UC San Diego
UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title
Dictators, democrats, and development in Nigeria

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1723h5qz

Author
LeVan, Arthur Carl

Publication Date
2007

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Dictators, Democrats, and Development in Nigeria

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Arthur Carl LeVan, Jr.

Committee in charge:

Professor Clark C. Gibson, Co-Chair
Professor Karen Ferree, Co-Chair
Professor Ivan Evans
Professor Peter Lewis
Professor Phil Roeder
Professor Matthew Shugart

2007
The dissertation of Arthur Carl LeVan, Jr. is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm:

Co-Chair

Co-Chair

University of California, San Diego

2007
DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to Moni, my companion in life’s great adventures who was present at the creation.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

SIGNATURE PAGE ........................................................................................................ iii
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................... v
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................... viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................. ix
VITA ............................................................................................................................ xiii
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION ........................................................................ xvi

Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1
NIGERIA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ........................................................ 11
SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS ...................................................................................... 15

Chapter 1: ......................................................................................................................... 23
Government Performance: Theory and Evidence ......................................................... 23
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 23
PERFORMANCE MEASURES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE .................... 25
MEASURING GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE IN NIGERIA............................. 31
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 58

Chapter 2: ......................................................................................................................... 60
Does Democracy Deliver? ............................................................................................. 60
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 60
DICTATORS, DEMOCRATS, AND DEVELOPMENT ............................................ 62
REGIME TYPE AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE ..................................... 69
TESTING REGIME TYPES: DOES DEMOCRACY DELIVER? ............................. 80
REVISITING NIGERIA’S REGIMES: WHICH ONES DELIVERED? .................... 88
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 119

Chapter 3: ......................................................................................................................... 122
A Multi-Regime Analysis of Preferences, Institutions, and Performance ................... 122
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 122
POLITICAL PREFERENCES WITH VETOES ........................................................ 124
A MULTI-REGIME MODEL .................................................................................... 132
POLICY CONSEQUENCES ...................................................................................... 142
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 149

Chapter 4: ......................................................................................................................... 151
Social Identity and Political Inclusion ............................................................................ 151
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 151
HOW DOES SOCIAL DIVERSITY IMPACT PERFORMANCE? .......................... 153
SUBNATIONAL IDENTITIES AND POLITICAL CLAIMS ................................... 156
IDENTITY AND INCLUSIVENESS ........................................................................ 163
AN ILLUSTRATION: THE “RESOURCE CONTROL” REBELLION ............... 175
CONCLUSION.......................................................................................... 180

Chapter 5:........................................................................................................................ 182
Leverage and Logic in Nigeria’s Politics since Independence ......................... 182
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 182
HOW MANY VETOES? .......................................................................... 183
NIGERIA’S REGIMES AND RULES, 1960 – 2003 ...................................... 189
CONCLUSION.......................................................................................... 244

Chapter 6:........................................................................................................................ 248
Dictators, Democrats, and Distributional Dilemmas ...................................... 248
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 248
PARTICULARISM, PUBLIC GOODS, AND INEFFICIENCY ......................... 250
TESTING FOR DISTRIBUTIVE DILEMMAS ............................................. 256
CONCLUSION.......................................................................................... 264

Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 267
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 267
A REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE .................................... 269
VETO PLAYERS AS A CAUSAL EXPLANATION ..................................... 273
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH ........................................... 278

Appendix 1: Preliminary Tests on Educational Inputs and Outcomes .............. 284
Appendix 2: Tests for Stationarity of Dependent Variables ............................ 291
Appendix 3: Policy Efficiency Model Summaries .......................................... 294
Appendix 4: Correlation of Awaiting Trial Persons and Clearance Rate .......... 296
Appendix 5: Regions, Zones, and States ....................................................... 297
Appendix 6: Geographical Distribution of Electoral Results .......................... 302
Appendix 7: Tests for Stationarity of Independent Variable ............................ 317

Works Cited ............................................................................................................. 318
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Public and Private Goods................................................................. 26
Table 2: Primary Student/Teacher Ratio, 1961 – 2002................................... 82
Table 3: Change in Number of Primary Schools, 1962 – 2002..................... 83
Table 4: Judicial Efficiency ............................................................................ 84
Table 5: Fiscal Discipline, 1961 – 2003 ......................................................... 85
Table 6: Policy Efficiency of Pork Spending .................................................. 87
Table 7: High Court of Justice Statistics......................................................... 95
Table 8: Supreme Court Case Disposal Rate, 1989 – 1993.............................. 113
Table 9: Nigeria's Geopolitical Zones (Six Zone Configuration)...................... 162
Table 10: Identity Matrix for Nigeria .............................................................. 168
Table 11: Presidential Election Results in the Southwest, 1999....................... 178
Table 12: Northern Regional Veto, 1966......................................................... 195
Table 13: Matrix Reflecting Southern Region's Veto, 1965.............................. 216
Table 14: Matrix Reflecting the South’s Regional Veto, 1982 – 1983 ............... 232
Table 15: Matrix Reflecting the South’s Regional Veto, 1999 – 2003 ............... 244
Table 16: Veto Players in Nigeria's Regimes.................................................... 246
Table 17: Impact of Veto Players on Pork, Measured in Student/Teacher Ratio .... 257
Table 18: Impact of Veto Players on Pork, Measured in Primary Schools .......... 258
Table 19: Impact of Veto Players on Judicial Performance ............................... 260
Table 20: Impact of Veto Players on Fiscal Discipline ...................................... 261
Table 21: Impact of Veto Players on Policy Efficiency, Schools 1962 – 2001 ....... 262
Table 22: Impact of Veto Players on Policy Efficiency, Teachers 1962 – 2002 ... 263
Table 23: Impact of Student/Teacher Ratio on Test Scores ............................ 289
Table 24: Impact of Education Spending on Test Scores .................................. 290
Table 25: Tests for Stationarity of Dependent Variables ................................. 292
Table 26: Generation of Teachers Residual..................................................... 294
Table 27: Generation of Schools Residual....................................................... 295
Table 28: Correlation between ATPs and Clearance ....................................... 296
Table 29: Population Distribution among Four Zone Structure, 1979 ............... 297
Table 30: Population Distribution among 30 States and Six Zones, 1991 ......... 298
Table 31: Population Distribution among 36 States and Six Zones, 1998 .......... 300
Table 32: House Seats Won, By Region, in 1959 Election .............................. 302
Table 33: House Seats Won, By Region, 1964/65 Election .............................. 303
Table 34: House Seats Won, By Zone and State, 1979 Election ....................... 305
Table 35: Senate Seats Won, By Zone and State, 1979 Election ....................... 307
Table 36: Governorships Won, By Zone and State, 1979 Election .................... 309
Table 37: House Seats, By Zone and State, 1999 Election ............................... 311
Table 38: Senate Seats, By Zone and State, 1999 Election ............................... 313
Table 39: Governorships, By State and Zone, 1999 Election ........................... 315
Table 40: Tests for Stationarity of Independent Variable................................. 317
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Primary Student/Teacher Ratio, 1961 – 2002 .............................................................. 38
Figure 2: Primary Schools, 1961 – 2001 .................................................................................. 39
Figure 3: Residuals for the Predicted Primary Student/Teacher Ratio, 1962 – 2002 .......... 42
Figure 4: Residuals for Education Spending Predicting # of Schools, 1962 – 2001 .......... 44
Figure 5: Clearance Rate, 1960 – 1987 .................................................................................. 51
Figure 6: Awaiting Trial Persons (ATPs) as Share of Inmates, 1967 – 2003 ....................... 53
Figure 7: Clearance Rate, 1962 – 2002 (including estimated values) ......................... 55
Figure 8: Budget Deficit/Surplus, 1961 – 2003 .................................................................... 57
Figure 9: North/South Population Distribution (as percent of national) ...................... 169
Figure 10: Each Veto Player Cuts across Regional Cleavages ...................................... 171
Figure 11: Coordination of Two Zones .............................................................................. 173
Figure 12: Coordination of Three Zones ........................................................................... 173
Figure 13: WAEC Results ..................................................................................................... 288
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A long list of people helped make this dissertation possible. My committee co-chairs Clark C. Gibson and Karen Ferree read countless drafts with patience and diligence. I thank them for insisting on necessary re-writes and for guiding this project through difficult stages. Phil Roeder, Ivan Evans, and Matthew Shugart also offered valuable advice and suggestions. Peter Lewis enthusiastically served as an outside advisor. I am grateful to him for his accessibility and his constant encouragement. Outside my committee, Kaare Strøm and Arend Lijphart critiqued my talks and my drafts; Alan Houston, Germaine Hoston, and Gerry Mackie helped in other, equally appreciated ways. Marcus Raskin counseled me through my most frustrating moments with encouragement and sage advice.

I wish to acknowledge a number of other scholars who offered helpful comments and counsel as well. Richard Sklar identified historical flaws with Chapter 4 and served as a constant source of encouragement. Darren Kew cheerfully critiqued Chapter 2. Thanks to the African Politics Conference Group, I was able to present Chapters 1, 2, and 3 on three different panels and receive useful feedback. Jessica Piombo provided an extensive critique of Chapter 3 during and after a panel at the American Political Science Association meeting. Sandra Joireman offered helpful comments concerning my judiciary data. The Working Group on African Political Economy sat through early iterations of this project, providing me with honest assessments and helpful ideas.

American University provided me with crucial support during the dissertation’s final stages. Claire Christian sifted through much of the data and filled in critical gaps
with trips to the Library of Congress. The staff in AU’s Social Science Research Lab
then patiently helped me interpret and understand the data.

A Fulbright grant enabled me to conduct ten months of field research, and the
U.S. Embassy in Abuja was extremely accommodating when my mother unexpectedly
passed away. A grant from the Institute for International, Comparative, and Area Studies
enabled me to return to Nigeria for a short trip two years later. Two small grants from
the Social Science Dean at the University of California, San Diego enabled me to visit the
University of California, Santa Cruz and Stanford University. My conversations there
with Larry Diamond, Paul Lubeck, and others provided critical feedback on the early
sketches of my theoretical framework.

I am also grateful to Professor Diamond for introducing me to the University of
Ibadan, which served as home base during my research. The political science department
welcomed me like the distinguished scholar I hope to become someday. Bayo Adekanye
taught me all about the Nigerian military, while Ademola Ariyo and the Economics
Faculty supplied helpful solutions to difficult data problems. Dean Adigun Agbaje
offered advice, encouragement, and educational tours of Ibadan – complete with egusi.
Vice Chancellor Adewuyi Akinwumi and Alex Gboyega, Head of the Political Science
Faculty, through their kindness helped me feel at home in an unfamiliar place. Kunle
Amuwo, Eghosa Osaghae, and my housemate Leslie Omoruyi taught me many valuable
lessons during our lively conversations (much as Funso and the Physics Faculty taught
me the joys of ayo). Victor Isumonah welcomed me into his home and read early drafts
of my theory chapter. Smaranda Olarinde introduced me to the Law Faculty and helped
me formulate solutions to some of the most important and difficult questions about
judicial performance. Last but not least, Rotimi Suberu served as my faculty sponsor during my stay at UI. He diligently read early drafts and then provided critical feedback on later drafts during his stay in Washington, D.C. a few years later.

Several institutions on UI’s campus opened their doors to me during my research including the Law Library, the Kenneth Dike Library, the Program on Ethnic and Federal Studies, and the French Institute for Research in Africa. Off campus I am eternally grateful to General Laoye and “Prof” Ade-Ajayi for allowing me to access their private libraries. Yemi Oyeniyi photocopied hundreds of pages and also gave me a deeper appreciation for Yoruba history. Dapo Ogunwusi generously arranged for me to use the Nigerian Tribune’s library. Many footnotes found herein originated there, and I miss the pepper soup we enjoyed upon the conclusion of those long days. I spent several weeks at the Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research, where Mrs. Agbaje and Professor Bankole Oni welcomed me warmly.

I am forever grateful to my research assistants in Ibadan. Idowu Kareem, Olumide Famuyiwa, Josiah Olubowale, and Nike Okotete spent countless hours on my behalf in libraries and elsewhere. Josiah, Donatus and the agbalagbi of Agbowo joined me on many great adventures which I will always remember with great fondness. Chris Bankole served me dozens of meals and provided me with a much needed home away from home.

Many people assisted me in my research elsewhere. I would be remiss to not thank Tunde Durosenmi-Etti and Samson for their hospitality in Lagos. Yinka Lawal and the Constitutional Rights Project Staff, as well as Emeka Iheme from the Libertarian Institute, both generously shared their organizations’ publications and resources. In
Abuja, I feel lucky to count Rotimi Fadeyi, Ben Agande, and Idowu Bakare among my closest friends. I have chosen not to name the many honourables in the National Assembly and various staff at the Independent National Electoral Commission who endured my recurring visits and went out of their way to help me. Fran Farmer, Paul King, and Christine Owre all generously hosted me in Abuja and introduced me to new friends. I will always be eternally grateful to Ken Wollack and the National Democratic Institute for introducing me to Nigeria in 1999. Deji Olaore, Sandra Omali, Bod Adebo, Valentine Eke, and Wayne Propst treated me as a permanent part of the NDI family when I returned a few years later.

Finally, I would like to thank my father Art, and my two sisters, Allison and Lisa for their support and encouragement throughout this project. Dad, you’ve always wanted “a doctor in the family.” I hope this will do.
VITA

EDUCATION

- Ph.D., Political Science, University of California, San Diego (2007).

I dispute explanations for government performance in Nigeria based on regime type or fiscal resources. To test a theory that the number of policy actors better predicts performance, I build a veto player model that applies across regimes. Qualitative and quantitative analyses show that my theory better predicts key policy outputs. Nigeria’s rules of political inclusion impact the number of veto players. My findings therefore pose a dilemma because increasing the number of political actors contributes to bargaining problems which impair the delivery of public goods.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Teaching Experience:
- “Contemporary Africa,” American University
- “Corruption, Development, and Democracy,” American University
- “Theories of Comparative and International Studies,” American University
- “Introduction to International Relations Research,” American University
- “African Political Development,” University of California, San Diego
- “Introduction to Comparative Politics,” University of California, San Diego
- “Comparative Federal Systems,” University of Ibadan, Nigeria

Country Director. Co-directed one of NDI’s largest field programs worldwide. Organized and participated in legislative training and capacity building programs for members of the National Assembly. Activities included issue development consultations and workshops on budget process, press strategy, ethics and the legislature’s role in privatization. Ethics rules drafted with the Ethics Committee were passed by the House of Representatives in 2004 and by the Senate in May 2005.

Legislative Director. Oversaw legislative operations, interns, and staff in the member’s personal office. Drafted legislation, amendments, speeches, talking points, press releases and testimony. Organized oversight delegations overseas, briefings for members of congress, and congressional letters to administration officials concerning foreign policy, national security, and trade.

Research Assistant. Conducted research for articles and organized a major conference.

PUBLICATIONS

Books:

Refereed Articles

Book Chapters:
- “The National Security State and the Tragedy of Empire” (co-authored with Marcus Raskin), in Raskin and LeVan, op. cit.

HONORS AND AWARDS
- Institute for International, Comparative and Area Studies field research grant (2005).
- Dean’s travel grant for research at Stanford University (February 2005).
- Dean’s grant for research at the University of California, Santa Cruz (May 2003).
- Funding for graduate studies, University of California, San Diego (2000-05).
- Special Honors in Political Science from George Washington University (1992).

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS
- “Paradoxes of Power Sharing,” presentation at the African Studies Association annual meeting (November 2006).
• “A Multi-Regime Analysis of Preferences, Political Institutions, and Performance,” presentation at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting (August 2006).

• Panel chair, “Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Africa,” Midwest Political Science Association Meeting (April 2006).

• Panel discussant, “Political Participation and Subnational Loyalties in Africa,” Midwest Political Science Association Meeting (April 2006).


• “Does Democracy Deliver?” presentation at the African Studies Association annual meeting (November 2005).


• “Dictators, Democrats and Political Coalitions,” panel presentation at Midwest Political Science Association (April 2005).


• Presentation on “Nigerian Civil Society: From Dictatorship to Democracy” at Comparativists Day for Graduate Students, University of California, Los Angeles (February 2002).

• “Pluralism, Progress and Paradoxes: Judicial Reform in Mexico,” presentation at Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, UCSD graduate student conference (January 2002).

• Guest lecture on Nigeria for “Introduction to Comparative Politics” at the University of California, San Diego (November 2000, November 2001, November 2005).

• “Policies and Pathologies of the National Security State” presentation at Institute for Policy Studies (August 2001).
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Dictators, Democrats, and Development in Nigeria

by

Arthur Carl LeVan, Jr.

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, San Diego

Professor Clark C. Gibson, Co-Chair

Professor Karen Ferree, Co-Chair

I dispute explanations for government performance in Nigeria based on regime type, fiscal resources, and ethnic diversity. I test a hypothesis which states that regimes with more veto players deliver more pork. Building upon the veto player literature, I construct a model that applies over time and across regimes. Informal, “regional” vetoes emerge when three conditions are met: one of Nigeria’s two geographical regions is under-represented, subnational actors have cause to organize, and when some organization facilitates preference coordination. I predict that regimes with more veto players will deliver higher overall levels of pork, fewer public goods, and will spend money on pork less efficiently. I operationalize public goods with variables measuring fiscal discipline and judicial efficiency. Utilizing original data, I operationalize pork with variables measuring student/teacher ratios and change in the number of primary schools. My tests show that veto players do not impact the level of pork. But regimes with more veto players deliver fewer public goods, and according to one measure they engage in
more wasteful spending on pork. Democracies waste less money than dictatorships on teachers, but they suffer from statistically significant levels of corruption when constructing schools.

I show that Nigeria’s rules of political inclusion impact the number of veto players. My findings therefore pose a dilemma because increasing the number of political actors contributes to bargaining problems which impair the delivery of public goods.
Dictators, Democrats, and Development in Nigeria

Introduction

Why do some governments in developing countries perform better than others? Nigeria possesses many of the factors that arguably impede government performance such as ethnic and religious diversity, an economy dependent on natural resource exploitation, and a history of political instability. Today, as in the early 1970s, government coffers overflow with astonishing oil wealth while a vast majority of the population suffers in poverty. Yet moments of developmental progress do punctuate Nigeria’s history. For example, the number of teachers per pupil increased in the early 1990s, recovering from a period of decline and uncertainty in the late 1980s. School construction followed a similar pattern.

This study identifies such performance variation in three broad policy areas. I argue that the complexities which hinder the country’s development stem from the underlying structure of the policy making process. Nigeria’s development trajectory has frustrated numerous scholars in search of a concise theory, but I demonstrate that the number of individual and collective policy actors reliably predicts different patterns in policy outputs.

To document government performance in Nigeria between 1960 and 2003, I focus on policies that contribute to economic development and demonstrate variation over time. I also distinguish between broad aggregate measures, such as macroeconomic indicators,
and policies whose benefits introduce the potential for rivalry in consumption. With these criteria in mind, I identify variables to measure performance in education, the courts, and budgetary discipline. My data reveal that there were more teachers per student in primary schools throughout the 1960’s than at any point during the 1980’s. The federal courts generated huge backlogs in the early 1980s, whereas they had actually been reducing backlogs fifteen years earlier. I also show that fiscal discipline predates the country’s modern monocultural economy.

Regime type offers one possible explanation for this variation in government performance. Democracies supposedly perform better than dictatorships because political competition through elections improves accountability. The credible threat of replacement gives politicians an incentive to respond to voters. By contrast, dictators have fewer reasons to consider the public’s preferences when no elections threaten to hold them accountable. A second explanation suggests that performance depends on the wealth of the state. According to a recent report by a group of Nobel Laureates, the government has earned over US$300 billion dollars from oil since 1970. The initial rise of oil revenues in the early part of that decade coincided with huge investments in education and infrastructure. When governments encountered reduced oil revenues, they faced the daunting task of collecting taxes in a poor country. By this logic, sacrifices in public policy flow from reduced fiscal resources. A third account for governance failures blames the country’s social heterogeneity in general and the politicization of ethnic differences in particular. Diversity breeds selfishness and mistrust, according to this view.
These explanations are characteristic of the conventional wisdom about Nigerian politics. Yet hardly any studies successfully translate them into testable hypotheses, and none do so with data extending back to independence. I present evidence that there is no clear correlation between regime type and government performance in Nigeria. Some authoritarian regimes improved the delivery of social services and public goods, while some democracies performed poorly. By controlling for oil revenues in my tests, I essentially eliminate oil booms and busts as a causal explanation. Since the number of ethnic groups has not changed over time, the mere existence of diversity also fails as an explanation for government performance. The politicization of social diversity does impact governance though. I discuss how inclusive institutions politicize subnational identities, endowing the larger cleavages with leverage to shape policy. Ultimately I advance an alternative explanation for government performance based on the number of “veto players” engaged in policy making. These individual and collective policy actors possess the political leverage to prevent policy changes and therefore to extract concessions.

This chapter proceeds in three steps: First, I offer a succinct overview of government performance in Nigeria. Then I outline several common explanations for these outcomes. I point out shortcomings with each one and discuss whether Nigeria as a case provides a good general test of these theories. Second, I identify key concepts utilized in this study as well as challenges raised by a comparative approach to government performance. In the third section I summarize the chapters that follow, including two chapters which lay out my alternative explanation.
AN OVERVIEW OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, 1960 – 2003

As of this writing, the United Nations counts Nigeria among the world’s most underdeveloped nations, ranking it 159th out of 177 countries on the UN Development Program’s Human Development Index. An astonishing 92 percent of the population lives on less than $2 per day and the average life expectancy is barely 43 years (United Nations Development Programme 2006). Nigeria earned these rather unfortunate distinctions after nearly five decades of development disappointments and broken policy promises. Hope springs eternal though, and I claim that government performance is neither stochastic nor follows a progressive decline. I begin by presenting evidence that government performance indeed varies in key policy areas over time. Then I discuss regime type, social diversity, and the state’s fiscal resources as three common but ultimately insufficient explanations for this variation.

By several measures, governments performed comparatively well in early 1960s. Modest budget deficits typically amounted to less than three percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Courts performed relatively well too, apparently resolving cases about as quickly as they received new ones. In the education sector, the government set out to increase school enrollments, partly hoping to curb regional disparities rooted in colonial-era policies. Yet aside from slight increases in the number of students per teacher after 1967, teacher hiring and school construction grew at a reasonable pace.

The next decade appears less predictable in all of these sectors. The government ran large surpluses (more than 5 percent of GDP) in 1971-1974 and 1980. In all but two years since then the federal government ran deficits. Two of the most egregious deficits occurred in 1978 and 1979, displaying evidence of fiscal indiscipline. In the education
sector, the government launched an ambitious universal primary education program in 1977, calling education the “greatest investment that a nation can make for the development of its economic, political, sociological and human resources.”

Student/teacher ratios were already increasing at the time, and they continued to do so afterwards. The courts, for their part, began a period of decline from which it seems they have never fully recovered.

The 1980s began with a budget surplus that quickly evaporated. The most egregious deficits, where the deficit amounted to over 10 percent of GDP, occurred seven times. Four of these deficits occurred during the 1980s. The 1990s show large budget deficits as well as two short-lived years of surpluses. Class sizes recovered from dips in performance in the early 1980s, in the mid 1990s, and again after 2000. The courts never returned to their earlier levels of efficiency but there is some notable variation. What might explain these curious spikes in performance and account for any shifts in these brief trends?

**The Regime Type Theory**

One possible explanation for this variation in government performance arises from distinctions in regime type. As systems for allocating political power and choosing leaders, the most basic distinction among regimes is whether they are democratic or authoritarian. Cross-national research yields at least three conclusions about the relationship between regime type and government performance: The first says that it if government performance is measured in terms of economic growth, regime type does not seem to have much of an impact (Przeworski, Alvarez and others 2000; Feng 2003;

---

Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2001, 57-72; Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2003, 1031-67). A second school of thought claims that when government performance is measured in terms of social insurance or other public services, democracies clearly outperform authoritarian regimes because they reduce opportunities for rent-seeking behavior (Lake and Baum 2001, 587-621; Boix 2003). This is especially true among poor democracies, who face electoral pressures to provide policies such as education (Brown 1999, 681-707). The third stream of research argues that authoritarian regimes often do invest in human capital, such as education and health care (Glaeser et al. 2004, 271-303).

Reflecting on progress made under military governments, General Olusegun Obasanjo in 1979 argued for the performance potential of authoritarianism. He credited his outgoing government with a fourteen-fold increase in economic output, the establishment of free secondary education, and a government task force that helped to reduce inflation.\textsuperscript{2} Another military ruler, four years into his tenure in 1989, similarly praised the military’s contribution to stability and progress. He claimed credit for rescuing the nation from the “serious economic crisis arising from the mismanagement of the political era.”\textsuperscript{3} Some Nigerian scholars acknowledge that for all their flaws and despite many mistakes, military regimes did contribute to the country’s development (Iwayemi 1979, 47-72; Ohiorhenuan 1988, 141-162).

Polls today show that Nigerians prefer democracy. However the government’s recent performance has been mixed, contributing to doubts about democracy. My own introduction to Nigeria came in 1999, only a few months into the country’s third attempt


\textsuperscript{3} Address by General Imbrahim Babangida on the Occasion of the Inauguration of the Armed Forces Consultative Assembly (Government Monograph), June 5, 1989.
at democracy and during a time of great optimism. When I returned to the capital a few years later I was stunned to hear vendors, grocers and their customers alike complain about increased congestion, corruption, and crime. A recent in-depth and long term study of the eastern states offers numerous, comparable tales (Smith 2007). AfroBarometer surveys since 2000 show a steady decline in “patience with democracy.” Nearly 40 percent of Nigerians said in 2005 that they will “consider other political options” if democratic performance does not improve (AfroBarometer 2006). For a country where nearly half of the population never lived under democracy until the current dispensation, the elder generation recalls how the 1983 coup enjoyed surprising levels of popular support. Obasanjo, who stepped aside in 1979 to allow a democratic transition, perhaps best expressed the nation’s enigmatic attitude toward democracy. The retired general commented after a 1985 coup that ordinary Nigerians are more concerned with the substance of government than its form. “They are interested in the ability to deliver, the ability to perform,” he said, “rather than the means by which the government is brought about.”

The empirical record seems to justify Nigerians’ ambivalence about democracy. Yet the country’s former dictators certainly do not hold bragging rights. The careful examination of the evidence I undertake in this study reveals that a simple dichotomous treatment of regime type fails to account for variation in government performance.

---

Poor States, Poor Performance

Some research suggests that the type of economy, rather than the type of regime best explains government performance. One view expects Nigeria’s oil to impede performance because economies that rely on natural resources weaken the link between politicians and citizens. When most federal revenues are derived from immobile capital, policy makers face a weaker accountability constraint and extracting rents poses fewer risks (Boix 2003, 184). Governments that enjoy earnings from oil, mineral extraction and other rent sources face a weak revenue constraint and do not have to place demands on the public in the form of taxes. In the long run, this “resource curse” reduces state capacity as public officials see politics primarily as a redistributive game (Karl 1997). In such economies, politicians formulate policies with their short term interests in mind and this encourages them to over-extract natural resources. Moreover, by increasing the value of incumbency, oil provides politicians with more resources for maintaining power (Robinson et al. 2006, 447-68).

Another view implies that governments fail to deliver both pork and public goods when the state lacks income. This interpretation attributes increased spending on development to surges in oil profits (Odetola 1982; Onyejekwe 1981). Poor social services and fiscal indiscipline are simply related to the poverty of the national treasury. Available fiscal resources dictate government performance and policy implementation (Asiodu 2000, 7-10). These resources may fluctuate with stochastic, exogenous factors such as the price of oil on the world market.
By controlling for the impact of oil revenues on budgets, I evaluate both views. Oil can increase the level of policy output as the latter view implies. But I show how it can also lead to more wasteful spending as the resource curse literature implies.

**Danger in Diversity?**

Nigeria’s governance failures could be rooted in its diversity. After all, the north is overwhelmingly Muslim, the south is largely Christian, and there are hundreds of languages creating countless possibilities for “ancient hatreds” to emerge. One variation of this argument says that incumbents serve their own ethno-regional political base at the expense of others. Politicians utilize ethnic patrimonialism to increase their access to the so-called “national cake,” which symbolizes the resource wealth controlled at the center of Nigerian politics. Therefore a core problem of governance has been the inability to limit such rent-seeking behavior and to generate national policies that represent an economically rational distribution. This argument has been theorized as a problem of “prebendalism” (Joseph 1991). It is closely related to what Nigerian scholars call the “national question,” referring to the difficulty of reconciling a person’s identity as a citizen of the modern state with his or her membership of an ethnic group (Amuwo, Agbaje and others 2000; Suberu 2001).

A second variation of the “dangerous diversity” argument suggests that social heterogeneity is inherently a problem. Some Africanists blame low growth, low school enrollment and federal budget deficits on ethnic fractionalization (Easterly and Levine 1997, 1203-50). Recent large-\(N\) studies on economic growth, corruption, and the quality of policy echo some of these findings (Alesina et al. 2003, 155-94). Nnoli blames ethnicity for Nigeria’s failure to allocate centrally-controlled resources, for intra-group
bourgeois competition, and for the increasing intensification of religious conflict (Nnoli 1995). The Nigerian government has employed a range of institutional experiments from strong regional governments to ethnic quotas to address the national question. But the challenge of identifying the common features responsible for the success or failure of these various experiments remains.

These two arguments about diversity should not be casually dismissed since cross-national survey data suggest that ethnic self-identification is in fact much stronger in Nigeria than almost everywhere else in Africa (AfroBarometer 2002). But an increasing body of evidence suggests that diversity has an uncertain impact on governance at best (Fish and Brooks 2004, 154-66). More likely, the pessimistic view overestimates the adverse effects of diversity on civil peace (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75-90) and on government performance generally (Collier 2003, 149-177). In fact, ethnic diversity may hold the potential for developing human capital across other types of social divides (Bates 2000, 131-4).

The dangerous diversity arguments further break down when we consider one case over an extended period of time, where the outcomes vary but the number of ethnic groups essentially do not. Such studies imply that ethnicity is stable but its saliency shifts with different political and historical incentives for self-identification (Posner 2005; Posner 2003, 127-46). In fact ethnic and religious self-identification varies locally and over time in Nigeria, according to a recent survey (AfroBarometer 2007). As a result, social heterogeneity by itself cannot explain the vicissitudes of government performance. Both interpretations of diversity fail in Nigeria without accounting for the shifting
saliency of social differences. The next section introduces some of the comparative tools I use to develop such an account and to measure policy.

**NIGERIA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE**

One of Nigeria’s most famous authors, Chinua Achebe writes in *The Trouble with Nigeria*, “It is totally false to suggest, as we are apt to do, that Nigerians are fundamentally different from any other people in the world” (Achebe 1983). Taking this observation seriously, I claim that a comparative approach can help us account for the vicissitudes of government performance in Nigeria. The reality of unique historical and cultural features should not intimidate scholars from searching for shared political trajectories and common causal factors in Africa or elsewhere. While practitioners of comparative politics will find this assertion idea rather quotidian, those who treat Africa as unique will view it skeptically. In what follows I outline three challenges to a comparative study of government performance, responding to concerns about each one.

First, government performance can be a slippery concept. I use it to refer to policy outputs. This includes results associated with particular policies or more generally, a publicly enjoyed benefit or service. Typically outputs are associated with specific policy goals, such as reducing patient-to-doctor ratios, rather than the eventual consequences of these policies (in this case a healthier nation). The public goods literature offers a useful conceptual framework for exploring performance by linking the properties of policy consumption with policy provision. When one person’s enjoyment of a policy does not affect another’s and it is also too costly to selectively deny the benefits, the “public” nature of these goods can paradoxically undermine their supply. The temptation to enjoy benefits without helping to pay for them means that individuals
have incentives to “free ride” on the contributions of others. As a result, individually rational behavior leads to the under-provision of public goods as people shirk their responsibilities. Large groups especially exacerbate the temptation to shirk.

The primary iteration of public goods theory points to selective incentives, coercion, or institutions that reduce group size or increase the benefits of cooperation as solutions to the free rider problem (Olson 1965). However these solutions reflect a presumption of selfishness that tends to underestimate the likelihood of cooperative behavior (North 1990; Axelrod 1972). To put it another way, there is too much Rousseau in the world for us to rely exclusively on Machiavelli. This does not require us to abandon the basic insights about how policy consumption affects provision. Instead it has led to discoveries about how solutions to the free rider problem can emerge endogenously through local knowledge (Ostrom 1990). Since shared goods such as fishing ponds and federal budgets both risk depletion, communities in radically different contexts devise comparable rules to regulate their use. Thus even social norms of solidarity need not interfere with an analysis of government performance built in the public goods tradition.

Explaining patterns of government performance presents a second challenge. An account of policy outputs naturally involves a study of the government at some level. But this approach risks emphasizing the more formal dimensions politics at the analytical expense of causal factors rooted in society (Hyden 2006; Chabal and Daloz 1999). My basic causal proposition links the number of individual and collective policy actors to government performance. Producing benefits that serve the common good involves a

---

5 See Tsebelis (2002, p. 188 passim) for a discussion of this analogy.
bargain among different interests, often with disparate preferences. I acknowledge that some policy actors may not formally reside within the government. I present a solution to identifying these informal policy actors.

“Veto players,” defined as policy actors whose agreement is necessary to change the status quo, offer a useful set of concepts for addressing these issues. Taking a cue from James Madison, this literature explores how the structure of the policy process impacts policy stability and can limit the opportunities for selfish behavior (Tsebelis 2002; Haggard and McCubbins 2001). While veto player models usually focus on government institutions and the coordination of preferences within them, they can capture a broad range of political organization. Thus even in political systems where formal constitutional structures obscure the actual nature of bargaining, in-depth analysis of comparatively few veto regimes allows us to identify other actors with the sustained capacity to exercise leverage. The literature acknowledges this possibility but rarely pursues it (MacIntyre 2001, 81-122).

Finally, the intervention of force in politics presents a third challenge since it could render a comparative approach to policy structures meaningless. Africa has indeed had more than its share of military coups. Personal rule and “strong man” theories of politics imply that once in power, a few actors can dominate policy and harness government to serve their elite interests (Jackson and Rosberg 1984, 421-42). In these circumstances, autocratic pathologies seem more important than regime typologies. A broader view grounded in comparative politics suggests that governance is not so random. Rulers do attempt to dominate politics. But they recognize that a fluid policy process increases information costs and that using force carries political risks. For
example, when Ibrahim Babangida seized power in a 1985 coup, he told Nigerians: “that a government, be it civilian or military, needs the consent of the people to govern if it is to reach the [sic] objectives.” While noting this principle was not absolute, he said “We do not intend to rule by force.”

Focusing on the actual capacity of political actors and their actual behavior allows us to avoid the hazards of judging Babangida’s sincerity. For example, after he annulled the presidential election in 1993, civil society groups, the middle class, and retired military figures rallied behind the “June 12” cause (referring to the date of the election). Political polarization and mass mobilization eventually forced him to step aside. The new regime moved to limit political activities but it could not exclude these new actors with demonstrable political leverage from the policy process. The new head of state thus assembled a “rainbow team” recruited from the June 12 movement. He appointed the defeated vice presidential candidate as Minister of External Affairs, a prominent pro-democracy lawyer as Minister of Justice, and the publisher of an independent newspaper to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. These kinds of gestures benefit the regime in question. Newswatch, for example, observed that the rainbow cabinet “can earn the government a lot of credibility” and noted the appointees “will attract some reputation for the government.”

Such reforms can also set in motion political dynamics which make it difficult for any single individual to dominate the policy process. By situating self-

---

8 In much the same way, autocrats start down a slippery slope once they permit a political opening. Liberalization thus often unintentionally leads to democratization (O'Donnell, Schmitter and others 1986; Joseph 1999, 3-17).
interest within this kind of broad political framework, I use an analytical focus on capacity and behavior to enable rich comparisons.

In sum, a comparative approach to Nigeria’s policy failures is both necessary and feasible. The tools of public goods theory allow us to analyze government performance without making unfair assumptions about the social characteristics of consumption. A systematic attempt to identify political actors as veto players does not require us to ignore the informal nature of many institutions. And even with the possibility of military intervention or the use of force, regimes at a minimum represent structures that manage the political process in relatively predictable ways.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

In Chapter 1, I discuss different ways of measuring of government performance and map out two dimensions of Nigeria’s record since independence. I suggest that relying on macroeconomic indicators, as many large-N studies do, has important drawbacks. Aggregate economic growth, said one of President John F. Kennedy’s economic advisors: “is extremely important to economists and about two thousand other people in all the land. This enlightened minority knows that growth is really important. The rest can’t remember whether the growth rate is three per cent, six percent, or ten percent” (Parker 2005).

The more innovative contemporary economists remedy this shortcoming by shifting the unit of analysis to micro-level units, such as the family (Sen 1999). I address this challenge in a different way, by incorporating measures of my dependent variable that resemble pure public goods as well as others that are comparatively excludable. I identify education, courts, and budgetary discipline as areas which meet these criteria.
After generating variables based on commonly used operationalizations, I discuss the trends in each area in detail. I utilize qualitative evidence to elaborate on the statistical picture and to describe the major policy shifts in each area. The qualitative and quantitative data largely consist of newspaper accounts, government reports, and other primary sources gathered during nearly a year of field research. It also includes an original data set composed of over 500 property rights-related cases and time series statistics on the number of Awaiting Trial Persons in prison.

In addition to describing the “level” of pork delivered over time, I explore the relationship between policy inputs and policy outputs for education. Using government spending by sector as the principal policy input, I compare predicted educational outputs with the observed ones. By plotting the residuals generated by a linear regression, I identify the years in which the government under-performed, given the level of spending. In Appendix 1, I offer some evidence of a causal relationship between policy inputs and actual educational outcomes – still a surprisingly controversial assertion within the comparative education literature. I present results of preliminary tests which show that student/teacher ratios and education spending both impact educational outcomes, measured by standardized test scores.

Chapter 2, “Does Democracy Deliver?” shifts from the empirical puzzle presented by Nigeria’s government performance to a potential explanation rooted in regime type. This hypothesis has its origins in the colder years of the Cold War, when some modernization theorists argued for a tradeoff between democracy and development. Economic growth required limiting popular participation to levels within the capacity of political institutions, meaning that democracy would have to be held down (Huntington
1968). In the years that followed, Latin Americanists pointed to “bureaucratic authoritarian” models of development in which unelected technocrats implemented economically rational but politically impractical policies (O'Donnell 1973; Collier 1979). Economic growth in East Asia, where states suppressed popular political aspirations, seemed to further confirm democracy’s disadvantages. China enjoys a booming economy with little democratization, while other Asian countries employ corporatism (Wade 1992) and “soft authoritarianism” to achieve high rates of growth (Johnson 1987, 136-164).

Newer scholarship aims to put the issue to rest. “Democracy works,” write Lake and Baum. “It remains the most effective instrument available for controlling the state and producing public services” (Lake and Baum 2001, 587-621). Yet the regime type debate persists. Some studies find that democracies offer a better quality of life but not necessarily better economic growth (Przeworski, Alvarez and others 2000). Others argue that dictators have incentives to perform well in office if political stability affords them a long time horizon (Clague 1997). With good economic performance due coherent policy making institutions, dictators often extend their tenure and avoid the worst dilemmas of exit (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). To this day, conservative Chileans insist that Pinochet’s economic legacy justifies his illiberal politics. In Rwanda, there are signs today that the middle class rationalizes away President Kigame’s weak human rights record, saying “It’s necessary to have a little repression here to keep the lid on,” in order to obtain economic development (Kinzer 2007, 23-6).

To test the regime type hypothesis in Nigeria, I analyze performance under all the governments between 1960 and 2003, classifying them as either democratic or
authoritarian. My tests control for shifting policy priorities as well as the impact of oil on
government revenue. I find that democracy does deliver according to some measures of
education performance, for example by maintaining low student/teacher ratios in primary
schools. But this record does not necessarily hold when we consider policies that meet
the stricter definition of public goods. Fortunately, for those concerned about the
normative implications of these findings, my causal story points in another direction. I
ultimately argue that regime type fails to capture the relevant institutional variation
impacting policy outputs; democracies perform poorly when the policy process
incorporates too many actors with the leverage to extract concessions.

As the first step in constructing this argument, Chapter 3 outlines how policy
actors as veto players better describe the structure of the policy process. I describe the
properties of institutional and individual vetoes. I also introduce informal veto players as
policy actors not specified by formal institutions but who exercise distinct political
leverage on the policy process. This includes “regional” vetoes and factions that emerge
in non-democratic regimes. The veto player literature converges on a broad set of
propositions concerning the number of vetoes, their internal cohesion, and the degree to
which their preferences differ (Tsebelis 2002; Haggard and McCubbins 2001). However,
the existing literature mainly asks how these propositions account for policy stability.
Moreover, virtually all of the existing studies focus on developed democracies.

I build upon veto player theory first by describing how authoritarian regimes
share risk, recruit expertise, and seek to protect themselves from charges of illegitimacy.
I then use a model developed by Cox and McCubbins to look at outcomes other than
policy stability. I establish a link to other outcomes because the conditions of policy
stability are also conducive to bargaining problems. This ultimately has consequences for distributional policies (Cox and McCubbins 2001, 21-63). Based on this theory, I hypothesize that more vetoes yield more pork. I formulate one test for how the number of distinct players impacts delivery levels of particularistic policies. A second test connects additional veto players to the delivery of public goods; as each actor imposes transaction costs on the policy process, bargaining problems emerge. The third test examines whether additional veto players reduce the efficiency of spending on pork.

Whereas Chapter 3 builds a causal logic within comparative literatures on authoritarianism, parliamentary bargaining, and veto players, my second step in theory construction situates political leverage within social context. Chapter 4 thus outlines the logic of informal regional vetoes and explains how they emerge in Nigeria. Social scientists now have considerable evidence demonstrating that social diversity cannot explain instability, civil conflict, or government performance (Reynolds 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75-90; Fish and Brooks 2004, 154-66). Linking causal processes to social or historical contexts requires understanding the incentives for politicizing identity. I summarize the historical basis of Nigeria’s subnational politics and describe the incentives for sustaining at least three cleavages. I then develop an analytical tool for capturing variation in Nigeria’s geo-political leverage. Regional vetoes do not emerge when formal political organizations adequately represent Nigeria’s largest cleavages. But the fact that representation generates particularistic benefits contributes to the persistence of discrete subnational identities.

In a seminal book on veto players, Tsebelis writes that the practical task of identifying the preferences and vetoes in authoritarian regimes involves careful scrutiny
of each regime (Tsebelis 2002, 78). Chapter 5 takes up this task by examining how the bureaucracy, subnational governance, and the balance of executive and law making powers can provide us with a comparative basis for the distribution of policy making authority. Even authoritarian regimes face political costs if these institutions are too exclusive. In such cases, regional vetoes emerge under three conditions: First, existing veto players must substantially under-represent a geopolitical region. Second, these collective actors must actually exercise a veto on at least one major policy issue. Third, the costs of organizing must be assumed by some organization that explicitly coordinates preferences, giving political actors a means to organize. Traditional rulers often play an important role in this regard. My application of these criteria involves a qualitative analysis that includes instances where we might expect to see an informal veto but one did not emerge. I identify thirteen distinct veto player regimes between 1960 and 2003, including five with regional vetoes.

In Chapter 6, I restate my hypothesis, introduce relevant controls, and perform statistical tests using original data. First I test to see if the overall level of pork increases with the number of veto players. This attempts to test Cox and McCubbins’ intuition that as each veto player demands a payoff, policy becomes burdened by pork (Cox and McCubbins 2001, 21-63). Particularistic policies, such as teachers and schools, are geographically targetable and excludable. I predict that an increase in the number of veto players corresponds with smaller student/teacher ratios and more primary schools as each policy actor demands pork. My second test determines whether a large number of vetoes increases bargaining problems. This would undermine the government’s ability to provide public goods, which include my measures for fiscal discipline and judicial
efficiency. My results show that veto players have the opposite predicted effect on teachers and no conclusive effect on schools. At the same time, I find robust evidence that additional veto players deliver fewer public goods.

Third, I test to see if additional veto players increase the per-unit cost of particularistic policies. If so, this would contradict a dominant stream of the veto player literature which expects additional players to improve accountability. According to this logic, when policy makers possess a high level of identifiability and are vulnerable to replacement, they should enjoy fewer opportunities for corruption. Multi-veto player regimes should improve the efficiency of spending. Using the metrics constructed in Chapter 1, I measure the efficiency of spending on primary school teachers and primary schools. I find that multi-veto player regimes do not have a major effect on per unit costs of schools. However they do have a large effect on the costs of teachers. The control for regime type produces some curious effects: democracy can mitigate the negative effects of veto players on teacher spending. But when it comes to education infrastructure, democracies consistently waste more money on school construction.

The conclusion discusses the various implications of my results. A practical implication is that democrats should be wary of capital-intensive investment in localized public policies, such as schools. This is especially salient since enrollments tend to increase after democratic transitions, thus requiring construction of new schools. I also identify important theoretical considerations. The literature already explores how multiple veto players can lock in bad policies. I add to this discussion by demonstrating how they can also generate bargaining problems which impede the delivery of public goods. This further implies that on a theoretical level, we may need to disentangle
commitment from accountability. The results for my policy efficiency hypothesis suggest that the credibility generated by multiple veto players can literally be costly.

After explaining in *The Trouble with Nigeria* that Nigerians are no different than anyone else, Achebe blames the country’s governance failures on leadership. But Achebe probes us to think about deeper explanations and alternatives. “Nigerians are corrupt because the system under which they live today makes corruption easy and profitable,” he writes. “They will cease to be corrupt when corruption is made difficult and inconvenient.” Veto player theory offers exciting new possibilities for discovering the circumstances that produce such inconveniences, and for determining the role of political institutions in restoring the nation’s developmental promise.
INTRODUCTION

As de-colonization neared its end in the 1950’s, a wave of optimism swept across sub-Saharan Africa. In the jewel of Britain’s colonies in Africa, Nigerians anxiously embraced the promise of political sovereignty. Upon his inauguration as Governor-General, Nigeria’s great nationalist Nnamdi Azikiwe recited a poem called “Youth.” It begins, “We have tomorrow bright before us like a flame/Yesterday a night-gone thing a sun-down name.” Langston Hughes, the African-American author of the poem, listened from the audience full of earnest Nigerians.9 With massive commitments to education and socio-economic development from the new political class, the future looked bright. The country’s growth rate reached 4.1 percent in 1962 and that figure more than doubled the following year.

The explanations for subsequent political and economic disappointments remain controversial. The expansion of oil in the economy surely matters, as does the persistence of military intervention in politics. Other explanations emphasize the

politicization of ethnicity. This chapter sidesteps causal explanations and limits itself to an overview of Nigeria’s empirical record of government performance. I demonstrate here that variation over time indeed exists, leaving the task of actually explaining the causes of variation for later. In the first section, I explain how the theory of public goods offers an effective tool for measuring government performance. It usefully helps us clarify the theoretical distinctions among policies based on the consumption of policy benefits. I also refer to studies on human capital formation, which show how the effects of some policies are indirect. This presents a dilemma for policy makers who seek more immediate results for their own political gain.

In the second section, I claim that measures of performance should ideally illustrate the range of “publicness” revealed by public goods theory. Some nationally-oriented policies may be enjoyed by all citizens while other policies are more vulnerable to targeted implementation. With this goal in mind, I identify primary education, the courts, and fiscal discipline as three relevant areas of government performance. I create variables to measure policy outputs using operationalizations grounded in the political development literature. After summarizing major structural and policy shifts in these areas, I describe performance in each of these areas over time using data gathered during nearly a year of field research.

This chapter yields multiple measures of my dependent variable that enable me to explore different aspects of performance. By adopting some variables that closely resemble public goods and others that do not, I can compare results between different types of policy. Since I describe the variables’ results in relative terms, I can also compare the level of performance over time. In addition, I capture two different
dimensions of education: one pair of variables that reflects the level of the policy outputs, and another pair that estimates the efficiency of spending. I accomplish the latter by generating predicted observations, given spending levels, and comparing predicted to observed levels. Plotting the difference allows me to pinpoint periods of “good” performance versus years with under-provision of goods. I conclude by making generalizations about government performance between 1960 and 2003.

PERFORMANCE MEASURES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

In this section I define “public goods” and explain why the concept is helpful for understanding and measuring government performance. This leads me to explain why states often become involved in the provision of services in the first place. I describe how scholars operationalize the concept in order to measure government performance. This includes a treatment of government policy as an investment in human capital formation. I claim that an emphasis on aggregated variables is a common weakness of approaches to public goods. I then explain why and how I measure government performance using variables that capture a range of “publicness.”

Theorizing and Measuring Public Goods

The theory of public goods describes why some policies broadly benefit the public while others serve narrower interests. It advances strong claims about the effects of group size on decision making. Due to the temptation to “free ride” on the contribution of others, it argues that large organizations can only resolve the problem of collective action through enforcement and select incentives (Olson 1965). It is properties of consumption that determine whether a good is public or not. The theory has important implications for the study of politics because states do provide many goods. As a
consequence, public goods theory has thus emerged as one of the most important tools for evaluating government performance and understanding the distributional effects of politics (Shugart 1999, 53-88; Haggard and McCubbins 2001; Feng 2003).

In a theoretical “Walrasian” economy, where markets exist for everything, goods are rivalrous. This means that enjoyment by one consumer prevents another from enjoying that particular good. Non-rivalrous goods, such as clean air or public safety, are “public goods.” Provision of the good does not impact the cost of consumption as the number of people benefiting from it changes. The classic example is a lighthouse since one ship seeing the light does not interfere with another doing so (Rosen 1995). The “public” nature of these goods stems from the absence of rivalry in their consumption, not the fact that they may be provided by the state or that their distribution may be the consequence of social organization. Public goods may also be “non-excludable,” meaning it is too difficult or “costly” in principle to deny them to any citizen just because she has not helped pay for their provision. Table 1 illustrates the relationship between excludability, rivalry and different types of goods. Economists disagree about whether nonrivalry or non-excludability is the minimum definition for all public goods. However they do seem to agree that “pure” public goods meet both of these criteria, and that markets will undersupply non-excludable goods.

Table 1: Public and Private Goods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Excludable</th>
<th>Non-excludable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rival</td>
<td>Private goods</td>
<td>Common pool resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonrival</td>
<td>Club goods</td>
<td>Pure public goods</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Przeworski (2003)*
States supposedly provide goods and services in response to market failures, although this is only one of several possible reactions to such failures. Welfare economics describes a hypothetical world without market failures to demonstrate that a competitive equilibrium leads to the efficient allocation of goods in society. The first theorem of welfare economics states that this is possible in a Walrasian economy because no single individual can affect the prices paid by others. The second theorem shows that an egalitarian distribution is possible through a redistribution followed by decentralized exchange, as long as the reallocation of initial endowments is costless. The significance of these two theorems is that in a perfect market, information about prices is sufficient to generate an adjustment of production and exchange that leads to a Pareto optimal distribution (Przeworski 2003). In reality of course, such perfect markets do not exist (North 1990). Moreover when states become involved in providing certain goods and services, they often do so with a comparative advantage over the market (Lake and Baum 2001, 587-621).

Policy makers have self-interests such as ensuring their political survival or maximizing their influence. The provision of public goods improves when political incumbents either see the formulation of national-oriented policies in their self-interest or when institutions constrain such self-interest (Bueno de Mesquita and Root 2000; Geddes 1994). The literature uses different terminologies but the principles are similar: policies that serve people regardless of their relationship to the incumbent are “publicly regarded” or “national-oriented” because of their non-excludability. By contrast, excludable policies include those that serve a narrow constituency, such as an interest group or a geographic region. I concentrate on “pork” as one such type of excludable policy whose
distribution follows a political rather than a technical or programmic logic. Despite its distinctly American origins, I opt to use this term because of its widespread use in comparative politics and political economy. In this project I only document changes in pork at the aggregate level, rather than actually demonstrating how and where the pork is selectively targeted. By distinguishing between pork and public goods, I effectively capture the range of excludability in policy outputs, which I refer to as “publicness.”

Many studies blur these distinctions by operationalizing government performance with aggregate measures such as economic growth per capita or inflation. By focusing on macroeconomic outcomes that tend to meet the strict definition of public goods, these studies generally neglect other relevant measures of government performance that are more private-oriented. Using broad national measures or making assumptions about the non-excludability of certain goods does have advantages, particularly when engaging in cross-national research. But such highly aggregated variables may not offer much insight into the outcomes as actually experienced by individual citizens (Sen 1999). Addresses these shortcomings requires using measures that capture a range of publicness.

**Social Investment as Human Capital**

Studies that make assumptions about non-excludability by using aggregate measures risk ignoring differences with some goods which may actually be more private-regarded. For example, schools and teachers are geographically targetable. This means that unlike the lighthouse example they are excludable. Consumption of resources devoted to education may also be rivalrous because one region might gain teachers at the expense of another. (This rivalrousness might be acute if there are major distinctions between publicly and privately operated facilities.)
In other ways though, government investment in education does resemble a public good. As components of human capital formation, they have long term benefits conducive to economic growth. In this view, “A greater amount of educational attainment implies more skilled and productive workers, who in turn increase an economy’s output of goods and services” (Barro and Lee 2001, 541-63). Baum and Lake, for example, argue that investments in these sectors create significant indirect effects conducive to growth (Baum and Lake 2003, 333-47). However such indirect benefits of education present a time horizon issue. This is because incumbents (including dictators) want to claim credit for good policies. The benefits of the policies might not be immediately visible to their constituency – or even during their tenure. This resembles a classic collective action problem because policy makers face the temptation to free ride on the short term sacrifices made by others to generate the policy. In general, economic policies with properties of a public good contribute to collective action problems (Haggard 1997, 121-152).

The idea that human capital investments promote development challenged the conventional economic wisdom (Galbraith 1976). Classical liberal economists still argue about the impact of human capital on economic growth.10 Among international development organizations there is now an emerging consensus that human capital

---

10 For example, Helliwell finds weak support for the hypothesis that investment in human capital leads to growth (Helliwell 1994, 225-48). For a good literature review and critique of this work on the effects of education on growth, see Schultz (1999). He considers large impacts of education on growth implausible because wages and other measures don’t change by comparable magnitudes. However, Feng finds strong support for Helliwell’s hypothesis. He extends the argument to incorporate the effects of political instability, arguing that it has an adverse effect on school inputs and human capital formation (Feng 2003). Schultz’s analysis of African education does conclude that educational investments have positive returns on growth. But his cases of Kenya, Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoir and Ghana suggest that investment at different levels has different effects. Some African education policies favor investment in higher education; this biases education policy in favor of the wealthy (Schultz 1999, 67-88).
investment does contribute to growth and development. The World Bank’s Millennium Development Goals, the conclusions of the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Reports and other prominent documents in the international development community all broadly share this view.

Moreover, the value of investing in human capital is a guiding assumption in many of Nigeria’s policy planning documents. For example, the National Development Plan for 1962 – 1968 stated that the “Education Programme is designed to increase as rapidly and as economically as possible the high level manpower which is indispensable to accelerated development.” It committed the federal government to providing substantial assistance to the states for this purpose (Federal Ministry of Economic Development 1960). In 1977, a task force on education chaired by Chief Simeon Adebo laid out a National Policy on Education. Its White Paper declared that education was the “greatest investment that a nation can make for the development of its economic, political, sociological and human resources.”11 A number of Nigerian social scientists share this view as well (Aregbeyen 1996).

The discussion of human capital suggests that both the public and the more private-regarded policies contribute to development. In the remainder of this chapter, I examine the Nigerian government’s performance in education, the courts, and “fiscal discipline.” I adopt these measures because they capture the range of publicness I identified above. I operationalize each of these measures with variables drawn from the development literature and then summarize four decades of government performance.

11 West Africa editorial, “Hard Road for Education,” May 21, 1979, p. 871. Similarly, the Ministry of Health wrote that “the health of the people not only contributes to better quality lives but is also essential for the sustained economic and social development of the country as a whole” (Federal Ministry of Health 1996).
MEASURING GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE IN NIGERIA

My measures express three different dimensions of performance: First, by tracking the relative outputs of particularistic policies, I generalize about levels of policy delivery. Second, my measures capture the efficiency of spending on particularistic goods. This allows me to pinpoint when the government spent an excess of money relative to the policy output purchased. Third, they reflect a range of publicness by incorporating some variables that meet the strict definition of public goods as well as other, more particularistic policies. Together, these dimensions make it possible later to compare the delivery of different types of policies.

I measure the first two dimensions of government performance with two distinct pairs of education variables. The first pair captures education performance levels, which I operationalize in terms of primary student/teacher ratios as well as the number of schools. Appendix 1 explores the controversy between student/teacher ratio and student performance. I offer some evidence to support scholars who claim that education inputs do contribute to better overall education outcomes. The second pair of variables measures performance by considering the relative relationship between policy inputs and outputs. I construct a model that uses federal spending on education to predict outputs. I then use the regression’s residuals to identify periods of good government performance based on years when government inputs were equal to or less than government outputs.

To study the third dimension of government performance I examine fiscal discipline and judicial efficiency. I operationalize fiscal discipline as budget surplus measured as a share of Gross Domestic Product; negative figures indicate a deficit. Budget deficits are directly related to observable and measurable spending policies. This
approach is consistent with operationalizations adopted by other studies that examine the relationship between political processes and economic outcomes. I measure judicial efficiency through case clearance rates. The clearance statistics are drawn from an original sample of over 500 property rights-related cases collected during field research. These types of cases are especially appropriate because of the widely studied causal relationship between a government’s ability to enforce individual property rights and economic development. This section explores each of these three dimensions of performance in turn.

**Education and Schools**

The research on government performance reviewed so far suggests that education impacts economic growth, whether through human capital formation or in other more direct ways. Enrollment rates and averages years of schooling are the most widely used measures of education policy in the developing world (Glewwe and Kremer 2005). The World Bank and other experts on education criticize these metrics because they inadequately capture education’s contributions to building human capital. Instead, factors such as class size, measured as student/teacher ratio, better measure education. Not only do they have demonstrable effects on economic growth over the long term, they are also linked to more immediate outcomes associated with better quality education (Barro and Lee 2001, 541-63; Lee and Barro 2001, 465-88). This is not necessarily the case with years of schooling as a measure, which has a more ambiguous relationship to student performance. Recent studies of student/teacher ratios in Africa also conclude that classroom size impacts educational outcomes (Case and Deaton 1999, 1047-88). The variables measuring education I adopt here are all policy outputs, as distinct from
educational outcomes, such as literacy rates or standardized test scores. I explore the issue of whether policy outputs can be linked to policy outcomes briefly in Appendix 1.

This sub-section proceeds in three steps. First, I provide an overview of how Nigeria historically implemented education policy. This summary makes clear, for what it is worth, that the government repeatedly pledges its devotion to education. I pay particularly close attention to the role of private actors and subnational governments, since their role in education could arguably reduce the validity of my operationalizations. Second, I illustrate education policy outputs in a series of charts. To measure delivery levels, I create a variable for the primary student/teacher ratio. I also examine overall construction of schools since this will allow me to offer some basic generalizations about school infrastructure even if we lack a reliable quantitative metric for its inconsistent quality. Third, I generate a second pair of education variables using federal spending on education to predict policy outputs. These variables capture policy efficiency. I then briefly summarize the periods with less or more efficient policy implementation.

**An Education Policy Overview**

Even before independence in 1960, Nigeria’s governments regularly accorded education top priority. In 1959, the Federal Minister of Education appointed a commission to study educational planning for the first decade of Nigeria’s independence. In 1961, the Federal Government pledged to implement key recommendations of the Ashby Commission, as it became known, including “progressive improvement in primary education throughout the Federation so that the foundation of national development may truly be laid.” The federal government declared that its multi-year development plans would “accord the highest priority to education.” With an eye towards anticipated
manpower needs for 1970, the Commission set targets for all educational levels (Federal Government of Nigeria 1961). Policy makers knew that a post-colonial Nigeria would need to train a new generation of bureaucrats, politicians, and entrepreneurs.

Up until 1970, primary and secondary education was largely in the hands of private voluntary organizations that were financially supported by the federal government. Vast disparities in the conditions between public and private schools prompted the federal government to set up the Asabia Commission in 1967. The government swiftly adopted the Commission’s main recommendation that the states take over all private schools and schools run by private voluntary organizations. Over the next several years, the federal military government proceeded to abolish various state and local institutions such as the State Advisory Board of Education, the Local Education Authorities, and the Teachers’ Council, which enforced discipline (Akinkugbe 1994). This had the effect of increasing the federal government’s role in education.

A constant in the federal government’s involvement in education since 1976 has been the Universal Basic Education (UBE), the government’s principal program for primary education. In 1977, a task force on education chaired by Chief Simeon Adebo laid out a National Policy on Education. Its White Paper declared that education was the most important investment Nigeria could make for its socio-economic development. Then in 1979 the new constitution guaranteed free primary and secondary education as a basic right. Two years later, the democratic government’s National Policy on Education called education “a huge Government venture” that is “an instrument par excellence for effecting national development” (Federal Government of Nigeria 1981).

---

At first the federal government assumed all the fiscal responsibilities for UBE but in 1977 it requested the states’ assistance. With the erosion of their tax base under military regimes, the states were in a weak position to assist but by 1981 the federal government had withdrawn from its funding obligations. Strapped for cash because of declining transfers from the federal government, the states in turn made the local government areas (LGA’s) responsible for funding most of primary education. This led to various management crises in education during the 1980s when teachers went unpaid and unions complained loudly about work conditions.

Subsequent governments remained formally committed to basic education. In 1988 the federal government established the National Primary Education Commission (NPEC) to help share the cost of teachers’ salaries. The NPEC was abolished in 1991 and then re-established in 1993, along with State Primary Education Boards (Akinkugbe 1994). Nigeria signed the “Jomtiem Declaration of Education for All” in 1990, an international agreement committing nine developing nations to reducing illiteracy, and maintaining various government programs to promote and fund education. UBE has remained a cornerstone, at least nominally, of all the governments since it began, including the democratic government that came to power in 1999. Bold constitutional provisions again enshrined the commitment to UBE.¹³

A concern with using education as a measure of performance is that the federal government’s role in its provision varies over time. This is true particularly in Africa, where missionaries and private institutions played such a large role in education

¹³ Section 18(3) of the 1999 Federal Constitution pledges the government to provide free compulsory Universal Primary Education, free secondary education, free university education, and free adult literacy programs. See also (Federal Ministry of Education 99; Universal Basic Education Programme 2003).
(Abernethy 1969). Nevertheless I believe federal spending provides a sufficient measure for four reasons: First, as Baum and Lake point out, even if the government is not a direct provider of such services it still regulates them and has an interest in ensuring that policy results “fall within politically acceptable limits” (Baum and Lake 2003, 333-47). When the state does actually provide such services, it typically does so with a comparative advantage over the market (Lake and Baum 2001, 587-621). Second, the federal government gives these policies high priority as part of its national development strategies; I have already cited numerous references to such policy statements. Third, in reality the Nigerian federal government provides extensive financial assistance to the states for carrying out their responsibilities in education. Fourth, I incorporate a control variable for education as a share of federal spending, which to some extent proxies for the federal government’s varying involvement in education.

In addition, tests performed in Appendix 1 to this chapter provide some preliminary evidence to support the assumption that the federal government has an impact on education. Subnational governments routinely refuse to implement national policies until they receive money from the federal government, either from grants in aid or through the revenue allocation system. One economist calls such behavior by the states a “complete negation of the very principles of federalism.” The states “merely fold their hands and do not lift a finger till they have obtained their chunk of the so-called national cake.”14 This is important for our purposes since it reinforces the view that even

14 Cover story, “Through the Eye of a Needle: States’ Billion Naira Budgets Based on Expectation from the Federal Government,” The Nigerian Economist, February 5, 1990, pp. 21-23. A similar drama played out in 2000 when the states refused to implement a minimum wage increase unless the federal government increased their share of money from the country’s national revenue allocation formula.
where states have jurisdiction over implementation, this autonomy means little when the central government still controls the purse.

Performance Levels in Education

Figure 1 displays the actual, observed student/teacher ratios in primary schools. It shows that in 1961 the student/teacher ratio stood at 29.3 students for each teacher in primary schools. Until 1965, the student/teacher ratio changed only slightly. The ratio then grew to 33.4 students per teaching, following two years of teacher salary increases. A strike in 1965 partly affected the supply of teachers. They appealed to the Federal Government to form a Joint Negotiating Council to harmonize salary and benefits (National Joint Negotiating Council for Teachers 1965). The ratio stood at about 1965 levels through the early 1970s (using averages of nearest years for the Civil War from 1967 to 1969). In 1976 the ratio reached 46.5 students for each primary school teacher. Although it fell from this peak, the ratio remained high for the rest of the decade.

---

The ratios reported for the 1970s might surprise readers familiar with the period, since the federal government spent so much money on education. The influential Commission led by Chief Simon Adebo called the education system a “cumbersome patchwork” at the primary and secondary levels. It proposed complete government control for planning, financing and running of the schools. The Supreme Military Council responded by issuing a decree in 1972 giving the federal government increased authority over education and giving it supremacy in the instance of a contradiction with state or local law. These new policies led to a purge of teachers and a serious decline in morale (Taiwo 1982). This period also coincides with the introduction of the federal government’s ambitious Universal Basic Education program in 1976. Enrollments surged because education became virtually free. When the Civil War concluded in January 1970, primary enrollment stood at about 32 percent of the school age population.

---

but by 1978, primary enrollment was at least at 86 percent (Federal Office of Statistics 1979). Even so, it is likely that these are conservative figures. The government faced the huge task of teacher recruitment to keep pace with the new enrollment levels. Thus it is not entirely surprising that Figure 1 shows an increase in primary school student/teacher ratio in the 1980s, with a slightly more dramatic increase around 1985. This is followed by improvement between 1990 and 1997, and minor improvements in 2001 and 2002.

Figure 2 shows the number of primary schools recorded by the federal government for each year (I utilize averages of the nearest years for the Civil War years, 1967 – 1969). Since it reports the absolute number of schools reported by the states to the federal government, it is little surprise that the figure generally increases over time. What is perhaps remarkable is the steep increase starting in the mid-1970s. The slump in the late 1980s and the slight downturn after 2000 are also notable. Appendix 2 reports that with a lead $t +1$, the variable is stationary after de-trending.

![Figure 2: Primary Schools, 1961 – 2001.](image)

Note: Variable shown here without de-trending or lead.
Nigerian policy makers have grappled for decades with a supposed tradeoff between resources for education and the desired policy results. School reformers in the 1960s often said “more is worse,” implying that expansion of educational opportunities should not outpace the capacity to supply education. To maintain capacity, various governments sought to ensure quality of education through a federal inspection process. It is unfortunately difficult to assess their impact because I know of no study evaluating the impact of education inputs on policy outputs in terms of more than a handful of years.\textsuperscript{17}

Partly to fill this gap, I examine how education spending impacts student/teacher ratios and school infrastructure at the primary level. I compare these results with those predicted by federal spending trends. I then identify the years when education was under-provided or adequately provided, given the model’s general predictions. The difference between the predicted outputs $\hat{y}_i$, compared to the observed value ($\mu_i + \hat{y}_i$) is captured by the residuals in a linear regression. This allows me to identify periods of good government performance based on those years when government inputs were equal to or less than government outputs. These years can be contrasted with years when inputs exceeded the predicted outputs such that:

\begin{align*}
\text{Equation 1: } & \text{"Good" performance: } & \mu_i & \geq 0 \\
\text{Equation 2: } & \text{Under-provision of goods/services: } & \mu_i & < 0
\end{align*}

\textsuperscript{17} See for example Abolade (1999) who discusses the joint UNESCO, UNICEF, and Federal Ministry of Education survey, “Monitoring of Learning and Achievement” (Abolade, J. O. 99). Gboyega \textit{et al.} examine school infrastructure, furniture for teachers and students, and include a list of 13 states with over 1000 primary schools that have no school building (Gboyega, Ogunsanya and others 1998).
Figure 4 displays the residuals for the predicted number of primary schools. Figure 3 displays the residuals for the predicted primary student/teacher ratios. Because a lower student/teacher ratio is a sign of better performance, it is important to note that the definitions in Equation 1 and Equation 2 need to be reversed. In other words, $\mu_i \geq 0$ is a sign of under-provision of goods when interpreting the residuals in the model predicting student/teacher ratios.

The predicted student/teacher ratio is calculated based on total federal spending on education for a given year. All education spending is expressed in constant 2000 naira.\(^{18}\) While the gross enrollment rate would be a useful control variable for this time series, such data are only available for about 20 years (many of which are non-consecutive). Total enrollments are one alternative option, and these data are available for all years. But using enrollments as a control would naturally introduce multicollinearity because I use those figures to calculate the student/teacher ratio. Such controls are essential where time-series variables are not stationary. Unit root tests performed on the student/teacher ratio show statistically significant evidence of stationarity at the two lower test levels. As test results in Appendix 2 show, education spending suffers from a unit root even though it is deflated. I therefore de-trend the education spending variable \textit{ed.all} with first difference tests. I also introduce a control, \textit{ed.budgt}, which measures education spending as a share of the federal budget. This helps

\(^{18}\) Most of the spending figures for the 1960’s are reported in fiscal years, which I converted to calendar years by multiplying the previous year by 0.25 and the current year by 0.75, since the fiscal year ends on March 31. The spending figures for 1969 are based on an average of 1968 and 1970. All years are then expressed in constant 2000 naira, calculated from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Indicators Consumer Price Index. I would like to thank Nora Gordon and Craig McIntosh from the University of California, San Diego, and Ademola Ariyo from the University of Ibadan for their advice on the conversions.
control for the federal government’s varying financial contribution. Where the dependent variable, $Pri.s.t.$, is the student/teacher ratio:

Equation 3: $\hat{Y}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (\Delta ed.all_{it}) + \beta_2 (ed.budgt_{it}) + \varepsilon_t$

Figure 3 plots the residuals for the model as the variable $Teachers1$. The Adjusted $R^2$ is .191 and the model is significant at the .01 level. The Durbin-Watson statistic of .968 signals no negative autocorrelation (within .01 significance points). The full test results are reported in Appendix 3. But there is some positive autocorrelation (meaning that the error terms are somewhat close to one another), so the results should not be treated as definitive. The model shows that the most efficient performance occurs in the 1960s generally, a brief period in the mid-1990s, and to some extent in the early 1980s. The most wasteful spending on education occurs in the late 1970s, and late 1980s into the early 1990s. Spending is also wasteful between 1999 and 2001.

Figure 3: Residuals for the Predicted Primary Student/Teacher Ratio, 1962-2002
For my other measure of policy efficiency in education, I incorporate a measure of school infrastructure inputs. The *Schools1* variable captures the impact of federal education spending, *ed.all*, on the total number of primary schools. I utilize a lead of one year based on the assumption that it takes about a year to build a school, so the effects of construction will not be observable until the following year.\textsuperscript{19} Since the number of schools typically increases over the previous year, this variable might present problems for time-series analysis. Tests in Appendix 2 report that the variable is not stationary, meaning that it will introduce autocorrelation problems over time. I de-trend it with first difference tests where $\Delta y_t = y_t - y_{t-1}$. To further control for time I introduce gross enrollment levels. Since Appendix 2 shows that this variable is not stationary either, I de-trend it with first difference tests, creating *Apri.enroll*. For education spending I use the amount of federal spending on education, after deflation and de-trending. De-trending and introducing leads (or lags) are common techniques for reducing the autocorrelation in time series data (Enders 2004). Again I introduce *ed.budgt* to reduce autocorrelation and control for the federal government’s varying involvement in education. Where $\hat{y} = \text{the de-trended variable for primary schools at } t+1 \text{ after de-trending (Pri.sch, lead +1_t – Pri.sch, lead+1_{t-1})}$:

\begin{equation}
\hat{Y}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (\Delta \text{ed.all}_t) + \beta_2 (\Delta \text{Pri.enroll}_t) + \beta_3 (\text{ed.budgt}_t) + \varepsilon_t
\end{equation}

\textsuperscript{19} Tests for a partial auto-correlation coefficient strongly suggest that $t+1$ accurately captures the lead time to build a school, showing that more than 90 percent of the value at time $t$ is determined by the value at time $t-1$. 
This model is significant at the .01 level and the Adjusted R\(^2\) is .288. The Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.338, indicating that neither positive nor negative autocorrelation exists. The results are reported in Appendix 3. I express the residuals of this model as Schools\(_1\). Tests in Appendix 2 show that this new variable is stationary.

![Figure 4: Residuals for education spending predicting number of Schools, 1962 – 2001](image)

The small negative residuals in Figure 4 for the early 1960s mean that the number of primary schools was only slightly below the predicted number. The number of schools drops off again in 1966. The figure improves for the remainder of the decade; once again nearest-year averages are used for missing values during the Civil War years (1967 – 1969). 1971 shows a return to low levels, with the number of schools until 1973 lower than predicted. From 1973 to 1977 the number is higher than expected. The 1980s are
full of seemingly stochastic ups and downs. 1994 to 1998 show notably higher than predicted number of schools but this situation is reversed in 1999.

**Judicial Performance**

Like all of my measures of government performance, the courts have a demonstrable relationship to economic development. Yet they have important differences compared to education policy outputs. Measuring judicial performance also presents a new set of challenges. In this sub-section I refer to literature which claims that courts contribute to economic development by protecting property rights. I then describe various techniques to measure court performance and explain why I choose to focus on efficiency in particular. Next, I provide a very brief overview of the Nigerian judicial system and explain how I operationalize efficiency in terms of case clearance rates. I utilize an original data set of property rights-related cases. Since my data only extend through 1987, I construct an alternative clearance variable using a separate but correlated measure of court performance. This parallel data set allows me to use predicted values to extend the data through 2003. I conclude with a discussion of the overall findings.

Numerous studies claim that dispute resolution and enforcement of property rights provide the foundations for long term economic growth (Alston, Eggertsson and others 1996; Pistor and Wellons 1999; Barzel 1997; Clague, Keefer and others 1997, 91-120; Olson 1993, 567-77). Another reason to include the courts is that compared to education, overall judicial performance closely resembles a nationally-oriented policy. To some degree, resources can be allocated by increasing the salary of judges or changing the number of judges. But even these changes do not necessarily introduce rivalry. This means that the judicial system essentially operates like a public good because everyone
benefits from dispute resolution which would otherwise be costly for one person to provide (North and Thomas 1973).

Scholars utilize a variety of metrics to gauge judicial performance including judge caseload, the number of disposed cases, the average time it takes to resolve a case, and the clearance rate (Buscaglia, Edgardo 1999). These differ from other measurements that potentially impact judicial performance such as the independence of the courts or the perceived “fairness” of decisions.20 (These other measures can become particularly important during authoritarian regimes. Chapter 2 will use additional qualitative and quantitative evidence to pinpoint when reduced judicial independence might interfere with an objective interpretation of clearance rates.)

To measure the courts’ efficiency resolving property-related cases, I focus on clearance rates. Dakolias describes clearance as a good overall measure of dispute resolution productivity. Other studies point out how judicial delay, which is manifest in a low clearance rate, increases the cost of private transactions. If few alternative dispute resolutions are available this hinders economic development (Buscaglia, Edgardo 1999). Consistent with these studies, I calculate clearance from the number of cases disposed divided by the number of cases received in a given year. This variable is generally an

20 The Nigerian courts have dealt with both the issue of a reasonable time for a trial as well as what constitutes a fair hearing. The Supreme Court set the standard in 1968 when the Chief Justice of Nigeria wrote that “the true test of a fair hearing…is the impression of a reasonable person who was present at the trial, whether, from his observation, justice has been done in the case.” The 1979 Constitution in Section 33(1) declared that “a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a Court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality.” The Court clarified its interpretation of Section 33’s expectations of reasonable time and fairness, which “must mean a trial conducted according to all the legal rules formulated to ensure that justice is done to the parties of the case. Reasonable time must mean the period of time which, in the search for justice, does not wear out the parties and their witnesses and which is required to ensure that justice is not only done but appears reasonable to persons to be done” (Craig, Justice E. B. 88).
effective indicator of the future efficiency of the courts (Dakolias 1999; Buscaglia and Ulen 1997, 275-91).

Nigeria’s legal system has gone through many changes since independence. The courts at the lowest level of the hierarchy (the State Customary Courts and the State Magistrate/District Courts, Customary/Area Courts) are not explicitly recognized in the federal constitutions. States have the discretion to determine whether they want to establish these local courts, although as of 1992 all states had established Magistrate/District Courts. The decisions of these lower courts are usually recognized by the state courts though, so this should not give the impression that they are not integrated into the legal system. At the state level, all states have a High Court, which is established as a *Superior Court* of record. Beyond that, states have discretion over whether they want to establish Shari’a Courts, which give the parties in the dispute the option of having their case judged by Islamic Law. By 1992 five states had also established official Customary Courts of Appeal. At the federal level, the Supreme Court has been operational since 1956, and in 1963 its decisions became the last word on legal issues in Nigeria as cases could no longer be referred to the Queen of England’s Privy Council. A Federal Revenue Court was established in 1973, and the democratic constitution of 1979 christened it the Federal High Court. The Federal Court of Appeal was established by a military decree issued in 1976 (Fawehinmi 1992).

The sample used to calculate clearance rate is composed of 518 cases either decided in or appealed from the Federal High Courts to the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court between 1960 and the late 1990s. (There are about eight divisions for the Court of Appeal.) The total sample is composed of land disputes (449 cases) and
“companies” cases (69 cases). Both of these legal categories involve protection of property rights. The issues covered by companies cases includes actions against companies, government regulation or inspection, corporate personality, tax assessment, and certain aspects of the bankruptcy and asset liquidation processes. Most of the land cases concern disputes over title to land and were governed by English law of real property, which Nigeria inherited “hook, line and sinker” at independence, in the opinion of one legal expert (Oluyede 1985, 94-123). The issues covered by land and property related cases in my sample include property title, conveyance, compensation for property confiscated by the government, and disputes over communal land use. The cases in my sample also include customary tenancy, which occurs when a person occupies land on the basis of permission of the owner under customary law. Customary land law flows from the legal principle of “inalienability.” In one celebrated decision, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council noted that “the notion of individual ownership is quite foreign to native ideas. Land belongs to the community, the village or the family, never to the

21 A complete list of issues covered by companies cases in Nigeria includes: (1) action against a company; (2) enforcement of an act of a company’s agent. For example, if a director or manager acts on behalf of the company, that person is taken to be the legal instrument of that company; (3) inspection of the affairs of a company. This includes investigations by Customs Department, National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control, and the Ministry of Commerce and Trades to ensure compliance with the relevant regulations; (4) winding up, liquidation and appointment of receivers and managers; (5) legal effect of articles of association; (6) change of name; (7) debenture and floating charges. Debenture is a form of borrowing by the company from the public through the capital markets. When a company goes bankrupt, payment of the debenture stockholders takes priority; (8) transfer of companies; (9) striking of a company’s name from the register of companies; (10) compulsory liquidation, such as being compelled into bankruptcy, usually by the government. For example this might occur if a company has been posting false figures. This happened with the failed banks in the late 1980s and early 1990s; (11) corporate personality; (12) appointment of directors; (13) declaration, payment and conversion of dividend; (14) nature and legal personality of a foreign company. This involves the standing of a foreign company under Nigerian Law; (15) tax assessment, such as capital gains tax, income tax; (16) insolvency and bankruptcy; (17) incorporation and pre-incorporation contract, allotment, ownership, transfer and registration of shares. Pre-incorporation contract involves contractual agreement entered into by promoters of the company in the name of the company that is being promoted. In law, such a contract is not binding on the company except where the company ratifies the action of the promoters. (Orojo 1992; Tonwe 1997; Agbadu-Fishim 1998).
individual.” These ideas, in place for hundreds of years, varied from state to state, especially between north and south. The Land Use Act of 1978 attempted to reconcile these different traditions by transferring all ownership of land (either jointly owned or individually owned) to the governor of that state to be held in trust for the indigenes of the state (op cit.). Under this landmark Act, instituted by a military government but still in effect, the sale of land requires the approval of the governor before the transaction is legally binding.22

Law reports offer the most reliable information about decisions. These reports are usually privately published and the information therefore does not strictly include all of

---

22 A more complete list of issues covered under land cases includes: (1) abandonment; (2) acquisition and claim for compensation over compulsory acquisition of land by government (this is very different from forfeiture in American law); (3) possession, adverse possession and recovery of possession of land and property. Possession covers physical control over land or property as distinguished from ownership, which concerns title. Adverse possession involves being in physical control of land or property against the rights of the legal title holder. This for example would include landlord-tenant relations; (4) assignment of property. This refers to conveyance of property not involving monetary value with the understanding that the assignee is the person who has been granted use of the property for certain reasons within a stipulated period of time. An example would be allowing someone to use a parcel of land for growing his/her crops but not granting them any rights to title; (5) breach of covenant. This usually occurs under customary law and is not always established by contract. It is an agreement not backed by law but recognized as binding by the parties entering into it; (6) claim for specific performance of sale of land and property. This usually occurs when the seller of property does not transfer ownership to the buyer in the agreed upon condition; (7) dispute over communal land takes place where a member of a community is exercising a right over a land held in joint ownership. This exercise is inconsistent with the general interest of the community and may be governed by the Land Use Act of 1978; (8) dispute over validity of certificate of occupancy and purchase; (9) conveyance of land or other property; (10) dispute of customary land and tenancy. Customary tenancy is when a person occupies a land not as the owner but based upon the permission of the owner under customary law. Often the occupation involves payment of some gratification or tithes to the owner. It can cover many years as long as the occupant continues to pay the tithes. The most famous example is the Modakeke-Ife dispute, where the Modakeke people migrated from Oyo and became customary tenants of the Ife people under an agreement that they will be paying farm produce to the Ife overlords; (11) action for declaration of title to land; (12) trespass and injunction; (13) equitable interest in land refers to when joint owners have equal rights to land or property. They might disagree on development, sale or lease; (14) family property, forfeiture, gift of land; (15) joint tenancy; (16) pledge of land falls under customary law when the owner allows an occupant to exercise possessory rights over the land with the understanding that the owner has granted mere use of the land. This can also involve pledging land as a collateral in a loan transaction; (17) registration of land instrument, title, conveyance of land. Under the Land Use Act, this might refer to irregularities in the process of conveyance or registering ownership of land; (18) statutory and customary right of occupancy. (Elias 1971; Olawoye 1974; Oluyede ; Aluko 1998; Olkany 1986).
the cases that reached these courts. This is one potential cause of measurement error. To address this problem, I cross-checked my list with a more complete indexes of cases: Olaitain’s *Index to Law Reports 1880 – 1990*. This exercise suggests that while such distortions are unavoidable, differences in the number of cases are fairly minimal (Olaitan 1998). A second possible cause of error could arise from the figures used to calculate the clearance rate. The actual number of cases filed in a given year is likely higher because the law reports only report cases after they are decided; they do not necessarily list all of the new cases filed in a given year. For this reason, I calculate clearance rate only through 1987, when the information about new cases drops off. Omitted variable bias is obviously a third possible source of error when measuring a phenomenon as complex as judicial efficiency. Fortunately, clearance conveniently measures performance in relative terms from one year to the next, since it reflects a proportion. This further reduces the risks of such measurement errors. Finally, if certain types of cases in my sample take longer to resolve, on average, this would skew my findings. Indeed, practicing barristers as well as legal scholars warned me during my field research that land cases take notoriously long time periods to resolve. Contrary to this anecdotal evidence, the two types of cases in my sample are actually highly correlated. Ideally such a comparison should include several types of cases but the evidence is sufficiently robust here (Pearson’s $R > 0.9$) that we can proceed while doing very little harm to measurement accuracy when it comes to this particular concern.

---

23 Of the 2,656 Supreme Court cases decided between 1963 and 1997, one third involved land disputes (Alabi 2002).
24 For example, the clearance rate for 1960 is based on five cases that whose decisions were actually reported in 1966, 1968, and 1975. More land cases were almost certainly filed in 1960, but the only information available about 1960 is from the law reports, which announce when cases are decided.
clearance rate of less than one indicates that the court is creating backlog, while a rate greater than one means that the court is disposing of cases faster than it is receiving them. It might also indicate that fewer cases are being filed. Figure 5 charts the clearance variable over time, from 1960 through 1987.

![Clearance Rate Chart](chart.png)

**Figure 5: Clearance Rate, 1960 – 1987**

The clearance variable shows that the courts operated efficiently throughout the 1960s, where the average clearance rate was 1.16 (impressive perhaps for a new democracy). The 1970s were moderately inefficient, with an average clearance rate of 0.48 between 1970 and 1978. The next nine years had an average clearance rate of 0.36.

Since the clearance variable only includes data through 1987, I construct an alternative measure using a closely correlated measure of judicial performance. I construct this variable, alt-clear, using data on the number of Awaiting Trial Persons.
The first step in this process is to explain and illustrate ATP trends in Nigeria. ATPs, as the acronym implies, are imprisoned persons awaiting trial. More often than not, the police have not even charged them with a crime yet. Several factors can contribute to the ATP population including problems with granting bail or inadequate police resources for conducting investigations. Regardless, it is reasonable to infer that a high percentage of ATPs means an increase in court congestion. Senior prison official suggest this is the case. One commented, “There is no prison congestion – there is court congestion.”

Officers throughout the judicial system share this view; a Ford Foundation survey found that 71 percent of respondents blame high ATP rate on the courts (Ajomo and Okagbue 1991).

Where my present data set of land and companies cases can measure only from 1960 through the late 1980s, data for awaiting trial persons cover 1967 runs through 2003. There is a margin of error in the case clearance statistics due to coding, and the possibility of incomplete information in the various law reports used. The data on ATPs are more precise because they are based on actual prison population counts. The Bureau of Prisons began systematically tracking the number of ATPs in 1967.

Figure 6 reports the prison population figures on ATPs provided by the Bureau’s Annual Reports. Three qualifications about the calculations reported here are in order: First, the statistics begin by relying on prison population figures as reported by the Bureau. The Bureau later shifted to report prison admission statistics; this change is not visible here. Second, it includes the prisoners who are “detainees,” a classification
meaning they might not be charged at all. Such a consolidation of categories is justified since the detainee class amounts to no more than 1.5 percent of all admissions for any given available year. Third, the calculations also draw no distinction between ATPs, the technical legal term used by the Bureau, and prisoners reported as “unconvicted” in other Federal Government sources.

According to Figure 6, number of ATPs increased dramatically in 1975. Between 1967 and 1974, the average number of ATPs was only 21.6 percent. From 1975 to 1985 the average was 64.3 percent. Between 1987 and 1997, the figure dropped to 41.4 percent. The number of ATPs increased again in the last three years, reporting an average of 63 percent from 2000 to 2003. An internal review document prepared by the National Planning Commission in May 2004 attributed the increased prison congestion to the judicial system’s inefficiency (National Planning Commission 2004).

![Figure 6: Awaiting Trial Persons (ATPs) as Share of Inmates, 1967 – 2003](image-url)
The logic of my parallel measure, *alt-clear* rests on an assumption that ATPs and clearance rates should be inversely related. This is because the latter measures the efficiency the courts while ATPs captures inefficiency. It also assumes that criminal and civil cases are handled at similar rates. For example, an increase in the number of ATPs should correspond with a lower clearance rate. To test this intuition, I constructed a sample with the corresponding years available for both sets (1967 through 1987). The results of this test show that the statistical relationship between ATPs and the clearance rate is as expected. The Adjusted-$R^2$ is 0.299, the coefficient is negative as expected, and the test is statistically significant at the .01 level. The test results are summarized in Appendix 4. This relationship gives me sufficient confidence to construct *alt-clear* as an alternative measure of judicial performance by using ATPs to predict the clearance rate.

Creating *alt-clear* and extending it to all the years of my study poses two challenges: First, as explained above for the *clearance* variable, it is not possible to report a clearance rate for the years after 1987. I compensate for this by using the predicted values for 1988 and years 1994 to 1997. Next, for years 1989 to 1993 I use the case disposal rate of all cases that came before the Supreme Court as reported in Alabi (2002, 182). Since this reflects the actual total number of cases disposed and cases pending (rather than cases reported in law reports), it offers a good proxy for clearance. Finally, I report the clearance rate for 1999 as .45, for 2000 as .56, and for 2001 as .41. These figures are based on case disposal rates for two states from a study on judicial efficiency funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (National Center for State Courts 2003b; National Center for State Courts 2003a; National Center for State Courts 2003c). Estimates for 1996, 1998, and 2002 are based on the averages of the nearest
years. A second challenge is that figures are missing for 1986, 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2001. I resolve this by estimating ATPs for the missing years using the averages of the nearest years. The estimated clearance rate is illustrated in Figure 7 as the *clear-alt* variable.

![Alt-Clear](image-url)

**Figure 7: Clearance Rate, 1962 – 2002 (including estimated values)**

Courts in the early 1990s are disappointing but not quite as bad as the early 1980s. They subsequently improve but cases in the mid-1990s are still cleared at about half the rate that new ones are received. At the very least, this provides an empirical basis for what scholars have long maintained about the inefficiency of the courts.

**Public Policy and Fiscal Discipline**

My last measure of my government performance is fiscal discipline, which captures the ability of the government to restrain itself from spending in excess of revenue levels. Fiscal discipline is a useful measure of performance for three compelling reasons: First, it meets the narrow definition of a “pure” public good. It is neither
excludable non-rivalrous in consumption. Unlike education, it is a purely national-level indicator whose benefits are neither geographically targetable nor easily disaggregated.\textsuperscript{27} Second, budgetary discipline has important developmental consequences. It may contribute to low inflation or economic growth. But maintaining fiscal discipline presents a political challenge because such policies are often not in the immediate interests of incumbents (Bueno de Mesquita and Root 2000). Fiscal discipline thus poses a classic collective action problem because self-interested incumbents have little incentive to be fiscally responsible in their own spending proposals as long as other incumbents are doing so. This behavior can promote their own survival or serve their constituency but it also exacerbates budget deficits. Their policy preferences are individually rational but lead to the collectively irrational outcome of fiscal indiscipline.

A third reason for incorporating fiscal discipline is that a variety of political institutions have a demonstrable effect on fiscal discipline. North, for example, argues that institutions shape the margins at which political actors make macroeconomic choices. “The polity and the economy are inextricably linked.” Political institutions enforce property rights, and affect the transaction costs involved in macroeconomic and macroeconomic policies (North 1990).\textsuperscript{28} Where policy actors are modeled as “veto players,” Tsebelis argues for their causal impact on macroeconomic performance including inflation and deficits (Tsebelis 2002).

\textsuperscript{27} Arguably, no public good is “pure” because an interest group or a sector of the economy (or a class) might benefit while the nation as an aggregate whole suffers. Feng, for example, argues that even inflation is not a pure public good because high inflation benefits creditors and private interests who hold debt (Feng 2003).

\textsuperscript{28} For a contrary view, see Feng (2003). He finds that political instability impacts inflation. But neither regime type nor the government’s political capacity to extract revenue impacts macroeconomic outcomes (Feng 2003).
Studies of budget rules and processes generally operationalize discipline in terms of budget deficits (Alesina and Perotti 1996, 401-7). Nigerian economists also frequently use budget deficits to analyze fiscal discipline (Egwaikhide 1996; Ariyo 1996, 263-278). Consistent with these views, I operationalize fiscal discipline in terms of budget deficits. Figure 8 plots the variable *discipline* which shows budget deficits as a share of Gross Domestic Product.\(^{29}\)

![Figure 8: Budget Deficit/Surplus, 1961 – 2003](image)

The data show that the government ran surpluses in 1971-1974 and 1980, and comparatively small surpluses in the mid-1990s. In all other years the federal government ran deficits, although the deficits for 1961 to 1963, 1965 to 1967, and for 1997 were relatively small (amounting to less than 2 percent of GDP). The most

\(^{29}\) The Central Bank of Nigeria reports 1961 – 1964 in fiscal rather than calendar years. To calculate surplus, I convert fiscal years to calendar years using the following procedure: (previous FY \* .25) + (current FY \* 0.75). Similarly, the CBN only reports nine months for 1968 and nine months for 1969, so the figures I report for these years are estimates based on a twelve month calendar year.

CONCLUSION

This chapter began by describing public goods as a tool commonly used for measuring my dependent variable, government performance. I discussed some issues that arise when different types of variables are used to measure government performance, especially excludability. Then I identified measures of performance in education, judicial efficiency, and fiscal discipline. I claim that these measures capture a range of publicness based on the excludability of their consumption.

I then summarized four decades of performance for each of my variables. With my first measure of education performance, student/teacher ratios were lowest in the early 1960s. The early 1980s and the mid 1990s were the only other two periods where the ratio reached modest levels. The worst years occurred in the late 1970s, the late 1980s, and 1999-2000. The number of schools generally increases over time. But I illustrate a steep increase starting in the mid-1970s, a slump in the late 1980s, and the slight downturn after 1999.

I then measure the efficiency of education policy on teachers and schools. My model based on primary school teachers shows that the most efficient spending occurs in the 1960s generally, a brief period in the mid-1990s, and to some extent in the early 1980s. The most wasteful spending on education occurs in the late 1970s, and late 1980s into the early 1990s. Spending is also wasteful between 1999 and 2001. The model based on primary schools shows that schools in the early 1960s were slightly below the predicted number. The figure improves for the remainder of the decade. Levels are low
from 1971 to 1973 but from 1973 to 1977 the number is higher than expected. The 1980s are full of seemingly random ups and downs. 1994 to 1998 show notably higher than predicted number of schools and this situation is reversed in 1999.

Next, I summarized performance of my measures for policies that more closely resemble pure public goods. I find that the courts operated efficiently throughout the 1960s and the 1970s were moderately inefficient. I build an alternative measure of efficiency based on a highly correlated measure of judicial performance and other detailed studies to extend my data beyond 1987. These estimated values of performance show that courts in the early 1990s are disappointing but not quite as bad as the early 1980s. They improve subsequently but cases in the mid-1990s but are still quite low.


What might explain this variation in government performance? Regime type is one such explanation. If democracies perform better than dictatorships, the above variables merely need to be evaluated for each Nigerian regime to determine which type performed better. The next chapter tackles this question by testing and rejecting a hypothesis based on regime type. Even when controlling for influxes of oil revenues, there is little evidence that democracies perform better than dictatorships.
INTRODUCTION

On December 31, 1983, Brigadier Sani Abacha announced the overthrow of Nigeria’s Second Republic. Outlining the reasons for the coup on behalf of the new Federal Military Government, he said “Our economy has been hopelessly mismanaged,” leading to increased debts and high food prices. Abacha, who would stage his own coup ten years later, added that “Health services are in shambles” and “our educational system is deteriorating at an alarming rate.” The FMG dismissed President Shehu Shagari, dissolved the National Assembly, banned political parties, and sealed the borders. The authority of the courts and the police were largely left intact (or so it seemed at the time). The new Head of State, General Muhammadu Buhari, then promised the nation that he would save the nation from “imminent collapse” (Akinnola 2000). If democracy was to blame for four disappointing years, did the military have answers?

This chapter argues that regime type provides an inadequate explanation for variation in government performance. Nigeria experienced a variety of dictatorships and democracies since it gained independence in 1960 but there is no consistent correlation between regime type and government performance. Some authoritarian regimes
improved delivery of social services, while some democracies allowed them to decline. Nigeria’s record therefore seems to present a challenge to the literature arguing for a causal link between democracy and policy performance.

Regime type should affect policy performance because democracy increases political accountability. Open competition for political leadership implies that politicians formulate policies in response to the credible threat of replacement. Yet this is still no guarantee. Leaders concerned about a brief political life may formulate policies that improve their own chances at survival or they might be tempted to abuse their public office. Additionally, unless political self interest is somehow bound to the broader common good, policy benefits might follow a localized distributional logic rather than one that serves national or shared needs. This chapter formulates a hypothesis to test these intuitions. Using the variables described in the previous chapter, my statistical tests here reveal that democracy in Nigeria does not consistently improve the level of pork, the delivery of public goods, or policy efficiency.

This chapter is divided into five sections: First, a literature review describes how comparative studies explore the relationship between democracy and development. The early research focuses on democracy as an outcome. Later studies grapple with the coexistence of authoritarianism and capitalism in important cases, reframing the central research question in terms of the impact of regime type on development. I suggest that Nigeria provides a good test of these recent theories. Second, I formulate a hypothesis informed by the current literature to test the impact of regime type on government performance. I then classify each regime in my sample as either democratic or authoritarian, based on standard comparative definitions. In the third section I perform
three types of tests, predicting that democratic regimes yield more pork, more public goods, and spend money on pork more efficiently. Since statistical tests only illustrate overall correlations, in the fourth section I take the additional step of elaborating on each regime’s performance record. This involves an extensive qualitative analysis. The fifth section discusses relevant implications. While the test results seem to suggest that democracy fails to consistently offer a meaningful advantage, I point to a less normatively disturbing interpretation: regime type fails to capture the relevant variation in policy making processes. Subsequent chapters examine a different dimension of political institutions, which transcends the blunt dichotomy tested here.

**DICTATORS, DEMOCRATS, AND DEVELOPMENT**

The withdrawal of colonial powers in the 1950’s generated hope that independence would fuel political development and economic self-sufficiency in Africa. In most places democratization accompanied decolonization thus binding political changes to the profound economic transformation underway. Offers of assistance from the developed world promised to ease the transition and popular support for new democratic regimes inspired boundless optimism. The coups and corruption that later followed prompted many to wonder: Does democracy deliver?

In this section I summarize how our understanding of the relationship between regimes and government performance has emerged since then. As it turns out, Africans were not alone in their disillusionment. I begin by reviewing variations of modernization theory, which links economic and government performance to political development. Next, I state the basic rationale for superior democratic performance and describe why some authoritarian regimes seem to perform well. I then examine how empirical puzzles
from Asia and Latin America inspired scholars to re-think the causal relationship and ask whether regime type really does drive developmental outcomes. Recent research offers hope for democracy’s defenders in this regard and guides us to our central predictions. I conclude by describing research that explores the impact of regimes on the measures of performance I utilize throughout this study. I also briefly describe why Nigeria offers a good test of these studies.

**Modernization Theory and its Critics**

In early modernization theory, we find the first systematic attempt to account for the persistent coincidence of development and democracy throughout the world. It experiments with objective measures of performance such as transportation and communication infrastructure. The casual relationship between development and politics is ultimately unclear, but these studies nevertheless conclude that socioeconomic factors largely explain political outcomes (Lipset 1959; Deutsch 1961, 493-514). Later modernization theory argues that expanding political participation often interferes with economic development. These scholars imply that slower political transitions allow for the gradual institutionalization of democratic institutions, which are otherwise vulnerable to anti-Western policies. Holding down democracy thus serves the dual goals of capitalist economic development and the suppression of communist ambitions (Huntington 1968). These research projects therefore tend to focus on political stability.

The challenges to modernization theory take several forms. Rustow points out an obvious weakness of modernization theory. In a seminal essay, he argues that the theory uncovers a significant correlation between development and democracy but fails to establish causality. He also claims that the features of a stable democracy may be
different from the factors that bring about democracy about in the first place (Rustow 1970, 337-63). There are no socioeconomic preconditions as Deutsch and others claim; there are many roads to democracy. The emergence of democracies in poor countries during the “Third Wave” of democratization thus refutes a key presumption of modernization theory. This transformation in the 1980s and 1990s revealed that other factors explain the democratic deficit in the developing world (Huntington 1991; Wood 2000). While wealthy democracies are more likely to consolidate and survive, dictatorships can die at any level of development (Przeworski, Alvarez and others 2000).

**Electoral Accountability and Democratic Expectations**

Democracy supposedly offers advantages by rooting public policies in political accountability. Political contestation and repeated elections generate a credible threat of replacement. In this way, democracies create equilibrium between the politicians who supply good governance and citizens who demand it. This self-enforcing bargain binds the short term interests of politicians to the long term process of economic development (North and Weingast 1989; Weingast 1997, 245-63). This bargain also provides efficient protection of property rights. An independent judiciary protects individuals from state encroachment. The courts serve as an engine for economic development by arbitrating property rights disputes and enforcing contracts. By generating public accountability, democracies impose checks on policy makers. This reduces the likelihood of rent extraction or property expropriation (Lake and Baum 2001, 587-621). Under authoritarianism, the absence of an institutionalized, recurring method of leadership

---

30 For examples of Rustow’s revival, see L. Anderson’s book on democratization (Anderson 1999), M. Anderson’s study of Weimar Germany (Anderson 2000), or Lindberg’s *Democracy and Elections in Africa* (Lindberg 2006).
selection contributes to uncertainty about the future. Without a credible threat of replacement politicians have fewer incentives to provide public goods and to resist “temptations for political opportunistic behavior that is economically damaging” (Alence 2004, 163-87).

Several circumstances conduce to good performance in non-democratic regimes. To start, stable dictators do encounter incentives to invest in productive policies because they plan with a longer political time horizon. As Olson explains it, they may behave as “stationary” rather “roving” bandits, protecting property rights and enforcing contracts (Olson 1993, 567-77; Clague, Keefer and others 1997, 67-90). Such regimes often do invest in policies that contribute to human capital (Glaeser et al. 2004, 271-303). This reasoning implies that Lipset and the modernization theorists have it right by claiming that good policies lead to good government institutions. Other dictators may choose to invest in productive policies because asset specificity endows them with rents and relatively reliable government revenue streams (Boix 2003).

Research on the impact of regime type on government performance falls into at least three categories: The first category includes studies from Asia and Latin America which find that dictatorship has a positive impact on performance. In South America, scholars point to countries where authoritarian experiments facilitated high growth rates. When democracies in Argentina and Brazil struggled with economic hardships in the 1960’s, O’Donnell argues these late developing nations opted for “bureaucratic authoritarianism” (O'Donnell 1973). Economic growth in these countries requires economic reform; bureaucratic authoritarianism offers insulation from populist impulses
and policies that contribute to irresponsible levels of consumption. Various studies apply the model to other Latin American countries (Collier 1979) and to parts of Europe (Herz 1982).

In Asia, numerous countries adopted components of free market capitalism without democracy. China has achieved tremendous economic growth with limited political liberalization. Countries such as South Korea and Taiwan supposedly use corporatist arrangements (Wade 1992) and “soft authoritarianism” to achieve high growth with limited participation (Johnson 1987, 136-164). Such “intermediate” authoritarian regimes apparently set spending priorities very similar to democracies when confronted with increased global economic competition (Rudra and Haggard 2005, 1015-49).

A second category of research is more agnostic. Regime type in Africa, for example, explains neither patterns of economic performance nor levels of corruption (Olivier de Sardan 1999, 25-52). Cross-national studies of Latin America find little relation between regime type and economic performance (Remmer 1989) but meaningful distinctions when the models include health and education (Sloan and Tedin 1987, 98-124). Przeworski, Alvarez et al. provide one of the most important examinations of these issues. They measure the impact of democracy on development by isolating the effects of regime type from the conditions under which the regime exists. By treating wealth as an exogenous variable, they conclude that dictatorship offers no advantage over democracy in terms of economic growth. They further suggest that poor development stems from the poverty of the state, not the type of regime (Przeworski,

31 For a contrary view, see Dix (1982) who argues that the case for authoritarian survival is overstated and the success of bureaucratic authoritarianism has been exaggerated (Dix 1982, 554-73).
Alvarez and others 2000). Other recent studies, covering more years and more countries, share their conclusion that regime type matters little when performance is measured in terms of economic growth (Feng 2003; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2001, 57-72; Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2003, 1031-67). In Africa in particular, the Third Wave of democracy had a surprisingly ambiguous impact on budget deficits, inflation, and other macroeconomic measures of performance (van de Walle 2001).

Democracy’s most ardent defenders argue that its record of performance empirically justifies the normative demands for it. This third category of research attempts to look beyond the macroeconomic picture to argue for both direct and indirect positive effects of democracy. The evidence for direct effects includes studies of Latin America which suggests that democracy impacts policy inputs and budget priorities (Ames 1987; Looney and Frederiksen 1987, 34-46). Democracy improves performance in terms of the absolute level of resources devoted to social services generally (Brown and Hunter 1999, 779-90; Brown and Hunter 2004, 842-64). Much the same is true in Africa, where democracy increases education spending, (Stasavage 2005, 343-58) and expands access to education generally (Stasavage 2005, 53-73). When performance is measured in terms of welfare spending, democracy improves governance even in the contrarian East Asian cases (Chan 1997, 227-243). All across the world, democratic and authoritarian regimes may spend on pension and welfare at similar overall levels. But welfare spending carries different effects in democracies because the incentives generated by the open competition for leadership improve performance (Mulligan et al. 2004, 51-74).
Democracy also appears to have meaningful indirect effects. These analyses suggest that measuring the impact of democracy on growth requires examination of social policies as intermediate variables. Democracies promote human capital formation through investments in health care and education, which contribute to economic growth as the labor force becomes healthier and more productive (Schultz 1999, 67-88). Democracy’s accountability constraints create incentives for governments to adopt policies conducive to growth, as well as procedures that increase the risks of rent seeking (Lake and Baum 2001, 587-621). Democracies therefore have higher levels of investment in human capital due to the lower costs of exit and participation (Baum and Lake 2003, 333-47; Feng 2003). This is true even for poor countries, where democracy’s electoral pressures and the environment emphasizing individual rights stimulate a minimum level of political expectations for social services. The earlier studies of modernization suggest that illiberal governance might help insulate policy makers from public demands. Now the empirical research generally points to the positive effects of such demands since human capital formation requires investments in social services (Brown 1999, 681-707).

Nigeria offers a good case study for the impact of regime type. As Chapter 1 shows, the government performance record reveals tremendous variation. The literature outlined here provides compelling evidence that regime type should account for this variation, especially if we incorporate variables which measure social services and aggregate indicators. Democracy reigned for 15 of Nigeria’s 42 post-independence years in my sample, providing a good test for the impact of regime on performance. The next sectionformulates a hypothesis to test the impact of regime type on performance,
controlling for the impact of oil revenues and shifting spending priorities. I then code Nigeria’s regimes since independence.

**REGIME TYPE AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE**

While the world displays a range of regimes now labeled “illiberal” democracies, “hybrid regimes,” or “electoral authoritarian” regimes, this chapter focuses on a simple dichotomy between democracy and dictatorship. In the first part of this section I formulate a hypothesis to test whether Nigeria’s democratic regimes consistently yield superior government performance. This formulation generates predictions relating to the level of pork, the efficiency of spending on pork, and the delivery of public goods. In the second part, I establish operational definitions of democracy and authoritarianism. In the third part I classify each of Nigeria’s regimes since independence using these definitions, identifying five authoritarian and three democratic regimes over four decades.

**The Regime Type Hypothesis**

I have discussed numerous studies which claim that democracies perform better in a variety of ways. One claim centers on the benefits that democracy provides in terms of services. This is true, for example, when measured in terms of policy output levels (Sloan and Tedin 1987) (Stasavage 2005, 343-58). Another empirical claim emphasizes incentives that democracy creates to invest in human capital formation (Baum and Lake 2003)(Brown and Hunter 2004, 842-64). By forcing politicians to consider the future consequences of their behavior, democracy therefore increases the chances of delivering public goods (Lake and Baum 2001, 587-621). The other tuitions derived from the literature suggest that democracies perform more efficiently than dictatorships.
Democracy increases the risks of rent seeking behavior by generating a credible threat of replacement (Lake and Baum 2001, 587-621; Alence 2004, 163-87).

My hypothesis, which states that democratic regimes perform better than dictatorships, captures all of these claims. However the three different intuitions described above require three different tests: First, they need to address the overall “level” of pork. Second, tests should determine if the type of regime influences the likelihood of delivering public goods, and hence the type of policy. Third, a good test of the hypothesis should also see how regimes impact wastefulness in pork spending. Democracy should reduce opportunities for corruption. Using the operationalizations of government performance from Chapter 1, I expect my three tests to offer only limited support for the regime type hypothesis. This means we will not observe significant improvement in the number of primary schools or the primary student/teacher ratios during democracies. I further anticipate that we will not necessarily observe better provision of public goods in the form of court performance and better fiscal discipline. Finally, I predict that democracy will not improve policy efficiency.

**What’s in a Regime?**

Regime refers to the fundamental distinction between different sets of rules which allocate power. Dahl offers one of the most commonly used definitions based on his ideal type democracy, “polyarchy” as a political system with “contestation and participation” (Dahl 1971). Przeworski, Alvarez et al. define democracy as “a regime in which government offices are filled by contested elections” (p. 19). This necessarily incorporates specific understandings of regime, contestation and government. A regime is “a system of rules and practices that determine who has political rights, how they can
be exercised, and with what effects for the control of the state” (Przeworski et al. 2000, p. 18). This definition allows for one dictator to succeed another without inaugurating a new regime. Governments are groups of individuals who exercise power within the boundaries prescribed by the regime’s constitutive rules.\textsuperscript{32} Such rules are not merely new policies or portfolios. They are the rules that determine how state power is exercised and the limits on it. These rules are described in constitutions or inaugural military decrees that explicitly nullify the previous regime.

In a widely-cited reference, Linz defines authoritarian regimes as: “Political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones” (Greenstein and Polsby 1975). I define an authoritarian regime as one in which either the chief executive or the law making body is not chosen through contested elections. Alternation of power is therefore neither institutionalized nor recurring.

Democracies must satisfy two criteria: First, high political offices including the legislature must be chosen through contested elections in which political competition guarantees the uncertainty of the winner. Contestation in this sense therefore requires extensive political and civil rights. Second, the rule of law both protects the rights of citizens and imposes limits on the exercise of state power.

\textsuperscript{32} This distinction between regime, state and government is standard in comparative politics texts (Almond, Powell and others 2005; O’Neil 2003).
These definitions of authoritarianism and democracy encounter three practical complications. First, much of the democratization literature focuses on consolidated democracies. Huntington says consolidation occurs only after two electoral turnovers, meaning “the group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners.” Those winners then in turn do the same in another subsequent election (Huntington 1991). This approach does risk creating an “electoral fallacy,” whereby elections ritually legitimate governments but say little about political rights and other liberal dimensions of democracy (Karl 1990, 1-21; Diamond 1996, 20-37). Nevertheless, many comparative scholars defend the basic dichotomy between democracy and authoritarianism (Brown and Hunter 1999, 779-90). Lindberg in a recent book claims that elected governments are fundamentally different, even if the elections that bring them to power are flawed (Lindberg 2006). Nigerian scholars also accept dichotomous classifications of regimes. Dictatorship is, in the words of constitutional scholar Ben Nwabueze, “a government not limited by law” (Osaghae 1998, pp. 163-64).

Acknowledging that consolidation is a process rather than an endpoint, and that democracy involves more than elections, I think my coding of Nigeria’s regimes utilizes widely accepted standards. The results of my coding of the First and Second Republics is identical to the coding used by Przeworski et al. and Boix in their prominent cross-national studies which test variations of the regime type hypothesis (Przeworski, Alvarez and others 2000; Boix 2003). My treatment of regimes also closely mirrors the classifications used by Freedom House and the Polity IV dataset published by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Even with ongoing human
rights problems and electoral corruption in the Fourth Republic, Polity IV assigns Nigeria a value which dichotomous studies of regime type consistently code as democracy (see Brown and Hunter 1999). Thus my coding is consistent with studies that take into consideration the imperfections of new democracies and then convert a scale into a dichotomous treatment.

The second complication with my definitions arises from the frequency of interim governments. How should they be classified? My default solution is to group them with the authoritarian government that created them. Such governments may be set up with the purpose of failing (in order to justify further authoritarian rule) or they might merely be puppets for the government that created them. There is no simple way to code such distinctions. But clearly if such a government extends its life significantly longer than its initially designated tenure, it earns its authoritarian label. More to the point, interim governments by definition are meant to provide temporary leadership that facilitates a carefully defined political transition, not to initiate broad new policies. At best they are meant to continue implementation of existing policies.

Grouping interim governments would probably not be necessary with more discrete measures of my dependent variable, along monthly or perhaps quarterly lines. But even then it would not be reasonable to expect a government in power for only two or three months to formulate and implement policies that affect my measures of performance. This problem points to the second complication presented by my definitions: some regimes live very short lives and my dependent variable only captures annual data. I address this issue by grouping regimes that last less than a year with their successor regime. This is not an ideal solution since it risks mixing short-lived but very
different regimes, but it is the most straightforward one. My decision to combine this blunt dichotomy with extensive qualitative analysis after my tests is intended to capture some of this discrete variation which might otherwise be lost. An alternative solution to these two problems would be to exclude “short-lived” or interim governments. But offering narrowly defined exceptions allows me to conduct an analysis that includes all regimes (and all governments) for all years in my sample. Applying these definitions, I identify three democratic and five authoritarian regimes in Nigeria since 1960. The exceptions apply in only a few, clearly identified instances.

**Nigeria’s Regimes since Independence**

The first democratic regime I identify is known as the “First Republic,” covering the early years of independence from 1960 through 1965. This regime includes two governments under Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. The second democracy is a presidential system in the Second Republic under President Shehu Shagari from 1979 to 1983. The third case covers the first term of President Olusegun Obasanjo from May 1999 to May 2003. Each of these three regimes operated under a different constitution, so they were more than just different governments. The five authoritarian regimes consist of: (1) the governments of Generals Aguiyi-Ironsi and Yakubu Gowon from 1966 to 1975; (2) the governments of Generals Murtala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo; (3) General Muhammadu Buhari from 1983 to 1985; (4) Ibrahim Babangida, from 1985 to 1993; and (5) General Sani Abacha, from 1993 until 1998. Each of these regimes is discussed in detail below.
Case #1: The First Republic

Prime Minister Balewa’s government came to power through federal elections held in 1959. This government took office upon Britain’s exit in 1960, amidst much fanfare. Although the government had a nominal president in Nnamdi Azikiwe, it was a parliamentary government in all other respects: the cabinet and the prime minister depended on the confidence of the National Assembly for their collective survival. At this time the country’s regional governments enjoyed substantial autonomy; they also maintained a high level of financial self-sufficiency. Balewa led a coalition to victory again in a highly contested election in December 1964. This first case covers just over five years, from October 1960 to January 1966.

Case #2: Ironsi and Gowon

Major Kaduna Nzeogwu’s coup d’etat in January 1966 killed Prime Minister Balewa and the premiers of two of the country’s four regions. Though successful in Kaduna and Ibadan, two critical political centers, it failed in Lagos where General Aguiyi Ironsi stamped out the revolutionaries. Ironsi orchestrated an “invitation to govern” from the President of the Senate and cut a deal with Nzeogwu whom he promptly betrayed and threw in prison (Akinnola 2000; Ademoyega 1981). Ironsi launched a major ethnic re-composition of the federal government and in May of that year, he abolished federalism in the country. Even though Ironsi’s regime possesses its own distinct set of rules, I treat it as one continuous regime based on the coding criteria established above. Ironsi was overthrown and killed only six months after taking power and only six weeks after abolishing federalism, depriving him of much opportunity to reshape the policy making

process, much less formulate policies. General Yakubu Gowon led a successful counter-coup to the Ironsi government in July 1966. Gowon restored federalism and created new states. He also had the unfortunate burden of seeing the country through the brutal civil war of secession fought by Igbo's from the eastern region. This second case therefore covers just over nine years, from January 1966 up to July 1975.

Case #3: Generals Mohammed and Obasanjo

Gowon adopted the now famous post-war policy of “no victors, no vanquished” pledging to re-integrate Igbo's back into the government and turn over the reigns of government to a civilian regime (Oyediran 1979). When he backed away from the promised transition and Igbo's in the military became frustrated with the pace of re-integration, Colonel Joseph Garba and several officers staged a coup in 1975.34 They then handed the government over to Murtala Mohammed, who himself was assassinated barely six months later, in February 1976. His successor, General Olsegun Obasanjo made clear that he would stay the course set out by Mohammed. As a leading military expert puts it, “the 1976 putsch altered neither the insiders’ preeminent status nor the direction of overall policy” (Othman 1989). More importantly, Obasanjo did not nullify the constituting rules of the Mohammed regime and kept its underlying institutional framework intact, including the timetable for the transition to democracy.35 The third case therefore treats the Mohammed and Obasanjo governments as part of a single authoritarian regime.

34 The significance of the Igbo grievances in the 1975 coup did not become clear until 1990; the usual story had previously focused on Gowon’s reversal of his commitment to the transition (see Akinnola, pages 38-40).

Case #4: The Second Republic

Nigeria’s second attempt at democracy began with an elaborate constitutional drafting process and a round of federal elections. In October 1979, General Obasanjo stepped aside and a new democratic regime took office. The Second Republic operated under a completely new presidential system of government. President Shehu Shagari was re-elected in highly contested elections in August 1983. Civil violence trailed the election result and the generals struck again, barely four months later. Thus this fourth case incorporates both of Shagari’s governments but only one democratic regime, coded as four years.

Case #5: Buhari

Mohammadu Buhari’s overthrew President Shagari’s government on December 31, 1983 and dissolved the parties and institutions of the Second Republic. Although he nominally claimed to maintain the federal structure of the country, Buhari’s first decree gave the Federal Military Government nearly unlimited legislative powers and specifically proscribed state legislatures from acting upon policy matters within the purview of the federal government. He also made clear that the executive powers of the governors could be revoked at any time (Akande 1985, 1-26). Buhari’s obsession with “indiscipline” weakened civil liberties and judicial independence, and he had few pretenses about institutionalizing any succession mechanism. He prioritized radical economic reform and establishing domestic security. His government, my fifth case, covers slightly less than two years.
Case #6: Babangida/Shonekan transition

Ibrahim Babangida staged a palace coup on August 27, 1985 and his eight year reign of power constitutes my sixth case. Much of the public, tired of Buhari’s “War on Indiscipline,” welcomed the new regime which immediately tried to convey its receptiveness toward political liberalism. Babangida’s government embarked on ambitious social projects such as the formation of state mobilization agencies and political experiments supposedly designed to increase public involvement in politics. He created two political parties by fiat and permitted the election of a national legislature in 1992. Babangida’s approach to governance persuaded many elites that his regime represented “guided democracy.” At the time, the former governor of Kano State defined democracy as “a political system which respects the rule of law and freedom of choice,” suggesting that Babangida’s regime is neither democratic nor authoritarian.36 In 1993 Babangida annulled the results of the 1993 presidential election that would have chosen his successor. He then aborted the transition plan underway and announced a new one.

Babangida finally “stepped aside” on August 27, 1993 after two months of unprecedented domestic and international pressure following the June 12 election annulment. Ernest Shonekan took over as the head of a new Interim National Government, which he called “a child of circumstance…conceived in crisis and born in crisis.” I incorporate the ING as part of my sixth case because it lasted less than three months and it failed to lead to a democratic transition.

36 “This is No Democracy,” The Nigerian Economist, January 22, 1993, p. 28.
Case #7: Abacha and the ING

Sani Abacha began his tenure with praise from the victims of the June 12 annulment, who lent him support believing that he would honor the election results. In a populist move to further legitimate the regime, he abandoned economic liberalization. He empowered a corruption commission which uncovered over $12 billion USD that had disappeared between 1988 and June 1994 (Osaghae 1998, pp. 273-279). However he also responded to rising economic frustration with repression. Most infamously, he executed the “Ogoni Nine,” a group of minority rights activists of international renown. By June of 1994, tensions with unions and pro-democracy organizations increased and the government began distancing itself from political transition plans (Edozie 2002). Abacha mentioned the possibility of “self-succession” in a January 1996 interview, infuriating Nigerian civil society who took it as a signal that he had abandoned any democratic pretenses. As one prominent human rights organization phrased it: “The Umpire Seeks to be the Winner.” Abacha died under mysterious circumstances on June 8, 1998 and another interim government took over, this one headed by Abdulsalami Abubakar.

Abubakar’s interim government attempted to distinguish itself from Abacha’s regime. He freed prominent dissidents, set a timetable for elections and significantly, and he stuck to the transition plan. By the end of the year Nigerian citizens elected a new National Assembly and former head of state Obasanjo, recently freed from prison, began campaigning for the presidency. Abubakar’s government was the only interim government to actually relinquish power to an incoming democratic administration.

---

Historians still debate his reasons for doing so. One seasoned politician says Abubakar considered himself “president by accident,” because he sought to relinquish power as quickly as possible, perhaps because Nigerians (as well as the international community) were “tired of transitions.”

The transition this time was successful.

**Case #8: The Fourth Republic**

The last case is composed of President Obasanjo’s first term, which officially begins May 1999 and ends in May 2003. The Fourth Republic inherited constitution promulgated by the ING under Abubakar but it quickly set out to distinguish itself. For the first time since 1983, Nigerians had independently elected governors and legislators along with a new chief executive.

Based on all of this above information, I create a dummy variable coding Nigeria’s eight regimes as either 1 for democracy or 0 for dictatorship. By treating each year as a separate value for the *regime* variable, the descriptive statistics show 28 years of dictatorship and 15 years of democracy. The next section uses this variable to test my regime type hypothesis.

**TESTING REGIME TYPES: DOES DEMOCRACY DELIVER?**

In this section I test my hypothesis with three kinds of statistical tests: First, I examine whether democratic regimes increase the level of pork, measured in terms of schools and student/teacher ratios. Second, I test to see if democracies deliver more public goods, measured in terms of efficient courts and low budget deficits. Third, I test for the impact of regime type on how governments spend money on pork using variables that capture policy inefficiency and wastefulness. For all three tests, I use a variable to

---

38 The source is a former Senate President, Abuja, May 29, 2004.
control for oil revenue as a share of federal spending. Oil booms and busts occurred under both democracy and dictatorship, and it is possible that lower levels of revenue lead to less pork and fewer public goods. The results of the tests are mixed: Democracies deliver more teachers but not more schools. They do not appear to deliver more public goods in the form of judicial efficiency or fiscal discipline, although these models are poor fits. My final set of tests show that education spending on teachers during democracy appears to be less wasteful than spending on school construction.

Delivering Pork

Does regime type impact the delivery level of pork? There are good reasons to argue that democracy should yield higher overall levels of pork. Elected politicians see advantages of responding to popular demands for policies such as increased access to education. Whether it is a direct effect by building schools or a long-term indirect effect as this investment eventually creates a more educated workforce, such policies serve the self-interest of politicians (Schultz 1999, 67-88; Stasavage 2005, 53-73). Skeptics counter that dictators sometimes do increase provision of education (Glaeser et al. 2004, 271-303). Cases from Latin America support this claim, especially if dictators aim to preserve policy influence over the long term (Ames 1987).

Before testing which of these schools stands on firmer ground, I introduce an additional control for budget priorities. Some studies claim that democracy improves government performance in terms of policy inputs or budget priorities (Ames 1987; Looney and Frederiksen 1987, 34-46). This control is therefore important because a shift in spending priorities could account for changes in the level of pork delivery. Where \( ed.budgt \) expresses education as a share of the federal budget, this model is expressed as:
Equation 5: \( 	ext{Pri.s.t}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{regime}) + \beta_2(\text{ed.budgt}) + \beta_3(\Delta\text{oil}) + \epsilon \)

Table 2: Primary Student/Teacher Ratio, 1961 – 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pri.s.t.</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regime</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.497***</td>
<td>-2.501*</td>
<td>-1.873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Democracy=1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.074)</td>
<td>(1.907)</td>
<td>(1.424)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ed.budgt</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>.660***</td>
<td>.730***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed. as % Budget</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.038)</td>
<td>(3.175)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>\Delta Oil</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.838</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Revenue Share</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.518)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adj-R²</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.174</td>
<td>.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DW</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>.674</td>
<td>.994</td>
<td>1.095</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute value of \( t \)-statistic in parentheses
*significant at the .1 level; **significant at the .05 level
***significant at the .01 level

The negative coefficients on \( \text{regime} \) displayed in Table 2 suggest that democracy does improve the primary school student/teacher ratio but the Adjusted \( R^2 \) is extremely low without our controls. The model captures more variation and becomes statistically significant once we incorporate spending priorities, and this variable captures most of the variation. Oil revenues do not have a statistically significant effect. The Durbin-Watson statistic also suggests some autocorrelation in the error terms.

Our other test for the “level of pork” uses the change from year to year in the number of schools that democratic regimes build with a lead time of one year. Here I introduce change in gross primary enrollment as a control variable, since growing enrollments could impact the pace of school construction. This model is written as:
Equation 6: $\Delta Pri. Sch_{t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{regime}_t) + \beta_2(\Delta pri. enroll_t) + \beta_3(\text{Ed. budgt}_t) + \beta_4(\Delta oil_t)$

+ $\varepsilon_t$

Table 3: Change in Number of Primary Schools, 1962 – 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\Delta Pri. sch_{t+1}$</th>
<th>Number of Primary Schools (de-trended)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (Democracy=1)</td>
<td>-1026.796</td>
<td>-1094.798*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.529)</td>
<td>(1.706)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta Pri. enroll$</td>
<td>.001**</td>
<td>.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment</td>
<td>(2.164)</td>
<td>(1.640)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Ed. budgt$</td>
<td></td>
<td>337.913***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed. as % Budget</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.562)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta oil$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Revenue Share</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj-R$^2$</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>.892</td>
<td>1.064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute value of $t$-statistic in parentheses
*significant at the .1 level; **significant at the .05 level
***significant at the .01 level

The negative coefficients on regime in Table 3 indicate that democracies actually build fewer schools. This finding is statistically significant but only after introducing our controls. As we add these controls the Durbin-Watson statistic improves, showing little sign of autocorrelation in the full model. Budget priorities are again important and significant, while oil revenues as a share of the federal budget are not. $\Delta Pri. enroll$ shows that increases in gross enrolments do positively impact primary school construction. Our first test for the impact of regime on the “level of pork” lends some support to democracy’s defenders. Here however, the results suggest much the opposite.

**Providing Public Goods**

Our second set of tests considers the impact of regime type on public goods, rather than pork. If dictators have few reasons to support policies beyond their
immediate self-interest, then we would expect them to deliver fewer public goods. With a high cost of exit and without a credible threat of replacement, they face few incentives to advocate such policies (Alence 2004, 163-87; Baum and Lake 2003, 333-47). By using a measure of public goods in addition to the measures of pork, these tests allow us to determine whether the type of regime impacts the type of policy. Aside from civil rights, regime type may have little impact the type of policies (Mulligan et al. 2004, 51-74). The model for these tests is represented here as:

\[ \hat{Y} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ (regime) } + \beta_2 \text{ (Δoil) } + \varepsilon \]

Table 4: Judicial Efficiency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime (Democracy=1)</td>
<td>(1) - .068 (.336)</td>
<td>(2) - .091 (.419)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \text{Oil} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Revenue Share</td>
<td>.690 (.651)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \hat{N} )</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj-R(^2)</td>
<td>-.034</td>
<td>-.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>1.154</td>
<td>1.094</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute value of \( t \)-statistic in parentheses
*significant at the .1 level; **significant at the .05 level
***significant at the .01 level

The columns on the left in Table 4 predict clearance, my dependent variable based on the observed clearance rates from my case sample through 1987. The columns on the right show predictions for alt-clear, the variable that incorporates estimated clearance rate values for 1988 – 2002. Neither democracy nor oil revenues has a
significant effect on judicial efficiency, although the models are generally a poor fit. The Durbin-Watson statistics show some evidence of autocorrelation.

Table 5: Fiscal Discipline, 1961 – 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Discipline 1961 – 2003</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (Democracy=1)</td>
<td>.664 (.351)</td>
<td>1.325 (.676)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔOil Oil Revenue Share</td>
<td>24.882** (2.360)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj-R²</td>
<td>-.021 (.083)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>1.266</td>
<td>1.404</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses
*significant at the .1 level;
**significant at the .05 level
***significant at the .01 level

Table 5 displays the results of tests considering the impact of regime type on fiscal discipline. The Durbin-Watson statistic in the full model suggests no autocorrelation concerns. Our control for oil as a share of federal revenue actually predicts fiscal discipline better than regime type. But the model on the whole is not very significant and the Adjusted R² is very low, meaning that the model is a very poor fit.

**Pork Spending and Policy Efficiency**

The third test of the regime type hypothesis predicts that democracies spend money on pork more efficiently than authoritarian regimes. This understanding of efficiency implies that naira-for-naira less money is lost to rents, corruption, or bureaucratic waste. Lake and Baum and others expect better performance from democratic regimes because electoral accountability increases the risk of rent seeking behavior by politicians. Rose-Ackerman’s widely-cited corruption study argues that this
is not necessarily the case; accountability fails in democracy for a variety of reasons (Rose-Ackerman 1999). In the bureaucratic authoritarian model, dictatorship is supposedly conducive to development because technocrats can make policy without worrying about popular pressures (O'Donnell 1979, ). Authoritarians in these cases claim that democracy produces popular but inefficient policies. One study of Nigeria similarly concludes “the military has performed more efficiently than the party system with respect to economic development” (Odetola 1978, 109).

To test whether elected politicians have fewer opportunities to engage in rent seeking or corrupt behavior, I formulate a test to capture policy inefficiencies. My understanding of efficiency outlined in Chapter 1 implies that naira-for-naira less money is lost to rents, corruption, or waste. In that chapter, I operationalize inefficiency with variables that express the residuals produced by a model that compares the predicted to the observed levels of output. Teachers1 expresses the residual from my model where federal education spending predicts the student/teacher ratio. Schools1 similarly measures the efficiency of spending on school infrastructure as a residual.

For Teachers1, negative residuals indicate that naira-for-naira the student/teacher ratio is lower, and therefore “better” than predicted, given spending levels. For Schools1, negative residuals signal much the opposite – that fewer schools were constructed than predicted. Since I expect to find little support for democracy in these tests, I predict we

---

39 Voters in democracies also routinely opt to not punish elected leaders for poor economic performance. This may also suggest that accountability requires more than merely elections (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999, 222-249).

40 The reader should recall that the models generating both of those variables incorporate a variable for education as a proportion of overall federal spending. This provides a control for the priority given education spending in the federal budget, and proxies for the varying degree of the federal government’s involvement in providing education.
will observe no significant relationship between democracy and my policy efficiency variables. As in the other tests of the hypothesis, I control for the impact of oil revenues with $\Delta oil$. The model can be stated as:

Equation 8: $\hat{u} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (\text{regime}) + \beta_2 (\Delta oil) + \epsilon$

Table 6: Policy Efficiency of Pork Spending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime (Democracy=1)</td>
<td>(1) -1.910 (1.592)</td>
<td>(1) -1333.520** (2.604)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) -1.749 (1.419)</td>
<td>(2) -1269.797** (2.426)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta oil$</td>
<td>4.284 (.660)</td>
<td>1896.256 (.704)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Revenue Share</td>
<td>N 41</td>
<td>N 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj-R²</td>
<td>.037 .023 .129 .117</td>
<td>.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>1.038 1.011 1.615 1.611</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses
*significant at the .1 level; **significant at the .05 level
***significant at the .01 level

Before interpreting the results in Table 6, it bears repeating that the values do not necessarily indicate higher levels of delivery, better “quality” of services, or improved access. Instead, the values estimate whether the policy output was higher or lower than predicted. The tests for Teachers1 suggest that neither regime type nor oil revenues tell us much about the efficiency of spending on teachers. There is some of autocorrelation and the low Adjusted-R² means that the model fits poorly. The results for Schools1 are quite different. They indicate that democracies waste more money building schools than dictatorships. The model with controls only explains about 12 percent of the variation, but it is significant at the .05-level and the Durbin-Watson statistic shows no autocorrelation. Oil is not significant in any of the tests. While these results cannot be
considered definitive, especially given in the absence of additional controls, they do suggest that Nigeria’s democracies have not improved accountability. In fact, when it comes to school construction, they appear to have been more wasteful than their military counterparts.

**Summary**

The first results, from the “level of pork” tests, do not tell us much about the impact of democracy on the supply of teachers. But the impact on primary school construction is a good deal clearer. These tests show that democracies actually build fewer schools than authoritarian regimes. This provides some fodder for those who claim that authoritarian regimes do sometimes face incentives to provide pork; it also prompts us to explore ways to distinguish among those non-democratic regimes. The second set of tests suggests that democracy has little impact on fiscal discipline, as van de Walle (2001) suggests has been the pattern in Africa. Democracies do not seem to promote judicial efficiency, although the results from the sample of court cases must be interpreted cautiously. Finally, the third set of tests suggests that democracy does not necessarily reduce corruption, much as Rose-Ackerman (1999) and others claim. In fact when it comes to school construction, Nigeria’s democracies have almost certainly been more wasteful than their undemocratic counterparts.

**REVISITING NIGERIA’S REGIMES: WHICH ONES DELIVERED?**

Since my statistical tests only tell us about correlations between regimes and policy results generally, in this section I extend the analysis by considering the record of each individual regime. The first part of this section discusses the performance of the three democracies in my sample, and the remainder looks at the five authoritarian
regimes. This largely qualitative analysis provides additional details about the delivery of pork and public goods. It supports my findings thus far about the inadequacy of the regime type hypothesis. Readers interested in a general overview rather than the vicissitudes of Nigerian politics should feel free to skim this discussion and skip ahead to the summary at the end of this section.

By examining each regime in turn, I am able here to refer to additional data that I could not consistently incorporate in the statistical tests. For the discussion of student/teacher ratios I incorporate enrollment ratios, which unfortunately are not available for many years. These statistics provide a useful control because a sudden surge in enrollment could adversely affect class sizes in the short term. For my analysis of the judiciary I utilize available information about case loads, since an unexpected increase in cases could account for decreased efficiency. I also refer to statistics on ouster clauses which limit jurisdiction, and useful qualitative evidence from human rights organizations concerning authoritarian regimes’ disposition toward the courts. This helps me assess whether weakened judicial independence may have impacted the clearance rate figures. Finally, I attempt to provide a more robust picture of fiscal discipline and the economy by referring to inflation and money supply trends in each regime.

**Democracy’s Promise**

The data for the first democratic case from 1960 to 1966 show steady improvement in education, consistently low deficits, and generally good performance in the courts. Specifically in terms of education, the First Republic had low student/teacher ratios in primary schools. These figures suggest high levels of pork but it is important to qualify them by pointing out the low enrollment ratios throughout the 1960s, and that
education was neither guaranteed nor universally accessible.\textsuperscript{41} No precise enrollment ratios are available for that era but population data estimates suggest an enrollment rate of approximately .17 for 1960 and .15 for 1965.\textsuperscript{42} The two parliamentary governments formed during this regime also managed to avoid letting enrollments outpace school construction.

The courts record high clearance rates during this period, disposing of property rights cases as quickly as new ones were being filed. My data show an increase in the number of cases filed between 1960 and 1965. But the number of cases resolved increases also, reaching 20 in 1965 during a bad year for clearance. Separate statistics from the Supreme Court also show increases in the number of total appeals during this period. There were 136 civil appeals in 1960 and 373 in 1966 (Kasunmu 1977, 1-52). This lends some validation to my sample. In the fiscal sector, the federal government ran low deficits (averaging only 1.37\% of GDP), limited the supply of money, and maintained low inflation averaging less than 4\%.

The second democratic case, the Second Republic from October 1979 through 1983 shows an increase in the primary student/teacher ratio. But this also corresponds

\textsuperscript{41} These national averages should also be read in light of acute regional disparities. On the eve of independence in 1959, 90\% of the country’s primary and secondary schools were in the south. The area had been exposed to Western education by Christian missions from an early date, whereas in the overwhelmingly Muslim north, Koranic teaching dominated the school curriculum (Forrest 1995). In the prosperous northern city of Kano in 1960, one in 65 children attended primary school and only one in 2,482 attended secondary school (“Educational Revolution in the North,” West Africa, February 20, 1960, p. 209). By 1972, 70\% of the southern school age children were in school, while the figure was less than 10\% in the north (“Schools and States in Nigeria,” West Africa, April 14, 1972, pp. 437-38).

\textsuperscript{42} To arrive at these estimates, I start with figures from the National Population Commission that place the under 15 population in 1960 at 17.8 million, and figures from the Federal Ministry of Education which reports just over 3 million students enrolled in primary and secondary education combined. This is probably a slightly conservative enrollment figure since the government survey required cooperation from schools that were mostly private at the time. This method suggests an estimated enrollment rate of about .17. Using the same formula to estimate the enrollment rate for 1965, I come up with .15, which is based on an under-15 population of 20.8 million at the time.
with large increases in enrollments (from a rate of 49 percent in 1975 to 91 percent in 1981) and improvements in the accessibility of education. The actual enrollments at the primary level in 1976/77 were 131 percent higher than the projection, and the problem was exacerbated by a teacher shortfall of 42 percent (Federal Ministry of Education 99). In other words, it is likely that the effects of such an increase lasted. School construction occurred at a very modest pace, especially compared to the boom in the mid-1970s.

The courts reached an historic level of inefficiency during this period. Readers knowledgeable about Nigeria might attribute this to controversial changes in property rights instituted by the outgoing military regime in 1978 and the new constitution in 1979. The Land Use Decree of 1978 vested control of all land in trust in the hands of the military governors of the states. The Second Republic’s Constitution entrenched these changes. Criticism of “nationalization” and state seizure grew, especially after the military government stepped aside (Awogu 1984). Since my sample of cases consists of land disputes, this could present a problem by stimulating new complaints. However neither my data set nor statistical information on Supreme Court cases for 1979 – 1983 point to any such increase in case load. In fact, the number of land cases handled by the Supreme Court and the courts in my sample declined after the transition to democracy (Alabi 2002). In other words, the courts experienced no significant increase in the number of cases which might better account for the declining clearance rate.

As for fiscal discipline, President Shagari inherited a huge deficit, reported as over 1.4 billion naira in 1979. But the outgoing military regime’s budget for 1980 called for strict budget discipline and remarkably, by July 1980 the government had a surplus of over 2 billion naira. Although increased tax revenue contributed to the surplus, the
government also enjoyed substantially increased oil revenues for the year. Unfortunately, the optimism proved to be short lived and fiscal discipline in the Second Republic declined considerably. A strong currency led to wasteful government spending and consumer spending on expensive imports (Lewis 1997, 303-28). President Shagari publicly blamed consumers for the economic decline, pointing to their “insatiable appetite for imported goods.” Although the states bore some of the blame for launching overly ambitious projects (which they expected to be financed with the help of the federal government), Shagari’s administration clung to economic optimism. In August 1981, a prominent opposition governor accused the president of lying about the economy and complained about cutbacks in his state’s share of fiscal allocation from the federal government. Shagari’s economic advisor accused him of playing politics and blamed any loss on the reckless spending of the states. As late as August of that year, he played down the significance of external factors such as declining oil revenues. Barely a month later, the executive branch reversed itself when the budget director made clear the severity of the situation. He announced hiring and travel freezes and a 30 percent “reservation” on all capital projects until the end of the year.

The government ran deficits of 14.8 percent of GDP in 1981 and 11.8 percent in 1982. The growth of money supply had slowed, but there was nevertheless a general “loss of financial control and discipline in the public economy” (Forrest 1995). Short on revenue, President Shagari borrowed money. All nineteen state governments

---

accumulated huge external debts, totaling $8 billion US dollars, and pushed the country
toward a desperate search for foreign exchange. Shagari’s problems worsened when
labor unions, emboldened after years of limitations on organizing under military rule,
launched a nationwide strike in 1981 to protest low wages, inadequate pensions and elite
corruption. “As far as the NLC [Nigerian Labor Congress] was concerned, and this
clearly represented the genuine views of the majority of the workers, the advent of party
politics had worsened the conditions of the Nigerian worker.” The number of strikes was
not significantly larger than during the mid-1970s but declines in worker participation
and productivity damaged the economy significantly (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985). By
the time the military staged a coup in December 1983, inflation was over 23 percent.

In the third democratic case, known as the “Fourth Republic,” education started to
improve and the government took some steps to reign in deficits while judicial
performance declined. The ratio in primary schools was slightly high but it does improve
over the five year period due to the hiring of 42,000 new teachers reported by the UBE
Programme. The figure of 40.3 also appears to be in line with the Programme’s goals for
classroom size. Significantly, the primary enrollment rates between this case and the
previous democratic case are nearly identical: from 1981 to 1983 the rate was between 91
and 93 percent, whereas from 1999 to 2001 the rate ranged between 92 and 95 percent.
This suggests that the comparison between these two regimes in terms of the
student/teacher ratios is particularly valid; larger class sizes cannot be blamed on
unexpected enrollments.

Despite rising demands for education and huge capital outlays, school
construction slowed during the Fourth Republic. The Obasanjo government’s classroom
construction plan anticipated spending 21 billion naira on the construction of 3096 classroom blocks. Only 280 were completed in the first phase of construction and only 18 in the second phase. Almost two thirds of the money had been released by 2001 but the Universal Basic Education Programme reported in 2003 that only half of the classroom blocks had been constructed. 95 projects had been completely abandoned (Universal Basic Education Programme Abuja; Universal Basic Education Programme 2003). A detailed study of five Local Government Areas in Rivers State uncovered various examples accounting for these kinds of failures, including a local government chair depositing federal revenue disbursements into his personal bank account. Other examples of abandoned projects documented by Human Rights Watch include a “demonstration fish pond” without water or fish. Similarly, the Rivers State government supposedly spent the equivalent of $55,000 USD on building a “football academy,” yet nothing had been constructed (Human Rights Watch 2007).

Court performance suffered in the Fourth Republic as well. Since the low clearance rate figures I report for these years are based on predicted values (see Chapter 1), I looked for alternate sources of data that might validate my statistics. I found this in a large, separate sample of court cases gathered by the Rule of Law Assistance Project funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development. These statistics confirm my portrait of low judicial performance. The statistics for the High Court of Justice in Abuja, FCT and Kaduna State are reported in Table 7. Although the pilot studies include only two states, they include all cases and distinguish between civil cases, criminal cases,
and motions. Nevertheless, the statistics closely resemble my predicted values for clearance rates in these years.46

Table 7: High Court of Justice Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KADUNA</th>
<th>ABUJA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999/00 2000/01 2001/02</td>
<td>1999 2000 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of civil cases</td>
<td>2129 2261 3096</td>
<td>786 848 929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cases and motions filed</td>
<td>2161 2411 3385</td>
<td>1129 1238 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total disposed</td>
<td>870 (40%) 636 (73.6%) 1490 (58%)</td>
<td>577 (51.1%) 479 (38.7%) 492 (24.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Expressing optimism about democracy’s ability to remedy the defects of the military in 1999, the President’s Chief Economic Advisor said: “Most of the problems of budget implementation could be attributed largely to the military dictatorship under which the planning and budgeting process operated for over a decade” (Asiodu 2000, 7-10). The administration declared itself determined to maintain single-digit inflation and to keep the budget deficit within the Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) benchmark of less than 3 percent of GDP. Although economic performance was far from the nation’s worst years, the average deficit to GDP ratio was 4.9 percent during the regime and the government failed to meet its goals.

The economic picture did not look rosy in 2000. Inflation climbed to 14.5 percent and the deficit hit 60 billion naira in the first half of the year alone – in spite of a surge in

46 This model’s predicted value is ŷ based on a linear regression of ATPs on clearance rate in order to determine the relationship between the two variables. See Appendix 4 for the model’s results.
export earnings. Economists complained that compared to the military, there was “no major change in the structure of economic activities” or the spending priorities of the federal government. They identified macroeconomic instability and low growth as serious problems (Taiwo 2001, 19-34; Akpakpan 2000, 11-21). On the one hand, Obasanjo seemed committed to fiscal discipline in his government’s first year with his elimination of a fuel subsidy. On the other hand, these cuts were accompanied by huge increases in capital spending (a 40 percent increase in 2001 alone) and civil service wage increases. The president’s policies on wages and the fuel subsidy and capital spending were announced without consultation with the National Assembly or the governors. This triggered a debilitating national strike by labor and a prolonged standoff with the legislature which had not even seen a minimum wage bill when the president announced the increase.47

In 2001 high debt payments took their toll and the CBN coped by increasing money supply far in excess of the government’s targets. Spending by all three tiers of government grew, contributing to inflation (Iyoha 2002, 27-43). The problems were much the same the following year when money supply rose 27 percent – more than double the CBN’s target – and government spending spiraled upward. The National Assembly increased the president’s proposed capital spending in the budget from 297 billion naira to 485.7 billion (Nnanna 2002, 45-61; Sanusi 2002, 79-89). The Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed his alarm about the increased spending commitments for 2002 in the face of declining revenue estimates, commenting

“we cannot allow this trend to continue.”

Facing re-election in 2003, politicians saw little cause for restraint. In the end, the Fourth Republic delivered few public goods.

Summary

These three democratic cases tell rather different stories about government performance. Measured in terms of student/teacher ratios, the First Republic performed well. It managed to keep deficit spending to low levels, and the clearance rate shows that the number of cases decided generally kept pace with the number of new cases. In sum it provides support for the hypothesis that democracies provide more public goods and pork, although low enrollment ratios should moderate the latter conclusion. The second democratic case shows generally poor delivery of public goods as the government struggled to reign in deficits, and low clearance rates resulted in huge court backlogs. Even with major deficit spending (averaging nearly 7 percent of GDP), school construction proceeds slowly and primary class sizes remain large, although enrollments grew considerably at this time. The third democratic case produced double digit inflation and maintained spending deficits well above Central Bank targets. Combined with dangerously inefficient courts, the picture for public goods is weak. School construction does grow and the student/teacher ratios improve, suggesting the regime did a better job supplying pork. In the end, we find only limited support so far for the hypothesis that democracy leads to better performance. How did the authoritarian regimes fare by these same standards?

---

Development without Democracy?

The first authoritarian regime, spanning 1966 to 1975, is most frequently praised for its post-civil war policy of “no victors, no vanquished” but it is also remembered for its attempts to harness new revenues from oil exports for development.\(^{49}\) Post-war reconstruction dominated the Second National Development Plan from 1970 to 1974. The federal government explicitly embraced the notion of education as human capital, “which attaches high premium to human skills as a factor of production in the development process.” It committed to training more teachers, increasing primary enrollments, and repairing schools and facilities damaged during the war. Even before Gowon left office in 1975, most of these goals had been met. School enrollment levels and ratios increased well above the targets. The student/teacher ratio at the primary level was largely unaffected by the massive new enrollments, which increased about 10 percent per year starting in 1970.

The federal government ran budget deficits of less than 2.5 percent of GDP during the war (June 1967 to January 1970). In 1970 the figure grew to 7.5 percent but this was followed by four optimistic years of budget surpluses. This may paint too optimistic a picture of the economic situation though. In the post-war years, money supply increased nearly five-fold due to vastly increased government fiscal spending and the monetization of substantial export earnings. The government squandered many of these earnings on import-substitution industrialization. This policy neglected agriculture and more sustainable development options. Consumers used the cash to import luxury goods and

---

\(^{49}\) Most states in the secessionist Eastern Region did not provide the federal government with statistics during the civil war years that are necessary for a complete picture. But statistics from the time preceding the war and information from the five years afterwards do give a reasonably accurate estimate.
foods (Iwayemi 1979, 47-72). The cost of food had increased 50 percent since 1964, with the biggest increase in food costs occurring in 1970.\textsuperscript{50}

The government recognized the problems posed by rising prices and spending. This prompted the formation of a much ballyhooed Anti-Inflation Task Force. In addition to consumer spending habits, the Task Force attributed the causes to wage increases, and unsustainable spending levels on current and capital projects (which anticipated consistently high oil revenues). Increases in current and capital expenditures averaged 23 percent in the first three years of the regime but rose to over 108 percent between fiscal years 1970/71 and 1973/74 (Federal Government of Nigeria 1975). The Adebo Commission in 1971 pushed up wages in the public and private sector,\textsuperscript{51} then the Udoji Commission in 1974 bestowed even further increases on civil servants (Bienen, Henry 1983). By 1975 Gowon’s government had lost control over the economy. The government recorded a 46 percent increase in money supply, the return of budget deficits, and a 34 percent inflation rate – nearly triple the previous year’s rate.

In the courts, the average clearance rate for the Gowon regime was an impressive 0.9. But there is a clear difference between the war and the post-war years. From 1966 – 1969, the clearance rate stayed above 1.0. While the civil war obviously presents data problem, this comparatively good performance record also probably reflects a relatively tolerant attitude towards the courts. “Generally speaking,” writes the former Chief Justice of Ondo State, “the Courts were permitted to continue to perform their traditional duties.”


\textsuperscript{51} Government wages rose considerably after the recommendations of the Commission, which called for increases of public wages based on a principle of “fair comparison” with the private sector. Ironically, the Commission hoped that such parity would prevent upward inflationary spirals where pay levels in one sector would simply be pressured upwards by the other. See “Fixing Fair Shares for All,” West Africa, December 3, 1971, pp. 1421-22.
role of adjudication between citizen and citizen, and between the citizen and the State” with certain exceptions (Aguda 1988, 112-138). Even though the government took steps to limit the scope of their jurisdiction, another legal scholar points out that judges mostly kept their jobs and the situation was “comparatively favourable for the operation of the judiciary” (Ezejiofor 1977, 67-89).

The courts adapted by simultaneously recognizing the military’s changes to law as legitimate but then attempting to hold the government to the letter of its law. For example, Ironsi had promulgated limitations on habeas corpus through the Armed Forces and Police (Special Powers) Decree. This was subsequently employed by Gowon, who had otherwise repealed many of his predecessor’s decrees. In court challenges, plaintiffs questioned the legality of special military tribunals and attempted to hold the military to the parameters specified in decrees for detention. Similarly, the courts in the celebrated Lakanmi case accepted the legality of the military government, claiming the civilians had constitutionally handed over power in 1966.\footnote{The military had a meeting with the Federal Cabinet to tell them a coup was inevitable, when in fact it was already unfolding. The ministers were unaware that the Prime Minister had been killed and President Nnamdi Azikiwe was overseas. Apparently believing the move would be temporary, the acting president and surviving cabinet members decided to turn over power to the military. On January 16, 1966, Acting President Nwafor Orizu announced that the Council of Ministers “had come to the unanimous decision voluntarily to hand over the administration of the country to the Armed Forces of the Republic with immediate effect” (Achike 1980). The 1963 Constitution made no provision for such a temporary suspension of democracy. However the military subsequently used Orizu’s declaration to claim legal legitimacy for the junta, a view the Supreme Court endorsed in Lakanmi (1970), which found that the military government nonetheless derived its authority from the Constitution (Ojo 1987, 124-126).} This much was consistent with the military’s own legal rationale. But the courts then said if the transfer of power was temporary and voluntary, then the 1963 republican constitution was still in effect and the government’s legislative powers were not unlimited. The junta responded to both
Lakanmi and the habeus cases with decrees that declared the supremacy of military law and allowed military tribunals to convict some suspects (Ojo 1987).

The effects of this seemingly arbitrary power of the military would logically be reduced use of the courts, reflecting citizen cynicism towards a judiciary with limited independence. But interestingly, this does not happen. The number of new property rights cases filed between 1970 and 1974 increases compared to the first four years of the regime; the clearance rate declines slightly because the courts actually decided fewer cases during these years. 1975 marks a precipitous decline in performance as the clearance rate suddenly drops from .65 to .26 in one year. By these standards the Gowon regime’s judiciary performed comparatively well, especially considering the increase in cases, at least until 1975.

Nigerians remember the second authoritarian regime under Mohammed and Obasanjo (1975 – 1979) for its Universal Primary Education (UPE) program and its role in crafting the 1979 constitution. This document left a lasting mark on constitutional law and set a standard for participatory drafting. The UPE legacy is in some ways less impressive, since the average student/teacher ratio of 40 to 1 stands among the worst of any regime. To some extent, this is accounted for by rapid increases in enrollment after UPE made primary school free and compulsory in September 1976. But the government had anticipated the increases, and they were no surprise given post-war enrollment trends. The Third National Development Plan projected an increase in primary enrollment from 4.7 million in 1973 to 11.5 million at the end of the 1975-80 period (Federal Ministry of Economic Development 1975). As a sign of its commitment, the government committed a greater share of its budget to education than at any other time in the country’s history.
In its final year the government spent 129 million naira, whereas in Fiscal Year 1975/76 the new government spent 295 million. The following year it spent 601 million naira (Bienen 1983, 50).

With the federal government’s willingness to spend money on education came its assumption of most financial responsibility for primary education. Yet state and local governments continued to administer the schools. As early as the first year of UPE, the enrollment projections proved to be low and the spending estimates were inadequate, even with large investments in education. Recurrent costs alone were more than double the estimates for the first year and capital spending grew so rapidly that Obasanjo attempted to impose a ceiling on capital allocations for education. The attempt failed due to on-going commitments which continued to drive up capital spending (Bray and Cooper 1979, 33-41). The government did attempt to address teacher shortages before Obasanjo’s exit by increasing teacher recruitment while maintaining the federal commitment to paying teacher salaries in his last budget.\(^{53}\)

The courts generally record their lowest overall performance during this period compared to other authoritarian regimes. Even though one might expect an increase in land disputes following dramatic new regulations on land sales with the promulgation of the 1978 Land Use Decree, the total number of new cases in my sample remains fairly constant. Supreme Court statistics tend to validate my sample in this regard, since they reveal a decline in land disputes in the years after 1978, both in absolute terms and as a share of cases (Alabi 2002, 176). The numbers for the immediate post-Land Decree

years resemble the pre-Decree years, meaning that the decline in performance cannot be attributed to an increase in cases.

The Mohammed/Obasanjo regime ran dangerously high deficits from 1976 to 1979, which were over 10 percent as a share of GDP. The sharp decline in federal revenue in real terms can partly be blamed, alongside federal government commitments to costly spending policies. The statutory revenue disbursement to the states multiplied, the federal government maintained high levels of defense expenditure and it continued to provide large education grants to the states (often above their statutory allocations) for the implementation of UPE. Over the course of this regime spending increased 7 billion naira while revenue increased only 3.4 billion. The Third National Development Plan optimistically – even carelessly – projected generous oil revenues with no end in sight. The government’s macroeconomic policies struggled to manage the situation once this optimism proved hollow. For example, money supply increased 75 percent in 1975 and 46 percent in 1977. Inflation was over 11 percent when the government stepped aside in 1979. Food prices in particular skyrocketed during the 1970s (Iwayemi 1979, 47-72).

Obasanjo’s last budget before the democratic transition put in place many of the reforms necessary to establish fiscal discipline. In his outgoing budget speech he called for “tightening our belts” and won praise for his fiscal restraint. He cut recurrent expenditures by ten percent and nearly halved capital expenditures, supposedly facilitated by the completion of military construction projects. He also imposed new custom duties and import restrictions, hoping to reduce the flood of imports and increase government revenues. “The 1979-80 import and foreign exchange measures may not make this military government immensely popular in the short run,” wrote one Nigerian economist.
in 1979, “but they should prove to be an extremely important legacy to its civilian successor.”

Obasanjo earned praise for having the wisdom to practice fiscal restraint. But as an outgoing incumbent, his government had the luxury of avoiding its political costs. This burden was passed on to a fragile democratic regime, with a president whose party lacked a majority in the National Assembly and whose election victory was immediately challenged in the Supreme Court.

The failure of the Second Republic to grapple with these issues over the next four years contributed to its unpopularity and decline. On New Year’s Eve 1983 the generals struck again, inaugurating the third authoritarian regime in my sample. In his first address to the nation, General Buhari blamed the National Assembly for neglecting its responsibilities. The government failed to “cultivate financial discipline and prudent management of the economy,” relying more and more on external borrowing and heavy deficit spending (Akinnola 2000). Inheriting a 23 percent inflation rate, Buhari embarked on strategies to increase foreign exchange earnings, reduce inflation, and refinance the debt. The federal government’s debt-to-service ratio at the time was approaching 35 percent.

However Buhari’s efforts to reschedule the debt and secure new lines of credit ran into a wall. The International Monetary Fund and the country’s creditors approved of his austere approach to budgeting, including the introduction of user fees, a wage freeze, and deep cuts to recurrent spending. They were far less comfortable with his reluctance to privatize state industries and the regime’s apparent ideological preference for self-

---

sufficiency through import restriction rather than trade liberalization (Osaghae 1998). Buhari’s government declared its intention to hold the rate of inflation in 1985 to 30 percent, with a one percent GDP growth rate – a realistic target given the economy’s contraction during his first year of tenure.55

Buhari reduced federal spending and inflation, while his economic team managed to increase revenue (thanks in part to the recovery of oil prices in 1984). But the social sector bore much of the brunt of the federal government’s austerity measures. Primary student/teacher ratios improved only slightly in 1984, recording a national average of 36.8 to 1. Then in 1985 the ratio rose to 44 to 1. The Guardian newspaper observed that education “has received a literal drubbing in the past year.” It editorialized that in the 1985 budget, “Federal policy is still actuated by the false presumption that genuine industrialization, social harmony and political stability are possible without mass education.”56

Judges thought at first that they might survive another military government relatively intact. Buhari dissolved the National Assembly but announced that the judiciary, the police and the National Security Organisation would all continue to exercise their functions, “subject to changes that may be introduced by the Federal Military Government” and certain decreed “exceptions” (cited in Akinnola 2003).

The apparent improvements in case clearance (rising from .50 in 1984 to .62 in 1985) came with noticeable costs. Administrative reforms of the judiciary may have enhanced judicial efficiency but they undermined the authority of the state courts to

control judicial appointments. In his first decree, Buhari abolished the Federal Judicial Service and created a judicial committee to advise the Supreme Military Council on appointments. Supposedly this insulated judicial appointments from local politics but it also weakened the country’s federalism (Aguda 1988, 112-138). Most notably, Buhari set up four military tribunals. Buhari’s government relied on these tribunals more heavily than his predecessors, making it clear that these special courts would be a central tool in the fight against what he constantly referred to as “indiscipline.” Among his accomplishments in 1984, he proudly listed “greater security (enhanced by public executions)” and “exemplary punishment for persons responsible for the rot of the nation.”

Buhari’s special judicial tribunals were notoriously unpopular (Constitutional Rights Project 1993). Arguably he aimed intended to produce a demonstration effect, not necessarily to replace the judicial branch. His reforms of judicial administration did subscribe to certain limits; for example he left the existing qualifications for judicial appointment intact (Ojo 1987, 170-71). However his critics saw his declining human rights record and the misuse of the tribunals as an opportunity and moved with Machiavellian efficiency.

Ibrahim Babangida, one of Buhari’s top lieutenants who had helped him plan the overthrow of the democracy government in 1983, staged a successful coup in August 1985. Babangida immediately set out to distinguish himself from his predecessor. Like many of Nigeria’s military regimes, this fourth authoritarian regime began hopefully. He announced large increases in education spending, outlined a new plan for the transition to

---

democracy, and created novel governmental organizations to facilitate broad political debates on policy. By the end of his eight years in office, some of the gains in performance suffered sharp reversals. Overall, Babangida’s government performed better than most authoritarian regimes in social services but not in terms of public goods.

When Babangida took over in 1985, the new Ministry of Education inherited a primary student/teacher ratio of 44 to 1. For primary schools this was an historic high. Babangida’s 1986 budget plan unveiled huge increases in education spending (as a share of the budget), representing the Federal Government’s apparent willingness to back its guarantee of free primary education. In his budget speech, he declared “education has been so relegated to the background that it is in danger of imminent collapse.” The budget provided relief to cash-strapped states by increasing recurrent spending for teachers’ salaries and administration and inspection of schools. It also included increased capital spending for buildings. By 1987 the primary student/teacher ratio was down to 37 to 1, but primary school construction had hardly budged. Up to this point, the regime therefore had a mixed record concerning the delivery of pork.

In 1987 the picture shifted. There was a slight increase in education spending but as a share of the budget it amounted to a large cut. Babangida said “it has become absolutely necessary for the Federal Government to re-adjust its educational priorities.” Resources were scarce after the government disbanded the Economic Rehabilitation and Recovery Fund (a temporary fund that levied special fees on corporate and property

---

58 A possible exception is 1976, the second year of the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime. The figures for this year are only estimates since a few states did not report some of their school statistics.
60 Goddy Nnadi, “Education Vote to Aid Implementation of 6-3-3-4 System,” The Guardian, January 4, 1986.
incomes), not to mention lower than expected oil revenues.\textsuperscript{61} The teachers’ union complained that they received their salaries irregularly from the states and urged the federal government to completely take over funding and management of these responsibilities (Obidi 1998, 274-80). As a consequence the estimated primary student/teacher ratio suffered again.\textsuperscript{62} Education spending recovered in the 1988 budget and the following year primary student/teacher ratios improved. Enrollments had been declining and were now at their lowest level (11.5 million primary school pupils) in a decade. In 1988 they began a rise that continued for the rest of Babangida’s tenure, making the improvements in student/teacher ratio a notable achievement.

In 1991 the federal government embarked on an unusual experiment for an authoritarian regime: true to the 1989 constitution’s calls for decentralization of education, it abolished the National Primary Education Commission and turned primary education over to the 453 local governments (LeVan 2005, 207-219; Akinkugbe 1994). To promote compliance with national standards, it established a bureaucracy of federal inspectors who quickly became unpopular with the Nigeria Union of Teachers (NUT). Proponents of free primary education at the time called the reforms “tragic and unfortunate” and a recipe for “chaos.”\textsuperscript{63} The government undertook the reforms with only modest cuts to the line in the federal budget for education and (significantly) a five percent increase in the general revenue allocation to the states. A year later total primary enrollments reached historic highs for the country while the student/teacher ratios


\textsuperscript{62} Since precise data on teachers for 1988 and 1989 are unavailable, I use nearest year averages for these two years.

improved again. In 1993, primary enrollments increased even further, surpassing 15 million pupils, while classroom size shrunk yet again. After two years of agitating by the teachers’ union, the federal government re-established the NPEC, tasking it with funding and managing primary education and preventing future strikes (Obidi 1998, 274-80). Several years after Babangida left office, a study by the NPEC and the World Bank concluded that the restoration of the federal government’s authority over teacher salaries had normalized their payments (National Primary Education Commission).

The administration’s performance in the education sector clearly had fits and starts but the overall picture, especially when examined in detail, gives it a positive picture in pork compared to most authoritarian regimes.

Despite the rise in social spending under Babangida, economic elites praised his early budgets for their fiscal discipline. The head of a major bank called the 1986 budget “a classic structural readjustment package” and later praised the 1987 budget for staying the course.64 The 1986 budget balanced spending levels with anticipated revenue and cut civil service wages and the fuel subsidy. That year, the administration achieved its objectives of economic growth with low inflation (5.7 percent) by reigning in an over-valued naira.65

In the end, the encomium proved to be misplaced since the government ran huge budget deficits throughout most of his tenure and inflation that surpassed even the worst years of the mid-1970s. The deficit in 1986 amounted to 11.3 percent of GDP. After

cutting it in half in 1987, the deficit was at least 6.4 percent for the remainder of his term. Taking heat from unions and other civil society groups for structural adjustment, the government offered a “reflationary budget” in 1988, lifting the freeze on wages, openly anticipating “modest” deficits, and acknowledging that spending ran the risk of stimulating inflation. The gamble failed. Over the next two years, inflation hit historic highs of over 50 percent. The budget for 1990 year made the usual gestures towards high growth, balanced budgets and low inflation (education was notably absent from the administration’s list of its top five priorities).

Promising to learn from the previous year and to finish the “last lap” of his term on a positive note, in 1992 Babangida said the budget would “enforce financial discipline at all levels.” Whereas his 1986 budget speeches highlighted broad consultative process with stakeholders, fiscal discipline now apparently required centralization of power. He placed the National Planning Commission’s authority directly under the presidency and froze those capital projects except for those he deemed “priority.” Instead of praising the budget for discipline, elites this time around openly mocked the administration’s commitment to balanced budgets and said the Central Bank of Nigeria must be able to “say no to Federal Government finance excesses.” The CBN went on to allow an unprecedented 63 percent increase in money supply in 1992. The following year, Babangida turned over the reigns of government to a fragile interim government that

---

faced a 100 percent inflation rate, an economy flooded with more currency (a 57 percent increase in money supply) and a budget deficit amounting to over 11 percent of GDP.

Babangida’s public finance record contrasts with his legacy in education. To avoid breaking his promises in the social sector, he relied again and again on deficit spending. Whenever federal revenues were lower than expected the government opted for a combination of spending less than originally budgeted, devaluing the currency, borrowing, and especially printing more money. A month after he stepped aside, the Federal Office of Statistics reported that the 1992 budget had anticipated a 2.1 billion naira surplus. By the end of the year FOS predicted a 44.16 billion naira deficit instead. It observed that the government typically dealt with the deficits by printing more money and limiting spending on goods and services – a combination that contributed to the country’s “runaway inflation” (Federal Office of Statistics 1993).

Buhari’s “War on Indiscipline” and his sweeping detentions of citizens had clogged the courts and earned him notoriety. Babangida knew this presented him with a political opportunity to signal a clear departure from his predecessor to increase his own popularity and credibility (Olanrewaju 1992). In his maiden speech he abrogated the unpopular Decree No. 4 and began releasing prisoners detained under its broad authority. A special panel of judges, dubbed the “Uwaifo Panel,” reviewed the 1,017 persons affected. The federal government released most of the detained politicians and referred the public servants and businesspersons accused of corruption to the judiciary except for

---

70 Bolla Olowo, “Fiscal Reflections,” *West Africa*, January 24 – 30, 1994, p. 122. (Babangida stepped aside in August. The inflation rate for all of 1993 was 57 percent.)
a few cases specifically mentioned, which were remitted to a tribunal (Federal Military Government 1986). The government pardoned prominent newspaper editors and others detained under Buhari’s decrees and again legalized civil society organizations such as the National Medical Association and the National Association of Nigerian Students.71

The military sustained a provisional attitude towards the judiciary’s independence during the regime’s early years. Although the military retained its prerogative to use ouster clauses, it respected the Uwaifo panel’s findings about the proper role of the judiciary in criminal questions and it allowed the Advisory Judicial Committee to retain its composition and role (Ojo 1987, p. 297). Babangida told the Nigerian Bar Association in 1985 that “the independence of the judiciary is incontrovertible and the powers of the court will remain supreme.”72 Less than six months later the administration started to backtrack when the Information Minister told the Uwaifo panel: “It is the AFRC [Armed Forces Ruling Council] and the AFRC alone that will decide on these matters.”73 The image of political toleration and respect for the judiciary as an independent branch of government did not last long.

The AFRC’s gestures of political toleration coincided with implementation of its unpopular structural adjustment program (SAP). At first, unions and the working class protested wage freezes, subsidy cuts and currency devaluation. Babangida saw these not just as complaints against his economic policy but as threats to his political authority. As he threw more and more activists into prison, civil society’s economic grievances turned

political (Diamond, Kirk-Greene and others 1997). Babangida’s tolerance for dissent and the façade of judicial independence faded. Large numbers of journalists and human rights activists were imprisoned and their appeals were stuck under the jurisdiction of tribunals.

The clearance rate in 1986 reached .69, the highest level since 1973. No observed statistics for the clearance rate from my sample are available after 1987; my estimated values report that the regime maintained clearance levels well above .5 until 1990. Again I turn to other available data to validate this general pattern of judicial performance. Table 8 shows the case disposal rate in the Supreme Court over the last five years of Babangida’s regime. Compared to my own sample, this data has the advantage of being based on the total population of cases. It also carries the disadvantage of factoring in case backlog since undisposed cases accumulate from one year to the next. Thus the figures do not give an indication of the number of new cases filed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases Pending</th>
<th>Cases Disposed</th>
<th>Disposal rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>56.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>30.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>38.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>27.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


74 Numerous studies of civil society share this narrative describing the transformation of economic grievances to political collective action (Olukoshi 1993; Diamond 1991, 201-31; Kukah 1999; Ihonvbere 1994). Protest against structural adjustment laid the foundation for Nigeria’s contemporary human rights organizations as well as the pro-democracy movement of the early 1990s (Edozie 2002).

75 Although the judiciary was clearly weak from the beginning, the extra-judicial killings and human rights violations escalated after 1987 according to catalogues of such incidents (Nwankwo 1997, 351-362; Olanrewaju 1992; Ogbonlah 1994).

76 This statistic differs from the clearance rate in that it reflects all cases pending versus all cases disposed, rather than cases disposed compared to cases received (Dakolias 1999).
The statistics on disposal rate reveal declining court performance. One detailed study of judicial performance during the year 1993 further confirms this picture. Looking at both the Supreme Court, the Federal Court of Appeals, and the State High Court, cases in these courts add up to a 41.6 percent clearance rate for the year (Obaseki 7-20). Like fiscal discipline, the courts under Babangida clearly show a general decline in the delivery of public goods, especially during his final years.

Babangida’s surrender of power in August 1993 came on the heels of two months of political upheaval in which the country became virtually ungovernable. His annulment of the presidential election infuriated and mobilized pro-democracy organizations monitoring the transition and politicized other grassroots organizations. The international community responded with capital flight, sanctions and diplomatic censure. Political constituencies divided sharply into two camps over the “June 12 Crisis” (the date of the election), debating the issue of whether to install the winner or to schedule new elections. The Interim National Government thus inherited an extraordinarily volatile political situation. Ernest Shonekan freed political activists from prison, pardoned politicians and allowed those in exile to return, and lifted restrictions on the press. Less than three months later, the military invited Shonekan to the barracks to express their concern about “the general uneasiness in the country and the apparent lack of stability.” They then informed him of “the restiveness of the rank and file in the military.” Immediately after Shonekan announced his resignation, General Abacha stepped in, promising to restore order and put the transition back on track.

In this new regime’s first months, Abacha gave high priority to building a consensus within the military. Divisions within the military reflected the fractures within political society over the election annulment. This made laying out a new transition plan all the more challenging. His cabinet started meeting immediately after its formation in November. According one member, the next six months were “purposeful and eventful” for the cabinet. The government formed an Economic and Finance Committee to chart an economic course for the nation and it sought the advice of unions and business organizations in preparing the 1994 budget. Unable to resolve the June 12 issue, the cabinet abruptly stopped meeting in mid-1994. Abacha dissolved the Finance Committee later that year (Babatope 2000). The effects on government performance over the next several years were profound as both pork and public goods suffered.

With the exception of a four year decline beginning in 1984 under Buhari, primary enrollments had increased virtually every year since independence. After 1994 this changes. Actual primary enrollments decline from 16.2 million in 1994 to 14.7 million in 1997. This occurs as education supposedly consumes unusually large shares of the total federal budget (as much as 7.7 in 1994 and 7.4 in 1995). By 1997, corruption was so rampant that 25 billion naira was reported missing from various ministries and parastatals, and the Finance Minister refused to disburse money for any capital spending.\(^78\) The impact on schools was apparent in the poor condition in which Abacha’s government left them. Less than a year after his death, a government survey found that out of 332,408 classrooms in 44,292 primary schools, only 42 percent were in good condition while the remainder required “massive rehabilitation.” The survey further

---

noted that 285,290 additional classrooms were required to accommodate enrollments (Tahir 2001, 1-12). The National Primary Education Commission and the World Bank found that it was common for two classes to be housed in one classroom, “rooms which are, generally, in poor states of repair” (National Primary Education Commission).

Abacha sustained a high inflation rate of 57 percent through 1994 and ran a budget deficit of over five percent of GDP. Budgets for the next two years enjoyed increased revenues both from the return of high oil high oil prices and supposedly from stricter enforcement of taxes and duties (Okunrounmu 1996, 11-21). Revenue figures in both oil and non-oil revenue more than doubled between 1994 and 1995. Amazingly the government actually ran a small surplus, the first since 1980, in 1995 and again the next year. Abacha correctly calculated that the world would tolerate Nigeria’s deteriorating human rights conditions (most notoriously the military execution of minority rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others) as long as he kept the country’s doors open for business (Sklar 2001, 259-288). The following year, funds for many budgeted projects – including those for education – went unspent. For example, only 35 billion naira of the budgeted 61 billion for such projects from the Petroleum Trust Fund was actually spent. Around this time, the government also ceased publishing audits of most accounts (Olaniyan 1996, 55-69). Although inflation started to drop, it was still high at 29 percent.

The accounting problems with the Petroleum Trust Fund, the missing 25 billion naira, and the dubious freeze in capital spending mid-year are consistent with the well documented corruption of the Abacha era. Deficits were comparatively low, and money supply and inflation were relatively under control by 1997. But compared to previous military regimes under Gowon or Obasanjo, fiscal indiscipline under Abacha meant
something altogether different. According to the World Bank, surpluses were actually _under_-reported (meaning the money went unaccounted for). The government commonly reported budgeted figures as actual spending and accurate figures for the Petroleum Special Trust Fund were unknown.\textsuperscript{79} Years after Abacha’s death, government investigators were still trying to recover literally hundreds of millions of dollars – much of it in cash – from his family. Thus, these surpluses should be interpreted cautiously.

Judicial performance (and independence) deteriorated under Abacha. While some judges continued to treat the military’s decrees and tribunals as legitimate promulgation of law, many became openly critical of the crisis in the courts. One issue was a near total disregard for judicial opinion by Abacha’s administration. In November 1994 the Chief Justice of the Federation expressed his frustration: “Disobedience of an order of court should not be seen as an offence against the personality of the judge but a calculated act of subversion of peace, law and order.” His widely publicized comments went on to say that such disobedience “portrays the government in bad light before its citizens…if the order of the court can be treated with disrespect, the whole administration of justice is brought into scorn.\textsuperscript{80}

Justice Bello had tolerated and rationalized numerous decrees under Babangida but his opinion changed when the military declared the June 12 election annulment non-justiciable. This sharp curtailment was the second issue that alarmed the judges, after the resurgence of ouster clauses. In 1993, the government promulgated 19 new ouster clauses, the largest number (by far) in any single year since Buhari’s military government

\textsuperscript{79} For several years, Nigeria became one of the few countries omitted from the IMF’s Government Finance Yearbook because of such serious accounting discrepancies (Hutchinson and Smith 1994).

issued 20 in 1984. A third issue was the creation of new tribunals, notably the Failed Banks Tribunal and various Miscellaneous Offences Tribunals established all over the country. Not only did the existence of these tribunals for crimes as petty as minor drug offences offend magistrates, who saw themselves as a last vestige protecting the people from arbitrary authority, they also referred at least 4,500 were cases to the courts, rather than deciding them on their own. Thus instead of potentially lightening the caseload of judges, the tribunals had the dual effect of undermining the authority of the courts without the benefit of lightening their workload.81

Summary

Based on these findings we can reject the regime type hypothesis. Among the authoritarian regimes, Babangida’s demonstrated one type of result where education improved during most of his regime but high deficits were the cost of this progress. Abacha’s regime generally typifies a second type, with low deficits. Several authoritarian regimes supply conflicting pictures of judicial performance. Buhari attempted fiscal restraint but had little to show for it in terms of public goods or pork; Abacha’s delivery of pork deteriorated steadily after 1994. Gowon generally performed better than the other military regimes and better than the two subsequent democracies on a number of counts, especially in terms of the level of pork. Education indicators were rather strong, even with surges in primary enrollment. Among democracies, judicial efficiency under the Second Republic plummeted and the Fourth Republic also produced a low clearance rate.

The evidence shows that Nigeria’s democracies have created huge budget deficits and high inflation, just like some of the dictatorships. Nigeria’s Second Republic quickly spoils the surplus it inherited in 1980 and the Fourth Republic engaged in fairly high levels of deficit spending, often over 5 percent of GDP. The good performance of the First Republic and the poor performance of Buhari’s military regime are the only two cases where each variable illustrates support for the hypothesis. Even so, the former suffers a decline in several measures over its six years.

**CONCLUSION**

In this chapter I rejected a hypothesis predicting that democracies perform better than authoritarian regimes. I began by reviewing the academic literature on the relationship between democracy and development. As the research struggled to explain important exceptions from Latin America and elsewhere, it also confronted complex issues of causation and measurement. While much recent research states that democracies offer more public goods and pork, various questions remain about how to demonstrate this and whether these two categories of policy can be meaningfully differentiated. I define democracies in terms of political competition guaranteed through political rights and a rule of law. I then identify five authoritarian and three democratic regimes in Nigeria since independence. Authoritarian regimes generally lack these characteristics but I do not equate this with necessarily vague or ambiguous policy making structures.

I subject my hypothesis to three types of tests: First, I demonstrate that democratic regimes do not appear to yield more pork, at least when we measure it in terms of teachers. The tests, however, cannot be considered conclusive since only one of the
models is significant (and barely so). When we consider school construction, elected politicians build fewer primary schools, although the *regime* variable is not significant until the model includes controls. Second, tests for the impact of democracy on the delivery of public goods are inconclusive. Neither type of regime performs better than the other. The clearance rate in the courts improves under democracies, however none of the coefficients are significant and none of the models correlate very well with the dependent variable. After analyzing each regime individually, it is clear that few regimes deliver both public goods and pork effectively. The First Republic, and to some extent Gowon’s regime, appear to be among the few possible success stories. But any account of Gowon cannot discount increases in inflation and fiscal discipline, especially in his final years when the courts started to suffer too. Authoritarian regimes such as Babangida’s and democratic regimes such as the Fourth Republic both increased delivery pork. But they did so at the expense of public goods. My third set of tests finds that democracies waste less money than dictatorships when supplying teachers. But policy efficiency disappears on a rather robust level when democracies build schools; qualitative evidence from the Second and Fourth Republics buttresses this finding.

What sort of implications can we draw from these conclusions? The test results seem to suggest that democracy fails to consistently offer a meaningful advantage in Nigeria. It is more accurate though to emphasize a less normatively disturbing interpretation: that regime type fails to capture the relevant variation in policy making. Subsequent chapters examine a different dimension of political institutions, which transcends the blunt dichotomy here. Another implication stems from the operational distinctions I make with my dependent variable. Few regimes perform well in terms of
both public goods and pork. For example, regimes such as Mohammed/Obasanjo and Babangida both increase the output of pork and sacrifice public goods. This suggests that these categories of policy outputs serve a useful purpose, as I claimed in Chapter 1. The results here show that my two measures for each type of output do not always behave similarly though, meaning that we should exaggerate neither the implications of the distinction nor the accuracy of my operationalizations. Future research could address this by including measures of pork not tied to the concept of human capital; this might help us understand the dissimilar results of the two tests reported in Table 6. Alternatively, it would be useful to determine whether democracies treat school construction as an investment in human capital, in contrast to dictatorships that treat such investments as pork. Such tests would likely require a longer time series in order to capture the time horizon of policy makers, since it takes longer to observe the effects of human capital.

In *The Social Contract*, Rousseau cautions his compatriots about democracy, noting “so perfect a government is not for men.” Yet it would be a mistake to take him for an enemy of freedom. Rather, he feared that humanity’s entry into society awakened dangerous passions which lead us astray. The next chapter advances a theory of government performance which aims to capture the sources of variation in Nigeria’s many types of regimes. No government is perfect, but those that perform better in terms of the measures I have adopted do share some common characteristics.
INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters presented an empirical problem by revealing fluctuations in Nigeria’s government performance. Chapter 1 lays out the vicissitudes of this performance along three measures and illustrates how they do not follow an obvious trend. Chapter 2 argues that regime type also does little to explain the puzzle. What then explains variation in government performance in Nigeria over time?

This chapter and the next develop a theory that links the number of policy actors to government performance. I describe in this chapter how bargaining among individual and collective actors impacts policy outputs. These “veto players” use their leverage to extract particularistic payoffs or to bargain over public goods. Government performance suffers when policy depends on agreement among too many players. Most models only apply veto players to democracies and only consider their effects on policy stability. I build on literature that extends the theory to different regime types and other policy outcomes. I then argue that veto players account for variation in the measures of
performance used throughout this study: the level of “pork,” the delivery of public goods, and the efficiency of government spending on pork.

I begin this chapter by explaining the basic principles behind veto players including distinctions between individual and collective veto players, and between institutional and partisan veto players. I outline broad agreement in the literature about how the number of actors, their internal cohesion, and the divergence of their preferences impact the stability of the status quo policy. By introducing transaction costs associated with influencing policy, I then modify a basic rule which governs how to count veto players. The second section examines informal institutions as a problem that arises when extending veto player models to non-democracies. I resolve this issue with generalizable assumptions about the relationship between political institutions and societal interests. I also defend the proposition that governance is inherently collective by deconstructing cases that present evidence to the contrary. I outline three reasons why dictators do not rule alone and summarize how this introduces a major source of variation among authoritarian regimes. The third section explains the feasibility of moving from a veto player model that focuses on policy stability to one that can predict other outcomes. I highlight empirical studies that point to similar consequences of veto players and legislative coalitions on policy outputs. Then I formulate a hypothesis and three empirical tests.

The link between the number of veto players and policy performance is important because it poses a difficult dilemma for Nigeria. On the one hand, political institutions that promote inclusion are arguably necessary to reduce social tensions and ensure that policy making is representative of the country’s diversity. On the other hand, by creating
new players or altering the cohesion of existing ones, these practices adversely affect government performance. The next chapter will elaborate on this dilemma by placing Nigeria’s politics in the context of its social heterogeneity. By exacerbating bargaining problems, inclusive political institutions create incentives for the “morselization” of policy and undermine the delivery of public goods.

**POLITICAL PREFERENCES WITH VETOES**

Tsebelis and others have developed the concept of “veto players” to compare institutional frameworks in which actors with distinct preferences compete to maintain or change policy. By exploring the relationship between different decision rules and two basic types of players, this conceptual framework has been used to explain a range of outcomes from economic growth to the rule of law. This section defines veto players and describes some broad differences between individual and collective actors. I then identify three causal propositions, generally shared by veto player studies which concern the number of veto players, the cohesion of these players, and the divergence of their preferences. The final sub-section describes the rule governing how to distinguish among players’ preferences. Even though the introduction of transaction costs alters this rule, I argue that the underlying integrity of the three causal propositions remains intact.

**Veto Typology**

According to a common definition, veto players are “individual or collective actors whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo” (Tsebelis 1995, 289-325). Veto player models incorporate different kinds of decision rules and allow for distinctions among actors such as those who can set the policy agenda and those who
cannot. The theoretical framework also incorporates both individual and collective political actors, as well as differences in preferences.

The term “veto” implies that the consent of various actors is necessary for the approval of new policies. According to the theory and terminology of veto players developed by Tsebelis, *individual* veto players are those who are unencumbered by internal decision making rules either because either this authority is exercised through one person or the preferences of the players are monolithic. Individual players include political actors such as presidents and most autocrats. More commonly, veto players are *collective*. This means that in order to exercise authority they must first satisfy an internal decision making rule such as simple or qualified majority. Political parties and legislative chambers are examples of collective players although the label applies equally to other organizations such as military councils. Significantly, when veto players consist of multiple individuals with the same preferences, they are treated as individual veto players because they behave as individuals. However organizations that satisfy these criteria are very rare because they must either decide by unanimity or their majorities must be monolithic (as in a communist system).

The other important distinction concerns the source of a veto player’s authority. When it is generated by constitutions or other formal rules of the polity, Tsebelis labels these players *institutional*. The House of Representatives in the United States provides an example because all legislative proposals must pass through it before they can become

---

82 Despite the resemblance, “veto players” should therefore not be conflated with the constitutional authority of many presidents to veto proposed legislation.
law. It is also important to note that myriad majorities are possible on any given issue within the House because of the multiplicity of preferences.

However the situation is entirely different in an organization where essentially only one majority is possible. In such a case it would be incorrect to locate veto authority inside the institution since only one subset of preferences within it decides when to exercise the veto. Defining collective players through a static set of institutions would fail to capture where political power is actually exercised. When politics within an institutional player generate a controlling set of preferences, these are partisan veto players. In a parliamentary system with a tightly disciplined majority party, it would be a mistake to simply say that the parliament or the lower chamber holds an institutional veto since only the majority party can effectively exercise the veto. Alternatively, if no party holds a majority and passing legislation depends on a coalition, then each party in the coalition has a partisan veto. This means that these parties must agree in order to change the status quo policy.

Partisan veto players are significant because many collective actors fall into this category while others should be excluded. For example, the presidents of Mexico, Honduras and Ecuador lack the formal power to veto budget legislation (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). Decisions to pass legislation must emerge instead from within the majority party. When the president is head of that same party, she may be able to exercise a partisan veto even though “veto” powers (in the traditional Madisonian sense of the term) are absent from the constitution.
Causal Propositions

From the above set of concepts, studies converge on three general propositions: First, increasing the number of veto players makes it more difficult to change the status quo because more preferences must be taken into account and each one of these players exercises leverage over the policy bargaining process. This situation is referred to as policy stability or “resoluteness” (Cox and McCubbins 2001, 21-63). Resoluteness is beneficial if the state faces a credible commitment problem and policies risk fluctuation, as is the case in many new democracies. Adding veto players produces checks on the arbitrary exercise of authority (Keefer and Stasavage 2003, 407-20). A large number of veto players is a disadvantage if interests are entrenched and new policies are necessary (Schiavon 2000). In this instance government “decisiveness,” meaning an ability to change the status quo, is desirable for the innovation and adaptability it permits (Haggard and McCubbins 2001). A balance must be struck: “having more than one veto player helps to reduce the likelihood of policy volatility, but there is some point of inflexion after which additional veto players become unwelcome, serving only to increase the likelihood of policy rigidity” (MacIntyre 2001, 88).

Second, observations about the number of veto players depend on the internal cohesion of the collective players involved. Because these actors cannot unequivocally choose the outcome they prefer, their preferences appear ambiguous to observers. Under a majority decision rule, preferences are intransitive and multiple majorities are possible. As a result, Tsebelis claims that policy stability decreases when veto players are collective since it may actually be easier for each of them to arrive at a decision independently. This changes if collective players prioritize preferred outcomes from a set
of alternatives that do not overlap with other players’ preferences. Qualified majorities also impact the cohesion of a collective player: as the threshold increases from plurality toward unanimity, policy stability increases or at least stays the same.

Third, the degree to which preferences differ also affects the ability to change the status quo. Bargaining among distinct players with radically different preferences increases the likelihood of paralysis because it becomes more difficult to compromise (Tsebelis 1995, 289-325; Treisman 2000, 837-56). This is easy to visualize with a spatial model of bargaining in which policy actors are at opposing ends of a continuum. In a single dimension, the positions of actors with very different preferences polarize the political space. Veto players theory has improved upon these approaches by modeling politics as multi-dimensional phenomena. Spatial distance in such models helps determine which policy preferences should be treated as distinct. The next sub-section explains the “absorption rule” which governs such distinctions. It also identifies transaction costs as a factor that modifies the absorption rule.

The Costs of Political Exchange

Effective application of veto player theory depends on a clear set of criteria for counting players and thus deciding which preferences count. The absorption rule states that if two actors share substantially similar preferences, meaning they are close to each other in terms of policy distance, then the addition of new players does not impact policy

---

83 Single dimension spatial models anticipate bargaining until equilibrium. Winning coalitions converge on moderate views on a single issue, illustrated by single-peaked a median (Downs 1957). Every status quo can therefore be defeated by some conceivable coalition. Riker challenges this by modeling a multi-dimensional policy space; equilibrium solutions do not exist since the opposition is always trying to defeat the status quo. While this would seem to complicate veto player models, Tsebelis maintains identification of distinct preferences is not problematic when the dependent variable, such as policy stability, measures incremental change (Tsebelis 2002, 51).
stability (Tsebelis 1995, 289-325). This rule governs what constitutes a distinct preference. It eliminates from analysis actors whose consent is not necessary because their preferences substantially resemble those of other players. In game theoretic terms the ideal point of a new player is contained within the unanimity core of an existing player.

The absorption rule assumes the absence of transaction costs in exchanges. Tsebelis concedes that this assumption is merely a necessary evil that arises due to the difficulty of operationalizing such costs across contexts (Tsebelis 2002, 29). Since the present study involves a multi-unit qualitative analysis of one country rather than a cross-national comparison, we can abandon this assumption. North shows that political transactions and market exchanges alike involve costs (North 1990). Cox and McCubbins incorporate transaction costs as an inevitable and often substantial consequence of bargaining among veto players who demand particularistic policies (Cox and McCubbins 2001, 21-63). Organizations such as political parties may internalize these costs but in doing so they face collective action problems. Olson argues that such problems can only be resolved through coercion or select incentives (Olson 1965). But even in this view, coercion has costs as do the select incentives that political actors receive as payments in return for cooperation. Thus there are sound theoretical reasons to include transaction costs, especially if we have adequate empirical information about the policy process and preferences.

Incorporating transaction costs has important effects on veto players but none of these effects do any violence to the model’s underlying causal logic. One consequence is that marginal changes in the status quo are rarely worthwhile (Tsebelis 2002, 22). When
marginal changes do occur this is attributable to the comparatively low transaction costs of players willing to cooperate, as when their ideal preferences are similar. A more significant result of including transaction costs is that “even an absorbed player would add difficulty in changing the status quo” because she still could cause chaos in the policy process (Tsebelis 2002, 29). For example, a party in an oversized parliamentary coalition may not be necessary to meet the decision rule’s threshold but its threat to resign could nevertheless undermine the government. Thus even though the coalition members could pass legislation without this party they do not want to risk having to reform the government (Tsebelis 2002, 93-96). This is a nontrivial point because oversized coalitions, which include more parties than are necessary to constitute a majority, are not uncommon. In one sample of 32 countries between 1945 and 1996, they occur in 21 percent of all cabinets (Lijphart 1999, 98). This modified transaction cost assumption is also consistent with an interpretation of self-interest that accommodates ambition rather than temporally-bound gains such as a single policy success. In this view, even if two players have similar preferences they cannot hold the same office at the same time and do not share the same career path.

A model that incorporates transaction costs threatens the parsimony of the veto player framework. After all, who really is relevant to policy making and how should one count the number of players? Cox and McCubbins maintain that “a veto actor must be an actor, not just any collection of officeholders.” This means that the actor offers an

---

84 Riker’s coalition theory argues that coalitions bargain to a minimal size, including only as many members as are necessary to assure winning (Riker 1962). This under-predicts oversized coalitions (Laver and Schofield 1998) and over-predicts the number of minimal winning coalitions. In post-communist Eastern Europe for example, the historical reputation of parties limited the possible winning combinations (Grzymala-Busse 2001, 85-104).
"organizational basis" for reducing transaction costs associated with collective action. In addition, they say the veto actor must actually have a veto (Cox and McCubbins 2001, 24-25). Yet the analysis of oversized coalitions demonstrates that political actors who can generate transaction costs may be also relevant. Even though these actors lack the "numerical" leverage to exercise a veto (by preventing the coalition from meeting the decision threshold), Tsebelis argues there is a "political” logic to accommodating their preferences (Tsebelis 2002, p. 96). They may still provoke a political crisis even if they cannot defeat the status quo.\textsuperscript{85} While it is difficult to ascertain their motives for doing so in cross-national studies, my qualitative analysis of cases mitigates this problem.

Summary

The first observation that emerges from this discussion is that across a broad range of dependent variables, studies arrive at similar conclusions about the causal effects of the number, distance, and internal cohesion of veto players. A second observation is that political exchanges generate transaction costs. This affects the absorption rule by requiring us to count some additional preferences as distinct and relevant. A third, related observation is that players who cannot effectively exercise a veto (because their vote might not be necessary to meet the decision threshold) can still impact bargaining. In many ways these observations suggest that veto player theory easily lends itself to an analysis across regimes. For example, it is significant that the theory allows for some actors without a formal veto to impose costs on the bargaining process. Yet a number of

\textsuperscript{85} In particular, Strom – like Cox and McCubbins – counsels against counting preferences as veto players just because they differ. He argues that “a credible veto player must have both opportunity and motive.” Partisan players in parliamentary government may lack opportunity while institutional players may lack motive (Strom 2000, 261-89). Tsebelis responds that “demonstrable opportunity” either sets an unreasonably high standard for data requiring a case-by-case basis, or ends up being equivalent to participating in government in the first place (Tsebelis 2002, 87).
problems arise when extending the model to authoritarian regimes. The next section outlines these challenges and describes how scholars have addressed them.

**A MULTI-REGIME MODEL**

Incorporating non-democratic regimes into the theory presents new complications. Since extra-constitutional behavior and informal rules may be the norms of politics under authoritarian regimes, identifying and comparing institutions is more difficult. Yet scholars have effectively addressed this challenge in contexts as diverse as China (Shirk 1993), the Soviet Union (Roeder 1993), and east Asia (MacIntyre 2001, 81-122) by incorporating bureaucratic centers of power and observed political behavior as a guide to informal rules and institutions. From this point, Tsebelis says the practical task of identifying the preferences and vetoes in authoritarian regimes involves careful scrutiny of each regime (Tsebelis 2002, 78).

This section focuses on collective governance. I address whether, why, and how governance is inherently collective, responding to each of these issues. I begin by establishing the necessary prior asserted by Tsebelis that even autocrats cannot rule alone. I support this proposition with evidence from non-obvious authoritarian cases. I then outline three reasons why dictators reach out to other political actors. Each rationale, drawn from accumulated knowledge about non-democratic regimes, is discussed comparatively and makes reference to Nigerian cases. Next, I describe how existing studies demonstrate that a key task in applying the veto player model across regimes is to identify alternative centers of power. As both MacIntyre and Roeder reveal, this is the principal variation among authoritarian regimes and it tells us much about the relationship between institutions and competing interests.
**Whether and Why Governance is Collective**

In extending this theory to authoritarian regimes, Tsebelis writes “while non-democratic regimes are generally considered to be single veto player regimes, close analysis may reveal the existence of multiple veto players” (Tsebelis 2002, 90). This proposition is illustrated with reference to two non-obvious examples – Chile and Iraq – that are least likely to support Tsebelis’ intuition. These examples are consistent with studies of the Soviet Union and China that uncover evidence of collective governance and “reciprocal accountability” through multiple “tiers” of officials (Shirk 1993; Roeder 1993).

In Chile, Pinochet’s regime was long considered a quintessential case of a successful concentration of power by a dictator. The regime’s rules specified that the military junta had legislative powers defined in the constitution and all decisions by the junta required unanimous agreement. This effectively gave Pinochet a veto and his ruthless disciplining of junta members kept rebellious military service chiefs in check (Valenzuela 1991, 21-71). Later interpretations of Chile’s authoritarian years paint a more nuanced picture in which the complexity of decision making emerges with competing centers of power. The consensus decision rule was in fact a compromise in response to protests by the navy and air force to Pinochet’s centralization of power. Pluralism within the junta and decision making rules that required input from the other service chiefs created constraints on Pinochet’s rule (Barros 2003, 188-222).

---

86 King et al. argue that “crucial case studies” (Eckstein 1975, 79-135) are not useful for testing hypotheses because too much causal inference relies on a few causal variables. But inference is improved by pairing separate and independent case studies. In this way case studies can play a valuable role in theory building (King, Keohane and others 1994).
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq provides an even more compelling “least likely” example than Chile. American intelligence reported in 1991 that “Saddam makes all key decisions in Iraq; he appears to have been a solitary decisionmaker most of his life.” Power was centralized within the Ba’th Party and the Revolutionary Command Council but it extended to a broader network of loyalists. The inner circle, largely drawn from Saddam’s Tikriti clan, communicated its decisions to a “second tier” of bureaucrats and Ba’th politicians. These “first tier” leaders maintained patronage networks through the National Assembly. Saddam trusted few and tortured many but he still constructed institutions to legitimize the regime and implement decisions. He used the Ba’th Party to “check the political pulse of the nation” and recruit new leaders. He replaced “party hacks” in the ministries with technocrats. In making many of these high level appointments, “the whole range of Iraq’s diverse population was well represented” (Tripp 2002, 223-235). He also combined his famously brutal repression of Shi’a opponents with targeted economic and social development programs intended to buy them off. Few dictators of the Twentieth Century stand on par with Saddam Hussein, yet he balanced his need for loyalty with a calculus of broader Iraqi politics.

To be sure, accountability is limited under authoritarian regimes such as those in Iraq or Chile, and citizens enjoy few political liberties. These examples do however help strip away caricatures of autocrats as solitary figures. They reveal the analytical dangers of equating an apparent centralization of power or the absence of elections with a single veto of monolithic preferences. There are at least three practical reasons why dictators

---

reach out to other political actors, including insuring against risk, recruiting expertise, and purchasing legitimacy.

First, dictators seek to share political risk. Unlike some democratic governments, particularly those governing through a parliamentary coalition, authoritarian governments have a high degree of identifiability associated with policies. Therefore dictators hope to claim credit for successes and assign blame for failures. Inviting new players provides insurance by distributing the blame for governance failures or unpopular policies. An often cited story from *The Prince* tells how Duke Cesare Borgia appointed a cruel administrator to establish order in Romagna and granted him vast powers. Machiavelli says once the administrator, Remiro d’Orco, established stability Borgia publicly killed him to give the public the (false) impression that he was not responsible for the hardships d’Orco imposed to restore order. The sight of d’Orco’s dismembered body “made the people of Romagna simultaneously happy and dumfounded” (Machiavelli 1994). Similarly, Babangida’s numerous cabinet re-shuffles in Nigeria helped absorb the political impact of his unpopular Structural Adjustment Program which had led to huge price increases. He went through three ministers of finance in barely three years and dismissed ministers for Rural Development, Water Resources and Agriculture. Firing the ministers was not politically costless but it permitted him to assign blame for the shortcomings of his Program.

Second, dictators govern with partners who have institutional memory or policy expertise. To return to the Chilean example, Pinochet recruited the help of technocratic

---

and legal experts even though he adopted repressive policies against much of civil society. When he came to power, the armed forces had no coherent view of national policy and few officers had even studied in universities (Remmer 1989, 149-70; Sanders 1978, 270-287). The alliances with experts and academic specialists were a defining feature of Latin America’s bureaucratic authoritarian regimes. These technocrats justified an undemocratic policy process on rational terms, which allowed the government to claim that policies were rooted in public interest rather than self-interest (Collier 1979; O’Donnell 1973). In Mao’s China, the policy makers at the center had to rely on technical expertise from the provinces to design economic reforms (Shirk 1990-1991, 227-58). In Iraq, Saddam Hussein replaced cronies with commanders respected by the military for their competence after the U.S. amassed troops in Saudi Arabia (in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait). Likewise, many of Nigeria’s autocrats recruited old hands from the civilian bureaucracy or academia (Umoden 1992; Amuwo 2002, 93-121).

Third and perhaps most importantly, authoritarian regimes expand the number of policy actors because they are susceptible to charges of illegitimacy. The architect of Nigeria’s 1975 coup, Joseph Garba, commented “While there are several problems that confront a military government on coming to power, the first critical issue is that of legitimizing itself through the distribution of appointive offices” (Garba 1995). Including new veto players generates legitimacy by sending a message that the regime is representative of society and various political interests. Perlmutter makes the sweeping

---

90 CIA (Jan. 1990) op cit. It is relevant to note that when Saddam replaced his military commanders in 1990, the CIA specifically argues that it was not due to any known dissention in the ranks – suggesting it was not a purge.
generalization that “Without exception, from the Bolsheviks to the autocratic praetorians of Uganda and Libya, from the Nazis to Franco, Salazar, Nasser and Perón, modern autocracies and authoritarian regimes seek popular legitimacy and support” (Perlmutter 1981). The need for legitimacy stems from the fact that decision making appears *ad hoc*. The absence of regular, recurring elections means leadership selection rules lack predictability and credibility. When dictators have information about the risks of governing with little public support, they often choose to address these problems.

Any combination of the above reasons argues that dictators cannot rule alone. The appearance of a single veto player often conceals a more complicated decision process, where consultations with others are expected or required. As a result, authoritarian regimes differ in important ways. The next section explains how several comparative studies account for this variation by incorporating authority not formally specified by the institutions of government.

**How Authoritarian Regimes Rule**

When weighing the importance of expertise, increased legitimacy, or risk insurance, authoritarian regimes confront difficult choices regarding how many actors they want to involve in decision making. I discuss three important studies of non-democracies, each involving a different dependent variable. Even though some of these studies do not use veto players, they all explore the relationship between formal and informal institutions. They identify this relationship as the key to distinguishing among

---

91 This therefore treats democracy as a continuous rather than a dichotomous variable. An alternative approach is to generate typologies and Parsonian “ideal types” of authoritarian regimes (Linz and Stepan 1996). While such nomenclature is useful, it typically must also accommodate numerous exceptions and creates residual categories.
authoritarian regimes. It is also an important way of analytically capturing how policy elites govern collectively.

Roeder’s study of the 15 post-Soviet republics claims that their differing authoritarian trajectories can be explained by elite responses to two dilemmas: In the first dilemma, self-interested policy actors delegated authority to strong leaders. However doing so created monitoring problems if leaders abused that authority. The second dilemma arose due to the risks of expanding participation; leaders hoped these measures would increase the number of “partisans” siding with them. Unfortunately it also opened a door to democratization by enfranchising new groups. The way in which elites resolved these two dilemmas explains the type of authoritarian regime that emerged. Roeder outlines three types: First, in Uzbekistan and Belarus, because the bureaucracies were unified they delegated power to the president, displacing parliamentary authority. This led to “autocracies” in these countries, where a small junta ruled and constituted the pool of all potential successors. Second, “oligarchies” emerged where politicians delegated away policy responsibility and bureaucracies were strong but not terribly unified. This was the case in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Third, “exclusive republics” emerged where competitive parties had control, excluding unsympathetic segments of the public from participating or barring parties backed by bureaucrats. The difference among these regimes is whether “policymakers are accountable to a narrow circle of chief executive(s), to officials of the larger apparatus of the state, or to groups located outside the state” (Roeder 1994, 63).

Rather than looking at authoritarian trajectories, Shirk studies the different paths to reform in the Soviet Union and China. One reason why her account is important here
is that she explains how political elites at the center became accountable to a broader political community. She attributes Deng Xiaoping’s successful push for economic reforms to his strategy of “playing to the provinces.” Although Communist political institutions at the center would not allow for reform, the central bureaucracy was dependent on the provinces. Moreover, policy change required consensus (not simply majority) decisions among the bureaucrats who made economic policy. Aspirants to the top Party offices needed the support of provincial officials and former members of the military. As a result, Deng cleverly exploited this system of “reciprocal accountability” to create a constituency for market reforms. He built a coalition among the political actors responsible for choosing the top Party officials and who also stood to benefit the most from fiscal and administrative decentralization (Shirk 1993).

Another reason why Shirk’s account is important is because it describes informal elite coalitions that formed around formal institutions. This often occurred with substantial input from informal interests. Retired party leaders and interested military officers formed an important counter-balance to the Communist Central Committee – part of Deng’s “constituency” for economic reform (Shirk 1993; Shirk 1990-1991, 227-58). Like Roeder’s exclusive republics in the former Soviet Union (Roeder 1994, 61-101), elites deliberately built political coalitions with political actors outside the state and the bureaucracy. MacIntyre argues that such channeling of interests is precisely why veto player models can capture informal institutions as well as unilateral or extra-constitutional executive action of dictators. “Institutional frameworks are surrounded by seas of contending interests,” he says. The range of preferences of informal actors was
very similar across his Asian cases, and “these contending interests were ultimately mediated through formal veto structures” (MacIntyre 2001, 90).

Drawing on these frameworks, we can establish a rough guide to counting the political actors involved in the policy process, starting with the cases with the fewest policy actors. In the first instance, Roeder’s model of autocracy and MacIntyre’s description of Indonesia are examples of cases with only one veto player. In Indonesia, the executive so dominated the party that the legislature’s preferences were indistinguishable from his.92 MacIntyre’s characterization of Indonesia is consistent with Tsebelis’ typology outlined earlier, which assumes the analytical equivalency of collective and individual veto players in such rare cases. Second, the executive creates and implements policy. But it is a collective body that must take steps to maintain internal cohesion. This resembles the relationship MacIntyre describes between the powerful cabinet in Malaysia and the country’s oversized political party, which had a limited ability to impose transaction costs on bargaining (MacIntyre 2001, 81-122). It also resembles the Soviet system Roeder describes, in which policy making was highly centralized in the Politburo but these officials were “reciprocally accountable” to bureaucrats (Roeder 1993). In the third instance, the number of veto players is in a middle range. The policy process includes additional political actors for any one of the reasons outlined earlier, and there are at least two veto players. However the government can still marginalize the role of alternative centers of power. This occurred in the USSR

---

92 One argument to the contrary suggests that Indonesia’s “New Order” depersonalized Suharto’s political authority, creating authoritarian institutions larger than his ability to dominate the party (Liddle 1985, 68-90). Another perspective attributes the concentration of power to the class structure inherited from the colonial experience, explicitly discounting the role of Suharto or any particular individual in shaping power relations (Robison 1988).
after the death of Stalin, when despite some decentralization the central bureaucracy remained strong enough to block reforms. Removal of the chief executive is a theoretical possibility in these regimes but it requires meeting a high threshold (in the USSR it was only met once in 70 years). Fourth, although the executive takes the lead on policy, it must contend with alternative centers of power, such as China’s provincial authorities and retired military officials during Deng. In these cases, the executive finds it difficult to monopolize political recruitment. They typically rely on specialized bureaucracies to identify candidates for recruitment and advancement. Finally, the authoritarian regimes with the most veto players have policy actors in multiple institutions, some of which may be indebted to organized societal interests. Removal of the chief executive is a political possibility and checks and balances may conduce to policy gridlock. This includes the exclusive republics of the former Soviet Union.

These generalizations create a standard whereby multiple veto players within a single organization, such as a revolutionary command council, can be compared to a different regime in which multiple veto players exist scattered throughout the government. Factions and organizations not specified by formal institutions can exercise real political leverage. This neither alters our criteria for distinguishing between different types of veto players, nor does it corrupt the basic causal logic about the number, cohesion, and distance of veto players. An important implication is that the difference between authoritarian and democratic regimes is not that the former have fewer vetoes or that they ignore public opinion; neither may be the case.93 Rather, the difference is

93 Henisz and Mansfield take a contrary view. They argue that the impact of veto players on trade policy is different depending on the regime type. They write, for example, “autocrats can more easily change policy than democratic leaders” (Henisz and Mansfield 2006, 189-211). This contrasts with the underlying
merely whether the players are determined by voters or not (see Tsebelis 2002, p. 78). This claim by Tsebelis is admittedly a strong one. After all political parties and ruling military councils may both be collective policy actors, but their rather different processes of preference aggregation might lead to qualitatively different policy preferences. This however is a separate question from the one raised by my dependent variable, which considers measures of government performance that possess different theoretical properties. In the next section I explore precisely how the causal logic of veto players can explain such complex outcomes, rather than merely policy stability.

**POLICY CONSEQUENCES**

In order to explain the empirical phenomena observed in Chapter 1, our theory needs to identify causes of several different policy results instead of just policy stability. The theory should account for performance in different types of policies as well as variation in “policy efficiency.” This section summarizes empirical findings about the relationship between veto players and policy stability and explains how we can move from these models to one that anticipates other types of outcomes. The existing models that attempt to do so lead to contradictory expectations about the impact of veto players on the supply of public goods. I conclude by formulating a hypothesis and three tests of it which highlight this contradiction.

**Policy Stability and Distributional Dilemmas**

The earlier discussion about the impact of different veto players was limited to generalizations about policy stability. The literature agrees about the consequences of the argument of Tsebelis (2002) and MacIntyre (2001), who emphasize the number of veto points – regardless of regime type – for policy stability.
number of players, distance of preferences, and cohesion within veto players on policy
stability. However, there is less agreement about whether the addition of political actors
to the policy process creates policy stability and “credible commitment,” or whether new
veto players also contribute to bargaining problems. Veto player theory addresses these
literatures as two traditions: The first argues that the essential tradeoff presented by veto
players concerns the benefits of “commitment” versus the hazards of too much policy
instability. The second tradition focuses on a distributional dilemma between nationally-
oriented versus particularistic policies. It suggests that veto players impact bargaining
problems and therefore the type of policies supplied.

The credible commitment literature claims that the promises of governments must
be credible. This is conducive to long term economic development because it strengthens
guarantees for property rights and protects private investment from state predation (North
and Weingast 1989). The veto player literature in this tradition suggests that when a
government faces a credible commitment problem, policy stability is an advantage. The
addition of distinct, cohesive veto players increases “resoluteness” by creating checks in
the policy process. Henisz argues this is conducive to economic growth because policy
commitment makes impetuous reversals less likely (Henisz 2000, 1-31). Similarly,
studies suggest that commitment generated through checks on central banks enhances the
credibility of macroeconomic policy (Keefer and Stasavage 2003, 407-20). Reducing the
potential for policy instability affects outcomes such the durability of economic reforms
in Latin America (Schiavon 2000), and the rule of law by introducing checks that limit
the ability of judges to collect bribes (Andrews and Montinola 2004, 55-87). Resoluteness is a disadvantage when policy flexibility or “decisiveness” is required. “A
high level of commitment” makes it more difficult to reign in high inflation (Tsebelis 2002; Keefer and Stasavage 2003, 407-20). MacIntyre’s study similarly shows that Thailand’s six veto players impeded its ability to make the policy changes necessary to restore investor confidence. Only the Philippines struck an appropriate balance because its policy was “sticky” but there was still sufficient flexibility to make the necessary policy changes (MacIntyre 2001, 81-122).

In contrast to the commitment literature, Cox and McCubbins propose a kind of distributional dilemma whereby more veto players means more pork. As a consequence of bargaining, “each veto player will be able to demand, and receive, such side payments in the form of narrowly targeted policies” (Cox and McCubbins 2001, 28). Narrow, private-regarded policies encompass “fiscal pork,” such as geographically targetable projects distributed according to a political rather than an economic logic, as well as rents. Supplying pork to everyone is costly both in terms of the budget and the costs of each individual transfer.94 An organization such as a political party may internalize the transaction costs of these transfers and give actors incentives to support national-oriented policies. But the bargaining problems that reduce supply of public goods may remain if these organizations fail to reconcile internally conflicting interests. MacIntyre makes a related observation: rather than claiming that more veto players necessarily means more pork, he argues that competition over pork creates incentives for veto players to distinguish their preferences from one another. This generates a kind of cycling effect, much like a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby the supply of and demand for particularistic

94 Kaldor-Hicks judges a policy as welfare-enhancing when a bundle of costless transfers benefit everyone. Cox and McCubbins’ point here is that transfers do have costs and they produce efficiency losses when they come as logrolls.
policies reinforce each other. Each party in Thailand demanded costly concessions rather than compromising on policies to restore investor confidence (MacIntyre 2001, 81-122).

The central problem of the distributional dilemma is that demanding particularistic policies is individually rational but it leads to collectively irrational outcomes in the form of fewer public goods. Studies of legislatures draw the same conclusion: when more parties have a say over policy, fiscal indiscipline increases because each party demands compensation. To satisfy everyone involved policy becomes a log roll plagued by coordination problems within the cabinet (Strom, Müller and others 2003). Coalition governments are therefore more likely to have spending deficits (Alesina, Roubini and others 1997). The World Bank finds that since coalition governments make so many compromises and payoffs, “fiscal outcomes are often worse than when majority governments are in power” (World Bank 2002b). Crepaz suggests this is more likely during economically good times, while during hard times governments (at least in the OECD) face up to the need for restraint (Crepaz 2002, 169-88). If all this is true, then we would expect to observe the opposite outcome when fewer parties are at the bargaining table. Lijphart claims this is captured by moving from these more “consensual” governments to more majoritarian governments (Lijphart 1999). In fact majoritarian governments do have smaller deficits, regardless of whether the system is parliamentary or presidential (Persson and Tabellini 2003).95 In their application of Lijphart’s typologies to a veto player model, Birchfield and Crepaz claim that

---

95 Lijphart’s findings are slightly different, reporting that consensus governments perform marginally better on inflation and budget deficits compared to majoritarian governments (Lijphart 1999).
majoritarianism produces fewer veto players (Birchfield and Crepaz 1998, 175-200). This supports my contention that the literatures on parliamentary coalitions and veto player bargaining both point to comparable policy consequences of bargaining problems.

**Predicting Performance**

As Treisman and Tsebelis both point out, the commitment tradition (broadly understood) and the distributional dilemma tradition lead to contradictory predictions for the supply of public goods (Treisman 2000, 837-56; Tsebelis 2002). I argue that because they can impose transaction costs, additional veto players with distinct, cohesive preferences generate bargaining problems. This has adverse consequences for public goods but it also produces “positive externalities” for other policy outcomes. I hypothesize that more veto players lead to more pork. I formulate three related tests for this hypothesis: The first examines the level of pork, the second tests for the impact on public goods, while the third considers the efficiency of spending on pork. Ultimately, addressing the tension between bargaining problems and commitment provides an answer to the empirical puzzle raised by the variation in performance documented in Chapter 1.

The first test proposes that distributing more pork yields increased levels of policy delivery because each veto player demands benefits for his or her community. This “fiscal pork,” such as new schools, is geographically targetable (see Cox and McCubbins 2001, 47). In the aggregate, national policy goals such as reducing classroom size and increasing the number of teachers may be met through this “morselization.” But the distributional logic of fiscal pork is inherently political. It does not adhere to economic

---

96 They exclude several features of Lijphart’s dimensions, which may affect their results (Tsebelis 2002, 88-89)
or any developmental rationality, even if it does improve the aggregate picture portrayed in national statistics.

**Test #1:** Level of pork – adding veto players increases the delivery of particularistic policies. Pork is observable in my education variables in terms of more teachers and schools.

A policy process that focuses exclusively on producing pork, however, impairs the delivery of public goods. The second test therefore focuses on this policy outcome. Following the criteria established in Chapter 1, I identify public goods as policies whose benefits are non-divisible and non-excludable, unlike particularistic policies which are targetable. My measures of judicial efficiency and fiscal discipline resemble this definition of public goods. If Cox and McCubbins, along with Alesina et al. (1997), are correct then additional veto players will exacerbate collective action problems, leading to morselization of policy. The delivery of public goods will decline while education may suffer no adverse effects.

**Test #2:** Public goods – adding veto players undermines the delivery of public goods. Public goods are observable in budget discipline and judicial efficiency.

Rather than looking at the level of delivery or the type of policy, my third test considers the impact of veto players on the *efficiency* of pork spending. Chapter 1 defined "policy efficiency" as a ratio of government spending (in constant terms) relative to policy output in education. Literature in the credible commitment tradition expects additional players to improve accountability and reduce opportunities for corruption. By this logic, policy efficiency should increase with additional veto players. But the intuition here is instead that no veto player sees the value in self-restraint while her peers
are permitted to “eat from the national cake” unrestrained (to use popular Nigerian terminology). The problem is not necessarily increases in the number of payoffs; individually these are only marginally expensive. The trouble is that collectively these payments add up to fiscal irresponsibility which is observable in policy inefficiency. I expect to see governments with more veto players accumulating deadweight loss: naira-for-naira, these governments spend more without necessarily delivering more. This means that extra checks may make policy more stable but they also make it more expensive.

Test #3: Policy efficiency – additional veto players make pork more expensive. This will be observable in my policy efficiency variables as each item of pork costs more money.

A conclusion I expect to draw from these tests is that increasing the number of veto players increases the level of delivery but it also contributes to bargaining problems. This means that additional schools or teachers are a positive externality of policy processes which actually undersupply public goods. Another conclusion I anticipate is that while additional veto players may increase the number of checks on the policy process, they do not necessarily eliminate corruption and rentier behavior. Before coding my data and conducting my tests, the next chapter will elaborate on regional vetoes as one type of informal veto. I suggest that the persistence of such vetoes pose a difficult dilemma for Nigeria. Specifically, avoiding the addition of excess veto players is complicated by political institutions that promote inclusive decision making.

97 Deadweight loss refers to a situation where the gain to the firm is smaller than the loss to consumers, but the difference in cost is passed on to society when the firm holds a monopoly (Przeworski 2003).
98 “An externality is an effect of actions of an individual that affects the welfare (utility) of others...Externalities are positive if the action of one individual increases the welfare of other individuals” (Przeworski 2003, 36-37).
CONCLUSION

I began this chapter with the standard definition of veto players as individual or collective actors whose agreement is needed to change the status quo. Institutional players are those whose authority is formally defined in the polity’s rules while partisan players are generated by the political game inside those institutions. I outlined three broad behavioral propositions common to the veto player literature which states that increasing the number, internal cohesion, and the degree of difference among players increases policy stability. Incorporating transaction costs in political exchanges increases the number of distinct preferences bargaining over policy. This modifies the “absorption rule” and suggests that a variety of actors can impose costs on bargaining. This modification is consistent with empirical findings from the literature on bargaining in oversized parliamentary coalitions.

Next, I addressed the first of this chapter’s two major tasks by showing how veto player models can incorporate non-democratic regimes. Using the non-obvious examples of Chile and Iraq, I claimed that even autocrats cannot rule alone. I gave three possible reasons why dictators turn to other actors for help, including risk insurance, expertise, and the need to generate legitimacy. I outlined how practical problems posed by informal institutions are substantially addressed by studies that define institutions broadly. These studies look to the bureaucracy, political constituencies, and non-governmental actors for their systematic input into the policy process. In this way, factions organized outside of formal constitutional structures can emerge as informal veto players. I also established a guide for counting the number of veto players. The possible range includes at one end regimes in which policy making and implementation require only the chief executive’s
consent and the preferences in collective bodies mirror his or her preferences. At the other end, removal of the chief executive is a real political possibility and gridlock may emerge from a system of checks and balances among multiple veto players.

I then addressed this chapter’s other major task, which is to explain how veto players account for various outcomes, not just policy stability. Building on studies which examine the consequences of veto players, I formulate a hypothesis stating that more veto players lead to more pork. I propose three tests of this hypothesis: the first links an increase in the number of veto players to an increase in levels of delivery of particularistic policies, the second predicts a decline in public goods as bargaining problems emerge, and the third claim that additional veto players reduce spending efficiency. I expect my empirical tests in Chapter 6 to support research that links distributive dilemmas in the policy process to bargaining problems. Before carrying out these tests though, the next chapter will identify institutions that incentivize morselization of policy by facilitating the formation of informal vetoes rooted in regional political structures. Nigerians designed these structures to approximate varying levels of diversity throughout the country. They now face a potential dilemma in that these institutions intended to reduce societal tensions and improve representation may also exacerbate bargaining problems.
INTRODUCTION

Nigerian politics unfold at the intersection of geography and identity. The British decision to unite disparate colonial territories in 1914, the description of the country as a “mere geographical expression” by nationalists in the 1950’s, and the resurgence of violent secessionist movements in the early 21st century are all manifestations of this uneasy nexus. The previous chapter outlined a conceptual framework which includes the possibility of “informal” vetoes. Here I establish a relationship between cultural identity and political leverage. I argue that the northern and southern regions can exercise informal, regional vetoes. This occurs when one region is under-represented and political actors have both incentives to appeal to sub-national preferences and the means to coordinate them. Thus this chapter outlines the logic of regional vetoes and the circumstances under which they emerge.

Nigeria’s cleavages range from broad regional distinctions to narrow lines of ethnic and even sub-ethnic identities. The more discrete cleavages compete for distinct representation and demand particularistic payoffs, activities which undermine the
delivery of public goods. However demands expressed through these smaller cleavages are unable to impose transaction costs sufficient to exercise an effective veto. This problem can be overcome when organizations or institutions coordinate these preferences. Political elites have incentives to organize at the subnational level when their region is acutely under-represented in the policy process.

In this chapter, I first point out that studies examining the impact of social heterogeneity typically focus on outcomes other than government performance. Many studies are pessimistic about the ability of plural societies to achieve economic growth or to prevent civil conflict. A rather different argument claims that one must explore the incentives for the politicization of identities in order to link diversity to different outcomes. Second, I describe various avenues for organizing sub-national identities and explain the historical basis for the politicization of social differences. Nigeria’s political institutions sustain at least three cleavages: regions express the country’s broadest difference, between north and south; “zones” provide a looser construction of cultural solidarity within each of those regions; and states serve as a still narrower unit of identity, often reinforcing ethnic distinctions. Third, I explain how sub-national identities influence the emergence regionally-based veto players. I describe competing philosophies of representation in Nigeria and develop an identity matrix to approximate the proportions of the three basic identities. Regions must possess both cause and capability to exercise a veto. Existing veto players benefit from the persistence of discrete identities because they can co-opt subnational interests and deliberately exacerbate coordination problems within regions. In the fourth section I provide an example of a regional veto in action.
HOW DOES SOCIAL DIVERSITY IMPACT PERFORMANCE?

Numerous studies attribute Nigeria’s governance failures to the politicization of cultural identities (Joseph 1991; Momoh and Adejumobi 2002). Since the number of ethnic groups does not change during the time-series covered by my data, this suggests that the mere presence of diversity is an inadequate explanation for the variation in performance documented in Chapter 1. In this section I outline the little that we know about the impact of social heterogeneity on governance, including efforts to isolate the effects of social diversity on different outcomes.

Research has generally focused on three logically appealing effects of diversity. The first concerns the likelihood of civil conflict. As ethnic conflicts threatened countries ranging from Rwanda to Yugoslavia in the 1990s, scholars began to question the conventional wisdom about the causes of civil violence (Gurr 2000; Mamdani 2001). Much of this literature now argues that ethnic and religious diversity does not by itself increase the likelihood of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75-90; Young 2002, 532-56). Even the troubling case of Nigeria’s civil war, a brutal war for ethnic secession, illustrates how the social meaning of ethnicity can shift substantially. Before the war, Igbo identity implied marginalization and untrustworthiness. After the war these stereotypes instead signaled to non-Igbos self-sufficiency and commercial ingenuity. Within a few short years, Igbo identification was first used to justify violence and then used to facilitate a civil reconciliation within the broader Nigerian nation (Anthony 2002).

99 Estimates for the number of ethnic groups in Nigeria range between 250 and 434; these figures vary due to different definitions of ethnicity (Egbokhare 2001, 39-48). Posner’s measure of ethnic diversity notes that the number of groups does change for some African countries since 1960 but Nigeria’s does not (Posner 2004, 849-63).
A second research emphasis concerns whether diversity affects political stability. Some scholars suggest that ethnic diversity impedes stability, regardless of regime type (Przeworski 2003, 114-144). Others claim that stable polities are possible in plural societies when the government takes various measures to accommodate differences and manage social tensions (Lijphart 1977; Lijphart 1996). Electoral institutions and federal structures are other potential mechanisms for promoting political stability in divided societies (Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Horowitz 1985; Reynolds 2002). Reynolds argues for example that the type of executive (president or prime minister), the electoral system, and the majoritarian nature of institutions all shape the degree of political inclusiveness in divided societies. Inclusiveness predicts the likelihood of “positive democratization,” including political stability and ethnic accommodation (Reynolds 1999). The central debate within this approach is whether political outcomes are better served by transcending social cleavages or by institutions that deliberately (and “fairly”) represent them.

Government performance is a third dependent variable. Africa’s development problems are often attributed to colonial manipulation of ethnicity or traditional authority structures. Studies that examine the consequences of ethnicity and social diversity on post-independence government performance are contradictory. Leading Africanists blame low growth, low school enrollment and budget deficits on ethnic fractionalization.

---

100 Few studies examine how social heterogeneity impacted post-colonial government performance specifically. This is not to argue for de-linking historical processes or to ignore colonialism’s enduring impact. My point here is simply that the range of post-colonial strategies for dealing with ethnic and social diversity is related to the variety of performance outcomes. Human agency is a reality of the post-imperial experience.
Some cross-regional studies measuring performance in terms of economic growth, corruption and the quality of policy are similarly pessimistic (Alesina et al. 2003, 155-94). Others claim that ethnic “dominance,” rather than diversity, undermines performance (Collier 2003, 149-177). Fish and Brooks argue that heterogeneity neither stifles economic performance nor makes conflict more likely (Fish and Brooks 2004, 154-66). Unfortunately, they do not explain divergent outcomes among plural societies in their sample.

A few scholars have sought to fill this gap by accounting for divergent outcomes across plural societies. One study attributes differences to the varying structures of ethnic groups. It argues that centralized traditional authority improves delivery of health care and education (Gennaioli and Rainer 2004). In a study of Kenya and Tanzania, Miguel compares divergent performance records in these two societies with similarly heterogeneous compositions. He attributes outcomes to their different nation building experiences: Tanzania’s post-independence ideology generated social capital by promoting a national identity. This helped resolve collective action problems, thereby enabling the delivery of public goods. In Kenya, by contrast, ethnic diversity is correlated with lower funding of public goods. Ethnic diversity undermines government performance when socialization processes fail to reinforce a national identity (Miguel 2004, 327-62; Miguel and Gugerty 2005).

There is no reason why the mere presence of social diversity should inspire civil war, promote political instability or impede government performance. Because the

---

101 Easterly has recently revised his earlier views regarding the effects of ethnicity. His new findings suggest that ethnicity only negatively impacts economic performance when institutions are weak (Easterly 2001, 687-706).
number of Nigeria’s ethnic and religious differences is essentially constant in my sample, it would be difficult to claim that the effect of social pluralism in Nigeria is always negative. The mere existence of heterogeneity does not undermine government performance. What does change in Nigeria, however, are the ways in which governance structures either transcend or reinforce social difference. In the next section I describe three different cultural bases of politics. I also explain the historical basis for geographic coordination of political claims through subnational units.

**SUBNATIONAL IDENTITIES AND POLITICAL CLAIMS**

In this section I describe how colonialism reinforced Nigeria’s identities by organizing them into geographically distinct voices. The essential bargain of Nigeria’s nationhood rests on a “regional” balance between north and south, the broadest cultural distinction. Politics also incorporate more discrete bases of identity. “Zones” represent cultural groupings within each region. Even though they do not officially exist in constitutions or other founding documents, political differences often reflect zonal cleavages. Finally, a number of states exist within each zone. Together these political units form the building blocks of representation and they help coordinate political preferences. After summarizing the historical basis of Nigeria’s subnational units, I describe how these cleavages persist culturally and behaviorally.

**Historical Bases of Ethno-Regionalism**

The organization of Nigeria’s many cultures on the basis of regional territories began under the British. Colonial rule over Nigeria started in 1861 when Lagos fell. The British divided the territory into northern and southern protectorates. At first they applied indirect rule only to the north where they had defeated the Sokoto Caliphate in the late
nineteenth century, then resurrected its hierarchies to facilitate indirect rule (Sen 2002, 119-32). One administrator described the logic of indirect rule this way: “Our aim is to rule through existing chiefs, to raise them in the administrative scale, to enlist them on our side in the work of progress and good government. We cannot do without them. To rule directly would require an army of British magistrates,” (Crowder 1978, 173). Indirect rule meant that the Emir forfeited his sovereignty but secured protection from his rivals through the British. Under Native Administration, the British Governor-General described local chiefs “not as independent but as dependent Rulers.”

After the amalgamation of north and south in 1914 the British applied the same principles to the remainder of the country but with less success. Unlike the Hausa and Fulani rulers in the north, the traditional rulers in the predominantly Yoruba west had less success imposing direct taxes. Indirect rule ran into even greater difficulties in the east. Only a few chiefs in the Niger Delta were appropriate British conduits and groups such as the Igbo and Ibibio had consensual and highly decentralized forms of governance. The absence of a clear hierarchy inspired the English to create the much hated “warrant chiefs” who became the target of famous rebellions against colonial authority (Crowder 1978; Afigbo 1972).

These three broadly distinct responses to indirect rule by Nigeria’s major ethnic groups were countered by administrative strategies that reinforced regionalism (Sklar 2004; Afigbo 1991, 13-29). Even after the extension of indirect rule to the whole country, governance of the regions remained distinct in practice through British “divide and rule tactics” such as regulating travel, keeping settlements segregated and keeping missionaries out of the predominantly Muslim north (Abernethy 1969). The 1939
division of the south into two more administrative regions meant that each of the three political sub-units of the country had a dominant ethnic group. As of the early 1950s, the Hausa and Fulani made up about 53 percent of the North, the Yoruba made up 83 percent of the West, and the Igbo counted for 70 percent of the East (Coleman 1958). The British created assemblies for each of these regions in 1946 to give the Native Authorities a voice in governing. But their role was based on a weakly federal distribution of power and they essentially depended on the consent of the center. Increasing regional autonomy as a step towards eventual independence became a rallying cry of the nationalists and the 1954 constitution accommodated them by granting the regions more authority. The question of ethnic minority under-representation went unaddressed though, even after a commission during the transition to independence highlighted the problem.

The Persistence of Ethno-Politics

On the surface, the independence government appeared to inherit a colonial tripartite structure where one large ethnic group dominated each region. But the reality was more complex, as (at least) three cleavages survived. The largest one manifests itself in the cultural divide between north and south. Slightly smaller cleavages exist within each region, in what Nigerians call “zones.” By 1963 the government was recognizing cultural groups through the creation of states. Each of these three cleavages has persisted.

First of all, national political structures reinforce the historical and cultural differences between north and south. To this day, the most basic cleavage in Nigeria lies between the predominantly Muslim north and the majority Christian south. The drafters of the independence constitution agreed in 1959 that Islam could govern certain areas of
civil law. This placated northern demands and codified an historic national compromise.
The north bargained on the issue at the time because Islam encouraged the reality and the perception of northern unity. Not only did the north want to portray itself as a viable cohesive political community, its leaders (such as Ahmadu Bello) feared that an orthodox Islamic path at odds with free markets would limit economic development (Mohammed 2005, 147-164).

Forty years after independence, a northern governor challenged this founding constitutional pact. The results illustrate the ongoing relevance of regional distinctions. In 1999 Governor Ahmed Sani announced Zamfara state’s adoption of shari’ā (Islamic law) for both civil and criminal matters. The state legislature made the new provisions compulsory for all Muslims in the state. “Without shari’ā there is no Islam” explained the governor. “We are Muslims and must live and die as Muslims.”102 Within months, eleven more northern state legislatures enacted Islamic criminal codes. Christian minorities in the north panicked. Thousands of people were killed in riots between Christians and Muslims in the north and reprisal attacks in the south.

Significantly though, the fault lines on shari’ā in 1999 were more regional than religious, as had always been the case. In part this stems from cultural and theological distinctions between Islam in the north and south.103 In the south the calls for shari’ā among the millions of Yoruba Muslims were largely muted, as they had always been. For example, when the shari’ā issue arose during the 1979 constitutional debate, and again in the 1990s, Christian and Muslim elites in the southwest displayed restraint and

103 As one expert on Yoruba politics sums it up: “In the South, Islam is a personal and family religion…in the north, Islam is a civilization – a system of authority and a fount of the law” (Sklar 2002, 333-348).
moderation (Suberu 1997, 401-425). This was again evident by 2000, when all 17 southern state governors issued a statement pledging unity and temperance.\textsuperscript{104} In the north, the religiously and ethnically mixed “Middle Belt” states on the edge of the region expressed profound discomfort with shari’a. Elites there openly complained that shari’a was “ethno-political” and had nothing to do with religion.\textsuperscript{105} Eager to avoid alienating these states on the fringe of the north, many states decided to take a less orthodox path compared to Zamfara’s (Paden 2004, 17-37).\textsuperscript{106}

In sum, north/south cleavages persist, despite millions of Muslims in the south, a few majority Muslim states in the north that did not adopt shari’a, and variation of religious traditions in the north. The southern governors found a consensus position defending secularism. Meanwhile, northerners found their own basis for compromises which preserve Muslim traditions and regional solidarity. Regional identities trumped religious identity, ultimately motivating moderation in each region.

The second layer of subnational identity exists at the zonal level. In the north this began with the colonial administration’s practice of recognizing the distinct histories of the Sokoto and Borno empires of the north. Thus even though the British formally organized the north as a single colonial unit, they varied their political strategies in the region. Paden takes this as evidence that Nigeria’s geo-political “zones” existed in the political imagination long before politicians explicitly identified with them as such (Paden 1997, 243-264). Three northern zones have since developed distinct dispositions.

\textsuperscript{104} Ben Charles-Obi, “We Demand Fiscal Federalism,” \textit{TELL}, January 22, 2001, pp. 36-38. At this summit held by the southern governors, they signaled that shari’a might be acceptable if it clearly only applied to Muslims.


\textsuperscript{106} Zamfara’s governor ended up pleading with business interests, many of whom were not indigenous, to stay within the state by promising that shari’a would only apply to Muslims (Mohammed 2005, 147-164).
The northeast and the northwest have largely retained caliphate traditions, while the north-central zone is more mixed (Sklar 2004, 39-60).

Distinct zonal identities have persisted in the south as well. The southeast is predominantly Igbo and fought the Biafran Civil War of secession. Igbos today for example, are agitating for a new state on a zonal basis, since the southeast has only five (rather than six) states. Ethnic minorities prevail throughout the south south, where oil has dominated political discussions since the 1960s. The success of militant movements agitating for “resource control” during the Fourth Republic is due at least in part to their ability to broadly fashion their messages, appealing to minorities throughout the zone. In the southwest Yoruba traditions dominate. Despite significant sub-ethnic differences, there are striking similarities in voter preferences throughout the zone in the federal elections of 1959, 1979, 1983, 1993, 1999, and 2003. This attests in part to the ongoing influence of pan-Yoruba political organizations. Though zones exist nowhere in the constitution, they play a central role in the ethnic balancing of politics (Sklar et al. 2006, 100-15). The zonal system is thus as an attempt to aggregate culture in a unit somewhere between regional identity and ethnicity by clustering groups on a geographical and cultural basis. This is portrayed in Table 9, with the present makeup of zones, states, and some of the ethnic groups in those areas.

A third level of subnational solidarity exists at the state level. Even before independence, Nigeria’s colonial regions faced pressure to create new states. One type of demands for statehood arose within large ethnic groups. For example, four major Yoruba cultural sub-groups have alternately claimed membership within a Yoruba “nation,” or emphasized discrete sub-ethnic identities. Lagos State was created in 1967, and Oyo and
Ondo States were created in 1976. Osun State, home to the sacred Yoruba city of Ife, was excised from Oyo State in 1991, creating a political boundary between sub-ethnic identities.\(^{107}\) During the Second Republic the Ijebu Yoruba agitated for their own state too. Elites who previously spoke eloquently for unity now declared: “As Yorubas we admit linguistic and cultural affinity with our brothers and sisters…but for self-preservation and economic, social and industrial progress we hold the view that we would rather stay on our own and be masters of our destiny.”\(^{108}\)

Table 9: Nigeria’s Geopolitical Zones (Six Zone Configuration)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Some ethnic groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>Sokoto, Zamfara, Kebbi, Kano, Jigawa, Katsina, Kaduna</td>
<td>Hausa, Fulani, Gwari, Attakar, Ayu Binawa, Jaba, Kandara, Kafanchan, Kanuri, Zuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>Borno, Yobe, Taraba, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa</td>
<td>Hausa, Fulani, Idoma, Kanuri, Gwon, Junkun, Jong, Tarok, Tikar, Wagga, Tula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Belt (North Central)</td>
<td>Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Plateau, Niger</td>
<td>Tiv, Igala, Idoma, Ufia, Gwandara, Yoruba, Fulani, Hausa, Kulele, Maba, Mada, Pyapum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>Anambra, Ebonyi Imo, Enugu, Abia</td>
<td>Igbo, Mbeme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-South</td>
<td>Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Rivers Akwa Ibom</td>
<td>Edo, Anang, Ibibio, Itsekiri, Urhobo, Efik, Okoi, Ukwani, Ododop, Yache, Ikwerre-Igbo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo</td>
<td>Yoruba, Awori, Egun, Ebira, Ijo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Adetowo Aderimi, *Nigeria: A Complete Factfinder* (Lagos: Tee-Rex, 2002)

Another more common type of demand for new states arose from minorities who sought to dilute the power of the ethnic majorities. State creation in these instances has

---

\(^{107}\) None of this is to suggest that these states are ethnically monolithic or that the reasons for their creation were not complex; Lagos for example was a cosmopolitan capital with its own cleavages between indigenes and settlers.

\(^{108}\) Statement issued by the Movement for the Creation of Ijebu State, February 9, 1982. Note that Oyo State voted against Awolowo’s party several times between 1959 and 1983, fearing Ijebu domination (see Laitin 1986, 121-23).
sought to accommodate minority demands for representation at the center. Each community stands to benefit from substantial oil revenues available for disbursement by the center, and the smaller ethnic groups fear being left out. This system has thus maintained incentives to progressively increase the number of states (Suberu 2001; Agbese 2004, 237-261).

In sum, Nigeria’s political map accommodates different dimensions of cultural identity. States, zones, and regions each possess some claim to community and serve as a basis for political solidarity. The next section describes how units that correspond to larger cleavages are capable of exercising greater leverage. While states and zones are part of a game of ethno-regional balancing, only regions can impose a veto on policy. I identify the circumstances necessary for this to occur. Such vetoes are critical informal players in Nigeria’s ethnopolitical landscape.

IDENTITY AND INCLUSIVENESS

In this section I describe the logic behind informal, regional vetoes and specify the conditions for their existence. First, I outline Nigeria’s competing philosophies of representation. This includes a brief discussion of the “federal character” tradition, which promotes fairness in federal appointments. Second, I use an identity matrix to illustrate how different identities represent cleavages varying in scale. Larger cleavages are capable of imposing greater transaction costs, giving them more bargaining leverage. Only the country’s regions, whose interests bind Nigeria’s fragile federal bargain together, possess sufficient leverage to exercise a veto. I argue that a policy process which substantially under-represents one region’s interests creates incentives for a regional organizing. This also requires a means for coordinating region-wide interests.
Third, I show how these multiple layers of federalism actually serve the interests of policy makers at the center. Small political units representing discrete identities offer inexpensive options for cooptation and also reduce the likelihood of a regional veto emerging. These two intuitions turn much of our understanding of Nigerian federalism on its head.

**Representation and Political Inclusion**

Social identity and political representation at the center are inextricably bound in Nigeria, as they are in much of Africa. Government cabinets in Africa are on average larger than elsewhere in the world. They also increased in size as sub-Sahara democratized, growing on average from 19.1 to 22.6 portfolios between 1979 and 1996 (van de Walle 2004, 29-63). The reason for this may lie in Africa’s diversity and there is evidence to suggest that ethnically divided societies are more likely to have large inclusive, cabinets (Reilly 2005, 159-171). But Africans have also built institutions that transcend these differences, as experiments with one party states attest.

Nigeria’s strategies for dealing with its pluralism reveal a latent tension in its leadership selection: some institutions are designed to cut across social cleavages while others reinforce the saliency of cultural identities. Examples of the former include the Single Member District-plurality electoral system adopted by every democratic regime. Some authoritarian regimes recognized the value in this approach too, as when Babangida created two political parties along ideological rather than sectional lines. This approach has roots in liberalism, which suggests that majority rule poses little threat to minorities as long as individual rights are protected.
At the same time, Nigerian institutions attempt to assure ethnic and geographical diversity in federal institutions. This approach to social heterogeneity has its origins in philosophical traditions emphasizing group rights and theories of multiculturalism.\textsuperscript{109} Nigeria’s solution here is the “federal character” tradition, a principle of governance which attempts to balance representation of different identities (Amuwo, Agbaje and others 2000). Federal character first appeared when the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC) in 1976 declared that government should “recognize the nature and character of the peoples within their area of authority and the need to promote a sense of belonging and loyalty to such peoples.”\textsuperscript{110}

But well before the coining of the term, governments practiced the federal character principle. Nigerian efforts to guarantee representation for particular groups extend as far back as the colonial era. At a conference in 1950 concerning the new House of Representatives, the north demanded equal representation with the south as well as a specific formula for sharing ministerial positions (Paden 1997, 245). A compromise entitled each region in the tripartite system to eight seats in the federal cabinet. After the fall of the First Republic in 1966, the military adopted ethnic quotas to promote Igbo advancement within the military. The 1979, 1989, and 1999 constitutions all codify federal character, declaring its applicability to the composition of government and its agencies.\textsuperscript{111} Specifically, in promoting equal representation federal character is meant to

\textsuperscript{109} Kymlicka et al. attempt to reconcile this tradition with liberalism, arguing an individual rights regimen can fail to protect minorities making other representative devices necessary (Kymlicka 1999; Ejobowah 2004, 301-316).
\textsuperscript{110} Cited in (Ejobowah 2001).
\textsuperscript{111} See the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic at section 14(3)(a); the 1989 Constitution of the Federal Republic at Section 15; and the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic at Section 14(3). See
ensure “that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government.”

The objective of federal character is to achieve balanced representation at the center by requiring national political leadership to reflect social diversity. Nigeria’s numerous institutional architects hoped that balancing authority would increase political stability and reduce the impetus for civic violence. Meanwhile, the application of Nigeria’s liberal tradition produces political institutions that transcend the sectional interests at work in these balancing acts. The next sub-section explains the logic behind regional vetoes and identifies the conditions under which they appear. The successful application of the liberal tradition weakens the incentives for a regional veto. Paradoxically, the multicultural approach ends up serving the interests of the center by increasing the available avenues for cooptation.

**Identity Repertoires and Political Leverage**

The awkward political bargain between north and south on which Nigeria rests means that neither region can rule the country by itself. Every government since independence has either acknowledged this in its appointments – or paid the price. Every regime has therefore to some extent institutionalized a commitment to demographic balancing. In what follows, I explain why only a region can exercise a veto, and doing so requires a substantial expression of regional unity. This implies a degree of pan-ethnic solidarity that is difficult to achieve when large segments of the region have been co-opted or are represented in the policy making process.

*Federal Character and Federalism in Nigeria* for the definitive history of federal character (Ekeh and Osaghae 1989).
To illustrate the relationship between regions, zones and states, I construct an identity matrix for Nigeria. Posner uses this technique to compare the relative electoral gains of Zambian politicians when they make appeals along one social cleavage compared to another. The country’s “tribes” represent smaller shares of the population compared to four large national language groups. Depending on the party system in pace, politicians formulate political appeals along the cleavage that will help them construct a minimum winning coalition (Posner 2005). Although I do not make predictions about when political actors adopt one identity over another, I do claim that such choices shape the complexity of the coordination problems that result. In particular, political coalitions constructed from identities that represent smaller population shares face greater coordination problems. Incumbents aim to capitalize on these problems.

Table 10 is an identity matrix for Nigeria where $x_i$ represents the regions (north and south), $y_i$ represents states, and $z_i$ represents the ethno-regional zones. Regions capture the largest population share while states capture the smallest.\textsuperscript{112} This is thus representative of a four zone, 19-state system such as the one in place in 1979. By portraying the subnational units abstractly, we can account for changes in the number of states and zones over time. Every such change since independence has attempted to maintain balance as the cardinal principal of federal organization. Thus the balance

\textsuperscript{112} Readers familiar with Nigeria will notice the omission of local government areas. LGAs are clearly more discrete units of difference than states, meaning they capture some relevant cultural distinctions. The number of LGA’s has steadily increased over time, granting explicit recognition to many of these distinctions. In addition to insurmountable data problems, their exclusion is justified on other grounds: First, LGAs have less direct contact with the federal government in making policy. They have no distinct mechanism comparable to the governors (or the ministers) for organizing their interests. Second, the inclusiveness of federal offices are not measured against the number of LGAs represented in appointments. The relevant units are some combination of zone, state, and region.
between north and south remains constant, and the number of states in each zone is approximately equal.

Table 10: Identity Matrix for Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$x_1$</th>
<th>$x_2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Z_1$</td>
<td>$y_{1,2,...,6}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Z_2$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$y_{7,8,...,11}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Z_3$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Z_4$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$y_{12,...,15}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A basic rule of governance, expects policy making to reflect a distribution of support from both regions. This derives from the multicultural tradition, as well as the fact that Nigeria is what Stepan considers a “holding together” federation, in which the power of the subnational units preserves the federation on the whole (Stepan 1999, 19). The experience during Nigeria’s censes also support the idea of regional equity. When some censes reported unexpectedly rapid population growth in only one region, this led to political paralysis and demands for political equity (Suberu 2001). This is not to say that either region has monolithic preferences, or that preferences remain stable over time. However no policy can advance in the face of one region united against it; Nigeria’s national existence rests on this federal bargain.

Figure 9 displays the northern and southern populations, illustrating the approximate balance between the regions.
Using the abbreviations from the identity matrix, this rule dictating a balance of representation between north and south can be expressed as:

Equation 9: regional balance: $x_1 \approx x_2$

States or zones may attempt to impose a veto on the federal policy process. But unlike regions, none have the leverage to succeed on their own. This is not to say that all zones (or states) possess equivalent levels of influence over policy, or that their political capital does not change over time. For example, the center depends heavily on oil revenues from the south-south and this arguably increases the zone’s political influence. Militant demands by surprisingly effective guerrilla organizations in recent years
highlight this possibility (Eberlein 2006, 573-96; Watts 2004, 50-80). But in general, transaction costs vary with the subnational unit in question. In the overarching logic of Nigeria’s federal bargain, the population proportions represented shape the perception of ethno-regional balance. The legitimacy of the policy making process thus depends in part on such perceptions of inclusion. Population proportions are visible in Appendix 5, where I attach census figures to the zones, states and regions under four zones and then the current six zone structure. A comparison of transaction costs that each of these units can impose on the policy process is expressed in Equation 10:

Equation 10: transaction costs: \( x_i > z_i > y_i \)

Regardless of the number of states and zones, Equation 10 remains valid. This affects bargaining because the leverage of any single subnational unit depends on the overall number of zones and states. If one entire zone out of four sought to extract concessions from the policy process, it could impose a greater cost than if one zone out of six did so. Even if all zones are not created equal in terms of political influence, it is more difficult in principle for a government to impose an unpopular policy on 30 percent of the population than on 10 percent.

The number of subnational units also impacts bargaining by shaping the coordination problems present. The improbability of a regional veto increases correspondingly with the number of political units. The rules of each regime aim to create policy actors that transcend Nigeria’s regional cleavages. Institutional actors, such as a military council or a legislature, can play this role. Partisan vetoes, a stable set of
preferences generated by institutional vetoes, can also cut across regional cleavages. These efforts reflect the liberal tradition. Alternatively, regime rules can attempt to balance regions’ presumably distinct interests. If the regime fails in either one of these regards, this creates incentives for a regional veto to emerge. Figure 10 illustrates the scenario in which a regional veto will not emerge because the existing veto players both cut across the regional cleavages.

![Figure 10: Each Veto Player Cuts across Regional Cleavages](image)

Unlike institutional or partisan veto players, regional vetoes are a manifestation of informal institutions because they are not “officially” specified as political actors. Yet their broad identities are a reality of national politics. In the next sub-section, I explain how zones and states have persisted as alternatives to regions in part because they serve the interests of the center. In particular, they provide politically appealing strategies to limit inclusion.

**Capitalizing on Coordination Problems**

Since states are entitled to grants from the center, scholars of federalism argue that the revenue allocation system drives the demand for new states. This system reduces incentives for generating revenues locally. Instead, it encourages subnational
communities to agitate for distinct representation through the creation of new states (or local government areas). Each community demands its a share of the “national cake” (Gana and Egwu 2003; Amuwo, Agbaje and others 2000; Onwudiwe and Suberu 2005).

However the creation of new subnational units also serves the interests of political actors at the center in at least two ways: First, veto players want the policy process to appear inclusive without suffering too large of a payoff loss. Taking the views of discrete subnational groups, for example $y$ rather than $z$, allows them to buy off excluded societal interests at a lesser cost. From the center’s point of view, Equation 11 presents a cheaper strategy than Equation 12:

Equation 11: $x_i + \{y_i, y_j \subset x_i\} \{x_1 \cap x_2\}$

Equation 12: $x_i + \{z_i \subset x_i\} \{x_1 \cap x_2\}$

Second, by taking discrete identities into account, new subnational units help policy makers at the center reduce the likelihood of a regional veto appearing. This is illustrated in a comparison of two potential regional vetoes.

Figure 11 shows a regional veto that requires coordination of preferences between two zones. Figure 12 shows a regional veto that requires coordination of three zones. From the perspective of existing veto players, more zones ($z$) mean more coordination problems for interests who aim to exercise a regional veto. Buying off a handful of select states ($y$) exacerbates these coordination problems even further. In this way, incumbents can limit access to the policy process and co-opt actors who might attempt to organize at the subnational level.
These two intuitions have three important implications. First, they offer new insights into Nigerian federalism. The existing literature on the subject characterizes the creation of new states as a local demand resulting from the revenue allocation system. By refocusing scholarly attention on regimes, regional veto players reveal how the creation of additional subnational units also serves the interests of political actors bargaining at the center, and not just locally based ethno-regional interests. Dividing up the “national cake” is therefore more than just a local response to centrally-controlled fiscal resources.

A second, related implication concerns the relationship between political institutions and social diversity. Scholars in the political culture tradition claim that inclusive governance stems from personal rule in Africa, where weak political systems make cooptation cheap. Transaction costs in these systems are high because personal rulers invest tremendous time and energy into building coalitions with surplus members (Hyden 2006). I have suggested a way of showing how inclusion based on different
identities shapes the costs of cooptation. Inclusion even in “strong” political systems encourages policy makers at the center to pursue co-optation strategies.

Third, the notion that new subnational units serve the interests of the center suggests that minimum winning coalitions are inadequate. Even if a government has enough regional support to satisfy the regime’s rules for inclusion, it still pays off additional political actors because it hopes to weaken their ability to coordinate a regional veto. This inclusion of other actors means that inclusive governance requires some degree of surplus membership. This rule is entrenched in norms of politics regardless of regime type and rooted in Nigeria’s colonial history. Oversized cabinets throughout Africa further suggest that Nigeria is far from unique in this regard.

Summary

I have claimed that Nigeria’s policy process involves actors whose interest aggregation often blurs the boundaries between formal and informal political institutions. A region can exercise an informal veto when two conditions are met: First, it must be under-represented in the policy process; and second, some mechanism must help coordinate subnational preferences. Incumbents benefit from discrete representation because it is cheaper to pay off small political units, such as states, which represent a smaller share of the population than zones or regions. This also serves incumbents’ interests by exacerbating the coordination problems that regional interests need to overcome in order to exercise a regional veto. An implication is that the politics of inclusion benefits politicians at the center rather than the subnational communities clamoring for distinct representation. States and zones may attempt to impose a veto on their own but ultimately they cannot impose sufficient transaction costs on policy makers.
The capacity of regions to do so stems from the historic federal bargain binding the interests of north and south. The next section demonstrates the logic of an informal regional veto with a recent example.

**AN ILLUSTRATION: THE “RESOURCE CONTROL” REBELLION**

A clear illustration of a regional veto in action should apply the above criteria as clearly as possible. This means that zones, states, and regions should all appear as identifiable subnational actors. Organizations and political mechanisms to coordinate their shared grievances should be visible. The collective leverage of the region, compared to smaller units, should also be distinctly greater. This leverage should ultimately result in a policy reversal. During the Fourth Republic, when new policies threatened the rights of states to offshore oil earnings, each of these characteristics of a regional veto appeared.

In his first term President Obasanjo vigorously argued for the Federal Government’s exclusive right to the proceeds of offshore oil. The stakes were high since revenues from drilling off the coastline of the six south-south states account for most of Nigeria’s revenue. The Obasanjo administration’s attorney general filed a suit in 2001 arguing that offshore petroleum deposits belonged to the Federal Government. The following year, a landmark decision by the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Government’s “onshore/offshore dichotomy.”

The Court’s decision infuriated the south-south states. Under an elaborate revenue sharing arrangement, these states in particular benefit from additional federal grants when the source of federal revenue originates in their state. One governor accused Obasanjo of blackmail and another hinted at secession, commenting that the lawsuit
could threaten the peace and unity of the entire country. Numerous ethnic minority
groups from the area protested that the major ethnic groups at the center sought to
deprive them of “resource control.”

The collective articulation of these grievances by south-south governors marked a
turning point. They accused President Obasanjo of reneging on a promise to resolve the
legal status of offshore oil through negotiation. Strategizing with a civil society
organization, the South-South People’s Conference, one governor said the bill is “the
desire of the people of the south-south geopolitical zone.” The National Assembly
sided with the states, unanimously passing legislation codifying the governors’ position,
extending states’ rights to oil out to the continental shelf. President Obasanjo vetoed the
bill and as late as December 2002 warned legislators that “resort may even be taken to
war to resolve the claims and counter-claims” with neighboring countries that would
result from the Assembly’s bill. In early 2003 the Supreme Court delivered the
president another victory on a related issue, upholding his prerogative to modify the
military decree (still in effect) that governed allocation of federal revenue to subnational
units. Fresh from these triumphs, Obasanjo then inexplicably reversed himself.

The president suddenly sought compromise on the resource control issue for at
least two reasons. The first stems from his political ambitions. Obasanjo’s challenger in
the presidential election only weeks away had announced his support for abolishing the

114 Austin Ogwuda and Sola Adebayo, “Oil Dichotomy Bill: Ibori Backs Clark,” Vanguard, January 21,
2003.
115 Rotimi Ajayi et al. “Why I won’t sign Oil Dichotomy Bill – Obasanjo,” Vanguard, December 12, 2002,
p. 1. A separate aspect of the 2002 Supreme Court decision overturned the Federal Government’s authority
to deduct various expenses from oil revenues before calculating the distribution of the money to
subnational government.
116 A recent account by one of the states’ lawyers provides a detailed explanation of the case (Egede 2005,
73-93).
onshore/offshore dichotomy. Packed rallies in the south-south greeted the opposition candidate’s speeches enthusiastically, particularly since the candidate hailed from the north where political elites had urged President Obasanjo to stand his ground.\footnote{See for example, Efem Nkanga, “Buhari in Akwa Ibom, Promises to Abrogate Onshore/Offshore Dichotomy,” \textit{This Day}, April 10, 2003, p. 4. A U.S. Embassy official responsible for monitoring the ANPP campaign offered the description of “packed rallies” in the South-South.} When the opposition party’s regional director for the south-south was killed many suspected political assassination (LeVan et al. 2003, 30-47). Not only was he sympathetic to resource control, he had decamped from the ruling party after accusing his home state governor of ruling with a heavy hand.\footnote{Dominik Umosen, “Odili is a Dictator,” \textit{TELL}, July 9, 2001, p. 28.}

In the 1999 election Obasanjo won all of the south-south states but now all six of the governors and the states’ legislative delegations in the National Assembly were furious with him. His party’s support was slipping in the region according to at least two polls (Kew 2004, 139-173) and numerous press accounts. With the 2003 election rapidly approaching he brokered a compromise with the governors that extended the territory of the littoral states. Within hours the Senate President announced that the Assembly would not override the president’s veto. This saved the president from an embarrassing loss and also closed up an emerging rift within his party, which held most of the governorships and comfortable majorities in the House and the Senate.\footnote{“Obasanjo, 6 Governors Reach Agreement,” \textit{This Day}, February 6, 2003. Perhaps not coincidentally, the Senate President’s home state of Ebonyi had been pressing the federal government to explore its oil potential for two years.} Obasanjo’s support grew in the south-south, earning him between 84 and 98 percent of the votes in those states during the presidential election a few weeks later. It would seem that the president
calculated that the political support from the south-south states was more important than the revenue the Federal Government would retain by insisting on its position.

However the other reason why the president reversed himself stems from a tactical error: the attorney general’s original lawsuit was filed against all 36 states. Thus even though the south-south states arguably had the most to lose, other littoral states in the southern region were natural partners in a political coalition. Five states in the southwest zone in fact filed a separate suit in which they demanded back payments owed to them under the federal government’s revenue allocation mechanism (Suberu 2004, 61-83). The Supreme Court ultimately rejected this case too. But this extended the offense across the southern region. The president, who was elected on the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) ticket, had lost every state in the southwest in 1999 by large margins. This is illustrated in Table 11. Ironically, many Yoruba in the southwest felt under-represented. President Obasanjo could neither afford to alienate the zone again, nor could he count on the atomization of inter-state politics.

Table 11: Presidential Election Results in the Southwest, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>ANPP/AD</th>
<th>PDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ekiti</td>
<td>73.15 %</td>
<td>26.85 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>88.07</td>
<td>11.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogun</td>
<td>69.83</td>
<td>30.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td>85.37</td>
<td>16.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osun</td>
<td>76.47</td>
<td>23.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>75.29</td>
<td>24.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Independent National Election Commission
The voices of political elites and civil society organizations in the south-south were united on the issue. The littoral states of the southwest, who also articulated demands on a zonal basis, formed a natural ally. The fact that the Senate President was from the southeast may also be significant here, even if only circumstantial; Igbos complained loudly that the executive branch had orchestrated multiple impeachments against several Senate Presidents. In the end the southern governors as a whole, backed by civil society organizations, broadly sympathized with demands for “resource control.” They played a crucial role in arbitrating a political solution to the legislative stalemate. After coordinating zonal complaints, the southern region exercised a veto not formally specified in any institution.

In the story of the onshore/offshore dichotomy, the states initially coordinated on a zonal basis. The south-south possessed the strongest zonally-based claim due to the states’ shared demands for “resource control.” But the southwest also had resource complaints with the federal government – and these states expected to benefit from any offshore rights due to recently discovered oil reserves off its coast. The governors organized preferences across the region in order to exercise a veto based on these claims. The south, after complaining and then coordinating, ultimately succeeded in reigning in a controversial new policy.

---

120 The governors’ positions are discussed in W. Adeyemo, “You’re Greedy,” TELL, September 24, 2001, pp. 34-35.
121 Ebonyi in the southeast also had high hopes for the future: In 2001 the state petitioned the federal government to allow development of oil deposits near Afikpo. See Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections Vol. 6, No. 2 (Jan. 2001).
CONCLUSION

In the previous chapter I argued that the number of veto players affects government performance. In this chapter I identified the factors that determine whether informal vetoes will emerge. Referring to the geopolitical organization of Nigeria dating back to the colonial era, I construct an identity matrix to illustrate the different scale of these various identities. I argue that a balance between north and south is a constant in the country’s tradition of ethnic balancing. For this reason neither region can be substantially excluded from policy making without increasing the likelihood of a regional veto. If a regime produces formal veto players that cut across regional cleavages, then subnational actors face fewer incentives to organize a regional veto.

Informal rules are a reality of Nigerian politics. For example, nowhere does the constitution describe the existence of geopolitical “zones.” But political coordination often unfolds along these lines. Zones exist in the political imagination of subnational communities and in the strategic calculus of the more “formal” Nigerian political actors. Mostly recently, the 2007 election demonstrated the power of unwritten rules and the critical importance of regional balance. The ruling party and indeed most of the country overwhelmingly agreed that the new president had to come from the north, since outgoing President Obasanjo was a southerner.

Taken together, my two chapters argue that political actors have a self-interest in maximizing their payments by preventing the addition of other players to the policy process. But they also must comply with political institutions and traditions that promote inclusion based on ethno-regional differences. This politics of inclusion ultimately has consequences for government performance. Producing public goods requires overcoming
the kind of bargaining problems exacerbated by a policy process with multiple veto players. Moving toward a test of this theory, the next chapter operationalizes formal and informal veto players. Utilizing operational definitions from the literature and evidence gathered during field research, I identify all of Nigeria’s veto players since 1960.
INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I elaborate on the framework for counting the number of veto players established in the previous two chapters. I begin by outlining the basic distinctions among regimes with many or few veto players and describing practical guidelines for counting veto players. I also simplify and specify my operationalization of informal vetoes.

Next, I code the number of veto players for each of the thirteen regimes in my sample in detail. I organize regimes based on the number of veto players rather than chronologically in order to emphasize analytical similarities. I uncover several factors critical to understanding the distribution of policy making authority in each regime: the strength of the bureaucracy, the autonomy of subnational tiers of government, and the relationship between the executive and law making authority. Table 16 at the end of the chapter identifies the veto players and summarizes my rationale for each one.

I pay careful attention to informal veto players throughout this chapter. Just like other veto players, these policy actors must possess both cause and capability to exercise a veto. This means that they must collectively organize their shared policy preferences
somehow. For regional vetoes, governors associations and networks of traditional rulers often serve this purpose. Other informal vetoes emerge when distinct factions organize themselves within non-democratic regimes. For the five cases coded with a regional veto, I point to at least one major policy in which a regional preference prevailed. This strict standard sorts out other examples I refer to in which regional grievances existed but a veto failed to materialize. For the cases with regional vetoes, I produce an identity matrix when necessary to simplify the overall balance of zonal and regional representation. Appendix 6 provides additional details about electoral results discussed when coding these cases.

**HOW MANY VETOES?**

In this section, I define “regimes” not in terms of whether they govern democratically or not but rather by the number of veto players generated by their constitutive rules. I maintain that single veto player regimes are rare, whether they are democratic or not. Then I incorporate insights about regional veto players described in Chapter 4 and specify my criteria for identifying other informal vetoes, rooted in factions. I establish a standard general enough to cut across dictatorships and democracies and to maintain its comparative leverage over time. Yet I also aim to convince the skeptical reader that these policy actors are not merely a residual category. My subsequent coding of Nigeria’s regimes mentions several instances when regional or factional vetoes might have emerged but actors failed to meet this standard.

**Counting Vetoes in a Multi-Regime Model**

A regime is “a system of rules and practices that determine who has political rights, how they can be exercised, and with what effects for the control of the state”
Comparative politics typically focuses on democracy and authoritarianism as basic regime types. Consistent with the idea of a regime as a set of rules for allocating power, I take the number of veto players as the most important source of variation among regimes. This tells us little about whether a regime guarantees civil liberties or allows political parties to organize. But it is at the heart of distributional questions because each player can extract concessions. Thus by referring to a new regime, I have in mind a new configuration of veto players. This means that the number of veto players sometimes changes even though the regime’s formal, constitutive rules do not. Chapter 3 describes various scenarios for why this occurs, including the existence of “partisan” veto players. Similarly, my coding allows for collective actors that are more temporary than the institutions that generate them. But they survive long enough to sustain collective action and enforce internal discipline over multiple, unrelated policy issues.

A single, individual veto player is less common than the colloquial characterization of autocracy suggests. When there is only one such veto player the chief executive must so dominate other collective bodies of governance that their preferences are indistinct from hers. More that just being internally cohesive, these collective bodies must actually behave like unitary actors. This is an exceedingly difficult presumption (Tsebelis 2002). Given the interests every regime has in recruiting expertise, insuring against risk, and acquiring legitimacy, executives govern through some type of collectivity. As Nigeria’s most famous constitutional scholar argues, “Rule by force or the threat of such force is inadequate” (Nwabueze 1992). Thus a single but collective policy actor for whom discipline is not costless is my minimum standard for a single veto
player regime. Westminster parliamentary governments are therefore also coded as single veto player regimes, just as the existing veto player literature prescribes.

Two veto players present a different set of governance dynamics. Governments attempt to marginalize alternative centers of power and they often succeed. Removal of the chief executive is a possibility but it requires meeting a high threshold. By definition, one veto player can effectively “check” the other. Regimes with two veto players include parliamentary systems that produce a government dependent on the confidence of two political parties in coalition. They also include dictators who depend on the collective cooperation of some ruling council that has at least some sovereign authority over policy areas. The council itself might seek the advice of technocrats or ministers. However these bureaucrats and appointees typically lack any political or legal autonomy; their authority is strictly delegated and therefore vulnerable to retraction.

Presidential systems typically produce at least three veto players because no new policy can advance without the consent of the legislature’s upper chamber, lower chamber, and the president who typically has “veto” power (in the classic Madisonian sense). In general, the executive has trouble dominating alternative centers of power and political recruitment in regimes with three or more veto players. Dictators depend not only on a ruling council but also on the collective advice of a cabinet or the governors. For these governors to exercise a collective veto, some organization must

---

122 Most presidential systems do provide the executive with a veto and require at least a majority if not a supermajority to override it (Shugart and Mainwaring 1997, 12-54).
internalize the costs of their collective action. Otherwise it is too easy for the executive to divide them against each other.\textsuperscript{123}

In regimes with four or more veto players the executive must contend with alternative centers of power, even if she still takes the lead on policy. Such power may be located in a council of governors, the bureaucracy, or a coalition of traditional authority figures allied with disenfranchised politicians. In these situations the executive finds it difficult to monopolize political recruitment. In these regimes the removal of the chief executive is a political possibility, and checks and balances may conduce to policy gridlock.

\textbf{Identifying Informal Vetoes}

By building a model of politics around veto players, my theory incorporates a variety of institutions and organizations that coordinate subnational interests. As one necessary condition for these collective actors to be treated as an informal veto, the costs of organizing must be assumed by some organization that explicitly coordinates preferences. This gives actors such as military factions or regime soft-liners a \textit{means} to organize. My second necessary condition for coding requires that an informal veto player must actually exercise a veto on at least one major policy issue. This concretizes political action, meaning the leverage is not merely abstract.

In addition to these two criteria for informal vetoes, regional vetoes require that a geopolitical region must be substantially under-represented in the existing veto players. This is visible in electoral results (when available) and through a qualitative analysis of

\textsuperscript{123} This is unfolding for example in post-Soviet Russia, where Moscow co-opts individual oblasts (provinces), thereby weakening their ability to act in concert vis-à-vis the center (Treisman 2001; Solnick 2002, 171-205).
the governing actors and the constituencies they claim to represent. As explained in Chapter 4, this gives subnational actors in the marginalized region an incentive to organize. I draw identity matrices in each instance of a regional veto to illustrate how subnational organizing adds up to broader regional political leverage. Political parties (or party coalitions) are an important feature of the political landscape that can help interests overcome the challenge of coordination. When these organized interests substantially transcend geographical bases of support, regional vetoes do not emerge.

Subnational actors and states in particular play a critical role in coordinating the political interests through which regional and other informal vetoes emerge. The sovereign power of governors implies a degree of genuine federalism, whereby subnational units possess authority in certain areas which the center cannot suspend or limit. Such autonomy does not automatically mean that these units have the means to act in their common interest. For example, a specific mechanism for coordinating a common agenda with the center does not exist in the quintessential federal case, the United States. Widespread cooperation among governors is not a systematic element of federal policy making. In fact, the governors have only met collectively with the president three times since 1787.124 By contrast, Nigeria’s governors meet frequently to coordinate their demands on the center.125 This is true under both democrats and dictators. The sovereign power of their subnational units stems from the incentives and the means they have to coordinate common interests. Political parties are thus only one principal

---

125 Examples from other federations include the First Ministers’ Conferences in Canada and the Premiers Conferences in Australia. These meetings have emerged as a regular and significant feature of inter-governmental relations.
coordination device in these federal systems. These coordination devices help the center and the units alike avoid the constant re-contracting for sovereignty (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1997, 27-42).126

Because the sovereignty of states involves contracting, any autonomous authority which states possess is as much a consequence political efforts to coordinate (and thereby increase their collective leverage) as it is a result of any constitution or a military decree. African scholars frequently argue that authoritarianism is inherently incompatible with federalism (Elaigwu 1988, 173-88; Nwolise 2005, 114-123). In the veto players’ view of federalism though, democracy or dictatorship is largely irrelevant. By recognizing the capacity for informal vetoes to emerge, my model thus allows for a substantial level of localized solidarity to produce autonomous subnational authority. As we shall see, traditional authority figures often play a crucial role here. Sometimes they conspire to protect local authority, constructing sovereignty from the ground up. Other times they are complicit in the subversion of state autonomy.

A List of Political Actors

The above discussion provides some clues about the cast of characters to look for in the coding exercise that follows. Presidents, prime ministers, heads of state, and military councils all populate the executive branch. Executives cannot ignore the cabinet or senior bureaucrats because they generally rely on them to implement policy. Even where limits exist on federalism, states, governors, and military administrators also construct authority that is counterpoised to formal authority at the center. Whereas

126 Ordeshook and Shvestova call these federal systems “integrated federations.” Since political parties in integrated systems such as the U.S. are decentralized, an important implication of the concept is its underlying claim that sovereignty actually originates from subnational coordination.
Chapter 4 largely discussed states as constitutive units of regional vetoes, we now see how states can also conspire to collectively defend their interests when federalism is at stake. Political parties, traditional rulers, and organized factions all emerge as potential players in Nigeria’s struggle to coordinate interests and consolidate power.

**NIGERIA’S REGIMES AND RULES, 1960 – 2003**

Applying the above criteria, I identify thirteen veto player regimes in Nigeria since 1960. The only single-veto player regime existed briefly during the final two years of Sani Abacha’s rule in 1997 – 1998. I identify six regimes with two veto players: one occurred during the parliamentary coalition government from 1960 to 1964, another during the short-lived government that followed in 1965, and a third in the country’s first authoritarian regimes in 1966. The other dual veto player regimes occurred during Yakubu Gowon’s military government from 1967 to 1974, the Buhari-Idiagbon junta from 1984 to 1985, and the first years of Sani Abacha’s rule from 1994 to 1996. The regimes with three veto players include the military government that took over in 1975 and ruled until October 1979, the first two years of the Second Republic (1980 – 1981), and the first several years of Ibrahim Babangida’s military government (1986 – 1989). The final years with Babangida (1990 – 1993) are coded as four veto players, as are the last two years of the Second Republic (1982 – 1983) and President Obasanjo’s first term during the Fourth Republic (1999 – 2003). The rationale for each of these regimes is described in detail below.

Several coding issues arise in this section. Obviously, the timing of coups rarely coincides neatly with calendar years. This poses a problem for my dependent variable’s data. As a working solution, I code the regime in power for more than six months of the
calendar year as that year’s regime. This is also reasonable since it takes at least a few months for the incoming regime to announce, much less implement, new policies. Operationalizing the internal coherence of collective actors poses a second challenge. This is important for determining whether a set of preferences is stable enough and sufficiently coordinated to exercise a veto. Only when these preferences are sustained over time and across multiple legislative issues do I assign such collective actors a veto. For these actors as for any I code as a veto player, the policy process cannot ignore them on important national issues. To persuade the skeptical reader, I identify at least one instance where each such veto player actually successfully exercised a veto. The coding of the regimes is summarized at the end of this section in Table 16.

**Single Veto Player Regimes**

*Abacha’s Final Years (1997 – 1998)*

Nigeria’s only single veto player regime existed during Sani Abacha’s final years. General Abacha set out to concentrate power early on. But he lacked the infrastructure and the political base to implement such a regime for his first few years. I do not pinpoint the shift to a single veto player until 1997.

Abacha began with a largely symbolic National Defense and Security Council and a weak cabinet in his Federal Executive Council (FEC). While Abacha reorganized the cabinet several times, he did not dissolve it wholesale until November 1997. He reshuffled the governors, by then called “military administrators,” on various occasions. By 1996 Abacha was confident enough to say: “This is normal military posting [sic] and
the commander-in-chief does not owe anyone any explanation.” Decree No. 6 of that year permitted Abacha to remove local government chairs or appoint provisional councils. He also pursued a contradictory policy that involved lifting the ban on political activities while cracking down on the press, banning protests, and outlawing various unions and civil society organizations (Amuwo 2001, 1-56). In sum, the governors, the FEC, and the bureaucracy never really had much power to check the Head-of-State to begin with. The restraints on his power since 1993 had rested elsewhere.

A single player regime emerged in 1997 for three reasons. First, until this time Abacha’s unilateral actions were restrained by a faction that supported the presumed winner of the annulled June 12, 1993 election (see below). Their anger remained visible until the end of the regime. Abacha continued to plan purges of them until his final days in mid-1998. Paranoid that they would back their kinsman, Abiola, Yoruba officers were disproportionately purged in August 1997. Out of 63 officers forced out, 49 percent were Yoruba and 60 percent were from the south generally. Only 6 northern officers were affected. In the Abacha government’s final eighteen months, the “June 12” faction lacked the leverage to exercise an effective veto. The erstwhile leader of the faction, Lt. Gen. Oladipo Diya, Chief of General Staff, was framed in a 1997 conspiracy. The infamous “phantom coup” came only three months after the devastating purge of the Yoruba officers. Diya was entrapped by the Chief of Army Staff, Maj. Gen. Bamaiyi, who proposed a coup to Diya when he apparently had no such plans. With Diya

imprisoned, Abacha had a freer hand within the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC). Moreover, he could advance his “self-succession” plan to skeptics in the military and civil society, through which he aimed to compete in the transitional elections. But by now the only remaining members of the government were those who mirrored his preferences. The alleged “co-conspirators” who avoided prison were exiled to busywork for the military. The junta received an unexpected boost when President Bill Clinton said in March 1998 that the United States would not oppose an Abacha presidency if he won in a fair election. Such overtures undercut the domestic opposition to the dictator’s plan for self-succession (Amuwo 2001, 1-56). Alienation also grew with a key ally: the Hausa-Fulani elites. Many of them had hoped that scuttling the 1993 transition might maintain northern political hegemony. They now started to turn against Abacha. First they rejected overtures from former President Shagari on Abacha’s behalf. Then, eighteen traditional rulers issued a statement opposing him as did a coalition of former politicians. The junta rebuffed their complaints.

The second reason for coding this regime as a single veto player lies in the neutralization of the military as an institution. After the deposition of Diya and his senior supporters, the regime lacked any politically based restraint. Professionalism within the military still might have undermined Abacha’s efforts to consolidate power. Completely aside from any loyalists lingering from the previous regime, many generals within Abacha’s inner circle feared that another democratic transition gone awry would reflect

---

poorly on the military’s traditions of honor and professionalism. However, less enlightened views prevailed. Abacha’s sabotage of the military culture was gradual but ultimately successful. He worked to circumvent the PRC by unilaterally creating a National Security Advisor responsible directly to him. This effort faced opposition from the Chief of Naval Staff and others in his inner circle, which drew heavily from the Army (Alli 2001, 298). After years of attrition, he prevailed over their attempts to preserve a balance of power.

The third reason for the single veto lies in the emergence of jealousies that weakened the military’s ability to coherently articulate its institutional interests. Nigeria’s military lacks the tradition of service rivalry that Americans typically view as healthy competition – presumably because it is confined to congressional funding requests and football games. Rather, the fear in Nigeria had always been ethnic rivalry within the military. This could manifest itself in coups, as it did in 1966. Or it might show up in promotion rate among officers of different backgrounds (Luckham 1971; Onyejekwe 1981). The implementation of a quota system through the “federal character” tradition aimed to prevent this in both military and civil affairs (Adekanye 1989, 230-255). An early sign of intra-military jealousy was the Navy’s failed attempt to check Abacha’s power by weakening the National Security Advisor (NSA). Then the Air Force complained about selective enforcement in corruption investigations. These setbacks came on the heels of compulsory retirements that unevenly affected the Air Force in particular. The NSA’s escape of scrutiny in the corruption investigations stimulated

---

additional resentment throughout the military. Abacha succeeded in consolidating power as no other dictator had. But he alienated and excluded powerful actors. Eighteen months later he was dead.

Regimes with Two Veto Players

Aguiyi-Ironsi (1966)

There are six regimes that I code with two veto players, starting with the first military government of Nigeria. General Aguiyi-Ironsi ruled through a small circle of decision makers. Upon assuming power in a counter-coup January 1966, he fused executive and legislative powers around himself. Decree No. 1 established him as Head of National Military Government and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. It created a Supreme Military Council (SMC) and an ineffective Federal Executive Council (FEC) to manage the ministries. It was clear that Ironsi concentrated power considerably. His legislative powers seemed virtually unlimited; Section 4 of the Decree outlined the law making process simply as any decree signed by the Head of the Federal Military Government. The decree also chipped away at the significant authority the regional governments had enjoyed. Section 2 vested the authority of any regional minister in the military governors. To co-opt elements of the political class and recruit expertise, each governor employed the former civilian governor as an advisor (Dent 1971, 78-93).

Under the decree, the SMC consisted of twelve members and only six had direct political responsibilities (Luckham 1971). The SMC did sometimes disagree with Ironsi,

---


135 Decree No. 1, January 17, 1966.
which would seem to suggest that it provided a balance of power. It opposed numerous military promotions of Igbo leaders, and against Ironsi’s wishes it voted for a trial for the leader of the failed January coup (Muhammadu and Haruna 1979, 25-46). Most significantly, the SMC and Ironsi deadlocked on how to handle anti-Igbo riots in the north which raged for two months. However the SMC tended to dissent privately, and it ultimately failed to enforce its will over his. In other words, the general largely got his way (Luckham 1971).

Table 12: Northern Regional Veto, 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-independence “regional” structure</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>Alienated and excluded from government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td>Allied with north on several issues; threatened to secede if East did</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td></td>
<td>Igbo aligned with Ironsi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td></td>
<td>Feared Eastern domination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The center of opposition rested elsewhere, with the mobilization of regional interests. Table 12 shows how Ironsi faced opposition from the north and eventually from the west too. Some Yoruba in the west at first saw the coup as a victory for the coalition of southern-based political parties. But Ironsi imprisoned Awolowo, the opposition leader of the ousted parliament and a Yoruba from the west. A strong movement to unify the Yoruba existed at the time, with the full support of the military governor of the west. As the most senior officer in the Army, the governor apparently felt slighted after being passed over for head of state. Then Ironsi’s military promotions almost completely excluded Yoruba and Hausa officers that spring. His civil service
reforms similarly met stiff opposition since they would have undermined western (and northern) interests. By June 1966, Yoruba members of the government were boycotting and protesting policy planning meetings (Dudley 1971, 94-110).

An eastern Igbo, Ironsi faced tremendous pressure to show good faith toward northern interests. Following the wholesale dismissal of elected politicians, he initially sought the advice of chiefs and traditional rulers. But northerners increasingly saw Ironsi and his government as “representatives of the Ibo Tribal Union in arms,” particularly after the military promotions. Then military officers and other northern elites colluded to successfully block Ironsi’s civil service reforms. Activists from the northern-based political party ousted by the coup funded and generated visible opposition (Dent 1971, 78-93; Dudley 1973). Northern military governors played a crucial role in coordinating these regional interests. Whereas strong class-based political forces had previously dominated northern politics, Hausa-Fulani commoners now moved to rally in favor of regional grievances (Kirk-Greene 1971). Ironsi forced the regional opposition to prove its mettle when he abolished the country’s federal system. He had already insinuated that the regions lacked political autonomy and referred to them as merely “areas” requiring governance. 136 Then in May he decreed the end of federalism, renaming the Federal Military Government the “National Military Government” and dropping “Federal” from the FEC’s name. 137 Like the other reforms which stumbled in the face of northern opposition, the regional veto once again prevented him from moving forward. Less than two months later, Yakubu Gowon easily routed him from office in a coup.

137 Decree No. 34, May 24, 1966.
Yakubu Gowon (1967 – 1975)

The two veto players of Gowon’s regime, which I date from 1967 through 1975, consisted of a unified bureaucracy and a cumbersome ruling military council, weighted down by powerful state administrators. This regime differs from Nigeria’s other authoritarian regimes in three important respects: First, unlike other military regimes, the head of state did not hold an individual veto. As the following discussion demonstrates, Gowon generally failed to impose his preferences over other regime elements on major policy debates. One general complained that the inclusive decision process significantly slowed down decision making.138

Second, the military governors enjoyed greater authority. Unlike later administrations, they were members of the Supreme Military Council. Gowon as Head of State chaired the SMC but he treaded lightly on governors’ authority. The governor of the Eastern State in fact boycotted the SMC’s maiden meeting, publicly declaring “Gowon is not my superior and the question of acknowledging him does not arise.”139 The power of the governors emerged as a major grievance of northern elites who were hardly consulted by Gowon and resented inexperienced young officers holding authority above the traditional rulers (Vaughan 2000).140 Gowon’s chief rival, Murtala Mohammed, who had played a key role in bringing him to power, also complained about the governors’ authority (Othman 1989, 113-144). Only one governor was ever fired.141 By 1974 the governors were discredited and corrupt but the SMC was unable to remove

138 Meeting with a retired one-star general, Ibadan, April 1, 2006.
this large bloc of its own members. This was Gowon’s “most obvious failure,” as the colonels later made clear.\textsuperscript{142} For these reasons, we can take the deliberative nature of the SMC seriously.

Third, technocrats in the bureaucracy acquired unprecedented sway over policy making through the Federal Executive Council. The permanent secretaries’ power had earlier grown under Ironsi, whose decrees failed to specify ministerial responsibilities for the members of the SMC and the FEC. This meant that senior bureaucrats gradually realized that they could operate with considerable latitude concerning day to day activities since there was no institutionalized oversight mechanism (Luckham 1971, p. 256). Gowon’s decrees formally stipulated that the FEC could only “exercise such functions as may be delegated to it by the Supreme Military Council.”\textsuperscript{143} A starkly different reality emerged though.

Coming to the helm of government with little experience, Gowon relied heavily on technocrats for advice and to garner needed legitimacy for his regime. Senior bureaucrats self-consciously filled the political void left when the government explicitly banned politicians. In effect, they capitalized on the absence of a parliament (Asiodu 1979, 73-95). They met almost weekly, making decisions according to a logic of collective responsibility.\textsuperscript{144} The emergence of oil exports as a major source of federal revenue after 1971 further increased their influence as the ministries suddenly commanded huge budgets. Even without explicit legal or political authority to do so, senior bureaucrats began attending meetings of the FEC alongside the commissioners

\textsuperscript{143} Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 8, 1967, Section 6.
\textsuperscript{144} My source is a former Ambassador and cabinet official, Abuja, Nigeria, March 31, 2006.
(ministers). This consolidated a government that a classic essay on the Gowon regime refers to as a “military-civil service coalition government” (Olugbemi 1979, 96-109). The so-called “Super Permanent Secretaries” who advised the ministers overturned key decisions of Gowon’s, such as the appointment of his oil minister (see Othman 1989, 122). One of Murtala Mohammed’s first acts after his 1975 coup was therefore to fire 11,000 civil servants in a legendary purge intended to both weaken and professionalize the bureaucrats. Olusegun Obasanjo commented of the civil service under Gowon: “What they ordained and what they wished would happen in most cases, no matter the pronouncement or desire of government.”

Gowon made some critical mistakes in 1974. In October, he publicly aborted the transition plan to democracy that he had announced four years earlier. “It would indeed amount to a betrayal of trust to adhere rigidly to that target date,” he said, declaring that the general ban on politics would continue indefinitely. He re-stated the message in February 1975 when he complained that the public should not “keep on talking about 1976.” The comment invited criticism from his Commissioners. At that point, his most prominent civilian cabinet member, the former leader of the opposition in the First Republic, had already resigned in anticipation of the ban being lifted. Gowon then appointed new commissioners, nearly half of whom were civilians. He discussed appointing new governors with the SMC in May 1975. But their membership on the SMC ultimately thwarted his ability to orchestrate and implement such a plan. In

retrospect, numerous political elites reflected that Gowon had become inaccessible and self-centered. On July 29, Murtala Mohammed staged a coup. Within a month, a new regime was in place.

**Buhari-Idiagbon (1984-1985)**

The military regime that came to power on New Year’s Eve 1983 presents several seeming contradictions that must be treated in detail in order to code it accurately. Despite Buhari’s pervasive powers, and some similarities with the three-veto player Mohammed/Obasanjo regime, this regime operated with Buhari and Idiagbon as two distinct veto players.

The regime’s founding decree points to the first notable similarity with the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime (see below). Decree No. 1 of 1984 stipulated a governing structure closely resembling the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime, which had ruled a few years earlier. For example, Buhari’s executive authority formally required consultation with the Supreme Military Council (Ojo 1987). The SMC was “the final arbiter on all the national issues” with the power to “overrule any decision or action of any individual or institution.” Secondly, the regime substantially weakened the powers of the governors, starting with the arrest of fifteen civilian governors (and 400 other politicians) following the coup. The Council of State and the governors who sat on it played an entirely consultative role. For example, early on in the regime the SMC fired the governor of

---

Rivers State. In a new encroachment on subnational authority, the SMC actually dictated the composition of the ministries within the states.151

A third misleading similarity with the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime is that the new SMC swiftly moved to undermine senior bureaucrats. It dismissed 17 permanent secretaries and reduced the number of federal ministries from 26 to 18. Tens of thousands of federal and state civil servants went with them. All of this came on the heels of mass firings of virtually all of the senior police commissioners and inspectors. In a gesture to the public, eleven of the 18 new ministers were civilians.152 But the consultative status and the strictly delegated authority of the Federal Executive Council was eminently clear, both in the decree and following the purge of the technocrats. The weakened FEC, alongside a feeble Council of State, meant a much narrower policy process.

Despite these three apparent similarities, the regime is more accurately described with two veto players: Buhari and Idiagbon. By decree and in practice, the role of head of state was distinct from the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters. Buhari was Commander-in-Chief but not Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This role fell to Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon, whose influence was sufficiently pervasive that scholars commonly refer to the regime as the “Buhari-Idiagbon regime.” Hailing from the southwest, Idiagbon brought a regional balance to a regime brought to power with northern support. Since the Yoruba had failed to capture the presidency during elections

in 1979 and again in 1983, this gesture seems especially calculated to generate needed legitimacy. Idiagbon also managed the regime’s most infamous policy initiative, the “War on Indiscipline.” WAI took a populist but extrajudicial approach to rooting out corruption (Diamond, Kirk-Greene and others 1997). In addition, he managed a new, dreaded internal security apparatus, the National Security Organization. The NSO’s reach extended even to senior members of the military (Othman 1989, 113-144). Later autocrats would take a different tact, concentrating such sensitive functions around themselves.

In sum, Idiagbon’s authority stemmed from a balance of power, not from a temporary or narrowly defined delegation of authority. One theory on the origins of this balance says that Idiagbon and Babangida both wanted to be head of state. Supposedly the coup planners settled on Buhari as a compromise candidate only very late in the plot’s execution. The coup that eventually terminated the regime in fact arose from the Babangida faction, which fought nearly every major policy posture of the government. In terms of politics, this faction opposed the treatment of the detained politicians. On the economic front, it strongly criticized a deflationary economic strategy without structural adjustment. This faction also advocated for defense to assume a much larger share of the domestic industrial base. Even with his powerful position as Army Chief of Staff and his persistence within the SMC, Babangida failed to advance the faction’s position on any of these issues (Othman 1989, 113-144).154

---

The regime’s governance strategy might have been sustainable but for critical miscalculations. Without the sympathy of the technocrats, traditional authority figures were the obvious alternative partners for the ruling coalition. “Having no constituency of their own,” explained one editorial, “the military people find it easy to fall back on ready-made vehicles of influence” through traditional rulers.\footnote{155 “The Uncertain Reign of Traditional Rulers,” \textit{Concord Weekly}, August 24, 1984, pp. 11-12.} The regime early on made various gestures to traditional authority figures. This included granting traditional leaders expanded powers of local government policy, referring to them as “an informal second tier of authority,” and consulting the Sultan of Sokoto (Vaughan 2000). Shortly after taking power, Buhari received the Benue State Council of Chiefs. Military governors in various states had cordial relations. In Cross Rivers the governor urged greater involvement of traditional rulers. But in the end the administration alienated traditional rulers as allies. Buhari dethroned several Obas (kings) in Yorubaland and relations with the Emir of Kano turned quite hostile.\footnote{156 “Traditional Rulers: Men of the People, or Relics of the Past?” \textit{Concord Weekly}, August 24, 1984, pp. 6 – 9.}

The regime had a paradoxical relationship with traditional leaders in the north in particular. On the one hand, the regime suffered from a widespread perception of northern bias. Lists of the SMC members make clear that a solid majority of its members were northerners (Ikoku 1985).\footnote{157 Banji Adeyanju, “The ‘Federal Character’ Serenade,” \textit{Concord Weekly}, January 28, 1985, pp. 7 – 9.} When 185 senior ranking Army officers were retired, a majority was Yoruba (from the southwest) while no more than 10 were ethnically Hausa.\footnote{158 “The Fallen Officers,” \textit{Africa Confidential}, January 30, 1985, p. 2.} Worse, the anti-corruption prosecutions smacked of selective enforcement. Northerners such as the governors Kaduna and Sokoto were acquitted. The former
The president was under house arrest while his vice president, from the south, languished in jail. Prosecution of the now banned opposition also weighed heavily against southern-based opposition figures of the United Party of Nigeria and the Nigerian People’s Party. Many SMC members publicly had close ties the president’s party, the NPN, during the Second Republic. Sentencing too, favored northerners (Osaghae 1998).159

On the other hand, the north failed to see Buhari as one of its own, even with his Fulani background and his stated support for Islamic law. Traditional rulers could not agree on how to implement sharia and the governors orchestrated a campaign of pan-northern solidarity (Othman 1989, 137). The Maitatsine riots in Yola State graphically illustrated this paradox, where tensions with Islamic radicals led to riots killing over 5,000 people (Ibrahim 1997, 427-447).160 When the military governor for Kano State asked the Emir for his resignation for disrespecting the federal government, Muslim protestors seized symbols of government and burned the governor’s top advisor alive.161 In another dramatic incident, the administration punished the Emir for traveling to Israel with the Oni of Ife. This further weakened the regime’s legitimacy among traditional rulers.

The broader explanation for the junta’s paradoxical relationship with the north is that Buhari rose to power at the behest of the “Kaduna Mafia.” In the 1970s, this powerful alliance grew out of the common ambitions of newly educated northern technocrats, military officers, and politicians who were increasingly impatient with the

---

conservatism of the Muslim caliphates. The emirs, for their part, felt threatened by this new educated class that had risen to power largely independent of their patronage (Olukoshi 1995, 245-278). Many governors were not indigenes of their appointed state. Moreover, the unpopular policies of northern governors in Kano and Borno reinforced a perception of their loyalty to the center. The SMC’s ambiguity, if not hostility, could not have been more pronounced when the governor of Niger State mocked traditional leaders, saying they should live in “mud huts.”162

Buhari’s miscalculations meant that he lacked a clear foundation for a political coalition. He lacked the support of the senior bureaucrats. He could not count on the traditional rulers either, particularly after punishing some of the most important traditional rulers in the north and the southwest. Already facing a military restive with General Babangida’s prompting, the regime crumbled.

The First Face of Abacha (1994 – 1996)

Little is known about the inner workings of Sani Abacha’s government, which took over following an aborted 1993 democratic transition. It is clear though that in its first few years, governance rested on a balance of power. On one side stood those who fought to restore the results of the annulled transition elections. As the election issue dragged on, some agitated for a constitutional conference (a proposal adamantly opposed by many northerners). On the other side were those who feared a shift of power to the south or who capitalized on such fear for self-interest. At least until 1996, these factions faced off regularly on the type of transition desirable as well as day to day policy issues.

Abacha indisputably possessed a veto and constructed complex political coalitions to maintain it. I code the pro-democratic faction as the other veto player within the regime. This faction exercised leverage until it lost its coherence in late 1996 after years of cooptation and subversion.

To start, the regime inherited some of the basic structures put in place during the transition under Ernest Shonekan. This included a Federal Executive Council (FEC) and a National Defense and Security Council (NDSC). Divisions within a deliberately weak NDSC prevented it from playing a conciliatory role. It suffered from divisions over whether to install the winner of the June election, and if not, precisely how to proceed with new elections (Emelifeonwu 1997, 193-216). Abacha immediately replaced their members, particularly weeding out those close to Babangida. Decree No. 13 created a new “Provisional Ruling Council,” in lieu of the AFRC, with legislative powers. Abacha’s maiden speech announced the dissolution of the Interim National Government (ING), all legislative assemblies, the two political parties that competed in 1993, and “any consultative committee by whatever name.”

The FEC was weak from the beginning. When Abacha moved to appoint military administrators instead of civilians as promised a few months earlier, the FEC fought the decision and lost. By late 1995, the FEC stopped meeting according to several former ministers who served in the government (Babatope 2000). This undermined any potential for collective protest by them and also kept the senior bureaucrats at bay. The governors were also weak. Abacha appointed a National Council of State, composed of

---

“military administrators” in place of governors. A recent World Bank report confirms this interpretation. The report classifies state autonomy under this regime as the lowest in Nigeria’s history, including the colonial era (World Bank 2002a).

The regime also inherited the political crisis of the short-lived Interim National Government (ING) which it replaced. Two major political factions appeared around this time. The first included those with close ties to Babangida, who were now viewed with some suspicion since he still watched politics from the sidelines. For purposes of self-preservation, Abacha avoided appointing any generals to his maiden PRC who were sympathetic to the previous regime. Some of the “IBB Boys,” as the Babangida loyalists were called, had their passports confiscated to prevent them from traveling.165 Abacha dismissed the Chief of Army Staff only two months into his regime, suspecting that he still held loyalties to the previous regime. Many of Babangida’s last minute military promotions were actually reversed. Several officials who served in Babangida’s AFRC then died under mysterious circumstances.

The second and arguably more important group was the “June 12” faction, referring to the date on which M.K.O. Abiola presumably won the 1993 election. The Vice Chairman of the PRC, Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Oladipo Diya was its most prominent member. A Yoruba, he served as the regime’s first Minister of Defense (Babatope 2000). During these years I claim that Diya, working through this faction, effectively held a veto. It was Diya, in his first portfolio as Minister of Defense, who had fielded complaints from the top brass about the appointments of civilian governors. The

service chiefs, along with some junior officers, feared political marginalization. They prevailed over the FEC that had argued for civilian governors. Colonel Abubakar Umar, a former military governor of Kaduna, spoke for the most radical elements of the June 12 faction. He resigned his commission and publicly informed the military government that he would not command his subordinates “to put down any civil disturbance that may arise” in support of the June 12 mandate. Although Umar denied any conspiracy, such statements lent credence to the widespread view within the upper echelons of the regime that the faction conspired to install Abiola by force (see Alli 2001, 291-292). Abiola’s vice presidential candidate, Baba Gana Kingibe, was actually implicated in the coup that ushered in the regime. He apparently also believed these colonels would install the winners of the 1993 elections.

Whereas the deposed ING slanted toward Abiola’s opponent’s party, Abacha’s civilian cabinet drew heavily from the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The nod to the SDP was also visible in that Kingibe was among only four ministers who sat on the 12 member PRC. Although he never admitted a deal with Abiola (for obvious reasons), Abacha consulted him constantly on cabinet appointments. Another SDP baron, the new Inspector of Police Solomon Lar, participated in many of these conference calls. The June 12 crisis had paralyzed the country in 1993 and as long as this faction stood behind Diya, governance required their participation. The regime’s innermost circle, the so-called “Abacha caucus” unanimously agreed that Diya and Abacha should be the only two members of the junta with political positions (Alli 2001).

For reasons still being debated, Abacha went to work dividing the Abiola clique. It gradually became clear that elites from Abiola’s party had been co-opted into the government on the condition that they temper their position on June 12 (Lewis 1994, 323-40). After a 1995 “phantom” coup, these junta members were constantly accused of being spies for the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), a civil society network agitating for the June 12 cause. By the end of 1996, Nigeria’s Civil Liberties Organization counted 87 purges directed at this faction (Amuwo 2001, 1-56). The government imprisoned former Head-of-State Obasanjo and other critics. These victims later recounted how their prison interrogators drilled them above all on Abiola and June 12.168 The repressive sweep extended to traditional leaders in the southwest, including the octogenarian chief of the pan-Yoruba group, Afenifere.169

However, Abacha’s efforts to subvert the clique took some time to succeed. When the PRC underwent a major reshuffling in October 1996, Diya and other June 12 sympathizers curiously survived. It is also notable that in 1996, all three military chiefs were Christian. This suggests that the regime still thought it necessary to “rotate power” and buy consent from the south (Sklar 2001, 259-288). The opponents of June 12 included the governors from the political party that ran opposed to Abiola (the National Republican Convention) and the Sultan of Sokoto. Like other religious groups and members of the bourgeoisie, many traditional rulers prioritized stability over democracy (Jega 2001, 101-144). The Sultan allegedly told Babangida in 1992 that neither Abiola nor his running mate could represent northern interests. When the government annulled

the elections the following year, a number of northern elders actually gathered at the Hilton in Abuja, the nation’s new capital. Neither they nor the pan-northern organization, Arewa Consultative Forum, moved to defend the June 12 mandate. Instead, they hoped to preserve northern political hegemony. In the east, some Igbo leaders saw a rebuffed Abiola as a way of getting even with the west for the Biafran Civil War (Omoruyi 1999). Igbo elites initially lent some support for Abacha’s self-succession bid. But their ringing endorsement failed to go over very well at the grassroots. Influential ethnic organizations such as Ohaneze Ndigbo later mocked the military’s attempts to manipulate them.

By 1997 the tide had shifted against the June 12 faction for a variety of reasons, denying it the leverage to exercise a veto. In February, Abacha systematically retired every military administrator known to sympathize with NADECO. The “ethnic cleansing,” as the press labeled it, was directed toward the south and Yoruba officers in particular. Abacha created a special task force to identify and spy on them. In addition, the civil society opposition had not been able to sustain the public pressure it generated in 1993-94. The regime easily circumnavigated the weak international sanctions imposed on it (Osaghae 1998; Sklar 2001, 259-288).

Its coherence now rent, the June 12 clique waged a losing battle within the PRC against Abacha’s self-succession bid. The dictator’s ambitions conflicted with his earlier promise to not contest for political power in any transition. The PRC argued over the issue during heated 1997 meetings. In May, a minister for special duties issued a

---

statement ordering government officials to not campaign for any presidential candidate. A scandal erupted when the Minister for Information said this was not the government’s official position. Senior PRC members stood diametrically opposed to each other on the issue. The soft-liners complained that the image of the military would be badly damaged by such obvious intervention in politics. Debates the following month concerning the transition timetable further exacerbated tensions within the PRC. An official PRC spokesperson said the Council was deadlocked on the matter. Then Abacha told former U.S. President Jimmy Carter that the elections were postponed. At this point Diya was still attending these meetings, arguing the June 12 faction’s case against self-succession. He was deposed only a few weeks later in the “Phantom Coup” plot. After this coup de grace, Abacha’s policy preferences prevailed over every potential political voice, inside or outside the government. The regime’s only other veto player had disintegrated.

The First Republic’s First Government (1960 – 1964)

Nigeria’s only democratic years with two veto players occurred during the First Republic, a Westminster-style parliamentary system. I distinguish between two distinct veto player regimes in this era. Here I discuss the first, which begins with the period when the government that came to power with independence in 1960. It ends with the dissolution of parliament and the parliamentary elections of December 1964. Two political parties entered into a coalition government, each with a veto.

In the 1959 elections the largest party, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), won only 134 out of 312 seats in the House. It fell well short of the majority necessary to form a government without a partner. After some initial jockeying among the other parties, the NPC invited the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) to form a coalition government. Each party in this coalition exercised a veto. The NPC’s support was strongest in the north; incredibly all of its victories were in the north. It captured 134 out of the available 174 seats in the region. Appendix 6 reports the election results, demonstrating the regional concentration of party strength. (Since it was a Westminster system, there are no Senate results.)

The NPC exacerbated the widespread perception of its regional insularity by insisting upon the “northernisation” of the civil service. At the time, Yorubas from the southwest held a disproportionate share of influence within the bureaucracy. The NCNC resented its partner’s posture but the eastern-dominated party managed to secure key cabinet posts, including foreign affairs and finance. A minority government in the European tradition was simply out of the question; no government could maintain confidence without a substantial showing of support from both north and south. The cabinet formed by Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in 1960 consisted of 23 portfolios, with eight going to the NCNC (and several to ministers of no party affiliation). Even after a row over the NCNC foreign minister’s radical demands for African liberation, West Africa in 1962 saw “no reason why the NPC-NCNC Coalition should not last until the elections in 1964.”

The reasons for the death of the coalition are complex but two stand out: One cause of the split stems from an acrimonious battle within the opposition Action Group (AG), based in the Yoruba-dominated west. The party suffered defeat in both the federal and the regional government elections. At the AG’s annual meeting, the disintegration became very public. The party divided over whether its leader in the federal parliament retained authority over the Regional Premier, whether it should offer to join the coalition cabinet, and over the centrality of socialism to the party. The feud climaxed with the expulsion of the regional premier, Chief Akintola from the party. Akintola responded by creating the Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP). This splinter party attracted a few members from the NCNC and two other minor parties in the Western Regional Government (Diamond 1988). The NPC viewed this as a new opportunity to undermine the AG opposition based in the Western Region.

The incendiary dispute over the national census accounts for the other cause of the coalition’s infamous decline. The Prime Minister insisted on the validity of preliminary, officially unpublished census results which gave the north a substantial edge. The Constituency Delimitation Commission opted to move forward anyway. It conceded that the provisional figures were a serious handicap, writing “This situation rendered some areas for consideration as border line cases” (Constituency Delimitation Commission 1964). Foreseeing the huge repercussions for constituency delimitations in the forthcoming elections, the eastern-based NCNC protested. The NPC Prime Minister supposedly told the NCNC ministers to accept the results or resign, retorting “my


acceptance and publications of the figures is final.” He denied making the comment. But then the NPC national spokesperson made much the same error a few weeks later. He said whether the NCNC liked it or not, “the NPC will rule the Federation forever.” 179 Such comments set off alarm bells throughout the south. The Yoruba, already hostile to the idea of northern domination, moved toward a coalition with the NCNC. The NCNC was further infuriated when its coalition partner in the federal government offered new cabinets seats to the newly formed NNDP. The NCNC Premier of the Eastern Region toured the West to build solidarity with the Action Group. The Western Premier’s popular visit laid the groundwork for regional solidarity throughout the south and the formation of a new coalition of parties in January 1965. 180 North-south cleavages now polarized political society (Dudley 1971, 94-110).

**The First Republic’s Final Year (1965)**

The other veto player regime during the First Republic lasted barely a year, beginning with the new government formed after the December 1964 federal elections. Appendix 6 reports these results by region. As in 1959, all of the NPC’s victories were in the north. Yet the entirely different political climate produced a different configuration of veto players, one rooted in the NPC’s majority and another organized through a southern coalition of regional interests.

The political climate differed first and foremost because the NPC secured a majority, winning 162 out of 312 House seats. Abandoning the NCNC, it formed a coalition with the NNDP called the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). The junior

---


coalition partner panicked when the prime minister initially failed to include any NNDP ministers in the cabinet. The Party secured huge victories against the AG in the west, surprising even Prime Minister Balewa. Eventually the coalition included the NNDP and the new government displayed some balance between north and south. The cabinet even included two UPGA members. But the coalition government retained a distinctly northern bias. Even though the prime minister doubled the number of portfolios, the cabinet still slanted heavily toward the NPC (Diamond 1988).

The political climate also differed because the party coalitions reinforced the most dangerous elements of north-south polarization. The two predominately southern parties, the NCNC and the AG, had teamed up with progressive dissidents in the north to create a new coalition: the United Grand Progressive Alliance (UGPA). The parties stood united in their anger over the census and in the need for the creation of new regions (which were only later called states). The census presented the politically unacceptable possibility of permanent northern domination (Suberu 2001). As a gesture of solidarity, the NCNC also demanded the release of the former AG party leader who was jailed on treason charges. An UPGA boycott in the east brought elections there to a standstill. A delicate political compromise led to a special election in the east in March 1965. UPGA won an impressive 52 out of the 54 re-contested seats.

This under-representation of the south in the federal government and the intense regional mobilization are both compelling reasons to identify a regional veto. While the

---

183 “Nigeria’s Little Election,” West Africa, March 27, 1965, p. 339. (The other two seats went to independents.)
UPGA did not control the regional government in the West, it completely dominated the governments of the Eastern Region and the recently created Midwest Region. The First Republic’s subnational governments were more powerful than the state governments of later years. And since there were only four regional governments, subnational elections carried huge consequences for political alliances and outcomes at the center. Thus when a one-party government appeared in the Midwest following the opposition’s defection en masse to the NCNC,\textsuperscript{184} this gave the southern region the substantial majority required by my coding for an informal regional veto. This balance is reflected in Table 13 below.

Table 13: Matrix Reflecting Southern Region’s Veto, 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-independence “regional” structure</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>Aligned with NPC/NNA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td></td>
<td>NNDP aligned with NNA AG aligned with UGPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aligned with UPGA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aligned with UPGA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A conventional coding of veto players would exclude the NNDP and the NCNC, since the NPC won enough seats to form a government alone. If the NPC could maintain even modest unity, then a majoritarian parliamentary government could survive a confidence challenge. However the NCNC’s support at the subnational level, ongoing grievances directed at the north as a whole, and a mechanism for coordinating regional solidarity endowed the south with a veto. The federal government’s 32-portfolio cabinet announced in April 1965 included seven NCNC ministers. With this calculated move,

the Prime Minister hoped to undercut southern solidarity. He also completely excluded the AG from the broad based government, but the party stated its continued loyalty to UPGA.¹⁸⁵ The NNDP swept the Western Regional elections later in 1965. UPGA alleged and the Federal Electoral Commission confirmed massive fraud. Opposition protests paralyzed the west and the NNDP government responded with widespread repression. After a few more months of instability, the military took over (Diamond 1988).¹⁸⁶

**Regimes with Three Veto Players**

**Mohammed/Obasanjo (1975 – 1979)**

There are three regimes with three veto players in my sample. The first of these consists of the governments under Murtala Mohammed and Olsegun Obasanjo, spanning the era between the 1975 coup and ending with the hand over to civilians in 1979. During this regime the head of state, the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, and the Supreme Military Council each held a veto.

I code these governments under one regime due to the significant continuity between them. After the assassination of Mohammed in 1976, Obasanjo retained the same structures of the regime and even the same members of government. Upon taking office, Obasanjo said “All policies of the Federal Military Government continue as before and all ministries should continue their usual duties.” The SMC actually held votes for Obasanjo and Lt. Col. Shehu Yar’Adua as the new Head of State and Chief of Staff,

¹⁸⁶ As additional evidence of a regional veto orchestrated by UGPA, one could also point out that when Major-General Ironsi staged his 1966 coup, he immediately replaced the NNA governor of the Western region with a known UPGA sympathizer (Osaghae 1998, 58).
Supreme Headquarters, respectively. Decree No. 32, which outlined the regime’s structure, was the first in Nigeria to provide a succession mechanism within the SMC should the Head of State be overthrown or killed (Ojo 1987, 49). Decree 32 also created a new organ to represent the interests of the governors, the National Council of States. Significantly, the purpose of the Council was actually to weaken the authority of the governors. Mohammed and Obasanjo believed the states had enjoyed too much power in the previous administration. They also hoped that positioning the Council between the FEC and the SMC would weaken the technocrats who Gowon became so dependent upon (see Othman 1989, pp. 124-25). To this end, they were removed as members of the SMC. Mohammed described the SMC as “the highest body in the hierarchy, providing general policy guidelines.” Section 9 of the Decree reflected this by making clear that the Council of State’s authority was always contingent upon the SMC’s approval and supervision (Ojo 1987).

The head of state maintained a veto in federal policy making. For example, when Mohammed took over he quickly appointed new governors whereas his predecessor had been unable to do so. However constitutional scholars emphasize that Decree 32 limited his title to “Head of State and Commander-in-Chief.” Thus unlike the Ironsi regime, the head of state was not “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.” The regime went to great lengths to give the impression that this distinction was meaningful. Internal government documents describe Obasanjo as the de facto prime minister, responsible for

---

188 Nevertheless, the surprisingly smooth succession after the assassination is likely attributable to the popular belief that Mohammed was murdered by elements sympathetic to Gowon, not by an Obasanjo faction.
the “day to day running of the government.” When Yar‘Adua became Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters after Mohammed’s assassination, his active role in policy further suggests this was no fiction. Yar‘Auda led the SMC initiatives on local government reform, launched the draft constitution discussion, and chaired an inter-ministerial committee on industrial development.190 His reforms allowed for the election of Local Government Councils calling them “the training ground for democracy.” The SMC apparently took the idea fairly seriously (Oyediran and Gboyega 1979, 169-191). Noting the significance of these initiatives, scholars later called the reforms “a major achievement of the military administration” (Gboyega 1989, 159-193).

In sum the SMC stood as the ultimate authority, appointing members of both the Federal Executive Council and the National Council of States. But the regime’s key constitutive decree emphasized that the SMC made decisions collectively. Yar‘Adua’s agenda setting authority suggests this was indeed the practice. The SMC also came to agreement about 17 provisions of the draft constitution it changed before the final promulgation (Gboyega 1979, 235-58). The head of state, with the third veto, possessed enough authority to stop policies he opposed. Yet he also understood that doing so would carry political costs for the regime as a whole.


The regime that replaced the Obasanjo Government is the only democracy in my sample with three veto players. Nigeria’s Second Republic began with the transition from military rule in October 1979 and ended with a coup on New Year’s Eve in 1983.

---

The basic constitutional structure for the regime suggests that the conventional coding criteria from the veto player literature should suffice: a president, a Senate, and a House of Representatives, each with a veto over legislation (Haggard and McCubbins 2001). However, applying this standard without more careful analysis would overlook the actual vetoes held by two distinct parties in coalition. Thus I code the country’s first experiment with presidentialism as two distinct regimes. In this sub-section I dissect the first of these regimes, covering the early years where the president and the two coalition parties each held a veto. When this coalition collapsed in 1981, the House, the Senate, and the president each had to contend with strong regional forces in the south. Due to the emergence of this regional veto, I code the political system after the collapse of the legislative coalition as a separate veto player regime.

Shehu Shagari, a northerner, became president in 1979 only after an extraordinary legal and political battle. The election law mandated a concurrent plurality for the election of the president. As stipulated by Article 126 of the new constitution, the winner must win a plurality nationwide and also secure 25 percent of the vote in at least two-thirds of the states. These “concurrent plurality” electoral systems encourage broad coalitions when choosing the executive. Therefore they are arguably useful in promoting ethnic accommodation in divided societies (Shugart and Carey 1992). However there are few incentives for politicians elected with separate and sovereign origins to remain loyal to such a coalition afterward the election. As we shall see, Nigeria’s experience confirms such expectations.

Since the presidential election yielded no clear winner, a constitutional crisis ensued. The constitution failed to provide clear guidelines for victory should no
candidate satisfy the electoral thresholds. The constitution also lacked a clear contingency plan regarding what to do in the meantime.\textsuperscript{191} After 13 years of military rule, the country was on edge. Shagari became president only after an extremely contentious Supreme Court decision interpreting two-thirds of 19 states as $12 \frac{2}{3}$, rather than 13 (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985).

Shagari won, but with a fragile mandate to rule. On top of his narrow victory for the presidency he lacked a majority in either chamber of the National Assembly. His political strategy in response to this dual challenge involved creating a legislative coalition between the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and the Nigeria People’s Party (NPP). The NPN’s leadership and general appeal bore a resemblance to the NPC in the First Republic, while the NPP was a splinter party that attracted support in Plateau State as well as the predominantly Igbo east. In the House, the coalition consisted of 168 NPN and 78 NPP “honourables,” totaling 246 out of 450 members. In the Senate, the 16 NPP seats combined with 36 from the NPN brought the coalition to 52 out of 95 Senate seats.\textsuperscript{192} NPP participation brought both the seats required to garner a legislative majority as well as a southern (largely Igbo) voice. Without its partner, the president’s party had not only slipped to minority status in both legislative chambers, it also lacked the geographical distribution of support that the concurrent plurality electoral system meant to promote.

\textsuperscript{191} Sections 133-134 of the 1999 constitution currently in effect are scarcely any better.

\textsuperscript{192} The separate sovereignty of the legislative elections weakens any incentive for party discipline. Yet Shagari’s response was in fact largely typical of presidential systems: contrary to long-held conventional wisdom, we now know that they operate with coalition governments 40 percent of the time. If no party secures a majority, coalitions are actually slightly more likely under presidential than parliamentary systems (Cheibub 2007).
Some scholars portray the coalition as more casual than official, which would suggest that we should not code each party in the coalition with a veto. However President Shagari was present when the Assembly Leadership created the coalition, enhancing the formal and official aura. According to the Senate President, the coalition also involved fairly specific quid-pro-quos, giving the NPP ten leadership positions in the National Assembly. These included the speaker and deputy senate president positions and numerous cabinet positions. The legislative productivity of the coalition early on suggests a level of party discipline sufficient to place the vetoes within the parties rather than in the institutions of the House and Senate. As discussed in Chapter 4, institutions can sometimes generate a stable set of preferences that can exercise a veto. Such internal coherence was visible in the early years of the legislative coalition: Between October 1979 and July 1980, the Senate passed 17 bills and 92 motions. This included major legislation such as the 1980 appropriation bill. The executive introduced all of the bills that passed, pointing to the influence of President Shagari and the cooperation of the National Assembly leadership. In addition, none of the 11 private bills introduced even reached their second parliamentary reading. This suggests that the party coalition had solid control over the agenda.\textsuperscript{193} For example, when the opposition brought a motion to not accept the executive’s supplemental appropriations bill in 1980, only five members of the coalition voted with the opposition.\textsuperscript{194}

The death of the NPN-NPP coalition brought the end of this three veto player regime and exacerbated regional frustrations in the south. The decline of party discipline


\textsuperscript{194} “Senate Proceedings,” \textit{Daily Times}, April 1, 1980, p. 3.
began sometime around mid-1980. The problem was that nothing “tied the President to the Party or the winning coalition after the election since he could act independently in the choice of his cabinet and in the performance of his activities once elected” (Omoruyi 1989, 188-229). All five of the Senators who voted with the opposition on the supplemental bill were NPP members, and the opposition’s motion on the supplemental bill passed by a single vote. The NPP was also irked by revelations that their coalition partner had secretly agreed to more than double a “contingency fund” to pay off military debts to the states. Another little noticed factor is that Igbos within the NPP were furious about the president’s choice of nominees from the east. The Senate President referred to them as politicians who no longer “came home,” meaning they lacked credibility at the grassroots. Chuba Okadigbo and other Igbo elites duly noted the slight to the NPP, as the Party had carried the two largest Igbo states by overwhelming margins in both the House and Senate elections.

In January 1981 NPP members voted against an NPN bill reforming the country’s revenue allocation system. To retaliate, the NPN refused to ratify ambassadorial nominees. The Chairman of the NPP accused NPN members of “bare-faced rape” of the coalition agreement. The NPN retorted that its partner had been “an unfaithful wife” in politics. The assignment of “Presidential Liaison Officers” to the National Assembly further contributed to tension within the coalition. The PLO’s generally weakened legislative-executive relations and seemed to strengthen the NPN’s hand since it controlled the presidency. To make matters worse, other nominees aside from the NPP

candidates for ambassador were summarily rejected (Joseph 1991; Falola and Ihonvbere 1985). The tension between the parties climaxed in July when the NPP announced it would formally withdraw from the coalition in six months. Four of its cabinet ministers resigned, apparently under presidential pressure. Interpreting this as an insult, the NPN urged termination.198

The impeachment of Kaduna’s governor, Balarable Musa, by the NPN-dominated state Assembly in early 1981 may be what ultimately doomed the coalition. Musa belonged to the radical People’s Redemption Party (PRP), which had widespread support among Hausa commoners in the north. These talakawa, as they were known in Hausa, posed a challenge to the conservative authority of the emirates and thus to elites within the NPN. The opposition parties seized the opportunity to attack the incumbent NPN. Meanwhile, progressives in the NPP were furious with their coalition partner’s reactionary response to Governor Musa’s enlightened socialism. Then a destabilizing riot followed two weeks later in Kano when the NPN announced that it planned to remove the Emir from office (Diamond 1982, 629-68). The collapse of the coalition ushered in heightened regional tensions and prefaced the tragic fall of the Republic.

Babangida’s Early Years (1986 – 1989)

I code the early years of Babangida as three veto players, including Babangida himself and the Armed Forces Ruling Council. A coalition of soft-liners with access to policy making structures also emerged. This critically included former politicians and retired senior military figures who maintained a high profile in national politics. They generally shared a reform agenda, and they capitalized on the government’s weakness

during economic turbulence. This coalition held the regime’s third veto until its own internal coherence dissipated around 1989.

Following his successful 27 August 1985 coup, Babangida announced, “We recognize that a government, be it civilian or military, needs the consent of the people to govern if it is to reach the objectives.” While acknowledging this was not without limits, he said “we do not intend to rule by force.” The government released hundreds of political prisoners and quickly annulled unpopular and repressive decrees. It created a Political Bureau and other novel mechanisms for constituent feedback, public participation, and civic mobilization. Within three years, these goodwill measures dissipated.

As its first major initiative, the government launched the economic liberalization program that Babangida had failed to advance as a member of the previous government’s Supreme Military Council. Another program involved broad efforts to professionalize the civil service. This time the bureaucrats caved in to the generals’ politicization. They did not acquire the kind of autonomous authority they held under previous governments such as Gowon’s (Adamolekun 1997, 363-75). The Political Bureau in particular was a hallmark of the regime. Senior bureaucrats resented its creation since a committee of eight federal permanent secretaries was already deliberating over similar issues. However their attempts to undercut the Bureau’s efforts failed, meaning the bureaucracy posed no veto threat. The government’s professed commitment to public participation afforded the Bureau a measure of latitude as well. Babangida was forced to expand the membership to better reflect “federal character.” He also largely stood idly by as the

---

Bureau essentially re-wrote and expanded its mandate (Diamond, Kirk-Greene and others 1997).

It would be unreasonable to assign the Bureau a veto given its advisory role. Plus the government accepted some of its recommendations and rejected others. But the Bureau did have important broader effects: It generated political cover for factions within the AFRC, supplanting their bargaining leverage on issues such as state creation and the nature of the transition plan. It also opened up political space for organized criticism from former senior military officers who emerged as a new force in politics.

That Babangida held a veto is not in dispute. He famously referred to himself as “President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces” and restructured the organs of government to reflect the change in title. Decree No. 17 endowed him with the exclusive authority to appoint the second ranking executive official, now referred to as the “Chief of General Staff, General Staff Headquarters.” Ojo compares the position to a prime minister even though the new title forfeited jurisdiction over military affairs (Ojo 1987, 293). Moreover, the Chief of General Staff could now be removed unilaterally rather than collectively. Since this in fact what happened to the first holder of this office, Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe, it is clear he did not exercise a veto.

A 1988 speech made clear the contingent nature of the cabinet’s authority, vested in the “National Council of Ministers.” Babangida declared, “I shall not hesitate to remove from office any of you found wanting on grounds of incompetence, impropriety and disloyalty to me in any capacity” (Cited in Othman 1989, 142). Ministers were frequently reshuffled. For example, Babangida appointed his first cabinet in September 1985 and by January 1986 announced a pending reshuffle, intended to bring “fresh
commitment to the values of efficient performance.” The reassignments occurred in September. He juggled the ministers in March 1989 and again later that year when he announced a new AFRC. He sacked 10 ministers again in 1992.\textsuperscript{200} The authority of the states through the new “National Council of State” was also consultative in nature, and the governors were also whimsically re-assigned. Eight new governors were appointed in 1986 only to be re-assigned a few years later.\textsuperscript{201}

The Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) held this regime’s second veto. This body replaced the Supreme Military Councils as the highest governmental authority. In a shift from previous regimes, Decree No. 17 stripped the Council of the power of appointing the chiefs of each armed service and the Police Inspector General. Like other self-perceived military reformers, the 1985 coup leaders claimed that Buhari had replaced “the concept of collective leadership” with “stubborn and ill-advised unilateral actions.”\textsuperscript{202} Whether the AFRC fulfilled this expectation is a matter of some dispute. Nwabueze for example claims that most decrees emanated directly from Babangida and never went through the AFRC: “He was for all intents and purposes the sole legislature of the Federal Military Government” (See Osaghae 1998, 192-93). If true, this would argue against coding the AFRC as a veto player.

Other factors contradict this view of a feeble ruling council. In formal terms, the regime’s constituting rules vested the AFRC collectively with the authority to consider


and approve revenues and expenditures of the government, declare a state of emergency, and to make laws which would then require the president’s signature. More significantly, the issue of state creation divided the AFRC. Those in favor of creating more states eventually prevailed. In September 1987 the administration announced the creation of two new states, increasing the number from 19 to 21 and declared the issue closed. The rancorous response from groups including the Igbos in the east and minorities in the south forced the administration to revisit the issue. A government White Paper on state creation leaked a few years later exposed the extent of the divisions within the AFRC (Suberu, Rotimi 1994; Diamond, Kirk-Greene and others 1997). Eventually nine more states were created in 1991. Circumstantially, it is also significant that Babangida could only make minor changes in the composition of the AFRC until its reorganization in 1989, which I pinpoint as the end of this veto player regime. This reshuffling reduced the AFRC’s numbers from 29 to 19.

Soft-liners in the government allied with senior former military officers held the regime’s third veto. During this time, retired military officials became publicly involved in politics on a scale never seen before. This afforded government soft-liners valuable political cover, which made it much harder for Babangida to ignore them. Many of these politically moderate officials still had strong links to their former colleagues now serving in government. The Political Bureau and other quasi-governmental entities also helped channel their preferences directly to incumbent government elites. These factors afforded

---

them a measure of autonomy that previous (and subsequent) elites of their stature and background lacked.

In January 1987 other soft-liners, including a former military governor who had been Army Chief of Staff, levied incendiary charges of northern bias against the government. That same month the recently-retired General Obasanjo published a controversial biography casting the leader of Nigeria’s first coup in a favorable – or at least a humane – light. The government was already alerted to Obasanjo’s potentially subversive sympathies; only two weeks before Babangida overthrew the Buhari-Idiagbon regime, Obasanjo “commended” key policies of the government. Later in 1987 Obasanjo delivered a major speech, criticizing government’s economic policy and denouncing proposals to extend the transition date. The comments created “rumbles in the corridor of power” and cemented his status as a particularly thorny critic of the government (Adekanye 1997, 55-80).

Other relevant former military figures include Obasanjo’s former deputy, the former leader of the Biafran secessionist movement defeated in the Civil War, and General Yakubu Gowon. They all publicly nursed political ambitions. Several other generals who governed during previous military thought it necessary to volunteer their views to the Political Bureau – and let this be known. The participation of this segment of the population was so widespread that Babangida attempted to impose a ban on their activities in September 1987. Yet the ban failed to cover or affect many of the government’s harshest critics. It did not cover those who had served in the SMC during

---

the regimes of Ironsi, Gowon, or Murtala/Obasanjo, nor those who had served as ministers or police officials under these regimes (Adekanye 1999). By evading the ban on politics and then helping to push the government to change course on the state creation issue, this community’s political preferences could not be ignored, whether the issue was the distribution of power or the allocation of public services.

As the novelty of government experiments in public participation faded, the government retreated to more conventional modes of authoritarianism. Structural adjustment proved so unpopular that the government abandoned its pretenses of civil liberties, jailing thousands of students, human rights activists, and union members (Diamond, Kirk-Greene and others 1997; Olukoshi 1997, 379-400). By the end of 1989, Babangida took over as Minister of Defense and abolished the National Security Organization. He replaced the NSO with three new internal security organizations, directly responsible to him. Babangida the reformer was no more.

**Regimes with Four or More Veto Players**


Three regimes in my sample have four veto players. The first is the Second Republic spanning 1982 – 83, following the withdrawal of the NPP from the coalition. Several factors highlight why a new veto player regime emerged at this point. Previously, the coalitions of two political parties each held what amounted to “partisan” vetoes. They managed to maintain enough internal cohesion that their preferences transcended regional cleavages as well as the institutional separation of the two chambers.

---

of the National Assembly. Now the House, the Senate, and the president each possessed an institutional veto over policy. A 1982 supplemental appropriation bill provides the strongest evidence of this shift. The National Assembly resoundingly defeated the bill. The Senate specifically objected to efforts by the executive to allow states to make foreign loans without the approval of the legislature.\textsuperscript{206} The institutional basis was even more obvious after the 1983 elections, where the NPN secured solid majorities in the House and Senate. The party consolidated its support in the north, capturing 13 (out of 19) governorships. This obviated the need for a coalition and diminished progressive hopes that parties would serve as instruments of inter-ethnic cooperation across regions.

In addition to the three institutional vetoes, a regional veto emerged in the south. Each of my criteria for the exercise of such informal authority was distinctly present: First, the collapse of the coalition in 1981 meant that the government now underrepresented the interests of the south in the policy process. (This was especially dangerous for a government which had come to power only after the infamous Supreme Court decision interpreting two-thirds of 19.) Until the collapse of the coalition in 1981, the alliance of NPN and NPP had thus diluted any significant efforts to exercise regional solidarity from the south. In the 1979 elections, the NPN showed its strength in only two southern states: Rivers and Cross River. Those states had the only NPN governors in the south. They were the only states where the party received more votes than any other in the House, Senate, or the presidential elections.

Second, when the NPP defected from the coalition, it explicitly aligned itself with the two opposition parties rather than taking up an independent mantle. The opposition

United Party of Nigeria (UPN), led by the loser of the 1979 presidential election, completely dominated the southwest. In the four states of the zone, it held all four governorships, 71 out of the 85 Federal House seats that represented the southwest states, and all 24 Senate seats. Table 14 illustrates this new arrangement of political alliances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Four zone Structure:</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northwest</strong></td>
<td>NPN strongest party but not dominant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South West</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aligned with UPN (Now allied with NPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aligned with NPP (Now allied with UPN)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The “Nine Progressive Governors” point to a third reason why the region held a veto. This alliance of southern and Middle Belt governors incorporated the three other opposition parties and began meeting in 1979. All of them hailed from either the south or the so-called middle belt states. When the NPP governors of Anambra, Imo, and Plateau joined in the wake of Governor Musa’s 1981 impeachment in Kaduna State, the group rechristened itself the “Twelve Progressive Governors” (Diamond 1982, 629-68). The monthly meetings of this cohesive group served to facilitate a carefully coordinated opposition that constituted a regional veto.

When the NPN-NPP coalition collapsed, the south was therefore equipped with both grievances and organizational mechanisms for exercising regional leverage on national policy. The north, by contrast was divided. The Middle Belt’s defection, on the
edge of the regional north, was problematic enough. Now Northern elements within the NPN were split between its “Northern Caucus,” dominated by the Kaduna Mafia, and other factions who supported President Shagari. This rancor weakened northern solidarity even though the Party was well represented in government. In the disastrous August 1983 elections, the NPN dominated the National Assembly, winning 264 out of 450 House Seats and 61 out of 95 Senate seats. Aside from inroads it made into Oyo State, the southwest remained almost completely dominated by the UPN. The House elections were so acrimonious that results for Ondo and Oyo States were not even finalized; “defeated” candidates overwhelmed the courts with complaints. When Nigeria’s second democratic experiment died in December 1983, much of the country heaved a sigh of relief. The nation also suspected that they had the Kaduna Mafia to thank (Othman 1984, 441-61). Under the new military government, the relief was painfully short-lived.

*Babangida “Steps Down” (1990 – 1993)*

Babangida’s final years in office present a puzzle: By the end of 1989 he had effectively marginalized the Armed Forces Ruling Council, undermining its collective authority and curtailing its jurisdictional scope. However important shifts beneath this move prevented the unilateralism often presumed of the policy process during these years. As a result of southern mobilization and fractionalization of the military, I argue that the number of veto players actually increased from three to four. To highlight the potential for new centers of power, it is worth noting that by this time Freedom House had changed its Nigeria rating from “Not Free” to “Partly Free.” The shift in vetoes at this time is due in no small part to the momentous decision by the government to lift the
ban on politics in 1989. In addition to Babangida’s veto, the AFRC split between a powerful Army faction and soft-liners, who included a group called the “Langtang Mafia.” A regional veto from the south formed the fourth veto.

Shortly after the government lifted the ban on politics, Nigerians elected a National Assembly and new state governments. Democrats hoped this would amount to a meaningful step in the larger democratic transition plan. In state level politics, the power of governors increased. According to one former Speaker of the House, the governors circumvented the state assemblies’ authority on spending “as a matter of routine.” But because of the states’ dependence on the center for revenue, local realities did not really increase their insulation from federal encroachment. The National Assembly also enjoyed a limited influence over policy. But these institutions did provide a platform for hundreds of national elites to criticize and mobilize.

Aside from the individual veto retained by Babangida, major policy initiatives now had to pass through three other gates. Following the sweeping reorganization of the AFRC in 1989, the Council lacked collective veto authority. However Babangida could not ignore two military-politico factions. Already a pivotal figure in the government, Lt. General Sani Abacha emerged from the AFRC reorganization an even more powerful figure. The young Chief of Army Staff had announced the August coup in 1985. He then helped foil a coup against the regime that same December. Abacha moved to keep the army united after this incident, a loyalist role he played again following a failed April 1990 putsch. As the AFRC lost ground in 1989, Abacha’s authority expanded.

---

207 My source is a former speaker of a State House of Assembly. Ibadan, April 1, 2006.
now included the sensitive (and strategic) portfolio of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By 1990 he held a veto within the regime. While the AFRC was increasingly marginalized Abacha and his cohort of Army allies were not.

It is hazardous to pinpoint where Abacha really stood on the transition plan during the tumultuous years of 1992 – 1993. However, his “Lagos Group” prevailed over the military faction that outright opposed the democratic transition. Abacha then negotiated exit guarantees for Babangida that helped keep the peace following the nullification of the June 1993 election. When a weak and divided Interim National Government fell apart after only three months, many supporters of a democratic transition lined up behind Abacha as the consensus candidate to take over (Omoruyi 1999). Whether he would install the presumed winner of the election or set in place a new transition plan became an explosive matter.

Government policy at this point also required support from soft-liners within the government who formed the third veto. This faction centered on the “Langtang Mafia.” This group of largely Christian Army officers included the prominent Army Major General Domkat Bali. Like Abacha, he had helped bring Babangida to power. He also had a respectable constituency within the military for helping to foil the December 1985 coup attempt. Babangida was thus indebted to both men on both issues. When Bali, as the most senior and longest serving Army general, publicly protested his reassignment


210 “Coup Plot Verdicts,” West Africa, March 3, 1986, pp. 444-46. The plotters even claimed in their radio broadcast that Bali’s demotion was central to their cause, thus making his loyalty to Babangida all the more significant. See “A Bloody Attempt,” West Africa, April 30-May 6, 1990, pp. 696-97.
from Minister of Defence to Minister of Interior, other powerful officers backed him up. The “Bali Affair” as it became known, exposed the limits of the regime’s centralization. Babangida backed down and took steps to placate the Langtang Mafia by promoting Gen. Bali. Following the 1990 coup attempt he went even further, placating other influential Army officials. Osaghae suggests that the Mafia – by itself – lacked comprehensive influence over policy (Osaghae 1998). However many of the same retired generals who had criticized Babangida’s government in the 1980s such as Gowon, Obasanjo, and Yar’Adua generally stood with Bali. These men provided political cover, geographical reach, and helped rally the constituency within the military favoring democratic transition. In effect, these allies gave a public face to like minded soft-liners within the regime (Adekanye 1997, 55-80).

Chief among the reasons for Babangida’s “stepping down” in August 1993 was a regional veto from the south that took shape after 1990. In the wake of the Bali Affair, transition advocates drew support from retired southern senior military officials and from key Christian officers. Four other critical factors contributed to regional solidarity that the regime could not afford to ignore: First, the regime’s decision to join the Organization of Islamic States in 1986 created a cause célèbre for the overwhelmingly Christian south. Not only did this mobilize the Christian Association of Nigeria, it also introduced widespread skepticism about the regime’s commitment to ethnic balancing (Kukah 1999). Babangida tactfully suspended the OIC membership. The largely southern and middle belt Christian profile of the 1990 coup plotters did not go unnoticed either.211 The

211 “Coup Attempt Foiled,” *Africa Research Bulletin*, May 15, 1990, pp. 9666-68. This also made their attack on the credibility of Sultan Dasuki particularly suspect and he rallied against them. See FN 217.
financier of the 1990 coup later claimed that despite its failure, the coup attempt restrained Babangida’s excesses and pressured him to exit. 212 Second, the 1989 AFRC reshuffling left only Muslims in charge of the armed services and the presidency. This was unacceptable to a military that had operated on the federal character principle for a generation. It was a key reason for Gen. Bali’s risky and very public dissent. It is also a clear example of a cautious policy reversal as regional actors flexed their muscle.

Third, conservatives in the National Assembly worked to awaken sectarian regional concerns. “We were selfish and without foresight,” explained a House member of the National Republican Convention (NRC) who supported the election annulment. Regional politics took over as northerners from Abiola’s party now openly organized against a southern politician assuming the presidency. This led them to an alliance of convenience with hardliners in the military government. The “military was looking for legitimacy and NRC members were looking for patronage,” recalled the member. 213

The fourth and final reason for the regional veto is that the loudest civil society voices, on the whole, spoke from the south. The pro-democracy movement could always count on militant activism in Lagos and the southwest, where most of the civil society groups were concentrated. The Nigerian Labor Congress regrouped after suffering for their opposition to structural adjustment in the 1980s. In the south south zone, militant oil workers (on whom the federal government depended for most of its revenue) lined up alongside minorities in the east and the middle belt on strategic issues (Osaghae 1998; Edozie 2002). Zonal preferences are less distinct here than with other regional vetoes, so

---

I do not hazard an identity matrix here. But these four reasons offer compelling evidence of a regional veto.

The Babangida government worked hard to undermine Igbo support for regional solidarity. The Igbo in the east had a mixed attitude toward the June 12 cause. Some felt they should have a “turn” at power while others insisted that a democratic transition required honoring the June 12 results. The government began attacking the Senate President, from the Middle Belt state of Plateau, for his insistence on June 12. Eastern senators initially opposed the impeachment plot against him in July 1993. The administration’s machinations eventually won out. Before the vote, a few governors from the east and from the southwest rallied to support the Senate President by reaching out to Igbo senators. Their efforts failed and the Senate impeached him on a vote of 55 to 25 in November.\(^\text{214}\) That same month the Interim National Government collapsed and its head stepped down. Above all, he blamed agitation by June 12 sympathizers. Nigeria’s Third Republic was officially dead.

Given all that northerners had to complain about during this time, we might have expected an informal veto to arise there. Babangida’s disagreements with the Kaduna Mafia during the Buhari regime are well known, as are his ambiguous relations with the northern elite. Only four of the initial 28-member AFRC were sons of the northern establishment; only seven of the 24-member cabinet could claim the same. As if to make the shift to the Langtang Mafia painfully obvious, only two members of the AFRC were

actually Hausa-Fulani at this time. Given this apparent under-representation, we might have expected a northern regional veto to emerge. Yet one did not. Various regional issues played out in geo-political blocs within the Political Bureau. Northerners were particularly well represented in the Bureau meaning they could scarcely complain for lack of voice. They formed a “Committee of Elders,” recruiting traditional elites from throughout the region. Traditional rulers finally presented a more united front on the shari’a issue and opposed customary court reforms (Vaughan 1997, 413-34).

Despite all this, the government politically outmaneuvered the emirs on these and other key issues. The creation of new states pitted the three northern zones against each other, undermining regional solidarity. Only one new northern state was created in 1987. When other requests were rejected in 1991, riots broke out in Kano and Sokoto but to little end. More significantly, Babangida engineered the replacement of the Sultan of Sokoto with Imbrahim Dasuki, rejecting the more conservative candidate favored by many local elites. The Hausa-Fulani kingmakers resented Dasuki for cultivating a support base over the years through national level politics, rather than within the caliphate (Paden 2004, 17-37). The regime’s Director of Military Intelligence later reflected that this posture toward the north contributed significantly to the government’s failures (Alli 2001). The government did not embrace the Political Bureau’s near hostility to the emirs’ requests for reforms. It did accept the Bureau’s recommendation to limit traditional rulers’ authority to local affairs, even as it elevated their stature in other

217 Dasuki returned the favor a few months later, lining up 63 traditional rulers behind Babangida and against the 1990 coup attempt. See “Ten Coup Suspects,” Newswatch, May 14, 1990, pp. 17-20.
ways (Diamond, Kirk-Greene and others 1997). Ultimately traditional leaders’ victories on local government, sharia, and the courts were limited. And with Muslims in control of all the armed services after 1990, northern marginalization was no longer a credible rallying cry.


The other regime which I code as four veto players is President Obasanjo’s first term in office during the Fourth Republic, from 1999 to 2003. Chapter 4 already outlined the broad set of regional grievances. I demonstrated how a veto was only possible after a substantial level of inter-zonal coordination and the organizations which performed this function. I argued that the president’s sensitivity on the Shari’a issue and his reversal on the revenue allocation debate provide evidence of the region’s successful exercise of political leverage. I also outlined a theoretical model showing how subnational coordination is more difficult among many smaller units (states) than it is among a few larger units (zones). Here I complete the account of this veto player regime with evidence of the widespread perception of the south’s under-representation.

The 1999 election results do not seem to give the south “cause.” The majority party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), seems well represented between north and south. The results reported in Appendix 6 do show that the Alliance for Democracy dominated the southwest. But they also show that the PDP had a majority of the House and Senate seats in the southeast and the south south. It also held all of the governorships in these zones. How then can we claim that a regional veto existed?

Like the previous presidential system from 1979 to 1983, the president, the House of Representatives, and the Senate each held a veto over policy. Unlike the Second
Republic though, the president’s party enjoyed majorities in the House and the Senate. A standing legislative coalition therefore seemed unnecessary – as long as the president could maintain an adequate level of party unity. The acrimonious first six months of the Fourth Republic made obvious that this would not be the case. Rather than vesting the veto with one disciplined party, the House and the Senate maintained institutional vetoes over policy.

A variety of issues demonstrate that the House and the Senate had both cause and capability to exercise vetoes. By the end of 1999, the Speaker of the House, Salisu Buhari, had been forced to resign for falsely claiming he had studied at the University of Toronto. The Senate soon thereafter impeached the Senate President, Evans Enwerem, for lying about his age and credentials. Within months their replacements, Speaker Ghali Na’Abba and Senator Chuba Okadigbo, were under attack. Police with armored vehicles surrounded the Senate President’s house in June 2000 after he refused to convene the Senate to vote on a bill supported by President Obasanjo. Some PDP members thought Na’Abba was also too confrontational. In September 2000 they allied with members of Obasanjo’s cabinet and quietly began convening caucus meetings to impeach the Speaker. By August, the Senate had impeached its new President, Chuba Okadigbo, for gross abuse of public office. Na’Abba’s battle stretched out until the PDP primaries in 2002 when he was expelled from the party.

A variety of policy issues, including a motion to impeach President Obasanjo, drove the National Assembly and the president apart. The “honourables” parted ways with the president on amendments to the Electoral Act out of concern that the sequence of presidential and legislative elections could influence their outcome. The most contentious battles arose over spending bills and the budget for Fiscal Year 2000 above all set the tone for much of what followed. The Chairman of the Senate Public Accounts Committee commented, “We are seriously concerned about the ability of the president to comply with whatever we approved for him, especially in view of the obvious cases of non-compliance with the contents of the 1999 budget.” This included both budgetary impoundments and at least 71 charges of unauthorized spending by the president. These charges exceeded tens of billions of naira. The president also fought a significant Anti-Corruption bill after the Senate Judiciary Committee created an Independent Counsel provision. The Senators sought to allow Federal High Court Judges to appoint a counsel to investigate allegations of serious wrongdoing by senior executive officials.

Although the frustration within the PDP appears generalized, much of it took on a distinctly zonal character. National Assembly rules “zoned” the office of the Senate President to the southeast. This guaranteed an Igbo would hold the office (since it was highly unlikely the Senate would vote for a southeastern minority). With an estimated seven impeachment plots against the Senate Presidents before 2003, Igbo politicians smelled conspiracy. One Igbo founding member of the PDP commented that the Party has failed to address their grievances, including integration of Igbos into the civil service.

---


and the military. Senator Okadigbo used this to his advantage. He appealed to the pan-Igbo organization, Ohaneze, for support in May 2000. The group organized rallies, a constitutional rationale for Okadigbo’s survival, and acted as mediator with the presidency. In keeping with the zoning rules, the Senate picked another Igbo to succeed Okadigbo. The new Senate president had much more cordial relations with President Obasanjo. When he came under attack for changing the committee funding structure, the southeastern senators declined to rally around him. While certainly not unanimous, the propensity of opinion in the southeast had shifted; opposition to the regime had taken on an ethnic dimension.

Other issues with a distinctly zonal character included the onshore/offshore dichotomy detailed in Chapter 4. Politicians and civil society throughout the south south zone also supported a 1999 bill in the National Assembly to create a Niger Delta Development Commission. The NDDC aimed to create a commission to improve the socioeconomic conditions in the oil producing areas. According to the Chair of the Senate Committee on the Niger Delta, the south south governors unanimously and vocally opposed amendments that Obasanjo proposed to the bill. In particular the president aimed to increase the role of the military in the region. A Senate tour of the area reinforced its opposition to the amendments. The Senate insisted on confirmation of the Commission’s appointees and a 3 percent tax on oil companies to help finance the Commission. When the president vetoed the bill, the National Assembly voted

overwhelmingly to override it. The regional dimensions of these alignments are captured by Table 15.

Table 15: Matrix Reflecting the South’s Regional Veto, 1999 – 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Six zone Structure</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>Aligned with PDP but APP strong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>Aligned with PDP but APP strong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Belt</td>
<td>Aligned with PDP with APP presence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dominated by AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discord within PDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South South</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discord within PDP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In sum, a PDP president from the southwest had virtually no electoral support from his home zone. He then alienated party on two fronts: first on issues with a zonal character such as the impeachment conspiracies. Second he attempted to sabotage the constitutional integrity of the National Assembly. This combination encouraged governors’ associations and various sectional groups to organize for regional interests over party interests. The regional veto succeeded in reversing the president’s position on the resource control issue. It also pressured the government to moderate clamor for religious law in the north.

CONCLUSION

Several important patterns emerge from this discussion: First, regimes with fewer veto players move quickly to dominate regional centers of power because they seek to prevent the emergence of informal, regional vetoes. This explains why powerful, decentralized bases of power are most visible in multi-veto player regimes. Second, military governments in Nigeria quickly encounter critical choices about their
relationship to the bureaucracy and to traditional leaders. No junta built an equally effective political coalition with both of these constituencies, and no military government that excluded both lasted more than a year or two. Finally, as the previous chapter explains, ethno-regional balancing is a constant in Nigerian politics even as the number of states and zones changes. The sensitivity over this issue emerges in the various purges, promotions, and in executive appointments. Authoritarian governments in particular used promotions and demotions to limit the pool of potential successors and consolidate power.

Although these generalizations are merely tentative, they suggest important new lines of future research. These distinctions could lead to predictions on a new range of dependent variables, such as regime stability or democratization. The analytical framework employed here also shows how veto players sometimes straddle the formal and informal political realms. In particular, the leverage that players in government exercise over policy often depends on their links to the broader political society. Finally, cross-national studies that use veto players would fail to capture nuances that became central to an effective coding in this study. This was visible from the analysis of the First Republic. It is also visible in Babangida’s later years, where he marginalized the AFRC yet the number of veto players actually increases. Without this rigor, the numbers assigned to complex social and political factions would be arbitrary. Now that we have credibly counted the number of vetoes, the next chapter will take the next step by testing to see if this analytical framework can indeed predict patterns of government performance.
Table 16: Veto Players in Nigeria’s Regimes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vetoes</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Description and Distribution of Veto Authority (Regional Vetoes in Shaded Boxes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1997 – 98</td>
<td>Decision making concentrated around Abacha loyalists within Provisional Ruling Council. He abandons transition and neutralizes PRC members opposed to his “self-succession.” Federal Executive Council stops meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Aguyi-Ironsi as Head of State rules through a limited Supreme Military Council. Federal Executive Council confined to policy implementation. Northern politicians, military officers, and elites coordinate through governors to oppose key policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Westminster parliamentary system. NPC runs in a coalition but wins a parliamentary majority on its own: 162, all in the north. Other parties selectively invited to participate in government. After NPC wins a majority of seats in 1964 election, southern interests marginalized. UPGA mobilizes an informal veto for the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1967 – 74</td>
<td>The Supreme Military Council rules collectively. Unlike in other regimes, it includes governors. Head of State Gowon never successfully dismisses them, despite widespread corruption and frustration with the states. Gowon relies heavily on technocrats for political support and advice. Cabinet and “Super Perm Secs” capture authority to make and implement policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1964 – 85</td>
<td>Buhari is Head of State but not head of the military Supreme Headquarters. Governors through the Council of State limited to consultative roles. Senior bureaucrats politically marginalized. Idiagbon, Chief of Staff, Supreme HQ, enjoys substantial authority. He runs the security apparatus and one of the government’s major policy initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1999 – 03</td>
<td>Abacha as Head of State governs with Provisional Ruling Council, which has legislative powers. Weak cabinet and weak National Council of State. Chief of General Staff Diya and the “June 12” group is the only faction within the PRC to hold a veto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1975 – 79</td>
<td>Mohammed, then Obasanjo Head of State have veto over policy. SMC collectively involved in policy making and transition plan. Local governments strengthened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1980 – 81</td>
<td>Babangida is “president and commander in chief” with Army support. Cabinet and governors weak. Babachir Lawal, former minister, has veto over transition plan. Governors are collective authority in policy making. Armed Forces Ruling Council has collective authority in policy making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1982 – 83</td>
<td>President possesses a constitutional veto. House Senate After party coalition breaks down, a southern regional veto forms with marginalized parties and elites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1990 – 93</td>
<td>Babangida expands his powers over the AFRC. Abacha thwarts coup and uses Army to acquire veto. A softliner faction composed of Maj. Gen. Bali, the “Langtang Mafia,” and moderates in AFRC. Pro-democracy coalition including civil society groups, politicians, and traditional leaders coordinate a southern regional veto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1999 – 03</td>
<td>President possesses a constitutional veto. House Senate The south coordinates through governor associations, and state delegations in National Assembly.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

I argue throughout this dissertation that political institutions have consequences for policy outputs. Chapter 2 revealed how a dichotomous classification of regimes neither explains Nigeria’s government performance nor captures the country’s institutional variation. As an alternative, I introduce veto players in Chapter 3 as key constitutive units of Nigeria’s policy process. I establish guidelines for identifying them in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. Chapter 4 describes regional vetoes, which arise when collective policy actors fail to cut across regional cleavages. Chapter 5 codes Nigeria’s veto player regimes since 1960. In general, I make three causal claims regarding the consequences of veto players on policy outputs: First, a policy process with many veto players delivers more pork. Second, these regimes face bargaining problems that undermine the delivery of public goods. Third, having additional veto players increases per-unit costs of pork, meaning that in the aggregate spending is more wasteful.
This chapter re-states these causal claims as three tests concerning the level of pork, the delivery of public goods, and the efficiency of policy, respectively. Utilizing data from Chapter 1, I find some support for my overall hypothesis that regimes with more veto players provide more pork. I demonstrate that policy processes with more veto players have difficulty delivering public goods. This does not necessarily contradict the claim throughout the literature that policy is more stable in regimes with multiple veto players. But it does imply that policy making in these regimes is prone to bargaining problems. This has important theoretical implications because it means that political processes with many veto players produce negative externalities for performance. Next, I find that particularistic goods in these regimes do tend to cost more, naira-for-naira. This challenges studies which anticipate that more inclusive policy making will reduce the opportunities for corruption or rents generally.

The first section of this chapter states my hypothesis and describes the measures of government performance I use to test it. I also identify controls for regime type and oil revenues. The second section specifies my models for three sets of tests. My test results provide only limited evidence that veto players increase morselization through increased levels of pork. But when we consider the impact of veto players on public goods compared to pork, additional veto players have an adverse impact on delivery. My tests for policy efficiency show that additional veto players increase wasteful spending, although the results are only clear with one of the variables. The third and final section reflects on the test results and explains their implications for the two theoretical traditions rooted in “commitment” and “distributive dilemmas.” My findings provide a basis for a theory of performance that integrates the consequences of commitment. Multi-veto
player regimes may include a broader range of interests. But by exacerbating bargaining problems they undermine the delivery of public goods. In a complex, heterogeneous polity such as Nigeria’s, expanding political inclusion with more policy actors may be a necessary tradeoff. Appendix 2 reports tests results for time series auto-correlation in my independent variables.

PARTICULARISM, PUBLIC GOODS, AND INEFFICIENCY

To build a model that can explain policy outputs rather than simply policy stability, Chapter 3 highlights a dispute implicit throughout the veto player literature. The “commitment” tradition emphasizes the importance of policy credibility and accountability (Henisz 2000, 1-31; Keefer and Stasavage 2003, 407-20). It argues that the number of veto players essentially generates a tradeoff between policy stability and instability; the policy process has to be flexible without being unpredictable. However, this framework does not adequately address the distributional consequences of multiple veto players. I contrast the commitment literature with the “distributional dilemma” tradition, which argues that more veto players leads to more pork (Cox and McCubbins 2001, 21-63; Alesina, Roubini and others 1997). This claim implies that regimes that produce policy stability also exacerbate bargaining problems. These problems undermine the government’s ability to deliver nationally-oriented policies in the form of public goods.

I am not the first to point out a tension between these two traditions (Treisman 2000, 837-56; Tsebelis 2002). But this project is among the first to actually conduct empirical tests of them. I do so utilizing variables that distinguish pork from public
goods and therefore capture a theoretical “range of publicness.”

My basic hypothesis states that an increase in veto players leads to an increase in pork. In this section I outline three tests for this hypothesis and identify appropriate controls. The first test measures the impact of veto players on levels of pork. This includes particularistic policies that are geographically targetable. The second test measures the impact of veto players on public goods. The variables here include policies that benefit the country as a whole, and therefore more closely resemble the strict definition of public goods. The third test gauges the impact of veto players on the efficiency of pork spending. Do schools and teachers become more expensive, naira-for-naira, as the number of veto players increases? After introducing controls for regime type and oil revenues, I conclude with two parsimonious predictions: First, regimes with multiple veto players deliver more pork but they also deliver fewer public goods. Second, pork is more expensive with too many veto players.

Public Goods versus Particularism

First, I test to see if the overall level of pork increases as each additional veto player demands benefits. Thus having many veto players should improve aggregate performance by increasing overall levels of pork. Unlike public goods whose benefits are nationally-oriented, these particularistic policies are geographically targetable and excludable. Increased pork will be observable in terms of more primary schools and lower student/teacher ratios. The first test can be stated as:

(1) **Level of pork:** Regimes with more veto players deliver more pork.

---

226 See Chapter 2, where I define “publicness” in terms of varying degrees of excludability in consumption.
Next, I test to see if the number of veto players affects the delivery of public goods. Following the criteria established in Chapter 1, the benefits of public goods policies are non-divisible and non-excludable. Public goods will be observable in terms of greater budgetary discipline and more efficient courts. This second test can thus be stated as:

(2) Public goods: Regimes with more veto players deliver fewer public goods.

If Cox and McCubbins (2001) along with Alesina et al. (1997) are correct, then the first test will show that regimes with more veto players tend to morselize policy. The second test will show that these regimes also exacerbate bargaining problems which impairs the delivery of public goods. Taken together I expect these two tests to show that it is difficult to deliver both pork and public goods; veto player regimes therefore impact the type of policy.

Policy Inefficiency: The Costliness of Sharing the “National Cake”

The third test of my hypothesis measures the impact of veto players on the per-unit cost of pork. Chapter 1 defines policy efficiency as a ratio of government spending (in constant terms) relative to policy output in education. The credible commitment literature expects additional players to improve accountability and reduce opportunities for corruption. This implies that multi-veto player regimes should improve policy efficiency.
I argue, however, that no veto player sees the value in self-restraint while her peers are permitted to “eat from the national cake” unrestrained. The problem is not small increases in the number of payoffs since individually these are only marginally expensive. Rather, the trouble is that collectively these payments add up to fiscal irresponsibility. I claim that such morselization stimulates overall policy inefficiency.\(^{227}\)

I anticipate that governments with more veto players accumulate deadweight loss: naira-for-naira, these governments spend more without necessarily delivering more. This third test can be stated as:

(3) **Policy efficiency**: Per unit cost of pork is more expensive in regimes with more veto players.

Policy efficiency is observable in my variables measuring the per-unit cost of primary schools and teachers. As explained in Chapter 1, Teachers\(_{1}\) and Schools\(_{1}\) express the residuals in models where I compare the predicted outputs (\(\hat{y}_i\)) to the actual observed values (\(\mu_i + \hat{y}_i\)), given constant spending levels. Sub-optimal government performance occurs when the predicted value exceeds the observed value. The residuals express this difference in a model where \(\varepsilon = y - \hat{y}\). For purposes of hypothesis testing, we must interpret the residuals for our variables differently though: for Schools\(_{1}\), large positive values suggest that the number of schools in a given year exceeds the predicted value. However, for Teachers\(_{1}\) we must reverse the logic since we interpret a lower

\(^{227}\) Recent studies similarly find that geographically targetable policies are prone to corruption when politicians face incentives to cultivate personal reputation rather than collective discipline (Chang and Golden 2006, 115-37).
student/teacher ratio as “good” performance. Here positive residuals are a sign of sub-optimal performance because they indicate larger class sizes.

Evidence consistent with my predictions would not necessarily contradict the commitment tradition’s contention that extra checks make policy more stable (Henisz 2000, 1-31). However it would mean that our theories of accountability must disentangle policy stability from accountability induced by checks and balances (Keefer and Stasavage 2003, 407-20; Andrews and Montinola 2004, 55-87). If additional veto players do increase the costs of individual policy outputs, then this implies that the same institutional framework which provides credibility also requires numerous side payments. These payoffs add up to overall policy inefficiency.

**Control Variables**

For all of these tests I use two control variables. Oil captures oil as a share of government revenue. It thereby controls for the years in my sample where government revenues were unusually high or low due to fluctuations in oil earnings. By incorporating this control, I can claim that veto players rather than oil revenues have a greater impact on policy outputs. This is useful because government revenue levels may in fact drive spending levels (Please 1967, 24-32). By such logic bad performance is a consequence of scarcity; the state delivers fewer goods when it has less money to spend.

---

(Przeworski, Alvarez and others 2000). Some scholars claim this is especially true in sub-Saharan Africa (Ekpo 1996, 219-242).229

Since the oil variable is not stationary I de-trend it with first difference tests, creating Δoil. The veto players variable, vetoes, is stationary only at the least restrictive level. Therefore my models include a lagged variable (vetoes\textsubscript{t-1}) to help reduce autocorrelation. Appendix 2 shows the results of the unit root tests on which I based these decisions.

My other control is for regime type because democracy, rather than the number of veto players, might better account for variation in government performance. This control should also tell us whether democracies or veto players generate the accountability necessary to reduce spending inefficiency and corruption. Rose-Ackerman argues that “the case for autocracy as a technically efficient form of government is weak.” But she also points out that democracy does not always succeed in checking corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1999). Finally, since authoritarian regimes arguably increase judicial efficiency by attacking the courts, regime type proxies for judicial independence. I do not expect this variable to have an impact. I utilize the coding of regimes established in Chapter 2. Between 1960 and 2003 there are 15 years where the value for this dummy variable regime is equal to 1, indicating democracy rather than dictatorship.

**Summary and Predictions**

I expect the “level of pork” tests to show that regimes with more veto players provide more pork. I predict that my tests for public goods will show that regimes with

---

229 Natural resource revenues also supposedly increase the value of being in power, leading politicians to spend more in order to preserve incumbency (Robinson et al. 2006, 447-68).
more veto players also deliver fewer public goods. For my policy efficiency tests, I anticipate that pork is more expensive when there are more veto players. Support for my overall claim that policy outputs increase with the number of veto players would yield two conclusions: First, regimes with more veto players suffer from bargaining problems and the morselization of policy. Second, additional veto players do not necessarily produce accountability that precludes corruption, as the commitment tradition maintains.

TESTING FOR DISTRIBUTIVE DILEMMAS

In this section I offer empirical evidence that the number of veto players accounts for a range of government performance. The first test measures the level of delivery and does not provide much evidence that multi-veto player regimes deliver more pork. However the results are only conclusive for the variable measuring student/teacher ratios. The second test shows that multi-veto player regimes are less likely to deliver public goods. The results are especially robust with regard to fiscal discipline. These findings hold even after controlling for regime type and the impact of oil revenues. Together, the results from the first and second tests only weakly support my overall theoretical claim about the expansion of the policy process: including more veto players induces a dilemma where governments must choose between different types of policy. In the third test I find evidence to support my predictions that regimes with more veto players have worse policy efficiency. However, the results are more robust with student/teacher ratios than with the variable measuring change in the number of primary schools.

Tests for the Impact of Veto Players on Policy Morselization

The first test looks only at the relationship between the number of veto players and policy outputs, measured in terms of primary student/teacher ratios and the number
of primary schools. If the predictions about delivery level are correct, then we would expect to see an increase in the number of veto players correspond with smaller student/teacher ratios and more primary schools. My tests use ordinary least squares regressions with and without control variables. The basic model for the level tests is:

Equation 13: \( \text{Pri.s.t}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (\text{veto}_t) + \beta_2 (\text{veto}_{t-1}) + \beta_3 (\text{regime}_t) + \beta_4 (\Delta \text{oil}_t) + \varepsilon_t \)

| Table 17: Impact of Veto Players on Pork, Measured in Student/Teacher Ratio |
|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| \( \text{Pri.s.t.} \) | \( \text{Primary Student/Teacher Ratio} \) | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| \( \text{Veto} \) | 2.491*** | 2.210** | 2.834*** | 2.883*** |
| | (3.994) | (2.679) | (3.415) | (3.448) |
| \( \text{Veto}_{t-1} \) | .244 | .015 | -.070 |
| | (.290) | (.018) | (.086) |
| \( \text{Regime} \) | | -2.809** | -3.008** |
| (Democracy=1) | | (2.274) | (2.375) |
| \( \Delta \text{Oil} \) | | -4.993 |
| Oil rev. share | | (.794) |
| \( N \) | 42 | 41 | 41 | 41 |
| \( \text{Adj-R}^2 \) | .267 | .239 | .314 | .307 |
| \( \text{DW} \) | 1.054 | 1.093 | 1.229 | 1.315 |
| Absolute value of \( t \)-statistic in parentheses |
| *significant at the .1 level; **significant at the .05 level |
| ***significant at the .01 level |

The results in Table 17 show that veto players predict student teacher ratios at a statistically significant level. But the results are essentially the opposite of my predictions: an increase in veto players leads to higher ratios across the board, even after controlling for regime type and oil revenues. Moreover, the negative coefficients on the \( \text{regime} \) variable indicate that democracy reduces student/teacher ratios when we expected no effect. Both variables are statistically significant although veto players are more significant. The Durbin-Watson statistic improves as the model becomes more complex; with the controls there is virtually no sign of autocorrelation. While the tests show that
veto players capture institutional variation, so far they do not support my prediction that additional veto players contribute to morselization.

Table 18 shows the results of tests where the dependent variable is the number of schools at time \( t+1 \), de-trended with first difference tests. Here we are able to introduce a separate control for enrollments since an increase in enrollments could impact school construction; this is not possible in the tests for student/teacher ratios since the ratios are calculated from gross enrollment figures. This is also a useful control because education performance studies show that regime change affects enrollment (Stasavage 2005, 53-73). As in Chapter 1, the variable measuring primary enrollment, \( pri.enroll \), has been de-trended with first difference tests making it \( \Delta pri.enroll \). This model can be expressed as:

Equation 14: \( \Delta pri.sch_{t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(vetot)+ \beta_2(vetot-1)+ \beta_3(regimet)+\beta_4(\Delta oil_t) +\beta_5(\Delta pri.enroll_t) + \epsilon_t \)

### Table 18: Impact of Veto Players on Pork, Measured in Primary Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( \Delta Pri.sch_{t+1} ) (Number of Primary Schools (de-trended))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto</td>
<td>-111.451 (.317)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto Lag -1</td>
<td>-656.438 (1.426)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (Democracy=1)</td>
<td>-1235.830* (1.762)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta Oil ) (Oil rev. share)</td>
<td>-1503.662 (1.426)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta Pri.enroll ) (Enrollment)</td>
<td>.001** (2.029)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj-R(^2)</td>
<td>-.024</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>.816</td>
<td>.826</td>
<td>.935</td>
<td>.945</td>
<td>1.106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute value of \( t \)-statistic in parentheses
*significant at the .1 level; **significant at the .05 level; ***significant at the .01 level
The results in Table 18 show that regimes with more veto players do not build more schools as my theory predicts. Oil as a share of revenues has no statistically significant impact. Regime type once again is significant. But this time the negative coefficient indicates that democracies consistently build fewer primary schools. Enrollment changes actually best predict the pace of school construction. This appears to suggest that gross enrollments predict school construction better than any particular element of the policy process itself. The Durbin-Watson statistics improve as controls are introduced, but it shows some signs of autocorrelation even with the lagged variable included in the model.

Taken together, these tests for my two measures of education performance present an interesting contradiction: In the first instance, democracy improves student/teacher ratios while additional veto players make them worse. In the second instance, we can state that democracies build fewer schools even without accounting for enrollment changes. Meanwhile veto players have very little impact on the number of schools if any (the lagged variable is significant at the .1 level). Thus the tests do not offer much support for the predictions about the level of pork but the implications for democracy are scarcely better.

Tests for the Impact of Veto Players on Public Goods

My second test measures how well the government delivers public goods. By comparing these results to the first test, we can also determine whether the number of veto players impacts the type of policy. I expect regimes with more veto players to correlate with less fiscal discipline and lower clearance rates in the courts. Table 19
shows the results of ordinary least squares regressions where the basic model can be stated as:

Equation 15: \( \hat{Y}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (veto_t) + \beta_2 (veto_{t-1}) + \beta_3 \text{ (regime}_t) + \beta_4 (\Delta \text{oil}_t) + \varepsilon_t \)

Table 19: Impact of Veto Players on Judicial Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) (2) (3) (4)</td>
<td>(1) (2) (3) (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Veto players</strong></td>
<td>-0.436*** (-3.383)</td>
<td>-0.391*** (-2.919)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Veto lag -1</strong></td>
<td>-0.170 (-0.945)</td>
<td>-0.170 (-0.935)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regime</strong></td>
<td>-0.013 (0.071)</td>
<td>0.018 (0.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ΔOil</strong></td>
<td>0.242 (0.255)</td>
<td>0.430 (0.540)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>28 27 27 27</td>
<td>43 42 42 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adj-R²</strong></td>
<td>0.279 0.261 0.229 0.197</td>
<td>0.152 0.133 0.111 0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DW</strong></td>
<td>1.834 1.616 1.613 1.611</td>
<td>1.396 1.259 1.263 1.296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses
*significant at the .1 level; **significant at the .05 level; ***significant at the .01 level

Veto players in the simplest models predict clearance rates at a statistically significant level. The columns on the left predict clearance, my variable based on the observed clearance rates from my case sample through 1987. The columns on the right show predictions for alt-clear, the clearance rate variable that incorporates estimated values for 1988 – 2002. In both models, veto players impact judicial efficiency but the results decline after introducing the controls. The negative coefficient on veto indicates that an increase in the number of veto players reduces judicial efficiency. The large Adjusted R² indicates a well fit model overall. The Durbin-Watson statistic shows only very limited evidence of autocorrelation with alt-clear, while the observed clearance values pose no significant autocorrelation issues. Neither democracy nor oil revenue has
a significant effect on judicial efficiency. Table 20 shows the results of the model where veto players predict the federal government’s budgetary discipline using ordinary least squares.

Table 20: Impact of Veto Players on Fiscal Discipline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Discipline 1961 – 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.547)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto lag -1</td>
<td>-.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime (Democracy=1)</td>
<td>2.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔOil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj-R²</td>
<td>.216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>1.625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses
*significant at the .1 level; **significant at the .05 level; ***significant at the .01 level

The results show that veto players predict budgetary discipline at a statistically significant level, even after introducing the controls. The large negative coefficients offer strong support for my predictions. All four models suggest that regimes with more veto players have larger budget deficits. Democracy has little measurable impact across the board. Oil does have some effect but even in this model the number of veto players has a larger effect on the federal government’s ability to maintain fiscal discipline. In every model, the Durbin-Watson statistics indicate virtually no positive or negative autocorrelation. In sum, we can claim that larger numbers of veto players impair the ability to deliver public goods.
Policy Efficiency

My third test expects additional veto players to increase the per-unit cost of particularistic policies. I measure these policies in terms of the efficiency of federal spending on primary school teachers and on primary schools. Teachers1 expresses the residual from my model where federal spending predicts the student/teacher ratio. Schools1 measures the efficiency of spending on school infrastructure, also through a residual. Again I control for regime type and the impact of oil revenues. The model predicting the impact of veto players on policy efficiency is:

Equation 16: $\hat{u}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (veto_t) + \beta_2 (veto_{t-1}) + \beta_3 (regime_t) + \beta_4 (\Delta\text{oil}) + \varepsilon$

Table 21: Impact of Veto Players on Policy Efficiency, Schools 1962 – 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Veto$</td>
<td>-526.344* (1.951)</td>
<td>-316.464 (.904)</td>
<td>-57.289 (.164)</td>
<td>-72.490 (.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Veto_{t-1}$</td>
<td>-337.729 (.942)</td>
<td>-459.137 (1.340)</td>
<td>-435.718 (1.250)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta\text{Oil}$</td>
<td>-1235.887** (2.329)</td>
<td>-1180.310** (2.166)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Adj-R}^2$</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.164</td>
<td>.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>1.447</td>
<td>1.439</td>
<td>1.720</td>
<td>1.698</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses
*significant at .1 level; **significant at .05 level; ***significant at .01 level

According to the results in Table 21, veto players impact spending on primary school infrastructure only without the control variables ($p = .058$). However the low Adjusted $R^2$ indicates that the model explains very little without controls for regime type
or oil revenues. The *regime* dummy is statistically significant. But the negative coefficients indicate that democracies actually waste more money on school construction than dictatorships. Next, we test the impact of veto players on *Teachers1*.

**Table 22: Impact of Veto Players on Policy Efficiency, Teachers 1962 – 2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Veto</th>
<th>Teachers1 1962 – 2002</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.746) (1.946)</td>
<td>1.591***</td>
<td>1.513*</td>
<td>2.254***</td>
<td>2.209***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto_{t,i}</td>
<td>.120 (1.52)</td>
<td>-.152 (2.09)</td>
<td>-0.75 (1.920)</td>
<td>-0.075 (1.920)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime_{(Democracy=1)}</td>
<td>-3.337*** (2.992)</td>
<td>-3.156*** (2.760)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔOil</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.529 (.797)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj-R²</td>
<td>.141</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>.271</td>
<td>.264</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>1.249</td>
<td>1.242</td>
<td>1.577</td>
<td>1.566</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute value of *t*-statistic in parentheses
*significant at .1 level; **significant at .05 level; ***significant at .01 level

Judging by the models in Table 22, veto players have precisely the predicted effect on spending on teachers. Here we need to recall that positive residuals expressed by *Teachers1* indicate higher – and thus worse – student/teacher ratios. The models indicate that additional veto players reduce policy efficiency when supplying primary school teachers. The negative coefficients on *regime* mean that when democracies spend on education, they lower student/teacher ratios more efficiently naira-for-naira. Again, we had expected democracy to have little impact. The Adjusted R² is larger with the control variables.
Oil revenues have no statistically significant effect in either model. Democracy has a statistically significant effect in every model but the findings seem to present a contradiction since the two variables have different results. I suggest a simple explanation for this: Democracies have more corruption and deadweight loss in school construction than they do with spending on education personnel. Veto players seem unable to account for the efficiency of spending on school construction. But they consistently capture spending inefficiencies on education personnel – under all types of regimes.

Summary

Our tests for policy efficiency reveal that multi-veto player regimes do not have a major effect on per unit costs of schools. However these regimes do have the predicted effect on teachers, since additional veto players undermine the efficiency of spending on teachers. Interestingly, democracy has a statistically significant effect on school construction, apparently by wasting a great deal of money. This suggests that commitment by itself is insufficient to create accountability, and credibility can be literally quite costly. My strongest results concern the relationship between veto players and bargaining problems, since the results show that multi-veto player regimes produce fewer public goods. These results are especially robust for my measure of fiscal discipline. There is little evidence that veto players are conducive to morselization; our strongest correlation here appears between regimes with more veto players and years with worse student/teacher ratios, which is contrary to our predictions.

CONCLUSION
In this chapter I found little support for Cox and McCubbins’ suggestion that an increase in the number of policy actors contributes to higher overall levels of pork. Neither student/teacher ratios nor the number of primary schools improve based on the number of veto players. In the case of the former they decisively worsen. It is conceivable that this can be attributed to veto players stimulating enrollments in excess of government capacity. It is also possible that schools and teachers are not ideal operationalizations of pork, especially since Nigerian policy makers have often explicitly recognized education’s role in human capital formation.

The consistently negative effects of democracy on school construction offer potentially clearer implications: democracy improves accountability through more efficient spending on teachers but curiously, it generates significantly sub-optimal outcomes in terms of school infrastructure. Not only do these regimes build fewer schools, they also waste more money doing so. This suggests a cautionary note for nascent democracies with ambitious school construction programs. Moreover, as the tests for Teachers1 show, additional veto players actually reduce efficiency when it comes to spending on personnel. This finding recommends a cautionary note for countries such as Nigeria that create new vetoes in order to share power.

Finally, one of the more robust findings of this chapter concerns the types of policies. Additional veto players do increase bargaining problems, much as Cox and McCubbins claim. For both fiscal discipline and judicial efficiency, regimes with more veto players deliver fewer public goods. This means that we need to re-think the relationship between courts and regime type. It also means that governing arrangements which aim to ensure political inclusion by arbitrarily increasing the number of vetoes put
the delivery of public goods at risk. There is thus evidence to support distributional
dilemma tradition in this regard. The conclusion further discusses these implications and
summarizes our overall findings.
Dictators, Democrats, and Development in Nigeria

Conclusion

INTRODUCTION

It is not too far of a stretch to credit James Madison with the underlying logic of veto player theory. In *The Federalist Papers*, he argues eloquently for dividing power in a republican system. Different branches of the American government would allow “ambition to counter ambition” he says, preventing any single faction from dominating distribution or debate. Hobbes takes a rather different view of sovereign power. He argues that placing the three major authorities of government (levying money, commanding an army, and making laws) in separate bodies would “endangereth the commonwealth” and would encumber lawmaking. “Few perceive, that such government is not government, but division of the commonwealth into three factions.” He concludes “the truth is that it is not one independent commonwealth, but three independent factions, nor one representative person, but three” (Hobbes 1994).

Hobbes saw too many sovereign voices as an invitation to chaos and the fragmentation of policy demands. By contrast, Madison feared that too few sovereign interests in government would pave the road to tyranny. Hundreds of years later we are still debating the virtues of dividing power in order to ensure representation and accountability. The distributional implications of multiple, sovereign voices in
government are still emerging. This project has shown how veto players offer a promising theoretical framework for exploring these issues. The crafting of so many new constitutions over the last two decades, alongside the inability of so many governments to improve the lives of their citizens, remind us of the practical urgency pressing many of these otherwise abstract questions.

In this final chapter I summarize my major findings, discuss their implications, and identify areas for further research. In the first section I outline the empirical puzzle I set out to explain: variation in government performance within one complex country over time. I restate the rationale for the operationalizations of my dependent variable and briefly describe the notable trends. I also note why the conventional causal explanations for this variation, such as regime type and ethnic diversity, do not withstand scrutiny.

In the second section, I restate the basic argument about why veto players have causal effect on government performance (Tsebelis 2002). This required extending the basic veto player model in several ways: I drew on insights from the literatures on bargaining, parliaments, and comparative authoritarianism to extend the model across regimes. I then built upon Cox and McCubbins’ work to argue that veto players can explain a range of outcomes, not just policy stability (Cox and McCubbins 2001, 21-63). I also described the logic of informal vetoes, identifying “regional vetoes” as one particular type that often intervenes in Nigeria’s policy process. My test results did not show that regimes with more vetoes deliver more pork as I predicted. But they did reveal that these regimes deliver fewer public goods, while they do not improve policy efficiency.
In the third section of this chapter I explore the implications of my findings and point out avenues for future research. One category of implications concerns veto players, since I extended the theory to non-democratic regimes and tested the models on a new range of dependent variables. I found strong support for the claim that additional veto players exacerbate bargaining problems, but weak support for the distributional dilemma tradition’s claim that this increases the level of pork. The implications for democracy fit into a second category. My observation that democracies consistently waste more money than dictatorships in some areas of education but not others especially stands out because new democracies often invest heavily in such programs. Finally, my findings on federalism populate another category of implications. By exploring the leverage and logic of Nigeria’s federal bargain, I revealed how state creation reinforces the saliency of discrete identities. State creation also serves the interests of the center. Future research in this area might explore the characteristics of successful subnational coordination.

A REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

Public Goods and Pork in Nigeria

I began this dissertation with a puzzle, demonstrating that Nigeria has experienced variation in government performance over time. Chapter 1 discussed different ways of measuring of government performance, drawing extensively from the public goods literature (Olson 1965). I argued that relying on macroeconomic indicators, as many large-N studies do, has important drawbacks. I addressed this by incorporating measures of my dependent variable that resemble pure public goods as well as others that are
comparatively excludable in consumption. I identify education outputs, courts, and budgetary discipline as policies which meet these criteria.

I generated a pair of variables based on commonly used operationalizations for each policy area. I discussed the trends with each variable in detail, utilizing extensive qualitative evidence to elaborate on the statistics and to describe any important policy shifts. This information captures three different aspects of performance: First, I document the delivery of pork by examining the number of primary schools and student/teacher ratios. I find that student/teacher ratios were lowest in the early 1960s. The early 1980s and the mid 1990s were the only other two periods where the ratio reached levels that the government considers good. The worst years occurred in the late 1970s, the late 1980s, and in 1999 – 2000. The number of schools generally increases over time. But I illustrate a steep increase starting in the mid-1970s, a slump in the late 1980s, and the slight downturn after 1999.

Second, I reviewed the delivery of public goods, which I measure in terms of judicial efficiency and fiscal discipline. Based on case clearance rates, I found that the courts operated efficiently throughout the 1960s while the 1970s were moderately inefficient. Using estimates for years after 1987, my figures showed that courts in the early 1990s clear cases slowly, but not quite as slowly as in the early 1980s. The courts subsequently improved but the rate in the mid-1990s was still quite low.

I operationalized fiscal discipline, my other measure of public goods, in terms of budgetary discipline. Here the data showed that the government ran surpluses in 1971-1974 and 1980. The government also ran comparatively small surpluses in the mid-1990s, although I caution these figures in particular warrant “a grain of salt.” In all other
years the federal government ran deficits. For some years, especially in the 1960s, the deficits were relatively small. The most egregious deficits occurred from 1976 to 1979, in 1981, 1982, 1986, 1991, and 1993.

Third, I measured the efficiency of education spending on teachers and schools. Using federal spending as the principal policy input, I compared predicted educational outputs with the observed ones. My model revealed that the most efficient spending occurred in the 1960s generally, a brief period in the mid-1990s, and to some extent in the early 1980s. The most wasteful spending on education occurred in the late 1970s, and the late 1980s into the early 1990s. Spending was also wasteful between 1999 and 2001. The model based on primary schools showed that schools in the early 1960s were slightly below the predicted number. The figure improved for the remainder of the decade. Levels were low from 1971 to 1973 but from 1973 to 1977 the number was higher than expected. The 1980s were full of seemingly random ups and downs. 1994 to 1998 showed notably higher than predicted number of schools, and this situation reversed in 1999.

**Possible Explanations for Performance Variation**

After documenting this variation in performance I turn to likely explanations for it. Three of the most common causal explanations for failures in government performance are authoritarianism, ethnic diversity, and an economy dependent on natural resources. Even though Nigeria possesses all of these characteristics, I argued that none of them adequately explain the variation in performance. I built this argument in three different steps.
First, Chapter 2 rejected a hypothesis predicting that regime type explains performance. Regime type should affect policy performance because democracy increases political accountability. Among democracy’s advocates, Lake and Baum write that democracy “remains the most effective instrument available for controlling the state and producing public services” (Lake and Baum 2001, 587-621). Others by contrast point out that numerous undemocratic countries around the world enjoy healthy economies and good government performance (Brownlee 2007; Gat 2007, 59-69).

I found no consistent correlation between regime type and government performance. Some authoritarian regimes improved delivery of social services and public goods, while some democracies allowed them to decline. My analysis of government performance under all the regimes between 1960 and 2003 reported that democracy does deliver according to some measures of education performance. For example, democracies maintained lower student/teacher ratios in primary schools. But this record did not hold when we considered policies that meet the stricter definition of public goods. Democracies did not have more efficient courts and they often had some of the worst fiscal discipline. In terms of wastefulness, education spending naira-for-naira yielded far fewer schools under democracy than under dictatorships. Nigeria’s record therefore seems to present a challenge to the literature arguing for a causal link between democracy and government performance. Before rejecting the regime type hypothesis outright though, I detailed the performance of each regime. This permitted me to single out which regimes performed as expected.

To address the second possible explanation, Nigeria’s natural resource-dependent economy, I controlled for oil revenues in all of my tests. Oil income makes fiscal
planning sensitive to exogenous shocks; when the government lacks revenue it can deliver fewer goods to its citizens. My tests throughout the dissertation showed that oil revenues have an effect only on fiscal discipline. But when I presented the final test results of the alternative explanation for performance, oil is actually less significant than veto players across the board.

Ethnic diversity provides the third possible explanation. Nigeria is certainly an extremely diverse society, and scholars attribute low growth (Easterly and Levine 1997, 1203-50), corruption (Alesina et al. 2003, 155-94), and other governance failures to such diversity. Since my study involves only one country over time, this explanation also fails. But social identities are important in Nigeria and my alternative explanation shows how the broader social cleavages can wield great leverage over the policy process.

**VETO PLAYERS AS A CAUSAL EXPLANATION**

My alternative explanation is rooted in veto player theory, which I outlined in several stages. Chapter 3 reviewed the literature and the logic of veto player theory. I argued that veto players better capture the structure of the policy process. Institutional vetoes can be individual, collective, or “partisan,” in which case they express a stable set of preferences generated by the institutions (Tsebelis 2002; Haggard and McCubbins 2001). Because the existing literature only shows how vetoes account for policy stability, and virtually all of it focuses on developed democracies, I extended the theory in two ways. As a first step I showed how the theory already accommodates the possibility of non-democratic regimes. Referring to “least likely” cases as examples, I described how authoritarian regimes share risk, recruit expertise, and seek to protect themselves from charges of illegitimacy. When it incorporates transaction costs in bargaining existing
veto player theory allows for a variety of unconventional collective actors with political leverage.

As a second step, I linked veto players to other outcomes besides policy stability. Drawing upon Cox and McCubbins, I pointed out how regimes with more veto players are also more prone to bargaining problems. This has distributional consequences (Cox and McCubbins 2001, 21-63). Based on these considerations, I hypothesized that more vetoes should lead to more pork. This is an important hypothesis because the “commitment” tradition in this literature expects veto players to enhance policy stability without generating bargaining problems. I contrasted this with Cox and McCubbins as representatives of the “distributional dilemma” tradition. These scholars show how additional veto players can generate negative externalities. Each policy actor is in a position to demand pork; a bargaining process with too many actors is both expensive and threatens to undermine the delivery of public goods.

I also described informal veto players as policy actors not specified by formal institutions but who possess political leverage just the same. Military factions, such as those that emerge in non-democratic regimes, form one such type of informal veto. According to Tsebelis, the practical task of identifying preferences and vetoes in authoritarian regimes involves careful scrutiny of each regime (Tsebelis 2002, 78). By looking to the bureaucracy, military factions, and other cohesive political interests I identified numerous vetoes that exist outside of formal constitutional structures. To exercise a veto, informal policy actors must possess both cause and capability. The other type of informal veto, rooted in regional preferences, must satisfy a third condition. “Regional vetoes” emerge only when existing institutional veto players fail to cut across
Nigeria’s broadest cleavage, between north and south. This is therefore a necessary but not a sufficient condition.

In Chapter 4 I outlined the logic of regional vetoes, linking social and historical contexts to representative institutions that create incentives for politicizing identity. I summarized the historical basis of Nigeria’s subnational politics and described the incentives for sustaining at least three cleavages. As far back as the 1950’s, politicians utilized ethno-regional quotas to guarantee equitable representation at the federal level. This practice continues today as the federal character tradition. I developed an identity matrix as an analytical tool for capturing variation in Nigeria’s three most basic geopolitical units. States are the most discrete sources of identity engaged in national politics. State creation began almost immediately after independence, first as an effort to dilute opposition voices and later to divide up the spoils of federally controlled revenue. “Zones,” the next largest unit, exist nowhere in the constitution. Yet the National Assembly divides leadership offices on this basis, political parties use them to allocate positions, and grievances often coalesce around these seemingly artificial boundaries. Zones have their origins in colonial administrative strategies, when the British used divide-and-rule tactics. Regions express the country’s broadest cleavage, between north and south. Brought together with the birth of Nigeria in 1914, the country is now held together by a precarious federal bargain predicated on the cultural and political equality of these two areas. Zones and states may attempt to exercise leverage, but only regions – when organized and united – can impose a veto on the policy process.

These historical, cultural, and economic complexities have earned Nigeria a reputation as the “graveyard of theory.” To preempt any such skepticism, Chapter 5
undertook a rigorous and lengthy process of coding the country’s veto players. At one end of the possible range of regimes rests those where policy making and implementation require only the chief executive’s consent. The preferences in collective bodies mirror his or her preferences. The veto player literature claims that such regimes are rarer than the popular understanding of authoritarianism suggests (Tsebelis 2002). In fact I coded only one regime, lasting two years, as a single-veto regime. At the other end of the range, removal of the chief executive is a real political possibility and gridlock may emerge from a system of checks and balances among multiple veto players. I identified three regimes with four veto players, spanning a total of 13 years.

After the 1980s, the flurry of publications about Nigeria’s military regimes dropped off. Chapter 5 made a convincing case that it is time for scholars to return to this research. Many new sources have come to light since the return of democracy in 1999. Exploiting some of these materials, my coding revealed some unexpected patterns of coalition building by those who held vetoes and those who hoped to hold vetoes. Even authoritarian regimes face political costs if their institutions are too exclusive. So who did they turn to in order to convey an image of inclusion? One type of regime, such as Gowon’s, depended on powerful senior bureaucrats while others, such as Buhari’s, turned to conservative traditional rulers. In another type of regime, softliners shifted the balance of power as they did under Babangida. Also, state military administrators sometimes collectively conspired against federal policy, as they did under Aguyi-Irons. Nigeria’s authoritarian regimes deserve revisiting, as rich new details continue to emerge in the press and in the memoirs of former generals.
Summary of the Veto Player Test Results

My basic hypothesis throughout this dissertation states that more veto players lead to more pork. I make three causal claims about how the number of veto players impact policy outputs. I predicted that regimes with more veto players deliver more pork, fewer public goods, and less policy efficiency. Chapter 6 introduced my control variables and performed statistical tests using original data. First, I found that veto players do not have the expected impact on the level of pork. There was no significant impact on the number of primary schools, and student/teacher ratios actually get significantly worse as the number of vetoes increases. This finding runs counter to Cox and McCubbins’ intuition that as each veto player demands a payoff, policy becomes burdened by pork (Cox and McCubbins 2001, 21-63). By contrast I found support for their theory in my second test, where my results showed that regimes with more vetoes deliver fewer public goods. Bargaining problems increase with the number of veto players, and this reduces the government’s ability to maintain fiscal discipline and judicial efficiency.

My third test revealed that multi-veto regimes do not significantly decrease the efficiency of education spending on school infrastructure as a measure of pork spending. They do, however, have the predicted impact on the policy efficiency of student/teacher ratios. An increase in the number of veto players led to a statistically significant increase in policy inefficiency, even after introducing controls. This challenges one stream of the veto player literature, which suggests that the opportunities for corruption decline with additional veto players (Andrews and Montinola 2004, 55-87). It also conflicts with the commitment tradition’s underlying premise, which links the credibility provided by veto players to political accountability more broadly.
The *regime* dummy produced some curious effects, both in tests of the “regime type” hypothesis and as a control variable in my veto player models in Chapter 6. My tests revealed first that regime type has no impact on the delivery of public goods. Neither fiscal discipline nor judicial efficiency improves under democracy. Democracy also fails to improve the level of pork. In fact, democracies build fewer schools. This holds at a statistically significant level; numerous scandals during the Second and Fourth Republics that I described (in Chapter 2) buttress the regressions. Finally, my tests for policy efficiency suggest that democracy improves the policy efficiency measured in terms of teachers. However the coefficients were only significant in the models where *regime* acts as a control. To the extent that democracies have a measurable effect on school construction, the results suggest that democracies are actually waste more money. I concluded from this that democracies improve accountability through more efficient spending on teachers but just the reverse occurs when they build schools. This finding provides a cautionary note for countries such as Nigeria that create new vetoes in order to share power.

**IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH**

My findings have a variety of empirical and theoretical implications. One category of implications centers on what we have learned about the promise of veto player theory. First, vetoes can be used to explain more than just policy stability. Even though some of my predictions failed, vetoes are highly correlated with student teacher ratios, budgetary discipline, and one type of inefficient education spending. Second, this means that vetoes express the structure of the policy process better than a dichotomous approach to democracy and authoritarianism. By establishing clear criteria and using
qualitative evidence to reveal veto players’ “cause and capability,” I incorporated factions and regional vetoes as two types of vetoes that arise through extra-constitutional political processes.

My third and probably most important contribution in this category arises from my tests of the two veto player traditions I identified: commitment and distributional dilemmas. While previous studies acknowledge these differences, none actually test these traditions utilizing variables that capture the differences between pork and public goods. I find that commitment not only increases bargaining problems, it does so without improving accountability. In addition, while my tests did not support the distributional dilemma’s argument about the level of pork, they did support its claim about how additional veto players impair the delivery public goods. These findings are particularly robust with regard to fiscal discipline. This means that governing arrangements that aim to ensure political inclusion by increasing the number of vetoes put public goods at risk. Future tests for distributional dilemmas should probably incorporate measures of pork that do not contribute to human capital. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, policies which do so acquire some of the properties of public goods by forcing policy makers to make political calculations with a time horizon beyond their immediate self-interest.

Another category of implications arise from observing the policy effects of democracy. For those concerned about the normative implications of my findings of the regime type hypothesis, I think the theory ultimately points to the inadequacy of a dichotomous approach to regimes. I argue that regime type fails to capture the relevant institutional variation impacting policy outputs; democracies perform poorly when the policy process incorporates too many actors with the leverage to extract concessions.
The different effects of regime type on teachers and schools may also be important. They showed that democracies spend money more efficiently than dictatorships on personnel. But the reverse is true when it comes to school construction. Both effects are quite robust. This suggests a practical, cautionary note for new democracies that launch ambitious and often costly education programs. To further explore this effect, I intend to use data I have that distinguishes between capital and recurrent education spending. (It was not possible to exploit this data for all of the years covered by this dissertation.) This would improve my operationalizations by linking the appropriate category of spending to the variable in question.

Finally, our third category of implications concerns the nature of Nigeria’s federal bargain. The fact that representation generates particularistic benefits contributes to the persistence of discrete subnational identities. Scholars of federalism widely attribute the creation of new states and local governments to this phenomenon (Suberu 2001; Onwudiwe and Suberu 2005). I argue that regional vetoes do not emerge when existing veto players adequately represent Nigeria’s largest cleavage, between north and south. This generates several new insights about Nigerian federalism. By refocusing scholarly attention on regimes, regional veto players reveal how the creation of additional subnational units also serves the interests of political actors bargaining at the center. Dividing up the “national cake” is more than just a local response to centrally-controlled fiscal resources. The localized view oversimplifies state creation as a collective action problem in the sense that the pursuit of rational self-interest by each subnational community generates collectively irrational outcomes. I have instead shown how this process is also part of a political strategy that serves the interests of the center.
The notion that new subnational units serve the interests of the center also means that minimum winning coalitions are inadequate. Even if a government has enough regional support to satisfy a regime’s rules for inclusion, it still pays off additional political actors because it hopes to weaken their ability to coordinate a regional veto. Inclusive governance requires some degree of surplus membership. This practice is entrenched in Nigeria’s norms of politics and deeply rooted in the colonial era. As we learned from our coding exercise, Nigeria legislated through oversized coalitions in 1965 and 1983. This is a timely finding since many critics of Nigeria’s recent 2007 elections endorse a surplus coalition as a gesture to overcome the election’s profound flaws (International Crisis Group 2007). Oversized cabinets throughout Africa further suggest that Nigeria would be far from unique by pursuing such solutions.

Future research in this area could address two important aspects of my intuitions about regional veto players. To start, I hope to demonstrate when actors identify with one cleavage rather than another. I also might delve into the dynamics of subnational coordination. This would allow me to identify the characteristics of organizing that are most conducive to the cohesion of informal collective political actors. Next, it is worth demonstrating that only regions can impose a veto. I make this argument in Chapter 4 using an identity matrix and the logic of a transactions costs model. The persistence of north/south differences on shari’a and the broader historical basis of Nigeria’s federal unity suggest that this assertion is eminently reasonable. But documenting the failed attempts by the smaller subnational units to impose vetoes would put this proposition on terra firma. This might also allow me to empirically demonstrate the population proportionality principle that I assert in Chapter 4. A result would likely be a valuable
contribution to research which explores how population proportions impact the saliency of ethnic identities (Posner 2004, 529-45).

A Few Reflections on Nigeria’s Future

At the time of this writing, Nigeria is enjoying its longest experiment with democracy ever. The same Obasanjo who stepped down in 1979 to allow a transition to democracy turned over the presidency in 2007 after serving two terms as president. Optimists praised the transfer of power in Sub-Sahara Africa’s largest country. They measured success by the absence of military involvement in politics, the relatively limited violence during the elections, and the failure of Obasanjo’s stealth attempt to change the constitution to allow himself a third term in office. Even if Nigeria’s democracy remains flawed, the ability of the National Assembly and civil society to thwart an illegal extension of power offers an encouraging sign.

On another level, the democratic gains seem more modest. First of all, the elections were so profoundly flawed that even the oil-dependent United States sent a low-level delegation to the inauguration. A coalition of 50,000 domestic election observers reported widespread irregularities and malpractices, concluding that “on the whole, the elections were a charade and did not meet the minimum standards required for democratic elections.” They recommended cancellation entirely.230 The European Union and other observers shared the profound sense of concern.

Second, Obasanjo’s record government performance seems mixed at best. Deficits are down but schools, courts, and other organs of government remain in crisis. Improving policy efficiency has become intertwined with the ruling party’s hegemonic

ambitions. Before the election its presidential candidate claimed he was the only governor who had not been accused of corruption by a federal government commission. And as mentioned in this dissertation’s introduction, all of this has both strengthened subnational identities and created an ambivalent popular attitude toward democracy. Following Buhari’s coup in 1983, Obasanjo commented on this ambivalence:

We’ll probably have to accept that the military will be a major factor to reckon with in the political life of the country. This is a country that needs to be governed. I believe that we have to look at our society and devise for ourselves a system that has everybody chipping in to participate in one form or another. A system that gives us direction, that gives us decisive and purposeful leadership and galvanizes us together as a nation. I don’t believe that the ritual of voting every four years really does that.231

The flawed elections of 2007 suggest that he has changed his mind little, and the institution of presidency is now more powerful than ever. However at some level, sovereignty ultimately resides in people and their ability to reconstruct authority. In this dissertation, I have suggested that a recurring dilemma in Nigerian politics requires balancing representation and performance. Hopefully I have provided some insight into the likely consequences of Nigerians’ institutional choices.

Appendix 1: Preliminary Tests on Educational Inputs and Outcomes

Do inputs, such as smaller class sizes or increases in education spending, improve student performance? There are two fairly distinct positions on this issue: Ever since a seminal study of the American education system by Coleman in 1966, one group of economists and social scientists have claimed that there is no real linkage between student-teacher ratio or spending, and student performance (Coleman and et al. 1966).\(^{232}\) Hanushek claims there is “no strong or systematic relationship” between school expenditures and student performance (Hanushek 1986, 1141-77). In a later survey of developing countries, he argues that school facilities and various measures of educational inputs have an ambiguous impact on educational achievement and test scores in particular (Hanushek 1996, 227-46). Other education studies similarly claim that institutional differences, rather than investment in education, better explain variation in student performance (Wobmann 2003, 117-40).

Several scholars challenge the seemingly counter-intuitive findings by Hanushek and Coleman. Card and Krueger ask whether the level school resources can explain educational or income outcomes of succeeding African-American and white cohorts in segregated public schools in North and South Carolina. Although they qualify their results by pointing to inadequate data on family background (because wealthier families tend to spend more on education), they find that school resources have a positive effect on both of these areas (Card and Krueger 1996, 31-50). Case and Deaton’s study of

---

\(^{232}\) Similarly, the National Association of Scholars, an independent group of American educators, released a report in February 2005 which argued that small schools have more staff turnover and fewer relevant resources to offer students. The report argued that American schools should have a minimum of 500 students. See Diane Ravitch, “Failing the Wrong Grades,” *New York Times* op-ed, March 15, 2005.
South Africa also finds a clear linkage between educational inputs (measured by pupil-teacher ratios) and outputs (measured by the probability of enrollment and standardized test scores). Their study is especially convincing because they note that it was extremely difficult for non-white families to move during the apartheid-era, thus reducing a potential endogeneity problem present in a system where families can simply move to better school districts (Case and Deaton 1999, 1047-88). Studies of other African countries suggest that cost of education may be the decisive factor. Kremer argues that families often prefer to send their children to schools that are less expensive, even if it means subjecting their children to larger class sizes. He found this to be the case in Kenya, where growing enrollments led to a 50 percent increase in their children’s class size, but parents saw this as a worthwhile tradeoff in return for free uniforms, textbooks and materials (Kremer 2003, 102-6).

The relationship between class size and matriculation rates, or between education spending and test scores, is important because it addresses the link between policy inputs and actual policy outcomes. In Nigeria, this is an especially relevant question given the federal government’s sometimes dramatic policy commitments in this area. Yet this is a highly under-explored area of research in Nigeria. Is the link between policy inputs and educational outcomes weak, as Coleman and Hanushek claim? Or should governments reduce class sizes and increase educational resources as Case and Deaton argue? To answer these questions I begin by summarizing educational outcomes, measured using standardized test scores. I then test one hypothesis which posits that small class size improves outcomes, and a second hypothesis which states that spending on education improves outcomes:
**H1:** smaller class size improves outcomes

**H2:** more education spending improves outcomes

I examine educational performance by looking at 20 years of standardized test scores obtained from the West African Examination Council. WAEC is one of the major standardized tests for West African secondary students who intend to continue their education. My data set covers almost all of the exams from 1983 to 2003. Since 1980 the General Certificate of Education (GCE) “O/Level” (meaning ordinary level) has served as the critical examination for gauging secondary student achievement. Administered by WAEC, the GCE was established for those who might not be able to attend a formal school but who wanted to continue their education. It also targets secondary school pupils who had not achieved the higher standard required for the School Certificate Examination (Federal Ministry of Education 1990; Agbodeka 2002). The advantage of using WAEC, as opposed to the Joint Admissions Matriculation Board (similar to the Scholastic Aptitude Test administered in the United States), is that WAEC is an internationally defined standard giving the scores a greater sense of objectivity. The passing rate of the JAMB might only reflect Nigerian evaluation of Nigerians, while WAEC measures results from a regional test created from and for European educational standards.

---

233 Like all standardized tests, the ones administered by WAEC are not perfect. Teachers often complained about enrollments dropping unless their curriculum was geared towards topic necessary to pass the GCE, and spikes in mass cheating forced WAEC to cancel thousands of exam results. See “Truth or Use,” *West Africa,* March 31, 1962, p. 352, and “WAEC Flunks It,” *Sunday Tribune,* October 11, 1981, p. 5.
WAEC is part of a long tradition of formal testing in Nigeria. Formal testing based on European education standards dates back to 1842 in Nigeria when teachers pressed dedicated students to take the University of Cambridge examinations. At first such tests were administered by schools and taken by school-sponsored candidates. But soon private candidates (those either not enrolled in school or attending a non-recognized school) were allowed to take the exams. In the period just preceding independence, colonial administrators recognized that the University of London School Examinations and the Cambridge tests were necessary to develop well-trained manpower for the post-independence period. By the 1950’s interest in standardized testing had grown so much that numerous other examining boards offered their exams in British territories throughout Africa and the Caribbean. WAEC was established to meet these demands and to ensure that students were treated fairly by the administering bodies (Agbodeka 2002).

Figure 13 reports results for the May/June Senior Secondary Certificate Examination (SSCE), which replaced the GCE O/Level in the 1980s. Its statistics are aggregates covering all subjects. The number of candidates for a given year is usually higher than the number of those students who actually sat for the tests, suggesting that many registered students do not show up for the tests. Passing rates are reported in two ways in the tables below: First, the overall passing rates reported below reflect the total percentage of students who passed as a share of the number of pupils who sat for the test.

---
234 I don’t run tests here on three other possible data sets for 1983 – 2003: The first set reports all results for GCE exams but several years are missing. The second set reports the results for the English and math subject tests for Senior Secondary Certificate Examinations administered in May/June. The third set reports English and math test results from the General Certificate of Education (GCE) administered in November/December. These GCE results are only from the ordinary level (“O-level”) exams, which replaced the London University matriculation exams offered until the early 1950’s. The Higher School Certificate Examinations advanced level tests (“A-level”) are not included.
In WAEC’s early years in the 1950’s and 60’s, passing was ranked by three divisions of students. Later these were expanded into eight rankings; the first two divisions are approximately the equivalent of levels 1 through 6 today, while the third division is the same as levels 7 and 8. Students who achieve these latter rankings qualify for admission to the less competitive post-secondary schools only. Thus the second way in which passing rates are reported is the percentage of students who pass at levels 1 through 6 out of all the students who sat for the test. This figure represents those students who qualify for Nigeria’s first tier schools.

![WAEC Exams (SSCE), all subjects](image)

**Figure 13: WAEC Results**

There are three periods where the results seem clear: first, an improvement in the passing rate roughly between 1987 and 1990. Second, a high pass rate between 1993 and

---

235 Additionally, a very small number of students – not reflected in the figures here – pass “with distinction.”
1995, followed by a sharp decline. For example, in 1994, 51.7 percent of test takers passed the SSCE exam. By 1997 or so, the passing rate had dropped considerably. The passing rate has been increasing steadily since about 1997.

My variable for student/teacher ratios in secondary schools is not stationary. I also use nearest-average estimations for 1988 and 1989 since no figures for these years are available. Consistent with the steps I take to control for time throughout this chapter, I de-trend it with first difference tests; these results are reported below. I use SSCE and GCE as two separate dependent variables indicating passing rates for these tests. I transform the variable to time \( t + 1 \) with the expectation that it takes at least one year for the effects of student teacher ratios to impact test scores. The model testing my first hypothesis about the impact of student/teacher ratios on educational outcomes can thus be stated as:

Equation 17: \( \hat{Y}_{t+1} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 (\Delta\text{sec.s.t.}_t) + \varepsilon_t \)

The results of these tests are reported in Table 23.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \Delta\text{sec.s.t.} )</th>
<th>SSCE(_{t+1} )</th>
<th>GCE(_{t+1} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>De-trended secondary s/t ratio</td>
<td>1.279 ( (1.280) )</td>
<td>1.427* ( (1.869) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj-R(^2 )</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>.709</td>
<td>1.605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*statistic in parentheses
*significant at the .1 level
**significant at the .05 level
***significant at the .01 level

I test my second hypothesis in a model where:

Equation 18: \( \hat{Y}_{t+1} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 (\Delta\text{ed.all}_t) + \alpha_2 (\text{ed.budgt}_t) + \varepsilon_t \)
The results of these tests are reported in Table 24.

### Table 24: Impact of Education Spending on Test Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SSCE$_{t+1}$</th>
<th>GCE$_{t+1}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta$ ed.all</td>
<td>.000*</td>
<td>.001**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-trended fed. ed. spending</td>
<td>(2.048)</td>
<td>(2.788)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1.680)</td>
<td>(1.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed.budgt</td>
<td>-333.984*</td>
<td>88.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education as % of fed. budget</td>
<td>(1.752)</td>
<td>(.509)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj-R$^2$</td>
<td>.151</td>
<td>.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>1.228</td>
<td>1.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$t$-statistic in parentheses  
*significant at the .1 level; **significant at the .05 level;  
***significant at the .01 level

While the results for all of these tests are based on the limited data available, I report some evidence of a relationship between student/teacher ratio and test results. I find a statistically significant relationship between education spending and the passing rate. This is particularly true for the impact on SSCE, where the model without education as a share of the budget is nearly significant at the .05 level ($p = .056$). The Durbin-Watson Statistic for that model shows no autocorrelation. With the GCE as the dependent variable $p = .115$, meaning it is almost significant at the .1 level. The tests for the impact of federal spending, displayed in Table 24, are only significant where SSCE is the dependent variable. This means education spending in fact impacts educational outcomes, much as Card and Kruger and others suggest. These test results are certainly preliminary and the conclusions are tentative. But they provide an additional rationale for the operationalizations utilized throughout this chapter.
Appendix 2: Tests for Stationarity of Dependent Variables

Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test, where:

Model 1: \[ \Delta x_t = \mu + \phi t + \alpha X_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \]

Model 2: \[ \Delta x_t = \mu + \alpha X_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \] (assuming: \( t = 0 \))

Model 3: \[ \Delta x_t = \alpha X_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \] (assuming: \( \mu = 0, t = 0 \))

\( H_0: \alpha = 1 \) and \( H_1: \alpha \neq 1 \)

Reject \( H_0 \) if \( t \)-statistic < critical test values

I = variable integration over time and I(0) = stationarity.

Test results are reported in Table 25.
Table 25: Tests for Stationarity of Dependent Variables
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>First Difference</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Intercept test (trend, const)</td>
<td>(2) Trend &amp; Intercept (const, no trend)</td>
<td>(3) None (no const, no trend)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pri.s.t. Primary s/t ratio</td>
<td>-3.85**</td>
<td>-3.12**</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pri.schl_1, Lead +1</td>
<td>-2.71</td>
<td>-1.32</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed.all Education spending</td>
<td>-2.56</td>
<td>-2.46</td>
<td>-1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pri.enrol Gross enrollment</td>
<td>-2.43</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed.budget Educat. as % budget</td>
<td>-4.43***</td>
<td>-3.63**</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers Primary s/t (residual)</td>
<td>-4.24***</td>
<td>-4.09***</td>
<td>-4.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools ΔPri.Schl_1 (residual)</td>
<td>-3.29*</td>
<td>-3.24**</td>
<td>-3.31***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance Observed rate only</td>
<td>-4.13**</td>
<td>-3.34**</td>
<td>-1.98**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alt-Clear Clearance w/estimates</td>
<td>-4.71***</td>
<td>-4.14***</td>
<td>-2.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline Budget Surplus/Deficit</td>
<td>-4.44***</td>
<td>-4.36***</td>
<td>-4.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Oil as share of revenue</td>
<td>-1.18</td>
<td>-1.79</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reports ADF test-statistic: *significant at the .1 level; **significant at the .05 level; ***significant at the .01 level
Appendix 3: Policy Efficiency Model Summaries

Table 26 displays the results of tests predicting the effects of federal education spending on the primary student/teacher ratio from 1961 to 2002. Spending has been deflated and the variable \(d-ed.all\) has been de-trended to make it stationary. The t-statistic improves in the second model after the introduction of the variable \(ed.budgt\), which measures education spending as a share of the federal budget. The Durbin-Watson statistic also improves but still shows some indication of autocorrelation. As stated earlier, tests using this models’ residual as the dependent variable need to be read with caution. Where \(\hat{y}\) is the student/teacher ratio (\(pri.s.t.\)) at time \(t\):

Table 26: Generation of Teachers Residual

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pri.s.t.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta ed.all)</td>
<td>-9.01E-006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-trended Fed. ed. spending</td>
<td>(.376)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ed.budgt)</td>
<td>.730***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education as % of budget</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R(^2)</td>
<td>-.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durbin-Watson</td>
<td>.692</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses
*Significant at the .1 level; **Significant at the .05 level; ***Significant at the .01 level

Table 27 shows the effects of education spending on the number of primary schools in year \(t+1\) where the variable has been de-trended. Again I use \(ed.budgt\) as a control variable. Also, here I am able to use gross enrollment statistics. The model is highly significant and the Durbin-Watson statistic shows no evidence of autocorrelation.

Where \(\hat{y} = Pri.sch\_t - Pri.sch\_t\_1:\)
Table 27: Generation of Schools Residual

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ΔPri.SchΔPri.Sch</th>
<th>Δed.all</th>
<th>Δpri.enroll</th>
<th>ed.budgt</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Adjusted R²</th>
<th>Durbin-Watson</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-trended Fed. ed. spending</td>
<td>.027**</td>
<td>.028***</td>
<td>.020**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.519)</td>
<td>(2.772)</td>
<td>(1.993)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-trended gross enrollment</td>
<td>.001**</td>
<td>.001*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.335)</td>
<td>(1.814)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education as % of budget</td>
<td>.226.800**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.216)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses
*Significant at the .1 level; **Significant at the .05 level;
***Significant at the .01 level
Appendix 4: Correlation of Awaiting Trial Persons and Clearance Rate

Table 28: Correlation between ATPs and Clearance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clearance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATPs</td>
<td>-1.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.017)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durbin-Watson</td>
<td>1.142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses
**significant at the .01 level
### Table 29: Population Distribution among Four Zone Structure, 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of zone</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NORTH</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SOUTH</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>6,115,000</td>
<td>26.25</td>
<td>Bendel</td>
<td>3,671,000</td>
<td>15.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>8,625,000</td>
<td>37.03</td>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>2,587,000</td>
<td>11.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1,782,000</td>
<td>7.65</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>2,537,000</td>
<td>10.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>6,771,000</td>
<td>29.07</td>
<td>Ogun</td>
<td>2,555,000</td>
<td>11.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td>4,071,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>7,770,000</td>
<td>33.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northwest subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>23,290,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.16</strong></td>
<td><strong>Southwest subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>23,190,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.03</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>3,628,000</td>
<td>24.19</td>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>5,365,000</td>
<td>25.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>4,472,000</td>
<td>29.81</td>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>3,621,000</td>
<td>17.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gongola</td>
<td>3,887,000</td>
<td>25.91</td>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td>5,188,000</td>
<td>24.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>3,022,000</td>
<td>20.15</td>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>4,472,000</td>
<td>21.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>2,581,000</td>
<td>12.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northeast subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,000,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>18.13</strong></td>
<td><strong>Southeast subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,230,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>25.66</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL NORTH</strong></td>
<td><strong>38,300,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>46.30</strong></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL SOUTH</strong></td>
<td><strong>44,420,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>53.70</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 30: Population Distribution among 30 States and Six Zones, 1991
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of zone</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>5,810,470</td>
<td>29.00</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>5,725,116</td>
<td>32.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kebbi</td>
<td>2,068,490</td>
<td>10.32</td>
<td>Ogun</td>
<td>2,333,726</td>
<td>13.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>3,935,618</td>
<td>19.64</td>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td>3,785,338</td>
<td>21.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>3,753,133</td>
<td>18.73</td>
<td>Osun</td>
<td>2,158,143</td>
<td>12.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>4,470,176</td>
<td>22.31</td>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>3,452,720</td>
<td>19.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northwest subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,037,887</strong></td>
<td><strong>23.37</strong></td>
<td><strong>Southwest subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,455,043</strong></td>
<td><strong>20.36</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>2,102,053</td>
<td>17.66</td>
<td>Abia</td>
<td>2,338,487</td>
<td>21.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>4,351,007</td>
<td>36.56</td>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>2,796,475</td>
<td>25.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>2,536,003</td>
<td>21.31</td>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>2,485,635</td>
<td>23.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taraba</td>
<td>1,512,163</td>
<td>12.71</td>
<td>Enugu</td>
<td>3,154,380</td>
<td>29.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yobe</td>
<td>1,399,687</td>
<td>11.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northeast subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,900,913</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.88</strong></td>
<td><strong>Southeast subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,774,977</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.57</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Belt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>2,753,077</td>
<td>22.60</td>
<td>Akwa Ibom</td>
<td>2,409,613</td>
<td>17.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kogi</td>
<td>2,147,756</td>
<td>17.63</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>2,590,491</td>
<td>19.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>1,548,412</td>
<td>12.71</td>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td>1,911,297</td>
<td>14.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2,421,581</td>
<td>19.88</td>
<td>Edo</td>
<td>2,172,005</td>
<td>16.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>3,312,412</td>
<td>27.19</td>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>4,309,557</td>
<td>32.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle Belt subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,183,238</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.21</strong></td>
<td><strong>South-South subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,392,963</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.62</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NORTH</td>
<td>44,122,038</td>
<td>51.46</td>
<td>TOTAL SOUTH</td>
<td>41,622,983</td>
<td>48.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Rotimi Suberu, *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria* (Washington, DC: USIP, 2001)

**Note:** Figures for the north include Abuja, Federal Capital Territory
Table 31: Population Distribution among 36 States and Six Zones, 1998
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NORTH</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of zone</th>
<th>SOUTH</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jigawa</td>
<td>3,237,123</td>
<td>12.01</td>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>Ekiti*</td>
<td>1,728,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>7,263,952</td>
<td>26.95</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>6,947,019</td>
<td>19.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kebbi</td>
<td>2,328,064</td>
<td>8.64</td>
<td>Ogun</td>
<td>2,662,400</td>
<td>7.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>4,255,091</td>
<td>15.79</td>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td>2,568,555</td>
<td>7.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>4,824,578</td>
<td>17.90</td>
<td>Osun</td>
<td>2,460,586</td>
<td>6.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>2,726,651</td>
<td>10.12</td>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>19,087,007</td>
<td>53.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamfara*</td>
<td>2,313,046</td>
<td>8.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northwest subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,949,045</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.79</strong></td>
<td><strong>Southwest subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>35,452,010</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.99</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>2,366,388</td>
<td>17.38</td>
<td>Abia</td>
<td>2,169,622</td>
<td>15.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>3,303,309</td>
<td>24.26</td>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>3,227,830</td>
<td>23.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>2,927,178</td>
<td>21.50</td>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>2,792,845</td>
<td>20.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gombe*</td>
<td>1,718,815</td>
<td>12.62</td>
<td>Ebonyi*</td>
<td>1,671,654</td>
<td>12.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taraba</td>
<td>1,723,722</td>
<td>12.66</td>
<td>Enugu</td>
<td>4,055,043</td>
<td>29.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yobe</td>
<td>1,574,699</td>
<td>11.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northeast subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,614,111</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.51</strong></td>
<td><strong>Southeast subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,916,994</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.77</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>2,099,171</td>
<td>15.66</td>
<td>Akwa Ibom</td>
<td>2,758,299</td>
<td>18.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kogi</td>
<td>2,477,836</td>
<td>18.48</td>
<td>Bayelsa*</td>
<td>1,327,488</td>
<td>8.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>1,765,053</td>
<td>13.17</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>2,952,928</td>
<td>19.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasarawa*</td>
<td>1,394,190</td>
<td>10.40</td>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td>1,606,114</td>
<td>10.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2,795,108</td>
<td>20.85</td>
<td>Edo</td>
<td>2,475,893</td>
<td>16.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>2,429,898</td>
<td>18.13</td>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>3,722,739</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle Belt subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,405,898</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.34</strong></td>
<td><strong>South-South subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,893,461</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.60</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NORTH</td>
<td>53,969,054</td>
<td>45.65%</td>
<td>TOTAL SOUTH</td>
<td>64,262,465</td>
<td>54.35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Calculations based on the 1998/1999 Constituency Delimitations.
Figures for the north include Abuja, Federal Capital Territory with a population of 445,339.
*Indicates a new state created in 1996.
Appendix 6: Geographical Distribution of Electoral Results

Table 32: House Seats Won, By Region, in 1959 Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NORTH</th>
<th>SOUTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>NCNC/NEPU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NORTH</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 33: House Seats Won, By Region, 1964/65 Election
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North</th>
<th>AG</th>
<th>NCNC</th>
<th>NPC</th>
<th>NNDP</th>
<th>Small Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid West</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NORTH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South</th>
<th>AG</th>
<th>NCNC</th>
<th>NPC</th>
<th>NNDP</th>
<th>Small Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SOUTH*</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Incorporates results from the March 1965 “Little Election.” (The other data displayed elsewhere are not available for this election.)
Table 34: House Seats Won, By Zone and State, 1979 Election
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th># Seats</th>
<th>UPN</th>
<th>GNPP</th>
<th>PRP</th>
<th>NPP</th>
<th>NPN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northwest subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>126</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>67</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gongola</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northeast subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>81</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NORTH</td>
<td><strong>207</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>95</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th># Seats</th>
<th>UPN</th>
<th>GNPP</th>
<th>PRP</th>
<th>NPP</th>
<th>NPN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bendel</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogun</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southwest subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>122</strong></td>
<td><strong>101</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southeast subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>120</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>59</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SOUTH</td>
<td><strong>242</strong></td>
<td><strong>103</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
<td><strong>73</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 35: Senate Seats Won, By Zone and State, 1979 Election
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th># Seats</th>
<th>UPN</th>
<th>GNPP</th>
<th>PRP</th>
<th>NPP</th>
<th>NPN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bendel</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogun</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th># Seats</th>
<th>UPN</th>
<th>GNPP</th>
<th>PRP</th>
<th>NPP</th>
<th>NPN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gongola</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northw.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southw.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 36: Governorships Won, By Zone and State, 1979 Election
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>UPN</th>
<th>GNPP</th>
<th>PRP</th>
<th>NPP</th>
<th>NPN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NW stale subtotal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gongola</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross River</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NORTH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SOUTH</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 37: House Seats, By Zone and State, 1999 Election
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NORTH</th>
<th></th>
<th>SOUTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State</td>
<td># Seats</td>
<td>PDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>Jigawa</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kebbi</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zamfara</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Northwest Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>67</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gombe</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taraba</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yobe</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Northeast Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Abuja, FCT</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kogi</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nasarawa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Middle Belt Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL NORTH</strong></td>
<td>157</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 38: Senate Seats, By Zone and State, 1999 Election
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th># Seats</th>
<th>PDP</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>APP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jigawa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kebbi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamfara</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northwest Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th># Seats</th>
<th>PDP</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>APP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gombe</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taraba</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yobe</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northeast Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th># Seats</th>
<th>PDP</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>APP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abuja, FCT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kogi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasarawa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle Belt Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th># Seats</th>
<th>PDP</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>APP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ekiti</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogun</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osun</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southwest Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th># Seats</th>
<th>PDP</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>APP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebonyi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enugu</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southeast Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th># Seats</th>
<th>PDP</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>APP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akwa Ibom</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayelsa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cr. River</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South South Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **TOTAL NORTH** | 58 | 39 | 0 | 19 |
| **TOTAL SOUTH** | 51 | 25 | 20 | 5 |

Table 39: Governorships, By State and Zone, 1999 Election
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>PDP</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>APP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jigawa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kebbi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamfara</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Northwest Subtotal**: 3 0 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>PDP</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>APP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gombe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taraba</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yobe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Northeast Subtotal**: 4 0 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>PDP</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>APP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kogi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasarawa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Middle Belt Subtotal**: 4 0 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>PDP</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>APP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ekiti</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ondo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oyo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Southwest Subtotal**: 0 6 0

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>PDP</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>APP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebonyi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enugu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Southwest Subtotal**: 0 6 0

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>PDP</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>APP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akwa Ibom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayelsa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cr. River</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Middle Belt Subtotal**: 4 0 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>PDP</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>APP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NORTH: 11 0 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SOUTH: 11 6 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source**: Independent National Electoral Commission, Department of Planning, Research and Statistics, “List of Elected Governors and Members of the State House of Assembly” (updated September 23, 2000)
Appendix 7: Tests for Stationarity of Independent Variable

Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test, where:

Model 1: $\Delta x_t = \mu + \varphi t + \alpha X_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$
Model 2: $\Delta x_t = \mu + \alpha X_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$ (assuming: $t = 0$)
Model 3: $\Delta x_t = \alpha X_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$ (assuming: $\mu = 0$, $t = 0$)

$H_0$: $\alpha = 1$
(Variable has a unit root.)

$H_1$: $\alpha \neq 1$
(Variable does not have a unit root.)

Reject $H_0$ if $t$-statistic < critical test values

$I =$ variable integration over time, and $I(0) =$ stationarity

Test results are reported in Table 40.

Table 40: Tests for Stationarity of Independent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>FIRST DIFFERENCE</th>
<th>DECISION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Intercept test (trend, const)</td>
<td>(2) Trend &amp; Intercept (const, no trend)</td>
<td>(3) None (no const, no trend)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto</td>
<td>-3.16*</td>
<td>-2.68*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant at the .1 level; **significant at the .05 level; ***significant at the .01 level

Notes: Reports the ADF test-statistic
Works Cited


Kukah, Matthew H. 1999. *Democracy and civil society in Nigeria*. Benin-City Nigeria,


Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.


Abuja: Universal Basic Education Programme.


