Contradictions and Vile Utterances:
The Zoroastrian Critique of Judaism in the Škand Gumānīg Wizār

By
Samuel Frank Thrope

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Joint Doctor of Philosophy with the Graduate Theological Union in Jewish Studies in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley

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Spring 2012
Abstract

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My dissertation examines the critique of Judaism in Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen of the Škand Gumānīg Wizār. The Škand Gumānīg Wizār is a ninth century CE Zoroastrian theological work that contains polemics against Islam, Christianity, and Manichaeism, as well as Judaism. The chapters on Judaism include citations of a Jewish sacred text referred to as the "First Scripture" and critiques of these citations for their contradictory and illogical portrayals of the divine. This dissertation comprises two parts. The first part consists of an introductory chapter, four interpretative essays, and a conclusion. The second part consists of a text and new English translation of Škand Gumānīg Wizār Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen.

My first essay presents a new approach to the relation between the citations from the First Scripture in the Škand Gumānīg Wizār and Jewish literature. Previous scholars have tried to identify a single parallel text in the Hebrew Bible or rabbinic literature as the origin for each of citation. Borrowing approaches developed by scholars of the Qur’ān and early Islamic literature, I argue that the Škand Gumānīg Wizār’s critique draws on a more diverse and, likely, oral network of traditions about the biblical patriarchs and prophets.

My second essay contains a close reading of three linked passages concerning angels in Škand Gumānīg Wizār Chapter Fourteen. I argue that the depiction of angels in these passages responds to a widespread Jewish belief in Metatron, an angelic co-regent whose power equals God's. This essay analyzes the these angelic passages in light of the traces of this belief that can be found in the Babylonian Talmud, Jewish mystical literature, and other texts.

My third essay concerns one of the longest citations in the critique of Judaism, a version of the story of the Garden of Eden from the first three chapters of the Book of Genesis. This essay
demonstrates that this citation is one of a motif of connected and mutually illuminating garden passages found throughout the apologetic and polemical chapters of the Škand Gumānīg Wizār. I argue that gardens' prominence in the critique of Judaism, and the Škand Gumānīg Wizār as a whole, derives from gardens' symbolic role in Iranian culture.

My final essay compares the critique of Judaism in the Škand Gumānīg Wizār to a Zoroastrian anti-Jewish text from another Middle Persian work, the Dēnkard. Whereas the earlier Dēnkard depicts Judaism mythically, relating the story of Judaism's creation by an evil demon, the Škand Gumānīg Wizār depicts Judaism textually, as citations from the First Scripture. I argue that the Škand Gumānīg Wizār's presentation of Judaism as a text is an interpretative key for understanding the Zoroastrian work as a whole.
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Acknowledgements

Over the course of writing this dissertation, I have benefitted from the support and guidance of individuals at three great institutions: the University of California, Berkeley; the Graduate Theological Union; and the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. In the Bay Area, I would like to thank the staff, faculty, and my fellow students in Jewish Studies and throughout the university, in particular G. R. F. Ferrari and the late David W. Johnson, S. J. In Jerusalem, I owe a special debt of gratitude to Domenico Agostini, Julia Rubanovich, Shai Secunda, David Shulman, and Shaul Shaked for their unflagging support of me and this project. Yaakov Elman of Yeshiva University helped me formulate the idea at the outset and read drafts of chapters early on and Richard Kalmin of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America read a draft of the entire dissertation in a late stage of preparation, as did Eli Stern of the Hebrew University; the work is better for their comments and suggestions.

I spent January to May 2011 doing manuscript research in India. My hosts in Bombay and Navsari were unceasingly helpful in navigating their libraries and archives. I have a great debt of gratitude to the staff, librarians, and trustees of the K. R. Cama Oriental Institute, Bombay, in particular Muncherji N. M. Cama, Homai N. Modi, and Dr. Nawaz B. Mody; of the First Dastur Meherjirana Library in Navsari, Gujarat, especially the chief librarian Bharti Ghandi; and of the Bombay Parsi Punchayat. My special thanks go to Dastur Kaikhusroo M. JamaspAsa for allowing me access to his family's personal manuscript collection housed at the K. R. Cama Oriental Institute in Bombay and to Ervad Parvez Bajan for helping me navigate that collection.

Versions of the arguments in Chapter Two were presented at the ARAM Society Conference on Zoroastrianism in the Levant at Oxford in July of 2010; Chapter Three at the Irano-Judaica Conference at Jerusalem in October of 2010 and at the K. R. Cama Oriental Institute in February of 2011; Chapter Four at the Association of Jewish Studies Conference in Washington, DC in December of 2011; and Chapter Five at The 7th European Conference of Iranian Studies in Cracow in September of 2011. I thank the participants in these conferences for their questions and feedback, in particular Patricia Crone, Geoffrey Hermann, Yishai Keil, Dan Sheffield, Michael Shenkar, Mihaela Timuș, and Arash Zeini. Galit Hasan-Rokem, Gershon Lewenthal, Jason Mokhtarian, Yosefa Raz, and Yuhan Vevaian read and commented on versions of the paper presentation that became Chapter Two.

My committee at Cal, Wali Ahmadi, Daniel Boyarin, and Deena Aranoff, read the various stages of this work with patience and a critical eye. Martin Schwartz, my dissertation chair, contributed his vast knowledge in Iranian and cognate fields as well as his menshlikhkayt.

The research and writing of this dissertation was made possible by the generous contributions of the Council on Library and Information Resources Mellon Foundation Fellowship for Dissertation Research in Original Sources (2010-2011), the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture's International Doctoral Scholarship for Studies Specializing in Jewish Fields (2011-2012), and a grant by the UC Berkeley Department of Jewish Studies (2011-2012).

Finally, my thanks go to my fellow students Lena Salaymeh and Zvi Septimus, on whose advice, support, and wisdom I relied throughout the research and writing of this dissertation. You have been the best of friends and the best of study partners.
### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>Bavli, BT</td>
<td>Babylonian Talmud</td>
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<td>ARN</td>
<td>Avot de Rabbi Nathan</td>
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<td>BD</td>
<td>Bundahišn</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>Concise Pahlavi Dictionary</td>
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<td>DD</td>
<td>Dādestān ī Dēnīg</td>
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<td>DK</td>
<td>Dēnkard</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMMPP</td>
<td>Dictionary of Manichaean Middle Persian and Parthian</td>
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<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>Ginza Rabbā</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRDD</td>
<td>Pahlavi Rivāyat Accompanying the Dādestān ī Dēnīg</td>
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<td>PRE</td>
<td>Pirke de Rabbi Eliezer</td>
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<td>ŠGW</td>
<td>Škand Gumānīg Wizār</td>
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Chapter One:

Methods and Approaches

The Škand Gūmānīg Wizār (ŠGW) contains Zoroastrian literature's longest polemic against Judaism. This polemic, referred to in what follows as the critique of Judaism, is comprised entirely of citations from a work the author refers to as the naxustīn nifsā, which can be translated as "the First Scripture" or "the First Book"; many of these citations are paralleled in Jewish sources. The scholarly attention that has been devoted to the two chapters on Judaism in the ŠGW has focused on the question of the origin of these citations. Scholars have been particularly interested in how and to what degree Mardānfarroxī Ohrmazdān, the otherwise unknown author of the ŠGW, was influenced by Jewish sources, especially the Bible and rabbinic literature. Building on this previous work, this dissertation will consider the critique of Judaism from a new perspective. While taking up the question of the citations' relation to potential sources, Jewish and otherwise, my focus will be on the connection between the critique of Judaism and the rest of the ŠGW. In this dissertation, I hope to demonstrate that the contents of the citations, Mardānfarrox's interpretations of them, and even the "Judaism" that is the object of the critique, are determined by the theological, ethical, and literary priorities of the ŠGW, rather than by the requirements of an exterior source. In other words, I will argue that the critique of Judaism is an integral part of the ŠGW and not a set of citations transplanted from another text.

The ŠGW and Pahlavi Literature

The ŠGW is one of the texts written in Zoroastrian Middle Persian,¹ also known as Zoroastrian Book Pahlavi, in the centuries after the fall of the Sasanian Empire (226-650 CE) to the invading Arab and Islamic forces.² Much of Pahlavi literature consists of works finally redacted in the early Islamic period that preserve Sasanian and earlier traditions. These include translations and commentaries on the Avesta (the Zoroastrian sacred scripture), law codes, wisdom and ethical literature (andarz), and certain short works originating in the circle of the court. These texts include two which will be discussed at some length below: the Bun-
dahišn—an account of Zoroastrian cosmogony, cosmology, geography, and anthropology—and the Dēnkard—a collection of philosophical, ethical, mythical, and legal materials. Both these texts will be introduced in more detail in the relevant chapters below. In addition to Sasanian works in Pahlavi, preserved by Zoroastrian priests, another body of Middle Persian literature from the Sasanian period was preserved in Arabic translation. These include technical works of astronomy, medicine, and philosophy; courtly ethics and "mirrors for kings"; the epic history of the "Book of Sovereigns" (xwadāy nāmag), which eventually served as the basis for Ferdowsī's Shahnameh; and retranslations from Pahlavi of works originally composed in Sanskrit, Syriac, and Greek.

A second group of Pahlavi literature consists of works composed in the Islamic period; conventionally, these works have been known as the "Ninth Century Books." These texts include legal compilations in the form of responsa, a genre that continued in New Persian and Gujarati; letters by the high priest of the provinces of Fārs and Kirmān, Manuščīr ī Gošn-jām, regarding a ritual controversy with his brother Zādspram, a priest in Sīrkān; and theological and ritual texts written by each of the brothers.

The ŠGW stands out from other texts in Pahlavi literature, both from the early and the later period, in a number of ways. First of all, it is a tightly composed treatise strictly focused on theology and polemics. Unlike more or less contemporary post-Islamic works, like Manuščīr's Dādestān ī Dēnīg, the ŠGW does not address ritual or legal questions at all. Furthermore, in opposition to the Dādestān ī Dēnīg and similar texts' lengthy retellings of Zoroastrian sacred history, the ŠGW is marked by the absence of such materials. Though, as I will show in Chapter Four, there are deep connections between the ŠGW and the cosmogony known from other texts, on an explicit level, the accounts of the creation of the world, Zoroaster's biography and his revelation, and the final eschatological battle almost go unmentioned.

The ŠGW and Rabbinic Literature

As will be discussed in more detail below, scholars have read the ŠGW's critique of Judaism in light of parallel passages in the Bible and rabbinic literature. As the term rabbinic literature and references to the rabbinic texts reoccur throughout this dissertation and deserve some introduction, before preceding with the description of the ŠGW, I will provide some explanation of the term. "Rabbinic literature" is a modern appellation for the group of texts redacted, orally or in writing, by a group of Jewish sages in late antiquity, between the third

3. On the xwadāy-nāmag literature in particular see Macuch, "Pahlavi Literature," 172-81 and the studies cited there.
and seventh centuries. While these sages, only later referred to collectively as the rabbis, claimed that the traditions contained in their texts represented the continuation and explication of the Oral Torah revealed alongside the written Torah by God at Mount Sinai, establishing rabbinic legitimacy is a common theme in rabbinic writings and in the immediate post-rabbinic period (c. 700-1100), when, under the leadership of sages known as the Geonim, rabbinic institutions like the academies and the exilarchate were growing in strength, the rabbinic movement faced considerable opposition from Jews who resisted their reliance on the Oral Torah and claims to authority.

Whatever their date of final redaction, like Pahlavi literature discussed above, rabbinic texts preserve earlier traditions. The earliest texts of rabbinic literature include the Mishnah and Tosefta, anonymous texts mostly dealing with legal material redacted in the third century. Both are organized topically by orders (sedarim) that are divided into tractates (masekhetot); for example, the order concerning festivals is divided into tractates on the Sabbath, Passover, Rosh Hashanah, etc. Collectively, the early rabbinic texts are known as tannaitic, after the name Tannaim given to the earliest generation of sages and meaning "repeaters" or "reciters."

After the tannaitic period, rabbinic literature (and the rabbinic movement) can be divided between the products of two main centers: Palestine and Babylonia. In Palestine between the fourth and sixth centuries, the Amoraim—the interpreters of tannaitic traditions—produced a series of Midrashim (singular, Midrash) on a number of books of the Bible, including Genesis, Leviticus, Lamentations, and Ecclesiastes. Alongside these midrashic works, sages in Palestine also engaged in translations of the Bible into Rabbinic

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8. Among other examples, for an expression of the idea of continuity see the first chapter of Mishnah tractate Avot, the Fathers and the discussion in Alexander, "Orality."


12. Babylonia is the rabbinic term for the area in Mesopotamia (present day Iraq) where the major rabbinic centers were located. On the geography of rabbinic Babylonia see Aharon Oppenheimer, Babylonia Judaica in the Talmudic Period (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1983).

13. In addition to the clearly rabbinic compositions discussed above, Jewish literary activity in Palestine in this period also included translations of the Bible into Aramaic (targum) and poetry (piyyut). These texts were produced by those who seem to have some knowledge of rabbinic Midrash, or, it might be better said, of
Aramaic and liturgical poetry in Rabbinic Hebrew and Aramaic. However, the major document of amoraic Palestine was the Palestinian or, as it is also known, the Jerusalem Talmud. Redacted in the late fourth or early fifth centuries, the Palestinian Talmud is, in structure, a commentary on the Mishnah, but it also contains wide ranging legal discussions and debates, stories about the exploits of sages, scriptural exegesis and narrative reflections of historical events.

In rabbinic Babylonia, the main, if not only, literary product of the sages was the Babylonian Talmud (also known as the Bavli). Like its Palestinian counterpart, the Babylonian Talmud is structured as a commentary on the Mishnah. However, it contains more legal and narrative material than the Palestinian Talmud. This additional material is, moreover, composed more elaborately and with greater complexity. The Babylonian Talmud is marked by the prevalence of an active, anonymous voice that engages in discussions, questions conclusions, and acts, in general, as the literary thread weaving together various earlier traditions; this feature is also found in the Palestinian Talmud but to a much less degree. Some scholars have taken this voice to be that of the text's redactors. While the dating of this anonymous layer is a contentious issue in the scholarship, a second approach claims that anonymous commentary was most active from the fourth century onward and increased over time. The final redaction of the Babylonian Talmud, a related and similarly contentious issue, is generally dated to the sixth or seventh centuries. While all scholars agree that the major


17. The theory of anonymous redaction is championed by David Weiss Halivni and his students, principally Shamma Friedman. Halivni views the redactors, a group he calls the Stammain, as a social group living in a historical period after that of the named sages in the Babylonian Talmud. According to the most recent iteration of his theory in David Halivni, Sources and Traditions: A Source Critical Commentary on the Talmud, Tractate Baba Batra (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2007), 10, he places the redaction of the Babylonian Talmud in the eighth century CE. Shamma Friedman, "Pereq ha-ʾIsha Rabba ba-Bavli," in Mehqarim u-Meqorot, ed. Haim Dimitrovski (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1977), 283-321, the classical statement of his position, understands the anonymous voice to be an active force used by the redactors to shape their received
editorial work of the Babylonian Talmud was finished by the Geonic period, even as the Bavli was gaining power as the foremost authority for Jewish law, numerous versions of the text, some of which were significantly different from each other, circulated at the academies in the cities of Sura and Pumbedita and, later, Baghdad.18

The Contents and Structure of the ŠGW

Returning to the ŠGW, the work’s unique concerns can best be seen in a short sketch of the book’s contents. The longest version of the ŠGW, which served as the base for the 1887 critical edition by the Indian Zoroastrian scholar Hoshang Dastur Jamaspji Jamasp-Asana19 and the British Orientalist and pioneering scholar of Iranian Studies Edward William West,20 contains sixteen chapters, the last of which is incomplete.21 These chapters can be roughly divided into two halves. The first half, comprised of Chapters One to Ten, contain a rationalist exposition of the main tenets of Zoroastrian theology. After an introductory chapter containing a dendritic metaphor of the Zoroastrian religion and an outline of the aim of the book, Chapters Two through Four contain a series of questions by an otherwise unknown Mihiraiiār i Mahmādāq of Isfahan. His questions concern apparent contradictions in Zoroastrian cosmogony, discussed in more detail in the body of this dissertation, that seem to violate the absolute division between the good creator god Ohrmazd22 and the primordial evil antagonist Ahriman.23 Chapter Five deals with epistemology and the necessary knowledge of God. Chapter Six consists of a refutation of materialists who deny creation and any cosmic principle other than time.24 Chapter Seven is dedicated to proving the existence of an evil principle traditions. He also establishes a rubric for distinguishing the work of these redactors from other layers of the Talmud, consisting of a) evolutionary markings, that more concise statements are earlier whereas longer explanations are later; b) linguistic criteria, that Aramaic is generally later and Hebrew generally earlier; and c) textual criteria, that the abundance of textual variants of a certain phrase in the manuscript tradition is a sign of that phrase’s late formulation or addition (Aryeh Cohen, Rereading Talmud: Gender; Law and the Poetics of Sugiyot [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998], 35-36). While most of Halivni and Friedman’s work has focused on legal material, Jeffrey Rubenstein, “Criteria of Stammatic Intervention in Aggada,” in Creation and Composition: The Contribution of the Bavli Redactors (Stammaim) to the Aggada, ed. Jeffrey Rubenstein (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 417-40 considers the contribution of the anonymous redactors to narrative and other non-legal material in the Babylonian Talmud.

24. Called dahrīya, a name applied to various groups of materialists in Islamic theological and polemical works.
opposed to the good and Chapter Eight to the character of this opposition and its implications for the physical and spiritual worlds and creation. Chapter Nine is a demonstration of the anteriority of the evil antagonist to creation. Chapter Ten contains a summary of the arguments and demonstrations in the preceding chapters, a more extensive spiritual biography of the author than that found in Chapter One, and a reprise of Zoroastrian sacred history from the prophet Zarathustra to the author's own days.

The second half of the book contains polemics against the three monotheistic religions and Manichaeanism. Chapters Eleven and Twelve are devoted to Islam—though the religion is never referred to explicitly—and focus on the basic dilemma of monotheism, namely that one God is responsible for both good and evil. The section, by far the longest and, as de Menasce notes, the "worst composed" of the ŠGW, is identified as a critique of Islam because of the parallels between the doctrines ascribed to the rival religion and passages in the Qurʾān and early Islamic literature. Moreover, the text retells the story of the downfall of Iblis, known from the Qurʾān, referring in three locations to a written text (as in the critique of Judaism, called in Pazand mīβδ) and cites by name and refutes the opinions of Muʿtazilite theologians. The two chapters on Judaism, Thirteen and Fourteen, will be addressed below. Chapter Fifteen attacks Christianity. This attack is, first of all, directed against the biography of the Holy Family, especially the virgin birth; the attack parallels, in certain degrees, well-attested Jewish and Islamic anti-Christian polemics along similar lines. Mardânfarrox also addresses inconsistencies and contradictions in Christian doctrine, in particular the

25. This chapter is also found in DK 3:239; see further discussion on this passage and the relationship between the ŠGW and the Dēnkār in Chapter Five.
26. The autobiographical passage will be dealt with in Chapter Five.
27. De Menasce, Apologétique, 125.
28. At ŠGW 11:45-87 and again at 11:352-358. On these passages see Chapter Four.
29. Once at ŠGW 11:248 in the context of a critique of the story of the downfall of the angels; at 11:264 in the context of a critique of the idea that both good and evil acts originate with God; and at 11:268 regarding God's curse in the book against the creatures.
32. ŠGW 15:4-45.
33. The biography of Jesus and his purported virgin birth are mentioned in various passages in the Babylonian Talmud. See Peter Schäfer, Jesus in the Talmud (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) and the literature quoted there.
34. The refutation of Christianity (like, and sometimes coupled with, the refutation of Judaism) constitutes a genre of Islamic writing. These refutations took more or less theological and/or exegetical forms. The Christians' scandalizing beliefs about Jesus' birth and upbringing—scandalizing because Jesus is also considered a prophet in Islam—constitute a major topic in these texts. For a brief survey in the context of Muʿtazilite works see Gabriel Said Reynolds, A Muslim Theologian in the Sectarian Milieu (Leiden: Brill, 2004), esp. 139-78.
nature of the Trinity. In addition, the chapter attacks contradictions in Paul's epistles and mentions groups adhering to different Christologies. The final chapter consists of a polemic against Manichaeism. It contains a reprise of the Manichaean cosmogony in the Three Times and the beginning of a critique of the Manichaean notion of infinity.

Mardānfarrox i Ohrmazdādān, Author of the ŠGW

Nothing is known of the author who composed this far-ranging treatise other than what is contained in his book. From the text's few biographical passages, we can glean the following information: Mardānfarrox claims that he underwent a crisis of doubt that prompted him to travel widely outside Iran, including to India, and to discuss religious questions with different kinds of people. His return to the fold was shepherded by reading Zoroastrian theological literature, in particular the Dēnkard. His book, he says, is aimed at new Zoroastrian initiates—or "young students," as de Menasce translates the Pazand nō-āmōžag—at in order to inform their judgement about these rival faiths and sharpen their rhetorical skills. It seems that Mardānfarrox himself was a layman, rather than a priest; this fact alone makes the ŠGW unique among Zoroastrian literature.

Scholars have called Mardānfarrox's account of his journey of self-discovery into question. The trope of a spiritual quest prompted by doubt can be found elsewhere in Pahlavi literature—the Sasanian-era Ardā Wirāz Nāmag, for instance, recounts that the protagonist Wirāz's visit to Heaven and Hell was inspired by doubt about correct ritual practice—and an earthly journey also appears in the introductory section to the Dādestān i Mēnōg i Xrad, a sixth century wisdom (andarz) text dealing with religious topics. The unnamed sage who is the text's protagonist is described as visiting the provinces and districts of the empire investigating the beliefs of the inhabitants; on the basis of the mutual opposition of these sects, he comes to the conclusion that only the Zoroastrian religion is true.

35. ŠGW 15:46-68.
36. I will address some of these passages in Chapter Four.
38. The ŠGW's anti-Manichaean polemic was studied in a dissertation by Dieter Taillieu of the Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven, entitled Negende-eeuwse Zoroastrische anti-Manicheïsche polemiek in Škand-gumanig wizar en Denkard. While some of the fruits of Taillieu's work have been published as articles such as Dieter Taillieu, "Pazand nīšāmi Between Light and Darkness," in Iranica Selecta, ed. Alois van Tongerloo (Turnhout: Brepolis, 2003), 239-46, and incorporated into the Manichaean Dictionary Project (Desmond Durkin-Meisterernst, Dictionary of Manichaean Middle Persian and Parthian [Turnhout: Brepolis, 2004]), I have not been able to access a copy of the dissertation itself. The Manichaean chapter has also been studied by Werner Sundermann, "Das Manichāerkapitel des Škand Gumānīg Wizār in der Darstellung und Deutung Jean de Menasces," in Augustine and Manichaeism in the Latin West, ed. Johannes van Oort, et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 325-37, who pointed out Mardānfarrox's correct use of Manichaean terminology.
42. ŠGW 10:78-79.
44. The comparison with the SGW is made by Carlo G. Cereti, "Some Notes on the Škand Gumānīg Wizār," in Languages of Iran, Past and Present: Iranian Studies in Memoriam David Neil MacKenzie, ed. Dieter
Outside of Zoroastrian literature, Mani, the third century founder of the dualistic religion which bears his name, is also said to have travelled to India.\textsuperscript{45} The accounts of Mani's travels, as well as archaeological and other literary evidence, could be taken to indicate the plausibility of Mardānfarrox's journey,\textsuperscript{46} though the latter does not refer to any Indian religious traditions, in particular Buddhism, in his work. These earlier accounts, however, also point to the existence of a literary trope of a "journey to India" that Mardānfarrox could be borrowing in the ŠGW.

The ŠGW's Style

Aside from these explicit statements, more can be discerned about the author and his work from the style and overall character of the ŠGW. Despite the diversity of its subject matter, the ŠGW is unified by its style. First of all, like many other Zoroastrian texts, the ŠGW is characterized by a question-and-answer style. This is found already in the Avesta. Among the ritual manuals, prayers and poems that make up the Avesta, the most important of which are the Gāthās, the sacred poems composed by the prophet Zarathushtra himself,\textsuperscript{47} are many instances of the revelation of sacred knowledge by asking questions. The Gāthās in particular are referred to as the sponto frašnā, the "holy questions," in the Avestan ritual and legal compendium, the Vidēvdād.\textsuperscript{48} This style continues in Pahlavi literature. The Dādestān ī Mēnōg ī Xrad, for instance, is structured as a series of questions put by an otherwise unidentified sage (dānāg) to the Spirit of Wisdom (the mēnōg ī xrad of the title). Questions are not, however, only put to spiritual beings. The Dādestān ī Dēnīg is just one example among many of Pahlavi compositions written in the form of questions on various religious topics accompanied by the author's answers.

The ŠGW exhibits this question-and-answer form in different ways. As mentioned above, the Second to Fourth Chapters of the book are cast as answers to questions raised by Mihiraiār i Mahmādāq. Several other expositions in the first, apologetic half of the ŠGW are presented in dialogical form, as answers to questions or objections put by various materialists and sectarians. This is found, for instance, in the discussion of the substance of good and evil in Chapter Eight.\textsuperscript{49} Chapter Ten opens with a litany of questions a person must ask his soul and body: Who created you? For what reason? Who incites you to commit evil? and similar queries.\textsuperscript{50}

However, the style is employed most widely in the polemical chapters of the ŠGW. The actual critique in these chapters is cast in the form of questions and answers. The following brief example from the critique of Islam in Chapter Eleven can serve as an illustration:

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\textsuperscript{47} For the most recent survey of Avestan literature see Almut Hintze, "Avestan Literature," in \textit{The Literature of Pre-Islamic Iran}, ed. Ronald E. Emmerick and Maria Macuch (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009), 1-71.


\textsuperscript{49} ŠGW 8:117-135.

\textsuperscript{50} ŠGW 10:2-10.
Furthermore this: is everything he says true and believable or not? (31) If what he says is true and believable then when he says: "I am the friend of good deeds and the enemy of evil deeds," (32) yet he creates more sinners doing evil than righteous doing good, (33) where then is his truthfulness?

More examples of this kind of polemical questioning can be found in the translation of the critique of Judaism in the appendix to this dissertation.

The questioning style connects the ŠGW to Pahlavi literature but other aspects of the text mark it as unique. Although the Third Book of the Dēnkard also deals with theology and polemics, the ŠGW is unique in its organization along rationalist lines. The apology for Zoroastrianism in Chapters Five through Ten begins with first principles—epistemology and a theory of perception—and proceeds from there to a proof of the necessary existence of the creator, his good nature, and the existence of his evil opponent who was also the impetus for creation. The order and logic underlying the proofs in this section lays the groundwork for the polemics which follow, devoted as they are to exposing the inherent contradictions of rival doctrines.

The ŠGW and ʿilm al-kalām

The sustained consistency and unity of rationalist argumentation is what sets the ŠGW apart from other Pahlavi works. However, as de Menasce already noted,51 the ŠGW's rationality connects it to early Islamic rationalist theology. The origins of the dialectical methods of this kind of rationalist theology—in Arabic ʿilm al-kalām52—go back to the pre-Islamic period.53 Within Islam, while there were various manifestations of kalām theology developed and espoused from the eighth century on, the field was dominated and systematized by the Muʿtazilite school. At the height of its sophistication and influence in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries, Muʿtazilite theologians formulated a compendious body of thought encompassing ontology, physics, ethics, and hermeneutics.54 Prominent as Muʿtazilites were, intellectuals from various sectarian and doctrinal groups participated in disputations for

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51. The general similarity between the ŠGW and Muʿtazilite rationalism as well as specific correspondences on a number of points was already noted by de Menasce, Apologétique, 8-10 and in various notes throughout his work.
which rational methods served as the ground rules and wrote apologetics and polemics in the kalām style.

Without going so far as to claim that Mardānfarrox was a Zoroastrian adherent of Muʿtazilite rationalist theology—as has been claimed of some slightly later Jewish intellectuals, such as the Rabbanite Shmuʿel ben Ḥofni Gaon and the Karaite Yusūf al- Baṣṣīr—I would, nonetheless, suggest that there are significant similarities between the ŠGW and Muʿtazilite works. The parallels can be illustrated with two examples. First of all, in the discussion of epistemology in Chapter Five mentioned above, the terminology Mardānfarrox uses to distinguish the three means of gaining knowledge by necessary knowledge, by necessary knowledge, by analogy from the present to the absent, and by reliable report—parallel Muʿtazilite usage. Just as importantly, the focus throughout the ŠGW on divine justice, one of the central tenets of

59. ŠGW 5:11: pa acār-dānānī aiḍa pa angōšūddā-dānānī aiḍa pa sāriāt saṣāt būdan. These three classes are translated by de Menasce as connaissance nécessaire, connaissance par analogie and connaissance selon la possibilité et la convenance (de Menasce, Apologetique, 65). The exact designations of the somewhat ambiguous Pazand terms are revealed in the examples Mardānfarrox provides for each type of knowledge.
60. Necessary knowledge is exemplified in ŠGW 5:12 by mathematical operations, i.e., one times one is one, two times two is four. The term is equivalent to Arabic ʿilm darūrī, as opposed to ʿilm ʿiktisābī. See Josef van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 4:667 and Binyamin Abrahamov, "Necessary Knowledge in Islamic Theology," British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 20 (1993): 20-32.
61. Analogy is the revelation of the unseen through the means of the seen: for example, in ŠGW 5:28-29: u xē naŋaštā ṯās kā napaʔtārs nā pōdā . . napaʔtār i q naŋaštā i acārī and regarding a text whose writer is not visible . . . the writer of that text [exists] necessarily. Again, this is similar to the idea in Islamic epistemology and theology of reasoning "from the present (ṣahīd) to the absent (ghāʾib)." See Ess, Theologie and Gesellschaft, 4:664.
62. Knowledge by means of reliable report depends on the character of the reporter. ŠGW 5:33-34 states: u in q i andār sāriāt saṣāt būdan viṃaṇḍ sāriāt drīg, bā ka q āḡāhī mard gōst kā pa rāstī xusrūb u pa vacōrdī xiżmūddā q andār rāstī u hastī viṃaṇḍ,
And that which remains within the limits of the possible could be false, but when the man who gives that information is renowned for truth and tested in judgement that [statement] is in the bounds of truth and existence.

Mu'tazilite theology, closely parallels the conception of divine justice in the writing of the ninth century Baghdadi Mu'tazilite theologian Abū Ishāq an-Naẓẓām. For an-Naẓẓām, the ethical orientation of a particular act was an inherent characteristic of the act itself. Thus, certain classes of actions are intrinsically bad while others are intrinsically good. The field of God's choice is limited to ethical actions; as Frank explains "actions which are ethically bad in themselves are excluded as such from those which are (potential) objects of God's ability to act, 'because one who is able to do something is such that the occurrence through his agency is not impossible'. This inherent ethical orientation of actions is also what we find in the ŠGW. For both, God does good actions because they conform to his good nature and he can not do bad ones because they oppose it. What limits divine free will is the underlying orientation of action in the physical universe.

The ŠGW and Manichaeism

Other scholars have pointed out the connections between Mardānfarrox's work and Manichaeism. In the brief autobiographical passage from ŠGW Chapter Ten mentioned above, Mani is singled out for special vituperation. Mani is called "the greatest of deceivers and the most powerful of false masters" and his religion is described as sorcery, deception, and seduction. Carlo Cereti has recently argued that this special emphasis on Mani points to Mardānfarrox's particular familiarity and contempt for that religion. Other scholars, in particular Werner Sundermann, have pointed to Mardānfarrox's mastery over Manichaean terminology, a mastery certainly not displayed in the critique of Judaism. While Mihaela Timuş has argued that Mardānfarrox's familiarity with Manichaeism is no more than the mark of a good polemicist's command of his opponent's sources, I will discuss a number of instances below where Mardānfarrox's arguments in the critique of Judaism are reminiscent of Manichaean critiques of the Bible as refuted by Saint Augustine. While Manichaeism was effectively extinct in the West by the ninth century, the religion continued to survive in Iran and Central Asia, where it was elevated to the state religion of the Uighur empire from

64. The most complete treatment of an-Naẓẓām is in Ess, Theologie and Gesellschaft 3:296-418.
66. It is not surprising to find agreement between an-Naẓẓām and the ŠGW on this and, potentially, other points. An-Naẓẓām learned from and polemized against adherents to other dualist theologies. See Ess, "Wrongdoing," 57.
67. ŠGW 10:59-60.
68. Cereti, "Notes on the Škand Gumānīg Wizār."
69. Sundermann, "Manichäerkapitel."
Mardānfarroox could have been in conversation with Manichæan sources and perspectives just as much as he was with Islamic rationalist theology.

_Dating the ŠGW_

The issue of the ŠGW’s relation to its intellectual environment raises the question of the text's dating and historical context. Edward William West dated the ŠGW to the mid-ninth century. This dating is based on an analysis of the ŠGW's use of the _Dēnkard_. As will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Five, Mardānfarroox mentions his dependence on the _Dēnkard_ several times in the ŠGW. However, since he only refers to the first compiler of the _Dēnkard_, Ādurfarnbag Ī Farrozxādān, and not the later editor Ādurbād Ī Emēdān, West concluded that Mardānfarroox must have lived and written after the first authority but before the second. As Ādurfarnbag is dated to the reign of the ’Abbasid Caliph al-Maʾmun (r. 813-833) and West argues that Ādurbād was a contemporary of Zādspram, who was living in 881, West dated the ŠGW near the end of the ninth century.

As other scholars have noted, there are at least two problems with West's argument. First of all, the dating West proposes for Ādurfarnbag is itself less than certain. It is based on Ādurfarnbag's appearance as the Zoroastrian participant in a disputation with a Muslim named Abališ (likely a corruption of 'Abd Allāh) before al-Maʾmūn. However, the historical reliability of this account, contained in the late Middle Persian text _Gizistag Abālīš_, deserves reconsideration. One cannot exclude the possibility that Ādurfarnbag appears as a character in that story because the author of this text considered him an archetypical representative of the Good Religion, just as, conceivably, Al-Maʾmun was the archetype of the wise king.

Secondly, as de Menasce pointed out, there is evidence of a third editor of the _Dēnkard_, named Ādurbād Ī Mahraspandān Ī Ašawahišṭān, a tenth century figure who is mentioned in a Persian _Rivāyat_ preserved in the British Library. Given the difficulty of determining the nature and extent of the redactional work by these two Ādurbāds, it is impossible to know what in the extant version of _Dēnkard_ was anterior to the ŠGW and what is dependent on it.

Despite these problems, most scholars have followed the ninth century dating of the ŠGW. While de Menasce rejects West's argument, on linguistic grounds he places the ŠGW

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72. But see Ahmad Tafazzoli, "Ādurbād Emēdān," in _Encyclopaedia Iranica_ (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda), 1:477, who dates Ādurbād to the mid tenth century.

73. Jamasp-Asana and West, _Shikand_, xvii-xviii.

74. For a discussion of the Gizistag Abališ as an instance of the literary trope of court polemics, see Albert F. de Jong, "Zoroastrian Self-Definition in Contact with Other Faiths," in _Irano-Judaica V_, ed. Shaul Shaked and Amnon Netzer (Jerusalem: Ben Zvi Institute, 2003), 16-26 and Timus, _Fonder; bâtir; rénover_, 15-16.


76. De Menasce, _Apologétique_, 12.
before Manušcihr's letters, composed, again, around 881, since the ŠGW uses less prototypical New Persian forms. Boyce, Cereti, Macuch, and Grenet follow de Menasce's dating. Recently, however, Mihaela Timuș has argued for a reevaluation of this consensus and proposed dating the ŠGW to the tenth century, after Ādurbādī Emēdān's redaction of the Dēnkard. She bases her argument on the fact that in the ŠGW's most extended reference to the Dēnkard, it refers to the latter as the Dēnkard "of one thousand chapters," the same name Ādurbād gave to his redaction of the work.

The Language of the ŠGW

The lack of agreement surrounding the dating of the ŠGW derives, in part, from the fact that scholars lack the original language of the text and cannot, therefore, provide a relative dating on linguistic grounds. The ŠGW was originally written in Pahlavi, a name for the Zoroastrian dialect and script of Zoroastrian Middle Persian. However, this version of the text has not survived. The text as it stands is a transcription by the Indian Zoroastrian scholar Neryosang Dhaval in Pazand, a system for writing Pahlavi texts in the less ambiguous Avestan alphabet developed among Zoroastrians in India. Pazand, precisely because it is written in a script that can more fully represent the features of Middle Persian, also reflects the interpretation—or, as it is better to say, interpretations, since Pazand was not produced by a single individual in a single period—of Pahlavi among the Zoroastrian community in India. Pazand includes certain dialectical forms, such as bahōṯ and šahōṯ for Middle Persian bawēd and šawēd, that are known from Early Judeo-Persian and Early New Persian texts.
the spelling of Pahlavi words in a pseudo-Avestan style, such as mainiiauuąnī for Pahlavi mēnōg; and the interpenetration of some Sanskrit and Gujarati forms.88

Along with the Pazand version, Neryosang also includes a Sanskrit translation of the ŠGW. While the Sanskrit is often helpful in deciphering cryptic Pazand forms, and I have used it to that effect in this dissertation, Neryosang’s language is quite different from classical Sanskrit. On the one hand, this is a function of the translation itself. The Sanskrit reproduces as closely as possible the syntax and structure of the underlying Middle Persian and this slavishness results, not surprisingly, in a sometimes ungrammatical text. However, irrespective of the underlying Middle Persian, the Sanskrit text also gives words different meanings or different genders than those used in the classical language.89

Finally, some of the manuscripts of the ŠGW also contain a Pahlavi version of part of the text; in his edition, de Menasce based the first five chapters on this Pahlavi retranslation. Whatever the function of this retranscribed Pahlavi,90 it is clearly based on the Pazand version. The Pahlavi versions often reproduce in Pahlavi Pazand readings, stray from standard Pahlavi orthography and confuse ideograms.91

The Manuscripts of the ŠGW

As much as can be learned from the Pazand, Sanskrit, and Pahlavi versions of the ŠGW, the original language, and what it might be able to teach us about the place and time of the composition of the text, is inaccessible. This problem is further exacerbated by the poor state of the manuscripts of the ŠGW. For the publication of the 1887 edition, West consulted thirteen manuscripts, including three that contained the complete text of the ŠGW.92 One of these three was AK2, which West named after the copyist Āsādin Kaka, a sixteenth century priest and scribe from Navsari, Gujarat, one of the most important Zoroastrian centers in India.93 Derived from a copy of the oldest extant manuscript, called AK,94 this was by far the

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90. Azarnouche, "Deux modes" has argued that it served a pedagogic role in familiarizing students with the difficult Pahlavi script.
92. See the descriptions in Jamasp-Asana and West, Shikand, xx-xxviii.
94. On the names and the confusion of Āsādin Kaka’s colophons, see Jamasp-Asana and West, Shikand, xx.
most important Pazand and Sanskrit manuscript of the second half of the ŠGW. However, because West became aware of it "as this edition was passing through the press," he did not use it as the base text nor did he include its variants in the notes to his edition. Instead, the text for Chapters Twelve through Sixteen were based on two later manuscripts, called JE and JJ, that were in the same family as AK2 but contained errors and misreadings.

While a number of additional manuscripts for the first half of the ŠGW have come to light since West's edition, the three manuscript witnesses for the second half of the work, including the two chapters on Judaism, have been lost. There is no record of JE and JJ in the various catalogs since Friedrich Müller recorded having seen JE in the collection of Dastur Hoshang Jamasp-Asa of Pune in 1899. At least until the 1940's, AK2 was in the possession of Dastur Minocher Jamasp-Asa of Bombay. Its presence is recorded in an undated catalogue of Dastur Minocher's collection completed by his widow Jerbai after the Dastur's death in 1922. However, sometime in the following decades, Dastur Minocher's family moved, along with the manuscript collection, to Calcutta. The collection was brought back to Bombay by Dastur Kaikhusroo M. JamaspAsa in the 1980s and is now held in a separate cabinet at the K. R. Cama Oriental Institute in that city. Likely because of this move, a number of manuscripts have gone missing. Though listed in the catalog, they are nowhere to be found in the current collection. During my field research in Bombay in 2010, I conducted extensive searches for AK2 and consulted Dastur Kaikhusroo and Ervad Parvez Bajan, who compiled a new catalog of Dastur Kaikhusroo's manuscripts in the 1990s. After these investigations, it is certain that AK2 is missing, perhaps destroyed. While further research in Calcutta, which I was not able to visit during my time in India, may yet bear fruit, at the moment, without access to the manuscripts, the best available text of the ŠGW's critique of Judaism is Jamsap-Asana and West's edition.

The Critique of Judaism? Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen Between Judaism and Islam

We can now turn to the critique itself. As mentioned above, the critique takes up Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen of the ŠGW. Like the other polemical sections of the ŠGW, the critique of Judaism is comprised of statements of Jewish belief and doctrine and Mardānfarrox's critique of those statements. Other chapters identify the doctrinal statements as coming from various sources: from oral communication by native, for example Muslim, informants; from written texts; or from an unidentified source. However, Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen are entirely devoted to the citation and critique of a text called the naxustin niβā, meaning "First Scripture," "First Writing," or even "First Book." The citations drawn from the First Scripture, as I will refer to it henceforth, include short passages, describing God's nature and characteristics, and longer narratives. Mardānfarrox, in his reading of these citations, highlights the contradictions between the First Scripture's depictions of God's anger, evil, violence, regret, and ignorance and the monotheistic position, outlined at the beginning of the critique of Islam, that God is unique, good, wise, powerful, generous, and merciful. At the end of Chapter Fourteen, Mardānfarrox states the final conclusion that he draws from

95. In Chapter Eleven, for instance, the story of Iblis is introduced at ŠGW 11:45-77 without reference to any source; the sayings of a certain group are discussed at 11:205; and, as mentioned above, a written text (niβā) is referred to at 11:248, 11:264, and 11:268.
96. ŠGW 11:3-5.
the presentation of these Jewish sources. From the First Scripture's depictions of the Jewish God's evil characteristics, which are similar to the characteristics of the evil antagonist Ahriman, Mardānfarrox concludes that the Jewish God is none other than Ahriman himself.

Mardānfarrox never refers to these chapters as a critique or refutation of Judaism, unlike Chapter Fifteen on Christianity and Sixteen on Manichaesim, both of which explicitly identify the group they attack. Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen are more similar to Chapters Eleven and Twelve. These two chapters seem to comprise a critique of Islam but which also do not identify the object of their polemic. It is tempting, on these grounds, to read the whole section from Chapters Eleven through Fourteen as a critique of scriptural monotheism that does not distinguish, on account of Mardānfarrox's ignorance or his intentional conflation, between Islam and Judaism. While this might seem like a minor point, the question of how, and if, to distinguish between these two sections of the ŠGW touches on some of the major concerns of this dissertation. For this reason, I will devote some space to addressing the issue. Through the lens of the question of syncretism, I will also describe the contents of these chapters in the ŠGW.

According to the syncretic reading, the critique of strict monotheism would be contrasted with the mixed dualism Mardānfarrox sees in Christianity and, finally, the erroneous dualism of Manichaesim. Alternatively, one could argue that the chapters seeming to be about Judaism are, as de Menasce argued is the case with the anti-Jewish polemic in the Third Book of the Dēnkard, actually meant as critiques of Islam; the vagueness of the Jewish association of Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen would, according to this reading, make the application of those critiques to Islam that much easier.

A further aspect of the critique of Judaism complicates this syncretic approach to these two sections of the ŠGW. As mentioned above, the critique of Judaism is comprised entirely of citations from the First Scripture and Mardānfarrox's interpretation of these citations. As all of the scholars who have studied the ŠGW have noted, each of the citations is similar to a passage or passages known from Jewish literature. Though the degree of similarity between a citation and its parallel varies, parallels have been adduced for all the citations.

Many of the citations are similar to passages from the Hebrew Bible. Chapter Thirteen is taken up entirely with the citation and critique of the story of creation and Adam, Eve, and the serpent familiar from Genesis chapters 1-3. Chapter Fourteen contains a number of shorter citations as well as longer narratives. Among the shorter citations, biblical parallels can be adduced for God's statement of his own vengefulness that is paralleled by passages in Exodus, Deuteronomy and elsewhere; a description of God's terrifying physical form resem-

99. All of the parallel passages are recorded in the notes to the accompanying translation of the critique of Judaism; see Appendix One.
100. Also known as the Old Testament, the Jewish biblical canon includes the Pentateuch, Prophets, Psalms, and the texts known as writings (Hebrew ketuvim): Proverbs, Esther, Ruth, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, Lamentations, Ezra, Nehemiah, and Chronicles. The Hebrew Bible excludes the Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, and the books of the New Testament (Gospels, Acts, etc.).
101. The citation and critique in Chapter Thirteen are discussed in detail in Chapter Four.
bling the destructive forces of nature, which seems like an amalgam of parallel passages in the Prophets and Psalms; a statement of his anger at the Israelites during their wanderings in the desert paralleled by a passage in Psalms; and God's statement that he regrets creation paralleled in the story of the flood in Genesis 6:6.

Other citations in Chapter Fourteen, however, in particular the longer narratives, are not paralleled by passages in the Bible but rather by texts from rabbinic literature. For example, the story of God's visit to Abraham in ŠGW 14:40-50, in which several of the motifs are similar to the midrashic expansion of the story of the annunciation of the birth of Isaac in Genesis 18;102 the account of the suffering saint and his wife in ŠGW 14:58-70 which resembles two stories about poor sages from Babylonian Talmud tractate Taanit; and a pair of citations describing God's abuse and violence against the angels which resemble angelological discussions from Babylonian Talmud tractate Hagigah.103

However, parallels for all of these citations can also be found in Islamic literature. For example, a parallel to the story of temptation in the garden cited in Chapter Thirteen is found also in the Qurʾān 7:10-25 and expanded on in Islamic commentary literature.104 Similarly, the story of Abraham's hospitality cited in Chapter Fourteen is paralleled in several Qurʾān passages (11:69-76; 15:51-9; 29:31; and 51:24-30) and likewise discussed at length in the commentary literature.105 The citations depicting divine violence against angels from Chapter Fourteen also have parallels in Islamic texts.

Aside from these Islamic parallels, the separate Jewish identity of Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen is called into question by the fact that, for all that the citations parallel passages in Jewish literature, the hierarchy of authority and distinction between texts that is a crucial part of that literature is not maintained. In other words, in his discussion of the citations Mardâfarrox does not maintain the distinction between the Bible and rabbinic literature, between the written and the oral law. The discussion in Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen treats the citations not only as if they all had equal status but also as if they were contained in the same book, the First Scripture. Citations that are paralleled by passages in the Bible sit next from and are undistinguished from citations that are paralleled by passages in the Babylonian Talmud. This lack of distinction is also found in some early Islamic critiques of Judaism.106

In addition to his arguments and the citations, Mardâfarrox also makes certain explicit statements about Jews and the First Scripture in these two chapters. The contents of these statements are also paralleled in Islamic sources. In the introduction to Chapter Thirteen at 13:1-4, Mardâfarrox refers to the First Scripture having been given by God to Moses. While this is, of course, parallel with the role of Moses as prophet and lawgiver in Jewish literature—among other texts, the revelation of the Law to Moses is recounted in the Bible in the book of Exodus—this same motif of the revelation of a book to Moses is also found in the Qurʾān107 and explicated in the early commentaries. The important exegete and historian

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102. See the further discussion in Chapter Two.
103. On the angelic citations, see the further discussion in Chapter Three.
104. See the discussion in Chapter Four.
105. See the discussion in Chapter Two.
Muhammad ibn Jarîr al-Ţabarî (838-923) identifies the kitāb and furqān that the Qurʾān states Moses received with tawrîţ, the Torah. After a citation that mentions God rested after the six days of creation, a citation paralleled by the account of hexameral creation in Genesis, Mardânfarrox comments at ŠGW 13:14 that the reason Jews rest on the Sabbath is because of God's resting after the act of creation. Discussions of the Jewish observance of the Sabbath are likewise found in Islamic sources.

I could continue cataloguing the Jewish and Islamic parallels to ŠGW Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen. However, merely listing parallels ignores an important distinction that will help answer the question of the ŠGW's Islamic-Jewish syncretism and is a central concern of this dissertation. This is the distinction between the sources of the citations in these two chapters of the ŠGW and their literary character. The existence of Islamic or Jewish (or other) parallels to the citations, arguments, and other statements in Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen does not determine the object of the critique or the author's method of argument. The difference between ŠGW Chapters Eleven and Twelve on the one hand and Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen on the other can only be determined by the literary character of the text itself and not by extra-textual factors. In other words, where the critique in these chapters (seems to) come from has not much to say about what it is.

On these grounds, there are elements of the literary character of the critique in Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen that justify distinguishing it from the preceding two chapters and treating the two as different polemics aimed at different objects. In arguing that the two sections should be distinguished I do not mean to imply that there is an impermeable boundary between Chapters Eleven and Twelve on the one hand and Thirteen and Fourteen on the other. The approach of this dissertation is based on the idea that they are connected, in so far as both sections serve the larger polemical, theological, and literary goals of the ŠGW as a whole. However, like the chapters devoted to Manichaeism and Christianity, connected is not the same as indistinguishable or aimed at the same object.

First of all, Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen are distinguished as a separate unit by indicators in the text itself. Chapter Twelve ends with a coda stating that the chapter or section (dar) is finished (sīhast) and Chapter Thirteen opens with and introduces a new topic, that of the First Scripture. The first word of Chapter Thirteen, Pazand diṯ, meaning "again," "then" or "further," is translated appropriately by de Menasce as de nouveau to mark the


110. ŠGW 11:82.


beginning of a new section. Chapter Fourteen opens with a reference to the contents of the same First Scripture (niβ̄) that is the topic in Chapter Thirteen\(^{113}\) and ends with a conclusion that summarizes the critiques of the citations that had come before. This is the coda, mentioned above, identifying the God depicted in the citations with Ahriman, the Evil Spirit.\(^{114}\) The final verse of the chapter states that it is completed (bunda).\(^{115}\)

The style of the two sections also distinguishes one from the other. Chapters Eleven and Twelve attack many of the same points which are raised in Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen. Both set out to prove the unsuitability of the monotheistic position and the first section states explicitly that it is addressing those who claim that one God is the author of both good and evil.\(^{116}\) What distinguishes the two is style. Chapters Eleven and Twelve present arguments against a range of monotheistic beliefs drawn from a variety of sources, some of which are indicated and some of which remain anonymous. Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen, on the other hand, are focused on the First Scripture. Though many of the same objections to the monotheistic position are raised, such as the one God's responsibility for both good and evil, in Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen these objections are couched as interpretations of the citations in the First Scripture.

The question of style is connected to a further issue. This is the different objects of the two sections. As mentioned above, Chapters Eleven and Twelve are devoted to raising objections to monotheistic theology; as de Menasce has pointed out in his notes to these two chapters, much of the theology that is discussed has parallels in contemporary Islamic theological writings.\(^{117}\) The object of chapters Thirteen and Fourteen, in contrast, is the First Scripture and the depictions of the one God found therein.

This raises, however, a further question. Is the critique of the First Scripture an end in itself or is the critique of the First Scripture a means of critiquing Judaism? Are Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen, like the other polemical chapters of the ŠGW, directed against a rival faith or is the object of their critique the book itself?

While I hope to have demonstrated that Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen do constitute a separate section distinguished from the polemic in the two preceding chapters of the ŠGW, the true object of the polemic in Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen is difficult to determine. On the one hand, Jews are mentioned as Sabbath observers in Chapter Thirteen. Jews and Judaism are also mentioned in Chapter Fifteen's critique of Christianity. ŠGW 15:5 refers to Jerusalem as the country of the Jews (dōḥ oẓ hām zuhūdq) and 15:76 to the Christians' claim that the Jews were responsible for Jesus' death. This same theme returns in 15:119, when Jesus is quoted as saying that the Jews come from the race of Abraham, who was himself a murderer—a reference to the story of the near sacrifice of Isaac from Genesis 21.\(^{118}\) At the end of the chapter at 15:141, he quotes Jesus as calling the Jews serpents of Mount Judah, or, perhaps, the Jewish mountain\(^{119}\) and refers to the law (dāt) of Moses.\(^{120}\) Finally, the polemics

\(^{113}ŠGW 14:1.\)

\(^{114}ŠGW 14:82-86.\)

\(^{115}ŠGW 14:87.\)

\(^{116}ŠGW 11:3-5.\)

\(^{117}De Menasce, Apologétique, 121-73.\)

\(^{118}vaš īncu guft ku dānom ku šumā oẓ tuxm i abrāḥīm hēṭ q i oẓ pāsh mardum aḇāzāṭ būṭ.\) De Menasce, Apologétique, 224 compares this passage with John 8:37.

\(^{119}vaš ḏiṯ zuhū-da mār i kōḥi zuhū-da q̄ad.\) On this section, see the discussion in Chapter Four.
in the *Dēnkard*, a text Mardānfarrox mentions as one of his inspirations and sources in composing the ŠGW, also takes Judaism as its object and refers to Jewish beliefs and practices.\(^{121}\)

Taken together, these references to Jews and Judaism could indicate that Judaism is understood in the ŠGW to be a separate religion that would deserve a critique of its own. In this light, the critique in Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen focuses on the First Scripture, implicitly connected with Jews through its ascription to Moses, as a means to attack the religion that holds this scripture as its most sacred inheritance.

On the other hand, the First Scripture is never explicitly identified as the scripture of the Jews and Judaism in the critique of Christianity need not be connected in this way with the citations in the earlier chapters. Furthermore, critiques of the Old Testament as such were well known in this period and, possibly, also known to Mardānfarrox. As I will discuss further in the body of the dissertation itself and as other scholars have pointed out, Mardānfarrox's critique of the First Scripture is very similar to the third century dualist Christian Marcion of Sinope's critique of the Old Testament. Some of Mardānfarrox's near contemporaries, such as the ninth century Jewish rationalist Ḥīwī al-Balkhī,\(^ {122} \) who wrote his own critique listing the contradictions contained in the Hebrew Bible, and his contemporary Abū Ṣā al-Warrāq, have been identified by scholars as Marcionites.\(^ {123} \)

Abū Ḥasan al-Warrāq has also been identified by others as a Manichaean,\(^ {124} \) as have other prominent writers and theologians such as the eighth century translator Abū Moḥammad ʿAbd-Allāh Rūzbeh ibn al-Muʿaqfā\(^ {125} \) or the ninth century Abū al-Ḥusayn Aḥmad b. Yahyā b. Ishqā al-Rawandi.\(^ {126} \) Manichaeans, like Marcionites, engaged in critiques of the Bible that resemble Mardānfarrox's; some of the evidence for Manichaean critiques is found in St. Augustine of Hippo's refutations of their arguments.\(^ {127} \) Werner Sundermann has argued that Mardānfarrox demonstrates good knowledge of Manichaean theology and terminology.\(^ {128} \) Given this connection, it could be argued that Mardānfarrox wrote Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen of the ŠGW as a critique of the Old Testament after a Manichaean model.

While evidence can be adduced for both sides of this argument, in the end the precise object of the ŠGW's critique in these two chapters can remain unresolved. In any case, the two options are not diametrically opposed. When critiquing Jews and Judaism, it would seem impossible to avoid the issue of the scripture that the Jews hold dear, just as when critiquing the Old Testament one cannot but refer to the people who revere that text. For the

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121. These polemics are discussed in Chapter Five.
122. On Ḥīwī, see below.
127. On Augustine and Manichaean critiques of Genesis, see Chapter Four.
128. Sundermann, "Manichäerkapitel."
sake of convenience, in what follows I will refer to these two chapters as the critique of Judaism.

Scholarship on the Critique of Judaism

In the previous section, I emphasized the importance of considering the literary structure of the ŠGW as a tool for the analysis of the critique of Judaism. I will expand on this methodology in more detail below. First, however, I will discuss earlier scholars' approaches to the ŠGW and the critique of Judaism.

Previous studies of the ŠGW's critique of Judaism share a common feature. What all these studies have in common is their concentration on the critique of Judaism as a link to a universe outside the text and outside Zoroastrianism. Scholars have been interested, almost exclusively, in the sources of the critique of Judaism, to the exclusion of discussions of the content of the critique itself, its theological stake, and literary structure.

Previous scholarship on the critique of Judaism falls generally into two types: translations of the text and studies of its content. However, as most translations that include discussions of content and studies also include original translation, both types will be considered together. Aside from general discussions of the critique of Judaism in surveys of Pahlavi literature, we can begin with the work of Edward William West. Even before publishing his critical edition of the ŠGW, West produced an English translation of the entire book, including, of course, Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen, for the series Sacred Books of the East. West notes some of the parallel passages for the citations in the critique noted above but, on the whole, his translation has been surpassed by later work.

Only two years after the publication of the Jamasp-Asana and West edition, James Darmesteter produced a translation of the critique of Judaism as part one of a two-part article on Pahlavi texts that refer to Judaism. Much more familiar with Jewish literature than West, Darmesteter notes a number of parallels between the citations in the ŠGW and rabbinic literature. In his introduction he raises the possibility that Mardânfarrox had access to a Pahlavi translation of the Bible, a theme that recurs in the scholarship on the ŠGW. However, Darmesteter refrains from an analysis of the text.

Building on Darmesteter's work, in 1906 Louis Gray published an article on the references to Judaism in Pahlavi literature which devotes considerable space to the ŠGW. Gray

129. West, "Literature", 106-107; Tavadia, Die mittelpersische Sprache und Literatur, 92-97; Boyce, "Literature," 46-47; de Menasce, "Literature after the Conquest," 561-65; Cereti, La letteratura pahlavi, 85; Macuch, "Pahlavi Literature," 149-50. I have also not included in this survey a few of the additional works which, being mainly derivative of the texts discussed, do not add new insights. Among these are Sadeq Hedayat, Gozareš-e goşan šekan (Tehran: 1943), a Persian translation by the modern novelist; Parvin Shakiba, Gozareš-e goşan šekan : šarh va tarjumah-e matn-e Pâzand Șkvand Gumânîg Wizâr: asar-e Mardân Farrukh pisar-e Urmazdâdâd (Champaign, IL: 2001), a recent Persian translation; and Bâghbidi, "Linguistic Peculiarities" which reproduces West's English translation.


includes a synopsis of the content of the critique of Judaism and discusses and rejects the possibility that Mardānfarrox used a Pahlavi translation of the Bible. As proof, Gray cites the differences between the ŠGW's citations and their supposed parallels, in particular in the verses parallel to sources in Genesis. On the basis of the ŠGW's statement that the serpent was punished by having his feet cut off, a Midrash also attested in the Aramaic targum, Gray concludes that Mardānfarrox was working from a source ultimately derived from the Aramaic translation. Gray also mentions the parallels between the longer narratives in Chapter Fourteen and rabbinc literature.

The critical edition and translation of the ŠGW by Jean de Menasce, which serves as the current standard, includes a new translation, introduction, and notes to the critique of Judaism. De Menasce, born and raised in a Jewish family in Alexandria and active in the Zionist movement before converting to Catholicism in 1926, brings his knowledge of Judaism and Islam to bear on these chapters of the ŠGW. In his introduction to Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen, de Menasce situates the critique of Judaism within the relevant historical and literary contexts; in these few pages, he establishes the guidelines for subsequent research on the ŠGW's critique, including this dissertation. First, de Menasce places the critique of Judaism in the context of the history of Jews in the Sasanian period, polemics against Judaism from other Pahlavi texts—including the Dēnkard, sections of which were translated previously by Darmesteter—and Judeo-Persian literature, which de Menasce speculates might have existed already under the Sasanians. De Menasce then discusses the possibility of Sasanian Pahlavi translations of the Bible, the citations' resemblance to Aramaic and


134. See further discussion in Chapter Four.

135. For more information on de Menasce's biography, see Michel Dousse and Jean-Michel Roessli, Jean de Menasce (1902-1973) (Bibliothèque cantonale et universitaire Fribourg [Suisse]: 1998).


138. As he notes, the twelfth century scholar Maimonides in his Yemen Epistle (Iggeret Teiman) refers to a pre-Islamic Persian translation of the Bible. Among the documents discovered near the oasis of Turfan in present-day Chinese Turkestan is a Christian translation into Pahlavi of the Syriac version of Psalms, dated to the sixth or seventh century. See F. C. Andreas and Kaj Barr, eds. and trans., Bruchstücke einer Pehlevi-Übersetzung der Psalmen (Berlin: Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1933). However, Martin Schwartz notes that this text, along with a Sogdian Christian Psalter and Early New Persian translation of Psalms in the Estrangelo script, attest to the importance of reading or reciting Psalms, not, necessarily, to the existence of translations of the Bible. See Martin Schwartz, "Sogdian Fragments of the Book of Psalms," Alterorientalische Forschungen 1 (1974), 257-61 and Nicholas Sims-Williams, "Die christlich - sogdischen Handschriften von Bulayiq," in Ägypten - Vorderasien - Turfan. Probleme der Edition und Bearbeitung alterorientalischer Handschriften, edited by Horst Klengel and Werner Sundermann,
Syriac translations, and the possibility that Mardanfarrox acquired his knowledge of Judaism through Christian or Muslim intermediaries. De Menasce summarizes the preceding discussion with the statement that, given the various possible means of transmission of Jewish material, it is impossible to identify the immediate sources of the citations in Mardanfarrox's critique; as we shall see, this cogent observation has been passed over by later scholarship. Finally, de Menasce turns to the potential repercussions of the ŠGW's critique on Judaism, in particular that of Ḥīwarī al-Balkhī.

In his notes, de Menasce adheres to the program laid out in his introduction. In addition to philological comments on the text itself, he not only records parallels to the citations found in Jewish literature, reproducing most of the references noted by Darmesteter, but also provides references to parallel passages in Christian, Islamic, and Manichaean literature.

Jacob Neusner's translation and notes on the critique of Judaism have been published twice. The first study includes a new English translation, based largely on de Menasce and prepared, as Neusner states, in consultation with Richard Frye of Harvard University. The translation includes some philological notes, in particular on the word ḥāṯ that Mardanfarrox claims is the name of the Jewish scripture. As Shaul Shaked remarked, several of Neusner's suggestions "cannot be commended as a model of erudition." In addition, Neusner includes in his notes references to parallels to the citations in the Bible and rabbinic literature, adding and emending the suggestions made by Darmesteter, Gray, and de Menasce. The usefulness of Neusner's work, however, lies not in his philological contributions—trained as a historian of Judaism, his mistakes in Iranian philology are not surprising—but in that he is the first scholar to seriously consider the structure of Mardanfarrox's arguments. In an appendix to his article, referred to as the "exposition," Neusner repeats Mardanfarrox's arguments against Judaism step by step. However, Neusner does not address the question of the underlying structure of the critique of Judaism, its literary characteristics or its connection to the rest of the ŠGW. The only exception is a passing mention to the fact that while Chapter Thirteen is focused on "the metaphysical foundations of Judaism," Chapter Fourteen sets out to prove the connection between Judaism and Ahriman. Neusner, however, does not develop this insight further. In an article that appeared three years later, Neusner argues for the existence, based on the evidence of rabbinic literature, for a Pahlavi Bible translation that might have been available to Mardanfarrox and provides further Talmudic parallels to the ŠGW's angelic citations. These two articles were combined and republished as an appendix to Neusner's History of the Jews in Babylonia.

Shaul Shaked refers briefly to the ŠGW in an article mentioned above on Zoroastrian anti-Jewish polemics. While mostly focusing on the Dēnkard, Shaked devotes one paragraph to the ŠGW. He states that, unlike most Pahlavi polemical literature, which place Judaism

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141. See ŠGW 13:2 and the discussion in the notes to my translation in Appendix One.
within the conceptual framework of Zoroastrianism, the ŠGW "represents direct confrontation," in other words face-to-face disputations, between Jews and Zoroastrians. While I will rely on Shaked's insights regarding the Dēnkard's polemics later in this dissertation, I will dispute his reconstruction of the ŠGW's polemical context. Not only does the text itself explicitly say that it is responding to a written work (the First Scripture) but, as I hope to show, the critique of Judaism is certainly enmeshed within the ŠGW's conceptual framework.

Dan Shapira presented an interesting new perspective on the ŠGW in a 2001 article. He provides new translations and philological analysis of selected passages, which, for the sake of convenience, he renders in Pahlavi transcription. Focusing on the account of hexameral creation (13:5-14) and God's declaration of his vengefulness (14:5-8), Shapira compares these citations with their biblical parallels in Hebrew as well as in Aramaic and Greek translation. He also discusses the versions found in Judeo-Persian Bible translations. Based on these comparisons, Shapira concludes that Mardānfarox likely did use a Middle Persian translation of the Bible in his critique of Judaism and, furthermore, that there is continuity between the language of the citations in the ŠGW and translations of parallel passages in later Judeo-Persian Bibles. Though I disagree with Shapira's conclusions regarding the existence of a Middle Persian Bible as the basis for the ŠGW, I will make use of Shapira's philological insights.

In addition to these discussions of the critique itself, which on the whole focus on the question of the ŠGW's relation to earlier Jewish literature, other scholars have examined the relationship between the ŠGW and later texts. David Halperin and Gordon Newby have explored the ŠGW's relationship to statements attributed to Jewish converts to Islam in hadith literature. Specifically, they focus on a citation at ŠGW 14:39 attributed to an unnamed group (han grōḥā) that at the end of days God will cast the sun and moon to Hell because they were worshiped by human beings. While there are several passages in rabbinic literature which express similar sentiments, the closest parallel is a tradition attributed to Kaʿb al-ʾAḥbār, an early Jewish convert to Islam, included in Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī's universal history. In the tradition, an anonymous informant told Ibn ʿAbbās, another early

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tradent, that Ka’b had said that at the end of days the sun and moon would be cast into Hell like two castrated bulls. Ibn ‘Abbás vehemently rejects this notion and identifies Ka’b’s statement as Jewish. Rather than arguing that the ŠGW is dependent on the Islamic text or vice-versa, Halperin and Newby argue that both texts are drawing from a non-rabbinic Jewish source. They go on to argue that this source is "akin, if not identical, to that which produced the Enoch literature." Essentially, the ŠGW serves here as an independent confirmation of the Jewish origin of Ka’b’s statement.

Other scholars have connected the ŠGW’s critique of Judaism to the writing of the Jewish rationalist Ḥiwi al-Balkhī. A ninth century contemporary of Mardānfarrox, he composed a list of two hundred contradictions and inconsistencies in the Bible. The list, which is lost but for a small fragment recovered from the Cairo Geniza, was refuted by the rabbinic authority and philosopher Saadia Gaon (c. 882-942) as well as by other scholars, both Karaite and Rabbanite. From the polemics against him, Judah Rosenthal reconstructed the contents of Ḥiwi’s polemic and noted a number of parallels between his and the ŠGW’s critiques. On this basis of these parallels and allusions in later Jewish writers, Rosenthal raises the possibility that the ŠGW could be the source of Ḥiwi’s critiques. However, Rosenthal also notes that the ŠGW, Ḥiwi, Islamic rationalists, and others who criticized Jewish theology and the Hebrew Bible in particular were drawing on earlier "gnostic" critiques.

Rosenthal’s and others’ reference to the earlier roots of Ḥiwi’s critiques and the ŠGW are instructive in interpreting the theological genealogy of the critique of Judaism. However, from a methodological standpoint, this study too locates the true source or meaning of the critique of Judaism outside the text itself. While Rosenthal, like Halperin and Newby, locate the origins of ŠGW in later texts, like the other studies mentioned above they are concentrated on the sources of the critique of Judaism. Especially in their reading of the citations, previous scholars have seen these passages as essentially alien elements in the ŠGW; their project is locating the citations’ true context, elsewhere. That elsewhere is variously identified, depending on the citation and the scholar’s perspective, as the Hebrew Bible, rabbinic literature, Early Judeo-Persian translations, Islamic or Christian treatises, or Enochic mystical tracts. Rosenthal’s discussion of Ḥiwi locates Mardānfarrox’s critique itself elsewhere, in anti-Jewish writings from late antiquity and before; nothing, as he says was forgotten or lost. With the exception of de Menasce, the only modern scholar who considered the

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159. In particular, Stern’s suggestion that Ḥiwi was a Marcionite is fascinating in light of the Marcionite connections with the critique of Judaism adduced below. See Menahem Stern, "Ḥiwi al-Balkhi Markion ha-Yehudi," in *Sefer Klozner*, ed. N. H. Tur-Sinai, et al. (Tel Aviv: Va’ad ha-Yovel, 1937), 210-25.
critique in the context of the work as a whole, scholars have looked to the citations as if they are not constrained, determined by or interacting with their context in the ŠGW.

**Critique, Citation, Context**

This dissertation takes a new approach to the critique of Judaism, engaging in a reading of the critique of Judaism that emphasizes the connections between the critique and its immediate context. I will argue that both the citations from the First Scripture and Mardanfarrox's arguments against those citations should be understood in light of the larger polemical, theological, and literary goals of the ŠGW as a whole.

This argument will proceed on two fronts. First of all, I will engage with the question of the ŠGW's relationship to Jewish literature. Previous scholars have seen in the parallels between the citations in the critique of Judaism and passages from the Bible and rabbinic literature evidence of Mardanfarrox's borrowing from these Jewish works. In this dissertation, I will employ a new methodological paradigm, that of Michel Foucault's concept of genealogy. As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter Two, in Foucault's formulation, genealogy argues for inverting the model of influence, according to which one event or phenomenon—in this case one body of literature—has multiple effects or outcomes. A genealogical approach instead seeks to investigate the multiple determining elements, the ancestors, of any particular event or, as here, any particular text.¹⁶⁰ A genealogical approach has been applied fruitfully to a similar problem, that of the relationship between the Qur'ān and Jewish literature, and I will draw on the insights of scholars in that field.

This genealogical approach will serve my overall argument, articulated most comprehensively in Chapters Two and Three, that the ŠGW's critique of Judaism does not draw solely or directly on Jewish sources but rather on a wider, probably oral nexus of traditions about the biblical patriarchs and the Children of Israel. Decoupling the citations in the critique of Judaism from their parallels in Jewish literature opens the possibility for reading the citations in their context in the ŠGW. The quotation of or allusion to a specific text is not mutually exclusive, of course, with the contextualization of those allusions. In other words, one can imagine that the ŠGW's citations could be both copied or borrowed from the Hebrew Bible, for example, as well as molded to fit the ŠGW's own context and concerns. However, emphasizing the multiple and unrecoverable determining elements that lie behind the critique of Judaism's citations, in addition to presenting a more nuanced model of the relationship between Jewish literature and those citations, means that the best context for interpreting the critique of Judaism is in its context in the ŠGW itself.

This new approach to the ŠGW's sources is signaled by the term I have chosen for the passages from the First Scripture that appear in the critique of Judaism: citation. This term, which I will use to refer to these passages from the First Scripture throughout this disserta-

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tion, embodies the complex relationship between parallels in literature, in particular where one text seems to or claims to be quoting another. Even as citation marks a connection between two texts, literary theorists have also identified the disjunctive functions of citation. Citation, these theorists have argued, is a process of alienation. By transplanting a section of a text to a new context, the original meaning of that passage is unsettled. While the passage in question gains a new meaning in its new context, this process of decontextualization and recontextualization is an inherent part of the process of citation.\textsuperscript{161} In referring to the critique of Judaism's passages in the ŠGW as "citations," I am evoking this process.

If the objective of the first front of this dissertation is demonstrating a more nuanced connection between Jewish literature and the ŠGW than that which previous scholars have seen, the objective of the second front is demonstrating the critique of Judaism's contextualization within the ŠGW. My main method of demonstrating this contextualization is pointing out literary connections between citations within the critique of Judaism and between the critique of Judaism and the rest of the ŠGW. I will do so through an examination of recurring motifs in the ŠGW. Borrowing the convenient definition of William Freedman, a motif can be a recurring theme, character, or verbal pattern within a literary work, or an "associational cluster of literal or figurative references to a given class of concepts or objects,"\textsuperscript{162} for example, animals, machines, music, etc. A motif is generally symbolic, carrying a meaning beyond its apparent or literal sense, and it requires a minimal frequency of repetition and improbability of appearance to make its presence felt, at least subconsciously.\textsuperscript{163}

As I hope to demonstrate in the arguments that make up the body of this dissertation, the motifs I identify in the ŠGW fit the definition outlined above. The motifs I will discuss are distinguished by their recurring on three different orders of magnitude. Chapter Three concerns a motif of angels that connects three of the citations in the critique of Judaism. Chapter Four focuses on a motif of gardens that is found in citations in the critiques of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity, as well as in the apologetic exposition of Zoroastrian theology in the first half of the ŠGW. The final motif, discussed in Chapter Five, is the motif of the sacred text as a source of authority. This motif, of which all of the citations in the critique of Judaism have a part, is connected with Mardānfarrox's numerous references to the Dēnkard as an authoritative text that shaped his own theology and spiritual identity. My goal in identifying and analyzing these motifs is not only to point to the connection between the citations in the critique of Judaism and the rest of the ŠGW. I also aim to show how these recurring motifs buttress the ŠGW's explicit theological arguments for Zoroastrianism and against monotheism and the First Scripture.

This method of reading a theological or philosophical text for its literary texture and understanding the theological or philosophical important of that texture is borrowed from studies of Plato's dialogues, in particular the Republic. The study of the philosophical import of the literary elements in Plato's work—the introduction in which Socrates describes going down from Athens to Piraeus, the port, where he meets Adeimantus and Glaucon (327a-328b); the character of these and the other interlocutors with whom Socrates conducts

\textsuperscript{161}See especially Georgio Agamben, The Man Without Content, trans. Georgia Albert (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) and the sources quoted there.


his conversation; and other elements—is indebted to the work of Leo Strauss. Strauss argues that these and other literary features of the *Republic* are not window dressing or background color but crucial information in interpreting the dialogue and unearthing Plato's intention. In the context of Strauss' reading of Plato (and others), "unearthing" is an appropriate term. As Strauss lays out most explicitly elsewhere, he understands Plato to be what G. R. F. Ferrari calls a "politic philosopher."165 Wary of the damage that his true theories might cause to a less than sufficiently intelligent and subtle reader—not to mention what Plato himself might suffer, like Socrates, were the authorities to discover his true notions—Strauss argues that philosophers like Plato hid their real intentions in such a way that only the most careful and dedicated readers, philosophers themselves, could discover them.166

Strauss' theories have been both influential and contentious in the scholarship on Plato's dialogues. One of their effects, though, has been to lead scholars to explore the connection between the literary and philosophical aspects of his work. My own method of reading the connection between—in the ŠGW's case—theological argument and literary structure is influenced in particular by the work of David K. O'Connor. In an article included in the *Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic*, O'Connor demonstrates how Plato recasts two well-known myths in the *Republic*: Homer's account of Odysseus' descent to the underworld in *Odyssey* Book 11 and Hesiod's story of Cronus and the races of metals in *Works and Days* 109-201. In the case of the descent to the underworld, O'Connor identifies widely separated references to the motif of descent and ascent, including the famous analogy of the cave (514a-518c) and the account of Socrates' descent to the Piraeus that opens the book. He argues that these instances of the motif are linked to the mythic substrate through shared key terms, common elements and references to Homer's text. O'Connor puts these allusions to the myth in dialogue with, among other themes, the *Republic*’s explicit denouncement of poetry and the banishing of poets from the ideal city (376d-398b).167

In the case of the ŠGW, my goal in exploring the interplay between literary form and theological argument is not to expose the complex relationship between Mardānfarrox's explicit statements and his form. Though this too is a worthy aim, in this dissertation I have a much more modest objective: to show the underlying unity of what seems on the surface to be a divided text. Mardānfarrox gives no justification for why the citations in the critique of Judaism appear in the order they do or what logic justifies certain passages being the objects of critique as opposed to others. The same is true, on a larger scale, of the various polemical chapters. The ŠGW never explains the relationship among the different polemics nor between the polemics and the apologetics at the beginning of the book. These motifs show the underlying connection between these various parts of the work.

In this focus on the literary character of the ŠGW's critique of Judaism, I am not denying that the critique is rooted in some historical reality of engagement between Jews and Zoroastrians. However, I see this engagement not on the level of Mardānfarrox's reading of texts but on the level of the construction of what Jeremy Cohen referred to in the Christian

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context as a "hermeneutical Jew." There as here, the construction of this rhetorical figure is based in a historical encounter with the rival faith. In the case of Christianity, encounters between communities of Jews and Christians occurred throughout late antiquity and the Early Middle Ages. In the case of Zoroastrianism, though, the encounter is less dramatic and less defining. Jews living in Mesopotamia were ruled by and lived with people practicing some form of the Iranian religion for thousands of years. As recent research has shown, the Babylonian Talmud provides evidence of especially close connections between Jews and Zoroastrians during the Sasanian period. The Talmud evinces connections between the rabbinic community and Zoroastrianism on the levels of language, law, hermeneutics, theology, and culture. This longstanding encounter, the possibility of coming to know Jews and their religion, underlies Pahlavi literature's anti-Jewish tradition centuries after the disappearance of the social setting in which it flourished. The image of the hermeneutical Jew, which entailed descriptions of Jewish practices, citations or pseudo-citations of their texts, and collective memories of Jews' roles in Iranian national history—all of which are alluded to in various Pahlavi texts—had already been fixed in the Zoroastrian constellation, as one of the dark stars against which Zoroastrianism oriented itself. Within the limited scope of the ŠGW, this dissertation will show how Judaism and its critique integrate with Zoroastrian theology.

Outline of the Chapters

Chapter Two will further address in more detail the question of influence and the scholarly search for the origins of the citations in the critique of Judaism in Jewish literature. Focusing on a citation in ŠGW 14:40-50 that parallels the annunciation of the birth of Isaac in Genesis 18, the chapter will analyze the two midrashic passages scholars have identified as the sources of the citation. After first questioning the search for origins in general on methodological and historical grounds, the chapter will demonstrate that while the ŠGW's citation and the passages from the Midrash are similar on the surface, the differences between them are significant enough to cast doubt on the theory that Mardānfarrox drew on these passages directly or indirectly. Instead of a search for origins, the chapter advocates a genealogical approach and proposes four alternate elements of the genealogy of the citation, drawn from Islamic, Manichaean, Mandaean, and Armenian traditions.

Chapter Three continues the critique of origins begun in Chapter Two. However, rather than addressing Jewish literature in general as the source of the ŠGW's citations, the chapter focuses on the connection between the ŠGW and the Babylonian Talmud. Recent scholarship has demonstrated the connection between rabbinic Judaism and Zoroastrianism in the Sasanian period. Taking this closeness as a starting point, the chapter considers three angelic citations that are all closely paralleled by passages in the Babylonian Talmud. After demonstrating that the ŠGW citations depict angels as weaker and more oppressed than their rabbinic parallels, the chapter sets these portrayals of weakened angels in the context of the widespread belief in an angelic coequal to the divine among Jews in late antiquity and the

169. I do not mean to imply that the boundaries between Jews and Christians were fixed already during the life of Jesus. On this point, see further the discussion in Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
170. See the discussion and references to scholarly literature in Chapter Three.
Early Islamic period. The chapter argues that the ŠGW's depiction of downtrodden angels is not borrowed from rabbinic polemics against "two powers in heaven" theology, but from the ŠGW's theological imperative to portray Judaism as radically monotheistic and thus the binary opposite of Zoroastrianism.

While Chapter Three investigates a motif that links a number of citations in the critique, Chapter Four discusses a more widespread motif of gardens that can be found in the polemics against Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, as well as in an exposition of Zoroastrian theology in the first half of the ŠGW. The chapter first identifies these garden passages, demonstrates the connections between them and discusses how a single narrative underlies all the linked passages. The chapter then turns to the question of why gardens served as a fruitful site to demonstrate the errors of monotheism. The chapter proposes that the role of gardens in Iranian culture, as symbols for justice, order, rule, and royal power, underlies the reversal of the garden in the polemical chapters.

Chapter Five considers the critique of Judaism's relationship to another Pahlavi text. This is the Third Book of the Dēnkard, in particular the passages polemicizing against Judaism in that work. The chapter first discusses the many connections between the ŠGW and the Dēnkard in general, chief among them that the ŠGW refers to the Dēnkard as its explicit source. Next, the chapter compares the two critiques of Judaism. While the two critiques are similar on many points, the chapter identifies a fundamental difference between them: whereas the Dēnkard attacks Judaism as a religion, the object of the ŠGW's critique is the Jewish text, the First Scripture. The chapter considers some of the epistemological and literary implications of this transformation of Judaism into a written text. The chapter argues that the ŠGW constructs the object of its critique as a written text in order to match the textuality of Zoroastrianism itself in Mardānfarrox's work.

The dissertation concludes with three appendixes. Appendix One is a new translation of ŠGW Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen that includes philological notes and references to parallels in other literature. Appendix Two, connected to Chapter Four, is a discussion of the word angōšidāa, meaning "likeness" or "similarity," and its use as a technical term in the ŠGW. Appendix Three is an annotated list of all known manuscripts of the ŠGW.
Chapter Two:

The Genealogy of Abraham:
The Critique of Judaism Beyond Jewish Sources

Confronted with citations claiming to be from a Jewish text, citations which, moreover, do resemble, to greater or lesser degrees, passages familiar from biblical and rabbinic literature, scholars have set themselves the task of identifying the citations' Jewish sources. If Mardānfarrox is critiquing a Jewish text, then it would seem obvious to assume that he somehow had access to Jewish texts; uncovering his sources would then be a task of perusing the Bible and rabbinic literature to find the similar, original passages Mardānfarrox must have read or heard. As discussed in the introduction, in previous studies of the ŠGW's critique of Judaism most effort and ingenuity has been put into a secondary and subsequent project, namely speculating about the means by which the stories and maxims (once identified) traveled from their Jewish origins to the Zoroastrian polemic. Scholars have postulated, for example, the existence of Sasanian Judeo-Persian or Pahlavi Bible translations\(^1\) and the preservation of Sasanian era court polemics against Judaism.\(^2\)

However, the aspect of the citations which this approach takes to be the simplest, their Jewish origin, is, actually, the most complex. The citations, both those which parallel biblical passages and those similar to texts from rabbinic literature, need not necessarily relate—directly, ultimately, or through some intermediary—to either of these canonical Jewish works. As I will attempt to demonstrate in this chapter, the scholarly presumption of the citations' dependence on or influence by these Jewish works is, at best, inconclusive. I hope to prove this point through a reading of one of the longer citations, the story of Ādīnūs's hospitable visit to Abrāhīm\(^3\) at ŠGW 14:40-50. In my examination of the passage I will identify some of the alternate traditions with which this story might be in conversation.

My point here is not to deny that the ŠGW could or might be related to the biblical and rabbinic sources that have come down to us. I also am not interested in replacing one textual origin with another, for instance, the Babylonian Talmud with Tābarī's Ṭafsīr. Rather, my argument is that the search for origins itself is, in the case of the ŠGW's critique of Judaism, a misguided endeavor. The Bible and Midrash make up two of the many potential sources—both oral and written, known and unknown—of the stories and statements in the ŠGW's critique. Ultimately, my goal in this chapter is to justify an interrogation of the citations which dispenses with the question of origins; I am interested in the critique of Judaism not as a copy of an absent original but in its own context within the literary and theological circumference of Mardānfarrox's work.

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1. Shapira, "Biblical Quotations."
3. In what follows I will distinguish between the citation from the ŠGW and parallel versions of this narrative through the use of different names. Abrāhīm, as the name appears in the ŠGW citation, will be used in reference to the ŠGW's account while Abraham will be used in reference to Jewish and Islamic parallels. The forms of the name Abraham which appear in Pahlavi literature (see de Menasce, *Apologétique*, 225) resemble the Arabic ʾIbrāhīm rather than Hebrew ʾAvraham. According to Josef Horovitz, "Jewish Proper Names and Derivatives in the Koran," *HUCA* 2 (1925): 160 suggests that Arabic ʾIbrāhīm was formed on the basis of comparison with Ismāʾīl.
As mentioned above, I will demonstrate this point through a close reading of the story of Abrahām's hospitality. After first considering the biblical and rabbinic passages scholars have identified as the sources of the citation, I will compare the citation with four parallels found outside Jewish literature. Motifs and characters central to the story of Abrahām's hospitality can also be found in Islamic, Manichaean, Mandaic, and Armenian texts. I will consider each of these alternative sources in turn and, finally, return to the question of the undecidability of the critique of Judaism' origins.

Was hat Mardānfarrox aus dem Judenthume aufgenommen?

Before turning to the citation itself, however, I want to take up a parallel and better explored problem which can serve as a methodological guide. For the problem of the relationship between the ŠGW's critique of Judaism and Jewish literature can be profitably compared to the connected issue of the supposed Jewish origins of certain sections of the Qurʾān. The Qurʾān contains numerous passages, often referred to in current scholarly discourse as Isrāʾīliyyāt, which have parallels in Jewish, especially rabbinic texts. As has been widely discussed and critiqued, the regnant model for most of the history of the academic study of Islam in Europe and the Americas was one of influence. As is case with the ŠGW, scholars were concerned with tracing passages from Qurʾānic and other literature to their Jewish sources, even when those connections were less than self-evident. This singular focus on influence vastly underestimated the wealth of biblical traditions at large in late antiquity. As Michael Pregil artfully describes the situation in the context of Islam,

the biblical tradition was not primarily manifest as a single work, the "Hebrew Bible" or "Old Testament" in the sense of a closed and stable canon of written texts (although it was also sometimes this). Rather, when we speak of Late Antiquity, the period in which Islam emerged, "Bible" should evoke the image of a plurality of rich traditions, in multiple languages, oral and written, centering on documents transmitted over the course of a millennium that conveyed the authentic cultural and religious inheritance of ancient Israel, its legacy of monotheism, covenantalism, and prophecy, but that also included a dazzling variety of exegetical traditions that supplemented, supported, amended, and even perhaps at times subverted that legacy. The Torah could certainly be identified as a book per se, but it was much more frequently experienced as a practically fathomless sea of stories by Jews, Christians, Jewish Christians, Manichaens, and a host of other – sometimes nameless – scriptuaries.

Rephrasing Pregil's statement, we can say that this passage rejects the search for origins. As he rightly notes, there was no single, stable text, no Hebrew Bible, which lay at the root of the tree of interpretation and diffusion. Rather than using an image, such as that of a tree, that implies organized, linear and measurable growth and change, Pregil uses the metaphor of a sea, which is to say a fluid expanse, flowing, dynamic, and expansive. Who can say where the sea begins and ends? The boundaries between stories are fluid, which is to say that "the authentic cultural and religious inheritance of Ancient Israel" has no pride of place over the various other expansion and subversions. At the same time, the boundary between "scripturaries" is just as permeable. Pregil implies that there are no "authentic" people just as there are no "authentic" traditions.7

Pregil's approach—and the methodological perspective which underlies this chapter—can be understood in terms of Michel Foucault's discussion of genealogy. As Foucault argued, the practice of genealogy is to be distinguished by its opposition to the search for origins.8 The search for the origin assumes the existence of eternal, immobile entities, a primordial and unchanging truth. The scholar's task, in this model, is to peel back the layers concealing this metaphysical kernel. However, for the genealogist, there is no essence or what we now perceive as essential "was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms."9 Foucault argues that genealogy ruptures the myth of pristine origins, replacing it with lowly and derisive historical beginnings, with accidents, petty rivalries, and contradictory failures from which values, morality, sexuality, and truths ultimately derive. As he writes,

Let us say, roughly, that as opposed to a genesis oriented towards the unity of some principal cause burdened with multiple descendants, what is proposed here is a genealogy, that is, something that attempts to restore the conditions for the appearance of a singularity born out of multiple determining elements of which it is not the product, but rather the effect. A process of making it intelligible but with the clear understanding that this does not function according to any principle of closure.10

Foucault's definition of genealogy in the final sentence of the above quotation is a concise statement of the most fruitful method for situating the citations in the ŠGW's critique of Judaism, the method I have attempted to model in this chapter. This chapter's discussion of the various co-texts and parallel traditions, including but by no means limited to the biblical and rabbinic sources previous scholars have championed, should be understood precisely as aimed at making the conditions of the appearance of the ŠGW's story of Abrahām's hospitality intelligible but without claiming exhaustiveness or closure. As Foucault says, to a genealogist such a claim would be meaningless.

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8. Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History."
10. Foucault, "Critique," 64.
I find a genealogical approach, explicitly defined in those terms or not, conducive to the understanding of the critique of Judaism both because of that approach's methodological sophistication and because it fits the historical context of the ŠGW. The sea of stories Pregil mentions did not dry up with the coming of Islam. On the contrary, by Mardānfarrox's time—as discussed in the introduction, he can be dated around the mid-ninth century—the mixture had become considerably richer. To the factions and traditions he mentions should be added the Qur'ānic narratives in their canonical forms and the various expansions of and deviations from those stories. Moreover, orality remained the dominant vehicle for the transmission of tradition. In addition to the research demonstrating the continuity of and esteem for orality within scholastic circles in the early Islamic period in Judaism, Islam, and Zoroastrianism, the fluidity of traditions has been well documented. In the case of Islam and Judaism, for instance, alongside the "expected" flow of tradition from the older Judaism to younger Islam, it has also been shown that expansions of narratives about the Patriarchs and the Children of Israel that appeared first within an Islamic context travelled to Jewish midrashic works. A particularly enlightening parallel to the ŠGW's critique of Judaism comes from Islamic critiques of the Bible. The goal of these Islamic critiques is different than Mardānfarrox's in the ŠGW, as these texts seek to demonstrate, on the one hand, the corrupted—and, thus, delegitimizing—transmission of a once pure scripture and, on the other, to


14. See, again, Pregill, "Influence," 655: "At least in some cases, the seeming affinities between Jewish Midrash and the Qur'ān may be due to an ongoing dialogue over scriptural matters that took place in both communities in the medieval period, and not to Muhammad's unequivocal 'debt' to Jewish informants." The late rabbinic Midrash Pirke d'Rabbi Eliezer, for instance, includes references to members of the prophet Muhammad's family and a number of stories unknown from earlier midrashic collections. See Dina Stein, Maxims, Magic, Myth: A Folkloristic Perspective on Pirkei de Rabbi Eliezer (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2004), 5-8 and 167-168 and Carol Bakhos, Ishmael on the Border: Rabbinic Portrayals of the First Arab (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).

show that the Jewish Bible itself prefigures Muhammad's revelation. However, as Lazarus-Yafeh has shown, up until the thirteenth century it seems that Muslim authors—with the notable exception of converts from Judaism and Christianity—did not have access to the biblical text in its original or in Arabic translation. Rather,

in the Islamic literature of *Tales of the Prophets* (*Qisas al-ʾAnbiyāʾ*), which used most extensively Biblical and midrashic materials (*Isrāʾīliyyāt*), exact literal Biblical quotations are extremely rare. Free and inexact paraphrases usually transmit in this literature (as in the Qurʾān and early Ḥadīth literature) the Biblical, midrashic, and other material mixed up together without distinction, perhaps partially following an ancient *Targum*-like (oral?) source. . . Most Muslim authors seem to have relied mainly on oral transmission, and constantly quote as their sources of Biblical information Jews or early Jewish and Christian converts to Islam, like Kaʿb al-ʿAḥbār and Wahb b. Munabbih. Many Muslim scholars readily admitted to such contact with Jews and Christians in order to elucidate Qurʾānic passages touching on Biblical material, a procedure that was condemned by others. The fact that Jews usually felt no need to differentiate between the Biblical text and later midrashic elaborations on it, and would have found it almost impossible to translate literally the Biblical text alone for their Muslim neighbors, may help to explain the combined material "quoted" by Muslim medieval authors. Rather,

Whether or not the conversations between Jews and Muslim scholars depicted in this literature reflect more than the rehashing of a trope of the native informant—which, it should be said, appears in the ŠGW as well—it is clear that Mardānfarroxt’s critique is of the same type as these Muslim texts. There as here, from the perspective of the now closed and mutually distinct canons of Bible and Midrash, the First Scripture in the ŠGW’s critique of Judaism appears to be a hybrid. By hybrid, I mean that citations that look like close parallels of well-known Biblical verses sit alongside and are not distinguished from passages resembling texts known from rabbinic literature. In the same time and in the same place, the ŠGW and texts within Islamic literature are constructing "Jewish" traditions. Without advocating that Mardānfarrox borrowed directly from these (or other) Islamic sources—an argument which, again, would be simply an isomorph of the standard scholarly model seeking the origins of the critique of Judaism’s citations—it seems fair to say that the Muslim and Zoroastrian texts are, likely, drawing from the same shared oral nexus.

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18. Lazarus-Yafeh allows the possibility that at least some of the conversations with Jewish sources depicted in the literature are “imaginary.” This possibility softens her problematic extrapolation from Muslim authors’ reports to what their Jewish informants might have believed or said. See Lazarus-Yafeh, *Intertwined Worlds*, 82.
19. See ŠGW 10:43-44 and the discussion of this passage in Chapter Five.
Abraham and the Angels

The citation of the story of Abrāḥîm's hospitality that I will analyze in this chapter is found in the latter half of SGW Chapter Fourteen. After presenting a translation of the text as it appears in the SGW, I will discuss the two midrashic traditions which scholars have unanimously identified as the sources of the citation.

(40) han jā īncə gōt, ku ma mohādār20 abrāḥîm i dōst i ādīnō21 cašm dardihast, aš xāt ādīnō ŏ pursāšni maṭ, (41) vaš bālin22 nišast u drūṭ pursīt. (42) u abrāḥîm āsīnaa23 yaš zōšast24 pus pa niḥq ħānīt25 guft (43) ku "ō vahāšt šaḥ mae i xār26 u pāk āfār." (44) šuṭ vaš āfārd. (45) u abrāḥîm vaš xāhīšī ŏ ādīnō kard (46) ku "āndar mān i mān mae še27 xār." (47) ādīnō guft ku "nū ħārom cu nā až vahāšt u nā pāk." (48) pas abrāhīm guftārā dāt ku "pāk ā mae až vahāšt u āsīnaa yam pus āfārd." (49) pas ādīnō āfīgumānī yaš pa āsīnaa u guftār i pa abrāhīm rā28 mae še xār. (50) pas kaš raftān kāmāst nū hişt aندāš pa saštaganād i garān yik i dīt xār.

(40) It says this as well in that place, that when the aged Abrāḥîm, the friend of Ādīnō was pained in the eyes, then Ādīnō himself came to converse with him, (41) and sat on a cushion and asked him about his health. (42) And Abrāḥîm, secretly, calling his dearest son Āsīnaa said: (43) "Go to Heaven and

20. Compare with Manichaean Parthian ms'dr, meaning "greater," "older" or "of higher rank" (Mary Boyce, A Wordlist of Manichaean Middle Persian and Parthian [Leiden: Brill, 1977], 5) and "presbyter" (Durkin-Meisterernst, DMMPP, 232).
21. On the name Ādīnō see below.
23. On the name Āsīnaa see below.
24. This superlative form is cognate with Pahlavi dōšt, the verbal stem meaning "like" or "love" (MacKenzie, CPD, 27) and dōst, "friend" (MacKenzie, CPD, 26). In form, it is closest, however, to Parthian zvāš, meaning "love" (Durkin-Meisterernst, DMMPP, 386). On the etymology of this word see Johnny Cheung, Etymological Dictionary of the Iranian Verb (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 473. Sanskrit sahādāram, however, means "co-uterine," "born in the same womb," "closely resembling," or "similar" (Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899), 1195).
25. MSS. JJ and JE have xānīdān.
26. Pahlavi xwār means "light," "easy," "mean," "abject," or "pleasurable" (MacKenzie, CPD, 95); in Manichaean Parthian xw'r has the sense of "good days," "prosperity" and the abstract xw ryyh, "happiness" (Durkin-Meisterernst, DMMPP, 365). Compare also Sogdian xvy'r meaning "easy," "light" or "disrepute" (Badr al-Zaman Gharib, Sogdian Dictionary [Tehran: Farhangian Publications, 1995], 440). Nyberg proposes a derivation from xwār meaning "delightful" or "delicious," ultimately from Avestan xvaθra-, "comfort" (Henrik Samuel Nyberg, Manual of Pahlavi [Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1974], 2:220). Sanskrit pavitrataramca indicates "purity" or "cleanliness" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 611).
27. The word še has been variously interpreted, for instance, as a Pazand misunderstanding of the Middle Pahlavi ideogram ŠORN or ŠEU forjaw, meaning "barley" (de Menasce, Apologetique, 198) and as a Pazand misreading of Pahlavi gāh as Arabic šay—a plausible mistake given Pahlavi writing conventions—a supposition which relies on the Sanskrit translation as corrected by Jamasp-Asana and West, Shikand, 146 of kṣanena "a moment." (West, Pahlavi Texts Parts Three, 225, n. 6). A better understanding of this issue will have to await a new edition of the manuscripts.
28. MSS. omit.
bring light and pure wine." (44) He went and he brought it. (45) And Abrâhîm made many requests of Ādînô [saying]: (46) "Drink wine and eat bread in my house." (47) Ādînô said: "I will not drink since it is not from Heaven nor is it pure." (48) Then Abrâhîm swore that "That wine is pure from Heaven and my son Āsînâa brought it." (49) Then because of his freedom from doubt in Āsînâa and the testimony of Abrâhîm, Ādînô consumed the wine and bread. (50) Then when he wanted to leave, he did not let him until they took the great oath.

Previous scholars were unanimous in reading this passage as a combination of two different-midrashic traditions.29 The first is an expansion of the biblical account of Abraham's hospitality and the annunciation of the birth of Isaac that appears in Genesis 18. Since the Midrash itself is engaged in a close reading of the biblical text, it is worthwhile to quote the Genesis passage in full:

(1) And the Lord appeared to Abraham by the Terebinths of Mamre when he was sitting by the tent flap in the heat of the day. (2) And he raised his eyes and saw, and, look, three men were standing before him. He saw, and he ran toward them from the tent flap and bowed to the ground. (3) And he said, "My lord, if I find favor in your eyes, please do not go on past your servant. (4) Let a little water be fetched and bathe your feet and stretch out under the tree, (5) and let me fetch a morsel of bread, and refresh yourselves. Then you may go on, for have you not come by your servant?" And they said, "Do as you have spoken." (6) And Abra-ham hurried to the tent to Sarah and said, "Hurry! Knead three measures of choice flour and make loaves." (7) And to the herd Abraham ran and fetched a tender and goodly calf and gave it to the lad, who hurried to prepare it. (8) And he fetched curds and milk and the calf that had been prepared and he set these before them. He standing over them under the tree, and they ate. (9) And they said to him, "Where is Sarah your wife?" And he said, "There, in the tent." (10) And he said, "I will surely return to you at this very season, and, look, a son shall Sarah your

wife have," and Sarah was listening at the tent flap, which was behind him. (11) And Abraham and Sarah were old, advanced in age, Sarah no longer had her woman's flow. (12) And Sarah laughed inwardly, saying, "After I being shriveled, shall I have pleasure, and my husband is old?" (13) And The Lord said to Abraham, "Why is it that Sarah laughed, saying, 'Shall I really give birth, old as I am?' (14) Is anything beyond for the Lord? In due time I will return to you, at this very season, and Sarah shall have a son." (15) And Sarah dissembled, saying, "I did not laugh," for she was afraid. And He said, "Yes, you did laugh."

The overall structure of the two passages is similar: visitor(s) arrive; the patriarch, with the aid of a boy, provides food and drink, which is described in some detail; and there is a disagreement between the guest and the host which is seemingly resolved at the end of the story. However, many of the significant motifs in the ŠGW's version cannot be found in the biblical account. These include Abraham's sickness, Asīnaa's journey to heaven, Ādinō's refusal to eat, and the "great oath" at the end of the encounter. Conversely, the most important element of the biblical version, the annunciation of the birth of Abraham's first son, is completely lacking in the ŠGW. Moreover, if, as seems likely, we can identify the name Āsīnaa as a corrupted version of the name Isaac, then the ŠGW citation not only lacks this detail but contradicts biblical chronology.

Again, as noted by previous scholars of the ŠGW, the most extensive midrashic expansions of this story are to be found in chapter 48 of Genesis Rabbah, the collection of aggadic traditions on the book of Genesis edited in Palestine in the first half of the fifth century, and on pages 86b-87a of tractate Bava Metsia of the Babylonian Talmud. While dating the final redaction of the Babylonian Talmud (also known as the Bavli) is a contentious issue, some scholars have argued that the Bavli's long aggadic sections, such as the one which deals with this story in tractate Bava Metsia, belong to the latest layer of development, between the fifth and eighth centuries. However, this late dating has recently been chal-

31. Many of these elements appear in the parallel story of the angelic annunciation of the birth of Samson from Judges Chapter Thirteen. However, this story in Judges—or the other additional Jewish parallels that are listed in the notes to Appendix One—should be seen not as replacements for the story in Genesis 18 but as additional intertexts.
32. Likely deformed by the process of translation from Pahlavi to Pazand, the form ʿĀsīnaa likely derives from the Arabic form of the name Isaac, ʾIshāq (de Menasce, Apologétique, 1998). The standard Pazand system for transcribing the Pahlavi script would seem to indicate that this could be the case. The ending -aa usually represents the Pahlavi participial suffix -k. The sounds /n/ and /o/ share a single ligature, the straight vertical line. Initial /e/ is sometimes written with the sign for /a/, for instance in the non-logogram spelling of the verb "to stand" estādān, est- ('ST-TN'). While the correspondence is not perfect, a Pahlavi spelling of the name as 'SH K could be misread as 'Āsīnāg. West (Shikand, 225) suggests that the Syriac form of the name, ʾIshaq, could be behind the Pahlavi, with the vertical stroke of /h/ misread as /n/. The Arabic form ʾIshāq is similar to the Syriac; substitution of š for ṣ already occurs in Hebrew by-form ʾIšḥaq (Horovitz, "Jewish Proper Names and Derivatives in the Koran," 155).
33. Strack and Stemberger, Introduction, 276-83.
34. For a recent discussion and critique of the methodology underlying the theory of a late, anonymous redaction of earlier rabbinic traditions see the recent dissertation Vidas, "Tradition and the Formation of the Talmud" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2009).
In any case, for the purposes of my argument regarding the ŠGW, either dating can be accepted. While I will be primarily referring to these two texts, the story of Abraham's hospitality is expounded throughout the rabbinic corpus and I will draw on traditions from numerous Midrashim.

Many of the motifs included in the ŠGW's account that are missing from the biblical version appear in these Midrashim. First of all, the divine identity of Abraham's guest or guests, which is ambiguous in the version in Genesis but a given in the ŠGW, is clarified in the Midrash. Genesis Rabbah 48:1 and BT Bava Metsia 86b both include a tradition that Abraham's three visitors described in Genesis 18 were the angels Michael, Gabriel, and Raphael. According to the Talmudic version:

Who are the three men? Michael, Gabriel and Raphael—Michael who came to give the news to Sarah, Raphael who came to heal Abraham and Gabriel who went to overturn Sodom.

The Babylonian Talmud also includes a tradition that, as in the ŠGW, it was God himself who came to visit Abraham. This detail arises in connection with the midrashic statement that, as in the ŠGW, God's visit to Abraham was prompted by the patriarch's illness. Unlike the ŠGW's statement that Abraham was in recovery from his recent circumcision, described in Genesis 17:24. As it states in BT Bava Metsia 86b:

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35. See Rubenstein, "Criteria," especially page 417: "The extended collections of stories found in the Bavli likewise point to the work of the redactors, unless we wish to posit the existence of lengthy Amoraic narrative compilations."
38. MS. Florence and MS. Vatican Ebr. 115: לא נזהר.
40. MS. Florence: בבראשית אשמה תמר אברום.
41. MS. Florence is missing from the text which lacks the typical late question-and-answer format of the anonymous redactional layer of the Babylonian Talmud. MS. Vatican Ebr. 115 includes the phrase, but has יהוה in place of יהו.
42. MS. Vatican Ebr. 115 adds י.ת.
43. This word is missing in MS. Florence.
44. MS. Vatican Ebr. 115 adds י.ת.
"The Lord appeared to Abraham by the oaks of Mamre as he sat at the entrance of his tent in the heat of the day" (Genesis 18:1). What is [meant by] "the heat of the day"? Rabbi Hama bar Hanina said: that day was the third day after Abraham's circumcision and God came to ask after Abraham. God took the sun out of its envelope so that that righteous man would not be troubled with guests. He sent out Eliezer [his servant] to find someone. He went but did not find. He said to him: "I don't believe you." As it says there: there is no trust in servants. He [Abraham] went out and saw the Lord God standing at the entrance. As it says: "He lifted up his eyes and saw three men standing there and he saw and ran towards them." From the outset they were themselves coming towards him for they saw that he was in pain. They said: "It is not proper to stand this way."

As much as this text from BT Bava Metsia states that God himself came to see Abraham and is somehow to be identified with his three visitors, the ambiguous status of the visitors is still maintained. When the text states that Abraham saw God standing at the entrance, are we to understand that Abraham did actually see God or that he saw God as he appeared in the shape of one (or all three) of the visitors? This ambiguity is entirely absent from the ŠGW's version: there is no question that it is Adinō himself in a physical form who comes to pay a visit to Abraham.

The central concern of the ŠGW's version, whether and what divine beings can eat, is also at issue in the midrashic accounts. In a number of sources it is debated whether Abraham's visitors really ate Abraham's food. BT Bava Metsia 86b records the following tradition:

45. This word is missing in MS. Vatican Ebr. 115.
46. MS. Vatican Ebr. 115: יהו אלך אכשה.
47. MS. Vatican Ebr. 115: יהו אלך אכשה.
48. This phrase is missing in MS. Vatican Ebr. 115.
49. MS. Vatican Ebr. 115: כל צדיק אתו יטריח שלא כדי מנורתך חמה.
50. MS. Vatican Ebr. 115: "מות אתו: יהוה יהו מדבר אתו.
51. The motif that the angels' visit coincided with Abraham's recovery from his circumcision can be found in Genesis Rabba 48:1 (Theodor and Albeck, Bereshit Rabba, 484-85 and the note to line 2); Tanhuma Wayyera 4 and 42 (Solomon Buber, Midrash Tanhuma [Vilnius: Romm, 1885], 84 and 108); BT Sotah 14a; BT Sanhedrin 59a; PRE 29 (Dagmar Börner-Klein, ed. and trans., Pirke de-Rabbi Elieser [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004], 317).
Rabbi Tanhum bar Hanilai argued that in deference to mundane practice, the angels ate while they were Abraham's guests. The response of the Talmud's anonymous voice, the presence of which is signaled both by the lack of a named authority who makes the statement and the switch in language from Hebrew to Aramaic, is that the angels did not actually eat but only appeared to do so, thereby both respecting Abraham's hospitality and preserving their divine purity. The anonymous comment puts the status of the eating and drinking in question and changes the smooth reading to a contentious one.

As in the ŠGW, the rabbinic tradition also identifies the boy who aids Abraham in preparing the feast. The biblical text at Genesis 18:7 does not name Abraham's helper, referring to him only as a *naʿar*, a youth or servant. In both *Genesis Rabbah* and *Avot de Rabbi Nathan*, however, the unnamed *naʿar* is identified as Ishmael, Abraham's other son, born to Hagar, Sarah's maidservant. As the version in *Genesis Rabbah* states:

"יוסף אל העשו—הז ישמעאל بشם לוהי במעתא."

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52. MS. Munich 95, MS. Vatican 115 and MS. Vatican 117 add the word *שוב*.
53. MS. Escorial G-I-3 records *לכם*, clearly an error for *לחם*. MS. Florence 8 and Munich 95 makes no reference to *לחם* but rather unspecified eating and drinking.
54. MS. Escorial G-I-3 has *כמי*. MS. Vatican 115 reads *כמה*.
55. The text follows the version in the twelfth century MS. Hamburg 165.
56. This disagreement can be found in different versions: in *Genesis Rabbah* 48:14 (Theodor and Albeck, *Bereshit Rabbah*, 491-92), as in BT Bava Metsia 86b, the argument that the angels did eat is attributed to Rav Tanhuma and the opposing argument is anonymous. However, in *Exodus Rabbah* 47:5, the opposing argument is attributed to Rabbi Yohanan; in *Leviticus Rabbah* 34:8 (Mordecai Margulies, ed., *Midrash Wayyikra Rabbah* [New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1993], 774-75) to Rabbi Yudan; and in *Ecclesiastes Rabbah* 3:18 to Rabbi Nathan. In *Tanhuma Ki Tisa* 19 (Zunz, *Tanhuma*, 118) both opinions are given anonymously and in *Numbers Rabbah* 10:1 and *Seder Eliyahu Rabbah* 13:1 (M. Friedman, ed., *Seder Eliahu Rabba und Seder Eliahu Zuta* [Tanna d’be Eliahu] [Vienna: Verlag der Israel.-theol. Lehranstalt, 1904], 59; William G. Braude and I. J. Kapstein, eds. and trans., *Tanna debe Eliyyahu: The Lore of the School of Elijah* [Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1981], 176) the Midrash states unequivocally that the angels ate. This statement from *Seder Eliyahu Rabbah* is alluded to in Tosefot apud Bava Metsia 86b. In *Targum Pseudo-Jonathan* 18:8 (Maher, *Targum*, 67) and *Antiquities* 1:197 (Josephus, *Antiquities*, 75), the text states that the angels only appeared to eat.
58. While much of ARN consists of reworkings of earlier material, the final redaction of the text is generally dated between the end of the amoraic period (fifth century CE) and the eighth or ninth centuries. See Menahem Kister, *Studies in Avot de-Rabbi Nathan: Text, Redaction and Interpretation* (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1998).
"And he gave it to the boy"—this is Ishmael, in order to encourage him in the commandments.60

*Genesis Rabbah*'s solution to the gap in the biblical text is elegant. An unnamed character is identified with one already known, limiting the circle of players in this family drama.61 Additionnally, placing Ishmael in the role of Abraham's willing assistant highlights the dramatic irony. Ishmael readies the meal for the strangers bearing the message which seals his fate: Isaac will be Abraham's chosen son and Ishmael cast out into the desert.62

**The Deceitful Son**

The second rabbinic tradition scholars have pointed to as the source of the ŠGW's version of the story of Abraham's hospitality is an expansion of a different biblical narrative. This is the account of Jacob's theft of the blessing intended for his older brother Esau from their father Isaac. This act of subterfuge, instigated by Jacob's mother Rebecca, culminates a history of sibling rivalry which begins in the womb63 and has already entailed Jacob's seizure of his older brother's birthright.64 In Genesis 27, Isaac, old and blind, asks his favored son Esau to make him a dish of venison in exchange for his final blessing. While Esau is out hunting, Rebecca instructs Jacob to disguise himself as Esau, bring him his favorite dishes and receive his father's blessing; the ruse is successful and Isaac does give Jacob the blessing intended for Esau.

The motif of heavenly wine appears in the Midrash's explication of Genesis 27:17. This section of the narrative, beginning in verse fourteen, describes how Jacob follows his mother's instructions and his disguise:

(14) וַיֵלֶּ: (15) וַיִּקַּח: (16) וַיֵּלֶ: (17) And he went and fetched [the two kids] and brought to his mother; and his mother made a dish of the kind his father loved. (15) And Rebekah took the garments of Esau her elder son, the finery that was with her in the house, and put them on Jacob her younger son, (16) and the skins of the kids she put on his hands and on the smooth part of his neck. (17) And she placed the dish, and the bread she had made, in the hand of Jacob her son.65

60. 48:13 (Theodor and Albeck, *Bereshit Rabba*, 490). In addition to ARN, this same tradition is included in the late Midrash *Sekhel Tov* (on which see Strack and Stemberger, *Introduction*, 357). Interestingly, BT *Bava Metsia* does not include this tradition and instead reads Abraham's command at 18:7—"and he gave it to the boy and he hurried to do it"—as referring not to one but to two separate youths.
61. On this function in the Midrash in general see Isaac Heinemann, *Darke Ha-Aggadah* (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1970), 27-32, esp. 28.
64. Genesis 25:29-34.
65. The translation follows Alter, *Genesis*, 139.
However, in 27:25, when Jacob presents the meal to his father, the text adds that he also served him wine: 'And he said, 'Serve me, that I may eat of the game of my son, so that I may solemnly bless you.' And he served him and he ate, and he brought him wine and he drank.' The Midrash concludes that this wine was brought to Jacob by the angel Michael from the Garden of Eden. The other version scholars have cited from a late Midrash called the Tanhuma states:

Where did he get wine? For we know that his mother did not give him wine, but rather "And she placed the dish [and the bread she had made, in the hand of Jacob her son."

And who brought him wine? Michael brought him wine from the Garden of Eden. Our rabbis said: One does not find wine of blessing but this and Abraham's, as it is said: "Melchizedek king of Shalem brought out bread and wine [he was priest of God Most High.] (Genesis 14:18). And even this [wine], after he [Isaac] drank, he blessed him.

In fact, this is only one of the heavenly attributes which the Tanhuma ascribes to him. Jacob also has a celestial odor, whether because the righteous carry the scent of heaven or because he wears the garments of Adam, which retain the scent of the Garden of Eden.

There is much to connect these midrashic expansions to the Jewish citation in the SGW. First of all, the character of Isaac—as an old man, a youth, and a divine promise—plays a central role in all three stories. There are also significant structural similarities. All three tales revolve around the presentation of a meal. In all three, a boy serves his father, either as an errand-boy and sous-chef in the SGW and Genesis 18, or as a waiter in Genesis 27. Each narrative also culminates in a blessing or oath. The father's illness, whether as Isaac and Abrāhīm's blindness or Abraham's post-circumcision weakness, is also a crucial element of all these stories. It is the connection between the two Midrashim which prompted Darmesteter to suggest that the SGW's description of Abrāhīm's eye pain could have resulted from the transfer of an element related to Isaac in Genesis 27 to his father in Genesis 18.

However, pointing to only these two sources is unsatisfying on a number of levels. First of all, the question can be raised of why and at what point the Midrashim on Abraham

66. The final redaction of the Tanhuma, which exists in two different recensions, post-dates the ninth century. See Leopold Zunz, Ha-Drashot be-Israel, trans. M. A. Jacques, (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1974), 247 and Strack and Stemberger, Introduction, 305-6. While the Tanhuma is based partially on earlier materials, the text's late redaction raises the possibility that this Midrash on Jacob's wine actually post-dates the SGW. This represents a further challenge to the theory that the SGW is based directly on this source.


68. Buber, Tanhuma, 135.

and Isaac became connected. Are we to imagine that Mardānfarrox combined the two Midrashim himself? This seems to be the thrust of Jacob Neusner's claim that "the author has obviously heard and reshaped stories useful for his polemical purpose." Alternatively, if the two expanded biblical narratives were already "mixed" by the time that Mardānfarrox heard them, since there is no rabbinic tradition which combines these motifs in that way, this presumption itself points away from identifying the Midrash as the source of this story. Even assuming that the ŠGW retains a lost Midrash of some type, it would have to be a strange Midrash indeed that casts Isaac as his father's assistant in the scene which announces his birth.

Describing the citation in the ŠGW as the "combination" of two traditions is itself not quite right. It would be more accurate to say that one or two motifs from the expanded Genesis 27 narrative have been incorporated into the body of the expanded Midrash on Genesis 18. There is an hierarchy of traditions: the story of hospitality is the dominant narrative and the motifs of wine from heaven and, perhaps, Abrāhīm's eye pain, have been drawn into its matrix.

Most significantly, if the ŠGW was influenced directly, somehow, by the Midrashim in BT Bava Metsia, Genesis Rabbah, the Tanhuma, and Avot de Rabbi Nathan, we can ask why only some of the motifs found in those sources are present in the ŠGW. For example, the long section devoted to Abraham in BT Bava Metsia includes numerological speculations on which and what kinds of animals Abraham prepared for his guests, the menu of the feast—tongues in mustard—how Abraham's hospitality prefigured God's future care for the Children of Israel in the desert, a comparison between Abraham's hospitality and Lot's inhospitality in Sodom, and, of course, a great deal of discussion of the role and character of Sarah, who does not appear in the ŠGW's account at all. If Mardānfarrox had access to this Midrash, why would he copy certain motifs and not others? There seems to be no underlying principle dictating which motifs make the jump to the ŠGW and which do not; the selection process is random and unmotivated.

In a certain sense, these questions are reductive and hyper-literal; it is unlikely that Neusner and the other scholars, in pointing to these Midrashim, imagined Mardānfarrox poring over the pages of BT Bava Metsia, for instance, to find the juiciest and most damaging Jewish stories. However, naming these as the sole sources of the citation invites this kind of response, precisely owing to the undertheorized notions of "influence" and "sources" being employed. If the ŠGW citation was "influenced" by these Midrashim, that influence must be accounted for, both in the ways that the citation adheres to its putative source and how it deviates from it.

On the whole, while it is undeniable that there is some relationship between the citation and the Midrash, that relationship cannot be as binary and unidirectional as previous scholars have thought. The ŠGW deviates too much from the Midrash as we have them; too much is unmotivated. It seems more likely that the ŠGW is drawing from an oral nexus of traditions now lost to us, the same kind of nexus described in connection with Islam by Pregil and Lazarus-Yaffeh.

70. Neusner, History, 4:422.
71. On the late dating of the Tanhuma see the note above.
72. The story of the destruction of the cities in the plain appears in Genesis 19, immediately following the story of Abraham's hospitality.
In what follows I will outline some of the other possible elements in this oral nexus which contributed to the citation as we find it in the ŠGW. This list is by no means meant to be exhaustive nor, to reiterate a point made above, do I wish to replace rabbinic literature with some other tradition's text or canon. Rather, I will point to similar motifs found in a number of traditions with the goal of highlighting the undecidability and impossibility of determining clear lines of influence in this case.

Angelic Abstinence

The ŠGW unquestionably engages with Islamic literature and sources. This is evident not only from the extended critique of Islam in ŠGW Chapter Eleven, but the generic conventions and theological concerns of the text as a whole. As mentioned in the introduction, these are entirely in line with the rationalist doctrines of the Muʿtazilite theological school. With this fact in mind, it is not surprising that the Qurʾānic accounts of Abraham's hospitality are, in a number of ways, closer to the ŠGW's version than the biblical or midrashic traditions. The story of Abraham's hospitality is repeated in four separate locations in the Qurʾān, testifying to its importance.  

Two of these passages in particular bear a striking resemblance to the version on the ŠGW: 11:69-73 and 51:24-30. The former passage reads:

Our messengers came to Abraham with the good tidings; they said, "Peace!" "Peace," he said; and presently he brought a roasted calf. And when he saw their hands not reaching towards it, he was suspicious of them and conceived a fear of them. They said, "Fear not; we have been sent to the people of Lot." And his wife was standing by; she laughed, therefore We gave her the glad tidings of Isaac, and, after Isaac, of Jacob. She said, "Woe is me! Shall I bear, being an old woman, and this my husband is an old man? This assuredly is a strange thing." They said, "What, dost thou marvel at God's command? The mercy of God and His blessings be upon you, O people of the House! Surely He is All-laudable, All-glorious."  

As in the account in Genesis, Abraham hastens to serve his guests a roasted calf. However, the messengers don't touch the food and, because of their strange behavior, Abraham be-

comes afraid.  

It is at this point that the visitors bring Abraham the good tidings of the birth of a son, identified as Isaac only in 11:70, and, as in Genesis 19, news of God's impending destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah.

The significant difference between the ŠGW and the Qurʾān on the one side, and the midrashic expansions on the other is not whether the angels ate; as discussed above, several midrashic texts preserve the opinion that they did not do so. Rather, the difference lies in the patriarch's perception of their abstinence. In the ŠGW and Qurʾān, followed by the later Islamic commentaries, Abrahāḵīm sees that Ādīnō and the angels do not eat and reacts accordingly; the motif is foregrounded and propels the narrative. In the Midrash, on the other hand, whether or not the angels actually partook of Abraham's food, they appeared to him to do so. Since the knowledge that the angels abstained is revealed only to the Midrash's reader, and not the story's characters, the narrative can proceed as in the Bible unaltered.

The point of citing the Qurʾānic account is to offer a possible parallel genealogy for the ŠGW's citation of the story of Abrahāḵīm's hospitality. In particular, the similar foregrounding of the motif of the guest's abstaining from eating points to the possibility that, rather than having been influenced solely by the Bible and midrashic versions outlined above, this Islamic narrative could also have been part of the oral nexus from which the ŠGW drew.

The Name of God

One of the aspects of the ŠGW's citation which seems to point most strongly towards its Jewish origins is the name given to the Jewish God, Ādīnō. This name appears throughout the critique of Judaism and it is undoubtedly a version, likely deformed by the process of translation from Pahlavi to Pazand, of one of the principal Jewish epithets for God. 'Adōnāy, meaning "my Lord," occurs frequently as one of the divine names in the Bible. Based on the evidence of the Septuagint, where the ineffable four-letter name of God is translated by the Greek kurios, likewise meaning "Lord," 'Adōnāy had replaced the pronunciation of the Tetragrammaton by the third century BCE. In rabbinic texts, the proscription on pronouncing the divine name is mentioned already in the Mishnah. Moreover, 'Adōnāy is mentioned as the usual substitute in BT Pesahim 50a:

אמר רב נחמ בר יצחק: לא עלול הזה עלול בא汚. ועלול הזה ומכח ידו היא נקראה באלאך dünya.

Rav Nahman Bar Yitzhak said: "This world is not like the world to come. In this world, [the Name] is written with yod he [the Tetragrammaton] and spoken with

77. Qurʾān 11:70 and 51:28. Qurʾān 17:60-63 makes no reference to eating at all, while at 15:52 the text mentions Abraham's fear but not its cause.
81. Mishnah Sotah 7:6; Mishnah Tamid 7:2; and Mishnah Sanhedrin 10:1.
82. The text follows MS. Munich 6.
The world to come: [it is] spoken with yod he and written with yod he."^{83}

However, 'Adōnāy was known as a name for God outside the Jewish context. In the form Adonaios and Adonin, the name is given to various evil heavenly powers mentioned in the Nag Hammadi documents.^{84} Abū Rayhān al-Biruni, the eleventh century polymath, mentions the name in his work on India, noting, as in the Talmud, the distinction between writing and pronunciation.^{85} Martin Schwartz has discussed the passage in Biruni as well as the appearance of versions of the name in a fifteenth century Arabic magical compilation, the Ḧiṭab ar-Rahma fi at-tībb wa-l-ḥikma, ascribed to Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī. Alongside versions of the names Gilgamesh, Gadriel, and others, the magical formula ḥdwn y ʾṣb wt ʾl šd ʾy,\(^{86}\) from the Hebrew phrase meaning "the Lord of Hosts, God Almighty," appears. A^{18}

Schwartz argues persuasively that these magical names and formulae passed into Arabic from a Manichaean Middle Persian translation of the Book of the Giants, one of the canonical books of the Manichaens authored by Mani himself. This is not surprising, as the name 'Adōnāy appears in other Manichaean texts. Especially interesting in light of the use of the name in the critique of Judaism in the ŚGW is a Manichaean polemical poem contained in a manuscript fragment known as M28. M28 contains three abacendarian poems, only the second of which is complete. The fragment is missing the verses of the first poem before the letter resh—the poems follow the order of the Aramaic alphabet—and the last only goes from

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84. On these names see the discussion in Tuomas Rasimus, Paradise Reconsidered in Gnostic Mythmaking: Rethinking Sethianism in Light of the Orphic Evidence (Leiden: Brill, 2010), esp. 103-128.
86. Hebrew: אדני מכה ואש♪ מכה♫ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מכה♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca♭ מeca flats
aleph to waw. It seems likely, based on their similar content, that these are not three separate poems but rather three successive cantos of a single work.\(^{90}\)

The polemic in the text is directed against various doctrines.\(^{91}\) While Skjaervo understood the poem to be a Manichaean composition polemizing, amongst others, also against Marcionites,\(^{92}\) de Blois has convincingly argued otherwise. As the poem's theology is somewhat at odds with Manichaean doctrine and, furthermore, as the reference to Marcion\(^{93}\) is entirely positive, de Blois has proposed that M28 could be a Manichaean adoption of an originally Marcionite work.\(^{94}\) In his analysis of the text, de Blois has highlighted the correspondences between the poem's polemic and what we know of Marcionite doctrine from other sources.

The name ʾAdōnāy, spelled as Manichaean Middle Persian ʾdvny, appears in two of the verses from the complete, second canto. The first is in the second stanza:\(^{95}\)

\[
\text{bycʾrwm}^{96} \text{ w ſrmzd kyrdwm} \\
ʾdvny ʾwš ghwdgʾn \\
kw "ʾgr yk ʾst yzd \\
gyhmwd ky wypt?"
\]

I made weary and ashamed
ʾAdōnāy and his foul offspring
saying: "If there is [only] one God
who then deceived Gayomard?"\(^{97}\)

As in the ŠGW, the polemic is directed against the idea that ʾAdōnāy is the author of both good and evil. Specifically, the polemic refers to the Eden story in Genesis; a version of this same story is discussed at length in ŠGW Chapter Thirteen.\(^{98}\) How, the polemicist asks, could the same God who created and put Adam in the garden, as the sole author and sustainer of the universe, also be responsible for his deception and temptation? As de Blois notes, this polemic accords well with Marcionite theology. In that conception, there is a radical division between the true God and the lower creator of the world. Just as there is a contrast between the two deities, their two books, the law of the creator in the Old Testament and the gospel of

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94. de Blois, "Turfan," 482.
95. R i, ll. 19-23. In the manuscript, the stanzas are in a single block of text; I have followed de Blois in his division of the stichs. Skjaervo, "Turfan," 245; de Blois, "Turfan," 482.
96. Bēzār-ʾum. On this word see de Blois, "Turfan," 482.
98. See the discussion in Chapter Four.
the true God, are diametrically opposed. This division, and Marcion's literalist critique of the Hebrew scriptures which accompanied it, was supported and articulated through a reading of Paul's letters. 99 In addition to these two beings, later Marcionites identified matter (called, as in Manichean tradition, *hyle*) as a third, evil deity. "In this view, the just god made Adam, but Adam was seduced by the evil god and rebelled against his maker, who repudiated him." 100 While subsequent stanzas contain interesting attacks against the Sabbath (*šmbyd*) and circumcision (*pwst brydg*) 101 and, perhaps, Adam as the son of God, 102 the next reference to ʾAdōnāy only occurs in stanza 11: 103

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{xw'nynd 'w br mrym}^{104} \\
pws 'y 'dwny hptwmyg \\
'gr h' n 'st xwd' y 'y wysp \\
pwsyš ky kyrd 'wbd r?^{105}
\end{align*}
\]

They call Bar Maryam
the seventh son of ʾAdōnāy;
If he is the Lord of All,
who crucified his son?

Here too, the polemic centers on the contradiction between God's omnipotence and the suffering of his creations, in this case his own son. A similar critique of the illogic of the story of the crucifixion is found in ŠGW Chapter Fifteen. 106 The identification of Jesus as the seventh son of ʾAdōnāy could be related to Elchasaites and Ebionite beliefs that the Christ appeared not once but in numerous forms throughout history, first as Adam, later as the figure encountered by Abraham (in Genesis 18) and the other patriarchs and finally as Jesus. 107 ʾAdōnāy is revealed to be, in this passage as the one before, the name by which the adherents of the doctrines attacked know their one, true deity. At the same time, it is the appellation of the evil, creator deity who produces foul offspring and is ashamed (*šrmzd*) by the polemicist's attack.

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99. Some scholars have suggested, in fact, that Marcion only "brought to its logical conclusion" the tendency inherent in Paul's writing to denigrate the Law; in Galatians 3:19, Paul even goes so far as to raise the possibility that the Law was not authored by God at all but "ordained through angels by a mediator." See the discussion in Heikki Räisänen, "Marcion," in The Blackwell Companion to Paul, ed. Stephen Westerholm (London: Blackwell, 2011), 301-15.

100. De Blois, "Turfan," 482.

101. Staza 3, r i, ll. 24-27. Literally, *pwst brydg* means "severed skin"; this is a different description of circumcision than that found in Dēnkard Book Three. See further discussion in Chapter Five.

102. R i, ll. 28-32. De Blois raises the possibility that the *pws 'y yzd' n* mentioned at the end of this verse refers to Adam. De Blois, "Turfan," 483.

103. R 11, ll. 24-28; Skjaervo, "Turfan," 246; de Blois, "Turfan," 483.

104. De Blois suggests that the retention of these words in Aramaic suggests that the translator "did not know who the son of Mary is and consequently treated *bar Maryam* as a proper name" (de Blois, "Turfan," 483).

105. Literally, the last line of this stanza would be translated as "who put his son on the tree (*d 'r*)." Manichaean Parthian has a similar word for crucifixion, *d'gyrdyyh*, from *d 'r* meaning "tree" and the verb *gryftn* (Durkin-Meisterernst, DMMPP, 136).


The importance of this text is twofold. First of all, it helps explain the surprising spelling of the name of the Jewish God in the ŠGW. Ādīnō results from the vowel metathesis of the /el/ and /i/, either in an underlying Pahlavi form written, presumably as in Manichaean Middle Persian, ʾdwny, or at some point during the transmission of the Pazand text. Darmesteter already suggested this explanation of the Pazand form.\footnote{108 Darmesteter, "Judaisme," 6.}

More crucially the ʾAdōnāy in this poem need not be the deity of Jews at all. The definition of Judaism and Jewish belief is, of course, a contentious and slippery endeavor. At the very least, however, those who believed that Jesus was "the seventh son of ʾAdōnāy" were outside of the domain of rabbinic Judaism; de Blois speculates that at least some of the polemical stanzas might be directed against Jewish-Christians.\footnote{109 De Blois, "Turfan," 483.} Whatever the identity of these adherents, ʾAdōnāy is not associated here specifically with Jewish scriptures. Of course, it is the God of the Old Testament who is attacked, but it would be ridiculous to read these stanzas and others in the poem as interpretations of specific passages in the Hebrew Bible. Rather, ʾAdōnāy has become uncoupled from those texts and reassigned, as a name and a character, to an entirely different context.

This is precisely the reason that I have devoted so much attention to this poem. The Ādīnō of the ŠGW need not be the sign of Mardānfarrox's reading Jewish texts at all. ʾAdōnāy was a divine name which circulated widely, independently of Jewish literature, and in polemical contexts quite similar to those we find in the ŠGW.

\textit{Polluted Wine}

ʾAdōnāy also occurs as a divine name in the writings, polemical and otherwise, of the Mandaens. The Mandaean community, living in Khuzistan in what is now the border region between Iraq and Iran, is thought to have originated as a Palestinian baptismal sect in the late Second Temple period.\footnote{110 See Dan Shapira, "ʾEin Mazal le-Yisraʾel: Celestial Race, the Jews," Kabbalah: Journal for the Study of Jewish Mystical Texts 5 (2000): 111 and the sources quoted there.} The community has preserved a significant religious literature—the Ginza Rabbā (Great Treasure) being a central work—including polemical texts. Ginza Rabbā I 23:17-24,\footnote{111 Text and translation in Shapira, "Celestial Race," 112; the older German translation can be found in Mark Lifzbarski, \textit{Ginzā, der schatz oder das grosse Buch der Mandäer} (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1925), 25.} for instance, describes how Adunai, as the Jewish God is called there,

elected for himself a nation and a synagogue was established for him. The walled town of Jerusalem, the city of the Jews, was built, those who circumcise themselves with a sword and sprinkle (cast) their blood unto their faces and (in this manner) they worship Adunai. The woman who are in their menstruation are lying in the lap of men. They turn aside from the primal law (šuta qadaita) and they make for themselves a book.
As in the Manichaean text just discussed, circumcision is a prominent theme here. The accusation of the violation of menstrual purity is also especially serious, as ritual cleanliness is a major Mandaean religious obligation.

In Mandaean writings, as Shapira notes, Adunai is more than just the name of the Jewish God. Adunai is also the sun (šamiš ḏadunai qarih, GR I 23:19), the chief of the evil archons who prevent the good souls from ascending to their celestial home.112 The Jews are, in fact, themselves identical with these archons. Effectively, the Mandaeans consider the Jews to be a species of demons; Shapira argues that this demonization of the Jews is inspired by Jewish lore, in particular the same myth of the fallen giants mentioned in the Manichaean context above.113

There is another Mandaean polemical passage which has a direct bearing on the citation in the critique of Judaism. I discussed above the motif of Āsīnaa bringing back wine from heaven and the parallel scholars have identified between this motif and the angel Gabriel's provision of wine for Jacob in the midrashic expansions of Genesis 27. Furthermore, Ādīnō's refusal to consume the wine Abrahām offers him is paralleled in Jewish and Islamic versions of the story of Abraham's hospitality. However, the reason Ādīnō gives for refusing to consume Abrahām's offering is not found in either tradition. Ādīnō's statement that "I will not drink since it is not from heaven nor is it pure," would seem to imply that if it were pure, he would drink. Indeed, once Abrahām assures him that the wine is, in fact, from heaven, Ādīnō happily receives the patriarch's gift. From the perspective of the Jewish and Muslim version of this story, the purity or impurity of the food Abraham offers to his visitors is not the issue at all. Angels normally subsist on the glory of the divine presence114 and, as is spelled out in the midrashic sources mentioned above, even those rabbis who believe the angels did eat the meal Abraham prepared recognize this as a violation of normal practice. Of course, it could be argued that the emphasis on the purity of Abrahām's wine reflects the purity regulations entailed in the Jewish cult and offerings. However, since sacrifice, not to mention the Temple, is never mentioned in the ŠGW, this seems an unlikely possibility.

Impure wine is a prominent feature, though, of certain polemical texts in the Ginza Rabbā. The motif appears in the following passage, polemicizing against the Manichaeans:

Again I will teach you, my disciples, that there is another gate,115 which emerges from Jesus (Mšaha), who are called Zandiqs (zandiglia) and Manichaeans (*marmania). They sow their seed secretly and allot a portion of it to the gloom, women and men sleep with one another, they take the seed and throw it into wine, and they offer it to the Souls [Mandaeans] to drink, saying that it is pure.116

115. Bābbā; each of the various false doctrines is referred to by this term.
116. GR I 227:17-27, emphasis mine; Dan Shapira, "Manichaeans (Marmaniaia), Zoroastrians (Iazuqaiia), Jews,
In his analysis of Mandaean polemics, Shapira has discussed the historical connections between Mandaeans and Manichaeans which might underly this passage as well as the degree to which the Mandaeans are "correct" in their representation of Manichaean belief and practice. He argues that the connection in the passage between seed and food relates to the Manichaean belief that certain foods contain greater amounts of "the swallowed light ejaculated by the archons."117 Without calling into question Shapira's argument, it is important to note that polluted wine is a motif which reoccurs in other polemical passages.118 This is found particularly in the passage concerning Venus:

> Behold, I told you about the "gate" of Libat (Venus) and about the deeds that she performed in the world, and about the sacraments, the Seven Primal Sacraments of Ruha.119 I am telling you: they kill a Jewish boy and take some of his blood and bake it with bread and give them as a meal, they mix in a goblet the menstrual blood of a whoring virgin-nun with wine and let them drink, and the eyes of the people should not fall upon them . . .120

Whatever the identity of this group—certainly Christians of some kind—the text presents a warning for righteous believers. The passage allows two possible readings. On the one hand, it is possible that the followers of the sect are the ones who prepare the defiled bread and wine for their own consumption. They make sure only that outsiders not discover the devilish recipes they employ to make the sacrament.

On the other hand, according to a second reading, this passage would resemble the previous polemic. In other words, the nefarious sectarians would deliberately defile unwitting Mandaeans through impure wine and bread; the Mandaeans would be those to whom they give the bread "as a meal" and "let them drink" the wine. According to this interpretation, the text reacts with horror to the killing of a Jewish boy for his blood not out of a sense of humanitarianism but rather because the blood of Jews, identified with the archons, is the most impure. The same can be said of the menstrual blood slipped into the wine; it is the especially tainted menstruation of a whoring nun. Just as in the anti-Manichaean passage, the point here is the depiction of the deliberate practice of ritual impurity rather than any sexual deviance.

While Mandaean polemics against Judaism do not include this motif of polluted wine, the Ginza Rabba does state that "from the circumcised, slothful Jews all the nations and gates..."

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118. I think that this motif should not be classed, as Shapira argues, under a general rubric of "unusual sexual practices." The distinction is a fine one but it seems that pollution, rather than sex, is at the heart of this practice.
119. Ruha, meaning "spirit," is *Adunai's* consort and generally characterized in the scholarly literature as an evil entity. J. J. Buckley, however, has argued that the Mandaean sources actually paint a more nuanced and sometimes even positive portrayal of Ruha. See J.J. Buckley, "A Rehabilitation of Spirit Ruha in Mandaean Religion," *History of Religions* 22 (1982): 60-84.
The Jews are the origin of all sectarianism and heresy. Ādīnō's hasty refusal of Abrāhīm's offer of a hospitable drink is precisely the reaction any good Mandaean should have when confronted with Jewish wine.

The importance of this Mandaean polemic is that it presents a parallel with a motif that is central to the citation in the ŠGW but present neither in any of the biblical and rabbinic passages scholars have pointed to nor in the parallel Islamic account. Again, without arguing that this particular Mandaean polemical text is the source for the ŠGW's citation, this text demonstrates that polemics relating Jews and polluted wine were part of the wider cultural matrix of the ŠGW.

The Cushion

As the ŠGW states in 14:42, when Ādīnō came to visit Abrāhīm he "sat on a cushion and asked after his welfare." This detail is not included in the midrashic versions of the story. While the extended discussion in BT Bava Metsia does mention Abraham's standing up out of respect for his guests—and this despite the pain of his recent circumcision—neither God's sitting is mentioned nor is the object on which he sat. Edward William West, in his translation of the passage, dismisses this description as "the usual Oriental salutation." However, this detail is more significant than West allows.

Under the Sasanians and even earlier, royalty was associated with sitting on a higher and more comfortable seat. More than just marking the status of the king, the power of various court dignitaries was signified by the height and proximity of their seats to that of the king. Thrones, of course, were important marks of royalty and special stools were reserved for highly placed persons. This custom is reflected in reports of the Sasanian court transmitted in Arabic as well as in the accounts of Achemenid practices. For instance, in the Book of Esther, Haman's promotion at court is symbolized by his stool being elevated above those of other dignitaries.

Cushions, though, were just as much signifiers of status. Several Sasanian engraved silver bowls and seals depict the king sitting and reclining on piles of mats and cushions. One example is found in a Sasanian gold cup in the collection of the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. The ruler, most often identified as Khosrow I Anoshirvan (r. 531-579), depicted in the central medallion of the cup, sits facing the viewer on a cushion on an ornately carved divan; next to him are piled six additional cushions, making a total of seven. Similar depictions of Sasanian notables can be found in Arabic, Armenian, and Talmudic texts and various sources convey different numbers and heights of the cushions. Ṭabarī describes the Sasanian general Rustam sitting on a golden throne piled with gold-embroidered cushions to impress a delegation of the Muslim army, and elsewhere depicts the Sasanian king Khosrow II

121. GR I 224; Shapira, "Manichaean," 26; Lidzbarski, Ginzā, 225.
122. West, Pahlavi Texts Parts Three, 225.
Parwez (r. 590-628) reclining on three cushions. The Talmud, for its part, mentions a pile of seven cushions which are removed one by one to reflect a rabbi's lowered status.

Even one cushion by itself can serve as a metonymy for kingship as a whole. This is exemplified in a crucial scene in the fifth century Armenian work the *Epic Histories* by P’awstos Buzand. While Armenian literature and culture in general are strongly connected to that of Iran, scholars have argued that P’awstos’ work in particular is cast in the mold of Iranian epic traditions. The *Epic Histories* provides an account of the wars between the Sasanians and the Armenians during the rule of Shapur II (r. 309-379); as will become immediately clear, the fact that the Armenian kings were descended from a branch of the Parthian royal family, the Iranian dynasty overthrown by the Sasanians in their rise to power, is a significant element in this rivalry. The episode of interest to us here describes the visit of the Armenian king Aršak II (r. 350-367) to the camp of the Sasanian monarch Shapur. Despite the good relations between the royal houses, Shapur, on the advice of various astronomers, is suspicious of Aršak’s intentions. After seizing the king and his vassal on their arrival at camp, Shapur unveils a ruse to reveal his rival’s true feelings. He orders a tent prepared in which half the ground is covered with Armenian soil and the other half with Iranian soil. Walking back and forth in the tent, Shapur engages Aršak in conversation. As long as the Armenian king is on Iranian soil, he is deferential to the Iranian ruler. However, when on his native earth, Aršak cannot restrain his feelings; he is defiant and condescending. Upon reaching Armenian soil, the text describes Aršak unleashing the following insult:

Away from me malignant servant, lording it over your lords! I shall not spare you or your children from the vengeance due to my ancestors, nor forgive the death of king Artewan. For you are but servants who have now taken the cushion from us, your lords. But I shall not concede this until that place of ours shall return to us!
Artewan is Artabanus IV (r. 213-224), the last Parthian king overthrown by Ardashir I (r. c. 206-242), the founder of the Sasanian dynasty. In denouncing the Sasanians as servants, Aršak could be referring to the tradition that Pabag, the father of Ardashir, was a local ruler in the province of Persia under Artabanus. The Sasanian's unjust usurpation of rule is symbolized by their taking of the cushion from the rightful Arcasid line. However, Aršak vows that he will not concede to Sasanian rule over Iran until Armenia is free.

As in this passage from the Epic Histories, in the ŠGW the single cushion on which Ādīnō sits is a sign of status and prestige. Whether the cushion is meant to indicate royalty as such is not clear, though one would imagine that such an association would not be inappropriate for a deity, even a false one. At the very least, the cushion indicates that Ādīnō has a higher status than Ābrāhīm and that the latter treats him as an honored guest. In the Talmudic passage and elsewhere the more cushions in the pile seem to indicate a higher status. According to that logic, depicting Ādīnō sitting on one cushion could be seen as a kind of damning with faint praise; he gets only one, as opposed to the six or seven of the Iranian king. However, as Aršak's outburst shows, even one cushion can stand metonymically for the whole complex of royalty and honor.

This source demonstrates particularly well the possibility of multiple determining elements intersecting in the citation in the ŠGW. This particularly Iranian motif is included in no other version of the story of Abraham's hospitality. Like the Armenian history, this citation draws on the symbolic value of the cushion as a marker of high status and kingship. The two texts are not directly related to each other but, rather, both draw from a larger, shared cultural framework.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have aimed to present the theoretical justification and textual support for a new interpretation of the sources of the critique of Judaism's citation of the story of Abraham's hospitality. The Qur'anic parallel, the Manichaean (or Marcionite) hymn, the Mandaean polemic, and the Armenian epic history all share motifs with the citation, and each of these texts illustrates a different relation to it. The Qur'an's versions of the Abraham story present an additional source for the tale of Abraham's angelic visitors. The Manichaean (or Marcionite) and Mandaean texts share motifs and names with the ŠGW's citation and are used in a similar polemical context. The final Armenian text points to the incorporation of a well known Iranian motif. While I have devoted considerable space to discussing each of these texts, I want to reiterate that my goal in this chapter is not to replace the midrashic texts other scholars have identified as the citation's sources. Not only would I not discount the importance of traditions preserved in rabbinic literature in Mardânfarroḵ's world, but none of the texts I have discussed—a selection that is by no means exhaustive—represents a "smoking gun," the source which must have directly influenced Mardânfarroḵ in composing the ŠGW. Rather, as in Foucault's definition of genealogy, I have attempted to show that in the case of the ŠGW's critique of Judaism, we are presented with "a singularity born out of multiple determining elements" the presentation of which "does not function according to any principle of closure."

I hope to have demonstrated in this chapter that the citation of Abrāhîm's hospitality does not rely solely on the rabbinic expansions of the story in Genesis 18. This means that the citation is best interpreted not as a text borrowed from and in relation to its origin, elsewhere, but in its context in the ŠGW. If the search for origins is inherently decontextualizing, in the sense that it looks for a source outside the text of the ŠGW, the alternative can be described as a project of contextualization. In the chapters that follow, I will attempt to show, in different ways, how individual citations in the critique of Judaism, and the critique as a whole, engage with the rest of Mardānfarrox's text and the ŠGW's overall theology and argument. As I hope to show, this engagement is deep, significant, and complex.
Chapter Three

Unnecessary Angels:
Angelology and Jewish Mysticism in the ŠGW

The Iranian context of the Babylonian Talmud has been a topic of renewed scholarly concern over the past decade and more. Reading the Bavli in Iran, as Shai Secunda titled one of his recent articles, has entailed the comparative study of the Talmud and Pahlavi literature. Working on the assumption that Jews and Zoroastrians inhabited a shared social space in late antique Mesopotamia, scholars have demonstrated the "acculturation," as Yaakov Elman has called the process, of Babylonian rabbis to the dominant Zoroastrian/Sasanian

2. Secunda, "Reading the Bavli."
3. Michael Morony, Iraq after the Muslim Conquest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) contains a survey of the various communities living in Mesopotamia at the time of the Muslim conquest. He notes that by the end of the Sasanian period Persians, some of whom had converted to Christianity and were no longer Zoroastrian (185), seem to have been concentrated in northern Iraq "along the line of the Zargos [mountains] as an extension of the ethnic settlement on the plateau; in a defensive perimeter along the southern border as garrison troops; in all of the major cities and towns as administrators and absentee landlords; and on estates scattered throughout the countryside" (189-190). For a general review of Morony's work see Moshe Gil and Shaul Shaked, Review of "Iraq After the Muslim Conquest," by Michael Morony, Journal of the American Oriental Society 106 (1986): 819-23. On the Zoroastrian population in northern Mesopotamia in the sixth century, as evidenced in Syriac writings, see Chase Robinson, Empires and Elites After the Muslim Conquest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 99-100.
norms and practices as they are represented in Pahlavi texts and contemporary Sasanian sources. Scholars have demonstrated parallels in the areas of culture, law, and literature.

While the validity of some of the parallels on which these Irano-Talmudic studies have been based has been called into question, this recent scholarship, as well as earlier studies on the prevalence of Middle Persian loanwords in Jewish Babylonian Aramaic, has shown that the Babylonian Talmud is the rabbinic work most engaged with the Sasanian cultural milieu, of which Zoroastrianism was a critical component. In the context of this dissertation, these recent studies sharpen the question of the origins of the critique of Judaism's citations broached in the previous chapter. Rather than asking about the relationship between the SGW and Jewish literature, or, even, rabbinic literature, in general, this research would seem to point in the direction of looking specifically at the parallels between the critique of Judaism and the Babylonian Talmud. If the Babylonian Talmud is the rabbinic text most indebted to its Iranian environment, would it not be the case as well that discussions of Judaism in Zoroastrian literature would be most indebted to the Babylonian Talmud?


This question entails two fallacies. First of all, the Iranian environment of late antique Sasanian Mesopotamia is not identical with Zoroastrianism, nor is it fully represented by the Zoroastrian Pahlavi literature composed several centuries later; this caveat has been noted by previous scholars. Secondly, along similar lines, the Babylonian Talmud is not identical with all Jews living under Iranian rule. The Talmud itself contains references to rival groups and individuals, and, furthermore, by the date of the composition of the ŠGW, organized opposition to growing rabbinic power had formed. These opposition groups, the Karaites principal among them, are well known to Islamic heresiographers. Particularly since they wrote in Arabic, there is no reason to suppose that they could not also have served as the sources of the citations in the critique.

Even taking these caveats into consideration, though, we are left with the fact that the ŠGW’s critique does include citations that are remarkably close to their parallels in the Babylonian Talmud, much closer than the parallels between the story of Abrāhīm’s hospitality and the midrashic expansion of Genesis 18 in tractate Bava Metsia. In this chapter, then, I will examine the three citations most similar to parallel sources in the Bavli. This examination will be a continuation of the discussion in the previous chapter in that it will also engage with the question of the origin of the critique of Judaism’s citations in Jewish literature.

At the same time, this chapter furthers the goal outlined at the end of Chapter One to demonstrate the embeddedness of the citations in the larger context of the ŠGW. For there is a further, thematic connection between the three citations discussed here. They are not only connected by the fact that they closely parallel Talmudic sources. Rather, angels are significant characters in all three citations. As I will argue in more detail in what follows, the reason for the citations’ particular depictions of angels is internal to the ŠGW, connected to the text’s overall polemical and theological goals.

The three citations are all found in ŠGW Chapter Fourteen: 14:34 and 36 deal with a conflict between divine and angelic power; 14:75-79 describes the angels’ objection to God’s punishment of the innocent with the sinners; and 14:58-70 demonstrates the Jewish God’s inability to control human destiny. In his discussion of the citations, Mardāngarrox never critiques angelic existence as such, meaning that he does not point to Jewish belief in the existence of divine beings other than God as a contradiction of monotheism. Nevertheless, in all three citations, angels are portrayed as weak, oppressed, and abused. After first comparing the angelic citations with parallel passages in the Babylonian Talmud, I will argue that these citations may be restituted as a response to Jewish mystical traditions that ascribe to angels power equaling God’s. Finally, I will discuss how the ŠGW’s reshaping of these traditions further challenges the current scholarly consensus that Mardāngarrox was directly influenced by rabbinic literature.

The ŠGW's Angels

In all three of the citations, angels are active characters, central to the narrative and to Mardānfarroxf's critique. The centrality of angels to these citations can be demonstrated with the translation and brief discussion of each citation and its rabbinic parallels. For the reasons outlined above, I will focus in my analysis on the parallel passages to each citation found in the Babylonian Talmud; other parallels will be mentioned in the notes.

We can consider first a pair of linked citations found in ŠGW 14:34-37. I will include Mardānfarroxf's commentary on these citations as it makes explicit his understanding of the citations' portrayal of divine violence against angels.

(34) Īnca gōeṭ ku "aḇaṭr tɔx tnišìnɔt ᱠ kɔ cihār fɾiʃtɔa aḇaṭr fɑɾi dāɾɔnɔd kɔʃɔ aʔ z ʂɔŋ bär hɑŋ yk ɾōdɑ i ạtəʃi əʃəʃ ɦəmā ɾəβət."  
(35) nũŋ ƙa ọi məinĩiɔ hast nɔ təni-kارد əgiʃə14 ɕi həmâr məstəmând i ʃəɾ ɡaro bãr pã raŋi dâʃtɔn ɕi?  
(36) dît fiŋ ƙu "həɾ rōʒ pɑ xʃʃ dast nəbaṭʃ hazər fɾiʃtɔa ʃiʃət, vəʃ əndə ʃəvə ɡâh15 ɦəmâr pəɾəʃtɔnd, ʋaʃə pã pɔ rōd-ʃ i ạtəʃi ő dōʒɔx ɦɔʃət."  
(37) ka dît16 ƙust ɯ aʃɔdâdî ʃi ɬa fiŋ əiʃnɔa pã kãɾ ɯ ɚkɔbɔa ɬ u hûkuniʃnĩ ģəʃɔiia bûdɔn ɬuʃ səʃət?  
(38) ka ọi məstəmând ʃiʃtɔa i tars-ągãh i fəɾmən nɨʃɔx ɬ aʃiʃəa kuniʃnĩ jumɛ aʃərə ɡûnəhқəɾə ő dōʒɔx i ŋəʃədəʃnãa əʃəgãnɔt?

(34) It says there as well: "He sits on a throne which four angels carry on their wings which from its weight a fiery river flows out."  
(35) Now when he is spiritual and not corporeal, what is the reason those four pitiful ones painfully bear that heavy burden?  
(36) This as well: "Every day, with his own hand, he forms ninety thousand angels, and they praise him until evening time, and then he abandons them in a fiery river to hell."  
(37) Again, when violence and injustice of this sort (exists), how is it fitting (for) mortal beings to persist in good deeds? (38) When he casts those poor angels, reverent, obedient and pure-acting, along with the other sinners into eternal hell?

Both these citations, at least in Mardānfarroxf's understanding, describe divine violence against angels. Suffering under the weight of God's throne—and Mardānfarroxf, in his critique of this citation, emphasizes that it portrays God as unfittingly corporeal—the angels' sweat pours out as fire. The second citation, criticized for its portrayal of God's unjustified violence, describes the daily massacre of the entire heavenly host.

These two images are linked in the talmudic parallel in BT Hagigah 13b-14a. The text there concerns a Midrash on Daniel 7:9 and 10, describing the throne and countenance of the

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14. Following the Sanskrit tatāstōpāṃ. See Jamasp-Asana and West, Shikand, 44.
16. De Menasce, Apologétique, 198 amends to dît. The same (incorrect?) spelling with a long vowel also occurs elsewhere at ŠGW 14:32. While the Sanskrit translation of drṣī implies that the past stem of dīdan, "to see," is meant, this would result in an unexpected verb-initial syntax and a befuddling translation.
the Ancient of Days. The key verse in this description is the depiction of the fiery river which flows from or before the divine throne. "A river of fire was flowing and coming out from before him. Thousands of thousands were serving him, and myriads of myriads were attending him. The court sat in judgement and the books were opened."17

The passage in tractate Hagigah is concerned with the question of the origin of this river and its ultimate destination. The text states that the river flows from the sweat of the hayyot, the four divine creatures supporting God's throne in the visions in Ezekiel 1 and Isaiah 6.18 Rav Zutra bar Tuvia adds that the river pours out in the end on the head of sinners in Hell. Later on in the Hagigah passage, after an intervening discussion, Shmuel states:

ר"א
כל ו הבא מתיכן אלפים אלף מלאכים מבא ואמר אביו השם השם של"הใกล้ על הקדוש ברה

Every single day twelve-thousand ministering angels are created from the river of fire, sing praises and are destroyed, as it says: "they are renewed every morning: ample is your faithfulness (Lam 3:23)."

There is not a marked difference between the language of the talmudic passage and that of the ŠGW's citation.20 However, the significance of the images is quite different. Rather than being a mark of divine violence, for instance, the angels' continual creation and destruction is a sign of God's faithfulness. The prooftext from Lamentations bears out this interpretation. There, despite God's wrath at the peoples' transgressions and his destruction of the Temple and Jerusalem, the poet places his hope in the abundance of divine mercy, which is renewed every dawn.21 The same process is at work on the cosmic scale: like day follows night, the


19. BT Hagigah 14a. The text follows MS. Munich 6. The other manuscripts do not significantly differ except for Munich 6's inclusion of the number of angels created.

20. Interestingly in light of what follows, the heikhalot literature also includes a passage which combines the two motifs of sweating angels and the fiery river. There, however, there is no mention of angelic destruction in the river of fire but rather of the "rivers of fire and the sea of fire which surrounds the throne of glory, from which come the hosts of angels, the ministering angels, and stand to the right of the throne." This text is §785 of the Oxford manuscript 1531 (Peter Schäfer, ed., Synopse zur Hekhalot-Literatur [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1981], 274). My thanks to Abraham Yoskovitz for pointing me to this passage and for sharing with me his work on this section of tractate Hagigah.

21. Lamentations 3:21ff: "Yet one thing I will keep in mind which will give me hope: God's mercy is surely not at an end, nor is his pity exhausted. They are renewed every morning; ample is your faithfulness!" For a discussion of this verse in the context of the chapter as a whole, see Delbert R. Hillers, ed., Lamentations, vol. 7A of The Anchor Bible, ed. William Foxwell Albright and David Noel Freedman (New York: Doubleday, 1972), 54-74.
heavenly host are ever recreated anew out of the fiery river which is itself the instrument of justice, pouring on the heads of the sinners in Hell.

Further on in the same passage in tractate Hagigah the Bavli also records an objection to Shmuel's statement:

And this disagrees with Rabbi Samuel bar Nahmani, for Rabbi Samuel bar Nahmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: "From every single utterance which leaves the mouth of the Holy One Blessed be He is created an angel, as it says 'By the word of God were the heavens made; and all the host of them by the breath of His mouth'" (Psalms 23:6).23

The objection is not ethical but scriptural: how can it be that the angels are recreated only every day when elsewhere scripture states that an angel arises from God's every utterance?

A similar characterization of divine violence against angels can be found in a second citation at ŠGW 14:75-78. This citation describes God's punishment of the innocent with the sinners and the angels' suppressed objection to this evident injustice.

(75) And in that place it says about his incoherent speech: (76) "I have struck down the flock of the sinners along with countless innocents." (77) When the angels protested that this is an act without reason, he said: 'I am Ādinō,24 the Lord all-powerful, (78) supreme, without rival, absolute, and no one dares to speak against me.'"

Here the angels who would resist the divine injustice are, though the citation does not make this point explicitly, suppressed by the declaration of God's power. This declaration is, of course, ironic, given that it comes at the end of two chapters devoted to demonstrating the limitations and contradictions of that power. Nevertheless, it does show God's triumph, at the very least, over the angels. Again, the ŠGW depicts the angels in a subservient position, under God's thumb if not literally under his throne.

The Talmudic parallel scholars have identified for this citation is far from exact and for this reason I will refrain from citing it in full. BT Sanhedrin 38b relates that when God wished to create humankind, he first asked the opinion of the ministering angels. The angels,

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22. BT Hagigah 14a according to MS. Munich 6.
23. Genesis Rabbah 88:1 (Theodor and Albeck, Bereshit Rabba, 2:916) includes a different objection, that the Bible elsewhere describes angels, like the one who struggled with Jacob, who are not destroyed with the dawn.
24. On the name Ādinō see Chapter Two.
considering this proposal, asked what human deeds would be. When they were told—and the Talmudic text does not clarify exactly what information God conveyed—they advised that humankind was not worthy of creation. God destroyed this group of angels; a second group he created met with the same fate. However, regarding the third group the text states:

The third band said to him: "Master of the world, the first [angels] who spoke to you, what benefit did they bring? The entire world is yours. Everything you want to do in your world, do." When the generation of the flood and the generation of the [linguistic] dispersion whose actions are accursed arrived, they said to him: "Master of the world, did not the previous ones speak rightly to you: 'What is a human being that you are mindful of him, [a son of man that you care for him]'?" (Psalms 8:5) He said to them: "Until you grow old I am the one; and when you grow gray, I will bear you. I have done it, and I will carry you; I will bear you, and I will save you" (Isaiah 46:4).26

Confronted with the reality of the evil deeds of humanity which preceded the flood, as described in Genesis 6:5, and the hubris of the builders of the tower of Babel, as described in Genesis 9:4-7, the third group can no longer hold their tongues. They agree with the previous bands of angels that it would have been better for humankind never to have been created.

As discussed by Philip Alexander, the exegetical impetus behind this verse is the problem of the use of the plural in Genesis 1:26 when God says "let us make man in our image, according to our likeness." As is attested elsewhere in rabbinic literature,27 the Bavli solves the problem of these plurals, which would seem to compromise divine unity, by saying that God consulted with the angels before embarking on the creation of humankind. Interestingly, in light of the version in the ŠGW, the angelic advice is dismissed out of hand. As Alexander states, "the story appears to introduce the angels only to denigrate them."28

25. The citation of the Talmud follows the version in the Yemenite manuscript Yad Harav Herzog 1. Despite having been copied only in the sixteenth century, this manuscript retains ancient readings. On the character of this manuscript (which includes BT Sanhedrin, Makkot, and a small portion of Taanit) see Mordechai Sabato, A Yemenite Manuscript of Tractate Sanhedrin and its Place in the Textual Tradition (Jerusalem: Ben Zvi Institute, 1998).


28. Philip Alexander, "3 Enoch and the Talmud," Journal for the Study of Judaism 18 (1987): 40-68; the quotation is on page 47. Alexander discusses a parallel to this story in the heikhalot text 3 Enoch—on which more below—which names the three angels who make the complaint against man as 'Uzzah, 'Azzah,
In its original context, the verse from Isaiah with which God answers speaks to the difference between the mute idols of the nations and the one God of Israel. While idols only move when carried by their worshipers, God carries his people through their times of trouble from infancy to old age. This verse lends the talmudic passage an entirely opposite meaning from the ŠGW's citation. In the Talmud, God is the figure protecting humankind from the angels' dismissal, if not destruction. In the ŠGW, on the other hand, the roles are reversed: it is God himself who seeks injustice and the angels who are powerless to stay his hand. While the hierarchy of power is essentially the same, the ethical orientation of the members of that hierarchy is reversed.

The final citation I will discuss is actually presented first in the ŠGW. The citation, which demonstrates the God's inability to control human destiny, appears at ŠGW 14:58-70. I have chosen to address it last because its characterization of suppressed angels is the most ambiguous. The citation reads as follows:

(58) And it says in that place: "There was a sick man who, with his wife and children, was suffering greatly, poor and without resources. (59) He was always diligent and active in prayer and fasting and supplication to God. (60) One day in his

and 'Aza'el. It is interesting to note that the anonymous tenth century New Persian translation of Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Ṭabarî's commentary on the Qur'ān includes a version of this story very close to 3 Enoch's. There, in a comment to Qur'ān 2:30, three angels, Gabriel, Michael, and Azriel, are sent in succession to the land on which will one day stand Mecca in order to gather clay from which to create the first man. The earth tells each of these angels in turn of human beings' future bloodshed and destruction. The first two angels return to heaven empty-handed having refused to carry out their task. It is only Azriel who, claiming the superiority of God's command, takes up the earth to heaven. Habib Yaghma'i, Tarjumah-i Tafsir-i Tabari, (Tehran: Intisharat-i Daneshgah-i Tehran, 1960), 1:44-45.

30. De Menasce, Apologétique, 201 emends to lāw on the basis of Manichaean Middle Persian làb, meaning "entreaty" or "supplication." The Sanskrit translation guptamahāpisatasayācata, however, like Middle Persian rāz, points to the semantic field of the secret. The first part of the compound, guptama-, means "secretly" or "privately." See Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 359.
prayer he requested in secret: 'Give me some happiness in my lot (61) so that my
life will be easier.'

(62) An angel descended and said to him: 'God has not apportioned in the stars a
lot better than this. (63) It is not possible to apportion a new lot. (64) But, in rec-
ompense for your supplication and prayer, I have created for you a four-legged
jeweled throne in heaven. (65) If necessary, I will give you one leg of that throne.'

(66) That prophet asked the counsel of his wife.

(67) His wife said: 'It is better that we be satisfied with a poor lot and bad life in
the material world (68) than if we, among our companions, have a three-legged
throne in heaven. (69) But if you can, obtain our lot by another means.'

(70) That angel came again saying: 'Even if I destroy the firmament and create
anew the heaven and earth and fashion and create anew the movement of the stars,
it is not evident from that whether your fate would be better or worse.'"

Mardānfarrox critiques this citation at ŠGW 14:71-71:

(71) ǝž īn saxun aβa pādā ku nā ṣat ǝi hast baxtār i rōžī u brīn (72) u baxšašni nā
pa kām i ǝi u baxt vardinidan nā31 tuça. (73) u gardašni i spihir u xūr u māh u
stāraga nā āndar fārābasta32 dānašni kām u farmaṇ i ǝi. (74) ǝncu ku tæxt yaš
nigšinīt33 ku āndar vaḥāšt dæhom nā ǝž kunišni u dahišni i ǝi.

(71) From these words it is apparent that he himself is not the dispenser of lots and
destiny, (72) their allotment is not according to his will and he cannot change fate.
(73) The revolution of the sphere, the sun, moon, and stars are not in the compass
of his knowledge, will, and command. (74) This as well, that the throne that he
announces: "I will give it in heaven," is not a product of his work and creation.

In his critique, Mardānfarrox interprets the angel as a messenger of God; the angel's
speech and actions reflect God's own power and capabilities. As he is portrayed in this pas-
sage, God cannot have the power befitting an omnipotent and omniscient deity. God is
unable to change the fate of the suffering saint and his family. Moreover, even if he were to
destroy the heavens and fashion them anew, he is ignorant of whether this change would
result in a better or worse situation.34 As the wife remarks, a chair leg in this world, even a
jeweled one, is cold comfort when, in eternity, one will be left with a broken throne. The
wife's reference to their heavenly company points to shame as a driving force in her refusal to
accept the chair leg; this theme also appears in the talmudic parallel.35

31. MS. JE omits.
32. Jamasp-Asana and West, Shikand, 149 inserts i.
33. De Menasce, Apologétique, 200 emends to niwāðinit, "to announce." Sanskrit niveditam also means "to
tell," "proclaim," or "report" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 559).
34. This criticism is especially cutting because the restoration of the world is precisely Ohrmazd's function at
the end of time. See Shaul Shaked, "Eschatology I: In Zoroastrianism and Zoroastrian Influence" (London:
35. Shame has been emphasized as one of the defining features of the culture of the late, anonymous redactors
of the Babylonian Talmud by Jeffrey Rubenstein. Comparing the Babylonian Talmud and rabbinic
literature written in late antique Palestine—the Palestinian Talmud, the Midrashim, etc.—Rubenstein finds
As all the scholars who have investigated this text have noted, this citation is very similar to a story about Rabbi Hanina ben Dosa found in BT Taanit 25a. 

His wife said to him: "Until when will be remain poor this way?" He said to her: "What shall we do?" [She said to him:] "Pray that you should receive something." He prayed and a sort of hand came out and gave him one leg of a golden table.

She said to him: "What is this?" He said to her: "In the future they will eat off a table with three legs and we from a table lacking [a leg]." "And what should we do?" "[Pray that] it should be taken from you." He prayed and a sort of a hand came out and took it from his hand.

The punchline in the ŠGW version, regarding the angel's inability to promise a better fate even if he makes the world anew, is found later in the same section of the Talmud in connection to a different impoverished rabbinic hero, Rabbi Elazar ben Pedat:

that "when we compare rabbinic stories we often find that the Bavli [=Babylonian Talmud ST] version stresses the theme of shame where the Yerushalmi [=Palestinian Talmud ST] does not mention it." See Jeffrey Rubenstein, *The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 67-79 and, for the quotation, 68. However, Rubenstein's characterization has recently come under attack. In a comprehensive review article, Isaiah Gafni has argued that Rubenstein has imposed a too-rigid distinction between early and later sources. See Gafni, "Rethinking Talmudic History: The Challenge of Literary and Redaction Criticism," *Jewish History* 25 (2011): 355-75.


37. Interestingly, only MS. Oxford 23 has the Middle Persian loanword אכואנא, from Middle Persian xwān, meaning "tray" or "table," in place of the standard Aramaic synonym פותר. See MacKenzie, *CPD*, 95 and Sokoloff, *Dictionary*, 129.

38. Following MS. Yad Harav Herzog 1. Other manuscripts and the standard printed edition of the Talmud (Vilna, 19th century) contain numerous variants. Of relevance to the present discussion is the fact that all the other extant manuscripts (though not the Vilna edition nor the Pesaro printing of 1516) make no mention of the heavenly hand descending to deliver the table leg. Instead, these versions state that it was cast down to him without specifying the means or identifying an agent. For a further discussion of the manuscript tradition see Galit Hasan-Rokem, "Ha-im hayu haza'l muda'im le-musag ha-folklor?," in *Higayon L'Yona: New Aspects in the Study of Midrash, Aggadah and Piyut in Honor of Professor Yonah Fraenkel*, ed. Joshua Levinson, et al. (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2006), 119-229. Versions of this story also appear in *Midrash Tehilim* 92:8; BT Berachot 32a and BT Shabbat 1456a-b. God's inability to alter fate is also mention by Hiwi ha-Balkhi. See Rosenthal, "Hiwi," 328.

39. This image seems to derive from the "form of a hand" (шибת יד) mentioned in Ezekiel 8:3.
Rabbi Elazar ben Pedat was bled [as a medical procedure] and he did not have anything to eat. He took a clove of garlic and put it in his mouth. He became unwell. The rabbis came to ask after his welfare and saw that he was crying and laughing and that a branch of fire went out from his forehead. They said to him: "What is the reason that you are crying and laughing and that a branch of fire is coming out of your forehead?" He said to them: "The Divine Presence was with me. She said to me, 'Elazar my son, do you want me to destroy the world and start over? Perhaps you would be born in a time of food.' I said to her, 'All this and [you say only] perhaps [I would be born in a time of food]! Which is longer, how long I have lived until now, or as long as I will live?' She said: 'What you have lived until now.' I said: 'If so, I do not want it.' She said to me, 'As a reward for your saying 'I do not want it', I will give you in the world to come thirteen rivers like the Euphrates and Tigris and they will plant along them pure balsam trees.' I

40. The other manuscripts have here similar, meaning "more" or "of greater number," while the Pesaro printing of 1516 has יַסְפָה. As pointed out to me by Reuven Kipperwasser, one solution to the unintelligible form יַסְפָה in which the final letters have been dropped and the ג confused with ג is that it is a misreading of the copyist of Yad Harav Herzog 1 of a closely written form of יַסְפָה which the final letters have been dropped and the ג confused with ג. Daniel Boyarin suggests that it could also be a misreading of יָסְפָה.

41. A scribal error for יָסְפָה.

42. This is a corruption of the phrase as it appears, for instance, in MS. Munich 140: "... with a fingerbone on my forehead." See the discussion in Sokoloff, Dictionary, 150.

43. This citation also follows Yad Harav Herzog 1. On the thirteen rivers the righteous receive in paradise see also Palestinian Talmud Avodah Zara 18b (3:1)


said before him, 'This and no more?' He struck me with his finger bone on my
forehead and said to me, 'Elazar my son, I have shot an arrow at you.'

In their context in the Bavli, both these stories are included in a narrative chain of
tales about poverty stricken but righteous believers. The underlying thematic connections
are apparent. Hanina ben Dosa and Elazar ben Pedat both give up divine aid in this world for
the sake of their heavenly reward. In both cases the aid they would receive here is less than
satisfactory: a golden table leg is a far cry from a table, for all its value, and, as in the ŠGW,
the destruction and recreation of the world is no guarantee of Elazar ben Pedat's richness next
time. Unlike the ŠGW, however, Elazar ben Pedat's decision to make do with his rewards in
the world to come is at least as much dependent on the practical calculation of his lifespan as
it is on the certainty or uncertainty of a better fate. Moreover, the sage's refusal of the possi-
bility of earthly riches, calculated though it may be, is itself rewarded by further pleasures in
the next world; no such reward is made available to the sage in the ŠGW.

The character of the angel in the ŠGW story is foregrounded in comparison with the
Talmud's narratives. While in Hanina ben Dosa's story one assumes that it is an angel who
offers the golden chair leg, the only appearance of this angel is as a disembodied hand
descending from heaven. In the second story there is no angel at all; Elazar ben Pedat con-
verses with God himself. In the ŠGW, rather than being God's silent, (mostly) unseen, and, in
the second tale, absent minion, the angel makes a distinction between himself and God.
While God has not apportioned a better lot for the suffering sage, the angel offers the throne
leg as compensation. Similarly, it is the angel in his second appearance, who explains that,
though he has the power to destroy the heavens, he cannot guarantee a better lot. In the
Talmud's version, Hanina ben Dosa himself realizes the provenance and significance of the
table leg. Again, while we cannot exclude the possibility, there is no explicit statement that
the angel is conveying God's message or, more importantly, offering an estimation of the lim-
itations of God's own power rather than his own. Though Mardānfarrox does use this citation
to demonstrate the Jewish God's powerlessness over the motions of heavenly bodies and the
human fates they control, in the citation itself it is far from clear that the angel's power and
God's can be collapsed into one.

The subservience of angels to God is, of course, present in Talmudic narratives just as
it is in the ŠGW; in the stories mentioned above and others which could be cited, this theme
is foregrounded. However, rabbinic literature also contains depictions of angels' vast power
which, in some cases, can even be confused with the power of the divine. These positive
descriptions are precisely what is missing in the ŠGW. Even in those cases where angels are
given more power than in the Talmudic parallels, particularly in the story of the suffering

46. This narrative chain is discussed in Hasan-Rokem, "Folk Narratives." For an analysis of the redaction
history of the Hanina ben Dosa stories see Tal Ilan, Massekhet Ta'anit: Text, Translation and Commentary
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 254-58.
47. ŠGW 14:71-73.
48. On angels in rabbinic literature see the discussion in Urbach, The Sages, 135-83; Peter Schäfer, Rivalität
zwischen Engeln und Menschen: Untersuchungen zur rabinischen Engelvorstellung. (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter, 1975); Saul M. Olyan, A Thousand Thousands Served Him: Exegesis and the Naming of Angels in
Ancient Judaism (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1993); and Bill Rebiger, "Angels in Rabbinic Literature," in
Angels: The Concept of Celestial Beings - Origins, Development and Reception, ed. Friedrich V. Reiterer, et
al. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 629-44.
sage, that power is not sufficient. In this way we can hear the angel's final comment to the suffering sage as tinged with sorrow: even if I refashioned the world, I cannot guarantee that you would end up better off.

**Metatron**

More than simply an interesting thematic connection between these narratives, the prevalence of angelology and the particular characterization of weak angels in the ŠGW is arresting in light of what we know of the role of angels in late antique Judaism.49 As discussed in a recent essay by Daniel Boyarin, a theology which ascribed vast powers and authority to angelic beings was widespread among Jews in this period and after.50 One facet of this theology was the belief that a heavenly figure known as Metatron served as God's coequal, sharing his power, bearing his name, sitting on a divine throne, and officiating as a heavenly High Priest; he was the Son of Man and Prince of the Divine Presence.51 Forms of this belief in the near-divine power of Metatron appear in the mystical collections which have come down to us, a body of texts known collectively as *heikhalot* literature,52 and in the Babylonian Talmud. In a number of passages, in particular a seminal text in BT Hagigah 15a, this theology is characterized as a belief in "two powers in heaven"53 and explained as originating in a misinterpretation of a mystical vision by the rabbinic apostate and arch-heretic Elisha ben Abuya, also known as Aher, the Other. In the company of three other early rabbinic sages, Ben Azzai, Ben Zoma, and Rabbi Akiva, Elisha ben Abuya entered the divine enclosure known as the *pardes*.54 While each of the sages was effected in a different way—only Rabbi Akiva escaped unscathed—the story states that Elisha "chopped down the shoots." The text explicates this laconic statement:

49. I am including, here, the first Islamic centuries within the period of late antiquity. For a critical evaluation of this periodization and its underlying assumptions, see Robinson, "Truth and Consequences."


53. For a reflection on the possible Zoroastrian context of the two powers doctrine see Secunda, "Reading the Bavli."

54. On the political designation of this term as a garden-palace within ancient Iranian culture and rabbinic literature, see Maria E. Subtelny, "The Tale of the Four Sages who Entered the Pardes: A Talmudic Enigma from an Iranian Perspective," *Jewish Studies Quarterly* 11 (2004): 3-58 and further discussion in Chapter Four.
"Aher chopped down the shoots." Of him the verse says: "Do not let your mouth lead you into sin, and do not say before the angel that it was a mistake; why should God be angry at your words, and destroy the work of your hands?" (Ecclesiastes 5:5) What did he see? He saw that Metatron had been given permission to sit for an hour a day and write the good deeds of Israel. He said: "We have a tradition that in heaven there is no standing and no sitting, no jealousy and no competition, no back and no tiredness. Perhaps, heaven forfend, there are two powers!" They took Metatron and hit him with sixty lashes of fire. He [Metatron] was given permission to remove the good deeds of Aḥer. A Heavenly Voice came out and said "'Return backsliding Children' (Jeremiah 3:14), except for Aḥer."

Upon seeing Metatron sitting in the role of divine judge and recording the good deeds of Israel, a function which should be reserved only for God, Elisha arrived at the mistaken conclusion that Metatron was the divine coequal. In order to demonstrate his subservience to the divine, Metatron is administered lashes. Elisha ben Abuya, for his part, was forced out of the rabbinic fold; it is at this point that he acquires the moniker Aḥer.

Previous scholars have, following the Talmud's lead, characterized the "two powers" doctrine as a heresy. In this scheme, the rabbinic texts, which ascribe to a stricter, though not absolute, monotheism, are contrasted with these mystical doctrines which at some point deviated from the mainline of Jewish orthodoxy. These scholars characterize the belief in an angelic coregent as secondary, belated, and marginal. Boyarin, however, argues persuasively that this characterization is a misrepresentation. Following the model of recent research on Christian heresy, he makes the salient point that most of the doctrines labeled as "heresies" are actually part of the main body of the religion itself: "almost always the so-called 'heresy' is not a new invader from outside but an integral and usually more ancient version of the religious tradition that is now being dis-

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55. The text is quoted according to MS. Munich 6. The major difference between the manuscript witnesses and the printed edition is that the manuscripts lack the following question put to Metatron by anonymous members of the divine retinue: "They said to him: 'when you saw him [Elisha], why did you not get up before him?'" For a discussion of the manuscript tradition see Alexander, "3 Enoch and the Talmud," 54.

56. On the hermeneutic character of this list see Boyarin, "Beyond Judaism," 347.

57. Lashes of fire appear elsewhere in the Babylonian Talmud as a particularly strict form of punishment. See BT Yoma 77a on the whipping of the angel Gabriel, BT Bava Metsia 47a in a metaphorical context, and further the lexicographical discussion in Sokoloff, Dictionary, 889.

58. The scholarly literature generated by this story is considerable. For a recent discussion in the context of the wider development of Jewish mysticism see Peter Schaefer, The Origins of Jewish Mysticism (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 196-203 and the sources quoted there.

59. The classical statement of this position is Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and Gnosticism (Leiden: Brill, 1977).
placed by a newer set of conceptions, portraying the relations almost mystifyingly in the
direct opposite of the observed chronologies."\(^{60}\) This same process is at work in rabbinic
Judaism's delegitimization of the "two powers" doctrine. When the Talmud, in the famous
passage in Hagigah mentioned above and elsewhere, casts this doctrine as heretical by
putting it in the mouth of sectarians, it is an attempt to excise a widespread, popular, and thor-
oughly "Jewish" belief.\(^{61}\) Rabbinic theology, in this conception, is only one aspect, and not
by any means the most important, of a "polymorphous Judaism." To read back from the
rabbis' later supremacy a march of triumphant rabbinic orthodoxy beginning in antiquity is
merely to relate history as the winners wish it to be told. As Boyarin summarizes his posi-
tion, if these traditions about Metatron

represent indeed the common religious heritage of much of Israel— again, not
all—and not particular sectarian formations, as I am convinced they do, then the
evidence just offered for such theology in the heart of the rabbinic socio-cultural
world is rendered even more cogent. I would go so far as to suggest (but in a very
tentative and preliminary fashion) that on the basis of the rabbinc material ad-
duced it is the Son of Man, Enoch, Metatron, Christ, who is always at issue when
"Two Powers in Heaven" is broached in rabbinc literature. The talmudic Rabbis,
it would seem, sought, if not surely to get rid of Metatron, to ensure that Jews not
regard him as in any sense a second, even if lesser, version of YHWH.\(^{62}\)

Two Powers in the ŠGW

Given this widespread belief in angelic co-regency, how should we interpret the weak,
oppressed, and abused angels who populate these three citations in the critique of Judaism?
In certain ways, the depiction of powerless angels in the ŠGW is reminiscent of the delegit-
imization of the "two powers" doctrine in rabbinc literature. One answer to the question
posed above, then, could be that the ŠGW is, in the end, borrowing from traditions circulating
in rabbinc circles. In these traditions, the role of angels would already have been degraded
and they would arrive at Mardānfarrox ready-made, as it were. According to this model, the

61. On the continuity of these beliefs in the period of the Geonim—that is to say, roughly contemporaneous
with Mardānfarrox—and Geonic responses see Brody, Geonim, 142-47 and the sources quoted there.
Karaite texts also condemn belief in angels—including Metatron—magic and mystical speculation, all of
which they identify with the rabbis and their followers. See the discussion of the tenth century scholar al-
Qrijysi in Jacob Mann, Texts and Studies in Jewish History and Literature (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union
College, 1931), 2:55-57; George Vajda, "Etudes sur Qrijysi: la magie, la mantique et l'astrologie selon le
'Livre des lumieres et des vigies,'" Revue des Études Juives 106 (1946): 87-123; and Fred Astren, Karaite
Judaism and Historical Understanding (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), 72-76.
The Jewish belief in Metatron is also noted by Muslim authors. See al-Mas'udi's analysis of the belief in
Adang, Muslim Writers, 100-1. Abū Muḥammad 'Alī ibn Ahmad ibn Sa'id ibn Hazm, the tenth century
Andalusian writer and polemicist also mentions the Jewish belief in Metatron, "by which they mean the
smaller God." See the discussion in Lazarus-Yafeh, Intertwined Worlds, 31-32. Martin Schwartz notes that
Metatron, spelled mitāṭrūn, also appears in the Kitāb ar-Rahmat fi at-Tibb wa'l-Hikmat by the fifteenth
century Egyptian polymath Jalāl ad-Dīn 'Abd ar-Rahmān as-Suyūṭī. On this text see Schwartz, "Qumran,
Turfan."
depiction of the powerlessness of the angels in these citations would originate in an earlier rabbinic source. In this case, this depiction would have little relevance to the compositional structure or theological goals of the ŠGW itself.

There is, however, a second and, to my mind, more compelling reading. Rather than seeing the degradation of the angels in the ŠGW citations as deriving from a previous demotion of angelic power already having taken place in rabbinic texts or among rabbinic circles, one can read these as two parallel processes. Both texts, rabbinic and Zoroastrian, alter certain widely circulating angelological traditions to suit their own ideological purposes. While the rabbis are engaged in a theological contest with the "two powers" doctrine itself, the ŠGW depicts downtrodden angels for a different reason, connected with the overall goal of the critique of Judaism.

Judaism is included in the ŠGW and given the considerable attention it merits not for its own sake or for the dangers it might pose as an attractive doctrinal alternative to wayward Zoroastrian youth. Rather, Judaism—along with, though differently than, Islam—represents the theological challenge of monotheism to Zoroastrian dualism. In ŠGW Chapter Ten, a summary of the logical demonstration of the rationality of Zoroastrian dualism and an introduction to the critiques of the revealed religions in the second half of the work, Mardānfarrox discusses a rubric under which he organizes the dogmas and beliefs he describes. ŠGW 10:39-42 reads:

(39) yak ā kə gōōt ku hamā nākī u anāī i pa gəhə až yəzaṭ. (40) yak ā kə gōōt ku hamā nākī i gəhə ômōdica i pa ruuə buxtaŋ až yəzaṭ, (41) u hamā anāī i tan bīmica i ruuə až āharman vəhən. (42) hamā až baxşašni i in du bun də kərdə kərdə bənəna bənəna fənəft hənd

(39) One is that which says that all goodness and evil which are in the world are from God. (40) One is that which says that the cause of all goodness which is in the world and of all hope in saving the soul is from God, (41) while the cause of all evil in the body and of all fear in the soul is from Ahriman. (42) All is from the apportionment of these two fundamental principles which become parted and divided.

This schematized division is, of course, not a full representation of the theologies addressed in the critique. Manichaeanism is also a dualistic religion, though its materialist dualism and logically contradictory notion of infinity are attacked by Mardānfarrox. Christianity is, like Judaism, a monotheistic faith. However this monotheism, at least in the eyes of the author of the ŠGW, is compromised by the doctrines of the Trinity, the critique of which takes up the majority of the chapter on Christian belief. The ŠGW’s treatment of Islam attacks the same

63. At ŠGW 10:78-79 Mardānfarrox states that his book is aimed at new Zoroastrian initiates (nō-āmōţagag) in order to inform their judgement about rival faiths. See the further discussion of this passage in Chapter Five.
64. Translation follows Cereti, "Notes on the Škand Gumānīg Wizār," 4-5.
66. ŠGW Chapter Fifteen, in particular 15:18-68. See also the discussion in Gignoux, "Škand Gumānīg Vīzār."
points which are raised in the critique of Judaism: both set out to prove the unsuitability of the monotheistic position and the critique of Islam states explicitly that it is addressing those who claim that one God is the author of both good and evil.\(^{67}\) Again, what distinguishes the two is the style; it is only in the critique of Judaism that Mardanfarrox explicitly cites at length from a text. In any event, if Judaism, like Islam, is to serve as the foil to Zoroastrian dualism, it has to be rendered monotheistically extreme: there is no space in this heaven for another power.\(^{68}\)

The motif of powerless, oppressed, destroyed, and silenced angels in the ŠGW might be a means of suppressing the kind of doctrines of angelic power, represented by the belief in the divine coequal Metatron, that would compromise Judaism's absolute monotheism. In light of this hypothesis, a number of the details in the passages above can be seen to gain new significance. The figure of the throne in particular, which appears in two of the citations, can be read in a new light. In ŠGW 14:34, the angels struggle and sweat under the weight of the divine throne. The same word used in that context, Pazand text, is also used to designate the jeweled throne in the citation in 14:58-70. Unlike the talmudic parallel, it is a leg of this throne, not a table leg, which the angel presents to the suffering saint in recompense for his poverty and piousness. This repetition is significant in light of the role that the divine throne plays in Jewish esoteric speculation,\(^{69}\) in particular in the context of the "two powers" doctrine.

The biblical Book of Daniel, where the image of the river of fire originally appears and which underlies the Talmud's discussion of angelic destruction and regeneration in tractate Hagigah, is the site of considerable speculation on the "two powers" doctrine. Daniel 7:9, mentioned only in passing above, contains the following description:

\[
\text{טוה תודת. טע יי קרוכן דרומי. ותעיסא יומין. יתב: יבשות פלחה חור. ושיש ראתה网页ו ינaida, קרציה. שמע בו דנינו, טלאווה נ動作 דלקט:}
\]

As I looked on, thrones were set up, and the Ancient of Days took his seat. His clothing was as white as snow, and the hair of his head was like clean fleece. His throne was fiery flames, with wheels of blazing fire.

It is the verse immediately following which describes the river of fire we find in BT Hagigah and the ŠGW. Another throne is mentioned only a few verses later, in Daniel 7:13-14:

\[
\text{טוה תודת. ליא ארויל ש苊 טעין, ישמעו בכר אاهتم האמה התה אום-יימין, ותעיסא יומין משקה יוהמוניה. (13) עי ông חורה והתחא ורחו והוילו יכל לארוקא אdeclspec תוחא. (14) יבשות פלחה חור. ושיש ראתה网页ו ינaida, קרציה. שמע בו דנינו, טלאווה נ動作 דלקט:}
\]

67. ŠGW 11:3-5.
68. This "monotheization" of Judaism tracks nicely against Shaul Shaked's notion of Zoroastrianism's emphasis on dualism as arising out of polemical contacts. See Shaul Shaked, Dualism in Transformation (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1994), 25.
69. As Gershom Scholem writes, "the earliest Jewish mysticism is throne-mysticism." See Scholem, Major Trends, 44. On throne mysticism (and angelic thrones) in Second Temple and early Christian literature see Olyan, A Thousand Thousands, 61-66; in Islam and the parallels with the Jewish concept see Subtelny, "Iranian Perspective" and the sources quoted there.
In my night vision I then saw with the clouds of the heavens there came one in human likeness. When he arrived where the Ancient of Days was, he was brought into his presence. Then to him was given dominion—glory and kingship. Every nation, tribe, and tongue must serve him; His dominion is to be everlasting, never passing away; his kingship is never to be destroyed.70

The thrones which are described in Daniel 7:9 were read in various Talmudic and other contexts as being the seats for two divine powers, the Son of Man and the Ancient of Days described in 7:13-14. The issue of multiple thrones arises in a passage from BT Hagigah 14b. In that text Rabbi Akiva, who figures as one of the four sages who appears in the Metatron tradition from BT Hagigah 15a cited above, reads the thrones in Daniel 7:9 as the seats of the Ancient of Days and King David; David is, if not identical with the Son of Man, likewise ensonced in messianic speculation. Rabbi Akiva's reading of the two thrones—which, as Boyarin and others have rightly observed, is likely not a genuine tradition of the second century Palestinian sage71—is attacked for his position by Rabbi Yose the Galilean. The Talmud states that Akiva did recant and follow Rabbi Yose in identifying the thrones as those of God's justice and mercy.72

The figure of the throne is also a crucial element in the story of Elisha ben Abuya's mystical apostasy on the next page of tractate Hagigah. That passage and, more clearly, the parallel source in the late Hebrew mystical text 3 Enoch73 both explain Elisha ben Abuya's mistaken conclusion that Metatron is the divine coequal on the basis of the sage's observation that Metatron was seated. While in the talmudic version this fact is obscured,74 the Enochic text stages the issue front and center. As Metatron himself recounts the event:

When Aher came to behold the vision of the merkabah [the divine chariot] and set eyes on me, he was afraid and trembled before me. His soul was alarmed to the point of leaving him because of his fear, dread and terror of me, when he saw me seated upon a throne like a king, with ministering angels standing beside me like servants, and all the Princes of Kingdoms crowned with crowns surrounding me. Then he opened his mouth and said: "There are indeed two powers in heaven!" Immediately a heavenly voice came out from the presence of the Shekhinah and said: "Return, backsliding children," (Jeremiah 3:14) except for Aher!75

Elisha ben Abuya is led astray precisely by the fact that Metatron is sitting on the throne, in the role of prince and judge. This image looks back directly to the passage from Daniel discussed above. Moreover, while there has been much speculation on this topic, it

70. The translation of both these passages follows Hartman and Di Lella, Daniel, 203.
74. See the discussion in Boyarin, "Beyond Judaisms", 346-52. For a different reading of the relation between these two passages see Alon Goshen-Gottstein, The Sinner and the Amnesiac: the Rabbinic Invention of Elisha ben Abuya and Eleazar ben Arach (Sanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).
has been suggested that the name Metatron itself is connected to the figure of the throne. Odeberg suggests that the name derives from the Greek ὁ μετά θρόνον, "the throne next to [the Divine] throne" or "the second throne." In this context, the metonymic function of the throne as being somehow representative of the essence of the angel is most intriguing.

The centrality of the figure on the throne and the throne itself for speculation about two powers in heaven and an angelic coequal with the divine casts the references to thrones in the ŠGW in a new light. If the throne represents angelic power and equality with the divine, the depiction of angels being crushed under the throne is a reversal of that symbolism. An angel on the throne is coequal with God; angels underneath, sweating and bearing the burden of his weight, are nothing more than slaves, abject and powerless. In rabbinic texts the sweating angels, of course, signify something else entirely. However, Mardānfarrox's reading of this citation in the ŠGW is perfectly correct. Taken on its own and outside of the context of a living tradition of mystical and angelic speculation, it represents only the oppression of the powerless angels by a cruel God. While this point is more speculative, the angel handing the leg of a heavenly throne can also be read fruitfully as a kind of metonymy for angelic power repressed. Not only is the throne broken into pieces, but the piece that the angel can pass on to the suffering saint is ineffective and impotent. It cannot change their lot and is a poor replacement for the power, which the angel admits he lacks, to restructure the world so as to guarantee a better fate. This is no Metatron recounting, as he does in 3 Enoch, that "I was sitting on a great throne at the door of the seventh palace and I judged all the denizens of the heights, the familia of the Omnipresent, on the authority of the Holy One, blessed be he."

Conclusion

In the citations discussed in this chapter, angels play a prominent role. In all three citations they are central characters crucial to Mardānfarrox's critique. Compared to their Talmudic parallels, these angels are powerless and downtrodden. Rather than imagining that these citations in the critique of Judaism derive directly from the Talmud, as previous scholars have claimed, I have argued that the prominence and degradation of the angels in these texts points to the ŠGW's engagement with and inversion of a Jewish belief in angels whose power equals the divine. The impetus for this inversion is internal to the ŠGW, relating to its goal of showing the First Scripture as monotheistically extreme.

In this chapter I have identified the connections between these three citations and reading them together as part of a motif of angels. This serves my overall argument in that it demonstrates that the citations in the critique of Judaism are best interpreted contextually, in light of the larger theological and polemical goals of the ŠGW. In the next chapter, I will

76. This opinion is cited and dismissed in Scholem, Major Trends, 69 and Alexander, "Historical Setting," 162. Boyarin, "Beyond Judaism," 356, on the other hand, supports this theory. A similar etymology derives the name from Greek συνθρόνος, in the sense of "co-occupant of the divine throne." This etymology has been supported in Saul Lieberman, "Metauron, the Meaning of His Name and His Functions," in Apocalyptic and Merkavah Mysticism, ed. Ithamar Gruenwald (Leiden: Brill, 1980), 235-41 and Schäfer, Hidden and Manifest God, 94. These and other etymologies are discussed in Andrei A. Orlov, The Enoch-Metatron Tradition (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 92-96. Martin Schwartz also suggests *metathronos.
focus on another prominent motif in the ŠGW. This motif, the motif of the garden, can be found not only in the critique of Judaism but in the ŠGW's polemical and apologetic chapters.
Chapter Four:
The Garden as Motif: Transplanting Eden in the ŠGW

ŠGW Chapter Thirteen, the first chapter comprising the critique of Judaism, concerns the story of creation. The entire chapter is devoted to a two-part citation and Mardānfarrox's critique of it. The citation bears a striking resemblance to the story of hexameral creation and the garden of Eden as told in the first three chapters of the biblical book of Genesis. The first part of this citation, ŠGW 13:5-13, recounts the primordial state; the creation and separation of light from darkness; and, in an abbreviated form in 13:12, the creation of the heavens and the earth during the remaining six days of creation. This section also makes reference to God's rest on the seventh day. In his critique of this section, Mardānfarrox attacks the contradictions and inconsistencies he identifies in the creation account. For example, he asks: if nothing else existed, to whom did God give the command "Let there be light" (13:78-91)? Likewise, he asks if God only spoke creation into being, why did it take six days to complete the process (13:92-101)?

The second part of the citation is much longer, comprising ŠGW 13:15-47, and concerns the story of temptation and exile in the garden parallel to Genesis Chapters Two and Three. Separated from the previous section by a comment concerning the Jews' resting on the Sabbath (13:14) that acts as a kind of caesura, this part of the citation concerns the creation of the first human couple, the garden, and the tree of knowledge, their transgression, punishment, and exile. In his critique, at 13:106-148, Mardānfarrox focuses considerable attention on this section of the citation. He questions, for instance, why God created the garden in the first place, if it only served as the means for the first couple's downfall (13:121-127); why God was sorrowful about the humans' gaining knowledge but content with their ignorance (13:135-140); and points to the citation's characterization of God as ignorant (13:141-142) and mendacious (13:143-144).

This chapter will focus on this garden citation, as I will refer to ŠGW 13:15-47 in what follows.¹ The chapter will be concerned with answering a basic question, namely identifying the reason why the story of the garden is given such prominence in the critique of Judaism: not only is this citation the longest in the entire critique, but Mardānfarrox also devotes nearly fifty sentences to its analysis and critique.

Why is the garden citation, this story of Adam, Eve, and the serpent, so central to Mardānfarrox's critique? At first glance, the answer to this question may seem obvious.

¹ My justification for focusing only on this second part of the extended citation in Chapter Thirteen is twofold. On the one hand, while the first section of the citation has recently merited renewed study by Shapira, "Biblical Quotations", the second section, what I am calling the garden citation, has not received the attention it deserves. On the other hand, while inarguably connected to the first section on hexameral creation, the garden citation is marked off as a self-enclosed literary unit. The distinction between these two sections is easiest to see in Mardānfarrox's critique: ŠGW 13:49-105 focuses exclusively on the story of creation in seven days while ŠGW 13:106-148 on the garden. While Mardānfarrox precedes eclectically within his comments on each section, for instance first discussing God's lack of knowledge concerning the whereabouts of the first human couple after they ate the fruit (ŠGW 13:135-140) and then turning to his creation of the serpent (ŠGW 13:141-142), he never mixes comments on the two sections, such as first discussing an aspect of the garden story and then an aspect of the story of creation.
Whatever the genealogy of Mardānfarrox's citations, by the time of the composition of the ŠGW it was widely known that the story of temptation and punishment in the garden was to be found in the Jewish scriptures. Part of the evidence for the wide diffusion of this knowledge can also be used to explain why Mardānfarrox chose to focus on this story. Earlier polemics against the Jewish scriptures, especially Marcionite and Manichaean texts, also devote a great deal of attention to this garden narrative. It is possible that the garden citation is prominent in the ŠGW because Mardānfarrox was familiar with and used these earlier polemics as a models.

While Marcion's *Antitheses* is itself lost, scholars have been able to reconstruct much of its argument from citations in the works of Christian heresiologists. The *Antitheses*, which lists the contradictions between the Old Testament and Marcion's versions of the Gospel and Paul's letters, refers to God's ignorance of Adam's whereabouts in the garden of Eden story. Ḥīwī al-Balkhī, the Jewish rationalist and contemporary of Mardānfarrox, whom previous scholars have identified as a Marcionite, also refers to the story of the garden of Eden. Ḥīwī asks why God did not know where Adam was hiding after eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge and refers to God's fear that Adam would also eat from the fruit of the tree of life.

In Manichaean literature, which sometimes took over Marcionite arguments, the story of the garden also plays a prominent role. In light of the connection other scholars have demonstrated between the ŠGW and Manichaean literature, the Manichaean polemics against the Eden story are especially interesting. It is possible that Mardānfarrox concentrates on the garden narrative because of its prominence in Manichaean polemics. An example of the Eden narrative in Manichaean polemics can be found in in St. Augustine's anti-Manichaean writings. His two works on Genesis, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* and *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim*, refer to and answer Manichaean attacks on the Eden

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story. The Manichaeans ask, Augustine reports, why God made human beings if he knew they would sin and they complain that he should have created them unable to do so; they ask who made the devil—that is, the serpent—and they complain that the devil should not have been made if God knew he would sin; they complain that the devil should not have been allowed to approach Eve; and they complain that Eve herself should not have been created. Augustine precedes this brief recounting of Manichaean critiques with a long spiritual and allegorical interpretation of the garden of Eden story. This interpretation both demonstrates the right way to read the Bible and preemptively undermines Manichaean literalist readings.

However, the importance of the garden narrative in the ŠGW's critique of Judaism cannot be entirely explained by an appeal to earlier polemics against Genesis and the Eden story. Gardens have a significance in the ŠGW that goes beyond this one citation in the critique of Judaism. The garden narrative in Chapter Thirteen is part of a larger motif of gardens. In three other passages in the ŠGW—two in the chapters on Islam and one in the chapter on Christianity—gardens are used to present the contradiction and irrationality of the beliefs of the rival religions. A final garden passage, an exegetical parable in ŠGW Chapter Four, uses garden imagery to demonstrate the truth of Zoroastrian theology.

When taken together, these four passages contrast the order and coherence of Zoroastrianism with the irrationality and contradiction of the rival religions. As I hope to demonstrate in what follows, in all four cases the garden is a model world, one of the tools Mardanfarrox uses to demonstrate the underlying similarity between the disparate false doctrines of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity and to set them all against Zoroastrian reason and rightness.

Furthermore, I will argue that the reason that gardens were chosen for this model role is not—or, at least, not only—on account of the prominence of the Eden story in Jewish literature and earlier polemical writings. Gardens have important symbolic value in Iranian culture. In particular, the garden is connected with kingship, rule, and order. Mardanfarrox is drawing on this symbolism in the ŠGW's garden passages. Setting the contradiction of the rival doctrines in a garden makes them seem all the more incoherent. Similarly explaining an apparent contradiction in Zoroastrian theology through the means of the garden parable in ŠGW Chapter Four reinforces the order and coherence of Zoroastrianism.

This chapter will proceed in three stages. After presenting the garden citation from ŠGW 13:15-47, I will first discuss the two garden passages in the critiques of Islam and Christianity and demonstrate their commonalities with Chapter Thirteen's garden citation. Next, I will analyze the Zoroastrian garden parable and discuss its relation to the other passages that make up the motif of gardens. Finally, I will discuss the significance of gardens in Iranian culture, emphasizing their connection with rule and political order.

The Motif of the Garden

We can first turn to the garden citation from ŠGW 13:15-47:

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10. Augustine, On Genesis, 139-40.
12. De Menasce points to the similarity between the Pazand and Manichaean Middle Persian forms of these two names (de Menasce, *Apologétique*, 184): ‘*m* and ‘*hw*’ or ‘*hw*’ (correcting the earlier ‘*hw*’). See Durkin-Meisterernst, *DMMP*, 24 and 35. For the appearance of Adam and Eve in Manichaean literature see Werner Sundermann, “Nomen um Götern, Dämonen und Menschen in iranischen Versionen des manichäischen Mythus,” *Altorientalische Forschungen* 6 (1979): 95-133. However, the Pazand versions are also similar to the forms found in the Qur’an and Muslim exegesis: ‘*Adam* and ‘*Hawwā*’. On these names see Horovitz, “Jewish Proper Names and Derivatives in the Koran” and William M. Brinner, “Some Problems in the Arabic Transmission of Biblical Names,” in *Solving Riddles and Untying Knots: Biblical, Epigraphic and Semitic Studies in Honor of Jonas C. Greenfield*, ed. Zionist Zevit, et al. (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1995), 19-27.

13. While *bāyešān* does not appear in Pahlavi literature, two common terms for gardens, *bāy* and *bāyistān*, do appear in the description of the destruction wrought by the Arab conquerers, who “eat bread like dogs,” on Iran in the rhymed prose text *Abar madān i sāh wahrām i warzāwānd* (Jamaspji Minocherji Jamaspasa and Behramgore T. Ankesaria, eds., *Pahlavi Texts*, [Bombay: Fort Printing Press, 1913], 2:383). In BD 30:5-6 (Behramgore Tehmurjas Ankesaria, *Zand-Akāsišt Iranī or Greater Bundahīshn* [Bombay: Published by the Rahnumae Mazdayasnan Sabha by its Honorary Secretary Dastur Framroze A. Bode, 1956], 201), in a description of the soul’s vision of the *dēn* after death, the *dēn* is described first as a plump cow, then as a beautiful maiden, and finally in the shape of a garden (*bōstān-kird*). The garden is described as *pur walq, pur āb, pur mēwag, “full of ol’ leaves, full of water, full of fruit” and bām i wahištīg, “the paradisical land.” See further the discussion in Martin Schwartz, “Gathic Compositional History, Y 29 and Bovine Symbolism,” in *Paitimāna: Essays in Iranian, Indo-European, and Indian Studies in Honor of Hans-Peter Schmidt*, ed. Siamak Adhami [Contra Costa, CA: Mazda, 2003], 241-44. Bruce Lincoln, *Religion, Empire and Torture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 79ff. has also pointed out the similarity between the description of paradise in the *Arda Wiraz Nāmag* and a garden. In Manichaean texts, a garden (*bwyst*’n) is mentioned in a Manichaean Middle Persian king parable in M 47 II (verso, l. 3). The text is transcribed and translated in Werner Sundermann, *Mittelpersische und parthische kosmogonische und Parabeltexte der Manichaer* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1973), 87-89. The Partihan cognate, spelled *bwyst*’n, appears in a Manichaean Parthian text from M 47 I (Werner Sundermann, *Mitteliranische manichaïsche Texte kirchengeschichtlichen Inhalts* [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1981], text 10) describing the conversion of Mihrshah. Thanks to Desmond Durkin-Meisterernst for this reference.

14. De Menasce reads this word as a denominative from an underlying Pahlavi *pāshbān*, meaning “protector” or “guardian” (de Menasce, *Apologétique*, 184; MacKenzie, *CPD*, 65, and Durkin-Meisterernst, *DMMP*, 259). The word also appears in the Pahlavi translation to Psalms (Andreas and Barr, *Psalmen*, 106). The Sanskrit translation has *praharakena*, from *prahakara*- “a watch” or “a division of time” (Monier-Williams, *Dictionary*, 701).

15. De Menasce (following Darmesteter, “Judaisme,” 6) sees a lacuna in the text at this point, in which we are missing Hauuē’s statement that it is she, and not the snake, who will eat and give to Ādā (de Menasce, *Apologétique*, 194).

16. Darmesteter amends to *magar-at* (Darmesteter, “Judaisme”, 7). The phrase *ma agar* however, also occurs in a Manichaean Middle Persian king parable: *m ĵ gr wn ĵ k ’myd*. For the text see Sundermann,
hāmā hiihīr u kīmār48 rōdāt (41) vaš ā hauuāe guft kut āįhāstānī pa dard u dušuār vat zāši ni pa gara xaştāβasī bāt (42) vaš ā mār guft ku až mīān19 cīhār pāeq u daqā i dašī t u kōhī nīfrīdāa bās (43) vat pāe ma bāt (44) vat raṭšāšī ni pa iṣkam u xarašī xiāk bāt (45) u mīān19 farzāndā t oō āβā zāni xīn u dušman gaštī āβā bāt ku ššā farzāndā sar gāzānd.

(15) This as well, that he formed Hūmā and his wife Hauuāe. (16) He put them in the garden of paradise (17) so that Hūmā could cultivate the garden and protect it. (18) Hūmā, who is himself God, commanded Hūmā: (19) "Eat of every tree in this garden except the tree of knowledge (20) which, if you eat from it, you will die." (21) And he then put a serpent in the garden. (22) That serpent spoke deviously to Hauuāe saying, "Pick from this tree; I will eat and give to Hūmā." (23) And she did so. (24) Hūmā also ate. (25) And their21 knowledge became thus that they distinguished good from evil and did not die. (26) And they saw and knew that they were naked. (27) They were hiding under the tree (28) and they covered their bodies with a leaf of the tree for the sake of the shame of nakedness. (29) Then Hūmā came into the garden, called Hūmā by his name saying, "Where are you?" (30) Hūmā answered, "I am here under the tree for I am naked." (31) Hūmā became angry. (32) He said, "Who made you aware you that you were naked? (33) You have not eaten from the tree of knowledge which I said you were not to eat from, have you?" (34) Hūmā said, "This woman whom you gave me deceived me and I ate." (35) And Hūmā asked Hauuāe: "Why did you do this?" (36) Hauuāe said, "The serpent deceived me." (37) And cursing all three, Hūmā, Hauuāe, and the serpent, he expelled them from the garden. (38) And he said to Hūmā, "Your food will be by wiping your sweat and the breath of your nose (39) until the end of your life (40) and the earth will grow excrement and filth." (41) And he said to Hauuāe,

Kosmogonische und Parabeltexte, 87.
17. The Frahang i Pahlavīg includes the Aramaic ideogram KPLWN, from the root qpl, meaning "to roll up, roll away," for ostārdan or ustārdan meaning to "shave" or "to erase" (Henrik Samuel and Bo Utas Nyberg, eds., Frahang i Pahlavīk [Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1988], 98). On the basis of the sense of the underlying Aramaic, de Menasce, Apologeticque, 185 translates "to wipe." However, this could be an instance of a polemical pun: Middle Persian āštārēn (from the same Proto-Iranian root *star) means "to sin" (Cheung, Etymological Dictionary, 363-64). Sanskrit āstāṃena, from the related root star-, means "to spread out" or "extend" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 161).
18. According to the Pahlavi Vīdevdād, hīxr is feces or dry dead matter, as distinguished from nasā which is wet; see especially 5:1-3 and 8:34. Interestingly, the Sanskrit translates hiihīr as mutra, meaning "urine" and kīmār as purśāna "feces." (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 636 and 825). At least in the case of mutra, the translator may have confused the Sanskrit word with Avestan mūthra, which does indeed mean "feces." See Christian Bartholomae, Altitranisches Wörterbuch (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1961), 1189.
19. MSS. JJ and JE omit.
20. MSS. JJ and JE omit.
21. This pronoun and the past copulas in the following sentences, while singular, refer to both Hūmā and Hauuāe.
"Your pregnancy will be in pain and difficulty and your birthing in great suffering." (42) And he said to the serpent, "Among the beasts and vermin of the plains and the mountains you will be cursed (43) and you will not have legs (44) and you will go on your belly and you will eat dust. (45) Between your children and the woman's will be such vengeance and enmity that they will bite the children's heads."

One can recognize the well-remembered story of creation, temptation, transgression, and exile. The four sections of the ŠGW's citation follow the basic outline of the biblical narrative in the Book of Genesis. The story begins with Ādīnō populating the garden of paradise with Ādam, Hauuāē, and the serpent and laying down the rules for their interaction: Ādam must cultivate and protect the garden and the couple cannot eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge. Next comes the transgression. Hauuāē is persuaded by the serpent into eating the fruit of the forbidden tree. She passes the same fruit to Ādam. In the third section, their transgression is revealed through their concealment of the shame of their nakedness. Finally, God metes out their punishment. All are banished from the garden and suffer the pains of labor and rejection.

Similar though the ŠGW's citation is to the biblical version, Genesis 2:7-3:24, the story as told from God's creation of Ādam to the exile from the garden, contains a number of details and themes not found in the ŠGW. In making the following brief comparison, I do not wish to upend the argument for a genealogical approach to the ŠGW's citations made in Chapter Two of this dissertation. Rather, my goal in contrasting the citation in Chapter Thirteen with the parallel version in Genesis is simply to highlight the unique character of the ŠGW's garden narrative. For instance, Genesis includes at 2:8-14 a description of the geography of Eden; an extended description of the creation of Eve at 2:18-25; and a more extended description of the punishment borne by the first human couple at the end of Genesis chapter three.

Another important difference is characterization. The ŠGW's narrative depicts Ādam, Hauuāē, and the serpent as flat characters lacking internal life and thought. By way of example, while Genesis 3:1-6 depicts at some length the serpent's temptation of Eve. The passage gives a window into her thought process and the workings of the serpent's arguments to break down her resistance. The ŠGW, in contrast, dispatches with this entire episode of persuasion, reasoning, and temptation in a single line. There, all the serpent has to say to Hauuāē is "pick from this tree." This example is typical of the abrupt style of the ŠGW's citation which has implications for Mardānfarrox's critique of the passage. It is because she is depicted as possessing this internal life, the ability to resist and succumb to temptation, that God's command and punishment have meaning at all. The fact that Hauuāē is not depicted as having the capacity for independent choice, makes it easier for Mardānfarrox to characterize Ādīnō's punishment is meaningless and cruel.22

22. The exception to the ŠGW's generally restricted depiction of the characters' internal lives is the passage at 13:26-28. There the text describes the couple's shame at their nakedness and their hiding and clothing themselves with leaves of the tree in order to conceal that shame. Aside from being necessary to advance the plot—they have to have some reason to hide in order for Ādīnō to go looking for them—there is a qualitative difference between shame and Eve's deliberation or Adam's choosing names for the animals and rejoicing at the presence of his wife. Whereas these other glimpses into the characters' thinking imply
To return to our theme, as I indicated at the beginning of this chapter the garden citation from the critique of Judaism is not the only horticultural passage in the ŠGW. The other polemics against the monotheistic religions also contain horticultural citations and reflections on gardens and their significance. In what follows I will point to some of the lines of affinity between these gardens in words and ask how their interrelations shed light on the citation in Chapter Thirteen's critique of Judaism.

The passage most closely connected to the account of the garden in Chapter Thirteen is found in Chapter Eleven's critique of Islam. ŠGW 11:51-77 tells a different version of the same story of humankind's downfall and punishment in the garden:

(51) ʔa òi ʔadāi i vīsp-tuua vīsp-āghā ḥandā nuñ vaṣa amar ŋis kard u³ vīrāst yakica nō ʔaṣa ʔaṣar ʔaṭ bahōt cuñš kāmāa pasica ʔa vīrāstan ēdhān i nō nō namāh pa-
haṛaṇaṭ. (52) cuñ kaṣ ḳ i naxustīn fīrstagā dādār yaṣq²⁴ garāmī ṭi až ētaṣ vīrāst;
caṇḍ hazārā ṣāl (53) i cuñ goeṇḍ ku parastaśnī i ŋi namāh kard. (54) aṣadīm pa yak
farman-akard yaṣ dāt ku, namāž ʔi ʔi mardum i naxustīn yam až gił vīrāst barāšt.
(55) vaṣ būḍšānī i pa nō saṣaṭ burdān cimīhā gūft (56) aġiš pa gił⁵⁵ u nifīnī u xaśm
θαr xār kard (57) u ṭi dābī u drūžī vardinīŋ až vahōst bōruṇ kard (58) hazārāḥīhā zīn-
dāi ṭadāi i jāfādānaa dāt (59) ku ʔaʃom bandaga u parastagā i mān aʃrāh viiʔaʃan
kunom. (60) vaṣ²⁶ ʔi xas kām vazaŭdār u patīiaɾa kard.

(61) aṣadīm aça mard kaṣ garāmī u ʔaẓar ²⁷ rā ʔi frīstaa mahāst aʃā vaṣa
parastagā namāz hāʃaṣ²⁸ burd farmūṭ (62) o bōstān i vahōst kard (63) ku varzaṯ²⁹ u
haravīst bar ʔaɾaɾ⁶⁴ (64) bō ʔi ṭi yak draxt yaʃ farmūṭ ku ma ṭaɾaʃ. (65) vaʃ aʃā ʔiša
frīʃtār i viiʔaʃanīdār vīrāst (66) ʔaḍar bōstān hišt— (67) i hast ka mār goeṭ hast ᱳ kə
aharman— (68) vaʃ ʔaɾaɾ³² ʔaɾdāri aʔūɾi³³ ham ṭaʃ ʔi ʔi mardum ʔiʃ. (69) pas³⁴ ʔi
viīaʃaμar frīʃt ḡeṇd ku až ṭi draxt ʔaɾaɾ. (70) hast ka ᱳ ʔaɾman goeṭ, (71) vaʃa pa ʔi cih-
har i ʔaɾdāri ᵃɾd. (72) paʃ až xardan aʃa dānaʃīmānd būṭ ḡeṇd kuʃa vahā u vata
ʔnāxt u ʔanast (73) až a ʔaʃa ʔaẓar u garāmī pa ʔi yak ʔaɾdār yaʃa farmōʃīt (74) —
u ʔa farmōʃidāri ʔi har až ʔi vahan— (75) aʃā zani ʔiʃa pa garā xašm u anāẓarīhī až

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23. The Sanskrit translation kāṃścīt āraçat omits kard u.
24. The Sanskrit translation dāta priyatvāya omits this word.
25. De Menasce suggests an emendation to drōg on the basis of the translator's confusion of the similar Pahlavi ideograms (de Menasce, Apologétique, 130).
26. MSS. AK and MH19 omit š.
27. MSS. K28, JJ and JE have aharman but the reading is corrected in MS. JE.
28. All MSS. haš.
29. All MSS. varzāt.
30. All MSS. ɣaɾaɾ.
31. MS. MH19 omits.
32. Jamasp-Asana and West, Shikand, 85 adds i after this word.
33. Pahlavi āzvarīh, meaning "greed" (MacKenzie, CPD, 16); Sanskrit trṣṇāyāh indicates both "thirsty" and "desire" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 454.
34. Jamasp-Asana and West, Shikand, 85 adds pa after this word.

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vahššt bōstān bōruŋ kard (76) ô dast15 ŏi dušman i frōftār u viiābangar aďaspārd hōnd (77) kušā kām i xāš ašar rāinīt ašaršā kārinīt.

(51) That omnipotent and omniscient God, who has so far created and fashioned innumerable things, not even one has come to be as he desired and still he does not refrain from continuing to create anew and newly fashion. (52) As when he created16 the first angels whom for honor's sake he fashioned from fire; for a few thousand years, (53) as they say, they were praising him. (54) Finally, one [angel] having defied the order he gave to worship this first man which I fashioned from clay, (55) and having given reasonable excuses why it was not fitting to worship, (56) since [the man] was made of clay, anger, wrath, deficiency, and frailty, (57) he turned him to devilishness and evil and cast him out from heaven (58) [and] gave him a millenial life [and] eternal dominion, (59) saying, I shall deceive and confound my servants and adulators. (60) He himself made a destroyer and opponent to his own will.

(61) Finally, that man for the sake of whose honor and respect he commanded the greatest angel, along with his adorers, to worship, (62) he put in the garden of heaven (63) to cultivate it and eat all of its fruits (64) except that one tree which he commanded: do not eat it. (65) And he fashioned along with them a deceiving trickster, (66) let him in the garden— (67) there are those who say it was a serpent and those who say it was Ahriman— (68) and also he himself gave to the men a gluttonous and greedy nature. (69) Then they were tricked by that deceiver, saying Eat from that tree. (70) There is one who says this was Adam. (71) And they ate out of their gluttonous nature. (72) Then, after eating, they became wise, recognizing and knowing good and bad. (73) From [a position of] such respect and honor, by that one precept which they forgot (74) —and that forgetting was also from the same cause— (75) with great wrath and dishonor he exiled him, along with his wife, from the garden of heaven (76) and delivered them into the hand of that tricksy and deceiving enemy (77) who ruled over them and made them act according to his will.37

35. Jamasp-Asana and West, Shikand, 85 adds i after this word.
36. The Pazand noun dādār, "creator," has been translated here, following de Menasce, Apologétique, 141, in the sense of the verb dād, "to create." The Sanskrit translation dātā, however, also indicates "creator."
37. Versions and allusions to this citation can be found in Qurʾān 2:30-39, 7:10-25, 17:61-65, 18:50, 20:115-124, and 38:71-85. See also the traditions collected in the commentary literature; references can be found in Cornelia Schöck, "Adam and Eve," in Encyclopedia of the Qurʾān (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 1:22-26. The story of the angel's refusal to worship Ādam is also similar to the story about the angels' protest at God's unjust punishment of innocents in ŠGW 14:75-79. The passage from Chapter Eleven is even closer to the story of the angels' opposition to the creation of humankind in BT Sanhedrin 38b, Genesis Rabbah 8:4 (Theodor and Albeck, Bereshit Rabba, 59-60) and elsewhere; for more context on this story see Chapter Two. Another version of the story can also be found in Satan's account of his fall in the pseudepigraphic Life of Adam and Eve 12-16. See the translations of M. D. Johnson, "Life of Adam and Eve," in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, ed. James H. Charlesworth (New York: Doubleday, 1985), 249-95 and L. S. A. Wells, "The Books of Adam and Eve," in The Apocrypha and Pseudepigraphica of the Old Testament, ed. Robert Henry Charles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 123-54 as well as the background discussion in G.W.E. Nickelsburg, "The Bible Rewritten and Expanded: The Books of Adam and Eve," in Jewish
There are a number of similarities between this citation and the garden passage from Chapter Thirteen. First of all, the two stories share key terms. Both refer to the garden as heavenly: in 13:16 as bāyāstanādi vahāṣt and in 11:62 as bōstan i vahāṣt. Bāyāstan and bōstan are close synonyms, as is demonstrated by the fact that the same Sanskrit word udyāna is used to translate both.\(^{38}\) Both verses refer to the serpent as mār and use similar words to describe his actions, particularly forms of the verbs frāṣṭāṇ, meaning "to deceive."

The simple past form frāṣṭit occurs at 13:22 and 13:34 and the adjective frāṣṭār at 11:65 and 11:69. The effects of eating the tree are also described in similar terms. 13:24-25 states that Adam ate (xārd) and became knowledgeable (dāniṣṇi aṣa ḍū) and distinguished good from evil (vazārd niīak oẓ vāṭ). Similarly, 11:72 states that after eating the fruit he became knowledgeable (pas oẓ xārdan aṣa ḍāniṣmaṇd būṭ) and that he recognized and knew good and evil (vahā u vatar šnaxt u dānast). God's response is also described as angry in both passages. In 13:31 we find the phrase God became angry (ādinō xaśm kard) just as in 11:75 it states that God removed them from the garden of heaven with great anger and unkindness (aṣa zamī ḍēṣān pa garq xaśm u anāzārī oẓ vahāṣt bōstan bōrun kard).

The two stories complement each other, together constructing a more complete account of the events in the garden. The story in Chapter Thirteen, laconic though it seems in comparison to the biblical account, provides much more detail than the version in Chapter Eleven. Whereas Chapter Eleven's narrative dismisses with the first couple's temptation, sin, discovery, and punishment in four brief sentences, Chapter Thirteen puts the characters, props, and dialogue in comparative focus; Chapter Eleven even lacks Ādam's wife's name.

However, reading only Chapter Thirteen we do not know the serpent's motive for acting so maliciously towards Ādam and Hauūaē, the heavenly backstory to the events in the garden. What happened after their exile also goes unmentioned. The larger narrative arc within which the events in the garden take place is lacking. Chapter Eleven fills in the missing pieces. Here, the reader learns that God's enmity for his creation applied already to his angels in heaven and he is told the deceiving trickster's motive for waylaying the first human couple. The first humans' gluttonous nature, which causes them to succumb to the trickster's temptation, is already formed and known by God before the events in the garden.

Humankind's suffering at the hands of the deceptive trickster does not end with the punishment of Ādam and Hauūaē; the world as a whole is given over by God to his evil dominion.

There are two points of seeming disagreement between the two accounts. In the first case, while Chapter Thirteen makes clear that it was a serpent who deceived the couple, the narrative in Chapter Eleven presents two alternative possibilities: some say that it was a serpent while others claim that it was Ahriman. Rather than reading the latter interpretation as a contradiction of the passage in the critique of Judaism, one can understand the presentation of these two possibilities as a device for more closely linking the versions of the story. The interpretation that names the trickster as Ahriman serves to connect the character of the trickster in the garden to the rebellious angel. Like the angel, Ahriman is an evil celestial being who torments God's creation here on earth.\(^ {39}\) The other interpretation, identifying the trick-

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\(^{38}\) On this word see Monier-Williams, *Dictionary*, 191.

\(^{39}\) The crucial difference between Ahriman and the rebellious angel, of course, is that the latter is the creation


Similarly, see the GR I 1:88 (Lidzbarski, *Ginzä*, 16) and 2:23 (Lidzbarski, *Ginzä*, 34). A version of this account can also be found in the *Dēnkard*. On this passage see Chapter Five.
ster as the serpent, aligns with the story in Chapter Thirteen. The fact that the two could be interchangeable raises the possibility that the serpent in Chapter Thirteen is no other than the outcast angel. This alternative identification further links the focused narrative in the critique of Judaism to the larger cosmic drama portrayed in the critique of Islam.

Similarly, Chapter Eleven's statement that some believe Ādam was the one who was tricked and first ate the fruit of the tree does not imply a contradiction with Chapter Thirteen. The phrase *hast ko ādam gōêt* follows a formula common in Zoroastrian legal and commentary literature. It presents an alternative interpretation of a law or fact. In this case, the unstated base interpretation would be, as in Chapter Thirteen, that Hauūe was the one tempted to eat the fruit. The opinion that it was Ādam represents an alternative, but not mutually exclusive, possibility.

The other instances of the garden story are likewise complimentary. Further on in the critique of Islam, at 11:352-258, we read:

(352) inca ko gōend ku yazaṭ ð ādam farmūṭ ku øz īṇ yak draxt i aṇḍar vahōšt ma ūrdē. (353) ažaṣq ā pursāt (354) ku farman i yazaṭ ð ādam daṭ ku øz īṇ draxt ma ūrdē nījak būṭ aiiā vaṭ? (355) agar farman nījak būṭ42 pādā ku draxt vaṭ būṭ. (356) nā43 sažaṭ yazaṭ ðis i vaṭ āfrīdan. (357) agar draxt nījak būṭ farman vaṭ būṭ qā44 nā sažoṭ yazaṭ vaṭ farman dādan. (358) agar draxt nījak būṭ vaṣ farman i pa nā ūrdē dāṭ qā46 ò vahī u aļļaxšīdārī i yazaṭ nā47 pasažaa nākī øz baṇḍaga i agunāh i ūαś aļļaxšastan.

(352) And this also they say, that God commanded Ādam: of this one tree in heaven do not eat. (353) He asked them thus, (354) "The command God gave to Ādam, 'From this tree do not eat,' was it good or bad?" (355) If the command was good, it is evident that the tree was bad. (356) [But] it is not fitting that God would create something bad. (357) If the tree was good, the command was bad; but it is not fitting that God would issue a bad command. (358) If the tree was good and he gave the command not to eat it, then it is not befitting the goodness and mercy of God to revoke goodness from his own innocent servants.

of the one God, who is thus ultimately responsible for evil. Ahriman, inherently evil, is preexistent in Zoroastrian cosmogony.

40. See the discussion in Phillipe Gignoux, "La controverse dans le mazdéisme tardif," in La controverse religieuse et ses formes, ed. Alain Bolluec (Paris: Centre d'études des religions du livre, 1995), 127-49.

41. Chapter Eleven contains a number of such repetitions, one of the reasons de Menasce called it "the longest and worst composed of the book." It seems a distinct possibility that, because of the popularity and relevance of polemics against Islam, over the course of its transmission material was added to Mardānfarrox's originally shorter critique.

42. Jamasp-Asana and West, *Shikand*, 113 proposes adding qā after this word.

43. Jamasp-Asana and West, *Shikand*, 113 proposes adding qā before this word.

44. MS. JJ reads qāš.

45. MSS. JJ and JE read xārdan.

46. MSS. JJ and JE read ā.

47. MSS. JJ and JE read bāš, but the Sanskrit translation *ananurūpam* indicates an original nā. 

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This horticultural passage is a critical allusion to the longer expositions of the garden narrative. The critique picks on the point of God's command not to eat the fruit of one of the trees in the garden, mentioned in both versions of the story. The critique focuses on a logical contradiction at the center of the story: if God did not want Ādam to eat the fruit of the tree, why did he put it in the garden in the first place? Both placing the tree in the garden and commanding them to refrain from touching it seems nothing more than a trap. As the critique points out, God necessarily contradicts his own nature; to be more accurate, we can say he contradicts the nature that monotheism claims for him. He is either the author of an evil creation, the tree, which contradicts his absolute goodness, or he forbids the first man's enjoyment of a good creation which similarly depicts him, in Mardānfarrox's characterization, as cruel and merciless. The same critique is repeated, in a slightly different form, in Chapter Thirteen.  

The importance of this passage lies in the metonymic relationship it establishes between the forbidden tree and the garden as a whole. God's command to avoid the tree of knowledge encapsulates the central ethical paradox of the narrative. The other ethically troublesome elements, such as God's allowing or letting the serpent into the garden, are only activated as evil in their relation to the tree. Likewise, the tree itself stands for the entire garden. The tree is the only plant foregrounded and brought into narrative focus. In Genesis, in contrast, figs also play a prominent role, as the leaves with which Adam and Eve cover their newly realized nakedness, as does the even more powerful tree of life which God aims to protect by finally evicting the couple from the garden. In the ŠGW's minimalist staging of the story, this one tree represents the fecundity, lushness, and verdancy of the garden as a whole which otherwise go unmentioned.

The metonymic character of the tree of knowledge is relevant to the interpretation of two linked passages in Chapter Fifteen. While that chapter, devoted to the critique of Christianity, does not include any discussions of gardens, it does contain two citations and critiques of arboreal parables. The first passage is found in 15:132-141:

(132) vaš Ḯu Ḭu draxt i kerbaa bar i bažaa nā Ḯa i  บา Ḯaa bar i kerbaa dādan (133) Ḯu aiaḥ hamā draxt āḏā bar i kerbaa kunāt aiaḥ hamā draxt āḏā bar i bažaa kunāt (134) ci har draxt āḏ bar pāḏā bahōt agar kerbaa u agar bažaa (135) vaš hamā draxt guft nā nīm draxt (136) nuṯ ᱲuṣ saḏaṯ nīm draxt roṣān u nīm tār (137) nīm kerbaa u nīm bažaa (138) nīm rāṣū ᱲu nīm drōẓanī (139) ka įn har du ayaṇīn hambidī ṣtānd (140) yak draxt būdan nā Ṣāḥiṇ.  

(132) And he also said this: "The good tree is not capable of giving evil fruit, nor that of evil the good fruit." (133) This also: "Either the entire tree produces good

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48. ŠGW 13:110-113; 122; 132-134.
50. Genesis 3:22-24. On this passage see the discussion above.
51. On this chapter see Gignoux, "Škand Gumānīg Vîzār."
52. MS. JJ omits ί, ms JE had ��.
53. de Menasce, Apologétique, 219 and Gignoux, "Škand Gumānīg Vîzār," 65-66 translate 15:135-140 as if the text were referring trees in the plural. I have followed West, Pahlavi Texts Parts Three, 240-241 who translates draxt in the singular.
fruit or the entire tree produces evil fruit, (134) as every tree will be known by its fruit whether it is good or evil." (135) And he said the entire tree, not half the tree. (136) Now how is it fitting that half a tree be light and half dark, (137) half good and half evil, (138) half righteous and half falsehood? (139) When these both oppose each other, (140) they cannot exist as one tree.54

Mardānfarrox’s comment on this passage is not, in fact, a critique. Rather, in emphasizing that a single tree cannot be both good and evil, he is confirming and strengthening the point of the citation itself, which draws a sharply dualistic distinction between good and evil trees. Mardānfarrox’s confirmation of this particular citation, however, does not imply approval of Christianity. This citation is part of a larger section focusing on Jesus’ contradictory statements about dualism. In ŠGW 15:108-116, for instance, Mardānfarrox contrasts Jesus’ statement that there is an enemy principle55 opposed to his Father56 to another statement that Ahriman is bent on his destruction and desires to seduce and trick him.57 In his comment, Mardānfarrox argues that if, as the first statement implies, Ahriman is opposed to Jesus and of a different substance,58 there is no way for him to seduce or deceive him. On the other hand, if Ahriman is of the same substance as Jesus, then he must have been created by God. Therefore, God, being omniscient, must have intended for Ahriman to deceive Jesus, in which case it is God himself who seeks to deceive his Son.59

In the case of the good and evil trees, Mardānfarrox is similarly aiming to emphasize the underlying contradiction between the sharply dualistic worldview expressed in the cita-

54. De Menasce notes the parallels to Matthew 7:15-20, 12:33, and Luke 6:43-44. A closer parallel passage, however, is found in the Manichaean Kephalaia, chapter two. As translated from the Coptic by Timothy Pettipiece, the text reads:

The good tree produces [good fruit,] and [the] evil tree produces bad fruit. [. . .] Neither is there a] good [tree] that produces bad fruit, [nor is there an evil tree that] produces good fruit. [Every tree
is known by] its fruit.

As Pettipiece states in his discussion of this section of the Kephalaia, the two trees are interpreted by Mani as representing the two fundamental opposing principles of good and evil. Each tree is said to have five limbs reflecting the five-fold nature of good and evil being and, at the same time, the five-fold path which leads to liberation or damnation. See Timothy Pettipiece, Pentadic Redaction in the Manichaean Kephalaia (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 21-24. Interestingly, both in the context of the Manichaean text and the general discussion of good and evil trees, this figure resembles the extended metaphor of a tree at ŠGW 1:11-20—likewise divided into trunks, branches, boughs, limbs, and twigs—that describes the underlying order of the universe and religion encapsulated in the concept of the dēn. For more on the Manichaean dualistic reading of the good/evil tree see J. Kevin Coyle, “Good Tree, Bad Tree: The Matthean/Lukan Paradigm in Manichaism and its Opponents,” in The Reception and Interpretation of the Bible in Late Antiquity, ed. Lorenzo DiTommaso and Lucian Turcescu (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 121-44.

55. ŠGW 15:109: han buniašttaa dušman, identified with Ahriman.

56. De Menasce, Apologétique, 224 relates this citation to Jesus’ statements in John 12:31, 14:30-31, and 16:11 regarding the existence of the “ruler of the world” (hō tou kosmou arkhōn). For example, 14:30-31 reads:

I will no longer talk much with you, for the ruler of this world is coming. He has no power over
me; but I do as the Father has commanded me, so that the world may know that I love the Father.


58. One of the basic physical and metaphysical principles of the ŠGW is that entities composed of opposing natures cannot interact or influence each other. This principle is demonstrated in Chapters Two through Four, Eight, and Nine.

59. This section is briefly mentioned in Gignoux, "Škand Gumānīg Vīzār," 64-65.
tion and the monotheistic belief in God as singular, good author of creation. This same point is made in ŠGW 15:141-145:

(141) vaš diṭ zuhūdā mār ī kōhī zuhūdaa ḵād. (142) vaš guft ku cuṇṭa kārbaa tuuq kardan ka bažagar zuhūdaa hāt. (143) vaš nā ḵās piṭ bažagar ḵād. (144) īnca gōeq ku har draxt i pidar nā kišt xanīhāt u ō ādar ašaganihāt (145) ko rā až iň sax-un šāyaṭ dānāstān ku hast draxt i pidar nā kišt xadan60 ašagadan āḇāiiaṭ

(141) And he also called the Jews (zuhūdq) "the serpent of the mount of Judah (zuhūdaa)." (142) And he said "How can you do good when you are malefactious Jews?" (143) And he did not call his own Father malefactious. (144) It also says this: "Every tree which the Father did not plant shall be uprooted and cast in the fire." (145) One can know from this statement that there is a tree which the father did not plant [which] must be uprooted and cast away.61

Both the reference to the evil of the Jews and the statement concerning trees planted by someone other than God the Father serve to emphasize Mardānfarrox's dualist interpretation of Jesus' statements. However, aside from their function in their immediate context in the critique of Christianity, both these citations are also connected to the larger motif of the garden. Any mention of good and evil trees calls to mind the tree of knowledge from the garden narrative in Chapters Eleven and Thirteen. Just as the trees mentioned here are in their nature good or evil, the tree of knowledge which the first humans taste imparts the ability to distinguish between the two. Were it not for the knowledge humans gained by eating from the tree in the garden, as it were, Jesus' arboreal dualism would be nonsensical.

Other elements in this passage also look back to the story of the garden. The word used for serpent here, mār, is also used of the cunning trickster in Chapter Thirteen. The reference to the serpents of the mountain resonates with the punishment of the serpent described in ŠGW 13:42 that it will be cursed among the creatures of the mountains and the plains. Even the mention of Jews might be seen as pointing to the context of the earlier critique of Judaism.

The order of citations here in Chapter Fifteen likewise echoes the structure of Thirteen's garden narrative. There, the peace of the garden is disrupted by the appearance of the serpent that leads directly to punishment, pain and exile. Here, the two arboreal citations, which, even without considering the parallel texts from the New Testament, are clearly connected, are intersected by the serpentine citation. While the trees in the first citation are undamaged and healthily bearing fruit, after the appearance of the serpent the tree in the second citation is uprooted and cast into the fire. Disregarding, for a moment, the good or evil character of the trees involved, the serpent's intervention is followed by destruction, just as in the garden.

Though Mardānfarrox's comment on Jesus' statement about good and evil trees cannot itself be taken as a critique of the passage cited in ŠGW 15:132-134, it does buttress one of the central critiques of the story of the garden. Mardānfarrox's comment is directed against

60. De Menasce, Apologétique, 220 amends xāndan.

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moral and metaphysical ambiguity. Either the trees are good or the trees are bad; since these natures are absolutely opposed, there can be no moral speckles or spots. However, this is precisely the description of the tree in the garden. It is both good, imparting knowledge, and evil in as much as it is forbidden and associated with seduction and trickery. The true orientation of the tree, its true nature, is undecidable and unclear. Mardānfarrox picks on this moral ambiguity in his reading of the garden narrative. As mentioned above, the second horticultural passage at ŠGW 11:353-358, and the critique of the garden citation at 13:121-130, address this same point. If the tree and the knowledge it imparts are good—and knowledge is a virtue—then why does God forbid the first human couple to eat of its fruit and why does he punish them so severely when they disobey? If the tree was bad, why did he put it in the garden in the first place, why did he let the serpent into the garden to tempt them to eat it and why, as it says in the first version in Chapter Eleven, did he give Ādam a gluttonous nature which made him easy prey for the serpent's trickery? The ambiguous position of the tree of knowledge shows up the contradictions and irrationalities of the garden story as a whole.

As portrayed in the ŠGW, Islam, Judaism, and Christianity come across as separate doctrines, opposed to each other and divided from within, each adhering to its own set of confused beliefs. Accordingly, Mardānfarrox treats each doctrine differently. The critique of Islam concentrates the most on issues of free-will, ethics, divine unity, and justice—among the central concerns in Islamic rationalist theology—without recourse to much scriptural or narrative exposition. In the case of Judaism, the sacred text is the focus of attention; the theological points arise as responses to the stories and statements the First Scripture itself contains. As for Christianity, the narrative of Jesus' birth and the contradiction between his divine and human natures frames the critique.

Taken together, the horticultural references and allusions found in each of these critiques constitute one of the tools Mardānfarrox uses to demonstrate the underlying similarity between these disparate doctrines. Islam, Judaism, and Christianity, despite their differences, perpetuate the same erroneous belief in good's compatibility with evil and one God's responsibility for both. It is this common error which Mardānfarrox sets out to expose and challenge. In the same way, the three faiths are united by this foundational story of good and evil in the garden. The story, expressed in each of the critiques in a different way and to a different extent, is shared by all three. Moreover, Mardānfarrox's rational critique of monotheism works together with the garden narrative to unite these three critiques; they are not divorced mechanisms, running on parallel tracks, but rather symbiotically related, working in tandem.

The narrative of the garden expresses Mardānfarrox's critique of monotheism, this theological point, in a dramatized form. It is a lens which focuses the contradiction, evil, irrationality, and stupidity of monotheism and contains them within a single event. The story of temptation and transgression, of God's willful ignorance or, even worse; his malicious intent, of Ādam, Hauuā and the serpent, is a parable for monotheism's unreasonableness and error.

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62. Christianity's opposition to Judaism comes through in the citation from Chapter Fifteen above and other passages in that critique.
63. Different sects or groups within Islam are mentioned at ŠGW 11:205, 11:260, the Mu'tazilites specifically at 11:280, and sects generally at 12:31. Within Judaism, the citation of the text of "a certain group" is mentioned at 14:39. In the critique of Christianity, divergent Christologies are mentioned at 15:31.
I will now turn to the final instance of the garden motif, the Zoroastrian garden parable. Chapter Four of the ŠGW, which contains the parable, is structured as a response to a theological question posed by an otherwise unknown Mihriār i Mahmād of Isfahan.  

Mihriār questions how, since both good and evil events on earth are dictated by the influence of the stars and the heavenly sphere, the creation of these celestial bodies can be attributed to either Ohrmazd or Ahriman. The radical opposition and incompatibility between good and evil is one of the central tenets of the ŠGW's theology and Mihriār's question points to a belief that seemingly contradicts this radical opposition. If Ahriman created the celestial bodies, then he is, contrary to his nature, ultimately responsible for good events; if Ohrmazd did so, he is likewise responsible for evil. If they created the celestial bodies together, then Ohrmazd would be complicit in Ahriman's evildoing.  

Mihriār’s questions from the two preceding chapters display similar concerns. In Chapter Two, he asks how Ahriman was able to attack Ohrmazd's domain of light since the two are composed of opposed and incompatible essences. Similarly, in Chapter Three, he asks why Ohrmazd was not able to prevent Ahriman from doing evil; this inability would seem to violate his perfection. Motivating all of these questions is a single underlying problem: the lack of sufficient distinction between Ohrmazd and Ahriman in the traditional Zoroastrian account of creation. In addition to his astrological arguments regarding the origins and functions of the planets and the stars, Mardānfarrox employs a parable of a gardener's defense of his garden against a destructive vermin to answer the challenge raised by Mihriār son of Mahmād. Like some rabbinic parables, a rhetorical device frequently employed in the Midrash, the ŠGW's...
garden parable is exegetical, meaning that it is used to structure and resolve an ambiguity in an enigmatic canonical narrative. In the ŠGW's case, this ambiguity, also called a gap, is the lack of distinction mentioned above between Ohrmazd and Ahriman. Chapter Four's garden parable is also similar to rabbinc parables structurally. It consists of two sections, first a short, timeless fiction concerning the attack on a garden by an evil vermin and the gardener's disposing of the vermin by means of a clever trap. The second half likens the elements in this fiction to Ohramzd's creation of the material world as a means to stop the attack of Ahriman.

The fictional narrative appears first, following a passage in ŠGW 4:60-62 lauding Ohrmazd's role as protector, healer and savior of his creatures. The passage reads as follows:

(63) vaš angošidaa aṣa cuñ bāy ḥadāe u būstąṣan i dānā kāš dāt72 u murū i gunāhdār u zadār pa taβāhinādān i bar i drauxt ō bāy kāmāt vāzūḏān (64) ōi bāyβan i dānā padasāe kam ranjī i xās aʃaž dāştān i ō dāt i gunāhdār ež xās bāy rā aʃažār i pas grīftān sāiāt i ō dāt ārāzet (65) cuñ ṯaraa74 u dam75 u cīnāa i fārāndāa (66) ku ka đāt cīnāa vīnāt76 vaš ranjāhā77 kāmāt raftān pa anāgāh78 i79 ṣolāa u đām āndaraα grōhīhāt80 (67) ḱā ašnā ku đāt ka ḏām ofīt nā ašavrβižī i đām bō ̔a i đām ārāstār (68) pa ḱā dāt ḱādār đām grōhīhāt (69) mōrāa81 bāy ḥadāe i đām ārāstār pa đānāi

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71. In Daniel Boyarin's formulation a gap is "any place in the text that requires the intervention of the reader to make sense of story." Boyarin, "Parables," 130.
72. Stern, Parables in Midrash, 4-45.
73. Both Pahalvi daad and Sanskrit śvāpada- mean "wild animal" (MacKenzie, CPD, 23; Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 1105). Given the context, I have translated "vermin" throughout.
74. In his edition, West amends from the manuscripts' reading maräa, noting that "here and elsewhere, the th has become m" (Jamasp-Asana and West, Shikand, 25). The Pahlavi versions clearly indicate a reading of talag. The Sanskrit kīlakā, "a bolt," "pin," or "wedge" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 285) seems not to be used in classical Sanskrit in the sense of "trap," but it does fall within the larger semantic field.
76. Timuş argues that the vermin's vision should be understood in a metaphorical sense, as flying towards the object of its vision. For, she argues, if it had seen the trap itself, it would have avoided it (Timuş, Fonder, bātir, rénover, 107). However, seeing the bait is not the same as seeing the trap.
77. Pahlavi ranjagihā, Sanskrit āyāsatayā. Both words are adjectives meaning "with trouble" or "painfully" (MacKenzie, CPD, 70; Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 148). De Menasce understands this phrase as descriptive not of the vermin's advance on the trap, as I have translated above, but of its strong desire to escape after being captured (Apologéntique, 55). This reading is problematic in that the event of capture only comes at the end of the sentence. My translation follows that of Timuş: "et il veut s'enfuir tout trouble" (Timuş, Fonder, bātir, rénover, 107).
78. MSS. AK, PB3, and L23 record an ending ḱā; all others have ḱā for ḱā.
79. The ezeaf is found only in MSS. JJ, JE, and R.
80. Pahlavi grawihēdā, "to be captured"; Sanskrit antargrāhiyāte, from grāha- "seizing," "holding," or "taking captive" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 372). See the discussion in Timuş, "Changer les mots," 143-44.
81. Pahlavi mērag, meaning "young man" or "husband" (MacKenzie, CPD, 55); see also, for example, Herbedestan 67: Sanskrit mukhyāsvu means "being at the beginning or head" or "leader" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 820). Following the Sanskrit, one is tempted to translate this word as "chiefly," or "first of all." The Pahlavi, however, seems to preclude such a reading.
ägāhṣ2 ku ą dāt i83 nīrō aňdãi cā sāmānāa u cānd jāmān (70) ą84 dāt nīrō u zōr yaš aň-

dar tan pā kōxšidārī ägārīhāt85 u rāzhīhāt cāndāš tūuq pā dām xādan86 u ērāa škā-
tan taťāhīnīdan kōxšīdan (71) u kaš abūndāa-nīrōī rā nīrō i kōxšīī ūxāt87 ägārīhāt

das88 ą bāyāfān i dānā pā xāš kām u anjāmī bar89 i xāš dānāhā ą dāt až dām bōruň

dājāganāhī hast-gōharihā; 90āgār-nīrōhā (72) xāš dām u ērāa āďāj-zārāstārīhā avaza-

ndīhā āďāz ő gānţ āďāsþārāt.

(63) And his likeness91 is like a garden owner and gardener who knows that the

sinful and harmful vermin and birds wish to destroy the garden by ruining the fruit of

the trees. (64) That wise gardener, through little toil of his own, to keep those

sinful vermin from his garden, prepared an instrument which could capture the

vermin (65) like a trap, a snare or a bait for birds (66) which, when the vermin

sees the bait and, troubled in desire, approaches, unaware of the trap and snare, it

is captured inside. (67) It is known that when vermin fall in a snare, the victory is

not accorded to the snare but to the snare's maker. (68) By this the vermin was

captured in the trap: (69) the owner of the garden who made the snare in wisdom

knew the limits and duration of the strength of that vermin. (70) The bodily

strength and power of that vermin became inoperative and flowed away in strug-

gle; as much as it was able, by uprooting the snare and breaking the trap, it strug-


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gled to cause ruin. (71) And when on account of its incomplete strength, the strength for struggle left it and it became inoperative, then that wise gardener, through his own desire and as fruit of his own accomplishment, wisely cast that vermin out of the snare, with its strength inoperative in its own essence. (72) He consigned his snare and trap, refashioned and undamaged, to the storehouse.

The second part of the parable, the application, connects each of the elements in the fiction to an element in a larger reality, the Zoroastrian account of cosmogony. The text continues:

(73) ściça mānā hast dādār hōrmāzd d ādānā būxtār u ādam ŋārāstār u vaṭ buniāštān āgārinīdār u bāy92 i ħās az vazūdār pādār (74) dāt i gunāhkār i bāy tābāhinīdār ə̄i gazistaa āharmān i ādamā štāfār pātīariinīdār93 (75) ādam i vaḥā āṣman kaš vaḥā dahišna ḏārd maḥmā94 ḏān (76) kaš ganāmānīīū u95 vašūdagā96 xāmast ḏārd grōhī ḏān (77) u ə̄vī97 ḏāraa u ādam i dāt ḏā ḏān i āharmān az ḏār āharmān vaš zōrā ḏābdārā ə̄vī98 dārang99 (79) i100 pa kōxšīdārī i dāt ḏārd ḏāraa u ādam āgārihāt yaš nōrō (80) ə̄vī101 dādār i ādamā būxtān yaš az pātīariiā jāḏadānā niiak-rajašinī vīnārdan aṭārāt ə̄i bāy ḏādāe i dānā ḏām u ḏāraa.

(73) He [the gardner] is like the creator Ohrmazd, savior of the creatures and fashioner of creation, who renders inoperative the evil principle and who protects his garden from the destroyer. (74) The sinful vermin, ruiner of the garden, he is accused Ahriman, who hurries and impedes the creatures. (75) The good snare is
heaven in which the good creatures dwell, (76) in which the evil spirit and the abortions are in captivity. (77) And [that which] by the trap and snare made the sinful vermin inoperative, through the performance of it own will, (78) is the time of the struggle of Ahriman and his powers and instruments, for the duration (79) of the vermin's struggle in the trap and snare during which his strength becomes inoperative. (80) The sole creator's saving his creatures from the adversary and arranging for them eternally a good course resembles that wise garden owner and his snare and trap.

In order to explicate the parable's exegetical relationship with the Zoroastrian creation story, I will recount this creation story in brief. Zoroastrian cosmogony receives its fullest treatment in Pahlavi literature, in particular in the Bundahišn. 102 Enrico Raffaelli has demonstrated the ŠGW's particular affinity to this text, 103 and it is for this reason that I will refer primarily to the Bundahišn in the synopsis of Zoroastrian cosmogony below. However, it is important to bear in mind that as much as Mardanfarrox declares himself an avid reader of Zoroastrian literature, 104 it is unlikely—though not impossible—that he had access to the same version of the story the Bundahišn tells. 105 More plausible is that the close affinity between the two texts is due to a common, now lost, source. 106

Given its length, I will recount the story of creation in brief rather than cite the text in full. In the beginning, Ohrmazd was on high, in omniscience, goodness and light for an unlimited time. Ahriman, on the other hand, was in the deep and in darkness. Both spiritual 107 entities were unlimited in every direction but that facing the boundary between them;

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102. A post-Sasanian work which makes uses of earlier materials, the Bundahišn describes the creation of the world and its diversity; various chapters are devoted, for instance, to astronomy, geography, and animal and vegetable life. The text also includes a final apocalyptical section. For a general discussion of the contents of the work and the manuscript tradition see David N. MacKenzie, "Bundahišn," in Encyclopaedia Iranica (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 1990), 4:547-51; Cereti, La letteratura pahlavi, 87-91 and Macuch, "Pahlavi Literature", 137-39. The other main Pahlavi witness for the creation story is the Wizīdagāhī Zādspram, a late-ninth century compilation which likewise draws from earlier sources. See the edition by Philiipe Gignoux and Ahmad Tafazzoli, eds. Anthologie de Zādspram (Paris: Association pour l'avancement des études iraniennes, 1993).


105. Partially, my skepticism arises from the predominantly oral transmission of Zoroastrian literature up to and including the ninth and tenth centuries. For an excellent recent discussion of the pervasiveness of orality in Sasanian Iran see Secunda, "Sasanian Stam" and the discussion in Chapter Two.

106. Raffaelli, "Astrological Chapter."

107. Pahlavi mēnōg, "spiritual" as opposed to gēğīg, "material." On the exact designations of these terms see Shaul Shaked, "The Notions Mēnōg and Gēğīg in the Pahlavi Texts and their Relation to Eschatology," Acta
this no-man's-land was filled by a void preventing any contact between the two (BD 1:7). Ohrmazd, on account of his omniscience, was aware of Ahriman, their conflict, and evil's ultimate defeat. Ahriman, however, was unaware of Ohrmazd. This situation lasted for three thousand years until Ahriman approached the boundary, saw the lights of goodness, and attacked (BD 1:15-16). Though Ohrmazd proposed peace to Ahriman and offered him the opportunity to aid goodness for his own benefit, Ahriman refused and pledged eternal enmity against Ohrmazd and his creation (BD 1:20-23). In his omniscience, Ohrmazd knew that if he did not set a limited time in which the battle between good and evil would take place, like two men who agree to fight from morning to night (BD 1:27), the strife would continue eternally. Therefore, Ohrmazd proposed to Ahriman that they fix a period of nine thousand years in which to do battle. Ahriman, unable to foresee that this time limit would lead inevitably to his own destruction, agreed to the terms (BD 1:26-28).

Their deal set, Ohrmazd recited the *Ahunawar* mantra, which set forth the future of the conflict between good and evil. The *Ahunawar* revealed Ahriman's defeat and Ohrmazd's triumph (BD 1:29): during the period of their battle, for three thousand years Ohrmazd's will would prevail; for three thousand years, during the period of the mixture (*gumezišn*), their wills would strive together; and during the final period, Ahriman would be incapacitated. Stunned by this knowledge, Ahriman fell back into the darkness for three thousand years (BD 1:30-32). Then Ohrmazd formed his creatures from his own essence; Ahriman, in response, counter-created (*kirrenīd*) the demons (BD 1:44-50).

I will discuss the exegetical relationship between the garden parable and Zoroastrian cosmogony as told in the *Bundahišn* further below. There is, however, an additional text from BD 4:10-12 that also relates to the parable's description of Ohrmazd trapping Ahriman and the demons inside the sky (ŠGW 4:75-76):

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108. *Ahunawar* is the Pahlavi rendition of Avestan *yaθa aθū vairō*, the opening words of one of the most sacred verses in the Zoroastrian tradition (Yasna 27:13). Part of the Zoroastrian liturgy, the *Ahunawar* mantra is the opening verse of the Old Avesta. This part of the Avestan corpus, written in a slightly more archaic form of the Avestan dialect, also includes two additional mantras, *Ašom Vohū* (Yasna 27:14) and *Yeǰhē Hāṯīm* (Yasna 27:15); the five Gathas, the sacred poems authored by the prophet Zarathustra himself (Yasna 28-34, 43-46, 47-50, 51, and 53); the *Yasna Hapāŋghātī* (Yasna 35-41) and a final mantra, the *A Airišma Isiio or Aiiriama* at the end of Yasna 54. Martin Schwartz has demonstrated that the *Ahunawar* is the original last stanza of Yasna 29. See his "Gathic Compositional History, Yasna 29, and Bovine Symbolism," in *Paitimana*, ed. S. Adhami (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2003), 214-17. For a description of the Avestan corpus see Jean Kellens, "Avesta," in *Encyclopaedia Iranica* (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 1988), 3:35-54 and, most recently, Hintze, "Avestan Literature." For a discussion of the intertextual relationship between the various parts of the Old Avestan corpus, notably the concatenations in the Gathas, see Martin Schwartz, "The Gathas and Other Old Avestan Poetry," in *La langue poétique indo-européenne*, eds. Georges-Jean Pinault and Daniel Petit (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 459-98 and the references to earlier studies quoted there.

109. Ohrmazd’s revelatory recitation of the *Ahunawar* prayer is significant on a number of levels. In particular, as Yuhan Vevaina has shown, the twenty-one words of the prayer are understood, within the Pahlavi commentary tradition, to encapsulate the entire content of the dēn. See the further discussion in Yuhan Sohrab-Dinshaw Vevaina, "'Enumerating the Dēn': Textual Taxonomies, Cosmological Deixis, and Numerological Speculations in Zoroastrianism," *History of Religions* 50 (2010): 125-27.
pas āxist gannāg-mēnōg abāg hamist dēwān abzārān ā padīrag ī rōśnān, u-š ān ās-
mān did, ī-sān mēnōgīhā nimūd ka ne astōmand dād estēd. arešk-kāmagīhā tag 
abar kard . . . māh ī frawardīn rōz ī ohrmazd andar dwārīst nēm-rōz. u-š asmān 
ēdōn aziš be tarsīd ceōn gōspond az gurg . . . u-š guft mēnōg asmān ā gannāg-
mēnōg ku "bēdom-zamānā-m pānagīh abāyēd kardan ku-t bērōn be nē hīlēm."

Then the Evil Spirit rose with all the powerful demons against the lights, and he 
saw the sky, which appeared spiritually for it had not been created materially. Full 
of jealous desire he attacked . . . in the month of Frawardīn on the day of Ohrmazd 
at noon he penetrated. And the sky was afraid of him like a speech from a wolf . . . 
. And the spiritual sky said to the Evil Spirit: "I must protect the furthermost time, 
meaning that I will not let you out."110

Though the sky flees from Ahriman "like a sheep from a wolf" during the attack, 
afterward it forms a barrier between the Evil Spirit and the untainted spiritual realm. Here we 
see why the parable identifies the trap with the sky: while Ahriman is able to enter, once 
inside he cannot to get out.111 Overall, the relationship between the garden parable and the 
creation story is quite clear; with the details filled in, the parable's correspondence between 
the gardener and Ohrmazd, the vermin and Ahriman and the trap and the sky seem perfectly 
fitting.

**Distinguishing Ohrmazd and Ahriman**

The lack of distinction between Ohrmazd and Ahriman that the parable sets out to 
interpret can be seen in the depiction of creation in the first chapter of the *Bundahišn*. First of 
all, the characterization of the two entities deserves note. The *Bundahišn* portrays both spiri-
tual entities as fully developed characters. Diametrically opposed though they might be in 
their natures, the fact that they are shown to both desire, think, converse, and create seems to 
derive the radical distinction between them. The text reveals the internal thoughts of 
both, equally. Ahriman is shown to be a character with whom we as readers can identify: 
Ahriman is a tragic hero, bamboozled into destruction by Ohrmazd's clever wiles. Though 
other Pahlavi texts insist on Ahriman's material non-existence, a point also alluded to in the 
*Bundahišn*,112 his existence and presence as a character in the text is exactly equivalent to 
Ohrmazd's.

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110. For an edition of the text see Fazolah Pakzad Soraki, "Bundahišn: Zoroastrische Kosmologie und 
Kosmogonie, Kapitel I-VI" (PhD diss., University of Tubingen, 2003), 61-62.
111. The same episode is retold in ŠGW 4:12-16, though, significantly, the sky's initial retreat is not mentioned.
l'avancement des études iraniennes, 1998), 72-73); DK 3:105 (Jean de Menasce, ed. and trans., Le troisième 
35). See the discussion in Shaul Shaked, "Some Notes on Ahriman, the Evil Spirit, and His Creation," in 
(Jeruslaem: Magnes, 1967), 337-52.
In addition to their equal characterization, the text also depicts the possibility of their agreement. In the Bundahišn, Ohrmazd and Ahriman are capable of rapprochement. BD 1:20-21 describe Ohrmazd's peace proposal to Ahriman before their battle:

(20) ēg ohrmazd abāg-iz ce-ēwēnag dānistan ī frazām ī kār ē padīrag ī gannāg mēnōg sūd. u-š āštīh ābar dāst ud guf kū "gannāg mēnōg, ābar ē dām ī man ayārīh bar ud stāyišn dah tā ād ān pādāšn amarg ud azarmān ud asōhišn ud apōhišn bāwē. (21) u-š cim ēn kū āgar ārdig nē sarēnē xwad nē āgarīhē ud ā-mān hār dōnān sūd abgārē." (20) Then Ohrmazd, with his knowledge of the end of the affair, went to meet the Evil Spirit. And he proposed peace and said, "Evil Spirit, befriend my creation and offer praise so that as a reward you become immortal and ageless and without feeling and undecaying. (21) And the reason is that if you do not provoke battle, you will not incapacitate yourself and you will promote benefit for both of us."113

This conciliatory gesture certainly highlights Ohrmazd's goodness. Despite his foreknowledge of the inevitability of conflict, he is depicted as a seeker after peace. Ahriman's answer is, predictably, a pledge of enmity. However, the dialogue between them not only demonstrates their equal status as characters within the work but also raises the possibility that Ahriman could have accepted the proposal. That would imply the mutability of Ahriman's nature and the lack of absolute opposition between good and evil which reason, as Mihīār's question underlines, would dictate.

A similar problem is raised by the two entities' agreement to battle for a specific period of time. On the one hand, as above, the necessity of Ahriman's agreement to Ohrmazd's proposal implies an equality between them as characters. As much as Ahriman lacks foresight in falling for Ohrmazd's trick, he is nonetheless capable of rational choice. Moreover time is a double-edged instrument. The finiteness of time guarantees Ahriman's ultimate defeat. However, time aids both good and evil. As BD 1:36 states, the Evil Spirit's attack could not be incapacitated but through creation, and the time which is necessary for Ohrmazd's creation animates or makes current (rawāgīh) Ahriman's evil counter-creation as well.114 It is clear from the Bundahišn's account that time is, to a certain extent, outside of Ohrmazd's control.115 Despite the fact that the text describes Ohrmazd fashioning finite time

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113. §21 is missing entirely from the shorter recension of the text, known as the Indian Bundahišn. It is possible that this paragraph was added in the longer Iranian recension as an explanation of why Ohrmazd would make his surprising offer of peace. Cereti and MacKenzie, "Battle," 55.
114. See Cereti and MacKenzie, "Battle," 37:
   u-š did pad rōšn-wēnāgīh Ohrmazd ku Gannāg Mēnōg hargiz az petyāragīh ne wardēd, ān petyāragīh jud pad dām-dāhišnīh ne agārīhēd ud dām jud pad zamān rawāgīh ne bāwēd, ka zamān brēhēnīd dām-ez ī Ahremen rawāg be bawēd.
   And with his clear-sightedness Ohrmazd saw that the Evil Spirit would never turn from his onslaught, that that onslaught could not be made powerless except by the creation, and that for the creatures there would be no currency without time, [and] that when time had been created the creatures of Ahriman would also become current.
115. This might reflect an alternative account of creation which states that both Ohrmazd and Ahriman were born from time (zurwān). This alternative version, identified as the "Zurvanite heresy" (see Robert C.
(BD 1:39), it also states that time is more powerful than both good and evil creation. Why should good enter battle with such an aimless weapon?

The parable resolves this gap by providing in the fictional story a deep structure\textsuperscript{116} for the creation narrative. The apparent equality between Ohrmazd and Ahriman is an illusion. Their natures are as diverse and incompatible as that of a human and a lizard or crow; no possibility of communication can exist between them. Moreover, in the parable no agreement is necessary between the gardener and the vermin. It is simply the vermin's nature to attack,\textsuperscript{117} and no peace offerings or gentlemen's agreements can offset or limit that attack. In essence, the parable sifts out of the creation narrative all hints of Ahriman's character. Without even a specific name or identity---\textit{dat} means vermin in general, not any particular species of animal---the attacker is portrayed here without any internal life or reflection, without emotions or reactions, but simply as a relentless force, a hunger. The garden parable deanimates the Evil Spirit and strips him of his character.

Similarly, the time which restricts the period of battle and animates creation is no longer the object of an agreement between the two entities. Rather, the time of the battle is determined solely by the strength of the vermin. While the gardener, in his wisdom, gauges the animal's strength and builds his trap accordingly, the struggle ends only when the vermin is exhausted, not according to some external timer or schedule. Indeed, one can even go so far as to say that the structuring fiction of the parable presents the story as if there were no real battle at all. Time, battle, will, and struggle---all are internalized in the evil vermin and have no effect on the garden of Ohrmazd. Whatever the surface contradictions, the deep story of cosmogony is one of radical opposition and inequality.

This revelation of this deep story by means of the structuring garden fiction can be said to entail, above all, a shift of narratological perspective. While creation in the Bundahišn is told, as it were, through human eyes, which see the battle between good and evil personified on this material plane, in the world and within ourselves, the parable is told from the point of view of Ohrmazd himself. From that perspective, evil's attack is, at best, a minor inconvenience and disturbs not at all his transcendent gardening.\textsuperscript{118}

\textit{Zaehner, Zurvan: A Zoroastrian Dilemma} [New York: Biblio and Tannen, 1972]), can be found in Pahlavi works (including the Bundahišn), later Zoroastrian religious texts in New Persian, as well as Armenian and Greek sources. On the misapplication of the concepts of "orthodoxy" and "heresy" to the different creation accounts in the Sasanian period see Shaked, \textit{Dualism}, 14-15.

\textsuperscript{116}On this as a function of the rabbinic parable see Boyarin, "Parables", 130: "It follows, then, that the so-called \textit{nimshal} [Hebrew: solution to the parable], which is the actual filled-out biblical story, is ontologically prior and axiologically primary in the \textit{mashal} [Hebrew: parable] text, and that the function of the \textit{mashal} in such contexts is, indeed, to provide a rationale for precisely this way of filling the gap, as at least a possible and plausible one, and thus a rationale for exegesis. . . . the \textit{mashal}, on my view, is an interpretation of the \textit{nimshal}." See further Boyarin, \textit{Intertextuality}, 90.

\textsuperscript{117}This is essentially the answer Mardanfarrox gives as to Mihiiār's question why Ahriman could attack Ohrmazd's creation: it is precisely because they are of irreconcilable natures that evil attacked good (SGW 2:5).

\textsuperscript{118}As Stein, \textit{Maxims, Magic, Myth}, 104 has noted, there are also gaps between the fictional narrative of the parable and its scriptural solution. To read a rabbinic parable is to engage in a double reading, first reading the two parts of the parable together, discerning the correspondences between them and how the fictional narrative structures the gapped scriptural text, and then returning to read the two halves separately in light of the gaps they contain. The same can be said of the SGW's garden parable. The most significant gap between the two parts of the parable is the problem of the trap. As BD 1:29 (Cereti and MacKenzie,
Between Parable and Polemic

Having established the garden parable's exegetical relationship with the Zoroastrian account of creation, I will now turn to the connection between the parable and the other passages that make up the motif of gardens in the ŠGW. First of all, there are linguistic connections between the various passages. For example, knowledge, a major theme in Mardānfar-rox's critique of the garden passages and one of the most important attributes of Ohrmazd, is a recurring theme in these garden citations. Forms of the word for knowledge, dānāī, are repeated throughout the passages. In ŠGW 4:69 the gardener prepares the trap with knowledge (pa dānāī) and his knowledge is emphasized again in 4:71: he is referred to as the wise gardener (bāγašān i dānā) and his capture of the vermin is the fruit of his knowledge (xāš dānāīhā). In ŠGW 13:25-26, after eating the fruit Ūdām and Hauuāe become knowledgeable concerning good and evil (u dānashni ašīq būṯ) and that they are naked (u dānast ku brahanāa hast). The tree itself is also referred to as the tree of knowledge (draxt i dānashni) in 13:33. The same is true of the citation in Chapter Eleven. ŠGW 11:72 refers to Ūdām's becoming knowledgeable (dānashnimand).

More important than the linguistic resonances, though, are the similarities in the narratives themselves. Like Chapter Four's parable, the passages from the critiques of Judaism and Islam are also set in gardens. As in classical Iranian gardens, the most important features in both gardens are the fruit trees. The importance of these trees is indicated by the lengths the gardeners go to to protect them. The vermin desire the fruit of the trees in ŠGW 4:63 and it is because of this desire that the gardener prepares his trap. Ādīnō forbids Ūdām and Hauuāe to eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge in 13:19 and punishes them severely when they do. The same prohibition is repeated in 11:64 and 11:354. The good and evil fruit is also the focus of the passage in the critique of Christianity at 15:132-134.

The gardens are also depicted as separated or distinguished from the surrounding space; in both cases there is a demarcated inside and outside. In the garden citations in Chapter Thirteen and Chapter Eleven the boundary is evident in God's act expelling the first couple from the garden to the land outside. In the parable in Chapter Four, the borders are less prominent. However, the vermin come from outside the garden to attack and, once the animal is incapacitated, the gardener removes it from the trap and, presumably, the garden as well.

"Battle," 36) makes clear, Ohrmazd revealed to Ahriman through the Ahunawar prayer his own ultimate defeat. While it is not clear whether Ahriman is destroyed or merely rendered inactive, the end of the world, the resurrection, and the destruction of the demons does seem to be the end of evil and its influence. However, in the ŠGW's garden parable, the finality of the ending is more ambiguous. Having been incapacitated the vermin, the gardener removes it from the trap—one presumes this implies removing it from the garden as well—and returns the trap to his storehouse. Having gone to all the trouble to construct the trap and catch the vermin, why doesn't the gardener kill the animal or why does the story not state explicitly that the vermin never troubled the garden again? The gesture of replacing the trap to the storehouse in particular raises the possibility of its being taken out a second time. It raises the possibility of repetition, of a cyclical struggle of good against evil which undermines the linear chronology of Zoroastrian cosmogony in the Bundahišn.

The characters and plots of the narratives are also similar. The passages in Chapters Eleven and Thirteen both cast God in a role similar to that of the gardener in Chapter Four's parable. God and the gardener both attempt to protect the trees in the garden, though only the parable's gardener is actually successful in his attempt. Both have unquestioned authority within the gardens and power over the creatures within it. Similarly, the gardens are infested by vermin: the serpent (or Ahriman) in Chapters Eleven and Thirteen and the unnamed wild animal in the parable. These creatures are absolutely evil and wish only to do harm. The gardens also contain a trap by means of which the vermin is neutralized and the fruit-trees protected. In the parable in Chapter Four, this is the gardener's trap or snare while in Chapters Eleven and Thirteen the element parallel to the trap is the tree of knowledge itself. Likewise, the two passages construct similar narratives out of these common elements. In both the parable and the garden stories in the polemical chapters, a gardener, in order to protect the fruit trees of his garden, lays a trap for hungry vermin. The vermin are similarly caught, incapacitated, though not destroyed, and removed from the garden.

However, while the garden parable is characterized by its coherence and its ordering of the Zoroastrian creation account, the garden citations from the critiques of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity are incoherent and disordered. First of all, the characters' motives and moral orientations are contradictory. Citing just a few of the contradictions in the story in Chapter Thirteen, Ādīnō, who creates Ādam and Hauuāē and puts them in the garden, also introduces the serpent who entices them to transgress that his prohibition to eat the forbidden fruit. Considering that Ādīnō himself set up the conditions for this transgression, his anger and punishment are unjustified. The same incoherence can be seen in the character of the serpent. Inserted into the scene by Ādīnō, he nonetheless immediately seeks to undermine Ādīnō's commands. However, his "crime" leads directly to the human couple's enlightenment, a surprisingly positive result for a seemingly devious creature. It is unclear if the serpent is good or evil. As for Ādam and Hauuāē, they follow the serpent's suggestion to eat the fruit without a second thought, a surprising development considering the severity of Ādīnō's prohibition. The nature of the tree is also difficult to define. In terms of its function in the narrative, it resembles the trap in the garden parable but, instead of catching the vermin—here the serpent—it catches precisely the human creatures whom were installed in the garden to cultivate and protect it.

The Garden Palace

In the preceding sections of this chapter I have argued for the existence of a motif of gardens in the ŠGW. I have attempted to show that the garden citation in Chapter Thirteen is an integral part of this motif. My goal in arguing for the literary connection between the passages discussed above has been to provide an alternative explanation for the prominent place of the garden citation within the critique of Judaism. As part of a larger motif of gardens that runs through the ŠGW as a whole, connecting the works apologetics and polemics, the cen-

120. Mardānfarroxs mentions this contradiction in his critique at ŠGW 13:121-131. This same problem inspired the Manichaean critique, cited by Augustine, that the serpent was Christ and a "god of the nation of darkness" (deum nescio quem gentis tenebrarum) gave the command for Adam and Eve not to eat from the tree because "he begrudged men the knowledge of good and evil" (Augustine, On Genesis, 135-36).
trality of the garden citation in the critique of Judaism should not only be traced back to the importance of this story in Jewish literature or in polemics against the Jewish scriptures.

The question remains, however, and with this question I will close this chapter, why the garden was chosen as the space in which to represent the coherence of Zoroastrianism and the incoherence of its opponents. I propose that Mardānfarrox chose to encapsulate the conundrum of monotheism as well as the triumph of Zoroastrianism in a garden because of the particular place of gardens in Iranian culture. In Iranian culture, as in the ancient Near East in general, the association between gardening and politics has been deeper than that of a resemblance between cognate arts. Beginning with the Achaemenid Persian empire (c. 550-330 BCE), royal gardens were the residences of kings and the seats of royal power, as Maria Subtelny succinctly notes, "it is the architecture of the garden which incorporates the palace and not the contrary." Gardens were linked with palaces both architecturally, as part of a single complex surrounded by a walled enclosure and conceptually. The idea of the king as royal gardener was intrinsic to the conception of kingship; the king as gardener rendered the earth fertile, a not insignificant attribute in the arid Iranian plateau. David Stronach has raised the possibility that the four-fold royal garden at Pasargadae, the Achaemenid capital, represented in microcosm the empire's extensive dominion. It is on account of this linkage that Achaemenid kings held court and executed justice in gardens. One of the more prominent examples of this policy can be found in the Book of Esther's depiction of the king's throne room, where justice is executed and the most important events of the story take place.


as located in the royal garden. As Esther warns Mordechai in 4:10-11, the royal garden was inaccessible to outsiders without the king's permission.

This same association of gardens with kingship, both in terms of design and conception, continued in the Sasanian and Islamic periods. While the evidence for Sasanian gardens is sparse, with especially little information to be gleaned from Pahlavi literature, scholars have argued that the quadripartite garden design familiar from Achamenid and later Islamic gardens was also known to the Sasanians. Evidence of the link between the palace and the garden includes a silver bowl engraved with the image of a garden palace; the bowl has been dated to the reign of Khosrow II (590-628). Archeological remains have been found of Sasanian gardens at Qasr-e Shirin and Hawsh Kuri dated, again, to Khosrow II. Both these gardens, complete with pools, shaded passageways and wide avenues, are designed to surround the palace complex.

This same close connection between political power and the garden continued under Islam. An example more or less contemporary with the ŠGW is the complex of gardens built by the 'Abbāsid Caliph al-Mu'tasim (r. 833-842) at the Jawsāq al-Khāqānī palace at Samarra, the capital city he founded. Similar in design to the Sasanian gardens just discussed, these palace gardens are mentioned as the location of the execution of a traitor to the crown and, presumably in another part of the property, where Caliph al-Mu'taz received the news of the sentence being carried out "sitting in a garden (būstān) of the Jawsaq filled with thyme mingled with Adonic anemones." Less than a century later, in 917, two ambassadors sent by the Byzantine emperor Constantine visited Caliph al-Muqtadir at Baghdad. An account of their visit, recorded in al-Khāṭīb al-Baghdādi's eleventh century History of Baghdad, describes a number of the ruler's garden palaces, full of date palms, melon beds, water tanks, artificial golden trees with mechanical birds, and, inside the palaces, sumptuous carpets and furniture.

127. Subtelny, Le monde est un jardin, 103.
128. Stronach, "Cahirbāgh.
131. An extensive history of Islamic garden design is given in the various articles in E. D. MacDougall and R. Ettinghausen, The Islamic Garden, (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 1976) and, more concisely, in Faqih, "Bāγy.
132. Again, see Bier, "The Sasanian Palaces and their Influence on Early Islam," esp. 60-61, on the problems in previous attempts to establish continuity between Sasanian and 'Abbasid palace architecture. Bier does note, however, that "when Sasanian influence is evident at all, it is invariably seen in the official portions, specifically in the throne-room ensemble which must have embodied for writers and builders alike the essence of the Sasanian imperium" (62).
135. A translation of this section of the History can be found in Lassner, Baghdad, 86-91.
The continuity of the symbolic relationship between kingship and the garden is exemplified in Persian literature from the tenth and eleventh centuries. Poets often liken the kingdom to a garden and the king to a gardener; these panegyrics also invoke the Islamic association between gardens and paradise.\(^{136}\) For example, in the dedication to his epic *Shāhnāme*, Ferdowsi praises his patron Maḥmūd of Ghazna in the following terms:

> ز فرّش جهان شد چو باگ بهار
> جهان شد به کردار باگ آرم

Because of his glory,\(^{137}\) the world became like a garden in spring, the sky full of clouds and the earth full of beauties; from time to time rain falls and makes the world like the garden of Iram.\(^{138}\)

Likewise, the eleventh century poet Muʿizzī's panegyric in praise of the Seljuk ruler Malik Shāh compares the kingdom to a garden. "The *shāh*," Muʿizzī writes, "is Rīdwān\(^{139}\) and his garden the divine Paradise. . . . Happy is the garden and happy the king within it."\(^{140}\)

A different, though complementary, association of kings and gardens is made in the literature of political council and mirrors for princes. In the twelfth century *Jāmiʿ al-ʿulūm* by Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, Maria Subtelny has identified a version of the famous maxim of the "circle of justice." The maxim instructs that the sovereign's power both provides for and depends on a flourishing agriculture, which makes use of the image of the garden. In Subtelny's translation, the text states: "the world is a garden irrigated by the state." An anonymous fifteenth century Arabic manuscript of the Councils of Alexander (*Naṣāʾīh-i Iskandar*) makes even more explicit the connection between the garden and sovereignty: "the world is a garden which the state must master."\(^{141}\)

A signal example of the symbolism of the garden palace can be found in a panegyric by the eleventh century poet Farrukhī, dedicated to Maḥmūd of Ghazna on the occasion of his construction of a new garden in the city of Balkh:

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136. For more on this association see the references in the following chapter.
140. The passage is cited in Hanaway, "Paradise on Earth", 46-47.
The king strolled in a garden whose master was spring and whose servant was Paradise; a garden which is an adornment of the kingdom and the pride and glory of Balkh; a garden whose trees are aloe and sandal and whose fragrant herbs are like coral . . . It is Paradise, this garden of the great Sultan . . . In it are found the beautiful people of the feast, and the warriors of the army. Parts of it are praised as hunting grounds and other parts are proper for feasting. . . . In its midst is a kingly palace with two figures on its walls painted in decorated niches, facing the view. . . . The painter has shown the king twice there, once in battle holding a lance, again at a feast with cup in hand.142

This poem weaves together many of the elements and design features discussed above. The space of the garden is described as filled with trees and fragrant herbs, areas for hunting and feasting, a decorated palace, and, in a further section not quoted, a deep pool and relaxing pavilion for drinking wine. The garden is the image of paradise and, at the same time, the reflection, or perhaps reserve, of the king's power. This dual power is reflected in the pair of images depicted on the garden palace itself. The king holding the lance signifies military might and the power of justified violence, also present in the form of the warriors and the hunting ground. The image of the king at feast, as well as the guests and the wine pavilion, signify the sovereign's wealth, his economic power. These two facets, of course, are interrelated, mutually reinforcing and transferable; returning to the Achaemenid context, we can think of the move between wealth and violence in Ahasuerus' order to execute Queen Vashti after she refuses to entertain at his drinking-feast.143 The presentation, in Farrūkhī's poem and the other sources cited above, of the king's power in the garden is fitting precisely because the garden is a site of mastery over the natural world.

With these associations in mind, we can turn back to the question of why Mardānfarrox settled on the motif of the garden in order to stage the error of monotheism. To my mind, the association between gardens and governance is crucial. Gardens are sites of justice.

143. Esther 1:9-22.
Though the metaphor associations between kings and gardens are shaded differently in different texts, both kings and gardeners rule, command, and decide the fates of the lives under their charge with an eye to the just vision of the whole. In the one instance this is the aesthetic justness of beauty and in the other justice in the state and the city. In both cases, the ruler's power is absolute and inviolate; no one, and certainly not the individuals he rules, can question his decisions and authority. The garden is the perfect polity, the utopia.

In the ŠGW's garden parable, the utopian space of perfect justice has been transformed into its opposite. In turning the potent symbolism of the garden on its head, transforming it from the quintessential image of justice and right rule, Mardānfarrox's polemic is sharpened. Set in the very space characterized by order, the disorder of the monotheistic garden is all the more jarring and unconscionable.

Conclusion

I have attempted to demonstrate two points in this chapter. First of all, I have tried to prove the existence of a recurring motif of gardens in the three critiques of monotheism in the ŠGW. Moreover, I have argued that these three horticultural passages are related, serving to link the critiques of the individual monotheistic doctrines and showing them to be permutations of the same basic error. Secondly, as discussed immediately above, I have offered an explanation of why the story of the garden, in its various forms, was chosen as this motif.

In focusing on a recurring motif, this chapter continues on a larger scale the argument of the previous chapter. Whereas that chapter concerned the motif of angels among the citations in the critique of Judaism, this chapter expands the scope of analysis to include the three chapters on Judaism, Islam and Christianity. In both chapters I argue that reading the citations contextually, which is to say as part of a larger, recurring pattern, reveals levels of meaning and polemical import that are lost when the primary point of reference is the citations' parallels in the Bible and Jewish literature.
Chapter Five:

Creating Judaism:
Between the ŠGW and the Dēnkard

The ŠGW is not Zoroastrian literature's only polemic against Judaism. In particular, the Dēnkard,¹ a work whose final cohesion is a product of the ninth or tenth centuries,² nearly

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1. The longest of the surviving Zoroastrian texts in Middle Persian, the Dēnkard has been called the "Zoroastrian encyclopedia." It is preserved in its entirely only in a single manuscript, B, the complete editions of which are Dhanjishah Meherjibhai Madan, The Complete Text of the Pahlavi "Dēnkard" (Bombay: Society for the Promotion of Researches into the Zoroastrian Religion, 1911); Behramjee Sanjana and Peshotan Sanjana, The "Dēnkard": The Original Pahlavi Text (Bombay: Duftur Ashkara Press, 1874) which includes a conjectural and insufficient translation; and a facsimilie edition by Mark Dresden, "Dēnkard": A Pahlavi Text, Facsimile Edition of the Manuscript B of the K. R. Cama Oriental Institute Bombay, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1966). Of the six extant sections (known as books) of the work, Book Three is the most eclectic, devoted to polemics, cosmogony, ethics, and medicine. It has been translated in its entirety by de Menasce, Le troisième livre du Dēnkart and various individual sections have been edited and translated. See the bibliographies in Phillipe Gignoux, "Dēnkard," in Encyclopedia Iranica 7:284-89 (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 1996) and Cereti, La letteratura pahlavi, 49-58. Book Four, dealing with history and metaphysics, contains selections from a "Book of Manners" (Pahlavi ēwēn-nāmag) written by the text's first editor Ādurfarnbag i Farrōzxādān (see the following note). Book Five contains Ādurfarnbag's replies to a Muslim and a Christian's questions about Zoroastrianism and it has been edited and translated by Jaleh Amouzgar and Ahmad Tafazzoli, Le cinquième livre du Dēnkard, (Leuven: Peeters, 2000). Book Six is devoted to ethics, advice and wisdom (andarz). It has been edited and translated by Shaked, Dēnkard VI. Book Seven contains an account of the life of the prophet Zoroaster (part of which is also recounted in Book Five). An edition and translation can be found in Molé, La legende. Books Eight and Nine contain, respectively, a summary and commentary (zand) of the contents of the Sasanian Avesta. For recent research on these two important sections of the Dēnkard see Vevaina, Zoroastrian Exegesis; Yuhan Sohrab-Dinshaw Vevaina, "Relentless Allusion: Intertextuality and the Reading of Zoroastian Interpretive Literature," in The Talmud in its Iranian Context, ed. Carol Bakhos and M. Rahim Shayejan (Tübingen: 2010), 206-32; and Vevaina, "Enumerating the Dēn." See further discussion of the Dēnkard and its contents in Jean de Menasce, Une encyclopédie Mazdéene: le Dēnkart (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958); Boyce, "Literature," 43-45; Mansour Shaki, "The Dēnkard Account of the History of the Zoroastrian Scriptures," Archiv Orientalní 49 (1981), 114-25; Gignoux, "Dēnkard"; Cereti, La letteratura pahlavi, 47-78.

2. The first editor of the Dēnkard is identified in the tradition as Ādurfarnbag i Farrōzxādān, among the most prominent Zoroastrian priests of the post-Sasanian period. Ādurfarnbag is mentioned a number of times in the Dēnkard itself, as well as in other post-Islamic Zoroastrian texts. He also appears, for example in ŠGW 4:107 and 9:3; and is attributed as the author of the Rivāyat i Ādurfarn bag ud Farnbag Sroš, a compendium of legal responsa, and an andarz collection published in Jamaspasa and Anklesaria, Pahlavi Texts, 79-80. See further bibliography in de Menasce, "Literature after the Conquest," 544-55; Ahmad Tafazzoli, "Ādurfarnbag i Farrōzxādān," in Encyclopaedia Iranica (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 1985), 1:477-78; and Gignoux, "Dēnkard." On the basis of his appearance in a Pahlavi account of a disputation before the ʿAbbāsid Caliph Al-Maʾamun (r. 813-833), called the Gизлизтг Abāliš, Ādurfarnbag is usually dated to the ninth century (but see de Jong, "Zoroastrian Self-Definition" and Timuš, Fonder, bâtir, rénover, 15-16. However, the version of the Dēnkard which has come down to us is not his own. According to the Dēnkard's own account of its history, Ādurfarnbag's son Zarduxš, who possibly converted to Islam, scattered and corrupted the texts collected in the Dēnkard by his father (Cereti, La letteratura pahlavi, 42-45). The version of the Dēnkard which has reached us is a redaction by Ādurbād ī Emēdān of Ādurfarnbag's partially destroyed earlier work. On the basis of a reference in the Arabic historian Masʿūd's Kitāb at-taḥīb wa-l-Iṣrāf, Ādurbād has been dated to the mid tenth century (Tafazzoli, "Ādurbād Emēdān"). However, even this later edition is not complete: of the text's original nine books, the first two and a portion of the third are missing from the single complete manuscript.
contemporaneous with the ŠGW, also includes a number of passages critiquing Judaism. Not surprisingly, both because of the central role that polemics—of Jews and others—plays in both the ŠGW and the Dēnkard, and because of more intimate connections between the two works which will be added below, the ŠGW's critique of Judaism and the Dēnkard's polemical chapters share a number of common features. However, despite this closeness, the ŠGW and the Dēnkard disagree on at least one crucial point. Whereas the Dēnkard, in various ways, attacks Judaism itself, the ŠGW directs its sights on a different object. The object of the ŠGW's critique is not Judaism as such, but a Jewish book; as has been mentioned before in this dissertation, Mardānfarrox declares at the outset of Chapter Thirteen that he will cite and critique from a text he refers to as the naxustīn ništā, meaning the First Scripture.

Though this seems like a small distinction, it is a significant difference. Accepting the ŠGW's chronological claim that it post-dates the Dēnkard, I will argue in more detail in what follows that the appearance of the Jewish text in the ŠGW signifies a break with Zoroastrian tradition. In the Dēnkard explicitly and in the ŠGW implicitly, Judaism is cast in the role of Zoroastrianism's primordial Other; Zoroastrianism's relationship with and superiority over Judaism is a sign of its primacy in the world.

In order to expand on these points and to better frame the central question of the difference between the ŠGW and the Dēnkard, I will first describe in some detail the two texts' affinities. I will then turn to the Dēnkard's polemical chapters and describe the depiction of Judaism to be found there. Finally, I will set the Dēnkard's Judaism against the ŠGW's First Scripture and attempt an interpretation of the significance of textuality in the ŠGW.

A Bibliophile's Confession

We can begin with the most explicit link between the two texts. This is contained in the autobiographical passage in Chapter Ten of the ŠGW. Since neither Mardānfarrox Ī Ohrmazddādan's name nor any references to his book appear in Zoroastrian literature outside the ŠGW, this short text, what we can call Mardānfarrox's confession, remains scholars' only recourse for the life of the author, his motives and the sources of his work. ŠGW 10:43-58 reads as follows:

(43) nuṇ mān har gāh pa yazaṭ šnāxtan cuṇ aẓaβar naβašṭ taftī-manišni pa vazōštāřī yaβ dīn u kām pursīdār būṭ hom (44) ham-cuṇ vazōštāřī rá ὤ bō kešβar u hinduua būm u vaša jaṭ-sardagā faraft hom (45) ciβ mān dīn nā q i pa aβarmād

3. The Dēnkard refers to Judaism as kēš jahūd or jahūd kēš both meaning the Jewish dogma, faith, or sect (Mackenzie, CPD, 51). The generally pejorative concept kēš is opposed in Zoroastrian Pahlavi literature to dēn, a multivalent theological and metaphysical term meaning vision, inner self, conscience as well as faith, belief or religion. For a discussion of dēn in Zoroastrian literature see Marijan Molé, Culte, Mythe et cosmologie dans l'Iran ancien: Le problème zoroastrien et la tradition mazdéenne (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1963); Mansour Shaki, "Dēn," in Encyclopaedia Iranica 3:279-81 (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 1994); and Vevaina, "Enumerating the Dēn," 114. Since dēn is difficult to render precisely in English, I will leave the word untranslated throughout.

4. A parallel source appears at ŠGW 1:35-38; for the most recent translation and discussion of these two passages see Cereti, "Notes on the Škand Gumānīg Wizār."

5. Sanskrit sansōdhanatathā, completely purifying, destroying impurity (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 1118).

6. MSS. JJ, JE, cuṇ.
dōšī (46) bā q xāhast i pa xard u guţār ā ostitiqar u padīrašnītar (47) ǭca ābāgī ī vasaj jaţ-sardaga ūṯ hom (48) andā bārā (49) ka man aţ q i yazdā xāḇarī u dīn i vahe aoj u xarhā u zōr aţ vas zufae ǭ i tamaa u gumaṇī i dušvāzā rast hom (50) aţ ham zōr i dīn dānāi (51) u niţīs ī tā āxskārī i dānāgā (52) u aţa āngōsīdaa niţīsā i farţānāa ādār-pādīiāḷāndā (53) u aţ a niţīs yaš kad huţarjard rōšan i ādār-farōbaq (54) yaş rōšān niţīs nam nāhāt (55) aţa i ţī ayṛī farţānāa aṣō ādār-farōbaq i frōxzādā (56) i hūdīnā pāšaśāe (57) aţ dīn vazārdan dīn-kard niţīs nam nāhāt (58) buxt hom aţ vas gumaṇī u ṣṛang u frāb u dōšī i kāšā

(43) Now, as I have written above, in order to know God, I have been an inquirer in every place, investigating his dēn12 and will with a fervent mind. (44) So too in the name of investigation I have gone out of the country, to the land of the Hindus and to many sorts of men. (45) For I did not like that dēn which [was mine] by inheritance, (46) but rather wanted that which was more reliable and more acceptable by wisdom and proof. (47) And I went to the company of men of many different sorts (48) until once (49) when I escaped the profound depths of obscurity and the doubts of the evil explanations, thanks to the beneficence of the Gods and the strength, grace and power of the dēn. (50) From the very power of the knowledge of the dēn, (51) and from the attentive writing of the sages, (52) and the incomparable writings of the wise Ādār-Pādīiāḷāndā, (53) and from the writing by the blessed Rōšan son of Ādār-Farōbaq, (54) which is named Rōšan Niţīs, (55) and that also of the great, wise and righteous Ādār-Farōbaq son of Farōxzād, (56) leader of those of the Good Religion.16 (57) The book, which explains the dēn and

7. Menasce "pour le esprit et pour le raison" (de Menasce, Apologétique, 117), Cereti "by wisdom and dialectics" (Cereti, "Notes on the Škand Gūmnāṅg Wizār," 5). De Menasce usually translates this word, corresponding to Pahlavi gūrgān, as "testimony" or "witness" (cf. 14:48); his translation here seems less clear. Cereti's analysis is based on the presumption of an underlying Pahlavi gōngēh, meaning "the art of eloquence," ie dialectics. The Sanskrit buddhā sākṣītāyača means "wisdom," "reason," or "discernment" and "evidence," "witness," or "testimony" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 733 and 1198).
8. Menasce's "jusqu'à ce qu'un jour," (de Menasce, Apologétique, 117) is a better depiction of the revelatory moment than Cereti's "until one time" (Cereti, "Notes on the Škand Gūmnāṅg Wizār," 5). The Sanskrit ekavārama can indicate not only, like Pahlavi ēw-bār, "once" or "one time" but "at once," "suddenly" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 229).
9. Manichaean Middle Persian zwp y "depth" (Boyce, Wordlist, 105; Durkin-Meisterernst, DMMPP, 385).
10. Suggested by West (Jamasp-Asana and West, Shikand, 73).
11. De Menasce "des livres de théorie" (de Menasce, Apologétique, 117), Cereti "the conscientious writings" (Cereti, "Notes on the Škand Gūmnāṅg Wizār," 5). Pahlavi xwēš-kār is translated as dutiful (MacKenzie, CPD, 96). Sanskrit pravamdhhasamāloccaṇa means "to consider well," "examine attentively," or "thoroughly" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 1162).
12. De Menasce suggests an emendation to ābās-angōsīdaa, "incomparable" (de Menasce, Apologétique, 117).
13. De Menasce amends this sage's name to Adūrpād Ī Yāwandān (de Menasce, Apologétique, 11); neither name is found among the extant Pahlavi texts. See further discussion in Timuš, Fonder, bātīr, rēnover, 16-17.
15. On the concept dēn see above.
16. The phrase "those of the Good Religion" translates Pazand "ḥūdīnā." Like Pahlavi wehdēn, this word is a compound of dēn and the prefix meaning "good" or "well" (MacKenzie, CPD, 44). Rival religions, as in the Dēnkaard passages cited below, are generally referred to as kēšā.

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is named Dēnkard (58) has saved me from many doubts, errors and deceit and from the evil of the sectarians.

Mardānfarrox's is a bibliophile's confession. What saves him from the depths of doubt is not—or, at least, not only—a stroke from heaven but the reading of books. While we know little or nothing about Ādar-Pādīāḵānda17 or Rōšān Ādar-Farōbaga,18 Ādar-Farōbāg Farōxzāda is, as Mardānfarrox indicates, identified in the tradition as the first editor and compiler of the Dēnkard. While the precise relationship between Ādurfarbāg's Dēnkard and the recension used by Mardānfarrox is not certain,19 the ŠGW shows particular affinity with the Third Book of the Dēnkard as it has come down to us. In addition to Mardānfarrox's explicit references to his dependence on the Dēnkard such as those found in the confession above,20 de Menasce has pointed out numerous instances where Mardānfarrox's apologetics and polemics match the Dēnkard's.

Among other examples of the two texts' affinity is the parallel between the extended comparison of the dēn to a tree in ŠGW Chapter One21 and a similar analogy found in DK 3:333. There, this image of the dēn is contrasted with the image of the evil religion as venom in a serpent.22 Another parallel is found in Chapter Three of the ŠGW. The chapter as a whole is concerned with answering the question of why Ohrmazd did not stop Ahriman from doing evil and attacking creation. Mardānfarrox answers that Ohrmazd's power is limited to that which is possible. Since good and evil are two entirely opposed and intransmutable entities, it would be impossible for Ohrmazd to alter or block Ahriman from doing evil. "If I said that Ohrmazd the creator was able to restrain Ahriman from the evil which is his constant nature," Mardānfarrox writes, "that demonic nature would be close to the divine and the divine could become demonic, and dark could be made light and light, dark."23 This same idea that divine power is limited to what is possible is found also in DK 3:185.24 The Dēnkard states that Ohrmazd's power is entirely contained (parwand) within the possible

17. He is also mentioned in ŠGW 1:38, 4:106 and 9:2, but unknown outside the ŠGW. See de Menasce, Apologétique, 11; de Menasce, "Literature after the Conquest," 560-61; Cereti, La letteratura pahlavi, 80; Timuș, Fonder, bâtir, rénover, 16.
18. Rōšān is mentioned also at ŠGW 11:213. On this sage see Gignoux, "Controverse," esp. 144 and the tables on 147-49.
19. Based on the fact that the ŠGW does not mention Ādurbād Ī Ṣmēdan, West, Pahlavi Texts Part Three, xxviii concluded that Mardānfarrox must have had access only to Ādurfarbāg's earlier recension. However, as de Menasce has argued, there is evidence of a third editor of the Dēnkard, named Ādurbād Ī Mahraspāndān Ī Aṣawahištān, a tenth century figure who is mentioned in a Persian Rivāyat preserved in the British Library (Mentioned in West, Pahlavi Texts Part One, 147-48 n. 4). Given the difficulty of determining the nature and extent of the redactional work by these two Ādurbāds, it is impossible to know what in the extant version of Dēnkard was anterior to the ŠGW and what is dependent on it; Mihaela Timuș, "Humour" goes so far as to argue that, in fact, the ŠGW must be later than Ādurbād Ī Ṣmēdan's redaction of the Dēnkard.
20. See also ŠGW 4:107, 5:92 and 12:1. Chapter Nine seems to be taken in its entirety from DK 3:239; see the discussion in de Menasce, Apologétique, 112; de Menasce, "Literature after the Conquest," 562; and Cereti, La letteratura pahlavi, 84.
21. ŠGW 1:11-34.
22. Madan, Dinkard, 326; de Menasce, Apologétique, 30; Dresden, Dēnkart, 249; and de Menasce, Le troisième livre du Dēnkart, 309-10.
24. Madan, Dinkard, 198; de Menasce, Apologétique, 42; Dresden, Dēnkart, 155; de Menasce, Le troisième livre du Dēnkart, 193.
(šāyēn) and that he has power over everything possible. The text goes on to specify that his power is only limited with respect to those things, such as created existence (stī?) the nature of which are determined. As in the ŠGW, this would seem to refer to the basic laws and structure of the physical universe, which cannot be violated. However, regarding those things which are undetermined (a-brīn), such as time, his power is unlimited. The limitlessness of divine power with respect to time could refer to Ohrmazd's ability to fashion finite time out of infinite time described in BD 1:39.25

Parallels between the Third Book of the Dēnkard and the ŠGW can also be found in the polemical chapters. The account of the fall of the angels in Chapter Eleven26 appears as well in DK 3:241. There, in the context of a discussion of worship, the Dēnkard states that the sectarians (kēšdārān) contradict their belief that it is improper to worship creatures in saying that God commanded the angels to worship the first human. This divine command, the text goes on to state, resulted in the transformation of the angels to Ahriman and the demons.27 Similarly, the critique of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity in Chapter Fifteen28 is paralleled by a similar passage in DK 3:40.29 The Dēnkard attacks the Christians—called, as in the passage just discussed, kēšdārān—for claiming that the Father and Son are one entity with no hierarchy between them. If neither Person is prior to the other, the Dēnkard asks, how can they be referred to as Father and Son, a relationship which by its nature entails priority and generation?

The Ancient Rivalry between Judaism and Zoroastrianism

As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, like the ŠGW, the Third Book of the Dēnkard also contains several passages polemicizing against Judaism.30 As discussed in a classic article by Shaul Shaked,31 these passages can be divided into two types. In the first, Judaism is criticized for its doctrines. For instance, the issue of next-of-kin marriages (xwēdō dah),32 a highly valued institution in Sasanian Zoroastrianism, is defended in DK 3:80,

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26. 11:52-87. See Chapter Three.  
27. Madan, Dinkard, 264-265; de Menasce, Apologétique, 158; Dresden, Dēnkart, 199-200, de Menasce, Le troisième livre du Dēnkart, 252-253. See also DK 5:24:15 (Amouzgar and Tafazzoli, Dēnkard, 86-87).  
29. Madan, Dinkard, 31-33; de Menasce, Apologétique, 224-25 (with full transcription and translation); Dresden, Dēnkart, 23-24; de Menasce, Le troisième livre du Dēnkart, 52-53.  
31. Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics."  
which bears the title "On the Shrieking Discourse of a Jew with a Hērbed". Concerning the
Grounds for and the Purpose of the Xwēdōdah, and the Answer of the Hērbed. Though this
text does not contain a sample of the purported Jewish critique, it does indicate a doctrinal
dispute on the matter.

More substantial is the critique found in DK 3:150:

(1) abar a-bun jud az ēk ast nē šayēn kēš jahūd, ud dō ī harw ēk pad tan a-samān
čāštak mānīyīg, ud hamāg xīrān kārān cišān a-bun ērāy ī sōfīstāg hängerdīg an-
darg. az nigēz ī weh-dēn. (2) hād a-bun dō ī dūr az āgenēn ast nē šayēn kēš
jahūd. andarg ēn-ez kū ka dō hamēstār ceōnīh ī a-bun ī dūr az āgenēn guftān zēfān
dārē, ceōnīh dō āgenēn hamēstār a-brīn-zamānīhā pad ēk stū ham-abyōxt būd čim
gōwē.

(1) A brief refutation of the statement of the faith of the Jews that it is impossible
to have more than one entity without beginning, and the doctrine of the
Manichaeans that there are two each of which is unlimited in its person, and the
inclination of the Sophists that all things, actions and individuals are without be-
ginning. From the instruction of the Good Religion. (2) The faith of the Jews, to
be more specific, is that it is impossible to have two without beginning, far from
each other. The refutation is this: "If you hold it is wrong to say that there are two
opponents in nature, without beginning and far from each other, what reason do
you give for two agents opposed in nature mixing together in limitless time in a
single existence?"

As Shaked notes, this is far from an accurate presentation of Jewish belief; Judaism
is forced to occupy a stereotyped position, as the radically monotheist opponent to Zoroas-
trian dualism. The text gives little positive information on what Jews actually believe. Like
the Manichaean and Sophist doctrines refuted in the paragraphs which follow, Judaism is

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33. A class of Zoroastrian priest. See Philip G. Kreyenbroek, "Hērbed," in Encyclopaedia Iranica (London:
34. Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 86; Madan, Dinkard, 73ff; Dresden, Dēnkart, 53-58; de Menasce, Le
troisième livre du Dēnkart, 85-90.
35. Next-of-kin marriages are illegal in Judaism. For a discussion of Jewish polemics against xwēdōdah
preserved in the Babylonian Talmud see Ahdu, "Polemics."
36. Madan, Dinkard, 152; de Menasce, Apologétique, 233-34; Dresden, Dēnkart, 153; de Menasce, Le
troisième livre du Dēnkart, 153; Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 94-95.
37. Skjaervo argues that the primary meaning of the particle is "agreement with the preceding statement, but [it]
also introduces an additional statement which restricts the original one;" in other words, "yes, but . . ."
Oktor Skjaervo, "On the Terminology and Style of the Pahlavi Scholastic Literature," esp. 187. This fits
the context here in the Dēnkard as this statement further restricts the briefer exposition of the Jewish belief
in 50:1.
38. Following Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 95.
39. See Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics" on tan.
40. On this typical statement which accompanies most Dēnkard chapters Menasce remarks: "This goes to show
that the author's purpose is to systematize the Religion, and to bring out the (metaphysical) principles that
give force and life to its structure" ("Literature after the Conquest," 554).
simply a foil against which the existence and opposition of Ohrmazd and Ahriman can be better defined. Neither Christianity nor Islam are mentioned in this passage because Judaism already fills the monotheistic slot; there is no need for a fourth side to the triangle. While Shaked has adduced historical reasons for the fact that Islam does not represent monotheism in this and other similar passages, namely that the Dēnkard is recycling earlier Sasanian materials, it also seems likely, as I will argue in more detail in the context of another Dēnkard passage, that Judaism was perceived even in the post-Islamic period as the representative of monotheism in its most extreme form.

Similar sketches and refutations of Jewish doctrine can be found elsewhere in the Third Book of the Dēnkard. Of particular interest is a passage which relates closely to the critique of Judaism in the ŠGW. The passage, from chapter 291, is concerned with Ohrmazd's concern for his creation. The text compares Ohrmazd to a father who cares for his creation as for a son. All the evils in the world and the suffering of the creatures comes not from the beneficent creator but from the evil adversary, who is likened to an enemy of the father and son. DK 3:291:5 contrasts this position with Judaism:

ud kēšdārān ke dōgānag anāgīh ī andar gētūg dahišnān az dādār ī dahišn jahūd kēš hambāsān kēš hēnd, o ī-ān abar abaxš-widārīh ī dādār āgāhēnīd ud abar anāg bazag-ez nē nēkīh i kerbag-ez kardan handarzēnīd.

And the sectarians who [believe] the two-fold misery in the material creation is from the creator, are of the contradictory faith of the Jews, who have proclaimed regarding the creator's regret and have advised not to do evil and sin but the good of right action.

This short text is difficult to interpret fully. Believing that God regrets his creation surely entails a contradiction. Regret implies a change in will and knowledge which does not befit a perfect and omniscient God. The imperative to do good rather than evil, however, does not

42. Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 91.
43. DK 166:1-4 (Madan, Dinkard, 179; Dresden, Dēnkart, 138; de Menasce, Le troisième livre du Dēnkart, 176; Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 95-96); 173:4 (Madan, Dinkard, 185; Dresden, Dēnkart, 143-44; de Menasce, Le troisième livre du Dēnkart, 182; Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 96-97); and 197:7 (Madan, Dinkard, 213; Dresden, Dēnkart, 165-66; de Menasce, Le troisième livre du Dēnkart, 205-06; Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 91-92)
44. De Menasce, Le troisième livre du Dēnkart, 287 reads ahōg. The manuscript, while ambiguous, does seem to indicate dōgōnag.
46. Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 92 amends to ud.
47. Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 92 reads both of the verbs as infinitives. In the first instance, the manuscript would allow a reading either of the finite verb plus ud or the infinitive. In the second case, the manuscript clearly shows two strokes at the end of the word. I have amended this word for the sake of clarity.
48. Madan, Dinkard, 301; Dresden, Dēnkart, 130; de Menasce, Le troisième livre du Dēnkart, 287; Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 92.
believers. What follows is the history of the demonic counter-principle: opposition to the good principle and its subsequent passage to the Prophet and the early believers. What follows is the history of the demonic counter-principle:

(14) ud ān bun dēwān frēb wirāyīnš ō tāz-tōhmag dahišn-kāhēnīdār dahāg wīresh-tan. ud dahāg xēm padeš winستان, ō kār kardan u-š freh-būḏīg ud abē-būḏīg54 sāštārīh ud ahlamōgīh wašnēnid.55 ud padiš mardōm xēm wināstan gēhān moṣēnī-dān56 dām margēnīdān. (15) ud57 ārāytā Ā58 jahūdīh bun-nibēg kardan ud ōrūšlem dēsidān padiš dāštān. ud59 dahāg frādom ō abrāhām60 ī jahūdān dastwar, ud az

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49. The passage is part of the critique of the story of God's daily destruction of the angels. On this passage see further Chapter Three.


52. Madan, Dīnkard, 252-54; Dresden, Dīnkart, supplement 17-21; de Menasce, Le troisième livre du Dīnkart, 238-41; Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 97-98.


54. The MS. reads 'YBYBWTYK.

55. Possibly to be emended to *waxšēnīdan "to cause to grow, to increase" (MacKenzie, CPD, 88). Martin Schwartz, however, notes that Old Avestan vasna-, meaning perhaps "divine power" and/or "will" could be the same word.


58. MS. ud.


60. 'BR' H'M
abrāhām ʾō mašīḥ 61 i awe 62 paywand, ke jahūḍ pad paygāmbar ud kēš-āwardār 63 dārēnd, madan, ud ʾāsān burdān. 64 ʾō mašīḥ *windādan 65 jahūdagīh kēš rawgēnīdān ud az pas ēd dēwān frēb. (16) ud dahāg pad wizend ʾī dāman dōsīd. 66 ag-dēnīh bun wāzag jahūdagīh ʾīdān andar... 67 dēn ʾī mazdēns ud ērān ʾnīṣēb 68 pad ahlomōgīg cārēnīg, bērhīhā 69 didīgārīg ud sidīgārīg andar gēhān nōgīhistan, 70 pad-iš dēwān cērīh *ud 71 marđōm xēm winastāgīh, gēhān ālūdagīh ud awērānīh, ud dāmān *frāhist 72 anāgīh, ud wehān nigūnīh ud tangīh ud duśwārīh ud wattarān afrāz frāxwīh ud pādīxšāyīh.

(14) And that principle, which is the setting up of deceit by the demons, fled to Dahāg of the Arabic (tāz) race, 73 the reducer of creation. And Dahāg corrupted nature through it [the principle], put it into action, and generated the tyranny and heresy of excess and deficiency. And through it he corrupted human nature, caused the world to lament and caused creatures to die. (15) And he made the ārāytā, 74 the fundamental book of Judaism, and built Jerusalem to keep it in. And

61. MŠYH, Moses. Martin Schwartz suggests that this form might indicate confusion with Hebrew/Aramaic mašī h, "the Messiah."
62. Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 97 reads narm-paywand, "whose bond is weak." While the contrast with Yima's strong bond in section 12 does, as he states (99 n. 4), suggest this translation, it seems simpler on the whole to read the ideogram LH for awe. Reading narm would require a further explanation of the final stroke.
63. Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 98 reads kēš-āwar dār dārēnd, but the manuscript clearly affixes the -dār to the end of āwar.
64. The ms could also be read as burd ī.
65. MS. ŠKWTN'.
66. Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 98 notes that this word could also be read jōsīd, in the sense of to shoot out or erupt.
67. Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 98 skips three (?) unclear words in the middle of the line.
68. MS. šēb.
69. Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 98 reads brāhīhā, from brāh, meaning "brilliance" or "splendor" (MacKenzie, CPD, 19).
70. Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 98 reads wanēhistan. The MS. however clearly indicated NWKYHST'N'.
71. Emendation following Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 98.
72. MS. PRHYSP'. Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 98 reads frašēb, but it seems simpler to interpret the final -P as a misreading on Madan's part of an unclear T.
73. Tāz is a backformation of Middle Persian tāzīg, derived from a form related to Jewish Babylonian Aramaic ṣawv' a and Syriac ṣawv', both meaning Arab, (Sokoloff, Dictionary, 501) with the addition of the demonymic suffix -cīk. Dahāg is often identified with foreign regions and cults. Yasht 5:29-35 and 15:19-21 associate Aḏī Dahākā with Bafri, which later tradition interprets as the land of Babylon. See, for example, the passages in the Bundahišn (Ankesaria, Bundahiştn, 268) and Dēnkard Book Seven (Molé, La legende, 56). Armenian traditions identify the dragon Azdahak as a Mede (Russell, Zoroastrianism in Armenia, 44-45). In the Ferdowsī's Shāh Nāmeh, the evil king Dahāk is described as having two man-eating snakes growing out of his shoulders. Martin Schwartz argues that this curious realization of the Persian name with a typically Arabic spelling—the Arabic phonemes ā and ī are not pronounced in Persian—associates Dahāk with the Arab other. See further Schwartz, "The Snake-Man from Indo-Iranian to Ferdowsī, with New Evidence for the Continuum," 276.
74. This word, the usual Aramaic term for the Torah, appears in various spellings a handful of times in Zoroastrian Pahlavi literature. On this word see Gikyō Itō, "Pahlavi hapax legomena: 'wlýt,' 'wlýk and 'wlýtk," Orient 27 (1991), 36-43, who proposes that 'WLÝT', transcribed here ārāytā, is an ideogram derived ultimately from Aramaic 'WL, a root which appears with the meaning "beginning" or "first" in

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Dahāg first came to Abrāhām the priest of the Jews, and after Abrāhām to Mašīh his descendant, whom the Jews consider a prophet and founder of the faith and he rested. He found Mašīh [and] propagated the Jewish faith and afterward the deceit of the demons. (16) And Dahāg enjoyed harming the creatures. He saw the principle of evil dēn in the pronouncement of Judaism, in . . . the decline of the Mazdean dēn and Iran through heresy, he fatefully renewed it a second and third time in the world, through which came about victory for the demons and corruption of human nature, the pollution and desolation of the world, the greatest evil to creatures, inversion, distress and hardship for the good and ascent, prosperity and kingship for the evil.

The creation of Judaism is a tool to propagate the evil principle and its history and heroes—Abraham, Moses, the Torah, and Jerusalem—are revealed to be of demonic origin. The goal of this passage, unlike the examples of the first polemical type discussed above, is not to state or refute any particular doctrine, though Dahāg's rest might be an allusion to the Sabbath, but rather to undercut the whole enterprise of Judaism by classifying it as a product of demonic, world-destroying cunning.

Jewish doctrines are referred to in the second passage in DK 3:288, but here too the point is revealing Judaism's demonic origins and its opposition to the good religion, Zoroastrianism. As in DK 3:227, the text contrasts Yima and Dahāg as the founders of the two rival faiths. In reaction to Yima's ten wise counsels, Dahāg authored ten wishes or desires (kām). These ten demonic commandments are, as discussed above, as much the opposites of Yima's principles as they have any connection to Jewish belief. For instance, in the second commandment (3:288:3) Dahāg orders sacrifice to the demons, in contrast to Yima's advice (handarzēnūd) not to sacrifice to the demons. The seventh commandment obligates "taking away from everyone" in opposition to Yima's counsel to give gifts.

Targum Hosea 9:10 and Targum Job 20:4. Itō interprets the underlying Middle Persian as naxast, connecting it with the naxustī niṣṭā in ŠGW 13:1. This ideogram, however, does not appear in any of the standard wordlists (ie Nyberg, Frāhang i Pahlavī).

75. Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," translates "he destroyed luminosity a second and third time." This translation makes much more sense in the context, being a negative rather than a positive action, but the necessary emendation is difficult to justify in the text itself. A parallel passage from 229:15 (Madan, Dinkard, 255-57; Dresden, Dēnkart, supplement 22-B 193; de Menasce, Le troisième livre du Dēnkart, 241-43; Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 100-1) can shed light on the conundrum:

(15) az dahāg ō abrāhām i yahudān dastwar madan az awe pad fradom ud didīgar sidīgar yahūdīh *wihīrīhistan [ms: W RŠSTN']. pad harw nōg ērān dēhān mardōm pad ēwēnag ēwēnag freh-būd ud abē-būd a-dād wēs āndēnād ud tabāhānīdan.

(15) From Dahāg it [the evil dēn] came to Abrāhām the priest of the Jews and from him it changed into the first, second and third Judaisms. In each innovation the people of the provinces of Iran were shaken and destroyed by various sorts of excess, deficiency and lawlessness. While the phenomena to which the first, second and third Judaisms refer remains unclear, the renovations discussed in DK 227:16 are of Judaism itself. If that is the case, brēhīhā (or brāhīhā) can be taken as the adverb rather than the object of the sentence.

76. Madan, Dinkard, 298-299; Dresden, Dēnkart, 227-228; de Menasce, Le troisième livre du Dēnkart, 284-285; Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 101-103.

77. DK 3:288:8: dahāg aye rāv appurdan ī az harw kas framūdan.
However, other statements either refer specifically to Judaism or bear a resemblance to doctrines familiar from Jewish texts. At DK 3:288:9, in opposition to Yima's council that cattle be killed only then they research maturity, Dahāg "taught to kill cattle freely, according to the custom of the Jews." 78 Despite the reference to Judaism here, this passage does not seem to relate to some underlying Jewish practice. On the contrary, killing cattle freely is precisely not what the Jewish religion commands. 79 Closer to Jewish realia is 3:288:10, a passage which seems to target circumcision. There Dahāg advocates that "every fruit of man should be castrated and branded, according to the custom of the Jews." 80 This counsel is opposed to Yima's more measured advice to geld only those cattle who are in difficulty and not of use.

Unlike the strictly doctrinal type of anti-Jewish polemic discussed above, the content of the two lists of dueling commandments is not the point of this passage. Rather, the commandments adds substance to the mythic frame story of Judaism's demonic origins given in chapters 228 and 229 as well as in the concluding paragraph of DK 3:288:12:

By these ten harmful counsels, which are opposed to Yima's ten beneficial counsels, he established the ūraytā-scripture and ordered it to be kept in Jerusalem. 84 And afterwards Abrāhām the priest of the Jews enacted it and Mūšāg who is the sridag of the Jews and whom they hold as a prophet completed it and Yašūwag bar Nūn who was Mūšāg's disciple propagated it, as they say. And all the Jews hold the sridag as their lot and believe in him.

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78. Dahāg harzag-kušīnī hī gōspandān jahūd ēwēn hammōxtan.
79. For a discussion of rabbinic regulations for the slaughter and consumption of meat see Jordan D. Rosenblum, Food and Identity in Early Rabbinic Judaism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), esp. 76-81.
80. Ud dahāg šābestān kardan ē mēwag und mēwag ē mardōm sar drōšīd bun handarzēnīdān ceōn jahūdān kēš. Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 103 follows de Menasce, Le troisième livre du Dēnkart, 285 in emending sar to zan. However, the MS. reads quite clearly L’YŠH. The ideogram for zan, NYŠH, while very similar, does not have the L prefix.
81. Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 102 reads bun kard, but there is clearly a stroke in the manuscript after the second word. This could either be read as the infinitive kardan or as the conjunction ud. I have followed the later reading.
82. Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 102 follows de Menasce, Le troisième livre du Dēnkart, 285 in reading sedīg, meaning "third." Shaked connects this reading with an epithet of Moses current in Jewish literature. I would tentatively suggest an alternate reading of wattar is based on the orthographic similarity between the SLYTK of the manuscript and the ideogram SLYTL.
83. Apparently Yehoshua ben Nun.
84. The motif of preserving a copy of the sacred writings is also found in the Dēnkart’s description of the history of the Avesta. Both Dārāy the son of Dārāy, the king who preceded Alexander’s destruction of Iran, and Shapur I are depicted as ordering copies of the Avesta to be deposited in the “royal treasury” (ganj ē sāhīgān). For these texts see Shaki, "Scriptures," esp. 115 n. 2 on the reading of sāhīgān.
As in the earlier passages, Dahāg is the author of the Jewish scripture, a text based on but more extensive than the ten evil commandments discussed in the passage. Abraham and Moses are key figures in enacting and propagating the demonic scripture. The passage also seems to mention Joshua, Moses' successor.

An element that stands out in these passages, as Shaked has discussed, is syncretism. Biblical characters like Abraham and Moses are woven into a syncretic Zoroastrian religious history. Judaism is an evil offshoot, but nonetheless an integral part of, a single, universal story. As the demonic reaction to or imitation of Yima's wise counsels, Judaism is unthinkable without a Zoroastrian model to mirror and reverse. Deeply and significantly, Jewish history is Zoroastrian history.

Shaked instructively compares this and other passages to the later syncretic histories of the early Islamic period that combine Iranian, Jewish and Islamic materials into a single universal narrative.  Ṭabarī's *History*, for instance, exemplifies this later tendency that might well be rooted in syncretizing traditions already present in Sasanian Iran. However, the incorporation of Jewish origins into Zoroastrianism has theological as well as historical significance. This adoption is part of the tendency Yuhan Vevaina has identified in Pahlavi interpretative literature—among which the Third Book of the *Dēnkar* should certainly be included—towards "exegetical totalization," which he explains as "attempts to extend the dēn to include all forms of knowledge."

As an example of this tendency we can recall the famous history of the Zoroastrian scriptures in *Dēnkar* Book Four (MS. B 512:16-510:9). According to this text, both Ardashir, the founder of the Sasanian dynasty, and Shapur his son expanded the dēn. Shapur included the various arts (such as medicine, astronomy, physics, and metaphysics) scattered in Rome and India. Similarly, Ardashir's chief priest Tansar is said to claim: "any exposition which differs from that in the Mazdayasnian dēn, but which provides awareness and knowledge, is not inferior to it."

The *Dēnkar*’s incorporation of Judaism is part of this same expansive interpretation. Regardless of the negative perception of the rival religion, the dēn has expanded to include Judaism inasmuch as Judaism is portrayed as arising from and in reaction to the dēn. Even if only on a metaphorical level, Judaism's origin in the mind of the demon Dahāg inscribes it within the mythical and symbolic universe of Zoroastrianism. Though Judaism is strange and, certainly, evil, it is not foreign; having been adopted within the mythic framework of the origins of the good religion, Judaism is intelligible on the Good Religion's own terms as Zoroastrianism's primal Other.

86. See, for example, the discussion of Bēwarāsb—another name for Dahāg—in Ṭabarī, *From the Creation to the Flood*, 344:

Some(one) said: Bēwarāsb ruled in the time of Idrīs. Some of Adam's speeches had happened to reach him, and he used them to perform magic. Bēwarāsb practiced that magic. When he wanted something from anywhere in his realm, or when he liked a mount or a woman, he blew into a golden reed (pipe) he had, and everything he wished for would come to him. This is the origin of (the custom of the) Jews to blow (the shofar).

I will now turn to a comparison of the characterization of Judaism in the Dēnkard and in the ŠGW. There are several points of agreement between the two texts on this issue. First of all, the characterization of Judaism in Chapter 150 as the doctrine which irrationally denies the primordial existence of two opposed principles also underlies the ŠGW's critique. As has been demonstrated at length elsewhere in this dissertation, the combination, in the character of Ādīnō, of good and evil, wisdom and ignorance, revenge and mercy, is a recurrent theme both of the citations from Jewish scripture and the critiques of those citations. This illogical combination is the basic monotheistic error. More specifically, DK 227's highlighting of the Jewish belief that the creator regrets is a motif found in the ŠGW critique of Judaism. ŠGW 14:32-33 explicitly target's the Jewish scripture's depiction of God's regret (pašṣmaṇī) at creating the world.

Though they are not as foregrounded as in the Dēnkard, Jewish figures are also mentioned in the ŠGW. The introduction to the citations in ŠGW Chapter Thirteen explains that they (presumably the Jews) believe that the First Scripture was given by God to Moses. The citations in Chapter Thirteen, of course, prominently mention Adam and Eve. Likewise, Abraham and Isaac appear in 14:40-50. The ŠGW's presentation of these Jewish characters is more scattered than the Dēnkard's depiction of a Jewish chain of tradition in chapter 288, for example, from Dahāg via Abraham and Moses to Yehoshua ben Nun. Nevertheless, the two most important Jewish characters in the Dēnkard's critique are also mentioned in the ŠGW.

The demonic origin of Judaism is also present, if in a different form, in the ŠGW's critique. While Dahāg is never mentioned, the concluding sentences of Chapter Fourteen claim that, according to the depictions of God from the Jewish scripture, that God must be none other than Ahriman himself:

(82) nuṇ agar 谔 yazaṭ kəš īn niṣa u dašaa 谔 rəstā ažaš dűr (83) u aşaxsāinī ažaš bəganī (84) vaš dānāl ašar nə vaxt (85) ci īn 谔 xaṭ hast dṛüž i dōžax sālār i *tār*’ī
grīstaia i tam tuxmaa (86) kəš vahšītágə i dəši vadaga pa ādīnō nəm stāęnd u namāž bariṇd.

(82) Now if these are the signs and tokens of that God, then truth is far from him, (83) mercy is unknown to him, (84) he has no part of wisdom, (85) and therefore he himself is the druž, the lord of Hell, of gloomy darkness, of the dark race (86) whom those perverted by demonic evil praise and worship by the name Ādīnō.

Given that ŠGW 13:1 states that it was this God himself who gave the First Scripture to Moses, we have here a close parallel to the Dēnkard's account of the origin of the Jewish

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89. On these citations see the discussion in Chapter Four.
90. On this story see the discussion in Chapter Two.
91. MSS. tar, though MS. JE omits. Sanskrit timirākarāḥ indicates "gloomy work" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 447). I follow de Menasce, Apologétique, 200 in emending to tār.
92. Pahlavi drūz appears as a name for Ahriman in, for instance, DD 36:4-13 (Jaafari-Dehaghi, DD, 112-13).
scriptures. Just as Dahāg gave the ōravtā to Moses, here it is Ahriman who passes the
demonic text to the prophet's own hand.

In addition to these thematic similarities between the two critiques, both also con-
struct the Jewish object that they attack. In other words, the primary reference point for both
is not Jewish sources, beliefs, or practices but Zoroastrian theology, history, and self-percep-
tion. The projection, as one might call it, of Judaism is more readily seen in the Dēnkard.
Both the doctrinal and mythological representations of Judaism are determined by the con-
tours of the Zoroastrian polemical discourse. In the first instance, Judaism, as stated above, is
made to occupy the monotheistic position in a schematic rubric of rival faiths, from the athe-
ism of the Sophists to the over-extensive dualism of Manichaeism. In the mythic texts as
well, Judaism is incorporated into Zoroastrianism and defined against and in opposition to the
Good Religion. The text even makes this opposition a theme: Dahāg's creation of Judaism
and the propagation of its laws are a reaction to the good dēn and Yima's wise counsels.
These polemical passages are not responses to nor evidence of what historical Jews practiced
and believed; even those references, for example to circumcision, which do parallel Jewish
belief and practice, are over-determined by their Zoroastrian context.

It is not surprising that the Dēnkard's polemics construct Judaism in this way. As
Albert de Jong has pointed out, religious polemics, Zoroastrian and otherwise, are not meant
to be historically accurate or anthropologically sound; they are texts designed for internal
consumption, making use of existing stereotypes of the rival religion that are then applied to
the particular offensive doctrine under discussion. This same observation also holds true for
the ŠGW. In the ŠGW the monotheistic aspect of Judaism, opposed to Zoroastrian dualism,
is given even more prominence. This is seen, first of all, in the overwhelmingly theological
content of the citations. All the citations express the Jewish God's ignorance, powerlessness,
evil-doing, and non-transcendence. This is most evident in the brief citations from the begin-
ning of Chapter Fourteen describing Ādīnō's vengeance, anger, regret, and his resemblance to
the destructive forces of nature. However, when taken as a whole, the longer narratives,
meaning the garden citation from Chapter Thirteen and Ādīnō's encounters with saints and
angels from Chapter Fourteen, are also primarily depictions of the Jewish God's interactions
with his creations. God is the sole protagonist of these citations, to the exclusion of any other
characters. Mardānfarrox's critique of the citations reinforces their theological coloring. He
reads the citations as if they were only theological maxims and the narrative elements of
those citations that are presented as stories are occluded in his reading of them.

Judaism as Text

The difference between the ŠGW and the Dēnkard lies not in the fact that the object
of the critique of Judaism is a projection but the nature of that projected object. The object of
the Dēnkard's critique is the Jewish religion (jahūd kēš) itself. This is best characterized in
the mythic account of Dahāg's invention of Judaism. The premise underlying this mythical
text is that Judaism is inherently knowable, tangible, and approachable. The Zoroastrian
observer of Judaism does not need to rely on Jewish accounts of or perspectives on the rival

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religion. In so far as Judaism is internal to and part of Zoroastrianism, its laws, prophets, and revelation can be understood within the Good Religion's own categories of the divine and the demonic. Indeed, inasmuch as the Zoroastrian reader of this Dēnkard passage has knowledge of the positive law and dēn against which Judaism is the negative reaction, he can know the rival religion better and more truly than the Jews themselves. Though the perspective of the Dēnkard is from the outside, it is at the same time deep and penetrates to the core of Judaism. Even taking the expansion of the dēn to include Judaism as described above metaphorically, we can say that, in the Dēnkard, Judaism is within the epistemological compass of Zoroastrianism.

The Dēnkard does not quote from Jewish writing at all. While the texts do state that Dahāg's ten negative commandments are related to the contents of the Jewish scripture, the precise nature of that relation—be it as foundation, summary, or selection—is unclear. Much depends on the interpretation of the "by" in the phrase "by these ten harmful counsels . . . he established the ēraytā" in chapter 288. By contrast, the object of the ŠGW's critique is precisely the Jewish text. This text is depicted as lying outside of the sacred history of Zoroastrianism and Judaism itself is, thereby, unknowable as an immediate object. A correct understanding of the religion, parallel to that of the perception of Dahāg's authorship of Judaism and its demonic nature in the Dēnkard, must be mediated through quotations from the text and preceded in by their interpretation. The citations from the Jewish scripture only speak, or only speak properly, after Mardānfarrox interprets them and demonstrates the incoherence and contradiction of the monotheistic theology they espouse and represent. It is only after such careful reading and interpretation that Mardānfarrox can arrive at the conclusion, through the operation of deductive reasoning, which, in the Dēnkard, is self-evident: Judaism's demonic origin.

This difference can be demonstrated by comparing two similar passages from the Dēnkard and the ŠGW. DK 3:288:11 includes the following item in the list of Yima's good counsels and Dahāg's evil counter-counsels. In opposition to Yima's counsel to "store up in summer and winter for expenses,"

\[\text{dahāg an-āmurzīgīhā kēn pad menišn hambārdan pad-iz 9 āwādag tōxtan guft.}\]

Dahāg said that one should store up vengeance in one's spirit up to nine generations and seek requital.\(^{94}\)

The underlying contrast between Yima and Dahāg's commands is quite clear. Whereas Yima's command is practical, economical, and world-affirming, Dahāg's counsel leads to the growth of retribution and destruction. Especially in the agricultural context of Yima's statement, Dahāg's counsel would lead to fallow land and the abandonment of agriculture, culture

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\(^{94}\) The translation follows Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 103. De Menasce, Le troisième livre du Dēnkart, 285 has "Dahāg, avec une haine impitoyable dans l'esprit, dit qu'il fallait engranger et, au bout de 9 générations, les donner en échange." On the basis of the comparison with the ŠGW, Shaked's interpretation is more likely. This passage is, of course, reminiscent of certain biblical passages: Genesis 4:15, Deuteronomy 32:5, Exodus 20:5, and 34:7; Shapira, "Biblical Quotations," 180-81 discusses the various Judeo-Persian translations. On the connection between the Dēnkard passage and the Bible see Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics", 93.
and civilization. Such a valorization of intergenerational vengeance would not only leave little time for agricultural activities but would make impossible the trust and relationships on which trade and commerce are based.

The ŠGW includes an almost identical citation in the critique of Judaism, but there inter-generational vengeance is cast in a different context. The text appears at the beginning of Chapter Fourteen:

(1) vaem kām ku nihaŋgā až̄ ham-ānbašānī ū pur-ārāngī i ham niβšā naβaštom (2) ku pur až̄ har bažān ū dāβī, u až̄ hazār yak i azaš pādā angirdīe nigāžom (3) padaš fārmāiast nigaridan (4) naxust ūn i goŋ aβār xāš cūnī (5) ku mān hom Ādinō xīn-xāhō95 (6) u xīn-thōž (7) u xīn i96 haft-ānbādaa pa farzanḏa tōžom (8) vaem bun97 xīn nā fārmōšat.

(1) And I wish to write a little about the contradiction and error of that same Scripture (2) which is full of every evil and devilishness, and I will briefly expose a thousandth of what it contains; (3) one is commanded to examine it. (4) First it says this about his own nature: (5) "I am God, vengeance seeking (6) and vengeance taking (7) and I repay the vengeance of seven generations on the children (8) and I never forget the root of my vengeance."98

In considering this citation, we can note first of all that the ŠGW's version is an example of the theologization of the Jewish object discussed above. While Dahāg's command in the Dēnkard was addressed to individuals, in the ŠGW inter-generational vengeance has become an aspect of the divine.99 Along with this internal change, the statement has been completely recontextualized. Instead of the demonic backstory of Yima and Dahāg that gives context and meaning to the statement, the passage is recast as a citation of the First Scripture. In this new context, as much as the citation has the weight of authority and authenticity—this is what the Jews actually say—the citation is ungrounded. Without the dialogue between the good and evil dēn, without Yima's counsels and Dahāg's counter-orders, why would the Jewish God even think of storing up vengeance in this way? Cast as a citation, the statement requires a further act—interpretation—to make apparent its deepest meaning. Entailed in the ŠGW's critical object becoming a Jewish text is an epistemological boundary between

95. The Pazand xīn is contrasted with the Pahlavi form kēn, both being vengeance (MacKenzie, CPD, 51). Martin Schwartz suggests that the two forms reflect two different Avestan words: kaēn-, meaning "retribution" or "revenge" (Bartholomae, Altiranisches Wörterbuch, 429) and aēnāh-, meaning "force," "iniquity" or "crime" (Bartholomae, Altiranisches Wörterbuch, 21). However, in the ŠGW the two forms seem to be virtually synonymous. This might be connected with the fact that both Avestan words are rendered in the Pahlavi translation of the Avesta by kēn.
96. MS. JE omits.
97. Shapira, "Biblical Quotations," 180 amends to bē on the basis of the similarity of the two words in Pahlavi orthography. This emendation seems to me unnecessary.
98. This passage has been compared with Genesis 4:15, Deuteronomy 32:5, and Exodus 20:5, and 34:7; Shapira, "Biblical Quotations," 180-81 discusses the various Judeo-Persian translations. On the connection between the Dēnkard passage and the Bible see Shaked, "Zoroastrian Polemics," 93. Interestingly, there is already resistance to the idea of trans-generational retribution in late books of the Bible. Ezekiel chapter eighteen, for instance, definitively rejects the principle and his reversal is recognized in rabbinic literature (BT Makkot 24a). See Greenberg, Ezekiel 1-20, 325-47.
99. As, indeed, it is in the biblical context. See especially Exodus 20:5 and 34:7.
Judaism and Zoroastrianism policed by the practice of citation. Judaism in the ŠGW is outside the sphere of Zoroastrian knowledge, which is what I mean by it being inside or outside the dēn, and can only be accessed secondarily, through interpretation.100

Zoroastrianism as Text

The ŠGW and the Dēnkard direct their attacks against two different Jewish objects, the First Scripture in the one instance and Jewish doctrine or the Jewish religion in the other. These two polemics also present two different underlying relationships between Judaism and Zoroastrianism. In the Dēnkard's case, Judaism, in so far as it is included in the expanded dēn, is presented as knowable and penetrable. Judaism comes from and is an evil offshoot of Zoroastrianism; the two religions are, for that reason, equally present. The relationship between Judaism and Zoroastrianism in the Dēnkard is as close as the relationship between Yima and Dahāg: they resemble each other, they respond to each other (or, at least, Judaism responds to Zoroastrianism), and they know each other.101

In the ŠGW, the relationship between Judaism and Zoroastrianism is more complex. As has been mentioned above, Judaism in the ŠGW, in the form of the First Scripture, is not immediately knowable or penetrable, requiring an act of interpretation to make apparent its true, demonic nature. Understanding Zoroastrianism in this formation to be represented by Mardānfarrox or the book he writes, the two doctrines are so different as to be almost mutually unintelligible. Not only is the First Scripture require interpretation by Mardānfarrox and the ŠGW, the two entities are of different orders of being: the First Scripture is fragmentary and elusive while the ŠGW is ordered, clear, and whole.102 This seems a far cry from the back-and-forth of Yima and Dahāg in the Dēnkard.

However, there is an additional reading of the relationship between Judaism and Zoroastrianism in the ŠGW. The Zoroastrian side in this relationship can be filled by another element, namely the Dēnkard itself. As I will explain in more detail in what follows, the references to and citations from the Dēnkard in the ŠGW relate to the the citations from the First Scripture in the same way that Zoroastrianism relates to Judaism in the myth of Yima and Dahāg. In this formulation, Judaism and Zoroastrianism, in other words the First Scripture

100. Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970) discusses two types of interpretation, contrasting two opposed hermeneutical poles. The first, “interpretation as a recollection of meaning,” he characterizes as faith, in the sense that “it seeks, through interpretation, a second naïveté” (28). This species of interpretation is represented by phenomenology and the phenomenology of religion in particular. The second type, represented by Nietzsche, Marx and Freud, is “interpretation as an exercise in suspicion.” All three thinkers, in different ways, engage in a process of demystification of the illusions of consciousness which ends with the aim of expanding consciousness over and against is false other. As Ricoeur writes of Freud's insight, "analysis wishes to substitute for an immediate and dissimulating consciousness a mediate consciousness taught by the reality principle" (35) Mardānfarrox's interpretation is of the second type.

101. In Zoroastrian myth as preserved in Avestan, Middle Persian, and later sources, Yima and Dahāg have a close and combative relationship. Yima is the primordial king who sins, loses his crown, and is replaced by Dahāg on the throne. For a comprehensive discussion of the primary sources and scholarly literature see Skjaervo, "Jamšid," 501-22.

102. Interestingly, this description of the relationship between Judaism and Zoroastrianism bears some resemblance to the relationship between the gardener and the vermin in the ŠGW's garden parable discussed in Chapter Four.
and the Dēnkard, are better paired. Both are authoritative, if fragmentary texts, and both are contained and interpreted within the larger structure of the ŠGW. Moreover, when interpreted correctly, both the Dēnkard and the First Scripture reveal equal, if opposite truths: the one of the nature of Ohrmazd and the truth of the Zoroastrian dualism and the other the nature of Ahriman and the falseness of (Jewish) monotheism.

Rather than come down in favor of either of these readings of the ŠGW's depiction of the relationship between Judaism and Zoroastrianism, I contend that the ŠGW holds both in tension. The particular textuality of Judaism in the ŠGW, casting the Jewish polemical object as citations from a text, the First Scripture, sustains both possibilities. The fragmentary textuality of the First Scripture, composed of citations, entails both disconnection from and equality with Zoroastrianism. Furthermore, underlying the ŠGW's doubled relationships is a response to Judaism as portrayed in the Dēnkard's own polemics.

On the one hand, the textual rendition of the Jewish critical object serves to mask the loss of the close relationship between Judaism and Zoroastrianism as they appear in the Dēnkard. That is to say, what is absent is not the mythic origins of Judaism in Zoroastrianism, meaning not the story of Yima and Dahāg, but the immediacy and accessibility of the knowledge of the rival religion that ground the myth. The First Scripture guards against the perception of this loss through the overabundance of polemical material. Compared with the Dēnkard's polemics, the ŠGW contains a wealth of information, and, what's more, seemingly authentic accounts of what the Jews really say. The citations are filled with characters, stories and foreign names. However the abundance of details can never take the place of the Dēnkard's knowable Judaism.

At the same time, the citations from the First Scripture also provide a mechanism for reaching the knowledge that has become unknowable. For not only has Judaism become a text in the ŠGW, but Zoroastrianism has been textualized as well. The relationship between the two faiths in the ŠGW is the relationship between two texts.

Turning back to the autobiographical passage I cited at the beginning of this chapter, Mardānfarroox's realization of the truth of Zoroastrianism comes not, for instance, in the form of a divine revelation, but from reading the Dēnkard. This is significant both in the sense that the source of authority is a book and not a divine vision or heavenly journey103 and that it is this particular book. Mardānfarroox does not read the Gāthās or the Vīdēvdād, not poetry or law, but a book which it would not be an exaggeration to call philosophy or, at least, theology. The Dēnkard is a book of propositions, arguments and doctrines. Not only in this one passage recounting his own profound enlightenment but throughout the ŠGW the Dēnkard is the authoritative source for the proofs of the existence of Ohrmazd and Ahriman, of good and evil and the radical difference between them. It is in this sense that Zoroastrianism in the ŠGW can be said to be a text, the Dēnkard: it is in this text, not in others and not through other means, that the truth of Zoroastrianism can be accessed.

103. Examples of both of these kinds of revelations are to be found in Zoroastrian literature. For instance, the righteous character Wirāz goes on an otherworldly journey to heaven and hell in the Ardā Wirāz Nāmag. The Sasanian-era Zoroastrian priest Kirdēr describes a similar vision in an inscriptional text. For the inscription see Martin Schwartz, "Kirdēr's Clairvoyants: Extra-Iranian and Gathic Perspectives," in Iranian Languages and Texts from Iran and Turan, ed. Maria Macuch, et al. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2007), 367-76.
Even as it occludes the relationship between Judaism and Zoroastrianism, the existence of the First Scripture allows Judaism and Zoroastrianism to relate on an equal plane, as texts. Judaism in the Dēnkard is the primeval Other, the demonic counterpart to Zoroastrianism; remember Dahāg "saw the principle of evil dēn in the pronouncement of Judaism." In making Judaism into the textual counterpart to Zoroastrianism, the ŠGW preserves a version of the deep relationship between the two rival religions. A significant gap separates them in the ŠGW, a gap that cannot be transversed by perception but only by interpretation. However, in casting both the source of Zoroastrian authoritative knowledge and the Jewish critical object as texts, there exists in the ŠGW a semblance of the relationship between Yima and Dahāg it appears in the Dēnkard, a semblance that preserves that earlier relationship precisely by recalling its absence.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have explored the relationship between the passages polemicizing against Judaism in the Dēnkard and the ŠGW's critique of Judaism. In both cases, the Jewish object is constructed and does not reflect access to authoritative or authentic Jewish sources. However, the significant difference between the two texts is that the ŠGW critiques a Jewish text and not, as in the Dēnkard, a projection of the rival religion itself.

Unlike previous chapters that have focused on a particular citation or citations, this chapter has offered an interpretation of the ŠGW's First Scripture as a whole. In so doing, my argument here expands on a larger scale arguments from previous chapters. Chapters Three and Four focused on motifs that are shared between citations in the critique of Judaism, among the various critiques and other chapters in the ŠGW. Through the comparison with the Dēnkard, I have attempted to show how another motif, the motif of written scripture and revelation through reading, connects the critique of Judaism to the rest of the ŠGW. Recognizing the existence of this motif changes the interpretation of Mardānfarrox's claim to have cited from the First Scripture. This chapter argues that this First Scripture should not be understood—or, at the very least, not primarily—as a literal text but as a polemical and literary strategy. From the perspective of the dissertation as a whole, this reading serves to further underline the critique of Judaism's contextualization within the ŠGW.

In earlier chapters of this dissertation I have challenged previous scholars' focus on the sources of the citations in the ŠGW's critique of Judaism. In this chapter, in contrast, I argue that the ŠGW is responding directly, if not exclusively, to the Dēnkard's anti-Jewish polemics in depicting the Jewish critical object as a text. While there is a difference between these two arguments, I believe there is no contradiction. Rather than looking outside the ŠGW and Zoroastrian literature for the source of a citation or argument, I contend that the ŠGW is in dialogue with Zoroastrian texts and traditions as it constructs its critique. This dynamic perspective both maintains the subservience of the critique's arguments and citations to the overall structure of the ŠGW and demonstrates how that structure was composed in response to larger literary and cultural tradition.
Chapter Six:

Conclusion

This dissertation proposes a new, contextualized reading of the critique of Judaism in the ŠGW. This reading situates the critique of Judaism as central to the ŠGW's larger goal of demonstrating the irrationality and contradiction of monotheism. The project of this dissertation cannot be undertaken without addressing several fundamental questions. What is contextualized reading? What is critique? And what is the Judaism to which I refer? This dissertation has attempted to answer these questions. In conclusion, I will consider further questions raised by these answers.

What is Contextualized Reading?

This dissertation begins by distinguishing its approach from that taken by previous scholars who have studied the ŠGW's critique of Judaism. They have focused almost exclusively on the question of how the citations of the First Scripture in ŠGW Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen relate to parallel passages in Jewish literature, in particular the Bible and rabbinic writings. In other words, previous scholars have been concerned with the question of the sources of the ŠGW's critique. I have argued, on the contrary, that the critique of Judaism is best understood in its context in the ŠGW. In other words, I have argued that the citations and arguments in the critique are best understood in light of the literary structure and theological goals of the ŠGW itself. These two approaches are by no means mutually exclusive: one can ask both where a passage comes from and what it means in its context. However, at least for a text like the ŠGW's critique, I think that the contextual reading should be primary. Only after establishing how the critique of Judaism relates to Mardānfarrox's larger goals in the ŠGW does the question of the critique's relation to outside literature become meaningful.

The method I have used to establish the critique of Judaism's meaning in context is identifying recurring literary motifs. Following in the footsteps of Straussian readers of Plato, I have taken the repetition of the motifs of angels, gardens, and written texts to be theologically significant. Rather than literary window-dressing, these motifs encapsulate some of the ŠGW's central theological problems, namely divine unity or duality, theodicy, and revelation. Moreover, the repetition of motifs serves to demonstrate the underlying agreement of sections of the ŠGW that are not overtly connected, such as the critiques against the various monotheistic religions in the case of the motif of gardens.

Like Plato's dialogues—and this is part of the reason that studies on Plato were so useful in formulating the approach to this dissertation—the ŠGW is a text that is rich both philosophically and literarily. It has complex and highly developed arguments as well as metaphors, parables, and myths. The discussion of the three motifs that were my focus in this dissertation by no means exhausts the investigation of the ŠGW's symbolic vocabulary. Not only can other recurring motifs be identified connecting the critique of Judaism with other chapters in the ŠGW, but the cultural context underlying the prominence given to these particular motifs can be further explored. In this dissertation I have examined why so much attention is given to angels and gardens. I have argued that these motifs might relate to the belief in an angelic co-regent in late antique and early Islamic Judaism on the one hand and the connection between gardens and kingship in Iranian culture on the other.
I would make a similar tentative proposal for the final motif that I consider, that of revelation by means of a written text. As I argue in Chapter Five, the textuality of Judaism in the ŠGW—in other words, the critique's focus on the First Scripture—contrasts with the Dēnkard’s anti-Jewish polemics. However, the primacy accorded to the First Scripture is quite similar to the importance given to the Dēnkard itself in the ŠGW. In both instances, insight happens through reading a written text. Mardānfarrox realizes the truth of Zoroastrianism, as he states in ŠGW Chapter Ten, by reading the Dēnkard. Just so, he realizes the falsehood and true, demonic identity of the Jewish God by reading the First Scripture.

The precise cultural context of the renaissance of Zoroastrian literature that occurred several centuries after the Muslim conquest—the composition of the "ninth century books" as Harold Bailey called them—are unknown. What does seem clear, however, is that Mardānfarrox was writing at a time when Zoroastrian texts that had been, until then, preserved orally were written down for the first time. On a larger scale, the recording of these Zoroastrian traditions coincided with a larger movement from orality to textuality. Evidence of this transition, as well as of resistance to it, can be seen in Islamic, Jewish, and other literature from the period. While this is a matter for further study, I would propose that the motif of insight through reading in the ŠGW, which entails a radically new understanding of sacred literature, canon, and authority in Zoroastrianism, can be fruitfully interpreted as a response to this changing relationship between orality and textuality in the culture at large.

In describing contextualized reading at the beginning of this section, I contrasted it with a source-oriented approach to the citations in the critique of Judaism. The importance of the above discussion of the motif of textuality in the ŠGW lies in the insight that contextualized reading is also culturally contextualized reading. That is to say that the ŠGW should be interpreted in light of what we know of the historical, cultural, and literary scene in the ninth and tenth centuries. However, at the same time the ŠGW itself adds to our knowledge of that cultural context. Rather than, as some scholars have assumed, the ŠGW and its critique of Judaism being only rehashed Sasanian material, in this light the ŠGW reveals itself to be evidence of transformation and upheaval in Zoroastrianism. The ŠGW presents a radical, rationalist solution to the problem of doubt and lack of faith. This area also, of course, demands further research. However, as a marker guiding the direction of that research, I would venture to say that the boldness of the ŠGW’s solution, which seeks to refound Zoroastrianism and its relations with rival faiths on ground of reason, testifies to the challenges Mardānfarrox saw facing himself and his religion.

What is Critique?

Throughout this dissertation, I have referred to Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen of the ŠGW as a critique. I have used this term as if it were virtually synonymous with polemic. However, there is an important difference between the two terms. Polemic is the more general term, referring to disputation, controversy, and debate. Polemics can be comprised of

2. On Judaism, see the sources and further discussion in Chapter Two and most recently Talya Fishman, Becoming the People of the Talmud: Oral Torah as Written Tradition in Medieval Jewish Cultures (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 20-64. On Islam, see Schoeler, The Oral and the Written.
different kinds of arguments employing more or less rational means. Critique, in contrast, is
a specific kind of argument, a certain species of polemic. Critique is the argument that
refuses to accept as truth what authorities claim to be true. Critique aims to undermine the
foundations on which power and subjectivity are based. Through the appeal to reason, the
arbitrariness of law, hermeneutics, or authority is revealed and called into question. As
Michel Foucault writes: "critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the
right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth."\(^3\)

Critique, in the sense described above, has a particular historical context, arising as
part of the Enlightenment in Western Europe.\(^4\) However, taking into consideration the histor-
ical context of the ŠGW and the position of Zoroastrianism in the ninth century, I think that
the ŠGW as a whole, and not only Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen, should be described as a
critique. For the ŠGW undermines authority in two senses. In the first place, the chapters
devoted to the revealed religions, in particular Islam, Judaism, and Christianity, question the
foundations of monotheism. These include the rational demolition of the monotheists' argu-
ments as well as showing the contradictions in their scriptures. Mardānfarrox's critique of the
First Scripture, as I have discussed in the body of this dissertation, is a crucial to that project.
However, Mardānfarrox's critique is not only theological but also political. Monotheism was
the ruling theology that dictated Zoroastrianism's subordinate status. Without arguing that the
critique of Judaism is simply a veiled critique of Islam as such, I do think that ascendant
political monotheism is the target of the ŠGW's critique. In other words, Mardānfarrox
attacks the monotheistic—Islamic, Jewish and Christian—portrayals of God as a willful, vio-
lent tyrant not only for their own sake. This critique entails a questioning of the truth claims
of the authority whose power is founded in the revelation of the deity they claim to be one,
true God.

Just as importantly, however, is the ŠGW's character as a critique of Zoroastrianism.
Mihaela Timuș has pointed to the importance of the fact that Mardānfarrox is not a priest and
does not come from one of the important priestly families.\(^5\) Perhaps not surprisingly, given
his position, Mardānfarrox states that he set out on his question for knowledge because he
refused to blindly accept the religion of his birth but preferred to adhere to that faith that most
accorded with reason. That he ultimately arrives at the conclusion that Zoroastrianism is the
most rational is, from the critical perspective, neither surprising nor especially important. For
in subordinating revelation to reason and rejecting institutional priestly authority—for he
turns to books and not to priests to gain insight—Mardānfarrox embraces a Zoroastrian dual-
ism that is thoroughly rationalized and entirely unique. In this sense, Mardānfarrox's rela-
tionship to Zoroastrianism can be compared to Spinoza's relation to Judaism: he reestablishes
the religion from first principles, according to universal criteria, and, while the product of this
distillation bears the same name, it represents a radical break from what came before.

Interpretation is a central part of both aspects of the ŠGW's critique. While Mardān-
farrox's reads the First Scripture very differently than he reads Zoroastrian sources, interpre-
tation is at work in both instances. A critical and still open question is how Mardānfarrox's
hermeneutics compare with earlier Zoroastrian interpretation. There is a sizable body of

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3. Foucault, "What is Critique?," 32.
4. But see Foucault, "What is Critique?," 71.
Zoroastrian literature in Middle Persian devoted to commentaries on the Avesta and this literature displays a versatile set of interpretative tools. Does Mardânfarrox read the Dēnkard, the First Scripture, or other texts like earlier Zoroastrian interpreters? Is there a singular hermeneutics in the ŠGW or are different kinds of interpretation employed on different texts? The garden parable in ŠGW Chapter Four, where we catch Mardânfarrox in the act of interpreting, is a central text for considering these problems. Future comparative research should begin first with this parable and establish the relationship between what one might call the ŠGW's positive hermeneutics and earlier Zoroastrian interpretation. The next step would be to turn to the later chapters and evaluate how, and if, these positive hermeneutics are applied or inverted in Mardânfarrox's critiques.

What is Judaism?

At the beginning of this dissertation I hypothesized that Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen of the ŠGW are not, in fact, a critique of Judaism at all. I raised the possibility of interpreting ŠGW Chapters Eleven through Fourteen as a single, undifferentiated critique of monotheism. I dismissed this possibility not because monotheism is not the ultimate object of the ŠGW's critique—as is clear from the immediately preceding discussion, I think that this is the case—but textual clues in the ŠGW indicate that each section is directed at a single critical object. Even though the objects of the critiques go unnamed in both Chapters Eleven and Twelve and Thirteen and Fourteen, key transitional phrases and distinct styles serve to distinguish the two sections.

In the introduction, I also raised the further possibility that the object of the critique in Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen was not Judaism as such, meaning the faith and practices, or the individuals who adhered to them, but rather the First Scripture. Despite some hesitations, for the sake of convenience throughout this dissertation I have referred to the ŠGW's critique in these chapters as the critique of Judaism.

However, the question of the true object of this critique is still live. Is this a critique of Judaism at all? As I mentioned there, at the outset, and throughout this dissertation, there are considerable similarities between ŠGW Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen and Marcionite, and Manichaean critiques of the Hebrew Bible. Like these earlier writers, Mardânfarrox exposes contradictions in the scriptural narratives and condemns the portrayal of God as evil, violent, and ignorant. Moreover, a number of the ŠGW's critiques of particular passages are also found in Marcionite or Manichaean literature.

Further research is necessary to determine to what extent the ŠGW's critique is in dialogue with these traditions. However, as a preliminary hypothesis it seems likely that this counter-tradition is an important part of the matrix from which Mardânfarrox drew the citations and greatly informed the contours of his critique. In this light, while it is difficult to

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separate the Jews from the scripture that was revealed to them and which they hold dear, the ŠGW's critique would be primarily a critique of a demonic text, the First Scripture, rather than the critique of Judaism as a doctrine or faith.

If that is the case, previous scholars' attempts to use the ŠGW as evidence for a Sasanian era or later Middle Persian translation of the Hebrew Bible would be undermined. The ŠGW could also not be taken as evidence for interaction between Jews and Zoroastrians in Mardānfarrox's time or earlier. If a substantial portion of the ŠGW's knowledge of Jews and their scripture is derived from Marcionite or Manichaean writings, neither actual Jews nor Jewish writings were necessary in order to compose the critique.

However, this hypothesis does not only lead to a negative result. Reading the ŠGW as part of a counter-tradition of scriptural interpretation opens up new horizons for considering the history of Marcionite, Manichaean, and other critical hermeneutics. Scholars have identified a number of contemporaries of Mardānfarrox as Manichaeans, Marcionites, or free-thinkers. Were they reading each others' writings? Is there evidence of an intellectual community? Are the ŠGW and these other critiques drawing on a single source or disparate lines of tradition?

The tantalizing possibility that Mardānfarrox was in dialogue with other anti-scripturalists removes the critique from the parochial fold of Jewish literature and history. If my dissertation argued that the critique in Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen is central to the ŠGW's text, this conclusion raises the possibility that the critique might also be crucial to understanding the ŠGW's cultural context. In other words, the ŠGW's critique should not only be interpreted in light of its context. As is true of the ŠGW as a whole, the critique is itself evidence of that context.


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1. MS. Jj andar.


4. Literally meaning "noble, free" (MacKenzie, *CPD*, 15), this name has never been satisfactorily explained. de Menasce, *Apologétique*, 182 argues that this is an incorrect reading of the underlying Pahlavi and proposes instead either tōrāt (from Arabic taurāt) or orāytā, as in DK 3:227 and elsewhere. Neusner, *History*, 4:406 suggests that the word is a transcription of Hebrew ha-avot or Aramaic avahata, both meaning "ancestors." Neusner bases his suggestion on a passage in BT Avodah Zarah 25a. There, the Book of the Righteous (Sefer ha-Yashar) is identified there as "the book of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who were called righteous." Neusner also quotes Andreas and Barr, *Psalmen*, vol 1, 9 which translates "generation" as awbāt. Itō, "Pahlavi Hapax Legomena", 36-37 argues for an underlying Pahlavi form azād meaning "derivation" from Proto-Iranian *haca-ata-. Shapira, "Biblical Quotations", 117 suggests a connection with Armenian haraik, meaning "faith." Martin Schwartz suggests a connection to Early Judeo-Persian (am)wād, which is included in the inscriptions discovered at Tang-i Aza in today's Afghanistan. Walter Bruno Henning ("The Inscriptions of Tang-i Azao," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 20 [1957]: 335-42) interprets this word, in light of Middle Persian ēmēd and New Persian ōmēd, as "hope." In light of the common designations of the Qurʾān as karīm, "noble," majid "glorious" and similar attributes (Mustansir Mir, "Names of the Qurʾān," in *Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān* [Leiden: Brill, 2003] 3:505-14), it seems best to follow Darmesteter (Darmesteter, "Judaisme," 5) in taking azād in a literal sense. The Sanskrit svaṭantra-, "independent, free" (Monier-Williams, *Dictionary*, 1275) lends support to this inclination.

5. This word is used in the same sense at the beginning of Dēnkard Book Six: abar nihang-ē az pōryōtkēšān kard ud dāšt wābār ġoвиšīn i dēn i maṣdēs, "concerning a little of the credible sayings of the Mazdean religion done and held by the orthodox" (Shaked, *Dēnkard VI*, 2-3).
(5) gōeṭ pa bun i niβš (6) ku "fradom būṯ zamī i āβ xūnš u tanš u tārīḵī u āβ i siāh (7) u vaxš i yazāt ašār rōḏ i ā ᾡ i siāh hamā niāβša. (8) pas yazāt guft ku "būṯ rōšanī" (9) u būṯ rōšanī. (10) vaš aẓār11 nigōnā12 šihast a rōšanī. (11) vaš vazārd rōšanī ō rōž u tārīḵī ō šav. (12) vaš pa šaš rōž āfīt ūn gšūh u āsmān u zamī (13) cu anḍar haftum rōž aspīnī13 ū āṣa būt. (14) pa ā ham rāž14 nunca zuhūdā rōž i šuṇbaṭ aspīmanḍ.

6. Darmesteter, "Judaïsme", 5 follows the Burḥān-i Qāṭi', a seventeenth Persian dictionary compiled by Muḥammad Ḥusayn b. Khalaf al-Ṭabrīzī at Hyderabad, in interpreting this phrase as "an island in the midst of the water." See Mohammad Ḥosayn ibn-i Khalaf Tabrizi, Burḥān-e Qāṭe', ed. Mohammad Mo'īn (Tehran: Librarirae Zowwār, 1953), 1:5. However, the same phrase also appears in the tenth century anonymous commentary Taʃfīr-i Qur'ān-i Pāk (on the text see Saeed Hasan Sadat Paγeγh Nasri and Manuchehr Danesh, A Thousand Years of Persian Taʃfīr (Tehran: Neshra Al-Borz, 1990), 57-66) where it refers to one of the humors (Ali Revaqi, ed., Taʃfīr-i Qur'ān-i Pāk (Tehran: Itišhart-i Bunyād-i Farhang-i Iran, 1968), 34). West, Pahlavi Texts Parts Three, 208 amends to afâm "without form" and Shapira, "Biblical Quotations", 117 to awērān, "desolate." De Menasce, Apologétique, 182 and Neusner, History, 4:406 retain the Pazand as it stands, translating as "chaos" and "dark water" respectively. The Sanskrit payōruṇḍhīrā indicates "blood-red fluid" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 585 and 884).

7. De Menasce, Apologétique, 182 compares to New Persian tān, "mouht" (Steingass, Dictionary, 277) and translates "abyss." Neusner, History, 4:406 proposes an emendation to taŋ, "body" in the sense of "unformed substance." Shapira, Biblical Quotations, 117 emends to tuḥīg "void" but notes that the Pazand form can also be read as a corruption of tom or tār both meaning "darkness." Sanskrit visīrṇā means "strewn", "covered," or "expansive" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 1001).

8. Shapira, "Biblical Quotations", 117 emends to rōy, "face."

9. de Menasce, Apologétique, 182 emends to niβlāzh. Both Middle Persian wāz- and Parthian waz- mean "to blow (of the wind)," "to move," and "to flow" (Cheung, Etymological Dictionary, 430; Durkin-Misterenst, DMPP, 360). Sanskrit paśṣati means "to see," "look," or "observe" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 611).

10. MSS. JJ and JE u, but Sanskrit yat indicates the relative particle i.  

11. De Menasce, Apologétique, 182 emends to aẓār, "below" or "under." Shapira, "Biblical Quotations", 117 emends to abēr, "very" or "much."

12. Darmesteter, "Judaïsme", 5 reads as nēkūn, from nēk meaning "good," similar to xašmūn in 14:48. De Menasce, Apologétique, 182 similarly suggests nēk or nēkōg. West, however, reads nigīn, "inverted," "upside down." The Sanskrit adhōmukha- also indicates "facing downward" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 20). While West's reading is the farthest from the version in Genesis, the vowel shift is confirmed by SGW 14:26 (Pazand xōn für Pahlavi xûn). Moreover, nigīn could indicate, perhaps, a polemical pun. In Pahlavi literature, nigīn appears solely in negative contexts; the departed sinner who falls to Hell from the Bridge of Judgement in the DD 20:7 (Jaafari-Dehaghi, DD, 78-79) faces downward; a worshipper is forbidden from holding the sacred twigs (barsōm) upside-down (nigīn) in Nīranganstān 48:3; when Fire laments to Ohrmazd at the abuse it will suffer at the hands of careless humans on earth, it hangs its head down (nīgīn) and weeps in PRDD 5:4 (Williams, PRDD, 2:97). This same negative connotation is brought out by the Armenian nkun, meaning "defeated" or "contemptible" (Nyberg, Manual, 2:140).

13. cf. New Persian xūspīdan, "to sleep" or "to rest."

(15) ïnç ca kuš ādam u zani i xåt hauuâe15 āfrît. (16) āndar bâyâstânâ16 i vahâšt kard (17) ku ādam āndar ą bâyâstân varz kunût u pâš pâaêût.17 (18) ādinó18—i xåt yazaṭ hast—ô ādam far-mûṭ: (19) ku "aţ haravist draxt i ândar īn bâyâstân xar bû ą draxt i dânašni. (20) ci kaš aţaš xârâxt mîrâxt." (21) vaš pas mårâ āndar bâyâstân kard. (22) ą mår hauuâe frîšt guft ku "aţ in draxt cin xârom ô ādam dahom." (23) vaš ham-gûnâa kard. (24) ādam ham-cûn xard. (25) u dânašni âfiâ bût vaš vâzârd nîiak aţ vaṭ u nô murd hûud. (26) vaš dît u dânast ku brâhânaa hast. (27) aţâ draxt nîh bût (28) vaš varg i draxt âba xâs tan nauhût sârman i brâhânaâ râ. (29) pas âdinó ô bâyâstân şût ādam pa naâm xânît ku "ku haê?" (30) âdam pâsux dît ku "în hom aţâ draxt ô râ ci brâhânaa hom." (31) âdinó xasm kard. (32) guft ku "kê āgâhînhê haê ku brâhânaa haê? (33) ma agara19 âţ draxt i dânašni yam guft ku 'ma xarâxt xard!' (34) ādam guft ku "în zani yat ô man dît frîšt hom vaem xard." (35) u âdinó ô hauuâe pursît kut "cim ëduñ kard?" (36) hauuâe guft ku "în mår frîšt hom." (37) vaš ādam u hauuâe u mår har so pa nîrînô aţ vaḥâšt bâyâstân bûrnû kard hûud. (38) vaš ô ādam guft kut "xarašni pa hustarašni"20 i xe â damañi i viñî bût (39) ândâ farzâm yat zîndaï

15. De Menasce points to the semantic relationship between the Parzand and Manichaean Middle Persian forms of these two names (de Menasce, Apologétique, 184): ‘d’m and ‘hw’y or ‘hw’y (correcting the earlier ‘hw’y). The ‘y ending of ‘hw’y could have been pronounced as a long ă; this is true of the Pahlavi orthography of words like ăny, transcribed ‘ény, meaning “otherwise” or “moreover” (MacKenzie, CPD, 30). See further Durkin-Meisterernst, DMMPP, 24 and 35 and for the appearance of Ādam and Ėve in Manichaean literature see Sundermann, "Nomen." However, the Parzand forms are also similar to the Arabic Ādam and Ḥawâ. On these names see Horovitz, "Jewish Proper Names and Derivatives in the Koran" and Brinner, "Biblical Names."

16. While bâyâstân does not appear in Pahlavi literature, two other common terms for gardens bây and bôystân appear in the description of the destruction wrought by the Arab conquerors, who "eat bread like dogs," on Iran in the rhymed prose text abar madan i sâh wahrâm i warzâwand (Jamsapa and Anklesaria, Pahlavi Texts, 383). A garden (bwyst n) is mentioned in a Manichaean Middle Persian king parable in M 47 II (verso, 1.3). The text is transcribed and translated in Sundermann, Kosmogonische und Parabeltexte, 87-89. The Parthian cognate, spelled bwyst n appears in a Manichean Parthian text from M 47 I (Sundermann, Kirchengeschichtlichen, text 10) describing the conversion of Mihr Shah. Thanks to Desmond Durkin-Meisterernst for this reference. For more discussion of gardens see Chapter Four.

17. De Menasce reads this word as a denominative from an underlying Pahlavi pâshbân, meaning "protector" or "guardian" (de Menasce, Apologétique, 184; MacKenzie, CPD, 65; and Durkin-Meisterernst, DMMPP, 259). The word also appears in the Pahlavi translation to Psalms (Andreas and Barr, Psalmen, 106). The Sanskrit translation has praharakēcaka, from prahakara- "a watch" or "a division of time" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 701).

18. Ultimately from biblical Hebrew Ādônây, "my Lord," one of the most common biblical epithets for the name of God. On the name see Chapter Two. For the transposition of the vowels see Carl Salemann, "Über eine Parsenhandschrift der kaiserlichen öffentlichen Bibliothek zu St. Petersburg," in Travaux de la troisième session du Congrès international des Orientalistes, St. Pêtersbourg 1876, Baron Victor de Rosen, ed. (St. Petersburg: Brill, 1879), 2:491-592.

19. Darmesteter amends to magar-at (Darmesteter, "Judaisme", 7). The phrase ma agar, however, is also used at 11:244 and, moreover, occurs in a Manichaean Middle Persian king parable: m’ gr wn’ h k myd. For the text see Sundermann, Kosmogonische und Parabeltexte, 87.

20. The Frahang i Pahlavi includes the Aramaic ideogram KPLWN, from the root qpl, meaning "to roll up" or "roll away," for ëstârdar or ustârdar meaning to "shave" or "to erase" (Nygberg, Frahang i Pahlavi, 98). On the basis of the sense of the underlying Aramaic, de Menasce, Apologétique, 185 translates "to wipe." However, this could be an instance of a polemical pun: Middle Persian āstârēn (from the same Proto-Iranian root *star) means "to sin" (Cheung, Etymological Dictionary, 363-64). Sanskrit āstarmena, from the related root star-, means "to spread out" or "extend" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 161).
(40) vat zamī hamā hihir u kīmār\textsuperscript{21} rōdāt." (41) vaš ō hauuāc guft kut "ābāstanī pa dard u dušuuar āt vašīnī pa garā xāštābašī\textsuperscript{22} bāt." (42) vaš ō mār guft ku "až mīān i\textsuperscript{23} cīhār pācā u daqā i daštī u kōhī nīfrīddaa bāš. (43) vaš pāc ma bāt, (44) vaš rāβošīnī pa iskam u xarašīnī xāk būt. (45) u mīān i\textsuperscript{24} farzanđa t o ō aβā zanī xīn\textsuperscript{25} u dušman gaštī aβā būt ku ōsā farzanđa sar gazand."

(46) ūnča gōnd kuš īn gōthī aβā har ci āndār har ōs mardumā rā kard u dāt. (47) vaš mardum aβar hamā dām u dahišīnī *i\textsuperscript{26} xīt u ūxāk pādīsāh kard.\textsuperscript{27}

(48) nuṇ gōnd niṁahgā aβar āndār yāsā ḍrāšīnī u zaspānī yāsā gaβošīnī (49) ku ā zamī i aβ xīn u\textsuperscript{28} tan u tārīkī u yazaż vaš vaxš u aβ i siāh ku u pa kadām vīmand būt? (50) aiaa ḍaṭ yazaż ci āīnā būt? (51) pādā ku nō rōsān būt (52) ci kaš rōsānī dīt (53) ā ra kuš\textsuperscript{29} nō dīt əstāt nigō- nāa šīhast.

(54) āgar gōnd ku tārīk būt, ā pādā ku tārīkī bun vāz frā\textsuperscript{30} i rōsān hast. (55) āgar gōnd ku nō tārīk bē rōsān būt, (56) ā kā ḍaṭ rōsān būt cim κaš rōsānī dīt škaft šīhast? (57) u āgar gōnd ku nō rōsān būt nō tārīk, (58) ašā sādfīgā pādāīndān aβāśīaṭ i nō rōsān u nō tārīk.

(59) āinā ā kaš gāh u mānāshī āndār tārīkī u aβ i siāhī būt vaš hamōsāa rōsānī nō dīt əstāt qš rōsānī dīdār cuŋ tuuqānast? (60) vaš yazażī až ci? (61) ci nuṇčā har ka āndār tārīkī mānāt qš rōsānī dīdār nō tuuqā. (62) ūnča ku āgarāš bun u mānāshī tārīkī būt qš padīrāa rōsānī ōstādān cuŋ tuuqānast? (63) ci īn āśnā ku tārīkī padīrāa rōsānī ōstādān nō tuuq ciš spōžāt avanāmāt.\textsuperscript{31}

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21. According to the Pahlavi Videvdad, hixr is feces or dry dead matter, as distinguished from nasā which is wet; see especially 5:1-3 and 8:34. Interestingly, the Sanskrit translates hihir as mutra, meaning "urine" and kīmār as purīsana "feces." (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 636 and 825). At least in the case of mutra, the translator may have confused the Sanskrit word with Avestan māt, which does indeed mean "feces." See Bartholomae, Altiranisches Wörterbuch, 1189.

22. Compare ŠGW 11:103: ҳaʃtāb, "oppression." Ultimately from Proto-Iranian *stap "to hasten, oppress;" similar forms can be found in Pahlavi and Manichean Middle Persian 'wyšt b-' and Parthian 'wyšt byšn (Cheung, Etymological Dictionary, 363).

23. MSS. JJ and JE omit.

24. MSS. JJ and JE omit.

25. cf. ŠGW 14:5-8.

26. MSS. u.


28. The MSS. omit u but it is included in parallels at ŠGW 13:6 and 13:64.

29. MS. Jī kī; MS. JE kaš.

30. de Menasce, Apologétique, 184 emends to vāž ʾāfrā on the basis of Manichean Parthian ḫr’s, "teaching" or "instruction." This word derives from *fras-prs meaning "to ask, inquire" (Cheung, Etymological Dictionary, 88-89). The Sanskrit vacāḥ siksāpanāvāḥ, "instructive speech" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 912 and 1070) would support this interpretation.

31. Compare Manichean Parthian bnft "to withdraw" or "depart" and Manichean Middle Persian bn m "to cause to go" or "depart." See Cheung, Etymological Dictionary, 280-81. Sanskrit pracchādayateca, on the other hand, means "to cover," "envelop," or "to hide, conceal" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 657-58).
(64) dišt ḏū ku ā zamī i āḏī xūn u tān kanāraomānd būt aīiā akanārāu? (65) agar kanāraomānd būt, āš būrūn ažāš cī būt? (66) agar akanārāa būt, āš akenāraīū ku šuṭ? (67) ka32 cūn haṃōḥ vinom īn zamī u gāthī nā ă i naxuṣīn hast.

(68) ā i āḏīnō guft (69) ku "bāt rōśānī" u būt. (70) pas dānastan sāzāt ku āḏīnō pāš āž ā ku rōśānī būt. (71) kaš rōśānī haṃōḥ kāmast kardan vaš farman ī pa bā būdan dāt pas *pa13 manišni andāṣīt ku rōśānī cī āināa hūcīn bahōt aīiā duṣcīhar. (72) ud agar-s rōśnīn pad xĪsās cūnīḥ andar dānīnūn ud andāṣīnīn ī āḏīnō ayāfī ān paydāg ku rōśnīn haṃōḥ būd ūm andar dānīnūn ud menišn ī āḏīnō (73) u ham būrūn ažāš. (74) ci hōcī ŏ is nā šāyagāt dānastan u aiūfān bā ḏastī pōdāī.

(75) agar rōśānī haṃōḥ būt ā *nā34 āfrīdaa i āḏīnō hast (76) u agar āγēnd ku rōśānī pa xōs cūnī andar dānānī nā būt, āš rōśānī ūḥast yaš nā ḏānast ku ci āināa aīfā adānīhā. (77) aiūa cūn šāiāa ṣa yaš hāŋziča nā minīt u ḏānast pa manišnī andāṣīdānā?

(78) u īṃca ku ā farman ī pa būdan i rōśānī ā ŏis dāt aīiā ŏ a-ōis? (79) ci īn ēḥar ku farman ŏ farmanārī šāiāa ḏādanān. (80) agraaras ŏ hastī dāt ĩ rōśān ā rōśān ūḥat būt. (81) u agaraas farman ŏ nūštī dāt, aigī nūštī farman ī āḏīnō ā cūn xšnūt.35 (82) aiūaś cūn ḏānast ku āḏīnō ḏūn kāmāa ku rōsān bom? (83) ci nūštī36 farman ī āḏīnō ham ajāā nā xšnūt cūn kaš nā dāt.37 (84) ci nūst pa hōcī āināa minūdanīcā nā šāiāa. (85) ā i nūst brīhīnīk ku nūst bā ḏast i dānān pās vīṅica būt kā ḏānast ku āḏīnō ci āināa haṃōḥ ūḥāt ku bom pa ā āināa yaš ūḥāst *ōī38 būt.

(86) agar āγēnd ku rōśānī āḏīnō cī bāsči āḏīnō būt yaš guft ku bās u būt, (87) ā ka āḏīnō vaš ūḥāt tārīk būt vaš hāŋziča rōśānī nā dišt ŏstāt, ā rōśānī aḏīnō ci āināa šāiāa ḏūdanān? (88) ci īn ēnūā ku gaṛušuśni zāśīnī manišnī hast. (89) agar āγēnd kuš39 gaṛušušī rōśān būt, a aīfā ūḥkāf ci pas rōśānī bār i tārīkī u tārīkī tuxmāa *ažās40 rūsānī dašāa ī41 aiūa īn ku rōsānī andar tārīkī nahuftāa būt (90) cūm guft ku farman bā farmanārī ḏādan nā šāiāa pōdā. (91) ku haš42 rōsānī būt pas farman ūḥāst dāt.

32. MS. JJ ku.
34. Darmesteter, "Judaisme," 8 emends rā, suggesting that is a misreading of the Pahlavi ideogram LA. The Sanskrit translation skips this word.
35. de Menasce, Apologétique, 186 suggests that this is a historicizing spelling on the basis of Avestan xšnu- "to hear."
36. The MSS. have nūst, but Sanskrit asatāt indicates "non-being."
37. This phrase has been variously interpreted. De Menasce, Apologétique, 186 and Neusner, History, 4:410 take dāt in the sense of "create" and understand it as referring to the non-existence of nothing.
38. West, Pahlavi Texts Parts Three, 215; Darmesteter, "Judaisme," 8; and Shakiba, Guzārish-i gümān shikan, 154 understand dāt as referring to Ādīnō's command.
39. I am following Jamasp-Asana and West, Shikand, 134 in emending the MSS. u.
40. MS. JJ ku.
41. MSS. vaš but Sanskrit asa indicates ažāš.
42. The Sanskrit does not indicate the ezafe.
43. Jamasp-Asana and West, Shikand, 134 suggests an underlying Pahlavi ēḏ while de Menasce, Apologétique, 187 emends to ḏū. Sanskrit tatkālām indicates "at that time" or "at the same time" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 432).
(92) diği kuš in dam u dahišni u āšman *u zamī ciš pa šaš rōž viřrāst u dāt (93) haftum aspīt ažaš. (94) augin kaš īn gūha nō až əis dāt bōš əβšaž až farman būt ku bāš u būt.

(95) aš šaš rōž dārāŋgī až ci? (96) ci kaš ranj əβšaž and bahōt çand bōš pa guftan q šaš rōž dārāŋgī būt vs kušmānā.43 (97) vaš ranj ašaš nō sažaŋ būdan. (98) agar nast hast kardan šāiḥaš u tuuŋaŋ aʃaž dārāŋgica dādan Šāaiaš. (99) u agar bōš pa rōž jaman dādan atuunqū aš až nast dāt44 guftan nō sažaŋ.

(100) u diği in ku xāšmār45 i rōŋa aš xaršiš dāniḥaš aigin pāš až afrišdan i xaršiš rōž mar nāmiqa in rōŋa až ci dāniḥaš? (101) ci gōenq kuš xaršiš rōž i cihārum i xaṭ cihār sūnaŋ dāt. (102) inca kuš rōž i haftum āša aspīn až ci əβšaiiaist kardan? (103) kaš pa afrišdan u dādan i gūha dārāŋ u ranj and būt çand guft ku bāš. (104) aš rōž cuŋ xāšmārīhoš kuš aspīn əβšaiiaist kardan kaš ranj hūgarīhoš. (105) ci aγara bōš bāš pa ham jaman guft aš ranj u āša ham jaman sažaŋ būdan.


(110) aγaraš pāš až kunišni nō šnāxt hōnd47 vaš nūcā dānast ku farman i oį nō nī:noxtshand pas adān u vaʃ-šnāṣ48 hast. (111) agar gōenq kuš xaṭ kām pa 49nō kardan būt aš pas farman i pa kardan çim dāt? (112) vaš pa nō kardan ci gunāh?50 u cuŋ raʃaŋ (113) aspī koš pa ray51 ham aiiōzhand vaš pa tāšaŋnaa52 xaʃtšaŋd. (114) až in gaʃšu niša u daša i frōftar pādāiho (115) kaš kām u farman yak o diş aŋbasas aʃaştar.53 (116) aγaraš kām u əβšaiiaist Šn būt až kām nō vardānd (117) nuŋ zūr o əβšaiiaist i əša pa vaʃtan i oʃ kām i oʃ vs ajoşiandtar u pādiiaʃaŋ-

43. Nyberg, Manual, 2:125 derives this word from māṅog, meaning "similar" or "like."
44. MS. JE ādān.
45. Pahlavi əśmūr, Manichean Middle Persian 'šmər, "to count" or "reckon" (Cheung, Etymological Dictionary, 137).
46. Pahlavi hūd, Sanskrit vilakṣīhavittuma. Both words have the sense of "confused" or "astonished" (MacKenzie, CPD, 6; Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 984). Manichean Middle Persian records "a state of being ashamed, sullenness" (Boyce, Wordlist, 10).
47. Menasse follows West in suggesting šnāxtomand. De Menasse, Apologétique, 188.
48. Pahlavi wad-šnās, Sanskrit suḥhāvalōkīka. The Pahlavi compound is a combination of wad, meaning bad, and šnāxtan, to know or regonize (MacKenzie, CPD, 80 and 85); the compound does not appear elsewhere in Pahlavi literature.
49. Logically, the negative belongs with the following clause: God commanded that they not do it, ie not eat from the fruit of the tree. The same holds for the §112: the negative before kardan is misplaced.
50. De Menasse begins §113 here.
51. Pahlavi raq, "a vein" (MacKenzie, CPD, 70). Sanskrit raśabhāreṇa, "guiding reins" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 869); de Menasse, Apologétique, 188 amends to raṣan, meaning "reins" (MacKenzie, CPD, 71).
52. De Menasse, Apologétique, 188 amends to tāšaŋna, Pahlavi tāzanag, "a whip" (MacKenzie, CPD, 83).
53. Pahlavi asaṭxār, Sanskrit ananūrūpāsca. The corresponding positive forms of these words both have senses of according and suitable (MacKenzie, CPD, 74 and Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 37).
tar ku ə i əi pa nə vaṣтан. (118) agaraš kām pa əa vaṣtan i əi kām u dānašnica padaš būt vaš fārnān ne vaṣtan dāt nūm muṣtampaḍ ādam cuṇ tuṇaṇast ku nə v ardından (119) vaš būn dāṣta-
cā 54 kām 55 nə saẓə būdan (120) cīs pa vaṣtan i əi fārnān ṣābāż pa fārnān drūžət pa nə vaṣ-
tan kām u dānašnica har du drūžə bahōt.

(121) dīt ən ku əu bāyaṣtan vīrāst cīm rə u cī sūt rə dāt? (122) u ḥaṭ draxt i dānašni yaś fārmūt
ku ma əarət vaṣ aṇḍarəcia i pa nə əarānd kard (123) vaš aə əa r u fārmān pədə kuš kām-dā-
našnī u adənī dōṣidatar (124) u kāmā u padaš vəs ku dānašni u dānəϊ (125) vaš sūdica əə
adənī vəs būt. (126) cī aṇḍāśa draxt i dānašni nə əarād astāt adən būt hənəd u aṇḍar əi aburdu
fārmān u aṇṇki nə. (127) ham-cuṇṣə dānašni būt aṇḍaraš aburdu fārmān būt hənəd.

(128) vaš aə adənī i əsə tūmərə nə būt ham-cuṇṣə dānašni būt (129) aṣaṛəq xāhiṭ u xāsmūn
būt. (130) vaš pa garə xərəi u anəzərməi əə vəhəst bəruŋ kard ə əməi aļəgaq hənəd. (131) aŋgird
ən ku ən dānašni zāiṇi i mardumə aṇḍar gəθi vaθan aə mər u 56 rəfətərə būt.

(132) ənca qəŋd ku hamōin əis mardum rə əfrίt kə rə pədə ku əu draxtica mardum rə əfrίt
(133) vaš mardum pa har daṃ u dahīni pədišək kard. (134) q əa garum-gūnaa nə aə q draxt
yaşə xəs būt kāmə vəzūdan cīm?

(135) aə ən gəbašəni əncə pədə kuš həmbunica dānašni nə būt, (136) ci gar frəʒ ə bāyaṣtan
maṭ vaš vəg kard u əarām pa nəm ənəŋ ku ku hae aļəq cuṇ kə ku jə həstə anəgāq būt. (137)
agarəs aphasux būt hae ku jə həstə i əarām anəgāq būt. (138) agaraş 57 vəqəcia pəs vənəšni nə būt
kuš aə q draxt əar dəiə nə ənca ku kə u cuṇ u kə əarəd u kə frəʃt anəgāq būt. (139) agarəğ
būt aə ma hərżiciqə əə q ə draxtx yam fārmūt ku ma əarəq əarəd pursənə kardəm cīm?
(140) u pa nəxəst ku frəʒ maṭ nə xəhi tə bət pas kaś dənəst ku xərdə 58 aṣaṛəq xāhi tə būt u xāsmūn
būt. (141) vaš kām-dānašnica aə ən kə mər yaş əa frə ətiərəa əfrίt u aļə əsə ə bāyaṣtan kard.

(142) aṇṇaś cīm bāyaṣan aļə drəpuṣtə nə kard kuš mər u hənica duθəman padaš aṇḍar nə əaʃət?

(143) vaš drəζənəcə aə q pədə kuş guft ku ka aə ən draxt əarət mərət vaşə əarəd u nə murdu hənəd
bə dānašnimaṅdəcia būt hənəd (144) vaşə niaq aə vaʃ huzuuərd.

(145) ənca kuʃ cuṇ anəbaq 59 həmbidə dānašni aļə kəm u fārmān. (146) ci agarəș kəmast əar-
dan aə q draxt vaš fārmān pa nə əarān dət dānašni i padaš būt ku əarəd? (147) nən pədə ku
har sə yək ə əi anəbaqə kəm u dānašni u fārmān.

54. Both MSS. J and JE indicate this reading, corresponding to Pahlavi dāṣt meaning "plain" or "open ground"
(MacKenzie, CPD, 25). On the basis of the Sanskrit mūlasṛṣṭiṣa, "the root of creation" (Monier-Williams,
Dictionary, 826 and 1245), West amends to dahīšnica, "creation" (Jamasp-Asana and West, Shikand, 138)
and de Menasce, Apologétiq, 190, bunyaštata "principle."
55. MS. JE kām, Sanskrit omits; de Menasce, Apologétiq, 190 follows JE.
56. De Menasce amends to i.
57. MS. JE agar vaš.
58. The Sanskrit omits the previous two words.
59. Sanskrit dvənədvica points to a missing u.
(148) ی‌نما کو کا آدام گن‌ه کارد نیریح یاکرد ابزار هاموین ماردوم ی‌ی‌م ی‌د یارس یتادادیه.

(149) پا هر اینا ای یتاسکاروم یاب‌یوش یا ادآن یا هالاگا یاب‌یاشنی. (150) پا ین دار دیرانگی را‌ا‌و بودآا شیهست.

60. MSS. JJ یا; JE امیت.
61. پاهلوی اینکردان "یاگاوگوک" یا "یاگواسی" یا "یداگوش" (مکینزی، CPD، 85).
Chapter 14

(1) vaem kām ku nihangō až ham-anbasānī u pur-şrangī i ham niβō naβaštom (2) ku pur až har bażāi u dāβi, u až hazār yak i azaš pādā angirdie nīgōzom (3) padaš farmāiastic nigariňan.

(4) naxust ůn i gőet aβlar īsš cūnī: (5) ku "mān hom ādiňō xīn-xāh (6) u xīn-thōż (7) u xīn iʰ3 haft-aŋbādaaʰ⁶⁴ pa farzandā ɵōzom (8) vaem bʊnʰ xīn nōfarmōšat.”

(9) u han jā gőet ku "aiiāfta xašm u garā manišni, (10) vaš laβ pur-zahar, (11) u huzuua çun ātaš i sōžā, (12) u vaxʰ⁶⁶ çun rōd i arōvïnā,—a i dāβ vāgi humānātār—(14) "vaš nišāstan anďar *tamʰ⁰⁰ u *nazmʰ⁷⁰ u aβlar (15) vaš bāraa wāt i xašinaʰ⁷¹ (16) vaš až raβšni i pāe xāk gard āxźošat (17) ka raβšat aš až pasī āxźoš i ādar.”

(18) u han aβlar xašmŹūnī i īsš gőet (19) ku "cīhal sāl aβlar asarāsara pa xašm būt hom."ʰ⁷² (20) vaš guft ku "vahōfta-dil hōht asarāsara.”

(21) hań gőet ku "ka hast xōr bā garā bańdaai mān, (22) kē xarg bā fṛāstāi i hamö brihīnom (23) kō hast xōr çun pādīşāh”—pōdā ku pādišāh ī šā xaţ ādīnō.

(24) han ťńca gőet kuš "fṛāstagq q ātaš vahōfta hōht.”

(25) ťńca kuš "kunišni dūṭ xurg barq (26) u kōxšašni xūn-rāźašni.”

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62. MS. JE adds -an.
63. MS. JE omits.
64. De Menasce, Apologétique, 196 and Shapira, "Biblical Quotations,” p. 180 amend to ōbādaa, on the basis of Pahlavi āwādag, "generation" (MacKenzie, CPD, 13).
65. Shapira, "Biblical Quotations”, 180 amends to bē on the basis of the similarity of the two words in Pahlavi orthography. This emendation seems to me unnecessary.
66. de Menasce, Apologétique, 197 and Darmesteter, “Judaisme”, 11 translate “souffle,” while Neusner, History, 4.413 follows West, Pahlavi Texts Parts Three, 221 in translating "breath.”
67. Martin Schwartz suggests deriving this word from Avestan auruu, meaning "swift" or "brave" (Bartholomae, Altiranisches Wörterbuch, 200-1). While the association does not appear in the Avesta or Achaemenid inscriptions, some Pahlavi texts (Pahlavi Videvdat 1:19, Zādspram 6:20 and 34:7) call the Tigris as Arvand, possibly because of confusion with the mythical river Arang. For more on the identity of the river, see M. Kasheff,”Arvand-Rūd,” in Encyclopaedia Iranica (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 1987), 2:679-81.
68. Manichaean Middle Persian grn’g is "sleet." PRDD 35 records a tradition that Ahreman's voice resembles thunder (yarrānāg). (Williams, PRDD, 2:145).
69. MSS. ģēam. All translators emend.
70. MSS. vāzm. All translators emend. Sanskrit dhumalatve indicates "smokey" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 518).
71. MS. JE xuštā. Pahlavi hōşdān, hōš- "to wither" or "dry" (MacKenzie, CPD, 44). Sanskrit śošaka indicates "drying up" or "absorbing." (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 1092).

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(27) ñîca ku "mardum yak ašar diṯ sarinom. (28) ašar āsmān nišēnom u73 ašarša ʾandaṯ.74

(29) ñîca kuṣ "pa yak šav saṭ šast hazār ʾaż gunḏ spāh i māzandarāq75 pa vaṭ marg ašaṭaḏ. (30) u han "jāvarō šaṣ sad hazār mard jaṭ ʾaż zani u ṛḏag i aḥārnāc ʾaż asaṛāsarā ʾandaṯ vīāβaŋ ašaṭaḏ (31) ʾō du mard i ʾō ṛṣt ḡaṇḏ."

(32) diṯ namāeq kuṣ farzāmgarī76 hamā pašāmanī, (33) cuṯ ʾīn i gōeq ku "zarīgā" ʾanda ʾūṯ vaš guft ku ʾpašāmā hom pa kardan i mardumā pa zamī."

(34) ñîca gōeq ku ašar taxt nišēnaṯ ko cihār frīstaḏ ašar farī ḍārən ḋaṣaṯ ʾaṯ ṣaŋ bār han yak ṛḏā i ṭaṭaşı ażaḥ hamā raʃlaṯ. (35) nuṇ ka ʾō ir mainīiḥ hast nā tani-kard ağišq78 cihār musta-manḏ i xār garq bār pa raṇj ḡāṣṭan cim? (36) diṯ ʾīn ku har ṛḏ pa ḡaṣ ḡas ḡafrī frīstaḏ virāeq, vaš ʾaṇḍa ṣaḏa ḡaḥ79 hamā parastaṇd, vaša paš pa ṛḏ-Ṣ i ṭaṭaşı ʾō ḡoḏaḵ ḡišaṯ. (37) ka diṯ80 muṣt u aβaḏadāḏ i pa ṭaṇ inaḏ pa kār u kembā u ḡuḵiṇišnī gāṭiḏa ḡuḏaṇ ṭu suḏer? (38) ka ʾō ir mustaṁaṇ ḡrīstaḏ i tars-āḡaḏ i ir māmā niḏoxi i aβiḏaḏa kuniṇi jumě aβarō ḡuṇahkārā ʾō ḡoḏaḵ i jāβaḏaṇaḏ aβaɣaṇaṯ?

(39) cuṯ ḡuca i han grōhā gōeq ku "yaṣaṭ ṛḏ i rītāxāz xaršeq u māh jumě aβar eq ǧuṇahkārā ʾō ḡoḏaḵ ḡaḥiṯ pa ṭu cim ku hast mardum kaša namāz ḡaβaš bud."
(40) han jā īncga gōĉ, ku ka mohādar81 abrāhīmā 92 i dōst i ādīnō caśm dardīhast, āš īaṭ ādīnō ā pūrāsāni maṭ. (41) vaš bāllnī 83 niśāst u drūt purṣīt. (42) u abrāhīm āśīnaa 84 yaš zōṣāst85 pus pa niḥqā ūnītī 86 guft (43) ku "ō vāhāst šaβ mae i īxār 87 u pāk āβār." (44) šuṭ vaš āβār.d. (45) u abrāhīm vas ūxāhīni ā ādīnō kard (46) ku "āndar mān i mān mae še88 ūxār." (47) ādīnō guft ku "nā xārom cu nā āž vāhāst u nā pāk." (48) pas abrāhīm guƅār dāt ku "pāk ā mae āž vāhāst u āśīnaa yam pus āβārd." (49) pas ādīnō aβsgūmāni yaš pa āśīnaa u guƅār i pa abrāhīm rā89 mae še ūxārd. (50) pas kaš raftan kāmasti nā hišt aŋdāš pa saβagaŋd i gaŋaŋ yak i diṭ ūxārd.

(51) nīgārīt ō īn pur-ūrng draišīni i yakīca pa yazaŋ nā pasāaža. (52) pa cuŋ āmadaŋ yaš pa tanimāndī ū mān i abrāhīm u nān īxāraŋi u90 mae91 īxāraŋi92 yaš yakīca haβaš nā pasāaža. (53) īncga aŋaž pādā ku ą dard i abrāhīm nō93 ąz ādīnō būt bō āž haŋ kardār. (54) vaš bavaŋi-

81. Compare with Manichaean Parthian ms'dr, meaning "greater," "older," or "of higher rank" (Boyce, *Wordlist*, 5) and "presbyter" (Durkin-Meisterernst, *DMMPP*, 232).
82. The forms of the name Abraham which appear in Pahlavi literature (see de Menasce, *Apologétique*, 225) resemble the Arabic *Ibrahīm* rather than Hebrew *Avraham*. According to Horovitz, "Jewish Proper Names and Derivatives in the Koran", 160 Arabic *Ibrahīm* was formed on the basis of comparison with Isma'il.
84. De Menasce speculates that underlying the form āśīnaa is Arabic Ḣishāq (de Menasce, *Apologétique*, 198). The standard Pazand system for transcribing the Pahlavi script would seem to indicate that this could be the case. The ending -a or -aa usually represents the Zoroastrian Middle Persian participial suffix -āg. The sounds /n/ and /o/ share a single ligature, the straight vertical line. Initial /e/ is sometimes written with the sign for /a/, for instance in the non-logogram spelling of the verb "to stand" estādan, est- (ST'TN'). While the correspondence is not perfect, a Pahlavi spelling of the name as 'SH' K could be misread as āšīnāg. West (Shikand, 225) suggests that the Syriac form of the name, Ḣishāq could be behind the Pahlavi, with the vertical stroke of the guttural misread as /n/. The Arabic form Ḣishāq corresponds exactly to the Syriac; substitution of ō for š already occurs in Hebrew by-form yishāq Horovitz, "Jewish Proper Names and Derivatives in the Koran", (155).
85. This superlative form is cognate with Pahlavi dōš-, the verbal stem meaning "like" or "love" (MacKenzie, *CDP*, 27) and dōst, "friend" (MacKenzie, *CDP*, 26). In form, it is closest, however, to Parthian zwē, meaning "love" (Durkin-Meisterernst, *DMMPP*, 386). On the etymology see Cheung, *Eymological Dictionary*, 473. Sanskrit saḥōḍaraṃ, however, means "co-uterine, born in the same womb" or "closely resembling, similar" (Monier-Williams, *Dictionary*, 1195).
86. MSS. JJ and JE have xāndān.
87. Pahlavi xwār means "light," "easy," "mean," "abject" or "pleasurable" (MacKenzie, *CDP*, 95); in Manichaean Parthian xwār has the sense of "good days" or "prosperity" and the abstract xwār ryyh, "happiness" (Durkin-Meisterernst, *DMMPP*, 365). Nyberg proposes a derivation from xwāhr meaning "delightful" or "delicious" from Avestan xvāhāra- (Nyberg, *Manual*, vol. 2, 220). Sanskrit pavitraṛaṃaṇca indicates "purity" or "cleanliness" (Monier-Williams, *Dictionary*, 611).
88. The word še has been variously interpreted, for instance, as a Pazand misunderstanding of the Middle Pahlavi ideogram ŠORN or ŠEU for jaw, meaning "barley" (de Menasce, *Apologétique*, 198) and as a Pazand misreading of Pahlavi gāh as Arabic shay—"a plausible mistake given Pahlavi writing conventions—a supposition which relies on the Sanskrit translation (as corrected by Jamasp-Asana and West, Shikand, 146) of kṣaṇena "a moment." (West, *Pahlavi Texts Parts Three*, 225 n. 6). A better understanding of this issue will have to await a new edition of the manuscripts.
89. MSS. omit.
90. MS. JE omit.
91. MSS. rā. Manuscript JJ records a Sanskrit translation of madhuhādanamca, meaning "to consume wine" (Monier-Williams, *Dictionary*, 339).
92. MS. JE omit.
93. MSS. rā.
(8) u han jā gōeṣ kə "būt yak āž vīmāraḵ kə aḵ̄ā xb̄̄s zani u farzaṇḵ aḏīrażāra u dariiōš aḵ̄ābahar būt. (59) harm vār pa namāz u rōža u parastaši n i yažāt aḏīr tuxsā u kardār būt. (60) vaš ū rōž aṇḍar namāz rāz96 āiīft ūhast kə 'mən frōxī-e i pa rōžī dah (61) yam ziḥāštān aṣa- tār bāt.' (62) vaš frīsta-e aḏār frōt amāṯ guft ku-t 'rōžī až īn vāš pa axtar yažāt nā baxt oṣtaţ. (63) až nō baxtan nā šāiī.āt. (64) bōm ū ṣū ṣ pāḏadahišni i parastaši n i namāz taxt-t kāš cī- hār pāe až gōhār aṇḍar vahāšt dāt oṣtaţ. (65) agar aḏīaḵāt amādāt až t ā taxt yak pāe dahom.97 (66) ā pāḏaḵār āfrā ṣ q i xb̄̄s zani ūhast. (67) ziiānaa guft 'ku-mā pa kam rōžī u vāt ziḥāšni i pa gōī ḥaɾasaṇḡ būdan vaha. (68) kə agar-mā pa vahāšt mīān ham-aḏīrā taxt sō pāe. (69) bās ağaɾat šāiīaḏ āғiṇmā rōžī-e až han dar fārmāc.98

(70) diṯ a frīstāa ūmādān guft ku 'bās agar spīhīr vaṣōḵom i ūmān zamī n až nō dahom u rāb̄ašni i stūra až nō paṣāţom u dahom až q frāz nā pōdā kə baxt vavo ūfōt aḏīāa vataŋ.'

(71) až īn saxu aḵ̄ā pāḏā kə nō ṣāt ṣi hast bāxtār i rōžī u bṛn (72) u baxšāsni nō pa kām i īi u baxt vardinidan nā99 tuā. (73) u gardāsni i spīhīr u xūr u māh u stūragā nādār fāražātan99 ūmān kām u fāmān i īi. (74) īnca ku taxt yā spīhīnū99 ku aṇḍar vahāšt dahom nā až kunišni u dahišni i īi.

(75) u han jā aḏār dārīšni i xb̄̄s gōeṣ (76) kə 'mən jumė mām ri ū gunāhḵāra čandā amar agunāhā aḏaţaŋ.' (77) ka frīstaga aḏečim kunišni ves guft aḏiŋš guft ku 'aḏom hom āḏīnū i kāmā xaḏāe (78) u aḏargar u anahambindi u kāmḵār u kās nā aḏiğaḵ aḏār man drouṇḏašni guftan.' (79) frōḥāst100 ves dārīšni i pur-šrāngiḏā yam naḏaštan dārāng ūhast. (80) kə nigore101 u aḏāj

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95. MS. JE omits.
96. de Menasce, Apologétique, 201 emends to lāw on the basis of Manichaean Middle Persian lāb, meaning "entreaty" or "supplication." The Sanskrit translation guptaṁabhāṅṣitaśayācata also points to the semantic field of the secret. The first part of the compound, guptaṁ-, means "secretly" or "privately." See Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 359.
97. MS. JE omits.
98. Jamsn-Aṣana and West, Shikand, 149 inserts i.
99. De Menasce, Apologétique, 200 emends to niwūḏniḏ, "to announce." Sanskrit niveditaṁ also means "to tell," "proclaim," or "report" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 559).
100. See New Persian fehrest, meaning "list," as used in the title of the catalogue of Ibn an-Nadim. According to W. B. Henning, there was also Middle Persian equivalent pehrest. See Tabrizi, Borhān-e Qāte, 3:1509, n. 1.
101. De Menasce, Apologétique, 200 emends to vigarāe on the basis of Pahlavi vigirāy, a juridical term meaning "to contest."
dāda¹⁰² až ḳ in gaβošni qš¹⁰³ rā gaβošni āžāt *i¹⁰⁴ dastūr-ā bāt.¹⁰⁵ (81) aŋdā bahōt agāh až ḳūni i ham nišō u rāstī i ḳ yam guft.

(82) nun agar ḳ yazaţ kōš ḳ in niša u dašaa ḳ rōstī ažaš dūr (83) u aβaššāšišni ažaš bēgānī (84) vaš dānāi aβar nō vaxt (85) ci ḳ in xaţ hast drūż i dōjaz sālār i *tār¹⁰⁶ grēstāa i tam tuxmaa (86) kōš vahōftagā i dōbī vadagā pa ādīnō nam stāēnd u namāž bārēnd

(87) aβar ḳ in dar i¹⁰⁷ ṣdar būndaa.

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¹⁰². Pahlavi abāz dādan has the sense of "to be an adversary" in a description of Mazdak in the Zand i Wahman Yasn; Sanskrit vyastācārāh means "to oppose," "disperse," or "expel" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 1035).
¹⁰³. Jamasp-Asana and West, Shikand, 151 suggests q.
¹⁰⁴. de Menasce, Apologétique, 200 adds i.
¹⁰⁵. de Menasce, Apologétique, 200 suggests xβāhad based on a confusion of ideograms.
¹⁰⁶. MS. JE omits. Sanskrit timirākārāh indicates "gloomy work" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 447). I follow de Menasce, Apologétique, 200 in emending to tār.
Chapter 13

(1) Concerning the contradictions and vile utterances of the First Scripture, (2) which they call "noble," (3) and they are unanimous in their opinion that God wrote it by his own hand and gave it to Moses; (4) since it is full of error and every evil, I will reveal, for your information, some of the abundance it contains.

(5) It says at the beginning of the book that "first was the desolate earth and void and darkness and black water (7) and the spirit of God moved on the surface of that black water. Then God said, "Let there be light" (9) and the light was. (10) And the light below seemed good. (11) And he separated the light for the day and the darkness for the night. (12)

(13) And in six days he created the material world and the sky and the earth (13) for on the seventh day he was resting and at ease. (14) For this mystery even now the Jews rest on the seventh day.

(15) This as well, that he formed Ādam and his wife Hauuāe. (16) He put them in the garden of paradise so that Ādam could cultivate the garden and protect it. (18) Ādīnō, who is himself God, commanded Ādam: (19) "Eat of every tree in this garden except the tree of knowledge which, if you eat from it, you will die." (21) And he then put a serpent in the garden. (22) That serpent spoke deviously to Hauuāe saying, "Pick from this tree; I

108. Shapira, "Biblical Quotations," 178 suggests an alternative translation of "in the original of the Writing."
109. Black water plays an important role in Mandaean cosmology. Black water is said to encircle the earth after its creation by the demiurge. Mandā d'Haiiyē, the divine savior, pours a stream of water from the heavenly Jordan into this black water in order to "issue the call of life" and to heal souls in the world. See Majella Franzmann, "Living Water: Mediating Element in Mandaean Myth and Ritual," Numen 36 (1989): 156-72.
110. Compare Genesis 1:1-5.
111. Compare Genesis 2:2-3.
114. De Menasse, Apologétique, 182 (following Darmesteter, "Judaisme", 6) sees a lacuna in the text at this point, in which we are missing Hauuāe's statement that it is she, and not the snake, who will eat and give to Adam.
will eat and give to Ādām."  

(23) And she did so. (24) Ādām also ate. (25) And their knowledge became thus that they distinguished good from evil and did not die. (26) And they saw and knew that they were naked. (27) They were hiding under the tree (28) and they covered their bodies with a leaf of the tree for the sake of the shame of nakedness. (29) Then Ādīnō came into the garden, called Ādām by his name saying, "Where are you?" (30) Ādām answered, "I am here under the tree for I am naked." (31) Ādīnō became angry (32) He said, "Who make you aware that you were naked? (33) You haven't eaten from the tree of knowledge which I said you were not to eat from, have you?" (34) Ādām said, "This woman whom you gave me deceived me and I ate."

(35) And Ādīnō asked Hauuā: "Why did you do this?" (36) Hauuāe said, "The serpent deceived me." (37) And cursing all three, Ādām, Hauuāe and the serpent, he expelled them from the garden.  

(38) And he said to Ādām, "Your food will be by wiping your sweat and the breath of your nose (39) until the end of your life (40) and the earth will grow excrement and filth." (41) And he said to Hauuāe, "Your pregnancy will be in pain and difficulty and your birthing in great suffering." (42) And he said to the serpent, "Among the beasts and vermin of the plains and the mountains you will be cursed (43) and you will not have legs (44) and you will go on your belly and you will eat dust. (45) Between your children and the woman's will be such vengeance and enmity that they will bite the childrens' heads."

(46) They also say this that "he made and created this material world with everything in it for human beings (47) and he made human beings kings over all creation, the wet and the dry."

(48) Now I will say a bit against their foolishness and their false speech: (49) where and in what limits were the desolate earth and darkness and God and his spirit and the black water? (50) Or, rather, of what nature was God himself? (51) It is evident that he was not light (52)
for when he saw the light (53) it was because he had not seen it before that it seemed good to him.

(54) If they say that he was dark, then it is apparent that darkness is the origin of the calling into being of light. (55) If they say that he was not dark but light, (56) then when he himself was light what is the reason that when he saw light he was surprised? (57) And if they say that he was neither light nor dark, (58) they must demonstrate a third kind of being which is neither light nor dark.

(59) Moreover, he whose place and dwelling was in darkness and black water, and who had not ever seen light, how, then, was he able to see the light? (60) And whence is his divinity? (61) For now everyone who remains in darkness is not then able to see light. (62) This as well that if his origin and dwelling was in darkness, then how was he able to stand before light? (63) For this is well known that darkness cannot stand before light which rejects and drives it away.

(64) Furthermore, were the desolate earth and the darkness finite or infinite? (65) If it was finite, then what was outside it? (66) If it was infinite, then how long did its infinity extend, (67) that, as we see, this earth and material creation are not as in the beginning.

(68) From that which Ādīnō said (69) "Let there be light" and it was (70) then it is reasonable to conclude that Ādīnō existed before light. (71) When he wished to make light and gave the command for it to be, then in his mind he thought whether light would have a good form or a bad form. (72) And if light was found in its own nature in the knowledge and thought of Ādīnō, then it is apparent that light existed both in the knowledge and thought of Ādīnō (73) and outside it. (74) For nothing can be known and found which is not in existence and manifest.

(75) If light existed, then it is not a creation of Ādīnō. (76) And if they say that light did not exist in his knowledge in its own nature, then when to desire light, the nature of which he did not know, was very ignorant. (77) Moreover, how is it possible to conceive in the mind that which he never thought or knew?

(78) And this as well: did he give that command to light to be to something or to nothing? (79) For this is certain that it is possible to give a command [only] to one who is commanded. (80) If he gave it to an existing light, then that light itself existed. (81) And if he gave the command to a non-existence, in that case how did non-existence hear Ādīnō's command? (82) Moreover, how could he know that Ādīnō's desire was that "I become light"? (83) For non-existence did not hear Ādīnō's command as if it was not given. (84) For nothing cannot think in any way at all. (85) That which does not exist (the non-existent) was created as noth-

125. In De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1:8 and Contra Faustum 22:4, Augustine relates that the Manichaeans also critique this same passage for its portrayal of God's surprise. For a discussion of these sources see Decret, Aspects, 123-49 and Augustine, On Genesis, 60-63.

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ing unlike the existent which knew and perceived in that it knew what form Ādīnō wished it to take and it took the form that Ādīnō wished. 126

(86) If they say that light was from the word of Ādīnō, that he said "Be!" and it was, (87) in so far as Ādīnō was himself darkness and he had never seen light, then in what way could that light come to be from his word? (88) For this is commonly known that speech is the offspring of thought. (89) If they say that his word was light, then that is very astonishing for then light would be the fruit of darkness and darkness the seed from which light is the sign or this that light was concealed in darkness. (90) As I said, it is evident that a command is not given without one who follows it (91) thus light already was and then he gave the appropriate command. 127

(92) This as well, that he prepared and created this creation and the sky and the earth in six days (93) and on the seventh day he rested from it. (94) But if he did not create this world from something but rather only from the command "Be!" and it was, (95) then why this period of six days? (96) As his labor would only be as much as saying "Be!" then a period of six days is very unfitting. (97) And his labor is not appropriate to it. (98) If he can make nothing into something he also has the ability to create in no time. (99) And if he was not able to create [the world] in a single day, then it is not fitting to say he created from nothing. 128

(100) And this as well, that when the counting of the days is known by the sun, in that case before the sun was created, how did he know the number of the days and their names? (101) For they say that he created the sun on the fourth day which is Wednesday. 129

(102) This as well, that for what reason did he have to be at ease and rest on the seventh day? (103) When in arranging and creating the world, the duration and labor was so much as it took to say "Be!," (104) then how was it figured that he had to rest that day when his labor was finished. (105) For if he said "Be!" in one moment then his labor and ease should also be in one moment. 130

128. Compare Jewish rationalist Ḥiwi al-Balkhi's critique that God did not make the world ex nihilo (Rosenthal, "Hiwi," 339). For a recent discussion of Hiwi, see Gil, Ishmael, 1:314-18. Rosenthal argues that Ḥiwi might have been influenced by the ŠGW. Though this is possible, the considerable differences between the ŠGW and the (at best second-hand) evidence of Hiwi's critiques casts some doubt on Rosenthal's argument.
129. Interestingly, the citation of the story of creation does not include the names of the days. Compare Genesis 1:15-19. On the critique, compare Augustine De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1:14 (Augustine, On Genesis, 68-70).
Furthermore, for what reason and cause did he create Ādam and Hauuāe? (107) So that they should perform his will? Then what is the reason that he did not create them in such a way that they would not turn from performing his will? (108) For when, before the act, he knew that they would not be obedient and he nevertheless created them, then now being irritated and angry at them is unreasonable. (109) For it reveals that Ādinō himself did not fully realize the desire of his will and it reveals him to be his own opponent and adversary. (110) If he did not recognize before the act and he did not know that they would not follow his command, then he is ignorant and recognizing. (111) If they say that his own desire was for them not to do it, then why did he give the command for them to do it? (112) And what was his sin in not doing it? It is like one riding a horse which he both drives with the reins and hurries with the whip. (114) From this speech is revealed the sign and token of deceivers, whose will and command are contradictory and discordant. (115) If his will and desire were thus that they not turn from his will, (117) now their strength and desire to turn from his will were mightier and more powerful than his that they not turn. (118) If his will was that they turn from his will and he had foreknowledge, and he gave the command for them not to turn, now how could oppressed Adam be able not to turn? (119) His will is not in accordance with basic principle, for in turning from his Ādinō's command he Ādam could only violate the command; in not turning his Ādinō's desire and knowledge both would be [proved] false.

(121) This as well: for what reason did he cultivate that garden and for what benefit did he create it? (122) And the tree of knowledge itself which he commanded them: "Do not eat it" and which he instructed them not to eat, what was the point of creating it? (123) From the instruction and the command it is evident that he prefers lack of knowledge and ignorance and his desire for it is more than for knowledge and wisdom. (125) And his profit from ignorance was also greater, (126) for until they had eaten from the tree of knowledge they were ignorant and neither disobeyed him nor were troublesome (127) but when they became knowledgeable they began to disobeyed him.

(128) And he was not sorrowful about their ignorance but about their knowledge; (129) he was irritated and angry with them. (130) With great unease and unlove he exiled them from heaven and cast them on the ground. (131) In brief, the cause of the birth of this knowledge among men in the world was a snake and deception.

(132) And they say this, that he created everything for the sake of human beings and on this account of it is evident that he also created that tree for sake of human beings (133) and he made men kings of all creatures and creation. (134) If this is so, now what is the cause of the wish to destroy them through that tree which was theirs?

(135) From these words this also is evident that he was in no way knowledgeable, (136) for when he came into the garden and he spoke and called Adam by name, saying "Where are you," that meant that he was not aware where he was. (137) If he had remained unanswered he would have been ignorant of where Adam was (138) and if he had not called out to him, he would not have seen whether he ate from that tree or not and he would have been ignorant

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of this: namely who ate and when and how as well as who deceived.\(^{131}\) (139) If he was aware, then what was the reason he asked, "You have not eaten from the tree that I commanded you not to eat from, have you?" (140) And when he first arrived he was not irritated; but then, when he knew that they had eaten, he became irritated and angry with them.

(141) And he is unknowing in this way as well, that he created the snake, which is his own adversary, and put it in the garden with them. (142) Moreover, what is the reason that he did not make the garden like a fortress so that the serpent and those other enemies could not enter?\(^{132}\)

(143) And his mendaciousness is also evident from this, that he said, "If you eat from this tree you will die," and they ate and did not die; rather, they became wise (144) and distinguished good from evil.

(145) And this as well, how his knowledge is the enemy and opponent of his will and command. (146) For if he wished that [he] eat from that tree and he gave the command not to eat, he knew that he would eat. (147) Now it is evident that all three are opposed to each other: will, knowledge and command.

(148) And this as well, that when Adam sinned, his curse unjustly reaches all men of every age.

(149) In any way I consider it, these statements are stupid, ignorant and foolish. (150) This chapter, on account of its length, seems sufficient.

\(^{131}\) The charge of ignorance is also made by Ḥiwi al-Balkhī. See Rosenthal, "Ḥiwi," 326.

\(^{132}\) Contrast the Bundahišn's account of the sky's trapping of Ahriman at BD 4:10-12 (Soraki, Bundahišn, 61-62) and ŠGW 4:75-76; see further the discussion in Chapter Four.
Chapter 14

(1) And I wish to write a little about the contradiction and error of that same Scripture (2) that is full of every evil and devilishness, and I will briefly expose a thousandth of what it contains; (3) one is commanded to examine it.

(4) First it says this about his own nature: (5) "I am Ādīnō, vengeance seeking (6) and vengeance taking (7) and I repay the vengeance of seven generations on the children (8) and I never forget the root of my vengeance."

(9) And it says there that "he has acquired anger and grievous thoughts, (10) his lips are full of poison, (11) his tongue is like a burning fire, (12) his spirit is like a strong river (13) and his voice is like thunder"—that is, it is more like the voice of a demon—(14) "he is seated in darkness, haze and cloud, (15) his steed is the parching wind, (16) his footsteps stir up dust whirls (17) and when he walks fire springs up behind him."

(18) And regarding his anger it says: (19) "For forty years I was angry with the Israelites. (20) And he said: 'The Israelites are corrupted at heart.'"

(21) It says there: "Who is blind but for my servant? (22) Who is deaf but for the angel I create? (23) Who is blind like the king?"—it is evident that their king is Ādīnō himself.

(24) It also says this: "The angels of the fire are corrupted." (25) And this: "His action brings smoke and sparks (26) and his endeavor bloodshed."

(27) And this: "I incite men against each other; (28) I am sitting in heaven and laughing at them."
(29) And this: "In one night he slew six-hundred thousand of the troops of the army of demons with a bad death."(30) And another time he slew six-hundred thousand Israelite men apart from women and children in the wilderness, (31) apart from two men who had escaped.(n146)

(32) It also indicates that his final work is entirely regret, (33) as it says: "he was so despondent that he said: 'I regret having made man on the earth.'"(n147)

(34) And it says this: "He sits on a throne which four angels carry on their wings which from its weight a fiery river flows out."(n148) (35) Now when he is spiritual and not corporeal, what is the reason those four pitiful ones painfully bear that heavy burden? (36) This as well: "Every day, with his own hand, he forms ninety-thousand angels, and they praise him until evening time, and then he abandons them in a fiery river to hell." (37) Again, when violence and injustice of this sort (exists), how is it fitting (for) mortal beings to persist in good deeds? (38) When he casts those poor angels, reverent, obedient and pure-acting, along with the other sinners into eternal hell?

(39) Like that which that group says: "On the day of resurrection God will send the sun and moon with the other sinners to hell on account of the fact that sectarians worshiped them."(n149)

(40) It says this as well in that place, that when the aged Ābāhīm, the friend of Ādīnū(n150) was pained in the eyes, then Ādīnū himself came to converse with him, (41) and sat on a cushion and asked him about his health.(n151) (42) And Ābāhīm, secretly, calling his dearest son Āsīnāa

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145. Compare Isaiah 37:36 and BT Hagigah 13b.
146. Compare these verses with Exodus 12:37 and Numbers 14:30-32.
148. See Ezekiel 1; Daniel 7:10 and the discussion in Chapter Three.
149. This tradition is cited in the name Ka'b al-'Aḥbār, an early tradent associated with Jewish material, in Tabari, From the Creation to the Flood, 233. Halperin and Newby, "Two Castrated Bulls" argue that the tradition derives from Enochic cosmological speculation and that its appearance in the SGW confirms its antiquity. It seems, however, just as likely that the SGW borrowed the tradition from an Islamic source.
150. Abraham is referred to as God's friend in both Jewish and Islamic texts. The epithet is found in BT Menahot 53b, though it is missing from the earliest manuscripts (see Raphaelo Rabbinovicz, Variae Lectiones in Mischnam et in Talmud Babylonicum [Munich: 1886], 15:134). The epithet is also found in ARN B 43 (Schechter, ARN, 121). However, this late Midrash was redacted in the post-Amoraic period and perhaps in the first centuries after the Islamic conquest; see Kister, Studies in Avot de-Rabbi Nathan. If this dating is correct, this passage could be evidence of interaction with the similar and more widespread Islamic appellation (for instance, Qur'ān 4:125). Tabari's commentary on this verse includes a number of examples of God's love and care for the patriarch.
151. In addition to resonances with Genesis 18's story of Abraham's hospitality and the announcement of the birth of Isaac discussed in chapter one, this citation resembles other biblical birth narratives, particularly the birth of Samson described in Judges 13:2-25.
said. They took the great oath. Then Abrahām said: "I will not drink since it is not from Heaven nor is it pure." (48) Then Abrahām swore that "That wine is pure from Heaven and my son Āśīnaa brought it." (49) Then because of his freedom of doubt in Āśīnaa and the testimony of Abrahām, Āḏīnā consumed the wine and bread. (50) Then when he wanted to leave, he did not let him until they took the great oath.

152. The use of the word dearest recalls the Jewish and Islamic traditions of Abraham's sacrifice of his beloved son. At Genesis 22:1 God commands Abrahām to sacrifice "your son, your only son, whom you love, Isaac." Similarly, Abrahām's sending Āśīnaa to heaven in order to fulfill his obligation of hospitality to Āḏīnā is reminiscent of the patriarch's unquestioning willingness to sacrifice his only son. Āśīnaa's journey to heaven recalls the son's brush with death on the altar. According to a Midrash in PRE 31, on account of his fear Isaac's soul does actually leave his body and ascend to heaven, only to return. (Börner-Klein, PRE, 363). Āśīnaa's return with "light and pure wine" is similarly reminiscent of the son's return with a replacement, an animal sacrificed in place of the rescued son which was understood to have been stored up in heaven. The ram appears in the biblical account in Genesis 22:13; BT Pesahim 54a and PRE 19 (Börner-Klein, PRE, 197) state that the ram was created on the evening before the first Sabbath after creation. Islamic traditions relate that the replacement animal was pastured in heaven for forty years before the sacrifice, or that it was the same ram sacrificed by Abel, Adam's son. While the precise identity of this replacement, whether a billy goat, a ram or an antelope, is not mentioned in the Qurʾān—Sura 37:107 only mentions that he was ransomed "with a great sacrifice"—these exegetical traditions are ascribed to Ibn Ā Abbas in the literature. See Th alʿabī, Prophets, 160; Muhammad ibn Jarīr Ṭabarī, Prophets and Patriarchs, vol. 2 of The History of al-Ṭabarī, ed. William M. Brinner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 94; Firestone, Holy Lands, 129-32 and S. Bashear, "Abraham's Sacrifice of His Son and Related Issues," Der Islam 67 (1990): 243-77.

153. Alongside the role heavenly wine plays in the midrashic expansion of the story Jacob's trickery in Genesis 27 (discussed in chapter one) wine stored in heaven or the garden of Eden is a motif particular to Babylonian rabbinic literature. Among other sources, we can mention a BT Berachot 34b (parallel in Sanhedrin 99a) on the wine stored in the grapes from the six days of creation; Babylonian Talmud 59b (parallel in ARN A 1 Schechter, ARN, 6) on the angels serving Adam and Eve wine and grilled meat in Eden before the fall; PRE 23 (Börner-Klein, PRE, 253) states that the vine Noah planted in Genesis 8:20-22 was originally from the Eden. The most interesting occurrence of the motif, from the perspective of the SGW, is in the midrashic expansion of the story of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah in Genesis 19. In explaining where Lot's two daughters procured the wine they used to intoxicate their father (19:31-36), the Midrash states, on the basis of Joel 4:18, that God made the mountain itself produced the wine. The tradition can be found in Mekhilta de Rabbi Yishmael, Shirah 2 (Jacob Z. Lauterbach, Mekhilta de Rabbi Ishmael: A Critical Edition on the Basis of the MSS and Early Editions with an English Translation, Introduction and Notes (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1933), 2:15; the translation follows Lauterbach) and the parallel version in Sifre Deuteronomy 43 (Louis Finkelstein, Siphre ad Deuteronomium H. S. Horovitzii schedis usis cum variis lectionibus et adnotationibus [Berlin: Jüd. Kulturbund in Deutschland, 1939], 94). See also Genesis Rabbah 51:8 (Theodor and Albeck, Bereshit Rabbba, 538).

154. The final statement that Āḏīnā was not allowed to leave before sealing a "great oath" is reminiscent of a number of biblical passages, including God's promise that Sarah will give birth at Genesis 18:9-10; Abraham's deal with God over the minimum number of righteous men whose presence could ransom Sodom at 18:16-33; and the covenant sealed by Abraham's circumcision, which immediately precedes the story of his hospitality, at 17:1-27. However, the closest parallel is the account of Jacob struggle with an unnamed figure at Genesis 32:25-31. While the identity of Jacob's sparring partner is indeterminate in the Bible, the Midrash makes clear the angelic nature of the visitor. Targum Pseudo-Jonathan on Genesis 32:25 (Maher, Targum, 114) identifies an unnamed angel; BT Hullin 91b identifies the stranger as an angel and explains that he had to leave with the dawn to sing in the morning's heavenly choir; Genesis Rabbah 78:1 (Theodor and Albeck, Bereshit Rabbba, 2:916) identifies the angel as Michael or Gabriel and Tanhuma
Consider this evil chatter which is entirely unbefitting of God. (52) His coming in bodily form to the house of Abraham, eating bread and drinking wine are in no way befitting of him. (53) This is manifest as well that Abrâhîm's pain was not from Ādînô but from another agent. (54) His deluded knowledge and stupidity were such that he did not know the purity and origin of the wine. (55) And his mendacity in this, that he said he would not drink the wine and in the end drank it, (56) then confessed that "it is holy and pure." (57) Now how is it fitting to worship he who has this nature as the omniscient and omnipotent deity?

(58) And it says in that place: "There was a sick man who, with his wife and children, was suffering greatly, poor and without resources. (59) He was always diligent and active in prayer and fasting and supellation to God. (60) One day in his prayer he requested in secret: 'Give me some happiness in my lot (61) so that my life will be easier.' (62) An angel descended and said to him: 'God has not apportioned in the stars a lot better than this. (63) It is not possible to apportion a new lot. (64) But, in recompense for your supplication and prayer, I have created for you a four-legged jewel throne in heaven. (65) If necessary, I will give you one leg of that throne.' (66) That prophet asked the counsel of his wife. (67) His wife said: 'It is better that we be satisfied with a poor lot and bad life in the material world (68) than if we, among our companions, have a three-legged throne in heaven. (69) But if you can, obtain our lot by another means.'

(70) That angel came again saying: 'Even if I destroy the firmament and create anew the heaven and earth and fashion and create anew the movement of the stars, it is not evident from that whether your fate would be better or worse.'

(71) From these words it is apparent that he himself is not the dispenser of lots and destiny, (72) their allotment is not according to his will and he cannot change fate. (73) The revolution of the sphere, the sun, moon and stars are not in the compass of his knowledge, will and command. (74) This as well, that the throne that he announces: "I will give it in heaven," is not a product of his work and creation.

(75) And in that place it says about his incoherent speech: (76) "I have struck down the flock of the sinners along with countless innocents." (77) When the angels protested that this is an act without reason, he said: 'I am Ādînô, the Lord all-powerful, (78) supreme, without rival, absolute and no one dares to speak against me.'

-Wayishlah 7 (Buber, Tanhuma, 165) with Michael. The seventh century apocalypse Sefer Zerubabel (on which see John C. Reeves, Trajectories in Near Eastern Apocalyptic: A Postrabbinic Jewish Apocalypse Reader [Atlanta, GA: Society for Biblical Literature, 2005], 40-66) identifies him with another divine figure, the archangel and sometime divine co-regent Metatron. Metatron, and angelology in general, are discussed in more detail in chapter three. Ibn Ḥazm, the eleventh century writer, insists that Jewish scripture states explicitly that Jacob prevails over God himself. See Adang, Muslim Writers, 238-39. Compare BT Taanit 24b-25a; Midrash Tehilim 92:8; and BT Berachot 32a and Shabbat 1456a-b. God's inability to alter fate is also mention by Ḥiwi ha-Balkhi. See Rosenthal, "Ḥiwi", 328. 156. On this passage see Chapter Three.
(79) This catalogue of their many erroneous sayings that I wrote seems long. (80) Whoever considers and contests these sayings should for his sake consult [about] the āzād with a das-tur (81) so that he will become aware of the nature of that same scripture and the truth of that which I said.

(82) Now if these are the signs and tokens of that God, then truth is far from him, (83) mercy is unknown to him, (84) he has no part of wisdom, (85) and therefore he himself is the druž, the lord of Hell, of gloomy darkness, of the dark race (86) whom those perverted by demonic evil praise and worship by the name Ādīnō.157

(87) This chapter is here completed.

157. Identifying the author of the Jewish scriptures with Satan is common in Manichaean polemic. See the discussion in Decret, Aspects, 123.
Appendix II:

Angōšīdaa: Terminus Technicus?

The fictional narrative of the garden parable (4:63-80) discussed in Chapter Four is marked at the beginning with the word angōšīdaa.1 Angōšīdaa, which usually indicates a resemblance, likeness, or comparison,2 occupies the same place in the parable as does the word mashal in the rabbinc genre. Other passages in the ŠGW imply that, at least in this text, angōšīdaa might also have the same function as mashal, meaning that the word functions as a generic marker. Though in its context in 4:63, angōšīdaa can certainly be read simply as "likeness" or "resemblance," these other passages point to Mardānfarroox’s use of the word as a generic marker.

First of all, angōšīdaa has this same function in a short passage from earlier in Chapter Four:

(24) angōšīdaa i în ašāxtarā nākī i āšā hamā baxšān̄ ṣad (25) ašā čuŋ gadūgā rāhdārā i āndar kārvān vāzargān̄ rāh bār̄n̄ aṣ̃ (26) vasāq ə̃s i mādāgī aparaṣ̃ (27) nā ṣā ḳāškārā arzaṇiā bɔ̄ ṣunāhākārā aḵāškārā jīhiā rōspiiā arzaṇiiā baxšān̄ u kahān̄

(24) an angōšīdaa of how these planets distribute their goodness: (25) [they are] just like highwaymen who cut off the path of a nobles’ caravan (26) and steal the things of value (27) [that] they distribute and give not to dutiful and dignified men but to sinners, slackers, prostitutes, whores, and peons.

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1. Martin Schwartz has suggested a derivation for this word from the preverb haṃ- with gō-, from the widely attested Proto-Iranian *gaus-, meaning "to hear" or "to listen to" (see Cheung, Etymological Dictionary, 115-116 and Vera S. Rastorgueva and D. I. Edelman, Etymological Dictionary of the Iranian Languages [Moscow: Izdatel’skaja firma"Vostočnaja literatura" RAN, 2003], 247-49). The semantic shift from hearing to resemblance or similarity is also seen in Greek symphōnos, one of the meanings of which is "to be in agreement with," (Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948], 2:1689) and German zustimmen, "agree" from Stimme, "voice" (Friedrich Kluge, Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache [Berlin: De Gruyter, 1989], 703-4).

2. Pahlavi hangōšīdag, Sanskrit nidarsanameva. The Sanskrit, meaning "exact comparison" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 548), seems to translate the entire Pazand phrase in 4:63: angōšīdaa ašā čuŋ. As for the Pahlavi, examples of various uses of the word can be drawn from the corpus of Middle Persian literature. The simplest sense, where hangōšīdag is used similarly to English "like" to introduce a simile, is illustrated by DD 21:5. A sense of likeness or counterpart is illustrated by the Supplement to the Šāyist nē Šāyist 15:13, as well as in a Manichaean text on the soul (Boyce, Reader, text ae, 89-90). However, hangōšīdag is also a mental power or faculty, as is discussed in a text on "the power of similitude" in DD 18:3. Likewise, angōšīdaa dānaṇi is listed as one of the three kinds of knowledge in ŠGW 5:13-30, where it is defined (5:15-16) as:

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\text{a ko zē pēdā tīs i nē pēdā pēdāmāz u zē viṇāṭadā tīs pa angōšīdaa i dast aʃar nahāt aʃarā i andōmānī i viṇāši i xard}
\]

that which makes manifest the non-manifest by means of a manifest thing, and by means of a visible thing an invisible thing, similar to a hand which transfers and brings in the presence of the vision of wisdom.

Self-reflexively, the definition of angōšīdaa contains within it an example of angōšīdaa.
Here angōšīdaa is used to describe the role of the evil planets. As in the garden parable later in Chapter Four, angōšīdaa introduces an extended comparison to explain a complicated astrological and theological phenomena. In the metaphysics of the ŠGW, good, being of an entirely different and opposed nature from evil, should not in any way join forces or partner with it. However, as astrology teaches, human fate is influenced by the movement of both the good stars, kept safe outside the crystal boundary of the sky from Ahriman's corruption, and the evil planets, themselves Ahriman's creations. The angōšīdaa resolves this contradiction through the comparison of the planets to highway robbers. Just like highwaymen do not produce anything of value themselves, but only steal the valuable things that others produce, so too the planets do not do any good of their own but, like other demons, usurp the good of Ohrmazd's creatures. Furthermore, in comparing the planets' distribution of fate to the highwaymens' distribution of their booty, the angōšīdaa clarifies that the planets only distribute good fate to evil people. Their reflected luck is granted, like the robbers' stolen loot, to pimps, whores, junkies and lowlives.

Similarly, in 11:205-212, as part of the critique of Islam, the ŠGW discusses the argument of a certain, unnamed group that since God is the absolute sovereign of all creation, all created things in the world are, thereby, his own and identical to him. None of his actions can be characterized as violent, for violence can only be enacted on an object other than oneself. According to this logic, the text argues, the actions of any sovereign can thereby be justified: lying is truth and sin is virtue. The relevant section follows at 11:213-216:

(213) aṉā cuṇ ā i ḥūfarbārd rōšan i ādar farōbagā pa angōšīdaa guft (214) kušqā mardā diḵ kā xarā hamš maržāt. (215) kašqā ažaš pursīt ku "iṅ nīgīnaaš kār cim kunāč?" (216) vaš pa bōžāšni guft ku "xarā am xāš."

(213) This is like that which the venerable Rōšan the son of Ādar-Farōbagā said in [an] angōšīdaa: (214) They saw a man who was copulating with a donkey. (215) When they asked him, What is the reason you are doing this vile deed? (216) He explained, I myself am a donkey!

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4. This discussion, just as relevant to terrestrial human politics as to theology, intersects nicely with the theory of the sovereign "state of exception" developed by Carl Schmitt. On this see Georgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Atell (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005) and, again in the messianic context of the Letter to the Romans, Agamben, Remains, 104-8.

5. Sanskrit garhyataram, "contemptible," "vile" (Monier-Williams, Dictionary, 350).

6. Donkeys are associated with sexual prowess elsewhere in Iranian culture. Martin Schwartz points to the Sogdian xarūne, meaning "lewdness" or "fornication" and xarīcak, meaning "a lewd woman," both of which are connected to the word for "donkey," xar. See Gharib, Dictionary, 431-32.
This short text attributed to Rōšan illustrates the absurdity of the theological position just outlined. Absolute power—such as that of the man over his donkey—is not the same as identity. Merely claiming identity does not make it so; the difference in ontological status between the man and the donkey is evident to any observer. So much the more so regarding the difference in ontological status between God and his creation. The fatalism described is just as beastly and sterile as copulating with a donkey.

The interesting theological implications of this short text aside, the passage, like the one before, does seem to illustrate a technical usage of angōšīdaa. Whether we understand the term as parable, allegory or some other rhetorical figure, angōšīdaa is used here not as a description of the relationship between the erroneous theological proposition and the sordid donkey tale or of the planets to highwaymen. Rather, it describes the kind of speech the text uses in both these instances. As such, it relates the reader not to a more general class of comparisons or similitudes which might be made between various entities in the world, similitudes made through the power of the mental faculty also called angōšīdaa, but to a particular kind or class of speech which illustrates a theological principle by way of a fictional narrative.8

7. On Rōš see Gignoux, "Controverse," esp. 144 and the tables on 147-149.
8. Interestingly, the word angōšīdaa is never used in the section of the ŠGW where we would expect it most, namely the extended discussion of Jesus' parables in Chapter Fifteen. I would argue that this absence is to be explained by Mardānfarrox's hyper-literal polemical reading strategy which disregards the citations' symbolic or metaphorical content.
Appendix III:

Manuscripts of the ŠGW

The following list includes all known manuscripts of the ŠGW, including those listed in Jamasp-Asana and West's edition, in published catalogs of Indian and European libraries as well as in the uncataloged or unpublished collections of those libraries. I have listed the manuscripts in approximate chronological order and indicated the languages and contents of each as well as the page and shelf number in the published catalogs; for further information, transcriptions of colophons, etc., please refer to the catalog entries. I have followed previous editors and catalogers' names for the manuscripts. Where no such names exist, I have named the manuscripts according to the catalog number or shelf number preceded by the first initial of the last owner of the manuscript. In the case of Dastur Kaikhusroo M. JamaspAsa's collection, the numerical portion of the name corresponds to the number assigned the manuscript by Ervad Parvez Bajan when he compiled a partial unpublished catalog of the Dasturji's collection in 1992-1993. It is important to note that some of the known manuscripts are no longer extant or are missing. For this reason, I have also indicated the current location of each manuscript or, if appropriate, that its location is unknown.

Abbreviations


Christian Bartholomae, Die Zendhandschriften der koniglichen Hof- und Staatsbibliothek in München (Munich: Palm, 1915)                                          Barth

Ervad Sheriarji Dadabai Barucha, ed., Skanda-Gumânî-Gujâra. (Bombay: Trustees of the Parsee Punchayet, 1913)                   Barucha

Edgar Blochet, Catalogue des manuscrits mazdéens de la bibliothèque nationale (Besançon: Paul Jacquin, 1900)         Blochet

The K. R. Cama Oriental Institute, Bombay                      COI

Bomanji Nusserwanji Dhabhar, Descriptive Catalogue of Some Manuscripts Bearing on Zoroastrianism and Pertaining to the Different Collections in the Mulla Feroze Library (Bombay: Trustees of the Parsee Punchayet, 1923)  Dhabhar MF


Hermann Ethe, Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the India Office Library (Oxford: India Office, 1903)                Ethe

The Dastur JamaspAsa Family Collection, housed at the K. R. Cama Oriental Institute, Bombay                   JamaspAsa

Dastur Kaikhusroo M. JamaspAsa                                      KJ

Jamshed Cawasji Katrak, Oriental Treasures (Bombay: 1941)    Katrak

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Feroz Kotwal, et al., *Preliminary Descriptive List of Manuscripts Donated to the First Dastur Meherjirana Library since 1923* (Navsari: 2008)  

Dastur Hoshangji Jamasp Asa, Pune  

*Catalog of the Mass, & Books owned by Late Dastoor Minocherji Jamaspasana, B. A.* (Bombay: n.d.)  

The First Dastoor Meherjirana Library, Navsari, Gujarat  


### Manuscripts

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