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All this dies with us: the decline and revision of a Mestizo Gentry (Chumbivilcas, Cuzco, Peru)

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All This Dies with Us: The Decline and Revision of a Mestizo Gentry (Chumbivilcas, Cuzco, Peru)

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in

Anthropology

by

Jonathan Cody Petterson

Committee in charge:

Professor James Holston, Chair
Professor Nancy Postero, Co-Chair
Professor Jonathan Friedman
Professor Christine Hünefeldt
Professor Misha Kokotovic
Professor David Pedersen

2010
The Dissertation of Jonathan Cody Petterson is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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Co-Chair

____________________________________________________________________

Chair

University of California, San Diego

2010
DEDICATION

For my mother and father
“But, accurately speaking, no good work whatever can be perfect, and the demand for perfection is always a sign of a misunderstanding of the ends of art. This is for two reasons, both based on everlasting laws. The first, that no great man ever stops working till he has reached his point of failure: that is to say, his mind is always far in advance of his powers of execution, and the latter will now and then give way in trying to follow it . . . The second reason is, that imperfection is in some sort essential to all that we know of life. It is the sign of life in a mortal body, that is to say, of a state of progress and change. Nothing that lives is, or can be, rigidly perfect; part of it is decaying, part nascent.”

John Ruskin

On the Nature of the Gothic
1854
13-14
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

All This Dies with Us: 
The Decline and Revision of a Mestizo Gentry 
(Chumbivilcas, Cuzco, Peru)

by

Jonathan C. Petterson

Doctor of Philosophy

University of California, San Diego, 2010

Professor James Holston, Chair 
Professor Nancy Postero, Co-Chair

Peru has experienced unprecedented social, political, and economic changes over 
the past fifty years that have left little of the traditional rural social order intact. The 
consolidation, expansion, and tentative decentralization of the Peruvian state have had 
particularly profound effects on labor relations, land tenure, electoral politics, 
administration, and social practice and ideology. New forms of identification and 
mobilization have helped to undermine traditional distinctions of status and ethnicity. 
This dissertation focuses on the historical and contemporary experience of the vecinos of
Chumbivilcas, a mestizo gentry that once stood at the apex of the old provincial social order.

Ethnographic research was spread over twenty months between 2004 and 2008, with all of 2006 spent in the highland province of Chumbivilcas, located in the far south of the Cuzco department of Peru. Data was collected predominantly through formal and informal interviews and participant observation.

The dissertation describes the emergence of local indigenist parties, made possible by the expansion of the franchise and motivated in part by increasing fiscal transfers from the central government to municipalities. The accession to power of these parties has, in turn, led to the formation of new indigenous elites. These new parties and leaders have decisively marginalized the old vecino establishment, forcing vecinos, particularly males, to struggle to reframe their values and identities.

Most vecinos privately retain diverse elements of traditional racial and ethnic ideologies. Likewise, vecinos and indigenous peasants (or comuneros) continue to discriminate between one another and to informally self-segregate along ethnic lines. With the massive influx of peasants into towns and the rapid disappearance of definitive markers of ethnicity, vecinos must rely increasingly on their detailed genealogical knowledge of the province. As the concrete differences between the two communities decline, vecinos have narrowed the emphasis of their self-identification toward cultural proficiencies and affinities. The result is a vestigial community held loosely together by shared family histories and cultural interests, rather than by formal ethnic institutions and prerogatives. For the vecino community, the future most likely holds increasing emigration to Peru’s urban centers and further weakening of local ethnic distinctions.
Chapter 1
History’s Antagonists

In 1928, the eminent Peruvian thinker José Carlos Mariátegui wrote that “Peru has to choose between the gamonal and the Indian; it has no other alternative.”¹ He was convinced that the backward, oppressive latifundios (large landed estates) that dominated Peru’s rural society—symbolized for him by the gamonales, the infamous feudal lords of the highlands—were the fundamental brake on the country’s development, and that choosing the Indian was the only viable solution to the nation’s political and economic predicament. Following Mariátegui’s advice, Peru chose the Indian. This dissertation is about the nature of that century-long decision-making process and its consequences. Although numerous sociologists, economists, historians and anthropologists have attempted to describe and analyze elements of this process, they have almost universally focused on its effect on and the experience of “the Indians” who were “chosen.” While I believe that the focus on the struggles and achievements of indigenous peoples is valuable and appropriate, this dissertation is focused in particular, though not exclusively, on the experiences, losses, and adaptations of those who were not ‘chosen’; I have focused on, to use the term that their enemies used and continue to use to vilify them, the gamonal.²

This dissertation explores the ways in which these vanquished landed elite have adapted to and tried to make sense of their altered circumstances, especially their attempts to integrate traditional concepts of race, class, and ethnicity with contemporary material and discursive realities. Though the particular events of their lives and the ways
they have experienced them are unique, they share commonalities with the events and experiences of individuals throughout Peru, Latin America, and beyond. This dissertation joins and engages the growing ethnographic literature on the dissolution of the old rural order in Latin America by focusing on the complex interaction of state policy, market relations, and ethnic identity in the evolving configuration of rural society. By focusing on the role and perspective of the traditional rural elite in this process, I hope to present a description and analysis that emphasizes the constraints that inform my informants’ historical action and experience: rather than heroically ‘make’ history, my informants struggled to evade it, interpret it, and adapt to it; rather than being the protagonists of their region and nation’s history, my informants were its antagonists. They are agents of their own destiny, but this agency has been heavily constrained by developments well beyond their control. Much of the drama, therefore, of their adaptations is in the ways they have ‘made sense’ of their predicament. I have tried throughout to conceptualize and analyze these adaptations without deadening their natural drama, dynamism, and creativity.

I will make several interrelated arguments in relation to this process and its results. Drawing on my study and analysis of contemporary social and political relations, I argue that the emphasis which the commonly accepted narrative, both in Peru and in the social science literature, places on the Agrarian Reform of General Juan Velasco Alvarado and on the Shining Path insurgency obscures the decisive effect of the administrative and electoral reforms of the 1979 Constitution as well as the ongoing effects of fiscal decentralization. I argue, additionally, that the transition from ‘gamonalismo’ (rule by gamonales) to the current social, economic, and political
configuration has effectively forced the so-called gamonales to ‘retreat into culture.’ This retreat into culture manifests itself in my informants’ preoccupation with folklore, afición (connoting locally the commitment to traditional occupational proficiencies and leisure pursuits, especially equestrianism, bullfighting, cockfighting, and musicianship), fiestas, recollection of the past, and heredity. Furthermore, I argue that as the formerly subjugated indigenous peasantry acquires greater political and economic power, they also gain access to these ‘styles of life,’ which has increasingly forced my informants to identify themselves and delineate themselves as a group genealogically, rather than by reference to the broad array of ethnic and class traits that once distinguished them from the local indigenous peasantry. Finally, I will make a number of subsidiary arguments along the way—about, for example, the nature of ‘gamonales’ as a group, the role of technological progress per se in social change, the relative importance of diverse factors in ethnic distinction, and the continuing influence of traditional values and ideas, in particular with regard to race, family, and status—that will support and help clarify the major arguments.

1.1 “All this dies with us”

For much of the history of Peru’s highlands, local ‘representatives’ of the state have wielded considerable power with near impunity, at times in contravention of state policy and national interest. The provincias altas of Cuzco, Peru are a case in point: up until the 1970s, hacendados (owners of large landed estates) monopolized local and regional political power, controlling not only day-to-day matters, but also the implementation of state policy. They were the local beneficiaries of the region’s historic
isolation, both through their status as legitimate state authorities and through their circumvention of legitimate state authority.

By the second half of the 19th century, many Peruvians had begun to think of these highland *hacendados* as retrograde and counterproductive to the national agenda. Ralph Beals, the American journalist and political activist who traveled throughout Peru in the early 1930s, summarized this conviction in his assessment of these *terratenientes* (another common term for ‘large landowner’), “proud in their lost world”:  

They dwell in fine, but uncomfortable, colonial homes without modern conveniences, but with magnificent patios. Rarely visible, they make little outward impress, save to dominate politics and support the clergy. They do nothing to further progress; their surrounding estates merely strangle the town. And the blood in their veins has grown thin and pale, their knowledge antiquated. Feeling their importance waning, they grow more unbendingly dogmatic, cling bitterly to all the medieval fetiches which once had importance, but which today have little meaning—even in enforced isolation.”  

Beals goes on to write that “the backward Sierra *gamonales* form a pampered class arrogantly medieval. They are arbitrary, ignorant, bestialized. Few ever open a book; most are as fanatic and superstitious as the Indians they exploit.” Here we see a mixture of two of the most common themes in the popular conception of the highland *terratenientes*: the image of a decadent elite strangling the countryside from their crumbling estates and the idea of the gamonal as having been swallowed up by the indigenous peoples he exploits, adopting, in the process, the very vices so commonly attributed to native Americans throughout Spanish America—backwardness, dogmatism, fetishism, arbitrariness, ignorance, animalism, fanaticism, and superstitiousness. Standing at the nexus of two worlds, the national and the communal, the hacendado was seen as a feudal obstacle to progress and rational administration by liberal and leftist modernizers
and as a despot, exploiter, and *chupasangre* (bloodsucker) by the vastly numerically superior indigenous peasantry (*comuneros*) and those Marxists and indigenists that identified with them and their struggle. Caught between these forces, as well as the totality of demographic, technological, economic, and political developments that characterize the process of modernization, the fall of the ‘gamonal’ was massively overdetermined.

![Hacienda Qellu Qellu, abandoned after the Agrarian Reform.](image)

**Figure 1. Hacienda Qellu Qellu, abandoned after the Agrarian Reform.**

From the perspective of these scions of the landed elite of Chumbivilcas, a mountainous province in the isolated southwest of Peru’s Cuzco department where the majority of my fieldwork has been done, the second half of the 20th century could not
have been more momentous. They have seen their position at the heights of rural society
erode and then collapse. They watched their land taken from them during the military
regime of Juan Velasco Alvarado and their fortunes dwindle. They watched the national
consciousness and then state policy turn against them. They spent years in hiding or self-
imposed exile as Shining Path militants administered ‘justice’ to the friends and family
whom they had left behind in the countryside. They have been progressively excluded
from local political power—an exclusion that is now virtually total. They have watched a
way of life disappear; a way of life that had sinister aspects, but which was satisfying and
meaningful for them. It is, perhaps more than anything, the loss of this reservoir of
meaning that lends a cast of melancholy to my informants’ reflection on their past and
their current place in the world. A friend summed up the ambivalence that many of my
informants expressed when he told me one afternoon, after talking about ‘the way it was’
and the struggles that he and his family had waged against the tide of history: “All this
dies with us.” His tone in expressing this comment was neither one of pure regret nor
pure relief; as he went on to explain, “with my daughters, it’s different. They didn’t see
what we have seen, what we have lived. Not anymore. Everything’s changed.” For him,
there was sadness that his daughters could not have seen his own father’s hacienda when
it was thriving and productive, or seen the bullfights and fiestas in the yards of his
grandfather’s estate, but also comfort in the fact that they would not be scarred by the
bitter class and ethnic animosities that have characterized his own lifetime.

Nonetheless, there is little reason to pity my informants. The majority have
withdrawn from the campo (countryside) and started new lives in towns and cities as
attorneys, office workers, schoolteachers and shopkeepers. Even though, as a group, they
have experienced a drastic decline in their power, status, and wealth, they remain better off than the vast majority of the peasants (campesinos or comuneros) with whom they share their social environment. Most are still treated with respect and even deference by indigenous Chumbivilcanos and, to my mind, continue to feel a sense of efficacy and wellbeing. Very few explicitly express, or even exhibit signs of, bitterness, anger, or deep disappointment with the manner in which the nation has dealt with them. I was, in fact, continually surprised by my informants’ present- and future-oriented quality of thinking and feeling. For my informants, all history, like politics, is local; not just grassroots-local, but soap-opera-local. This dissertation is not, therefore, a lament for my informants’ loss, nor an apology for their ill-gotten gains and their sometimes devious attempts to hold on to them, but an analysis of the social, economic, and political processes that have displaced them and the means by which they have adapted to these processes.

1.2 Perpetuation of the “Unruly Order”

My second night in Santo Tomás, the provincial capital of Chumbivilcas, I left my rudimentary hotel room for a walk through its cold, windy streets. The town had perhaps 8 or 9 paved streets (though the number has grown each year since that first visit in 2004), all of which surrounded the Plaza de Armas. Stone casonas still ring the plaza, except for the northwest corner, which is guarded by the town’s towering colonial templo mayor (main church). After walking aimlessly through the town for a half hour or so, I was returning to the relative warmth of my room, when I heard the melancholy notes of a huayno coming from a half-buried tavern. Huayno music is the ubiquitous ‘soundtrack’ of the Andes. The name seems particularly apt to most English-speaking visitors, since
the songs sound, frankly, like whining. The form itself is of great antiquity. Ernesto Camassi Pizarro, drawing on doctoral work by Leandro Alviña, argues that the huayno gets its subject matter and plaintive tone from the *yaraví* (slow, melancholy love song), its faster and syncopated rhythm from the *qhashwa* (round or circle dance), and its name from the Quechua word for death (*wañuy*). The result is imploring, melodramatic, and somewhat strident, especially when sung by the typically high-pitched female voice, accompanied by synthesizers, and punctuated by laser sounds and voiced over exclamations of “Eso!” For *serranos*, however, it is the quintessential expression of their emotional life—a song of longing, nostalgia, and doomed love.

Figure 2. Santo Tomás from a nearby hilltop.
On that second night in Santo Tomás, I heard a style of huayno I had never heard before. I had spent the vast majority of my time in Peru amongst comuneros. Comuneros are enthusiastic consumers of recorded music. Adults and children alike listen to huayno tapes and compact discs all day, every day. In the evenings they gather in their one-bedroom houses to watch DVD videos of their favorite performers (if they have electricity) while they mend clothing, prepare food, or gossip. In my work in other provinces, however, I hadn’t seen comuneros personally play instrumental music for pleasure in their homes, bars, or restaurants (though there are many professional performers of comunero extraction). Coming out of this hole-in-the-wall was the sound of two guitars playing a song that was a mixture of huayno and the more Iberian música criolla (coastal, creole music). I climbed down into the three-tabled tavern and ordered beers for the only three patrons in the bar, two of whom were playing guitars with their eyes closed from intoxication. The oldest of the three was bearded (which in the Andes can be a mild way of emphasizing one’s Spanish ‘sangre,’ because indigenous men typically grow little facial hair). The bartender told me the bearded guitarist was a hacendado who split his time between town and his hacienda in the valley below. In the thirty minutes before his companions dragged him unconscious out of the bar, I was intrigued and baffled by a side of Peru that I had never encountered.

The next morning I left, with a good pair of boots and a 50-pound backpack, to do what I had come to do, which was climb up into the high puna to find a suitable community of alpaca pastoralists with the goal of studying their changing way of life. I spent a week up to my ankles in unseasonable drifts of snow, eating unseasoned boiled potatoes, helping to pasture sheep and alpaca, and benefiting from the extraordinary
hospitality of Quechua herders, who shared their meager resources unstintingly with me. Andean pastoralists spend much of the year on isolated family estancias (ranches), far from their villages and ‘neighboring’ families, pasturing their herds of quizzical alpaca. As I walked from estancia to estancia, I was burnt by the sun, frozen by the cold, exhausted by the altitude and topography, and driven nearly mad by the stark loneliness of the landscape. I continually saw signs of the past. One herder’s father-in-law had purchased the property he now pastured from the government after Juan Velasco’s land reforms. In the valleys, I passed the ruins of old villages and the crumbling facades and cloisters of haciendas and their chapels. I asked one herder if Shining Path militants had come through in the 1980s. He said that they had, and that they had been good, because they stopped “el abigeato” (cattle rustling) and “la bigamia” (bigamy), which seemed to me an idiosyncratic way of understanding a Maoist insurgency. Another asked me if it was true that the US was fighting a war in Iraq and, if we were losing, as he had heard we were, why we didn’t send Rambo in to win it. I began to see the barren countryside littered with history, crossed by movements, ideas, incursions, and connections that I had not anticipated.
Figure 3. The Province of Chumbivilcas and its Districts

This realization was, in part, what ultimately led me to focus on the province as a whole rather than a tiny pastoral community as initially intended. But I was also thinking about that night in the tavern—the mournful mestizo huayno, which had seemed like an elegy to a world and way of life that had all but disappeared. The mystery of that moment itself quickly dissipated (it’s hard for me to imagine now that there was anything mysterious about it at all), but I was left with a curiosity and the faintest suggestion of a direction of research: how could a way of life, with its own institutions, infrastructure,
and ideology, which had dominated the highlands for close to four hundred years, vanish in less than a generation? How could its manifestations have been effaced to the point of near invisibility?

Of course, years of fieldwork and investigation have forced me to revise those initial perceptions, as well as the problematic that emerged from them, but those basic questions remain vital to my ethnographic project. One of the primary goals in returning to the field was to understand what had happened to the society of the hacienda and the national political economy of which it was a basic element. More specifically, in subsequent research I found that the anthropologists who had worked in and around Chumbivilcas in the 1970s and early 1980s had found that the gamonal was still wielding political, economic, and social power, despite Juan Velasco Alvarado’s military takeover and ambitious Agrarian Reform. Lindqvist wrote in 1972 that, “locally, the power of the landowning oligarchy is still practically absolute, and its political influence on the national scene disproportionately great.”\(^\text{13}\) Glynn Custred, writing in 1973, discussed briefly the continuing domination by mestizos of economic and political life in Alccavitoria, Chumbivilcas.\(^\text{14}\) Benjamin Orlove argued that, based on “anecdotal information collected from informants in 1974, 1976, and 1979” in the neighboring province of Canas, the “elite, though no longer the unchallenged masters that they once were, have retained more of their land and can still control peasant labor with a fair degree of success.”\(^\text{15}\) All of the contributors to the 1994 collected volume *Unruly Order: Violence, Power and Cultural Identity in the High Provinces of Southern Peru* generally agreed that the power of the landed elite, though reduced and partially transformed, was largely intact. Deborah Poole wrote that “in this era after the agrarian reform and the
subsequent penetration of such state apparatuses as development agencies, banks, and schools into Chumbivilcas, what makes gamonal power hold is their ability to control the productive force of those technologies of power which shape the identities of Chumbivilcanos of all social classes.\textsuperscript{16} Christiane Paponnet-Cantat, in the same volume, argued that “whereas for a few years after reform the landowners were on the defensive, they have now regained their confidence and remain key figures in the economic and political operation of Capacmarca’s rural life.”\textsuperscript{17} Peter Gose goes so far as to argue that

\begin{quote}
Ironically, it was in their ostensible defeat by an alliance of commoners and the central state that the \textit{gamonales} achieved their most definitive victory: the consolidation of the tributary bond between community and state. That this tributary bond was renovated to bring civilization and order to the hinterlands was better still. Within less than a generation, notables transformed themselves from retrograde \textit{gamonales} to progressive schoolteachers and political authorities in the struggle for modernization. In the process, they not only held the material gains of the \textit{gamonal} past, they also secured the cultivation and distinction which had previously eluded them.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

The consensus amongst North American anthropologists of the era was thus that the gamonal had retained power in spite of the Agrarian Reform, both by holding onto estates and cynically co-opting changing national discourse and policy. Reconciling this consensus with my initial perception of a class and rural society closing quickly with the horizon has been a major goal of my fieldwork. Furthermore, this endurance \textit{and} transformation through time begs the question: who are these ‘gamonales?’ What is their nature as a group or distinctive population such that their transformation from “retrograde \textit{gamonales}” into “progressive schoolteachers and political authorities” could constitute a collective victory? Or such that they could a) remain a group and b) continue to “control the productive force of those technologies of power which shape the identities of
“Chumbivilcanos” (ignoring the infelicitous conjunction of control, production, force, technology, and power in a single phrase), despite radical changes in the organization of labor, sociality, and governance? Are the ‘*gamonales*’ a class? A caste? A racial or ethnic group? A political elite? The way in which one answers this question is intimately tied to one’s theoretical framework and assumptions, and fundamental to the larger arguments of the dissertation.

1.3 *Gamonal and vecino*

As I noted in passing, the term ‘gamonal,’ though common locally as well as in the ethnographic literature, is neither accurate nor value-neutral; it is a derogatory epithet rather than an analytical category. As I will discuss in later chapters, the historical use of the term is itself part of the process of vilification, marginalization, and debilitation of the group which it names. The term has been used for at least two hundred years to imply that a particular group of people—positioned at the nexus of the coastal-oriented ‘national’ society and rural, largely indigenous local societies—lacks legitimacy. It thus serves both to identify its object as a member of this intermediary group and to implicitly condemn the behavior of this group.

None of my informants would say, “I am a *gamonal,*” except perhaps for blackly comic effect, and I generally prefer not to either. Just as it would be inappropriate for anthropologists studying American businessmen to call their informants ‘capitalist fatcats,’ or evangelicals ‘bible-thumpers,’ or police officers ‘pigs,’ it would be inappropriate to call my informants ‘gamonales.’ It is likewise inapt. Because the intention of the term is to cast aspersions rather than comprehend, the social parameters
and the criteria of membership are ill-defined. As we shall see in the chapter 4, the term gamonal has historically been used to refer to a relatively broad array of social, economic, and political statuses, including large landowners, small property holders, merchants, traders, managers, attorneys, *prefectos* (prefects), *diputados* (congressmen), and military officials.

In several places, I use the terms ‘gentry’ or ‘landed elite,’ which are also, however, potentially misleading. Though land ownership was certainly a key element of traditional structures of domination in the countryside, I will show that it was not the *sine qua non* of provincial power, and that it is not the exclusive or even the primary criteria of inclusion in my study population. Likewise, it certainly stretches the word’s meaning to call some of my informants ‘elites,’ formerly or currently. Some of them are not and were never, in any sense, elites. Very few Chumbivilcanos were elites at the national level—though the fathers of several of my informants were *diputados* (representatives) in the National Congress—and virtually none of them are now. Many of them were provincial political and economic elites, or came from elite families, but are now decidedly non-elite. Whatever the case, ‘eliteness’ is not the defining feature of inclusion in the group I am trying to designate.

The challenge of analytically defining this group, and giving a term to the group so defined, is complicated by an idiosyncrasy of my research design: because, from the beginning, I chose to combine a historical and a contemporary ethnographic perspective, I have been forced to focus on a group that has changed rapidly enough that it is not exactly the same *kind* of group now that it was merely 40 years ago. Certain elements have remained constant, foremost among them a belief in racial and ethnic distinction.
from the local indigenous population, but other defining elements of their group have changed drastically. While it would be perfectly legitimate to define a group as those individuals descended from the members of another group, it would imply that the primary source of coherence of the group were this shared descent, rather than current traits or associations of its members. The ties that bind the group I study, however, are ongoing and evolving, and not isolated to their shared relationship with the past, though that relationship remains a key element of their identity, both individually and as a group.

Though it is uncommon in the anthropological or sociological literature on Peru, the term that I have adopted throughout the dissertation to refer to this group is ‘vecinos.’ The category of ‘vecino’ was brought to the New World from Spain, where it was a precursor to modern conceptions of citizenship, designating an individual’s residence in and membership of a particular town and implying his possession of the rights and exemptions accorded by that town’s fuero [royally recognized bylaws], often including rights to utilize communal land and to serve in council. It is similar in meaning, therefore, to the English word ‘burgher’ and the French ‘bourgeois.’ In the New World, it developed overtones of caste, as the title came to denote householding within and membership of the council (cabildo) of a Spanish-founded town, and in some cases rights to indigenous labor. It is in this sense—of householding in and participation in the political institutions of a Spanish town, rather than an indigenous community—that my informants use the term. A number of alternative terms would have been intelligible to locals and informed readers, among them ‘mestizo’ (mixed race), misti (Quechua for mestizo), ‘ladino’ (rural non-Indian, particular to Central America), ‘propietario’ (landowner), or ‘hacendado’ (hacienda owner). One of the few anthropologists to use
the term ‘vecino’ to describe this population was José María Arguedas in his
*Comunidades de España y del Perú*. The term appears to have been common enough,
and its meaning self-evident enough, that Arguedas did not feel the need to explain its use
to describe non-indigenous townsfolk in highland Peru. This also points to one of my
primary reasons for using the term ‘vecino’: it is the term my informants most often use
to designate themselves as a distinctive population. The term is important because it
emphasizes the fact that vecinos, as a community, conceive of themselves in terms of
their civic status and their membership in a national social and political community,
which they distinguish from the indigenous and institutionally distinct communities of
the countryside. In addition, it forces us to keep in mind that vecinos are a remnant of a
colonizing population and that the modern rural town is not just an ‘urban center,’ but
also itself the remnant of a colonial institution. Its primary disadvantage, on the other
hand, is that it does not have an explicit, self-evident meaning that other terms appear to
have. The question—“Who, or what, is a vecino?”—is not one that can be easily
answered. The term ‘vecino’ is, in a sense, a screen; it’s clear that, for vecinos, the term
serves to self-identify while avoiding explicit reference to the class and racial distinctions
that are nonetheless involved and implied. I also use the term as a screen; but rather than
use it to veil, I use it as a surface on which to foreground and thematize the distinctions
that underlie its normal use.

### 1.4 Defining the vecino

Any Peruvian (or for that matter, any Latin American) with a passing familiarity
with the countryside recognizes this group as a distinct social category. They have been
referred to in Peru as *mistis, llaqta taytakuna* (Que. town fathers), *hacendados, gamonales, propietarios, patrones* (bosses), *mestizos, notables, señores* (gentlemen), and *vecinos*, each of which implies slightly or substantially different interpretations of the nature of their association. Bobrow-Strain calls them ‘landowners’ in his work on southern Mexico,30 anthropologists working in Central America tend (following local practice) to call them ‘ladinos,’31 Chris Krupa calls them ‘mestizos’ in Ecuador,32 as does Robert Albro in Bolivia33 and Pierre van den Berghe in Peru.34 In Chumbivilcas in particular, Deborah Poole refers to them as ‘gamonales,’35 while Christiane Paponnet-Cantat calls them variously ‘patrones,’ ‘hacendados,’ and ‘gamonales.’36 While there are obviously regional and national variations, the basic features of the category are similar.

The list of terms above gives some indication of the possible ways of defining the *vecino* community: it possesses certain characteristics of a class (as the terms ‘landowner,’ ‘hacendado,’ ‘propietario,’ and ‘patrón’ suggest),37 an ethnic group or caste (as suggested by ‘ladino’ and ‘mestizo’),38 status (suggested by ‘notable’ and ‘señor’), race (the term ‘mestizo’ implies this as well), and political association (‘vecino’ suggests civic participation while ‘gamonal’ suggests violent and illegitimate exercise of power). Again, disambiguating these terms and their implications is a key element of my research project and its exposition in the dissertation; but it is important to give some initial, provisional coherence to this cacophony of qualities and characterizations.39

The most definitive fact about *vecinos* was, and is still, that they were not *comuneros*—that is, members of an indigenous peasant community (*comunidad campesina* or *indígena*). This doesn’t necessarily help us in narrowing the definition of the group, however, given that indigenous peoples have historically been
comprehensively subordinate to non-indigenous Peruvians and that, therefore, the
distinction involves an array of aligned or isomorphic status distinctions. Using the
trichotomy developed by Max Weber in his seminal article “Class, Party, Status,” we
can say that vecinos, prior to the 1970s, were economically, socially, and politically
dominant vis-à-vis the indigenous campesinado; that is, in sociological terms, they
maintained what Harold Kaufman called a state of “status equilibrium,” or what has
subsequently been referred to as “status crystallization” or “status congruence.”
Nonetheless, I will argue that, in the case of the vecino, the ethnic, or status proper,
component predominates and which gives coherence to the group through time; I thus
argue that vecinos form, fundamentally, an ‘ethnic group.’ I follow Weber’s definition of
ethnic groups as
groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because
of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of
memories of colonization and migration; conversely, it does not matter
whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic membership
differs from the kinship group precisely by being a presumed identity, not
a group with concrete social action, like the latter. In our sense, ethnic
membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation
of any kind, particularly in the political sphere.

The monopolies—political and economic—of the vecindario were clearly guaranteed by
their ethnic distinction from the subject population (a distinction solidified by perceived
racial difference). The vecindario was, in essence, a colonial and later republican
administrative and economic diaspora, whose cultural fluency (in language, custom,
world-view, et cetera) and social relations secured them access to state institutions and
authority and to national and international markets. Clearly, the landed estates of the
vecino community were essential elements of its hegemonic power over the countryside,
but I will demonstrate that control over land and the labor that made it productive was predicated on political power, which itself was delegated through essentially ethnic channels.\textsuperscript{47}

Ethnic divisions, I will argue, are still sharp, and omnipresent, but they neither are formal (in the sense of official recognition or endorsement) nor is their substance as distinct as it formerly was. Ethnicity no longer formally determines access to political power (though, in practice, the overwhelming numerical superiority of the campesinado, and their tendency to vote along ethnic lines, gives comuneros de facto control over provincial and district elected office, as well as locally-appointed positions). Likewise, ethnicity is no longer fundamental to the division of labor. There are still various ‘things’ that vecinos never do: utilize chaki-taqlla for sowing, belong to peasant communities (and therefore participate in collective or reciprocal labor), or herd sheep or alpaca. There are also things that vecinos rarely do and that are therefore perceived as being characteristic of the campesinado. For example, although there are vecinos who do control enterprises that produce alpaca and sheep fiber, the local industry is overwhelmingly the preserve of small comunero family productive units. Similarly, though some vecinas may know how to weave using a backstrap loom, I have never seen any of them actually doing so. Finally, there are activities that are virtually the preserve of vecinos, though they are technically accessible to comuneros or ‘gente de origen humilde’; the control of large-scale cattle-raising enterprises is more or less exclusive to vecinos (though there are several communities that have dissolved their communal status and privatized parcels, which has led to a certain degree of land concentration and
specialization). Likewise, the homes and businesses on the Plaza de Armas are virtually all owned and operated by vecinos.

Many of the most successful vecinos emigrated to Cuzco, Arequipa, Lima, Chile, Brazil, the United States, Spain, and beyond to become professors, attorneys, taxi or truck drivers, businessmen, researchers, and musicians. Others stayed behind and became shopkeepers, educators, and small holders. Very few retained large estates and even fewer reside on them. Customary forms of social and economic interaction are correspondingly rare; ‘in kind’ labor remuneration, for example, is largely confined to vestigial relationships between landowners and their former colonos (serf/sharecroppers). Even paid labor relations between landowners and comuneros are largely confined to the mutual opportunism between vecinos looking for cheap, short-term labor and young comunero couples trying to build self-sufficient family productive units.

Just as economic differentiation and dominance have drastically subsided, vecinos have almost completely lost control over local political institutions. Even more, they have lost the ability, paraphrasing Weber, to engage in any form of ‘associated goal-directed planning and activity’; in other words, the experience and idea of ‘vecindad’ (vecin-ity) has lost its ability to motivate and facilitate collective organization for the pursuit of common objectives. Outside of strictly cultural activities (for example, private parties or round dances during fiesta), I would be hard pressed to cite a single instance of collective organization above the level of the clique or extended family. This is not just because ethnic distinctions are not as motivational or socially significant as they once were: quite the opposite, for comuneros they have become vitally important, especially in the political sphere. Vecinos have, practically speaking, become atomized individuals, each
of whom has been forced to respond personally and familially to their altered circumstances.

Even the properly cultural characteristics, the minima of ethnic distinction, are losing their distinctiveness. Literacy, Spanish-proficiency, formal education, and national identity are no longer the exclusive domain of the vecinos. Likewise, whereas, in the past, vecinos marked their differences sartorially with suits, fedoras, and ranchero finery, while comuneros wore primarily bayeta (homespun), both now wear cheap suits or mass-produced Chinese-made street or athletic wear. Though vecinos still don’t play flute or drum, comuneros are perfectly comfortable—and many of them very proficient—playing stringed instruments like the guitar, mandolin, and charango, which were traditionally the preserve of vecinos. Though the dominance of vecinos in organized cultural institutions is still evident, the exclusive cultural bastions of the vecino—cock-fighting, the provision of ‘toros de lidia’ for bullfights, print culture (magazines, broadsheets, historiography, et cetera), and fine art (particularly music and poetry)—are beginning to ‘fall’ to the indigenous majority. Furthermore, with the erosion of cultural distinctions, the underlying weakness of racial differences becomes clearer (by exposing both the fallacy of racial determinism and the significant biological mestizaje on both sides of the social divide). As a result, the distinction between vecinos and comuneros may not even be immediately apparent to the outsider (though any native Peruvian would immediately perceive and anticipate it). In fact, I have spoken to visiting NGO workers who were baffled when I pointed out the distinction.

This loss of cultural distinction has exposed the genealogies that are the skeleton of group identification. The role of genealogical reckoning is particularly salient in my
informants’ delineation of the bounds of the vecino community. As the practical implications of group membership and the means of distinction decline, genealogy and stylized folklore increasingly bear the burden of bounding and defining the group. Rather than a group ‘in-itself’ or ‘for-itself,’ the vecino community has become a group ‘for-the-sake-of-being-a-group’; of individuals associated for the sake of association, highly aware of their supposed shared attributes and interests (in the sense of *aficiones*), consciously reflecting on their shared ‘Interest’ (in the sense of benefit and advantage) vis-à-vis the campesinado, but unable to organize in its pursuit. The vecino community is no longer a social edifice; today, it is all floor plan and façade.

This erosion of ethnic distinction is both a cause and the result of the historical changes discussed through this dissertation; economic and political privileges amplified practical ethno-cultural differences and perceived racial ones, and the largely successful state project of eliminating those privileges—itself spurring and spurred by popular political, economic, and cultural participation—has in turn impoverished the distinctions traditionally perceived as ethnic. The result has been the transformation of the feared gamonal, exercising social, economic, and political domination, into a diffuse community of individuals held together socially by historical memory, cultural affinity, and mere genealogy.

1.5  *Representing the past*

The ethnographer is always struggling to see into, and under, and beyond representations. Participant observation—‘being there’ and ‘seeing for oneself”—may be a weak means of conducting this effort, but it is nonetheless our strongest. Of course, the
fieldworker can only live through and participate in so many moments, or be in so many places; for everything else, he must record and interpret the representations of his informants and written sources (of course, even “being there” doesn’t completely free one from the mediation of representations—the researcher himself goes into the experience of participation burdened by representations, and walks out of it with only more representations). The men and women with whom I studied, like all men and women, are surrounded and penetrated by public representations. In Chumbivilcas, the concept of the ‘gamonal’ remains central to these representations.

Everyone in Chumbivilcas is familiar with the idea of *gamonalismo*. Although they were not the primary beneficiaries of Peru’s exploitation of the indigenous masses—that honor belongs to the coastal elites and Euro-American investors who stood at the apex of the political economic system—the vestiges of the old landowning class have the misfortune of being its living symbols. Most of my informants would agree that as a group, the vecinos of Chumbivilcas—themselves, their parents and grandparents, and their friends—were abusive to the *comuneros* of the province, though they invariably hedge a bit: their parents ‘were fair, if sometimes harsh,’ ‘there was oppression, but not exploitation,’ ‘it was bad, but never *that* bad because the Indians of Chumbivilcas are so fierce,’ and so on. Indigenous political leaders frequently use the gamonal as a bogeyman, threatening crowds with a return to the ‘era of the gamonal’ if they vote for this or that competing party. At one point in the 2006 election, a radio interviewer asked the presidential candidate Lourdes Flores Nano, “There are people who say you support the gamonales. What do you say to that accusation?” She took the opportunity to emphasize her absolute rejection of the now quasi-mythical gamonal and gamonalismo.
The past, or rather representations of the past, is thus a palpable force in my informants’ lives in a way that was initially surprising and even unsettling for me, raised as I was in a strongly forward-thinking environment. Furthermore, the relative fixity and simplicity of rural social structure means that my vecino informants are almost all more or less ‘known’ to the overwhelmingly comunero populace. Some of my informants were, in fact, recognized by name and family throughout the province. Within their natal district, not only were their identities known, but also their personal and familial exploits (abolengo). Not only does the public continually superimpose this past on them, but they themselves are constantly, even obsessively, reviewing, reframing, and re-presenting this past to themselves and their peers.

When talking about the past, Chumbivilcanos are perfectly capable of differentiating basic historical epochs and key events. Even amongst educated professionals, however, this knowledge isn’t particularly deep; historical knowledge is probably similar in Peru as in the population at large in the United States. Just as in the US, where most people can identify major events like the American Revolution, the Civil War, and the Great Depression, as well as some of the persons and ideas associated with them, my informants (to the extent that I can generalize), can identify major events like the Conquista, the revolution of Bolívar and San Martín, and the Chilean invasion. The culture itself is nevertheless very much oral rather than written. Even literate Chumbivilcanos generally do not read on a daily basis. The average family has few books and even educators do not read outside of work hours. Thus, it is not surprising that the finer grain of Peru’s social and political history rarely enters into folk historical accounts (again, this strikes me as a universal rather than local phenomenon). Vecinos normally
divide historical time into “ahora” and “aquellos tiempos,” with the Reforma Agraria as the historical boundary.

When asked about the past, or when reflecting spontaneously on it, my informants focus on two imposing phenomenon to explain what happened to them individually and as a class: the Agrarian Reform of Velasco Alvarado and the armed revolution of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, PCP-SL). Of the Agrarian Reform, the most common refrain is that it has “tergiversó” or “distorsionó” (twisted around or distorted everything). In other words, that it changed the local and national representation of the vecino community and prejudicially altered social relations between them and the campesinado. The period of Sendero activity is referred to as “el tiempo de la violencia” or simply “el tiempo del terrorismo” (the time of violence or of terrorism). For many vecinos, the Shining Path era was a time in which their long-standing fear of the campesinado was fully realized, or justified, in the flesh. Many fled, others slept in caves or safe houses. Those who stayed in the campo worked their fields with rifles slung over their shoulders.

While these two periods or processes were clearly important, this account of the past didn’t sit well with me. Not only had anthropologists in the area found that the power of the vecino had, to various extents, survived the Agrarian Reform and the Shining Path, as I noted earlier, but my own sense of the contemporary political economy did not jibe with these two periods being determinative. I began to realize that there were inherent limitations in my informants’ recollection and representation of their past. In particular, I perceived a tendency to systematically overrepresent certain kinds of phenomena and to ‘forget’ or ignore others.
1.6 Violent memories

Even the informants most deeply affected by particular historical events or processes live in the present and future. They can reflect on the past, but I was amazed by their ability to move on and forward. Perhaps not even by the ability so much as the inevitability. The last 50 years have altered their world entirely, and yet many spoke about the events in an amused, anecdotal way, recalling memories that they had almost forgotten from lack of use and reflection. Even relatively reliable informants sometimes said frankly absurd, patently counterfactual things. These distortions, however, have frequently been more revealing and more useful to me than veridical confessions. Jan Vansina reminds us that “oral tradition is not only a raw source. It is a hypothesis, similar to the historian’s own interpretation of the past.” The assumptions, structure, and style of my informants’ “hypotheses” have provided invaluable sociological insights. The fact that certain kinds of historical ‘things’ seem much more salient—more ‘charismatic’—to my informants is an excellent example of this. Likewise, my sense that when there is not something salient about a particular process or series of events, my informants seemed to represent it in distorted ways to heighten its salience or comprehensibility. My informants generally have difficulty representing, to themselves and others, processes that are not forceful. I mean this in a literal sense: my informants represented violence, coercion, force, exception, and command with enthusiasm and fluency. In fact, I came to understand that, in many cases, they represented processes that were not forceful or exceptional through the use of proxy events that were.
A couple of examples will clarify what I mean. One comunero political leader, talking about the struggles surrounding the Agrarian Reform, argued that a neighboring hacendado had never had clear title to his land and that the president of his comunidad must have colluded with the hacendado to “make the documents appear.” He knew clearly that there were “documents” that adjudicators had determined were authentic because his community had fought them in court. Furthermore, he would certainly not have made his accusation in public because he knew that there was a broad consensus, amongst comuneros and vecinos alike, that the particular property was lawfully acquired. So why would he claim that there had originally been no such documents? Of course, he may simply have been engaging in the kind of petty rumor-mongering that takes place everywhere on earth. But, more importantly, I think he was trying to represent a more fundamental truth about the illegitimacy of the hacienda regime. He was essentially questioning the validity of a whole host of other technically legal but ethically questionable practices, including the original theft by the viceroy of native lands and the acquisition of prime riverfront land from depopulated and displaced peasant communities. Since he was not prepared or inclined to challenge the ethical validity of the totality of the colonial and post-colonial regime, it may have seemed to him that the best way to represent the illegitimacy of the claim was to simply argue that it was a forgery.

In my assessment, this ‘representation by proxy’—in which people misrepresent the facts or events in order to express a personal, ‘higher truth’—happens frequently in fieldwork. This informant could have said, “Well, he had the documents, but, come on, the whole titling and juridical system back then was a sham, and what’s more, it was all
our land before the Spaniards came and stole it.” This would certainly be consistent with local ideology (and, for that matter, fact). However, this response would not have been an acceptable argument in the legal realm in which the original conflict had been fought and in which the terms of his dispute had been established. Furthermore, an argument about the colonial regime in its abstract totality is not one that is fluently elaborated or manipulated by most Chumbivilcanos. So, in this case, a particular instance of supposed malfeasance functioned as an accessible proxy for the long-standing injustice of the political economic totality.\textsuperscript{54}

Another informant claimed that a local terrateniente had kept a harem of indigenous women locked in a room of his house, of which he availed himself whenever the desire struck him. Now, the abuses of the seigniorial system, wherever on earth any of its many versions have reigned, are varied and grievous. But the idea of a hacendado of the 1960s keeping a locked room of stolen women is patently absurd. A whole series of norms, both on the vecino and comunero side of the social divide, would have prevented such an abuse. The forcible acquisition of a female domestic partner (\textit{warmisuwa}) was traditionally a tolerated, if not entirely acceptable, form of behavior within the comunero community, which some vecinos seem to have informally adopted in their relations with both vecinas and comuneras.\textsuperscript{55} Nonetheless, harem-keeping was unheard of. From a social perspective, the maintaining of a mistress was, and to some extent is still, an acceptable behavior, tolerated angrily even by wives so long as it was unseen and did not unduly impact the family finances. But it is simply impossible that comuneros, as well as vecino wives, peers, siblings, and offspring would tolerate such a flagrant violation of social norms as the imprisonment of a harem. Nevertheless, the clearly exaggerated and
distorted representation of events and actions serves to accurately express the seriousness and painfulness of the everyday structures and processes of domination and abuse that would otherwise go unrepresented.

Andean campesinos have experienced brutal extermination, exploitation, and expropriation by Europeans and their descendents for nearly five hundred years. More recently they have been subjected to murder, rape, theft, forced labor, and degradation by the rural landed elite. On a more quotidian level, the peasantry was locked in grinding, desperate poverty and permanent self-abasing subservience. This was the result of fear of expulsion from customary property or loss of customary privileges, linguistic and cultural handicaps, ingrained tradition or habit, inequality before the law, and, ultimately, the avoidance of reprisals and abuse. The more flagrant, punctuated forms of violence—whether veridical, embellished, or invented—are used to express the daily, inexpressible reality of depreciation and domination.

In the case of the ‘harem,’ it is absolutely true, as I will discuss in chapter 8, that hacendados and their children took substantial sexual liberties with young campesinas, particularly house servants and colonas. The most attractive comuneras in a region were likely to be seduced or raped by vecino men. It was not, however, force and violence alone that compelled comuneras to enter into sexual relations with vecinos. Although it’s naturally difficult or impossible for a white American male researcher to discuss with middle aged and elderly comuneras the nature of their sexual relations and their psychological significance, vecinos are far more comfortable talking about their experience. They are universally aware that, on some level, the “cholita” with whom they or their male relatives were involved got a raw deal in comparison to what they or a
mestiza sexual partner could hope to receive. That said, the list of benefits that vecinos fondly report giving their cholitas include jewelry, clothing, foodstuffs, continued and potentially enhanced employment, livestock, customary rights to pastures and fields, ongoing financial support, affection, romantic love, publicly recognized cohabitation, and even, in the rarest of circumstances, marriage. These benefits were not extended to all or even most comunera lovers, but there’s no question that these inducements frequently played a decisive role in exploitative sexual arrangements, ideology, and behavior. Even rape, kidnapping, and other forms of sexual violence were, perversely, frequently infused with and complicated by these factors; conversely, each of these ‘inducements’ was backed by the implied or explicit threat of sexual violence, and the set of elements that entered into any particular mestizo-comunera relationship often included some form of sexual violence or punishment for non-compliance. Likewise, although many mestizos who report having extra- or pre-marital relations with comuneras claim to have supported the resulting offspring, it has traditionally been, and continues to be, very rare to recognize them or give them the full benefit of their paternity. I would argue that the ‘harem’ accusation serves as an especially forceful proxy for this complex and largely taboo mix of sexual and power politics.

My sense from having spoken to hundreds of comuneros and vecinos is that the deepest abuses of the hacienda system were not spectacular, but structural. Structural inequalities and inequities, in the abstract, are difficult to recollect specifically and represent. One does not tell one’s children or grandchildren, or ethnographers for that matter, about inequalities in the labor market or access to land, or about the daily toll of humiliation and forced deferential behavior or differential access to material or cultural
resources. Comuneros therefore represent abuse in its most flagrant, and to some extent embellished, aspects, not because they are trying to misrepresent the truth, but because they are attempting to represent a truth that is difficult to quantify and express. The same is true of vecinos in their representation of their own, more modest, trials and tribulations.

1.7 Charismatic histories

I argue that the Agrarian Reform of Velasco Alvarado and the incursions of the Shining Path are just such ‘charismatic’ historical phenomena. My informants remain captivated by the forcefulness of these two processes and haunted by the fear they inspired. One of my informants recalled himself and his cousin holding off an invading group of comuneros with rifle fire. Another remembered his father promising that the only way the Reform agency would remove him from his hacienda would be in a coffin. It was a time of frantic maneuvering against the backdrop of a deeply resentful, hostile, and vastly numerically superior indigenous population. In many ways, the era of Sendero incursions was even more terrifying. Although Sendero Luminoso actually only killed perhaps a couple of dozen Chumbivilcanos, each incursion was magnified in the public imagination. Some of my informants can laugh now about just how terrified they were at the time, but Sendero incursions hit mestizo society in Chumbivilcas like successive shockwaves. Sendero columns were putting cattle rustlers and gamonales on trial in impromptu ‘peoples’ courts’ and killing, mutilating, and decapitating those found guilty of abuses against comuneros.
I had difficulty, however, squaring the prominent place that these two phenomena have in my informants’ conception of the past with both the ethnography of the region and the contemporary configuration of power and authority in the province. As previously noted, ethnographers working in the region found that gamonales had largely retained their positions and relationships of domination and abuse despite the Agrarian Reform and Sendero Luminoso. Even more difficult to account for was the fact that the decline of the power of the gamonal and the rise of that of the comunero seemed to be fundamentally political rather than economic. Individual comuneros still do not own large swaths of agricultural land or restaurants on the Plaza de Armas (though this is becoming a possibility). Their power is solidly vested in the control of local political office and the spoils that spill out from municipal government. It was this gap between the purported fact that ‘gamonales’ had retained power well into the 1980s and their current marginalization from, in particular, political power that forced me back to observation of the current political economy and from there to the national political developments of the last several decades.

Ultimately, I came to understand that as a researcher I could only grasp the importance of the various historical processes by understanding the present social configuration and scanning the historical past for clues to its origins. The conclusion to which this change in approach led me was that, although the Agrarian Reform and Sendero Luminoso had important effects on the countryside, many of which were indirect, the phenomena that have fundamentally changed provincial society were the extension of the franchise to illiterates in the 1979 Constitution and the fiscal decentralization of the post-Fujimori era (the turbulent presidency of Alberto Fujimori
extended from 1990 to 2000). I realized that, although none of my informants expressly attributed the altered circumstances in which they found themselves to the extension of the vote to illiterates (many of my informants could not recall when or under what circumstances the franchise had been extended) or fiscal decentralization, the political economic structure of the province could not speak more eloquently to the impact these two political developments have had.

Initially, I shared my informants’ lack of interest in the specifics of electoral policy and the organization of municipal governance. I hadn’t previously been sufficiently concerned with the actual local functioning of the state. Although activists fought long and hard to include analfabetos in the 1979 Constitution’s definition of the franchise and continue to fight for the progressive decentralization of governance, these policies do not exert a powerful, charismatic pull on the imaginations and memories of my informants. As I said more generally of ‘charismatic proxies,’ my informants tend to account for their changed experiences by augmenting the importance of the more flagrant or flamboyant events of the Agrarian Reform and the Shining Path insurgency, and virtually forgetting many of the more routine, procedural, or secular changes. This is not to say that they are not fully involved in the day-to-day arguments around the capacity or effectiveness of contemporary municipal government, but that they see, for example, even the supposed shortcomings of comunero political representatives in terms of the ideological conviction and supposedly false sense of their own capacity instilled in them by the Velasco regime and Shining Path militants.

More generally, I argue that neither of these phenomena would have been, in and of itself, sufficient to dethrone the terratenientes of Chumbivilcas, but that they interacted
in such a way that made the marginalization of the vecino community all but inevitable. Decentralization would likely have increased the power of the traditional elite, as regionalization (de facto or de jure) had done throughout the several hundred previous years. Likewise, expansion of the franchise would not have appreciably changed the candidate pool, since prior to fiscal decentralization the municipality was essentially unfunded, which made municipal authority only useful to those who already had the resources and connections to acquire and steer the political apparatus. Together, however, fiscal decentralization and the extension of the franchise to illiterate citizens have produced an epochal shift in the social life of the campo.

1.8 Recipients of policy

Anthropologists work in a post-synchronic era, in which it is difficult to understand how ethnographers could have constructed timeless moments, or timeless annual cycles, from the process of fieldwork. Informants themselves live in a present that is always branching into the future and rooted in complex, ambivalent pasts. But it is equally perplexing that ethnographers could have treated their fieldsites as though they were spatially isolated and self-contained. Not only must we admit that the accelerating movement of men and women, capital, and ideas has invalidated the study of communities in isolation, but also that the isolation, even in anthropology’s infancy, was never sufficiently complete to justify treating ethnographic fieldsites methodologically as though they were isolates.

It will be noted that the four major elements discussed above—the Agrarian Reform, the Shining Path’s twelve-year armed struggle, the 1979 Constitution’s
extension of the franchise to illiterate adults, and the ongoing process of fiscal and administrative decentralization—share something essential: they all originate externally and at levels of political decision-making high above the province in which I did my fieldwork. Although my informants, vecino and comunero alike, have responded in dynamic, innovative ways to these policies and developments, in each of the cases they have been reactive or responsive rather than determinative. Even at the height of its power, the provincial vecino community was never a critical or decisive element in the formulation of national policy. Outside of several provincial legislators, Chumbivilcanos have reacted and adapted to, rather than elaborated, the laws that govern them. This adaptation often involved the selective enforcement of laws and policies that served their interests and the willful failure to implement those that did not. With the expansion and consolidation of the central state beginning in the 1920s, these forms of autonomy and ‘creative interpretation’ became progressively restricted. Furthermore, though vecinos had rarely been true protagonists of the national narrative, by the 1960s they had become its vaudevillian villains. One of the challenges of my research has been to balance the localized nature of ethnographic fieldwork with the external sources of political and economic developments. An ethnographer at the periphery can’t help but be plagued and puzzled by determinations that originate outside of and escape the local frame.

I have attempted throughout to fight the conceptual temptation to locate the locus of control within my fieldsite rather than predominantly in external institutions and processes. While I have focused, especially in the second half of the dissertation, on my informants’ daily struggles to defend and augment their economic, political, social, and cultural positions, this attention should not cause us to lose track of the fact that the
storms that have buffeted them over the last half century were not microclimatic, but national, continental, and even global. My informants are painfully aware of and bewildered by this fact. In Aaron Bobrow-Strain’s book on an analogous class of highland ranchers in southern Mexico struggling against land invasion and reform, one landowner pithily sums up my informants’ own feelings “‘We didn’t defend our land because the conflict was something bigger than us.’”63 It is a measure of the force of this political economic avalanche that has flattened the fortunes of the terratenientes of Chumbivilcas that they have each individually fallen back on their own private and familial efforts to survive and flourish. In fact, the single most common response by vecinos has been flight from the province. They are entirely incapable of formulating a collective project. As I will discuss in chapter 10, it is unclear, in fact, what collectivity is left in-which and for-which a project could be formulated.

This may appear to be a highly deterministic account of provincial history; the structural limitations that have constrained vecinos in this epochal shift have been overwhelming and brute, and the scope for voluntarism accordingly narrow. While acknowledging the sometimes heroic struggles for land, representation, and respect that comuneros have waged, and the reactionary attempts of vecinos to contest and retard progress, Chumbivilcas is nonetheless isolated and under-populated enough that it has effectively had zero aggregate impact on national politics and international economic regimes. The Agrarian Reform, the Shining Path, the 1979 Constitution, and fiscal decentralization—all of these may have been fueled, in some infinitesimally small way, by the anger and hope of Chumbivilcanos, but these provincianos ultimately had virtually
no part in determining the nature and general consequences of these national-level processes and events.

To the extent that ethnographers have focused on historical change, they have frequently trained their attention on so-called ‘turning-points,’ or what Antonio Gramsci has called “the terrain of the conjunctural,”[^64] which tends to produce voluntaristic accounts of historical processes. There are certainly historical moments in which things happen very quickly, in which long-standing disagreements boil over into open conflict, in which festering contradictions peak in paroxysms of revolutionary or reactionary violence, or in which ‘wars of position’ shift suddenly into fast-paced ‘wars of maneuver.’[^65] Likewise, the maneuvering and frequently the murdering that take place in these conjunctures may at times be historically decisive. Nonetheless, everything I have witnessed and learned tells me that the vast majority of work that goes into making history is done in the supposedly ‘quiet’ years that build up to and set the stage for these ‘moments.’

I am not a historian and this dissertation is not ultimately historiographical. I did not begin this project with an interest in land policy, Maoist insurgency, suffrage, or neoliberal decentralization. I have also been loathe to compound the ethnographic challenge of trying to isolate a fleeting ethnographic present or a locale that is a fragment of a larger whole, with the historiographical one of distinguishing and appraising the countless threads that connect countless causes to countless effects. I nonetheless believe that it is impossible to understand the people and places that do interest me without national and historical context. For me, there has been a dialectical process of research, in which ethnographic fieldwork has helped me to understand the past, and this...
understanding of the past, in turn, has served to further illuminate the present. Like James Holston, I “use history to make an argument about the present.” The ultimate objective is ethnographic: my project has always been to understand how the vecinos of Chumbivilcas live and make sense of their lives in the midst of epochal change that has threatened and compromised their livelihood, their status, and their identity. This dissertation is unapologetically about a people and a place at a particular moment in time. I have attempted, through historical and political economic contextualization, to remedy some of the inherent weaknesses of ethnography, without sacrificing the social and cultural depth that are its strengths.

1.9 Multiplicity of discourses

In the course of this dissertation, I will explore contemporary Chumbivilcano class, ethnic, and racial ideas and practices. I constantly reiterated to informants that ethnic relations were a key element of my research project. Nonetheless, many of my informants would not be happy to see their words and behaviors represented in such a stark light. I have tried however to detail the multiplicity of discourses and attitudes that is available to and expressed by informants. I think it is fair to say that no informant, vecino or comunero, failed to express and embody elements of this multiplicity, complete with contradictions, complications, and confusions. I understand this multiplicity, in fact, to be a human universal. This multiplicity is certainly not just an analytical construct: my informants are aware that they are drawing from multiple, often conflicting discourses. As one of my key informants told me after we had sat drinking chicha with a group of campesinos ‘techando’ (replacing the straw of a roof): “Even though I’m racist, I could
stay here all day with these simple folk. Dancing, learning how they think, how they are.” He did not say this in a condescending manner, but with a feeling bordering on yearning. Like many of my informants, he exuded a genuine sense of comfort and well-being when sitting and talking with campesinos (and especially campesinas) in the fields.

Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that ethnicity/race is a significant, ever-present factor in highland social relations. In fact, despite a half-century of radical, sweeping change, it remains perhaps the most ubiquitous social fact in the Andean world. Certainly, it is at the forefront of daily life for vecinos. Nonetheless, it is not something they would publicly acknowledge as essential. There are a wide variety of reasons why vecinos would not publicly verbalize their preoccupation with race/ethnicity. Vecinos represent a small minority in the highland provinces. In the barest pragmatic sense, they are wise to downplay their differences with the demographically, politically, and economically (in aggregate terms) dominant majority. In addition, they are not, in the eyes of comuneros and the nation at large, a morally neutral minority. To publicly draw attention to one’s mestizaje, nivel (social level or caliber), or linaje (lineage or pedigree) in Chumbivilcas is to recall the abuse that one or one’s family once inflicted upon the now dominant campesinado. Although no vecino I spoke to denied that pre-Reform social relations were frequently harsh and demeaning for peones (farmhands), most former hacienda-owning families passionately contest the extent of the abuse inflicted by the hacienda system. Nonetheless, there is a consensus among comuneros, the nation at large, and most informed outside observers that the abusiveness and oppressiveness of the gamonal is an incontrovertible historical fact.
Anti-indigenous prejudice now comes at a serious cost for vecinos (albeit far milder and more subtle than its toll on comuneros). Unlike the true national elites who are walled off from the masses in up-scale neighborhoods in Lima and Arequipa, vecinos interact intimately, constantly, and predominantly with indigenous people. While vecinos socialize preferentially with other vecinos, they live in an environment in which they are a small minority, with inadequate political, social, and economic resources to create spaces of exclusivity (outside of their homes). Vecinos will, when possible and appropriate, interact exclusively with each other. Intimate social occasions—birthday parties, Catholic sponsorship rituals, get-togethers with visiting family or friends, *qhashwa* (round dance) or other fiesta pre-parties—almost always exclude comuneros, except as cooks, servers, or other support staff. This isolation is not, of course, perfect, and there are frequent exceptions, but in each case of exception there is a particular logic to the inclusion. Where music is being played, for example, *comuneros* may be invited to family celebrations to round out the band. Likewise, when comuneros and vecinos belong to the same formal institutions, which is increasingly common, they will happily and comfortably attend meetings and celebrate institutional anniversaries together. But the feelings and ideologies that run against this cooperation are deep and can be exceedingly harsh. When mestizos speak amongst themselves, to their friends, spouses, or children, it becomes clear that old discourses about the “*indio*” (a now derogatory term for an indigenous person) have survived its disappearance from public discourse. I devote two chapters to describing and analyzing these survivals and new arrivals in ethno-racial ideology and practice in Chumbivilcas. Though my informants are not, in this process, great innovators or promulgators of ideology, they and their families have been the local
interpreters and enforcers of many of the most reactionary elements of this ideological mix. They have also been the major losers in the inexorable advance of egalitarian ideologies, which gives a unique intensity and turmoil to their attempts to synthesize the discursive multiplicity.

1.10 Studying elites

For non-anthropologists and for anthropologists who work outside of Latin America, the fact that this study concerns vecinos—or, in the more common disciplinary terms, ‘mestizos’ or ‘ladinos’—will not occasion surprise or controversy. For anthropologists working in Latin America, however, the fact that I have chosen to study mestizos, and relatively affluent mestizos at that, is proof either of bad taste or right-wing sympathies. There is a barely-concealed animosity toward highland mestizos in much of the ethnographic work on Latin America. Jorge González Ponciano writes that

In Guatemala, just as in other countries of Latin America, many European and American anthropologists tend to promote anti-ladino or anti-mestizo sentiment in the name of the defense of the cultural rights of the indigenous or afromestizo populations, without noticing that the ladino-phobia and mestizo-phobia only distorts the role that mestizos of distinct social classes and cultures have played in the process of constructing the nation-state.67

But this ‘mestizo-phobia’ is only a particular instance of a more general phenomenon in the discipline. Anthropologists, from the inception of the discipline, have tended to work in tribal or peasant societies. As Laura Nader has noted, “If we look at the literature based on field work in the United States, we find a relatively abundant literature on the poor, the ethnic minority, the disadvantaged; there is comparatively little field research on the middle class and very little firsthand work on the upper classes.”68 This focus is not
unique, of course, to fieldwork in the United States: anthropologists working in Peru have virtually universally chosen to work with subordinated ethnic groups, primarily small tribal groups in the Amazon and Quechua or Aymara peasants in the Andes and, increasingly, ethnically marked urban migrants in peripheral pueblos jóvenes (shanty towns).

This inattention to non-indigenous Peruvians is especially marked in the nearly complete absence of ethnographic studies of the hacienda sector while it was still thriving. As in the Mexican literature discussed by Aaron Bobrow-Strain, “landowners act as foils: interesting only insofar as they shape the contours of indigenous communities and provide the historic target for indígenas’ resistance.” The vast majority of Andean ethnographies, where they treat haciendas at all, treat them as malignant entities lurking just off-stage. This indifference is characteristic not only of North American and European anthropologists, but Peru’s national anthropology as well. Frank Tannenbaum noted in 1962 that,

A curious phenomenon in Latin American intellectual life is that the hacienda, which is so all-embracing in its influence is, except in an occasional novel, never written about or seriously studied. It is, or was, so much part of the environment that the intellectuals, who were mostly children of the hacienda, were no more conscious of its existence than we are of the air we breathe. When the Latin American sociologist looked for something to write about, he worried about the unemployed in London, or about the new sugar and banana plantations in foreign lands. But the hacienda, which had a determining effect on the country’s culture, was something he was hardly aware of.

While it is certainly true that the top tier of Peruvian anthropologists is overwhelmingly criollo or mestizo, excessive familiarity is hardly the primary reason for the disciplinary
inattention to the hacienda and more specifically to the landed elites that controlled them. To my mind, the major boundaries are practical and ideological.

1.11 *Barriers to entry*

There are significant objective boundaries to investigation of non-subalterns. It’s commonly difficult to gain access to high status individuals and communities. As Nader notes, “The most usual obstacle is phrased in terms of access. The powerful are out of reach on a number of different planes: they don’t want to be studied; it is dangerous to study the powerful; they are busy people; they are not all in one place, and so on.”

Much of their socialization takes place in milieus that are restricted by class, occupation, or formal membership. The members of the upper and middle classes typically spend large amounts of their time in private spaces, into which they are averse to allowing strangers.

Elites have public power, position and reputation that may be negatively affected by the publication of ethnographic data. This may be true to a more modest degree with poorer informants, but anthropologists can rarely offer elites sufficient incentives to offset the risks of ethnographic participation. Anthropologists must rely on the ongoing welcome of host communities; especially in the case of hacienda owners, given their political and social situation, elites could not be expected to show enthusiasm for the long-term residence and invasive questioning of potentially (and typically) critical anthropologists amongst their families and dependent workers. Elites frequently have the ability to successfully resist ethnographic research into their community both by
manipulating public opinion and pulling strings with the local bureaucracy to formally restrict research.

Finally, in contrast to traditional ethnographic subjects, elites are often drawn from classes, races, and families that are perceived to be superior to those of the ethnographic investigator. Individuals who are elite vis-à-vis the researcher are naturally unwilling to open their homes and lives to scrutiny. Teresa Caldeira has written, of the “silence of upper-class people,” that “refusals increased as I talked with people farther up the social hierarchy, who felt confident in saying no to a middle-class person. Interviews with upper-class people were hard to obtain and required introductions.” The status and modest wealth of an American researcher opens many doors in indigenous and peasant communities; they are likely to be of meager benefit in opening the doors of political and economic elites. The average scruffy, bespectacled anthropologist is more likely to be an object of mild derision and discomfort amongst society’s ‘movers and shakers.’

1.12 Ideological disinclination

The ideological barriers to the study of elites are probably even more profound than the practical ones. Self-selection is essentially the sole source of recruitment in anthropology, producing a notable homogeneity of ideological commitments and frames of reference. Anthropologists fall overwhelmingly to the left of the political spectrum. Whatever the sources of this overwhelming political bias, it cannot but affect the choices of research subjects and the perspectives taken in the course of research. Few indeed are the anthropologists who can talk or write academically about neoliberalism, colonialism, racism, opportunity, equality, class, or gender in a way that is morally or politically
neutral. These predispositions, along with the significant boundaries to entry into elite milieus, heavily influence the anthropologist’s commitment to research in communities of subalterns, frequently in the developing world. In addition to the ideological self-selection in entry into the field and choice of research questions, field experience in politically, socially, racially and/or economically subordinate communities only reinforces initial predispositions, and subsequent work is even less likely to focus on communities and individuals whom they find abusive, immoral, or ignorant. The influence of advisors and committee members, as well as the overall disciplinary environment and its formal apparatus of associations, societies, and journals, serves to accentuate and overdetermine ideological conformity.

There is not space here to discuss all the reasons that self-selection and the disciplinary environment breed the propensity of anthropologists to study the have-nots rather than the haves. Nader argues that “anthropologists value studying what they like and liking what they study and, in general, we prefer the underdog.” There is certainly a confluence between the discipline’s origins and the romanticism that has attracted so many students to the discipline. Ethnologists were naturally interested in the variety of human institutions and the practice of ethnography emerged out of the ethnologist’s need to acquire more detailed and accurate data than the reports of travelers, merchants, and government representatives could provide. The resulting demand for students willing and able to travel to distant and exotic lands was a siren-call to romantic young academics. From this beginning it is easy to see why the discipline would attract and produce curious, adventurous researchers with deep sympathies for the people with whom they lived and learned. Anthropology’s focus on variation and difference has also meant that
ethnographers have been predominantly concerned with and attracted by ‘traditional’
highland culture and society, and communities of resident hacienda laborers were
naturally perceived to be ‘deficient’ in both.75 It seems to me that Nader is fundamentally
right, particularly with regard to the discipline’s ignorance of hacendados and other rural
elite: anthropologists frankly find the landed gentry—who admittedly can be arrogant,
prepossessing, and generally hard to love—disagreeable and imminently worthy of
avoidance.

Furthermore, as Bobrow-Strain notes, “while studies of contemporary landed
elites are rare, research that attempts to interpret the everyday lived experiences of
landowners—of actors typically constructed as the bad guys—is even rarer”; rural
landowners are thus understudied not only because they are elite, but because they are
‘villains.’ Nonetheless, fieldwork has convinced me that the study of the quotidian
perpetrators of racist and reactionary ideology is vitally important in understanding and
ameliorating the nature of racism.

As a result of these barriers and aversions, ethnographic research is adept at
investigating the ways in which subalterns understand, accept, and challenge denigrating
stereotypes or systematic bias, but has little to say, beyond assumption and inference,
about the ideological and affective orientations of elites and super-ordinates who, more
often than not, are the authors, promulgators, and enforcers of demeaning ethnic
categories (and the countervailing categories that lionize themselves). While it may be
self-evident that elites ‘have agency,’ act, and resist, it is ironic that the continuing
disciplinary interest in power has focused on the power of the weak in response to
governments and abstract class, ethnic, and political hegemonies, rather than on
concretely powerful individuals and communities. This, luckily, is beginning to change; several collections and monographs have appeared in the last decade that specifically attempt to begin to fill this disciplinary gap and I make efforts throughout to articulate my work with this emerging literature.\textsuperscript{77}

I should note in closing that while the vecinos I have studied certainly remain cultural and ethnic elites locally (facilitated by the fact that Peru is still a deeply racist country), they are neither national elites nor even local power elites.\textsuperscript{78} This is part of why I was, in fact, able to study them at all. Ironically, if I had set out to study indigenous political parties in the highlands, I would perhaps have written a study more accurately about elites (and had more difficulty gaining access to them). In many ways, the indigenous villagers who populated the ethnographies of the previous generation are the true up-and-coming elites. As I will discuss in chapters 7 and 10, while the wealth and influence that my vecino informants now wield still exceeds those of the vast majority of comuneros, they are exceedingly modest by Euro-American standards.\textsuperscript{79} And though they were universally eager to befriend me and participate in my research, I doubt very much that their ruthless and formidable forbears would have been anywhere near as enthusiastic or welcoming.

1.13 Apologism

I have attempted in this work to avoid being an apologist for the vecinos of Chumbivilcas or any other group of people. I have sought to clarify rather than defend. No spirit of activism or apologism informs this dissertation. My informants all have their foibles and virtues, their moral failings and successes. I met few if any heroes or
heroines. Central government functionaries do their jobs, often of genuine benefit to the community, with indifference and, sometimes, disdain. They want to get out of the dull countryside, back to Cuzco, Arequipa, or Lima. Teachers show genuine affection for and commitment to their students, but they are sorely underpaid and overworked, and their efforts often flag accordingly. NGO workers are frequently prepossessing and, while they work hard in support of the comuneros of Chumbivilcas, they drive Toyota Hiluxes and milk their status as “ingenieros” and “profesionales” for all the vanity and authority they’re worth. They rarely identify with the province and often return to Cuzco each weekend. With few exceptions, the feared gamonales are now middle class farmers, teachers, and shopkeepers. They have been and, in ways vastly more modest, continue to be victimizers, but they have also been the victims in Peru’s process of reform and reorganization. The vecinos closest to the campesinado (peasantry)—the most culturally and linguistically conversant—are often also, ironically, the ones that remain the most abusive and unrepentantly racist. Comuneros themselves are rapidly differentiating socioeconomically, with the wealthiest and most ambitious riding political machines into office (and, thereafter, to the bank). The campesino middle class is rapidly converting to various brands of U.S.-inspired evangelical and Pentecostal churches (7th Day Adventism, Jehovah’s Witness Adventism, Mormonism), in the process consciously identifying with Western modernity, the pursuit of affluence, and individualism, and, not incidentally, escaping from communal obligations (in particular, reciprocal labor, cargo sponsorship, and obligatory ritual over-consumption of alcohol). Perhaps this perspective says more about my temperament than my fieldsite, but the fact remains that
I have no desire to carry anyone’s water, or to apologize for, eulogize, or romanticize any individual or group, myself included.

My lack of romanticism concerning its subjects has perhaps made the process of writing particularly onerous. On the other hand, I have had the enormous academic benefit of studying a population that comes to me already delegitimized, in particular within the discipline of anthropology. Its traditional forms of logic and classification—particularism, hierarchy, proportional equality (i.e. inequality), entitlement to privilege, racism—have been discredited and stigmatized both in the social sciences and in the population at large. I am under no illusions about the injustices perpetrated by them, their forbears, and their community, or about the distasteful ideological vestiges that remain. That said, I recognize that there is no way to avoid identifying with informants. Like all anthropologists, I have come to feel deep affection for the friends and fictive kin I have made in my fieldsite. I frequently found myself adopting their emotional responses to events and individuals. If people around me were irritated or saddened by a behavior or attitude, it was a struggle to remain unmoved. When they were indignant, I found myself becoming indignant. There were times when I found myself, for example, adopting my informants’ attitudes toward comunero contractors or supplicants. I would become frustrated with the so-called asistencialismo (dependence on government or NGO assistance) of the peasantry, by the constant demands for contributions and conversation, the drunkenness, the accusations that I had come to steal their water or that I was working for the CIA, and the ubiquitous “Invítame una cerveza” [“Invite me to share a beer”] and “Que nos ha traído?” [“What have you brought us?”]. I was certainly susceptible to these frustrations without encouragement from my vecino informants, but at times I discovered
an unsettling isomorphism between my attitudes and the racial attitudes of my vecino informants. I believe this mirroring, in fact, to be fundamental to the process of participant observation. It is the emotional and ideological equivalent of learning to dance, hunt, or communicate. Nonetheless, it is a constant fight to detach oneself at the end of the day from these emotional and ideological identifications, and pin them down in the notebook like so many beetles and butterflies.

1.14 Method and theory

The basic methodology that I have used is classical ethnographic participant observation. I spent two summers (July to September 2004 and June to September 2005) moving back and forth between Centro Bartolomé de las Casas’s Intensive Quechua Program and my ultimate fieldsite. My primary field study extended from January 2006 to January 2007. I have returned twice subsequently for month-long field visits in June of 2007 and 2008. Throughout this time I have done structured and semi-structured interviews, collected genealogical data, recorded private and public musical performances, and participated in a broad array of rituals, celebrations, discussions, performances, and fora.

I have chosen to take a regionally holistic approach to ethnography. To the best of my ability I have tried to collect data throughout the province of Chumbivilcas. This is an approach that has distinct advantages over a more narrowly focused community study, but which also presents significant methodological challenges. As Colby and Van Den Berghe noted in 1969, the regionally holistic approach to ethnography has a long history, beginning with the work of “Max Gluckman (1958) in Zululand and of Robert Redfield
While a community of several dozen peasant families may be too narrow a focus to provide a realistic ethnographic vision, a province of 80,000 is certainly too large to ethnographically manage effectively. There is the risk in an extensive approach to fieldwork that the available data exceeds one’s capacity to collect and synthesize it. My focus on vecinos has allowed me to expand my focus spatially while maintaining a relatively manageable subject population. Likewise, I believe that keeping national political processes in the corner of our ethnographic eye is absolutely essential given the vital role of differential access to intermediary positions between local and state society and the importance of national policies in the organization and evolution of the regional social and ideological fields.

Although I agree fundamentally with Frederic William Maitland’s conviction that “anthropology will have the choice between being history and being nothing,” I am not a historian. And although I have tried to master the historiography of Peru as it regards the subject of study, neither my training nor my methodology is historical. Anthropology is itself a problematic guide with regard to the marriage of ethnography and history. The discipline has always hosted historically-minded individuals and schools of thought: from the evolutionism of Tylor (1871) and Morgan (1877) to the diffusionism of A. L. Kroeber (1923) to Michael Taussig’s Benjaminian riffing on the Putumayo (1987) and Thomas Abercrombie’s work on social memory (1998). Nonetheless, anthropology as a discipline has had difficulty formulating a theoretical and methodological framework with which to synthesize history and ethnography in a structured way. As far back as 1933, Paul Radin struggled in *The Method and Theory of Ethnology* to formulate an ethnological methodology that would combine informant testimony, long-term fieldwork, and the
sometimes meager historical record to reconstruct the past and enrich the understanding of the present. Although his critiques of evolutionism and diffusionism were piercing, his own substantive contribution seems in hindsight to be more a demonstration of his own process of controlled inference than a programmatic statement.

There are a number of excellent contemporary efforts to combine history and ethnography; for example, Tania Murray Li’s (2007) analysis of the impact of historical modes of colonial and post-colonial governance and land policy on the formulation and local responses to current multinational development and conservation programs, and Marisol de la Cadena’s (2000) analysis of the ways in which Cuzco’s unique historical context has structured contemporary understandings of indigeneity, mestizaje, decencia, and respect. I have found James Holston’s (2008) articulation of historical and ethnographic research particularly illustrative. In his Insurgent Citizenship, he traces parallel genealogies from 18th and 19th century political philosophy and colonial and Republican land law that converge on contemporary struggles of squatters on the urban periphery for civil and, specifically, civic rights. These genealogies have provided a model for me of the level of detail and comprehensiveness required to synthesize an analytically sufficient historical context and to meaningfully articulate that context with an ethnographic present.

Much of the current effort to integrate properly historical and ethnographic data has been fueled by a greater interest in historically-minded continental thinkers like Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci. Antonio Gramsci’s conceptualization of political and social processes was an early element in the conceptualization of my project. His
sociological perspective seems to me to owe more to his underlying Machiavellianism than to his Marxism. Many of the social and political concepts that have proved most useful to me—including his reflections on Caesarism, hegemony, organic intellectuals, civil society, and wars of position and maneuver—are departures, rather than inheritances, from classical Marxist theory and practice. Gramsci is specifically critical of vulgar materialism, or what he terms ‘economism,’ and—though classes remain for him the fundamental unit of collective action and ideological elaboration—he puts strong emphasis on “ethico-political relations,” rather than exclusively productive ones, and on the contingency of hegemonic struggles.

Thus, though Gramsci is often identified as a progenitor of Cultural Marxism, for me, it has been more useful to situate him in critical dialogue with the classical sociology of the early 20th century. Kees van der Pijl notes that “Gramsci stands in the tradition of the organic intellectuals of the modern cadre, the strand of neo-Machiavellian elitism, represented by Pareto, Michels and notably Mosca.” I think his oeuvre bears particular kinship and enters fluently into dialogue with the work of Max Weber. Carl Levy deals in a sophisticated way with the convergences and divergences between Gramsci and Weber’s work, noting in particular the compatibility between the Gramscian concept of hegemony and Weber’s work on ‘legitimate domination’ and their shared interest in state formation and bureaucracy. For me, what unites the two is their shared commitment to analyzing society historically and in its totality, emphasizing the interdependence of socio-cultural, political, and economic factors in the unfolding of particular historical sequences. It is this emphasis on interdependence that draws me particularly to Weber. While I acknowledge the significant, even dominant, role of the economy (conceived as
relations of production) in social processes, the complex interdependence of politics, economy, and culture challenges any attempt to draw lines of causation from relations of production up through sociality, culture, ideology, party politics, and policy. This is particularly true at the provincial level, where personal or factional disputes (‘petty politics’) tend to predominate and both ideological currents and administrative ‘ground rules’ tend to be determined in the center and therefore relatively non-negotiable (though subject to local interpretation, avoidance, and adaptation). As a result, the struggles for power tend to be much more tactical, parochial, and personalistic. Ideological differentiation between parties or factions tends to be rudimentary and rhetorical, parties tend to be built on vertical cleavages of ethnicity, kinship, residence, and patronage, and epochal shifts tend to be driven by national policy and agenda. Under such conditions, the wealth and catholicity of the interrelated concepts that Weber provides is vital; I draw from his posthumous *Economy and Society* (1978) to formalize and generalize my observations about social processes in Chumbivilcas, in particular his methodological focus on institutions.

1.15  *Space and time*

As with my spatial expansion of focus to the nation and the globe, my extension of focus into the past has been fundamentally an effort to give context to the present. Although I use secondary historical sources to contextualize the current conjuncture, my exclusive interest is in the evolving present over the half-decade I have been observing Chumbivilcas. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are specifically historical in their focus. The historiography of Spanish America is truly vast. I am interested here in that portion of the
historiography that directly concerns the rise and fall of the hacienda political economy in Peru’s southern highlands. Methodologically, these chapters might be called ethnohistorical, in the sense that they rely on historical data reinforced and augmented by ethnographic interviewing. Given constraints of time and training I gathered little primary historical data. The majority of my properly historical data is therefore derived from secondary sources.

Nonetheless, Chumbivilcanos keep old newspaper clippings, deeds, wills, letters, and photographs, which I gathered and, where possible, scanned, and which I include in my analysis. I also did research in Centro Bartolomé de las Casas’s photographic archive. That said, the primary way I have come to my understanding of the recent past is through the words and actions of my informants. Informants speak frequently about the past, though, as I have noted, frequently in distorted ways. Some of these distortions are self-serving, some are reproductions of hegemonic, though not necessarily self-serving, discourses, and some are genuine errors. As I’ve said, these distortions can be studied in and of themselves, but they can be sharply misleading if used to compose an ostensibly veridical account of the past. I would be very hesitant to draw any definitive conclusion about the reality or fiction of my informants’ arguments about the past, or to use my informants’ testimonies to resolve any controversies with regard to the past. Many of my informants lived through both the closing, ‘halcyon’ days of the hacienda period and the historical events that followed, and I have woven interview data they provided into the historical chapters, but I have been careful to distinguish between informant testimony and other forms of historical data.
One of the problems with any historical approach is the risk of infinite regress. If there are first causes in history, they exist well beyond the human capacity of perception and understanding; each historical cause is itself caused. Somewhere one has to stop, but at points that are relevant and relatively essential—finding, as Plato wrote, natural joints at which to cut.94 What I know best, naturally, is the last several years in and around Santo Tomás, through which I have lived with my informants. I have therefore personally experienced the ongoing processes of decentralization and peasant political hegemony. I have tried, through interview data and literature research, to extend this focus into the past.

The data that I present and the analysis that I provide progressively drop off in detail at horizons where my familiarity declines. My data on Land Reform and the Shining Path era are multifaceted, specific, and progressive (in the sense that I treat them as dynamic processes unfolding in time). My informants were able to give first person accounts of these processes and I was able to find numerous printed primary and secondary accounts to bolster those of my informants. My discussion of the preceding century is much more schematic. I generally follow the distinction that most informants implicitly or explicitly make between the “pre-Reforma,” or traditional, Chumbivilcas and the “post-Reforma,” or modern, one. It’s clear, looking at the historical record, that the relationship between the gamonales, who controlled Chumbivilcas, and the Peruvian state was constantly being renegotiated, at times with cold steel. While I try to give some idea of the evolution that occurred within the Republican period, I have necessarily crafted an artificially stable portrait of the system known as ‘gamonalismo.’ Likewise, the changes that the Velasco regime wrought in rural class structure were made possible by
social, political, and economic developments in the half-century prior to 1969, and I have treated some of these in chapter 5. My treatment of the colonial period is cursory and serves merely to establish the origins of some of the central ideologies and institutions with which my informants continue to wrestle to this today.

I have supplemented my own ethnographic data with sociological, historical, and ethnographic data from throughout Peru, as well as from many of the nations of Spanish America. Although each of the successor states of the former Spanish Empire has its own history, culture, and administrative structure (divergences that began well before Independence), the similarities are truly overwhelming. Even an expert would have trouble differentiating, for example, a brief account of vecino/indigenous relations in the Guatemalan highlands from an account of such relations in the Peruvian highlands. Establishing the factual and interpretive similarities can fortify one’s observations and interpretations, while the differences demand explanation and are essential in locating areas of fruitful investigation and analysis.95

Throughout, I have tried strenuously to maintain the distinction between my own observations and interpretations, those of my informants, and those of the various literatures to which I have referred. The result is inevitably imperfect, but it is my hope that I have sufficiently distinguished between the three to allow an active, interested reader to develop their own counterarguments and hypotheses using the data I have presented.
1.16 Review of contents

The body of the dissertation begins with chapter 2, “Chumbivilcas, La Tierra Brava,” a brief overview of the province in which the majority of fieldwork was conducted. This sets the stage for chapter 3, “Reconquista and Conquista,” a brief historical review of the ideological and institutional antecedents of the system of gamonalismo that dominated rural Peru in the late 19th and early 20th century. Chapter 4, “Republic and Gamonalismo,” covers the functioning and structural origins of gamonalismo. Chapter 5, “Modernization, Revolution, Reform,” begins with a discussion of the secular trends that were slowly eroding the foundations of traditional modes of domination in the years preceding the Velasco revolution, proceeds into a discussion of the Agrarian Reform and the Shining Path’s revolution, and closes with an analysis of the decisive democratic and administrative reforms of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.

The second half of the volume covers more exclusively ethnographic terrain. It begins with chapter 6, “Reconquista Indígena,” a discussion of the rise of properly indigenist local political parties from their Marxist origins in response to the expansion of suffrage and, in particular, to steeply rising fiscal transfers from the national government. A lively form of machine politics has emerged, articulating the aspirations of indigenous political leaders and the popular demand for the concrete benefits of modernization. Chapter 7, “The New Kurakas,” extends this discussion by describing and analyzing the rise of a new class of indigenous political elites and their displacement of the traditional local vecino establishment. Special attention is paid to decisive marginalization of
vecinos from local politics during 2006 municipal and presidential elections, and their attempts to rally around the local APRA apparatus and the candidacy of Alan García.

Chapter 8, “Still Waters,” concerns the multiplicity of attitudes and discourses that mix and compete for hegemony beneath the muted surface of sociality. The chapter discusses the ways in which informants struggle to harmonize traditional ideologies and contemporary ones while retaining their sense of identity and self-value. I also discuss what I have called, drawing on the work of James Holston, “characters of discourse,” which Chumbivilcanos use to organize their thoughts about race. I pay especially close attention to the character of the “cholita,” which I argue condenses a number of key elements of racial ideology and practice. In chapter 9, “Putting People in Their Place,” I try to make sense of the practice of racial distinction and the calculus vecinos use to place fellow Chumbivilcanos. In particular, I argue that genealogical reckoning, rather than analysis of racial, ethnic, and class traits, is the preferred and most common form of identification in Chumbivilcas.

Chapter 10, “Retreat,” deals specifically with the place of vecinos in contemporary society. The once fearsome and locally omnipotent class is now predominantly educators, grocers, and hoteliers. The chapter discusses their widespread emigration and their political marginalization, as well as the prominent role of inheritance and property litigation in undermining their ethnic solidarity. The chapter analyzes the ways in which vecinos have responded to the changes described in previous chapters, in particular their physical retreat out of the campo and back to the Plaza de Armas, their occupational retreat into the public sector and, especially, the school system, their retreat
into culture and essentialized, folkloric expressions of identity, and, finally, their related retreat into the past.

The final, concluding chapter, offers a constructive critique of the limitations of the discipline’s overwhelming emphasis on ethnography. By way of summary, I trace a genealogy of the historical transformations of the concept of ‘vecindad’ and discuss its contemporary obsolescence. I close with a discussion of where the processes I describe appear to be leading provincial society. Although these predictions are provisional and may prove to be mistaken, it is my belief that the effort to think predictively can reveal important insights into the present.
Chapter 2
Chumbivilcas, La Tierra Brava

One of the great challenges in working information into narrative is trying to fit data that are densely interdependent into a linear format that necessarily represses the myriad lines of relation. This, of course, is what makes endeavors like hypertext fascinating and potentially productive avenues of representation. A research project exists as a universe of interrelated data and analysis, and flattening all of these forms of relation into a single line of letters stretching for several hundred pages is an exhausting and disfiguring struggle. In blazing a path through this data, much of the richness of the surrounding ethnographic landscape must necessarily be omitted. In this chapter, I provide a description of the province that remedies some of these ethnographic omissions and may help to contextualize the chapters that follow. While such a ‘land and its people’ chapter may be an unsatisfactory narrative device, it allows me to provide context which would not necessarily emerge organically in the course of discussion. There are inevitably many aspects of provincial life that I could not specifically treat in the course of the dissertation; this chapter allows me to discuss these aspects in general terms, to demonstrate that I am aware of them, and to give the reader access to them despite their lack of emphasis in the remainder of the text.

Although I widen the focus to the national level where necessary, and devote particular attention to the provincial capital of Santo Tomás, the primary focus of this study is regional. The processes described in the Introduction have unfolded in the context of a shared political economy, a single social landscape, and a single, if hybrid,
culture. Vecinos and comuneros share the vast majority of roles, attitudes, and beliefs. It would be misleading, therefore, in the initial characterization of provincial social and economic life, to distinguish, for example, between vecino and comunero commerce, schooling, or celebrations. While I note the ethnic divergences that seem vital to the discussion, in this chapter my primary goal is to provide a brief synoptic account of the common geographic, social and economic environment. Borrowing a visual metaphor, in this chapter I lay down a ground in relation to which subsequent chapters will be figural.

The chapter begins with a brief geographic sketch of the province, which leads into a discussion of the historic isolation that the province’s forbidding topography has forced upon its inhabitants. The bulk of the chapter deals with various aspects of the province’s economy, in particular the lack of financial institutions, the predominance of traditional agricultural and pastoral production, the nascence of industrial mining, and the scarcity and irregularity of wage labor. After a brief characterization of public sociality, I close with a discussion of the centrality of emigration to social processes in the province.

2.1 La Tierra Brava (The Wild Country)

Rising westward into the Cordillera Huanso, and bisected by the churning Río Apurímac, Cuzco’s province of Chumbivilcas is high, broken country. Winter in Chumbivilcas is dry and bitterly cold. With little atmosphere to get between the sun and skin, the days can be pleasantly warm. The nights, however, are bone chilling and the visitor finds herself trying to imagine a way of heating and humidifying the air before it hits her throat. Chumbivilcanos dislike the winter, foremost because the lack of rainfall leaves their largely unirrigated fields and pasture bone-dry.
But winter is also a time of fiesta. In Chumbivilcas, the most significant fiesta of the year is the anniversary of the province’s founding. Nine days of celebration leave the populace sated and drained—horse races (*carrera de caballos*), parades (*desfiles*), dance contests (*concurso de danzas típicas*), folkloric costume competitions (*concurso de trajes típicas*), concerts (*conjuntos musicales*), cockfights (*riña de gallos*), bronco busting (*doma de potros*), *torokacharpariy* and the climactic bullfights (*corrida*).

Chumbivilcanos, especially the denizens of Santo Tomás, the provincial capital, plan, prepare, and imagine the events for months in advance and recover and regale for months after. Following the first couple of days, even the most hardened *festejero* looks peaked, perhaps trembling a bit from the effects of sleeplessness and hang-over. Some men may hole up in their homes for one or two of the days, sleeping off the worst of it. The overall sentiment, however, is one of elation and collective effervescence. People argue over the way in which municipalities or private sponsors have organized events, or disagree with judges over the merits of dances or other performances, but there is a palpable spirit of belonging to the region and unique culture of Chumbivilcas. Performers strut in their *trajes típicas*: women in layers of pleated skirts, hand-sewn coats specific to their district, decorated sombreros, woven shawls (*lliklla*), and half-laced cowboy boots; men in their ponchos, chaps (*qarawatanas*), sombreros, knit caps (*ch’ullus*), plaid flannels shirts, and hand-sewn pants and jackets of *bayeta*. Almost all Chumbivilcanos wear one or several items from this repertoire as they amble across the plaza and the surrounding streets.

In August, as temperatures begin slowly to climb, ruthless winds rise to howl and sheer the tin roofs off of houses. By November, *comuneros* and farmers watch the horizon for signs of water-bearing clouds that bring desperately needed rain to the valleys
and cap the mountains that tower on all sides with snow. Torrential rains fall throughout February and March, dragging down hillsides and filling the narrow river valleys with furious, turbid currents. By May winter has returned, and any sign of precipitation is met with consternation and panic, as hail can destroy an entire crop in minutes.

2.2 Demography and topography

Up until the 1970s, large haciendas dominated the countryside, and their storehouses, stables, workshops, residences, patios, gardens and arcades were visible for miles around. These are virtually all abandoned and collapsed now; their owners sold what they could, campesinos pulled down what remained for materials or let their straw roofs rot and the rains slowly eat away their adobe walls. A few of their foundations and palm or fruit trees are all that stand as reminders of a troubled past. The disappearance of the haciendas has left the countryside to the peasant communities (comunidades) to which, in a sense, it belonged before the Spaniard arrived. The last century witnessed an unprecedented demographic expansion that has doubled and trebled the population of even these impoverished communities (and, ecologically speaking, overpopulated them). Even at 13,000 feet or higher, it’s hard to find a place that is not under active cultivation, being used as pasture, or laying fallow. The upper puna may be an intensely lonely place, but virtually all of it is under human exploitation.
The large communities at middle altitudes, between their pastures and their riverside fields, are thriving and bustling. Ambitious rural electrification programs are bringing light and the buzz of power tools to communities that, when I first arrived five years ago, seemed impossibly, permanently remote. Battered trucks that have outlived their usefulness in Japan, Europe, and the US, are sold into these mountains, where they lumber along pitted, narrow dirt roads with standing-room-only loads of campesinos and their crops and implements. Many communities have moved themselves to the sides of these winding roads, storing crops in low-slung huts, opening bars, grocery stores, and restaurants, and building schools and clinics that are more accessible to staff and clients.\textsuperscript{1}
The towns that serve as commercial and administrative centers are burgeoning as well. District and provincial municipalities are utilizing fiscal transfers from the national government to pave roads, build schools, and construct outsize municipal buildings to house themselves in relative opulence. Urban land was unaffected by the Agrarian Reform of the 1970s, so vecinos, once the exclusive occupants of provincial towns, still tend to have residences and shops around the Plazas de Armas, which remain the centers of civic and social life. Nonetheless, their domination of town life is rapidly coming to an end. Today, the vecino is a minority even in town, surrounded by an industrious new generation of comuneros, who shuttle comfortably between their comunidades and their shops and residences in town.

With a total area of 5,371 km\(^2\) and 72,341 inhabitants, Chumbivilcas is half the size of San Diego County and has only twice the population of La Jolla, CA. Its average altitude is 3,660 meters (12,000 ft), ranging from 3,500 to 5,400 meters (11,500 to 16,000 ft), and it is spread primarily over two Andean ecological zones: suni, or lower puna (3,300 to 3,900 meters), and puna proper, or upper puna (3,900 to 5,300 meters). Both zones are arid and virtually treeless (except for cultivated eucalyptus groves). There is therefore very little opportunity to grow maize or other temperate crops, which grow only at lower altitudes. In the suni, “wheat, barley, broad beans and potatoes” grow, as well as other native tubers. Only bitter potato varieties can grow at the higher elevations. Pastoralism is therefore the primary economic activity in the puna. Alpaca and sheep are far and away the most common livestock in the puna. Cattle can be pastured above 4,000 meters, but peasants say that at such altitudes they are undernourished and produce little milk. The province is also cut by numerous river valleys (qheswa), which are
considerably warmer and support the cultivation of maize, fruit trees, and other temperate crops.

The province of Chumbivilcas is divided into 8 districts: Capacmarca, Colquemarca, Chamaca, Livitaca, Llusco, Quiñota, Velille, and Santo Tomás. Until recently, Capacmarca and Colquemarca were the most isolated districts, but the shortest road from Santo Tomás to Cuzco now passes directly through Colquemarca. Quiñota and Llusco are close enough to Santo Tomás to use its transportation network but also lie along a road that leads to Cuzco through Apurímac via Haquirí and Abancay. Chamaca, Livitaca, and Velille, on the other hand, are distant enough to rely on the road east to Arequipa or Cuzco via Sicuani. Capacmarca is the most isolated province of Chumbivilcas. There is now a truck that travels three days a week between Cuzco and Capacmarca, but Capacmarca was bypassed by the main Santo Tomás-Cuzco artery. Teachers who live in Santo Tomás but work in Capacmarca take the Sunday afternoon Santo Tomás-Cuzco bus, are dropped off at nine or ten at night, and must hike down two hours in the dark to the town of Capacmarca itself. On Friday nights they reverse the process, hiking or getting a motorcycle ride to the main road and waiting until the bus passes around 11pm. The eastern districts are close enough to the large towns of Yaurí and Sicuani that they have relatively little practical involvement with Santo Tomás and the rest of Chumbivilcas.
Weekly markets are held in all district capitals and usually host a similar array of local agricultural produce and imported manufactured goods. Produce sold includes peaches, avocados, cactus fruit, lima beans, corn, wheat, alpaca meat, beef, pork, lamb, and skins. A broad array of manufactured goods are on display, including school supplies, leather riding tackle, tools, cleaning products, clothing, and electronics. Prepared food stalls are also a prominent feature.

Figure 5. Plaza de Armas of Santo Tomás
2.3 Isolation

Chumbivilcas has always been isolated. The root cause of this is the forbidding nature of its topography. As Daniel Gade notes, “In this part of the Andes, valleys, which in most areas facilitate human access, instead form steep canyons that are not easily penetrated. In the face of such barriers, sheer distance is only a secondary isolating factor.” The daunting obstacles that this broken, vertiginous landscape poses to transport and communication are immediately apparent to the visitor. This topographical isolation has prevented the construction of road networks, thus amplifying its relative neglect: “Absence of vehicle roads is the prime isolating factor in the late twentieth-century Peruvian sierra. Without trucks to transport surplus agricultural products, commercial farming is hardly viable and self-sufficiency becomes an indication of poverty.” The introduction of dirt roads, passable by minivans, has completely revolutionized transport over the last two decades. As discussed elsewhere, transport is universally by private vehicle, either personal, institutional, or combi service. Private owners and institutional users will not offer rides except to family, close personal friends, and individuals of known high status. During the election cycle, candidates sometimes pick up individuals they believe might secure them votes or other forms of political support. Combis ply fixed routes and charge fixed fees based on pick-up location and destination. Comuneros in peripheral districts where roads may penetrate but where population densities do not support regular combi transport still rely on foot and hoof for transport. The Saturday market in Quiñota, for example, brings comuneros from surrounding comunidades, most of whom either are not served by combi transport or do not have the funds to regularly
utilize it. The peripheral streets to the north of the town are filled with tethered and hobbled horses. This was typical of all of Chumbivilcas several decades ago, and there is still not a single inter-district paved road in the entire province.

This lack of roads has restricted access to markets, which in turn has hampered the development of commerce and industry. Aguirre Beltrán has called this kind of backwater a “region of refuge,” which he defines as areas that are particularly hostile or inaccessible to human movement, where exploitation of available resources necessitates the investment of considerable effort even for modern technology, and where this effort is not recompensed proportionately. Thus they are kept in reserve by industrial society for future use as long as the need for their resources is not sufficiently great to warrant their exploitation.\(^6\)

National industry may one day tap into Chumbivilcas’s dormant riches, but currently, as Christiane Paponnet-Cantat noted in 1989, the province “lacks any industry except for some home-based weaving and pottery” and it remains severely underdeveloped.\(^7\) There is, for example, forestry, if one is comfortable calling a comunero with a chainsaw ‘forestry.’ While women with grinding stones (batan) still do virtually all food processing, local communities, collectives, and commercial enterprises do some grain milling on a small scale. Nonetheless, industry is nearly nonexistent.

Historical circumstances have intensified this topographically induced underdevelopment. Like many of the provinces of the southern Sierra, mining mitas\(^8\) battered the native population of Chumbivilcas in the 17th century. Parish visitas (tours of inspection by Catholic church officials) tell a chilling story of genocidal labor exploitation. Villanueva quotes the parish priest of Chamaca, Dr. D. Joseph Hermosa y Cisneros, who opines that the mita “goes along destroying and annihilating, and ruining
this town and all those of this Province.” The same devastation was reported in each of the parish reports of 1689. Chumbivilcas belonged to the mita of the Huancavelica mining complex (as well as the Cailloma mine), which provided the necessary mercury for the exploitation of Potosí’s famed silver deposits. Kendal Brown notes that by the 17th century Huancavelica was known as “the ‘mine of death.’” Franciscan legalist Miguel Agia, who argued for the mita’s continuation, acknowledged that sending Indians to Huancavelica was equivalent ‘to sending them to die.’ Damián de Jeria, Protector of the Indians, called the main tunnel a ‘public slaughter house.’” Combined with the annihilating introduction of Old World diseases, these depredations left Chumbivilcas virtually vacant well into the 19th century. The 1876 National Census only found roughly 23,000 inhabitants in the entire region.

Until the growth of tourism and state institutions increased its importance, Cuzco was sleepy and economically stagnant, and provided Chumbivilcanos with little impetus to visit. Although a province of Cuzco, Chumbivilcas has traditionally had closer economic and cultural ties to Arequipa as a cattle-raising periphery. In the days before roads, muleteers carried wool and cattle from Chumbivilcas over the Cordillera Huanso to the large markets of Arequipa. As textile production spearheaded Britain’s industrialization in the mid-19th century, wool grew into the region’s dominant commodity. Pastoral production remains a mainstay of the economy of Chumbivilcas—cattle for the domestic market, sheep and camelid fiber for domestic and international markets.

At the time of the 1993 census, Chumbivilcas was the least urban province of Cuzco department, with 88% of its 72,000 inhabitants classified as rural. Though
urbanization has increased significantly (with 22% percent of Chumbivilcanos now classified as urban residents), the province remains predominantly rural and peasant, with family-organized subsistence production and small-scale participation in commodity markets the dominant means of social reproduction.\textsuperscript{13} Chumbivilcas has one of the highest rates of outright home ownership in the department (90%) and amongst the lowest rates of alternative tenancy arrangements, suggesting that stagnation and lack of functional differentiation have retarded the development of a market for the leasing, renting, and \textit{anticresis} (antichresis) of residential property.\textsuperscript{14} Furthermore, only 35% of homes in Chumbivilcas have plumbing and access to public potable water (up, however, from 4% in 1993); 54% of homes are still dependent on river, spring, and channeled water. Likewise, 89% of homes lack public sanitation and 81% lack electricity. All of this contributes to the backwater feel of the province, which, however, is rapidly changing as a result of mining exploration, government decentralization, and Peru’s strong growth over the last decade.

2.4 \textit{Absence of financial institutions}

In many ways, the provincial countryside remains not just pre-industrial, but pre-capitalist; while individuals and families do engage in petty production and commerce, the institutions of capitalist investment and development are virtually nonexistent. This is true not only of indigenous communities, but of district and provincial capitals as well. There is very little financial activity, and what activity does exist is not rationalized. There is one bank office (\textit{Banco de la Nación}) in Santo Tomás, the provincial capital. There is also an office of \textit{Red Rural}, a NGO-government joint venture specializing in
agrarian loans. *Red Rural* offers a variety of financing options, none of which, from a Euro-American perspective, make sound financial sense. *Red Rural* and similar agencies require collateral well in excess of the loan value, as well as secondary signatories. Interest rates are astronomically high, certainly usurious by any reasonable standard. The basic interest rate is 3% monthly, which, adjusted for the monthly nature of payments, is equivalent to around 40% annually. Informal lending is normally even more usurious. Friends, cousins, and merchants frequently charge ten percent monthly; these loans are therefore utilized only in emergencies and in the short term. Even in dynamic Western economies, forty percent annual return on investment would be considered exceedingly difficult to achieve; it is virtually impossible in low-technology farming or other local economic activities. Without reasonably priced financial instruments, Chumbivilcanos are able to finance neither the expansion of their personal or family enterprises, nor the economic development of the region as a whole.

As a result of the events and processes of the last half-century, there are really no significant local capital stocks. Concrete financial data on rural individuals or enterprises is difficult or impossible to acquire and verify—there are, for example, no income tax data or similar official assessments of wealth or revenue available—but even the wealthiest Chumbivilcanos are decidedly middle class, even by Peruvian standards. Informants are unable to name local individuals who would be able to make large capital investments. While some families and individuals are considered wealthy, this is usually stated in terms of amount and quality of property, rather than revenues or liquidity. The *alcalde’s* salary (roughly $1,300 a month), for example, is considered a major, and disproportionate, source of wealth. Proprietors of restaurants, pharmacies, shops, and
haciendas were not particularly forthcoming in their estimates of income (even the ones whom I considered close friends). Certainly, few if any garnered yearly incomes in excess of ten or twelve thousand dollars. At the other end of the spectrum, cash incomes of the poorest peasants approach zero. Although it is notoriously difficult to accurately estimate the ‘income’ of the peasant household, there are some proxies that can give us a general idea of things. The standard wage paid in the private, informal sector for unskilled day labor is 10 soles, but a day laborer in Chumbivilcas can only rarely be coaxed into working more than five or six hours a day, primarily because he has work to do on his own land or in his own household, but also because this is the culturally appropriate length of the workday. The municipality generally pays 15 soles for a day of unskilled labor. Extended to a 20-day work month, this would yield 200 to 300 soles (roughly $60 to $90) as the estimated regional minimum wage in the ‘more-or-less formal’ sector. This is merely the roughest possible estimate, and likely a significant overestimate. Wage labor is relatively scarce, so most families must rely on the vagaries of small-scale agro-pastoral production. A prosperous peasant family may make significantly more than this through the production and sale of meat, fiber, and animals, as well as remittances—provided ideal climatic and market conditions—but the vast majority of peasants probably make substantially less. High altitude pastoralists are generally the very poorest Chumbivilcanos, as even basic foodstuffs and supplies must be purchased under unfavorable terms of trade rather than self-produced.
2.5 *Agriculture and pastoralism*

Agricultural methods in Chumbivilcas have not changed significantly in the last 50 years. For most Chumbivilcanos, the *chaki-taqlla* and hoe are still the fundamental implements of agricultural production, both of which are handmade by affixing a forged metal blade to a hand-hewn wooden handle using a thong of recycled tire rubber. Ox-drawn ploughs are used by *propietarios* and wealthier *comuneros* to plow large fields. I have seen only two agricultural tractors (though municipalities use tractors for building and road-planing) in my travels throughout the province and there are certainly not more than a dozen. Potatoes are by far the most common crop, followed by maize. Maize is the more common in markets, because valley communities produce it specifically for commerce with puna communities where it cannot grow, whereas potatoes are basically a staple crop that is sold only when there are bumper crops. Altitude generally constrains the production of fruit, but *tuna* (the fruit of the *Opuntia* cactus) and *capulí* (cherry-like fruit of the *Prunus salicifolia*) are grown in the valleys and sold seasonally locally. Because of their poverty, campesinos can rarely afford to sit on their crop until prices rise, so that even in seasons of high yield, campesinos must sell their products into a glut and correspondingly low market prices.
The vast majority of agricultural produce is grown and self-consumed within peasant communities (I will discuss the peasant community in more detail in chapter 4). There is very little agricultural wage work. Although the remaining private landowners frequently complain about the difficulty of acquiring wage labor (which frequently end up being young men without land, noted alcoholics, elderly comuneros, and land-poor neighbors) and permanent or seasonal help may take months to locate. Employers may go to other districts, provinces, and even departments in search of couples or individuals for permanent positions. Wages are generally quite low (even in Santo Tomás), so only the poorest of the poor (generally those without, or with inadequate, land) will work for
agricultural wages. Furthermore, landowners are generally producing within the same agricultural cycle as neighboring comuneros, and therefore have corresponding periods of peak labor demand. As a result of the Agrarian Reform, all but the poorest comuneros are subsistence-sufficient and are not in dire need of supplementary cash income (though they are naturally always eager to earn it at wages that they perceive as fair). This self-sufficiency puts them in a position of relative strength in labor negotiations. The poorest comuneros are forced to enter into long-term, informal labor relations with land and livestock owners in order to supplement their meager cash incomes and food crops. It is, therefore, true that the most abject campesinos are those still involved in the agrarian labor economy in ways that echo pre-Reform exploitative socio-economic relations. But the remnants of the hacienda sector serve mainly as safety nets, albeit highly deficient ones, for the lumpen-peasantry that, for one reason or another, ‘falls out of the bottom’ of the comunidad, rather than an engine of dispossession as it was in the past.

The collective tenancy of peasant communities has the contradictory effect of protecting the long-term access of comuneros to subsistence resources, while handicapping their ability to achieve specialization, surplus and growth.\textsuperscript{15} In fact, the lack of dynamism in the peasant sector has contributed to the deeply problematic over-urbanization that now characterizes Peru. The very nature of communal property prevents, for example, the capital improvements that would allow intensification of production. It is extremely difficult for comuneros to obtain financing. Barring the design and implementation of novel financial instruments, a comunero’s right to community resources cannot be used as collateral because it is not quantifiable in the way that fee simple property is and because the law prevents seizure of community property in the
event of default. Furthermore, *comuneros* are loath to sell their portions of community land, and even sales of land within the community must be approved by the community as a whole, which makes expansion of family property preventatively difficult and impedes *comuneros* from achieving economies of scale, responding to market incentives through expansion and specialization, or mechanizing production. On the other hand, while correcting these issues may lead to greater specialization and competitiveness, corrections would also lead to greater landlessness and absolute poverty, as unsuccessful peasants would lose land through defaulting on loans and selling land to survive family crises.

Both private landowners and *comuneros* rely primarily on cattle production to obtain cash revenues. The preferred form of sale is ‘on the hoof’; usually at auction to middlemen, who fatten the animal at lower altitudes and resell them into the urban beef market. A healthy bull or cow can sell for more than a thousand soles, earning vastly more per unit of labor than potatoes or maize. Furthermore, cattle and other livestock can be pastured in the commons. As with agricultural production, the most common form of pasturing is the lone peasant, on communal land, shepherding several cows and/or a small flock of sheep. Women with a spindle and a baby on their back, young men listening to portable radios, and children daydreaming and swinging switches are the core of the pastoral ‘workforce.’ Peruvian peasant pastoralists are generally not participating in the improvement of the productive process that their global competitors are. Peasants do not, for example, systematically select sires, although NGOs are actively trying to train pastoralists to do so. Likewise, they are not trained to effectively identify and treat livestock diseases. Alpaca estancias, in particular, are usually located beyond the range of
veterinarians or even merchants of veterinary medicine. *Propietarios*, to a certain extent, share these handicaps, but are more likely to have (a) some basic agronomic training, allowing them to diagnose illnesses, perform rudimentary artificial selection, and manage improved pasture regimes, as well as (b) the minimal capital necessary to invest in these activities.

There are some districts in which extensive cattle herding is still practiced by private landowners, foremost among them Colquemarca. Since the time of the Jesuits, Colquemarca has always been a center of mestizo social, economic, and cultural life. The *Reforma Agraria* reduced the vast *latifundios* of the Alvarez family, as well as those of the Romero, Ugarte, and Gomez, but many remain gigantic. They are also rich in natural pasture, especially *bofedales*. A *bofedal* is a puna wetland or bog, usually naturally occurring, that forms in hollows or other depressions where moisture collects. In rainy season *bofedales* may become inundated and form shallow ponds. *Bofedales* are considered ideal grazing areas because of their rich soil and fast growing and nutritious pasture, and because they require little or no maintenance and remain naturally irrigated year-round. *Bofedales*, if numerous or extensive enough, can therefore help to support the extensive cattle herding traditional to Spanish America. Where latifundios were not eliminated completely by the Reform, extensive cattle herding remains a viable form of economic activity. It requires relatively minimal operating costs, and land and livestock inputs are usually inherited.
2.6 Fiber Production

Although cattle production is the most lucrative form of pastoralism in Chumbivilcas, sheep and alpaca herding are also important.\(^{16}\) The production of animal fibers by peasant families is, however, basically a subsistence activity. Because international competitors have drastically improved the efficiency of fiber production through technical and technological innovation, prices have inexorably dropped as the market responds to declines in the cost of production. Even optimal productive units, organized along ideal capitalist lines—benefiting from improved livestock and pasture, veterinary care, economies of scale, enclosure, mechanization, and other forms of labor maximization—have found the current market environment extremely challenging\(^{17}\); there is no realistic way a peasant household could hope to generate even modest incomes through fiber production and sale, except through severe self-exploitation. Pastoralists are therefore commonly miserably poor, and agriculturalists usually consider them to be socially inferior (this is a more complicated social phenomena that will be discussed in later sections).\(^{18}\)

Although Peru is commonly associated with the production of wool and woven textiles and alpaca and sheep are ubiquitous in the southern highlands, it is not a major producer of wool. Peru’s contribution to the world market is minimal. Whereas Peru’s estimated production of sheep wool climbed from 18 million pounds in 1946 to 25 million in 1965, Australia’s (the world’s foremost producer) rose from 1.06 billion to 1.7 billion pounds in the same period.\(^{19}\) On the other hand, Peru produces somewhere around 90% of the world’s alpaca fiber, but this is due almost exclusively to Peru’s near
monopoly on the alpaca population itself; what’s more, the world alpaca fiber production (roughly four thousand tons a year) is negligible relative to the world production of sheep fiber (roughly 83 million tons a year). In terms of the global economy, commerce in alpaca fiber is virtually non-existent.

2.7 Vestigial hacienda sector

Agricultural and pastoral wage labor is uncommon. Even in-kind arrangements are nowhere near as common as they once were. Propietarios usually have long-term semi-customary relationships with specific land-poor peasant families in surrounding communities. Though they may still exist in some form in the province, I have not personally encountered actual ‘hacienda-run’ or peasants permanently or hereditarily tied to a hacienda. There is certainly a ‘lumpen-peasantry’ that is dependent on hacienda work for land and income, but it is drawn from peasants who are land-hungry through family misfortune or young peasant families that are still in the growth phase of their development; this segment is now reproduced by the inequality inherent in the peasant sector itself, rather than by the domination of the hacienda. Frequently, in fact, hacienda workers are aging campesinos, accompanied by one or two grandchildren whose parents have left to do seasonal work in the city (which often turns into long-term employment and thus absence). The elderly in peasant communities are often sharply marginalized. Children expect to receive their inheritance, or part of it, at majority, rather than the death of their parents. Aging comuneros will have typically given the majority of their land and livestock to their married children, who may or may not adequately fulfill their reciprocal responsibility to provision and care for their aging parents.
Though hacienda work is not very financially remunerative—if it were, it wouldn’t be so difficult to attract workers—it can provide able and clever comuneros with an opportunity to generate income and, more than anything, obtain use of pasture. The social relationship remains unequal and occasionally demeaning, but the commitment in labor time is minimal, the intensity low, and payment modest. In-kind labor relations can be especially beneficial for comuneros; propietarios almost always have more land than labor to exploit it, and they therefore discount its value. Comuneros can therefore gain relatively generous usufruct of unutilized land if they have the time to spare and enough livestock to exploit the resources. One family with whom I boarded resided on a small plot of land directly adjacent to a large private parcel. The owners of this parcel lived in the provincial capital of Santo Tomas, 45 minutes away by minibus, and rarely visited. In return for monitoring the irrigation system and providing several extended family members as laborers during the semiannual planting and harvest of potatoes, they were given usufruct on the unused remainder. My informant, the owner of the property, would note with a combination of irritation and admiration whenever we visited the property, that the mother of the peasant family always happened to ‘incidentally’ allow the irrigation water to overflow directly onto the pasture over which she had usufruct. Nonetheless, he was satisfied with the arrangement, because the minimal exploitation of the land would not have generated enough cash or produce to pay a year-round employee in cash or kind.

Whereas these neighboring peasant families often perform long-term, low-intensity labor, including the management of irrigation infrastructure for crop and pasture, as well as pastoral supervision, propietarios must tap a reserve of comuneros
they know to be cash-strapped or land-poor when temporary labor is needed. Even this source of labor is, from the perspective of vecinos, inadequate and unsatisfactory. Temporary labor tends to be required during periods of high-intensity sowing and harvesting. Furthermore, many propietarios do not have, or have lost, relationships with customary peasant labor, and must seek out semi-salaried employees even for long-term supervision of their herds and properties. This often involves weeks or months of periodic searching for, ideally, a husband-wife team to watch cattle or fields. Because these types of employees have plots of their own, they are usually only available for a month or two at a time, so that locating and contracting the next month’s laboring family can be a constant concern.

2.8 Absence of Industry

Though peasants have been shifting from subsistence production to cash-cropping over the last several decades, very little ‘value added’ activity is performed in the province and what is performed is exclusively artisanal. Wool processing (rudimentary carding, spinning, weaving, and knitting) and the elaboration of cheese rounds are the most common forms of artisan production. Generally only peasants are active in the first, while both propietarios and peasants produce cheese to be sold locally or carried by brokers to Cuzco and Arequipa for sale. Nonetheless, all cheese producers complain that the market has been glutted (propietarios and merchants typically blame this glut on the dissemination of cheese making to peasant producers). Although the municipality sponsors regular agricultural fairs that award judged prizes for outstanding cheeses and other elaborated products, the level of sophistication is extremely low, probably due in
part to the weak market. Even *proprietarios* produce less than a dozen rounds a week during prime lactating periods, though they could conceivably produce much more with minor improvements of the process. Cheese was once nearly the exclusive preserve of the hacienda, and the exchange of cheese was a major element of *vecino* social prestation. Abraham Valencia Espinoza writes that, “for the Indians, the cheeses prepared by the mestizos carry messages of ostentation. Thanks to the cheeses they can buy consciences and change the decisions of attorneys and judges, or diminish the sentences; for mestizos, the cheese rounds are the best social connectors.”

Even now the essentially non-commercial nature of cheese-exchange amongst *vecinos* is evident. Vecinos bring rounds to Cuzco to give to *parientes*, send them on buses as remittances to their children studying in distant cities, sell them below market rates to acquaintances, and set them aside for visitors and houseguests. Amongst vecinos, cheese is generally passed through social networks rather than sold to hotels, restaurants, or grocers. One of my informants has a cheese logo that he commissioned decades ago with the intention of commercializing his product; the plan never came to fruition, however. There continues to be little or no marketing or commercialization of cheese within the province or in nearby urban markets.
Weaving is slightly more commercialized, though this is accomplished virtually entirely through the active intervention of NGOs in training, organizing, and marketing. This intervention is facilitated by the fact that elaboration of fiber is performed almost exclusively by comuneros, whom NGOs preferentially target. NGOs teach comuneros to utilize natural local dyes, rather than aniline, in order to make the process ostensibly more traditional (though aniline dyes have been utilized for over a century), more appealing to the tourist market (predominantly in Cuzco) and less harmful to the health of producers. NGOs also help to organize cooperatives, predominantly of peasant women, provide them funds for trips to regional fairs, and foster commercial ties between local producers and ‘fair trade’ vendors in urban centers. Nevertheless, virtually all weavers complain.
that the enthusiasm of NGO workers for the revival of traditional weaving is not justified by the weak market for their products and the meager prices they command.

2.9 Mining

The mining industry in Cuzco’s provincias altas predates the Spanish Conquest.\textsuperscript{24} With the arrival of conquistadors and encomenderos, however, the extraction reached a new level of intensity. The Visita of 1689 attests to the devastating impact that mining had on the province. Mitas drained villages of adult males. Given the brutal working conditions and the brutal disregard for the value of Indian life, many never returned. Most of the mitayos (slave-like labor levees) of Chumbivilcas were destined for Caylloma or Huancavelica. The discovery of Potosí in 1544 fundamentally changed the economic structure of the entire Spanish-controlled part of the continent (as well as, through interdicted trade, the Portuguese portion).\textsuperscript{25} In addition to this massive mining complex, a myriad of subsidiary industries sprung up across Spanish America, throughout the areas that would later become Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia. As the purest veins became exhausted, the demand for mercury to separate silver from stone increased. The mines at Huancavelica were the major source of mercury for Potosí, and also the major destination for Chumbivilcancano levees.

When large scale Spanish mineral extraction collapsed in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, artisan mining became the dominant form of mining activity. Chumbivilcas is rich in mineral resources, including gold, silver, copper, iron, lead, and tin, as well as granite, tuff, and salt.\textsuperscript{26} Mineral deposits and artisan mines exploiting them are ubiquitous in the province; they include “the silver and lead mines of San Marcelo, Poderosa, in the district of
Capacmarca; the gold-bearing deposits of Santa Cleofé, Phuyani, Clorinda, Inca, Emperatriz, in the district of Colquemarca; those of Portuguesa, Brillante Azul, Salvación, Navidad, Toro Sentado, Oasis, Catanga, Laura, Imperio, in the districts of Livitaca y Chamaca. In the early 18th century, Jesuit priests became active in mining in Velille, Colquemarca and Capacmarca. In addition to its monetary value, gold and silver were highly valued by the Church for the embellishment of their garments, their ritual paraphernalia and, more than anything, their churches. With the revocation of the Jesuit charter in 1767, families of allied criollos and mestizos took control of the small-scale mines. Several vecino families, particularly in Colquemarca and Alqavictoria, used peones or waqchilleros (hacienda laborers) to mine small family placer, or alluvial, deposits and even some lode deposits on a small scale.

During the late 19th and early 20th century, gold and silver mining served to reinforce the power of the ‘gamonales,’ who leveraged their local political, economic, and cultural advantages to maintain control over the extraction, distribution, and sale of mineral resources. One vecino informant, an elderly man in his late 90s, who formerly owned and operated a small artisan mine outside of Colquemarca, spoke with evident superciliousness and self-satisfaction of his time controlling the family gold mine, with frequent trips to Cuzco and Lima to sell gold and buy modern luxury goods, of bohemian drinking, singing, and celebration, and, perhaps, most of all, his legendary disregard for the reproductive rights of women, expressed frequently through the quasi-normative tradition of warmisuwa (woman-theft), with its predictable trail of abandoned children, both recognized and natural (illegitimate). This elderly vecino’s stories highlighted the role of mining in amplifying the disparity in wealth between vecinos and comuneros.
Mineral extraction was even more prone to monopolization than agriculture, pastoral production, or commerce. Artisan mining demands relatively minimal labor and capital investment, so mining families could generate high levels of income with little or no need to reimburse workers or otherwise contribute to surrounding communities. Perhaps most importantly, gold and silver have an extremely high weight-to-value ratio, especially relative to agricultural produce, which, given the isolation of Chumbivilcas and the resultant cost of transport, made the sale of gold in Lima and Arequipa an attractive source of currency and savings. Nonetheless, mineral exploitation in the province was generally desultory. Gade notes that “mining generally languished in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, often for other reasons than depletion of the ores. Within the past century, many small mines—the bulk of them owned by hacendados—have been worked episodically, but quite a few other concessions of known mineral deposits have apparently never been exploited at all.”

Today, artisan mining is done mostly by comuneros in small, kin-related groups with minimal technological inputs. The most common form of extraction is placer mining along the rivers and streams that carry gold from lodes high up in the surrounding mountains. In some places, like Alqavictoria, individual families of comuneros work lodes, located on customary property, with picks, then use a specially constructed wheel, on which they stand and rock back and forth, to crush ore for panning. This type of artisan mining is taking place against the backdrop of “Peru’s increasing dependence on mineral exports as the engine of economic growth,” and the palpable increase in exploration activity by multinationals in the region. National and multinational mining
companies have already claimed most of the subsurface rights in the province, and several multinational companies are currently in the exploration phase.

Chumbivilcanos look with eager anticipation at the modest prosperity that the mining industry has brought to neighboring provinces. Chumbivilcanos of all stripes look forward to the day when mining companies will enter into the production phase and begin to employ locals. Much of the speculation that has affected the local land market in recent years is due to the belief that mining in the region is about to take off. Even hard-core Marxists and indigenist activists believe that mining development will provide opportunities for self and communal improvement, and criticize the particulars of corporate involvement (i.e. the fact they’re not yet receiving gifts or a salary) rather than mineral exploitation per se. Current negotiations with mining companies pit peasants-turned-alcaldes against seasoned corporate vice presidents, CFOs, and their attorneys.

2.10 Wage labor

By all accounts, the local, urban market for labor has experienced a drastic expansion and differentiation over the last decade. Even over the 5 years I have worked in the region, there has been a palpable increase in economic activity—or, as Chumbivilcanos frequently observe, “Pucha, ya hay movimiento aquí! Antes no era así”—and, in particular, a proliferation of new forms of economic activity. The causes of this expansion will be discussed in later chapters, but here I will briefly characterize this urban employment. In the capital of Santo Tomás, people work as nurses, physicians, pharmacists, psychologists (the first practicing child psychologist hung his sign up in the third year of fieldwork), curanderos, bus drivers, agronomists, bank tellers (in the sole
bank in the province), hoteliers, attorneys, merchants, street sweepers, and educators. Even trades that formerly could be performed by a single individual have now differentiated internally: for construction, which formerly consisted of masons for the erection of walls of stone and tuff and carpenters for the construction of lintels, jambs, and flooring, has now functionally differentiated along similar lines to any modern economy: electricians, experts in tiling for kitchens and bathrooms (and even façades), plumbers, carpenters, manual labor, architects, masons, glaziers, and painters. Internet cafés, cellular phone vendors (which arrived in 2007), gas stations, hardware stores, beauty salons, fixed-menu restaurants, and electronics stores dot the town’s dozen or so paved roads; in short, all of the trades and establishments that one would expect in a thriving town in the developing world.

What deserves note is that, up until forty or fifty years ago, virtually none of this existed. There was certainly a Plaza de Armas (which, however, was merely a dirt field at the center of town), the colonial Templo, the large casonas of several families of vecinos (most of them roofed with thatch), and a periphery of modest stone huts, but functional economic or occupational differentiation hardly extended beyond peasant and lord. This is, obviously, somewhat of an exaggeration, as the following chapters will painstakingly demonstrate, but the juxtaposition is important to understanding the gravity of the social and political changes that occurred over the last half century.
Despite the evident ‘modernity’ of economic life in Chumbivilcas, the culture of labor in Chumbivilcas, as might be expected given the rapidity of these changes, is still not entirely ‘modern.’ Labor and employment tends to be occasional rather than professional. The peasant bourgeoisie often have homes in town as well as in the countryside and will do contract or artisan work as masons, carpenters, or haulers. In fact, peasants with dual town and country residence do all such work in Santo Tomás. Although these workers are often quite skillful, they would not be considered professional in the Western sense. They have only rarely received any professional training and their work pattern is inconsistent. Laborers are often tracked down on Sundays in the street market or sought out by radio announcement. If they need plumbing fixed, foundations dug, or showers installed, my vecino informants walk over to the house of someone they know to be competent to do the work and cajole them into coming.
back with them to accomplish the task. There is still a good deal of haranguing or critical
exhortation of laborers, even skilled ones. This verbal coercion is ‘necessary,’ in turn,
because wages are low and laborers frequently consider communal and familial
obligations equally or more pressing than wage labor. As in the case of agricultural labor,
manual and service jobs are almost exclusively filled by comuneros, who have their own
chacras and livestock in their native community, usually within easy walking distance of
the place of employment. Day laboring tends to be an opportunistic strategy, utilized
during idle periods in the agro-pastoral cycle to make up for occasional shortfalls or to
augment income in anticipation of exceptional expenditures. In part because comuneros
have family plots that provide for their family’s subsistence in normal years, there is a
discretionary quality to labor that would be foreign to the properly urban sector.

Work hours are flexible and often irregular. During sowing or reaping periods
personal fields are a higher priority than wage employment; as a result, the employer
obtains a peasant’s labor only when agricultural work is finished or temporarily in
abeyance—that is, sporadically. Even off-season, labor is irregular and a contractor will
sometimes disappear for a week without notification and will return without comment or
explanation. Promised completion dates are extremely approximate (if not arbitrary or
deaftively optimistic). A job that a contractor says will be completed, seguro, in three
days may take as many months. A contractor may work for a few hours, then never
return. Even advances or promised bonuses will not guarantee completion, much less
timely completion. All labor contracts are negotiated, and because virtually all
contractors are peasants with their own independent sources of income, residence and
alimentation, they are in a relatively strong negotiating position. Vecinos frequently
exclaim, in exasperation, “Chumbivilcas is the only place in the world where jobs are overabundant, but no one wants to work.” A more accurate statement might be that “No one wants to work for the wages being offered.” It seems clear that higher wages would increase willingness to work, as well as improve job performance, but the subsistence security of the peasant-laborer (and the attractiveness of emigration to those who would traditionally have been the labor reserve, which I will discuss subsequently) is a powerful restraint on labor exploitation.

The public sector is the main exception to this informality. The two most significant sources of salaried employment are the municipal administration and the school system (municipal employment will be treated in detail in chapters 6, 7, and 10). Public education is far and away the most significant source of wage employment in the province. While vecinos are disproportionately represented in the ranks of tenured primary and secondary faculty, many schoolteachers are now of ‘origen humilde.’

Although the majority of teaching positions are naturally in peripheral districts and comunidades, most profesores prefer to live in the provincial or district capitals and commute to work. Teachers who live within an hour or so of their teaching post will squeeze themselves with other teachers into a dedicated minivan every morning and return in one every afternoon. Teachers who work in more distant or isolated communities leave for their post Sunday night and return home the following Friday afternoon. The salary, depending on seniority and contract, varies between 800 and 1300 soles a month. This may seem meager, but given that public education is virtually the only local source of steady salaried employment, it is an extremely desirable field.
2.11 Domestic labor

While female employment outside of the home has increased, especially in the field of education, domestic labor is still performed almost exclusively by women and female children. Few homes possess the kinds of laborsaving devices that would ease the burden in time and energy of domestic work. A broad array of technological and service innovations that might reduce this workload—for example, dishwashers, washers, dryers, microwaves, restaurants, drycleaners, automobiles—have yet to be widely adopted in Chumbivilcas. As a result, many vecinas work long hours outside of the home, then return to prepare meals for their families, serve, clean, and monitor their children’s homework and other activities. Throughout my fieldwork, I was struck by how idle men often are after work, and how industrious the women. This was brought home to me with special force when a friend died, after a brief hospitalization, of complications from cirrhosis. Though an avid athlete, he had been an extremely heavy drinker throughout his life and had lived, by all accounts, a bohemian, improvident existence. The death seemed to me the natural, if deeply regrettable, outcome of his alcoholism. I was surprised, therefore, to hear widespread grumbling that his death was ultimately the result of his wife’s unwillingness or inability to take proper care of him, that she “never took care of him,” “never made him healthy meals,” and, generally, “neglected him.”

As is typical amongst traditional cultures in the process of acculturation, men demonstrate less obvious signs of traditionalism than women. They are more frequently bilingual, tend more often to wear western style dress, and engage in acculturated economic, social, and political activity outside the home. The fact that comuneras are
generally less likely to have the requisite knowledge, status, and sense of entitlement to seek legal redress and remedy, domestic violence is a serious problem, particularly in peasant communities. I have heard many grisly accounts from community health care workers of savage violence against women, often fueled by alcohol abuse. On the other hand, women are given substantial leeway and deference in their management of the domestic sphere and, more generally, the family budget. Women maintain their maiden names and give them to their children, who use them throughout their lives. Only with grandchildren is the grandmother’s apellido displaced. Likewise, local conceptions of property show the influence not only the relatively gender-neutral Spanish model, but also the influence of indigenous models of property. Married couples scrupulously distinguish between the husband’s and wife’s inherited property. It is, in fact, surprising to hear a family constantly distinguishing between spouses’ respective properties. It seems, furthermore, that vecinas have generally adapted better to than their husbands to the changes that I will describe in subsequent chapters, perhaps primarily because their daily existences and life trajectories have been anchored by the home and family and therefore less drastically affected.

2.12 Public sociality

Existence in Chumbivilcas is intensely social, and the claims of extended family, compadres, and community almost always trump business contracts and other formal commitments. This is true for all social strata. This intense social engagement is probably the single most important constraint on contract employment. A three-day absence of an albañil more likely than not involves a prior or prioritized social commitment—for
example, a two-day marriage *cargo* with a day of hung-over recovery. For *comuneros*, in particular, various reciprocal labor obligations, deeply enmeshed in social, familial, and political interests and responsibilities, also affect their willingness to seek cash employment. Traditional labor commitments to family members and ritual kin frequently conflict with wage employment. *Vecinos* and *comuneros* alike spend a huge portion of their time in social engagements. Talking in the plaza or a friend’s shop, sharing drinks in one of the town’s bars, home visits, funerals, weddings, and *compromisos* in general are the primary activities, social or otherwise, in a Chumbivilcano’s life, and remunerative economic activity frequently takes a back seat to them (this topic will be discussed at length in chapter 10).

Much sociality takes place in the context of public events, sponsored either by the municipality or other state institutions, in particular the school system. The overwhelming majority of public events are organized around children and adolescents. Municipal authorities and school directors therefore wield disproportionate power over social intercourse. On weekends parents may watch a soccer or volleyball tournament hosted by the municipality or the school district. More often than not, school-affiliated groups are practicing on the playground for a dance or marching competition. On most Sundays students march around the Plaza de Armas and their parents arrive from surrounding communities to sit in clusters watching them. The ubiquity of marching children and the peals of their brass bands is truly mind-boggling. Competitive cultural events for students dominate public discourse and activity. Virtually all public festivities involve folkloric competition between school classes. For literally months prior to these competitions, students practice in schoolyards and the streets; mothers sew costumes and
prepare food for the exhausted performers; and fathers try to scrape together funds to pay for the food and other supplies.

Beyond these public events, the role of the school system in sociality is overwhelming. Comuneros from nearby comunidades may come to town for the Sunday market to sell agricultural surpluses, to receive identification documents or subsidies from the federal government, or to seek medical treatment at the local clinic, but by far the most common reason to come into town—and the primary form of interaction with the state—is to attend to some aspect of their child or children’s education. An individual who is not affiliated with the education system—either as a student, instructor, parent or other relative of a student—is likely to be largely isolated from public life in general. The public education system is doubly essential to the lives of vecinos: not only are many of them parents of school-aged children, but also, because the public education system is the primary source of wage employment in the province, many, if not the majority, are educators (this will be specifically discussed in chapter 10). Almost all of my vecino informants are or have been educators, and those who are not are typically married to one. While men may have relationships built around bar-culture or political affiliation, female instructors socialize almost exclusively with other educators.

2.13 Emigration

There is one key social process that the regional focus of this dissertation can only capture obliquely, or in a fragmentary way: the inexorable urbanization of Peruvian society. At the provincial level, this is manifested both in the increasing size and density of provincial and district capitals and as a constant outmigration of Chumbivilcanos to
regional and national urban centers. The process of urbanization is complex and involves social, cultural, and economic elements, but I think Aguirre-Beltrán sums up the fundamentally reality, which is that “rural-urban migration is basically a flow of workers following capital investment.”

The steady decline in the terms of trade between the rural and urban sectors has made low-productivity Andean agriculture increasingly unprofitable. At an economic level, this is largely a logical outcome of the basic economics of supply and demand: as the modernizing agricultural sector has increasingly utilized technical and technological innovations, as well as economies of scale, to increase productivity and supply, prices for primary agricultural resources have fallen. This kind of technologically and capital intense agriculture is beyond the reach of most Chumbivilcanos, not only because they lack the capital to make the initial investment in improvements, but also because (a) most units of production are too small to cost-effectively exploit these new technologies and (b) most properties are too steep, too isolated, too elevated, too fragmentary, and/or too stony to mechanize and rationalize effectively. These basic handicaps have been exacerbated by national development policies that are prejudicial to the agricultural sector (such as the Velasco regime’s price controls on basic foodstuffs, which facilitated industrial growth by driving down the cost of production, while undermining agricultural producers) as well as the free trade policies currently pursued by the national government.

The decreasing profitability of agriculture would not necessarily cause urban migration, however, if the urban sector were not comparatively more dynamic. For many centuries, in fact, only modest employment disparities existed between rural and urban economies: Andean cities like Cuzco served primarily as centers of agro-pastoral
consumption, aggregation and distribution, rather than manufacturing (to this day Cuzco
has only one full-fledged factory—the Cuzqueña beer distillery). The growing dynamism
of the urban sector in Peru—driven largely by tourism in Cuzco, but also by
industrialization, mining, commerce, and the expansion of the service industry in the
country at large—has contributed to skyrocketing urbanization, particularly in Lima,
which exploded from 660 thousand inhabitants in 1940 to more than seven million in
2007.

2.14  *Historical vecino urban migration*

There has been a generational cycle of urban migration in the vecino community
for centuries. At the apex of rural society, non-indigenous Peruvians have used landed
estates to elevate themselves socially and gain prestige and entrée into local political
office (membership in the *cabildo*, for example).\(^3\) Estates and political offices have, in
turn, been used by provincials to gain resources and status in order to access higher levels
of government and commerce in national urban centers. Educational training for urban
professional employment has therefore been a major element both of financial planning
and migration. Seemin Qayum et al. note that, in Bolivia, there was a consistent transition
in the second generation of the landed gentry from farming to the professions (for
example, law, engineering, medicine, and mining).\(^4\) More specifically, there seems to
have been a historical shift in interest and investment from law to agronomy and
engineering and now to modern, upper middle-class service careers in medicine, nursing,
architecture, tourism, and computer science. Nonetheless, the structural role of
education—in upward and outward mobility—remains basically the same.
Several of my informants have noted that the majority of their parents’ fortunes were spent providing educational training for their children. Most of my informants themselves invest the majority of their discretionary income in education for their children. As one informant put it, “the best inheritance that one can leave is a profession.” The acquisition of a professional degree necessarily involves education outside of the province. The practice of education is therefore itself a process of emigration. Sometimes, it not only involves the emigration of the children, but of the parents as well: given the importance of childrearing to most Chumbivilcanos, many parents emigrate temporarily or permanently to the city in order to spend more time with their children and to better monitor their education. In fact, Qayum et al. argue that in Bolivia “the education of the children was the principal motive for the family’s transfer of its permanent residence from the countryside to the city.”

The diagram below provides a schematization of this generational cycle.

![Diagram of generational cycle of vecino migration]

**Figure 9. Historical generational cycle of vecino migration.**
Furthermore, once a degree is obtained, there are very few local job opportunities, which increases the pressure to emigrate permanently to the city. Aguirre-Beltrán notes that this process is common throughout rural Latin America: “the controlling elite pays a high price for the advanced education of their children, who seldom return once their training is completed; there is no need for their specialized work. The cost of the preparation of the artisans and professionals who leave represents a serious bloodletting for the regional city; this is another factor contributing to its stagnation.”

Although a number of anthropologists and historians have argued that the profits of hacienda production were either squandered in luxury consumption or otherwise sunk into status displays, in Chumbivilcas (and the Central American cases treated by Beltrán), much of the value generated by the labor of colonos, waqchilleros, and other hacienda workers was used to fund the professional preparation and persistent urban migration of the children of hacendados and the vecino bourgeoisie.

2.15 Modern vecino emigration

While it may be impossible to quantify the contribution of the Reforma Agraria, Sendero Luminoso, and the subsequent electoral and municipal reforms to emigration, there is no question that, for vecinos, the flight from the province has been accelerated by the particular events of the last several decades and the rising tide of ethnic antagonism toward them. Linda Seligmann argues that in Paruro, Chumbivilcas’s northern neighbor, “following the reform” there was an “exodus of most of the landed elite from highland communities.” In Chumbivilcas as well, the majority of vecinos (or former vecinos) now live outside of the province. All vecinos have multiple family members
living in Cuzco, Arequipa, and Lima. Every member of the former landed elite has family members living in Europe, the US, Chile, or other countries of the global north. One informant now living in Lima (but born in Ayacucho) succinctly summed up this reality: “I left Ayacucho in 1967. In 1969 I was already in Europe, studying. My children have studied overseas. In Sweden, the US, Spain, France. All of my children have studied overseas. One son is a physicist, my oldest daughter is a biologist, my youngest is studying the environment in Spain and wants to return to work with an NGO in environmental projects.”

Many vecino informants who now live outside of the province—and return only for fiestas or to visit ailing friends or family members—report that the Reforma and Sendero were major elements of their decision to ‘pack up and leave’ the province, and openly express their belief that there is no future for non-indigenous people in the countryside. Many of my informants share the sentiment which Bobrow-Strain attributes to rural landowners in southern Mexico—that their “children’s real futures lay off the land.” In a certain sense, emigration is the unmarked choice: a Chumbivilcano émigré doesn’t need to explain why he or she chose to leave the province, but virtually all vecinos who have stayed express a concrete, conscious reason for remaining. This reason virtually always involves local economic assets, most commonly urban or agro-pastoral property inheritances, or a tenured teaching position. In one family, for example, of six middle-aged siblings, half live outside the province (one sister lives and works as a teacher in Cuzco, one sister lives and works as a teacher in Lima, and one brother lives and works as a biochemist in Utah); the two remaining brothers both inherited urban property and large estates on the valley floor with year-round irrigation, and the
remaining female is developmentally disabled. Within the family, emigration seems to confer status and authority (all Chumbivilcanos speak with reverence of family members who have emigrated to Europe or the US), whereas being left behind in the province seems to carry some degree of shame.

2.16 Comunero urban migration

This emphasis on the particular causes of current vecino emigration must be balanced with a recognition that, on the one hand, emigration has always been the norm amongst vecinos and, on the other, that comuneros are also being drawn inexorably to the cities, despite having benefited from many of the phenomena that have injured the interests of vecinos. Peasant emigration from the province is itself an accelerating phenomenon rather than a new one: comuneros have been drawn to the cities and coast for centuries by, in particular, labor opportunities and military conscription. As a voluminous literature suggests, this migration has cascading impacts on peasant societies: remittances from emigrants often become the primary source of wealth in villages; emigrants, with their improved command of urban and state culture, often become absentee leaders or representatives of local communities; emigrants are often the beachhead of new values, aspirations, and consumption practices; resulting orientations toward the city and wage-employment, fueled by rural overpopulation, often lead not just to an equilibration of rural population levels but, further, to rural depopulation. Emigration is thus central to the ongoing processes of social change in peasant society.

While vecinos have always, constitutively, lived in town (or at least maintained residences there), the last forty years have witnessed a massive movement of comuneros
from comunidades into the outskirts of district capitals (I address this movement from the perspective of vecinos in chapters 8 and 10). The vast majority of these immigrants continue to maintain homes, livestock, and fields in their native communities, and to spend part of the year attending to their ongoing economic, social, and political interests in their comunidades. As with emigration beyond the province, this movement to the towns is overwhelmingly motivated by economic and educational opportunities. Without having gathered comprehensive data on the subject, I would nevertheless argue that even in situations where maintaining residence in town is not financially beneficial, and may involve substantial sacrifices, comuneros will do so in order to obtain access to the superior educational institutions in town.

More generally, it should be noted that comuneros are frequently drawn to the city under markedly less favorable terms than vecinos. While vecinos frequently emigrate to the city to attend boarding school or university and subsequently enter into wage employment in the formal economy, comunero emigrants frequently experience difficulty in finding work and eventually settle into informal employment (though affluent comuneros are increasingly able to send their children to the same universities which vecino children have traditionally attended). Even extremely poor campesinos often have several children working or going to school in Arequipa, Cuzco, or Lima. The poorer immigrants are frequently employed in minimally remunerative service jobs and have very little disposable income to send back home to their parents, siblings, and young children.

Although all Chumbivilcanos feel pride in their folkloric traditions, they also naturally think of the province is a rural backwater. In addition to jobs and educational
opportunities, the city also offers malls, movie theaters, discotheques, girls . . . in short, the city is “where the action is.” While much of this is essentially a product of economic opportunity, the perception of the city as a place of excitement, movement, and change is itself a powerful stimulus to emigration. Furthermore, especially for vecinos, so many of their social and family relations now live in Cuzco, Arequipa, and Lima that remaining in the province is frequently paradoxically experienced as disconnection from, rather than connection to, kith and kin. That said, in chapter 7 I will discuss the possibility that the expansion of the budgets and responsibilities of local municipalities may begin to slow this ‘bloodletting,’ by expanding the job opportunities for professionals within local administrations. Throughout the course of my fieldwork over the last half-decade, vecinos and comuneros alike have become increasingly sanguine about the economic outlook for the province; for vecinos this optimism frequently even outweighs their gloomy sense of belonging to a dwindling and increasingly marginalized ethnic minority.
Chapter 3
Reconquista and Conquista: Institutions and Ideologies

This chapter explores the historical context of contemporary Chumbivilcano thinking, feeling, and social practice. In particular, it explores the Iberian ideological and institutional antecedents of Spanish colonization in the Americas and the ways in which these antecedents were reshaped to adapt to the unique circumstances of the colonial situation. In the first section, I discuss several key ideological elements associated with the *Reconquista* of Moorish Spain that contributed to the attitudes and orientations of conquistadores and subsequent settlers and, I argue in subsequent ethnographic chapters, continue to exert an ideological influence on *vecinos chumbivilcanos*. In particular, I focus on the preoccupation with lineage and family honor, the disdain for physical labor, and the intense preoccupation with ethnic distinction and ‘*pureza de sangre*’. In subsequent chapters, I will argue that these are the historical precedents for many of the ideologies that my *vecino* informants are struggling to square with contemporary social and political realities.

The second part begins with a description of the institutional framework of conquest and colonization. Spanish settlement in the New World—though characterized by significant (and frequently perverse) ‘play’ between royal authorities in Spain, their local representatives, and colonists—was nonetheless pursued through formal institutions. I trace the development of several of these institutions from their roots in the *Reconquista* of Moorish Spain and their subsequent adaptation to the colonial American context. In particular, I discuss the role of *encomienda*, *repartimiento*, *ayllu*, *mita*,

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tributo, villa, cabildo, doctrina, and later reducción, corregimiento, obraje, and hacienda, in the development of the patterns of settlement and subjugation that characterized social and ethnic relations in Chumbivilcas and the southern Peruvian highlands throughout the colonial era.

Throughout the discussion, my objective is not to summarize the process of the Spanish conquest and colonization of Peru; many such summaries have been written, and I have not gathered any data that would allow me to meaningfully contribute to this literature. I do, however, believe that the ethnographic data that I have collected and that I will present and analyze in subsequent chapters can be more fully understood within the context of an historical trajectory or genealogy. Because the past forty years have been so momentous in the changes and challenges they have presented to my informants, the current configuration cannot be comprehended except as a result of a historical ‘ torsion,’ whereby traditional institutions and relationships have been radically twisted into new ways of interacting and being. My vecino informants feel this ‘torsion’ in visceral ways, as ideological contradictions, status incongruences, emotional and behavioral anachronisms, desfases, ambivalence, anxiety, and disorientation. Describing and analyzing their social experience synchronically would therefore be partial and potentially deeply distorting. The trajectory I follow through the historical background is designed specifically to illuminate the social and ideological tensions and conflicts that continually harass my informants as they struggle to build and make sense of new lives.

Finally, in the description and analysis of colonial institutions, it is virtually impossible to make strictly accurate generalizations. Colonial policy was continually evolving and, given the distances and impediments to communication and enforcement,
there was often substantial irregularity in its application in the ‘periphery.’ Not only must one hypostasize moments or eras of historical stability and coherence, but one must recognize that there were substantial differences in institutional structure from audiencia to audiencia and even from district to district. This is summed up well by Christine Hünefeldt in her work on land conflict at the close of the colonial period:

In large part, the coexistence of multiple types of alcaldes, gobernadores, caciques, and the indefiniteness of their assignments when the colonial reality is observed, is the result of the fact that royal dispositions could almost never be implemented uniformly in all of the colonial territory. Until the end of the colonial period there were comunidades that didn’t have caciques, others that had no gobernadores, and a third portion that didn’t have alcaldes.¹

Given such local and temporal variations, it would be foolhardy to attempt a literal description of these institutions. In the following discussion, I am interested in the historical precedents of Spanish settlement in the indigenous countryside and the evolution of successive systems of ethnic subjugation. One of the facts that I hope to demonstrate in the course of this and subsequent chapters is the remarkable endurance in the Peruvian sierra, and in Chumbivilcas in particular, of the basic socio-economic and ideological structure of subjection from its peninsular antecedents through the colonial and Republican eras, and up through the revolution of General Juan Velasco Alvarado in 1969—a structure so enduring, in fact, that it continues to inform the ways vecinos chumbivilcanos make sense of their continuously altering social circumstances.

3.1 Iberian ideological inheritances

It is common for historians to point to the aristocratic pretensions of the conquistadors and later colonists, and to point back to their origins in the militarism of
Reconquista Spain. There does appear to be a body of interrelated and mutually reinforcing ideological elements that soldiers and settlers brought with them to the Americas that have had decisive effects on sociality, industry, and governance in the colonies. Taken together we might call this an ‘aristocratic complex,’ the foremost elements of which are (a) a heightened attention to lineage and, in particular, inherited titles and status, (b) a related sense of ethno-religious difference and superiority toward conquered peoples, and (c) a disdain for physical labor.

Hereditary titles and privileges were absolutely essential elements of social distinction and reproduction in Medieval Spain, particularly given the circumstances of the military expansion and settlement that characterized the Reconquista. The hallmark of a feudal society is that the sovereign lacks sufficient power or resources to completely subordinate and administer his (or her) dominions. He is therefore forced to delegate governance over subordinate political units to largely autonomous lords who, in return for the benefits that they receive from their fiefdoms, are obligated to render military service to the sovereign. Though the system of feudal lords (king, duke, marquis, count) is perhaps the most visible aspect of feudal government, its entire logic is based on the exchange or recognition of titles (with all their benefits, social and material) for fealty and service. Without implying that wealth was not an important element in status or ranking, the martial conditions that prevailed in Spain in the high Middle Ages, which depressed commerce and industry and prioritized warfare and plunder, made titles (generally associated with military service to the Crown) even more essential than they might have been under circumstances of peace and stability. Along with the existence of
religious and ethnic minorities, discussed below, the importance of hereditary titles was central to the distinctive preoccupation of Spanish colonists with lineage.

3.2 Disdain for physical labor

An integral part of the aristocratic complex was disdain for physical labor. This disdain for physical labor could be stated in other ways: for example, as a belief that manual labor is degrading or that manual labor is suited to (or better performed by) peoples of low birth. Contemporary critiques of the so-called ‘Spanish character’ frequently noted the unwillingness of Spanish colonists to engage in any form of manual labor. Hanke writes that “the idea that someone else should do the hard manual work of the world appealed strongly to sixteenth-century Spaniards, who inherited a taste for martial glory and religious conquest from their medieval forefathers who had struggled for centuries to free Spain from the Moslems.” He quotes the following rhetorical question asked by “Juan Delgado, writing in the middle of the eighteenth century about the Philippine Islands”: “Do Spaniards work the soil and plant crops in these islands? Certainly not! On reaching Manila all become caballeros.” This disdain and the emphasis on lineage and genealogical difference were mutually reinforcing: high status lineages were engaged in martial (and leisure) pursuits rather than agricultural labor, and agricultural labor therefore implied, ipso facto, that the laborer was of a low status lineage. It’s easy to see why a rights-bearing townsman (vecino) would be so eager not to engage in any activity that might identify him as a serf or peasant; the desire to avoid becoming debased by manual labor therefore fed into the vital importance of vecindad as a social distinction, which will be discussed later in the chapter.
3.3  *Ethno-religious distinction*

The most noticeable aspect of the *Reconquista*, however, was obviously the contact of two ethnically and religiously distinct peoples. While attitudes toward conquered Moors were initially relatively tolerant, these hardened toward the end of the 15th century. Johnson points out that an ethnic division of status and labor existed in Reconquista Spain, in which Jews acted “as doctors, intellectuals, and money lenders; the Moors as artisans and small tenant farmers; and the Christian *hidalgos* monopolized the ownership of land and the administrative posts, both civil and ecclesiastical.” This structured and stratified coexistence began to falter in the late 15th century, leading to forcible conversion and, ultimately, the expulsion of Jews in 1492 and the Mudéjars in 1611.

One result of the subjugation of and, in particular, hardening animosity toward Moors and Jews was an essentialization of ethnic and religious identity, both in the sense that Spaniards came to believe in the intrinsic difference between themselves and conquered peoples and in the sense that ethno-religious identity became the *sine qua non* to social worth. The associated statuses of ‘*cristiano viejo*’ (old Christian) referring to the fact that one was not a recent convert to Christianity, and ‘*limpieza de sangre*’ (cleanness of blood, blood purity), both clearly refer (one from a religious and other from a genealogical perspective) to one’s membership in the conquering rather than conquered group. These twin distinctions are ubiquitous in the historical record from late medieval and early modern Spain. As Chacón Jiménez notes, “the necessity of demonstrating the ‘*limpieza de sangre*’ of one’s ancestors, imprinted a profound biographic-genealogical
tradition [that] differentiates and distinguishes Spanish society from that of neighboring territories.” Though genealogical memory could, in practice, be manipulated or mythologized, the inability to demonstrate the Christianity of one’s ancestors or the purity of one’s bloodline was a crippling social impairment. The need to demonstrate ethno-religious distinction therefore contributed substantially to the aforementioned importance of lineage and genealogy.

While I am leery of attributing undue causation to so-called ‘national character,’ it does seem that the peculiar history of Spanish state formation, amplified by continual military expansion, may have generated a distinctive attitude and ideology (or, at least, popularized a cultural complex that in other nations was more confined to nobility) with regard to lineage, labor, and ethno-religious identity. It seems clear that these ways of thinking and feeling were strengthened by the ethnic subjugation of the *Reconquista* and subsequent *Conquista* and that, furthermore, they reinforced and were themselves reinforced by the distinctive institutions of the expanding Spanish state.

3.4 *Institutions of expansion*

While the adventurism, autonomy, and pillage that characterized the initial years of the *Conquista* give the impression that the colonization of Latin America was an essentially lawless enterprise, the reality, of course, is that Spanish colonization was regulated by a system of preexisting and evolving cultural and governmental institutions. Many scholars, following Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz, have argued that the Spanish conquest and colonization of the Americas was, institutionally, an extension of the process of the *Reconquista* of Moorish Spain. For half a millennium, the Romanized
Visigothic kingdoms fought endemic wars of expansion into the declining Moorish caliphates of southern Spain. The concomitants of this process were a political, religious, social, and cultural organization geared toward militarism, subjugation, forcible conversion, settlement, and ethnic and status distinction.

Two of the institutional foundations of the centuries-long expansion of the Reconquista, were the villa (under various forms and denominations, including pueblo, comuna, and municipio) and the feud (in various forms and under various names, including comenda, encomienda, prestimonio, and feudo). These same institutions were to become, in turn, the foundation of colonial expansion in the New World as well. Traditional accounts of the Conquest and early colonization of Spanish America have put heavy emphasis on the institution of encomienda, but the villa was as important to the process of colonization, both of southern Spain and the Americas.11 During the Reconquista, the military nature of the expansion meant that the fortified villa with its surrounding agricultural and pastoral land and dependent hamlets was the primary mode of resettlement.12 As H. B. Johnson points out, the “towns that were erected in the wake of the reconquistadores were military and religious centers, not places of trade.”13 Each municipality was governed by a “settlement charter (forum, carta puebla) for the original inhabitants and an elaborate extensive customary code (fuero extenso) complied at a later date for their descendants and newcomers,” mixing Roman and Visigothic customary law.14

The villa/municipio was important not just as an administrative and demographic (in the sense of distributing a population) institution; the villa was also the primary locus
of sociality and, even more importantly for our analysis, belonging and rights-bearing.

Herzog writes that, in medieval Spain,

citizenship was formulated as a contract in which the newcomer agreed to certain obligations (mainly to reside in the community and to pay taxes) in return for receiving certain benefits (usually access to communal lands and office holding). By the sixteenth century, this citizenship regime extended to all Castilian communities. Whether under royal or seigniorial jurisdiction, whether rural or urban, the people of all three estates were divided between citizens (vecino) and noncitizens (residentes or forasteros).  

Townsmen and women thus received rights to communal resources, legal protections, and exemptions from certain royal taxes as members of the corporate town, from which the peasantry in the surrounding countryside were excluded. The model brought to the New World thus already distinguished clearly between townsmen (vecinos) and various classes of rural peasantry in the surrounding countryside. In subsequent chapters, I will argue that vecindad became the central idiom of differentiation in the southern highlands of Peru not only because urban residence, in practice, was juxtaposed to residence in an indigenous comunidad and associated with political and economic participation in the nation at large, but also because of the Iberian, pre-modern emphasis on vecindad as the primary source of citizenship and civility. In early modern Spain, vecindad was not conceived as an alternative to state citizenship; a Spaniard may have been a subject of the king, but his rights and responsibilities were stipulated in the fuero, or charter, of his city.

As Herzog emphasizes, the absence of a supra-municipal citizenship meant that it was unthinkable that a person “be without a ‘known citizenship’ (vecindad conocida) because this lack of citizenship meant a complete personal liberty, which could not be
permitted.” Vecindad was, literally, city-zenship (or ciudadanía), and the vecino, literally, a city-zen.

3.5 Cabildo

The deliberative body of the villa was the concejo or cabildo, which exhibited wide historical and local variability. The form that was initially imported into Peru was the result of the municipal reforms (the Cortes de Alcalá) implemented by Alfonso XI of Castile in 1348. Prior to these reforms, the concejo was made up of ‘hombres buenos,’ caballeros (gentlemen, knights), merchants and other townsfolk “who had a casa poblada with a wife and children, and who possessed a recognized decency” or “good reputation.” Throughout the Middle Ages, these concejos were themselves subordinated to the authority of the feudal or ecclesiastical lord who held their town and territory in encomienda or fief. John Preston Moore points out that, as cities grew from the 13th century onward, the open council of vecinos became progressively more unwieldy. Increasingly, officeholders assumed more and more of the responsibilities of governing municipalities. Alfonso formalized this trend by replacing “the concejo general de vecinos [with] a concejo reducido or regimiento” and introducing the office of regidor (or corregidor), who became the direct representative of the crown at the municipal level. In essence, the regimiento became the executive organ of “popular assembly of vecinos,” which was marginalized into an essentially advisory role. The primary intention of these reforms was apparently to shift the balance of power from municipalities toward the royal administration. In addition to subordinating local municipal power to royal power, there is a general consensus that, from the 13th to 16th
century, there was a steady process of monopolization of municipal power by local hereditary elites, particularly through the trend toward the endowment and sale of municipal office.\textsuperscript{25} With regard to this decadence of municipal institutions and the slow erosion of the autonomy and representativeness of the consejos, Gonzalez Alonso has spoken of “the absorption of government by the nobility.”\textsuperscript{26}

In the course of the 15\textsuperscript{th} century, the villa began to “be considered as ‘capital’ of a ‘land’ or ‘province’” and the regidor, as royal overseer of the cabildo, was transformed into the ‘corregidor’ of an extensive region constituted by an urban center and its dependent towns and countryside.\textsuperscript{27} In the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, the corregimientos (or regimientos) were transformed into ayuntamientos (though the three terms had been used interchangeably for centuries), which further reduced the size and representativeness of the concejo and expanded the number of paid offices (which were frequently monopolized by council members).\textsuperscript{28} In the course of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century, the cabildo also “lost the right to make land grants,” further contributing to the decline in its power and autonomy.\textsuperscript{29} Finally, the Bourbon reforms further centralized and rationalized administration, subordinating the concejo to the increasingly bureaucratized royal apparatus.

3.6 \textit{Articulation of Iberian and Inca institutions}

This process of centralization and bureaucratization was unfolding in Spain as well as in the American colonies. One of the distinctive aspects of the colonial territories, however, was the difficulty of successfully implementing administrative rationalization and other government policy and law. Mario Góngora (1951) and Magnus Mörner (1970)
have written about the importance of non-enforcement of law in the development of
Spanish colonial ethnic relations. Though the Spanish colonial legal framework was
becoming more and more elaborate and comprehensive in course of the 16\textsuperscript{th} and early
17\textsuperscript{th} centuries, forcing colonial activity into its constraints proved difficult. Royal
authorities responded to complaints from Church officials, indigenous caciques, and other
officials about the mistreatment of \textit{indios encomendados} and other natives by elaborating
a myriad of protective laws. These laws were not only humanitarian, but were also
(perhaps primarily) intended to serve the crown’s interest by undermining the autonomy
of \textit{criollo} elites and arresting the rapid decimation of tribute-paying indigenous subjects.

The vast distances separating the metropolis from the administered colonies made
communication difficult and time-consuming, and necessitated substantial autonomy for
local colonial representatives. The size of the colonial possessions drastically exceeded
the reserves in Spain of qualified and dependable administrators; like a snake swallowing
an elephant, the Spanish royal apparatus was unable to administratively digest the
colonies. As such, entire provinces were effectively left to rule themselves, with limited
oversight from parish priests and periodic visits from royal representatives. While the
crown succeeded in suppressing or preventing the development of formally autonomous
institutions, Góngora points out that positions in the \textit{cabildos}—\textit{alcaldes ordinarios},
\textit{jueces}, \textit{teniente general}, \textit{alcalde mayor}, \textit{corregidor}, \textit{gobernador}, \textit{alguacil}—, whether
elected by the local \textit{cabildo} or appointed by the viceroy, were ultimately filled by vecinos
of the respective municipalities, thus undermining the bureaucratic and centralizing thrust
of colonial policy. In the century following the \textit{conquista}, \textit{cabildos} were the centers of
local and regional power. Though the autonomy of the colonial villa and \textit{cabildo} was
weakened by the absence of detailed customary rights (villas in the colony received only royal charters, stipulating their rights and responsibilities, rather than the *fueros*, built up over centuries, which guaranteed a degree of autonomy to the Iberian villa), the distances separating colony from metropole, and even provincial seat from the *audiencia* in Lima, meant that the colonial *cabildos* were significant powers unto themselves. In the first fifty years of colonization, the *cabildos* were dominated, and often monopolized, by *encomenderos*.

The charters of many villas stipulated a temporary, encomienda-like grant of *mitayos* to all founding vecinos. In the villa of Arnedo, discussed by Louis Farón, for example, all 22 founding vecinos received the right to a proportional allotment from the 242 (80 year-round, 100 winter-only, and 62 summer-only) *mitayos* apportioned to the villa, for a period of 10 years. In addition, vecinos were given their own urban plot as well as agricultural land around the periphery of the villa. Many of these later properties became the foundations of haciendas, as vecinos received *mercedes* or official recognition of their de facto possession of land ‘abandoned’ by declining surrounding indigenous communities.

The overwhelming challenge that colonial administrators faced was how to articulate Peninsular institutions, like the *villa* and *cabildo*, with existing local institutions. Even had it been motivated and possessed the conceptual and technical tools available to do so (which, in the event, it was and did not), the Spanish state lacked the human and financial resources to completely restructure the populous societies of the Andes along Iberian lines. Góngora argues that the Crown, recognizing that it lacked the resources to directly fund the conquest and colonization of America and that, therefore,
“a fundamental reform on purely bureaucratic principles was impossible,” chose instead to utilize private enterprise “incorporated into the State by privileges and obligations” as “the most efficient form of conquest.”

The Crown’s mode of intervention, therefore, was selective. The encomienda, as it adapted to the colonial context, is an excellent example of this selectivity.

### 3.7 Encomienda

The feud or *encomienda* had a lengthy history, stretching back deep into the Middle Ages. It was an essential element of feudalism; stated in general terms, “the encomienda consisted in the temporary grant by the sovereign of territory, cities, towns, castles, and monasteries, with powers of government and the right to receive revenues, or a stipulated part thereof, and the services owed to the Crown by the people of the areas concerned under fuero and custom. The grant was given for the lifetime of the recipient, for that of the sovereign, or at the will of the latter . . . [though they] tended to become hereditary.”

In return for these privileges, “the recipient of an encomienda, or comendador, was under obligation to maintain a certain number of lances for military service, granting to these emoluments, to support the *curas* of the churches of the encomienda, and to give alms to the needy.” The encomienda that emerged in the Americas, initially in the Caribbean, was substantially different. Keith argues, in fact, that the two had hardly anything in common and notes that the practice of allotting Indians to conquistadors was initially called *repartimiento* and only later came to be referred to as encomienda.
The objective of the encomienda in the New World was not to intervene into and alter the structure of indigenous governance and sociality, but rather to leave the autochthonous communities intact (except for their religious beliefs and institutions) and, in effect, to merely cream the agricultural and labor surplus off the top of native production. As it developed in the Americas, the encomienda lost its jurisdictional or governmental role\textsuperscript{40} and encomenderos retained merely the rights to tribute and service. The encomienda in the American colonies was not a grant of land, but of a subject population; encomenderos received a repartimiento or allotment of natives who were obligated to render tribute and services, in theory in return for Christianizing, educating, and insuring the welfare of allotted communities (though in practice such reciprocal responsibilities were rarely fulfilled).\textsuperscript{41}

This policy was the result, in part, of a fortuitous coincidence between Castilian political norms with regard to ethno-religious minorities and the pre-Conquest Inca system of tribute. On the Spanish side, the self-rule of local indigenous political institutions had its precedent in the royally supervised self-government of Mudéjar and Jewish communities in Spain prior to their forced conversion. According to Robert Chamberlain, “Mudéjares and Jews residing in the Castilian cities and towns were set apart from the remainder of the population in special districts, known as aljamas and arrabales. Moorish and Jewish authorities exercised civil and criminal jurisdiction over their own people, subject to the superior authority of the Crown.”\textsuperscript{42} On the Inca side, Inca representatives had intervened in limited ways in the internal organization of local polities (in particular with regard to marriage and other cult activities), but had generally been content to co-opt amenable local nobility in return for labor and in-kind tribute. As
such, the *encomienda* was, at least theoretically and initially, both a continuation of Spanish ethnic policy and a continuation (with several essential modifications) of the Inca’s own tribute system.

3.8 *Corregimiento*

The Spanish crown viewed the encomienda as a disagreeable expedient in the conquest of the Americas, but was always uncomfortable with the autonomy that it afforded to conquistadors and the developing colonial elites. The New Laws of Carlos V, in 1542, were an attempt to abolish the encomienda, but quickly triggered the revolt of Gonzalo Pizarro, half-brother of Francisco Pizarro, who was able to take control of the whole of Peru and modern Ecuador and defeat and execute the first viceroy of Peru, Blasco Nuñez Vela, who had been sent to implement the New Laws. Although Gonzalo Pizarro was ultimately captured and executed, the laws repealing encomienda were revoked in a bid to placate the restive *encomenderos*. Although the encomienda would not be formally abolished until 1720, the rapid decline in native population quickly eroded the viability of existing encomiendas. According to Burga, “by the final decade of the 16th century, encomiendas had lost 45% of their initial profitability,” undoubtedly largely because so many of their *indios encomendados* had fled or expired from introduced disease. The importance of the encomienda was further reduced by modifications to the preexisting Spanish institutions of *repartimiento* and *corregimiento*. The New Laws and subsequent *instrucciones* (policy statements) allowed for native labor to be compelled by the viceroy when there was no practical alternative (for instance in extractive industries
and agriculture). Under pressure from colonists, however, the provisions allowing for repartimiento of indigenous labor were expanded and eventually developed into a form of a labor compulsion that, while more bureaucratized and under stricter royal control, was subject to many of the same abuses as the encomienda system.

Under the new system, the power to draft and dispose indigenous labor levies rested in the hands of royally-appointed corregidores. Although the king was the ultimate authority in the administration of the indigenous population, the office of corregidor was the semi-autonomous authority at the level of the province or, more accurately, at the level of the corregimiento. As was the case with his peninsular counterpart, the colonial corregidor was appointed by and served at the discretion of royal authorities. From the peninsular perspective, the introduction of corregimientos was a logical step in the rationalization of colonial administration. According to Góngora, “The Spaniard who received Indians in repartimiento didn’t acquire any privilege whatsoever; it was treated, rather, as a mere administrative measure that conferred to him the right to utilize remunerated manpower.” Thus, the personal authority and autonomy of the encomendero were replaced by the relatively strict subordination of the corregidor to royal oversight and regulation.

A portion of the corregidores in the New World oversaw municipalities of Spaniards, where their authority was somewhat constrained by the cabildos de vecinos. The corregidores de indios administered large regions populated exclusively by indigenous subjects and were effectively omnipotent within their jurisdictions. The most troublesome duties and privileges of the corregidor de indios proved to be the collection of tribute, the repartimiento de mitayos, and the repartimiento or reparto de mercaderías
Corregidores were responsible for the collection of the Indian tribute and its delivery to the royal administration. In fact, the salary of corregidor was paid with a portion of the collected tribute; Góngora points out that, in Peru, “each tribute-paying Indian subject” was required to pay an additional sum to pay the corregidor’s salary. Both tribute and mita were conceived under the Incan Empire in terms of reciprocal, if asymmetrical, exchange between subject ayllus and the Inca. Steve Stern argues that some of the earliest encomenderos recognized this and, as in the case of Diego Maldonado, set aside portions of tribute in kind to be redistributed amongst tributaries. Under the Toledan corregimiento, these forms of reciprocity were overwhelmed by the Spanish goal of maximum extraction of precious metals, labor, and produce. Though Indians were obligated to pay tribute to the crown, they were exempted from tithes, sales tax, and military service (in fact, they were prohibited from owning or bearing arms and riding horses). While informal ‘contributions’ in kind continued to be solicited by authorities throughout the colonial administration, the formal tribute was monetized and the former system of collective tribute was replaced by individual payment to the corregidor or his agents. Toledo also regularized tribute and labor levies; all Indians 18 to 50 were obligated to pay tribute and each indigenous community obligated to provide 1/7th of its population for labor service.

Second, while the corregidor was officially charged with guaranteeing the welfare of indigenous communities, in practice his primary task was the allocation of indigenous labor to various Spanish enterprises (primarily mining and textile industry (obrajes)). Indians granted in repartimiento were commonly called mitayos. Throughout the colonial era there were a myriad of mitas (the Potosí mita itself went through a
number of distinct organizational periods, each governed by a redesigned charter). The largest were associated with mining, but mitayos were also levied for agricultural and even domestic work (the so-called mitas de plaza). The mitayos levied in a particular mita, in addition to being specified in geographic terms, were also defined in terms of their membership in particular ayllus. Though the Conquest and subsequent colonial exactions forced the ayllu into a myriad of different forms, ayllus in the Inca era had been the basic unit of indigenous social and political organization. The ayllu was, in Frank Salomon’s terms, a “named, landholding collectivity, self-defined in kinship terms, including lineages but not globally defined as unilineal, and frequently forming part of a multi-ayllu settlement.” Salomon goes on to suggest that the ayllu was essentially bilateral kindred that traced its descent from an apical ancestor. In Murra’s classic formulation, the ayllu was spatially distributed vertically (from river valley to puna) such that it could control the delivery of water and production of agricultural and pastoral produce from several ecological niches.

Ayllus were led by hereditary leaders called kurakas, or caciques, in conjunction with community elders; candidates did not necessarily succeed to the position of kuraka through primogeniture, however, but rather were selected from amongst the members of the noble patriline based on their perceived fitness for leadership. As a result of the Toledan reforms (1569-1581), kurakas or “caciques became state functionaries with few powers apart from collecting tributes and delivering levied labor.” The kurakas increasingly served primarily as intermediaries between corregidores and their communities, a position that exposed them to conflict from both sides, but also gave them an opportunity to appropriate land, labor, and lucre for their own benefit. From the
perspective of the Spanish colonial administration, the cacique was essentially an agent for the collection of tribute and the delivery of *mitayos*; within the community, however, the cacique had to practice legitimating communal traditions. While a clever and unscrupulous cacique could usurp communal land, such an action could potentially undercut the support of the community, on which his tenure depended. The position of cacique became an even greater source of conflict as *corregidores* began to exert more control over their selection, increasingly appointing mestizos and even *criollos* throughout the course of the 18th century.\(^6^0\)

The colonial *mita* was officially constrained by a number of royal laws governing the treatment of *mitayos*; in practice, however, it was a grim business. Mining and *obraje mitas* were particularly perilous. In the *Visita* of 1689, Church authorities blamed the *mitas* of the Cailloma and Huancavelica mines for the massive depopulation of *ayllus* in Chumbivilcas, many of which had been reduced to only a half dozen families.\(^6^1\) The local *Llusco* and *Inga ayllus* of Livitaca had each been reduced to a single surviving couple.\(^6^2\) Many *ayllu* members undoubtedly chose flight rather than become *mitayos*, thus contributing both to the decline of workers available to *encomiendas*, and later *corregimientos*, and to the massive increase in *forasteros* and internally displaced peoples.\(^6^3\) Refusal to perform *mita* labor could be punished with loss of property, imprisonment, and death; Stern gives the example of a judge who publicly hanged ten Yauyos Indians when their community dragged its feet in providing *mitayos*.\(^6^4\)

Finally, as part of his custodial role, the *corregidor* was empowered to act as a broker in the distribution of goods between communities under his jurisdiction and the larger mercantile system.\(^6^5\) This responsibility frequently devolved into the forced sale of
agro-pastoral products (at reduced prices) and forced purchase of imported products (at inflated prices). A number of laws were passed that attempted to regulate the practice of *reparto de mercancías*, but none were fully effective. Colonial authorities did treat the forced sale of merchandise at inflated prices as a crime, receiving complaints from indigenous authorities and responding periodically; the *corregidor* of Tarma, for example, was imprisoned in 1745 for having sold 100,000 pesos of goods for 800,000 pesos. But the practice remained widespread and was a major source of conflict between native communities and colonial administrators. Tupac Amaru II, in fact, cited the abuse of the *reparto de mercancías* as one of the key reasons for his uprising, and throughout his revolt the trial and execution of *corregidores* was a prominent vindicatory activity.

3.9 *Reducción*

Hand in hand with the gradual displacement of the encomienda by the *corregimiento*, the Viceroyalty of Peru, under Francisco de Toledo (1569-1581), began to implement a policy of *reducción*, or the forcible concentration of formerly dispersed native communities into central villages. This was, in part, a response to the depopulation of indigenous communities, which had left many of them nominally in control of large tracts of essentially uninhabited land. But the primary goal of the *reducción* was to gather Indians into settlements that more closely resembled “the Mediterranean type, with their own municipalities (cabildos),” so that they could be more effectively supervised, administered, and subjected to proselytizing and pastoral guidance. In addition to facilitating management of the indigenous population, the *reducción* had
significant effects on land tenure. The process of *reducción* made vast swaths of land, which had been increasingly sparsely populated by indigenous communities, technically uninhabited and unused, and therefore “available for appropriation by colonists. Some of the land forcibly abandoned by its indigenous cultivators was sold in *composiciones de tierras* and given away in land grants (*mercedes*) by royal officials.” These *composiciones de tierras* and *mercedes* were fundamental elements in the steady infiltration of vecinos into formerly native communities and to the foundation and expansion of haciendas, discussed later in the chapter.

3.10 *The exclusion of non-Indians and its eventual failure*

While the separation of ethno-religious communities into formally distinct institutional spheres, with limited administrative autonomy for ethnic minorities, had its roots in the peninsular experience administering Jews and Mudéjars in southern Spain, the management and exploitation of the vast native populations of the Americas presented a more difficult problem. The Spanish crown recognized that the mixing of native and immigrant populations threatened public order, complicated administration, and, perhaps most importantly, threatened its vital system of tribute and labor distribution. As a consequence, the Spanish crown began in the 1550s to promulgate laws prohibiting Spaniards from living in Indian towns. Even *encomenderos* could not reside in the same communities as their *mitayos*. Those non-Indians that had business, through encomienda or commerce, with Indian communities were permitted to stay no longer than three days. The only exceptions to this were parish priests, who could reside amongst their parishioners but were prohibited from engaging in any local economic
activity. Although the prohibition was never effective,\textsuperscript{71} it had significant institutional consequences, including the establishment of parallel, ethnically exclusive political institutions. Throughout the Peruvian viceroyalty, Indians were governed by native authorities (\textit{caciques} or \textit{kurakas}) within the context of organizations modeled on the Iberian \textit{municipio}, but heavily influenced by pre-Colombian socio-political traditions.

The infiltration of Spaniards and mestizos into indigenous lands and municipalities was gradual but inexorable. Magnus Mörner argues that the general causes of the breakdown in the crown policy of segregation were “the weakness of the executive administrative and judicial apparatuses” and “the very strong demographic and social forces in the countryside.”\textsuperscript{72} He discusses several demographic and social elements, including the birth of mestizos to indigenous mothers within \textit{pueblos indios} and the bridgehead of made by mestizo renters in indigenous communities.\textsuperscript{73} He argues that the basic impetus for mestizo expansion was the “hunger for land to cultivate”;\textsuperscript{74} epidemics and \textit{mita} enslavement had left decimated indigenous communities with large surpluses of attractive agricultural land.\textsuperscript{75} The result was a steady process of demographic expansion into formerly Indian highland towns. Mörner writes that “an inspection tour by a high administrator in central New Granada in 1755-1756 revealed that the so-called pueblos de indios in the district had a population of no more than 28,000 Indians, compared with 59,000 non-Indians, mostly mestizos (vecinos).\textsuperscript{76} When the Indians of a pueblo de indios had melted to a small minority, the transformation of the place into a ‘Spanish town’ was relatively easy.”\textsuperscript{77} In Chumbivilcas, in 1586, the \textit{corregidor} reported that there were no \textit{pueblos de españoles} in the entire region.\textsuperscript{78} Throughout the region Indians still wore the traditional Inca outfit, “a sleeveless shirt to the knees with wool cords around their
heads." Except for the current capital of the province, Santo Tomás, all of the current district capitals were already indigenous pueblos controlled by their own indigenous caciques. In his inventory of his corregimiento’s assets, the corregidor Francisco de Acuña does not mention any haciendas, obrajes, or, for that matter, any resident Spaniards, except for parish priests (curas).

By 1689, just a century later, there were dozens of Spanish haciendas in Chumbivilcas. There remain historiographical lacunae with regard to the transformation of pueblos indios into villas or Spanish municipalities. It is difficult to establish definitively how these Spaniards were able to gain a foothold in a region that was exclusively indigenous a century earlier, though some mixture of rental (followed by expropriation) and composición de tierras was probably involved. The only district capital with a large non-indigenous population at the time appears to have been Colquemarca, probably because of the local mineral deposits. The rest of the non-indigenous population resided in the countryside on their haciendas, the majority of which were located in the valleys in order to produce sugar and cereals. Though there are few historical analyses of the specifics of the transition from pueblo indio to Spanish villa, it must have been attended by conflict. Neither Spaniards nor mestizos could legally be ruled by indigenous officials. Tierras baldías could be confiscated from indigenous communities through composiciones de tierras, and sold or granted in merced, but the actual urban core of a reducción would not have been usurped through this mechanism (barring the complete extinction of the resident ayllus). The transition would necessarily involve decades of co-existence, in which Spaniards and mestizos multiplied in a locale (technically illegally), beyond the jurisdiction of the Indian cabildo.
It’s possible that non-indigenous *barrios* or neighborhoods expanded to swallow up indigenous centers\(^{83}\) or that interbreeding and acculturation actually ‘ladinized’ the indigenous town population, particularly the local *cacique* class.

### 3.11 Catholic parish

Parallel to the properly state administrative apparatus, the Catholic church played a vital role not only in the management of the indigenous population, but also in the reorganization of its social, cultural, and spiritual life. Given that the parish priest was frequently the only permanent representative of the Spanish authorities, it is particularly important to understand the ‘pioneering’ role of the Catholic Church in the Spanish ideological and economic penetration of indigenous society. Though the Spanish colonial administration was overwhelmingly an instrument for the extraction of tribute, the Spanish crown (in particular Ferdinand and Isabella, the so-called *Reyes Católicos*) was deeply committed to the religious conversion and salvation of subject peoples. The Valladolid controversy was fueled by a genuine concern on the part of Charles V with the extremes to which the forcible conversion of souls (and their hasty deliverance to the afterlife) appeared to have gone in the colonies. Nonetheless, as with other forms of oversight, the ostensibly spiritual activity of the Catholic Church was a significant source of harm to the indigenous population.

The Church fulfilled several essential ideological or indoctrinatory roles in the colonial endeavor. At the most basic level, the conversion of Native Americans to Catholicism was the primary rationalization for the Conquest of the New World. The Spanish authorities were obliged to give Church representatives a prominent position in
the process of colonization; local Catholic parishes became prominent and pervasive institutions in the lives of indigenous peoples. Furthermore, the Catholic clergy were the primary ideologists of the classification, treatment, and subjugation of indigenous Americans, a role they continued to play in the countryside essentially up to the present. The *curas* (parish priests) were both the cultural vanguard of the Spanish colonization and, once Spanish settlement began, the ‘spiritual propagandists’ of the exploitative arrangements that evolved.

As with other colonial institutions, Catholic parishes (*doctrinas* or *parroquias*) to a certain extent stepped into roles that had formerly been played by the Inca state (for instance, with regard to the regulation of marriage) or by local religious cults (benefiting, for example, from the reservation of a portion of communal land for the support of the cults and shrines). The Church not only provided the justification and the ongoing ideological legitimation for conquest and colonization; parish priests were also fundamental to the articulation of indigenous communities with the national market as well as to the penetration of non-Indians into indigenous communities. Church representatives were frequently personally involved in the exploitation of indigenous communities.

After the legal exclusion of Spaniards from indigenous communities, parish priests were the only Spaniards authorized to reside in them, giving them a near monopoly as intermediaries. Though priests were technically forbidden from engaging directly in business transactions with and/or tithing Indians, there is ample evidence that they were, in fact, commonly engaged in commerce, lending, growing, ranching, mining, illegal appropriation of community resources, and acquisition of property within Indian
pueblos. Indians were technically exempt from diezmo, but several authors suggest tithes were nonetheless collected in informal or customary ways. The cost of religious services—for example, sacrament, confession, burial, and matrimony—was born by the recipients and often extremely expensive relative to the poverty of most parishioners. Hopkins writes about the expropriation of cofradía (religious brotherhood) labor, funds, and property by the parish priest of Andahuaylillas; this was likely not an isolated phenomenon. The Jesuits, in particular, operated lucrative, essentially capitalist enterprises in and around indigenous communities; Chumbivilcanos still repeat local traditions about the economic activity of Jesuits, especially their local activity in the mining of gold and silver.

The role of priests in the mestización of indigenous communities had two main facets, the first and most important of which was their recruitment of family members to settle in Indian pueblos. It has frequently been noted that many of the first Spanish settlers in indigenous regions were blood relations of parish priests. Given the fundamental role that the extended family played in the organization of sociality and production in colonial Spanish society, it is no surprise that parish priests sought to parley the benefits of their privileged access to Indian communities to their kin. This tendency was fortified by the attitude amongst many colonial families that sending a son into the priesthood was a political-economic as well as spiritual decision: a son in the priesthood was not lost, but rather remained an integral member of the extended family enterprise. Furthermore, the inability of priests to father legitimate heirs undoubtedly increased their psychological investment in their nieces, nephews, and other potential heirs. One result of the tendency to attract relatives to the parish was that priests and their kin frequently
formed the early nucleus of Spanish settlement in indigenous towns, thus allying political, economic, and religious control within the same ethnically distinct kin block.

The second facet of the parish priests’ involvement in mestización was their renowned sexual enthusiasm for their female parishioners. From the very beginnings of the colonization of Peru, there were complaints from diverse sectors about the tendency of parish priests to sexually exploit the women of their parishes.\(^{92}\) In the course of the 15\(^{th}\) and 16\(^{th}\) centuries, the Church became increasingly strict with regard to monastic and clerical celibacy, but in medieval Spain the keeping of a concubine (barragana) by a priest was normal and evidently common.\(^{93}\) This liberty was, naturally, facilitated by the colonial situation. Parish priests had many opportunities for sexual liaison; they had easy access to pongas (female house servants), lay Church assistants, and candidates for confirmation; they lacked spouses who might object or file formal complaints; their parishes were often too distant from Church administrative centers for their behavior to be effectively monitored; because priests were legitimate representatives of both the Church and, putatively, God, opposition from the local community was discouraged by fear of punishment by one or the other or both. Crucially, in addition to all of these opportunities, the vast majority of priests undoubtedly had similar libidinal motivations as the rest of the male population (and, because material interests competed so successfully with religious ones in the recruitment of parish priests, they were probably less likely to be restrained by moral scruples than one might otherwise expect). The extent to which motivation and opportunity led to behavior, and to which behavior might have contributed to the larger phenomenon of mestización, can obviously not be determined with any certitude, given the vast lacuna in the historical record with regard
to illicit sexual behavior, but the ubiquity of references to and recognitions of the problem in contemporary sources suggests that the effects were by no means negligible.

3.12 Hacienda and obraje

It’s particularly important to briefly discuss the nature of the hacienda regime, given the fact that the wars of Independence left few functioning political institutions in the countryside, which effectively gave the hacienda the quality of a total social institution, structuring not only economic relations, but also social, religious, and political. The sixteenth century saw a dramatic increase in haciendas, particularly cattle-raising estancias. This process began in earnest after the encomienda’s monopoly over indigenous labor was weakened in the wake of the New Laws. Ramirez argues that encomendero cum hacendados were effectively initiating a form of import substitution to satisfy the demand generated by increased European immigration and the growth of urban and mining centers. This economic activity took various forms, but the most common institutions were obras, mines, and haciendas. An obra was essentially a workshop. In the Cuzco region in the 16th and 17th centuries, obras were primarily textile mills, though they also included lumber mills, tanneries (tenerías), and soap-making factories (tinas). Obras utilized harsh labor regimes, including chaining forced labor to their looms, locking employees inside of work spaces, and severe corporal punishment. The brutality of the obra system was a major source of resentment and conflict between Spanish authorities and the indigenous population; during the revolt of Tupac Amaru II, the rebels reportedly destroyed many or all of the textile obras in Chumbivilcas. Though large-scale mining was performed under royal license and was
effectively a state enterprise, small-scale mines functioned much like obras, with Spaniards employing vulnerable forasteros or compulsory mitayos under mortally threatening work conditions.

The most prominent and historically significant socio-economic institution to develop out of the post-encomienda Spanish colonial environment was the hacienda proper. There is a vast literature on the Latin American hacienda, both from a historical perspective and from an institutional economic one. Though much of the discussion on the nature of the hacienda as an enterprise and a social institution has understandably focused on economic factors in its distinctive organization and activity, the hacienda was dependent on the state in virtually all aspects of its early development as an institution. The early hacienda relied on the state both for its supply of land and its supply of labor. With regard to the former, virtually all early hacienda land was acquired through purchase from the state or grant by the state of formerly indigenous land. With regard to labor, the state furnished, directly or indirectly, three distinct sources: (1) the provision of labor through the institutions of the corregimiento and repartimiento (or mita), (2) the ‘incentive’ that monetary tribute gave Indians to seek cash employment on haciendas, and (3) the supply of employable forasteros fleeing from or dislocated by encomienda and mining repartimiento (in particular the Potosí mita).

As noted earlier, the demographic decline of the native population, followed by reducción, opened up large tracts of officially empty land (tierras baldías). As Diane Hopkins notes, the majority of hacienda property was initially acquired “through State policies of reducción, merced, and composición de tierras.” As the population of native communities shrunk, so did their land usage, and colonial authorities made
periodic trips to the countryside (often at the behest of interested parties) to determine which lands were empty and could be auctioned off or given in *merced*. Spaniards with inside knowledge of community land use patterns—*encomenderos*, relatives or associates of parish priests, *corregidores*, traders, *arrendatarios* (renters of indigenous land)—were particularly well-placed to identify and acquire land from these *composiciones de tierras*. Christine Hünefeldt has highlighted the prominent role of the process through which *arrendatarios* were able to obtain legal recognition of their rights to land that was initially leased.\(^{101}\) It should be remembered, as well, that the land or garden (*huerta*) grants that frequently accompanied membership in a Spanish pueblo or villa, could form the foundation of hacienda property.

Haciendas were even more dependent on the state for labor than for land. Especially in the initial stages, haciendas (including *obrajes*) depended on *mitayo* labor for cultivation and processing. In a certain sense, the logic of the encomienda never disappeared; the *corregidor* may have been an intermediary between the hacendado and the supply of forced labor, but the means of labor exploitation were initially not appreciably different than the earlier *encomienda* system. After the New Laws, labor contracts were technically voluntary and were to be witnessed and negotiated by the *corregidor*. In practice, however, the mita system involved the temporary assignment or allotment of native laborers to bidders or to favored associates. Haciendas were particularly dependent on *repartimiento* labor during sowing and harvest. As noted early, *hacendados* could also receive a *repartimiento* of native laborers as vecinos through the charter of their villa.\(^{102}\)
State policy indirectly provided two more important sources of indigenous labor. First, the monetization of tribute initiated by Toledo encouraged *aylluruna* to work in the nascent hacienda economy in order to generate sufficient funds to fulfill their semestral obligation. Tribute was, in fact, justified by Spanish authorities as a way of overcoming the supposedly natural slothfulness of the Indian; the need to generate sufficient funds for payment of tribute was expected to drive Indians onto the labor market. Finally, and probably most importantly, the *repartimiento* (both under *encomienda* and *mita*) drove Indians inexorably from their *ayllus*. Initially, *ayllus* paid tribute to the crown or to their encomendero on a collective basis; the Toledan reforms required direct payment by the individual *ayllu* member (or, more precisely, by male heads of family) to the Crown via the *corregidor*. Nonetheless, in practice, caciques served as intermediaries between members of their *ayllus* and their *corregidor*, and *forasteros* could therefore frequently avoid paying tribute altogether by fleeing from their *ayllus* and caciques. Forasteros naturally forfeited their rights to communal land in their natal pueblos or *reducciones*, but effectively escaped the harshest obligations of the encomienda and later *corregimiento* systems. Because tribute was conceived, in part, as a guarantee or legitimation of rights to *ayllu* land and other resources, Indians who settled in non-natal *ayllus*, in which they did not have full rights, were allowed to pay a reduced tribute.

Indians who settled on Spanish haciendas could therefore hope to escape from tribute and mita obligations altogether (though some resident laborers continued to pay tribute through their native *ayllu* and thereby retained rights to communal land). Because tribute and mita were administered through the institutions of *corregimiento* and *ayllu*, physically withdrawing from their jurisdiction was often sufficient to avoid
payment and draft. Furthermore, hacendados, given their cultural, social, and political relations with the Spanish colonial community and State, could more effectively shield their workforce from corregimiento obligations and abuse. As a result of these factors, dislocated forasteros escaping tribute and mita seem to have been the core of the permanent hacienda labor force throughout the southern Peruvian sierra. In many ways, whereas the encomienda and corregimiento relied on intact indigenous local societies, the hacienda thrived on the breakdown of indigenous institutions.

3.13 Weak markets

Spanish colonial policy and administration was a key element in the early development of the hacienda as an institution; but macroeconomic factors also played a decisive and deepening role in its evolution. The majority of historical and social science research on the hacienda has focused on the analysis of the economic determinants of the ‘logic’ of the hacienda. Given the importance of the institution in the evolution of the vecinos as a distinct provincial population, it behooves us to take a brief look at these economic factors, the most fundamental of which are weak markets and labor scarcity. Under the rubric of weak markets fall several related phenomena: (a) the distance to established European markets, (b) the Spanish mercantilist trade policy which restricted entry into European markets, (c) the underdevelopment of domestic markets, and (d) the difficulty and resultant cost of transport to domestic markets. It goes without saying that the vast distances separating colony from metropole and other European markets was a competitive disadvantage (especially given the sea and land transport technology of the era). Only products with extremely high weight-to-value ratios (like gold, silver, and
other precious metals and stones) could remain profitable in spite of the transport costs associated with trans-Atlantic transport. This natural commercial disadvantage was accentuated by the mercantilist policies of the Spanish crown. Trade with all other European power was interdicted;\textsuperscript{108} furthermore, the royal authorities in Spain outlawed the importation into Spain of any commodity (in particular sheep fibers and textiles) that competed with domestic Spanish products, and in fact attempted to eliminate colonial manufacturing completely, repeatedly demanding that the Peruvian viceroy destroy all obrasjes within the audiencia.\textsuperscript{109}

These limitations on international trade were coupled with a limited development of domestic markets.\textsuperscript{110} Although Spanish settlements emerged quickly after the Conquest, a dynamic urban sector was slow to develop. The first wave of soldier-settlers virtually all held encomiendas, huertas, or estancias that supplied them and their dependents with produce, building-materials, and labor service, which effectively reduced demand for products and services and prevented the growth of commerce, despite urbanization.\textsuperscript{111} Throughout the colonial era, most towns were largely entrepôts for agricultural produce (with goods transported, ‘within’ a family enterprise, from rural estates to urban casonas, rather than through commerce per se) rather than sources of demand or consumption.

There is a general consensus among researchers who have investigated the hacienda that insufficiency (and instability) of demand was a major determinant of the attitude of hacienda owners toward production. Because the hacendado could not count on stable prices for his products, the colonial hacienda was organized so as to maximize its economic self-sufficiency: haciendas (as well as surrounding indigenous communities)
produced the majority of the supplies necessary for domestic production and social
reproduction ‘on site’ (thus contributing to the weakness of the domestic market).
Hacendados sought to limit costs to an absolute minimum, such that the hacienda could
generate modest profits with minimal inputs. Nonetheless, many haciendas were heavily
mortagaged or leased from the Church, requiring a minimum of market orientation in
order to generate sufficient rents to make payments.\(^{112}\)

The hacienda proved capable, in bull markets for agricultural or pastoral produce,
to increase production through expansion (internally and externally), intensification of
labor exploitation, and/or incentivizing the labor participation of Indians from
surrounding communities; Potosí is clearly the exemplar of this potential for market-
orientation within the institution of hacienda. But, given the inflation, volatility, and
lengthy depressions that characterized the colonial era, hacendados sought to minimize
risks rather than maximize returns. The majority of haciendas were owned and operated
by absentee landlords;\(^{113}\) their objective was to derive status and a sufficient income to
maintain the urban lifestyle of a gentleman or vecino notable, rather than to reinvest
profits in order to augment their capital stock.

Physical impediments to the transport of goods also played a significant role in
inhibiting commerce. The towering mountains and plummeting canyons of the Peruvian
Andes proved formidable obstacles to transport and communication. Even on horseback,
it can take the better part of a day to reach a point on an adjacent hillside that is literally
within shouting distance. Furthermore, since transport usually took (and still takes) place
at middle altitudes,\(^{114}\) agricultural produce had to be hauled from relatively fertile valley
fields up precipitous mountainsides to transport arteries at middle altitudes. Prior to the
arrival of dirt roads and automotive transport, for example, the overland route from Santo Tomás to Arequipa, some 200 kilometers as the crow flies, “was made normally in 10 days . . . in grueling and strenuous journeys by caravans, or mule trains.” Furthermore, the topography presented a formidable obstacle to road building, further retarding the speed and development of commerce in the highlands. If large, deep, slow-moving rivers had been available, or flat, temperate plains, transport costs would have been moderate, thus increasing the viability and profitability of commerce; as it was, however, “the elevated cost of land transport . . . insuperably hobbled” commerce in bulk commodities.

With such significant constraints on commerce, capital improvements had little or no marginal utility. Several particular factors further discouraged investment in the southern highlands. The forbidding topography of the region meant that any improvements in agriculture, like terracing or irrigation, required disproportionate capital and labor investments. Some of the most serious issues were the altitude and the low fertility, steepness, and stoniness of land. Fields on steep hillsides are acutely vulnerable to soil erosion, contributing to the shallowness and barrenness of the soil. Without heavy artificial fertilization soil is rapidly depleted. In Peru’s provincias altas, most fields had to be left fallow for between one and thirty years, depending primarily on altitude and steepness of slope. Above 3,500 meters only a few agricultural products grow (predominantly bitter potatoes) and above 4,000 meters virtually none. Furthermore, many of the steep, irregular, and stony fields were not easily accessible to plows and oxen (and even today are not readily mechanizable) and the broken quality of the terrain makes systematization of harvest difficult, lowering productivity and preventing
economies of scale. An excellent example of the difficulty of productive improvements comes from the later Republican era: Nicanor Berrío, the grandfather of one of my informants, spent the better part of his life building a four-kilometer-long canal along the left bank of the Río Santo Tomas to raise water five to ten meters up from the riverside to his estate on the valley floor. In fact, despite investing a fortune into the project, which tunneled through several cliff sides and cost the lives of a number of _feudatarios_, he never lived to see the canal reach his property. With such staggering costs and doubtful returns, major capital improvements were the realm of wealthy and willful eccentrics rather than wise investors. While it may have been theoretically possible to improve productivity through capital investment, the natural impediments and the difficulty of bringing goods to market meant that investors could usually find much more attractive places and processes in which to invest their money.\(^{119}\)

3.14 _Potosí_

The major exception to the general tendency toward stagnation was the gargantuan trade network that radiated out from the city and silver mining complex at Potosí, drawing to itself vast sums of labor, raw materials, and petty industrial products. During its periods of peak production, Potosí provided sufficient demand to dynamize the entire South American economy.\(^{120}\) The actual configuration of economic activity at the mines varied over the course of the colonial period, shifting particularly in relation to the changing monarchical regimes (Trastámara, Hapsburg, and Bourbon periods). In all but the very first years of exploitation, Potosí was what might today be called a public-private partnership. The mines themselves were exploited by _mitayos_ (usually as
unskilled laborers), *mingas* (paid skilled labor), and *azogueros* (‘mercuriers’ or, in other words, mine operators), who themselves were often entrepreneurs leasing mines and mills from property owners. Specialized merchants then purchased the mined silver. But the State was heavily involved as well: first, mita levies, drafted and delivered through the *corregimiento*, provided around half of all laborers, and virtually all of the unskilled labor, at any given time. Second, the Crown received the *quinto real* (royal fifth), initially 20 percent but later reduced to 10 percent, on all sales of silver, thus heavily investing it in the continued viability of the mines. Finally, after the creation in 1751 of the *Banco de San Carlos* and its ‘royalization’ in the 1770s, the state provided interest-free loans to producers and “enjoyed a . . . monopoly of the purchase of silver production” from the mines at Potosí. Potosí was vital to the development of the production and commerce in Cuzco and other Andean regions. Cristóbal Kay sees the explosive growth of demand from Potosí for livestock and their by-products as the driving force behind the sharp increase in royal land grants and sales at the turn of the 16th century. By the early 17th century, Potosí had grown to as many as 160,000 inhabitants and required a supply network that stretched from present-day Argentina to Colombia to provision its population and industries. At the same time, however, the decline of silver production at Potosí throughout the 17th century, and its collapse in the 18th, compromised the entire economic system that had developed to supply the Potosí mining complex and resulted in a ruralization and disarticulation of the southern Peruvian sierra.
3.15 Labor scarcity

Perhaps the most critical factor in the development of the hacienda as a socio-economic institution was the perennial scarcity of labor.\textsuperscript{126} Ramirez tells us that “the shortage [of labor] had become so acute at the end of the sixteenth century that the problem required the attention of officials at the highest levels of administration both in Peru and the metropolis.”\textsuperscript{127} In the regions of southern Peru that were subject to mining mitas, the scarcity of labor was even more acute. This scarcity led to several responses by hacendados. They sought to acquire land in order to deny it to potential competitors and laborers. The ideal was naturally to acquire land with resident peasants who could then be incorporated into the hacienda labor pool. But even empty land was desirable because, on the one hand, this would contribute to the land insufficiency of surrounding communities and drive them to seasonal work on the hacienda\textsuperscript{128} and, on the other, this land could be offered to forasteros in order to tie them to the hacienda as colonos or waqchilleros.

Despite the formal change in orientation— from labor control under the encomienda regime to land control under the hacienda—the objective therefore remained the same: to acquire and retain indigenous manpower. The underlying objective of voracious land seizure—invading it, renting it (and later laying claim to it), using political influence to validate claims to it, or judicial connections to mis-adjudicate it—was to force residents, nearby communities, and migrants into servile labor relations in order remedy their land shortage and subsistence insufficiency.
3.16 Conclusion

What I have presented above is not intended as a synoptic account of the colonial situation in the Peruvian highlands, but rather as a brief overview of the ideological and institutional elements of Spanish imperial expansion that I believe to be essential to understanding the development of provincial society and culture in the 19th and early twentieth centuries. Of these, the ideological elements most vital to analysis in subsequent chapters are the emphasis on lineage, ethnic or caste distinction, and disdain for manual labor, which I have together called an ‘aristocratic complex.’ These ideologies contributed to, and were reciprocally perpetuated by, the distinctive institutions of the imperial Spanish state, the most important of which were the interconnected (a) compulsory labor institutions of the *encomienda*, *corregimiento*, and *mita*, (b) the *reducción* of native populations into nucleated, manageable communities, (c) the Catholic parish, and, perhaps most importantly for my larger ethnographic project, (d) the Spanish *municipio*. The chapter closed with a discussion of the hacienda as it developed alongside the declining encomienda system and adapted to domestic markets that were volatile and subject to long periods of stagnation. As will be seen in the following chapter, many of these basic ideological and institutional features were carried over with remarkable fidelity into the Republican period and beyond.
Chapter 4
Republic and Gamonalismo

“It must also be added that those who enjoy too many advantages—strength, wealth, friends, and so forth—are both unwilling to obey and ignorant how to obey... nurtured in luxury, they never acquire a habit of obedience, even in school. But those who suffer from a lack of such things are far too mean and poor-spirited. Thus there are those who are ignorant how to rule and only know how to obey, as if they were slaves, and, on the other hand, there are those who are ignorant how to obey any sort of authority and only know how to rule as if they were masters. The result is a city, not of freemen, but only of slaves and masters: a state of envy on the one side and of contempt on the other. Nothing could be further removed from the spirit of friendship or of political association”

Aristotle
Politics
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This chapter explores the system of *gamonalismo* that developed in the Peruvian highlands in the wake of Independence. The end of colonial rule in 1821 involved the disappearance of the administrative institutions of the Spanish Empire—which had been in the process of rationalization and professionalization under the Bourbon crown—and a dislocation from the Spanish mercantile system. The departure of the colonial regime involved, therefore, serious political and economic disruption. The remaining vestiges of the state apparatus were even less able to extend their authority and administration across the national territory. The result at the highland periphery was an intensification of the social, political, and economic relations and subjugations that had characterized colonial rule. Indigenous Peruvians, in particular, became even more vulnerable to ethnicized forms of exploitation. Furthermore, following Independence, Peru was gradually drawn into the sphere of British industry and commerce, as a provider of precious metals and
wool for Britain’s textile-driven industrialization. This so-called ‘neocolonialism’—in which foreign commercial interests sought to extract raw materials without assuming control over governance and administration—was particularly important in Chumbivilcas. Up until the second half of the 19th century, vecinos in Chumbivilcas had been almost exclusively interested in cattle production; British demand for wool, however, drove vecinos to attempt to wrest control of sheep and alpaca fiber production from indigenous peasant producers.

It is these intensified forms of exploitation—resulting from the weakening of the central state and the penetration of capitalist markets—to which Peruvians give the name ‘gamonalismo.’ The phenomenon of gamonalismo endured in its basic form from the 1850s up until the revolution of Velasco Alvarado. Understanding gamonalismo is particularly important, because it was the direct historical antecedent of the modern process of expropriation and marginalization that I describe and analyze in subsequent chapters. Gamonalismo is often described as the domination of hacendados over local political institutions, or as the confluence of landed wealth and political authority. I will argue that it is more useful to conceptualize it as a continuation of the colonial ethnic regime, in which vecinos—conceived as non-indigenous, town-holding (regardless of whether or not they resided primarily in their rural or urban residences) national citizens—monopolized local political authority, production, and commerce, primarily through their preferential access to exterior and higher-level social spheres and, through it, political influence. The social, political, religious, and economic spheres of activity all obeyed the same fundamentally ethnic organizational principle.
4.1 Independence

The expulsion of the Spanish imperial administration significantly weakened the Peruvian state. As Samuel Huntington argues of the results of independence throughout Latin America, “political authority decayed and the institutions withered: the Latin American constitutions became pieces of paper.”1 In effect, the early Republican state was largely deinstitutionalized. Independence resulted in devolution of power to non-official social groups, including family networks and factions. In spatial terms, the State no longer had the strength to extend its power over the national territory and therefore ruled even more through ethnic proxies.2 Mannelli, studying post-Independence family structure, argues that “the colonial administrative apparatus was dismantled and extensive parts of the national territory were left outside public control,” leaving an institutional vacuum that was filled essentially by family networks.3 In the provinces, this meant that power fell increasingly into the hands of local vecino notables, particularly hacendados, but also merchants, moneylenders, shopkeepers, officials, and military officers.4 Tannenbaum and others have argued that Independence also significantly increased the relative importance of provincial towns and their cabildos relative to the central government:

with the passing of the king and all of his servants in America, the only organ of government that remained was, therefore, the local, regional, and isolated cabildo. The cabildo was staffed by local hacendados who elected and re-elected each other to office annually . . . The only real wealth or prestige in most places was in land, and as one moved from the capital to the smaller cities and village centers, the landed aristocracy dominated both the countryside and the town and all local authority was in its hands.5
The stratum of non-indigenous town-dwellers, dominated by the landed elite, served as economic and political representatives of their ethnic confederates in other provinces and in urban centers of commerce and government in Cuzco, Arequipa, and beyond.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Spanish royal administration had struggled continually throughout the colonial era to restrict the autonomy of local political and economic actors, in the process becoming the primary protector of the rights and well-being of indigenous Peruvians against the abuse and prepotence of local entrepreneurs and political authorities, however insufficient this protection frequently proved. Its departure from the political scene therefore involved a significant reduction in the ability of indigenous Peruvians to seek and obtain political remedy and redress. Compounding the effects of the withdrawal of the Spanish state, the liberators attempted to implement comprehensive liberal reforms. These reforms were largely ineffectual and were quickly superseded by more conservative policies. In their short period of validity, however, they had significant negative consequences for indigenous communities. The privatization of peasant holdings opened up ample opportunities for purchase or seizure of community land and seriously weakened the solidarity of indigenous communities, one of whose primary roles had been the holding and distribution of communal property and other resources. Relatively autonomous, non-indigenous local representatives of the central government, therefore, confronted indigenous communities whose ability to defend themselves had been compromised.
4.2  *The weak state*

The concept of ‘state strength’ has developed within the disciplines of sociology and political science, largely out of the Marxist and Weberian traditions. A number of theorists have approached problems of state strength, consolidation, autonomy, and penetration. While a full description and analysis of this literature is beyond the purview of the current chapter, a few of the key insights will help to theoretically contextualize the proceeding discussion. Many of the fundamental concepts are closely interconnected. The weak state lacks autonomy from its ‘host society’: it is penetrated by its society both normatively and practically. This can be described as a lack of institutionalization, in the sense that the offices of state, and the government as a whole, neither define a normative environment proper to themselves, nor inspire preponderant loyalty in office holders, nor produce policies exclusively or preponderantly in the interest or logic of state or in isolation from the interests of other social institutions. Obviously, no state is completely autonomous from civil society, but a weak state is completely shot through by exterior social norms and interests, such that it is difficult in practice to tell where society ends and the state begins. This usually means that the state, reciprocally, has very little penetration into its own society. A state that is unable to foster a relatively autonomous normative and decision-making environment within its own apparatus, is naturally unable to effectively penetrate and reshape civil society in ways consonant with state policy. Whereas the strong state can intervene at the level of population, the weak state can’t even successfully create an exclusive normative and procedural environment within its own institutions.
Michael Mann has developed an influential dichotomy between despotic and infrastructural power that is useful here. He describes ‘despotic power’ as “the range of actions which the [state] elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society” and ‘infrastructural power as “the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.”’\(^{11}\) In Mann’s conceptualization, “capitalist democracies are ‘despoticably weak’ but ‘infrastructurally strong’” in the sense that “whether one regards the democracy as genuine or not, few would contest that politicians are largely controlled by outside civil society groups (either by their financiers or by the electorate) as well as by the law” but also that “the state penetrates everyday life” in ways unimaginable under pre-modern states.\(^{12}\) A comprehensively weak state, as Peru was throughout the 19\(^{th}\) and early 20\(^{th}\) centuries, lacks both autonomy from civil society and capacity to penetrate it.

The strength of the state can also be conceptualized in terms of its ability to satisfy particular kinds of needs that have become associated with state provision, or that states are functionally better suited to satisfy than other social institutions. Robert Rotberg discusses state strength in terms of the state’s ability to deliver critical “political goods,” including security, law, adjudication, political participation, education, currency, infrastructure, and education.\(^{13}\) While the market metaphor underlying this model may be problematic, it is clear that effective states do, in fact, ‘supply’ these ‘goods’ and that a society that is not provisioned in this way suffers significant negative consequences, including stagnation, instability, violence, and insecurity of person and property. It’s important to recognize that the state is not merely an instrument of subjugation or a
source of aggrandizement to the interests that capture it, but is also (or, at least, can also be) a provider of essential services; the weak state is not only susceptible to capture by partisan interests, but also fails to deliver crucial services to its citizens.

The weakness of a state is usually evident to both its citizens and its leaders. Nonetheless, state authorities cannot easily remedy the economic and social structural determinants of weakness. These include the relative strength of competing institutions, the resources at the disposal of the national society, the ability of the state to obtain these resources through taxation or nationalization, the position of the nation within the global capitalist market, as well as its international geopolitical position. Leaders are forced to engage in what Joel Migdal calls a ‘politics of survival’ in order to preserve their own tenure and to provide sufficient benefits to the national population to stave off unrest and revolt. Migdal discusses the fact that, in under-institutionalized states, there are insufficient norms and institutional counterweights to bind recipients of conferred authority to the central state, such that any delegated power tends to have “centrifugal tendencies.”\(^{14}\) The state must therefore balance the utility of establishing new institutions—with their proper authority and responsibility—with the risk of thus creating alternative centers of power within the as-yet unconsolidated state. This is all the more likely when there are pre-existing, strong non-state social institutions that are likely to ‘capture’ or otherwise undermine state power. Under such circumstances, it may be appealing to state power-holders to simply destroy existing social institutions and limit the creation of new institutions to highly centralized military or highly personalized ones.\(^{15}\) But this means foregoing the mobilization, technification, organization, and institutionalization that are the keys to securing the productive benefits of modernization.
As Migdal points out, the frantic quality of policy shifts in weak states is attributable not only to “the search for optimal economic strategies,” but also reflects the struggle “to minimize the political difficulties of leaders in weak states: on one side of the ledger, fear of allowing large concentrations of social control to grow inside or outside the state organization when their own mobilizational capabilities are so low; on the other side, anxiety about increasing international pressure and growing domestic dissatisfaction with existing strategies of survival if the leaders themselves undermine economic efficiency and vitality.”

As we will discuss, gamonalismo is the peripheral expression of a particular kind of ‘politics of survival,’ in which central authorities of the weak Peruvian state tolerated substantial autonomy and impunity in the provinces in return for dubious cooperation in the implementation of policy, maintenance of order, and collection of taxes.

4.3 Internal colonialism

One significant consequence of the post-colonial weakening of the Peruvian state and the failure of Bolivarian market and other reforms was that social and economic relations in the countryside retained their essentially colonial character. Roland Anrup writes that “Peruvian gamonalismo began to develop itself when the disappearance of the centralizing bureaucratic and economic apparatus of the Colony opened the way to a process of refuedalization, after the failure of the liberal agrarian program of the liberators.” A number of scholars have argued, in fact, that Independence involved an intensification of colonial ethnic cleavages and exploitation. Pablo González Casanova and Rodolfo Stavenhagen, amongst others, have argued that, following independence, the
long-standing relationship between metropole and colony was reproduced at the national level, a phenomenon that they call ‘internal colonialism.’ Internal colonialism in Peru involved the exploitation of the resources and indigenous labor of the nation’s own mountainous and jungle interior by non-indigenous elites in Lima and other urban centers. Stavenhagen argues that the “ethnic discrimination, political dependence, social inferiority, residential segregation, economic subjection, and juridical incapacity” that characterized the “colonial situation” were carried over into the post-Independence period, except that, “this time, colonial society was national society itself, which progressively extended its control over its own territory.” Michael Hechter, in his work on Britain’s relationship with its “Celtic fringe,” traces this way of conceptualizing internal colonialism to Lenin’s work on Russian capitalist development and Antonio Gramsci’s writings on the so-called “Southern Question.” Although the term has fallen out of fashion since its vogue in the 1970s, it remains particularly apt to describe gamonalismo in Chumbivilcas up until the 1960s, given the nature of social and economic relations and the evident survival of a number of essentially colonial ideological elements.

4.4 Post-mercantilist incorporation into the capitalist world system

These ‘internal colonial’ social and productive relations were exacerbated as Peru was swept up into the British commercial sphere in the 19th century, initially through the market for sheep and alpaca fiber and later through the extraction of precious metals, guano, and other raw materials. This form of incorporation appears to have led to an intensification of labor exploitation in the interior, particularly the wool-producing
highlands, as hacendados who had been content to live comfortably on the modest returns of primitive agro-pastoral production looked for ways to gain a greater share of the newly lucrative market for animal fibers. The phenomenon of ‘gamonalismo’ lies, therefore, at the nexus of three interlocking political economic characteristics of the early Republic: first, the ‘weak state’ that resulted from the expulsion of Spanish colonial authorities; second, ‘internal colonialism,’ or the continuation, intensification, and internalization of the colonial political economy; and third, the incorporation of Peru, and the highlands in particular, into the periphery of the growing global capitalist market, initially as a provider of fiber and other raw materials for Britain’s textile-driven industrialization. As such, the emergence of gamonalismo as a social, economic, and political regime dates to around the middle of 19th century.

4.5 Gamonalismo

Although Peruvians and other Andean nations use the term ‘gamonalismo’ to describe this reality, the social organization or system suggested by the term is not unique to the Andes. Other former colonial territories of the Spanish Empire developed distinctive post-colonial states, incorporated their interiors politically and economically in somewhat divergent ways, and were themselves incorporated into the world economy on slightly different terms (for example, as sugar, coffee, or cattle producers), but the basic forms of social practice and economic exploitation that developed in the post-colonial period in their interior or ‘internal colonial’ periphery were remarkably similar to what Peruvians have called gamonalismo. The term ‘gamonalismo’—though it includes some nationally-specific elements—is essentially a regional term for a basic social situation
that obtained throughout Latin America. Stripped of geographic and linguistic markers, Stavenhagen’s characterization of Ladino-Indian relations in southern Mexico and Guatemala, or Aguirre Beltrán’s treatment of the domination of ladinos over local indigenous communities in Mexico, could easily serve as descriptions of rural-urban, vecino-comunero, and center-periphery relations that existed in the southern Peruvian sierra up until the 1960s.  

More generally, gamonalismo fits loosely into what Huntington calls “oligarchical praetorianism,” in which “the dominant social forces are the great landowners, the leading clergy, and the wielders of the sword. Social institutions are still relatively undifferentiated, and the members of the ruling class easily and frequently combine political, military, religious, social, and economic leadership roles. The most active groups in politics are still basically rural in nature. Families, cliques, and tribes struggle unremittingly with each other for power, wealth, and status.” The similarity of this generic characterization to the specific picture I present below should be striking.

The power of the central government in Lima was never sufficient to maintain a permanent controlling presence outside of the few large urban centers. Furthermore, the sheer difficulty of transport hindered effective communication and regulation. Pierre van den Berghe and George Primov note that at the turn of the 19th century the trip from Cuzco to Lima “took two months on horseback.” Rural sovereignty thus devolved in large part onto local elites. Anrup argues that “in a society that has lost its legally regulated stratification and in which, moreover, the market doesn’t determine social position,” it becomes possible for local elites to use the “confusion between private power and public authority at the local level” for personal gain, creating a social order in
which “public offices, family connections and a dependent clientele, serve the objective of gaining access to economic resources.” Gathering large gangs or *pandillas* around themselves, controlling the judiciary through ties of real or fictive kinship, monopolizing provincial political positions, managing production on their estates and distribution of goods to and from surrounding comunidades, gamonales controlled most elements of public life.

The following discussion will emphasize the fact that, although the hacienda was a key element in the overall structure of exploitation and control, it was only one of a number of mutually reinforcing media of asymmetrical social interaction. Even within the economic sphere, numerous forms of economic enterprise vied for the labor and produce of the indigenous peasantry. Virtually all vecino individuals and families combined multiple forms of economic, social, and political activity in their overall social practice. Land, therefore, was only part of the gamonal’s power. In addition to being a landowner at the local level, the gamonal acted as a broker between, on the one hand, peones and local communities of peasants and, on the other, urban markets and state institutions. Perhaps, given the nature of their intercession, a better term would be “mis-brokers”: shifting the burden of taxation onto the peasantry, delaying the implementation of or concealing outright the promulgation of progressive or liberal national legislation, utilizing police and military detachments to extend and protect their personal property and favorable labor relations, using the judiciary to delay, dismiss, and miscarry judgments for personal advantage, and actuating ties of compadrazgo with departmental authorities to procure partisan military intervention. In each case, the gamonal used his
intermediary position to further his private interests and to insure unfavorable and often grave outcomes for his ‘clients.’

*Vecinos* acted as mediators between national and local provincial society within four mutually reinforcing spheres of activity, namely, the social, political, religious, and economic. Contained in the following ‘reading’ of the historiography is a somewhat contentious argument. The basic consensus on the relationship between political office and property that lies at the heart of the concept of gamonalismo is that owners of landed property wielded political power. It is commonly implied and sometimes made explicit that hacendados were able to use the rents derived from their landed property and the labor of resident workers to maintain control over the local political, security, and judicial apparatus and to mis-use it to their benefit. As a statement of fact, this is indisputable. In the following discussion, however, I will emphasize the parallel fact that the hacendado’s control over land and labor was constituted and maintained by political institutions and relations. In other words, the hacendado was ‘always already’ a political actor and it is therefore just as true to say that the politically-connected controlled landed property as to say that landowners controlled politics. In adjusting the traditional lines of causation, I want to make it clear that my argument is not Hegelian. It’s obvious that, at the national and international level, the economic sphere—the old bottom line—was, and remains, disproportionately important in conditioning other spheres of activity (i.e., social, political, and religious). My argument is that, at the local level, an inversion occurred in which ethnically restricted social relations guaranteed preferential access to and treatment by national institutions and, through these, access to political authority and economic prosperity. In other words, preferential social access allowed the acquisition of political
authority, fortified by ecclesiastical ideological and institutional support, which secured for vecinos a highly favorable political economic environment.

4.6 Gamonal as ethnic proxy

Anthropologists and historians have written of the gamonal’s ‘hybridity’; that is, his ability to bridge national and local culture, society, and polity, and to monopolize intercourse between the rural, peasant world and the Eurocentric world of urban markets and state authorities. It has been argued that the dual proficiencies of the gamonal are at the heart of his power: “Fully versed in the Andean peasant world, their language, customs, norms, and codes of behavior, he felt superior to them by dint of his education (even if slight), his modern life-style, his social intercourse with notable citizens of the province, or even birth.” Poole has argued that “the provincial mestizos—who self-identified as ‘whites’—shared most cultural traits, including language, with the Indians around them.” While it is true that many vecinos were fluent in Quechua and may have subscribed to a number of Indian beliefs, attitudes, and values, the characterization of them as “sharing most cultural traits” or possessing a hybrid cultural identity obscures somewhat the actual nature of the gamonal’s identity and brokerage. The gamonal’s cultural repertoire was a specific, asymmetrical mixture of two cultures.

To the extent that I can speculate based on my contemporary ethnographic research—particularly with elderly Chumbivilcanos (some of whom are still identified by comuneros as gamonales) and the children of men reputed to be gamonales—I would argue that the self-representation of the gamonal, as well as his power, centered not on the cultural elements that he shared with comuneros, but on those he shared with the
Ibero-centric national society. Perhaps one way to frame this would be in terms of major and minor elements of his identity. It’s fairly clear from the historiographical literature, and indisputable in my own ethnographic fieldwork, that the vecino considered himself to be a representative of the national culture. Both in his interactions with ‘higher’ levels of social organization (the State, the national culture, and national and international markets) and his interactions with lower levels (colonos and the indigenous peasantry more generally), the vecino conceived of himself as a representative of the former. He framed the ‘local’ elements of his identity and self-representation in terms of aptitudes (Quechua fluency, folk knowledge, familiarity with indigenous social conventions) and predilections (for morenitas, waytampu, huayno music) or, in other words, his ‘indigenousness’ was limited to instrumental and ‘decorative’ elements. Even when the gamonal was ‘actually,’ phenotypically hybrid, his power was enhanced by obscuring rather than exploiting his mixed origins.

This clarification is important because it follows that the strength of the gamonal was not his hybridity, but rather the degree of his non-Indianness. What gave him power was his membership in the national, Hispano-philic community, rather than the local, indigenous one. I would follow Aguirre Beltrán’s programmatic statement that “Ladinos are part of the population which share the modern national culture; they do not consider themselves a separate etnia from the rest of the nation, but rather a segment of it which in the regions of refuge represents the interests of the national majority group.” The vecino (or in Beltrán’s terms, ‘the ladino’) is not just a cultural representative of the national society. The fact that he shares cultural affinities (and a claim to racial identity) with the national, non-indigenous population is intimately related to the fact that he possesses
Concrete social ties with that population. On the one hand, cultural affinity necessarily involves greater facility in social relations with ethnic counterparts in the cities and in higher echelons of economic and political organization. On the other, the cultural affinities themselves are largely produced through the process of personal development in non-indigenous family and social milieus.

These provincial vecino social milieus were—or, at least, aspired and were represented by their participants to be—ethnically exclusive. Any contemporary adult vecino can name the families in the various districts of the province—for example, the Alvarez, Ugarte, Negrón, Gomez, Maldonado, Pacheco, Berrío, Peña—who “siempre han tenido trascendencia” [“always have had transcendance”] or “han tenido aceptación” [“have been socially accepted”] and can provide rudimentary histories of their exploits and interrelations. These social networks—formally closed to the local indigenous peasantry—in turn maintained relations of family, friendship, and fealty with analogous social circles in neighboring provinces and in regional and national urban centers. These social networks were themselves the major conduits of political administration and commerce.

4.7 (L)awful rule: Perversions of administration

Historians and anthropologists working throughout Latin America have noted that provincial political office has been a prominent path to upward social mobility. In later chapters, I will describe the ways in which political authority continues to be the predominant avenue of social and economic ascent. But this is not the primary way in which the political sphere was socially determinative. It is a truism that social norms and
politico-legal frameworks, even ostensibly universal ones, serve to benefit certain groups and harm others socially and economically (and, to a certain extent, they are intentionally designed or modulated to foster and support just such inequalities). As such, political organization (including norms, laws, and institutions) always exerts a decisive influence on social and economic processes. But two elements make the political sphere distinctively important under gamonalismo. The first is the degree to which political power and ethnic privilege were coextensive: the provincial vecino stood at the outer limits of an essentially ethnic state. The second is the extent to which the ethno-political sphere, fortified by ecclesiastic institutions, actively intervened to structure economic relations. In Hechter’s terms, under an ‘internal colonial’ regime, “national development has less to do with automatic social structural or economic processes, and more with the exercise of control over government policies concerning the allocation of resources.” Power was exercised through officially sanctioned, ethnicized social networks rather than through formal political institutions; and while the liberal, formally ‘free’ market was fitfully rising at the national and international level, gamonalismo involved a vigorous struggle to prevent the local development of a formally distinct economic sphere. Although several scholars have objected strongly to the traditional practice of referring to gamonalismo as a ‘feudal’ social arrangement, the decisive influence of ethnicized political structures over productive relations has a close kinship with the classic feudal political economy (except, obviously, for the absence of a properly feudal military obligations).

The state required the collection of taxes (which were often so meager that they couldn’t sufficiently remunerate the labor of the collection), recruitment of labor (for
local public works and, later, road building), and conscription of military levies. Following the abolition of the indigenous head tax in 1854, however, the central state had very little material interest in the southern highlands. The question, then, is: why did the state bother to maintain a presence in the provinces at all? At the most basic level, the state continued to formulate policies that demanded local implementation. Implementation required, ideally, a long-term governmental representation that could implement new policies and insure the ongoing compliance with established law. To a certain extent, therefore, the central state had a compelling interest in enlisting, directing, and supporting local ethno-political representatives in the pursuit of state policy.

Furthermore, provincial interests themselves exercised significant control over the central state—as legislators, officials, and even heads of state. In fact, because apportionment of congressional seats was based on area rather than population, rural diputados (congressmen) were disproportionately influential in Congress. Petitions from provincial notables to the various offices of departmental and national government were rife with demands for state intervention. Provincial demands for state arbitration and intervention were therefore an essential element of the extension of state institutions into the provinces.

Inertia also played a role: the Republican administrative units, which for the most part endure to the present day, were carried over directly from the parishes and provinces of the colonial era. These had served specific, vital roles in the maintenance of imperial authority and, in particular, the extraction of wealth in the colonial period. In the southern highlands, in particular, the corregimiento (commonly coextensive with the province) had been responsible for the recruitment and delivery of mitayos to Potosí and Huancavelica,
as well as the collection of tribute. The parish had been the unit of proselytization, indoctrination, and tithing. By the second half of the 19th century, the collapse of the mita system, the abolition of Indian tribute, and the confiscation of Church properties had effectively hollowed out the administrative structures, but their shells remained the skeleton of local government.

Finally, the central state (or, in other words, the individuals and elite communities that held national office) was motivated to maintain a presence in and of itself. The logic of the consolidated state demanded sovereign coverage of the national territory, even if merely nominal or titular. This logic was likely motivated by consciously reflected concerns about the threat to security and legitimacy of uncontrolled regions (for example, the risk of ‘liberated territories’ becoming areas of refuge for insurgents or being claimed and seized by competing states, or the fear that uncontrolled regions might undermine the logic of national authority and unity). Likewise, gaps in sovereignty probably became ‘unthinkable’ to officials and lawmakers. As a result, otherwise negligible regions had to be minimally administered, or at least ‘papered-over’ with officially-recognized local surrogates.

Whatever the motivation behind state administration, government presence had to be maintained at minimal cost because of the weakness and penury of the central state. The post-Independence Peruvian state, like the colonial one before it, was highly centralized: controlled by Limeño elites of European descent, the ‘republic, since its first constitution of 1823, relied on a pyramidal system of authorities inherited from the Bourbon era of colonial rule . . . In accord with the republic’s centralist model, these authorities were not elected by the inhabitants of their jurisdictions but appointed by the
government.”43 It is important to reiterate, however, that although the Republic, throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, was centralized, it was not strong; the mode of administration was top-down, but it did not have sufficient revenue, personnel, or authority to effectively control peripheral provinces. Monitoring and intervention was intermittent and the State relied on the personal authority and power of provincial representatives to pursue State policies. The weak Lima-based state of the 19th and 20th centuries effectively required rule by proxies, who through their own industry, and sometimes malevolence, projected state power with a minimum of state investment.44 Gamonalismo therefore involves, in Migdal’s terms, the “capture of the state” by the local, ethnically distinct bourgeoisie.45

This ‘capture of state’ involved both a confusion of personal and state authority and a parallel confusion of personal and official objects of governance.46 Because the central state relied on the personal authority and resources of local representatives to pursue state objectives, it could not afford to be very particular about the personal uses to which representatives put state authority. From a certain perspective, the state tolerated (or systematically failed to restrain) the misuse of its delegated authority by local representatives. But there is a more active facet of the central state’s involvement in the periphery. The Republican state served, somewhat counter-intuitively, to hold open a vacuum of power that was filled by ethnically-aligned, but formally non-state actors. The state could not effectively guarantee the rights of or provide services to its citizens, particularly its indigenous citizens; it could, however, insure that no competing forms of social organization emerged that might be able to do so. In other words, the state was not only responsible for providing services, but also for suppressing competing ‘political
service providers’ who might attempt to provide services for which the state was ostensibly responsible, but which it routinely (and, at some level, intentionally) failed to deliver. The state, in effect, held open a space in which vecinos—in particular hacendados, but also merchants, traders, priests, attorneys, and other non-indigenous businessmen—were able to operate with significant autonomy from state regulation and effective immunity from legal sanction (except with regard to legal complaints from other vecinos). Comuneros, on the other hand, were effectively prevented from participating in all levels of government above the comunidad, and even informal forms of cross-community cooperation were greeted with suspicion and repression. The state guaranteed a total situation, therefore, without having to intervene directly into the organization of public life (which, in any case, it could not have accomplished, given its overall weakness): vecinos were left in de facto control and comuneros were denied effective avenues of remedying injuries committed against their interests and persons.

In sum, the state conferred provincial authority (with a guarantee of support in the event of unrest) in return for a measure of local control in pursuit of state policy. The state gained little, in light of the modesty of state objectives in rural highlands, but the costs of the exchange were equally negligible. The real beneficiaries were the local vecinos—who were able to systematically exploit the confusion between personal and state authority—and the real losers the local indigenous peasant communities—who were not only denied state resources and services, but also prevented from developing alternative political institutions that might be able to effectively provide such benefits. At the political level, this is precisely what made the Republican state ‘internally colonial’: while its ultimate objective may, in some sense, have been self-perpetuation, state elites
conceived of themselves as members of an ethnic polity, committed to their private and collective interests, if need be (and necessarily) at the expense of the subordinated indigenous population. To negotiate a ‘new deal’ with Indians in the provinces in pursuit of order, stability, or revenue, at the expense of ethnic confederates, would therefore have seemed illogical, because it would have gained stability at the cost of subverting the ethnic subjection that was an essential element of the order that the State sought to perpetuate.

4.8 **Shifting fortunes of the municipio**

The actual structure of provincial government is a somewhat more complicated matter. There are a number of excellent historical treatments of provincial political economic processes, but few deal systematically with the institutional structure and practice of local governance. The work of Pedro Planas (1998) on the institutional development of the municipality and of Carlos Contreras (2005) on prefectural administration and, in particular, tax collection are significant exceptions to this deficit. One of the themes that emerge from Contreras’s work is the mercurial quality of state policy; not only policies but administrative structure changed with remarkable frequency. At the center of this administrative instability was the continual conflict between elected local control through the municipio and central administrative control through the subprefectura, a tension that has characterized local governance from Independence through to the present day.

The institutional strength and autonomy of the municipio fluctuated throughout the Republican period. Independence initially left the municipal cabildo as, effectively,
the ‘only governmental institution standing.’ In fact, in Pedro Planas’ words, “In Peru, as in all of Hispanic America, the cabildo appeared before the State.” Planas argues that, although the intendencia system was implemented in the waning years of the colonial era as a form of administrative and fiscal rationalization and centralization, they effectively increased the strength of the cabildos. In 1809, cabildos were empowered by the King to elect diputados to the Junta Central of Peru, in an apparent effort to circumvent viceregal authority. Planas argues, furthermore, that intendentes were frequently co-opted by the local cabildos, and that the crown appears to have preferred to yield to the demands of cabildos, rather than confront them.

After the declaration of independence, both the initial decrees promulgated under the aegis of San Martín and the Constitution of 1823 were strongly ‘municipalist,’ “conserving and confirming the political importance” of the municipio as an institution. According to Planas, “the Constitutional Commission [of 1823] indicated that vecinos recognized in the municipalities an authority that protected them, that settled their differences and guarded their persons and property. The municipal regime—affirms the Commission—‘is not a bounty that the Constitution gives to the pueblos,’ but rather ‘the declaration of a right, whose use was conferred by the system of colonization.’” In recognizing the primordial right to municipal representation and protection, as well as the essentially pre- Constitutional legitimacy of the municipio, the Commission was emphasizing the historical and juridical lineage of the municipio-cabildo, which stretched back to the Reconquest of Spain and the settlement of the New World.

Bolívar, however, was generally antagonistic toward municipal power and initially blocked these municipalist measures. At the same time as the 1823 Constitution
confirmed the legitimacy of the municipio, it also established the competing institutional structure of executive representation at the various administrative levels: the prefecto at the departmental level, the intendente (or subdelegado or subprefecto) at the provincial level, and the gobernador at the district level. Bolívar attempted to strengthen this countervailing, more authoritarian prefectural system, postponing municipal elections and directing prefectos to appoint municipal representatives. Nonetheless, he did belatedly implement the representative elements of the 1823 Constitution and the 1824 Ley de Municipalidades. In Bolívar’s so-called Constitución Vitalicia of 1826, however, municipalities were entirely suppressed. Though “municipalities were immediately restored” in the anti-Bolivarian reaction the following year, during the subsequent 50 years the municipio existed in a fragile institutional state, dominated by appointed subprefectos and gobernadores. Prior to the War of the Pacific, “prefects and subprefects were commonly recruited among army officers: prefects from the ranks of colonels and lieutenant colonels, and subprefects from among lieutenant colonels and majors.” Subsequently, however, prefects and subprefects were drawn increasingly from local notables. The municipality was effectively defunct between the promulgation of the Constitution of Huancayo (1839) and their reestablishment by President Ramón Castilla in 1845. The 1892 Ley de Municipalidades reinvigorated municipal government. Nonetheless, Presidential administrations continually marginalized and undermined the municipio, preferring to rule through prefectural channels. As a consequence, only five municipal elections were held in the entire period between 1895 and 1979 (1897, 1900, 1919, 1963, 1966).
The difficulty of characterizing the formal administrative structure resulting from this temporal instability is compounded by the spatial variation in actual local governance. Because institutionalization was weak, policies were imperfectly implemented and power was exercised through channels and in ways that were not necessarily anticipated by law. As a result, it is impossible to characterize a properly ‘Republican administrative structure,’ short of a detailed historical account of the lengthy series of political reorganizations (which is beyond our current means and interests). While acknowledging the ideal, reified quality of the characterization, in the following discussion I will try to paint a composite picture of the general nature of vecino political control (in similar fashion to a Weberian ‘ideal’). The goal of the discussion is to present a historical context for subsequent discussion, rather than to analyze the era of gamonalismo in its historical fullness.

4.9 State offices

Vecinos monopolized a broad array of formal statuses, including administrative, judicial, electoral, legal, and military. Up until the Velasco’s revolution, the subprefect was the primary political authority at the provincial level. Appointed prefects and subprefects were responsible for the collection and allocation of municipal funds. These were generally negligible. The government experimented with various tax policies and techniques for tax collection. After the abolition of the indigenous head tax in 1854 (in the liberal fever at the height of the guano boom), provinces relied almost exclusively on funds remitted from Lima. This lasted until 1883, when, following the Chilean occupation, the property tax, craft-licensing tax, and general head tax were reintroduced,
albeit at minimal levels. Because each link in the prefectural chain of authority (minister of government, prefect, subprefect, governor, and deputy governor) was appointed by political superiors rather than local election, social and political connections to urban administrative centers and higher levels of government were determinative in occupation of provincial municipal office. Consequently, vecinos rather than comuneros monopolized these appointments. The same is true of the justices of the peace (juez de paz), magistrates or lower court judges (juez de primera instancia), and military officers.

While comuneros could occupy the lower reaches of the administrative apparatus, these positions were essentially bereft of authority and effectively functioned as mere servants of vecino authorities. Although ethnically marginal men might be appointed as gobernadores (for example, members of families who, through intermarriage, had become increasingly culturally comunero but who retained a basic fluency in Spanish and, perhaps, basic literacy), the only administrative position routinely available to comuneros was the ‘office’ of mandón, which corresponded administratively to the level of the comunidad and was essentially a servant to higher local authorities. The ‘kurajkuna’ of Bolivia, described by Rockefeller, roughly correspond to the Peruvian mandón: “Until approximately 1984, the major political role of the kurajkuna (political authorities) of the indigenous Quechua community called Quirpini was to perform menial services for the leading officials in the town of San Lucas, the regional capital. Most of the authorities were required to go to town on a weekly basis to do tasks such as sweeping the mayor’s patio, taking eggs to the authorities, and gathering and cutting firewood for them.” It is evident, however, that referring to these mandones or kurajkuna as ‘authorities’ strains the meaning of the term ‘authority.’
Vecino officials also controlled the local police as well as any military detachments stationed within the province. The actual manpower that was routinely available to departmental political authorities was minimal. As Carlos Contreras notes, “entire departmental police contingents consisted of a few dozen gendarmes, stationed only in the capital of the department and in some of the provincial capitals. District governors lacked any police forces.” The introduction of the guardia civil in 1922, modeled on the Spanish police force and under the control of the subprefecto, gave provincial authorities a more disciplined tool in the maintenance of order. Furthermore, on a social level, as van den Berghe and Primov point out, the guardia civil was “by definition mestizos and, when assigned to small towns, quickly identif[ied] with the little local mestizo oligarchy of teachers, shopkeepers, and medium-scale landowners.” The historical record is rife with reports of the misuse of the guardia civil and other security forces, particularly against the campesinado. One source describes officers of the guardia civil beating a comunero for failing to kneel and show respect in front of a vecino. Sur magazine noted in 1979 that the “public order of legal texts has no practical validity. Generally, it is the members of the Guardia Civil who define, in the final instance, compliance or noncompliance with the law and judicial or prefectural laws and orders, in accordance with those interests with whom they are most immediately tied.” These interests, in nearly all cases up until the Velasco years, were those of the provincial vecino notables.

Often omitted from historical and sociological accounts of rural society is the office of diputado, or congressman. Though the diputado was an essential figure in provincial politics, he was, almost by definition, an off-stage character because he was
often in Lima, and therefore essentially invisible in ethnographic and local historical accounts. On the other hand, in the historical literature on national politics, he is represented in his status as a member of a party or political faction involved in legislative conflicts, rather than as a representative of and participant in a specific provincial social milieu. The *diputado* was, first and foremost, one of the most prominent and influential local figures and almost universally a wealthy landowner. Second, along with the *subprefecto*, he played a pivotal role in representing the interests of provincial vecinos, not just in legislative terms (perhaps not even *primarily* in legislative terms), but also in the sense that he had privileged access to decision-making spheres in Lima, both through official channels and through membership in elite social circles and exclusive clubs. In the event of strikes, land invasions, and other forms of local unrest, for example, he had the connections and stature to secure the dispatch of additional troops and to block reforms or legal redress; similarly, he could intervene in judicial or administrative decisions and appointments in order to secure favorable outcomes for his own or allied interests.

Powerful vecinos, in particular *subprefectos* and *diputados* and their networks, were frequently able to turn even progressive reforms to their personal advantage. They notoriously exploited, for example, the system of *conscripción vial*—implemented in 1920 by Augusto Leguía to modernize the transportation system—“to have roads built, without any expense to themselves, to connect their properties to national transportation networks” and to furnish themselves with conscripted labor for their personal projects. It needs to be recognized, however, that these misappropriations of official authority and resources were in some sense constitutive elements of the political system, rather than
subversions of it. As noted by Contreras, the salaries of local government officials were insufficient (as in the case of subprefectos) or non-existent (as in the case of gobernadores, who were completely unremunerated). Contreras points out that, although “the accusing finger was pointed toward local authorities, judges, and the parish priests of the interior,”73 the system itself assumed and necessitated some form of “corrupt” revenue seeking by local authorities in the absence of adequate official inducements. Likewise, to a certain extent, community members relied on personalized relationships with officials to reduce the risk of anonymous transactions with the minimal institutionalized Peruvian state of the 19th and early 20th century. Contreras notes, in particular, the unwillingness of peasants to pay taxes to professional tax collectors, rather than through personalized payment through communal varayoq to gobernadores.74

4.10 Ecclesiastical mischief

The Catholic parish was both an essential ideological support for the total political economic system, and also itself a major provincial political and economic institution. The parish priest was the ideologist of local vecino political economic control, as he had been for the colonial regime in previous centuries. A conversation between two “Franciscan friars,” overheard by Arguedas in Spain, expresses this ideological support well, with one of the friars stating that: “the patrón, head of the hacienda, is the representative of God, and the voice of the landlord must be heard and obeyed as if it were the voice of God himself.”75 In addition to providing a theological justification for traditional social relations, the Roman Catholic clergy, specifically the parish priests, wielded considerable power in their own right, in close alliance with vecino secular
authorities. The parish frequently controlled agro-pastoral estates and, particularly in Chumbivilcas, mines. Up until the passage of disentailment laws in the 19th century (beginning with the Bourbon reforms), the church was the major financial institution in the provinces. Although many parishes were able to retain modest estates, which they managed or leased out to support Church activities, the church’s role in finance decreased and parish priests became more dependent on the financial sponsorship of hacendados and other wealthy provincial vecinos.

The intimate relation between the Church and local power brokers therefore survived and even strengthened in the period. Especially given the disruptions attendant upon the struggle for Independence and the de-institutionalization of post-colonial government, the Church was a rare island of institutional stability in the countryside. In the words of Mannarelli, “there was one institution that was strengthened by the caudillista chaos, and that was the Church. Everything seems to indicate a strengthening of the local powers and the hacendados, and of the power of families, and that ecclesiastical authority aligned itself harmoniously with this new configuration.”

As noted in the previous chapter, because parish priests were initially the only non-Indians allowed to reside in native communities, priests played a central role in vecino settlement in indigenous regions and communities. A number of historians and anthropologists have noted that the earliest non-indigenous settlers in highland provinces were frequently related by kinship to parish priests and, more generally, that close family ties existed between secular and ecclesiastical elites throughout Spanish America. Hacendados also filled many of the lay positions within the local Church apparatus, contributing to a multifaceted community of interest between the clergy and local
landowners.\textsuperscript{81} Perhaps even more significantly, priests were commonly involved in sexual relations with local indigenous women.\textsuperscript{82} The supposed lechery of the Roman Catholic clergy is a ubiquitous theme in Peru. Many of the jokes that I heard in buses, bars, and living rooms concerned the sexual exploitation of young women by priests. Clorinda Matto de Turner’s description of a rural priest’s facial expression in her 1889 novel \textit{Aves sin nido} fits this widespread characterization: “Father Pascual’s combined features could be summed up by a nest of lustful serpents, ready to awaken at the first sound of a woman’s voice.”\textsuperscript{83} In fact, the discursive tropes regarding priestly sexual exploitation of female parishioners are largely interchangeable with those regarding the abuse of female servants by hacendados. In subsequent chapters, I will discuss these and other elements of ecclesiastic power in more detail.

4.11 \textit{Local and capitalist world economies}

A great deal of emphasis in the historical and ethnographic literature has been placed on the hacienda as the type institution of gamonalismo. The hacienda was undoubtedly the key economic institution in the countryside from the 17\textsuperscript{th} century up until at least the 1960s. Chumbivilcas was (and remains) an overwhelmingly agrarian society. It is true, therefore, that one of the primary socio-economic institutions was the agro-pastoral estate. Nonetheless, merchants, schoolteachers, attorneys, and a number of other subsidiary occupations could and did contribute to economic ascendance and status distinction. Aguirre Beltran notes that although the gamonal class\textsuperscript{84} essentially “consists of large property owners,” it also included “rich merchants, university professors and descendants of old families which were once powerful.”\textsuperscript{85} Of course, merchants and
hacendados were frequently the same individuals or members of the same families. The control of commerce was naturally a key element in the domination of vecinos over the economy.\textsuperscript{86}

Poole argues that in Chumbivilcas, in contrast to the situation that prevailed in Puno, “it was outside merchants and middlemen—many from the provinces of Arequipa—who assumed the role of market agents for both hacendados and Indian,”\textsuperscript{87} rather than the hacendados or comuneros. While I can’t be certain, this seems like an overstatement of the case. Many of my older informants claimed to still remember the mule trains that left with wool and returned with sugar, salt, alcohol, fabric and other supplies.\textsuperscript{88} They recall both non-local merchants, particularly arrieros that brought spirits in animal-skins, but also teams of mule drivers composed of hacienda laborers. These two forms of commerce—one controlled by non-local middlemen and the other by local merchants or by hacendados themselves—probably coexisted throughout the highlands, and my own interview data suggest that Chumbivilcas was not notable for its relative dependence on rescatistas or other outside middlemen.

As had been the case in the colonial period, the health of local economies was heavily dependent on international rather than the national markets, which remained underdeveloped throughout the 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries.\textsuperscript{89} In Chumbivilcas, the international wool market was a key determinant of local prosperity. Jacobsen claims that “The two decades between Piérola’s civil war victory in 1895 and World War I marked the high tide of gamonal power over the Indian peasantry of the altiplano,”\textsuperscript{90} a periodization that corresponds fairly closely with the high water mark of the international wool market. In 1920-1, however, the wool market collapsed, with devastating
consequences for the southern Peruvian Sierra: “The crash of the wool market in 1920 brought the crisis for hacendados, gamonales, wool merchants, and the system of domination they had gradually constructed to its head . . . A “seismic wave” of rebellions and other forms of peasant resistance engrossed nearly every highland province of Puno and Cuzco departments between 1920 and 1923.” These waves never fully receded. Peasant unrest continued, with periodic upsurges, into the 1960s.

Nonetheless, vecinos in Chumbivilcas have been preoccupied, for at least a century, with cattle production, rather than the raising of sheep or camelids. Chumbivilcas is famous throughout southern Peru for its distinctive ‘cowboy’ culture organized around the raising of free-range cattle on large ranches. Although detailed data are difficult to obtain, elderly informants claim that the production was overwhelmingly destined for Arequipa, requiring an arduous traverse of the Cordillera Huanso to the southwest. The gradual urbanization of Peru beginning at the turn of the 19th century fostered demand for beef, and meant that production was oriented toward urban domestic rather than international markets. In the absence of affordable refrigeration and motor-transport, cattle were brought to Arequipa, Cuzco, and other urban markets on the hoof. Free-range cattle ranching required few capital inputs (except for land and livestock, which reproduce quickly with little care) and minimal labor inputs, which increased its appeal to land-rich and capital poor hacendados.

A number of scholars have pointed out that the provincial landed elite, as the point of articulation between the capitalist and non-capitalist sector, were directly responsible for the expropriation of surplus from the peasantry in the form of rents and heavily discounted produce and labor. Nonetheless, they were rarely the only or even
primary beneficiaries of their frequently ill-gotten gains. In the case of the wool industry in southern Peru, Burga and Reátegui demonstrate that the majority of the economic surplus generated in the peasant economy was ultimately accumulated by European commercial and industrial interests and, to a lesser extent, merchant houses in Arequipa and Lima. They argue that, because prices set by European firms and commission agents did not reflect the cost of production, "haciendas had to function almost without monetary costs in order to be profitable." They argue, in fact, that "the articulation with the international market, through wool, reproduced the Andean feudalism." In short, the prices fixed by English wool houses insured that primitive, non-capitalist forms of exploitation were needed to drive down production costs in the absence of capital sufficient to mechanize or otherwise modernize production. Not only did this encourage ‘re feudalization,’ but it also meant that hacienda owners were generally heavily indebted to metropolitan merchants and banking interests.

4.12 Hacienda and feudatario

Beginning in the early 20th century, some gamonales attempted to modernize their estates, but the logic of exploitation and domination on haciendas and in the small provincial capitals was not predominantly capitalist. Although pastoral and agricultural produce was destined for capitalist commodity markets in Cuzco and Arequipa, within the province both production and distribution were governed in large part by pre-capitalist logics. The base of the hacienda system was the ownership of landed property and the employment of resident, largely non-wage labor. These were called, variously, feudatarios, colonos, waqchilleros, peones, or yanaconas. Sometimes these various terms
signify specific forms of contract; more often than not, however, the term used to
describe workers was based on local custom rather than fine terminological distinctions.
As José María Caballero points out, “in many haciendas distinct types of colonos, with
different obligations, coexist[ed].” 101 ‘Colono’ is the most common catchall term in
Chumbivilcas, though ‘feudatario,’ which means roughly ‘serf’ or ‘feudatory,’ is more
common in the domestic Peruvian anthropological and sociological literature. It is
sometimes unclear in the literature what is meant by the term feudatario. In many
instances, feudatarios lacked their own community organizations. But many feudatarios
were in fact members of entirely subsumed indigenous communities that had either been
absorbed by neighboring haciendas or had developed over generations from colonos and
other employed forasteros. Some feudatarios negotiated collectively with landowners,
agreeing to terms of service in return for formal guarantees, or evolving customary
agreements with regard to labor and land. Other feudatarios were far more divided, with
few or no autonomous community structures or social networks.

There is no question that resident laborers on haciendas were in a highly
vulnerable position vis-à-vis landowners. They were the poorest population in the
countryside. This poverty, in fact, was both the cause and result of their precarious
tenancy. It’s quite easy to misunderstand the relationships of causation between the
poverty of hacienda-associated peasants and the labor system of the hacienda. It’s clear
that prior to the Reforma Agraria, the hacienda employed various repressive strategies to
restrict the capacity of yanaconas, feudatarios, colonos, and waqchilleros to improve
their lot in life through education, emigration, or capital accumulation. Furthermore, one
of the major forms of labor acquisition for the hacienda was to expand into community
land—through legal and illegal means—, absorbing formerly free peasant proprietors into the hacienda’s labor regime. But this always existed side by side with the tendency of the hacienda to absorb and exploit the poorest of the campesinado: the land-poor, forasteros, and other peasants who, through famine, family and personal crises, or simply bad luck, were left without the means to reproduce themselves physically and socially. This is not to say that haciendas didn’t systematically aggravate these handicaps once they had acquired the workers, but it is important to recognize that the hacienda was exploiting inequalities inherent in the rural economy at large.

Feudatarios were the least likely segment of the rural population to be educated, literate, or conversant with the national culture, in particular the Spanish language. Likewise, they were less likely to possess the social and kin connections in distant urban centers that would have facilitated flight or secured them remittances or other aid. Perhaps most importantly, their labor on the hacienda gave them customary rights to land and pastures which, though precarious, feudatarios considered significant assets and which they were loath to abandon. These factors placed them in an extremely weak position with regard to labor negotiations, and made it exceedingly difficult and potentially costly for them to object to mistreatment or abuse. The literature, both popular and academic, is filled with references to the abuse of colonos. Lyons, whose work draws on lengthy ethnohistorical interviews with former hacienda workers in highland Ecuador, elicited memories of insults, threats, whippings, beatings, rapes and murders. It’s important to recognize, however, that labor relations were not merely based on abuse and coercion. The relationship was obviously prone to abuse, but the customary terms of mutual, if asymmetrical, obligation were also susceptible to negotiation. Webster,
drawing on fieldwork in a formerly dependent community in southern Peru argues that relations between community members and hacendados were “a matter of enlightened mutual opportunism rather than simple dependency and domination.” Although landowners had substantial leeway in meting out punishment and abuse, they seem to have been careful to avoid doing so in forms or degrees that residents might consider arbitrary or excessive, or so ubiquitous as to be unavoidable, which might thereby encourage flight. In short, violence was restrained by the need for landowners to retain their workforce, and any regime that was so abusive that the risks for feudatarios of remaining outweighed its benefits would have quickly left a hacienda shorthanded. As Lyons shows in his study of indigenous memories of the hacienda in Ecuador, midnight flight was always the ultimate guarantor of feudatario survival and welfare. Of course, the ability to flee itself was affected by the presence or absence of laws against debt peonage and enslavement and the willingness of authorities to pursue violations against their infringement, factors that were not always favorable in the Sierra.

4.13 Surrounding peasantry

Given the enumerated handicaps, which would have ‘raised the bar’ on tolerable levels of abuse, the ‘protection’ afforded by the possibility of flight may have been cold comfort, but at least it meant that the most flagrant forms of violence were reserved for the neighboring ‘free’ indigenous comunidades or parcialidades. Although comuneros often served as a reserve labor force for the haciendas, the relationship between the hacienda and the comunidad was overwhelmingly antagonistic. The quintessential element in this antagonism was conflict over land, and it is in this arena
that the most flagrant violence of the hacienda system was perpetrated, including theft, arson, kidnapping, false imprisonment, torture, rape, murder, and mutilation.

The majority of Chumbivilcanos were neither vecinos nor colonos, but rather comuneros. There is a truly vast literature on the indigenous peasantry in Peru, much of it written by anthropologists. As I noted in the introduction, almost all of the anthropology done in Peru up until the early 1960s was done in highland peasant communities. There is no need to reproduce the voluminous and varied findings of this literature. These peasant communities (or parcialidades, comunidades indígenas, and later comunidades campesinas) existed alongside haciendas as distinct and independent social institutions, with their own authorities, political structures, values, and beliefs. Their basic relationship with the haciendas was antagonistic and involved frequent disputes over land and livestock. The labor regime of the hacienda depended on recruiting members of these surrounding, relatively free communities in times of high labor demand. Haciendas were frequently able to compel this sort of participation by extending rights to pasture and access to other resources throughout the year. As a result, the hacienda regime rarely ended at the legal limits of its titled property. The relations between haciendas and these peripheral, semi-incorporated communities seem to have been the most contentious, and the mutual acrimony is still palpable to this day. Hacendados had substantially less formal authority to coerce compliance and punish non-compliance with customary agreements—including, the grazing of excess animals, appropriation of firewood and other resources, shirking of pastoral obligations, and failure to send labor for sowing and harvest—from independent peasants, and this likely contributed to their employment of extralegal means. One comunero reported, for example, that
once, my father was in the field working—he was always working for Ramírez, without pay—and I was climbing a *capuli* tree. Fidelio Ramírez came around the bend on his horse with his carbine and he dismounted and hit my grandmother and then took the butt of his carbine and hit me here in the chest. When my father came back he said, that’s it, and the next day he denounced Ramírez in Santo Tomas. There were maybe 20 families here in Waytampu at the time, but they were all terrified of him, so none of them supported my father.

It’s important to recognize that these recollections are part of ongoing, intense public controversy over the recent past and, if in fact it was lodged at the time, the original denunciation was itself an element in the general rise of peasant activism in the 1960s, as well as a skirmish in a particular local conflict over land titles and labor obligations between the named hacendado and the peasant community that neighbored his property and was partially incorporated into the labor regime of the hacienda. In this case, for example, the dispute appeared to center on the rights of occasional workers to harvest *capuli* fruit. Nonetheless, it does appear that hacendados in Chumbivilcas were continually attempting to expand the land and labor limits of their estates and, while peasants were equally eager to press whatever advantages they perceived, hacendados had substantially more access to judicial, security, and administrative authorities (as well as firearms) and were thus much more aggressive and generally successful in pursuing their aggression.  

4.14 *Violence and performance*

Violence plays a prominent role in both the social science literature and the local discourse around gamonalismo. It’s clear that violent coercion was relatively common, even routine, in social and labor relations in the countryside, across Latin America.
Chumbivilcas and the surrounding provinces, in particular, were noted for their violence; so famous is the region’s violence that people in Cuzco still warn travelers against visiting. As Vie writes in her article on musical expression in Chumbivilcas, “Violence is a whip that is present throughout the Andes, but in Chumbivilcas it has the particularity of not only being accepted, but also exalted through music.” Violence obviously played a vital role as the ultimate threat behind all other forms of consent and coercion—but it was also an element of an overarching performative environment that included not only the exemplary use of violence but also classical elements of Ibero-Mediterranean cattle-herding culture, as well as traditional Andean beliefs and practice, like the emphasis on reciprocity and reverence for the local sacred geography.

The continued predominance of pre-capitalist and under-institutionalized labor relations contributed to the importance of status performance and violent coercion in the maintenance of vecino domination. As mentioned above, the association of the gamonal with rape, pillage, and violence is widespread in Peru. Given the environment of empowerment and impunity described above, and the perverting amplification of perceived racial superiority, this is unsurprising. I take it as self-evident, even axiomatic, that within a socio-political structure that does not effectively regulate abuse or, worse still, that makes participants’ wellbeing and the wellbeing of their families dependent upon abuse, individuals will tend toward abusiveness. As Dollard, in his study of race relations in the American South, puts it in rather droll terms “Extorting deference from other human beings is probably one of the things the human being will do if he gets a chance, unless his culture is so built as to make such extortion impossible.” Invidious
systems thus give incentives for abuse to even the best men and women, and they tend to 
reserve a special place of power and status for the true villains.

Violence was chronic between haciendas and feudatarios, between hacienda 
owners and surrounding communities, and between competing vecino factions. As discussed above, violence within the hacienda institution was quotidian, but probably rarely lethal. The violence of landowners seems to have been most flagrant when trying to prevent members of nearby indigenous peoples from directly contacting external authorities to report abuses. The historical record also includes a good deal of properly political violence, including assassinations of rival families and the “classic ‘encierra y toma de mesas’ (encircling and seizing of voting tables).”¹¹¹ The historical record includes periodic reports of peasants using slings and thrown rocks, beatings, and attacks with agricultural implements, but vecinos and their clients frequently utilized firearms.¹¹² I know of no account of early 20th century indigenous disturbance in which comuneros used firearms against hacendados or other vecinos. This points to a clear advantage that vecinos possessed with regard to the use of violence: vecinos had a monopoly, or near monopoly, on the ownership and use of firearms.¹¹³ I am not certain of the mechanics of the firearm market in Peru in the early 20th century, and can therefore only speculate about the manner in which this monopoly was maintained.¹¹⁴ It’s likely that some form of registration was required, as it is today, in which case local government officials, themselves vecinos, could have restricted sales to comuneros by officially refusing them permission to purchase or own. Likewise, bolt-action rifles had to be imported and were therefore expensive (as they continue to be today), and few comuneros would have had the resources to purchase firearms and ammunition.
Many vecinos, on the other hand, were avid sportsmen, hunting vicuña, deer, and other wild animals for their meat and skins and for diversion. In Chumbivilcas, many vecinos participated in the Shooting Club (Club de Tiro) 229 of Santo Tomás.\textsuperscript{115} Photos from the 1940s and 50s show Chumbivilcanos posing with their bolt-action rifles and carbines. The father of one of my informants owned a large collection of firearms, including a tripod-mounted machine gun. There is no question that the ownership and display of weapons and the development of marksmanship were wrapped up not only in the personal identity of many vecinos, but also in the maintenance of a hostile, deterrent posture toward the increasingly restive indigenous population.

Figure 10. Members of the Shooting Club of Santo Tomás, mid 1950s
This widespread possession and use of firearms contributed to a distinct ‘cowboy’ culture in Chumbivilcas, involving chronic and notorious abigeato (cattle-rustling). Abigeato is one of a set of illicit activities involving gangs (pandillas or cuadrillas), vendettas, assassination, land seizure, theft, rape, and warmi-suwa (Quechua, abduction of women). Abigeato is a phenomenon deeply wrapped in local mythology, which makes it difficult to parse out fact from fiction. Both Poole and Paponnet-Cantat imply that abigeato was historically an activity primarily of the gamonal or vecino group, and that comuneros were commonly its victims. Many of my informants support this contention. As one elderly informant said: “It was the Alvarez [one of the most powerful local landowning families]. They had plenty of money, plenty of cattle. They were just uneducated and bored. They would go and raid Velille. Steal, rape. Then a few months later Velille would retaliate.” Understood in this way, cattle-rustling had an instrumental value for the armed vecino vis-à-vis the indigenous peasantry. It should be noted, however, that abigeato can also be seen from another angle as a form of lawlessness that was unsettling to the central state, the local municipality, and the vecino establishment. In my own experience, many of the renowned abigeos were members of junior branches of vecino families, rather than power-holders in their own right. It may be that they were, to a certain extent, protected by their more influential tíos and primos, but they also represented a continual source of instability and threat to the legitimacy of vecino office-holders.

More generally, however, the focus on violence—both in the literature and in local discourse—risks stunting the analysis of other factors in the production of obedience and consent. Given the endemic weakness of the Peruvian state, and most
post-colonial states in Latin America, it’s far-fetched to think that continual violence could actually be the exclusive or even the predominant form of social control. A number of scholars have argued that, despite the essentially political emphasis on abuse in the local subaltern discourse, in the words of Aguirre Beltrán, “class or caste interests resort to physical coercion only in extreme situations.” Jacobsen echoes this conclusion in his assertion, drawing on the work of Alberto Flores Galindo and Manuel Burga, that “legends and rumors could imbue a gamonal with an aura of magic, associating him with supernatural events and shamanistic powers. Use of violent force, although vital for such all-encompassing visions of the patrón, constituted merely a tool of last resort in the construction of his authority.” In this sense, violence is the far extreme of a spectrum of practices and ideologies that together constitute an overall structure of subjugation, a spectrum that might be called, following Casaús Arzú, “traditional-charismatic domination.” As Pierre Bourdieu argues in his Logic of Practice, “because the pre-capitalist economy cannot count on the implacable, hidden violence of objective mechanisms . . . it resorts simultaneously to forms of domination which may strike the modern observer as more brutal, more primitive, more barbarous, and at the same time as gentler, more humane, more respectful of persons.” These ‘traditional’ practices and ideologies functioned, on the one hand, to distinguish the vecino from the comunero, the ‘misti’ from the ‘indio,’ and, on the other, to hold them together in asymmetrical relationships. The distinguishing ethnic ideologies and practices will be discussed in chapter 8; here I merely note that, in addition mutual distinction and antagonism, ethnic relations involved negotiation, legitimation, and consent. Lyons, for example, drawing on interviews with aging former feudatarios, writes that
The relationship between hacienda landlord and resident laborers did have some of the character of a pact of reciprocity. The hacienda provided plots for people to cultivate, pasturage for their animals, and other resources; labor was demanded in return. A part of hacienda products and profits was redistributed to the laborers. Ritual gifts and feasts on the hacienda reaffirmed the mutual goodwill and obligation that ideally characterized the relationship. If there was a pact, however, it was a tense, conflict-ridden one.\textsuperscript{122}

Lyons argues that this distorted or asymmetrical reciprocity was a key element in the mix of coercion and consent that characterized the hacienda regime.\textsuperscript{123}

This asymmetrical ‘reciprocity’ was part of a larger performative complex. The semi-feudal ideological climate, similar to that of cattle-producing peripheries throughout Latin America,\textsuperscript{124} required constant public performance for the achievement and maintenance of social status. John Charles Chasteen, writing about the Uruguayan cattle frontier in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, argues that “demonstration was vital, because the state of one’s honor did not depend on an inner voice, but on public reputation. It was the iron law of ‘el qué dirán,’ literally ‘what others will say.’ Honor was the link between collective standards and individual performance.”\textsuperscript{125} In the case of Chumbivilcas, Poole notes that gamonales, rather than investing in capital improvements, invested profits in Chumbivilcas proper as “symbolic capital in the form of gold and silver, fancy horses, saddlery, fighting cocks, and pedigree fighting bulls.”\textsuperscript{126} Acts of dramatic violence and disregard for personal danger, hallmarks of Chumbivilcas’s “qorilazo” tradition, cemented reputations and, in the case of hacendados, reinforced their control over peones and neighboring communities. Along with charismatic demonstrations of masculinity, gamonales “adapted the construction of their power to the cultural and material environment of the Andean peasant world. They practiced and championed a traditional
Catholicism and showed a certain respect for peasant ritual. Celebrations of the estate’s patron saint, weddings, and funerals served to reenact and actualize the paternal ties binding the patron to ‘his men.’

Hacendados embellished productive relationships with the trappings of fictive kinship: compadrazgo, parent-child terminology (tayta, mamacha, etc.), *ius primae noctis* (it is claimed), and other forms of sexual exploitation. Productive, affective, and abusive relationships were confused in a turbid social stream that flowed through provincial life.

### 4.15 Factionalism

The violence of provincial life was not restricted to vecino-comunero relations, but was also deeply intertwined with the endemic factionalism of the 19th and early twentieth century. Aside from passing mention in general terms, “factional socio-political rivalries at the provincial and district level” as Lewis Taylor points out, “go largely undiscussed except insofar as related to national conflicts.”

There are few detailed historical treatments of specific, local factional systems in the Peruvian countryside and, so far as I know, no such ethnographic accounts. This is surprising given the ubiquity of factionalism, particularly in periods and regions of state weakness. As Taylor suggests, when it is discussed, it is treated in terms of the endemic struggle between so-called liberals and conservatives at the national level. Many contemporary scholars have pointed out, however, that the conflicts and the factions that formed to fight them, were often substantially less ideological than their rhetoric suggested. Balmori et al. write that researchers have described the nineteenth century as a period of ideological struggle between liberals and conservatives and between modernizers and traditionalists, or of class struggle among various
socioeconomic groups or between those tempted into dependency and those upholding autonomy. But close examination shows no set of ideological or class lines, and where they nominally existed, groups and individuals continually moved back and forth across them. Notable families, however, provide a clue to understanding what actually occurred.131

Poole, discussing Chumbivilcas specifically, echoes this conclusion, asserting that “local factional disputes and power struggles . . . borrowed the affiliations (Civilista and Pierolista), though by no means the allegiances or purposes, of the two sides in a national civil war.”132 This close relationship between factionalism and family is vital not only to the current discussion but to the argument put forth in subsequent chapters.

Factionalism is a pervasive political pattern in under-institutionalized social environments. As Huntington points out, factionalism is indicative of a particular historical phase of political organization, characterized by low political participation and low political institutionalization.133 Taylor writes of 19th century Peru, that a “key factor promoting conflict was the chronic weakness of the Peruvian state which lacked legitimacy and a monopoly of coercive power.”134 Because of this lack of legitimacy and power, subprefects, governors, and other state officials were powerless to implement state policy unless they cooperated with or were themselves members of one or another faction. Furthermore, implementation in practice pitted government officials against a population that was not just politically opposed to policy, but personally involved in antagonistic, vendetta relationships with office holders.135 Factionalism is thus an outgrowth of the ongoing primacy of the extended family in social organization. The faction is, in point of fact, not an institution, but rather a block of families and individuals that is constituted contingently and is relatively impermanent.136 The ties that bind a
faction together are myriad, including economic interest, strategic necessity (in the sense that a faction may form negatively, as a calculated means of counterbalancing a competing faction), friendship between two family patriarchs, and—perhaps exceptionally—political convictions. The faction itself does not, however, have a proprietary institutional existence. The fact that almost all factions are referred to by the surname of their leading families illustrates the secondary or derived quality of the faction. Individuals, for example, do not have loyalty to a faction per se, but rather to a family that is involved contingently with a faction. It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a faction would command loyalty in opposition to a constituent’s family. The faction does not have bylaws or even a set of norms proper to itself. It may be that a faction survives a given era or generation, but this is largely a reflection of the endurance of the interests that bind constituent families, rather than because the faction has developed its own institutional longevity.

Drawing on Antonio Gramsci’s observation, it’s clear from historical evidence that vecinos—even members of antagonistic factions—consistently formed a united front in the face of revolts by indigenous communities. Factional conflict did, however, prevent vecinos both from presenting a unified front outward or toward the national government and from consolidating its local domination in stable, effective, and functionally specialized institutions. Kautsky argues that the “unchallengable and unchangeable” nature of aristocratic control meant that conflict in traditional societies was “intraclasse” rather than “interclass.” “The politics of traditional government,” he writes, “is characterized by a high degree of both instability and stability. Instability prevails with respect to the personnel occupying certain positions since, being scarce,
these are objects of a great deal of competition . . . But while the rule of particular
aristocrats is unstable, aristocratic rule as such remains infinitely stable.”140 I would argue
that this tension between stability and instability contributed to the rapidity with which
gamonalismo collapsed in the second half of the 20th century. So long as the hegemony of
the vecino’s petty aristocracy was unchallenged—and the state remained willing to
intercede in the event that it was momentarily threatened—the instability of factionalism
was not a mortal risk to the provincial social order. But as their social hegemony began to
erode with the steady advance of modernization and the state became increasingly
unwilling to underwrite their wayward authority (both of which are discussed in the
following chapter), the legacy of factionalism in vecino political control was a near total
absence of viable institutions to unify, mobilize, and direct vecino political activity and,
consequently, an inability to mount effective opposition against reform and revolution.
My informants frequently lament this lack of unity amongst the landowning class,
especially in terms of the failure to resist the erosion of their holdings through invasion
and adjudication and with regard to their current political marginalization. In the
following chapter, I will discuss in detail the process of modernization in the countryside
and in the nation at large over the course of the 20th century, and the resultant obsolesce
and eventual extinction of gamonalismo.
Chapter 5
Modernization, Revolution, Reform

*It is a liberal political education for the average northerner to live for a while in a southern town. He comes to see for the first time what it means to be able to vote, and, quite as important, not to be able to vote. What may have been previously a mere ceremony to him suddenly snaps into significance as an effective method of determining how local government will influence his personal life and interests.*

John Dollard
*Caste and Class in a Southern Town*
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The goal of this chapter is to establish a historical context for the contemporary social and political realities that I treat ethnographically in the remainder of the dissertation. I pay special attention to the parallel processes of modernization and state consolidation that advanced fitfully throughout the 20th century. Comprehending such a vast subject is obviously beyond the capacity of the present chapter; in order to preserve the coherence of the historical picture, I have elected to focus on several key historical sequences and to treat other relevant historical processes with unforgivable brevity. Despite the precarious survival of gamonalismo into the 1960s, profound changes in the nature of Peruvian national society were inexorably eroding its foundations throughout the first half of the 20th century. Many authors point to the first decades of the century as the ‘golden age’ of gamonalismo. Concurrently, however, Peru’s humiliating defeat in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) at the hands of the Chileans set in motion a series of policy and productive changes that helped to initiate a process of modernization—
involving industrialization, commercialization, incorporation into global markets, rationalization and functional specialization of administration, introduction of technological and technical innovations, the expansion of literacy, precipitous urbanization, and democratization—which would eventually eliminate the gamonal and the political economy of which he was the icon.

Peru shares with many of the post-colonial nations of Latin America a 19th century plagued by the permanent contest between liberal and conservative elements of the elite for control of the state. Although this conflict propelled the nascent state through continual, frenetic changes of policy and governmental form, the emergence of popular political movements amongst the urban working and professional classes at the beginning of the 20th century led to still more rapid changes in the ideology and practice of government. The Ocenio of Augusto Leguía (1919-1930) was, in many ways, the point of take off for many of the processes of modernization, as Leguía’s dictatorial populism reached out to the middle and working classes in order to solidify his power base in his confrontation with the traditional oligarchy. Leguía’s tenure was a significant leap forward in the slow march of state consolidation and autonomy that continues fitfully to the present day. This rising ‘state autonomy’ is fundamental to the political processes that helped to displace the gamonal.

The breadth and magnitude of these national social, economic, and political changes were such that no amount of initiative or deviousness could have staved off serious structural consequences for provincial life. Many of the Chumbivilcanos who benefited from the previous regime of gamonalismo were able to maintain their wealth and status by trading in their ponchos and silver spurs for suits and briefcases, their
property titles for diplomas, and their *pongos* for (minimally) paid employees. More than anything, adapting to these changes required participating in the massive surge of urbanization, and therefore leaving the province for Lima, Arequipa, Cuzco, and other cities of the southern sierra in search of higher education, professional employment, and greater business opportunities. In short, although vecinos have survived, and even thrived, through the epochal changes, they have done so by transforming—as individuals, families, and as a community—into something sociologically different than the gamonal of the earlier era. This process of transformation, by all local accounts, accelerated precipitously beginning in 1968 with Velasco’s takeover. I argue in this chapter that four historical phenomena were of predominant importance in the transformation of social world to which my Chumbivilcano informants now find themselves heir: (1) the Agrarian Reform initiated by Juan Velasco Alvarado; (2) the Maoist revolution of Sendero Luminoso; (3) the extension of the franchise to the illiterate peasantry; and (4) the process of fiscal decentralization that was initiated in earnest after the collapse of the Fujimori regime. All of these ‘kinds’ of phenomenon—land reform, revolution, electoral reform, and fiscal reform—are essentially universal in the transition from traditional to modern society across the globe. Nonetheless, it’s important to examine the *particular* ways in which these universal elements of modernization occurred in Peru (and, more specifically, in Chumbivilcas) in order to understand their equivocal and distinctive social consequences.
5.1  *Modernization*

Despite the relative longevity of gamonalismo as a political economic arrangement, the conditions of its predominance suffered continual erosion beginning around the turn of the 19th century. Although it has lost some of its currency in contemporary debates, the simplest way to understand the process of social, economic, and political change in the countryside and in Peru more generally is through the concept of ‘modernization.’\(^1\) A number of influential sociologists and anthropologists have criticized aspects of the concept of ‘modernization’; in particular, the risk it carries of assuming a teleology toward Euro-American modernity.\(^2\) Following authors like Max Weber and Reinhard Bendix, I approach modernization not in teleological terms but rather in terms of multiple, interdependent processes, which potentially, even necessarily, lead to divergent social, economic, and political outcomes. These processes include industrialization,\(^3\) standardization, rationalization, monetization, commercialization, functional specialization, expansion of literacy, increased social and physical mobility, expansion of communication and transportation infrastructure, democratization, and, perhaps especially, urbanization.\(^4\) A wealth of data from across the globe has demonstrated that, rather than being associated serendipitously, *these processes are interdependent and mutually reinforcing.* This mutually constitutive and reinforcing relationship between the various elements of modernization has been widely discussed in the sociological and political science literature.\(^5\)

Hans Blokland, in his recent book *Modernization and Its Political Consequences*, draws on Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, and Joseph Schumpeter in defining
modernization in more abstract terms as “an exceptionally complex process, roughly covering the differentiation, individualization, and rationalization of society.”6 Blokland puts special emphasis on instrumental (or, in Mannheim’s terms, ‘functional’) rationality and, more specifically, “the rationality of technology,” and argues that “the undeniably superior performance of this rationality gives it a sacrosanct aura. Thus, it is increasingly held up as a model for order and organization in human relations.”7 Much of the advance of modernization can be attributed to the “technical superiority” of rational organization—or, in other words, the efficiency with which a given technique achieves a desired end. The saw gives way to the chainsaw; the tomahawk gives way to the Tomahawk missile; local craft production gives way to industrialization; the family business gives way to the vertically integrated corporation; the feudal regime gives way to liberal democracy and bureaucratic administration.8 In the following section, I discuss these processes of modernization specifically in terms of Chumbivilcas and Peru more generally. My goal in this brief discussion is merely to highlight some of the key secular elements of Peruvian modernization, as a context for the subsequent discussion of the transitional period beginning in 1968.9

One of the overwhelming difficulties of discussing the process of modernization is that the component processes are so various and densely interdependent that they defy linear representation.10 The only reasonable approach is to start with a particular, more or less arbitrarily selected, process and proceed through the related processes, with the understanding that they are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. I begin with a discussion of technological and technical innovation with an understanding that, though
from a certain perspective it is a more independent variable than others, the introduction and distribution of technology is nonetheless itself socially and politically dependent.

5.2 Technology

The pace of technological development accelerated substantially in the second half of the 19th century, driven by new sources of demand in the world economy and by an influx of British and later American capital investment. Foremost among the vast array of innovations—largely imported—were those involved in transportation (including the steam and later internal combustion engines as well as advances in the fabrication of railways and roads) and in mass communication (including the telegraph, radio, telephone, and television). Although the railroad from Arequipa reached Sicuani in 1893, the effects on the local economy were modest. Given the distance to Sicuani (a couple of days on horseback) and the cost of railroad transport, the overland route across the Cordillera Occidental remained the primary route for mule trains and cattle drives until the 1930s. The introduction of the automobile and the slow advance of the road network were, however, the decisive developments in the transport of people and products. Local road construction under Leguía’s Conspiración Vial began in 1925 with a road between the provincial capital and three of the district capitals. The first government truck arrived in Santo Tomás in 1928 and was transferred with great fanfare from the subprefecto to the alcalde. Construction of the road eastward, which would eventually serve to connect Santo Tomás with Cuzco, Puno, and Arequipa, began in 1957. While roads have driven the rapid commercialization of local agro-pastoral production, their contribution to the exodus of Chumbivilcanos to urban centers has been just as profound.
The first telegraph line was installed in Santo Tomás in 1912, providing immediate communication between the local and national governments, as well as facilitating commercial transactions. The subsequent introduction and diffusion of the radio was perhaps the single most important technological contribution to the social transformation of the countryside. It’s hard to imagine the social movements and collective mobilizations of the second half of the 20th century without the radio. The growth of radio programming and listening in the 1920s and 1930s coincided with and enabled the rise of mass democracy and genuinely popular political parties. While television has largely supplanted the radio in Europe and America, radio remains the overwhelmingly dominant medium of mass communication of information, ideas, and local and national news in the countryside. Local programs in Spanish and Quechua reach listeners who would otherwise lack access to the culture at large. Especially amongst the indigenous peasantry, radio is a vital tool in consciousness-raising and the diffusion of knowledge and new forms of identification. Virtually every peasant in the field has a portable radio in his hand, slung over his shoulder, or sitting nearby on a broken chunk of soil, and almost every adobe home has a radio inside blaring noticias or waynos. Local radio stations host debate and topical discussions, confront municipal officials, announce upcoming events, and give members of the community the opportunity to voice criticism of government policies and other social issues.

5.3 Urbanization and industrialization

The quickening pace of urbanization is one of the most salient social, economic, cultural, and political elements of modernization. In Chumbivilcas, urban migration has
involved two interrelated and somewhat conflicting processes: on the one hand, despite high birth rates, falling child mortality, and longer life expectancy, the province’s population has stagnated due to massive emigration from the province to cities like Cuzco, Arequipa, and Lima. On the other, local movements of comuneros from their communities into nearby district and provincial capitals have significantly expanded the province’s modest urban centers, both in terms of population, area, density, and services. In 1940, Santo Tomás had the fewest residences of any provincial capital in the department of Cuzco—162—and only 4 homes with running water and three with sewage. Today, Santo Tomás has 2,292 private homes, 1,723 of which have running water.

Urbanization is both a product and a producer of an explosion of services in cities and burgeoning towns. Where there is a road, there are roadside restaurants, which generate demand for agricultural products and the year-round labor of cooks, waitresses, and other service workers, who themselves need lodging and other services. As will be discussed in the following chapter, the expansion of the state employment opportunities has substantially increased the demand for a broad array of products and services, in particular for food and lodging. Many of these urban entrepreneurs and employees have become specialized in their trades and no longer have the time—or no longer own the land—to produce their own food, thereby greatly expanding the local market for agro-pastoral products. Schoolteachers cannot simultaneously teach and farm, and are frequently posted far from their hometowns, and therefore also need food and lodging (and beer). The same is true of municipal employees, shopkeepers, traders, and NGO workers. Employment in commercial enterprises or government agencies generates
multiplier effects that cascade throughout the local economy, greatly increasing demand for an expanding array of local services. Hardware stores filled with lighting fixtures, PVC pipes, and screwdrivers imported from China, barbershops, fabric stores, electronics stores, tailors, clothiers, discothèques, internet cafés, mechanics, pharmacies, carpenters, cobblers, veterinary supply stores, gas stations, photo studios . . . all have appeared literally in the last two decades. Many elderly Chumbivilcanos still find the concept of eating lunch and dinner at a restaurant an extravagant novelty.

As in many countries in the developing world, urbanization and the exodus of peasant populations to the cities has been intimately connected with the explosive growth of population. Peru experienced a spectacular increase in population in the second half of the 20th century. This increase was itself a product of numerous factors, foremost among them technological advances in medicine, the development of clinics and other health care techniques and institutions, improvements in public sanitation, and the introduction of high yield crops, pesticides, fertilizers, and irrigation, all in the virtual absence of widespread adoption of contraception and family planning. The so-called ‘Green Revolution’ has been particularly important to this process. One of the defining features of highland agriculture has been the primitive nature of the productive process. In the 1950s, some haciendas began introducing moldboard plowing, but most haciendas and affluent peasants in Chumbivilcas still use a cattle-drawn root plow. Even today, most plowing in peasant communities is done by chakitaqlla. Despite the relative primitiveness of local agro-pastoral production, a wide variety of technologies and techniques have drastically improved, if not quite revolutionized, local farming and animal husbandry. In agriculture, these include high-yield crop varieties, pesticides, and, to a limited extent,
fertilizers. Improved cattle, artificial selection of sires for fitness and color, and modern veterinary medicine—including vaccines, dipping, and antibiotics—have significantly changed the practice of animal husbandry.21

Rates of population growth in Peru have been amongst the highest in Latin America throughout the 20th century.22 Peru’s population almost trebled between the 1876 and 1940 censuses (2,700,000 to 7,023,000 inhabitants), doubled between 1940 and 1972 (to 14,121,000) and doubled again between 1972 and 2007 (28,000,000).23 Chumbivilcanos have felt the effects of this explosion acutely. In Chumbivilcas, local landowners frequently complain that the communities that neighbor their haciendas were, in living memory, merely hamlets of a dozen related families, whereas their inhabitants now number in the thousands.24 Large numbers of children surviving to adulthood have aggravated the already severe minifundación (subdivision and progressive miniaturization of peasant holdings), counteracted concurrent land reform measures, and contributed to the massive influx of excess rural population into the cities.

All of these processes have affected and been affected by profound changes in the national and international markets. At the macroeconomic level, urbanization has been closely tied to commercialization and industrialization, both as economic trends and as an explicit objectives of government policy. The protectionism of the first decades of the Republic gave way in the 1840s to a headlong rush toward free trade.25 The discovery in 1841, and subsequent commercialization, of guano from the Chincha Islands gave liberal elites in Lima the funds to push through comprehensive liberal reforms, which included the abolition of slavery and Indian tribute, the reintroduction of indirect congressional elections, and the general dismantling of trade protections for domestic industry.26 Most
of the massive windfall from the guano boom, however, was consumed in the repayment and service of domestic and foreign debt, the expansion of the state bureaucratic apparatus, and the construction of a precocious and hugely costly railroad system.\textsuperscript{27} As Carol Wise points out of later periods of state expansion, “the lost opportunities from debt-backed consumption, versus borrowing for productive investments, emerge as a major theme in the Peruvian case.”\textsuperscript{28} By the 1870s, the Peruvian state had a foreign debt of £35 million and, in 1876, it defaulted.\textsuperscript{29} Attempts to stave off financial ruin by shifting into nitrate production were thwarted in 1879 by the War of the Pacific and Chile’s eventual annexation of Tarapacá and its nitrate deposits. In the wake of the war, President Andrés Cáceres was faced with a country devastated by occupation and a foreign debt of £51 million. Rosemary Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram note that the “primary task of the Government was felt to be the re-establishment of Peru’s international credit-worthiness, the attraction of foreign investment, and (if possible) further government borrowing abroad.”\textsuperscript{30} In 1889, Cáceres was forced by necessity to sign the Grace Contract with the Committee of Foreign Bondholders (which became the Peruvian Corporation in the following year), ceding control of Peru’s railway system for 66 years and granting ownership to vast tracts of the Amazonian interior, as well as stipulating annual payments of £80,000, in exchange for cancellation of bondholder claims.\textsuperscript{31} The fall in silver prices in the 1890s had the further negative affects of depreciating the Peruvian currency (which was pegged to silver) and decreasing the value of Peruvian silver exports (and thus discouraging further foreign direct investment in the Peruvian mining sector).\textsuperscript{32} Although silver accounted for 33 percent of export value in 1890, it had fallen to 6 percent by 1905.\textsuperscript{33}
Agricultural production took up some of the slack in foreign trade. Export agriculture remained the mainstay of the Peruvian economy throughout the early 20th century. Cotton and sugar together accounted for between 30 and 70 percent of exports by value between 1890 and 1930, but their contribution declined precipitously in the 1960s. The export value of coffee, wool, and rubber dwindled rapidly in the early 20th century. Although silver production slumped in the first half of the 20th century, by 1974 silver and copper were once again accounting for a third of exports by value. The extraction and export of zinc, lead, and vanadium were also important sources of foreign trade. The most significant addition to Peru’s export economy in the early 20th century was petroleum, which by 1930 was accounting for 30 percent of exports by value.

Furthermore, tariff policy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries contributed to the development of domestic industry. Thorp and Bertram argue that, because the government—in the wake of the virtual elimination of direct taxation by Cáceres in 1854 and the sovereign default of 1876—had few sources of reliable funding, it turned, in the last decades of the 19th century, toward import tariffs because they “were the easiest to apply, and encountered the least resistance.” Despite being geared toward revenue generation—rather than developmental goals—these tariffs fostered a degree of national industrialization, much of which was geared toward satisfying (the inadvertently protected) domestic markets. By the turn of the 19th century domestic industry included textile mills, food processing facilities, smelters, and foundries.

Most of this industrialization was initially accomplished with national capital, but by the 1920s foreign capital—initially British and later primarily US—had acquired majority stakes or outright ownership of many of the most lucrative enterprises.
was essentially a logical outcome of the fact that American firms had access to greater supplies of capital at substantially better interest rates—allowing for faster and larger scale improvements—as well as vertical monopolies and access to better information about international markets, all of which increased their rates of return and allowed them to purchase enterprises at prices that exceeded the profits that local entrepreneurs could hope to obtain.40

Government policy in the first half of the twentieth century was aimed at facilitating this nascent industrial sector’s access to the rural population as a reserve of inexpensive labor, as well as fostering a broad domestic market. Héctor Martínez and Carlos Samaniego argue that in the 1950s “the existing supply of labor exceeded the needs of export agro-mining activity,” and that “the urban-industrial groups that rose to political power” were interested not so much in the acquisition of formerly rural labor for industrial development, but rather the expansion of the domestic market through the incorporation of rural consumers.41 The flood of immigrants into Peru’s cities thus provided the cheap labor for industrialization as well as the primary domestic market for industrial products. Policies oriented toward industrialization—including import substitution, price controls, and greater urban public sector investment and services—have also systematically favored the urban sector at the cost of rural producers, further incentivizing urban migration. The same roads that brought waves of Andean migrants to the cities, quickly and cost-effectively brought Andean produce to newly dynamic urban markets. Migrants brought their tastes and other consumptive customs from the highlands to the coast. In Chumbivilcas, the fifties, sixties, and seventies were heady times for potato production. This window of opportunity gradually closed as coastal growers,
responding to increased demand, adopted breeds of potato that could be grown on lowland farms and delivered more cheaply to nearby markets. Urbanization and prosperity also increased national meat consumption, which Chumbivilcanos were prepared and eager to satisfy. The arrival of roads in the 1950s greatly facilitated the delivery of meat on the hoof to urban markets and abruptly made the long, arduous cattle-drive to Arequipa obsolete. Monetization, banking, and commercial investment have all appeared in Chumbivilcas in the last fifty years. One elderly informant remembered paying for alcohol and supplies with gold nuggets from his mine. Others recalled the days when their haciendas produced virtually all of the foodstuffs and implements necessary for their operation.

5.4 State consolidation

These societal aspects of modernization have interacted in complex ways with Peru’s fitful and largely tragic political development. Just as the state has played a fundamental role in fostering and retarding these processes, these processes have played a fundamental role in the constitution of the modern Peruvian state. The process of Peruvian state formation and consolidation, such that it has been, has not occurred in a vacuum. Theda Skocpol has discussed “the various ways in which state structures and actions are conditioned by historically changing transnational contexts. These contexts impinge on individual states through geopolitical relations of interstate domination and competition, through the international communication of ideals and models of public policy, and through world economic patterns of trade, division of productive activities, investment flows, and international finance.” The international geopolitical context and
ideological currents have had continual, decisive effects on the unfolding of the Peruvian social and political process.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Peruvian state entered the 20th century with weak institutions, little autonomy, and little ability to penetrate civil society. One of the most significant processes of the century has been the slow consolidation of the state and the increase of its autonomy from competing states and from its own civil society. As Mann notes, “autonomous state power is the product of the usefulness of enhanced territorial-centralization to social life in general.”\(^{43}\) In Peru, the challenges attendant on the process of modernization and international competition have been essential catalysts of state consolidation. Military crises—in particular, the war with Chile, the Cuban-style revolutionary activity of the 60s, and the civil war fought against the Shining Path—have been particularly important in motivating consolidation. Carlos Contreras points out that the “indigenous rebellions, such as that led by Atusparia in Huaraz in 1885, had convinced the Limeño elite that central state control over the exactions demanded of peasants was fundamental in order to guarantee internal governance and peace of the republic,” encouraging reformers to seek “to build a body of professional bureaucrats who would be more docile than the local mestizo and indigenous oligarchies.”\(^{44}\)As has been noted by students of European state consolidation,\(^{45}\) there has been a close relationship between militarization and the development of a proper national tax and industrial base.\(^{46}\) Tilly, Skocpol, and Migdal have all emphasized the importance of geopolitical and, in particular, military competition in motivating state consolidation.\(^{47}\)

In Michael Mann’s terminology, the Peruvian state progressed in the course of the 20th century from a comprehensive weakness, in which it had limited despotic power and
negligible infrastructural power, to significant power in both despotic and infrastructural terms. Peru’s rapid, ignominious defeat at the hands of the Chileans demonstrated that the state was unable to maintain even its despotic sovereignty over the national territory. The coups and revolutions of the 19th century were won with trifling numbers of soldiers, further proof of the extremely limited despotic power of the state. Leguia’s rule represented a significant, though ambivalent and unsettled, moment of state consolidation and autonomization. Nonetheless, various elements continued to disrupt even the despotic power of the state throughout the middle of the 20th century: civilian control over the military was notoriously faulty, as manifested in continual military coups; labor unrest was chronic; the state was unable to successfully suppress APRA as an autonomous, and to a certain extent competing, political organization; repeated crises with foreign creditors and investors demonstrated the inability of the state to broker relations between external entities and its own restive population; and legislative obstructionism demonstrated the weakness of the executive and prevented the elaboration of coherent, adequate state responses to the processes of modernization. It was not until the second half of the 20th century that the state began to exercise significant infrastructural power. In fact, one of the positive judgments that Peruvians frequently make about the Fujimori regime is that it did something, not only in the sense that it implemented effective, if painful, policies to deal with inflation and the Shining Path, but that it produced visible, infrastructural signs of its rule.
5.5 Liberalism

Peruvian historians have pointed to several key political turning points prior to the Velasco era, including (a) the liberalization initiated by Ramón Castilla’s terms in office (1845-1851, 1855-1862), (b) Peru’s humiliating defeat in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) and the role it played in ushering in the so-called Republica Aristocrática (dated 1895-1919 by Jorge Basadre) and the hegemony of the liberal Partido Civil, (c) Leguía’s eleven-year dictatorship, which substantially increased the autonomy and institutional strength of the Peruvian state, (d) APRA’s Trujillo uprising in 1932 and the subsequent thirty years of conflict between APRA and the military-backed oligarchy, and finally (e) Belaúnde’s moderate, reformist bid to resolve the systemic contradictions that had been mounting for the previous century. Although it can be useful to periodize historical processes in this way, the pace of social and economic change was basically continual and relentless.

The local adoption and adaptation of Euro-American political ideologies (especially liberalism and later Marxism) intensified local demands for political change. In the 19th century, the adoption of classical liberalism by elements of the national elite motivated limited political and economic reform and opposition to conservatism and the rule of caudillo military officers. A central feature of 19th century Peruvian politics was the slow transition from post-colonial conservative dominance (after the brief experiment with liberalism under Bolívar) to the hegemonic control of the liberal oligarchy. Nicolás de Piérola was a transitional figure in this process. Although a “leader of the landed oligarchy and clerical elite,” Piérola, as Minister of Finance and later as President of
Peru, was instrumental in liberalizing and modernizing the Peruvian economy, in particular through the Dreyfus guano contract and, later, through fiscal reforms, rebuilding and reforming government institutions in the wake of the War of the Pacific, and ushering in “the political leadership of the civilistas—members of the Peruvian oligarchy, which included bankers, hacendados, and traders with modern approaches to economy. This elite, called civilistas after their antimilitary politics, inaugurated a long rule (1895-1919) that came to be known as the República Aristocrática.”

Representatives of the Partido Civil were able to slowly expand the export-oriented economy and the institutional capacity of the state, while continuing to prevent the expansion of democratic representation.

The first decades of the 20th century witnessed an intense ideological and political struggle within civilismo between advocates of steady industrialization through the accumulation of national capital (represented by Francisco García Calderón) and elements within the bourgeoisie who advocated more rapid industrialization through massive foreign investment (represented by Leguía). Although Augusto Leguía initially ran for President as a civilista, he gradually turned against the party leadership. By his second run for office, he had officially broken from the party. After assuming dictatorial authority in a military coup in 1919, he “launched an active campaign to eradicate civilismo from the political arena while pursuing an economic crusade that called for industrialization with massive foreign investment which could and eventually did displace the profit-making capabilities of national capital earmarked for exportation.”

Leguía’s eleven-year dictatorship, frequently termed the Oncenato or the ‘Patria Nueva’
period, marked a decisive turning point in the modernization of the Peruvian state and
economy. In Poole and Rénique’s description:

Leguía undertook to modernize Perú’s slumbering state and economy. During his eleven years in office, Leguía oversaw the expansion of state control over different areas of Peruvian society by creating departments of statistics, agriculture, mines and Indian Affairs. The expanding bureaucracy spawned a middle class of functionaries and professionals whose livelihood depended on the state. By incorporating these middle sectors into the state administration, Leguía’s ‘Patria Nueva’ eroded the oligarchic elite’s monopoly on public affairs, while leaving their economic power intact.53

Of particular significance for Peru’s modernization was the institution of the
conscripción vial, which vastly expanded the national road network. The massive road projects brought many once-isolated highland towns into contact with markets for their produce and seasonal employment, but were built using compulsory peasant labor and were often redirected in ways that directly benefited provincial landed elites. Leguía also inaugurated two lasting developments in Peruvian politics: populism and the hegemony of US capital. Leguía used populist rhetoric (demagoguery to his opponents) to solidify his political base in the popular and rising middle classes, and courted foreign, primarily US, investment to jump-start the country’s nascent industrial sector.54

The entry of the middle class into the political arena obviously marks a watershed. It is inevitably the result of a complex push and pull between elements of the contemporary elite who see potential benefit in soliciting mass support and legitimation and the vigorous and increasingly importunate demands of various social movements for representation and for their portion of the benefits of modern productivity.55 Leguía’s populist courting of the middle and working classes is an excellent example of the former: faced with stiff opposition from his former Partido Civil, Leguía appealed
directly to the public to legitimate his rule. This drive for mass support was not, however, merely a self-interested ‘politics of survival’; liberalizers like Leguía are frequently motivated by a bourgeois “ideal of an open society with firmly enforced standards of equal participation.” Furthermore, liberal and other modernizing intellectuals and politicians have often “themselves absorbed during their exposure to the industrialized world” a belief in the legitimizing power of mass support. Leguía himself was reportedly deeply affected by the years he spent in the US and Europe between his first and second terms of office.

At the same time, the nation’s commercial and industrial development and state expansion created a burgeoning middle class of professionals and bureaucrats and drew hundreds of thousands of peasants into urban centers, proletarianizing them and exposing them to education, information, and trade unionism. Just as elements of the oligarchy sought common cause with the rising middle class, the middle class saw the working class below them as a natural ally in its drive for rights and representation. Massive urban migration brought the marginalized populations of the Sierra from the isolated rural backwaters to the doorsteps of the capital, where they were increasingly difficult to ignore. As a consequence, a variety of social movements began to emerge in the 1920s, challenging a broad array traditional entitlements and exclusions.

The expansion of public education throughout the 20th century played a key role in both the nation’s glacial economic reorganization and the expansion of civic participation amongst the working class and peasantry. Gose writes of his fieldsite in the town of Huaquirca in neighboring Apurímac that “it was in the schools that commoners first became both fluent in Spanish and literate. Everyone agrees that it was commoners
with these new skills who transformed Huaquirca’s political structure during the period 1945-1960 . . . Of all the changes that took place in Huaquirca since the 1940’s, it was the expansion of the local education system which most transformed the nature of notable rule.  

5.6 Marxism and trade unionism

Despite all of these mutually reinforcing processes, the transition from gamonalismo to modern liberal democracy was not, by any means, automatic. As a number of authors have pointed out, while the consolidation of the central state under Leguía involved a significant strengthening of governmental institutions and a limitation of rural autarky, vecinos notables largely retained power, albeit increasingly within the constraints of the administrative apparatus and of the rule of law. In Gramscian terms, Peru has experienced a crisis of political hegemony that has lasted nearly a century.  

Leguía defeated and eradicated civilismo in the 1920s and in the subsequent century no ideology has successfully captured the hearts and minds of the majority of Peruvians.  

Until Velasco’s coup in 1968, the oligarchy tried, with little imagination, to crush and then co-opt the growing political consciousness of professionals, workers, and peasant.  

As Nelson Manrique wrote, though

the social contradictions that faced the mercantile bourgeoisie and the highland terratenientes in the immediate aftermath of war [with Chile] might seem large, these were evidently secondary in comparison to the contradictions that confronted both forces in relation to the indigenous peasantry. As a consequence, in a process not devoid of shocks and contradictions, the alliance established after the civil war of 1895 remained in effect in its basic form until the end of the oligarchic state, in other words until the Agrarian Reform of 1969, which culminated the
process of liquidation of the power of the landed elite set in motion by the peasant struggles of 1956-1965.  

Thus, despite the fact that traditional hegemony of the oligarchy had begun to collapse early in the century, it wasn’t until the second half that a fundamental re-articulation of state and civil society was strenuously attempted.

Although the level of mobilization and organization of revolutionary activity began to rise in the 1930s, periodic revolts and civil disturbance had been the norm throughout the highlands in the colonial and Republican eras. Significant regional unrest occurred throughout the colonial period several times a century, including Manco Inca (1536-37), Taki Onqoy (Ayacucho, 1565), Tupac Amaru’s so-called Neo-Incan state (ending in 1572), Ayacucho (1616), Laycacota mine revolts (1661-1668), Juan Santos Apu-Inca-Atahualpa (Chanchamayo, 1742), Tupac Amaru II (Cuzco, 1780), and Pumacahua (1815). In addition, there were frequent localized revolts against encomenderos and corregidores (for example, by Angaraes Indians in 1542 or in Velille, Chumbivilcas, in 1777). Factional fighting was endemic throughout the first decades of the Republican period, which to a certain extent overshadowed and encompassed other forms of rural protest. In 1868, anti-gamonal protest in and around Huancané was brutally suppressed. This was followed in 1885 by the Atusparia revolt, Rumi Maki (1915), Capachica (1921), and, again, unrest in Huancané (1923). Localized revolts broke out in a number of districts of Chumbivilcas in the early 1920s, the most serious of which took place in the district of Quiñota, in Chumbivilcas, and Haquira, in neighboring Apurímac (1922-1924). Indigenous peasants spent 400 years testing both the capacity of landed elites to repress them and the willingness of central governments to
intercede violently on behalf of their ethnic confederates. Until the mid-1960s, peasant protest was met unfailingly with disproportionate violence. But, with the spread of mass communication, political consciousness, legitimizing ideologies, and techniques of strike and land invasion, rural unrest became increasingly widespread and difficult to suppress, which, in turn, contributed to the growing unwillingness of governments to intercede on behalf of landowning proxies.

Marxist ideology, mobilization, and organization were key elements in forcing the national bourgeoisie, the military, and segments of the traditional oligarchy to incorporate the middle and working class in stabilizing and legitimizing forms of mass politics. Leftist organizing began amongst urban workers at the beginning of the 20th century. By the 1920s trade unionization drives had begun to spread to the countryside, first amongst plantation labor in the coastal regions of the north and subsequently to the peasantry of the Central and Southern Sierra. The roots of the CCP (Confederación Campesina del Perú), the FDC (Federación Departamental de Campesinos), and other peasant organizations lie in the labor unions of rural workers that emerged during Leguía’s tenure during the 1920s. Haya de la Torre’s APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) was the first institutionalized, national organ of leftist agitation and mobilization. Many of the first rural organizers were inspired directly by Marxism, and especially the strain of Marxism developed by Mariátegui and his fledgling PSP (Partido Socialista del Perú, which, in 1930, became the PCP—Partido Comunista Peruano).

Because of the growing power of APRA and the intransigence of the military and other political elites at various levels of government, from the 1930s on, the national government was paralyzed and major policy initiatives were continually postponed as
various parties sought to impede each other and the President. Peasant trade unions and federations multiplied and consolidated. Radicalized peasant organizations began to invade and hold the landed property of neighboring haciendas and haciendas on which they worked. Formerly parochial and reactive peasant and urban unrest took on more strategic and institutionalized forms. Marxist militants were particularly important in bringing techniques of land invasion and peasant unionization to the countryside. There is a general consensus that rising tide of increasingly organized rural unrest in the 1950s and 1960s was a major element in the growing willingness of national elites to entertain a comprehensive national political and economic reorganization. These were still predominantly syndicalist movements for concrete labor reforms, but the early 1960s marked an expansion of the terms of protest, with a shift from land invasion and strike to demands for recognition and protection of civil rights and for fundamental changes in the nation’s political and economic structure.

Political deadlock in Lima between Christian democrats, reactionaries, liberals, APRA, and the military had a retarding effect on government responses to rural unrest. The struggle between the military establishment and APRA was a particularly important element in the postponement of meaningful reform until the end of the 1960s. In 1932, Apristas in Trujillo launched an armed revolt, capturing and executing several dozen Peruvian army officers. The army quickly retook the city, killing more than a thousand apristas in retaliation. The resulting antagonism prevented the military from consenting to APRA’s assumption of the presidency. Because APRA was the predominant political organization of the middle and working class, this effectively aligned the military with the oligarchy, whatever the political leanings of the officer corp. Government practice
and discourse throughout the nineteen-thirties, forties, and fifties was shifting and frequently contradictory but, in the absence of the necessary political consensus, the basic collaboration between rural landowners and the federal government continued, despite the growing recognition that it was ultimately untenable.

The close of the 1950s coincided with another wave of peasant mobilization: invasions and strikes occurred in Pasco (1959-1962), La Convención (1960-1962), Junín (1963), and Cuzco (1963). The military seized power in 1962, in part in response to escalating rural unrest and the inability of the civilian government to contain and resolve it. Mass evictions were violently employed throughout 1961 and 1962, killing dozens of campesinos throughout Pasco. In December of 1962, the guardia civil massacred a dozen peasant protesters in Chaullay in La Convención. Likewise, the military government employed mass arrests to crush peasant activism in Junín and Pasco in early 1963. Repression continued to be the consistent response to rural strike, invasion, and protest. Beginning with Belaúnde’s assumption of office in 1963, Peruvian government policy reflected deep confusion about what stance to take vis-à-vis revolts. The unquestioned support of the central government for hacienda owners had eroded significantly, as the executive struggled to discover a path toward revived state legitimacy and the legislative branch became deadlocked by partisan obstructionism.

Government responses in 1963 were equivocal, some invasions being met with acquiescence or negotiation, others with overwhelming violence. Although the invasions that were launched in Pasco just after Belaúnde’s inauguration were met with “little repression or bloodshed,” and the invading communities ultimately retained the majority of occupied land, the invasions that began to strike Cuzco later in the year were
met with prison and gunfire. In Chumbivilcas, Arcadio Hurtado Romero, the hijo natural of a local hacendado, led a series of armed invasions with revolutionary undertones. Doña Toribia Varzuelo de Ricalde, the owner of one of the affected properties, obtained “through her son, who was the Trial Division Judge . . . a detachment of thirteen civil guards, one sergeant and a lieutenant on her hacienda. Their presence meant that the police were at the disposition of the landowning class; they would be ready to assist hacendados at any time and in any way necessary.” Arcadio Romero was eventually captured and imprisoned in Cuzco, where he was killed behind bars by an unidentified individual. As late as 1969, Handelman could still report after doing interviews in communities throughout the central and southern sierra that “virtually all village leaders believed that in almost any landlord-community conflict, the government would intervene on behalf of the hacendado.”

5.7 Decline of gamonalismo

Roland Anrup has written that “the apogee of the gamonal order can be situated between the last decade of the past century and the decade of the 1930s, when its slow decomposition began. At the end of the 60s many elements of gamonalismo still remained, but the system as such had entered into open crisis.” This decline was in part the secular outcome of gradual, but significant changes in the ideology and practice of governance, including bureaucratization, universalization, standardization, and centralization, all of which were antithetical to gamonalismo. The traditional order relied on immobility—in all its senses—and roads, radios, telephones, education, and industrial labor opportunities for peasants in the growing cities significantly undermined the fixity
of traditional society. The movement of populations challenged the ability of vecinos to maintain lines of ethnic stratification.\textsuperscript{88} New ideologies of equality weakened the hold of custom and hierarchies of status and value. The spread of basic education threatened the exclusivity of the cultural affinity that the vecino shared with the nation at large. The decrease of Quechua monolingualism as a result of education, labor migration, conscription, and technologies of mass communication allowed local indigenous citizens to communicate directly with the national community.

At the national level, the dominance of rentier capital was replaced by industrial and later financial capital. The consolidation of the state—in particular its increasing monopoly on legitimate violence through the strengthening, professionalization, and centralized control of the military and police—advanced at the expense of the power and autonomy of the gamonal. The increasing subordination of the judiciary to law and central authority likewise deprived local vecino powerholders of key prerogatives. One of my vecino informants recalled with indignation an incident in the 1970s in which a local student of \textit{origen humilde} (i.e. a comunero) denounced his father for hunting vicuña. The indignation, however, was clearly not so much that the accusation was false, but rather that a comunero would have the nerve to denounce a vecino notable, and that the state would allow him to do so with impunity.\textsuperscript{89} In a further ‘injustice,’ which brought a laughing scoff from him, he noted that the student went on to become the provincial magistrate.

With greater popular participation in national elections and policy pressure, the government itself ceased to be an exclusively class and ethnic institution (although
mestizos and criollos continued to predominate), so that it was naturally less enthusiastic about extending politically costly support to a fractious ethnic minority to which it was no longer tied by interest or identification.\textsuperscript{90} Contreras describes a clear desire on the part of reformers and administrators to excise the local oligarchy from the political equation.\textsuperscript{91} The turn against the landed aristocracy has been a fundamental element of liberal modernity more generally. Antony Taylor writes about this phenomenon in Britain at the turn of the last century.\textsuperscript{92} The tropes Taylor describes were common in Peru from the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century up until today; the aristocracy was portrayed as unproductive, decadent, debauched, sybaritic, sexually coercive, parasitic, and vampiric by “radicals and progressives of all political stripes . . . Indeed, the one factor that united Labour, Liberals, and radicals was their dislike of the encumbrances aristocracy placed on the British people.”\textsuperscript{93} The actual role of vecinos, as individuals and as entrepreneurs, was obviously more complicated and ambivalent.

5.8 \textit{Nicanor Berrío Márquez}

Despite the steady eclipse of gamonalismo \textit{as a social order}, many hacendados recall the 1950s and 60s as a period of new commercial opportunities and continued affluence.\textsuperscript{94} At the heart of this contradiction was the ability of the vecino community to adapt to the 20\textsuperscript{th} century in similar ways as the rising popular classes, and to invest their energy and resources in new ideas, techniques, and opportunities. While the encompassing structure of exploitation and domination was buckling under weight of modernization, individuals and families were adjusting themselves in pragmatic ways to the altering circumstances. The life of Nicanor Berrío Márquez, the grandfather of one of
my primary informants, is illustrative of the contradiction inherent in the position of the vecino community with regard to these epochal changes. On the one hand, Nicanor was a prominent member of the landed elite of Chumbivilcas. His hacienda, Casablanca, just to the west of the provincial capital, controlled the entire west bank of the Río Santo Tomás for several kilometers: rich, flat, temperate valley land. The casa grande on the property was a center of festivities for the vecino community, hosting bullfights, feasts, and other celebrations. He owned several casonas in Santo Tomás and most of the land that would eventually become the northern quarter of the town. Nicanor was a musician and an avid dancer. He maintained numerous fictive kin relations with members of neighboring peasant communities. His property was worked by customary labor, and domestic work in the casa grande and the casonas in town was provided by pongos. He controlled large swaths of highland grazing land. He was a compadre and close friend of Leonardo Alvarez, the patriarch of the notorious Alvarez clan of Colquemarca. He served as the province’s congressional Diputado from 1945-1948. He was also the head of the “Anti-Communist Front of Chumbivilcas,” which was formed in 1953 to arm and defend landowners and their property against the perceived threat of socialist agitation.95 Nicanor is also the man in the suit who stands at the center of the most iconic photograph of Chumbivilcas, taken by Martín Chambi circa 1945.
Although the photo is listed by the Chambi archive as having been shot in the “Chumbivilcas region,” it was actually taken on the grounds of Cuzco’s *Club de Cusco*. The overall composition of the photo gives the impression of having been taken in the patio of a *casona*, as was typical in the era, but on closer inspection eucalyptus trees can be seen in the background. Nicanor commissioned Chambi to take a series of photos in Cuzco and brought his cowhands and agricultural workers, as well as musicians from nearby communities, all the way to Cuzco for the express purpose. Although the photo is usually used to represent the brutal hierarchies of race and class that characterized the ‘feudal’ countryside, the reality is somewhat more complex. Several of the men are
mayordomos and other trusted managers. The famous musician Pancho Gomez Negron is recumbent with his charango in the bottom left. In an unarchived photo taken the same day, some of the men are mounted on horseback, while others stand close beside Nicanor. The band members are clearly indigenous peasants but, it should be noted, a number are from families of esteemed wakawaqra masters from the district of Llusco. More generally, the men in the photograph are not hastily gathered serfs, but hand-picked workers, friends, and musicians brought hundreds of kilometers on foot and horseback over broken terrain for the occasion.

The larger paradox of Nicanor Berrío, however, is that he was a man on the cusp of a new age, not only a feudal lord, but also an urbane legislator and enthusiastic modernizer. His main rural estate had a swimming pool, orchards, groves, and its own bridge across the river Santo Tomás, when most Chumbivilcanos still lived in stone huts. He spent decades building a two-kilometer stone and cement canal in order to raise irrigation water from the river to his fields, tunneling through several rocky outcroppings. As diputado, he secured state resources in 1947 to stock the Velille and Santo Tomás rivers with trout. In the photograph below, obtained from one of his descendants, Nicanor stands in one of his orchards with a shovel, wearing the typical overalls of an American family farmer. This self-representation goes to the heart of the contradiction at the heart of modernization. On the one hand, Nicanor was a man
whose wealth and status were deeply rooted in traditional labor relations and ideologies; on the other, an industrious, overall-ed family farmer. Gone from the second image is the disdain for physical labor, the sybaritic sartorial markers of status, the retinue, the fieldworkers, and the band. Here the gamonal has remade his image around labor, productivity, pragmatism, and American modernity. This tension is not, however, idiosyncratic. The vecino was not only a lord of the land, but a town-dwelling burger—a member of the bourgeoisie. Summarizing the work of Jonathan Dewald, Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla reminds us that
what the [European] nobility underwent in early modern times was not so much a crisis as a process of adaptation resulting from the change in its internal composition. The entry of new members and the growing cultural integration with other rising classes resulted in a nobility that was constantly changing. Within that class there developed many of the values later to be recognized as bourgeois, which foreshadowed the modern world: the culture of merit, the sense of privacy and individual development, a certain modern sense of the family and domesticity, the taste for reading, etc. \(^9^9\)

Men like Nicanor Berrío, therefore, were not aberrations, but rather representatives of an organic tendency inherent to a modernizing agricultural sector. It’s important to recognize, however, that this adoption of liberal ideas and identities did not displace the belief in ethnic superiority or the ‘colonial mentality,’ but rather, as Casaús Arzú argues in her discussion of elite ideology in Guatemala, shifted the justification of ‘benevolent’ dominion from God and Crown to progress and civilization. \(^1^0^0\) These contradictions are, amongst other things, signs that not only was the nation at large changing, but the gamonal himself was changing. Adapting to these changes was not merely a question of whether to resist or acquiesce; he could also embrace and be an integral part of the process of modernization and even liberalization.

5.9  Revolution and reform

In this section, I explore four interrelated processes of reform and revolution that were decisive in the transition from the moribund gamonalismo of the 1960s to the peasant political ascendancy that I will describe in subsequent chapters: (1) Juan Velasco Alvarado’s bloodless 1968 coup and, in particular, the Agrarian Reform implemented by his Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, (2) the Maoist insurgency of the Shining Path (PCP-SL—*Partido Comunista Peruano-Sendero Luminoso*), (3) the 1979
Constitution and, in particular, its extension of suffrage to illiterate Peruvians, and (4) the political and fiscal decentralization that have characterized government policy since the return to democracy in 2000. These occurrences and the way they have interacted illustrate the complex relationship between reform and revolution in the process of modernization. Unrest and political mobilization can provide the foundation for true revolutionary upheaval, or provide a signal to political elites that reform is urgently needed in order to shore up the legitimacy of traditional political institutions. Revolutionary activity can mobilize popular support or exhaust and enervate it. Repression can tame and regiment society or trigger democratic mobilizations that destabilize controlling regimes.

Of all the reforms and revolutions of the last half-century in Peru, the Agrarian Reform of Velasco is the most frequently cited turning point for rural society at all levels of discourse—popular, academic, mestizo, and comunero. If Chumbivilcanos could start modern history at any date, their 1st Vendémaire would fall on October 3, 1968—the date of Juan Alvarado Velasco’s coup. Adult Chumbivilcanos still reckon history in terms of “antes de” or “después de” Velasco. In the words of one middle-aged comunero, “Before Velasco, campesinos had to bow on their knees to propietarios, holding their hats in their hands. And if they didn’t, they beat us, to the point of bleeding. That’s how it was. But after Velasco, it was the propietarios who had to humble themselves.”

By the 1960s, all parties and political persuasions recognized that the status quo was politically and economically untenable and that Peru faced a choice between revolution and reform. The alliance between the reactionary Odría and the rabidly anti-communist and increasingly accommodationist APRA had proved unable to channel or
repress popular mobilization. The interim military government of 1962-63 decreed minor agrarian reform measures. The modest, watered-down reforms of the first Belaúnde administration were controversial, obstructed, and ineffective. The inability of the Belaúnde administration, hampered by stiff congressional opposition, to effectively govern in the face of rising political unrest and a series of fiscal and monetary crises, led General Juan Velasco Alvarado and a faction of progressive officers to seize control of government.

5.10 **Juan Velasco Alvarado’s Agrarian Reform**

In October 1968, with Peru in the grips of a severe fiscal crisis that threatened to draw it into an economic abyss, General Juan Velasco Alvarado toppled the democratically elected government of Fernando Belaúnde Terry in a bloodless coup. The resulting military government was modernizing, populist, and left-leaning. Less than a year after taking power, in June 1969, Velasco’s regime promulgated Law 17716, the Agrarian Reform Law, perhaps the most enduringly significant action of his administration. A number of volumes have treated the Reform’s impacts on the rural sector and, more specifically, the peasantry. From its inception, the general public and social scientists in particular were acutely aware of the significance of the Reform for the future of the country. As a result, the research and literature on it is extensive. Among other things, research has explored: the macroeconomic elements and repercussions of the Reform; the policies of the Revolutionary Government and the agencies formed to implement them; the extent of income redistribution; poor performance of collective enterprises, particularly in the highlands; the role of peasant federations and activism.
in the Reform process.\textsuperscript{109} Likewise, there is a large body of work dealing specifically with the post-Reform social and economic environment.\textsuperscript{110}

Although the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces may not have been as revolutionary as its official title suggested, it did attempt and, to a certain degree, accomplish significant reforms and restructuring of Peruvian society and economy. In Adrianzen’s words, “\textit{Velasquismo} tried to create new laws and new guarantees in the regulation of disputes between capital and labor; to define democracy in a substantive manner; to redefine the relations between the city and the countryside, between the nation and the international system; and to emancipate the peasant through the elimination of gamonalismo, of the large landowners, and through access to landed property.”\textsuperscript{111} The Agrarian Reform itself had various objectives, but two of the most important were: (1) to redistribute land from the hacienda to peasant sector and, by doing so, stabilize the increasingly restive countryside; and (2) to increase agricultural production in order to facilitate industrialization.\textsuperscript{112} With regard to the former, the progressive elements in the officer corps, led by Velasco, had come to the conclusion that the nation must definitively turn against the gamonal and incorporate the indigenous peasantry in the interests of justice, prosperity, and stability.\textsuperscript{113} As Huntington notes, “No social group is more conservative than a landowning peasantry, and none is more revolutionary than a peasantry which owns too little land or pays too high a rental. The stability of government in modernizing countries is thus, in some measure, dependent upon its ability to promote reform in the countryside.”\textsuperscript{114} The controlling officers, particularly those in army intelligence, had drawn the conclusion, from their experience in counterinsurgency
in the highlands, that without land reform, the peasantry would continue to be a source of instability and potential revolutionary mobilization.

Figure 13. Velasco Alvarado lends his name to this rural primary school.

The agricultural policy of the Revolutionary Government represented an intensification and radicalization of national policy from the 1950s on, rather than a complete departure. Particular emphasis was put on “satisfying the demand for industrial inputs; increasing the production of foodstuffs and diversify their composition in order to augment the proportion of products destined for urban consumption and diminish, accordingly, the proportion of products destined for local or self-consumption; [and] guaranteeing sufficient and cheap enough manpower for the development of industry.”

Commercial plantations on the northern coast were immediately seized and collectivized.
In the sierra, all property in excess of 15-40 hectares (depending on quality) was to be confiscated by the Peruvian state.\textsuperscript{116} Agrarian Reform courts were formed to adjudicate competing land claims (Agrarian Reform courts didn’t actually begin functioning in Chumbivilcas until 1974).\textsuperscript{117} For my vecino informants, the threat to their ownership of property fell into three distinct categories: afectación, reivindicación, and invasion. Afectación involved the application of regionally specific size limits. Reivindicación was the judicial process for evaluating the legality of title and possession, in which peasant communities with potential claims on parcels and current holders were able to submit documentation to the Agrarian Reform Court for settlement. Finally, land invasion involved attempts by peasants to seize land once the prior two had left a given property unaffected (or once peasants concluded that proceedings were hopelessly stalled).\textsuperscript{118} In Chumbivilcas, the entire process appears to have been rather haphazard.\textsuperscript{119}

5.11 SINAMOS

The Reform process produced two institutions, in particular, that were significant for the development of peasant political self-expression: SINAMOS (Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social) and the CNA (Confederación Nacional Agraria).\textsuperscript{120} Many vecinos place SINAMOS consciousness-building at the very center of the calamity of the Agrarian Reform. SINAMOS was founded in 1971 to mobilize and channel popular political participation. It was a key element in the regime’s efforts to undercut APRA’s preeminence in trade union organizing and to fold the institutions of civil society into the state apparatus in a corporatist fashion. Almost all vecinos express a certain degree of ambivalence about the concientización that SINAMOS spearheaded in
the countryside. On the one hand, they frequently make statements like, “Before, the peasant didn’t have morale. He was completely oppressed. Like an animal. He walked with his head bowed. Now he has self-esteem. Está bien.” Some of this discourse may be adopted out of mere pragmatism, given the present socio-political environment, but some vecinos seem genuinely thankful or relieved to no longer be a participant in the rabid, tireless de-humanization of the comunero.121

On the other hand, there is virtually complete consensus among them that the consciousness given by SINAMOS and other reform agencies was exaggerated and has permanently distorted rural social relations. The most common complaints are that the Reform “ha tergiversado todo” (distorted everything), that SINAMOS gave comuneros a falsely elevated sense of their own worth and capacity, that it led to a pervasive lack of respect, and that it made comuneros contentious and unwilling to work. Instead of seeing SINAMOS as providing validation and avenues for expression for pre-existing dissatisfaction, frustration, and fury, many vecinos see it as having itself produced and fostered these very responses.122 Many Chumbivilcanos still express a sense of betrayal and shock at these forms of peasant protest and identify them with outside instigators rather than genuine local grievances.123 Comuneros are generally as grateful for the elevation and vindication given to them by Velasco as vecinos are resentful of it. Many comuneros experienced the velasquista message, frequently delivered to them by SINAMOS promoters, as both political liberation and personal valorization. They also experienced it as an opportunity for retribution. As one comunero municipal authority exclaimed in a moment of intoxicated enthusiasm: “Velas said to us: ‘No longer will
they eat from the sweat of your brow!’ There it is. ‘Now is the time to kick the shit out of the mistis.’”

At the same time, however, as representatives of the various reform agencies, including and in particular SINAMOS, brought new forms of political consciousness and organization to the campo, they also elaborated a reconfigured form of domination rooted in expertise, formal education, and bureaucratic authority. Van Den Berghe called this “technocratic paternalism” and argued that “the ethnic barrier between reformer and ‘reformee’ leaves intact the structure of ethnic domination.” Conlin, who did work in a peasant community during the Velasco era, found that SINAMOS promoters systematically undercut the contribution of peasant participants in their courses and “that peasants were only allowed to participate in any true sense when the decisions to be made were of a trivial nature—such as choosing the name of the Co-operative.”

5.12 Foundation and mutiny of the CNA

In 1974, the regime promulgated DL 19400, which dissolved the SNA (Sociedad Nacional Agraria—National Agrarian Society), the trade association of hacendados and other landed property owners. The government attempted to replace the SNA with the CNA (Confederación Nacional Agraria—National Agrarian Confederation), which in effect functioned as an official national peasant trade union. The CNA was an attempt to contain the massive upsurge in rural mobilization and aspiration within official channels. The attempt was only partially successful. The CNA leadership and militants were consistently to the left of the regime. Because one of the primary objectives of the CNA was to marginalize APRA, the regime was forced to align itself, and the CNA in
particular, with the Communist party’s trade union federation, the CGTP (Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú).\textsuperscript{128} In legitimizing CGTP, and allowing it to consolidate itself, the regime created an ideological and institutional counterweight to its own agenda that was sharply to its left. With the rightist reaction initiated under Bermudez, this ideological divide widened further. The CNA continued to promote a more militant position. By 1977, the split had become severe and irremediable. In late May of 1977, the military regime moved to arrest key leaders of the CNA, accusing them of partisan politicization and corruption.\textsuperscript{129} By early 1978, it was clear that the CNA had effectively escaped government control and, in May of that year, DL 221999 officially dissolved it.\textsuperscript{130}

The conundrum faced by the regime in managing rural mobilization was ultimately insoluble. As Delavaud writes,

by 1976, all the large estates were finally affected and expropriated, but at the cost of a double struggle in the centre and the south. The former set the SINAMOS with its ally the CNA (Confederación Nacional Agraria) against the CCP (Confederación Campesina del Perú) formed by trade unions, largely Trotskyist and Maoist in inspiration. The second struggle highlights the internal contradictions of agrarian reform, by bringing the new cooperatives formed by one or more haciendas and run by former workers and sharecroppers into direct confrontation with the comuneros from the neighboring indigenous communities.\textsuperscript{131}

In the attempt to co-opt and guide peasant activism the regime was continually forced to move leftward on agrarian policy in order to undercut its primary institutional competitors in the countryside, the peasant trade federations. But any more aggressive rural programme would threaten the regime’s more basic interests in stability and industrialization. At the same time, the SAISs (Sociedad Agrícola de Interés Social), in addition to consuming costly agricultural subsidies (including seeds, fertilizers, livestock,
equipment, and infrastructural investments), were themselves contributing to conflict in the highlands. Conflict between stakeholders (incorporated peasants and former hacienda workers), occasional workers, government managers, and neighboring peasant communities with their own claims on former hacienda land was constant. Collectivized plantations on the north coast, whose workers had already been proletarianized, continued to function relatively well, but highland SAISs—formed by collectivizing former *feudatarios* and peasants—went quickly from bad to worse. In general, SAISs never achieved profitability or even stable institutional functioning. Peasants began to effectively dissolve and parcelize collectives within only a few years of their establishment. Both the apostasy of the CNA and the dissolution of the collectives demonstrate the difficulty faced by the regime in forming autonomous institutions and illustrate Migdal’s description of the centrifugal forces that weak states must face in their bid to institutionalize and consolidate themselves.

5.13 *Local vecino responses to the Agrarian Reform*

The predominant responses of hacendados to the implementation of the Agrarian Reform can be grouped into four major categories: (a) fire sales of assets (i.e. decapitalization) and of landed property itself; (b) direct negotiation with neighboring communities and resident laborers; (c) exploitation of legal loopholes and delaying tactics; and (d) temporary abandonment of property. Many hacendados used combinations of these techniques to respond to the Reform process. Decapitalization, though technically illegal, was an almost universal response. Many of my hacendado informants were forced to sell large herds of cattle rather than surrender them to the
Reform agents. Once the Reform had been announced and began to be implemented, sale of land, equipment, and livestock was legally prohibited; furthermore, buyers were particularly hard to find given the insecurity of land title. Nonetheless, landowners often sought to parcelize and sell land at significant discount. This shaded into the second category, as landowners sought to sell or otherwise convey land to workers and neighboring communities in anticipation of affectation. Ceding puna or steep hillside land to *feudatarios* and *comuneros*, when necessary, was a common way of avoiding the loss of fertile agricultural land on valley floors.\(^{134}\) Peasants were willing to buy land rather than wait for it to be seized and allocated in large part because they were unsure if the land would or would not be affected and to whom it would be awarded if it were. *Sur* magazine complained that many landowners would enter into generous agreements with workers and other peasants in order to discourage them from filing claims, only to renege on agreements once the reformist fervor subsided.\(^{135}\)

Perhaps the most widespread category of response was the exploitation of loopholes and delaying tactics.\(^{136}\) The most common exploit was to partition the property amongst children and other family members so as to make a single large property appear to be a number of medium-sized ones.\(^{137}\) Another technique was to exploit social relationships with Reform judges or other authorities in order to receive favorable judgments. One large landowner from a neighboring province told me that his father had sent him to study law in Lima immediately after Velasco announced the Reform, with the express intention of understanding the Agrarian Reform Law and the judicial apparatus that was being organized to implement it in order to better protect the family’s landholdings. This sort of knowledge was essential for delaying court proceedings until
the Reform petered out, which, in the event, it had begun to do by the mid-1970s. Finally, many landowners were exasperated by, hopeless about, or indifferent to the entire process and simply abandoned their property to workers or neighboring communities. Ironically, this turned out to be a fairly successful, albeit inadvertent, strategy: subsequent laws allowed landowners to recuperate their property, and peasants who had moved into abandoned properties had frequently failed to initiate formal judicial procedures and thus lacked a paper trail of claims and court decisions to prevent the land that they had occupied from being returned to its formal owner.

5.14 End of an era

In 1975, with Velasco increasingly sidelined by ill health, a junta of more conservative officers under the leadership of Francisco Bermudez seized control of the military government from Velasco’s left-leaning faction. In April, the Dirección General de Reforma Agraria declared the end of the Agrarian Reform, announcing that its goals had been achieved. The net effects of the Reform were complex and have been subject to divergent interpretations. Nearly 8 million hectares (roughly 20 million acres) were expropriated and reallocated to cooperatives and peasant communities in less than a decade. Many peasant communities in fact received relatively significant grants of land. In the district of Capacmarca, for example, the average size of peasant farms went from 1.2 hectares before the Reform to 3.5 hectares in its wake and "the number of landless households has decreased." Susan Eckstein points out that “more and better quality land was redistributed in Peru in [the Reform’s first] four years than in Mexico.
and Bolivia since their respective upheavals” (which Eckstein treats in Mexico as 1910-1970 and in Bolivia as 1952-55).\textsuperscript{141}

Even more impressive, most Peruvian social scientists agree that the military government’s Land Reform effectively eliminated the hacienda sector as an economic and political force in the country. The Reform was successful in stripping traditional landed elites of a critical source of control in provincial politics and economy. Kautsky argues with regard to the dual objectives of land reform—improvement of peasant livelihood and attack on the landed aristocracy—that “land reform and similar measures . . . must be understood, and their success or failure evaluated, as attacks on the aristocracy quite as much as attempts to benefit the peasantry materially . . . land reform may not, at least for quite some time, benefit the peasantry materially and may yet not be a failure from the modernizers’ point of view if it reduced the power of the aristocracy.”\textsuperscript{142} In this sense, the Peruvian Agrarian Reform was similar to Nasser’s ambitious 1952 land reform in Egypt, which, Migdal argues, was successful in breaking the strength of the landowning class but whose benefit to the rural poor was ultimately limited.\textsuperscript{143}

The highland \textit{terrenientes} were in many ways the whipping boy and, ultimately, the sacrificial lamb of the Peruvian state and the coastal elites that overwhelmingly controlled it. The fundamental obstacle to development in the Andean periphery has been the difficulty of access resulting from its forbidding topography. The highly centralist Peruvian state has been unwilling to divert attention and funds to remedy this isolation. The infrastructure and services (particularly in the domains of transportation, education and health) that the highlands typically lack have traditionally been state responsibilities and monopolies. Without state-led infrastructure and human resource investment,
successful commercialization is almost impossible and private investment is therefore unremunerative, and predictably scarce. Outside of large-scale mining, this continues to be true to the present day. Because the poverty and underdevelopment of the southern sierra was, and remains, predominantly the result of enduring geographic and structural handicaps, rather than the oppression of the reactionary landed aristocracy or other contingent phenomena, it is hardly surprising that the immediate local consequences of the Agrarian Reform were modest.

In fact, despite the impressive achievements of the Agrarian Reform, many researchers have argued that the Agrarian Reform ultimately failed in its principal objectives: the Reform did little to slow or reverse the massive influx of rural poor into Peru's cities (principally Lima); per capita food production fell; agrarian unrest continued; augmentation of peasant landholding and improvement in their welfare were temporary and modest at best. 144 Matos Mar & Mejia argue that "with respect to the total rural population, the sector directly or indirectly benefited by the agrarian reform isn't very numerous . . . in its totality [the Agrarian Reform] only involved 17% of the 2,176,900 workers considered agro-pastoral workforce in 1977." 145 Likewise, Bourque and Palmer, writing prior to the Reform’s completion, point out that "the total income transfer is estimated at less than 2 percent of the 1967 income. Furthermore, even if it is fully carried out, the agrarian reform will benefit less than 40 percent of all farm families needing assistance and less than 10 percent of the Indian communities." 146 The beneficiaries of expropriated land were overwhelmingly ex-feudatarios, rather than surrounding comunidades. 147 Poole and Renique point out that “only 2.5 per cent of these lands were given directly to the peasant communities,” whereas “ninety per cent of the
land was constituted into large ‘associative enterprises.’”148 Virtually all of these collectives had been parcelized or otherwise failed within a decade, but not before they had fruitlessly consumed hundreds of millions of dollars of subsidies.

To make matters worse, throughout the 1970s production per capita of wage foods continued to stagnate or fall and the terms of trade for rural producers continued to deteriorate. Production stopped growing and in some sectors actually dropped in the early 1970s and only slowly began to climb thereafter.149 Sur magazine noted that “between 1970 and 1976, agricultural production grew only 0.9% and agro-pastoral production per capita [actually] diminished.”150 Of particular importance for the southern highlands, the numbers of sheep, goat, and alpaca actually declined from 1970 to 1975.151 Potential seizure of property (and the resultant insecurity of commercial tenancy), collectivization, outlawing of lease and rental agreements, and size limits that prevented expansion in response to market conditions virtually eliminated the market in agricultural land.152

Furthermore, despite the Agrarian Reform, the overall economic policy of the Revolutionary Government was generally prejudicial to rural interests. It was accompanied by fiscal and price policies that systematically favored the urban industrial sector over the rural (in particular, price controls on wage foods).153 Price policies favoring imported basic foodstuffs and depressing the prices of domestic agricultural produce insured that the position of the peasantry eroded further during the Velasco years despite land allocations. As José Matos Mar and José Manuel Mejía put it, “it remains evident that the most important sector of the peasant population, this is the communal and independent parcel owners, the majority of whom were minifundistas, did not receive any benefit and, therefore, their situation continues to be marked by the tendency to
pauperization and semi-proletarianization, just as before the reform.”\textsuperscript{154} In this sense, the Agrarian Reform facilitated the structural exploitation of the peasantry, through ostensibly free national and international markets, while attacking the more coercive and visible traditional rural labor regimes.

Finally, the entire rural sector as a political and economic ‘community of interest’ was marginalized. Barrington Moore argued in his influential \textit{Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy} that the “taming of the agrarian sector has been a decisive feature of the whole historical process that produced [modern liberal] society. It was just as important as the better-known disciplining of the working class and of course closely related to it. Indeed the English experience tempts one to say that getting rid of agriculture as a major social activity is one prerequisite for successful democracy.”\textsuperscript{155} The Agrarian Reform was, in effect, the culmination of an inexorable decline in the terms of trade between the food production sector and other domestic and international sectors that had begun in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{156} All the largest agri-businesses—formerly key lobbyists for, amongst other things, favorable tax, price, and tariff policy—were eliminated. As Eguren notes, with the abolition of the \textit{terreniente}–dominated SNA, “the most powerful rural organizations during and immediately after the agrarian reform were of peasants or small producers. These defended peasant interests, but were not capable of or oriented towards economic or technological modernization.”\textsuperscript{157} Efforts were made to organize a national association of medium-sized proprietors to replace the dissolved SNA, resulting in the formation of FAR (\textit{Frente de Acción Rural}) and CODEAGRO (\textit{Comité Organizador del Gremio Agropecuario}), but they were never as influential as SNA had been.\textsuperscript{158} As noted in the previous chapter, the most powerful terratenientes of
Chumbivilcas were congressional diputados, mayors, and subprefects who, up until the 1960s, had wielded considerable influence in Lima on agricultural policy. By attacking the rural bourgeoisie, the Reform had the effect of eliminating key defenders of provincial agro-pastoral interests at the regional and national levels.

5.15 Return and attempts at reconstitution

Many sources in the 1980s noted a ‘return of the gamonales,’ as medium-size proprietors, merchants, and other “mediators (alcaldes, gobernadores, etc.) and administrators of the traditional power of the great landowners” returned to the countryside in order to continue their former agricultural activity or secure local educational or other governmental employment.\textsuperscript{159} As discussed in the Introduction, anthropologists and other social scientists working in the Southern Highlands in the wake of the Reform have argued that gamonalismo was “not an entirely spent force.”\textsuperscript{160} Gose found in 1981-2 that, despite the fact that in neighboring Apurímac “condemnation of the gamonales was universal and mandatory . . . the same families, and sometimes the same individuals, were in power as before the struggles of 1945-60. The gamonales had been re-educated and absorbed by state reform, but not eliminated.”\textsuperscript{161} Poole notes that “Chumbivilcas is the only Cusco province of the many in which I have worked where peasants are frequently armed, where violent beatings, and robberies by cattle rustlers are daily fare, and where the notorious highland political bosses called gamonales, continue to rule twenty years after the agrarian reform took away their lands.”\textsuperscript{162} Paponnet-Cantat’s entire dissertation is a testament to this fact.\textsuperscript{163} Seligmann describes a similar state of affairs in Paruro, where “the state exists in its most insidious form at the local
level, where law enforcement agents and small clusters of the landed elite continue to act with impunity, eluding formal legal sanctions and informal disapproval on the part of communities.”

In order to square these assessments with the general consensus among Peruvian social scientists that “there is no doubt that the grand agrarian bourgeoisie, land-owning or -leasing, has disappeared, in the same way as the class of great estate holders,” I would argue that the Reform was highly effective in destroying terratenientes as a class and as power holders at the national and departmental level, while leaving intact, though substantially weakened, the power of vecinos as a dominant provincial ethnic group. The hacienda as a form of property was not eliminated. I have literally never heard a vecino say “ya no hay terreno.” While many vecino families lost land to the Reform, most were able to retain their best land. In some districts, vast estates of thousands of hectares were (and are) still controlled by lone individuals and whole mountain chains by extended families. One vecino informant from neighboring Haquira reported that the Reform took none of his grandfather’s four vast haciendas. Community land may be difficult to acquire for various reasons, but there is still plenty of private rural land available and underutilized that could be acquired at discount prices.

And yet, virtually all of my vecino informants agree that the Reform was a disaster for themselves and their family, and that it marked the end of the old way of life—the ancien regime, if you will—and the beginning of a new, supposedly debased one. I would argue that the Reform was able to accomplish two general things, above and beyond the remedial accomplishments listed above: it (1) robbed the hacienda of its labor and (2) raised the consciousness of the indigenous peasantry. While these may seem
modest, they are in fact fundamental to the contemporary political economy. Though the hacienda as landed property survived in Chumbivilcas, the hacienda as a system, or as a particular way of organizing capital and labor, was mortally undermined. Landowners still lack capital—as they always have—but in the wake of the Velasco era they also lack labor—especially laborers who are compelled to work merely in order to have access to fields and pasture. Though I never heard a hacienda owner lament about being left with insufficient land, I frequently heard the refrain “ya no hay gente” [“there are no workers anymore”] from cultivators and shopkeepers. This sense reflects the fact that massive migration out of the province and subsistence sufficiency have robbed the hacienda sector of its labor force.

Migration is itself intimately connected with the massive increase in social and political consciousness amongst the indigenous peasantry that Velasco’s tenure fostered. As discussed earlier in the chapter, a significant part of this raising of consciousness was secular; political mobilization and organization had been increasing inexorably over the course of the century. Nonetheless, the efforts of the Agrarian Reform agencies to integrate indigenous peasants into the nation were unprecedented. The fact that vecino informants invariably identify “la Reforma” as the historical period in which traditional social relations broke down and comuneros stopped being respectful, suggests just how decisive the intervention of the Revolutionary Government, particularly SINAMOS, was in awakening peasant consciousness. While Marxist and trade union activists did much to mobilize the peasantry, Velasco’s regime provided a form of consciousness that was distinctive and vital for Peru’s subsequent social and political development: Velasco was able to mobilize the peasantry as Peruvians. Rather than mobilizing the peasantry against
the gamonal or against an oppressive criollo state, SINAMOS and other government agencies gave peasants a sense of mobilizing with and within the state, of being integral parts of a national political community. While this can be seen negatively as cooptation, the peasantry would eventually be driven, in part by this validation and sense of national membership and entitlement, to take for themselves many of the rights and resources that Velasco’s idealized new order had promised.

5.16 Rise of Sendero Luminoso

The tension between reform and revolution is fundamental to the struggle of governments to manage the political consequences of modernization. Although quite different in method and ideology, both the Reforma Agraria and Sendero Luminoso responded to or exploited similar tensions in the rural socio-political economy. The relationship between the two is complex. On the one hand, the Shining Path exploited tensions and aspirations that had not been resolved or successfully addressed by the Agrarian Reform. On the other, the Shining Path took advantage of conditions and aspirations that had, in fact, been fostered by the Agrarian Reform: the Shining Path inserted itself into social structural niches that had formerly been filled by vecinos (or gamonales), but which the Agrarian Reform had left empty and delegitimized. The outlines of Sendero’s dozen years of armed insurgency are well known and needn’t be reviewed here. In the following section, I will focus my analysis on those facets of Shining Path activity that have specific relevance to Chumbivilcas and to the vecinos who are the focus of my ethnographic research.
The general strikes of the closing years of the Bermudez regime signaled an increasing massification of politics and a politicization of civil society. On the one hand, the Constituent Assembly of 1979 opened up the possibility of a more inclusive and democratically legitimate political system. On the other, Peru was gripped by systemic crisis. Javier Diez Canseco speaks of a “failure of the system; a crisis not of the moment but of the structure, of the form of economic, social, political, and cultural organization of the society” and of a “crystal clear exhaustion of political alternatives within the system.” The Revolutionary Government had succeeded in disassembling large parts of the old order, but had failed to establish a coherent, organized society in its stead. Several scholars have argued that Sendero Luminoso was able to thrive in rural areas by entering in the power gap left by the collapse of the rural landowning elite. Degregori has written that the PCP-SL was able to incubate and thrive in Ayacucho from the late 1960s on by “taking advantage of a certain vacuum of power, a decisive moment in which the landowning seigniorial stratum had been beaten into retreat, but the new bureaucratic and commercial strata tied to the expansion of the State apparatus still hadn’t arrived.” As Degregori notes, there was virtually no organized resistance by the traditional terrateniente elite to the student and peasant union activism in Ayacucho in the 1960s that directly preceded the rise of PCP-SL. He argues that the slow eclipse of the previous decades (driven primarily by economic stagnation and outmigration) had left them unable to mount collective resistance. Luciano Metzinger argues that it was specifically the “concientización” of the peasantry accomplished by the Velasco regime that the PCP-SL attempted to exploit in their own mobilization efforts.
The challenge for the Shining Path leadership, preparing in Huamanga for the armed phase of its revolutionary activity, was to harness the popular dissatisfaction and aspiration—resulting in a diffuse way from the long process of modernization described earlier in the chapter—before it could be addressed, managed or co-opted by the slowly consolidating Peruvian state. Betram Wolfe makes a relevant argument about Lenin’s response to the land tenure reforms proposed by Stolypin, which Lenin believed, if implemented, would effectively shift the peasantry from the revolutionary to the conservative column. In the event, Stolypin was assassinated before his reforms could be fully implemented, preventing the transformation of the peasantry into petty bourgeois small proprietors. In a certain sense, the timing of the Shining Path’s initiation of armed struggle can be explained by an analogical relationship toward land reform. Though Velasco’s Agrarian Reform was not as effective or comprehensive as originally envisioned, it was, nonetheless, a significant alteration of rural class relations and ameliorated somewhat many of the most egregious social inequities. It was clear, furthermore, that bourgeois reformism, under Belaunde or Garcia, might progressively, if modestly, improve the wellbeing of peasants and undermine the appeal of revolutionary alternatives. As unfavorable as 1980 may have been for launching a revolutionary struggle, the outlook was not likely to improve, but rather to deteriorate under the steady advance of bourgeois reform.

The Shining Path did not just emerge into a crisis-ridden rural order; it emerged from it. While the PCP-SL vigorously recruited and conscripted indigenous peasants and urban migrants as militants, the most important members of the PCP-SL cúpola were disaffected academics, many of whom were members of marginalized or junior
branches of provincial vecino landowning and petty bourgeois families. Lumbreras recalls that Augusta, the companion of Guzmán, for example, was the daughter of an hacendado. Degregori writes that “in the case of the Sendero intellectuals, they weren’t necessarily children of hacendados, but they were of the misti strata, gente ‘decente,’ and furthermore intellectuals, that despite their social origin and academic qualifications, felt the contempt of the limeño criollo elite that marginalized them as provincials, serranos, cholos . . . [the Shining Path was thus] a response by a minority sector of the Andean-mestizo fringe.” Degregori goes on to argue that “the misti or simply mestizo extraction of the SL inner circle—their perception of being different and, at the same time, the necessity that they felt to ally themselves with or impose themselves upon the indigenous peasantry—helps to explain the ease with which SL exercised violence against the indigenous stratum.” As Robert Albro succinctly put it, “Sendero was Maoism wedded to the authoritarianism of a rural elite.” From the gamonal, to Trotskyist foro-istas in the 1960s, to the SINAMOS promoters in the 1970s, to the instrumentalism of the Shining Path cúpola toward indigenous militants, there is a continuity of mestizo presumption of authority and superiority, despite otherwise significant political differences.

5.17 Activity in Chumbivilcas

The extent of Shining Path involvement in Chumbivilcas is poorly documented. Cuzco as a whole was never a focal point of Sendero activity. Chumbivilcas, along with neighboring Apurimac, served primarily as a corridor between the regions of Ayacucho and Puno, in parts of which Sendero exerted quasi-administrative control. In a paper
entitled “Geographical Dimensions of the Shining Path Insurgency in Peru” for example, Robert Kent neglects to mention the entire department of Cuzco, much less Chumbivilcas. 181 Although in the first three years of the insurgency (1980-1982) the department accounted for 7% of guerilla attacks nationwide, that percentage dropped to 4% in the period between 1983 and mid-1986, 2% between mid-1986 and 1992, and only 1% in all following years. Even in the period of maximum activity in Chumbivilcas (roughly 1986-1989), there were only 17 reported attacks in all of Cuzco department. 182 While this number understates the extent of Sendero control not associated explicitly with violent attacks, it does indicate the low intensity of Sendero operations in Cuzco overall.

Chumbivilcanos can list the names of people who were killed or who disappeared, but the stories surrounding these deaths are complicated by the difficulty of attributing deaths to Sendero activity, rather than police, military, paramilitary, intercommunal, or interpersonal violence. An attribution by one informant of an attack to Sendero is frequently flatly contradicted by another, who attributes the actions to vendetta, banditry, or some other source. Certain SL activities within the province are common knowledge and many people will, in private, talk about which individuals are commonly agreed to have been SL leaders, militants, sympathizers, or collaborators. There is general agreement that the Shining Path was instrumental in suppressing abigeato (cattle rustling) in the region. 183 It seems clear that during the middle of the 1980s, sympathy for SL’s property redistribution campaign was widespread amongst the campesinado of Chumbivilcas. That said, comuneros who held communal and district leadership positions frequently note that outright opposition to Sendero Luminoso in the mid-eighties was considered a potentially fatal proposition. Although vecinos often claim that the
peasantry was basically pro-SL, comuneros themselves talk about their own fear of SL. Campesinos recount stories of hiding in terrified silence from Sendero columns below bridges or behind rocks. Because the Shining Path could be equally vicious toward comuneros who were cattle rustlers, were considered abusive or immoral by local community members, were government representatives or collaborators, or were merely uncooperative, most indigenous peasants never felt comfortable enough to unequivocally identify with or commit to the PCP-SL.

Poole, who was doing ethnographic fieldwork in the Chumbivilcas district of Qolquemarca in 1985-86, caught the very beginning of PCP-SL activity in Chumbivilcas. She writes that In August 1986, just before I left the field, a commando of guerrillas from Sendero Luminoso attacked the post of the Civil Guard in Velille, Chumbivilcas. Two policemen were killed, and subsequently all police except those in the larger posts of Santo Tomás and Velille were withdrawn from Chumbivilcas. Later that month my gamonal informants from Qolquemarca attacked a rival gamonal family, stealing six horseloads of weapons and 20 million soles in money. They were disguised as “Senderistas.” Today Chamaca, Livitaca, and parts of Qolquemarca are “liberated zones” controlled by Sendero commandos who have initiated a redistributive economy and who acquire their arms from gamonales and rustlers.184

Many of my informants support Poole’s observation that the commission of crimes under the ‘cover’ of Senderismo was common and contributed to the general confusion.185 Poole’s claim about “liberated zones” and the institution of a “redistributive economy” are more controversial. My informants from Chamaca, Livitaca, and Colquemarca uniformly dispute the claim that their districts were liberated zones or were controlled in an economic or administrative sense by SL. Again, given the environment of impunity and lawlessness that characterized the province between 1983 and 1988, it’s difficult to
say who exactly was in power in a particular community or geographical area, or what
groups or individuals committed which crimes with what motives. Most likely,
however, SL activity in the region never advanced passed what Kent calls “a moralization
campaign, a technique . . . which singles out thieves, abusive governmental officials, and
local elites for punishment and is usually met with widespread popular support.”

The Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee makes several broad
claims about Sendero activity in Chumbivilcas. Arguing that the intensity of the conflict
in the High Provinces of Cuzco was similar to that in neighboring Puno, the Report says
that

The weak presence of the State represented in dispersed police posts—
insufficient to combat robbery and cattle-thievery—and public officials—
justices of the peace, lieutenant governors—were rapidly eliminated by
subversion with harassment, threats, and assassinations. In the easily
generated power vacuum, a new power was installed. In many places this
pattern was repeated: in Paco, since the first years; later in Tulumayo; in
the high provinces of Cuzco and Apurímac, equally. Thus, lack of access
to education, legitimation, and promotion, social differentiation, the abuse
of local power and cattle rustling alike opened these spaces to subversion
in the second half of the 1980s.

The Report asserts that between February and June of 1987
different police posts and communities in Canas, Acomayo and
Chumbivilcas were attacked; all the high provinces. There, like in the
neighboring high provinces of Apurímac, actions against the police were
complemented by attacks on bands of cattle rustlers and the PCP Sendero
Luminoso constituted itself as the authority that protected the peasants.
According to witnesses in the zone, in 1987, the drastic reduction of
rustling and growing acceptance (‘adherence’ would be excessive) of the
population was already visible.

These isolated guerilla activities escalated until, according to the Report, they reached
their peak in 1988, when Sendero “ravaged” Chumbivilcas and neighboring Cotabambas
(Apurímac), assassinating “lieutenant governors, peasant leaders and cattle-rustlers.”
In 1988, in the neighboring district of Haquira, two French employees of the NGO SICDA, along with several local authorities, were killed by a column of Sendero fighters.\textsuperscript{191} Later in the same year, in the community of Antuyo, a Sendero column ‘tried’ and executed six comuneros accused of cattle-rustling.\textsuperscript{192} The column then entered Quiñota, where it captured Meri Valencia Escobar, a schoolteacher and the wife of a rancher and provincial police officer, and Elsa (or Blanca) Berbeño. These two women were ‘tried,’ ‘found guilty’ of crimes against the local peasantry, and executed by SL militants in Quiñota.\textsuperscript{193}

These flagrant actions only give a partial picture of Shining Path activity in the province. Almost all informants tell stories of local ‘trials’ and extrajudicial killings that appear nowhere in the written record. Comuneros, who typically have more precise and accurate information about actual Sendero movements and activities, are naturally reticent to discuss the topic, except in so far as they also report being fearful.\textsuperscript{194} Without a detailed ethnographic investigation in the isolated comunidades of the province’s puna, where SL operated with much more impunity, it would be impossible to accurately assess the full extent of Shining Path activity in the province. By the close of 1988, the government had begun installing counter-insurgency bases, as well as organizing peasant ‘Self-defense Committees,’ and had begun dealing significant military setbacks to SL throughout the Southern Andes. From 1990 on, the military would do the killing, much of which again fell disproportionately on the indigenous peasantry. In that year, a column of government soldiers passed into Chumbivilcas on patrol from their base in nearby Apurímac, torturing, raping, and slaying 21 presumably innocent Chumbivilcan peasants—including an eight-year-old girl. In 1991, the entire province was placed under
a state of emergency. The government responded not only with violence—frequently indiscriminate and disproportionate—but also by extending the entire apparatus of governance into the highlands, including not only counter-insurgency teams and bases, but also schools, clinics, roads, and other mediums of practical and ideological control in a classic, multi-pronged counterinsurgency programme to win hearts and minds as well as gain security hegemony. The revolutionary conflict was thus a major impetus for the expansion of infrastructure and state services that would to characterize the Fujimori era.

5.18 Fear

As discussed in the previous section, the Velasco administration legitimized peasant indignation and facilitated their attempts to obtain redress. There’s no question that peasants were deeply unhappy with local hacendados, and that the political environment under Velasco unleashed a certain amount of pent up anger and may even have stoked it to a certain degree. Many vecino informants tell stories illustrating the seething anger of campesinos during the Velasco era, and peasant informants are also forthcoming about the sense of righteous indignation they felt at the time. As a result, hacendados were left with few illusions about where they stood with the surrounding peasantry and were perhaps justifiably fearful. Land invasions, judicial proceedings, and rumors of *matanzas* had put hacendados on edge and many report having felt hopeless and exhausted by the constant threats to their lives and livelihoods. The PCP-SL incursions not only found the non-indigenous population already scared and on the defense, but also significantly increased their fear of reprisals from the long-suffering peasantry. Although, as already noted, the PCP-SL was neither indigenist nor peasant-
led, in the minds of many vecinos, SL was instigating and directing the local peasantry against them, and many vecinos viscerally felt themselves to be isolated and vulnerable in a vast sea of hostile comuneros. The Shining Path thus had a psychological and social impact grossly disproportionate to its physical capacity to disrupt or reorganize provincial social life. The picture that vecino informants paint of the “tiempo de terrorismo” is suffused with fear. The most decisive impacts of the Shining Path on Chumbivilcas and, in particular, on the vecino population, were produced by this ‘shockwave of fear.’

The fear and sense of insecurity felt by a ruling ethnic minority is clearly a transhistorical phenomena, resulting predominantly from the logical calculation of the overwhelming numerical superiority of subject peoples, the recognition of the vulnerability of customary privilege to doubt and repudiation, and, ultimately, on the “law of the gift.” My sense is that, whatever ideological justifications vecinos make for the nature of traditional ethnic domination, they felt on a deep level that they ‘had it coming.’ In the second half of the 1980s, the vecino community was tensed for the retribution it felt certain was coming. Hacendados traveled the countryside armed. Some families slept in safe houses on their estates whenever workers warned them of possible trouble. Photographs taken at harvest time or family picnics show men with rifles slung over their shoulders.

From the relative security of their present circumstances, vecinos seem to recognize the excessiveness of their fear in the humorous stories they tell about events involving the Shining Path. One informant tells a story of mistaken identity, in which he and a cousin were returning on horseback from Cuzco. The entire journey back, comuneros came out from their huts with food, humbling themselves (at this point in the
story, Chumbivilcano listeners begin laughing because they can see where it is going).

When they arrived in Colquemarca, the entire town was empty—no one in the streets, all
the shops shut. Entering into the plaza de armas, they saw a boy peaking his head out of
the main entrance to the church. Recognizing them, the boy ran out to tell them that most
of the town was hiding in the church because news had come of a Sendero column
approaching from Cuzco. The two were fearful for a moment, before realizing that they,
in fact, were the presumed ‘Sendero column.’ Other informants tell stories of colonos
who suggest that landowners give them land or livestock, because the Shining Path will
soon come and take it away, and they might as well give it to them and in the process
gain communal recognition of their generosity should they be put on trial by SL guerillas.

One of the common audience responses to these stories is laughter and scandalized
exclamations of “Que lisura!”

Far and away the most common response to Shining Path activity in the province
was flight. Many vecinos fled temporarily or permanently to Cuzco, Arequipa, or other
cities to escape the perceived threat of Sendero ‘adjudicación.’ Because the PCP-SL was
specifically targeting subprefects, governors, alcades, and other state and community
leaders, the government pulled its civilian officials out of the province in the late 1980s.
Many vecinos left hastily, abandoning or delegating their farms, livestock, and
equipment, or selling them at fire sale prices. What had been a steady drift away from the
countryside turned to an exodus during the height of Sendero activity. Eventually,
however, some returned to their homes, properties, and livelihoods. Vecinos often lament
the fact that many of those driven out by the PCP-SL found jobs and started families in
the city, and now return only for special events.
Although the practical consequences of Sendero incursions were probably minimal, interview data from both vecinos and comuneros suggest that it contributed to the political empowerment of the indigenous peasantry, through three primary avenues: first, Sendero’s message of class warfare reinforced the work of SINAMOS and other Reform agencies in validating peasant grievances and channeling them into ideologically organized collective action. Second, Sendero incursions stimulated the Peruvian state to intervene not only militarily but also institutionally in a broader sense. Third, because many vecinos responded to Sendero terror by fleeing the countryside, “el tiempo de terrorismo” allowed comuneros to envision a social world without vecino domination and mediation with the nation and gave them a concrete opportunity to organize themselves without vecino interference. For vecinos themselves, widespread flight from Sendero terrorism disrupted traditional social and labor relations and reinforced a sense that there was little or no future for non-indigenous peoples in the countryside.

5.19 Constitution of 1979

Concurrent with the emergence of the Shining Path, Peru was embarking on a process of liberal democratic reform that would have significant consequences for Chumbivilcas and the nation at large. As already noted, the final years of the military regime were tumultuous. By 1977, the economy had entered into crisis, with unemployment and inflation increasing rapidly and the IMF unwilling to meaningfully renegotiate to reduce the imbalance of payments. A constituent assembly was convened in 1979 to draft a new constitution in preparation for the resumption of civilian rule. Amongst other things, the 1979 Constitution extended voting rights to illiterate
Peruvians. The elections that the Shining Path disrupted in 1980 were the first in which many Peruvians had had the opportunity to vote.

Because the franchise had been restricted by literacy, the Peruvian voting public had been miniscule throughout the 20th century. At the start of the century, the electorate was roughly 3 percent of the total population; in 1930, it was still only 7%. Throughout the century this proportion grew slowly, as expanding access to education raised literacy rates. Nonetheless, illiteracy remained high, particularly in the countryside, effectively restricting electoral participation to the wealthy and non-indigenous. One of the key demands of the Left from the 1930s on was the elimination of the literacy requirement for voting, which would effectively extend the vote to millions of illiterate workers and peasants. By 1979, there was a widespread consensus that political rights would eventually have to be extended to illiterates (analfabetos). In effect, while the urban middle and working class began to be politically incorporated in the 1920s, the 1979 Constitution marked the beginning of the incorporation of the peasant masses. This was Peru’s version of what Huntington calls the “Green Uprising,” or “the inauguration of rural masses into national politics.” According to Huntington, one of the primary paths of “the Green Uprising . . . takes the form of one segment of the urban elite developing an appeal to or making an alliance with the crucial rural voters and mobilizing them into politics so as to overwhelm at the polls the more narrowly urban-based parties.” As will be discussed at greater length in the following chapter, parties of the left in Cuzco immediately benefited from the expanded franchise and quickly acceded to most municipal offices.
5.20 *State penetration*

The Peruvian state inherited from the military regime a commanding presence in the economy and the provision of public services more generally. Throughout the 1980s, state institutions progressively penetrated the highlands in ways that had formerly been unimaginable. With growing consolidation, the state sought to directly control the periphery, rather than rule indirectly through gamonal intermediaries. State institutions, manned by professional bureaucrats, displaced the informal family networks that had previously exercised power. The state slowly began to expand its infrastructural investments in the provinces, in particular with regard to roads and electrification. This expansion was funded primarily by increasing mineral revenues and foreign lending. As noted earlier of the Leguía’s *Conscripción Vial*, the expansion of road building in the 1990s not only brought the central state into the periphery, but also brought the periphery into the center, in the form of massive and precipitous urban migration. The public education system expanded rapidly, leading to a burgeoning financial burden and a drop in teaching qualifications.

By 1983, the second Belaúnde administration was struggling with a debt crisis made more acute by that year’s catastrophic *El Niño*. By the end of the Belaúnde administration the ratio of salaries to the cost of living had fallen dramatically. Although Alan Garcia was initially able to contain the debt and inflation that had begun to climb under Belaúnde, his nationalization of the banking industry, capping of debt service, and inability to curtail government spending helped to propel inflation to more than seven thousand percent, catastrophically disrupting social and economic life and
reducing millions of Peruvians to penury. The success of his popular *Banco Agrario* was quickly eclipsed in the public consciousness by the catastrophic devaluation of subsequent years. Only hardcore Apristas now recall the *Banco Agrario* favorably. García proved unable to contain the spiraling violence of the internal war with the Shining Path. On the one hand, the Shining Path expanded their operations, strangling Lima with a campaign of assassinations and bombings. On the other, García was heavily criticized for human rights violations in his attempts to quell the insurgency, most notably the Accomarca massacre and the mass killing of rioting Shining Path inmates in El Frontón.

5.21 *Failure of the party system*

One of the most fateful elements in Peru’s political development has been the tragic failure of the political party system. One is struck by the shifting, provisional nature of the alliances and fronts that under-institutionalized and highly personalistic political parties formed, and against which they arrayed themselves. As such, the political structure seems to have been a series of *modi vivendi* rather than a product of the inter-relationships between enduring ideologically-determined parties. Seen from the perspective of the institutionalization of parties, the 20th century was a long series of calamities: the repeated military assumptions of power, the ongoing hostility of the military toward APRA, APRA’s own opportunism and partisan obstructionism (particularly in the first Belaúnde administration), and the chronic sectarianism within the Marxist left. The hyper-inflation of Alan García’s first term in office and his inability to successfully defeat or contain the Shining Path insurgency deeply undermined
the credibility of APRA, which had emerged from military rule as the only major party with longevity, organization, and a stable electorate.\textsuperscript{219}

The victory, in 1990, of Alberto Fujimori’s \textit{Cambio 90} party—its populist, hastily formed, and largely uninstitutionalized—was both an indicator of the dire debility of the party system as a stabilizing and mediating force in political representation and policy development and, after his assumption of dictatorial powers in 1992, the nail in the coffin of the weakened party system. Although his campaign for the presidency drew much of its impetus and popularity from opposition to the proposed neoliberal policies of Mario Vargas Llosa’s \textit{FREDEMO (Frente Democrático)} party, Fujimori almost immediately initiated sweeping neoliberal austerity measures. The so-called \textit{Fujishock} was successful in bringing about macroeconomic stability, though at the cost of re-establishing “abundant and cheap labour as the characteristic of the Peruvian economy, . . . subduing the labour movement and rolling back the social and economic rights that workers had won from employers in the course of the twentieth century.”\textsuperscript{220}

In part because of intractable opposition in the Peruvian Congress to his Washington Consensus reforms, on April 5, 1992 Fujimori launched his famous ‘\textit{autogolpe},’ closing congress, suspending the constitution, and arrogating dictatorial powers to himself. Fujimori immediately began a massive expansion of the office of the President.\textsuperscript{221} In 1993, Fujimori convened a new constituent assembly, which drafted a constitution that replaced the previous constitution of 1979. In addition to facilitating a drastic liberalization of the Peruvian economy and privatization of government assets, the 1993 constitution (and subsequent 1995 \textit{Ley de Tierras}) allowed for the sale of communal properties and removed those limitations on private land ownership that had
survived the Velasco era.\textsuperscript{222} The 1993 Constitution also instituted direct democratic reforms, including the introduction of the referendum and \textit{revocatorio} (plebiscite for the removal of local authorities).\textsuperscript{223} The primary goal of the promotion of direct democracy under Fujimori seems to have been the circumvention of traditional political channels in order to directly appeal to local populations with populist rhetoric and material inducements.

Fujimori weakened the intermediary levels of regional and provincial government and strengthened district municipalities. He attempted to rule directly through an array of newly formed “decentralized public enterprises, institutions, and organs, dependent on the Ministry of the Presidency, [including]: the \textit{Banco de Materiales} (BM); \textit{Instituto Nacional de Infraestructura Educativa y de Salud} (INFES); \textit{Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo} (INADE); \textit{Programa Nacional de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado} (PRONAP); \textit{Servicio de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Lima} (SEDAPAL); \textit{Superintendencia de Bienes Nacionales} (SBN); and \textit{Fondo Nacional de Compensación y Desarrollo Social} (FONCODES).\textsuperscript{224} Other important programs introduced or expanded by Fujimori, and still important to the present day, include \textit{FONCOMUN} (\textit{Fondo de Compensación Municipal}), from whose funds a large portion of municipal budgets are drawn, and \textit{PRONAA} (\textit{Programa Nacional de Asistencia Alimentaria}), which directs the popular \textit{Vaso de Leche} and \textit{Desayuno Escolar} programs.\textsuperscript{226} The Fujimori regime also greatly increased government investment in road building, electricity generation and transmission, the treatment, storage, and delivery of potable water, and sewage.\textsuperscript{227} Many of these investments were channeled directly through newly formed agencies of the executive branch, circumventing traditional administrative and congressional channels,
fostering direct clientelistic relationships with local beneficiaries. Thus, while Fujimori was responsible for a massive expansion of state intervention in the provinces, this was accomplished in an ad hoc fashion through the office of the executive rather than through a strengthening of formal, state institutions. Furthermore, Fujimori’s dictatorship contributed to the decline of national parties and set the stage for the formation and electoral dominance of politically independent regional parties.\(^{228}\) The election of Alejandro Toledo, at the head of the newly formed party *Perú Posible*,\(^{229}\) in 2001 was a continuation of the tradition of ephemeral, populist, and personalist parties. Toledo’s term in office also saw a continuation of Fujimori’s neoliberal policies.

In Chumbivilcas, during the period from the Bermudez reaction in the mid-70s through the end of the Fujimori era, vecinos were temporarily able to retain their power, albeit in reconfigured forms, due largely to inertia and to the centralized nature of governance, which continued to favor vecinos’ privileged access to supra-provincial levels of society and government. Louis Ratinoff wrote in 1967 of a ‘new urban middle class’ in Latin America, which “gathered around the state institutions; the new entrepreneurs came to the fore under the protection of the state; the various levels of white-collar workers kept up pressure on the political authorities, or used the public machinery to improve their economic situation.”\(^{230}\) In Chumbivilcas, the ‘new urban middle class’ was, paradoxically, largely made up of the ‘old landed gentry.’ The largest source of local public sector employment was the education system and vecinos had a clear advantage in obtaining teaching positions. Their advantage was multifaceted: vecinos generally had received superior education, they frequently had kin and social relations with fellow vecino officials of the school district (UGEL-*)Unidad de Gestión*
Educativa Local), and, at the height of demand for teachers in the expanding school system of the 1980s, being a vecino seems to have been a sufficient qualification for teaching comuneros. Although local elections were reintroduced, lack of funding and statutory responsibilities made the alcaldía virtually irrelevant. Federal and departmental intervention continued to be preferentially channeled through the centrally appointed subprefectos and gobernadores. Furthermore, in Chumbivilcas, voting in the first years of the 1979 Constitution remained desultory and troubled by irregularities.\footnote{231}

### 5.22 Decentralization

With regard to the social and economic structure of Chumbivilcas, the most significant development of the post-Fujimori era has been the relentless drive to decentralize elements of the state apparatus.\footnote{232} The need for fiscal and administrative decentralization has been a central political plank of all parties since the return to civilian rule in 1980, and was a major theme in the elections of 2001.\footnote{233} The belief in the democratizing value of decentralization is pervasive, even hegemonic.\footnote{234} Decentralization has been particularly appealing from a neoliberal perspective. As Gerd Schönwälder suggests, decentralization can “be used to shield the central state apparatus from potential social or political conflicts by devolving unwanted responsibilities to regional or local governments, which are often without the corresponding resources to meet them,” which serves also “as a way to reform a central state apparatus seen as bloated and inefficient.”\footnote{235} While the ideology has, however, various points of articulation with neoliberalism, it is by no means exclusively an element of a ‘neoliberal agenda.’\footnote{236} Although regionalism, as noted in the previous chapter, was associated in the highlands
with conservatism and gamonalismo, there has been a parallel emphasis on the democratic potential of regionalization in popular and Marxist discourse.\textsuperscript{237} Similar reforms aimed at the decentralization of governance have been implemented across Latin America over the last several decades.\textsuperscript{238} As I will discuss in subsequent chapters, it was the fiscal component of decentralization, in the form of significantly increased municipal budgets,\textsuperscript{239} which has finally made genuine indigenous participation in and even control of local government a reality, and which has spurred a broad range of social, economic, and political change in recent years.\textsuperscript{240}

The 1979 Constitution and the \textit{Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades} of 1981 were the first formal revisions of municipal structure since the \textit{Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades} of 1892. There have been a number of subsequent minor revisions of the structure of municipal government;\textsuperscript{241} nonetheless, the actual administrative structure has remained relatively constant.\textsuperscript{242} Even the new decentralizing measures, though they have injected financial streams and oversight into the process of municipal governance, have not fundamentally altered this underlying structure. According the \textit{Ley Orgánica} of 1981, “the Municipal Council (\textit{Concejo Municipal}), composed of the alcalde and the regidores, [acts as] the legislative organ. The \textit{regidores} [organize] internal working committees in order to realize studies, formulate proposals, and regulate local services . . . finally, the alcalde [serves as] the executive organ of the municipality.”\textsuperscript{243} The \textit{Ley Orgánica} established the \textit{Comité de Alcaldes Distritales} as the “organ of coordination between the municipalities of the province. This committee was composed of the alcalde provincial, who was the presiding officer, and the alcaldes of the districts of the province; it [would coordinate] plans, programs, projects, and the budget of the municipalities of the
province.” The 1979 Constitution also established “the areas of competence of the district municipalities, in general, [as] those of local character: public transport, local public services, and citizen participation. To the provincial municipalities were given: zoning and urban planning; primary education; culture, recreation, and sports; tourism; conservation of archaeological and historic monuments; cemeteries; and other local services whose execution wasn’t reserved for other public organs.”

5.23 Marginalization of the subprefectura

One of the major impacts of municipal reforms has been the marginalization and diminishment of the prefectural line of administration that previously passed from the executive to the prefecto to the subprefecto to the gobernadores, and down to the mandones. In addition to the extension of the franchise, the 1979 Constitution also reintroduced local elections for provincial and district municipal office and expanded their political and administrative authority. Municipal elections had been suspended under Leguía, and were not revived until 1960; they were again suspended by the Velasco regime in 1968. During this period alcaldes and municipal councils were nominated by the prefecto and local notables and appointed by the central government. As discussed in the previous chapter, this centralized form of administration gave vecinos a distinct political advantage, because they had preferential access to higher, ethnically exclusive levels of society and government. At the same time as the 1979 Constitution reinstituted local elections and administratively revived the alcaldía, it decisively marginalized the subprefectura. In fact, it “made no express reference to either the prefecto, or the subprefecto, or the gobernador as representatives of the Executive
branch." The 1993 Constitution likewise omitted reference to any element of the prefecture as an administrative unit. Furthermore, the 1981 Ley Orgánica del Ministerio del Interior removed the guardia civil from the control of the prefectura. Given the fact that control of the guardia civil had been major element of prefectural authority—and therefore of vecino power over the indigenous majority—this significantly altered provincial ethnic relations. As power shifted to the locally elected municipalities, the relationship between external social relations and local governance was drastically weakened.

5.24 Income and responsibility

The current drive toward decentralization involves a number of different types of fiscal transfer from the central state to the departments (now regions), provinces, and districts. Municipal budgets (presupuestos) come from various funds and are delivered and overseen by various government institutions, including the Presupuesto Participativo, Fondo Nacional de Compensación y Desarrollo Social (FONCODES), Canon Minero, Fondo de Compensación Municipal (FONCOMUN), Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas, Amazónicos y Afroperuano (INDEPA) (formerly INADE), Programa Nacional de Asistencia Alimentaria (PRONAA), Programa Nacional de Manejo de Cuencas Hidrográficas y Conservación de Suelos (PRONAMACHS), and Proyecto Especial de Infraestructura de Transporte Descentralizado (PROVIAS Descentralizado). In addition, provinces receive reimbursement in the form of various ‘canons,’ including the canon minero, canon de los hidrocarburos, canon hidroenergético, canon pesquero, and the canon forestal, which
are “regarded as payments for the extraction of non-renewable assets” and “accrue exclusively to producing local and regional governments.”

Rural landowners and merchants provide little in the way of property taxes and other fees and local governments lack the financial and institutional resources to assess liability. Because there is a lack of local revenues, decentralization relies primarily on transfers from federal and departmental government to provincial and district municipalities.

The “limited exploitation of economies of scale in the decentralized provision of goods and services, and lack of coordination and equity across jurisdictions” are serious shortcomings of decentralization. The severe lack of qualified administrative personnel at the national level is obviously magnified at the periphery. Budgetary guidelines, responsibilities of sub-national political units, and inter-institutional relationships are all underspecified in law to date. As a result, the functioning and structure, in practice, of municipalities continues to be “diversified and irrational.”

The government envisions fiscal deliveries to municipalities increasing annually along with widened responsibilities and increased oversight. To date the sums transferred to municipalities have been relatively modest. As of 2004, municipal budgets accounted for only 13 percent of government expenditure. Nonetheless, this is a substantial sum given the history of the municipal funding in Peru. In the period from 1955 to 1975, municipal spending accounted for around 0.7 percent of total government spending. In 1968, when municipalities accounted for 37 percent of expenditures in Bolivia, and more than 40 percent in Chile, Uruguay, and Ecuador, in Peru they accounted for only 3.8 percent.

With the growing emphasis on decentralization, this percentage climbed slowly in the 1980s, from 2.16 percent in 1980 to 3.69 percent in 1987, but remained extremely low.
compared to neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{265} Even in 1987, however, the average number of public employees in district municipalities was less than ten.\textsuperscript{266} The real explosion in municipal budgets and power has occurred in the years following Fujimori’s flight. The total transfers from the central government to the region of Cuzco as a whole rose from 114 million soles in 2002 to 699 million in 2006—\textit{a 600\% increase in just four years}.\textsuperscript{267} FONCOMUN for Chumbivilcas rose from 8 million in 2002 to 14 million in 2007.\textsuperscript{268} As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, these increases in funding and authority have had significant effects on social and economic life in the province.

5.25 Conclusion

The gamonal was a participant in a mode of governance destined to be superceded. The kind of power exercised by provincial elites—particularistic, coercive, and often violent—was an embarrassment to national elites, whose own massively superior power was (and continues to be) exerted in less visible and more structural ways. The ethno-racial power at the edges of national sovereignty was a visible manifestation of the veiled forms of racism, disenfranchisement, and exploitation that underwrote the power of national elites and of the state itself. My informants frequently express sentiments akin to those reported by Aaron Bobrow-Strain in southern Mexico, where “rancher narratives evoke the hopelessness of struggle against an inevitable tide of defeat.”\textsuperscript{269} It’s important to remember, however, that what was mortally compromised was \textit{a form of social organization} and the social statuses and groups that constituted and were constituted by it; the survival of the vecinos as individuals and families was never in question. In subsequent chapters, I will explore both the new forms of social organization
that are coming to predominate in Chumbivilcas and the ways in which these ‘surviving vecino individuals and families’ are accommodating to and helping to determine it.
Chapter 6

Reconquista Indígena: The Rise of Indigenous Political Machines

In this chapter, I make several interrelated arguments about the consequences of the political reforms implemented by the Peruvian state over the last several decades, in particular the extension of the franchise to illiterate citizens and fiscal decentralization. New political organizations have emerged from within the indigenous population, initially within the framework of national political parties of the Marxist left, but increasingly in the form of explicitly indigenist regional and local parties. I note that this development runs counter to the traditional anthropological consensus on indigenous activism in Peru,¹ which is usually conceptualized as being co-opted by or subsumed under class-based socialist and communist collective-identification and activism, or else expressed in terms of more narrowly ethnic or ‘cultural’ interests and objectives. Although the current wave of ‘indigenism’ has emerged from within traditionally Marxist quarters, it involves significant revisions of Marxist thinking about the place of ethnicity in mobilization. While the new indigenist parties have largely preserved the class discourse that has motivated many of their leaders and militants throughout their lives, they have begun to place ethnic identity at the forefront of their self-representation, thus subverting a century of Marxist antagonism toward non-class identification and mobilization. Some elements of the resulting political discourse are drawn from the pan-Andean indigenous movements, while others are autochthonous and regionally specific.

The second part of the chapter describes and analyzes the actual mechanics of municipal party politics. Local parties, initially Maoist but increasingly indigenist, have
been catapulted into municipal power by the overwhelming electoral strength of enfranchised *comuneros*. I argue that the organization and consolidation of these parties was made possible by significant increases in fiscal transfers from the central government in Lima, which have given indigenous parties the resources to secure cadres, campaign contributions, and votes. I also identify several characteristics of contemporary rural Peru that have contributed to the development of machine politics, foremost among them the poverty of the local peasantry, the relative unfamiliarity of newly enfranchised peasants with the formal political system, and the practical and policy limitations inherent in municipal governance. Several elements of this political situation are particularly decisive in restricting who can participate in provincial politics and what kinds of policies can and cannot be formulated within the provincial paradigm, including the nearly exclusive emphasis on *obras* or public works, the prominent role of alcohol, and the dense interpenetration of parties with familial and communal structures.

6.1 *Anthropological discourse on Peruvian indigeneity*

The exceptionality of Peruvian indigenous activism has long been a truism in Latin American anthropology; anthropologists and other social scientists have noted an absence of the kinds of national indigenous political activism that have characterized other Latin American countries, in particular its neighbors Bolivia and Ecuador. Rodrigo Montaya noted, for example, that “in contrast to the Otavaleños, Ecuadorian Quichuas, there doesn’t exist amongst Peruvian Quechuas an indigenous bourgeoisie or a properly indigenous intellectual tradition. For that reason, it’s impossible to speak, in 1991, of an ethnic identity.” The general anthropological consensus is that the Velasco regime’s
emphasis on the class dimension of the indigenous peasantry was the predominant element in the delayed development of explicitly indigenist social movements and identification. In Paul Gelles’s description, “peasant communities in Peru have not organized into ethnic-based indigenous federations, but rather into peasant federations,” a fact which he attributes to the official discourse and policies of the Velasco regime, which effectively “made the class-based term of campesino the predominant idiom for discussing rural dwellers; the regime replaced an ethnic designation, indígena (as in Comunidades Indígenas) with a socioeconomic one, campesina (as in Comunidades Campesinas).”\(^4\) Terminologically speaking, this is certainly true: indigenous Peruvians have not, in recent times, politically organized themselves (or been organized by others) specifically around or in terms of their indigenousness.

Recently scholars have argued, however, that, in Maria Elena Garcia’s words, “the more visible politics of national protest and marches draws scholarly gazes toward the dramatic showdown between dominant power and subaltern agency in capital cities and public plazas”\(^5\) and away from the wealth of more local, culturally-oriented forms of indigenous activism and organization. Gelles, for example, compares and contrasts the “ancient” indigenous water management model and the modern, bureaucratic one, a focus that illuminates his understanding of what constitutes indigenous political activism and organization. At the end of his article he makes this more explicit when he argues that it is specifically their “cultural distinctiveness” that indigenous peoples have, in the course of their struggle, demonstrated can be compatible with modernity.\(^6\)

Defined in such a way, the ‘indigenousness’ of activism must necessarily be traced back to historical antecedents (in the sense that an autochthonous provenance of a
particular cultural practice or ideology must be established) or interpretively teased out of phenomena that might otherwise be defined indiscriminately as ‘modern’ or ‘contemporary.’ Garcia, in her book *Making Indigenous Citizens,* argues that activists in the Andes are attempting to “construct indigenous citizenship” in such a way that it “stands not for what states give to subjects but for the agency and autonomy that indigenous people claim to construct it for themselves.” She furthermore argues that the “central arena for the construction of this new kind of citizenship, in the view of activists, is the schoolhouse,” though she acknowledges as well that educational activism is accompanied by “mobilizations around mining, coca, and human rights.” In her discussion of already-existent alternatives to the ‘ideal-type’ indigenous activism, Garcia points to “daily confrontations between states, NGOs, and indigenous agents in rural communities and schoolhouses”, particularly with regard to indigenous opposition to Quechua language instruction, the development of “rondas campesinas,” and, following Gelles, the community management of “local natural resources, such as water.”

These are important points and I think these authors accurately describe some of the community-level indigenous activism occurring in the countryside around Cuzco and throughout the southern highlands. In the following sections, however, I present two distinct rejoinders to this literature, one of which is an attempt at reframing, and the other a description and analysis of recent developments that complicate the picture they present. First, it is my sense that participants in the disciplinary discussion have overstated the difference, in practice, between peasant and indigenous activism. At least in the southern highlands, all campesinos are *indígenas* and the vast majority of *indígenas* are campesinos. The terms, in fact, are very nearly synonymous. It is only by defining
‘indigenous activism’ as exclusively ‘indigenist activism by indigenous peoples’ that the
question—“Why is there no organized indigenous activism in Peru?”—can be asked.
Because of the artificiality of the definition, whatever answer the question produces is
bound to be rather scholastic. In the highlands, all popular activism is indigenous, in the
sense that it is of indigenous people for indigenous people. It is academically interesting
that, in the last several decades, much of it has been framed in the class-inflected
discourse and practice of ‘campesinos’ and ‘liga agrarias,’ but this fact is ultimately
secondary to the overwhelming indigenousness of all political activity in the countryside.
Furthermore, even the local parties, and local chapters of national parties, that were
predominantly organized around class discourse, are virtually all, in practice, heavily
influenced by and enthusiastic practitioners of indigenous custom, cosmology, and
culture. As I will show, even the hardline communist party that controlled Chumbivilcas
between 2001 and 2006 was consciously, even flamboyantly, ‘indigenous’ in their
presentation and practice. The line between a socialist party with indigenous candidates
who express their message in indigenous cultural mediums to indigenous citizens, and an
explicitly ‘indigenist’ party that is led by socialists and has an essentially socialist
platform is therefore rather thin.

Second, I argue that properly indigenist organizations and identifications have, in
fact, already emerged within the very public, lively, and sometimes brutal arena of
provincial and district politics. There has thus far been little discussion amongst
Peruvianist anthropologists of this development, despite the fact that it appears to be
general throughout the southern highlands. This would be understandable if I were
referring to the appearance of minor, politically irrelevant indigenist parties; but, on the
contrary, these regional, provincial, and district political movements and parties—
foremost among them the parties *Ayllu* and *Pachakuteq*—have emerged rapidly and
triumphantly to control district and provincial municipalities throughout Chumbivilcas
and surrounding provinces. Furthermore, from discussions, articles, and papers at recent
conferences, it is my sense that this local political activism, by indigenous peoples for
indigenous peoples but under the rubric of traditional electoral politics, is a growing
factor throughout Latin America,\(^1\) but that, as Garcia noted, the more charismatic, more
culturally-inflected transnational indigenous activism has drawn ethnographic attention
away from it.\(^1\) This tendency to associate indigenous activism with strictly *non-official*
mobilization and organization not only risks ignoring indigenous struggles within *official*
channels, but also risks strengthening the traditional denial of indigenous civil capacity
and legitimacy.

6.2 Reasons for delay

It is essentially true, as posited by the ‘anthropological consensus’ alluded to
above, that, though local politics were practiced in indigenous modalities by indigenous
peoples, they were not articulated in explicitly ‘indigenist’ terms prior to the turn of the
21\(^{st}\) century. At no time, in fact, prior to perhaps 2005, did I ever hear any of my
indigenous *compadres*—in Chumbivilcas, Quispicanchis, or Cuzco—refer to themselves
as ‘*indígenas,*’ but rather always as ‘*comuneros*’ or ‘*campesinos.*’ The most common
explanation of this ‘underdevelopment’ of indigenist political activism in Peru—i.e., that
political claims and struggles were not directed toward specifically indigenous objectives
or expressed in ostentatiously or stereotypically ‘indigenous’ terms—has been that the
success of Velasco’s ideological programme of ‘campesino-ization’ of indigenous Peruvians—that is, the military regime’s efforts to frame rural society in class rather than ethnic terms—suppressed alternative forms of identification.\textsuperscript{17} This is certainly part of the explanation, though, as noted in previous chapters, peasant unions and federations—generally organized and conceived in Marxist terms—were the dominant form of activism for \textit{comuneros} for decades prior to the Velasco regime. As Degregori notes, a major element of the selection of class rather than ethnic modes of identification and mobilization was also the strongly demeaning valence of ‘Indianness,’ a valence that has only recently begun to weaken.\textsuperscript{18} At a more practical level, Donna Lee Van Cott argues that Fujimori’s recentralization of governance “severely restricted the sphere of action for all social movements at a time when indigenous mobilizations had far greater political space in Ecuador and Bolivia.”\textsuperscript{19}

One of the unique variables retarding the formulation and popularization of a properly indigenist project in Peru is the fact that conventional representations of ‘pre-Conquest’ or ‘Inca’ Peru were appropriated as early as the 1930s by urban intellectuals and the state.\textsuperscript{20} Several disparate ideological strands went into legitimizing and popularizing “autochthonous” culture in Cuzco, and Peru more generally. Because the Peruvian highlands were the heartland of the Inca Empire, there has always been a potential to associate Peru in its totality with the Inca polity. Peruvians of all stripes take pride in being, in varying senses, heirs to the Inca legacy; the father of one of my informants, for example, who was a powerful hacendado and had been subprefecto, built a house in town, at great expense, in the “\textit{estilo Inca},” with huge sculpted stonework, and reportedly took great pride in thus demonstrating his respect for and continuation of the
pre-Conquest tradition. In Cuzco in particular, cultural practices and beliefs that were perceived to be ‘autochthonous’ were further validated by the indigenista movement beginning in the late 19th century and reaching its zenith in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{21} In addition, the rise of tourism in the 1960s—specifically organized around pre-Columbian ruins and architectural remains—proved to Cuzqueños that ‘lo indígena’ was, at the very least, a lucrative resource to be exploited. To a certain extent, therefore, the indigenous peasantry has had to struggle to reclaim this expropriated and nationalized ‘indigenousness.’

6.3 Marxism and peasant syndicalism

The hard left has dominated provincial office in Chumbivilcas since the return to civilian rule in 1980. Though the history of the complex relationship between the indigenous peasantry and the Marxist Left in Peru is beyond the purview of the current discussion, it is important to discuss briefly the extent of the confusion between the two. Local political organizations and ideology developed out of the confluence of national political movements—particularly the PCP and its numerous heirs—, traditional community structures, and peasant federations and ligas agrarias. Most of the parties that have controlled district and provincial municipalities have been local chapters of national communist or socialist parties, first the IU\textsuperscript{22} and, after it fragmented in the early 1990s, the MNI,\textsuperscript{23} essentially a front party of the PCP-PR.\textsuperscript{24} The local chapters of these parties were hybrids of national platforms and local grassroots activism and interests. The line between peasant federations and indigenous communities was and continues to be particularly blurry. The comunidades campesinas (previously called comunidades indígenas) are key institutional political players in their own right in Chumbivilcas and
throughout the highlands. Not only do their members and leaders provide the bulk of party and federation personnel, but, to the extent that community leaders exert normative political pressure on community members, their support or opposition is often the decisive element in electoral contests.

The most powerful provincial socio-political institutions at the resumption of democratic rule, however, were the peasant trade unions and federations. The vast majority of so-called Marxist or ‘socialist’ activism in the southern highlands has been, more accurately, trade union organizing (the most significant exceptions being the Cuban-inspired ‘foro-ismo’ of the 1960s and the Shining Path insurgency). Peasant trade unions have, from their inception, paid a certain amount of lip-service to their indigenous revolutionary forbears, but indigenism per se has not been a major discursive element. The program of the Confederación Campesina del Perú for its Fifth National Congress in 1978, for example, draws in its introductory paragraph a lineage to the indigenous revolutionaries “Juan Santo Atahualpa y Túpac Amaru y Túpac Katari,” and makes reference to “the Quechua and Aymara nationalities,” but the framework presented in the remaining body of the program is clearly Marxist and there is no further mention of indigeneity per se.25

A great deal has been written—most notably by Marx and Lenin—about the distinction between the socialist practice and ideology and trade union or syndicalist. Lenin was particular vehement in his critique of trade unionism. He associated trade unionism with ‘spontaneism’ or the belief that the working class could spontaneously develop a properly socialist programme and struggle without recourse to the theorization and long-term organizing of a “conscious element” or non-worker, socialist
At a certain level, he believed trade unionism was consistent with revolutionary praxis; as a preliminary tool for the raising of class-consciousness, Lenin considered trade unionism, muckraking, and other forms of non-revolutionary, narrowly economic mobilization appropriate and desirable. He objected, however, to trade unionism as a predominant or exclusive form of political activity. Because trade unionism involves the mobilization of opposition in order to achieve concrete ameliorations of the immediate economic distress, rather than challenging the foundations of the system as a whole, “the ‘first available means of struggle’ will always be, in modern society, the trade-union means of struggle, and the ‘first available’ ideology the bourgeois (trade-union) ideology.”

Although the distinction is quite clear to the university-trained (or Russian- or Chinese-trained) cadre of the orthodox Marxist parties or factions—and was vigorously and violently emphasized by the Shining Path—most leftist activists in the countryside, if they recognize it, do not make the distinction an important element of their political practice. In Marxist terms, though they purport to be Maoist, the political practice of Marxist parties in Peru is essentially, at best, Bernsteinian.

Because of this, trade unions—specifically peasant federations—have been the predominant form of leftist organization in the countryside. Throughout Cuzco, the most powerful peasant organization since the 1960s has been the FDCC (Federación Departamental de Campesinos del Cusco—Departmental Federation of Peasants of Cusco). The FDCC is a departmental umbrella organization of provincial and district peasant unions, leagues, and federations. These unions themselves represent a variety of local organizations and interest groups. In Chumbivilcas, for example,
The Provincial Agrarian League of Chumbivilcas is the most important union representative of the Chumbivilcan peasantry, having among its grassroots organizations the organizations of women, peasant defense patrols, the Head Office of Peasant Communities of Chumbivilcas—which plays an important role in economic activity through its mills that allow for the elaboration of a series of products—, and the peasant communities of the province, of which there are 78 represented by their presidents in the assemblies of the League.29

The relationship between these peasant confederations, unions, and grassroots organizations, on the one hand, and the parties of the Marxist left, on the other, are intimate, long-standing, and multifaceted. The most basic form of interpenetration derives from the fact that, in the countryside, many, if not most, of the peasant union activists are also leftist party militants, and vice versa. It’s therefore frequently impossible to say, in fact, that a given individual is one or the other. In addition, the ideology underlying peasant activism has been overwhelmingly Marxist; when comuneros have organized themselves at levels higher than the community, they have done so in terms of their ‘peasantness’ and have conceived of their struggle in Marxist terms. Finally, much of the peasant activism of the last half-century has in fact been organized by leftist party militants, especially from the various Trotskyist parties and splinter factions. Though many of these organizers emerged from within peasant communities, the contribution of non-peasant, mestizo organizers to the process of consciousness-raising and organization has been significant. It is widely recognized, however, that though the parties of the Marxist left have depended on these peasant organizations and interest groups for their election, they have, in practice, frequently pursued an instrumental and somewhat authoritarian, or ‘non-participatory’ relationship toward them.
6.4 *Marxism to indigenism*

Because Marxist and trade union organizing have been so fundamental to the political preparation of the indigenous peasantry in the southern highlands, I argue in the following section that several elements of Marxist ideology and praxis have been decisive in the deflection of political activism away from indigenism and in impeding efforts to bring it back.\(^{30}\) Given the institutional antecedents of contemporary indigenist regional parties, it is no surprise that the project of the indigenous peasantry to reclaim for themselves their revalorized indigenousness has emerged out of Marxist traditions of activism.\(^{31}\) To fully explore the complexities of the Marxist accommodation to indigenism would require a book-length treatment. Though this accommodation is electorally logical, at least in the highlands—where the vast majority of workers are peasants and the vast majority of peasants are indigenous—, for long-time Marxist militants the reframing of rural struggle and identity requires the resolution of significant ideological contradictions. Just as the turn toward Maoism had been a ‘natural’ response of highland Marxist-Leninists to the overwhelmingly rural nature of the workforce and underdevelopment of the national economy, but was nonetheless a source of significant theoretical contradiction, dispute and factionalization, so the contemporary ‘indigenization’ of the Marxist left requires a whole series of significant re-alignments and revisions of party doctrine. For the development of Maoism and of ‘Gonzalo thought’—the doctrine of the Shining Path’s Abimael Guzmán—the fundamental problem was how to conceptualize a revolution in dialectical and practical terms in the context of a nation with rudimentary capitalist development, limited industrialization, and
thus a tiny proletariat, and therefore how to develop a revolutionary programme centered on the peasantry, which had traditionally been viewed by Marxists as one of the most reactionary elements of society. A similar problem presents itself in the development of indigenist leftism: after more than a century of considering problems of ethnicity and race as at best distinctly subsidiary to, and at worst counterproductive for, the building of class identification and organization, the Marxist left has begun trying to conceptualize the two—class and ethnicity—as being mutually reinforcing.

The ideological and doctrinal gap to be bridged is considerable. Two of the predominant elements of the traditional Marxist orientation toward indigeneity and toward indigenous Peruvians have been instrumentalism and antagonism toward non-class ideology. Though the ethnic situation in the southern highlands undoubtedly accentuated them, both of these factors are essential, generic elements of Marxist struggle throughout the world, rather than merely Peruvian aberrations. Marx conceived of the socialist struggle as the culmination and supersession of capitalist development. As Gouldner notes, it would therefore have seemed nonsensical and counterproductive to Marx to pursue a socialist revolution in a pre-capitalist society. One of the essential theses of dialectical materialism is that the bourgeois industrial and political revolution, and, more generally, the capitalist mode of production, is progressive in relation to prior feudal and absolutist regimes. Capitalism amplifies the productive capacity of a society, rationalizes the processes of production (while externalizing and leaving to private, bourgeois interests the determination of the ultimate ‘object of production’), and makes universal ‘freedom from want’ a possibility, at least in theory. Furthermore, it breaks the old bonds of community, guild, and patriarchal family and gives the individual the
freedom to seek and achieve self-actualization. A pre-capitalist socialist revolution leaves this whole massive project of industrialization and emancipation to the state, resulting in the well-known tendency of modernizing socialist governments to become themselves exploiters of their national labor force in an attempt to accumulate capital and reorganize society along technically rational lines.

And yet, as many in the Marxist parties of Western Europe began to recognize in the late 19th century, the depth of bourgeois civil society and the consolidation of the bourgeois state, and therefore its capacity to resist, compromise, and deflect revolutionary activity, increased concurrently with the capacity of the proletariat to radically challenge its hegemony (in point of fact, its seems to have significantly outpaced socialist organization and mobilization). As a result, the successful socialist revolutions occurred in nations that were either pre-capitalist or nascently capitalist (again, thus forcing them to take responsibility themselves for the often brutal process of modernizing their societies). The Leninist and Maoist projects are both focused on achieving an early institutional advantage in terms of mobilization and organization and, in essence, beating the bourgeoisie to the punch. But, in order to do this, they must agitate and guide a proletariat and peasantry that have not been sufficiently ‘modernized’ by capitalist relations of production and are not yet fully capable of self-organization. As was quite frankly recognized by Lenin, the result is a vigorous vanguardism and a distinctly instrumental relationship toward the participating working classes, particularly the peasantry. Forced to strike, in dialectical terms, prematurely, Leninists and Maoists must necessarily impose their vision and will on a proletariat that is relatively uninformed,
unconscious, and undisciplined, and a peasantry still mired in feudal ideologies and relations of production.

These are precisely the contradictions and exigencies that faced Marxist activists in 20th century Peru. From this perspective, the instrumentalism and the unwillingness to allow the indigenous peasantry autonomous forms of identification and organization were not shamefully undemocratic, but rather principled, essential elements of successful Marxist organizing in a pre- or nascently capitalist society. Hand in hand with this instrumentalism is an overriding concern with discouraging non-socialist forms of identification and mobilization. The doctrine of the Shining Path—that ethnic identities and cleavages were confounding forms of ‘false consciousness,’ detrimental to the building of a revolutionary movement and, therefore, necessary to suppress—may have been particularly strident, but the basic doctrine was virtually universal amongst Peruvian socialists and communists. In fact, it is one of the foundational principles of all classical forms of Marxism. Lenin was absolutely explicitly about this: “there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working masses themselves in the process of their movement, the only choice is—either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind has not created a ‘third’ ideology, and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or an above-class ideology). Hence, to belittle the socialist ideology in any way, to turn aside from it in the slightest degree means to strengthen bourgeois ideology.” There is very little ‘wiggle room’ in this perspective: indigenous forms of identification and mobilization are bourgeois and anti-socialist. Modern theories of ‘articulation’ may provide plausible arguments for the innocuousness or even beneficialness of non-class ideologies to the class struggle, but
they represent substantial departures from, perhaps even subversions of, traditional Marxist doctrine.

Both this instrumentalism and the antagonism toward indigenism are clearly evident in the doctrine of the Cuban-inspired foro-ists in the 1960s as well as that of the Senderistas of the 1980s. In the late 1960s, the Swedish author Sven Lindqvist interviewed two prominent Marxist guerilla leaders, both of whom expressed distrust of ethnic identifications. Héctor Béjar, the leader of the Trotskyist ELN (*Ejercito de Liberación Nacional*—National Liberation Army), which fought a brief insurgency in Ayacucho in 1965, told Lindqvist in an interview that

> It’s easier and more important to create social consciousness; it would be a detour to go via increased racial consciousness. The land workers are very hungry for land. But they hardly ever encounter Whites in situations that they experience as discriminatory on the grounds of race rather than class. Among the radicals, the passion for things Indian is a passed stage. In the Thirties and Forties, people played Indian music and spoke of restoring the Inca civilization. This has come back now as drawing-room politics in Belaúnde. But it no longer fulfills any function in revolutionary practice.\(^{37}\)

Likewise, Lindqvist reports a conversation he had with the Trotskyist revolutionary Hugo Blanco in which Blanco cynically argues that the “racial theme only needs hinting at. I remember a mass meeting in the Plaza de Armas in Cuzco, where no language had ever been publicly spoken except Spanish. The square was full of campesinos in ponchos, and I spoke in Quechua. ‘WE INDIANS, OPPRESSED FOR CENTURIES . . .’ No more is needed. I think it would be dangerous to make race a major theme”;\(^{38}\) in other words, enough cultural and racial reference to establish credibility and solidarity, but not so much as to distract from the fundamental consciousness of class.
6.5 Transition to indigenism

It is thus remarkable that many of the leaders of the rising indigenous movement in and around Cuzco are these same Marxists that once warned against racial and ethnic identifications. Hugo Blanco himself is one of the luminaries of the Cuzco indigenist revival. Since 2006 he has been the director of *Lucha Indígena*, a journal dedicated to the promotion of indigenous viewpoints and activism. His opinion pieces, published in the Spanish online journal *Sin Permiso*, advocate political activism rooted deeply in the indigenous cultural tradition, rather than a class or predominantly economic consciousness. Although my primary exposure to this shift has been in and around Cuzco, and specifically in the province of Chumbivilcas, indigenist parties are emerging throughout the southern highlands. These include MINKA (*Movimiento de Integración Kechwa Apurímac*—Movement of Quechua Integration Apurímac) which currently controls the *alcaldía* of Huanta province of Ayacucho; Frente Popular Llapanchik whose David Salazar is currently Regional President of Apurímac; in Puno, the disgraced former Regional President of Puno, David Jimenez Sardón, formerly of the militant ‘*Puka Llaqta’* (Quechua-Red Fatherland) splinter faction of Patria Roja, won election in 2002 as head of MARQA (*Movimiento por la Autonomía Regional de Quechuas y Aymaras*—Movement for the Regional Autonomy of Quechuas and Aymaras); Jimenez Sardón’s successor in the *Presidencia Regional*, Hernán Fuentes, has put forward a radical indigenist secessionist agenda. In addition to these predominantly indigenist parties, there are a number of regional parties, like Renacimiento Andino (Andean
Rebirth\textsuperscript{42}, that include an indigenous strain in their discourse without, however, making it a predominant plank in their platform.

Again, it is not my intention here to exhaustively explore the reasons for this transition, both within the Marxist left\textsuperscript{43} and within the indigenous community as a whole; there is a vast literature on the phenomenon throughout Latin America, particularly in the Mayan areas of Central America and the heavily indigenous regions of Bolivia and Ecuador; the transition toward and efflorescence of indigenous identities that I am describing shares many of the characteristics discussed in this literature. The vacuum into which indigenist parties emerged was undoubtedly widened by the crisis of legitimacy and the collapse of national parties during the 8 year Fujimorato (not to mention their sidelining during the Velasco years).\textsuperscript{44} For socialist and communist parties, in particular, the need to re-design their agenda and message has undoubtedly been accentuated by the damage done by \textit{Sendero Luminoso} to the communist label. Robert Albro points out that indigenist populism grew in Bolivia under similar conditions of erosion of legitimacy:

This pervasive disenchantment and ideological uncertainty [resulting from economic crisis of the 1980s and the neoliberal about-face of the MNR] facilitated the appearance of several ‘neo-populist’ political alternatives, eventually organized as political parties, with roots in different regional arenas. These new parties have combined a significantly ‘indigenist’ rhetoric with folkloric practice, prioritizing and circulating a reified ‘Andean’ (\textit{lo andino}) identity.\textsuperscript{45}

Because Peru has been somewhat behind the curve with regard to properly indigenous activism, the international indigenous movement and the general prominence of indigenist identity politics throughout Latin America also play key roles in the growing popularity of properly indigenous identity in the countryside (the so-called
Various NGOs have been instrumental in introducing and advocating this revalorization of indigenous identity to leftist circles in Peru; Centro de Estudios Bartolomé de las Casas has, in particular, played an important role in doing so in Cuzco. Some of the recent rise in the popularity of explicitly indigenous activism is, to use a market metaphor, demand-driven—in the sense of a dawning popular awareness of indigenous identity as an appealing alternative to class-based or other forms of self-identification—and some supply-driven—in the sense of being promulgated by local political practitioners who recognize an electoral advantage in framing their message in terms of essentialized indigenous identities. Both are obviously involved and mutually reinforcing. To a large extent, the shift of some elements of the Marxist left toward ‘neo-indigenism’ is probably a principled revision, or correction, of traditional Marxist emphases, rather than a calculated re-branding effort (although re-branding is obviously an element of the process). Certainly, the willful marginalization and even elision of indigeneity by the Marxist left was always both ideologically awkward and practically crippling.

6.6 Indigenist activism in Chumbivilcas

This efflorescence of indigenist populism reached full bloom in Chumbivilcas in the form of Autogobierno Ayllu (Self-Government Ayllu), which took control of the provincial municipality in the 2006 Municipal Elections. Growing out of the FDCC (Federación Departamental de Campesinos del Cusco—Departmental Peasant Federation of Cusco), Ayllu explicitly joins socialism and indigenous identity politics. It won the 2006 municipal elections on a wave of enthusiasm for indigenist discourse and
proposals. An example of the depth of this mixture is the professional trajectory of its candidate for *Segunda Vicepresidencia*, Carlos Ernesto Paredes Gonzáles. Paredes is a university-trained economist who has been active for the last three decades in both peasant organizations, including the aforementioned CCP and FDCC, and various parties of the Maoist ultra-left, including *Vanguardia Revolucionaria* (Revolutionary Vanguard—eventually folded into the IU) and the PUM (*Partido Unificado Mariateguista*-Unified Mariateguist Party). Though he has been active in consulting on issues of participatory democracy, peasant production, and regional planning, there is little evidence that he had, prior to participating in the foundation of Ayllu, any commitment to indigenism per se. On the contrary, the rapidity of his ‘conversion’ suggests that he, like so many of the Ayllu cadre with whom I have spoken, do not actually perceive the shift from peasant union activism to indigenist activism as requiring significant ideological reorientation (whatever its theoretical implications) because they were always, whatever the terminology, working on behalf of the indigenous peasantry.
Candidates of the Izquierda Unida controlled the provincial municipality from 1980 until 1998, when Florentino Laime Mantilla and his regional populist party Movimiento Nuevo Chumbivilcas (Movement New Chumbivilcas) was carried into office, in part by dissatisfaction with the results of nearly two decades of IU rule. Nuevo Chumbivilcas was something of a transitional party: more populist than socialist, more regionalist than indigenist, the party served predominantly as a political vehicle for Laime and his kin-network. Though he was voted out in the 2002 elections, in favor of a return to Maoism with the MNI (Movimiento Nueva Izquierda-New Left Movement), his tenure and its discourse were precursors to the full-blown indigenism that brought
Ayllu into office in 2006. In the 2002 municipal elections, Partido Inka Pachakuteq, a competing indigenous party, came in second (with 19% of the vote) to MNI (which carried 37% of the vote), and the aforementioned Renacimiento Andino came in third (with 10%). In the 2006 municipal elections, Ayllu secured 27.4% of the vote, Pachakuteq again came in second with 23.4%, and MNI fell to third with 22.7%. If we step back, we can see a clear trend: except for a brief interlude, Izquierda Unida controls the province until 1998, when the regional populist party of Florentino Laime takes office with a discourse that includes elements of indigenous revival. Though this suggests that the hegemony of the Marxist left was faltering, it returns to office with the MNI. MNI, however, wins election in part by interjecting a broadly indigenist strain into its discourse and practice, and is closely trailed by the indigenous party Pachakuteq. Finally, in 2006, indigenist parties come into full force, with Ayllu and Pachakuteq together garnering more than 50% of the vote.

6.7 Indigenist discourse

There are actually two levels of “indigenousness” operating in these parties, one of which is properly ‘traditional,’ the other of which is decidedly not. Ironically, it is the element of mobilization that is explicitly ‘indigenous’ that is not traditional. On the one hand, these parties emerge in part out of traditional social institutions (including the family and comunidad). Again, informants can literally describe the communities and families that provide the organizational nucleus of specific parties. Building a party on these primordial institutions—in the sense that they are forms of organization and identification that have survived (with significant modifications) through centuries of
higher level political change, rather than class or ideological affinity or community of interest—can therefore be conceived as a form of traditionalism or reactive politics. On the other hand, the use of cultural practices or beliefs as reified elements of political mobilization is decidedly post-modern rather than pre-modern. The contemporary ways of conceptualizing and utilizing ‘ethnic identity’ to mobilize participation in mass politics diverge significantly from both actual, contemporary ethnic practice and pre-Columbian, autochthonous tradition (to the extent that such a tradition can be historically reconstructed). In this sense, contemporary indigenist political mobilization in Chumbivilcas involves the development and dissemination of an “invented tradition,” which Eric Hobsbawm defines as “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.” In chapter 10, we will see that this indigenist tradition is, in fact, in competition for cultural hegemony with other local ‘invented traditions,’ most notably the “Qorilazo” tradition, which seeks to represent the province as a culturally composite whole, in part by tracing the province’s cultural lineage back to the Spanish-dominated free-range cattle ranching of the 19th and early 20th century, rather than a predominantly indigenous past.

Ayllu won office on a number of explicitly indigenist planks, the majority of which, however, involved philosophical rather than fiscal commitments. For example, the affirmation, “We believe that in our past, our culture, and our identity is where our primary and principal strengths are found, that in order to move forward we must recover,
redeem, and develop them”⁵⁴ or the commitment to “revalorize the Andean-Amazonian cultural identity as a generative source of the principles, values and understanding of the human being, closely connected and interdependent with nature and the environment.”⁵⁵

It is difficult not to see these sorts of non-binding, stylistic elements of the contemporary indigenist political programs of Ayllu and similar parties as predominantly rhetorical. Even elements that appear to be novel to neo-indigenist parties—like their emphasis on regionalization or closer cooperation between the municipality and civil society—on closer inspection turn out to be reformist proposals that, while recently gaining popularity, are generalized throughout contemporary Peruvian politics. Fiery commitments to channel funds to peasant communities rather than towns were made with equal vigor by the prior MNI, presumably because the majority of voters reside in communities rather than urban centers. Likewise, the emphasis of candidates on their indigenous origins is not qualitatively different than the universal populist emphasis of candidates on their supposed impoverished or humble origins, described by Robert Albro in Bolivia as “the strategic and imaginative management of political self-image . . . particularly the case in a new electoral environment where local populist leaders must persuade the electorate of their popular status, their evidently ‘humble origin’ (de origen humilde) in the still significantly rural provinces.”⁵⁶

There are, however, several substantive, if problematic, indigenist proposals. Several indigenist parties, including Ayllu, have advocated greater devolution of governance to the peasant communities rather than the provinces or districts. One of the most popular proposals of Ayllu was to govern through a council made up of two representatives of each of Chumbivilcas’s 79 peasant communities, rather than or in
addition to the provincial consejo (town council). Critical commentators argued that, among other things, this would be illegal (a municipality does not, under the Peruvian constitution, have the right to rearrange the structure of municipal government).\textsuperscript{57} Even with regard to these substantive proposals, therefore, there is a certain element of gamesmanship, and, needless to say, after ascending to power, Ayllu quietly discarded the proposal.

It is important to note, before moving to a discussion of concrete political practice, two paradoxes of the development of regional indigenist parties. First, as decentralization expands the opportunities for indigenist activism, it isolates indigenous parties and peoples from national political struggles and canalizes their aspirations and struggles toward parochial and, to a certain extent, apolitical concerns. Indigenous peoples only have sizable majorities in the provinces of the central and southern highlands, whereas they are a minority in the north, along the coast, and within the nation as a whole. Decentralization therefore gives them the opportunity to control their own destiny, but within narrowly defined geographical and legal limits. Even within these provincial limits, local autonomy is compromised by the direct intervention of various national institutions.\textsuperscript{58} Furthermore, the selection of ‘indigeneity’ as a source of identification and cooperation, may diminish the facility with which these movements can articulate their struggles with national, class-based forms of protest and negotiation, like unity parties, mass rallies, and general strikes.\textsuperscript{59} A second paradox is that the rise of these indigenist political projects is occurring at the same time that peasant communities themselves are facing challenges of individualism and potential parcelization, and indigenous peoples are increasingly adopting the national culture. While the mythical
‘closed corporate community’ may never have been as closed or as corporate as ethnographers once portrayed it, comunidades campesinas are now, by all accounts, significantly less closed and less corporate than they once were. As Motte notes, the neighboring district of Haquira “must confront individualism and the weak organization of the peasant communities.” 60 Virtually every indigenous family with which I am familiar has one or more members dwelling periodically or permanently in a major city. One now has to travel to the very poorest, highest, and most isolated communities of Chumbivilcas to find Quechua monolinguals or men wearing bayeta (homespun) or ojotas (the sandals traditionally characteristic of comuneros). It is thus at a point of critical loss of cultural distinctiveness that indigenous Chumbivilcanos are discovering or forging their ‘imagined community.’

6.8 Marxism or populism?

During the majority of my ethnographic fieldwork, the Movimiento Nueva Izquierda (MNI) party controlled the provincial alcaldía. MNI is ostensibly hardline Maoist. Although the rhetoric of the party is heavily tinged with class antagonism and struggle, the vast majority of local leaders, militants, and supporters are (or are conceived by themselves and the community at large as) indigenous. It might be said that MNI is discursively and affectively communist, without its leadership being unduly concerned with the impracticality of locally implementing a meaningfully communist agenda. The local party does not advocate, much less implement, any redistributive policies (again, it probably could not legally do so, even if it so desired); it does not advocate or actively seek collectivization; it does not offer any solution to the famous ‘peasant question’ (nor
did I ever hear anyone suggest the fact that Marxism has historically been critical of peasant social and economic organization). To be fair, it is necessary to express a hard truth about rural voters and politicians: the level of civic preparation in Chumbivilcas, and I suspect other rural provinces, is low. The local educational system is woefully inadequate and those Chumbivilcanos who do obtain post-secondary education, through family affluence or the rare scholarship, are often enticed to the cities by professional opportunities that are unavailable locally. Furthermore, because political parties have suffered nearly four decades of chronic crisis and disintegration, they have not fulfilled their traditional role of providing consciousness-raising and political and ideological discipline. There are therefore few voters with the political and intellectual training to accurately sift out the actual policy programme of a party from its rhetoric and to gauge the likelihood that such a programme will produce, in the long term, favorable social and macroeconomic effects for the province as a whole (as is probably true, to a certain extent, of voters throughout the world). There are even fewer party cadre who could design (or, in the case of local chapters of national parties, adapt to the local reality) and implement an integrated provincial plan. In fact, there are probably no more than one or two provincial members of MNI with sufficient technical familiarity with Marxist political and economic theory to design a policy that was Marxist in anything but name.

Thus, though MNI is overtly Marxist, the designation is not as meaningful as one might imagine. Throughout the provinces of Peru, there is a certain disjuncture or looseness between, on the one hand, party rhetoric and platform (to the extent such a thing is drafted and distributed) and, on the other, the objectives or actual policies of the party cadre, that makes political classification difficult. This is true with both regional
parties and local chapters of national parties. As is probably the case worldwide, the
success of local chapters of national parties frequently depends far less on local support
for the national party platform than on the local candidate’s personal qualities, family,
professional, and community relations, and concrete offers of particularistic benefits, like
public works, jobs, foodstuffs, and targeted social services. Thus, the concrete promises
that a party makes during an election and, even more, the actual way in which it disburses
municipal funds once elected, may have very little to do with the party’s ostensible
political ideology.\textsuperscript{63} This difficulty is made even more acute by the fact that, whatever a
party’s expressed political agenda, it is essentially engaged in the consumption of
financial transfers from the central government, rather than in the generation of
proprietary revenues.\textsuperscript{64} This lends a certain make-believe quality to party discourse and a
tendency toward improvidence in municipal expenditure, because municipalities are not
expected by voters to foster economic development or expand educational or other
opportunities, but rather to produce concrete (often literally) signs of their tenure. For a
party to proclaim, for example, that it is \textquote{ultra-izquierda} (ultra-left) or \textquote{maoísta, puro y
duro} (hardline Maoist), does not necessarily involve significant sacrifices or policy
constraints, because the municipality does not have the authority to reorganize relations
of production, communalize property, or launch their own ‘Great Leap Forward’;
essentially, all they can do is expend the funds allotted to them in conspicuous and
\textit{politically} effective ways. Whatever the ideology, therefore, administrations tend to
distribute money in particularistic, populist forms, rather than ideologically consistent
ones.\textsuperscript{65} A more accurate description of MNI and, frankly, the vast majority of district and
provincial Leftist parties in the southern highlands, would be a term like \textquote{Socialist
Agrarian Populism,’ in the sense that, in alignment with popular demands, they advocate the distribution of resources directly to, or in ways that predominantly benefit, impoverished agrarian communities. Very little in this “Agrarian Populism” is specifically Marxist and, in fact, much of it contradicts orthodox Marxist doctrine.

Because the overwhelming majority of the targets of this populism are peasants, the actual policy distinctions between parties tend to be rather rudimentary, as competing parties (virtually exclusively of the Left and Center Left) attempt to develop a pro-peasant message to graft onto their fundamentally clientelistic political enterprises. It is therefore natural that all parties would, to varying extents, ‘indigenize’ their discourse and practice, given that most of their leaders and militants and virtually all of their electors are indigenous peasants. Although, for example, the language of public discussion—in bars, streets, and patios—is Spanish, political speeches are frequently delivered in Quechua, particularly the emphatic introductions, conclusions, and other emotional high-points. Likewise, whereas Cuzqueña brand beer is the norm in private and informal settings, in public events and celebrations the party leadership conspicuously quaffs chicha from large cups in the traditional indigenous fashion. The recovery and promotion of traditional weaving is also heavily discursively emphasized, despite the fact that it is not generally profitable for its practitioners, and certainly could only be an ancillary element of any provincial development plan. It should be noted, however, in closing, that, though there may be a certain degree of politically-driven over-emphasis (sometimes bordering on caricature), of indigenous cultural elements, virtually all political actors in Chumbivilcas—producers and consumers of political discourse alike—are indigenous. One could argue that giving speeches in Quechua or having one’s wife
wear the *pollera* (the skirt associated with indigenous women) for public ceremonies were theatrically emphasized for solidary effect, but the fact remains that the general public speaks Quechua preferentially, at least in the home, and one’s wife and her friends frequently wear the *pollera* in private as well as on public occasions.

6.9 *Party machines*

In this second half of the chapter, I argue that these new forms of indigenist identification and appeal are more appropriately understood in relation to the vigorous municipal machine politics that has developed over the last decade. By ‘party machine’ we refer to what James Scott described in his classic “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change” as “a non-ideological organization interested less in political principle than in securing and holding office for its leaders and distributing income to those who run it and work for it. It relies on what it accomplishes in a concrete way for its supporters, not on what it stands for. A machine may in fact be likened to a business in which all members are stockholders and dividends are paid in accordance with what has been invested.”\textsuperscript{66} Scott argues that machine politics thrives in transitional periods during which “the expansion of suffrage together with the rupture of traditional economic and status arrangements”\textsuperscript{67} have opened a space for popular participation, but in which “community and family orientation are [still] most decisive.”\textsuperscript{68} Furthermore, Scott argues, party machines depend “on a clientele that is both unfamiliar with the contours of the political system and economically on the defensive”\textsuperscript{69}; with regard to the latter, Scott argues that “perhaps the most fundamental quality shared by the mass clientele of machines is poverty . . . Poverty shortens a man’s time horizon and maximizes the
effectiveness of short-run material inducements.”

It’s clear that contemporary Chumbivilcas, as I’ve described it, provides an ideal environment for the growth of machine politics.

A number of analysts of contemporary provincial Peruvian politics have noted the prominence of machine politics. It is certainly not isolated to Peru, however; Aaron Bobrow-Strain describes his reactions to machine politics in Chiapas, Mexico, as a “growing realization that most forms of indigenous authority emerging through the cracks of landowners’ declining hegemony have been cut from the same fabric of corrupt and violent clientelism as those of their ladino predecessors.” There’s probably a fair amount of convergent evolution of improvised approaches in the similarities of political action and organization, both between traditional politics and contemporary and between machine politics in Chumbivilcas and Chiapas (or Chicago for that matter), though some of the similarities may, in fact, result from perverse political inheritances. Three factors, in particular, are decisive in the form of machine politics practiced in Chumbivilcas.

6.10 Obraismo and asistencia

One of the most glaring attributes of politics as it is practiced in Chumbivilcas, by both Marxist and Indigenist parties, is what might be called ‘obra-ismo’ or ‘rule by obra.’ In Spanish, obra signifies ‘a work’ in the broadest sense of the word. In the sphere of politics or government expenditure, it refers to ‘public works’ or any concrete (again, often literally) manifestation of government expenditure. This category frequently includes irrigation canals, water treatment facilities, reservoirs, roads, paved streets,
plazas, administrative offices, schools, clinics, electricity transmission infrastructure, communication infrastructure, fair grounds, stadiums, basketball courts, bullrings, and *coliseos de gallos* (cockfight arenas). Political discourse in Chumbivilcas consists, apart from the sloganeering and bombast typical of campaign speeches around the world, virtually exclusively of the debate around these kinds of public works. Promises to construct these ‘obras,’ delivered directly to the recipient communities, are the overwhelming modality of political discourse during elections. As Motte notes, “some [candidates] have only a list of *obras* and commitments to communities, which they utilize as a campaign strategy.” The much-desired posters of ruling political parties (which are one of the primary forms of wall-adornment) usually include a large photo of the *alcalde* and/or an icon of Chumbivilcas in the center, surrounded by small photos of the *obras* that the candidate has ‘given’ to the province or district and brief textual descriptions of each. Several informants who had run for office claimed that the two most common questions on the campaign trail were, “What have you brought us?” and “What are you going to bring us?”
Once in office, the struggle to acquire funding for, to build, and then to inaugurate these public works is the foremost concern of municipal authorities. Alcaldes and their staff may not be proficient in public administration or planning, but they are intimately familiar with the electoral reality on the ground and are constantly attempting to direct expenditures to communities of voters whose electoral support was, and/or may be in the future, crucial to their election. This concern and effort is well justified by the fact that the number, quality, and prominence of these public works are the primary diagnostic criteria that the electorate uses to gauge the success or failure of a given administration. Peruvian commentators are widely aware of the problems attendant on this limited conceptualization of political activity; del Valle complains, for example, of
The tendency of the population, their organization and even local governments to understand these processes through an entirely material perspective of the realization of obras . . . the institutions and organizations of [Santo Tomás River basin] have not achieved sufficient maturity to tackle with a more ample criterion fundamental themes, like education, where the necessity of improving the quality is evident; and where the ‘obrista’ vision prejudices in a certain manner more profound attempts to introduce change.76

It should be noted, however, that the prominence of the obra in local political practice is not just a cultural or ideological idiosyncrasy of Chumbivilcanos or Latin Americans (conversations with other Latin Americanists suggest that it is common throughout the hemisphere); the structure of municipal governance sets certain parameters on political activity and administration that tend to produce this mode of apolitical and, to a certain extent, superficial government. Despite improvements in administrative autonomy and increases in the subnational share of fiscal expenditure, municipalities do not have the authority, as alluded to in the previous section, to alter the basic institutions of governance. They cannot change the relationship between the province and its districts. They cannot increase or decrease existing taxes, or levy new ones. They cannot issue their own currencies in order to affect unemployment, investment, and growth through monetary policy. They cannot sign trade agreements with foreign governments, alter the electoral process, or raise the minimum wage. In other words, most of the policy decisions that depend on ideology, values, and philosophical or theoretical frameworks, are beyond the purview of municipal government. Even if they wanted to carry out a sophisticated, ideologically informed and constrained political program, they are essentially prevented from doing so by the limitations of municipal administration. Nevertheless, the major shortcomings of obraismo include the selection of projects for
their potential electoral benefits rather than their more diffuse long-term developmental benefits, the elaboration of electorally-targeted projects that are not integrated into broader regional plans, and the under-prioritization of long-term planning. Furthermore, the deeper structures of economic and political life are depoliticized and placed outside the realm of local contestation. As Nancy Postero has argued with regard to neoliberal reforms in Bolivia, “rather than fighting the national government over large issues of resource allocation, civil society organizations were encouraged to engage in decisions over small development projects at the local level.”

The predominance of this obra-ismo articulates with and is informed by what Peruvians refer to as ‘asistencialismo.’ At the most basic, asistencialismo denotes charitable giving as a general phenomenon; but local Spanish speakers usually use it to indicate the habitual reliance of particular individuals or populations on charitable giving by government and NGOs, and the tendency of government to facilitate this dependency. It is therefore akin to the English term ‘welfare,’ and carries many of the same connotations and criticisms. Del Valle voices many of these complaints in his *Aprendiendo los Derechos*:

> The population understands rights only as demands on the State, limiting themselves to demands for reparations without assuming responsibilities. . . in southern Peru, social actors see the charity of the State or of private organizations as a continuation or contemporary variant [historical] relations of servitude. The peasant, disposed and accustomed to supplicate, doesn’t find anything strange in these gifts or works of infrastructure.

Del Valle, whatever his personal convictions, is not writing here as a reactionary but as a representative of a reformist NGO. While del Valle’s historical interpretation—that the current form of asistencialismo is a continuation of traditional paternalism and
servitude—is arguable, no visitor to the countryside could reasonably question the prevalence of an attitude of dependence. Though it is certainly not exclusively a response to impoverishment, I think del Valle underemphasizes the contribution of poverty per se to the orientation. Whatever the case, the government, both municipal and national, generally takes a restitutive or paternalistic stance toward the countryside, in particular the comunidades. This orientation is reinforced by the charity model of most NGO giving, which is geared toward short-term, direct alleviation of particular deficits within a target population or region, rather than providing dedicated funds for the ongoing employment of health care providers and/or educators, or otherwise fostering regional development that would continue to improve the lives of all residents in the long-term. Community activism is reciprocally oriented almost exclusively toward demanding that the government provide ‘assistance,’ and can usually be satisfied (or neutralized) by delivering a steady drip of improved cattle, seeds, veterinary resources, fertilizers, pesticides, medicines, nutritional supplements, blankets, roofing materials, and other modest subsidies. In some areas, the role of the peasant community has changed drastically to adjust to this situation; Paerregaard, in fact, argues that “the chief function of peasant communities in Peru is to direct and distribute allocations from government and private development agencies.” While this may overstate the case somewhat, asistencialismo is certainly a fundamental element of government administration and political calculation.

In particular, obraismo and asistencialismo have profound effects on the party system in Chumbivilcas, by strengthening the hand of small, pragmatic, local parties against large, ideologically-constituted national ones. Because the population understands
politics in terms of targeted public works and other particularistic benefits, the ideological appeals and state-level programs of national parties tend to fall on deaf ears. One could argue, in fact, that obraismo is, in part, a local response to several hundred years of bad faith governance by the Lima-based criollo state, which has eroded the confidence of community leaders in the abstract assurances of national parties; election and rule by obra can thus be conceived as a demand by the population that the state provide ‘incontrovertible’ benefit (i.e., as a collective “show us the money!”). Local parties, however, are much better suited to respond to these types of demands than national ones. National parties are necessarily dependent on political platforms that are generally applicable throughout the nation and ideologies that can appeal across disparate regions and sectors. Their platforms must be general enough to appeal to a diverse, nation-wide voting public, as well as minimally coherent and relatively consistent over time. Ideally, a party attempts to create a set of policies that would organize a polity in a manner that would lead to diffuse economic, political, and social benefits to the population at large. In practice, however, these policy positions are usually far too abstract to compete with the concrete promises of personal and communal benefit that local parties offer. Local parties, or chapters of national parties with substantial local autonomy, are usually built, ‘from the ground up’ as it were, to address local concerns; furthermore, they are built by and attract individuals who understand the local electoral reality; their platforms and policy proposals (to the extent they are not merely lists of proposed obras) evolve through the constant, intimate contact of party militants with the local population (of which the militants are members); finally, their proposals are not unduly constrained or diluted by national ideological convictions and policy objectives.
Any centralized, national party structure and ideology is bound to be severely handicapped in its ability to tailor a ‘winning’ package of public works and particularistic interventions to local demands.

6.11 Alcohol and political practice

Another cultural peculiarity of Chumbivilcas deserves mention, because it has definite effects on who can participate in politics and how politics gets done: alcohol consumption is a major—perhaps the major—consumer of time and discretionary income in Chumbivilcas. Although many peasants have claimed to me that this came with the roads, it is obviously not a new phenomenon. Raimondi claimed, drawing on his travels through the province in 1865, that when peasants were not in the fields they were in a state of nearly constant inebriation. Historically speaking, it’s perhaps more accurate to say that the high level of alcohol consumption that was once general throughout the world, and particularly in peasant societies, has remained the norm in Chumbivilcas. It’s difficult to say what portion of the population is alcoholic, because local normative social behavior would probably be classified in the United States as alcoholism. I am not a heavy drinker and therefore dreaded walking across the main plaza any time after noon, since it invariably involved the socially tense attempt to avoid the demands of acquaintances to spend the afternoon drinking beer. This nearly constant state of inebriation is common throughout the social spectrum, from municipal workers, teachers, and storekeepers to campesinos and construction workers. Although particular individuals can become belligerent when intoxicated, this is certainly not the norm. Most men drink peaceably until they pass out or lack the coordination to bring another glass to
their mouth. On any day of the week, men will spend the evenings passing around the bottle and glass. Any attempt to extricate oneself from the process before collective self-destruction is invariably met with remonstrance verging on outright anger. On a number of occasions I have met male schoolteachers before noon in a state of drunkenness—after having drunk all night—preparing to return to their homes to sleep it off. Classes are either dismissed for the day or shared by a fellow schoolteacher when a drunken professor fails to arrive. Chumbivilcanos frequently note, however, that the level of alcohol consumption today is substantially lower than it was a generation ago (in part, no doubt, due to the increasing popularity of teetotaling evangelical creeds), which is a frightening intimation of how alcohol-soaked political and social life in general must have been under the provincial ‘ancien régime.’

It is entirely unacceptable for a man to refuse alcohol. As Simmons noted, drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in Andean Peru in the 1950s, “perhaps the single most important drinking rule that obtains among adults is that one cannot refuse a drink if invited to partake. Those who attempt to refuse are subjected to intolerable pressure by means of a wide variety of devices. As one informant said, ‘If a man does not wish to drink, he has to go away from the place where the drinking is taking place and must avoid places where men are drinking.’”83 Only if one has a strong, commonly known, unavoidable rationale (for example, a fatal allergy, liver or kidney problem under active treatment, or a bus driver driving or preparing to drive) is abstention tolerated, but more likely than not that individual is not invited to celebrations, or else, anticipating the resulting tension and disapproval, he intentionally avoids them. One relatively prominent member of the community was a publicly acknowledged recovering alcoholic who had
spent nearly a decade near death and on the streets of Arequipa before recovering and reintegrating into community life. This was the only case I encountered in which men actively facilitated another man’s avoidance of alcohol, and whenever they did so they would reiterate how ferocious his alcoholism had been, as if their restraint demanded explanation. Nonetheless, he was not frequently included in social celebrations. The only male population that is more or less excused from drinking is committed evangelicals, but this effectively excludes them from public male sociality (if in fact they are faithful in their abstinence, which is by no means universal).

It would be inconceivable for a politician to abstain, because so much of the ‘work’ of politics is done both through and under the influence of alcohol. Alcohol consumption among regidores, for example, is constant and copious. The wives of regidores frequently complain that the quasi-official drinking schedule cuts severely into their home and family life. This drinking, however, serves several important social, political, and economic functions. For example, as Robert Albro notes of rural politics in Bolivia, and many of my informants echo, drinking bouts foster “confianza” and appear to create a sense of affinity and mutual esteem. Furthermore, traditional forms of vecino political behavior—old boy networks, backroom political intrigue, sweetheart deals, nepotism—are mated in indigenous political activism with traditional peasant community practice, producing a hybrid that mixes hard-drinking power politics with traditional indigenous reciprocal prestation and ritual over-drinking. The prestation and ritual use of alcohol is an Andean tradition that predates the conquest. Sponsorship of drinking occasions is the favored normative manner of expressing esteem for invited guests. For a host of any event or compromiso to not provide alcohol for guests would be literally
inconceivable. When this norm is extended to the political sphere, it makes alcohol provision and consumption fundamental to all political occasions, including campaign events, internal policy debates, negotiations between the municipality and representatives of civil society, and sponsored fiestas. I have personally participated, in an ancillary manner, in many of these events (to the extent my constitution could support) and can attest to the fact that a sine qua non of successful provincial political participation is an iron gut.

Most importantly, the central role of alcohol in political practice effectively excludes women from real political life. Many commentators have attributed the exclusion of women from politics to the machismo of Latin American society. While this is undoubtedly a factor, my sense is that the practical consequences of ‘alco-politics’ is today responsible for the lion’s share of the exclusion, and is certainly the most intractable element of the equation. In contrast to male norms, women are expected to drink only small quantities of alcohol during festivities and to avoid inebriation. Women are almost never seen in a state of drunkenness, except during major festivals, and even then rarely appear to be more than tipsy. During birthday parties or other occasions when men and women drink together, women will ask to be skipped after the first or second round. The first discothèques began to appear several years ago, and young women increasingly drink to the point of inebriation in them, but any adolescent or adult female who habitually became drunk would still suffer a catastrophic loss of community reputation and respect. It would certainly be a serious violation of norms for a woman to become stumbling, nose-bleeding, vomiting drunk. Furthermore, I have never seen a local woman in a proper bar (except as a proprietors), where the vast majority of male
sociality takes place. Because of these norms and taboos, women are effectively prevented from entering the shadowy spaces and participating in the alcohol-soaked negotiations in which and through which backroom political decisions ‘get made.’ The space and practice of politics are simply not culturally appropriate for women. In order to enter in force into politics, women would therefore have to force a drastic restructuring, not just of gender values, but also of these spaces and practices of politics. At this point it is hard to even imagine how such a transformation could be effected.

6.12 Parties and civil society

Taylor Lewis’s assessment of the gamonal’s authority in the late 19th century—that it was “maintained by a blend of personal loyalty via kinship ties . . . and patronage” These patron-client or patronage networks may be invisible to an outsider, but to a Chumbivilcano they might as well be drawn in neon. In part, this is because the political patron-client networks are largely re-tooled networks of kinship, compadrazgo, and community. It has long been argued that kinship played a stronger role in the staffing of public institutions in Iberian America than in North America. Lipset, for example, argued with regard to corporate culture that “Family particularism is much more common among Latin American business executives than among their counterparts in more developed nations . . . the type of managers employed by family groups are known as hombres de confianza (men who can be trusted), and have been selected more for this quality than for their expertise.” This observation fits rather well with the nature of political clientelism in Chumbivilcas.
Local political parties are not created out of kinship alone, however; they are hybrids, bred on multiple levels of civil society. This hybridization occurs primarily at the level of personnel, rather than formal institutional integration. Because community leadership structures (varayog, dirigente, etc), alcaldías, political parties, and federal aid programs are all built upon peasant kinship networks of filiation, affination, and alliance, there is an understandable confusion between them, and any given interpersonal relationship tends to be something of a palimpsest of overlapping institutional and personal vínculos. But, beyond this overlap of personnel, district and provincial parties are beginning to emerge from within civil society institutions, so that it is unclear in their initial stages where the social institution ends and the party begins. This increases the likelihood that state norms will not gain predominance over competing institutional norms and that political parties will not “acquiesce to established political procedures.”

Joel Migdal points out that “noncompliance . . . is not simply personal deviance or criminality or corruption; rather, it is an indication of a more fundamental conflict over which organizations in society, the state or others, should make these rules.” The struggles over compliance and the penetration of state-sponsored norms are therefore “over whether the state will be able to displace or harness other organization—families, clans, multinational corporations, domestic enterprises, tribes, patron-client dyads—which make rules against the wishes and goals of state leaders.” The interpenetration of social and political institutions, which verges on an indistinction between institutional constituents, therefore illustrates the problematic lack of autonomy of state institutions. Furthermore, because virtually all political and administrative positions in the municipality are filled anew with each political administration, family, community, and
other social institutions are decisive in structuring not only political parties, but also the local state administrative apparatus itself. One of the shortcomings of this penetration of state institutions by civil society is that it prevents properly state norms from gaining predominance over competing traditional norms, even within the state apparatus. Given the importance of institutionalization in the process of modernization and state consolidation, the continued vulnerability of state institutions to penetration by counterproductive civil norms is a serious governmental shortcoming.\textsuperscript{96} On the one hand, this is an example of what Huntington called ‘praetorian politics,’ in which, because there are “low levels of institutionalization and high levels of participation,” “social forces using their own methods act directly in the political sphere.”\textsuperscript{97} On the other hand, the fact that these social forces are channeling their efforts into party politics and through political parties, however incipient, is itself a sign that a process of institutionalization is underway.

Huntington attributes this to “the general politicization of social forces and institutions. In such societies, politics lacks autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability. All sorts of social forces and groups become directly engaged in general politics. Countries which have political armies also have political clergies, political universities, political bureaucracies, political labor unions, and political corporations. Society as a whole is out-of-joint, not just the military.”\textsuperscript{98} This argument obviously involves at set of normative assumptions about the preferability of order, stability, and productivity; a radical, of the left or right, would no doubt object that ‘everything is political.’ Whatever its normative assumptions, however, Huntington’s characterization of such a “general politicization of social forces”—as a socio-political complex in which
there is limited consensus concerning political norms and in which “each group employs means which reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities. The wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup. In the absence of accepted procedures, all these form of direct action are found on the political scene”—seems an apt description of Peru’s process over the last several decades. This may, in fact, be a desirable social vision for certain individuals, groups, and political confessions (in particular for student activists, union leaders, death squad commanders, revolutionaries, ambitious colonels, and other actors who stand to benefit directly). Others, while acknowledging that such political regimes have detrimental impacts on, for example, productivity, prosperity, and/or standards of living, nonetheless consider them desirable as transitional stages in the progress toward more equitable or otherwise favorable social and political configurations.

In the run-up to the campaigns, these hybrid parties emerge from their hosts directly into the political arena. *Ayllu*, for example, emerged out of the FCPP with the express purpose of shifting the peasant federation from dialogue *with* the state to control *of* the state. This is by no means a universally desirable confusion; there is a definite risk that party cadre will vampirize or parasitize ostensibly non-partisan civil society institutions for ultimately partisan objectives. As Motte notes, “it was also observed that many candidates exploited the spaces of peasant organizations, for example, women’s organizations were utilized to carry out their campaigns, getting out the vote, assisting in assemblies and reunions. This created a climate of instability and in many cases diminished the programmed activities.” These are not merely philosophical qualms: many of these organs of civil society have statutory relations to the state (like the
directory committees of *Vaso de Leche*), customary relations to state institutions (like the *Clubes de Madres de Familia*), or receive financial support from non-political NGOs, and their involvement in politics carries with it significant risks to their legitimacy and future funding. I would expect a network analysis to demonstrate clearly this contribution of pre-existing family, community, and union relations to party affiliation, though I was not myself focused on gathering the quantitative data relevant to such an analysis.

Informants, however, can clearly identify the *comunidades* from which particular parties emerged and which are their electoral bastions; they can also name the family circles that constitute the leadership of particular parties, and sometimes even provide precise folk-models of the relationships and commitments that draw militants and supporters to particular parties.

6.13 *Clientelism and patronage*

As noted in the previous sections, while ideological framing plays a role in differentiating parties during the election cycle, the practice of governance primarily involves the cultivation of the client-base through the steering of public works, employment, and contracting to partisans and potential voters. With regard to the voting public, this is commonly expressed as targeted public works, but campaign donors and party militants are ideally rewarded with municipal employment and contracts. Fiscal decentralization has therefore been absolutely fundamental for the growth of regional parties.\(^{101}\) Party machines use federal funding to ‘energize’ their own patronage networks, to reward both militants and voters, thereby solidifying their support and attracting the support of others who anticipate similar rewards. This is most exuberantly
on show during political campaigns. Throughout my 2006 fieldwork, the presidential and municipal elections were hotly contested and were major elements of public discussion. Listening to party debates, in the municipal theater and on the radio, it was difficult to avoid the sense that beneath the veneer of sloganeering and rudimentary ideological differentiation was basically a struggle to acquire state income streams to fuel patronage machines. This suspicion was strengthened by late night, intoxicated political discussions with party leadership and militants. It is, in fact, expanding fiscal transfers from the federal government that allow candidates and their financial backers to anticipate handsome returns on their campaign investments. All knowledgeable political actors have estimates of the amount of money it would require to run a competitive district or provincial mayoral campaign. Estimates can be made, discounting the candidate or the ideology, because Chumbivilcanos believe that elections are basically processes of distributing rewards and promising further largesse to comunidades, again, usually through the provision of alcohol and prepared food in hosted celebrations, the provision of household supplies and construction materiel during community visits, and the promising of jobs and local projects.

The dirigentes of peasant communities are essential brokers in this process of wooing the electorate; several of my comunero compadres approached me and asked me for whom I thought they should vote in the presidential election, noting that the community president had instructed them to vote for Ollanta Humala. 102 While I don’t have any hard data on the role of community authorities in directing the vote, it is clear that these individuals at least exert disproportionate influence on the electoral preferences of community members, and may, under certain circumstances, be able to, in effect,
‘deliver’ their communities to particular candidates (it would be interesting to see focused ethnographic research on the actual mechanics of the relationships between parties, dirigentes, and voters). Local political practitioners are keenly aware of the most populous comunidades. A candidate may be able to win a district municipal race by securing the unanimous, or nearly unanimous, vote of just one of these large communities. Strong majorities in several of these communities may alone deliver the provincial alcaldía to a candidate. The presidents and other dirigentes of key communities are therefore extremely important brokers in the political process.

The problem of machine politics is obviously most acute amongst incumbent parties, who can use state resources for their re-election campaigns (though, again, this is counteracted somewhat by the strong countervailing ideological commitment to political ‘turn over,’ expressed in phrases like, “Ahora les toca a otros”). This brings us into a sensitive area of political activity that is usually defined as corruption or graft. I want to discuss corruption only briefly, because, since I was not a party insider, I can only speak to external appearances and therefore do not have sufficient evidence to speak in a definite way about the underlying reality of local corruption. Corruption is universally recognized as a significant problem in Peruvian governance, however, by academics, lending institutions, government officials, and the general public. Furthermore, there is virtually unanimous agreement that, while decentralization has brought essential decisions closer to the local public, thus ostensibly exposing them to the oversight of local institutions of civil society (for example, radio, rumor, and revocatorio), it has also dramatically increased the challenges of fiscal oversight and expanded the opportunities for graft, especially under conditions of rapid, almost experimental
implementation and adjustment. As Fritz Burga notes, “the norms that were anticipated in the redesigned mechanisms of participation, of transparency and accounting oversight, haven’t stipulated in an explicit way the responsibilities of the authorities, nor the sanctions that correspond to them.”105 There is, in Chumbivilcas, a universal consensus that, as Dargent writes of Peru more generally, politicians have yet “to learn to distinguish their own interests from those of the institution.”106 This is preeminently a problem of institutionalization; one of Huntington’s measures of party strength is the “extent to which political activists and power seekers identify with the party and the extent to which they simply view the party as a means to other ends.”107 Furthermore, there is a confusion implied between state and party resources and services. As Francke notes,

The key issue here is that in democracy, the tie-up between social programmes and the search for votes should not be achieved via the partisan use of the state apparatus. It is quite legitimate that governments do things for people to win over support; what is not legitimate is that party militants make delivery of social assistance conditional on certain types of political behavior or use state resources for party campaigning . . . Delivery of social programmes is a function of the state, not a party.108

On one level, this normative pronouncement is in line with the general opinion of Chumbivilcanos; on another level, however, practices conceived as ‘corrupt’ in the abstract are entirely normative.109 Political opponents decry the fact, for instance, that a provincial alcalde would leave office having acquired rental properties in Cuzco, Arequipa, and/or Lima, but one who failed to do so would be widely viewed as abnormal or incompetent. The role of obraismo in the redirection of public funds is also widely recognized. Expenditures on large public works are notoriously difficult to track and audit, and therefore provide numerous opportunities for graft. Kickbacks and obligatory
contributions of public servants to re-election campaigns are so widespread and accepted that participants may freely discuss them in casual social settings. Dominique Motte, who gathered ethnographic data in and around Chumbivilcas, notes that “the intent to ‘buy votes’ was present under diverse modalities (the distribution of products of first necessity and others).”\textsuperscript{110} While claims of vote-buying should be taken with a grain of salt—given that the supposed susceptibility of their vote to purchase has long been an argument of conservatives against the extension of the franchise to the poor\textsuperscript{111}—, I have personally witnessed, or heard about from participants, vote buying, threats of retaliation for non-cooperation, shopping one’s vote around, kickbacks, influence peddling, slush funds, the corralling and intentional intoxication of voters, theft by school officials of student food subsidies, and skimming from construction contracts. One form of budget manipulation ties into the earlier discussion of the role of alcohol in political practice: the padding of accounts in order to divert funds for the purchase and provision of alcohol. State law forbids the use of government funds for the purchase of alcohol, which is a serious obstacle, given the absolute centrality of alcohol consumption to local social and political life. I was involved intimately with several institutions that received state funding, all of which found various ways to misrepresent expenditures in order to use state funds to purchase alcohol.

6.14 Conclusion

I have argued that there is a significant element of instrumentalism in the current essentialization and political thematization of indigenous identity in Chumbivilcas, as parties with basically similar fiscal priorities embellish their self-representation with
electorally-effective indigenist discourse and practice. It is important to note, however, that (1) these are potentially early, rudimentary signs of an indigenism that may eventually evolve into more robust, substantive ‘indigenist’ projects and that (2) the almost viral spread of enthusiasm for indigenous identification suggests that it speaks in uniquely effective ways to the aspirations and the desire for dignity of indigenous Chumbivilcanos. An exploration and exposition of the reasons for this enthusiasm are beyond my means here. It is clear, however, that the appeal of essentialized ethnic identity and organization is, in many ways, homological to the appeal of nationalism at the national level. As a number of late nineteenth and early twentieth century sociologists noted, and number of contemporary scholars have elaborated upon, nationalism has a profound capacity to foster collective identification, energize political participation, and to secure the consensual submission of a population to the state. While this undoubtedly involves a certain amount of mystification, these solidary ideologies and identities respond to powerful practical exigencies. Drawing on the work of Donald Horowitz, Donna Lee Van Cott argues that “ethnic elites organize coethnics into parties in order to secure their particular interests. Because ethnic identity is ascriptive, ethnic elites understand that once they have captured their ethnic constituency they will be able to count on its support. Voters support ethnic parties in order to improve their access to material goods, mainly through improved access to the state, as well as to enhance their self-esteem by enhancing the status of their ethnic group.” Put in layman’s terms, no one ever lost money betting on human self-interest and vanity. Just as classical nationalism inexorably draws adherents by speaking at a particular historical conjuncture to a population’s concrete and solidary needs, contemporary ethnic
‘nationalism’ in Chumbivilcas has drawn adherents rapidly and seemingly irresistibly. Marxist organizers waged grueling, sometimes gruesome, struggles throughout the 20th century to convince the working class of the inherent metaphysical priority of class interests and organization and to draw the proletariat and the peasantry together based on a supposed community of interest; ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, has the dual advantages of, first, appealing to cultural affinities, which appear to be naturally, or at least universally, amenable to the formation of political communities; and, second, exploiting the preexisting, widespread respect in Peru, fueled in part by global interest, for pre-Conquest autochthonous culture, which gives indigenous identification an immediate attraction. Nonetheless, as I have shown, the transition from predominantly Marxist forms of mobilization and organization to increasingly indigenist ones involves significant ideological and organizational contradictions and challenges.

Jonathan Friedman presents a strong critique of “the view that movements aimed at the reconstruction and re-establishment of cultural models are necessarily the work of modernized charlatans who select and folklorize true culture in their modern interests.” I would agree with his conclusion, that “constructing the past” and, implicitly, other forms of “self-identification” are elements of “the existential relations between subjects and the constitution of a meaningful world.” I would argue that both the interested adoption and promulgation of indigenist ideology by more or less modernized charlatans and the need to constitute a meaningful world and a meaningful place within it are at play in the current indigenist revival in Chumbivilcas. More precisely, I argue that comunero politicians, drawn predominantly from the most ‘modernized’ sectors of the comunero community (for example, educators, bureaucrats, agronomists, hoteliers, and the
proprietors of parcelized ranches), have begun identifying as indigenous and running for office on indigenist platforms because these adaptations are politically expedient, and because they appear to them and their community to be plausible, and because they feel genuine and meaningful. Seen from another angle, there is a pre-existing pool of potential candidates, some of whom feel a natural and passionate affinity for indigenism, and the electoral benefits of indigenous identification exert a selective pressure that favors these candidates.

Voters have thus far consented to the election of indigenist candidates, and to a certain extent have adopted elements of indigenist discourse and indigenous identification, but there are compelling reasons why they may not, in the long-term, fully adopt indigenous identities or continue to support indigenist platforms. I would draw an analogy here to Karl Polanyi’s argument, with regard to the causal relationship between the collapse of the international monetary system in the 1930s and the second World War, that countries, like financially devastated post-Versailles Germany, “which, for reasons of their own, are opposed to the status quo, would be quick to discover the weakness of the existing institutional order and to anticipate the creation of institutions better adapted to their interests. Such groups are pushing that which is falling and holding on to that which, under its own steam, is moving their way.” While comunero political leaders naturally see the immediate electoral benefit of indigenism, the comunero population as a whole still seems predominantly invested in assimilation. Although prosperity has been slow to reach the countryside, for many comuneros, urban migration and the ongoing extension of modern amenities to the province (for example, the provision of electricity, sewage, potable water, roads, and internet and cellular phone
service) have made cultural assimilation an appealing and increasingly plausible alternative to indigenous identification. If Peru continues to experience monetary stability and steady economic growth, and if the government can find ways of extending the benefits of this national prosperity to the rural poor, comuneros are unlikely to ‘push falling’ forms of national identification’ or ‘hold on to’ novel forms of indigenous identification.

The political practices that I have described can be conceived, to borrow Marshall Sahlins’ phrase, as ‘indigenizations of modernity’; that is, as local adaptations of poorly conceived and alien state legal norms. As in the case of alcohol purchase, the extreme centralism of legislative decision- and law-making in Lima prevents the elaboration of laws and administrative processes that are better adapted to local realities. These local adaptations may, in part, be related to long-standing political traditions in Peru (and Latin America more generally). More generally, however, many of these practices are strongly consistent with the global and trans-historical phenomenon of ‘machine politics,’ suggesting a certain amount of convergent evolution in response to similar political economic environments. In particular, the administrative and policy limitations inherent in municipal government, the continued predominance of traditional institutions and allegiances, and the numerical predominance of impoverished, newly enfranchised voters appear to encourage the growth of party machines that deliver concrete, particularistic benefits to voters and militants in return for electoral and organizational support.

Whether these political practices are conceived as creative local ‘modifications’ of state norms, or as good old-fashioned corruption, they are contributing to the emergence and rapid ascent of new indigenous elites. The increasing strength of
provincial and district municipal government is allowing these new political authorities to displace old, non-indigenous provincial power-holders, and to begin a process of capital accumulation, both social and economic, within the indigenous sector. Finally, in addition to fostering the social, political, and economic ascent of the provincial indigenous population, the growing power of local municipal office is contributing to increasing disparities of income and wealth within indigenous communities.

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Chapter 7
The New Kurakas

“In theory, the principal aim of socialist and democratic parties is the struggle against oligarchy in all its forms. The question therefore arises how we are to explain the development in such parties of the very tendencies against which they have declared war.”

Robert Michels
Political Parties
1962 [1911], 50-51

“Ya estamos en la época de la dictadura de la ignorancia.”
[“Now we’re in the era of the dictatorship of ignorance.”]

Elderly vecino joking at a small social gathering

In this chapter, I continue my analysis of the contemporary political reality in Chumbivilcas with a discussion of the ascent of indigenous elites and the displacement and marginalization of vecinos from the political sphere that this has wrought. First, I argue that with their control over salaried municipal employment, municipal construction and service contracts, as well as various forms of appropriation, the leaders of indigenous parties are becoming the new social elite of Chumbivilcas. Because, as a result of fiscal decentralization, the district and provincial municipalities have become the primary engines of capital formation, their control is now the preferred means of social and economic ascent. Second, I discuss the marginalization that new forms of indigenous
solidarity and political control have imposed on the vecinos who formerly dominated the provincial political order. Although vecinos still basically control the local APRA party apparatus, and also therefore the largely vestigial subprefectura and the seven district gubernaturas (which are appointed by the national administration in consultation with the ruling party apparatus), they generally recognize their complete inability to successfully participate in electoral politics, either as candidates or as a voting block. I discuss this particularly in terms of the political activity surrounding the 2006 presidential and municipal elections. Given the disproportionate size of fiscal transfers in relation to the modesty of private sector wealth in the province, and the fundamental role that political privilege previously played in securing assets and access to labor, this exclusion has had profound economic consequences for vecinos. Furthermore, I argue that the loss of political ascendancy is an acute element in vecinos’ personal and collective crisis of identity, in particular for vecino males.

Finally, I argue that these conclusions will soon have to be reformulated, not because they incorrectly reflect the reality of political life during my major fieldwork in 2006, but because the pace of administrative reorganization is so precipitous that the political reality on the ground continues to change rapidly. Although transfers of funds and responsibilities from the national to subnational governments are ostensibly increasing, new approval and oversight mechanisms are being implemented that test the capacity of rural municipalities to design, obtain approval, and implement projects and comprehensive plans. This, in turn, has severely restricted the ability of indigenous party machines to attract and enrich members and supporters, as well as to effectively implement policy. As municipalities attempt adapt to these new regimes of governance,
they must grapple with the contradictory demands of traditional political methods and ideologies and the rationalizing and professionalizing exigencies of modern state governmentality.

7.1 New municipal elite

At the apex of this evolving provincial political reality a new comunero elite is forming. While Peru’s political structure looks, at the level of the nation, increasingly liberal—free trade agreements, reduction of protectionism, streamlining of taxation, decreased social spending, privatization of state industries, and increasing decentralization of government decision-making and expenditure—, at the provincial level, fiscal decentralization has had the opposite effect: although subnational transfers are still modest relative to the total national budget, the underdevelopment of commerce and industry in the province means that even these modest sums give the municipal government disproportionate impact on local society and economy. There are virtually no independent ‘centers of economic gravity,’ private fortunes, or sources of wealth. The municipalities have become, therefore, the predominant source of capital formation in the province. The overwhelming majority of salaried jobs are public: teaching, public administration, maintenance, and law enforcement. Furthermore, most of the private sources of salaried employment are ultimately reliant on municipal contracts (carpentry, construction, electric and water utilities). Wage-work in the private sector is scarce, seasonal, informal, minimally remunerated, and subject to fluctuation.

As a result, the municipal government wields substantial economic power in the province. In the language of contemporary American political discourse, it ‘decides on
winners and losers’ in the private market. The provincial municipality and the school system provide the vast majority of salaried employment in Chumbivilcas. Beyond this, there is a mass of individuals who receive economic and subsistence benefits from the municipalities in informal ways or via wage work for contractors on municipal projects. When my informants discuss local opportunities for salaried employment, they refer almost exclusively to teaching jobs and to jobs that are directly or indirectly dependent on the provincial municipality and the seven subsidiary district municipalities. It is obvious, therefore, that control over this municipal apparatus affords the opportunity for self-aggrandizement, both through formal and surreptitious channels. In 2006, the provincial alcalde received a monthly salary of five thousand soles (or roughly $1,500), nearly ten times the minimum wage. The eight regidores themselves received around 2,500 soles. Dozens of managers and staff received salaries between 800 and 2,000 soles. A tenured schoolteacher with a decade or two of service, by comparison, received around 1,300 soles monthly. A contract schoolteacher received around 800 soles. Agricultural labor general received ten soles a day and unskilled municipal employment fifteen soles. Even without graft, municipal employment therefore offers the opportunity for drastic improvements in income.

In practice, however, municipal authority is substantially more lucrative than these incomes alone would suggest. Again, I don’t want to speculate about how exactly this occurs, but several alcaldes and party insiders have left office with substantial fortunes. As Motte notes, “The population [laments] the emergence of non-representative sectors of the peasant population, given that candidates for municipal government see the municipality as a ‘business center’ or an alternative to work.” While officials may only
wield provincial power for several years, the status bestowed by the office and, more importantly, the funds generated by the ‘business centers’ are ongoing sources of power. One of the most popular ways of investing political spoils, as might be expected in a country like Peru where most capitalist activity is of the rentier variety, is in urban real estate, which subsequently provides a steady stream of rents.

The political situation in its totality, is therefore strikingly similar to Robert Scott’s characterization of Latin American politics in the 1960s:

> The politically ineffective citizens are manipulated by the party elite, often through slogans and promises that portend social justice, economic reform, and political democracy as ends, while at the same time the party itself operates through largely undemocratic means. As long as the masses remain uneducated and inarticulate and so unable to hold their leaders responsible, both the mass parties and the functional interest associations which include large numbers of the lower class will continue to be dominated by oligarchical elites.\(^4\)

The exception, of course, is that in place of the old ‘oligarchical elites’ at the apex of rural society, we see newly empowered indigenous elites. Of course, these new elites clearly do not emerge _ex nihilo_. The consensus among my informants is that party leaders themselves come from families of relatively well-off peasants—what might be called ‘Andean kulaks’—and have parleyed their initial modest affluence into university degrees and positions of authority within the educational system and civil institutions (for example, in NGOs, peasant leagues and federations, and research centers). The current trajectory of the emergent provincial elite therefore begins with a moderately differentiated element within the peasantry that invests this affluence in professional training (primarily education, law, and agronomy), parleys professional training into authority within civil institutions, utilizes this to gain political office, and with political
power augments and cements their economic resources, power, and status. This is obviously an idealized account (in the Weberian sense), but the actual social ascents which I have personally observed fit more or less into this sequence.5

One of the iconic expressions for me of this transition occurred in 2007, during the crowning of a local school’s ‘reina’ (queen). Such an honor was purportedly formerly bestowed based exclusively on status and popularity (including, of course, all of the class factors that go into such an assessment). In an effort to raise funds, however, local schools have altered the process of selection to include a bidding element. Each classroom still elects its nominee for queen, but the parents of the nominees must now bid money on their daughters, and the nominee who receives the highest bid becomes the queen. Parents harangue aunts, uncles, and friends in an attempt to pool more money than the families of competing nominees can muster. The daughter of one of my primary informants was nominated by her class, and many people expected my informant, who is a member of one of the most prominent vecino families and owns and operates a large local hacienda, to place the highest bid in order to assure his daughter’s election. Her primary ‘competitor,’ however, was the daughter of the former mayor. My informant and his wife spent days agonizing about whether they should enter a bidding war with the former mayor. They knew that their daughter desperately wanted to be reina, and I also sensed an acute awareness that the community was expecting them to offer the highest bid and that not doing so would imply that their family had declined in status. Nonetheless, they knew that the mayor had access to more resources than they, and, furthermore, that he would be willing to utilize it, in order to translate his economic and political power into social status. Eventually, they swallowed their pride and declined to
bid: in the event, this was the wise decision, because the ex-\textit{alcalde} did, in fact, outbid all competitors. When the mayor, his daughter, and the rest of his family participated in the public ritual of crowning, they did so with grace and aplomb, demonstrating, in effect, that they had ‘arrived.’

This path of ascent is strikingly similar to that employed by upwardly mobile \textit{vecinos} before them, which I described in chapter 4: ethnic status—in the current case ethnic commonality between the politician and the electorate, in the former ethnic commonalities between the gamonal and the departmental and national state authorities—is leveraged to gain control of local political office, which office-holders then utilize to enrich themselves and further distinguish themselves socially. Although these phenomena are in their infancy, if office holders do not leave the province altogether, rents derived from municipal office-holding will likely be reinvested in the province in ways that will once again grant a hereditary complexion to provincial power. However, the contemporary egalitarian ideology places natural limits on this aristocratization of provincial power. As Albro points out in terms of rural Bolivia, indigenist populist parties rely on discourses of indigenousness and popular-ness that make candidates vulnerable to evaluation and critique in those terms, and “the question of plausibility boils down to whether the implied claims of políticos' ritualized self-images are in fact adequately supported by the thick knowledge others possess of their life experiences,” Albro also notes that “political plausibility—the cultural authority to represent a local popular constituency—turns on many factors, including the negotiation of such issues as racial appearance, dress, the social origins of one’s parents, how one makes a living, perceived competence in agricultural techniques, fluency in the popular regional dialect, whether
one drinks chicha, one’s capacity for and comfort with manual labor, or whether or not one is conversant in the historical idiom of union politics, among others.” In the event that deep class and status divisions develop within the indigenous community, therefore, they leave indigenous elites vulnerable to self-contradiction and de-legitimization. Many of the proficiencies, customs, and life histories described by Albro would be quickly jeopardized by any significant social differentiation. Of course, any true indigenous elite would likely eventually emigrate to Peru’s urban centers, just as the vecino elite did before them.

7.2 Marginalization

These new elites have virtually completely displaced vecinos from their traditional position at the apex of rural society. In private—away from election campaigns and communal meetings—comunero politicians acknowledge that the reign of the gamonal is over. As one community leader put it: “It’s over politically for the old families: Ugarte, Berrio, Alvarez, Romero, Gomez. Ya no.” An MNI politician even suggested that mestizo support was no longer needed and in the following election his party would “limpiar” (clean) the electoral list of mistis. Nonetheless, the gamonal remains a powerful presence in indigenous political discourse. The irony is that the ‘gamonal’ has been doubly effective in organizing indigenous political activity; first, historically, in maintaining and enforcing a social and political landscape that emphasized and essentialized the indigenous/non-indigenous dichotomy, and second, symbolically, in providing a discursive foundation for the obfuscation by indigenous elites of the vertical cleavages that would otherwise problematize ‘indigeneity’ as a mode of identification
and organization; in other words, to borrow Marx’s memorable phrase, first as tragedy and then as farce.\textsuperscript{8} Just as the reality of gamonal violence necessitated solidary organization in the past, the bogeyman of the ‘gamonal’ is the ‘external’ enemy that justifies ‘\textit{lo indígena}’ as an ‘imagined community.’\textsuperscript{9}

This marginalization is not only a question of being excluded from municipal politics, but \textit{from the vast majority of all government and NGO support}. Federal and NGO development aid is most often channeled directly through \textit{comunidad} structures, rather than the municipal or prefectural apparatus. When it is channeled through the municipality, it is virtually always treated as political spoils and likewise delivered to the \textit{comunidades}, where the overwhelming majority of the voting public resides. Because, as noted earlier, \textit{comunidades} are a parallel legal and administrative system, the decision to characterize the target population of rural aid as \textit{comuneros} involves a distribution by membership (from which \textit{vecinos}, by definition, are excluded) rather on grounds of means or efficacy. Government programs aimed at augmenting the supply of foodstuffs, clothing, bedding, and other household items, subsidizing the provision of water and electricity, and providing agricultural inputs are aimed almost exclusively at \textit{comuneros}. NGOs are also overwhelmingly concerned with supporting \textit{comuneros}, providing them with education, job training, consciousness-raising and leadership seminars, seeds, livestock, building materials, latrines, and even cultural exchanges with Europe.\textsuperscript{10}

NGOs and donors both appear, to a certain extent, to fetishize indigeneity per se. To be fair, a large part of this bias results from the solid association between indigeneity and poverty, or more broadly between social, economic, and political forms of marginality and discrimination; interventions targeted at alleviating these forms of
marginality, discrimination, and hardship are therefore largely justified in using indigeneity as a proxy for assessing need. Nonetheless, having spent large amounts of time in the field, it is clear that many NGOs and their employees are so preoccupied with the category of indigenousness that they are unable to perceive the emergent socio-economic differentiation within the indigenous community, or to alter their policies and practices to insure aid reaches those most deserving or needful. In my experience, just as municipal authorities frequently form cooperative agreements with NGOs, and then direct their educational and training programs, agricultural and building inputs, and cultural exchanges through their patronage networks and, ultimately, into their reelection campaigns, savvy emerging elites within comunidades use their intermediary relationships with NGOs to direct aid and revenue streams to family and friends and to capture resources within their own patronage networks. One of the common denominators of these ways of selecting targets of intervention is the exclusion of vecinos from social investment.

To a certain extent, this process of marginalization began with the rise of leftist parties after the return to democracy. Vecinos continued to play prominent roles in leftist provincial politics throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Though the first alcalde elected after the military regime was a comunero,11 every subsequent alcalde, up until 1998, was from a vecino family. Many of the outside organizers of peasant resistance and federations were mestizos from Cuzco and other neighboring cities and towns.12 Nonetheless, as opportunities for post-secondary education and other forms of advancement expanded for the campesinado, the leadership, skills, and connections of the small number of pro-peasant vecinos became less and less essential. Furthermore, in the post-Fujimori collapse
of national parties, and the drastic statutory weakening of the subprefectura, local relationships, reputations, and cultural proficiencies have become far more important for political practice than the relationships with national parties and the ideological competencies that leftist vecinos once monopolized. In a certain sense, the real losers in the latest shift toward properly indigenous political discourse and identification are these leftist vecinos, who were able to stay ‘politically relevant’ by, in effect, changing their stripes; becoming ‘indigenous,’ however, is a far more difficult proposition than becoming a peasant-sympathizer.

For most vecinos, even the first proposition (peasant fellow-traveling) was and remains far-fetched, given both their own life-histories, ingrained sympathies, and ideologies and the incredulousness with which such a transformation would be met by the general population, vecino and comunero alike. As Huntington notes, ideology-based mass “parties are an innovation inherently threatening to the political power of an elite based on heredity, social status, or land ownership.” Vecinos not only lack the appropriate ideology and conception of society and authority, but also the appropriate skills and attitudes. The difficulty that the vecino has in adapting to the new political circumstances is humorously illustrated by John Kautsky in his discussion of the general inability of ‘aristocrats’ to identify with and adapt themselves to the rising peasant masses. While the modernizer “derives intense satisfaction from addressing and being cheered by a mass audience of the ragged, dirty, and illiterate poor,” the aristocrat, “when informed that ‘the peasants are revolting,’ merely replies ‘they certainly are.’ With such an attitude, he will neither want to nor be able to become an effective leader of a mass movement.” Because of this dual inability—to identify with the comunero (either as
peasant or indigene) and to ‘sell’ this identification to the community if it were attempted—it is now almost unthinkable that a vecino could garner the votes of the comunero electorate.

It’s difficult to assess the extent to which anti-vecino resentment amongst the campesinado contributes to this exclusion. As might be expected, given the historical context, there is definitely a spirit of ‘reivindicación’ (recovery, vindication) that borders on ‘venganza’ (vengeance). Motte notes in neighboring Haquira the existence of a “campesino/misti antagonism, clearly palpable in electoral meetings, even though the word “revenge” that we’ve heard might seem excessive.”¹⁶ One of my informants, a prominent comunero municipal employee, expressed this antagonism one night thus:

*Informant:* We’re almost dignified.

*JCP:* Why ‘almost?’

*Informant:* When we finally get rid of that dominant race—when they’re nowhere to be seen—then we’ll be truly dignified.

In light of the continued presence of strongly deprecating anti-comunero sentiment and ideology among vecinos, it is not surprising that indigenous Chumbivilcanos would feel resentful and distrustful toward vecinos, or that they would be disinclined to support their candidacies. One former vecino municipal candidate spoke with intense frustration and disappointment of the response of comuneros to his ticket’s campaign visits, “We expressed our message well, and we knew business and agriculture better than any of the other candidates, but in the end, our opponents would just say, ‘Look at them, they’re mistis, gamonales.’”

The social and psychological difficulty of this marginalization is deeply gendered. Certainly, there are contemporary challenges unique to females within regional society at
this point in time, not the least of which is the fact that the injunction to associate
sexually and romantically with their small and shrinking subset of the population falls
most heavily on them, and that their sexual continence is a major element in the
maintenance of social boundaries and stratification. Nonetheless, the spheres of social
action that were their traditional reserve are still theirs, and many new ones have opened
up to them. Women still derive fulfillment from their immediate familial and social
milieus, and from the challenges and achievements of their family and friends. Men also
derive pleasure and self-worth from these things, but for them the loss of access to the
political realm has been a grievous blow to their identities and sense of efficacy. Those
who have the resources to participate at the departmental or national level can participate
in APRA or other party politics, but there are few or no local opportunities for political
participation. If they have the resources they can run quixotically for office, but the
chances of them acceding to it are exceedingly slim.

Most vecinos still have a deep belief in the importance of political activity, which
was never fully distinct from the control of family enterprises. More generally, they share
a cultural model that identifies masculinity with the public sphere and political
leadership. Furthermore, many were encouraged to derive meaning and fulfillment from
leisure, management, and command, rather than the labor of daily provisioning and food
preparation, which were traditionally the preserve of indigenous peasants, domestic
servants, and women more generally. Masculine and ethnic privileges combined to
constrain efficacious activity to political and economic management. Women may have
(a) shared in the wealth, influence, and well-being, (b) controlled family enterprises in
certain cases (especially in the event of their spouses’ death), and (c) exerted political
influence through their kin and over their clients, but the overwhelming bulk of the prerogatives and benefits accrued to males. Seen from this angle, many of political reforms of the past several decades were attacks specifically on male vecino prerogatives. Males continue to dominate political office and rural society more generally, and continue to benefit from masculine prerogatives; the female body continues to be vulnerable to physical coercion and abuse, and the female mind continues to be denied full access to educational resources. In effect, local political prerogatives have largely been shifted from vecino men to indigenous men; because the male vecino was self-defined by his prerogatives and evaluated by his community in terms of his exercise of them, the loss of these has been a serious blow to their identity and sense of meaning.

The inability of vecinos to adapt, either by adopting a more ingratiating attitude and ideology or organizing themselves as a minority community, is a central element in their exclusion. In chapter 8, I will specifically discuss some of the traditional sentiments and conceptualizations, particularly those around race and ethnicity, which prevent vecinos from reorienting their thinking about and behavior toward the indigenous peasantry. With regard to organization, outside of the local APRA party apparatus and several explicitly cultural associations, vecinos have virtually no remaining collective institutions. In subsequent chapters, I will discuss some of the internal divisions that prevent such cooperation and will identify some of the ‘cultural bastions’ to which the vecino community has fallen back; nonetheless, given the current hostile socio-political environment, it’s difficult to imagine vecinos making any explicit reference to their ethnicity or status, much less organizing around it. The hegemony of the peasant masses and their representatives is so total that any such reference would jeopardize the vecino’s
access both to state resources and to social approbation. And because the state is so deeply involved in the province’s economic and social life (especially through the social prominence of the education system, but also through fiestas, sports leagues, cultural competitions, and other sponsored activities), any overtly pro-vecino or anti-indigenous position could have dire consequences.

7.3 APRA and the 2006 municipal elections

_A party of the landed gentry which should appeal only to the members of its own class and to those of identical economic interests, would not win a single seat, would not send a single representative to parliament._

Robert Michels
_Political Parties_ 1962 [1911], 46

Despite this marginalization, many vecinos continue to feel that exercising political power is the highest form of social activity. As one informant told me in a conversation:

_Informant: _The campesinos all stick together and vote communist. So we have to stick together too if we’re going to make anything happen.  
_JCP: _But there’s just so few of you. You’ll never gain office.  
_Informant: _But you know, you can’t just sit back and watch. You’ve got to try to make a difference.

In 2006, this conviction led several vecinos to run high-profile, but ultimately fruitless, campaigns for the provincial and municipal alcaldías. Noemí Negrón Romero ran throughout the department of Cuzco with the center right AF (Alianza por el Futuro-Alliance for the Future) for a congressional seat, but received a mere 736 votes. Her pariente, Emma Álvarez Negrón ran a highly visible campaign for alcalde distrital of
Colquemarca, driving from community to community in her personal pickup truck.

Emma Álvarez is not only a member of the most powerful branch of the most notorious *gamonal* family in Chumbivilcas, she is also the owner of Yavi Yavi, one of the largest and most storied latifundios in the province. The Álvarez family is something of a paradox: despite having retained vast stretches of land, and thousands of head of cattle, and being famed for their roughness and unscrupulousness, many of the family continue to prefer living on their rural estates, rather than in town, and are therefore uncommonly close, in physical and cultural terms, to the indigenous peasantry. More than anything, the Álvarez family, and Colquemarca more generally, is famous for its embodiment of the *qorilazo* tradition: horsemanship, bullfighting, cattle wrestling (and rustling), cockfighting, bohemianism, philandering and hard-drinking. Emma Álvarez entered the race, therefore, with a significant level of cultural legitimacy, but also with the massive burden of her family’s history of purported nefariousness and abuse of the *campesinado*. When Election Day came, she came in fourth with only 366 votes, or 13 percent of valid votes.

The primary vecino political effort in 2006, however, was the candidacy for *alcalde provincial* of Raul Gomez, representing the APRA party. Although Ollanta propaganda (signs, posters, spray-painted icons) were plastered prominently throughout the *comunidades* and in the advancing periphery of town, around the Plaza de Armas of Santo Tomás all the banners hanging from homes and restaurants were for APRA. A single Lourdes Flores banner hung on the main street. As mentioned earlier, the local party organization of APRA is far and away the most significant political institution of the vecino community. Even this local ‘office’ is not an institution in an administrative
sense. The party plays very little role in the community outside of election years, and
does not organize in any significant way the social lives of its members. Its members, in
fact, are not so much formally registered as reciprocally recognized. There was much
complaining, in fact, from long-term (one might even say ‘hereditary’) members that the
election of Alan Garcia had flooded party meetings with johnny-come-latelies who were
supposedly interested exclusively in obtaining a portion of the rewards that party
affiliation might bring through the *subprefectura* and the federal government.
Furthermore, the local party was bitterly divided by factional disputes, with so-called
‘Hayista’ fundamentalists squaring off against supposedly reformist Alanistas.²⁰

The fact that APRA is so closely identified in Chumbivilcas with vecinos, and
vice versa, is somewhat surprising, and itself demands explanation. Many of my
informants are *apristas*, but I would place few of them on the center-left, where APRA
traditionally situates itself. The association between APRA militancy and vecindad is
long-standing; virtually all party members recall their parents’ and grandparents’ support
for APRA. The pro-peasant journal *Sur* reported in 1984 that, in Colquemarca, “of the 77
votes that APRA obtained, 70 were cast by literate voters, which is to say, probably in the
majority from the capital of the district, while amongst illiterates only 7 voted for
[APRA], which is associated in the zone with the gamonales.”²¹ As it turns out, the
identification between vecinos and APRA is general throughout the southern sierra.
Degregori notes that in Ayacucho in the 1960s “APRA was at that time the party
associated with the most traditional and reactionary sectors in the region.”²² And yet, at
the national level and especially the northern coast, APRA is at root an alliance between
organized agricultural and light industrial labor and the urban petty bourgeoisie. The only
way to understand the idiosyncrasy of aprismo in the southern highlands, therefore, is in historical terms.

One of the defining features of APRA, since almost its founding in 1924, has been its opportunism. Carleton Beals could already write as early as 1934 that “unfortunately, the APRA movement has already compromised its program . . . This opportunism is largely due to Haya de la Torre, now entirely too enmeshed in the intrigues of Lima politics.”23 A large part of this opportunism was undoubtedly the result of its founder, Haya de la Torre’s, personal character, but the party ideology itself contributes to the tendency toward instrumentalism and political vacillation. In a sense, Maoism and Aprismo wrestle with the same underlying problem: how to successfully implement socialism in a largely pre-industrial nation. Where Maoism approaches the problem from a technical perspective—that is, by adjusting the method of revolution—APRA answers by denying the necessity of antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and arguing that the two can cooperate by (a) advancing capitalist development to the point where (b) they can together shift toward socialism. To the Marxist, this is obviously the worst sort of bourgeois hokum. Hokum or no, this form of Third-Way-ism puts the party leadership in the position of determining whether and when to introduce socialist policies, and, even more importantly, when and to what degree to intensify capitalist exploitation and to discipline labor—all in the name of the progressive and eventual transition to socialism. The fact that the APRA party leadership tacks incessantly between pro-capital and pro-labor positions, for tactical electoral or power-political purposes, or that it mixes fiery denunciation of capitalist exploitation by the Euro-American ‘imperial’ powers with rapid anti-communism, is neither fortuitous nor
exclusively a product of its ‘institutional culture,’ but a logical result of its particular
revision of historical materialism.

Given the party’s socialist discourse and its origins in unionization and student
radicalism, the relationship between APRA and the ruling oligarchy was sharply
antagonistic from its inception in the 1920s. Military and oligarchic administrations met
APRA activism and revolts with imprisonment, exile, and massacres. As noted in chapter
5, this conflict culminated in President Luís Sanchez Cerro’s crushing of the 1932
Trujillo insurrection and, in retaliation, Sanchez Cerro’s assassination the following year
by an APRA militant.24 APRA spent much of the 1930s and 1940s underground and
heavily repressed. In 1945, APRA supported Luís Bustamente’s reformist platform.
When it emerged in the 1950s, it was through alliance with the right wing dictatorship of
Manuel Odría. The emphasis on anti-imperialism that had previously motivated the party
shifted toward staunch anti-communism (again, both had always been present). For the
1956 elections, Haya de la Torre navigated his party into an alliance with Manuel Prado’s
conservative coalition and later, for the 1962 elections, with Manuel Odría’s Unión
Nacional Odrista.25 It is this anti-communist APRA of the 1950s that captured the
loyalty of the rural oligarchy in the southern highlands.26 In subsequent years, APRA
continued to oscillate somewhat—for instance, with Alan’s apparent vacillation on the
Free Trade Agreement with the United States and his subsequent embrace of it—but it
has never returned so far to the right. Nonetheless, vecinos continue to support APRA,
frequently in dynastic or familial terms, and it remains the only consistently viable non-
communist political alternative in Chumbivilcas.
The candidacy of Raul Gomez is diagnostic in many ways of the quandary in which vecinos find themselves politically. Tall and pale, dressed in dress shirts and windbreakers, Gomez is the image of the affluent urbanite. He lives most of the year in Cuzco, where he owns and operates a hotel in downtown Cuzco. Gomez speaks very little Quechua and has had very little exposure to the life of the indigenous peasantry. He has been involved in APRA politics at the local and departmental level for decades, and has close relationships with APRA’s departmental leadership. The campaign of 2006 was his second run as APRA’s candidate for alcalde provincial; in 2001 he ran with Juan Cancio Berrío, a hacendado who’s father had been subprefecto and who’s grandfather, Nicanor, was the hacendado and congressional diputado discussed in chapter 5. Gomez reportedly believed that the antagonism of the campesinado toward Berrío had cost him the election and, in 2006, selected Nivardo Carrillo, “El Inca,” as his running mate. “El Inca” is himself an interesting character. Born into a comunero family, he has strongly indigenous facial features, but is two meters tall (6’6”). He is an accomplished musician and has played around the world. He spent several years in the United States as a performer at Sea World and was featured in a Gloria Estefan video. His striking appearance and skills as a performer have won him the coveted role of Inca in Cuzco’s famous Inti Raymi festival multiple times (thus the sobriquet). His selection as candidate for teniente alcalde (lieutenant governor) was, however, indicative of the APRA’s ham-fisted approach to the campesinado. It was clear that Gomez realized he needed an indigenous running mate; but it was equally clear that, while Nivardo Carrillo still has warm relations with his community, speaks fluent Quechua, and is genuinely popular, he has been so radically removed from the indigenous community by his decades overseas that his selection only
served to reinforce the sense that APRA was the party of urban elites, and that APRA still couldn’t accept more grassroots peasant candidates into its fold.

This inability to adapt to the altered political circumstances was brought home to me with special force one afternoon when I ran into Raul Gomez and “El Inca” in the street. We struck up a conversation. Several other vecinos collected around us and eventually someone hauled over a case of beer from a nearby vendor. Gomez was overseeing the construction of a rental property and several dozen comunero day-workers were hauling, mixing, and pouring cement. Gomez, “El Inca,” and half a dozen well-known vecinos continued to drink in the street for several hours. All the while, the cement-dust covered employees slowed their work to stare enviously at the circle of vecinos leisurely laughing and back-slapping over beers. It seemed the perfect opportunity to win twenty votes on the cheap by calling a brief lunch break and giving each worker a brotherly swig of beer. It seemed that the problem was that the workers and the comuneros passing in the street were effectively socially invisible to Gomez and his fellow vecinos: how can a candidate possibly win over voters that are invisible to him? Because local politics is not mass politics and must be ‘done’ through social relationships, the vecino’s engrained discomfort with and discounting of the campesinado is a serious handicap. Both Gomez and “el Inca” would be appealing candidates on a stage or rope-line: handsome, articulate men delivering rousing speeches to anonymous listeners. But local politics is about ‘pressing the skin’ and about treating voters as friends and equals and inviting them to share a beer and express their concerns. There are vecinos who could do this—who have spent their lives in the midst of the peasant population, ‘sacando provecho’ [drawing benefit] from the soil of family farms—but Raul Gomez—
affluent, clean, criollo, non-conversant in indigenous culture, and largely absent from the province—was not one of them. As a result, APRA received just 1,555 votes, or 6.8% of the valid provincial vote.

The relationship between the vecino community and APRA is complex, however. Because the vecinos have traditionally been, in effect, the local representatives of the national society, APRA candidates (presidential, regional, and congressional) and visiting political operatives appear to be more comfortable planning and conferring with them than with comuneros. Furthermore, APRA membership tends to run in families and the APRA leadership tends to be somewhat clannish, so that vecino party members may have several generations of family connections with party counterparts in Cuzco, Arequipa, and beyond, and may have spent much of their lives coordinating with other members of the APRA party apparatus. On the other hand, the higher level APRA leadership seems to recognize that vecinos can’t win provincial election, that the mere fact of their support and candidacy compromises APRA’s overall electoral viability in the countryside, and that there is no electoral future for the party in the provinces if it doesn’t terminate its association with the vecino community. This recognition puts the party in an ironic position of wanting, in effect, to ditch itself.  

27 Alan Garcia himself purportedly recognized this when he visited Santo Tomás during the 2006 campaign. Because many of my informants are APRA activists, I was able to sit in on several intimate party meetings. At one point during a campaign visit, a prominent APRA congressional candidate jocularly chastised one of the local party’s few indigenous leaders for not being more assertive and visible during Alan’s previous visit to Santo Tomás:
You’ve got to force your way up front. I was talking to Alan and he said, “All the leadership in Chumbivilcas is . . .” [he pauses to think of how to say it appropriately] is . . . [gathered vecino apristas start laughing because they know what he’s trying to say] they’re all mistis, mistis!” [he feels more comfortable saying it now that everyone’s laughing] And I told him, “Well, the party head is a campesino, a dirigente,” and he said, “Hmmm, bueno.” [More laughing]

To a certain extent, this sort of instrumental concern about race—about how to put an indigenous face on a white machine—is common to all national parties that want to compete in the countryside in Peru. The unique problem for APRA is that, unlike competing centrist parties—which effectively have no cadre at all in the province—APRA needs to re-brand itself as comunero, or at least pro-comunero, when, at the provincial level, it is a constitutively vecino institution. The conversation shows, amongst other things, that the vecino is doubly marginal. He is effectively excluded from all parties but APRA, and even APRA would prefer to ditch him somehow.

7.4 Countervailing processes

I would be remiss, however, if I did not note that there are processes under way that may lead to greater cooperation between comuneros and vecinos, bring the vecinos back into the political fold, or bring their traditional party more political access to the vote of the comunero. I will briefly discuss three cases in particular that point to the possibility of rapprochement. First, in Chamaca, the district to the northwest of Santo Tomás, a comunero named Rolando Abarca, running on the APRA ticket, won the district alcaldía. This, for me, was difficult to understand at the time—first, because APRA is largely a vecino party in the province, and second, because in no other district did APRA win more than 12% of the vote. Eventually, an informant confirmed my guess
that it had more to do with the personal popularity of Abarca than support for the APRA per se. This informant’s response, however, deepened my understanding of the processes that may eventually bring the vecinos and campesinos closer together politically:

In the case of [the election of Abarca], it wasn’t APRA’s victory. It was because of the person, because of the quality of the candidate Roland. He’s not a vecino... well, he’s a comunero, but he’s a very advanced person. He lives with a Colquemarquina who isn’t comunera. The comuneros of Velille, Chamaca, Livitaca... they’re different. They’re not like those from here. They’re more like propietarios. They have their own properties... seventy, a hundred hectares. They don’t have the mentality of the comunero. The comunero of Chamaca has a way of thinking of a propietario. And now, he’s demonstrated to the entire province that he’s the best alcalde of all. He’s implementing good obras. And he’s the only alcalde whose resignation the public isn’t calling for.

The statement is relevant to the analysis in later chapters of ethno-racial thinking in Chumbivilcas, but it is also politically significant. The fact that this informant, generally critical of comuneros, could speak respectfully, even admiringly, of a comunero politician surprised me. Although this informant often racialized the purported differences between vecinos and comuneros, he here implies that the differences may in fact essentially be distinctive “mentalidades,” which themselves originate in distinctive forms of economic organization. The informant seemed to accept and even identify with the comuneros of eastern Chumbivilcas in terms of his and their shared status as propietarios. One can imagine the evolution of a party that would appeal to comuneros and vecinos alike as propietarios. Rolando Abarca appears to have done something close to this with APRA in Chamaca, and as more communities parcelize and modernize, this may become a possibility at the provincial level as well.

Albro describes a process of re-identification in rural Bolivia in which “one detects the surprising possibility that, contrary to prevailing wisdom vis-à-vis the colonial
dynamic, mestizo politicos are busily redefining themselves as indios." While I think this sort of identification would be rather far-fetched in Chumbivilcas, vecinos in Livitaca, the farthest east of the districts, have been able to de-emphasize their vecindad and focus on their established leftism or fictive-kin relations to comunero politicos. In a certain sense, this is due to the fact that there are virtually no vecinos left in Livitaca, and the ones that remain socialize almost exclusively with comuneros, and that the social and cultural distance between the two is increasingly minimal. During one visit to Livitaca, an informant from a neighboring district pointed out that, “Casi no hay personas visibles” [“There are almost no socially visible people”], despite the fact that the plaza was filled with people. In this informant’s perspective, there were only two or three ‘visible’ families left in the district. The middle-aged sons of these families are all militants in leftist parties. One noted that, though he is a life-long and avowed Aprista, he was “on loan” to the MNI-controlled municipality. Furthermore, while compadrazgo between vecinos and comuneros has declined precipitously in the rest of the province, it is still ubiquitous in Livitaca. I would say that this political option involves the eventual subsumption by a modernizing campesinado, in which comuneros progressively adopt the national culture and the vecindad of the vecinos is gradually effaced, with the two populations eventually becoming indistinguishable, socially and politically.

Finally, the shift from Marxism to indigenism has the paradoxical effect of, on the one hand, excluding the participation of vecinos, and mestizos in general, and, on the other, sidelining somewhat the class antagonism that dominated and continues to dominate the discourse of the parties of the Marxist left. While vecinos are constitutively excluded and opposed in both discursive modalities, the logic of indigenist discourse
lends itself far more naturally to being extended to other forms of identity politics. To a certain extent, therefore, this new-found ethnic nationalism opens up an opportunity for vecinos to articulate a folkloric regional vision of ‘lo Chumbivilcano’ that would include their contribution as an integral element. In fact, much of the indigenist discourse in Chumbivilcas already revolves around an essentialized folklore in which autochthonous, colonial, and more recent elements cannot be easily distinguished. For example, the iconic cowboy figure of Chumbivilcas, the Qorilazo (combination of the Quechua word for gold and the Spanish for lasso), is the quintessential hybrid of Spanish and indigenous culture (see chapter 10 for a full discussion of the qorilazo). And yet indigenists have adopted the qorilazo and the folklore surrounding him as key elements of their identity and discourse, in part because it is the most salient way in which Chumbivilcanos have traditionally differentiated themselves from and elevated themselves above Peruvian society at large. This form of identity politics, therefore, potentially reopens a space for vecino political participation at the same moment that it appears to definitively exclude them.

Parenthetically, a fourth form of collaboration is already developing, somewhat to the side of the discussion in this chapter. Evangelical Christianity has made significant inroads into Chumbivilcas, drawing both vecino and comunero converts. To a certain extent, evangelicals are able to develop a common identity through the church. The categories of ‘comunero’ and ‘vecino’ are thus subsumed under a third category, ‘evangélico,’ which ostensibly equalizes participants but, in practice, allows vecinos to continue to act as primus inter pares. Several prominent vecinos have converted to evangelical Christianity and assumed informal leadership positions within the evangelical
community. While I haven’t gathered specific evidence with regard to this phenomenon, it may play a significant role in future relations between the two groups, as well as future political practice.

7.5 *Residual status*

Despite this drastic diminution in the political roles of vecinos, they retain a widely recognized social status. This sort of disequilibrium between political and economic power and social status is a natural outcome of the pace of change over the last half century. In Emile Benoit-Smullyan’s classic formulation, “in a dynamic and mobile society status equilibrium is always being disturbed since pronounced changes in status occur ordinarily in only one type of status at first, and are only gradually ‘converted’ into equivalent statuses in the other hierarchies.” Vecinos generally comport themselves with comuneros in an aloof and sometimes supercilious manner that makes it clear that they are accustomed to and believe themselves worthy of respect and deference. And, though it’s impossible to measure in an objective manner, I would say that in most social situations vecinos are still accorded a greater respect than would be expected of a comparably educated or affluent comunero. Only if a comunero were a political authority, for example, would he address a vecino as anything but “señor” or “caballero.” On the other hand, many of my comunero informants express feelings and opinions in private that suggest that this respect is more formal than substantive. It’s clear that relatively affluent comuneros feel significant ambivalence toward vecinos: they simultaneously value their associations with vecinos, no doubt because it reflects well on
their own status, and feel an active dislike toward vecinos because of their perceived superciliousness and hauteur.

Part of this residual status is probably force of habit and indoctrination: though now relatively powerless over the destiny of the province, these same vecinos and their fathers, grandfathers, and great-grandfathers, wielded nearly absolute power in living memory. Middle-aged comuneros grew up taking orders from vecinos, watching their fathers ordered, beaten, and forced into submission by vecinos, and resenting their sisters’ sexually exploitation by vecinos. It’s hardly surprising that the subconscious models of social hierarchy—the ‘status matrices,’ if you will—and the relational habits ingrained in the pre-Reform milieu would be difficult to throw off completely. Beyond force of habit, however, there is another key element of this status that is not so much a reverberation of the past as a distinctive advantage vis-à-vis the past: many vecinos possess a perceived cultural authority that revolves around their privileged relationship with the hegemonic folkloric representation of the provincial past.32 This is a complicated issue that will be treated in depth in chapter 10. I would like to note here, however, two ramifications within the political sphere: first, the cultural authority of the vecino introduces an element of instability or incongruence to status relations. Because political practice always occurs ‘within’ social practice—especially at the municipal level—comunero political elites are constantly encountering and practicing politics amongst vecinos who have a distinctive and, to a certain extent, superior social status and cultural authority. The tension is heightened by the fact that the municipal offices are located in the center of town, which was traditionally the exclusive preserve of the vecinos and is still disproportionately vecino; although there are relatively few vecinos in the province,
virtually all of them live within several blocks of each district capital’s Plaza de Armas, municipio (municipal offices), and centro cívico (civic center). In effect, therefore, vecinos always have ‘home field advantage,’ despite being mere spectators to the political game. Second, and perhaps more importantly, their social status means that the political input—criticisms, perspectives, opinions, and recommendations—of vecinos is frequently given far more weight and consideration than that of an economically or politically comparable comunero.

7.6 Everyone’s a critic

Beyond voting and quixotic campaigning, the most common form of ‘political’ activity amongst the vecinos is criticizing the new indigenous municipal authorities. This they do enthusiastically, in homes and bars, on park benches, on buses, in shops, and in the street. The majority of this talk occurs in exclusively vecino groups, in distinctly class or ethnic terms, but vecinos are not afraid of locking horns in public, or expressing their disapproval directly to municipal authorities—in softened, ‘constructive’ terms, of course. No doubt one motivation for this criticism is the desire to de-legitimize a political system that effectively excludes them. With regard to this criticism, it’s important to note that my fieldwork has spanned two distinct provincial municipal administrations. Vecinos leveled distinctive criticisms at each of these two administrations. To my mind, the criticism leveled at the earlier MNI administration primarily concerned the supposed corruption of the administration. MNI’s regidores and gerentes were predominantly of comunero origins, and some of them did not have post-secondary education. There were, however, vecinos in prominent positions—including the teniente alcalde (lieutenant
governor) and a few regidores—and most of the MNI ticket and many of its officials were schoolteachers with credentials from some of the same teaching colleges that many of the vecinos had attended. The alcalde provincial, Clemente Enríquez, was widely respected, and I have never heard his competence, his control over the municipal apparatus, or his comprehension of the provincial political reality questioned. If anything, vecinos felt he was too clever, and too adept at turning municipal office to his advantage. As to the perception of the effect of his stewardship on the welfare of the province, the consensus was also generally positive (outside of the acrimony of the political campaign). Many claimed that he and his inner circle had skimmed money in various ways from the municipal budget, but there was little substantive criticism of his actual development programme. The only common criticism from vecinos was that he had directed disproportionate resources to the countryside and had neglected urban development and improvement, leaving urban infrastructure in a poor state of repair.\(^{33}\)

The criticism directed at the subsequent Ayllu administration was, on the other hand, vocal and vociferous. In fact, some of the criticisms that vecinos level against Ayllu’s comunero municipal authorities are exceedingly harsh. The criticism of Ayllu predominantly concerns the supposed incompetence and ignorance of its office holders. One of my elderly informants claimed, with tragi-comic gravitas, “Now we’re in the era of the dictatorship of ignorance.” Virtually all vecinos agree with the informant who asserted that “es el peor gobierno municipal en nuestra historia” [“it’s the worst municipal government in our history”]. Others made comments like, “No son preparados” [“They’re not prepared”] or, pointing to the civic center, “Ese edificio ya esta lleno de comuneros. Pero no saben, no tienen preparación” [“That building is now
full of comunero . . . but they don’t know, they don’t have preparation”]. Those vecinos who have been hired on contract by the municipality are amongst the most savage of its critics. One such employee commented, during a dinner party, that “they put comuneros and people who don’t even know how to use a computer in key positions so that the vivos who control everything can manipulate them. The Director of Development [gerente del desarrollo], Jaime González, is a complete comunero [comunero total]! He doesn’t know anything. And the general director [gerente general] is Victor Flores, who doesn’t know anything either. Do you know who controls everything? Arturo Palomino.”

Though the trope—“they’re all a bunch of idiots, except X, who controls everything”—is common in Peruvian political discussion more generally, the vehemence with which this informant denounced the supposed ignorance of the administration and her use of peasant-indigenousness (again, comunero effectively combines the two) to imply ignorance or incompetence, seemed very specific to the Ayllu administration.

To a certain extent, the differences in reception fit into the more general discursive tropes of leftists as ‘demagogues who are actually only concerned with their own enrichment and aggrandizement’ and comuneros as ‘ignorant animals with tragically inflated senses of their own competence.’ This later is particularly salient in the discourse of vecinos about Ayllu. In the middle of a group discussion of the current administration, one informant interjected a comment on the newfound assertiveness of indigenous women: “the indigenous woman has learned how to complain [quejar], now she’s assertive. The NGOs come to raise political consciousness, but in a very dogmatic form. She knows how to repeat what she’s heard in leadership courses, and in this way she’s completely manipulated.” Again, the trope of the inflated fool is deployed here to
lampoon the supposed divergence between the discourse of indigenous empowerment and the actual competence of indigenist activists.

To be fair, there may be a certain amount of truth in the accusations of lack of educational preparation, at least in formal terms. While MNI militants came out of a long tradition of ideologically intensive Maoist party activism and were predominantly schoolteachers and rural professionals, Ayllu emerged out of the much more grassroots Departmental Federation of Peasants, and while many of its ideologists and core cadre are agrarian specialists, most of its militants are peasants who have gained experience through direct political action, completed *cursos de liderazgo* (leadership courses) taught by NGOs or other political organizers, and risen through the ranks of peasant unions. Put another way, they are *ultra*-organic intellectuals. This dichotomy between the leadership of socialist parties and that of the trade unions has long been discussed in socialist circles, perhaps most famously by Robert Michels, who attributed to trade-union leaders an “insight into the extraordinary complexity of social and economic life and a keen understanding of the politically practicable,” but argued that this gift was “often united with a lack of interest in and understanding of wider problems.”

35 While I would not personally want to go this far on the limited data, there is a distinct sense amongst vecinos that the Ayllu leadership is highly versed in the intricacies of peasant politics and organizing, but is far less prepared to handle the technically demanding job of governance. 36
7.7 Provisionality of conclusions

While preconceived ideas about *comuneros*, as well as the possibly real lack of preparation of municipal employees, have played a part in prompting this criticism, it seems to me that the primary source has in fact been far-reaching changes in the regulatory environments in which the municipal administrations function. This, in turn, points to one of the major realizations of successive trips to the field: because ethnographic fieldwork unfolds over time, and time—as they say—changes everything, all of the above ethnographic ‘conclusions’ are in fact provisional. My initial impulse with regard to the rapidity of social and political changes in my fieldsite is to argue that things are changing especially quickly, because X or Y phenomenon is causing them to accelerate. On reflection, however, I can’t point to a five year period at any point in last half-century in which changes were not occurring at a similarly fast pace and in which conclusions would be any less provisional. Perhaps, as is often suggested, there was a time when change was slower, and that this acceleration is a distinctive element of ‘modernity,’ or, as Marx wrote, that under the pressure of modern capitalism “all that is solid melts into air.”

Perhaps social change really has accelerated apace with technological discovery. Whatever the case, in Peru, profound changes in the structure of municipal government are currently being made at a pace that defies analytical closure.

By the time of my 2007 return to the field, the freewheeling, discretionary style of municipal expenditure that characterized the previous provincial administration, and which its members effectively parleyed into economic and social capital, had given way to a hamstrung administration characterized by insufficient funds for projects and
festivities and recriminations from the public; when the provincial alcalde (governor) took his triumphal ride around the bullring during the province’s anniversary celebrations, he and his retinue were greeted by comuneros hurling insults, trash, and bottles rather than the usual ovation. For days afterward, the radios broadcast citizens and competitors complaining about the pitiable prizes received by winners of the various anniversary competitions: $60 for best marching band, $40 for the winner of the weaving competition, 4 inexpensive hats and a child’s lasso for the bronco-busting winner, and so on. “Four hats?” cried one of the winning horse-tamers the following day on a local radio program, “We risked our lives, and what do we get? Four hats?” Clearly, something had gone dreadfully wrong in the municipality’s relationship with the public. Later, over drinks with the alcalde provincial and his inner circle, I was given a name for this ‘something’: “el esnipe.”

7.8 SNIP

SNIP or Sistema Nacional de Inversión Publica (National Public Investment System) was conceived by planners as a way of simultaneously rationalizing and streamlining the transfer of state funds to subnational public institutions and providing oversight over the resulting expenditures. I am not an expert in this program, and it has only recently become a significant element in municipal calculus (after I finished the main body of my field research), but I will attempt as best I can to describe the program and its effects on municipal governance. In the words of the NGO Asociación Civil Transparencia, SNIP “consists of a combination of norms, procedures, and techniques that have as their objective to provide the public administration with a tool of
management that permits the optimization of the use of public resources in socially
profitable and sustainable investment projects.\textsuperscript{40} Technically, the system operates by
forcing municipalities, and other institutions like public universities, to submit project
proposals to the central office for approval. Although the program envisions the
participation of all public institutions, only a portion of Peru’s municipalities have been
incorporated to date.\textsuperscript{41} As I understand it, municipalities who participate in the program
receive a liaison officer from the OPI (\textit{Oficina de Programación de Inversiones}-
Investment Planning Office). This officer ostensibly helps the municipality in several
ways. He or she helps to prepare municipal employees to successfully interact with the
SNIP process and bureaucracy, to translate community demands into projects, and to
structure these projects so that they are more likely to be approved by SNIP.
Unfortunately, these benefits appear to be rather meager compared to the administrative
burden of submitting all discretionary spending to SNIP for authorization.

SNIP has definitely limited, for the time being, the potential of the municipality to
be used to fund new family fortunes. In a certain sense, the elite that I describe at the
beginning of this chapter appears to have ‘weaseled its way’ into the lag time between
fiscal decentralization and the implementation of oversight measures. The possibility that
a provincial elite could capture a portion of fiscal transfers was certainly anticipated by
planners. One IMF report on decentralization notes, specifically, that “political
decentralization may . . . simply transfer power from national to local elites. In this
respect, it has often been argued that the institutional foundations for fiscal
decentralization, such as revenue-sharing arrangements and expenditure rules, should be
in place before political liberalization begins.”\textsuperscript{42} Events do seem to have born out the
authors’ concerns. On the other hand, there is no reason why the provincial municipality will not be able to eventually master the oversight and approval mechanisms of SNIP, and utilize transfers in ways similar, if subtler, to those of the previous administration. In the meantime, while it does appear that SNIP, along with several other anti-corruption measures, has drastically reduced the opportunities for graft, it has also sharply limited the ability of the municipality to obtain funding even for legitimate policy objectives. Effectively, the primary expenditures constrained by SNIP are discretionary spending on public works. This is especially problematic for the municipality, given the centrality of obras both to machine politics and to public perception of municipal efficacy.

The major problem appears to be the unfamiliarity of municipal employees with the new process and the lack of specialized training within the municipality that would allow them to plan and adequately propose projects to SNIP, as well as to complete the efficacy studies required by SNIP. As of August 2007, the municipality had purportedly only been able to receive approval to disburse a third of the annual provincial presupuesto (budget), due primarily to its inability to formulate projects in such a way that they could gain approval from SNIP. These ‘growing pains’ are not isolated to Chumbivilcas; there has been criticism throughout the country about the disbursement bottlenecks that SNIP has produced, and municipalities throughout Peru are apparently struggling to fortify their offices of planning and development, especially the Gerencia de Bienestar Social y Desarrollo (Office of Social Wellbeing and Development).

Municipal employees generally do not posses the technical proficiencies required for project design, proposal, and implementation, both because trained professionals are generally in short supply in rural areas and because municipal appointments are
traditionally made nepotistically—to satisfy the exigencies of machine politics—rather than meritocratically. In reality, SNIP has only highlighted and exacerbated the underlying lack of trained professionals in the countryside. As Friz Burga notes, “another of obstacle for the transition to a decentralized state is that decades of emigration of its best minds, topped off by the Agrarian Reform of the 1970s, have decapitated regional society. Today, there are no elites other than university professors, a few professionals from NGOs (generally in a merely transitory situation), and petty entrepreneurs.” While many of these few rural professionals have been rapidly drawn into the municipal government, there is still an acute lack of professional expertise.

7.9 Professionalization and crisis of machine politics

Two ‘emergency’ or ‘stop-gap’ approaches have been implemented to relieve this acute deficiency of expertise: the first response has been to hire outsiders with the required level of proficiency in planning, engineering, law, or whichever particular expertise is unavailable locally. This has several drawbacks: first, outsiders usually perceive rural employment as a form of exile. They will not, under almost any circumstance, bring their family with them, primarily because their children would be forced to attend provincial schools, which they perceive as inferior. This, and the perception that rural social life is stultifying, leads contract workers to commute 20 hours round-trip to Cuzco every weekend to visit their family and friends. This prevents them from identifying with the province and from immersing themselves in its social life, which in turn accentuates the sense of Chumbivilcanos that they are carpet-baggers, come to the province only to ‘expatriate’ their salaries back to Cuzco. To a population
accustomed to thinking of the municipality as a purveyor of well-salaried jobs rather than services, this importation of hired guns is intolerable and has generated furor and accusations of betrayal of the province.

The second emergency measure appears to be an alliance between municipalities and NGOs, with NGO personnel acting as a sort of *consiglieri* to *alcaldes*. NGOs appear to have begun to fill the vacuum of technical expertise, mediating between multiple levels of government in addition to their traditional mediation between civil society and the state. Several commentators have made similar observations in other Latin American nations about the evolving relationship between NGOs, civil society, and the state, arguing that NGOs are becoming increasingly essential to the successful functioning of the ‘neoliberal’ state, especially at the local level. As Maria Elena Garcia notes, “In Cuzco, as elsewhere in Peru, NGOs represent indigenous highlanders vis-à-vis the state and international funders.” This is a long-standing fact, but recent developments have made NGOs even more fundamental to political and social processes in the countryside. Increasingly, NGOs are representing various state institutions in their interactions with other state institutions. In Chumbivilcas, NGO experts are helping to draft regional development plans, train municipal employees, and personally advise *alcaldes*. Several NGOs were pivotal in the creation of AMSAT (*Asociación de Municipalidades del Río Santo Tomás*), which itself has been a key regional forum for formulating long-term, integrated regional development plans. NGO personnel therefore are helping to fill the void that has opened between statutory responsibilities and local capacity. The relationship is not always smooth, but is becoming a constitutive fact of municipal governance. Nonetheless, neither hired guns nor NGO *consiglieri* have been very
effective in facilitating municipal adaptation to changing regimes of funding and oversight—as evidenced by the inability of the current provincial municipal administration to acquire its apportioned funding and to effectively discharge its official and perceived responsibilities. The continuing demand for expertise and efficiency is therefore placing substantial pressures on municipalities to change their governing ideology and practice in more fundamental ways.

Municipal authorities are faced with a classic problem in the evolution of statecraft: traditional party machines, constituted and controlled through relations of kinship and clientelism, must face the inexorable demand for efficiency, rationalization, and professionalization. The result is an ‘ideology of rule’ in transition. Traditionally, the party cadre participates because its members anticipate employment in the event that their party wins office. But if the bulk of offices require specialized skills to adequately discharge their responsibilities, the party leaders must frequently face a choice between staffing an office with a political appointment who will fail in a job for which he or she is underqualified, or hiring a qualified professional who has no particular loyalty to the controlling party. The same applies to construction or other municipal contracts. The tension will undoubtedly be intensified by the municipalization of education that the García administration is currently implementing. The problem that SNIP presents to the municipality is therefore merely an object lesson in the classic conflicts between nepotism and merit, particularism and universalism, bonds of affection and the old ‘bottom line.’ To my mind, it appears that SNIP and the general increase in responsibility and oversight are contributing to a marked trend toward rationalization and professionalization. Awarding a position to a non-affiliated professional may anger party
militants, but a successfully implemented program is likely to more than make up for the loss when it comes time for reelection. In effect, SNIP makes professionalization and merit-based hiring in the interest of the party machine itself: without funding for obras and other projects, the machine has no way of acquiring and securing clients. This appears to be driving municipalities, by all accounts, to become more professional. As del Valle notes, “it constitutes a significant gain that the local dynamics are clearly tending to be endowed with the instruments of planning necessary for municipal management.”

I have noted that educated Chumbivilcanos are beginning to think of returning permanently to the province as a potentially attractive alternative to settling in Arequipa, Cuzco, or Lima, in large measure because of the expansion of opportunities for technical professionals within the municipality.

Gose has noted that the extension of state power in neighboring Apurímac had rationalizing effects that eroded traditional forms of power, even when its bearers were traditional authorities:

The various projects realized through faena in Huaquirca reflect the enhanced presence of the central state and the corresponding decline of gamonal domination. Schools and municipal buildings were among the first products of the central state’s renewed presence in Huaquirca. Although notables controlled virtually all of the positions in the local state and education system, the strengthening of these institutions slowly eroded the personal nature of notable power as it existed in the era of unbridled gamonalismo. For instance, the very fact that the mayor governed from the municipal building, and not his salon, already implied a modified notion of power.

I think this is an important point, and bears directly on the current conjuncture. The fact that indigenous elites have, up until this point, used political office to fund their personal ascents (as do all politicians, to a certain extent), should not blind us to the fact that
democracy, whose tenets are equality of the vote and rule of quantity over quality, is inherently antagonistic to elitism and particularism. In 1993, Adrianzén lamented the disastrous state of political norms in the direst terms:

An abyss is thus established between official norms and actual conduct. The new collective activities, especially those of emerging sectors, cannot find a place in the old institutions, particularly in political power, which are precisely those which determine actual conduct. They are thus no political spaces to legitimate the democratic regime. This absence is even more problematic if we consider that political legitimacy implies the existence of belief, norms, and values that are tied to the notion of mutual understanding between political actors. In this context, political power is oligarch-ized. The changes of the 1970s thus result, in what has been a constant in [Peruvian] history, in a process of “traditionalist modernization.” In other words, the processes of modernization end up being subsumed by a conservative nucleus and by an elite that adapts its function with the goal of preserving the old order. 52

Undoubtedly, 1993 was a particularly dark time for democracy in Peru. But it is important to recognize that despite the emergence I have described of a nucleus of indigenous elite, there are significant countervailing pressures limiting the “process of traditionalist modernization.” While SNIP and its associated pressures may not make Aristotle’s ancient political commandment to never to use public office for private benefit normative, 53 or stop the boss from wanting to give his nephew a job, it does appear, for the time being, to be making it difficult and potentially counterproductive to do so.
Chapter 8
Still Waters: Ethnic Ideology and Practice in Chumbivilcas

While racism is ubiquitous in Peru’s cities it is usually refracted through veiled, euphemistic class and regional categories and mediated through residential segregation and labor relations. Arequipeños, for example, speak of the “invasion” of “Puneños”; in Lima, people lament the unending flood of “serranos” streaming into the pueblos jóvenes. Newspapers throughout the country offer a steady drum of exposés and articles reporting crimes of passion, greed, and perversity committed by youths in villages and pueblos jóvenes. Each article notes the province or region of origin of the perpetrators, as well as their indigenous surname—Huamaní, Quispe, Condori, Layme, and Cusi, for example—while avoiding explicit reference to their race. In urban Peru, social and spatial distance is maintained in part by structural mechanisms—like labor relations, property values, and cost of living—that allow class to serve as an effective proxy for race and ethnicity.¹ In the rural highlands, however, class distinctions are flattened significantly, and barriers of ethnicity must be maintained largely through face-to-face social practice. The most salient social cleavage in Chumbivilcas, both in practice and ideology, remains the vecino/comunero divide. The social networks of the two groups remain surprisingly segregated, despite the fact that their life worlds have become increasingly similar and interdigitated.²

The sharp minority position of the vecinos simultaneously whets their particularism—by putting them in constant contact with an other they believe to be inferior—and forces them to dissemble their true feelings. The highhanded and abusive
quality of vecino treatment of comuneros that prevailed 50 years ago has been replaced in
Chumbivilcas by avoidance, coolness, and willful ignorance. What remains of the old
ethno-racial discourses has ‘gone underground.’ *Vecinos chumbivilcanos* rarely talk
explicitly about race. They virtually never discuss it in mixed company. Nonetheless,
ethno-racial identity, segregation, and tension are ubiquitous and overwhelmingly
important social phenomena in Chumbivilcas. Much of what makes social relations in
Chumbivilcas distinctive, in fact, is the continued centrality of traditional modes of ethnic
ideology and practice. Despite the rise of a comunero elite and of a comunero middle
class more generally—through their participation in municipal government, as well as
through activity in transport, commerce, and education—vecinos still believe that there is
a fundamental and qualitative distinction between themselves and comuneros, and behave
accordingly.

This chapter explores several interrelated facets of ethno-racial practice and
ideology in Chumbivilcas. It begins with a review of the traditional spatial segregation
between town and *comunidad* and the labor and sexual relations that troubled and made
possible that separation. Special attention is given to the figure of the *cholita*—the
prototypical comunera sexual and romantic partner (or victim) of the vecino male. I argue
that socio-economic changes of the last 40 years have—in undermining the hacienda
regime—virtually eliminated the intimacy (albeit asymmetrical) that once existed
between vecinos and comuneros. At the same time, the traditional separation of town
from comundidad has weakened with the widespread immigration of comuneros into
district and provincial capitals. As a result, the two ethnic communities live in close
proximity, dwell in integrated neighborhoods, and interact in a myriad of social roles,
public spaces, and events. Despite the breakdown of spatial segregation, economic
differentiation, and linguistic and cultural markers, the two groups continue to maintain
distinct spheres of sociality. For vecinos, the carefully maintained social discrimination is
accompanied by a number of ethnic and racial discourses. The origins of these discourses
are diverse and their intermixture lends a confusing instability and disarticulated quality
to local expressions of racial ideology. The chapter concludes with an analysis of vecino
discourses concerning the comunero, as well as the ways in which members of the vecino
community understand themselves in ethnic terms. I should note, in closing, that the
generalizations that I make about Chumbivilcano attitude and ideology are drawn from
the discourse and behavior of several dozen key informants, as well as a wealth of public
culture (including books, magazines, music, poems, and radio broadcasts). As I’ve
already noted, I am well aware that attitudes and ideas can be very personal and
idiosyncratic, as well as, conversely, highly culturally stereotypical. I’ve tried to avoid
generalizing from data that seemed unduly idiosyncratic or deviated sharply from
representations available in the public sphere.

8.1 Town and country

One of the keys to understanding contemporary vecino ethno-racial practice is
recognizing their historical situation as a tiny minority in the middle of the essentially
indigenous campo. Stripped now of their former particularistic economic, social, legal,
and political entitlements, they still behave like an affluent but threatened diaspora,
despite the fact that many of their families have resided in Chumbivilcas for more than a
century. As noted in chapter 4, the dichotomy between the town and comunidad has
historically been at the heart of the ethno-racial practice and ideology. Vecinos still talk about the bastion-like quality that the town once possessed, surrounded by indigenous comunidades and the forbidding landscape. The strength of the association between town and vecino and comunidad and comunero is best demonstrated, of course, by the fact that the ethnic dichotomy is most frequently represented terminologically in residential and civic terms. Arturo Villena Aguirre, a sociologist who also happens to be a vecino chumbivilcano, wrote in 1982 that “the población campesina or india was the numerical majority in the province, with 52,573 inhabitants in 1972 and 57,788 in 1981, versus a población urbana y mestiza of 5,739 inhabitants in 1972 and in 1981 6,270 inhabitants.” What is most interesting about this quotation is that the 1981 census, like all censuses after 1940, did not collect data on race or ethnicity. Villena uses rural population as a proxy for the indigenous peasant population and the urban population as a proxy for the mestizo or, as I have termed them, vecino population. He reinforces this association by combining urbana and mestiza as though they were coterminous. And, furthermore, he does this without recognizing any reason to problematize the assumptions involved. I point this out not to criticize Villena, or to argue that his conflation of urbanity and mestizaje was objectively incorrect, but rather to illustrate the deep-seated nature of the association between indigeneity and the comunidad, on the one hand, and vecindad (in the ethnic sense in which I have been using the term) and the town, on the other.
8.2  *Labor and sexuality*

This spatial segregation was always troubled, however, by two primordial forms of intercommunal contact: labor and sexuality. As a result, a deep *intimacy of exploitation* existed between vecinos and comuneros, the product of generations of social and economic interdependency. Members of each group knew the others’ histories, characters, networks, politics and genealogies intimately. The entire socioeconomic system was predicated on indigenous agricultural and pastoral labor on country estates, domestic service in town, and monopsony of peasant commercial produce. Ties of compadrazgo facilitated, prolonged, and imbued with spiritual significance relations of mutual, asymmetrical obligation involving debt, servitude, and paternalistic support. Knowledge of and familiarity with the family and communal lives of resident *colonos* and neighboring comuneros was an essential element in the management of the hacienda and urban residence. Vecinas spent the majority of each day overseeing the labor of the domestic sphere, working in the kitchen, quarters, and patio with indigenous *pongas*. In many regards, vecino and comunero shared not only work, but many elements of a way of life. As Qayum et al. note with regard to pre-revolutionary Bolivia, “when the children got sick, it was the custom of the *clase terrateniente* to call not only the doctor from the city, but also the *curandero* from the hacienda that cured with herbs, poultices, and other traditional techniques.” The fact that virtually all vecinos were suckled by indigenous wet-nurses (*amas de leche*) and cared for by indigenous nannies (*amas de cría, niñeras*) is a further illustration of this intimacy.
8.3 Endogamy

It is a truism that, in class-stratified societies, the upper classes are endogamous. Virtually all historians who have worked on kinship in Latin America have noted the endogamy of the titled and landed oligarchy. The concept of endogamy, however, is misleading at best and meaningless at worst. It must be exceedingly rare, throughout the world, for groups to practice endogamy against their best interests. The practice is logically associated, and has been associated throughout Latin American history, with ‘arranged marriages’ and ‘marriages of convenience.’ On closer examination, virtually all ‘endogamous’ marriages are, in point of fact, marriages of convenience in which the participants believe that marrying outside of their class, ethnicity, or social network would be inconvenient. To say that an elite is endogamous vis-à-vis its social and economic inferiors is therefore virtually meaningless.

It seems to me self-evident that any society or social class in which the contribution of inherited capital (conceived in the most inclusive way) is significantly higher than the contribution of personal endeavor in social reproduction, will develop a strong lineal ideology and practice marriages of convenience (that is, marriages contracted in such a way as to maximize the utility of the resulting family alliance). This is because, amongst other things, whenever individuals must rely on a chain of progenitors for their economic and social survival and advancement, that chain itself will tend to function as the locus of calculation and control, as opposed, for example, to calculation amongst the urban lower and middle class, in which the ratio of inherited capital to personal labor in social reproduction is generally low, and marriages are
contracted predominantly through mutual, personal anticipation of well-being and the opportunity to form a productive, supportive nuclear family. In any society in which lineal ideology and practice prevail, rational (within the terms of the culture) calculation of advantage will focus predominantly on contracting marriages that maximize the capital and power of the resulting union; families invested predominantly in landed property will be particularly *locally* endogamous, because their ‘convenience’ often centers around the addition of contiguous or otherwise complementary estates.

‘Endogamy’ can be used to describe the result of these calculations of interest, but it is a derived rather than primary characteristic of the matrimonial logic. Powerful families contract marriage with powerful families. To say that a family prefers advantageous marriages to its own kind (homogamy) or within its own group (endogamy) is redundant if their group is defined by their relative advantageous situation. This kind of marriage is typical in any society in which ‘marriages of convenience’ are the norm. One would hardly expect a princess to marry a pauper, but to explain the avoidance in terms of the endogamy of the royal class would mistake the aggregate outcome of ulterior calculations for the cause. ‘Endogamy’ becomes even more absurd when looked at from below: the poor within a stratified society, by extension, are at least as ‘endogamous’ as the wealthy, and yet, it is patently obvious that this so-called ‘endogamy’ is a by-product of other social factors, rather than a positive cultural commitment to matrimonial exclusivity.

Endogamy can only be a logic, rather than an aggregate outcome, if ‘internal’ marriages are preferred to materially or socially more beneficial ‘external’ marriages. Endogamy can therefore only meaningfully be used to describe the tendency of groups or
individuals, for one reason or another, to avoid marriage with external individuals or
groups who would otherwise appear to be socially beneficial matrimonial partners. If, for
example, Chumbivilcano elites traditionally avoided marriage with analogous elites from
neighboring provinces, then one could speak of them as an ‘endogamous’ elite. Of
course, they did not and do not avoid such marriages; in fact, they eagerly sought affinal
alliances with homologous landowning and commercial families in neighboring
provinces and regions. Even more problematic, the historiography of marriage among
elites in Latin American shows that supposedly ‘endogamous’ strata have almost
invariably accepted powerful and promising newcomers into their folds. The families of
conquistadors and encomenderos married Peninsular traders and government officials,
and later ambitious Basque ranchers, and later British diplomats and investors, and later
Italian and German entrepreneurs, and later American industrialists, and now World
Bank officials or multinational investment bankers. In fact, the historical record is clear
that when Indian females had access to large hereditary estates, as in the case of Inca
princesses, marriages with them were eagerly pursued by conquistadors (and officially
encouraged). Peru is a racist society, as is Latin America more generally. ‘Endogamy’
is clearly a poor description for the calculus of a mestizo family that vehemently refuses
to let their daughter marry an indigenous man, but eagerly courts the visiting gringo.
Simple pragmatism alone would lead them to avoid detrimental and to seek beneficial
marriages.

The fact that the perceived social inferiority of Indians enters into marriage
calculations is not surprising. This does not, however, necessarily mean that ‘endogamy’
per se is a value or objective. In fact, even when informants claim to value endogamy (for
example, when they make statements like “we marry amongst our own people”), they seem to be using the idiom as a shorthand to describe the correlation between their preference for marrying in a socially or financially advantageous way and the overwhelming social and financial benefits that members of their own group possess (as is demonstrated by their enthusiasm for marrying well-placed or professional outsiders). This is not to say that there are not cultures that are properly endogamous—in the sense that in-marriage is an end in itself or considered a good in and of itself, so that endogamy is practiced despite being contrary to the interest or well-being of its practitioners—but these cases must necessarily be rare. In fact, a caste system maintains its genealogical coherence—the distinctness of its cleavages—by so disenfranchising subordinate classes, races, or ethnic groups that no incentives are left that would lead a rational member of the enfranchised to marry precipitously downward. In effect, successful caste systems relentlessly eliminate ‘endogamy’ as an independent variable of marriage calculation by increasing the redundancy of social handicaps and making exogamy more and more irrational.

There is one incentive, however, that seems to be ineradicable: namely, sexual attraction. Men across the world are, of course, perfectly happy to send their gametes across lines of class and race. When we talk about endogamy, therefore, we are almost universally talking about what might be called more accurately ‘endomatriony.’ In Chumbivilcas, formal marriages between vecino and comunera are still uncommon, and between vecina and comunero nearly unheard of. Certainly, in the families descended from vecinos notables, marriage to local indigenous women was extremely infrequent. The upper class of Chumbivilcas was officially racially endogamous (or
endomatrimonial). In the years prior to the *Reforma*, marriages were contracted within the vecino community, either within towns, between district capitals within Chumbivilcas, or with vecino families in neighboring provinces. Even today, vecino-*comunera* marriages occur only if the couple has met outside of Chumbivilcas, one of the partners is not from the province, or the comunera has been *cholo-*ized through accepted channels of higher education or employment (and, even so, local vecinos ‘keep score’ and apply subtle social sanctions to violators).

8.4 *La cholita*

Sexual relations, however, between vecinos and indigenous women (exo-gamy) were omnipresent. Charles Hale’s observation that “sexual predation has been . . . integral to ladino-Indian relations in the past . . . Sexual predation is ubiquitous, if rarely talked about openly, following the familiar pattern of dominant culture males viewing lower status women as fair game”\(^{17}\) applies just as well to Chumbivilcas as it does to his fieldsite in Guatemala. This, of course, has been true from the very beginning of Spanish colonization. As Mörner writes, “In a way, the Spanish Conquest of the Americas was a conquest of women.”\(^{18}\) In the early years of the colony especially, Spanish women were scarce and indigenous women were therefore the only possible sexual and domestic partners available to most Spanish men.\(^{19}\) A number of first generation conquistadors and *encomenderos* selected Inca royal princesses as unofficial domestic partners.\(^{20}\) Although many eventually married Spanish women (imported for the purpose), informal sexual and affective relations continued to be universal. Relationships between Spaniards, criollos, and mestizos and young indigenous women emerged out of power-laden, starkly
asymmetrical contexts of interest, availability and convenience. Young indigenous women were frequently powerless in social, political, and economic terms, marked as racially and ethnically inferior (which, among other things, decreased the likelihood that their feelings, interests, and well-being would be considered); and forced into domestic environments of servitude that facilitated access to them and prevented escape or avoidance.

Throughout Latin America, interethnic marriage has been heavily discouraged, but interethnic sexual and romantic relations extremely common. From the perspective of the vecino chumbivilcano, the young indígena was not only an appealing candidate for sexual involvement, but also, in many ways, the only candidate available. Whatever other traits men find sexually arousing, availability is undoubtedly one of the most consistently and universally attractive. The overwhelming majority of women, especially in the countryside, were indigenous. Though the labor exploitation of the indigenous population may have been the primary element in the region’s political economy, the sexual aspect of interethnic relations—specifically and nearly exclusively vecino-comunera relations—was disproportionately important for my informants. The most common representation of the campesinado in conversation and folklore is “la cholita.” Literally speaking, the term ‘cholita’ is merely the diminutive female form of ‘cholo.’ Although the term ‘cholo’ is widely regarded by Peruvians as derogatory, cholita is usually employed in a playful, desirous way. In fact, if a Chumbivilcano wanted to refer to a young indigenous woman in a critical or insulting way, he or she would most likely not use the term cholita, despite the fact that it might be literally appropriate. Despite having a positive valence, the term clearly implies a status asymmetry, and is
only used to describe women or girls who are beneath the speaker in status and power. During my fieldwork I assiduously avoided romantic involvement with local women, but my conspicuous bachelorhood frequently drew comments like, “Tenemos que buscarle una cholita” [“We need to find you a cholita”], delivered in a jocular tone. In this sense, the cholita is both a young indigenous woman and, as the most common and available form of female companionship, a girlfriend more generally.

In Chumbivilcas, the most vulnerable female population was traditionally colonas or feudatarias, members of the hacienda’s resident workforce. Within this population, the pongas—women performing a stint of domestic service—were the most likely to be the victims of sexual exploitation. As one elderly informant stated, “the gentleman of the old days always had relations with their female employees.” Young vecinos in particular frequently availed themselves of the ready access to domestic employees. The sexual exploitation of nannies, housekeepers, and other domestic employees is often lamented in the Peruvian national press. In Norma Fuller’s account, affluent adolescent boys frequently have sexual relations with “ethnically marked” female employees in “encounters that are defined as strictly restricted to the release of sexual fluids or the affirmation of dominion over a woman of subordinate ethno-racial extraction.” Fuller reports that female care-givers in Iquitos, usually of indigenous extraction, are expected to allow the young boys of the house to engage in ‘el gateo,’ the surreptitious, cat-like creep into their rooms at night for sexual intercourse. Although indigenous comunidades or parcialidades had significant cultural, economic, and political handicaps vis-à-vis the mestizo elite, they were organized and solidary enough to present disincentives to flagrant sexual abuse of their female members. Vecinos certainly preyed
sexually on female community members, but the semi-captive resident labor pool presented a much more appealing target of opportunity. The overwhelming majority of my informants’ youthful sexual partners were selected from the so-called “hacienda runa” rather than “comunidad runa.” Of course, the distinction between the two was somewhat unstable, given the incorporation of neighboring comunidades into the hacienda labor regime.

Almost all middle-aged vecino men had their first sexual experience with indigenous women, and were frequently not exposed sexually to vecinas until after marriage.\textsuperscript{30} There were several reasons for this. As already stated, indigenous women were highly accessible, given their frequent presence in the house or hacienda and their legal, economic, and social vulnerability. In addition to ease of access, another important aspect of the sexual economy and selection process was the strong cultural value placed on the preservation of the virginity and purity of the ‘señoritas,’ or the daughters of elite families. As Marisol de la Cadena has discussed with regard to turn of the 19th century Cuzco, one of the foundational elements in the cultural construction ‘decencia’ was the “impeccable sexual virtue of the damas.”\textsuperscript{31} Parents, siblings, friends and extended family all monitored the sexual comportment of young elite women to protect the family against dishonor. On the other hand, the culture of machismo demanded that males possess ample sexual experience. For the elite male, the logical consequence of the prohibition of endogamous pre- or extra-marital sexual relations, coupled with the prescription of sexual prolificness,\textsuperscript{32} was what de la Cadena refers to as “erotic adventures outside of his moral-racial group.”\textsuperscript{33}
My overall sense is that the essential appeal of the *cholita* has been her relative ease of access. As Mörner puts it, “the satisfaction of a natural instinct should not be confused with social and esthetic attitudes.” This is not to say that the cultural and social attributes per se of indigenous girls (for example, their perceived naturalness or simplicity, their dress and comportment, or their subordination or submissiveness), as well as the phenotypical elements associated with indigeneity, have not exerted an attraction on vecino men, but the practical vulnerability of indigenous women to sexual advance and abuse has been the decisive factor. Likewise, the impunity with which indigenous women could be sexually exploited probably satisfied vecinos’ need for mastery, control, or even sadism, but I think this was generally sharply secondary to the romantico-sexual license. I certainly never heard vecinos talk about *cholitas* in terms that foregrounded their own impunity or the vulnerability of the *indígena*, nor did I see other evidence that this was a predominant element. In fact, the general discourse downplays, if not denies, the coercive elements, and tends to frame vecino-indígena sexual relations in terms of romance and mutual passion. Virtually all of those informants who admitted to relations with indigenous women seemed to flatter themselves that the relationships had been based almost exclusively on mutual romantic love and desire. There must certainly be men for whom the raw desire to control and demean was the essential element of the vecino-indígena relationship, and it may well be an element in all such relationships (as it may for all male-female relationships everywhere), but it was certainly not a major element in the discourse or behavior of my informants, nor in the cultural representations of the region at large (for example, in the art, music, and literature of the province).
I would argue that the fetishization of the *cholita* derives not only from her availability and vulnerability to sexual exploitation, but also from her embodiment of the vecino’s deep identification and entanglement with indigeneity. In chapter 10, I will discuss the bohemian cultural complex has grown up in Chumbivilcas around extensive cattle ranching. A key element of this complex is the romantic involvement of vecinos with comuneras. The many provincial songs professing love for the *cholita* frequently describe desirously traits both phenotypically and culturally associated with *lo indígena*. In “Era una chola chumbivilcana,” the singer identifies his lover in the first verse by her “pollera verde, phullito rojo” [“green homespun skirt, red woven shawl”] and in the final verse by her “ojitos negros, cara redonda” [“black eyes, round face”]. In the *cholita*, the indigenous traits that degrade the “*indio*” are revalorized through the process of romantico-sexual involvement. Traits like small stature, dark skin, almond-shaped eyes, and rustic dress, used in other situations to negatively mark comuneros, become the subject of longing reminiscence or confessions of love. One informant spoke with genuine tenderness about a young domestic servant with whom he had fathered a child. His wife’s profession required her to be away from home for long stretches and, in her absence, he said he had slowly become emotionally and then sexually involved with the girl, who was caring for the infant child he had fathered with his wife. He said that he had been forced by his wife’s wraith to help her and the child he fathered with her to relocate to a distant city, and that he had eventually lost contact with them. He said that he wished, however, that things could have worked out differently because he had felt a true and abiding emotional connection with her. The structural brutality of the situation—the husband’s power, the young caregiver’s emotional and physically vulnerability, the
ultimate rejection of mistress and resultant offspring—is stark, cruel, and uncomfortable to discuss, but in listening to this and other stories I was constantly struck by the ardor and bittersweetness of the accounts. This informant fished out an old photograph that incidentally captured the cholita’s image (because his wife wouldn’t tolerate the retention of photos explicitly of the girl), in order to point out how lovely, simple, and unspoiled she was. This informant was perhaps more sentimental than most local men, but his regret and guilt seemed genuine and palpable.

The vecino’s involvement with the cholita has always been potentially threatening to the established order and subversive of the affective structuring of social relationships. Not only did the vecino feel and behave in an ethnically contradictory fashion toward the cholita, but the relationship troubles a whole web of social and domestic hierarchies. In particular, the cholita threatens the rightful place of the señora within the family unit. Perhaps most troubling is the fact that her children may ultimately be his as well, a fact that is often phenotypically self-evident. One vecino informant noted, with undisguised pride, that his ‘comunera’ daughter, whom he hadn’t publicly recognized, was the splitting image of the daughter he had by his vecina wife. Given that such relationships may engender strong affinities between fathers and children born out of wedlock, the señora has every right to fear that illegitimate offspring may draw resources and attention away from her own children. Many of my informants wrestled with how to treat illegitimate offspring that they had fathered with indigenous women. Vecinos often pointed out the physiognomic similarities between particular comunero children and one or other local vecino. These comparisons were most often made with young comuneras and often proved to be thinly veiled references to positive
knowledge that the speaker possessed about the sexual dalliances of peers. Some of my closest informants shared personal feelings associated with their children from extra- or premarital relationships with *cholitas*. Many vecino fathers express little apparent paternal affection or responsibility for their offspring by cholitas, and almost none extend the full benefits of kinship to them, but most describe some degree of guilt, regret and confusion about the situation.\(^{41}\) It may be cant or rationalization, but one of the most common explanations I have heard for the lack of relationship with or recognition of *hijos naturales* is that the vecino father would like to recognize and provide for his offspring, but his wife would not allow it out of jealousy. Whatever the reasons, vecinos typically play little role in the lives of their *hijos naturales* and, to the extent they contribute to their wellbeing, it is sporadic and surreptitious. Lumbreras, for example, notes, in a remembrance of his visits to his grandmother’s highland hacienda in his youth, that some of his relatives broke ethnic rank to bring food to the servants who watched their family festivities and suggests that part of the reason was that many of the ‘indigenous’ children may in fact have been offspring of his vecino relatives.\(^{42}\) My own informants far more frequently spoke of why it was difficult to lend a hand, rather than of what they had in fact done to help.

8.5 *Loss of (despotic) intimacy*

The changes described in previous chapters have, however, largely effaced these intimacies of exploitation. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Agrarian Reform did not, by and large, turn peasants into affluent small-scale farmers. It did, however, bring a degree of subsistence sufficiency to campesinos and colonos. A key element of the hacienda
regime (and, for that matter, capitalist development) had been the availability of landless or poor peasants desperate for access to land and income, and therefore forced to negotiate the price of their labor on highly unfavorable terms. Without significant improvements in the transportation network and private capital investments in productive processes, the profits obtained by agro-pastoral enterprises continue to be slim and wages correspondingly insufficient to attract and retain any but the most impoverished agricultural workers. Most domestic work in town is performed not by adult peasants but by children from isolated mountain communities whose parents send their children to stay with and work for vecino _compadres_ in order gain them access to urban educational institutions.

As a result of the disintegration of the hacienda labor regime, the old asymmetrical intimacies have largely disappeared. As Dollard noted of the American South, “caste, as compared with slavery, forces on the Negro a greater isolation from southern white people.” As the hacienda was the nexus of a _shared_ society of stark asymmetry. New types of sharing are starting to develop in Peru, especially around education and employment, but, in the meantime, rural mestizos and comuneros have lost the sense of intimate connection that formerly characterized their relationship. Bobrow-Strain found the same phenomenon in his work with landowners and indigenous peasants in Chiapas: “An old intimacy founded on inequality has broken down.” Furthermore, several factors have combined to weaken the ‘_cholita_ complex.’ These include the declining public authority, legal impunity, and wealth of the vecino community (and a corresponding strengthening of the comunero community). Even when relationships do occur between vecino and comunera, they involve significantly less status and power
asymmetry, and are much less ethnically marked (though the ethnic dimension is still disapprovingly remarked by vecinos). Furthermore, the liberalization of sexual mores has increased the availability of non-indigenous pre-marital sexual partners,\textsuperscript{45} and male sexuality is no longer framed in nearly exclusive terms of attraction for and sexual exploitation of indigenous women.

8.6 Mingling without mingling

*The different classes in aristocracies resemble vast enclosures which one can neither leave nor enter. There is no communication between the classes, but within them men are bound to live in daily contact. Even though their natural characters are not in the least sympathetic, the expediencies of a similar status bring them together. . . . In aristocracies men are separated by high, immovable barriers. In democracies they are divided by a lot of almost invisible little threads, which are continually broken and moved from place to place.*

_Democracy in America_
Alexis de Tocqueville
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The loss of these intimacies of exploitation has combined with the steady immigration of the indigenous peasantry into the province’s once solidly vecino towns—described in chapter 5—to give a new character to interethnic relations in Chumbivilcas. Rather than masters and servants interacting across distinct spatial and social spheres, the two groups now live and work in close proximity and frequently fulfill similar social roles in shared institutions. In Michel Wieviorka’s terms, Chumbivilcas has shifted from a society of segregation—which involved “keeping the racialized group apart, setting aside designated spaces for it which it [could] only leave under certain, more or less restrictive, conditions”—to a society of discrimination—which “consists in imposing
differential treatment on the group in various fields of social life, a treatment in which the group itself participates, along lines which render it inferior.”46 In contradistinction to Peru’s major cities, where commercial and residential property values effectively segregate wealthy *criollos* or *blancos* in neighborhoods like Miraflores and *serranos* in *pueblos jóvenes*, in Chumbivilcano towns comuneros and vecinos are often separated merely by low walls, fences, or apartment floors. It is remarkable, given the interdigitation of the two ethnic communities, that they are nonetheless able to maintain a strong degree of social distinction, selection, and mutual coolness.

Ethnic lines are well, if subtly, socially defined. Birthday parties and other family celebrations tend to be ethnically exclusive. Vecinos and comuneros generally sit at separate tables in local dives. In part, this a natural, unintended consequence of the fact that, as distinct social communities, the two have differing tastes, habits, concerns, and patterns of sociality. But the role of ‘natural sorting’ or ‘elective affinity’ shouldn’t be exaggerated. While they may have been different in the past, the contemporary vecino shares the majority of his social forms with the comunero. Bars can be particularly tense places of mixing and micro-segregation: comuneros and vecinos may share the same close space, separated by only a few feet. Because no vecino would make explicit the underlying segregating norm, and because drunkenness can disinhibit social behavior, the boundaries are difficult to maintain. I have witnessed comuneros ‘inviting themselves’ over to predominantly vecino tables, and the resulting discomfort and inhibition that seize the vecinos, at least initially. I have also experienced several uncomfortable episodes in which comuneros publicly and bitterly pointed out the fact that vecinos were in exclusive social groups. Though no vecino has ever spontaneously volunteered these segregating
norms to me, they readily acknowledge their existence when questioned. Informants with whom I have discussed these forms of social avoidance generally conceptualize them as reflections of social networks or cliques, rather than ethnic divisions. In my experience, this fine-tuned segregation is common throughout Cuzco and surrounding departments.

The converse of these norms is that comuneros also socialize preferentially with other comuneros. Like vecinos, comuneros share with each other bonds of language, culture, personal history, perspective, political affiliation, family and residence. What complicates their preference for each other’s company is the fact that many of them are eager, when possible, to invite vecinos into their social spheres.47 There are a number of sources for this eagerness, which essentially involve practical considerations. Although vecinos no longer exert the sort of full spectrum dominance they once did, many still hold positions of influence and honor, especially as schoolteachers, engineers, or merchants. In addition to actual possibilities of reward, these professionals continue to have extremely high status in rural Peru. Given the low levels of economic and cultural capital in the campo, even those who possess the bare minimum are accorded status that, for an American, would seem surprising. An elementary school teacher, with two years of post-high school education and a minimum-wage salary, is often treated with fawning deference by comuneros, especially if their occupational status is mixed with other forms of capital. Many of those who no longer wield real power retain a lingering aura of authority and status.
With few exceptions, the vecinos with whom I work treat campesinos with at least formal respect, and more often than not polite indifference. In my years of working in Chumbivilcas, I have never observed a vecino physically abusing a comunero. There is, however, a pervasive, if subdued, supercilious quality to vecino treatment of comuneros. Vecinos often seem to be struggling with the difficulty, described by George Marcus, of demonstrating their elevated status “in the modern era of mass liberal societies,” in which “they lack legitimate opportunities to assert and glorify in public their superior distinctiveness.” Vecinos frequently criticize and mildly insult campesinos, but rarely outside of employer-employee settings. Beliefs about ethnicity no doubt facilitate this deprecation, as they do everywhere. There is a generalized, forlorn recognition that comuneros are now numerically predominant—even in town—and wield provincial political power, and that this has placed vecinos somewhat outside of provincial power politics, but this resentment is rarely publicly expressed or discussed. Where a third party’s behavior has in some way irritated a vecino or violated his norms, he may make reference to the violator’s ethnicity, to the extent that the individual’s specific deviation or violation appears to be consonant with received negative characterizations of comuneros.

Comuneros, especially those who live in comunidades, still treat recognized vecinos with mild deference, though it often seems grudging and ambivalent. Nonetheless, as noted in previous chapters, vecinos often lament the loss of respect and deference that they have suffered in the passage from ‘aquellos tiempos’ to ‘ahora.’
Rather than feeling, however, that they and their parents have done something to forfeit the comuneros’ respectful treatment (or lose the power to compel it), they most often express a sense that outside political actors have deluded comuneros into exaggerating their own capacities and worth. At base, this attitude is closely allied to the belief in the inferiority of the comunero and the intrinsic propriety of his deference. During one festival, a group of vecinos—some living locally, some visiting for the celebration—was gathered in an alley discussing the current state of affairs in the province. One man in his sixties shook his head and said, “Ya no puede llamar atención al comunero” [“These days you can’t even get a comunero’s attention”]. In local Spanish, the term “no llamar atención” is used to suggest that something isn’t worthy of notice. Even worse than disrespect, the comment reflected a feeling of no longer being relevant or even noticed by the campesinado—a serious handicap in a culture preeminently concerned with public status and recognition.

8.8 Multiple discourses

Underpinning these social conventions are multiple conflicting and reinforcing ethno-racial discourses. There is no hegemonic racial ideology in Chumbivilcas. Even within the vecino community, racial ideology is made up numerous discourses or traditions, some interrelated, others frankly contradictory. Much of this mélange is undifferentiated. Some of these discourses are more affective, others more logical or formal. Some are recent, others centuries old. Some are promulgated by government or other official organizations; others emerge at the grassroots and are passed from parent to child over generations. Some are part of an integrated ideological whole, others nothing
more than a few remaining aphorisms. Each may be employed in particular situations, audiences, or moods. They may be used concurrently or under similar circumstances, potentially creating inversions, contradictions, and confusions. The basic reality of local racial ideology is the simultaneous existence, interpenetration, and mutual resistance of a number of discourses that have emerged at particular historical moments and from various sectors of Peruvian and international society. Individual racial ideology is not only multifaceted, but also often inarticulate, not only at the level of expression but also at the level of conceptualization. The comments on race provided by informants frequently showed signs of not having been thought through completely.

I don’t mean to suggest that the ideas that informants express are merely, or exclusively repetitions of preexisting discourses, but that even the genuine products of individual creativity tend to be elaborated in alignment with received discursive traditions. One informant would pun, for example, on the term ‘comunero’: “‘Comunero’ is for ‘común’ [vulgar, run of the mill], because everything they do is común, nothing well done, nothing done with distinction, everything común.” It’s possible that this play on words naturally presented itself to him; it’s also possible, and rather more likely, that he heard it from a friend or family member. Whatever the case, the idea expressed is consistent with a tradition of disparaging aristocratic discourse about the peasantry stretching back to Antiquity.

In the following section, I will briefly describe some of the distinct local discourses about race and ethnicity. Virtually all of the ethno-racial discourses are unflattering and most are downright cruel and humiliating. Almost any inferior quality can be attributed to comuneros. At the most general level, there is clearly a universal
tendency in racially stratified societies to associate all negative traits with the subordinate group. Many of the old stereotypes get updated in laundered discursive forms. The critique of the “asistencialismo” of the comunero clearly refers back to the ‘indio as child’ or ‘hombrecito’ tropes of previous eras, with the comunero playing the role of the child who wants to be treated like a man, but can’t hold down a job or pay his own bills. At the national level, as Oboler points out, terms like “serrano” and “indio” have been replaced by “provinciano” and “indígena,” but the denigrating implications are carried over, albeit in softened forms.

8.9  *El comunero*

In my experience, most vecinos share beliefs in the relative uneducability, dishonesty, indolence, larcenousness, intemperance, and brutishness of the male campesino (as already discussed, beliefs about the female *campesina* are quite distinctive and frequently much more generous). This perspective on the comunero was so hegemonic in the first half of the twentieth century that even an avowedly indigenist journal like *Amauta* could publish an article that announced: “Easy prey to deception, fodder for exploitation [carne de explotación], rudimentary intelligence, the *indio* is extremely suggestible. His ignorance, his incapacity for reflection, his ingenuousness little less than primitive and his blind love for the earth leave him handtied in the hands of the exploiter.” Even vecinos involved with campesino-oriented organizations or political parties will frequently express in private or amongst vecino peers elements of this belief-system. Only vecinos who have been heavily reeducated in, for example, university post-graduate programs or over the course of long-term leftist political
activism, will actively express contrary beliefs about the campesino. Nonetheless, vecinos are acutely aware that the national ideology concerning campesinos has changed and have incorporated elements of this changed national discourse into their own expressed ideology, either genuinely or in a calculated effort to dissemble their true beliefs.

I have already discussed in several places the general contours of the categories of comunero and campesino. The two terms are used more or less interchangeably, though the former suggests a stronger ethnic and communal element, while the latter is more strongly associated with the ideology and policies of the Velasco regime, and therefore carries stronger political undertones. Both Peter Gose and de la Cadena translate ‘comunero’ as ‘commoner.’ Gose contrasts the category of ‘commoner’ with that of ‘vecino notable,’ or simply ‘notable.’ In *Indigenous Mestizos*, De la Cadena refers only elliptically to the personal and familial rural histories of her urban immigrant informants. She notes, however, that her informants are “cuzqueño commoners with recent or remote peasant background.” This reference to ‘commoner’ is in fact the only specific, if uncertain, reference to the category of ‘comunero,’ despite the fact that this, rather than indigeneity, is one of the primary categories from which her informants are escaping into mestizaje. Though she does not explicitly state that the term ‘commoner’ is her translation of the Spanish word ‘comunero,’ it is a reasonable assumption. Gose and de la Cadena’s translation is etymologically correct, since both terms derive ultimately from the Latin *communis.* Nonetheless, this translation gives a distorted sense of the word ‘comunero’ as it is used in the Peruvian highlands.
Despite their common origins, the two (‘commoner’ and ‘comunero’) have diverged substantially in the last several centuries. In English, commoner has lost its connotation of a ‘member of a village with rights to a share of resources held in common (commonage), most importantly pasture.’ In American English, the term is used in a consciously anachronistic fashion—when it is used at all—to denote someone unsophisticated or run-of-the-mill (a degradation similar to that which has affected its first cousins, ‘peasant’ and ‘villain’). In Peru, however, the meaning of the term ‘comunero’ has not degraded but rather retained its older meaning, denoting a member of a peasant community, and developed a newer, racialized connotation. When my informants use the term ‘comunero’ to describe someone, they mean that he or she is both a member of a ‘comunidad campesina’ and of predominantly indigenous descent. While there may be indigenous people who are not comuneros, all comuneros are indigenous. For Chumbivilcanos, this goes without saying and, in fact, is rarely explicitly stated. Some vecino families, particularly in Colquemarca, have, over the course of generations, obtained parcels of land within comunidades, and some degree of formal membership, but locals consider this a manipulation of norms and statutes, and would continue to categorize the member as a vecino, albeit a devious one.

8.10 *El indio (de mierda)*

The term ‘comunero’ itself is fairly neutral; it is used in public and in mixed company. Although, as I will describe in subsequent sections, people are aware that many negative stereotypes can be associated with comuneros, the term itself doesn’t generally bring to mind these stereotypes, and they must be explicitly attached to the term by a
speaker for it to become pejorative. “Indio de mierda,” on the other hand, is probably the strongest racial epithet throughout Latin America. It condenses all the most contemptuous ideas about and attitudes toward the autochthonous population of the Americas. To be clear, I have never heard a mestizo, in public or private, refer to a comunero as an ‘indio de mierda.’ In fact, the only time I heard the term explicitly used in the field was by a heavily intoxicated comunero, describing himself.\textsuperscript{62} Certainly, no one but an ornery elderly vecino would use the term in public. Very few Chumbivilcanos, in fact, would use even the word ‘indio’ in their own voice, and never in mixed company. When informants use the term ‘indio,’ there are commonly implied quotation marks around the word. As the limit-concept of the baseness of the Indian, however, the ‘indio de mierda’ is frequently implied in vecino discourse. The ‘indio’ is indolent, uneducable, importunate, freeloading, alcoholic, groveling, servile, impudent when intoxicated, volatile, cruel, violent, treacherous, brutish, devious, dishonest, and childish.\textsuperscript{63} He is the ‘indio’ of the phrase “No seas indio!” [Don’t be Indian!].\textsuperscript{64} I would argue that vecinos don’t actually believe that indígenas possess all of these traits, but rather that, when faced with behavior by a comunero that could possibly be correlated with any of them, the character of the ‘indio de mierda’ emerges into their awareness to situate and racialize the behavior and to locate the source in the comunero’s nature, rather than the particular circumstances.\textsuperscript{65}

A key element in the body of negative discourses is the concept of the brutishness or animalness of the comunero. As discussed in chapter 3, Spanish racial prejudice metastasized during the Reconquest of Moorish Spain, and the preoccupation in the Americas with race and limpieza de sangre owes some of its strength to the encounter
with Muslim Arabs and Berbers. As Hanke suggests, terms like “perro moro” and associated racial attitudes translated well into the “perro indio” of the New World. Discourses surrounding the comunero’s supposed animalness are not, however, merely metaphorical ways of talking. Many informants appear to believe deeply that the comunero is a lower form of life, and in some regards closer to an animal that a proper human. Many of these beliefs are clearly related to the labor relations of the recent past; most commonly they relate to the physical, servile labor traditionally performed by the comunero. By far the most common criticism leveled by former hacendados against comuneros of the pre-Velasco era is laziness, expressed using a broad array of relevant terms (perezoso, ocioso, indolente, flojo, vago). One informant summed up this feeling: “You have to be very clear with campesinos. You have to think for them. That herdsman, he won’t move the wire, he won’t close the pen. You just have to tell them everything. If you walk away they’ll stop working and sit down.” Another often repeated a proverb his hacendado father had been fond of: “Con el mulo y el indio, el palo.” [“With the mule and the Indian, the stick”]. The quote establishes an analogy between the Indian and a beast of burden, and suggests that both are indolent, stubborn, inaccessible to reason, and therefore responsive only to physical force; in other words, that coercion is necessary in the control of the comunero because he is incapable of informed consent. Neither mule nor Indian recognizes legitimate authority or reasonable command.

As important as the phrase is in representing the thinking of the hacienda-owning class in the 50s and 60s, the attitude of the informant in repeating it may be even more useful in illuminating current ethnic thinking. The informant had a keen sense of the inappropriateness of the sentiment expressed, and would certainly not have repeated it in
mixed company (that is, with comuneros present), except to indicate deprecatingly how hard a man his father was. Even the use of the term “indio” would now be controversial. From time to time he would repeat the proverb, always sourcing it to his father, but he would repeat it specifically at times in which he was discussing the difficulty of getting campesinos to show up for work, work consistently when they did show up, and do quality work without constant supervision. Commenting on the quote, the informant once said, “My father was firm (fuerte), not abusive. He was just. He demanded respect. And he used to say ‘El indio es animal. El indio y el mulo, el palo con el.’ It hurt me to hear him talk like that, but now that I have experience, I see the truth in his words. El indio es así.” Repeating the proverb thus served to say, in effect, ‘My father recognized the problems inherent in working with indigenous people and his response was physical coercion. Although excessive by current standards, it was effective in its time.’ Furthermore, this informant claimed that former employees of his father reported that although they were resentful at the time, they subsequently were thankful that his discipline had made honest, hard-working men out of them. While it is more than likely that these reported testimonies either did not occur, did not carry the sense imputed to them, or were made in contexts which complicated their content, the fact that the informant repeated the claim indicates the extent to which he believed that the old labor regime was more salutary, from an abstract technical perspective, from his own perspective, and from the perspective of the involved workers (as well as being a way of dealing with guilt or other emotions). The act of quoting his father expresses nostalgia for a time in which behavior (toward comuneros) and belief (about them) were congruous and uncomplicated.
The discourse of animalness articulates with the claim, expressed in partial jest, that the prosperity of the United States and Argentina is the result of the two nations having eliminated their native populations, whereas a large, unproductive indigenous population has burdened Peru; the Indian becomes not just any animal, but a pest to be exterminated for the good of the nation. The discourse is also fueled by the vecino’s fear of retributive violence, discussed in chapter 5. Vecinos still find comuneros ultimately unpredictable and unknowable. Many informants expressed a distrust of the comunero that struck me as mildly paranoid. One afternoon, a vecino friend and I were walking through a comunidad. We were keeping pace ten meters or so behind a comunero returning from his fields along the same road. The vecino said to me, quietly, “That’s how it has to be with comuneros. Not very far, not very close.” He was speaking generally and metaphorically about the need to maintain a safe distance from a threatening and incomprehensible other.

The discourse of ‘animalness’ of the comunero shades into a milder, more paternalistic discourse about his supposed childlikeness. Like a child, the comunero is lazy, lacks foresight and understanding, and must be disciplined in order not only to be a productive worker, but in order to do what is best for himself. Aguirre Beltran found a closely similar set of beliefs about the Indian in rural Mexico: “according to regional ideology, the Indian depends on Ladino support. He is like a child, a minor who must be governed by the firm but paternal hand of the hacendado.” Corporal punishment and other rigorous forms of correction are justified by the comunero’s immaturity and simplicity. Vecinos frequently talk to adult comunero employees and clients as though they were children, chiding, enunciating, assuming ignorance and lack of comprehension,
and asking them to repeat what they’ve just been told.\textsuperscript{70} In vecino thinking, the comunero is unable to mature, continues to be dependent, and now demands to be treated nonetheless as an adult. The critical discourse of ‘asistencialismo’ discussed in chapter 6 draws on this longstanding characterization of the comunero. One informant complained, “It’s OK to receive support, but not forever. It’s high time the comunero began his self-development.” There is a lingering remnant of an even softer, more paternalistic complex that might be termed the ‘\textit{sirviente fiel}’ (loyal servant). Submissive, supplicating elderly comuneros are sometimes be referred to as \textit{hombrecitos} or \textit{mujercitas}.\textsuperscript{71} There are undoubtedly analogues throughout the world from caste, semi-feudal or otherwise strongly ethnically asymmetrical societies. Because the relationships that underlay this way of thinking and talking have all but disappeared, this paternal ideology and terminology is quickly disappearing.

8.11 \textit{El indígena}

There is, generally, a deficit of affirmative local discourses about comuneros. As discussed in the two previous chapters, comuneros and their allies are increasingly using and advocating the use of the term ‘\textit{indígena}.’ Although the term ‘\textit{indígena}’ is certainly becoming more popular, I sense a certain euphemistic, wishful, or half-believed quality in its local usage.\textsuperscript{72} Nonetheless, vecinos are aware that many Westerners believe indigenous Peruvians are more worthy of attention than themselves and, furthermore, that it is specifically the ‘primitive’ traits that Euro-Americans find most interesting and valuable.\textsuperscript{73} Tourists flock to nearby Cuzco to snap photographs of Inca ruins and indigenous women in picturesque folk costumes. Tour groups pay Quechua ‘shamans’ to
perform ritual blessings for their entertainment and spiritual exploration. The contemporary zeitgeist regarding indigenism—driven in part by regionally vital cultural tourism industry—makes it particularly difficult to maintain a belief in the inferiority and sordidness of comuneros. Vecinos must come to terms with the fact that what is primitive and contemptible to them is authentic and beautiful to the gringo and, increasingly, to the nation at large.

Furthermore, Western NGOs are overwhelmingly interested in intervention in the peasant sector. NGOs are frequently constituted in order to address poverty-related issues amongst the poorest elements of society; nonetheless, vecinos naturally interpret this attention as a fetishization of indigeneity or backwardness. European NGO workers often scrupulously avoid interaction with vecinos, largely because they socialize with the peasants with whom they have fostered professional relationships, but also because their political orientation leads them to feel antagonism toward the somewhat reactionary rural landed interests and small-town petty bourgeoisie.

Vecinos find both their marginalization—from national, international, non-governmental, and tourist interest—and the attention and admiration given to comuneros somewhat galling. One joke, which I heard a vecino tell at a social gathering, expresses both the typical vecino perception of Euro-American interest in indigenous peoples and the vecino counter-argument to the contemporary interest in the ‘authentic native’:

They say that, up there in the mountains, they’re doing genetic robbery. A lot of gringas that work with NGOs, they have sex with guys from villages way up in the mountains. And when she’s pregnant—the guy doesn’t even know—the blanca leaves for Europe. Oi, but what she doesn’t know is that her son is gonna come out a drunk, a liar, and a thief.
It is especially significant that the sexual coupling alluded to in the joke is between a *gringa* and a *comunero*, a highly taboo inversion of local sexual norms. The pairing functions to intensify the sense of astonishment and absurdity that the vecino feels with regard to the contemporary Western valuation of the comunero.

8.12 *Cholo qorilazo*

There is one common positive characterization of indigenous men that is peculiar to Chumbivilcas and deserves mention. This is the trope of the ‘*cholo qorilazo*.’ The term *cholo*, though used from time to time to dismissively refer to absent third-persons, is extremely pejorative as form of direct address and hardly ever used to address someone. I have only heard it used in such a manner once—as an insult—and it immediately triggered a fistfight between two young men. When combined with the status of ‘qorilazo’ (the heavily romanticized local version of the cowboy or gaucho), however, ‘cholo’ takes on a positive, bohemian valence. The concept of the ‘cholo qorilazo’ dates back at least to the 1920s. The famous author José Uriel Garcia wrote in 1928 that, “no region [is] more fertile for *mestizaje* than Chumbivilcas. The *indio* of that territory is entirely a mestizo, mestizo in action as much as in sentiment.” The passage is interesting for various reasons—in particular, the concept that an *indio* can achieve *mestizaje* through action and sentiment—but the important element for the current discussion is Garcia’s conviction that the indigenous inhabitant of Chumbivilcas is different than that of other provinces and that he better approximates the desired qualities of *mestizaje*. 
As I will discuss in the chapter 10, vecinos argue that because the indigenous peoples of Chumbivilcas are particularly independent, pugnacious, and self-assertive, there was “domination but not exploitation.” The idea of the *cholo qorilazo* builds on the basic regional belief about the distinctive qualities of the provincial campesinado. This distinctiveness often traced to the supposed warlike nature of the region’s pre-Conquest *ayllus* and their dogged resistance to Inca aggression. Alternatively, some attribute the strong character of the native Chumbivilcanos to the wildness of the landscape and the resultant rigors of drawing a living from the land. The ‘cholo qorilazo’ is associated, above all else, with cattle-wrangling and cattle-rustling. ‘Life on the range’ is believed to foster independence, initiative, resourcefulness, and toughness, as opposed to peasant agriculture, which is supposedly demeaning and stultifying. Another key element of the ideology is that the cholo qorilazo is an *employee of the large landowner*. Although peasants often have livestock, they have few and they lead them out to and back from pasture each day. The qorilazo, on the other hand, wrangles large herds of open-range cattle. He braves the elements, lives in the saddle, and sleeps under the stars.

With the eclipse of the hacienda system, however, the ‘cholo qorilazo’ has become a folk category, rather than a living type. Vecino employment of comuneros takes much more quotidian forms today. Nonetheless, the ways in which vecinos reappraise and suspend their concepts and attitudes about race in order to adapt to and manage the practical exigencies of social and economic life are an important corrective to the stark picture I have been painting. Vecinos are not deluded, however; although they have strong racist ideologies, they leave room for elision and ‘fudging’ and are constantly suspending and ignoring racist precepts and attitudes in order to account for, anticipate,
and adapt to reality. Things like comunero expertise and competence are almost always doubted initially, but ultimately susceptible to observation, testing, and revision. The vast majority of skilled albañiles, electricians, and bricklayers associated with the building industry, for example, are comuneros. In order to build a house, a vecino therefore needs to accurately gauge the competence of these craftsmen and professionals, or else his home will end up woefully deficient. I have witnessed this process on numerous occasions and it is always awkward and amusing. The vecino is normally essentially ignorant of the technical portion of the job, but nonetheless assumes an air of authority and omniscience. The skilled worker is either exasperated and irritated or forbearing and even slightly amused by being tested by someone who is clearly underqualified to pass judgment. In one such interaction, a vecino informant was inspecting the work in progress on the upper wall and roof of his house. The albañil and his assistant were carefully making measurements, cutting lumber, and shifting sillar (tuff) blocks. The vecino began asking questions and mildly criticizing the craftsmanship. After answering a series of disapproving, but genuinely curious questions, the albañil stopped trowelling for a moment and said, chuckling, “I’ll tell you about it later. We can talk later. Right now, we need to get this done.” The vecino laughed as well and said, “Yeah, no, that’s right. Later.” As we walked away, he said to me, “He knows what he’s doing.”

This exchange draws attention to an important point that should be made before continuing. The above discussion as a whole might lead the reader to believe that vecinos and comuneros interact with each other exclusively as members of opposed social categories. The reality, of course, is that there is always a dynamic relationship between personal relations of affinity and antipathy and more abstract ethnic and class solidarity.
and antagonism. Chumbivilcanos have distinctive, personal relationships with most of the individuals with whom they are brought into contact each day. These relationships are heavily influence by categorical (for example, ethnic, class, and gender) ideologies and norms, but also idiosyncratic and often genuinely intimate. This tension was illustrated to me as I walked past a funeral party with one of my close vecino friends. As we neared the group of heavily intoxicated mourners, my friend said quietly to me, “Oh, I wish we could have avoided this. When campesinos are sad and drunk they get angry, and there can always be a confrontation.” But, when we arrived at the group, he was exceedingly kind to the son of the deceased, pointing out that the man’s mother had lived a good, long life: “Everyone dies, but, with 85 years, she had a full life.” We took two shots of anisado liquor and continued toward our destination. As we walked away, my friend said to me, “That Loayza is a good man. But it’s best to keep a healthy distance from campesinos. The class struggle is still very strong, so it’s best to keep a good distance.”

From the interaction and his subsequent tone, it was clear to me that my friend genuinely respected and felt warmly toward the deceased woman’s son, while at the same time deeply distrusting the comunero mourners as a whole and as a social category.

8.13 Genes and cultura

More than anything, the ideological innovations that have penetrated into the province over the last 40 years have confused vecino thinking about the nature and origins of the purported differences between the two ethnic communities. The impacts of these contemporary ideological introductions have been the subject of study in Peru and throughout Latin America. Here, I would merely like to briefly describe the competition
and confusion that occurs between these ideologies in contemporary vecino discourse. I would argue that the certainty with which particular ontological claims are expressed suggests not confusion or uncertainty, but rather the reproduction and repetition of competing historical discourses about the origins of difference. At first glance, local racial ideology is characterized by the tension between genetic and cultural explanations of difference; forms of these two bodies of discourse are, indeed common. I argue below, however, that the strongest element is actually a more classical belief in *naturaleza*, for which modern biological and cultural etiologies are moot. The nature of the comunero is frequently explained in biological terms. Pseudo-biological and social Darwinist theories of race propagated vigorously in Latin American in the second half of the 19th century and many vecinos Chumbivilcanos continue to frame their experience of comuneros in terms of them. The discourse often involves direct reference to genes. The following exchange between a rancher and his son is an excellent example of this. Comunero neighbors had asked to use his adjoining patio for a family celebration, and he was explaining to his son why this was inadvisable:

*Father:* We can’t let the comuneros use the patio. When the comunero is drunk, he’s a savage. He messes up [*malogra*] everything. He’s like an animal.

*Son:* Like the turkey?

*Father:* Wah! The turkey’s already a bit educated. But it’s like that, the turkey is savage [*salvaje*] because of [*por*] its genes. The comunero also: savage because of his genes. ‘*El indio* is savage because of his genes.’

The above exchange indicates the explicitness of the discourse. The father makes the quite common statement that the comunero is “like an animal” and the son asks him, in effect, to explain the simile. The father then explains that the source of the similarity is, in fact, a shared genetic disposition toward savagery (or, more accurately, a shared
inability to become civilized). There is nothing ironic or tongue-in-cheek about this discourse. Vecinos will even, on occasion, argue vehemently against the cultural origins of purported characteristics of the comunero. Discussing the son of a vecino friend, who was dating the daughter of a comunera, one informant suggested that the girlfriend’s misbehavior was the result of her humble origins:

Vecino: She’s the daughter of our female servant [nuestra muchacha].
JCP: Meaning . . . she lacks cultivation [falta cultivación]?
Vecino: Because of the very genes that she has.

And yet, under other circumstances, the same Chumbivilcanos attribute the perceived inferiority of the comunero to their upbringing and the pernicious effects of their way of life. It would be more accurate to say that the vecino is, at the least, aware that it is now official and appropriate to ascribe to class and culture many traits formerly associated with race, and may, in part, believe this to be true.

This acknowledgement of the role of culture, or of the environment more generally, is expressed in various ways. Most often it is expressed in terms of the negative aspects of the comunero social environment that contribute to the purported negative aspects of his character. For example, one informant spontaneously made the following statement about comuneros: “You know what the problem is? The comunero has no values. He doesn’t understand what liberty is. Friendship. Do you believe that the comunero understands friendship? No. Because of poverty and alcoholism, he can neither understand nor accept values. All his life he’s consuming alcohol, until his brain is incapable of analyzing or criticizing.” Beyond the strident tone of condemnation, what is notable is the cultural and even neuro-physiological account of the deficiencies.
‘Degeneration’ is a constant theme in cultural accounts of ethnic difference. This degeneration is described both ontologically (that is, that comunero custom produces degenerate individuals) and, in a manner of speaking, phylogenetically (that is, that the history of the indigenous community in Peru is a long process of degeneration). As one informant put it, “The Incas weren’t like that. You can see it in the constructions. An indio couldn’t make something so beautiful. They’ve degenerated during 500 years of abuse. It’s because of the trauma of the Conquest. They’ve been traumatized.” These quotations speak to the way in which traditional convictions and attitudes about indigenous people are often merely updated with modern causal explanations. The common denominator in these cultural explanations, however, is that they are almost always used to explain the degraded nature of the comunero, rather than examples of success or virtue. It is rarely argued, for example, that the comunero could become socially valuable or equal to the vecino if only he benefited from a proper upbringing. The constructivist discourse is used, rather, to explain the supposed degradation of the comunero, effectively inverting the causal relation between culture and essence (pernicious custom causes baseness, rather than baseness causing pernicious custom), but preserving the depreciation of both.

8.14 Naturaleza

If one wanted to make the two discourses (of genes and of culture) mutually consistent, one could characterize the local ethno-racial theory with a statement like “the poverty and pernicious way of life of the comunero exacerbate his basic inferiority.” While most vecinos chumbivilcanos would probably agree with this statement, I would
argue that, at the most basic level, most Chumbivilcanos do not submit the origins of the nature of man and of particular kinds of men and women to analysis. The question—‘why is a comunero the way a comunero is’—does not interest most people. The various competing ways of thinking and talking about character and capacity are deployed opportunistically, in a basically disorganized fashion. The same informants express frankly contradictory theories of race and ethnicity at different moments. Beneath these theories and discourses I detect an older and, for my informants, more intuitive belief in ‘naturaleza.’

In local discourse, almost any statement that is made about genes could just as easily employ the term sangre (blood). One informant, upon hearing that comuneros appeared to be taking of political gifts from one party but voting for another, commented that “The indio is treacherous [traicionero] by blood.” Another joked that one of his vecino relatives was “treacherous. He’s got a lot of sangre comunero.” Informants sometimes explicitly conflate the concept of sangre (blood) with genes and biological inheritance. For example, one informant argued that “you can give them money, education, así, but they’ll always fall back to the old ways, it’s in their sangre, their genes.” Despite this apparent lack of differentiation between the two terms, sangre in fact harkens back to essentially pre-modern conceptions of essence, which are often summed up in Chumbivilcas as “naturaleza.”

The concept of “naturaleza” is ancient, and probably primordial. At base, it is a theory of essence that circumvents, ignores, or remains indifferent to the potential causal relationships between biology and culture. In the version that Arguedas describes in Bermillo, Spain, wealthy “señoritos” assert that “God made the [peasant] thus. Because,
if not, how would you explain that they are ignorant in that way, despite schooling, and brutish, always brutish and hypocritical? They are the way they are, just as the stone was born stone and the spider is spider.\textsuperscript{84} The explanation presented is neither biological nor cultural; it is built upon essences that are almost Platonic forms.\textsuperscript{85} In the discourse of naturaleza, the nature of the comunero is neither racial nor ethnic, but ‘essential,’ in a pre-modern sense that refers back to ultimate causes rather than proximate ones. In this way of thinking, particular \textit{comuneros} are instantiations of the concept or archetype of “comunero-ness” and therefore naturally partake in its qualities. The exact causal chain that leads from archetype to instance is not an object of reflection; in a sense, the ideology lies outside of a paradigm of causality.

As spiritual or essential arguments become less socially acceptable, however, and therefore ‘go underground,’ genetic and cultural justifications take up the slack. As already noted, cultural arguments are often times recruited to express old beliefs in more palatable terms. But there is a natural affinity between the older concept of \textit{naturaleza} and bio-racial theories of difference that makes the latter particular effective and popular in the ideological, or at least discursive, adaptation of vecinos. Ultimately, one is struck by how little difference it makes, in practice, whether depreciation is framed in biological, cultural, or natural terms. The contemporary liberal and scientific discourses often seem to be formally appropriated in order to express predominantly traditional conceptions of human value.
8.15 *Ontological asymmetry*

Up to this point, I have restricted discussion to vecino ideas about and attitudes toward comuneros. These are generally similar to racial ideology throughout Latin America (and the rest of the world, for that matter). The ways in which vecinos conceptualize themselves are somewhat more irregular and eccentric. Although one might anticipate that the purported qualities of the vecino would essentially be inversions of those attributed to the comunero, this is only partially the case. Many of the ways of conceptualizing *vecindad* are asymmetrical to those concerning the nature of the comunero. This *ontological asymmetry* takes a number of forms, including the avoidance of racial definitions or characterizations, resentment and regret about Spanish rather than Anglo-Saxon cultural inheritance, and an overwhelming emphasis on family lineage.

At a certain level, vecino self-definition does, in fact, rely on a binary opposition between themselves and the indigenous population. The juxtaposition between the modernity of the vecino and primitivism of the comunero is recurrent and central to vecino self-understanding. This distinction is the related, in turn, to the perceived status of the vecino as a member and local representative of the nation at large, in contradistinction to the comunero, who is conceived as an alien, non-citizen other. In this imagining of social identity, the vecino acts as a colonist on the fringes of the nation, in the midst of an essentially alien native population. While greater access to elementary and secondary education has eroded the objective association between *vecindad* and cultural access to Western modernity, vecinos still consider themselves representatives of modernity, science, and rationality and comuneros benighted primitives. They frequently
go out of their way to accentuate the primitivism of comuneros and their own enlightenment. An example from fieldwork will illustrate this ideological emphasis. A vecino friend and I were riding in a taxi and talking to the driver and his wife, both comuneros. The four of us began talking about a mutual acquaintance, who had been sick recently. The wife commented that he probably had been struck by “viento,” and noted that her nephew had died as a result of being struck by *viento*: 86

Vecino: But how did he die?
Comunera: Viento.
V: What?
C: Viento. From *viento*. A whirlwind (*remolino*) came.
V: Yeah, but what happened?
C: Viento.
V: Did he get blown over? [Chuckling.] What happened?
C: He died in a few hours. He burst (*reventado*). His stomach was like this [indicating distension with her hand]. Filled with blood. He got really hot inside.
V: But the wind can’t do that. It must have been something else.
C: No. I told you. It came, like so [indicating wind rushing against her face with her hand], and he burst inside. He was screaming in pain.
Driver: I have a niece who got struck by *viento* and this side of her face got moved to the other side. If you don’t cure it quickly, it stays like that.
C: Antimony (*antimonio*) does that too.
JCP: Antimony? Where does it come from?
C: Well, it’s in a bottle. Centuries ago—no one knows how long ago—one person put it in a bottle, and then you find it and open it or break it, and it kills you.
V: No. Antimony comes from gold. When gold is in a closed space it degrades into antimony. Then, when you dig it up, it releases the antimony.
C: [Mildly irritated, dismissively] He can say what he wants.
V: And *viento* isn’t a disease. It may lead to a fever, or a change in temperature may cause a stroke, but *viento* itself can’t kill you.
C: Well, it does. I’ve seen it. Say what you want.

A number of points could be made about the exchange, but I will confine myself to those that directly relate to the current discussion. At the beginning of the conversation, the vecino expresses ignorance of *viento*. This is clearly feigned: everyone in the province
and throughout the Andes is familiar with the belief that certain winds cause fever- and
stroke-related illnesses. He seems to want the comunera to explicate her belief, and in
the process expose her superstitious ignorance (in part, no doubt, for my ‘benefit’). He
eventually lists the ways that wind, ‘objectively’ speaking, can harm a person, including
knocking a person over, causing fever (presumably through exposure to cold), or
contributing to a stroke. In effect, he is challenging the comunera to describe a
scientifically plausible causal relationship between wind and the resulting symptoms. By
the end of the conversation, when antimony is being discussed, he has dropped the
pretense of suspending his attack until the two comunero interlocutors have exposed
themselves, and shifts toward dismissing their beliefs by fiat. The correctness or accuracy
of their respective beliefs is not important here; the important points are: (1) that the
vecino believes that his ideas are generally consistent with the contemporary Western
consensus; (2) that he believes that they are the product of and subject to scientific proof
or falsification; (3) that he considers the beliefs of the comunera to be primitive and
demonstrative of her ignorance; and (4) that he seems to relish exposing them as such.
Vecinos express similar attitudes about a wide range of comunero beliefs, including those
surrounding the ūnakaq, ēru (black widow), and gentiles.

8.16 City-zens

I would argue that the emphasis on the modernity of the vecino community and
the primitiveness of the comunero is primarily a way of identifying vecinos as members
of the nation at large and comuneros as, in essence, non-national aboriginals. This is
specifically related to the retention of ‘vecino’ as a term of identification: although the
urban residential designation—now the primary element in the modern Latin American concept of vecindad—is still important, the local category of ‘vecino’ is, at heart, a civic category. As discussed in the chapters 1 and 3, the status designation originates in the Peninsular and colonial municipal civic tradition. Throughout early colonial Latin America, soldiers and other founding colonists “were each given a vecindad, or allotment, by the viceroy’s representative, either in person or in his name. The grant carried with it the title of vecino, or burgher, and usually consisted of a building lot, a garden, one or two caballerías of harvest land, and a sheep pasture located within a six-mile square surrounding the town. In exchange, the settlers promised to take up residence on their land, not to sell their grant for at least ten years (later reduced to six), and to maintain a horse and weapons.” Vecindad also carried rights and responsibilities with regard to participation in the cabildo and subsequent forms of municipal government. While the institutional nature of vecindad disappeared with the elaboration of a modern Republican citizenship, the concept of urban civic membership, in contradistinction to comunidad membership—remained fundamental to vecino identity through much of the 20th century and lingers on in the minds of adult vecinos.

8.17 Mestizaje

The vecino of Chumbivilcas sees himself as standing at the apex of the regional pyramid of value. To the extent that he looks beyond his immediate environment for identity and custom, he looks to the coast and to the city, not because he aspires to be like them but is not, but because he believes himself to be a member at large of the national community. The vecino in Chumbivilcas considers himself to be the local
representative of the national society or ethnic community. At the most basic level, despite the logical importance of non-indigeneity in the constitution of the vecino community, race per se rarely enters into the self-representation of vecinos and their community. The vecino does not normally consider himself a hybrid in any essential way. As I’ve already noted, the term ‘mestizo’ is in fact rarely used. Van den Berghe has stated this fact clearly: “The run of the mill townsman would refer to himself mostly through non-ethnic terms such as vecino, but if pushed for an ethnic label might call himself mestizo.” References to mestizaje and to phenotype carry unwanted connotations of mixture or hybridity, drawing vecinos’ own identities into racial discourses around indigeneity and undermining their attempts to establish an unblemished cultural and civic membership in the nation as the foundational element of their identity. Reference to phenotype also risks gravely offending other vecinos, who might exhibit strongly indigenous phenotypic features despite their social identification as vecinos.

The meaning of mestizaje in the Cuzco department has evolved over the last century. As attested to by a wealth of historical research, the term ‘mestizo’ or ‘mestiza’ was, in the early twentieth century, a term of depreciation or contempt. Traditionally, the top of the ethno-racial hierarchy in Peru has been the criollo: Spanish, white, coastal, wealthy, and Eurocentric. The term criollo is readily intelligible in Chumbivilcas, but I’ve never heard it used by a Chumbivilcano, mestizo or comunero, to describe a person. The most common usage is in the phrase “música criolla”, used to describe several genres of coastal music traditionally performed by and popular with vecinos. It includes marinera, vals, pasodoble, bolero, and a number of other forms perceived to emerge from
the Spanish or more generally European tradition. It is opposed paradigmatically and most frequently to the *huayno*, which Chumbivilcanos identify as essentially autochthonous. Although the term *criollo* thus exists vestigially in opposition to *indígena* or “*lo Andino,*” its position in the dichotomy is now filled almost exclusively by the term “mestizo” (or, again, more commonly, ‘vecino’). I never heard anyone try to trace such line or claim to be *criollo*. All of my primary informants talked in ways that implied they believed there were indigenous forebears in their and their associates’ bloodlines, and would periodically attribute behaviors and character traits they considered undesirable to this “*sangre comunera.*” Nonetheless, when used in the opposition “mestizo/comunero” mestizo is used as a diametrical opposite, in a way identical, or nearly so, to the old use of criollo; that is, mestizo is used in all situations where criollo would have been used in the early 20th century, to make similar claims about difference and superiority.99

As I alluded earlier, in the overwhelmingly indigenous countryside the term mestizo actually seems to be a Spanish rendering of the Quechua term ‘*misti.*’ To a campesino, ‘*misti*’ does not mean ‘of mixed blood,’ despite the fact that the term derives originally from the Spanish ‘*mestizo.*’ Rather, ‘misti’ refers to all non-indigenous people, particularly those who live in or visit the countryside and are perceived as being potentially exploitative or meddlesome.100 Thus, when one of my informants refers to himself as ‘mestizo,’ he is essentially arguing that he belongs in the comuneros’ category of ‘*misti.*’ For vecinos, the category of ‘mestizo,’ therefore, functions to distinguish or contrast, rather than to positively define. Nonetheless, the term is not common in daily conversation, most likely because the urban, or national, meaning corrupts the local one, thus destabilizing and injecting an uncomfortable ambiguity into the local usage.
De la Cadena has argued that “for working-class cusqueños self-identification as mestizos implies changing social condition, but not cultures, as I had been used to thinking. De-Indianization as explained to me by indigenous cusqueños means indeed shedding the markers that indicate the social condition of Indianness, such as walking barefoot or with ojotas (handmade rubber sandals) and lacking urban skills in general . . .

Within this process, a de-Indianizing individual can be mestizo and indigenous at the same time.”

As I understand the significance of the terms, the reason “a de-Indianizing individual can be mestizo and indigenous at the same time” is precisely because the term ‘mestizo,’ for an urban immigrant, does not denote a sociological category but rather a personal claim to achievement, the proverbial ‘I have arrived.’ Both the ‘indigeneity’ and the ‘mestizaje’ described by de la Cadena are heavily cultural; unfortunately for her informants, many Peruvians do not see the two in an entirely cultural light. De la Cadena argues that the indigenous mestiza “considers herself neto and thus familiar with practices deemed extraneous to the dominant culture—and at the same time understands practices that are perceived as belonging to the dominant national formation.”

For non-indigenous Peruvians indigeneity is not ultimately a question of ‘familiarity’ with indigenous culture, nor is mestizaje a question of ‘understanding’ “nationally dominant” practices. Rather, as I will discuss in the following chapter on genealogy, the categories of ‘comunero’ and ‘vecino,’ ‘indígena’ and ‘mestizo,’ are fundamentally related to the family origins of the individuals so categorized. For my informants, the word for ‘indigenous mestizo’ is ‘cholo,’ though they are too polite to say so under normal circumstances.
8.18 *Ambivalent Spanishness*

Though vecinos might be expected to identify themselves in contradistinction to comuneros as hard working, principled, and self-controlled, they in fact frequently lament their own dissoluteness, mendaciousness, and lack of industry. Spanishness itself is not an unproblematic quality. Vecinos frequently lament the fact, for example, that Spain, rather than the Britain or another Northern European nation, colonized Peru. Gose quotes one of his mestizo informants as saying “We have two bloods that run in our veins, one which is Indian, noble and hard-working, another which is Spanish, lazy and overbearing.” Vecinos frequently make comments like, “por eso somos ladrones” or “es por eso que somos atrasados.” Sometimes this is expressed in humorous, self-effacing way. One official of the *Instituto Nacional de la Cultura* (INC) quipped at a conference: “The Incas were able to build Machu Picchu, Vilcabamba, Saqsayhuamán. And what are we able to do? Charge an entrance fee.” More often than not, however, ambivalence about Spanishness is expressed as condemnation of third party vecinos who purportedly bear the negative traits of the Spaniard (for the rest of the supposedly innocent vecino community, as it were). This is likely a discursive inheritance from the anti-gamonal discourse of the Cuzqueño indigenist movement of the twenties and thirties. As already noted, de la Cadena argues that the second wave of indigenism, centered in Cuzco in the 1920s and 30s, was largely elaborated by mestizo elites, many of whom were themselves hacendados or members of landowning families. A significant element of their project was to distinguish between proper, legitimate hacendados and perverse gamonales, in order to, in effect, rehabilitate the highland hacendado. In a typical
discussion between elderly vecinos in the Plaza de Armas, one informant complained that “The Spanish were barbarous. Terrible. It’s for that reason that we’re backward. If people from another country would have colonized Peru, it would be different. They were terrible. Here, the señores had eighty, forty children. Five recognized [Laughter]. The others, illegitimate [naturales]. It’s in the blood. The violence. They were criminals. The Montes of Ccapacmarca—they say that in the old days they cut off the heads of the people. Just like that. They tossed the body and the head rolled.” The criticism is expressed predominantly in historical terms, though there is still a tiny stratum of mostly ranch-dwelling vecinos who remain enmeshed in intimate, abusive relationships with comuneros from surrounding comunidades, who are sometimes identified by vecinos as gamonales, and who are used as examples to demonstrate negative ‘Spanish’ traits.

8.19 Gente decente

In conjunction with the greater propensity to think of non-indigenousness in civic rather than racial terms, vecinos frequently use the concept of decencia to identify themselves and their vecino peers. Although the acquisition of university degrees, political office, and professional employment has weakened the association, the vecino/comunero dichotomy ideally maps onto the “opposition between gente decente and gente del pueblo.” Furthermore, though etymologically unrelated, decency (decencia) is closely related to descent (descendencia). In fact, the term ‘gente de línea’ is sometimes used, more or less interchangeably, with ‘gente decente.’ In characterizing fellow vecinos, reference is often made to their family and ancestors (antepasados), whereas vecinos almost never describe a comunero by reference to his lineage (lina).
Distinctions of quality are often made within the vecino community between families. The term ‘vecino notable,’ used by several ethnographers, is now rarely used, but everyone is familiar with its meaning and older vecinos note that, in the past, “Not all were equal. There was an aristocracy, a royalty (realeza). Even though it’s foolish, that’s how it was. Gente de nivel, de linea.” The term ‘de nivel’ is probably the most common term that vecinos who believe their families to be ‘de nivel’ or to have been ‘movers-and-shakers’ of pre-Reform Chumbivilcas use to distinguish notables from the common vecino, or the “pequeños propietarios” [small property owners] who “never have had trascendencia social [social transcendence], never controlled the destiny of the province.” At an even lower status level, certain financially and socially reduced vecinos, residing predominantly in the countryside, are identified as having “degenerado” or having become “ya medio comunero.”

In the fading ideology of lineage, one’s family history, or ‘abolengo,’ is the ultimate guarantor of his or her social value, or ‘nivel.’ In the following chapter, I will discuss the ways in which vecinos place or categorize their social interlocutors. I argue that the preferred method, and the one most frequently resorted to in local social interaction, is not analytical or diagnostic (in the sense of checking biological and cultural traits against a checklist of defining ethnic criteria) but rather genealogical. Vecinos traditionally lived in a closed, ‘known’ social space that was genealogically ordered. This genealogical ordering is still very much alive in the minds of vecinos Chumbivilcanos, though its practical implications are increasingly trivial, given the decline of vecino power and the political economic ascent of the comunero community.
Chapter 9
Putting People in their Place

JCP: When he was talking about ‘vecinos,’ about ‘vecindad,’ what did he mean?
Eduardo: He was talking about the powerful families.
JCP: But, ‘power’ pertains to race, wealth . . . or . . .?
Eduardo: Surname, surnames [apellidos]. And, in any case, having a surname in the old days meant that you had estates [propiedades], you had power . . . that’s what it refers to.
JCP: Then, surname signifies . . . race also, and economic . . .
Eduardo: That’s it. Family line [línea].
JCP: Family line. People also speak of ‘nivel.’
Eduardo: Of nivel also. Now you’re more or less forming a better idea. And all of us know each other. There are social connections all over.”

Conversation with Eduardo González
Hacendado

“Do you know the lady Lucia, Juan?” she asked,
“I go to mass, Marcela, and there everyone is known,” replied Juan with indifference.

Clorinda Matto de Turner
Birds Without a Nest

The previous chapter was dedicated to describing and analyzing the discourses surrounding race and ethnicity in Chumbivilcas. In particular, the category of comunero was shown to be strongly racial or ‘essential,’ and that of ‘vecino’—beyond its connation of non-indigeneity—to be strongly civic, both in the political and urban sense. In the current chapter, I analyze the criteria that vecinos use in placing other Chumbivilcanos. While social categories in the highlands are strongly racialized, race or phenotype is
actually a minor element in the ‘algorithm’ that Chumbivilcanos use to place each other.

A good deal of ink has been spilled, particularly in the discipline of anthropology, over the nature of ethno-racial ideology in the Peruvian highlands and the relative weight of phenotypic and cultural traits in attributions.\(^2\) In the first half of the chapter I discuss the various elements that go into assessing a particular individual and fitting him or her into one of the categories I discussed earlier. In the second half of the chapter I argue that, for vecinos, placing interlocutors into categories actually rarely involves this complex process of measuring and weighing phenotypic, cultural, and class traits. Assessment and analysis of traits only take place at the limits of an individual’s social sphere. Within the province, vecinos move in a largely ‘known’ social universe. Rather than analyzing constituent traits, Chumbivilcanos refer fellow social actors to a pre-established genealogical matrix.

What I have called ‘lineal ideology’ is still strong in Chumbivilcas, though its social importance is in rapid decline. Vecinos still think of themselves as belonging to established lineages, with their own distinctive histories and characters. Nonetheless, the changes described in prior chapters have drastically weakened the institutional cohesion and power of lineages; no longer is social and political life controlled by lineages and their patriarchs. Furthermore, migration, social mobility, and the spirit of individualism have disrupted the fixity that genealogical reckoning relied on and reinforced. Although many vecinos continue to categorize people genealogically, and often socialize accordingly, they increasingly share social \textit{interests} with each other, rather than the concrete economic and political ‘\textit{interests}’ that once motivated ethnic differentiation.
The general consensus amongst anthropologists has been that phenotype is not as important to identification and categorization as the public discourse would seem to suggest. Van Den Berghe writes that, “concerning the Spanish American area, there is general (but not unanimous) agreement among social scientists that racial criteria of group membership are, if not entirely absent, distinctly secondary to cultural and socio-economic criteria, and that labels such as *mestizo* or *blanco*, which at one time were racial, have become redefined in socio-cultural terms between race and ethnicity.” More narrowly, Conlin found that, despite the expressed belief of many highlanders that Aymara and Quecha peoples are phenotypically distinguishable (Aymara, for example, being “darker and huskier” and Quechua having “rounder faces”), “none of the responses” he elicited from locals to a battery of photographs “approached statistical significances and there were no systematic tendencies of any kind.”

In a general sense, this consensus seems correct to me. It is clear, even for Chumbivilcanos themselves, that their idealized social *dichotomy* is super-imposed on a phenotypical *spectrum*. Many, perhaps most, vecinos are not phenotypically distinguishable from comuneros. Phenotypically, vecinos vary from indistinguishable from an average southern European to indistinguishable from an indigenous Peruvian. A number of the foremost vecino families are clearly phenotypically distinct from the local indigenous population. Van Den Berghe wrote in the 1970s that, “for someone from the coast, used to a *criollo* culture and to a monolingual Spanish environment, the entire sierra appears culturally alien and indianized. He might call the sierra mestizo a *cholo,*
and everybody else an *indio*. A number of environmental factors further complicate phenotypic identifications. Exposure to the sun, for example, can complicate assessment of skin color. Height is also a confounding factor: though commonly associated with race, it is also subject to exception, especially with the expansion of school nutritional programs. Nonetheless, I think the anthropological consensus understates the importance of phenotype in the categorization of unknown interlocutors. Phenotypic traits perceived to be indigenous certainly play an important role in the overall complex of assessments, despite the fact that informants (particularly more phenotypically indigenous ones) tend to minimize its relative weight. Prominent noses, dark skin and short stature are all traits associated with indigenousness, and contribute to the identification of a bearer as comunero. A comunero with highly defined indigenous physiological traits would find it hard to pass as mestizo or vecino. Likewise, certain bearers of peculiarly European features would be presumptively identified as non-indigenous.

Vecinos frequently discuss the fact that there are comuneros who are tall, white, blue or green eyed, and blonde haired, and, at the same time, Quechua monolingual and illiterate. In the absence of concrete genealogical knowledge these people are identified and treated as comuneros, but not without some confusion and fascination. The emotion they express when describing these individuals varies from mild astonishment to knowing amusement. Sometimes they are used to suggest how sexually prolific and abusive the old male hacienda owners were; at other times it is merely an amusing story about a peculiar category violation. They note that these people—referred to as *‘comuneros gringos’* or some other humorous name—can be found in the district of Capacmarca and contiguous valleys. It may be disturbing and abnormal, but the
whiteness of these individuals does not change their fundamental character as comuneros. Despite the fact, therefore, that phenotype is a significant element in categorization, it is often overridden by a range of salient ethnic traits.

9.2 *Ethnicity: Language, custom, belief*

As I’ve already mentioned, there is broad historiographical and sociological consensus about the centrality of ethnic markers in the classification of individuals in the Peruvian highlands. Van den Berghe identifies “cultural and linguistic factors” as the essential criteria of “ethnic distinction in Peru.” Cope argues that 18th century documentary evidence from Mexico City suggests that “no strong phenotypical barrier existed between the ‘mestizo’ and ‘Indian’ categories. If an Indian was willing to surrender those traits of dress, coiffure, and speech summed up in the phrase ‘*anda como indio,*’ he could quickly ‘pass’ as a mestizo.”

Clothing has historically played a major role in ethnic distinction. In recent years, however, its role has declined precipitously. Not only have comuneros gained access and developed a preference for modern casual clothing, but mestizos have relaxed their style of dress. In old photos, both candid and posed, vecinos wear suits or shirtsleeves. Modern vecinos wear the same blue jeans, polyester shirts, and work boots as comuneros (though often of higher quality or in better repair). Female dress, as is typical, remains more distinctive. Comportment and body language, likewise, contribute to attributions. Highland herders still tend to demonstrate their shyness or abasement physically, holding their hats in their hands in front of them, slightly bandy-legged, and hunching over. A broad range of customs are also associated with indigenous
peasantness. These include ritual behavior (*t'inkay, chukcha rutuy, wasichana*), certain kinds of labor activity\(^\text{12}\) (modalities of work, like *minka* and *faena*, as well as particular kinds of work, like sheep and alpaca herding and back strap loom weaving), as well as more narrowly cultural activities (like coca chewing).

![Image of a picnic in Chumbivilcas in the 1950s](image)

**Figure 16. Stark ethnic distinction at picnic in Chumbivilcas in the 1950s**

Some ethnographers identify religion as a traditional source of ethnic differentiation.\(^\text{13}\) In Chumbivilcas, the syncretic Catholicism that has traditionally characterized comunero religious practice is not a salient feature of ethnic differentiation. Vecinos certainly are aware of and emphasize the perpetuation of indigenous religious elements, but generally conceptualize these as cultural elements, rather than religious.

Vecinos sometimes *tink’ay* with beer or soda, especially in social situations in which others are doing so, and will happily participate in indigenous festivities, despite their obvious non-Catholic spiritual implications. Catholic-protestant conflicts are far more salient than conflict between ‘proper’ and syncretic Catholicism, and these generally crosscut ethnic boundaries.\(^\text{14}\)
Language has always played a major role in ethnic differentiation in highland Peru. Certainly, up until the second half of the 20th century, it was the most indelible marker of ethnic difference. Nonetheless, Van den Berghe argues that “language especially is not an accurate criterion of ethnicity in Andean Peru, due to extensive bilingualism on the part of the dominant group.” This seems, to me, an overstatement of facts. It is true that bilingualism is extensive—nearly universal, even. In the most isolated communities, there are still many women who speak very little Spanish, but even in high altitude herding communities, I’ve never encountered a middle-aged comunero male who was not at least functionally bilingual. Similarly, most vecinos speak functional Quechua. Many are, in fact, fluent in Quechua, conducting business, singing, haranguing, joking, punning, and gossiping in it. Nonetheless, though language aptitude may not be an accurate indicator, language preference and patterns of use very much are. Comuneros generally mix Quechua and Spanish in the home. Comuneras, however, clearly prefer to use Quechua in the home, so that Quechua seems to predominate in domestic conversations. In the streets and bars, comuneros also use both Quechua and Spanish, favoring somewhat the latter in public, while vecinos will only use Quechua when speaking to comuneros or jesting with each other.

All students of Latin American society have noted the importance of surnames in social distinction. Flores Ochoa makes a strong, though typical, claim for the significance of surnames:

Surnames are another aspect of ethnic relations which is usually disregarded but which from the point of view of the inhabitants of Kaykay is very important in differentiating themselves from the Indians. Spanish surnames such as Montalvo, Ramos, Vargas, Garcia and Flores abound in Kaykay. Therefore, those with names such as Tecsi, Quispe, Chura and
Turpo occupy the lowest levels in the internal social hierarchy of the town because, according to the Kaykay people, these names indicate the Indian origin of their bearers.\textsuperscript{17} While this undoubtedly was and, to a limited extent, remains true, it merely suggests an association between surname and status, rather than indicating that the possession of an indigenous surname itself somehow diminishes one’s status.

Surname is a complicated phenomenon in Latin America. As I will argue in greater detail later, it is not the surname per se that is distinctive, except in the case of clearly Quechua or Aymara surnames;\textsuperscript{18} the primary importance of a Spanish surname is that it associates the bearer with a locally known family with an illustrious history (abolengo). To have the last name ‘Arestegui’ for example, is virtually meaningless if there is no locally known branch of the family; even if the family were locally renown, it would do nothing for the bearer of the surname if he weren’t known to be genealogically related to the local family.\textsuperscript{19} Informants from time to time note that a particular bearer of a surname isn’t actually related to a particular family: “his is another Marquez,” for example, or “it must be that his family perteneció a [lived on or were colonos of] the Álvarez estate.” Thus, though the surname is technically a cultural element, it is believed locally to be, or at least to indicate, an essential characteristic, much like a genetic trait, that passes to the individual at birth. One could change a surname, just as one could get a nose job or use a bleaching agent to whiten the skin, but knowledgeable social interlocutors would be aware of the artifice or deception, and make ‘passing’ difficult, if not impossible.
9.3 *Class: Capital, education, occupation, residence*

Economic or class elements are obviously essential factors in classification. Of course, the division of labor in post-Conquest Peru has been so heavily ethno-racially determined, and ethnicity and class so intimately related, that the two must be interpretively teased out of concrete social phenomena in which they are inextricably mixed. A number of scholars have argued, in fact, that ethnicity in the Peruvian highlands is strongly subsidiary to and determined by class relations. Benjamin Orlove argues that the nominally ethnic “separation could better be considered as one of class.”\(^{20}\) Van Den Berghe writes that, while “in much of sub-Saharan Africa . . . ethnicity is more salient than class,” “class is generally more salient than ethnicity” in “much of Latin America.”\(^{21}\) It is self-evident, of course, that beverage, food, and clothing choices, as well as other behavioral elements are quite frequently influenced, if not determined, by economic necessities. For example, chicha is essentially a by-product of staple crop production,\(^{22}\) whereas beer is made with barley and hops, which require using fields to grow specialized crops. In the event that there are widespread crop failures, corn can be shifted from chicha to food consumption, whereas luxury crops like barley and hops cannot. Likewise, in its commercialized form, beer must be purchased from specialized producers, whereas chicha can be produced at home with water and corn and with minimal effort, investment, or expertise. A major element of the traditional comunero ‘cultural preference’ for clothing made of homespun (*bayeta*), rather than imported industrial fabrics, has obviously been poverty. Similar arguments could be made about
the use of *chakitaqlla*, communal landholding, Quechua monolingualism, and most other ‘ethnic’ traits.

Nonetheless, vecinos generally think of class factors as distinct from ethnic. Although it is common to hear Peruvians point to the role of wealth in ethnic transformation—one sociologist cautions drolly that “we shouldn’t forget that in Peru money still has a powerful detergent effect . . . money whitens.”—vecinos in Chumbivilcas do not generally consider wealth to be an independent factor in the ethnic categorization of others. Poverty is closely associated with comunero-ness and wealth (especially landed wealth) with *vecindad*. Nonetheless, ‘mismatches’ of ethnicity and class are recognized and acknowledged without, however, leading to a weakening of categorization. Vecinos continue to classify members of the new political and economic elite as comunero, despite their power and affluence. Similarly, many vecinos are as poor or poorer than their comunero peers, but continue to be identified as vecinos.

Occupation continues to be correlated with ethnicity, and anyone herding, weaving, or performing physical or occasional labor in town or in the fields is presumptively assumed to be a comunero. Beyond the manual/mental dichotomy, however, occupation is not a strong ethnic indicator. It is self-evident that low levels of education are associated with comuneros and high levels with vecinos. Nonetheless, educational attainment is not generally an independent variable, and is not likely to affect an attribution. Most vecinos do not consider baccalaureate university education a sufficient honor to override other factors, a fact that causes friction between mistis and returning, city-educated comuneros. One of the outcomes of the expansion of the education system and, in particular, municipal office, is that there are expanded
opportunities for professionals of comunero descent to find employment in their natal districts. Conlin noted in the 1970s that “potential ethnic leadership may return to the rural communities as technicians or teachers, but they return as mestizos and thus become marginalized from the social structure of the community,“ but in contemporary Chumbivilcas, college educated comuneros return to their communities not only as schoolteachers, agronomists, and administrators, but also remain comuneros, retaining their rights to communal land and their connections to their family and social relations.

Finally, residential location and membership are also class-dependent factors in categorization. As already discussed in terms of the dual meaning of vecindad (that is, it’s simultaneous signification of non-indigenousness and urban residence and membership), location of residence is a major factor in ethnic identification. This nexus between ethnicity and location is long-standing. Cope notes, for example, that in the 18th century, “the very parish in which marriages occurred offered strong evidence of the partners’ racial identity.” As I have already noted, urban migration has undermined the traditional town/comunidad dichotomy. It has not, however, brought vecinos into the comunidades. Because of this, living in the countryside, or in peripheral urban barrios, carries with it the strong suggestion of comunero-ness.

9.4 Weights and measures

I have, above, merely listed the variables that potentially enter into an evaluation of ethnic identity. As I’ve noted, broad characterizations can be made about ethnic attributions—like the fact that ethnic markers in most cases trump racial and class criteria—but the actual calculus or algorithm by which particular individuals or groups
identify others is obviously not only variable and idiosyncratic, but also complex beyond precise specification. Assessments are distributed in patterned ways, not only between ethnic groups (for example, vecinos weigh elements differently than comuneros), but also based more generally on where the individual making the assessment is located in social space (that is, based on age, gender, class, status, and education). Researchers frequently attempt to give an global characterization of what are actually distributed cultural processes: the fact that an informant classifies himself differently than an associate or a social subordinate or superior might does not suggest irresolvability, but rather a complex, socially distributed calculus. With such a large number of potentially conflicting variables that enter into any assessment, one would expect classifications to be unstable, provisional, and prone to error, and produce confusion for individual assessors and disagreement between them, especially given the current level of economic, educational, and physical mobility. I would argue, however, that most vecinos very rarely experience confusion in identifying social interlocutors, particularly fellow Chumbivilcanos.

In part, this certainty and unanimity is a result of the great redundancy across the various criteria of identification: the relationship between race, ethnicity, and class has traditionally been close in Peru, particularly at the bottom and the top of the social order. But this is only a partial explanation; the confusion, contradiction, and fudging of traits that reigns in the broad middle reaches of social space in Peru have been the subject of much research. Furthermore, the adoption of new cultural practices, cultivation of new cultural proficiencies, or acquisition of education or wealth barely affect local identification at all. As Colby and van den Berghe note in the case of Guatemala, passing
“from one group to another without going to live elsewhere is virtually impossible, and
most informants cannot give any cases.” The same essential problem exists in
Chumbivilcas: so long as an individuals (comunero or vecino) remain within the
province, it is “virtually impossible” for them to alter their identity. Faced with this
‘virtual impossibility,’ Colby and van den Berghe ask:

How can one resolve the apparent contradiction between the salience of
cultural traits in the drawing of group distinctions, and the majority of
ladino opinion that passing is impossible for reasons that are at least partly
‘racial’? Passing is, de facto, locally rare and nationally fairly common . . .
Locally, the situation is quite different; even strongly ladinoized Indians
are still regarded as Indians, irrespective of their degree of education . . . It
seems that only children of mixed unions can in time become accepted as
ladinos, provided they speak Spanish without Ixil interferences and
associate mostly with ladinos.

In addition to this “seeming paradox between local rigidity and nationality fluidity,”
Benjamin N. Colby and Pierre L. van den Berghe found that “the ethnic line between
ladinos and Indians often remains quite rigid in spite of considerable hispanization.”
The solution they give to these apparent paradoxes is illuminating and applies equally
well to Chumbivilcas. Their answer is to shift from a cultural to a social analytical
perspective: “Both apparent paradoxes in the Guatemalan situation are best explained by
shifting the analysis from the cultural to the sociological aspects of ethnic relations . . .
Indians and ladinos are also member of groups structured by well-defined networks of
ties of kinship, friendship, neighborliness, economic exchange, and power relations. This
interaction takes place within the matrix of structured roles and statuses both within and
between ethnic groups.” They advocate a “structural approach” in order to study the
“complex matrix of social ties and social roles” that are as or more important than “the
possession of certain cultural traits.” My own fieldwork led me to a similar, if
somewhat more particular, solution to the analogous puzzle presented by my fieldwork in Chumbivilcas. The central features of the maintenance of ethnic distinction in Chumbivilcas are (1) that vecinos in Chumbivilcas live in a ‘known’ social universe and (2) the matrix constituted by this knowledge is predominantly genealogical.

9.5  A ‘known’ social universe

What does it mean, exactly, to say that Chumbivilcas is a ‘known’ social universe? Riding on the interprovincial bus with vecino friends, I would assume that their experience of anonymity and ignorance was similar to mine: I, frankly, did not have the time or energy to meet or interact with everyone on the bus, so I would greet and catch up with those I knew and ignore the rest. Behaviorally, this is precisely what my informants did. It was a long time before I realized that, although they ignored the vast majority of people, they knew more or less who they were. I would sit for 9 hours across from someone who hadn’t received the slightest sign of recognition from my travel companion, and yet, when I mentioned I had met the fellow passenger at the rest stop, my companion would make a statement like, “Yeah, he’s a Layme from Wayllani. His brother-in-law is the Juez de Paz in Colquemarca.” Vecinos not only have a deep and broad level of knowledge about fellow vecinos, but also comuneros from surrounding communities, as well as wealthy or influential comuneros throughout the province. As already noted, a lifetime of labor relations, land conflicts, water negotiations, and political contest has brought them into constant, intimate contact with comuneros.

Their knowledge is naturally imperfect—how could it be, in a province of 80,000 people?—but individual social knowledge about the department is truly vast. The quality
of their information naturally degrades the farther one moves out from family, affines, *compadres*, and friends, but any vecino can place almost any other from the province’s 8 districts in a matter of moments, even if he or she doesn’t immediately recognize or has not previously met the other: “Ah, pues, eres esposo de la hermana de la Señora Nelly de Velille. Casi somos familiares!” [“Oh, then, you’re the husband of Señora Nelly de Velille’s sister!”]. This sort of comment is constantly made by vecinos and indicates the most important facet of social knowledge in Chumbivilcas. The provincial social universe is not only ‘known’; it is *known genealogically*.

9.6 Genealogy

Within this known universe, the *process* whereby Chumbivilcanos place others in the category of comunero, or vecino, does not involve reference to particular racial or ethnic attributes that the object of analysis may or may not possess, but rather reference to preexisting genealogical knowledge and placement into an ordered ethno-genealogical matrix. By ‘genealogical’ I wish to define a field of valuation and identification that relates to descent and affinity, without necessarily involving genes or biology. Unlike race and ethnicity, genealogy does not refer directly back to a concrete reality (e.g., traits or markers), but to a social reality, so that someone’s ‘true’ race or ethnicity is posed as a question only under rare circumstances (for instance, when an ethnographer asks one to define it in those terms). For this reason, it is precise and ‘factual,’ in the sense that it refers objectively to social ‘facts’ rather than biological or ethnic assessments or judgments. The *vecindad* of someone, for example, who ‘looks’ comunero, but who has an established vecino pedigree, will never be questioned or even reflected upon. Lineage
absolutely trumps phenotype. To be honest, most of the above discussion of traits would strike a vecino not only as academic, but as nonsensical. Unlike common folk and ethnographic models of *mestizaje*, genealogical reckoning does not allow for fuzziness, negotiation, or upward mobility. An acculturated comunero could become a vecino, but only if he were to move to a new space in which interlocutors were unaware of his genealogy. While unknown individuals might be identified based on some combination of traits, many, if not most, comuneros encountered are *known* as such. Furthermore, *an unknown is, almost by definition, a comunero*.

The ethnography and historiography of the Peruvian highlands, together with the manifestly racial nature of my informants’ categories, initially obscured the genealogical nature of attribution, which is not ultimately analytical, but referential and relational. In the initial months of fieldwork I relentlessly interrogated my informants about the categorizing terms they used when referring to self and others. Their terms all appeared to me to be euphemisms for racial and ethnic categories: vecinos, gente decente, gente de nivel, gente de línea, comunero, campesino, gente del pueblo, or gente del campo. When I began trying to formalize the criteria that I believed my informants were using to identify people, it was immediately apparent that the traditional method of specifying definitive social or phenotypical markers that put this or that person into this or that category would not work. It took months of listening to and, ultimately, respecting my informants to hear these terms not as glosses, but as highly expressive bearers of spatial, class, cultural, and genealogical conceptions. Once I was willing to accept this, I looked back over reams of notes and transcriptions and realized that, while I had been trying to parse out their process of *ethno-racial* classification, they had been accurately expressing
their *actual process of classification*, which, again, was *genealogical*. Suddenly it became clear why lineage plays such an apparently disproportionate role in Chumbivilcanos’ discourse about their own and other’s social position, a fact that initially seemed a quaint anachronism.

The epigrammatic conversation that prefaces this chapter is revealing in this regard. The informant makes several claims regarding vecinos and *vecindad*, describing vecinos as those possessing, variously, power, surname, landed property, and lineage. Two of the four refer to family, two to class, and none to race or ethnicity. It is clear in retrospect that each of my interjections was inadvertently aimed at drawing him into connecting *vecindad* with race. At some level, I was trying to understand the broad ethnic cleavage that seemed self-evident to me. As I’ve already described at length, the vecino-comunero divide *is* profound, both ideologically and in social practice. But this informant, like many before and since, kept shifting the discussion back toward family. Initially, I felt an ethnographic impulse, common to the Andes, to treat his familial or genealogical idiom as a screen or euphemism for race.

In such a social system, however, it isn’t cant or disingenuousness (or, at least, isn’t only that) that leads informants to disavow or downplay race or even ethnicity as an element in the constitution of their social groups, including cliques, marriages, and political factions, as well as the vecino community as a whole (to the extent that such a thing ‘exists’). It is *literally true* that the calculus surrounding sociality does not routinely involve reference to race or ethnicity. I am not engaging here in apologetics for the vecino community; race and ethnicity are certainly factors in defining the *nivel* or social status of a family (in fact, they are, along with wealth, the most significant factors). I am
arguing that race and ethnicity do not explicitly enter into daily social calculus because they are mediated through family and through a genealogical ideology or conception of social structure. If we treat ethnic divisions as emerging from and maintained by the aggregate mutual distinctions between lineages within a relatively fixed matrix, we can better understand why categorization is so self-evident, imperturbable, and matter of fact—so referential rather than analytical.

9.7  Limits of knowledge

Of course, at some point in the distant past a calculus was made to determine in which category a given lineage or ancestor belonged, though the modern Chumbivilcano does not reflect on or treat that calculus (which may have been performed centuries ago) as open to reexamination, so that identification of lineage is a sufficient, and the preferred, form of categorization. My guess is that the defining moment in the identification of most families as vecino occurred at the point of arrival in the province—an act of relocation that allowed them to recategorize themselves (if such a change were necessary)—and that once identified, revision was difficult, if not impossible. Vecinos, particularly those whose families have been wealthy and powerful in living memory (the so-called notables), characterize their family’s status, and the social structure more generally, as having been unchanging prior to the Reforma, but this is clearly a mischaracterization. The ideology is of enduring lineages, regardless of whether or not the lineages are actually enduring or of elevated provenance. Actual visibility into the past, however, is limited. Many family oral genealogies begin with the progenitor who first arrived from elsewhere, purchased an estate in the province, and settled down, often
five or six generations back, commonly in the second half of the 19th century. Great-great grandfathers can usually be named and some salient, semi-mythical personal characteristic ‘identified.’ Some informants include rudimentary ‘facts’ about the generation just prior to immigration. The resulting genealogical picture is relatively shallow and schematic, but broad.

Anywhere in the province, a vecino finds mutual recognition with vecino peers. More generally, an individual from a prominent vecino family can travel anywhere throughout the provincias altas and fit in, not only because he possesses a ‘legitimately’ vecino comportment and self-presentation, but because he can triangulate through fathers, uncles, cousins, and grandfathers. It is only necessary that some portion of the genealogy be related to some portion of the interlocutor’s for the two to become ‘known’ to each other. Not only are their networks more extensive, geographically and genealogically, than would be typical in the contemporary United States, but the degree of intimacy and identification conferred by familial affiliations is much more intense—the intimacy conferred by, for example, one’s cousin having grown up with another’s great-uncle would seem wildly disproportionate to a middle class American. When they discover, for example, that a visitor’s father used to drink with their uncle at cattle auctions in Cuzco in the 1970s, Chumbivilcanos will become animated and together make a beeline for the nearest bar.

Vecinos may be familiar with the families of neighboring districts outside of the province, but, in general, the quality of knowledge seems to drop precipitously at or near the provincial boundaries. This is likely the result not only of geographic distance but also of intensity of political association. In district capitals, where vecinos typically
congregate and reside, visitors know by first name the vast majority of the men and women they encounter on the street, as well as the general outline of their kin networks. Anonymity increases quickly, however, the farther into the countryside that a vecino travels from town or estate. I often traveled the province with vecino friends; though traveling through district capitals is a constant process of backslapping, ‘catching up,’ and being hosted by reunited ‘parientes,’ boarding in comunidades almost invariably involves finding a stranger willing to accept payment for a spare bed. Unless a vecino is traveling through communities near his own property, happens to encounter a fellow vecino visiting his fields or estate, or encounters a comunero of district- or provincial-level prominence, the individuals and kin networks of the countryside are bound to be unknown quantities.

Within the genealogical model of society, unknowns are presumptively comunero. In the absence of a clear cue (for example, possession of a late-model pickup truck or strongly European phenotypic features), those who fall completely outside of their knowledge are defined negatively as comuneros (i.e. not vecino). Outside of employees, comuneros from neighboring communities (who are often either seasonally employed or potential sources of conflict), and politically powerful peasant leaders from other districts, comuneros are still basically treated as non-entities. When encountered in travel, they are ignored, avoided, politely but indifferently greeted, or harangued for resources or services. Genealogical reckoning is the tool of a social world in which those who are unknown are inherently unworthy of being known.

Apellido per se, which, as has already been noted, is often accorded a prominent place in ethnographic accounts, only plays a role at the limits of one’s social knowledge.
At the farthest reaches of genealogical knowledge, vecinos can identify by triangulation: using *apellido* to postulate district or community of origin, using community of origin to identify likely kin relations, or, more often than not, tracing a social or genealogical relationship between a known individual and an unknown. It is easy to see how this kind of genealogical ‘stretch’ could lead progressively to the use of phenotypic, linguistic, class, and other ethnic markers to augment assessment. At the limits of genealogical reckoning, or what could be called ‘primary process,’ the Chumbivilcano begins to weigh the various elements of the race-ethnicity-class mix, or to employ a ‘secondary process,’ a mode of assessment and judgment that he would prefer to avoid.

The secondary forms of categorization are frequently being used, however, for several reasons. First, despite the closeness of the social world, a vecino may not immediately recognize a fellow vecino from a distant district and an initial, provisional assessment may be required before addressing an unknown interlocutor. This is a rough assessment, but suffices for the first several sentences until a positive, genealogical identification can be made. In fact, I have often seen a vecino make a muted greeting to an unknown individual, which is sufficient to hold the relation in a neutral space until precise genealogical information can be gathered to make a positive identification, at which point both will suddenly light up with enthusiasm and affection. Second, aid workers, traders, and government representatives are continually visiting the province, especially the provincial capital, which requires vecinos to utilize the secondary process for identification.
9.8  **Lineal ideology**

Several scholars working in other Latin American countries have noted that the identity of parents, grandparents, and other relatives is important to the identification of social peers. Charles Hale writes that “when the mix of [ethnic] elements began to lose weight in the judgment of people, the dress of the woman and surnames remained. In essence, knowing who was who is a question of knowing the origin of the family: from where the parents came, if the grandmother ‘era de corte’ [was of traditional dress], knowing the ethnic significance of surnames.” Albro writes that “In Quillacollo [Bolivia], it is taken for granted that when people use the term ‘de origen humilde’ they are thinking not so much about an individual, as about the social status of his parents.” Cope notes that reference to “genealogy” was common in establishing legal identity, giving as an example a case in which reference was made to a defendant’s uncle being a “mestizo prieto.” Cope also notes that a “quick review of the Inquisition cases . . . shows that the accused nearly always substantiated their racial status by pointing to that of their parents.” In these modes of genealogical thinking, an individual whose status is otherwise uncertain is established by linking him or her through descent to one whose status is a matter of ‘fact’ or consensus. This kind of association is certainly utilized in Chumbivilcas at a certain degree of unfamiliarity. The genealogical reckoning to which I refer is deeper, however, than merely knowing whom one’s father or mother or even grandparent was. Vecinos conceptualize social structure as constituted by a relatively stable set of family lineages, more or less historically deep, and their members.
As noted in chapter 3, genealogical enthusiasm has been a hallmark of Iberian culture. More specifically, I would argue that Chumbivilcanos inherit a ‘lineage ideology’ that structures their way of understanding their society. This ideology is related to what Chacón Jiménez calls the “sentiment and thinking derived from the culture of patronazgo and lineage [that] inundated and impregnated the ensemble of Spanish society and its institutions over the course of various centuries. The sense of the transitoriness of life was shaded by the permanence of the surnames of those who possessed titles of mayorazgo, and also in different symbols like family coats of arms, ancestral homes, and crypts.” For those raised with the individualistic ethos of the Euro-American west, it is difficult to grasp the depth of the belief in kinship and the degree to which individuals in kin-based societies believe themselves to partake in the spirit and substance of the family line. Many of my informants believe that they are part of a lineage in a literal, essential way. The traits that individual ancestors demonstrated, and that their lineage is perceived to possess collectively, are felt to be inherent in an individual, not by association, but through spiritual and corporeal membership. One often hears comments like “All the Álvarez are that way,” or “that family has always been quarrelsome.” More importantly, personal value is inextricably tied to the status or quality of the lineage and personal plans and enterprises are inextricably affiliated with familial ones. Within this ideological paradigm, “the family is converted into the true protagonist of the social system.” Vecinos live constantly with the ‘weight’ of family history. Alliances, enmities, patron-client arrangements, employer-employee relationships, and fictive kinships are recalled—sometimes vividly—and encoded in genealogical matrices that continue to inform social behavior.
This lineal identity is key to understanding the pride, responsibility, and shame that Chumbivilcanos feel with regard to relatives, both *antepasados* and contemporaries. One informant, in explaining why he had chosen not to pursue litigation against brothers and cousins who had purportedly appropriated property that had not been allotted to them, asserted that: “We still have our image. All the gold in the world can’t buy an image. Even though I’ve lost land—my brothers grabbed all the prairie land up above, even though they don’t even visit—it’s more important to maintain the image of the family. In other districts, family honor has gone to the ground.” In a sense, it is the *abolengo*—both in the sense of a reputation and a familial cultural tradition—of the family line that holds back the indigenousness or, in other words, that keeps the rural vecino from being swallowed up by ‘Indian country’ and becoming comunero. To compromise that reputation or one’s association with it is therefore a significant threat to identity and social worth.\(^{54}\)

9.9 *Vestigial lineages*

As discussed in chapter 4, the role of the family in political life and that of the state tend to vary inversely. At the most basic level, kinship gains prominence as a multifaceted social institution under specific social, political, and demographic circumstances. Societies in which kinship is likely to play significant social, political, and economic roles include those in which political structure is small scale and relatively undifferentiated, state institutions are weak, there is a lack of social and physical mobility, and inherited resources are predominant in social reproduction. The robust family- or kin-based factions that played such a prominent role in the economy, politics,
law, and public administration in Chumbivilcas until the middle of the 20th century were therefore a natural institutional adaptation to the isolation and lawlessness that characterized the province in the era.

Though lineal ideology still has powerful effects on identity as well as social practice, the lineage system is now largely vestigial in Chumbivilcas. Vecinos regularly reckon social identity in terms of family relations. At times it seems like the entire province is one extended family. If one asks a vecino chumbivilcano who someone is, he or she will more than likely respond that she is a ‘tía’ or ‘mi pariente.’

Structurally, however, both the genealogically ordered society of the Spanish tradition (centered on titles, mayorazgos, and pureza de sangre) and that of the pre-Colombian ayllus are represented only in impoverished and isolated strands. While the argument could be made that municipal politics is ‘mortalmente revitalizando’ comunero kin groups (in the sense that it is recruiting them for political purposes, and thus making them more relevant, while at the same time altering, potentially detrimentally, their underlying logic), the overall experience of modernity for Chumbivilcano families has been greater nucleation and a more limited social role for the family. Even the Latin ‘grand-family,’ described by Lomnitz and Pérez-Lizaur as “composed of a couple, their children, and their grandchildren,” is rare in contemporary Chumbivilcas as a functioning familial institution. Brothers rarely cooperate with each other, especially after the death of their parents. I know of few family businesses in which siblings amicably share proprietorship. Loyalties are so mixed after marriage, and the autonomy of the nuclear family so strong, that siblings’ relationships frequently collapse into mutual recriminations and endless legal disputes over inheritance once parents have passed away. Adult sisters seem more
likely to share some degree of intimacy, though rarely in a corporate or institutional environment.

9.10 *The obsolescence of knowledge*

It is clear from the preceding discussion that what I have called the primary or genealogical process is dependent on a society that is modest in scale and relatively socially and physically immobile, such that it can be generally known and such that the accuracy and value of this knowledge does not decay rapidly. Both the vecino and the meaning of *vecindad*, in the archaic sense which I have described, are lost in a city of any size. In a city like Cuzco, vecinos prefer to visit and transact with individuals of known provenance (above and beyond, it seems to me, the simple desire to interact with friends, family, and people who share one’s interests and values). In effect, they move in the same genealogically determined social universe in which they move in Chumbivilcas, embedded in the alien city. The complexity and potential for incorrect interpretations and errors in weighting the various elements of the ‘secondary process’ contribute to the discomfort, and tendency toward insularity, of the provincial vecino when visiting Cuzco or Arequipa. To treat someone who is ‘de nivel’ like a comunero or a comunero as though they were ‘de nivel,’ to confuse a *presidente de comunidad* with a *peon*, or an *albañil* with an *alcalde*, would be a deeply embarrassing and potentially socially and politically compromising *faux pas*. Even more threatening is the fact that *vecindad*, as a historically, genealogically, and regionally rooted civic status, is virtually meaningless in the city. Because the automatic recognition of ‘quality’ that obtains in Chumbivilcas proper does not derive primarily from outward signs but from the community’s shared
genealogical knowledge, it is difficult or impossible for anonymous urbanites to identify vecinos as ‘gente de nivel’ and the urban Peruvian could potentially identify vecinos as a cholos or gente del pueblo.\textsuperscript{59} It is safer by far, therefore, to remain in fixed social orbits where one’s cultural credentials are recognized and esteemed.

Even the provincial social world, however, is rapidly becoming ‘like the city.’ In Santo Tomás, the increase in mobility, anonymity, and individuality forces vecinos increasingly to shift from the primary, genealogical process of identification to the secondary, analytical process of assessing the traits described in the first half of the chapter. While the divergence between genealogical knowledge and reality hasn’t necessarily grown, the frequency of circumstances and interactions in which genealogical knowledge is deficient or absent make it less and less useful, and the categories into which it places individuals are less and less relevant and useful. Though these aspects of modernization or, speaking more expansively, modernity are recent development in Chumbivilcas, they have been affecting Peru for centuries. As discussed in chapter 5, the urbanization of society has been progressing gradually but inexorably for thousands of years. Urbanization has been causing reorganizations of ethnic identity and relations throughout the colonial and Republican eras. As Cope demonstrates in the case of Mexico City, ethnic instability and anonymity were pressing social and administrative issues even in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century:

the reconstruction of racial status demanded precise knowledge of ancestry, which seldom survived for generations, even among status-conscious Spaniards. Among the largely illiterate plebeians, knowledge of ancestry was slimmer and appeals to ‘reputational’ race (i.e., the consensus among friends and neighbors) more common\textsuperscript{60} and that, in his archival sample, “better than one in six persons recorded here changed their racial status during their adult (postwedding) lifetime.”\textsuperscript{61}
This has undoubtedly been typical of urban environments in Peru as well, where positive knowledge about other social participants is difficult to gather, organize, and utilize effectively.

Literal physical mobility has been fundamental to the growing ethnic instability in Chumbivilcas, and the resulting obsolescence of genealogical reckoning. As has already been noted, the relationship between migration and passing has historically been close. In Colby and Van Den Berghe’s words, “horizontal mobility is the way of crossing the ethnic line.” Vecinos frequently express bewilderment with the massive influx of unknowns into towns like Colquemarca and Santo Tomás. As one elderly informant in the district capital of Velille once quipped, “You know what? Ya no hay vecinos. Who knows who these people are? Teachers, traders . . . who knows?” Because outsiders or unknowns are now frequently not comuneros in the traditional sense (that is, they may be racially indigenous, but they are acculturated in ways that would normally lead others to identify them as mestizo), but rather potentially important governmental or non-governmental workers, unidentified individuals are no longer, in a practical sense, socially negligible.

As discussed in chapters 5 and 7, social mobility has also increased drastically, in particular through greater access to education, urban employment, and municipal office. As Chacón Jiménez points out, the key to social mobility in the Iberian world has always been the ability to “invent and manipulate the genealogical memory” and the “dialectic between the hierarchy of money and that of honor.” Albro has pointed out that the obscurity of politicians’ origins and, in particular, their paternity is an essential element
of their political practice in provincial Bolivia. While it’s still unlikely that the paternity or origins of a local political candidate in Chumbivilcas would be unknown, the sharp changes in fortune, professional qualifications, and influence from one generation to the next undermine the utility of genealogy. Genealogical reckoning requires a certain level of continuity through time of familial fortunes, such that inherited status, wealth, and power offer a rough estimate of individual social position. Under current conditions, family wealth can be decisive to the extent that it is used to finance professional preparation or business enterprise, but the inherited wealth of vecino families is usually too modest to ensure the affluence of subsequent generations in the absence of individual effort and aptitude. As a result, the abolengo and reputation of an individual’s family is a poor indicator of subsequent power, wealth, and status. The fact that the younger generation is increasingly indifferent to genealogy reflects the greater role of the nuclear family and personal accomplishments in success and social standing.

The significant loss of status distinction, wealth, and political power in relation to the campesinado is therefore a—perhaps the—decisive contributor to the decreasing utility of genealogy. Given the precipitous decline in political economic distinction, it would be difficult to understand the current ethnic or more generally social dichotomy without a longue durée understanding of the province’s social relations. In certain regards, the contemporary situation in Chumbivilcas is analogical to that described at the district level by Flores Ochoa and later by Paerregaard. Both independently attempted to describe relations between “mistis” (in essence, their term for vecinos) and “Indians” under circumstances in which the differences and, in particular, the prerogatives of the mistis appeared to be wholly customary and resulted from Indians allowing mistis to
abuse and exploit them. Flores Ochoa argues “that there is no substantial economic
difference between mistis and Indians, and that they share much of their culture . . . their
positions and structural relations rest rather on their self-identification as mistis or
Indians, which governs their mutual behavior.” Paerregaard states even more explicitly
that the most powerful vecino family “became mistis because the Indian population
categorized them in opposition to themselves and allowed the family to act like mistis.”
Without a long-term perspective on social, economic, and political relations, we would
quite likely fall into the same anti-materialist error. In his critique of Flores Ochoa, Van
Den Berghe draws on a historically deeper perspective to argue that in Kaykay, Flores
Ochoa’s fieldsite, “the misti group are the impoverished remnants of a decaying center
whose very status as a district capital is threatened; the misti group is so depleted by
emigration and economically impoverished that even its political domination has become
quite ineffective. They have become, in effect, Lumpenmistis, but their class status was
once very distinct from that of Indians.” While I have no personal experience in
Paerregaard’s fieldsite, my guess is that a similar situation obtained. Under circumstances
of precipitous disempowerment and impoverishment, the cultural, social, political, and
economic advantages—including Spanish language competence, familiarity with national
laws, social relations and ethnic solidarity with provincial and departmental elites,
municipal offices, and knowledge of regional markets—that gave vecinos concrete power
vis-à-vis Indians can be eroded to the point where they are not longer detectable by a
synchronic approach. In contemporary Chumbivilcas, as is generally the case, inertia can
preserve social attitudes, ideologies, and behaviors well beyond the lifespan of the
political economic configurations that bred and sustained them.
9.11 Interest into interests

In a crowning irony, the portion of the matrix that concerned ‘gente de nivel,’ though still affectively essential, is becoming increasingly immaterial, whereas the mapping of comunero families has retained its practical relevance, especially given the growing power of indigenous political parties. One could say that the mapping of comunero lineages is increasing in importance, but I think this would (1) risk understating the long-standing value of comunero genealogical data to vecinos, and (2) belie the rapid obsolescence of genealogical data per se. Detailed knowledge about regional comunidad leadership, as well as of the local comunero labor pool, has always been vital. Informants recall vividly their knowledge of contemporary peasant political activists during the 1960s and 1970s; they recognized which peasant individuals and kin groups were responsible for organizing land invasions, drafting formal complaints, initiating litigation, and advocating labor non-compliance; they knew, and still know, who the local presidentes comunales were, as well as their affiliations, orientations, and capacities. The matrix, however, is losing data, and the finer distinctions are flattening out. There are still, naturally, personal differences, personal relations of enmity and affection, but the significance of intraethnic and, especially, family-dependent distinctions is dwindling.

The fluidity of modern social relations has undermined the value of any fixed social map or matrix. On some level, Chumbivilcanos recognize this. But both indigenous urban immigrants and provincial vecinos seem to misrepresent social mobility and the cross-generational endurance of social status in ethnically particular ways. The
distortion inherent in vecino assessments of social structure and status is the tendency to fix or to make eternal or long-standing evanescent, provisional historical facts and circumstances. This postulated or assumed fixity of lineage, however, is simultaneously what makes it expedient and what makes it prone to obsolescence and irrelevance in the face of the rapid changes to which I referred earlier. The genealogical data is still accurate, in the sense that an Ugarte is still an Ugarte, a Wamaní still a Wamaní, but it no longer signifies much, practically speaking. Genealogical knowledge was formerly not primarily a means of establishing identity and affinity, but rather a concrete modeling of power relations. The vecino is not only increasingly unable to genealogically place his interlocutors, but—given his increasing political and economic marginalization—his ‘placements’ are also increasingly irrelevant to the determination of social status. The distinctions he makes are no longer meaningful. They cut the world at places where there are no longer joints.

The definition of the term ‘vecino’ presented by one of my hacendado informants in the epigraph of this chapter—which defined the vecino as one of those who traditionally had power, surname, property, and lineage—suggests that the basic factor that defined the vecino community was ‘Interest’ (in the sense of advantages and financial and political stakes), something about which it now says relatively little, and less each year. Genealogical knowledge is now used primarily to delineate a community of fraternity, or of interests, in the sense of subjects of enthusiasm or afición. A vecino’s concrete interest may be served by associating with a comunero alcalde, but the scions of the old landowning families are far more likely to share social interests: in cockfighting,
musicianship, reminiscing and gossiping about mutually relevant peers. In the subsequent chapter, I specifically discuss this shift from Interests to interests.

9.12 Conclusion

The overarching point is that even in relatively modern, state-level societies, in which kinship and kin groups no longer play important corporate economic and political roles, genealogical reckoning remains a powerful, structuring social ideology. In Chumbivilcas, there are no longer lineages in the fullest sense; what exists, or remains, is an echo or a shadow preserved in lineal ideology. It is a tribute to the enchanting power of lineal or genealogical ideology, especially for declining elites, that many of my informants continue overwhelmingly to associate and identify with their fellow vecinos, continue to marry endogamously, and continue to treat comuneros with indifference—despite the fact that their Interests would be better served—given the growing provincial hegemony of the campesinado—by adopting and implementing more practically appropriate categories and practices of categorization. Comuneros are taking over the very positions within social space that once helped to define ‘nivel’ and ‘decencia’: they are, for example, doctors, attorneys, comerciantes, regidores, and alcaldes. They are now literally vecinos—in both the residential and the former civic sense—and yet my informants’ lineal models of descent and affiliation hamper adaptation to these changes. While they are forced increasingly to interpret the complex bricolage of distinct racial, ethnic, and class traits, they continue to cling to the traditional process of genealogical identification. In fact, this is a central part of what makes ‘decadent elites’ decadent: the fixity and immunity to pragmatic revision of their values and social categories.
Chapter 10
Retreat

The basic feature of the contemporary life of the vecino community is retreat; a pervasive retreat across almost all fronts of economic, political, and social activity. They have, nearly to a man, retreated from their country estates to their weatherworn casonas in town and, more often than not, sold even these to move into more modest townhouses or apartments in Santo Tomás or distant cities. They have retreated from the private into the public sector, from estate agriculture, cattle-raising, and commerce into, above all else, education. Instead of exploiting and expropriating the labor and property of the comunidad, they have retreated into squabbles and litigation over their own inherited property, turning inward against their own siblings and cousins. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, they have retreated from political power into culture, elaborating and asserting a proprietary claim on the province’s distinctive folklore and, in the process, retreating from the present into the past. The chapter closes with a discussion of the ways in which these forms of retreat are also ways of advancing into a challenging and rapidly changing future and the competition that the vecino community faces in its attempts to maintain legitimate authority over the province’s distinctive cultural tradition.

10.1 Retreat from the countryside

Though the vecino’s identity or self-image was dominated by his ethnic and civic distinction from the indigenous peasantry and was rooted in urban residence, the country estate was traditionally his primary source of income. Even urban services were provided
primarily by colonos or wagchilleros from rural estates. The changes of the last several decades have decisively undermined the hacienda regime and have thrown vecinos back to the towns and to the cities beyond the province’s boundaries. The returns on investment of time and money in farming and herding are now matched or exceeded by alternative forms of urban employment and enterprise. Those vecinos who still own rural property generally underutilize it, or lease it to comuneros from nearby communities. In and around Santo Tomás, the number of vecinos involved directly and predominantly in agro-pastoralism is minimal. Several older family lines still have chacras (small agricultural plots), which are maintained by neighboring comuneros, frequently with long-standing ritual ties to their families, and which they visit several times a year during sowing or harvest. Nonetheless, one can count on two hands the families who are intensively involved in and derive the majority of their income from agro-pastoral production. Furthermore, with the decline in relations of compadrazgo between vecinos and comuneros, those vecinos who do operate haciendas find it increasingly difficult to recruit caretakers and seasonal labor.¹

The retreat from the countryside has been proceeding for several decades. Several scholars working in Chumbivilcas and nearby provinces have argued that the sierra’s landed elite has been shifting into novel urban and commercial socio-economic positions rather than struggling to retain or regain their former agricultural dominance. Linda Seligmann, whose primary fieldwork was done in the province of Paruro directly to the north of Chumbivilcas, asserts that, in the wake of the Agrarian Reform and “following the construction of the truck road, hacendados turned their attention to the potential of participating in the commercial sector by purchasing trucks. Some did so, not because
they were upwardly mobile but because the economic prospects in agriculture had gradually waned.”

Maria Lagos has echoed this finding in her work in Bolivia.³

Although this retreat from the countryside has often involved a departure from the province altogether, many vecinos have taken an intermediate step by pulling back to Santo Tomás or one of the province’s district capitals. Santo Tomás is a small town. The area in which government services, specialty shops, and restaurants are located covers perhaps 12 blocks of paved streets. The structures letting onto the plaza are still owned almost exclusively by members of the traditionally ‘notable’ vecino families. As one moves out from the center, however, the proportion of vecinos drops precipitously. Despite the much greater population density in the urban core, the blocks surrounding the main plaza are still largely the “known social universe” described in the previous chapters (except, of course, on market day, when the streets fill with vendors from comunidades).

To reiterate what has already been said regarding vecindad and the function of the Spanish town in the countryside, the villa was the center of non-indigenous exploitation of the countryside. As Stavenhagen puts it, “the regional city was an instrument of conquest and is still an instrument of domination.”⁴ Or, in Aguirre Beltran’s description, “the regional city, as the home of the Ladino population in Indian territory, plays a dominant role in the colonial situation as chef-lieu of the geographical area where it acts as a powerful integrating factor.”⁵ These towns were almost exclusively inhabited by vecinos and their retainers and other service providers. One elderly informant recalled that in his youth in Santo Tomás, “there were hardly any people. Few. Everyone was in the campo. It was a feudal world [speaking semi-ironically]. Everyone in Santo Tomás
was related by family.” The *casonas* surrounding the Plaza de Armas were owned exclusively by *vecinos notables*. Tannenbaum writes of the hacienda-town relationship in Peru more generally that “better houses in the town usually belong to the neighboring haciendas and are occupied by some members of the family, probably an old mother, or a brother who does not like to live on the hacienda or who has some professional interest. The children of the hacendado also are in this house during the school year.” It is to these houses that the relatively impoverished and socially diminished members of these families have withdrawn.

10.2 *Peasants in town*

In the last twenty years, however, neighborhoods of adobe residences have sprung up along the main arteries into town and out toward the municipal stadium. The social character of these neighborhoods is distinct from the city proper. Almost all of their residents are comuneros, splitting their time and energy between town and their homes and fields in natal communities. Most are still literally *comuneros*, retaining membership in the *comunidad* through continued participation in its assemblies and performance of communal labor, either personally or by proxy. Unlike ‘true’ urban migrants, most translocating comuneros hail from communities that are within several hours walk of Santo Tomás, Colquemarca, or the other district capitals. As a result, they are able to maintain their communal relations and assets with little difficulty and substantial benefit. Aguirre Beltrán argued in the 1970s, that “the most important step” in the adoption of non-indigenous identity was “taken when the Indian establishes residence in the *misti* capital of the province, *chef-lieu* of the region of refuge.” In Chumbivilcas, however, in
the current conjuncture, urban migration does not involve *mestización*. Given the fact, as I have noted in previous chapters, that conspicuous expressions of indigenousness have gained significant cachet and that comuneros have taken municipal power—*in large part by articulating an affirmative discourse of indigenousness*—it is no longer necessary or advantageous for comuneros to forsake their indigenousness in order to urbanize and to rise socially (though poverty and peasantness are still, obviously, mortal social handicaps). Urban migrants always risk becoming doubly marginal—marginal to their former rural communities and marginal to their new urban communities—but the retention of both communal social relations and communal identity means that urban migration within Chumbivilcas is indigenizing the town rather than deracinating the indigenous migrant.

Although the majority of new town residents move into peripheral *pueblos jóvenes*, the more affluent now have residences in the center of town. One thing to keep in mind is that the real estate market in district and provincial capitals is still in its infancy, and capital investment is extremely low, so that even properties within blocks of the plaza are financially accessible to moderately successful campesinos. What’s more, because most urban migrants are still able to consume staple foods from their family plots, the cost of living in town is not necessarily substantially greater than that in the *comunidad* (of course, the change of lifestyle does ultimately necessitate greater expenditures). This, along with the absence of legal segregatory mechanisms and the depression of property values due the continual outmigration, has resulted in the rapid erosion of traditional segregation. Unlike in modern European and American cities and towns, citizens of all racial, ethnic, and class categories coexist in very close quarters in
rural Andean towns; town-dwelling comuneros sometimes share undivided patio or kancha space with the scions of hacendados. Racism is a simple thing to forswear when one lives in a sharply and effectively segregated environment. Where, as in America, race and class are closely associated, economic and occupational factors tend to serve as more neutral proxies for race, allowing Americans of European descent to live in racially homogenous neighborhoods, where those ethnic others whom they encounter are more likely than not entering their social space temporarily as service workers, and therefore obligated to carefully observe deferential, even obsequious, behavior toward white employers and clients . . . or lose their job. So long as white American employers demonstrate gracious or generous demeanor toward appropriately subservient latino or black service, they can consider themselves race-blind. Furthermore, because racial interaction for most Americans takes place largely in commercial environments that obey their own strict behavioral norms, there is a limited amount of negotiation involved. The environment of close inter-ethnic and interracial interaction in Chumbivilcas denies vecinos (and comuneros) such luxuries. Neighbors, commuters, shoppers, and competitors of different ethno-racial categories must interact daily and in many settings and modalities. The aegis of socio-economic exploitation that formerly super-imposed itself upon, conditioned, and codified inter-ethnic thinking and behavior is no longer viable or exigent. It certainly exists, vestigially as it were, in the minds and memories of all serranos, but both mestizos and comuneros recognize that it has no objective power (on the provincial level), despite its engrainedness and, for mestizos, its allure.
The public sector and the educational bastion

The economy of Chumbivilcas is still geared predominantly toward agro-pastoral production. There is barely any local industrial development. There are several cooperatively owned mills and some private facilities for the elaboration of dairy-based fortified powder for the government’s Vaso de Leche program. Santo Tomás has an array of small family businesses, including metal-workers, glass-cutters, and carpenters. Nonetheless, the primary source of salaried employment is the federal and municipal government. Some of these jobs are in autonomous state enterprises like SEDAPAL or Electro Sur Este, the water and electric utilities respectively, and some are in municipal administration and contracting (from which, again, vecinos are increasingly excluded), but the greatest portion of public sector employment is in the educational system. Teaching positions have been some of the few sources of government salary in rural areas, and personal career planning tends to revolve around how to acquire a tenured teaching appointment.

Chumbivilcas has traditionally been severely educationally disadvantaged. At the time of the 1993 census, it had the lowest literacy rate in Cuzco department (tied to its low degree of urbanization): an overall rate of 55% and a female rate of 36% (compared to the rate of Cuzco province proper of 92% and 87% respectively). It had the highest rate of individuals with no formal education (44%) and the lowest rate of individuals with higher education (2%). In a country in which the general population associates dependence on Quechua with poverty and ignorance, 95% of Chumbivilcanos learned Quechua as their mother tongue. School facilities are meager and dilapidated, funds are
sparse, the curriculum is outdated, teaching materials virtually nonexistent, temperature at times viciously cold, and the communities isolated and alien to many instructors. Salaries for primary and secondary teachers are likewise meager to modest. The more junior and financially insecure contract teachers receive around 800 soles a month, with minimal health and retirement benefits. This is not much—barely enough for a single worker to make ends meet—but, given the fact that the Peruvian minimum wage at the time of fieldwork was 530 soles ($169) a month and local wage employment scarce, even contract teaching jobs were coveted sources of income. Tenured teachers, principals, and administrators can make between 1,200 and 2,500 soles, which, while not a fortune, is enough to provide for a family, especially when supplemented by a second wage or rents from property. In addition, appointed teachers obtain access to the proprietary educational healthcare system, and longtime schoolteachers are grandfathered into the more generous pensions of the pre-Fujimori era.

Insufficient salaries have, in fact, likely contributed to a ‘vecinification’ of educators. As Lipset points out of university professorships, because salaries are rarely sufficient to fully support instructors, professors need to be otherwise wealthy and thus the “high prestige of the university in Latin America is to some extent linked to its identification with the elite, with the assumption that professors and graduates, ‘doctors,’ are gentlemen.” While many vecinos left the province—again, primarily to seek professional, urban employment—those who remained have been able to combine modest rents from farming and stock-raising with teaching salaries. Teachers from outside of the province, on the other hand, must rely exclusively on the relatively meager teaching salary. This discourages competition from qualified outside applicants for
contract teaching positions and, prior to the expansion of popular education in the 1980s, made vecinos the sole minimally qualified candidates for posts.

10.4 Status of teachers and other technocrats

In addition to modest, relatively stable salaries, the status accorded to teachers and other technocrats in rural Peru has contributed to the appeal of the sector. Even minimal credentials or professional titles afford their bearer significant social distinction in the countryside. Contemporaneous social relations are increasingly egalitarian, but elderly campesinos will still literally hunch themselves over in a humbling bow when addressing a teacher or low-level bureaucrat. Although, therefore, education and educators are associated with modernization and liberal values, there is countervailing tendency for education to contribute to reconfigured forms of distinction and hierarchy. It may seem counterintuitive, but even the declining nobility in Europe, for example, was supportive of meritocracy when it served its interests. Davis Bitton discusses several discursive strains in 17th century France that advocated the investment of noble agrarian rents and state subsidies in the legitimation of nobility through education and that juxtaposed the rising bourgeoisie’s supposedly illegitimate rule of wealth to the nobility’s traditional rule by birth, cultivation, and, ideally, merit.

By investing in education, the more farsighted vecino families were able to make precisely the advocated shift from illegitimized forms of coercive ethnic or caste rule to legitimate forms of meritocratic or technocratic authority. Conlin argues, drawing on fieldwork in Cuzco department in the 1970s, that beneath the “guise” of merit and technocratic proficiency “runs an old theme for, while education expands at primary level
(thus instilling it as a highly valued good), it is those who are already well-placed who have the means to give their children more and better of it so that they might become experts respected by all.”\textsuperscript{16} Though many professors are now from outside of the province (and many of these are former \textit{comuneros} or \textit{de origen humilde}), vecinos still hold well over half of the tenured elementary and secondary teaching positions, despite constituting less than ten percent of the total population.\textsuperscript{17} Beginning with the return to civilian rule in the 1980s, vecinos became nearly a caste of rural educators. Without this opportunistic shift, the exodus of vecinos would have been even more complete. This remarkable transformation has been discussed by Gose, Paponnet-Cantat, and Poole, all working in and around Chumbivilcas.\textsuperscript{18} Gose found, in the Huaquirca province of neighboring Apurímac that

\begin{quote}
eleven of the town’s thirteen teachers were born locally, and the other two married into notable families, had children, and are long-time residents. Of those notables under the age of forty at the time of my fieldwork in Huaquirca, eleven out of sixteen were teachers, and every notable household of this generation included at least one teacher in its focal couple. The status of notable and occupation of teacher have all but converged, and this creates a powerful lobby of the expansion of education.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

Paponnet-Cantat found the vecino community in an equivalently hegemonic control of educational institutions in Chumbivilcas (specifically Colquemarca and Capacmarca).\textsuperscript{20} Gose’s reference to the two in-marrying educators suggests another facet of the vecino domination of education: not only have educators tended to be drawn from local vecino families, but non-local educators tend to become allied by marriage and affinity with the culturally similar vecino community.
10.5 Calculation and exploitation

Paponnet-Cantat has specifically treated the assumption of educational power by “members of the landed class” in Capacmarca, Chumbivilcas. She writes that, “in an attempt to retain some control at the local level and to prevent the spread of outside political influence, members of the landed class increasingly occupied the available teaching positions which became important sources of power.”21 I would argue that, though ‘retaining control’ and ‘preventing outside influence’ may have been ancillary benefits of educational authority, vecinos seek to obtain teaching positions predominantly to receive the associated salary and secondarily to salvage a modicum of their former status. The sociopolitical intentionality that she attributes to the landed class’s shift into education seems like, at best, a minor element of personal and familial calculation. The remainants of the vecino community shifted into the educational sector neither collectively nor as part of a calculated attempt to retain political control. I have lived amongst and talked at length with dozens of teachers in Chumbivilcas, and everything I have heard convinces me that financial opportunism was the overwhelming determinant of their decisions to go into teaching.

Paponnet-Cantat and others have also emphasized the exploitation of students by schoolteachers. Paponnet-Cantat writes that exploitation is endemic. The majority of teachers are involved in graft, theft and corruption which continuously drain the comuneros’ resources. Various forms of extortion are employed as mechanisms of domination. Public funds are also misused. For example, in 1983 the Ministry of Education provided funds to complete the construction of a high school, but the director (who was also a rustler) preferred to use the money for installing community water taps near his home. This led to the closing of the secondary school in 1985. Also, goods intended for the children are
confiscated by teachers for their own use. Even worse, students frequently serve as domestics or carriers. Though this sort of activity appears to have declined in recent years, with greater government oversight and greater parental and student understanding of their rights, it remains a serious problem. Sexual exploitation of female students by male teachers is frequently rumored and I am aware of several cases that have resulted in criminal investigation. Students sometimes perform light labor in the homes of their teachers, though, in my experience, this is usually an informal kind of after-school care: young students are given nonessential work, fed, and kept out of trouble until their mothers can finish their work and take them back to their communities. The mothers of schoolchildren sometimes cook or clean in teachers’ homes, particularly during fiestas, but this labor is usually rewarded in kind (women commonly receive a portion of the prepared food or other comestibles to take home to their family) and is part of an environment of diffuse labor reciprocity.

The main problem with accounts that attribute extraordinary deviousness or viciousness to vecinos is that they overlook the profound irony of the vecino shift into education: the social stratum that once lived and profited by exploiting the indigenous peasantry continues to live off them, but they now live by providing services to, rather than obtaining services from, the peasantry. In this they were the beneficiaries not of their own deviousness, but of the exigencies of state policy implementation. In the context of the massive drive in the late 1970s and 1980s to extend educational services to the popular classes, the government was forced to recruit educators of extremely modest educational achievement and little or no specific teaching training. Primov wrote, at the
time, that to “teach Indians, it was sufficient to be a mestizo.”23 While this may have been a bit of an overstatement, almost any level of post-primary education was sufficient qualification for teaching in the countryside. Few comuneros at the time had received a complete primary education, fewer still had any secondary education, and almost none had completed a college degree. Many vecinos, on the other hand, had received local primary education as well as secondary education in boarding schools in Arequipa or Cuzco. As a result, they had a nearly absolute employment advantage vis-à-vis the provincial campesinado. Exacerbating this was the fact that educated, urban teachers frequently considered posts in the isolated southern Sierra a demeaning form of exile.24 Left with virtually no local competition and little interest from potential competitors from outside the province, the vecino acquired a near monopoly of positions within the expanding educational apparatus. Finally, the administrative officers of the provincial UGEL (Unidad de Gestión Educativa Local), or school district, were often recruited from this same population of minimally qualified and politically-connected vecinos. With control over hiring, placement, and promotion, the vecino control of education was effectively absolute.

The educational hegemony of the vecino community was thus secured largely through structural advantages, rather than extraordinary initiative and deviousness. Vecinos were, in short, in the right place at the right time. The competition for positions was uncharacteristically light and the lure of a secure salary, status, and legitimation—with perfunctory duties and little oversight—naturally strong. Vecino families had traditionally invested a portion of their wealth and influence in acquiring post-primary education for their children, often in prestigious institutions in Cuzco and other Peruvian
cities. The education received in these institutions, in turn, put them in a highly advantageous situation vis-à-vis the indigenous peasantry with regard to teaching appointments. The life histories of many of my vecino informants demonstrate the inadvertent, windfall quality of the shift into education: few had anticipated a career in teaching prior to the rapid expansion of local teaching positions. The oldest teachers essentially stepped immediately into newly opened positions, with no specialized training; the generation now in their fifties and late forties came home to teaching positions after two years of training in teaching institutes in Cuzco.

While I have argued that the move into teaching was not calculated to perpetuate the exploitation and control of the campesinado, it does seem true, as Conlin argues that the technocratic ideology of state representatives in rural communities “negates the real meaning of participation. It creates experts who use the status they gain from higher education in order to control the peasantry under the guise of participation.”25 The context of Conlin’s assertion were the efforts of reform agencies of Velasco Alvarado’s Revolutionary Government to reorganize communal landholding and production. Under the current circumstances, educators seem to be much less interested in control and more interested in getting paid. It would actually be difficult to hypothesize precisely to what purpose vecino educators would ‘control’ their students or their students’ parents. It is obviously true that the more pliable a student or parent, the easier the educator’s job. The school district and principals set goals and promulgate directives, which educators must implement, and the ability to control certainly facilitates this. In a more general sense, educators seek to parley their status as teachers into prominence and esteem in the larger
community, which may facilitate their individual endeavors. I would argue, however, that there is nothing extraordinary or particularly sinister about these motivations or activities.

More disturbing than control is the diffuse denigration of peasantness and the patronizing and sometimes demeaning attitude taken toward, in particular, comunero parents of students. Conlin writes, somewhat histrionically, that, “for the peasant child in general, he becomes educated enough to give him due respect for the educated few coupled with a distaste for country life, and to make him fit to become ‘rubbish in the slums of Lima’ . . . participation becomes the new way of domination, or rather legitimation of that domination.” Webster, working in Cuzco around the same time period as Conlin, argues that the use of Spanish in instruction, “along with moralistic overtones in the teaching of most subjects, served mainly to derogate runa culture and extol that of mestizos.” At the same time as vecino domination of educational institutions gives them access to salary and status, it also enables them to continue to treat their students and students’ parents in a fairly demeaning manner, and to lend an air of legitimacy to this mistreatment.

10.6 Low quality of local schooling

Anthropologists working in and around Chumbivilcas in the 1980s associated the low overall quality of education in Chumbivilcas with vecino control of the education system, essentially implying a causal relationship between the two phenomena. Without entering too deeply into the mechanics of schooling and the school system in Chumbivilcas—which are a constant source of gossip, indignation, and lamentation amongst my informants, many of whom are schoolteachers—the local school system
does, in fact, seem lamentably deficient in the educational opportunities it provides its students. Vecinos and comuneros alike consider the local system to be sharply inferior to those of Arequipa and Cuzco. Vecinos with sufficient income—even, and perhaps especially, schoolteachers—send their children to boarding schools in Arequipa or Cuzco.28 Although I have met and shared deeply satisfying intellectual companionships with a number of vecino educators, most teachers partake of the general population’s lack of academic passion. Even literate Chumbivilcanos do not, as a matter of habit, read. The only library in Chumbivilcas—which must serve a province of 80,000—has only four or five shelves of books, most of them for children. The average vecino has less than a dozen books lying on tables or shelves. Comuneros rarely have any books except for bibles and children’s textbooks. There is no local press, and newspapers must be brought overland from Arequipa or Cuzco.

Frequent rotation of teachers through varying grade levels prevents teachers from developing specialized, age-appropriate approaches, curricula, and expertise. Frequent classroom changes prevent teachers from cultivating an optimal environment for learning or a proprietary interest in their classrooms. Teaching qualifications, by European and American standards, are low. English teachers, for example, typically read grade-school level English prose with great difficulty and their English conversation is barely intelligible. I have rarely seen teachers prepare lessons in advance or grade papers after class in the home. Many work long hours, especially in fiesta season, but most overtime is mandated by school administrations to prepare for parade and folkloric dance competitions, rather than tutoring or other properly academic activities.
The schools that serve comunidades are even more handicapped. The farther from town, the more likely that positions in communities will be filled by teachers on yearly contracts, who receive minimal wages and are not grandfathered into the more generous retirement benefits of long-time instructors. Just as teachers from Cuzco consider teaching assignments in Santo Tomás demeaning and onerous, for locals, the failure to receive a nombramiento or at least a contractual position in Santo Tomás or their natal district capital is considered a serious personal and family crisis. Teachers who are not native to the region treat rural assignments as a lamentable, even calamitous, financial necessity. They flee back to the city whenever possible, often taking extended weekends. Even Santo Tominos who teach in districts or comunidades often extend their weekend visits home as long as possible.

Ethnicity is an integral part of the education system, though it is mediated spatially through the town/comunidad dichotomy and socio-economically through teaching certificates and university degrees. Most vecino children attend one of two prestigious primary schools in the center of town, while urban migrants are tracked into the more peripheral primary and, later, trade schools. While post-secondary education for vecinos typically involves university education in Arequipa and Cuzco, most comuneros are only able to attend the local teaching institute or the provincial sede (seat) of the departmental university, usually consisting of several classrooms, one or more contracted professors, and a limited, regionally appropriate curriculum aimed at training students for local trades rather than producing professionals. Teacher training is also ethnically inflected. Most provincial capitals have an instituto (two-year teaching college) to provide basic training for primary and secondary school educators. Certification from a
teaching institute is normally considered inferior to a university diploma, for several interrelated reasons. First, institutos confer a teaching certificate rather than a Bachelor’s degree. The teaching certificate or certificado is considered by most to be a license to teach, whereas, in rural Peru, a bachiller, in addition to giving its recipient the proficiency to practice a profession, is a status marker which significantly improves the recipient’s social standing, disproportionately to the four or five years of additional preparation. Second, degrees received in urban centers are almost universally considered superior to those received in local institutes. It is therefore preferable to attend UNSAAC (Universidad de San Antonio Abad, Cuzco) or UNSAA (Universidad de San Agustín, Arequipa) to receive academic training, and even more prestigious to attend San Marcos or La Católica in Lima. It is likewise preferable to attend an instituto in Cuzco than one in Santo Tomás. The provincial instituto is the most peripheral of the post-secondaria institutions and is therefore the least respected. Thirdly, there is a feedback relationship between these status distinctions and the long-term tendency of provincial institutes to train comunero teachers, which amplifies the depreciation of institute certificates.

Finally, alcohol abuse is an even more serious problem in education than it is in politics. All informants agree that the level of alcohol abuse amongst teachers, both inside and outside of the classroom, has declined significantly in recent years. Nonetheless, most acknowledge that alcoholism remains embarrassingly common amongst male teachers. It is fairly common to see educators on campus with wan faces and bloodshot eyes from the previous nights’ festivities, and sometimes displaying the lingering affects of intoxication. As in politics, alcohol is not only an aspect of the informal leisure culture of educators, but also, to a certain extent, an element of its
institutional functioning. In particular, educators argue that drinking between educators, between educators and administrators, and between educators and padres de familia is an essential part of fostering a proper spirit of trust and collegiality. One educator vehemently criticized the principal of his school for not drinking with the padres de familia, arguing that they would soon ask for him to be replaced if he failed to obtain their trust through sharing a jaraneo, or all night drinking spree, with them.

10.7 Property, inheritance, and litigation

For many of the same reasons that vecinos have retreated from the countryside and from the private sector more generally, they have also retreated from inter-communal conflict into intra-familial conflict. As their capacity to project their power into and expropriate land from neighboring communities has declined, vecino family members must now content themselves with subdividing and fighting over what land they have left, rather than match their natural increase with further acquisitions. Disputes over inheritance are integral to the factionalism, rumor-mongering, and general pettiness that characterize rural life throughout the world. Peasants everywhere have no doubt muttered their own versions of the aphorism, repeated constantly by my own informants, “pueblo chico, infierno grande” [small town, big hell]. Though conflicts over family property are common everywhere, given the basic unscrupulousness of humankind, the intensity and pervasiveness of internecine antagonism and chicanery between adult siblings in Chumbivilcas are remarkable. Offspring abscond, for example, with furnishings, destroy documents in order to avoid repaying loans from the estate, shift property markers, sell unassigned livestock, and illegally sell or squat indefinitely on property bequeathed to
another. One informant recalled stealing several hundred head of cattle from her father, loading them in trucks, and selling them in Arequipa. Another recalled watching a neighbor drown his brother in the Rio Santo Tomás in a furious dispute over land. One of the González sons purportedly paid his peon to murder his father in order to speed and ensure his inheritance of the family’s vast estates in Colquemarca. Murders of siblings and cousins over inherited property are so common that they hardly seem to occasion surprise.

Historically, the Spanish system of partible inheritance has involved a number of formal and informal methods for guaranteeing the equitable distribution of property while at the same time attempting to preserve the rent-generating capacity of family holdings. This tradition has prevented, among other things, the progressive immiseration of cadet lineages, but also contributes to the rancorous conflict over inherited property. Lamar Marti writes that the “Castillian system of inheritance is regarded as a system of partible inheritance because, in contrast to systems of primogeniture, all legitimate heirs received a portion of the deceased's estate. The Castilian system of partible inheritance, however, was in a sense an intermediate system in that it neither required an absolutely equal division of an estate nor gave free rein to the testator to favor one child." A portion of the estate (the tercio or quinto) could be bequeathed disproportionately or in its entirety to a particular heir. In practice, however, estates were divided relatively equitably. Women were often favored with disproportions of the tercio and quinto, "as a reward for love and services rendered and [in order to guarantee their] financial security," but in the majority of cases minimal or no mejora (augmented share) was granted. Certain norms were followed with regard to gender, with women tending to receive jewelry and
moveable wealth, including cash, as well as residential and rental property, and men
tending to receive “productive enterprises.” In order to prevent the pernicious
parcelization of agro-pastoral estates, families resorted to various formal and informal
mechanisms, including the entailment of property, bequeathing of shares in a single,
consolidated estate or enterprise, and purchase by one sibling or brother-in-law of other
inhabitants’ shares of the estate.

Even more problematic is the bewildering unwillingness of Chumbivilcanos to
draft and notarize testaments. All informants recognize the seriousness of the problem.
When asked why testaments were not prepared by their parents and grandparents they
suggest it was due to the precipitousness of their death or because an oral testament had
been made but was not respected or because it was not the custom in “aquellos tiempos.”
In one such conversation I asked why an informant’s father had died intestate, despite his
having known for several weeks that he was dying:

Vecino: I don’t know. For that reason, we’ve got problems now.
JCP: And you? Have you prepared a will?
V: [Laughing] No. I haven’t either.
JCP: Why?
that’s the reason nobody prepares them here.

The unwillingness to draft and the infrequency of drafting actionable wills and
testaments, carried over several generations, produces labyrinthine disputes between
siblings, half-siblings from second and third marriages, illegitimate half-siblings, cousins,
and even second cousins. It also contributes to the complexity and informality of titling,
which, in turn, complicates and discourages the drafting of wills.
More common than outright violence is the relentless litigation that plagues Chumbivilcan families. One of the most salient features of family relations in Chumbivilcas is the extreme litigiousness within the vecino community. Chumbivilcanos are acutely aware of this social problem. As one informant said, “almost all of the families here are embroiled in disputes because of inheritance.” Even vecinos who have essentially abandoned the province and now live in Cuzco, Lima, or Arequipa, maintain litigation with cousins, siblings, and other claimants to inherited property. When I visit elderly Chumbivilcanos in Cuzco, the conversation almost invariably drifts into lengthy grousing about ongoing land disputes and litigation, mostly between relatives. In fact, only two things routinely draw the vecino diaspora back to Chumbivilcas: litigation and fiestas. One encounters almost daily visiting members of old vecino families in town to take a deposition, gather land titles or other documents, confer with attorneys or allied family members, or speak with the local magistrate. Such encounters often adjourn to a house or local bar for beer and gossip.

Flores Ochoa noted the same tendency toward conflict over inheritance amongst misti families and argued that it led to a lack of cohesion relative to Indian families and ultimately to an “enmity” that went “so far as to stop them from talking to each other.” The socio-political consequences of this enmity and unwillingness to talk to each other are far-reaching. Disputes over property, and specifically inheritance, are a major element of the fissioning into hostile families and factions of vecino kin-networks. This intra-communal antagonism is, in turn, a decisive factor in the inability of vecinos to organize a united ethnic front, despite the fact that (a) vecinos still share enough interests, norms, and values to, in theory, formulate a consensual ethnic platform and that (b) it is
conceivable that an organized ethnic party or faction could effectively compete politically with the splintered socialist and indigenist comunero-based parties.

Vecinos essentially possess no organs of class. Certain cultural organizations, like the one that organizes festival cock fighting tournaments, are dominated by members of the old vecino establishment and vecinos sometimes form essentially ethnically or genealogically exclusive musical groups, but I am not aware of any properly vecino party, club, trade organization, or other institution, either newly founded or carried over from their era of ascendance. The Santo Tomás Club de Tiro is long defunct. The hacendado or propietario ranching associations have disappeared and been replaced by peasant dominated trade unions and cooperatives. As a caste, class, or ethnic group, vecinos will likely never again act in a concerted way in the pursuit of their collective interests. The closest vecinos come to reconstituting even a social block, in the sense of a social community with the critical mass to establish exclusive spaces and norms, is during the major festivals, when the vecino diaspora typically returns temporarily en masse.

10.8 The fiesta cycle

Fiestas are the ‘megafauna’ of sociality in Chumbivilcas. Three or four times a year, all social activity becomes oriented around competition and celebration, often for weeks at a time. In 2006, the anniversary of the province lasted nine days and included competitions of carros alegóricos (allegorical floats), danzas folklóricas (folkloric dances), marching, folkloric costume, painting, photography, weaving, poetry, soccer, volleyball, chess, cheese, milk, alpacas, sheep, cattle, bronco-busting, bullfighting,
horseracing, and cockfighting; the *torokacharpari* (cavalcade through the main plaza); multiple musical concerts in the municipal theater and main plaza; and, perhaps most pervasively, marathon bouts of public drinking. The sound of guitars and the intoxicated singing of men are persistent and ubiquitous. The most ‘folklorically enthusiastic’ citizens wear *traje típica* (which, despite the name, is typical only of fiestas and musical performances). Similar competitions and festivities are enacted for the *Fiesta Patronal*, as well as *Carnaval* (with the addition of qhashwa circle dancing and water fights) and *Navidad* (which includes the famous *takanakuy* fights).

The fiesta cycle accomplishes a number of vital social and psychological tasks. As Villena Aguirre noted of local festivities “the background of the reunion must be interpreted as a mechanism of sociability and collective communication of the *vecindad mestiza* of Santo Tomás.” Even in the period prior to the Agrarian Reform, fiestas drew into town the many ranchers and farmers who spent the majority of the year on their country estates. For vecinos today, one of the most satisfying aspects of the major fiestas is that it draws the diaspora back to the Tierra Brava for a short time. Although I’ve done no formal surveying on the subject, the main fiesta periods—*Carnaval* (February and March), *Aniversario* (June 21-24), *Fiesta Patronal (Virgen de la Natividad) de Santo Tomas* (September 6-13) and *Navidad/Takanakuy* (December 25)—can draw hundreds of members of the old vecino families. These periodic returns of the vecino diaspora are the metaphorical rains that water and sustain the traditional vecino identity. Suddenly the resident vecinos—marginalized, dwindling, and beleaguered—are once again surrounded by men and women whom they consider their peers. These fiestas are the most important means of reinforcing the traditional vecino self- and collective representations and
reconstituting, if only momentarily, a community fragmented and scattered by epochal change and migration.

At the level of the conceptualization of society, the fiestas allow the tattered, idealized remains of the genealogical model of society to once again be actualized or instantiated in social practice. The country siblings and cousins of old families have the opportunity to embrace, host, and stand in chattering groups around the main plaza with their relatively wealthy and successful urban parientes. They become, once again, the center of public attention, not only because their community is numerically augmented, but because the vecino community partakes of the status of its returning ‘native sons and daughters.’ Social interlopers who, through personal prosperity or political power, have ‘put on airs’ throughout the year, can momentarily be excluded from the legitimating association with returning vecinos. As one informant commented: “Now, during the fiestas, is the time to gauge niveles. People of one nivel can’t invade another nivel. People will be coming from Lima, Arequipa, Cuzco . . .” This statement was made in the context of the informant’s irritation that individuals of low or ambiguous status were attempting to assume social prominence that he believed they did not deserve genealogically (in the sense both of possessing a familial abolengo and of having received cultivation within an elevated family environment). He was confident, however, that visiting vecinos would share and thus validate his estimation of the offenders’ low status and that their concerted disapproval of the offenders’ airs would encourage the year-round community to sanction them and ‘put them in their proper places.’
10.9 Former vecino domination of fiestas

Up until Velasco’s seizure of power, vecinos played the decisive, controlling role in the fiesta cycle, organizing and sponsoring festivities and competitions, frequently in cooperation with the local Catholic parish and lay confraternities. The following extended excerpt from Villena Aguirre’s description of the horse races of Aytata, traditionally celebrated on the Sunday prior to the Día de Comadres, illustrates the former social prominence of the vecindario in local festivities:

The mestizos of Santo Tomás and those of the districts went to flaunt their horses, ponchos, and riding tackle; to eat fruit with their kin, to communicate and converse with other mestizos, because this festivity served as a mechanism of sociality . . . the traders also came out when they finished selling their goods. The mistis and mozos transferred themselves to the horserace track of Condepampa in order to agree on match ups and to place bets; assessing horses. Mestizo men, women and children; mozos and campesinos installed themselves on the cliffs and elevated places in order to get a panoramic view of the entire length of the track . . . The mestizos constituted a distinct group from the mozos and campesinos in order to orchestra the races, conserving social distances. These latter organized two or three competing teams, each with five or six racehorses that, after prolonged discussion over the weight, quality, stature, defects, and graces of the animals, they would run in pairs . . . Other times these competitors resulted from prior agreements between those propietarios who were aficionados of race horse breeding, whose rivalry was traditional, like the Góngora, Villena, Pacheco, Mendoza del distrito de Velille; Álvarez, Gómez, Negrón, Romero de Colquemarca; Vega, Ugarte, Boza, Cuba, Berrio, Peña, Gómez, Chávez de Santo Tomás. These races were called tapados (capped) and the horses were run without discussion or objection to the opposing animal.43

To be sure, Villena Aguirre elsewhere describes properly indigenous communal festivities, as well as the enthusiastic participation of comuneros in civic festivals, but the passage clearly portrays a socially distinct set of mestizo families in domination of festival preparation and celebration. Nonetheless, Villena Aguirre notes that the festival
of *Aytata*, though it was still actively celebrated in 1974 when he collected the major portion of his data, had, by the 1980s, “become impoverished in its essence” “as a consequence of the changes in the economic structure of the region of refuge and the migration of small proprietors to the cities of Lima, Arequipa, Cuzco, and Sicuani after the application of the Law of Agrarian Reform.”

![Figure 17. Audience (almost exclusively comunero) for *takanakuy* in Quiñota.](image)

There is still an element of ethnic specialization or segregation to participation in festivities, though it is rapidly eroding. The *riña* or *pelea de gallos* draws more vecinos than comuneros, in terms of both entrants and audience. Entrants to the *pelea* must pay a fee to participate, as well as pay for the upkeep and training of roosters, and spectators must pay an entry fee. On the other hand, vecinos generally take little part in the *carrera*
de caballos (horse races) and the doma de potros (rodeo) presumably because these require daily, intensive livestock handling on horseback, an activity that few vecinos, and even fewer of their young, able offspring, now perform. The bullfight, on the other hand, seems to draw equal numbers of young comuneros and vecinos, despite the fact that the vecino population is substantially smaller than the comunero. I attribute this to several factors. First, with the end of the hacienda system (except in isolated pockets, particularly in Colquemarca), few comuneros perform open-range herding. The culture that breeds bullfighting is not that of small peasant proprietors, but of large, extensive cattle estates. The toros de lidia, or feral bulls, which are favored for bullfighting are ideally raised on large estates rather than in peasant communities. Nonetheless, few large landowners remain who practice extensive free range stock raising. Even these estates tend to pasture more or less improved cattle on bofedales or irrigated land with improved pasturage, returning the animals to enclosures at night. Most individuals with heavily domesticated livestock have trouble providing bulls that are adequately wild and ill humored. Feral bulls are a luxury to which few propietarios and even fewer comuneros now treat themselves. Bullfighting teams sometimes must provide their own animals; on other occasions, ranchers sponsor the event by providing bulls. The overall system, however, favors vecino participants. More fundamentally, few Chumbivilcanos have real rodeo or roundup experience. As a result, participation is governed more by testosterone and a sense of communal expectation or entitlement to participate in the society’s symbolically central arena. I would hypothesize that vecinos chumbivilcanos participate disproportionately in the bullfights because they are expected to do so and feel entitled to
the kind of attention and social visibility that entering the bullfighting ring involves, whereas comuneros may feel inhibited or avoidant under such circumstances.

10.10 Compromisos

Vecinos retain some official prominence in festivities, due mostly to their predominance in education. The role of the school system in public life and, in particular, fiestas has expanded along with the influence of the municipality (both being, essentially, facets of the state’s expansion and penetration of civil society). Roughly half of fiesta days are committed to competitions between schools and classrooms from throughout the province. For months in advance, the town is awakened by the sound of practicing marching bands. Schoolteachers are obligated to coach their students late into the night preparing them for folkloric dances, folkloric parades, and formal marches. The most significant change over the last several decades in the organization and celebration of fiestas is their progressive municipalization. Greater municipal funding has meant the displacement of private and church funds and initiative from the management of fiestas. Combined with the nearly complete exclusion of vecinos from municipal government, this means that vecinos have essentially lost control over the planning, organization, and implementation of festivities; they are now largely consumers rather than producers of the provincial fiestas that their parents and grandparents once controlled.

The intense spirit of social commitment and communion that characterizes fiestas is a conspicuous version of the more humble category of the ‘compromiso.’ In Chumbivilcas, a substantial amount of time is spent lounging in the plaza after lunch and dinner, talking to friends and neighbors in the street, drinking in bars, and waiting for
transport. The phenomenon of the ‘*compromiso,*’ however, deserves special attention. The word in Spanish technically means a “commitment, obligation, or engagement.” As with its equivalents in English, it refers not so much to a concrete event or action, but rather to a class of unavoidable social commitment. In fact, it leaves intentionally obscure to what or whom the speaker is obligated or committed. Whereas Americans tend to use this class of terms to describe formal obligations, Peruvians frequently use it conversationally to signal to interlocutors that his or her schedule is constrained in a manner that they consider non-negotiable. In my experience, the range of reference is virtually limitless. It normally refers to a social obligation of one sort or another, but can be used euphemistically or deceptively to refer to some private activity which the speaker nonetheless considers obligatory. In a social environment as intense and demanding as the *vecino chumbivilcano*’s, it is in everyone’s interest to have a sort of ‘safe-word’ to indicate that attempts to sway him or her from fulfilling a social obligation would not be appropriate or successful. Although a compromiso is sometimes fabricated or over-stated to avoid a social demand, they usually truly are the bedrock of social life, and life more generally.45

In a sense, the daily responsibilities are what get a *vecino* from one compromiso to the next. This is especially true for male mestizos. While females are generally expected to keep track of the children, clean, cook, feed household poultry or livestock—as well as hold down a salaried job if possible, usually in education—men are usually not expected to attend to household labor after work. Adult vecinos spend afternoons walking down the streets, sitting on benches in the plaza, or visiting the *tiendas* of kith or kin. Evenings are spent in *pensiones,* bars, or perambulating through the town center. The
“paseo” is standard daily practice for men and women, though women tend to make this promenade ancillary to purposive activity (trips to the corner store, pension, or classroom), whereas for men the paseo is frequently an end in itself, frequently ending serendipitously with a cousin, compadre, or co-worker hectoring him off the street and into the nearest bar.

Alcohol is considered a quintessential element of any significant social occasion. The alcohol of choice is the 1-liter bottle of beer, normally Cuzqueña. Beer is usually bought in bars or street stalls—two twelve-bottle hard plastic cases at a time—and brought to private parties or to groups in the plaza during festivities. Between two and six men will share a single bottle and single glass or plastic cup, following a rigid ritual: the first person pours beer from the bottle into the cup, passes bottle to the person left, spends half a minute or so drinking the contents of the cup, then passes cup to the left, and the cycle is repeated. Whenever one bottle is finished, it is immediately replaced by another and the process continues. As has been alluded to in earlier chapters, it is extremely difficult for men to avoid being dragged into bars by friends and acquaintances, and virtually impossible during fiesta. Despite drinking copious amounts, however, most Chumbivilcanos are probably not clinically alcoholic. Many find the extensive and intensive social drinking onerous. All but bon vivants will go to some length to avoid impromptu drinking, especially if they find drinking unpleasant or physically injurious. One informant confided that he had selected the isolated location of his house in order to minimize exposure to importunate peers: “I built my house up here because we liked the view from here and, more than anything, because there’s just too many compromisos
below. There’s drinking 4 or 5 nights a week and I just can’t take it or avoid it when we’re living down there.”

10.11 *Retreat into culture*

In addition to being an opportunity to temporarily reconstitute an ethnic community, the fiesta is the quintessential ‘cultural’ event and therefore an opportunity to reassert the hegemony of the vecino community over the regional cultural tradition. As already noted, vecinos have little or no recourse to collective action, project formulation, or myth making. Their responses to modernity and its challenges are thus atomized and personal. Their ethnic group, widely considered illegitimate, is unable to act, either in or of itself. Any attempt to become vocal or self-aggrandizing would immediately make one vulnerable to accusations of *gamonalismo*. Responding to the previously enumerated challenges faced by their community, vecinos have almost entirely retreated from the political field and into the realm of ‘disinterested’ culture.46 Having lost their political authority, they are cultivating their cultural authenticity; no longer *jueces* (judges), they jealously guard their entitlement to selection as *jurados* (jurors who decide the winners in cultural contests).47

The preoccupation with leisure and cultural pursuits has been universal amongst established elites. As Bourdieu points out, “economic power is first and foremost a power to keep economic necessity at arm’s length. This is why it universally asserts itself by the destruction of riches, conspicuous consumption, squandering, and every form of gratuitous luxury.”48 Landed aristocracies have traditionally devoted a substantial portion of their time and resources to cultural pursuits and the cultivation of status distinctions.
Kautsky notes that “peaceful substitutes for war” have universally been developed and adopted by the aristocracy and that “tournaments, various sports involving horseback riding, and hunting” provide “opportunities for the maintenance of one’s honor and the acquisition of glory.” In Chumbivilcas, the vecino community traditionally followed this pattern; Villena Aguirre noted that the “ideal of disinterested culture leads them to place a high value on leisure, artistic skill, and intellectual speculation.”

Vecinos feel themselves qualified to continue to dominate the cultural life of the province, and the community at large continues to grudgingly concede this authority in certain regards. The vecino assumes, in effect, the right to represent four different modes of culture: (1) modern, rational Western culture (as the local representative of national society); (2) the ‘authentic’ autochthonous tradition (in an expository or curatorial manner); (3) the Spanish equestrian culture historically proper to the vecino community; and (4) ‘authentic’ regional culture (as an essentialization and romanticization of early 20th century hacienda folkways). The cultural repertoires of comuneros and vecinos have much overlap, but there are a number of indigenous songs and genres that vecinos do not normally perform. Certain types of mortuary, festival, and other occasional music are performed only by comuneros; in particular, woodwind, brass, percussion, and certain kinds of female vocal music are the exclusive preserve of comuneros. I have never encountered a vecino chumbivilcano who could play *pinkuyllo* (large flute or *flauta grande*) *pitu* (fife or piccolo or *flautín*), *qena* (flute or *flauta mediana*), *wakawaqra* (bullhorn), brass (trumpet, cornet, or tuba) or percussion (mostly shoulder-hung drum). These are instruments that are played almost exclusively by indigenous men (although, many comuneros now play stringed instruments, sometimes with great skill). Likewise, vecinos
rarely perform the lively, sometimes bawdy group dances characteristic of the comunidad. If and when vecinos gain proficiency in and perform these types of music—in the cases, for example, of wayno or qhashwa (round dance) dancing, they conceptualize their performance as a means of preserving, rescuing, or “giving value” to indigenous musical traditions.

![Casona of a vecino notable being built in the 1940s in the ‘estilo Inca’](image)

**Figure 18. Casona of a vecino notable being built in the 1940s in the ‘estilo Inca’**

The attitude or proprietary sense that accompanies these performances is complex. With regard to certain autochthonous artistic traditions, there seems to be a sense amongst vecinos, particularly musicians, that they are more appropriate guardians, even of indigenous traditions, than the contemporary comunero. In this, they echo the sense amongst Cuzqueño intellectuals of the 1920s and 30s, described by de la Cadena, that they were the legitimate *cultural* or *spiritual* heirs of the Incas, rather than their biological, but purportedly degenerated, indigenous descendants. At various times I
have heard vecinos argue that centuries of oppression have made the comunero too ignorant and debased to adequately appreciate, rescue, and preserve the Inca tradition.

This attitude is expressed with regard to a number of modalities of cultural expression, but primarily with regard to local traditional musical forms, like the wayno and yaraví, which have, in the process of popularization and contact with other musical genres, diverged sharply from their traditional forms. During one musical session with several middle-aged and elderly vecinos, I asked why the waynos that they were playing—composed, compiled, or adapted from indigenous melodies in the first half of the 20th century—were so melancholy:

(Vecino musician): That’s the thing!
(Vecino musician 2): Precisely for that reason.
(VM): That’s the sorrow, in the face of the powerlessness, of surrendering themselves . . .
(JCP): But those songs [of the 1920s and 1930s] were performed by mestizos . . .
(VM2): Yes, but who was able to feel, let’s say, oppression?
(VM): The indígena was totally dominated. He didn’t have morale. The only one who could feel, for how it was, was the mestizo. On behalf of his mother, his country, his land.

As I’ve alluded to in other places, there are circumstances in which vecinos will self-consciously thematize their mestizaje. Although they are speaking here in terms of the past, this discussion of mestizaje is a typical way of conceptualizing their contemporary ‘right to indigenous tradition.’ The logic of the ideology is (a) that the debasement of the contemporary campesino impairs their ability to appreciate the Andean tradition and to articulate their own experience, (b) that the vecino (as a mestizo) inherits, emblematically from the mother and the colonized motherland, an insight into and genius to express the indigenous experience, and (c) that, implicitly, this gives them a right, even an obligation,
to give voice to the purportedly voiceless *indígena* and to preserve autochthonous tradition.

In general, however, vecinos acknowledge that comuneros, especially those who live at higher altitudes, have retained many traditions that have since disappeared at lower altitudes and that this retention makes them more competent and legitimate practitioners. While the general comunero population is conceptualized as being vulgar, philistine, and ignorant of their own tradition, it is acknowledged that the very best practitioners of ‘legitimately’ indigenous culture are comuneros. Vecinos agree that the best *wakawagrap* players, 52 drummers, flautists, *harawi* singers, dancers, *paqos*, and weavers are comuneros. Their attitude suggests, however, that vecinos believe that they are in a better position to appreciate, judge, and preserve these traditions than the comunero masses. In short, vecinos generally conceptualize themselves as, if not the ideal practitioners of indigenous culture, the *curators* of it. Vecino cultural leaders think of it as their responsibility to ‘dar valor’ and ‘difundir’ these ‘recursos culturales’ to the public, both in Chumbivilcas and beyond.

This attitude and conceptualization can have comic consequences. One musical group of vecinos with whom I was associated often performed autochthonous songs in a conspicuously indigenous style. On one occasion they performed a traditional ritual song at the ‘wasichana,’ or roof raising, of a fellow schoolteacher of comunero descent who sometimes played mandolin and flute in their group. This teacher’s circle of family and friends were present, most of them comuneros. As the vecino group sang the traditional indigenous song of benediction, some of the *comuneras* snickered, with a combination of proprietary umbrage and genuine amusement that the daughters of some of the most
powerful hacendados in the province were wearing traditional indigenous costumes and singing traditional indigenous songs. Soon after, with a palpable air of one-upmanship, a group of comunerias, in the typical contemporary street attire of peasants, performed their own wasichana song, seemingly asserting their stronger claim to indigenous culture through their intimate command of the musical form, as well as implying the potentially spurious relation between folk costume and cultural legitimacy. In a final slight, the crowd of comuneros that politely clapped for the vecina group erupted in applause after the comunerias’ performance.

Further illustration of the expropriation of indigenous tradition is provided by the various accounts of the origin of the province’s most famous ritual event, the *takanakuy*. Throughout the southern highlands, comuneros meet in ritual combat on communally specific festival occasions. Sometimes these fights take the form of armed combat between neighboring communities, sometimes ritual fights between opposed moieties of the same community, and sometimes a daylong series of judged fights between individual members of opposing moieties. In Chumbivilcas, *takanakuy* generally takes the later form. Although the origins of the practice are somewhat obscure, it seems clear that they trace ultimately back to the pre-conquest era; nonetheless, vecinos tell a number of stories regarding the origins of the ritual, all of which trace it to the peculiarly brutal genius of their Spanish ancestors. Many of my informants concur with Villena Aguirre that a pair of 18th century Chumbivilcano hacendados began the tradition by diverting themselves with gladiatorial fights between their black slaves. Others argue that, having lost their supply of fighting cocks due to some calamity, several hacendados struck upon the solution of pitting their indigenous serfs in individual combat instead. These
‘historical’ accounts are almost certainly spurious. Nonetheless, as myths, they illustrate the expropriating thrust of vecino cultural ideology.

10.12 El qorilazo

The central element of this folkloric complex is the figure and concept of the qorilazo. The qorilazo is the cowboy of Chumbivilcas. He is identified by his qarawatanas (chaps), chullu (wool cap), white felt cowboy hat, charango, six-shooter, silver spurs, and poncho. Ideally, he is mounted on his rampant steed. The qorilazo is related to the more general Andean figure of the walaychu—a rootless, romantic, bohemian wanderer. Sociologically, the qorilazo is a working cowboy; as such, in Villena Aguirre’s description, the term corresponds to “a specialty and a prestigious social status, acquired through the mastery of the roles proper to the cattle-raising activity of the moderately affluent mestizo and the affluent peasant; in general terms, with certain exceptions, the rich misti and the poor peasant are excluded from the category;” the first because his wealth exempts him from manual labor on his ranch, and the latter because of “his lack of preparation in the arts and techniques of cattle-raising,” given that his poverty prevents him from acquiring either the land or livestock to necessitate such a style of life. The impoverished campesino may, however, accede to the status of qorilazo through employment as a ranch hand on a large vecino hacienda.

Objects associated with the qorilazo have particular resonance within the regional identity, including saddle and horse tackle, spurs, chaps, cowboy hats, ponchos, boots, guitars, horses, and infuriated bulls. The female folkloric costume and the stamping, spinning female part in the folkloric dance seem to be particularly powerful symbols.
Iconic natural and colonial monuments also serve as symbols of the regional identity; for example, the *Templo Mayor* in Santo Tomás, the *Gruta de Warari* in Livitaca, and the vast, open puna where the qorilazo archetypically roams. Images of these sites are often featured on compact disc covers, concert and festival posters, and calendars. If possible, families prefer to have their photos taken in front of these, or to have images of them photoshopped into their portraits.

![Figure 19. Qorilazo, circa 1960 (note that the costume is already folkloric).](image)

The development of the qorilazo tradition as a conscious, stylized collective representation of particular facets of provincial life dates at least to the early 20th century. Exponents like Pancho Gómez Negrón made the qorilazo a national and even international symbol of the Peruvian ranching culture. In the 1920s, the most prominent intellectuals of Cuzco contributed to this mythologization as part of their larger regionalist and indigenist agenda. The famous Luís Valcárcel wrote, somewhat
histrionically, that the “only gaucho that remains in America is this gaucho of Chumbivilcas, Indian on horseback, Andean centaur that awaits his Martín Fierro.”

Uriel Garcia propounded an environmental determinist thesis regarding the origins of the qorilazo’s supposed wildness: “Across these implacable landscapes there is nothing for man but a dilemma: perish or dominate . . . the drama of the landscape creates in man a parallel state in the soul . . . The pampa incites movement. There is a pleasure in defying danger in this unrestrainable nature. Because of this the man of these territories is a spirit essentially sporting and thus youthful.” This theme of the close relationship between the qorilazo and the natural environment has been a constant element in the mythology and remains strong today. Chacon wrote in the late 1950s that the

Chumbivilcano presents himself to us always as a man ready for adventure, strong and hard, tranquil in the face of the fury of the storm, serene before the ferocity of the feral bulls, and haughty atop the indomitable steeds . . . if the land and the landscape have their singularities and their distinction, how is the man of Chumbivilcas—the inhabitant of that singular plateau—not also going to possess these traits. If the natural world shows itself splendid, open, and untamed; at times sullen and crackling, and at times, more frequently, sunny, diaphanous, and cordial, the heart of the Chumbivilcano must also be, and is, in effect.

Although Chumbivilcanos frequently say things like, “Somos qorilazos” or “Estamos en la tierra del qorilazo,” the genuine qorilazo is as rare in Chumbivilcas as the genuine cowboy is in the United States, the charro in Mexico, or the gaucho in Argentina. Each is an evocation of the romance of the open range; although there may be practitioners of these cattle-raising cultures at the margins of modern society, the political economy that produced them, and that necessitated their iconic skills, tools, and institutions, is now a thing of the past. Like the myth of the gamonal, which is still trotted out from time to time as a political tool, the myth of the qorilazo survives and thrives
because it serves important social and ideological functions. The consensus among anthropologists working in Chumbivilcas over the last several decades has been that the qorilazo tradition, with its mythologization of ante-Reform Chumbivilcas, has contributed to the continued domination of the old landed interests. Poole argues that, “as a hegemonic project mounted by intellectuals with ties to the gamonal class, the bullfight and its attendant folkloric practices had successfully enshrined the icons, attitudes, gestures, and symbols of an otherwise reviled and abusive elite as the identity of an entire province.” Vié similarly argues that, though the daily “reality is more associated with commerce and public services than the exploitation of grand landed properties” over which the qorilazo mythically roamed, “folklore continues to be a medium to dominate not the reality but the imagination of the province’s inhabitants.” She argues, furthermore, that vecinos possess “an entire system of diffusion for this image” of the qorilazo, which extends beyond the borders of the province to the Chumbivilcan diaspora in cities throughout Peru, and argues that, though “image corresponds to an identity valued by all the inhabitants of the province of Chumbivilcas,” it is nonetheless “manipulated by the dominant class (the vecinos), with the objective of maintaining a part of their power, formerly founded on the possession of large haciendas and the employment of violence. In this way, despite the loss of a great part of their lands, the vecinos, when they exalt the image of the qorilazo, continue to impose their domination by . . . forcing others thus to identify themselves with their model.” As her primary evidence, she analyzes the provincial musical tradition and the sociology of folkloric performance in Chumbivilcas. Musical performance is a major element of the qorilazo tradition. One of the symbols of the tradition is the famous early 20th century bohemian
charangista Pancho Gómez Negrón, who helped popularize Chumbivilcas and the qorilazo throughout Peru. Vié points out that,

in effect, over a long period of time, the use of [guitar and mandolin] was reserved for the descendants of Spaniards and prohibited to other social categories,” and points out, furthermore, that the most popular “musical groups . . . are formed by vecinos that retain local power, closely tied to the world of the hacienda (being landed property owners or descendants of them) and to the urban world . . . in general, the authors of songs are frequently known and all are vecinos.64

There is no question that vecinos have played and continue to play a prominent role in the elaboration and dissemination of the qorilazo tradition. What I will argue, however, in the proceeding section is that, while it is true (1) that elements of this body of folklore or tradition are invented, and frankly somewhat spurious, and (2) that certain elements of the tradition as it has developed are (a) particularly accessible to the vecino community, (b) disproportionately beneficial to it (most importantly its imagining of a shared, regional identity) and (c) articulated with self-serving pastoral myths about the nature of pre-Reform Chumbivilcas, the invented tradition surrounding lo qorilazo (3) is currently a genuinely collective project, shared by vecinos and comuneros alike, that (4) carries the potential to level and even invert the ethnic and class hierarchies that have historically characterized the province.

10.13 Invention of tradition

Given the central economic role of culture in Andean tourism, especially in and around Cuzco, it is natural that a relatively instrumental relationship toward folk practices would develop. Much of what Cuzqueños consider “cultura” would more likely be referred to as ‘folklore’ in America. Most provinces in Cuzco have their own moderately
distinct folkloric tradition. While these ‘traditions’ undoubtedly draw on distinct regional histories, this folkloric differentiation has been powerfully elaborated in the wake of the indigenist revival of the 1920s and 1930s. The folkloric costume of Chumbivilcas, for example, is certainly largely a product of innovations in the last several decades. Photographs even from the 1940s show vecinos in suits, ties, fedoras, and sometimes chaps, vecinas in European-style dresses and even jodhpurs, comuneros in ponchos and homespun calf-length pants and coats, and comuneras in long black homespun skirts, blouses, and button-decorated coats. If confronted with these photos and asked how the current folkloric costume—which is shared throughout the high provinces, with variations from district to district—developed, vecinos will often trace it back to the uniforms of this or that hacienda owner’s staff. While I am not crucially interested in definitively establishing a pedigree for the contemporary folkloric tradition, it is important to recognize that, though it draws on regionally specific folkways, it is essentially an ‘invented tradition’ in the sense delineated by Hobsbawm (as discussed briefly in chapter 6).
Elderly Chumbivilcanos complain that the iconic ponchos, which are now quintessentially and most commonly red with bands of *pallay* (woven, often figurative, designs) at the sides, were traditionally light grey or beige with simple vertical stripes at the edges. Qarawatanas, likewise, are now almost universally black with white figurative appliqués of horses, horseshoes, and pistols, whereas they were once made of unadorned, tanned leather. It’s clear that two unrelated processes are operating here. First, both ponchos and *qarawatanas* were historically crafted locally of locally available materials (their colors thus reflecting the colors of undyed alpaca fiber and tanned leather). Technological innovations, specifically imported aniline-dyed fibers and colored leathers, have been adopted to decrease the cost of production and increase the impact of the costume in culturally satisfying ways. Second, decoration has not only become more
figurative, but increasingly figures itself (a critic might say ‘caricatures’ itself). The logical extreme of this would be a *mis en abyme* of qharawatanas decorated with white appliqués qharawatanas, but even the pistol-decorated chaps demonstrate an objectifying, post-traditional sensibility toward ‘tradition.’

In 2007, I was invited by the Chumbivilcas chapter of the INC’s (*Instituto Nacional de la Cultura*) *Casa de Cultura* program to participate in their annual planning conference. The system of provincial *Casas de Cultura* was founded and is sporadically funded by INC to preserve, recover, and disseminate living folkloric culture. Much of the subject matter of the conference was implicitly concerned with ways of conceptualizing custom and costume as moral, economic, and ‘identity-building’ resources. Directors spoke of the need to “valorize our native foodstuffs,” “fortify the culture,” and “disseminate the culture.” Questions about how to propagate folkloric practices and celebrations (in defiance of the accelerating disappearance of their material contexts), and above all how to foster folkloric *identification*, were front and center, along with much hand-wringing about the looming risk that these ‘traditions’ would be lost for lack of enthusiasm from the community. In effect, cultural promoters lamented the displacement of folkloric culture by the contemporary lived culture. The INC directors, Casa de Cultura promoters, and provincial Casa de Culture officers conceptualized modern popular culture as alien, spurious, and inauthentic, and expressed the belief that the provincial folkloric traditions like that of the qorilazo—which are liable to be criticized by anthropologists as calculated and imposed—were in fact more authentic expressions of collective identity.
Despite the discourse of the public, press, and official institutions, it’s clear that vecinos have a degree of communally legitimate authority with regard to the qorilazo tradition, rooted in their descent from renowned aficionados of the tradition, their possession of inherited material accoutrements associated with the qorilazo (for example, licensed vicuña ponchos and scarves, saddlery, *casonas*, and ranch houses), and their distinctive mastery of one or other of the associated cultural expressions. Furthermore, as noted in the discussion of education in Chumbivilcas, their prominent positions within the school system give vecinos a forum for propagating versions and interpretations of the tradition that are particularly favorable to their own ethnic community. As a result of these advantages, many vecinos are able to present themselves as, in effect, ritual specialists of the invented tradition. More generally, vecinos naturally want to stay relevant—to keep their proverbial horse in the race—and to preserve their status and value to the community; their claim to privilege with regard to the tradition is an attractive means to accomplish these objectives.

10.14 Regionalism and cross-ethnic identification

Under normal conditions, however, vecinos prefer not to explicitly distinguish between indigenous, Spanish colonial, and properly shared elements of folkloric culture, but rather to subsume them all under a single, Chumbivilcan regional identity. This preference is reinforced by a nationwide regularization and, to a certain extent, commoditization of regional identities, which is fueled in part by the spread of provincial diasporas eager to cultivate an affirmative identity and a degree of distinction from fellow urban immigrants, but even more by the penetration of the state into the promotion of
Folklore, both at the level of the school system and through organs of government specifically tasked, ultimately, with fostering forms of public culture that attract tourism.

Folkloric dance performances and competitions play a prominent role in public education in Cuzco. Some school dance troupes are long-term, but many are formed by individual grade school classes for specific events, usually associated with the fiesta cycle. There is a more or less fixed repertoire of provincial dances and costumes from which teachers can choose. In the city of Cuzco, the individual teacher usually makes a selection from the repertoire. In Chumbivilcas, there are sometimes separate competitions between troupes that are performing Chumbivilcano dances and between those that are performing dances from other provinces of the department. Most of these dances are consciously choreographed performances of *regional folklore*, rather than expressions of indigeneity per se. Chumbivilcanos often note, in fact, when a dance troupe from a highland community is dressed to perform a dance that is ‘*netamente*’ (properly or genuinely) indigenous, signaled by their use of more historically accurate local peasant costume.
Figure 21. Elementary school students performing folkloric dance

It is clear that one of the advantages of this way of conceptualizing identity, given the contemporary political ascendance of the comunero and the hegemonic public discourse of indigenous vindication, is that it minimizes the alienating social distance that has traditionally separated the two communities and therefore allows the vecino to participate amicably and even favorably in a now largely comunero local public sphere. Many of the elements that are now central to the performance of regional identity are semi-fictitious and—to the extent they have historical antecedents—are not proper to any surviving sociological category. The folkloric costume is an excellent example of this: as already noted, the male costume corresponds organically neither to the vecinos notables nor to the peasantry, but rather to the middle reaches of social space, occupied by the
medium proprietors and ranch hands for whom cattle herding was a necessary daily routine. There are still a few aging individuals who could legitimately lay claim to such a self-representation, but their numbers are insignificant and dwindling. This is perhaps even more true of the female folkloric costume, which is a combination of customary comunera clothing (itself a combination of indigenous and Spanish colonial elements), possibly hacienda domestic uniforms, and a healthy serving of stylistic innovation over the last fifty years. And yet, increasingly, Chumbivilcanos of all classes and ethnicities are proudly wearing these costumes on special occasions, both within the province and throughout the Chumbivilcano diaspora. To be fair, the vecino chumbivilcano lives deeply enmeshed with the campesino world, he knows it intimately, and he feels it as a aspect of his own identity. He is proud of “nuestros campesinos Chumbivilcanos.” He is proud to be a judge of popular custom at competitions. His adoption of a regional identity with pronounced indigenous elements is therefore a mixture of calculation, self-interest, and also deep, genuine cultural involvement.

Nonetheless, it seems clear that a major impetus for the emphasis on a collective regional identity and folklore, rather than on potentially distinct parochial ethnic traditions, is that vecinos thereby foster a broad, hegemonic conception of the tradition over which they can preside, both authentically (over those aspects of the culture they have mastered) and curatorially (over those they have not). De la Cadena has argued—essentially, if inadvertently, from a diametrically opposed hegemonizing position—that there is no contradiction in her urban migrants of comunero decent asserting “mestizo identity as a social condition with room both for literacy and urban education and for the continuation of regional costumbres, the customs that they call authentic or
neto and that I term ‘indigenous’ for lack of a better word.”68 It is precisely this conflation of “regional” and “indigenous” customs and folklore, itself historically and analytically problematic, that my informants are attempting to overcome and, in some regards, invert. Vecinos acknowledge and even celebrate the indigenous origins of many of the province’s costumbres, but they also emphasize the peculiar contributions of their own ethnic group, and its unique, historical way of life, to the regional tradition and attempt to establish guardianship over this tradition as a whole.

Figure 22. Folkloric band in front of Templo Mayor (Santo Tomás).
It seems to me that one of the elements of this regional folklore that anthropologists find particularly disagreeable is its implicit relationship with apologetic pastoral myths propagated by scions of the old landed elite. Downwardly mobile social groups have a natural tendency to idealize the past. There are two independent factors in this process: on the one hand, they share the human tendency to idealize or enhance the contribution of their group to the social whole; on the other, seeking the most favorable light in which to portray themselves, downwardly mobile groups naturally look to the past for sources of identity and self-worth. The result is a heightened attention to a rose-colored vision of the past and a pervasive minimization of its abusive elements. Aguirre Beltrán notes of Mexico that “the Ladino idealizes the past and the patriarchal relationships of the old colonial regime.” Bobrow-Strain likewise found there “a nostalgic longing for the return of a mythical world—a world that made sense.” In Bolivia, Qayum et al. report that “interviewees assured us that there wasn’t mistreatment of the colonos of the hacienda, or more precisely, corporal punishment, violence, or sexual assault against the peasant women, even though they acknowledge that there were in other haciendas.” Davis et al. and Dollard found similar types of minimization of abuse and idealization of the past in the American South.

These attitudes are almost universal amongst vecinos. The overwhelming majority of vecinos who were active in the hacienda sector remember the era before Velasco as a time of few problems and integrated, if asymmetrical, social relations. This sense is expressed in the most varied possible terms and characterizations. Teun van Dijk, in his
book on contemporary elite racist discourses, points out two forms of revision that are particularly common amongst vecinos in Chumbivilcas: the conviction that the former social and labor relations were ‘severe, but just’ and that they were ultimately in the ‘best interest’ of the colonos. One elderly former mayordomo asserted matter-of-factly that “there were never labor problems. They were well-provided for, and they worked well.” Former terratenientes frequently speak of compadrazgo, cargo sponsorship, support in times of drought or crisis, and shared cultural understandings. In Chumbivilcas, in particular, it is common for vecinos to cleverly claim that “there wasn’t oppression because the indígena of here was ferocious, indomitable.” Through rhetorical slight of hand, they are thus able to draw on the affirmative, pro-indigenous discourse in order to whitewash the abuse inherent in the hacienda regime. This rehabilitation is obviously a difficult task, given how extensive the sociological and historical literature contradicting them is. At one point I asked several vecinos what they thought about Ricardo Valderrama and Carmen Escalante’s well-known study of the ‘uprisings’ in Haquira (Apurímac) and Quiñota (Chumbivilcas) in the early 1920s. Their response is typical of the general vecino discourse with regard to academic literature on the abuses of the hacienda regime (which—it should be acknowledged—is, in fact, often motivated by indigenist and Marxist sympathies and commitments):

Vecino 1: A lot of that, what they say, they paint the gamonal as a demon.
Vecino 2: Yeah, a lot of the old folks who were familiar with those things say, “Everything that they wrote is a lie.” Most of it.
V1: The truth is that in almost all of Chumbivilcas there has never been exploitation.
V2: Yes.
V1: Domination . . . there was that.
V2: Clearly.
Because exploitation is at the level of agriculture. Because they had to work . . . cane. No? So slaves were need. No? Here in Chumbivilcas, who sold potatoes? Who sold barley? No one. Never. No one. Why would anyone need to exploit the people? And who would take your produce? Who would buy it? But yes, domination. That was at the cultural, social, economic level. There would be that. No?

V2: Yes.

In fact, there was a coexistence, a duality of thought, between comunero—campesino—and propietario. They got along well because both needed each other. That’s how it is. They’ve made it look worse than it was.

V2: Yes. These days . . . and a lot of NGOs have made us fight. They’ve made the mestizo, the misti, look bad with the campesino. They’ve . . . damn.

Since the Agrarian Reform everything has been distorted.

The truth or falsity of these claims is a historical question that I am not qualified to answer historiographically here—though the claims seem, on the face of it, far-fetched.

What the passage demonstrates, however, is the attitude of today’s vecinos toward the past and their sense of exasperation with the loss of control over not only historical events themselves, but also their recounting and interpretation. While it is obvious that this situation is practically frustrating, in a political and economic sense, it is also important to acknowledge that vecinos, like everyone else, have a genuine affective relationship to the past and that their interpretation of that past is a significant element of both their collective identity as a community and their personal identities.

As Qayum et al. note, in their research on the landowning class in Bolivia, “all the individuals interviewed expressed an enormous nostalgia and became emotional recalling this past of rites, ceremonies, beliefs, and cycles of life.” Political attacks on the ‘gamonales’ or ‘terrenientes’ are also attacks on a set of understandings of communal and familial history, which are themselves fundamental to the vecino’s sense of identity.

Qayum et al. have written of the landowning class in Bolivia that
perhaps of equal or greater magnitude than the economic consequences that the Agrarian Reform brought for the landowning class was the loss of identity as a class and the concomitant crisis of family and gender. As we have seen, a fundamental part of this identity, above all for the women, was their vision of having an intimate relation with the people and environment in the countryside. The Reform signified a distancing from this landscape; the elite sought refuge in the city and the rural was converted into the enemy . . . the reform equally implied a rupture with a rural world that was shared—if under unequal conditions—with the peasantry . . . there exists an enormous and deep nostalgia for this lost past. 78

Here, Qayum et al. are referring to land owners who were effectively ejected from their rural estates and permanently transferred their households—which had formerly been split seasonally between the country and the city—to La Paz. In Chumbivilcas, many women of the landowning class still retain and exploit, albeit in a more easygoing fashion, medium-sized agricultural parcels, and maintain relatively close relations with indigenous market women. Furthermore, many women are actively involved in the community through their employment as schoolteachers. As I argued in chapter 7, the most serious crisis of identity has affected vecino men, who have lost not only a way of life centered around the hacienda enterprise and political machination, but with it a source of distinctive identity. This sense of loss, lost-ness, and self-pity is often acute. As one informant lamented, after an evening of drinking, “You have had the bad luck of getting yourself mixed up with us, so depreciated is our family. How they despise the Gutierrez family!” The attempt to lay claim to a folkloric culture and to propagate a mythologized past is therefore not only an attempt to regain a degree of social status or ascendancy, but also to stabilize identities undermined by rapid social change and threatened by competing revisions and re-imaginings.
10.16 Retreating forward

My use of the term ‘retreat’ throughout this chapter is obviously, to varying extents, metaphorical. A literal retreat involves a movement of men and materiel away from an opposing group of men, typically in the wake of a defeat or as a result of an inability to hold a desired position. Vecinos do, in fact, conceive of their historical trajectory as one of retreat, and many informants clearly would have preferred to maintain the social positions that their families once held. In this sense, it seems legitimate to refer to these phenomena as ‘retreats.’ But the enumerated forms of retreat are also, simultaneously, particular ways of advancing; the vecinos of Chumbivilcas are retreating forward.

With the collapse of the hacienda labor regime, agro-pastoral production is not, economically, ‘terrain’ that merits holding. Paved roads may one day bring Chumbivilcano produce more quickly and cost-effectively to urban markets but, until then, profits are insufficient to fund and to justify mechanization or to pay trained wage labor. The urban public sector, particularly the school system, offers modest wages and high status at low risk with virtually no capital inputs. Though many teachers express dissatisfaction with their jobs, and favorably recall the hacienda lifestyle of their youth, their physical retreat from the countryside to the bastion of town is a canny adaptation to the changing nature of the local and national economy. Even the internecine conflict over familial property is, in a sense, an adaptation, albeit painful, to the increasing formalization of land titling and the slow expansion of the land market. Properties whose titles have been murky and dubious are, in the process of intra-familial legal dispute and
negotiation, slowly being given firm legal footing. This not only makes them more attractive for sale, but also legitimizes their use as collateral for financing.

Conceptualizing retreat as a mode of advance is even more important in relation to the “retreat into the past,” which I have described. The question that must be asked is, “where is this ‘past’?” The inevitable answer, of course, is that “the past is nowhere at all.” All backward-looking identities, ideologies, and projects are necessarily ways of understanding and acting in a present that is continually pressing into the future. As I’ve noted, the ‘invented tradition’ of the Qorilazo (rooted in mythologized accounts of the past), and the prominent place vecinos give it in their self-representations, is fundamental to their ongoing social projects, personally and collectively. One is reminded of the Papuan ‘Big Man’ Ongka’s comment in the classic ethnographic film Ongka’s Big Moka, that “pigs are our strong thing”; in the case of the vecinos of Chumbivilcas, the preferential relationship to the mythic regional past is their ‘strong thing.’ It is entirely appropriate, and shrewd, therefore, that they would give it such a prominent role in their personal and collective identification.

10.17 Conclusion

The vecino community is not, however, the only group attempting to appropriate the past or to align the ‘invented tradition’ with their own interests. As Albro has noted of rural Bolivia, “new actors are using different cultural strategies for the reconstruction of these pasts: from criollo pastoral nostalgia, to Aymara paths of memory, to the folkloric logic of survivals.” Fiestas are being used throughout the Andes to inflect the traditional
conflicts in order to manipulate collective understandings for political and personal gain.

Albro write that in his fieldsite in rural Bolivia

the municipality has striven to imbed the fiesta’s history in a regional ‘pastoral narrative,’ which displaces the spiritual essence of the town from a chaotic semiurban present to a more pristine pre-1952 era of feudal agriculture . . . The municipality thus draws a direct equation between itself and a local criollo history. However, this history of erstwhile provincial landowners is one to which in most circumstances the current leadership of the town, popular in origin, has little relation.80

This is an important observation because it reinforces my argument that, while the proprietary claims on the qorilazo tradition by the genealogical descendants of its avatars and early ideologists may currently be recognized by the population at large, the reconfiguration of political and economic power will undoubtedly open the ‘tradition’ up to expropriation by new claimants, even by those whom the traditions had formerly excluded or denigrated.

Though ethnographers have conceptualized lo qorilazo as a hegemonic project designed to reinforce the power of the former landed elite, it is important to remember that it is, in fact, diffuse, uncoordinated, and now propagated by vecinos and comuneros alike. What’s more, despite the fact that, as noted, vecinos have greater claim to certain elements of the tradition and attempt to claim curatorial authority over the whole of it, the tradition is validating for all Chumbivilcanos and many of its elements are in fact particularly legitimizing for indigenous Chumbivilcanos. I would argue that the myth of the qorilazo carries within it the potential to subvert traditional relations of power, authority, and legitimacy. The qorilazo was never, by anyone’s estimate, a member of the vecino aristocracy. Drawn predominantly from the campesinado and the proletarianized mestizo poor, the qorilazo was a cowboy or ranch hand. Vecinos tend to have greater
access to the musical training, fighting cocks, and costume that are part of the expressive aspect of the tradition. Nonetheless, even within the performing arts, comuneras and comuneros have much greater fluency in an array of cultural expressions, including, as noted above, dance, weaving, the playing of woodwinds and percussion, and singing. As already noted, vecino musicians are self-conscious about their inability to play woodwinds, and often attribute it to a vague cultural-spiritual aptitude that comuneros have for the native woodwinds. Furthermore, the comunero necessarily has a more intimate command of the practical aptitudes of the tradition, expressed during fiestas in the *doma de potros*, *carrera de caballos*, and *corrida de toros*. This subversive quality of horsemanship and labor aptitude is an integral part of the fundamental ambivalence within cattle raising societies between democracy and authoritarianism, equality and caste described by Hennessey.81 Other than the few vecinos who continue to work most of the year in the *campo* (primarily in Colquemarca), the bearers of the equestrian and cattle-raising traditions symbolized by the qorilazo are comuneros, in particular those in the east of the province who have begun to parcelize their communities and to practice range herding. Notwithstanding the fact that the herd and property sizes are not normally extensive enough to produce a full-blown ranching economy and culture, comuneros are still the group most likely to poses the pastoral skill set associated with the qorilazo.

The comunero fluency in Quechua has also gradually changed from a serious social handicap to a mark of authenticity and legitimacy. Although most vecinos have a playful, practical command of Quechua, few have true fluency. Several vecino informants, whose parents forbade them from learning Quechua,82 seem to hide their relative ignorance of the language out of embarrassment or even shame; several vecinos
have admitted to simulating comprehension of Quechua in order to disguise their lack of fluency. This revalorization of Quechua is closely related not only to the general, nationwide rehabilitation of indigeneity, but also to the local comunero *reconquista* of municipal power.

The progressive municipalization of education will likely eventually displace vecinos from their prominent position within the teaching establishment. Alan Garcia’s advocacy of *municipalización educativa* was strongly opposed by vecino teachers, despite the fact that many were committed *Apristas*. The most common criticism was that municipalization would politicize the school system, leading to (a) control by unqualified political appointees, (b) design and implementation of curricula by ideologically motivated non-professionals, (c) hiring and firing based on political loyalties and exigencies, and (d) purging of vecinos from teaching positions (given that comunero control of municipal government now seems to vecinos a forgone conclusion). Vecinos have already lost their former grip on the provincial UGEL (*Unidad de Gestión Educativa Local*), the director of which is appointed by the DREC (*Dirección Regional de Educación del Cusco*) at the regional (or departmental) level, which itself is increasingly staffed by professionals of popular origin who no longer have relations of kinship and friendship with provincial vecinos.  

It is hard not to interpret the pervasive retreat that I’ve described as the result of demoralization or exhaustion. On some level, vecinos themselves believe this to be true. Many of my informants expressed the belief that if their ethnic community could just regain their former sense of efficacy, honor, and purpose, they would once again be politically and economically relevant and even dominant. Much of the apparent lethargy
and involution, however, is merely the result of the drastic decline in motivation and rise of impediments to exploitation and political domination. Given the extreme social, economic, and political handicaps that afflicted comuneros prior to the 1960s, power in Chumbivilcas was something of a ‘low-hanging fruit’ for ambitious non-indigenous immigrants. The vecino’s opportunities for aggrandizement in the current conjuncture are obviously vastly inferior.
The impact of citizenship on such a system was bound to be profoundly disturbing, and even destructive. The rights with which the general status of citizenship was invested were extracted from the hierarchical status system of social class, robbing it of its essential substance . . . National justice and a law common to all must inevitably weaken and eventually destroy class justice, and personal freedom, as a universal birthright, must drive out serfdom.

**Citizenship and Social Class**
T.H. Marshall

The class struggle is fierce here in Chumbivilcas. Even though we’ve lost everything else, we still have that.

Hacendado chumbivilcano

11.1 *Introduction*

Jorge and I climbed the back streets toward the stretch of road that was doubling as a straightaway for the horse races that are an important part of Chumbivilcas’s anniversary celebrations. The western edge of Santo Tomás has advanced more slowly than the southern and eastern, which have crept along the roads to Arequipa and Cuzco, respectively. Facades change quickly from ancient stone to locally quarried *sillar* and out into squat huts of adobe. Turning a corner, we were nearly knocked over by a cantering horse. Its rider reined it to a snorting, stamping stop. Jorge was unfazed by the near collision, but his face immediately formed a scowl when he recognized the rider. Looking
up at the man in the saddle, I too realized that it was the young husband of the comunero couple that Jorge had hired to look after his livestock and hacienda for the month. “What are you doing here?” he snapped loudly. “I was just running my horse in the races,” the still-mounted worker answered back, in a tone that was a mixture of defiance and defensiveness. “Who’s back at the property?” Jorge demanded. “My mother.” “What about your wife?” “She’s there too.” “I’m paying you to watch the animals.” The comunero responded defensively, “I’m just here for the afternoon,” and then added, with a mildly theatrical air of indignation, “*O no tengo el derecho?*” [“Or do I not have the right?”] This final rhetorical question hit Jorge like a slap in the face and elicited a scandalized scoff. As we continued walking, he repeated the comment several times with exaggerated disbelief, “‘*¿O no tengo el derecho?*’”

On the one hand, Jorge had some right to expect his paid worker to be working. The ranch hand recognized that he was, to a certain extent, neglecting his duties; his time off would have been better taken when the animals were in corral in the evening. On the other hand, he clearly had the right to take time off, as long as he and his wife were fulfilling the terms of their contract, which was to herd the cattle, process cheese, and maintain the premises for the month. But the philosophical implications of the question were much more profound. The errant worker was explicitly referencing the modern civil rights paradigm that began to gain hegemonic sway in the Velasco era. Whether out of genuine or politically expedient umbrage, many comuneros are apt to interpret any form of conflict with *vecinos* as a reemergence of the historical abusiveness of the gamonal. To Jorge, it was preposterous that his righteous indignation that a worker was sporting on his dime would be reinterpreted as a human rights violation; but it was also socially
threatening, given the widening network of governmental and non-governmental organizations now active in the province raising peasant consciousness and investigating, documenting, and seeking to remedy labor violations and other forms of abuse.

What struck me most about the interaction, however—and what seemed particularly galling to Jorge—was that Jorge was on foot and the comunero mounted.\textsuperscript{4} There is no more powerful symbol of the transformation that has taken place in Chumbivilcas over the last forty years, than a young, handsome, and dignified comunero on a stamping horse talking rights to a middle aged hacendado staring up at him from the ground. That same evening, in fact, Jorge spontaneously reflected on the fact that neither he nor his siblings owned any horses: “We always had horses around. Lots. They were everywhere. In the morning I was on one, in the afternoon another, then another. I would go around the property, giving orders. My father would say, ‘Follow his orders, he’s in charge today,’ and I would ride around telling them what to do. It’s completely different now.”\textsuperscript{5} The encounter left Jorge in a brown study, seemingly trying to understand and master the feelings elicited by the deep social changes that the mounted ranch hand symbolized. As Valcárcel wrote in 1928, specifically of Chumbivilcas, “the Indian on horseback is a new Indian, haughty, free, propertied, proud of his race that disdains the white and the mestizo. There, where the Indian has broken the Spanish prohibition against riding on horseback, he has also broken his chains.”\textsuperscript{6} Though the sentiment may have been premature and a bit melodramatic in the 1920s, the haughty ‘\textit{indio al caballo}’ who reared up in front of Jorge and I was, indeed, the paragon of a people who have broken their chains.
11.2 *Universality and particularity*

The processes that I have described and analyzed in this dissertation, both contemporary and properly historical, are obviously not structurally unique to Chumbivilcas, or even to Peru more broadly. They are, in a certain sense, universal, and have unfolded in similar fashions in nations throughout the world. The timing of these processes, their precise relations with each other, the particular institutional backdrops against which they are unfolding, and, perhaps more than anything, the agency that particular individuals and groups have exercised in the development of these processes all diverge from one nation and region to another. What I offer is an intimate portrait and analysis of the ways in which particular men and women—in this case, the vecinos of Chumbivilcas—with a particular set of social institutions and cultural values, resist, adapt to, and make sense of the essentially universal processes associated with modernization.

The consequences of these processes are, at a certain level, overdetermined. The processes themselves are so redundant, overlapping, and mutually reinforcing that many of their aggregate impacts on social and political organization are unavoidable. As a result, a myriad of particular sequences of national development tend to lead to common, or at least closely similar, socio-political outcomes. It’s difficult to argue, for example, with Samuel Huntington’s general thesis that the “violence and instability” that characterized many societies in “Asia, Africa, and Latin America” in the 1950s and 1960s was the result of “rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions.”7 The current dissertation’s depth of field, however, has been focused on the historically specific
trajectories that these formally universal processes have taken nationally in Peru and locally in Chumbivilcas.\textsuperscript{8}

While it behooves the ethnographer to have one eye on national and global processes, an ethnographic dissertation is necessarily parochial. Anthropologists have developed numerous methodological innovations to overcome the handicaps of ethnographic research, but, so long as ethnography involves talking to specific individuals in specific places at specific moments of time, narrowness of vision will be the necessary, if regrettable, obverse of the depth and detail that are ethnography’s resounding strengths. That said, I have been discomfited throughout the process of research and composition by the overabundance of closely analogous societies and studies of them.

On the one hand, this discomfort stems from the sheer size of formerly Spanish America and the close similarities between its successor national societies. The nationally specific social science literatures of each of these countries are voluminous and individually difficult to master. A comprehensive, academically competent survey of the social scientific literature of the region as whole, however, would be virtually impossible. The historiographical and ethnographic literature to which I have been exposed, however, convinces me that a concerted approach to this literature is a necessary preliminary to ethnographic work anywhere in region. In the particular context of this dissertation, the literature from highland areas with large, sedentary indigenous populations has been exceptionally valuable. These areas include not only the neighboring and nearby countries of Andean South America (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Columbia), but also much of Central America (including Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua).
Throughout the dissertation I have drawn on ethnographic research conducted in these countries, both in demonstrating the genetic institutional similarities and in borrowing theoretical perspectives developed to account for phenomena closely analogous to those I encountered in Chumbivilcas. I have found the work of Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán (Mexico), Aaron Bobrow-Strain (Mexico), Marta Elena Casaña Arzú (Guatemala), Benjamin Colby and Pierre van den Berghe (Guatemala), Jeffrey Gould (Nicaragua), Charles Hale (Guatemala), Barry Lyons (Ecuador), Frans Schryer (Mexico), and Leon Zamosc (Columbia) particularly useful as culturally and politically comparable analogues. Compare, for example, my characterization of the predicament faced by the vecino community to Aaron Bobrow-Strain’s assessment of his landowning informants’ experience, who, he writes,

found themselves squeezed between indígenas’ increasingly organized struggles for territory and declining political and economic support from the neoliberal Mexican state. Caught between these two flames, landowners found their ability to define and defend the spaces of landed production eroded in important ways. Critically, as part of these historical changes, shifting patterns of political mediation displaced landowners from their positions as the sole nexus between countryside and nation, indigenous peasants and the state.9

The particular ways in which (a) the Mexican state supported and later withdrew support from cattle ranching, (b) political parties recruited the local indigenous peasantry, and (c) the Catholic clergy were influenced by liberation theology to encourage peasant to invade land are obviously divergent from the Peruvian and, in particular, the Chumbivilcan transformation. Nevertheless, the net consequences—given the wider context of interwoven processes of modernization—are remarkably similar and a fully comparative
approach would allow the constituent elements to be more accurately weighed and analyzed.

On the other hand, I have naturally been struck by the close similarities between the society and political organization in Chumbivilcas, and their gradual reorganization, and those of a number of European peripheries at various historical conjunctures, particularly those of Mediterranean Europe. Some historiographical analogues that I have found useful are Davis Bitton (France, 16th to 17th century), Antonio Gramsci (Italy, 20th century), Michael Hechter (‘Celtic Fringe’ of the United Kingdom, 16th to 20th century), Juan Martinez-Alier (Andalucia, 20th century), and Jane and Peter Schneider (Sicily). Of particular interest to me was the work of John Dollard and Allison Davis et al. in the early 20th century American South. Clearly, in gross terms, the similarities stem from their common peripheral position (at diverse historical moments) within a global capitalist system. More precise observations and conclusions could be drawn, however, about the mechanics by which global market position, particular forms of state administration, and pre-existing local social and political traditions interact to produce similarity and divergence, both in structure and transformation. This would require, however, not just the abstraction of law-like regularities, but also minute comparisons of the internal dynamics of particular societies. The so-called ‘Indian question’ in Peru, for example, is closely structurally analogous to the ‘Southern question’ in Italy, except that the ‘question’ is significantly more racialized or ethnicized in Peru. The manner in which both the similarity (the fact and discourse of regional underdevelopment) and the difference (its racialization in Peru) develop, the practical consequences of the difference, and the ways in which the tension between similarity and difference affects the
differential transformation of the two over time, are all elements that can only be 
explored through detailed historical and ethnological comparison. The anthropological 
dissertation process, structured as it is around ethnographic fieldwork, necessarily 
produces a narrowing of the analytical field. In future work, I would like to pursue more 
properly comparative research, seeking to understand the structural nature of the 
similarities as a preliminary toward theorizing the logic of variation within these broader 
structural similarities.

11.3 Vecindad and its vicissitudes

In closing, I would like to take a backward glance at the co-evolution of the 
concept of vecindad and the social and political organization of colonial and republican 
Peru, and to reflect on the significance of the impending disappearance of the ‘vecino’ as 
a social category, an identity, and a member of a distinctive ethnic community. 
Developing out of a similar legal and political economic conjuncture as the medieval 
European categories of ‘burgher’ and ‘bourgeoisie,’ the category of ‘vecino’ took on 
distinctive, expansionary qualities in the course of the Reconquista of Moorish Spain. In 
the context of the resettlement of southern Spain, ‘vecindad’ came to designate “the 
privileges and duties of individuals who were willing to abandon their communities of 
origin and come to settle in lands recovered from the Muslims and now under Christian 
control.” The transposition of the status to the Canaries, and, ultimately, to the New 
World initiated a process of divergence between the peninsular and Spanish American 
concepts of vecindad. The comprehensive fueros of the Spanish municipalities, in some 
cases developed over centuries of negotiation between townsfolk, local nobility, and the
Crown, were replaced by brief, relatively formulaic royal guarantees, exemptions, and grants of property within administratively distinct Spanish villas. Herzog argues that the concept of vecindad was remodelled in two important ways in its transposition from Castile to the American colonies: first, once cabildos lost the power to grant land in the 17th century, vecindad became increasingly reputational and implicit, rather than formal; second, it developed the “tendency to exclude Indians and persons of mixed blood or African descent from citizenship.” Vecindad became increasingly associated with ‘Spanishness,’ in opposition to indigenousness, blackness, and mestizaje (as well as non-Spanish European-ness). In essence, vecindad came to signify a member of a “civilized” urban community, in distinction to unincorporated “barbarians.” Thus, what had been a form of urban citizenship on the Peninsula, formally recognized by the town council, increasingly became a form of social, racial, and ethnic distinction.

As discussed in the section “4.8 Shifting fortunes of the municipio,” while Independence may have briefly imbued the municipality with a legitimacy that was primary rather than delegated, the fitful consolidation of the state inexorably diminished the autonomy and authority of municipal institutions throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Nonetheless, the factional conflict and weak institutions plagued the Republican state from its foundation until well into the 20th century; afforded local landowners and their allies in the isolated, mountainous interior substantial autonomy in their private activity and in their control of the rudimentary local government apparatus.

The municipio entered the 20th century virtually devoid of proprietary political prerogatives and responsibilities; Leguía’s Oncenoato (1922-1933) further eroded the autonomy and authority of civic government. The category of ‘vecindad’ suffered a
corresponding loss of formal significance, and became almost exclusively an ethnic and urban residential designation. Nonetheless, it remained a way of asserting civic membership in the nation at large and entitlement to favorable state intervention. In formal appeals to the departmental and central government in the early 20th century, the term is ubiquitous. Despite the degradation of urban institutions, urban residence continued to be associated with civic legitimacy and with full national citizenship.

As an ethnic diaspora, the vecinos’ distinctive cultural traits, social connections, and political influence made them the primary point of articulation between the local indigenous peasantry and the national society and state. In almost all cases, vecino rule involved disproportionate concern with the interests and wellbeing of ethnic confederates and a systematic disregard for that of indigenous citizens. Any attempt at collective self-organization by comuneros, at any level higher than the comunidad and for any objective that extended beyond communal boundaries, was treated with suspicion. Any cross-community association that actively asserted itself against members of the local vecino establishment was repressed, if need be with violence. The very means by which the departmental and central state became aware of and assessed local threats to ‘public’ safety were reports and later telegrams from ethnic confederates in local office, who more often than not were responding to threats to their or their associates’ private interests.

The ideological foundations and the political context of ‘vecindad’ as a solidary civil and status were, however, under continual pressure from a variety of processes commonly grouped under the rubric of modernization. While the concrete manifestations of technological and technical modernization have had profound ramifications (as described in chapter 5), the fitful consolidation and bureaucratization of the Peruvian
nation-state throughout the 20th century played a central role in the displacement of vecinos from their intermediary positions between the national and local indigenous societies. James Holston argues, in fact, that “one of the fundamental projects of modern nation building has been to dismantle the classic primacy of urban citizenship and replace it with the national.” The Agrarian Reform of Velasco Alvarado’s administration, in particular, represented a significant escalation in state intervention. The centralization and bureaucratization of state administration (the transfer, for example, the local guardia civil from subprefectural to direct administrative control) severely constrained vecino influence over state institutions and policy implementation.

The discovery and adoption of new ways of conceptualizing the nation and national membership, including the steady advance of various liberal democratic and socialist models of universal citizenship, have been especially portentous for the vecino community and for the concept of ‘vecindad.’ The exclusion and stigmatization of indigenous Peruvians had been a major impediment to the elaboration of a “homogenized national identity.” As such, the attack on the particularism of ethnic privilege and exception was an essential element in the formulation of a universal national citizenship and identity, which itself was a key element of modernization and state consolidation. The introduction of mass democracy was obviously a decisive factor in this process.

Robert Michels noted in 1915 that

In the old regime, the members of the ruling class and those who desired to become rulers continually spoke of their own personal rights. Democracy adopts a more diplomatic, a more prudent course. It has rejected such claims as unethical. Today, all the factors of public life speak and struggle in the name of the people, of the community at large... Every government endeavors to support its power by a general ethical principle... Political parties, however much they may be founded upon
narrow class interests and however evidently they may work against the
interests of the majority, love to identify themselves with the universe, or
at least to present themselves as co-operating with all the citizens of the
state, and to proclaim that they are fighting in the name of all and for the
good of all.\textsuperscript{24}

Ernest Gellner elaborates on Michels’ observation, arguing that the ideology of agrarian
society

exaggerates rather than underplays the inequality of classes and the degree
of separation of the ruling stratum . . . Among the higher strata of agro-
literate society it is clearly advantageous to stress, sharpen and accentuate
the diacritical, differential, and monopolizable traits of the privileged
groups . . . Thanks to the relative stability of agro-literate societies, sharp
separations of the population into estates or castes or millets can be
established and maintained without creating intolerable frictions. On the
contrary, by externalizing, making absolute and underwriting inequalities,
it fortifies them and makes them palatable, by endowing them with the
aura of inevitability.\textsuperscript{25}

In mass industrial society, on the other hand, “the role of culture is no longer to
underscore and make visible and authoritative the structural differentiations within
society (even if some of them persist, and even if, as may happen, a few new ones
emerge); on the contrary, when on occasion cultural differences do tie in with and
reinforce status differences, this is held to be somewhat shameful for the society in
question.”\textsuperscript{26} Ethnic and status differentiation become counterproductive for the
development of national consciousness and integration. In Peru, the public
delegitimization of racial and ethnic discrimination\textsuperscript{27} and the obsolescence of the
traditional concept of ‘vecindad’ were therefore integral elements in the creation of a
collective national project. Peru’s tardy adoption of universal adult suffrage in 1980 was
obviously a critical moment—especially in heavily indigenous Chumbivilcas—both in
the gradual disintegration of the vecino community as a coherent economic and political
force and in the delegitimization of ‘vecindad’ as a criterion of social status and as grounds for the receipt of particularistic privileges.

Not only has it become inappropriate to assert one’s ethnic distinctiveness as grounds for status superiority, but the extension of homogenizing public education, mass media, and opportunities for social mobility have significantly reduced actual ethnic differences. Jonathan Friedman has pointed out that the “foundation of the democratic revolution lies not in egalitarianism but in the negation of ascription, an ascription based on supposedly inherent qualities of those occupying given positions.”28 The eclipse of vecindad by national citizenship has been accompanied by an intensification of those forms of purportedly achieved social distinction and inequality—principally capital and education—whose legitimacy remains, and has become even more, hegemonic.29 As discussed in chapter 10, the landed wealth, social relationships, political power and ethnicity that once distinguished the vecino community from the comunero have all declined sharply. Perhaps the most visible representation of this sharp decline is the political marginalization of the vecino. The cabildo itself, once the executive organ of the vecino community and now rejuvenated by fiscal, political, and administrative decentralization, is currently solidly under indigenous control. After centuries of vecino domination, the towns of Chumbivilcas are once again, in effect, ‘pueblos de indios.’ The category of ‘vecino,’ in spite of its strong ethnic implications, has always relied for its coherence on the traditional association between non-indigenousness and urban residence.30 The precipitous loss of the historically exclusive relationship between the vecino community and the town, therefore, will likely be the loss that finally drives the concept of ‘vecindad’—with its 800-year lineage—into extinction.
11.4 *Looking forward*

The present slips inexorably into the future: stop to write it down, and ethnographic research immediately becomes historiography. Throughout this dissertation, I have attempted to use the past to illuminate the present. One can only hope that careful study of the present, in turn, will help to anticipate some of the broad outlines of the near future. Barring a more protracted global economic downturn, fiscal deliveries to municipalities will continue to gradually increase, expanding opportunities for educational, political, and professional advancement in the countryside. Direct employment in mining may bring some jobs, as well as provide inputs into secondary industries, but mining is notorious for the paucity of its direct contribution to local economies. Hoteliers and restaurateurs are cautiously optimistic that visits by mining engineers and exploration crews, as well as visiting government functionaries, will continue to increase, allowing the local service industry to grow out of its infancy. Landowners, both peasant and *propietario*, are confident that prices for cattle and beef will continue their upward trend. Dairy producers plan to diversify into yogurt and artisan cheeses.

My own guess is that the importation of Brazilian beef along the recently completed transcontinental highway will severely compromise the Andean cattle industry, just as American beef has done for the Mexican cattle industry.\(^\text{31}\) The province’s altitude and the general scarcity of improved pasture make Chumbivilcan beef a poor competitor with Brazilian. Furthermore, the scale and capital intensity of the Brazilian cattle industry gives it significant competitive advantages over peasant
production. Peasant land tenure is still macroeconomically irrational and, while it may serve to prevent the further immiseration of the rural poor and to ensure self-sufficiency for many rural families, it does so, in effect, by forcing peasant proprietors to ‘self-exploit’ by investing disproportionate time and capital into a product that must compete domestically against cattle produced by streamlined, significantly more profitable capitalist enterprises.  

In a similar fashion as the introduction of the railroad, telegraph, radio, road, and telephone had revolutionary social and economic consequences, the arrival of internet and cellular phone will, in turn, have theirs. Just as the expanding state effectively displaced vecinos from their intermediate political position, so television, radio, and now internet have mortally undercut the vecino claim to cultural authority, superiority, and mediation. The province is increasingly permeable to national and international values and ideas, which will inevitably compromise the efforts of vecino cultural elites, especially members of institutions like the Casa de Cultura, to codify and maintain curatorial control over the province’s qorilazo ‘tradition.’ Chumbivilcanos will continue to value their distinctive and aggrandizing identity, but its future evolution will increasingly escape the control of the scions of the former landed elite.

As indigenous Peruvians continue to parlay political office into lucrative contracts and other spoils, class differentiation will increasingly occur within the peasant population, rather than between it and the vecino community. Comunero elites will gradually wrest control even of the edifices surrounding the Plaza de Armas. Vecinos, for their part, will likely abandon this last bastion of their community gladly (though not without a certain amount of nostalgia) and move definitively to Cuzco, Arequipa, and
other large cities. Urban migration has always been fundamental to the dynamism of vecino generational cycles. The landed estate, from this perspective, has been an institution through which vecino families pass in the long, multigenerational path from rural anonymity, upward and outward to the city. As I have conceived it, families rose and fell, but only exceptionally did they maintain equilibrium over time. Many of the members of the generation born prior to the Agrarian Reform have already completed the cycle described in chapter 2 and become middle-class professionals in the city. Their children will probably sell or lease family property to affluent comuneros. They will, in the future, continue to seek post-secondary education in Cuzco and Arequipa, and many of them will settle permanently there once they have laid down professional and interpersonal roots. Unlike previous generations, however, there will not be a steady supply of ambitious mestizo immigrants to fashion new lives for themselves in the province with the labor of serfs and peasants. The next generation of merchants, ranchers, and political leaders will be drawn from the local comunero population.

It is entirely possible that vecinos will regain a small measure power they have lost over the last 40 years. The increasing emphasis on oversight, professionalization, and rationalization of governance may, paradoxically, help those who formerly benefited from their lack. Vecinos remain collectively much better educated than comuneros. Despite the growing prominence of comuneros in politics and commerce, the majority of them are still deeply impoverished. Any formally equal system of hiring and advancement would necessarily advantage those vecinos who choose to remain in the province. Nonetheless, they will continue to disappear as a distinct ethnic and status group. This disappearance, of course, does not involve an elimination of its constituent
members, nor even necessarily a diminishment of their affluence or influence; though the vecino community will continue to disintegrate, its former members may, in fact, find themselves reintegrating into more lucrative and higher status occupations and communities.

11.5 Final thoughts

Five hundred years of oppression and expropriation of financial, cultural, and social capital cannot be overcome in a generation. Oppression is literally demeaning, in the fullest sense of the word. One function of a racist system is to demean the minority to such an extent that its behaviors and deficiencies appear to validate commonly held prejudices. Economic privation and the denial of political rights, legal protections, government services, and educational opportunities to the indigenous peasantry historically decreased the likelihood that they would master the Spanish language, gain the cultural proficiencies necessary for success in the larger world, or become sufficiently motivated to change their status—all of which served to reinforce the racist postulates.33 There is a tendency to decry the oppressive brutality of racist systems, while denying or overlooking their concrete, invidious effects on human development. This sometimes manifests itself as a celebration of the cleverness and creativity exhibited by victims of racism and oppression. While it is certainly true that many campesinos have admirably overcome the structural constraints that commonly dog them from birth, it undercuts criticism of racism to ignore the devastating effects of economic, educational, nutritional, and motivational deprivation. This is true both historically, in the sense that 500 years of privation and exploitation have left indigenous Peruvians as a community severely
disadvantaged vis-à-vis Peruvians of European descent, as well as in terms of personal development, in the sense that many indigenous Peruvians were and continue to be raised in environments that deprive them of opportunities to fully develop their human potential. The differences in comportment and capacity between, for example, a 55-year-old former peón—like the pongo in Arguedas’s Deep Rivers, “bowing like a worm asking to be crushed” —deprived of post-primary education and living in near-absolute poverty, and a campesino who has had all the benefits of primary and secondary education, as well as university or leadership training, could not be starker. The current generation of comunero children is amongst the first to be raised with a near parity of preparation and opportunity with vecino children. As John Dollard wrote of mankind in general (and of white southerners in particular), humans do “not like to be caught in inconsistencies.” This seems like a small point, but its effects on the process of ideological change are inestimable. The young comuneros of the current generation are living rejoinders to traditional racial ideologies that drew strength from the demeaning effects of deprivation and humiliation; their proficiency and achievement are cutting the perverse circuit that once existed between the racist fantasy of inherent inferiority and the degrading brutality of gamonalismo. Vecinos may profess some of the ethno-racial beliefs of their mothers and fathers, but today they are continually brought face-to-face with savvy, successful, and upwardly mobile comunero students, teachers, artists, merchants, and politicians that challenge their smug sense of superiority.

One afternoon toward the end of my fieldwork, I was with my friend Aníbal as he oversaw the potato harvest on his hacienda. He scrambled over the broken field to where a cluster of workers was breaking apart a mound of potatoes and began haranguing them.
They listened impassively, while continuing to sift through the dirt for potatoes. One stood up with a wry smile on his face and said something to Aníbal, who scoffed and began walking back toward me, shaking his head. Standing beside me, he said, “How things have changed. My father used to say, ‘With indios and mules, the stick,’ and now? That campesino over there just said, ‘You’re always criticizing. Why don’t you tell us how well we’re doing and bring us something to drink?’ That’s how things have changed.” Aníbal was shaking his head in mock disbelief, but he was also chuckling softly at the irony of a world turned upside down. Out in the field the workers were still sifting through clods of dirt for potatoes, smiling and laughing amongst themselves, also perhaps at the irony of an upended world.
Chapter 1 History’s Antagonists

2 The term gamonal has various possible etymological origins, none of which strike me as authoritative. The root of the word is ‘gamón,’ the Spanish word for the asphodel. Some authors argue, following Mariátegui, that the word derives from an asphodel-like flower of the puna, which is purportedly parasitic, like the eponymous villain. This strikes me as an etiological or reverse etymology. ‘Gamonal’ is a relatively common Spanish surname, as well as toponym, referring to places where the asphodel is abundant. Ultimately, the current and historical usages are sufficiently disconnected from its linguistic origins to make detailed etymological discussion moot. By at least the turn of the 19th century, the term referred generally to the hacienda-owning class of the Andean highlands, in Peru as well as Bolivia (Qayum et al. 1997), Columbia (Zamosc 1986, 11, 15, 218), and Ecuador (Lyons 2006, 115; Krupa 2007, 24). More specifically, writers or speakers used the term to imply that these highland hacendados were abusive, backward, and base. As I will discuss later in the chapter, though this term is common in public discourse and the historical and ethnographic literature, it is problematic and I will generally avoid its use, particularly in the properly ethnographic chapters.
3 In late 1968, the Armed Forces of Peru, commanded by Juan Velasco Alvarado, deposed the democratically elected President, beginning 12 years of military rule. One of Velasco’s first major policy decisions was the design and implementation of a comprehensive, Cuban-inspired Agrarian Reform program. One of its key objectives was to eliminate the latifundios and reorganize relations of production in the highlands.
4 The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) was a Maoist splinter faction of the Peruvian Communist Party that waged a twelve year (1980-1992) war on the Peruvian state before being largely defeated by Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori. Shining Path remnants continue to clash with government forces, but they no longer threaten the State and they function primarily as a protection racket for cocaine producers.
5 The ‘high provinces’ in the far south of the department of Cuzco are generally conceived of as a godforsaken backwater, or, as my informants put it, “So close to the sky, so far from God.”
6 It should be noted that Beals, in addition to being an enthusiastic fellow traveler of various Marxist revolutionary movements, was a great admirer of Mariátegui, as well as a friend and supporter of Haya de la Torre, founder of the powerful APRA political party.
7 Beals 1934, 237.
8 Beals 1934, 300. Although Beals may have been particularly strident, his perspective was widely shared, even amongst social scientists. Francois Bourricaud, for example, made similar arguments about the gamonal, characterizing the landed elite more generally as “not only greedy and gluttonous, but sterile” (Bourricaud 1966, 17).
9 As I will discuss later in the chapter, and in detail in chapter 4, the traditional equation of the gamonal and the hacendado is not strictly accurate. Although landed property was the predominant and ‘type’ form of economic and social organization (along with the
ayllu, or indigenous peasant kin group/community), accusations of ‘gamonalismo’ were leveled at non-indigenous individuals of many different statuses.

10 It must be noted that, despite their class discourse, the bulk of Shining Path violence ultimately fell on comuneros rather than landowners. Furthermore, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, comuneros also suffered from rape, murder, and other forms of abuse by state security forces, a fate generally avoided by non-peasant proprietors.

11 The urban mansions, of one to three patios, that served as the focal point of each family’s social, political, and commercial activity.

12 Camassi Pizarro 2007, 32-35.

13 Lindqvist 1972, 216. Although the book was originally published in Swedish in 1969, this quote comes from the updated appendix, “Peru—A Check Up,” to the 1972 English language edition. His comment is a general statement about the Peruvian countryside, rather than Chumbivilcas in particular.

14 Custred 1973, 18-19 and 206-207. Custred only mentions interethnic relations several times and then only in passing. Neither Juan Velasco Alvarado’s Revolutionary Government nor his Agrarian Reform decree appear anywhere in the dissertation. To be fair, Custred’s fieldwork was completed in 1970, prior to the full administrative implementation of the Reform in Chumbivilcas. Nonetheless, Velasco’s dictatorship and Agrarian Reform—not to mention the widespread unrest that had preceded his takeover and the peasant mobilization that followed it—were certainly the most momentous and conspicuous of public events and processes in Peru throughout the 1970s, though they are not mentioned by Custred.

15 Orlove 1980, 117.

16 Poole 1994, 124.

17 Paponnet-Cantat 1994, 217.

18 Gose 1994b, 192.

19 Manuel Burga and Alberto Flores Galindo restrict their use of the term to “the owners of small and medium haciendas, like those of Chumbivilcas that have between 3 and 19 families of enserfed colonos” (Burga and Galindo 1980, 29). They contrast the gamonal to the absentee terrateniente, who usually resided in Lima, Arequipa, or other large city.

20 See Gose 1994a, 21.

21 In spite of my objections to the term, I will refer where appropriate to this group in the historical period prior to the Agrarian Reform as ‘gamonales,’ particularly in the properly historical chapters. This allows me a) to align my terminology with historical sources in which the term ‘gamonal’ predominates without having to constantly quibble and b) to distinguish two hypostatized ‘moments’ in the life of a single group.

22 Gerhard Lenski defines the elite as “the highest ranking segment of any given social unit, whether a class or total society, ranked by whatever criterion one chooses” (Lenski 1984, 78-79.

23 I am, furthermore, sensitive to Rogers Brubaker’s critique of ‘groupism’ in ethnographic research (Brubaker 2004, 2-4). The vecino ‘community’ is not a “bounded whole.” In fact, today it has no genuinely collective institutions that would give it a corporate existence. I use the term ‘vecino community’ merely to suggest a population of individuals and families that share certain cultural traits, social relationships, and
historically rooted identities that are distinctive from those of the individuals and communities that surround them.

24 Herzog 2003, 18.
26 The term ‘mestizo’—which literally refers to an individual of mixed race, in particular Spanish and Native American—is perhaps the most plausible, and common, alternative. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, my informants do not, however, frequently use the word ‘mestizo’ to describe themselves. To my ear, when ‘mestizo’ is used, it is intended in much the same way as ‘ladino’ in the countries of Mesoamerica to denote the ‘non-Indian.’ Although the Quechua term for a non-Indian, ‘misti,’ is linguistically derived from the Spanish ‘mestizo,’ in local practice the term ‘mestizo’ ironically functions as a Spanish rendering of ‘misti’ rather than suggesting mixture. To the general audience ‘mestizo’ denotes hybridity, whereas for my informants it connotes ‘non-indigenousness.’ Mary Weismantel seems to concur, arguing that “in actual practice within specific social contexts, there is no intermediate or ‘mixed’ racial category: race operates as a vicious binary that discriminates superiors from inferiors” (Weismantel 2001, xxxi). The use of ‘mestizo’ would therefore potentially blur fundamental distinctions in meaning and identity.

27 Arguedas [1968]. This otherwise intriguing ethnography is weakened somewhat by Arguedas’s use of the contemporary Spanish community of Bermillo as, essentially, a historical antecedent of various highland Peruvian indigenous communities (while he refers only elliptically to the significant political and social effects of the conservative retrenchment produced by General Franco’s ruling Falangist regime). This problem is relevant to his use of ‘vecino,’ because his argument centers on the supposed parallelism of the Spanish ‘señorito/vecino’ dichotomy and the Peruvian ‘vecino/comunero’ dichotomy; Arguedas argues that the Peruvian vecino is structurally equivalent to the Spanish señorito and the Peruvian comunero is the equivalent of the Spanish vecino. The irony of the inverted meanings of ‘vecino’ was therefore a key element in Arguedas’ choice of terminology.

28 Peter Gose, who worked in the neighboring province of Antabamba, notes that “the terms most commonly used by the people of Huaquirca to refer [to] the two social groups recognized in their town” are “comuneros (commoners) and vecinos notables (notable residents), often vecinos for short” (Gose 1994a, 18). Gose uses the English term “notables” throughout his work to refer to the later group, though we are essentially in agreement about the parameters of the group (or, perhaps more accurately, since we are using emic categories, our informants are in agreement, in spite of the fact that his informants are primarily comuneros). The main problem with the term ‘notables’ is that many members of the group are not particularly notable, in any sense. Gose interprets ‘vecino’ as a shortening of ‘vecinos notables,’ whereas, though Chumbivilcanos use the phrase, I believe that ‘vecindad’ (given its suggestion of Spanishness, town-dwelling, and civic membership) is in fact primary and ‘notability’ secondary. If anything, notability is an internal distinction with the category of vecino. Without a conception of the specific civic roots of the term ‘vecino’ it is easy to treat it as merely a reference to residence.
The valuation of *vecindad*, and the depreciation of the comunero, also resonates with the “unanimous” belief “of the Spanish in the 16th and 17th centuries” in the “superiority of urban life” to rural (Mörner 1970, 18, see also 155).

Colby and van den Berghe 1969; Aguirre Beltrán 1979; Hale 2006.


Van Den Berghe 1974.

Poole 1994.

Paponnet-Cantat 1989.

One could conceptualize the *vecindario*—as Gramsci does an analogous southern Italian population in “The Southern Question”—as a “rural bourgeoisie” (Gramsci 1995, 37). This would be technically accurate, so long as one defined the bourgeoisie in the broadest possible manner. Gramsci defines the rural bourgeoisie as “the petty and medium landowner who is not a peasant” (Gramsci 1995, 37). Because, however, virtually all long-term residents in the countryside come to own or have usufruct of some quantity of land, this definition essentially boils down to defining the rural bourgeoisie as all non-peasants in the countryside, which may be accurate, but is not a class designation (except negatively, in the sense that the category includes everyone who is *not* of the peasant class).

Richard Adams concluded, for example, that the mestizo-indio division constituted, at least up until the beginning of the 20th century, a “caste system” (Adams 1959, 82).

Though Peter Gose, for example, ultimately emphasizes the class element, the emphasis is largely dialectical (in that he is critiquing the tradition in Andean ethnography of emphasizing the ethnic element), and he has a very sensitive discussion of the difficulty of defining groups in the Andes, in particular the confusion of ethnic and class criteria. He points out that each of the oppositions “*indio/mestizo, comunero/vecino, comunero/propietario*, and *runa/misti*” seems to “emphasize a different aspect of the same felt distinction instead of designating a different social alignment” (Gose 1994, 23).

Weber breaks society into three analytically distinct ‘orders’: the economic, characterized by the distribution of ‘goods and services,’ the social, characterized by the distribution of ‘honor,’ and the legal or political order, characterized by the distribution of power (Weber 1978, 926-939). To each order, or sphere, there is a corresponding form of organization or, at least, coherence. Classes, which for Weber are always *potential* sources of identification and association, correspond to the economic order (Weber 1978, 927). ‘Status groups’—“amorphous” groups of people drawn together by “style of life” and shared “social honor”—are the associations of the social order (Weber 1978, 932). Finally, ‘parties’ are the actual, concrete associations of individuals seeking to maximize their power in the legal order (again, Weber’s translator uses the term ‘legal,’ his actual usage suggests he intends it to cover the political field more generally) (Weber 1978, 938).

Kaufman 1945, 205.

Lenski 1954.

Adams 1953, 17.
Lenski defines a status group as “endogamous, hereditary, and communal” and applies the term “chiefly to racial, ethnic, and religious groups” (Lenski 1966, 78). I would merely qualify this by noting that, rather than actually being hereditary and endogamous, it is believed or claimed within its social context to be so, and that this exclusiveness is sociological rather than biological or reproductive per se. I will define what I mean by ‘ethnicity’ more fully in chapters 8 and 9, which specifically treat the subject.

My informants would not immediately recognize themselves as an ‘ethnic group’; with regard to their own ‘ethnicity’ their self-representation would be as ‘representatives of the national society in the largely indigenous (i.e. ethnic) sierra who, in the course of generations in the countryside, have acquired certain distinctive customs and attitudes.’ They would nonetheless consider these distinctive traits secondary to their basic Ibero-Peruvianism.


The existence of similar forms of enduring social distinction in regions or societies where the ethnic or racial element is less emphatic problematizes this theorization of the primacy of ethnicity in social distinction and group formation. As I will discuss in later chapters, vecinos generally believe that the traits they ascribe to comuneros are, to some extent, racial. Essentialized characterizations of the peasantry were common in Spain, at least up until the 1960s, except that in Spain they were directed at the Spanish peasantry, which was not generally conceived of as a racially distinct population. Arguedas’s discussion of the señorito/vecino dichotomy indicates the caste-like nature of distinction and the superfluity of the racial dimension per se (Arguedas 1968). Arguedas’s Spanish informants do, however, naturalize the supposed inferiority of the peasant. I will discuss the difference between biologization and naturalization, both of which are present in discourse about race and ethnicity in Chumbivilcas, in chapter 8. The existence of similar discourses about the Spanish peasantry, Black sharecroppers, slaves in classical Greece, and the Peruvian indigenous peasantry suggests that race can be opportunistically recruited to amplify or reinforce a more basic prejudicial ideology rooted in class or communal relations. George De Vos observes that “physical, genetic, or racial differences when recognized as a constituent of social stratification usually are used by dominant groups to maintain a castelike exclusion regardless of the presence or absence of ethnic distinctions” (De Vos 1990, 220), but the converse is also true: namely that ethnic distinctions are perfectly capable of maintaining castelike exclusions in the absence of racial differences and, furthermore, that physical differences will be purported in support of caste-like exclusion even when none objectively exist. It is likely that, in all seigniorial societies (for example, ancien régime France, Spain, England, feudal China and Japan, and century Eastern Europe), some degree of ‘ethnification’ and somatization of the peasantry, bourgeoisie, and aristocracy is likely to develop. In Ernest Gellner’s description, the “whole system favours horizontal lines of cultural cleavage, and it may invent and reinforce them when they are absent. Genetic and cultural differences are attributed to what were in fact merely strata differentiated by function, so as to fortify the differentiation, and endow it with authority and permanence” (Gellner 1983, 10). Superordinate non-peasants likely everywhere expound beliefs in the ‘natural’ origins of the purported idiosyncrasies and inferiority of the peasantry. In Peru and the rest of
Spanish America, however, the process of conquest and colonial exploitation probably gave ethnic ideology and solidarity a particularly strong logical and practical priority. In a certain sense, race becomes an idiom to express—to amplify and render indelible—a differentiation and depreciation that is more primordial than even race, that could be called familial, tribal, or national; it delineates and essentializes not a race, but an affiliation (in both the literal and figurative sense).


49 Radio interview, 18 February 2006.

50 One of the major limitations of the ethnographic record of the southern highlands is that it came to a virtual standstill after the mid-1980s, just prior to (and in part because of) the full-fledged Sendero incursions.

51 In her ethnography Friction, Anna Tsing makes a similar observation about the challenges posed by improbable testimony (Tsing 2005, 259-260).

52 Vansina 1985, 196.

53 Both of these examples deal with representations provided by comunero informants. This should not imply that any individual or group has a local monopoly on misrepresentation. If anything, my vecino informants were more likely to present obviously distorted visions of the past; those distortions and their meaning will, however, be treated extensively in the body of the dissertation.

54 My argument here is similar in some ways to that made by David Stoll in his Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans (1998). With regard to the controversy surrounding Stoll’s work, which seems unduly vituperative, I take no position: the bulk of the criticism seems directed at Stoll’s motives and justifications, rather than his basic claim that Menchú distorted elements of her personal and family history for personal and political purposes, a fact that Menchú has since acknowledged (for an overview of the debate see Arias 2001).

55 Bride theft, though conceived locally as an indigenous tradition, also has Peninsular antecedents (the so-called “marriage by abduction,” discussed in Dillard 1984, 127, 134-143).

56 I will discuss the local meanings of ‘cholo’ and related terms in chapter 8. In simple terms, in Chumbivilcas ‘cholo’ is a mildly derogatory term for an indigenous person in the process of adopting ‘Western’ style of life or one working as a laborer. ‘Chola’ is the feminine form but is predominantly used to designate market women. ‘Cholita’ refers to a young indigenous girl, particularly a sexually appealing one or one with whom the speaker is in a romantic or sexual relationship.

57 To be frank, few of my informants, so far as I could ascertain, supported their illegitimate offspring in any meaningful way.

58 It’s not my intention here to intervene in the thriving research on human memory, which has produced a vast literature (see Baddeley 1990 for a review). The unreliability of human recollection, in particular, has been a particularly rich vein of investigation (see, for instance, Loftus 1996 on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony). It has long been understood that the specific character of events or stimuli influenced their recollection. Herman Ebbinghaus, in his 1885 Memory: A Contribution to Experimental
Psychology, artfully described this with regard to his decision to use nonsense syllables to standardize his experiments in recollection:

The nonsense material, just described, offers many advantages, in part because of this very lack of meaning. First of all, it is relatively simple and relatively homogeneous. In the case of the material nearest at hand, namely poetry or prose, the content is now narrative in style, now descriptive, or now reflective; it contains now a phrase that is pathetic, now one that is humorous; its metaphors are sometimes beautiful, sometimes harsh; its rhythm is sometimes smooth and sometimes rough. There is thus brought into play a multiplicity of influences which change without regularity and are therefore disturbing. Such are associations which dart here and there, different degrees of interest, lines of verse recalled because of their striking quality or their beauty, and the like (Ebbinghaus [1885] 1964, 23).

I am not arguing, however, specifically about recollection in any cognitive sense. While it would be interesting to grapple with the cognitive significance of my informants’ form of historical representation, it is outside the scope of the present work.

This distortion may also go so far as to involve the disregard of agreeable or neutral daily phenomena in favor of highly salient negative ones. Consciousness-raising and ideological indoctrination during the Agrarian Reform and peasant union activism before and after have likely contributed to the tendency to recollect the most flagrant forms of hacienda abuse, rather than the more tolerable daily grind. Lyons argues, drawing on his work with elderly former hacienda workers in Ecuador, that “it may be that the agrarian reform and subsequent developments have tended to highlight in oral memory the negative aspects of hacienda life and to obscure the extent to which some people could have conceived of the amos as moral exchange-partners” (Lyons 2006, 205).

As I will clarify in chapter 5, there are few written sources on Sendero activity in Chumbivilcas. The only article-length investigation of the violence was produced by a government commission investigating the massacre of 21 comuneros by a Peruvian military patrol in April of 1990. As a result, much of my information comes directly from informants, largely unsupported by documentary evidence.

As such, this dissertation complicates the large ethnographic literature pitting indigenous activism against neoliberal reforms.

For a brief discussion of the problem of “exogenous change” and the necessity of studying higher levels of decision-making and “administrative organization,” see Vincent 1968, 261.

Bobrow-Strain 2007, 183.

Gramsci 1971, 178.

Gramsci 1971, 229.

Holston 2008, 34.

González Ponciano 2004, 121-122.

Nader 1972, 289.

Bobrow-Strain 2007, 38.

Tannenbaum 1962, 80.
Dollard noted, for example, in 1957 a “sectional” (i.e. Northern) and personal bias with regard to the study of the American south, in particular the “strong feeling for the underdog” and the desire “to stand with [the black] against the dominance of the white caste,” as well as a fear of being “pulled into the southern mode of perception of the racial problem” (Dollard 1957, 34-37).

This, despite the fact that many resident communities, due in part to their relative closure and poverty, were in fact particularly resistant to change. There were very few contemporary ethnographic studies of resident laborers. Gustavo Alencastre Montúfar’s unpublished Lauramarca: Vida y muerte en un latifundio Peruano (2006), based on fieldwork done semi-surreptitiously in the indigenous alpaca herding communities of the vast hacienda Lauramarca in 1957, is an excellent exception.

See, for example, Caldeira 2000; Pina-Cabral and Pedroso de Lima 2000; Shore 2002; Hale 2006; Bobrow-Strain 2007; of particular interest is Casais Arzú 2007, which, though largely historical, in capítulo IV uses formal interviews to investigate contemporary ethnic ideology amongst the Guatemalan national elite.

Davis and Gardner make a similar point in their ethnography of Natchez, Mississippi, where even large landowners were only moderately wealthy relative to property owners in the nation at large and might even be considered “middle-class owners”: “when we compare the holdings of the largest planters in Old County and of their families with the holdings of American industrialists and of their families, we at once place the cotton-producer in his proper economic” (Davis et al 1941, 280).

Michael Kearney argued in 1970 that alcohol consumption was “the pivotal point in Catholic-Protestant opposition” and was the predominant factor in conversion (Kearney 1970, 149-150, cited in Brandes 2002, 33).

In this, I follow John Dollard, who wrote, in 1957, that “it is of the utmost importance to watch one’s own mental life, fantasies, and responses in contact with the new culture . . . The object of study is, of course, precisely the emotional reactions of oneself and one’s associates in the concrete social situation” (Dollard 1957, 20).

Race or ethnicity has not been recorded in the Peruvian Census since 1940. In Chumbivilcas, the 1940 census classified 8,629 (19%) of 45,465 respondents as ‘blanco or mestizo’ (Perú, Dirección Nacional de Estadística 1944). In a related category, it found that 3,231 (8%) of 38,319 respondents were Spanish monolinguals or were fluent in both Spanish and a second language (the overwhelming majority of this Spanish-Quechua bilinguals). It’s unclear, however, what the actual methodology for determining race was in practice. Judy Meltzer, quoting from the instruction manuals given to ‘enumerators’ or census takers, writes that “ascription of race depended primarily on the ‘personal appreciation’ of the enumerators, who were instructed that it was ‘not actually necessary’
for them to ask explicitly about race if they could tell by looking at the participant and if it wasn’t ‘clear’ than [sic] they should be recorded as Mestizo” (see Meltzer 2008, 10). The text of the 1940 census itself claims that 87% of racial assessments were made by enumerators rather than respondents (see Rowe 1947, 206). It’s impossible to say how enumerators were actually making their assessments. Virtually all of the enumerators must have been local vecinos, since literacy was a requirement and the participation of “teachers and state officials . . . was mandatory” (Meltzer 2008, 10), and to a certain extent they would have ‘known’ who was mestizo and who indigenous. On the other hand, as I have noted, racial mestizaje is the norm on both sides of the vecino/comunero divide, and it’s impossible to say whether local census takers were successfully distinguishing between their typical social categories—vecino/comunero (or runa or ayllu-run, the Quechua term for an indígena, as would have been the more common terms in the era)—and the biological categories—mestizo-blanco/indio—advocated by the Dirección Nacional de Estadística. Whatever the case, the census likely drastically underestimated the indigenous population, since many indigenous people lived in isolated villages, and overestimated the percentage of mestizos, since, given the difficulty of objectively determining race, respondents would have been encouraged to claim the higher status and enumerators would have been likely to give respondents ‘the benefit of the doubt.’ It is my sense that the percentage of sociological mestizaje or vecindad is more accurately reflected in the mere 8% of Chumbivilcanos who were not Quechua monolinguals. This fits well with my own ‘guesstimate’ for the vecino community constituting 8-10% of the total current population of Chumbivilcas (77,721).

84 Maitland 1911, 295.
85 See van der Pijl 2005. See also Femia 1981, 133-135 for a discussion of Gramsci’s intellectual kinship with Machiavelli.
86 Gramsci 1971.
87 Gramsci 1971, 167. This focus on “ethico-political relations” seems, in fact, to be specifically what has gained him a strong following in anthropology and among Cultural Marxists.
88 Despite his conviction that “everything that is of real importance in sociology is nothing other than political science” (Gramsci 1971, 243).
89 Van der Pijl 2005, 500.
90 Levy 1987. Van der Pijl also argues that “Gramsci’s real counterpart as a forward-looking cadre intellectual is Max Weber” (Van der Pijl 2005, 505).
91 This is represented most forcefully in the remarkable similarity of the typologies they use to facilitate analysis; although Levy doesn’t explicit note its homology to Weber’s trichotomy discussed above, he writes that Gramsci’s work attempts to understand society on three levels of abstraction, incorporating and transcending the automatic iron laws of elitist political science. First, there are habitual and intellectual behaviors that run in a continuum from senso commune or folkloric beliefs to hegemonic ideologies. Secondly, there are the primordial facts of any society: the ‘technical’ division of labour between rulers and ruled, specialist and layman. Finally, there are the dull constraints of the social infrastructure. These three levels of can
be equated respectively to civil society (voluntary organizations), political society (the state and its coercive apparatus) and economic society (the modes of production)” (Levy 1987, 390).

In analyzing this complicated mix I will also draw, to a lesser extent, on Wilfredo Pareto, whose vast, digressive *The Mind and Society* covers much of the same territory as Weber’s *Economy and Society*, but in a more psychological and idiosyncratic way. I have, more than anything, a temperamental attraction to Pareto, particularly his Machiavellian cynicism and keen eye for irony. His thinking about aristocracies, and elites more generally, and their ultimate decadence and replacement are particularly apt for the current study.

*Economy and Society* is obviously difficult to summarize; it is arguably the most comprehensive sociological exposition ever written. It will be discussed in greater depth in later chapters.

Phaedrus § 265e; Plato 2002, 55.

I make use, at various junctures, of some of the pioneering anthropological work on the American South as an analogue to my own research. It was not until the final phases of my research and composition that I familiarized myself with this particular literature. As such, none of my data was collected or analyzed in light of this material. I think that this fact lends even more significance to the parallels that I have found to exist between the two situations, widely separated in time and space yet eerily similar in structure and timbre.

Chapter 2 Chumbivilcas, La Tierra Brava

1 See Guillet 1979, 19.
3 Paponnet-Cantat 1989, 70.
4 Gade 1994, 41.
5 Gade 1994, 42-43.
6 Aguirre Beltrán 1979, 23.
7 Paponnet-Cantat 1989, 76.
8 *Mitias* were drafts of corvée labor, used by the Inca for public works and later adopted by the Spanish primarily for mining.
10 Brown 2001, 471.
11 This includes the district of Livitaca, which was not censused, but which was estimated at a population of 5,000. This seems to be rather high compared to other censused districts. Whatever the case, the total estimate should be considered an extremely rough approximation.
13 Censos Nacionales 2007: XI de Población y VI de Vivienda.
14 Antichresis is a financial contract that, for various reasons, has virtually disappeared in Europe and the US, but is still frequently, even predominantly, utilized in Peru. It is
essentially a lease arrangement whereby the usufruct (or rents) of a property is given for a specified period of time in return for an interest-free loan (in effect, the profit potential or use-value of the property is considered equivalent to the profit potential of the loan). The relative scarcity of capital and modest effective finance charge makes this form of contract popular with property owners in Peru.

15 See for instance the article “El capital financiero sugiere . . .” Sur 1979, 16.
16 Horses and goats are also raised, the former for transport, the later for meat. Though just two decades ago horses were still ubiquitous, and in peripheral districts and communities they are still the primary form of transport, they are becoming increasingly uncommon. Many Chumbivilcanos note that horses consume much more grass than—as much as four times as much as—cattle do, and that their purchase and maintenance are therefore only justified if automobile or combi service is unavailable or unaffordable. Old horses are sold at the end of their usefulness to itinerant middlemen and their meat used in the industrial elaboration of feeds and, purportedly and illegally, salchichas (hot dogs). Goats are rarely bred. Some larger landowners have free-range goats on their property, though I have never seen them harvested or sold.

17 Sackett 2004.
18 The denigration of herders may not be entirely attributable to their poverty. Jane and Peter Schneider argue that herders in Sicily are considered inferior in status to cultivators and townsfolk, despite having “greater freedom of movement and more power than the peasant cultivators” (Schneider and Schneider 1976, 66). They imply that the origins of the depreciation lie in cultural models of civility and barbarity.

20 Jane Collins points out that young couples are often in a particularly difficult economic position, which drives them to migrate or engage in wage work (Collins 1988, 142).
22 A similar phenomenon occurred when peasants and other small-scale producers began growing and milling sugar at the turn of the 18th century (Ramirez 1986, 215).
24 Villena Aguirre 1987, 38.
25 Chumbivilcanos claim that Potosí was in fact discovered by a fellow Chumbivilcano Diego Huallpa, a native of Yanqui, Capaqumarca, Chumbivilcas. This is supported by Diego de Esquivel y Navia, who wrote in the 1740s that “Antonio de Herrera . . . dice que un indio llamado Huallca, de nación Chumbivilca, provincia cercana al Cuzco, corriendo tras unos venados, que trepaban el cerro, se asió una mata, que arrancándose, descubrió el metal” (Esquivel y Navia [1749] 1980, 137).
26 De la Barrera 1930, 30.
27 Villena Aguirre 1987, 38.
28 Negrón notes, in particular the “Templo of Santo Tomás, which dates from this era, as well as the Templo of Colquemarca and one of the oldest, the chapel of Yanqui” (Negrón 1995, 19).
29 Gade 1994, 36.
Drinot 2006, 12.

31 “Damn, now there’s action/activity here. It wasn’t like this before.”

32 This will be analyzed in detail in chapter 8.

33 See del Valle 2005, 86.

34 On gendered elements of the Spanish colonial property regime, see Wilson 1984, 310; Lamar 1994. In chapter 10, I briefly discuss Spanish inheritance law.

35 It should be kept in mind, however, that, while men were frequently involved in commerce, politics, and public affairs more generally, vecinas were often the primary authority in the day-to-day operation of haciendas. In Qayum et al’s description, “the work of administering the hacienda was seen as an extension of domestic labor, in other words of the daily operation of the household in the city” (Qayum et al 1997, 48). The collapse of the hacienda regime therefore constituted, in some cases, a significant alteration of the vecina’s way of life.

36 This fact has been noted by all social scientists working in the region, including Poole and Paponnet-Cantat.

37 Aguirre Beltrán 1979, 54.

38 Free trade policies generally hurt all agricultural producers except those that produce exotic crops with high demand in Europe or the United States and a high value-to-weight ratio. Because most peasants commonly sell only the surplus of their subsistence production, this is not a viable alternative.

39 Several historians, in particular those working on New Spain, have argued that the landed estate was, in fact, more of a consumer than a producer of fortunes, and served to translate the capital generated in mining into social and political capital (Brading 1971; Keith 1977).

40 Qayum et al. 1997, 42.

41 There is a teaching institute in Santo Tomás, but it mainly caters to comuneros and is perceived to be inferior to outside institutions. Chumbivilcanos universally would prefer to attend a university or institute in Cuzco or Arequipa, though lack of funds prevents most from doing so.


43 Aguirre Beltrán 1979, 54.

44 Rockefeller found the same high levels of urban migration amongst the provincial landed elites in Bolivia: “Bolivia’s rural elite are trying to become part of the national elite, moving out of places like San Lucas into the cities and sending their children to universities. The position of the rural elite is today far more precarious and marginal than it was 50 years ago. The number of prominent old landed families in San Lucas is dramatically reduced from a few decades ago, but where few of the elderly elite have even secondary school degrees, their children go to college or technical school after completing high school, and many have advanced degrees. Most members of this younger generation have moved to or were born in the cities” (Rockefeller 1998, 205).

45 It should be noted, however, that the locally and nationally specific events that seem to have accelerated emigration are also, to a certain extent, merely particular instantiations of universal disincentives to remaining in the countryside. Both Colby and van den Berghe, who performed ethnographic research in Guatemala in the 1960s, and de la Peña,
drawing on historical research on early 20th century Jalisco, report large scale emigration of ladinos and landed elite from the countryside to nearby cities in response to greater opportunities for education, employment and commerce (Colby & Van Den Berghe 1969, 111; de la Peña 1984, 209). Jane and Peter Schneider describe a similar trend in 20th century Sicily (Schneider and Schneider 1983, 165).


47 [“Me fui de Ayacucho en 1967. En 1969 ya era en Europa, estudiando. Mis hijos todos han estudiado en la extranjera. En Suecia, Estados Unidos, España, Francia. Un hijo es físico, mi hija mayor es bióloga, mi menor está estudiando el ambiente en España y quiere regresar para trabajar con un ONG en proyectos ambientales.”] This sort of testament is prone to a certain degree of exaggeration. The extent to which vecinos have emigrated to Europe and the US as scientists and professionals is probably less than Chumbivilcanos claim, but I have met dozens of Chumbivilcanos who work overseas, and the phenomenon seems fairly common.

48 The role of loss of ethnic privileges per se in emigration is difficult to assess. Paerregaard argues, with regard to an analogous population of provincial mistis, that ethnic considerations are not only important or predominant in the decision to emigrate, but virtually conclusive:

Manuel Toribio’s [a vecino patriarch] descendants can no longer lay claim to their own particular ethnic identity or make use of Tapay’s political institutions to exercise power as misti. The children of the only Pérez who today makes claim to a particular misti status have all migrated. Evidently, they are not interested in inheriting their father’s property. Indeed, they did not migrate for economic motives, nor can money entice them to return. Rather, what triggered the family’s extensive migration was the change in ethnic relations and the disintegration of the political dominance that bound the first two generations of the Pérez family to Tapay” (Paerregaard 1997, 178).

This argument is somewhat problematic, however. First, Paerregaard’s use of the word ‘evidently’ suggests that his conclusions about misti motivations are based on inference rather than interview data. Second, to say that “what triggered the family’s extensive migration” were changes in ethno-political relations implies that emigrating to the city with capital and status accumulated in the countryside were not a long-standing tradition in Latin America. Third, to argue that “they did not migrate for economic motives” implies that the author can determine and has determined that the economic opportunities in the city for mistis are inferior to those in the countryside, which is highly doubtful.

Fourth, despite an apparent lack of interest in “inheriting their father’s property,” many urban migrants continue to think of family property in the countryside as their inheritance, so that emigration is not actually considered a loss of resources (this is true both of comuneros and vecinos). Finally, a far more plausible reason for the greater emigration of mistis than comuneros—Paerregaard found that, “of the 107 surviving descendants of Manuel Toribio, 81 percent have migrated, an unusually high percentage compared with other Tapeño families” (Paerregaard 1997, 175)—is that wealthier, higher status individuals emigrate in greater numbers because they have greater capacity to do
so, and can do so under more favorable terms. While it is important to acknowledge the potentially determinative force of cultural and ideological elements, it is equally important to avoid the kinds of Hegelian inversion into which Paerregaard appears to fall.  

49 Bobrow-Strain 2007, 103.

50 Matos Mar points out that military recruitment, training, and service are key elements in raising the consciousness of the peasantry (Matos Mar 1976, 213).


52 See Collins 1988; Paerregaard 1997, 43.


Chapter 3 Reconquista and Conquista: Institutions and Ideologies

1 Hünefeldt 1982, 5.

2 Robert Keith notes that the reconquista actually involved the subjugation of a more economically and technologically advanced society by a less (Keith 1971, 433-434). Nonetheless, a clear Spanish sense of moral superiority developed, and intensified around the turn of the 14th century.

3 See Bendix 1977, 43-45.

4 It should be noted that this whole complex is not locally specific. The disdain for manual labor is not isolated to the Iberian peninsula or even the southern Mediterranean. Kautsky notes that aristocrats throughout the world look “down with contempt upon productive and, especially, manual labor, an attitude that is also extended to trade and moneymaking. Not only does he not need to engage in such activities, but to do so would obliterate the line between him and the peasant and others in society. While saving and hard work are considered dishonorable, conspicuous consumption and display of wealth and generosity are regarded as noble and worthy of the aristocrat” (Kautsky 1972, 29).

5 Hanke 1959, 13.

6 Hanke 1959, 14.

7 Johnson 1970, 9; see Moore 1970, 152 for a slightly different description of ethnic division and stratification in late medieval Spain.

8 Chacón Jiménez 2004, 23.

9 Sánchez-Albornoz 1970, 43-44. It has been noted that the subjugation and settlement of the Canary Islands was an even more direct precedent for the institutional organization of American colonization.

10 It should be noted that Sánchez-Albornoz was absolutely convinced that “between the Roman municipality and the Medieval Peninsular one” there is “not a single connection, not even a tenuous and slight one” (Sánchez-Albornoz 1943, 126). He believed that the Visigothic and Islamic occupation had effectively erased all substantive traces of the Roman civilization. He asserts that the “Medieval Castilian-Leónese municipality emerged as the mature fruit of the social, economic, and political organization of the North, without exterior influences or insertions” (Sánchez-Albornoz 1943, 129). The vehemence of this position may owe something to the partisan nature of
the debate (evident also in the tone of his introductory discussion of the historiographical context); whatever the case, Sánchez-Albornoz stops short of discussing the Roman or other antecedents of the “organization of the North.”

11 It should be noted that the expansion of Spain into the more sparsely populated areas of North America was accomplished through a slightly different set of institutions. Cutter notes that “the primary institutions of Spanish colonial control” along the frontier north of New Spain were “the presidio, the mission, and the town” (Cutter 1988, xi).

14 Dillard 1984, 3.
15 Herzog 2003, 18.
16 Dillard 1984, 18.
17 Herzog 2003, 28.
18 Merchán Fernández 1988, 52.
19 Chamberlain 1939, 135.
21 Merchán Fernández 1988, 54.
22 Merchán Fernández 1988, 55.
23 Moore 1970, 158.
24 Bermúdez Aznar 1974, 50.
28 Merchán Fernández 1988, 201-203.
29 Ramírez 1986, 134.
30 Benjamin González Alonso points out that the “partial noncompliance with laws, the relative divergence between written norms and legal practice” was a salient feature of Spanish Peninsular administration as well (González Alonso 1981, 20).

31 Góngora notes, for example, that *fueros* (municipal charters), which developed over centuries in Spain and guaranteed to certain amount of judicial and administrative autonomy to *vecinos*, never developed in the American colonies (Góngora 1951, 10).

33 See Powers 2000 for an example of a detailed medieval *fuero*, as well as his discussion of the gradual royal restriction of municipal privileges (22-23).
34 Ramírez 1986, 5. It should be noted that indigenous pueblos also had *cabildos*. These were much smaller in scale, but with many of the same functions as the *cabildos* of Spanish villas. See Hünefeldt 1982, 85-90.
35 Faron 1966, 154-155.
36 Góngora 1951, 50.
37 Chamberlain 1939, 35.
38 Chamberlain 1939, 39.
39 Keith 1971, 433. Keith is responding to a historiography that perhaps presumes more of a lineage from the peninsular to colonial encomienda, and his argument about the non-relationship seems like an overstatement. At the very least, both encomiendas obey a
similar formal logic in their delegation of authority, privilege, and responsibility from the
king to encomendero, whatever the divergences in the nature or substance of the
delegated powers.

40 Chamberlain 1939, 46. Indians were direct vassals of the king and were governed
“exclusively by officers of the royal government and by local native officials and
cabildos,” though encomenderos were nonetheless charged with ensuring the well-being
of the natives within his encomienda.

41 Ramírez 1986, 17.
42 Chamberlain 1939, 44.
43 Burga 1976, 103. Burga’s study is focused in particular on the Jequetepéque Valley,
Pacasmayo Province, La Libertad Department, Peru.
44 Góngora 1951, 132-133.
45 See Keith 1976, 56. In fact, the Potosí mita, as well as the Huancavelica and Cailloma
mitas that so depopulated Chumbivilcas, was not introduced and administered through
encomienda but rather corregimiento (Góngora 1951, 136).

46 The King retained the right to appoint a dozen or so corregidores in Peru, the rest
being “appointed by the viceroys, governors, and captains general” (Castañeda 1929,
450).
47 Góngora 1951, 137.
48 Góngora 1951, 55.
49 Stern 1982, 33.
50 Moore 1967, 41.
52 Spalding 1984, 161 & 164.
53 Though it is an interesting historical question, I know of no specific comparative study
of the effect of autochthonous institutions on the differential evolution of encomienda and
later corregimiento in Peru and Mexico.
54 Hopkins 1983, 29.
56 Salomon 1991, 22.
57 Murra 1975.
58 Murra 1961, 51. The exemption from mita, however, was confined by Spanish
authorities in the early 17th century to the legitimate sons of the kuraka, and the
exemption from tribute confined solely to his male firstborn, implying a
60 Hünfeldt 1982, 30-32, 55.
61 Villanueva Urteaga 1982. Virtually every parish report from the 1689 Visita blames the
Huancavelica and Cailloma mitas for “destroying, and annihilating, and ruining” the
pueblos of the province (295). According to Cook, the 1578 Potosí mita charter specified
a weekly quota of 15 mitayos to be sent by the community of Caratopa in Chumbivilcas
(Cole 1985, 76). Because Condesuyos, which was included in the Potosí mita, and
Chumbivilcas, which was not, were jointly administered (i.e., by a single, shared
additional Chumbivilcanos were probably sent as mitayos to Potosí as well, despite not being technically specified as one of the affected provinces.

Assadourian 1982, 309. Jeffrey Cole argues that while the Potosí mita drastically altered the population distribution in the southern highlands, driving Indians in affected corregimientos into unaffected ones, the actual mortality in the mines was demographically insignificant and most of the decline in population can be attributed to epidemic diseases (Cole 1985, 26, 28, 109).

Stern 1982, 104.

See Mörner 1985, 90-91, for a brief description of the reparto.

The introduction of sarna (mange) had devastated camelid herds, leaving even pastoral communities with large tracts of unused pasture.

Mörner 1993, 19.

Hopkins 1983, 34.


Mörner 1993, 11.

Mörner 1967, 98-100.


Sinclair Thomson’s work suggests that the decline of the cacicazgo, accelerated by the insurrections of the late 18th century and their bloody repression, opened a space for mestizo infiltration and political economic mediation (Thomson 2002, 248-249).

This is an excellent example of the elision of the term ‘vecino’ from the historiography. Mörner, being eminently familiar with the historical record, recognizes that ‘vecino’ is the most common term for non-indigenous townsfolk in colonial documents, and yet, in deference no doubt to his readers and the historiographical norm, he uses the term ‘mestizo’ to gloss ‘vecino.’

Mörner 1967, 100.

Spain. Ministerio de Fomento [1586] 1885, 12. The provincias of Chumbivilcas and Condesuyos were jointly administered by the same corregidor through much of the colonial period.


For description and analysis of ‘infiltration by arrendamiento,’ see Hünfeldt 1982, 55-64.

Villanueva Urteaga 1982, 298, 305-309. The number of haciendas grows quickly as the Río Santo Tomas descends into altitudes more propitious for growing European crops (see the report on the parish of Capi in Villanueva Urteaga 1982, 428-429). These same valley districts, in particular Capacmarca in Chumbivilcas and Capi in Paruro to the north, are famous amongst people in the region for the purportedly European phenotypic features of the local comuneros. Though Chumbivilcanos don’t necessarily recognize any historical cause, it is tempting to connect the phenomenon with these 17th century Spanish and mestizo settlement patterns.

The primary exceptions being Mörner 1970 and Hünfeldt 1982.
See, for example, Christine Hünefeldt’s description of mestizo infiltration in Hünefeldt 1982.

Mayer 1984, 103.


See, for example, Paerregaard 1997.

I will discuss this later in the chapter with regard to Republican gamonalismo, as well as in chapter 8 in relation to the concept of ‘la cholita’; here I will merely mention some of the properly colonial elements of the phenomenon.

In Spanish society of the late Middle Ages, concubinage was “not only legal but widely supported” (Dillard 1984, 127). Called a barragana, the concubine was “the lawful companion of a townsman’s youth and was herself characteristically a young woman” (Dillard 1984, 133). If a married man was found to be maintaining a barragana, both the man and woman could suffer serious consequences, including flogging and other forms of humiliation (Dillard 1984, 132-133).

Ramírez 1986, 42-43.

The term ‘hacienda’ can technically refer to any sort of property, including mines and obrajes, as well as to a royal or national treasury. That said, in the 17th century it began to refer specifically to landed agricultural or mixed agricultural-pastoral property, and it is in this sense that I use it throughout the discussion. Ramirez distinguishes between three types of landed hacienda: estancia (livestock ranch), trapiche (predecessor to the plantation), and hacienda proper (mixed farm) (Ramirez 1986, 2). For our purposes here, it is sufficient to note that there was substantial variation in the productive orientation and organization of the hacienda as an institution.


Ramirez 1986, 81.

Hopkins 1983, 263-270.


Hopkins 1983, 27.


Faron 1976.

The term ‘repartimiento’ can refer to both the distribution of Indians to an encomendero (for his lifetime or longer) and their temporary distribution by a corregidor.


This should go without saying, because only non-ayllu Indians would be available for long-term, resident labor, and non-ayllu Indians were basically forasteros.

Kay 1971, 197.

Assadourian 1982, 128.
It should also be noted that the constant draining of wealth through tribute and silver extraction was a continual constraint on the domestic economy. Data presented by Assodourian seem to suggest that the steep decline of remittances from Lima to Spain were in part a product of the harshness of the Crown’s extractive, mercantilist policies, which sharply reduced long-term growth (Assadourian 1982, 131-133).

That is, markets within the colonies. The most significant exception to this was the massive trade network that developed to supply Potosí, which will be discussed momentarily.

Hopkins 1983, 23.

In the case of the Church, for example, lease payments were normally fixed at 5 percent per annum. Analogical situations of indebtedness existed throughout Spanish America. See Van Young 1981, 123, for a discussion of indebtedness of hacienda estates in colonial Guadalajara, Mexico.

Kay 1971, 86.

In part this is because travel along riversides is virtually impossible due to the absence in many places of traversable shorelines, but it is also because of the structure of the ayllu, which tended to hold a vertical swath of land stretching from river to puna, and to have its main settlement at the middle altitudes between the two. Since major trade routes connected these settlements they tended to pass through middle altitudes.

Villena Aguirre 1987, 46.

Assadourian 1982, 38.

Godoy 1988, 16.


The endemic inflation that afflicted the Spanish economic system throughout the colonial era was undoubtedly another key motivation for the conservatism and lack of dynamism in production. Hennessey notes that part of the attraction of landed property was that it served as “hedge against inflation which rarely drops below double figures and may even rise to treble figures” (Hennessey 1978, 126). Though this may have encouraged landed investment, it simultaneously discouraged landed production.

Assadourian 1982, 298-299. Potosí went through a series of steep increases and long, continual drops in production. The first boom followed discovery 1545, but production fell quickly after 1565. The Toledan reforms, in particular the introduction of the mita and of a new mercury amalgamation process, which allowed the easy processing of the silver-rich tailings of the earlier phase of exploitation, rapidly drove production to its historic highs from around 1580 to 1615, after which production fell inexorably (with brief spikes in the 1640s and 1740 to 1790) (Bakewell 1988, 17).

Cole notes that “in many respects the privileges granted to the azogueros by Toledo were reminiscent of those awarded the encomenderos by the Crown” (Cole 1985, 65), most importantly the right to forced labor, without associated rights to land or jurisdiction.

Tandeter 1981, 100-101; Cole 1985, 133. These are merely the economic elements of state intervention. The Crown also exercised those judicial and political functions natural to the state, via the competing institutions of the Audiencia de la Plata (or de Charcas), within whose territorial jurisdiction Potosí technically fell, and the Virreinato del Perú,
which appointed the corregidor de Potosí and claimed ultimate colonial authority from distant Lima (Cole 1985, 69-71).

123 Kay 1971, 84.
124 Bakewell 1988, 23.
125 Cotler 1976, 313; Assadourian 1982, 127.
126 Of course, this is also a function of the lack of demand and the high cost of transport: had hacendados been able to bring their goods to market at low cost and received high prices for them, they presumably would have been able to increase, or introduce, wages, which would have attracted more workers. The basic problem therefore is that low profits led to wages that were insufficient to attract labor, especially given the fact that land was initially plentiful and potential workers could generally guarantee the subsistence of themselves and their families independently.

127 Ramírez 1986, 108.
128 See Dobyns 1964, 85 for a modern account of this strategy.

Chapter 4 Republic and Gamonalismo

1 Huntington 1968, 200.
2 See, for example, Dammert 2003, 42, 44.
3 “Una reflexión sobre la familia en este período implica considerar que el aparato administrativo colonial fue desmantelado y extensas partes del territorio quedaron fuera del control público” (Mannarelli 2004, 348).
4 Silverman discusses an analogical population in Perugia of landowners, “minor professionals, bureaucrats, and shopkeepers” which, with “the expansion of bureaucracy” after unification, welcomed exogenous “professionals and administrators” into their fold (Silverman 1977, 17). This kind of communal block is likely a universal way of organizing social distinction at particular political economic conjunctures.
5 Tannenbaum 1962, 75.
6 The work of the German Otto Hintze (1975) has also been influential in the formation of the field of study.
7 See, for example, Albert Hirschman 1945 and 1970; Samuel Huntington 1968; Perry Anderson 1974; Charles Tilly 1975; Theda Skocpol 1979; Michael Mann 1986; Joel Migdal 1988; Davidheiser 1992.
8 This is a particularly serious problem in the characteristically particularistic cultural environment of Latin America. Seymour Lipset has noted that the “Latin-American system has been identified by Parsons as an example of the particularisticascriptive pattern. Such a system tends to be focused around kinship and local community, and to de-emphasize the need for powerful and legitimate larger centers of authority such as the state” (Lipset 1967, 7). As such, opposition to the imposition of state organization and rationality is likely to be particularly vigorous.
10 Although James Scott’s work is somewhat outside of this paradigm, his work illuminates some of the technical and administrative innovations that facilitate state
consolidation and the lack of which contributes to state weakness. He writes, for example, that the “premodern state was, in many crucial ways, partially blind; it knew precious little about its subjects, their wealth, their landholdings and yields, their location, their very identity” (Scott 1998, 2). He goes on to argue that this “illegible society . . . is a hindrance to any effective intervention by the state, whether the purpose of that intervention is plunder or public welfare” (Scott 1998, 78).

11 Mann 1986, 113.
12 Mann 1986, 114.
13 Rotberg 2003, 3.
17 Anrup 1990, 47. See also Mejía Navarrete 1990, 24.
19 Stavenhagen 1965, 71.
20 Stavenhagen 1965, 71. It should be noted that Stavenhagen, in this passage, is talking about a particular form of internal colonialism. On one level and in certain locations, the colonial situation continues. But simultaneously, national settlers move out into formerly strictly or largely indigenous regions, thus reproducing not only colonial social relations, but the actual process of settlement and colonization proper. In this passage, he is dealing with the later, more specific process of internal colonization.
21 Hechter 1975, 8-9.
23 Huntington 1968, 199.
25 Anrup 1990, 47.
26 Ramírez 1986, 265.
27 In fact, the focus on land ownership in the study of hacendados has resulted in a relative inattentiveness to the mechanics of the transmission of non-material benefits, including compadrazgo and other contacts, by hacienda elites (see Eisenstadt 1956, Wolf 1966, and Gudeman 1971).
28 See José María Arguedas’s Yawar Fiesta for an insightful fictional treatment of the conflict and collaboration between local vecino notables and the central state (1985).
29 It will be noticed that, except for the addition of a separate ‘religious’ category, this is basically Weber’s tripartite schema of society. In practice, the Catholic church in rural Peru tended to operate much like a parallel political institution, so that it would perhaps be more appropriate to speak of a “polico-religious” sphere or a religious sub-category within the political sphere; nonetheless, the Church operated (and continues to operate, albeit in more benevolent ways) through distinct institutional channels and justified itself in distinct ideological terms, which I think ultimately makes it preferable to treat it as a separate sphere.
30 Nonetheless, it’s also clear that some level of economic prosperity was necessary to gain recognition as legitimately vecino or ‘de nivel’ and to gain proficiency in the skills,
habits, and attitudes of the non-indigenous power-holders; or, in other words, that relative affluence was an element in ethnic identification.

31 Jacobsen 1993, 305. I am generally in agreement with this assessment. I would add, however, following from the prior discussion, that hybridity is not necessarily an attribute of the individuals but of the institutions they create and operate. Many ‘gamonales’ do personally exhibit this hybridity, but competency is usually distributed throughout the family enterprise: mayordomos directly manage feudatarios, attorneys argue cases before departmental judges, patriarchs serve as congressmen in Lima, etc.

32 Poole 1994, 102.

33 As I argue in chapter 8, the idea that the *gamonal* is hybrid, or is part-Indian, reflects the discourse of 19th and early 20th century liberal reformers, rather than a sustained sociological analysis. One could argue that the trope of the ‘gamonal as hybrid’ was elaborated by the dominant society to repudiate a segment of itself, and thereby launder its image and ‘rationalize’ its exploitation.

34 I am aware that the term ‘national society’ *should* include the indigenous citizens and their societies. In practice, however, the assimilation of indigenous Peruvians to the ‘national’ society was predicated on their adoption of the culture of the dominant Iberian and mestizo population. The national society today is vastly more pluralistic and embraces many characteristically indigenous elements, but is still largely oriented toward imported European values, attitudes, and beliefs.

35 The meanings of the terms *comunero* and *vecino*, the behaviors that are culturally prescribed for interaction between the two categories, and the logics that underlie social distinction and the ethnic categorization of social interlocutors are all complex and ambiguous. In chapter 8, I will specifically discuss the multiple discourses surrounding race, ethnicity, and class in Chumbivilcas and the behaviors that characterize inter-ethnic relations. In chapter 9, I will discuss the models that lead my informants to place themselves and their social interlocutors in one or the other category. It must suffice here to accept that two such diffuse groups do in fact exist and that a body of ideologies and practices guarantees their existence. The impatient reader can refer to the later chapters for an in-depth discussion.

36 Aguirre Beltrán 1979, 96.

37 In her treatment of colonial Cuzco, Susan Ramírez writes that “most of the newcomers began their careers as merchants, royal bureaucrats, or professionals . . . In general, the socially mobile were more active in the public affairs of the province than those who already had land in the family. Before acquiring land, the nouveau riche typically held several different positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy, in the militia, or on the town council” (Ramírez 1986, 136). Luna wrote of the paradigmatic provincial social climber that he sought to “contar como instrumentos con el subprefecto, el juez, los gobernadores i en fin para realizar su sueño dorado de poblar de ‘merinos’ i ‘holsteins’ sus extensos latifundios con el apoyo del Estado” (Luna 1935, 22), Speaking of the Guatemalan elite, Elena Casais Arzú writes that, beginning in the 17th century, “todo parece indicar que en este período la res pública empieza a ser un instrumento de enriquecimiento económico y de prestigio y poder. Asimismo surgen nuevas alianzas con miembros procedentes de la
casta militar” (Casaús Arzú 2007, 61). Qayum et al. testify to the same phenomenon in Bolivia, noting that “el ascender socialmente se debía a lo política” (1997, 39).

38 Hechter 1975, 34.

39 See, for example, R. H. Hilton’s discussion of various definitions of feudalism (Hilton 1992, 9-15). While monarchy and military service were obviously essential elements of medieval feudalism, many of the social, economic, and decentralized administrative structures and “imaginary” of medieval feudalism are remarkably similar to their post-colonial analogues. There are parallels, of course, with other essentially ethnic states. Dollard, for example, writes of the American South that it must be remembered “that the crux of the matter is the white control of formal force, the police, sheriffs, justices of the peace, judges, and juries” (Dollard 1957, 33).

40 Until the professionalization of the Peruvian army in the wake of the War of the Pacific, officials were reluctant, however, to conscript, train, and arm indigenous Peruvians. The armies that Republican commanders could muster were therefore tiny and, to the extent they were willing to recruit local peasants, poorly trained. Despite having a population of nearly three million inhabitants, at no point during the War of the Pacific, for example, did Peru field any army exceeding five thousand soldiers. Military recruitment of indigenous soldiers was, accordingly, at best a localized emergency measure rather than a routine requirement.

41 Mejía points out, “the electoral law of 1896 had established provincial representation according to area rather than population, in such a way that the presence of the provinces where terratenientes predominated benefited in the composition of Congress, to the disadvantage of the bourgeoisie of the city” (Mejía Navarrete 1990, 35).

42 According to Contreras, “under the circumstances of [post-War of the Pacific] penury, it was impossible for the national treasury to pay a regular salary to the almost 1,000 governors serving throughout the republic. A modest yearly salary of a 1,000 soles (equivalent to that of an army captain) would have meant an expenditure of nearly one million soles, about one-fifth of republic's budget, and almost half of the direct taxes to be collected in the departments. Under these circumstances it was hoped that the social prestige of the office would be a form of compensation. It was also well known that the closeness to the district's residents and knowledge of their resources provided governors with the possibility of acquiring—informally or even illegally—tangible benefits that the fiscal system could not extend” (Contreras 2005, 129).

43 Contreras 2005 117.

44 One can see here the continuation of the long-standing colonial practice, dating back to the Conquest itself, of delegating or outsourcing governance, exchanging authority for revenue or representation, at the expense of oversight and control.

45 Migdal 1988, 247.

46 Contreras 2005, 130.

47 This is, in essence, Alvin Gouldner’s point when he writes that “What makes a group a ruling class is its ability to monopolize a necessary service, to inhibit others from providing this service, and, above all, to prevent those receiving help from helping themselves and satisfying their own needs” (Gouldner 1980, 333; quoted and discussed in Skocpol 1982, 822).
Valderrama and Escalante 1981. John Kautsky notes that because they were isolated in villages with little inter-communal communication, peasants were “virtually unorganizable beyond the village,” giving uprisings an unarticulated, parochial character Kautsky 1972, 37-38. While this is true, the role of the state in preventing inter-communal cooperation, rather than its naturalness or inevitability, needs to be stressed.


See also Planas 1998, quoted elsewhere in this and the following chapter.

Planas 1998, 63.
Planas 1998, 64.
Planas 1998, 66.
Planas 1998, 66. See also Wilson 2003, 225 on the relative strength of the municipio in the 19th century.
Planas 1998, 70.
Contreras 2005, 118.
Dammert 2003, 44.

Mejia 1990, 38, 92-93. The Oncenio of Leguía (1919-1930) was particularly decisive in the centralization of governance in Lima and the weakening of the municipality (Deustua and Rénique 1984, 92).

Contreras 2005. The basic difficulty, once the Indian head tax was abolished, was that tax revenues were insufficient to adequately remunerate the labor of collection. When, for example, in an attempt to separate taxation and administration, the government attempted to ‘farm out’ collection, the commission was insufficient to retain collectors. Four percent of collected taxes amounted, in some cases, to less than the salary of a doorman at a government office. “In the poorer provinces of the interior, the taxes were too meager to make the collection effort lucrative on this percentage basis. In the modern senses of the words, neither commerce nor industry existed there. Property existed, but the income it generated was small, or difficult to estimate in monetary terms” (Contreras 2005, 123).

Though Bolívar abolished Indian tribute, it was reinstated when he left in 1826 (Kristal 1987, 31).

Contreras 2005, 119.
Contreras 2005, 125.
Orlove 1994, 69.
Van den Berghe and Primov 1977, 73.
Mendoza Arroyo, ed. 1993, 15.

Rural diputados were disproportionately influential in Congress because, as Mejía points out, “the electoral law of 1896 had established provincial representation according to area rather than population, in such a way that the presence of the provinces where terratenientes predominated benefited in the composition of Congress, to the disadvantage of the bourgeoisie of the city” (Mejía 1990, 35).
Orlove 1994, 69.
Beals 1934, 298.
Conteras 2005, 130.
Conteras 2005, 128.

Arguedas [1968], 212. “El patrón, dueño de la hacienda, es el representante de Dios y que la voz de terrateniente debía ser escuchada y obedecida como la voz de Dios mismo.” Arguedas argued explicitly, in fact, that the attitude and power of the clergy in the communities of Falangist Spain in which he studied in the 1960 was equivalent to those of the rural Peruvian clergy forty years earlier in Peru (Arguedas [1968], 214-215).

Balmori et al 1984, 55.
Villena Aguirre 1987, 74.

de la Peña 1984, 207.
Mannarelli 2004, 348. “Sin embargo, hubo una institución que se fortaleció en medio del fragor caudillista, y fue la iglesia. Todo parece señalar que se estuvo frente a un fortalecimiento de los poderes locales y de los hacendados, y de los poderes familiares, lo mismo que de la autoridad eclesiástica que coordinó armoniosamente con esta nueva configuración.”

Lyons 2006, 192.
Again, Aguirre Beltrán discusses the analogical social relations in Central America in terms of a ladino-Indian dichotomy, rather than gamonlismo or a vecino-comunero divide.

Aguirre Beltrán 1979, 96.
Taylor 1990, 56.
Poole 1994, 102.
See also Villena Aguirre 1987, 41.

Hennessey 1978, 21.
Jacobsen 1993, 212.
Jacobsen 1993, 344.

Cotler 1976, 318.

There’s some truth, therefore, in the argument of vecinos that cattle ranching involves disengagement (and social domination) rather than exploitation.

Burga and Reátegui 1981; see also Yepes 1979.
Prices for processed wool were effectively set in England. The great Arequipa wool exporters adjusted the prices they were willing to pay for fiber in the field in relation to British rates. These prices were transmitted to field agents. With the arrival of the telegraph to Cuzco in 1903, central offices were able to continually communicate with and dictate prices to purchasing agents in the field (Burga and Reátegui 1981, 75).

Burga & Reátegui 1981, 182.

Burga and Reategui 1981, 15.
This is also related to Guillermo Bonfil’s discussion of “formas vicariales o subsidiarias de articulación” (Bonfil Batalla 1971, 136).

Montoya 1980 and Burga and Reategui 1981, 159-163. Rodríguez and Solares report a similar situation of chronic indebtedness amongst the “los ‘gamonales’ cochabambinos” in Bolivia (Rodríguez & Solares 1990, 26).

Caballero 1981, 265.

There is one particular element of Lyons’ research that I find particularly illuminating. Lyons found that “Indigenous people in Pangor have learned that at some point only indigenous people lived in Ecuador, that whites came from another country and took power and land by force. Older villagers testify almost unanimously that they and their elders did not know this before . . . the legitimacy of white people’s ownership of the land did not generally come up as an explicit question for most people in Pangor in the decades prior to 1960. Haciendas were simply a fact of life” (Lyons 2006, 129). This is an important example of the degree to which the absence of information and a historical record, aggravated no doubt by centuries of displacement and social dislocation typical of hacienda-run and other forasteros, likely handicapped their ability to formulate collective, counter-hegemonic projects.

Lyons 2006. Bobrow-Strain argues, furthermore, that indigenous alcoholism was fostered by ladino hacendados as a form of labor control (Bobrow-Strain 2007, 68-69). This may have, to a certain extent, been the case, in the sense that hacendados exploited and distorted local traditions for their own benefit. Hacendados in Chumbivilcas appear to have routinely provided alcohol to their laborers, especially for agricultural work, and for religious celebrations. Nonetheless, alcohol use and abuse is common during work and celebration in dependent and independent peasant communities alike, and it’s likely that the provision of alcohol was considered by workers to be a legitimate and even essential element of labor remuneration (as it is considered in reciprocal peasant-peasant relationships). While R. F. Watters collective resentful recollections of abuse to be common, his poor and middle peasant informants recalled the hacienda regime as having been generally mutually beneficial (Watters 1994, 138-146).

Webster 1980, 141. Webster believes that the “preoccupation with the exploitive aspects of highland hacienda regimes” has distorted anthropological accounts of the hacienda regime, excluding the processes of “compromise and accommodation” that he believes to have been common throughout southern Peru, arguing that:

It is significant that despite the rebellious indignation of the Cheqec which precipitated the expropriation, a large faction of the community favoured continuation of the hacienda regime, even under the very unpleasant owner of that time. Evidently for many, the advantages of a patron in the provincial centre, able to act as both representative and buffer between the Cheqec and the agencies of mestizo society, outweighed the indignities of the hacienda regime, compromised as it was through decades of mutual accommodation . . . From the perspective of this example, one may view the relationship between some highland hacienda administrations and the inhabitants of their land as a political and economic symbiosis characteristic of plural society. This is obscured by presumptions of
domination, class oppression, and long-suffering peasant passivity. Furthermore, these latter presumptions may be fundamentally ethnocentric, demeaning the capacity of the peasant or runa to maintain a viable option in his ethnicity despite potential or actual oppression” (Webster 1980, 140-141).

105 For an analogue, see Davis et al 1941, Chapter XVIII.
107 Drawing from interviews with elderly vecinos, it does seem that some land-grabbing was motivated by a somewhat irrational belligerence or a desire for aggrandizement (I will specifically treat the role of performance and violence below). Nonetheless, informants could frequently cite specific benefits that participants hoped to obtain through confrontation and, barring countervailing, comprehensive data on motivation, I think it’s safe to assume that most of the land disputes had concrete, pragmatic objectives.
108 “La violencia es un azote presente en todos los Andes, pero en Chumbivilcas tiene la particularidad de ser no sólo aceptada sino también exaltada a través de la música” (Vié 2005, 125).
109 Many of the performative elements of social practice in Chumbivilcas are self-evidently shared with extensive cattle-raising regions throughout Spanish America (including the U.S. southwest), but it should be noted that transhumant herding culture shares many cultural traits from Mongolia to the Sahara that are probably the result of convergent evolution rather than diffusion. The qorilazo is not only a vaquero, he is also, more generally, a horseman.
110 Dollard 1957, 176.
111 Taylor 1990, 37.
112 It has been suggested that firearms were plentiful as a result of lingering materiel from the War of the Pacific (Contreras 2005, 124). This seems like a weak inference. The war ended in 1883. During the war, Peru had been able to circumvent trade restrictions and
import breech-loading rifles, cartridges, and other munitions through US firms. Many of the weapons used by soldiers, however, especially by the ragtag *monteras*, were likely earlier muzzle-loading rifles. Either way, the firearms required manufactured ammunition. Even if the weapons themselves had been well maintained, the supply of leftover ammunition would have quickly been exhausted. Purchase of manufactured ammunition would therefore have been an essential part of owning and operating a firearm, even if the weapon itself had been obtained during the War.

The right and obligation of vecinos to bear arms and render military service stretches back to the colonial era and beyond to the *Reconquista*. For an extended discussion, see Garcia-Gallo 1972, 745-812.

Currently, rifles and handguns are legal in Peru but must be permitted through DICSCAMEC (*Dirección General de Control de Servicios de Seguridad, Control de Armas, Munición y Explosivos de Uso Civil*) and require a background check and mental health exam. Controls were likely strengthened in the wake of Sendero Luminoso.

Vega Vizcarra 1964, 11. D. S. Parker notes that in the 1920s many members of the rising middle class “flocked to Lima’s many shooting clubs, target shooting being a favorite pastime of the respectable *caballero*” (Parker 1998, 57). François Bourricaud reported that, in pre-Reform Puno, “the shooting club, ‘The *Kuntur*’ [‘condor’ in Quechua]” was associated with other elite clubs like the Lion’s Club and the Rotary Club (Bourricaud 1967, 75).

Paponnet-Cantat claims that the sergeant of the Guardia Civil in Capacmarca was an *abigeo*. Poole argues that much of the banditry and other gang violence was perpetrated by *cuadrillas* under the direction of landowners who themselves did not participate directly in the violence (Poole 1994, 108-9). Lewis Taylor’s historical work supports this interpretation. He notes that, in the response to banditry and other forms of violence, the task of the “subprefect and district governors” was “complicated by the protection afforded to bandits and other criminals by members of the provincial elite, who employed them as gunmen when pursuing vendetta, economic and political goals” (Taylor 1990, 19).

Aguirre Beltrán 1979, 136.

Jacobsen 1993, 304. Dollard makes precisely the same point vis-à-vis the pre-civil rights era American South: “It must not be supposed that the major or perhaps even the significant part of white aggression against Negroes consists of the few dramatic acts of lynching featured in the newspapers. Massive and continuous pressures of other types are far more important in achieving social stability” (Dollard 1957, 316) and “in spite of the number of such incidents described by both Negro and white informants, it should be made clear that these are relatively rare occurrences” (Davis et al 1941, 49). It would seem that both the relative rarity of violence and the tendency of participants to overestimate its prevalence are close to being human universals. In fact, they are likely universal because the relationship between the two is so close (i.e., the exemplary function of violence is normally so effective that excessive employment of it is superfluous and potentially counterproductive).

Casaús Arzú 2007, 19.

Bourdieu 1980, 126.
I echo here Cope when he writes, of colonial Mexico City, that “the patron-client system, as an individualistic method of social control enacted a price. Elite-plebeian relations had to be constantly renegotiated, hammered out daily in thousands of implicit contracts with members of the plebe who were not passive, alienated, or crushed by feelings of racial inferiority and worthlessness” (Cope 1994, 165). This statement would probably be too rosy to describe rural social relations, which were likely far more vulnerable to force and abuse. Nonetheless, it’s important to keep in mind that both peasants and feudatarios were full-fledged human beings with the universal human capacity for calculation, imagination, and self-preservation, traits that they undoubtedly used throughout the era of gamonlismo.

Lyons 2006, 126-127.

It should be noted that Lyons implies in several places that the adoption of pre-contact cultural elements, like reciprocity, were merely window-dressing for what amounted to raw exploitation. He writes, for example, that “the hacienda was a social order in which coercion was pervasive but often wrapped in varied ideological garments with deep cultural roots” (Lyons 2006, 255).


Chasteen 1990, 54.


Jacobsen 1993, 304.

Taylor 1990, 2.

Benjamin Orlove provides a brief but vivid historical account of factional violence in neighboring Espinar (Orlove 1994).

The Liberal/Conservative opposition took many forms throughout the Republican era. Carlos Contreras characterizes the Cacerista/Piérolista version of this opposition at the close of the 19th century as “a conflict between two distinct political cultures then vying for dominance in the country: that of the enlightened Limaño elite pursuing its project of constructing a “republican” order inspired by idealized Europe and North America; and that of the people in the provinces especially of the Andean interior who conceived of the concept of good governance (buen gobierno) primarily as an adequate exchange of services between the elites and popular groups, rather than a system controlled by faceless bureaucrats” (Contreras 2005, 132).

Balmori et al 1984, 5.

Poole 1994, 106. See also Hennessey 1978, 131; Favre 1976, 113-114.

Huntington 1968, 412-417. Schneider and Schneider argue in opposition that “clientelistic factionalism is not the property of any particular society or political culture, nor is it the unique property of any particular stage in the evolution of political systems. One must ultimately question what kinds of factions will emerge under what conditions” (Schneider and Schneider 1976, 158). They ultimately argue that clientelistic factionalism emerges in situations in which access to external sources of patronage are “a critical economic and political resource” to local antagonists (Schneider and Schneider 1976, 159). I think I would fall somewhere in between the two interpretations. Clearly, local factions are competing for access to higher levels of authority, expenditure, and force. At the same time, however, the competition for local advantages would likely be sufficient
to motivate the development of a factional system in the absence of adjudicating and order-imposing state institutions.

Taylor 1990, 17. Factionalism is obviously widespread throughout Latin America from Conquest up until the early 20th century. In a certain sense, all Latin American political history is the history of interest-based family factions. See, for example Rockefeller 1998, 195 concerning Bolivia and Olivero 2004, 261 on 18th Century Argentina.

Tax policy presented a particularly thorny problem. In the case of local dissatisfaction with taxation, government officials were potentially leaders of opposition against the very policies they were charged with implementing. For discussions of tax unrest, see Taylor 1990; Contreras 2005; Bobrow-Strain 2007, 78.

Huntington 1968, 412-413. Frans Schryer distinguishes “factional disputes” from “family feuds” “which sometimes became intertwined” (Schryer 1990, 216). In 19th and 20th century Chumbivilcas, factional disputes seem to have always been intimately intertwined with family feuds, to the point of indistinction.

These are, to a certain extent, generalizations or, more accurately, idealizations. At the same time, however, they are definitional, in the sense that a block that was developing its own autonomous attraction, normative culture, and interests would be more productively conceived as a transitional form between a faction and a party or other political institution.

Gramsci argued that parties are ultimately class-based and that politically opposed but class-aligned parties will invariably form a “united bloc” at “decisive turning-points” (Gramsci 1971, 157).

Kautsky 1972, 29.

Chapter 5 Modernization, Revolution, Reform

Reinhard Bendix distinguishes between “industrialization,” which he classifies as “economic changes brought about by a technology based on inanimate sources of power as well as on the continuous development of applied scientific research,” and “modernization,” defined as “all those social and political changes that accompanied industrialization in many countries of Western civilization” (Bendix 1977, 6). He is not, however, entirely consistent in this distinction, and implicitly uses the term ‘modernization’ to encompass both economic and socio-political elements (for example, he writes that “a basic element in the definition of modernization is that it refers to a type of social change since the eighteenth century, which consists in the economic or political advance of some pioneering society and subsequent changes in follower societies” (Bendix 1977, 413). My own use of the term ‘modernization’ follows this later example, encompassing both economic and socio-political processes.

For an excellent, mildly critical discussion of modernization theory as it applies to ethnographic research see Orlove 1977, 308. For a more caustic critique, see Wallerstein 1979, 132-137.
Using John Kautsky’s definition, industrialization is “the process of the introduction and growth of a technology utilizing inanimate sources of energy, complex tools and specialized scientific know-how” (Kautsky 1972, 19).


See, for example, Huntington 1968, 32-39.

Blokland 2006, xi.


Blokland 2006, 43. Obviously, the technical superiority of the ‘modern’ solutions is ultimately dependent on the goals that a particular society selects as desirable. In contemporary capitalist societies, the consensus goals tend to include accumulation, prosperity, individual achievement, longevity, and ‘quality of life.’ I make no judgment here about the relative merits of these objectives over others (like community, equality, mutual aid, or moral righteousness).

For a detailed description and analysis of the process of economic, social, and political development or modernization in Peru, see López Jiménez 1997.

This is what Vilfredo Pareto referred to as “cycles of interdependence” (Pareto 1935, 1540-1547).

de la Barrera 1930, 33-34.


Gamarra 1995, 16.

Villena Aguirre 1987, 44.

Similarly, the radio enabled the diffusion of mass culture and facilitated the development of shared national identity. Zoila Mendoza discusses La Hora del Charango, a Cuzqueño radio program of the late 1930s, which she argues was an essential element in the production of a properly Andean musical culture, which itself became, metonymically, an essential element of Peruvian national identity (Mendoza 2008, 93-123).


In Peru, migration has not only been directed toward cities, but toward the coast and down from the highlands. In 1940, 65% of Peruvians lived in the sierra and only 28% on the coast; today the relationship is almost reversed, with only 32% living in the sierra and 55% in the coastal regions (http://www1.inei.gob.pe/perucifrasHTM/inf-dem/cua10.htm).


Censo Nacional 2007: XI de Población y VI de Vivienda.

Hennessey notes that one of the key distinctions of agricultural development in Latin America was the divergence between regions where the “unimproved wooden rooting plow” was used and those in which immigrants used the “moldboard plow, cutting and turning at the same time” (Hennessey 1978, 24-25). He argues that “wherever European immigrants introduced a similar system as in Chile, Argentina and southern Brazil they made significant contributions to efficient agriculture and a pattern similar, in some respects, to North American experience emerges” (Hennessey 1978, 25). Whether or not this is, in fact, a decisive causal element in differential agricultural development, it is certainly an element of the low productivity of highland agriculture.
These were, in turn, often sources of serious conflict. Owners, for example, attempted to isolate their herds from the unimproved and potentially diseased herds of huaqchilleros, undermining the traditional organization of labor and rent.

23 It’s virtually impossible to accurately trace the demographic history of the province at the district and community level. Although each of the national censuses contains relevant local data, the method of collection, the criteria for inclusion, and the units of analysis are so various and divergent that comparison is impracticable. If we take a particular district—for example, Llusco—we find the corregidor in 1586 reporting a population of 479 “indios de tasa” (which, in effect, meant heads of family) (Peru 1885, 21). Though it appears that his assessment concerns the entire area of which Llusco is the administrative center, this isn’t certain, and it’s unclear which communities this includes and how many individuals are actually members of each household. The Church visita of 1689 claims that in the “district and the seven leagues around it” there are “sixty Indians including tributaries and resident forasteros [that is, male heads of household] and eighty grown women” (Villanueva Urteaga 1982, 293). The Census of 1876 gives the population as 255 males and 221 females (Peru 1878, 216). The Census of 1940 reports 6,752 residents, but, at the time, Llusco included the equally populous Quiñota within its jurisdiction, thus complicating matters significantly. The 2005 census gives the population as 7,325, but the number includes only Llusco, Quiñota having become administratively independent in 1962. These estimates are clearly incommensurable, even without considering the uncertainties introduced by their methodological divergences. So while it’s possible, making various assumptions and adjustments, to create a historical demographic narrative—for example, 1586:2,395; 1689:380; 1876:1,139; 1940:3,376; 2005:7,325—the accuracy of such a series would be highly suspect.

26 Gootenberg 1993, 54-57.
28 Wise 2003, 24-25.
30 Thorp and Bertram 1978, 23.
32 Thorp and Bertram 1978, 24.
33 Thorp and Bertram 1978, 40.
34 Thorp and Bertram 1978, 40.
35 Thorp and Bertram 1978, 208.
36 Thorp and Bertram 1978, 40.
37 Thorp and Bertram 1978 30.
38 Thorp and Bertram 1978, 31.
39 Thorp and Bertram 1978, 79-86.
40 Thorp and Bertram 1978, 85-86.
41 Martínez and Samaniego 1971, 151.
42 Skocpol 1985, 8.
Mann 1986, 135.

Contreras 2005, 121.

See Kautsky 1972, 67-68; Tilly 1975.

Migdal picks out “three types of state policies” in particular that he believes “underlay the rapid and widespread weakening of old social and political arrangements: (1) effecting important changes in land tenure patterns; (2) adopting new forms and procedures of taxation; and (3) instituting new modes of transportation.”

Migdal 1988, 273. Furthermore, military conscription plays an important part in introducing the population to national norms and identity. Although none of my informants specifically made reference to the role of returning military conscripts in social change, it’s clear that they were significant element in the exposure of the campesinado as a community to modernity and the nation at large. This is a prime example of the unintended consequences of government policy in a situation in which social processes are so tightly interwoven. Even conservative administrations need to tap the popular classes for industrialization and militarization, thus undermining the social bases of their political support.

Mann 1986.

Kristal 1987, 97.

de la Cadena 2000, 15.

Kristal 1987, 176.

Kristal 1987, 165; see also Mejia 1990, 60.

Poole and Rénique 1992, 104; see also Dammert 2003, 44.

Kristal 1987, 188.

See Collier 1999.

More generally, the recruitment of the middle and working classes, as well as the incorporation in the 1970s and 80s of the indigenous peasantry, was dictated by the same political concerns that led Aristotle to advocate some form of democratic incorporation, namely the recognition that extending political representation to the demos stabilized the polity. As Aristotle argues in his discussion of ‘constitutional government, “‘What are the matters over which freemen, or the general body of citizens—the sort of people who neither have wealth nor can make any claim on the ground of goodness—should properly exercise sovereignty?’ Of course there is a danger in people of this sort sharing in the highest offices, as injustice may lead them into wrongdoing, and thoughtlessness into error. But there is also a serious risk in not letting them have some share of power; for a city with a body of disenfranchised citizens who are numerous and poor must necessarily be a city which is full of enemies” (Aristotle 1995, 109). Tocqueville echoes this final point in Democracy in America, when he writes that “the most powerful way, and perhaps the only remaining way, in which to interest men in their country’s is to make them take a share in its government” (Tocqueville 1969, 235). More specifically, Alfred Stepan argues that “inclusionary attempts are most likely when oligarchical domination is beginning to erode under the pressures of early modernization, where political mobilization, although increasing, is still relatively limited and uninstitutionalized, and where the industrialization process is still at an early stage. Under such circumstances public and private industrial managers, under the leadership of a new state elite, can forge
alliances with the working classes against the old order of the rural and ‘comprador’ oligarchy” (Stepan 1978, 79)

57 Ratinoff 1967, 63.
58 Kautsky 1972, 113.
59 Ratinoff 1967, 63.
60 Drinot 2006, 18.

61 Gose 1994, 190. In the case of Chumbivilcas, the expansion of education has been a double edged-sword. While education has greatly increased the consciousness and competitiveness of the peasantry, it has also provided the primary source of high-status, high-income employment to the scions of landowning families. This is changing rapidly, but many, perhaps the majority, of tenured primary and secondary school faculty remain vecinos.


63 The usual terminology for these events frequently misrepresents their true nature. Many of these episodes of rural unrest were neither revolts, nor rebellions, nor revolutions. The vast majority are brief, reactive peasant actions, motivated by labor and land disputes, followed by reprisals by hacendados and the military or guardia civil, frequently involving extremely disproportionate violence. While true that the disproportion may have served a cautionary purpose, body counts are overwhelmingly one sided. In the most common scenario peasants attack an isolated hacienda, killing or injuring a dueño or mayordomo, usually in retaliation for long-standing abuses but triggered by some act of flagrant abuse by the landowner or his agents (including beatings, sequestering, rape, or murder). Members of the affected landowner’s family and faction then organize a mob, perhaps waiting long enough for military reinforcements from the provincial or even departmental capital to arrive, then descend on the communities believed to be responsible for or in any way associated with peasant resistance, and beat, capture, or kill community members with minimal discrimination (though making sure, in the process, to target and eliminate known resistors or ‘troublemakers’).

64 Stern 1982, 28.
70 Valderrama and Escalante 1981.
71 See Aguirre Beltrán 1979, 96 on Mexico and Latin America more generally.
72 The CCP was founded in 1956 and immediately became a major force in the mobilization and direction of rural protest (Cotler and Portocarrero 1976, 300).
73 Poole and Rénique 1992, 105.
74 Although Haya de la Torre developed Aprismo as an autochthonous alternative to Marxism-Leninism, its theory and revolutionary praxis were heavily influenced by Marxism, and it can reasonably be considered a bourgeois deviation from Marxism, rather than an entirely opposed tradition.
Incidentally, many of the first peasant organizers were disaffected mestizos. Howard Handelman (1975) includes amongst the key rural labor organizers Ortega (93), Grijalba (95), outside organizers key (110), Vladimir Valer (133), los Cáceres (144), Ledesma (136-137), and, above all, Hugo Blanco (73-82; see also Blanco 1972). Once comuneros had gained greater access to education and ideological training, however, they quickly rose to central positions of leadership in the syndicalist movements. Some of the earliest of these include Tácunan (139-142) and Moises Mesa Vilchas, a comunero educated in US and Mexico (Handelman 1975, 143).

Bobrow-Strain discusses the analogical importance of “Learning to Land Invade” and of the Church and Socialist activists who taught these techniques and ideologies in the success of peasant mobilization in southern Mexico (Bobrow-Strain 2007, 121). It should be noted that the ideology and strategic practice of invasion was developed in interaction with mining and other trade unions.

The explicit justification for intervention was the troubled and controversial general elections of 1962.

Several informants claim that their fathers and other landowners put together a kitty to pay a guard to murder him.

Along the same lines, Aguirre Beltrán argues that “the Indo-Ladino stratification . . . cracks when groups on the move push past the obstacles isolating the regional center and go on to establish open relations with the centers of attraction of the developed regions” (Aguirre Beltrán 1979, 55).

Although the informant claimed that on that particular occasion he and his father had been hunting deer, he subsequently recalled fondly his vicuña-hunting trips with his father. Furthermore, he reported having thrown numerous vicuña skins into the river during the Velasco years for fear of being caught with them and prosecuted.

Several authors have argued that the exclusionary ideologies and policies toward indigenous Peruvians hampered the formation of a modern national project and identity (Mallon 1995, 275, 315; Thurner 1997, 151-152; and Chambers 2003, 34). The process of ethnic inclusion that has characterized the second half of the twentieth century is therefore also a key element of the development of a solidary Peruvian national identity and collective project.

Contreras 2005, 121; see also Rockefeller 1998, 205, for more recent antagonism of the Bolivian state toward local elites.

Taylor 2004
Because sociological interest in rural dynamics has been closely related (if not, as in many cases, identical) to interest in the plight of the peasantry, there is a gap in the historical coverage of the hacienda in the 1950s. Although the existing literature suggests that the hacienda sector was in decline, the actual structure, productivity, and profitability of provincial landholding at the time of expropriation is obscured behind impressionistic characterizations. Many of the most essential facts of the post-World War II era are foggy, including: the extent to which landowners had diversified their investment portfolios; the proportion of absentee to resident landholding; the portion of profits coming from cash land rents versus sharecropping, manorial obligations, or monopsony (monopoly of purchase and distribution); the rate of reinvestment in physical plant; and the extent and mechanics of landed elite control over local judiciaries and political appointments. Historians addressing the period 1890-1930 and the subsequent collapse of the wool market have focused more intensively on estate organization and activity in the southern highlands, but the period 1930 to 1970 has yet to find its place in the literature.

Large, private irrigation projects at this, or any time, were extremely rare in Peru. In fact, as Ramírez points out, the difficulty of building irrigation canals, and the inability or unwillingness of the state to aid such projects, was a significant element in the backwardness of highland agriculture (Ramírez 1986, 144). Deepening the contradiction, the canal was purportedly built using customary labor from communities that he controlled in the puna, several of whose lives were lost in the construction.

His descendants, when commenting on this photograph, note how atypical the overalls were and continue to associate them with the American farmer.

Even individuals under 50 consider the Reforma Agraria, and Velasco’s regime more generally, to be the turning point of modern rural history. Since the Velasco’s coup occurred in 1968, one would have to be at least 50 years old to have practically experienced the pre-Reform era.

propia democracia; redefinir las relaciones entre el campo y la ciudad, entre la nación y el
sistema internacional; emancipar al campesinado mediante el fin del gamonalismo, de
los terratenientes y el acceso a la propiedad de la tierra” (Adrianzén 1993, 32).


113 The shortage of agricultural land in highland peasant communities, described in
previous chapters, had become even more acute through the course of the 20th century,
due in part to continued pressure from neighboring haciendas, but more than anything do
to sharply rising peasant populations. As Lindqvist pointed out in 1972, across Latin
America “the agricultural labour force increased between 1925 and 1960 from 20 to 32
million. It was estimated then that this entire increment of labor was superfluous to the
existing latifundia-minifundia system” (Lindqvist 1972, 72). According to *Sur* magazine,
Peru in 1975 had the least amount of arable land and land under permanent cultivation of
any country in Latin America (*Sur* 1978, “Situación del sector agropecuario en el Pacto
Andino,” I:9/10/11, 54, 57). The combination of extremely high levels of concentration
of land in the hands of a small number of private and corporate owners and the
burgeoning rural population was the predominant factor in peasant unrest.

114 Huntington 1968, 375.


116 The Reform limited coastal properties to 150 hectares of irrigated land and properties
in the Sierra and Selva to between 15 and 55 hectares. Absentee landlordism was also
grounds for **afectación** (Watters 1994, 167).

117 *Sur* magazine reported that “La Reforma Agraria de 1969 no llegó a Chumbivilcas
Política,” III:29, 14), but this seems like an exaggeration. According to informants,
properties close to the provincial or district capitals were affected earlier than this.
Furthermore, it is my understanding that negotiations between Reform agents and
landowners began several years before this.

118 Several informants recalled actually violent confrontations with workers and local
comuneros. One vecino told me about fighting off an invasion by neighboring **comuneros**
with small arms fire. Another reported catching wind of an invasion from a worker and
bringing the **guardia civil** to his family’s property and thus foiling the supposed plot.
Though the event did not actually involve land, Mario Peralta, a local schoolteacher and
landowner, was killed in the main plaza of Livitaca in retaliation for his supposed crimes
against the local population (Villena Aguirre 1987, 77) and as a result of land disputes
with neighboring peasants. Nonetheless, in general land invasion, as practiced during the
Velasco years, seems primarily to been an element in judicial maneuvering rather than an
independent, extra-legal activity. Peasants or **peones** would sometimes invade estates in
anticipation of or in the midst of adjudication, in order to gain the perceived legal
advantage of being in possession of the disputed land or to gain use of the land in the
meantime. Likewise, some ‘invasions’ were actually occupations of land that had already
been formally awarded to ‘invaders,’ but that the original owners were preventing them
from accessing while they sought judicial remedy. Resident **feudatarios** also seized
hacienda land in order to prevent neighboring communities from laying claim to and
occupying it, and vice versa. I would argue, however, that outright land invasion, in the
absence of a parallel judicial struggle, was the exception rather than the rule.

I have yet to read any account that communicates the uncertainty and contingency of implementation and resistance that my informants frequently express. In fact, despite the novel and even revolutionary aspects of the Velasco reform, little sustained academic attention has been paid to the specifics of its application. Many of its effects have been studied, including its impacts on agricultural productivity, its function within a suite of often countervailing government policies, the general failure of the collective and semi-collective enterprises that it established, and the extent of amelioration of peasant livelihoods. However, a researcher would be hard-pressed to find, for example: a series of maps depicting the extent of expropriations and the configuration of grants and recoveries in a given locale; the description and analysis of a set of concrete processes of afectación, reivindicación, and/or toma de tierra; or even an estimation and explanation of the different sizes of retained estates in a particular region. Simply stated, the administration of the Reform, clearly central to its outcomes, remains a mystery from an academic standpoint. There are passing references to local anomalies in the Reform's implementation (for example, suggestions that many landlords were able to avoid expropriation outright, that ownership was manipulated between family members in order to avoid afectación, that implementation was delayed in many regions, and that estates were decapitalized in anticipation of reform), but these "treatments" of the internal processes of reform, however, are haphazard and incidental to the works in which they occur.

Handelman 1975, 258-265.

This will be discussed at length in chapter 8. Villena Aguirre, himself a vecino of Chumbivilcas, expresses: "Now, with changes like the implantation of the Agrarian Reform, the functioning of the Arcadio Hurtado Agrarian League of Chumbivilcas and SINAMOS, there is open repudiation against the hacendado" (Villena Aguirre 1987, 76).

It is important to keep in mind that even highly educated and informed vecinos are situated within an environment of endemic ethnic conflict, which inevitably affects their interpretation. Sur magazine refers to Villena as the "tinterillo" who "moves the papers from [his office in] Cuzco and is the real strategist of the ex-hacendados" (Sur 1978, "[Los hacendados: 'Recuperaremos las haciendas.'&apos;]", I:7, 24).

The tendency of landowners to express bewilderment and a sense of betrayal with regard to local resentment and land invasions, and to blame them on outside agitators appears to be universal. Qayum et al report exactly this response in Bolivia (Dodd 1977, 86), as do Bobrow-Strain in southern Mexico (Bobrow-Strain 2007, 196-197) and even Dollard in the American South in the 1940s (Dollard 1957, 185)."
serious problems of social relations in the countryside is this recapitulation of ethnic subjection through successive, ostensibly reformed periods.

131 Delavaud 1980, 49.
132 See Sur 1979, “Gamonales al acecho en Coaza”, 18, for a contemporary account of some of these strategies.
133 Critics characterize the decapitalization of the haciendas as a treacherous way in which landowners betrayed or undermined the Agrarian Reform (See, for example, Sur 1978, “9 Años de Reforma Agraria,” I:5, 10), but this sort of moral attribution misses the point. It seems more appropriate to see decapitalization as a weakness of the Reform’s design and implementation. It must be kept in mind that a military junta had illegally seized power and declared the immanent confiscation of formerly constitutionally-protected property. Under such conditions, one can hardly blame owners for seeking sought to sell their property and otherwise avoid government appropriation can hardly one’s property, one would not feel unduly guilty about selling one’s portion of the government’s newly acquired property in order to salvage some portion of one’s capital stock. The ills of decapitalization can more properly blamed on the limitations of a particular design and implementation of land reform mechanisms, rather than to the rational responses that affected parties took in response to the policy. A more productive land reform programme might have been designed and implemented that limited the tendency toward decapitalization.
134 Lyons notes a similar technique in highland Ecuador in the 1960s, where “modernizing dairy landlords, who no longer needed so much labor, were prepared to relinquish hillside land to huasipungueros and employ wage labor, as long as they could keep prime valley land” (Lyons 2006, 61).
136 Sur noted in 1979 that “era claro que lo que buscan los terratenientes y grupos de poder no es ganar el juicio y recuperar las haciendas, sino sencillamente ganar tiempo” (Sur 1979, “Acobamba,” 6).
139 Matos Mar & Mejía 1980, 64-65.
140 Paponnet-Cantat 1989, 184.
142 Kautsky 1972, 112.
143 Midgal 1988, 186.
144 Mainstream economists seem to be the harshest in their judgments of the Agrarian Reform. Drinot represents their basic conclusion: “As has now been well documented, this ‘experiment’ was a resounding failure and by the return to democracy in 1980 the
positive reforms of the ‘first phase’ of the military revolution had been largely scaled back thanks to an orthodox and debilitating structural adjustment (Drinot 2006, 18-19). The primary reason for this is probably that they are not inclined to take into account, or their methodological tools are not suited to measure, the diffuse ideological and sociological effects of the Reform.

Matos Mar & Mejía 1980, 68.
Bourque & Palmer 1975.
Sur 1:5, 9.
Poole and Rénine 1992, 71.
Sur 1:5, 25-27. Even this rise, however, was problematic, because it was funded by massive public sector debt—agro-pastoral lending that was eventually ‘forgiven’ and that contributed to the subsequent fiscal and monetary crises of the 1980s.
Sur 1979, “El capital financiero sugiere.”
Matos Mar & Mejia 1980, 112.
Moore 1967, 429.
Thorpe and Bertram 1978, 280-281.
Eguen 2006, 117.
Gose 1994, 186.
Gose 1994, 191.
Poole 1988, 368.
Paponnet-Cantat 1989.
Seligmann 1995, 202-203.
Drinot says, for example that Velasco’s Agrarian Reform “wiped out the traditional sierra hacienda” (Drinot 2006, 18).
See Mejía 1990, 97-115 for a discussion of the rise of diverse social movements in the Bermúdez years.
Diez Canseco 1989, 196, 119.
Degregori 1990, 46.
Degregori 1990, 154.
Metzing 1989, 377. He argues that their efforts at utilizing this raised level of consciousness of injustice were ultimately unsuccessful and had to be “amenaza.”
Diez Canseco writes that “part of the logic of Sendero is to sharpen the polarization of forces and confrontation so that the democratic spaces conquered for the masses are
closed and all the remains are two large camps in the development of a total war” (Diez Canseco 1989, 205).

174 Bertram Wolfe, quoted in Huntington 1968, 378.

175 As Huntington puts it, rather flippantly, “Alienated university graduates prepare revolutions; alienated technical or secondary school graduates plan coups; alienated primary school leavers engage in more frequent but less significant forms of political unrest” (Huntington 1968, 48).

176 In Degregori’s description, the PCP-SL leadership was drawn from a “new generation of mestizo provincial intellectual petty bourgeoisie, that in many cases shared a feeling of unjust marginalization by the local powers” (Degregori 1990, 115).

177 Lumbres 1989, 321.


179 Degregori 1990, 214. Another curious aspect of the ethnic character of the Shining Path was that indigeneity per se disappeared from their discourse, and “reading the documents of the PCP-SL, one would think that Peru is a society as homogenous as Japan or Scandinavia; not a single line alludes to ethnic or racial problems” (Degregori 1990, 213).

180 Albro 1998, 103. Peter Gose similarly argues that “stylistically and organizationally, Sendero is a direct outgrowth of the rural education system and, by extension, of notable culture in small Andean towns” (Gose 1994a, 252).

181 Kent 1993.


183 For a detailed discussion of cattle rustling in Chumbivilcas see Villena Aguirre 1987. There is universal agreement that cattle rustling was, prior to the Shining Path period, a serious social and economic ill in the region.

184 Poole 1988, 392.

185 According to informants, Sergio Álvarez of Colquemarca was caught by comuneros dressed as an senderista, stoned to death, and carried on horseback through the town’s main plaza.

186 Chumbivilcanos still disagree, for example, about whether the attack on the guardia civil post in Velille, mentioned by Poole, was launched by SL or another armed gang. Likewise, Olympia Sotelo, a property owner, was killed in 1983; though Villena Aguirre reports that the “comuneros of Phuisa killed [her] in a land dispute,” and several knowledgeable informants confirm that her death was unrelated to SL activity, the circumstances no doubt contributed to the peasant willingness to take violent action.

187 Kent 1993, 444.

188 Informe Final 2004, Tomo I, 196.

189 Informe Final, Tomo II, 122.

190 Informe Final, Tomo II, 122.

191 To get an idea of the brutality of these Sendero incursions, here is an account of the events by Aníbal Arredondo, an hacendado from Haquira: “In the first incursion they took the Municipal offices with the alcalde and councilors who were then in session, they captured the Frenchmen and their staff, whom they executed in view of the multitude, slitting their throats one by one, the Juez de Paz Ernesto Valdivia Gallegos and one
Rendón and others. The victims clawed holes in the ground as they died until their fingernails came out, and one of the Frenchmen shat himself when the criminal, knife in hand, punctured him in the jugular. Later they set the municipal building on fire, sacked the stores for provisions and in the morning left with all the loot loaded on beasts of burden taken with threats from the town’s inhabitants” (http://www.blogsperu.com/blog/7387/).

193 Enriquez Paredes et al. 2003, 36. Aníbal Arredondo’s account of these last two attacks is equally grisly. This incursion began, again, in Haquira, where a number of comuneros were killed, “with the same technique of taking hostages, tying their hands behind them, obliterating them with kicks, and subjecting them to justice according to them, then slitting their throats. This time they killed the Sumalave, Huamani, Layme, and Limascca families in their entirety, regardless of age or sex. Later they passed into the District of Quiñota in Chumbivilcas, and assassinated the entire Salazar family, capturing Mrs. Valencia Escobar, wife of a rancher from Arequipa . . . Later they captured Señora Blanca Berbeño Alvis, whose breasts they cut off while she was still alive, passing them around the town plaza . . . then they stabbed them to death after long agony” (http://www.blogsperu.com/blog/7387/).
194 Several heavily intoxicated comuneros have spontaneously revealed extremely sensitive information to me about Sendero activity in the 1980s, but I make no use of this data here or elsewhere.
195 Poole 1994, 248.
196 Incidentally, although it is a common trope in other ethnically divided areas (see for example Dollard 1957, 296), no vecino informant, male or female, has ever expressed fear of rape by a comunero. Obviously, if it were to occur, it would be considered a heinous, socially catastrophic crime, but it is socially significant that it is a significant element neither in discourse about the threat of indigenous violence, nor in the folk-historical discourse surrounding the violence of the Shining Path and other vecino-comunero conflict. The opposite—vecino rape of comuneras—is, however, obviously ubiquitous, both in discourse and in fact.
197 See, for example, the strong parallel between the vecino’s fear of the campesinado and the southern white’s fear of black (and before that of the slave); Dollard writes of the American South in the 1950s that the “possible recurrence of Negro supremacy is an ever-present threat and a dominating consideration” (Dollard 1957, 49).
198 Mauss 2002, 70.
199 Various anthropologists have found this exact sense of anxious fear amongst mestizo and criollo elites. It has been reported, for example, in Bolivia (Qayum et al 1997, 86), Guatemala (Midrè & Flores 2002, 161-162), Mexico (de la Peña 1984, 215; Bobrow-Strain 2007, 9), Peru (Orlove 1994, 88), and the American South (Dollard 1957, 317-319).
201 No political party was able to obtain an absolute majority in the elections for the Constituent Assembly. APRA had the most representatives, having garnered XX% of the vote, and the AP was a close second. The Left split its votes amongst a number of
sectarian parties and the Right received a minimal aggregate portion of the vote (Sur 1978, “Resultados de las Elecciones,” I:4, 6; Friz Burga 2004, 19).

The 1979 Constitution also lowered the voting age from 21 to 18. Though analfabetos were given the right to vote, they could still not be elected to office (Montoya 1993, 105).

In 1890, an amendment to the Constitution restricted the right to vote to literate citizens (Mallon 1995, 275).

In 1890, an amendment to the Constitution restricted the right to vote to literate citizens (Mallon 1995, 275).

In 1980, ??% of the Peruvian population of voting age was still illiterate. (Sur 1978, “Situación y derechos políticos del analfabeto en el Perú,” I:8, 26-27).

All peasant organizations at the time of the Constitutional Convention were calling for the vote for the illiterate. The CCP made it their second demand, after the demand for recognition of the multiethnic nature of Peru (Degregori 1978, 278).

Huntington 1968, 74.

Huntington 1968, 75. Huntington argues that the other mode of incorporation is when a “military junta comes to power and then attempts to develop a broad power base in the countryside to overwhelm and contain its urban opponents” (Huntington 1968, 75). Peru’s experience of peasant political incorporation was essentially a combination of these two processes.


The process of state penetration is remarkably similar to that which Rockefeller describes in Bolivia (Rockefeller 1998, 205).

Gose 1994, 190.


Dammert 2003, 59.


Apristas are critical of the García administration, and even of the way the Banco Agrario was administered, but are invariably convinced that its economic effect was beneficial for agriculture and for the campesino, despite abuses. As one vecino informant put it, “the Banco Agrario gave money to the campesino. Before the Banco they had nothing. After, windows for their houses, calamina, spray packs, pesticides, fertilizers, trucks, and seeds.”

According to Lindqvist, “Peru has experienced thirty-three attempted coups and seven military assumptions of power since the Great War” (Lindqvist 1972, 217).

Crabtree notes that “perhaps the closest Peru came to establishing something approaching a party system was in the 1960s, when APRA and AP vied with one another for political office. Nevertheless, their failure to agree on the basic rules of the political game led to the 1968 coup and 12 years of military government during which party activity was outlawed and electoral competition abolished” (Crabtree 2006, 28).

According to Philip Mauceri, for much of the 1960s and 1970s, “the most important problem confronting Peru’s Maoists was not government repression but the movement’s incessant political divisions” (Mauceri 1996, 120).
FONCODES was instituted under Fujimori as an attempt to offset the hardships produced by liberalization and privatization, but continues to be important today (Eguren 2006, 115).

Friz Burga 2004, 107; see also Dammert 2003, 71-73; Francke 2006, 95; Monge Salgado 2006, 50.

Francke 2006, 90. *Vaso de Leche* was originally implemented by Alfonso Barrantes Lingán during his mayoralty of Lima from 1984 to 1986. It became a model for subsequent government intervention at the grassroots and remains an essential and jealously guarded entitlement in the countryside (Schönwälder 1998, 77).

Dammert 2003, 65-66; a disproportionate amount of these investments were directed toward countering the influence of the Shining Path in the emergency zones of the Central and Southern Sierra.

Perú Posible evolved from País Posible, which itself had been formed to facilitate Toledo’s previous presidential run in the 1995 elections.

Ratinoff 1967, 83


Voting in the first years after the return to democracy will be discussed at greater length in the following chapter.

Although some spending was decentralized during the second Belaúnde administration through specially instituted programs like CORDE (*Corporación Departamental de Desarrollo*), the sums were small and rarely reached into the provinces (Sur 1984, “I Convención de Alcaldes”, 31-32). The drive toward regionalization began to gain speed under Alan Garcia, but was cut short by Fujimori’s autogolpe.

The fact of a general trend toward decentralization, or more specifically broad-spectrum support for decentralization, is clear; the exact reasons for it, and the reasons for it to bear fruit at this point in history are less so. Garman et al argue that both divided governments and weak or decentralized political parties contribute to drives to decentralize governance, because they free legislators from accountability to the executive and to national parties or elites (Garman et al 2001). Peru has a notoriously weak and unstable party system and has seen a number of presidents with minority support in the legislature or at best narrow or coalition majorities, which undoubtedly contributes to the lack of political accountability and solidarity between legislators and the executive, and to an association between the growth of democracy and of centrifugal political impulses.

In fact, Monge Salgado reports that the most powerful resistance to decentralization has come from within the ministries, particularly the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)—one of the bastions of neoliberalism within the state. He writes that “resistance to decentralization, both within ministries and social programmes, was stronger than the will to proceed. This was particularly the case in the Ministry of Economy and Finance
(MEF). It helps to explain the paralysis on decentralizing budgetary matters and transferring responsibility for social programmes to the local level, as well as the lack of significant advances in transferring responsibilities to regional and local governments” (Monge Salgado 2006, 48).

237 See Vásquez 1932, 279.
238 See Albro 1997, 77; Midré & Flores 2002, 45; Bobrow-Strain 2007, 149.
239 Although the drive toward greater decentralization has had impacts at the departmental or regional level, our attention here is essentially focused on the municipality, both provincial and district. Much of the drama and public dispute surrounding decentralization has focused specifically on regionalization, or the abortive project of forming and decentralizing policy making, administration, and expenditure to ‘regions’ formed by the aggregation of several departments. Up until the present, this effort has largely failed. The 1979 Constitution called for regions to be designed and implemented within four years (Friz Burga 2004, 29). Rather bizarrely, the 1983 Plan Nacional de Regionalización (PNR) merely established criteria for the self-organization of departments into aggregate regions, rather than establishing the structure and contours of particular regions (Sur 1984, “Plan Nacional de Regionalización: ¿Un paso atrás?”, 4). These included, among other things, contiguity, economic complementarity, historical and cultural commonality, mutual accessibility, and a maximum number of 12 regions (Sur 1984, “Plan Nacional de Regionalización: ¿Un paso atrás?”, 4; Friz Burga 2004, 235). This unwillingness to dictate the parameters of the regions was guided not only by a desire to have a de-centered process of decentralization, but also by the lack of political will or consensus in Lima to tackle such an overwhelming restructuring. The net result, as might be expected, was nearly complete inaction in regionalization of governance. Under Garcia, regionalization began to advance slowly. In 1989 and 1990, elections were held for regional assemblies (Friz Burga 2004, 80). In 1992, Fujimori definitely stopped the faltering regionalization programme (Friz Burga 2004, 52-53). Most recently, with the return to democracy, departments have been renamed ‘regions’ with the express hope that neighboring ‘department-regions’ will electively unify with each other to form administratively and economically appropriate ‘regions’ (Friz Burga 2004, 413). In a referendum in 2005, however, all but one ‘region’ rejected combining to form regions (Ahmad & García-Escribano 2006, 11, 409).
240 In the following chapters, I specifically discuss the impact of these fiscal transfers on the development of local political parties and machine politics.
243 Friz Burga 2004, 41
244 Friz Burga 2004, 42
Van den Berghe and Primov assert that the prefectural line of administration initially “lost power and functions as a result of the continuing process of centralization” (Van den Berghe and Primov 1977, 64).

Though elections for local municipal offices were technically reinstituted in 1960, full implementation was effectively postponed until the resumption of civilian rule in 1980 (Mejía 1990, 38, 93; Dammert 2003, 48).


Mejía 1990, 93


Friz Burga 2004, 98.


Ahmad & García-Escribano 2006, 14; Friz Burga 2004, 181. In 1985, Ley N° 24300 established that a minimum of 20% of mineral royalties should return to the region in which the resources were extracted (Friz Burga 2004, 37).

Friz Burga 2004, 166.

The collection of several kinds of fees has been decentralized in the last several years (for instance, the sales tax administered through the SUNAT (Superintendencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria). It is my understanding, however, that fee collection has been entrusted to the department (or region), rather than the provincial or district municipalities. For a list of properly municipal fees see Friz Burga 2004, 164-165.


In practice, the poorly defined nature of municipal institutions, in particular the indeterminacy inherent in the relationship between the provincial and district municipalities, means that in each municipality the institutional matrix varies widely. The recent collection, Democracia participativa en los Andes (CICDA 2003), describes the divergent informal municipal milieus that have developed in four districts in and around Chumbivilcas. In these four districts, highly distinctive arrangements of governmental, non-governmental, and civil society institutions have developed that are hardly recognizable as being part of a shared national administrative system. In each, different combinations of institutions are responsible for formulating and approving municipal plans, facilitating dialogue between the municipality and the community, and implementing municipal programs. Some of these apparent differences are the result of local institutional terminologies, others may be due to divergent interpretations of the anonymous authors of the individual chapters of the collection, and others to the participants’ own idiosyncratic perceptions and evaluations of the institutional framework in which they are acting. Nonetheless, the variety of overlapping and poorly defined institutional mandates, the decisive role played in planning and administration by various local NGOs, and the divergent levels of development and involvement of community organizations make municipal configurations of power complex and irregular. Virtually all informants recognize this, and they frequently present folk theories about which particular individuals, communities, or NGOs are ‘really in control.
Chapter 6 Reconquista indígena: The rise of indigenous political machines

1 When I use the term “indigenous activism” throughout this paper, I am referring specifically to mobilization and organization in highland indigenous peasant communities rather than lowland hunter-gatherer societies. Lowland indigenous activism has increasingly adopted and adapted models of political activism similar in many ways to the indigenous movements in neighboring Bolivia and Ecuador (as evidenced by the recent outbreak of confrontation and violence in the Peruvian selva).

2 Garcia 2005, 5-6.

3 Montoya 1993, 111. Author’s translation. “A diferencia de los otavaleños, quichuas del Ecuador, no existe entre los quechuas peruanos una burguesía indígena y tampoco una intelectualidad propiamente indígena. Por eso, no es posible hablar, en 1991, de una identidad étnica.”


5 Garcia 2005, 172.


7 Garcia 2005, 11-12.

8 Garcia 2005, 12.


11 Garcia 2005, 175.

12 It is especially of interest to any extended Gramscian analysis of the construction of authority or legitimacy within the provincial political arena.

13 By ‘properly indigenist party’ I refer essentially to what Donna Lee Van Cott calls an “ethnic party,” which she describes “as an organization authorized to compete in elections, the majority of whose leaders and members identify themselves as belonging to a nondominant ethnic group, and whose electoral platform includes among its central demands programs of an ethnic or cultural nature” (Van Cott 2005, 3).
James Cameron’s recent article, “Hacia la Alcaldía: The Municipalization of Peasant Politics in the Andes” is one of the first signs of a dawning academic awareness of this process in Peru.

Albro, for example, has discussed some similar political phenomena in rural Bolivia under the rubric of ‘popular’ politics (Albro 1997). The relation between indigenousness and ‘lo popular’ is, in certain regards, close and has been discussed by Guillermo Delgado in Stefano Varese’s edited volume, Pueblos indios, soberanía y globalismo (1996). Although the main thrust of Charles Hale’s Mas Que Un Indio concerns ladino reaction to the growing power and legitimacy of indigenous Guatemalans, Indians in the ‘background’ have taken municipal power, and the man whose comment gives the book its title was, in fact, himself an indigenous mayor.

Montoya makes a similar point in the aforementioned article, noting that “there are growing nuclei of professionals who are recovering their identity as ‘runa,’ that are revalorizing Quechua-ness and American indigenousness, and that are configuring a new Indianist phenomenon, different than the indigenism that we have known in the past, that still haven’t drawn the attention that they deserve” (Montoya 1993, 111). [“Hay núcleos crecientes de profesionales que reivindican su condición de runas, que revaloran lo quechua y lo indígena americano y que van configurando un fenómeno indianista nuevo, diferente del indigenismo que conocimos en el pasado, que no ha merecido aun la atención que requiere”].

Garcia 2005, 73-76.

Degregori 1993, 120-121.

Van Cott 2005, 141.

See de la Cadena 2000 for an extended discussion of this appropriation. See also Van Cott 2005, 143.

As discussed later, this movement effected concrete improvements in the lives of indigenous Peruvians, particularly in contributing to Leguía’s formalization of community protections, but was also influenced by an invidious distinction between ‘Inca’ culture and the culture of contemporary indigenous peasants. The valuable elements of contemporary indigenous culture were those that had survived the Conquest and the Indian’s subsequent ‘degeneration.’

Izquierda Unida—United Left.

Movimiento Nueva Izquierda—Movement of the New Left.

Partido Comunista Peruana-Patria Roja—Peruvian Communist Party-Red Fatherland.

Appended to Degregori 1978, 267.

Lenin 1969, 39.

Lenin 1969, 45.

See Bernstein 1993 for Bernstein’s extended exposition and defense of his social democratic revision.

del Valle 2005, 95. “La Liga Agraria Provincial de Chumbivilcas es la representación gremial más importante de campesinado chumbivilcano, teniendo entre sus organizaciones base a las organizaciones de mujeres, rondas campesinas, la Central de Comunidades campesinas de Chumbivilcas, CCCH—que tiene una actividad económica importante a través de los molinos que permiten la elaboración de una serie de
productos—, y las comunidades campesinas de la provincia, llegando a participar 78 comunidades representadas por sus presidentes en las asambleas de la Liga.”

30 Though I would not consider myself a Marxist, I believe, given the importance of Marxism in the historical organization and mobilization of the Peruvian peasantry, it behooves us to study Marxist doctrine seriously if we are to understand the consequences of its long-term influence.

31 It should be noted that the FNTEC (Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos) developed an independent strain of center-leftist indigenist activism that predated the current Marxist accommodation to indigenism. Founded by the propietario Roger Cáceres, FNTEC took its inspiration and self-conception from a particular idealization of the Incan Tawantinsuyo, pursuing an agenda of justice, peasant empowerment, and decentralization (SUR 1978, 1:3, 19–20). Given the current turn of Latin American politics, Cáceres’s program was visionary—Chavismo ‘avant la lettre.’

32 Gouldner 1980, 66.

33 Gouldner 1980, 141–142.

34 Lenin 1969.

35 Van Cott 2005, 35–37. Evelina Dagnino argues that the “primacy of the concept of ideology in the end established a trap for cultural studies from which few analysts on the Latin American Left escaped. Its primary impact was to impregnate the cultural realm with negativity . . . culture was entrapped in negativity in the sense that ideas, and culture itself, were seen predominantly as obstacles to social transformation” (Dagnino 1998, 35).

36 Lenin 1969, 41. Lenin’s basic point is that, left to its ‘own’ devices, the proletariat and peasantry will necessarily adopt bourgeois ideology (albeit reformist). The ease with which indigenous elites have been able to rise into positions of authority and privilege indicates the facility with which indigenism articulates with bourgeois ideology, and appears to justify Lenin’s concern.

37 Quoted in Lindqvist 1972, 121.

38 Lindqvist 1972, 120.

39 The Ley de Partidos Políticos was in fact intended in part to control the multiplication of small, opportunistic regional parties. “As regions increase both their functions and their budgets, political competition to control them should increase. A new municipal law seeks to increase levels of public participation in local government, providing openings for the parties as well. However, decentralization also lends itself to the multiplication of local parties, a tendency that the law of Political Parties aimed to check” (Crabtree 2006, 39).

40 Somewhat apart from this is the emergence of indigenous cocalero activism, in particular the movement around Nelson Palomino, including Qatun Tarpuy (Quechua, Great Harvest) and, more recently, Kuska Perú (Quechua, Together Peru).

41 Jiménez Sardón, it should be noted, is himself essentially a vecino, in the sense we have been using the term here, rather than an indigenous Peruvian. This was, in fact, an element of the popular criticism of his adoption of the ‘indigenist’ mantle. As I understand the general criticism of the party, it centered on the supposed hollowness and instrumentalism of its indigenist rhetoric. I certainly do not have the expertise in Puno’s
complex political reality to judge. MARQA, despite the name, seems to me to be more of a Cacerist party, rather than a properly indigenist one.

42 *Renacimiento Andino* is a bit of a puzzle. From its electoral rhetoric and campaign literature one might gather a sense that it is a mildly indigenist party of the center left, but its presidential candidate, Ciro Gálvez (who is an attorney and Quechua instructor), eventually renounced his candidacy and threw his support behind Lourdes Flores Nano and her center-right UN (*Unidad Nacional*—National Unity) party.

43 The core of this transition within Marxist parties seems to me to be the growing emphasis on the ‘articulation’ of disparate social movements rather than their subordination to the class-struggle and to class-consciousness. Emerging from the work of Antonio Gramsci in the wake of the collapse of revolutionary communism in Germany and Italy, and picked up by authors like Ernesto Laclau (1977) in the post-1968 crisis of world Marxism, the doctrine seems less a response to the proven *effectiveness* of ‘articulation,’ than to the proven *ineffectiveness* of exclusively class-based activism. See Escobar 1992, 77-82 for a brief discussion of ‘articulation’ and its application in contemporary Latin American social movements.

44 See Poole and Rénique 1995. Rojas Samanez also points to the “nationalization of the banking system” by Alan Garcia in 1987 as “detonator” of the “demolition of the party system in Peru” (Rojas Samanez 2006, 91), in the sense that it marked a failure of parties to effectively mediate between the electorate and state policy. See also Van Cott 2005, 8.

45 Albro 1997, 78.

46 See Van Cott 2005, 42. She refers to the ‘diffusion effect’ of successful indigenous activism in neighboring countries.

47 Although a regional Cuzqueño party, Ayllu ran as a subordinate member of Susan Villarán’s national *Concertación Descentralista* (Decentralist Coalition) ticket and agreed to provide the coalition’s candidate for second vice-president.

48 Laime Mantilla is himself an interesting character. His career as an artist and painter exposed him to the Euro-American expatriate community in Cuzco (as well as taking him to UC Davis as an artist in residence), giving him a cosmopolitan bent of mind, resources to invest, and status throughout Chumbivilcas. He is outspoken about his indigenousness, claiming to be the province’s first indigenous *alcalde*, but has spent most of the last decade traveling between Santo Tomás and Cuzco, which has distanced him somewhat from the daily life of the indigenous peasantry. He is still, however, popular and well-liked, and could possibly win future municipal elections.

49 For the three years from 1987 to 1989, Erasmo Mendoza held the *alcaldía* for APRA, buoyed by initial optimism in the García administration’s ability to stem the looming financial meltdown inherited from the second Belaúnde administration.

50 There is generally a strong anti-incumbent feeling in Chumbivilcas, though conversations with colleagues suggest this sensibility is generalized throughout Latin America. When asked why a given party was voted out of office, Chumbivilcanos frequently say, “*Ya les toca a otros*” (“Now it’s someone else’s turn”), with the implication being that the party and its personnel have already had their opportunity to feed at the municipal trough, and that ‘now it’s someone else’s turn’ to enrich themselves and their clients through the redirection of municipal funds.
Pachakuteq is a much more exclusively ‘indigenist’ populist party, in the sense that its platform and rhetoric specifically eschew left-right, Marxist-liberal ideological distinctions and focus primarily on the revival of the indigenous Peruvian values and institutions.

Hechter 1975, 320-326.

Hobsbawm 1983, 1.

(http://es.groups.yahoo.com/group/AutogobiernoAYLLU/). “Creemos que en nuestro pasado, nuestra cultura, y nuestra identidad, es donde se encuentran nuestras primeras y principales fortalezas, por lo que para poder salir adelante debemos ir a su rescate, reivindicación, y desarrollo.”

(http://www.concertaciondescentralista.com/la-concertacion/autogobierno-ayllu) “revalora la identidad cultural andino-amazónica como fuente generadora de principios, valores y comprensión del ser humano estrechamente vinculado e interdependiente con la naturaleza y el medio ambiente.”

Albro 2001, 61. In fact, in Chumbivilcas, the term “origen humilde” is widely used as a euphemism for indigenousness or ‘campesindad’ (peasant-ness).

It was also argued that, because there is no provision in Peruvian law for funding such a council of community representatives, they would effectively be unpaid, which would be a dramatic limitation on regular attendance, given the modest means of most peasant proprietors. Furthermore, such a council of comunidades would, it was argued, effectively exclude urban, non-community citizens from contributing to governance.

Midré and Flores note the same circumvention of local authority by the central state apparatus in Guatemala: “Today the indigenous population might be able to feel represented in the municipal government of Quetzaltenango, because it is controlled by an indigenous mayor; nonetheless, this doesn’t appear to have a coherent reflection in the connection of the population with the deliberation of the functionaries of health and housing in the area of the country, who implement programs conceived by the central government, and don’t involve the participation of the departmental, municipal, and local government” [“Hoy la población indígena podría sentirse representada en el gobierno municipal de Quetzaltenango, por la conducción de un alcalde indígena; sin embargo, esto no parece tener un reflejo coherente en la vinculación de la población al ideario de los funcionarios de salud y vivienda en el área del país, que impulsan programas concebidos desde el gobierno central, y no cuentan con la participación del gobierno departamental, municipal, [y] local”] (Midré & Flores 2002, 41-42).

It obviously does not prevent articulation entirely: Ayllu itself joined the Concertación Descentralista for the 2006 elections. Nonetheless, as noted, Ayllu’s regional leaders are largely life-long communist militants, and its indigenism is superimposed on an essentially Maoist party machine, which undoubtedly facilitated its cooperation with Villarán’s Concertación; it’s likely that a more profoundly or exclusively indigenist party (whatever that might look like) would have considerably more difficulty articulating itself in this manner, and might require far more ‘ideological work’ to do so successfully.

Motte 2003, 17. “Haquira tiene que enfrentar el individualismo y la débil organización de las comunidades campesinas.”
There seems to be a generalized avoidance among academics to discuss the weakness of rural civic preparation. Though all social scientists recognize that the denial of educational opportunities to the campesinado was a serious shortcoming of the traditional regime (and continues to be a shortcoming of the modern Peruvian state), few follow this up by recognizing that it has had significant consequences for the quality of electoral democracy. Most professionals who work in the field organizing, training, or otherwise facilitating local political practice acknowledge, however, that the unwillingness of the Peruvian state to educationally provision its rural population has, in fact, seriously hampered the development of an informed, politically sophisticated voting public.

The average Chumbivilcano, for example, does not, after grade school, read with any frequency (though they are avid consumers of radio, which ameliorates to a certain extent the lack of print media).

Schneider and Zuniga-Hamlin found, similarly, in their own research in rural Peru that party “platforms hardly differed and were not particularly developed” and that NGO-sponsored campaign debates served as an opportunity to promise “particularist benefits” to potential clients rather than a forum in which to ideologically and politically differentiate candidates and their parties (Schneider and Zuniga-Hamlin 2005, 22).

The national government is in the process of devolving responsibilities for the collection of taxes. However, the funds received by provincial and district municipalities are still not directly tied to the amount of taxes they collect, and municipalities do not yet have the autonomy to determine their own tax policy.

This is not merely a problem with classifying MNI, but with all political classifications in the provinces. When I classify a party or an administration based on its discursive self-representation, I recognize that its actual expenditure of resources may not necessarily correspond to its stated political ideology, though I do believe that the evolving electoral preferences of the population do (a) have diagnostic value for the overall ideological climate of the province and (b) ultimately have concrete consequences for the distribution of resources and power within the province (if only to distribute particularistic benefits to particular groups of people and deny them to others).

Huntington also makes the association between modernization (or, more precisely, the transition phase between traditional and more modern forms of political organization), machine politics, and corruption (Huntington 1968, 59-67). William Stuart argues, similarly, that “patronage-clientage systems are structurally transitional forms” (Stuart 1972, 39). For Stuart, however, they are administratively transitional, in the sense that they are intermediary between traditional forms of local power and the full imposition of “strongly rationalized and higher level state apparatus” (ibid). Stuart notes, additionally, that “patron-client systemics are a phenomenon characteristic only of state-organized societies” and rely on “the presence of derived state power, a resource that patrons, as a structural type, are able to exploit” (Stuart 1972, 37).
The similarities between the description I provide below of contemporary machine politics in Chumbivilcas bears a remarkable resemblance, in fact, to that which Wilfredo Pareto present of late 19th century Italian politics, in particular those of southern Italy (Pareto 1950, 11-82).

Motte 2003, 12. “Algunos [candidatos] solo contaban con un listado de obras y de compromisos adquiridos con las comunidades, los que utilizaron como estrategia de campaña.”

“Que nos ha traído?” and “Que nos va traer?” respectively.

Postero has noted this tendency to ‘measure success by public works’ in Bolivia (Postero 2007, 152).

“la tendencia de la población, sus organizaciones y los mismos gobiernos locales a entender estos procesos dentro de una perspectiva enteramente material de realización de obras . . . las instituciones y organizaciones de la cuenca no han alcanzado la madurez suficiente para abordar con un criterio más amplio temas fundamentales, como el de la educación, donde resulta evidente la necesidad de mejorar su calidad; y donde la visión ‘obrista’ perjudica de alguna manera una intención mas profunda de cambio” (del Valle 2005, 22).

See Postero 2007, 150-152 for a discussion of the distortions that accompany the exclusive focus on public works in municipal politics in lowland Bolivia. It should also be noted that the construction of large public works, or in Rotberg’s description, the elaboration of “unnecessarily wasteful construction projects arranged so as to maximize the rents that they generate” (Rotberg 2003, 8), is a classic form of corruption.

Postero 2007, 16. See also Kohl 2003, 161.

Rojas Samanez associates asistencialismo with both clientelism and populism and faults the Fujimori administration for making it the predominant mode of state-society interaction (Rojas Samanez 2006, 94).

“la población entiende los derechos sólo como demandas al Estado, o como limitarse a levantar reivindicaciones y no asumir obligaciones . . . en el sur peruano los actores sociales ven el asistencialismo del Estado y de organismos privados como una continuación o variante contemporánea de aquellas relaciones de servidumbre. El campesino, dispuesto y acostumbrado a pedir, no encuentra nada extraño en estos obsequios y obras de infraestructura” (del Valle 2005, 42-44, see also 103).

Paerregaard 1997, 57.

Raimondi 1874, 229-230.

Simmons 1960, 1022.

Albro 1997, 83.

Stanley Brandes argues that friendship more generally is demonstrated and fostered through shared alcohol consumption (Brandes 2002, 110).

A number of academics (and anyone who has any familiarity with peasant communities) have commented on the manner in which drinking at peasant festivities seems to involve drinking to the point of ecstasy, incoherence, and unconsciousness as a objective, rather than as a byproduct of drinking alcohol as a social lubricant. There does appear to be a general difference in drinking behavior between vecinos and comuneros. Vecinos drink frequently, but seldom to the point of unconsciousness; comuneros, on the
other hand, seem to drink less regularly, but when they do—predominantly on ritual occasions—do so to the point of truly frightening intoxication. Hosts and sponsors of indigenous weddings, cortes de pelo (first hair-cuttings), first communions, and other ritual occasions are expected to become wildly and then catatonically drunk. Guests of honor are frequently forced by other participants to drink amounts of alcohol that will inevitably lead to severe over-intoxication. Female kin of party sponsors force guests of honor who are already staggering or in and out of consciousness to drink large glasses of fortified chicha.

87 Although not a central topic of this investigation, the prominent role of alcohol also effectively excludes evangelical Christians, who are forced to form their own parties, in part for properly political and ideological reasons, but also for procedural reasons associated with alcohol consumption.

88 The only woman I have ever seen drinking in a local bar was a Limeña who came with a visiting band. I should note that women sometimes enter bars to gather their husbands, or to say hello briefly to relatives with whom their husbands or other male relatives are drinking. The point is that bars are virtually taboo to women. One could say that they are the local version of a men’s cult house. Recently, several rudimentary ‘discotecas’ have appeared. Although the clientele is mostly in its twenties and late teens, adult men and women do increasingly drink and dance together. These are not, however, the kinds of establishments in which políticos get together to socialize and hatch their plans.

89 Taylor 1990, 55.

90 Lipset 1967, 13.

91 Although the structure and process of indigenous political parties was not one of my primary research interests, and my association with vecinos accentuated my outsider status, it is my sense that the personnel at distinct levels of the organization are selected or recruited using differing criteria. Regidores, who are the public faces of the party during the election and, if successful, throughout the time in office, appear to be selected based primarily on electoral concerns; aspirants, for example, from key districts, communities, or other interest groups are nominated in order to attract support and votes (women, for example, are sometimes selected, though they are placed at the bottom of the list, where they would likely become, in the event of an electoral victory, lower officials rather than regidores). Gerentes (managers) and staff—the bulk of appointments—however, appear to be selected from key political supporters, donors, kith and kin.

92 Huntington 1968, 21.


95 The turnover of the entire municipal apparatus with each new administration is a serious problem in and of itself. It effectively prevents the development of an apolitical cadre of professional bureaucrats, draining local government of all the experience and training that the previous administrators were able to acquire in the prior term of office. Schneider and Schneider discuss a similar problem in their work on rural Sicily (1976, 155-156). The difficulty of professionalizing municipal administration will be discussed in the chapter 7.
See Huntington 1968, 20-22. It also suggests that there is deficient organization within the state apparatus. The Peruvian state has gone through substantial, if fitful, consolidation over the last several decades. Great strides have been made, on the one hand, in the subordination of government institutions to central oversight (for example, in civilian control of the military, long an illusive goal in Peru) and, on the other, in the guarantee of the autonomy of functionally distinct government offices (for example, the independence of the judiciary and the Central Bank). Nonetheless, the balance between autonomy and consolidation in the relationship between various levels of the Peruvian government seems still to be unstable and contentious.

“También se observó que muchos candidatos se aprovecharon de los espacios de las organizaciones campesinas, por ejemplo, las organizaciones de mujeres fueron utilizadas para realizar su campaña, comprometiéndolas con el voto, asistiendo a las asambleas y reuniones. Eso creó un clima de inestabilidad y entorpeció en muchos casos las actividades programadas” (Motte 2003, 13).

Donna Lee Van Cott argues, more generally, that decentralization “opens new playing fields for relatively weak political actors at local and regional levels, where indigenous peoples are often concentrated demographically and where fewer financial resources are necessary to compete” (Van Cott 2005, 8).

The exact quote I have written in my notebook is, “El dirigente nos mandó votar por Humala. Que le parece” (“The director ordered us to vote for Humala. What do you think?”).

For a series of articles on the historical, institutional, and economic facets of corruption in Peru, see Felipe Portocarrero S. ed. 2005. See also Schonwalder 2002, 30.

The JNE (Jurado Nacional Electoral—National Electoral Court) oversees the process of revocatorio or “recall,” whereby electors can vote non-performing or corrupt officials out of office.

“las normas que han previsto los reseñados mecanismos de participación, de transparencia y de rendición de cuentas, no han considerado de manera explícita las responsabilidades de las autoridades o funcionarios públicos que incumplan con la implementación de estos mecanismos, ni las sanciones que les correspondería” (Friz Burga 2004, 315).

Dargent 2006, 155.

Huntington 1968, 410. Drawing on his own extensive fieldwork, Guillermo Bonfil Batalla suggested that a key tension for emerging indigenous elites (in Latin America generally, but for Bonfil particularly in Mexico) between “manipulating their identity for personal benefit” and using their authority for the good of the community (Bonfil Batalla 1978, 144).

Francke 2006, 92.

Eduardo Morón, drawing on survey data, argues that there is an “enormous tolerance with regard to corruption” in Peru (Morón 2005, 147), in particular with regard to public budgetary corruption (corrupción presupuestal).
“El intento de ‘compra de votos’ estuvo presente bajo diversas modalidades (la distribución de productos de primera necesidad y otros)” (Motte 2003, 13).

Dollard 1957, 213.

See, for example, Gaetano Mosca (1896), Georges Sorel (1908) Wilfredo Pareto (1916), as well as modern work by E. J. Hobsbawm (1990) and Benedict Anderson (1991). See also Toqueville 1969, 235-237.

Van Cott 2005, 7.

See Gellner 1983 for an extended discussion of the economic and political factors that make some form of nationalism virtually inevitable.

Friedman 1994, 137.

Friedman 1994, 145.

Polanyi 1944, 28.


Chapter 7 The New Kurakas

1 An earlier version of this chapter is being prepared for publication in Ethnicity from Various Angles and through Varied Lenses: Yesterday’s Today in Latin America. Christine Hünefeldt and Leon Zamosc, eds., Brighton; Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2010.

2 The only real local ‘competitor’ to the municipalities is, of course, the Catholic church, currently led by the widely-respected Padre Jeremiah, originally of Boston, Mass. For the majority of my fieldwork Padre Jeremiah was in the United States undergoing and recovering from cancer treatment. Nonetheless, the acrimony of the ruling MNI toward him and the Church projects he had fostered was still palpable.

3 Motte 2003, 12.

4 Scott 1967, 131.

5 Some of the elements of this sequence are similar to those given in the accounts of Isbell and Paerregaard (Isbell 1978, 191-195, Paerregaard 1997, 54) of indigenous political ascent, though they both emphasize the role of migration in the process. Though credentials and experience gained in the wider world are important symbolic achievements in Chumbivilcan politics, the election of a non-resident mayor that Paerregaard describes in his field-site would be unlikely in Chumbivilcas, where regional sentiment is strong. That did not stop APRA’s 2006 provincial municipal candidate from essentially trying, and failing, to accomplish just this.

6 Albro 2001, 60.


8 Marx 1963, 15.


10 Here I am merely discussing the consequences of a particular way of conceptualizing aid, rather than criticizing the current manner in which it is distributed.

11 Demetrio Huamani Romero was elected in 1980 with a stunning 60% of the vote. Huamani was one of the founders of the provincial Liga Agraria and vecino informants
claimed that his landslide election was a continuation of the spirit of the SINAMOS and the Velasco years. They note with relief that the alcaldía quickly fell out of the hands of the campesinado with the election of Walter Silva in 1983. It should be noted that Florentino Laime claims to have been the first indigenous alcalde of Chumbivilcas (Laime Mantilla 2001). This is certainly not literally true. No one disputes that Huamaní was “netamente comunero.” Nonetheless, Laime was the first to explicitly identify himself as ‘indigenous’ rather than ‘peasant,’ and the first to have been directly exposed to and involved in the international indigenous movement in Cuzco and the United States. In other words, he was definitely the first indigenous alcalde to claim he was the first indigenous alcalde.

12 Though the participation of local vecinos in peasant organization and activism seems to have been limited, one category of local mestizo was prominent in rural activism: the hijos naturales, or children out of wedlock, of vecinos and comuneras were frequently given opportunities and resources denied the typical comunero, and yet remained in a vulnerable and depreciated position vis-à-vis vecino society. They thus had both the means and the motivation to attack vecino privilege. The most famous of these resisters in Chumbivilcas was Arcadio Hurtado Romero, who organized invasions in Capacmarca in 1963, was eventually captured, murdered in prison in Cuzco (purportedly at the paid behest of interested Chumbivilcan hacendados), and posthumously gave his name to the Liga Agraria Arcadio Hurtado de Chumbivilcas.

13 Huntington 1968, 403.

14 In their study of the American Deep South, Davis et al found a similar inability or lack of motivation to participate in democratic politics amongst the Southern aristocracy: “The upper classes, on the other hand, are much less active in politics and are apt to be ineffectual when they do become active. Frequently they seem unable to lessen the social distance between themselves and the voters enough to obtain the wholehearted support of the lower class. In spite of their lack of political power, however, their superordinate class position is clearly recognized by the officials” (Davis et al 1941, 497).

15 Kautsky 1972, 129.

16 Motte 2003, 36.

17 Jonathan Powis writes of the aristocracy more generally that “a public role was part of the aristocrat’s inheritance. . . Leadership in the community was the birthright of great aristocratic lineages” (Powis 1984, 49-50).

18 She also purportedly offered to give a large portion of her inherited property to a neighbor community if it could guarantee her its decisive vote.

19 Ollanta Humala ran as the 2006 presidential candidate of the center left UPP, but was the founder of the Peruvian Nationalist Party. A former Army officer, Humala’s policy proposals are nationalist and socialist, and he is frequently compared with Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. In both the first and second rounds of the 2006 presidential elections, Humala was the de facto candidate of the Peruvian left.

20 The arguments proffered by the schismatics did not, however, seem sufficient to justify the acrimony of the factionalization. I shared the sense of most insiders and outsiders that the dispute was essentially about control of the local party per se, rather than the particular direction the party was going.
23 Beals 1934, 428.
24 Poole and Réquique 1992, 110.
25 For a history and analysis of the so-called ‘convivencia’ between APRA and Prado and later Odría, see Bourricaud 1970, 261-231.
26 Valle Reistra characterizes the APRA “formulas” of 1956 as “rabid anticommunism, desire for the coexistence of classes and fear of any form of nationalism or anti-imperialism” (Valle Riestra G.O. 1989, 451).
27 The departmental and national leadership of APRA is itself heavily mestizo.
28 There is a minority of comuneros who vociferously support APRA. For all of the comunero activists with whom I spoke, the Banco Agrario that García implemented in his first administration was a major element in their commitment to the party.
29 Albro 1997, 78.
30 Benoit-Smullyan 1944, 160.
31 It should be noted, more generously, that vecinos often demonstrate a related sense of self-assurance and equanimity. In his work with the upper-class in the American South, Dollard notes, with his characteristic perspicacity, his impression of their analogous “poise and social readiness of the group, their ease in conversation, and the grace and certainty with which they receive a stranger. They know that they are placed indefinitely in the social world by the strings which bind them to their ancestors and that they have a form of personal security which cannot be taken away by economic disaster or by anything short of death or destruction to those who remain” (Dollard 1957, 80).
32 This residual status is eerily similar to that described by both John Dollard in Indianola and Allison Davis et al in Natchez, Mississippi in the 1930s: “Although it has lost its actual grip on the social machine to a very great extent, it has maintained the momentum of its social prestige and assimilation into it is still a great value in the South. To be an upper-class person is to have a certain kind of memory of the past and to hold a certain role in the eyes of others with similar memories” (Dollard 1957, 79).
33 Though it is not exactly a criticism, there was a subtext of fear to the vecino feelings toward the growing indigenousness of MNI administration. During an official visit of a family member who, as a high ranking member of the administration of the University San Antonio Abad in Cuzco, was going to announce the opening of a university extension in Santo Tomás, one informant expressed disbelief that no vecinos had been invited to the official announcement: “El estaba solo. Todos comuneros. No había ni un vecino. Esta mal. Esta peligroso. Como puede ser así. No han invitado a ni un vecino. Regidores y comuneros no mas. Es evidencia que no tiene aceptación.” These sorts of responses echo the fearfulness that characterized the vecino’s response to the peasant activism stimulated by the Velasco regime and to Sendero Luminoso, discussed in chapter 5.
34 I have replaced the real names with pseudonyms.
36 It should be noted that the shortcomings attributed to Ayllu and other municipal administrations are identical to the weakness described by Kohl in his work on the effect
of decentralization on rural Bolivian municipalities: “Bolivian public administration is frequently more political than professional. Municipal employees, often hired on the basis of family or party connections, change with each election, providing little administrative continuity . . . Another problem comes from the brain drain, a chronic problem in all economically depressed rural areas, where educated people tend to migrate to the cities” (Kohl 2003, 159).

37 Marx 1948, 12.

38 During this episode, I was sitting amongst a group of vecinos who, after a brief moment of amusement, began to shake their heads in consternation and disapproval, making comments like, “It’s not right. Granted, he [the alcalde] hasn’t done his job well, but it shows a lack of respect, a lack of comportment” and “Mira como son . . . animales” [Look how they are (referring to the crowd, overwhelmingly comuneros) . . . animals”]. I think this showed a recognition that, despite their ethnically-tinged criticisms of the alcalde and his staff, there was an analogy between the respect and deference appropriate to the treatment of the alcalde and the respect and deference they believed appropriate to the population’s treatment of themselves; or, to put it in a more general way, disrespect of any form of authority potentially threatened all forms of authority.


40 Boletín Informativo 20 Municipal, 5, Julio 2005, Asociación Civil Transparencia

41 According to Asociación Civil Transparencia, as of 2005, 63 of 194 provincial municipalities and 132 of 1634 district municipalities had signed agreements with SNIP.

42 de Mello & Barenstein 2001, 5.

43 Crabtree 2006, 35-36.

44 Friz Burga 2004, 82.

45 Bebbington 1997. See also Kohl, who notes that “NGOs have increasingly assumed the role of consultants that sell services to municipal governments” (Kohl 2003, 160), writing municipal plans and providing civic education. While this might be seen as a shortcoming, Kohl notes that “Municipalities that have active NGOs have generally fared much better under the LPP than those without them” (Kohl 2003, 160).

46 Garcia 2005, 130.

47 Motte 2003, 17.

48 As del Valle notes, between the municipality and NGOs there seems to “exista un celo natural, acicateado por cierto discurso anti-ONG de los partidos” (del Valle 2005, 69). Parties can naturally be quite distrustful and antagonistic toward those elements of civil society that are not under their suzerainty, most importantly the Catholic church and the ONGs.

49 Lipset 1967, 5-7.


51 Gose 1994, 189.

52 Adrianzén 1993, 33.

Chapter 8 Still Waters: Ethnic Ideology and Practice in Chumbivilcas

1 Suzanne Oboler has written that while her informants acknowledge that there is “racismo solapado” (concealed or veiled racism) in Peru, many claim that “there isn’t explicit racial discrimination” (Oboler 1996, 26) and emphasize the collective belief (or pretense) that “aqui todos somos peruanos” (“here we’re all Peruvians”) (Oboler 1996, 30).

2 Orlove has questioned the usefulness of analytically separating the population “into hacendados, comuneros, and peons” (Orlove 1980, 126). His argument, however, is unconvincing. In the 30 years since his fieldwork, the final category has all but disappeared, but the first two remain not only discursively but also socially predominant. It is true, as Orlove points out, that “elite-peasant relations, can be analyzed only in conjunction with their external articulation” (Orlove 1980, 126), but it does not follow that the hacendado/comunero distinction should be discarded. As Van Den Berghe wrote in 1974, “the degree of sharpness in the ethnic boundary is essentially unrelated to the objective degree of cultural differences between them, a point also stressed by Barth (1969) and many other ethnic analysts” (Van Den Berghe 1974, 8). The important point is that this binary social dichotomy is not merely an analytical distinction. Members of the society believe it to accurately describe their social world, and it leads them to actually structure their sociality in ways that make it objectively true from a sociological perspective. Martinez-Alier describes a remarkably similar “dual view of society” in southern Spain that is remarkably similar (Martinez-Alier 1971, 206-212), as does Frans Schryer 20th century Mexico (Schryer 1980, 50-53), despite the fact that various qualities—for example, wealth, phenotype, ethnic belief and practice—may be continuously rather than dichotomously distributed across a social spectrum.

3 In his work with landowners in southern Mexico, Bobrow-Strain describes a parallel quality of threat. He writes that a “palpable sense of siege was particularly sharp in Chilón, where a tiny minority of landowners are in fact surrounded by hundreds of indigenous communities, and racially charged violence extends far back in local histories” (Bobrow-Strain 2001, 183). In spite of the labor unrest of the 1960s, reform and consciousness-raising of the 1970s, and Shining Path agitation and violence of the 1980s, the siege mentality is not as pronounced in Chumbivilcas as Bobrow-Strain describes in Chilón. There is, however, a pervasive sense of being isolated from the nation at large amongst a people that is, at root, culturally distinct, untrustworthy, and potentially antagonistic.

4 Villena Aguirre 1987, 69.

5 Drawing on the work of Julio Cotler, Van Den Berghe quips that “Peru is, in fact, well integrated . . . but on the basis of inequality” (Van Den Berghe 1974b, 17).

6 Qayum et al 1997, 75.

7 Qayum et al 1997, 74. A similar situation prevailed in the American south up until the civil rights era. Davis et al write that “often [the mammy] has a more intimate and affectionate relation with the white children, greater contact, and more direct authority than the real mother, although the term ‘Mother’ is never applied to her” (Davis et al 1941, 93). It’s likely, in fact, that the intimate developmental exposure to the indigenous
nanny contributed to the vecino’s subsequent romantic involvement with the ‘cholita’ described below.

7 By ‘lineal ideology,’ I mean a way of conceptualizing and experiencing social life in which the image and perceived interests of a corporate, property-holding lineage play a significant or predominant role in the identities and calculations of individual members. I will discuss the concept of ‘lineal ideology’ at greater length in chapter 9.
8 In fact, they are likely more endogamous, more likely to marry locally, and less likely to marry internationally.
9 Balmori et al 1984, 61.
11 Casaús Arzú writes, for example, concerning elite families in Guatemala, that “exogamous marriages that don’t suppose and improvement of the conditions of life, or an improvement of ‘race’ by means of a prior certification of ‘limpieza de sangre’ are almost never permitted (Casaús Arzú 2007, 53).
12 A particularly clear statement of this fact was made by Davis et al about the pre-civil rights American South: “There is no taboo preventing sexual intercourse, despite the inflexible taboo upon marriage or upon any action which might tend to introduce their offspring into the white group. The sanctions of the white group, however, require either that such affairs be conducted with a certain amount of discretion” (Davis et al 1941, 31). Dollard echoes this focus on social recognition rather than miscegenation per se: “the taboo falls heaviest on social acknowledgement of such relations rather than on the fact of their occurrence” (Dollard 1957, 151).
13 One can see clearly that this is a basic consequence of the hypergamous tendency in complex, stratified societies (Ekholm Friedman and Friedman 2008, 105-106, Friedman 1998, 57). It was certainly a feature of Medieval Spanish society. According to Dillard, “No stigma attached to the Christian man who consorted or cohabited with Jewish or Muslim women,” but a Christian woman who fornicated with a Jewish or Muslim man could expect to be burned at the stake, along with her lover (Heath 1984, 206-207).
16 Several authors attribute interethnic sexual relations to the permissiveness of indigenous societies (see, for example, Hennessey 1978, 45 and Esteva-Fabregat 1995,
36). Be this as it may, given the extraordinary differential in power between conquistador and indigene, it’s likely that neither the putative permissiveness of native culture nor the submissiveness of native women entered much into the equation.

23 It may be, in fact, that status inequality per se is arousing. One need only witness the enduring appeal of the French maid costume to see that sexual attraction can survive, and even be piqued, by income and status maldistribution.

24 I don’t want to speculate too much about the psychological or identity benefits of exaggerating the sexual and de-emphasizing the labor exploitation; a few suggestions will suffice: perhaps the hyper-cognizing of sexual conduct serves to underplay the degree to which the vecino is dependent on the labor of the campesino for their social reproduction (I find this sort of explanation unconvincing, however, because vecinos are usually quite aware and even proud of their control and ability to “sacar provecho” from the labor of campesinos) my informants don’t generally think of vecino-cholita relations as exploitative, but rather mutually satisfying and only incidentally ultimately prejudicial toward the female participant, so that they are more likely to feel unmitigated satisfaction about the relationship; furthermore, this ostensible consensuality may serve as an idealizing model for other forms exploitation; labor exploitation tends to be relatively diffuse (punctuated by confrontations, punishments, et cetera), and therefore unworthy of recollection and thematization, whereas romantic and sexual involvement seems universally pleasurable to recollect.

25 Subtleties of the term’s use can be brought out by comparison to Dollard’s characterization of the white male attitudes toward black females in pre-civil rights era Mississippi. His informants felt the black woman to be “a seducing, accessible person dominated by sexual feeling and, so far as straight-out sexual gratification goes, desirable” (Dollard 1957, 137)—the attitude of mestizo men toward the indigenous female is relatively less sexual. My informants certainly recognize that indigenous women are, practically speaking, more sexually available; indigenous men rarely had the power to effectively protect their womenfolk from sexual exploitation. Furthermore, the resources that vecinos had at their disposal—economic, punitive, political, and social—also discouraged resistance and encouraged compliance. But there is a sense that these practical inducements only amplified the fundamental disinhibition of the indigenous female. There is a general belief that comuneros are, especially in their youth, more sexually promiscuous than vecinos, having intercourse in the countryside in chosas or in the undergrowth and participating in orgiastic indulgence during fiestas. This feeds into a general discourse about the supposed animal-likeness of indígenas, male and female (i.e., that they approach sexual coitus like animals, taking each other where and whenever the urge and opportunity strikes them). Indigenous women are likewise thought of as more romantic and passionate than white women, and more likely to succumb to seduction as a result of romantic attachment or basic lack of inhibition. In line with the greater emphasis in Chumbivilcas on romantic involvement with the cholita, vecinos frequently characterize comuneras as more sentimental, passionate, and innocent, whereas vecinas are believed to be cold, calculating, and punitive. I did not, however, find a belief that the sexual desire of indigenous women was more powerful than that of vecinas, but that they were closer to a natural libidinal state, without the restraint typical of civilized life.
And while Dollard argues that “The white belief . . . seems to be that Negro women invariably welcome coitus with a white man and do not feel the lack of the attention surrounding legitimate love affairs” (Dollard 1957, 149), my informants absolutely recognize the full emotional capacity of indigenous women and, whatever their actual behavior, frequently express guilt or regret (though they undoubtedly also feel relief) that they were unable to treat their ‘cholita’ in a way that was emotionally satisfying to her. They almost invariably do, in fact, treat them in shabby ways, but they also regretfully acknowledge this. I would hypothesize that this acknowledgement derives from the cultural, psychological, and even phenotypic closeness of vecinos and comuneras in Chumbivilcas.

26 Lyons 2006, 167-175.
27 In effect, as Mannarelli argues, within this “model of seigneurial virility” the servitude of female servants was both “domestic and sexual” (Mannarelli 2004, 351).
29 Fuller 2001, 262-263.
30 Dollard found the same fact in his work on the American South: “many, if not most, southern boys begin their sexual experience with Negro girls, usually around the ages of fifteen or sixteen . . . It was said further that many white men do not have experiences with white women until they finally marry” (Dollard 1957, 139).
31 de la Cadena 2000, 263.
32 The ‘Don Juan complex’ is an important element of machismo throughout Latin cultures. Vié has written about the particular importance of sexual exploits in the constitution of masculinity in Chumbivilcas specifically (Vié 121-122).
33 de la Cadena 2000, 265.
34 Mörner 1967, 22.
35 We should keep in mind, however, that the relationship was not merely about power, but also about sexual attraction per se. Attractive indigenous women, in fact, were particularly sought after by vecinos and therefore particularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation and aggression (Lyons 2006, 175); Davis et al found a similar situation in the American South (1941, 33).
36 By way of balance, it should be noted that, given their overall social weakness, ‘cholitas’ stood to gain modest, if frequently short-lived, rewards from their association with relatively powerful partners (See Lyons 2006, 213 on the offer of “exemption from work or material rewards” for sexual access). From a structural perspective, this inducement was obviously minimal compared to all the coercive elements listed above, but it is important to recognize, especially with regard to the ‘cholita’ trope, which relies on the genuine romantic and sexual interest of the mestizo male and the romantic participation of the indigenous female for its positive valence and cultural salience. There were certainly situations in which it could be a significant advantage to be a mistress or concubine to a wealthy hacienda owner (as Davis et al point out with regard to black concubinage in the American South (1941, 36-37). One of my vecina informants humorously tells the story of her father-in-law’s dalliances with one of the shepherdesses. She tells how he would shave and put on his sharpest outfit to hike up the hill to the
pastures. When asked if the relationship was consensual, she exclaimed, “Oh, yeah, he was always giving clothes, jewelry, things like that, which I had to hide from the señora.” Although it is not my focus here, the constant sexual exploitation of female kith and kin undoubtedly accentuated the bitterness of comunero men toward vecinos, contributing to the acrimony and resentment of interethnic relations. As an analogy, Dollard notes that “Negro men experience constant jealousy and hatred because of sexual affronts to their women” (Dollard 1957, 164).

It should be remembered that the vecino-comunera romantic relation is also a particular instance of the more general phenomenon of romantic love, which was traditionally suspect in Iberian and Latin American family ideology, because it threatened the rational, pragmatic calculation of family interest and honor in marriage and reproduction (Gutiérrez 1984, 253; Pellicer 2004, 149-150).

Casaús Arzú hypothesizes, in fact, that “the high rate of marriages of convenience has been one of the causes of extramarital relations and of illegitimate children” (Casaús Arzú 2007, 212), presumably because the lack of romantico-sexual involvement with the formal spouse leaves an emotional void that tends to be filled by extramarital affairs.

Kathryn Burns has written, for example, about the extensive efforts, in the immediate wake of the Conquest, of conquistadors to find advantageous placements and marriages for their daughters and, as in the case of Diego Maldonado, to find ways for their mestizo sons to perpetuate their line and inherit the properties that they had amassed (Burns 1998).

Mannarelli writes that “illegitimacy doesn’t necessarily suppress loving sentiment” (Mannarelli 2004, 339), which is undoubtedly true, but, amongst my informants and I suspect the population at large, it quite frequently does.

As Dollard put it in terms of the American South, “white men do not sleep with Negroes very much in Southerntown any more because there are so many white girls available . . . modern trends which have tended to lessen the severity of sexual taboos on American women in general have also affected the situation in Southerntown” (Dollard 1957, 151). A whole host of ideological and political economic changes, including the declining role of lineages and great families in politics and the economy and the influence of more liberal Euro-American moral doctrines, have effectively altered the moral atmosphere of the society and, in particular, the strictures that formerly disproportionately restricted the liberty of women.

It should be noted that vecinos are themselves now eager to drink and otherwise associate with comunero political authorities.

See Lumbreras 1989, 308, for recollections of the normativity and ubiquity of physical abuse of indigenous peasants in the author’s childhood.
He also notes that the basic recourse is to “remain invisible—and in private . . . in their little worlds they indulge in bias, prejudice, and self-glorification” (Marcus 2000, 22).

Although, in my experience, vecinos do not often gossip about comuneros, they are aware of the information about which they could potentially gossip and, when asked specifically about a comunero, will divulge such information, in an indifferent, critical, or mildly amused tone. They know, for instance, that X is in a bitter dispute with his brother, Y is depressed and has stopped cooking for her family, or Z is cheating on his wife with a particular vendor in the market, but under normal circumstances act as though they feel it would be beneath them to concern themselves with the goings-on of comuneros. One exception to this generalization is that teachers and employers frequently gossip about their students or employees, especially when the particular phenomenon complicates, disrupts, or otherwise makes more challenging the speaker’s own work.

Racial ideas are naturally situated in and distributed throughout social space, such that it’s impossible to generalize without distorting the fundamental plurality of racial ideologies. As Van Den Berghe wrote with typical insight, “not only is the terminology specific to place and to ethnicity, but also to class, sex, age, and many other social as well as idiosyncratic characteristics. The general impression given by most monographs is one of far greater consensus about the nature of the social order than in fact exists” (Van Den Berghe 1974b, 18). Husbands and wives, for example, may come from the same town, similar educational backgrounds, parallel political ideologies, and even traditionally allied families, and they frequently share elements of racial ideology, but nonetheless they frequently disagree about other elements, and virtually always apply these elements in different ways in particular situations. I will try here to give a description of an “agreed upon” or hegemonic set of racial categories and associated attributes, augmenting it where appropriate and possible (provided specific ethnographic examples) with ways in which individuals or subgroups may deviate from this characterization. The larger point is that even within an individual mind there are multiple, asymmetrical, incoherent, and potentially contradictory discursive strands and complexes of feeling. This is all the more true when considering the collective categories and beliefs of a class, or a culture, or a polity.

Fuller sees evidence of two competing metadiscourses in this discursive pluralism: an egalitarian one typical of the middle class and a particularistic, hierarchical one rooted in the conservative Iberian family institutions (Fuller 1997, 57). While these are undoubtedly important factors, I don’t think they exhaust the diversity of local discourse.

In their discussion of Mexican elites, Larissa Lomnitz and Marisol Pérez-Lizaur note that “the ideology of an upper-class Mexican family can be traced to heterogeneous beliefs and values taken from the dominant ideology in areas such as religion, class nationalism, and modernization” (Lomnitz and Pérez-Lizaur 1987, 229). They argue, however, that when “apparent inconsistencies are analyzed more closely, they can usually be resolved on grounds of family interest . . . it is an organized body of values and beliefs that provides specific responses to all conceivable situations members of the group may encounter (Lomnitz and Pérez-Lizaur 1987, 230). I would insist, however, that these
ideologies, in particular those pertaining to race, are, in fact, remarkably unorganized and that there is a high degree of contingency and improvisation and application.

Bobrow-Strain describes a version of this discursive plurality in his work on landowners in Chiapas, Mexico. He notes that one of his hacendado informants “like a number of other landowners I encountered in Chiapas...surprised me by moving fluidly between the language of his Marxist student years and nostalgia for a harmonious past fractured by the incursion of the left’s foreign ideas” (Bobrow-Strain 2007, 19). Many of my vecino informants themselves represented this duality as a progression from the indoctrination of their student days, to their current, ostensibly more mature, reactionary understanding.

It should be noted, in passing, that there are few blacks in Peru generally (in the 1940 census, the last that included race, they accounted for less than half a percent of the population), though on the coast they exert a cultural impact disproportionate to their small number. There are very few blacks in the Peruvian highlands. In Chumbivilcas in 1940 there were 8 (out of 45,000 individuals censused). I know of one permanent black resident of the province. Whatever the case, blackness doesn’t enter significantly into ethnic ideology in Chumbivilcas and surrounding provinces. The only reference I heard to ‘negros’ was the oft repeated phrase, ‘trabajar como un negro,’ which was used to suggest that someone worked extremely hard at a strenuous task. Informants claimed, however, that this referred to their former status as slaves, forced to work, rather than to an inherent work ethic.

Cross-cutting and complicating these racial and ethnic discourses is a fairly profound dichotomy between thinking about comuneros and comuneras. Virtually all of the harshest ideas and attitudes about indigenous people are leveled at comunero men.


Luna 1935, 20.

de la Cadena 2000, 30.


Gavin Smith notes that becoming an “ersatz member of the community” was one way for hacendados to secure communal labor from neighboring communities (Smith 1989, 81).

The comunero had been drinking with a vecino whose aging mother he had cared for his entire life, first as a colono and later as a sort of family retainer. With great pride, and implicit criticism, he announced: “Soy indio de mierda. No soy nadie, pero si la cuido a su madre, algo que el no hace” [I’m a piece of shit Indian. I’m a nobody, but I look after his mother, something that he doesn’t do.] Even in this statement, there was an element of quotation. It seemed that he was pointing out the irony that the man that the vecino’s family would once have called an “indio de mierda” was fulfilling the vecino’s most solemn filial responsibility. When I spoke later to the vecino, he told me that one of the tasks the servant performed was to carry his mother on his back downstairs in the middle of the night so she could urinate in the ground floor bathroom, and then carry her back upstairs and put her to bed.
Dollard reported that his informants in the American south attributed similar traits to blacks, including dishonesty, untrustworthiness, shiftlessness, laziness, savagery, emotional instability, inscrutability, capriciousness, smelliness, ignorance, childlikeness (Dollard 1957, 371-380, for similar characterizations see Davis et al 1941, 17-19).

The phrase is used as an admonition to scold someone for behaving in an uncivilized or otherwise disapproved manner.

I would note here, in passing, that a number of conversations and incidents during fieldwork have suggested to me that even comuneros who cease, through exposure to egalitarian ideas, to consciously ‘believe’ in the comunero’s inferiority still have suspicions that indigenous peoples are naturally or genetically inferior in some regards to Europeans. Del Valle also found amongst indigenous Peruvians in the southern highlands a “sense of inferiority” (del Valle 2005, 99). Dollard found in the American South that his black informants to a certain extent shared this grudging belief in their own inferiority, “Most Negroes accept the superiority of white characteristics and the inferiority of their own, and attempt to edge over toward the white model” (Dollard 1957, 182). Davis et al also found evidence of black belief in stereotypes of their community, both in biological and cultural terms (Davis et al 1941, 41).

As a point of fact, there is a suite of ambiguously positive traits that comuneros possess, as corollaries outgrowth of their animal- or brutishness. As one informant put it, “the campesino has abilities that we don’t have. Years and years in the campo make him better than us at certain things. He doesn’t tire. He can walk for 2 days straight without food and not get tired. He can see at night. He can travel between villages in the middle of the night and see just fine. He can see and hear at a distance. He can recognize people from far off. But he also has weaknesses. And his great weakness is his intelligence.” While the physical rigors of manual labor and poverty may, in fact, accustom and, to a certain extent, inure peasants to hardship, the fact that they were historically prevented from complaining to their employers about their discomfort and dissatisfaction with their work likely contributes to the vecino’s belief in hist indifference to abuse, deprivation, and exhaustion. Casaús Arzú reports a similar belief amongst her elite informants that Indians are “mas resistentes” (Casaús Arzú 2007, 233).

Arguedas quotes one of his “señorito” informants about the vecinos españoles—the Spanish equivalent of the campesino—characterizing the peasantry as “gente baja, sucios, brutos, ignorantes, hipócritas y, sobre todo, cobardes, como no hay más . . . Cuanto más dinero tienen son peores. Porque ellos no han nacido para manejar dinero . . . Para esta gente, amigo, no queda otra cosa que el rigor. Con el palo andan bien, y no se quejan” [emphasis added] (Arguedas [1968], 168). Davis et al. found similar beliefs amongst American whites in the South. They write that, “to the whites,” the Negro appears as an ‘unsocialized being,’ that is, he is thought to lack many of the social restraints and compulsions which form the pattern of approved white behavior. Thus, to them, he is lazy and will not work except under the compulsion of force or immediate need; he is irresponsible and does not anticipate and prepare for future needs; he is dependent upon the whites and prefers this dependence to the struggle of existing in the present society without their protection” (Davis et al 1941, 17). As a result, whites believed the Negro
was responsive only to “violent methods” (Davis et al 1941, 46). Aristotle associates “slaves and tame animals,” arguing that the slaves are “destitute” of reason and fit, therefore, “for menial duties” (Aristotle 1995, 16).

69 Aguirre Beltrán 1979, 140.

70 To be fair to the vecino, it is likely that many of these beliefs are reinforced by the tendency of the campesinado to resort to Scott’s so-called “weapons of the weak,” including deception, lies of omission, shirking, avoidance, noncompliance, failure to arrive, and failure to notify of impending absence or departure (Scott 1985; Dollard 1957, 302). To be fair to the comunero, as Dollard sagely writes, “Who will forever be on time for a date he did not make?” (Dollard 1957, 373).

71 Flores Ochoa 1974, 70. The term ‘hijito’ is also used, as a form of address, a usage that seems parallel to the use of ‘boy’ or first names in the pre-Civil Rights south (Davis et al 1941, 22).

72 Though Maria Elena Garcia uses the term “indigenous” throughout her book to describe her informants, ‘comunero’ and ‘campesino’ are by far the most common terms for indigenous peasants throughout the Cusco region. The use of the term ‘indigenous,’ it seems to me, is potentially misleading, because it implies that indigeneity is the essential element in comunero identity, which, for many, it still is not. More precisely, I would argue that Garcia, working with the progressive, pro-indigenous Bartolomé de las Casas, uses the term in a manner slightly ‘in advance’ of its popular usage. Nonetheless, local usage is quickly catching up to her anticipatory terminology.

73 Indigenist discourse has gone through several shifts in emphasis over the last century and a half. What might be called the ‘first wave’ of indigenism began in the second half of the twentieth century with liberal thinkers and authors, like Manuel González Prada and Clorinda Matto de Turner, who mixed a general low estimate of the capacity of the Indian with a condemnation of their feudal exploitation (de la Cadena 2000, 301). In particular, they lamented the malign influence of the highland clergy and latifundios. Narciso Aréstegui’s *El Padre Horán* is perhaps the best-known example of this tradition (Kristal 1987, 42-55). In this late 19th century indigenism, the Indian was essentially a pawn in intra-elite political conflict, pitting modernizing, coastal liberals against highland conservatives or regionalists (Kristal 1987, 21; de la Cadena 2000, 253). The second wave of indigenism struck in the 1920s. This wave involved the establishment in 1919 of the *Patronato Nacional de la Raza Indígena*, the publication of the journal *Amauta* beginning in 1925, the publication of Valcárcel’s *Tempestad en Los Andes* 1927, and of Uriel García’s *The New Indian* in 1930 (Beals 1934, 318; see also de la Cadena 2000, 253-254). José Carlos Mariátegui’s socialist interpretation of pre-Conquest Peruvian society was also important, though Arguedas argues that his was largely an appreciation of the “*cultura incaica*” rather than contemporary Indian communities. (Arguedas 1985a, 12-18). Despite the rising concern about the abuse of the indigenous peasantry, traditional conceptualizations of race remained foundational. Even an indigenist journal like *Amauta* could begin a 1935 article on the evils of the “gamonal letrado” with the sentence “El indio es por naturaleza litigante” (Luna 1935, 20). In Cuzco, in particular, de la Cadena argues that a major element of this second wave of indigenism was the attempt by landowning intellectuals to distinguish gamonalismo from their own supposedly
legitimate exploitation of the peasantry (de la Cadena 2000, 302-308). I have already discussed in previous chapters the peasant cum indigenous mobilization of the late 1950s and early 1960s that culminated in Velasco’s pro-peasant reforms (which might be called the third wave) and the contemporary indigenist political mobilization (or fourth wave).

Van Den Berghe 1974b, 18.

I later described the altercation to one of my close friends who said that it showed the “malcriadez” of the young man who had hurled the insult . . . and then laughed and added, “But, then, he’s right, that other guy’s a cholo.”


To a certain extent, biological explanations are offered for ethnic differences, but there is a basic asymmetry in vecino ontological accounts: for reasons I will discuss in the following section, biology actually rarely enters into vecino descriptions and identifications of themselves.

Hanke 1959, 100; van Dijk 1993, 55.

The family’s turkey was continually escaping its enclosure, eating all the señora’s flowers, and defecating in the bedrooms of the house. I have put the final sentence in quotes because the father’s use of the word ‘indio’ was out of the ordinary, as was the repetition of the phrase; at the time of the conversation, it struck me that, as the informant was talking about the genetic origins of the comunero’s savagery, he recollected and recited the phrase as he had heard it at an earlier time.

The degenerative effect of endemically high of alcohol consumption has been a constant theme in the literature on indigenous Peruvians for centuries. It articulates well with the condemnation of their supposed proneness to violence, moral laxity, and sexual license.

This quote demonstrates a common, clever rhetorical maneuver in attributions. The trauma and abuse of the Conquest and the subsequent centuries are acknowledged, even blamed, but the phrase nonetheless manages to denigrate the comunero. In fact, this sort of statement could probably be made without consequences in front of comuneros, who might even nod their heads in agreement. Even the use of ‘indio’ might escape notice because of the historiographical context.

It is present at least beginning with the literature of classical Antiquity. Aristotle, for example, wrote of the potential for a slave to be born with a freeman’s soul, but the paradigm in which he writes clearly assumes a general correspondence between “nature’s intention” and the actual social world (Aristotle 1995, 17). Thus, despite recognizing the potential for combinations “contrary to nature’s intention,” he concludes his discussion by stating that “it is thus clear that, just as some are by nature free, so others are by nature slaves” (Aristotle 1995, 17). Skinner points out that in the moral literature of the Renaissance this tension in the concept of nature, and more specifically in the term ‘nobilitas,’ was appreciated and used to dichotomous claims: “Sometimes the aim is to insist that one can have noble qualities even if one lacks noble birth . . . But sometimes the aim is to insist that, while nobility is a matter of attainment, it
happens to be connected with nobility of birth. This fortunate coincidence was even more commonly pointed out” (Skinner 2002, 84). Ober shows that the antiquity of the association between birth (genos) and excellence (aretē) implied by the concept of nobilitas is matched by the antiquity of the spirited democratic critique of the supposed connection (Ober 1989, 256; see also Gouldner 1965, 17, on the historical status incongruence that resulted from aristocrats possessing wealth without martial honor).

84 Arguedas [1968], 169.
85 In the Arguedas example, the argument is spiritualized—“God made them thus”—in a way that my informants in Chumbivilcas rarely make explicit. I can imagine that several decades ago, when Roman Catholicism was much more influential, the same spiritual element would have been common in theories of ‘naturaleza.’ On the other hand, it’s clear that the theory of ‘naturaleza’ functions in the same basic way, whatever the spiritual or philosophical justification to which it has recourse.
86 The terms “vecino” and “comunera” obviously do not exhaust the attributes of the two involved speakers. I use the terms merely because they are most relevant to the current discussion.
87 To be more exact, there is a widespread belief in viento as an illness in and of itself. Though I am not familiar with any literature on the subject, and do not consider myself to be an expert on it, indigenous informants seem to believe that abnormal wind movements, dust devils, or eddies strike the victim and cause facial disfiguration, fatally-high internal temperatures, and frequently death. These symptoms or expressions of the illness are not only caused by the viento, they are the illness ‘viento.’ In other words, there appears to be some form of identity between the abnormal wind and the illness.
88 In point of fact, with regard to gold decaying into antimony, my friend is incorrect: though the two are often found together in vein deposits, gold and antimony are not chemically related. Both he and the comunera are incorrect, furthermore, in believing that acute antimony poisoning is potentially fatal. Acute inhalation exposure to antimony causes, at worst, skin rashes and conjunctivitis.
89 My friend was trying to be as inclusive as possible in listing what he believed to be legitimately wind-related injury or illness. When asked later about the potential association between wind and stroke, he clarified that, more accurately, he believed that high temperature might contribute to stroke.
90 Belief in the ñakaq or pishtaco is widespread through Andean Peru. In Chumbivilcas, the ñakaq is monster that looks like a Caucasian male, decapitates its victims, and removes their body fat. For an extended description of the mythology surrounding the ñakaq see Weismantel 2001.
91 Black widow spiders are common in Chumbivilcas. Vecinos claim that, until recently, comuneros believed that the neurotoxic effects of the spider’s venom, including severe muscle contractions and cramping, were the result of the spider injecting its web into the victim. In order to counter this, comuneros purportedly used thick needles to remove the nerves, which, it is claimed by vecinos, they believed were a sort of spider silk.
92 Various comunero informants represent gentiles in different ways. Most accounts describe the gentiles as small men who live in mountains and come out periodically. It seems that most believers feel that there is something uncanny about them, rather than
being outright mal- or benevolent. Informants say that they predate humans, and there seems to be an association between gentiles and mummified remains. For ethnographic accounts and analysis see Gose 2008, 283-320.


Edward Reuter wrote in 1918, in reference to the mulatto in the US, that the “center of gravity of the hybrid group is outside itself” (Reuter 1969, 315). Vecinos certainly look to Cuzco, Arequipa, and Lima as arbiters of their values, norms, and identities, but they so not, in their minds, as outsiders looking in, but rather as integral members of the national community resident in a neocolonial periphery.

Van Den Berghe (1974b, 18) cites a similar observation in Fuenzalida 1970. González points out a similar avoidance in Guatemala (González Ponciano 2004, 122).

Van Den Berghe 1974b, 19; see also Mendoza Arroyo, ed. 1993, 126.

There clearly a ‘pigmentocracia’ at the national level of Peru, similar to that described by Jorge Ramón González Ponciano in Guatemala (Taracena Arriola 2004, 108). While darker or more indigenous-looking vecinos may experience discrimination in, for example, the wealthier neighborhoods of Lima, skin color is not brought up in disparaging ways, and when it is referred to it done in a neutral and descriptive fashion. Colby and Van Den Berghe found the same avoidance of “mention of physical differences between ladinos” in highland Guatemala (Colby & Van Den Bergh 1969, 110).

Chambers 2003, 42. This depreciation of the mestizo goes back to the very beginnings of the Spanish colonies. Mestizos were associated with “illegitimacy, moral laxity, and vagrancy” (Chambers 2003, 34). By the early 17th century, they were prohibited from holding various offices (including those of scribe, Protector of Indians, priest, and cacique), from receiving encomienda or military commission, and from settling in Indian towns, for fear their purportedly immorality would corrupt the Crown’s indigenous charges (Mörner 1970, 106; Rodas Núñez 2004, 165-166; Casaús Arzú 2007, 31).


There’s a certain irony here, because, if my interpretation is correct, the aspirational power of mestizaje in Cuzco comes in part from the association between mestizo, misti, and non-indigenousness. The comunero in this sense is not becoming culturally mixed, but culturally non-indigenous.

De la Cadena 2000, 30.

A particular conception can become hegemonic at the level of public discourse, while still being disputed or rejected at other levels. De la Cadena is correct, it seems to me, to the extent that her characterization of hegemonic racial ideology pertains to the level of public discourse. Likewise, her characterization seems accurate with regard to the racial ideology of the popular classes who, at least in the Cuzco region, are overwhelmingly acculturating comuneros. However, while the landholding elite in Cuzco, for example, may be biologically mixed as well as fluent in Quechua, they consider themselves ‘gente decente’ and many of their tenants ‘gente del campo’ or ‘comuneros.’ I have had many
landlords in Cuzco, and virtually all of them have expressed relief at having ‘gringo’ tenants, frequently making depreciating comments about their usual tenants like “These gente del campo are like animals, they make a mess [malogran] of everything.” A member of Cuzco’s old elite—a member, for example, of the Club de Leones—would refer to himself as a ‘mestizo’ only if running for office or speaking hypothetically. It seems to me that one of the reasons why, in practice, upper class Cusqueños don’t use the term ‘mestizo’ very often is because it doesn’t serve to distinguish them from their subordinates (if anything, it blurs the distinction—precisely what gives it political appeal). Indigenous people may aspire to ‘mestizarse’ and second generation urban immigrants may take pride in having become, to themselves and their peers, ‘mestizo,’ but the term is not very useful for defining people—either elites trying to identify and fix subordinates or sociologists trying to produce an objective map of social space. In practice, ‘on the ground,’ the term delineates an aspirational complex or, as de la Cadena shows, a tendency in the Highlands to displace properly racial discrimination into ‘more acceptable’ forms of class discrimination. For many indigenous and mixed race peoples this displacement does, in fact, offer them opportunities for advancement and self-actualization that would be unavailable to them if phenotypic race were the dominant criteria of social valuation; but it simultaneously reinforces discrimination against indigenous peasants.

104 See Fuenzalida 1970, 17-18 for a brief discussion of the negative valence of Spanishness.
106 Gose 1994, 165.
107 These expressions of regret are often framed in cultural or institutional terms, but, drawing on what I have already written about ‘naturaleza,’ I would argue that the regret concerns, more generally, the Peruvian inheritance of the Spanish nature—again, in the sense that informants believe there to be a set of attitudes, beliefs, and institutions that are natural, in some transcendental sense, to the Iberian peoples.
108 As de la Cadena points out, the term ‘gente decente’ itself has civic implications and “was translated in the formal terms of legal jargon as personas perfectas, a juridical notion employed to evaluate the degree of responsibility of an individual for legal purposes” (de la Cadena 2000, 260-261).
109 Fuller 1997, 49. Cope describes the distinction between “gente decente (respectable people) and the plebe (plebeians)” in colonial Mexico City, which he argues “corresponded to the division in Spain between nobles and commoners” (Cope 1994, 22). De la Cadena has written an excellent article specifically on the concept of “decencia” in Cuzco in the 1920s (2000b). See also Parker 1998, 24-29.
110 These terms are closely related to Arguedas’s term “ricos de cuño viejo” (Arguedas [1968], 305).

Chapter 9 Putting People in their Place

2 Similar debates have occurred in the ethnographic literature throughout South and Central America.

3 Van Den Berghe 1974, 4. This also appears to be the consensus of anthropologists in highland central America as well, especially with regard to *ladinismo*. Colby and Van Den Berghe argue that “physical differences are recognized by both ladinos and Indians, and both groups express an aesthetic preference for lighter skin and hair color, but phenotype is irrelevant to group membership. Ladinos and Indians constitute ethnic and not racial groups” (Colby & Van Den Berghe 1969, 87). Van Den Berghe’s conclusion about the constitution of ethnic groups in Guatemala is thus essentially the same as his conclusion about ethnicity in Cuzco department. Casaús Arzú, working with a higher level of regional and national elite in Guatemala, believes racial differences are more important in the process of differentiation than anthropologists have normally claimed (Casaús Arzú 2007, 197).

4 Conlin 1974, 59.

5 Van Den Berghe 1974b, 19.

6 They would not likely, however, be identified as a ‘vecino.’ As I have already intimated and will describe later in this chapter, ‘vecino’ is not only a civic category, but also a designation of a particular kind of non-indigenous person who is a member of a known provincial family.

7 It seems fairly clear to me that this phenomenon’s origin is essentially topographical. Mestizos throughout the Andes have historically preferred settlement in the lower altitudes, normally in valley bottoms, and had the power to acquire land there. Valley floors provided excellent pasture, warmer temperatures, year-round access to river water (with some basic capital improvements), and higher yields, especially of fruit. Nonetheless, transport tends to take place at middle levels, partially because of the frequently impassable, stony river edges, but because peasant villages, and therefore preexisting foot, llama, and mule paths, were preferentially located at middle altitudes. It is therefore an irony in the Andes that the deep valley floors of the major river systems, in this case the Ríos Santo Tomas, Velille, and Apurímac, are some of the most isolated places of all, requiring exhausting climbs just to get to the nearest road. So the agreeable temperatures and productivity attracted mestizos, but the profundity of the valleys isolated and stranded them, producing the strange phenomenon of blond haired, blue-eyed Quechua monolinguals in *ojatas*.

8 Although, as Van den Berghe points out, François Bourricaud argues that, in the final analysis, the ethnic groups that I have delineated essentially belong to same cultural group (Bourricaud 1967; Van den Berghe 1974, 16).

9 Van Den Berghe 1974b, 19.

10 Cope 1994, 55.

11 Part of this is cultural, but poverty obviously plays a role in sartorial distinction as well. This will be treated below in the discussion of class.

12 These are discussed in more detail in the section below on class, but there are properly ethnic or cultural aspects to these labor roles beyond their function in the social division of labor.

13 See, for example, Colby & Van Den Berghe 1969, 94-95.
Colby and Van Den Berghe noted this trend toward Catholic-protestant differentiation in Guatemala in 1969.

Van Den Berghe 1974, 4.


Flores Ochoa 1974, 66.

This is essentially Cope’s conclusion as well, when he notes that “put in broad terms, a Spaniard’s surname was part of his heritage, a means of linking himself to earlier generations of his family. For castas, in contrast, last names were often no more than a convenience or a bureaucratic necessity” (Cope 1994, 63).

Data presented by Adams supports the relative importance of the locally known provenance of a surname, rather than its Spanishness or indigenousness per se (Adams 1959, 84).

Orlove 1974, 90.

Van Den Berghe 1974, 3.

Corn is grown both as a food crop and as the basic ingredient in chicha. The point here is that harvested corn can be used as a staple food in the event of poor harvests, which makes it more attractive to subsistence farmers than hops or other non-comestible crops.

León 1998, 49. Fuenzalida wrote, along the same lines, that “the more elevated in the social scale, the more white one seems; the lower, the darker” (Fuenzalida 1970, 26).

As I will discuss in the following section, class is obviously a fundamental element in achieving the status of vecino over the course of generations; that is, in obtaining public recognition of one’s vecindad.

A vecino would not, for example, lose his ‘membership’ by losing his employment, landed property, or business; only by adopting a specifically comunero ‘style of life’—for example, speaking Quechua preferentially, living and participating in an indigenous community, playing woodwinds, using chakitaqlla, marrying an indigenous woman—would his status as a vecino be compromised (and, even then, his vecino origins would be recognized).

Conlin 1974, 61.

Charles Hale refers to this as the “spatial dimension” of ethnic identification: “The established ladino population is identified, with great attentiveness, by the color of the skin, the color and texture of the hair, height, even by the nose, and differing valorizations follow, more or less clear, with the indio being the depreciated and the European the coveted. But within the logic of the ethnic ideology these valorizations do not determine inescapably the identity and the value of the individual. Knowing who was who also had a spatial dimension . . . And the peripheral spatial location was reinforced with various other cultural facets: dress, the imperfect command of the Spanish language, occupation and low economic position, and even the bodily comportment of submission” (Hale 2004, 142).

Cope 1994, 55.

Much of the historiographical discussion of ethnicity has focused on establishing which ethnic, kinship, occupational, and phenotypic traits are associated with one or other category. The circumstances under which historical documentation dealing with ethnicity
is produced are themselves potentially distorting. The historical evidence from court records, for example, shows litigants, witnesses, and officers of the court making various kinds of identity claims. The question of caste becomes subject to juridical authority and discretion, however, only when it involves controversy; that is, some sort of ‘turbulence’ in genealogical flow. Historically, this turbulence has, no doubt, been substantial—produced by emigration, displacement, exogamy, extramarital affairs, and other sexual ‘informality’—but must have always in dynamic counterpoint to normative, genealogically traceable succession, particularly amongst the literate, propertied class (that is, the gente decente).

Colby & Van Den Berghe 1969, 87-88. Of course, if there had been a case, ‘forgetting’ or ‘ignoring’ the passing from one group to the other would be part and parcel of the passing but, nonetheless, I think they accurately assess the reality. Arguedas likewise found in Muga, Spain that “it was exceedingly difficult to improve one’s status, or rise in the consideration of others” (Arguedas [1968], 302). This is similar to the phenomenon of “passing” in the South, where moving to a new location was essential to successful redefinition (Davis et al 1941, 42).

Colby & Van Den Berghe 1969, 90-91.

Colby & Van Den Berghe 1969, 171-173.

Colby & Van Den Berghe 1969, 173.

Colby & Van Den Berghe 1969, 92.

De la Cadena notes that Cuzqueño intellectuals in the 1920s elaborated a manner of thinking in which “lineages supposed to be gente decente were those in which moral purity—or educación de cuna, as the elites referred to it—had been inherited over the length of generations” (de la Cadena 2000, 257). This is an example of what I mean by an ideology that is genealogical without being biological, and it ties back to my earlier discussion of naturaleza.

This ‘factualness’ should not, however, suggest that genealogy is veridical in any absolute sense. Just as in the case of phenotypical or linguistic attributions, there is an element of myth to genealogical reckoning, and most genealogical accounts of self and others have elisions, in which people strategically ‘look the other way’ or ‘fudge.’

Davis et al experienced a similar process of reflection and discovery in their work in the American South, culminating in the ascertainment of their informants’ “genealogies and inner thoughts”: “There were many clues to assist in the ‘placing’ of people within broad limits, some easily observable, such as peculiarities of speech, type of clothing worn, the manner of drinking and ‘carrying’ liquor, or occupation. (Among Negroes there was the added factor of color evaluation.) Other criteria were far more subtle—genealogies and inner thoughts—which were ascertainable only after prolonged acquaintance with the society” (Davis et al 1941, 60).

It’s possible that some individuals would be touchy about the blood-purity or mestizaje of this ‘apical ancestor.’ Charles Hale tells the story of an informant’s family reacting violently to her implication that they may have had some indigenous blood (Hale 2004, 143). I never experienced this sort of response in my fieldwork and, though many informants take pride in their strongly European physiological appearance, most are
rather philosophical when discussing the possibility that there are birds of a different feather somewhere in their family tree.

This must be a nearly universal norm, especially amongst declining elites. Davis et al, again, write that “upper-upper-class reverence for ancestral generations, however, does not generally extend indefinitely into the past. It confines itself, for the most part, to the local scene, although knowledge of one generation before the first settlers in the local community is sometimes cherished” (Davis et al 1941, 84).

Although all of my vecino informants can read and write fluently, the culture is not literate in its interests and preoccupations. This probably contributes to the shallowness of genealogies.

Dollard, in his work on the American South, describes a similar genealogical preoccupation amongst the ‘aristocracy’ of Indianola, Mississippi: “[membership in the aristocracy] seems to be based largely on memories of interrelationship with other leading families of the past, rather than on current achievement . . . There are echoes of old transactions, such as whose relative sold what house and piece of land to whose grandfather, and there is amazing knowledge of the tangled genealogies of all the leading families” (Dollard 1957, 80).

Harald Eidheim makes a similar observation in his contribution to Fredrik Barth’s *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*: “People in the area have a good personal knowledge of each other and can classify each other very precisely as either Lapp or Norwegian . . . This is true only within local districts: I define the district, with reference to interaction and communication, as the area within which people have mutual personal knowledge of place of residence, heritage, doings, and personal inclinations” (Eidheim 1969, 43-44).

Albro 1997, 81-82. Interestingly, both Hale and Albro note that the defining factor, at least metonymically, is the dress of the mother, who, if indigenous, is referred to as being “de corte” in Guatemala and “de pollera” in Bolivia.

Cope 1994, 54.

Cope 1994, 56.

Chacon Jimenez writes that one of the pervasive preoccupations of Iberian culture was “to collect and accumulate [the merits] of the ancestors and prepare them in family books and genealogies. This is, precisely, one of the features most peculiar of this society: its love of genealogy. A justificatory genealogy that not only permitted a defense against the attacks of the Inquisition but also the aspiration to elevated posts in the administration and to honors, privileges, and benefits. Naturally, in this situation, if it was necessary to invent and manipulate genealogical memory, it was done” (Chacón Jiménez 2004, 39).

Middleton and Tait use the term ‘lineage kinship’ to describe social systems in which interests are conceived in terms of “aggregates of unilineal kin” (Middleton and Tait 1968, 156). Interests in Chumbivilcas are certainly not conceived in terms of “aggregates of unilineal kin” nor, I suspect, were they ever, in a literal sense. By “lineal ideology” I mean to suggest rather the intense, expressed belief in the centrality of kinship, and its continued influence on sociality. As I will subsequently note, lineages no longer actually play a decisive role in politics or the economy.
See also Friz Burga 2004, 137, for a brief discussion of the current emphasis on *línea* and, in particular, the importance of cemeteries. In Peruvian municipalities, a *regidor* is politically appointed exclusively to manage the municipal cemetery.

George Simmel described the essence of this lineal mode of thinking and feeling in his 1908 essay on “The Nobility” (Simmel 1971, 205-207). Stanley Brandes also writes that in his fieldsite of Monteros, Spain, “*nobleza*, *honradez*, and *vergüenza* are usually associated with whole families rather than with individuals” and that “townspeople make moral judgments about one another based largely upon family reputation but also on individual acts—acts that of course ultimately operate to create that collective reputation” (Brandes 1980, 48). As George Marcus argues, there is an obvious tension for modern “dynastic descendants in Euro-American societies” between contemporary ideologies of autonomous self- hood and this “merging of notable past lives with one’s own present celebrated life” characteristic of traditional aristocratic dynastic ideology (Marcus 2000, 17).


These characteristics of a declining hereditary elite are undoubtedly universal at analogous historical conjunctures. Especially illuminating in this regard is the work of Davis et al in the American South in the 1930s. They write that “closely linked to [the high value of the past in their collective identity], and an integral part of it, is the upper-class preoccupation with lineage. It may be said that an upper-class person is primarily a member of a group and is only secondarily an individual. He is a member of a kinship group and, as such, a bona fide member of his class” (Davis et al 1941, 75). Davis and the Gardners write, furthermore, that “concepts of kinship and the family color the whole life of the upper class. The family name is the capital stock of the upper class and must be conserved” (Davis et al 1941, 99). Finally, “unbecoming conduct on the part of one member of a family group usually indicates a lack of respect for the family name, a lack of reverence for the past, and a breaking of highly valued ties with his ancestral line” (Davis et al 1941, 91). It is remarkable how closely these ideas and attitudes correspond to my own informants conceptualization of themselves and the past, and a sign that the processes and responses we are dealing with are not so much Peruvian, or Latin American, but transhistorical in the sense that the psychology and ideology tend to be reproduced in analogical historical conjunctures.

Aguirre Beltrán writes of Mexico and Central America that “mistis or Ladinos consider themselves inherently superior to the Indians, not because of specifically acquired skills but because of divine disposition, by virtue of having been born into a family, lineage, or caste which had long before usurped the highest position in a vertically structured social order” (Aguirre Beltrán 1979, 129). Though this, I think, overstates the case somewhat, it is certainly true that family status is a major element of social distinction more generally, and usurps much of the role that personal excellence and accomplishment currently play in the United States and Europe.
Again, I find the parallels between this situation and that of the early 20th century American South interesting. Davis et al write that the “number of ‘cousins’ an upper-upper-class individual knows and recognizes in the community seems almost unlimited. Older members are able to point out their exact relationship to each of their many kinsmen” (Davis et al 1941, 88). Neither of the two societies are kin-based in the traditional sense. The importance of inherited wealth and status undoubtedly increase the relative practical relevance of family and of genealogy more generally. It is, however, at the level of genealogy that the importance of the genealogy is most pronounced. At the most basic level this is probably a result of inertia and, more importantly, declining fortunes: the ascendant family has wealth and status. As a declining elite loses wealth and power, it naturally begins to over-emphasize what it has left; that is, status, honor, or breeding (in whatever way that remaining quality is conceptualized).

De la Peña, drawing on research in southern Jalisco, notes that “people use the word *family* to refer both to a specific kin group and to close kin (distant kin are usually *mis parientes*, not mi *familia*)” (de la Peña 1984, 212). This is true generally in Peru as well.

The *ayllu* and *línea* seem to have been mutual reinforcing. In effect, it seems that the *comunero*’s own kinship ideology reinforced the Iberian genealogical system, intensifying the. The *ayllu* was itself ideally endogamous and several studies have found surprisingly strict endogamy between even affiliated populations of herders and agriculturalists (Tomoeda & Fujii 1985, 309).

The noted Peruvian archaeologist Luis Lumbreras recalled in an interview: “Well, I was a *serrano*, an *ayacuchano*, but here [in Lima] I was a cholo. I went from my status as a member of a family of hacendados, to that of a cholo in Lima” (Lumbreras 1985, 56).

Colby & Van Den Berghe 1969, 179. Stavenhagen echoes this conclusion (Stavenhagen 1975, 197).


Albro 1997, 82.

Flores Ochoa 1974, 67.

Paerregaard 1997, 177.

Lest I be accused of making a straw dog out of the Flores Ochoa and Paerregaard or exaggerating their claims, I include several more quotations from each demonstrating their explicit belief in the origin of ethnic difference in cultural rather than political economic processes. Flores Ochoa writes that “we can see that economic differences are not considerable, and that the people of Kaykay are not richer nor have more income than the Indians” (Flores Ochoa 1975, 66) and later that “the aggressiveness and power of the misti can, and does, give him an economic advantage over Indians. Nevertheless, we want to make clear that this does not result from the better economic position of the misti, nor from his ownership of more land or his position as hacienda owner but exclusively from his status as misti” (Flores Ochoa 1974, 69). Paerregaard writes that he is “not arguing that ethnic status in Tapay is defined by a specific set of features. The features stressed by the native Tapeños are of relative importance to ethnic identification. The
yunta, Spanish language and horse which are claimed to be essential to ethnic identification are but a random selection of many other possible characteristics. Different features can be crucial for the determination in other places at other times. What matters is that Tapeños classified [the local vecino family] in opposition to themselves and that [they] used the ethnic status thus attributed to them to establish supremacy” (Paerregaard 1997, 177).

Though it is obviously beyond the scope of the current research, it would in fact be interesting to investigate how long.

On the other hand, there are strong incentives for distortion on the part of comuneros that lead them to overstate the fluidity and negotiability of ethnic identity.

Chapter 10 Retreat

1 See Collins 1988, 112-116 for a discussion of the importance of kin relations for labor mobilization.
2 Seligmann 1995, 50 & 182. Seligmann’s Paruro is closer to Cuzco than is Chumbivilcas and therefore more closely commercially tied to it, but it is equivalently impoverished and underdeveloped. Given the rigors of transportation in the provincias altas, and therefore the importance of transport costs in market prices, it is no surprise that transportation specialists would obtain strong profits and wield considerable power (before the advent of trucks and roads, mule and llama trains served the function, and muleteers, like Tupac Amaru II, were a well-connected elite in the colonial highlands).
3 Lagos 1994.
4 Stavenhagen 1965, 64.
5 Aguirre Beltrán 1979, 31.
6 Although the exact distinction is not made, so far as I can gather, in the historiographical literature, there seems to have been two distinct forms of establishment of Spanish towns. The classical form involved the foundation of a town in strategic but a more or less uninhabited location. The other form, which seems to have actually been more common in the southern highlands, was the infiltration and Hispanicization of a formerly indigenous community. This latter route typically resulted in the intercalation of a Spanish barrio between opposed moieties of the pre-existing indigenous community, as described in a number of ethnographies.
7 Tannenbaum 1962, 88; see also Aguirre Beltrán 1979, 96.
8 Aguirre Beltrán 1979, 106.
9 For an incisive description of the poor state of the educational system in Cuzco more generally in the late 1970s, see van den Berghe and Primov 1977, 79-81.
10 Great strides have been made on almost all of these indicators in the intervening decade and a half. In the recently released 2007 census, Chumbivilcas climbed slightly ahead of Canas, Paruro, and Paucartambo on most indicators. 74% of Chumbivilcanos are now literate, only 23% are without formal education, 4% have received some form of post-secondary education, and 91% learn Quechua as their mother tongue (Censos
Nacionales 2007: XI de Población y VI de Vivienda). Nonetheless, Chumbivilcas remains deeply educationally disadvantaged in relation to the rest of the country.

The national teachers’ union, SUTEP (Sindicato Unitario de Trabajadores de la Educación del Perú), is the nation’s most powerful union and has fought successfully to protect educational jobs, wages, and benefits. It has also, however, effectively blocked meaningful professional and curricular reform in the school system, contributing to an overall deterioration of the Peruvian educational system (Webb 2006, 248).

Lipset 1967, 22.

See Gose 1994a, 66 and 1994b, 191.

Primov notes, for example, that “the professoriate,” under modernizing conditions comes to serve as “the equivalent of an aristocratic title, [and] may be converted into high position in other dimensions of stratification” (Lipset 1967, 22).

Bitton 1969.

Conlin 1974, 31. See also Watters 1994, 128.

These are, again, necessarily rough estimates, given the fact that explicitly ethno-racial data are not a category of collection in the Peruvian census.

The phenomenon of the entry of the old rural landed elite into local teaching has also been treated by Rockefeller in Bolivia, suggesting the process is general to modernization in the countryside, rather than particular to Peru. He writes that “teachers are overwhelmingly drawn from the landed elite.” (Rockefeller 1998, 195).

Gose 1994, 190.

Paponnet-Cantat 1994, 214.


Paponnet-Cantat 1994, 215-216; van den Berghe and Primov found essentially the same conditions and excesses in the Cuzco department twenty years earlier (van den Berghe and Primov 1977, 166-167).

Primov 1980, 156.

This appears to be a universal difficulty in rural educational staffing. Lipset writes that the “‘educated’ often develop diffuse elitist status and cultural sustenance demands so they refuse to work in the rural or otherwise ‘backward’ parts of their country” (Lipset 1967, 47).

Conlin 1974, 31; van den Berghe and Primov echo this warning of the “impersonal, bureaucratic tyranny of central government technicians” (van den Berghe and Primov 1977, 87). It should be remembered, however, that both these research projects were carried out during the first, most vigorous phase of Velasco’s military regime.


Webster 1980, 143.

Gose argues, in fact, that teaching salaries have “little visible effect, since most of the money that the teachers earn goes into the education of their own children, which is often facilitated by the purchase of a home in the city” (Gose 1994, 191).


I have used a pseudonym here.

Lamar 1994, 126.

Interestingly, Michel de Montaigne noted a similar tendency to avoid writing wills for fear of death in 17th century France: “These people take fright at the mere mention of death, and most of them cross themselves at that name, as at the name of the devil. And because death is mentioned in wills, don’t expect them to set about writing a will until the doctor has given them their final sentence” (Montaigne 1957, 58).

As Vié notes, no “public or private reunion ends without music. The man that can’t sing or play an instrument finds himself automatically disqualified to seduce women” (Vié 2005, 113).

I would group compromises into two general classes or tiers. The first includes business appointments, dinner arrangements, or other quotidian obligations. The second would include birthdays, institutional anniversaries, despedidas, cortes de pelo, or other familial celebrations.

Davis et al. noted a similar withdrawal in the American South from political institutions and activity and into purely cultural or historical ones: “members of the upper class seldom participate actively in contemporary community organizations or activities. There is almost no political activity among them, or even any pronounced effort to observe with care the laws of the community . . . Their associational activity is limited almost entirely to participation in the Historical Club, the primary function of which is preservation and honoring of the past” (Davis et al 1941, 75).

In Bourdieuan terms, the vecindario is attempting to capitalize on the symbolic capital that remains to it or, in other words, to reorganize itself as an explicitly symbolic elite (Bourdieu 1980, 122-123; Van Dijk 1993, 46-47).

See de la Cadena 2000, 293 for a discussion of this era of Cuzco indigenism and, in particular, the Teatro Incaico.

See, for example, Villena Aguirre’s discussion of which indigenous communities produce the most sought after musicians for festivals (Villena Aguirre 1987, 143). Several older comuneros have recollected memories of the melee form between antagonistic communities taking place in their youth in the isolated communities of the puna.

Villena Aguirre 1987, 164.
To be clear, although the figure of the gamonal has become something of a boogeyman, there is still a remnant of individuals who fit roughly into the category. Usually living in isolated district capitals or in the countryside, surrounded by comunidades, these individuals and families are still strongly racist in their discourse and still infamous in surrounding communities for their abusiveness and unscrupulousness. Comuneros strongly dislike them, and even fellow vecinos express their disapproval of them in strong terms, but they are considered something like living fossils, representing a virtually extinct style of life that is disagreeable to contemporary sensibilities, but also has an undercurrent of attraction and begrudging respect because it is virile and picaresque.

Chumbivilcanos are understandably proud of their musical tradition and generalized competence. My closest friends and informants involved me within an exceptional musical milieu, but basic competence in guitar, mandolin, or charango (violin is very rare in Chumbivilcano music) is nearly universal among male vecinos. Virtually all women are capable and enthusiastic singers, and each has a wide and largely shared lyrical repertoire. Women will frequently joke that men can’t remember lyrics very well, though they lustily sing along when there are women to lead the way. The huayno (wayñu) is the quintessential musical genre of the central and southern Peruvian Andes. To the outside or casual listener, it is difficult to differentiate one huayno from another; even life-long practitioners must often wait until the lyrical portion of a song before identifying it. Because the primary function of the musical form is to accompany pair dancing, keys, chord progressions, strum patterns, and tempo show limited variation between songs, and creativity is expressed through lyrics and bordado [is this right, or is it bordón?] (literally, “embroidery,” but used to describe decorative notes or finger work).

Hobsbawm 1983. See also Canclini 1995, 145-170 for a discussion of the invention of tradition, in particular as it pertains to the elaboration of folklore in Latin America; Bayart argues that ‘invention of tradition’ involves the “recycling . . . of fragments of a more or less phantasmal past in the service of social, cultural or political innovation”
This emphasis on the role of innovation is essential to understanding the dynamism and contemporary relevance of such ‘traditions.’

See Sobral 2002, 153 on the value of estates and ancient family homes as forms of symbolic capital.

This later is a bit more complicated than it initially may appear. Mastery of the ‘traditional’ practices is obviously technically available to all Chumbivilcanos (and, in fact, to non-Chumbivilcanos as well). As we’ve noted, however, of the relationship between the hereditary elite and the egalitarian logic of merit, certain groups tend, in practice, to have more favorable access to formally universally accessible resources. Vecinos tend to have received some degree of cultural training relevant to the qorilazo tradition in their home environments and social milieus. In many cases, this was later augmented by relevant post-secondary training. Mastery of the guitar is an excellent example of this. Not only were vecinos customarily exposed to guitar music and playing in their home and social environment, but the best players were afforded university training in musical theory and performance by their social and economic advantages. And though comuneros were typically exposed to woodwinds (in which I include the waka waqra) in their family and community environment, they were not customarily exposed to stringed instruments. Both woodwinds and stringed instruments are esteemed in the current hegemonic conception of regional folklore, but only stringed instruments are closely associated with the qorilazo.

If anything, I would argue that there is a necessary relationship between performing these dances and being mestizo. Because these dances are not conceived as indigenous, but rather folkloric, to perform them is not just consistent with one’s mestizaje, but a proof of it. I have watched numerous comunero compadres make the transition to urban ‘gente del campo’ and their children begin the slow climb toward ‘mestizaje.’ The mothers start the process wearing the pollera, but eventually transition to the pleated skirt and later to jeans and athletic jumpsuits. It is certainly a moment of intense pride when a mother sees her daughter dance her first folkloric dance, as it must be for all mothers across the planet in similar situations. The children of urban immigrants rarely perform, however, the folkloric dance of their natal province, or the natal province of their parents. Most dance troupes represent and are recruited from elementary and secondary schools, which are not organized by ‘region of origin’ or any similar criteria, but rather by neighborhood, entrance exams, and, for private schools, capacity to afford tuition. Part of the urban immigrants pride, therefore, often is that her daughter is not dancing the folkloric dance of her natal region: the folkloric dance is sign that she has begun to separate herself from her particular, ascribed ethnic and regional identity, and has begun to ‘take up’ or ‘perform’ an objectified, ‘inorganic’ folkloric representation. A daughter who can put on the costume and perform the dance of Paucartambo, or Chumbivilcas, or Quispicanchis, or Cuzco proper—depending on what regional dance her instructor has chosen for the troupe—has taken a major leap away from her parents’ exclusive, ascribed, and compulsory identification.

Albro argues that, in rural Bolivia, “cultural nostalgia for a regional past is the response to the economic uncertainty of the present” (Albro 1998, 106). I would widen the motive
from “economic uncertainty” to an overall lack of meaning and efficacy (which wealth would undoubtedly help to remedy).

70 Aguirre Beltrán 1979, 140.
71 Bobrow-Strain 2007, 162.
72 Qayum et al 1997, 56.
73 Dollard 1957, 361; Davis et al 1941, 400, 405. It is interesting to note that in many of these examples, the overseers are blamed by the landowners for the ‘worst abuses.’ This is common in vecino discourse about past labor relations as well.
74 Van Dijk 1993, 93 & 95.
75 I was often reminded in interviews of the comment made by the father of a white Kenyan business colleague who, when asked how he felt about blacks, replied without a hint of irony, “Oh, I can’t say a bad thing about them. They’ve given me damned good service all my life.”
76 It should be noted, however, that just as vecinos are almost always whitewashing the past, there is a corresponding incentive for comuneros to ‘blackwash’ it, in particular because the vilification of the gamonal has been a major element in their political mobilization over the last several decades. Dollard made a similar point in his work on the American south: “All writers, researchers, and officials who consult with Negroes in the South should be aware of this pattern and realize that there is an element of revenge and protest in the information received from Negroes. This is, of course, inevitable, since more direct forms of protest are not allowed” (Dollard 1957, 205).
77 Qayum et al 1997, 59.
78 Qayum et al 1997, 81.
80 Albro 1998, 106.
81 Hennessey 1978, 114.
82 Luis Lumbreras, himself descended from Ayacucho haciendados, recalls that “it was very bad if someone tried to learn quechua because that was going to mess up their Spanish” (Lumbreras 1985, 56).
83 The current director of DREC, for example, is Edgar Cusihuallpa Díaz.

Chapter 11 Conclusion

1 “La lucha de clases es fuerte aquí en Chumbivilcas. Mantenemos eso, aunque ya no tenemos nada, pero se mantiene eso.”
2 Gender roles are also, obviously, in play here. The fact that the ranch hand had pawned off his contractual obligations on his wife and mother, while he amused himself with his friends should hardly occasion surprise.
3 James Holston has written, of a similar instance of “insurgent” assertion of rights encountered in his work in Brazil, that such performances indicate “the force of a new conviction about citizenship among the working classes. Her demand for respect and equality; assertion of rights in public and to the public; and realignment of class, gender, and race in the calculations of public standing are evidence not only of being fed up with
the old formula of civic assumptions. They also articulate essential premises of a new formulation. They establish a radically common measure among Brazilians who are anonymous to each other—neither friends nor enemies, but citizens who, for some purposes, are equal” (Holston 2008, 17. Such a “radically common measure” is perhaps even more audacious and potentially explosive in situations in which citizens are, in fact, not “anonymous to each other,” but rather deeply enmeshed in life-long relationships of familiarity, status asymmetry, and contempt.

4 In the 16th century, Indians had to obtain official permission to own horses. The association of the Spaniard or vecino with horseback and the comunero with foot continued, however, clear up to the current general decline of horse use. Valcárcel, in famous Tempestad en los Andes, wrote that “The American civilization . . . is a pedestrian civilization, of Indians on foot. The horse brought by the conquistador was incorporated by the dominant caste, by the oppressors . . . Spanish law was wise to prohibit Indian, along with the use of firearms, the use of the horse” (Valcárcel 1972, 91). Older comuneros sometimes recall being sanctioned by vecino authorities from horseback riding when not actively performing ranch duties. More generally, the horse’s ravenous appetite (compared to cattle), and the usual meagerness of pasture available to peasant families, traditionally meant the peasants could ill afford the luxury of horse ownership. Thus, though comuneros in distant districts ride horseback, the sight is still jarring to older vecinos.

5 It is a particularly evocative of the intimate association between the horse and the power of the vecino that Leopoldo Alencastre Zapata, the father of the gamonal-poet Andrés Alencastre Gutiérrez (aka Killku Warak’a), named his horse “Kaiser.” Leopoldo was eventually savagely murdered by the deeply resentful local peasantry, as was his son 63 years later (Valencia Espinoza 2002, 16).

6 Valcárcel 1972, 92.

7 Huntington 1968, 4.

8 The dissertation has also wrestled with this tension between national and local processes. One of the thorniest difficulties with the historiography and ethnography of peripheral regions is that it is often necessary to intimately understand what is happening in distant centers in order to make sense of the most quotidian of local phenomena. To adapt a phrase from Marx, rural men and women make their own history, but under circumstances given and transmitted from the metropolis. There are moments of great unrest and disorder in which this relationship is reversed, but they are rare and fleeting.

9 Bobrow-Strain 2007, 8. See similar characterization on pages 28, 89, and 178.

10 Likewise stimulating, though perhaps two far afield to warrant discussion here, is the wealth of literature on the initial transitions from feudalism to capitalism in Western Europe (see, for example, Dobb 1963, Hilton ed. 1976, Martin 1983, and Aston and Philpin eds. 1985)


13 See Gramsci 1995.

14 Herzog 2003, 6.

15 Herzog 2003, 44, 47.
Herzog 2003, 44. This exclusion was fortified by the legal classification of Indians as “rustic’ and ‘miserable,’ which is to say, more or less equivalent to a minor” (Mörner 1970, 148).

Herzog 2003, 54.

Herzog 2003, 7.

Alan Zuckerman argues that “increasing industrialization and the penetration of the society by the government and political parties” led to a similar displacement of “traditional clienteles of local notables” by “party associated political clienteles” in southern Italy after the Second World War (Zuckerman 1977, 65).

Holston 2008, 22. Alexis de Tocqueville gives a cursory account of the degradation of municipal government in Europe in the course of the late Middle Ages and its supplanting by royal administration (Tocqueville 1955, 14-18).

See Schönwälder 2002, 27-29 for a brief discussion of the emergence of a “ciudadano identity” with the return to democratic government in Peru in the 1980s.

Chambers 2003, 34.

See Bendix 1977, 90-96, 433

Michels 1962, 55-56.


Gellner 1983, 64.

It’s important to reiterate that ethnic differentiation and discrimination has only disappeared from legitimate public discourse. As I’ve noted throughout, racism is still strong in Peru—only it has gone underground and behind closed doors. On December 24, 2009, as I was writing the last pages of the dissertation, a bus packed with passengers coming home to Santo Tomás for the Christmas holidays went over a seventy foot cliff, killing 42 Chumbivilcanos. In one of the reply threads that accompanied an online article about the accident, one of the comments read: “This is an immense tragedy and the country and its leaders barely care about it, because many bad Peruvians the dead are only a few ‘cholos de m…[jerda]’ It happened in Chumbivilcas, a place that has always been a joking matter for Peruvians. There is discrimination even in death in Peru. And afterward, equality between brothers is preached in churches. Pure hypocrisy” (http://peru21.pe/noticia/385616/cusco-al-menos-10-muertos-20-heridos-deja-accidente-vial).

Friedman 1994, 218.

See Marshall 1992, 44.

In historical documents, the term ‘vecino’ is commonly followed by the name of the town in which the particular individual resides and, informally, belongs (for example, “Faustino González, vecino de Chamaca”).


Eguren writes, along these lines, that the “neoliberal agenda helped frame a conception of agrarian development and modernization that could only be achieved with free markets, free enterprise and minimal state intervention, and subject to an international order in which competitiveness was the key criterion for judging the efficiency of producers and countries. Only internationally competitive private businesses matched the requirements. However, all peasants, the majority of small-scale producers and a
significant number of medium-sized producers found themselves marginalized in this scheme of agrarian modernization” (Eguren 2006, 118).

33 Deprivation can even create somatic divergences between classes that are easy to mistake for racial traits. As Jane and Peter Schneider point out in their work on “Latifundist Sicily,” “until the twentieth century when conditions began to improve for the lower strata, civile [the rural bourgeoisie] boys were often more than a head taller than other boys” due to nutritional advantages, in particular extensive use of wet-nurses (Schneider and Schneider 1983, 151).

34 Arguedas 1978, 14.
35 Dollard 1957, 365.
GLOSSARY

abigeo, abigeato: cattle rustler, cattle rustling.
afición: enthusiasm for, knowledge of, and competence in traditional leisure pursuits.
ahijada/o: god-daughter or —son.
alcaldía: mayor, mayoralty; the mayor is the locally elected executive authority at the district level; the mayor of the provincial capital district is also the alcalde provincial, and wields executive authority over the province as a whole.
analfabeto: an illiterate.
campesino: a peasant; in the southern and central highlands, the vast majority of peasants are indigenous and the term therefore implies indigenousness as well.
ayllu: Quechua, pre-Columbian corporate kin group.
bayeta: homespun.
cabildo: town council.
casona: large townhouse of one to three patios; the urban social and economic hub of a hacienda family enterprise.
chakitaqlla: foot plow
charango: small ten-stringed guitar-like instrument, descended from the Spanish vihuela.
cholo: depreciating term used locally to refer to an acculturated or acculturating indigenous peasant.
cholita: diminutive feminine form of ‘cholo,’ used colloquially to refer to a young, sexually appealing indigenous female.
chupasangre: bloodsucker
colonos: landless peasant working on a hacienda under a customary labor agreement, often involving the exchange of labor for the right to fields and pasture.
comadre, compadre: godmother, godfather.
comunero: member of a comunidad; this is the most common term for indigenous peasant comunidad: indigenous peasant corporate community
Conquista: the Spanish subjugation and colonization of the Americas.
criollo: an individual of Spanish decent born in the Americas.
diputado: congressional deputy; representative of the province in the national legislature
estancia: high altitude pastoral property, in particular the small complex of buildings that serve as the center of associated activity
fiesta: large public celebration
gamonal, gamonalismo: abusive highland hacendado
gobernador: governor; in the Peruvian administrative structure, the governor is the representative of the national executive at the district level
hacendado: owner-manager of a hacienda
hacienda: medium to large, privately owned agricultural property
huacchiqlla or waqchillaq: Spanish-Quechua criole, a customary hacienda worker, usually engaged in herding and deeply impoverished.
Huayno or wayno: mournful, pentatonic love ballad of mixed indigenous and Spanish origin
indígena: indigenous person; though increasingly prominent in public discourse, it is commonly replaced in daily conversation by the terms campesino or comunero
**indio**: term for an indigenous Peruvian, now considered strongly depreciating.

**latifundio**: large landed estate

**ladino**: an acculturated mestizo towns-person, closely analogous to the *misti* or *vecino* in Peru.

**línea, linaje**: family line, lineage.

**mestizo**: technically a person of mixed European and indigenous ancestry; used locally to imply non-indigenousness rather than hybridity

**misti**: Quechua transliteration of the Spanish word ‘mestizo’; used by *comuneros* to refer to a non-indigenous individual, with an implication of illegitimate power, status, or authority.

**música de salón**: chamber music; used to refer to classically-inflected music performed in the home for small social gatherings

**nivel**: social status, respectability.

**origen humilde**: humble origin; euphemism for indigenous peasantness.

**peón**: a *colono* or other servile laborer.

**patrón**: boss.

**plaza de armas**: main plaza or town square.

**pongo**: house servant, usually drawn from the female or child members of *colono* families.

**prefecto, prefectura**: prefect, prefecture; in the Peruvian administrative structure, the prefect is the representative of the national executive at the departmental level

**proprietario**: alternative term for *hacendado*, preferred by landowners because it does not carry the negative connotations of other equivalent terms.

**Provincias Altas**: the ‘high provinces’ of southern Peru, which are characterized by large indigenous populations, poverty, and high altitude and which, broadly speaking, share a body of cultural traditions. Usually included in the designation are the Cuzco provinces of Acomayo, Canas, Canchis, Chumbivilcas, Espinar, and Paruro, and the Antabamba, Cotabambas, and Grau provinces of neighboring Apurimac.

**qhashwa** or **qhaswa**: Quechua, round or circle dance.

**sangre**: blood; frequently used metonymically to refer to purportedly inherited attributes

**sierra**: the mountains.

**Reconquista**: the Christian conquest and colonization of Moorish Spain.

**Partido Comunista Peruano—Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL)**: Peruvian Communist Party—Shining Path; Maoist revolutionary movement that waged a civil war against the Peruvian government from 1980 to 1992 (though pockets of revolutionary activity continue to the present day).

**subprefecto, subprefectura**: subprefect, subprefecture; in the Peruvian administrative structure, the subprefect is the representative of the national executive at the provincial level

**terrateniente**: alternative term for *hacendado*, often carrying negative connotations.

**toros de lidia**: feral bull, ideal for bullfighting.

**vecino, vecindad**: neighbor, city-zenship; in contemporary urban areas of Peru, the term ‘vecino’ refers primarily to a neighbor or a resident of a particular neighborhood. In rural Peru it was historically, and is still vestigially, used by town-dwelling mestizos to
describe themselves, in contradistinction to *comuneros*, as a legitimate members of the
Spanish or post-Colonial civil and civic community.

*yanacona*: alternative term for *colono* or *pongo*.
*yaraví*: Quechua, slow love song
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