Title
UC Santa Cruz in the Mid-1970s: A Time of Transition, Volume I: John Marcum, Sigfried Puknat, Robert Adams, John Ellis, and Paul Niebanck

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Interview History

On January 23, 1976, UC Santa Cruz’s second chancellor, Mark N. Christensen, resigned from office. He had served the campus from July 1974 to January 1976. These two oral history volumes, comprised of interviews conducted between 1976 and 1980, set Christensen’s resignation within the broader context of a tumultuous and transitional moment in the campus’s history. Founding Chancellor Dean McHenry had brought to fruition his singular vision for UC Santa Cruz as an innovative institution of higher education that emphasized undergraduate teaching centered in residential colleges, each with a specific intellectual theme and architectural design, within the framework of what he envisioned as a major public research university. McHenry oversaw the planning and building of UCSC from 1961 until his retirement in June 1974. In the early years, UCSC drew high caliber students and gained considerable national visibility as an innovative university. But by the mid-1970s, applications were declining and enrollments were on the verge of falling. Internally, the campus was fracturing along fault lines created by debates over the colleges’ academic role and over the relative weight to be placed on research and teaching, while UCSC struggled to weather a variety of external political and economic pressures and to hold its own as a distinctive campus within the traditional University of California.

Christensen’s tenure as chancellor rather tragically ended in controversy after only eighteen months. Although most of the faculty liked Christensen as a person, they lost confidence in his ability to govern the campus. The Regional
History Project never conducted an oral history with Mark Christensen, who passed away in 2003. But former director Randall Jarrell completed a series of interviews with key faculty members and administrators who had been directly involved in the Christensen case. Jarrell decided to withhold publication of these oral histories due to their sensitive political nature at the time. Now, nearly four decades later, we are able to publish these volumes as part of the Project’s Institutional History of UCSC series.

This is a two-volume publication. The five oral histories in volume one not only illuminate the painful events leading up to the resignation of Chancellor Christensen, they capture and reflect on the “McHenry years” and on a complex and challenging period in the history of what was then a young, still experimental, and somewhat vulnerable campus of the University of California. The second volume contains a brief oral history with George Von Der Muhll conducted by Randall Jarrell in 1976 and then a much longer, follow-up oral history with George Von Der Muhll conducted by Irene Reti in 2014, in which Von der Muhll shares his thoughts not only on the Christensen administration, but also on the reaggregation and reorganization programs of the late 1970s, in which he played a central role. He also contemplates UC Santa Cruz as an experiment in public higher education, from the perspective of fifty years after the campus was founded. For reasons of chronology and length, we decided to dedicate a separate volume to Von Der Muhll’s interview. A third oral history volume, Daniel H. McFadden: The Chancellor Mark Christensen Era at UC Santa
UC Santa Cruz in the Mid-1970s, A Time of Transition

Cruz, 1974-1976, also originally part of this series was published in 2012 and is available on the Regional History website.¹

I want to express my special appreciation to John Ellis for reviewing and releasing Sig Puknat’s oral history; to Gwen Marcum, who reviewed and released her husband, John Marcum’s, oral history; and to all of the narrators who were patient with my rather sudden request to publish interviews they had participated in nearly four decades ago. Special thanks to my predecessor Randall Jarrell, for having the prescience to conduct these oral histories early in her own career, and to Professor Michael Cowan, who generously shared his memories and insights into this chapter of UCSC’s history and who assisted with the many logistical and editorial challenges I faced in completing this project.

Copies of this volume are on deposit in Special Collections and in the circulating stacks at the UCSC Library, as well as on the library’s website. The Regional History Project is supported administratively by Elisabeth Remak-Honnef, Head of Special Collections and Archives, and Acting University Librarian, Elizabeth Cowell.

—Irene Reti

Director, Regional History Project, University Library

University of California, Santa Cruz, May 2014

¹See http://library.ucsc.edu/reg-hist/mcfadden
John Marcum

John Marcum was a professor of politics at UCSC and was affiliated with Merrill College. He first arrived at UCSC in 1969 as a visiting professor and then became permanent faculty in 1972. Marcum was provost of Merrill College from 1972 to 1977. Marcum earned a B.A. (1949) and Ph.D. (1955) from Stanford University and an M.A. from Columbia University (1951). He served as the senior faculty member on the Chancellor’s Search Committee that hired Mark Christensen as chancellor of UC Santa Cruz. Marcum was interviewed by Randall Jarrell on May 20, 1976.

Coming to UC Santa Cruz

Jarrell: Why don’t we just start out with your background, when you came here. You were here at UCSC in 1969 for the first time?

Marcum: Right, I was here as a visitor in 1969 when I was still on the staff of Lincoln University in Pennsylvania. Then I went from here to the Graduate School of International Studies at Denver, and I was there two years. Then I was invited back, [to UCSC] much to my surprise, and came here then on a permanent basis in July of ’72.

Jarrell: When you came here permanently, then, you already had an idea of the kind of unconventional institution this was?

Marcum: I already had an idea, not necessarily of what life as a provost might be, but what Santa Cruz was about, yes.
Jarrell: You were invited back not only with an academic appointment, but as provost?

Marcum: As provost, that’s right. At that point, you see, they were still, and for one or two times later, going on national searches for provosts, bringing people in from outside, whereas now it’s almost always internal.

Jarrell: Inside.

Marcum: Stephen [E.] Toulmin came at the same time as I, as provost of Crown. And then a year or two later, I chaired the committee at Kresge that brought May Diaz in. I think May was the last outside appointment, because after that you had [Joseph F.] Bunnett and [Richard R.] Randolph and [Joseph H.] Silverman, all of them internal appointments.

Jarrell: That’s right. Then I see the recent Crown search [for a provost] is going to be somebody either from this faculty or from [the] UC system. So that’s interesting, it has changed. So you got here at the end of McHenry’s tenure, really.

Marcum: Yes, the last two years of his tenure.

Jarrell: I would like to get your overview on what kind of place you thought this was during his last two years before he left, from the point of view of being a provost; in terms of the future of Merrill College; in the context of whatever issues or conflicts that you think were significant, since they were your first two years here, really, but at the same time, they were the end of a certain stage of
development here. Just as a contrast for what came after Christensen was appointed Chancellor.

Marcum: I think it was very clear to us all in that last year, maybe during that last two years of the McHenry administration, that the campus was ending an era. It had reached a different size. It could no longer be that the chancellor knew everybody. He had, of course, [known everyone], and I guess it was really true. He is famous for the fact that he’d interviewed all appointments and he really had been the creator, or the founder. There was a proprietary interest, as well as a vision, and yet the place had grown, gone through certain historical changes. I guess it was reaching the point where it needed a reexamination to see what things had worked, what hadn’t. A lot of the decision making was, I think, by that time, overly centralized. There was a welling up of problems and need for change. The external situation had changed, so utterly, that the growth phase was clearly coming to an end, although it’s easier, and we’re clearer now about that than at the time. I don’t think any of us, at the meetings I sat in, had a sense of how imminent this steady-state was—

Jarrell: And how drastic the decrease in numbers from the original projection?

Marcum: Exactly, yes. There were the tensions concerning the role of boards and colleges. These sorts of things, however, were matters that could be adjusted, that needed some examination but could be worked out. That’s been my feeling all along. On the other hand, the examination had to be within a realistic context of what was going [to] be possible. There was a sense of expectancy, a need for a kind of new thrust, if you will. A reexamination and a new thrust. Any new
institution, ten years old, comes to face this situation, once it has experiences to build upon. This was perhaps all the more so, given that the administration was headed by the person who had been in charge right from the beginning. [He] probably found it a little more difficult to reexamine some of the basic notions, for the simple reason that he had very firm ideas about them. It was harder for him to get a distance, and I think McHenry himself realized that. It was time for someone new to come in and lead us into a different phase. Not the more heroic stage, but a kind of reassessment and making things work and then making them work within the context of a much less favorable context.

**Jarrell:** Were you at the Asilomar conference?

**Marcum:** The one that McHenry called?

**Jarrell:** Yes.

**Marcum:** I was.

**Jarrell:** I’ve heard several people say that they felt, after that conference, that no change, or reorganization was possible as long as McHenry remained at the helm. Did you have this feeling as well? You seem to have been sort of relaxed—that things could work themselves out?

**Marcum:** Well, no, but I agree about the Asilomar meeting. But I was still listening. And it was my first year. Santa Cruz is a complicated place. I think I spent much of my first year listening, trying to figure out how things did work. I was surprised by the fact that things were as centralized as they were, that so many things were on formula. I found that the provost’s role involved very little
decision-making. It was an in-between role, where you got pressures from both sides and it took a lot of figuring out to just find out what the creative space was.

Jarrell: To collect your balance?

Marcum: Yes, and what you could do with it. Because my whole point in coming was to try to make something of [the provostship], particularly for the college in the academic realm [because] otherwise there was no point. I did find that Asilomar meeting sobering because it appeared that those who were raising serious questions, or had major doubts, were viewed as being a bit immature. There was a kind of crossness toward them. Joe Bunnett, who was then chair of the Senate and who chaired the meeting, was not, I think, a strong exponent of the collegiate system and that was reflected a bit, too. There were a lot of ideas expressed, but it was pretty clear that this wasn’t going to get anywhere; it was really ventilating feelings and some frustrations. What came out of it [was that] there wasn’t going to be any real leadership given to resolving these problems. The assumption was if people acted more wisely, made better choices, worked together, cooperated, it would all work out. Yet I think there were and are real structural problems in the Santa Cruz model that aren’t insuperable, but they are there and they have to be recognized as such. To make it work you really have to deal with structural, not just personal issues. It’s not [a question of] people either acting properly or intelligently that will resolve it [but] people getting at the structure and enabling it to facilitate what we’re doing.

Jarrell: Now, as the provost of a college, you mentioned that one of your goals was to deal with the academic side of your college, of the collegiate system,
which is certainly the center of the problem that many of the colleges are criticized for, that they don’t have a real academic reason for being. Could you talk about this for a bit because I’ve heard many people say that the African studies program at Merrill is the most substantial college program [at UCSC] and that must have something to do with you and your vision.

Marcum: Well, I’ve gone through a lot of changed thinking about this, in grappling with how one could use the college framework, or take advantage of it, for something more than what I call the environmental support system possibilities in it, which are very real. That is, the social, the cultural life in the dormitories, the residence aspect. I don’t mean to underplay that. I think that’s important.

But as I looked at it over time, I think this is the kind of vision that seemed to me to be sensible. I think it is the one that is shared here in the college rather generally: that as the college grew, the idea of having a series of equally balanced, somewhat independent liberal arts colleges—based on either a Haverford model, or the Claremont College model, or the British, Oxford-Cambridge model—was really not that realistic in a state university, because, in fact, the appointments being made, the resource allocations, both of persons and funds, were much more centralized, or much more standardized. No college had the critical mass to really be independent. The advantage to the student coming here was in fact that it was that it would represent the size and reality of a university with certain aspects of a collegiate quality. If you got into the competition for resources or for doing things, and did it on a territorial basis, you would spend all of your time haggling, fighting, [having] jurisdictional
squabbles, and most of the time the colleges would come out second best, anyhow. Because as time went on, [it was seen] that boards or disciplines had clearly defined needs and colleges had [vaguer] notions, or ideas, or a sort of ethos but not very often—

**Jarrell:** Do you mean that colleges had rather ambiguous, harder-to-define needs?

**Marcum:** Right, the boards could articulate needs in the budgetary process which would be rewarded [because they] were the standard needs and were, of course, reinforced by all the external reality of academia. [But] if a college had a lot of external resources, [such as] Oakes, the one that had the most, might try, even at this late date, to maintain a certain independence, if you will, to build walls, and to say, “[We’re] going to do this and that; we’re going to have more counseling than anyplace else.” That kind of external, private support is going to be rare and Oakes was particularly able to appeal to it in the person of its provost [J. Herman Blake], and of its particular mission. However, I think that is not likely to last indefinitely, and Merrill and all of the other [colleges] were not in a position to get sufficient independent funding that they could really do things independently of the rest of the campus. Therefore this problem has struck us as we looked to our effort to do something more cohesive, but at an interdisciplinary level, which is after all the essence of a college. [We have concluded] that we should think in terms of ourselves as a focal point for activities. Or [to] put [it] another way, we should develop a college without walls where certain kinds of things happen because there is a greater density of people, both in the teaching and on the student side, who want to do those things.
Now, reaggregation, of course fit very nicely into that mode of thinking. If we could increase a little bit more the number of people who were involved in interrelated studies of international dimensions, including particular non-Western countries, the scientific side of this, we would be able to do more. We gravitated toward this sort of three-modular system that we now are working on, which is to organize our program around three sets of things. One we call world studies, purposefully very broad, and this involves people in a number of areas; Africa’s one; and Latin America; the South Pacific; and insular Southeast Asia are others. They are not just area studies, though. We’re trying to bring people in on a kind of comparative level, and international fields to tie that in. But the thing is, that Latin American studies isn’t going to be just Merrill, nor is insular Southeast Asia, if you will. We’ll have a nucleus of faculty here; by moving the South Pacific Studies Center physically into the college, but not subsuming it, in no way putting it under Merrill’s jurisdiction, but simply having it in proximity—we get people interacting. Yet some of the people teaching, in dealing with Pacific or insular Southeast Asian areas, or Latin America, will not be in the college. In fact, the majority of the Latin American people are not, [in Merrill] because there are eight colleges. We just have some [of them]. What we do have now is a secretary who serves these programs, as a board secretary serves a discipline’s programs. The programs are open to students across the campus, but much of the activity revolving around them will be here. Our thought is that those students who really are very much involved in these kinds of things will tend to want to come here because that’s where more of it’s happening. It’s a kind of voluntary selection process; there are no walls, but an attraction. It means that in the budgeting process these programs need to present their cases as
campus-wide programs, but college-based. They must be judged on their merits in terms of how they serve the entire campus within the context of the campus’s priorities, but with a physical location or center of gravity in one college.

Other things we can develop in different colleges, which means you’re not pitted against other boards or colleges because you’re doing something that is an understood part of the public good, but you’re trying to center it in a way that gives the college a life and which over time will change, too. That is, it may be that any one of these programs will have its day and fade away and something else replace it and so on. It’s a somewhat more flexible and realistic notion of what one can do in a college. It also would allow for differences of intensity. Some colleges may do more, academically, be more ambitious about themselves, aggregate people, again, both faculty and students in a very conscious way; others may decide, as Crown apparently has decided, to play [the academic function] very low key, not to be very programmatic in terms of academic things. And that, on the other hand [is] helpful to us. Because in the American studies field, I mean it’s helpful to us, it’s not as helpful as it might have been had College Eight been where Crown is, or if Oakes had been where Crown is, we would have then been able to interact in a very intense and creative way. At one point I had hoped and argued for a shifting around because I thought that would really be exciting. But it proved impossible to get decisions made of that basic nature.

Jarrell: Yes.
Marcum: So what we do, we then build upon, or take solace in the fact that Crown doesn’t make very high demands on its own faculty. A number of the American studies people are at Crown and some are at Merrill, and that American studies notion is a combination of the kind of traditional high culture approach to American culture, and one deals with the ethnic and women’s and class dimensions that are left out of American studies. We couldn’t possibly have all the faculty in Merrill that were needed to deal with that. And so again, it’s something that we can service out of here with a nucleus of people at Merrill and at Crown and then some others at the other colleges. And Crown doesn’t mind if their faculty is involved in this program because they don’t have any demands that they’re [going to] put on them.

Jarrell: Right. Well that’s interesting because I didn’t understand the dynamics of, say, Merrill and Crown and Oakes. I have sort of gotten that feeling about Oakes, it is more—very—

Marcum: Self-contained.

Jarrell: Yes, it’s self-contained and has very concrete ideas about what it’s doing and the kind of people whom it’s going to serve.

Marcum: Yes. We hope to mount this coming year, the beginnings of a program, of a kind of outreach effort that will tell more about what we are. We’re reaching the point now where we are something that we can talk about a little more. For example, beginning this fall we’ll have four people in the field of China: an economist, an historian, a political scientist, as well as a language instructor. And that provides us with the chance of attracting students who, at the
undergraduate level, would like to specialize in that area. Which is, what, a fourth of mankind? George Hammond and Jean Langenheim are here and George has moved his office of the foreign secretary of the National Academy of Sciences here into the college, and their program on Science and Technology in Developing Countries is being taught from here, and he brings people into the college that way. Then his office can interact with the Pacific Studies Organized Research Unit and they can interact with faculty who are interested in non-Western developing parts of the world.

**Jarrell:** This is like a little nucleus here.

**Marcum:** It’s a little nucleus of interrelated activities that are not hierarchically organized, but are functionally interrelating.

**Jarrell:** And they’re not just for Merrill, but for the entire campus. Do you like students to be affiliated with Merrill, or does it matter?

**Marcum:** I think we hope that some of them will find that it would be nicer to be affiliated, because they’d like to live here and they’d like to be in close proximity to it and put their energies into it. It’s less the membership certification, than the presence and participation that counts.

**Jarrell:** So you’ve been devising and refining this whole idea for the last couple, two or three years?

**Marcum:** Well, we’ve been trying to gradually work out something that we thought could achieve our basic principles, but very flexibly. That’s another thing that I got into and I’ve been arguing about, pontificating on, I guess, is this
whole business of course labeling. To get out of the board-college thing about faculty, we’ve taken the position [in Merrill] that we do not care if courses that are given by our faculty relate to the things we’re interested in. We don’t care if they have board labels instead of college labels. We will count board-labeled courses as college teaching; we will ask only for that increment that we really need in college courses that can’t be given under board auspices, that are usually interdisciplinary. But we’re not going to dock people or fight over the hours [go along with] an accounting system that says, “You must teach “X” amount of college-labeled courses in order to be bona fide,” or that the college’s own success will be measured by how many hours of college courses it offers. It’s a false thing, you see. It contorts things and so by simply arguing that we want to carry out certain functions—

**Jarrell:** There are simply needs that need to be met.

**Marcum:** Exactly.

**Jarrell:** Yes, you’re not going to play the game, of “How many [courses] are you listing?”

**Marcum:** Yes. And I think that now the principle’s being taught more broadly and [it changes a little bit the] frame of reference for discussion.

**Searching for a New Chancellor**

**Jarrell:** To change the subject now, what was your position on the Chancellor’s Search Committee?

**Marcum:** I was the senior faculty member.
Jarrell: And what did you see as your charge, as your personal responsibility as a member of the committee? What did you have in mind as to what you were going to try to do in terms of finding and assessing prospective candidates?

Marcum: Well, as I went into it, it was a new experience and I really couldn’t answer those questions. I had hoped to have some role in identifying and arguing for a candidate that might be good for the campus. But until the committee met and we were given our charge—our instructions from the president—it was hard to be very specific about those things you’ve asked. I just had a general feeling that I’d like to be able to have some input into that process, but I didn’t know that much about it. I’d not been on such a committee before. It was very apparent to us from the letter we got and what little information those of us named had, that it was a joint committee with the Regents and we would have to find out what the interrelationship was, what the relative role of faculty and regents might be.

Jarrell: What was the make-up of the committee?

Marcum: Well, there were twelve on the committee: there were five faculty; five Regents; and in addition, the chair of the regents and the president of the university. So there were, in effect, seven non-faculty and five faculty, four of whom came from Santa Cruz, one of whom came from Riverside. And that also further reduced our numbers in terms of presenting anything from here.

Jarrell: How did the committee go about coming up with prospective candidates?
Marcum: The first meeting—I remember it because I was in Ethiopia and came in the very morning of the first meeting, which had been delayed a couple days because of this. I was rather blurry-eyed. All the meetings were at the San Francisco Airport. We went in; we were given some general background by Charles Hitch, the president, who said something about how he perceived UCSC, what he thought some of its problems were, [what] some of its possibilities were. Among other things, he felt we had a bit of a top-heavy administration, more vice-chancellors than he could quite understand. It was overly bureaucratized in his mind. We had a strong emphasis on undergraduate education, and a collegiate system that might have some problems, and he wasn’t sure just what those were. The place, by and large, he seemed to feel had been successful but now needed to move into [a] new phase. All of that made sense to us, I think.

Then he indicated that we would be advertising nationally—the Chronicle on Higher Education, all the normal outlets for that. And we could look internally and externally—internally to the campus or to the system and then externally. Any of us could come up with names that we would like to put into the hopper. The advertisements would generate literally several hundred applications, and this proved only too true. A good many of these, of course, were totally out in left field. A twenty-five-year-old assistant to the president of West Texas or an interesting—

Jarrell: Or a business college, or a—

Marcum: Right. It just, it was really quite amazing.
Jarrell: It generates a lot of paperwork.

Marcum: [Yes, it does.] We had meetings here on the campus with Vice-President Kidner who, even before the search committee had been set up, had come down to meet with provosts and others to get some ideas about what Santa Cruz might want, might need. Our list of faculty from here was originally, I think, fifteen, and then Hitch chose out of the fifteen. Fifteen faculty members from Santa Cruz and the system—he chose five. So Hitch had that choice out of the list of fifteen that went in from the Committee on Committees. That’s the same thing that’s happening now again. I must say in a general way that all along from the very beginning, the faculty group, not having been in this process before—the Regents had, although this was the first time it had been a joint Regents’ faculty meeting or faculty committee—we were always about one step behind. We sort of thought we understood the process and what was [going to] happen and then found it kind of short-circuited.

I had one very early role to play which I think, in retrospect, [was] not one of the places where it fell down. I was asked from the faculty side to join Mrs. Heller in a screening of the original inflow of dozens and dozens, several hundred applicants. In effect, Vice President Kidner had gone through all these, because they all went into the president’s office and they were given to us. Now, what we did was to create two or three different piles. One, the largest, were the people that simply just weren’t in the ballpark. And then some that might be. And then the two important ones, the kind of “A” and “B” list of people who seemed really very likely. As I recall, even the “A” list had probably about fifty people on it. It was big and even then the second list had a lot. And all of those were then taken
back to the full committee and they could look at it immediately and take anybody who’d been put in a lower list and put them back up in a higher list if they wanted. But you know this is one of the things I found absolutely fascinating. What we had in the way of information, put together largely from the raw data [sent] into the president’s office, what the committee got, what even that little subcommittee I was on got, was a brief paragraph. I mean by that, five or six, seven, eight lines—

**Jarrell:** That had been summarized by the people in a—

**Marcum:** — summarized. It would have up in the corner where the person was; then in the paragraph [below] where they were born, what degrees they had, what positions they’d held, period. When you got into the list of names of people who looked like real candidates, there was a lot of informal discussion in the committee, mostly by Regents who knew the system, and who knew people, vice-chancellor of this or that in the California systems, “Wouldn’t ‘X’ or ‘Y’ be great?” Christensen’s name, in fact, appeared at the very first meeting, somebody saying, “There’s Mark Christensen at Berkeley, who is a fine young man. Wouldn’t he be wonderful?” And somebody else said, “Oh, well, I don’t think he would be willing to accept this sort of thing.” And there were two or three other names. In fact, Saxon’s name was mentioned. And some people outside who were [known to], Hitch and the Regents, with other administrators at other campuses, both internal and external to the system.

We had not for the most part gone in having fixed on names. Most of us didn’t have that close an association with other university presidents and all. The point
I was [going to] make here is that the quality of that data remained the same throughout.

Jarrell: Didn’t it get more expressive as to the—

Marcum: We were constantly warned that we should not act as a caucus. And we tried to act independently but we did consult among ourselves. We asked for things that these candidates might have written; we asked for longer and fuller curriculum vitae. We asked for the kind of information that you normally ask for a prospective assistant professor, step 1, an instructor. And we never got these. We were promised this kind of information but we never got it. And as I say, we were usually always a step behind. We would be asking for that and find that the rest of the committee were moving on to cutting down the list to a smaller number, moving terribly swiftly. Because the Regents fly in to those meetings from various parts of the state and they don’t have a lot of time. They do not want the sort of discursive discussions that faculty are, I suppose, notorious for. They wanted to get at this quickly and they quickly focused in on some ideas.

Christensen’s candidacy became open. He decided he would like to do it, after a visit to the campus and a stay with Chancellor McHenry here. That was another problem, quite frankly, because we, on the faculty wanted at least the short list of candidates to come visit the campus. And as far as I know, Christensen was the only one who came as part of that search. There was one other candidate, who was a candidate for the Kresge provostship, who happened to be here, and did see the campus and also became a candidate for the chancellorship but who
didn’t have much chance as it turned out. But otherwise none of the candidates saw the campus.

**Jarrell:** I’m interested in the rhythm of this thing, this process. Now, you said that the Regents really had no time to sit around and chat; that they were really quite to the point.

**Marcum:** Very businesslike.

**Jarrell:** I am sure that you and your UCSC colleagues felt that you wanted more information on the candidates before you made a decision. What happened? Were you adequately supplied with it?

**Marcum:** Well, we were told that we would get this information by mail; it would be sent down to us.

**Jarrell:** But it never was?

**Marcum:** That’s right.

**Jarrell:** Were you feeling dismayed or—

**Marcum:** Well a little bit ill at ease, I think—and maybe a bit awed. But right down to the end we thought we would indeed have visits, and it would be a short list. Many of the candidates that came before us were good candidates. I think any of the candidates that were interviewed would have been better than the final choice.

**Jarrell:** How many did you get down to at the end?
Marcum: I think we interviewed, I don’t remember accurately now; it would have been six or eight or so that we, in fact, interviewed.

Jarrell: Sort of finalists at the end of the day.

Marcum: Yes, right. Incidentally, I have written a memorandum which summarized my criticisms of the process, which was presented to the convener of the provosts and to the head of the Senate so that they could funnel that into the new search committee.

Jarrell: The new search committee, post Christensen—

Marcum: So all the places where the process didn’t work would be on record. I’m not, in any sense trying to make it ad hominem, or to be critical of Christensen, who I think was the victim of all of this, not the transgressor. I didn’t know this fully until the whole thing was over, but one of the candidates whom I knew, in fact I had submitted that person’s name, was coming in from out of state. He called me before he came to say that though the time had been set for an interview, he had received no other information, and would I send a catalog. Well, I learned afterwards that they were one-hour interviews. People came in, had a one-hour interview, and left. He had not been sent so much as a catalog or any other information about the campus. Now, he was pitted against people who were on the campus at UCSC, or within the system. He had a one-hour interview and, of course, he was inevitably asked questions about colleges and boards and narrative evaluation systems.
Jarrell: Somebody from a more conventional institution would just be totally unprepared.

Marcum: And all of the affirmative action candidates were from out of the system, except one. And again, what kind of equality of opportunity there is in that if you are not— Now, the argument was that you can’t have people come to the campus because they don’t want it known back at their home institutions. Well, I subsequently learned a lot about other searches, and that, of course, is just not true. People do go to campuses and it is learned back home, if they themselves say, no, they won’t do it, okay. They don’t want to be embarrassed by it being known that they were a candidate but didn’t get chosen.

Jarrell: Right.

Marcum: Or it sets up alarm signals at home. So there are problems, but there are ways of getting around them. And certainly at the very end there was a way of getting around it. That’s another point I’d like to make. One of the understandings that we had at the end, after the discussions within the committee—you’ll call it a vote—was when the president went around the room and said, “How do you feel about ranking the candidates in order?” And one candidate came out head and shoulders above the others in terms of votes; that was Mark Christensen. It was not unanimous. But it was strongly in his favor. But there were a couple of us who were still arguing that it was important that the candidates come to the campus and be seen by and talk with faculty and students. I had a kind of liaison role in terms of students and faculty during this time, and we’d had a big battle about student representation, student
participation on the [committee.] An announcement went out of Chancellor McHenry’s office that the first of several visits was scheduled and Mark Christensen was coming down. I think it was on a Monday evening or afternoon. He met with probably the CCR and then he met with different faculty groups. I was asked to funnel back information; that is, to sort of get a sense of how it went and to phone it back to Vice President Kidner, who would then give it to President Hitch. I did it immediately. I called people that night and I got very negative feedback. I called this information in early the next morning after I’d compiled it. I think it was a Tuesday morning and I told Kidner that though people liked him [Christensen] they felt he was a lightweight, that he really didn’t have the experience.

There are two things we wanted the candidate to have, that we had stressed in our committee, and I had pushed for very hard. One was a deftness at handling complicated administrative structure, an experience and ability to deal with that sort of thing. The second quality we were seeking was intellectual clout, something which the campus would feel proud about in a new chancellor. Both of these were important in the minds of faculty. We distilled this out by sending a memo to that effect. Now, on both of these accounts, his meeting here was not successful. People did not feel that he showed real strength in either of those areas. I phoned that in. Kidner told me that he was sorry, but a special meeting of the Regents had already been called for later that week—Thursday or Friday of that week—and an announcement was going to be made of his appointment. And I said, “Do you realize what this means? The faculty is being misled, the committee is being misled. I had thought that this was a genuine exercise and at
least if there were negative results coming back to you that you would listen to those.” He responded something like, “Well, it was too late and they thought he would be a fine person,” and so forth and so on. I said, “Well, can I at least count on you to inform the president of this and to inform the candidate of this, before he accepts the job, since I thought he would want to know that that’s the feeling?”

He promised me that he would talk to the president and that the president would transmit this [to Christensen]. My guess is that he never did. So at that point I was in on this situation where I saw the inevitability of it. I’d seen it. I suppose I’d had that feeling at the last meeting of the committee—that I was in a very small minority and that the president was very strong. And the president had told me that if it were not for what a wonderful candidate we had in this person, he would have been very interested in another person that I had thought myself had the kind of stature, experiences, and qualities that would have worked out very well here.

One of the sad, sad things about all of this is that we have learned—and with what accuracy I don’t know—that we got very mixed results from the telephone calls I and several others had made, trying to find out what Christensen was like.

**Jarrell:** You talked to people at University Hall who had worked with Christensen?

**Marcum:** Yes. And some thought that he was really not up to it. I had transmitted this information to the committee but it was me, one person, going against the overwhelming evidence of euphoria, people mostly telling you that
he’s been just marvelous. And the chancellor says, etc. etc. You feel kind of silly after awhile. I just felt very ill at ease and in a very nervous way continued to argue that I thought there was a facile quality which Christensen had. Of course he raised good questions all during his stay here. It was very unfair to him, a tragic thing for him, really. There should have been a careful assessment of his administrative record there. We needed that kind of information to avoid a mistake for the institution and for the person involved.

**Jarrell:** And for the person. It works both ways.

**Marcum:** Right. It’s both ways and that’s what I felt so badly about all along. I think there was a decision made that it would be great to have a scientist following Chancellor McHenry. I know that Chancellor McHenry felt that way. There was a visit here to the campus, a feeling that Christensen with his sort of outdoors [quality], Alaskan boyish, and friendly buoyancy fit in nicely and those are very endearing qualities in him. But those were not the kinds of tough questions that needed to be asked. And they weren’t; they just weren’t asked at any point.

And the information we got—I guess what I started out to say here was that apparently, sadly, it seems that there had been some statements made to President Hitch. This I have indirectly and obviously I can’t say I know this absolutely, but I’m persuaded that this is probably true—that [Hitch] had been told that Christensen simply was not that strong or not that experienced and [Hitch’s] response was reported to have been, “Well, he will grow in the job.” And Bowker in the meantime, probably had wanted somebody stronger. There
were a lot of things to suggest that Berkeley was, in effect, easing Christensen out and was delighted to have him come here. The Daily Californian said as much, and people called me after the appointment to confirm that that’s what they thought. Yet a couple people up there gave me quite misleading advice. I mean, even what I picked up in terms of my own telephoning. I regret my error not to have aggressively gone up to Berkeley and spent a day just going around and pounding on people’s doors and going in and investigating. If I ever did this again I would know better but somehow I was relying on the judgment of Hitch and his vice president and others, assuming that they had done this —

**Jarrell:** That they would know.

**Marcum:** Yes, since they were on the spot, were right there and knew and would be responsible. But they were not responsible.

**Jarrell:** To you and to others on the committee? Since they had access to all of the information?

**Marcum:** Exactly. Responsible to the institution.

**Jarrell:** I have heard it said, or expressed in a more paranoid sort of view that, speaking colloquially, that Berkeley—University Hall—dumped Christensen on Santa Cruz?

**Marcum:** Yes.

**Jarrell:** But I wonder if this sort of comment is *ex post facto*?
Marcum: Yes, I think that’s a nice, simple way of putting it, an oversimplified way of putting it. It’s more complex than that.

It was just not careful, probing. I was hurried. I have the feeling, and this is one of my real hopes, that President Saxon will not act this way. I have a feeling that it reflected in part, and this is again impressionistic, that Charles Hitch was a president who didn’t like dealing with people all that much. He was a reticent, introspective man, a kind man, but he didn’t like dealing with controversial things. He liked neatness. He wanted a process that kind of went, just bang, bang, bang.

Jarrell: With dispatch.

Marcum: [Hitch] saw somebody he could send down here that looked like he wouldn’t be a problem, who stylistically fit Santa Cruz. We’d all kind of liked him and once [Hitch] saw that person, he probably ceased listening to very much else. The Regents wanted something. They again, were anxious to do it neatly and quickly. And so you just sort of short-circuited— On the basis of a one-hour interview, it was quite true that Christensen handled the questions very well. But that’s a superficial kind of search.

Jarrell: What kind of administrator, or what kinds of capabilities has this person, for instance? You can’t judge that in an hour interview.

Marcum: Yes. Also what kinds of intellectual qualities. I suppose those are things that the Regents don’t rate that highly, or worry that much about. But I have the feeling that Saxon is a man of thoroughness, of toughness, who respects
intellectual qualities, who recognizes—he told us as much during the ultimate crisis that we had, that he thinks there’s always a bit of chance in these searches. Even a good search may not work out well. And of course that’s true. I understand that. But I think you minimize the risks by being careful and thorough. And that was not what characterized this.

**Jarrell:** And maybe not being rushed, too.

**Marcum:** At least, though the process wasn’t rushed in the length of time, of months it took, but it was in terms of the meetings. And I guess again, one thing that would worry me is that, when you play these things over, once you’ve been in it, you know how to do it a second time. But the faculty who’ll go in this next time will be new as well. And we’re always novices at this, whereas they know the game, they system. That’s theirs. And so, we probably tended to be a bit awed.

**Jarrell:** Yes. I could see how dealing with the Regents could be mildly intimidating since they’re so experienced in this—not wanting to cross them.

**Marcum:** Yes. And we used up a lot of our energies too, trying to get a student representative on the committee. We had support from Mrs. Heller on that. We had a fearful response on the part of Hitch, who I think wasn’t at all sure how the Regents would respond, and didn’t want to use up credit on that. When we finally got a student on, it was for the last four people who were interviewed.

And you know, one of the great ironies was the problem of finding a process at Santa Cruz, because of its complicated government system, for getting
students—how do you produce those who can be said to be representative? It finally went down to the Committee of College Representatives because that’s all there was. They put forth a slate; the president chose one person from the slate; this was a precedent, having a student participant. We argued that that person, who was a woman, would not see her role differently than the rest of us. That is, it would not be a question of going back and talking to City on a Hill Press about what was going on in confidential meetings. It’s harder for a student because the pressures will be greater. If the student is seen as a representative, it’s easier for the faculty, I think, to understand that this is like a personnel process. You go in and you participate, but you have to hold confidentiality. What did happen, finally, was when the student came back after the process was over, she did give an interview to City on a Hill and did misrepresent one of the candidates.

Well, since this is an historical record now, I can say that one of those persons who had originally been interviewed was then vice-chancellor and Provost [Glenn] Willson. He withdrew, since the job involved dealing with the legislature and political aspects of California, which he would find difficult because he’s from Britain, and wasn’t that experienced. So he withdrew before any of the final discussions. But it was reported in City on a Hill that he had pushed his candidacy and so forth and so on. It was inaccurate and indiscreet. My hope is that that was not picked up and will not be a block to student participation in the future. But it was exactly the type of thing that could mess that up. I still myself would favor student participation on it. I think it’s important. But it was dramatized how important it is that it be by the ground rules.
Jarrell: Yes. So once Christensen was chosen and came here, I felt as a member of the university here, I felt, let’s wait and see what’s going to happen. Nobody really knew that much about him except that he was from Berkeley.

Marcum: Yes.

Jarrell: I think generally, except for a few people who were insiders, there was an ambivalence, with no clear idea of what a tragedy this was all going to turn into.

Marcum: Yes. I had premonitions of it. I told my wife I had felt it was an error. I had felt rather used by the process. I think I felt angry with myself in a way that I hadn’t fought harder, although I felt embarrassed that I had been negative. I found that I sort of withdrew from it all. I had to put a good face on things. I mean, I wanted him to succeed once he was chosen, yet I was really very afraid he wouldn’t.

And when he first came and he opened up all these sorts of things that we couldn’t look at very much—that is, that had been sort of closed issues, parts of the process we didn’t have anything to do with—there was a bit of euphoria there for awhile. I found myself caught up in it even, thinking, “Maybe, hopefully I was wrong; I had been wrong in my judgment.”

Jarrell: Could you expand on the idea that Christensen was discussing specific issues and structural problems?

Marcum: During the very first meeting at his house, with an informality that seemed appealing in the beginning, he made a little statement about how
important colleges were. In effect, he was giving us a charge, the provosts, a charge for doing something with the academic programs. He was very much in favor of the reaggregation motion that had gone through the Senate, which again was an indication of the timing, that is the rightness for change. We were really in the mood for new leadership and change, and there was a new kind of energy. He made some comments about how we would deal with him. He was approachable. He seemed to have done some thinking about where he wanted to go, and at that juncture he could not be expected to be more specific. What he heard to that point, had dealt a lot with the collegiate issue, I guess. But in any case, it seemed very encouraging. It seemed very refreshing.

Now, what in effect happened was that the same questions were posed and reposed and then there were more questions and counter-questions, and we learned over the months ahead that he had no process for resolving them. He would end meetings by raising new questions rather than coming to conclusions, rather than drawing issues to a point of making a decision. Of course, there was the great debacle in October of the Quarry, the convocation in the Quarry. I’d urged him for example, that he talk—

**Jarrell:** Are you speaking about the inaugural address?

**Marcum:** Yes. I urged that he talk a bit about Santa Cruz briefly, but to the point, because he seemed to be a man with ideas. I think he is a man of ideas. One of the problems that bugs me about Santa Cruz is that I think some people think of it as a piece of furniture. It’s the sixties. And it’s very important that we understand that some of UCSC’s qualities are more enduring, that it wasn’t just
sort of tripping about in the redwoods barefoot in the flowers in the 1960s. You know, there are other qualities and the institution will adapt itself, while keeping those things that are important about it in the seventies. What is Santa Cruz in the seventies? What is new? What is our challenge now? How do we respond to the present time? And what are the important things about us that remain lasting?

Jarrell: Can you assess the inaugural address for me?

Marcum: I guess the speech had been rewritten several times. Then he threw the script away and just rambled. And it went on and on and on. Previously, I’d allowed myself to put aside my doubts about him, and decided maybe I was just a sorehead, since others hadn’t thought the way I had. Well, I think after the inauguration it was kind of all downhill. He never regained the initiative. Because there’s something about respect and initiative and leadership. And I remembered it so well at that time. One of the things he’d said in his original interview that had bothered me was something he’d said about not really believing in leadership. He didn’t really know what this leadership thing was all about. We didn’t need a heavy-handed, personal leadership, one-man rule. That was true and we were eager to move away from that kind of model. This was no longer the Fifth Republic. But we need someone who took seriously his own qualities of leadership, his ability to articulate goals, to assume certain responsibilities, but in an open way.

Jarrell: Right. And to represent, in a strong way, his faculty.

Marcum: Exactly. And that was not possible.
**Jarrell:** You felt generally the faculty did want strong leadership. But you modify that. Apparently there was an effort to, so-call democratize, or to distribute decision-making in a new way. Maybe he was anti-leadership, but I thought during the first year, just from certain things I read at the beginning, let’s say, that there was a positive faculty response to that in a certain way. Maybe it was that euphoric feeling you mentioned.

**Marcum:** You take down the constraints, and you get everybody bubbling with ideas, but then you create “X” number of committees and you find people going down parallel paths, collision paths, with energies consumed, and no way of bringing these two to a conclusion. Then pretty soon you’re starting to hear the same things over and over again. You’ve been over that path and you’ve tried that route and you try another. You can’t get decisions until it’s in a crisis situation, and then that decision will be off the wall, because it hasn’t been thought out carefully. So there were long periods of no action, and then hasty and ill-considered action, both in terms of appointments and in terms of other kinds of decisions.

**Jarrell:** Would you like to characterize what you think the main problem was, in terms of his failure to be an adequate chancellor?

**Marcum:** I think central to it was this leadership matter. It may be partly a question of self-confidence. I don’t know, because I can’t say I knew him that well. Relations were easy with him. He’s a good man. I really do think it was a very tragic thing. But he was unable to face up directly to choices and he would find ways of evading and coming to grips with things. It seemed to be a pattern
of behavior. You could ramble and open up and discuss and enjoy things as kind of exercises, intellectual exercises. He had excellent qualities as a faculty member in that respect. But he lacked that decisiveness, that, I think is indispensible.

Jarrell: Of coming to grips, making, drawing conclusions from all of these forays into problem-solving committees?

Marcum: Yes. And a lot of it had to do with experiences, it really did. I remember him saying at a meeting, “Well, I’ve had more experience in these things than you have,” and it was some sort of an argument. But the fact was, and it was so transparent, that that was not the case. There were other people in the room who had had more experience. At a certain point, he could not command the respect of his faculty. If you lose that respect, and you know those tragic meetings toward the end—I was out of town during the open Academic Senate meeting. But I was present at all the others. And your heart just ached for him. You wondered, how can a man take this kind of punishment and put himself through this kind of demeaning situation? He would then fly up with these last-minute proposals. He was not able to understand, I think, until very near the end just how serious it was. He had not let himself confront the real seriousness of it.

I think he was rather angry with me. He felt I had not leveled with him about how serious things were. I thought about it afterwards and analyzed what had happened was that I had quit talking. I’d given up. So I’d ceased being an irritant. I had been pushing for decisions. I had been caught in some squeezes where I thought actions were not being taken that needed to be. I wasn’t being
given support or protection where I needed it, and I finally felt that he couldn’t understand that, that he didn’t understand what I was saying. And so there was no point.

I distanced myself from that point on. You know what it is, you sort of save your own skin. You save your own institution. I was trying to protect Merrill and do the best I could, but I’d given up. It was just very difficult, trying to get responses at the problem-solving level, which is where you need to be working.

Jarrell: As a provost, you really had to look out for a lot of other people besides your own relationship with the chancellor?

Marcum: Exactly, and if you found the administration wasn’t there when you needed them, well, you just sort of, decided from that point to fend your own way.

Jarrell: A sort of attitude that, if this is the case you were.

Marcum: Within the limits that I had, yes.

Jarrell: That’s right. You’ve enumerated some of the problems with the search committee which indicate that this needn’t have happened, really. Is this going to be illuminating for the future, that is, with future search committees?

Marcum: I would hope very much that under a new president who is less insecure and fixed on a kind of minute process, and with a faculty informed by this previous experience, that such an undertaking will be brief. When the member of the final committee are chosen, those of us who’ve been on before
will talk with them, so that vicariously, anyhow, they’ll have some of this experience. I have every hope that it won’t happen again that way.

**Jarrell:** Yes.

**Marcum:** That that was a particular circumstance and that it need not, as you say, be repeated.

**Jarrell:** Do you have anything more to say about Chancellor Christensen now? If not, we can go on.

**Marcum:** I don’t think so. I very much hope he is able to, in spite of all this, pull his own career together in public policy and science teaching. It was an awfully hard blow for a man like that. Everything up to then had been easy for him. There’d been no real tests, I think. He was head of the Senate in a position as vice chancellor where decisions were made, both above him and at the provost level below him, and suddenly he was set down in this very complicated campus, which had feisty faculty, a difficult structure, and he was without the kind of experience he needed. It was just a dreadful nightmare for him, I think. And I’ve been very happy and pleased that people who’ve seen him recently say he’s holding together well and probably will be able to bounce back in his own career. He’s young and resilient enough.

**Acting Chancellor Angus Taylor**

**Jarrell:** That was very tragic for him, certainly. What do you think about Acting Chancellor Taylor and his efforts to stabilize the campus?
Marcum: Well, I think we’ve been extraordinarily fortunate, really. We were worried that we were going to have a punitive reaction on the part of Saxon—

Jarrell: Yes.

Marcum: —who was just fed up with our carrying on and our insisting on pushing this thing to a conclusion. My own sense is that when Angus Taylor came on campus, I don’t know what he thought himself, thought we’d been intemperate or even insubordinate. I’ve not asked him that. But I believe he did see what a mess we were in very quickly. My sense is that he was able to convey that back to University Hall. He’s very methodical, kind of a wise old man. I really have found his qualities very fitting for our circumstances. He’s coming in at the end of his career. He cannot be blamed in any way for the mess he inherited. Thus, from his side, there isn’t any great risk from it.

Jarrell: He can be dispassionate.

Marcum: He can be quite dispassionate, quite detached. And yet he cares about the place and he had two daughters who went here. I think he genuinely likes the job. He has a sense of process within the institution. He’s not a flamboyant or sort of upward and onward kind of person. That’s not what we need right now. We need to pick up the pieces, sort some things out, consolidate things, get a bit of order and confidence built back into matters. He has a nice sense of humor, loves to play with words, and is a recognized scholar. Very strong credentials there. He has deceptive quietness, that is, he’s a stronger person than I would have thought, perhaps, at the very beginning. He’s thoughtful, but he’s not incapable of making decisions, at least some kinds of decisions. We’ll see. It’s a
bit awkward for him because I don’t suppose he knows himself just how long he’ll be here. But I really think we were uncommonly fortunate in bouncing back and that we’ll, at the end of this process, owe him a great debt of gratitude. His wife, too, yanked herself up out of all the things she was doing at Berkeley, and they had just no time at all, and just plunked down here into this and the faculty response has been very positive. He seems to genuinely be enjoying it all too. I don’t know how the students feel. They haven’t had as much chance to meet him, I guess, as I suspect will be the case next year as he gets a little bit out from under the things that are on top of him now.

**The Future of UCSC**

**Jarrell:** Just as a final question here, as a provost of a college and a professor as well, how do you view the steady-state budget that seems to be in the offing? Seems they’re all over the horizon for a long time to come.

**Marcum:** Yes.

**Jarrell:** What does that mean to you in terms of the provostship and your trying to run this college and establish something of substance? What does it mean if the enrollment is going to stay down and the money accordingly?

**Marcum:** Inevitably it is a constraint, but I think not as grave a one as might be thought. If you take our particular sense of things, that we would like to aggregate people who are doing things, we deal with present strengths, small incremental changes a position here or there to make something really work. On the other hand, in certain places perhaps dropping this and that because we really won’t go on to do it. We thought we could build that, we can’t. Those are
all, very difficult kinds of decisions and they cannot be made just at a college level. They obviously have to be made at a campus-wide level. Resource allocation, process and committees, both on the academic and physical side, are important, the kind of thing Taylor is indeed talking about for the next year. At the college level, that need not cramp our style. We are not far from having what we might anticipate having in terms of personnel.

**Jarrell:** Your scale is comfortable?

**Marcum:** Scale is comfortable enough. Particularly if the people teaching in the programs we’re talking about aren’t all going to be at Merrill, anyway. A lot of what we’re doing is campuswide. And a certain focus of it is internal. We could indeed use more resources. I think our hope there lies in some additional private help to enrich the kind of cultural and social activities and marginally, perhaps, the academic program. There are certain outreach notions that we can develop at our present size, or perhaps the relationship we might or might not have with Monterey Institute of Foreign Affairs and other institutions. It doesn’t bother me that we’re not going to grow. I would like, I would hope there might be a little bit of growth left, just a little.

**Jarrell:** To fill out a few corners.

**Marcum:** Right, because the growth had been that rational.

**Jarrell:** That’s interesting because you’re unusual in this. People are very upset and disturbed about steady state. Often professors look at it from the viewpoint of employment for their students.
Marcum: Because they will not be able to get the specialization they’ll need?

Jarrell: That’s right, because of the problems of emphasis on taking graduate study.

Marcum: I think it misses the fact that many of the best institutions of higher learning in this country, most of this category will be in the East, are small liberal arts colleges of two or three thousand. Now we’re six thousand, and we’ll probably be a little over six. That gives us a lot of latitude. And we’re tied into the University system. We can do things, for instance, exchange arrangements with Berkeley. There’s a lot of possibility there of bringing in graduate students to do some teaching and work here. Various sorts of interrelationships which mean we can have the advantages of being relatively small, and yet draw on this bigness.

Jarrell: Without having to be Berkeley?

Marcum: I think we just have to be very resourceful, very clever, take a lot of initiative in these things. So we’ve got to make do with less than we thought we were going to have. But if we’re clever enough, bright enough, mischievous enough in a way, to operate within the system, I think we can do it. And I think it would have been a shame if we’d ended up being 27,000. It would have been awful.

Jarrell: I agree.

Marcum: There were growing pains and we wouldn’t have grown the way we did grow, if we’d known that they were going to cut off—I don’t want to
minimize that factor, but it’s susceptible to rational, careful planning, good sense of the public good of the institution as a whole breaking out of the territorial dispute sort of way that we’ve done with a lot of things. And centralizing, not in the sense of a person, but in terms of processes, and then letting various units do what they can in understood realms.

Jarrell: So you’re pretty optimistic about the seventies problem, in terms of this interview? Maybe you’re speaking just for Merrill, but I think you’re speaking for the whole campus?

Marcum: I must admit to an inconsistency of view on this. I think there’s every reason why this institution should go forward as a first-rate place. A lot will depend, on the other hand, on the choice of a new chancellor, on the kind of leadership, and style, and quality that is given to the place. Faculty morale is a very big problem. It’s not back up to where it should be from this last year. There’s no doubt about that. And we need to have reassurance that we are able to continue to attract good students. There is the danger in people’s minds of a [UC] Riverside syndrome. We can’t let that happen. But the point, I think, is that we are much too tough on ourselves. We’ve got a lot of good talent here. Really good faculty and really good students. A lovely location. A little too soporific maybe, but—

Jarrell: Yes.

Marcum: You know, people will give their eye-teeth to come here from other parts of the country. Well, let’s take that and run with it. It’s the tired, the cynical that would drag us down into the area of lack of confidence. If those things take
over, we could become very mediocre. But as a Marxist would say, “The objective realities of history,” or whatever, we don’t need to, we really don’t need to. I think we’re a whole lot better than we let ourselves be.

Jarrell: Well, it’s always hard with a place such as this, conceived as it was in a real utopian atmosphere. I think that generally people here, professors, different faculty people have very high standards; they expect a great deal from themselves and from the institution. I think they’re very rigorous in their assessment of this place, more so than people at other institutions.

Marcum: Right. More demanding of them.

Jarrell: There’s a strain of self-criticism that runs quite strong.

Marcum: Yes. I think you are right.

Jarrell: Well, thank you very much for being a participant in this. You’ve been very helpful.

Marcum: I have enjoyed talking about it. Thank you.
Sigfried (Sig) Puknat

Sigfried (Sig) Puknat was professor of German and comparative literature and was affiliated with Cowell College. He arrived at UC Santa Cruz on July 1, 1964, and was the first full-time nonadministrative faculty hired on the campus (Page Smith was the first faculty hire but served as provost of Cowell). Professor Puknat earned his B.A. in German and French from UCLA; an M.A. in French from UC Berkeley; and a Ph.D. in German from the University of Minnesota. He was interviewed by Randall Jarrell on May 28, 1976.

Puknat’s friend and colleague, Professor of Mathematics Anthon Tromba remembered Puknat as an “engaging, stimulating, and charming,” professor who loved rigorous intellectual arguments. According to Tromba, “Sig often expressed his love for the University of California, whose traditions he deeply admired, and for UCSC in particular. He believed in the greatness of UC and its well-deserved place in American higher education.”

Coming to UC Santa Cruz

Jarrell: When did you come to UCSC?

Puknat: Well, the exact date was June 29, 1964. The reason I remember is that it is also the hundredth anniversary of the Episcopal Church here, to the day. I’m a member and that is the day that my wife and I arrived. I was to be here July 1, 1964. That’s one year before the campus opened.

Jarrell: You were one of the earliest appointments, is that correct?
Puknat: Well, I’m not too clear whether I was the first or the second appointment. My appointment was held up slightly so that Page Smith could have a say in mine. So, of course, my appointment would be second to his, but whether there was anyone else I don’t know. Certainly there was no tenured person.

Jarrell: Where did you come from and why did you come here?

Puknat: I came from the Davis campus, where I’d spent quite a few years as one of the, I don’t know that I should use the phrase, “founding fathers,” of the College of Letters and Science at Davis. I was very hopeful for the development of that college and of course today it’s a big operation. But it was started in what you might call a “technical school,” a campus in which the College of Agriculture and I think the College of Engineering may have been separate at that time, perhaps not. But in any event, that was the campus. And so it was an atmosphere that wasn’t the kind in which I feel particularly comfortable. What I hoped for was more rapid development of letters and science than in fact occurred. And then when Clark Kerr or someone announced the opening of new campuses and I heard what the plans were for Santa Cruz, I registered interest very early.

Jarrell: I see. What did you expect from the exposition of Clark Kerr and McHenry that the nature of this campus would be? What particularly appealed to you?

Puknat: Well, I suppose basically what I expected and what I think did occur was an emphasis on the humanities: this is what attracted me. Now the rest of it, when you think of any unique feature of Santa Cruz, such as the collegiate plan,
naturally that would appeal to me although I knew relatively little about it. I had taught at two liberal arts colleges but they were independent colleges. They were not part of any system. So I found it attractive, although it was something that I knew relatively little about, at least on the basis of experience. I think it was the fact that the humanities would be in on the ground floor.

**Jarrell:** You are a professor of German and comparative literature, is that correct?

**Administrative Service**

**Puknat:** Yes, my title here is professor of German and comparative literature.

**Jarrell:** Could you list any Academic Senate committees that you are serving on?

**Puknat:** I’m the chairman of the Santa Cruz Division of the Academic Senate.

**Jarrell:** Any other affiliations of committees or administrative duties?

**Puknat:** I was the first number of things. I was the first chairman of the Budget Committee of this campus. I was the first chairman of the Board of Studies in Literature. I was the first coordinator of language studies.

**Jarrell:** That’s a number of diverse activities.

**Puknat:** Yes. I was on a number of university-wide committees. It seems to me, for at least a year, that I was the Santa Cruz representative on both the Committee on Educational Policy and the Committee on Budget. I can’t remember any other things. All I know is that all of us had a lot of duties in the early years.
Jarrell: Did you come to Santa Cruz acknowledging that you would have administrative duties and activities?

Puknat: Well, I think so. Coming a year before school opened, one would assume that a part of his activities would be quasi-administrative. I did not come with any administrative title and in fact I didn’t have any until I became vice-chancellor of humanities on this campus, an office that I held for three years. I resigned in 1970, to take an assignment in the London office of the Educational Abroad Program, a two-year assignment.

Jarrell: I hadn’t realized that you were vice-chancellor of the humanities on this campus.

Puknat: Yes, I was the first vice-chancellor of humanities on this campus. Dean [Frederick] Hard preceded me, and at the time I took office the chancellor had the notion that the three divisional offices should be headed by the people with the title of vice-chancellor rather than dean for, I think, two reasons. One reason was that at the time it was thought that the divisional office should have jurisdiction on the graduate level as well as the undergraduate level and that the person in the office of the graduate division would hold the title of something like associate dean, but that the main responsibility for developments on the graduate level would rest with the divisional offices. And the other reason was that I think he could get a larger stipend. Though I must confess that I don’t recall getting any larger stipend. University-wide it was possible to offer people larger stipends with a title of vice-chancellor than dean, and of course Dean
McHenry wanted to get the very best in the country. Naturally he couldn’t be successful in all of his attempts to get high-powered people here.

**Chancellor Dean McHenry**

**Jarrell:** That’s right. Would you like to discuss what you now consider, in retrospect, to have been McHenry’s vision of this campus? You can divide it into periods if you want. You came a year before the campus opened and you saw an unfolding pattern in terms of the collegiate system, in terms of the kinds of appointments that you were made. Weren’t you responsible, in great measure, for the early appointments on the literature board?

**Puknat:** Oh yes, languages and literature.

**Jarrell:** That would reflect that vision but I guess we could put this under McHenry’s vision or his idea of what kind of a campus this would be.

**Puknat:** Well, the thought that comes to my mind as a crucial aspect of this campus is the type of collegiate structure that developed. As I understood from Dean McHenry himself, it had originally been his idea to have a series of quote, “liberal arts colleges,” each to develop on the basis of the desires of the faculty gathered in that college. Clark Kerr thought that each college should have an emphasis, should have a character that was at least in part predetermined by virtue of the kind of emphasis that would be attached to each college. In retrospect I would—even at the time when McHenry told me this, and now as well—I would have preferred the McHenry approach. I’m sure that many people
would disagree with me, but I do not believe that in the long run the campus has benefitted by this search for, what should I say, originality? You start out with Cowell, Humanities; Stevenson, Social Sciences; Crown, Natural Sciences; and then what do you do? Well, you could have performing arts as we do in College Five. In between came College Four. There was a problem then, because in the early years when I was involved and I was the adviser to the architects of College Four, which became Merrill College—it was to be a language and area studies college, which I still thought was a kind of natural, in the development of a liberal arts campus. But the first provost, Paul Seabury, resigned almost before he took office, and after that the college emphasis became Third World.

Well, then if you add College Six, and you add College Seven, and you have College Eight, you have, from my point of view, rather strange college emphases. I think they are valuable as campus emphases and I think they should be perhaps more diffused than they are. I do not think they should be determining the character of a liberal arts college. That’s just my view. It’s a bias that I have. I think some of the problems that we’ve had on this campus do stem from the attempt to reconcile a unique emphasis with the mission of a state university campus.

You asked me to comment on the original plan and that’s the only thought that occurs to me. I think it’s a very important aspect of the campus. As far as the collegiate structure itself is concerned, it appeals to me.
The College System

Jarrell: I would like to discuss the collegiate system a bit. Do you think that then-Chancellor McHenry had a really substantial notion of the role that the colleges would play in terms of their academic menu or their academic role? I’m sure that the social side—the idea of a community of live-in people, residency, was thought out and planned—but the other, more academic side of it—do you think that that was sufficiently planned out?

Puknat: Well, I don’t know if they were sufficiently planned out, but it’s fairly clear in my mind—normally boards would handle traditional disciplines and colleges would concern themselves with general education, perhaps core curricula, not major curricula, but core curricula.

Jarrell: For the first two years?

Puknat: In the case of Cowell, it involved the first two years, what you might call interdisciplinary and experimental programs. I see quite a distinction here. Santa Cruz has done a lot in what you might call the experimental and interdisciplinary side. Whether successful or not, the History of Consciousness Program was the result of the coming together of people in different disciplines who produced that particular curriculum. It was a curriculum that was associated with Cowell College and came out of Cowell College. But now, I think this distinction has been somewhat blurred. In my opinion, that’s a mistake. I think having a somewhat traditional major located in a college is all right if it’s clear that that major is open to all on the campus. Then it’s all right. If it just happens by coincidence or by design, let’s say, that all people in the field of
linguistics are in one college, I don’t see any problem there. You can call it a college program if you want, but I don’t think it matters from the point of view of education and from the point of view of the student, whether that, let’s say, a major in linguistics, is a college program or a board program. I think it’s totally irrelevant.

**Jarrell:** Irrelevant to the student?

**Puknat:** Yes. So I think you could have such a thing as a traditional discipline sponsored by the college but I think if that happens it should be the result of something that was unplanned.

**Reaggregation**

**Jarrell:** Sort of reaggregation.

**Puknat:** Reaggregation, I think, is all right in that respect.

**Jarrell:** You think if it evolved sort of informally, that would be all right?

**Puknat:** Yes.

**Jarrell:** But if it’s planned—

**Puknat:** Well, maybe it would have been all right to have it planned. But if it were planned, then I don’t see how you can assign general education to the college because then you’d have fewer representatives. Dean McHenry did want as many disciplines represented in a college as possible. And so, if you took such a thing as music and you had a person in music in each college, that person
would be responsible for whatever could be contributed in the area of music in the college.

Jarrell: At College Night.

Puknat: That may mean that that person would go to a colleague in other colleges for assistance at certain times when something happens in his college. Now, if you have reaggregation and you find that the musicians are all in one or two colleges, and the rest of them are without music, then it seems to me the possibilities of approach here of alternatives would be either that the other colleges do nothing in music except on a completely amateur and spontaneous basis, or they do some hiring on their own, which I think is a mistake, but it’s happened, that would then have to be soft money. If it’s hard money, then you get a peculiar situation of reaggregation. And/or you have people in music in other colleges bring some of their people to your college as guests to perform. But I think that reaggregation really works against the notion of general education in the college.

Jarrell: Weren’t these supposed to be multifaceted and give a sampling to the undergraduates of a variety—

Puknat: Yes, yes. If you had total reaggregation, then it seems to me the situation here would be no different from elsewhere—that is basic courses and disciplines would be part of general education. You could still have general education courses designed in the college. You could have, for example, a college consisting of only people in literature, history, and philosophy. The people in
those three fields could design a very attractive general education program for the members of that college.

Now there’s a very peculiar thing if you do this, and that is what about the complexion of the student body? Are they all going to be students in these three fields or are they going to come from everywhere? If they come from everywhere, you could still require them to take the core course, but I find it anomalous that a chemistry student who is attached to College “A” should be obliged to take a general education course that is completely different from a general education course in College “B” that his friend is attached to. I feel uncomfortable in this area.

The Role of College Provosts

Jarrell: There has been, over the years, quite a turnover in the provosts. Do you have any idea on why that has happened?

Puknat: Well, I used to say in the early years that the toughest job on the campus was that of provost.

Jarrell: Why?

Puknat: Well, you’re all things to all men. You’re everything. You’re not just an academic dean. You’re dean of students; you’re sort of host and hostess socially; you’re father confessor. It’s a strange kind of job. It really does involve the whole man or the whole woman. And that means a 24-hour kind of thing. It’s really quite different in nature from other administrative offices.
I think the occupants of that office in the early years had a great deal of satisfaction in being creative, and I must say I think some marvelous appointments were made. Well, as the years went by, Page Smith, who I thought was a splendid provost, he decided after something like five years that that was it. We have had in our college a succession of two. The second provost, Jasper Rose, was in office I think something like four years. And now we have Rich Randolph. I think Cowell has been lucky. I’m not sure there’s been such a tremendous turnover on the campus. It’s just that after the initial years, the job changes. I think, to a certain extent, you’re a kind of caretaker. I think that’s less satisfying and therefore there would be, less of the kind of enthusiasm that we did experience in the early years.

Jarrell: From my reading and researching, I certainly agree that Cowell’s been very fortunate in its succession of provosts.

Puknat: Yes, yes.

The Early History of Consciousness Program

Jarrell: And I think it’s contributed significantly to its particular development as a college, an identity, although it was the first. You mentioned the evolution of the History of Consciousness Program as a kind of merging of the boards and the colleges. Were you very active in that formation?

Puknat: No, I really wasn’t. I was not very active in the original core course because you see, as I said a while ago, I was both coordinator of language studies and chairman of the board in literature for a year and a fraction. And so during
that time my energies went elsewhere. So I was not one of the group that established history of consciousness.

**Jarrell:** Do you have any opinions about it, in terms of assessing it?

**Puknat:** It’s very difficult for me to assess it because it’s difficult to define the educational nature and aims of history of consciousness. I think it had very interesting people in it. There’s no question that the quality of student in the early years, and maybe since as well, was higher than many a program. We had many, many applications, and could take the cream and had really first-rate people. So there was quite a bit of intellectual stimulus generated by the students and the faculty members that participated. Why a number of that original faculty withdrew rather early, I do not know. I can just imagine that it’s a tremendous challenge to carry a program of this sort, the nature of which is somewhat obscure. And so there may have been differences of opinion among people. When I was in the office of the division of humanities I tried to cope with the problems of history of consciousness and it was never quite clear to me why people withdrew, on what basis. I think in most instances it was simply differences as to the nature of the program. As an outsider, it’s difficult for me to discuss the history of that program.

**Jarrell:** I wondered because it’s always been difficult for a person who is at all familiar with it to explain to an outsider, or another person in another institution, exactly what is the essence of this History of Consciousness Program.
Puknat: Yes. Well, I would be asked a question like that at statewide meetings and naturally I didn’t have very clear answers. I must say that it affected my thinking, the existence of this program.

Jarrell: In what way?

Puknat: Well, I’m much more aware of the significance of consciousness in the evolution of man and in the developments of cultures. The most basic thing about human nature that distinguishes human nature today from human nature, God knows how long ago, must be consciousness. And so you have people in, certainly anthropology—

Jarrell: Philosophy.

Puknat: Philosophy and so on and art. All of them.

Jarrell: And how things were perceived over time.

Puknat: So now what you can do about history of consciousness and you really need a person who is interdisciplinary. You need somebody like Toynbee or Spengler, who is willing to cover a very broad base. But it fascinated me and it took, of course, some time, maybe several years, before I felt at home with the concept “history of consciousness.” I think I understand it now.

Dean McHenry’s Legacy

Jarrell: I’d like to discuss the legacy that McHenry left. What would you say was the academic status of the campus when he resigned?
Puknat: Dean McHenry threatened a number of times to resign. I never believed it. Therefore when it happened, of course, I was surprised.

Jarrell: Was this dating back?

Puknat: Dating back a number of years, let’s say like three or four years.

Jarrell: Whom would he threaten?

Puknat: Well, that’s a badly chosen word. I mean he mentioned it to me.

Jarrell: I see.

Puknat: He must have mentioned it to others. It was not a threat. It was just an expression of perhaps annoyance on his part. I don’t know what it was. Well, it indicated that he had given birth to this campus and this baby was now developing and it was at times a bit obstreperous even, and possibly his attitude here was a response to certain things that he may not have approved of. This I don’t know. All I know is that he did say to me several times that he thought he would resign, let’s say the following year or something. In that sense, what I’m coming to is that I think it would have been better for the campus if he had left a couple of years earlier. I don’t say that just because the last years or maybe the last two years of anybody’s tenure may be the least fruitful years.

Jarrell: They are drained.

Puknat: I don’t mean it in that sense. I simply mean I think something like about six or eight years sufficed, and after that you maybe need new spirit, and certainly morale on this campus was not of the best in the last years. I think if he
had resigned perhaps two years earlier and we had had a new chancellor, the right kind of chancellor, something might have happened to morale.

**Jarrell:** What was the nature of this malaise or bad morale? You can generalize.

**Puknat:** It’s difficult to generalize. McHenry was too much involved in everything going on. There was a lack of delegation of powers. He was in on every aspect of the campus, whether it was academic or a building, or what have you. I think that people in subordinate positions did not feel free enough to proceed because they didn’t have the authority to do so. He ran a tight ship. I don’t know what that did to morale. I don’t know whether that accounts for the fact that morale had suffered. Maybe no matter what, morale would suffer. Certainly you cannot have a continuation of the kind of tension, attractive tension, that dynamic quality that we had in the very first years—that you can’t expect. But there was something about McHenry, well let’s say vis-à-vis the provosts, and to a certain extent perhaps vis-à-vis some of the other administrative officers that I think called for a fresh outlook in the Office of the Chancellor.

**Jarrell:** There was quite a change from the beginning to the end. From your own personal experience and various responsibilities you had—both as a faculty member and certainly in the Academic Senate—from various vantage points which you held, what would be the nature of your, either satisfactions or dissatisfactions, with the way he ran his ship?

**Puknat:** That’s very hard for me to answer, because in the time I was in the office of the division of humanities for three years, I really had no complaints
when it came to my personal relationship with him. It was always cordial. He consulted me on a number of things and on several he didn’t follow my advice. One of them had to do with a case that went to Privilege and Tenure and he himself later said that I had advised him against the action that he took. I would have to say that our relationship was cordial all along. Nevertheless, you knew that he was running the thing. And I have the impression that some people were treated less gently than I was.

**Jarrell:** Do you have any criticism or appreciation for the way in which he made appointments and the quality of appointments?

**Puknat:** Well, his sights were high and that really raises the question why some people didn’t come to this campus. You’re asking me for my opinion and I’m giving an opinion that I can’t back up at all. I can just tell you what I believe.

**Jarrell:** Your opinion.

**Puknat:** I believe that McHenry was a pioneer. I think he’s an administrator. He’s a manager. I think he’s very efficient in these areas. I think he’s an extremely able man. But I think the fact that morale deteriorated may in part stem from the personality of McHenry and the kind of relationship he established with other people on the campus. One might be able to say that some of the people interviewed to come to this campus to take important administrative positions were not attracted because they realized the nature of the existing administration.

**Jarrell:** They’d have very little space to move in, is that what you’re getting at?
Puknat: Yes, little space to move in. I think that’s right. Also, perhaps this is saying the same thing, the fact that this was a campus run by one person.

Jarrell: So the prerogatives were curtailed.

Puknat: I think so. But you see it isn’t just that the prerogatives were curtailed. It’s also a spiritual, or philosophical, or a moral kind of thing.

Jarrell: Yes. It’s an atmosphere, almost.

Puknat: It’s an atmosphere that might not attract you. I think that may account for part of the problem that arose on this campus. I think that Clark Kerr made a mistake. In fact, I know that Clark Kerr realized he made a mistake in not insisting, as he did in the case of the Irvine campus, on the appointment of two people. At Irvine, when the chancellor was appointed it was clear who was to be the vice-chancellor. And there was a kind of division of labor at Irvine that I think can be productive. That didn’t happen here. Here one person was appointed, namely the chancellor, and it was the job of the chancellor to recommend the appointments of other people. One of the problems on this campus was that these appointments were delayed. Developments were delayed to the extent that university-wide administration was concerned. I haven’t mentioned that I was a member of the original advisory committee to the Santa Cruz campus that consisted of, I believe, seven people—something like four from Berkeley, two from the Davis campus. We were the Academic Senate, so to speak, of the Santa Cruz campus before the campus opened. All appointments had to be approved by this
particular committee, which met once a month in Berkeley for a couple of years before this campus opened. Now, it was in the course of that period of approximately two years—it was perhaps around 1964—I believe I hadn’t arrived at Santa Cruz yet—that President [Clark] Kerr called this group together on a confidential basis. I believe afterwards he spoke with Dean McHenry about it. But the reason he called us was to express his concern about the very, very slow movement that he observed at Santa Cruz. One of the characteristics about McHenry, by the way, is that he’s a very cautious man. And that characteristic means that things proceed slowly. Many appointments were delayed.

Jarrell: Would you attribute this to the fact that he was dispersing everything—that he was not delegating authority to a variety of people, that it was slowed down not only because of his caution, but because one man can only do so much?

Puknat: I think that’s part of it. Part of it I’ve already mentioned, is that his sights were high. He aimed very high. He wanted to get tremendous people here.

Jarrell: Crème de la crème.

Puknat: Crème de la crème. If you spend a lot of time in this approach, you’ll get a number of refusals and that, of course, of necessity, delays action. But the other thing, of course, is that we didn’t have two people here. If we’d had a division of labor as Irvine, or any other place might have had, obviously more could have been accomplished. Some years later—I was already at Santa Cruz—I was approached by the then vice-president of the University who had known me
from Davis days to tell me that the administration felt that an executive vice-chancellor should be appointed at Santa Cruz and if necessary imposed on Dean McHenry. So you see there were these two incidents.

Jarrell: I never have heard of that.

Puknat: Yes.

Jarrell: Nothing came of it, I guess.

Puknat: Yes, yes indeed. The result was the appointment of an executive vice-chancellor named Lea Grant McConnell. And as far as I know, Grant McConnell was in the office for one year. So you talk with him. Grant McConnell is a professor of political science.

Jarrell: This was very early on, like ‘65 or ‘66?

Puknat: No, no. This is after a couple of years. You see the first vice-chancellor was not called executive vice-chancellor. As a matter of fact, I can’t even remember whether he was called vice-chancellor immediately. He was to become dean of engineering, Francis Clauser. Now, Francis Clauser, I don’t think you could call executive vice-chancellor, because he, after all, had authority only by virtue of what the chancellor allowed him to do. But if you had a system such as that established at Irvine with a kind of division of labor, then the second person knows to what extent he can proceed rather freely. No, it was felt in the president’s office that things were not developing rapidly enough, and so they decided that an officer with authority should be appointed. The first person to hold that title was Grant McConnell, professor of politics.
Jarrell: So he held that position for a year, also.

Puknat: Well, I doubt that it was over a year but certainly it would be a maximum of two years.

Jarrell: Did he wield any real power or authority?

Puknat: I think I was away during that time. I was away from 1970 to 1972 in London, as I mentioned before, in the Education Abroad Program. And I think that that appointment may have been something like 1970.

Jarrell: Oh, I see.

Puknat: The reason that I might have been approached, aside from the fact that the vice-president knew me, is that I held the title of vice-chancellor of humanities at that time. The vice-president of the university took me for a walk on this campus and during that walk broached this subject. It was an expression of concern.

Faculty Appointments

Jarrell: How would you like to assess the quality of McHenry’s appointments?

Puknat: I felt the quality was good. I think he made good appointments. I think they were especially good in the sciences, and I can’t account for this except that more money was spent. I’m saying something that I can’t easily back up, but it is my opinion that the average salary for a science appointee in the first years was higher than the average salary of people in the social sciences.

Jarrell: They’re comparable steps.
Puknat: Well, no. I don’t mean at comparable steps. The professors who were hired, the average salary would be higher. I would also say that there were more people hired on the upper level.

I do believe that we’re speaking of quality on all levels, and I think that the appointments he made were good appointments.

Jarrell: I have interviewed six or seven other people recently and one comment that has come from several individuals was that the science appointments were of a high quality because Kenneth Thimann was in such direct control of who would be appointed, whereas in the social sciences and the humanities McHenry was solely in control, and even junior appointments were interviewed by him.

Puknat: Well, that may be true, but I can recall a remark of his that Page Smith had a, “Good nose,” in the area of recruitment. Well, if he said that and I heard him say it, that would mean that he acknowledges Page Smith’s role in recruitment. I think you might say it was also the role of a few others that were here in the very first years. There were several other appointments for which I was exclusively responsible. I do think that we had a good faculty and I know that was one of McHenry’s primary interests. He shared this with others.

I have to make two comments in this connection. One is that, for some odd reason, the average salary allocated to this campus and to Irvine was for a period of several years lower than the average salary of new positions allocated to the San Diego campus. That always intrigued me, that difference. But I think the second point is even more intriguing, and that is that we returned some money to statewide. We did not hire up to the level allowed. I recall McHenry saying
that he wanted a lot of assistant professors. There I would have disagreed with him, because, while it’s nice to have young people, a lot of fresh enthusiastic people with a lot of energy, you’re asking the wrong people, in my opinion, to pay the price. In my opinion, we had a disproportionate number of assistant professors, in comparison with, probably Irvine, and certainly in comparison with San Diego.

Jarrell: The ratio was rather unusual.

Puknat: That’s right. You can’t attribute this entirely to the point I made about a difference in the amount of money given to San Diego, because we actually returned money. McHenry was not eager to have, it seems to me, high-level appointments, and it may be that Thimann is responsible for the number in the sciences, this I can’t say. But I think it is clear that the development of a college of the type we have at Santa Cruz is heavily dependent on the kind of people that you find in the humanities and the social sciences more than in the sciences, even though we do have some scientists in Cowell College who are very active college people. But as a group, one thinks of the natural scientists as less college-oriented than are the people in the humanities and social sciences who come to Santa Cruz. And since there was a disproportionate number of assistant professors in the humanities and social sciences, the burden, I think, fell on the wrong people. And so there were people who made commitments that were expensive from their point of view, because an assistant professor, after all, if he’s going to be make commitments to devote a good deal of time to his research as well as teaching, and I don’t think an institution would want to have unmarketable people—
Jarrell:  For someone who had just put all of his or her energy into the development of the college and had neglected the more marketable developments of his own scholarly work or research or whatever—

Puknat:  Yes, yes. I wish somebody would make a statistical study of the ranks of the appointments made on the Irvine campus and on the Santa Cruz campus in the first three or four years.

Jarrell:  You think it would have some significance?

Puknat:  Well, I would say if there is a significant difference, it should have been exactly the opposite. That is, Irvine could afford, in my opinion, the assistant professors, and Santa Cruz could not, because Santa Cruz makes greater demands on the individual faculty member.

Jarrell:  I’ve heard several other people comment that one of the main problems to emerge, no necessarily as a result of the collegiate system, was that junior faculty had no specific, objective guidelines on where to put their time in terms of the college, in terms of their discipline, and that many of them had very difficult problems in finding other divisions when they didn’t get tenure.

Puknat:  Yes. There’s no question at all that there was this problem, and I think we can relate that lack of responsibility on the part of certain people, let’s say including me as, say chairman of a board or whatever, to the lack of delegation of authority on the part of the chancellor. Now that may sound far-fetched, but I believe that we have a problem to this day in that area. You state that assistant
professors should perhaps have been given more guidance in the early years and I think that’s true.

Jarrell: Or even now?

Puknat: Yes, what I wanted to say about now is that we have an atmosphere on this campus—a kind of laissez-faire atmosphere—which means that you’re not given guidance, on the one hand, and also means that you can operate to a certain degree as you please on the other, so that there are some odd things going on on this campus because of the lack of “accountability,” a word that is gaining greater frequency these days.

Jarrell: Well, I can understand that it’s all well and good for it to operate this way, as long as a junior faculty doesn’t have to leave here.

Puknat: Yes.

Jarrell: But if he gets into the outside world it’s a different set of rules.

Puknat: Yes. But that accountability is to the advantage of both the individual faculty member and the institution. In the case of the assistant professor who devotes all of his time to the campus it certainly is. Of course, he needs guidance because of his own future, as you have just said. Well, now you can also have, and this exists right now, people on the campus who live elsewhere—who are not easily available, whose psyches are focused on things away from here. They may conceivably be doing research work, in which case you might say the results will rebound to the benefit of the campus, as well as to their own benefit in the context of marketability. But it may also be that they are not giving the campus
the kind of service to be expected from a member of the faculty. Do you follow me?

Jarrell: Oh, I follow you exactly. I’m a student here as well, a graduate student, and I find it very difficult sometimes to pin somebody down, to get ahold of them, to find them accessible.

Puknat: Yes. So if we look at this thing historically, I do think that a situation was created at Santa Cruz in which people had to be rather self-reliant. They did not have the kind of guidance that one would expect in, let’s say, a department.

Assessing UCSC and Chancellor Dean McHenry

Jarrell: How would you assess McHenry’s chancellorship?

Puknat: Well, I think I’ve already said that he’s established his reputation as the founder of a very interesting campus of the University of California. He’s an extremely hard-working person. His intentions are good, I think, without question. He has lots of energy. So you’d have to say that he created this campus, and I believe after a certain number of years he’s fulfilled that function that he after all, welcomed. And I think then perhaps a fresh look. I think that he has reason to say, as he has to me at least once, “Oh, what have I wrought?” Because if one looked at the campus through dark lenses, one might use the phrase “the two-headed monster.” There are certain defects in the campus that I suppose McHenry would have to assume responsibility for. But I think, in total, you’d have to say that he’s one of the people in the country who have made a dent, certainly in the establishment that concern themselves with undergraduate education.
Jarrell: Do you think that Santa Cruz is going to maintain itself and its reputation? Do you think it’s well established already, that it’ll just hold from this first decade and a little more?

Puknat: Well, yes, I think so. If you had asked me that question two years ago I would have answered yes with more conviction than I do now. I believe that my slightly modified position really has to do with a nationwide phenomenon, which is something that can’t be attributed to Santa Cruz. I feel less secure now than I did two years ago but that may not be because of anything going on at Santa Cruz.

Jarrell: Right, because the national picture of higher education is certainly very mucky.

Puknat: Yes, exactly.

Jarrell: But if we forget about the national situation, if we just think about the University of California system, do you think something concrete has crystalized here that will be maintained, although there will be currents and fluctuations?

Puknat: Yes, I do.

Jarrell: Do you think it’s based on the existence of the collegiate system?

Puknat: Yes, in great part I think it’s based on the structure. Of course it’s based also on the unique setting of this campus, the fact that it’s near the water, near Monterey Bay, in the redwood area, and so on—all these things. And it may also be, certainly this was true in the early years, I don’t know if it is now, but I
thought that we attracted a disproportionate number of very good humanities students. That may no longer be true, and if it isn’t true I can’t quite account for it.

I think that Santa Cruz was long on image very, very early, and that image was of a creative, imaginative or experimental campus. That may have had more appeal to the average humanities student than the average student in the natural sciences. But what has crystallized, I think should be attractive to many young people, I don’t know to what proportion of the young people. It seems to me that there must be a lot of high school graduates who’d be happier at Berkeley than at Santa Cruz, and vice versa. What Santa Cruz has to offer is different from Berkeley, and some people would like that. They’d certainly have closer relations with faculty here, and they’d have the chance of identifying themselves with a college.

**Jarrell:** It’s the scale.

**Puknat:** Yes, the scale. All that, I think is very good and if we continue with our academic program and keep improving it I think the campus is here to stay.

**The Search For Dean McHenry’s Successor**

**Jarrell:** I would like to discuss the Chancellor’s Search Committee that existed to find a successor to Chancellor McHenry. Could you define what kind of a candidate you think the committee wanted? As an academic member and a faculty member, what did you expect from the committee? How did you see their role?
**Puknat:** I was a member of the University-wide Senate Committee that advised the Regents on the selection of the new president who is a successor to President Hitch [President David Saxon]. And during that time, I was given some information about the committee you have just referred to. This committee functioned at that time that I was on sabbatical leave for two quarters. So I wasn’t close to the situation at the time, and what I know I learned subsequently to its negotiations. You do know, probably, that there is a document on the activities of that committee that was given to the convener of the provost and to me as chair of the Senate last year, a document which I then passed on to President Saxon after the resignation of Chancellor Christensen. That document was written by John Marcum, who was a member of the search committee.

**Jarrell:** I interviewed him.

**Puknat:** It gives the details. But you’re asking me of my impressions.

**Jarrell:** And also, since we are engaged in a similar search now—a successor for Angus Taylor who is the acting chancellor—just the process of how the search is conducted, who has the most influence on such a committee. Any thoughts you have about it, because it seems that insufficient time was given, according to some sources. It was very rushed.

**Puknat:** Yes.

**Jarrell:** The Regents, of course, have a great deal of influence in such a selection.

**Puknat:** Yes. Not too long ago the Committee on Committees and one or two others asked me to meet with it and with a couple of members of that search
committee that came up with Christensen. The consensus, I believe, of the search committee is that they were not sufficiently experienced in this area, that indeed at a certain point perhaps they should have resigned. They certainly didn’t feel that they had freedom to operate. My own opinion is that somewhere on the University-wide level—whether it was President Hitch, whether it was a Regent or two, or a combination—already favored one or perhaps a couple of people, the names of them I presume were submitted to the search. I don’t know to what extent the search committee did explorations on its own. I asked them, “Did you people use the telephone?” This is all in the context of my role on the Presidential Committee. I know what a terrific telephone bill the individual members of that committee ran up. I haven’t any idea what it was. We paid no attention. We were given no budget. We simply went ahead. We had a credit card, and I used that credit card in my home. I would call different places in the country. We really checked out every person who was seriously considered. And, of course, we called people of our choice. That is to say, if you want to find out something about somebody, you ask. And you ask people who you think can give you information.

So I asked this question of John Marcum: “Did you people use the telephone?” And apparently they did not, to the extent that one might expect. He said he did talk with some people at Berkeley and he did get mixed reactions or at least he did get some unfavorable reactions but nothing was done with this information. So I have the impression that the committee didn’t explore sufficiently on its own as to possible candidates. And then when the list was reduced say to just two or
three, or four people, that then the committee did not explore sufficiently the qualifications of each of those persons. It’s a sad chapter.

Impressions of Chancellor Mark Christensen

Jarrell: Yes, it is. Once Christensen was selected, however he was selected, when was your first meeting with him, your first exposure to him? Was it early on when he was appointed in July?

Puknat: That was ‘74 and I was abroad until September. I believe I met him at a reception for Cowell College at University House. That reception isn’t too easy to forget, because next to Christensen was a paper-mache figure which represented the chancellor’s wife. I never met the chancellor’s wife for about a year after that. But anyhow, there was a figure to represent the chancellor’s wife.

Jarrell: It was a mannequin?

Puknat: Yes. I walked up and Christensen said, “Hello Sig,” to me. I recognized him but I was surprised that he recognized me, that he remembered my name. Afterwards I asked Rich Randolph, who stood next to him, “I suppose you primed him?” He said, “No, no. I never said a word.” So Christensen did remember me. What he remembered was an occasion of about ten years ago at an all-University conference. It was a sort of committee and I think I may have been chairman of the committee. I remember saying to myself, “Who in the world is this student who is on this committee, or attending?” It was a person who looked 22 and I guess at that time he must have been about 32. And so here
I recognized him, of course, and he recognized me, and I thought, he still looks a
decade younger than his years.

He was very cheerful. Well, then I saw him rarely in the course of that year.
People on campus and maybe even off campus would ask me what I thought of
the chancellor, and my stock answer was, “I can’t figure him out. Either he’s
bidding his time or there’s nothing there.” Now that covers the first year. I don’t
know whether you want me to go into the second year.

Jarrell: Oh, I certainly want you to go into it.

Puknat: All right.

Jarrell: When did you decide it would be either/or?

Puknat: The summer of ‘75 I was abroad again.

Jarrell: That was his second summer.

Puknat: Yes. And I learned of certain decisions he had made that have to do
with academic personnel. One of them involved a case in which I had served as
Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, which is, as you know, a confidential
committee.

Jarrell: Was this on beginning appointments?

Puknat: No, promotion.

Jarrell: Promotion and tenure?
Puknat: No, promotion. I was given information of some other cases and I thought, “Well, is this the direction that Santa Cruz is going in?” So I made up my mind that when I got back I would take him to lunch and open up the subject and get an answer from him as to how he visualizes the future of Santa Cruz as an academic institution.

Jarrell: Could you be a little more specific on what the general nature of this complaint was?

Puknat: Yes. It had to do with advancements that he supported which, as it turned out, were against the recommendation of the ad hoc committees and the Budget Committee of the Senate. I came back and asked him to lunch, and he may have felt that I had something on my mind because he said on the telephone, “Could Gene Cota-Robles join us?” And I said, “Oh, by all means.” So we went to the place where I hadn’t been for lunch for a long time. It was the place that McHenry in the early years took everyone, and that was the Dream Inn. It’s sort of funny, because in my first years I was at the Dream Inn so often for lunch. And now the McHenry era was over and we were starting a new one, and at this point I thought maybe it was appropriate to take him to the Dream Inn.

So there the three of us had lunch. Cota-Robles never said a word, which I think was quite proper. He listened to what Christensen and I had to say. And I must say Christensen disarmed me. One thing he definitely said, that I remember so clearly, was that he didn’t have enough information. Now that, to me, was appalling because the information was available. So if he didn’t see it, it was
because he wished not to see it. He attributed his action to a lack of understanding of the full situation. And he indicated, implied to me that he made a mistake or that he may have made a mistake. In any event, the conversation ended with myself satisfied. Everybody makes mistakes. So if a person says to me, “I made a mistake,” even though this is inconceivable on the part of a person who had the experience as vice-chancellor on the Berkeley campus, one accepts it. All right, that was in September.

Then a number of things happened in the month of October. I don’t know whether you want me to go into the details of those, but you asked me the question of when did I come to a conclusion? Well, when an incident occurred, the removal of a lecturer from his particular office in admissions, I was concerned, as chair of the Senate, and I had a very legitimate reason to make an appointment with Mark Christensen on this matter.

Again, I was somewhat disarmed because he said to me—I forget whether it was that session or later session, he said, “You’ve caught me with my pants down.” But he disarmed me by saying, “Oh gee, I didn’t realize this and I’ve made a mistake.” Well, people can make even two or three mistakes. I mean, you just accept it. I left his office with a feeling—this may have been just a romantic notion of mine or sort of wishful thinking—I left the office with the conviction that he was going to undo what he had done. Because, you see, my main argument was that granted he has the right to hire and fire on the administrative level, but the appropriate time is June 30. After all, we are in midstream now and not only is he disrupting things possibly in central services, which would not directly be any of my business, but this action of his has ramifications in an area
that is part of my business, and I feel that the situation is just too complex for that kind of drastic action at this time of the year. He agreed with this, or at least I had the impression that he agreed with this.

**Jarrell:** Do you think he was totally ignorant of the fact that the lecturer would cease to be in the Academic Senate?

**Puknat:** He didn’t realize that at all. Now, he should have known that, but after all you can’t know everything. Therefore I thought, well, he’ll undo this. Now of course what his relations are with the office that is headed by a person who holds the title “director of enrollment,” but the fact is that from my own point of view I thought he realized we should revert to the situation and carry out the year, maybe even as of January 1, make a change in the administrative side. This was on a Monday, and he told me that he couldn’t act right away.

That led me to believe that he would do something along the lines that I’d expected. For reasons that I’ve forgotten now, he had to go elsewhere, he wouldn’t be able to talk with me about this until Thursday. I’m not even sure I had word Thursday. I think it was not until Friday morning that I learned he was going to back up the director of enrollment and not undo the action that had been taken by the director of enrollment. Well, that was—I call it sort of the assassination of the Archduke in 1914, dropping the match on something, because after that things that were unrelated to that case happened in rapid succession.
Jarrell: If we could just go back. I want to pick up one thing from the Ad Hoc Committee. When you had lunch and he admitted that he had acted mistakenly, did he change his decision on the appointments or promotions?

Puknat: Oh, now he couldn’t, you see. He couldn’t because the decisions had been made as of July 1.

Jarrell: It was too late, I see.

Puknat: So all those things [were] water over the dam; they were settled. Remember I said to you my concern was what the chancellor had in mind with respect to the future of this campus?

Jarrell: Is this the direction he was going to take?

Puknat: Exactly. If he had said, “You people are all wrong. Santa Cruz should do such and such and so on,” then there could have been a disagreement between him and me. But we never got to that because he used his lack of knowledge as an excuse for his action.

Jarrell: Ignorance.

Puknat: Yes, ignorance. Which is pretty difficult to accept, but then it implies that this sort of thing will not happen again.

Jarrell: That’s right.

Puknat: Well, of course, we didn’t even get to the point of that happening again because we got into other areas.
Jarrell: What are some of the other things that struck you firsthand?

Puknat: The lack of decisiveness on his part, coupled with decisions when they were made, some of which seemed appalling, led me to the view that we were in a situation that might be hopeless. I don’t think I can give other incidents now. I’d have to think for a while to remember.

Jarrell: This is the famous letter that came later in December 1975 to President Saxon, which was sort of an evaluation for Christensen.

Puknat: Yes. My name is there too.

Jarrell: Your name is here. Now obviously these all didn’t happen to everyone. Some of these varied. Various people experienced different difficulties with him. Number nine states, “Mark Christensen has failed to demonstrate a necessary minimum of respect for the Senate and its constituent committees.”

Puknat: This has to do primarily with the Budget Committee. You see, the chancellor can overrule the recommendation of the Budget Committee. But when he does so, he must, by regulation consult the Budget Committee once again. First, there might not have been any consultation except in one direction. The Budget Committee makes its recommendation to the chancellor; the chancellor then acts.

Now, according to University-wide regulations, if the chancellor acts against the recommendation he must then give them one more chance to respond to his action which is after all not in harmony with their recommendation. Now when he violated that rather early and his attention was called to this, he then said,
“Oh yes, of course. I’m sorry.” This is as it was quoted to me. “I’m sorry and you know, I realize that.” That was in his first year.

So when this thing happened three or six months later and he used—I’m now quoting others, this isn’t firsthand, he said, “Of course. That’s right. I shouldn’t have. I didn’t realize the regulation.” The committee then reminded him that he had apologized for a violation several months before. That refers to a report to the Santa Cruz Academic Senate in the fall of ’75.

**Jarrell:** Number four is, “He has not followed through on the initiatives of or agreements made with administrative units and senate committees,” period. So that could be both four and nine.

**Puknat:** That’s right. And administrative, of course, that may include provosts.

**Jarrell:** From your vantage point as both chairman of the Academic Senate and as a long-time faculty person, what did you expect of the chancellor? What do you expect of any chancellor and how did he fall short?

**Puknat:** Well, in my opinion he fell short, in that I don’t think he was chancellor. And by that I mean something as simple as full-time chancellor. It’s ironic. I’ve sort of registered the complaint against Dean McHenry that he did not delegate enough power. I think Christensen may have delegated too much power to the vice-chancellor. I don’t think he retained enough of what a chancellor should do. I don’t know whether he thought of himself as a P.R. man but I believe he stayed on the periphery of too many things that had to do with the academic program.
He simply did not have direct lines of communication with other administrators or with the Academic Senate. He telephoned me a total, I think, of four times between September and December of 1975, for one purpose and that was that we should set up some kind of committee of Senate chairpeople, a small group maybe five or six, to meet with the chancellor and would I give this a thought? And then the conversation would usually end with, “Well, let’s talk about this sometime soon.” The second call would be on the same subject and then he’d say, “But I’m too busy now for us to go into details on this matter, so let’s give it some thought.”

The last call was as late as December, at a time that just amazed me, because by that time it seemed to me that this whole thing would be ineffectual. But even as late as December he would say, “Let’s sort of arrange this kind of thing.” Well, you don’t need to say this three or four times. You just do it. You simply do it. It wasn’t a case of his asking me to set it up. He was saying that the two of us should do so and so and I certainly was ready to hear. I don’t think he had lines of communication, active lines, with any academic agency on the campus. And I don’t think that in a small campus such as Santa Cruz the chancellor should be nonacademic. I believe he was playing a nonacademic role.

**Jarrell:** I would think a chancellor sets the tone, in a certain sense, the faculty would look up to him as a person of substance, and in terms of academic credentials, background and interest, certainly not just as a manager or facilitator. What do you think was Christensen’s definition of UCSC?
Puknat: I have never understood it because I’ve never heard him on the subject. In the few conferences that I can recall which he attended, it seems to me he came mainly to listen. He had very little to offer and my own impression was that he expected the campus to determine its own future and he would be guided by whatever—I mean, to me it seemed like a vacuum.

Jarrell: Do you feel that generally the faculty wanted and wants now, strong leadership from the chancellor in defining the direction of growth or the direction of activities?

Puknat: Well, I think so. It’s sort of ironic that some of the rather mild opposition to McHenry was on the basis of his strong leadership, but maybe that’s an oversimplification. Maybe it’s the kind of leadership. I think the faculty is agreed that the chancellor’s office should be occupied by someone who has a commitment himself and who administers efficiently. That’s a very important part of the situation and, of course, Christensen was criticized on that score. But besides administering, a chancellor should also offer some kind of leadership. After all, he has to make the decisions. He makes many, many decisions with respect to academic matters, to be sure on the advice of various groups, certainly many faculty groups. I think that a campus without a fairly strong chancellor is adrift.

Jarrell: Do you think Christensen’s early characterization as a steady-state entity motivated or directed his policies or the ideas that he did put forth, however paradoxical or contradictory they might have been?
Puknat: Well, you see the only idea that he put forth that I can recall was his sudden reaction to a faculty challenge. You remember he came forth with the notion that the two divisions of humanities and social sciences should be divisional, the elimination. The reorganization.

Jarrell: Yes.

Puknat: That’s the only thing that I can recall that he put forth. As you know, that met with expressions of dismay.

Jarrell: Yes.

Puknat: No, I really don’t think he offered anything. Sure, this is a steady-state situation for some time, but within it I believe we are overextended. I think we have to do some very careful program reviewing, the consequence of which certain programs may be strengthened, and if that is so, that may mean, who knows, even the elimination of some programs. I think the chancellor has to take an active role in this. And to my knowledge Christensen simply did not concern himself. I’m not aware of any thinking that he did on the subject.

Jarrell: But you certainly feel that the faculty was not consulted in terms of the divisional reorganization?

Puknat: I’m quite sure it wasn’t consulted at all. In fact, I think this was one of the problems of his administration, that he did not consult sufficiently, or perhaps he consulted the wrong people. He certainly made some bad decisions.
Jarrell: Do you think that the steady-state budget generally, as its characterized, has played a certain role in exacerbating tensions and conflicts here which already existed? The idea that money was not going to be flowing so plentifully from now on.

Puknat: I think so. But I think I’d like to answer that question as follows. When the matter of a problem on the administration level was brought to the attention of President Saxon, one of his early responses was, “Well, I know there were some difficulties, but I assumed they were related to Santa Cruz problems.” Now I think really these two things have to be kept separate. Your question was, “Did this situation, the steady-state situation or budgetary constraints, exacerbate the problems of Santa Cruz?” I think they may have, but I think that’s outside the subject we’re talking about. I think that any chancellor of any campus of the University of California today is going to have major problems, particularly a campus that’s overextended. This is the way I regard the Santa Cruz situation—we have too many programs launched and we haven’t got the hard money needed for these. All right, so there are problems here. If you try to solve these problems, there’s going to be a bloody thing and the chancellor is going to have to take a good deal of the flak. But I really don’t think this came up in the Christensen context.

Jarrell: I see. I wanted you to make that clear if you felt that way.

Puknat: Yes, I do.

Jarrell: It seemed very early on that Christensen used the steady-state characterization as his way of explaining what was going to happen here.
Puknat: Oh, yes.

Jarrell: And at the same time, there was a reality of restricted budgets.

Puknat: Exactly.

Jarrell: So they were paired; there were two realities.

Puknat: Yes, yes.

Jarrell: And how you perceived it was different from how he perceived it?

Puknat: Well, he conflated them and I believe they were two separate issues.

Jarrell: I see. Well, that’s very important, to make that distinction.

Puknat: Yes, yes. And I thought it was very important in the case of President Saxon because he hadn’t made that distinction. In fact, I think it took him awhile before he did.

Chancellor Christensen’s Resignation,

Jarrell: I would like to talk about the chronology of the resignation, the various events, happenings, or particular incidents which would illuminate the move that ended in resignation.

Puknat: You mean, from my point of view?

Jarrell: From your point of view. We could begin with, what did you think of the letter to President Saxon in December of 1975? Or we could go back to the background of that letter which you signed; or you can go back as far as you want.
Puknat: Remember, I mentioned that I received news while I was in Europe in the summer of ‘75 with respect to personnel decisions that the chancellor had made.

Jarrell: Yes.

Puknat: Well, then we’re now getting to the point where a number of faculty approached me, since I was chair of the division of the Senate, with the request that I call President Saxon. My own thinking at that time was that I would make no move until there was a sufficient number of calls or approaches to justify this kind of thing. Well, I had made the decision on a Thursday or a Friday, before the Saturday conclave in Crown College in the Senior Commons Room. The [Santa Cruz] Sentinel in reporting that conclave said, “As a result of that meeting, and the request of faculty there, Professor Puknat called President Saxon.” That wasn’t true because I had already made arrangements with President Saxon’s secretary on Thursday or Friday. Saxon was out of town.

Jarrell: The meeting was on Saturday.

Puknat: That meeting was on a Saturday. It was decided before noon that I would call President Saxon at five o’clock Saturday afternoon, a very minor point. The point is that I had already made the decision. I’d already been in touch with his secretary on my own. I was asked by a faculty member later by what authority I called the president. By nobody’s authority, by my own. On my own I made the decision, because of the number of people. I had assessed the situation. I was now at the point that I felt that the unfavorable reaction to Christensen was so great that the president should know the possibilities of a crisis here, of an
open kind of conflict. So in any event, that meeting, which was a completely informal meeting on that Saturday in the Senior Commons Room, did include about twenty-five, most of them senior faculty, and so that’s part of the picture. But in my telephone call, which was completed then at five o’clock that Saturday afternoon, I gave no opinions of my own. I went into no details. I said, “My only purpose in calling you is to alert you to what I think is a critical situation at Santa Cruz. I think this could hit the newspapers. It seems to me you ought to hear from us before you hear it from the newspapers.” He had not heard from anyone. He told me he had heard from absolutely no one, so mine was the first call from him.

**Jarrell:** What month was this?

**Puknat:** That was October, I think. But anyway, my call to him was that Saturday, that same Saturday, although it was not the result of the meeting. Now my second call to Saxon, which I think was about ten days later—I hope I’ve got this right, there may have been three—but the second one that I remember was on the Sunday before the Monday evening Senate meeting. That was a public meeting. I called the president on Sunday to suggest to him the decision would be entirely his, naturally, but to suggest to him that he send an observer to our meeting, because I thought again there might be fireworks. But whatever, it certainly will hit the papers and he might like to have an observer of his choice here. He sent Angus Taylor, University Provost, to the meeting that Monday evening.

**Jarrell:** This was in November?
Puknat: The meeting of the provosts, deans and the chair of the Senate with President Saxon on Thanksgiving Eve, that was a three-hour meeting at his house from 8:30-1:30 that Wednesday evening, the first half of which I would say was an uphill endeavor on our part.

Jarrell: Do you recall all of the people who met with Saxon in Berkeley?

Puknat: Yes.

Jarrell: There were five or six of you?

Puknat: No, there were about fifteen of us. All the provosts, all the deans, vice-chancellors, the librarian. I was the only non-administrator. In fact, it was the same group that signed the letter, the letter we’ll get to in a minute. Well, Saxon had asked two people to attend that meeting. Angus Taylor and Chet McCorkle, vice-president of the university. And these two people, I suppose one would have to call observers. I don’t recall their speaking. The discussion was between Saxon and our group. And we had coffee in the middle of it.

The first half was very difficult. We were somewhat discouraged because we felt that the attitude was non-receptive. Not unwilling to listen to us, but an attitude of, “Well, I’ve got to be shown,” which is all right. I think it’s perfectly proper for the president to take that attitude. But I’m talking about our psychic response to this. It was very, very hard on our group.

Jarrell: Yes.
Puknat: And several of us, I think, were quite resolute as a result, because we were even partly annoyed at this kind of an impasse that we had reached. We felt that we weren’t really communicating. However that isn’t true of the second half. I think we had what you might call smooth sailing, as far as communication was concerned and I left the meeting with the thought that we had succeeded. My usual naive self thought, “Well, we’ve done it.” Now there was one particular point where Saxon said that he just didn’t feel that we gave enough evidence; we weren’t sufficiently persuasive as to the problem.

Jarrell: Is it that document?

Puknat: Yes, of course we didn’t go into details. We were really talking generalities. I suppose the main generality was lack of or loss of confidence. Now, my response to this was I thought the president had either an incompetent on his hands, or an incompetent campus. If all the senior administrators were of one mind with respect to this matter, then something’s wrong with that group if the chancellor’s a competent person.

Well, his answer to that was, “Well, I have to admit you’ve got numbers on your side.” But anyway when we did get to the end of that three-hour session, I felt that the matter would be resolved. He told us that he would let us know his views fairly soon. Then when we learned that he was leaving on a ten-day trip to somewhere in Europe, we thought we’d better put our arguments in writing. We thought that he should receive this document before his trip. As a matter of fact, we thought maybe he should take it along on his trip so that he wouldn’t fail to give some thought to our problem.
Jarrell: Certainly.

Puknat: I’m sure he had been giving a lot of thought to the matter. Nevertheless, we wrote this up. It was done hurriedly; it was done at an evening with almost all of the people present. Perhaps all were present. Certainly all signed that letter by the next morning and it was conveyed to President Saxon that next morning, which was maybe a day or two before his departure. Well, we felt then there’d be a response by the end of that Christmas holiday, but in early January nothing had happened. So the group of fifteen decided, that five of us, and I was one of the five—there were two provosts, two deans, and myself—should ask the president for an appointment.

Jarrell: This is the January meeting when five or six of you drove up?

Puknat: This is the January 13th meeting—five of us. Christensen also came and he was asked into the meeting, I would say after about a short hour that the five of us had with Saxon. There were students from this campus as well as from Berkeley, both the curious and representative of the student press, who had asked if they could join the meeting but Saxon would not agree to that. He said he’d talk with them afterwards, separately, but they would not be present at this particular meeting. So they sat outside, and Christensen sat somewhere, because I did not see him until he was called in after what I call a short hour.

Well, it became clear rather quickly that Saxon was not going to make a change. At least that’s what he said explicitly—that he had reached a decision and the decision was not to ask Christensen to resign, that he would continue. We were floored. We were absolutely floored because, you see, there was no discussion of
that evaluation? There was no discussion of that at all. In fact, we had the feeling that the president might even think this assessment was a valid one, which of course is illogical. I mean, we just felt our meeting didn’t make sense.

Then Christensen was called in and we were outspoken in our view. We were deeply disillusioned by this and made this clear to the president. The president said that he regretted the situation very much; he regretted our attitude very much. But that’s how we left. We left, feeling that we had just experienced utter defeat. That was the 13th of January. It was about a week later, when for the second time I went to see Christensen to ask him to resign. I’m not sure whether I mentioned this the last time we talked.

**Jarrell:** You didn’t.

**Puknat:** All right, the first time I asked him to resign was Sunday afternoon before that Monday evening Senate meeting. We talked for about an hour. I called him and asked if I could see him. He said, “Yes.” So I went to University House and we had a perfectly amicable conversation, as one always does, because Christensen is a very pleasant person. We talked for about an hour, at the end of which Christensen said to me, “Well Sig, we pretty much agree.” And I said, “Chris, I don’t understand how you can say that. It’s clear we don’t agree at all.”

**Jarrell:** Agree on what?
Puknat: That’s exactly the point because, of course, I suggested to him that he resign, that there was no other solution to the problem that we were facing. I don’t recall what arguments, if any, that he gave then.

But I do recall two at the second meeting, which I guess I should come to now. Before I do, I should say that I’ve heard several times since that Monday evening meeting, which I thought was—oh, I suppose the word “ghastly” is an exaggeration, but since I was chairing it, I might have overreacted to some of the things I saw and felt, and I thought it was a ghastly meeting. I find it very, very odd that Christensen left the meeting with a feeling that he hadn’t done badly and that the situation hadn’t turned out badly for him. In fact, he is quoted as saying the next morning, “We’ve had a victory.” Now, of course, I didn’t hear him say that but he was quoted as saying it. And it is in harmony with his general, somewhat optimistic reaction to the thing.

Jarrell: It’s certainly a contradiction to your perception of the meeting.

Puknat: Exactly, exactly. So there was that one Sunday session in which I suggested that he resign. The other meeting was about a week after the January 13th meeting with Saxon. It was a Monday before the Tuesday evening that he resigned. That Monday, all the chairpersons of the Senate committees met. I called a meeting that Monday morning to discuss Senate action, because we had taken no action. We had been willing to let the deans and the provosts and vice-chancellors, along with, to be sure, the chair of the Senate, to handle the thing. The Senate itself as a faculty group had not done anything officially. We may have had a meeting both Monday and Tuesday. My meeting with the chancellor
was Monday and the other meeting was Tuesday morning. My meeting with the chancellor on Monday was to give him notice that if he did not resign, that the Senate would now enter the picture in a more open and a more formal way than it had. As far as I know, at that point he had not yet made a decision. That morning he had scheduled a meeting with deans and provosts and nobody came.

Jarrell: That’s right.

Puknat: That was his first blow that Monday. His second blow was when I saw him at something like one o’clock, at which time I told him the Senate was going to get into this thing openly. So there were those two things that happened.

Sometime between that afternoon and Tuesday afternoon or evening, he made his decision. He wrote his letter, I am told, Tuesday evening. Well, Tuesday morning we had the meeting that I mentioned a little while ago, of the chairpersons, and we agreed at the meeting that the twenty-one officers of the divisions and the chairpersons would go to the chancellor and ask the chancellor to resign. They thought it should be on a Wednesday. Well, I had to be out of town, in fact, I was leaving town that Tuesday afternoon, and I said that I thought it was perfect, that they should go ahead. They felt I should be present. So then they asked me that Tuesday before noon, to telephone the chancellor’s office and see if he would see us at twelve or at twelve-thirty that Tuesday. And the answer was, “Yes, he would.”

So the twenty-one chairpersons and officers of the division met in the conference room in the Central Services [Building]. I sat at one end of the table. The chancellor came in. The chair had been left free at the other end of the table, and
here were all these other people in the room. They looked at me and so I said, “Chris or Mr. Chancellor,” whatever, however I opened the thing, “We are here to ask you to resign for the good of the campus.” I said some more things, that if he did not, our group was going to pursue this thing.

Jarrell: You said that if he did not agree that you would, as chairperson of the Senate, initiate proceedings to continue in this direction.

Puknat: Yes.

Jarrell: Now, what kind of Senate machinery is available or at your disposal for ousting a chancellor?

Puknat: Well, you see when our group of fifteen met with President Saxon, on Thanksgiving Eve, he or Angus Taylor asked the question or both did, “Was there a vote of no confidence Monday evening?” The paper, *The Sentinel* had said there was. My answer to that was, “Technically the answer has to be no, because the only vote was on the proposal that the chancellor made and that proposal was voted down. Now if somebody wants to interpret that as tantamount to no confidence, that’s an interpretation. But technically it can not be called a vote of no confidence.” That had not occurred.

Now, my answer to your question is that the Senate could have resorted to this kind of action. The University administration can ignore it, but I can remember ten years ago driving in a car with Chancellor McHenry, I don’t know whether I have mentioned this to you, and a visitor from, I think, it was the University of Chicago. The three of us were driving to Berkeley, and the matter of the
Academic Senate of the University of California came up, because it’s thought of as a rather strong body in comparison with senates at other universities. The visitor asked Dean McHenry, “What happens if there’s an open conflict between the chancellor and the Senate?” And I remember so well, it impressed me, of course, Dean McHenry’s answer—”The chancellor resigns.”

Now that isn’t necessarily the case, because something like this has happened at UC Riverside and the chancellor did not resign. So it’s a matter of the chancellor’s attitude. There are some people who apparently don’t mind being chancellors in a situation where they’re operating in an atmosphere of no confidence. But there are some people, certainly any chancellor who is a strong Senate person, and the irony here is that Chancellor Christensen, after all, had been chairman of the Berkeley Academic Senate.

**Jarrell:** It’s a body not to be put off lightly.

**Puknat:** No. And if one is a strong Senate person himself, he wouldn’t want to operate in a situation where the Senate has made clear that it has lost confidence in him. So I think that’s the only thing that the Senate can do. The Senate can make its official motion, whatever you call this resolution; it can make it known to the president of the University and to the Regents.

**Jarrell:** Now, to get back to this meeting, you were sitting facing Chancellor Christensen.

**Puknat:** Yes. And then he said, and I think some of us had this feeling that something had already happened. His response to us was something like this:
“I’m willing to discuss this matter with you, but not with the entire group, one or maybe two or three of you.” And it’s possible he would have told us he had already] reached a decision. However, it was clear that our group was not receptive to this idea and I said categorically, “The situation has reached the point where I, as chair of the senate, feel unable to enter into any kind of understanding that does not allow me to divulge the content of your remarks to the other members.”

Jarrell: Right.

Puknat: So that just fell through, you see. There was no possibility. But he felt that he could not speak openly. Well, naturally I thought that this was significant. I felt that he had perhaps reached a decision. And the fact is he had, only I don’t know exactly when he did. We do not know what effect this appearance of twenty-one people amassed had perhaps because he may have already decided by Monday evening that this thing was not going to work. How could it work if the head administrative officers refused to appear at a meeting called by the chancellor, and when the Senate, the division of the Senate, makes clear to him that there’s going to be an open confrontation?

At that point, I think, he realized it was hopeless. I did not know then until Thursday. I was told in confidence by someone in the administration and I was told that I could not pass this word on to anyone else that he had resigned and that the resignation would be announced either Thursday afternoon or Friday at the Regents’ meeting. Thursday, of course, the committees of the Regents meet. So you see this is from Tuesday to Thursday. I believe I did not hear anything on
Wednesday. Many people were curious; I was curious. Then on Thursday I was given this information. One reason for it was that several people were expected to make a statement and I was one of those, you see; that’s how it happened that I was informed, before the public statement was made.

**Jarrell:** From what you know of your two meetings with President Saxon and several phone calls, how would you characterize Saxon’s role? How do you perceive the balance he was trying to maintain as president of the University?

**Puknat:** This reminds me of two things that the chancellor said in that last meeting between him and me in January. I think I’d like to mention that because it relates these comments to how I see President Saxon’s role in this. That week of Christensen’s resignation, that Monday when I went in alone at one o’clock in the afternoon to suggest to Christensen that he resign, I remember two arguments he gave for his not resigning. One of them was that he was concerned about the future of Santa Cruz, and he quoted a fellow chancellor as saying the following, “If they,” whoever they are, “if they get rid of you they’ll send a gauleiter to Santa Cruz.”

**Jarrell:** What’s a gauleiter?

**Puknat:** Hitler used the expression “Gau,” which is an old German word like province of an empire. He would appoint the head of a province and a leader German and the gauleiter then. It’s a Hitlerian word. I don’t recall the use of that word in any other context, but it was in the official vocabulary of the Nazi government. So they’ll send a gauleiter to Santa Cruz. Christensen was concerned about the future of Santa Cruz. He wanted to spare Santa Cruz this kind of thing.
That was one point. The other point he made was there were some important people on the outside who would react to his resignation or dismissal in a way that would be to the disadvantage of this campus.

**Jarrell:** Meaning financially, for instance?

**Puknat:** This I don’t know, and I don’t know whether he had a Regent in mind, or whom he had in mind. A couple of times in my encounters with him, he would talk about this kind of thing and I would then say, “Name someone.” For example, he once said to me that there are, how did he put it—oh, it’s a strong word that is equivalent to important. There were important members of the faculty who were his supporters. Well, he never named anyone. He said they existed, but he would not name one. He’d say, “Well, if they’re willing to come out in the open,” which I must say made me wonder what kind of faculty we have if this is true. But, of course, I didn’t believe that it was true. If he had supporters, why were they unwilling to say how they felt? I couldn’t pin him down on who these important people were on the outside who would react to this kind of thing.

Well, if we relate that to Saxon’s behavior in this whole thing, it could very well be that there were chancellors and Regents who were not convinced, and that Saxon decided to proceed cautiously, so that there would appear to be at least peer acceptance. That is, to let things develop to the point where no one could say that an injustice had been done to Christensen. Now, this is the way I see it.

**Jarrell:** Let them become intolerable if they will.
Puknat: Yes, yes. Now of course what does that mean, if that is a correct assessment of his attitude toward the problem? That puts a tremendous burden on the people at Santa Cruz who felt that things could not go on with Christensen as chancellor. It would have meant that they’d have to raise hell. They would have to—

Jarrell: Churn the waters.

Puknat: Exactly. But in a sense that’s what Saxon did.

Jarrell: And it became a cause célèbre. It was in the papers and it was quite ugly.

Puknat: Yes, exactly. And all along I had said to faculty members and to—this is going back to October now, a period from October, November, certainly into December—all along I said, and I felt this way when I went to see Christensen too, for Christensen’s own sake, for the sake of his reputation, a resignation on his part would be, it seems to me, the wise thing. Because he could always say then, “Well, that’s an obstreperous faculty. Everybody knows Santa Cruz is an odd campus and it has its problems and so on and it’s just too difficult to cope with these problems and so I’m resigning.” I think he could have gotten out of this thing fairly unscathed. I think he could have pulled it off.

Well, he didn’t choose to do that. He was encouraged, apparently, by some people to hang on. Now his reputation has been damaged. But I believe that Saxon’s cautious response can be explained only on that basis. I cannot believe—and as a matter of fact a person who ought to know told me that Saxon did understand the situation—I cannot believe, you see, that he did not. But then the
question is, “Well if he did understand it, why didn’t he act?’ And the only logical, reasonable answer that I can give is that he felt it was best for the campus and best for the University if there was total acceptance or almost total acceptance of Christensen’s resignation. And I think this is what happened.

**Jarrell:** Well, it was certainly a catharsis. But it did damage his reputation.

**Puknat:** Oh, yes.

**Jarrell:** I would think that the president of the University, Saxon in this case, always has to see nine campuses. Do you think, from your experience that there should be an objectified set of instructions for Senates or faculties to get rid of chancellors when they are incompetent, or if they are breaking rules? Right now all you can do is give a loss of confidence.

**Puknat:** Yes, well I really don’t know what else would help. What kind of system or method could be devised? I really doubt if any could.

**Jarrell:** I mean this is, to me, similar to impeaching a president.

**Puknat:** Yes. Well of course the Regents have tremendous responsibility when they appoint chancellors. So you can see that it ought to be very difficult to get rid of a chancellor because that reflects on the Regents’ judgment.

There is also the matter of publicity, unfavorable publicity, public reaction. I do not know whether this is a factor, but I can quote Saxon as saying that Thanksgiving Eve meeting to our large group, that if he had to sacrifice Santa Cruz for the sake of the entire University [of California], he would do so. Well,
now that was a shock to us, even though, of course, one can agree with him. Obviously if you set up the thing in such a way that the University of California can survive only if you dump the Santa Cruz campus into Monterey Bay, we’d all have to agree then we must dump the campus into the bay. But nevertheless, one hates to hear it. So that startled us, that kind of thing, because you wonder how is the University damaged by the removal of an incompetent chancellor? The logic should be the other way.

Jarrell: The opposite.

Puknat: Yes. And so I think you have to bring in the factor of public relations, you know, all that sort of thing. There are lots and lots of off-campus things, I have to admit, that most of us are not aware of and that a president of the university is aware of. So there is that.

Jarrell: That’s right. What do you consider the most critical factor in the chancellor’s loss of support from the faculty, or other groups, like staff?

Puknat: Well, I think really there were two. I think that one of these two was really a series of incidents and that was his relations with the Budget Committee. That’s a strong factor in this whole thing—that he, after all, violated University procedure in not consulting with the Budget Committee when he reached a decision to overrule. He can overrule, but the regulation is that when he overrules the Budget Committee, he gives them one more chance to consider the matter. Now if you do that once, that’s all right. If you do it several times it’s a problem. And, in fact, if you do overrule, even after due consultation, you have a problem. I’d have to say that was part of the situation. Now, remember, I was
bothered by certain decisions he had made with respect to promotions, decisions that I thought were unwise, and as a result of which remember I had a luncheon with him and I’ve described that to you.

**Jarrell:** That’s right.

**Puknat:** Okay, so I was concerned at that time. When he removed the lecturer from admissions—I would have to say that was one of several important incidents that finally led to the resignation of the chancellor. I really think there is one thing that led to all this, and that is incompetence. The man simply was inappropriate for chancellor of this campus. It was known at Berkeley that he was not what you could call a successful vice-chancellor. It’s amazing but the explanation for the kind of success he has had seems to me to be due to his charm. He’s a very likeable, very appealing person, and therefore he must have had many friends. He apparently was popular with students and all that. So he advanced in the administration. And, of course, he went way above his head. I think what led to his resignation is incompetence.

**Jarrell:** In terms of the actual resignation, what do you think was specifically gained for this campus in terms of the future? From the faculty point of view, for instance, do you think that the faculty, whether they were provosts or whether they were in the Senate, worked together quite closely? I heard that the provosts especially developed quite a rapport.

**Puknat:** Yes.
Jarrell: Now maybe this was a crisis situation in which people just gathered together and now they’re spread apart again. Do you think this kind of working together is a short-term thing, or could it develop into a long-term thing?

Puknat: Well, I really can’t answer that but it seems to me, quite aside from that there are certain things that have to be done. We were living in a vacuum. Since Angus Taylor has been here, an attempt has been made on his part to establish a kind of organization that should already have existed. Just exactly how the campus was run in the last years of the McHenry tenure, I do not know. But in any event, in that almost a year and a half of Christensen’s chancellorship we were drifting. We were not getting anywhere. We didn’t have an academic plan. At one time it was said that the Santa Cruz campus was the only one that didn’t. Well, it’s understandable with the change of chancellor and all that, but nothing was happening. Our Senate committees weren’t functioning properly. One of them was in open conflict—we mentioned the Budget and Planning Committee, felt it wasn’t getting anywhere. And now, recently you recall the theater arts kind of reaction that we had on budget matters—

Jarrell: Yes.

Puknat: —in this month of June. That is a result of what I would have to call sloppy management. This thing has to be organized and Angus Taylor is in the process of getting the kind of organization that allows for systematic program review, lots of things. So I would say that the spirit, the kind of cooperation among provosts and deans—I said at least twice in the many meetings that I had with them, “Let’s hope that this wonderful spirit that we have will continue for
at least some time.” Because, after all, it’s a result of reaction. We were focused on one issue and therefore we could have unanimity, but we also had excellent spirit, if the spirit can only go on. I don’t know whether that spirit will go on, but I think that the campus has to be administered; it has to function. So whatever the fate of this kind of spirit that we experienced for at least that period, I think we’ve got to have an orderly set of procedures whereby this campus can function.

The Future of UCSC

Jarrell: I know from our previous interview that you feel quite optimistic about the college system here. Do you think that UCSC’s reputation for academic excellence is contingent on the continued existence of colleges?

Puknat: Well, I really can’t answer that in the affirmative, because, after all, there are many, many fine institutions that have the traditional structure. I think it would be unfortunate if Santa Cruz gave up this dimension. I think this dimension is very attractive, but I don’t think we’ve been clear in our own minds as to the price that should be paid for it. There are people who think that if a person has given tremendous service to a college that somehow he should be rewarded and should be part of the future of the campus. Well, now it depends on what you’re referring to when you say “excellence.” If, when you use the expression “academic excellence,” you’re talking about quality of mind reflected in the teaching and scholarship and all that kind of thing, okay. I think that we should have had a rule-of-thumb approach here with respect to the requirements for promotion—you can always have exceptions.
But I think we should say that the support of a board of studies, or the support of a college for the advancement for a faculty member, is necessary but not sufficient. That is to say, in a certain sense, that a board or a college could have veto power. If you advance at Berkeley you do so primarily through this monolithic structure. The department puts you up, and then of course you go through committees and all that sort of thing. But that’s checking; that’s a kind of presumably objective supervision. But the recommendation comes from the department for a person who’s to be promoted to tenure, and then these various committees assess the thing and make their recommendation to the chancellor.

Now here the board, of course, is weaker, because it is in competition with another agency, namely the college. So it’s easier for a person to be promoted at Santa Cruz without the support of his discipline, than it would be in a traditional—

**Jarrell:** Anywhere else.

**Puknat:** Anywhere else. In a traditional setting, the only place that the recommendation would originate is in the department. Here there are two agencies. And it seems that with our approach there’s a price to pay. This price is, you know, life is tough. Things are tough. If a person comes to Santa Cruz—we’re not talking about quantity, we’re talking about quality—if a board backs a person and the college does not, well, this rarely happens, but it seems to me it could happen. And I would say, “Well, it’s just too bad. A person who comes to Santa Cruz, knows what the Santa Cruz situation is like,” he or she says, “Santa Cruz is wonderful because of the collegiate system.” Well then, it seems to me
one adjusts to that system. If a person does not have the support of his college, I would say then maybe that board recommendation is not sufficient. But I really mean that vice-versa as well. That’s been our problem at Santa Cruz—we have had people who have committed themselves to colleges. They can be deans of students; they can do all sorts of things. They can help make things lively in a college and all this is worthwhile. But it isn’t sufficient.

Jarrell: It shouldn’t be the basis for tenure.

Puknat: That’s right. That’s one error I believe was made in the early years. That was not articulated clearly enough.

Jarrell: One of my questions was, what do you think UCSC has to do in order to maintain its academic reputation? This would be an instrument for insuring that excellence.

Puknat: Yes.

Jarrell: We’re not talking about social life or colleges, but the—

Puknat: No, no. But I think Santa Cruz has attracted good people. And now that we’re kind of at a steady-state point, why there isn’t really too much that you can do with Santa Cruz, as far as personnel is concerned, because there are either no new positions or very few. Some people may leave, some may retire, some may die, and you’d have some replacements. But I really don’t know how to answer your question because I don’t see the opportunity for great change.
The Enrollment Crisis

Jarrell: UCSC, for the last several years has had trouble enrolling students, in getting a sufficient number of applicants and filling slots. I call it, not derogatorily, sort of the numbers game.

Puknat: Yes.

Jarrell: From various reports that I’ve read, UCSC is trying to maintain its present enrollment and slowly increase it to about 7500 students, by 1984.

Puknat: Yes.

Jarrell: Paul Niebanck, who is now going to be our new vice-chancellor for student affairs, is very much in favor of trying to increase the number of so-called minority or disadvantaged students allowed into the university. Do you see problems emerging from increasing admissions of so-called affirmative action students? As a faculty member, what is your opinion of this?

Puknat: Well, California is distinguished for its three-tier, higher education system. The junior college plays a very important role in that it takes care of people who are not admissible to the state university college system or the University of California. It makes it possible for a person to get to either of these two other systems by way of a junior college. There is a mechanism by which students can be handled within the state of California who are not admissible on the basis of the criteria that are set up for the University of California. Now my answer to your question is that I think all admissible students who apply should be encouraged to attend the University of California. I think affirmative action
plays a role, from my point of view, primarily in the area of need, of financial support. I do not believe that the University of California should admit more than the very, very small number of normally non-admissible students. Am I answering your question directly?

Jarrell: Yes.

Puknat: I guess I should be a little more blunt. I do not believe in discrimination on the basis of the unusual. Therefore I am no in sympathy with the apparent situation at present where a white, Anglo-Saxon male has difficulty getting into certain institutions. I do not believe in the quota system. In fact, if we use the quota system what would happen if we identified Jews as an ethnic group? If we did, then we would have to cut down the number of Jews. I think it’s a dreadful thing. America has discriminated against minorities; we have discriminated against women. But now, in order to make up for the crimes of the past, are we going to commit a different kind of injustice? I read in Newsweek or Time that about a third of Harvard is Jewish. I bring this up because I am a teacher of German Literature and I’m very much interested in German culture and my background is German. Of course, I’m very sensitive to that great tragedy of the 20th century, the period from especially 1933 to 1945. I’m against quotas.

I think that if you’re going to increase the number of minority students and you have a fixed target figure for the total thing, that means you disqualify certain others. I think a person should be admitted on the basis of criteria that are set up. Now it can be argued, as many people who were very strong in affirmative action do argue, that lots of people have been disadvantaged at early years. Well,
of course we’ve got the junior colleges, as I’ve said. And if they’re disadvantaged financially, I’m very much in favor of financial support for a student who is admissible. I do not know that the kind of thing that has happened at Santa Cruz in the last year because I think very, very special effort was made at Santa Cruz. I’m not sure we can afford that.

**Jarrell:** I bring this up because I see it as a wave of the future, of certainly the next ten or twenty years because I feel that institutions of higher learning are very vulnerable to political and social pressure.

**Puknat:** Yes.

**Jarrell:** Much more so than what they call the private sector, let’s say.

**Puknat:** Yes.

**Jarrell:** I think it’s a very important problem.

**Puknat:** Well, yes. But I can’t quite see the justification for the admission of students who are going to find the competition a great struggle if they do not qualify academically. After all, we do have the state college system, and the junior colleges. They can attend and adjust to, and then transfer into the University of California. I don’t really know whether it’s doing them a favor, and I’m sure it’s not doing the faculty or the other students of the University a favor. I mean, if they’re able to do it, fine. It’s very difficult to prove the rate of success at Santa Cruz, because you have to analyze the kind of courses that are taken.
And you’d have to see what kind of mortality rate you have in courses. If you find out there are courses with a 100 students and nobody fails in the course, well, I don’t know what you do with that information. So it’s very hard. I’ve heard it said that the normally non-admissible student has a good record. Well I’d have to analyze, scrutinize the thing to see what just this means. What kind of courses were taken? Are they courses in which the competitive level was high or low. I don’t know. It’s very difficult. I think it’s a very difficult problem.

**Jarrell:** I want to thank you for being so gracious and participating in this interview.

**Puknat:** I was very glad to.
Robert Adams

Robert Adams was a professor of economics at UCSC and served as acting dean of social sciences and coordinator of fiscal and academic planning for the campus at the time of this oral history, which was conducted by Randall Jarrell on May 12, 1976. He was affiliated with Crown College. Adams earned his BA from Oberlin College and his MA and PhD from the University of Michigan. He arrived at UC Santa Cruz in 1967.

Coming to UC Santa Cruz

Jarrell: To start off with, would you like to talk about your personal background, and when you came here?

Adams: Okay. Well, I came to Santa Cruz in 1967, originally as a visitor, partly on a lark, [on the] grounds that my wife told me I was an academic and she wanted to travel, and at the displeasure of my home institution (the University of Maryland), which asked, “You want to go to San Jose, where?” [They had] never heard of UC Santa Cruz. And so we came out on a lark, as one of the initial people at Crown. Then I was invited to stay permanently and I’ve been here since.

I’m an economist. My specialty is public budgeting, public finance, public policy, public institutions. Before I came here I was at the University of Maryland. My PhD is from the University of Michigan and my BA is from Oberlin College. I’d had quite a lot of experience and involvement in the federal establishment before I came, and was a consultant on management matters to the then-governor of Maryland, and generally very much involved in that kind of life.
Coming to Santa Cruz was really a fairly radical departure, professionally at least, in terms of the expectation that there would be less access to the kind of professional things I had done. Oh, I suppose after about six weeks here I was in love with the place, primarily because of the kind of initial faculty that I met here. I was quite impressed [mostly] because of the kind of students that I met here and which I still think you find at Santa Cruz. In fact, I still remember my first advisee. It’s always a cute story. We had the [Chadwick] Garden then and she came and handed me a tomato and said, “I have just picked this and I thought you might like it.” And Santa Cruz, for me, has always been that way.

Jarrell: That sort of epitomizes that —

Adams: Well, the openness, I’ve had that kind of relationship with students ever since I’ve been here. And I suppose to the extent that I feel I no longer have that kind of connection, well, this is not as attractive a place as it was for me at one time.

Jarrell: You started out saying that you’ve done practically everything on this campus.

Adams: Well, I came and in the second year I became chairman of the board in economics and I did that for a year.

Jarrell: You came here as a lecturer originally and you went right to associate professor. Is that correct?
Adams: Right. That was largely because they appointed me late in the year and didn’t have time to run it through a normal—I was a visitor and normally I would have been a visiting associate professor.

Jarrell: I see.

Adams: So I just moved into the associate professor rank, became board chair for the year. I think it was the year after that I became a member of the campus planning committee.

Jarrell: I found it listed as ’71.

Adams: Anyway, I’ve done the Crown trip, which is to have been on the executive committee for about five years, and I wrote the bylaws for Crown College, the Senate bylaws, and had that involvement. I was on a committee on courses; I’ve been on the budget committee for a quarter, the budget, personnel committee. But then I moved to the campus planning committee and I think I probably did a four or five-year tour there as faculty rep.

Coordinator of Fiscal and Academic Planning

Then [Chancellor] Dean McHenry asked if I would serve as coordinator of fiscal and academic planning for the campus and I assumed that responsibility. At that time there wasn’t even a title attached. He just asked me if I’d do that. We thought about the title later.

I was only in that job for about two days when I realized that I had assumed the responsibilities for the unit that was also handling the fiscal matters of the campus. After two weeks, I discovered that there was no real fiscal mechanism
for the campus. So most of my time was spent actually handling the fiscal matters of the campus. So I essentially developed the Office of Planning and Analysis, and developed a notion of an assistant chancellor of planning and analysis under Dean that was really somewhat different from what I think Dean and I had talked about at the time. But we sort of fell into that relationship and it worked very well.

Jarrell: Could it be there was a need for that sort of development?

Adams: Absolutely. Yes. Everything was accountable to Dean before I came. There was no officer who had been delegated the power to handle these matters, whose sole responsibility was to do that job. To some extent at that time, Hal Hyde, the vice chancellor of planning and analysis, of business and finance, handled some things, like the enrollment forecasts, out of our office.²

Jarrell: What a diverse business task, really.

Adams: Oh yes. At the same time I taught practically every quarter. We had a very small office and it was really a rather delightful experience. I think we got everything done. It wasn’t a bureau—I’m still not really a bureaucrat at heart. We moved things along and we focused on decisions, rather than on the paper. In that time we went through the big fire at Central Services, we went through the student disruptions and the unpleasantness that went with that, and the kind of pressure it put on Central Services, and one couldn’t help having that spill over. I went through the unpleasant situation of also having left a job—this was a year

² See Randall Jarrell, Interviewer and Editor, Harold A. Hyde, Recollections of Santa Cruz County (Regional History Project, UCSC Library, 2002). Available in full text at http://library.ucsc.edu/reg-hist/hyde
before Dean resigned—and having my successor commit suicide. Although I wasn’t a close personal friend of his, I was as close a personal friend as he had outside of Dean McHenry. And so I came back from Europe and had to go into Central Services and pick up again what I had just left in the interim, until Dean was able to bring Bob Rogers in for a year. So that was difficult and unpleasant.

Jarrell: I can imagine.

Adams: So we went through all those different things and at the same time I kept teaching, doing the Crown thing, took my sabbatical leave, went back to Crown, found over the years that I had really not a day when I didn’t get a telephone call from Central Services: “How do we do this?” Or, “What do you think about that?” And then I was offered the acting deanship here and I really finally felt, Well, if I’m going to be doing all these things, I might as well get paid for it and have my time clear rather than try to do it the other way. And that sort of brings us up to date.

Jarrell: What is your academic appointment? Are you teaching at the moment?

Adams: I’m teaching, but this year I happen to be teaching one course. Next year I’ll be teaching two. I’m just carrying a normal kind of administrative—

Early Impressions of UCSC

Jarrell: You came here initially from Maryland, a more traditional institution, certainly, and you’d never met McHenry, I suppose, before that.

Adams: No.
Jarrell: How did you find him, and did you have any preconceived ideas about how this place was going to be run, since you were really starting out in its infancy?

Adams: Well, I think actually Dean was not the first impression. I originally came because they needed somebody to fill in and I had an acquaintance here, David Kaun, who’d suggested I might come out. I came at the first planning conference with Crown. So my main and initial impression of the campus involved the planning conference at which some people, some of whom are still here, made a lasting impression on me. I still have great regard for them—Kenneth Thimann, Glenn Willson, Page Smith and many of the fellows of Cowell-Stevenson and the newly-formed Crown. It was an impressive group of academics. You really had the feeling there was something there. At that point, there was discussion of a core program for Crown that dealt with Science and Man. I guess from the beginning I was rather dubious as to how one would fit into all of that.

The whole notion of Crown College was very impressive. Kenneth Thimann himself—just going around the college with Kenneth—I remember him talking about the notion that he might have Crown stamped on the silverware. Well, you just knew you were somewhere else. It was an absolutely beautiful sight, magnificent sight. The first time I came, there were only two colleges and Crown

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3 See the following oral histories conducted by the Regional History Project: Randall Jarrell, Interviewer and Editor, Page Smith: Cowell College and UCSC: A Decade of Educational Innovation http://library.ucsc.edu/reg-hist/smith; Randall Jarrell, Interviewer and Editor, Kenneth V. Thimann: Early UCSC History and the Founding of Crown College http://library.ucsc.edu/reg-hist/thimann; and Randall Jarrell, Interviewer and Editor, F. M. Glenn Willson, Early UCSC History and the Founding of Stevenson College http://library.ucsc.edu/reg-hist/willson.
was a building site. There was a kind of vitality and a kind of craziness with it—that people weren’t doing the normal, run-of-the-mill, kind of rote, pedestrian social science. They were concerned about broader issues. They had an enthusiasm for the place. The students had an infectious enthusiasm, too. They weren’t just grinds. They were just unusual. So the initial impression I had of the place really focused mostly on the people I had met from Crown, primarily Kenneth Thimann. I don’t really remember the first time I met Dean McHenry. I’m one of the few people that you’ll meet on this campus who never had an entry interview by Dean.

**Jarrell:** Yes, he always interviewed everyone, junior and senior.

**Adams:** That’s right. And one of my little funny things, I think, is that I never did have that interview, because I came late in the year as a visitor. I never had the interview and I don’t remember how I got to know Dean, but I got to know him without having a formal interview, even when I switched over to the regular rank. So I never went through that process. I just always remember the confusion everyone had when they came—Dean McHenry, was that the dean or was that the chancellor? It was sort of funny.

Now, the other man who was here that I had high regard for, who I think did quite a good job, except he did it in such a way that it wasn’t always appreciated, was Robert Calkins, who was dean of social sciences when I came. And also a very impressive man in the science area, Francis Clauser, who now is provost at Cal Tech. He was the first vice-chancellor under Dean.
But in general, I was very impressed with the way staff-faculty relationships went. People had a common enterprise. And socially it was nice. It was a kind of academic community.

**Jarrell:** Well, going on in time a little, you became a chairman of the board of studies quite early.

**Adams:** Right.

**Jarrell:** I’ve heard certain other faculty people say that in the area of appointments that it was extremely difficult to be on a board of studies, finding people to fill various slots, since McHenry did not interview everyone and sort of parceled out FTE’s, that there was, in some cases, difficulty.

**Adams:** Yes. Well, I think that in terms of the first three colleges there were practically no difficulties because you were trying to fill out the basic disciplines. I think we began to have difficulties when we came into Merrill, because [Merrill] had a theme. That’s where the difficulty began to come between college and board, at least over these thematic kinds of matters. When I came, I felt that at least in economics, and it may be true in some other fields, that people were worried that they were never going to be able to get the high-class appointments. In fact, I think the first chair from Stanford, he was visiting from Stanford in his last two years, I can’t think of his name, but he was brought here to start the board. My feeling was he’d made the assessment before he came that Santa Cruz was never going to be first-rate, first-rung in economics. So there really wasn’t much effort made to attract the kind of superstars in economics. When I came, I
had the sense that there was concern—are we really going to be able to get people here to do these things?

**Jarrell:** In a certain sense, wasn’t Calkins eminent?

**Adams:** Yes, as an administrator and in Brookings. Science [always differed] because of Kenneth [Thimann]. They shot high right from the beginning. They came in with these sort of semi-retired or late National Academy types. The whole science orientation was quite different. Kenneth took a great deal of interest in hiring at Crown. He used to make his own phone calls, evaluate the case himself, and was never satisfied about evaluations of standards by just the board chair. So that was the other part I saw, in terms of Kenneth having a profound impact on the science faculty. To some extent, I thought he made Crown a very strong faculty, because he was really interested in what an individual was doing professionally.

But there was, when I came, a sense of, “Well, are we really going to be able to make it?” I think it went further than that. I think there were some faculty members, probably at Cowell more than anywhere else, who almost had an uneasiness about bringing professional types here at all. You could see that when one came. People weren’t sure. And it was difficult then because you did have to traipse the candidate through and talk to a lot of people. I thought that raised some issues. Those years the most difficult thing I had to do when I was chair, we didn’t retain two people for not having published enough, and that was very unpleasant, extremely difficult. Page Smith was almost impossible and I had to deal with all that.
Jarrell: He was almost impossible in what sense?

Adams: Well, he fought very hard against the—

Jarrell: Against the whole criteria?

Adams: That’s right. It started back then. Who knows who finally was right in these cases. I don’t think it was right or wrong. It was just that that was an awkward and difficult time for people because we were still feeling our way on what the basis would actually be. Now, it’s not a matter of publish or perish or whatever. It was just, what was that package in total going to be; how were you going to measure it; what was your assessment of these people and on what basis? It was probably one of the most difficult things I have had to do since I’ve been here, to actually talk to both people involved and tell them they weren’t going to continue. Especially since the campus was so humane and personal at that time—it was just unpleasant.

Jarrell: I’ve heard from several people that the initial projection was that we (UCSC) are going to excel in humanities and social sciences. Davis and Berkeley, for instance, are preeminent in those fields. But we’re flourishing in sciences. Thimann was taking care of sciences, and someone remarked, “Well, maybe that’s the reason that the appointments in science turned out to be so strong.” McHenry had so much to do with the appointments in the humanities and social science divisions. Do you think McHenry’s appointments in these areas were not as good as they might have been and it has affected subsequent appointments?
Adams: Number one, I know that Dean McHenry and Clark Kerr⁴ felt that if this campus was going to be successful, it would have to have a good science component. They worried, initially, that the sciences here would be weak and it would drag down the rest of the campus. So I think, in a way, you would say they were oversensitive about the science appointments. Now, part of this is also a matter of luck. It’s a matter of the history. It just evolved. The fact that they brought Francis Clauser here, that was the key, and Kenneth Thimann too. Thimann being a provost but having a, you know, this is Mr. Science, U.S.A.

Jarrell: Right.

Adams: When I came to Crown the first year and sat at the table, there was Aaron Waters, Kenneth Thimann, Larry Blinks—the full professors were practically all in the National Academy. They were there because of Kenneth, and because of Francis Clauser, and because of people like Aaron Waters, who was very eminent in his own field. So for whatever various kinds of reasons—and I think this is partly luck—one thing follows another—the sciences flourished, very quickly. Actually, it’s very interesting because if you look at the initial science appointments here, they were not strong. If you look at the campus now, you find the eminent scientists start with Crown. There are some very good scientists at Cowell, et cetera. But they’re more interested in teaching and involvement in the college than they are in the hard sciences. So if you want to

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⁴ See Randall Jarrell, Interviewer and Editor, *Clark Kerr and the Founding of UC Santa Cruz* (Regional History Project, UCSC Library, 1988) http://library.ucsc.edu/reg-hist/kerr
look at the physics, it’s [Michael] Nauenberg⁵ and [George] Gaspari at Crown; I mean it just sort of started with that.

Jarrell: That nucleus.

Adams: Now, in terms of the social sciences, well, it’s not as easy to identify what is number one.

Jarrell: That’s right.

Adams: There is no National Academy that you can—well, it’s just not easy. You can’t tote it up.

That’s one thing. The other thing is that I think there’s less uniformity of excellence in the social sciences. I can talk about that. There are areas in the social sciences that are kind of mushy. They just aren’t going as well as others. But in general, I think the social sciences self-selected and brought people here who really wanted to do something else. I suppose I even include myself in that regard. I think the traditional economists, for example, would have found it unpleasant here, just couldn’t get the work done. My brother is an econometrician at the University of Pennsylvania. I know what he does and he couldn’t possibly do it here. So I think people had some understanding that it would be hard, especially in the initial years, setting up a college and doing all these things, to bring those kind of social scientists here.

⁵ See Randall Jarrell, Interviewer and Editor, Michael Nauenberg, Professor of Physics, 1966-1996 (Regional History Project, UCSC Library, 2004) http://library.ucsc.edu/reg-hist/nauenberg
Now, let me say one other thing. The difficulty of establishing quality in words what you mean by quality in different divisions, is hard to make now as well as it was then. I think that most of our colleagues in this campus underrate the social sciences for what it really is. If you were now to do a cross-section of the campus and ask, where are the really strong departments, and where are the weak ones, it wouldn’t all be science. I should add, there was one other thing the campus started with that’s very important and that’s the Lick Observatory.

Jarrell: As a base, a foundation?

Adams: That’s right. They had that and if you look now, I think most scientists would tell you astrophysics here is probably one of the top departments in the science division. But if you look at the quality of appointments that were made later, in economics, in politics, in sociology, if you begin to look at the range and quality of people, I’d argue that the apparent or sort of projected differences in hardness of the different divisions isn’t quite what it really appears to be.

If you look now and I told you well, here’s Brewster Smith and Ted Sarbin and Elliot Aronson and Frank Mier, as I did with the accreditation people when they were here, they said, “Well, that’s just first rate.” And our economists, for example, are quite good here, but we did lose an outstanding appointment when I was chair, I brought Dan Suits here. Now Dan Suits is the main-liner, well-known internationally. So we have made some of those appointments; we have also lost some in the division.

But I think too much is made of Dean in this. I don’t think Dean was the problem. I think most college programs had no way of really figuring out what
in hell to do with the sciences. So they left them alone. The colleges have eaten up, in some ways, humanities and social science types, the college programs of core courses, all that stuff—the interests, the feeling that you could know something about social science that you didn’t know about science meant that quite often, at least in some boards and in some appointments, we didn’t go for what I would call traditional excellence. In fact, in some cases you’d take the fourth candidate just to get somebody through, rather than take number one. I don’t think the science division has ever really to deal with that. That is a bias on the part of the central administration, that they would even consider divisional appointments with no collegial affiliation if they had to, to get a national-academy type. But I think if you wanted to go ahead with the appointment of somebody in the social sciences, humanities, it was a substantially more difficult struggle if you couldn’t get concurrence with the college, because it wasn’t clear that the administration would let you off the college hook. So in that way, I think there was a bias towards science, which just made it easier. It meant that it was simpler to make strong appointments.

The UCSC College System

Jarrell: In talking about the evolution of the college, do you think that their function and what their role was to be in this configuration was understood clearly at the beginning?

Adams: No. This is the fundamental congenital flaw of this campus. Dean had a very simple notion: Smallness within bigness. He had with it a kind of benign but strong father figure who was a provost. And it meant that the wife served punch at appropriate times. It was very genteel; it was lovely. It was probably
carried out to its highest manifestation by Page Smith. It was a magnificent display. It worked beautifully in Cowell the first year with Page, but there are very few American scholars who are capable of carrying that out. Part of the problem is that quite often the most successful provosts have been Englishmen.

Jarrell: Right, with that style.

Adams: It’s the whole style. It’s a cultural thing.

Jarrell: Yes.

Adams: But that’s all Dean ever really had.

Jarrell: He had the idea that they [the provosts] were a social function, but if you talk about colleges in England, for instance, they [provosts] have a specific, academic function. From my research into the history of this campus, it seems that that function still is not defined. It’s very amorphous. Now you talk about Crown and a program of Science and Man, which is quite specific. And yet if you look at the catalogs over the years and if you look at the statistics of what students take for course work, it seems they have the old departmental line.

Adams: Yes, I know what you’re getting at, but I’m saying Dean never figured it out. He still, to this day, hasn’t figured it out.

Jarrell: What do you think? How do you see it?

Adams: Well, [I have figured it out] to some extent. But let me add that, number one, it was very clear from the beginning, and it is still true, we’re in a dangerous
situation if we’re not careful, but colleges are terribly successful, social, cultural—

Jarrell: You think so?

Adams: I think so, absolutely. I don’t think there’s any other institution in the country that I know where students have the kind of relationship with faculty, if they want it, that they have here.

Jarrell: And that’s fostered by the college?

Adams: It’s fostered by the college and it’s based—because of the college and because of the self-selection this place had—it’s being interested in undergraduates. It isn’t just found in the colleges. Faculty members are open to students in many ways that they aren’t at other places, even in their board activities. It permeates the whole campus. It was a self-selection. A certain kind of academic came here. They may be terribly hardline professional, and I know that some of them are, but still the notion was that students could be your friends. I don’t know how else to describe it. It was something—

Jarrell: That thing has broken down now.

Adams: That’s right, that’s right—and that was a marvelous thing. Sometimes a little bit paternalistic but that’s all right. It worked, and I think in many ways it still does work for a lot of people. You knew students by their first names. You had them to your house occasionally. It wasn’t quite what the catalog made it out to be, but it was there. And that just does not happen on any other campus that I know.
Jarrell: Well, that’s very interesting. Would you attribute that to the college?

Adams: Well, it was the whole dream.

Jarrell: So that was part of it and then there was the other part that doesn’t seem, at least in my opinion, to have panned out in terms of taking, if you give a college course, for instance, that kind of—

Adams: Oh, well what happened then, let me say, was that there was nothing. And then there was this attempt to mount some core courses. I can’t talk about the early years with Cowell and what they had, but when I came it was the notion that you have a core course and a senior seminar. The difficulty was—I faced this personally, and I think a lot of other people did—you were fundamentally asking people to teach out of their professional interests, or even about something they knew nothing about. You were willing to do that for a year or so, but then it was always, “Well, no it’s your turn.” The size of the college meant there weren’t enough people to circulate these chores around. There was a lot of tension over this. We had three or four social scientists here of one kind or another, and humanities and science types always looked at this with a certain skepticism anyway. It never had the scale in any one college to really make it go. So what happened was that at least for the first three colleges, they broke down to the minimal program. Now, at the same time we had this permissiveness that was the sixties, so you couldn’t require anything. And when you start throwing out requirements of college courses, it made it even less viable.

Jarrell: That’s right.
Adams: So finally you can look around the campus and see little pieces of core courses, but that’s about it. Now the other thing you should understand is that there is a fundamental division among all academics about what we call general education. We had great debates about that, but never could get it resolved.

One year [Cedric] Davern and I at Crown proposed to the Crown faculty that, of the first six quarters, we would require essentially five of them would be taken in Crown College, that the students didn’t need this enormous menu of courses. They would just do that and then essentially just transfer to the campus as a whole.

Jarrell: For their upper-division programs?

Adams: That’s right. We were voted down, whatever it was, forty to two. We even had questions by the biology board about our competence to teach the lower-division biology. It was ridiculous. They were asking, “Could Thimann, Davern, and others teach the kind of biology that the upper division would need?” That was petty. But I think it just failed because we couldn’t get our heads together on what we mean by general education. Now, boards are not big, strong entities, either. They’re flimsy. The board programs, by and large, in the traditional boards don’t look very different from programs, departmental programs, anywhere.

But what happened was that we lost in a—we really get diverted to try to figure out what in hell to do with the colleges. I personally think that was a mistake, because what we should have been doing is asking, “What should we do about education here?” In other words, for the first ten years of this place, there was
this great need to prove that colleges work, rather than to prove that you could have quite a radically different undergraduate education in the University of California with colleges, but not exclusively colleges. Now the other thing you should understand—and I told this to Kenneth even from the first year I was here—when you asked, “What were colleges to be?” Thimann did not really know. He’d say, “Well, they’re supposed to be little Oberlins or little Swarthmores.” Well, I am an Oberlin undergraduate. In no way is there anything like Oberlin on this campus, of the sort that I remember, or that my other colleagues who are here from Oberlin, or from Reed, or from Swarthmore remember, and that’s because those schools self-selected a particular kind of student. I think it’s presumptuous to assume that you could ever find seven thousand, let alone twenty-four thousand of them in California. After all, Oberlin, when I went there had twelve hundred students. Swarthmore had six hundred. These were kids, I just remember as quite different. They weren’t the kind of lovely California kid. When I was at Oberlin, they were either a Midwestern preacher’s kid with a very heavy kind of academic dose, a kind of Protestant ethic, or from a kind of New York Jewish culture that put intellectual activity at its prime.

**Jarrell:** It was the highest.

**Adams:** That’s right. You mix these people together and you’ve got a marvelous intellectual atmosphere. But nobody at Oberlin ever talked about programs, about core courses. We didn’t have any kind of intimate relationship with the faculty, as we have here now. But it was a marvelous place. And it was a marvelous place because the people that were there were intellectual.
Jarrell: Right. A very big difference.

Adams: That’s right. And I don’t think I’ve ever really quite seen that here. I think it’s much too much to ask the colleges that they provide that, when the structure can’t do that.

Jarrell: Yes. I think that Kerr went to Swarthmore, and he was extremely impressed all during the planning stages, [of UCSC] with that sort of vision, or that experience, as a guide, in a way.

Adams: Now, I’ve argued that if we took these colleges for what they’re worth, and used all the powers that they have, there could be one Swarthmore here, okay? Twenty-four of them, let alone eight, is crazy. But we could have had one Swarthmore here. But that would involve emphasizing a demanding education, not a permissive one. I think it would have emphasized serious students.

Jarrell: It would have discriminated in terms of affirmative action and things like that, I’m sure.

Adams: Not necessarily. I have to remind you that Oberlin was the first school to give a B.A. to a black. I think you could have affirmative action and all this. It just means that you’ve got to go to find those students, and you’ve got to convince them that instead of going to Oberlin, or going to Princeton, they should come to Santa Cruz. That’s all. I could talk about Oberlin for days. But when I was at Oberlin, the point was it also was a rather radical place.

Jarrell: Certainly.
Adams: So, in any case, Santa Cruz has never quite had that. Now the other element is that Oberlin, and particularly Swarthmore, still to this day are exceptionally competitive places. If you really look at what Santa Cruz is about, in the old days it was totally uncompetitive. Competition was a no-no. It wasn’t until about five years ago that students even read their evaluations. This was just a delightful Elysian fields that people wandered through and learned. I have to say, in those early years, we had a very limited catalog. It wasn’t a big menu. But I dare you to show me that an increasingly variety of courses has really improved the education. With sadness, I look back and say to myself, well, it was pretty good then. We had half as many courses, not as much variety. My lesson from all this is that size rules over all. That bigness, smallness within bigness, means that we’re somewhat different from Santa Barbara, Riverside, Berkeley. But nonetheless, the size of the place affected the education.

Jarrell: The departments.

Adams: That’s right. We are now much more like Santa Barbara and Berkeley, if you look at our catalog, than we are like Oberlin or Swarthmore, etc. Some of this is because students wanted it too. They wanted the broad menu. So, the other thing that happened was we took our eye off of lower division versus upper division. I think we failed in the lower division. That’s my own opinion. All this reaggregation with regard to colleges has drawn attention to specialized, narrow programs at the upper division. A program in South Pacific studies, with an interest in insular South Pacific—I mean, we’re talking about Indonesia. What we’re not offering, which the University of Chicago now does, and I hope we can reinstate it here, is a prerequisite that everybody in the social sciences has to have
a three-quarter sequence where they read the great books in the social sciences. I’m looking to the future and saying, “Well, the colleges don’t seem to be able to do it; the division will do it.” But, you see, we lost. We became so permissive that practically any damn thing would be a prerequisite or meet the social science requirement.

**Jarrell:** Well, I know that’s changing. For instance, in politics, more and more, there are courses that are required and you can’t just fit in “X” number of units, and that counts as your major.

**Adams:** Sure. That’s right. That’s the problem with the requirements idea; you have to be careful, as they tend to go the more professional route. Grant McConnell and I teach a course and we’re profoundly affected by the notion that these students haven’t read anything. I mean, we’re talking about upper-division students and this is a Crown course, but when you ask them, “Who is Edmund Burke?” “Do you know who John Stuart Mill is?” We were amused yesterday when we finally asked them, “Has anybody read the Communist Manifesto?” They’re just not well read. And the difficulty is, I suspect, that a lot of our students can go through here as they can any other major, good university, and be, in some ways, illiterate, and not very well educated.

**Chancellor Dean McHenry**

Now I know, having talked to Dean, that Dean will tell you that he really now sees that this lower-division charge—to make sure students know something before they get into these more professional level courses is something he probably now feels the colleges should do. But this is ex post—
Jarrell: Yes.

Adams: He really didn’t understand it at the beginning. Now, if you add to that Dean’s own style of politics, which is a kind of dialectic pluralism, that one force would be weighted with another; that somehow, as a result the public good would come out of that. He’s a pluralist. It wasn’t divide and conquer, as I think a lot of people see it. I don’t really believe that. I think he was just a pluralist and thought you’d let this run and always have an opposing force.

Jarrell: The process would—and that would emerge.

Adams: That’s right, a public—the good of the institution.

Jarrell: Yes.

Adams: Dean did not run this place as a dictator. On occasion he made his own choices. I’d say probably one of the great problems he had was in the last two years he backed off. There were non-decisions, and too many of them.

Jarrell: Of what nature?

Adams: Well, on certain appointments when there were conflicts, he just left the parties in the room to decide it, this kind of thing. I’m convinced he knew that he had a mess. By the time that he got past five colleges he didn’t know what to do anymore.

I think over and above that, because he had this baronial view of provosts living in their houses and all, he never knew how to make the colleges accountable. And he didn’t know how to make the provosts accountable. So in the last few
years, I remember, he never visited the colleges. In the early years you could see him all over the campus. You asked him, “Why don’t you go up to Crown?” And he’d say, “Well Bob, they didn’t invite me.” I used to say, “Well, hell, you go down there like the admiral of the fleet and you tell them that you’re coming on inspection.” And they would clean the place up, but he had difficulty. He could never see that somehow this was administrative and that he could hold them accountable. Now, this also has to do with the fact that the colleges are communities. That’s something he never understood. I guess what I’m really saying is he never understood the colleges as they really were: cultural entities. And that’s because he never was in one. I used to think, when I was assistant chancellor of planning and analysis, my enormous advantage was that I was the only person in Central Services who was in a college, so I could understand those messages. I could read them. When they were upset about something, I knew what it meant.

Jarrell: You could read between the lines and knew where they were coming from. I was going to say you’re one of the few people that I’ve encountered who has been so involved in both places.

Adams: Right, right. And I think it came out in funny ways. I used to think I did a damn good service for the campus in running its fiscal stuff, just meeting a payroll. But if you ask Dean, “What did Bob Adams do for Dean?” —it was that I understood what was going on the campus. I could interpret it for him. Part of that was just my style, but I think the other part of it was that I had been in those other units, and I understood how to read them, the board as well. And there is something about this campus that has a strange and isolated central services.
And that has to do with its structure and the vision that the chief officer has, of how he relates. Dean, I have to believe, saw that he was having difficulty with all this.

**Jarrell:** And that it was kind of unraveling everything.

**Adams:** Yes, yes. My own interpretation is that he should have done something. Now, I think what it really means in terms of education is that after four colleges, this place was going the Santa Barbara-Berkeley route. Because when we had just the colleges on one side, that was ideal. That was just perfect.

**Jarrell:** In terms of scale and—

**Adams:** The whole thing. Everybody knew everybody. All the faculty knew each other. There were four colleges; there were only four provosts. That made sense, okay. Once we started going up to eight, I think we lost that overall community sense of values. People don’t know each other anymore. And the kind of alienation that comes from fragmentation set in. So that’s when you begin to get the ambiguity, the love-hate relationship that faculty have with the place. It got too complex. Every time you want to hold a meeting or get something done, you have to have ten people there.

**Jarrell:** Or coming from all over the place.

**Adams:** Yes. After four, you could begin to see that working. After four, you could begin to see that eight provosts have to be treated differently than four, especially when you have four of all chancellorial capability, or at least three. I mean, Glenn Willson, Page Smith, and Kenneth Thimann—I think everyone
would agree, any one of those three could have been, and still could be a chancellor of this campus. If you looked now at the eight provosts, they’re fine people but they’re not in that league.

**Jarrell:** They’re not of that rank.

**Adams:** And that just means a whole different feeling to the campus. So Dean was having trouble running it. It was getting too complicated. Now, if he was conscious of it or not, I certainly was.

**Jarrell:** Well, to fit in a nice, straightforward question, if you just could give me a sort of quick assessment of just how he was as a chancellor. How would you rate him?

**Adams:** Oh, all right. I rate him prima. I felt, due to being an administrator, very fortunate to have worked under him. But he had his failings, too. From the standpoint of an administrator, he had an immense capacity to accumulate detail. He knew where everything was. And that’s partly because he grew up with it, but also partly because he just paid attention. He loved it and he worked. I’ve not seen a man I’ve ever worked for put that much time in. He loved the campus.

Now that’s one aspect. The other side of it was, that he was always open to faculty. He knew every faculty member by name. In fact, I remember one being insulted because he didn’t know him by name. They were genteel people, the McHenrys. They invited faculty to their house. You always knew who you were with, where you were at with him. If he didn’t like what you were saying, it
showed all over. He’d get red in the face. He was tough. But if a faculty member had a difficulty, he would say, “Come to my house tonight and we’ll talk about it.” If there was the slightest notion that one of our senior faculty was going to leave, Dean would have them to the house. “Let’s talk about this and what we can do about it.” He knew where it was at that way. He got to know students; he loved the physical planning aspects, the campus. He was an old farmer and he enjoyed getting out just seeing where things were, and of course, he had a crazy thing about the trees. But mind you, that it was the kind of, in my mind, the kind of funniness about the physical plant. Early on, the Twist Report said that we should not build along what is called the ecotone line. That is along the trees, because everything is there. Why? Well, because Dean wanted the views for the provosts’ houses. You know, in fact, it’s sort of a funny ambiguity. If you look at the College Five entrance, there’s a tree standing there. That entrance was supposed to be a one-piece entrance, but it wraps around the tree. Well, Dean overrode Tommy Church. I was there. The landscape consultant said, “That tree had to stay.” So, it was sort of a funny thing.

The other thing was that he had an enormous concern about details of life of people on the campus. If he was walking alone here and he saw a hole in the road, he’d call down there and say, “Get it fixed.” Or our pathway we’ve just had put into the social sciences—that’s a dangerous situation. Dean would call [Hal] Hyde in and say, “Do something about it.” He was very concerned about people’s lives on the campus. The paper fluid went with him. I used to draft letters for him, and it was just a very smooth operation. He was marvelous for
me to work for directly, simply because on only one occasion did he ever override my decision. But any other time—

**Jarrell:** He gave you a lot of rope.

**Adams:** — there were no end runs, I mean, there were a couple of interesting cases. At one time we were fighting for resources with University Hall, which Dean saw as his job.

**Jarrell:** Representing this campus against—

**Adams:** This campus against University Hall. And connection with the Regents. That was his prime thing, although most people didn’t know it. I remember the occasion when finally I had come down so hard that Chet McCorkle, the vice president, came down and asked Dean to put me on a rope, that I was coming on too heavy. Dean was lovely and said, “Well, I can do that, Chet, but you know the six things Bob’s been talking about, I agree with five of them and if you give me four of them, I think we can quiet down.” Well, we got four of them. And whenever Dean, or a vice chancellor, or a faculty member wanted resources, Dean would see them, but his answer always was that, “Before I’ll go ahead you’ll have to get Bob’s okay.” So he was marvelous that way.

**Jarrell:** Support for faculty, support for the conditions for faculty.

**Adams:** That’s right. Well it was very important that the assistant chancellor of planning and analysis was an academic, because the academic side of the campus ought to drive it. He didn’t fully trust the nonacademic. I think he worried they wouldn’t enrich that side of the campus and I think he felt that’s
not where it was at. But over and above that, he was just very supportive. Only on one occasion did we have a major drag out, and that happened to do with a personal foible of his. It’s one of the few times that I identify a personal thing. And that is I had okayed $15,000 for the purchase of birth-control stuff for the health center.

Jarrell: For the ladies.

Adams: Not just for the ladies, for the men too.

Jarrell: Oh.

Adams: Dean was furious. It was strictly a personal thing. Hal Hyde was there, I remember that. Dean blew up at me, and I said, “As far as I’m concerned we ought to be passing out condoms in the dining halls the way they used to pass out cigarettes.” He was furious. Then it finally got down to Hal saying, “Well, Bob, this is a new generation.” I said, “Dean, you were a Marine, weren’t you? Didn’t they give you a sex lecture?” Well, that was the one time he overruled me. I respected him for it. It was his—

But otherwise, the other thing you have to understand, I was staff to him. I shared that job with no one. I was the only officer on the campus that didn’t have his job interlocked with somebody else. So I was happy and satisfied. And I knew why. I didn’t have to go around asking other people to match their job up with mine. Every provost, every dean, vice chancellor, whatever, always had to go through this matching up. And, of course, none of them I think ever found it as satisfying. There was always an appearance that Dean called the shots and this
was all designed so he could decide. My impression was that wasn’t always really true. It was just his style to have that balance.

I think he’s a very impressive man. I think if he had any failures it was in the last couple of years. I’m not sure that he showed the judgment on appointments that he could have in the earlier years. I don’t think he was as tough. I think he was rather desperate to get a couple of things going on the campus before he left. That’s one thing. The other thing is that he had a capacity to be a mean son-of-a-bitch, and that’s the only way I can describe it, over petty things.

Jarrell: He’s a very strong man.

Adams: Very strong man, but strong in a funny sort of way. He rarely wanted to be in a room in a conflict situation without someone else there. So I was often called in when we knew there was going to be conflict. My role was to be the antagonist so Dean could sit and not get involved; then occasionally he would tone me down and come out looking comfortable. But he rarely—he did not like personal conflict. He didn’t like personal confrontation; he hated it, in my judgment. So usually when there was a tough situation, there was always more than one person there.

Jarrell: But that’s just a strategy.

Adams: No, I don’t think it was just a strategy. I think he honestly, personally he didn’t want to be in those situations and it was absolutely comforting to him to have somebody else in the room. Even sometimes when he was the tough guy, just having me sit there—you know over trivial things. Once a man came in from
manufacturing: “God damn it, why don’t you have a football team here? I want to give money and I built Michigan State University’s football team and why, why—“ So Dean called me and I had to come in and sit there. There’s a funny story there, because I had a paper route in the worst part of town when I was a kid, and this man was a vice president of a manufacturing company in Michigan. And he said he’d been in Michigan in Saginaw, where I grew up, a number of times, and he remembered being on Water Street. I smiled and said, “Well, I used to pedal papers on Water Street.” Then I looked at both of them and said, “You know, in fact, I’m probably the only major administrator of a major university, in a fairly high position, who has pedaled papers to a whorehouse.” Which is what I did on Water Street. It was very clear what kind of recreation this guy was involved in when he visited Saginaw. And it was funny. Dean was actually horrified that I would say this, because this is Dean’s moralism, but it shut him up, the other man. The other man decided, “Well, I think it’s time for me to go.” I thought it was terribly funny. I was proud of it, because I thought, you know, I’ve done a lot of different things, and that was one of them. I learned a great deal from that. If you pedal papers in a place like that you know something about a university.

Dean was magnificent outside. He translated this campus beautifully to the Regents, to visitors. [But people in town] never really warmed up to him. I suppose that’s partly what Dean wanted. Dean knew everybody, always smiled, but I think somehow there was a kind of estrangement there. People respected the fact that he was interested in everybody, but he was powerful, and fear goes with that. So I think there was always some ambiguity about people’s feelings
towards McHenry. Some people really disliked him. And unintentionally, on occasion, I saw him do things that I would just consider mean, just mean. Nothing big. It was something that most people wouldn’t really observe. But it just was simply mean. And that I never understood. That part of Dean McHenry I never could agree with.

**Jarrell:** He did this little petty stuff?

**Adams:** Yes. There’s a certain vindictiveness to it. But over things that I never felt were critical. Academics have their foibles, and they sometimes push too hard or they say the wrong things, and you just have to say, “Well, that’s the way they are,” and let it go. Dean occasionally said “No, you challenged me in a way I didn’t like and I’m going to ding you.” And he would ding people. But again, as I say, not in a way that most people would observe it. You know, more of a private way and not over significant matters. I never could understand that.

But absolutely, I think as I understand now, outside of Roger Heyns [chancellor of UC Berkeley], he’s probably the best chancellor that the University of California has had in a number of years in any of the campuses. Just knew what the hell was going on. You could go to Regents meetings and the Regents would ask questions; they’d ask questions about something at Santa Barbara, and Dean would get up and say, “Well, I think I can explain what the Regents had done and this is how it worked.” He knew this stuff, and he could get up and tell people that this is how it happened. He’d come to the Senate; a faculty member would ask a question. Dean would get up and say, “Well, look, I’ll explain. This is how it went, Professor so-and-so. We did this and then we did that and then I
decided to do this and that." He knew it and people—you just couldn’t push him around, he knew where it was at. So in that sense he was great. He had a hell of a time with the student riots, with the whole late sixties, but I don’t think because he was unnecessarily unsympathetic to the antiwar movement. I think it was much more of a personal reaction. He never did understand the longhair.

Jarrell: What the propriety of it all—

Adams: It was defiling his campus. This campus was his sort of virgin Cinderella. I don’t mean to be this Freudian about this; this is simply true. Anything that would, sort of defile the campus, he was against. And he thought that these student demonstrations and that sort of activity would do damage to the Santa Cruz campus. Well, I suspect it did, but there were broader social issues that one had to think about. But that’s what’s finally in his head. I mean, it even came, as I say, to the birth control business finally—that it was all right for people to screw around in town but just don’t do it on my campus. That really was what was behind some of that. And so, he was a very interesting man.

As I look back, I will always remember having the opportunity [to spend] a lot of time with him. Occasionally, in retrospect, I shouldn’t say this because it has bad connotations, but for a couple of years there I remember Brewster [Smith] once saying Lloyd Ring and I were McHenry’s Ehrlichman and Haldeman—shouldn’t say that nowadays, in retrospect—but we had that kind of relationship with him.6

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6 This oral history was conducted shortly after the Watergate crisis—Editor.
Jarrell: But you weren’t just like—that connotes hatchet men.

Adams: That’s right. No, no. We didn’t do that sort of thing, at least I didn’t. But it was fun and things were moving ahead very nicely, and I think Dean just knew what, where he was going. Dean knew how to make the thing go. The problem was that very early, as I said, he didn’t understand anymore what Santa Cruz was, what the colleges ought to be. I mean, he had a sort of notion about the values of Santa Cruz—there should be flexibility, decency to students, encouragement of innovation, and pride in his faculty. People used to say, “My God, you know he’s always talking about the number of the National Academy people that we have here, and all.” They’d ding him for that in the early years. But then they understood that he was proud of his faculty. I think he meant for the Regents and the outside world to understand how successful Santa Cruz was after five years, because there were a lot of people—still today—a lot of people who don’t believe in its success.

The Search for a New Chancellor

Jarrell: At the end of his tenure, once he had announced he was going to retire, did you have anything to do with the chancellor’s search committee? Were you on it?

Adams: No.

Jarrell: Did you have any thoughts generally about it, anything significant that you thought they should try to come up with—assess itself?
Adams: Well, sure. Not many people know this, but I actually went in and told Dean that he ought to step down. I knew him well enough that we had these conversations. One day I went in and said, “You know Dean, I think it’s gone far enough.” Probably because I realized that Dean had done everything that he could possibly do for the campus and things were getting bad, fiscally, etc. You can only do so much. He’d had his ten years and that’s it. I said, “What you should do,”—but he never did do this—I said, “Please, what you should do is come in one day, say to Ginger Campbell, who is a marvelous person, “This is my last day. And then leave. Tell [President Charles] Hitch in advance that you’re going to do it, but don’t tell the campus.” He didn’t choose to do that, so we had a lame duck year. And that was the beginning of a not-too-good transition.

As far as the search committee goes, I didn’t have a great deal of involvement with it, except that I had a long interview with them at one point about what I saw as the kind of chancellor Santa Cruz ought to have. And then, on a few occasions during the search, I was really very disturbed that it didn’t appear as if the campus was going to get the opportunity to see who the new chancellor was. I called at least two members of the search committee, and told them I thought unless something improved they ought to resign, because we just couldn’t afford to have someone just lay somebody on us, as it appeared it was going.

I think the search committee was pretty good. It may have not had enough of what I call hard hats on it, toughies who’d been through this, who could just stare down the Regents, or who were willing to resign. But I sense that they [the hard hats] had the least opportunity for conversations with the candidates. I had
that formal interview with them and then I had conversations like that after. And of course, as it played out, in many ways the new chancellor was—laid on us.

**Jarrell:** By whom, do you think?

**Adams:** Well, I don’t know. I’d been invited over to Dean’s house to meet Mark Christensen. I was told at the time that he was one of the candidates. So I went over and met him and that afternoon. I went over to see McHenry. Dean looked at me and said, “They picked the chancellor. I can’t tell you who it is, but I’m very pleased. It’s a scientist.” I think Dean in some ways wanted a scientist. It was very strange. I went home that evening and then it finally clicked in my head what he was telling me. This didn’t occur to me at the time, that I had just met the new chancellor.

Well, then the next day John Isbister called me. He was calling on behalf of John Marcum, who was running the search. They were part of the search committee, “What did I think of this one candidate?” I said, “I’m not going to tell you because that’s the new chancellor, and why should I now tell you what I think of him?” And that’s how it came to pass. Later on it came out that there had been a scanty search and that Christensen really had been laid on the search committee.

This is all secondhand information and so it’s nothing that I know directly. There’ve been some people on the search committee that speculate that Dean McHenry had a strong hand in this. My honest opinion is that he did not. I really don’t think so. The man had an enormous sense of propriety and I should say, the one thing he really knew better than anyone else, he knew exactly what a chancellor was. The chancellor is the chief officer carrying out the orders of the
Regents on this site, and he’d never let you forget it. He was chancellor. He worked for the Regents. I think, because of that, my own guess was that he would never interfere with the chancelloral search, because he was so proper in his thinking about who did what. I think he felt this was the president’s appointment. If the president asked his advice he’d give it, but he wasn’t going to meddle. So my suspicion from what I know of Dean, is that he really didn’t have much to do with the selection of Mark Christensen. Then there’s a lot of speculation as to who did, but I—it’s third hand stuff.

**Jarrell:** You met Mark Christensen but you wouldn’t tell [John] Isbister what you thought of him?

**Adams:** Right.

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**Impressions of Chancellor Mark Christensen**

**Jarrell:** Once he was here, once it was a fact, he’d given his inaugural address—can you characterize just some general feelings you had about the kind of man he was?

**Adams:** Well I, it’s sort of funny. My involvement with Mark Christensen, I think, was prior to his inaugural.

**Jarrell:** Oh, when he was at Berkeley?

**Adams:** No, I never knew him [there]. By the way, my impression of him was reasonable. I should make it clear—I had an impression of him when I first met him, although I didn’t pass it on—which was, that he was “all right.”
Jarrell: Yes.

Adams: I didn’t know what to think of him. He was the number two person at Berkeley, so you know it must be pretty good. It was such a funny kind of cocktail thing. I don’t like to make judgments of people from meeting them over cocktails. It’s just not very useful. But he seemed like a kind of youngish, boy Bob Kennedy, John Kennedy type person. That was my impression of him. There are things here that I’ve not really told other people, but it’s sort of useful, I think it’s interesting.

I can’t date this, but I’d say August after he’d been appointed, by the end of August, maybe even into early September, I happened to be over at Central Services, and you must understand that people over there, I saw them all as my friends, I still do—Ginger Campbell, Barbara Sheriff, Barbara Santa—I knew all these people and I admire them and they’re nice people to work with, just a marvelous group of people. And one of them, I don’t remember who it was, pulled me aside and said, “Bob, can’t you do something?” I said, “Well, what’s the matter?” And he said, “Well, something’s wrong here. The paper’s not flowing, it just—you know, he [Christensen] doesn’t really quite understand. He really ought to be talked to by somebody that’s been around a bit to try to fill him in. Plus, you know, he ought to talk to faculty members. Anyway, he ought not to be isolated.”

Well, so I called him up and I said, “Let’s go to lunch.” Marvelous. We went to lunch. He was very nice and I, I think, I pointed out to him at that time that there was, what I call drums along the Nile here about the colleges and boards, and if
he let the chancelloral cloak get dragged down into that he’d never survive.

“Now this is just a mess. Stay away from it. Take your time. Spend a first year just grinding things out and presenting us well to the outside. But be careful that you don’t get involved. This place will eat you up. Don’t get caught in that.” It was a very nice discussion.

But a funny thing happened that—you know, I don’t know why, but it hit me symbolically. I don’t know what somebody listening to this will think about it, but it seemed very strange. When lunch was done, we spent two or three minutes trying to figure out how much of the bill was mine and how much was his. My immediate reaction was to remember Dean McHenry the last time I went out to lunch with him—he picked up the bill and said, “It is my pleasure to pay for one of my faculty members.” Now you have to remember that the chancellor has a discretionary fund. None of this comes out of his own pocket, and to some extent that it might it’s a tax write-off. I had this sense all of a sudden, “Gee, this guy’s not very savvy. My God, if you’re an experienced top-flight administrator —” I introduced him to Gilda Stagnaro that day. We ate at Stagnaro’s. Gilda’s just a lovely person.

Jarrell: Oh, she certainly is.

Adams: She knows everybody by first name—she knows my kids yet, by first name—and I thought, well here’s real Santa Cruz. I introduced her to Mark Christensen, but he just sort of passed her by. So I left that meeting puzzled. I questioned Mark. That was my first meeting with him and it left me puzzled. My next meeting with him was over a matter of affirmative action appointment, the
appointment of the assistant chancellor of planning and analysis. There was a major search for an assistant chancellor of planning and analysis and, for whatever reasons, nobody ever asked my advice. Well, now you can say that’s hurt feelings or whatever, but I felt, I’m a senior faculty member. I think I’m well respected in that capacity. I was at University Hall, I’m certain of that. I knew what the job was about and what was going on.

Jarrell: You’d made the job.

Adams: Yes. You’d think somebody would call you up and ask you but they didn’t. So I wrote them a letter and I said, “Look, there’re two people who I recommend. One is a woman on this campus. The other is an acquaintance of mine at Harvard University; I’d recommend either one of them as being top-class.” Well, as you know, he made a different appointment than that. So I called up [Eugene] Cota-Robles and said, “I have not talked to the woman involved, but I understand from the people on the search committee that this woman was one of the finalists. And the chancellor ignored that. I think as a matter of affirmative action— Well, unfortunately, and to my surprise, Gene just set up a meeting like this with Chris. I didn’t expect to have this. So I went in to see him and I said, “Look, here’s where I am. You should have appointed Penaat—this is the person involved. As it’s worked out, I think Elizabeth’s even in a better—anyway, so it’s all come out to the good.

Well, we went around on that. It was a rather interesting experience. He just said, “Oh, this other person was top-flight, had a lot of budget experience.” And I
said, “Well, I’ve never seen a file and I don’t know that.” It was, I think, a funny session. Because we just sort of left it up in the air.

**Jarrell:** He did?

**Adams:** Yes. I think he was mad. But anyway, I had a funny relationship with him.

**Jarrell:** Early on?

**Adams:** Early on. In retrospect, I kind of wish—as my wife says, “You should not have gone and said, ‘Hey, look, here’s how you ought to do things.’” So I can understand why. All I know really about the administration is just what I heard and saw and the scuttlebutt I naturally picked up, and what I saw of him. He came to Crown and he talked about dinosaurs and evolution. He gave essentially the same speech that he gave at the inaugural. I think the inaugural was the first time the whole campus saw him.

**Jarrell:** At the Quarry.

**Adams:** That was the first time I saw him in that capacity. And I was left very unimpressed. He was a nice person; he met people well. I think many of us were probably more upset about the way he handled some of the student receptions. I don’t think anybody expected his wife to be there, but the mannequin with her name on it was, I think, an affront to a lot of people.

**Jarrell:** I don’t understand.
Adams: His wife was not there, okay? They had a mannequin standing there that had “Mrs. Christensen” stuck to it.

Jarrell: Really?

Adams: Yes.

Jarrell: Was that a joke?

Adams: I don’t know. But you see most people felt it was sort of insulting. There were just a lot of things from then on.

Jarrell: Let’s talk about leadership. There was clearly some kind of tenuous situation during this last part of McHenry’s tenure.

Adams: Right.

Jarrell: So I assume that some kind of a strong person was needed to take a certain situation in hand, or to represent the university.

Adams: Right.

Jarrell: Just in terms of leadership alone, from what you saw, from what you have come to expect from a chief officer, how did he pan out? What were your feelings?

Adams: Well, I don’t think he understood the job in many, funny kinds of ways. I don’t think he understood the politics of it and I don’t think he understood what powers he had. There was a kind of nihilism there. So things started to disintegrate. A little comment like from a person who ran the files—I met here
and said, “How are things going?” “Fine, fine, not like when you were around.” And I said, “What do you mean?” “Well you know everything goes in, but nothing comes out.” This was halfway through the year. You know, when you hear something like that, that’s of course symbolic of the faculty member who is never getting his letters answered. There was just a total breakdown in the administrative paper flow, from what I could see. There were an awful lot of meetings that would always lead to further meetings, further iterations. There was a great deal of attention paid to things that weren’t really very significant. You couldn’t bring closure on things. I think that just sort of went on. There was a kind of Populism there.

I know at one time he said, “Well faculty are easy to get now, but staff and students are hard to find, so we’ve got to cater to them and not the faculty.” I just felt that Chris really never had the experience of an administrative officer. He really never did. I mean, he just wasn’t even really a chairman. He never had the tour. He just lacked administrative experience. That’s probably a fundamental problem. And then over and above that, he just didn’t know how to cover. As the year wore on, I felt he just continued to press into issues. Towards the end I told him, “You ought to take a major junket and look at multicollegial universities around the world. Just go for two months.” But he just never, couldn’t do that. He might have saved himself, I think, had he backed off a bit or tried something else.

**Jarrell:** Is he an articulate man?

**Adams:** Christensen?
Jarrell: In terms of talking about things like this?

Adams: No, no, no. I think he always used a lot of different words. He had sort of a strange systems language. I never quite fully knew what he was getting at. He couldn’t project terribly well, and when he did, it was nothing that faculty would have confidence in. It was a credibility gap that slowly developed. I think everybody felt he was a decent guy, an honest guy, a nice man. But he didn’t understand what being a chancellor was about. He just didn’t understand it.

I think another thing is that maybe he didn’t understand the job as seriously as ought to have, in some ways. Now, that had to do partly with his family. But he just couldn’t, or didn’t put in the time and effort that the McHenrys had. That was a hard act to follow. To be fair to him, I think anybody would have had difficulty following the McHenrys. Just on shear time and quality, it’s a hard act to follow. I have no question about that. But I don’t think the Christensens’ act worked out totally either. Yes, it’s okay, it’s all right, women’s liberation and all women should have their own profession and do other things, but I’m afraid I have to say, that when you pay one man $50,000 dollars a year, I suspect you really are buying more than just his time at the office. The family has to make adjustments. And if you’re not really ready to make those adjustments, then stay the hell out of the kitchen. I mean, don’t get involved. That isn’t to say his wife shouldn’t have had a profession. I think that’s fine, a good symbolic thing for the campus. But then you have to find other ways of dealing with the social aspects of the job.

Jarrell: Which are many and that’s part of the politicizing that’s very important.
Adams: I think that’s true. But they never had that worked out either. He could have survived that. My own feeling was that finally he just—I don’t know where he got his advice.

Jarrell: Did he have any advisors or friends?

Adams: I don’t think he ever had any friends on the campus. I think that’s sad for him. I think he got more and more isolated over time. I mean, it was a basket case at the end. I felt terrible about it. The man was totally alone. I just find it remarkable in retrospect, that can happen, that he should back himself into a corner like that.

Jarrell: And yet you were the person that went out of his way in one instance, and I know of other people who went out of their way, to phone him up and say, “Let’s go to lunch or let’s do this or that,” who made the first move in other words.

Adams: Right, right.

Jarrell: And felt a compassion, “I want to be of help here, in this situation. I want to ease this transition or whatever.”

Adams: Well, early, I could have easily told him where all the bodies were. He wasn’t really interested in that. It’s very, very strange. He could have said, “Bob, this is very helpful. We ought to talk more often, because I want to know about this and why that and why don’t you cover me a little bit on the fiscal stuff occasionally if I need some help?” But he never did that. He completely rebuilt his administration, which I thought was insane. I mean, just to come in and wipe
away the past without asking. He just took a recommendation of a group of people, who I would think were the ideal people to restructure things, and just restructured. So he got rid of all his experience. He got rid of [Howard] Shontz; he got rid of [Hal] Hyde—and I don’t use those words casually. I mean, they sort of got pushed aside. He brought in new people, created new jobs, and never took care of the delegations, never worked out who was reporting to who or what or why. But he just turned the whole thing, and it just fell apart.

**Jarrell:** Do you think it had any substance, any direction, any vision?

**Adams:** No, no, no. I really don’t. But you don’t have to have that to be chancellor. In fact, most chancellors at the University of California are hardly what you call visionaries.

**Jarrell:** You don’t have to be a visionary. You have to have an idea of what’s happening.

**Adams:** I think that’s a job that nine-tenths of the people could do if they’re just willing to work hard and if they’re not totally screwy. And that’s what’s remarkable about the Christensen story. He could be totally caught in the way he was. There were a lot of faculty members in the campus that could have stepped in and done a better job than him, just the average faculty member. The paper bobs up, you sign it, you push down—it works. Heavens, you just don’t start inventing all kinds of new committees and committees to committees, and when you don’t like what one committee is doing, you invent another one and that just went on for days.
Jarrell: Well, for instance, this divisional reorganization. Do you think it was some kind of a smoke screen so that people would think he was doing something?

Adams: No, I think that was so late, that it was just part of the politics. That was ill conceived. I think he finally took the advice of somebody on the campus. It was a political move. I don’t think there was any substance to it.

Jarrell: A political move.

Adams: It was an attempt to divert and to create a divisive situation. I don’t think there was any substance at all. I think then it was a very political situation. It’s sort of funny the way I got involved in this. In some ways I was one of the few people who was singled out by him as a source of his trouble.

Jarrell: I didn’t realize that.

Adams: Yes. Well, it’s sort of a funny thing. Of course, I have to see it in terms of my own life here and the way things went. But when he made me acting chancellor, his Erhlichman, one of his associates told him that, “You know if you have Adams there he’ll be very useful. He knows what the hell is going on.” This is what I was told. I wasn’t there. “If you make Adams the assistant, the acting dean of social sciences, he’ll either make you or break you.” That’s a crazy thing to tell him. I was terribly upset about it at the time. But one of his associates told him that. So needless to say, you can imagine why later on, I stayed studiously away from a lot of this conflict. I was in an acting position. I was terribly upset
about it all, but did not make a public thing about it. I didn’t talk to Wally Wood. I didn’t do all that kind of stuff. But I was outspoken.

Jarrell: Among your colleagues.

Adams: Among my colleagues, I had no question about it. I had strong feelings and I knew by then where I was at with what was going on. It wasn’t that I had a personal thing about him. I feared for this campus. I think we came pretty close to putting ourselves in a situation where the only solution was to close us down.

The Enrollment and Budget Crisis of the Mid-1970s at UC Santa Cruz

Jarrell: One thing we haven’t picked up on, which is related, is the whole money, steady-state problem.

Adams: Yes. It had nothing to do with it.

Jarrell: It had nothing to do with it, but he used that—

Adams: He used that, but it’s not true. The faculty here—things aren’t well, but there never was a cut. I mean, we’re talking about serious situations.

Jarrell: Certainly.

Adams: But there were no cuts. The only thing that happened was there were increases in the sizes of administrative budgets.

Jarrell: That’s right.
Adams: But I don’t think that that had sunk in yet. He used that, but I really don’t think that that was a problem. The problem was how to work with him.

Jarrell: But you thought at this point that actually the campus itself was threatened in some way.

Adams: Yes, I think it was threatened, because how long can you have a yo-yo at the top? It was going to affect the resources we got. I had a vision of what this place was, and I felt that if he were here too long, even if we survived, it would be at a lower level. We just couldn’t be the kind of humane place where people dealt with each other in a decent way; where you had your thing with students; where it was creative—all the things that I thought Santa Cruz stood for aside from colleges and boards, they’re there. But what it’s really about is that we’ve got some very creative, interesting students, we’ve got a good faculty, and it was an interesting place. What scared me was that we’re all going to go into our bomb shelters and hide, and that what you might call civilization at Santa Cruz would stop although we would all still be here.

Jarrell: But life would go on.

Adams: Life would go on. What I saw was that he was taking us the route where we ran the risk of becoming Riverside. That was, we’d start to have enrollment problems, all kinds of other things because we’d lost our identity. We have to have the courage here to be different. That’s really what it’s all about. We can’t be Berkeley, and we can’t be UCLA, and if we end up being Riverside we’re going to go the same route as Riverside has gone. What’s always kept us going is the fact that it was hard to pin Santa Cruz down. All that people could really see
was that students loved it, that there were all kinds of interesting things happening here. It was kind of exciting but people outside would say, “Gee, it’s kind of a funny place, but how come that happened, and that happened, and there are interesting things going on?

Jarrell: It’s not static. This is what UCSC is.

Adams: That’s right. As long as we had the courage and the kind of guts to play that game, I think we’d survive. But what I saw was we’d gotten down into talking about this program, and that program just didn’t sound like Santa Cruz anymore. That scared the hell out of me. It really just scared me. I had identified some of that with Chris. Any time someone talks about him, they all like him, they think he’s a nice person, but totally incapable of dealing with what he had to deal with.

Jarrell: You were appointed acting dean here. What was your relationship with him, in terms of your function?

Adams: I never talked to him, for a half a year. He never called me up and talked about the social sciences. The only time I saw him was when I asked to see him. I was a memo writer; I just filed memos. I didn’t even know if they had any impact. That was part of the problem. It wasn’t functioning. He didn’t need anybody else. I went to a lot of meetings that were hostile, in which there was turmoil.

Jarrell: What kind of meetings?
Adams: Provosts and deans. Where this would all spill out; it was unpleasant and it got worse. You couldn’t get answers. You’d call up, “What about this?” Well, I’ll tell you next week.” And it wasn’t just him. It was the way he handled his staff. He, unfortunately, didn’t build a strong staff around him. He had no Ehrlichman and Haldeman. He had nothing. I mean, it was just nothing. You’d call and ask to get answers to things and wouldn’t get them. You’d call again, “Well, I’ll tell you tomorrow.” And then there’d be switching of signals. I went to a meeting one night at his house to talk about a town center, and we met for an hour and b.s.’d about a town center for the campus, which I had grave doubts about. We came to some resolution for that one-hour meeting and he said, “Let’s float a paper around the campus on this.” And I said, “Oh God, please don’t float another paper around the campus. There are too many papers floating on the campus now.” But what he didn’t understand was that what he said and what he did was seen as the chancellor doing it and saying it. He wasn’t just a faculty member gadfly, like I’d like to be, where I know people aren’t going to run off and—

Jarrell: Hold you to something.

Adams: That’s right. But every time he said things, people saw them as marching orders. They all started marching in different directions, back and forth.

Jarrell: He didn’t realize the power that comes with the job?

Adams: Well, I think that was one aspect of it. Then there’s a curious thing, of which I only had one insight and only once, but I suspect was also true—I think that his wife also took more of an interest in the campus than she pretended not
to. I really think he went home on occasion and talked about these things and she told him, “Chris, that’s wrong, and you’ve got to go it this way.” And he’d come back to the office and change it. And that’s one of the reasons for the mixed signals.

I only saw one glimpse of that. Once towards the end she called me up and asked me why I hadn’t come to a meeting. She was just going through his papers and noticed that I hadn’t returned a call. That’s a minor little thing, but quite significant. I think by then his back was up against the wall and I suppose his wife, I don’t know how much earlier she’d been doing this, but I think she was involving herself in this, as I suppose many wives would, but not like that. I mean, you might go home and say to your wife, “What the hell do I do? It’s all coming down.” But I’m not sure you’d have her call one of your senior officers. I don’t think she made life easy for him. I was with them both on occasions where she—I don’t know how to say it—I went to a lunch, a supper for our inaugural lectures at which she pointed out that Chris had never given an inaugural lecture and never would be asked because he became a professor through the back door. They gave it to him because he was an administrator. Now that’s a very [odd] thing to announce to a public group. People in the community.

**Jarrell:** This wasn’t just to you on an aside. This was to the whole group?

**Adams:** This was in the toast.

**Jarrell:** Oh, my goodness. Quite astounding.
Adams: Well, it’s very strange, very strange. So as I said, there were all these kind of funny blips. It just never was all together. And—well, it’s a personal thing and it’s a family thing. The whole thing never really worked and so crazy things came out. He never knew why. I don’t think he made the best appointments. It wasn’t just that he was following McHenry and the campus wasn’t organized too well. I think a fairly incompetent bloke would have just made it go, kept the paper going.

Jarrell: Just the nuts and bolts, just keeping things moving.

Adams: Sure, sure.

Jarrell: Now, you said that publically you didn’t engage in any dialogue, but you were frank with your colleagues.

Adams: Yes.

Jarrell: Were you a loner in all this? Or did you act with other people at some point?

Adams: Well at some point, when at provosts’ and deans’ meetings, I think that became a group. There was a lot of discussion with a lot of people, faculty, etc. But at one point I was told by somebody that I was on an enemies list. This is when it got political. See, I think at a certain point it no longer was an issue of administrators squabbling. It became political, political, in the sense that something had to be done and the only way was to take some actions. And the response began to be not just a substantive one, but one of how to deal with the crisis. Analogies with the White House are reasonable.
Jarrell: Right.

Adams: I was told at one point by a good authority that I and several other people were on an enemies list. And the next day I got a call that I was to see the chancellor. I knew what was going to happen. He just looked at me and said that he’d heard I’d been pissing in the well, which is not a typically Christensen phrase, so I really felt someone else had said that I was part of his problem, not the only one. But I was rather upset, because if people had been pissing in the well, I’d have been doing less of it. I didn’t get up like Martin Kanes. I hadn’t done those things.

He said he just didn’t think he and I could work together, and what were we going to do about it? It was just an amazing thing. It was the most emotional thing I’ve ever done as an administrator, to be involved in that discussion. I said I didn’t know what the hell he was talking about, pissing in the well. I said, what I think and say on the campus I say responsibly up and down the line. That is to say, I report directly to the vice-chancellor on the campus and I had said everything to him that I said to my colleagues or students or anybody, and so I had been honest. It wasn’t something I had been saying in a cloakroom. I had been saying it to my immediate superior that I reported to. In fact, I had said it in more vibrant language to him. So it was a very curious discussion.

He finally said, “Well Bob, I guess what really upsets me is you haven’t told me these things first.” And I said, “Well, the only reason I haven’t told you first is I don’t report to you. I report to the vice-chancellor.” But I said, “If you’ll feel better about it, I’ll tell you first.” And he said, “Oh, that would help matters.” He
sort of started to back off. But it was very clear at that point that, for some crazy reason I think he would have taken my resignation, or would have liked to have seen that happen. I don’t know what he wanted to come out of that meeting. I told him, “Well, okay, now you just passed out this thing about the withering away of the social science division and I haven’t talked to anybody about it, so I’m going to tell you first. I think it’s a stupid proposal and I think you conceived it in a panic. It has no substance to it and I’m telling you first.” Fine.

**Jarrell:** He had never consulted with you about any of this, nor with any of the deans or vice-chancellors?

**Adams:** No, no, nobody. He hadn’t consulted with anybody. It just came out of his office somehow. So we left, having had that meeting, and I always thought it was curious, maybe because I was in an acting capacity, or maybe it was just a personal thing, that he or somebody had just said, “Bob is the problem.” I don’t know what it was. Was I more vulnerable than some of the other people on the “enemies list?” I don’t know what it was. But that was an awful experience, and it was part of the whole crisis. I felt badly about it.

**Jarrell:** Could you date that just roughly?

**Adams:** Oh, it must have happened the week after the proposal came out. Of course, you have to understand that from my standpoint I then began to realize that this was no longer just fun and games. This was getting to be heavy. I think it made me feel that what he was really saying to me was, in some ways it’s either me or you. He probably meant “you” in a more general sense, but it was personally taken by me at the time. I felt, well this isn’t any longer just a matter
of my feelings about the campus and my love for it. To use the parlance of the street, I was going to protect my ass now and that was it. I can take care of myself; people were going to get hurt. If not me, some other people. Of course, it was a crazy thing to do. I think if I had left that meeting no longer the acting dean it would have been the equivalent of the Saturday Night Massacre. And it would have blown the campus. Not because people have great love for me.

**Jarrell:** But you were a symbol.

**Adams:** Well, there were rumors around the campus that the chancellor had tried to fire me. Two days later he called me up and said, “Bob, the *City on the Hill Press* called me and said that I tried to fire you. Is it your understanding I tried to fire you?” I realized I don’t even have any great animosity for the guy. He really didn’t understand what that meeting could mean to somebody. I said, “No you didn’t fire me. But if *City on a Hill Press* wants to know what happened, I think it’s for you to tell them.” I never did talk to the student paper about it. I didn’t feel I needed to, or that I should, because it wasn’t really germane to what the real problem was. I saw it as sort of a petulant thing he did under the pressure of what was becoming a disaster, personally for him. But it was very sad.

**Jarrell:** It all seems very puzzling.

**Adams:** Well, not really. I think that he just didn’t have it all together. It just all came apart and he had nobody to cover for him. Part of it was the campus structure, but it was very strange. There were really no personal elements to it. Now, most would think that it would have gone somewhat differently if there
had been some personal elements to it. For example, if everybody thought one of his problems was that he was a mean son-of-a-bitch, at least there would have been something tangible.

**Jarrell:** That’s what I meant by puzzling. It seems very impersonal, very unemotional in terms of feelings about him. It’s not like, “We hate this guy; he’s just despicable, he’s a despot.” It’s totally the opposite.

**Adams:** Well, you know, towards the end in fact, he got the point. I remember at one meeting I said, “I refuse to talk about this anymore because I can’t keep telling you that you’re not hacking it, without beginning to hurt me personally.” I really felt, finally, that this was tearing me up, that I was getting chewed up in this. Not because he was doing anything to me but because I can’t spend my life telling people what’s wrong with them all the time. We’d have these heavy meetings and some of my colleagues would say, “Well Chris, you’re just incompetent, and you ought to quit.” I finally at one meeting said, “All right, let’s call a halt to the meeting. I don’t want to talk about it anymore. Why don’t you [Chris] go upstairs and we’ll talk about it by ourselves, but we just can’t go on this way because it’s disturbing, and you don’t sleep at night.”

**Jarrell:** Did you have any part in writing the December 3 letter to President David Saxon that asked for Christensen’s removal, or did you just sign it?

**Adams:** I had some part in writing it.

**Jarrell:** This was a crisis point? Something definite had to emerge, because Saxon wasn’t moving?
Adams: No, I think there were two reasons for this. One was that students were asking all the time, “What are the bill of particulars?” Now this was not a bill of particulars. This was much more of a performance evaluation. For instance, if you have a secretary who wasn’t performing well, you might say, “Well, let’s sit down.” Then the secretary would say, “Well what’s wrong?” Then the personnel officer would say, “We better put it in writing.” And you would say, “Well, this individual can’t type well, can’t articulate the needs of this office to the outside world.” It was not a bill of particulars. It was a performance evaluation. Well, students were running around saying, “What is all this?” And even some of our colleagues, “What the hell are you guys talking about? It’s all sort of vague. You can’t work with him and we don’t understand it.” So I think there was enormous pressure to finally begin to have to say something.

Jarrell: It was very ambiguous in the public mind and to the students.

Adams: That’s right. That was one side of it. The other side was that we were getting to the point where we were taking actions like this letter that asked for his removal. My personal feeling is that maybe everybody involved in this didn’t feel the same way. I felt that if my colleagues could not put their name to some document that gave in writing specific issues in which they all agreed he was failing, then we should pack up our bags and quit. We couldn’t carry this on any further.

Jarrell: It was the end of the line.

Adams: Yes. We’re down to where you had to say, “I, so-and-so, yes, I have seen these things,” or, “I understand them. I agree with them.” And so, in a way, this
letter was a heuristic thing, as well as anything else, to make it very clear that all of us weren’t talking about fluff. And that when everybody said, “Yes, I agree, let’s go,” that finally they had to take responsibility for their action, and it wasn’t a palace revolution where you could just join in.

Jarrell: Wild-eyed faculty trying to pull a coup.

Adams: That’s right. So that’s where that letter came from and why. It also resulted from a feeling and a need to respond to David Saxon. To do something that made it clear why we weren’t just wild-eyed revolutionaries.

Jarrell: How would you appraise Saxon’s role in all of this?

Adams: The first time we met with him, I was very impressed, the Thanksgiving evening meeting. That was interesting. I was one of the people that went up to the second meeting. That was very heavy. That was very strange sort of a kiss and make-up.

Jarrell: Solution.

Adams: Yes. I think we were all very upset by that meeting. One of my colleagues threw that letter for that committee that Saxon had named on the table and said, “Well, this is a big act. What are you talking about?” It was very heavy. Saxon was very uncomfortable. At one point I said, “Well, the way it looks to me, is that you’re going to send a study committee around here and they’ll fire some other people. You know, they’ll say, ‘This isn’t working, and that isn’t working, and get rid of these people.’ But it could well be that Chris would still be here and that’s not the point.” And he got furious with me.
Jarrell: Really?

Adams: Oh, yes. He just jumped down my throat. He just jumped out of his chair. Well, it was a very difficult time for him. I think he was on the spot. It was a heavy meeting. But I came out of this having a great deal of respect for David Saxon. I think he ended up doing the right thing and doing it well, and I admire him because he is human. I like him because I know where I’m at with him. I thought just the fact that he had the capacity to explode, that’s something I respect. After Chris—

Jarrell: Where you don’t know what has happened.

Adams: Yes. The interesting thing about this I might mention, is that after Angus Taylor⁷ got here—I think we were there the first night that the Taylors had people to dinner—there was the personal, handwritten invitation and a lot of little things happened that we’d all missed. I think we felt like, “Gee, things are in good hands.” We had a meeting of senior officers later on. Finally it came out that this campus hadn’t admitted any students, that the admissions office had come to a complete, stop and we’d had no admissions. Which is just an awful situation. Well, after that meeting, one of my colleagues, maybe even more than one, said to me, “Gee, you know, I guess we really did do the right thing.”

Jarrell: I knew that there was a big tie-up at admissions, that they were way behind in paperwork. But actually that was the state of it—no students were being admitted for a period of time?

Adams: Yes, they just, broke down. I don’t know how public that was.

Jarrell: I knew things were bad, but I never actually–

Adams: I think the main point was that, even after going through all of this, it was clear to me, it was a lesson to me that there were people who, even after signing a paper like this, still somewhere in the back of their minds had serious doubts. Not necessarily about what was wrong, but doubts about, should we have gone through all this?

Jarrell: The ethics in terms of, this is a person and we’re passing judgment on him?

Adams: Yes. I can understand it. It’s sort of a Cain Mutiny. And it’s also spooky because my feeling about these bills was that we were now talking specifics; this was the meat and potatoes of it all. And if one couldn’t talk at that level, I wasn’t about to associate myself with pushing anybody out, or creating a ruckus of doing anything of this sort, if there wasn’t anything that you could finally put down. Because if a group of administrators can get together in a university and push somebody out just because they don’t like him, that’s the end of the university; we can’t have that. But it was interesting that even with all we went through, there were still people who, while, “We’re involved in it, we’re all for it,” personally underneath just never fully understood it in some ways.

Jarrell: The sort of due process machinery for ousting someone at that level.

Adams: There isn’t any.
Jarrell: There isn’t any?

Adams: One of the things we told David Saxon, and I think one of the lessons that came out of this, is that the University [of California] has to institute some due process. There wasn’t any. There was no way to do this.

Jarrell: This was an ad hoc attempt to try to be fair and to document these things and make them objective.

Adams: Sure, right. But there is no due process for chancellors. That’s one of the things I learned about all this. Chancellors are there at the behest of the Regents. Some of our other chancellors aren’t what you would call beautiful people, necessarily. I think we all realized in the middle of this that was really part of the problem—there wasn’t any due process. I think the other thing we realized was vis-a-vis the students. I felt very strongly this was an internal administrative matter, that we wanted to do this in a way that would least damage Chris. Why put all the dirty linen out. But Chris made it so damn difficult. He just couldn’t back off. He would insist on calling those meetings when one would ask him not to call the meetings. He just put the pressure on all the time. I never did understand that.

Jarrell: Were you one of the faculty involved in approaching him shortly before he did resign, saying, “You must resign, please resign. You know you can go out and it’ll be much less traumatic.”

Adams: No. By then I was strictly operating as an administrative officer of the campus. Some faculty did that, I know. But that was the Senate and they handled
that separately. They did that separately. They did meet with us once and discuss it. I think there was some feeling that we’d gone so far and nothing was happening, that we had put ourselves on the line. My feeling was, and I think some others felt that way too, I was at a point in all this where, if nothing happened, I would resign. I saw that was the only way out. In fact, I seriously considered resignation several times earlier, before Chris did, on grounds that I felt I just couldn’t continue this. But resigning is a very serious, difficult thing. It is different for provosts than it is for deans. Provosts have this constituency feeling towards their colleagues and students and all, which deans don’t have in the same way. But it got to the point where you just couldn’t continue, and you had to seriously think about resignation. But resignation could have meant not ever carrying an administrative duty again for the University of California.

**Jarrell:** You would have resigned as acting dean, not as professor of economics?

**Adams:** That’s right. So I didn’t have a lot to lose.

**Jarrell:** Right.

**Adams:** Except that there was the possibility that had Chris stayed someone would have said, “Well, Adams is one of those troublemakers and we don’t want him as an administrator anymore.”

**Jarrell:** It would have made life difficult for you?

**Adams:** Well, yes. All I’m trying to say is, I think that crossed everybody’s mind. I saw Chris about a month ago at the All-University of California Charter Day. He seemed well. I think we had a pleasant momentary chat. I would say that in a
way he showed enormous strength and I think he has to be given credit for that. I really don’t think that if he stayed here or was involved in this campus in any way that he would ever be vindictive. He never showed any vindictiveness in this. He had that awful meeting with me, but that was a private meeting. He never displayed his vindictiveness publically.

**Jarrell:** He didn’t start manipulating outside—

**Adams:** Well, I don’t know. I’m sure he talked to some Regents and other people like that.

**Jarrell:** Oh.

**Adams:** But the main point was that Mark Christensen was a human being; he didn’t have the strength to make a good chancellor, but I observed that in many other capacities he was a very strong man of character. I think some of us give him a lot of credit for that. It may have been the fact that the kind of character that may have helped lead to his downfall, because in terms of the politics of it all, he was rather helpless. He couldn’t believe us. It wasn’t his nature to bully. He didn’t bluff because it wasn’t in his nature to bluff. He didn’t threaten to be vindictive.

**Jarrell:** All the political savvies—

**Adams:** Well, you know when administrators get in tight spots, there are the arsenal of things they can pull out. But this man didn’t have that. In that sense I think he left the campus, and I think many people felt sad for him because of it.
Although I don’t think it would be the best idea, I think most everyone would welcome him back.

**Jarrell:** As a faculty member?

**Adams:** Sure. Because he showed himself to be a person of character. Not making it as a chancellor, I don’t see as a character flaw. You know a lot of us don’t make it in certain ways.

**Acting Chancellor Angus Taylor**

**Jarrell:** Have you had much to do with Angus Taylor? What can you say about his stabilizing efforts, the tone he’s set?

**Adams:** It’s very clear to me he’s a man who works very carefully. He gets his advice very broadly on the campus. He sees the beginning and the end of issues. He’s eager to solve problems, settle things, get things done. He’s obviously had the experience of being a departmental chairman; you can see that all over. He also clearly understands University of California systemwide. He’s got a marvelous boyish smile. He may be a political genius. I think anybody that introduces himself to the campus by showing homemade movies of his mountain climbing, that’s political genius. I like him. He’s honest in many ways, if I can say this as a funny thing—he’s scotch in others. I begin to think that this campus can only be run by Scotchmen and only have English provosts. That’s the way it really works and we Americans ought to get the hell out of the administration. My feeling is that he really understands it. I think he’s a remarkable person to just walk into this situation and to have done what he’s done. And that in many ways reminds me more of the McHenry years, except
that I think he’s probably more personable. He’s not as much a big power thing and he’s not a pluralist. He’s not afraid to make decisions. Whether he’s able to solve what I call a congenital problem, is another question.

**Jarrell:** The college system?

**Adams:** Yes. I think that Angus is an enormously useful, stabilizing force and we’re all together. I think we all feel good about the campus. Morale is up.

**Jarrell:** I feel like there’s been a sigh of relief in certain quarters, really.

**Adams:** Yes, yes. I think everybody is just delighted and some people would like him to stay on longer. My own feeling is to look ahead and say we’ve got to get the campus straightened out. Not just, we’ve got to get rid of our congenital problem. It’s all right to have a congenital problem. It’s just when you worry about it all the time that it really causes difficulties.

**Jarrell:** Your solution would tend in the direction of strengthening or defining the role of the colleges?

**Adams:** Well, I think we just have to straighten out what we’re doing, whatever form that takes. We’ve got to look beyond colleges and not just always talk about colleges. We’ve got to strengthen it. All we need to do is go back and forget that we’re an experiment of a collegial university. All we have to say is, what you see is what you’ve got, because that’s true, to quote Flip Wilson. And then I think we have to say, “Where is the future? What do we have to do to make this campus viable in the future?” Being a stepchild of the sixties is not where it’s at. We’ve got to change. We’ve got to look ahead. Following Angus, I’d be delighted if we
could get a fairly vigorous person. One thing I’d really like to see is that it be an intellectual.

**Jarrell:** Rather than an administrator?

**Adams:** Yes, a different kind of chancellor. I think this University, this campus, deserves a different chancellor than the other campuses. I mean, I hate to say it, because there’s a certain romance about this, but a Clark Kerr type. Roger Heyns was fine that way, too. Somebody who is respected in national educational circles; somebody who knows something about higher education, about where it’s going, who has a vision. And then it won’t be that difficult to back that up with a good administration. Santa Cruz will have just a very different flavor. It just won’t have somebody who’s come up through the ranks as a good administrator. That would be neat. The faculty would love it. The faculty of this campus has a strong attachment to the chancellor. That’s an inheritance from the McHenry days. The faculty wants somebody that—now Angus provides that. But they want somebody who they think is a strong intellect.

**Jarrell:** Do you think they want strong leadership, or a direction to be indicated as well, from the chancellor?

**Adams:** Yes. And this is still an inheritance. They want somebody, even if they don’t agree with them, who will give reasons why and says, “This is the way I’m going.” Now they can say, “We disagree with that, but okay, we understand why. You’ve explained to us why we need to go that way and we’ll go along.” So the campus does need a strong chancellor, in that regard.
But what I’m saying is I don’t think that we should let the unfortunate circumstance of the Christensen years lead us to think that what this campus desperately needs is just an able administrator. That would be a tragedy. There are many people who can make this campus go at the administrative level, but what the campus needs is somebody with some vision who’s respected on the Berkeley campus, that sort of person. Somebody of the sort that we had here originally as provosts. I have to say that I’d like to see much more a person like Page Smith at work. Rather controversial—a Page Smith or a Glenn Willson or a Kenneth Thimann.

Jarrell: Who suffuse what they do with a lot more than just what they do.

Adams: That’s right. People know how to do the administrating for them. It’s a real question because I look at the University of California, they have a real habit of not picking those kinds of people. You know people talk about Kingman Brewster at Yale, and they talk about Levi at Chicago.

Jarrell: They’re people of real stature who are heading these places.

Adams: That’s right, that’s right. Wouldn’t it be neat if Santa Cruz had somebody in that ballpark, that distinguished the Santa Cruz campus from others. It fits in with what we are trying to do here. This is not just a big multi-campus, multi-college campus that’s just grinding out students in the typical state college fashion and is just big enterprise. When it becomes that, then I think most of us are not going to find it as pleasant a place as it’s been.

Jarrell: Thank you, it’s been most illuminating.
John Ellis

John Ellis was a professor of German literature at UCSC and was affiliated with Crown College. He arrived at UC Santa Cruz in 1966 from the University of Alberta, Canada. Ellis earned his BA and PhD from the University of London. He was interviewed by Randall Jarrell on May 6, 1976.

Administrative Service at UCSC

Jarrell: Let’s start out by talking about your association with UCSC.

Ellis: I’m at Crown College. I was a fellow of Stevenson until July of 1975. Then I changed to Crown College. I’m currently on leave, but from 1966 right up to now, I’ve never been a member of the faculty on campus without being chairman of a Senate committee. I’ve had chairmanship of one committee or the other in the Senate every single year I’ve been on campus and I’ve just been asked to go back on one immediately when I get back.

Jarrell: In the fall of ’76?

Ellis: Yes. So it’s going to be totally unbroken for me. I’ve never spent a minute on campus without being chairman of a committee, a senate committee that is. I’ve put a lot of my life into the Academic Senate here. I’ve believed in it as a way of organizing the faculty and a way of the faculty having a voice in the institution. I’ve always thought it was a marvelous system, best system I’ve ever seen anywhere.

Jarrell: The Academic Senate system?
Ellis: The Academic Senate, yes. So I’ve always cooperated with it totally and, as I say, I’ve always been one of the officers of the Senate. My first year I was chairman of the courses committee.

Jarrell: In ’66, ’67?

Ellis: In 1967 I was chairman of the Committee on Educational Policy. Then I was chairman of Privilege and Tenure for many years after that. I kept returning to that year after year. Then I finally decided I should quit that because I was getting too identified with it. It wasn’t good for me or anybody else. Nobody else on campus had ever been chairman of it, except me. So I wrote a letter asking to not be reappointed after I was chairman for five years. That was two years before I went on leave. Well, then immediately I was made chairman of the Committee on Collective Bargaining for two years, the Senate Special Committee on Collective Bargaining, which went out of existence just as I went on leave. I’ll be chairman of Privilege and Tenure again next year.

Jarrell: So you’ve been very actively involved in all the kinds of faculty issues and questions and problems?

Ellis: Well, yes, the kind of issues that turn on legal matters; I mean legal in a broad sense—the rules of the university, how those rules are applied to individual faculty members.

Jarrell: The requirements?

Ellis: Yes. The conditions of employment, the privileges of faculty, the tenure decisions, and all those things within the purview of the Privilege and Tenure
Committee. That’s really the reason I’m going back on it. It’s somewhat a technical thing. You could be chairman of the Committee on Educational Policy, simply because you’ve been around a university five years, and we all think about what educational policy is. But the Privilege and Tenure Committee is one where you have to know the rules and know the custom and know how the situation works. You have to have a quite strong grasp of the details, of the rules of the system, and you can’t pick that up overnight. You can’t just have anyone take that role. You’ve got to have someone with experience of it. That’s why the terms of that committee tend to have been longer.

**Jarrell:** So there’s specialized knowledge?

**Ellis:** Yes. There’s a lot of specialized knowledge involved.

**Coming to UC Santa Cruz**

**Jarrell:** So you came to UCSC in 1966?

**Ellis:** Yes.

**Jarrell:** Where had you been before then?

**Ellis:** The University of Alberta, Canada.

**Jarrell:** And why did you come here?

**Ellis:** Well, I left Canada because I got tired of the cold winter. Also, I was an assistant professor without tenure and it was clear I could get tenure by moving to a more attractive position from a physical geography point of view, and financially and security-wise.
How I came here was just answering advertisements. There’s a famous [professor] at Columbia University who is recognized as a kind of employment exchange in the field of German. If you have a job that you want to appoint, you let him know. Everybody else in the country knows that and they just write him and say what jobs and he gives you a print-out of [who] he knows. That’s how the profession worked in those days. I think it may be a little bit bigger now. He sent me a list of about eight immediately and Santa Cruz was one of them. So I just applied and wound up with three or four job offers—this was one of them—and I liked the area. There’s no question, the Pacific Coast, the ocean, and Santa Cruz brought me here.

Jarrell: And during that time that’s when a sort of golden aura was around UCSC.

Ellis: Well, that didn’t attract me.

Jarrell: That didn’t?

Ellis: No. What attracted me was a very, very nice place to live and one or two congenial people. I never thought the college system had been well thought out. I always thought that would give trouble sooner or later.

Jarrell: You thought that before you had actual experience.

Ellis: Yes. I never thought it was a well-thought-out system.
Jarrell: Did you come with any particular expectations of what kind of a scholarly life was available here, in terms of the academic community? Had you heard anything, or did you have anything in mind, or were you pretty open?

Ellis: Well, the only thing I knew was that it was new, obviously, and I’d be involved in building up a department. That was attractive, of course—to get together a first-rate group of Germanists. In fact, we’ve grown so slowly that wasn’t possible. That was an expectation that actually wasn’t realized. It certainly would have been nicer if we had grown faster, from that point of view.

Jarrell: The literature board is very large.

Ellis: Yes, but German is very small. There are three [faculty]. To get a reasonable group, six or seven, we’d need to be fifteen thousand students, twenty thousand students.

Jarrell: We’d have to be at least double.

Ellis: Yes, right.

Jarrell: But in those days that was foreseeable because the enrollment was going to be so much grander than what’s predicted now.

Ellis: Sure. Well, we had the same numbers of faculty in German in 1967 that we do now.

Jarrell: That’s very interesting.

Ellis: Yes. I know.
Jarrell: I’d like to talk about McHenry.

**Chancellor Dean McHenry**

Ellis: Well, McHenry is always going to be thought of as a strong figure when people look back on the founding of Santa Cruz. Most people are going to remember his weaknesses rather than his strengths, because there were really many more of those. I feel obliged to dwell on the good he did. It’s very impressive that he built up the campus out of redwood trees, and I still feel that the sheer organizational skill to create something out of nothing is really admirable. I admire the fact that he was able to preside over that. God there’s a hell of a lot to do: decisions to hire, not just good faculty people, but people who have to run the steno pools; people to run the campus police; people to run the business office; the architects.

Jarrell: All the mechanics.

Ellis: Yes. He had every detail, down to the design of the sewers. That’s a really impressive achievement for anyone to have presided over.

However, his contribution to the campus academically, his influence on the academic development, the way he leaves things after ten years, the whole quality of the place—the quality of faculty, the strength of the administration, the degree of coherence of the way the place runs—all that is really not so impressive. To begin with, he was a very poor judge of people, especially of administrators and senior people to appoint. He made countless, terrible mistakes in top appointments.
Jarrell: Are you talking about administrative appointments?

Ellis: I’m talking about leading faculty appointments and senior administrator appointments. He made a number of senior faculty appointments which effectively crippled the subject areas. Two subjects that are very close to me are linguistics and philosophy. McHenry made the initial senior appointments [that] would obviously dominate the development of the field.

Jarrell: The rest of the appointments?

Ellis: Yes. The initial senior appointments were just very silly and showed a total lack of judgment on his part. I think the same was true in history. These are personal judgments, I guess, although there are ways in which one can test them. The funny thing is that the sciences, which were thought to conceivably be the weak link in Santa Cruz, have flourished. They flourished because Dean McHenry had no influence on them.

Jarrell: Well, he got [Kenneth] Thimann here, right?

Ellis: He got Thimann and then from that point on Thimann dominated the development. Thimann was a lucky appointment. McHenry managed to get a very distinguished scientist from Harvard and from that point on the development of the sciences was really assured because Thimann dominated the whole area.

Jarrell: Thimann made decisions about who and what?
Ellis: Yes. Essentially Dean McHenry had very little influence on the sciences after that. The result is the science boards are very strong now and this is supposed to be a liberal arts campus. The humanities division, on the whole, is rather weak in most areas. Social sciences is really weak in a lot of areas.

Jarrell: Numerically, if you go through the whole roster of the faculty, I think it’s three to one in favor of social sciences and humanities appointments to natural sciences. I’m just starting to understand that is a strange development. This is supposed to be our liberal arts campus. If you count the total number of faculty, including lecturers and acting assistants, there were more appointments in humanities and social science versus scientists, hard scientists. But it seems that the influence of the larger numerical number has waned.

Ellis: Well, because the competence of the scientists is very great. Many of the humanities, social science areas are quite weak, really. The sociology board is a moderately weak board. Psychology, apart from one or two people, is moderately weak. Politics, Dean McHenry’s own field, is not terribly strong.

McHenry had an immense concern that he oversee every appointment. He insisted on interviewing every single candidate for a junior position himself. But he was totally devoid of judgment. He made horrendous errors and we now face a situation where there is a good deal of weakness on the faculty, much more than there should have been for a new campus in a beautiful place as this. No question that it was McHenry’s bad judgment which has produced a faculty with some strengths, but some really great weaknesses, whole departments.

Jarrell: So you think in terms of academic planning that he was just lousy?
The UCSC College System

Ellis: Well, no. I’ve been talking now about appointments. When you come to the business of academic planning, the college system is his contribution. But Dean really never understood what he was doing when he set up a college system. For example, anywhere else where you have a college system like Pomona, London, Oxbridge, the colleges bear responsibility in some measure for the bread and butter stuff—chemistry, physics, sociology, mathematics—the colleges are involved.

What Dean had facing him was a situation where the American university had departments running the programs. He liked this notion of nice liberal colleges. But what he didn’t realize was that those colleges were involved in running programs. In Oxford, the tutor in a particular field teaches the students in that field in his college. London has a different setup. London has bigger colleges, and on the whole what happens there is that the colleges take the first couple years of an undergraduate [student’s education] and as the student gets more senior, he branches out into university-wide courses. Graduate students [take] university-wide courses.

In the collegiate system, there is a sort of established position for the college running bread and butter programs. That’s how they function. That’s why they’re meaningful; that’s why their buildings are there, because they got work to do. Now, when Dean set up these buildings, Cowell College, Stevenson College, he totally ignored what they were going to do. Not a single moment was given to this planning, so we have university-wide departments called boards of studies. They call them boards of studies, but they’re departments. They run
programs; they certify majors exactly as they do at the University of Minnesota, in Yale, and Harvard. This is a departmental university.

**Jarrell:** Although it’s called by a different name.

**Ellis:** That’s right. There are collegiate buildings, and people talk a lot about colleges, and the propaganda of the place talks about colleges, and Dean McHenry was obsessed with presenting it as a college campus. But this is a departmental university. People try to find work for the colleges to do. They try, but the failures have been dreadful. And even when they’ve succeeded, they’ve been minor things. So what Dean did was to set up a fraud, a system where this was a departmental campus with a collegiate facade. It would be advertised in *Time* as this great collegiate experiment. “Experiment” nothing. The colleges did nothing. What sort of collegiate structure was that? All that happened was that we have buildings called colleges.

**Jarrell:** We have provosts.

**Ellis:** We have provosts. And both the buildings and the provosts tend to get in the way of the ordinary bread and butter stuff going on. Typically, what’s happened over those years is that the departments would get in the swing of doing the work. Provosts would sit there thinking, “Gee, I’ve got a big title and a salary, some buildings, and college fellows, and students live in the college—what am I going to do with it all?” So they would try to think up schemes and they would tend to get very resentful. The board of studies really did everything. They ran promotions and funds.
Jarrell: Who has the money?

Ellis: Well, you see that’s a myth. The real people who have the money are the central administration.

Jarrell: Well in terms of your appointment, for instance—you’re a fellow and you’re at Crown?

Ellis: Yes.

Jarrell: Now, you’re also in the literature board?

Ellis: Yes.

Jarrell: Is your salary paid from two sources or from one?

Ellis: Well, you see this is metaphysical. In other words, it’s totally unreal.

Jarrell: Is it pretend money?

Ellis: Yes. It’s very pretend money. It’s budgeted as half-Crown College, half-literature board. When I was in Stevenson, it was half-Stevenson and half-literature board. But it’s unreal. That’s a budgeting system. It all comes out of central services. Let me put it this way, they can drop that thing on my paycheck of my money coming half from here or from there tomorrow. It wouldn’t make the slightest bit of difference to what I do. I can leave Crown College tomorrow without it making much difference to what Crown College’s students do. The students take courses from other people in other colleges, just as they used to do. Well, this basically is kind of a time-consuming system, to keep up a sort of front,
try to pretend you’re collegiate when you’re really not. I think Dean only really got involved in the collegiate notion as a sort of watchword, a slogan, to sell to the outside world and the Regents. He achieved quite a bit of notoriety for the campus as a collegiate campus, but there was never any academic planning behind it.

**Jarrell:** Any substance?

**Ellis:** Yes. There was nothing at all. What then happened was that people slowly got slightly fed up with this and started to complain that there was something wrong with this system. Various people expressed the complaints in different ways. The scientists would complain typically that the colleges got in the way of what they were doing. The people who believed in the colleges, in, say Cowell College, complained that the colleges didn’t do enough, didn’t have enough power. They wanted more power for the colleges. The scientists wanted less power for the colleges, Cowell College people wanted more power for the colleges. But both sides were really responding to the same thing: the system didn’t work. The Cowell College viewpoint was that the colleges ought to be doing more; the scientists’ viewpoint was that the colleges ought to be doing less.

**Jarrell:** So they were really talking about the same thing.

**Ellis:** They were talking about the same thing, which was that the colleges didn’t fit into the work of the campus. The scientists’ emphasis was, “Okay, if the colleges don’t fit into the work of the campus, for God’s sake, don’t let them get in our way. If they’re not contributing anything, just keep them out of our way.” The Cowell College viewpoint was, “Well, if they’re not involved in the work of
the campus, let’s get them into the work of the campus.” But I don’t think there’s necessarily any fundamental conflict between those two groups, in terms of the reality that was the case and they were distressed by. Well, people started to get uneasy and suggest that things had to be looked at.

**Jarrell:** Was this quite early on?

**Ellis:** Oh, after about five or six years. Dean McHenry’s characteristic response was really obstinate. His response was that this was an injury to his plan, that you were sniping at him if you were saying it wasn’t working properly. Typically, when we’d write him a note saying, “Gee, things could be working better,” you’d get a note back which, in effect, questioned whether you were committed to the Santa Cruz ideal.

**Jarrell:** Loyalty and patronage.

**Ellis:** Yes, loyalty and patronage. “I insist this will remain a collegiate campus.” You would say to him in return, “Dean, I take that for granted. But it’s got to work.” Well, there was a blind spot. You were criticizing him; you were criticizing his plan. This must mean you were against Santa Cruz, must mean you were against the collegiate system. Simple as that. The trouble was, he couldn’t see it. He couldn’t see how phony it really was to run a campus where 95 percent of the teaching was orthodox American departmental organization, and a tiny handful of freshman courses here and jazzy interdisciplinary things there were offered to students. They usually failed pretty quickly, anyway, and disappeared. He couldn’t see that was not a really good system. He was so
committed to his baby that everyone knew that no change was feasible until Dean left. Absolutely no change feasible.

**Jarrell:** As a member of the college, are you supposed to have a balance between the courses you teach for your board and college and for the college? Or is that another charade?

**Ellis:** Everybody knows that it is impossible. Everybody knows in theory it ought to have happened. Everybody knows it doesn’t happen, but can happen. And there are varying degrees of response to why that is. Some people, as I do, think of that as one of the symptoms of what is really not quite working on this place. And other people accept it as a sort of four-to-one split: nominally four the board, one the college. But actually, it probably isn’t even that, overall, I think. Maybe it is. But in terms of students, student credit hours, it’s over 90 percent.

**Jarrell:** Regular hours.

**Ellis:** Sure.

**Jarrell:** Orthodox.

**Ellis:** No question about it.

**Jarrell:** The literature department.

**Ellis:** Yeah. The trouble is, too, in the process of college courses being promoted what you get typically is a provost coming up to someone saying, “Won’t you teach something for the college?” Well. Usually you have it the other way around. There’s a program, the students—you’re needed. Your time is needed.
My God, there are people just waiting for you. In other words, a program, a need exists, and it comes out and grabs you.

Well, can you imagine the situation then in which there’s someone wandering around the corridors in the college saying, “Gee, can’t you find something to teach.” To which, I feel like replying, “Gee, look, I don’t have to find anything to teach. I’m needed to teach. I’m needed. I’ve got people waiting for me to teach. My time is in demand. What are you asking me to do in dreaming up some need that doesn’t yet exist? If it existed it would come and find me.”

And then that led to the notion that one should perhaps teach outside one’s own field in the college. If you couldn’t teach in your field in the college, you taught outside it. Well, that has led to some of the most appalling amateur stuff. And this has become totally institutionalized now to the point where half a dozen people get together to teach Stevenson Core Course, or something like that.

**Jarrell:** They get literature, and history and sociology and—

**Ellis:** That’s right. They teach Wittgenstein in that [course]. I’m qualified to teach that. I went along to see what was going on. I was totally horrified to find that the faculty didn’t know what it was about. Those who were teaching it didn’t know what it was about. The students were totally bemused by it. It’s impossible to understand what Wittgenstein means without having read something of the decade of philosophy that was preceding Wittgenstein, just can’t follow it. I came away thinking, this is the worst kind of charade. This is really trying to persuade kids that they’re having a jazzy, high-powered education, but in fact, it was totally meaningless.
Jarrell: It’s also very demeaning in a certain way.

Ellis: Yes. Well, it was also pretentious, too, because basically those kids were not understanding Wittgenstein. Over the years this has become institutionalized to the point where now the Stevenson group—I didn’t mean to single out Stevenson—but people tend to teach those interdisciplinary courses in the colleges on material they don’t understand. They’re not trained, and they don’t know. But they’ve become so used to doing it they have the impression they know something about it. And they’re quite incompetent to teach it. In the fields of linguistics and philosophy, the ones I know at Stevenson at various times people have taught both those things without any knowledge of those fields, and it kind of shocks me that suddenly Santa Cruz is involved in promoting as real values, ignorance. Ignorance on the part of the faculty is a value now, all of a sudden. I think this is kind of silly and what it points out is that no one thought out what the colleges would do.

Jarrell: You see this as a function of the colleges, this particular unfortunate development?

Ellis: Seeking out things that are meaningless is unfortunately a way of life in the colleges. The watchword is, “do something in the college,” no matter if there is a need for it.

Jarrell: Or if it’s quality.

Ellis: Yeah, right. Obviously, some colleges are better than others on this. Merrill College, I think, is very good. But it’s largely because it functions as a
department of African studies. It has real content. If you want to know something about African studies, you go there. You find out something. People know something about it. There’re not just sort of amateurs who are dragged in to teach nice collegey things and be interdisciplinary. They’re people who have professional interests in the field. Merrill’s program is done very well. But the kind of nonsense that we’ve seen at some of the other colleges is just really sad. I found it very sad to see what happens to people when you give them a role in a college, call them provost or senior preceptor. They have a stake then in the college. They have a stake in there being a college program. Some people will say the most astonishing things to try and get people to teach colleges. “Teach something for the college. You don’t have to make it terribly professional. Teach something for the college. It really doesn’t have to be part of anybody else’s program.”

**Jarrell:** Then it takes it all into another realm entirely.

**Ellis:** It’s crazy. I find it very sad to see how very intelligent men that I respect have not been able to resist this pressure to get a course on the books, come what may, to swell the list of offerings of the college, without any kind of rational—I mean, there’s no college program, in the sense that there’s a coherent thing like the literature board that has a program where one can see that one course functions to round out other courses. It’s “list as many as you can, because the more you list, the better Stevenson looks.”

**Jarrell:** There’s nothing integral.
Ellis: Very, very silly. The odd thing is, the absurdity of this, was I used to give courses in Stevenson in all sorts of interdisciplinary things that I was interested in and that I was actually professionally interested in, that I do research in. I’d give these and I’d get a seminar of fifteen students. It was Stevenson College 144 or something. Well, two of the students were from Stevenson, three or four from Cowell, three or four from Crown. But somehow this was listed under Stevenson. It made Stevenson feel good that they’d really gotten a lot of courses. Well, one thing I did when I went to Crown was I talked to my friend Ed Landesman, who is sort of acting provost, and I said, “Ed, I really want to break with practices that I can’t have job respect for. I’m not going to offer Crown courses which I know are not really Crown courses, where other colleges will take them from more than Crown. I’m not going to offer a course which is not genuinely part of a program in Crown, a coherent group. I’ll do certain things that I think will help the students of this college. I’ll try to get as many of my German literature students into this college as I can. I’ll run informal discussion groups with them, because that’ll exploit the physical proximity. I’ll develop a way of life of meeting with them for coffee and things like that. But I’m not going to pretend on this courses thing.”

I tend to be somewhat upset if the world is not reasonably coherent and consistent and sensible. I take to this nonsense less well than most people. I’ve got a shorter fuse on these issues than most. But, in summary, what I would make of all this, is that there simply was no system planned in advance, other than that the word “college” would be employed. There would be buildings called colleges. That was the, I kid you not, that was the full extent of planning
for how the colleges would be involved in programs. There was no more than that.

**Jarrell:** Do you think, perhaps, that McHenry and various other people who did planning in the early stages had a dislike of traditional departments and wanted to emasculate them in a certain way?

**Ellis:** No, I don’t think so, because the reverse was the case. McHenry was a man who recognized an attractive idea politically and the college system was terribly attractive and had great vogue in those years.

**Jarrell:** Certainly.

**Ellis:** But McHenry was a dyed-in-the-wool conservative about departmental power. Now, the thing that was an issue was departments versus the administration. That was faculty versus McHenry. Essentially McHenry’s notion of keeping departments weak was to do with faculty power versus his power. They could be weak in that sense, sure. But when it came to judgments of professional competence, I mean, God, all his instincts were on the straight orthodox traditional publish or perish lines. He was an academic conservative. He’s probably more conservative than most. In no way was he progressive on that one. He thoroughly believed in the old departmental system, underneath.

**The Question of Graduate Programs at UCSC**

**Jarrell:** I’d like to talk about undergraduate and graduate-level students and how originally there was going to be a kind of ratio. There was going to be a developed graduate program in very many departments and areas and that has
not turned out to be the case. What are your feelings about this as an undergraduate institution and what do you think about graduate programs? You’ve dealt with graduate students, of course.

Ellis: Yes.

Jarrell: How important do you think graduate students are to an institution like this?

Ellis: Well, I think they’re very important to a university. The main thing is that you have a full balance of senior faculty all the way down to first-year undergraduates, with no stages missed out. In a lot of fields, you can’t expect faculty to do research without graduate students around. Graduate students are immensely valuable for keeping members doing things. I really don’t think you can be a university without graduate students. In the same way, I don’t think you can have a university without faculty doing original thinking and research.

Jarrell: And you think the graduate students have a link to that?

Ellis: They’re an important part of it. I’ve done a lot of work here without graduate students, but it would be nicer if I had graduate students. I think, over the years, collaboration with graduate students has been quite an important part in what I’ve done, sometimes. Just at the moment, I’m writing with a senior just about to graduate, on Grimm. I would never have gotten involved but for the fact that she was very much into it, very much involved in it. It’s just wrong to have a generation missing in a campus. Some people would no doubt see this as being unduly research-oriented, but I think it isn’t that. Undergraduates get a lot
out of having graduates around. Now, on the other hand, I’d have to say that the present stage of things—

**Jarrell:** Yes, let’s talk about your immediate working conditions.

**Ellis:** Well, at the present stage of things I think graduate students are not a good idea, because with the crunch in the profession there are fewer people applying to graduate schools. What this means is that in literature all we get are moderately weak graduate students, if we advertise places. In German, we could probably get one or two mediocre graduate students every so often. That isn’t worth it. A good graduate student is a total joy. A fairly weak graduate student is the most time-consuming thing on earth. I’ve had experiences of having to practically write dissertations for people.

**Jarrell:** Really?

**Ellis:** Yes. One should never allow one’s self to do it, and of course I don’t, but the amount of time you spend—for example one graduate student would submit a poor draft of a dissertation. I have to go over it, correct it. It would take me hours to go over it with a fine-toothed comb. You really should just throw it away and start again, do another one, a totally different one. Then I would have to do that all over again. God the amount of time that takes is just appalling. A good graduate student, on the other hand, takes less time and is terribly interesting and stimulating and lively. But I think the present stage of things is not in favor of graduate students in literature, because we don’t get very good ones, and it’s not worth it unless you’re getting reasonable quality. It’s terribly time consuming. So until there’s an upturn in the profession again, where more
students are coming because there are more jobs available, at this particular local point in history I’m not terribly unhappy not to have graduate students. But I don’t see any conflict between undergraduate and graduate education.

Assessing Dean McHenry’s Chancellorship

Jarrell: In terms of McHenry’s leadership, what do you think was the most valuable contribution of his tenure?

Ellis: Oh, I think Dean McHenry was a poor chancellor. I think the most important thing a chancellor or an administration can do, really, starting off with the campus anyway, is make excellent initial appointments, senior appointments in the individual fields, so that those individual fields will be developed well.

And good faculty, he’d get unreservedly poor marks on that one. It’s difficult to see how he could have done too much worse than that. The next thing you ask of an administration, after its initial appointments, is that it concentrate on making working conditions optimal for the faculty. When I was chairman of the literature board, I used to think my job was to make it possible for every member of the board, twenty professors, to do their best for the university. I used to think my job was to do anything I could to help create those conditions, keep morale high, keep them feeling that I was rooting for them, doing all I could for them. I used to say that I judged my tenure as chairman on the basis of just how many accelerated merit increases I could get for them, really build confidence in the department, high morale.

Well, I think that just as a chairman of a department has to do that for his department, an administrator really has to be judged, apart from the quality of
his appointments, by the degree which he creates conditions in which people do their best work. What Dean did was a total disaster on that one. Dean saw the degree to which everyone was harassed by an appalling committee load and the silly, unanalyzed college situation. But Dean was not willing to sort out what the hell the roles of the colleges was to be. He allowed a confused, contradictory situation to go on, in which people expended enormous amounts of energy to no purpose. Dean was willing to place his own sense that he had succeeded in that college system above any notion that he must keep trying to improve things to make working conditions best possible for his people. When he got complaints, his instincts should have been, “My job as chancellor is to keep morale high, working conditions the best possible, get the best possible work out of people, and so on.” Instead his instincts were, “Damn it, they’re criticizing me and my system, the college system.”

I think it was very bad. I think that many people often totally despaired of his administration’s inability to respond. People used to get so angry with Dean McHenry’s dismissing of any point that was raised. I remember we had a search for a classicist. We found, after years of searching, a very bright young man. We wanted to offer him a job. Dean was currently annoyed with a few people in the lit board and refused to give us the position. He knew we’d been looking for all that time. Harry Berger and a number of others and I were furious with him for wasting our time in that way. Totally furious with him, it was unforgiveable to let people spend so much time doing a search for a good person, and then waste it.
Time and time again, we would go to Dean McHenry. His response to situations was totally inward directed. It was sort of Dean McHenry’s, the chancellor’s prerogatives, the dignity of his office—all that came first for him. The fact that he was, in a sense, the servant of the faculty, the man whose job it was to make their working lives as productive as possible—he lost all sight of that. It was very much defending his prerogatives that took over his position, his authority, his prestige, as chancellor, his stake in the college system, the whole campus as his baby, the thing he had created—those were the things that moved Dean McHenry.

The fundamental thing that an administrator must keep in mind—that he is there to always facilitate getting the best out of the people in the unit he administers—it slipped from his mind totally. He’d see people distressed and overworked, and harassed; he wouldn’t care. He’d get complaints and instead of thinking, Gee, I’ve got to do something to raise morale, he would just be angry there’d be complaints. He was an inflexible, obstinate, stubborn, proud man who forgot the duty of an administrator again and again.

Recruiting was a nightmare with Dean McHenry. One would look hard for a candidate, find the one you wanted, and then be told there was no position. Then you would say to Dean, “Well, can you please spell out to us which departments are being allocated positions?” Oh no, he wouldn’t do that, because he wanted the flexibility. So you came to him with your candidate and he would look at it and say, “Well, don’t like that one. No job for you this year.”
Incidentally, there were many, many complaints that in fact this had a discriminatory basis, too.

**Jarrell:** In terms of race, or sex, or political—

**Ellis:** Not necessarily race. No, I don’t mean that. That would be maligning him. On the contrary, Dean was very supportive of black candidates, enormously so actually. For example, I brought a black, prospective professor of German in 1967 for an interview. I chose him on the basis that he was the best person I knew. I didn’t know he was black.

**Jarrell:** You didn’t realize it?

**Ellis:** No, I didn’t know he was black. I knew him through his work, only by the printed word.

**Jarrell:** His byline?

**Ellis:** That’s right. I knew what he’d written; it was excellent. I phoned him, wrote to him, phoned up one of my friends who was a senior colleague in his department, and the guy said, “Well, you know he’s black, of course.” I said, “I had no idea he was black. I’m not calling you because I want to hire a token black. I’m calling you because I want to hire the best man I know in the field.”

**Jarrell:** God.

**Ellis:** So anyway, he came here for an interview, and he and I both agreed that he should not come at that time. He was just below the tenure bar, two years
away from it. My feeling was, and his was too, that he should earn himself
tenure.

**Jarrell:** What is the tenure bar?

**Ellis:** Well, as an assistant professor, which is the first appointment, you spend six to eight years. After the end of that, your work is evaluated and you get tenure, or you don’t get tenure. This particular man was just below the bar and he was about to get tenure in Chicago. If he came here, he might move all the way here and not make tenure after a year or two. So we thought that, on the whole, it was sensible for him to wait and just get tenure, and then for us to negotiate again with him.

My God, I got a letter from Dean McHenry the next day, very unusual, saying how much he’d loved this guy, and how he’d love to offer him the maximum we could. I had to phone Dean and say, “Dean, hold on. The department isn’t recommending it because the guy doesn’t want us to yet.” But Dean was tremendously gung ho to get him. Later on in the literature board we did hire a black, who left after one year. But he was a guy recommended to us by Dean McHenry. Dean sent us news of this guy, and we said, “Yes, it’s a good idea.” So Dean can’t be accused of—

**Jarrell:** You said he did discriminate in some ways.

**Ellis:** The discrimination I was aware of was, I think lifestyle is what you’d call it—more than political. It’s true that this would quite often be aimed at left-wing figures. I would say that it was people whom he suspected for any reason. For
example, there was one case where a very distinguished man, actually an outstanding candidate for provost of the college, was passed over by Dean, very unsurprisingly to all of us who’d been involved in the interviewing. And the reason was that he’d heard that this guy ran around with women, I don’t mean that it was just sex—there was a personal—Dean’s discriminations were usually personal lifestyle.

Jarrell: His sense of propriety.

Ellis: Yes. It wasn’t that a guy was left-wing that he objected to, but if a guy was a radical who gave speeches all over the place, speeches and headlines and stuff like that—

Jarrell: He wanted discretion.

Ellis: He didn’t like that. He didn’t mind anyone’s political views. That wasn’t it. That would be to malign him, to think he was against anyone’s politics. Wild men, crazy men, troublemakers, those were the things. You had five slots available and you had seven departments looking. What you knew was that if one of them came up with a brilliant guy who was a slightly crazy man, he’d say, “Well, no I wasn’t really going to give your department one this year anyway.” At least that was the suspicion in many people’s minds. I must say I found there was a reasonable amount of evidence for that. Dean maintained this flexibility always to choose people he instinctively felt he liked, as opposed to those he didn’t. And what’s wrong with that? Well, first it’s discriminatory, but more important than that, it was really very inconsiderate of his faculty. It meant that there were whole departments working hard recruiting, finding people, reading
files, reading work, interviewing, phoning other departments to find out about other people. Doing it for nothing because there wasn’t a job available.

Jarrell: But you never knew for sure.

Ellis: You never knew. We used to say to Dean, “Why can’t we have a nice orderly process? You crank into a machine student numbers that the department has, the program needs, and you, Dean, feed all these things in, where your departments submit requests to you, and at the end of the year, you look at all the requests and allocate and so on.” No, he didn’t like that and he was angry about it, too. He was angry about those suggestions.

Jarrell: You ought to be able to rationalize the process.

Ellis: Yes, we wanted to rationalize the process. That was our side of it. But from his point of view, it was diminishing his power, his arbitrary power to make discretionary judgments of his own on an ad hoc basis in every case. He didn’t want anything to tear him down.

Jarrell: I’ve heard that he had to pass judgment on every appointment. At some of the other campuses, San Diego, Santa Barbara—would the chancellor at those places pass on every candidate for appointment?

Ellis: No, no.

Jarrell: That was his peculiar despotism?

Ellis: He insisted on [vetting] every assistant professor. In fact, I think it was only after a couple of years that he decided not to interview language associates.
I forget the exact chronology of that now. But I think it was that inconsiderateness towards his faculty that many faculty felt very bitterly about, that he not only turned a blind eye to the fact that we were overworked, and overworked because he would refuse to rationalize the system, but in a sense, he actually made work for us to preserve his own power, his own arbitrary, discretionary power.

So, in terms of both the administrator’s function of making excellent appointments, he was poor. And [in terms of] the other main administrator’s function of getting the best work out of his people, making conditions in which they can use their time most fruitfully, no, he wasted our time. He made all sort of harassments for us and really was somewhat awful on all this.

The other thing, since I was chairman of Privilege and Tenure all these years, was that Dean McHenry had extraordinary blind spots about freedom of speech. I sat on cases as chairman of the Committee on Privilege and Tenure where he was attempting to discipline people for exercising their First Amendment rights. I’ll always remember the strange episode when he objected to [a faculty member’s political speaking. [The faculty member] was making left-wing, anti-Vietnam speeches. To be sure, he was talking about people burning draft cards, but actually that’s protected speech as well. But Dean issued him a formal warning that he’d better cut that out or else. The “or else” meaning or else he’d be fired. [The faculty member] appealed to us, the Privilege and Tenure Committee, for our protection. He said, “The chancellor has no power to warn me or to stop me from exercising my freedom of speech.” We held a hearing. We heard the chancellor’s side; we heard the young guy’s side. I did some rooting around. I
found the Regents had voted about ten years before that to adopt a resolution which read something like this, “Freedom of speech on the University of California campuses shall not be limited beyond the purview of the first and fourteenth amendments.” Those are the amendments of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and so on; liberty and property, all those things where the government has to leave you alone to do your own thing unless you’re infringing on other people.

**Jarrell:** Through due process.

**Ellis:** Yes, all due process amendments. So I showed this to Dean and said, “Dean, look, this makes it totally clear. If this guy had the right to say those things anywhere in Santa Cruz, then he had the right to say them on a campus. What the Regents have said here means that freedom of speech is the same on campus as off campus.”

**Jarrell:** It’s not applied by any chancellors.

**Ellis:** That’s right. That’s right. Dean had argued precisely that it was limited by the fact that it was on campus and there were students there.

**Jarrell:** Did this get in *City on the Hill?* I don’t remember anything about it.

**Ellis:** Oh, sure. Well it was years ago. This was about 1968. Well, I tell you. I was surprised at what happened next. A huge smile came over Dean McHenry’s face. He beamed with delight. I thought, what’s he doing that for? I’ve just shown him something that totally destroys the position he’s taken up. He beamed with pleasure at me and he said, “I wrote that resolution.”
Jarrell: Oh, my God.

Ellis: He was the one who had presented it to the Regents for their adoption, originally.

Jarrell: He was quite the civil libertarian in the early days.

Ellis: Yes, sure. That’s right. Well, I believe he’s probably still quite a civil libertarian in fact, but it doesn’t extend to someone rocking the boat in his ship. Santa Cruz was his creation and no one was going to screw this up. If [a faculty member] speaking on campus was going to get the townies writing letters to the Sentinel saying, “We should get rid of these bunch of commies on the UCSC campus,” [it] so offended Dean that there were people in this world who didn’t love his campus anymore, even if they were just dingbats in Santa Cruz (there aren’t even half a dozen of them anyway), it so offended him that he went after people and tried to discipline them and went against everything he stood for, went against academic freedom.

We had a terrible job getting him to withdraw the letter. He did, eventually. That’s because Dean had respect for one thing. One of his redeeming features was, he had tremendous respect for the Academic Senate, the machinery of the Academic Senate. When I made it clear to him that I would issue a full report to the Senate on this freedom of speech issue, would lay it right out in the open and ask for a vote of confidence—the whole thing would be right out in the open and I would ask for a vote of confidence of the faculty in the committee.
He knew what that meant, because the next stage is—there’s a scenario. Everyone knows it. He knows it. I know it. A vote of confidence of the committee. The committee goes back to the chancellor, says, “We now speak with the authority of the full Senate, not just five committee members. Take back that letter of warning because it violates free speech.” And you mustn’t do that. If he refuses, we go back to the Senate, next meeting and we say, “The chancellor flouts the authority of the Senate on this.” A vote of censure is next. And Dean knew, Dean once told Sigfried Puknat that if ever a chancellor was censured by the Senate, he had to go. Dean knew that. Those were the rules he played by.

And to give him his due, when the chips were down, he played fair with the committee and he even respected tough behavior from the committee. Three times I had to say to Dean—three separate cases during my five years as chairman of that committee I had to spell out to Dean that if the committee took this position, it would not back down. It would go the full scenario, if that was the way that he wanted to go. It didn’t have to be said explicitly. Within a short while, we established good relations with Dean on that committee.

And it didn’t take long, in fact, about a year or two, for Dean to treat us with great respect. We had a very good working relationship and anything we brought to his attention he took seriously, and very cooperatively. I just have the feeling that a strong, obstinate person in a way respects another. I felt it was my job to look as if I was the arm of a strong, obstinate Senate. But he was a very good Senate man and he knew very well that a chancellor must cooperate with a Senate. He knew there had to be a good working relationship. He knew that if the Senate expressed any lack of confidence in him, he must go. He said this
quite openly. He gave us the weapon we could use against him. He didn’t attempt to conceal this. He knew he couldn’t dream of trying to stay on—

**Jarrell:** He’s totally realistic.

**Ellis:** It’s totally realistic, yes.

**Jarrell:** It’s like a prime minister or something. It’s a vote of confidence.

**Ellis:** Yes, sure. Now that’s where we come to Christensen, of course.

**Jarrell:** I want to ask you about these various discontents of the faculty—for instance, the colleges, or the certain working conditions—you knew they would not be ameliorated until he went. You knew there was no chance for reform.

**Ellis:** Yes.

**Jarrell:** So he left and what did you think?

**Ellis:** Well, I thought there was now some chance that someone was not totally committed to 1965 could come in now and have the flexibility of mind to consider the possibility of sorting things out. We couldn’t go on with a double bureaucracy and the kind of silly wasting of time. We had to sort out what the colleges were going to be for. We had to improve the situation. I thought there was a chance of doing that with Dean gone. We had a conference, at Asilomar, Dean’s last year I think it was, or maybe the year before that.

**Jarrell:** I’ve read about that, yes.
Ellis: And during that, there were a lot of people getting up and saying, “This system is not working.” That was the high point of discontent. One person after another getting up and saying, “This is going wrong.” A few people made some suggestions. Dean got up and angrily denounced those suggestions. One of my friends, I think it was [G. William] Domhoff, said to me, “That was it.” As soon as McHenry got up you could feel a chill come over the room. You could feel everyone sense that this was a pointless exercise.

Jarrell: This whole conference?

Ellis: This whole conference was totally pointless. Dean was not going to put up with any change while he was chancellor. We might as well quit until he left. And I think he was right. [But through it all he was] a strong man, and a man you had to take seriously. I still have a certain admiration for him.

Jarrell: He’s a hard man to shake his hand and dislike, I find.

Ellis: Yes, that’s right, that’s right.

Jarrell: He’s very friendly to meet and to be with in a certain situation.

Ellis: Yes, that’s right. Yes. I find myself coming back to admiration, for he built a campus from nothing. It’s a mind-boggling thought, actually. I find admiration for the fact that I fought with him bitterly on many occasions over those Privilege and Tenure cases, but he was never less than gentlemanly with me afterwards. Now, during it was quite a difference. But after we’d have a knock-down-drag-out, he would still be decent and gentlemanly. I don’t think he bore grudges. I could be wrong. I think he was always prepared to let his temper go and then
days later forget about it and treat people as colleagues again. But mind you, when his temper went, that was rough. I was on the phone with him once and I’ve never been spoken to that way before. Not except by my mother-in-law, anyway.
Paul Niebanck was a professor of environmental studies and was affiliated with College Eight, where he was also founding provost. He earned his AB from Johns Hopkins University and his PhD from the University of Pennsylvania. He arrived at UCSC in 1973. He was interviewed by Randall Jarrell on June 4, 1976.

Coming to UC Santa Cruz

Jarrell: This interview with Paul Niebanck is being recorded in the Regional History office on June 4, 1976. First, we’ll document your personal background. When did you come to Santa Cruz?

Niebanck: I came in summer in 1973 as the first provost of College Eight. I’ve had that job for three years and I’m just now leaving it to become vice-chancellor for student affairs.

Jarrell: And your academic appointment is as a full professor of—

Niebanck: Yes, I’m a professor of environmental studies. Previous to coming here, I worked with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare as deputy assistant secretary for two years. Prior to that, I was assistant and associate professor at the University of Pennsylvania in urban planning and I was chairman of the Department of City of Regional Planning at Penn from 1968-1970.

Jarrell: You’re an Easterner. Why did you come to Santa Cruz?
Niebanck: Well, needless to say, the attractions of the liberal arts campus have to be at the root, the main draw. I had, in my professional teaching leading that department at Penn and in subsequent work with the government, discovered with in myself much more of a concern for what could be called underlying social and cultural issues than are typically treated in either place. In that sense, I was quite ready to take on responsibility within a liberal arts campus. My administrative abilities were being honed during those years and I recognized that I would like to hone them further and have greater experience in administrative work. My loyalty to academic life and to education generally, has always been rather sharp and deep. So combinations of those things made Santa Cruz quite attractive.

In addition, there’s no question that Dean McHenry personally played the significant role. He paid me a call when I worked for HEW in the summer of ‘72, that gross election year, and we simply talked for an hour in my office. We became acquainted. Then after I had left HEW, he phoned me and asked, could I drop into Santa Cruz sometime and talk about possibilities? His recruitment style is probably without peer. He was very convincing. I had other possibilities emerging at the same time, but Santa Cruz looked like a wonderful opportunity, particularly in the role of provost of a new college. I’m the kind of person who would rather do a new job than enter one that’s already established, evidenced by my willingness to take the vice-chancellor’s job, which is an entirely new job on this campus. So coming to a liberal arts campus, responding to McHenry, responding to the opportunity to build a college from scratch—those kinds of things were critical.
Jarrell: Would you say that, besides the administrative challenges, the idea of also building curriculum that would gather together some of your different interests was appealing?

Niebanck: I think that College Eight has emerged in three years with as clear an academic identity as any college on the campus. It’s by no means mature and I hope in some senses it never is; I hope it stays vital. But one of the things, yes, that attracted me was the possibility of creating an academically meaningful unit, [college] as well as a social and cultural unit. It was one of my major struggles to help College Eight come to the point where it did have an identity, and indeed now I think it does. The collection of identities that it has is rather close to my own interests, yes. In that sense my coming here was compatible with what the college eventually looked like it wanted to be. And, of course, I resonate with that. I can’t say that the college system here will, at any foreseeable time in the future, involve controlling academic identities. I think the boards, and to some degree the divisions will retain those main identities, but at the same time the colleges ought to have, it seems to me, greater roles in academic life than they even do now.

**The McHenry Era**

Jarrell: You came in at the end of McHenry’s tenure, really—the last phase of his era. When you first came here as provost, what was your initial impression?

Niebanck: I’ll back into it, but I’ll try to back in quickly. I have through these years by osmosis, I suppose, discovered in myself a very insistent loyalty to UCSC on the basis of its style—that is the relatively intimate student-faculty
contact, the evaluation system, the college system, the informality of things, the student orientation generally, and the undergraduate emphasis. Those things are what, in my current mind, as well as others, make the campus a viable and unique place, a place worth preserving and enhancing.

My initial reaction, however, was of course from the biased position of a new administrator trying to build a college. What captivated me and in some ways dominated me in the first year, and which only lately I’ve been able to kind of work out, was the incredibly dense, conflicting, exhausting, bureaucratic structure—the redundancies and the layers and the impossibility most times of stopping a buck. It kept moving, especially for people that wanted to assume responsibility and be accountable for some things. This is very difficult to live with. I felt myself, almost from the first day, recognizing and reacting to these bureaucratic intricacies and human wastes. Now that didn’t really demoralize me. I think I’ve sustained my own identity and come out of it probably stronger than I went in, but at the same time I wish there were a lightening that would allow people to operate in a more fluid and accountable way than they’re currently able to do.

**Jarrell:** What do you think are the reasons for the development of this duplication, the redundancies in the administrative layers, and the waste?

**Niebanck:** Well again, one could elaborate for hours. It’s a combination of the rather rigid and programmed university structure at large onto which Santa Cruz was tacked. That is, we did not deviate from the usual system of chancellor, etc., all the way down to boards, strict hierarchy and central control, central
accountability and answerability. What we did was add to that system a new system. That is what’s called the college system. That was in combination with Dean McHenry’s own style, which was at one and the same time, to retain authority and to delegate authority. What he seemed to do was to the benefit of himself and I think essentially the campus, at least in its early years—to delegate out, to listen to all manner of ideas, but to allow virtually no significant decision to be made by anyone but himself. Now, those two things in combination make life very difficult for everyone except the kind of person Dean was. He had, and still has of course—but he’s not in the role anymore—the capacity to handle enormous detail. And he had a vision that was clear enough in his own mind—he knew what he wanted and he was insistent enough to get it, by and large. But it wore heavily on virtually everybody else, and I think the campus now is exhausted as a result.

Jarrell: Do you think that what later emerged after his retirement, not just the resignation, but a kind of vacuum, was the result of that thing?

Niebanck: Well, every unit after an initial leadership of as intense a form as McHenry’s has to go through an adjustment period. At the same time, there was, I think, a great readiness for the kinds of styles that, at his best, Christensen represented. He came in with all manner of good ideas and his more free and delegative style was greatly needed and I think for the most part wanted on the campus. It was his own ineptitude that got in the way of success, not his wishes and not his inherent style.
College Eight

Jarrell: If we could just continue with McHenry—would you talk from your firsthand experience as provost, of the relation of your college, College Eight, with various boards of studies, and the mechanics of running a college in terms of other units, campus, units, the divisions and the boards and any conflicts which you found particularly noteworthy.

Niebanck: Well, we had any number of conflicts, as new colleges will. Particularly in our case, we were a college that didn’t have its own facilities and soon discovered that it might not for a very long time have its own facilities, in building at a time when resources were closing out and it looked like there wouldn’t be many new resources coming to the campus of a personnel and budgetary kind. Of course, that made life difficult too.

In College Eight, we were essentially swimming upstream or against the current. Now, that came out in myriad ways—one of them was our attempts, which have now been successful, to secure adequate space within the Social Science building which was inadequately used—that is, all kinds of underutilized space existed in the building and to some degree still does. Nevertheless, to secure some of that space without causing people to think that we were encroaching upon their territory was very difficult, especially in the absence of clear leadership from central services. We were changing chancellors, and of course that kind of leadership was not forthcoming.

On another front, that is the hiring of faculty, it seemed that most of the interactions between colleges and boards had, in recent years, been antagonistic
ones, whereas in College Eight we wanted to establish cooperative relationships with boards. Before very long, we discovered that we could do cooperative work with boards, that is engage in joint faculty searches, for example, and not rub each other the wrong way. But in learning that, we went through a few episodes that weren’t very healthy, weren’t very pleasant. We had one instance with the psychology board, it was most unfortunate—great, great misunderstandings. On the other hand, the relationship with environmental studies, and with the marine sciences group, with histcon and other boards and programs, have been very good indeed. Now when I sum it all up, I think we’ve come out of it in a very healthy situation, in part because now we’re respected as an academic unit, and as a unit that means something to the campus. College Eight has innovated in a variety of ways, has become an important symbol to the campus, and is relatively well known throughout the community as a college that has meaning. So I think our current situation is quite healthy, but it wasn’t altogether healthy getting there.

Jarrell: You said you would like to work with the boards in a cooperative way. Were you trying to build clusters of faculty in various areas?

Niebanck: Yes. And as we began to identify those clusters, I think the relevant boards recognized that the best approach was a cooperative approach. The best example perhaps is when we engaged in a faculty search in the environmental studies area. Typically, the college will have a representative or two on the search committee, and likewise the board will and the recommendation will be a joint recommendation of college and board, rather than the board doing one thing, the college another, and then having a third party having to reconcile the
differences. In virtually every recent instance, our searches have been undertaken in that cooperative mode and they’ve been, in that sense, quite successful. The difficulty is not so much in the lack of cooperation between college and boards, but in the difficulties campuswide that we’ve had in securing positions and holding them.

**Jarrell:** Your college is now housed in Social Sciences. Are there plans for a building project for the college eventually?

**Niebanck:** Oh, sure. Again we have the change in leadership problems and the volatility of state politics that have impinged. Reflective or expressive of that is the fact that we have not yet gotten a revised long-range development plan for the campus, without which the college really has no site. Joe Esherick has been, of course, on campus and has done exceedingly good work trying to help us get an LRDP revision completed. When that is completed, I think there will be assigned a reasonable site for College Eight. Already alternatives have been shown but no decision has been made. Once that occurs and we get approval of a revised LRDP that’s more responsive to the realities of enrollment projections, to general size of campus, and functions of college, then I think we can go to the legislature anew with fair hope within the next five years of getting permanent facilities for College Eight. Unless I’m wrong, I think we’re going to have enough students on this campus by 1990, let’s say, to fully justify the construction of an additional college. So I think the long-term future in physical terms is good for the college, but at the moment we have to settle for Social Sciences’ academic and cultural space, and College Five for residential space.
Jarrell: Do you think that being housed in so many areas works as a disservice, in a sense, to the residential function of a college?

Niebanck: Not really, because of many reasons. Primary among them are that we have a central location. The faculty and students are happy to have that central location. Secondly, we have an older student clientele, by and large, that wants to live off-campus, and has its own life constructed off campus, so doesn’t need the campus the same way that a younger clientele might. We have sufficient spaces in College Five to accommodate those students who want to live on campus. Also, we have a substantial portion of the married-student apartment complex devoted to College Eight married students. So we’re not really anxious about the future in physical terms. I think we’re quite well situated.

Jarrell: You seem to have overcome a lot of your physical problems to sustain yourself, because I’m a student on this campus also and I feel College Eight has definite, substantial definition.

Niebanck: We’ve gotten a lot of feedback in that very vein and it’s exceedingly rewarding because that’s what we wanted—the physical accoutrements are in a sense incidental then. We have a community that is innovative, it’s solid, it’s serving an important constituency, and in a way represents some of the frontiers that UCSC as a whole will have to move into—whether it’s cooperative education or women’s re-entry program, older student emphasis generally, the interdisciplinary but sharp academic identity, community involvement, a variety of things like this.
The McHenry Legacy

Jarrell: How would you assess McHenry’s chancellorial legacy to UCSC from what you experienced in his last year here?

Niebanck: My acquaintance with that era is not sufficiently long to really make an evaluation. I had difficulties with him in his last year, there’s no question about that. But I think underlying the difficulties resides a very strong mutual loyalty and respect. I’ve seen Dean a good deal since he left and I think there’s evidence given for the underlying loyalties and respect. His departure occurred at time when the campus still felt that it had the world by a string and then soon discovered that it didn’t. It left the campus without an ability to govern itself, without a sense that it had to govern and manage its own affairs, and without practice at doing it, without the kind of authority figure that Dean had become. In a way, one of the miracles that one would wish for was that a benevolent authority would replace Dean, and would in the process of replacing him teach the campus how to go with the job, incremental in small doses, so that over the course of time we could plan creatively for ourselves rather than rely on a separate figure who, in a situation of crisis and difficulty, would find it even difficult to do this. Now, what he was replaced by personified in Christensen was say the right style, but entirely an incapacity to follow through and get the job done.

Jarrell: Do you think that, generally speaking, the faculty maybe almost unconsciously wanted a figure who would represent the campus in a strong way?
Niebanck: Let me say this. Jim Pepper, who was a faculty member of College Eight, and a dear friend, at one time said in a glib, but penetrating way what the situation was. Of course, any summation like this is overstated. But he said that the faculty at Santa Cruz kept waiting for Christensen to be like McHenry; Christensen who had come from the faculty town, the center town of the campus, kept waiting for the Senate to be like the Berkeley Senate; and neither happened. They both waited and neither happened. The Senate still is a relatively ineffective institution here. While structurally it has all kinds of authority and the chancellorship—although Angus Taylor is beginning to change that—it didn’t in any way under Christensen represent the kinds of so-called strengths that McHenry had required us to expect.

My favorite candidate for chancellor, George Hammond, had decided not to sustain himself as a candidate. George Hammond was dean of natural sciences at the time and a tremendous figure. He was probably the best representation of the campus for me. He was on my search committee and called me, among other nice things, a new breed of provost. It was his style that personified and typified for me what Santa Cruz was at its best. I honored him greatly. I was wishing that he would become a candidate for chancellor. I knew that he had decided not to. I knew that Gene Cota-Robles, and Glenn Willson wished they would become chancellor, but that was not findings from the search committee—it was just my general knowledge of the two individuals and their ambitions. And then, of course, I knew Christensen was named and went immediately to him to make his acquaintance. But otherwise I knew very little, virtually nothing about the candidates and the operation of the search committee. It was only when John
Marcum revealed much later the difficulties in that search, that I, as provost, was made privy to some of these things.

**Impressions of Chancellor Mark Christensen**

**Jarrell:** What were your initial impressions of Christensen?

**Niebanck:** I made an appointment immediately with him in Berkeley and went up that day to talk with him. We had lunch. I was impressed. I saw him as an open, receptive, and unfettered delegate, a humane kind of person, and one who seeming to want to delegate authority. He seemed tremendously loyal to the relationships of colleges, and to undergraduates. I was, in some ways, enamored with him as a person. Delightful kind of person to be with. I remember interacting thereupon in a lunch situation with a couple of people who were dissidents from the beginning—faculty members who were not going to give him the time of day, and I argued with them not to give him lumps before the start. It was before July when he came in. And I sensed already that we would be polarized, at least in part because of the people who did not want to give him a chance, for whatever reasons I didn’t quite know.

Because of a combination of my college needs, that is the need to aggregate more successfully the college, and my own personal proclivities in wishing that the campus would be kind of liberated from its harsh, oppressive, and redundant kind of structure, and of course my response to Christensen as a person, I supported him strongly. I saw him very frequently those days, on invitation to advise him whenever I could during the early months. I became probably in those early months as significant a person, in policy terms, on the campus as
anyone. I was, for example, a member of his Committee on Academic Programming. I was a member of the College Council, of course, as a provost. And I was a delegate to the cabinet that he established as well on behalf of the provosts. So I was present in a lot of the early conversations.

He might have, if he had been stronger, achieved a new lighter kind of identity for the campus. It was very soon that I began to discover the ambivalence in Christensen, the uncertainty in him, the lack of confidence in him, the lack of intimate acquaintance with the politics and the personalities on this campus that eventually caused his demise. I was even one of those who, in private conversation and occasionally in confidential memorandums, which I didn’t even keep copies of, so I can’t in any way display, tried to convey to him that he was in a certain amount of even early jeopardy. That unless he made better, deeper acquaintance with the faculty and the individuals, and got a sense of what this campus could stand and what was needed, he was going to have a continuing difficulty. As a signal of all this, in about February or at the latest, March—Christensen recalled this to me a few days before his resignation—I wrote to him a very thoughtful, lengthy, personal memorandum, and I don’t even remember the contents, describing all manners of difficulty that I could see, not actions that he should take, I didn’t want to, in effect, dictate personally what he should do, but things he should think about, an interaction that he ought to get into.

Shortly after that, I, myself, having been rocked by the new findings I had about him, his weaknesses, my own exhaustion in trying to help before the winter quarter of his first year, I found myself disengaging, in a way, giving up, and
saying, “Well, I’ve done as much as I can. If I try to do more, I’m only making life
difficult for him in a situation. I will now become passive with respect to policies
and his own behavior. If he wants to call on me, fine, but I won’t press any
issues.”

So during the spring quarter of his first year, I did hardly anything more in a
campus policy sense, than to go to meetings. In the college I was still working
very actively, making enormous progress, but not on the campus front. I pretty
much withdrew.

Then another important signal was the set of retreats or meetings that he called
in the early summer after his first year.

**Jarrell:** At Asilomar?

**Niebanck:** No, the ones that he held on campus. They were, by all reports,
complete losers. Then he opened the fall with a few kinds of contradictory and
weak statements; then the Asilomar conference gave it all away. I saw no future
for him. And the provosts, then, went in effect into private meeting after private
meeting, after private meeting, trying to find ways to bolster Christensen, to
sustain him, and at the same time stabilize the campus politics and
administrative—

**Jarrell:** This is the Council of Provosts?

**Niebanck:** Yes, the Council of Provosts.
Jarrell: Just to backtrack for a moment, you continued to do your own work in the college and attend meetings, so basically, was this motivated because of his unresponsiveness?

Niebanck: Well, I think maybe first in organizational terms. One of the beautiful things Christensen did when he came was to establish a management system which involved essentially three elements, in all three of which he would play, as chancellor a visible and important role. One of those I’ve mentioned before but I’ll make it more explicit, the Committee on Academic Programming, which was to coordinate and articulate the joint work of the Senate people, administrative people, and the student leadership in, for example, developing an academic plan and working with budget realities. That committee was a marvelous invention. Among other things, it was small enough to be manageable.

The second thing he established was a cabinet, again small, with representatives from the deans and the provosts, but mainly a staff unit that would advise him on day-to-day necessities, assign tasks, and get work done. The third thing he was going to do, and began to do, was to chair a new Council of Provosts which would bring into the limelight, symbolic of the colleges, an effective set-of-line units. So you would have a coordinated unit, staff unit, and a line unit, which weren’t as clear under McHenry because everything came from him—you couldn’t really differentiate what was staff and what was line, they were all everything, because McHenry called them.

Now, those units that Christensen established pretty much failed by the end of the first quarter. That is, either he didn’t come anymore, or he came without an
agenda, or with a contradictory agenda, or he didn’t follow up the things that were missing at the previous meetings, or the committee meetings were cancelled, or there were a variety of other administrative mishaps and ineptitudes that quickly demoralized and made ineffective all of those units.

By early winter term, it was obvious that there was no future in this administration as it was then cast. One time, for example, he announced that he would no longer chair the Council of Provosts, that Gene Cota-Robles would chair. This was just when we were getting our momentum going, and our faith was being restored. Well, we came back with a hue and a cry. Then after that, for the most part, both of them met with us. But Gene pretty much had to carry the agenda, and Chris was pretty much on the forum and acted in an ad hoc and kind of informal way. So all of those units fell by the wayside.

Now, in the meantime, speaking only second or third hand for others who were not administrators, the evidences of Christensen’s ineptitude were becoming obvious all around. It became obvious, without I suppose much student understanding, but nevertheless to the rest of the campus, that Christiansen was just not going to make it as a chancellor. The campus had already suffered and if he was sustained, the campus would suffer greatly.

**Jarrell:** In what particulars would you say the campus would suffer if he was retained? Also, what damage do you think was done during this two years of tenure?

**Niebanck:** Well, it’s difficult to spell out without having written notes which I apologize for not having done, but—
Jarrell: Can you just give a few examples you think might characterize things?

Niebanck: Well, to go back to something I said earlier, which is obvious, McHenry’s dominance didn’t cause us to recognize the enrollment reality. And Christensen did not deal effectively, and forthrightly, and in an involved way with the enrollment realities. Certainly his appointments, particularly in this arena, were the wrong kinds of appointments. They didn’t have legitimacy, they didn’t have support, and they weren’t the kinds of people who could pick them up and lay them down.

Jarrell: Are you talking about the reorganization?

Niebanck: And likewise on the academic planning front, we had to, especially in a situation of declining resources, get that academic plan together. We didn’t do it, and it was at root Christensen’s fault.

Jarrell: The academic plan, as a tool, you mean?

Niebanck: Yes, as a tool for understanding ourselves, for coming to grips with reality, and making important allocative decisions, distributional decisions. Also, because we were all so dominated by Dean, we didn’t have the need with Dean to have a clear administrative structure and lines of authority spelled out. And while as I say, Christensen started off with some clear directives, detailed early, he didn’t follow that through and sustain that. Therefore everybody entered a state of limbo and uncertainty and papers were flying all over the place, not stopping on his desk, not stopping on anybody else’s desk. Of course, in the McHenry era they all stopped with McHenry, but at least they stopped. This
state of limbo gave everybody who cared and was the least bit involved a sense of demoralization. So I’d say that those three things—enrollment realities, the budget and planning realities, and the organizational realities were the greatest difficulties.

**Reaggregation**

**Jarrell:** Would you classify reaggregation as an organizational reality?

**Niebanck:** Well, not in organizational terms.

**Jarrell:** How would you classify them?

**Niebanck:** Well, here I’m heavily biased because College Eight has benefited from the reaggregation a great deal, the college identities substantially depend on the faculty profiles in the colleges, the respective colleges. We started off with a clear signal by the Senate, the spring before Christensen came on, and then by Christensen in his early days, that reaggregation would be encouraged and permitted to happen. That reaggregation was meant to give the colleges substantial academic identity and to align individual faculties with other faculty members with whom they felt closest affinity. That’s very important, in a long-range sense, for individual strengths, growth among faculty, and for clear identification of a college’s interests. Well, what happened was a certain fear, I say that in general terms, I don’t mean a psychological fear, set in central services, which caused an enormous, new bureaucratic system to emerge that was to guide the reaggregation. That new bureaucratic system never did guide the reaggregation, all it did essentially was stand in the way of a fluid interchange and exchange of faculty members around colleges based on their
own interests. In my mind, it would have been much better to allow in the second decade of UCSC’s maturing, to allow individually determined college transfers to occur. I believe had that been allowed to go on in a free way, by now we would have settled into a relatively new pattern that would have been very helpful. As it is, we’re still kind of stuck in the middle. The wave is coming up on the shore; it hasn’t quite broken; it’s held in a fixed pattern. And that’s how I see the situation.

**Jarrell:** It seems to me that the whole notion of the reaggregation was faculty people clustering according to their own affinities with people and interests should be nonstructured, it should be left up to them. If you were a faculty member and somebody said, “Well, we decided over here at this college we are going to do this and those,” that would not sit well with the faculty members.

**Niebanck:** Hear, hear. And in an informal and very almost spiritual sense, what we’re now talking about is an extension of academic freedom. It seems to me that we’ve got to see ourselves as one campus. And within that campus, wherever faculty can aggregate, subaggregate, affiliate in ways that give them strength and new life, renewal, and opportunities for growth, that should happen.

**Jarrell:** What exactly do you think Christensen’s view was of reaggregation? It seemed that he did quite a few flip-flops. I’m not clear on how he defined it, how he perceived it.

**Niebanck:** I don’t think he ever did understand it.

**Jarrell:** Do you think it was just some words?
Niebanck: Yes, I do. I think he had good impulses, but I think he had great difficulty articulating and following through on these impulses, and understanding how systems change, or on this particular campus how best to accomplish or follow through on it. And in turn, given these misunderstandings and basic lack of understanding, then certain things became the purview of other units that had other axes to grind and other sensors working and who didn’t feel an intimate and direct loyalty to Christiansen in following through on his impulses. For example, there was unquestionably a conflict between Cota-Robles’ style and Christiansen’s style. Cota-Robles has much more affinity with the McHenry style. McHenry was, I think, substantially Gene’s model of how the campus might best work; Christiansen was not. That doesn’t mean they had personal antagonism, nor was there essentially any disloyalty either way. But there certainly wasn’t a good fit, which didn’t help the situation and gave the people around the campus mixed signals. They weren’t altogether sure who was boss or whose initiatives would ultimately be the ones that caught on.

The Future of UCSC

Jarrell: Well, you’ve mentioned academic planning, the long-range academic plan. What was Christiansen’s relationship to the ongoing planning? You felt that he didn’t really have an understanding of what was required?

Niebanck: Well, Christiansen began to engage early on the academic planning requirement and the planning process, in the Committee on Academic Planning. The University of California system as a whole wants the plan, yes. But no academic plans in a substantive sense. That is, were none of the campuses to have by the University of California central office definitions, academic plans, I
don’t think it would make a great deal of difference. But because they want it, that’s sufficient. Evidence to say, yes, in order to bargain well, you’ve got to have a plan. Because they won’t bargain with you unless you do. So it’s a bureaucratic and administrative requirement. Substantively, I think it’s important for us to have a bead on what we are and be willing to make some choices. I don’t think we’d need a plan as such to do that. But in those terms, yes, generally an academic plan might be useful.

Jarrell: Can you tell me as provost, and secondly as professor, as an academic appointment, what steady-state means to you?

Niebanck: I don’t like the term.

Jarrell: You don’t like the term?

Niebanck: No. I have great difficulty with the term. I don’t think that we should ever see ourselves or be forced, allow ourselves, to be seen in a steady-state. College Eight typifies what I mean. We came into a situation where all the realities that now everyone sees were seen. At the same time, a new and vital entity was established. New styles, new clienteles, new emphases, a reallocations, redeployment of things—we became an essential part of the campus with, as I say, distinct styles and the like. Maybe renewal is a better word.

Jarrell: Or rejuvenation.

Niebanck: Rejuvenation. Continual refreshment. No matter what the upper limit of budget or facilities, numbers of faculty, students, or whatever, there
might be, that’s where we ought to put our emphasis, on rejuvenation and renewal. I don’t think that we should be allowed ourselves to be bound by this concept of steady-state. It’s on the surface a stagnant note, a static note.

Jarrell: Well, I like the way you’ve just risen above the whole idea, the whole notion steady-state implies. I guess it’s an economic term.

Niebanck: Yes.

Jarrell: But in the way you’re discussing it, you’re transcending it.

Niebanck: We’ve got to feel that we’re a vital society. If we, at the national level, for example, thought of ourselves in a steady-state situation, that would have equivalent demoralizing and debilitating effects. We’re into a different situation that’s terribly challenging. We need to constrain our consumption, to limit our wastage, to delegate authority to individuals in small communities in ways that we haven’t experienced for one hundred years. These things are marvelous, new frontier challenges for the nation. Likewise, on the campus at a much smaller scale we have wonderful challenges ahead of us and we should not at all be dominated by this notion of steady-state. It is a reaction to and a part of the growth ethic, which itself is a nonsense kind of an ethic.

Jarrell: To the assumptions of economics which always—

Niebanck: Yes, yes, and of economic man.


Niebanck: That’s quite a book.
Jarrell: This whole notion seems beside the point, really in terms of what you’re actually doing. This institution is a microcosm, certainly.

The Events Leading to Christensen’s Resignation

Could you highlight some of the points in the chronology in the second year of the chancellor’s tenure which kind of tapped things for you?

Niebanck: Yes.

Jarrell: In the first year, you say you had a clear realization that he was going nowhere.

Niebanck: Yes, by February, March of the first year, I pretty much thought I recognized the realities. I entered the fall with a symbolic gesture. I went to the chancellor, renewed certain statements to him, and said explicitly, “This year my orientation will be the college. You must not count on me for substantial campuswide policy involvement. The friendship remains, but at the same time I can’t survive another year like last year.” As it turned out, none of us really survived the second year because it required of us such an enormous emotional drain. I went back very happily to the college, thinking this was going to be a tremendous year for College Eight, which in some ways it was.

Then suddenly the collapse came upon us. I was not involved in any of the early throes of it, I was far removed from it, and not wanting to engage in it at all. But inevitably, quickly, that is, I was drawn in. Now I was drawn in first, and for a while exclusively through the provosts. We retired from the action in a certain sense to engage it as sensitively and responsibly as we could. We removed
ourselves from deans, from Gene Cota-Robles, from the chancellor, and engaged in hour after hour and day after day, many times, and many weeks, three and four meetings a week, Saturdays, evenings, trying to figure how we might sustain the campus, stabilize the situation, in effect protect the chancellor, operate the campus in effect without him, and we worried with reorganization possibilities and new governance possibilities. In the meantime, most of the action was in the Senate, and, of course, informally in other individual respects.

Jarrell: I had no idea of the scope of this, of the provosts—

Niebanck: Oh, we exchanged confidential memoranda; we met again and again and struggled to find what responsible combination of faculty and administrative caring we might express.

Jarrell: Like a collective, almost, I mean really working together.

Niebanck: It was. Enormous unity came from that, enormous unity. As an effort, it was as beautiful a human exercise as I’ve ever been through. A marvelous rapport, complete faith, and essentially a confidential kind of undertaking. Had reorganization occurred, that would have put the Council of Colleges into a position of authority on the campus and I think we could have saved the day. But it did not occur. Now, as time wore on during the fall, events moved very fast. I became an attender, although not a heavily involved person, in Senate meetings and other conversations, but my main concern was with the Council of Provosts.
In November, when one of the big Senate meetings happened, I was to give my inaugural lecture. I was going to give it on aspects of the environmental crisis and the planning response to that crisis in the society. The title was “A Question of Balance.” I remember Barbara Sheriff asking me to give that lecture in early September and saying she needed a title, so I threw one back. It was about ten days or two weeks before I was to give that lecture that I finally discovered that there was no avoiding addressing some of the structural, organizational, and even personal issues that the campus was involved in, in my lecture.

Jarrell: As a mirror of—

Niebanck: Yes, of my own thinking and of the provosts’ thinking, without divulging any specific ideas that we had been working on.

Jarrell: Yes.

Niebanck: So that lecture in early November, on the same day as it turned out of a rescheduled Senate meeting, which was to have been later, I gave the inaugural lecture which I think personally ought to become part of the archives of this particular undertaking that you’re involved in leading.\footnote{See Paul Niebanck, “A Question of Balance; Inaugural Lecture, UCSC, November 12, 1975.” Available in the UCSC Library’s Special Collections Department’s Archives.} It has certain significant references in it and says, I think, some important things to the campus. I think the library has copies already. For me it was an opportunity to vent and to talk in I hope articulate ways about the campus’ needs. After that lecture, which, as I say, was a significant stopping point or reference point for me, the action became all the more intense.
And the provosts inevitably became one of the, and maybe the most effective units to try and dislodge the chancellor and encourage him to resign, specifically to call to his mind the difficulties and impossibilities now of his leading the campus out of the morass. There was no laying on him his own responsibilities, laying blame and calling foul—we saw ourselves as much more loyal to him than that. But nevertheless, there was a calling forth of what we saw as the immediate and prospective reality. In my mind, which I articulated over again and again, it was only a matter of time before he would resign. I was in a very small minority, at times a minority of one, saying that kind of thing. But I really believed, having experiences in other institutional settings and knowing something about the pressures that were mounting, that he had no real choice but to resign and to resign very soon.

**Jarrell:** It was inevitable, yes.

**Niebanck:** My own preference, and I think the provosts’ preference at one time, was that he would resign early, but announce as of June, so that we could undertake a search for a permanent chancellor that very year. That wasn’t forthcoming. He waited much too long. Then we collectively, that is deans and provosts, made a call on President Saxon and exposed to him the realities and the intense importance of the situation. He gave us a positive response, but at the same time, I think creatively in his terms, dragged his heels.

**Jarrell:** Do you think Saxon had really an inkling of how grave the situation was here?
Niebanck: No. No, I think we caught him substantially by surprise in that first meeting.

Jarrell: Saxon was beginning his term as well.

Niebanck: Yes. And he had a lot of agenda items; he did not want to put this kind of thinking high on his agenda. It would occupy too much of his own energy and time. I don’t blame him for that—as a matter of fact I don’t blame him for anything.

The second meeting was in late January, or middle of January, at which there was a much smaller number of people. I believe it was Laporte, Adams, Silverman, Puknat, and myself. That was it, a delegation of five was to have been four, but Laporte wanted to play a role. We met with Saxon again. While that meeting was a dreadful meeting, in the sense that Saxon said in effect to us, “No,” and he brought Christensen in, and in his presence said, “No, I’m going to stay behind my chancellor,” at the same time my own reading was that Christensen would still resign. And I’ll believe, unless I hear otherwise, until I’m dead, I believe that Saxon said to Christensen, conveyed to him afterwards the following—and this is, in my mind what would be very responsible presidential behavior, I think Saxon is astute and did this, or something very much like it—he probably said, “All right, Chris, I’ve stood behind you as forthrightly, publicly, and in a sustained way as I possibly can. Now you’ve gotten all you can get from me. Now, the delegation knows that. They’re going to go back dreadfully demoralized. Now if my backing sticks, fine, we’re out from under. But if you go back, and you can’t govern and you can’t manage that campus now, you must
resign. I’m not going to ask you to resign. But I’m telling you very sharply that if you can’t do it, given all the backing that I’ve given you—I’ve put these people down as academics not to do to each other nor should any human beings do to others—you’ve got all the backing you can get from me, now if that doesn’t stick, finished. You can’t do it. You must resign yourself.”

Jarrell: You can’t hold it together.

Niebanck: Yes. “Because I’ve done what I can.”

Then we had an agonizing meeting of provosts with others on a Saturday. It was that Saturday morning—we were all exhausted; I walked home. I often walk home from the campus. I live in downtown Santa Cruz; it takes me quite a long time to walk, but it’s refreshing to do it and it’s all downhill, which helps. I got down to Westlake School, roughly, and Chris was driving along in the car with his family. His car came to a screeching halt. He popped out. He stood with me for half an hour and he walked the rest of the way home with me. I noticed the catharsis he was going through, the very difficult place he was in. It was at that time that he recalled to me the March or February memo that I had forgotten I ever wrote. He said, “Paul, I feel like of all the people that I can feel open with it’s you, because you told me early. I didn’t do what you said, and I know it’s coming down upon me now.” We talked about a myriad things, and very personally. It was a marvelous conversation, but again almost more than I could take because I was so exhausted physically and emotionally.

Well, then the next morning (I guess that night, but I didn’t hear until the next morning), I may have been the last person he called—he called every one of the
deans and provosts and vice-chancellors, and the librarian, and the graduate dean and so on. He said he was going to have a meeting Monday morning at 9:00. There was, to my knowledge, no conversation amongst any of the people, but no one came to that meeting. That was the signal that it was over.

Jarrell: But that was not a concerted decision. Everyone made it independently.

Niebanck: That’s right. We all had talked about scenarios and what we would do, but all of our feelings were contradictory. We were confused and ambivalent. We didn’t know where to go. We felt demoralized from the Saxon meeting. We all just wanted to leave the place. That was the emotional feeling. But there was no conspiracy or coalescence of attitude, to the point where one could say that it was prearranged that no one would go to that meeting. We weren’t even sure the meeting would take place. Gene [Cota-Robles] said he was going to be away, but then Chris said he was going to be there, and that he was calling the meeting. It got very hairy. Well, no one came.

The very next day Christensen told his staff that he figured he would resign. Then that Friday at the Regents meeting he did indeed resign. So it all happened, in effect, that weekend. Part of the reason I read Saxon the way I do, is that indeed Saxon’s decision to back the chancellor did not stick. The troops universally, including those early supporters, for example, Leo Laporte, who only gave up at the very last minute; it was only Elizabeth Penaat who was a supporter, became one of the dissenters, and then reversed, thinking that he would be sustained. I think she did that in essentially political terms, made her decision on political grounds—otherwise it was virtually unanimous that he
should go and that we couldn’t be a campus with him, when he’s still here. No one came to the meeting and that was that.

Jarrell: That was his signal.

Niebanck: Yes. He may even have been in conversation with Saxon. This is pure speculation of course. Saxon might have advised him, propping him up once more, to call our bluff. It could have been.

Jarrell: Yes.

Niebanck: I could see myself in a presidential role hypothetically saying to a subordinate, “Well, look you’re in terrible shape. You’ve got to find out. You’ve got to get a signal, and you can’t back off from the meeting. You said you want a meeting. Nobody really knows whether you do. If you want it, you better say you want it and tell your subordinates they’re supposed to be there.” I can see that happening, at least something like that going through Christensen’s mind, somehow inspired. And then his doing it and finding out that indeed no one was going to cooperate with him. That’s how solid people were.

Jarrell: That’s really remarkable.

Niebanck: Yes.

Jarrell: I’ve interviewed several provosts. Until just recently, because this was not apparent in the research I did, or the public documents, I had no idea of the Council of Provosts, the togetherness of it.

Niebanck: It was incredible, yes.
Jarrell: But do you think that that working relationship among the provosts will stand this campus in good stead in the future? Or was this just a crisis sort of working?

**Acting Chancellor Angus Taylor**

Niebanck: Well, it won’t because essentially, or substantially, I don’t know what words to use as a qualifier, but by and large it won’t because we’re back in a kind of double-structure. Angus Taylor’s style is more of a hierarchical style, a centrist’s style, something like McHenry’s bat with a nice veneer.

Jarrell: Yes.

Niebanck: Angus Taylor is a marvelous person. He operates very well within that style. The college is experiencing financial pressure and not really having the authority that would give them to operate as a unit. Yes, the crisis produced the kind of consensus and solidarity that was represented, but so would a long-term situation where the colleges were, for the most part, in charge. But we don’t have that now, so there’s no reason to expect that the colleges will be together. My experience is that college business is pretty much conducted without any knowledge of what other colleges do. That’s the way it has been; that’s the way it is now, I suspect. As I understand it, the provosts haven’t met for many, many weeks. So anyway, we’re back to normal. (laughter)

Jarrell: In terms of the resignation, what specifically was gained for the future?
Niebanck: Well, we were released from a very, very bad ineffective administrative situation. And that release and the opportunity to relax, recover [phone interruption]

Jarrell: Now we’re going to go on to the post-Christensen—we’ve said that Angus Taylor’s stabilizing efforts are kind of centrist and kind of in the line of McHenry’s, but with a little different personal style.

Niebanck: Yes.

Jarrell: But do you think basically things are sort of on an even keel again?

Niebanck: Yes. For this quarter I’m an outsider, and from an outsider’s standpoint, yes, I think they are. There is a relatively low level of enthusiasm on the campus. But I think that’s inevitable after the kind of catharsis we’ve been through. By this time next year, assuming we have a good search and we have a positive figure coming in, I think people will be hopeful again. It’s a good campus essentially, let’s face it. It has a lot to say to the world. Symbolic of it all is my own choice to respond favorably to Angus Taylor’s request on this vice chancellor job. In a way that’s, if you can’t fight them, join them.

Jarrell: (laughter)

Niebanck: I was wishing, and I put this on paper, that we wouldn’t have to invent new positions to manage the campus, that we could delegate the present officials, of whom there are myriad, the responsibilities for managing the campus. But Angus chose to bring things a bit closer to himself in the usual University of California structure, which includes a vice chancellor for academic
affairs. So while I had argued, and spiritually would wish that there wouldn’t be that kind of position, if there was going to be that kind of position, if he wants me, let it be. That’s fine. That’s fine. I can operate well from that kind of posture.

**Jarrell:** You’re going to be the vice chancellor for student affairs? How do you envision that—the job description, your tasks?

**Niebanck:** Well, I’m essentially a line officer in charge of health, counseling, physical education, registrar, admissions, enrollment, student services.

**Jarrell:** Funding of student—

**Niebanck:** Student activities, arts and lectures, probably a couple of other things that haven’t occurred to me at the moment.

**Jarrell:** Wouldn’t student grants and monies, financial aid—

**Niebanck:** Financial aid, yes. That’s in there. Lots of opportunity for service and for articulating more forcefully, and I hope creatively, the very important functions represented by those groups.

**Enrollment Crisis at UCSC**

**Jarrell:** Do you think, as this new vice chancellor, that you will be responsible for articulating what you see as problems in enrollment?

**Niebanck:** Yes. That’s one of my immediate challenges, also problems in counseling. I suppose those are the two highest agenda items the ones I’ve got to move on the quickest. Of course, enrollment problems are very, very complex. I think what we’ve got to institute quickly is some fashion of outreach and state
cultivation that involves faculty and students, current students, as well as a few responsible administrators in Central Services.

Jarrell: Do you mean this in terms of, pardon the word, salesmanship?

Niebanck: I think we have something to sell and the way to sell it is simply by exemplifying what we are by putting people who are it into the presence of people who have to know about it. We don’t literally have to sell as such, hard sell certainly not, but we have to be known.

Jarrell: I think certainly there are erroneous images of this campus in the public mind, things that hark back to maybe ten years ago, that simply have to be brought up to date.

Niebanck: Yes.

Jarrell: From my own readings, I would say that enrollment is a serious problem confronting this campus. Do you see it that way?

Recruiting a More Diverse Student Body

Niebanck: Indeed. Indeed I do. Or at least—well, I’ll simplify it. We’ve got to learn how to absorb new clienteles. The population that wants to go to college is changing in character. For example, lots of older people and lots of junior college transfers. We’ve got to learn how to absorb them and yield to their needs. We’ve also got to cultivate two important freshperson entry clienteles. One of those is a sustenance, an enlargement of the Anglo populations we’ve been serving. We’ve only been skimming that population and we’ve been doing disservice to the
main feeder high schools by not pulling in substantial numbers from individual high schools, which I think we ought to do. We are a service unit.

Jarrell: From a broad base. Is this what you mean?

Niebanck: Oh, from a broad base, but more intense within specific bases. I think I would choose, unless I’m advised to the contrary intelligently, to do more concentrated effort rather than a scattered effort, if that choice has to be made.

Jarrell: You’re talking about economic groups of students or —

Niebanck: I’m thinking of particular high schools.

Jarrell: I see.

Niebanck: Perhaps not exclusively, but largely in Southern California. And I think also the untapped Chicano clientele has to be tapped. Roberto Rubaclava has in the first rounds done a good job in attracting Chicano students here. What I’m looking at is a much larger picture, when we know that by the mid-eighties a quarter of the California population will be Chicano. We’ll have to address that need. Santa Cruz, I think, is beautifully poised to absorb and serve well substantial numbers of Chicano students. We could become, probably not predominantly a Chicano campus, but substantially a Chicano campus.

Jarrell: Now, that is fascinating.

Niebanck: I really think it has to happen.
Jarrell: I saw a newsreel the other day of a large demonstration at Berkeley. I think the Chicano population is something over 15 percent in the State. And the Chicano groups at Berkeley were protesting that such a small percentage of the overall campus population, it’s just disgraceful according to them.

Niebanck: Over 100,000 students in the University of California; 3,000 Chicano students.

Jarrell: Now in recruiting substantial, a substantial proportion of the Chicano student population to UC campuses and maybe to here, do you see problems in terms of—oh, this for instance has been called an elitist institution.

Niebanck: Yes.

Jarrell: We have very high academic standards. People say that affirmative-action students, whether they’re Chicanos, Blacks, Asians—that they come ill-prepared, they come at a lower-level, academically prepared. What do you think of this? How do we fare? How do you balance things out?

Niebanck: Well, on the one hand, people are people. And Chicano people will respond to high standards as well as anyone else will. And the term “elitist,” yes, that’s an image—I would rather think of the high standards and the opportunities for individual work, the things that UCSC can offer, to which I believe Chicano students would respond. That’s the one side. The other side is the University has difficulty doing what it calls remedial work.

Jarrell: Yes.
Niebanck: It has an ego problem. It has a self-image problem. Insofar as the University, and particularly this campus, can see a legitimate teaching, the teaching of courses which in this case Chicano students perceive that they need and indeed need, then I think we will have gotten over that hump. And if we can see certain English, or Spanish, for that matter, courses being taught which aren’t typically taught in the University of California to this date in anything but remedial fashion, if we can see them as legitimate offerings, then I think we ourselves can make a change. We don’t have to ask the Chicano population to be readier, in some stereotypical fashion. We can become readier in a more fluid and more responsive fashion.

Jarrell: I have discussed this with several other people in interviews and, let’s call them more traditional academic types—

Niebanck: Okay.

Jarrell: —who see—what do we call, what’s the cliché, it’s called lowering standards, or substantially changing what is traditionally taught. And they have argued that this is really the job of junior colleges or the state colleges, but that the UC system must maintain a certain essence.

Niebanck: Well, besides differing with it philosophically, I have to differ with that attitude politically. I’m, as it happens, strangely enough, a Republican. And the Republican Party is known for its self-defeating personality, that is, it would rather have its right-wing candidate lose, than have a middle-of-the-road progressive candidate and win. The University of California, giving a rough
analogy, if it holds to this elitist and false ego kind of stance, may find itself in political, greater political difficulty, and find itself on the wane very quickly.

**Jarrell:** In jeopardy.

**Niebanck:** And it just ought not, on political grounds to take that kind of stance. I really don’t believe that individual faculty will resist responding to a slightly different cast of student over the course of years. They will find rewards in serving new kinds of students which they’re not altogether used to.

**Jarrell:** And new kinds of rewards.

**Niebanck:** Moreover, as we have opportunities to bring in faculty who have the orientations we need, then attitudes will change on that account too.

**Jarrell:** Well, I certainly wanted to get you on the record because it’s a very sticky subject. People have quite passionate feelings about it.

**Niebanck:** Yes. It’s going to take deep and sustained cultivation both within the University of California and without. Images are stark and they’re along the lines you’ve expressed, and they have to be changed. Yes.

**The Future of the College System at UCSC**

**Jarrell:** I would like you to sum up, in terms of the future, what you think of the college-oriented system, the idea that UCSC is, its image in the public mind, is the college school. Do you think this is a viable way of maintaining this institution. As a provost—
Niebanck: You know the bias and you know why I came. I came on account of the college system. If we were to try to become a small-scale Berkeley—that is yielding to the traditional structure entirely, we would be engaging in a losing operation. If we were to engage, for example, in a graded system here, A, B, C. or whatever, or if we were to eliminate the colleges, or if we were to make student life in many ways more routine than it is, less oriented to the individual, it would all be self-defeating. What I would like to see contrariwise, which may not come about in full, I doubt that it will, is that the colleges be enhanced and that we retain all of these other supporting elements that give Santa Cruz its vitality and uniqueness. We have to operate from strength and we have plenty of strength. We cannot say, “We’re going to outdo our competitors in their terms.” We have to say, “We are something distinct, if you like what we are.”

Over the long run, I have to believe that the health of the society depends on units like UCSC, not on what we call the traditional forms. We will survive and be a vital element in American education in the ten, twenty and thirty-year run. So our present condition of declining enrollment, for example, and the challenges that that represents shouldn’t cause us to give up our strengths. We ought to enhance our strength. Now the colleges, in that vein, ought to have, it seems to me, more authority with respect to curriculum and all manner of academic enterprises. Whether that means—as Christensen made a pass at reorganization that eliminates, for example, a divisional orientation, which I favor, remains to be seen. I doubt now, since Angus Taylor has in effect reinforced the traditional structure.

Jarrell: And the three divisions—
Niebanck: Yes, that this will occur in very short order. I don’t think it will. But at the same time, we ought to make very sure that we don’t drain the colleges of their residual importance. Were we to take the colleges out of the picture here, no matter how difficult it is to sustain them and how draining it is to many of us, I think we would find very quickly that we didn’t have the kind of campus distinction that we now have.

Jarrell: These entities are vital to this—

Niebanck: They are indeed. My wife said to me the other day, looking at the College Eight newsletter, she said, “If you didn’t have a college, the students wouldn’t have that kind of intimate thing to relate to.” That’s just one tiny symbol of the importance of colleges, one very incidental, almost symbol. The campus wouldn’t turn out something that says, “We have this afternoon a tea with somebody or other.” Not something that anybody would pay attention to. You couldn’t operate that way, no. And when a person gets into difficulty, you wouldn’t have a counselor or advisor to come to the rescue and give assistance. The small-scale intimacy of the colleges is a dreadfully important characteristic.

Jarrell: It’s a question of scale, very definitely.

Niebanck: Yes.

Jarrell: I understand it that way. Some of the colleges seem to me, from my readings about the way they define themselves, to be less than substantial, in academic terms.

Niebanck: Yes.
Jarrell: They have a very vital social function, or a residential function. But I think of Merrill and College Eight as the two colleges which have established a real gritty academic definition. How do you see the other colleges faring in this realm? Academically? Or what could be done, for instance Crown is a good example in my mind.

Niebanck: Well, my model is one of a kind of permissiveness and inducing style, that is, the campus ought to create opportunities wherein colleges can become, in so far as they wish, more academically clear and assertive. This does not mean that from every college one will see an immediate or a sustained response. That’s all right. As long as some do, eventually by and large, all of them will. That Crown at this moment, for example, doesn’t want an academic identity. That’s okay. That’s healthy. But those that do ought to be permitted and encouraged to have one.

Jarrell: From an administrative point of view, are the colleges a way to lessen the bureaucratic problems?

Niebanck: Well, one can criticize surely, because the colleges now and under present circumstances are places where bucks don’t get stopped, and they ought to stop there in many cases. I think that the summary kind of statement would be if the colleges were given more authority they would assume responsibility, insofar as they have to compete for every little bit they become less accountable, less responsible, pass the buck more and deal in irrelevant detail, because in some ways that’s all left of them to maneuver. If they have important things to work with, they work with important things. Lacking them, they work with
unimportant things, they eat their hearts out and that’s a shame. I really wish, in my heart of hearts that we would make a choice and allocate to the colleges the responsibilities that divisions now have, including the budgets.

**Jarrell:** It seems it’s neither fish nor fowl right now, really.

**Niebanck:** Yes. And that’s the way it looks like it’ll continue for awhile. The divisions, I don’t think on a small campus are needed. There are many colleges in the United States, many campuses that operate without divisions. The divisions are the invention, in this case, of the University of California large campuses. With six thousand students, who needs divisions? Particularly when graduate education and research are not as critical here as they are elsewhere.

**Graduate Students**

Even graduate work can be significantly undertaken by colleges and administered by colleges. And at root, graduate students and colleges are a magnificent fit. To have graduate students in College Eight—we have a couple of dozen of voluntary affiliates there—means that life is more vital. Teaching opportunities come that aren’t fettered by TA’ships, for example, although some of them are TA’s. More mature voices are heard on committees, events are established and run, and funds are provided that undergraduates or faculty or staff could never invent or never have the authority to get in. Innovative courses and interdisciplinary things occur and social life is enhanced. And there’s a gradation, pardon me, from undergraduate through graduate through younger faculty to older faculty, that if you take out the vital, graduate element, there’s
too much of a leap, a gap. So even the graduate people, it seems to me, ought to be formally integrated into college life.

**Jarrell:** Well, that is really a remarkable way of looking at it because I’m a graduate student here. I’m not affiliated with a college, but I see that, I see quite a few graduate students who are not affiliated and we’re sort of in limbo. But the idea that there’s a benefit for both the college and for the graduate student.

**Niebanck:** To have a graduate student in College Eight’s case on a search committee, for example, or to have Sharon Quinn become a preceptor in our College Five circumstances, or to have an event by a jazz concert, a blues concert conducted in the quarry that Bill Barlow, a graduate student in College Eight stimulated and got funded through the college, etc. etc. These seemingly small, but in cumulative terms, enormously rich, vital contributions, not only enhance life for the colleges but for the graduate students themselves and give them practice with the things that they’re going to do throughout their lives. It’s been wonderful for us, even on a small scale.

**Jarrell:** About how many graduate students are going? A couple dozen?

**Niebanck:** A couple of dozen, yes. In mainly marine sciences and in histcon, occasional others. There’s a literature person; there’s a psychology person or two. They act as advisors and get paid for that. A variety of roles that can be played.
The Future of UCSC

**Jarrell:** Just in finishing up, what do you think the campus—not just your college or any of the colleges—what do you think the campus has to do to maintain its reputation? I’m sure your new role will address itself to that.

**Niebanck:** Well, when it gets down to it, I think it’s renewing our sense of self and of purpose and of unity. Insofar as we do that, we do those things, we will in turn, unqualifiedly become known for the strengths that we have. We’re self-doubting; we’re ambivalent; we’re worried; we feel oppressed; we feel alienated both from the system at large and from each other. And insofar as healing and integrative efforts can occur here and people can be renewed and honored and highlighted, I don’t know what the right term would be there.

**Jarrell:** Recognized?

**Niebanck:** Recognized—I think it will begin to happen. The long-term future of the campus is enormously bright if that kind of internal identity comes forth once again. It need not be a 1960s identity. It can be a current and a progressive kind of identity.

**Jarrell:** In terms of this campus and the Santa Cruz community, the county and the town, you’re one of the really few faculty members who have really built a relationship and have participated in community affairs. Do you see a bright future in terms of town-gown relationships?

**Niebanck:** Well on the occasions where opportunities are provided, and I’ve been among many as you imply, there are all kinds of bright sparks. I don’t think
we provide ourselves enough occasions. We don’t make ourselves as available as we ought as an institution and as subordinate parts or as individuals. I don’t think there’s an inherent difficulty between town and gown. I think there’s an enormous physical separation, and our being on the hill makes it inherently difficult. We should have built near High Street.

Jarrell: I agree.

Niebanck: Gee, what a gross mistake.

Jarrell: I agree.

Niebanck: But those realities can be overcome. Look some of the symbolism even—I mean, again I could talk for hours. This is really close to my heart. But take some of the symbolism. If we could convert, with no offense to anybody meant, the chancellor’s house into a university club which anyone could belong to, and if we slightly changed the nature of that enterprise, maybe adding a tennis court below or a pool or some such thing and—

Jarrell: A gathering—

Niebanck: And there would be a dining room that could be arranged for anyone for a small group, a large group. In old cluby terms, I suppose a pool room, a smoking room, a debate room, a whatever room. And if, in combination with that, some of the physical facilities other than that particular house were made available to the community largely, and you would have an occasional city council meeting, or AMBAG [Association of Monterey Bay Area Governments], or some force would come and meet, and if conventions and such were held
and—a variety of moves like this that could be done with modest effort. I think that very soon the community would see itself as being honored by and brought by, into the university, and find ways of using individuals that now it can’t find.

I was part of an early effort to get an urban observatory, so called, funded here by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. We failed because the politics didn’t work out. But the idea was that we would jointly participate with the city and the county and the region in research activity germane to the problems of the city, county, and region. Well, in looking for faculty who would be of service, potentially there were many. Now most of them are not active, but had they been provided with a vehicle or two, they would, I think become active, and they would see their lives joined in ways that now they don’t now with the fate of this region. Of course I’m a planner, so this has some bearing on what I’m saying, but of all places probably in the world that are worth our investment, the Monterey Bay area is one of those. It’s plenty deep as a laboratory, whether it’s in humanities or natural sciences or social sciences terms.

**Jarrell:** Really, you could go at it from any direction. It’s so rich.

**Niebanck:** That’s right.

**Jarrell:** Problems and possibilities.

**Niebanck:** Yes. And a very astute population. A very involved population. There’s more citizen participation of both a bureaucratic kind and a creative kind in this city than I’ve seen anywhere or known anywhere. And more opportunities for radical departures. So, there it is.
Jarrell: Well, I think that’s a very valuable perspective on that, because as head of the project here I see myself as one of the few people bridging—

Niebanck: Yes.

Jarrell: — directly. My work is in the community, all over the county, not just in the north county. I hear complaints like this so frequently, of a kind of aloofness.

Niebanck: Sure, sure. I was in some fashion honored, I guess is the term, when the Rotary Club, to which I would typically never belong—I’m not a joiner to start with and I wouldn’t think of getting tied into a kind of an establishment unit like Rotary—but when Rotary invited me to join in the classification of university provost, I leapt at it because this is one opportunity for bridging. Ed Dirks is there primarily because he was a member of Rotary in St. Louis, but other than Dirks, who came in for different reasons, I’m the only academic yet to be invited into Rotary.

Jarrell: Isn’t Dave Heron in Rotary also?

Niebanck: And David was a member. He opted in. He was a member elsewhere. He’s a more recent member. But I was the first one. And that’s symbolic too. I hear all this stuff, all this same stuff you’re hearing in a way in a more light fashion, because they recognize that I have a role so they play it a little bit lighter. But then I hear the jocular side, which is deep and has cutting overtones. It hurts, no question about it. And it’s unnecessary.

Jarrell: Do you think that there’s any scope in your new position, your new appointment, for you to implement any of these ideas at all?
Niebanck: Not on the academic side. On the student side I hope there will be.

Jarrell: I mean, on the vice-chancellorship?

Niebanck: Yes. Well, I won’t have academic side authority, although I will be interacting with people who do, and in that informal sense can help. On the student side, I hope there will be opportunities to influence university behavior, but on the student side it’s readier, and there’s more involvement. Students are very much citizens of this region and particularly this city. When we had the public policy forum series, on seven beautiful occasions students came and acted responsibly. The city, among other things, has to learn that students are citizens.

Jarrell: Right.

Niebanck: Maybe I can help with that. I don’t think I can do a great deal directly on the academic side from the position I’ll have.

Jarrell: No, I didn’t mean so much academic, but some of the plans, or some of these ideas of trying to redraw, or to encourage visitors, or more interchange between the community and the campus.

Niebanck: Yes. Inevitably I will do that.

Jarrell: Yes. That’s very encouraging. Well, thank you so much for being interviewed. It’s been a pleasure, really.

Niebanck: Thank you.
About the Interviewer and Editor

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Randall Jarrell was born in Los Angeles and lived in the San Francisco Bay Area until moving to Santa Cruz in 1970. She received her A.B. in History from San Francisco State University in 1969 and an M.A. in History from the University of California, Santa Cruz, in 1978. She worked as a journalist before her appointment in 1974 as director of the Regional History Project, and retired from the Project in 2004.

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