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Peacebuilding, Political Order, and Post-War Risks

By

George Frederick Willcoxon

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in

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in the

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of the

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Abstract

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by

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Since 1945, violent conflict has occurred primarily within sovereign states rather than among them. These internal conflicts have far surpassed international conflicts in lethality, economic destruction, and social upheaval. This phenomenon is diverse: no region has avoided civil wars, while the stated aims of rebel groups have ranged widely. Prominent examples include anti-colonial nationalists in Algeria, Mozambique, and Kenya; ethnic separatists in Eritrea and Bosnia; leftists in Latin America and Southeastern Asia; Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria; and income seeking warlords in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Internal conflicts have emerged in rich European countries such as the United Kingdom and Spain, and in the context of state collapse and extreme poverty in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia. Some civil wars have lasted only weeks, while the longest-- in Sudan-- lasted over 40 years.

Intense violent conflicts often leave core state institutions debilitated, fragmented, or, in some cases, totally destroyed. For these societies, the central tasks for ending conflict and beginning post-war recovery involve reinvigorating
or reestablishing legitimate state authority. These post-war states must both win the acquiescence of the governed and develop the infrastructural power to implement state policy. The risks of conflict relapse are significant: since 1970, 44 of 111 post-war cases (40 percent) relapse into a full-fledged civil war, while 68 of 111 (61 percent) experience at least a low-level conflict. The time for policymakers to mitigate this risk is short: of post-war countries that fall back into civil war, the median time to relapse is just 35.5 months. The immediate post-war environment is therefore particularly critical for determining the political, economic, and social trajectories of conflict-affected countries. The right combination of policies can help determine whether a country recovers quickly and secures any available peace dividend, or whether it relapses and slides into a conflict trap. This dissertation explains how societies that have managed to end their civil wars are able or unable to rebuild political order in the their post-war period.

This dissertation focuses on one key policy arena--perhaps the most critical policy arena--for post-war societies to address: the security sector. It may sound simplistic or even tautological to claim that the organization, disposition, control, and reform of armed groups are the most important task for a post-war society to undertake. It may seem obvious to stress the importance of the size, competencies, oversight, social embeddedness, and other qualities of the military, the police, the intelligence services, and any remaining armed non-state actors. But such qualities resist easy quantification, and most scholars and practitioners over the past decade have focused on economic performance, political democratization, communal reconciliation, post-conflict justice, and other “soft-power” variables to explain patterns of post-war successes and failures. The following chapters attempt to shift the
conversation back to the formation and reformation of security sector actors in war-affected countries.
Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife Nicole, my son Theodore, my parents Michael and Anne, and my sister Katharine.
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CIVIL WARS AND MODERN STATES

Since 1945, violent conflict has occurred primarily within sovereign states rather than among them. These internal conflicts have far surpassed international conflicts in lethality, economic destruction, and social upheaval. This phenomenon is diverse: no region has avoided civil wars, while the stated aims of rebel groups have ranged widely. Prominent examples include anti-colonial nationalists in Algeria, Mozambique, and Kenya; ethnic separatists in Eritrea and Bosnia; leftists in Latin America and Southeastern Asia; Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria; and income seeking warlords in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Internal conflicts have emerged in rich European countries such as the United Kingdom and Spain, and in the context of state collapse and extreme poverty in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia. Some civil wars have lasted only weeks, while the longest-- in Sudan-- lasted over 40 years.

Intense violent conflicts often leave core state institutions debilitated, fragmented, or, in some cases, totally destroyed. For these societies, the central tasks for ending conflict and beginning post-war recovery involve reinvigorating or reestablishing legitimate state authority. These post-war states must both win the acquiescence of the governed and develop the infrastructural power to implement state policy. The risks of conflict relapse are significant: since 1970, 44 of 111 post-war cases (40 percent) relapse into a full-fledged civil war, while 68 of 111 (61 percent) experience at least a low-
level conflict.¹ The time for policymakers to mitigate this risk is short: of post-war countries that fall back into civil war, the median time to relapse is just 35.5 months. The immediate post-war environment is therefore particularly critical for determining the political, economic, and social trajectories of conflict-affected countries. The right combination of policies can help determine whether a country recovers quickly and secures any available peace dividend, or whether it relapses and slides into a conflict trap. This dissertation explains how societies that have managed to end their civil wars are able or unable to rebuild political order.

The following chapters and appendices focus on one key policy arena—perhaps the most critical policy arena—for post-war societies to address: the security sector. It may sound simplistic or even tautological to claim that the organization, disposition, control, and reform of armed groups are the most important task for a post-war society to undertake. It may seem obvious to stress the importance of the size, competencies, oversight, social embeddedness, and other qualities of the military, the police, the intelligence services, and any remaining armed non-state actors. But such qualities resist easy quantification, and most scholars and practitioners over the past decade have focused on economic performance, political democratization, communal reconciliation, post-conflict justice, and other “soft-power” variables to explain patterns of post-war successes and failures. The following chapters attempt to shift the conversation back to the formation and reformation of security sector actors in war-affected countries.

¹ The definition of war and conflict used in these chapters follows the UCDP-PRIO project definition. A conflict is “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” A war exceeds 1,000 battle deaths. (UCDP-PRIO Codebook v. 4-2013).
The chapters deliberately take three quite different methodological approaches to study peacebuilding, political order, and post-war risks. The following chapter conducts a large, cross-national comparative analysis of all post-war periods since 1970 to determine what policy arrangements sort post-war cases into successes and failures. The analysis finds that there are four major, successful peacebuilding strategies since 1970, and finds that these strategies share a focus on the institutional and military configurations of the post-war society. The institutional and military policies that favor peacebuilding success include the presence (or absence) of power-sharing arrangements, political decentralization, sufficient numbers of security forces, demobilization and integration programs, and peacekeeping troops. The findings suggest that peacebuilders should focus on the institutional and military architecture of post-war countries, rather than on their economic development, democratization, or communal reconciliation, at least if they are narrowly focused on preventing war relapse.

The third chapter tests these results by analyzing post-conflict risks more broadly, using conventional regression approaches on virtually the same cross-national data. The findings are roughly congruent with Chapter 2: regime features, military size, and decentralization are evidently correlated with peace duration, while political terror as a governing strategy virtually guarantees civil war relapse. Post-war economic growth is highly correlated with longer spells of peace. Post-war justice, ethnic fractionalization, the size of a country, DDR, military integration, and national elections are not correlated with longer durations of peace after civil wars end.
The fourth chapter provides an “analytic narrative” to a prominent, recent post-war case: Libya after Qaddafi. From 2011 to 2014, Libya managed to implement much of the “peacebuilding handbook” promoted by western governments and international organizations. The rough stability that existed from 2011 to 2014 -- the “peace” -- was not, however, due to those policies but to an underlying political and military stalemate. The stalemate was based on four pillars: the territorial independence of the factions, secure government finances in the form of oil revenues, a weak national army, and the lack of any attempt to impose post-conflict justice on the factions. These factors meant that no political faction (including the government) had the capacity to destroy its rivals; but neither did any faction view the stalemate as intolerable. The chapter argues that the four pillars were each necessary conditions for the stalemate to endure: remove any of them and the stalemate would collapse. In the event, two pillars crumbled during late 2013 and early 2014, and Libyan society returned to open warfare by mid-2014. The chapter provides a detailed narrative for these processes.

The fifth chapter looks at how a post-war security sector organization -- the Kosovo Police Service -- was created from scratch, and evaluates its institutional performance using conventional regression analysis of police deployment data and crime rates, among other variables. The findings are hopeful: the new Kosovo Police Service was successful at controlling violent crime. The analysis finds that Kosovo Police Service (KPS) deployments had a significant and large downward effect on murder rates and IED attack rates in a given region of Kosovo. This effect translated to between three and nine fewer murders in a region annually, for each additional KPS officer per 1,000 residents. At the same time, violent crime rates in post-war Kosovo were not determined by the factors typically identified
as critical to avoiding conflict recurrence. Poverty, rough terrain, and ethnic heterogeneity are not good predictors of violent crime in post-war Kosovo. The findings suggest that the data generating process for post-war crime and conflict recurrence are distinct.

Altogether, these chapters, I believe, provide wide-ranging and innovative research on the issues of peacebuilding, security sector formation and reformation, institutional effectiveness, and post-conflict risks.
Responding to civil wars and rebuilding states that have experienced them are a major challenge of our era. The ways in which local and international actors attempt to build peaceful societies after civil war are quite varied. In some cases, such as Kosovo and East Timor, international actors have acted as trustees and implemented a peacebuilding strategy directly on the war-torn society. In other circumstances, the international community provided narrowly-tailored if crucial assistance on one or more key policy dimensions, such as security, elections administration, or humanitarian aid. Another set of cases has had limited to no international involvement: “peacebuilding” efforts were an entirely local affair and in such cases as Myanmar and Chechnya operated well outside international norms and best practices. Ongoing instability in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia suggests that both local and international peacebuilding efforts will remain a challenge for years to come.

Despite the best efforts of theorists and practitioners to learn lessons from experiences in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, we still know little about how to (re)establish political order after conflict. It remains a vexing policy process with few rules of thumb. In particular, there is no consensus on the priority or relative effectiveness of the major policy alternatives. How early should elections be held? Under what conditions should third parties deploy unarmed monitors, armed peacekeepers, or no forces at all? Are far-reaching economic reforms constructive or disruptive to post-war stability? Should peacebuilders exploit or subvert established
patronage networks? Are some forms of power-sharing agreements more effective than others? The historical record reveals not only a wide range of decisions on many such individual policies but also quite diverse combinations of policies—some combinations reflecting intentional, coherent, integrated peacebuilding strategies, other combinations reflecting historical contingencies or ad hoc decision-making processes.

Using a methodological approach novel to the civil war and peacekeeping literatures, but common to research on European political economies, this chapter systematically evaluates and compares the effectiveness of the major policy configurations undertaken after every civil war episode since 1970. Using Charles Ragin’s Qualitative Comparative Analysis on data extracted from the quantitative civil war and peacekeeping literatures, this analysis improves our understanding of peacebuilding strategies, the complexities and complementarities of these strategies, and their relationship to patterns of war recurrence.

The analysis finds that there are four successful peacebuilding strategies since 1970, and their critical features are institutional and military in nature. The institutional and military policies leading to success include the presence (or absence) of power-sharing arrangements, political decentralization, sufficient numbers of security forces, demobilization and integration programs, and peacekeeping troops. These institutional and military factors determine success rather than a host of other common policy prescriptions: economic development, democratization, and reconciliation among them. The findings suggest that peacebuilders should focus on the institutional and military architecture of post-war countries, rather than on their economic development, democratization, or reconciliation efforts.
The four paths to political order can be characterized as follows. A **Local Politics and Patronage Strategy** (50 percent of success cases) involves early elections, a decentralized political system, and the prospect of acquiring government employment or other financial resources for former combatants. A **Durable Stalemate Strategy** (38 percent of success cases) necessitates the territorial independence of factions, secure and independent government revenues, and clear signals that the government cannot or will not militarily pursue the rebels. In this configuration, both the government and rebels accept a stalemate as less costly and risky than continued fighting. A **Peacekeeping Strategy** (21 percent of success cases) requires large numbers of peacekeeping troops in conjunction with elections within 30 months. A **Domination Strategy** (16 percent of success cases) requires large numbers of local security forces, political centralization, the absence of peacekeepers, and the rejection of post-war justice mechanisms.  

The Domination Strategy suggests that strong, credible authoritarians are able to negotiate enduring ceasefires with rebel groups.

The analysis undermines central pillars of the “peacebuilding consensus” that has emerged since the end of the Cold War. First, the presence of peacekeeping troops is a necessary condition in only one successful post-war policy configuration: when peacekeeping troops are combined with early elections. In four-fifths of successful cases, the presence of any peacekeeping troops was redundant or, indeed, would have destabilized the country by preventing local authorities from pursuing alternative, effective strategies. This finding suggests that the international community can conserve resources by deploying peacekeeping troops only in circumstances where

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2 Percents do not add to 100 because cases can be covered by more than one policy configuration.
early elections are feasible and advisable, and pursuing other peacebuilding strategies when early elections are not.

Second, the presence of democracy does not help determine success or failure of peacebuilding efforts. In fact, authoritarian governance better explains successes, though for the majority of cases the level of democracy is simply irrelevant. While democracy might be desirable for normative reasons or for improving governance outcomes in post-war countries, its presence appears not to sort cases into “success” or “failure” categories, at least as defined as avoiding a recurrence of war within five years. This finding contradicts influential conventional wisdom about post-war democratization that underpins much international security policy formulation.

Third, I find little evidence that economic liberalization or economic growth explain the successful consolidation of peace, at least at any policy-relevant level. I do find that high income and upper-middle income countries are a perfect subset of countries that do not experience civil war recurrence: no wealthy post-war country has relapsed into civil war since 1970. However, it is not clear how the vast majority of post-war countries, which are generally quite poor, can leap from low to high economic-development levels in a short 5- to 10-year policy window.
The Theory and Practice of Peacebuilding

Academic treatments of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, taken together with the practitioner literature and historical record, suggest a large policy menu for both local and international peacebuilders after civil wars end. These policies range from constitutional reforms, democratic elections, political-institution building, and economic liberalization; to post-conflict justice and reconciliation, security sector reform, and programs to demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate fighters into society; to mass arrests, mass killing, and other violent and repressive post-war policies observed in authoritarian countries. My own review identified over 100 distinct, major policy alternatives, listed in Appendix A with a representative citation. This section introduces the major approaches to peacebuilding after civil war and identifies the major policy alternatives within each approach, providing descriptive statistics on their prevalence.

International Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Approaches

The most prominent—and perennially controversial—approach to establishing peace in societies riven by civil war is the deployment of international armed forces to the affected country, sometimes in concert with a large civilian administrative component. Third-party deployments have been a significant feature of civil wars since 1945, but especially so since 1989, including some of the most intense, intractable, and longest-lasting episodes: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia, and Sudan among them. By one count, there were 37 peacekeeping interventions related to internal violent conflict
from 1945 to 1989; since 1989, third parties have conducted 165 peacekeeping interventions during or after civil conflict (Mullenbach 2013).

These interventions have evolved in intensity and scope since the first UN peacekeeping deployment in 1948. The first generation of interventions typically monitored ceasefire agreements, separated combatants, patrolled buffer zones, and perhaps assisted in demobilizing the parties and providing security while the initial treaty terms were implemented (Paris 2004). These limited missions were essentially the only kind deployed prior to the thaw in superpower competition at the end of the Cold War, and were generally brief operations with narrow, “military-technical” portfolios, based on the consent of combatants under Article VI of the United Nations Charter.

Traditional peacekeeping operations after civil wars, both during and after the Cold War, have had mixed success. Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) find that roughly half of all first-generation peacekeeping missions failed to prevent a recurrence of war. They also find that countries with first-generation peacekeeping missions still performed better than post-war countries without any intervention, ceteris paribus. Theorists of peacekeeping have offered various mechanisms for the effectiveness of even these limited, first-generation operations. They argue that traditional peacekeeping missions can mitigate coordination problems, in cases where the parties seek peace but lack the capacity to implement it safely. For example, peacekeepers can assist with communication among military forces maneuvering away from the front lines, or can assist with demobilization and the collection of weapons (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:53-54). More-assertive peacekeepers can punish aggressors (those who renege on the peace terms, or take advantage of the changing tactical environment) and thereby
raise the costs of aggression. Even observer missions have access to political and financial resources they can use to reward compliance. Peacekeepers can reduce perceptions of vulnerability by providing credible information to factions on their opponents’ preferences, strengths, and compliance; peacekeepers can also reduce perceptions of vulnerability by physically separating warring parties, which has the salutary effect of reducing the chances of misperceptions or accidents escalating into conflict (Fortna 2008:86-98).

The end of the Cold War marked a sharp departure in international peacekeeping practice. In the present era, international interventions have evolved into “complex peacebuilding” operations that also “attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of current hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Complex peacebuilding operations are now quite common. Roughly 25 percent of all post-civil war periods since 1989 witnessed a complex peacebuilding mission; another 25 percent witnessed an assistance, monitoring, or traditional peacekeeping mission. The UN, ECOWAS, NATO, the African Union, the European Union, and Russia, France, Britain, Australia, and the United States have each implemented complex peacebuilding operations in a variety of contexts.

In practice, most peacebuilding operations have been even more intrusive and revolutionary than envisioned by early proponents. Paris (2004) gives the “typical formula” of peacebuilding strategies that emerged in the 1990s:

Promoting civil and political rights, such as the right to free speech and a free press, as well as freedom of association and movement; preparing and administering democratic elections; drafting national constitutions that codified civil and political rights; training or retraining police and justice officials in the appropriate behavior for
state functionaries in a liberal democracy; promoting the development of independent ‘civil society’ organizations and the transformation of formerly warring groups into democratic political parties; encouraging the development of free-market economies by eliminating barriers to the free flow of capital and goods within and across a country’s borders; and stimulating the growth of private enterprise while reducing the state’s role in the economy (Paris 2004:19).

During the peacebuilding missions of the 1990s, the emphasis was on speed: “shock therapy” or “revolutionary transformations” for post-war societies.

Post-war Kosovo and East Timor are the clearest examples of this “international peacebuilding consensus.” In both cases, the United Nations directly governed the territories as protectorates: with international troops and police enforcing their writ, the UN deployed agents to administer or supervise the administration of hospitals and schools, courts and prisons, and police, fire, and rescue services. Over several years, these missions established multi-party parliaments, supervised the local media for incitement, and auctioned off state-owned enterprises. The basic infrastructure of the state was built at all levels, and as local authorities reached certain benchmarks for capacity and behavior, the UN transferred responsibility to them.

The logic behind the international peacebuilding formula--democratization plus liberalization leads to a durable peace--is the belief that democratic regimes with market economies are more peaceful at home and less likely to wage war abroad, at least against other democracies. Political theorists as far back as Kant have linked democracy and peace: democracies have internal mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of political disputes, they ensure universal participation in representative self-government, they codify alternation in the control of the state, and they foster norms of negotiation, compromise,
tolerance, and a live-and-let-live perspective. Empirical work on the Democratic Peace Theory has shown that democracies virtually never fight one another (Doyle 1983, Oneal and Russett 1999, Russett 1993). Others note that societies with market economies outperform other societies across a range of indicators of social well being and human development, and that growth-promoting reforms reduce the risk of civil war and other forms of political violence (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, de Soysa and Fjelde 2010).

These perspectives inform international peacebuilding strategies devised at the United Nations, in Washington, DC, and in European capitals, but their assumptions have also earned criticism for conflating established market-based democracies with the destabilizing, complex, and often bloody processes of marketization, development, and democratization (Hegre, et al. 2001, Paris 2004:44-46). In addition, Mansfield and Snyder (2003) find cross-national statistical evidence that transitional political regimes (anocracies) are more bellicose. Nonetheless, this “international peacebuilding consensus” is so strong that the “typical formula” is encouraged even in post-war countries relying solely on local peacebuilding capacities, in societies with little or no experience with democracy or market capitalism, or even where residual violence persists.

**Democratic Approaches to Peacebuilding**

With or without the presence of international forces, democratization remains one of the most prominent and common approaches to peacebuilding after civil wars. In these approaches, societies take formal steps toward open, competitive, representative government, such as reforming the constitution, extending the franchise, strengthening and
training of the legislature, drafting political party and elections law, and holding free and fair elections. These strategies have been implemented (in the absence of peacekeeping troops) in Peru, Nepal, Libya, Aceh, and the Philippines, among others. In addition to the mechanisms discussed above, advocates claim that democratic systems can transform fighters into politicians by opening peaceful channels for personal advancement and for the realization of their political goals.

The optimal timing and sequence of post-war elections is an ongoing area of research. Diamond (2005) warned that early or poorly planned elections may only “enhance the power of actors who mobilize coercion, fear, and prejudice, thereby reviving autocracy and even precipitating large-scale violent strife.” He advocates instead for delaying national elections for as long as politically feasible while “militias [are] demobilized, new moderate parties trained and assisted, electoral infrastructure created, and democratic media and ideas generated” (Diamond 2005: 18-19). In his view, holding elections later under better circumstances improves chances for moderate politics and the consolidation of democracy.

Countries often hold nationwide local elections as a “dry-run” for elections for national office. Local elections can help by “providing an opportunity for new local leaders to emerge and gain experience and for political parties to build a support base,” and has the potential of generating a “broader, more diverse, and more legitimate array of [local] interlocutors” with whom the central authorities can work (Dobbins et al. 2003:154, Diamond 2005:20). Using cross-national regression analyses, Brancati and Snyder (2010) find some empirical evidence that holding early elections increases the likelihood of new fighting but that “favorable conditions, including decisive victories, demobilization, peacekeeping, power sharing,
and strong political, administrative and judicial institutions, can mitigate this risk.” Adapting their data to my list of cases since 1970, I find 79 percent of civil war episodes involved a nationwide election of any type during the final year of fighting, or within 5 years of the end of hostilities; 52 percent held local elections during this time frame. Early elections are also common: 69 percent of post-war episodes witnessed nationwide elections of any type in the last year of fighting or within 30 months; 39 percent held nationwide elections for local offices in the same time frame.

**Power Sharing Approaches**

There is considerable debate in the scholarly literature whether or to what extent various forms of power-sharing institutions produce a more durable peace. Post-war power-sharing institutions are argued to mitigate the risks of renewed fighting through the “participation of representatives of all significant communal groups in political decision making, especially at the executive level” (Lijphart 2004:97). If the recent conflict involved fighting across deep social cleavages of ethnicity, religion, or tribe, power sharing may include some degree of cultural or territorial autonomy for communal groups “to run their own internal affairs especially in the areas of education and culture” (Lijphart 2004:97). Advocates argue that power-sharing provisions can force cooperative politics on former combatants, for example, by carefully distributing decision-making power across multiple actors, or by checking-and-balancing political power.

Research on civil war termination and peace agreements identifies four main types of power-sharing institutions: political, territorial, economic, and military. **Political power**
sharing refers to political institutions that embody consociational politics: proportional representation; the formation “grand coalitions” across the major social groups; social integration of the bureaucracy, judiciary, and military; and internal autonomy for social groups, especially in the realm of family law, education, language, and culture. The bargain must also include a mutual veto over major changes to these institutions. If communal groups are geographically concentrated, power sharing may take the shape of territorial autonomy, nationwide political decentralization, or nationwide federalism, which scholars term territorial power sharing. Economic power sharing involves the explicit (re)distribution of economic resources such as oil revenues, development spending, or land tenure. Military power sharing, also known as military integration, is discussed separately below.

In practice, power sharing institutions can be implemented in at least two formal ways and one informal: through a negotiated peace settlement whose terms include power-sharing provisions, through a post-war constitutional or statutory process enacting power-sharing provisions, or (informally) through the appointment of ministers and other high officers who represent the communal groups and who hold real, not just symbolic, power.

An example of post-war power sharing is Sudan from 2005 to 2011. The government and rebel movement, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/SPLA), concluded hostilities with an exhaustive, 258-page Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in January 2005 (Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005). The agreement detailed the institutional forms of governance in post-war Sudan: religious and cultural autonomy for the mostly-Christian southerners, the official recognition of the autonomous regional government in South Sudan, equitable
representation for southerners in a national unity government and in the legislature, the creation of a First Vice Presidency to be held by the leader of the SPLM and which exercised vetoes over some acts of the president, and the integration of the bureaucracy and the judiciary across regional and ethnic lines (CPA Chapter II). The agreement also detailed oil and other revenue sharing (CPA Chapter III). The terms of this treaty more-or-less successfully governed Sudan until South Sudan voted to secede in 2011, also following provisions in the peace treaty. Note however, that post-war governments can implement power sharing without a formal peace treaty, either forming national unity governments or adopting consociational political institutions.

Power-sharing institutions are quite prevalent in post-war societies (based on data from Walter (1999), Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), Mattes and Savun (2009, 2010), Brancati and Snyder (2010), and Harbom et al. (2006)). Such institutions include a decentralized political system (57 percent of post-war episodes), proportional representation (33 percent), bicameralism (35 percent), a formal power sharing agreement (34 percent), reserved seats for women (28 percent) and minorities (21 percent), and federalism (20 percent).

**Security-Related Approaches to Peacebuilding**

Another set of peacebuilding policies advocated by the international community focus on the disposition, composition, integration, training, and oversight of the formal and informal security sector, including the armed forces, police, intelligence agencies, rebel forces, pro-government militias, and private security firms. Practitioners offer three distinct post-war strategies related to the security sector: (1)
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); (2) security sector reform (SSR); and (3) military power sharing. These strategies are often conflated in the policy literature because they are frequently implemented together.

**Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration**

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration DDR programs attempt to dissolve non-state armed groups and absorb their members back into society. As the name suggests, the modalities of an ideal-type DDR program are threefold. First, DDR attempts to secure and store weapons and other war matériel, often involving weapon destruction ceremonies, registration drives, or buy-back programs. Second, DDR attempts to break up military units and break down command-and-control of all armed groups except the official security services. Demobilization can involve the cantonment of military units in camps or on bases, formal demobilization ceremonies, the registration of individual fighters for veterans’ benefits, and the geographic dispersal of fighters across the country. Third, DDR attempts to transform soldiers back into civilians by offering financial or programmatic assistance to create a small business, start a farm, receive an education, access physical or mental health services, reconcile with their communities, and so forth. In order to ease the reintegration process, DDR programs may attempt to sensitize communities to the needs and perspectives of defeated rebels and veterans in general.

DDR programs may also involve the recruitment of some fighters into the army, police, and other post-war security services, but this is not a definitional component or even the primary thrust of DDR programs as practiced by the international community. Since 1970, international and local peacebuilders have implemented some type of DDR in 42 percent of post-war episodes, in such diverse places as El Salvador, Ethiopia,
Kosovo, Liberia, and Nepal. However, the resourcing, scope, and implementation of DDR programs vary widely and few rigorous program evaluations exist. Exactly whether, how, or why DDR works remains unclear (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis 2010, cf. Humphreys and Weinstein 2007).

Security Sector Reform

The second security-related peacebuilding approach is the thorough reform of the country’s official security organizations and infrastructure. SSR is a catchall term for a vast number of policies thought to improve security practices and outcomes in developing and democratizing states. The United Nations describes security sector reform as:

A process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its people without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law [and should be] a nationally owned process that is rooted in the particular needs and conditions of the country in question (Ban 2008).

Others have offered their own definitions (e.g. U.S. Department of State, 2009; McFate 2010:4). These definitions for SSR share an emphasis on organizational reform, improved civilian oversight, the modernization of doctrine or equipment, transparency in budgeting and acquisitions, and accountability to civilian authorities. SSR therefore differs from DDR in both the identity of the target (state vs. non-state actors) and the level at which the policy operates (institutional/organizational vs. individual fighters). Post-war countries can conduct and have conducted one policy, both, or neither.

From the perspective of Western powers, the textbook examples of SSR occurred in post-authoritarian regimes in
Central and South America, and post-communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, the latter group undertaking reforms as part of their accession to NATO during the 1990s. The term can also refer to current NATO members’ efforts toward force reductions, ending conscription and converting to an all-volunteer force, and improved oversight of contracting, acquisitions, and budgeting.

As a post-war policy, SSR seems problematic. Even in the best circumstances, reforming the security sector is a complex, highly political, and multi-year process. In a post-war setting, SSR may disrupt the transition to peace, reduce military pressure on rebels to demobilize or stay demobilized, or provoke a coup d’état by the military. A victorious military may resist thoroughgoing reforms in the post-war era on the reasonable grounds that the existing system proved its worth in battle. Fragile post-war countries may not have the institutional capacity or expertise to manage such a complex organizational transformation, especially among civilians newly tasked with overseeing military professionals.

Yet thoroughgoing reform of the security sector may be the fundamental condition for a durable peace: to agree to a demobilization of their private forces, factions must believe that the post-war government and military will not afterwards use its advantageous position to crush them. Credible commitments to root-and-branch reforms—such as the reduction and professionalization of forces, and the subordination of military commanders to the civilian government—may be the best way to reassure skeptical rebels. Even in the relatively brief time horizon of a war termination and peacebuilding phase, the basic organizational, statutory, and policy frameworks for SSR can be developed, and even commenced.
Despite the centrality of security sector reform to peace after civil war, I am aware of no scholarly comparative research, or cross-national data, relating SSR to the durability of peace after civil war, except insofar that SSR is considered an aspect of military power sharing, since both address the shape of post-war security sector.

**Military Power Sharing**

Military power sharing, also called military integration, is the policy of integrating the rebel armed forces into a new or reformed national army or police force, often coupled with an overall reduction in the number of personnel to pre-war levels, if not further. Like the other forms of power sharing discussed above, military integration is thought to mitigate the risk of war recurrence by building self-enforcing mechanisms into the post-war settlement. A policy of military integration implies that significant numbers of fighters from all sides of the conflict remain under arms, and factions retain some ability to defect from the post-war armed services and return to open combat, though they are formally subordinate to the unified command structure. By remaining at least partially mobilized, factions maintain a residual capacity to punish the post-war government should it renege on the terms of the peace. This residual capacity protects factions; factions should therefore feel less vulnerable in post-war settings characterized by military power sharing.

Military power sharing should help preserve peace through at least three additional mechanisms. An integrated military is less likely to follow orders to punish a faction in a way that a large segment of its organization perceives as illegitimate. This should dampen the government’s willingness to use force against its political enemies. Furthermore, integrated military
and police services are likely to enjoy better trust from the wider community, which should improve their organizational effectiveness. Lastly, military integration should create economic disincentives for future rebellion by offering employment to former rebels, similarly to DDR (Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008). Updating data from Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008), I find 22 attempts at military integration in the five years following the end of civil wars between 1970 and 2013 (22 percent of the total).

Military integration and DDR may functionally overlap if the DDR program recruits some former combatants into the military or police, in addition to reintegrating other former combatants back into society.

**Economic Recovery, Liberalization, and Privatization**

It is often noted that the most robust finding in the civil war literature is that civil wars are a problem of poor countries (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Collier, Hoeffler and Roehner 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2008) argue “multinational post-conflict efforts should be concentrated disproportionately in the poorest countries and should focus heavily on economic recovery.” In the short run, this can mean stabilizing the currency, reopening banks and markets, providing electricity on a predictable schedule, securing and opening major transit corridors, and increasing the supply of food and fuel. If the war destroyed significant amounts of physical capital and infrastructure, local or international peacebuilders may provide humanitarian assistance to the region until the new infrastructure and institutions of the economy are produced.
But beyond this immediate post-war recovery, local and international peacebuilders often attempt quite ambitious economic reforms along the lines of those advocated by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which have for decades conditioned their financial assistance to poorly-performing and conflict-ridden countries on the liberalization and privatization of their economies. Post-war Tajikistan, for example, signed structural adjustment agreements with the World Bank in 1998, 1999, and 2001, which restructured and privatized farms and state-owned industries, promoted international financial standards and systems among local firms, changed corporate governance rules, retrenched public expenditures, and reformed public financial management and procurement (World Bank 2014). Liberalization and privatization are not confined to post-communist countries: Uganda, Liberia, Rwanda, and Libya have also attempted such reforms, with or without the assistance of the international financial institutions. Both critics and supporters of the IFIs and their policies note that implementation of structural adjustment programs are uneven, delayed, and often manipulated for political ends (Leonard and Straus 2003; Reno 1998, 2002), but the logic of economic reforms in post-war settings remain compelling to many economists and to international peacebuilders.

Collier and Hoeffler present data showing that growth is more sensitive to policy in post-conflict countries than in other countries, and that aid is a particularly effective policy lever in post-war settings because the absorptive capacity of those economies is roughly double the normal level starting about the third year after the conflict ends (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). They argue that thoroughgoing economic reforms supervised and assisted by the international community are particularly important post-war policies. Using cross-national
statistics, De Soysa and Fjelde (2010) find that “economic freedom” lowers risk of civil war significantly. The mechanisms for reducing conflict have yet to be studied systematically: most proposed mechanisms work indirectly through growth promotion, and directly by lowering the stakes of controlling the government, since many opportunities for personal enrichment and patronage are (theoretically) closed off by liberalization and privatization.

**Reconciliation and Post-Conflict Justice**

Though first implemented in the aftermath of World War II, and occasionally during the Cold War following regime transitions, post-conflict justice mechanisms only became routine policy after the success of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in post-Apartheid South Africa, which began work in 1994. Post-conflict justice institutions are thought to contribute to the consolidation of peace by promoting equity, justice, and social reconciliation.

Post-conflict justice institutions are multiple. Olson, Payne, and Reiter (2010) and Binningsbø, et al. (2012) identify the most common: truth and reconciliation commissions such as those in South Africa and Liberia; trials for alleged war-related crimes, some which involve international tribunals or local prosecutions with high degrees of due process and credibility, others involving little more than local trials to implement a repressive victors’ justice; amnesties; reparations for war-related death, injury, or property damage; lustration or purges of collaborators from the political, administrative, and military classes; and exile. Olson, Payne, and Reiter (2010) find that amnesty is the most common form of transitional justice after civil war and that amnesty mostly targets rebels
rather than state agents. Similarly, trials after civil war mostly prosecute rebel opponents, rather than state agents. Binningsbø, et al. report a total of 272 post-conflict justice processes related to 173 conflict episodes between 1946 and 2006, meaning roughly 48 percent of all conflict episodes have at least one post-conflict justice mechanism (Binningsbø, et al. 2010:733). Of the 99 civil wars listed in Appendix B, 15 percent implement a truth and reconciliation process within five years, 26 percent hold trials, 58 percent have amnesties in place, 14 percent provide reparations, 7 percent purge their political system of collaborators, and 14 percent exile key figures from the war.

**Rule of Law**

Rule-of-law approaches to peacebuilding include policies to ensure the security of person and property, establish rule-based rather than arbitrary governance, constrain the executive, reduce corruption, and improve judicial and bureaucratic performance. Haggard and Tiede (2013) argue that the rule of law encompasses “both basic rights and liberties and the complex political and administrative arrangement that support them.” For our purposes, there are at least three distinct components.

**Public Order**

Public order involves the protection of individuals, communities, and property from violence or appropriation by the state or third parties. Jones et al. (2005) have identified a minimum threshold of security forces needed to provide public order after civil war. In territories at risk of severe instability, they suggest a minimum ratio of 1,000 troops per 100,000 inhabitants and 150 police per 100,000 inhabitants. In territories at less risk of instability, force ratios may be
smaller (Jones et al. 2005:19). Since 1989, the United Nations has deployed police to an increasing number of post-conflict environments (Smith, Holt, and Durch 2007). Dobbins and his coauthors (2013) consider internal security and basic public order the sine qua non of all other peacebuilding policies.

**Police, Judicial, and Penal Reforms**

Beyond a minimum level of public order, peacebuilders often undertake extensive reforms of the police, judicial, and penal systems to conform their rules and procedures to international norms. International and local peacebuilders frequently train police, judges, corrections officers, administrators, and support staff. Police may adopt new community policing strategies, as did the Kosovo Police Service, and legislatures may change legal codes and adopt new standards of human rights. Of course, post-war government may move away from international norms of governance, a phenomenon discussed below.

**Transparency, Bureaucracy, and Anti-Corruption**

International NGOs and some scholars have put increasing focus on the issues of transparency, bureaucracy, and corruption in post-war settings. The U.S. experience in Afghanistan suggests to many that corruption can severely undermine all other peacebuilding efforts (e.g. Galtung and Tisne 2008). The cross-national empirical literature has found conflicting results. Neudorfer and Theuerkauf (2014) find that corruption increases the risk of large-scale ethnic violence by distorting political decision-making and deepening social cleavages (Neudorfer and Theuerkauf 2014). Others follow Huntington (1968) and suggest that corruption can have a stabilizing effect on changing societies (e.g. Fjelde 2009).
PATRONAGE-BASED, ILLIBERAL, AND AUTHORITARIAN APPROACHES TO PEACEBUILDING

Outside the best practices and received wisdom of the international community sit a large collection of more authoritarian approaches to post-war “peacebuilding.” Generally speaking, these approaches rely on the use of coercion against sources of political instability, and for that reason they find few advocates among contemporary western scholars and international practitioners. Authoritarian approaches to peacebuilding remain common, however, and should be evaluated for their efficacy, if only to learn why such strategies prove so tempting to local decision-makers.

Patronage and Civil War Recovery

The converse of liberalization, privatization, and rule-of-law approaches to peacebuilding are found in a number of authoritarian post-war countries. Patronage is a central feature of politics in many developing countries, especially in Africa, which account for over half of all post-war cases since 1989 (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Unlike corruption, patronage is not necessarily illegal, being only the exchange of political support and personal favors, including privileged access to public resources. Patron-client networks permeated regimes in newly independent African states and “typically took the form of public sector jobs [and] the distribution of public resources through licenses, contracts and projects,” for which clients mobilized political support (Bratton and van de Walle 1997:55).

Evidence from cases for the relationship between patronage and peace is mixed. Patronage-based regimes in oil-rich countries such as Libya, Gabon, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States can have quite long tenures, and decades of domestic peace. However, patronage-based systems in sub-Saharan Africa
are generally much less successful at avoiding civil conflict, even in oil-rich countries like Nigeria and Angola.

Dobbins and his coauthors argue that coopting existing patronage networks into the post-war political coalition is essential to establishing peace in the short run, but that this strategy risks entrenching networks that will undermine long run efforts to build sustainable political institutions (Dobbins et al. 2013 238-239). In their view, the post-war government will be dependent on these patronage networks for political support, and any effort by the government to develop autonomous capacity will be resisted since it may be directed against the patronage system in the future.

Empirical tests of these hypotheses have produced conflicting results. Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer (2010) find evidence that adopting a package of liberalizing policy prescriptions, embodied by a structural adjustment program offered by the International Monetary Fund, is associated with greater risk of civil war onset, holding other factors constant. They suggest that SAPs, and liberalization policies more generally, create winners and losers: specifically they threaten the personal wealth and power of well-connected, politically active incumbents in the bureaucracy, state-owned enterprises, and producer syndicates, which may increase their willingness to organize violent confrontation with the state.

A post-war regime’s ability to compensate any “losers” in the liberalization process seems to be marginal. In the first place, it seems unlikely that the welfare gains from economic liberalization can be realized during the relatively short post-war time horizon adopted by peacebuilders (on the order of five to ten years). In addition, as the state’s control over the economy is reduced, the ability of political leaders to offer stability-enhancing patronage, social welfare spending,
development programs, or other forms side payments is increasingly constrained.

**Illiberal Peacebuilding**

At the less bloody end of the authoritarian policy continuum, states responding to the end of major hostilities may use the opportunity to finish dismantling a rebel movement using illegal, punitive, or unjust means. For example, after Sri Lanka vanquished the Tamil Tigers in 2009, the government pursued an increasingly authoritarian governing strategy not only in the Tamil homeland but also against the loyal opposition in the south. The government, the military, or their political allies appropriated land, buildings, and industrial facilities they claim were associated with the rebels (International Crisis Group 2012b). The government held hundreds of alleged rebels and collaborators without trial for five years, often incommunicado and in deplorable conditions, and human rights groups have accused the Sri Lankan authorities of systematic torture of former combatants (International Crisis Group 2013a). The government held post-war elections in the north, in which the mainstream Tamil party won a landslide victory; yet, de facto political power in the north remains in the hands of the military and the national government in Colombo (International Crisis Group 2013b). The cultural and language rights that represented the core grievance of the Tamil community were nowhere on the national political agenda (International Crisis Group 2012a). War-time policies that restricted political rights, civil liberties, and due process remained in place, despite the end of combat and the full dissolution of the Tamil rebel organization; the government moved against political opponents, the judiciary, human rights advocates, and critical media-- even against loyal opposition parties in the south that
were previously in government (International Crisis Group 2013a).

Post-war politics in Sri Lanka were characterized by the extension of wartime policies into peacetime, and were criticized as the formalization of a “national security state” similar to regimes in Pakistan or Egypt. Sri Lanka is following a common authoritarian practice after civil wars: forming single-party or personal regimes, often with the backing of the post-war military. Such strategies have been present in (at least) post-war Cambodia, Chechnya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, Uganda, and Yemen. Though perhaps formally democratic, these countries evolved into single-party dominant regimes using extensive patronage, cooptation of rivals, harassment of political opposition and critical media, and the manipulation of party laws, electoral rules, eligibility requirements, and politically-compromised courts. Recent elections suggest these illiberal post-war policies may soon be reversed.

Coercive Approaches to Establishing Order after Civil War Ends

On the more violent end of the authoritarian policy continuum, states or their proxies may conduct post-war pacification campaigns through forced relocations, targeted assassinations, or mass killings. For example, human rights groups have accused the Kagame regime in Rwanda of assassinating opposition figures in exile, some of whom were connected to the genocide, but others who apparently only objected to the president’s continued rule (Human Rights Watch 2014). Prominent figures in Russia, variously connected to the wars in Chechnya, have been assassinated or died under mysterious circumstances (Human Rights Watch 2009b); the Kremlin-backed president of Chechnya ordered his forces to burn the homes of the families of alleged rebels (Human Rights Watch 2009a). Applying data from
the Political Terror Scale Dataset to the list in Appendix B, I find 34 percent of post-war episodes witnessed mass violence by the government within five years, and 44 percent see political repression.

**Other Approaches**

Appendix A gives the catalogue of post-war policies I found in my review. Other approaches involve basic governance such as returning displaced persons, forming new ministries or reforming old ones, creating new administrative districts, and conducting basic social surveillance such as issuing identification cards and holding a census. Other policies center on military reformation, such as creating specialized internal security forces with counterinsurgent or counterterrorist capabilities, or securing border zones and rural areas. Public works are another commonly advocated approach, including jobs programs and road building.

Dobbins and his coauthors have argued that favorable external influences, what they term geopolitics, can dramatically influence the success or failure of post-war peacebuilding. In their view, the activities of major powers can have a benign or malign affect on the course of a post-war period to the extent that it is the determinative factor.

Others organizations focus on non-governmental and civil-society approaches to post-war reconstruction and reconciliation. The US Institutes of Peace, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and others train local media, host conferences promoting social reconciliation and mediation, and help establish local non-governmental organizations to promote human rights and good governance. The empowerment of women, minorities, youth, and other at-risk
communities are often the focus of such approaches. Bigombe, Collier, and Sambanis (2000) suggest that remittances should be constrained or redirected to sever linkages between diaspora communities and rebel movements.
Recent research on civil war and peacebuilding are dominated by quantitative studies exploiting some form of multiple regression analysis, typically using general linear, event history, or logistic models. These correlative approaches have yielded important insights into the origins, duration, termination, recurrence, and other qualities of civil wars. One methodological difficulty of a correlative approach is that civil wars, despite their importance to comparative political development and to the international system as a whole, remain a relatively uncommon phenomenon since World War II (N ~ 150), and, for a number of key research questions, covariates can grow well into the double digits. The nature of the data means that regressions are relatively inefficient—they require stronger evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no relation between a variable (e.g. policy) and the outcome (e.g. peace). More to the point here, regression analyses are not optimal tools for examining configurations of policies or conditional relations of policies because regressions are conventionally limited to two or three interaction terms. If we have a peacebuilding theory that includes four or more conditions working together, multiple regression is not a terribly effective research strategy. Instead, researchers studying cross-national and cross-conflict patterns of civil wars and their aftermaths should strive to supplement conventional regression analyses with alternative methods, including more explicitly comparative approaches.

I take such an approach here. I use sociologist Charles Ragin’s Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to analyze the combinations of peacebuilding policies that have characterized
each post-civil war episode since 1970, whether implemented by international actors or local actors on their own (i.e. by the post-war government). QCA allows me to test a long list of peacebuilding strategies against the historical record, using data ‘mined’ from the quantitative civil war literature and, among other benefits, to sift through the historical record for patterns of strategies in a way that conventional regression analyses do not.

Because Qualitative Comparative Analysis remains a relatively uncommon method in political science and international relations, a brief summary is appropriate. Ragin introduced QCA in 1987, and he and his coauthors have refined and championed the method over the ensuing decades (key texts include Ragin 1987; Ragin 2000; Ragin 2008b; Ragin and Rihoux 2004; Rihoux and Ragin 2008; Ragin and Sonnet 2005). Though QCA was initially slow to gain adherents, comparative social scientists have employed it with increasing frequency since about 2000, with over 30 published articles in 2010 and 2011 each (Thiem and Duşa 2013). Nonetheless, QCA has yet to make inroads into the major American political science and international relations journals, despite its promise for a great number of cross-national and cross-conflict research programs.³

³ At its core, QCA is a method for making formal, tightly-structured comparisons of the sort common in historical, qualitative, ethnographic, and small-N comparative social science, yet do so across a far larger number of cases than would be possible using ‘manual’ techniques. QCA requires the
researcher to score cases for the presence or absence of causal conditions and for the outcome of interest. The researcher then uses Boolean notation to assess configurations of these causal conditions, and then use Boolean algebra to reduce these ‘causal recipes’ to their essential ingredients. Ragin and others have introduced metrics for evaluating the significance and explanatory power QCA’s findings. There are now several software packages available to conduct QCA; I conducted the present analyses using Ragin’s fsQCA program and the QCA package in the R program (Ragin and Davey 2014; Duşa and Thiem 2014).

Interpreting the results of this chapter will require understanding four distinctive features of QCA, especially as it contrasts with conventional quantitative methods.

First, QCA is grounded in set theory, an ontological approach to social science that focuses on the ‘set memberships’ and ‘set relations’ of empirical cases, including subset and superset relations. In the language of set theory, for example, the research program on peacekeeping effectiveness examines the relationship between two sets of post-civil war countries: the set of countries that host a peacekeeping operation and the set of countries that do not experience a recurrence of civil war. An (incorrect) claim that post-war countries that host peacekeeping operations never experience a recurrence of civil war within five years is a claim about a set relation: that countries hosting a peacekeeping operation are a perfect subset of countries that do not experience a recurrence of civil war. In this example, a perfect subset relationship means that peace is implied by peacekeepers; that peacekeeping cannot occur

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4 Some other options are the stand-alone software programs kirq (Rubinson 2014) and Tosmana (Cronqvist 2011), and the “fuzzy” program in STATA (Longest and Vaisey 2008).
5 I use only country-cases in my examples, but QCA can also be used for individual- or group-level data.
without peace following it; and that the presence of peacekeepers is logically sufficient to explain the consolidation of peace. Note that the subset relationship does not mean that peacekeepers are logically necessary to peace, since there may be other avenues to peace without peacekeepers. Among its other advantages, QCA provides a way for researchers to examine which causal conditions, or combinations of causal conditions, approximate perfect subsets of the outcome, and therefore allow researchers to make claims about necessary and sufficient conditions for the outcomes of interest.

To score these set memberships researchers typically use crisp or fuzzy sets. Crisp sets require bivalent data: scored 1.0 for the presence of the condition (full membership in the set) and 0.0 for absence of the condition (full non-membership in the set). Alternately, fuzzy sets allow degrees of membership or non-membership, and researchers score cases using intervals or continuous data ranging between 0.0 (full non-membership in the set) and 1.0 (full membership in the set). With fuzzy sets, a score of 0.5 indicates the crossover point, or point of maximum ambiguity of set membership. Commonly used, continuous data such as GDP per capita or barrels of exported oil can be easily calibrated and transformed into fuzzy sets following procedures outlined by Ragin (Ragin 2008b, chapter 5).

To give a concrete example, consider a researcher of peacekeeping effectiveness who wishes to score interesting set memberships for such cases. Post-war Kosovo (1999 to 2004) is such a case. Some theoretically relevant crisp set memberships for Kosovo are:

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6 Note that, unlike the correlation coefficients generated by conventional quantitative methods, set relationships do not imply symmetry: there are (likely) multiple paths to the successful consolidation of peace, and therefore the set of peaceful post-war countries is not coincidental to (or a subset of) countries with peacekeeping operations.

7 Less common are multi-value QCA (mvQCA) and temporal QCA (tQCA).
• 1.0 for membership in “the set of post-war territories that hosted a UN peacebuilding operation”

• 1.0 for membership in “the set of post-war territories that received large amounts of official development assistance”

• 0.0 for membership in “the set of post-war territories that exported oil”

• 0.0 for membership in “the set of post-war territories with a residual insurgency”

• 1.0 for membership in “the set of post-war territories that held early elections”

We also score the outcome variable:

• 1.0 for membership in “the set of post-war territories that remained at peace for at least 5 years after the end of major hostilities”

The second distinctive feature of QCA is the generation of truth tables from these set membership scores. A truth table is a list of all logically-possible combinations of set memberships. For example, a researcher may hypothesize that the presence of three factors explains the consolidation of peace after civil war (PEACE): the presence of peacekeepers (PKO), the implementation of early elections (EARLY), and the receipt of large flows of foreign official development assistance (ODA). Using crisp sets, the researcher scores all 99 post-war episodes since 1970 on these four set memberships (PKO, EARLY, ODA, PEACE). A truth table representing all logically possible combinations of these conditions would have $2^4$ or 16 rows, corresponding to two possible conditions (1.0 or 0.0) for each of three input conditions and one output condition. The researcher would then record on the table the number of cases that correspond to each of the 16 rows. Using actual data, the truth table for this crude example is in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Truth Table for Three Major Post-War Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PKO</th>
<th>EARLY</th>
<th>ODA</th>
<th>PEACE</th>
<th>Number of Instances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three policy configurations have unambiguous results: PKO*EARLY*ODA, PKO*EARLY*oda, and PKO*early*oda correspond only to PEACE. They are not associated with any cases of civil war recurrence within five years. Thus these three configurations are perfect subsets of the outcome.

The other configurations contain some contradictions—that is, they lead to both “PEACE” and “peace” outcomes. The configurations pko*early*ODA and pko*EARLY*ODA are recorded as contradictions, using conventional thresholds.

Every configuration in this example has instances of success, failure, or both. That is not always the case. Configurations can associate with zero outcomes at all (the outcome is neither present nor absent). When configurations are

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8 In QCA, presence of a condition is indicated in ALL CAPS, absence by lower case letters.
not represented by any historical cases, they are termed logical remainders.⁹

With a truth table, the researcher can evaluate the hypothesized relationships between the causal configurations and outcomes of interest. (The construction of truth tables with fuzzy sets requires a few additional steps, but follows the same logic as crisp sets.)¹⁰ Note that each observed case can exhibit exactly one configuration. Outcomes are conceptualized as the intersections (unions) of input conditions. If the information gathered in the truth table suggests a clear relationship between a causal configuration and an outcome (success or failure), then the causal configuration is a logical subset of the outcome variable: the configuration represents one path to the outcome, though not necessarily the only one.

A third distinctive feature of QCA is the application of Boolean algebra to the information summarized in the truth table. Boolean algebra first gives the solution, which is simply the union (logical AND) of all the causal combinations that co-occur with the outcome present. That is, the solution is a list of input configurations that (separately) approximate subsets of the outcome. In our peacekeeping example, if we define configurations with a success-to-failure ratio of 3:1 and better as “success,” configurations below 1:3 as “failure,” and

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⁹ Because of the limited diversity of social and historical data, the researcher should expect to find many logical remainders (Ragin and Sonnet 2004). Researchers must decide whether to incorporate the logical remainders into the minimization process. The intermediate solution advocated by Ragin, and employed here, is to incorporate logical remainders to the extent that existing theoretical and substantive knowledge indicates unambiguously that a causal condition operates on the outcome in one direction. This step allows us to interpolate a “missing” historical case—an “easy” counterfactual that allows us to continue the Boolean minimization of the solution. See Ragin (2008, Chapter 5) for an explanation of this process.

¹⁰ Rows in fuzzy set truth tables correspond to corners in multidimensional vector space. The extent to which a case exhibits the configuration represented in a fuzzy set truth table row is given as the lowest score from among the causal conditions. For example, a post-war case that scores 0.8 on UNPKO, 0.6 on ODA, and 0.9 on ELECT would have an overall membership score for that causal configuration of 0.6. Using a simple rule that a membership score above the cross-over point in a fuzzy set (0.5) represents a case “more in than out” of the causal recipe, the researcher can determine the configuration of each case, and count the number of cases for each causal recipe.
configurations between those ratios as contradictions, then the solution in Boolean and QCA notation is:

(1) \[ \text{PKO}^*\text{EARLY}^*\text{ODA} + \text{PKO}^*\text{EARLY}^*\text{oda} + \text{PKO}^*\text{early}^*\text{oda} + \text{pko}^*\text{EARLY}^*\text{oda} + \text{pko}^*\text{early}^*\text{oda} \iff \text{PEACE} \]

This equation states that the combination of policies in the five terms is a necessary and sufficient explanation for PEACE (e.g. If PEACE, then one of the five configurations. If one of the five configurations, then PEACE).

QCA then uses Boolean algebra to reduce these logical expressions to those that are minimally sufficient to explain the outcome. These reduced expressions called prime implicants. In this crude example, Boolean algebra reduces the solution in equation (1) to:

(2) \[ \text{PKO}^*\text{EARLY} + \text{oda} \iff \text{PEACE} \]

This solution states that the presence of peacekeepers in conjunction with early elections is sufficient to explain peace, and that the absence of official development assistance is also sufficient to explain peace. Together they are necessary to explain peace. Official development assistance is superfluous to the first policy configuration, and both peacekeepers and early elections are superfluous to the second policy configuration; they have been reduced out. (We might interpret the second term--the absence of official development assistance--as capturing a country’s financial independence or freedom to implement policy without international involvement.)

A final distinctive feature of QCA is that it allows a researcher to assess her findings by producing metrics that are roughly analogous to a regression table. Set-theoretic
consistency indicates the extent to which an input or configuration of inputs accurately describe one path to the outcome— the extent to which an input or configuration of inputs approximate a perfect subset of the outcome, or what we might call its explanatory significance. Set-theoretic coverage indicates the extent to which an input or configuration of inputs explain the entire outcome set, and thus indicates the explanatory power of a given input or configuration of inputs. In QCA, both consistency and coverage are given as scores between 1.0 and 0.0, with higher scores representing better consistency or coverage.

QCA is a useful method to triangulate findings from regression-based approaches to the cross-national study of civil wars for a number of reasons. First, the major theories of post-war peacebuilding are easily transformed into the language of set theory, which I have done in Appendix C. Second, much if not most of the civil war and conflict data collected is essentially qualitative and bivalent in nature— coding for example the presence or absence of peacekeeping troops or power-sharing agreements. QCA permits the conceptualization of this bivalent data as bivalent set-membership scores. Third, QCA explicitly recognizes causal complexity and equifinality, essentially turning the research strategy of conventional regression analysis on its head. Whereas regression analyses begin with the assumption that explanatory variables are independent of each other, and then gradually introduce interaction terms to test for causal complexity, QCA begins from a perspective of causal complexity and then strips away input conditions that are discovered to be logically redundant, unsupported by the empirical record, or theoretically implausible. Lastly, QCA’s primary advantage remains that it permits the sort of rich qualitative comparisons common in small-N research, but across a
far larger number of cases that would be possible otherwise, which makes it a fitting method to examine the record of policy configurations implemented by local and international peacebuilders after civil war.
To compare and evaluate the effectiveness of post-war policy configurations using QCA, I leverage the vast amount of data published in the quantitative civil war and peacekeeping literatures since the late 1990s. This research program has generated scores of major articles on the onset, duration, termination, recurrence, and other qualities of civil war (see Blattman and Miguel, 2010, for a survey). Some key figures in this research program are Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, James Fearon, David Laitin, Michael Doyle, Nicolas Sambanis, Barbara Walter, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Virginia Page Fortna, Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, Peter Wallensteen, Håvard Hegre, and their respective co-authors. Some key organizations in this research program include the World Bank, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the Peace Research Institute Oslo, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, and the Journal of Peace Research. Working mainly from the political science and economics disciplines, these and many other researchers have examined dozens of correlates to civil conflict and civil war, such as economic opportunity structures (Collier and Hoeffler 2000), the feasibility of rebellion (Collier, Hoeffler, and Roehner 2009), economic shocks (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004), ethnicity (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Posner 2004; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005), rough terrain (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala 2009), primary commodity exports (Ross 2004; Fearon 2005), political institutions and governance (World Development Report 2011), peacekeeping missions (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008), peace treaties and power-sharing agreements (Walter 1997, 1999, 2004; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007; Mattes and Savun
2009, 2010), border sanctuaries (Salehyan 2007), elections (Brancati and Snyder 2011, 2012), and political decentralization (Brancati 2006). Some recent efforts have yielded major new data on coups d’état (Powell and Thyne 2011), pro-government militias (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013), non-violent political protest (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013), and the geo-referencing of conflict incidents (Raleigh, et al. 2010; Sundberg and Melander 2013), among many, many others.

I synthesized these data in three steps. First, working from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, I generated a list of all civil-conflict episodes since 1970. The Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) reports 320 armed, internal conflict episodes since 1970 that exceeded 25 battle-related deaths. Of these, 287 episodes had ended, defined as a gap in fighting of at least one year. The other 33 episodes experienced fighting during the 2013 calendar year and are recorded as ongoing conflicts. From this list, I extracted the most-intense, highest-fatality conflict episodes: those that exceeded 1,000 battle-related deaths. These I define as “civil war episodes.” I adjusted the episodes in six countries (Algeria, Chad, Philippines, Sudan, and Uganda) because ACD coding decisions lump together distinct conflicts (with independent rebel groups) so long as the groups are each attempting to overthrow the central government in the same time period. Disaggregating these cases added six conflict-episodes

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11 I chose 1970 because most cross-national indicators reach back roughly this far.
12 The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset defines conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (ACD codebook 4-2013, p. 1). Note this definition excludes communal violence and one-sided violence (mass killing).
13 A conflict episode is a period of sustained fighting, beginning when a dispute exceeds 25 battle deaths, and ending when the last reported fatalities are followed by a year of inactivity; a new episode is therefore coded if violence restarts after a year or more of inactivity (ACD Codebook, 11). Depending on the case, war episodes began and ended as reported in the ACD, the UCDP Dyadic Dataset (1-2013), or the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset (2010-1).
to my list. By my count, there have been 99 completed civil war episodes since 1970, with another 26 civil war episodes ongoing. Appendix B lists this universe of episodes since 1970 in alphabetical order. I record the date, if any, that a war (1,000 or more battle deaths) or lower-level conflict (25 to 999 battle deaths) recurs. This list is broadly consistent with similar lists published by the Correlates of War project, Collier and Hoeffler (2000), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Doyle and Sambanis (2006), and others. I define a post-war episode as the five years following the end of a civil war episode.

The second step in synthesizing these data was to take the catalogue of policies listed in Appendix A and frame them as discrete policies in the language of crisp set memberships. Generally, this was a straightforward procedure since most of the policy alternatives that I want to test had been previously conceptualized as bivalent indicators in the quantitative civil war and peacekeeping literatures. I created set membership categories with an eye for clarity and easy scoring.

The third step in synthesizing the data was to ‘mine’ the theoretical, practitioner, and case study literatures for cross-national or cross-conflict indicators on individual post-war policies for each post-war period. Because of sharp differences in coding practices within the research program (including, importantly, conflict end dates), conforming this ‘mined’ data to my 99 cases was quite laborious, requiring frequent consultation of individual codebooks and sometimes careful recoding of indicators based on raw data supplied by authors.

14 One important difference is that I select war episodes based on fatality numbers within a given episode, rather than cumulatively across the entire conflict, which might consist of several separate episodes. For example, other lists of civil wars typically include periodic but low-intensity conflicts that, over decades, accumulate over 1,000 fatalities, such as conflict in Iran’s Kurdish northwest or the Casamance region in Senegal. Thus, Appendix A is a shorter list of more intense wars than is commonly reported in the academic literature.
Generating the lists in Appendices A, B, and C took the majority of my time on this project.
To explore the post-war policy configurations associated with a sustained peace, I performed several crisp set qualitative comparative analyses. Based on the empirical and theoretical literatures, and the findings in section five, I developed a core model of 10 input conditions to score for all post-war episodes since 1970:

(3) \text{peace} = f(pko, \text{dem}, \text{early}, \text{powshar}, \text{decen}, \text{ddr}, \text{sap}, \text{oda}, \text{pcj}, \text{army})

where

- \text{peace} is having no recurrence of war within five years
- \text{pko} is the presence of more than 1,000 peacekeeping troops
- \text{dem} is governing using a democratic regime by year five
- \text{early} is holding any nationwide election within 2.5 years
- \text{powshar} is having a formal power-sharing agreement in place
- \text{decen} is having a decentralized political system
- \text{ddr} is implementing a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program
- \text{sap} is concluding a structural adjustment program with either the World Bank or IMF
- \text{oda} is receiving on average greater than 5 percent of gross national income in official development assistance
- \text{pcj} is implementing any form of post-conflict justice
- \text{army} is having higher than the median per capita security personnel (5.54 per 1,000 residents)
This model reflects tradeoffs between comprehensiveness and the desire for interpretable results in QCA, since including fewer conditions improves interpretability. In selecting policies to test, I sought input conditions that (1) most post-war decision-makers could implement, rather than conditions that were essentially predetermined, (2) reflected inputs or processes rather than outcomes, (3) captured the range of theoretical claims in the literatures, and (4) was a direct measure of a policy rather than a proxy for it. I dropped from the model set membership scoring for high-income or upper-middle-income economies, oil and natural gas producers, and receiving diaspora support, since decision-makers cannot easily modulate these inputs in the short time frame of a post-war period. For the same reasons, I do not include common controls for ethnolinguistic fractionalization, mountainous terrain, population size, and others. I also set aside set membership scoring for most military policies and materiel to test in a separate model.

Table 2.2 gives the parsimonious solution to the crisp set analysis, with the configurations grouped by congruence, offset to improve readability, and numbered for reference. The parsimonious solution in QCA uses the logical remainders (configurations with no instances) to reduce the solution to the fewest terms possible. It is the most aggressive minimization strategy, and therefore can be interpreted as the core of the essential prime implicants for distinguishing between success cases (peace) and failure cases (war recurrence). Note that post-war episodes can be covered by more than one prime implicant--such cases are overdetermined. The raw coverage score gives the proportion of success cases explained, while the unique coverage score gives the proportion of success cases covered uniquely by that configuration.
Table 2.2: csQCA Results for Core Model (No War Recurrence; May have low-level violence)\textsuperscript{16}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Configuration</th>
<th>Raw Coverage</th>
<th>Unique Coverage</th>
<th>Consistency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) PKO*EARLY</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) pko<em>powshar</em>decen<em>pcj</em>ARMY</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) EARLY<em>DECEN</em>DDR</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) EARLY<em>DECEN</em>sap</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) DECEN<em>sap</em>ODA</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) powshar<em>oda</em>army</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) powshar<em>oda</em>pcj</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) powshar<em>oda</em>dem*SAP</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) DEM*ODA</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) POWSHAR<em>sap</em>oda</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) dem<em>POWSHAR</em>ddr*army</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) pko<em>POWSHAR</em>DDR*ARMY</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13) pko<em>DDR</em>sap</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solution coverage: 0.986842
Solution consistency: 0.986842

Each of the 13 policy configurations represents one path to peace after civil war; some configurations explain a greater number of successful cases than others, ranging from almost 30 percent of such cases explained by EARLY*DECEN*DDR to only 4 percent of such cases explained by dem*POWSHAR*ddr*army. Most post-war episodes are covered by more than one configuration, which is indicated by the low unique coverage scores. Overall the solution set explains over 98 percent of successful cases.

**Peacekeeping Forces and Early Elections**

The presence of peacekeeping troops is a necessary condition in only one post-war policy configuration:

\textsuperscript{16} The reader is reminded that consistency is the approximation of a subset relationship, and raw coverage is the proportion of all success cases covered (including cases covered by more than one configuration). Unique coverage is the proportion of success cases covered uniquely by the configuration.
Configuration 1 indicates that the presence of peacekeeping troops in conjunction with early elections is sufficient to explain the presence of peace; this configuration accounts for one-fifth of successful cases.

Why might these two necessary conditions together form a cohesive, successful post-war strategy? Early elections 1) may confer legitimacy on presence of the international peacekeepers, 2) begin the process of political normalization, 3) provide peaceful avenues for personal advancement to former rebels, 4) signal a commitment for a relatively quick transfer of sovereignty to locals, and 5) create local partners to govern jointly with the international mission and provide credible political communications to the public. UN Secretaries General have repeatedly made such claims with regards to UN complex peacebuilding efforts. For example, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) viewed holding elections as early as possible as critical (Annan 2000a). After deployment in June 1999, UNMIK immediately established an interim authority to advise it and communicate with Kosovar society. UNMIK held successful province-wide municipal elections within 15 months, and held province-wide assembly elections within 27 months. Establishing local institutions of self-government was “an essential element in the creation of long-term stability in Kosovo... increasing inclusion of its people in the administration of the province to give them greater responsibility for its development” (Annan 2000b).

Not all countries are capable of holding elections within 30 months of the end of major hostilities. Often the basic infrastructure of elections is missing: there are no civil
registers or voter rolls, locals with experience as poll workers, electoral districts, political party and election laws, available or adequately secure ballot boxes, or even legitimate political parties. In other cases, both the candidates and the voters lack experience with and a basic understanding of elections in democracies, such as the role and origins of political parties, party programs and manifestos; the role of partisan and non-partisan media; and familiarity with ballots and how their counting translates into seats in a legislature. Post-war DR Congo, for example, delayed elections from 2001 to 2005 while the factions, neighboring countries, and international community negotiated a formal peace agreement, subsequently followed by the government and the UN mission organizing the basic structures for elections. Other circumstances delayed elections as well. Rwandan and Ugandan troops only withdrew during 2003, communal violence was widespread throughout the period, and political parties more closely resembled militias or gangs and needed to be reoriented away from rebellion and toward responsible government (Dobbins, et al. 2008).

Looking back at Table 2.2, peacekeepers are also consistent with but not necessary to nine other policy configurations (3 through 11); however, the presence of peacekeeping troops would preclude peace in configurations 2, 12, and 13.

These findings indicate that third party peacekeeping missions involving substantial numbers of troops must hold early elections, otherwise the presence of peacekeepers is redundant or even harmful.

If an international peacekeeping mission, working with locals, cannot hold or decides against holding early elections, policy configurations 5 through 11 are still open to them. These strategies are consistent with the presence of peacekeepers and
late elections. However, if the mission selects one of these other policy configurations, the presence of peacekeepers is no longer necessary to avoid a recurrence of civil war: their presence does not contribute to the sorting of cases into successes and failures. Other conditions are doing the work.

This finding directly challenges the peacebuilding consensus that has developed over the past 20 years. In particular, it challenges assumptions about the centrality of third-party interventions and security guarantees to explanations of civil war termination and the consolidation of peace. Peacekeeping missions are not selected randomly across civil war cases (King and Zeng 2007, Gilligan and Stedman 2003). Given finite international resources and patience for peacekeeping operations, distinguishing circumstances for successful peacekeepers is vital. The findings here suggest the single salient criterion is the feasibility and advisability of holding early elections. If the international community determines that early elections are infeasible or inadvisable to post-war politics, local and international peacebuilders should adopt an alternative path to political order. The international community can thereby conserve scarce resources for the circumstances where peacekeepers are essential.

**LOCAL POLITICS AND PATRONAGE STRATEGY**

Another coherent strategy that emerges from the QCA and explains roughly half the cases is a Local Politics and Patronage Strategy. There are three variants, which can be represented by the equations:

(Conf. 3, 4) \[ \text{EARLY*DECEN*(DDR + sap)} \]

(Conf. 5) \[ \text{DECEN*sap*ODA} \]
In the first equation, early nationwide elections operate in conjunction with political decentralization and either a DDR program or the absence of a structural adjustment program. I hypothesize that Configurations 3 and 4 represent post-war processes that funnel former combatants--especially junior grade and field grade officers--into local employment opportunities--especially local government employment.

The logic of Configurations 3 and 4 proceeds as follows. Early elections signal to former combatants that the political system is at least somewhat permeable--that actors who can marshal political resources and generate political support can secure political office. Political office in developing countries is often quite lucrative. For potential political entrepreneurs emerging from the civil war, the problem is the relative scarcity of political and administrative offices; securing good jobs in the capital is difficult for all but the highest-ranking officers; junior-grade and field-grade officers are too numerous and most presumably lack a large enough constituency to secure national office (otherwise they would be general officers in the rebel forces). Decentralized political systems mitigate this problem by opening avenues for political advancement to a greater number of actors. Early elections and decentralization are complementary, necessary conditions for this strategy to operate.

I argue that the final ingredients of Configurations 3 and 4 represent access to the opportunities offered by decentralized political systems. Former rebels need help reintegrating with their communities, as well as gathering resources to form or join a local political machine, which could be provided by DDR programs indicated in Configuration 3. Or the entrepreneurs need assurances that government jobs or private employment
opportunities will be available. Signing onto a structural adjustment program signals both that they government payroll will be cut and that the private employment markets are weak. Thus the absence of an SAP is a necessary condition to maintain peace in Configuration 4.

**Domination Strategy**

Configuration 2 contains many necessary conditions, but together they suggest a strategy of political and military domination by the post-war government:

(Conf. 2) pko*powshar*decen*pcj*ARMY

The presence of large numbers of security forces (ARMY) in conjunction with the absence of peacekeepers (pko) implies that the post-war government can move against political opponents relatively unhindered: the government is in full control of its internal security architecture. Its words are backed with force, and third parties lack troops to interpose themselves between former combatants. The domination is also political in the sense that this strategy requires the absence of a power-sharing agreement and the presence of a centralized political system. Lastly, this strategy requires that post-war government reject any post-war justice mechanisms, including amnesties or trials for former rebels. Configuration 2 covers post-war episodes in Eritrea (1991 to 1996), Iran (1982 to 1987; 1988 to 1993), Iraq (1996 to 2001), Mauritania (1978 to 1983), and six episodes in Myanmar.

The roster of cases covered by this policy configuration indicates that the strategy falls outside international norms and best practices. It is unlikely that the United Nations, the
United States, European powers, and others would urge this strategy on a post-war government that they were advising. Understanding this strategy is still useful, however, since it helps explain strategic behavior in post-war countries whose actions the international community hopes to shape.

Nuri al Maliki’s government in Iraq arguably followed this strategy after the exit of U.S. forces in 2011, especially with regards to the Sunni Arab community. He refused to decentralize power to a Sunni federal entity patterned on the Kurdistan Regional Government, he excluded Sunni Arabs from key security positions in the cabinet, and he kept the portfolios of defense, interior, and security for himself. Maliki’s adoption of this strategy depended on the withdrawal of international troops, which give him a freer hand against (Sunni Arab) political opposition. His government also needed to control enough loyalist forces to view this domination strategy as feasible. Maliki’s strategy was ill-advised: his attempt at dominating Sunni Arab areas provoked a new rebellion from a coalition of former Ba’athists and jihadists. It is important to understand that a large proportion of post-war governments will find the domination strategy enticing, precisely because it has proven historically successful, Maliki’s case notwithstanding.

DURABLE STALEMATES AND SUPPRESSING POLITICAL OPPOSITION

Interpreting configurations six, seven, and eight is challenging because the strategies mostly consist of the absence of certain policies. The three configurations can be factored and represented in one equation:

\[ (\text{Conf. } 6, 7, 8) \cdot \text{powshar} \cdot \text{oda} \cdot (\text{army} + \text{pcj} + \text{dem} \cdot \text{SAP}) \]
The terms inside the parentheses are policies that substitute for one another in this strategy. Looking back at the cases, the configurations appear related to two types of war outcomes—stalemates and successfully driving the rebel groups underground. If we define stalemates as situations where the fighting stops but rebel groups maintain control of some territory, and we define suppression as situations where the fighting stops and the rebel movement is shattered or forced underground. Table 2.3 groups the cases covered by configurations 6, 7, and 8.

Table 2.3: Strategies and Cases by War Outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stalemate Cases</th>
<th>(6) powshar<em>oda</em>army</th>
<th>(7) powshar<em>oda</em>pcj</th>
<th>(8) powshar<em>oda</em>dem*SAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHA7, CON1, IND1, PHI3</td>
<td>CHA7, IRN1, IRN2, LEB1, MYA1, MYA2, MYA3, MYA4, MYA5, MYA6</td>
<td>AZE1, CON1, LEB1, MOR1, MYA1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppression Cases</td>
<td>ALG1, IND2, IND3, INS1, INS2, NGA1, PER1, SRI1, SRI4</td>
<td>IND2, IND3, IRQ3, RUS2, ARG1, INS2, NGA1, PAK1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Cases</td>
<td>BNG1, BNG2, GUA1, LIB1, YAR2</td>
<td>YAR2</td>
<td>BNG1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I hypothesize that these policy configurations represent 1) necessary conditions for durable stalemates and 2) policies that victors employ after suppressing rebel groups during the civil war. These strategies depend on three factors. First, the strategies depend on the political independence of the government and the rebel groups; there is no attempt to form a power-sharing agreement (powshar). In the stalemate cases, this means that the rebel leaderships remain in their stronghold, and the government makes no effort to come to terms with the rebels. In suppression cases, the lack of a power-sharing agreement
reflects that the rebel leaderships have refused to surrender and have gone underground—or that their organization has been totally destroyed. Accordingly political “independence” of the combatants is a necessary condition for both stalemate and suppression.

Second, these strategies depend on the financial independence of the government, represented by the absence of aid dependence as a necessary condition (oda). The absence of aid dependence means at least two things: that post-war revenues are not obviously disadvantageous to the government, and that the international community has little leverage over the post-war government. This financial health makes a stalemate less threatening to the government—a government whose finances are not threatened by the continuing existence of a rebel group is more likely to accept a stalemate outcome. In addition, the government can resist any international pressure to come to terms with the rebels, since the government does not rely on aid to finance its activities. These mechanisms operate in the suppression cases as well: the absence of aid dependence means the government can ignore the political demands of the suppressed rebel movement.

The third component of a durable stalemate is some assurance for the rebels that the government will not pursue them for the time being. This assurance manifests in one of three ways: the government lacks a large army (army), the government does not attempt to bring the rebels to justice (pcj), or the government is an autocratic regime with a demonstrated willingness to make hard decisions (dem*SAP). This latter condition (dem*SAP), I suggest, represents a credibility-building step for the post-war government: if a post-war government is willing to signal a raft of major economic
reforms, any claims it makes to abide by a de facto ceasefire agreement are more credible.

The third component of these strategies is harder to interpret for the suppression cases. Policies that provide assurance to the rebels in the stalemate cases might, in the suppression cases, perhaps represent a willingness to use coercive force against political opposition. Post-war states with weak armies (army), post-war states that neglect post-war justice mechanisms (pcj), and post-war authoritarian states (dem) all generally pursue more coercive governing strategies than their inverse. Suppression may be a successful “peacebuilding” strategy because it signals a willingness to potential rebels that coercive war-time policies are still in place, thereby deterring renewed rebel activity.

Framed another way, the Qualitative Comparative Analysis provides insights into the nature of what are frequently termed “frozen conflicts” (e.g. Lynch 2004). Indeed, these configurations cover quintessential frozen conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, as well as numerous other Eurasian cases. The QCA has identified the essential ingredients for sustaining such stalemates as: the absence of power-sharing agreements and aid dependence, coupled with a weak army or the absence of post-war justice or authoritarian governance plus a structural adjustment program. One could fairly argue that these conditions are symptoms of, rather than causal inputs of, states with unresolved conflict. Yet the finding here are an advance on our understanding of such conflict, even if only by isolating the constitutive elements of a frozen conflict, identifying the entire subset of post-war episodes that reflect such dynamics, and demonstrating that post-war governments that have fully suppressed their rebel movements often have matching strategies.
**Other Findings**

**Democracy.** One intriguing result in Table 2.2 is the relative absence of democracy as a necessary condition to avoid war recurrence. In Configuration 9, democracy combines with substantial official development assistance for successful peacebuilding, but this path accounts for only a relatively small proportion of successful cases (7.8 percent). The episodes covered by the solution are post-war Burundi (2006-2011), Liberia (2003-2008), Nepal (2006-2011), Nicaragua (1990-1995), Sierra Leone (2001-2006), and Sri Lanka (1990-1995).

**Power Sharing.** Consistent with research by Barbara Walter and others following her, power-sharing agreements are quite important in distinguishing between successful and unsuccessful cases. The presence or absence of power sharing agreements is a necessary condition over half of all configurations that together explain over a majority of cases.

**Post-Conflict Justice.** The presence of post-conflict justice does not help explain peace in any policy configuration; its absence and is necessary in two strategies. The presence of post-conflict justice mechanisms, though quite prevalent among the cases, in inessential to avoiding a recurrence of war within five years.

**Security Personnel.** The presence of high numbers of military personnel is necessary in only two configurations, both of which require the absence of peacekeepers.
CONCLUSION

Maintaining peace after the end of civil war is a complex and challenging task for international and local peacebuilders. Since 1970, roughly one quarter of post-war episodes relapse into civil war between the same combatants, a number that rises to 40 percent if we include a return to lower-level conflict. Contrary to the expectations of the academic literature and the policy prescriptions invoked by the international community, peacebuilders should generally focus their efforts on the organization of the institutional and security architecture of the post-war society, rather than its democratic or economic features, to avoid a recurrence of fighting within five years.

There are four major strategies open to peacebuilders. The most familiar is the peacekeeping strategy, which combines a large number of peacekeepers with early elections. The second strategy focuses on local politics and patronage, which I hypothesize is effective because it funnels former fighters into local employment opportunities, especially into local political employment. A third strategy, a simple domination strategy, explains fewer cases and sits outside international norms and best practices, but is nonetheless important to understand to shape the strategic behavior of post-war governments that may find it appealing.

The last policy configuration explains not so much a “peacebuilding” strategy as the conditions necessary for a durable stalemate: first, the political independence of the government and rebel leadership; second, government finances that are secure enough such that a stalemate is not too threatening to the government, and third, an army too weak to threaten rebel groups or the absence of any attempt at post-war
justice or an authoritarian government that signs a structural adjustment policy. A democracy-centered strategy with significant external assistance--with or without peacekeepers--is also viable but surprisingly uncommon. Post-conflict justice, non-democracy, and structural adjustment programs are, generally speaking, unnecessary ingredients for successful post-war strategies to avoid war recurrence within five years--whatever else they may provide to a post-war society.

The policy relevance of my analysis is direct: I have identified the policies and configurations of policies that are associated with virtually every successful post-war episode since 1970, and have established the four general approaches that explain the vast majority of episodes successful at avoiding war recurrence. The analysis supplements and extends the lengthy quantitative civil war and peacekeeping literatures—which tend to focus on individual correlates to peace and their independent effects on peace--by instead assuming causal complexity and equifinality. It examined the causal recipes that emerge out of an analysis of all possible combinations of a 10-policy recipe scored on 99 observations. Policymakers in Washington, New York, and elsewhere can use these findings to determine the optimal policy configurations for future post-war episode--say, in Iraq, Ukraine, Syria, eastern DR Congo, or Colombia. The findings here allow policymakers to match the appropriate strategy to their desired ends.

The findings also indicate avenues for future research. Some researchers believe that quantitative, cross-national studies of civil war and peacekeeping have reached their limit—the further accumulation of knowledge in this subfield depending instead on micro-level research strategies. Bringing an alternative method to bear on the same data, this chapter identifies several areas for continued cross-national and cross-
conflict work—namely, comparative analysis of the major strategies and their variants, and the interactions of the central pillars of post-war policymaking. Peacebuilding after civil war can be dramatically improved and rationalized with a more complete understanding of this fraught policy environment and the policy levers open to local and international policymakers.
The use of Qualitative Comparative Analysis has been steadily increasing since at least 2010 (Thiem and Duşa 2013). Yet it remains relatively uncommon in the discipline and unfamiliar to many social scientists. Its shortcomings have been examined by Achen (2005) and in a recent QMMR newsletter (2014). As a robustness check on the findings of the previous chapter, here I conduct a conventional multivariate regression analyzing essentially the same data, but using continuous and time-variant data where available. The analytical focus is again on the determinants of peace consolidation versus war relapse in post-war countries since 1970.

The most appropriate approach is a Cox proportional hazard model, which here estimates the risk of war relapse during a spell of peace. A Cox model is a type of event-history, survival, or duration model: it counts the time between events and associates these durations with covariates. In the present analysis, peace periods “fail” when they return to war: the duration of a peace period is the number of years from the last day of fighting to the next recurrence of fighting\(^\text{16}\) (uncensored) or to December 31, 2014 (censored).

Much of the data are time-variant (i.e. it changes over time) so I transformed the cross-sectional dataset into time-series format, including GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth, Polity IV scores, military personnel per capita, total population, proportion of GDP derived from oil and natural gas rents, the Political Terror Scale, the occurrence of national

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\(^{16}\) Between the same actors, or, if the actors have evolved over time, at least over the same contested issue.
elections, and the duration since the last national election. Indicators for post-conflict justice, power-sharing governments, U.N. and other peacekeeping operations, DDR, military integration, military fragmentation, and decentralization are all essentially qualitative and time invariant. Some key data are not available for the entire post-war period in every episode, such as local elections. These data limitations were a primary motivation for attempting a QCA in the first instance.

Aside from differences in time-variance, there are three additional features to note. First, I updated the dataset with the newest UCDP-PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (July 2015). Second, I reincorporated into the analysis variables from the post-war and peacebuilding literature, namely ethnic fractionalization scores, GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth, and total area. Third (not shown), I included other standard control variables, such as total population, region dummies, the proportion of youth in the population, and the proportion of mountainous terrain: none of these variables showed statistically significant correlations with peace duration, across many different model specifications. They were therefore dropped from the analysis. What is left are specifications that closely follow Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom’s models of post-conflict risk (2008); this chapter can be seen as an update and refinement of that work.

With 44 out of 111 post-war episodes falling back into civil war, the average risk of relapse is 39.6 percent over the lifetime of a peace period. Figure 3.1 shows the estimated survival function for the core specification, which reveals the failure rate over the first 20 years, on the mean values of the covariates. The failure rate is much higher in the first five to seven years of the post-war period, at which point the curve
flattens. The dotted lines show the 95 percent confidence interval.

The core specification is given in Table 3.1, Column I, which closely follows the set memberships tested in the previous chapter. Subsequent columns show variations on that theme.
Note that Table 3.1 gives hazard ratios, rather than coefficient estimates. The ratios are interpretable relative to 1.0. If the ratio is greater than one, then the covariate increases the hazard rate multiplied by that amount, all else equal. Hazard ratios less than one indicate that a covariate reduces the hazard rate, holding everything else constant. For
example, a ratio of 0.85 means that a one unit increase in the covariate decreases the hazard rate by $1 - 0.85$ (or 15 percent). A 0.85 hazard ratio would translate (in our case) to a reduction in the overall risk of war relapse from 39.6 percent to 33.7 percent, ceteris paribus.

I tested the covariates for time-dependence in each model specification. If covariates have time-dependent effects— that is, their effects on war relapse change as the peace period progresses— then the hazards are not proportional and the Cox procedure will yield biased and inefficient estimates on all parameters (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001). No covariates showed evidence of time-dependent effects.

The findings are discussed by sector.

**Economic Influences**

The results confirm a key finding of the quantitative civil war and post-war literatures: economic growth matters considerably. The effect of GDP per capita growth on the hazard rate is large and statistically significant. In Column I, the hazard ratio is 0.964, meaning that for every additional percentage point in annual economic growth, the risk drops 3.6 percent, holding everything else constant. This ratio implies that an additional 5 percentage points of annual growth per capita— a feasible goal in many developing post-war countries— reduces the overall risk of war relapse from 39.6 percent to 32.5 percent. An additional 10 percentage points of growth per capita annually would reduce the overall risk from 39.6 percent to 25.3 percent, holding everything else constant. The significance and effect size of GDP per capita growth is robust in alternative models (Columns II, IV, V, VI).
Other measures of economic activity are not significantly associated with peace durations. Increases in GDP per capita and in oil and natural gas rents as a percentage of GDP are both associated with lower risk of war relapse, but not to a statistically significant degree. These results contradict central claims in the civil war and resource curse research programs (including, for example, Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2008)). Almost 10 additional years of economic and conflict data, as well as the inclusion of new and better data on military and political covariates, have perhaps washed out the statistical findings on GDP per capita and primary commodity exports.17

**Regime Features and Institutional Architectures**

In the previous chapter I defined the post-war institutional architecture as the overarching framework of the post-war settlement: for example, whether there was a victory or negotiated settlement, whether peacekeeping troops were present, whether a power-sharing government was in place, or whether the country was politically decentralized. The csQCA found significant relationships between such architectures and the ability of a society to avoid war relapse. The regression results generally confirm these findings.

Regime coherence dramatically lowers the risk of conflict relapse. I introduce dummy variables for democracy (scoring 5 or greater on the Polity IV measure) and autocracy (scoring -5 or less on the Polity IV measure); the missing dummy therefore represents anocracies: regimes with hybrid features.

17 An initial next step is to replicate directly the models from the earlier studies, using updated data.
A democratic regime reduces the risk of post-conflict relapse by approximately 72.7 percent compared to anocracy. Democracy reduces the overall risk of relapse from 39.6 percent to 10.8 percent— a truly massive risk mitigation effect, 20 times larger than adding an additional percentage point of economic growth per capita. An autocratic regime reduces the risk of relapse by approximately 60 percent compared to an anocracy, implying a reduction in overall risk from 39.6 percent to 15.8 percent. Evidently, democratic regimes perform better than autocratic regimes in post-war settings, but both perform far, far better than anocracies.

Why might the differences be so dramatic? Anocracies may perform so much worse as post-war regimes because institutional incoherence and institutional incapacity are closely linked. Hybrid regimes are considered incoherent because they are constituted by institutions that rely on differing sources of legitimacy—say, a president-for-life operating alongside an elected parliament. Such regimes often struggle with internal competition, but without the established conflict-regulating apparatuses of mature regimes. Unrestrained internal competition could make it difficult to implement post-war policies decisively. As far as post-war peacebuilding is concerned, anocracies have perhaps the worst of both worlds: they lack the pacifying effects of both the popular legitimacy of mature democracies, and also the ability of mature autocracies to deter rebellion.

**Political Terror**

Another statistically significant regime characteristic is a government’s use of political terror on its citizens, apart from civil war related death. I introduce a dummy variable for
whether a country scored four or five on the Political Terror Scale in a given year (Gibney, et al. 2015). A score of four indicates:

Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

While a score of five indicates:

Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

The use of political terror essentially guarantees war relapse: it increases the risk by 2.67 times. Indeed, if the overall rate of relapse is 39.6 percent, the presence of political terror pushes the overall risk to just above 100 percent!

The csQCA findings from the previous chapter found exactly the same result. The set of post-war countries that adopt political terror as a governing strategy are a perfect subset of countries that relapse into civil war: the presence of political terror is a sufficient condition to explain war relapse. We can say with confidence that political terror is a perfect predictor of whether a country will relapse into civil war.

**Military Influences**

The analysis finds that the size of the national military has a statistically significant, large, and negative effect on the risk of war relapse. For each additional security personnel per 1,000 residents, the hazard rate declines approximately 8.5 percent, ceteris paribus— an effect size more than twice as large as a one percentage point increase in GDP per capita.
growth annually. For the country in the dataset with the median population (Sri Lanka in 2002), an increase in one personnel per 1,000 residents is equivalent to raising the military by roughly 20,000 total personnel, or approximately 13 percent of Sri Lanka’s total reported military personnel in 2002 (158,000). (Note that these numbers are counting support staff, sailors, airmen and women, the entire chain of command, and other personnel, not strictly front-line soldiers.)

Contrary to the findings in the last chapter, other military variables are not important to predicting a durable peace in post-war episodes. Surprisingly, the presence of UN peacekeepers or other peacekeepers in the initial post-war phase does not seem to influence peace duration. Yet as described in Chapter 5, it is well established that the Security Council sends peacekeepers to “hard cases”-- precisely the cases most likely to relapse. The null result is probably due to selection bias, for which the Cox regression cannot account.18

**Power Sharing and Decentralization**

In the previous chapter, I found the presence or absence of power-sharing governments to be a key factor sorting cases into success or failure categories. The regression analysis does not find any evidence of a relationship, but this result may be due to selection bias: power-sharing governments, like peacekeeping missions, occur in “hard cases.” Typically actors must be forced by circumstances into power-sharing governments, which make such governments inherently less stable.

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18 One follow up analysis could be to replicate a recent, high-quality peacekeeping article that uses matching, such as Gilligan and Sergenti (2008), with the new data.
Decentralization shows some evidence of association with a lower risk of war relapse. The hazard ratio almost reaches conventional significance thresholds in several specifications. In Model III, decentralization shows a large and statistically significant effect on lowering the risk of conflict relapse, reducing the hazard 52.7 percent, holding everything else constant, and moving the overall risk from 39.6 percent to 19.1 percent.

**Elections**

The multivariate analysis finds no evidence that elections matter. The presence of an election in a given post-war year has no statistically significant effect on the hazard rate, nor does the number of years since the last election. Unfortunately I cannot test for the independent effect of local elections, or of holding local elections first, because there is no cross-national time series data available for local elections, unlike national elections. (I was able to test local elections in the QCA using cross-national data from Brancati and Snyder (2013)).

**Other Findings**

Ethnic diversity (measured by fractionalization) apparently has no influence on post-war hazard rates, all else equal. Addressing ethnic and communal tensions in post-war societies may be beneficial for other reasons, including normative ones, but such efforts should not substitute for policies that directly reduce the rate of conflict relapse. The analysis finds no evidence that post-conflict justice, DDR, or military integration reduces the risk of relapse.
CONCLUSION

The quantitative results in this chapter indicate the usefulness of taking multiple approaches to the study of civil war, peacebuilding, and post-conflict risks. This first pass suggests that the results from the csQCA are generally robust: regime features, military size, and decentralization are evidently correlated with peace duration, while political terror as a governing strategy virtually guarantees civil war relapse. Post-war economic growth is highly correlated with longer spells of peace. Post-war justice, ethnic fractionalization, the size of a country, DDR, military integration, and national elections are not correlated with longer durations of peace after civil wars end.
Libya after Qaddafi was originally thought to be fertile ground for a peaceful transition to democracy and the rule of law. Among the countries touched by the Arab Spring, Libyan society had comparatively high levels of education, wealth, and ethnic, linguistic, and religious homogeneity. It obviously had enormous oil wealth that could be used to smooth over political differences and fund the government. Yet the transitional government inherited deeply fragmented state institutions, many new political actors with little knowledge and deep skepticism of their peers, and a citizenry with no experience in majoritarian governance or the rule of law. The transition nonetheless moved forward in a number of sectors.

The focus of this case study is a structural explanation for Libyan stability and apparent progress from 2011 to 2014, and for the breakdown of the transition in mid-2014. Though Libya adopted many of the best practices of the international peacebuilding consensus—quickly restarting economic activity, holding early elections, democratizing its politics, developing post-conflict justice and reconciliation mechanisms—the explanation for stability is deeper: the main political and military factions were locked in a durable stalemate. The stalemate rested on four pillars: the territorial independence of the factions in defensible space, the free flow of revenues to the government, a weak formed security sector, and a situation of legal impunity for all actors. Each pillar was a necessary condition for the stalemate: remove any of them and at least one faction would have preferred fighting. In the event, the stalemate ended in 2014 because two pillars broke down.
First, the nationalist secular faction centered in Benghazi ceded its defensible space to jihadists, who then massively escalated its assassination and terror campaign against members of that camp. With their backs against the wall, the nationalist-secular faction returned to full scale armed combat.

Second, the legal impunity of one faction became jeopardized by mid-2014. The national-secular camp won a lopsided victory in low-turnout parliamentary elections in June 2014. Their rivals—a motley coalition of Misratans, Brotherhood members, Salafis, and anti-Qaddafi revolutionaries—perceived their loss as removing the last legal impediment to the imposition of an Egyptian-style military regime on Libya, staffed in large measure by Qaddafi-era holdovers. With the example of Egypt at the front of their minds, the Brotherhood members in particular found such an outcome threatening and unacceptable. As a result, they led an armed uprising against the new parliament even before it was seated. No amount of oil-related patronage could substitute for the (perceived) existential threats facing key actors in Benghazi and among the Brotherhood and their allies.

In mid-2014, Libya lapsed back into civil war for the first time since the death of Muammar el-Qaddafi in October 2011. In late 2013 and early 2014, the low-level insurgency near Benghazi rapidly escalated, with bombings and assassinations targeting hundreds of military and police officers, judges, lawyers, human rights and women’s rights activists, and others. In May 2014, a coalition of official and quasi-official armed groups, led by former Qaddafi general-turned-dissident Khalifa Hifter, launched Operation Dignity, a campaign aimed at demobilizing the Islamist militias they blamed for the surge in killings. To the west, Hifter’s allies successfully pressured the transitional parliament to schedule elections that it had refused to hold despite the expiration of its mandate in January. Those
elections were held in June amid very low turnout and ongoing skirmishes across the country. As it slowly became clear that the nationalist camp had trounced the Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in the elections, the Islamist’s allies launched a putsch in Tripoli, called Libya Dawn. Led by revolutionary brigades from Misrata and Tripoli, Dawn forces drove their rivals from the capital. With the capital in hostile hands, the new parliament convened instead in Tobruk; the Dawn coalition declared its own government in August. The crisis escalated further when Egypt and the United Arab Emirates launched airstrikes against the Islamist-backed militias near Tripoli. Jihadist groups affiliated with al Qaeda and the Islamic State gained strength and territory in Benghazi, Derna, and Sirte during winter and spring 2015.

After 42 years of a corrupt and vicious dictatorship, eight months of civil war, and three years of fraught transition, Libyan society finds itself lurching from one political crisis to the next. Even if intensive negotiations led by the United Nations and diplomatic pressure from regional powers can stop the current fighting, Libya’s immediate future looks grim: a fragmented state, disrupted oil exports, shrinking government revenues, local political monopolies, and moribund national politics. Yet when Qaddafi was killed in fall 2011, many observers believed that Libya would have a fairly easy transition. Relative to the other countries affected by the Arab Spring, Libyan society had comparatively high levels of education, broad affluence, and ethnic, linguistic, and religious homogeneity. Libya had enormous oil revenues that the government could use to smooth over political differences—revenues absent in Egypt, Tunisia, or Yemen. In addition, the various rebel groups had worked fairly well together during the war, the transitional government had drafted a well thought-out
plan to get the country operating again, and the Libyan people were politically activated and eager to transform their society along democratic lines.

This chapter offers an explanation for the uneasy peace from 2011 to 2014, and the changing conditions that led to the breakdown of the transition during 2014. Libya comprised a specific policy configuration discussed in Chapter 2. This configuration allowed a stalemate to endure. No political faction had the capacity to destroy its rivals; but neither did any faction view the stalemate as intolerable. There were multiple opportunities for Libya to tip back into civil war between 2011 and 2014. Bloody clashes were frequent, even endemic, but each time that Libya reached the precipice of renewed civil war, the factions deescalated the situation. Only in 2014—after the underlying conditions favoring a stalemate had shifted—did the contest escalate into full-scale armed conflict.

Post-war Libya has important, ongoing policy relevance for the international community for at least two reasons. First, some western strategists have touted the “Libya Model” as a simpler, cheaper, less risky, and less taxing intervention approach to the “Bosnia,” “Kosovo,” “Afghanistan,” or “Iraq Models.” The “Libya Model” uses western air and sea power and clandestine Special Forces operations to support local fighters—followed by a post-war support mission limited to diplomatic, technical, training, and financial assistance. The “Libya Model” thus lacks two key components of conventional peacebuilding practice: a large troop deployment and an intensive civil-administrative, state-building effort. International actions in post-war Libya—including the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)—are assistance missions whose roles are limited to advising, training, brokering, warning, exhorting, funding,
and otherwise supporting. In essence, international actors were attempting peacebuilding without peacekeepers. If, in the next few years, Libya successfully consolidates itself as a democratic country at peace with itself and its neighbors, western powers are more likely to adopt this strategic approach in future crises.

Second, the Libya case has policy relevance to the international community because a conflict-ridden or failed state on the Mediterranean Sea will become an ongoing threat to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Libya has already become a safe-haven for international terrorists, a source of large refugee outflows, and a source of significant instability in the global oil markets. Finding a viable path to political order in Libya is critical to Western security in the near term.

Beyond these policy consequences, post-war Libya has quite significant implications for theories of comparative political science and international relations because it has followed a relatively unusual post-war path that has not been well studied in the academic literatures. Rebel organizations rarely win civil wars when they are as organizationally and politically weak as the Libyan revolutionaries. The rebel groups lacked deep local legitimacy, a coherent political program, a strong internal discipline, or an administratively powerful organization. Instead of answering the basic questions about Libya’s future, the fall of Qaddafi only added to them. Having won only with timely assistance from NATO and the Friends of Libya coalition, the victorious but weak rebels began their transition almost from scratch, without a large international mission to provide basic security or public services during the transition. Rebel state-building without international supervision is not unprecedented in recent history, but the closest historical comparisons are not promising: Chad (1990),
Ethiopia (1991), Somalia (1991), Uganda (1992), Rwanda (1994), DR Congo (2001), and Nepal (2006). In each of these countries, the end of the civil war coincided with a regime change, and the new rebel-led governments needed to reconstitute the state. Yet half succumbed to renewed war within five years, none are consolidated democracies, and all remain extremely poor.

Most of peacebuilding literature focuses on international policy interventions, rather than on local attempts to build peace in the absence of international supervision. Post-war Libya is therefore a good case to test many of the dominant findings: that third party enforcers are essential to the consolidation of peace after civil war; that internal security is the sine qua non of any post-war policy agenda; that early elections are premature in countries inexperienced with democracy; that natural resources are a political ‘curse;’ that consociational political institutions improve prospects for peace; and many others. That Libya, despite so many handicaps, has muddled through even three years without a recurrence of hostilities on the scale of the 2011 civil war is remarkable in itself, and it suggests that post-war countries can consolidate peace even in inhospitable settings and without international supervision so long as they adopt policy configurations appropriate to their context.

The case study has four parts: (1) a presentation of the policy environment in which victorious Libyan rebels found themselves in late 2011, (2) an explanation of key policy decisions made in the first three years of the post-war episode, with a particular focus on the incentives and capabilities of the most important actors, (3) a discussion of the changing strategic environment that led to the collapse of the transition during 2014, and (4) an analysis of the configuration of
policies that Libyan and international policymakers should adopt going forward.
Contemporary theories of civil war and civil peace do not seriously grapple with the subset of post-war cases that are essentially stalemates or frozen conflicts.\footnote{Furthermore, the insights from the relatively small scholarship on frozen conflicts have not been incorporated into the dominant theories of civil war and peacekeeping. The primary insight is the role of external actors in sustaining and manipulating local political cleavages (Cite).} Most studies of civil war termination and recurrence (e.g. Walter (1997, 1999, 2004), Hartzell and Hoddie (2003, 2007), Hoddie and Hartzell (2005), Mattes and Savun (2009 2010), Fearon (2004)) lump stalemate cases together with cases that have more definitive post-war settlements: for example, cases where the political incompatibility has been resolved through a battlefield victory, where a negotiated settlement is enforced, or where an international actor imposes a trusteeship.

Yet stalemate cases are clearly distinctive. In cases like Nagorno-Karabakh, Myanmar, or Kurdish Iran, major combat operations cease for a considerably long duration, but without the underlying political incompatibility being resolved. There are often no national institutions to manage the conflict, the actors remain mobilized for war, and fighting and low-level conflict periodically erupts. While all the key actors surely prefer a clear political or military victory, the actors are also willing to tolerate an uneasy peace for long periods of time. Prevailing theories of civil war termination and peacebuilding do a poor job explaining these stalemates. These episodes do not resemble our common notions of post-war reconstruction or political order, but rather they resemble the sort of strategic stalemate or balancing that existed between

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the superpowers during the Cold War, or among the major European powers from 1815 to 1914.

Under what conditions does such a stalemated peace emerge after major civil war? Is stalemate explained by a roughly equal distribution of power across domestic political actors? Or can we isolate other conditions that buttress these stalemates after a civil war concludes?

The previous chapter proposed the following necessary conditions for a stalemate:

A) The political (territorial) independence of factions,

B) Secure government revenues,

And either:

C) A weak national army, or

D) No attempt to impose post-conflict justice on factions, or

E) An authoritarian-reformist central government.

In Boolean notation, this configuration of conditions can be expressed as:

(1) stalemate = A*B*(C+D+E)

These configurations keep war from recurring in as much as 20 to 40 percent of all post-war cases since 1970. I argue that these conditions create a strategic environment in which no actor has the incentive or the capability to defect from the stalemate and attempt to revise this post-war “settlement.”

Libya after Qaddafi is one such case. The experiences of post-war Libya are consistent with the theoretical claims made in the previous chapter: that institutional and military factors explain whether a post-war country can avoid a recurrence of civil war, rather than factors such as democratization, economic liberalization, reconciliation and post-conflict justice, or the expansion of women and minority representation. In fact, by
almost all accounts, Libya made significant progress on peacebuilding policies from 2011 to 2014. The multi-track strategy adopted by Libyans--with the crucial assistance of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)--yielded impressive results, including many peacebuilding policies that (on paper) met or exceeded international best practices. Yet these efforts were not enough to end the political conflicts and establish a new and functional state. The weakness and fragmentation of Libya’s political and security milieu precluded the implementation of most policies, the restoration of state control, and the normalization of social, economic, and political life. The transition’s apparent progress was ultimately superficial since no progress was made on renovating Libya’s institutional and military architectures.

This political and security fragmentation had two effects. First, it contributed to the stalemate and provided short-term stability because of a rough balance of power among the major factions. No faction was strong enough militarily to threaten their rivals’ strongholds. Furthermore, because Libyan political identities and organizations revolve around local and tribal networks, the political appeal of actors from other regions of Libya was limited. As a result, the major factions felt relatively secure from political and military encroachment.

Second, the fragmentation meant that hard decisions about the demobilization of rival groups and about how to confront spoilers kept being put off. The unstable government’s only option was to exhort or bribe the revolutionary brigades to demobilize or integrate with the armed forces. These policies were unsuccessful at bringing the armed groups to heel, and issues related to demobilization and counterterrorism policy accumulated over 2013 and 2014. The modus vivendi that held among the major armed factions broke down in the first half of
2014. It broke down for two reasons. First, radical groups in Benghazi accelerated their campaign of terror against mainstream nationalist groups and former establishment figures. Prior to this point, Benghazi was a comparatively safe area for centrist groups representing the local establishment and the nationalist current. When the going got tough in Tripoli, figures from transitional government or the National Forces Alliance could always retreat to Benghazi. But with Benghazi itself now under threat, the nationalist camp had its back against the wall, and was forced to strike back at the revolutionary brigades conducting the terrorism campaigns (mostly Ansar al-Sharia with tacit support from more mainstream Islamist revolutionary groups). The “territorial independence” of the nationalist camp in their Benghazi stronghold faltered, and this helped end the stalemate. The second factor that broke down the stalemated transition was the almost complete exclusion of Islamist politicians from the successor body to the General National Council. For the entire post-war episode, no faction and no military organization had a preponderance of legitimate power across Libya, let alone a monopoly. With Islamist’s excluded from the new parliamentary body, there would be little legal impediment to Libyan nationalists adopting the violent anti-Brotherhood strategy that was unfolding in neighboring Egypt. Indeed, Hifter cited Egyptian president Fattah el-Sisi and his actions as his model. (Whether the new government or Operation Dignity would soon have the capacity to implement Egypt’s strategy was another matter.) The election results would have allowed the parliament (dominated by nationalists) to impose itself, by law, on the Islamist coalition. The prospect of legal jeopardy, of subordination to the civil or military justice systems, was too dangerous to the Brotherhood affiliates or
their Misratan allies. Thus two necessary conditions for stalemate failed in 2014, and civil war renewed.
Libya’s unstable and fragile transition was the direct outgrowth of Qaddafi’s malign legacy, and the manner in which the 2011 civil war unfolded. Qaddafi intentionally kept his formal security sector weak and fragmented, protecting his regime instead with politically loyal paramilitary organizations and a ruthless secret police. Once the rebellion and NATO strikes destroyed these pillars of his regime, the remnants of the formal security sector—especially the police and army—were incapable of establishing public order in the post-war environment. Neither were the victorious rebels able to provide adequate security. Indeed, the NATO intervention averted almost certain defeat for the rebels in March 2011, and NATO later shifted the ensuing stalemate in favor of the rebels in September and October 2011. The rebels toppled Qaddafi without developing a coherent, nationwide political-military organization, and the war ended before the various rebel groups had answered basic questions over command-and-control, their political program, or transitional governance. Despite the substantial advance work of the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council (NTC), the NTC entered Tripoli only as the most prominent of several competing rebel factions, rather than as a true post-war government-in-waiting with the popular legitimacy and administrative capacity to enact its program. Yet despite these handicaps, post-Qaddafi Libya did not experience a recurrence of major civil war until mid to late 2014, and only then arguably. This section and the next section explain the decrepit state of the security sector, which ultimately enabled the post-war stalemate.
Security Sector Fragmentation and Politicization

Muammar Qaddafi was one of seventy junior officers and enlisted men who led the bloodless coup d’état of September 1969 that deposed the monarchy and established an Arab nationalist regime headed by a Revolutionary Command Committee. The RCC appointed a cabinet to run the ministries, promoted Qaddafi to colonel and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and named him chairman of the RCC (Vandewalle 2012, 73, 81, 145). The ruling clique—virtually all of them graduates of the military academy from the class of 1963—immediately purged high-ranking military officers, and dramatically increased the number of personnel in the small, 7,000-soldier force, by recruiting new soldiers and merging regional militias into it (Vandewalle 2012, 73, 81, 145).

From the beginning, Qaddafi used the security sector as a political tool, and consequently the security sector provided neither security nor justice for most Libyans. In the early years of Qaddafi’s regime, the country was governed directly by the armed forces: military men dominated the RCC, and the RCC directed the cabinet. Qaddafi adopted the confrontational and revolutionary rhetoric of Gemal Abdul Nasser, but the new regime pursued a relatively pragmatic foreign policy concerning its international oil contracts (Vandewalle 2012, 77-78). The U.K. and U.S. were, however, forced to evacuate air bases located in northern Libya.

Over time, political power shifted from the formal security sector to informal and paramilitary institutions. In response to internal and external threats in the mid-1970s, Qaddafi inserted political loyalists into the armed forces, police, and judiciary (Vandewalle 2012, 119). He also established extralegal political courts to suppress opposition (Vandewalle 2012, 121, 141). An
informal group of several-hundred regime loyalists cycled through the major security organizations, which were multiplied and given vague and overlapping remits to prevent any one agency from posing a threat to the regime (Vandewalle 2012, 148-150). Qaddafi also regularly purged the armed forces of perceived malcontents.

The official security sector and other elements of the formal state were kept weak. Appointments issued based on loyalty, rather than merit, and officials rotated quickly such that ambitious officers would not have the chance to build a power base (Vandewalle 2012, 145). Military funding decisions were made for domestic political reasons, rather than any assessment of security needs (Vandewalle 2012, 146). Family members, including Qaddafi’s sons, ascended to the highest positions, with Qaddafi’s tribe and other politically important tribes over-represented in the security sector leadership (Vandewalle 2012, 149).

While the relative importance of individual security institutions waxed and waned over time, Qaddafi’s security sector overall remained fragmented, politicized, and unprofessional. As elsewhere in Qaddafi’s state, the security sector was bifurcated into parallel structures: a set of powerful, regime-protecting, personalistic, but informal institutions alongside withered and relatively powerless formal institutions.

To maintain political legitimacy at home Qaddafi frequently sought to provoke his neighbors and western powers, positioning himself as a leading Arab nationalist, the champion of the Palestinian cause, and the nemesis of western imperialism. His rhetoric was not matched by battlefield successes. Egypt crushed Libyan tank formations and disabled the Libyan air force in a border skirmish in 1977. Libya deployed 3,000 troops to support
Idi Amin’s invasion of Tanzania in 1978 and 1979, but they performed poorly and took heavy casualties. When the United States launched punitive airstrikes in 1986 against Tripoli and Benghazi, Libyan anti-aircraft defenses barely functioned, soldiers deserted their posts, and command-and-control broke down. Libyan military initiatives in Chad were thwarted throughout the 1980s by French and Chadian forces. Chadian units forcibly ejected the Libyan army in 1987 despite being outnumbered and under supplied.

Qaddafi complemented these limited conventional capabilities with terrorism, offering safe haven and material resources for a variety of Arab left-wing and nationalist terrorist groups, and sponsoring deadly and often spectacular attacks in the 1970s and 1980s that pushed the regime to the fringes of the international system. Rather than giving Qaddafi the domestic and international legitimacy he craved, Libyan support of terrorism weakened the regime at home and marginalized it even among potentially sympathetic audiences like the Soviets or the Arab nationalists. Qaddafi also developed or acquired WMD capabilities—mostly chemical weapons, but also a rudimentary nuclear program—that he renounced in late 2003.

**Force Structure and Arms Acquisitions**

The regime quickly recognized the political benefits of a large military, which it used to groom loyalists and distribute patronage. From 7,000 soldiers in 1969, manpower peaked at around 125,000 active and reserve personnel in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Cordesman 2005). The army constituted the bulk

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of this manpower, with 55,000 active-duty, professional soldiers at its peak. Just before the Arab Spring, force strength had declined to approximately 25,000 professional soldiers, with another 25,000 conscripts, and an estimated 40,000-person reserve force (The Military Balance 2011, 320-321).

The regime purchased weapons, at least in theory, to fight wars of maneuver in the desert. Using his massive oil revenues, Qaddafi purchased such vast quantities of tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles that Libya became “the world’s largest military parking lot” (Cordesman 2005). Most of this weaponry quickly became useless: Libya never trained personnel to operate the equipment, nor budgeted for maintenance. Just before the civil war, Libya reported over 2,000 main battle tanks, 2,400 artillery pieces, and 2,000 mechanized infantry vehicles—most of them obsolete and with perhaps half being serviceable (The Military Balance 2011, 320-321; Cordesman 2005).

Qaddafi’s navy was also barely operational. By 2011, the navy owned two frigates and one submarine—none deployable in combat—and various smaller craft suited for coast guard missions (The Military Balance 2011, 320-321). In 2010, the navy and coast guard reported 8,000 personnel. By 2011, the air force had a variety of fixed-wing aircraft, including one bomber squadron, a single advanced fighter squadron of six planes, and many lesser quality fighter squadrons.

Qaddafi’s air transport capabilities were adequate to police the tribes in Libya’s vast southern deserts. The air force maintained 60 attack helicopters and several dozen transport helicopters, and the training of helicopter units was at a higher level (The Military Balance 2011, 320-321; Cordesman 2005). One of the regime’s best successes was its strategic deployment capacity; Libya used transport aircraft to send troops to a number of African countries since the late 1970s,
even if those troops did not perform adequately upon their arrival.

Beginning in the mid 2000s, during his rapprochement with the west, Qaddafi began to modernize his forces with purchases of fighter aircraft, air defense systems, a submarine, main battle tanks, anti-tank missiles, and communications equipment from France and Russia (The Military Balance 2009, 237). These efforts included training from British Special Forces. The highest quality unit in the regime’s armed forces was the 32nd Reinforced Brigade, known as the Khamis Brigade after its commander Khamis al-Qaddafi, son of the dictator. The Khamis Brigade was later crucial to the regime’s efforts to suppress the rebellion, defend Tripoli, and isolate Misrata (Fahim 2011b). The Arab Spring cut short this belated attempt at force modernization.

**The Security and Justice Sectors as an Instrument of Oppression**

Early in his tenure, Qaddafi retained at least some popular legitimacy as an Arab nationalist and thorn in the side of western powers. He was also adept at funneling patronage through Libya’s political and tribal systems. Yet as time wore on, Qaddafi’s popularity waned and he became increasingly dependent on the brutality of his paramilitaries to maintain his political dominance. By the late 1980s and early 1990s-- at the height of Libya’s international isolation-- the most important instrument of Qaddafi’s political control was his internal security apparatus.

The justice sector, like the security sector, was bifurcated into a politicized regime-serving system, and a more typical criminal and civil systems. Most of the worst human
rights abuses occurred in the former, though neither half of the system provided adequate justice for the Libyan people.

Qaddafi established political courts in the 1970s. These courts resumed the death penalty for regime opponents, including coup plotters. Qaddafi’s agents assassinated opponents at home and abroad (Amnesty 2010, 17-18, 30). The Internal Security Agency operated secret detention centers and prisons, and answered only to Qaddafi (Amnesty 2010, 30). At these sites, the regime conducted executions, extrajudicial killings, severe torture, ‘disappearances,’ and holding prisoners incommunicado (Amnesty 2010, 29-54). Even non-political crimes were punished harshly: judges regularly condemned adulterers (in practice, mainly women) to flogging, and punished thieves with amputation (Human Rights Watch 2006a).

Legislation prohibited any political, social, or economic activities outside state-sanctioned ones. The rights of association, speech, assembly, the press, information, privacy, or petition were non-existent. Any efforts to exercise these rights received harsh reprisals for virtually the entire Qaddafi-era. The consequence of these policies was that Libya has had essentially no independent civil society since the mid-1970s (Human Rights Watch 2006b, 1-4; Amnesty 2010, 10).

**Abu Salim Prison Massacre**

During the twilight of Qaddafi’s regime, one of the most important human rights controversies was the Abu Salim Prison massacre in 1996, in which a protest by prisoners led to the mass murder of some 1,200 detainees. For years afterward, the regime denied any deaths occurred and restricted all information coming out of the prison. The government did not officially recognize the event until 2004; families of the disappeared sought information from the Qaddafi regime with no success.
(Amnesty 2010, 67). Even now the victims have not been authoritatively identified. In 2008, the government began issuing death certificates and offering significant financial compensation, yet no explanation for the deaths was forthcoming (Human Rights Watch 2009, 5-6).

Late Attempts at Legal Reforms

The years leading up to the civil war saw modest, but notable moves toward reform, centered on Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, Muammar Qaddafi's second-oldest son. The Gaddafi Development Foundation (GDF), for example, was allowed to criticize the regime, and served as a vehicle for Saif’s political ambitions. The foundation did have some modest liberalizing successes: namely, publicizing human rights violations, facilitating the release of hundreds of political detainees, and organizing visits by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (Amnesty 2010, 20-21). Separately, Saif’s al-Ghad corporation established the first two privately owned newspapers in decades, which did manage to be critical of the regime when they were not being harassed (Amnesty 2010, 21-22).

Impact on Post-War Libya

The legacies of the Qaddafi era are unfavorable terrain for the quick or easy emergence of security and justice sectors that are transparent, accountable, effective, and responsive to the needs of the public. None of the personnel available to the new government has any experience participating in a human-rights-centered security sector in which the uniformed forces submit to civilian authorities. Key oversight bureaucracies-- the Ministries of Defense and Interior in particular-- are being built from scratch on external models, and will lack the local familiarity and support that organically- and historically-
derived institutions enjoy. Libyan security personnel-- new and old-- have no experience 1) conducting long-term planning, 2) recruiting or promoting based on merit, 3) accounting for key public stakeholder preferences, or 4) keeping transparent financial accounts. Finally, there seems to be little in the way of a culture of tolerance or human rights at any level of society and state. In short, Libya’s experience under Qaddafi suggests the country was most likely to replace one authoritarian security sector with another.
The Libyan civil war is notable for how quickly the entire process unfolded. Four days after protests finally drove President Hosni Mubarak from power in neighboring Egypt, small groups held demonstrations and sit-ins in Benghazi on Wednesday, 16 February. These protesters objected to the detention of a human rights lawyer and demanded justice for mass killings in 1996 and 2006. Separately, youth organizers inspired by events in Cairo’s Tahrir Square used social media to organize a large protest in Benghazi on Thursday, 17 February. Qaddafi miscalculated and attempted to suppress the gathering with massive violence in Benghazi. His regime’s response escalated the situation and precipitated even larger protests in Benghazi on Friday, and new protests in Misrata and Tripoli over the weekend. On Monday, Tripoli witnessed widespread violence: rioting, bombings, the burning of government buildings, and the regime’s deployment of heavy weapons and helicopters in densely-populated areas within the city limits (Agence France Presse 2011a). Unlike in neighboring Egypt, where the protesters were largely peaceful, and the security forces operated with some discretion, it was clear after only a few days that Libya was engulfed in a true popular revolt, with all actors adopting strategies of violence.

Regime Fragmentation

The popular uprisings triggered a rapid fragmentation of the state apparatus. Security forces in eastern Libya deserted their posts and, depending on their allegiances, either retreated west toward Tripoli or pledged support to the demonstrators and opened their arsenals to them. On 21 February,
the Justice Minister, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, resigned in protest of the mass violence and was joined by several diplomats stationed abroad. Two fighter pilots, both colonels, flew to Malta and defected rather than follow orders to fire on unarmed protesters. The following day, Interior Minister Abdul Fatah Younis resigned and called for a military coup d’état. By the end of this first week, loyalist forces had abandoned all of eastern Libya, and Benghazi was securely in the hands of opposition protesters (Agence France Presse 2011b). Misrata, Libya’s third city, was in open revolt and under sustained attack from Qaddafi forces positioned outside the city limits. Even in western Libya, much nearer to Qaddafi’s seat of power and his tribal homeland, protesters had driven security forces from the important towns of Zawiya and Zaroua. Though fast moving, the conflict was also intense: fatalities had already climbed well above one thousand in little more than a week, and opposition groups were gathering military equipment for protracted warfare (Agence France Presse 2011b). Even the international community moved with unusual alacrity— the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the regime’s crackdown on 22 February 2011; on 26 February 2011 the Council imposed an arms embargo, banned travel by regime leaders, and froze regime assets through UNSC Resolution 1970.

The combat in this first week was sharpest where the regime calculated it needed to stand and fight: Tripoli, Misrata, and oil assets in the west, including the town of Zawiya. Zawiya was both the closest town to Tripoli to rise up, and the site of Libya’s largest oil refinery. Over the second week of the revolt, Qaddafi’s regime regained its footing and reversed some territorial losses using all tools of coercion and patronage available to it.
Figure 4.2: Map of Libya (Source: United Nations)
The loyalists’ first action was to secure Tripoli. Turning whole neighborhoods into “free fire zones” successfully drove the protesters from the streets (Agence France Presse 2011a). (For the duration of the conflict, rebel organizations in Tripoli operated underground.) The regime then ringed Tripoli with checkpoints and roadblocks by 25 February; its most loyal and capable units, including the elite brigade led by Qaddafii’s son Khamis, protected the western approaches to the capital (Fletcher 2011). The town of Zlitan and Qaddafii’s tribal homeland around Bani Walid remained loyal, which meant that by the end of the second week, regime security forces controlled a stronghold roughly 100 by 75 miles, including the capital, several revenue-producing oil facilities, the country’s main air and sea ports, and massive amounts of artillery, armor, vehicles, and ordinance that Qaddafii had stored in the west for precisely this contingency. The regime also controlled the cities of Sirte and Sabha, and a modest number of serviceable warplanes and helicopters.

In addition to these maneuvers, the government took a series of public and private steps to secure its position. The regime used cash payments to fortify the loyalty of citizens still under its control in the west. On 27 February, national banks began issuing cash and mobile phone credits to Libyan families, with promises of more (Michael 2011). The regime undoubtedly (if clandestinely) purchased the loyalty of tribal figures, military officers, and other notables with cash payments. Qaddafii and his son Saif al Islam made efforts to delegitimize the protest movement, and appeared on television and radio broadcasts linking the protests to al Qaeda, then claiming that the protesters were drug- and alcohol-addled youths. (Whatever minimal effect these claims may have had on local public opinion, they opened up the regime up to
international ridicule.) Lastly, in these early weeks the regime enforced discipline on its closest ranks by executing scores of high-ranking officers for their unwillingness to follow orders that would have led to mass civilian casualties--a fact only revealed in interviews after the war (Worth 2011).

**From Popular Uprising to Rebel Movement**

With its stronghold secured by the end of February, the regime prepared for a general counterattack. Now the popular uprising revealed some fundamental and, in the event, almost fatal weaknesses. First, despite a few high-profile defections and army mutinies in the east, the uprisings’ military capabilities were almost non-existent. In the east, the popular uprising and the withdrawal of most security forces westward caused “citizen militias” to self-mobilize and provide basic public order. These militias armed themselves with weapons at hand, patrolled their neighborhoods and villages, and celebrated the developments. These casual revolutionaries allied themselves with defecting army units, but the army units lacked the organizational infrastructure and time necessary to absorb the militias, train them, and establish any command and control. Furthermore, the uprising in the east faced a shortage of modern weapons, especially heavy weapons, and were poorly trained, since Qaddafi had a deliberate, longstanding policy of holding back resources, quality personnel, and training from his regular army units stationed in the east for precisely this reason--to undermine easterners’ ability to organize themselves, if a revolt did come, into an armed opposition that could resist the more loyal and better-equipped paramilitary forces stationed in the west. Throughout the war, rebels from the east maneuvered
chiefly with converted pick-up trucks or personal automobiles, and used no airpower of their own.

A second rebel weakness was a lack of any credible, legitimate leadership that could step into the political vacuum created by the popular uprising. While most popular uprisings struggle to find leaders and organize themselves, this problem was heightened in Libya by the idiosyncratic political and social life imposed on society by Qaddafi since the 1970s. Libyan society lacked even weak or partially independent social institutions that could step into the breach: Libya had no political parties, regional or local governments, trade unions, independent legislators or judges, independent or robust civil society groups, or even religious or traditional organizations (Vandewalle 2012). The Muslim Brotherhood was a virtual shadow of its counterpart in Egypt. The only social organizations that could draw on independent sources of legitimacy, and were therefore the most likely to provide a focal point for organized political opposition, were Libya’s tribes. Yet this traditional system had been effectively subverted by 40 years of skillful, highly personalistic, patronage-based rule. Over the course of the conflict, the tribal organizations did not coalesce into political opposition, except among the eastern tribes around Benghazi. As organizations, the major tribes in Libya’s central, western, and southern regions either split into loyalist and rebel camps, or remained studiously neutral throughout most of the war. Thus the rebels in the east had few leadership figures or organizational resources to draw on as they began constituting a shadow government and military command in Benghazi in late February and early March. Communicating with, let alone coordinating or organizing with, potential rebel leaders in Misrata and further west was essentially impossible.
With no other path forward, organizing for rebellion in the east began from scratch and from the ground up. Nine days after the initial protests began, a collection of individual lawyers and human rights advocates formed a committee in Benghazi, and announced the formation of a city council to administer the city (Agence France Presse 2011c). Other eastern cities quickly followed Benghazi’s lead and formed their own revolutionary councils. With crucial guidance from high-ranking defectors, these municipal committees formed the National Transitional Council on 27 February (Schemm 2011). The NTC announced its 33-member legislative body on 5 March and its executive cabinet on 23 March---over a month after the start of the uprising.

Throughout the war, but especially at its beginning, the NTC struggled to establish political legitimacy and administrative control over the rebel movement and liberated territories. Initially, the Council’s membership was largely eastern in origin; some representatives were appointed from cities and towns that had rebelled in the west and center of Libya but, for reasons of safety, the NTC did not reveal their names. Regime-held territories were not represented at all, with the Council instead “eagerly awaiting” these delegations when battlefield circumstances permitted ("NTC Statement on Membership," 2011). Furthermore, many Libyans felt the leadership of the Council was politically suspect. The designated chairman of the NTC was the former justice minister Mustafa Abdul Jalil, while its chief executive was the former high-ranking economic official Mahmoud Jibril--a former confidant of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi. The leadership’s previous allegiances to the regime left the Council open to the charge that it did not represent, nor would implement, revolutionary change. At this early phase, however, the greatest deficit was time: neither the new Council nor the revolutionary brigades had
time to prove their loyalty or competence in battle, or to establish any popular legitimacy through elections, or to transform the popular protests into a true rebel movement.

The NTC had barely announced itself when Qaddafi loyalists began their general counterattack eastward, recapturing coastal towns almost as fast as it had lost them. The regime used combined arms and paramilitary forces with great effect: Bin Jawaad fell on 6 March; Ras Lanuf was captured after a coordinated attack from air, land, and sea by 10 March. Zawiya, in the west, fell on 11 March; Brega, a major oil city, was retaken on 13 March. Also on 13 March the Khamis Brigade besieged Misrata, thereby protecting the supply lines of Qaddafi forces farther east. By the afternoon of 17 March, regime loyalists had arrived 90 miles west of Benghazi, having pushed the rebels over 500 miles along the seaside highway in only ten days.

If their brush with defeat had galvanized Qaddafi’s forces, the rebels reacted to their setbacks with ever-greater disorder. The rebels in the east appointed former Interior Minister Abdel Fattah Younis as their overall commander, but when Qaddafi’s vanguard began infiltrating Benghazi on 18 and 19 March, the uprising was on the verge of collapse.

**ENTER NATO AND THE LIBYA CONTACT GROUP**

The lack of a politically and militarily viable organization would have almost certainly proven fatal to the rebellion had not the United States, Britain, France, and other coalition members begun a military intervention just as Qaddafi’s forces reached Benghazi. The diplomatic origin of the intervention was somewhat novel, and had important implications for the post war environment. The Obama administration pursued a
cautious strategy during the Arab Spring reflecting competing U.S. interests, the regional security context, and the political and diplomatic legacy of the Iraq War (see Chivvis (2013) for a detailed discussion of the political and diplomatic history of the conflict). Generally sympathetic to the protester’s goals of democratization and reform, the Administration was quite wary of taking steps that might precipitate instability and violence at the heart of the Arab world-- results that might unravel the complex tapestry of security agreements in the region. U.S. signaling, public diplomacy, and private assurances played a critical role in coaxing actors into a relatively peaceful transition in Egypt in January and February 2011. Such a ‘soft touch’ approach was infeasible in Libya for a variety of reasons, not least because the situation became so violent so quickly. At the same time, the Administration resisted early calls for military intervention from familiar corners of the Washington security establishment.

Instead the Administration pursued a strategy they later described (perhaps inartfully) as “leading from behind:” the United States would provide support to European and Arab efforts to end the violence in Libya, but would not itself lead the process. The Administration told its European and Arab allies to build a case against Qaddafi and recruit a coalition for any intervention.

Qaddafi’s rhetoric became increasingly bloodthirsty as his forces reached Benghazi in mid-March (c.f. (Kuperman 2013)). By then, Qaddafi’s forces had already deliberately targeted and killed hundreds if not thousands of non-combatant civilians, but the perception that he would massacre thousands of civilians in Benghazi provided the final, key rationale for a UN-sanctioned intervention. The Arab League formally requested a no-fly zone on 12 March. On 17 March, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1973, which imposed a no fly zone but crucially included a very strong “Responsibility-to-Protect” component. The resolution authorized member states to use “all means necessary” short of military occupation in order to prevent the mass killing of civilians-- not just in and around Benghazi, but anywhere in Libya (UNSC Res. 1973). The resolution passed over the abstentions of Russia, China, Germany, India, and Brazil. In retrospect, Russia and China clearly misjudged the implications of the RTP clause, and likely would have vetoed the resolution had they anticipated the war to follow.21

The western powers interpreted the RTP mandate expansively. Less than 48 hours after the resolution passed, US, British, and French air and sea forces launched massive strikes against Qaddafi’s air defense systems and air bases, and attacked his ground forces positioned outside Benghazi. Over the next six days, allied warplanes and warships totally destroyed Qaddafi’s air defense systems, and his forces were thrown back from Benghazi. Over the next two weeks, the coalition struck over 1,000 targets.

The successful implementation of the no-fly zone and the apparent prevention of a massacre in Benghazi did not, however, signal the end of the air assault. Instead, during the last week of March, the coalition shifted its targeting to the regime’s ground forces, using some of its most formidable ground attack weapons: A-10 Warthogs, AC-130 gunships, Brimstone precision antiarmor missiles, and UAVs armed with Hellfire missiles. Qaddafi’s personal headquarters outside Tripoli and other command and control infrastructure were struck repeatedly, as was the headquarters of the Khamis brigade. Despite claims that

21 On 21 March, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin harshly criticized the U.N. resolution, “The resolution is defective and flawed. It allows everything. It resembles medieval calls for crusades.” (Bryanski 2011)
the overthrow of Qaddafi was not the coalition’s aim, U.S. aircraft broadcast messages urging regime forces to defect, and the U.S. collected signals intelligence that it shared clandestinely with rebel forces (Schmitt 2011). Russia and China objected strenuously to what they perceived as overstepping of the UN mandate in Resolution 1973.

The diplomatic process culminating with the intervention occurred with such speed that important details were negotiated only after the strikes had begun, such as to whom the U.S. would cede operational control once the opening phase of the bombing was complete. (The U.S. was the only actor capable of disabling Qaddafi’s air defenses.) France, Turkey, Germany, Qatar, and the U.A.E. each objected, for different reasons, to turning over the mission to NATO command. In the end, NATO and the Libya Contact Group (also known as the Friends of Libya coalition) jointly provided the political and military framework for the intervention.

**Battlefield Stalemate and Post-War Planning**

After the initial strikes drove Qaddafi’s forces back from Benghazi, fighting on the ground stalemated through April and into May. Coastal cities and towns in central Libya changed hands repeatedly, as no side could defend or govern territory adequately. A ceasefire was forestalled since neither was willing to compromise on their key terms: the rebels insisted that Colonel Qaddafi exit power, while his regime insisted Qaddafi stay.

The NTC used the battlefield stalemate to strengthen their organizational capacity, husband resources, and establish a political program. The NTC effectively coordinated with the international coalition supporting it, winning diplomatic
recognition from Qatar, France, and Italy. A series of international conferences pledged both harsher measures against Qaddafi’s ruling clique and ever-greater financial support to the shadow government. The NTC expanded its membership to include notables from territories not under their direct control. The latter half of April saw the first foreign weapons reach the rebel forces, and news media reported clandestine military training in eastern Libya. In late April, Britain, Italy, and France announced they would send advisors to the rebels. Finally, the Libyan opposition announced a transitional political program at a 6 May conference in Rome (Bone 2011). This roadmap included a unity government made up of representatives from the NTC, Qaddafi’s inner circle, and the military, police, and courts. This unity government would draft a constitution leading to elections. A post-war planning process convened in Qatar, which was designed to produce more detailed white papers.

At the end of May and through June, the coalition dramatically increased military and diplomatic pressure on Qaddafi. Diplomatic discussions at the G-8 meeting in Deauville, France, prompted Russia, South Africa, and the African Union each to make separate initiatives to find a negotiated solution; these initiatives again failed because Qaddafi refused to cede power. Coalition forces then increased the tempo of their airstrikes, and used attack helicopters for the first time. The U.S., Britain, and Australia recognized the rebel government on 10 June, and the Libya Contact Group pledged $1 billion in support to the NTC. Finally, the International Criminal Court indicted Colonel Qaddafi, Saif al Islam, and Abdullah Senussi on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. By the end of June it became increasingly difficult to envision a negotiated ceasefire in which the personal freedom and wellbeing of
Qaddafi’s inner circle could be credibly ensured; the likelihood of a military conclusion to the war correspondingly increased.

In early June a team of experts arrived in Benghazi to advise the National Transitional Council on post-war planning (Stringer 2011). This effort included working through a variety of scenarios with the Council’s leadership, and developing a timetable for resuming oil exports, which was considered feasible as early as one month after the dictator left office. Notably, the plans ruled out a “large footprint” international peacekeeping mission—scenarios were limited to humanitarian mission, or to a small, unarmed observer mission (ISRT 2011). The UN then drafted its own planning document (Martin 2011). Post-war planning efforts were explicitly intended to “learn the lesson of Iraq:” plans are drawn up for teams to enter Tripoli and secure the ministries and other government facilities, to prevent widespread looting and public disorder, to secure weapons stockpiles, and to retain, rather than demobilize, Qaddafi’s security forces.

NATO TIPS THE BALANCE TOWARD THE REBELS

This upturn in military and diplomatic pressure got results by the end of June. Rebels in the western mountains consolidated their holdings and, on 25 June, cut a pipeline to the Zawiya refinery. Rebels also cut supply routes from Tunisia to Tripoli, and prices in the capital increased as gasoline supplies ran short (Kirkpatrick 2011).

In July, rebel forces moved methodically closer to Tripoli, despite clear indications that these forces had yet to solve difficult problems of communications, logistics, discipline, and governance in their own areas of control, let alone jointly across the non-contiguous, rebel-controlled territories. Rebel
infantry complained that they still lacked basic weapons and supplies, suggesting that rebel commanders were hoarding materiel delivered by France and Qatar (Chivers 2011). The rebels did not perform well in combat. Where rebels engaged with regime loyalists in direct combat, such as in Zlitan in July, results were frequently inconclusive even with substantial NATO air support (Lamloum 2011). Five months into the war, the popular militias still lacked even minimally trained officers. The balance was tipping to the rebels, but not because of any comparative advantage in cohesion, power, or internal organization. They were winning because they had cut off Qaddafi’s supplies and encircled his stronghold, which was only possible with NATO assistance.

This combination of dependence on NATO and basic governance problems was never clearer than at the end of July, when forces nominally under his command assassinated the most competent rebel military commander, Abdel Fattah Younis. Younis was the field commander for eastern Libya, as well as the NTC’s chosen post-war defense minister; he was killed alongside two other senior commanders in Benghazi on 23 July. Later evidence indicated that Benghazi-based Islamists conducted these assassinations in revenge for Younis’ role in violently suppressing Islamist resistance groups during the 1990s and 2000s (Kirkpatrick 2012). If their aim was also to weaken the hand of Benghazi-based secularists and the NTC at the moment of their success, the assassins succeeded spectacularly.

The killings threw the NTC into disarray. The “February 17 Convention” called for the resignation of the top officials, while some leaders scrambled to establish a judicial process to investigate the killings. On 9 August, Mahmoud Jibril dissolved the NTC executive committee in response to the assassinations, and the NTC essentially ceased operating as a body for days or
weeks afterwards (Hider et al. 2011). Several ministers continued performing their duties on an interim basis. Virtually simultaneously, and again with NATO air support, independent rebel groups in western Libya began their final maneuvers toward Tripoli, capturing three towns to the south of the city and fighting for control of three more. As independent revolutionary brigades approached Tripoli, western diplomats warned of “catastrophic success”—the unraveling of the Libyan state without any political leadership to step into the vacuum (Hider et al. 2011). These issues were unresolved when Qaddafi’s forces unexpectedly withdrew from the capital, and rebels from western Libya, together with the rebel underground in Tripoli, jointly seized control of the city on 21 August.

**Rebels Contest Control of Tripoli**

Resistance in Tripoli collapsed during the final ten days of August, under the combined pressure of an uprising in the city and the advance of rebels from the Zintan region and the Nafusah mountains, with Misratan brigades not far behind. The various rebel groups had coordinated their final assault, although these groups were not under the same command structures. The rebels advanced methodically though the city and the immediate environs from 20 August to 28 August. The dictator, his immediate entourage, and some remaining forces evacuated the city and went into hiding in Libya’s vast interior. The rest of the loyalist forces self-demobilized. The mood in the streets was jubilant and largely peaceful.

As coalition strikes continued elsewhere, and rebel forces hunted down regime holdouts and searched for Qaddafi himself, Tripoli avoided the social disruptions, crime waves, and unrestrained looting that characterized the fall of Baghdad to
U.S. forces in 2003. Neighborhoods quickly organized their own security with local patrols and checkpoints. The revolutionary brigades from Zintan, Misrata, and Tripoli took up strategic positions around the capital. These groups began marking their territories with graffiti, like urban gangs (Fahim 2011a). The NTC immediately sent a respected minister to try to coordinate the armed groups; he convened a security council to coordinate these independent rebel forces. Following the contingency plans devised in Qatar and Benghazi, the NTC requested that the city police return to duty. Only the traffic police did so; most regular police officers reportedly feared retribution from the brigades and neighborhood militias that controlled the streets.

Control of Tripoli was thus fragmented and politically contested even before the end of the war. The NTC’s post-war planning tacitly envisioned a negotiated ceasefire with the regime’s security forces remaining at least partially intact, or that forces under the direct command of the NTC would take control of the city (ISRT 2011; Martin 2011). The planning also anticipated the rapid deployment of expert teams from Benghazi to Tripoli to take control of the ministries, prevent the destruction of government property, recall the ministerial staff, and get the day-to-day administration operational as rapidly as possible (Coghlan 2011); the explicit emphasis was to learn the lessons of the Iraq War and occupation. The contingency that the NTC did not anticipate was that Tripoli would fall into multiple, rivalrous rebel hands. As a result, the plans were largely abandoned for ad hoc decision-making.

There were no well-organized security forces to assume control of the city from revolutionaries from outside Tripoli or from the neighborhood militias. First, no Tripoli-based revolutionary brigades existed akin to the well-organized and well-led brigades from Zintan, Benghazi, or Misrata: Tripoli’s
rebels operated underground throughout the entire conflict, were not battle-tested, and had not developed deep linkages to the constituencies on whose behalf they fought. Second, NATO ground forces would not deploy following the air campaign, as they had in Kosovo or Bosnia. Third, Qaddafi’s ‘official’ security forces in Tripoli had demobilized. With no forces to displace them, the revolutionary brigades from outside Tripoli quickly calculated that holding pieces of the capital would give them leverage over the trajectory of post-war political developments. Their interests lay in the capital.

More generally, other conditions militated against a withdrawal of the non-Tripoli forces: No actor could credibly promise that the interests of the provinces would be respected if provincially-based forces withdrew— the NTC was too new, too politically suspect, and too weak to make any such promises credible— and no brigade wanted to be the “sucker” that left first, only to have their erstwhile allies take full control of the capital. In late 2011, no one could break the prisoners’ dilemma over public order that quickly enveloped Tripoli.

**Qaddafi Killed and the NTC Enters Tripoli**

Despite the lack of operational unity among rebel forces, Tripoli immediately after Qaddafi’s fall was relatively secure: there was no looting, riots, or mass violence. Traffic police returned to duty in many parts of the city, but regular police did not answer calls to take up their posts, apparently fearing retribution from the rebels. The revolutionary brigades and neighborhood militias ended up patrolling the neighborhoods. The various rebel groups each seemed to calculate that controlling a segment of the capital gave them leverage in the post-war political process. Without a unified rebel command or loyalists
in control of most of Tripoli, the NTC did not officially relocate to Tripoli until 31 October. The transition planning called for the deployment of 70 or so personnel to Tripoli to take control of the ministries and restart public services: there is no evidence that this plan was implemented (Coghlan 2011). Control of government facilities devolved to militias who arrived there first: most notably, militias from Zintan took control of the airport, and Misrata militias seized the seaside homes of high-ranking Qaddafi officials. (Both locations would be recurrent flashpoints through 2014.) Until the last Qaddafi stronghold fell, and the dictator himself was killed or captured, the NTC leadership feared leaving the relative safety of Benghazi.

Qaddafi and his immediate entourage eluded capture until late October. Misratan revolutionary brigades took the lead in pounding the loyalist cities Bani Walid and Sirte, where the dictator was suspected of hiding. As the noose tightened on Sirte, a U.S. Predator drone struck a large convoy carrying Qaddafi as he attempted to flee. The convoy halted, and the dictator and a few others fled on foot. Nearby rebel soldiers captured and killed them. Three days later, on 23 October 2011, the NTC declared Libya liberated, starting the clock on the post-war timeline established in mid-summer.
The post-war phase began with several common peacebuilding policies taken off the table. There would be no international, complex peacekeeping operation; no ‘pacted’ transition, negotiated ceasefire, or official power-sharing agreement; the official security forces could not provide internal security while the political transition unfolded. The local and international contexts were also relatively fixed but considered favorable to a successful transition: Libya’s human development levels are quite high compared to most civil war cases since 1945; the society is ethnically and religiously homogenous (though tribally and regionally fragmented); European and Arab countries supported the new government and stood ready to assist; and no neighboring power sought to undermine the transition actively. The government had few spending constraints once oil exports resumed.

The organizational and administrative weaknesses of the NTC and the political fragmentation of the country and the capital meant that the post-war government operated with relatively few degrees of freedom. No single rebel faction could claim a nationwide mandate to govern in late 2011. As a result, two other peacebuilding policies were essentially predetermined. First, early national elections were probably inevitable, though not the exact timing, electoral rules, or sequencing of national and local polls. Second, post-war governance would proceed with an informal power-sharing approach, even if elections resulted in a large parliamentary majority for any one political faction. Whatever the outcome of the election, the country would be dominated by multiple armed groups that would not simply demobilize themselves or disinterestedly follow orders emanating...
from the post-war government. Given the administrative and military weakness of the state, these armed groups would have to be coopted into the governing coalition, even if their public support was minimal. (In the end, early elections did not produce a mandate for any one political grouping.) This informal power-sharing arrangement would necessarily proceed on consensus.

In this context, post-war policy makers attempted a multi-track strategy. The government established basic frameworks for post-conflict justice mechanisms, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, new security ministries, a reorganization of the oil and finance sectors, and negotiations over political decentralization and a new constitution. Table 4.1 gives the post-war ‘policy recipe’ that Libya comprises, and which was used in the csQCA in the previous chapter.

Table 4.1: Selected Peacebuilding Policies in Libya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Presence of more than 1,000 peacekeeping troops</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM</td>
<td>Governing using a democratic regime by year five</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EARLY</td>
<td>Holding any nationwide election within 2.5 years</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POWSHAR</td>
<td>Having a formal power-sharing agreement in place</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECENT</td>
<td>Having a decentralized political system</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Implementing a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Concluding a structural adjustment program with either the World Bank or IMF</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Receiving on average greater than 5 percent of gross national income in official development assistance</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCJ</td>
<td>Implementing any form of post-conflict justice</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>Having higher than the median per capita security personnel (5.54 per 1,000 residents)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Libya case is relatively straightforward, with easy coding for most set memberships.

Which of these policies were crucial for the uneasy peace that held from 2011 to 2014? What changed in 2014 that led to

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the breakdown of this stalemate into open conflict? A close examination of the case reveals that the relative stability that existed from late-2011 to mid-2014-- essentially a stalemate punctuated by low-level violence-- was due largely to political, institutional, and military factors, rather than on the reforms comprising the bulk of the multi-track strategy.

**Political and Institutional Origins of the Stalemate**

The original political timeline envisioned forming a caretaker government to shepherd the country to parliamentary elections 18 months after the end of hostilities. With the NTC in disarray after the assassination of General Younis and Tripoli in the hands of rival rebel groups, the government moved up the political timeline. Elections were scheduled for June 2012, probably the earliest feasible date. (Logistical difficulties pushed the election to July.) The NTC announced the liberation of Libya on 23 October 2011 and resigned, and an interim, technocratic government took office in late November. Early elections were less a strategic choice than the only hope for forming a strong government with national legitimacy.

Public opinion research conducted in 2012 suggested very high support for democracy and elections among the Libyan public, but also extraordinarily high expectations that “democracy” could deliver public goods, cut through difficult social and political problems, and improve the quality of life (Doherty 2012, 13). With no experience in democratic governance, much of the Libyan public undoubtedly viewed democracy instrumentally-- as the means to achieving or even conceptually equivalent to high standards of living, personal and religious liberties, improved personal security and justice outcomes, or an increased role for Islam in public life relative to the
Qaddafi era, depending on the demographic of the survey respondents (Doherty, 2011, 24-37). Perhaps only a small minority viewed democracy as a political process, a set of rules and norms, or a pattern of government decision-making.

Intensive negotiations over the electoral law lasted until late January 2012, with debate focused on reserving seats for women, and on party-based versus individual-based voting systems. The electoral system that emerged was an obscure hybrid that varied across districts, such that voters in different areas confronted vastly different ballot formats and parties. The electoral law created 13 districts for party-based voting; populous districts were further sub-divided, yielding a final total of 20 districts for party-based voting (POMED 2012). These 20 districts were then divided into 73 constituencies for individual candidate elections (POMED 2012).

Forty members were elected by a plurality in a single-member district, 80 members were elected by plurality in multi-member districts, and 80 members were elected from the 20 party-voting districts using closed-list proportional representation (Jandura 2012). Individual districts and constituencies blended their voting systems differently: some areas had no party voting, some areas had no individual seats, and in the remaining areas, the ratio of party seats to individual seats varied significantly. Voters in only 50 of 73 constituencies faced both individual and party ballots (POMED 2012). Seats were distributed across Libya based on population, which meant that there was a regional imbalance: 105 seats for Tripolitania in the west, 60 seats for Cyrenaica in the east, and 35 seats for Fezzan in the south. Overall 80 seats were decided based on closed party lists, and 120 based on individual candidates, who could be affiliated with a party. Party lists were required to
alternate male and female candidates, but there were no reserved seats or women’s constituencies.

Organizing the election was daunting. Most authoritarian regimes have at least a skeleton of election infrastructure in place. In Libya, there were no voter lists, no electoral districts, no electoral or party laws, no party organizations, and no strong or credible party-like organizations such as trade unions, civil society organizations, or religious organizations. Election organizers confronted a population with no experience casting ballots; no concept of political parties or how they form; no proficiency interpreting party slogans, platforms, or other electioneering; and no familiarity with overseeing the counting of ballots. Yet despite some violent protest from federalists based in Benghazi over the distribution of seats by population, and the downing of a helicopter ferrying election supplies and officials, the elections were a success, and turnout was far higher than expected.

Only two groups attempted to field party lists in almost every multi-party constituency: the National Forces Alliance led by former NTC Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, and the Justice and Construction Party, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Most other party lists were local to that district; there was no requirement that registered parties field lists in more than one district. This system yielded high party fragmentation: the 80 party seats were distributed across 21 parties, and 15 parties earned only one seat (Libyan Election Party List Results: Seats Per Party by District 2012).

The election results reflected these institutional choices, as well as a lack of popular consensus about the trajectory of post-war Libya. The National Forces Alliance won 39 party seats and 25 individual seats. The Justice and Construction Party won 17 party seats and 17 individual seats; Salafi parties and
independent Salafis won 26 seats overall. Other small parties and non-Salafi independents won 75 seats. No single grouping won a governing majority, and negotiations began immediately on establishing a coalition government.

Though the western media portrayed the results as a victory for “liberals” and a setback for “Islamists,” the NFA was more accurately a non-ideological party representing the traditional, business, and conservative establishments. The NFA had recruited candidate slates of local notables, tribal representatives, and prominent families who had remained in Libya during the Qaddafi era (Lacher 2013). There were few expatriate dissidents or bold reformers among their parliamentary group. The group included several prominent former Qaddafi officials, including Jibril himself. While the party was generally skeptical of the Brotherhood, the NFA expressed positions on political Islam that were virtually indistinguishable from the JCP. As a coalition of local power brokers, NFA parliamentarians displayed less internal discipline over the next two years relative to the more ideological, Brotherhood-affiliated party.

Though the NFA won the largest bloc of seats, the GNC elected independent former dissident Mustafa Abushagur to form the government, rather than Mahmoud Jibril. Seen as sympathetic to the Brotherhood, Abushagur twice failed to gain parliamentary support for his cabinets. After the killing of the U.S. ambassador and three others in Benghazi in September 2012, the GNC asked independent former dissident Ali Zeidan to form a cabinet, which he accomplished in mid-November, four months after the election and an entire year after the declaration of liberation. Zeidan had the support of the NFA and independents in the GNC.
Local Elections and Local Political Monopolies

Misrata, Benghazi, Zawiya, Derna, and a few other municipalities held wildcat elections for city councils, without supervision or any controlling legislation from the national government. Observers considered these elections generally well run, free, and fair despite these legal shortcomings. Local elections and local political pluralism were not a central part of Libya’s post-war peacebuilding strategy. Not until late 2014 did widespread local elections take place, and only then in roughly half the municipalities. Between 2011 and 2014, local political monopolies asserted control over municipal and regional governance.

Legislative Momentum and Executive Paralysis

Despite Libya’s territorial fragmentation, the party fragmentation in parliament, and the ambiguous mandate offered by voters in July 2012, the multi-track strategy of pressing reform forward across all policy dimensions yielded impressive results. With the critical technical and logistical support of UNSMIL, Libyan leaders held months of public consultation and intensive factional negotiations that led to legislation on constitutional reform, electoral laws, transitional justice, decentralization, a national dialogue process, Islamic banking, increases in social security and direct transfer payments, reparations, political liberalization and human rights, cultural and language rights for minorities, and support for victims of rape. Under duress from armed groups occupying government facilities, the GNC also passed a law on political and administrative isolation, which purged many former Qaddafi officials from government. The government was also successful at restarting oil exports. Excepting the isolation law, these legislative and policy achievements generally fell within the
parameters of international-recognized peacebuilding best practices.

The apparent momentum for reform ended up being superficial, and these signals of good faith and reconciliation could not overcome the lack of enforcement mechanisms. The fundamental problem facing post-war Libya was not finding agreement among the major political groups. Indeed, the political differences among the major parliamentary groups were minimal. Rather, the fundamental problem was sticking to these legislative bargains and implementing their terms. Most major legislation was revised repeatedly after one or more parties defected from the agreement after it was struck. The constitutional drafting process was revised several times due to objections from eastern Libyans, and was then delayed by Islamists who feared the outcome of the process. The original political isolation law was revised and strengthened repeatedly before the final, controversial version in mid 2013 supplanted the more lenient original statute from early 2012. Security-related initiatives developed in the ministries were announced, and then invariably watered down due to resistance from the revolutionary brigades. The GNC reported out copious legislation only to see its own members (or their allies outside parliament) undermine or stall the reforms at the cabinet or ministerial level.

Simply put, there were no internal or external institutions capable of enforcing any political deals struck among the factions in the GNC. The mechanisms for enforcement present in mature parliamentary systems were weak or non-existent in post-war Libya. First, party discipline within the GNC was weak. Second, the judiciary and civil service were very weak, and their members frequently targeted for assassination. Third, the president, prime minister, and cabinet ministers all served at
the pleasure of the GNC, and could be dismissed individually without a constructive vote of no confidence. The executive was frequently hobbled by such votes (though votes of no confidence for the prime minister were unsuccessful until early 2014). As a result, turnover in the cabinet was high, including in the security ministries, and many key offices were held by acting or interim ministers for long stretches. Fourth and perhaps worst, members of parliament were not disciplined by the prospect of losing the next legislative election. Though exact numbers are difficult to determine, many Islamists had concluded early in the transition that they could not win national elections with any regularity, and viewed their quasi-control of the GNC as their last, best hope for establishing a regime that fit their preferences (Pack, Mezran and Eljarh 2014, 57-59). These were “one man, one vote, one time” legislators. Other parliamentarians felt secure in their local political monopolies back in their constituencies: they had no reason to fear the opprobrium of the voters or the generation of local political competition. In most cases, the perceived audience costs of defecting from legislative bargains were low. The institutional results were an activist legislature and a neutered executive unable to implement the transition. Their paralysis, however, helped preserve stability since a weak government could not threaten the factions.

**Military Origins of the Stalemate**

Since 2011, none of the successive governments in Tripoli has had the capacity to demobilize the armed groups scattered throughout the country. Early efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate fighters into society (DDR) were minimally effective. The most successful efforts involved the creation of
the Warriors Affairs Committee, which registered more than 125,000 fighters by the July 2012 election (Wehrey 2012). (A massively inflated number, but still a notable accomplishment.) The Committee paid out small stipends to registrants, but did not require them to hand over weapons, sequester themselves, forswear violence, or relocate— all against common practices in DDR programs. Otherwise, government DDR policy between the fall of Tripoli in August 2011 and the election in July 2012 was essentially limited to exhorting fighters to leave Tripoli and return home. Again and again, the government announced financial packages, plans to integrate thousands of rebel fighters into the security sector, plans to provide job training and small business loans, a number of ‘final’ deadlines— all to induce fighters to self-demobilize. Casual rebels mostly returned home by the end of January, but the best organized and most committed rebel groups remained mobilized in strategic locations around the capital.

There were pressing needs for internal security, and the revolutionary brigades were needed to keep the peace. Communal violence between rival ethnic groups and tribes— and political violence among militias— emerged almost immediately, especially in southern Libya. These clashes required ‘peacekeeping’ actions by the NTC: separating combatants and monitoring locally-negotiated ceasefires. The demoralized remnants of the official security forces lacked the capacity to conduct such missions autonomously, so the new Libyan authorities had no choice but to utilize non-professional, revolutionary brigades of dubious loyalty to the transitional government.

Local Military and Civilian Councils

After the fall of Tripoli, the NTC called on all municipalities to form military councils to organize local
security and supervise local militias. Equivalent civilian councils also sprung up to restart public services. Of course, not every town and village had supported the revolution. Many, if not most, of the municipalities in the west and center of Libya had sharply divided loyalties (Crisis Group 2012, 2-3). The result of the NTC’s policy was a patchwork of councils across Libya, some revolutionary and militant in character, and others representing cities and tribes closely associated with Qaddafi’s regime and fearful of political retribution. The newer councils had tenuous allegiances to the post-Qaddafi government developing in Tripoli, and their creation caused friction with the most committed revolutionaries. The patchwork was itself a source of instability. Revenge attacks and other opportunistic killings—launched from one town against another—became commonplace. Municipalities that had defected to the rebellion sought to dominate nearby, loyalist municipalities.

Yet Libya did not collapse into unrestrained violence. From late 2011 though 2012, the prime minister, defense minister, and others shuttled across western, central, and southern Libya to negotiate ceasefires among rival towns and tribes.

The NTC mobilized local councils and then negotiated with them because it enjoyed only limited legitimacy in the areas it did not directly control, and had little autonomous coercive power to extend its writ into western and central Libya. The NTC sought to provide interim security by formalizing, in effect, the fragmentation of social and political life in Libya: the local institutions created were parochial, ideologically heterogeneous, and at best ambivalent about their relationships with neighboring councils and with the national government. Over time, the result in many towns was the creation of local monopolies on force, as independent, spontaneously organized
militias were folded into their localities' military councils (Secretary General 2011).

**The Supreme Security Committees and The Libya Shield Forces**

The interim government sought to coopt the best-organized and most-committed revolutionary brigades into the formal security sector-- an outcome that the armed groups themselves desired since it meant access to salaries and influence over post-war politics. This parallel security sector took shape over early 2012 under the caretaker government.

The most important organizations have been the Supreme Security Committees and the Libya Shield Forces, with a large number of smaller, private armed groups. The Supreme Security Committee was originally founded in September 2011 to coordinate brigade activity in Tripoli, and included rebel commanders from Misrata, Zintan, and Tripoli, and representatives from the nascent defense and interior ministries. In early 2012, the Ministry of Interior took control of the SSC and used its structure to assert control over the neighborhood and village militias across Libya. SSC branches were quickly established across the country. The SSC looked and operated like a police auxiliary: members could serve in their hometowns, and SSC units operated in parallel to local police units. Recruits were paid monthly wages of Euro 650. The Ministry of Interior announced plans to register as many as 25,000 former rebels, who were given six moth contracts with prospects for permanent employment (Secretary General 2012). The first SSC units were operational by February 2012. By April 70,000 fighters had been registered, a figure which swelled to 85,000 only one month later (Crisis Group 2012). External oversight of the SSC from the Ministry of Interior or Police service was minimal, and the SSC structure was under the firm control of revolutionaries.
The most-committed and best-organized revolutionary brigades emerged as the Libya Shield Forces under the aegis of the Ministry of Defense. The MoD began registering these brigades and working directly with local military councils. The ministry offered formal “certification” and granted registered fighters one-time payments of 1,500 Euros, or 2,500 Euros if they had families. Registration and certification involved no screening of fighters or collection of weapons, or even formal subordination to the ministry. The ministry paid fighters’ salaries to their commanders, rather than to the individual fighters. While the first system of payments was scrapped in April due to widespread corruption, the formalization continued.

The first unit of the Libyan Shield Force was formally established in March 2012, in the southern city of Kufra, where revolutionary brigades had been sent to quell communal violence in February. Its proponents envisioned LSF as an interim, all-purpose paramilitary and rapid reaction force that would, in theory, suppress communal violence and then transfer responsibility for security to army or police units. In practice, the army and police were never capable of assuming responsibility for security. Deployment of LSF became routine over the course of 2012 and its share of responsibilities grew. With the encouragement of the MoD, LSF units quickly formed in the western mountains and central Libya, out of the well-organized revolutionary brigades that did the hardest fighting during the civil war. By May, the Libyan Shield Forces established a high commission to lead it, and also negotiated a contract with MoD establishing terms of service and responsibilities. These working relationships circumvented the army general staff.

From their perspective, revolutionary brigades and military councils-- including the SSC and Libya Shield-- were overseeing
the post-war political system to ensure a truly revolutionary political transition. They did no want a political system dominated by Qaddafi holdovers, by Tripolitanians, or by any single tribal grouping, and generally they distrusted political actors who did not take up arms during the war (20). How committed they were to Islamism or secularism was a constant source of debate.

**Contracting with New Militias**

The prospect of salaries induced new entrants into this private security market by the end of 2012. These new and smaller ‘firms’ were far more opportunistic, far less disciplined, and far less concerned with their public image than the revolutionary brigades. The Petroleum Facilities Guard was founded in 2012, and after some episodic indiscipline, was transferred to the Defense Ministry. The PFG was tasked with protecting oil facilities, especially near Ras Lanuf, from seizure by actors seeking to pressure the central government, which is totally dependent on oil revenues for financing operations. After receiving command of the facilities as Ras Lanuf, PFG units promptly mutinied in support of autonomy for Cyrenaica and local control of oil revenue. The PFG’s attempt to sell oil and distribute the revenue to Cyrenaica was only stopped when U.S. Special Forces seized their fully loaded oil tanker in the Mediterranean Sea.

Similarly, the militias contracted for border security have been implicated in smuggling, and the militia hired by the president of the GNC to protect the country’s political leadership instead kidnapped the Prime Minister during a political dispute.

With weak official security forces and oversight institutions, the Libyan security sector is riven with
principal-agent problems: the government and other stakeholders have extreme difficulty monitoring the performance and loyalty of the myriad official and quasi-official agents that it employs directly, or that it contracts with. One clear lesson from the Libya experience has been that a security sector formation strategy that treats militias as private security firms must have a reserve force that can enforce the contract.

Holding the Transition Hostage

From the outset of the transition, armed groups linked to political factions seized or ransacked the GNC and government offices on numerous occasions. Government leaders and their family members, security officers, and international personnel were targeted for kidnapping or assassination. Policies that threatened the power of the revolutionary brigades were the most contentious; the most prominent example was the intervention of armed groups from Misrata in Tripoli in April and May of 2013. Seizing ministries, the revolutionary brigades clinched the passage of a strict political isolation law that forced the resignation of the president of parliament, ministers, and several prominent members of the GNC, including the former NTC prime minister Mahmoud Jibril, widely considered a moderate and a leading candidate for post-war office. Inadequate security on oil and water infrastructure also allowed regionally-based groups to seize facilities critical to government revenues or to the population of Tripoli, to extort political concessions such as cabinet appointments, the release of individuals in detention, the deconcentration of government offices from Tripoli to Benghazi, the revision of the constitution drafting process, and others.
The Federalist Gambit

In late July 2013, the Petroleum Facilities Guard unit responsible for the Ras Lanuf terminal mutinied on behalf of the federalism for Eastern Libya (called Cyrenaica or Barqa). This mutiny was probably the single greatest threat to government revenues since the 2011 war: Ras Lanuf accounts for almost 60 percent of Libya’s refining capacity, and the Ras Lanuf and nearby Sidra terminals account for one-third of export capacity (U.S. EIA 2014; BBC News 2014). The leader of this mutiny was Ibrahim Jadhran, a rebel commander in the 2011 civil war; Jadhran seized on popular dissatisfaction in eastern Libya with the pace of the transition, the lack of effective public services, and growing insecurity.

Jadhran espoused the federalist position supported by a small but vocal minority of eastern Libyans. (Whether he did so instrumentally— as a way of marshaling political support for other goals— is unclear.) Public opinion clearly indicates that federalism has never enjoyed majority support even in eastern Libya, and has minimal support among the political class. Yet a well organized, and very vocal, minority has kept the issue on the national political agenda. Federalists are centered on eastern tribal authorities and enjoyed occasional support from army units in the east.

Federalists in Libya do not advocate for any form of federalism, but a very specific type: the decentralization of authority and sovereignty to a regional entity comprising all of Cyrenaica, which would collect oil revenues directly without passing through central government accounts. These activists would not be satisfied with a federal constitution that established, for example, six federal provinces in the Cyrenaica region, instead of one, nor that allowed the national government
to withhold oil revenues should it wish to.\footnote{More specifically, their optimal institutional outcome is likely a locally-controlled, state-owned oil company that exploited oil assets in the east and distributed a share of revenues upward to the government in Tripoli.} “Federalism” to these activists is equivalent home rule, autonomy, self-determination, and local control over local assets. Federalism motivated an (unheeded) boycott of the July 2012 elections, several conferences leading to an (unrecognized) declaration of home rule for Cyrenaica, and the latest mutiny of the PFG. Reflecting the central government’s lack of autonomous coercive power, federalists enjoyed influence in Libyan politics disproportionate to their popular support.

Zeidan adopted a cooptation strategy to resolve this crisis, which was unsurprising given the weakness of his governing coalition and the incoherence of the security sector nominally under his control. This strategy ultimately backfired. Jadhran refused offers of substantial patronage and increased influence (Eljarh 2013). The Misratan brigades presumably would have preferred a coercive strategy that left them in control of Ras Lanuf, but this outcome would have been unacceptable to the Benghazi camp. After negotiations collapsed and Jadhran allowed an oil tanker to fill up and put to sea, U.S. Navy SEALs captured the ship. U.S. Special Forces also captured the supposed mastermind of the killings of their ambassador and three others in Benghazi. The Islamist camp had enough and Zeidan lost a vote of no confidence in the General National Congress, and fled to Switzerland. The Islamists in the GNC attempted to install Ahmed Maetig outside normal order—essentially a coup—but yielded to a ruling of the Libyan Supreme Court overturning that vote. Defense Minister al-Thinni was appointed interim prime minister.
The federalist mutiny was ultimately a prelude to the recurrence of major fighting for the rest of 2014. In February 2014, a former Qaddafi general declared a coup against the GNC from his base of operations outside Benghazi. Khalifa Hifter is a Qaddafi-era general who had fled to the United States in the 1980s and founded a dissident group. He returned to Libya during the early phases of the civil war, but was denied a major leadership role by the skeptical NTC. Hifter slowly built political support in eastern Libya during the post-war period. His coup announcement was met with “shrugs,” but he found allies later that spring, after the GNC refused to dissolve and the violence in Benghazi continued escalating. Hifter announced Operation Karama (Dignity) in May. In addition to his own forces, Hifter swiftly built a coalition of Special Forces units, air force units, federalists, and certain tribal groups from the east and southeast. His coalition was allied with the Zintani brigades in western Libya, and enjoyed increasing support from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.
In a sense, anti-Islamist forces in eastern Libya had no choice but to go on the offensive by mid-2014. During the latter half of 2013, Benghazi-based Islamist groups had dramatically increased their campaign of assassinations against former Qaddafi figures, security officers, liberal and secular activists, and others seen as hostile to the Islamist agenda. By late 2013, dozens of people were being assassinated each month in Benghazi alone. Most analysts believe that the perpetrators were militants from the increasingly powerful al Qaeda affiliate, Ansar al Sharia (ASL), which had also been blamed for the assassination of U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens in September 2012. More mainstream Islamist revolutionary brigades in Benghazi, such as the February 17 Martyrs’ Brigade and the Rafallah al Sahati Brigade, turned a blind eye to ASL’s campaign. Facing annihilation, the non-Islamist elements of Benghazi’s political class embraced Operation Dignity.
Hifter’s strategy made no distinction between more mainstream Islamist groups and radical jihadists such as ASL. Positioning himself as the Libyan version of President Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, Hifter’s rhetoric against Islamists of all stripes was uncompromising. He blamed the GNC for deliberately cultivating terrorist groups on Libyan soil (Engel 2014); he vowed to “cleanse” Benghazi of terrorists.

Hifter’s initial moves targeted both moderate and jihadist Islamists across Libya. Operation Dignity began on 16 May with airstrikes on Islamist positions in Benghazi, the majority of which were launched from Benina airbase on the outskirts of the city (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2015). Targets included facilities controlled by ASL, the Feb. 17 Martyrs’ Brigade, and the Rafallah al Sahati Brigade (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2015). Hifter’s forces followed the airstrikes with a ground assault on 17 May, causing scores of casualties. On 18 May, Hifter’s Zintani allies surged into Tripoli, seized the GNC, and declared it dissolved. After these initial attacks, Operation Dignity paused, suggesting the initial attacks were meant as a demonstration of the coalition’s commitment and capacity, presumably to build the coalition further. Assassinations and bombings, presumably conducted by jihadist groups, increased in late May and into June.

Operation Dignity’s indiscriminate targeting of all Islamist groups, regardless of their revolutionary bona fides and their political program, had the effect of strengthening the Islamist alliance in Benghazi, and pushing the Misratan and Islamist camps closer together in western Libya. On 20 June the major Islamist brigades in Benghazi formed the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council (BRSC) to coordinate their defense of the city.
2014 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

During this phase of heightened violence and institutional incoherence, Libyan voters went to the polls on 25 June to elect a successor body to the General National Congress. Throughout 2013 and 2014, the Islamist, JCP, and Misratan groupings in the GNC had resisted new elections or the formation of a new transitional parliament. They had presumably noticed their low standing among the public, and did not want to yield their formal leverage over the post-war transition. Inexplicably, these camps agreed to the elimination of party ballots, which gave the JCP little chance of entering a coalition government. Instead of retaining a reduced foothold in the successor legislature, the Islamist and JCP were virtually shut out of the plurality voting. In a campaign organized by the National Forces Alliance, traditionalists, nationalists, and local notables virtually swept the election results. The GNC then tried to delay the results of the election, and, when that failed, attempted to undermine the legitimacy of the low-turnout election.

LIBYA DAWN

On 13 July, brigades from Misrata and Tripoli launched their own military operation, Libya Fajr (Dawn). The single most powerful military group in post-war Libya dominated the Dawn coalition: the Misratan revolutionary brigades, which had adopted the mantle of the Libya Shield Forces in 2012. Misrata suffered the most intense fighting during the civil war, and their brigades emerged from the conflict as, by far, the most coherent, potent, and well-led forces in post-war Libya. While sympathetic to political Islam, the Misratan camp was mostly concerned with preventing Qaddafi-era figures from participating
in government. They were joined in the Libya Dawn coalition by a collection of smaller, quasi-official Islamist militias based in Tripoli; a brigade from Zawiya, the municipal rival of Zintan; Amazigh village and tribal militias; and the Islamist revolutionary brigades from Benghazi, discussed above (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2015). Tripoli, Zawiya, and the Amazigh tribes each had their own locally-rooted grievances against the Zintani camp, both from before the war and after.

Operation Dawn began before the election results were released. The coalition took direct aim at the positions held by the Zintan brigades, including Tripoli’s main airport, which the Zintanis had held since 2011. A month of fighting followed, which destroyed all the planes located at the airport and Tripoli’s main fuel depot. By the end of the fighting, the Dawn coalition was firmly in control of Tripoli, and the Zintani brigades had retreated to their strongholds in the Nafusah Mountains. The Dawn Coalition clearly calculated that their continued political relevance depended on seizing the capital. Anticipating the election results, they struck “prior to [their] release... to increase their leverage by altering the facts on the ground and asserting their control over the capital” (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2015).

New Stalemates

Renewed fighting in 2014 did not lead to any faction gaining the upper hand. By the end of 2014, Zintani forces were able to stop Dawn advances into the Nafusah Mountains, and Hiftar’s forces in eastern Libya fought to a draw with the Islamist brigades and ASL. As of this writing, UN-led negotiations are ongoing; the constitutional assembly had not yet published its negotiated document; and Egypt and the United
Arab Emirates had taken an increasingly assertive role in the conflict.
DISCUSSION

Between 2011 and 2014, Libya was most at risk of collapsing into civil war during the frequent, bloody skirmishes that erupted between the major political groups. In other contexts, these clashes could have easily escalated beyond skirmishes into full-fledged combat and nationwide violence. Yet each time a major incident occurred, the key actors managed to pull the country out of danger. The dozens of major skirmishes from 2011 to 2014 repeatedly brought Libya to the brink of war, yet never over the precipice, despite collectively causing thousands of battle deaths. This pattern of violent clashes followed by de-escalation repeated regardless of the groups involved, the proximate cause of the skirmish, its location, or its timing within the transition. The explanation for why these crises de-escalated rather than intensified into civil war is, indeed, the explanation for why the stalemate in post-war Libya held from 2011 to 2014.

These critical junctures followed a stylized pattern. A review of the deadliest such clash in Tripoli will give the basic contours. On 15 November 2013, hundreds of protesters in Tripoli marched to the Tripoli sanctuary of the Misratan revolutionary brigades and demanded their exit from Tripoli. The march was organized in part by the head of Tripoli’s local council, in protest of minor skirmishes during the previous week. The brigades opened fire with machine guns, killing at least 40 people and injuring nearly 400 (Hauslohner 2013). The national government declared a 48-hour state of emergency and demanded that the responsible militias leave Tripoli. Perhaps surprisingly, not only did the Misratan brigades withdraw from Tripoli, but also Zintan’s al Qaqaa brigade handed over its
Tripoli base to the army, and an Islamist brigade controlling Mitiga airbase handed that facility over to the government (Shennib and Markey 2013). An air force spokesperson told Reuters: “After what happened left week, these men chose to leave voluntarily to avoid more bloodshed. They know the people are determined and that they want police and army instead” (Shennib and Markey 2013). Residents of Tripoli then held a general strike all week, culminating in a Friday protest march numbering in the thousands, organized (again) in part by the Tripoli local council and the student union. At least five brigades had withdrawn from Tripoli by the end of the week (Al Jazeera 2013). Tripoli was then mostly quiet until the start of Operation Dignity in May.

This cycle of violence--protest--withdrawal occurred regularly across Libya from 2011 to early 2014. The pattern that developed was very clear: a brigade or militia would attack civilian demonstrators, a rival armed group, or security forces over a relatively minor dispute--perhaps over turf, detainees, or passage through checkpoints. Political and civic leaders would respond by calling for protests against continued presence of brigades and militias in the cities; the local population would respond with significant demonstrations sometimes numbering in the tens of thousands. The offending forces would then cede territory, facilities, or ‘responsibilities’ to the police or army, and withdraw to their stronghold or to the desert. Such cycles occurred in Tripoli in December 2011 and in November 2013, in Benghazi in July 2012, September 2012, June 2013, November 2013, and March 2014, and in a variety of desert towns and villages. All factions were complicit in these clashes, not just the Misratan brigades. These events could have easily escalated into civil war; instead, the SSC units, the Zintani brigades, the Misratan brigades, the Libya Shield
Forces, or others armed groups repeatedly made gestures or concessions that halted the escalation. Indeed, the commanders of the offending forces often resigned. One key takeaway is that these groups viewed themselves as constructive actors, not entrepreneurs of violence, and were sensitive to their reputation and any declines in popular support.

These cycles, while perhaps effective at chastening badly-behaving armed groups, did not a sustainable “strategy” because it depended on several uncertain factors. First, the government and civic leaders needed to react quickly and decisively to exploit the window of opportunity presented by missteps by brigades and militias; incoherence in the executive or fear among civic leaders would be enough to prevent decisive action. Second, the Libyan public had to remain politically activated and willing to take to the streets in the face of armed groups and on behalf of the government; creeping dissatisfaction with politics threatens to undermine that willingness. Third, the brigades and militias needed to remain responsive to public outcry, to be unwilling to double down on mass violence against civilians, and to calculate that its interests were better served by a tactical retreat. Finally and most importantly, there had to be a safe stronghold to which to armed groups could withdraw.

The previous chapter and the present chapter have argued that post-war stalemates hold because of a specific political, institutional, and military architecture. Political, institutional, and military factors have clearly shaped the behavior of the groups most likely to wage civil war--the dominant, heavily armed groups arrayed across the country. In Libya, this architecture has led the government and the various armed factions in Libya to calculate that their interests are better served by returning, repeatedly, to political negotiation.
instead of escalating to civil war. These factors made it unlikely that strategies of violence would be successful, and they made the stalemate an acceptable, non-threatening status quo to the most important actors. This architecture comprised four pillars: The political independence of factions, a weak formal security sector, secure government revenues, and no attempt at imposing post-war justice.

**The Political Independence of Factions**

By necessity, each of the post-war governments that formed in Libya were power-sharing governments in the general sense of the term: all major political and social groups were represented in the cabinet, government policy proceeded on consensus, and armed groups controlling a given territory had an implicit veto on national directives in that territory. The regions of Libya were tied to each other and to the national government only tenuously. The territorial arrangement in post-war Libya resembled so-called frozen conflicts in Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia, Moldova, or Kosovo. In frozen conflicts, sub-national territories are, for the most part, functionally independent of each other, though they share the same juridical sovereignty and they may share some national political process. These conflicts remain frozen because the national government has, for whatever reason, stopped trying to usurp local political authorities in the disputed territories. The territorially-based factions are independent of one another--they do not depend on the national government or each other for their revenues, political legitimacy, security, or administrative power.

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23 Their shared national political process may include formal institutions, but often the national political process is simply negotiations over their constitutional status.
This condition has been present in Libya since the end of the civil war. The war ended with a single dominant rebel group situated in almost every region of northern Libya (about 90 percent of Libyans live near the coast). Revolutionary brigades from 1) Zintan and the Nafusah Mountains, 2) Misrata, and 3) eastern Libya were clearly the dominant powers in their respective regions, even if dozens of amateur village and neighborhood militias also operated in their regions. In the first months after the war, these powerful groups established rough monopolies of force in their home regions. They did so by subjugating rival municipalities, absorbing or demobilizing the amateur militias, and securing weapons and finances. The Zintani militias also enjoyed some protection from the rugged terrain of the Nafusah Mountains. By mid-2012, the major rebel factions controlled their strongholds and had little reason to fear incursions from the other former rebel groups.

Each of these three factions was situated in relatively defensible space—dislodging a rival group in a neighboring region would be costly and risky. Though the rival brigades were heavily armed, none had attack helicopters, ground attack aircraft, armored vehicles, adequate C4ISR capabilities, or sheer numbers needed to invade their rivals’ strongholds and end any political disputes through combat. Having secure strongholds meant that brigades could safely withdraw from skirmishes with rivals (in Tripoli or Benghazi, for example). This meant that a clash could de-escalate, and negotiations could recommence. (A brigade without a stronghold would be more likely to calculate that its survival depended on standing and fighting.)

This informal, territorially-based power-sharing agreement held through early 2014, when changing conditions made strategies of violence more attractive, and less risky. First, external actors began to see conflict in Libya as part of a
region-wide contest between Islamists on the one hand and secularists and monarchies on the other. Over time, Turkey and Qatar lent increasing support to Islamist actors in Libya, while Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE supported the nationalist-traditionalist coalition. These external actors developed linkages with local groups to act as proxies in this putative region-wide contest: Libyan groups received significant amounts of aid, military advice, and arms—reducing the costs and risks of violence.

Second, the prospect of losing elections in mid-2014 created a fear in the Islamist camp that they would be excluded from the Libyan political transition going forward. With a much diminished Islamist caucus in the national parliament, the NFA and other establishmentarian groups could easily overturn any legislation passed in the GNC, undermine the ability of Islamist groups to compete electorally, and even attempt a massive purge of the Brotherhood and other Islamists from public life, similar to what was taking place, in a more violent fashion, in Egypt next door. Though, for his part, Khalifa Hifter was vocal about purging Islamists from political life in Libya, it was by no means clear whether the NFA and its allies were contemplating such a move. Nonetheless, the Islamists in the GNC calculated it could not take that risk, especially with the shadow of Egyptian events looming over them. The Islamist commitment to democracy and constitutionalism waned as President el Sisi cracked down on the Brotherhood. One Benghazi-based, ultraconservative Islamist democrat, Sheik Mohamed Abu Sidra told the New York Times that President Morsi’s overthrow “made it far more difficult for him to persuade Benghazi’s Islamist militias to put down their weapons and trust in democracy.” “Now they will just say, ‘Look at Egypt,’ and you don’t need to say anything else” (Kirkpatrick and Hubbard 2013). Ceding the political arena to the winners of
the election would have created unacceptable vulnerabilities to the Islamist-Misrata bloc.

Third, jihadists in Benghazi accelerated their campaign of assassinations and bombings starting in mid-2013, ultimately forcing a military response from the more mainstream groups who were their targets. Apparently instigated by Ansar al-Sharia and splinters of the Libya Shield Force, assassins began a vicious campaign targeting police officers, judges, human rights activists, women’s rights activists, former Qaddafi officials, former and current military officers, and others whom they perceived as enemies. Even in the immediate aftermath of the civil war, Benghazi was never as secure as Misrata, and over the course of the post-war era, Benghazi became increasingly contested space. Public order was provided by an uneasy coalition between Army units that had defected at the start of the war and revolutionary brigades that exceeded the strength of the Army units. The revolutionary brigades were seen as more Islamist and more hostile to the role of Qaddafi-era officials in the transition. Jihadists operating under the banner of Ansar al Sharia took advantage of the cleavage in the security sector, and established themselves in Benghazi no later than September 2012. The jihadists acted as spoilers, antagonized the secularist half of the Benghazi security alliance, and drew the more mainstream Islamists into their orbit.

These three factors led the major actors in Libya to begin fearing their status quo. The autonomy of factions and their safety in their respective strongholds became threatened over the course of late 2013 and early 2014. This change meant letting the stalemate persist was no longer a viable option, and the main actors returned to combat.
A WEAK FORMAL SECURITY SECTOR

A weak formal security sector buttresses a stalemate for at least two reasons. First, having a weak security sector relative to internal armed rivals means that a government is not tempted to attack these rivals: strategies of pure coercion are not open to the government, or are, at least, resource-wasting and unlikely to succeed. All else equal, post-war governments in these situations must coopt armed groups into their coalition, or adopt blended strategies of cooption and coercion depending on relative military strength.

This condition has obviously been present in Libya since 2011 and is closely related, though not identical, to the political independence of factions. The discussion in the previous section demonstrates that the government has been too weak to pacify recalcitrant political actors and spoilers. Imagining the counterfactual is straightforward: if this condition did not hold— if the government had a stronger security sector— then it would have behaved differently in the frequent cycles of violence—protest—withdrawal. Instead of letting the offending brigades withdraw safely to their strongholds, the government would be tempted to respond to these windows of opportunity with military force. The government would be tempted to choose military escalation as a strategy, perhaps on the principle of never letting a good crisis go to waste. In this way, a weak security sector was a necessary condition for the repeated de-escalations in post-war Libya. A weak security sector may not be capable of preventing or deterring violent flare ups, skirmishes, or low-level terrorism, but by lessening the temptation for the government to adopt coercive governing strategies, it helped avoid a relapse to full-fledged civil war.
How is a “weak formal security sector” conceptually different than the “political independence of factions?” Consider the notional Venn diagram in Figure 4.2 to represent the set memberships of “weak formal security sector” in region A and “independence of factions” in region B. Libya sits in the overlapping region C: Libya has both a weak formal security sector, and its political factions are functionally autonomous. Area D represents post-war cases that feature strong security sectors, and that have political factions that do not operate as quasi-states.
Many post-war cases sit in either region A or B but not both. In region A, for example, sit post-war El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Nepal. In these three post-war episodes, the formal security sector was quite weak. Though combat was over and non-state actors were largely demobilized, the post-war governments in each of these three countries could not feasibly pursue purely coercive governing strategies against political opponents, former rebels, or rival groups. Former combatants could have easily re-mobilized, and fighting could have easily restarted. At the same time, these cases could not sit in region B: the political factions were not autonomous of one another. Each case featured strong political factions that did not operate (or no longer operated) as quasi-states; they were not (or were no longer) territorially or functionally independent of one another.
Area B in the Venn diagram represents the converse circumstance: post-war episodes where local political factions are operating as quasi-states (territorially and functionally independent of each other and the government), but where the central state has a strong security sector. Political theorists would argue that this situation should be rare: central governments covet power and should not ordinarily allow a weak internal rival to remain standing very long. Based on the codings introduced in the previous chapter, the conventional wisdom is correct. Since 1970 these circumstances do occur only rarely: usually only where an external power intervenes to protect the weaker party (such as Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldova) or in democratic and federal arrangements (such as Northern Ireland).

The Quantitative Comparative Analysis in the previous chapter indicates that “independence of factions” and “weak security sector” are not substitutes for each other, and the presence of each condition is necessary to sort post-war cases into successes or failures for this specific policy recipe. The Libya case is a case where both such conditions are present.

Secure Government Revenues

Despite the incoherence and insecurity of the Libyan transition, the stalemate was not a ‘hurting stalemate’ to the most important political actor in Libya, the government, because its revenues depended only on the thinnest layer of internal security. So long as basic oil and financial infrastructures operated, political disorder did not seriously threaten Libyan government cash flow. That meant securing oil fields, pipelines, seaports, terminals, refineries, and the central bank.
Compared to the complicated and invasive administrative infrastructures necessary to collect property taxes, sales taxes, or income taxes, oil revenues are relatively easy to secure even in insecure countries. In Libya’s case, small, loyal garrisons with enough firepower to repel lightly armed guerrillas and rioters were basically sufficient to secure virtually all government revenues.

Indeed, truly massive government revenues were collected from 2011 to 2014, despite having a barely functional central government, multiple armed conflicts, and a much-degraded public infrastructure. Absent oil, the Libyan government would have long since collapsed; alternatively, it would have become dependent on external financing by patrons who may have forced the government to confront and defeat militants much sooner. In either case, the oil revenues sustained the stalemate by allowing the government to undertake negotiated, incremental, and cautious governance strategies, rather than gamble on a showdown with the major armed groups.

Figure 4.3 shows the monthly oil revenue figures in Libya since 2010, superimposed on a representation of monthly security incidents over the same period. The two major dips in oil production are due to the civil war (January to October 2011) and the federalist mutiny at Ras Lanuf and Sidra (July 2013 to April 2014). Despite the closure of the oil terminals in eastern Libya for 10 months, the government’s patronage-based governance strategy basically continued. Even at reduced output, cash still flowed into government accounts, and such accounts were already full enough to make government payroll and patronage payments. If that failed, government allies from the private sector were willing to step in and help, as they did during the federalist gambit; unnamed government allies offered Jadhran tens of millions of dollars for his loyalty.
While both the government and insurgents realized the importance of oil exports, and oil infrastructures were major flashpoints throughout the period, the stalemate over that period never threatened the ability of the government to operate. Indeed, that is why anti-government actions often took the form of attacks on oil infrastructure: so long as government accounts were full, the government could ignore many constituencies and their grievances. Ultimately, disruptions to oil production and exports failed to have a major effect on the government’s governing strategy—and certainly far less an influence on the government than the personal insecurity of government officials, the cabinet, the prime minister, and members of parliament. With revenues secure enough to operate, the Libyan government never viewed the insecurity of the country as a hurting stalemate, and thus never had to escalate to full-fledged armed conflict from 2011 to 2014.

Figure 4.4: Government Revenues in Libya
Another necessary condition for the stalemate was that the government did not try to impose any post-conflict justice mechanism. This is a counterintuitive finding. Most peacebuilding literature argues that post-conflict justice mechanisms increase the likelihood of a successful post-war transition (for example, the work of the United States Institute of Peace). That may be true in many contexts and may be true for the average case, but in Libya and in post-war settings similar to Libya, the absence of post-conflict justice mechanisms is a necessary condition for a stalemate.

This counterintuitive finding rests on self-interest. The lack of an adequate, autonomous post-conflict justice mechanism means that the factions in Libya do not fear the continued stalemate. Whatever crimes the factions commit, there is no prospect of punishment. The Libyan brigades and other violent non-state actors-- even those guilty of major crimes-- have little to fear from the Ministry of Justice, the police, and the judiciary. Quite the reverse: chiefs of police, judges, and interior ministry officials were frequently the targets of assassination attempts. In late 2012, the top ministry of interior official for eastern Libya told the New York Times, “it is impossible for members of a brigade to arrest another... and it would be impossible that I give the order to arrest someone in an militia. Impossible” (Kirkpatrick 2012).

Indeed, post-conflict justice processes are so moribund in Libya that even imposing a victor’s justice on former Qaddafi elites has been difficult. A Zintani brigade has held Muammar Qaddafi’s son and heir apparent, Saif al Islam, since 2011 without trial, along with dozens of top officials captured during and after the civil war. The Misratans have detained
hundreds if not thousands of suspected, relatively low-ranking Qaddafi officials, loyalists, and sympathizers-- and are holding them without trial, often in barbaric conditions and often subject to torture. Libyans have refused to allow the International Criminal Court to operate in the country.

The factions have imposed their own rough justice, but they themselves are subject to none. As discussed in the previous section, the government has had a difficult time disciplining military and paramilitary units scattered around the country. The government, aware of its own weakness, does not press the issue. Paradoxically, this impunity sustains the stalemate: the various armed groups in Libya would undoubtedly stand and fight if their members were at risk of fines, imprisonment, or execution.

**Pillars of Stalemates are the Flashpoints of Violence**

Precisely where one or more of these factors has not held are where the post-war violence in Libya has been highest: Tripoli and Benghazi. In Tripoli, no faction ever developed a local political monopoly; control of the city has been contested across the entire post-war episode. Tripoli-based rebel organizations were never strong enough to establish their autonomy, and instead entered alliances with Zintani and Misratan brigades. Tripoli became dependent on outsiders to provide security, and, as a result, the city became a battleground for groups trying to seize control of the post-war transition.

In Benghazi, the revolutionary brigades were never as unified as they were in Misrata and the western mountains: the alliance between the army and police, secular-nationalist brigades, and Islamist brigades broke down over time. While
relatively secure in late 2011 and 2012, by 2014 the campaign of assassinations against moderates and secularists provoked an armed response by Khalifa Hifter.

Post-war Libya has been unable to transition from the quasi-anarchy of a post-war stalemate to a conventional political order built on strong institutions, organized security, democratic legitimacy, and economic development. What makes Libya and similar cases so difficult to solve is that the precise conditions that favor an uneasy stalemate are the ones that need to be overcome to build centralized government: namely, the political independence of sub-national territories, a weak official security sector, and the lack of any mechanism to punish illegal or insurrectionist behavior. Attempts to rectify these institutional deficits are, of course, subverted by the various political factions because they put factions in legal jeopardy and weaken their relative power.
Libyan society still comprises the same underlying conditions that sustained an uneasy stalemate for three years while the political process inched slowly forward. If a ceasefire does take hold and political negotiations restart, Libya can still muddle through with judicious external support.

First, the main political coalitions and their affiliated brigades must negotiate a detailed military power-sharing and power-dividing agreement. This agreement should formalize, precisely delineate, and grant legal force to the territorial division of power that already exists on the ground: a western military zone administered by the Zintani brigades, a western-central military zone administered by the Misratan brigades, and an eastern military zone to be administered by Hifter’s Libyan National Army, once the latter has suppressed the jihadist groups operating there. These brigades would agree to respect each other’s territory on the condition that each organization root out violent extremist groups such as Ansar al Sharia. The brigades would share responsibility for keeping the peace among tribes in the south. Most importantly, the parties must negotiate a timeline for the withdrawal of Misratan forces from Tripoli and the transfer of security control to a local, neutral municipal administration that will need to be organized. Once completed, Libya would establish a fourth military zone in the capital and surrounding areas and parliament could return safely to Tripoli.

Obviously such a process is easier said than done. The transfer of territory and assets in and around Tripoli is the central problem and may require a brief international peacekeeping presence. There are multiple precedents for short-
duration, narrowly-tailored peacekeeping deployments focused on monitoring the withdrawal of forces and facilitating the transfer of territory among factions that have signed a ceasefire agreement but lack the capacity to implement the ceasefire safely. In post-war Guatemala (1997) peacekeeping troops successfully disengaged combatants, monitored compliance with the ceasefire agreement, collected weapons, and demobilized rebel fighters—all within three months. United Nations forces successfully verified compliance with agreements at the end of the Iran-Iraq War (30 months), at the end of the Aouzou strip conflict (2 months), during the transfer of West New Guinea from the Netherlands to Indonesia (7 months), and after the India-Pakistan War of 1965 (7 months), to name a few examples. Monitoring the withdrawal of Misratan militias from Tripoli, reconstituting and redeploying the city’s police, and organizing a local gendarme could take a matter of months. Much of the local materials for a ‘police-building’ effort already exist on the ground in Tripoli: the local security organizations are simply weaker and less organized than outside brigades. Less intrusively, NATO could offer to secure, repair, and administer Tripoli’s international airport or extend a security guarantee to the fourth military zone and monitor its boundaries until metropolitan Tripoli is able to secure itself.

A ceasefire agreement can also be structured to provide opportunities for confidence building. For example, a ceasefire agreement might include public commitments to the ongoing constitution-drafting process, and an agreement to invite international monitors to observe the ratification plebiscite. Despite the current crisis, the constitutional assembly expects to issue an initial draft sometime in early 2015. If events have not overtaken the process, the factions could demonstrate their commitment to peace and democracy by providing security
guarantees to the electoral commission as it begins work in their zones of control. The constitutional assembly can build confidence by communicating clearly that peaceful or moderate actors should not fear any constitution they produce—the constitution will marginalize only violent extremists who wish to subvert a free, democratic, and prosperous Libya at peace with itself and its neighbors.

Another opportunity to build confidence is to issue a new municipalities law and hold local elections for city, town, and village councils. Ad hoc “committees of notables” have governed most municipalities in Libya since 2011. All factions seem to agree that strong, elected municipal governments should, at the very least, administer primary and secondary schools, set rules for land use and urban development, collect trash, and provide basic utilities. Municipal reforms and elections can move forward while the constitutional assembly continues its work on issues of regional federalism and autonomy. A ceasefire agreement should include a schedule for holding municipal elections before new parliamentary elections, or at least simultaneous to them. Alternatively, the ceasefire agreement could also establish a rough outline of municipal reforms and appoint a committee to propose a detailed law. Many contentious local government issues—the size of councils, the number of reserved seats for women and minorities, district versus at-large elections, partisan versus non-partisan elections—are relatively technical and ‘low stakes’ compared to other items on Libya’s legislative agenda. Municipal government reform therefore provides an excellent opportunity for national political actors to demonstrate their commitment to democracy and decentralization without engaging controversial issues of federalism or autonomy.
Local elections will also give a voice to ordinary Libyans, create new stakeholders in Libya’s day-to-day governance, and inject a modest pluralism into the local political monopolies that have developed under the Misratan and Zintani brigades. These new stakeholders could act as interlocutors with the brigades that happen to control their particular region, and engage them on issues of basic public services and security. Local elections may shift the political terrain toward moderate, negotiated solutions and away from violence.

Roughly half of all post-war countries endure renewed conflict within five years. In this respect the Libyan experience is common. A failed state or outright civil war can be avoided, but only with a negotiated ceasefire and the suppression of terrorist groups in and around Benghazi. If these efforts fail, Libya’s powerful neighbors may ultimately intervene--an outcome that would open an entirely new Pandora’s box.
Reestablishing public order after civil war has been called the *sine qua non* of post-war recovery: without basic public order no other peacebuilding policies can move forward effectively. What factors shape the ability of peacebuilders to establish public order after civil war? What are the determinants of institutional effectiveness among security sector actors in post-war settings? This chapter addresses core questions of order, institution-building, and post-conflict risks by conducting a quantitative analysis of the economic, geographic, social, and security factors that contributed to patterns of violent crime in post-war Kosovo. This chapter utilizes new data and information that were gathered during field research in the disputed province, including interviews with security sector actors. It contributes to the peacebuilding research program in at least three ways. First, it shows that crime prevention in and of itself is an indicator of institutional effectiveness. Post-war societies with disproportionately high crime rates are likely to have ineffective security sectors. Second, this chapter establishes the patterns and determinants of post-war violence in one of the most-cited, paradigmatic cases in the post-war and peacebuilding literatures. Third, it offers a micro-level test of current theories of peacebuilding success— theories that were generated primarily from macro-level research strategies.

Aside from being intrinsically interesting as indicators of institutional effectiveness, violent crime rates examined here are also potential precursors or early warning signs of war
recurrence: murder, aggravated assaults, arson, and IED attacks. The analysis shows that poverty, rough terrain, and ethnic heterogeneity are not good predictors of violent crime in post-war Kosovo. Instead, in post-war Kosovo, the presence of both international police and local police are highly correlated with violent crime.

Kosovo Police Service (KPS) deployments had a significant and large downward effect on murder rates and IED attack rates in a given region of Kosovo. This effect translated to between three and nine fewer murders annually in a sub-region of Kosovo, for each additional percentage point of KPS officers per 1,000 residents.

In general, violent crime rates in post-war Kosovo were not determined by the same factors that the civil war literature identifies as critical to avoiding conflict recurrence. This finding suggest that the data generating processes for post-war crime and conflict recurrence are distinct.

International peacekeeping operations have grown in both number and complexity during the past twenty-five years. During the Cold War, peacekeepers were mostly deployed in response to international conflicts, and they generally served as unarmed or lightly-armed observers or monitors. In that era, peacekeepers’ primary tasks included physically separating combatants, monitoring ceasefires, preventing the escalation of minor violations, and acting as a “neutral referee.” Since 1989, two related trends have emerged. First, the international community more frequently deploys peacekeeping missions to address civil wars rather than international wars. Second, the role of peacekeeping missions has been enlarged to include “peacebuilding,” or an attempt to address the underlying sources of conflict with varying combinations of economic reconstruction, humanitarian relief, political mediation,
election-monitoring, institution-building, democratization, and even direct international trusteeship. Though they each have a mixed record, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are “arguably the most important innovation in international conflict management since World War II” (Fortna 2004a).

Most recent scholarship on peacekeeping and peacebuilding takes a quantitative approach, using multiple regression analyses on cross-national or cross-conflict datasets. These studies attempt to estimate the independent effect of peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions on conflict recurrence and other post-war outcomes, like democratization. Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006), Fortna (2004b), Gilligan and Sergenti (2008), and others generally find that these international interventions do indeed improve the prospects for peace. Explanations for how these missions work— the causal mechanisms of peacekeeping and peacebuilding— are less well-studied. Hypothesized mechanisms range from reconstituting institutions to manage political conflict, to restructuring the incentives of potential rebels to join the legal labor market, to reconciling social groups, and to solving security dilemmas. This chapter uses within-country, micro-level social statistics to evaluate these competing theories of peacebuilding mechanisms.

The “Kosovo model” is an extreme case of peacebuilding. Following the 1999 NATO intervention and the withdrawal of Serbian security and administrative personnel, the United Nations (UN) assumed direct control of Kosovo, and organized the provision of everything from social welfare payments to internal security. Acting through the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the international community deployed its own police officers, judges, prosecutors, health administrators, development and reconstruction teams, education and environmental policy experts, and other
administrators, monitors, and consultants. These personnel were drawn from UN member-states, but especially from Western Europe. NATO troops were responsible for Kosovo’s internal and external security immediately after the war, but NATO quickly began transferring control of internal security to UNMIK police units, composed of police officers from UN member states. By June 2000, NATO had transferred control of police functions to UNMIK in four of five Kosovo regions, and was only technically in control of the fifth (Muharremi, et al. 2003). NATO troops, administratively and legally distinct from UNMIK, retained exclusive responsibility for external security, disarmament of Kosovo rebels, and border security.

Kosovo’s post-war environment required such a large administrative and policing component because few Kosovo-Albanians had formal experience in government, and no state institutions were functioning. Beginning in the mid-1980s, Serbian nationalists led by Slobodan Milošević began an increasingly aggressive, systematic exclusion of ethnic Albanians from the political system and the administrative state in Kosovo. Ethnic Albanians responded with a boycott of the Serbian government, and formed a “parallel system” of social welfare, education, and political institutions starting in 1990; the Albanian diaspora subsidized this system. When Serbian officials fled the province after the NATO intervention, few residents had any experience in formal administrative governance, especially democratic policing. Even granting the “parallel system,” post-war Kosovo was an unusually clean slate compared to other well-known peacebuilding operations, for example in Bosnia, which had multiple legacy institutions in need of reform but not wholesale invention. No Kosovo-Albanian “state” was waiting in the wings (Mertus 2009). Since the end of the Cold War, few international interventions have matched
UNMIK’s level of penetration and control over the post-war society.

Because the peacebuilding effort in Kosovo is an extreme case, it is therefore “likely to offer advantages in elucidating the mechanism at work in a causal relationship” (Gerring 2001). In situations where social phenomena are difficult to measure, typical-cases may have causal effects and causal mechanisms too subtle or attenuated to detect using conventional methods. For these phenomena, an extreme-case study may uncover causal mechanisms because they are more readily apparent. The drawback of examining an extreme case is that conclusions drawn from that case may not be representative of other cases (externally valid). For example, the fact that international police in Kosovo were more effective at reducing crime than local police might not tell you much about how international policing affects crime rates in post-war Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, single case studies are useful insofar as they can test prevailing theories, help develop theories, and be compared to a body of other case studies (Rueschemeyer 2003). Given that peacebuilders “lack any viable theory about how to build a functioning state apparatus” after civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2004), this chapter is intended to stimulate theory building on peacekeeping and peacebuilding mechanisms.
Kosovo is a densely populated, landlocked territory at the center of the Balkan Peninsula with a population of around 1.8 million to 2 million, and a per capita income of $3,940 in 2013. As of 2011, 30 percent of the population lived below the poverty line. The economy is heavily dependent on international aid and remittances from Kosovo-Albanians living abroad. Kosovo sits at the nexus of several important transportation corridors, and contains large deposits of zinc, nickel, coal and lignite, and lead; Kosovo also has very fertile farmland. According to the 2011 census and international estimates, roughly 89 percent of Kosovo’s people are ethnic Albanians, five percent are Serbs, and six percent are another ethnicity, mostly Turkish, Bosniak, Roma, and Gorani. Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are mostly Muslim, while the Serbs are mostly Orthodox Christian.

Previously an Ottoman vilayet, Kosovo was divided between Serbia and Montenegro at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. After World War II, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia granted Kosovo autonomy as a territory within the Socialist Republic of Serbia. During the Cold War there were periodically discussions about elevating Kosovo’s constitutional status, but the province ultimately never attained the standing of a constituent republic of Yugoslavia like Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Ethnic Albanians comprised the majority of the population of Kosovo since at least World War II (Malcolm 1998). Through a combination of the natural growth of the Kosovo-Albanian community and the outmigration of Kosovo-Serbs, Serbs declined from about 25 percent of the population in 1948 to about 10 percent by the end of the Cold War. Across the same period, other minorities
comprised between five and 10 percent of Kosovo’s population and their proportions remained comparatively stable.

During the communist period, Kosovo-Serbs enjoyed privileged status compared to their Albanian counterparts. Aside from a short period in the 1970s, Serbs dominated government positions, party offices, and the managerial class (Kubo 2010). Albanians formed the majority of the labor and agricultural classes in Kosovo, which was the poorest and most agricultural region of Yugoslavia. Most government business was conducted in the Serbian language. After the death of longtime leader Josip Broz Tito in 1980, ethnic tensions across Yugoslavia increased. Serb nationalists led by Slobodan Milošević gained ascendancy in the Serbian Federal Republic in 1986. As communist rule faltered across Eastern and Southeastern Europe in 1989, Milošević adopted increasingly nationalistic policies. In June 1989, the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, he gave a virulently nationalistic speech at a mass rally near the battlefield outside the provincial capital, Prishtinë/Priština. Milošević’s speech and other nationalistic propaganda placed Kosovo and its eponymous battle at the center of the Serbian identity. Later in 1990, he revoked Kosovo’s autonomy and began a purge of ethnic Albanians from the political system and the bureaucracy. The Yugoslav army surrounded the Kosovo assembly in Pristina, which voted to abolish itself under duress. Protests by local leaders, workers, students, and intellectuals were suppressed with force. Locals formed a new assembly in secret, and this assembly declared Kosovo an independent republic within Yugoslavia in 1990.

briefly attempted to halt these secessions by force. The situation degenerated further when Serb minority communities in Bosnia and Croatia rebelled against the secessions, and sought to join their areas to a Greater Serbia. Civil wars in Croatia and Bosnia erupted. In the first phase of the Bosnian war, Croat communities also fought Bosniaks (Muslim Slavs) for control of the Bosnian government, but ended up forming an alliance against the Bosnian Serb rebels. Croatia and Serbia supported their proxies in each of these fights. Though relatively brief, the wars in Bosnia and Croatia caused 100,000 and 20,000 battle deaths, respectively. By 1995, the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO had been drawn into the conflicts, establishing a series of peacekeeping missions that, at their height, totaled more than 60,000 military personnel in Bosnia and 15,000 military personnel in Croatia.

In the midst of this tumult, Kosovo-Albanians organized an illegal referendum on full independence in late 1991, which passed overwhelmingly. With this mandate, the underground Kosovo assembly declared full independence in 1992. Unlike elsewhere in Yugoslavia, however, the situation did not immediately turn violent. Instead, the rump Yugoslavian and Serbian governments simply ignored the declaration, and ethnic Albanians began a long boycott of the government. Having been purged from the political system and bureaucracy, ethnic Albanians formed “parallel systems” of social welfare, education, taxation, and political institutions starting in 1990. Albanians from Albania and from the global diaspora subsidized these parallel systems. During the 1990s, the poet Ibrahim Rugova was the leader of this non-violent protest movement as the elected “President of the Republic of Kosova.”

Kosovo-Albanians dissatisfied with the progress of Rugova’s non-violent movement organized the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
in the mid-1990s. In early 1996, the KLA began conducting low-level attacks against police stations, military bases, and other Serb-controlled government installations. The KLA pursued a classical insurgency strategy, with some suggesting that the ultimate goal was to provoke an overreaction from Milošević’s regime that would end with an international intervention leading to Kosovo’s independence. The rebellion developed linkages to groups in Albania and in the Albanian diaspora, receiving funding and weapons from both sources. The Serbian government deployed military and paramilitary units to the province, and conducted aggressive raids in suspected KLA strongholds. By 1998, the KLA had become capable of a sustained insurgency campaign, and the government responded with ever-greater force. Violence escalated across 1998, with battle deaths reaching the low thousands.

Diplomatic efforts to end the conflict began in earnest in mid-1998. Both sides of the conflict made and then broke a series of commitments to the Contact Group, composed of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as representatives from the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the UN. By September 1998, over 230,000 refugees had fled the fighting, and on 23 September the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1199, demanding a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Serbian forces, the return of refugees, and the uninhibited access of international monitors to the province. In November, the OSCE deployed the Kosovo Verification Mission to monitor compliance with Resolution 1199. Nevertheless, Serbian paramilitaries conducted a series of well-publicized mass killings during late 1998 and early 1999, which accelerated efforts at a negotiated settlement as well as NATO preparations for war.
After much shuttle-diplomacy, and under pressure from the Contact Group, Kosovo-Albanian and Yugoslavian/Serbian representatives agreed to meet at a peace conference in Rambouillet, France, in February 1999. The Contact Group proposed a settlement that included an immediate ceasefire, negotiations over final status, the preservation of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity, the protection of the cultural rights of national communities, the prosecution of war crimes, ethnic proportionality in Kosovo’s bureaucracy and police services, democratic self-governance for the people of Kosovo, the decentralization of power to municipalities, and the supervision of the agreement by competent international bodies (Weller 1999:225-226). Despite much negotiation, these were essentially the terms of the final agreement. After the negotiating teams reconvened in Paris in mid-March, the Kosovo delegation signed the Rambouillet Accords, but the representatives from Belgrade refused to do so on 18 March. Indeed, during a break in talks, Belgrade had increased its troop presence in and near Kosovo. On 20 March the Kosovo Verification Mission withdrew from Kosovo, and Serbian forces began a new offensive in northern and central Kosovo. On 24 March, the NATO air war began, with the stated aim to impose the terms of the Rambouillet Accords on Belgrade.

Airstrikes lasted from 24 March to 10 June 1999. During this air campaign, Serb forces ultimately expelled around 850,000 Kosovo Albanians from the province. Another 600,000 were displaced internally, meaning that virtually the entire Kosovo-Albanian community was displaced. NATO inflicted significant casualties on Serbian military forces, and destroyed much infrastructure, reaching even to Belgrade. Negotiations with Milošević’s regime continued throughout the strikes. On 9 June, Serbian officials agreed to a Military Technical Agreement, outlining the terms of their withdrawal from Kosovo. The
following day, NATO suspended its campaign, and the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, imposing the terms of the Rambouillet Accords on Kosovo, and setting the framework for the peacekeeping operation in the province. By mid-June 1999, 20,000 NATO peacekeepers had entered the province, 600,000 Kosovo Albanian refugees had returned, and perhaps 200,000 Serb and Roma civilians had fled north to Serbia proper in fear of reprisals.
The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) shared responsibilities for security with NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR). UNMIK had sole responsibility for the civilian peacebuilding mission, which was headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, initially French diplomat Bernard Kouchner.\textsuperscript{24} The peacebuilding mission recognized that the political institutions in Kosovo would need to be built essentially from scratch; UNMIK was organized into four “pillars,” each headed by a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General. Pillar 1 (Police and Justice) and Pillar 2 (Civil Administration) were administered by the United Nations, Pillar 3 (Democratization and Institution Building) was administered by the OSCE, and Pillar 4 (Reconstruction and Economic Development) was administered by the European Union.

The international community decided upon a division of labor that gave the OSCE responsibility for training new government officials, including police officers. The OSCE, however, remained under the aegis of UNMIK and worked in partnership with the international police in Pillar 1 to train local police officers. The OSCE quickly renovated the abandoned Serbian police school in Vushtrri/Vučitrn and graduated the first class of cadets in October 1999. UNMIK decided to train and deploy officers as quickly as possible, and several officer classes trained simultaneously at the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS). From February 2000 through May of 2001, an average of about 260 officers graduated the academy each month. The rate dropped in 2001 and 2002, and again from 2003 to 2005.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{24} Sérgio Vieira de Mello was SRSG for a single month during UNMIK’s initial entrance into Kosovo.
Figure 5.1 shows the annual graduates from the KPSS since 1999 (data is missing for 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2011).25

By the end of 2001, the KPSS had graduated over 4,100 cadets. By December 2005 the total number of graduated cadets was 7,600. Originally, cadets received eight weeks of basic training in police work at Vushtrri/Vučitrn followed by 19 weeks of field training under the supervision of a UNMIK Field Training Officer. Basic training was increased to 12 weeks in September 2001 and to 20 weeks in May 2004. Field training was reduced to 15 weeks in September 2001. Field training included both the UNMIK mentorship and an “additional 80 hours of classroom training in traffic accidents, criminal investigation, community policing, and domestic violence” (Jones, et al. 2005). During field training, UNMIK officers evaluated trainees daily; after completion officers entered a two-year probationary

25 The school has been called the Kosovo Academy for Public Safety since 2011.
period, during which international officers evaluated their local counterparts less frequently.

Even after the probationary period ended, all local officers worked alongside international officers at municipal and regional stations. KPS and UNMIK officers often conducted joint patrols, conducted joint investigations, and observed each other’s behavior. Learning thus continued in a day-to-day, if less formal, setting. UNMIK police rotations in country were generally short, averaging from six to nine months, limiting the opportunity for a stable mentor-relationship. Over time, local officers were expected to assume greater responsibility and autonomy.

The culmination of this training and mentoring process was a transfer of command authority from international to local officers. This occurred first at the municipal level, then at the regional level. The transfer process was phased: command of traffic enforcement was transferred to local control first, then minor investigations, then major investigations, and, finally, the executive command of the municipal station. Final transfer relegated UNMIK police to a monitoring role. Before the transfer, the UN presence at the municipal police station would have declined to two monitoring officers. This process was followed for regional police directorates as well, but regional directorates had a larger residual UNMIK police presence. Local media widely reported municipal and regional transfer ceremonies, and prominent UNMIK and local officials often attended.

The final steps in the transfer to local command authority were the creation of Ministries of Interior and Justice, which took place in 2005, and the transfer of KPS command to the Ministry of Interior in April 2006. Even then, however, international police and prosecutors located at headquarters
lead or supervised the most sensitive investigations, including those involving murder, inter-ethnic violence, financial crimes, and organized crime.

Negotiations over Kosovo’s final status commenced in 2006 after local political and administrative institutions met a series of benchmarks. By then, independence was essentially a fait accompli, and the only uncertainty was whether Serbia and its ally Russia would recognize Kosovo’s independence, perhaps as part of a novel “joint sovereignty” arrangement with the European Union. In the end, the differences were too great. Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008; by early 2015 Kosovo had been recognized by over 50 percent of UN member states, and over 80 percent of EU member states. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 remains in effect, but primary oversight of the police and justice sector now resides with the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) since 2008. EULEX investigates and prosecutes sensitive cases and “monitors, mentors, and advises local counterparts in the police, justice and customs fields.” It too has monitoring officers at many municipal stations, and at the regional and national levels.

Evaluations of Kosovo’s post-war policing regime have been generally positive. Most observers consider the creation of the Kosovo Police Service to be a success, perhaps the greatest success of the entire post-war recovery effort. The KPS repeatedly scored at the top of surveys of citizen satisfaction and trust, far above the post-war assembly, presidency, political parties, bureaucracy, courts, and UNMIK itself (Rees 2004, ISSR 2006, OSCE 2008). Expert analysts generally concurred in these positive assessments. Scholarly evaluations of Kosovo’s post-war crime and policing system have employed historical, ethnographic, or qualitative methods; several important themes emerge from this work. First, the initial training at the Kosovo
Police Service School focused heavily on community policing, multi-ethnic policing, ethics, and other topics important to establishing a democratically-minded police force, but did not train police on the Kosovo legal system itself. This was a practical issue: not until the 2004 enactment of a new criminal code could academy training incorporate specific instruction in Kosovo law (Heinemann-Grüder and Grebenschikov 2006; Peake 2004). Second, UNMIK police had the equipment expected in modern, western police forces, but the KPS was “starved” of equipment and other resources. During major riots in 2004, KPS officers had no anti-riot gear, and rioters could easily monitor KPS’s open radio communications (Crisis Group 2004; Peake 2004). Lack of computers and renovated stations hampered the mission. The international community, through the provisional Kosovo government, paid officers roughly €250 per month, barely enough for rent in the capital.

This chapter adds to our understanding of the peacebuilding mission in Kosovo the first quantitative analysis of crime and policing in the territory.
The advent of peacekeeping and peacebuilding as common policy tools has generated considerable scholarly research on their patterns. This literature has sat alongside the larger, related research program on civil war. The theoretical and empirical literatures have focused on a few narrow questions: Where do peacekeepers go? Are they effective when they get there? Does their presence improve the durability of peace after war? Quantitative scholarly research on these questions reaches back to the middle of the Cold War. Wilkenfeld and Brecher (1984) found that, from 1945 to 1975, the UN was far more likely to intervene in response to the most serious and complex international wars: for instance, in the most violent conflicts, in conflicts involving territorial or existential threats to member-states, or in crises with greater numbers of participants. Yet researchers studying the Cold War cases did not find conclusive evidence that international peacekeeping was effective. Butterworth (1978) found that UN interventions had no lasting impact on conflict reduction, though Haas (1986) found that the most robust UN military operations were successful at ending conflicts. Wilkenfeld and Brecher (1984) found that UN involvement raised the likelihood of a settlement agreement, but had no effect on the recurrence of conflict, suggesting that UN-brokered ceasefires and peace agreements were not very effective. Looking at international conflict from 1946 to 1988, Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel (1996) examined the effect of various types of UN interventions on the duration of peace. These interventions ranged in intensity from diplomatic efforts, to peacekeeping, to enforcement. They found that peacekeeping
interventions reduced the probability of conflict recurring within 10 years by roughly 70 percent.

As noted above, after the Cold War ended, the UN began deploying peacekeeping missions in response to civil wars and with the peacebuilding formula. A series of prominent civil wars and peacekeeping failures in Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda stimulated research into the effectiveness of peacekeeping and peacebuilding after civil war. Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) constructed a new data set of all civil wars since 1944, and all peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions across the same period. They found that peacebuilding efforts have a large and significant positive correlation with the endurance of peace after civil war, while traditional peacekeeping operations and other mission types have less conclusive effects. These findings were confirmed by Fortna (2004a) and Gilligan and Sergenti (2008). Indeed, the latter study used a notably improved methodology and found that the earlier researchers significantly underestimated the positive effect that UN peacekeeping has on the duration of peace after civil war.

**Causal Mechanisms of Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding**

Why does peacekeeping and peacebuilding work? How do peacekeepers and peacebuilders create a more durable peace after civil war? Scholars have advanced several explanations. The first arguments are military and structural in nature. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions can mitigate coordination problems, such as in situations where the combatants seek peace but lack the capacity to implement a peace agreement safely. For example, peacekeepers can assist with communication among military forces that are maneuvering away from the front lines, or can assist with demobilization and the
collection of weapons (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:53-54). Even unarmed peacekeepers can act as conflict managers by “punishing” defections from the peace agreement--for instance by “naming and shaming” defectors. Unarmed peacekeepers often have access to political and financial resources they can use to reward compliance. Peacekeepers can reduce perceptions of vulnerability by providing credible information to combatants on opponents’ preferences, strengths, and compliance; peacekeepers can also reduce perceptions of vulnerability by physically separating warring parties, which has the salutary effect of reducing the chances of misperceptions or accidents escalating into renewed war (Fortna 2008:86-98).

The second set of arguments addresses peacebuilding mechanisms specifically: peacebuilding missions are, at least in part, institution-building missions. Peacebuilding erects closely-supervised political institutions that, at least in theory, constrain bad behavior of former combatants and provides forums for the peaceful negotiation political disputes. As practiced by the United Nations and Western powers since 1989, peacebuilders do not impose just any institutions on post-war societies, but very specific ones: liberal democracy and market economies. The logic behind this international peacebuilding formula is the belief that countries with market economies and democratic regimes are more peaceful at home and less likely to wage war abroad, at least against other democracies. Political theorists as far back as Kant have linked democracy and peace: democracies are thought to have internal mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of political disputes, to ensure universal participation in representative self-government, to codify alternation in government, and they foster norms of negotiation, compromise, and tolerance. Empirical work on the Democratic
Peace Theory has shown that democracies virtually never fight one another (e.g. Oneal and Russett 1999).

For other scholars, the key institutional transformations are market reforms. These scholars emphasize that societies with market economies outperform other societies across a range of indicators of social well-being and human development, and show that growth-promoting reforms reduce the risk of civil war and other forms of political violence (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2004). These perspectives inform international peacebuilding strategies devised at the United Nations, in Washington, and in Europe, but have earned criticism for conflating the stability of established capitalist democracies with the destabilizing, complex, and often bloody processes of marketization, development, and democratization (Hegre, et al. 2001, Paris 2004:44-46). Despite criticism, this “international peacebuilding consensus” is so strong that the “typical formula” is encouraged even in post-war countries relying solely on local peacebuilding capacities, in societies with little or no experience with democracy or market capitalism, or even where violence is ongoing.

A third set of causal mechanisms includes changing labor market incentives for potential rebel soldiers. The most robust finding in the civil war literature is that civil wars are a problem of poor countries. Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2008) argue “multinational post-conflict efforts should be concentrated disproportionately in the poorest countries and should focus heavily on economic recovery” (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2008:469). In the short run, this can mean stabilizing the currency, reopening banks and markets, providing electricity on a predictable schedule, securing and opening major transit corridors, and increasing the supply of food and fuel. If the war destroyed much physical capital and caused much
suffering, local or international peacebuilders may provide humanitarian assistance until the new infrastructure and institutions of the economy are produced.

**Sources of Crime and Social Violence**

Theories of peacebuilding and civil war have considerable overlap with theories of crime and social violence. The variables investigated are frequently identical: labor market and other economic indicators, ethnic diversity, social capital, the presence or absence of an effective security sector. Traditional models of criminal behavior generally follow one of three complementary approaches: rational choice, sociological, or cultural. Gary Becker (1968) first introduced a rational-choice model of criminal behavior and criminal justice policy. He conceived of criminals as utility-maximizing individuals who face certain incentive structures in local labor markets. Individuals calculate whether they will gain more utility from engaging in crime, or by selling their labor for legal wages. An individual’s estimation of their expected value for licit or illicit labor might be sensitive, on the one hand, to the prevailing wage rate for their skills and the likelihood of finding work, and, on the other, the payoff of crime, and the probability of arrest and conviction. Regression analyses based on this approach allows researchers to incorporate a rich variety of socio-economic and criminal justice indicators, such as the prospect of future earnings, the adequate presence of police, the severity of criminal punishment, education levels, and others. Of particular relevance to the analysis here, this body of research explores the effect of police presence on crime.
Starting in the 1980s, sociological explanations of crime gained renewed prominence. These theories moved beyond conceptualizing criminal behavior as strictly a cost-benefit and labor market calculation. William Julius Wilson, Charles Murray, James Q. Wilson, and others considered the importance of peer relationships, demographics, and social capital in determining the prevalence of crime. In particular, social disorganization theory predicts that urban areas in which the levers of official and unofficial social control (say, police, social networks, churches) are in decline have greater rates of social deviance (Kelling and Wilson 1982; Sampson 1986). More recently, scholars have included culturalist explanations into theories of crime (Almgren 2005). The relevance to this study is that ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity may generate different patterns of crime data; in certain contexts, ethnic diversity and inequality may even “cause” crime. In Kosovo, the diverse palette of ethnic and religious groups—Albanian, Serb, Bosniak, Roma, Gorani, Turk, Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic, and others—may have different tolerances for crime, may rely on different forms of social control, and may interpret social deviance differently.
DATA SOURCES AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

MEASURING CRIME

The Kosovo Police Service provided yearly reported crime from 1999 to 2011, broken into crime type and region of Kosovo. Their computerized data management infrastructure is called the Kosovo Police Information System (KPIS). KPIS began just after the war concluded in 1999. UNMIK police administered the system until 2007, when control was handed over to the Kosovo Police Service. From 1999 through 2007, KPIS tracked 59 individual offenses. From 2007 through 2011, crime categories expanded to 187 offenses, to provide law enforcement with more granular data.26 Despite these transitions, most major violent crime figures are directly comparable across the entire period. (The following analyses are limited to the comparable data.) A given incident might generate several crimes in the database, for example a stolen car being driven recklessly causing a pedestrian fatality might lead to several charges. Crime data can be entered into KPIS in four ways. First, a citizen can report a crime to officers, who then file a police report and enter this report into KPIS. Second, police can directly witness a crime, and enter their report into KPIS. Third, Kosovo police investigators from the major crimes division at headquarters can report crimes to the database. Fourth, international police investigators and prosecutors in Kosovo can report crimes to the database.27

Figures 5.2 through 5.5 show time trends in selected crime rates from 2000 to 2010 for each region of Kosovo. The measures

26 Interviews with KPS officers, Prishtinë/Priština, June 2011.
27 Interviews with KPS officers, Prishtinë/Priština, June 2011.
of crime used in the following analyses are murder, aggravated assault, arson, and IED attacks.\textsuperscript{28} The rates are constructed using population figures from the 2011 census supplemented with minority population estimates from the OSCE.

Murder in post-war Kosovo was highest at the beginning of the peace period (1999 to 2000) and declined in all regions until about 2003 to 2006, when the rate stabilized between .05 to .20 per 1000 residents. (By comparison, Oakland, California, a relatively high crime city, reported a murder rate of .211 per 1000 residents in 2014.) Pejë/Péc and Mitrovicë/Mitrovica regions saw consistently high rate across the time period. (These regions also saw the heaviest fighting during the war. Mitrovicë/Mitrovica region is home to the largest Kosovo-Serb communities.) The capital’s region saw the highest murder rates in 2000, but saw the sharpest declines in 2001 and 2002. The southern region of Prizreni/Prizren—the furthest from the boundary with Serbia proper—had consistently low rates since 2002.

Aggravated assault rates show less significant time trends, and the regions are grouped over time from about .10 to .30 per 1000 residents. Aggravated assaults trend upward over the period. Notably Pejë/Péc experienced a large spike in the aggravated assault rate in 2002, 2003, and 2004.

Arson rates vary quite dramatically over time and across regions. Arson and IEDs were a weapon of intimidation against Kosovo-Serbs and the international mission; they were also a tool of organized criminals.\textsuperscript{29} Kosovo-Albanian nationalists targeted Serb property, Orthodox churches, and international facilities during times of political tension. Arson spikes

\textsuperscript{28} The term “Improvised Explosive Device” (IED) is not used in KPIS; it reports grenade/mine/explosive attacks.

\textsuperscript{29} Interviews with UN officials, Prishtinë/Priština, July 2005.
across all regions during the two major political and security crises in post-war Kosovo: province-wide riots in 2004, and the unsuccessful final-status negotiations in 2007, leading to Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. Arson rates declined precipitously after 2008, and seem to be headed to historic lows at the end of the time series. Though also a tool of intimidation, IED rates show rapid declines in all regions. By 2010, their rate of use had approached zero.

The box plots in Figures 5.6 through 5.9 show that crime rates across regions have generally comparable medians and the data are generally compact. There are relatively few outliers and the data are relatively unskewed, especially considering the time trends discussed. None of the regions are so different as to warrant dropping them from the analysis.
Figure 5.2: Murder Rates 2000 to 2010, by Region

Incidents per 1000 persons

Ferizaj
Gjilan
Mitrovice
Peje
Prishtine
Prizren

Figure 5.3: Aggravated Assault Rates 2000 to 2010, by Region

Incidents per 1000 persons

Ferizaj
Gjilan
Mitrovice
Peje
Prishtine
Prizren
Figure 5.4: Arson Rates
2000 to 2010, by Region

Figure 5.5: IED Rates
2000 to 2010, by Region
MURDER RATES BY REGION

![Box plot of murder rates by region.](image)

Figure 5.6

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT RATES BY REGION

![Box plot of aggravated assault rates by region.](image)

Figure 5.7
Selecting these four major, violent crimes for the empirical analysis has several advantages. The primary advantage is minimizing measurement error, especially measurement inconsistencies that might vary across time and space. First, the popular and administrative conception of these four crimes is unlikely to have shifted over time or across regions in Kosovo. A murder is a murder, and arson is arson, whether in Prizreni/Prizren in 2000 or Mitrovicë/Mitrovica in 2010. Second, these crimes are difficult to miss—or to conceal. There is less ambiguity, when these crimes are reported, that a crime has in fact occurred, even if the perpetrators are unknown. Murders, aggravated assaults, arsons, grenade attacks, and so forth are far more observable and verifiable than other reported crimes in the KPIS database, such as property crime, harassment and intimidation, sex crimes, or domestic violence. International personnel, the media, neighbors, and other witnesses are all more likely to notice a major, violent crime than property crimes, sex crimes, or domestic violence. Figures for these four crimes are at less risk of underreporting and false reporting, and therefore are less likely to be biased in some unobservable way.

Murder is generally believed to be the most consistently reported crime statistic (Fajnzylber, et al. 2002). Murders are often very public crimes (such as assassinations or spree killings), local media generally report murders (which is true in Kosovo), and aggrieved family members, friends, and coworkers form a natural constituency to demand an investigation. While the police may not “get their man,” we can reasonably rely on them and the public to report the crime— even when the murder involves organized crime, political corruption, or “acceptable” inter-ethnic violence. Aggravated assault, arson, and IED
attacks likely suffer from a greater degree of misreporting, though not, I believe, enough to preclude their use. In general, we should have the greatest confidence in results from the regressions with murder rates.

**Measuring Police Presence**

Contemporary reports and press releases from the UN, NATO, and OSCE provided figures for UNMIK and KPS officer deployments in each region of Kosovo, at the main headquarters in Pristina, and on the borders. The regional directorates are Ferizaj/Uroševac, Gjilan/Gnjilan, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, Pejë/Peć, Prishtinë/Priština, and Prizreni/Prizren. The personnel figures in each region are from the 15 June report in each year, or the nearest date to 15 June that I can locate. Using annual figures, rather than monthly figures, masks some variability in the data. The variability of regional personnel levels within a given year is, broadly speaking, from three sources. First, there is generally an overall increase in KPS personnel within each year, as new police academy classes graduate and are deployed to each region. Second, UNMIK police are frequently rotated in and out of country, and their numbers move dynamically across the year. Third, UNMIK police are shifted among the regions during the year, presumably for public safety or training purposes. These within-year changes are relatively small, however, compared to the overall trends of deployment figures in each region.
MEASURING ECONOMIC, GEOGRAPHIC, AND SOCIAL CORRELATES OF CRIME

Based on existing models of peacebuilding and of crime, I collected data on a variety of social, economic, and geographic factors for each region of Kosovo. To examine ethnic or social determinants post-war violent crime, I constructed ethnolinguistic fractionalization scores for each region using census data from 2011, supplemented with estimates from the OSCE. As an alternate specification, I recorded the proportion of Kosovo-Serbs in each province. To capture the presence of rugged terrain, I recorded the highest peak in each region as reported in the “Great Yugoslavian Atlas” published in Zagreb in 1988. I calculated the proportion of forested land in each region as reported by the Kosovo Statistics Agency (KSA 2009). There are no annual figures for GDP at the regional level, but there are poverty figures for 2000, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2009 from the Kosovo Statistics Agency and the World Bank.

Table 1 gives these figures by region, and also includes, for illustrative purposes, data on GDP per capita, literacy rates, and Gini coefficients from the Kosovo Human Development Report (2004). Note that the data in this analysis is both time-variant (crime, police deployment, poverty) and time-invariant (ethnic heterogeneity, forests, elevation).
TIME-SERIES--CROSS-SECTION REGRESSIONS WITH CRIME DATA

Regressing crime data on economic, social, and security indicators presents statistical and interpretive challenges, particularly with time-series--cross-section (TSCS) techniques utilized in this chapter. The statistical challenges are two-fold. First, there is a risk of finding spurious relationships due to autoregression. While in the long run we might expect to see crime rates change dramatically, in annual intervals, crime is “sticky”: a good predictor of an annual crime rate is the previous year’s crime rate (Fajnzylber 2002; Wooldridge 2003). Second, the error terms may correlate across time or cluster by region, violating Gauss-Markov assumptions. If error terms are serially or spatially correlated, the standard errors will be inaccurate and the t-statistics inflated. In this situation, OLS estimators are no longer the best linear unbiased estimators. The presence of autocorrelation will introduce bias and inconsistency, rendering statistical tests invalid (Wooldridge 2003).

Beyond the statistical challenges of time-series--cross-section regressions, the interpretive challenges of regressing crime data are significant. The central difficulty of using econometric methods to isolate the independent effect of police presence (or other interventions) on crime rates is endogeneity due to causal simultaneity. Crime rates and police presence are codetermined: communities hire and deploy police officers based (in part) on crime rates, yet the presence or absence of police should also (in part) determine crime levels. Each causes the other. Indeed, most independent variables introduced in both crime and civil war regressions--economic growth and development, demographic indicators, the presence of peacekeeping missions--are codetermined with the dependent
variables. For example, crime rates influence investment decisions and therefore economic growth, while simultaneously poverty and unemployment are thought to drive crime rates. In the next section I review the methods I used to address these issues.

**Patterns of Police Deployments in Kosovo**

One of the advantages of micro-level or single-case studies is the potential contribution of detailed case knowledge to hypothesis testing—contribution that would be infeasible in truly large-N, cross-national TSCS studies. It would be grossly inappropriate, for example, to attribute a universal driver of worldwide police deployments, and their causal relationship to crime rates. Indeed, there might be multiple explanations across the observed units (equifinality). Conversely, detailed field research is able to offer some insights on single cases, like post-war Kosovo.

Looking at monthly deployment data between 1999 and 2008, I find it relatively clear that UNMIK assigned newly-trained KPSS graduates based on a population formula, rather than any evaluation of crime rates. New officers graduating from the academy were deployed in constant proportion to the population in each district; once deployed officers were rarely reassigned (in large numbers) between the regions. KPS deployments in each region are virtually unchanged across most months. The number of officers assigned to each region changes almost exclusively when a new officer class graduates from the police academy in Vushtrri/Vučitrn. (Figure 5.1 above gave the annual graduation totals.) In other words, changes in KPS officer presence occur mostly when new classes graduate; and graduating officers are primarily assigned to regions in proportion to the regional
population. I believe that KPS officer deployments are therefore exogenous to crime rates.

The patterns of UNMIK police deployments are less clear: the number of UNMIK officers in each region often shifts significantly from month to month with no obvious relationship to, for example, the schedule of in-country rotations. I suspect that marginal changes in police presence are likely due to intelligence and public safety concerns. Thus interpreting any significant coefficient on UNMIK police presence is more difficult.
First, I use methods reviewed by Beck (2008) to address the statistical challenges discussed above. To test for autoregression, serial correlation, and spatial correlation, I utilize the battery of procedures in Croissant and Millo (2008).\textsuperscript{30} The general form of the linear model is:

\[
\text{Crime Rate}_{i,t} = \beta_1 \text{UNMIK}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \text{KPS}_{i,t} + \beta_3 \text{Poverty}_{i,t} + \beta_4 \text{Geography}_i + \beta_5 \text{Ethnicity}_i + u_{i,t}
\]

Crime rate takes on four values; geography and ethnicity two each, all of which are time invariant. This gives us 16 specifications to test using Croissant and Millo’s “plm” package in R. For specifications with murder and IED attack rates, there is little evidence of autocorrelation, or serial or spatial correlation of the error terms. For specifications with aggravated assault and arson rates, there is strong evidence of autocorrelation and serial correlation of the error terms; as a result, I introduce a lagged dependent variable for these regressions.

Tables 2 through 5 report the linear regression results of a fixed effect model, random effect models, and random coefficient models for each dependent variable.\textsuperscript{31} I do not report the intercepts. The aggravated assault and arson regression tables report the lagged dependent variables.

\textsuperscript{30} Namely, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test, Durbin-Watson test for serial correlation in panel models, Breusch-Godfrey/Woodridge test for serial correlation in panel models, Wooldridge’s test for serial correlation in FE models, and the Pesaran CD test for cross-sectional dependence in panels.

\textsuperscript{31} In all cases I used multiple imputation to account for missing data. The process used for multiple imputation for time-series--cross-section data was introduced by Honaker and King (2010). All imputations and statistics were computed in R.
Table 2: Murder Rate Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>FE</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>RC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
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<td>0.035**</td>
<td>0.035**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFS</td>
<td>-0.018**</td>
<td>-0.018**</td>
<td>-0.018**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.093</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elevation</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forested Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>SE</td>
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<td>0.470</td>
<td>0.557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELF</td>
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<td>-0.046</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Serb</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.208</td>
<td>0.229</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.448</td>
<td>0.424</td>
<td>0.428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes
* significant at the 10 pct. level; ** significant at the 5 pct. level; *** significant at the 1 pct. level.
First differenced model found only UNMIK significant, again positively correlated with murder rates (coef. = -0.054).
Random Coefficients Models do not report p values because there is some debate over how to interpret them.
There is also no conventional way to report a goodness-of-fit statistics akin to an R-squared statistic.

Table 3: Aggravated Assault Rate Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
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<th>RE</th>
<th>RC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LengAssault</td>
<td>0.067</td>
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<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.072</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFS</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
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<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>-0.583**</td>
<td>-0.548**</td>
<td>-0.523**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.162</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELF</td>
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<td>-0.101</td>
<td>-0.395</td>
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<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.550</td>
<td>0.621</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Serb</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes
* significant at the 10 pct. level; ** significant at the 5 pct. level; *** significant at the 1 pct. level.
A first-differenced model also found poverty significant, negatively correlated outcome (coef. = -0.737).
Random Coefficients Models do not report p values because there is some debate over how to interpret them.
There is also no conventional way to report a goodness-of-fit statistics akin to an R-squared statistic.
### Table 4: Arson Rate Regression Results

<table>
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<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>FE</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
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<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
<th>VIII</th>
<th>IX</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.092</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPS</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.082</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>-0.174</td>
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<tr>
<td>SE</td>
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<td>0.319</td>
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<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elevation</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
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<td>SE</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.439</td>
<td>0.164</td>
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<td>-0.418</td>
<td>0.244</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forsted Area</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELF</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td>0.669</td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>0.658</td>
<td>0.292</td>
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<td>0.292</td>
<td>0.272</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Serb</td>
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<td>-0.713</td>
<td>-0.706</td>
<td>-0.752</td>
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<td>0.606</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
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<td>0.606</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>0.562</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.467</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>0.140</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**
* significant at the 10 pct. level; ** significant at the 5 pct. level; *** significant at the 1 pct. level.

First differenced model found no significant coefficients.

Random Coefficients Models fit by REML.

Random Coefficients Models do not report p values because there is some debate over how to interpret them.

There is also no conventional way to report a goodness-of-fit statistics akin to an R-squared statistic.

### Table 5: IED Rate Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>FE</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
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<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
<th>VIII</th>
<th>IX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>0.044**</td>
<td>0.049***</td>
<td>0.052***</td>
<td>0.049***</td>
<td>0.052***</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.049</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPS</td>
<td>-0.033***</td>
<td>-0.032***</td>
<td>-0.031***</td>
<td>-0.032***</td>
<td>-0.031***</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
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<td>SE</td>
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<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.008</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
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<td>0.243***</td>
<td>0.239***</td>
<td>0.244***</td>
<td>0.231***</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.242</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-0.112</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forsted Area</td>
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<td>ELF</td>
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<td>-0.252</td>
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<td>Percent Serb</td>
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<td>-0.220</td>
<td>-0.193</td>
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<tr>
<td>SE</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
<td>66</td>
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<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.711</td>
<td>0.699</td>
<td>0.694</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>0.687</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**
* significant at the 10 pct. level; ** significant at the 5 pct. level; *** significant at the 1 pct. level.

First differenced model found only KPS and poverty marginally significant. KPS coefficient was -.019; poverty was .101. R-squared was only .091.

Random Coefficients Models fit by REML.

Random Coefficients Models do not report p values because there is some debate over how to interpret them.

There is also no conventional way to report a goodness-of-fit statistics akin to an R-squared statistic.
**Results**

**Murder.** Police presence had a large and statistically significant correlation with murder rates in post-war Kosovo. For each additional percentage point of UNMIK police officers per 1,000 residents, a region saw on average an additional .030 to .035 murders per 1,000 residents. At the low end, this translates to an additional six to seven murders annually in Ferizaj/Uroševac (the least populous region). At the high end, this translates to an additional 14 to 16 murders annually in Prishtinë/Priština (the most populous region).

For each additional percentage point of KPS police officers per 1,000 residents, a region saw on average .018 to .019 fewer murders per 1,000 residents. This translates to three or four fewer murders annually in Ferizaj/Uroševac (the least populous region) and eight or nine fewer murders annually in Prishtinë/Priština (the most populous region).

These models explain approximately 42 to 45 percent of the variation in the data.

**Aggravated Assault.** At the margin, changes in UNMIK police deployments were not correlated with changes in the aggravated assault rate. I find no evidence that marginal redeployments of UNMIK police had any effect on aggravated assault rates. Furthermore, I do not find any association between KPS officer deployments and aggravated assault at the margin.

Poverty rates have a large and unexpectedly inverse relationship with aggravated assault rates. For each additional percentage point in poverty rates, a region on average saw .506 to .583 fewer aggravated assaults per 1,000 residents. At the low end, this translates to 94 to 108 fewer aggravated assaults annually in Ferizaj/Uroševac (the least populous region). At the
high end, this translates to 238 to 274 fewer aggravated assaults annually in Prishtinë/Priština (the most populous region).

The aggravated assault models perform slightly worse than the murder models, explaining between roughly 21 to 26 percent of the variation in the data.

**Arson.** UNMIK police deployments had a strong and statistically significant correlation to arson rates. Each additional percentage point of UNMIK police officers per 1,000 residents was associated with an additional .196 to .251 arsons per 1,000 residents. At the low end, this translates to an additional 36 to 47 reported arsons per year in Ferizaj/Uroševac (the least populous region). At the high end, this translates to an additional 92 to 118 arsons per year in Prishtinë/Priština (the most populous region).

No other indicators have a statistically significant relationship with arson rates, including, surprisingly, measures of ethnic diversity. The models perform relatively poorly, explaining between roughly 9 and 16 percent of the variation in the data.

**IED Attacks.** Each additional percentage point of UNMIK police officers per 1,000 residents is associated with an additional .044 to .052 IED attacks per 1,000 residents in a region. At the low end, this translates to an additional eight to 10 IED attacks annually in Ferizaj/Uroševac (the least populous region). At the high end, this translates to an additional 21 to 24 IED attacks annually in Prishtinë/Priština (the most populous region).

For each additional percentage point of KPS police officers per 1,000 residents, a region on average saw .031 to .033 fewer
IED attacks per 1,000 residents. At the low end, this translates to six fewer IED assaults annually in Ferizaj/Uroševac (the least populous region). At the high end, this translates to 15 to 16 fewer IED attacks annually in Prishtinë/Priština (the most populous region).

For each additional percentage point in poverty rates, a region on average saw an additional .231 to .260 IED attacks per 1,000 residents. At the low end, this translates to an additional 43 to 48 IED attacks annually in Ferizaj/Uroševac (the least populous region). At the high end, this translates to an additional 109 to 122 IED attacks annually in Prishtinë/Priština (the most populous region).

The IED models perform well, explaining between 69 and 72 percent of the variation in the data.
The Determinants of Violent Crime in Post-War Kosovo

Police Presence is a Significant Predictor of Crime Rates

Keeping in mind the interpretive difficulties discussed earlier, it seems nonetheless clear that the presence of both UNMIK and KPS police personnel is significantly correlated to violent crime rates in post-war Kosovo. UNMIK presence has statistically significant associations with murder rates, arson rates, and IED attack rates; there was no correlation with aggravated assault. KPS presence correlated with murder rates and IED attack rates. In every case, UNMIK presence had a more sizeable correlation with crime rates than KPS presence. There is an interpretive puzzle however: the signs of UNMIK’s coefficients are positive (UNMIK is associated with greater crime), while KPS’s are negative (KPS is associated with lower crime).

We need to understand the case history to interpret these results. As discussed in the previous sections, UNMIK officers were deployed over time in patterns suggesting a possible relationship to local intelligence and public safety concerns. But were they? An understanding of the history of post-war Kosovo allows us to reject alternative hypotheses. The first alternative hypothesis is that marginal increases in UNMIK presence caused a jump in crime rates; crime was lower in areas with marginally fewer UNMIK police. Globally, peacekeepers have often been accused of major crimes, most notoriously during the ECOMOG mission to Liberia, which saw its forces loot the country during the deployment from 1989 to 1996. Peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo were credibly accused of participation in sex trafficking. However, there is little indication from published sources or from my field work that international police were a
significant source of major violent crime in Kosovo, for example murders, grievous assaults, arsons, or IED attacks.

The second alternative hypothesis is that an increased presence of UNMIK officers simply led to an increase in crimes reported, perhaps because they were more vigorous in their police work. If this is true, then the coefficients reflect an increase in crime reporting rather than an actual increase in crime. This interpretive difficulty is present in all crime regressions based on reported crime. (The major alternative research strategy--to use survey methods that attempt to measure citizens’ perception of crime--presents its own interpretive challenges.) As noted above, I selected crime rates to investigate based on their heightened violence and public nature, therefore minimizing the difference between reported crime and actual crime. For the most violent crimes, such as murder and grievous assault, I believe reported crimes are virtually identical to actual crimes in Kosovo; therefore we can reject this alternative hypothesis.

The regression results confirm the intuition that marginal changes in regional UNMIK police presence were reactions to changes in major crime rates.

The second, more interesting finding is that deployments of the Kosovo Police Service had a significant downward effect on murder rates and IED attack rates. KPS deployments did not have any correlation to arson rates and aggravated assault rates. Here too, case study knowledge is crucial to understanding the causal pattern. KPS deployments to each region were apparently based on regional population, not regional crime rates: I argue that KPS presence is exogenous to crime patterns in post-war Kosovo. As a result, there is not an interpretive challenge from joint causality: the causal arrow goes directly from KPS presence to crime rates. At the margin, regional increases in
KPS presence significantly reduced murder rates and IED attack rates. This quantitative analysis therefore confirms previous, qualitative assessments that the KPS was an effective post-war institution-building enterprise.

**Poverty Does Not Predict Murder, Arson; Does Predict Aggravated Assault, IEDs**

One of the central findings of the civil war and peacebuilding literatures is that civil conflict is a problem of poor countries, and that wealthier post-war countries rarely relapse back into civil war. Poverty rates in Kosovo were only partial predictors of civil peace, at least as far as major violent crime is concerned. Murder and arson were not associated with poverty rates, while aggravated assaults and IED attacks were. The latter results are somewhat contradictory. For the aggravated assault regressions, the sign of the coefficient on poverty was positive, while in the arson regressions, the sign was negative. The effect size is also quite large in both cases.

It is possible there is a confounding variable at work here. It is possible, for example, that there is an urban-rural dynamic that is not accounted for by the data I have collected (e.g. perhaps aggravated assault is an urban phenomenon and IED attacks a rural one). We must mark this down as an area for future research.

The equivocal findings on poverty suggest that there are distinct data generating processes for violent crime and for conflict recurrence. Poverty’s close relationship to civil war is the most robust finding in the civil war research program. In other words, different factors determine post-war social violence (crime) than post-war political violence (war). If so, the post-war economic policies designed to address political
violence by mitigating poverty should not also be expected to reduce crime levels.

**Geography Does Not Predict Crime Rates**

Geography is another important factor driving patterns of civil conflict, but it was not a factor driving violent crime rates in post-war Kosovo. Geographic factors are thought to increase the likelihood of civil conflict by making guerrilla warfare tactics easier to implement (e.g. Galula 1964, Fearon and Laitin 2003). Rugged terrain such as forests, jungles, and mountains make it easier for insurgent groups to hide from numerically and technologically superior security forces. This terrain advantage seems not to have any effect on crime rates in Kosovo: measures for both forests and mountainous terrain are not correlated with violent crime rates. Even in a post-war society where organized crime was endemic, terrain advantages apparently had little to no effect on crime patterns. Violent crime, even organized violent crime, may be driven more by social terrain: for example, the presence of clan networks and large diasporas is often cited to explain patterns of crime in Kosovo and the rest of the Balkans.

**Social Heterogeneity Does Not Predict Crime Rates**

Post-war planning was deeply concerned with violence among ethnic groups in Kosovo, and, indeed, there were significant episodes of communal conflict, including mass demonstrations and targeted terrorist attacks. The results here suggest, however, that post-war policies to prevent ethnic violence were apparently successful: neither ethnolinguistic fractionalization scores nor measures of the Serb population are good predictors of crime rates in post-war Kosovo. This is not due to the
absence of cross-ethnic crime; such crime has been a constant feature of Kosovo society since 1999, especially at the outset of the post-war period. Yet post-war policies were apparently effective at keeping cross-ethnic violent crime in relative proportion to the demographics of each region, holding all else constant.
CONCLUSION

Linear regression analyses test how marginal changes in independent variables change the outcome of interest. This chapter tested how differences in policing deployment, poverty rates, ethnic makeup, and geography independently influence violent crime rates in post-war Kosovo. It cannot tell us what would happen if UNMIK police had never deployed, or if UNMIK had withdrawn from Kosovo completely in, say, 2004. Those changes would almost certainly have caused violent crime to spike, thought it would have been difficult to measure without adequate police. It is therefore important not to lose sight of the overall context of security and institution building in Kosovo. As noted, Kosovo is an extreme case: in comparison to many other post-war peacebuilding efforts, Kosovo had (in practice) almost unlimited financial and programmatic resources from international actors. Early on, the UN, U.S., and E.U. decided that they could not afford to botch the recovery— for security and reputational reasons. Since this mission, the deployment of international police in post-war settings has seemingly diminished. If “policekeepers” are deployed at all, they are sent to small countries like Sierra Leone and Liberia. The U.S. failed to deploy any “policekeepers” to post-war Iraq; the U.S. and NATO have deployed very few to Afghanistan (relative to Kosovo’s per capita deployment).

Yet from a policing perspective, the Kosovo framework was clear. Intensive peacebuilding, large development assistance, large numbers of peacekeeping troops, holding early elections, quickly establishing local political institutions— these policy decisions created a context that allowed the international policing regime to have clear successes. International police
deployment, lengthy training, joint patrols, careful oversight, and phased transitions, I find, created a local police force that was effective at deterring, at minimum, murders and IED attacks—and possibly other violent and property crimes.

This chapter puts numbers on earlier qualitative evaluations that praised the formation of the Kosovo Police Service. For each additional percentage point of KPS police officers per 1,000 residents, a region saw on average .018 to .019 fewer murders per 1,000 residents. This translates to three or four fewer murders annually in Ferizaj/Uroševac (the least populous region) and eight or nine fewer murders annually in Prishtinë/Priština (the most populous region). These are significant effects, not just for the victims, but also for the creation of political order in a divided society emerging from a civil war.

This chapter undertook a within-country test of theories of crime, of civil war recurrence, and of peacebuilding. It challenges theories that put emphasis on ethnic, geographic, and poverty factors. The results instead point to security sector explanations of crime, civil war recurrence, and peacebuilding. It confirms cross-national findings that identify police as a key determinant of crime rates (e.g. Fajnzylber et al. 2002). It also lends support to arguments I have developed in the other chapters: that the institutional and security architecture of a post-war society better explains peacebuilding success than economic or social factors. This analysis thus points to the crucial importance of the new, international focus on security sector reform on reducing both social and political violence.
CONCLUSION

This dissertation has presented detailed analyses of peacebuilding and postwar recovery in the contemporary era. It has challenged core tenets of the “institutional peacebuilding consensus”-- in particular that economic recovery, democratization, communal reconciliation, and third party interventions are sufficient to explain the consolidation of peace after civil war. Instead, my analysis points to the institutional and military architectures of postwar societies driving, in large part, the emergence of a durable peace and the avoidance of war relapse. It has also exposed some gaps that future research can profitably address and thereby improve our understanding of these processes.

BETTER QUANTIFICATION OF SECURITY VARIABLES

Security sector reform, DDR, military integration and fragmentation, and the presence of non-UN troops have all resisted easy quantification and are therefore commonly excluded from large-N comparative work. An emerging international consensus around the importance of security sector reform should improve efforts at measurement. Developing continuous and time-variant measures of those policies will aid investigation about their relative importance among other post-war policies.

DEVELOPING CASE STUDIES ON SECURITY REFORMS IN CONFLICT-AFFLICTED COUNTRIES

Much of our knowledge of security-related reforms are drawn from political transition in Latin America, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe. As a result, our knowledge is quite detailed on
transition and reforms in countries at peace. There are far fewer case studies and far less comparative work on security sector reforms in conflict-afflicted countries. Such countries almost certainly face distinctive challenges of reform.

**Research on conflict in the Middle East, North and East Africa, and the Sahel**

While civil war has touched all regions of the world, the most dangerous and destructive conflicts are currently ongoing in the Middle East, North African, and East African regions. Compared to other regions of the world, the MENA region experienced fewer civil wars until the ill-fated U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the Arab Uprisings that began in 2011. The Arab region is distinctive in a number of ways— for example, governance, political economy, and civil society— that make comparisons with previous civil war experiences difficult. Perhaps the best comparison cases are immediately to the south of the Sahara desert and in East Africa. Academics and practitioners working on conflict resolution and peacebuilding should produce high-quality research to draw lessons from many of the lesser-known historical conflicts from these regions: among them Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and Yemen.
## APPENDIX A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacebuilding Approach</th>
<th>Specific Policy</th>
<th>Hypothesized Effect on Peace</th>
<th>Representative Citations or Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Deploy a UN monitoring mission</td>
<td>Separates combatants, provides information, reduces risk of accidents, improves coordination</td>
<td>Paris (2004); Doyle and Sambanis (2006); Fortna (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deploy a UN peacekeeping mission</td>
<td>Separates combatants, provides information, reduces risk of accidents, improves coordination</td>
<td>Paris (2004); Doyle and Sambanis (2006); Fortna (2008)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deploy a UN complex peacebuilding mission</td>
<td>Addresses causes of conflict</td>
<td>Paris (2004); Doyle and Sambanis (2006); Fortna (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deploy other 3rd party monitoring mission</td>
<td>Separates combatants, provides information, reduces risk of accidents, improves coordination</td>
<td>Paris (2004); Doyle and Sambanis (2006); Fortna (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deploy other 3rd party peacekeeping mission</td>
<td>Separates combatants, provides information, reduces risk of accidents, improves coordination</td>
<td>Paris (2004); Doyle and Sambanis (2006); Fortna (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deploy other 3rd party complex peacebuilding mission</td>
<td>Addresses causes of conflict, transforms society, (re)builds institutions to mitigate risk of conflict</td>
<td>Paris (2004); Doyle and Sambanis (2006); Fortna (2008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Adopt a new, interim, or amended constitution</td>
<td>Directs political conflict into peaceful channels, accommodation, negotiation</td>
<td>Boutros-Ghali (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish a multiparty system</td>
<td>Democratic theory</td>
<td>Boutros-Ghali (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extend political rights</td>
<td>Democratic theory</td>
<td>Boutros-Ghali (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hold elections</td>
<td>Democratic theory</td>
<td>Boutros-Ghali (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hold early elections</td>
<td>Democratic theory</td>
<td>Bosnia, Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hold local elections first</td>
<td>Democratic theory</td>
<td>Diamond (2005)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen political parties</td>
<td>Democratic theory</td>
<td>USAID Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen the legislature internally and vis-à-vis the executive</td>
<td>Democratic theory</td>
<td>USAID Programs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Rights and Civil Society</td>
<td>Improve civil liberties</td>
<td>Reduces feelings of vulnerability, improves trust in political system, promotes liberal norms, constrains government's ability to use violence</td>
<td>Boutros-Ghali (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adopt a human rights charter</td>
<td>Government's ability to use violence</td>
<td>Boutros-Ghali (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve minorities' rights, political participation, and access to services</td>
<td>Reduces grievances, promotes economic growth and good governance</td>
<td>Development Report (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve women's rights, political participation, and access to services</td>
<td>Reduces grievances, promotes economic growth and good governance</td>
<td>World Bank World Development Report (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Train media, disseminate hate speech</td>
<td>Improves governance, reduces social tensions, prevents incitement</td>
<td>Paris (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control &quot;hate speech&quot;, ban and demobilize extremist or nationalist groups</td>
<td>Reduces social tensions, chances of communal violence, prevents incitement</td>
<td>Paris (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Build a &quot;culture of peace&quot;; promote NGOs working across communal or factional lines</td>
<td>Promotes social reconciliation</td>
<td>Paris (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Sharing</td>
<td>Establish a post-war cabinet that reflects a &quot;grand coalition&quot;</td>
<td>Participation in government</td>
<td>Lijphart (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Give communal groups a mutual veto</td>
<td>Participation in government, promotes liberal norms</td>
<td>Lijphart (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integrate the bureaucracy, judiciary, and military</td>
<td>Addresses demands for equity</td>
<td>Lijphart (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding Approach</td>
<td>Specific Policy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Sharing</td>
<td>Give communal groups autonomy in their internal affairs</td>
<td>Reduces feelings of vulnerability, improves trust in political system, control liberal norms</td>
<td>Lijphart (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Sharing</td>
<td>Decentralize political authority</td>
<td>Communal groups control own affairs</td>
<td>Lijphart (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Sharing</td>
<td>Economic power sharing</td>
<td>Addresses demands for equity</td>
<td>Hartzell and Hoddie (2003); Mattes and Savun (2010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR: Develop national security strategy</td>
<td>Improve accountability</td>
<td>Reduced feelings of vulnerability, improves trust in security sector, puts constraints on the security sector, depoliticizes security sector</td>
<td>OECD (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR: Improve transparency</td>
<td>Reduced feelings of vulnerability, improves trust in security sector, puts constraints on the security sector, depoliticizes security sector</td>
<td>OECD (2007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR: Force reduction, modernization, and professionalization</td>
<td>Reduced feelings of vulnerability, improves trust in security sector, puts constraints on the security sector, depoliticizes security sector</td>
<td>OECD (2007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR: Professionalization</td>
<td>Reduced feelings of vulnerability, improves trust in security sector, puts constraints on the security sector, depoliticizes security sector</td>
<td>OECD (2007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR: Reform criminal laws, especially national security related laws</td>
<td>Reduced feelings of vulnerability, improves trust in security sector, puts constraints on the security sector, depoliticizes security sector</td>
<td>OECD (2007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR: Reform penal system</td>
<td>Reduced feelings of vulnerability, improves trust in security sector, puts constraints on the security sector, depoliticizes security sector</td>
<td>OECD (2007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Sharing; MI: Integrate equal or a large number of rebels into national military or police</td>
<td>MI: Integrate equal or a large number of rebels into national military or police</td>
<td>Promotes economic growth, secures livelihoods for rural peasants</td>
<td>Mozambique, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Sharing; MI: Establish a NCS comprising multiple factions</td>
<td>MI: Establish a NCS comprising multiple factions</td>
<td>Promotes economic growth</td>
<td>Mozambique, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Sharing; MI: Appoint rebel commanders to high-ranking command positions in the national military or police</td>
<td>MI: Appoint rebel commanders to high-ranking command positions in the national military or police</td>
<td>Promotes economic growth</td>
<td>Mozambique, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR: Reform external trade</td>
<td>SSR: Reform external trade</td>
<td>Promotes economic growth</td>
<td>Mozambique, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Liberalization</td>
<td>Economic Liberalization</td>
<td>Liberalize internal markets</td>
<td>Promotes economic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Liberalization</td>
<td>Economic Liberalization</td>
<td>Liberalize external trade</td>
<td>Promotes economic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Liberalization</td>
<td>Economic Liberalization</td>
<td>Promotes economic growth</td>
<td>Mozambique, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatization</td>
<td>Privatization</td>
<td>Privatize state-owned enterprises</td>
<td>Promotes economic growth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Citations or Cases:
- Doyle and Sambanis (2008); Hoddie and Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008); c.f. Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010); c.f. Humphreys and Weilstein (2007)
- Hartzell (2003); Mattes and Savun (2010)
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<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>Implement public works projects</td>
<td>Promotes economic growth</td>
<td>Turkey, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>Receive official development assistance</td>
<td>Promotes economic growth</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>Use NGOs to provide public goods</td>
<td>Promotes economic growth</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>Diaspora support; remittances</td>
<td>Promotes economic growth</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>Build roads into conflict zone</td>
<td>Improves economic opportunities in conflict area, provides jobs, allows easier movement of security forces</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian and Basic Needs</strong></td>
<td>Increase education spending</td>
<td>Promotes economic growth, addresses political grievances</td>
<td>World Bank World Development Report (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian and Basic Needs</strong></td>
<td>Increase health spending</td>
<td>Promotes economic growth, addresses political grievances</td>
<td>World Bank World Development Report (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian and Basic Needs</strong></td>
<td>Increase social welfare spending</td>
<td>Promotes economic growth, addresses political grievances</td>
<td>World Bank World Development Report (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian and Basic Needs</strong></td>
<td>Increase spending on rural and agricultural programs</td>
<td>Promotes economic growth, addresses political grievances</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian and Basic Needs</strong></td>
<td>Receive UNHCR, OHRA, ICRC assistance</td>
<td>Reduces deprivation, grievances</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illiberal Economic Policy</strong></td>
<td>Return IDPs and other refugees</td>
<td>Reduces deprivation, grievances</td>
<td>Rwanda, Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illiberal Economic Policy</strong></td>
<td>Develop patronage networks into post-war</td>
<td>Develops ties between government and local patrons, provides patronage opportunities</td>
<td>Dobbins, Jones, Crane, (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illiberal Economic Policy</strong></td>
<td>Nationalize or collectivize large parts of the economy</td>
<td>Provides government revenues, reduces economic or anti-colonial grievances</td>
<td>Angola (1975), Vietnam (1975-1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illiberal Economic Policy</strong></td>
<td>Seize property of losers</td>
<td>Provides government revenues, patronage opportunities</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-Conflict Justice</strong></td>
<td>Implement a truth and reconciliation commission</td>
<td>Social reconciliation, addresses demands for justice or punishment</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-Conflict Justice</strong></td>
<td>Purge collaborators from political, administrative, and military life</td>
<td>Conflict-promoting actors isolated from society, addresses demands for justice or punishment</td>
<td>Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-Conflict Justice</strong></td>
<td>Exile key figures</td>
<td>Figurese expelled from post-conflict life, addresses demands for justice or punishment</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authoritarian</strong></td>
<td>Govern with an authoritarian regime</td>
<td>Coercion, restricts political rights, excludes political opposition from political life</td>
<td>Indonesia, Chad, Sri Lanka, Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Authoritarian</strong></td>
<td>Restrict civil liberties</td>
<td>Coercion, restricts political rights, excludes political opposition from political life</td>
<td>Indonesia, Chad, Sri Lanka, Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Authoritarian</strong></td>
<td>Mass arrests, suspensions of habeas corpus; use of military courts for civilians</td>
<td>Imprisons organizers of violence, future violence</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Authoritarian</strong></td>
<td>Mass killings; extra judicial killings, assassinations</td>
<td>Kills organizers of violence, deters future violence</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Authoritarian</strong></td>
<td>Suspend constitution; rule using emergency powers or under martial law</td>
<td>Allows full use of coercion against political opposition</td>
<td>Myanmar (2007)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Authoritarian</strong></td>
<td>Forced migration</td>
<td>Removes threatening populations</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>State Organization</strong></td>
<td>Reinstate constitution, end emergency powers or martial law</td>
<td>Puts constraints on government's use of force</td>
<td>Peru</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding Approach</td>
<td>Specific Policy</td>
<td>Hypothesized Effect on Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Organization</td>
<td>Form new ministries; reorganize ministries</td>
<td>Increases governance, provides patronage opportunities</td>
<td>Uganda, Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Organization</td>
<td>Improve or train the bureaucracy, reduce corruption</td>
<td>Improves governance, helps mitigate pathologies of liberalization</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Organization</td>
<td>Increase government payroll</td>
<td>Improves governance, provides patronage opportunities</td>
<td>Iraq?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Organization</td>
<td>Improve the judiciary, reduce corruption</td>
<td>Improves governance, helps mitigate pathologies of liberalization</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Organization</td>
<td>Create new regional or local districts</td>
<td>Improves governance, helps mitigate disagreements between two or more constituents in conflict region a legitimate, local government; provides local patronage opportunities</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Organization</td>
<td>Conduct a census; issue government identity cards</td>
<td>Improves governance, surveillance, and intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Security Sector</td>
<td>SSF: increase size of ground forces</td>
<td>Improves security, raises costs of rebellion, deters rebellion</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Security Sector</td>
<td>SSF: have enough security personnel deployed</td>
<td>Provides internal security, deters terrorism, crime</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Security Sector</td>
<td>SSF: establish units for COIN, CT, rural pacification, SWAT missions</td>
<td>Improves security, raises costs of rebellion, deters rebellion</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Other Security Sector</td>
<td>SSF: equip security sector for internal warfare, COIN, CT, etc.</td>
<td>Improves security, raises costs of rebellion, deters rebellion</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Other Security Sector</td>
<td>SSF: establish a presidential bodyguard, or regime-protection force</td>
<td>Reduces feelings of vulnerability in the executive, and regime leaders</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Other Security Sector</td>
<td>SSF: secure international borders and border areas</td>
<td>Improves security, raises costs of rebellion, deters rebellion</td>
<td>Paul, Clarke, Grill, and Dunigan (2013)</td>
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<td>Other Security Sector</td>
<td>SSF: use paramilitaries or militias</td>
<td>Improves security, raises costs of rebellion, deters rebellion</td>
<td>Jones (2012)</td>
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<td>Other</td>
<td>Govern with the assistance of traditional or charismatic forms of legitimacy</td>
<td>Improves legitimacy of government</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Other</td>
<td>Foreign power provides security guarantee to factions</td>
<td>Provides assurance to parties, reduces feelings of vulnerability</td>
<td>Hartzell and Hoddie (2003); Mattes and Saun (2010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Predetermined Factors</td>
<td>Conclude a peace treaty, transition pact</td>
<td>Signals preferences</td>
<td>Walter (2000)</td>
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<td>Predetermined Factors</td>
<td>Conflict termination type</td>
<td>Secure peace; negotiated settlements secure and difficult to implement</td>
<td>Collier and Hoefler (2000); Fearon and Laitin (2003)</td>
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<td>Predetermined Factors</td>
<td>Development level</td>
<td>High development reduces risk of civil war</td>
<td>Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2013)</td>
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<td>Predetermined Factors</td>
<td>Regime transition</td>
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<td>India (Maoist insurgency I)</td>
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<td>September 1984</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka (vs. LTTE II)</td>
<td>SRI4</td>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>July 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (vs. SSLM)</td>
<td>SUD1</td>
<td>December 1963</td>
<td>January 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (vs. SPLM/NDA)</td>
<td>SUD2</td>
<td>May 1983</td>
<td>December 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Darfur)</td>
<td>SUD3</td>
<td>April 2003</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Southern Border)</td>
<td>SUD4</td>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria I</td>
<td>SYR1</td>
<td>June 1979</td>
<td>February 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria II</td>
<td>SYR2</td>
<td>October 2011</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>THI1</td>
<td>October 2003</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>TUR1</td>
<td>August 1984</td>
<td>February 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda (vs. LRA I)</td>
<td>UGA1</td>
<td>November 1986</td>
<td>December 1991</td>
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<td>Uganda (vs. UPA)</td>
<td>UGA2</td>
<td>December 1987</td>
<td>December 1992</td>
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<td>Uganda (vs. LRA II)</td>
<td>UGA3</td>
<td>February 1994</td>
<td>December 1998</td>
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<td>Uganda (vs. LRA III)</td>
<td>UGA5</td>
<td>January 2000</td>
<td>August 2006</td>
</tr>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>UKG1</td>
<td>August 1971</td>
<td>November 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen I</td>
<td>YAR1</td>
<td>October 1962</td>
<td>May 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen II</td>
<td>YAR2</td>
<td>March 1979</td>
<td>May 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen III</td>
<td>YEM1</td>
<td>April 1994</td>
<td>July 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (vs. AQAP)</td>
<td>YEM2</td>
<td>December 2009</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>ZIM1</td>
<td>April 1973</td>
<td>December 1979</td>
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</table>
**APPENDIX C**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The set of post-war countries that</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Proportion of cases in set</th>
<th>OUTCOME = NOWAR</th>
<th>OUTCOME = NOCONFLICT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Submit to a UN monitoring mission</td>
<td>Presence of UN monitoring mission</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submit to a UN peacemaking mission</td>
<td>Presence of UN peacemaking mission</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submit to a UN complex peacebuilding mission</td>
<td>Presence of UN complex peacebuilding mission</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submit to other UN PKO</td>
<td>Presence of UN PKO</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submit to other 3rd party monitoring mission</td>
<td>Presence of any 3rd party monitoring mission</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submit to other 3rd party peacekeeping mission</td>
<td>Presence of other 3rd party peacekeeping mission</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submit to other 3rd party complex peacebuilding mission</td>
<td>Presence of other 3rd party complex peacebuilding mission</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submit to other 3rd party PKO of any kind</td>
<td>Presence of any 3rd party PKO</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adopt a new, interim, or amended constitution</td>
<td>New, interim, or amended constitution adopted</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govern with a democratic regime</td>
<td>Democratic regime type</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have 'free' civil liberties</td>
<td>Score 4 or better in source</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have 'free' political rights</td>
<td>Score 4 or better in source</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expand civil liberties</td>
<td>Improve score</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expand political rights</td>
<td>Improve score</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold any election within 5 Years</td>
<td>As reported in source</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold national elections within 5 Years</td>
<td>As reported in source</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold local elections within 5 Years</td>
<td>As reported in source</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold any local election within 2.5 Years</td>
<td>As reported in source</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Select legislators using any proportional representation</td>
<td>As reported in source</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govern with a post-war, political power-sharing agreement</td>
<td>As reported in source</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Appendix C Table Note:**

The table above presents the operationalization of various indicators for the outcomes of "NO WAR" and "NO CONFLICT". Each row represents a specific action that countries can take post-war, along with the proportion of cases in which that action is taken, and the significance level, consistency score, and coverage score for both outcomes. The significance level indicates the statistical significance of the association between the action and the outcome, while the consistency and coverage scores provide measures of the reliability and breadth of the evidence, respectively.

*Note: The asterisks (*) indicate significance levels:*  **p < 0.01**,  *p < 0.05*,  *p < 0.10*.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The set of post-war countries that</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Proportion of cases in set</th>
<th>OUTCOME = NOWAR</th>
<th>OUTCOME = NOCONFLICT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion</strong></td>
<td><strong>Significance Level</strong></td>
<td><strong>Consistency score</strong></td>
<td><strong>Coverage score</strong></td>
<td><strong>Significance Level</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve seats for minorities</td>
<td>As reported in source</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve seats for women</td>
<td>As reported in source</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decentralized political system</strong></td>
<td>As reported in source</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are a federal system</td>
<td>As reported in source</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve seat for opposition in legislature</td>
<td>As reported in source</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement military force reduction</td>
<td>duty array &lt; 10 percent</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are a large number of rebels into military or police forces to maintain armed forces in their territories</td>
<td>As reported in sources</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign an IMF SAP</td>
<td>As reported in sources</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sign an SAP</strong></td>
<td>As reported in sources</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve official development assistance</td>
<td>Average yearly ODA &gt; 5 percent of GNI</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve diaspora support remittances</td>
<td>Average yearly remittances &gt; 1 percent of GDP</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are high income or upper middle income</td>
<td>As reported in source</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grow their economy</td>
<td>Average annual growth rate exceeds 10 percent</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have high health expenditures*</td>
<td>Average annual expenditures exceed 4.5 percent of GDP</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host an ICRC mission</td>
<td>As reported in source</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produce diamonds</td>
<td>As reported in sources</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produce natural gas</td>
<td>Average annual production exceeds 100 metric tons</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produce oil</td>
<td>Average annual product exceeds 1,000,000 metric tons</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produce diamonds, natural gas, or oil</td>
<td>Scored 1.0 on diamond, gas, or oil</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Process</td>
<td>As reported in sources</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host war trials</td>
<td>As reported in sources</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide amnesty</td>
<td>As reported in sources</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32 Data since 1989 only.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The set of post-war countries that</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Proportion of cases in set</th>
<th>OUTCOME = NOWAR</th>
<th>OUTCOME = NOCONFLICT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide reparations</td>
<td>As reported in sources</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.17 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force the political, administrative, or military class; frustration</td>
<td>As reported in sources</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War very short</td>
<td>As reported in sources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-press any post-conflict justice mechanism aside from amnesty</td>
<td>Scored 1.0 on truth, trials, reparations, purges, or exile</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govern with an autocratic regime</td>
<td>Any Autocratic regime type, as reported in sources</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrict civil liberties</td>
<td>Worsen score</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repress political rights</td>
<td>Worsen score</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commit mass killing</td>
<td>&gt; 100 reported deaths in any one post-war year</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commit mass violence</td>
<td>Greater on political terror scale</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repress political opposition</td>
<td>Political terror scale (inclusive) and 4.0 on political terror scale</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have better than terrible corruption</td>
<td>Average annual corruption score is 3.0 or greater</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase size of active duty army</td>
<td>Increase in active duty army &gt; 10 percent</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have sufficient active duty forces</td>
<td>Above median (5.53)</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.53</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have ministry of interior troops, forces, or national police</td>
<td>As reported in Military Balance</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have a gendarmerie or other rural constabulary force</td>
<td>As reported in Military Balance</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main battle tanks</td>
<td>&gt; 100 reported main battle tanks</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have armored personnel carriers</td>
<td>&gt; 100 reported armored personnel carriers</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have main battle tanks</td>
<td>&gt; 10 reported main battle tanks</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have Mi-24, Mi-35 &quot;Hind&quot; helicopters</td>
<td>&gt; 10 reported Mi-24, Mi-35 &quot;Hind&quot; helicopters</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have MI-24, MI-35 &quot;Hind&quot; helicopters</td>
<td>&gt; 10 reported MI-24, MI-35 &quot;Hind&quot; helicopters</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have Mi-24, MI-35 &quot;Hind&quot; helicopters</td>
<td>&gt; 10 reported MI-24, MI-35 &quot;Hind&quot; helicopters</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.78</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have Mi-24, MI-35 &quot;Hind&quot; helicopters</td>
<td>&gt; 10 reported MI-24, MI-35 &quot;Hind&quot; helicopters</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.36</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>The set of post-war countries that</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Proportion of cases in set</th>
<th>Significance Level</th>
<th>Consistency score</th>
<th>Coverage score</th>
<th>Significance Level</th>
<th>Consistency score</th>
<th>Coverage score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have border troops, border police, or frontier forces$^3$</td>
<td>As reported in Military Balance</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a village militia, local guards, or communal policing$^4$</td>
<td>As reported in Military Balance</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have MBT, APC, or HEL$^4$</td>
<td>As reported in Military Balance</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^2$ Data since 1989 only.
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