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the nature of the villae system. The author also relies heavily on such contemporary scholars as Marc Bloch and M. Finley for information about slavery and the villae, supplemented by two aerial surveys of Gaul and some archaeological data. This book is heavily indoctrinated with Marxist historical interpretation and offers little critical insight to an important subject.

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*Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia, 1810-1895* by Gerald Morgan is a study of the comedy of errors of British and Russian diplomacy in nineteenth-century central Asia. The region Morgan discusses includes present-day Soviet central Asia, Afghanistan, and bordering territories in Iran, Pakistan, India, and China. The guiding ideas of the book are that neither England nor Russia had any farsighted master plans for annexation in the area, that Russia posed no real threat to the integrity of the British Indian empire, and that England posed no real threat to Russian domination in Central Asia north of Afghanistan. According to this view, both empires were drawn into the region in a step-by-step fashion by such factors as the fluidity of their borders, the instability and aggressiveness of the neighboring principalities and tribes, a morbid suspicion of the motives behind each other’s moves in the area, and the meddlesome activities of their own nationals on the spot.

In the chapter “Russia in Central Asia up till 1842” we see the factors drawing Russia into the region: the construction of lines of forts in southern Siberia and Transcaspia, the suppression of Kazakh caravan raiding and Turkmen slave stealing, the acquisition of trading rights on the Aral Sea and the Amu Dar’ya River. Russia’s first large-scale military effort in the area, an invasion of the Khanate of Khiva in 1839, grew out of just such activities. The failure of this invasion supports the author’s contention that Russia could not threaten British India from this angle—the campaign turned into a complete fiasco as the inhospitable climate, disease, and supply shortages destroyed two thirds of the Russian forces, most of whom never even reached Khiva. Russia—subsequently
penetrated the region more slowly through trade missions and scientific explorations. It was only in the late 1860s and early 1870s, when Russia finally realized the full internal weakness of the Khanates of Bukhara, Kokand, and Khiva, and when suspicion of British commercial and political contacts in the area grew, that Russia decided to subjugate the entire region.

Morgan details the analogous steps by which England was drawn into the internal politics of nineteenth-century Afghanistan and other territories on the Indian empire's northwest frontier. In the First Afghan War (1838-1842) and English army was destroyed in an ill-considered effort to seat a friendly ruler on the throne of Afghanistan—much the same reasons that the Russian force had been destroyed in 1839. An invasion in the Second Afghan War (1878-1879) almost led to a similar disaster. As Morgan points out, had either side made a serious logistical appraisal of both countries' inability to carry out sustained military operations in Afghanistan and central Asia, the governments might have listened to the appraisals of their more sober-minded men on the spot and tensions could have been greatly reduced.

As it was, both empires ultimately achieved a point of stasis when their boundaries reached lines beyond which further expansion appeared infeasible or unprofitable. Afghanistan—whose fierce people, inhospitable terrain, and relative economic inconsequence combined to dissuade further English or Russian expansion—became a buffer zone between the two empires. Britain gained the right to control Afghan foreign policy in the Second Afghan War but little else. The final balance was formalized by the Joint Pamirs Boundary Commission in 1895.

Perhaps the book's greatest merit is its wealth of color and detail. In addition to local factors, Morgan looks at the influence on British and Russian involvement outside the region. The policies of subsequent conservative and liberal governments in England draw substantial attention from the author as do Russian domestic political circumstances. Morgan considers such factors as espionage, the Crimean War, and the Russian railroad building effort of the late nineteenth century. Especially fascinating is the treatment of British and Russian diplomats, explorers, maverick military men, merchant adventurers, missionaries, spies, and eccentrics. The author's thesis of the accidental and contingent nature of imperial expansion in the area is convincing.

The book has only two serious flaws. The first involves sources. The author relies on such materials as India Office records and private papers, as well as Foreign Office correspondence, auto-
biographies and travellers’ memoirs. Unfortunately, there are only a handful of Russian sources, mostly translated abstracts of contemporary Russian newspapers and journals. Since the author does not read Russian, he could not tap a wide variety of Russian documents and memoir literature. His treatment of Russia, while good overall, is therefore not of the same quality as his treatment of Britain and causes certain minor historical inaccuracies in the discussion of Russian history. In the chapter “The Origins of Russian Expansion in Asia,” for example, the author claims “it was only in the sixteenth century that the hold of the Golden Horde was weakened enough to allow the first stirrings of Russian nationhood” (p. 1). But the first stirrings of Russian nationhood were in the fourteenth century, and in the sixteenth century, Russia actually destroyed and absorbed the Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan, two of the three successor states of the Golden Horde.

The second flaw in the book is that the author generally does not use footnotes. This makes it difficult to pursue subjects he only touches on briefly. It also gives the book a superficial appearance of having been written as popular history.

Flaws notwithstanding, the book is well-written, cogently argued, and offers a novel contribution to European and Asian history in the age of imperialism. Earlier studies by Edward Ingram (The Beginnings of the Great Game in Asia, 1828-1834), Muhammad Anwar Khan (England, Russia, and Central Asia: A Study in Diplomacy, 1857-1878), Vinodina Terway (The East India Company and Russia, 1800-1857), and others are all more narrowly focused than Morgan’s. The book includes an epilogue by Geoffrey Wheeler briefly summarizing British, Russian, and Soviet involvement in the area from 1895 to 1981. Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia is well worth reading for both the specialist and the general reader.

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The Philistines and Their Material Culture. By TRUDE DOTHAN.

Readers seeking a history of the Philistines or a history of Philistine archaeology will be disappointed in this version of a 1967 Hebrew language work of the same title. Others, however, will find information relating to ceramics, architecture, history of religion, cultural diffusion,