Title
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Who Does What, to Whom, and How:
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Recent research on Latin American politics has placed substantial emphasis on the authoritarian relationships between national states and interest groups characteristic of the region. Particular attention has been paid to the limitation of pluralism and to "corporative" patterns of interest representation as distinctive features of the systems of state-group relations that have emerged. However, though many theoretical statements and descriptive case studies have examined these themes, little cross-national research has systematically compared state-group relations across a number of cases. Yet systematic comparison can yield important benefits, both as a means of sharpening conceptualizations and ultimately as an approach to testing propositions about the emergence of different types of state-group relations.

This chapter explores opportunities for the comparative analysis of state-group relations in Latin America. It first evaluates the contribution that quantitative cross-national research on national political regimes has made to the analysis of interest representation. Building on available conceptual discussions of corporatism, it proposes an approach to comparing corporative structures cross-nationally. It then argues that though the examination of corporative structures is an important starting point, it is essential to consider as well the differing relationships of economic and political power that are ratified or consolidated by means of these structures. The answers to the question, "Who does what, to whom, and how?" may be used for identifying a series of dimensions in terms of which these relationships can be compared. An examination of the answers to these questions with reference to one major aspect of state-group relations—the relationship between the state and organized labor in the modern sector—is presented to illustrate the wide variety of uses to which corporative
structures have been put in Latin America. It is argued that the answers to these questions have appeared in certain recurring patterns and that an essential task of future research is to identify the variety of different patterns that have emerged in Latin America. Finally, it is suggested that if the comparative analysis of state-group relations is to be meaningful substantively, a research strategy based on the analysis of relatively small numbers of cases and relatively simple cross-tabulations of nominal and ordinal scales derived from careful scoring of historical data must be employed.

Cross-National Analyses of National Political Regimes

Cross-national research that has included Latin American countries has given extensive attention to the analysis of national political regimes but has made only a limited contribution to the comparative analysis of authoritarian patterns of interest representation and state-group relations. One reason for this limitation has been the fact that the substantive concerns of much of this literature have been embedded in a tradition of research on political change oriented around the analysis of democracy and the evolution of territorially based systems of representation. These themes were emphasized in part because of a desire to deal with aspects of political life that lend themselves readily to counting and quantification, and in part because of the widespread belief in the 1960s that formal democracy and democratization were central issues of political development. These studies focused on such things as extent of suffrage; degree of competitiveness of the party system (which involves the results of territorial elections and the distribution of seats in a territorially based legislature); and the regularity of elections and of constitutional succession. The most important cross-national data banks that have included Latin America emphasize these same kinds of variables.

In contrast to the heavy emphasis on territorial representation, relatively little attention has been given to the system of interest representation. The greatest problem with efforts to analyze interest politics cross-nationally is the limited investment that has been made in developing relevant measures. As a result, most studies that have employed indices measuring characteristics of interest representation have used the same indicators, those developed by Arthur Banks and Robert Textor. Banks and Textor constructed two indices that dealt with interest-group representation. The first is a measure of freedom of group opposition that distinguished countries where groups were free to organize and able to oppose, free to organize but limited in ability to oppose, tolerated informally but effectively outside the established political system, and not tolerated. They also classified interest articulation by associational groups as either significant, moderate, limited, or negligible.

Three observations may be made about the Banks and Textor indicators. First, from the perspective of political science, their efforts were particularly interesting because of the extent to which their data bank, unlike many, was made up predominantly of political variables. Their work clearly represented a bold attempt to get at some of the more complex aspects of political life. Second, however, in any attempt to score all the nations of the world on a large number of complex variables, there are likely to be major problems of reliability. Reliability is indeed a problem for the Banks and Textor assessment of interest politics in Latin America. For a number of countries the scores have only a weak correspondence with the conventional wisdom among Latin American specialists concerning interest politics in the region. Finally, their categories represent highly aggregated descriptions which fail to deal conceptually with the different mechanisms through which state control and regulation are exercised and which do not take into account the fact that in any particular country there are likely to be a number of distinct "subsystems" of interest representation that may differ greatly across sectoral or class lines.

A limited number of additional studies have appeared that make some contribution to the comparative analysis of interest representation. Deane Neubauer developed two ordinal variables on which he scored the extent of organization of voluntary associations as high or low and the degree of group autonomy as high, medium, or low. However, he unfortunately included only two Latin American countries among the ten that he considered. Other studies have overcome the problem of the high degree of aggregation involved in characterizing the entire system of interest representation by focusing on only one aspect: the labor movement. Irna Adelman and Cynthia Morris scored eighteen Latin American countries on an ordinal measure of the strength and autonomy of the labor movement. Other authors have analyzed the extent of union membership and strike activity. Though one of these studies includes only one Latin American country and another analyzes all of the data in dichotomous form, thereby losing a great deal of information, they do have the advantage of including more concrete comparative data on what are clearly important aspects of interest representation. However, though they include variables that would be very useful in the comparative analysis of authoritarian systems of interest representation, they do not directly measure the authoritarian characteristics of these systems.

On balance, then, little in the cross-national literature can be of use in analyzing interest groups and state-group relations in Latin America. Cross-national studies have made a heavy investment in measuring and
analyzing features of national political regimes related to democracy and territorial representation and have devoted only limited attention to interest representation.

Ironically, one of the most important critiques of this neglect might be made not from the point of view of the scholar interested in authoritarianism and corporatism, but from the point of view of democratic theory: While cross-national analysts have been measuring democracy in terms of elections and parties, the pluralist school of democratic theory has emphasized interest-group politics as a principal basis for democratic representation. The "antipluralist" tradition within the literature on American politics places a similar emphasis on the role of interest politics, though with less optimistic conclusions regarding the implications of existing patterns of group interaction for American democracy. The conspicuous neglect of interest politics in most cross-national studies obviously represents a serious limitation from both of these perspectives.

From the point of view of scholars interested in authoritarianism and corporatism, this neglect of interest politics is equally serious. Some of the most important aspects of political life emphasized in analyses of authoritarian politics are the ways in which pluralism is limited and the ways in which elites control interest aggregation and articulation through a variety of means, in considerable measure through establishing corporative structures. Yet no effort has been made to construct indices dealing with these mechanisms. Cross-national studies have thus to a substantial degree become divorced from the central analytic concerns of a growing body of research on Latin American politics. Because of the heavy emphasis in cross-national studies on indicators of democracy and territorial representation, regimes have too often been conceptualized in terms of a continuum with democracy at one end and an unspecified nondemocratic, authoritarian, or undeveloped political system at the other. Relatively little attention has been devoted to the numerous dimensions of variation among the nondemocratic systems, or to the extent to which certain features usually associated with authoritarianism, such as corporatism, cut across a democracie-nondemocratic dimension. It is therefore time to go beyond the early scoring of regimes to construct indicators of the various techniques for channeling and controlling interest representation as a fundamental dimension in terms of which regimes may be compared.

Comparing Corporative Structures

Given this neglect of interest representation in cross-national research, what direction can cross-national studies of this aspect of political life most usefully take? One promising focus is suggested by recent writing on interest representation in Latin America that emphasizes the concept of "corporatism." Though this term has been applied to a wide variety of different phenomena—including ideology, broad cultural traditions, modes of political action, and types of political participation—the apparent consensus regarding its meaning when it is used to describe systems of interest representation. Philippe Schmitter, Howard Wiarda, Kenneth Mericle, Guillermo O'Donnell, Robert Kaufman, James Malloy, and Alfred Stepan have all presented essentially structural definitions that treat corporatism as an approach to organizing state-society relations. While using different vocabulary and phrasing, they all treat corporatism as a type of interest representation based on noncompeting, officially sanctioned, state-supervised groups. In contrast to the pattern of interest politics based on autonomous groups that is posited by the pluralist model and approximated to a substantial degree in some empirical cases, in the case of corporatism the state encourages the formation of a limited number of officially recognized groups that interact with the state in clearly defined and regulated ways.

Though these definitions have not been applied to the systematic comparative analysis of corporatism, their empirical referents are sufficiently clear that they are useful for developing such a comparison. They point to three specific types of mechanisms used in regulating state-group relations: structuring, subsidy, and control. The following working definition may be employed as a synthesis of available definitions:

A system of interest representation is defined as corporative to the extent that it is characterized by a pattern of state structuring of representation that produces a system of officially sanctioned, noncompetitive interest associations which are organized into legally prescribed functional groupings; to the extent that these associations are subsidized by the state; and to the extent that there is explicit state control over the leadership, demand-making, and internal governance of these associations.

This definition lends itself relatively easily to comparative analysis because it is explicitly criterial. That is, it identifies a series of traits that may be present or absent to varying degrees. It thus avoids an excessively narrow conception of corporatism as a phenomenon that is either present or absent and views it instead as a dimension (or, potentially a set of dimensions—see the next section) along which cases may be arrayed.

What types of data can most usefully be employed in the compara-
tive analysis of these corporate traits? Various authors have emphasized that the relationship between the state and interest associations in Latin America is, to a substantial degree, formalized in the legal system. One useful point of entry is therefore to examine the formal legislation that regulates state-group relations. The analysis of law also has two important practical advantages. First, many of the relevant laws are readily available, providing a convenient source of comparative data. Second, the analysis of laws from different historical periods makes it possible to develop data involving relatively long time series, permitting not only comparative analysis among countries but also extended longitudinal analysis within countries.

As part of an ongoing study of state-labor relations in Latin America, we have attempted to take advantage of this opportunity for comparative-longitudinal analysis by using labor law as a principal source of data on one important aspect of state-group relations. A code for scoring labor law has been developed that identifies thirty-six different provisions for state structuring, subsidy, and control of organized labor. The relevant provisions concerning state structuring can be classified under the following subheadings: registration and recognition of unions; compulsory membership and the representation of nonmembers; definition of the sectors into which unions are to organize; hierarchical and horizontal structuring of unions; monopoly of representation; and creation of multiclass representative bodies in which workers' representatives participate. Two types of subsidy of unions have been identified: state financing and direct state involvement in sponsorship. Three types of control have been identified: control of demand-making, control of leadership, and direct state monitoring and intervention in union affairs. On the basis of this code, the labor laws of ten Latin American countries have been scored annually for the period 1905 to 1974.

Data collected on the basis of a code of this type can be aggregated and analyzed in a variety of ways. One approach is to construct an overall index of the extent to which corporate provisions are present in the laws of each country. Such an index permits a detailed analysis of the timing and degree of changes in the legal framework of state-labor relations. The order and patterns in which different corporate provisions appear in different countries may also be tested to see whether they fit any recognized scaling patterns. The three different approaches to shaping state-labor relations—structuring, subsidy, and control—may be analyzed to discover whether, to some degree, they represent distinct dimensions that appear in different combinations in different settings. Data on labor law can also be analyzed in connection with other variables in an attempt to explain variations in the extent to which these corporate legal provisions have appeared in each country and in the timing of their appearance.

The analysis of the legal framework of state-group relations obviously represents only a starting point in the analysis of corporate structures. One must also consider the application of law and certain aspects of corporate practice that may never be ratified in law. Such an extension of the analysis would have to rely on available monographic literature on state-group relations or on new field research, and hence would not lend itself as readily to the comparison of large numbers of cases. It would be more appropriate to use this supplementary type of data in more focused comparisons of small numbers of cases or in the analysis of change over time within a single country. Even with these limitations in the scope of comparison, however, it appears that an analysis of this type focusing on both law and informal practice would provide a valuable approach to comparing corporate structures.

On the basis of available conceptual discussions of corporatism, it is thus possible to derive a set of criteria for evaluating the degree to which any particular case is characterized by corporative structures of state-group relations. However, conceptualizing corporatism only in terms of structure, whether formal or informal, cannot by itself form the basis of an adequate analysis. Similar structures may have very different functions in different settings. They may be used to ratify or consolidate very different distributions of political and economic power. To the extent that this is the case, an understanding of structure provides insights into the means through which certain ends are accomplished, but not into what those ends are or who seeks to accomplish them. Yet it is precisely this context of power relationships that makes the analysis of structure interesting.

Who Does What, to Whom, and How?

If one is to move beyond a concern with structure and study the relationships of economic and political power that are ratified or consolidated by means of corporate structures, it is essential to identify dimensions in terms of which these relationships can most usefully be compared. With Lessianan brevity one may ask, "Who does what, to whom, and how?" The answers to this question may be used as a starting point for identifying the different types of corporate-state-group relations that have emerged in Latin America.

In the analysis that follows, as in the discussion of labor law presented earlier, the focus will be restricted to the relationship between the state and organized labor. This may be justified not only because it
makes the task at hand more manageable, but also because, as O'Donnell has emphasized, state-labor relations are a particularly crucial aspect of the reality of Latin American corporatism. If one were to consider the relations between the state and other interest associations, a set of parallel, yet distinct, answers to these questions would emerge.

Who?

When one says that corporatism ratifies or consolidates relationships of economic and political power, it is essential to ask, Whose power? Who creates or uses corporative structures? Whose interests are being served?

Since the focus of this portion of the analysis is on state-labor relations, it is convenient to begin by considering these two “actors”—the state and organized labor. Corporatism may enhance either the power of the state or the power of the labor movement—or, in many cases, of particular sectors or factions within the state or the labor movement. In some cases, corporative structures of state-labor relations are introduced or actively retained in settings in which a strong state is consolidating its domination over the labor movement. At the other extreme, a weak state may enter into a coalition with a powerful, often highly mobilized, labor movement, introducing corporative provisions desired by labor organizations or labor leaders in exchange for political support. A wide range of empirical cases, involving a variety of different power relationships and alliance patterns, are found between these extremes.

The way in which these apparently opposite outcomes can be achieved may be understood by considering separately the three component elements of corporatism discussed above: structuring, subsidy, and control. Whereas structuring can be used to reduce the ability of organized labor to engage in active and effective demand-making, it may also be used to ratify or reinforce the dominance of a favored sector of organized labor which is an ally of the government over other sectors of the labor movement. Though subsidy can reduce the autonomy and militancy of organized labor by making labor leaders dependent on the state and reducing their concern with defending and winning support of their own rank and file, it may also be used selectively to reinforce the power of a favored sector of the labor movement in relation to other sectors. Finally, though mechanisms of direct control may be used against the entire labor movement, they may also be used selectively against certain sectors of organized labor in a way that strengthens the position of the sector that is allied with the government.

The difference between these two patterns corresponds to a distinc-

tion that Schmitter, drawing on the literature on European corporatism, has identified as the contrast between state and societal corporatism. Following Mihaïl Manolescu, he characterizes state corporatism as that in which “singular, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered representative ‘corporations’" are created by and kept as auxiliary and dependent organs of the state which found[ed] its legitimacy and effective functioning on other bases.” In the case of societal corporatism, “the legitimacy and functioning of the state [are] primarily or exclusively dependent on the activity of ‘corporations.’” In the first case, interest associations are thus “dependent and penetrated”; in the second case, they are “autonomous and penetrative.” Schmitter identifies societal corporatism primarily with the “postliberal, advanced capitalist, organized democratic welfare state” that has emerged in the most advanced North Atlantic societies and state corporatism with the “antiliberal, delayed capitalist authoritarian, neomercantilist” state that is more characteristic of Latin America.

It is certainly correct that societal corporatism is more prevalent in North Atlantic societies and state corporatism more prevalent in Latin America. However, it is evident that there are significant variations along this dimension within Latin America as well. The instances of state corporatism are numerous, with the contemporary authoritarian regimes in Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile obvious examples. A striking example of societal corporatism is Cuba in 1933, when a powerful labor movement won important concessions from a relatively weak government. In many other cases, there is a complex mix of control from above and mobilization from below—including Venezuela in the period after 1945, Argentina after 1943, Mexico under Lázaro Cárdenas, and Colombia during the Liberal era.

Though the state-societal distinction provides a useful starting point for answering the question of “who,” it is important that it not lead one to treat society and the state as unified entities. The present discussion has already employed a relatively disaggregated conception of the societal side of the distinction, both because the analysis has been restricted to the labor movement and because the implications of corporatism for organized labor were explained in terms of its consequences for the relations among different sectors of the labor movement. In dealing with the state, one must likewise be careful not to treat it as a “black box,” thereby neglecting to consider the question of “who” the state is, or which economic or political groups are acting through it.

*That is, multiclass interest associations that appear in the most extreme cases of “corporatism” as defined earlier in this chapter.
In the case of societal corporatism, it is primarily the labor movement, or a sector of it, that is acting through the state—or, more specifically, extracting concessions from the state or winning concessions by allying with other actors in the state or associated with it. In the case of state corporatism, and in those cases which involve a complex mix of initiatives from above and mobilization from below, a variety of economic and political interests may come into play. These may again include the interests of the favored sectors of the labor movement, but in a context of more initiative from above and less autonomous initiative on the part of labor. Other interests served have included those of elements of the urban middle class, national industrialists, foreign capital, and civilian technocrats inside and outside the state. Military elites have often played a central role, including both national political leaders who have risen from the military and in some cases the military acting as an institution. Finally, political parties have played a crucial role in the development of corporatism in a number of countries.24

What and to Whom?

In emphasizing that corporatism ratifies or consolidates relationships of economic and political power, it is important to ask, “Power to do what, and to whom?” The exercise of political power is of interest, not in itself, but rather in terms of how it is used for pursuing certain objectives or policies. The question is “what” policies and objectives, and at “whom” are they directed?

An important part of the answer to this question involves the impact of corporative provisions on labor-management relations. These provisions may greatly strengthen the position of labor vis-à-vis management, as when corporative structures are used to protect major sectors of the working class that have not previously been organized in unions or have not participated in collective bargaining.25 Alternatively, corporative provisions can be used to weaken the labor movement in its relations with management. In some cases this is done through a general tightening of control over the entire labor movement.26 In other instances, it may be done by deliberately supporting a portion of the labor movement that is clearly more moderate and less militant in its demands.27 In these different contexts, the answer to the question “to whom” thus varies. In some instances, corporative structures aid organized labor and to some degree are directed against employers. In other instances, they favor employers and are directed against organized labor.

Apart from the immediate consequences for the labor movement, answering the question “what and to whom” requires a consideration of the broader policy objectives being pursued by the state. These are relevant because corporative structures may be used either to win the support of the labor movement in a way that enhances the ability of the state to pursue certain broad objectives or to facilitate the control of the labor movement in a way that reduces its ability to oppose the state as the state pursues objectives that may conflict with the interests of an important portion of organized labor.

A striking variety of policy orientations—in terms of a right-to-left spectrum—has been associated with corporatism.28 A convenient means of summarizing this spectrum is in terms of the overall development strategy pursued by the state. Drawing on the classification proposed by Charles W. Anderson, three types of development strategies may be identified: conventional, based on the elaboration and subsidy of the established modern sector; populist, based on the subsidy of the established modern sector and the active attempt to extend benefits to less privileged groups within society; and revolutionary, which views the established modern sector as an obstacle to development.29 The relationship among these three categories may be conceptualized in terms of the degree to which they are oriented around the redistribution of wealth to the lower classes.

In terms of these categories, there is great diversity among the regimes under which corporative structures of state-labor relations have played an important role in Latin America. The post-1964 regime in Brazil and the Juan Carlos Ongania period in Argentina clearly fall at the conventional end of the spectrum. In the populist category, at the middle of the spectrum, Juan Perón's first government in Argentina, Getúlio Vargas's first government in Brazil, and the Cárdenas period in Mexico are obvious examples. Other regimes that fall in the populist category include Venezuela from 1945 to 1948, Cuba in 1933, and the experiment in “military socialism” in Bolivia in 1936.30

Finally, one case in which a number of new corporative structures of state-labor relations were introduced fits in the revolutionary category—contemporary Cuba. Because of the degree to which the content of public policy in Cuba diverges from that which is traditionally associated with corporatism, this case underlines the importance of analyzing the functions performed by particular corporative structures.

The labor movement in pre-Castro Cuba had to a substantial degree been dominated by relatively conservative, and often corrupt, leaders who did not play a significant role in the overthrow of Batista. Important sectors of organized labor did not initially support the revolution, even though the overall thrust of the revolution involved a major redistribution of resources to the lower classes. In the context of massive foreign opposition to the revolution, the Cuban government was inevitably concerned about ensuring the loyalty of domestic groups.
and introduced a series of new corporative provisions in labor legislation as a means of building a labor movement that would support the revolution. This sharp increase in corporative provisions produced some of the highest scores on the aggregate “corporatism” variable that have appeared among the countries considered in our analysis of labor law.  

Corporative structures of state-labor relations have thus played an important role under regimes that span the full spectrum from right to left. The introduction or consolidation of corporative structures has made it easier for these regimes to promote very different patterns of distribution of resources in society. The answer to the question “to whom” has thus varied greatly, since these policies have benefited, and have been directed against, very different combinations of groups within society.

The contexts in which corporative structures emerge may be analyzed in terms of more immediate political goals, as well as in terms of broad development strategies. Specifically, political elites have used the introduction of corporative structures as a means of winning and consolidating political power. In Bolivia in 1936 and in Argentina after 1943, corporative structures were used to win labor support for political leaders who rose to power from the military. Corporative structures have also played an important role in the winning and consolidation of power by political parties. In some cases parties have sought to expand their electoral base by encouraging the formation of a new labor movement; in some cases a new party and a new labor movement have emerged together; and in still others, a new party has been built onto a labor movement that already had substantial power. Finally, corporative structures may be used to facilitate the consolidation of power by political coalitions that wish to pursue policies opposed by organized labor. In these cases, corporative mechanisms are used to reduce the political power of organized labor.

How?

The final step in addressing the question, “Who does what, to whom, and how?” involves an analysis of the ways in which the corporative ordering of state-labor relations is achieved. This brings the discussion back to the issues of structure considered in an earlier section of this chapter. However, structure is now treated as only one of several dimensions in terms of which specific cases of corporatism can be compared.

In addressing the question of “how,” one must consider the different patterns of corporative provisions present in each country. In what combinations and variations do they occur? Do different combinations of provisions for structuring, subsidy, and control appear in different settings?

Important variations within each of these broad categories of structuring, subsidy, and control are also present. Some of the most striking differences are found in the approaches to structuring labor representation. These include variations in terms of the presence or absence of particular provisions. In addition, highly varied partial approximations of certain important corporative “traits” have appeared. Conceptual discussions of corporatism emphasize such features as the replacement of “horizontal” class organizations with “vertical” organizations that correspond to functional sectors of the economy; the granting of monopoly of representation; and compulsory membership. Yet these features of corporatism rarely appear in their most elaborated form. Instead, they are often achieved indirectly through various combinations of legal provisions and informal practices.

With regard to the vertical organization of representation along functional lines—as opposed to horizontal organization along class lines—perhaps the closest approximation in contemporary Latin America is the attempt to supersede horizontal organization by establishing self-managing enterprises such as those which have appeared in Peru. In general, however, the fundamental basis for organizing interest representation in Latin America remains horizontal, along class lines. Within this framework, many attempts have been made to achieve some degree of vertical integration among different class groups through the formation of public or semipublic representative bodies that bring together representatives of business and labor. These include various kinds of social and economic councils and a variety of agencies concerned with specific policy areas such as social security.

Another, very different, approach to fragmenting worker representation and substituting vertical for horizontal integration has appeared in several countries. Laws have emerged that appear to do this by orienting worker representation around local “enterprise” unions (also referred to as “plant” unions, “works” unions, and “industrial” unions). Particularly in countries at lower levels of industrialization, where factories are small, such a unit of organization appears to lend itself readily to the formation of labor organizations which resemble “company unions” and which help perpetuate a paternalistic relationship between workers and managers. In one case, the requirement that a portion of the profits of the enterprise go directly to the union appeared to strengthen this relationship.

In some cases, an exclusive monopoly of representation has been granted outright to particular unions, but with this feature of corporatism as well, perhaps the most striking thing is the variety of partial
approximations that have appeared. These may be ordered in terms of a broad spectrum of degrees of monopoly, including the extension of certain privileges associated with monopoly of representation to more than one union, but not to all unions, in particular occupational groupings; granting of monopoly of representation to an interassociational committee that represents all unions in the particular occupational grouping; granting many privileges associated with monopoly of representation to one union, but permitting other unions to exist; and granting a monopoly of representation to one union and completely prohibiting competing unions.

Provisions for compulsory membership are in fact relatively rare. Once again, what one finds is a variety of provisions that indirectly perform the same functions as compulsory membership. These include laws that give unions the right to represent nonmembers (such as provisions that make collective bargaining agreements entered into by the union applicable to nonmembers); provisions concerning open, closed, and union shops; and syndical taxes that apply to nonmembers as well as members.

The state may subsidize organized labor in many different ways as well. Along with the great variety of funds available through ministries of labor and public welfare programs that directly or indirectly subsidize union leaders or union activities, the most crucial form of subsidy involves state assistance in the collection of union dues. The most comprehensive means of doing this is the syndical tax, which is paid by all workers under the union’s jurisdiction—whether or not they are union members—and is distributed among the various levels of union hierarchy. Such taxes have rarely appeared, however, and provisions that facilitate the collection of union dues generally involve such things as dues checkoffs, requirements regarding open, closed, and union shops, and laws concerning compulsory membership.

One also finds a variety of mechanisms of direct control of labor representation. A number of different provisions limit the right to strike and specify when strikes may occur in relation to conciliation and arbitration procedures. Many different requirements have appeared concerning who may be a union leader. Finally, a variety of provisions give legal sanction to direct state involvement in the internal governance of unions, including provisions that allow a state official to attend a union meeting; permit a state official to preside over a union meeting; authorize the state to assume direct control of unions; and give formal legal sanction for the state to disband unions. The various forms that these and other mechanisms of control have taken merit central attention in any attempt to answer the question of “how?”

Varieties of Corporatism

In considering the various answers to the question “Who does what, to whom, and how?” it is evident that different answers cluster to some degree in recurring patterns. Two of the most widely discussed patterns are associated with regimes based on the “populist coalition” that have emerged in the phase of import-substituting industrialization in some Latin American countries and with the “bureaucratic-authoritarian” patterns that have emerged in some countries in the context of economic crises associated with the apparent “exhaustion” of the initial “easy” phases of import substitution. The most conspicuous examples of these populist regimes are the first Vargas government in Brazil and the first Perón government in Argentina, with the Cárdenas period in Mexico exhibiting many similar features. The “bureaucratic-authoritarian” pattern is best exemplified by the post-1964 regime in Brazil and the Onganía period in Argentina. It has also been followed to some degree by the post-1973 regimes in Chile and Uruguay. Though much remains to be done in terms of elaborating and systematically testing arguments about the emergence and characteristics of these regimes, a brief summary of available arguments provides a useful illustration of what two important varieties of corporatism may look like.

In the case of regimes based on populist coalitions, the answer to the question “who” is often intermediate with regard to the distinction between state and societal corporatism. Organized labor, or a sector of it, is in alliance with the government, which derives its legitimacy in part from the support of labor. Other actors in the dominant political coalition include a newly emerging class of national industrialists, important sectors of the newly emerging labor movement, and the political elites that lead these coalitions. These may involve leaders who have risen from the military, as in the case of Perón; the elite of a political party, as in the Cárdenas era in Mexico; or other civilian political leaders, as in the case of Vargas in Brazil.

These regimes tend to strengthen the bargaining position of organized labor. Their emergence frequently either coincides with or shortly follows the first major elaboration of corporative provisions in labor law. These provisions often mark the end of long periods in which governments attempted to deny or at least limit the right of unions to exist and a shift to active government protection of unions, generally focused on one sector or confederation with which the government seeks to form an alliance. This protection is accompanied by active support for the formation of new unions and for broadening worker benefits through expanded social security programs and wage increases. The immediate answer to “what,” in terms of the working class, is the
protection, and sometimes the creation, of an organized labor movement and an extension of benefits to the working class.

In terms of broader economic policy, these regimes pursue the “populist” development strategies that are intended to promote import-substituting industrialization: the termination of free-trade policies, the development of domestic industry, and the expansion of the domestic market for consumer goods. The protection of organized labor and the extension of benefits to the working class appear to complement the goal of promoting industrialization in two ways. First, they win the allegiance of organized labor to the political coalition which supports the public policies that directly encourage industrialization. In addition, they increase labor income and thereby expand the domestic market for nationally produced consumer goods.

Politically, a common feature of the way in which corporative structures are employed under these regimes is in building a strong political party. The “incorporating,” “inclusionary” thrust of the use of corporatism under these regimes serves to win the support of labor and often gives these parties a powerful base in the labor movement.39

In the case of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, the answer to the question “who” emphatically involves state corporatism rather than an intermediate case between state and societal corporatism. In these regimes the state does not depend on labor for legitimacy and support. The ruling coalition includes technocratic elites within—as well as outside—the state bureaucracy; the military, often acting to a substantial degree as an institution; and, directly or indirectly, foreign capital.

These regimes tend to weaken the bargaining position, as well as the overall political power, of organized labor. They exclude the labor movement from political power and adopt a policy of holding down wages or at least producing a shift in labor income unfavorable to large sectors of the working class.40 Corporative structures play a central role in implementing these policies. This control of organized labor and labor income—as well as the broader “conventional” development strategies of these regimes—is part of the effort to overcome the crises of inflation and balance-of-payments deficits associated with the apparent “exhaustion” of import substitution, to facilitate capital accumulation, and to attract new foreign investment.

Politically, corporative structures are employed to protect the position of the military as it tries to rule as an institution. In contrast to the earlier period, the primary thrust of corporatism is “exclusionary,” and the purpose is to control the political demands of organized labor.41

This schematic summary of these two patterns shows how particular combinations of answers regarding “what and to whom” as well as “who” have been grouped together in the context of two phases of industrial growth in certain countries in Latin America. In each phase, a certain economic and political “logic” appears to have produced these particular recurring patterns. Much remains to be done in terms of exploring the way these different features are linked even in the most often discussed examples of these regimes, and assessing the way they appear in modified form in other countries during different phases of economic growth.42 Nonetheless, these do appear to be two of the most important patterns that have emerged in Latin America.

These two phases of industrial growth are by no means the only contexts in which it is relevant to look for patterns. An important direction that studies of corporatism must take involves the analysis of other modal, as well as deviant, patterns. For instance, attention needs to be given to cases in which a substantial elaboration of corporative structures of state-labor relations has occurred in preindustrial settings. In these contexts, rather different combinations of interests of other urban middle-class and rural elite groups appear to come into play, along with a variety of military, party, and other political interests.43

Conclusion

A remarkable variety of answers to the question, “Who does what, to whom, and how?” thus emerges, even when one considers only one aspect of the system of interest representation—state-labor relations. This finding may suggest that the concept of corporatism casts too broad a net and perhaps obscures a variety of interesting distinctions that ought to be made within the Latin American context. In a period in which the study of corporatism is increasingly popular in research on Latin America, it may be too easy to achieve a sense of intellectual closure by simply applying the label “corporative” to a given political situation. Because corporative structures appear in such a wide variety of contexts, this sense of closure may be illusory.

The concept of corporatism does usefully highlight certain features of systems of interest representation that distinguish them both from pluralism and from situations in which there is a denial of the right of groups—most commonly labor unions—to exist.44 Corporatism is a system of nonpluralist group representation both because it is nonpluralist and because it is a system of group representation. The approach to the comparative analysis of corporative structures proposed earlier provides a basis for determining the degree to which corporatism, in this sense, is present in any particular case.

Once one has considered these important issues of corporative structure, however, it is essential to analyze the relationships of economic and political power that are ratified or consolidated through these
structures and to use differences in these relationships as a basis for identifying different varieties of corporatism. In this chapter, we have tried to take a first step in this direction by identifying dimensions in terms of which one might distinguish different varieties of corporatism. We then presented a preliminary discussion of the combinations of answers that go together in recurring patterns.

If the next task for comparative analysts is the further exploration of different varieties of corporatism, what implications does this have for the types of cross-national comparisons that are most appropriate? It was suggested that certain aspects of the legal structure of corporatism—and hence an important part of the answer to the question "how?"—lend themselves to fairly elaborate measurement and scaling across large numbers of cases and over long periods of time. On the other hand, the informal aspects of structure and the answers to the questions "who, what, and to whom" require a very different kind of analysis.

What is called for is a type of "event scoring" of historical data that involves the classification of cases in terms of nominal or ordinal scales on the basis of available historical evidence. Because of the difficulty of collecting this type of data, it may not be possible to analyze large numbers of cases. The kinds of comparison that can be made on the basis of these data will often not involve elaborate, multivariate tests of hypotheses, but rather a type of "small-N" analysis based on selected cross-tabulations of categorical variables. This may not allow for sophisticated statistical analysis, but it will permit systematic cross-national comparison. This approach obviously loses a great deal in terms of the number of cases that can be considered and the kinds of data manipulation that can be performed, but these losses appear to be a small price to pay for greater substantive relevance.

NOTES

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1. Following Linz, we are using the expression "regime" broadly to refer not only to the state itself, but also to the patterns of interaction between the state and society. See Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Handbook of Political Science, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), vol. 3, p. 265.

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3 in this volume; Robert R. Kaufman, chap. 5 in this volume; James J. Malloy, chap. 1 in this volume; and Alfred Stepan, State and Society: Perspectives in Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming), chap. 2. The structural emphasis in available analyses of corporatism is also discussed in Stepan, State and Society, chap. 2.


16. The principal source of data on labor legislation was the annual Legislative Series published by the International Labor Office. In addition, the standard editions of labor laws published in each country were used both to examine the laws in the original language and to fill in gaps in the Legislative Series. For a preliminary presentation of the data derived from this code, see David Collier, Leslie Spencer, and Cherri Waters, “Varieties of Latin American Corporatism” (paper presented at the 1975 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association).

17. In his State and Society, chap. 2, Stepan has likewise emphasized the limitation of structural definitions. Rather than focusing primarily on the functions performed by corporate structures, however, his concern leads to a different, but very important, question: What conditions affect the success of the installation of these structures and their legitimacy?

18. See chap. 3 of this volume.

19. These alternative functions of the structures linking the state with labor have been analyzed by Erickson in terms of the idea that skillful labor leaders may turn “sources of uncertainty” in labor regulations into sources of political power. See Kenneth Paul Erickson, “Corporatism and Labor in Development,” in Contemporary Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political Development, ed. H. Jon Rosenbaum and William G. Tyler (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 146.


23. These cases are discussed in a number of standard labor histories. See note 30.

24. Examples of the specific combinations of groups involved in particular historical periods will be presented shortly. For an important statement regarding the role of political parties as an intervening actor in state-labor relations, see Kaufman’s analysis in chapter 5 of this volume.


26. See, for instance, Moricle, chap. 10 in this volume.
31. For a discussion of the way this was done in Brazil in the 1930s, see Howard J. Wiarda, The Brazilian Catholic Labor Movement: The Dilemmas of National Development (University of Massachusetts, Labor Relations and Research Center, 1969), pp. 15–16.


33. Charles Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967), chap. 7. The first and third categories employed here involve the same labels and roughly the same content. The middle category differs both in its label and to some degree in its content. It is referred to here as “populist” rather than “democratic reform” since this approach is frequently adopted by regimes that are clearly nondemocratic. The middle category in the present analysis, like that in Anderson’s analysis, includes development strategies based on “a belief in the centrality of the public role in the developmental effort” (p. 176) and on the conviction that public policy should “incorporate” social groups that had previously been marginal to the national society (p. 176). However, given the focus of the present analysis on organized labor in the modern sector, the concern here is particularly with populist policies toward groups in the modern sector, and not with the incorporation of the traditional sector, as in Anderson’s analysis (see p. 174). I would like to thank Elizabeth Jelin and Oscar Oszlak for helpful comments regarding the issues involved in classifying development strategies.


35. For a discussion of this period, see Roberto E. Hernández and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, “Labor Organization and Wages,” in Revolutionary Change in Cuba, ed. Carmelo Mesa-Lago (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), pp. 209–49. The relevant labor legislation is reported in the International Labor Office Legislative Series and in Grupo Cubano de Investigaciones Economicas, En estudio sobre Cuba (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1963). Since complaints about the “authoritarian” control of the Cuban working class under Castro have been used as the basis for counterrevolutionary attacks on the Castro regime, it is noteworthy that writers sympathetic to the Cuban Revolution, such as Maurice Zeitlin, have reported the total replacement of the traditional, often corrupt, labor leadership and a “withering away” of the labor movement during the revolutionary period (Maurice Zeitlin, Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class [New York: Harper Torebooks, 1970], pp. xxx–xxvill). For an interesting discussion of the emergence of conservative “labor bureaucrats” as an obstacle to revolutionary change, see Leon Trotsky, Marxism and the Trade Unions (London: Plough Press, 1968), pp. 5 ff.


37. Colombia is an example of this first pattern (see Urrutia, Development of the Colombian Labor Movement, chap. 8); Venezuela is an example of the second (see John D. Marz, Acción Democrática (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966): 256–78; and Robert Alexander, The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), chap. 18; and Argentina is an example of the third (see Alexander, Labor Relations). The first pattern corresponds to Kaufman’s machine systems, and the second and third to his group-based systems (see Kaufman, chap. 8 in this volume).

38. The following discussion is drawn primarily from the preliminary analysis carried out in connection with the scoring of labor law discussed earlier.


41. For an interesting early statement regarding the basic conditional alternatives involved in these two patterns, see Trotsky, Marxism and the Trade Unions, pp. 10–11. James Malloy provides a valuable introduction to these patterns in chap. 1 of this volume. Standard general works on these patterns include Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enio Paleto, Dependência e Desenvolvimento em América Latina (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, Editores, 1969); Fernando Henrique Cardoso, “Associate and Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications,” in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 142–76; and O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism.

42. These shifts emerge clearly in the preliminary analysis of labor law that we have carried out.

43. For a discussion of the concepts of incorporation and inclusion, see O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, pp. 53 ff.; and Stepan, State and Society, chap. 3.

44. For a discussion of issues of income distribution under one of these regimes, see Kenneth S. Merid, “Conflict Regulation in the Brazilian Industrial Relations System” (doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1974).

45. For discussions of the concept of exclusion, see O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, pp. 53 ff.; and Stepan, State and Society, chap. 3.

46. For a discussion of the differing patterns of development followed by bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes—and of the differing patterns of economic and political “logic” through which these regimes select policies—see Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Reflexiones sobre las tendencias generales de cambio en el Estado burocrático-autoritario” (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad, 1979).

47. For an extended discussion of the configuration of interests that surrounded an important, early law in Chile, see Morris, Elites, Intellectuals, and Consensus.

48. For a general discussion of these issues involving the donal of the right