as the project of U.S. multiculturalism enables the formation of permissible forms of being Latino—further fragmenting Latinos along the lines of citizenship, race, and class (Davila 2008: 8).

\(^{14}\) As Melamed (2006) has shown, antiracism becomes a nationally recognized social value and gets absorbed into U.S. governmentality. For Melamed, this has global effects as “official antiracisms themselves deflect and limit awareness of the logics of exploitation and domination in global capitalism” (2).
to how Latino Fruitvale is understood in relationship to other Oakland neighborhoods. The fact that Fruitvale is such a stronghold of Latino nonprofit mediated mobilizations has served to construct it as a zone of economic possibilities, and Latino subjects as also equally more deserving, and hard working than other racialized subjects (see chapter 3). These processes enveloped by care and benevolence are clearly articulated through a “post-racial” neoliberal multicultural construction of US society. Projects of benevolence mediated through post-Civil Rights state reforms served to police race, reproducing forms of racism through further differentiation of racial groups, namely by leaving untouched the polarizing divisions between Blacks and Latinos.

This dissertation contends that understanding the role of nonprofit organizations in processes of racial formation is important to analyze the multiple forms of power not reducible to the state that produce the conditions of possibility of urban racialized neighborhoods. Furthermore, a focus on nonprofits allows me to locate the diverse forms of politics distinct from state-mediated electoral politics that constitute alternative modes of power (see Kelley 1994). As Stephen Gregory defines, politics “refers to a diverse range of social practices through which people negotiate power relations” (13). Using a Foucaultian conception of power, Gregory further argues that politics “describes a variable field of social practices, that, imbued with power, ‘act upon the possibilities of action’” (Ibid.) Viewed in this fashion, politics envelopes people’s daily actions, their modes of survival, and when and how they choose to act as a collective. As Robin Kelley argues: “Politics is not separate form lived experience or the imaginary world of what is possible; to the contrary, politics is about these things” (1994: 9).

In contrast to the state-centrism of the racial formations scholarship, each chapter of this dissertation is concerned with how nonprofits mediate processes of racial formation. I do not argue that state institutions or actors are absent from these acts of race-making. Instead I show how state actors, social movement leaders, and nonprofit activists worked together, though not without conflict. This site of collaboration and conflict between nonprofit leaders and state actors is productive of new kinds of political struggle, institutional formations, and bureaucratic pathways as well as roadblocks. Locating these intricate negotiations within racial formations underscores how contemporary nonprofit organizations are ripe with politics. As community based organizations defined by their work on the “local” terrain, nonprofits negotiate how urban racial subjects articulate with a multiplicity of different state agencies as well as publicly sponsored social services. As institutions committed to assuring wellbeing, they build intimate relationships with community residents. Through these pastoral forms of working with neighborhood residents, nonprofits play a foundational role of guiding and directing clients. In so doing, nonprofit organizations, similar to state agencies, enact diverse techniques of government that target specific racial identities and populations. From this perspective, the workings of nonprofit organizations in urban racialized neighborhoods has everything to do with politics.

Focused on four Latino nonprofit organizations, this dissertation also begins to chart a more comprehensive history of social movement mobilizations in Oakland. The Bay Area has been the incubator of many race-based movements including those led by Mexican Americans and Chicana/os. However, much of this history has been overshadowed by the scholarly focus on Oakland’s premier racial mobilization—the Black Panthers and the Black Power Movement (BPM). This dissertation critically analyzes how the BPM impacted Mexican American

15 Though I use Black Power as a unitary political entity, Black Power itself was not a single ideology or political strategy. As Laura Pulido (2006) argues: “the term included an array of ideologies, organizations, and personalities.
political mobilizations in Oakland and throughout the entire US Southwest. The main thrust of
the dissertation documents the consolidation of various grassroots Mexican American
organizations into the Mexican American Unity Council in the 1960s and how this organization
tactfully navigated the rise of the Black Power mobilizations. In the late 1960s and 1970s,
Fruitvale was also a site of one of the strongest support groups for the United Farm Workers
(UFW) under the leadership of Cesar Chavez. The UFW mode of organization that emphasized
peaceful collective action served as a central organizing force in stark opposition to the professed
radicalism and violence of the BPM. Through archival sources and interviews with social
movement leaders, I follow the rise of Clinica de la Raza and Centro Legal de la Raza, two
foundational nonprofit legal and health centers. In the final chapters, I locate my work with a
new nonprofit started in 2002, Bienestar Project, and how this organization is inducted into the
new immigrant rights movement. Each of these historical moments traces the development of
different kinds of nonprofit organizations and then how they interact with a changing Latino
population and the legacies and reality of Oakland as a racially bifurcated Black/White city.

This dissertation is guided by a dialogical relationship between the ethnographic present
and the historical past. While much of the literature of nonprofit organizations is emptied of
history and ethnographic context, I turn to historical and participant observer methods to reveal
the political traction that these agencies produced. The choice of this methodological approach
emerged organically and shaped my engagement both with the archives and my interactions with
neighborhood residents and nonprofit organizations.

My ethnographic practice was initially shaped by my political work with neighborhood
nonprofits. I did not intend to write a dissertation on the topic as I was simply invested in my
volunteer work with two of the agencies, Centro Legal de la Raza and Bienestar Project.
Through my engagement with these agencies I came to understand how the history of social
movement mobilizations of the past powerfully shaped the goals and aspirations of the nonprofit
organizations established in the 1960s. Furthermore, I understood how the nonprofit
organizations discursively channeled the past as a mandate for their work in the neighborhood.
These organizations marshaled their long-term work in this neighborhood and a past of social
movement mobilizations to make claims to their authority. I wanted to understand and
contextualize the importance of these agencies and why the past always factored into discussions
of the present. I turned to archival sources, relying on bits of nonprofit correspondence with state
officials, newspaper reports, nonprofit mission statements and projects, as well as city of
Oakland planning documents, and official reports. I also collected oral histories from 1960s and
1970s nonprofit and social movement actors, and was surprised at how little documentation there
was on these influential political actors. Not only was there a scarce community historical
memory of this work, but also a complete void of these accounts in Oakland’s historiography.
Instead, these memories were guarded and revered by a few movement activists that remained
active in many nonprofit mediated projects.

The historical void on both Mexican American institutions and social movement actors
was something that many activists wrestled with but was not surprising given the scholarly
tendencies of Bay Area academic studies. The study of race in Oakland, and the city’s
historiography in general, has been traditionally a Black/White endeavor (see Rhomberg 2004;
Self 2003). This Black/White racial narrative has been fused with Oakland’s geography—the
hills are predominantly White and affluent while the flatlands and downtown Black and poor

Inspired by Malcom X, Black Power symbolized a deep radicalization of African Americans' (and others') struggle
for equality with a focus on self determination and self-defense” (91; see also Self 2003: 217-255).
(Self 2003). The increasing presence of Latinos and Asians has begun to unsettle theses rigid geographies of race. In 1996 for example, the ample boulevard of East 14th Street which serves as a major arterial street through Fruitvale was renamed International Blvd. City of Oakland officials believed the new name best reflected the “international” feel along this busy thoroughfare. Traveling down International Blvd, for example, one passes through downtown Oakland and into Chinatown, then San Antonio’s Chinatown annex, and finally Fruitvale. The renaming of East 14th Street, however, reproduces the erasure of Latinos and Asians as historical actors in Oakland. Instead, it portrays non-Whites and non-Blacks as foreigners to the city. These groups, including Latinos, only become part of Oakland as members of a new cosmopolitan internationalism. This branding of Asians and Latinos as “international” erases their historical presence in Oakland and their political mobilizations of making claims to the city and its resources.

This conceptualization of Fruitvale as a Latino and therefore a barrio of “foreigners” serves to erroneously delink the neighborhood from other spaces. It also erroneously disconnects Fruitvale from Oakland’s rich history of racial political mobilizations. Labels of “ethnic/immigrant enclave” have for long operated to artificially sever Latino and other immigrant neighborhoods from “mainstream (non-immigrant) society.” As Franz Fanon (2004[1963]) argued, the compartmentalization of urban space into neighborhoods of poverty populated by ethnic/racial groups and regions of affluence linked with whiteness was not a natural occurrence. This artificial partitioning of space was actively produced by technologies of rule (see also Anzaldúa 1999[1987]). Most scholarly and popular conceptions of the “immigrant enclave” tend to evade analyses of power relationships in the production of spatial inequities. Instead, much of the focus on the reliance of ethnic solidity and ethnic enterprise that demarcates immigrant enclaves from non-immigrant “mainstream society.” Doreen Massey (1994) explains: “what gives place its specificity is not some long internalized history but the fact that it is constructed out of a particular constellation of social relations, meeting and weaving together at a particular locus” (154). In this dissertation, my central argument is that nonprofits play a foundational role in mediating processes of racial formations and that this constitutes mutations in space. By linking the Fruitvale district with processes of international migration, and translocal state bureaucracies and social movement activism, nonprofit projects reveal the porosity of places artificially and erroneously partitioned into isolated ethnic enclaves.

Central to my deployment of a racial formations framework is an understanding of the shifting meanings of Latinidad. These shifts reveal how residents and nonprofit actors deploy this racial/ethnic category in relationship to Oakland’s Black/White binary. The various chapters demonstrate how nonprofit mediated actions and social movement mobilizations help to contour how groups identify themselves as well as how the state positions them. Within the past 60 years, nonprofits as well as residents of the neighborhood tactfully identified by varying categories including: Spanish-speaking, Mexican American, Chicano/a and pan-ethnic terms such as Latino and Hispanic. Throughout these years there have also been diverse streams of Latino migrants. At first Fruitvale attracted longterm Mexican American residents from other Bay Area cities and

16 Ronald Takaki (1989) showed this for the example of the Japanese in mainland United States. He demonstrated that Japanese ethnic solidarity and the establishment of a highly profitable ethnic economy resulted primarily as a result of “ethnic antagonism.” As he argued: “Denied access to employment in the industrial trade labor market, many Issei entered entrepreneurial activity, turning to self-employment as shopkeepers and fathers”(180).

17 According to Portes and Jensen (1992: 930) an ethnic enclave refers to “a concentration of ethnic firms in physical space—generally a metropolitan area—that employ a significant proportion of workers from the same community.” See also Portes and Jensen 1987; Waldinger 1993; Wilson and Portes 1980.
neighboring farmlands, and continues to draw new migrants from Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador. In sum, these categories and my usage of Latino and Latinidad is not meant to homogenize all of the Fruitvale’s residents. In fact, there is no unitary Latino subject in this neighborhood. Instead there are internal differentiations that relate to Latino and Latina class and nationality differences, state practices of racial and ethnic categorizations, transnational migration circuits, and residents’ situated relationship to Blacks and Asians. I am guided by scholarship in geography, anthropology and ethnic studies that has long asserted that space matters in analyses of power and so do the micro-practices of subjects. As such, I am attentive to politicized mobilizations rooted in claims to place, and in the historical formations that produce specific social-spatial milieus.

**Entering Fruitvale, Mapping the Latino Nonprofit Sector**

While Oakland neighborhoods like West Oakland are commemorated as sites of racialized political mobilizations, people come to know Fruitvale primarily for its “authentic” Mexican food. The district is the home of many Mexican restaurants and a plethora of food trucks specializing in Mexican fast food. My first visit to the district in 2005 was to look for Latino ingredients and spices as well as tacos, pupusas, and tamales. My second encounter with Fruitvale was through a nonprofit organization. As a transplant from San Fernando Valley in Los Angeles, I was eager to find a Latino community similar to the one I grew up in. I quickly realized how Fruitvale was linked to other migrant spaces throughout the United States which is why it served as a reminder of home and offered a particular call to action. As a locus of transnational migration circuits, Fruitvale was also routed to historical networks of social movement activism throughout the Southwest. This is evidenced in Fruitvale’s high concentration of nonprofit organizations and the plethora of services available to residents. Despite Fruitvale’s absence from Oakland’s historiography of racial politics, Latino nonprofit organizations were a testament to the political mobilizations emanating from this neighborhood.

Upon beginning my doctoral program I contacted Centro Legal de la Raza to volunteer. At Centro, as everyone called it, I met a group of committed lawyers, longterm activists, and middle-class Chicanos all invested in providing free or affordable legal services for low-income mainly recently-arrived immigrants. Centro brought together people from different walks of life and each invested in channeling the concerns and demands of neighborhood residents. The organization as a whole served as a powerful reminder of the continued traction of 1960s social movement mobilizations in shaping this neighborhood and impacting nonprofit mediated projects. The legal center’s name tethered to the popular 1960s term “Raza” which roughly translates to “our race” or “the race” served as a reminder of monumental role that race played in 1960s social movement and continues to shape nonprofit projects.

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18 Scholars on Latinidad raise caution against adopting totalizing narratives to explain Latino/a experiences (De Genova and Ramos-Zayas 2003; Grosfoguel 2003; Oboler and Dzidzienyo 2005). Grosfoguel (2003) argues that too often, the term Latino “obscures the complex, heterogeneous, and contradictory relationships between and within so-called Latino groups” (144). As Hall ([1989]2005) argues, there is no essentialized subaltern subject nor a monolithic oppressor. By fixing notions of what it means to be Black or White, argues Hall, we are unable to truly appreciate how race intersects with other forms of oppression, namely, gender, sexuality, and class (see also Davila 2008: 8). Indeed, Chicana feminist critiques of the homogenizing impulse in the construction of a monolithic Latino/Chicano has rendered visible the gendered and sexual exclusions that such a discourse naturalized (Anzaldúa 1999[1987]; Lugones 2007; Perez 1999). This for Hall and Chicana feminists is an imperative project for it has serious ramifications in the way in which we conceptualize politics and the ability to conceive of social change.
The nonprofit sector that this dissertation focuses on is not a homogeneous unit. For instance, these organizations were established in different historical moments and therefore comprise distinct degrees of professionalization and bureaucratization. The degree of an agency’s institutionalization impacts the political concerns of the organizations. This agenda is shaped by funding mechanisms that depend on complex formulas that take into account the nature of service, target of service population, and their status as documented or undocumented. Centro Legal de la Raza belongs to the original group of nonprofits in Fruitvale. Alongside with the Unity Council and Clinica de la Raza, these are what I call the 1960s social movement derived organizations transformed into institutionalized agencies. In the present day, organizations like Unity Council and Clinica de la Raza rely heavily on public funding from various state agencies. The Unity Council, for example, receives sizable funding from the federal government to run Head Start programs while Clinica de la Raza bills state and federal healthcare programs for services rendered to its clients. Centro Legal de la Raza, however, relies primarily on private foundation funding as well as donations from law firms. As chapter 5 reveals, nonprofit funding streams impact the kind of population these agencies prioritize. Agencies that bill the federal government for services, such as Clinica de la Raza, for example, have a more difficult time serving undocumented clients that are disqualified from federal health provisions.

In stark contrast to these older and more institutionalized nonprofit organizations are new post 1990s start-up nonprofit agencies like Bienestar Project. By analyzing how these different generations of nonprofits related with each other I show the important relationship of reciprocity and interdependence between these different kinds of nonprofits. In Fruitvale, I saw how older institutionalized nonprofits actively worked to mentor and collaborate with newer less professionalized nonprofits. In a similar fashion, newer start-up nonprofits pressured institutionalized agencies and pushed them to think of the changing nature of Fruitvale’s population. This relates almost entirely on the fact that newer nonprofits engage with Fruitvale residents that are undocumented and more recently arrived and therefore with different needs than more established residents.

**Nonprofits and Urban Racialized Immigrant Communities**

The intricate and expansive work of nonprofit organizations in Fruitvale is not an isolated phenomenon. Throughout the United States, nonprofits serve as central conduits of urban reform and welfare provision including legal, health and job assistance for racialized neighborhoods (Cordero-Guzmán 2005; Marwell 2004, 2007; Wong 2006). A growing body of literature in the fields of sociology and political science documents the importance of nonprofit organizations in immigrant incorporation (Bloemraad 2006; de Graauw 2008, Hula and Jackson-Elmoore 2001; Hung 2007; Wong 2006). Other scholars have explored the powerful role nonprofit organizations play in protecting immigrant workers’ rights in the context of declining levels of unionization and an increasing levels of immigration (Gleeson 2009; Martin 2011; Valenzuela 2006).

The literature on nonprofit organizations is expansive and heterogenous but can be summarized as oscillating between two competing poles. One set of literature uncritically accepts the professed independence of the nonprofit sector from the state. This literature identifies nonprofit organizations as an autonomous “third sector” designed to meet the failures of the “state” and “market” (Salamon 1987a; Weisbrod 1977). Despite the nonprofit sector’s reliance on public funding, these scholars assert that it is an important site for alternative (and often idealized) models of governance outside a gridlocked state bureaucracy (Berger and
Neuhaus 1977; Butler 1980; Pines 1982; Piven and Cloward 1988; Salamon 1987b; Savas 1982). Other scholars such as Wolch (1990) accept the nonprofit sector’s complicated relationship to the state and even affirm its role as a “para-state apparatus” (4). However, Wolch similarly argues that these organizations are “administered outside of traditional democratic politics” (4). These diverse scholarly interpretations mirror popular understandings of nonprofit organizations. The progressive community in the Bay Area and Fruitvale residents, for example, commonly understand nonprofit work as “good” vis-à-vis an inefficient state bureaucracy or private businesses only concerned with profit.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, another set of literature has long critiqued claims of the nonprofit sector’s alleged independence from the state. This scholarship conceptualized the nonprofit sector as the prime example of the state’s co-optation of radical 1960s race-based mobilizations. For these authors, the extremely profitability of what they term the Nonprofit-Industrial Complex (NPIC) as a 1.3 trillion dollar industry and the 7th largest economy in the world is evidence of the co-optation of the social justice tenants of 1960s mobilizations (Allen 1969; Smith 2007). As Dylan Rodriguez (2007) argues, “the NPIC thus serves as the medium through which the state continues to exert a fundamental dominance over the political intercourse of the US Left, as well as US civil society more generally” (30). Wolch (1990) similarly cautioned against the “deepening state penetration” into everyday nonprofit activities which could “ultimately vitiate sectoral autonomy and capacity to pursue social change” (xvi). Roelofs (2003) raises similar scrutiny: “A closer look at the ‘third sector’ belies its frequent profession of neutral benevolence. Although all radical organizations are found within this sector, challengers to the system are rare and generally invisible. The third sector is largely devoted to activities that directly protect and promote capitalism” (21). In these analyses, the state (and by proxy the demands of capital) has the potential to “shackle” the nonprofit sector and stymie radical political mobilizations.

This dissertation is critical of both of these previous scholarly tendencies of analyzing nonprofit organizations. Firstly, this dissertation critiques normative academic and popular understandings of nonprofit organizations as ahistorical and nonpolitical service providers fundamentally delinked from the state (see Wolch 1990). Secondly, I critique the lack of attention to race in previous academic literature on nonprofit organizations. In contrast, I critically analyze how nonprofits operated as a technology that intensified the state’s relationship to urban racialized communities in the mid 20th century. I examine how state officials courted 1960s activists and crafted the architecture for Latino nonprofits that channeled urban activism from the streets into institutionalized organizations. The formation of Latino nonprofit organizations was a historical processes related to the expansion of state welfare agencies and bureaucracy and private foundations into racialized communities.

I argue that the critical nexus of state agencies and nonprofit organizations cannot be reducible to a coherent project of co-optation. The argument of state co-optation implies that the state operates as a totalizing entity reduced to a singular logic. The state is not a monolith: it is comprised of various offices, which are run by bureaucrats who hold different and often competing interests. The state is also comprised of different scales shaped by contentious differences in jurisdiction and power among municipal, state, and federal agencies. It is undeniable that the institutional and fiscal architecture of the nonprofit organization implies a relationship to various state agencies, including the IRS. The federal government, for example, sets out the parameters through which an organization can be recognized as a tax-exempt agency. Furthermore, as chapter 2 of the dissertation reveals, since 1969, federal recognition as a 501(c)3
requires that nonprofits not engage in formal political processes such as campaigning. In this dissertation, however, I explore the practice of these depoliticizing clauses, to reveal that they not always secure a practice of depoliticization. I underscore how nonprofit organizations engender multiple forms of political mobilizations that are at times contradictorily complicit and/or in opposition to state projects. Nonprofits strategically navigated state instituted bureaucratic and regulatory pathways and are not simply minions of the state. As Thomas Biolsi has astutely argued, “the state’s gaze, in other words, may be studiously non-panoptical, its sovereignty purposely not flat, full, or even across its territory but carefully zoned” (2005: 240).

The portrayal of the state as a co-optation machine also relies heavily on a narrow definition of 1960s activism. This homogenizing impulse has rendered 1960s activism as operating within a singular logic of radical (and often violent) mobilizations. I reveal the multiplicity and concurrent histories of activism that the 1960s period encapsulated, all of which were not reducible to the “radicalism” ascribed to that period. Understanding the relationship between different factions of the Mexican American activists and how they interacted with Black Power movements allows me to show the agency these social movement actors exerted and their strategic navigation of both state institutions and the reality of Black political power in Oakland. This strategic navigation of 1960s political mobilizations contributed to the differential racialization of Mexican Americans and African Americans. In other words, these activists were not dummies of state power but rather exerted their political agency within constricted parameters of action.19

Charting this longer genealogy of both state and 1960s social movement actors that shaped the formation of Latino nonprofits, allows me to reveal how the nonprofit organization continues to be a crucial site for racialized political action and state regulatory projects. I affirm again, state regulation does not mean anti-politics or co-option. Instead, I critically analyze how the nonprofit sector becomes a critical site constituted by the contentious articulations of different political projects. It is also the site where new political formations are created and re-imagined.

Few academic analyses investigate the crucial political formations that nonprofit organizations engender. Notable exceptions include the work of Janelle Wong (2006), Nicole M. Marwell (2007), and Els de Graauw (2008) that specifically analyze nonprofit role in electoral and other political processes within racialized communities. These works, however, reduce the political to electoral politics and do not assess nonprofit engagement with process of race-making or other modes of difference such as gender, sexuality, and immigration status. One of Janelle Wong’s most convincing arguments is that community-based organizations help to foster the “retention” of ethnic identity as a by-product of their larger political work (2006). Instead of viewing race and ethnicity as a by-product, I understand racialization as a constitutive to the political projects of race-based nonprofit organizations.

Neoliberal Devolution and the Politics of Care
The growth of the role of nonprofit organizations in urban spaces is closely related to the neoliberal devolution and privatization of public services (Wolch 1990). It is now well recognized among scholars of the state that one of the important federal policy shifts undertaken during the presidency of Ronald Reagan between 1981 and 1989 was the devolution of the

19 I analyze this relationship based on Moore’s conceptualization of agency. As Moore astutely argues: “the ‘subject’ implies both subjection to power and a subject of action. Agency, in this vision, is always already entangled in power relations, never outside or beyond them” (Moore 2005: 326, note 16).
spending of public funds and resources from the federal government to states, counties, and municipalities (Collins et al., 2008; Marwell 2004). This devolution was part of a larger neoliberal practice that accelerated the state’s retraction from New Deal and Great Society social services such as education, health, and support of the poor (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, 2003; Hackworth 2007; Harvey 2005; Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005). Studies of urban poverty influenced by Michel Foucault’s analytic of governmentality further argue that neoliberalism devolves the responsibility of the state to individual citizen-subjects by normatively constructing individuals as entrepreneurial actors in every sphere of life (Brown 2006; Ong 2003). Subjects are expected to self-care and to take responsibility for their own needs and ambitions (Rose 1999). A pivotal component of this trend in relationship to urbanization is the reconfiguration of the territory of government from the nation-state to the level of community and the reliance of non-state agencies to help construct productive and entrepreneurial subjects (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Ong 2003; Raco and Imrie 2000). Proponents of devolution couch the transfer of responsibility to local municipalities and non-state agencies in a language of empowerment that portrays these localized arenas as the best sites of productive and positive action (Raco 2003).

Scholars often refer to the effects of this state devolution as nonprofits taking on the role of the state, or what Jennifer Wolch (1990) refers to as the emergence of a shadow-state apparatus. As Donald Moore (2005) has aptly argued, too often Foucault based-studies on neoliberal devolution have relied on institutional analyses that give us little insight into the grounded practices of these projects. This has resulted in assertions of efficacy in the completion of projects, whereby institutional plans are translated into concrete reality. Furthermore, state institutions are always the central players in these studies that rely on analysis of state planning documents, statistical surveys, or studies on the effects of welfare agencies.

Instead of uncritically accepting this simple “transfer” of responsibility as an outright fact, this dissertation analyzes the mechanics and situated practices of neoliberal devolution. This analysis emerges out of a two-pronged critique of the literature on neoliberalism: 1) its romanticization and periodization of the welfare state as a racially egalitarian epoch in welfare practices and 2) the literature’s lack of specificity about how state regulatory practices and contract policies reassert its presence in areas where responsibility of welfare provision has been ostensibly “transferred” to nonprofits or other private agencies.

I raise these critiques because this literature rarely acknowledges that state welfare programs had at best a tenuous relationship with impoverished racialized communities like Fruitvale. Scholars have argued that inner city racialized communities were never the intended beneficiaries of Great Society welfare programs (Brown 1999; Self 2003) or earlier New Deal and Progressive Era reforms (Fox 2012). The expansion of state welfare practices via the 1960s War on Poverty for example, was much more focused on preventing urban unrest than concerned with truly advancing social change. Furthermore, to imply causality between state retraction from welfare provision and the rise of nonprofit organizations fails to take into account the historical origins of many race-based nonprofits in the United States. Race-based organizations developed as responses to what leaders described as state inefficiencies and outright violence. Nonprofit services in racialized neighborhoods emerged out of critique of the limited presence of state welfare programs, best evidenced by the various Black Panther assistance programs in communities like West Oakland (see Murch 2010; Self 2003: 219). They also emerged through a

20 In a similar vein, Murray Li (2007) also draws attention between what she calls the inevitable gap between what is attempted and what is accomplished.

21 For an analysis of the reassertion of state power through regulatory mechanism see Roitman (2005).
forthright critique of who had the best ability to govern these spaces. Mexican-American groups found that their ability to provide language and cultural specific services made their projects much more expansive and effective in relating with an overwhelmingly working class and monolingual community (chapter 1). These powerful critiques of inefficient (or non-existing) and culturally and linguistically inappropriate state services were central to the impetus to create race-based nonprofit services. In other words, this language of “transfer” renders invisible the history of activism in which community organizations fought for culturally-specific services in their neighborhoods. Moreover, it obscures the intense state regulatory and bureaucratic powers that shape nonprofit political possibilities.

Lack of attention to situated practices, and the processual nature of historical processes, leaves us with scholarly interpretations of devolution as initiating a process of state disengagement from governing urban residents. I demonstrate that in these neoliberal urban spaces, what emerges is in fact a contested terrain of government. In Fruitvale, nonprofit organizations and state agencies simultaneous enacted practices of government upon the population. Forged through a social-historical nexus between the expansion of state welfare infrastructure, and the concurrent social movement formation of an organized urban front against racialized oppression, race-based nonprofit organizations constitute a contested terrain of political technologies of rule. This is a foundational constitutive feature of nonprofit organizations which has been overlooked in most analyses of devolution. Thinking of devolution not as a coherent project but as a “contested terrain” enables me to challenge claims of a teleological “transfer.”

Both state welfare and nonprofit governing practices are intertwined with the legacies of 1960s race-based social movements and the continued traction of the legacies of racial formations from that period. These forms of power operate through a professed moral and ethical commitment to care. To better situate the contested terrain of welfare provision in urban communities, I conceptualize care as a highly politicized act. This politics of care, as a state and nonprofit mandate becomes centrally tethered to the ability to effectively govern Fruitvale. I advance the “politics of care” as an analytic for understanding contentious projects of urban improvement normalized as benevolent acts of kindness despite their violent existential and structural effects. Academic debates typically construct welfare as the privileged site of state projects. In contrast, my conceptualization of the “politics of care” attends to the role of state agencies and the work of non-state actors such as nonprofit health clinics, legal-aid centers, and community development corporations. I reveal how care is politicized through the competing claims to efficient provision of healthcare and other forms of welfare between nonprofit organizations and a myriad of state agencies.

**Governmentality and Racialized Communities**

In this dissertation, I locate practices of government and how they impact subject formation and subjection. By government I refer to Foucault’s understanding of as a field of power relations that “enlist subjects in the project of their own rule, guiding conduct and encouraging self-discipline” (Moore 2005: 3). Governing, as Foucault regarded, is not the same as “commanding” or “laying down the law,” but more strategic and tactical. The governing of subjects is productive and educative in nature. Governmental practices employ “political technologies to guide, encourage, and orchestrate actions among subjects whose agency becomes

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22 For an analogous analysis on the effects of 1960s social movements on contemporary forms of youth activism in Oakland see Clay (2013).
deployed—rather than destroyed—by government” (Moore 2005: 8). Foucault draws upon a metaphor of animal shepherding and the Christian and pre-Christian divine care to elaborate a pastoral technique of power. According to Foucault, the primary concern for the pastor was to ensure the wellbeing of his flock through caring and individualizing practices (Foucault 2007: 127; Pandian 2001). The pastorate “constituted a set of techniques and procedures that sought to constitute a specific subject, of a subject whose merits are analytically identified, who is subjected to continuous networks of obedience, and who is subjectified through the compulsory extraction of truth” (Foucault 2007: 185). As one technique of power, pastoral power is exercised on a multiplicity rather than a territory, it is a power that guides towards an end and functions as an intermediary towards this end (Foucault 2007: 129).

I view nonprofit organizations as central actors in these diverse practices of government. These organizations exert pastoral forms of power to guide their constituency and represent this neighborhood in particular fashions. In these guiding practices lies a central contradiction whereby some nonprofits reinforce state mandates and others challenge them all in the name of caring for the population. In Fruitvale I saw how care was deployed in a normative fashion that was complicit with state demands of constructing self-sufficient subjects that would “cost” less to the healthcare system. Preventative care at a local community clinic, for example, was far more inexpensive than a visit to the emergency room. As this dissertation will show, some nonprofit organizational practices are in fact complicit with state mandates of producing obedient, responsible and self-caring subjects. This is probably why some activists in Fruitvale and migrant clients had a sense of skepticism towards nonprofit and state-mediated practices of professed benevolence.

Therefore, I read Foucault’s elaborations on governmentality in conversation with the seminal work of Frantz Fanon. Like Foucault’s writings on governmentality, Fanon was concerned with understanding power through an analysis of spatialized practices of rule and its relationship to subject formation. Fanon was attentive not only to the direct uses of violence and force to guide the actions of the colonized, but also to the very educative, and less forceful means by which the colonized were directed to conduct themselves in a fashion amenable with the colonial endeavor. Fanon’s writings critiqued governmental projects that acted at a distance and employed projects of benevolence to acquire particular kinds of comportment from racialized subjects. Fanon maintained a firm skepticism of care derived from centers of authority, despite their professed benevolence. This included the work of medical doctors, psychiatrists, teachers, and what he referred to as “confusion mongers” (Fanon 1994[1965]).

Though Fanon underscored that violent disciplining is the preferred force deployed by colonial agents, he was also attentive to indirect forms of keeping natives in their place. He declares that “as soon as the colonized begin to strain at the leash and to pose a threat to the colonist, they are assigned a series of good souls who in the ‘Symposiums on Culture’ spell out the specificity and richness of Western values” (2004[1963]: 8). These “good souls” offer seemingly benevolent things such as education, health, and technical expertise that ultimately served to fashion European superiority by denigrating anachronistic native lifestyles. Similarly in non-colonial capitalists societies, Fanon argued that: “a multitude of sermonizers, counselors, and the ‘confusion-mongers’ intervene between the exploited and the authorities” (2004[1963]:4). By paying close attention to the different agents that helped to contour these unequal conditions, Fanon demonstrates his attention to both the destructive as well as productive aspects of these technologies of care.
While anti-political state technologies of rule governed the bureaucratic and institutional spaces through which nonprofits operated, I show how this did not occlude nonprofits from retooling these same pathways to enact political projects that envisioned alternative modes of engaging with the care of the population. This includes, for example, politicizing the care of undocumented immigrants despite strict federal mandates against it, or encouraging the successful election of Latino candidates despite federal mandates that occlude nonprofits from engaging in formal political processes. In each of these circumstances, nonprofits mobilized to envision alternative futures for Fruitvale and a firm commitment to social justice. However, state technologies of rule became entangled with the legacies of 1960s social movements and the political technologies that civil rights and Black Power movements elaborated, as well as interacted with the governing practices of nonprofit organizations. These formations of power all shaped the neighborhood in particular ways as well as effected the conditions of possibility for how residents experienced the neighborhood.

The nonprofit sector operates as a kind of black box in contemporary society. It is assigned all kinds of liberatory potentials, misunderstandings, and often conceived of a non-political sector solely concerned with rendering services. Yet in urban racialized communities the provision of services for neighborhood residents is a highly politicized act, and shaped by a long tradition of social movement activism in urban barrios like Fruitvale. Nonprofits are in fact productive of a number of power relations that are routed through claims to place and rights for residents with constricted citizenship. Therefore, this dissertation critiques one of the greatest misunderstanding of this sector—the supposed “not-for-profit” categorization of nonprofit organizations. As this dissertation will show, nonprofit organizations are extremely profitable, and not just in an monetary fashion. If we remove an economic conception of profit, it is possible to see that the nonprofit sector is very lucrative in immigrant and racialized neighborhoods. It is in fact productive of new kinds of social relations and powerful race-based services that make it one of the principle actors of racial formations. Latino nonprofit projects are also productive of new new urban landscapes and help to contour changing political formations.

Architecture for the Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into two parts. Part one historicizes the development of a Latino nonprofit sector in Fruitvale from the 1950s to the 1980s. The second part ethnographically analyzes the contemporary work of nonprofit agencies with a focus on the post 1990s developments in Fruitvale. Chapter 1, “Unsettling the Geography of Oakland’s War on Poverty,” critically examines the formation of Latino nonprofits as a key component of state welfare practices and a product of 1960s Mexican American mobilizations. I show how state officials courted 1960s activists and crafted the architecture for Latino nonprofits that channeled urban activism from the streets into institutionalized organizations. These entanglements of state agencies, activists, and nonprofits had consequential effects on urban movements and informed how Latinos became racialized in relationship to African Americans and Asian Americans. The devolution of federal responsibility for welfare provided the political and institutional opening for the rise of powerful Mexican American organizations whose goal was the recognition of a “Mexican American community” meriting government intervention. Mexican American organizations mobilized in relation to African American social movements and to geographies of poverty that were deemed exclusively Black.

In chapter 2, “Revolution Interrupted: Racial and Spatial Effects of the 1969 Tax Reform Act,” I look at how the federal government sought to regulate the increasing power of nonprofit
organizations. At the core of these regulatory projects were debates about the degree of political mobilizations nonprofits should engage. I argue that the 1969 Tax Reform was a racial act that had effects on the political possibilities of race-based nonprofit organizations. Whereas scholarly literature on private foundations portrays the reform as a federal regulation of the growing power of philanthropic institutions, I analyze how the tax reform was a regulatory response to rising anti-racist militancy and to the racial diversification of the electorate. White congressional elites saw both of these contentious processes as an imminent catastrophic racial revolution. The racial 1969 Tax Reform Act forbid nonprofit organizations to engage in formal political processes and mandated foundations to have better oversight over their grantee’s actions. Despite the anti-political clause, I show how organizations like Fruitvale’s Unity Council enacted development projects which were political because they reified a conception of the rising power of Latinos in Oakland. This history of the federal policing of nonprofit mobilizations is usually eclipsed by the scholarly focus on the militancy of the Chicano Movement of this period. I argue that this period reflected not a singular history of radical Chicano mobilizations but rather concurrent histories of different modes of activism that included both radical and reformist positions.

The third chapter, “Marketing Latinidad: Urban Redevelopment and the Mechanics of Racialization,” argues that nonprofit-led projects of urban improvement in Fruitvale are fundamentally projects of race-making. I analyze the 1994-2004 Fruitvale transit village project and its racial and political-economic foundations. I argue that the Unity Council deployed the neoliberal mandate of devolution and state retraction from social services to market itself as an entrepreneurial nonprofit agency and wielded its neighborhood authority and long-term connections with federal, California state, and municipal agencies to garner public and private funding. It strategically deployed Latino ethnic culture to push redevelopment, and constructed a narrative of neighborhood decline that erased the racialized causes of urban inequality. In so doing, it branded Fruitvale as a beacon for ethnic economic development and Latino subjects as efficient entrepreneurial residents. Planners and nonprofit project managers rendered the neighborhood's geography, architecture, and culture, as Latino and constructed this Latinidad as Fruitvale's distinctive feature vis-à-vis other Oakland districts. This project fused race-making with care as the the Unity Council marketed this ethnic culture through its technologies of caring for the neighborhood and branded itself as the custodian and ambassador of the region's vibrant Latino culture.

Chapter 4, “Disciplining Space: Nonprofit Organizations and the Regulation of Undocumented Labor,” argues that the neoliberal redevelopment of a Latino Fruitvale involves process of spatial discipline and policing of Latinidad. This chapter draws from a four month ethnographic engagement with day laborers on two Fruitvale street-corners. I show how the City of Oakland enlists the work of a nonprofit organization, Community Partners, to enact policies that constrict day labor solicitation practices. I argue that undocumented labor, thought to be in the “shadows of the state,” is in fact governed by an entire assemblage of state agencies and non-state publicly funded organizations. I analyze how the nonprofit mediated policing of race competes with Latino day laborer’s own racist practices in the process of competing for labor.

In Chapter 5, “Care is Political: Nonprofits in Defense of Immigrant Rights,” I analyze how the struggle for undocumented migrants becomes centrally tethered to Fruitvale nonprofit politics of care. I show how nonprofit organizations that work with undocumented populations eek out alternative sources of funding and strategically navigate different state and private foundation funding streams. Like 1960s nonprofit leaders that avoided certain federal funding entrenched in political turmoil, present day nonprofit leaders similarly navigate a contentions
terrain of funding. In so doing, nonprofits politicize care and produce creative ways to fund services to undocumented people. I argue that in making the provision of services for undocumented migrants and immigrant rights a central mobilizing issue nonprofits racially demarcate Latinos from African Americans. This division between Latino “immigrant” organizations and African American agencies has consequential effects for the construction of coalitional politics as well as for how Fruitvale is perceived vis-à-vis other Oakland neighborhoods. As placed-routed organizations, nonprofits’ terrain of government includes both residents as well as the space of the Fruitvale district. I show this by detailing the nonprofit-mediated organizing against ICE encroachment of the Fruitvale district.
Chapter 1
Unsettling the Geography of Oakland’s War on Poverty

On April 15 1966, Oakland’s Mexican American Unity Council held a press conference to announce a six-point list of demands from City Hall. The manifesto boldly called on the newly elected Republican mayor, John R. Reading, to appoint a Mexican American to the city council. The *Oakland Tribune* reported that the group also sought the hiring of an expert who could “train the city council and other civic leaders” to better recognize the problems of the Spanish-speaking community (4). Activists delivered their manifesto in a language of urgency with a fierce determination to be heard by city officials and Oakland residents. Collectively, these requests endeavored to secure equal funding for Spanish-speaking residents in Oakland’s War on Poverty. Mexican American leaders were concerned that such funding would be directed predominantly toward alleviating African American disadvantage, leaving the Spanish-speaking community with little monies. Activists argued “Oakland, whose motto is ‘The All-American City’ should be for all Americans: that the Treaty of Guadalupe should be honored to the letter as well as in spirit” (Oakland Tribune 1966: 4).

This chapter investigates how coordinated 1960s protests by Mexican American political organizations reveal Oakland’s changing racial/ethnic conditions and shifting trends in the state’s relationship to the urban poor. It charts the increasing role of community-based advocacy and service provision during a period commonly understood as the apex of federally directed welfare programs. It demonstrates how a national shift to place-based solutions to poverty devolved the “problem of poverty” from the national to the local level and empowered new actors such as nonprofit organizations in the fight against poverty (Marwell 2004; O’Connor 1996, 1999). Focused on Mexican American organizations, this chapter also examines how these groups demanded antipoverty funding by challenging the conflation of racial inequality and poverty with African American disadvantage. This coupling of poverty and Blackness was in part constructed by an impressive list of poverty studies that focused on urban ghettos and “rendered technical” the needs, desires, and behaviors of the poor. The focus of the War on Poverty as a solution to African American disadvantage also reflected White middle-class fears about the “threat” of Black radicalism and violence.

Fearing a repeat of the Watts riots that had taken place in Los Angeles in 1965, President Lyndon Johnson's administration targeted Oakland in the War on Poverty in 1965. By 1968, 140 nonmilitary federal programs were spending close to $100 million a year in Oakland, an amount dwarfing the City's own budget of $57.9 million (Orozco et al., 2008; Pressman 1975: 18; Self 2003). Designed to eradicate poverty, federal legislation between 1964 and 1971 provided

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1 Consistent with the terminology of the time, I use the term “Spanish-speaking” to refer to people of Mexican American ancestry. Government officials, newspaper articles, and academic studies of the time commonly equated Spanish-speaking with Mexican American. Mexican American activists also preferred to use “Spanish-speaking” to ally with other groups, such as Puerto Ricans and Filipinos, that also spoke the Spanish language.

2 The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed by the United States and Mexico on February 2, 1848 and ceded almost half of Mexican territory (which incorporated present-day states of California, New Mexico, Nevada, and parts of Colorado, Arizona, Utah and Oklahoma) to the United States. The treaty most notably guaranteed U.S. citizenship for Mexicans who inhabited the Southwest upon the United States takeover of Mexican territory (Acuña 2004; Gutierrez 1995). The fact that activists referenced this treaty is a specific claim to their status as rightful citizens of the United States. As rights-bearing subjects, leaders positioned the Mexican American population as deserving of state welfare provisions.

3 Tania Murray Li (2007) defines the practice of “rendering technical” as a term to describe an ensemble of practices concerned with representing the domain to be governed as an intelligible field of action (7).
generous funding for antipoverty programs that included job, educational, and social service projects—all focused on a new agenda of human development rather than improving decaying urban structures or eliminating structural inequalities (Katz 1993; Self 2003; Weir 1988). The War on Poverty was fundamentally concerned with the “empowerment” of the poor—a term that signaled a new understanding of poverty and how to fight it (Cruikshank 1999). Antipoverty experts introduced programmatic innovations such as Head Start, remedial instruction, elementary summer school, and neighborhood legal services to improve the quality of life in America’s ghettos. The federal government’s antipoverty agenda relied on empowering local communities to develop, organize, and implement federally funded antipoverty programs and slowly to devolve control for these to local communities (Kramer 1969; Marris and Rein, 1967; O’Connor 1996).

Historical studies of the War on Poverty have overwhelmingly focused on its consequences in African Americans communities and social movements (Gregory 1998; Moynihan 1969; O’Connor 2001; Self 2003). Here I want to chart how Oakland’s “Mexican American community” came into existence out of competition for War on Poverty funds. This mobilization emerged through a tactful negotiation with different state agencies and a carefully crafted relationship with African Americans. In their negotiations with California state and federal agencies, Mexican American community leaders organizationally rendered Oakland’s Spanish-speaking community legible as rights-bearing residents and positioned the organizations they had created as their stewards. Like their African American counterparts, Mexican American political organizations mobilized to become agents in the rapidly expanding market of federally funded, place-based solutions to poverty. They reinterpreted the War on Poverty agenda and helped guide their community by marshaling a commitment to efficient care and guidance of the growing Spanish-speaking population.

Governing Through Devolution
By making the local community and private entities, such as community based organizations, the primary agents in charge of planning and organizing antipoverty measures, the War on Poverty set an important precedent to the current neoliberal trend of devolution. It is now well recognized among scholars of the state that one of the important federal policy shifts undertaken during the presidency of Ronald Reagan between 1981 and 1989 was the devolution of the spending of public funds and resources from the federal government to states, counties, and municipalities (Collins et al. 2008; Marwell 2004). This devolution was part of a larger neoliberal practice that accelerated the state’s retraction from New Deal and Great Society social services such as education, health, and support of the poor (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, 2003; Hackworth 2007; Harvey 2005; Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005). Studies of U.S. poverty influenced by Michel Foucault’s analytic of governmentality further argue that neoliberalism devolves the responsibility of the state to individual citizen-subjects by normatively constructing individuals as entrepreneurial actors in every sphere of life (Brown 2006; Ong 2006). Subjects are expected to self-care and to take responsibility for their own needs and ambitions (Rose 1999). A pivotal component of this trend in relationship to urbanization is the reconfiguration of the territory of government from the nation-state to the level of community and the reliance of non-state agencies to help construct productive and entrepreneurial subjects (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Ong 2006; Raco and Imrie, 2000). Proponents of devolution couch the transfer of responsibility to local municipalities and non-state agencies in a language of empowerment that portrays these localized arenas as the best sites of productive and positive action (Raco 2003).
The War on Poverty was such a devolutionary project that transferred the problem of poverty from the federal government to local communities and ultimately to individual subjects. As Marris and Rein (1967) argue about War on Poverty efforts, the “devolution of power extends beyond any formal jurisdiction to the citizen himself. He is expected, ideally, to be an active promoter of the well-being of his community—his children’s school, the amenities of his block, neighborhood affairs” (9). Much of the development of this devolutionary shift came from the programmatic agenda of the Ford Foundation Gray Areas Program, which as reported in the Oakland Tribune (1962), had selected Oakland in 1961 as one of three pilot cities to receive a $2 million grant to help forge an “all-out attack on the social problems of minority groups and the proper assimilation of new citizens into the community” (1). The program targeted the Castlemont district of East Oakland, which was deemed a “transition area” due to the outmigration of White middle-class residents and their replacement by lower-income Blacks, resulting in what analysts of the time called “social disorganization” (Rhomberg 2004: 135; Salzman 1963). The program’s objective was to prevent this neighborhood from becoming a “Negro ghetto” by conscripting community participation though a formalized citizens’ advisory committee and coordinating existing city services through the Oakland Interagency Project (OIP). Neighborhood citizen participation coupled with the coordinated support of city agencies became the cornerstone of the Gray Areas Program. The local community represented both the target of intervention and the agents responsible for bringing about the desired change (O’Connor 1996, 1999).

The Gray Areas Program, according to O’Connor (1996), signaled the first shift away from structural and economic reform as a way of alleviating poverty to a concentration on individuals and their behaviors. Focused on assimilating once rural Black populations to urban life, the object of antipoverty programs was to transform deficient Black subjects into self-governing urbanites. The Gray Areas Program and subsequent War on Poverty, explains O’Connor (1996) “perpetuated the notion of poverty as a problem confined to other people and diverted attention from its links to economic restructuring, population movements, racial discrimination, and government policies that perpetuated inequality” (617).

A shift in focus to individuals and in changing peoples’ behaviors required the recruitment of different local agencies—both state and non-state—to run projects to govern the conduct of the poor and other subjects who were viewed as deficient. With the goal of achieving the overall welfare of the population, the federal War on Poverty governed at a distance and expanded its reach among the poor by tactically granting authority to local communities, albeit within a limited field of possible actions.

The Community Action Program (CAP), started in 1964 by the Economic Opportunity Act, was the centerpiece of this agenda and mobilized community members through non-state, usually private nonprofit organizations, known as Community Action Agencies (CAAs) (Cruickshank 1999; Jackson 1993). Rather than sending War on Poverty monies to states or to municipalities as grants, the federal government allocated them to the newly established, independent Community Action Agencies (Clark 2000; Marwell 2004: 268). The CAA theoretically administered a diverse collection of over a thousand federally funded, local, neighborhood-based antipoverty agencies whose mission was to coordinate existing social services and bring new services closer to the poor. As in the Gray Area program, the federal government privileged associationalist practices which promoted a new and powerful role for non-state agencies like CAAs in combating poverty (O’Connor 1999). At the local level, federal policies also encouraged nonprofit community service organizations to expand their existing
activities by contracting with the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and competing for federal grants.

The devolutionary practices of the War on Poverty, however, were fundamentally limited from the onset. Employing the famous motto of “maximum feasible citizen participation,” War on Poverty efforts employed an unrealistic language that sought to empower communities and individual citizens to become agents in the development of their own communities (Kramer 1969; Moynihan 1969). According to the Office of Economic Opportunity (1965) Community Action Program Workbook, community action agencies were organizations “established at the local community level to direct and coordinate the attack on the complex of poverty problems found in the given community” and were to serve as “catalyst and coordinator, acting to bring about change and to mold diverse activities into a smooth, effective instrument for reducing and eventually eliminating poverty in the local community” (10). This dual role of catalyst and coordinator bestowed individual Community Action Agencies with enormous responsibility and required that community members, most of whom had minimal educational and organizational training, to act as a cohesive administrative entity (Kramer 1969).

Oakland’s Community Action Agency was troubled from the onset because of lack of training, difficulty in acting as a cohesive entity, and disputes with city-government. Black middle-class leadership which dominated the CAA also came into conflict with working-class Black sentiments and goals (Pressman 1975: 63). As O’Connor (2001) writes, the federal government never fully clarified the meaning of “maximum feasible citizenship participation” or articulated how much decision-making power would be granted to individual citizens (133). In fact, the idea of mobilizing communities as political and programmatic entities was an ideal without much of a proven record (Kramer 1969; O’ Connor 1996; Williams 1975). According to Ralph Kramer’s (1969) study of war on poverty programs in the San Francisco Bay Area, this mobilization of the local community proved to be a disaster in actual practice. However dystopic the devolutionary practices were, they represented a moment of opportunity for community-based organizations and existing leaders to render poverty in Oakland as an identifiable, researched, and necessary target of governmental improvement programs. African American middle-class professionals took control over Oakland’s CAA and utilized it to expand opportunities for the Black population and, according to Rhomberg (2004), “facilitated their own political entry into the new institutional forms of the regime” (139). For Mexican American leaders in Oakland, the War on Poverty helped strengthen their organizations by bringing disparate groups together, and by so doing bolstered their demand for access to antipoverty funds and programs and their more equitable distribution.

The Coupling of Poverty and Blackness
The federal government envisioned the War on Poverty, at its creation in 1964, as a program of empowerment aimed at the “poor” (Cruikshank 1999). While the “poor” brought together disparate racial, gender, and generational segments of the population, numerous scientific and authoritative studies of the time came to define poverty as synonymous with African American disadvantage (Marris and Rein, 1967; Nichols 1966; Record 1963; Salzman 1963; Wood 1968). Studies overwhelmingly reported that “Negroes” suffered far greater unemployment rates than

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4 As Michael Katz (1993) explains, the War on Poverty and the expansion of related government programs in the 1960s created poverty research as a field in the social science because federal legislation mandated official evaluations (14). See also O’Connor (2001) for a complete elaboration on the history of poverty knowledge as a social scientific enterprise.
Whites as well as diminishing incomes; these studies employed a culture of poverty analysis that justified a coordinated front of job, educational, and other skills-development programs intended to transform deficient subjects into respectable urban dwellers (Marris and Rein 1967; Nichols 1966; O’Connor 1996; Record 1963; Self 2003).

Within these poverty formulations, researchers deemed Mexican Americans a nebulous third group in between Blacks and poor Whites. Categorized as “whites with Spanish surnames” by 1960, 6.5% of Oakland’s population had Spanish surnames and constituted one-fourth of the non-White minority group (Bernardi 1965: 1). Compared to African Americans, Mexican Americans were far more dispersed and not confined to a single geographical region. Bernardi (1965) found that Mexican Americans, like African Americans, were over-represented among the unemployed and poor and had the lowest levels of educational attainment of any group (4). While researchers acknowledged the importance of studying the growth of the Mexican American population and poverty, influential studies such as those of Dr. Wilson Record of the University of California, Berkeley and research director of Oakland’s Gray Areas Project held that emphasis on studying “Negro” poverty and disadvantage was most pressing. As Record (1963) wrote “The Negro population is relatively new to the Bay Area, whereas Mexicans have been a familiar site for a long time” (1). As new migrants from the South and Southwest, Dr. Record argued “Negroes…have a salient conspicuousness, their semi-rural traits standing out even more sharply against the Bay Area urban backdrop because of their color” (1). Dr. Record’s findings thus recommended that Blacks merited more immediate consideration in poverty studies.

Poverty researchers and program administrators also explicitly overlooked Oakland’s Spanish-speaking residents because they were not perceived to symbolize the threat that Blacks did. As early as 1963, for example, the Oakland Tribune reported on Dr. Record’s study in which he warned that San Francisco Bay Area communities had either to “make room” for Blacks or face the threat of a “growing number of Angry black men” (Irving 1963: 8). Estimating a doubling of the Black population by the 1980s, Black-White relations, Dr. Record (1963) argued, would become the racial tension most critical to San Francisco Bay Area communities. What was particularly worrisome, noted Record (1963), was the “social and political militancy of Bay Area Negroes, in contrast to the passivity or mild protest of the Chinese, Japanese, Indians, and Mexicans” (2).

War on Poverty efforts theoretically conceived of the poor as composed of diverse groups. In practice, cities like Oakland with a prominent African American population officially equated poverty with Blackness, and accordingly funneled antipoverty funds predominantly towards alleviating African American disadvantage. Oakland's Spanish-speaking community quickly understood this and organized en mass to prevent their continued marginalization in the contest over federal War on Poverty resources. They did this by building on a long history of community-based organizing and by allying themselves with important sectors of the African American Democratic Party establishment. Organizations such as the Community Service Organization (CSO), the Mexican American Political Association (MAPA), the American G.I. Forum and religious groups had represented the Mexican American population for decades, primarily in West Oakland and in the Fruitvale neighborhood. These organizations came into existence focusing on small-scale, membership-run, neighborhood-improvement campaigns aimed at citizenship participation and leadership development. They had built relationships of trust with the Mexican American population in Oakland that allowed them to at once help care
for and direct their constituents to integrate their Mexican American barrios with the broader society—an integral component of the assimilationist goal of War on Poverty programs.

**Post WWII Mexican American Organizing**

Oakland’s postwar organizing had its roots in a small but active Spanish-speaking Catholic movement that focused on developing religious and social services for Mexican Americans. Created by radical priests such as Father Gerald Cox, Father Charles Phillips, and Father John Ralph Duggan, this church-based movement began by creating Spanish-language masses, next fostering self-help projects including after-school programs for youth and assistance for poor families. These priests maintained that the best way to live as Christ had was through fighting for the poor and oppressed while simultaneously linking Oakland’s Spanish-speaking residents with Mexican Americans throughout California (Cox 2006). As long-term activist Elvira Rose recounts, the priests “used to go up and down California’s Central Valley organizing people in the small towns.”

Through these activities, Oakland church groups networked with rural towns and the farm worker struggles throughout California. By so doing, noted CSO leaders Elvira Rose, Herman Gallegos, and Alex Zermeño, the church was also instrumental in providing the guidance and organizational base to build secular organizations such as the CSO in Oakland. 

Alongside these Catholic groups emerged a cadre of regional offices for organizations such as the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), the American G.I. Forum, and the Community Service Organization (CSO), which developed in the post–World War II period and were committed in an integrationist agenda. LULAC was officially funded on February 17, 1929 in Corpus Cristi Texas with the mission of improving the appalling conditions of poverty and civil rights abuses facing Mexican Americans. As Gutierrez (1995) writes, from its inception, LULAC’s constitution emphasized that the best way to overcome these conditions was to organize as American citizens, even to the extent of excluding unnaturalized Mexican nationals (77; see also Acuña 2004). The G.I. Forum was established by a group of Mexican American veterans in 1949 and like LULAC, Gutierrez (1995) reports, it argued strongly that civil rights efforts must be focused on U.S. citizens of Mexican descent (155). While these organizations claimed that they were nonpolitical associations, they were both active in political issues from the onset. Founded in Los Angeles in September 1947, the CSO was the first organization that promoted cooperation between Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants. Unlike the G.I. Forum and LULAC, the CSO had no citizenship requirements for membership and often encouraged noncitizens to join. As Gutierrez (1995) states, the CSO made naturalization of noncitizen members a priority and radically expanded its organizing campaigns to incorporate resident Mexican aliens whom they understood not as sojourners but as integral members of the Mexican American community (170). As historian David Gutierrez further argues, the post–WWII period “marked a significant victory for Mexican American activists and organizations that had pursued an integrationist civil rights strategy. These organizations shrewdly manipulated a wartime rhetoric shaped by discussions of human rights and the self-determination of peoples that dominated domestic and international political discourse” (152). This agenda significantly impacted the claims-making process of an expanding collection of organizations, advocacy groups, and mutual aid societies that began to dot the U.S. Southwest.

Building on the work of radical priests in the Catholic Church, the Community Service Organization (CSO) was a group that played a large role in organizing Mexican Americans after

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5 Rose, Elvira. Interview with the Author. May 2, 2011.
6 Zermeño, Alex. Interview with the Author. August 2, 2011.
1945. Founded by Fred Ross, Antonio Rios, and Edward Roybal with the support of Saul Alinsky’s Industrial Areas Foundation, the CSO became the training ground for the first generation of Mexican American leaders, including Cesar Chavez, Dolores Huerta, and Gilbert Padilla (Acuña 2004; Gallegos 1989; Gutierrez 1995; Orozco et. al., 2008). The CSO grew rapidly in California. By the early 1960s, Acuña (2004) writes, it had thirty-four chapters with a total of 10,000 dues-paying members (279), but as a grassroots organization it had little institutional support and meager funds.

Portrayed by reporter G.W. Sherman of The Nation in 1953 as the source of the “political awakening” of the Spanish-speaking minority, the CSO endeavored to transform a “relatively voiceless element in the community into an integrated responsible segment of society” (256). It did so by concentrating primarily on the training of indigenous leaders who were taught to engage in self-help efforts such as neighborhood physical improvements, voter registration, education, housing, and other civil rights projects. The CSO believed that community development happened only first by building internal leadership. In a classic integrationist move, CSO leadership hoped to enlist its membership in a democratic project and to guide them to participate fully in all aspects of American society. The CSO was committed to giving voice to Mexican Americans as virtuous agents of change in society.

By 1956, the Oakland CSO chapter had 143 dues-paying members and a regular attendance of about seventy-five people at general assembly meetings. The chapter’s services included a voter registration program that worked with the Voters League of Alameda County. Education was a prominent component of the organization’s activities, which included citizenship, basic ESL, and Spanish language classes led by the head of the educational committee who was a teacher at the Oakland Public Schools. In both its educational programs with youth and adults and its voter-registration drives, the CSO was bestowed with an immense responsibility not just to provide for the Mexican American community, but also to direct this community in a particular fashion. It did so by creating relations with already existing city services and by guiding its membership in the use of these services.

In 1954, the CSO became a national organization whose objectives as reported in the Los Angeles Daily News (1954) were “to coordinate efforts for the common good of the community” and “encourage active participation of neighbors in civic life and to improve relations among all races, nationalities, and religions” (3). Believing in the power of the vote to leverage demands and reap the promises of democracy, the CSO equated voter registration with progress. It maintained that voter registration drives would “build sufficient community bargaining power throughout the Spanish-speaking neighborhoods to command the attention of the public and private officials who [were] in the position to assist in the neighborhood improvement and group advancement.” Voter registration and voting, for the CSO, were the conduits to obtaining help from outside the community. The CSO, however, was not in the business of running political

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7 Address by Mr. Herman Gallegos, Former National President of the Community Service Organization, to a Meeting of the Mexican American Political Association Executive Board, December 6, 1964, box 14, folder 11, Ernesto Galarza Papers, Stanford University Archives.
8 Gallegos, Herman. Interview by the Author. August 2, 2011.
10 Community Service Organization Target for Progress Voter Registration Flyer, 1956, box 13, folder 7, Ernesto Galarza Papers, Stanford University Archives.
11 Letter from Henry Nava (CSO Chairman) to Miss Consuelo Salcedo, August 10, 1949, box 4, folder 9, Fred Ross Papers, Stanford University Archives.
campaigns. Instead, it served to leverage the Mexican American vote to attain demands from government representatives and elected officials.12

Building Institutional Presence: The Mexican American Unity Council
At the height of federal investment in the War on Poverty, between 1964 and 1968, Mexican American organizations sought recognition and compensation for their labors in community development. Given that the federal government distributed War on Poverty funds at the local level and encouraged nonprofit organizations and local state agencies to vie for these monies, Mexican Americans were concerned they did not have enough of an institutionalized presence or history to effectively compete for this funding. At the time, most of the existing organizations, like the CSO, were storefront membership-based groups without state and private foundation fiscal support. As Orozco et al. (2008) report and Arabella Martinez, the first executive director of the Mexican American Unity Council, describes, “The concern underlined the need for [Mexican American] leaders to collaborate and form a united front and build a local movement. The Mexican American Unity Council was designed to bring together activists and groups and build a cohesive agenda” (15). Building a critical mass required transforming groups such as soccer clubs, church congregations, and brotherhood associations into politicized entities that fit the federal requirements necessary to qualify as War on Poverty Community Action Programs.

Mexican American activists understood that to attain War on Poverty funding, they had to tap into the power of African Americans. In the postwar years, African Americans had made tremendous inroads into city offices, in the Democratic Party, and had garnered substantial political clout in Oakland (Rhomberg 2004; Self 2003). According to Rhomberg (2004), this was symbolized by the 1954 founding of the Men of Tomorrow, a civic service club of Black business, professional, and religious leaders (123). In addition, as Gallegos (1989) writes, African Americans had institutionalized groups like the Urban League and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) which accomplished a plethora of civil rights gains that helped them garner legitimacy among the White establishment (33). In Oakland, prominent Black businessmen and politicians were committed to ensuring the advancement of Blacks and understood the War on Poverty to be the fruit of their civil rights struggles.

Mexican Americans in Oakland accordingly turned to African Americans leaders with whom they had worked and whom they counted among their friends (Gallegos 1989; Grillo 2000). They relied on two key figures—Jimmy Delgadillo and Evelio Grillo—who both had affiliations with the CSO and the City of Oakland.14 A community leader extraordinaire and competitive boxer, Delgadillo had been born in West Oakland and grew up with many of the Black leaders of the time. He was a childhood friend of William Byron Rumford, the first Black elected official in Northern California, and others who represented Black Democratic power. Evelio Grillo was an Afro Cuban immigrant who spoke Spanish and was well connected with the city’s African American elite and served as assistant to D.G. Gibson, who became one of the foremost leaders of the California Democratic Party (Grillo 2000: 133). These two figures, both because of their African heritage and having grown up alongside African Americans, played

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12 Gallegos, Herman. Interview by the Author. August 2, 2011.
13 Consistent with the archival sources analyzed, I use the name Mexican American Unity Council to refer to this organization. However, by the late 1960s, the Unity Council officially became the Spanish-speaking Unity Council in order to make the organization more inclusive to non-Mexican groups.
14 Gallegos, Herman. Interview by the Author. August 2, 2011.
tremendous roles of linking these two communities. According to Mexican American activists of the time, forging alliances with these African American leaders was seen as crucial to gain access to War on Poverty program monies.

With support from African American leaders, Mexican Americans began to make claim the need to have their own linguistically and culturally autonomous spaces for community organizing. The formation of the Mexican American Unity Council in 1964 represented this concerted effort to consolidate existing Spanish-speaking organizations to collectively represent Mexican Americans in War on Poverty related negotiations. One of the initial actions of the Mexican American Unity Council was to create a Spanish-speaking advisory group in 1966. According to Jack Ortega (1966), the chairman of the Unity Council, “[F]or the first time, the poverty program was explained to these people, and they were made to feel that there was a place in it for them.” In a letter to the head of the Oakland Community Action Agency (CAA), Ortega (1966) extolled the success of the meeting:

The group is expanding rapidly, and wishes to continue on this basis—not because we want to isolate ourselves from other minority groups, but rather because we feel that, in this way, we can best resolve the problems of communication and cultural differences that are peculiar to the Spanish-speaking people of this area.

Mexican American community groups understood that their cultural and linguistic differences made it difficult for them to adequately participate in the larger society as full participants. By representing the Mexican American community and fostering culturally inclusive meeting spaces, leaders sought to address and direct the demands of this population.

This mobilization by community organizations resulted in the establishment of a special Spanish-speaking Target Area Advisory Committee by the City of Oakland Community Action Agency—popularly known simply as the “poverty board.” This was a significant accomplishment given that Oakland’s Target Area Advisory Committees (TAACs) were designed to represent communities in four geographic areas: East, North, West Oakland, and Fruitvale. The fifth TAAC, which became known as the Fruitvale Spanish-speaking Committee, was the only one defined by language and culture. The committee ultimately challenged the geographic definitions of antipoverty programs and demanded the recognition of Oakland’s Spanish-speaking population. Mexican American groups argued that unlike African Americans, Spanish-speaking residents were not confined to one specific geographical location; they were dispersed widely throughout the city and beyond (Brasher and Martinez-Springer, 1966; Wood 1968). While War on Poverty stipulations privileged “community” as the unit of analysis, it emphasized a geographic, place-based understanding of organizing and belonging. For Mexican American leaders, community was far more than geography, uniting an ethnic/racial collective that cohered around a shared agenda of social, cultural, and political improvement throughout the Southwest. By accentuating their differences in terms of culture, geographical distribution, and language, Mexican American organizations unsettled antipoverty efforts that focused solely on geographic notions of community.

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16 Ibid.
Mexican American admission into War on Poverty programs quickly transformed organizations like the Unity Council and altered their activities. While Oakland’s Unity Council started as a political action group it soon became an institutionalized social services provider to ensure that Mexican Americans in the Fruitvale received the assistance that they needed. As a service-providing organization, the group was able to attain important antipoverty funding that allowed it to create various programs including Education for Advancement which offered ESL classes. The Unity Council also established a separate 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, the East Bay Spanish Speaking Citizens Foundation (EBSSCF), as a service provider agency. In addition, it became the host of Oakland’s first Latin American library which offered books in the Spanish language and was funded through a direct grant of $100,000 of federal antipoverty funds (Pressman 1975: 59). The California Department of Labor established one of its employment service centers in Oakland’s Unity Council office, working with the Council to ensure that Spanish-speaking residents could access the deluge of job training programs created by War on Poverty funding. This was a significant accomplishment because before the establishment of the Unity Council no social services existed in Oakland that targeted Spanish-speaking residents (Orozco et al. 2008: 17). The Unity Council became an institutionalized presence in Oakland, serving as both an advocacy group and a meeting point for different community services.

Utilizing their own research and distributing their own authored community reports, the Unity Council and other Mexican American groups quickly gained legitimacy among existing state and federal agencies. Given the invisibility of Mexican Americans in government-funded poverty studies, Mexican American organizations contested these studies by conducting their own research. They leveraged their own authority on the needs of Spanish-speaking residents to forge a cohesive programmatic agenda for their constituency and in the process created a distinct target of government—the Mexican American community. In 1965, for example, representatives of MAPA, CSO, and the Mexican American Unity Council worked together with the City of Oakland to produce a report entitled “Staff Report of Mexican American Community Development Survey and Resulting Proposal.” The report was the product of months of interviews and collaboration between different Mexican American organizations and City of Oakland staff members. It revealed the lack of access Mexican Americans confronted in gaining city services and recommended the creation of bridging programs to connect Mexican Americans to existing city and state services. In this proposal, Mexican American nonprofit leaders envisioned a comprehensive package of care rooted in cultural revitalization, empowerment, and inclusion in the broader U.S. culture. Their proposal sought to “inculcate in the Spanish surname community a pride in its historical and cultural heritage.” To do so, leaders hoped “to create in the people an awareness that their forebears played an outstanding role in the exploration, settlement and development of this country and in contributing to the establishment of its institutions.” Mexican Americans did not need to feel excluded from access to civic services; they were entitled to these benefits because they themselves had helped to create them, armed with a sense of pride in their culture and their rightful claims as citizens. In their negotiations with the city of Oakland, leaders thus gave coherence to the term “Mexican American

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17 Rose, Elvira. Interviewed by the Author. May 2, 2011.
18 City of Oakland, Department of Human Resources, Staff Report of a Mexican-American Community Development Survey and Resulting Proposal, March 1965, Ernesto Galarza Papers, box 14, folder 8, Stanford University Archives.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
community” for the first time and articulated a set of mutually shared interests, needs, and desires.

The formalization of the term “Mexican American community” was at once a valorization of Mexican culture and language heritage, and also an homage to the important contributions Mexican Americans had made in the United States. This was a specific response to official U.S. Census usage of terms such as “whites with Spanish surname” that leaders claimed led to the undercounting of the Mexican American population. In Oakland, Mexican Americans’ widespread identification as Spanish-speaking allowed them to ally with other groups such as Puerto Ricans and Filipinos that spoke a common language. However, this language-based identifier did not adequately portray the racial/ethnic experiences of discrimination and inequality particular to Mexican Americans. Like African Americans, Mexican American leaders also understood the War on Poverty to be a form of compensation for racial injustices of the past. The term “Mexican American community” sought to solidify their position as a group that shared experiences of racialized oppression and inequality.

To further attract the attention of state and city agencies, Mexican American Political Association (MAPA) and CSO representatives including James Delgadillo, Bert Corona, and Edward Quevedo also involved themselves in expanding Mexican Americans as a voting block. MAPA was formed in 1959 and committed itself to provide an environment “through which the Mexican American can channel his political efforts and demands.” MAPA leaders envisioned themselves as stewards in the proper political guidance of the Mexican American population. According to James Delgadillo’s letter of July 16, 1965 to Anthony Barbieri of the U.S. Department of Labor, MAPA possessed “special resources which consist of an organized statewide rank-and-file citizens, who have had useful work experiences within and offer real hope for the progress of a million Americans of Mexican descent in California.” Bestowed with “special resources” developed through extensive experience organizing, MAPA claimed it could mobilize a contingency of “organized rank-and-file citizens [which included]…a considerable number of young and determined leaders…capable of transposing the responsibilities of citizenship to persons of bilingual cultural background and instill in said persons the incentive to contribute to the fullest extent of their abilities in furthering the vitality of our economical and social betterment.” Not only did MAPA’s leadership have extensive organizing experience, they also claimed they could mobilize a “million of Americans of Mexican heritage.” Mexican American leaders thus sought to harness the social, economic, cultural, and civic improvement of Spanish-speaking residents by directing them in the appropriate political path.

Mexican American organizations took seriously their role as mediators between the Mexican American population and different state agencies. In their exchanges with state agencies such as the California Department of Employment, the City of Oakland, and federal antipoverty offices, Mexican American leaders requested that these agencies be sensitive to the needs of a rising Mexican American population but also informed them that they were prepared to guide the community to vote in a particular fashion and to empower them as citizens for full civic participation.

22 Ibid.
**Government and its Impacts on Mexican American Organizing Strategies**

By accepting federal antipoverty funds, Mexican American organizations became at once agents of government as well as subjects of the state’s governmental technologies. Organizations like MAPA, the Unity Council, and the CSO enacted practices of government by guiding their constituents along the rightful path of “true” U.S. citizenship. They branded themselves to different state and federal agencies as capable of shaping exemplary and even obedient citizen-subjects. And though not explicitly stated, Mexican American obedient subjects were almost always implicitly contrasted to disobedient and even “radical” Black subjects. This was of course all in the name of attaining specific resources from state agencies and as a means to leverage political contacts.

The Federal government promoted a specific type of incorporation into its new schema of localized welfare provision. As Stephen Gregory (1998) has argued for Black leaders in New York, the War on Poverty attempted to incorporate activists into a “new genre” of state-sponsored institutions and relations (86). Mexican American leaders in Oakland learned the modes of comportment around state officials and the bureaucratic means to accomplishing particular tasks. These leaders created institutionalized bureaucratic organizations such as the Mexican American Unity Council that could compete for federal and state funds. They also learned the suitable modes of conducting public protest and the appropriate bandwidth of radicalism they could employ. As Foucault explains, governmental forms of power do not seek to eliminate a particular activity or occurrence. Instead, government focuses on maintaining an appropriate range of permissible behaviors and actions (Foucault 2007). The art of government is not about forcing subjects to do the will of some kind of authority figure or sovereign, but rather to encourage them to choose certain paths over others, to guide conduct towards one end while limiting other possibilities.

Mexican American groups accordingly navigated a social movement terrain already heavily contoured by African American protest, exerting its own political technologies on Mexican American activism. To effectively speak the language of racial/ethnic rights in the 1960s, Mexican American activists understood they had the duty to ally with African Americans as racialized subjects. They also carefully crafted a history of their experiences of inequality based on an existing language of civil rights and protest which African Americans had codified through negotiations with the state. Mexican American groups celebrated and in fact emulated both the civil rights gains of African Americans and the urgency of the emergent Black Power movement. However, they clearly understood both the potential openings of each movement strategy as well as the limitations of militant and radical practices. While they supported a direct linkage with African American civil rights struggles and in fact collaborated with certain groups and campaigns, they also saw the limitations of this movement that did not place their own issues of language and immigration at the center of discussion.

In the 1950s, CSO representatives were part of a civil rights coalition that regularly met with Jewish, Black, Anglo, and trade unionist leaders to frame their collective strategy for public policy involvement in California. This formal coalition accomplished the Rumford Fair Housing Act in 1964 and earlier, in 1958, the Fair Employment Practice Commission (Orozco et al. 2008). In 1963 the Oakland CSO chapter publicly aligned itself in a united front with the NAACP and Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) against discriminatory practices. The CSO formalized this position in 1963 during its Executive Board meeting in San Jose where it reaffirmed its national policy and openly advised that a violation of civil rights, or the denial of equal protection under the law, was a matter of historical concern to CSO, nationally, and at the
chapter level. As a result of the CSO’s work, twelve families received waivers of the citizenship requirement for admission to the City of Oakland Housing authority low-cost housing. The CSO committed itself to continuing the struggle for the elimination of this type of citizenship requirement, which it claimed, served to “intensify the inequitable burdens on minorities who contribute to the growth and progress of the community.”

Oakland’s CSO chapter saw civil rights abuses as a priority and justified alliances with African Americans based on their shared experiences with discrimination. A 1963 Oakland CSO newsletter, for example, acknowledged the formal partnership in antidiscrimination claims through a special feature entitled “El Momento Actual” (The Current Moment), written entirely in Spanish. Utilizing the imagery of brutality against African Americans in Mississippi and a language of compassion and urgency, the piece declared that Mexican Americans should be committed to support African American civil rights. CSO leaders in 1963 endeavored to convince their constituency that African American civil rights efforts were equally their struggles:

It should be noted that this is not a struggle of Negroes against whites although it might appear this way on the surface. This is something that affects all minority groups and it is fitting that we the members of other ethnic groups also make this struggle our struggle. Because we are all treated alike we must all identify with this struggle. We must not be mute witnesses or insensitive to another groups’ pain. Their pain is our pain at the same time that their gains are our gains. It is not just that we abandon that brave race.

This is a clear example of how Mexican American organizations attempted to construct a shared sense of discrimination by a White oppressor, which they hoped would propel their constituents to defend the civil rights of all minority groups. Oakland’s CSO chapter argued that in the Southwest, Mexican Americans overwhelmingly benefitted from “Negro” anti-discrimination efforts, such as drives against housing discrimination, and employment discrimination cases. Similarly, they acknowledged that Mexican Americans shared a parallel experience of police brutality and excessive surveillance by law enforcement. Oakland CSO members were encouraged not just to sympathize with African American struggles, but to also analyze experiences of disadvantage through the lens of their own civil rights abuses.

Oakland CSO activist were so adamant in their shared civil rights agenda that they ridiculed Mexican Americans from other regions who were allegedly hesitant to ally with African American struggles. A 1964 CSO newsletter featured an essay entitled “What is the Mexican American Doing in the Civil Rights Movement?” that critiqued the statements of an unnamed Mexican American attorney from Los Angeles who worked for the State Attorney

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24 Community Service Organization (CSO) Newsletter, September 1963, Oakland, CA, Bert Corona Papers, box 38, folder 5, Stanford University Archives.
25 Community Service Organization (CSO) Newsletter, September 1963, Oakland, CA, Bert Corona Papers, box 38, folder 5, Stanford University Archives.
26 El Momento Actual (The Current Moment) in Community Service Organization (CSO) Newsletter, September 1963, Oakland, CA, Bert Corona Papers, box 38, folder 5, Stanford University Archives.
27 Translated by the author from Spanish. El Momento Actual (The Current Moment) in Community Service Organization (CSO) Newsletter, September 1963, Oakland, CA, Bert Corona Papers, box 38, folder 5, Stanford University Archives.
General’s Office. The attorney described the sentiments of Los Angeles Mexican Americans regarding civil rights struggles in the following fashion:

With the tremendous Spanish surname population our group could be a potentially powerful force in the civil rights movement. However, in the past there has been a lack of participation by the so called grassroots. [T]here are some who have stated that the Mexican-Americans have no problems, others who have stated our problems are different from those of the Negro, and finally we have those who state that if we do have problems, that we should be left alone to solve them in our own manner.28

Members of the Oakland CSO chapter were outraged by the article and declared that it was ridiculous to suggest that Mexican Americans in Los Angeles remained “selfishly concerned with what is or is not Mexican American, Spanish speaking vs. the problem of the Negro.” The Oakland CSO Newsletter editors declared that these Mexican Americans had truly lost sight of the problem confronting them and asked: “[h]ave they not seen discrimination in Public Housing, Accommodations, Education and Employment?” The editors were so concerned that they jokingly stated: “Perhaps, it is the music from the Mariachis that blinds them.”29

The scolding tone of these newsletters can also be read to illustrate the reservations some Oakland-based Mexican Americans had about allying themselves with African American movements. It is not at all surprising that Oakland Mexican Americans organizations would support African American civil rights struggles, given the degree of friendships and formal relations they had with prominent African Americans. What is most revealing are the Mexican American organizers’ emphatic and dedicated attempts to convince their constituents that such alliances were not only necessary but also a matter that directly affected them.

Some organizers feared that associating too closely with African American civil rights would render issues of language discrimination, culture, and immigration of less import. CSO representatives agreed that while the problems of Spanish-speaking groups were not as “exacerbated as the Negro’s,” their concerns were complicated by the additional fact that many spoke mainly Spanish and thus required different kinds of mobilizing strategies and agendas.30

As former CSO leader Herman Gallegos (1989) noted:

[T]he issue of color discrimination was much more severe for blacks...Hispanics were an unknown quantity. We had to overcome the language barrier and the citizenship barrier to become a potent political force so as to get attention. It wasn't because blacks didn't want it; it was just simply that we had to do our own development (35).

While most Mexican Americans thus did not question supporting a shared civil rights agenda with African Americans, certain sectors were cautious of the organizational means employed.

28 What is the Mexican Doing in the Civil Rights Movement? In Community Service Organization (CSO) Newsletter, June 1964, Oakland, CA, Bert Corona Papers, box 38, folder 5, Stanford University Archives.
29 Community Service Organization (CSO) Newsletter, June 1964, Oakland, CA, Bert Corona Papers, box 38, folder 5, Stanford University Archives.
30 Community Service Organization (CSO) Newsletter, September 1963, Oakland, CA, Bert Corona Papers, box 38, folder 5, Stanford University Archives.
Emphasizing their rightful participation in all aspects of American society as citizens, Mexican American leaders urged their constituents not to embark on a radical separatist approach akin to the Black Power movement. Instead, leaders wholeheartedly critiqued organizational practices that did not respect an integrationist approach centered on active citizen participation through formal political processes. In a 1966 MAPA newsletter, for example, president Eduardo Quevedo cautioned an expanding constituency about engaging in a separatist radical movement: “Much is heard today of Black power, non violence versus violence or self defense…for us Mexican Americans and other Spanish-speaking people in California the idea and slogans of Brown Spanish-speaking Mexican American Power is being suggested as a new slogan.” While welcoming a new militancy in demanding Mexican American appointments to government and policy-making positions, MAPA admonished militant leaders who discouraged voter registration campaigns. “Today we are hearing many well intentioned Mexican Americans shouting ‘we are not going to register any voters unless we get money from the party…or unless we make COPE come across with some money.’” Quevedo warned of the danger of this approach: “MAPA [was formed] because we had not the ‘power’ to bring about some significant changes about our living conditions and relationships in our society.” For Quevedo, change was only possible “through active political participation” and exerting pressure “by the Mexican American community in the area of policy making.” True to this integrationist agenda of the post–World War II period, MAPA readily privileged formal political processes and rightful participation in democratic lobbying as the core values of Mexican American organizations. MAPA and other organizations constructed this idealized practice of citizenship, which they argued could only be employed in a manner that respected the democratic and peaceful principles of the movement.

**Conclusion**

Though War on Poverty programs had many limitations from the onset, they constituted unique political and institutional openings for local-based organizations and political action groups. As a devolutionary governmental program, the War on Poverty set up the architecture for the inclusion of non-state entities—community-based nonprofit organizations—into a new schema of welfare provision. This served to transform grassroots movements into institutionalized federally recognized tax-exempt nonprofit agencies. This process shifted organizational goals from leadership development and advocacy to the proper management of programs and community development projects and aided in subduing the urgency and rising militancy of grassroots protest.

Robert O. Self’s 2003 *American Babylon* has argued that for African Americans in Oakland, War on Poverty efforts “constituted a discrete phase in the evolution of black political capacity” and transformed Oakland’s political culture (200). In this chapter, I have described how the War on Poverty catapulted Mexican Americans into political action. Not unlike their African American allies, Mexican Americans also deployed the War on Poverty agenda of empowerment to build leadership capacity and to consolidate disparate Spanish-speaking organizations into a united Mexican American movement. The War on Poverty did not initiate Mexican American activism; rather, it served to consolidate already active political organizations which transformed themselves into institutionalized entities that guided the Spanish-speaking

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31 MAPA Registration Newsletter by Eduardo Quevedo, July 18, 1966, box 14, folder 10, Ernesto Galarza Papers, Stanford University Archives.
population and leveraged their pastoral technologies of government to represent, care for, and constitute the Mexican American community.

Through different culture-based projects of empowerment, Mexican American community-based organizations set in place specific power relationships. As Barbara Cruikshank (1999) reminds us: “Whether inspired by the market or by the promise of self-government and autonomy, the object of empowerment is to act upon another’s interests and desires in order to conduct their actions toward an appropriate end” (69). Bestowed with responsibilities of care that included bridging relations between the state and the Mexican American population, organizations enacted governmental technologies of their own. These political techniques deployed the language of “empowerment” prioritized by federal antipoverty programs, but rendered it Mexican American by suturing it with a project of cultural revitalization.

Enacting diverse culture-mediated technologies of citizenship the leaders of community-based political organizations sought to educate Mexican Americans about their shared interests; interests that parroted the state’s integrationist agenda of democratic civic engagement. However, whereas War on Poverty programs focused on individual attainment, whether through job training, educational advancement, and self-development programs, Mexican American groups insisted on achieving a collective improvement. These organizations thus enacted relations of government that both constituted and fundamentally transformed not a universal citizen-subject but rather a collective of Mexican American subjects. This collective of Mexican American subjects as well as the demands, organizational tactics, and relationship to the state enacted by these organizations emerged through a carefully crafted relationship to both the Civil Rights Movement and Black radicalism of the time.

Mexican American political mobilizations of this period unsettled both the geography of race and poverty in Oakland. They challenged the automatic conflation of poverty with Blackness and began to articulate their own unique experience of racial inequality and poverty that differentiated Mexican Americans from Blacks. By stressing the importance of issues of language and culture discrimination as well as experiences of international migration, Mexican American leaders cultivated their own organizing agendas and programmatic efforts. This historical account of the political formation of the Mexican American community offers an important window into the study of changing racial/ethnic dynamics in post–World War II Oakland beyond the Black and White binary. The War on Poverty was thus an important period for the consolidation of Mexican American institutions such as the Unity Council and other community-based organizations that continue to provide services and guide Mexican American and other Latino constituents in Oakland.
Chapter 2
Revolution Interrupted: Racial and Spatial Effects of the 1969 Tax Reform Act

On July 20, 1969 while the entire world waited in anticipation to see the first man land on the moon, a group of Mexican American leaders were abruptly called into an emergency meeting with Ford Foundation officials in Asilomar, California. The men represented the newly formed Southwest Council of la Raza [hereafter SCLR] an umbrella organization funded by the Ford Foundation in 1968. The foundation formed this institution to channel funding to grassroots nonprofit mediated-projects for Mexican Americans. Leaders such as Herman Gallegos and respected activist scholars Dr. Ernesto Galarza and Dr. Julian Samora anxiously awaited the news from the Ford Foundation. In the months leading to this meeting, SCLR’s relationship with the Ford Foundation had become strained. US Congress had reprimanded the Ford Foundation over some of the activities of organizations funded by SCLR. It alleged that a Ford Foundation funded Mexican American organization had made public statements endorsing violence. Congress therefore charged the Ford Foundation of having insufficient oversight over the actions of its grantees. It responded with the 1969 Reform Act, a federal reform intent on limited the growing powers of private foundations. In his oral history, Herman Gallegos recalled the catastrophic news from Ford Foundation directors: “It was literally a mandate from Ford that we had to get out of the community-based organizing and the community-change programs aimed at building leadership, changing institutions” (1989: 73). The Ford Foundation gave SCLR an ultimatum: if it wanted to continue receiving funding it had to go into what the foundation deemed as “hard programs.” Instead of politicizing communities or organizing to changing institutions, grantees had to produce measurable results: a given number of units of housing, or create a given numbers of jobs through community economic development. After a contentious debate among SCLR’s leadership, the organization accepted the Ford Foundation’s new funding stipulations. In the months that followed many of SCLR’s most radical members left the organization alleging that “hard programs” were really “safe programs.”

The proceedings of that historic July 20, 1969 meeting had consequential effects on a nascent nonprofit-mediated movement throughout the southwest. But why was the Ford Foundation so compelled to discipline SCLR in such a profound way? And what explains the Congressional fear over the activities of nonprofit organizations? The leaders present at the meeting were all moderate Mexican American activists that favored the crowning principles of U.S. philanthropy at the time—the creation of a more democratic society and the inclusion of “race issues” without extensive analysis of racism in the shaping of inequality. As this chapter will analyze, it could be easy to suggest that Congress was reacting to a period of increasing militant anti-racist organizing among African American and Chicanos and equally radicalized protests over the war in Vietnam (see Oropeza 2005). This was the late 1960s, a radicalized period of race-based movements in the United States and throughout the world. Yet

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1 Herman Gallegos, Dr. Ernesto Galarza and Dr. Julian Samora were the initial founders of the Southwest Council of la Raza (SCLR). Herman Gallegos has been a pioneer of Latino civil rights and civic engagement and was a major advocate for philanthropic funding for Mexican American communities. He became the first Latino to sit on major foundation and corporate boards, including the Rockefeller and Rosenberg foundations, Union Bank and AT&T. Dr. Ernesto Galarza was a Mexican-American labor activist who advocated for farm workers and was vehemently opposed the bracero program. He received a PhD from Colombia University and was a prolific writer and scholar activist that supported various organizations and labor struggles throughout the Southwest. Dr. Julian Samora was the first Mexican American to receive a doctorate in sociology. Like Dr. Galarza, he was involved in numerous organizations and labor issues and taught at the University of Notre Dame.
Congressional scrutiny over “permissible” nonprofit activities related to much more than just violence. It also related to successful Mexican American electoral and economic gains which coupled with African American voter registration and politicizing drives, appeared like an impending racial revolution. Therefore, as SCLR leaders’ meeting with Ford Foundation officials reveals, the 1969 Tax Reform was much more than a mere policing of private foundations. It had everything to do with race and the actions of race-based political organizations.

This chapter analyzes how the federal government sought to regulate the growing power of nonprofit organizations and their political projects. I foreground the effects of the 1969 Tax Reform Act on the programing and projects of race-based nonprofit organizations, as well as their relationship to social movements. The 1969 Tax Reform Act has been portrayed in scholarly literature primarily as a federal policing of the growing power of private foundations (Ostrander 2005; Roelofs 2003; Simon 1996). Congress feared that private foundations’ increasing power granted excessive governmental authority to organizations that fundamentally represented the interests of capitalists. That is, foundations were using their power to defend the interests of the class from which their wealthy funders emerged (Ostrander 2005:38). I argue that the tax reform was a racial act that had effects on the political possibilities of race-based nonprofit organizations. Furthermore, it shows how White elites viewed African American and Mexican Americans as a relational threat. With the tax reform, the federal government created a strict register of what it deemed to be appropriate nonprofit political projects. It forbade nonprofit organizations from engaging in any form of electoral politics—including voter registration projects and official endorsement of candidates. While the federal government strictly linked “politics” with electoral processes, in practice the anti-political mandate limited other kinds of political activity as nonprofit leaders feared that their actions would be deemed prohibited. This congressional obsession over the political activity of nonprofit organizations demonstrates that the 1969 Tax Reform was a regulatory response to both rising anti-racist militancy and a racial diversification of the electorate. White congressional elites saw both of these contentious processes as an imminent apocalyptic racial “revolution” that challenged democratic institutions.

The 1969 Tax Reform reveals the growing conflict between state institutions and philanthropic organizations over the appropriate engagement with racialized communities and race-based social movements. The field of Chicano Studies, however, has rarely explored the impacts of private foundations on 1960s movements. Instead, much of this literature focuses on state attempts to co-opt the Chicano movement. Robert L. Allen (1969) was one of the first scholars who cautioned about the relationship of the Ford Foundation to Black protest movements. As he deemed it in 1969, the Ford Foundation might be considered “the most important, though least publicized, organization manipulating the militant black movement”

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2 This trend continues to the present day as the largest foundations are truly economic giants. As Faber and McCarthy (2005: 4) describe “In 2001, the Ford Foundation held assets of $10.8 billion and distributed over $829 million. Likewise the W.k. Kellogg Foundation and Andrew W. Mellon Foundation held assets of $5.53 billion and $4.14 billion, respectively, and gave out nearly $201 million and $182 million in 2001.” This fiscal power, argue Faber and McCarthy, confers enormous political clout on U.S. philanthropic foundations. See also Roelofs (2003).

3 Despite the emergence of philanthropic funding on racial minorities, the money going to these organizations was minimal. As Faber and McCarthy (2005: 5) argue, most powerful foundations channel the bulk of their resources toward elite class-based institutions, which leaves little money for those organizations serving the neediest members of society. This is evidenced by the fact that nonprofits providing human services receive only about one in ten of all foundation dollars.
More recently, political scientists such as Adolph Reed (1999: 17) argued that philanthropic funding of black protest movements represented an important part of a “new regime of race relations management,” or as Joan Roelofs (2003: 2) described it the “incorporation of the restless and cheeky.” Historian Karen Ferguson has shown that this increasing relationship between philanthropic organizations and racial minorities emerged out of the desire of powerful white interests, including the Ford Foundation, “to restore social stability in the era of 1960s race riots and racial protest movements, not simply through the iron fist, but also the velvet glove of black leadership development” (Ferguson 2007: 71). Though these scholars have given us insight into the effects of private foundations on Black organizations, we know little of its effects in Latino organizations or more generally how it impacted the conceptions of Latinos and Blacks relationally.

This chapter analyzes how 1969 Congressional reforms and subsequent changes in foundations’ grant-making processes had consequential effects in Fruitvale and in the insertion of Mexican Americans into Oakland politics. First, it transformed 1960s Mexican American grassroots political organizations originally committed to a goal of politicization and social change into institutionalized nonprofit agencies, intent on developing communities by implementing business models of neighborhood improvement. Second, I show how this had spatial and racial effects. Fruitvale’s Unity Council became one of the first race-based Community Development Corporations (CDC) in the country and for the first time in Bay Area history, a Mexican-American organization constructed architectural sites and ran complex social services. This set a precedent for an image of Latino political and economic attainment. Though nonprofit institutionalization stymied leaders’ initial attempts at achieving what they deemed to be more transformative social change, it opened new routes of political and economic ascent for Latino organizations. Despite the non-political clause of the 1969 Tax Reform Act, nonprofit organizations in Fruitvale become recognized as institutional powerhouses that could wield their authority and expertise within the neighborhood and beyond. As a testament of this, one of the Unity Council board of directors, Joe Coto, was successfully elected as Oakland’s first Mexican American city councilman in 1972.

This period resulted in a growing diversity of nonprofit services and practices. Noel Gallo, a former employee of the Unity Council who went on to have an illustrious political career, described: “In the Fruitvale the Unity Council was really strong. La Clinica de la Raza grew and Centro Legal was pretty hectic. I can still remember all of their leaders. Anyone who wanted to deal with anyone in Northern California outside of LA would come to Oakland to be with the Chicanos, because primarily outside of Oakland it was mostly farm areas. So they would come here.” As Gallo argued, the neighborhood became defined by its nonprofit organizations and served as a central hub for Bay Area Chicana/o political mobilizations.

Noel Gallo and other leaders repeatedly portrayed nonprofits as far more than mere service provision agencies. For Gallo, these nonprofit agencies were key political players in the construction of this Latino community and in the constitution of a Chicano collective identity. Nonprofit leaders viewed the gains of their efforts in entirely spatial ways. The fact that they could point to a building, and name it as a Mexican-American institution was a testament of the gains of their struggle. Nonprofit agencies and their leaders spatialized a Latino presence in the area and viewed the positive transformation of urban space as a representation of the growing influence of Latinos.

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4 See Reed (1999) for an analogous analysis of the effects of increasing bureaucratic openings for African Americans and its effects of Black politics. See also Gregory (1998) and Self (2003).
Latino power in Oakland. It was also as proof of the political struggle waged through institutionalized nonprofit organizations.

The nonprofit sector’s growing professionalization and bureaucratization exacerbated already contentious political divisions different Mexican-American activist camps. This had consequential effects on the past and the present. At the time of my fieldwork beginning in 2005, for example, the Unity Council was the object of many critiques from activists and other nonprofits in the neighborhood that understood that it held a position of advantage in the nonprofit hierarchy. Grassroots activists critiqued that the Unity Council, as an institution, was no longer at the forefront of community needs. As a former activists argued, “the suits” had taken over the organization and it no longer reflected the needs and desires of the grassroots comprised mainly of working class and recently arrived immigrants. As another 1960s activist critiqued, “the role of the nonprofit is to do advocacy, and education, to teach community members how to get up in front of a city council. When nonprofits became businesses… running childcare, running Head Start or whatever… they moved away from the original intent. They became businesses that don’t do money.”

Despite the multiplicity of critiques I heard of the Unity Council, most critics admitted the important role the organization has played in improving Fruitvale. I turned to archival sources and oral histories to understand the Unity Council’s complicated relationship to its present programatic efforts that dramatically differed from its grassroots social movement focus on politicization and social transformation of the organization’s inception. I found that the Unity Council’s professionalization and institutionalization was not an isolated phenomenon. These dramatic transformations of neighborhood nonprofits like the Unity Council are not surprising given the historical period from which they emerged and the state regulatory practices that the 1969 Tax Reform set in place. As Stephen Gregory (1998) argues, this period saw the incorporation of radical activists into the more moderate or centralist positions that the state favored (see also Allen 1969; Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Jenkins 1998; Self 2003). In this chapter I seek to understand how Oakland-based Mexican American activists navigated this terrain. Were they, as Gregory poses, co-opted or did they strategically deploy the opportunities enabled by the state and private foundations? Given the moderate tendencies of the previous generation (chapter 1), how much of it is co-optation, and how much is just an accomplishment of a broad moderate/reformist agenda? I argue that a narrative of omnipotent and uniform project of co-optation enacted by structural forces emanating from the state and private foundation misses the important nuances and political struggles that took place. Furthermore, the idea of a monolithic project of co-optation constructs nonprofit activists and leaders as acquiescent subjects duped into a particular position. As anthropologist Philippe Bourgeois (1995) has argued, “a focus on structures often obscures the fact that humans are active agents in their own history, rather than passive victims” (17).

To understand the micro-politics of this tenacious and contradictory process, I employ a multi-scalar analysis that is attentive to how activists navigated different institutional forces. I analyze not only the particularities of activism in the city of Oakland, but also to federal and California state policies and private foundation agendas. This also requires a more nuanced understanding of the multiple forms of Chicano/Latino activism of this period. As this chapter analyzes, the late 1960s and early 1970s era did not represent a singular Chicano radical agenda in Oakland. Though Oakland is popularly known as the epicenter of radical organizational tendencies (epitomized by the Black Panthers), most of the mobilizations in Fruitvale were much less militant in scope. Activists employed multiple approaches to attaining demands that were
trans-local in scope. Following these historical actors’ multi-scalar activists processes allows me to demonstrate how Fruitvale, which is often understood as a closed ethnic enclave, has actually always been historically linked with other geographic spaces and national political processes.

This chapter is organized in the following fashion. First, I begin with an analysis of what I call concurrent histories of activism—a framework that allows me to position the multiple forms of politics activists deployed. I analyze how competing activist camps envisioned different interactions with the state and private foundations. This analysis critiques how Chicano historiography flattens our understanding of the diversity of Chicana and Chicano political actors by centering analysis of this period solely on the radical tendencies of the Chicano movement. I then analyze how Mexican-American nonprofit leaders fought for funding from philanthropic institutions as a viable alternative to federal and municipal funding. I describe how Foundation stewardship along with federal stipulations channeled Oakland-based organizations in particular direction and how leaders tactfully navigated this constricted terrain. Finally, through an analysis of different Unity Council projects of the late 1970s and 1980s, as well as the political campaigns and entryway of certain nonprofit leaders into public offices, I examine the ramifications of these political mobilizations.

Concurrent Histories of Activism

Nonprofit mobilizations in Fruitvale can only be understood by critically analyzing the complexities and situated historical struggles of the social movement actors that produced them. The 1960s represented a mélange of different mobilizing agendas for Mexican American leaders which included diverse repertoires of struggle that ran the gamut from radical, reformist, to assimilationist. In my engagement with archival sources as well as interviews with key Bay Area 1960s leaders, I was attentive to how activists themselves represented these heterogenous approaches to struggle. Though 1960s activists I interviewed were often dubbed vendidos or “sell-outs” because they chose an institutionalized path of nonprofit mobilizations, they understood their actions as justified and appropriate for the historical and political terrain they navigated. These leaders never considered themselves as having been duped into taking a particular path. They saw their actions—which more radical activists viewed as conservative or “soft”—as appropriate and justifiable for the events of the time.

Just as these more reformist activists had been branded as “sell-outs,” they also pejoratively constructed a constituency of “radicals” who engaged in inappropriate forms of mobilization. I found that neither archival sources nor interviewees revealed a clear definition of what constituted “radicalism” or “militancy.” Activists that fought for greater state resources and electoral opportunities for Mexican Americans viewed “radicalism” and “militancy” as the constitutive outside of their ideals of democratic integration. To be clear, even the more reformist activists varied in what they conceived as appropriate engagements with state institutions and private foundations. Despite this diversity, self-described radical groups often dubbed the reformist organizations as comprising a monolithic group of vendidos or sell-outs. Thus radicalism and conservatism were elastic terms that shifted in relationship to spatial and historical contexts.

Geographer Laura Pulido shows that the term “radical” is a profoundly relative term. As she described: “while the Chicana/o movement was indeed radical, there was tremendous diversity within it, with some groups assuming far more conservative positions than others” (2006: 19).

Self (2003: 217-255) argues that in an analogous fashion, Black power was an extraordinarily plastic concept adaptable to multiple contexts. As Laura Pulido (2006) argues: “the term included an array of ideologies,
This elasticity or contextual vision of activism is absent from the historiography of this period. In fact, Chicano historiography privileges the rise of 1960s and 1970s youth mobilizations that eclipses all other previous histories of activism (Acuña 2004; Chavez 1994; Gómez-Quiones 1978, 1990; Muños 2007). While Chicano historians have acknowledged the existence of reformist policies that fit into what Ethnic Studies scholar Carlos Muñoz Jr. (2007) calls the Mexican American generation, or what historian Ernesto Chavez (2002: 42) calls “inadequate forms of protest for securing the plight of Chicanos in the late 1960s and 1970s.” These studies fundamentally argue that with the rise of Chicano militancy in the late 1960s, reformist forms of political engagement ceased. As Chavez (2002) writes:

This ineffectiveness [of reformist or centralist mobilizations] combined with the general protest environment of the later 1960s helped to ensure a new style of politics known as the Chicano movement. Instead of relying on the ballot box, Chicano activists took to the streets and demanded change through protest. This is not to say that protest was nonexistent in prior years, but, rather, that it now attracted mainstream attention, especially from the media and young people, the ‘baby boomers’ who had come of age in the 1960s (42-43).

This episodic conceptualization of Chicano history overly emphasizes activism as a temporal process—with different stages that replace one another—as opposed to employing a place-based analysis that is attentive to the multiplicity of different modes of activism within a particular space-time.7 Maylei Blackwell’s (2011) brilliant critique of Chicano historiography, ¡Chicana Power!, demonstrates the mechanics of erasure operant within the temporal linearity assigned to Chicano movement history. Blackwell argues that this politics of periodization locates ‘feminists’ interventions outside of movements instead of including them in a larger agenda for social justice integral to the legacy of the Chicano movement” (29). As she reveals, Chicano historiography has produced a monolithic portrayal of the movement organized around “epic male heroes rather than the mutisited local community and labor struggles that coalesced into a national movement” (Blackwell 2011: 28). The reduction of multivariant movement organizing into a single lens flattens our understanding of Chicana and Chicano political actors.

Instead of understanding reformist forms of activism as inadequate modalities of protest, or the vestiges of an earlier generation, I propose an analysis of the of the concurrent histories present at a particular space and time. Here I borrow Maylei Blackwell’s (2011) analytic of “retrofitted memory” as a form of “countermemory that uses fragments of older histories that have never been disjunctured by colonial practices of organizing historical knowledge”(2). Labeled as vendidos that created institutions, these activists and their embodied practices of a nonprofit mediated mobilizations have been rendered invisible, discarded as aberrations of the past. As Blackwell’s analytical term of retrofitted memory suggests, it is possible to draw from these discarded and suppressed forms of knowledge in order to understand the way in which, as

organizations, and personalities. Inspired by Malcom X, Black Power symbolized a deep radicalization of African Americans' (and others') struggle for equality with a focus on self determination and self-defense” (91).

7 For an analysis of the difference between a history of a temporal process and a history of place, see Patricia Nelson Limerick (1987: 26). Geographer Doreen Massey argues that space must be conceptualized integrally with time, so that it is best to think always in terms of space-time (1994: 2). For Massey, the space-time is a configuration of social relations which must be conceived as a dynamic simultaneity.
these leaders defined it, they were mobilizing to construct “new forms of consciousness customized to embody material realities, political visions, and creative desires for societal transformation” (Ibid.). These leaders deemed nonprofit mobilizations as the most strategic and immediate means of accomplishing social change. They did not view institutionalization as a means to attaining individual gains. They saw it as the most appropriate means to take part in the improvement of a collective of Mexican American subjects and other Latinos. Furthermore, they saw this as the fulfillment of the goals of a longer genealogy of activism dating back to the post-WWII period in Oakland and the entire southwest.

Nonprofit activists that I interviewed regretted the exclusions that a linear narrative of the Chicano movement produced. 1960s activists challenged the preoccupation scholars placed on Chicano mobilizations that overshadow the day-day work of nonprofit organizations and other nonmilitant groups that took place before, during, and after the heyday of the Chicano movement. These leaders envision alternative historical narratives that incorporates the grassroots Mexican American activism that in Oakland began largely as a result of the work of the Community Service Organization in the 1950s, and earlier work of radical priests and church congregations (see chapter 1). Unlike the cultural nationalist tendencies of the Chicano Movement, these organizations were integrationist and reformist in scope and argued for a more equitable distribution of resources and government positions. Therefore they courted various state officials and private foundation officers to demand funding for Mexican American groups.

The Production of Space as Proof of Political Struggle

Nonprofit leaders argued that it was not difficult to find proof of the appropriateness of the political struggle they waged. These leaders pointed to nonprofit mediated projects that produced spaces such as health clinics, neighborhood resource centers, or legal-aid agencies. They leveraged these spaces and the political possibilities the institutions enabled to prove the appropriateness of the nonprofit and institutionalized route. In stark contrast, nonprofit leaders from organizations such as the Unity Council and the Southwest Council of la Raza questioned the actual material legacies that radical and militant mobilizations left. Prominent nonprofit leaders such as Herman Gallegos and Alex Zermeño argued that the Chicano movement left no long-lasting material legacy.

In contrast, Gallegos and others credit the non-militant and therefore less publicly visible political mobilizations led by groups such as the CSO and the Unity Council that left lasting material effects. That is, these groups left a legacy of long-term community resources and services and physical buildings. As Herman Gallegos proudly recounted:

I think that if you look at what was left behind by these years of activity you can go to the barrios where we organized throughout California and East San Jose is a good example of where we had no street lights, no stop signs, the creek would overflow. Today the streets are paved, there are sidewalks, the streetlights, there are soccer fields, youth agencies, head start programming in cities. You can physically see the changes…[A]nd you can also see that in areas like San Jose there is abundance of [Hispanic] political leadership, elected leadership.

For Herman Gallegos, these material legacies do not only show the “progress” made in urban barrios as a result of the mobilizations, but also a sign of the accomplishments of this specific route of activism. The very fact that you could walk through a neighborhood and point to
specific services, buildings, or other infrastructural changes is proof of the gains. Furthermore, the buildings and service programs are proof that this was the appropriate path to take. Leaders such as Herman Gallegos equate choosing the path of institutionalization with the attainment of valuable resources and services as well as infrastructural improvements in urban racialized communities. This translated to increased political representation for these neighborhoods.

In a similar fashion the Unity Council’s Arabella Martinez overwhelmingly credited the building institutions as proof of the legacies of this form of activism. When asked what her biggest accomplishment was with her work at the Unity Council she proudly responded: “It really was building an institution. If I think of anything its building this incredible institutional and leadership base. I mean we have a lot of people all over the place now. While the brick and mortar is nice what is really important is the institution” (Martinez 1991: 38). The legacies of this activism are evidenced not just in the changes in the built environment. They go beyond these physical changes and have to do with what Martinez calls the leadership and institutional base. For Martinez, this represents a field of interconnections that enabled these organizations to serve as institutions that channeled resources into the community.

In contrast to the efficacy of an institutional approach to mobilizing, nonprofit leaders pointed to the inefficiency of radical approaches to community mobilization. Dr. Hayes-Bautista, one of the initial founders of Clínica de la Raza, for example, argued that many of the “radical” and “revolutionary” approaches to community empowerment were not clear and failed to translate into much more than just rhetoric. As he described:

There was a lot of posturing going on. [We at the Clínica de la Raza] had things to do so we didn’t really have to do with our super militant. In fact every so often we get some undergrads from UC Berkeley who said they want to revolutionize the community and we would tell them: “here is a broom...lets get started with that.” That’s the way to revolutionize a community. So there [was] a good amount of posturing and chest-beating and everything else in this time period. The kind of people that the Clínica was pulling in were the people that were beat up by the posturing and [being called] “not-sufficiently Chicano” and “not-sufficiently revolutionary.”

Fruitvale’s community-based organizations were a meeting point of divergent approaches to political mobilization. This was the era of militant calls for revolutionary change as embodied Berkeley’s Third World Strike, West Oakland’s Black Panther struggle, and War on Poverty mobilizations (Self 2003). Yet as Dr. Hayes-Bautista described more radical groups had unrealistic plans to “revolutionize” the community. La Clínica’s leadership, which was dubbed as “not-sufficiently” Chicano, found that mobilizations needed to be more practical and concerned with meeting the most critical community needs such as easy access to healthcare.

These reformist factions of the community organizing of the 1960s actively marketed themselves as non-radical in order to garner the attention of elected officials and foundation program officers. As leaders trained in an integrationist and reformist democratic movement epitomized by Saul Alinsky’s organizing, they understood the realities of maintaining good

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8 Saul Alinsky created the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), which developed an extensive model for neighborhood organizing. IAF organizations had different stages of organizing, with the first one often included protest strategies. This was the stage in which they mobilized existing community churches and social clubs through
relations with government officials. They similarly understood there was an adequate way to press for demands. They had seen how organizations that deployed radical rhetoric or militant actions were ignored by government officials in charge of providing resources and funding. Leaders such as Alex Zermeño therefore actively distinguished themselves from militant groups:

There was some coexistence and sometimes we just didn’t pay attention to them...We sort of boxed out this area here for us, they want to do it a different way on the streets, or mouth to mouth thing, let them do it. In fact by them doing [more militant style of mobilizing] it helps us because we look reasonable. Even the establishment wants to come talk to us now cause they don’t want to talk to those guys.

As politically savvy grassroots leaders, they courted elected officials by projecting themselves as the more adequate negotiators. In this view, these leaders strategically deployed the militancy of other groups to command greater respect from state agencies and philanthropic organizations. As Zermeño further described: “Elected officials were like everybody can throw a rock! But sooner or later you gotta make a decision. And who do you want making a decision with you? Not the rock throwers. They want those that are mature. That’s politics.” Politics for Zermeño was about carefully crafting demands that did not seem too radical or militant in order to garner attention from elected officials. For Zermeño, organizations and leaders had to be careful in the organizational means deployed to attain gains. He suggested that successful lobbying took a lot of maturity and collaboration that would come from negotiating and not from feuding.

The Politicized Evasion of War on Poverty Funding

Non-militant leaders’ strategic negotiations with state officials also translated to their selective negotiation with state funding streams. This was best evidenced in the disillusionment most nonprofit leaders expressed over War on Poverty mobilizations. While in the last chapter I outlined how Mexican American organizations fought for federal anti-poverty funding, towards the late 1960s, many of these same groups came to distrust War on Poverty funding. Leaders such as Bert Corona from the Mexican American Political Association (MAPA) and Arabella Martinez from the Unity Council made calculated decisions regarding accepting War on Poverty funding. In fact, some Mexican American organizations refused to even fight to attain these funds. These leaders’ deft negotiation with different state projects further demonstrates how they developed their own political agency.

Nonprofit leaders worried that the federal government and other antipoverty programs wanted to “steal” indigenous leadership from impoverished communities. They also critiqued the uncertain duration of federal funding and what they deemed as the egregious misuse by many War on Poverty programs. Leaders’ skepticism of War on Poverty funding reveals their doubts of the efficacy of state projects. It also demonstrates that leaders viewed alternatives to state funding, like private foundation money, as a way of avoiding the problematic terrain of working with state agencies.

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9 Haines (1984) shows an analogous pattern for African American reformist organizations. He argues that the activities of relatively radical black organizations, along with the urban riots, stimulated increased financial support by white groups of more moderate black organizations, especially during the late 1960s.
One of the harshest critiques of federal WAP programmatic efforts emerged from Bert Corona of the Mexican American Political Association (MAPA). In a February 1, 1966 letter to Mr. Eddie C. Brown of the Citizens' Crusade Against Poverty, Bert Corona harshly critiques the Citizen’s Crusade for its attempts to request information about MAPA’s leadership. In this letter Corona accuses both Anglos and Blacks of wanting to take away indigenous leadership from barrio organizations by way of war on poverty mobilizations. As Corona brazenly affirmed:

These poverty professionals whether White-anglos or Black-anglos are all paid and funded. We are struggling with the limited resources from our people. It would seem that MAPA would be in default if it failed to recognize the danger to us as the original peoples of the Southwest in giving freely, to outsiders who come paid, our most powerful resources—the leadership and know-how and experiences of our community.  

This critique shows that Mexican American leaders were astutely cautious of affiliating with War on Poverty funding. Mexican American leaders like Bert Corona sought to defend their community from the penetration of foreigners and prized themselves in not depending on outside sources of funding. Corona’s statements shows the multiplicity of different approaches to more democratic reformist approaches to organizing. While Bert Corona of MAPA agreed that changes could be accomplished through democratic institutions, he was far less diplomatic than other groups such as the Unity Council. His statement, for example, argues that Mexican Americans are the “original peoples” of the southwest, a language that borrowed from the growing Chicano cultural nationalism of the time (see Acuña 2004). As Corona argued: “MAPA has never received one cent from either private foundation sources or government sources. All activities have been totally funded by our people.” Corona was thus cautious of funding from certain mainstream organizations because of the possibility of co-option. The letter goes on to critique what he deemed the “poverty fighters” funded and paid by the government bodies, foundations, universities, and churches who “come down to our Mexican American communities not to strengthen such indigenous groups as MAPA but to seek to turn Mexican Americans against us; they come down to pick our brains and glean the hard-earned and dearly-paid-for experiences of our leaders in the field of who, how and what to do in our Mexican American communities.”

Arabella Martinez from the Unity Council, while less critical than Corona, also understood the temporal and spatial confinements of War of Poverty funding. She argued that War on Poverty funding would only last for a short period of time and worried that the limited funds would be stymied due to Oakland’s political culture. Martinez recalled, “I just said…let’s go and raise money outside of Oakland, and the fact of the matter is, we were exactly right. We

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10 The Citizens Crusade Against Poverty (CCAP) was founded in convention in October 1964. It was a broad, non-partisan coalition of organizations and individuals dedicated to eradicating poverty from the nation by focusing on education, national action programs, community activity, and involvement of the poor. It closely assisted the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and programs such as Head Start as part of war on poverty mobilizations.
11 Letter from Bert Corona to Mr. Eddie C Brown of the Citizens’ Crusade Against Poverty, February 1, 1966, Folder 9, Box 14, Ernesto Galarza Papers, Stanford University Archives.
12 My intent in labeling these groups as reformist is not to homogenize their multiple activist practices. I offer these generalizations only to emphasize certain broad tendencies in this mode of organizing.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
built all of those relationships and we survived and all those War on Poverty programs did not, basically none of them survived” (Orozco et al. 2008: 23). Martinez mobilized to find money outside the confined spaces of the War on Poverty and limited limited duration of this initiative. Martinez also wanted to avoid divisive conflicts with African Americans who dominated the War on Poverty negotiations in Oakland. As she reflected on the Unity Council’s mission of the time, she recalled: “We were into building coalitions and the little bit of money that we got was not worth risking all this battle” (Acuña 2004: 308-309; Martinez 1991: 28).

Along with groups like MAPA and the Unity Council, the leadership behind the recently established Clinica de la Raza was also skeptical of War on Poverty funding. When asked about the War on Poverty, Dr. Hayes Bautista quickly referred to Oakland’s Community Action Program (CAP) as the “poverty mafia.” Like Bert Corona’s earlier sentiments, Dr. Hayes-Bautista argued that members of the Oakland CAP imposed their form of “organizing” the poor as the only available method. This included both Anglos and African Americans that came to the Fruitvale district to try to organize the Spanish speaking population. As he described the early years at Clinica de la Raza:

We purposely didn’t want to become even affiliated with the old OEO neighborhood health centers. From our perspective (remember this was 40 years ago) federal money was corrupting. Even though people kept telling us ‘why don’t you become a Neighborhood Center, you get a lot of money from the feds?’ For a number of reasons we chose not to do that. We wanted to develop services our way. We didn’t want to have a model imposed [on us]. We used to call it “Imperialist Medicine.”

Dr. Hayes-Bautista argued that Clinica de la Raza avoided War on Poverty efforts to maintain autonomy. Clinica de la Raza wanted to operate without what they deemed as “colonizing” strings from federal funding agencies. According to Hayes-Bautista, War on Poverty efforts imposed a top-down model that did not allow for much autonomy. Furthermore, this approach did not accommodate Spanish-speaking organizations’ distinct linguistic and cultural needs. Groups like Clinica de la Raza maintained independence from anti-poverty funding in order to conduct services that they deemed culturally appropriate. The appropriateness of services would be measured not by federal agencies or Oakland based individuals affiliated with these programs, but by the very members of the community that had initially pushed for the creation of a local health clinic in Fruitvale. For nonprofit leaders like Dr. Hayes-Bautista, War on Poverty mobilizations had become detached from the community that was theoretically supposed to administer and run antipoverty programs. Furthermore, these nonprofit leaders saw War on Poverty mobilizations as ineffective and ripe with federal regulatory regimes.

Nonprofit leaders such as Arabella Martinez and Herman Gallegos looked to private foundations as an alternative to federal money already tainted by political turmoil. They courted various foundation officers and made immense strides within the Ford Foudation. In my interview with Ramon Rodriguez, who served as the first urban planner for the Unity Council, he explained how Arabella Martinez, took him from his was work on a housing project funded by the WAP in Fremont, California. He recounts how Martinez told him: “you are too good to be working down here, let’s go do something big in Oakland. I think I’m going to get some money from the Ford Foundation for a nonprofit there independently from the poverty program…I got this concept of being an independent nonprofit who really gets to the needs as we see them, not
as someone in Washington leads you to see them.” Similar to Dr. Hayes-Bautista, Rodriguez and Martinez construct philanthropic foundation monies as a viable alternative to the strings from the federal government. These nonprofit leaders were not opposed to federal money, however they critiqued the WAP approach that merely gave lip service to the “community” but did not necessarily develop indigenous resources. These leaders thus demonstrate skilled negotiation with state projects that, while tactful and professional, did not compromise on local goals. They subsequently procured funds outside of Oakland and beyond the strict confines of state regulatory regimes. This tactful negotiation was also about diversifying funding streams to leverage more flexibility both regarding programing and projects they deemed worthy. They also constructed this path as a means to be more accountable to the community’s needs. As they would soon learn, however, philanthropic organizations also enacted their own programatic imperatives and imposed a new terrain of funding conditionalities.

The Ford Foundation and Federal Responses to 1960s Movements
Institutionalization and professionalization was pivotal to leaders’ goals and organizational methods. They understood that building institutions required access to state funding and heavy investments from private foundations. This corresponded with the funding priorities of philanthropic organizations like the Ford Foundation (Durán 2005; Haines 1984; Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Jenkins 1998; Magat 1979:47; Marquez 2003). However as late as the 1950s, Mexican American organizations were completely off the radar of private foundations. Mexican American leaders such as Arabella Martinez and Herman Gallegos along with Dr. Julian Zamora and Dr. Ernesto Galarza courted private foundations to legitimize the Mexican American community as worthy recipients of funding. Foundations viewed Mexican Americans as “the other minority” and modeled their programatic funding agendas in relationship to a longer history of working with African American institutions.

Like its funding strategies for African Americans, philanthropic foundations funded Mexican American organizations to “help” this minority group appropriately incorporate into American society. As Benjamin Marquez (2003) has argued, foundation money began to heavily fund and in many instances transform Mexican-American political mobilizations in the 1950s. He argues that by funding groups, Anglo-administered institutions had a profound influence on the contours of Mexican-American political activity (330). As Marquez (2003: 333) writes, foundations encouraged Mexican American leaders to create large bureaucratic organizations modeled after already existing African American institutions such as the Urban League and the NAACP (see also Gallegos 1989). The Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), for example, was incorporated in 1968 with a 5-year, $2.2 million start-up grant from the Ford Foundation (Acuña 2004: 316; Marquez 2003: 333; Tijerina 1968). The Ford Foundation continues to be MALDEF’s primary benefactor (MALDEF 1999).

The Ford Foundation and the Midcentury Urban Problem
The Ford Foundation crafted its relationship to Mexican American organizations based on its longer history of funding African American organizations and projects. It funded projects

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15 Mexican American scholars and leaders such as Julian Samora used this language to stress that African Americans were not the only minority in the United States. This strategic framing of Mexican Americans was a politicized indictment of the lack of social services and assistance for the poor available to this other minority population. The Ford Foundation funded one of the first major studies of Mexican Americans. The study was conducted by Julian Samora, Ernesto Galarza and Herman Gallegos. See Galarza et al. (1970).
that sought to alleviate African American disadvantage with the ultimate purpose of preventing further violent racial political unrest. As O’Connor (1996) describes, by the 1950s the Ford Foundation became committed to issues of racial and ethnic inequality indirectly through its efforts to influence public policy regarding the “urban problem.” The Ford Foundation saw itself as activist and interventionist in relationship to urban and regional development (Magat 1979: 120; O’Connor 1996). It did so by employing a liberal race-neutral language of empowerment that also expressed the foundations’ neutrality regarding racism (O’Connor 1996: 8). Historian Karen Ferguson shows that in the 1960s the foundation’s primary domestic goal was “to better the overall health of the American body politic, which suffers most acutely at this point in history from the entrance pains of the American Negro into full citizenship” (as quoted in Ferguson 2007: 84). Issues of racism and Black out-migration from the south were transformed into race-neutral terms such as “immigrant assimilation” and “inequalities of the poor.”

The Ford Foundation believed this betterment involved a social engineering effort that sought first and foremost to “prepare” African Americans to enter the American mainstream. It committed itself to the appropriate stewardship of African Americans, which it accomplished not just through its own programming efforts but also predominantly in its guidance of community-based projects and nonprofit organizations (Allen 1969; Ferguson 2007; Jenkins and Eckert 1986; O’Connor 1996).

The Ford Foundations’ funding for African American organizations transition from a strict integrationist approach (which funded primarily civil rights groups) to one that tolerated and at times even advocated the development of separatists movements (Ferguson 2007). It therefore included militant groups within its grantees to educate them on more reformist appropriate methods of protest. Furthermore, the Ford Foundation encouraged minority groups to develop their own separatist agenda as a period of transition, but not without sight of the ultimate step of full integration (Ibid.). The Ford Foundation focused on programs that stressed “economic and educational advancement of disadvantaged minority groups” even when in segregated settings, believing that these programs would “in time normalize social integration” (as quoted in Ferguson 2007: 85). By 1968, the Ford Foundation’s new Division of National Affairs was explicit in its promotion of this model. In defending grant proposals directed at increasing the group identity and power of minorities the Ford Foundation insisted that “in black identity (at least those manifestations free of reverse racism and destructive apartheidism) may lie the social strength that played so critical a part in the rise of other urban ethnic groups to political and economic status” (Ibid.). The Ford Foundation strategically selected more radical and even Black nationalist organizations in order to promote their incorporation into a more integrationist agenda. This new strategy led to the admission of a more radical

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16 This language of evading that race mattered in shaping inequality was central to conceptions of poverty at the time. This language skirted any analysis on the role of the federal government in creating racialized forms of inequality as well as policies that enabled some groups to accumulate resources. This analysis was fundamentally influenced by the assimilation and economic and political growth of white ethnics. The Ford Foundation as well as other funding entities believed that African Americans and Mexican Americans could follow their lead. Yet as historical studies have shown, white ethnics did not just pull themselves from the bootstraps as it was popularly believed at the time. As Robert O Self (2003) argues: “Across the united the postwar United States, as cities were remade by two of the most extensive internal migrations of the nation's history—the migration of southern African Americans to the cities of the Northeast, Midwest, and West and the mass suburbanization of whites—the federal government did not stand idly by. It gave contour and direction to these migrations. Its housing policies helped to develop some places and under develop others” (2).
organization, the Congress on Racial Equality, which would cause controversies in the foundation world.

*The Southwest Council of La Raza*

It is not surprising that the Ford Foundation selected the most reformist Mexican American leaders to coordinate the Ford’s projects on Mexican Americans (see Durán 2005; Jenkins and Eckert 1986). Mexican Americans had to struggle to attain funds from foundations and many of the early mobilizations began almost by accident. In 1963 Herman Gallegos, one of the most prominent Mexican American leaders, met the vice president of the Ford Foundation while working in San Francisco Bay-Hunters Point. In his oral history, Gallegos recounts people’s confusion when they saw him, a Mexican American, serving as an executive director of a Black youth project. This was exactly what Paul Ylvisaker asked a young Herman Gallegos:

“‘What is a Mexican American doing working in a black neighborhood?’ I said, ‘Well, it doesn’t appear that [the Ford Foundation] funds Mexican American projects, and so I have no other place to go to do what I like to do’” (Gallegos 1989: 36). As Gallegos recounts, Mexican-Americans as a group did not exist in the foundation world and, as a political force, did not represent a united group. Most of the Ford Foundation’s urban antipoverty funding at that time was earmarked for African American programs.

Through its affiliations with prominent Bay Area leaders such as Herman Gallegos and Dr. Ernesto Galarza, the Ford Foundation began to closely align itself with Mexican American activists and organizations throughout the southwest. Its commitment to Mexican American organizations was formalized when on June 10, 1968 the Ford foundation awarded the Southwest Council of la Raza (SCLR) $630,000 to begin its operations as a 501(c)3 tax-exempt organization. Funds were issued to Dr. Julian Samora, Dr. Ernesto Galarza and Herman Gallegos, who then enlisted a diverse group of organizers and leaders of the Mexican American community to serve as SCLR’s governing board. These participants represented a broad spectrum of organizations with both moderate and radical tendencies. The invited participants included self-described Chicano activists like Maclovio Barrazo, an organizer with the AFL-CIO, Bert Corona, president of the Community Service Organization (CSO), and Alex Mercure, then a teacher in New Mexico alongside more reformist members like Albert Peña, an elected official from Texas (Mora 2009: 68).

SCLR organizers had ambitious plans to establish a set of community-driven barrio projects (Gallegos 1989: 68; Garcia 1994: 228; Mora 2009: 68). Initially they did not want to create a centralized institutionalized organization like the NAACP or MALDEF. Instead, they wanted to channel funds to the grassroots. The group’s fundamental goal was social change—a vision that included immediate economic development projects, leadership development, and advocacy for the transformation of different institutions. This social change ideology was based on the ideas of liberation theology and Paulo Freire which Mexican American leaders sought to

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17 Paul Ylvisaker entered the Ford Foundation in 1955 after an extensive early career working with city governments and academia. He considered himself a liberal urban activist and received a PhD in 1948 in political economy and government. When Ylvisaker joined the Ford Foundation’s public affairs staff, he took the foundation in a more activist direction in urban programs (O’Connor 1996: 600). His expertise in urban reform led him to advocate for a shift from brick and mortar forms of urban renewal to an emphasis on “people problems” which became the central philosophy behind the Ford Foundation’s Gray Area Program and subsequent federal War on Poverty efforts. He was one of the first Ford Foundation member that advocated for the foundation to become involved in issues of race and the “urban problem.”
bring to the barrios. As Bert Corona details in his memoir leaders believed they needed participation of the people to achieve real political power. As Bert Corona further recounts:

[The Mexican American leadership] was impressed with what the farmworkers and César Chávez were doing, and we looked to the farmworkers' union as a model...In the barrios, it would involve a strong barrio organization. It would have to be an organization that would go into every nook and cranny of the barrios. His idea was to establish concilios, or councils, everywhere...These concilios would meet regularly to discuss common problems and to plan strategy for combatting the establishment. In Galarza's mind, this concilio movement would spread throughout the Southwest (Garcia 1994: 228).

This goal to support grassroots community efforts fit nicely into the Ford Foundation’s goal of fostering minority-based organizations and leadership. It differed, however, from the Ford Foundation’s emphasis on funding institutions and not grassroots struggles. Therefore, the Ford Foundation created SCLR which would operate as the bureaucratic institution. For leaders such as Dr. Galarza, SCLR was just a means to channel foundation monies to grassroots struggles. Ford initially placed no serious restrictions on the kinds of barrio projects fit for funding. SCLR would be responsible for the actions of the community-based organizations it chose to fund. The new organizations’ leadership decided that it would grant the local community as much authority in administering its programs and funds. Therefore, rather than the Ford Foundation choose programmatic focus as was common for private foundations, SCLR leadership was empowered to channel funding into a multiplicity of different programmatic efforts that best represented the diverse needs of the Mexican American population.

The arrival of Ford Foundation money fortified Mexican American trans-local organizing and networking. Money for traveling and meetings facilitated communication among different factions of Mexican American political movements. According to Gallegos (1989):

At that time, many Hispanics18 knew about each other but had never really met. There were people like Reies Lopez Tijerina whom I had read about and heard about. I had never met him until the Ford grant. People—like Corkie Gonzales, Grace Olivarez—we were known to each other but had never met because we had no resources. So when [the Ford] asked us to go out, we began to sit down, and I talked to Reies Tijerina about the whole land grant issue and spent time with him (64).

These interactions convened both radical and reformist Mexican American leaders and were instrumental in improving their organizational potential. The meeting of these concurrent modes of activism united Mexican Americans as a group that shared conditions of inequality across the entire Southwest. These interactions produced of an entire mélange of protest, radical, and

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18 Herman Gallegos firmly believes that “Hispanic” is the appropriate term to refer to Mexican Americans and other Latinos. He played a crucial role in advocating for the usage of this terminology even in the heyday of the Chicano movement. He was, for example, one of the central players in advocating the US Census to adopt this term. In my interview with him in 2011, Gallegos explained that “hispanic” was a more inclusive umbrella pan-ethnic. I was surprised that other activists of the time also preferred to use this term but understood that in the historical context in which they organized, their usage of this category also helped to differentiate them from Chicano “radicals.”
integrationist demands all intent on securing the wellbeing of Mexican Americans throughout the US. As sociologist Cristina Mora (2009) recounts, some of the more radical protest members of the SCLR became frustrated with the limitations of working alongside moderate members (70). Yet the frustrations were not just in relationship to the intra-group dynamics. They were also related to the increasing limitations set in place by the new source of funding—the Ford Foundation.

Oakland’s Spanish Speaking Unity Council was one of the initial SCLR grantees (Martinez 1976; Orozco et al. 2008). Other organizations in Texas and in Los Angeles were also selected. With this funding, the Unity Council and other Latino nonprofits were inducted into the processes of transforming their work into the rubric of 501(c)3 organizational structure. Some of these leaders of these first set of nonprofits, according to Gallegos, did not even know what a 501(c)3 organization was nor truly understood how to run a privately funded organization (Gallegos 1989: 69). These organizations had been supported through membership dues as well as in kind volunteer and other supportive services. They were true grassroots political organizations that met in members’ homes and coordinated services by referring clients to existing city and county services. They were not directly in the business of service provision. Getting access to SCLR funding was their first formalized form of monetary aid and their first contact with the bureaucratic machinery of both private foundations and federal agencies that recognized them as tax-exempt organizations.

The Unity Council utilized Ford Foundation money to fund small barrio projects that engaged in community advocacy and leadership training. It issued mini-grants of approximately $1,000 each to a collection of small organizations in Oakland (Orozco et al. 2008: 21). The Unity Council hoped to train and develop smaller organization with the aim of fulfilling the SCLR mission of promoting leadership development. The mini-grant recipients were a diverse group including a Latino newspaper, the Oakland Brown Berets chapter, the Filipino American Political Association, and Frente, a Latino student organization at U.C. Berkeley. This group of organizations was diverse not only in purpose but also in organizational tendencies. Some groups like the Brown Berets, were much more radical than the others and could easily raise concern among conservative and centralist constituents. The Unity Council decided to fund these organizations because it deemed them to be in most need of leadership development. It also believed that these organizations were at the forefront of community needs and desires. The Unity Council helped to train these membership-based organizations to apply for their mini-grants and gave them their first experience with a formal funds application process. It also served to establish relationships of mutual support among existing nonprofits.

**The Racial 1969 Tax Reform Act**

Mexican American groups’ initial engagement with private foundations proved to be productive of new political and economic openings. It also helped these organizations muster greater respect and authority in many cities throughout the southwest. As new nonprofit agencies, Ford Foundation funding legitimized them as institutions that could be trusted. Federal authorities were not blind to the triangulations of nonprofit organizations, social movement actors, and philanthropic foundations. White political elites became vigilant of race-based organizations’ escalating authority within racialized communities, and its impacts on U.S. society in general. By proxy, they also kept a close watch on the philanthropic organizations that funded them. In what follows I critically analyze key Mexican American and African American mobilizations that led Congress to pass the 1969 Tax Reform Act. This Congressional regulation policed the funding
practices of private foundations which subsequently served to regulate their grantee’s programmatic efforts. The reform was a racial act because it strategically targeted race-based organizations and limited the expansion of their political movements. With the tax reform, the federal government created a strict register of what constituted appropriate nonprofit political projects and forbid tax-exempt organizations from engaging in any kind of voter registration campaigns or advocacy that would impact electoral processes. As Susan A. Ostrander (2005) argues, this anti-political prohibition “to this day discourages funding for social justice work for fear of overstepping these bounds” (38). Despite this heightened policing of nonprofit political activity, I show how Fruitvale nonprofits worked around these limitations to continue their political work. Organizations like the Unity Council deployed private foundations’ new programmatic emphasis of community development to leverage greater economic and political clout in the City of Oakland.

From the onset of their engagement with the Ford Foundation, SCLR leaders understood that philanthropic funding sought to prevent the eruption of violence among Mexican American organizations. Many of these leaders themselves firmly advocated for nonviolence. According to Gallego’s (1989) oral history, the Ford Foundation channeled funds to the Mexican American organizations to garner more information about this racial group, especially about the more militant activists. The Ford Foundation enlisted SCLR leaders to broker relationships with groups that could prove to be violent. Gallegos (1989) specifically recounts this concern at the time over the actions of Reies López Tijerina and the land grant issues occurring in New Mexico which he reported to Ford officials could “erupt in violence unless something is done to resolve the claims that Reies is presenting” (65). Similar to its practices of courting of African American organizations, the Ford Foundation also sought to bring more militant Mexican American organizations into its purview. It envisioned itself as a philanthropic institution empowered to guide minority groups into appropriate forms of mobilizing.

Ford Foundation oversight over SCLR funded activities and its affiliate organizations, however, was never panoptical. In fact, the foundation granted much more autonomy to SCLR than it normally did to grantees, namely because of the diversity of programatic efforts that Mexican American communities needed. This relative autonomy allowed SCLR to fund some of what it deemed as more “protest” based activities which included voter registration programs designed to raise consciousness about electoral processes and several demonstrations and marches (Mora 2009: 72). As Cristina Mora’s analysis of SCLR archival sources reveals, in early 1969 SCLR helped to stage a walkout at a National Institute of Mental Health Conference. The walkout critiqued the lack of resources directed toward Mexican American mental health services (Ibid.). SCLR also equipped community affiliates with resources to organize conferences and rallies. One of these community affiliates in San Antonio, Texas provided MAYO with money for student conferences that protested racial discrimination in public schooling.

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19 Ostrander (2005: 33) defines social justice funding as: “philanthropic support for advancing progressive social change, that is, the redistribution of power and resources (economic, social, cultural, and/or political) in a more egalitarian direction.”

20 The Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO) was made up of second, third, and fourth generation students. This group organized against what it deemed as rampant discrimination and enforced social constraints in Texas educational system (Acuña 2004: 316). It serve as the foundational organization in establishing the Raza Unida Party, an alternative third party that begun in Texas and eventually spread throughout the Southwest. Prominent Chicana/o leaders formed the Raza Unida party because they believed that a third party was necessary to achieve political party because neither the Democratic or Republican parties truly represented their issues. It
The Ford Foundation, under pressure from the U.S. Congress, quickly came to suspect that SCLR sub-grantees were endorsing violence. For example, in one instance Congress was angered by the alleged public militant (i.e. anti-White) rhetoric by a Mexican American, Jose Angel Gutierrez, a politician from MAYO. Though SCLR never funded any organization engaged in violent rhetoric or behavior, this politician’s statement negatively impacted public and Congressional perception of SCLR funded projects. As Gallegos (1989) recounts:

Jose was appearing to advocate violence. He made some comments about “getting rid of the Anglos.” [People wondered] “You mean, kill them?” He said, “Well, you can take it anyway you want.” Well, that's all that Congress wanted to hear because the next thing you know, the accusation was that Ford was funding programs to foment violent behavior. What Jose Angel Gutierrez was saying is was, “Look, we are 90 percent of the population in city after city, but we don't control any of the bread or the beer delivery franchises, we have no economic control of those towns.” His idea was to get rid of the Anglos and let Mexicans own a piece of the pie (70).

As evidenced by Gallegos’s recounting of the incident, Jose Angel Gutierrez’s statement was not even militant per say. Instead, Congressional and public response to his statement raises another key issue: White political and economic elites’ fear regarding the economic success of Mexican American businesses and trades. Chicano historians differ on the intent of Gutierrez’s words. Lorena Oropeza argues that MAYO as an organization was unapologetically anti-gringo and viewed Anglos as the “enemy.” As she describes: “Although members sometimes drew finer distinctions between sympathetic and racist Anglo Americans, the organization’s aim was to present a clear choice to Mexican American in South Texas: Did they stand with MAYO or with the enemy?” (Oropeza 2005: 77-78). Rudy Acuña (2004) downplays MAYO’s militant stance and argues that Gutierrez was simply advocating ending White control over Mexicans (323). Regardless of the intentionality of violence, the Congressional “fear” of Mexican American political activity related both to violence as well as to growing Mexican American economic clout and its impact on existing White social structures.

Ford Foundation officials did not stand idle over Gutierrez statements and the Congressional debates that resulted. Mora (2009) demonstrates that in a letter dated April of 1969, a Ford Foundation director critiqued SCLR’s funding of MAYO activities (74). Fearful of negative publicity, the Ford Foundation warned that funding of any organizations that endorsed violence would not be allowed and that funding for groups like MAYO would not be acceptable (Ibid.). In his oral history Herman Gallegos recalls receiving an angry call from a Ford Foundation officer saying “What the hell are you funding? I want you to get rid of those guys and not give them any more money” (Gallegos 1989: 71). The following day, the Ford Foundation released a press release announcing that the grant to MAYO was being cut off.

Excessive alarm over minority militance served as a pretext for defunding programs that had led to increasing Mexican American power at the polls and in popular protest and effective

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21 Jose Angel Gutiérrez was one the initial organizers of the Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO) a San Antonio, Texas organization. He became one of the most active participants of the Raza Unida Party (see Gutierrez 1999)
The 1960s was a decade of great electoral gains for Mexican Americans. In 1963, a slate of Mexican American candidates had won control of the city council in the small South Texas town of Crystal City (Oropeza 2005: 47). By 1965, three Mexican Americans—Henry González, Edward Roybal and Eligio de La Garza—were elected to the U.S. House of Representatives (Mora 2009: 66). At the same time, the United Farm Workers, under the leadership of Cesar Chavez, Dolores Huerta, and Larry Itliong had initiated successful marches and boycotts, all which garnered national attention and linked thousands of Mexican Americans throughout the Southwest. Further politicization among the newer generations promised further electoral gains by the late 1960s. According to Herman Gallegos (1989): “to make matters worse, a young man by the name of Mario Cumpean, just a street kid, ran for mayor against Mayor McAllister and scared the hell out of him because the population of San Antonio is very heavily Mexican. A Hispanic surname running could attract a sizable vote. All of a sudden it looked like here was a mammoth revolution coming with violent behavior in the wings” (70). White elites at the time viewed Mexican American political gains as a threat, especially giving shifting demographics in major southwest cities like San Antonio. They also questioned Mexican American candidates affiliation with Ford Foundation supported organizations. They charged that philanthropic organizations were interfering excessively in functions like electoral politics that were strictly the domain of the federal government. This concern served as a major factor in subsequent Congressional moves to limit the political projects of race-based nonprofit organizations.

The White elite desire to curb nonprofit organizations’ political culture was also related to growing efficacy of Ford Foundation funded voter registration campaigns for African Americans. The Ford Foundation channeled extensive funds to voter registration projects operated by the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) in Cleveland, Ohio. On July 14, 1967, it awarded CORE a $175,000 grant to establish a “Target City” voter registration and leadership training project for inner-city African Americans in Cleveland (Ferguson 2007: 67). This city was undergoing massive racial transformations contoured by White outmigration and a dramatic in-migration of Blacks, which entailed a rising significance of the African American electorate. CORE understood this demographic transition and acted to increase the number African American voters, which analysts speculated had led to the election of Carl Stokes as Cleveland’s first African American mayor. Elected on November 7, 1967, Stokes was the first African American mayor of a major U.S. city. For the political elite at the time, this successful black mobilization, coupled with the fear of Mexican American political organizations emulating these gains, further propelled Congress into action to curb philanthropic funding of voter registration campaigns and other “political” projects.

Congressional policing of private foundations and nonprofits through the 1969 Tax Reform Act cannot be divorced from other well studied state responses to national social movements and global struggles in the late 1960s. In many instances throughout the world and in the United States, state agencies projected their own forms of violence to quell urban movements. In Mexico City federal police massacred student protesters at Tlatelolco in 1968. This stunned student activists worldwide and galvanized an entire generation of Mexican American leaders. In the U.S. protests against the War on Vietnam and increasing racial injustices in urban communities radicalized many political action groups and entire movements (Oropeza 2005). The killing of Ruben Salazar during a demonstration against the War of Vietnam further propelled new generations of Mexican Americans into political action (Acuña 2004: 332). Throughout major cities in the southwest, youth organized high school walkouts to
protest discriminatory conditions in schooling (Bernal 1999; Muñoz 2007). Rodolfo “Corkie” Gonzales and other members of the Crusade for Justice had many altercations from the police and symbolized the struggle to control urban barrios (Acuña 2004: 326). And in more rural areas, Reies López Tijerina and the Land Grant Movement employed militant means to call attention to this historical injury to Hispanos (Durán 2005; Kosek 2006). All this stunned New Mexico, attracted national media coverage, and strongly inspired the urban Chicano community (Garcia 1994: 252). The FBI initiated its Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) which targeted activists and with the help of local police enforcement routinely surveilled and jailed militant or highly visible activists (Pulido 2006: 173).

In this tense context of national racial movements demanding greater equality both through the ballot box and the streets, it is impossible to think of the 1969 Tax Reform Act as delinked from these contentious processes. The tax reform was part of a constellation of state responses to the reformist and militant modes of activism I previous described. The congressional act was not a direct policing of nonprofit organizations. The 1969 Tax Reform only served as a threat to discourage nonprofit political activities. The federal government reserved the right to step in should tax-exempt organizations engage in any type of prohibited activity. Congress operated a distance and employed philanthropic foundations to redesign their programatic efforts for nonprofit agencies. As funders and stewards of nonprofit organizations, private foundations were expected to have greater oversight over the actions of their grantees.

The Ford Foundation responded to the 1969 Tax Reform Act by shifting its programmatic agenda to “hard programs” that could produce measurable results. The Ford created the Community Development Corporation as a model nonprofit entity intent on producing the measurable development of ghetto communities (see Ford Foundation 1973). This new programatic focus aimed to channel nonprofits away from direct public actions or protest activities. For the Ford Foundation, the transition into solely funding minority community development corporations emphasized its new programatic focus on “product rather than on process” (Magat 1979: 123). As the Ford Foundation deemed it, in regards to funding for minority community organizations “a couple of hundred housing units is worth more than ‘telling whitey off’” (Ibid.). The Ford understood the transition into “measurable results” would direct less energy into minority protest movements that helped to buttress actions against a common White oppressor. Instead of fomenting this anti-White sentiment, nonprofits were encouraged to redirect their efforts to the redevelopment of urban space.

The Tax Reform and the Ford Foundation’s restructuring of its grantee program fractured already tense divisions between SCLR’s diverse membership of reformist and radical leaders. Bert Corona was one of the first members to leave SCLR. According to Gallegos (1989), the 1969 Tax Reform Act brought about a curtailment of the advocacy agenda so integral to the activist fervor of these organizations. Other board members alleged that the foundation’s new focus on “hard” programs aimed to produce “safe” programs that did not challenge power structures. SCLR underwent major transitions that were influenced by its shifting relationship with the Ford Foundation as a result of the tax reform. By 1973, SCLR changed its name to the National Council of la Raza and relocated its headquarters from the Southwest to Washington, DC. Cristina Mora (2009) argues that this transition brought the organization in closer relationships with the federal government. Its funding went from primarily Ford Foundation to being mainly comprised of federal grants and a more diverse set of private foundation funding. At this point, NCLR became a more pan-ethnic Latino organization that included Puerto Rican and Cuban groups (Mora 2009). It also became more focused on research and advocacy through
the federal government. In short, NCLR became detached from the grassroots community struggles in the southwest that propelled Mexican American leaders to form the Southwest Council of la Raza (SCLR).

**Politics by Other Means**

Oakland’s Spanish Speaking Unity Council became one of the first Mexican American Community Development Corporations (CDC) which helped it attain an expedited institutionalization. In its role as urban developer, it found new opportunities to gain further authority in the neighborhood. The Unity Council understood its transition into a CDC to be a propitious change that helped it harness a better future for its many projects. As a CDC the Unity Council now courted Ford Foundation directly, without assistance from SCLR. Despite the new anti-political clauses that the tax reform set in place, nonprofit leaders and community activists found alternative ways of enacting different forms of politics. First, despite the fact that the 1969 Tax Reform explicitly forbid direct nonprofit intervention in electoral campaigns, nonprofit leaders mobilized alternative strategies to assure that Latinos gain political representation in City of Oakland government offices. Second, the Unity Council found greater economic and political opportunities in its new role as developer. It found that redeveloping urban racialized spaces was a political act which reconstituted neighborhood politics.

The 1969 Tax Reform did not render nonprofits apolitical. This was best evidenced in how nonprofit leaders talked about the successful election of Joe Coto as the first Chicano to be a part of the Oakland City Council. Coto was not just any member of the Fruitvale community. He had been involved in various nonprofit mediated projects and had been trained as a leader through his involvement with prominent Community Service Organization (CSO) leaders. At the time of his campaign, Joe Coto was on the board of directors of the Unity Council. He was a key player in Fruitvale’s nonprofit sector and in fact represented the most powerful of them all: the Spanish Speaking Unity Council.

Fruitvale nonprofits played a foundational role in electing the first Chicano into the City of Oakland. They enlisted their extensive patronage and volunteer networks to spearhead campaigning efforts. The organizations therefore informally served to campaign for Joe Coto. As Noel Gallo, who served on the board of education for many terms, described: “Yeah, when Joe ran, that’s when the whole Chicano thing was really strong and that’s how Joe got in. Cause the Unity Council, whoever worked at the Unity Council, la Clinica de la Raza, Centro Legal, it was understood that that’s what you are supposed to do. You may not like Joe, but that’s what you did.” As Gallo argues, nonprofit organizations were central actors in how the “Chicano thing” manifested in Fruitvale: it was understood that Chicanos/Latinos needed political representation and thus there was a culture of supporting this cause. Nonprofits helped to give contour to this culture by encouraging their constituency to vote in a certain fashion, or serving as central places where politically active people convened.

Nonprofit organizations and their leaders, however, tacitly engaged in electoral politics. Alex Zermeño, who in his career has been involved in various different nonprofit organizations, admits: “Nonprofits, the ones I’ve been [involved in] have never been directly involved with politics.” That is, nonprofits as an entity, according to Zermeño, cannot directly endorse a political candidate or a particular political campaign. As he elaborates: “Members of that nonprofit may go run for office like Joe Coto did or may endorse publicly as individuals a candidate. The nonprofit never endorses a candidate, never conducts fundraisers, but individuals of that nonprofit endorse candidates, raise money in the streets, etc.” Thus according to Zermeño,
because 501(c)3 organization are forbidden to be involved in what the federal government deems as “political” acts, they found alternative ways of influencing electoral processes.

Joe Coto’s 1972 campaign galvanized an entire generation of leaders and helped to enlist new members into nonprofit organizations. After hearing about the Spanish Speaking Unity Council in a newspaper article, Teresa Limon knew that this would be her opportunity to get involved. As a stay at home mom, Limon was eager to become active in something. “I had five little kids and my youngest was about six months old, but I also had the itch.” She remembers how immediately after seeing the newspaper article she knew she could be involved in this type of organization. She contacted Arabella Martinez and one of the first things she came into was Joe Coto’s political campaign. She remembers dearly how participation in this campaign helped to fuel her enthusiasm for the type of political work coming out of the Unity Council. As Teresa Limon recalled:

One of the first things I did at the Unity Council was to support the political campaign for Joe Coto. I used to take my baby on the stroller and my other four kids and my sister and my husband and we would go walk precincts for Joe. One of my boys was only four years old and he would ring doorbells, so people would talk to him.

As Teresa Limon describes Joe Coto’s election became an entire family endeavor. This meant that not only the nuclear family was involved but also the broader community. Nonprofits like the Unity Council, as community-building institutions, were at the forefront of informally supporting the Joe Coto campaign and this meant working outside of normal business hours and enlisting entire families to support the campaign struggle.

The Unity Council’s involvement with Joe Coto’s election was so strong that Arabella Martinez described his successful election as one of the organizations’ greatest accomplishments. As she described it in her oral history:

We [the Unity Council] were moving and making waves...to the point that we even elected one of our board members to be a city council person...I mean we elected him against a Republican—a White Republican who had been there eight years...we got no support from the newspaper and we won citywide. We did not just win in the district, we won citywide (Martinez 1991: 36).

Nonprofit leaders like Arabella Martinez interpreted Joe Coto’s successful election as proof of the successes of nonprofit-mediated political mobilization they envisioned for Oakland. In their collective struggle, nonprofit leaders envisioned that their organizations would train the future leaders that could helped to disrupt the White political clout in the city and gain further representation for Fruitvale in city politics. The Unity Council at this point held the lead as the nonprofit most closely aligned with different national funding streams including federal agencies and the Ford foundation. It viewed itself as the representative of the Mexican-American ascent in Oakland. Central to this prosperity was helping to land a Mexican-American from its own board of directors into an elected office. The Unity Council and its leader Arabella Martinez saw this as a powerful way of spatializing the rising Mexican-American power in the City of Oakland. Joe Coto’s election in 1972 was viewed as the gains of the Chicano mobilizations of the time and further proof that nonprofit-mediated institutionalized path was the appropriate mode of struggle.
Nonprofit organizations like the Unity Council maintained that the political went beyond the terrain of state-mediated electoral politics. As a community development corporation the Unity Council saw itself as empowered by the mandate to make physical changes in urban space. The organization and its leaders viewed their development projects as political because they served to fashion a new image of Mexican Americans through productions of space. As Henri Lefebvre argued the production of space enacts a “logic of homogeneity and a strategy of the repetitive” with the ultimate goal of reproducing the social relations of production (Lefebvre 2009:189). Unity Council development projects disrupted this homogeneity by branding their projects as Mexican and Mexican American. This production of space as Mexican American was a highly political act. As Doreen Massey argues, “the identities of place are always unfixed, contested and multiple” which therefore means that any attempts to stabilize the meaning of a particular place involves “a social contest, battles over the power to label space-time, to impose the meaning to be attributed to a space”(1994: 5).

The Unity Council’s successful development projects consolidated its authority as an efficient community steward. In 1973 the Unity Council completed its first development project—61 units of family housing, Las Casitas. This was at the heigh of the mobilizations of the late 1960s and it was the first time the Unity Council was able to prove itself as a community development corporation. As Arabella Martinez (1991) recalls: “When we had our open house for Casitas there were a lot of people and the community was excited because I mean...Mexicans built this”(36). This was not just any kind of development project, it was an entirely Mexican project and it served to project an image of Mexican-Americans as capable of engineering large-scale projects. It was also a testament of the Unity Council’s savvy fundraising capabilities, leveraging both federal redevelopment funds, private loans, as well as important development loans from the Ford Foundation (Martinez 1976). Unity Council development projects were thus racial redevelopment projects that constructed Mexican Americans as fully capable of economic development.

The Unity Council waged a political battle to be recognized as a legitimate community development corporation. Initially the organization was not taken seriously because it was critiqued for being too young and inexperienced. Many city officials and other institutions also questioned its affiliations with some of the Chicano Movement struggles. As Ramon Rodriguez recalled, “it was an uphill battle to take seriously for obvious reasons: you were new in the business and you are young and you talked like a radical. I guess we still had long hair!” As a recent college graduate, Rodriguez was just learning the tricks of the trade and he was able to quickly understand that development projects were not just about getting money and successfully completing a project. Development projects, especially for this new organization, required a deft political hand. As Rodriguez describes, most people of the White owned establishments were reticent to trust a long-haired Mexican American. Therefore, though Rodriguez was far from the image that we have today of the militant, this recent college graduate was perceived to be too radical for the time. Rodriguez admits that he had to learn new ways of comportment and how to leverage influential contacts. He learned this primarily from watching Arabella Martinez in action. As he described: “Arabella would not be perceived as radical; she was a little bit more state, a little bit more conservative. All of her stuff was Cal [UC Berkeley] stuff, we learned that there was the code for dealing with people.” As Ramon’s comments reveal, this “code” was as much about differentiating Unity Council workers from more militant sectors of the Mexican
American community by leveraging contacts and connections with state officials. Furthermore, as both Arabella and Ramon were graduates of UC Berkeley, they also deployed their University training and affiliations to garner further respect.

The Unity Council prided itself in how the economic development programs made improvements in the physical environment of the community. Its crowning glory was the construction of the agency’s headquarters which it marketed as a Community Resource Center. Arabella Martinez saw these architectural sites as proof of the Unity Council’s financial dexterity and its ability to deploy its affiliations with both state agencies as well as philanthropic institutions in order to bring changes to the neighborhood. As Martinez described, the Unity Council harnessed a grant of $406,200 from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Economic Development Administration (EDA) to build the community resource center (Martinez 1976: 201). Furthermore, through Martinez’s contacts, the Unity Council secured a $325,000 loan from the Ford Foundation. As an institution the Unity Council secured direct funding from the Ford Foundation and no longer had to rely on the Southwest Council of la Raza (SCLR) as an intermediary. This dynamic financial deftness required the skillful management of institutional relationships. The Unity Council deemed this work as a means to direct capital for the benefit of the community. Moreover, it saw its various construction projects as directly impacting how Mexican Americans were perceived as a group. As Ramon Gutierrez proudly recalled, by 1976 the Unity Council had three housing projects, two completed and one in progress. Ramon recalls:

We were in our own sweet brand new building that everybody knew as the Spanish Speaking Unity Council building. We learned to develop, at least to do some commercial development. Though the Unity Council headquarters is only three stories high and not huge..it was built from the ground up. And in those days everything had to be Mexican! You had to hire a Mexican architect!

Therefore, the new Unity Council building was seen not just as any kind of redevelopment project, it was understood as a Mexican American project and an architectural symbol of the group’s ability to succeed.

Some of the most impactful programs the Unity Council built were educational and job training endeavors for youth. Manuel Alcala was then a youth and recalled how inspired he was to see the workings of this kind of Mexican-American organization: “So I walked [into the Unity Council offices] and I looked around and there was a lot of Chicano art on the walls. I said ‘Wow! This is great! This is wonderful’ I felt like I was at home because there was no place else that reflected our culture.” As he and other people I interviewed recalled this period, they all held dear the memories of the tremendous cultural work the Unity Council and other affiliated nonprofits did in this period. Manuel Alcala recalled how one summer Arabella Martinez “called all the Latinos, all the Chicanos, all the Mexicanos to go work for the summer program.” He worked as a newspaper delivery boy and a photographer at UC Berkeley events. He also participated in educational retreats where the youth learned about Chicano culture and also networked with many youth from the neighborhood. These types of programs as Manuel Alcala described, were instrumental to tracking students into achieving University education as well as preparing them for professional jobs in the nonprofit or private sector. These programs were also instrumental in instilling a sense of pride about their culture that resonated with the cultural tendencies of the Chicano movement.
Conclusion: The People are Our Business

“While historical conditions have modified the applications, the original goal has never been lost—to improve the social and economic health of the community. The People are Our Business. The Unity Council knows that the business of the community and the people of the community are one and the same”(8). 22

In concluding this chapter, I want to signal the Unity Council’s transition into an organization that prided itself over its business approach to community improvement. This was a completely different organization from its initial focus on community improvement through leadership development and organizing constituents to demand changes in state institutions. By the 1980s, the Unity Council measured its organizational goals as well as its outcomes in business terms. As the above epigraph demonstrates, this meant that the organization understood its work as an investment in the community and it quantified its outcomes as profits. The Unity Council also framed its target population as a type of business, and improvements in the community’s social and economic health as a business transaction. This degree of institutionalization and professionalization also meant increasing ties with major corporations. While it could be easy to understand this as the complete co-optation of the organization, I view this change as part of the Unity Council’s navigation of a shifting terrain of funding. It also shows how the organization engineered strategies to legitimize itself in a new landscape of constricted public funding for social services. There is no doubt that the organization continued to be invested in providing services for the community and in expanding opportunities for Latinos in Oakland. These were the organization’s initial goals at its foundation in 1964.

The Unity Council responded to state and private foundation regulatory mandates that channeled it into this particular route. Yet the organization also found strategic political and economic openings in these new routes of service provision and development. The central components of the organization’s aggressive business approach was a product on the Ford Foundation’s shift to “measurable” results. As this chapter has shown, the Ford Foundation has been a key player in contentious negotiations over the proper comportment of racialized minorities, especially African Americans and Mexican Americans. It viewed these groups relationally and funded organizations that channeled minority leadership into what it deemed as safer modes of organizing. The Ford Foundation, along with state officials of the time therefore served to craft specific kind of Mexican American and African American subjects. In these negotiations, nonprofit leaders enacted their own politicized maneuvers to to work around philanthropic and federal regulations. This triangulation of state agencies, nonprofit organizations, and private foundations plays a powerful role in contemporary projects of racial formation. However, these dynamic negotiations and nonprofit leaders’ situated navigation of federal and philanthropic institutions regulatory regimes are left out of Chicano/a historiography.  

Chicano historiography’s focus on Chicano Movement radicalism has rendered invisible these community and institutional struggles of moderate nonprofit actors. As I argued in this chapter, state agencies did not react solely to the Chicano radicalism of the period. Congressional debates that led to the 1969 Tax Reform Act saw both Mexican American militant protest and moderate electoral campaigns as a threat to the White controlled institutions of the time. Radical and moderate activists occupied a singular register of threat to existing social conditions at the time. Therefore these concurrent modes of activism have to be understood relationally as key political identities that mutually served to racialize Mexican Americans as a group.

The intense debates between the federal government, nonprofit organizations, and private foundations were competing claims to authority in urban racialized neighborhoods. At the heart of these debates were questions surrounding the political possibilities of Mexican Americans. This preoccupation with politics linked with economic growth and the control over resources were also relationally linked with African American struggles in Oakland and beyond. Therefore, Mexican American nonprofit forms of race-making were relational to the racialization of African Americans. These nonprofit mediated forms of racializing Mexican Americans and other Latinos were also fundamentally spatial. As the next chapter analyzes, the Unity Council continued to forge racialized understandings of and Latinos in general through its more recent architectural projects in Fruitvale.
In his remarks at groundbreaking ceremony of the Fruitvale Transit Village (FTV) in 1999, then U.S. Secretary of Transportation Rodney E. Slater praised the significance of this new ensemble of transit, housing, and revitalization of urban space. “Transportation,” remarked Slater, “is about so much more than concrete, asphalt and steel. It should be about building communities and creating new possibilities for people...We are all looking to Fruitvale as an example of how that can happen.” As an experiment in transit-oriented development, Slater argued that Fruitvale’s transit village proved the importance of community collaboration in urban redevelopment. This novel approach coupled improvements in transportation with housing and business developments. Slater also emphasized the partnerships between the Unity Council, the Department of Transportation, and other state agencies as key to bringing change to this neighborhood. As he saw it, Fruitvale’s transit village would be built through complex translocal processes that brought fiscal patrons to the neighborhood. These fiscal and administrative patrons did not just invest in Fruitvale in a vacuum. The Unity Council courted federal and California state agencies in addition to private foundations. In these elaborate bureaucratic transactions, it positioned itself as an efficient business partner and neighborhood steward invested in assuring the community’s wellbeing.

The Fruitvale Village is the largest redevelopment project in the modern history of the Fruitvale district. A project of this scale is usually a product of municipal planning and funding, and under neoliberal privatization schemes, would be a coveted project of large-scale developers. However, this retail and community resource ensemble is fundamentally marketed as a Unity Council, nonprofit project. Like its name suggests, as a community-based organization, the Unity Council positioned itself as the virtuous representative of a unified community voice and guardian of the neighborhood's interests. As a project for and by the community, the FTV promised economic development with the assurance that the Unity Council would protect Fruitvale from the potential ravages of gentrification and an inefficient and irresponsible state bureaucracy (Kirkpatrick 2007).

The Transit Village is a four-acre mixed-use, mixed-income transit-oriented development project located next to the Fruitvale Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) station. The project entails real estate opportunities that include 37 market-rate loft-style apartments with ten affordable units, office space, and more than 20 retail stores. This real estate development is anchored by a social service component whereby the complex’s major tenants are publicly funded agencies. They include a new community senior center, a Head Start child development center, a city of Oakland public library, and brand new Clinica de la Raza facilities (Kirkpatrick 2007: 9; Scully 2005). As the project manager Manny Silva observed, the transit village is ultimately a “social services center wrapped within a real estate project” (Scully 2005). Nonprofit and publicly funded city of Oakland social services secured the project’s economic feasibility of the project and advanced an alternative to market-oriented redevelopment schemes focused solely on profit.

In addition to the physical improvements it also instilled a new sense of safety and community identity to the neighborhood. The project organized disparate constituents of residents, merchants, and nonprofit allies along a coherent agenda of community uplifting. When Fruitvale’s transit village opened its doors in 2004, the neighborhood merchants hoped it would transform the entire region. As the owner of the new Casablanca Bridal and Tuxedo store, Jimmy

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Grogg told the *Tri-Valley Herald* “Like everybody else in the neighborhood, we have big hopes about the transit village, and hope it will help change the whole area” (Counts 2004). A proud Arabella Martinez, executive director of the Unity Council and the driving force behind the project told the press: “It’s beautiful. I think that beyond anything else this is really transforming the community. Ten years ago this was dirt, filth, and bars” (Ibid.). Residents and merchants alike viewed the new transit village as a kind of architectural messiah that would propel Fruitvale into a new era of safety and progress. Community activists involved with the project were enthusiastic to finally see the brick and mortar buildings and redesigned urban space that had been the subject of countless meetings. Like Arabella Martinez, charismatic and socially conscious residents hoped their efforts would distill the neighborhood of the violence, grime, and poverty that it had come to represent throughout the 1980s. As the embodiment of years of participating in nonprofit projects, residents’ and merchants’ activism was proof of how the Unity Council constructed its pastoral power in the Fruitvale community. It did so by closely working with residents and merchants on various small-scale projects and eliciting their consent at key moments of planning. The Unity Council employed this mandate of community care and representation to empower its constituency and nonprofit allies as agents in the neighborhood’s change.

As the last chapter argued, the Unity Council viewed its transition to a Community Development Corporation (CDC) as its mandate to become the neighborhood’s caretaker. It leveraged its connections to various state and non-state agencies, including the Ford Foundation, to build its authority in the neighborhood. This chapter critically analyzes how the Unity Council navigated neoliberal political and economic changes to harness greater power in the neighborhood. I demonstrate how the Unity Council did not experience neoliberal federal retraction from social services and urban redevelopment projects as a monolithic annihilation of inner-city state social welfare and service provision. Instead, it experienced it as a new set of economic processes it had to manipulate. It positioned itself as a savvy entrepreneurial agency that could develop Fruitvale in light of the lack of state-led development projects in the neighborhood.

Whereas studies of race-making overwhelmingly stress the role of state agencies in formal processes of racial categorization, this chapter reveals a much more complex mechanics of racialization. Nonprofit organizations like the Unity Council participate in intricate process race making by transforming urban landscapes and suturing race and place. Like contemporary projects of neoliberal urbanization, the FTV project strategically deployed ethnic culture to push redevelopment. From its initial conception, the project was fundamentally branded as a Latino redevelopment effort that proclaimed to embody the community’s vision and effervescence. Planners and nonprofit project stakeholders rendered the neighborhood’s geography, architecture, and culture as Latino and constructed this Latinidad as Fruitvale’s distinctive feature vis-à-vis other Oakland districts. Planners and Unity Council representatives deployed Latinidad as a homogenizing planning issue and a tool to attract new more affluent residents and capital investments.

The Unity Council marketed this ethnic culture through its technologies of caring for the neighborhood and branded itself as the custodian and ambassador of the region’s vibrant Latino culture. Racial and ethnic cultural identity formation operated through the physical transformation of the community. Furthermore, Latino racial identity became linked with care whereby Latino subjects could take care of themselves and their neighborhood and nonprofit agencies like the Unity Council assured that this would happen. The Unity Council served as an
important intermediary in achieving the neoliberal ethics of responsible governed subjects willing and able to care for themselves (see Ong 2003).

I argue that the Unity Council deployed its commitment to care of the community as a technology of government that normalized neoliberal urban redevelopment. In this sense, the project differs from the monolithic portrayals of neoliberal urbanization in its overwhelming linkage to care sutured with community participation. Caring practices entailed linking residents to social services as well as defending the community from private investors or city government planned projects deemed as non-indigenous to Fruitvale. The Unity Council deployed a gendered vision of care that positioned the organization as the principle agent in the proper articulation and rearing of the community. As such, the Unity Council and its nonprofit allies embarked on processes of urban redeveloped linked with caring practices at the level of community which entailed “fostering people’s relationships and social connections,” a form of labor that has been referred to as “kin work” or as “community mothering” (Nakano Glen 2010: 5; see also Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). The Unity Council positioned its kinder form of “community mothering” in direct opposition to improper state projects of care that had “disengaged” from Fruitvale. It defined itself as the sole provider of appropriate care and created pride amongst the neighborhood activists and merchants that mobilized their affective attachment to the community in order to render themselves responsible subjects committed to conceiving the proper neighborhood care. Yet like other neoliberal schemes, these nonprofit caring practices would devolve to individualized responsible citizen-subjects willing and able to care for themselves and the community.

Neoliberalism, Nonprofits, and the Inner City
A large body of literature has defined how a transition to neoliberal policies transformed urban governance and redevelopment processes. Neoliberal urbanization can be characterized by a profound break between an era of state-led redevelopment (Hackworth 2007; Harvey 1989). As a variegated process, neoliberalism operates in a contextual nature. Scholars utilize the term “actually existing neoliberalism” to account for the role of political and economic context in shaping how neoliberalism manifests in geographical spaces (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Peck and Tickell 2002). This literature has shown an uneven application of neoliberal practices accross geographical and social spaces. This includes, for example, the coexistence of Keynesian welfare state practices such as public housing with neoliberal practices such as the welfare-to-work requirements of current public assistance programs. In fact, the U.S. inner city, with its concentration of many federal programs and agencies is often seen as a vestige of Keynesian national welfare state (Jessop 2002). Inner cities are also spaces most heavily impacted by neoliberal descaling of the federal government’s role in public projects. Given limited federal funding, municipal governments subsequently find themselves with more constricted possibilities for inner city redevelopment. As Hackworth describes: “Because of the reduction of national interventions in housing, local infrastructure, welfare, and the like, localities are forced either to finance such areas themselves or abandon them entirely” (Hackworth 2007:12). That is, social improvement is rendered less important than the quest for marketability and profit. This results in a scenario in which certain sectors of the inner city are allowed to decay because they are not deemed apt for redevelopment by private contractors.

In many urban centers, social services including education and healthcare are increasingly subcontracted to private businesses and nonprofit organizations. Scholars have therefore argued that non-state actors like nonprofit organizations “take the work of the state” in
service provision and serve to govern populations. The literature implies a deep delinking of state and nonprofit civil society actors, mainly in its emphasis on the exponential growth of nonprofit mediated social services. This analysis often misses how nonprofits actually intimately relate with the state not just fiscally, but also in soliciting and complying with state regulatory practices and procedures. Federal retraction from social projects did not mean that state agencies and institutions relinquished their oversight and regulatory powers. Therefore, neoliberal devolution created complex and contentious relationships between different state agencies and nonprofit organizations. Yet, there has been scant attention to how nonprofits participate in these processes and thus serve to contradictorily mitigate and reinforce neoliberal projects. While the literature has shown that nonprofits “take on the work” of the state, we know little about how they in fact work through neoliberal reforms and actively reinforce these policies.

Scholarly focus on the novelty of current neoliberal practices also profoundly romanticizes earlier welfare state policies. Furthermore, it erases the long tradition of race-based nonprofit organizations like the Unity Council that have worked to provide services for underserved communities since the 1960s. Anthropologist Eleana Shever (2008) argues that the literature on neoliberalism tends “to deemphasize failures of state welfare and development and to neglect the continuities between neoliberalism and other regimes of rule” (703). As previous chapters have shown, state welfare programs had at best a tenuous relationship with impoverished racialized communities like Fruitvale. Federal state agencies, for example, did not eagerly grant social services to Mexican Americans. Activists struggled to make the population known and render this group worthy of assistance. Nonprofit leaders courted federal and municipal agents to convince them to open up more state services in Fruitvale. Scholars have argued that inner city racialized communities were never the intended recipients of Great Society welfare programs (Brown 1999; Self 2003) or earlier New Deal and Progressive Era reforms (Fox 2012). This explains why many 1960s activists argued that Fruitvale’s transit village was the architectural embodiment of long-term Mexican American self-help projects focused on leadership development. As an expert 1960s Mexican American leader Herman Gallegos argued: “It is important to think of the Fruitvale Transit Village as the fruits and direct result of decades of strong leadership that dates back to postwar [Mexican-American] mobilizations in Oakland and the entire Southwest.”

These historical relationships of interdependence and reciprocity between state institutions and nonprofit organizations has important ramifications for racialized communities. Given that nonprofits have increasing authority in urban neighborhoods, this opens up complex questions. One question relates to how nonprofits come to represent impoverished communities and the other is how they serve to reproduce neoliberal ideologies among constituents. The Unity Council, for example, cohered residents as a united entity and linked Fruitvale with powerful fiscal patrons. Through these bureaucratic and fiscal transactions, it rendered Fruitvale a manageable and functional space. This work is key to the technocratic efficiency required by neoliberal regimes. Furthermore, nonprofits like the Unity Council acted as community stewards and thus enacted governmental technologies targeted at Fruitvale residents.

In these practices, nonprofits can serve to reinforce neoliberal state imperatives that privilege individuality, and the creation of self-caring and self-governing subjects. As Shever (2008) describes, scholars “tend to overlook the way in which people participate in advancing neoliberal projects” (Shever 2008: 703). I take on her concern by looking at how nonprofit organizations promote the creation of subjects who are able to self-care and in fact uphold and advance these neoliberal projects. As I will demonstrate, the Unity Council worked directly with
residents to encourage them to participate in neighborhood watch associations, to attend meetings, and to effectively care for themselves and the neighborhood. Furthermore, the social service projects housed in Fruitvale’s transit village, for example, all encouraged clients to better care for themselves and their families.

**Harnessing Entrepreneurial Expedience**

As a community development corporation, the Unity Council already had extensive experience constructing housing projects, especially senior assisted living facilities. However, it had never taken on a project as large-scale as the transit village. So how was this relatively small nonprofit organization able to engineer such a large-scale development project? One of the central ways in which the Unity Council accomplished this project was in marketing itself as an efficient entrepreneurial organization. The Unity Council demonstrated its entrepreneurial prowess and fiscal expedience by orchestrating intricate financial assistance, both from state as well as private agencies. This neoliberal entrepreneurial identity pivoted on the sophisticated patron-client relationships it built through its incorporation as a nonprofit organization. Therefore, the success of these new neoliberal fundraising schemes depended on an earlier period of nonprofit integration into practices of state welfare provision.

The Unity Council demonstrated and celebrated its entrepreneurial prowess during the opening ceremonies of Fruitvale’s transit village in 2004. The Unity Council commemorated the completion of the project with a press tour, a reception and gala dinner, titled “Realizing the Dream.” The keynote speaker was Susan Beresford, President of the Ford Foundation, and guests included Oakland Mayor, Jerry Brown, Ajay Banga, President of Citigroup’s North American Retail Banking unit, State Senator Don Perata, and Raul Yzaguirre, President and CEO of the National Council of la Raza (NCLR) (Orozco et al. 2008: 85). This tightly woven group of both public and private representatives, as well as long-term national Latino organizations such as NCLR, were all commemorated for their fiscal and bureaucratic contributions to the construction of the Fruitvale Transit Village. The attendees were not bureaucratic disembodied state and private foundation employees—they were personal and long-term friends of the Unity Council and its leadership.

Attracting different fiscal patrons was fundamentally a translocal and allochronic process that required Unity Council executives to activate their own networks, especially their long-term connections with federal agencies in Washington, DC. Arabella Martinez, for example, drew heavily from her work as assistant secretary of Health, Education and Welfare for the Jimmy Carter administration (Martinez 1991: 39). While in Washington she gained important training and courted prominent allies in different federal agencies as well as with organizations like the National Council of la Raza. These Washington allies provided the financial and bureaucratic assistance for the initial planning and feasibility studies. Then Secretary of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), Federico Peña, for example, first heard about the FTV project in 1992 through his personal connection with Arabella Martinez. After only a couple of meetings, he personally presented the Unity Council with a $463,000 check for predevelopment planning, which included economic, traffic, and engineering studies of the area (Orozco et al. 2008: 80). As Unity Council board member Alex Zermeño recalled: “We took a picture with [Federico Peña] with a big enlarged check to start [planning] when we hadn’t even submitted our proposal, cause we knew each other…Arabella knew him from the National Council of la Raza.” As he continued: “Arabella knew him from Washington and she collected every ally that you could think of and created new ones…[Through these connections] we started working with City Bank
and other big institutions.” Validation and trust from long-term patrons such as the Ford Foundation and federal agencies such as the Department of Transportation opened doors to more complex fundraising schemes. These connections occurred before an era of neoliberal economic restructuring. However, Unity Council’s deployment of these connections enabled it to compete better for funding from other agencies.

The Unity Council’s most prominent fiscal patron, the Ford Foundation, had long supplied the organization with prestige and respect. In the late 1990s the Ford Foundation provided a large infusion of funds, about $1,800,000, which allowed the Unity Council to pay off all of its debts, including the mortgage on the Community Resource Center, and to invest $500,000 in the Fruitvale Transit Village development (Orozco et al. 2008: 51). Ultimately, the Ford Foundation’s long-term support allowed the Unity Council to prove its financial accountability as well as its expedience as a incubator of diverse forms of funds.

With these long-term fiscal relationships the Unity Council performed a complex calculus of financial partnerships. This allowed the Unity Council and its partners to obtain substantial financing for the Fruitvale Transit Village project, initially in the form of planning grants, then later as grants and loans for construction. The City of Oakland sponsored tax-exempt bonds and Citibank provided the credit enhancement, and its subsidiary, Salomon, Smith, Barney, was the underwriter of the bond. The variety and complexity of funding sources was remarkable. As many as 31 sources had to be tapped, blended, and coordinated, as funder’s requirements were often different (Blish-Hughes 2004). The Unity Council demonstrated a careful articulation of City of Oakland resources as well as good working relationships with Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART).

The Unity Council's project of employing past networks and courting new ones was fundamentally a project of financial expedience that positioned the organization as a savvy and entrepreneurial agency. This contemporary entrepreneurialism, however, depended on the linkages Unity Council leaders had created through interaction with a previous era of state-led development. Thus, the accelerated processes of accomplishing neoliberal processes depended on an earlier era of welfare state relation with racial communities. Central to gaining these funds was the Council’s defense of the community, its assurance of its ability to show technocratic expertise on the region and its people, and its authentic community support.

The Efficient Circulation of People, Resources, and Capital
Fiscal expedience, however, was not solely how the Unity Council constructed its mandate to push forward the Fruitvale Transit Village project. For the Unity Council, the project symbolized its successful role of protecting the neighborhood’s urban space from inefficient “outsiders”—state bureaucrats and agencies such as the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART). In fact, The Fruitvale Transit Village emerged out of political struggle in which the Unity Council leveraged its historical expertise in community engagement to make claims to its authority in the neighborhood. To do so, the Unity Council constructed a history of state government disengagement and mismanagement of community resources as proof of the need for it to enact its own more appropriate projects of urban renewal. The efficacy of the Unity Council projects pivoted on its alleged “true” representation of the community. These critiques of neoliberal state retraction and “disengagement” from the district, however, were presented in safe forms that did not preclude the Unity Council from working in partnership with different state agencies. These “safe” critiques were in line with neoliberal rhetoric surrounding state retraction from inner cities
and social services projects. They also overwhelmingly evaded an analysis of race and racism in shaping the neighborhood’s decline.

**Opposing an Inefficient and Indifferent State Bureaucracy**

The FTV was the product of community opposition to a proposed BART project that never relied on Fruitvale residents’ input. In 1991, BART unveiled its plans to build a five-story parking structure at the site of the Fruitvale station where street level parking covered the current site of the entire Fruitvale Village, a total of nine acres. According to Jeff Ordway, Property Development Manager at BART, the need for the parking garage was generated because at the time BART was losing ridership due to a lack of parking at certain stations (Orozco et al. 2008: 79). The Unity Council was outraged by the proposed plan and began to organize the Fruitvale community against what it deemed to be a violation of Fruitvale’s ability to decide how and when to change its public space. It worried BART’s plans did not respect the neighborhood’s authority to make decisions in processes that would directly impact the region’s future.

The Unity Council and other community-based organizations vehemently argued that a high-story parking structure would further isolate the neighborhood. The proposed multi-storied parking structure would stand between Fruitvale’s commercial hub along International Boulevard and the station. The Unity Council and its community allies argued that the Fruitvale neighborhood was not the object of BART redevelopment plans. Rather, BART planners focused on accommodating a ridership from outside Fruitvale.

The Unity Council and its activist allies blamed state bureaucrats for attempting to compartmentalize space, and further isolate this neighborhood from other geographies of affluence (Orozco et al. 2008). As Frantz Fanon argued, spatial compartmentalization is a process of imposing power relations by segregating spaces through the policing of public space and unequal allocation of resources. Fanon (2004[1963]) argued that compartmentalization served to maintain conditions of subordination and thus reinforced unequal power relations. Fruitvale activists and nonprofit allies similarly drew on a past history of government “disengagement” in the district and argued that BART planners sought to further divide Fruitvale from more affluent ridership. They argued that BART had a long history of deploying processes of the compartmentalization of Fruitvale’s space in order to serve the needs of more affluent riders.

**The Historical Formation of Fruitvale Station as a “Collector” Station**

Bay Area Rapid Transit completed the Fruitvale station in 1972 as part of the newly established service connecting Fremont to Oakland. Since its inception, Fruitvale BART station was fashioned as a “collector” of ridership from outside the neighborhood and not a “destination.” BART’s research team found that riders would come to the Fruitvale only to reach other destinations like Downtown Oakland or San Francisco. The image of Fruitvale as a “collector” station was consolidated in a 1973 study that analyzed the impacts of BART on this and other neighborhoods. The urban planners of Gruen and Gruen and Associates of San Francisco, CA, found that “[b]y 1975, Fruitvale station is expected to have one of the heaviest patronages of all of the stations in the East Bay, totaling 16,674 trips on an average day. The great majority of all trips, or approximately 85 percent, are expected to be trip productions. Thus, Fruitvale is conceived primarily a collector station, with its use as a destination playing a relatively minor role” (Gruen Gruen & Associates 1973: 191). Fruitvale station would collect
passengers from more affluent neighborhoods such as the Oakland hills and the Alameda, who would use Bart to travel predominantly to Downtown Oakland and San Francisco.

In this study the area’s poverty and crime became predictors for neighborhood ridership trends. It also shaped how BART planned this particular station and its surroundings. Unlike more affluent neighborhoods like Oakland’s Rockridge, the Fruitvale BART station would not serve to jumpstart future developments in the area. Gruen and Gruen and Associates assured BART that new residents and business would not move to the Fruitvale solely because of the station. The study concluded that the region’s poverty, as evidenced by its low rents and house values, would detract future residents. Similarly, researchers argued that Fruitvale residents, due to their “poverty and economic and social isolation,” would not use BART to any significant degree (192).

The researchers determined that BART should focus on making the station a safe and attractive space to ensure that the ridership from more affluent areas would continue to use services. In effect, Gruen and Gruen and Associates planners advised that the BART station should shield passengers from Fruitvale’s poverty and crime. Planners advised BART that it should plan to ensure riders’ public safety rather than create a more attractive and usable space for the area’s residents. As this study by Gruen and Gruen and Associates reveals, planners constituted the neighborhood and its people as economically insignificant. They utilized concerns about the Fruitvale's decaying built environment and the fear of public safety to justify their actions.

This had consequential effects for how the station was built and maintained. Unity Council representatives argued that Fruitvale BART station had been forgotten. By the 1980s, Fruitvale BART station became a magnet for crime and what urban planner Mario X. Turner-Loveras (1997) described as “social disorder.” Because few efforts had been made in improving the area surrounding the station, by the 1990s, Fruitvale station had the second highest crime rate from all other BART stations. The descent of the Fruitvale BART station into a space of crime and violence was emblematic of the urban decay encountered by the entire neighborhood. Planners and Unity Council representatives portrayed this urban decay primarily as a product of the natural shift from an industrial to service economy and rapid suburbanization.

Fruitvale’s Selective History of Economic Decline

Residents and researchers from the University of California, Berkeley agreed that like the BART station, the entire Fruitvale district had gone into decline in the 1980s and early 1990s. The area’s economic decline was understood in race-neutral terms. Causes of neighborhood decline were attributed to vague terms such as economic restructuring, suburbanization, or the descaling of the welfare state as part of neoliberal trends. In these accounts, the neighborhood spiraled into economic and physical decay due to a natural process of “blight.” Researchers never identified people or agencies responsible for blight, but rather were quick to blame a “blighted environment” for deterring the potential development of the region. Turner-Loveras (1997), for example, notes: “The district is blighted by several vacant properties, poorly maintained storefronts, and streets filled with litter, trash and overflowing trash receptacles. The area is rarely used by shoppers and pedestrians and has become a haven for dunks and disorderly behavior” (62). Blight is further accompanied by degenerate activities such as drinking, homelessness, and other “disorderly behavior.” In addition to blight, residents’ behavior was heavily linked with the neighborhood’s economic and physical decay.
Researchers and residents attributed this deterioration to “suburbanization and decentralization of services” due to postwar US economic and spatial restructuring. Furthermore, most community and academic analyses agreed that this economic decline was also part of what they deemed as government neoliberal disengagement with the area. In addition, they argued that neighborhood decline was also due to the increase in drug related behaviors. As the CEO of the Unity Council, Gilda Gonzales told me in an interview:

> Like other urban communities through the 80s that really took a hit with the crack epidemic, and the urban flight that was taking place along with disengagement by Government, at that time you remember was the Reagan years and many republicans who were wiping down social services and so you had a real decline in urban American and Oakland was really symptomatic of that situation.²

Government disengagement in that area left Fruitvale with many unmet needs. This disengagement became coupled with what Gilda describes as the crack epidemic that devastated Oakland. Again, the blame for Fruitvale’s decline was placed on broad and abstract Republican led government policies and drugs. As urban planner Alberto V. Lopez (1996) revealed a growing concern among residents and nonprofits was that “the Fruitvale neighborhood was being overlooked by both City Hall and outside private development interests, and that the neighborhood was become another example of central city decline” (1).

Missing from these accounts was an analysis of coordinated federal policies that relied on race and racial segregation to organize space and the allocation of resources in postwar California. As Robert O. Self (2003) powerfully argues, the federal government shaped the remaking of postwar cities by overwhelmingly privileging Whites over other groups. Federal housing policies, for example, drew Whites into the suburbs through low interest loans while African Americans were overwhelmingly disqualified from these benefits (see also Gregory 1998; Lipsitz 2007). Federal subsidies overdeveloped the suburbs, leaving less funds for inner-cities. These processes led to the underdevelopment of inner-cities like Fruitvale where racial minorities remained. This was profoundly visible in the planning of BART stations. BART planners overdeveloped stations in upwardly mobile and predominantly White neighborhoods while they opted for minimal infrastructure and beautification projects in impoverished minority neighborhoods.

Nor did this narrative take into account other race-based geopolitical and economic factors that gave contour to international migration waves to Fruitvale. In these matters, the federal government chose to welcome certain kinds of migrants over others. Furthermore, it restricted services for undocumented migrants leaving municipalities to fund these unmet resources. In their redevelopment plans, Fruitvale transit village planners project stakeholders used a language of economic decline that elided any analysis of race, racism, and inequality. These forms of race-neutral analyses were coupled by a neoliberal deployment of race and ethnicity as marketable commodities.

From State Disengagement to the Proper Nonprofit-mediated Care

Whereas state agencies and other municipal government representatives had ignored Fruitvale, the Unity Council projected itself as the competent caretaker of the regions’ present and future development. It argued that BART’s construction of Fruitvale station solely as a

² Gilda Gonzales, Interview with the Author, 22 November 2007, Oakland, CA.
“collector” signified how this region and its people had been overlooked by state bureaucrats. Thus, when the Unity Council heard of BART’s desires to build a high rise parking structure that would further isolate the Fruitvale district and its people, it boldly opposed this development. The current CEO of the Unity Council, Gilda Gonzales, recounted the importance of preventing the building of the proposed parking structure:

[At that time] the neighborhood had its back to the World. Here the World being a regional transportation hub where people are coming from different cities of the bay area and [Fruitvale] had its back to them. The parking structure...[would create] a physical barrier between access to the world and the natural corridor of International Blvd. And if we would allow this to happen [building of the parking structure] we would have allowed something to begin, start something that would forever seal the fate of the neighborhood that is already isolated.

Gilda’s comments present several points about the symbolic and material effects that planners and proponents of the FTV envisioned. First, she situates Fruitvale in a position of disadvantage vis-à-vis other richer Bay Area regions such as the neighboring city of Alameda and Oakland Hills—zones from which many BART riders come to board trains at Fruitvale station. Fruitvale is understood to fall at an economic disadvantage and linked with the overall image of Oakland as a decayed city replete with violence and poverty that renders it outside the global economy that the Bay Area represents. Second, she positions Fruitvale as a victim of unfair planning strategies from “outsiders”—the Bay Area Rapid Transit Authority (BART)—that planned to build the parking structure that would partition Fruitvale from the “world.” Third, Gilda’s comments propel Fruitvale into a strategic position to attract a particular kind of ridership from the more affluent Bay Area cities and thus establish the potentiality for Fruitvale to develop as an equal partner in the region. Collectively, all of these positions are primarily concerned with achieving proper circulation of people, goods, and capital through Fruitvale, with a telos of harnessing some of this flow to propel Fruitvale (and its residents) into a fruitful path of economic development.

The Unity Council and its allies thus sought to dislodge Fruitvale from its isolation as a marooned inner-city barrio—a product of compartmentalization of space engendered through state government disengagement in the area as well as the imposition of planning structures from state agencies such as BART. This critique and the struggle to define Fruitvale BART station in their own terms was thus an attempt to situate this “vibrant Latino community” within what Foucault called a “space of circulation” (Foucault 2007: 13) and the destruction of racial compartmentalization of space Fanon (2004[1963]) so vehemently critiqued. Unity Council organized to prevent the construction of what Arabella Martinez came to call the “neo-fascist parking structure” that would further compartmentalize the Fruitvale (as quoted in Orozco et al. 2008: 79).

Fruitvale’s entry in to a space of circulation was fundamentally a project of efficient community care. While activists and members of the Fruitvale transit village planning committee envisioned that the project would propel the Fruitvale into a space of more efficient capitalist development, it was also fundamentally designed and organized as a project that would further institutionalize existing nonprofit services. For planners, Fruitvale’s entry into a space of circulation was not just concerned with the efficient flows of goods and capital into Fruitvale but also heavily invested in providing services to Fruitvale’s residents. The FTV thus served to
project a new image of this neighborhood, which committed itself to the proper care and guidance of its population composed of deserving, family-oriented, and hard working residents. The Unity Council positioned itself as the sole provider of this benevolent care. Speaking to the press about the opening of the Fruitvale Transit Village, Arabella Martínez proudly stated:

> My vision was to transform the Fruitvale district by creating a more vibrant, and livable community. Further, in the wake of negative publicity about Oakland, we want people to know there are organizations like the Unity Council that care about the community we serve. By enriching the quality of life of families in the Fruitvale District we're creating a healthier and safer community for everyone (Paoli 2003).

The Unity Council’s entrepreneurial and bureaucratic expedience was transformed into effective “community mothering” that positioned it as Fruitvale’s sole guardian.

The Unity Council demonstrated its care of Fruitvale’s residents by incorporating an entire social services complex in the transit village. “This is not a shopping center,” Gilda Gonzalez clarified, “this is a community resource center.” As she described it, planners organized the transit village as a “one stop community center where people could come and avail themselves of different social services, that being a clinic, Head Start services, the city library, an official city senior center, and a multitude of different kinds of services.” Fruitvale’s path towards development thus depended on providing for its residents and the FTV served as the epicenter of community resources to ensure the shaping of a particular kind of Latino subject. Whereas other community nonprofits and political groups had taken part in the formation of the FTV, the Unity Council projected itself as the sole entity in charge.

The Transit Village, had in fact been a collaborative project that brought together BART officials, City of Oakland representatives, the Unity Council and Clinica de la Raza. Beginning in 1994, the three main players formalized their relationship in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Unity Council, the City of Oakland, and BART. This established the Fruitvale Policy Committee, comprised of two representatives of the Unity Council, one from BART and two from the City (including the mayor and the council member representing the area, Ignacio de La Fuente). Clinica de La Raza also participated in these policy meetings. This was the first time BART had utilized such a diverse arrangement of entities to plan the area around one of its stations (Blish-Hughes 2004: 82).

**Building Community Approval and Support**

The Fruitvale Transit Village became articulated as community project that represented the needs and desires of residents and merchants alike. However, this articulation of the project emerged only after years of community engagement. In the initial stages of the project, there was enormous frustration from planners. This was best articulated by planners’ frustrations over how to render the “collective” needs and desires of the community. While planners admitted it was easy to surmise the conditions that residents and the Unity Council apposed, it was less obvious what they indeed wanted. As urban planner Alberto V. Lopez (1996) revealed, “It appeared that the community knew more of what it did not want than what it did.” As Lopez (1996) further elaborates: “As more attention was given to the Fruitvale area, mostly through university coursework and independent student study at UC Berkeley, the BART parking lot became a

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3 Gilda Gonzales, Interview with the Author, 22 November 2007, Oakland, CA.
natural target for potential intensive development”(6). Thus, it was through the various mobilizations and stages of the project that the needs and desires of the community were integrated into a cohesive plan. As the next sections reveal, this process entailed that the Unity Council work closely with a prominent group of Fruitvale merchants as well as residents’ committees. This ability to work with a diverse constituency and elicit community consent became the cornerstone of the Unity Council’s project.

Residents’ Beautification Projects and the Defense of the Fruitvale Neighborhood

Citizenship participation and the image of a coherent Latino residential community was the cornerstone of the Unity Council's approach to taming processes of neoliberal redevelopment. In most accounts of this project, community participation was central to constructing the novelty and the importance of the project. Furthermore, community participation was seen as key to making sure that redevelopment in the Fruitvale was not an imposed project from outside developers. Instead, planners portrayed this type of redevelopment as an indigenous production and therefore representing the “authentic” needs and demands of all the residents of the Fruitvale. As Arabella Martinez proudly proclaimed: “This is not the usual planning process. It came from the community and the people that live here” (quoted in Orozco et al. 2008: 82). The Unity Council strategically deployed community participation as a technology to secure its authority as neighborhood steward.

Fruitvale transit village planners often exaggerated the degree of community participation. What planners deemed as “community participation” did accurately project the desires and mission of improving the Fruitvale district developed by a small but active cadre of citizens of the Fruitvale Community Collaborative. This collaborative project successfully cultivated a group of grassroots community leaders comprised mainly of mothers and older women, and built patron-client relations between residents, the Unity Council, and Councilman Ignacio de la Fuente. For residents engaged in these grassroots beautification and neighborhood rehabilitation projects, the Unity Council and Councilman Ignacio de la Fuente became Fruitvale’s institutional and bureaucratic guardians.

In 1995, the Unity Council established the Fruitvale Community Collaborative to cultivate residents’ participation in Fruitvale’s redevelopment. It effectively built on longer term grassroots engagement initiated by other organizations such as the Clinica de la Raza. Maria Sanchez, a committed mother and dedicated volunteer began her activism at Centro Infantil, an alternative elementary school run by Fruitvale community leaders. She also volunteered at Clinica de la Raza, where she participated in courses on diabetes and nutrition. As she recalls: “I really enjoyed that because I had people to talk to. When I arrived here I didn’t know anyone...I was a volunteer for many years and then one day at La Clinica they told me that the Unity Council was looking for a community member who spoke Spanish and could help bring in more Spanish-speaking people.” Today, Maria Sanchez is perhaps the most highly regarded Unity Council representative in the community. A humble, kindhearted woman, Maria’s exudes pride in the neighborhood and the collaborative work she has helped to foster through her various projects in the Unity Council. For Maria Sanchez, her involvement with nonprofit organizations helped her construct new types of social relations and it was her role as a mother and caregiver that propelled her to become active. As such, she interprets her work as a struggle to secure the wellbeing of the neighborhood and in promoting residents’ and merchants’ participation in making this a thriving and more beautiful community.
Through small-scale community engagement projects Maria Sanchez and other Unity Council leaders cultivated Fruitvale residents’ participation in grassroots community beautification projects. During my interview with Maria Sanchez, she recalled how before this project, the neighborhood residents had no pride in their community and no sense of a Fruitvale neighborhood identity. Maria recounts: “It was really interesting back in those days. In Christmas time no one would decorate their homes. People felt like they were in prisons. People were afraid of signing petitions. People would open their doors with a lot of fear.” Maria Sanchez and other Unity Council organizers were confronted with fearful residents that had no pride in their neighborhood and had little trust in institutions. Most of these residents were recently-arrived immigrants that distrusted any form of organization. To nurture people’s trust, they organized residents block by block. As Maria recalls, the group would knock on doors and slowly gained residents’ trust by handing out information and inviting them to organize street clean ups and tree trimming endeavors.

This grassroots mobilizing strategy helped to give residents a sense of neighborhood identity and showed them how to act as a collective. The Unity Council’s efforts secured the organization of over fifteen different neighborhood block associations. As Maria proudly recounted, each group created a name for themselves some examples included “Neighbors of 38th Avenue” and “The Defenders of Fruitvale Ave.” These neighborhood block associations learned how to work with state institutions. They were especially instructed on how to report crimes to the police, how to report broken streetlights, and how to arrange for trash clean-ups. As such, they were inducted into the process of being engaged citizen-subjects that could make demands in protection and care of their neighborhood.

Victoria Pequeño was one of the activists involved in the mobilizations. As an immigrant from Peru, she has lived in Fruitvale for over 30 years and has created community through her involvement in various organizations. Instead of starting a conversation about her work in the Fruitvale, she handed me a binder she brought with her. She immediately opened it to show me an impressive collection of certificates. They were different types of certificates of participation, of appreciation and of recognition. She had a certificate from about every major nonprofit organization in Fruitvale. Yet most prominent were the countless awards and recognitions Victoria received from the Unity Council.

Despite her fuzzy memory of the particulars of each award, Victoria’s extensive collection of awards, recognitions, and training certifications validate her longterm participation in Fruitvale improvement projects. They also demonstrate the important role of nonprofits like Clinica de la Raza and the Unity Council in creating that connection to the neighborhood. In fact, her entire binder was a historical archive of all this past involvement in Fruitvale which she fondly recalled as her most valued “memories.” The binder was not a particularly well organized archive of her activism—it was not organized by date, nor by the organization for example. It, however, shows the organic nature of her community activism that did not revolve around a radical transformation of the Fruitvale but rather a gradual, sometimes incoherent, but always active way of bringing about change to this neighborhood. Furthermore, Victoria’s activist binder revealed the formation of a Fruitvale “community” that cohered through the active work of different nonprofit organizations, of which the Unity Council was the most active.

Coupled with their devotion to the Unity Council, other neighborhood activists were also vocal about the role of Ignacio de la Fuente in making possible change in the Fruitvale district. Agnes Ramirez and Guillermina Jimenez, for example, solidified their devotion to the “patron,” Ignacio de la Fuente. Agnes Ramirez, a longtime Fruitvale neighborhood activist, for example,
understood de la Fuente was the central municipal representative that facilitated the development of the FTV: “Ignacio de la Fuente did a lot to push the Fruitvale Transit Village forward. We decided to commemorate this by naming the entryway to the FTV De La Fuente Avenue...He has worked hard for this community and everybody knows him.” Though she admits that she could not keep up with all the FTV planning meetings, Agnes is fully sure of Ignacio de la Fuente's commitment to the project. As she described: “Committees would change and others would come… and Ignacio really worked hard on getting the money.”

Ignacio De la Fuente’s commitment to the Fruitvale residents happened almost immediately after his election. As Agnes Ramirez recalled: “When Ignacio was voted as councilman [in 1992]...he invited many of us to take classes on a series of topics in order to better support him and to empower ourselves...I took a leadership course on how to fundraise and how to improve our community.” As Agnes and other community activists like Victoria Pequeño and Guillermina were inducted into councilman De La Fuente’s sphere of influence they became the de facto representatives of the Fruitvale community.

The Fruitvale Transit Village planning process rendered technical this history of community-based activism. It transformed the heartfelt experiences and sedimented attachments to their work of neighborhood activists into a University created and tested “model for citizenship participation.” In May 1993, the Unity Council partnered with the University of California at Berkeley's National Transit Access Center (UC NTRAC) to sponsor a community design symposium at which architects translated ideas of participants into a plan for the station area (BlishHughes 2004). Urban planner from the University of California, Berkeley, Alberto V. Lopez (1996), for example, created a report about the use of 3-D modeling techniques in community participation forums in the pursuit of involving a diverse community in the design process. His task was to build a three-dimensional model and plan a series of workshops in which facilitators would guide the community along the process of choosing what the FTV would look like. He hoped that his report and three-dimensional model and citizenship participation program would give “an equal voice to various cultural, economic and social groups; who because of the technical and professional nature of Urban Design and Planning, may feel they have no voice in the process” (18). Reports like these and the events of a series of citizenship-participation workshops became the voice of the Fruitvale community and translated years of Unity Council community engagement into an enumerative process that objectively measured residents’ needs and desires.

Years of community activism also became translated into residents’ signatures in support of the Fruitvale Transit Village. As Guillermína Jimenez recounted: “back when the Transit Village project was happening, and I say this with a lot of pride, we (the people at the Unity Council) proposed that every person would get at least 500 signatures. I was able to collect more than 2,000. I did it because I wanted to show that we were in need and invited others to support us.” These acts reveal how the Unity Council was able to employ both the techno-scientific approaches of its University allies along with the devotion of longterm-community activists to enumerate its ability to accurately represent the united demands of the entire neighborhood. These practices served to homogenize the Fruitvale community and reveal the organizations’ commitment to neighborhood care. This commitment to citizenship-participation also became the cornerstone of how the Unity Council projected itself as the defender of the community from processes of urban blight and the opposite—neoliberal gentrification.
Merchants and the Latino Fruitvale District

Fruitvale transit village planners routinely emphasized how the new structure respected community needs and desires. The Unity Council interpreted community to represent both residents and merchants and thus targeted these two groups in its organizing schemes. Planners and Unity Council representatives understood the important role merchants played in creating the commercial infrastructure of the neighborhood as well as attracting people and capital to the region. They thus sought to harness the potential of this merchant sector by bringing together disparate and often competing merchants together along a unified plan of neighborhood improvement and the commercial development of the region. Unity Council efforts to conscript merchant’s support was also intended to calm merchant’s fears that Fruitvale’s transit village would bring unfair competition to their thriving ethnic business.

FTV planners therefore placed tremendous efforts in incorporating merchants into their redevelopment plans. Planners understood that the Fruitvale neighborhood has been Latino not just because Latinos migrated to this region but also because an important group of small merchants have constructed it as a Latino space. In my interview with Jose Dorado, owner of Dorado Tax Services, for example, Dorado recounted the history of the development of a Fruitvale district by telling me the story of Fruitvale’s changing merchant landscape. He described ethnic succession by detailing changes in the neighborhood’s merchant landscape. He narrated how Italian stores and shops run by the Portuguese immigrants were gradually replaced by new Latino stores run by Mexicans. As the owner of a tax preparation and bookkeeping business, Dorado understood that merchants had transformed this neighborhood and in so doing, attracted Latinos to the neighborhood.

I met Jose at his office and had heard much of him from other residents. Aside from being a merchant, he has a long history of political engagement in the region and in 2011 ran for city council of Oakland’s 6th district. Such was his political connections and interest in the history of Latinos in Fruitvale that he had personally invited Claudia Burgos from Ignacio de la Fuente’s office to sit in on our meeting. Claudia Burgos serves as councilman De la Fuente’s liaison to Fruitvale’s nonprofits. Jose could not tell the history of the Fruitvale district without referencing the neighborhood’s merchants. The Fruitvale merchants, as Jose describe them, were a prominent force in the transformation of this neighborhood. As he described, “Chuy Campos started where Guarache Azteca [now] is, that’s where Otaez Restaurant was. Where the tacos part is now that used to be a Portuguese bar and right next to that there was an Italian grocery store.” According to Dorado, these small merchants that included restaurant owners and money transfer offices were critical to the economic growth of this region. The merchants saw themselves as powerful actors in the neighborhood and marshaled their history of contributing to its economic and social development to command more political authority.

Hugo Guerrero of Hugo’s Travel and Tours was perhaps the most boisterous of the merchants in making a claim to the building of a Latino Fruitvale district and assuring its economic growth. I met Hugo in his travel agency which has the appearance of the decades of the 1970s and 1980s when he first came to Fruitvale. The furniture, tourism advertisements that adorn the walls, as well as Hugo’s own attire seemed to exude the aesthetics and fashions of times past. As a self-described leader of the merchant community, Hugo was always professionally dressed. Unlike other merchants that dressed in a more relaxed style and were less outspoken, Hugo would never be seen without his sports jacket and spoke with a style and proper diction that commanded attention. Hugo’s retelling of Fruitvale’s history emphasized the strong
role Latino merchants played to transform the community into a respectable and economically solvent place. As he described it:

My assistant and I arrived to the area [in the 1970s] and the whole avenue was empty. International Blvd was a prostitution runway and there were drugs. The only types of businesses left were bars. Prostitution, drugs and assaults became the norm. You had to be careful if it was dark outside, otherwise you’d get mugged. A lot of people thought that the pioneer business owners were stupid [for coming into this neighborhood]. But we came here to service the needs of Hispanic clients. By then Hispanic customers had needs such as travel agency, Hispanic food and other services.

Portraying himself and other fellow merchants as pioneers, Hugo retold a story of the pastoral role of these merchants played in charting new economic territory. They risked thousands of dollars solely to provide services for a growing Latino population in the area. They were not only savvy entrepreneurial subjects, but also intent on securing the wellbeing and the provision of services. Furthermore, their entrepreneurial projects were fundamental to the efficient transformation of this region. As a result of these pioneering efforts Hugo argued:

Then this district began getting better. Once people noticed we were doing well others came. More Latinos began buying property. In ten years Fruitvale was booming. By 1992 you couldn’t find an empty space to rent.

In 1994 Fruitvale merchants formed a collaborative called the *Associacion de Comerciantes y Profesionales de Oakland* (ACPO). The merchants organized in order to garner more support from city officials and the police. Since its inception, ACPO, with a membership base of 103 members according to Hugo, has helped change the image of the Latino merchant in the eyes of the city (Varela 2003). According to Hugo, Jose Dorado, the merchant community was growing and ACPO came out of the need for representation in local government. The merchants felt that they needed to be taken into account and to be acknowledged as a new power. They joined forces to argue that they as merchants were paying more taxes, and that as a result their political and economic clout was increasing. They did this also to fortify their position as Latino merchants in the area that had led the way in the neighborhood’s ascendance after decades of economic decline.

Claudia Burgos, policy analyst and community liaison at Councilman De la Fuente’s office, however, challenged these merchant’s claim to unity. She argued that Fruitvale merchants were not organized in any significant fashion. Rather, she describe that there was a lot of bickering between the merchants and they often failed to act as a collective. Claudia has been working to cultivate greater participation from the merchants in Fruitvale, coaching them on how they should be more involved in city council meetings and to make appropriate demands to the City. Only when there is a crisis, argued Claudia, do the merchants want to work together. And in these instances of crises, they place explicitly blame on a “failing” city government and an “inefficient” police department that does not do its work. As Claudia described, these merchants must cultivate long-term relations with both city officials and the police department so that when a crisis happens, there are more appropriate and faster means of making demands. Claudia offered the example of the Chinatown merchants. When there is an issue that affects them, she
described, the council chambers are full with merchants. It is standing room only. However, the Fruitvale merchants only show up in moments of crisis.

Many of the rifts between the merchants of the Fruitvale are not just about in fighting. They also related to the class, generational, and English-language abilities that contours differences among the merchants. As Jose Dorado revealed, there is a substantial divide between the Fruitvale merchants and those more established, University trained, Latino businessmen that can leverage greater connections through Oakland-wide organizations such as the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce. As Dorado described, the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce is run by pochos, born here, English speakers and educated. The Fruitvale merchants, Dorado remarked, are overwhelmingly monolingual Spanish-speakers, immigrants, and generally don’t have a college education. They are small merchants, and not the big storeowners with masters degrees in business administration. These differences, according to Dorado, create a huge divide and at times divisive politics within Latino businesses and their ability to act politically as a united force.

In order to get merchants to support the Fruitvale’s transit village development, the Unity Council worked closely with these merchants and served to unify them despite internal differences and bickering. Maria Sanchez of the Unity Council began to offer an institutional space in which the merchants could gain greater access to city programs. The Unity Council attained grants from the City of Oakland to create greater cohesion among the different stores. The consolidation of the Merchants as a united, homogenous entity, was also visually incorporated into the architectural redevelopment plans. As one planner argued: “The Unity Council hopes to build on the existing cultural and ethnic diversity of businesses in the Fruitvale District, and will market/promote the area around a Latino theme because of the high concentration of Latinos in the community” (Turner-Lloveras 1997: 10). As I will demonstrate in the following section, the homogeneity of the merchant corridor pivoted on the valorization and marketing of a vibrant Latino culture of the region.

**Architecture and the Suturing of Race and Place**

Like other forms of neoliberal urban transformations, the Fruitvale Redevelopment Project employed Latino culture as a marketable commodity to brand the neighborhood and homogenize its residents. Within this planning process, Latinidad became detached from the heterogeneity of country of origin, class, as well as immigrant and native born distinctions that cross-cut this community. Unity Council planners deployed Latinidad as a homogenizing planning issue and a tool to attract new more affluent residents and capital investments. The Unity Council marketed this ethnic culture through its technologies of caring for the neighborhood and branded itself as the custodian and ambassador of the region’s vibrant Latino culture. This marketing of Latino culture was also a politicized claim to its authority as the neighborhood’s guardian. As a Latino organization of a Latino neighborhood, the Unity Council utilized its expertise and long-term commitment to channeling residents needs and desires to push forth redevelopment plans.

The deployment of a particular architectural style in Fruitvale was a political act. I employ the concept of the architectural from Eyal Weizman who argues that architecture is not an abstract construction of buildings or roads. Architecture, as Weizman defines it, is a “conceptual way of understanding political issues as constructed realities” (Weizman 2007: 6). Weizman’s work about the Israeli occupation of Palestine powerfully demonstrates how architecture served as a medium by which Israel constructed a claim to Palestinian land and strategically blurred the facts of occupation (26). He powerfully demonstrates how Israeli state
officials wielded planning as a tactic to control and design particular relations and interventions on the social. These architectural interventions served to legitimate claims to space and validate forms of belonging.

In producing the FTV, the Unity Council and other Fruitvale community members employed architecture and planning to create a sense of belonging and political claims to a spatial terrain. When the opportunity came to turn the nine acres of BART street parking into an transit plaza, the Unity Council specifically planned to infuse the “Latino” into this new architectural ensemble of transit, housing, and social services. As Gilda Gonzales, the Unity Council’s CEO describes, the alternative to the BART parking structure was:

To build a beautiful pedestrian plaza that really reflects kind of the cultural experience of this neighborhood which has become very Latino…[W]e had to be mindful of what this neighborhood had become and so when you think about the plaza, if you stand over at the furthest end of the plaza you see the Church, St. Elizabeth and so it mirrors centers in Spain and Mexico where in all the plazas, at the foot of it is the Church. It just made a lot of sense for what we were trying to create here.⁴

According to Gilda Gonzalez, Fruitvale’s transit village projects a racial and cultural image of the Fruitvale—or what anthropologist Jaqueline Nassy Brown (2005) calls a suturing of race and place. This center solidified a triumphant image of Latino/as that would also locate Fruitvale within a path of development—yet with a selective attachment to key anchors of tradition such as the church and a longing for a kind of pastoral, family oriented village. So important was the preservation of the church as an important anchor of the community that residents did not want the project to obscure views of nearby St. Elizabeth Church. According to Scully (2005) planners responded to this request by keeping the building heights of the FTV to four stories, even though zoning would have allowed them to go higher. The nuclear family anchored by the church and the stability of the extended Latino familia was fundamental to how the transit village was racialized and gendered. The church, family and nonprofit practices of community mothering were also essential to demonstrating how this Latino neighborhood was able to care for itself. As the owner of one of the new restaurants, Jalisco II Restaurant, Juan Ramon Vazquez recounted: “Sundays, in Mexico, people stroll with their families. Every town has a plaza and it's full. This looks just like that. People will feel very safe at night” (Counts 2004).

The design aesthetic sought to represent not only the neighborhood's current surroundings and demographics but also its historical foundation a part of the Spanish mission system. As urban planner Scully (2005) described elements of the project: “evoke the California Mission Style, while other parts are more influenced by local reinterpretations of Mediterranean and Mexican styles. Chosen with the intention of creating a festive atmosphere, the color palate also reflects the aesthetics of the region” (5). As a whole, the architects viewed the project as a collage meant to represent the different building styles and cultural heritages found along the niegh International Boulevard. The design thus became a linking of past and present architectural and cultural styles that solidified itself as Latino by its “festive” atmosphere and color palate. It also emphasized the historical importance of the Latino aesthetic in the region—a legacy of California’s history as a former Mexican and Spanish territory.

⁴ Gilda Gonzales, Interview with the Author, 22 November 2007, Oakland, CA.
Fruitvale’s specific branding as a Latino space was a strategy to attract a particular market niche. Planners wanted Fruitvale to distinguish itself from the rest of Oakland (Chew 1991; Lopez 1995; Montaña 1981). Planners fashioned the Fruitvale district as an “authentic community” in which its residents shared immutable cultural backgrounds. In these market analyses, planners and the Unity Council, overemphasized the Latino character of this community and marketed the neighborhood by its Latino culture. This coincided with an underlying goal that Fruitvale would again become a retail and service destination rather than an automotive thoroughfare and transfer point (Chew 1991:11). As the urban planner Alberto V. Lopez described: “The project is proposed to give the Fruitvale area a more regional appeal with a distinct cultural identity within a new development setting. The neighborhood has a distinct Mexican/Latino flavor within a larger diverse populous” (Lopez 1996: 5).

Since the 1980s, studies sponsored by the Unity Council and UC Berkeley’s department of City and Regional Planning encouraged Fruitvale to harness its Latino culture in order to attract more investment in the neighborhood. Susana Montaña’s (1981) study, for example, recommended that the City condemn and acquire property near Fruitvale BART station, and sell it to a local CDC for development of a commercial market and cultural center (27). As Montaña recommended: “The project should feature a Latino theme and identity and should encourage weekend and fiesta cultural events serving the Latino community” (27). The proposed cultural center and market intended to cater to the neighborhood’s Latino residents but more importantly, “stimulate increased patronage and further private sector investments” (25). As this study recommended, Fruitvale’s Latino culture needed to be deployed as what Arlene Davila calls “an instrument of entrepreneurship used by government and businesses, a medium to sell, frame, structure, claim, and reclaim space” (Davila 2004:10).

A project of massive scale, the Fruitvale Transit Village’s construction also imbued its branding of Latinidad onto the merchant sector along International Blvd. The revitalization of Fruitvale’s business district further demonstrates how planners utilized architecture to suture race and place. Unity Council representatives deployed a politics of belonging and claims to progress that it branded to the areas surrounding the transit village. The Unity Council worked with newly elected City Councilman Ignacio de la Fuente to obtain $185,000 in Community Development Block Grant funds for an ambitious program of store façade improvements, park and playground upgrading, graffiti removal, street lighting, and tree planting. Businesses along International Boulevard were transformed from run-down cookie-cutter storefronts, to lively, colorful and quaint “Latino” stores replete with murals and designs. The design aesthetic is characterized by an attractive mélange of Mexican and Spanish influenced stucco façades colored at certain key places by Aztec hieroglyphics, vibrant murals also imbued with indigenous and Mexican symbols, and colorful signage to welcome customers.

Planners standardized and created harmony among Fruitvale’s merchant storefronts. One of the critical design goals was to create homogeneity in signage and to enhance the existing architectural styles. In 1996, the Unity Council spearheaded the Fruitvale Mainstreet Program which organized to bring a more coherent architectural design and aesthetic to the district. As Turner-Lloveras writes, the Main Street Program was designed for small towns with a homogenous white population and had never been implemented in racial and ethnically mixed inner cities. The Main Street Program is largely a volunteer-driven and relies heavily on the organization element. Organization establishes “consensus and cooperation by building

partnerships” among the various groups—e.g. merchants, property owners, individual citizens etc.—that have a stake in the commercial district (Turner-Lloveras 1997:15).

Planners utilized City of Oakland zoning regulations create a unitary architectural and design aesthetic in the neighborhood. Urban planner Jeff Chew (1991) proposed to unifying the merchant corridor would be the establishment of zoning regulations of Fruitvale’s commercial sector. Zoning, according to Chew (1991:18) would “unify land use” as well as provide a “legal method of enforcement for common practices agreed upon by residents of a community” and “serve as a blueprint for the objectives of the citizens of Fruitvale as they seek to improve the business environment in their community.” Planners agreed that a primary concern in the ordinances would be to standardize the signage practices of existing and future businesses.

The development of Fruitvale must be understood as a production of a specific milieu that sought to shape the meaning of Latinidad in Oakland and served to solidify new relations between Latino non-profits and local and federal state agencies. Foucault defines the target of government is to fabricate, organize and plan a milieu which consists of: “A set of natural givens—rivers, marshes, hills—and a set of artificial givens—an agglomeration of individuals, of houses, etc. The milieu is a certain number of combined, overall effects bearing on all who live on it” (2007: 21). The milieu is not fixed, but rather always in formation and contingent. Moreover, such a milieu is not planned or orchestrated by an omnipotent and violent state, but rather shaped by a diverse set of actors, bureaucracies, and non-profit organizations. As this chapter has argued, race is also a major component deployed in the crafting of specific social-spatial milieus. Through Fruitvale’s transit village, Latinidad was not only sutured with place, but also positioned within a propitious path of development. Latinidad became enmeshed with a modern progress-oriented ethos that certified that Fruitvale residents did not only deserve of state money, but also exemplar model citizens of consumption and respectability.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have analyzed not an evil process of gentrification that produced Fruitvale’s transit village. It is too soon to determine if any kind of gentrification has resulted from the transit village and surrounding revitalization efforts. I described how the Fruitvale Transit Village served to suture race and place and propel this region and its people into a model form of development. Focusing on the interrelations that transformed this inner-city neighborhood into a place that signifies Latinidad and progress, I drew attention to the power-laden process by which a space is produced and how it serves then as a vehicle of power. Furthermore, as my work with day laborers has shown me, a suturing of race to place, as a political process is also laden with power asymmetries. As community based organizations and the City of Oakland sought to render Fruitvale more Latino and more developed, they have also favored certain forms of circulation of goods of people over others, privileged particular kinds of interrelationships, and specifically rendered certain forms of congregation on streets as illegal. Such complex relationships that take place in Fruitvale demonstrate how place becomes a powerful matrix of power to be taken just as seriously as other categories such as race, class, and gender.

Inner cities like Fruitvale along with other “ethnic enclaves” and “Black ghettos” have long been understood to be reservoirs for violence, poverty, welfare-dependency, and crime—in direct opposition to White suburbs or normative “mainstream” society (Bourgois 1995; Gregory 1998). Local newspapers and even some current social science serve to render these cities as a priori problematic reservoirs of poverty and racial abjection—erasing the multiple spatialities, translocal linkages, and histories that have shaped these places. Furthermore, in becoming
signifiers for class and racial abjection, the tropes of the urban ghetto and immigrant enclave serve to render invisible differences along class, gender, and immigration status that shape the social relations and lived experiences that bring meaning to these places. This chapter has sought to dislodge Fruitvale from the isolationist imperative of the label of “immigrant enclave” and impoverished barrio that too easily severs Fruitvale from other spaces.

By examining the planning a Fruitvale milieu, I emphasize how contemporary urban spaces are revitalized through a less top-down city planned and managed process (often characterized as a forceful intrusion of dispossessed communities), to one that is much more organized by a diverse constituency, with different non-state actors, and various private foundations at play. The FTV and other revitalization projects in Oakland are products of an entire assemblage of state and non-state actors: Oakland’s City Council, Federal Transportation agencies, community-based organizations, private foundations, and disparate community representatives. This kind of assemblage is not a process by which the state simply retreats from the public sector. Rather, it should be understood as a transformation of its reach and a recalibration of state power. To construct the FTV, the Unity Council planners relied on state regulatory powers, fiscal assistance, and patron client relationships municipal representatives help to build with neighborhood residents. These complex relationships came together under a united agenda of assuring appropriate neighborhood care. These nonprofit mediated practices of care sought to ultimately secure self-caring and responsible Latino subjects.

Processes of care, however, as previous chapters have revealed are inherently political and as such conflictual based on their attempts to direct and represent a diverse constituency of residents, merchants, and leaders. Thus, community care is shaped not by a coherent project but instead filled with contradictions and political debates about Latinidad, class, and immigration. In the process of redeveloping the Fruitvale district, there were different positioned subjects and power holders that were differentially situated in these processes dealing with the resignification of the neighborhood. As the next chapter analyzes, day laborers and other recently-arrived immigrants were left out of Fruitvale’s branding of progress and development. The city of Oakland responded with aggressive efforts to discipline space and the growing concentration of day laborers on Fruitvale’s newly redeveloped streets.
Chapter 4
Disciplining Space: Nonprofits and the Regulation of Undocumented Labor

In spring of 2008 I interviewed Lucía Rodriguez, the director of Oakland’s Day Labor Center. Though the City of Oakland funds the day labor center, its daily operations are contracted to Community Partners, a nonprofit organization situated in the Fruitvale district. My questions to the director were aimed at understanding how and why the center was created. As a seasoned activist, Lucía had organized Fruitvale’s Cinco de Mayo celebrations and the advocated for the expansion of the district’s successful lunch trucks. In describing some of the dilemmas confronting day laborers and to justify the day labor center as a method of “caring” for them, she made emphatic statements about the specific needs of the “Guatemalitos.” As Lucía described, these individuals were perhaps the worst off from all the other workers. For this director, “Guatemalitos” which roughly translates to “little Guatemalans” are indigenous Guatemalan day laborers whose short stature makes the use of the diminutive very apt. In her compassionate and patronizing comments, she fashioned “Guatemalitos” as poor and misguided day laborers who were innocent, perhaps even childlike and at the mercy of exploitative employers. The day laborer center, Amelia argued, served to protect these defenseless workers. These statements were not surprising to me, a Guatemalan immigrant who is well versed in my country’s own arsenal of derogatory beliefs and discourses about indigenous peoples. Yet at the time of my interview I remember trying to hold my tongue while I listened to this “activist,” well-meaning Latina, who could house such patronizing and yet simultaneously benign feelings about these groups.

This chapter analyzes Fruitvale nonprofit mediated projects that contradictorily cared for and policed day laborers. In the above example, Lucia's compassion is immediately linked with patronizing and racist comments about indigenous Guatemalan day laborers’ inability to govern themselves. Why are these acts of care so closely aligned with attempts to guide the appropriate conduct and solicitation practices Fruitvale’s growing population of undocumented laborers? At the height of Fruitvale’s redevelopment analyzed in the previous chapter, the City of Oakland responded to what it deemed as an unattractive daily congregation of day laborers soliciting work on street corners. As this chapter will reveal, the Oakland Day Labor Center sought to police day laborers by limiting their solicitation practices. To do so, the city contracted a nonprofit organization, Community Partners, to run a publicly funded day labor center. Community Partners’ technologies of caring for day laborers normalized powerful techniques of policing these workers. Oakland’s day labor center deployed practices of spatial discipline to legitimize its regulatory practices. This chapter shows that care is a contested concept that can at times be deployed to enact restrictive conditions for certain kinds of groups.

This chapter also grapples with a question regarding the government of undocumented migrants. I critique popular conceptions that render undocumented workers as “in the shadows” of state agencies or other political technologies of rule. This idea of undocumented migrants living in the shadows stems from the assumption that undocumented status precludes interaction with state agencies or with formalized modes of employment or political processes. This popular conception of undocumented status is also informed by undocumented migrants’ own fear of engaging with state agencies, especially Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials. Yet if undocumented migrants are in the shadows of state institutions, why were nonprofit

1 Community Partners is a pseudonym
agencies like Community Partners and municipal governments like the City of Oakland so intent on engineering programs and regulations for undocumented day laborers?

Day laborers are perhaps the most highly visible and most well-researched examples of informal undocumented labor throughout the United States. In the last decade, policy analysts, social scientists, and the media have constructed an elaborate body of knowledge about day laborers including detailed accounts of the age, place of origin, and employment rates of this population (O’Brien 2007; Theodore et al. 2006; Theodore 2007; Valenzuela 2001a, 2003). Much of the academic literature on day laborers is survey-based and focuses on documenting the demographics of this population rather than offering ethnographically situated accounts of day laborers. Nearly all of the literature documents the widespread popular debates about the “problem” that day laborers pose for cities throughout the nation. Residents, city governments, and merchants accuse day laborers of causing a public nuisance by creating traffic congestion; deterring customers from entering businesses; and loitering. In these debates, day laborers, popularly known as jornaleros, have been objectified and described as undesirable subjects or as defenseless victims in need of proper stewardship and care. Though many studies identify these debates surrounding day laborers, few offer an in-depth analysis of the grounded, day-to-day experiences of day laborers living in U.S. communities and navigating these spaces. In most academic and public policy accounts, day laborers are portrayed primarily as transient workers and not understood to be a central component of the very communities in which they live and look for work.

Through an ethnographic study of two day labor hiring zones in this chapter I present the hiring zone as a social-spatial milieu produced by the relationships that jornaleros construct with each other and their employers as well as the disputes surrounding the “problem” of day laborers. I argue that social-spatial relationships matter and rather than understand jornaleros as despatialized transient laborers, it is more productive to locate them within a particular political and economic context. This localized approach is critical for understanding the contextual nature of day laborers’ experiences. A focus on the situated experiences of day laborers also reveals how they become rendered visible to different state and non-state governing projects.

The fact that numerous city governments, merchants, and residents alike are mobilizing to eliminate, control, and/or regulate day labor hiring zones reveals how day laborers are subjects of governmental technologies and other modes of power. In this chapter, I describe how state and non-state actors render day laborers a sector of the population to be simultaneously monitored, cared for, and policed. State actors include agents such as the police, federal immigration officers, and local city officials, as well as social workers and school administrators. I define non-state actors as representatives of nonprofit organizations, residents, merchants and other entities (including day laborers) not directly tied to state. The analysis that I present below is primarily concerned with how these actors in various assemblages and entanglements employ different tactics to fashion a particular type of day labor behavior and idealized forms of employment solicitation. The analysis also illustrates the fundamental spatiality of Michel Foucault’s elaborations on power. Thinking about the conflicts surrounding “the problem of day laborers” in this fashion allows us to understand the power-laden process through which worker subjectivities are formed by competing practices of spatial discipline.

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2 Three exceptions to this are Purser’s (2009) study of boundary formation between day laborers; Walter et al.’s (2004) study of the effects of injuries on day laborer masculinities; and Pinedo Turnovsky’s (2006) study of the day-to-day practices that day laborers engage in at street corners.
The predicaments that arise from the organization of people and space through the use of political technologies are key to Foucault’s analytic of governmentality. Foucault (2007) defines governmentality as a field of power that seeks to shape human conduct by calculated means, and with a concern for the ultimate wellbeing not of individuals, but of the population as a whole. As Donald Moore (2005) describes, “rather than using force to dominate, the governing of subjects is productive in nature and employs political technologies to guide, encourage, and orchestrate actions among subjects whose agency becomes deployed—rather than destroyed—by government” (8). The act of governing subjects through indirect means involves a carefully planned interaction of what Foucault (2007) calls the relationship between “men and things.” Government is concerned about people’s relationships with “things like wealth, resources, means of subsistence, and, of course, the territory with its borders, qualities, climate, dryness, fertility, and so on” (96). Foucault argues that the target of government is to fabricate, organize and plan a milieu such that geography and relationships in space are of fundamental importance. Moreover, such a milieu is not designed or orchestrated by an omnipotent and violent state, but rather shaped by a diverse set of actors and institutions—both state and non-state entities.

Some of the most productive ethnographically-situated applications of Foucault’s analytic of governmentality have focused on analyzing the role of other agents and institutions not just reducible to the state in governing populations (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Moore 2005; Kosek 2006). Foucault’s analytic of governmentality is especially productive for the study of new spaces of informality, where state agencies may not be able to fully reach populations. This form of analysis is also useful in a neoliberal context whereby provision of services for inner cities is increasingly pushed to private entities like nonprofit organizations.

The modern state functions in a similar way with regard to day laborers and recruits various non-state entities to penetrate different social, psychic, and geographic spaces. To achieve an efficient social-spatial milieu that does not include and/or limit the congregation of laboring men on street corners, cities like Oakland deploy political technologies that seek to shape the conduct of day laborers through tactical practices of spatial organization and routinized regulatory procedures. Through these practices, state and non-state actors give significant contour to the experiences of undocumented workers such as jornaleros by limiting their available options for work and their ability to settle down, form families, and build a life for themselves in communities like Fruitvale. In addition to these practices of guiding undocumented workers, the federal state also enacts direct forms of disciplining day laborers, instills fear, and engenders a sense of spatial immobility on this population. Such forceful and direct forms of restraint, I argue, work in partnership with less direct and non-violent forms of governmental technologies of power.

**The Day Labor Parada**
To demonstrate how jornaleros become subjects of technologies of power, I study the dynamics of the day labor hiring zone. Known as the parada to most day laborers, the hiring zone is a geographical area usually located along sidewalks and street-corners where men congregate to solicit work. The parada, however, is much more than just a physical space where potential laborers desperately await employers; it is a place of multiplicities and interrelations, where men socialize with peers, recreate and reinterpret hierarchies of power, and establish and refine
repertoires for daily survival and subsistence. The parada serves as a medium for power relations and as a site of multiple contradictions: It is, simultaneously, the object of community battles over appropriate uses of public space; a target of immigration control and police harassment; a vehicle for the exploitation of workers by employers in search of the cheapest and most flexible kind of labor; and the site where some men’s luck can change for the better by landing a permanent job. The jornalero parada is thus virtually agentic—becoming a key faultline in many community debates and acquiring a subjectivity of its own.

I spent a four-month period visiting two adjacent paradas in East Oakland, which I refer to as the International and the Railroad sites, respectively. These day labor hiring zones are both located in a predominantly Latino, immigrant, and working class neighborhood of East Oakland, California. The men who solicit work here are predominantly Mexican and Guatemalan, and most are recently arrived immigrants who are adjusting to life in the United States. Though only two city blocks separate these two paradas, they are completely different and attract distinct kinds of jornalero populations. At the International site, most of the men are Mexican and non-indigenous Guatemalans. At the Railroad site, the day laborers are almost exclusively indigenous migrants who come from rural regions of Guatemala and are often not fluent in Spanish. Most of the men are here without their families. They are as young as sixteen and usually no older than thirty. These men live and work in the same community and live within a twelve-block radius of the paradas where they look for work on a daily basis. As residents of this Oakland district, these men serve as the biggest clientele for the local restaurants, grocery stores, and convenient shops.

I interacted with the men as they looked for work, sat with them as they chatted with friends, and accompanied them on their daily trips in and out of the street corner. I did not follow the men to work; instead, I focused my analysis on the kinds of interactions, activities, and stories that I heard from the men at the parada. In addition to this period of fieldwork, I also volunteered for two years at a community resource center located near the paradas, which serves mainly day laborers.

The “Problem” of Day Laborers and the Regulation of Immigrant “Illegality”

In much of the academic literature as well as media and public policy discourse, undocumented workers such as day laborers are often understood to be at the margins of the state and engaged strictly in the informal economy (Valenzuela 2003; Zolniski 2006). Castells and Portes (1989) characterize the informal economy as a “specific form of relationship of production” unregulated by legal and governmental institutions (10-13). Zolniski (2006) contends that informal economic activities are those “income-generating occupations that escape the control of the state and local government authorities.” These activities, he argues, are a common feature in Latino immigrant neighborhoods (73). The use of the word “escape” betrays the analyst’s assumption that state authorities do not monitor or seek to govern the subjects that engage in the informal economy. Indeed, some analysts argue that the lack of institutionalized permits or forms of employer

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3 Massey (2005) argues that place must be understood as first and foremost about interrelations. As she argues, “space is a product of interrelations; as constituted through interactions, from the immensity of the global to the intimately tiny” (9).

4 By family I mean their immediate relatives such as spouses, mothers, fathers, or siblings. However, these men create alternative notions of family whereby they build strong friendships with a group of men that become their source of support. These men also engage in transnational familial practices with their spouses, parents, or other family members that live in their home country. For a detailed elaboration of homo-social notions of family see Shah 2001.
verification such as licenses, social security numbers, and formalized bureaucratic procedures are evidence that state agencies do not regulate the informal economy of undocumented labor. This line of argumentation wrongly presupposes that state institutions are the only entities concerned with forms of regulation or surveillance. And by demarcating the exceptionalism of the state’s (lack of) relation to the informal economy, these arguments also construct a mutually exclusive division between the informal and formal economies.

Contrary to these perspectives that render state agencies blind to these spaces of informality, my fieldwork reveals that undocumented immigrants live their lives going in and out of the formal and informal economy and being simultaneously invisible and highly visible to different state and non-state agents. Many day laborers reported going to work with licensed contractors who, on paper, engaged strictly in the “formal” economy, but in practice, hired “informal” day laborers to cut costs. In many cases day laborers also reported their earnings to the state hoping that by paying income taxes they could prove their respectability as workers, which, in the future, could potentially help them formalize their immigration status.

*Jornaleros*, like other undocumented workers, are in fact members of communities whose activities become subject to both state and non-state agents that seek to shape their laboring practices. In the section that follows, I critically analyze the state regulation of the informal economy and labor, and the techniques, modes of operation, and partnerships with non-state entities through which this occurs. I argue that efforts to control or even render intelligible the “problem” of day laborers demonstrate that undocumented immigrants are by no means outside of the state’s sphere of influence or regulation. In fact, as De Genova (2002) argues, “illegality” is a “juridical status that entails a social relation to the state” such that migrant “illegality” is fundamentally a political identity created and maintained by the state (422).

**The Care of Day Laborers and Restrictions on their Mobility**

Oakland, the most populated city in the East Bay, has a reputation for being proudly liberal and a city that welcomes immigrants, as illustrated by its official status as a sanctuary city. Furthermore, the Latino district of Fruitvale, is home to a vibrant collection of nonprofit organizations that cater to a predominantly immigrant population. Given this context, it would be counterintuitive to completely prohibit day laborers from soliciting work on the streets or forcefully patrol them using the police or private security guards. Not only would this incite the anger of an entire assemblage of local pro-immigrant activists, but it would also upset a slew of private employers who eagerly hire day laborers instead of more expensive formal laborers.

Despite its liberal tendencies, residents and merchants of the neighborhood were quick to raise concerns about the development of several day labor *paradas*. This was exacerbated by the redevelopment plans that took shape in the late 1990s. A member of Day Laborers Together, an organization that advocates for *jornaleros* in Oakland, told me of how critical the situation

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5 Day laborers represent one of the most recent trends in informal workers in the U.S. For more detailed studies on the informal economy and informal workers, see López-Garza 2001, Zolniski 2006, Sassen 1991, Castells and Portes 1989.

6 Many liberal cities have chosen to become sanctuary cities to affirm their commitment to protecting the civil rights of all immigrants. The City Oakland declared itself a sanctuary city on May 15, 2007 and established a resolution: 1) Calling on the federal government to impose a moratorium on federal immigration raids and to adopt fair comprehensive and humane federal immigration reforms 2) Affirming that Oakland is a city of refuge for immigrants and 3) Declaring the city’s policy against local enforcement of civil immigration laws while permitting cooperation with federal agents in situations involving public and serious crimes. See Oakland City Council 2007.
became between 2000 and 2004 when redevelopment plans came to fruition. At 35, Jose Olivares is a seasoned activist who has been organizing as a day laborer for over ten years. Jose describes the conflict:

The local businesses were the first to complain about us jornaleros, especially the people at the thrift store where many men stand to look for work [at the International site]. They complained that jornaleros were harassing their customers, urinating on the streets, etc. This is a matter of aesthetics; they are concerned with the kind of image that their stores have. They claim that jornaleros that stand in front of the stores create a bad image and deter customers. The thing is that we are also customers there. I buy all my clothes from the thrift store and I buy my food at the different grocery stores in the area.

Jose, like other jornaleros, found himself the object of attacks from residents, business owners, and city officials. Not surprisingly, Jose and other workers were outraged by new restrictions placed on their solicitation practices, and they argued that day laborers, as residents and customers of the Fruitvale district, had the right to solicit work on any street corner of their choosing. As Jose recounted, members of Day Laborers Together, with the support of more established nonprofits like Centro Legal de la Raza, challenged the city’s first attempts to prohibit day labor solicitation. They organized marches, rallied in front of city government offices, and sought to make their demands heard by both city governments and merchant organizations.

Day laborers are a recent phenomenon in Fruitvale’s history. In my interviews with residents, most people date the mass influx of day laborers to about the early 1990s. One resident of Fruitvale for the past 16 years, Maria, who is a hairstylist by trade, told me about this kind of shift: “Before 2000, there were day laborers in Fruitvale but few. They looked for work in only like two different locations. But after 2000, I don’t know exactly when it started happening, but there were so many jornaleros. You started to see them along Foothill next to the Walgreens, and then along High Street. They were just everywhere.” Maria has seen the change in her clientele and also a shift in the locations of businesses in the Fruitvale: “There are now many more Guatemalans that are coming here to Fruitvale. Just look next door there is a Guatemalan restaurant and a bakery. Many of my clients are also Guatemalan.” Not only are the incoming immigrants no longer just Mexican, they are also primarily male.

As redevelopment efforts resurrected the once decayed streets of Fruitvale’s commercial sector, merchants and residents raised concerns about the “unorganized” congregation and circulation of day laborers. In envisioning a particular kind of redevelopment, planners, city officials, and community-based organizations sought a specific kind of flow of people, goods, and capital. They were primarily concerned with attracting new consumers and their money to the redeveloped zone. The day laborer form of soliciting work—which requires standing on the streets and waiting for work throughout Fruitvale—came in direct opposition to the specific branding of progress that redevelopment plans wanted to secure. Such a vision was heavily influenced by a powerful merchant sector that sought to harness further economic growth in the region.

These preoccupations with the efficient government of subjects within a given territory mirrors the concerns raised by early European officials in charge of planning the development of

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7 Day Laborers Together is a pseudonym
modern towns at the turn of the 17th century. As revealed in the recent English translation of Foucault’s 1989 lectures entitled *Security, Territory and Population*, (STP), Foucault’s understanding of governmentality stemmed fundamentally from a desire to appreciate the organization and politics of space and the ways in which populations are administered in historical-spatial contexts. Foucault’s explorations begin with the development of modern European towns. As the once closed and walled off European towns begin to enter into new relationships with other places, “what was at issue in the eighteenth century was the question of the spatial, juridical administrative, and economic opening up of the town: resituating the town in a space of circulation” (13). The problem was how to manage the type of circulation that occurred in and out of space. This was especially the case in the 18th century when newer towns were being constructed to facilitate greater circulation of goods and people, both within the town, and on external roads where goods could be exchanged. An important problem for towns in the 18th century was surveillance of bad types of circulation, since rigid walls no longer fortified the towns. Foucault contends that a different problem emerged which was not about fixing or enclosing territory, “but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement…in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are canceled out” (65). What was needed were mechanisms by which to govern at a distance, where the focus on territory and people would no longer be sufficient, nor a possibility, and the wellbeing of the population needed to be secured.

Illustrating some of the strategies that Foucault described were used to open up and develop modern European towns, Oakland city officials, residents, and merchants sought to position the Fruitvale district into a space of circulation. As the Fruitvale was branded a redeveloped space of progress and economic growth, project stakeholders raised concerted attempts to keep control day laborer solicitation practices. These technologies entailed maintaining the day laborer form of soliciting work and sociality as Foucault describes, “within socially and economically acceptable limits and around an average that will be considered as optimal for a given social function” (Foucault 2007: 5). City Officials, residents and planners debated how to manage the day laborer sector of the population in an appropriate and ethical fashion, so as to diminish the potentiality of this kind of “bad” circulation of people.8 Governmental forms of power do not seek to eliminate a particular activity or occurrence. Instead, the concern focuses on maintaining an appropriate bandwidth of permissible behaviors and actions. Unlike a more punitive treatment of day laborers, such as seeking to eliminate them from the streets at all costs, this more calculated approach pivots on the careful calibration of different agents, tactics, and strategies of efficient spatial organization to better manage day laborer solicitation practices. This adaptive and caring approach is key to the regulation of day laborers in liberal, progressive, pro-immigrant environments.

To solve the “problem” of day laborers, the city of Oakland created an official city-sponsored Day Labor Center (ODLC) to manage *jornalero* activity and behavior. Other pro-immigrant cities throughout the U.S. have done the same and, in most cases, in partnership with non-profit organizations, church groups, or other non-state entities. In Oakland’s neighboring city of Hayward, for example, the city helped to create a center with the assistance of a local church that had long been providing services to day laborers. Filipia, a founding member of the new day labor center in Hayward, explained: “They [the city] gave us $80,000 to start the center because they plain and simple wanted the men out of the streets. They wanted more order, less

8 Attempts to manage day laborers also coincided with newly activated concerns to monitor and police sex workers who also solicit employment on Fruitvale’s streets.
men on the streets. They do not really care for them, they just don’t want to see them.” Although they may be the outcome of a benevolent act, day labor centers funded by city governments can in fact become mechanisms for greater management of subjects. But rather than the city government taking direct control of these projects, the city subcontracts them to local nonprofit organizations. The state (in its various dispersed and capillary forms) does not just directly police day laborers. It also attempts to fashion a particular kind of immigrant laborer—one that is out of sight and out of mind—and that behaves and solicits work within a certain bandwidth of permissibility.

These day labor centers are by no means oppressive instruments of authority deployed to shape the conduct of day laborers. They are centers that seek to care for and transform jornaleros into proper laboring subjects. Furthermore, they seek to bring the day labor hiring site within some degree of formality. As Theodore et al. (2006) argue, worker centers offer the most promising policy intervention to “restore the floor under the day labor market” as they serve as spaces “where day laborer hiring is more formalized, transparent, and where labor standards, including wages and earnings, are better protected” (408). Some day laborers experience this as productive (and positive) kinds of activities or habits. For example, many of the day laborers report having learned many things at the city-sponsored day labor center, such as how to perform a certain kind of skilled labor and how to be attentive to their health (Purser 2009). Other day laborers report a greater degree of safety at day labor centers, as they can rely on the center to protect them against unscrupulous employers and assist them in any kind of difficulty they face (Martin et al. 2007). The art of government is not about forcing subjects to do the will of some kind of authority figure or sovereign, but rather to encourage them to choose certain paths over others, to guide conduct towards one end while foreclosing other possibilities. By addressing the issue in this matter, local city governments appear to be attentive to the demands of their constituents; they claim to “solve” the problem of day laborers. Similarly, they appease their pro-immigrant and progressive constituents by caring for and supporting undocumented laborers. State-sponsored regulation of the informal day labor market is thus invested in maintaining an efficient social-spatial milieu through selective practices of spatial discipline as well as the calibration of different tactics and careful orchestration of diverse actors and constituents.

Day Laborers and The Conduct of Conduct
Representatives of the Oakland Day Labor Center (ODLC) and city officials argue that their efforts have “solved” the day laborer problem. The resolution, however, does not equate with getting rid of jornaleros, for they continue to congregate in huge numbers at various street corners throughout Fruitvale. Rather, such interventions on the spaces that dictate where men can and cannot look for work sought to fashion a bandwidth of acceptable conduct, a range of permissible outcomes and relations. Such attempts to guide the conduct of day laborers includes their relations with each other, their relations of production, and their sedimented relationships to the very physical spaces where they solicit work.

One of the first goals of the ODLC is the spatial segregation of day laborers. The office is located in the industrial hinterlands of Oakland—far removed from the meticulously kept and polished image of the merchant corridor. It is situated in the middle of abandoned warehouses and storage places and located away from the newly face-lifted commercial artery of International Boulevard. On my first visit to the ODLC I realized that few day laborers actually solicit work here. Instead, most jornaleros wisely gravitate towards the highly transited boulevards.
I had often heard day laborers complain about how the ODLC was run-down and was simply too isolated and removed from the heavily transited streets. But what appears to be a run-down, under-funded, and underutilized day labor center has an incredible entangled history that demonstrates the different claims to space enacted by disparate actors that make up this community. I learned of this history in my interview with Lucía, the coordinator of the ODLC. Lucía is a lively woman of nearly fifty who has worked as an organizer in Fruitvale for over 15 years. Lucía described how the Day Labor Center emerged in the following fashion:

In 1994 our city council member Ignacio de la Fuente was really worried about what was going on with the day labor community because this group was growing rapidly. They [the city] started to create a program to help them. At that time, the Day Labor Center was just a place for the men to get work. The solution was not just to find them work. When I came here [in 2000] I expanded the program so that we could cover all of their needs and those of their families. There were many complaints from the merchants, from residents, because, well, day laborers would commit violations—urinating on properties, alcohol and drug use, and so we decided to give them a designated area. It is like seven blocks, they have an enormous amount of space. But they like soliciting work on High Street. And there we have problems with the merchants. Really the merchants don’t really complain unless the day laborers cause problems or tamper with their property. But now we are not only thinking about the merchants, but of the danger…that drug dealers, child molesters, and rapist infiltrate as day laborers—and that is a serious problem.9

In this description of the Day Labor Center’s creation, Lucía explains how the center was formed for the welfare of day laborers, their families, the wellbeing of merchants, and the population as a whole. I want to call attention to the process by which such welfare is to be achieved. First, the city created a day labor center and a designated solicitation space, which renders “illegal” the procurement of work in non-designated areas. As Lucía described, the designated area comprises a total of seven city blocks along a less heavily transited street and away from businesses. According to Lucía, the reason for partitioning off this area as a designated day labor zone is to protect the day laborers themselves and to surveil not only the day laborers, but also employers and prevent potential criminals from passing as day laborers. Lucía’s comments throughout our interview heavily emphasized this kind of surveillance as one of intended protection. When day laborers come to solicit work at the designated area, they are promised that they will go to work for registered employers who will not cheat them. Employers are equally assured that the day laborers they employ are registered and thus are good workers with skills and not criminals or ex-offenders. By urging workers to stay within the designated area (and potentially penalizing them for procuring work outside this zone), the day laborer center would serve to protect and care for a greater number of people.

Isolated from the transit and commercial hub of Fruitvale, the designated area seems to have its own kind of jurisdiction, whereby the Day Labor Center staff apparently patrols the traffic of both employers and employees. Such patrolling also entails a gathering of information of the day labor population that traffics this area. The city, for example, requires ODLC to keep statistics on the kinds of people that come in and out of the center and the designated area as a

9 Lucía Rodriguez, Interview with the Author, 4 December 2007, Oakland, California.
whole. According to city agreements with Community Partners, the non-profit that runs the ODLC, the center must maintain current data of employers and laborers served and gather information such as the demographics of the center’s participants. Furthermore, Community Partners must “establish an outreach strategy that focuses on the ethnicity, gender, and work culture of the Oakland casual labor population, with special emphasis on the Fruitvale District” (City of Oakland 2007). This is an example of the kind of numerical technologies enacted by the state in its local city government manifestation which are used to generate knowledge about a particular sector of the population so as to better manage them. Like Foucault’s analogy of the pastor who took care of and knew intricate details about his congregation, the state provides, cares for, and knows facts about its population (Foucault 2007). The city of Oakland, however, solicits the help of Community Partners as a nonprofit organization to collect information about jornaleros that locates them within the radar of governing technologies.

Day labor centers such as the ODLC perform a dual function of both caring for jornaleros and keeping them under control. According to a city of Oakland document granting Community Partners a contract to operate the ODLC from July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2009 for a total of $388,000 for the two year contract term, the program “is considered a viable mechanism for controlling the large numbers of men and women who congregate on street corners in the Fruitvale District” (City of Oakland 2007). The language of control is an interesting way to describe the kind of protection that Lucia asserts her center creates. The same document, however, continues by stating that “another concern is based on the well-being of the day laborers themselves, who are prone to being exploited by unscrupulous contractors, with little or no legal recourse” (2). Day laborers are thus both a nuisance and victims of discriminatory practices of employers. The nonprofit agencies serve to couch the directed policies of city officials—the control of day laborers and the informal economy they engage in—within a language of care, protection and proper stewardship. Furthermore, the mission of the community-based organization is to “maintain an effective working relationship with casual laborers, local police department, local churches, community organizations, labor unions, government agencies, local resident groups, and local businesses, in order to promote civic harmony and community participation in an effective Day Labor Program” (ibid. 2).

These strategies revolve around the construction of a particular kind of day laborer: one who is both defenseless (i.e. exploitable) and potentially deviant. To ensure their wellbeing and appropriate behavior, day laborers require the care of both the state and nonprofits. To solicit work on the street, jornaleros must seek work in the designated area and conduct themselves in an appropriate fashion: they should not consume drugs or alcohol on street corners, avoid littering, and limit their visibility near businesses. Oakland’s development of the ODLC for the care of day laborers also hinges on the construction of specific jornalero subjects and the elaboration of new entangled relationships between state and non-state actors. Day laborers like other undocumented workers often understood to be at the shadows or margins of the state, are indeed subjected to different forms of state and non-state regulation.

**The Micro-Practice of Governmental Forms of Power**

The reluctance of many day laborers to attend ODLC reveals the contradictions in attempts to govern subjects. It demonstrates that jornaleros themselves do not easily subject to the demands of a highly dispersed and incoherent state or its non-profit partners. Workers go against city sanctions and look for work in areas that they identify as having the most access to potential employers. Day laborers also construct elaborate codes of conduct that serve to shape how men
behave at the parada. These codes establish a range of permissible wages and behaviors, and help to filter the racial composition of a particular parada. In their own governmental practices, jornaleros both comply with certain demands made by opponents of street-corner solicitation and add their own rules.

The workers have a grounded understanding of the geographies associated with where they solicit work and they have sedimented relations with these places based on the interrelations that such paradas enable or foreclose. When I asked workers to list the various paradas they knew of, they quickly provided an impressive list of all the places as well as a cost and benefits analysis of soliciting work at a particular location. Furthermore, the men spoke about the very organic construction of paradas and the fact that like other places, paradas are always in formation (Massey 2005, Lefebvre 1991).

Juan: So are there other places where men look for work around here?

Carlos: All over the place. You go to Foothill and there are men on every street corner. High Street as well. Before it only used to be along the railroad tracks but now it is along the entire High Street.

Juan: But how do the employers know where to go? I would get pretty confused.

Carlos: Well, it depends on who goes with them. For example, if I go to work with this man, and then he drops me off near a corner on Foothill, next time he goes to pick me up there. And little by little, more men start to congregate in this area, and a new place to hire men is born. It happens all the time.

The creation of paradas is thus inherently connected to the kinds of relationships that day laborers form with employers. These statements reveal that most employers also do not obey the city-sponsored ordinances. As the men explain, new paradas are constantly forming based not only on the jornaleros’ desires but also on the employers’ actions. This kind of organic formation of paradas as well as the constant movement of workers that these men describe makes governing such places even more difficult and conjunctural.

My fieldwork reveals that men do not just go to look for work in a particular area just because it is “available” or because it is the location closest to their homes. Rather, day laborers construct their own effective milieus that seek to attract the greatest number of potential employers. I routinely asked many of the men why and how they chose to look for work in a particular parada.

Juan: How do you decide which site to go to? Why is it that you all continue to come here at International?

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10 Another important actor in the formation of day labor paradas is the existence of a booming home improvement industry, led primarily by giant home improvement stores that on a daily basis seek to attract customers. Home improvement stores thus become prime sites for paradas, where men await as customers come to buy supplies and simultaneously pick up labor.
Mario: See it’s where you have the most luck. For me, I go to the site that has treated me the best. Here, at this place, I have been able to get my good little jobs here and there (me han salido mis buenos trabajitos).

Carlos: Yes, it’s about where you feel comfortable, and where they pay good. Back there in by the railroad tracks for example, many of the employers want to pay you less. All the Asians (los chinos) want to pay 7 or 8 dollars an hour. Over here [International], if anyone goes for under $10 we kick him out. Everyone knows that and they know if they want to work for less, they should look for work in another spot.

These instructive comments demonstrate the process by which men choose to look for work in a particular location and the forms in which day laborers themselves govern the parada. These are not senseless decisions. They are educated choices based on where more work and better pay can be found, which illustrate the relationships of affect between the men and their respective paradas. Furthermore, day laborers have racialized understandings of employers based on which racial groups they feel pay higher rates. Asian employers are understood to be the worst possible bosses because of the low pay that they typically offer and the long hours that they expect from workers. According to the laborers, these racialized employers are also aware of the kinds of laborers that frequent specific paradas. That is, they are conscious that certain paradas have a code of conduct that specifies the minimum hourly rate that day laborers will work for.

The laborers revealed that there are specific sets of conditions that they themselves construct to maintain the conditions of the paradas (Valenzuela 2001b). Not only do these rules set a minimum pay for each parada, but they also attempt to shape the behavior of the workers. According to jornaleros who I interacted with, certain paradas have a bad reputation because they attract too many drunken jornaleros and drug users. At the International parada, the men prided themselves on maintaining a drug and alcohol free environment. When workers spotted a drunk, they sent him home or attempted to quiet him. The workers understood that they could not do drugs or alcohol at International and some actually chose to “take a break” from the parada and wandered off to other regions where they would consume their alcohol or drugs away from the scrutiny of the other jornaleros at the International site. This parada thus maintained a certain degree of formality and prestige and often men contrasted it to other less appealing paradas. This preoccupation with maintaining a clean and controlled parada reveals the way in which day laborers come to govern their own behaviors at the paradas. Furthermore, day laborers make their decisions about which parada to frequent based on their assessment of the moral character of each of the street corners available. The obsession with maintaining a “decent” environment reveals how the desire of the state, merchants, and nonprofits to shape the conduct of day laborers becomes internalized by the workers themselves. They have come to understand that proper comportment at the parada results in less harassment from opponents of day laborer solicitation on street corners.

Though day laborers upheld certain regulations that were complicit with state and non-state desires to regulate their laboring practices, they also created distinct types of rules. I also interacted with men at an adjacent parada, located approximately one block west of the International site. In contrast to the International site, this parada had a completely different feeling and a distinct jornalero demographic. The men were predominantly indigenous Mam and Quiché speakers from Guatemala as opposed to the mainly non-indigenous day labor
contingency at International. Whereas at the International site the men were congregated in one specific place, the men at this second site were dispersed. It always appeared as if things were a lot more informal and the area appeared to be some kind of hinterland in the jornaleros’ labor geographies.

Many people who were looking for work at the International site commented that the men at this second site were more prone to suffer from abuse and, most importantly, lowered wages by agreeing to work far below the $10 wage minimum set at the International site. The men at this second site, argued workers from International, were desperate for any kind of work and thus much more vulnerable to employer abuse. While none of the men would make the claim that racism was at play in producing this kind of spatial segregation of indigenous and non-indigenous day laborers, I contend that such segregation reveals how racism shapes how certain codes, regulations, and internal rules guided the conduct of day laborers.

These types of regulations imposed by day laborers demonstrate that the state is not the only governing body on the parada; day laborers are subjected to multiple kinds of governmental attempts at control, some of which lie outside the demands or objectives of the state. The description presented above demonstrates that attempts to govern such a complex set of relations are not simple or straightforward. Furthermore, the state is not the only agent with the power to shape the conduct of subjects.

Day Laborers’ Lived Experiences of Immigrant “Illegality”

Thus far, I have described the various ways in which a governmental mode of power has been mobilized as an indirect, less oppressive means to shape the conduct of day laborers in East Oakland. The deployment of governmental forms of power, however, does not foreclose the possibility of direct use of force or violence. Indeed, Foucault identifies three modes of power: sovereignty, discipline, and governmentality. Such a triad is not to be viewed as a linear progression of one over the other, with governmentality at the apex. Rather, Foucault understood these concepts as different modes of power that operate in entangled processes. They should be viewed as differentially applied and enacted based on different temporal and spatial conditions—a contingent process that Donald Moore (2005) aptly calls a triad in motion which enables him to locate “shifting alignments and contingent constellations of power rather than a single ruling rationality” (7).

This characterization of power is especially useful for thinking about the U.S. state which is itself comprised of different scales (federal, state, local) and embodied by different agencies and actors. Often, some scales of government enact policies that are in direct opposition with another. Oakland’s status as a sanctuary city, for example, establishes that the city will protect undocumented immigrants and not report them to federal agencies. However, the city of Oakland cannot impede federal immigration officials from entering and policing undocumented workers. Though progressive, pro-immigrant cities like Oakland and San Francisco choose not to help “control” illegal immigration, this does not guarantee that forceful and even violent federal immigration enforcement tactics will not take place. As Foucault demonstrates, different modes of power can operate simultaneously, though one might be privileged over another for a particular social-spatial milieu. Indeed in my interactions with day laborers in Oakland, I also came to understand the more direct and even violent ways in which day laborers and other undocumented workers are disciplined by different regulatory techniques of state power. In what follows, I describe in detail other disciplinary and even forceful mechanisms adopted by the U.S. Homeland Security State that day laborers confront (De Genova 2010; Waslin 2010).
The high visibility of jornaleros while soliciting work, for example, makes the parada one of the preferred sites of immigration raids. Day laborers in East Oakland constantly alerted me to the prevalent fear of deportation that they experience—the contingency that shapes the conditions of possibility of recently arrived undocumented immigrants. In the summer of 2007 many of the men spoke of immigrant raids, of the pervasiveness of ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) raids at day labor sites in the neighboring cities of Richmond and San Rafael. This specter of deportability—imbued with fear and anxiety—loomed high in the minds of many men.¹¹

So strong was the fear of deportation that some of the jornaleros decided not to look for work in Berkeley, another place where it was rumored that the migra had visited. At the time of my fieldwork, day labor work in Oakland was scarce and so I asked why people would not go to other cities such as Albany or Berkeley where I was told work was more abundant and wages were better. One man responded by expressing his fear of going to look for work in other areas: “I used to go [to Berkeley] but since they are doing all these immigration raids lately I’d rather not even get close. They got a lot of men in Berkeley last week. La migra picked up these men from the parada just like that without any reason. I’d rather be standing here without work than to get sent back to Mexico.” While extra work might be found in more affluent cities, a reported immigration raid effectively steered people away from these locations. Whether factual or fictitious, the stories of these immigration raids created real limitations on the mobility of these undocumented workers as well as a heightened sense of fear. These stories also reveal how the specter of deportation is mapped onto particular spaces such as the day labor parada, which in turn become catalogued as geographies of fear that workers either avoid or enter with caution. As residents of Oakland, day laborers also spoke about their daily preoccupation with the potentiality of an immigration raid in their homes. Often, they did not understand that the local police was in fact a separate entity from immigration officials. One recently-arrived Guatemalan man, Cypriano, spoke to me about a raid that had just occurred in the apartment building of a friend: “The migra came and looked like police officers. They knocked on the door and when no one answered they almost tore it down. They were looking for some people in my friend’s apartment building. They got those people but they also took anyone else they found.” As Cypriano describes, while ICE officials came for a particular person, they assumed that all others in the apartment were undocumented regardless of their actual legal status. For a recently arrived immigrant who has yet to fulfill his immigrant dream (and is still in debt from his passage to the U.S.), the specter of deportation arouses much more than fear—it forecloses all potential fruits of the sacrifice that migration entails. These are the particular situations in which a person’s illegality becomes activated and fashions a degree of immobility as a result of being subjected to heightened policing by various state or non-state actors.

Driving Checkpoints and Geographies of Fear

Immigration raids as a form of state infiltration in the day-to-day lives of undocumented immigrants are but one modality of limiting mobility. While most day laborers do not have cars, when they do drive, they also have to do so with caution. Police often set up routine retenes or

¹¹ Nicholas de Genova (2002) argues that it more useful to think of deportability and not the act of deportation. Deportability more aptly describes how undocumented migrants experience the constant fear of being deported. Undocumented migrants’ experience of deportability means that they are more likely to be compliant workers and tolerate exploitative conditions. The will less likely protest exploitative working or living conditions because of the constant fear of possible deportation.
checkpoints at particular intersections where they verify that drivers are driving with a valid drivers license. These are routine checks, conducted at random, in which cars are stopped at a particular intersection and a number of the cars are selected for a more throughout inspection. So pervasive are these checkpoints that Spanish language radio will announce where such retenes are taking place—alerting its listeners to avoid these locations at all costs. While these checkpoints are not directly aimed to target “illegals,” many undocumented people have been subject to these routine inspections. Jesus, who is a day laborer, recounted, “[The retenes] take place everywhere here in Fruitvale. I have seen retenes on International Boulevard, on Foothill, in Alameda, like around 79th and 80th street. On all of International Boulevard.” Such “inspections” usually require drivers to produce driver’s licenses and proof of insurance. Day laborers are usually unable to provide such documentation and this results in their vehicles being taken away. As Jesus elaborates, “Retenes happen a lot here, and for the most part people get their cars taken away. This past month, for example, I borrowed a friend’s car and I was driving it by the Kelley Moore Paint Store on International and there on High there was a reten and I was so nervous, but luckily the police never pulled me over. I was lucky. They take away your car, and they leave you stranded.” When I asked Jesus if this made him afraid, he responded rather matter-of-factly that no, he just understands this to be the fact of living in this country without papers—and being subject to losing your car if the police catches up with you. He even cited other instances where he had simply been able to avoid encounters with the police or immigration officials: “On 35th, in a park, they were telling me that they had gotten lots of people there. Last Sunday immigration visited that grocery store Mi Pueblo. They just went in to investigate some things and then left. I saw them and just continued my shopping.” Jesus’s comments show that whether effective or not in producing immigrant immobility, state-sponsored forms of policing and patrolling serve to contour a specific form of existence where one’s illegality is always at play.

Thus, just as city officials, local businesses, and potential employers are concerned with the proper circulation of day laborers, jornaleros themselves are cautious about their own movements in and out of Oakland. Their illegal status limits their own mobility, and the presence of ICE officials and driving checkpoints in Oakland creates geographies of fear that are to be avoided at all costs. Such tactical navigation in and out of different kinds of spaces points to the ways in which day laborers and other undocumented immigrants adopt various strategic maneuvers to live their life as “illegals.” Furthermore, the kinds of interactions with ICE officials detailed above reveal that governmental forms of power often work in partnership with more direct and violent forms of disciplining.

Conclusion
Fruitvale’s disputes about “the problem” of day laborers demonstrate that jornaleros and other undocumented workers are subjects of governmental rationalities and other technologies of power. Though it is commonly believed that undocumented labor hides within the crevices of the informal economy, this chapter demonstrates the various ways a dispersed state agencies and non-state entities render this population visible. Debates about the propriety of day labor solicitation and the practices of both city governments and its non-profit partners to discipline the jornalero parada reveal the sophisticated methods by which the state maintains informal laborers within its governing radar. Rather than understanding jornaleros as transient de-spatialized laborers, it is important to locate them as members of communities and thus subject to a diverse set of attempts to govern their actions and behavior. Far more than laborers, jornaleros are
family members, consumers, activists, and residents of the neighborhoods where they solicit work.

These findings about the management of the informal economy of labor, both through forceful (and often violent) punitive measures as well as indirect (and often productive) methods, have relevance for how we theorize power relations in “advanced capitalist” countries. Some scholars too often suggest that in societies such as the United States and Western European countries, the study of violence in the form of disciplinary and sovereign power has less relevance given that in these contexts, citizenship has been expanded in radically egalitarian forms (as evidenced by the existence and application of anti-discrimination state policies). The study of state violence and excessive use of force is located elsewhere—in the third world or other “developing” nations. By highlighting the increasing presence of internal and informal mechanisms of control that operate on day labor hiring zones, I have sought to demonstrate how political technologies designed to punitively control “immigration,” such as ICE raids, driving checkpoints, and anti-immigrant vigilante actions have a complicated co-existence with less forceful and more indirect ways of governing. This study demonstrates that sovereignty is applied with greater force on certain “illegal” bodies that are seen to pollute or contaminate (Inda 2005). Often the rule of law is enacted more heavily on groups that cannot easily contest such forms of power because they lack access to formal citizenship and are labeled criminals for their “illegality.” The experiences of day laborers and other undocumented immigrants highlight that enforcement of immigration policies is practiced by both state and non-state actors in formal and informal spaces beyond the border that entail contested practices, procedures, and lived experiences.

This chapter also suggests, following a Foucauldian analytical framework, that power should not be analyzed solely as something possessed by an omnipotent and de-spatialized state. While Foucault (2000) acknowledges the state’s ability to centralize and orchestrate its power, he emphatically argues that “power relations are rooted deep in the social nexus, not a supplementary structure over and above ‘society’ whose radical effacement one could perhaps dream of” (345). Power for Foucault is first and foremost about relations. Power exists, “only as exercised by some on others, only when it is put into action, even though, of course, it is inscribed in a field of sparse available possibilities underpinned by permanent structures” (340). As the experiences of day laborers on the parada reveal, the state does provide some permanent structures that shape jornaleros’ conditions of possibility for economic and social ascent. These state structures, however, are not the sole actors in these relations of power or the single governmental agents. There are other agents and institutional bodies, bound by complex relations that seek to shape the actions, behaviors, and conduct of subjects. In urban racialized communities, nonprofit organizations are powerful actors in these governing practices.
On my first day volunteering at Bienestar Project in 2007, I was ushered into a room with two Mam-speaking indigenous migrants from Guatemala. I was given all of their paperwork and instructed to prepare them for their meeting the following day at the California Labor Commissioner’s Office in Downtown Oakland. Centro Legal de la Raza helped the men, Saloman and Calixto, fill out copious amounts of paperwork in order to file a wage claim. Through Centro de la Raza’s guidance, these two undocumented Mam-speaking day laborers, filed paperwork alleging that their employer failed to pay them for work. The two men worked for a man that pricked them up daily at a street corner. One day this man no longer showed up and left the men without payment them for weeks of work. Through friends the men heard that at “La Raza” attorneys helped workers fight to get back unpaid wages. As they recounted the story on our first meeting, the men had full faith in the process and carefully held a folder with all the documents that had been prepared for them. The men knew nothing about the California Labor Commissioner’s office, and I honestly did not have prior knowledge of the agency or the wage claim process. The men could not read the papers and just barely managed to produce signatures on the forms. Their eyes, however, exuded hope that perhaps they could get some monetary compensation from this uncertain bureaucratic transaction.

The next day I met them at Bienestar’s office and then headed to the downtown Oakland offices. We struggled to find the correct office in the labyrinth of hallways and entryways that make up the Ronald V. Dellums Federal Building. Inside the office we found an even more confusing set of waiting rooms and an overall sterile environment. It was anything but a welcoming space and no one made an effort to help us. After signing in with an attendant I was simply told to wait for us to be called. No one at the California Labor Commissioner’s office spoke Spanish. When we were finally called by our appointed labor commissioner, we were ushered into a room where she reviewed the paperwork. The labor commissioner was friendly but quick and to the point. Calixto’s and Saloman’s employer never showed up to defend his case so the labor commissioner determined that they were owed four weeks pay. She informed the men, however, that there was nothing that her office could do to collect the money. While the California Labor Commissioner’s Office could hear Calixto’s and Saloman’s claims, it could not prosecute the employer that had unjustly denied them of their wages. The Labor Commissioner has no jurisdiction over independent contractors and only limited purview over employees of public federal, state, county or municipal agencies. The men were absolutely heartbroken by the news but warmly thanked the labor commissioner for her help.

It would be easy to dismiss Saloman and Calixto’s visit to the Labor Commissioner’s as insignificant given that they did not receive any monetary compensation. Yet, the fact that these two undocumented and recently-arrived migrants with no formal education were heard by the California Labor Commissioner’s Office is remarkable. The Labor Commissioner’s Office is a highly difficult space to navigate and requires workers to fill out numerous forms, many which are not even translated to Spanish, and certainly not Saloman and Calixto’s native Mam.

1 Mam is one of 23 different indigenous languages spoken in Guatemala. Fruitvale is a critical point along the migration stream of many indigenous migrants from Guatemala. Some of the initial Guatemalan indigenous migrants began at the height of the civil war in Guatemala in the early 1980s. Many of these migrants worked as farmworkers in the central valley and then relocated to find more urban employment in cities like Oakland.

2 http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/policies.htm
language. The California Labor Commissioner’s Office is also not known to most workers, let alone undocumented day laborers without formal employment. These services were created primarily for industrial workers in factories or formal businesses where regulations and procedures are easier to uphold. Throughout my time working with both Centro Legal de la Raza and Bienestar Project, however, I witnessed many these kinds of cases. Many day laborers actually did get some monetary compensation mainly because their employers paid them after receiving an intimidating letter from the Labor Commissioner’s Office. These bureaucratic transactions are a testament to the powerful role that nonprofit organizations play in networking poor and recently-arrived residents with California state services and protections.

Nonprofit organizations worked tirelessly to make different resources and assistance available to undocumented migrants. This meant that they had to maneuver a complex set bureaucratic and institutional barriers. These roadblocks relate to undocumented immigrants’ precarious status that precludes them from making proper battles for their rights. As the previous chapter argued, to think of undocumented immigrants as “in the shadows” fails to accurately gage how they are defined through their relationship with different state agencies, in particular the federal Department of Homeland Security. In Fruitvale I observed how undocumented workers engaged with both nonprofit and state agencies in very tangible ways. This included, for example, the Alameda County Public Health Department, the City of Oakland funded Day Labor Center, and California State courts. As the above ethnographic moment reveals, nonprofits served as brokers between undocumented immigrants and different state agencies. In the above example, Centro Legal’s attorneys worked with indigenous Mam speakers to fill out a confusing set of forms. These undocumented indigenous Guatemalan laborers had minimal experiences with bureaucratic processes, given that they came from remote rural towns. Furthermore, as undocumented workers, they had tremendous fear of any contact with state officials. Calixto and Saloman only went to the court proceedings that day because I accompanied them and served as their interpreter.

This chapter focuses on the specter of federal anti-immigrant constraints and regulations and how present day nonprofits negotiate them. Federal mandates police migrants and distinguish documented citizens from undocumented “illegals.” These technologies of rule render Fruitvale undocumented residents ineligible for many federal and state social services and make them targets of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers. Anthropologist James Quesada (2012) refers to undocumented immigrant’s experience of an entire constellation of structural vulnerabilities as fundamentally embodied and productive of cumulative injurious effects (see also Quesada et al. 2011; Willen 2012). Sociologists Cecilia Menjivar and Leisy Abrego (2012) describe this as legal violence which has psychic impacts and influences the day-to-day activities of undocumented migrants. As they define it, “legal violence captures the suffering that results through the implementation of the body of laws that delimit and shape individuals lives on a routine basis and that are normalized because ‘it is the law’”(1387). I extend their analysis by demonstrating how legal violence constrains nonprofit organizations’ engagement with undocumented migrants. This chapter critically analyzes nonprofits’ situated struggles to assist undocumented workers in order to show how they challenge federal anti-immigrant mandates.

This chapter draws from seven years of volunteer work at a community health clinic, Bienestar Project that provides free healthcare and serves as a community center in Fruitvale. During my time at Bienestar Project I served as program coordinator, research assistant, board member and board president. This participation allowed me to build close relationships with the
organization’s staff and board of directors and its changing base of clients. In these engagements, I was attentive to how Bienestar crafted its relationship to other nonprofit organizations and different state agencies and philanthropic foundations. As a board member, I was also entrenched in the organization’s fundraising efforts. I paid close attention to how Bienestar grant writers and executive director strategically navigated different forms of funding in order to provide services for undocumented workers.

Nonprofit practices of care for undocumented immigrants are constrained the more institutionalized and professionalized an organization becomes. Nonprofits like Bienestar Project emerged to work with clients that the neighborhood’s federally qualified health center, Clinica de la Raza, had difficulty reaching. Bienestar especially targeted a growing population of undocumented day laborers in Fruitvale. Clinica de la Raza’s reliance on federal and county funding meant that it prioritized documented clients who could enroll in federal insurance programs. As this chapter will demonstrate, undocumented migrants confront institutional constraints that deter them from accessing care at certain healthcare centers, a condition that sociologist Hellen B. Marrow (2012) describes as bureaucratic disentitlement. While anthropological and sociological literature reveals that disentitlement for undocumented immigrants exists, we know little about how care is afforded to this population. Furthermore, we are left with an anemic knowledge of the political work nonprofit organizations must wage to provide services for this population. And in providing care for undocumented immigrants, how do these nonprofits in fact produce new kinds of relationships between the state and undocumented people, and come to define undocumented subjectivities? Nonprofits play a foundational role in forging undocumented immigrant subjectivities and in shaping the experiences of recently-arrived immigrants. Furthermore, they deploy technologies of care to construct a powerful immigrant rights consciousness that shapes the politics of citizenship in Oakland.

This chapter analyzes how the struggle for undocumented migrants becomes centrally tethered to Fruitvale nonprofit politics of care. I focus on the most hotly debated forms of state welfare provision—healthcare. Due to federal mandates that make undocumented migrants ineligible for publicly-funded medical services, healthcare provision to undocumented immigrants is a politicized act (Menjívar 2002; Holmes 2007, 2012). I show how nonprofit organizations that work with undocumented populations eek out alternative sources of funding and strategically navigate different state and private foundation funding streams. Like 1960s nonprofit leaders that avoided certain federal funding entrenched in political turmoil (see chapter 2), present day nonprofit leaders similarly navigate a contentious terrain of funding. In so doing, nonprofits politicize care and produce creative ways to fund services for undocumented people. I argue that in making the provision of services for undocumented migrants and immigrant rights a central mobilizing issue—a kind of linked fate—nonprofits racially demarcate Latinos from African Americans. This division between Latino “immigrant” organizations and African American agencies has consequential effects for the construction of coalitional politics and impacted how Fruitvale is perceived vis-à-vis other Oakland neighborhoods.

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3 For African Americans, linked fate is the recognition that individual life chances are inextricably tied to the race as a whole. Political scientist Michael Dawson (1994) suggests that linked fate represents awareness that blacks are seen as a collective entity and that entity has often borne the blunt of racist policies and behavior. I believe that this operates in a similar fashion for Latinos and immigration is a key factor in forging a Latino collective identity. And because immigration serves as such an important component of this collective identity, it also differentiates Latinos from African Americans.
Introduction to Bienestar Project

I was first introduced to Bienestar Project in 2006, soon after relocating to the Bay Area from Los Angeles. I chose to volunteer at Bienestar because I was interested in working directly with Central American migrants, a population that the organization closely worked with. I was part of a long tradition of Latino UC Berkeley students that found in Fruitvale a place where they could “give back” to their community and to “put to practice” their University training. Many students volunteered at different legal clinics or health clinics throughout Fruitvale. Like generations of the past, self-identified students of color at UC Berkeley found in Fruitvale an important site to develop and test their politicization.

At that time Bienestar's office was located in an old hospital building that was run down but showed signs of the grandeur of the past. Various nonprofit organizations occupied the small offices of this building as rent was affordable given the deteriorating condition of the space. As I entered the Bienestar office, all I could see were people busily going about their activities. On one end of the room men were being served lunch, on another end a curtain partitioned a makeshift clinic where patients saw the doctor. There were probably about forty people in a room with a capacity of thirty. Volunteers carried clipboards where they took patient’s intakes. The room permeated with the smell of food cooked on hotplates on one corner. The men talked with one another while they either waited for lunch or their turn to see the doctor. I looked for a woman named Esperanza Rico, the organization's executive director. I initially did not see her but could hear her powerful voice giving orders and making sure that everyone was being helped. At five foot, Esperanza was far shorter than her voice projected. Esperanza was clearly the organization’s main motor and her caring nature attracted clients to the organization. Clients came to Bienestar not only to access medical care. Many came solely to consult with señorita Esperanza about a particular problem they had, and medical care would ensue afterward. As an immigrant from Peru and a former undocumented worker herself, Esperanza personally understood the fears and and limitations that Bienestar’ clients confronted on a daily basis.

Bienestar Project was founded in 2002 by a group of Alameda County nurses and premed students from Mills College. At that time services were mainly on the streets and the organization only existed on an irregular basis as a mobile clinic. The head organizer of the services was the energetic Rita Kumar, a senior Alameda county nurse that pulled strings to get the Alameda County Health Department to let her go out to the streets. Nobody ever said no to Rita Kumar because she exuded so much conviction and compassion to help people. As an refugee from India, Rita understood that many recently-arrived immigrants get left out of care. According to Rita, the “system” was not created to reach out to this population. She had been part of a group of small medical clinics staffed by public health nurses that operated as part of Alameda County's Health Department effort to reach out to the most disenfranchised. After the county cut off funding for this program in 1996, Rita continued to advocate for the expansion of healthcare services to the neediest. Bienestar Project emerged to help one of the most visible sectors of recently-arrived immigrants—day laborers that solicit work on Fruitvale’s streets. Like nonprofit workers of the past, the charismatic Rita Kumar wore many hats and served as a critical nexus between the Alameda Public Health Department as a state agency and Bienestar Project. Furthermore, as a product of 1970s grassroots activism in the Bay Area, Rita Kumar also served to link past struggles to the present. All of this was embodied in the day-to-day services at Bienestar and the political work of targeting primarily undocumented recently-arrived immigrants.
Undocumented Migrants and Bureaucratic Disentitlement
When I first started to work at Bienestar Project I did not understand the agency’s work as political. In fact, none of the other volunteers and staff did. For Bienestar volunteers like myself, the agency served to meet a basic human right of healthcare and basic social services. However, I soon learned how the provision of medical care for undocumented laborers is a political act that requires organizations like Bienestar to navigate an uncertain terrain of funding and bureaucracy. Cities also take on this task. Pro-immigrant cities such as Oakland and San Francisco, for example, commit themselves to extending healthcare to undocumented migrants despite federal anti-immigrant mandates (Alameda County Health Department 2008; Marrow 2012).

Despite this pro-immigrant healthcare climate, undocumented immigrants confront innumerable structural limitations in accessing healthcare. These limitations were not a result of the intentional acts of local community based clinics or hospitals refusing to grant services to undocumented migrants. They resulted from the constraints imposed by federal and state policies that restrict the eligibility of undocumented migrants. Sociologist Hellen B. Marrow (2012) describes undocumented workers’ lack of access to healthcare as a result of what she terms “bureaucratic disentitlement.” Bureaucratic restrictions produced a complex web of constraints shaped by moral and ethical regimes surrounding not just access to care but also discussions about who is deserving of care. In communities where healthcare and social services are scant, health care professionals often regard undocumented as the least deserving of care (Holmes 2007, 2012; Marrow 2012; Menjivar 2002).

The strained bureaucratic relationship between undocumented immigrants and state welfare services became punitively defined in the 1990s. In California, the 1994 passing of Proposition 187 demonstrated the state’s widespread xenophobia against undocumented immigrants (see Chavez 2008; Garcia-Bedolla 2005; Varsanyi 2010). As Monica Varsanyi (2010) argues, proposition 187 initiated a wave of local attempts to limit services for undocumented immigrants throughout the United States. Just two years after California’s controversial proposition against undocumented immigrants, President Bill Clinton’s 1996 Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) dramatically restricted public assistance for “legal” immigrants and residents alike. A large body of social science research has analyzed PRWORA’s impacts in a context of accelerated retrenchment of the welfare state, and the neoliberal devolution of responsibility of care to the local level (see Coburn 2000; Morgen and Maskosky 2003; O’Connor 2000). As these studies reveal, PRWORA’s passing rested on dual construction of the undeserving welfare queen and the “foreign” immigrant (both documented and undocumented) draining the country’s social service coffers (De Genova and Ramos-Zayas 2003: 60; Reese 2005; Viladrich 2012: 822). PRWORA denied documented “legal” immigrants access to federal public assistance during their first five years in the country (Reese 2005: 4). The specific targeting of “legal” permanent residents as a drain on the nation’s economy further stigmatized undocumented laborers.

PRWORA further spelled out the federal government’s firm position against funding

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4 This California initiative also known as the Save our State initiative was passed on November 8, 1994. It was designed to prevent undocumented immigrants from accessing social services including healthcare and K-12 and postsecondary education. The initiative also required that local police agencies help federal authorities in the enforcement of federal immigration law. Although the initiative was held to be unconstitutional, it initiated a long trend in other initiatives that similarly targeted undocumented migrants.
services for undocumented migrants.\textsuperscript{5} While undocumented immigrants had always been excluded from federally funded services, this act created even more stigma and diverted many from entering the preventative health system. With the exception of emergency Medicaid, the law did not include provisions for undocumented immigrants. Following neoliberal devolutionary trends, the law made states and local municipalities explicitly accountable for the financial and logistic burden of providing services to undocumented immigrants (Kaushal and Kaestner 2005).

Explicit federal devolution of responsibility of care for undocumented laborers to counties and municipalities created an uneven geography of service. In the Bay Area, the bordering counties of Alameda and Contra Costa have radically different treatment of emergency services for undocumented migrants. Alameda county, for example, sets aside Measure A\textsuperscript{6} money each year, which is made available for emergency treatment to indigent county residents. Undocumented immigrants are eligible for medical coverage through an Alameda county funded health insurance program designed to target uninsured residents. Measure A money does not explicitly cover undocumented immigrants. It funds treatment of undocumented immigrants solely because the majority are uninsured. Contra Costa county, however, is more restrictive and does not easily grant money for the treatment of undocumented immigrants. Undocumented migrants in Contra Costa County have a much more difficult time accessing healthcare services. Many Bienestar patients came from Contra Costa county to use services because they felt that their local community clinics were not a welcoming space. Or in counties with little resources, community clinics do not even exist. In contexts with more constricted funding, health professionals find less incentive to provide services for undocumented residents. Marrow (2012) found that even in the progressive and inclusive healthcare system of San Francisco, some lower level health care professionals often expressed views of unauthorized immigrants as “less deserving” of publicly-funded medical services than “legal residents”(849).

Undocumented migrants’ limited access to medical services was also impacted by their fear and their lack of knowledge complex healthcare systems. Many Bienestar clients had never attempted to access the local federally qualified health centers because they feared these bigger institutions like Clinica de la Raza. Others did not even know that such clinics existed. Rita Kumar, as a public health nurse argued that even community clinics were too structured and this deterrent many clients. She described the following: “In structured places like La Clinica [some people can easily be turned away] because the receptionist in the front line is taught that the first thing he/she says is ‘Hi. How are you? Where is your insurance or do you have insurance.’” For Rita Kumar and others at Bienestar, these practices problematically structured medical care only through private insurance or publicly funded insurance programs. This practice ostensibly disqualify undocumented immigrants or deterred them from even attempting to access services.

Bienestar’s clients also did not readily access community health clinics because they

\textsuperscript{5} Following international humanitarian protocols, the federal government continues to fund emergency services for anyone regardless of documented status under emergency medical.

\textsuperscript{6} Measure A, the Essential Health Care Services Initiative, was adopted by Alameda County voters in March 2004. The Measure authorized the County of Alameda to raise its sales tax by one-half cent in order to provide for additional financial support for emergency medical, hospital inpatient, outpatient, public health, mental health and substance abuse services to indigent, low-income, and uninsured adults, children, families, seniors and other residents of Alameda County. Alameda county channels funding for undocumented immigrants through this specific funding stream because it provides provisions for “uninsured” people. Though the measure never explicitly names “undocumented” most undocumented people are uninsured and by proxy covered under this measure. See http://www.acgov.org/health/indigent/measureA.htm
often could not provide proof that they lived in Alameda county, a requirement that agencies like Clinica de la Raza uphold due to state and municipal mandates. Because many of Bienestar’s clients are undocumented they usually find alternative means to attain housing. Many day laborers lived in apartments that were rented to someone that no longer lived there. In my interaction with most day laborers, I found that people come up with ingenious housing arrangements. On one occasion, for example, I met a Bienestar client at his apartment. Eight people lived in this two bedroom space: two people in each bedroom, and the living room was partitioned into four separate “rooms.” All of the residents of this apartment could not produce a utility bill or other “proof” that they were Oakland residents. Marrow (2012) describes this complex web of restrictions as linked to the “documentation steps” which effectively exclude most undocumented immigrants from accessing care. Therefore Marrow argues that many of the safety net services are only able to reach “a pinch” of the undocumented population (851).

Federally qualified health centers like Clinica de la Raza also require clients to produce a photo identification card to become members. Most Bienestar clients did not have any form of state issued identification card such as a California ID. As a documented resident working with undocumented migrants I had to remind myself of the privileges that I symbolically and materially held. There were forms of mobility and certain mundane types of activities or transactions that I could easily engage in due to my own documented status. My personal privilege was revealed by my initial dislike of producing Bienestar member identification cards. I initially did not understand why so many people wanted this membership card and felt that my time could be better spent on other tasks. I was annoyed by the laborious and mundane process of making these member cards which entailed photographing the person, uploading their information, printing the IDs and finally, laminating a copy of the ID card.

My annoyance quickly subsided once I realized the incredible meaning people placed onto these cards, and the useful purposes that they served. One man commented for example: “I opened a back account and used this [member card] as a second ID.” Another person had used this ID when stopped by a police officer. While the card has no validity for it is not a government issued form of identification, it performs a symbolic function—it gives a person, however limited, some form of validity—it substantiates a person’s existence. This is important for failure to have a form of identification can effectively foreclose a person’s possibility of performing many day-to-day activities. As Nicholas De Genova argues, “the transformation of mundane activities—such as working, driving, or traveling—into illicit acts, related to compounded legal ineligibility... signifies a measure of captivity and social death”(De Genova 2002: 427). I often heard day laborers describe this sense of captivity in their expressions of fear of going to different places or leaving what they deemed as the “safe” and familiar place of Latino Fruitvale.

Bienestar clients also feared accessing publicly-supported health services because they assumed this rendered them more visible to immigration officials. When Esperanza first started working with day laborers, she recalled how especially salient this fear was: “The people felt intimidated because of their immigration status. They would ask ‘what kind of information do you need from me?’” Instead of accessing preventative care, most undocumented day laborers would only seek medical care in severe emergencies. As a result, many day laborers had been charged exorbitant costs for medical care. As she explained: “a lot of [the day laborers] already had some bills from hospitals. They felt scared that these bills would reveal their undocumented status to immigration officials.” Esperanza lamented that many day laborers feared that a medical bill could be used as an excuse to deport them. Clients did not understand why Bienestar’s services were completely free of cost and they were not required to show proof of residency.
Bienestar staff worked closely with day laborers to educate them about their rights and convince them that the agency could be trusted. Many of the migrants from Guatemala had an added difficulty accessing community resources due to their limited Spanish language fluency. This made them appear somewhat reserved and shy. It was often difficult for me to strike up a conversation with day laborers from Guatemala. Being Guatemalan myself, I often tried to use my cultural background and familiarity with some of the country's geography to get their trust. But this never worked as most of the Mam speakers kept to themselves and hardly talked to others. It was not until Bienestar hired a Mam translator that the men started to open up, that we learned more about them. This is one of the limitations of community-based projects created to help “Latinos” but that are not equipped to handle the cultural and linguistic diversity of what that means.

Bienestar’s Asian clients also confronted increasing limitations to healthcare access because of language barriers. Many of the longterm community clinics were not equipped to provide translation services to new Asian immigrants that speak languages other than the more common Vietnamese, Korean, and Chinese. Institutionalization generated by particular strong ethnic groups such as Chinese and Japanese, for example, also means new Asian groups are not fully encompassed within those organizations. For example, Bienestar began a health access program for Mongolians as no other services existed that specifically targeted that population. Mongolian patients come from as far away as Sacramento because Bienestar had a Mongolian interpreter and health navigator. These language barriers create further bureaucratic disentitlements that lead to certain sectors of the most marginalized getting left out of care.

The escalating anti-immigrant climate in the 1990s unleashed a fury of restrictions on service provision for undocumented immigrants. Yet, undocumented status is not the only type of disentitlement from healthcare access and other social services that laborers experienced. Language barriers such as those experienced by nontraditional Latino and Asian migrants are additional forms of disentitlement. As the next section will demonstrate, these forms of disentitlement are also spatial and linked with poverty and race.

Community Health Clinics and Fruitvale’s Shifting Population

Communities like Fruitvale have a history confronting limited access to healthcare. Fruitvale residents have long been disenfranchised from access to healthcare and other services for the simple reason of being poor and monolingual Spanish-speakers. In the late 1960s, nonprofits began to play a crucial role in mitigating these inequalities in healthcare access. For Chicano activists at the time, healthcare was a key site of struggle. Nonprofit leaders innovated new ways of thinking about the relationship between health and community and how to treat people appropriately. As a former nonprofit worker, Manuel Alcala, recalled: “One of the things they started doing was using culture. I remember seeing posters with sayings like ‘la cultura cura’ [culture cures].” Manuel Alcala recalled the power of this new way of thinking about healthcare and culture which he argued developed into theories and new modes of working with people. He also argued that this period of innovation came to a halt once healthcare clinics became institutionalized. According to Manuel Alcala, the growth of community health clinics related to expanding nonprofit institutionalization and professionalization meant that these agencies no longer became key sites of innovation. As Manuel Alcala further explained: “There was a transition, from grassroots agencies to very structured organizations. And they lost something along the way.”
Nonprofit community health clinics emerged in the early 1970s to bring healthcare access to impoverished and racialized communities. The Fruitvale’s district’s most prominent community clinic, Cinica de la Raza, emerged as part of the grassroots effort of a group of concerned Spanish-speaking parents that wanted medical services available to them in Spanish. These parents were a part of a strong Catholic church community in Fruitvale and solicited the help of a recent UC Berkeley graduate who had worked with them as part of War on Poverty efforts through the Alameda County Human Relations Commission. As Dr. David Hayes Bautista recounted: “I graduated from Berkeley and I was going off to UCSF. In that summer in between Berkeley and UCSF I got a phone call one night from one of the moms who I was working with, Eleanor Moreno, and she was describing lack of medical care and other social services in Spanish. The parents group could not depend upon the county so they needed to develop their own service center.” The concerned group of parents conscripted Dr. Hayes-Bautista who at the time had not even started medical school to create a small health center in Fruitvale. Dr. Hayes-Buatista admitted that the health center began as a couple of desks in the back of another newly formed organization, Centro Legal de la Raza. Like Bienestar’s humble beginnings sharing space with other organizations and relying on an all volunteer staff, Clinica also emerged as a completely grassroots community project. It was a grassroots struggle that recognized the lack of state health services for Latinos in Fruitvale.

Clinica de la Raza is now a multimillion dollar community clinic in Fruitvale with multiple branches throughout Oakland. Its growth was facilitated by its transformation in the mid 1970s into a Federally Qualified Health Center (FQHC). Clinica de la Raza’s ability to bill the county and federal government gave it a secured steady flow of revenue that guaranteed its continued growth. Throughout this process the federal terrain over the provision of services for undocumented people completely changed. As the Fruitvale district’s population shifted, a greater proportion of residents were undocumented immigrants. Clinica’s primary reliance on federal funds meant that it could not as easily offer services to undocumented clients. Furthermore, its increasing professionalization made it into a health clinic less focused on its links to the community.

Bienestar Project was founded in 2002 to directly link the most impoverished sectors to community health clinics like Clinica de la Raza. Bienestar Project worked closely with Clinica de la Raza to help expedite the service for undocumented migrants. They developed a relationship of reciprocity and interdependence that allows them to hold each other accountable. Before Bienestar’s emergence few day laborers had access to Clinica de la Raza. Many simply could not produce any form of residency in Alameda County, a requirement that Clinica de la Raza firmly upheld due to federal and state funding guidelines. Furthermore, in order to be seen at Clinica, new members were put on a three month waiting list. Bienestar created a referral system with Clinica de la Raza so that its clients would be seen within a week. Through this referral system, Bienestar clients also avoided the proof of residency requirement that many day laborers could not produce.

In the past ten years, Clinica de la Raza and Bienestar Project have become important partner organizations in Fruitvale. This was best evidenced on September 27, 2012 when I attended the celebration of Bienestar Project’s 10th Year Anniversary. At this celebration, I was able to see the connection between 1960s organizations and their links to the formation of newer nonprofits. As a young organization, Bienestar celebrated 10 years of operation by thanking key players in the organizations’ formation. These players included both nonprofit allies (including Centro Legal de la Raza and Clinica de la Raza), Alameda County officials, and philanthropic
organizations. This triangulation of municipal agencies, nonprofits and philanthropy is a key feature to the formation of current projects in Fruitvale and shaping the direction of newer nonprofits. Representatives of all three sectors identified the unique contribution of Bienestar Project: that unlike other more institutionalized nonprofits, Bienestar connected effortlessly with people that are completely disenfranchised. Representatives from Alameda County positioned Bienestar as a model for achieving social justice in healthcare.

Bienestar’s executive director awarded Centro Legal de la Raza and Clinica de la Raza for their continued support. Jane Garcia, executive director of Clinica de la Raza, graciously accepted Bienestar's award. In her acceptance speech, she portrayed Clinica de la Raza and Bienestar as a kind of sisterhood of sorts. Jane Garcia characterized Bienestar as a younger sister and Clinica de la Raza as the big sister in the relationship. And sometimes, Jane Garcia remarked, big sisters need a little sister to tug at them and nudge them to do something. Jane admitted that Bienestar had awakened Clinica de la Raza to the reality of their institutionalization and the fact that as Jane saw it, Clinica was also now part of the “system.” Like any system, she agreed that Clinica was difficult to navigate, especially for newly arrived immigrants. She described a relationship of reciprocity between the two organizations whereby Clinica helped to mentor Bienestar and provided key openings to its medical services. At the same time, Bienestar Project's prodding helped Clinica realize some of its pitfalls: the fact that as a community clinic, it was inaccessible to a certain kind of population. The sisterhood was thus a two way relationship filled with mentorship, mutual policy suggestions, and a continuation of the 1960s organizing that promoted the formation of the Latino nonprofits in Oakland.

This insightful ethnographic moment illustrates a critical transmission of information between institutionalized organizations that emerged out of 1960s activism like Clinica de la Raza and newer grassroots nonprofits such as Bienestar Project. These organizations rely on mutual interactions and exert pressures on one another that help to shape Fruitvale residents’ experiences. Both Clinica de la Raza and Centro Legal de la Raza emerged out of the 1960s mobilizations and were the products of the institutionalization of grassroots activism. Now, according to Clinica de la Raza’s executive director Jane García these once grassroots struggles are completely part of “the system” and they have to deal with the daily struggles of institutionalization. Jane García's point was also about how residents of the Fruitvale are then unable to navigate these rigid bureaucratic systems. Bienestar Project responded to these bureaucratic limits of institutionalization and the shifting nature of Fruitvale’s population.

The Foundation Hustle
Bienestar’s flexibility to provide services for undocumented immigrants and its growing immigrant rights activism is dependent on its strategic navigation of different funding streams. Bienestar leadership prides itself of being free of federal funding and the constraints that come with it. Many federal funds are littered with stipulations that constrain organizations’ ability to work with undocumented migrants. Bienestar has found greater flexibility in its reliance on private foundation funding, which it primarily receives for its medical clinic services. Bienestar’s leadership has built strong relationships with private foundations and their program officers. Furthermore, these foundations supported the organization’s entry into an organizing framework centered on immigrant rights. Bienestar’s strategic relationship with private foundations shows the complexity of how nonprofits interact with a variety of funding institutions and maintain their integrity. This mutually beneficial relationship between nonprofits like Bienestar and private foundations challenges scholarly arguments that render philanthropic institutions as a
regulatory apparatus intent on stifling nonprofit political possibilities (Allen 1969; Roelofs 2003; Smith 2007).

Throughout this dissertation, I have emphasized the importance of understanding the situated practices of both nonprofit leaders and those of the various state agencies and funding institutions they interact with. As chapter 2 revealed, some of the first Mexican American nonprofit leaders that interacted with private foundations such as the Ford Foundation knew they had to tactfully navigate this new institution. Foundations and Mexican American leaders courted one another and set in place key agreements about how these new partnerships would ensue. In a similar fashion, Bienestar leaders talked extensively about the practices of collaboration and mutual support they have established with private foundations. In each of these cases, nonprofit leaders exerted their own techniques to use private foundation monies to ensure organizations’ wellbeing.

Bienestar’s main articulation with private foundations occurs through grant writing. Bienestar’s grant writer at the time of my fieldwork was a Chinese American woman Sylvia Lang who holds a PhD in psychology. Sylvia grew up in New York in a diverse neighborhood where she interacted mainly with Asian Americans and Latinos. She speaks Spanish fluently and came to Bienestar to stay connected with Latino community struggles. Though Sylvia had no formal training as a grant writer, she understood the importance of how to strategically relate to private foundations. She refers to this deft negotiation with philanthropic institutions as the “foundation hustle.” For Sylvia, this foundation hustle is fundamentally about translating the organization’s projects into a language that is likely to attract foundations. This does not imply compromising the organization’s mission or the political nature of many of its projects. As a grant writer, she argued that there is a theory behind grant writing which is fundamentally about “bringing an academic spin” to social work and social services.

Sylvia’s strategy pivots on careful articulation of how an organization presents itself to multiple audiences. It is also partially related to the appropriate branding of the agency. Sylvia affirmed that this branding has to be appealing to foundations while maintaining the agency’s integrity and values. This also relates to how the organization engages with community members, other nonprofit allies and possible competitors, and with elected officials. The foundation hustle entails harnessing the appropriate forms of representation for each of these different entities.

Sylvia’s strategy of “hustling” philanthropic organizations entailed strategically harnessing program officers’ strengths and expertise. Program officers operate as gatekeepers and can help to usher different kinds of services and information to nonprofit staff (Kohl 2010). Sylvia described how program officers helped her more effectively communicate Bienestar’s mission. When the organization was first created, Bienestar described itself to foundations as a portal to the healthcare system for low wage workers and recently-arrived immigrants. However, this framed Bienestar as a competitor to community clinics, including Clinica de la Raza. When in fact, Bienestar serves to bring people into the healthcare system like undocumented day laborers who do not easily get access to services at Clinica. As I previously analyzed, federally qualified health centers encountered bureaucratic limitations that led to the exclusion of vulnerable populations, especially undocumented day laborers. Bienestar thus serves as the safety net for those individuals left out of the initial safety net that federally qualified health centers provide. After much debate about Bienestar’s proper branding, one program officer said: “Bienestar is the ‘safety-net of the safety-net.’” This specific branding differentiated Bienestar
from other agencies. It also used a language that other foundation program officers could understand.

Another key factor in Sylvia’s foundation hustle was learning how to strategically describe Bienestar’s target population. Bienestar leadership employs a calculated framing of the organizations’ target population in interactions with different audiences. In grant applications, Sylvia never described Bienestar’s target population as undocumented. Instead, the organization actively selects to use phrases like “recently-arrived immigrant” and “uninsured or underinsured” as categories that could encompass undocumented immigrants but also include a large number of documented people. In this terrain, the undocumented immigrant becomes a kind of tacit subject whose “illegality” is never officially stated but often assumed.  

Bienestar’s strategic framing of its target population at times meant that its leadership outright denied that it worked with undocumented migrants. Esperanza recalled one instance when a private donor vehemently did not want to fund projects for “illegals.” The older gentleman was impressed with Bienestar’s programing and even came down to the offices to see the projects in action. He gave a check only after Esperanza assured him that Bienestar did not work with undocumented laborers only hard working “recently-arrived” immigrants. Esperanza was infuriated with the donor’s statement but laughed his hurtful comments away by emphasizing her victory in securing some funds to support Bienestar’s lunch programs for predominantly undocumented day laborers.

The foundation hustle also fundamentally delinks Bienestar from federal funding. Institutionalized community clinics like Clinica de la Raza have a high client base insured by federal and California state health programs for the poor. This is primarily how federally qualified health centers generate their funding. As an informal clinic, Bienestar is unable to bill the federal government. Furthermore, most of its clients are undocumented and disqualified from federal and state health programs. Bienestar leaders strategically avoid federal funding in order to care for undocumented immigrants and maintain programatic flexibility. As Esperanza described it: “It [the federal government] requires a lot of documentation, reports and asking our patients for various things. Since we don’t receive this type of funding, it is easier for us to do a variety of things.” Bienestar’s refusal to accept federal funding is also an act to protect client’s private information, especially regarding their immigration status. A former Bienestar grant writer and clinic supervisor argued that federal and state money is riddled with information gathering processes. Michelle Miles is a now a resident doctor at San Francisco General Hospital and worked at Bienestar before attending medical school. She recalled how Bienestar had to turn down federal funding because it required the agency to collect information about clients’ immigration status. Michelle recounted: “we have turned down money because politically we did

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7 I employ the analytic framework of the tacit subject elaborated by Carlos Ulisses Decena (2008). In Decena’s study, his homosexual Dominican subjects chose to strategically not come out of the closet. For Decena these subjects did not choose to silence their homosexuality. They just chose to strategically reveal it or leave it up for interpretation. As he describes: “In thinking that their homosexuality is knowable in a tacit way to the people close to them, my informants assume that many people have the requisite skills to recognize and decode their behavior. Everyone may not ‘get’ the signs, but my informants understand that there is a distinction between their intentional manipulation of their self-presentation and impressions that they give to others unintentionally” (340). In a similar fashion, I routinely saw how undocumented status, like homosexuality, became an identity tacitly assumed yet not always expressed. For example, Bienestar client’s were never asked their immigration status. And rarely did clients disclose their undocumented status. In both the ways that Bienestar presented its clients as well as how clients chose to represent themselves, immigration status was always tacitly assumed. And many Bienestar clients were always presumed to be undocumented solely because they were low wage Latino workers.
not want to disclose any information about our clients, especially not their immigration status.” At that time Michelle was in charge of tracking clients to keep a record of the number of clients served, their country of origin, and the languages spoken at home. However, Bienestar staff would never ask any questions regarding immigration status. Michelle argued that Bienestar would avoid any kind of affiliation with founding streams that required it to ask client’s their immigration status. As Michelle framed it, the fact that Bienestar chooses not to take federal money is a political act. And avoiding federal money also means that the organization is freed from additional paperwork and limitations over the organization’s political activities.

**Bienestar’s Politicization as an Immigrant Rights Organization**

Bienestar differs from more institutionalized service organizations like Clinica de la Raza because of its political involvement with key issues surrounding immigration. Though it is articulated as a healthcare agency, Bienestar operates as much more. In the past ten years, Bienestar Project transitioned from a service provision impromptu health clinic to a political advocacy organization centered on championing immigrant rights. What has contributed to this politicization? In part, this politicization related to Bienestar’s flexibility as a newer nonprofit. Many more institutionalized organizations do not have the freedom to stay politically connected to different community struggles. They are tied to strict funding streams that limit the time they can dedicate to political mobilizations. Bienestar’s limited institutionalization enables it to have greater flexibility in its programing and focus. Yet the limited degree of institutionalization alone does not explain the organization’s staunch pro-immigrant stance. Bienestar’s politicization was also a direct response to Federal immigration enforcement in Fruitvale. Furthermore, Bienestar’s leaders brought to the organization their previous organizing experiences on college campuses, in other U.S. cities, and in nation-wide coalitions. Despite its very localized formation, Bienestar’s immigrant rights politicization is fundamentally a translocal process linked with spaces and political formations beyond Fruitvale’s geographical confines.

**Federal Devolution of Immigration Enforcement Practices**

Bienestar entered immigrant rights organizing to defend Fruitvale from the increasing presence of immigration officials in the neighborhood in 2011. Day laborers and other residents repeatedly saw Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) officials eating at neighborhood food trucks. This directly affected day labor solicitation practices. In fact, the International site (see Chapter 4) next to the Goodwill store no longer served as a day labor hiring zone because of the frequent presence of ICE officials eating at one of the local food trucks. As Teresa, Bienestar’s outreach coordinator, told me:

The manager [of the Goodwill] called the police to complain about the day laborers. Next thing we knew immigration officials were there and took two day laborers. Another day ICE officers took two day laborers after they ate at the local taco trucks. Day laborers reported that on another occasion they saw ICE officials putting a bunch of people in their vans at one of the driving checkpoints along International Blvd. On that day alone they deported ten people.

Teresa’s recounting of these events reveal the blurring of boundaries between local Oakland police and immigration officials. Undocumented workers usually saw no difference between ICE
officers and Oakland Police—both were equally feared. The heightened presence of ICE officials exacerbated this fear and indeed Teresa suggests that the Goodwill manager first contacted local police yet what resulted was heightened policing by immigration officials. This alarmed nonprofit allies because it meant that Fruitvale was quickly becoming a dangerous geography for undocumented immigrants, especially more publicly visible workers like day laborers.

This was change from the time of my fieldwork at the day laborer sites in 2007. For day laborers at that time, other areas like Berkeley or Richmond were cities where immigration raids happened at day laborer sites. This shows that geographies of immigration enforcement change and therefore undocumented people must always be prepared with the potentiality of contact with immigration enforcement. Despite the Bay Area’s long standing support of the plight of undocumented workers, there is little that municipal authorities can do to protect them from federal immigration authorities. The federally controlled Department of Homeland Security has full powers to enforce immigration law, despite states’ and counties’ attempts to oppose these actions (Varsanyi 2010).

This heightened presence of ICE officials in communities like Fruitvale is a result of more aggressive federal strategies of deporting undocumented immigrants. The federal government responded to a proliferation of state initiatives such as California’s Proposition 187 by creating new mechanisms by which local police departments could cooperate with immigration enforcement processes. Under the pretext of looking for what it deemed “criminal aliens,” beginning in 1996, the Department of Homeland Security, created a bureaucratic pathway by which local authorities could assist in immigration enforcement endeavors (Mejívar and Abrego 2012: 1392-1396). Along with scaling back legal immigrants access to social services through PRWORA, congress also passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Under IIRIRA the federal government created a program that solicited the help of local police in immigration enforcement. This program, also known as 287(g), trained local police officers to enforce immigration laws (Menjívar and Abrego 2012; Waslin 2010). According to Monica W. Varsanyi (2010) by 2009, 67 jurisdictions had signed agreements with federal immigration authorities the 287(g) section of IIRIRA.

Cities like Oakland and San Francisco staunchly opposed these federal programs. On April 27, 2007 newly elected Mayor Ron Dellums, for example, announced his support of declaring Oakland a Sanctuary City that affirmed the city’s refusal to cooperate with local enforcement of immigration laws (MacDonald 2007). As Dellums declared: “we cannot allow our citizens to be harassed, abused and intimidated by anyone”(Ibid.). On May 15, 2007 Oakland’s City Council unanimously passed Resolution 80584 reaffirming the city’s strong stance against local policies of immigration enforcement (Oakland City Council 2007). Oakland was first designated a sanctuary city for refugees fleeing South Africa, Haiti, Guatemala and El Salvador in 1986, but the 2007 resolution expanded the protection to all immigrants.

The federal government’s adoption of Secure Communities in 2008 challenged municipal attempts to refuse to cooperate with immigration enforcement practice (Menjívar and Abrego 2012; Kohli et al. 2011; Waslin 2010). Popularly known as SCOMM, this federal program forces local law enforcement agencies to comply with new protocols for arrested individuals. SCOMM

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8 In many anti-immigrant cities, entire police departments have conspired to work with the federal government in customs and immigration enforcement procedures. In a post September 11 climate, the federal government has increasingly sought out these new partnerships with local police departments (see Kanstroon 2007; Menjívar and Abrego 2012; Varsanyi 2010).
mandates that local police agencies share electronic data on arrested individuals. In the past local police shared fingerprint data of people they arrest with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As a result of Secure Communities, the FBI now electronically forwards fingerprints to the Department of Homeland Security. While this data sharing is supposed to target what the department deems “criminal aliens,” it has led to mass deportations of low-level offenders (Kohli et al. 2011:3). An undocumented person, for example, can be arrested for driving without a drivers license or running a red light, local police will fingerprint the person and send information to both the FBI and ICE. If ICE determines it wants to take further action, local police officers place an an ICE hold on the person. This process has led to massive deportations of undocumented immigrants, including those with no past criminal record. Researchers at UC Berkeley’s Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute found that Latinos comprise 93% of individuals arrested through Secure Communities, though they only comprise 77% of undocumented immigrants (Kohli et al. 2011:2). In practice, researchers found egregious instances of racial profiling (Menjívar and Abrego 2012). Furthermore, this extensive information system blurs the divisions between federal ICE officers and local police and leads to increased criminalization of immigrants. Undocumented immigrants therefore now fear police officers even more and avoid all possible interaction with these authorities.

Nonprofit Responses

Latino nonprofit organizations did not stand idle during these processes. Immigration officials’ active policing of the Fruitvale district sent Bienestar into a fury of immigrant rights organizing. Bienestar joined a coalition of pro-immigrant agencies that organized to oppose federal immigration policies. Lisa Grant, Bienestar’s volunteer coordinator with previous union experience understood the urgency of organizing against Fruitvale immigration raids. She steadfastly became Bienestar’s representative in many of the immigrant rights coalition gatherings. Lisa also brought along the organization’s executive director, Esperanza to some of the most important organizing meetings. Lisa enthusiastically described: “Esperanza and I went to a meeting sponsored by this coalition to oppose Secure Communities. A lot of people showed up and an attorney there spoke about SCOMM. When we got back to [Bienestar] Esperanza went straight to teach all the guys about SCOMM. Esperanza told the day laborers that it was urgent to organize against these unfair federal immigration enforcement practices.” Lisa’s statements show how nonprofits like Bienestar serve as a central vehicle for the exchange of crucial information that effects the lives of undocumented immigrants. This nonprofit mediated activism was organized in defense of undocumented people and the neighborhood. The catalyzing force for Bienestar’s increasing politicization as an immigrant rights organizations was the defense Fruitvale’s integrity as a safe space for undocumented migrants.

Bienestar's entry into a space of immigrant rights linked the organization with statewide and Oakland-based coalitions. A sizable portion of Bienestar's staff was ready to take a more proactive role in immigration related issues. As Lisa reveals in her subsequent comment, this also served as a way for Bienestar to become an active agent in mobilizing its membership around these issues. As Lisa continued: “so [Esperanza] felt a great sense of urgency and I think that has enabled me to gradually expand my role in these meetings, especially of the Alameda County United in Defense for Immigrant Rights (ACUDIR).” In these policy coalitions, Bienestar was a unique organization. Unlike other members of ACUDIR that mainly served as advocacy organizations involved in policy and in directly organizing residents, Bienestar was actually a service organization. As a healthcare clinic, Bienestar could speak directly about how
issues impacted its clients because staff had first-hand experience working with people. Yet as an organization that primarily offered medical services and other social services, Bienestar did not always know how to act as a political entity. Bienestar’s executive director always worried about being too political. She questioned the organization’s 501(c)3 status, a federal recognition that limits the kind of political activity that an organization can take. While the anti-political clause refers to electoral politics (see chapter 2), many executive directors like Esperanza had a much broader definition of what “political” activity entailed. Because of this, Esperanza had a much broader definition of what “political” activity entailed. Because of this, Esperanza feared that the organization could not be involved in too many different campaigns. She and other Bienestar leaders, however, never had any reservations about their political involvement in immigrant rights issues. The organization’s fundamental political concern was ensuring the wellbeing of its clients and the Fruitvale community. It therefore framed immigrant rights organizing as an unquestioned political project to take on.

Esperanza made Bienestar’s pro-immigrant stance very public as she became the spokesperson for undocumented people in health related issues. She became involved with a coalition of different organizations working to ensure that health care reform solutions address the needs of communities of color. The Having Our Say Coalition was established in 2007 by the California Pan-Ethnic Health Network (CPEHN), Latino Issues Forum (LIF), and the California Immigrant Policy Center (CIPC). Through Esperanza’s leadership, Bienestar Project became one of the only nonprofit organizations involved in this coalition that advocates for undocumented people in current negotiations about health reform.

As vocal advocate for immigrant rights in the Having Our Say Coalition, Esperanza garnered the attention of the Healthy California Foundation, a major healthcare philanthropic institution. This foundation recognized Bienestar for being one of the few nonprofit health clinics advocating for undocumented immigrants in all negotiations regarding the federal healthcare reform. Healthy California Foundation was so impressed with this type of advocacy that it channeled $200,000 to fund Bienestar’s immigrant rights organizing projects. Bienestar used these funds to start La Collectiva or the Workers Collective, which works with a group of day laborers to help them look for work and to understand their rights as workers.

Healthy California Foundation’s program officer, Roberta Small, praised Bienestar for leading policy debates regarding the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and how it will impact Alameda County undocumented residents. She applauded Esperanza Rico for being in those debates and for always advocating for the community she works with. As Roberta framed it, Esperanza understands that ACA will not include undocumented immigrants but she continues to remind policy makers of this egregious exclusion. According to Roberta, unlike other health clinics, Bienestar has pushed for elected officials to find alternative means to fund services for this population. Roberta remarked that it was so impressive for Esperanza to be putting so much effort into this kind of advocacy for undocumented people and she admired her steadfast dedication. As she described, most other clinics are only advocating for those clients that they can enroll into federally funded insurance programs. This of course excludes undocumented immigrants. As a former community activist herself, Roberta appreciated Esperanza’s advocacy and therefore always finds ways to channel funds to Bienestar Project. As this example demonstrates, foundation funding is not always intent on regulating or policing nonprofit projects. Foundation patronage of nonprofit organizations must be understood as any kind of power relation—infused with a complicated terrain of struggle not reducible to a singular agenda

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9 For more information on the Having Our Say Coalition see http://www.cpehn.org/havingoursay.php
10 Healthy California Foundation is a pseudonym
of policing or regulation. Furthermore, it demonstrates that immigrant rights organizing is also viewed as overwhelmingly “safe” humanitarian work that philanthropic foundations are willing to invest in.

Esperanza was very specific in detailing how Bienestar fills an important void in the policy arena, and how it serves to advocate for undocumented and working class Latinos. As she described: “I went to a meeting with Boys and Men of Color\textsuperscript{11} and I was stunned by the lack of diversity in the Latino organizations.” Esperanza described that before Bienestar became part of the Boys and Men of Color initiative, the only Latino organization involved was the Unity Council. Esperanza asked: “How do these foundations invest millions of dollars on projects for men and boys of color and only go to Unity Council to represent all Latinos in Oakland? I asked myself, have these people considered things like immigration?” According to Esperanza, Bienestar and the Unity Council serve and represent a different population. As she clarified:

> You see they the Unity Council represent Latinos, but [they] are different... it's class! People that are a little more educated, that have papers will go to the Unity Council for help. People that speak Mam, that don't speak English, that are undocumented come to Bienestar. You can't say that one organization is going to represent an entire group. You need at least three.

For Esperanza, being undocumented also implies major class and language differences that more institutionalized organizations like the Unity Council cannot really represent. So for Esperanza, Bienestar Project exerts presence in policy debates to bring a different perspective of the Latino population in Alameda county. And she believes that there should be more organizations, that the greater diversity of perspectives is necessary to bring a much more nuanced understanding of the experiences of Latinos, especially in policy deliberations that will specifically impact how services will be distributed to this population.

The voice of the “undocumented immigrant” becomes produced by the powerful interventions of different nonprofit organizations, leaders, and years of training and coaching of community members. There was no doubt that Bienestar understood the urgency of political action in defense of undocumented immigrants. Most of the staff members came to Bienestar because they specifically wanted to work with undocumented immigrants and support their struggles to attain social services and other kind of help. The strong pro-immigrant sentiment of the organizing was even manifested in Bienestar’s office. When I began to volunteer there in 2006, the walls had just been painted in warm yellows and deep orange, creating a southwestern color palate. The mission at that time was to create a welcoming environment for clients that catered to their linguistic and cultural needs. Slowly after the immigrants rights marches in 2006 the walls became adorned with immigrants rights posters. The walls now have absolutely no empty space. They now feature a melange of protest posters each commemorating a different march. And they have also become much more diverse. The posters are not just about Latinos or immigration struggles any more. They now transgress different issues and focus on coalitional political movements across race.

\textsuperscript{11} The Boys and Men of Color initiative is a long-term research, policy and service program founded by a major health foundation in California. It is a major collaboration between the University of California, Berkeley and different nonprofit organizations throughout the state of California. It is focused on improving the health and wellbeing of boys and men of color.


Traces of Past Organizing on the Present

This was not the first time that Bienestar attempted to take a proactive step to organize and represent day laborers and to work towards protecting undocumented immigrants in general. In fact, the organization was consolidated as a result of a sizable grant awarded to the Oakland Workers Center in 2005. Even before that, some of Bienestar’s founders had been involved with United Farm Workers organizing in the neighborhood. Other Bienestar leaders brought to the organization their past experiences organizing on college campuses for undocumented students. Though current immigrant rights activism was centered in Fruitvale, it was networked through other places and times. Furthermore, present day mobilizations in the neighborhood built upon past struggles.

The Oakland Workers Center was a collaborative of different organizations that sought to create a shared space, a workers center, where people could avail themselves of different services—legal services provided by Centro Legal de la Raza, health services provided by Bienestar, legal help in diverse Asian languages provided by the Asian Law Caucus, and ESL and computer literacy programs in addition to indigenous services offered by Grupo Maya. The organizing around this was spearheaded by the executive director of Centro Legal de la Raza and it required countless meetings to envision a shared mission. In the beginning the collaboration between the different organizations worked beautifully—there was a shared sense of responsibility of working together to ensure the wellbeing of low wage immigrant workers. For Bienestar, this coalitional work was essential to helping the executive director, Esperanza, consolidate her training as a nonprofit leader. From Oakland Workers Center meetings, Esperanza gained valuable skill about navigating nonprofit politics and how to run meetings and how to work collaboratively with a team. An important part of this collaborative was a strong politicization project that member organizations sought to enact.

The most prominent organizing group of the Oakland Worker’s Center was Day Laborers Together, a day labor organization. United Struggle organized day laborers to demand better treatment from the city and especially to advocate around immigration related issues. They started to organize a small group of day laborers and taught them how to attend city hall meetings on issues that were most impactful to them. The organization’s leader, Jose Olivares, was a day laborer whose educational training and connections with different professional organizations propelled him to build this day laborer organization. This small organizing effort came under the auspices of Centro Legal de la Raza. Yet it had trouble sustaining itself as a movement and instead became an organizing group with its ebbs and flows of action. This previous day labor organizing served as an important backstop to the activities that Bienestar enacted in the present day.

Bienestar Project’s Rita Kumar also embodies a longer genealogy of activism. I initially understood Rita’s involvement in different community projects emerged solely from her work as an Alameda County public health nurse. Rita, however, had a longer process of politicization that had a connection to the farm workers struggles of the 1970s. As a recently-arrived refugee in the 1970s Rita was captivated by the strength of the Cesar Chavez farm workers movement. For Rita, the movement represented much more than farm workers’ struggles. It epitomized the training of a generation of community leaders that developed a vision of helping to link poor people with much needed social services. She saw first hand the powerful role of the Church in this movement and was inspired to be involved. She recalls:

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12 Day Laborers Together is a pseudonym
There was a coalition in those days. Back in the seventies churches backed them up to have people come in from Salinas, all over the place. We would go into the Lucky’s, Safeway all the big grocery stores to protest grapes. So that’s where the groups came together to work in some social welfare issue and labor issue.

From this movement Rita understood the value of collective action and gained a profound desire to make this kind of mobilizing sustainable. For Rita, it was important to think of the longevity of the struggle. She interpreted working within the Alameda county health system as a way of making sure that she could reach out to the most poor. As a recently-arrived refugee at that time, Rita experienced the huge needs felt among the poor. The farm workers' movement galvanized her to become involved in this and other struggles.

Rita recalled how a whole generation of leaders transferred their grassroots energy that centered on collective action on the streets into working through institutions to demand the everyday care of poor and marginalized people. As Rita nostalgically recalled: “Having a visibility at that time Cesar Chavez was there gave people a sense of ‘hey, you can be leaders!’ This sense of momentum to start up and then to also enter health care.” According to Rita, some of the most prominent leaders were propelled to take on different kinds of work in Fruitvale and surrounding communities. She referenced Joel Garcia who was trained as a lawyer but gained greater visibility in healthcare through his work in establishing Clinica de la Raza and Tiburcio Vasquez Health Center (in Hayward, California), both community health clinics that focus on reaching out to the most marginalized. As a public health nurse, Rita always advocated for less institutionalized provision of healthcare because she understood that the most marginalized could not be easily reached via large institutions. Instead of waiting for the poor to come to community clinics or hospitals to seek emergency care, Rita believed that healthcare institutions should actively reach out to the poor. This is why she and other public health nurses collaborated to establish Bienestar Project. She also helped establish a number of other organizations for a diverse sector of the Asian migrant population in Alameda county.

Other Bienestar staff brought to the organization an extensive set of previous organizing experiences. Teresa’s first form of politicization was through her political involvement in campus organizing at UC Berkeley. Teresa serves as Bienestar's outreach coordinator and works one-on-one with the workers to help their organizing efforts. She is a bright and reserved young woman which makes her appear shy at first glance. Yet Teresa has a powerful way of working with day labors and commands attention. While a student she participated in the DREAM Act mobilizations, a large-scale student movement that pressed for California legislation to aid undocumented youth to legalize their status.13 This large-scale student movement was a formidable source of politicization for Teresa and also connected to her upbringing as a child of

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13 The DREAM Act is a piece of pending federal legislation that would create a path to legalization for some undocumented youth. In order to qualify for the DREAM Act, an undocumented young person must have lived in the United States since age 15 or younger, be between the ages of 12 and 30 when the legislation passes, have graduated from high school and completed two years of college or military service, and have a “good moral character.” The bill has been debated in every Congressional session over the past 11 years, each time reigniting the long-standing debate about the rights of undocumented migrants in this country. Most recently, in 2010, the DREAM Act was passed in the House of Representatives before it failed to receive the necessary votes in the Senate. Numerous scholars have analyzed the impacts that immigrant “illegality” produces on undocumented students (Abrego 2006; Negron-Gonzales 2013; Rincon 2008). Another set of literature has also revealed the powerful role undocumented student activism has played in pushing this legislation forward and reshaping public perception about undocumented students (Abrego 2008; Gonzales 2008; Olivas 2004).
recently-arrived immigrants who labored primarily as low-wage workers. Through her school activism, Teresa also began to volunteer at Centro Legal de la Raza, and helped with wage claim issues primarily for undocumented day laborers. These past experiences helped her gain day laborer’s trust. Immigration and the experience of being an immigrant or having immigrant parents was a major source of politicization that informed her political activism and the kind of organizing skills and projects she brought to Bienestar.

Eligio Salazar also came to Bienestar with a prior engagement with various different immigration-based movements. Eligio serves as Bienestar’s current grant writer and all around liaison to funders. As a child he was politicized through his parents’ involvement in farmworkers’ organizing. He recalled that his father was active in United Farmworkers organizing with lettuce workers in Coachella Valley California and that his entire family was involved in this type of collective bargaining work. As an undergraduate at UC Berkeley, Eligio was a founding member of the undocumented student organization RISE, which organizes undocumented students on campus to pressure the University to be more attentive to their needs. At the University they mobilized for the rights of undocumented students and participated in state-wide coalitions that sought to pass the DREAM Act. Eligio translated many of his previous organizing experiences to his work at Bienestar. For example, Eligio talks to the day laborers about the farmworkers organizing and ends every meeting with a unity clap. Bienestar is impacted by the traces of activism from the past that propelled the organization further into political action: from Rita’s experience with the farmworkers organizing to Eligio's farmworker and student organizing experiences, and Teresa’s student organizing.

Bienestar and the Navigation of Oakland’s Racial Politics
As the previous sections have demonstrated, Bienestar’s strong pro-immigrant stance was evident in its organizing both in Oakland and in statewide coalitions. Therefore, Bienestar's insertion in the the Alameda County healthcare system pivots on its specific branding as an immigrant organization and as an alternative healthcare portal. Like in other urban counties, Alameda County's public hospitals are popularly understood primarily as Black. Oakland's immigrant and monolingual Spanish-speaking residents were especially cognizant of the limitations of accessing these places. One set of limitations relates to bureaucratic constraints and their fear of interacting with formal institutions due to their undocumented status. However, undocumented immigrants also avoided Alameda County hospital services because they deemed them to be institutions for African Americans. For both residents and healthcare professionals, Alameda County healthcare was profoundly racialized as Black. While Bienestar never made intentional attempts to distance itself from African Americans, staff and board members were fully cognizant that they operated within a system that rendered Blackness as the absolute nadir in relationship to deservingness.

Oakland’s Highland Hospital is one of the nation’s top trauma centers and the main source of care for indigent residents. It is one of the central entry-points for people without health insurance to access some type of emergency medical care. Its emergency waiting room is pure chaos and wait times are notoriously long. On any given day, Highland Hospital attracts a higher proportion of African American clients. Even in the management, African Americans have made significant gains in the Alameda County Health Department jobs. Alameda county proclaims to be one of the most progressive counties regarding healthcare and has made a commitment to fight racial disparities in healthcare access.

The Alameda County Health Department overwhelmingly interprets racial disparities in
healthcare as predominantly a Black and White issue. This was best evidenced in the department’s public goal to reduce what it deems as egregious “racial disparities” in healthcare access in the county. The department’s director, Alex Briscoe, spoke at a fundraiser I attended in November 2011. In Alex Briscoe’s speech regarding the challenges his department sees, he summarized the results of a 2008 Alameda County Health Department study that found that African Americans in the county live four years less than White residents. Throughout Briscoe’s talk, he described racial inequalities as those between Black and White residents, and never mentioned of health access for Latinos and Asians. The be clear, the department’s larger report employ’s a more extensive analysis of race and includes Latinos, Pacific Islanders, and other Asian groups (Alameda County Health Department 2008). However, similar to Briscoe’s singular focus on African Americans, the report also underscores that the most severe health disparities are found between Black and White racial groups in Alameda County.

Health professionals and Oakland residents in general commonly subsume the Latino racial group under the all encompassing “immigrant” category. In Briscoe’s talk, for example, the only mention of Latinos did not explicitly reference Latinos as a racial group. This tacit inclusion of Latinos occurred when Briscoe proudly applauded the fact that the county does not restrict healthcare access by immigration status. While he did not specify who occupied the “immigrant status” category, it was widely presumed among the audience members that this meant Latinos and Asians. This is an example how in a racially bi-furcated county, Asians and Latinos are are often not prioritized in analyses of racial inequalities in healthcare. Furthermore, these healthcare practices show how immigration status commonly becomes sutured with Latinidad. The immigrant label even applies to Latinos who have been in the county for generations and are in fact natives to the region. At the fundraiser I immediately spoke to Allen Woo, a Bienestar board member who is a resident at Highland Hospital and asked him about how Latinos are seen by management and directors at the hospital. Allen agreed that Latinos and Asian groups are often times absent in the health department’s day-to-day understanding of racialized health disparities. Instead, they are included as part of the immigrant population an in the analysis of healthcare access for newly-arrived immigrants. In this way, the Alameda County Health Department portrays the provision of healthcare services for Latinos as one of the department’s “successes” vis-à-vis its “challenge” to adequately care for African Americans.

Bienestar’s branding as an “immigrant” organization positioned it differently from African American agencies. Bienestar’s leadership understood that this had consequential effects for how the Alameda County Health Department and other agencies interacted with the organization. Its position as an immigrant organization became especially salient when the agency initiated its ten year anniversary strategic planning process. At these meetings the topic of race and healthcare animated lively discussions. David Singer, a Bienestar board member cautioned that Bienestar had to be careful how it navigated these “racial politics.” David’s linking of race, healthcare, and politics stemmed from his careful analysis of African American’s clout in Alameda County’s extensive medical services. As one of Bienestar Project’s initial founders, he has seen the organization grow institutionally and cautioned about what this might mean given Alameda County’s racial terrain of healthcare. After returning from medical school in Boston, David came back to the Bay Area and is now a doctor at Highland hospital. He has extensive experience navigating different health agencies and therefore understands what he deems to be the racial political terrain of health provision in Alameda county. For David Singer, this related to not only understanding the county hospitals as Black but also that African
Americans wield extensive power in the county system.14 Within this context, Bienestar was positioned as a more deserving organization because it did not specifically target African Americans. David explained how Latino and “immigrant” issues or communities had a particular kind of cache within the Alameda county health system. He argued that in healthcare settings, immigrants are usually constructed as “hard working” because they are willing to take any job offered. In addition, many nonprofit agencies viewed undocumented day laborers as “victims” of abusive employers and targets of immigrant enforcement officers. Unlike African Americans, they are not seen as people that “take advantage of the system.” The trope of the hardworking immigrant and the victimization of day laborers marketed Latino deservingness in opposition to African Americans.

David Singer also spatialized these geographies of racialized deservingness. As he explained: “there is a big difference between a Latino neighborhood like Fruitvale and more predominantly Black spaces like East Oakland that continue to signify the absolute worst places in Oakland.” According to David and other board members that commented on the issue, there is a powerful way that Fruitvale, because it is immigrant and shows some degree of economic and political growth, symbolizes a very “safe” place to invest in. Philanthropic foundations and municipal and other state agencies, would not even question the neighborhood’s deservingness in relationship to other spaces such as East or West Oakland. Whereas Fruitvale as immigrant and Latino symbolizes hope, East Oakland and possibly certain areas of West Oakland come to represent severe states of hopelessness.

Scholars such as Nicholas de Genova and Ana Ramos-Zayas have explored how Latino immigrants occupy a different register of deservingness than African Americans. Ramos-Zayas and De Genova (2003) argue that Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago elaborate complex techniques to draw differences between themselves as distinct groups. These processes ultimately revolved around what Ramos-Zayas and De Genova call the politics of citizenship, or the fact that Mexicans and Puerto Ricans occupy radically distinct positions in respect to US citizenship. People born in Puerto Rico, a U.S. colony, are granted citizenship by birthright whereas Mexican migrants arrive as U.S. non-citizens. However, despite the complex situated practices that Mexicans and Puerto Ricans deploy to differentiate themselves as racially distinct, both groups identified as Latino in order to set themselves apart from African Americans. As Latinos, they differentiated themselves from the racialized abjection both groups equated with Blackness.

Arlene Dávila (2008) contends that the increasing distinction between African Americans and U.S. Latinos plays an important role in contemporary politics of race. She argues that marketable “positive” portrayals of Latinos in popular culture and media outlets, for example, help to consolidate polarities between Latinos and other minorities—most specifically with Blacks, who are the unnamed reference against which these representations are made. Furthermore, by advancing and marketing these success stories, the U.S. media and a the project of U.S. multiculturalism constructs narrow permissible forms of being Latino—further fragmenting Latinos along the lines of citizenship, race, and class (Davila 2008:8). She shows that Latinos are being co-opted into a larger project of whitening that, far from welcoming them to the rungs of whiteness, has in fact contributed to the marginalization of many Latinos, and people of color in general. This reifies the U.S. nation state’s post-racial multicultural rhetoric

14 I speculate this comes from the War on Poverty era when many Black community clinics were also established. I speculate that many of these Black community clinics produced a formidable cadre of leaders that became a part of the County healthcare system.
that assimilation is indeed possible and thus racism is no longer an obstacle towards full incorporation. The U.S. nation’s showcasing of Latino and immigrant success pivots on the reification of African Americans as the embodiment of social abjection. As Dávila argues: “this discourse pits blacks and Latinos against each other in a contest to win approval of the dominant (white) society”(162).

In urban neighborhoods like Fruitvale contentious differences between Latinos and African Americans were far more than just discourses. Latino Bienestar clients went through extreme cautions to avoid interactions with African Americans. For many of Bienestar’s Latino clients, Highland hospital is the last recourse not just because it is difficult to access services there, but also because it is deemed to be a Black hospital. Throughout my time at Bienestar I observed how many clients stigmatized services or places they deemed Black. Additionally, clients generally associated African Americans with criminality. Many of the men alleged that they had been robbed numerous times by African Americans. As one day laborer from Mexico told me, “the morenos [Blacks] think we are walking ATMs, they look out for us at the end of the day cause they know that we were probably just paid after work.” Day laborers therefore walked around the neighborhood in groups and avoided being out past nightfall.

Latino immigrants also overwhelmingly favored living next to other Latinos and not in close proximity to African Americans. Long term Fruitvale residents spoke favorable of the growing Latino or Hispanic population in Fruitvale. A long term Fruitvale resident, Felicita Hernandez, told me about how the neighborhood had gone from being much more diverse to now being more Latino. She was happier now that the neighborhood was much more Latino. As Felicita told me during an interview at her Fruitvale home:

Before there were more morenos [Blacks]...I know it’s not good to discriminate but they were troublemakers. The police slowly took them away, thank God. There were a lot of deaths here. Now it’s more peaceful...We are ok. Now it’s almost all Hispanics.

Admittedly, Felicita knew that she was outright discriminating against her African American neighbors. Yet she rationalized that because the police took them away, they were indeed “troublemakers” and not good people for the neighborhood. Felicita was one of many Fruitvale residents that favored the areas growing population of new Latino immigrants because they longed for African Americans to move out of the neighborhood.

These racialized distinctions between Latinos and African Americans effect how Bienestar clients access services. They also impact how Bienestar is viewed as a health clinic and as it relates to philanthropic organizations. These racialized distinctions between Latinos and African Americans are primarily defined by debates about immigration status and about the behaviors of these distinct groups. Discussions of bureaucratic disentitlement are not specific to undocumented immigrants. African Americans in Oakland and across the United States have long been disentitled from many services along with economic and political opportunities and resources. Therefore, any discussion of bureaucratic disentitlement and rights in racially bifurcated city like Oakland needs to pay closer attention to the longer genealogies of disentitlement based on race and poverty that have shaped the city in tremendous ways.
Conclusion
The fusion Latino nonprofit organizations with immigrant rights activism has a powerful way of foreclosing other forms of organizing. Throughout my time at Bienestar, and my engagement with other Fruitvale nonprofits I saw how Black and Latino divisions were never a topic of discussion. Furthermore, Bienestar had few collaborations with African American institutions. The organization’s closest non-Latino allied organizations were Asian organizations such as Asian Health Services and the Asian Law Caucus. Many of the organization’s connections and interactions with Asian organizations were facilitated by Rita Kumar who herself was of Indian descent and had strong ties with the Asian community in Alameda County. It was not until 2012, ten years after its founding that Bienestar had its first African American board member. That same year, Bienestar also established a strong partnership with a prominent youth organization that has a predominantly African American leadership.

This lack of Black-Brown organizing impacted how Bienestar’s Latino clients interacted with African American clients. Most Latinos in Fruitvale believe that the persistence of Black poverty stems from that group’s lack of motivation or a deficient work ethic, not from an absence of jobs or from white privileges that deny or limit educational opportunities. Furthermore, most recently arrived Latinos, especially day laborers, rarely interacted with African Americans. Even when African Americans and Latinos were present together at Bienestar’s functions, there was little cooperation between the two groups. As Bienestar moved into building more coalitions, especially the Men and Boys of Color initiative, its leadership including the board of directors questioned the lack of discussions around Black and Latino relations in the organization. They argued that these discussions were especially salient given the racial political terrain of healthcare provision in Alameda County.

As I have demonstrated in this chapter, Bienestar project along with other nonprofit organizations have constructed Fruitvale as a haven for immigrant rights. They have done so by breaking the forms of bureaucratic disentitlement and unjust policing practices set in place by federal anti-immigrant mandates. However, an organization’s degree of institutionalization and reliance on federal funding severely constricts its ability to reach undocumented immigrants. Regardless of nonprofit and municipal attempts to help undocumented immigrants, many get left out of care.

Through their situated practices of politicizing their care of undocumented immigrants, organizations like Bienestar wrestle with federal regulations and policies. They challenge federal anti-immigrant legislation and create innovate strategies to avoid the strings attached to different forms of state funding. This entails practices of “hustling” private foundations and joining coalitions that advocate for undocumented immigrants in a context of increasing devolution of immigration enforcement to local police. Through these situated practices of politicizing their care of undocumented immigrants, they racially demarcate Latinos from other racial groups, predominantly African Americans. These practices profoundly produce Fruitvale as immigrant and Latino in relationship to other Oakland neighborhoods.
In July of 2013 I received an enthusiastic call from Esperanza Rico, Bienestar Project’s executive director. She informed me that the organization had successfully received the city’s bid to become the new Oakland Day Labor Center. In the months leading up to this call I met with Esperanza and Bienestar board members to speak seriously about the politics of placing a bid to run the city’s day labor center. Bienestar board members questioned if the organization should get involved with City of Oakland funds for day laborers. Many of the organization’s founders had vehemently opposed the city’s past day laborer project—the Oakland Day Labor Center run by Community Partners, a nonprofit agency. They recalled the political nightmare surrounding the previous day laborer center which unjustly policed day laborers. Given this past history, board members and bienestar staff wondered if it was wise for the organization to compete for new City of Oakland money earmarked for day laborer services. However, after much debate, the board of directors agreed that this funding was better off in Bienestar’s hands. Bienestar leaders wanted to avoid another mismanagement of resources like the previous day laborer center.

In the weeks leading up to the City Council vote over Bienestar’s bid for Day Labor Center money, the organization was certain it was going to receive the funding. Bienestar had impressed the committee in charge of the day laborer center monies. The committee was most impressed with how well Esperanza knew day laborers, how she genuinely cared for them as evidenced by the organization’s ten year track record. However, at the last minute, the City Council decided to vote on whether to give the bid to Bienestar or a rival organization, Hayward Day Labor Association. The leadership of the Hayward Day Labor Association wanted to bring its services to Oakland and pressured city council members to consider them as a serious alternative to Bienestar Project. Esperanza told me how she showed up with just two staff members and two day laborers at the City Council meeting, thinking that the negotiations had ended. But on that day, the City Council opted to hear from each of the organizations to decide which group was more deserving of funds.

Hayward Day Labor Association’s representatives had an entire entourage of day laborers to testify on its behalf. They were prepared to make a powerful case to win the city’s bid. Like any other competition, this City of Oakland contract pitted neighborhood organizations against one another. This is the unstated reality of competition between nonprofit organizations over limited opportunities for city projects and funding. As Esperanza recalled: “I got scared and started to call everyone...I called all of my friends from nonprofits, Alex Briscoe from Alameda County Public Health Department. I called all the day laborers I could to come and speak on our behalf.” And before she knew it, there were at least thirty people at the City Council meeting to support Bienestar. Esperanza was floored when Roberta Small, program officer from the Healthy California Foundation, showed up and was eager to show her support.

The night ended with the City Council’s unanimous decision to award Bienestar the funds. In Esperanza’s recounting of the events, she was far less enthusiastic about the actual two year $175,000 award. Esperanza proclaimed “I can’t believe so many people showed up to support us. It was late in the day and people dropped what they were doing to testify on Bienestar’s behalf.” All of the people that spoke on behalf of Bienestar spoke praised the organization’s work of caring for day laborers and other community residents. Speakers praised the organization’s multiple projects of care: its focus on healthcare provision, food programs,
and educational and social services. Speakers also spoke highly of the organization’s fiscal efficiency: how it manages money effectively and can care for many people with limited resources. In sum, this example demonstrates how Bienestar’s ability to care for its clients is entangled in the relationships it forged with other nonprofits, municipal agencies, private foundations, and California state and federal offices. Bienestar’s ethics of care was therefore routed through extensive networks of support and politicized negotiations between different state and non-state entities. That day at the City Council meeting this extensive patronage network came together to support Bienestar. In a constricted terrain of nonprofit funding opportunities and the existence of a plethora of agencies vying for funding, these patronage networks matter.

**Nonprofits and the Politics of Care**

It is impossible to understand nonprofit practices of care without paying close attention to the politicized terrain through which this care is routed. This dissertation has emphasized that contemporary U.S. race-based nonprofit organizations are not abstract fetishized organizations solely intent on service delivery. Popular and academic conceptions of nonprofit organizations rarely think of these agencies as political. Furthermore, these agencies are seldom understood as central players in politicized processes of racial formations. As the above example shows, these organizations produce complex networks of authority and support. Therefore, I critically analyzed how nonprofit organizations are a conceptual nexus of different forms of power. At the City Council hearing, speakers on behalf of Bienestar Project represented a diverse constellation of agencies and nonprofits that produced a robust ethics of care in the neighborhood. Nonprofits and state officials employed this ethics of care as a technology of rule that guides the actions of different state and nonprofit actors. I advanced the “politics of care” as an analytic for understanding contentious projects of urban improvement normalized as benevolent acts of kindness despite their violent existential and structural effects.

In Fruitvale, care served as a mode of government that oversaw the kinds of projects that agencies enacted. However, as with any intervention on a multiplicity of social relationships, these technologies of rule were forged in a contested terrain of practices of care. Fruitvale agencies, for example, strategically deployed care to legitimize forms of claims making to a particular spatial terrain. Nonprofit agencies also wielded their mandate to care for the neighborhood and its residents to defend immigrant rights. In a similar fashion, the Unity Council exercised this ethics of care to normalize processes of neoliberal redevelopment, as shown by the construction of Fruitvale’s transit village. City of Oakland officials and nonprofit allies contradictorily disciplined day laborer solicitation which punitively policed day laborers—all in the name of securing their wellbeing. These practices reveal that there was no singular definition of care or of appropriate practices of care. Instead, care was central to the construction of contentious political projects.

This widespread and sometimes contradictorily deployment of care was made possible by mid 20th century changes in the state’s relationship to racialized minorities. In the 1960s, U.S. state policies crafted an official anti-racist framework by which state agencies would relate to racial minorities and to issues of racism and inequality. This new anti-racist modus operandi set forth a new state legislative and administrative focus of benevolence towards racial subjects. State projects of benevolence primarily silenced critiques of racism. In a post-racial era, projects linked with welfare consolidated an image of a state that cared for its population and that had, since the 1960s, legislated corrective measures to alleviate racial disparities. Practices of racial egalitarianism provided an entire language of redistribution that was linked with expanding
social services in urban racialized communities. In this context, state agencies crafted themselves as anti-racist institutions that no longer upheld racist practices. Race-based nonprofit organizations became one of the best ways state agencies marshaled their new anti-racist projects. To do so, the federal government created the nonprofit organization to expand its reach into racialized neighborhoods. The federal government crafted the architecture of nonprofit organizations and created the tax-exempt status to maintain fiscal regulatory oversight over these institutions. Therefore, nonprofit organizations must adhere to strict federal mandates regarding fundraising and expenditures and must commit themselves to conduct work that ensures the wellbeing of society at large. As a result of the 1969 Tax Reform Act, nonprofits must adhere to federal standards of permissible political activity. This arbitration over permissible activity rendered certain forms of mobilization as safer than others. As I revealed in chapter two, nonprofits continued to forge political claims by spatializing a racial presence and finding alternative means to support Latino candidates. Yet, the federal government’s anti-political clause did fundamentally alter nonprofit projects against racism and racial inequality. Nonprofits channeled these critiques through new equal opportunity openings and indirect forms that did not mention racism or inequality.

State agencies’ adoption of anti-racist policies, however, did not guarantee an egalitarian practice of welfare provision. From their inception, state welfare programs employed selective processes of welfare provision. State practices of racial discrimination produced unequal access to state welfare programs. As chapter one and chapter two argued, state mandated provision of welfare was primarily intended to alleviate White poverty (see Brown 1999; Fox 2012). At the turn of the 20th century, when state and philanthropic agencies included non-Whites in their practices of welfare provision, their focus became helping “deficient” Black subjects. Most of these initial programs for African Americans were intended to help alleviate issues of Black outmigration from the South (O’Connor 1996). As chapter one demonstrated, when the federal government began its intensive focus on the inner city “urban problem,” it fundamentally coupled poverty with blackness. In this context of outright exclusion of Mexican Americans from state practices of poverty alleviation and welfare provision, Mexican American leaders mobilized to become included as deserving subjects of care. These race-based mobilizations fought for state agencies to include Mexican Americans in practices of welfare provision. These practices became embodied in what came to be known as neighborhood nonprofit organizations this study has examined.

The extensive care network in urban racialized neighborhoods was therefore deeply connected to 1960s race-based social movement struggles. The interconnection of nonprofit projects, state welfare, and social movements is rarely acknowledged as a fundamental component of inner city processes of delivering care. There is a plethora of literature on nonprofit organizations and much of it does not accurately reflect the historical ties that nonprofits have with social movement struggles. The organizations that this dissertation analyzed are all either a direct product of 1960s Mexican American mobilizations or are articulated to these movements in some way. They are also directly linked with new social movements that center on immigrant rights. It is precisely through these articulations to social movements that these organizations become sutured with this an ethics of care.

Nonprofit organizations’ direct linkages with social movements has rarely been studied in ethnic studies fields such as Chicana/o Studies. Why do nonprofit organizations get left out of the literature on race-based social movements? As I argued in chapter two, this is a result of the legacies of historical practices of periodization of movements. Chicano/a studies literature
assumes that the period of the late 1970s and 1980s saw the end of the gains from 1960s race-based social movements. This literature assumes that as the public protest decreased and the most vocal leaders were either jailed, killed, or incorporated into state offices or other institutions, so did the impacts of these mobilizations. In these interpretations as the state incorporated many activists into different government and institutions, their movement ideals and historical struggles were destroyed. This periodization of social movement struggles does not enable us to see the continued traction of the Chicano/a Movement gains in urban communities such as Fruitvale. As this dissertation has revealed, movement leaders that entered institutions including nonprofits did not become disengaged from the ideas they developed through grassroots activism. Furthermore, other leaders that landed city and state elected offices as well as private corporations, did not end their political advocacy on behalf of Mexican Americans and other Latinos. They continued to hold institutions accountable to many of the principles surrounding social justice and equality. Even though they had to deploy new terminology and tactics, they continued to wage struggles in their new positions to envision greater electoral and economic power for Latinos.

My analytical tool of the politics of care therefore allowed me to understand the multiple genealogies of power that came to constitute nonprofit agencies. In the United States race-based nonprofit organizations are a critical nexus of competing claims to authority in urban neighborhoods— emblematic of social movements, state projects, and private philanthropic foundation ventures. This triangulation includes social movement struggles of the past and the present that shape the contours of nonprofit-mediated projects. As this dissertation has revealed, nonprofit agencies are also fundamentally interconnected to federal and local state agencies either through public funding or regulatory procedures. And finally, as chapter two revealed, philanthropic organizations have similarly shaped the conditions of possibility of nonprofit projects. These complex power relationships between different institutions and social movements have fundamentally pivoted on crafting specific conceptions about Latinos as a group and Fruitvale as a Latino neighborhood.

The Gendering of Nonprofit Organizations

I have shown that nonprofit organizations are generally not understood as an integral component of the state welfare system. In the United States, the term “welfare” is inextricably linked with state practices of providing a social safety net for its population. This narrow linking of welfare with state bureaucracies and institutions does not accurately portray the realities of how care is experienced in many urban racialized communities like Fruitvale. In urban racialized communities nonprofits play a foundational role not just in the service provision components of the welfare state. They also politicize residents and link migrants with constricted citizenship to alternative modes of belonging. Yet why are nonprofit organizations, especially those that provide direct services to urban predominantly immigrant neighborhoods, left out of this discourse on welfare?

This egregious undervaluation of nonprofit work is in part related to the gendering of nonprofit mediated mobilizations. In much of the literature and popular fusion of welfare and the state, non-state practices of care such as those mediated by nonprofit organizations become feminized. Like the traditional devaluing of women’s labor throughout the world, nonprofit labor is typically regarded as inconsequential or having no real impact on society. Nonprofit labor and its situated practices of care, is often constructed as apolitical and having no relative power. This delinking of nonprofit institutions from the realm of politics reflects a gendered understanding of
power and authority as emanating solely from a state bureaucratic and institutional apparatus
gendered as male. Academic critiques of the nonprofit organizations which positions them as
mere “dummies” of the wills and demands of state power also constructs this passive conception
of nonprofits. By the same token, this kind of reading of nonprofit labor overemphasizes the
power of state and regulatory regimes. Furthermore, this type of analysis leads to an
interpretation of governmental plans as reality and erases the contested terrain of struggle over
their implementation.

The devaluation of nonprofit labor is not unique to academic renderings of inner-city
communities. Community members also overlooked the role nonprofits play in projects of
neighborhood improvement and social service provision. Many Fruitvale residents did not fully
understand the services they received as nonprofit projects. While nonprofits built their strong
patronage networks with residents, this obviously did not encompass everyone. In fact, nonprofit
organizations could only target a fraction of Fruitvale’s population. For example, despite the
Unity Council’s work of building community participation, for the majority of residents,
Fruitvale’s transit village was just another beautiful building built by some private contractor or
“el gobierno” or the government. As one activists told me as we walked down the neighborhood
and she pointed to the transit village: “many people don’t realize that all this came out of
struggle.” These activists viewed that part of their project of politicizing their constituents was in
making them aware of how the spatial transformation were not just the result of an automatic
channeling of economic funds to Fruitvale but rather, a product of nonprofit, community-based
mobilizations and political struggle. These activists lamented that neighborhood residents often
don't acknowledge nonprofit mobilizations of care. Residents assume that these groups exists as
part of the government’s public assistance programs. Activist also argued that the majority of
residents don’t understand that there are different agencies that do work in Fruitvale, and that
each one is different. They assume that diverse organizations such as Centro Legal de la Raza,
Clinica de la Raza, and Bienestar Project, are really one group intent on helping the Latino
population.

Community Mothering and Kinship Work

Nonprofit labor in urban racialized community enacts the important work of networking
residents, or what authors have defined as community mothering (see Nakano Glenn 2012). In
fact many of the nonprofit workers in Fruitvale are women. Yet this to me was not surprising
given the overrepresentation of women in other sectors such as social work often deemed as
“women’s work.” What became more surprising wast the fact that none of the people I
interviewed or the community members I interacted with ever questioned the overrepresentation
of women in nonprofit leadership and staff positions. Why did this happen when it was obvious
that women dominated the nonprofit sector? The powerful executive directors at nonprofit have
been primarily women. The Unity Council’s rise to power, for example, was fundamentally a
result of Arabella Martinez’s leadership in and out of Oakland. The past two executive directors
at Centro Legal de la Raza as well as Clinica de la Raza’s longtime executive director have all
been women. And at Bienestar Project, staff members, volunteers and clients respected
Esperanza Rico’s unquestioned motherly oversight over the organization. Furthermore, the staff
at Bienestar as well as extensive volunteer network are all primarily comprised of women.

1 To be clear, social services agencies that are part of the state’s welfare programs are also equally feminized. For
example, the work of social workers, child welfare workers, etc., is deemed to be less important than other more
masculine and “productive” arenas of state work.
This coincides with the traditional practices women enact in immigrant communities. A large body of scholarly research has asserted the important role women play in forging the social ties that help to form community. Especially in the context of immigration, women are overwhelmingly primary care providers for families and they construct female-centered networks for support (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). These networks of support are especially important among immigrants, minorities, and impoverished groups (O’Connor 1990; Stack 1974; Yanagisako 1977). Women have historically played a role of creating kinship networks which become extremely important in forging connections for mutual aid and care. Immigrant women are the central “nodes” that connect people. The primarily initiate and maintain networks through which people migrate and settle, but they do it so subtly that their actions are not always recognized (Yanagisako 1977). Immigrant women create relationships with various organizations like nonprofits and create a culture of linking their immediate and extended family to these institutional networks (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994).

Women play a foundational role both in directing nonprofit labor as well as traditional work of rearing family and community. In these capacities, women are thus central players in the elaboration and implementation of governmental projects of care. Yet studies that use Foucault’s analytic of governmentality are predominantly male-centric. Foucault’s foundational analysis of pastoral power that fundamentally shaped his understanding of governmentality, emerged from his analysis of Hebrew and Christian shepherding practices. In these traditions, the shepherd was a male God figure that exercised power over a flock in motion and constituted a set of techniques and procedures (Foucault 2007: 125). Foucault’s genealogy of the pastor rested on the image of a strong patriarch that ensured the wellbeing of his flock, which became institutionalized in Christianity and encompassed other scales such as the family, the church, and all humankind. These new institutionalized practices influenced male patriarch’s traditional role of governing his family which was transposed onto other scales including the town, and then later the state. Foucault’s analysis of governmentality and its origins as a mode of power were thus fundamentally gendered male. This male figure and a multitude of male-led institutions kept watch over the population and established a form of power committed to care. This dissertation has presented a different gendering of a multiplicity of individuals and institutions committed to ensuring welfare in urban racialized communities. These multiple networks primarily led by women enact complex practices of government centered around assuring wellbeing and care. While I am not prepared to answer what this means for governmental practices, I present this dynamic as an opening for further research and new lines of investigation.

Nonprofits as Place-Routed Organizations
Throughout this dissertation, I have shown how nonprofits are fundamentally place-routed organizations. While in many instances I described nonprofits as community-based organizations (CBOs) in line with widespread usage of this terminology, a more apt descriptor would be place-routed organizations. In popular as well as academic contexts, nonprofits are fundamentally fashioned as place-based, given that these agencies and their projects operate in particular spatial locations. This characterization pivots on conceptions of space as static and closed. As this dissertation has shown, Fruitvale’s space is anything but sealed off nor fixed. This popular understanding of nonprofits as community-based organizations misses the many ways that these agencies are routed to other places. Furthermore, these agencies produced Fruitvale in relationship to other spaces. This relational formation of the Latino Fruitvale district was

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2 I thank Donald Moore for alerting me to this more apt descriptor of nonprofit agencies.
primarily related to Oakland’s geographies of Blackness and linked to transnational migration circuits connecting Latin American cities to the U.S.

I have emphasized various ways that this routing happens. First, nonprofits help channel money to inner-city neighborhoods from disparate private foundations throughout the United States and diverse sets of public funding. These fiscal patronage networks extend way beyond the geographical confines of urban inner-cities. Second, nonprofits are intimately linked to social movement connections that are fundamentally translocal and even international in scope. In the 1950s and 1960s, Fruitvale organizations were tightly connected to southwest-wide mobilizing for the advancement of Mexican American rights. In the current context, many nonprofits like Bienestar Project are networked to nation-wide grassroots organizing for immigrant rights. Third, nonprofits are also linked to an an entire assemblage of state and private foundations’ regulatory regimes. By definition of their tax-exempt status, nonprofits must abide by federal stipulations surrounding 501(c)3 status and must routinely report to agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Nonprofits must file an extensive set of forms with the IRS called 990 forms. These are not just annual forms of financial reporting. The IRS also requires extensive details of the organizations’ programing and activities, including board of director meeting notes. Fourth, nonprofits engage with transnational migration circuits that bridge Fruitvale residents to their homelands and other cities along the migration stream. Fruitvale is known as a place along the migrant stream where laborers can find cheap housing and look for employment in nearby factories or homes of affluent residents of nearby neighborhoods. Migrants also come to Fruitvale because of the existence of an entire network of nonprofit agencies that play a crucial role in transforming immigrants into long-term residents.

Nonprofits and the Racialized Production of Space

Fruitvale’s geography is sedimented with the grounded experiences of struggle for economic and racial justice. It is a site where multiple generations of activism coalesce and mutually help to constitute the current political terrain. The history of past activism continues to have a powerful traction in this neighborhood. The multiple forms of power operating in this particular spatial terrain effect the kinds of services and programs available to residents. They also impact how the neighborhood is projected and how organizations are understood to represent different neighborhood constituents. As this dissertation has shown, nonprofit mediated projects served to market the Latino Fruitvale district as a space distinct from other Oakland geographies of race. This racialized distinction differentiates Fruitvale from spaces of Blackness (such as East and West Oakland) and Asian spaces such as San Antonio and Chinatown.

Nonprofits have historically played important roles in marketing Fruitvale as racially distinct from other Oakland geographies of difference which also impacts how residents of the neighborhood are perceived. In Chapter 1 I detailed how Mexican Americans were understood by researchers as more “docile” and therefore less of a racialized threat compared to African Americans. Mexican American leaders deployed this racialized difference in their projects of courting both state and philanthropic institutions. They even differentiated themselves from other Mexican American “radicals.” These practices served to cohere an image of Mexican Americans as more willing to work with state institutions and as “safer” to invest in. In the present, Fruitvale as an immigrant neighborhood is also deemed as a place more deserving of funding than other Oakland geographies of poverty. Similarly, Latino racial subjects are deemed to be “hard working” and more deserving in contrast to African Americans. While undocumented status among for many Latinos serves as a form of disentitlement from many social services and state
welfare programs, African Americans overwhelmingly experience extreme forms of disentitlement.

Latino nonprofit practices of committing themselves to what they deem as “Latino issues” of immigration also powerfully differentiated Fruitvale from other neighborhoods. Foundations and state institutions were also implicated in this branding of Latinos and Fruitvale as immigrant. This had consequential effects for the kinds of projects Latino nonprofits enacted, and limited the scope of coalitional mobilizations. Furthermore, these organizational practices partitioned Latino immigrant struggles from African American struggles around racism and inequality. Latino nonprofits like Bienestar rarely collaborated with Black institutions and seldom politicized clients about Latino and African American shared experiences of racism and discrimination. Both historically and in the present, Latino’s racialization as immigrant and “foreign,” constrains the potentiality of forging alliances over shared conditions of inequality with African Americans.

This dissertation project emerged as an investigation of the process by which Fruitvale came to be defined as a Latino space. I was interested in the history of how the neighborhood transitioned from a region of mainly Italian and Portuguese migrants to a Latino immigrant stronghold. This dissertation partially tells that story. I learned, however, that I could not talk about the neighborhood’s transition into a predominantly Latino barrio without telling the story of Fruitvale’s powerful nonprofit organizations. I also could not analyze Latinidad and nonprofits without taking seriously African American social movements and their political gains. Nonprofits in Production has argued that Latino nonprofit organizations play a pivotal role of shaping the neighborhood’s identity and politics. These nonprofits are engaged in multiple sites/acts of production that have spatial, demographic, as well as political effects. By producing this community as a target of projects of improvement and care, nonprofits link Fruitvale with other spaces outside the geographical confines of the neighborhood. Both through their daily practices of neighborhood care as well as their long-term projects of planning and development, they market the neighborhood as Latino and produce representations of this Latinidad that are architecturally and aesthetically visible in the urban form. No other neighborhood in Oakland is so profoundly defined by its nonprofit organizations. As this dissertation has argued, Nonprofit organizations are a productive site of power in contemporary urban racialized communities like Fruitvale.
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