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Connected Worlds: Communication Networks in the Colonial Southeast, 1513-1740

By

Alejandra Dubcovsky

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
History
in the
Graduate Division
of the
University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:
Professor Mark Peterson, Chair
Professor David Henkin
Professor Steven C. Hahn
Professor Kathleen Donegan

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Abstract

Connected Worlds: Communication Networks in the Colonial Southeast, 1513-1740

By
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Doctor of Philosophy in History
University of California, Berkeley
Professor Mark Peterson, Chair

“Connected Worlds: Communication Networks in the Colonial Southeast, 1513-1740” is a study of the struggle to acquire and control information in a pre-postal, pre-printing press colonial world. This dissertation focuses on the period between 1513 and 1740 in the American Southeast. It argues that the acquisition and transmission of news was crucial to the creation, development and growth of colonial spaces. Secondly, this study examines the different groups and individuals who traversed and traded in the region, the routes that Spanish, English, French, Indian and African individuals followed and constructed, and the changing interpretations and values assigned to news.

The dissertation addresses a simple, yet often overlooked concern with how people in the colonial world came to know what they knew. The principal questions therefore explore both the practical as well as conceptual aspects of information. How was news acquired and transmitted in the colonial Southeast? What do these networks of communication reveal about the relations within and between the different groups that inhabited this geopolitical region? To answer these questions, the dissertation draws upon a wide range of sources, such as official dispatches, newspaper articles, personal reports, and other governmental records from Spanish, British, and North American archives.

Part I of the dissertation analyzes early definitions and understandings of news in the exploration and settlement of Florida. Part II turns to the practical aspects of information spread, providing an examination of Spanish networks of communication. Part III shifts the focus to the English, detailing how South Carolina used information networks to establish and define its authority in the region. And Part IV examines how changes to the economy, demography, and political structure of the Southeast in the 1730s altered the value and emphasis placed on news.
To my parents, who taught me to love learning;
To my brother and son, who taught me to love life;
And to Ryan, who taught me to love.
# Table of Contents

LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... iii  
LIST OF TABLES.............................................................................................................. iii  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iii  
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1  
PROLOGUE: SPANISH CONQUISTADORES, INDIAN NETWORKS, AND EARLY ENTRADAS INTO LA FLORIDA, 1513-1565 .............................................................................. 13  
CHAPTER 1: INDIAN NUEVAS, SPANISH INFORMATION, MAKING SENSE OF “LA TIERRA ADENTRO” AND THE FLORIDA PROJECT .............................................. 22  
 “With fire and blood,” Indians, News, and Foreign Threat .......................................... 24  
Information, Expansion, and the Survival of Florida ................................................... 36  
A Changing Network .................................................................................................... 47  
CHAPTER 2: “TO KNOW IF IT IS TRUE...” SPIES, SENTINELS, AND PRISONERS OF WAR AS INFORMERS ............................................................................................. 49  
As Allies Become Foes ................................................................................................. 50  
“We Must Send Spies” ............................................................................................... 52  
“The Enemy… was seen by the sentinels” ................................................................... 60  
“The news was collected by prisoners…” ................................................................. 65  
A Network with Moveable Nodes ................................................................................ 73  
CHAPTER 3: NETWORKED APALACHICOLA, SPANISH CONNECTIONS IN WESTERN FLORIDA ..................................................................................................... 75  
Troubles in Apalachicola .............................................................................................. 76  
Antonio Matheos, English Threats, and Yamasee Spies .............................................. 81  
Marcos Delgado and “Opening roads” to Nowhere ..................................................... 92  
A Fallen Fort, a Worthless Node .................................................................................. 96  
CHAPTER 4: THE CAROLINA CONNECTION, ENGLISH NETWORKS IN THE SOUTHEAST, 1670-1711 ................................................................................................ 98  
Untrustworthy Indians, Unknown Connections, and Certain Enemies ......................... 99  
Henry Woodward and Trade as Communication ....................................................... 103  
Trade, Slavery, and Expanding Networks .................................................................. 110  
South Carolina’s Tuscarora War ................................................................................. 121  
CHAPTER 5: COLLAPSE AND RECONSTITUTION: COMMUNICATION NETWORKS DURING WAR, 1715-1725 ........................................................... 127  
English Networks and the Yamasee War.................................................................... 128  
Interconnectedness of Indian Networks...................................................................... 135  
New Connections: Coweta and Charles Town ........................................................... 143  
Competing Instructions: Indian Maps and English Networks .................................... 147  
CHAPTER 6: NETWORKS OF POWER, INFORMATION, SLAVERY, AND WAR IN THE 1720-30S ........................................................................................................ 153  
“The confines and boundaries of the land,” the struggle for Fort King George .......... 155  
Spanish News in a Changing Landscape .................................................................. 164  
English Networks: Security, Settlement, and Slavery ............................................... 179  
The Different Information Needs: the Invasion of 1739 .......................................... 182  
EPILOGUE: THE STONO REBELLION AND THE POWER OF INFORMATION .... 187  
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 191
List of figures

Figure 0.1— Communication Network of the colonial Southeast ..................7
Figure 1.1— Mission Spanish Florida, 1565-1763 .................................23
Figure 1.2— Drake’s attack on Spanish Florida, 1586 ..............................27
Figure 1.3— The murder of the Frenchman Pierre Gambie ......................29
Figure 1.4— Towns Visited During Juan Pardo’s second expedition ...........38
Figure 1.5— Main Timucua Towns ..................................................44
Figure 1.6— Testimonio de Visita of Governor Diego Rebolledo, 1657 ...........46
Figure 2.1— Forts in Spanish Florida, 1565-1763 .................................61
Figure 2.2— Map of Georgia Country in Spanish Day ............................79
Figure 3.1— Map of Indian Towns along the Chattahoochee River, 1686 .........88
Figure 4.1— “A plan of the town & harbour of Charles Town” ..................101
Figure 4.2— Henry Woodward’s Journal ...........................................106
Figure 4.3— Map of Port Royal .........................................................108
Figure 4.4— “The Death of John Lawson” at the Eve of the Tuscarora War, 1711..122
Figure 5.1— Raiding and Retreat in Spanish Florida, 1659-1711 ..................135
Figure 5.2— English and Spanish Expeditions to Creek Country (1715-7) .......139
Figure 5.3— Chickasaw Map (1723) ..................................................147
Figure 5.4— Catawba (1725) ..............................................................149
Figure 6.1— Map of Fort King George by Colonel John Barnwell, 1722 .........156
Figure 6.2— Indian Populations and their Movement after the Yamasee War ..157
Figure 6.3— Current Reconstruction of Fort King George .......................158
Figure 6.4— Map of Georgia Country in Spanish Day (Herbert Bolton) .........173
Figure 6.5— Governor Oglethorpe’s forces attacking San Agustín, 1740 .......183

List of Tables

Table 4.1— Southern Native Americans ...........................................112
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Introduction

“[T]he subject of communication offers possibilities in that it occupies a crucial position in the organization and administration of government and in turn of empires and of Western civilization.”
— Harold A. Innis, Empire and Communication (1950)

This is a study of communication, of how the spread and acquisition of information determined how societies in the colonial Southeast operated, developed, and grew. The societies in question are the composite communities that inhabited the Southern provinces of North America— the European colonists of Spanish Florida and English South Carolina, the many different American Indian actors, and eventually the large numbers of enslaved Africans in the Carolinas— during the first two centuries of European colonization in the region, roughly from 1513 to 1740.

The goal of this work is to give an account of how people in the colonial world came to know what they knew. This was a world that lacked a regular mail system; so every piece of writing bore the personal stamp of individual authorship. The colonial Southeast was also a world that operated for almost three centuries without a printing press; so communication depended upon individual couriers who bore no recognized authority to transmit messages. Information flowed with and by people. And thus, this is a study of people. Of how very different groups of people came together to learn the latest and make sense of their changing world. The connections they forged, and the competitions and struggles that thereupon ensued, reveal several surprising things: inclusive and flexible networked relations that sharply contrasted with the otherwise stratified and hierarchical organization of colonial societies; complex social dynamics that transformed the Southeast into one of the most volatile places in North America; and finally, the power of local actors to determine the fate of empires.

Colonial North America is usually depicted as an un- or under-informed place, where colonists starved for information and were forced to operate with limited knowledge. But the inhabitants of the colonial Southeast-- and the protagonists of this dissertation-- processed high volumes of information. They also had to develop extensive networks of information in order to determine what, among all the static and noise they gathered, was relevant. Successful communication was about more than spreading and acquiring information; it entailed “knowing one’s way around a cultural system, knowing how to go on in specific circumstances whose characteristics and exigencies no rulebook

1 Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth, Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), In pre-print societies: “Knowledge circulated within a system of everyday recognitions, just as the crediting or gainsaying of relations formed the fabric of everyday interaction. Pre-modern society looked truth in the face.” 410.
2 This dissertation uses Eric Hinderacker’s definition of empire: as a “process” created by “the people immediately engaged in colonization” and not by the “policy directives originating in” the metropole. Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xi.
could possibly envisage. As Robert Darnton has argued (in reference to eighteenth-century communication networks in Paris), what people want to know, what they deem valuable information, and how they go about securing it, reveals a great deal about a society.

Information thus offers a unique interpretive lens into colonial Southeast. On the one hand, information networks were products of the intense connections and competitions in the region; they were spaces of cross-cultural interaction. On the other hand, information networks produced these exchanges. They forced all the different inhabitants of the region to interact. As both little explored sites of interaction and unexamined contests, the struggles of information exchange offer new insights into the daily (and local) negotiations that shaped empires. They help reframe the focus of imperial systems, and “remin[d] historians that early modern empires were shaped as much by the experiences and decisions of those at the periphery as by the vision and organization of those at the center.” Information networks, this dissertation argues, help render peripheral voices central, bringing together previously splintered narratives and drawing attention to the importance of an otherwise ignored geopolitical space; they de-Anglicize the story of the American South, making English colonist equal players in the imperial contests for the Southeast.

It would be hard to conceive the history and the historiography of the colonial South without taking into account Verner Crane’s 1929 *Southern Frontiers*. Crane’s eloquently written and painstakingly researched work has become canon for colonial Southern history. Even the most recent dissertations tend to include a discussion of *Southern Frontiers* in their introductions. Although over eight-years old, Crane’s scope and approach continue to be emulated. Crane examined the growth and trials of South Carolina as it transition from an unstable colony to a powerful force in the Southeast. *Southern Frontier* charts the growth, in size and influence, of South Carolina by following the westward push of its English population, their dealings with Indian Nations, and their interactions with French colonists and policies. If “westward the course of empire takes its way,” so does Crane’s analysis.

Crane knows the end of the story he is telling. He knows that French-Anglo relations, especially over Indian allies, dominated the Southeastern politics in the mid to late eighteenth century; he also knows how these power struggles developed and who the victors of these contests were. Crane knows this so well, that Spanish Florida has almost not part in his Anglo-centric Southern frontier. The fleeting references to Spanish presence do nothing more than acknowledge that Spanish Florida, in fact, will not be a part of his study. Crane was perfectly aware of his bias. In the introduction of *Southern Frontiers* he explained that his lack of engagement with Spanish material was to prevent any duplication of the efforts by the Bolton School. Although reviewers at the time

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7 Christian J. Koot, "The Merchant, the Map, and Empire: Augustine Herrman's Chesapeake and Interimperial Trade, 1644-73," *William and Mary Quarterly* LXVII, no. 4 (2010): 6343.
criticized Crane for this neglect and lamented a missed opportunity, most of the scholars influenced by Crane did not make note of this exclusion and went on to mimic his dismissal of Spanish influence (but without recognizing their omission).  

Herbert Bolton and his students were supposed to be the antidote to Crane’s neglect. When Crane published his work, Herbert Bolton had been teaching at UC Berkeley for over a decade, and in his tenure he would advise more than 400 graduate theses and produced nearly 100 works. Bolton advocated for a hemispheric approach to American history, expanding the colonial world beyond the thirteen English colonies. Bolton also hoped to de-Anglicize the story of early North America by showing the influence and importance of Spanish colonies. Many of his works, including The Spanish Borderlands (1921) and Debatable Land (1925), dealt with the same geographical area that Crane discussed. But if Crane’s focus was English connections, Bolton’s emphasis was on Spanish inclusion. For Bolton, integrating Spanish Florida simply meant adding it to the historical narrative. Once the history of San Agustín had been described, once the details of the missions, explorers, and friars had been recounted, Bolton’s argument stopped. Florida, in Bolton’s work, was important because it had been a Spanish colony, not because it played any role in the rest of the colonial South. If Crane’s representations of the Southeast had a hard time accommodating Spanish Florida, Bolton’s Iberian emphasis also led to an incomplete treatment of the region.

Although the literature on Spanish Florida has grown substantially since the 1920s, Bolton’s legacy has been a heavy anchor to lift. The main issues raised by Bolton: exploration, mission development, and early imperial and Indian rivalries, remain the most analyzed aspects of colonial Florida. Works like Patricia Galloway’s Choctaw Genesis (1995) and Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun (1997) by Charles Hudson add layers of complexity to Bolton’s epic tales of exploration. The studies of Jerald T. Milanich Laboring in the fields of the Lord (1999) and Amy Bushnell Situado and Sabana (1994) provide richer and fuller accounts of mission life. Even Jane Landers’


Bolton administered 104 Dissertations and 300 Master Theses.

Bolton’s way of discussing Spain and Spanish North America history has been very influential. Even contemporary historians, like Jorge Canizares-Esguerra, follow Bolton’s lead. In Puritan Conquistador, Iberianizing the Atlantic, 1550-1700 (2006), Canizares-Esguerra, like Bolton, is preoccupied with connections, but with precedent. He seeks to find the Iberian roots to Puritan actions and explanations

Patricia Galloway, Choctaw Genesis 1500-1700 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995); Charles Hudson, Warriors of the Sun: Hernando De Soto and the South's Ancient Chiefdoms (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1997).

These works focus on Indian experiences and struggles; although they shift away from Bolton’s emphasis on the trials and tribulations of the Spaniards, these newer analyses still have to wrangle with Bolton’s models. Amy Turner Bushnell, "Situado and Sabana, Spain's Support System for the Presidio and
groundbreaking *Black Society in Spanish Florida* (1999), which explores a previously neglected aspect of Spanish Florida, builds on Bolton’s argument about imperial rivalry. Landers shows how black society was shaped and also helped shape the imperial contests that engulfed the Southeast.¹⁴ Landers, Bushnell, and Milanich (among others) have helped move the historiography beyond Bolton’s heroic conquistadors, friars, and epic battlegrounds; they described specific aspects of Spanish society that Bolton had overlooked and re-centered perspectives he had deemed secondary. But for all their contributions, Landers, Bushnell, and Milanich, like most scholars of Spanish history in North America, have continued to rely on Bolton’s larger framework.

There are only two contemporary studies, David Weber’s *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (1992), and more recently Paul Hoffman’s *Florida’s Frontiers* (2002), that have attempted to construct their own approaches to this region. In *The Spanish Frontier*, Weber synthesized vast amounts of previous scattered scholarship, and called for a different type of historical treatment of Spanish North America. He argued that while Bolton’s pro-Spanish narrative might have “fallen from fashion...no new paradigm has taken its place.”¹⁵ Weber insisted that the history of the Spanish colonies in North America did not belong in the footnotes of larger Latin American narratives— narratives that tended to prioritize (and normalize) the colonial projects in Mexico and Peru. Webster also believed that the histories of Florida, New Mexico, Texas, and California served as more than a mere prelude to Chicano Studies literature—a literature mostly concerned with developments in the 19ᵗʰ and 20ᵗʰ centuries. Weber identified and discussed the Spanish borderlands as their own unit of analysis.¹⁶ He showed differences and connections throughout the Spanish North American borderlands; he examined how Indian groups perceived and interacted with Spanish settlers; and finally, Weber detailed how the Spanish settled— not just explored or conquered—the land, formed relationships and families, and tried to adapt to their new world as much as they tried the New World to adapt to them.

While Weber’s survey spans the whole of North America, Hoffman’s *Florida’s...
Frontiers provides the first true synthesis of Florida from pre-contact to the Civil War. Describing Florida’s transformations, from a Spanish tidewater frontier to a Spanish colony, and then to a Euro-American military frontier, and finally to an American frontier, Hoffman is able to show the changes, variety, and dynamism of the region. While Weber and Hoffman have created different frameworks than Bolton, their works circumvent rather than overcome Florida’s historiographical isolation. The Spanish Frontier in North America connects Florida to New Mexico, California, and other Spanish colonies, but never considers Florida (or any other of those settlements) outside of their intra-Spanish connections. In Florida’s Frontiers, Hoffman is interested in the region’s changes over time, so his story of transitions, from Spanish to English to American, never extends beyond the modern borders of Florida. Hoffman provides chronology, but not connection; Weber provides connections, but only within the Spanish empire. So despite their efforts, colonial Florida remains ambivalent in the historiography, as an important, yet not quite integral component in the narrative of the colonial South.

Florida seems to be sui generis. While the uniqueness of this Spanish settlement has led some historians to focus (almost exclusively) on the intricacies and curiosities of this colony, other scholars have cited these same particularities to separate Florida from the rest of the colonial South. In a way, both of these assessments are right. Florida was distinct. It was unique and different. But the importance of Spanish Florida should not come from its particularity; it should come from the relations forged from, by, and with San Agustín. By arguing that this colony’s uniqueness was relational, as opposed to absolute, my work hopes to integrate and connect Florida into a larger colonial world.

If engaging with Spanish sources, Spanish colonists, and Spanish historiography helps make an important historical intervention in the narrative of the colonial Southeast, including the experiences of Indians in this geopolitical region is part of a long, established historical tradition. Weber’s massive work on the Spanish borderlands perhaps best exemplifies this historical trend. In The Spanish Frontier in North America, Weber’s main focus is Spain and its colonies, but the way he chooses to connect these disparate locations is through Indian agency. He is not the only one to use Indians as a comparative lens.17 “The field of Ethnohistory,” historian Daniel Usner argues, has become one of the “busiest bridge[s] between Borderlands and Anglo-American colonies.”18 Indians and Euro-Indian relations have become one of the most common ways to connect (and compare) different colonial experiences.19

19 In recent years, these “busy bridge” has seen congestion and even a few traffic jams. Although there are a plethora of historical works dealing with Indian groups in this region, Creeks and Cherokees have received the most attention. Choctaws and Chickasaws have, to a lesser extent, been present in most Southeastern stories. And only very recent literature has given coastal and smaller Indian nations, like Yamasees and Westos, book-length examination. “Yamasee Indians and the challenge of Spanish and English colonialism in the North American Southeast, 1660—1715” by Schrager, Bradley Scott, Ph.D., Northwestern University, 2001; Bowne, The Westo Indians, Slave Traders of the Early Colonial South; Oatis, A Colonial
One of the earliest and most important works to give Native Americans a prevalent role in the shaping and growth of the colonial South was Crane’s *Southern Frontiers*. Crane included Indians in his story, but his main preoccupation remained the English side of the colonial struggle. Much like the Indian historiography by Bushnell, Milanich, and John Worth which revised Bolton, there is recent scholarship by Leitch Wright Jr., Alan Gallay, Joshua Piker, William Ramsey, Kathryn Braund, and Steven Hahn (among others) that has tried to retell Crane’s narrative through the experiences and from the perspectives of Indians.\(^\text{20}\)

My work follows the lead of this vibrant historiography and brings Indian actors and actions to the forefront. But I do this in a slightly different way. Rather than focusing on trade and economic developments, or on political formations and diplomacy, or even on cultural resistance and agency, I examine information. Communication—the struggles to both obtain and transmit it—helps cast a wide net that not only includes many of these standard organizing categories (such as trade, politics, and agency), but also cuts across them. Through the lens of information I can tell a larger and more inclusive story. Rather than compartmentalizing these complex interactions, I bring them together in a cohesive and comprehensive way.

This is not an entirely new approach. Helen Hornbeck Tanner wrote a brief article titled “The Land and Water Communication Systems of the Southeastern Indians” in Gregory A. Waselkov, Peter H. Wood, and Tom Hatley’s classic work *Powhatan’s Mantle* (1989). The main goal of Hornbeck Tanner’s work was to show the intertribal interactions that spanned and connected this vast region. But in the 2006 revised edition of *Powhatan’s Mantle*, Tanner lamented that although it has been over twenty years since her original essay, there had been, beside her article, “no publication specifically devoted to communication networks in the Southeast.”\(^\text{21}\)

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At the heart of her study was a map. The map, which has no date, shows with the paths among important population hubs in the Southeast. All these routes, whether they were coastal trails between Charles Town and Savannah or interior bound paths between Pensacola and San Augustín, are represented in the same manner: with a single black line. All the trails seem the same. These black lines suspend social, military, and political realities as well as time. For example, the path that connects Savannah and San Agustín ignores the 150 years of history that separated the founding of the two towns and disregards mutual antagonism between Spanish and English colonists. Hornbeck Tanner had set out to make an important argument about the many and different connections Indians had forged in this region. While she was able to argue and illustrate that these connections existed, she was not concerned with how these relations developed, who they involved, or what they meant. Her useful and interesting map unfortunately flattens an otherwise complex, fluid world.

My work builds on Hornbeck Tanner’s descriptive arguments. While there not many other studies that examine information networks before the advent of mass media, the models and analyses of 18th communication offered by David Hancock and Paul
Duguid have provided me with context, background, and comparison. In his book, *Citizens of the World* (1995), Hancock demonstrated that the business associations between wine merchants were as much about personal relations as they were commercial ventures. Hancock, as well as Duguid, stressed that networks were not perfectly functioning institutions. These authors showed how merchant networks, much like communication networks in the Southeast, could not operate outside the social interactions that constructed them. Information networks were reflective of the power struggles in society.

Similarly, the work of Richard Brown emphasized the ways in which power and communication intertwined. His deeply research study, *Knowledge is Power* (1989), directed me to the broader field of communications and to one of the earliest authors to discuss the connections between information and empire: Harold Innis. Innis’ now classic texts, *Empires of Communications* (1950) and *The Bias of Communications* (1951), focused on the process through which information was conveyed. To unpack this complex process, I turned to the works of Jürgen Habermas, Benedict Anderson, and C.A. Bayly. Bringing together the approaches of these three scholars helped me anatamize the different components of information spread.

Habermas was not particularly interested in networks of information. His work, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, translated into English in 1989, introduced a very important concept: the “public sphere.” The public sphere was a space between the private and public in which and through which individuals could come together, form opinions, and articulate a general interest. In another direction, Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* (1983) explored the development of nation and nationalism as historical constructs. Anderson introduced the concept of the “imagined communities.” Communities were imagined, not because they were false or disingenuous, but rather because they were socially constructed and defined by the people in them. The public sphere enabled people to act publicly for a common interest, and that common interest, according to Anderson, bound those same individuals in communities that were “both inherently limited and sovereign.”

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22 The majority of works dealing with information have to with the 19th century, or have brief chapters on the 18th century as they quickly move to the changes that took place in the 19th see: Richard D. Brown, *The Strength of a People: The Idea of an Informed Citizenry in America, 1650-1870* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Richard D. Brown, *Knowledge Is Power, the Diffusion of Information in Early America, 1700-1865* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).


25 Brown, *Knowledge Is Power, the Diffusion of Information in Early America, 1700-1865*.

26 For the limited influence of Innis, see Patterson, *History and Communication, 3-30*; Carey *Communication as Culture, 14-72*.

27 For a more detail definition as well as examples, critiques, and discussions see Craig Calhoun, ed. *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992).

Taken together, Habermas and Anderson describe connected, inclusive, but not limitless communities of people, who, in spite of their inequalities or differences, shared a “horizontal comradeship.” Although Habermas was interested in the tensions between government and society, and Anderson was preoccupied with historicizing nationalism, the social relationships that underlay their works bare a strikingly resemble the interactions that connected the colonial Southeast. Bound together by need, experience, and/or specific privileges Europeans, Indians, and slaves in the colonial Southeast also created decentralized and flexible networks, in which “information had to be shared, control had to be dispersed, and authority had to be delegated to individuals, groups, and communities on the periphery.”

But for all the interconnections and interdependence, inclusiveness was not a choice, but a necessity. Colonists were wary of placing information, one of their most vital necessities, in the hands of people they did not fully trust or control. Regulating information became both imperative and incredibly difficult. Bayly’s superb book, *Empire and Information* (1997), examines the strengths and weaknesses of English political intelligence in India, and argues that this surveillance system played a crucial role in both the shaping and the erosion of English authority. While Anderson and Habermas were concerned with information spread, Bayly was much more invested in the stakes of such a system. Bayly argued that the institutions the English created to regulate information, ended up betraying them. The informers had not lied and the reports had not been faulty; the problem was with the information system itself. By privileging particular informants and certain types of information over others, the surveillance agencies established by the English provided a distorted image of India. Thus the knowledge the English acquired was prejudiced and incomplete.

This fragmented network of information allowed many aspects of the Indian experience to endure and develop independently from England’s grasp. As colonial authorities in India centralized the institutions that acquired and provided information, many indigenous and decentralized sources of knowledge slyly sauntered beyond English control. While Foucault argued that centralization of control created a mechanism of order through fear, Bayly claimed that the more the English clenched their fists of power, the more incomplete their information became. The incompleteness of English information agencies created discrepancies in the colonial knowledge. These unregulated gaps proved fatal. Just as the soldiers who rebelled in Meerut and shocked the English Empire with the 1857 mutiny, the Stono slave rebels, who surprised their unsuspecting South Carolinian masters in 1739, underscored the importance of regulating information.

Although ending with the Stono rebellion, the narrative of this dissertation is not about the deterioration of relations. It is not about how middle ground existed and then fell apart or about how close, intertwined relations became far more racialized and then

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29 Ibid., 7.
30 David Hancock, "The Triumph of Mercury: Connection and Control in the Emerging Atlantic Economy" (paper presented at the Atlantic History: Regional Networks, Shared Experiences, Forces of Integration, Harvard University, 2007, June 21-3).
31 *Empire and Information*, however, does not romanticize the power of information. The English Empire, Bayly contends, did in fact infiltrate into many aspects of Indian life (such as the army, police, and medical services). For the classic work on the importance of decentralization, see Frederich Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," *American Economic Review* 35(1945).
segregated.\textsuperscript{32} It is not a story that begins with simple relations that became more complex, or with more complex relations that simplified.\textsuperscript{33} This dissertation instead describes the ebbs and flows of power in the Southeast through an individual’s (or a group’s) ability to communicate. This skill revealed his (or their) capacity to work within, maneuver, and control an interdependent and connected world. And since no particular individual was omnipresent, all the inhabitants of the Southeast—colonists, Indians, and slaves—played an active, however unequal, role in the spread of news: “every principal was an agent and vice versa.”\textsuperscript{34}

The process of not only acquiring, but also transmitting and evaluating information often led to unexpected journeys—especially since finding one bit of news often gave rise to further questions and triggered an even deeper desire to know more.\textsuperscript{35} Communication was therefore not a simple process. By treating networks as more than evidence of exchange, but rather, as the event itself, this dissertation can show the dynamic relations that defined the colonial Southeast.

**Summary**

This dissertation is organized into four parts which chronicle the creation, developments, and challenges of communication networks in the colonial Southeast from pre-contact to the Stono Rebellion. Part I of the dissertation analyzes early definitions and understandings of news in the exploration and settlement of La Florida. Part II turns to the practical aspects of information spread, providing an examination of Spanish networks of communication. Part III shifts the focus to the English, detailing how South Carolina used information networks to establish and define its authority in the region. And Part IV examines how changes to the economy, demography, and political structure of the Southeast in the 1730s affected the value and emphasis placed on news.

Chapter 1 examines the role of news and information in the exploration and settlement of Florida (1565-1670), this chapter argues that the Spanish made an important distinction between \textit{información} (information) and \textit{nuevas} (news). The Spanish separated news from information, seeking each at different times, for distinct purposes, and in unique ways. \textit{Información} was gathered by Spanish soldiers and officials, and was concerned with facts, such as the location of a river or the size of a neighboring town; \textit{nuevas}, on the other hand, dealt with daily developments and imminent threats, and depended, almost exclusively, on Indian messengers. News and information thus played

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\textsuperscript{34} Hancock, "The Trouble with Networks: Managing the Scots' Early-Modern Madeira Trade," 486.

\textsuperscript{35} and Brooke E Sheldon Ken Haycock, ed. \textit{The Portable Mls: Insights from the Experts} (Westport, Conn.: Libraries Unlimited, 2008), 40.
different roles in colonial Florida. The processes through which nuevas and información were acquired, transmitted, and interpreted reveals not only how the Spanish were trying to learn about the world that surrounded them, but also helps explain the dynamic relations among Indian, Spanish, and French inhabitants that made and remade that world.

Chapter 2 explores Spanish efforts to establish a network of communication in Guale (present-day Georgia) from the settlement of South Carolina in 1670 to the outbreak of the Yamasee War in 1715. The chapter describes how the Spanish created a new network of information that, instead of being rooted in a set place, consisted of mobile and trusted informers. Through spies, sentinels, and prisoners of war San Agustín officials tried to make sense of a world that was quickly spinning out of their control. Chapter 2 chronicles the efforts of these informers and argues that as the categories of news and information became conflated, the Spanish developed new ways to acquire and evaluate the intelligence they needed.

This following chapter looks at Spanish trade and communication networks in western Florida from 1670 to 1715. Chapter 3 argues that the communication infrastructure the Spanish tried to establish in Apalachicola (western Florida) was different from the one they developed in Guale (eastern Florida). In Apalachicola, the Spanish had a unique opportunity to establish a network based on stable, rather than moveable nodes. Florida officials hoped that by establishing a visible presence in the western lands they could: influence Indian groups, discourage South Carolina traders, and remain informed of the latest developments. Building on the descriptions from Chapter 2, this chapter shows how the Spanish tried to prevent western Florida from turning into coastal Florida. It argues that clear Spanish presence was a necessary but insufficient step in the construction of a working communication network. Without understanding or properly collaborating with the local Indian populations, the Florida government failed to achieve control over its western provinces.

Chapter 4 chronicles the creation and expansion of English trade networks. The chapter's first section examines early English exploration and settlement of the region; the second part explores the growth of South Carolina through trade and war. The communication networks build through the deerskin and slave trade gave the English a visible presence all over the region. These trade and communication networks were far-reaching, but they were also diffused and unregulated. Ending with South Carolina’s triumphant involvement in the Tuscarora War (1711), this chapter details the power as well as the peril of the networks established by the English.

Chapter 5 is about the collapse and reconstitution of the English networks. First, it describes how the Yamasee War (1715-17) destroyed South Carolina’s trade and communication networks detailed in the previous chapter. Second, chapter 5 examines the many different, often contrasting, reconstitutions that took place in the war’s wake. This chapter describes the individual endeavors of South Carolinians and then of American Indians groups to forge information networks during the first two decades of the eighteenth century. It shows the messy, but necessary efforts to establish and obtain “good communication.”

The final chapter looks at changes in the spread, evaluation, and meaning of news in the 1730s through the lens of a single event: the diplomatic struggle over Fort King George (1721-5). South Carolina officials used Fort King George to voice their
discontent about the growing number of fugitive slaves who found asylum in Spanish lands; the Florida government portrayed the garrison as an affront to their Indian allies. This chapter argues that Spanish efforts to protect their Indian allies exposed Florida’s continued dependence on both Indian informers and on an old infrastructure for information spread and acquisition. For South Carolina, Fort King George revealed a new type of communication network, which limited the participation of Amerindians as it protected African slavery. The fight over this garrison was ultimately about how the region was to be connected and demarked.

The dissertation concludes with the Stono Rebellion. It examines the 1739 slaves uprising, a moment when the enslaved managed to overpower the enslaver not only in force, but also in information: the slave rebels killed their masters and marched South to Spanish Florida with the knowledge that once they reached San Agustín they would be receive their freedom. The Stono Rebellion underscores all the main concepts of this dissertation: the intricate and multilevel networks of communication that crisscrossed the Southeast, the struggles to control information, and the tangible power of this seemingly ephemeral commodity.
Prologue: Spanish Conquistadores, Indian Networks, and Early Entradas into La Florida, 1513-1565

Concerning the country I have up to now learned no secret… When I have acquired any clear knowledge or account of the condition of this country and of the successes which God may give us in it, I will write concerning it your Majesty.

— Tristán de Luna y Arrellano to Philip II of Spain, May 1, 1559

Tristán de Luna wanted to proceed carefully. Landing in Ochuse Bay (near present-day Pensacola), the adelantado (military and legal title) hoped that his exceedingly well-supplied fleet and the over 1,500 colonists under his command could successfully tame the Southeastern wilderness and reap some the rumored riches waiting in La Florida. Luna also relied on the information of four Indian women who had been captured during Hernando de Soto’s entrada (entry) almost two decades prior. Determined to avoid the failures of previous Spanish expeditions, Luna had ample supplies, a sizeable Spanish population, and had access to local Indian knowledge.

Unlike Ponce de León’s 1513 expedition, which had barely been able to reach land before it was attacked by Calusa Indians, or Lucás Vázquez de Ayllón’s short-lived 1526 colony, which had suffered constant harassment from Guale Indians, Luna managed to avoid hostile encounters with local populations. As a matter a fact, this Spanish party had hardly encountered any Indians. “Until now,” Luna explained to the King, “there have appeared in this bay a few Indian fishermen only.” The lack of Indian presence, which had been only a minor inconvenience to Luna, suddenly became a major problem on September 19, 1559. A short month after making landfall, “a fierce tempest” decimated the barely established Spanish settlement and “did irreparable damage to the

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2 John R. Bratten and John E. Worth, "Shipwrecked History," American Heritage 2009 “On August 15, 1559, the bay now known as Pensacola slowly filled with a curious fleet of 11 Spanish vessels, their decks crammed with an odd mix of colonists and holds filled to bursting with supplies and ceramic jars of olive oil and wine from Cadiz. Aboard the 570-ton flagship Jesus stood the wealthy and ambitious Don Tristan de Luna y Arellano, with direct orders from the king of Spain to establish a permanent colony in La Florida. The rest of the fleet included two galleons, beamy cargo ships known as naos, small barques, and a caravel. North America had never before seen anything like it on this scale. The 1,500 sea-weary passengers eyed the sandy shores and began to disembark, a diverse group of 540 soldiers with armor, plus craftsmen, farmers, Africans, Mexican Indians, about 100 Aztec warriors, a handful of Dominican missionaries, and women and children…Among the usual complement of shipboard food, such as hardtack, dried and salted meat and fish, cheese, beans, vinegar, and water, the holds contained the sweet smell of Caribbean persimmons, papaya, and sapote. They also carried dried and preserved plums and cherries. (In comparison, the British colonists at Jamestown almost 40 years later would mount their colonial efforts with only a tenth of the people and an even smaller fraction of resources.)”
ships of the fleet.”

As the wind blew with unimaginable force, the heavy rain drowned Luna’s high hopes. The supplies, ammunitions, and population intended to support the Spanish endeavor were gone. Gone as well was Luna’s plan for weathering the tumultuous Southeast.

The Spanish could no longer survive in isolation. Luna needed to find Indian allies, and he needed to do so quickly. The adelantado sent parties inland to “give me information of the character of the country and the towns they may find.” As Luna tried to remedy his limited understanding of the interior, his lack of information interfered with all of his future endeavors. He searched in vain for food; he misguidedly relocated the colony twice (once to Nanipacana and then again back to Pensacola); and even sent a small party on a foul’s errand to Coosa, supposedly “a well-populated land with abundant food,” only to find barren and sparsely-populated Indian towns. And when the Spanish finally located Coosa Indians willing to feed and welcome the colonists suffering “in the extremity of hunger,” Luna discovered that there was a high price for friendship with the Coosa. As retribution for the Coosas’ support, the Spanish had to render their services in an attack against Napochies, a former and now rebellious Coosa tributary.

Luna explained that the Coosa “had placed themselves under the protection of the king, Don Felipe our lord, that we would show them favor and aid so that those other Indian should not prevent their communication, trade, and intercourse thus with their own natural lord.” It was “for precisely these reasons had they come to serve us and trade with us, so that we might preserve to them to use of the roads and passes.” To protect their own “communication, trade, and intercourse,” Coosa Indians had pledged their support to Luna. The Spanish adelantado began to understand that to access these local networks and obtain “clear knowledge or account of the condition of this country,” he was going to have to get involved in local relations and exchanges. Luna, who had hoped to avoid the mistakes of other Conquistadores and establish an autarkic Spanish settlement, was drawn into inter-Indian conflict. As Coosa Indians defeated the Napochies, they also capitalized on the Spanish need for friendship, food, and information. To erect a successful colony, Luna now had to engage in and mold complex Indian relations—to survive in La Florida the Spanish needed to understand the Indian networks that bound the region.

The miseries and struggles that accompanied Luna’s efforts were nothing new, albeit no less frustrating, to the Spanish experience in La Florida. From Ponce de León and Ayllón’s unsuccessful settlements along Florida’s eastern coast to Pánfilo de Narváez and Hernando de Soto disastrous entradas into the interior, the American Southeast had not kindly greeted the Spanish. These expeditions to Florida form a mosaic of destitution, failure, and destruction—especially when compared to parallel and far more successful Spanish efforts in South and Central America. But when taken together, the fifty years of Spanish exploration and attempted colonization of the Southeast reveal more than

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4 Ibid., “Don Tristán de Luna y Arrellano to his Majesty, Port of Santa María, September 24, 1559, 245.
5 Ibid., “Don Tristán de Luna y Arrellano to his Majesty, Port of Santa María, September 24, 1559, 245.
6 Declaration by Luna in Ibid., 400-2.
7 Ibid., “Fray Domingo de la Anunciación and Others to Luna, Coosa, August, 1560, 223.
8 Ibid., 419.
extraordinary, if not bizarre enterprises. The independent, yet interrelated journeys of Ponce de León (1513 and 1521), Lucas Vázquez de Ayllón (1526), Pánfilo Narváez and his secretary Álvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca (1529-1537), Hernando de Soto (1540-1), and Tristán de Luna y Arellano (1559-60) offer a glimpse into the vast connections that networked the Southeast.

The Spaniards traversed through and via these networks and, although sometimes unknowingly, these Conquistadores made discerning observations about the way information traveled in, through, and from these Indian worlds.\(^{10}\) It was through these networks, which were bound by trade, war, and kinship that Indians learned of their surroundings and neighbors.\(^{11}\) Although most of these paths were short and served to reinforce the ties between neighboring and allied towns, some of these trails spanned vast distances.\(^{12}\) As Cabeza de Vaca’s arduous overland journey from Florida to northern Mexico demonstrated: Indian trails spanned the whole of the continent. Cabeza de Vaca was amazed by both the extent of these connections and the speed at which news moved through them.\(^{13}\) Traveling a decade later, Hernando de Soto also remarked on Indians’ ability to navigate through “a pathless,” inhospitable land and connect through many and across different polities.\(^{14}\) The Spanish Conquistadores recognized the extensive connections between and among native groups; to understand, exploit, and let alone survive in that world, the Spanish needed to journey through Indian roads, trust Indian guides, and rely on Indian knowledge.

\(^{10}\) Spanish conquistadores and their entradas to the Southeast have long captured the attention of historians, especially since many of these expeditions produced rich paper trails, providing insight into European-Indian encounters and contact, native life and organization, as well as material, physical, and environmental conditions of the colonial South. These entradas are often the strongest bridges between historical and archeological and anthropological research of the region. They help link material evidence from the pre-Columbian period with documentary sources made during the earliest decades of the colonial period. Much of the literature examining these explorers has been concerned with finding the routes taken by the Spanish conquistadores, identifying the Indian groups and towns visited, and verifying the authenticity of the Spaniards’ claims. This rich, detailed investigative work has led to some very detail-orientated debates, such as locating the precise location of Ponce de León’s landing or mapping the exact route taken by Hernando de Soto. For Ponce de León see T. Frederick Davis, "The Record of Ponce De Leon’s Discovery of Florida, 1513," *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, 11, no. 1 (1932); T. Frederick Davis, "Ponce De Leon’s First Voyage and Discovery of Florida," *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, 14, no. 1 (1935); T. Frederick Davis, "Ponce De Leon’s Second Voyage and Attempt to Colonize Florida," *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, 14, no. 1 (1935); Douglas T. Peck, "Reconstruction and Analysis of the 1513 Discovery Voyage of Juan Ponce De León," *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, 71, no. 2 (1992); Jerald T. Milanich, ed. *Earliest Hispanic/Native American Interactions in the American Southeast*, vol. 12, Spanish Borderlands Sourcebooks (New York: Garland Publishing Inc.,1991); for Hernando de Soto see: Charles Hudson, *Warriors of the Sun: Hernando De Soto and the South's Ancient Chiefdoms* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1997); Jerald T. and Charles Hudson Milanich, *Hernando De Soto and the Indians of Florida* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993); Eugene Lyon, "Spain’s Sixteenth-Century North American Settlement Attempts: A Neglected Aspect," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 59, no. 3 (1981).

\(^{11}\) For the most recent and detail study of pre-Columbian Indian networks see, Christina Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), Chapter 1.


\(^{13}\) *The Account: Alvar Nunez Cabeza De Vaca's Relacion*, trans. Martin A. Favata and Jose B. Fernandez (Houston: Arte Publico Press, 1993). For the importance of Indian trails see: 44, 49, 65; and for the spread of news through Indian trails see 79, 92, 94.

In his 1513 journey to Florida, Juan Ponce de León’s inability to find a friendly Indian population contributed to the limited scope of his exploration and to his quick return to Puerto Rico.\(^\text{15}\) But if not finding native allies led to failure, engaging with unfriendly groups proved deadly. Ponce de León was killed by hostile Indians as he tried to make landfall during his second voyage to Florida.\(^\text{16}\) Lucas Vázquez de Ayllón suffered a similar fate; in 1526, Guale Indians repeatedly attacked his settlement on Sapelo Sound (on the coast of South Carolina) and, unable to secure any Indian allies or tap into a local source of knowledge, Ayllón feared that his settlement would not survive.

Ayllón soon found his worst fear come to life when his sole Indian guide, Francisco Chicora, abandoned the Spanish settlement.\(^\text{17}\) Ayllón had captured Francisco during a Spanish slaving raid on the Southeastern coast several years prior; Francisco had furnished Ayllón with information about the wealth and abundance of his birthplace, possibly in the hopes of someday returning to Chicora— when in Spain, Francisco was even interviewed by Pietro Martiere d’Anghiera (Peter Martyr), who used some of this Indian’s descriptions in *De Orbe Novo*.\(^\text{18}\) Francisco’s descriptions, which had fueled Ayllón’s dream of establishing a “new Andalucía” in Florida, proved vastly exaggerated. Guale was not a welcoming place. Without an Indian guide and, unable to find any other reliable source of information, the Spanish saw their hopes for a prosperous future quickly become a nightmare of starvation and struggle.\(^\text{19}\) Ayllón felt much like Luna would thirty-years later: incapable of “acquir[ing] any clear knowledge or account of the condition of this country,” unable to unlock the secrets of La Florida.

The key, as the *adelantados* would all inevitably recognize, was held by Amerindians. But the Indians carefully guarded their knowledge, exploiting the Spaniards’ need and lack of information. Chief Ucita captured Juan Ortiz, who was a member of the 1527 Narváez expedition, by luring the Spaniard with information. Narváez had divided his men into two groups, and the two parties spent a great deal of time searching for news of each other. Ucita seems to have been aware of this predicament and attached a letter to a stick near the shore. Since Utica made the stick resemble a cross, Ortiz believed the paper to contain news of Narváez. But as soon as he reached the coast, the Spaniard was apprehended as he attempted to retrieve the false message. Chief Ucita’s trap as well as Ortiz’s folly revealed both the Spanish need to stay informed and the Indian’s ability to capitalize on that necessity.\(^\text{20}\)

The Spanish went to great lengths to acquire and spread news during their *entradas*. Tristán de Luna had to devise an intricate plan to communicate with his own

\(^{15}\) Davis, “Ponce De Leon’s First Voyage and Discovery of Florida,” 44.

\(^{16}\) Davis, “Ponce De Leon’s Second Voyage and Attempt to Colonize Florida.”


\(^{18}\) Hudson, *Warriors of the Sun: Hernando De Soto and the South’s Ancient Chiefdoms*, 33.

\(^{19}\) Hoffman, *A New Andalucia and a Way to the Orient: The American Southeast During the Sixteenth Century*.

men. In order to inform a party of Spaniards who had journeyed to the interior of his decision to relocate the larger Spanish settlement from Nanipacana back to the coast, Luna placed a placard on a tree which read: “dig below.” Buried beneath the sign, the Spanish returning from Coosa found an urn with a letter and instructions inside.\footnote{Priestley, “The Luna Papers, Documents Relating to the Expedition of Don Tristán De Luna Y Arrellano for the Conquest of La Florida, 1559-1561,” 359.} The careful measures taken by Luna to keep his men informed hinted at the difficulty of communication, especially when the Spanish wanted to exchange news without Indian cooperation or interference.

But while the Spanish had difficulty operating independently from Indian networks, Indians seemed all too knowledgeable of Spanish wants, preoccupations, and customs.\footnote{Davis, "Ponce De Leon's First Voyage and Discovery of Florida," 44.} Cabeza de Vaca noted how well Indians understood Spanish desires, especially their fixation with gold. In one of the first Indian towns visited by the Narváez expedition, the Spanish “found samples of gold. Through signs we asked the Indians where they had gotten those things. They indicated to us that very far from there was a province called Apalachee, in which there was much gold, and they gestured that it had a great quantity of everything we valued.”\footnote{The Account : Alvar Nunez Cabeza De Vaca's Relacion, 35, emphasis mine.} Although Cabeza de Vaca would go on to have many more and far more complex interactions with Southeastern Indians, this early encounter is very revealing. The Indians not only displayed their geographical knowledge of and connections to “a very far… province called Apalachee,” but also revealed their awareness of who the Spanish were and what they valued.

Beyond gold and mineral wealth, Southeastern Indians seemed to know more about the strange men marching through their lands than the Spanish ever did of their native hosts. The cacique of Ocale greeted de Soto by stating,

\begin{quote}
‘I have long since learned who you Castilians are… through others of you who came years ago to my land; and I already know very well what your customs and behavior are like. Too me you are professional vagabonds who wander from place to place, gaining your livelihood by robbing, sacking, and murdering people who have given you no offense, I want no manner of friendship or peace with people such as you.’\footnote{de la Vega, ed. La Florida Del Inca: Historia Del Adelantado Hernando De Soto... 188.; the English quote from the translation John Grier and Jeannette Johnson Varner Varner, ed. The Florida of the Inca (Austin: University of Texas Press,1951), 118.}
\end{quote}

The chief of Ocale not only had previous experience with “Castilians,” but also had “large noticia” (long communication) of their intentions. This Indian leader dismissed all of de Soto’s promises of friendship and ordered his people to kill any of these “professional vagabonds” who wandered aimlessly and harmed “people who have given [them] no offense.” De Soto attempted to convince the cacique that he was mistaken and that his men meant no harm. The chief of Ocale remained unmoved; he communicated his displeasure with the Spaniards in a way that left little room for interpretation: he ordered Spanish bodies to be dug-up and hung along the trail. With mutilated corpses serving as grim trail markers, de Soto’s men had, for once, an easy time making sense of...
the unknown land; only death awaited the Spaniards if the journeyed through Ocale’s lands.

The cacique of Ocale was not the only Indian chief to cite his previous experiences with Spanish explorers as the reason for denying de Soto’s request for friendship. Vitachuco, the chief of Napituca, also had negative associations these wandering Castilians and, “very well [aware of] what [Spanish] customs and behavior are like,” mistrusted de Soto’s intentions. Although de Soto and his men claimed to be “valiant sons of the Sun,” Vitachuco believed that these “Christians cannot be better than those who had previously committed so many cruelties on this land, for they are from the same nation and follow the same laws.” Vitachuco recalled the “many cruelties” carried-out by these Christians and declared that de Soto and his men were not “sons of the Sun,” but rather “sons of the devil.”

While Spanish Conquistadores had a proclivity to repeat the mistakes of their predecessors, Southeastern Indians proved more willing to learn from their experiences. This built-in memory system would not only surprise (and frustrate) de Soto’s march, but would shape Indian-Spanish interactions well after the establishment of a permanent Spanish settlement in Florida. In a 1598 expedition to Tama, Gaspar de Salas reported that once they reached Ocute, the cacique warned the Spanish not to continue, for “if they went forth they would be killed by the Indians, for long time ago… Soto had gone by… [and the Indians] had killed them, and it was likely that they would kill” any Spanish party that entered their land. Salas heeded the Indian’s threat and turned back. The entradas were an education for both the Spanish and the Amerindians. They exposed Indians, like the Ocute, to the character, desires, and determination of the Conquistadores and they taught the Spanish about the many hardships lurking in the Southeast.

The men who led the Spanish expeditions to the Southeast were seasoned inhabitants and settlers of the New World—men who in theory were capable of weathering the challenge presented by La Florida. Ponce de León had traveled in Columbus’ second voyage and had served as the first governor of Puerto Rico; Ayllón had participated in slaving raids all through the Caribbean; Pánfilo de Narváez had been involved in the early conquest of Mexico; Hernando de Soto had fought alongside Francisco Pizarro against the Incas. But all experience of these adelantados did little to aid the Spanish conquest of the Southeast. Unable to either locate existing hierarchies or tap into sources of power, the Conquistadores found themselves at the mercy of small and scattered Indian groups.

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25 de la Vega, ed. La Florida Del Inca: Historia Del Adelantado Hernando De Soto... 204.
26 Indian slave/informer tried to dissuade de Soto from travelling to Apalachee, saying that Pánfilo Narváez had been there and died  Hudson, Warriors of the Sun: Hernando De Soto and the South’s Ancient Chiefdoms, 108.
27 “si yban adelante los avian de matar los yndios, porque muchos tiempos antes, que se entiende quando pasao Soto, con llevar mucho gente que yban a cavallo, mataron dellos, y que mehor les matrioan a ellos…” Documeto 2: Relacion de la tama y su tierra..., February 1600, in Manuel Serrano y Sanz, Documentos Historicos De La Florida Y La Luisiana, Siglos Xvi Al Xviii (Madrid: Librería General de Victoriano Suárez, 1912), 14-160.
The importance of Indian guides and information is perhaps most apparent in de Soto’s disastrous expedition. In a journey marked by failure, struggle, and death, the limited victories the Spanish enjoyed were owed, in great part, to Indian guides who shared their local (be it geographical or linguistic) knowledge. De Soto avoided certain death in Napituca only when four Indian interpreters revealed the developing plot to murder the Spanish. Vitachuco, the cacique of Napituca, had welcomed the Spanish, but informed de Soto’s Indian interpreters that his intentions were not amicable. Vitachuco described the major assault he was planning against the trusting Spanish delegation and solicited the aid of these Indian interpreters. At first, these four Indian men agreed to follow Vitachuco’s plan, but soon

the four Indian interpreters had reconsidered the substance of the Curaca’s communication, this time with more wisdom. To them the undertaking now appeared difficult and a victory in it impossible, first because of the strength of the Spaniards who had shown themselves to be invincible, and then because of their feeling that the Spaniards had never been so poorly prepared and careless as to be taken by treachery, or again so simple as to permit Vitacucho to deceive them as he had thought and planned to do.29

Deciding that Vitachuco’s plan was destined to fail and that their lot was better protected by the Spaniards, the interpreters divulged the chief’s plan to de Soto.30 The Spanish responded quickly, foiling Vitachuco’s attack and capturing many Indians as slaves. With Indian information at his disposal, de Soto was able to transform certain death into a profitable opportunity.

But the Spanish were not always so fortunate. De Soto was more often than not led astray by his Indian guides. As he made his way from the town of Ochete, the adelantado suspected foul play; instead of reaching the nearby towns, de Soto and his men were guided down increasingly arduous paths. The guide’s nefarious intentions became all too clear when, after several days of marching through an inhospitable terrain, the Indian hit a soldier with a burning log and tried to flee the Spanish encampment. De Soto’s men clamored for the death of this troublesome Indian, but the adelantado intervened. De Soto spared the life of this man, explaining that “he is the guide and we do not have another.”31 Luis de Moscoso Alvarado, who assumed control of the de Soto’s expedition after the death of the adelantado in May of 1542, was also tricked by an Indian guide (from the town of Nondacaco). This guide vowed to take Moscoso and his men to Soacatino, a town that was rumored to be hosting another group of Spaniards. Departing from the town of Guasco, the Spanish party was quickly led astray. The guide eventually confessed (after being tied to a tree and threatened with the Spanish hunting dogs) that the chief of Nondacaco had wanted the Spanish to die in the wilderness,

29 de la Vega, ed. La Florida Del Inca: Historia Del Adelantado Hernando De Soto... 211-3.; English translation from Varner, ed. The Florida of the Inca, 143.
30 Stephen Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions, the Wonder of the New World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 104-08.
31 “qué era guía y no tenía otra” de la Vega, ed. La Florida Del Inca: Historia Del Adelantado Hernando De Soto... 262.; the town is called Aute by Garcilaso de la Vega.
“perish[ing] from hunger.” Moscoso and his men, stranded in a terrain that had proven almost impossible to travel, had become victims of both Spanish ignorance and Indian cunningness.

Perhaps the most notorious guide of de Soto’s expedition was Perico, a young Indian boy captured at Napituca. Perico promised to take the Spanish to Cofitachequi. In Cofitachequi, Perico insisted, the Spanish would find all the riches they desired. After a long and strenuous march through desolate lands, the dreams de Soto had built on Perico’s promises began to disappear. It became clear that Perico had misled the Spanish. With other guides at his disposal, de Soto considered executing Perico, but eventually decided that the boy’s linguistic abilities were worth preserving. De Soto’s experience with Perico showed that the Spanish often put their life in the hands of people they did not fully trust or control. This incident also demonstrated the importance of Indian guides, interpreters, and information, for despite the boy’s deceit, the adelantado was willing to keep and continue relying on Perico, albeit with more care. The known unreliability of Perico perhaps afforded de Soto some certainty in the face of the many and larger unknowns the Spanish faced.

The explorers of the Southeast knew little and fared even worse at learning the information they needed to traverse and conquer the land. The entradas were therefore these peculiar moments in which Spaniards felt weak, incapable of uncovering “the secrets of the country;” unsurprisingly, the Conquistadores often responded to their ineptitude with violence and cruelty. But on the flipside of their aggression and anxiety lies an almost invisible story about available (not lacking) information and control of that knowledge. It is a story of Indian networks of information. Amerindians communicated in ways and at rates that bewildered the Spanish. News of the Spanish reached Indian towns before the Spanish themselves ever did; Indians leaders knew about the “customs and behavior” of the Conquistadores; and these connections supported the creation of a common memory regarding Indian-Spanish experience and exchanges—a memory that played a role in Euro-Indian interactions well into the seventeenth-century. While Indians seemed able to traverse “pathless” lands, recognize different groups, and understand changing conditions, Spanish parties were completely consumed by their own inability to uncover even the most basic details, such as appropriate sources of food. Even when admitting their own ignorance and recognizing- sometimes lauding- Indian knowledge, these Spanish leaders seemed baffled by a native networks and often coupled their comments about Indian information with shock, surprise, and derision.

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32 Ibid., 234. Book 5, part 2 chapter 3.; also in Hudson, Warriors of the Sun: Hernando De Soto and the South’s Ancient Chiefdoms, 367.
33 Perico in Spanish means parrot. Although it has been suggested that the name was given to this Indian boy because of his ability to speak the language, it is also possible that the name parrot referred to this boy’s message, which echoed what the Spanish wanted to hear.
36 For a similar discussion about New England Indians see Matt Cohen, The Networked Wilderness: Communicating in Early New England (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), in particular, 68.
But Indians were not impervious to the trials of communication. They also struggled to understand the newcomers who moved through to their world. Shipwrecked around 1549, Hernando de Escalante Fontaneda lived with Indian groups (primarily the Calusa) for over seventeen years. He recounted the frustration of the cacique of Calusa when his “newly captured” Spanish prisoners failed to understand him. The chief instructed his captives “to dance and sing,” but since the Spanish “did not understand” the cacique’s orders, they disobeyed his request. Calusa Indians became offended and thought the Christians were rebellious… And so they would kill them… because they would not do as they were told.”

The cacique then turned to Fontaneda, and inquired about the “rebellious” nature of his compatriots. “[T]ell us the truth,” the cacique of Calusa demanded, “When we tell these, your companions, to dance and sing, and do other things, why are they so mean and rebellious that they will not? or is it that they do not fear death, or will not yield to a people unlike them in their religion.” The chief wanted to know the root of Spanish insolence.

Fontaneda attempted to explain that the “rebelliousness” of the Spanish was nothing of the sort. The prisoners had disobeyed the cacique simply “because they cannot understand” him. But the cacique of Calusa remained unconvinced. He did not believe that linguistic limitations bore all the blame. After all, “often he would command them to do things, and sometimes they would obey him, and at others they would not.” The arbitrary responses of the prisoners led the cacique to believe that Spanish had no respect for his authority. Ironically, the Spanish would also complain about the erratic responses of their Indian captives, allies, and guides. Labeling Indians as “gente sin razón” (people without reason), the Spanish agreed that whatever arrangement they established between themselves and Indians would be imperfect. Apparently, as Fontaneda’s testimony showed, Indians thought so too. It took another interpreter, who confirmed Fontaneda’s response, to fully convince the cacique that confusion, not insubordination, fueled the actions of his Spanish captives.

The story of communication and of the networks that sustained this exchange is one of confusion and struggle, by all side involved. It is also a story of an intensely connected world. And it is to these connections, exchanges, and interactions that this dissertation turns to.

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37 Paul W. Mapp, *The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713-1763* (The Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture and Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 2011), Chapter 2, especially 84.
38 Memoir of S d’Escalante Fontaneda, Respecting to Florida, Written in Spain, about the year 1575, in Milanich, ed. *Earliest Hispanic/Native American Interactions in the American Southeast*, 300.
39 Memoir of S d’Escalante Fontaneda, Respecting to Florida, Written in Spain, about the year 1575, in Ibid., 300.
Chapter 1: Indian Nuevas, Spanish Information, Making sense of “la tierra adentro” and the Florida project

The Indians… looked at him [Gonzalo Vicente] with evil eyes and said: “Having left those provinces as desolate as you did, you want us to give you news of them?” and they [the Indians] did not want to answer him any further; and talking amongst themselves they said, (as the interpreter who traveled with them translated) “we would rather shoot him with arrows than give him the news he requests.”

—Don Luís probably to Gonzalo Vicente, in *La Florida del Inca* (1605)

By the time a Spanish rescue party left Santa Elena, it was clear that the Jesuits’ endeavors in the Chesapeake Bay (1570-1) had failed. Against the advice of Florida’s government, Father Juan Baptista de Segura and his assistant Luís de Quirós had ventured far from San Agustín and Santa Elena, and they had done so without a military entourage. Like Pedro Menéndez de Avilés’s efforts to explore southern Florida, Segura’s mission to Ajacán was an attempt to expand the realm of Spanish and Catholic influence in the Southeast. Segura understood his vulnerability, but felt that his project was feasible because he had the help of Don Luís, an Algonquian-speaking Indian who years earlier had been taken (either by force or trade) from Chesapeake Bay and was now a Catholic convert. Don Luís was familiar with the land, people, and language of the region; he was also a devoted Spanish subject. Segura had a seemingly ideal guide. But Don Luís had other plans. In his livid remark to Gonzalo Vicente (cited at the beginning of this chapter), this Algonquian-speaking guide revealed his anger towards the Spanish and their enterprise in the Southeast.

As the Spanish rescue party later learned, Don Luís had quickly abandoned the Jesuits after reaching Ajacán. Without their trusted guide and sole interpreter, the friars saw the relations with local Indians, which had been tense from the onset, quickly deteriorate. Segura and Quirós were violently murdered; their mission was a complete failure. The friars might have hoped to extend Spanish and Catholic power in the Southeast, but to achieve this goal they needed reliable Indian allies and support. The Jesuits discovered a little too late that Indians like Don Luís had their own agendas—

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1 “Los indios viendo que aquel español era de los que fueron con el gobernador Hernando de Soto, le miraron con malos ojos y le dijieron: ¿dejando vosotros esas provincias tan mal paradas como las dejásteis, queréis que os demos nuevas ellas? y no quisieron responderle mas; y hablando unos con otros dijeron, (según dijo el intérprete que con ellos iba) de mejor gana le diéramos sendos flechazos, que las nuevas que nos pide…” de la Vega, ed. *La Florida Del Inca: Historia Del Adelantado Hernando De Soto...* 402.
agendas which often complicated any Spanish effort in the region. Although the friars, much like the Conquistadores before them, had feared that the local populations would be unreceptive to their message, the Spanish had not anticipated Indian agency. In their long conquest of the Southeast, the Spanish had to repeatedly learn the lesson that neither the land nor its inhabitants were a tabula-rasa. The Indian groups Segura and Quirós had tried to convert had known about and dealt with the Spanish in some facility for over half a century. The Spanish tended to forget this history of interaction, failing and often never attempting to include Indian insights, ambitions, and reports into their plans.

Figure 1.1 — Mission Spanish Florida, 1565-1763 (John Worth)

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5 Pedro Menéndez also makes this realization, see Reilly, "A Marriage of Expedience: The Calusa Indians and Their Relations with Pedro Menéndez De Avilés in Southwest Florida, 1566-1569."

6 “Maps of Spanish Florida,” John E. Worth (University of West Florida), accessed January 13, 2011, http://www.uwf.edu/jworth/spanfla_maps.htm “Missions, 1565-1763. This map shows the known or projected locations of selected Spanish missions across greater Spanish Florida during the First Spanish period, including early efforts by Jesuits and secular clergy, as well as later missions established by Franciscan friars (only provincial designations are provided in most cases, since individual mission names are too numerous for the map).”
But even when they did make an effort, as the rescue party sent to Ajacán endeavored, it was not all together clear how to gather the Indian perspective or what that perspective would entail. Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, governor of Florida, “sent Don Diego Velasco, his son-in-law, with a hundred soldiers… to look over the condition of the land” and find-out what had transpired. “From the information obtained regarding the territory, it appeared that the land was rich. They [rescue party] returned, however, with little or no news considering the things they desired to know for the frightened Indians had fled.”

While Velasco could secure information about “the condition of the land,” he could not obtain news about the latest developments because the “frightened Indians had fled.” Velasco separated information from news. The former, dealing with stable, quantifiable facts, such as the condition of the Chesapeake Bay, could be gathered by the Spanish soldiers and officials; the latter, relating to recent threats and imminent attacks, depended on Indians.

The Spanish needed both. They needed nuevas (news) to learn of breaking events and they needed información (information) to transform the unknown Southeast into a manageable, travelable known. No supplements for food or drink, news and information were nevertheless instrumental in facilitating the Spanish colonial project in La Florida. Nuevas and información played different roles in the settlement and colonization of Florida, and this chapter’s main objective is to elucidate and discuss those related, coexisting, yet decidedly distinct roles.

“With fire and blood,”¹⁸ Indians, News, and Foreign Threat

As the heavily armed French ships peeked over the horizon, San Agustín was nothing more than a series of half-dug trenches and a fortification in the early stages of construction. Pedro Menéndez de Avilés feared that his risky gamble was going to end much like all previous Spanish efforts in Florida. If the expeditions of Pánfilo de Narvaéz, Hernando de Soto, and Tristán de Luna y Arrellano had taught the Spanish anything, it was that Florida was a magnet for destruction, failure, and death. Menéndez was not off to a better start. The adelantado to Florida had endured a disastrous Atlantic voyage only to arrive after the French supply vessels he had been trying to intercept. Menéndez had also lost his only advantage: the element of surprise. French soldiers unloading the recently arrived supply ships had spotted the advancing Spanish forces and prepared for confrontation. The resulting naval skirmish did not afford the Spanish much promise either. As French and Spanish ships exchanged fire, Menéndez climbed on deck and boldly declared to the French soldiers that he was, “Pedro Menéndez, Sent by order of Your Majesty to this coast and land to burn and hang the French Lutherans who were

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¹⁷ Luís Gerónimo de Oré, "The Martyrs of Florida (1513-1616),“ Franciscan Studies, no. 18 (1936): 29 emphasis mine. The date of this publication is unknown, but textual evidence seems to indicate that Oré wrote this account after his second visit to Florida in 1617. See Ibid. and Noble David Cook, "Beyond the Martyrs of Florida: The Versatile Career of Luis Gerónimo De Oré," The Florida Historical Quarterly 71, no. 2 (1992): 187 for 1619 date.

¹⁸ Juan Carlos Mercado, ed. Pedro Menéndez De Avilés, Cartas Sobre La Florida (1555-1574) (Madrid: Iberoamericana,2002), 154, October 15, 1565.
found here."

But in spite of Menéndez’s spirit, the fighting ended in neither burning nor hanging. Uncertainty and retreat were in the end all Menéndez and his men could muster. The French settlement in Fort Caroline (1562) had forced Spanish to reconsider their project in La Florida. French presence and competition had re-awakened Spain’s interest in this disaster-ridden territory. Florida suddenly became a more coveted possession. Menéndez articulated a rationale for settling the area, boldly proclaiming that San Agustín held “the key to the Spanish empire.” While this assertion was, by any account, an overstatement, in the years following the establishment of a French colony, the Southeast became a higher priority for the Spanish Crown. La Florida was not merely viewed as a place with natural wealth waiting to be exploited and with souls in need of salvation, but also as a territory plagued by “Protestant weeds,” weeds that needed to be eradicated. The Huguenot colony forced Spain to assert dominance or, at the very least, establish a permanent residence in the region. French settlement had thus opened a different kind of front in the struggle for Florida.

In 1565, the Spanish responded to the French threat by establishing San Agustín. During the first two decades of Spanish settlement in the region, when real, feared as well as imagined forces threatened the already precarious existence of the Spanish colony, San Agustín officials recurrently articulated a yearning for nuevas, literally for what was “new.” More than a desire to know, the Spanish expressed a need to learn the latest developments and enemy movements. While nuevas were not substitutes for the colonists’ practical needs, such as food and ammunition, they were instrumental in facilitating the Spanish colonial project in La Florida. And while there is nothing surprising about this need, it was not a constant. The Spanish value of news varied with time and circumstance.

When the Spanish felt their hold on the region compromised by French or English forces, San Agustín officials would more commonly discuss their need for nuevas. News, always a coveted commodity, would suddenly gain a sense of urgency. During the times Florida came under foreign threat, obtaining and possessing nuevas became priority, a matter of survival. But when Spain was the sole European power in the Southeast, nuevas were no longer a pressing matter. The process through which news was acquired, interpreted, and valued thus reveals more than just how the Spanish were trying to learn about the circumstances that defined their colonial endeavor; it also shows the dynamic relations between Indian, Spaniards, and French that made and remade San Agustín.

The connection Spanish Florida drew between foreign threats and the sudden prioritization, and just as sudden deprioritization, of nuevas resonated with developing ideas about the role, meaning, and importance of news (as a category as well as a means) in Europe. Through the mid-17th century, as Nicole Greenspan has observed, “news”

9 Ibid., 129, September 11, 1565 “que iba por mandado de V.M. a esta costa y tierra, a quemar y ahorcar a los franceses luteranos que hallase en ella.”

had a “negative or disparaging designation, indicating insufficiently processed, unmediated, or misleading information.” News had connotations of rumor and gossip, lacking reliability and importance. More specifically, the Spanish tended to differentiate between “buenas nuevas” (good news) and “malas nuevas” (bad news); a distinction that had to do with the content as well as context of the message. News became “buenas nuevas” when it dealt with foreign affairs; local news, on the other hand, was tied to gossip (“malas nuevas”). While developments in and about distant parts, such as wars or diplomatic talks, were eagerly received, reports about less remote affairs were mistrusted and seen as dangerous. These ambivalent sentiments about the use and responsibility of nuevas were echoed by Spanish officials in San Agustín. In Florida, the need for and discussion of nuevas appears almost exclusively in times of foreign threat, when, for example, French Huguenots and/or English pirates jeopardized Spanish settlements; and disappears when the Spanish face no other European competition in the Southeast.

The value of news varied, but what news was and how it was acquired did not. Nuevas were hastily collected messages; they were regarded as incomplete, but timely pieces of a larger, complex whole. In spite of their imperfect and partial representation, news mattered to the Spanish in Florida because as the latest and, more often than not, the only reports available, nuevas were like the last gasp of air before a deep dive. Defined by a sense of urgency, news were “gathered and evaluated by albeit often ad hoc agencies.” In colonial San Agustín, these agencies were Indians and Indian networks.

The Spanish began using Indians to learn nuevas almost immediately after landing in Florida. Menéndez wrote to the King Philip II about using Indian informers and guides to discover the French forces. From the location of Fort Caroline to best approach to the French stronghold, Menéndez depended on nuevas acquired, carried, and delivered by Indians.

For the Spanish, having news required Indians. In 1586, like dreaded apparitions, the sails of Sir Francis Drake flew near the coast of Florida. To prepare for the attack, the Spanish sent Captain Vicente Gonzalez to learn as much as possible about this English pirate and his forces. Gonzalez traveled to “the coast to talk with the Indians to inform [him]self from them if any vessel or vessels had traveled there.” But since the Captain could not locate any coastal Indians, he continued his “search for other… Indians

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14 Mercado, ed. Pedro Menéndez De Avilés, Cartas Sobre La Florida (1555-1574), 130.
15 Mercado, ed. Pedro Menéndez De Avilés, Cartas Sobre La Florida (1555-1574), 154. Pedro de las Roelas, n.d. 1567, AGI Reel 3 Stetson Collection “aviendo hechada a los dichos franceses de la dicha Florida y panado les dos Fuertes avia tenido aviso de los yndios por el mes de hereno de año pasado de senta y seis que en el Puerto de Guale y Santa Elena que es en las dichas provincias delia mas francises y se estaban fortificando y que por ser aquellos puertos y tierra muy Buenos temio que si fuera socorridos de francias antes que el los hechase de allo se fortificaban de manera mas fuerte empicio muy trabajoso y de mucha costa para nia real hacienda.” For the use of Indian correos in other Spanish colonies, see Sylvia Marina Sellers-Garcia, “Distant Guatemala: Reading Documents from the Periphery” (University of California, Berkeley, 2009), Chapter 4.
and for news.”

Indians and news went together. If Gonzalez wanted to uncover the latest position or intentions of Drake, he needed to find Indians who had both seen (or interacted with) this pirate and, more importantly, who were willing to communicate with the Spanish.

![Figure 1.2 — Drake’s attack on Spanish Florida, 1586](image)

The search for news was a search for Indians—a connection the Spanish did much to reinforce in the following decades. By the time English surveyors began exploring the region in the mid 1650s, Indians and nuevas were closely intertwined. In 1657, to learn of early English exploration of the Carolinas, Florida Governor Diego Rebolledo sent “some Indians with their weapons until there was news [of the English].” He explained that “the same would have been done in other situations of less risk and suspicion since this [using Indians to procure news] was the quickest and the most immediate relief that can be found to resist the enemy that was so close.”

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16 Capt Vicente González, June 11, 1586, AGI, Stetson Reel 6 “el siete de Junio llegue a costas hablar con los yndios yformarme de ellos si avia pasado por allí algun navio o nabios donde dijeron que no havia visto ninguno… en busca de otros que Col. E yndios y para me informarnos …” These Indians were probably eastern Timucua or Guale.


18 Diego Rebolledo, September 18, 1657, AGI, Stetson Reel 12, “algunos yndios con sus armas asta que ubiese noticias y seguridad de dichas armas por abeirse hecho esto mismo en otra ocasiones de menos riegos y recelo por ser la diligencia mas pronta y el Socorro mas ynmediato que se allava para poder resistir al enemigo que estava tan cerca…"
stakes had not been so high, Rebolledo would have still depended on Indians. Capable of moving through the Southeast and among European groups, Indians like Guale, Orista, and Escamaçu provided “the quickest and the most immediate relief that can be found.”

Relying on Indian nuevas implied so much more than using Indian messengers; it meant that, on the ground, the Spanish were using Indians to learn about other Europeans. Indian mediated what Europeans knew about each other. Southeastern Indians were responsible for forging relations among Spanish, French, and English forces in Florida. During the few weeks in which French and Spanish settlements shared an estranged cohabitation on the Florida coast, Fort Caroline and San Agustín were connected to each other via Timucua Indians, as well as those Indians’ allies and foes. Indian relations with Europeans, but also, and more importantly, Indian connections with other Indians, shaped what and how the Spanish learned about the French (and later the English) and vice-versa.

René Laudonnière, the founder and commander of Fort Caroline, understood perfectly both the precarious state of the French colony and the importance of Indian relations. Laudonnière had attempted to secure French survival by expanding his influence among neighboring nations. The French had gained the friendship of the powerful Saturiba (chief of the Eastern Timucua) by promising to attack the Potano (Saturiba’s main rival). Laudonnière soon went back this word. Noninvolvement in Indian affairs, it seemed, was less risky and alienate any potential ally. But the French could not remain neutral. Lacking enough men and goods to assert influence in any meaningful way, Laudonnière quickly discovered that if he wanted to retain any alliances or protection, he was going to have to intervene in inter-Indian relations, like the rivalry between Saturiba and Potano.

The Indian majority felt neither intimidation nor loyalty to the handful of half-starved French colonists, and instead of being able to jockey their Indian neighbors, the French found themselves fighting in Indian wars and manipulated by power-struggles that had little to do with French wants. These Indian relations shaped not only what the French could accomplish in the region, but also affected how the French responded to the Spanish settlement of San Agustín. By the time Menéndez de Avilés sailed up the Florida coast, the Indian relations Laudonnière had wanted and those he had been thrust into shaped the interplay between these two European rivals.

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19 Though none of the accounts dealing with the failed French endeavors in Florida were written by Indians, the importance of Timucua groups, like Potano and Utina, cannot be missed; Indians figure prominently in the reports of French Florida.

20 For the complicated relation of Saturiba with the French see, Lyon, The Enterprise of Florida: Pedro Menéndez De Avilés and the Spanish Conquest of 1565-1568, 199. Nicolas Le Challeux, A True and Perfect Description, of the Last Voyage or Navigation... (London: By Henry Denham, for Thomas Hacket, and are to be solde at his shop in Lumbart streate, 1566); Rene Goulaine de Laudonniere, A Notable Historie Containing Foure Voyages Made by Certayne French Captaynes Vnto Florida... (London: Imprinted by Thomas Dawson, 1587).

The French had succeeded in obtaining some Indian allies, but the price of that friendship had been attacks against other Guale and Timucua Indians. The settlers of Fort Caroline had made that bargain, and they could only hope that their friends would prove stronger and more determined than their enemies. The resentment Guale and Timucua Indians had towards the French translated directly into an alliance with the newly arrived Spanish soldiers. These Indians, possibly Saturiba himself, supplied Menéndez with nuevas about the location, size, and number of men residing in Fort Caroline.

In 1568 Saturiba would yet again change his alliances. The Indian chief provided Dominique de Gourgue— a French pirate who decimated San Agustín in retaliation for Menéndez’s attack against the Huguenot settlement in 1565— with important details about

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22 Michèle Duchet, ed. L’amérique De Théodore De Bry: Une Collection De Voyages Protestante Du Xviè Siècle, vol. 1 (Paris: 1987); Stefan Lorant, The New World; the First Pictures of America, Made by John White and Jacques Le Moyne and Engraved by Theodore De Bry, with Contemporary Narratives of the Huguenot Settlement in Florida, 1562-1565, and the Virginia Colony, 1585-1590. (New York, Duell: Sloan & Pearce, 1946), “In my narrative I spoke of Pierre Gambie, a Frenchman who obtained a trading license from Laudonniere for that province and not only succeeded in acquiring considerable wealth but also married the daughter of a local chief. As he wished to visit his friends at the fort, he was permitted to go, on condition that he would return within a certain time. He was given a canoe with two Indians to paddle it, and the wealth he had acquired was stowed in the boat. On the journey, however, while the Frenchman was bending over to make a fire, his Indian companions murdered him. They might have done this out of revenge, since once when the chief was absent and Gambie had taken his place, he had beaten one of them.” 19.
the state of the Spanish presidio. Saturiba’s shifting alliances, from French to Spanish and then back to French, hinted at the risks of using Indians for learning *nuevas*. News was intended to provide French and Spanish with the latest developments, but in the hands of Indians, these reports could be turned into weapons—a non-commutable commodity, once learned, news could not be returned.

The Spanish were well-aware of the risks involved in using Indians informers. The colonists often paid with their lives for relying on people whom they did not fully understand or control. In the fall of 1566, a party of soldiers met an unarmed group of Indians who, with signs, displayed their friendly intentions and appeared eager to communicate news. But these Indians had been merely “feigning friendship,” and as they bowed before the Spanish, instead of “kissing their hands,” the Indian disarmed the soldiers and killed the Spanish with their own swords. The “betrayal of these Indians” spoke of the insecurity of Spanish Florida—this attack happened within walking distance of the San Agustín presidio; it emphasized the Indians’s ability to trick the Spanish; and, more importantly, it revealed the Spanish inability to tell friend from foe.

In spite of the violent nature of the crime, Menéndez, the governor, chose not to punish the Indian attackers. He cited both the tenuous relations San Agustín had with its neighbors, which would certainly not improve if the Spanish decided to punish members of a neighboring tribe, and Florida’s need for Indian allies and news. Without the friendship of local Amerindians, the Spanish were vulnerable, disconnected from the larger Southeast. Menéndez argued that the Spanish soldiers killed by the Indians had simply misread the Indians’ message. Had these soldiers followed the governor’s orders and stayed within the presidio walls, or had they been accompanied by an interpreter, this unpleasant situation would have not transpired.

Many officials criticized Menéndez’s leniency. Pedro Valdés, the interim governor, insisted that the Spanish had been purposely misled. He argued that Indians were not to be trusted. Florida officials needed to find other ways to stay informed. Menéndez insisted that the Spanish could not afford to lose Indian allies; Valdés believed that Indians compromised the safety of the new colony. Men from either side of this debate drew a similar moral from the 1566 murders: Indians had their own ambitions and goals. Their intentions could be difficult to read, hidden, or even deceptive, but they were always present.

A particularly telling incident occurred in the summer of 1580, when the Spanish welcomed *nuevas* by an unnamed Indian who came running into the Spanish fort. Panting and in between breaths, he “told the general that he brought a Nueva: he had seen a French vessel.” The Spanish had long-feared a French retaliation for the destruction of Fort Caroline. It seemed that the day had finally arrived. The Spanish, eager to learn more, began by asking a series of questions dealing with the French vessel. Inquiring about the size, weaponry, number of troops, and location of the French, the Spanish wanted to learn every possible detail about the intruding forces.

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23 Pedro de Valdés to King, September 12, 1566, AGI-SD Reel 5 Stetson Collection, PKY.
24 Shapin, *A Social History of Truth, Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England*. “Knowing how to evaluate testimony was, therefore, knowing one’s way around a cultural system, knowing how to go on in specific circumstances whose characteristics and exigencies no rulebook could possibly envisage.” 231.
25 In 1568 Dominique de Gourgue had attacked and destroyed Fort San Mateo (formerly Fort Caroline), and in retribution for the massacres at Matanzas, the French privateers killed all the Spanish who surrendered. Gourgue allied with Saturiwa, a Timucua chief and former ally of the French.
If time allowed, most Indians who arrived with nuevas were submitted to an interrogation. Through these queries, the Spanish attempted to squeeze as many details as possible from the Indians. A short, out-of-breath comment from an Indian about having spotted a foreign sail could easily precipitate a long interview. Yet for all their questions, the Spanish tended to interrogate the news itself, not the informer. They took pains to know the type and number of masts on the ship, but more often than not the Spanish took the Indian messengers at face value. While there are specific details about the French vessel that attacked Florida during the hot months of 1580, but there is no mention of the informer’s name or tribal affiliation—I know that the Indian messenger was male only because Spanish is a gendered language. The careful questioning of the nuevas and the simple acceptance of the informer were in part due to the fact that the Spanish, in the early decades of settling Florida, had no other option. If they wanted nuevas, they needed to rely on Indians who knew the land, the river-ways, and the populations. In the face of imminent threat, what mattered to the Spanish was what they knew—not how or even who they gathered the news.

But the informer mattered. And in the case of the 1580 French attack, the unnamed Indian messenger mattered a lot. As this Indian recounted with surprising precision details about the invading French forces, the Spanish interviewers became curious as to how this Indian had come by such specific news. To the dismay of the Spanish governor, the Indian calmly declared that he had been on board the French vessel and had even conversed with the enemy forces. Though the Spanish had been grateful to this man for gathering news, they were less receptive to the notion that he might have also exchanged it.

At this point in the “very faithful Relation,” the tone of the interrogation suddenly changes. The Spanish, leaving behind their worries about the size and firepower of the French forces, expressed concern with what this Indian might have revealed to the French about the conditions and strength of San Agustín. “The Indian said that he told them [French] that in the fort there were no vessels... and that in the port there were not many people and those [who were there were] sick.”26 This reply shocked the Spanish. What the Indian had told the French had been neither true nor false; it was instead a strange mixture of both. The Spanish had indeed endured a difficult summer, but at the present there were several boats in the San Agustín harbor and the Spanish population, though small, was not at its weakest point. The Spanish “asked the Indian why he said there were few people [and that they were] sick since he knew there were many [people] and he knew that there were two large ships in the port.” The Indian replied that he misled the French on purpose, encouraging them to attack at a time when the Spanish forces could overpower the French ones. He had misrepresented Spanish strength so the French would land, be killed, and then the Indian could claim some of the bounty from the ships. 27

In the process of obtaining the latest and newest reports about French operations, the Spanish became entangled in the Indian’s own ambitions. Even though the Spanish had understood nuevas to be imperfect—these were, after all, incomplete reports,

26 “Relacion muy verdadera de lo subcedido en la Florida en el mes de Jullio” July 1580, AGI-SD Reel 5 Stetson Collection, PKY.
27 Ibid.
quickly compiled— the problem was supposedly the format, not of the messenger. But this incident reminded Florida officials that they could not separate message from messenger— they could not separate nuevas of the French exploits from the personal motives of this unnamed Indian. What, how, when, and why the Spanish uncovered this latest French attack was contingent on this opportunistic Indian. If the interviewer’s visceral reaction towards the Indian’s own plotting was any indication, it was clear that Spanish were not too keen on needing Indians to learn of French activity. San Agustín officials did not enjoy feeling vulnerable. Governor Pedro Menéndez Marqués needed Indian help, but he refused to be trapped by this communication arrangement.

After revealing “his Nuevas” and his plot to capture French bounty, the unnamed Indian awaited a Spanish response. The Spanish carefully debated the best course of action. They had two options: wait for the invasion to materialize, which was what the Indian had suggested, or chase-out the French ships before they could attack. The governor opted for the latter. Governor Menéndez Marqués erred on the side of caution and decided to expel the French before they could cause any major damage to the Spanish presidio. The governor also made it perfectly clear that he was not following the plan devised by the Indian messenger. Menéndez Marqués had decided on a different course of action. An Indian could provide Florida officials with news about the French, but an Indian could not to dictate Spanish policy.

In the hot summer months of 1580, Spanish forces based in San Mateo (formerly Fort Caroline) managed to prevent at least three separate French invasions. The remainder of the “very faithful Relation” recounts the French-Spanish confrontations that ensued and describes the damages, injuries, and deaths brought on by this fighting. Much like the Spanish themselves, this source leaves behind the unnamed Indian. This messenger had tried to mold the Spanish-French conflict to his advantage and, while he had ultimately failed to secure French bounty, he had provided the Spanish with all the details they had about the French. Menéndez Marqués had used this news to craft an attack plan and the French never set anchor on the Florida coast again.

The Spanish were the ones who made sense of Indian nuevas. Indians could help procure news, but the Spanish alone were the ones who could determine what they meant. It was as if news were pieces of a puzzle, and while the Indians could bring the pieces, only the Spanish could give the scattered parts some semblance of order. Having little control as to what or how stable these pieces were, San Agustín officials turned their efforts not to gathering nuevas, but to evaluating them. For the Spanish to assign nuevas a context, when they could barely understand or control their content, might seem impractical, but by interpreting and implementing nuevas, the Spanish attempted to separate Indians from the leverage news could provide. Governor Menéndez Marqués, for example, had listened attentively to news of a French threat, but had tried to remove the informer’s own wants from the Spanish response to the situation.

Yet this separation was never complete. While the pieces to the news puzzle might have been scattered, they were never insular or isolated. Indians would continue to embed their own agendas into the nuevas they communicated. They did this not simply because they were deceitful, as the Spanish accused them of being (although sometimes they most certainly were), and not merely as an expression of Indian agency and strength (although sometimes providing nuevas most certainly was), but because it was hard to tell

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news any other way. For example, when the Cacique of Calusa, Don Carlos, welcomed governor Menéndez, encouraging an alliance with the Spanish, urging the building of a church, and recommending that the Spanish soldiers remain in his town, the cacique’s intentions had less to do with San Agustín’s power and more with Calusa’s desire to overpower his powerful rival, Don Felipe. Much like Indians who adopted European goods but employed them in ways which, though surprising to the Europeans onlookers, were in clear accordance with Indian practice, Indians like the cacique of Calusa or the unnamed man reporting on the French used nuevas to reinforce existing structures and the relationships. Nuevas were related by Indians, who lived, traveled, and were confined by the structures of their societies. It seems commonsensical, but it is important to recall that news did not exist beyond or outside people.

One of the most telling examples of the complex relations among Indians, nuevas, and foreign threat comes from Ais Indians (also spelled Ays). The Ais Indians inhabited Southeastern Florida (from present-day Cape Canaveral to the Saint Lucie Inlet); their location made them privy to a great deal of news. Governor Pedro Ibarra explained that every formality and sign of friendship had to be extended to the Ais because they live “in a port where all vessels, friend and enemy, disembark and tend to come to shore.” The Spanish regarded the Ais as important gatekeepers of news that flowed north from the Caribbean. The Ais’ access to European news and trade surprised Jonathan Dickinson, a shipwrecked Quaker merchant who spent the fall of 1696 as a captive among this group. Dickinson not only noted the many European goods held by the Ais, but also remarked on the Indian’s keen awareness of distinctions among European groups.

Stranded and uncertain of his exact location, Dickinson quickly realized that the English were not regarded with kindness by the Ais—who were an early target of Indian slaving from South Carolina. In his efforts to convince a group of Indians to take his party north, Dickinson “heard a saying that came from one of the chief Indians, this ‘English Son of a Bitch,’ which words startled [him].” The cacique had spoken harshly about Dickinson’s party, but most importantly, he had done so in English. A “startled” Dickinson decided that his best chance for survival was to convince a party of Ais from Saint Lucie Inlet that he was in fact Spanish and thus a friend. “We hailed them in Spanish,” since Solomon Cresson, a member of the English party, spoke the language; Dickinson’s companions even made signs of the cross as testaments to their Catholic devotion. But to no avail. The Ais, who had regular contact with both English and Spanish groups, saw through this charade and quickly identified Dickinson and his party by calling-out “Nicklaeer! Nicklaeer,” meaning English.

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30 The Ais identified Dickinson as English. The Indians had clear connections to different players in the region. See, “Gov Aranguiz y Cotés reporting on English settlement” September 8, 1662 bnd 1565, 54-5-10, Reel 12 Stetsen Collection PKY or Bolton Collection, Carton 51, folder 5, Bancroft Library. Amy Turner Bushnell, "Escape of Nicklaears, European-Indian Relations on the Wild Coast of Florida in 1696, from Jonathan Dickinson's Journal," in Coastal Encounters: The Transformation of the Gulf South in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Richmond F. Brown (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 58. Dickinson found: that being Spanish in the Southeast, while might have saved the lives of his party a couple of times, was not a magic shield. The influence of the Spanish was limited, but it was better than the hatred towards British, who were increasingly engaged in Indian slavery.
The Ais’ access to the Atlantic world had made them an important ally for the Spanish. In one of Menéndez’s earliest explorations of Florida, he identified the Ais and their coastal lands as strategic and expressed a desire to establish a fort and watchtower. But for all his efforts, the governor found that maintaining a garrison in the area was too difficult and failed to establish an active partnership with the Ais. Governor Ibarra was thus pleasantly surprised when Capitan Chico arrived with words of friendship from the Capitan Grande of the Ais. The Spanish governor lamented that until the arrival of Captain Chico the Spanish had “never been able to attract” these Indians to San Agustín. Ibarra, like Menéndez, believed that an alliance with the Ais, who could easily spot, indentify, and report on vessels sailing from the Caribbean, would provide the Spanish with an important source of protection. Since nuevas were salient for only a brief time, the Spanish hoped that a good relation with the Ais would enable San Agustín to receive news with some regularity. Reporting on foreign ships and activities, the Ais could participate in a latent network, which the Spanish hoped to tap into in times of need or threat.31

But Spanish hopes were dependent on the Ais’ corroboration and willingness. The Ais understood their importance to a successful and regular news network. And in their visit to San Agustín, the Ais delegation did much to emphasize their knowledge and position of strength. Capitan Chico did bring nuevas; but he spoke not of French vessels or shipwrecked Englishmen. He brought news of Spain. To Ibarra’s surprise, the Capitan Grande sent an armed delegation to San Agustín to protect the Spanish. The Ais captain had received news of war between Spain and England and, fearing for the safety of San Agustín, he had sent a delegation to defend the Spanish garrison. Sending these nuevas along with thirty warriors, Capitan Grande was not only showing his strength and power, but also his ability to obtain news and respond as he saw fit.

The Spanish governor was simultaneously elated and irritated by the Capitan Chico’s visit.32 Ibarra first graciously welcomed the Indians, but then proceeded to inform them that the war was over and England had surrendered. While the Spanish governor needed and wanted “relations and communications with the caciques of Ais, Horruque, Oruba, and the others… along the coast and [was willing to] keep them satisfied and happy for the reasons aforementioned [access to the coast and to recent events].”33 Ibarra was taken aback by both the cacique’s interpretation and initiative. The Captain Grande had assumed that Florida needed protection and had responded to the war’s breaking by sending armed men. Though nuevas went from Indians to Spanish, decisions and policy were supposed to travel in the other direction. The slight switch in

31 The Ais were reporting on the Anglo-Spanish War fought between 1585 and 1604. The war concluded with the treaty of London. While the beginning of the war was disastrous for Spain, with the infamous loss of the Spanish Armada in 1588, the slowly Spanish gained momentum. Towards the war’s end, the Spanish feet (guarda costa) was rebuilt and proved effective at blocking English raids. By the time the Capitan Chico arrived to San Agustín the English, though not defeated as Ibarra had suggested, were no longer on the offensive. “San Augustine diligencias for frie ndships with Indians of Ays. Horruque and Oribia” n.d. 1605, Stetson Collection, Reel 8 bdn 896, 54-5-9.

32 For an extended discussion on the diplomats and informers selected by Indian groups see James Merrell, Into the American Woods, Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 54-105.

33 “Servicio de su mag el tratro y comunicar con los casiques de Ais, Horruque, Oruba y lo demas … en la costa y tenerlos gratos y contentos por prazones referias.” “Horruque, Ays, Oribia, Abia, and Caparaca” July 10, 1605 bdn 896 54-5-9 Reel 8, Stetson Collection, PKY.
the dynamics surprised the Spanish governor and hinted at the Ais’ own understanding of their role in the spread of news. By mobilizing news, these Indians had also mobilized themselves.

In the first century of Spanish settlement of La Florida, the Spanish had forged, but also grown dependent on/accommodated to the connection between Indian and nuevas; Indians had also accepted and played into this connection. By 1670, when the English established Charles Town, both Spanish and Indians had established clear expectations and assumptions when it came to news. The English, who would introduce different ways of acquiring news and valuing Indian reports, redefined the rules of exchange. As a group of Guale Indians soon discovered, the standards developed by the Spanish were not universal; rather, they had been created and reinforced by a century of exchange.

A group of Guale men, spying on the early English activities in South Carolina, had a chance encounter with Joseph West, South Carolina’s governor. West proceeded to “ask them of the said Florida and of the disposition of San Augustine and its presidio.” This type questioning was nothing new to the Guale— in fact, when they retold the ins and outs of this encounter to Captain Antonio Argüelles, Argüelles’ first question was about the conditions and disposition of the English settlements. But just as the Guale “cacique was going to give them [English] an account of everything… Henri Gistlo… [who] had been here [San Agustín]… said it was not necessary, that he would relate [the news] and that he would do it quite well.”

The English did not seem to need Indian news, they had their own informers; Indians were simply “not necessary.” The Guale found the dismissal of their news both puzzling and troubling.

Captain Argüelles was troubled by the Guale’s communication with the English not by the Indians’ experiences in Charles Town. Nevertheless these Guale men made a point to speak of West’s dismissal of Indian nuevas. This brief encounter served as a warning. The Guale party realized the English did not seem to share the Spanish enthusiasm for Indian informers— neither the meaning of news nor the role Indians would play in spreading nuevas was certain. The association the Spanish had drawn among Indians and nuevas radically changed with the permanent settlement of an English colony in South Carolina. But before these planters from Barbados set foot in South Carolina and redirected Spanish efforts and defenses, San Agustín was concerned with local developments and struggles. From 1590 to 1670, during this long moment of internal focus, nuevas were relegated to the background, Indians came to play a very different role, and information became an essential part of the colonial project.

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34 “Reports on English… by Bernardo Medina of Guale” Nov 10, 1678 bnd 2081, 58-1-26/52a Stetson Collection, Reel 1; in 1682/3 Robert Searles attacked San Agustín.
35 The Spanish had already faced an English threat with the settlements of Roanoke (1585) and Virginia (1607). Some historians have argued that English presence in these early days forced the Spanish to move Florida’s capital from Santa Elena to San Agustín. This assessment, I would argue, is only partially true. The Guale-Orista burning of Santa Elena played a more decisive role in the relocation of Florida’s capital. Spanish documents in Florida seldom mention the English before 1670. The Spanish knew all too well the difficulties of the region, and the early English failures convinced the Spanish that the English colonial project in the Southeast would fail. Spanish officials considered the English a threat to Florida, but until 1670, that threat was distant and ephemeral.
Information, Expansion, and the Survival of Florida

In the hundred years following the 1562 expulsion of the French Huguenots, Spanish Florida did its best to endure. This was no easy feat. Short on supplies, men, and, most importantly, food, San Agustín was completely dependent on the situado, a subsidy from the crown which was often delayed when (and if) it managed to arrive. Serving as both a military and a religious outpost, Florida never succeeded in establishing any sort of profitable economic ventures. Quite the contrary, this colony was unable to support itself, becoming an increasing burden to the Spanish Crown. Suárez Toledo, a well-connected resident of Havana who had sailed with Menéndez de Avilés, explained to the King that, “to maintain Florida is merely to incur expense because it is and has been entirely unprofitable nor can it sustain its own population.” The strategically located colony was often on the brink of starvation, destruction, and destitution. But in spite of its many failures, Florida was never abandoned. Survival and endurance were arguably San Agustín’s most tangible successes.  

In their efforts to negotiate the Southeastern terrain, settle and missionize “la tierra adentro,” and develop profitable (or at least viable) relations with the Indian populations, Spanish officials turned their attention away from external threats that had so defined the first two decades of San Agustín’s existence, and focused on the local realities that shaped Florida. During these times of internal focus, the Spanish did not articulate a need for nuevas, but rather sought to fulfill a related, but different want: información. While news was coveted in times of external pressures and carried almost exclusively by Indians, información was concerned with measurable, stable, and internal developments. It was also reported by Spanish colonists (almost exclusively).  

First and foremost, the endeavors to make and gather information emphasized a certain privilege. Generally preoccupied with local matters, in particular with Indian populations and the conditions of the land, information produced in Florida had an official veneer. It took the form of surveys, inquiries, and expedition reports/journals. Information was, and could be, adequately collected and reported. Information was assumed to be a representation of the complete, complex whole.  

Second, information was produced by specifically sanctioned individuals, and was approved by an equally selective group. While news was acquired, “tengo nuevas,” information was made. The productive aspect of information meant that el informante (the informer) played a larger role than a bearer of news. This role can be seen in the level of scrutiny and questioning to which informers and potential informers were subjected. In almost a full reversal from the questions asked of the Indians who brought nuevas, the Spanish asked the informantes little about the details of their reports, which

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tended to follow the appropriate standard or formula; instead, the Spanish focused their scrutiny towards the informer’s personal qualifications, such as their occupation, rank, and experience. News could be brought by anyone; information required a different process.\(^{39}\) Since there was method, procedure, and logic to procuring information, the Spanish debated at length who could provide the best information. Besides the expected criteria— an informer had to be male, Catholic, and affiliated with the government and/or military— the Spanish also sought someone “plático.” This was someone who understood what to look for as well as what they were looking at. From the Latin verb informare (to give shape or form), información required a certain level of interpretation. Much more than warnings about impending peril, information was a way to make sense of the colonial space and its inhabitants, give shape to it, and control it.\(^{40}\)

And third, in a circular logic, information was deemed important because important people made and required it.\(^{41}\) Información was not only produced by, but also reflective of the hierarchies that structured colonial Florida. Although histories of information have focused on the changes in the amount or nature of information, from scarcity to abundance, from restricted to open access, the reality of colonial Florida complicates those stories of progression.\(^{42}\) The need and use of nuevas, which required a reliance on Indian networks as well as a willingness to act, plan, and make decisions with very incomplete knowledge, coexisted with the need and use of información, structured and official reports made by, for, and favoring the commanding voices in Spanish society. Nuevas had forced the Spanish to be inclusive and adaptive, information allowed them impose some sort of order over the inclusivity that had enabled them survive.\(^{43}\)

If nuevas, shaped by inter and intra Indian relations, defined what the Spanish knew about the Southeast, Indians, and other Europeans, information had to do with the Spanish ability to “make” and “shape” the Southeast. In part, this making and shaping was based on the writings of military, governmental and religious bodies— as well as who, what, and how these bodies deemed important enough to represent. But the other aspect of making and shaping information was dependent on, quite literally, what the

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\(^{39}\) Daniel S. Murphree, ”Constructing Indians in the Colonial Floridas: Origins of European-Floridian Identity, 1513-1573,” *The Florida historical quarterly* 81, no. 2 (2002). Murphree argues that the construction of Indians by Spanish (as well as French and English) led to the European failures to expand and control Florida. Similarly, the failure to produce information was often blamed on Indians.


\(^{41}\) Whereas historians have tended to be more interested in nuevas— especially because happened and dealt with moments of threat and excitement— the Spanish in colonial Florida saw the acquisition and production of informes (reports) as vital. Not only was información more carefully compiled, collected, and requested, it was also considered to be more important, in the long-term, than nuevas.


\(^{43}\) Ettinghausen, ”The News in Spain: Relaciones De Sucesos in the Reigns of Philip Iii and Iv.” This types of report thus “reflects the traditional power structure based on the Crown, the Church and the military.” p. 14.
Spanish made. Missions, forts, and, to a lesser extent, towns were how the Spanish chose to convey to each other and to Indians what Florida stood for.

The first efforts to reconnoiter and describe colonial Florida followed a predictable pattern. In 1566, within months of destroying Fort Caroline, the Adelanto placed Juan Pardo, an experienced Spanish captain, in charge of a large and well-armed expedition to the interior.\(^\text{44}\) Pardo’s party resembled the military entradas of Hernando de Soto and Tristán de Luna, and like those previous efforts, Pardo encountered more obstacles than successes. He could locate neither Zacatecas (the silver mines of Mexico, which were grossly miscalculated to be only 200 leagues from San Agustín), nor precious gems rumored to abound in the Florida interior.\(^\text{45}\) But in comparison to the fantastic disappointments of de Soto and Pánfilo de Návarre, Pardo’s forces fared much better. For starters, he lived to tell the tale. The two accounts describing his journeys and experiences reveal many interesting details about the lands and people in present-day South and North Carolina and Tennessee, but they also provide insight into how the Spanish were thinking about the tierra adentro as well as what actions were needed to appropriate the promises of the interior.\(^\text{46}\)

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\(^{44}\) December 1, 1566 to March 7, 1567, and again from September 1, 1567 to March 2, 1568, both had about 120 men.

\(^{45}\) Although Pardo did find crystal reserves and the promise of his first expedition led to the announcement of a second; both accomplished little. The Spanish stayed on or close to Indian trails, exploring little of the area and failing to secure the forts they had erected during the expedition.

\(^{46}\) Historians and anthropologist, led by the efforts of Charles Hudson, have produced extraordinary research on the journey, see Charles Hudson, *The Juan Pardo Expeditions: Exploration of the Carolinas and Tennessee.* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990).

\(^{47}\) Ibid.
The main Relación, recorded by the notary Juan de la Bandera, is supposed to be an account of Spanish exploration and imposition. But this highly descriptive text, which chronicled both the bounty land and the Spanish efforts to traverse it, described Pardo’s mishaps more than Spanish success. The tone of this relación is shaped by its representations of Southeastern Indians. This account either fails to describe the Indians the Spanish encountered or includes them only as parts of a set pattern, in which one group of Indians could be interchanged for another and in which Amerindians were merely seen as passive, stating “Yaa” after every Spanish declaration (which the Spanish interpreted as “I am contend to do what you command me to do”). The relación creates a strange combination of Indians that appear in almost every single page, yet are never fully present.

Ordered to observe, report, and control, Pardo found that he had to do much more: he had to constantly evaluate situation, distinguish friend from foe, and uncover possible danger. Pardo became more than a lens into the interior. His first-hand experience with Indians and the country transformed Pardo’s efforts from merely interpretative to performative. Pardo, as well as other Spanish expedition leaders who followed in his stead, were perfectly aware that although Indians were not the intended audiences for their reports or journals, they were, more often than not, the sole witnesses to Spanish endeavors in the interior. Pardo worried deeply about the example his hungry soldiers and abandoned garrisons were setting— “the power of example” Pardo realized, could be an intimidating but also debilitating force. While information was intended to give Spaniards a better sense and thus more clear control of Florida, the process of attaining information tended to place the Spanish in precarious situations beyond their control; “hacer información,” more often than not, ended by giving Indians a better read on the Spanish than vice-versa. The irony was not lost on Pardo.

As the Spanish eyes and ears to the interior, Pardo was often unsure of what he was seeing or listening to. Instead of being able to follow the governor’s clear instructions on how to exchange goods for loyalty, build forts, and encourage evangelization, Pardo became entangled in Indian rivalries and relations. During Pardo’s first expedition, Sergeant Moyano, who had stayed with a small force at Joara to build fort San Juan, defied orders and allied with Joara in attacks against Coosa/Chiscas. These raids had serious consequences during Pardo’s second voyage.

As Pardo approached Coosa territory, an Indian entered his camp to inform the Spanish of the impending danger. It was midnight when this unnamed Indian entered the village of Satapo and summoned Guillermo Ruffín, the party’s interpreter; this Indian demanded an axe, and once payment was received, he revealed that the Coosa planned to ambush the Spanish party, letting Pardo also know that the Spanish had been traveling the long way to Coosa: there was an easier and faster route. This brief encounter revealed that Pardo was willing to pay for what this Indian had to say: Indian knowledge, like furs or corn, was a valuable commodity. Furthermore, the axe given as payment was a highly-coveted and not-often bestowed European good. By asking for this high price, this Indian had revealed, without divulging any of the particulars, the importance of his message; his request had also hinted at the existence of a recognizable exchange rate, in which the value of communication fluctuated with its connection to Spanish survival.

48 Ibid., 52, see footnote 3.
The message Pardo received had three related components: an attack was a coming, the Spanish were going to be denied access to Indian corn, and there was a shorter route leading to Coosa. These three warnings— safety, food, and paths—underscored Pardo’s complete reliance on Indians as well as Spanish inability to properly decipher the intentions of these individuals upon whom the Spanish depended on. After all, Indians supposedly allied with the Spanish were the ones leading Pardo and his men to danger.

The Indian’s message also reminded the Spanish that there were consequences for their actions. There was a living memory among Indians for abuses committed by the Spanish, be they Moyano’s attacks of the previous years or Hernando de Soto’s violent entrada of 1540. The Indians’ memories of this violence often surprised the Florida explorers; the Spanish might have learned little from their earlier entradas, but the Indians remembered. Spanish actions would echo long beyond their immediate effect—what the Spanish did, not merely what they described, mattered.

Pardo was thankful for this man’s warning and tried to prepare for the coming danger. Pardo trusted the Indian because he had requested payment for his services, and the Spaniard believed that a real commodity, like this man’s news, required real payment. Pardo nonetheless decided to test the veracity of the warning by calling the cacique of the town. Pardo asked him to give him certain Indians who were needed to carry certain burdens. The cacique dissimulating, made as if to go seek the Indians and after a while he came and he did not bring a one, giving excuses which occurred to him, by which the captain understood and saw that what the Indians had told him was true. Since the cacique refused to aid the Spanish, Pardo dubbed him a liar. Pardo gathered his men and “told them how he had learned that the cacique of that place… and Coosa and other caciques, with their Indians had agreed to kill him and his company.” Pardo heeded the warning of this Indian and the Relación makes mention of the Indian’s role, but neither gives much agency to this unnamed Indian. Although Pardo had first learned of this attack via an Indian informer, it was the Spaniard’s test that had confirmed the report. Pardo had transformed conjecture into reality. He then credited himself- “how he had learned” of the caciques true intentions- with being able to uncover impending danger.

Pardo had turned this Indian’s incomplete news into information to be included in the Relación. The official report also downplayed the importance of this Indian; never listing the name or tribal affiliation of this individual who, in the hush of night, saved Pardo and his men. Pardo’s expedition was part of a Spanish effort to begin surveying and controlling the territory of La Florida, and although Indians were seen as an important part of that world, their role in helping the Spanish understand it was much more uncertain. Pardo and the Relación became interpretive filters, determining who,

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51 Ibid.
how, and what could be trusted and deemed an official representation of La Florida. While Indians were ever present, participating, guiding, and feeding Spanish efforts to reconnoiter the interior, the Spanish were the only ones capable of creating information, distancing Indians from the final product describing their very presence.

When Governor Gonzalo Méndez de Canço sent Gaspar de Salas to Tama in 1597, the governor ordered that “the very particular information of the aforementioned land’s disposition, [be learned] be means by way of the caciques.” Salas, who was chosen for the task because he knew the land and spoke Guale, was encouraged to learn “by way of the caciques.” Though compiling information from Indians was necessary, it was not sufficient. Salas still had to take what he had learned and give it a shape, putting it in a form the Spanish governor would recognize. Thus, after Salas spoke with the caciques, he was ordered to “communicated it [his findings] with the most experienced people that could be found in the presidio,” and after they had been conferred, they “would send [the governor] a Relation of everything.” The Indians could be called and interviewed, but “the Relation of everything” sent to the governor was comprised of information filtered by the “most experienced” people.

The “most experienced people” did more than merely describe the tierra adentro and its inhabitants. Through a combination of knowledge, expertise, and status, they could interpret and infer from what they knew. These were the men called to testify by Don Fernando Valdés, son of the governor of Cuba, who in 1602 arrived in San Agustín with orders to evaluate the state of the colony. With royal Cédula in hand, Valdés summoned military personnel, prominent citizens, government officials, and members of the clergy; besides their gender, the quality that bound these 18 colonists together was their “experience.” Excluding the Fathers, on average, the men who testified about the conditions of Florida had over 20 years of service and experience in the colony—service and experience were related, but distinct criteria. While the first emphasized established connections to the colonial structures, like the government or military, the second hinted at the individual success within those institutions. The elite group of men called to testify in 1602 had mastered both. Social context was not absent from information, but indicative of it.

By this logic, the most experienced men were the ones who could provide the best information. Pedro Ibarra, who was governor of Florida immediately following Valdés’ trial, certainty thought so. Ibarra was particularly interested in settling Tama, the land surveyed by both Salas and Pardo. The governor became increasingly frustrated as inconsistent reports about this region reached his desk. In the forty years following Pardo’s expeditions, waves of epidemics, tense relations with Spanish friars (which had turned to violence during the 1597 Guale Rebellion), and internal pressures had affected

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52 Serrano y Sanz, Documentos Historicos De La Florida Y La Luisiana, Siglos Xvi Al Xviii, 141-60 Documeto 2: Relación de La Tama y su tierra... Nov 9, 1598.
53 Primary source found in: Charles W. Armade, "Florida on Trial, 1593-1602," Hispanic American Studies, no. 16 (1959).
54 In July of 1602 Méndez de Canzo sent Juan Lara, a 34 year veteran, to the area explored by Juan Pardo, and on May 22, 1610 Ibarra sent Sgt. Francisco de Salazar y Cuñiga to spy on the English (Jamestown), Reel 9, Stetson Collection.
the governing and structuring of Guale and Mocama.\textsuperscript{55} The reports the governor received were conflicting because Tama itself had been changing. But Ibarra thought his status and experience would give him clairvoyance, enabling him to produce a true \textit{informe}. The governor visited Tama in last months of 1604; he lavished prominent caciques with gifts (including iron tools) and inquired about the state of land, its people, and their treatment by Spanish friars.\textsuperscript{56} Although Ibarra’s stated objective was to become more knowledgeable of the region, his gathering of information did much to strengthen his position and power among the Indians—especially vis-à-vis the authority of the friars.\textsuperscript{57} By gathering the information himself, Ibarra sought to better understand and thus control the region, its inhabitants (Indians and Spanish alike), and their often violent interactions. He was not the only governor to think this way.

In 1666, Governor Don Francisco de la Guerra y Vega, also frustrated at “the very different reports” from the Apalachee port, decided “to personally go reconnoiter” the area and “by means of his experience... secure with precision and individuality” the needed information. The soldiers who had produced the earlier reports had recalled only scattered details through “experience not science;” the governor, self-described as possessing the most “science and military experience,” could synthesize those details and create a “true report” worthy of the crown’s attention.\textsuperscript{58} Through their discerning gazes, both Ibarra and Guerra y Vega provided their own accounts of Florida, which would be accurate and true because they were produced by the highest of authorities.

The problem of course was that not all discerning gazes saw from the same vantage point. In Spanish Florida, the military government, rooted in San Agustín, and the religious authorities, the main Spanish presence in the interior, tended to view their situations very differently. Although Menéndez de Avilés, the Adelantado to the colony, had coupled his initial foray into Florida with advocacy for a strong missionary presence, the tensions between the military and religious powers were present from the colony’s founding.\textsuperscript{59} In one of the earliest and most disastrous missionary expeditions, Jesuits

\textsuperscript{55} John E. Worth, \textit{The Struggle for the Georgia Coast: An 18th-Century Spanish Retrospective on Guale and Mocama} ([New York]; Athens: American Museum of Natural History; distributed by the University of Georgia, 1995), 12.; Milanich, \textit{Florida Indians and the Invasion from Europe}, 216.

\textsuperscript{56} Pedro de Ybarra, AGI, SD Legajo 224, Folio 658-920, Full Legajo Reel 1 28-B, PKY.

\textsuperscript{57} Hoffman, \textit{Florida’s Frontiers}, 93, Relations with the friars had been tense since the 1597 revolt. “At the height of the dispute, Ibarra claimed that he had told the Indians, ‘I am your governor, they [the friars] are not!’”

\textsuperscript{58} The governor sent to invesitage if “combieno o no fortificar el Puerto de Apalachee... [y lo que recibe son] noticias muy diferente de lo que por experiencia yo vi de: yendo personalmente...” and unlike the “hombres que navegan algunas veces al Puerto de Apalache: no es asegurar la presision y yndividualidad que su Mag mando si solo de la entrada o salida del Rio y en esto no obserban todo lo que deben poser nabegantes de costumbre sin ciencia y lo que su M manda pido siencia y experiencia milita.” 15 June 1666, Reel 12, Stetson Collection AGI 54-1-20 bnd 1621.

\textsuperscript{59} Mercado, ed. Pedro Menéndez De Avilés, Cartas Sobre La Florida (1555-1574), 196 15 October 1566 “Por una parte, recibí grandísimo content de ver lo bien que el rey Nuestro Señor nos socorrió.” While the government could play a role in improving Spanish hold in the region, Menéndez believed that the Catholic faith would be the most appropriate ambassador to the Southeast. In one of his earliest letters to the King, Menéndez expressed his conflicting emotions upon the arrival of a supply vessel. “In some regard, [I] received the greatest of pleasure at seeing how well the King, our Lord, had come to our aid; and in the other, I became saddened and lost when I saw that no one had arrived from the Society of Jesus [the Jesuits], or anyone with religious learning.” Not all future Florida governors would agree with Menéndez’s approach. Some, like Damián de Vega Castro y Pardo and Diego de Rebolledo, would actually blame the
Father Juan Baptista de Segura had led a small party to Chesapeake Bay (1570-1), a site he had carefully selected because it was populous and, more importantly, removed from the secular and military authority of San Agustín. Segura soon realized the danger of his decision. Abandoned by their Indian guide, unable to secure other Indian allies, and away from the presidio’s protection, the Jesuit mission quickly disintegrated—a failure that emphasized the purposeful lack of cooperation between the church and the military-gubernatorial body of San Agustín. The untimely death of this expedition’s members, however, was not enough to defuse the power struggles between the government and the church.

Both sides went out of their way to portray the other in a negative light. The Fathers argued that they were the ones who best understood the situation of la tierra adentro; risking their lives to settle in Indian country and reside with native populations, the missionaries were the ones who had rightful authority in (and over) the Florida interior. In his 1630 Memorial intended to serve as a recruitment tool for Florida, Fray Francisco Alonso de Jesus argued that the church had succeeded in places the government had not. “[E]vident from the histories of… the most noble knight, Pedro Menéndez… who won out over the French,” but abandoned the interior, eventually defeated by “the harshness of the land, the ferocity of the natives, [and] the little or no help from the Spaniards.” Where the harsh land and fierce Indians had toppled even the bravest governor, the Franciscans stood as Florida’s best and only hope. Their steadfast determination had transformed Guale, Timucua, and Apalachee into places of “unbelievable devotion and notable spiritual benefit.”

The Franciscans not only portrayed San Agustín’s governors as lacking the needed perseverance and understanding, but also attacked them for their meddlesome interference. The friars accused the governors of fabricating information, “it is widely-known that in this province a governor can make the information he wants.” In turn, the governors criticized the Fathers for using their pulpits to rally against the government and creating discontent among the Indian populations. In one instance, Governor Ibarra accused Father Bermerjo of “rais[ing] anxieties,” and reminded the priest that for all his insistence that he “and not another [could] order” the Indians, it was actually Ibarra who was in charge. During Valé’s 1602 inquiry into the state of the colony, the Franciscans were the harshest critics of Méndez de Canço’s administration, while the governor and his cronies pointed to the Guale uprising that had occurred only five earlier as a clear evidence of the missionaries’ shortcomings. San Agustín’s government and the Catholic Church saw each other more as competitors, than allies.

But these were more than petty disagreements; this was a competition for power, a fight that hinged on who was best suited to interpret unfolding events, evaluate the

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61 “Como si fuera notorio que en estas partes hace un gobernador las informaciones que quiere.” “Carta de los religiosos de la provincial de Santa Elena a SM…” September 10 and Oct 6, 1657. Lowery Collection, PKY.
62 “Carta de los religiosos de la provincial de Santa Elena a SM…” September 10 and Oct 6, 1657. Lowery Collection, PKY.
63 Arnade, "Florida on Trial, 1593-1602."
viable options, and decide what mattered most in Florida. Secular and religious leaders vied for this position, arguing that their vantage point afforded them the best information about the land, people, and struggles that made and challenged colonial Florida. Information was regarded as official and true because only important and experienced people made it; but in the power struggles between the Franciscan Fathers and the presidio’s governors, both sides could cite experience and importance—both had a right to and a stake in the developments of the Florida interior. While it comes as no surprise that these competing authorities often produced conflicting accounts, it was during moments of internal dissent that secular and religious officials discussed their roles as informers and their power to “hacer información,” make information.64

![Map of Main Timucua Towns](image)

Figure 1.5—Main Timucua Towns

The 1656 Timucua Rebellion was one such moment. The causes of this Indian uprising can be traced to the combination of increased demand of Indian labor and reduced goods from San Agustín. Although Timucuas had suffered a devastating epidemic in 1655, San Agustín not only continued to impose labor and military requirements, but also decreased the payments, in terms of both goods and ceremony,

64 These debates were not always between secular and religious bodies. While there is less evidence available about the internal squabbles among the friars, there are many accounts of tensions within government ranks. From the Adelantado Menéndez de Avilés, who worried about the sworn testimonies from munitions soldiers, to the residencias of pivotal government officials, government authority was routinely challenged.
rendered to Timucua chiefs. As Governor Diego Rebolledo courted the more lucrative relations with the strategically located Ais and the corn-producing Apalachee, Timucua caciques, like Lucás Menéndez, were denied gifts and goods as they were simultaneously ordered to provide 500 men to protect San Agustín. Lucás Menéndez refused to be disrespected in this manner and, by choosing not to comply with the repartimiento, provoked the uprising.

The rebellion started in western Timucua, and quickly spread through Utina, Yustaga, and Potano. The Timucua attacks were not random: the Indians went after the military government, leaving the Franciscans alone and alive. While in the Guale revolt of 1597 or the Apalachee uprising of 1647, Indians had specifically targeted Franciscans for their impositions and restrictions to Indian life, Timucuas went after government officials and soldiers. Rebolledo spent several months trying to launch retaliatory raids, and by November of 1656, he had organized a force of 60 Spanish and 200 Apalachee. Scattered fighting by Indians and Spanish soldiers raged for months and, in the end, the Spanish hung six of the most prominent Timucua chiefs, destroyed or removed towns, and emptied missions.

The Timucua Revolt had shown that native leaders could and would resort to violence to oppose Spanish policies they found intrusive or discordant with their own structures. But by revealing their strength, Timucuas also exposed the deep divisions which ran through Spanish Florida, divisions that were clear to Spanish and Indians alike. This revolt fueled a frantic search by both Rebolledo and the leading friars, like Alonso del Moral and Fray Miguel Garçon de los Cobos, to produce a report of the uprising, an official informe of what had happened and, most importantly, who bore responsibility.

In 1657, Rebolledo visited the Timucua and Apalachee towns, producing a one-hundred and thirty page report of testimony and observations. Although the uprising had occurred mostly in Timucua, he spent a month in Apalachee and only a week in Timucua. In Apalachee, the governor inquired after the causes of the revolt, and discovered that most Indians, or at least those he had interviewed, found the mission system oppressive and abusive; these Indians welcomed Spanish soldiers and the building of a fort. Rebolledo’s much briefer visit to Timucua yielded different results. Finding a general hostility toward the government, the governor chose not to inquire about the rebellion; he focused instead on local concerns, such as labor requirements.

Unsurprisingly, the friars spent more time in Timucua. The Franciscans gathered testimonies and grievances that rallied against the government. They argued that the Indians, afraid of the government’s potential retribution, had lied to Rebolledo; the Indians who had recently rebelled wanted less, not more Spanish forces in the area. The

66 This fort, Fort San Marcos de Apalachee would be build much later: see Chapter 5.
friars tried to show that it was the soldiers’ presence and the government abuses that had caused the revolts and, standing in Timucua, the friars’ assessments rang true.  

Rebolledo, on the other hand, insisted that his military efforts in Apalachee had prevented the wildfire spread of the revolt and, viewed from Apalachee, these claims were also true. After the rebellion, Rebolledo sought to reorganize Timucua, its missions, and its leadership. Before the 1656, the Timucua missions, unlike the ones in Guale or Apalachee, were scattered and connected to the Camino Real only by Indian trials; the governor wanted to change this and place all Timucua missions on a single Spanish road. Located between the grain producing region of Apalachee and San Agustín, the Timucua Missions were integral to the movement of corn from the tierra adentro to the presidio. Since the uprising had shown Timicua’s potential for interference with the distribution of food, the governor began advocating that the missions needed to be more clearly and directly connected to San Agustín and to the government.

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68 [Franciscan] Petición [to Rebolledo], August 4, 1657; See also Visita del lugar [San Antonio] de Bacuqua, January 19, 1657; Visita del lugar de San Pedro de Patalí, January 19, 1657; Visita del lugar de San Juan de Azpalaga, January 22, 1657, AGI Escribanía de Cámara, Legajo 155, Stetson Collection, also in A. M. Brooks, *The Unwritten History of Old St. Augustine, Copied from the Spanish Archives in Seville, Spain*, by Miss A. M. Brooks and Tr. By Mrs. Annie Averette (St. Augustine: The Record Co., 1909), 102-05.

69 Milanich, *The Timucua*, 111.
But as Rebolledo moved to reorganize the region to better suit the needs of the military government, he met a new opposition. Franciscans, like del Moral and Garçón de los Cobos, traveled through Apalachee trying to discredit the governor’s efforts. These Fathers went as far as encouraging Apalachee men to “withdraw” from Spanish military efforts. Father Provincial San Antonio conducted his own reports of Apalachee, and found that soldiers were not regarded as kindly as Rebolledo had described. Fray Alonso de Moral argued that “said governor [Rebolledo] made information (which he called visita) against the religious men,” which instead of investigation the situation, actually “described his [governor’s] ill will and opposition he harvested against the ministers of god for instead of trying to find the guilty among the living, he conducted residencia against the dead.” Testimony against testimony, and report against report, the governor and the Franciscans battled over the cause, meaning, and aftermath of the Timucua revolt until Rebolledo’s death in 1657. There were no clear winners in these debates, only contentious competitors. Though information was supposed to be complete and truthful, there was no uniform or inclusive voice that spoke for Florida.

**A Changing Network**

The 1656 Timucua uprising hinted at an important change. The request for 500 men that the cacique Lucás Menéndez had so angrily refused had not been a capricious demand on Rebolledo’s part. The governor wanted these Indians to protect the Spanish presidio from an imminent English threat. English vessels had been seen near Apalachee and rumors of an English attack quickened the most steady of Spanish hearts. Though Rebolledo’s defensive maneuver came ten years later too early, English interest and militancy in the region began increasing in the mid-seventeenth century.

In 1668, the feared English attack materialized. The pirate Robert Searles surprised San Agustín in the early morning hours, causing serious damage to the city’s fortifications, showing that this garrison’s defenses could be easily breached. But the worst was yet to come. In 1670, three vessels from Barbados reached what the Spanish considered the northern Florida coast and established Charles Town, the most southern English port in North America.

The permanent English settlement in South Carolina would reshape the practices and expectations that had defined the Southeast since the founding of San Agustín. For Florida, a permanent, aggressive, and expansive English colony located within 80 leagues of its main settlement meant that external threats were no longer sporadic events, but the

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71 Cartas de los religiosos,(September 20 and October 6), 1655 Lowery Collection, Bancroft “hico dicho gobernador una informacion (la quien llama visita) contra los religiosos, ocacion en que describe su mala intencion y oposicion en que tiene a los ministros de Dios pues no se contenta con culpar en ellas a los vivos sino que pasa residencia en los muertos.”

72 September 18, 1657 bnd 1475 58-1-26, Stetson Collection, Reel 12

73 Lowery Collection, Bancroft.

74 Ethridge, ed. *The Transformation of the Southeastern Indians, 1540-1760*, Introduction. Ethridge explains that while there are several reasons as to why the Southeast was transformed, she believes that the adaptation/incorporation of European practices, in particular the English Plantation system, was the most transformative force in the Southeast.
expected norm. Thus, English presence re-ignited the Spanish preoccupation with and need for news, relegating official informes to brief moments of diplomacy or peace. But this growing need for news was coupled with a drastic decline and reorganization of the native populations in the Southeast, especially debilitating those groups who lived in Guale— the “debatable land” between Charles Town and San Agustín. The close connection the Spanish had drawn between nuevas and Indians was placed in jeopardy, compromising Florida’s access to news exactly at a time when knowing the latest held the key to survival.
Chapter 2: “To know if it is true...”¹ Spies, Sentinels, and Prisoners of War as Informers

“And although it is true that all this time I have spent seeking for people knowledgeable of those provinces [South Carolina], I have not found one... capable of informing me of those territories with any detail.”²

—Antonio Argüelles to Governor Manuel de Cendoya, 1671

Officials in Spanish Florida knew that in 1670 English colonists had landed and settled a town within seventy leagues of San Agustín. The Spanish knew that the English had brought guns, African slaves, and a readiness for trade. The Spanish also knew that Spain and England were at peace, and that the neighboring colonies were bound to respect that accord.³ But as English traders ventured into the interior and southeastern Indians moved to secure the newly available goods (in particular firearms), the Spanish began to realize that they did not know nearly enough about South Carolina. And what was even more troubling, the ways in which the Spanish had gathered nuevas and información were becoming inefficient and increasingly unsuccessful.

In the 1670s and 80s, Spanish settlers, territory, and allies became casualties of English expansion. Finding people “capable of informing” San Agustín officials “with any detail” of South Carolina’s plans turned into a complicated, if not dangerous endeavor. Although establishing communication networks had never been easy, the settlement of South Carolina forced the San Agustín government reconsider both their strategies for obtaining nuevas and the priority they placed on this increasingly valuable commodity. The chapter describes how the Spanish created a new network of information that, instead of being rooted in a set place, consisted of mobile and trusted informers. Through spies, sentinels, and prisoners of war San Agustín officials tried to make sense of a world that was quickly spinning out of their control. As the Spanish developed new ways to acquire and evaluate the intelligence they needed, the once distinct categories of news and information became conflated. This chapter argues that this conceptual reorganization coupled with the new information-seeking approaches employed show the adaptability, resilience, and ingenuity of the Spanish and their Indian allies, especially Indian groups in the Guale region. Although traditionally the historiography has described Spanish Florida as incapable of coping with English pressures and the Guale

¹ “Para saber si es cierto,” in Testimonio de Antonio Argüelles in letter from Governor Manuel de Cendoya to the Queen, October 31, 1671, AGI 58-1-26 bnd 1741, Reel 13, Stetson Collection, PKY. The Spanish seems to be using the substantive information, rather than the process, “informing.”
² “y aunque es verad que e procurando en todo este tiempo lo buscar personas practicas de aquellas provincias no las he allado... capaces de que me yinformacion de aquellos terenos con individualidad.” Melchor Portocarrero to Francisco Salazar, September 15, 1683. AGI 58-1-37/1 bnd 2342, Reel 16, Stetson Collection, PKY.
merely as victims of English backed slaving raids, through the lens of information, the power of Spanish Florida and, more importantly, its Indian allies becomes evident.\textsuperscript{4}

**As Allies Become Foes**

In May 1680, an impressive force of Chichimecos (Westo),\textsuperscript{5} Yuchi,\textsuperscript{6} and Chiluques\textsuperscript{7} attacked the Mission San Buenaventura de Guadalquini (on St. Simons Island). They killed Spanish, Tama, and Yamasee who resided within the mission area; while some of the victims were Catholic Indian converts, many were refugees, escaping earlier Chichimeco raids. For over five years, the Westos, aligned with and armed by South Carolinians, had wreaked havoc in Spanish Florida. A Chisca woman who had been enslaved by the Chichimecos came to San Agustín with tales of her captivity and details of Westo-English dealings. This Chisca Indian reported that the English were not only in Westo towns, but they were also providing these Indians with guns and ammunitions—she had been sold for “an escopeta” (rifle).\textsuperscript{8} Though the English described the Westos as “warlike” and “Man eaters,” Florida’s governor believed that the English were the ones at fault. Through their goods and requests for slaves, South Carolina had been encouraging, if not orchestrating, the attacks against Spanish holdings.\textsuperscript{9}

The Spanish archive from this period is filled with records of displaced Indian groups, fleeing populations, and harrowing testimonies of destruction. In January of 1680, just months before the destruction of the Mission de Guadalquini, a group of Yamasee refugees poured into the mission San Antonio de Anacape (on the St. John’s River). Although Yamasee, along with Tama, Mocama, and Timucuan groups, had previously sought protection in Spanish missions, the Mission of San Antonio was located thirty leagues south of San Agustín. This was the furthest south any group seems to have relocated. These refugees were a long way from home, a home that was no longer safe. Chichimeco raids had pushed Yamasee as well as other groups deep into Spanish Florida.

When the Westo attackers fell upon the Mission de Guadalquini, Florida’s Governor Pablo de Hita y Salazar did not hesitate to blame the English. Though he had no clear evidence to support his allegation that South Carolinians had been involved in this particular incident, Florida’s experiences during the previous decade seemed only to corroborate the governor’s accusations. The English weapons wielded by the Westos, Yuchis, Chiluques, and other Indians who attacked Spanish holdings were a troubling sign for Florida. South Carolina’s Indian policy belied English declarations of peace and amity. Though the 1670 Treaty of Madrid had required the Spanish to recognize English

\textsuperscript{4} Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade, the Rise of the English Empire in the American South 1670-1717*, 40-69.
\textsuperscript{5} Bowne, *The Westo Indians, Slave Traders of the Early Colonial South*.
\textsuperscript{6} Later identified as Creeks, see Galgano, *Feast of Souls: Indians and Spaniards in the Seventeenth-Century Missions of Florida and New Mexico*, 101.
\textsuperscript{7} Later identified as Yamasee see Ibid., 101.
\textsuperscript{9} Nicholas Careteret, “Collections of the South Carolina Historical Society,” (Charleston: South Carolina Historical Society, 1897), 165.
Carolina and pursue peaceful relations with their Anglo neighbor, the Spanish governor insisted that English policies, especially English-Indian relations, were not conductive to a peaceful Southeast. South Carolina disregarded Spanish allies and land claims; the Treaty of Madrid confirmed English strength, not its cooperation.

But the English attacks were just one of the many challenges Florida faced. Since the 1647 revolt, the Spanish had experienced tense relations with the inhabitants of Guale, the land in between San Agustín and Charles Town. As both the mission list of 1655 and the 1675 Residencia by Bishop Calderón indicate, despite major efforts to rebuild the area, Guale’s population had declined significantly. Threatened on two fronts, dwindling populations of converts and increased raids by Indian-English forces, the Spanish attempted to consolidate their holdings in Guale. Instead of scattered missions and settlements along Georgia’s coastal island, the Spanish wanted Guale Indians to be relocated to three main missions closer to San Agustín: Santa María (on Amelia Island), San Juan (Ft. King George Island), and San Pablo, sometimes labeled San Juan (on St. John’s Island). The missions would thus be much closer to the main Spanish garrison and to one another. Not all Guale populations agreed to this relocation; but when Spanish pressure failed, English attacks and Indian raids proved persuasive. Juan Márquez Cabrera, governor from 1680-1687, was pleased by this relocation.\(^\text{10}\) Having Catholic Indians closer to the Spanish presidio meant that an invading force would have a difficult time sneaking-up on San Agustín and, in the event of an attack, the Spanish could respond faster and distribute aid with more ease. Unless, of course, the attack came from within.

By 1685 there were close to 2,000 Yamasees living near Santa Elena (northern Georgia). Yamasees had allied with the Spanish and even sought refuge in Spanish missions. But they had never been missionized or willing to relocate closer to San Agustín. Furthermore, not all Yamasees lived near the Spanish; between 1683 and 1685 there were also Yamasees living among the Coweta and Cussitas. These groups of Yamasee had begun forming relations with English traders who had been venturing into the interior.\(^\text{11}\) For all the Spanish efforts to relocate Indians in Guale away from the English, the Yamasees had been developing their own networks that linked the coast to the interior, connected different Indian groups together, and even moved across Spanish and English territories.

As Westo-South Carolina relations began to sour, Yamasees positioned themselves as a probable and strong ally for the well-supplied English. Even before Charles Town began officially trading with Yamasees, the Scottish colony established in Port Royal readily welcomed Yamasee alliances and skins.\(^\text{12}\) To the dismay of the San Agustín, the Yamasee sought an alliance with the new settlers. And in March of 1685, the cacique Altamaha led a Yamasee attack against the Mission Santa Catalina de Ahoica. John Chaplin, an Indian trader from Port Royal, reported that “[A]rms and other things

\(^{10}\)“Es tanto junto al presidio y amparados [y] de corta comunicazion de las demas fuera facil con que se allaron estas probincias y presiodo con mas fuerza para lo que se fuera de sus defensas …” October 6, 1685, AGI 54-5-15/94bnd 2446, Reel 17, Stetson Collection, PKY.


\(^{12}\) This trade caused tensions among English factions. Lord Cardross in Stuart Town and Governor Morton in Charles Town each vied to control the Indian trade.
[were] delivered to the Yamasee, and that they are gone against the Timechoes [Timucuas]... [and] a great booty is expected from the Timechoes.” Chaplin’s prediction was right on target. The Yamasee killed over fifty Timucuas, including a Spanish friar, and brought 22 Spanish Indians as slaves for the Scots.  

13 Yamasees, who had been friendly to Spanish efforts and even refugees within Florida, had suddenly become a powerful foe.

This pattern soon repeated itself; the Spanish lost allies, while their enemies multiplied. As Spanish Guale shrunk, its reduction to a handful of small missions seemed only to encourage more English aggression. Although the Spanish desperately tried to learn of coming attacks and plan accordingly, the only certain reports they received seem to come too late. Refugees and runaway Indian slaves reached San Agustín’s gates with tales of suffering and destruction.  

14 Not only were the Spanish losing land, allies, and influence, but all their news seem to come from people who were at a loss themselves. Florida officials scrambled to secure better positioned allies and establish an easier and more reliable way to remain informed. The Spanish who had once separated quick reports (nuevas) from detailed dispatches (información), now just spoke of their need to know.

The Spanish needed to know about South Carolina, about its strength, its weaponry, and, most importantly, its intentions. South Carolina’s power grew, and with it, Spanish interest in their English neighbor. Yet increased interest did not lead to increased access. English expansion was coupled by a contraction of Florida’s land, allies, and thus Spanish ability to obtain news. In a deadly combination for Florida, the Spanish lost their ability to learn the latest intelligence at a time when information was needed the most. Unable to retain Indian alliances or establish a clear physical hold over their territory, the Spanish searched for alternative ways to remain informed. Spanish officials turned to spies, sentinels, and prisoners of war to uncover the latest news regarding South Carolina. Though there was nothing new about spies, sentinels, or prisoners of war, their role as bearers and interpreters of news expanded and diversified from 1670 to 1690.

“‘We Must Send Spies’”

To uncover English plans and intentions, the Spanish employed spies. Reconnaissance missions required very little overhead and, if successful, could furnish the Spanish with important news. From acquiring specific details (such as the number of armed men in town or the types of ships in the Charles Town harbor) to gaining insight into the larger English strategy (when and how attacks were to unfold), undercover agents were instrumental in shaping what the Spanish knew of their neighbor colony. These men and women were instructed to observe and listen; through sight and sound, they had to be

14 San Agustín officials, like Sergeant Major Domingo de Leturiondo (appointed Defender of the Indians), reported on the destruction and attacks in Guale. For destruction of Guale see, Worth, The Struggle for the Georgia Coast: An 18th-Century Spanish Retrospective on Guale and Mocama.
15 “Hay que mandar espias,” Nicolas Ponce de León report on Cédula, July 8, 1673, AGI 58-1-26/23, bnd 1837, Reel 13, Stetson Collection, PKY.
able to discern not only what changes were taking place, but if those changes mattered. Intelligencers had to make sense of the disruption and chaos that from 1670 through the first two decades of the eighteenth-century consumed the Southeast— they had to receive (and send) a clear message through all the static and interference clouding the region. Informers had to differentiate the relevant threats among the larger perils.

San Agustín officials relied on both Spanish and Indian spies. The Spaniards who served in this capacity tended to also operate in other official capacities. Spanish agents were diplomats, soldiers, friars; these men traveled into English lands with legitimate reasons, such as to sign a treaty, negotiate the release of captives, or serve as an interpreter. Yet once they entered English territory with an official excuse, they engaged in clandestine reconnaissance. Spanish espionage, however, was no great secret to South Carolinians. Whenever an envoy from Florida reached Charles Town, English officials would send warnings to guard against any unwelcomed Spanish observations or activities. In addition, the English issued strict guidance limiting the access of San Agustín’s delegation. South Carolina had rules, for example, about whether Spanish officials could be allowed to disembark from their vessel or about how many (and if any) could enter Charles Town.16

Indian agents, on the other hand, were much harder for the English to properly identify. In the early decades of settlements, Charles Town officials often failed to grasp both the risks of Indian undercover agents and the proper ways to monitor them. Indians were usually able to move between Spanish and English spaces without arousing much suspicion.17 Indian hired by the Spanish to reconnoiter were therefore not sent on or with official envoys; their main role was to infiltrate English settlements.

Indian Spies

The employment and use of Indians to undercover details about South Carolina was, at first, fairly straightforward. The Spanish relied on Indian spies from groups like Guale, Escamacu, Yspo, Chiluque, and Yamasee (among others); these were Amerindians who lived in present day-Georgia. Their very location, between Spanish and English settlement, made these groups a natural choice to serve as informers. The Lieutenant of Guale, offered to reward Yspo Indians with clothing for any “noticias” they could bring regarding the English. Yspo Indians had been Spanish allies for a long time and, although not Christian, they had a history of peaceful interaction with Florida. Both Yspo and Spaniards stood to gain from this arrangement. Without traveling far or beyond their territory, Indians who resided in Guale found it easy and lucrative to bring to light English ventures, especially since the Spanish seemed all too eager to compensate their minor efforts. San Agustín officials, for their part, stood to learn about relevant developments.

In the early 1670s, it was Santa Elena Indians who confirmed that the raids in Apalachee were in fact the work of English armed Chichimecos (Westos). The Santa Elena who had provided the latest surveillance were nothing more than a group of men

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16 Job Hows, Journal of House Assembly, 1704, Nov. 6; and Francis Nicholson, June 5, 1724 Journals of the Commons House of Assembly, June 2, 1724- June 16, 1724 in SCDAH.
17 Baszile, "Communities at the Crossroads: Chiefdoms, Colonies, and Empires in Colonial Florida, 1670-1741", 118.
who, during one of their hunting expeditions, had stumbled upon a Chichimeco raiding party. Recognizing the danger at hand, the Santa Elena Indians had hurried back to their towns. In the comfort and relative safety of their towns, they reported their findings to the Santa Elena Lieutenant, who in turn sent an urgent message to San Agustín.\(^{18}\)

Spanish officials treated and understood Indian spies in the same manner they had Indians who carried *nuevas*. These informers were considered a “blank slate witnesses”— Indians were expected to “take” news in the way one would “take” a photograph and bring it back, devoid (supposedly) of the creator’s interference. It was the Spanish who were responsible for making judgments and interpretations based on the Indians’s observation. Although the Spanish no longer separated *nuevas* from *información*, they still tried to exert some authority on this Indian delivered news. San Agustín officials were the filter; they were what the distinguished, amidst all the noise and confusion, the true message.

These Santa Elena hunters possessed the three characteristics the Spanish sought in an Indian spy. First, they belonged to Indian nations whose friendship with or, at least, receptivity to Spanish interests were clear. Second, the Santa Elena hunters also needed little encouragement or incentive to observe English whereabouts— espionage required no major changes to their daily habits. The location of their lands and settlements simply exposed these men to important developments. The Spanish believed that exposure, as opposed to the active seeking-out of news, made these Indian observers less biased. And finally, these Indians had witnesses the enemy with their very eyes; their reports were based on what they themselves had seen. Not repetitions or corroborations, the news from these Indian came from firsthand experience.

While these criteria intended to prove both the veracity and objectivity of the news, they polluted the source. The Spanish might have tried to ignore the status or character of Indian spies, welcoming reports from a wide-array of Indians. But the fact that they were dependent on Indians who friendly with the Spanish or willing to establish bonds with San Agustín— actually, the very fact that the Spanish had established criteria to authenticate Indian reports— biased this very source.\(^{19}\)

But with the establishment of English settlements and trade relations, these criteria became a relic of the past. There were increasing complexities to relying on Indian reconnaissance. Trade and warfare engulfed the region, and Indians, regardless of their alliances, began feeling the devastation brought on by both. If native groups in the Santa Elena area had been instrumental to constructing Spanish understanding of both English plans and power, they were also some of the early victims of these plans and

\(^{18}\)Hita y Salazar to King, n.d. AGI-SD 839 folio 273-4, Reel 8 PKY “Y se vera por la razon que remite a los pies de VM de una delcaracion que hicieron unos Indios que vinieron de Santa Elena que dicen estuvieron en San Jorge que es a la parte de Guale de la Apalache dan razon otros Indios que estubier on en los Chichimecos que estan catorce or quince leguas de los Ingleses de ellos y esots estan de Apalachee treinta dias de camino todo senor de cuidado y mas quando estos estan tan solo y intratables de parte alguna otra que cuando viene el situado con los reigos que emos experimentado y a haver venido.”

\(^{19}\)This is contrasting to what is occurring in Mexico, see Sellers-Garcia, "Distant Guatemala: Reading Documents from the Periphery", 14; María Elena Martínez, *Genealogical Fictions: Limpieza De Sangre, Religion, and Gender in Colonial Mexico* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008), 91-122; Patricia Lopes Don, "Franciscans, Indian Sorcerers, and the Inquisition in New Spain, 1536-1543," *Journal of World History* 17, no. 1 (2006); Solange Alberro, *Inquisición Y Sociedad En Mexico, 1571-1700* (Mexico: Fondo de Culture Económica, 1987).
power. Indians gathering intelligence for the Spanish began having less direct access to the English; Florida officials were hard pressed to find any Indians who, without previous arrangement or incentive, had stumbled upon vital information about South Carolinians. Although the Spanish stressed that the reliability of these observers depended on their direct exposure to the enemy, increasingly Indians hired by the Spanish received their news secondhand. Before reaching the Spanish, news of South Carolina filtered through both the hired spy and the spy’s informants. In 1688, a Chacato Indian was hired to reconnoiter the region arrived at the Spanish garrison. At the same time, four Apalache Indian towns, Coweta, Tasquique, Casita, and Colome, sent delegates to San Agustín; these headmen had come to ask for “misericordia” (mercy) in the wake of San Jorge’s attacks (the Spanish name from Charles Town). The news brought by these headmen echoed the testimony of the Chacato agent. To make matters worse for the Spanish, the little news the paid Chacato informer had exposed about English activity had come not from his direct experience with South Carolinians, but rather from his dealings with other Indian towns. To learn of the five English vessels making their journey south, the Chacato Indian had conversed with Apalache leaders, much like the ones who were present in San Agustín. The Spanish hired spies in the hopes of obtaining this level of specificity and the ample warning it afforded Florida. But the fact that this Chacato man had relied on other Indians and had not uncovered the developments himself troubled Florida officials. The Spanish worried about the corruption of news as it moved from source to source.

As time went on, lacking firsthand accounts became only the least of problems for Indian hired to collect news. Indians, who had once been employed for their ability to move through the land, began to face additional obstacles. The lands as well as the people whom these Indians knew and relied upon were rapidly changing. Indians might have been able to walk into English settlement without arousing much suspicion, but traversing unknown or enemy Indian territory was a completely different ordeal. Indians traveling without companions and/or familial/social connections aroused suspicion. Indian spies had to begin concealing not only their intentions, but also their

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20 Governor Juan Cabrera to King. March 22, 1688, PKY Reel 9, AGI SD 839, Folio 492-94. The four Indian nations: Coweta, Tasquique, Casita, and Colome have asked for “misericordia” to deal with English attacks.

identities and affiliations. As Indians rallied against Indians, the success of any one informer depended on his ability to quickly discern enemy from foe, and to conceal his true identity.

San Agustín officials found themselves caught in a bind. On the one hand, the Indian whom the Spanish hired and who had a clear interest in protecting the Spanish well-being were poorly informed. Though loyal, or rather, because of their loyalty to Florida, these informers interacted less with the settlers of South Carolina and tended to not be attuned to English actions. On the other hand, though the Spanish could reach out to Indians who regularly interacted with the English, who thus were more knowledgeable, these Indians were not always trustworthy. The Spanish feared that relying on English Indians would encourage counter-espionage and potentially trigger an attack, since they enemy would be privy to insider information about San Agustín, its defenses, and weaponry. What was to prevent a Yamasee Indian hired to uncover information about the English from also spying on the Spanish?

The answer proved to be very little. Indians, such the Escamu, Chilique, Santa Elena, and Yspo, served as double agents for both English and Spanish interests. Living between two European powers that not only wanted to learn about the other, but were also willing to pay for news, Indians in the region of Santa Elena in Guale, previously controlled by the Spanish, began playing both sides. With little to lose and much to gain, Guale Indians began transforming Spanish and English need for news into personal leverage.

The cacica Pamini was one such Indian. As chieftainess of Yspo, a group who resided near Santa Elena, she fashioned herself into a broker of news. The Spanish eagerly received her reports of English activity. Living near Port Royal (Santa Elena), Pamini had easy access to both Spanish and English settlements. But San Agustín officials soon began to worry about the motivations behind Pamini’s espionage. The cacica’s visits to San Jorge and other English settlements seemed guided more by her desire to forge a friendship with South Carolina than by devotion to Florida. While she was supplying Florida with news, it was clear that Pamini was also developing other arrangements.

Though the cacica might have had closer ties with the English than San Agustín would have liked, the Spanish still found this information arrangement beneficial. Placing their worries aside, the Spanish still relied on Pamini’s reports. For a couple years, Pamini supplied Spanish and English officials with reports of the other and, in the meantime, secured trade and relative non-aggression from both sides. While the

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23 Almost no information exists on Yspo groups; they later seemed to have become part of the Yamasee. John E. Worth, "Yamasee Origins and the Development of the Carolina-Florida Frontier" (paper presented at the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, Austin, Texas, July 12, 1999). For details on Indian names see, Gene Waddell, Indians of the South Carolina Lowcountry, 1562-1751 (Columbia: University of South Carolina, Southern Studies Programs, 1980).

24 Two Yspo parties to San Agustín. The testimonies come from the first part, which arrived in August of 1671 and was led by Blauacacay and Barcoaminiy; the letter comes from Captain Pacheco of Guale and an interpreter: Joseph, who knew Yspo and Guale (and was Catholic). The first meeting’s emphasis is on the trustworthiness of the Yspo. The second meeting took place on Sept 9, 1671; Captain Pacheco summoned the Indians to Santa Catalina. Unlike the first meeting, the Spanish used the second meeting to gather as much news as possible. The Yspo reported on South Carolina’s growth and on the many “negros” that lived in San Jorge. Ten days after the meeting at Santa Catalina, the cacica herself traveled to San Agustín in order to display her sincere intentions to befriend the Spanish.

56
caica’s gains might not seem impressive, at a time when slaving raids decimated most of Guale, Pamini’s ability to establish peace was impressive. News was a powerful weapon—it was both the sword Pamini waved to announce her authority and the shield she wielded to protect her town.

But by 1672 her influence began to wane. First, Pamini was not the only Indian seeking leverage through news. The cacica herself appeared before Governor Manuel Cendoya to warn Florida of an impending English attack, but within months of her testimony a couple of Chiluque Indians came before Governor Cendoya and accused Pamini of lying. Pamini and her Yspo spies stood by their reports. The cacica had instructed the Yspo to remain alert for the “enemy’s designs,” and since “the enemy had grown in its population it had in San Jorge” and had established a new settlement in Port Royal, the Yspo had thought it prudent to alert San Agustín. The cacica had received these warnings and “with haste [went] to… give the news.”

The Yspo reports sounded threatening enough, but upon hearing the Chiluque protests and contradictory reports, the Spanish became skeptical. Chiluque Indians openly challenged Pamini, stating that she “had tricked [the Spanish] and the enemy had but one ship and one lancha [raft] at the port.” The English were much weaker than the cacica had insinuated. In fact, the Chiluque argued, it was the English who were in real danger; incapable of managing the land, weather, or local inhabitants, the English suffered daily as Indians raided their cattle and livelihood. Even more disturbing to San Agustín, the Chiluque accused the Yspo cacica, not the settlers in Port Royal, of inciting attacks against the Spanish in Santa Elena.

The more the Spanish waited for the English attack Pamini swore was coming, the more it seemed that the cacica had been playing with fire. By heightening the sense of tension between the Spanish and the English, Pamini would have also heightened her position as a news broker and obtained more goods for the important service she provided. Eventually the flame grew out of Pamini’s control. First the Spanish began mistrusting the cacica’s authority and then the English started questioning her intentions. Port Royal officials ceased to view Yspo reports as warnings, and began treating them as threats. Thus instead of rewarding her espionage efforts, the English threatened Pamini’s life and captured members of her family.

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25 Gov. Manuel de Cendoya to the Queen, Oct. 31, 1671 AGI 58-1-26 bnd 1741 PKY Stetson Collection Reel 13 “llegaron unos yndios y dijeron yban de parte de la cacica de ospo [Yspo] para que ymbiasen a avisar al senor gobernador de las nuevas de enemigo y disegnios… el enemio yba en aumento en la poblazion que tiene San Jorge”; “y que hay una poblacion nueva [Port Royal] y los indios fueron y vieron que habia muchos barcosy unos iban a San Agustin… a si les mando dicha casiza que en todo brevedad biniesen a dar las nuevas y asi llegaron a Guale al lugar de Santa Catalina en tres dias a toda prisa y al cavo de la ynfanteriaque esta alli le dio dicho aviso.”

26 Ibid, Testimonio de Antonio “tenian en su poblazion muchos navios gente y artilleria se detemino ymbiar espias para saber si era ciero.”

27 Letters from governor, March 24,1672, bnd 1759, 58-1-26 PKY Stetson Collection Reel 13; “y preguntados que habian oyo de por donde yban me dijo que no supo para donde yban”; “alborotados con los yndios de Cofarchiqui porque les andan matando las bacas y los cochinos”; The English “no tiene mas de cuatro palos alli puestos y otros pocos caydos en el suelo y diciendole que coo me engañaba dijo que la cacicade Yspo quando fue a ber a su señorla le abia enganadoen que abia tres castillos que no ay as que el que el dice.”

28 Ibid, she had already secured clothes for her reports on the English.

29 Manuel Cendoya to the Crown, March 24, 1672 AGI-SD 839 folio 273-4, Reel 8 PKY.
When she reappeared before the San Agustín governor, she lacked much of her former strength and was but a shadow of her former self. Pamini’s towns had been attacked by Westos and, unable to rally a military response, she eventually abandoned her settlement, her people, and thus her stance as ruler. She appeared before San Agustín seeking protection. The Spanish were at a loss. She had spied on the English as requested, but she had also lied, alienated the English, and comprised her ability as an informer. But in Pamini’s failure as a double spy, operating between Spanish and English interests, she succeeded in proving her devotion and loyalty to the Spanish. As San Agustín officials extended protection to Pamini, they recognized the sacrifice the Yspo cacica had made, welcomed her as refugee, all the while mourning the loss of a valuable informer.

In addition to lying and telling the truth, Indians also had another option. Indians could say nothing at all. The Spanish almost preferred Indians who provided incomplete and even faulty reports, to those who chose not to interact with San Agustín altogether. If an Indian group absented itself completely, their silence was interpreted mean as animosity. So just as detailed reports and partial news needed to be evaluated, silence also carried a deeper meaning. In his 1685 journey through Apalachicola, which the following chapter discusses in detail, lieutenant Antonio Matheos realized he had reached the end of the Spanish sphere of influence when the Indians he encountered moved and “labored cautiously.” Since Apalachicola Indians attempted to conceal their intentions from Matheos, the Spanish lieutenant suspected that these Indians had something to hide, mainly their growing relations with South Carolina. The Spanish had to learn to read through both common reports, like news of English violence, and absent information.  

**Spanish Spies**

Indians were not the only ones who gathered intelligence for the Spanish. Florida soldiers, diplomats, and even friars, also acted as double agents. Although Indians were hired specifically as “spies,” the Spanish officials who conducted espionage tended to have additional obligations. For example, diplomats sent to negotiate the release of Spanish prisoners held in Charles Town received additional instructions to reconnoiter enemy lands; or agents sent to establish peace with Apalachicola Indian groups were encouraged to “look around.” Although there was nothing surprising about the decision to turn any trip to Indian and English lands into an opportunity to gather information, the fact that the Spanish began issuing explicit orders about the need for espionage, regardless of the original purpose of the mission, hinted at both the increased need for

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news that dealt with the greater Southeast and the inability of Indians to serve as the sole bearers.

The English were aware of that Spanish presence could lead to espionage; hence South Carolinians tended to immediately dub any Spaniard moving through the Southeast suspicious. The South Carolinians issued a series of regulations about how to conduct exchanges with Spaniards in order to limit the danger of spying. The English established strict guidelines about how and when Spanish colonists could even enter English territory. As the House of Commons requested the governor, “We desire your Exec’y would be pleased to write again to the Government of St Augustine that he suffer none of the Spaniards to come to this Settlement by Land on Publick Ambassy’s or other Occasions & that in case they doe they will be restrained of their Liberty.” But for all their precautions and their threats of “restrained liberty,” South Carolinians knew they could do little to prevent a Spanish party traveling “by Land” from reconnoitering their colony.

The English blamed the additional information that Florida officials had gathered through spies and sentinels as the determining factor in the successful Spanish raid of Port Royal in 1686. According to the English, the Spanish had gathered enough information to undermine Port Royal’s defenses. The fact that South Carolina credited even some of Florida’s victory to the Spanish being better informed underscores the importance that both colonies placed on gathering news. Although the Port Royal attack seems like a natural extension of the animosity that had defined the relationship between Charles Town and San Agustín, the Spanish invasion seems to have truly surprised the settlers of Port Royal as well as Charles Town who were much more accustomed to being on the offensive, rather defensive end of conflicts.

The English recalled how, “the few Inhabitants of that Towne having scarcely given the Alurm to their Neighbors by fyring great guns, when the Spanish came running tho’ the woods.” With three vessels and a large force, the Spanish destroyed the southernmost English settlement in North America and caused personal damage to South Carolina’s governor—Joseph Morton lost his brother in law and his Edisto plantations. English efforts to retaliate proved futile. Captain Daniel, who led the counterattack, received “information that the Enemie was at” Captain Benjamin Blake’s plantation on Stono River (near Church flats), but when Daniel arrived at the reported location, the Spaniards, “were not there according to intelligence.” The English intelligence had either been tardy or wrong. South Carolina’s governor was then “positively informed by Two fugitives from the Spaniards… that the Enemye was on Edeston Island att Mr. Grimballs,” but after sending Stephen Bull with 100 men, the governor received a report that contradicted the two fugitives’ earlier testimony. It now seemed that the Spanish had been “at his new Plantacon near London” (which was in Willtown).

The English seemed to be embarked on an endless wild goose chase. Every time South Carolina soldiers received word of the Spanish army, the Spanish had either departed from that location days prior, “gone a day or two before in great hast

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32 June 12, 1724, Journals of the Commons House of Assembly, June 2, 1724- June 16, 1724, 33.
34 Ibid., 82.
35 Ibid., 84.
intelligence hearing of his pursuing,” or had, in fact, never been there. Not only did the Spanish seemed be better informed, always a step ahead, but the English also kept hurting their own chances by pursuing false reports. “Whilst these things [the Spanish attacks] were transacting,” the governor complained, “the expedition of the several parties was much impeded by frequent contrary and false intelligences together with continuall wet and windy weather.” 36 Chasing false rumors through uncooperative weather, the English could never capture their elusive neighbor.

In the 1686 attack, spies had provided San Agustín with an important advantage. Through both European and Indian informers, the Spanish had learned of the latest information about their English neighbors. In the bitterly contested terrain occupied by Spanish and English colonies, double agents were prevalent. Spies helped link together a malleable and flexible system—a system that attempted to accommodate to the changing circumstances. The diffuse nature of this network did not, however, affect its hierarchy. The Spanish still expected their agents to be directly connected, not to each other, but to a singular, central source: San Agustín. It was one thing to decentralize news acquisition, it was quite another to decentralize Spanish authority and decision-making. These reports could arrive in multiple of ways, but judgment was still expected to come from San Agustín. Yet, as the Yspo cacica had shown, agents could— and would— lie, exaggerate, and misinterpret news. Their personal bias and selective reports made these observers and informers indispensable but problematic informants.

“The Enemy… was seen by the sentinels” 37

Since the efforts of spies were necessary, but insufficient at satisfying the information needs of San Agustín’s, Spanish officials supplemented the intelligence acquired by espionage with reports from other informers. The employment of sentinels was nothing new to Spanish Florida and certainly not a product of English aggression. Spanish centinelas had been a fixture of Florida since the establishment of San Agustín in 1565. The adelantado Menéndez de Áviles viewed sentinels as vital monitors of the land, people, and potential dangers that surrounded the small Spanish population in Florida. Sentinels were stationed in scattered, but connected forts spread throughout the province. Removed from San Agustín, the particular position of these lookouts, which in theory made them privy to a great deal of news, in reality, exposed them to starvation, isolation, and fear. Most of the posts established by Menéndez were abandoned within the first months. By 1566, only three Spanish outposts remained. 38 Yet the early and dismal failures of these sentinels did not prevent subsequent governors from erecting outposts or employing a similar military strategy.

Sentinels tended to be Spanish soldiers with unquestioned loyalties to both the Catholic Crown and faith. Instead of being sent into the enemy territory, sentinel soldiers were often ordered to keep watch within Spanish land. Guarding the mouths of river

36Ibid., 84.
37“Los Enemigos… fueron vistos por las centinelas” July 10, 1685, AGI 58-2-6/1, bnd 2434, Reel 17, Stetson Collection, PKY.
38The first was San Agustín, which in 1565 was nothing more than half-finished wooden structures. The second was Matanzas; built on top of an existing French structure and a short distance from San Agustín. Much like its French predecessor, the Spanish fort in Santa Elena was also quickly abandoned.

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ways, they were supposed to keep track of the number of vessels sailing up and down the coast, monitor Indians allied with (or hostile towards) Florida, and report on the movements of new groups be they Indian or European.

Sentinels were nodes in a Spanish communication network that spanned the Southeast. Some lookouts were on the periphery of Spanish Florida, but the majority were strategically located along the coastlands between Spanish and English settlements. Spanish eyes and ears on the border between Florida’s territory and its uncertainty, sentinels were often the last warning in the event of war. Sentinels had to anticipate conflict, and were instructed to pay attention to the rhythms of the Southeast, noting fluctuations in the expected patterns of trade, migration, and movement.

Figure 2.1— Fots in Spanish Florida, 1565-1763 (John Worth)

39 “Maps of Spanish Florida,” John E. Worth (University of West Florida), accessed January 13, 2011, http://www.uwf.edu/worth/spanfla_maps.htm “Forts, 1565-1763. This map shows the known or projected locations of Spanish forts and military garrisons throughout greater Spanish Florida during the First Spanish period, including early coastal forts established by Pedro Menéndez de Avilés and deep interior forts established by Menéndez’s lieutenant Juan Pardo, along with a range of late 17th-century military outposts established to protect the Franciscan mission provinces during the era of the Indian slave trade. Pensacola’s presidios, garrisoned out of Mexico after 1698, are also shown.”
By the late seventeenth century, however, the dominant pattern observed by the sentinels was that of change. Surrounded by constantly mobile, if not threatened or threatening Indian populations, sentinels were hypersensitive to their limitations. In the wake of Robert Searles’s 1668 pirate attack, the reports from the sentinels guarding the Matanzas inlet read as if they were manifestos of incapacity.\[40\] The “pirate enemy… arriving in full force and with much care (and being about 300 men strong) managed to enter the land and surprise us from behind… [they came through] the mountains, which the sentinels failed to monitor since their watch is always done along the marina and coast.”\[41\] Ordered to monitor the coast and inform governor Márquez Cabrera if the enemy loomed near, the sentinels had remained completely unaware of the large invading force simply because Searles had gone around them. The lookouts learned of the pirate’s presence as smoke from the burning San Agustín fort covered the sky. Searles entered San Agustín undetected, causing major destruction to the Spanish presidio that, despite having a line of defense in place, had received no warnings.\[42\]

Before the governor could chastise the sentinels, they protested that their very role, to monitor the vast Florida coast and land, was next to impossible. Small in number, isolated from the main garrison, and with armaments that were barely sufficient for self-defense, the soldiers insisted that being capable sentinels was more about luck than strategy.\[43\] There were often quarrels between San Agustín officials and sentinels about what the exact role and responsibility of a lookout should be. Though the former emphasized the sentinel’s role in protection and defense of a designated post, the latter tended to define their tasks in terms of news acquisition and delivery. Sentinels were adamant that their obligations were defensive spotting and informing, not physical protection. Spanish officials, on the other hand, expected sentinels to serve as a shield against threat, especially an English attack. The combative, as opposed to preemptive role sentinels were supposed to play, was a constant point of contention between the government in the main garrison and these soldiers stationed in the más allá.\[44\] Governors reprimanded sentinels for not doing more. Sentinels, surrounded by increasingly empty lands, complained that their numbers were simply too small. The best strategy to employ, sentinels argued, was to run. As soon as enemy sails peaked over the horizon, as soon as

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\[41\] “Captian Andres Perez,” March 26, 1685, AGI54-5-12/14, bnd 2404, Reel 17, Stetson Collection, PKY

\[42\] “hallandonos de guaricion en la sentinela que llama de matansas qye esta en la Isla frontera de este presidio acata esto venio El enemigo pirata, a treinta de dicho mes El qual viniendo con toda mana y cautela (Y siendo con numero trecientos hombres) procurer entrar y coxemos por las epaldas por la parte del monte sin poderlo remediar respecto de hacerse la sentinela siempre por la parte de la marina y barra principal que es por donde se vigilan las embarcaciones que paresen.”

\[43\] Serrano y Sanz, *Documentos Historicos De La Florida Y La Luisiana, Siglos Xvi Al Xviii*, XIV. Letter Giving the Order of the Governor. From Cabrera to Sergeant Major, Don Pedro de Aranda: complaints that the Spanish have a huge disadvantage because they have no sentinels, whereas the English have plenty. Cabrera argues that with sentinels the English can be aware and anticipate Spanish actions, but the Spanish cannot reciprocate.

\[44\] El más alla: literally meaning, what is extends beyond. It was used to refer to spaces/places/people who were not subjects to the Spanish authority.
powder smoke was smelled in the air, as soon as anyone or anything unusual was felt, the sentinels needed to flee their post and head to the closest Spanish stronghold.

There was strength, however, in the sentinels’ vulnerability. Their small size allowed them to move through the region relatively unnoticed; furthermore, if they were apprehended, all the Spanish lost was one man, rather than an entire garrison, which could be captured, refurnished, and used against Florida. Unlike armory which could be turned against the Spanish, sentinels who were apprehended could, when they escaped or were returned by the English, provide additional information about the enemy. One of the earliest reports of English efforts in Port Royal came via a sentinel who had been captured in a routine survey of the region. During his short time as both a lookout and a captive, the sentinel had uncovered a great deal. He learned not only that the English had settled Santa Elena, but that “they have [allied with] Indians who had previous sworn their devotion to his [Spanish] Majesty.” The English had befriended former Spanish allies and were using these Indians to launch raids into the province of Timucua. In his imprisonment in Port Royal, the sentinel found both Spanish church bells stolen from a mission and Timucuan Indians, especially women and children, who were used and sold as slaves.

For all the news a sentinel could bring, there was also some fear of these lookouts could reveal if captured. After all, as soldiers serving in the military forces, they were exposed to a great deal of information that could aid the English, such as the location of other sentinels or the size, armory, and strength of the garrison. In some cases, this concern proved unrealistic, for the same location that place the sentinels near enemy towns, also removed them from the main Spanish hub. In May of 1683, when captured by English forces, a group of Spanish sentinels emphasized their desolate conditions to convince their English captors of their ignorance. These five Spanish sentinels had confidently left Santa Catalina, “without thinking of the risks that was to come,” only to march directly into English hands. The sentinels’ misplaced confidence, however, ultimately saved their lives. After the English easily apprehended the five sentinels, the Spanish soldiers “pretended having know of” English presence and claimed to have “already sent warning about the enemy’s whereabouts.” The sentinels declared that the English would “be captured with ease and in no time;” Spanish reinforcements would arrive before “the enemy had a chance to secure his piraguas.” Although, or maybe because, they had overpowered the Spanish forces without any difficulty, the English were keen to trust the five soldiers’ story. The English believed that the successful capture of these men had more to do with Spanish awareness and planned counter-attack, than with the sentinels’ unpreparedness; and just as quickly as they had made landfall,
the English were gone. In their failure to observe and send warning without being detected—in their failure as sentinels—these five men had secured an even bigger victory. These soldiers had managed to both gain valuable information about the enemy and repel their military efforts.

But even at their worst, when sentinels completely failed to guard or warn, they still managed to provide San Agustín with valuable information. Since there were only a limited number of Spanish soldiers in Florida, sentinels were often forced to keep watch over a variety of sites. It was often as they moved through the backcountry, between one post and another, that sentinels made their most important discoveries. While they were not exposed to more developments by traveling, their success or failure to appear at their intended destination served as an alarm. The Spanish employed all the tools at their disposal, even those that were broken, to remain informed.

More often than not, it was the failure of a sentinel to report to his post that alerted the Spanish to the presence of an enemy. Through the regular reports of lookouts, the Spanish had been able to create an expectation for news; and when that expectation was not met, San Agustín officials could assume that all was not well. In the spring and summer of 1683, English vessels were regularly seen off the coast of Matanzas. The English were both pirating off the coast and attempting to settle Port Royal. The Spanish, although stationed all along the coast and inland flowing rivers, had failed to learn anything of the English efforts. English ships kept venturing inland through rivers which the Spanish were not watching. News of their landfall came when one group of sentinels, who were supposed to be surveying the rivers north of the Matanzas Bay, failed to report back. The Spanish interpreted their absence to mean both that the sentinels had been captured and that English were in the area. Estimating by the route the sentinel usually traveled, the Spanish were able to determine the probable site of the English vessel.

Eventually the five missing sentinels did make their way back to San Agustín. But by then, it was 1685. Captain Andrés Pérez, Ayudantes Manus Risso and Juan Ruiz de Canizares, Joseph de Cardenas, and Pedro de Tejeda, had supposedly spent two years trying to escape their captors and make their way back south through Guale. The first part of their testimony seemed probable enough; the English often apprehended Spanish sentinels to prevent them from foiling English plans. Two years seemed suspiciously long, however, to traverse less than 60 miles. To make matters worse, the testimony of these men was not embedded in an intelligence report, but rather in a petition to receive back-pay for the two years of service.

Governor Márquez Cabrera was hardly amused. First, the Matanzas’ sentinels had failed to defend the Spanish outpost and had been captured by the enemy. Then, these soldiers had spent almost two years missing, presumably shirking their required service. And finally, they requested pay for their absence, all the while accusing the Spanish authorities of inadequate support and protection. The protests by Pérez and his men illustrated some of the negative elements of relying on sentinels for news. Sentinels, for

49 The sentinels’s testimonies are filled with biting criticism of the lack of Spanish control and knowledge of the coastal areas.
50 April 16, 1683 bnd 2313, 54-5-14/154 Reel 16, Stetson Collection, PKY.
51 March. 20 1685 march 26, bnd 2404, 54-5-12/14 Reel 17, Stetson Collection, PKY, Soldiers capture by English-French in 1683 give their accounts in order to receive pay. Captain Pérez argued that since he and his men had, to the best of their abilities, fulfilled their roles as sentinels and remained loyal servants to the Spanish Crown, they deserved compensation for their endeavors.
the most part, tended to gather little or limited information; and the few sentinels who did manage to detect English forces rarely took the opportunity to conduct careful or detailed observations. Instead, sentinels quickly fled their posts fearing that the enemy would overpower them. The Spanish soldiers who did not flee fast enough were apprehended, and as much as the Spanish could learn from returned sentinels, these soldiers’ homecoming was never certain or especially timely—and in the case of Pérez’s men, it was also costly.

While in some instances Spanish sentinels had been able to derail or postpone South Carolina’s incursions, Florida’s failure to act on a sentinel’s report, especially reports by sentinels who had escaped from English hands, made South Carolina question Spanish ability to turn news into action. The English learned a great deal about Spanish vulnerability from captured sentinels. Soldier Francisco Marques had transformed the absence of one his sentinels into pressing news of English whereabouts and intentions; he told Governor Márquez Cabrera that unless immediate action followed the news he had uncovered, the small advantage the Spanish had just gained through their sentinels would be lost. What good would a warning be if nothing was ever done to remedy the danger? Florida, however, was in no position to retaliate.

“The news was collected by prisoners…”

Unable and often unwilling to mobilize news into action, sentinel reports foretold, rather than prevented, English attacks. But with these attacks came a new possible informer. The Spanish learned much of what they knew about their expanding neighbor from prisoners captured as a result of the fighting that Spanish and Indian spies had warned was developing and sentinels had revealed was coming. Beginning in the 1670s, prisoners of war became important, albeit unexpected informers. English and Spanish colonists shared a common preoccupation with capturing prisoners. Though the prime objective of spies and sentinels was to help prevent and prepare for an impending attack, Spanish and English colonists both believed that conflict was inevitable. Instead of focusing exclusively on preventing war, San Agustín and Charles Town officials searched for the possible and positive that could unfold from an imminent attack. Prisoners of war were that certainty. Captured combatants could shed insight into the enemy’s tactics, strength, and future plans. Though the majority of prisoners were captured during wars and smaller raids, some prisoners fell into the enemy’s hand by chance, such as shipwrecks or misfortune in la tierra adentro.

Regardless of how they were apprehended, the capture of English prisoners brought great rejoicing to San Agustín. In the immediate aftermath of the settling of Charles Town, Governor Francisco de la Guerra y Vega was pleased by his “luck” in having captured several English colonists. The Spanish governor then “sent for their

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52 April 16, 1683 bnd 2313, 54-5-14/154 Reel 16, Stetson Collection, PKY.
53 “Teníamos noticias juntadas por prisioners…” Report of Francisco de Sotolongo reports July 4, 1668, AGI 54-5-18, bnd 1660, Reel 13, Stetson Collection, PKY.
54 The main English attacks against Florida were led by Moore, who relentlessly attacked the Spanish missions from 1703 to 1706. See also: Charles W. Arnade, The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702, ed. University of Florida Press, vol. 3, Summer, University of Florida Monographs (Gainesville 1959).
55 Menéndez learned about French efforts in the area from captives. Mercado, ed. Pedro Menéndez De Avilés, Cartas Sobre La Florida (1555-1574), Document XVII, August, 13,1565, 127.
declared be taken down.” Guerra y Vega asked very specific questions about the type of ships at Charles Town harbor and the kinds of armaments carried by the new settlers; he also posed more general queries about the size and intentions of the English population. Florida officials, though anxious about the settlement of the Carolina colony, used this opportunity to learn as much as they could.

The interrogation of these prisoners revealed two related patterns. First, the Spanish interviewer trusted and believed his prisoners’ testimony. And second, the English prisoners told the truth. There was almost a tacit understanding that captured individuals had to or would disclose whatever news they possessed. Perhaps the testimony from uncooperative prisoners was not taken down or has been merely lost to time. But more likely, part of the centuries-old, implicit rules of warfare, which required prisoners to be treated and to act as they would like were the situation reversed, prompted cooperation from prisoners. There seemed to be an agreement that as a consequence of being apprehended and in exchange for good treatment at the expense of the captor, captives were supposed to share any details they knew. And they did.

The Spanish often expected English prisoners to provide details not just about their latest expedition, but also about the state of Charles Town and the general well-being of the colony. In 1679, five Englishmen were captured off the coast of Florida. Governor Pablo de Hita y Salazar inquired after the state of Charles Town and the most recent English endeavors. Thomas Jibe [Kibby] and Samuel [Thomas?] were all too eager to comment on the economic ventures of Carolina, praising the strength of the new colony through its connections to Bermuda, Virginia, and Barbados. While this information was important, the Spanish governor was not satisfied with this report.

Hita y Salazar pushed the prisoners further. The governor inquired about the Indian alliances South Carolina had developed and, in particular, about the trade that seemed to be reshaping the whole region. Spaniards and Indians in Guale, Timucua, Apalachee, and more recently Apalachicola, had felt the brunt of South Carolina’s violent incursion into the Southeast. Though the governor knew all too well the devastation brought on by this trade, he wanted to gain an insider’s perspective. Hita y Salazar asked these English prisoners about South Carolina’s Indian relations because he hoped to uncover where the English traders and/or slavers planned to strike next.

But these prisoners, who seemed to know a great deal about Charles Town’s connections and booming economy, were at a loss when it came to Indians. Jibe and Samuel provided only vague answers, telling the governor that South Carolina “attend[ed] to many different people and trade[d] different types of skins.” These men could not remember any specific nations or dealings. At this point the Spanish governor either lost his patience or decided to be more explicit about what he wanted to know; Hita y Salazar asked the prisoners directly about English dealings in Apalachicola. This was a risky move. The governor’s exposed both Spanish preoccupation with this region and Apalachicola’s vulnerability. Hita y Salazar’s question revealed that as much as he valued the western territories, he did not know or fully control what was going on there.

56 Francisco de la Guerra y de la Vega, October, 31, 1671 AGI SD, 839, Legajo 151-152 Reel 13, Stetson Collection PKY.
The Spaniards had had incredibly limited success in missionizing the Apalachicolas and had not managed to establish clear partnerships in the region; they nevertheless considered the western Apalachicola lands as the jewel of Florida. Western Florida had arable land, and (rumored) mineral wealth. The Spanish governor asked the prisoners about current and future English dealings in western Florida. Samuel told Hita y Salazar to rest easy. While South Carolina interacted with “Chiscas and Chichimecos [Westos], they had not traded with any Spanish or Christian Indian.” 58 Hita y Salazar took a deep breath; this was exactly what he had hoped to hear.

The prisoners were telling the truth. At the time of their interrogation, South Carolina had not made any tangible headway into Apalachicola. For the most part, English traders had tried to circumvent Spanish Indians, missions, and outposts while they secured allegiances with Indians such as the Westos, who were hostile to the Spanish, and the Chiscas, who had never warmed to Spanish care. Although Hita y Salazar was relieved that there were no English traders (or at least not many) in Apalachicola, this was part of South Carolina’s strategy. Avoiding Spanish centers did not mean respecting Florida authority. On the contrary, South Carolina traders were working around Spanish hubs with the ultimate goal of undermining Florida’s claims, influence, and allies.

In 1686, an indentured English servant fleeing from South Carolina and captured by the Spanish, openly discussed English efforts and plans. He identified himself as a Catholic and spoke forcefully about the abuse he had endured under his English, Protestant master. 59 Florida officials readily welcomed Catholic prisoners and/or fugitives, who usually tended to be Irish, French or African; though the Spanish still required these prisoners to swear an oath and reaffirm/prove their faith. 60 When questioned about the English activities in the interior, this indentured servant first qualified his answer, explaining that he had spent only a couple months in Carolina before leaving his master. Yet this man knew a great deal. The prisoner detailed the extensive gun and ammunition trade that South Carolina sustained with key Indian groups. The indentured servant explained how by favoring some Indian groups over others, South Carolina had not only created, but was also exploiting the inter-Indian chaos in the region. He concluded his testimony by stating that, in spite of English insistence to the contrary, South Carolina was in fact enslaving Christian and Spanish Indians and sending them to Barbados. 61 Terrified by this man’s testimony, San Agustín officials nonetheless welcomed his warning and details. Florida could not necessarily sever all of the English tentacles of power, but at least the Spanish officials felt more secure knowing where and how these tentacles moved.

58 Deposition of five Englishmen. October 22, 1679. AGI SD 839, Fol. 63 [58-1-26.] in Ibid.
59 Although this man was indentured and Catholic, and thus had a lot of reasons not to favor the English, his interrogation and testimony reads like documents produced by other prisoners of war. Document XI, p. 97, Series II. The English on the Chattahoochee, Folder 4 in Bolton, "Folder 3-7: Documents Concerning the Settlement of Florida, English Encroachments, and Indian Troubles."
To be sure, not all prisoners told the truth. In 1686, the Spanish attack of Port Royal had placed Florida on the offensive. As the Spanish recaptured Santa Catalina Island, which had been taken from the Spanish by a joint English-Indian force several years earlier, Florida soldiers also captured several English prisoners. San Agustín officials had begun taking down the testimony of these prisoners when another group of Spanish soldiers marched into town. These soldiers vociferously contradicted some of the testimonies by the English prisoners of war. The Spanish soldiers stated that the English were merely exaggerating the strength of Charles Town; the prisoners, the Spanish soldiers insisted, were merely trying to scare Florida into not invading Charles Town.

The Spanish governor Márquez Cabrera was unsure whom to believe. Were the prisoners of war deliberately overstating English power or had the Spanish soldiers failed to grasp Charles Town’s true potential?\(^{62}\) The answer was both. The prisoners were overplaying the strength of Charles Town, but the Spanish soldiers had also failed to see the influence and reach of English power. This failure was evident in the questions posed to the English captives. The Spanish inquired after English forts and settlements planned for the interior. The Spanish saw, but did not fully understand, the sprawling economic connections the English had set in place instead of missions and doctrinas. Although the Spanish had enjoyed, at best, a very tentative hold in the Southeast, they had a hard time imagining South Carolina trying a different approach. Spanish officials kept looking in English actions for Spanish strategies to colonize and control the southeast. Western Florida might have been el más alla for both South Carolina and Florida, but for the English, beyond settlement or forts did not mean beyond trade. For South Carolina, these distant lands had great potential. Trade connections enabled and, in some cases, required the English to move quickly into the uncertainty of el más alla with hope, rather than fear.\(^{63}\)

For all the confusion they caused, prisoners of war were not easy to come by. The trick was to get prisoners without becoming one. Both Spanish and English government had protocols in place if their vessels, delegations, or cargo was intercepted by the enemy. Correspondence and any other form of news needed to be thrown overboard or otherwise destroyed in event of capture. In a letter to London, J. Parris explained that this was his second attempt to report the failed 1686 Spanish invasion of Charles Town. His first letters had been on board a vessel that had been seized as it made the Atlantic voyage. As a precaution, all the correspondence, including Parris’ account, had been thrown overboard.\(^{64}\) Diego de Quiroga y Losada, governor of Florida from 1687-93, was not as fortunate as Parris. The governor’s communications were intercepted before they could be destroyed. In October of 1691, Quiroga y Losada had sent letters to New Spain and Havana “requesting any type of aid and provisions.” In his pleas for help the governor detail with excruciating care the weakening state of San Agustín—Quiroga y Losada described the decrepit garrison, the weak population, the poor relations with native neighbors, and even the failed spring harvest. To make matters worse, “in the midst of these calamities and ordeals word reach [Quiroga y Losada] that an enemy French [ship] had captured off the coast of Havana the [Spanish] vessel [carrying the governor’s requests] before the aforementioned frigate could free itself from the

\(^{62}\) March 20, 1686. bnd 2463, 2-4-1/19/13, Reel 17 Stetson Collection PKY.
\(^{63}\) See Chapter 4.
\(^{64}\) SCDAH BPRO Volume 7, 1717-1720 J. Parris. November 14, 1719, 217.
dispatches it was carrying." Quiroga y Losada buried his head in his hands and ordered Florida to prepare for a French attack. With vital and incriminating information in their hands, the governor was certain that a French invasion was imminent.

It was therefore imperative that news and informer(s) reach their intended destination intact. Just as evidence needed to be discarded in the event of threat, informers also received special instructions about what to do in the event of capture. Spaniards were counseled to turn their captivity into an opportunity for espionage. Soldiers who had been prisoners of war but had managed to escape or had been returned by their captors were great sources of information. In 1707, Juan Gabriel de Vangar had been a Spanish soldier stationed in Pensacola when a large force of over 100 Indians led, or at least armed, by the English, had easily overwhelmed the meager Spanish garrison. De Vangar had managed to escape. But his journey back to San Agustín proved to be more terrifying than the English attack. De Vangar found English soldiers in every town and even Indian nations who claimed to be friendly only with Florida were eagerly welcoming English trade. Spanish Florida seemed under English siege. The Spanish forts established in Apalachee (1678), Apalachicola (1689), and Pensacola (1698) were not enough, not nearly enough.

English trade had a visible presence in Florida. De Vangar reported that while Indians were more than happy to join the Spanish, before loyalty and friendship, Indians wanted and needed weapons. In fact, it was through the gun and ammunition trade that the Spanish were finally able to see, in a tangible and real way, the vast networks connected and controlled by South Carolina. As Joseph de Roxas, another of the escaped prisoners, reported

All Indian had fire arms... [the Spanish prisoners] passed through different towns and nations of infidel Indians all who had devotion to the English... which were as following, the Talapuzes, who had 26 [towns] and... the witness counted 600 shotguns and 400 archers [flecheros]... in the province of Apica, which has 14 pueblos, [and]... 300 shotguns[,] the Ayabamos are composed of four pueblos and they have 500 shotguns ...
Also, the witness saw by 4 Christian Apalachee pueblos...Thomole, Escambe, Patale and Baququa... and in all these places... there was an English lieutenant.

October 15, 1691, bnd 3022, 54-4-13/26 Stetson Collection, Reel 22. The governor had sent letters to Nueva España and Havana “a solicitar qualquier parte socorro de bastimientos... y en el medio de estas calamidades y tra bajo llego noticia de haver apreso el enemigo francés en la costa de Havana la dicha fragata sin librar de ella ninguno delos despachos que llevaba as para V Mag.” One of the Spanish captives who escaped the French reported “quedado con un marinero de los nuestros platico de estos rios y con estos del arte para venire a presar esta plaza motivo que dizen les dio las noticias que adquirieron por las cartas y despachos que vieron del estado de ella y lo que se suplica a V Ma su Socorro.” Recorded by Joachin de Florencia and Juan de Pueyo.

Although this attack occurred shortly after the chronology examined in this chapter, the testimonies of De Vangar and Roxas are similar to those of Spanish prisoners of war captured in the 1680-90s. But since the capture of these men occurred later, their testimonies give more clear insight into English control of the Southeast.

“Indios todos con armas de fuego... pasaron por differences pueblos y naciones de indios yñieles y de la devocion de dichos ingleses que son de las dichas naciones las siguientes los talapuzes que tienen veinteyseis... les conto el testigo seicientos escopetas y quatrocientos flecheros, estubo y paso el
Roxas also stayed in Tiquipache, which housed English Captain Lanzon and seventeen other English officers. English trade activity, like a net thrown over Indian Country, had captured many Indian groups, tangled them together, and bound them to South Carolina. The Spanish realized that while they could sway one group of Indians with goods, the net stayed in place. Indian alliances were much harder to secure and even more taxing to retain. The Southeast had changed.

Reports from other escaped prisoners revealed even more impending danger. On December 15, 1687, Thomas de la Torre, a 46 year-old mulatto slave to Antonio de Arguelles, marched into San Agustín from the western trails. He claimed to have been on the French colony in Santa María de Galve (Gulf of Mexico). San Agustín officials were elated. The Spanish, in spite of several well founded expeditions, had not been able to find the rumored French settlement in the region. Governor Quiroga y Losada eagerly took down Thomas’ declaration. This interrogation unfolded as if it were a swashbuckling tale of pirates, spies, deadly storms, and an unlikely hero, who overcame all obstacles. Before Thomas reached the French settlement he had been a slave, a soldier in the 1686 attack against Port Royal, a prisoner in Charles Town’s cells, a guide and pirate on board French and Dutch vessels, and eventually a runaway traveling through the Southeast.

Thomas’s testimony offered rich details on the French settlement, the new threat to the Spanish Southeast. Thomas noted especially that the French population was not exclusively male: women, children, and slaves were also present—surely a sign that the French intended to settle the area permanently. This was not merely a French effort to explore and trade; this was the beginning of a colony. Furthermore, the French had erected what appeared to be permanent fortification made of stones, “crisscrossed with lead and steel pipes… [rising] ten feet in height,” and armed with cannons. As Thomas’s account moved from one detail to the next, the Spanish governor listened carefully, never interrupting or asking for clarification. Quiroga y Losada might have not cared about Thomas’s military career or his ventures in the Caribbean, but the governor wanted to hear about every feature of the French settlement. Thomas knew his audience well. While he offered a rich account of this incipient colony, the remainder of his testimony was a skeletal chronology of events, devoid of description.

In his travels, Thomas adopted and adapted to many roles: slave, pirate, spy, prisoner, sailor, soldier, and guide. And he played those roles for very different audiences, moving among Spanish, English, Dutch, French and Indian spaces and worlds. But the role that continually saved his life was that of an informer. It had been Thomas’s reports to South Carolinians about Spanish strength and settlement that had

68 Quiroga y Losada to the King, transmitting a statement relative to the Bay of Espiritu Santo. February 24, 1688 bnd 2675 61-6-20/57. Stetson Collection, Reel 19, PKY; Thomas would be what historian Ira Berlin calls an “Atlantic Creole.” Ira Berlin, Many Thousand’s Gone, the First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1998), 17.
granted him a ticket out of jail, transforming him from prisoner to guide in an English expedition. His ability to communicate and convince French leaders of his linguistic abilities had afforded him a trip from the Caribbean back to the Southeast. Thomas’s dual ability to know and communicate the appropriate information, such as the military capacity of French garrison, not only saved him (on several occasions), but also edged him further into this world. Information was a commodity that connected and cut-across all these world; it also afforded Thomas with fixed, known rate of exchange that he employed to his advantage.

Prisoners of war who managed to escape thus posed a real danger for the group who apprehended them. Captivity, as Thomas’s testimony demonstrated, exposed prisoners to a great deal of information. In the summer of 1688 the Spanish had received news of French activities from a captured French prisoner, but San Agustín official quickly became terrified when this man fled to the English. This man had seen the desolate state of San Agustín, and the Spanish feared that his descriptions of the feebleness of the Spanish would inspire an English attack. When an English attack materialized, the Spanish insisted that the escaped French prisoner was responsible. While the Spanish could not prove beyond reasonable doubt that this former prisoner was to blame, the English force that had attempted to take San Agustín had been almost insultingly small. Unless the English had known about the dire state of the Spanish garrison, their small attack could only be interpreted as irrational or suicidal. The Spanish concluded that English attack had been informed by the details of the prisoners who escaped from the Spanish presidio.

Although Indian and European groups worried about the implications of having individuals associated with the enemy travelling through and housed in their lands, it was the English who codified this fear into regulation. South Carolina passed strict laws about how and where prisoners of war should be kept. The English wanted to curb the prisoners’ access to English military plans and prevent prisoners from conversing with Carolina’s settlers “and not sufferd them to Ramble as now is usuall.” South Carolinians especially feared that Spanish prisoners would “ramble” to the enslaved population and tell them about the proximity of and opportunities they could find in Spanish Florida. Furthermore, the House worried that unless prisoners were monitored,

They have all the opportunities to see the whole province and know all our circumstances. Besides those that are brought by land from Apalatche have an opportunity to know and learn the roads and get acquainted with the several Nations of our friendly Indians which we conceive might in time prove fatal to us if these Indians should once leave our alliance and join our Enemies. We therefore request your House to give orders to such persons as your House have or shall commissionate to wage war against the Spaniards which the friendly Indians to bring into this settlement but one or two Spanish prisoners at the most of those that are the ablest to give

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69 Francisco de Sotolongo reports on English attack. July 4, 1688, bnd 1660, 54-5-18 Stetson Collection, Reel 13, PKY. The Frenchman was the culprit because the governor and him had gotten into a fight—the cause is unclear, listed as “por cuentos y enredo de mujeres.” (by stories and rumors of women)

70 September 14, 1702. House Assembly of Journal, 1702. SCDAH p. 117.
the best information and to let the rest of them go or get the (best) what ransom for them.\textsuperscript{71}

The English wanted “blindfolded” prisoners, who could not see the roads, friendships, and connections South Carolina had been forging. But if the prisoner was to be blind to English developments, he still had to be “able to give the best information” about the Spanish.

This law, however, hinted at another difficulty. How were prisoners of war to be returned? Both English and Spanish officials worried about the exchange of individuals who had been held in such close quarters. Prisoners could reveal a great deal of information, but they were also bound to observe. They could see the strengths, such as “the roads and acquaintances,” as well as weaknesses, like “the little defense,” which were in place.\textsuperscript{72} But in spite of their fears, when peace bound England and Spain, Florida and South Carolina were required to maintain good communication, respect each other’s laws, and exchange prisoners. This exchange was a complicated venture.\textsuperscript{73} Neither Florida nor South Carolina wanted to transgress the Crown’s orders, yet neither side wanted to relinquish to the enemy an individual who had been inside their fortifications. Thus, when an exchange of prisoners actually occurred, these actions were read as true testament of peaceful intentions.\textsuperscript{74}

Captured prisoners did not always become dangerous. On several occasions, prisoners of war were slowly integrated into Spanish society. English prisoners Juan Calens [John Collins], Carlos [Charles] Robson, Andrés [Andrew] Ranson, and Guillermo Car [William Carr] all became integral parts of the Spanish community. Lacking sufficient and skilled workers, San Agustín officials often employed these men. Calens and Carr were both masons, and knowing how to “make lime and can remove stones,” they were given leave to work on the reconstruction and strengthening of the main garrison in San Agustín.\textsuperscript{75} Searles’s 1668 attack had burned San Agustín’s wooden structure and the Spanish had decided to rebuild their garrison with a less flammable material: coquina. Carr even embraced the Catholic faith and married in San Agustín.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{71} Nov. 6, 1704House Assembly of Journal, 1704. SCDAH 294-5/P43-44.
\textsuperscript{72} Four English in San Agustín: “Diego Flamenco, Thomas Vide, Hugo Jordan, and Charles Miller.” May 8, 1674 bnd 1889,58-1-35/16, Stetson Collection Reel 14, PKY; for prisoners as spies see, AGI-SD, 839, folio 500-504 Reel 9, PKY.
\textsuperscript{73} In 1706, South Carolina offered to return Spanish prisoners, if Florida bought boats from South Carolina boats and furnished the expense of transporting these men. See, March 11, 1706. House Assembly of Journal. SCDAH, p. 33. The Spanish also discussed the complicated nature of exchange see “March 8, 1689, AGI 54-5-12, Doc. 74” in Wright, “Dispatches of Spanish Official Bearing in the Free Negro Settlement of Gracia Real De Santa Teresa De Mose, Florida,” 151., and January 22, 1710, 22 58-1-28/72 bnd 4545 Stetson Collection Reel 34, PKY.
\textsuperscript{74} A.S. Jr. Salley, ed. Narratives of Early Carolina, 1650-1708 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,1911), 300. The individuals who were the exception, on the one hand, and the example, on the other, were slaves. From 1670 to the outbreak of the Yamasee War, there was only a small number of slaves (probably around 50) who reached San Agustín from South Carolina. Yet the amount of correspondence and debate over these individuals is truly shocking. The English pursued their runaway slaves with an obsessive persistence; more on runaways, especially on the complicated strategy the Spanish employed for returning runaway slaves, in Chapter 6.
\textsuperscript{75} June 8, 1690, AGI 54-5-12/114, Reel 21, Stetson Collection, PKY.
\textsuperscript{76} “Carta del Governador de Carolina,” January 24, 1695, AGI-SD 840, Folio 13, PKY.
But Ranson’s story is perhaps the most surprising. In 1684 he led an ill-advised pirate attack against San Agustín. Although apprehended and ordered to death by hanging, the noose intended to strangle Ranson broke. He found sanctuary and Catholicism in San Agustín’s church.\(^{77}\) After years as a Spanish prisoner, both the governor’s anger and Ranson’s ambitions cooled. Once considered a violent pirate, Ranson helped with the fort’s construction and in 1702, when South Carolina governor James Moore’s seized San Agustín, Ranson remained loyal to the Spanish. Instead of fleeing to the English, as the Spanish had feared their English prisoners would do, Ranson stayed with the Spanish, serving as an interpreter and intermediary for the Spanish.\(^{78}\)

Though not a very common occurrence, these prisoners became active members of Florida society. Ranson, Robson, Calens, and Car were now connected to and trusted by the Spanish; but once this welcoming into San Agustín society had occurred, these captives were not and could no longer be used to learn the latest English news. This integration removed both the threat and the potential use of prisoners of war as informers.

**A Network with Moveable Nodes**

With the settlement of English South Carolina, the eastern provinces of Florida became increasingly volatile and complex. The Spanish attempted to negotiate or, at least understand, some of these complications by strengthening and supplementing their networks of information. As their lands, allies, and influence decreased, San Agustín officials saw their nodes of power, the places they had once controlled and known, threatened. Thus the Spanish tried to network eastern Florida through individual informers, developing a more mobile and flexible approach to gather news. The Spanish relied on many (and) different informers. Informers came in all shapes and sizes, and were as different as the situations that surrounded them. Spies, sentinels, and prisoners of war were some of the most common seekers and acquirers of news employed by the Spanish.

There were clear advantages to using and connecting the province of Guale through individual informers. First, informers tended to be scattered throughout the region, making it nearly impossible for the enemy to capture or even be aware of all the nodes linking the Spanish network. Second, spies, sentinels, and prisoners gave the Spanish access into a region that was increasingly beyond their control. And third, informers proved to be flexible and adaptable, helping to forge a fairly responsive network. However, there were some obvious disadvantages to this system for news acquisition. To start with, some of the most useful informers, the nodes that bound this informer network together, were neither Spanish nor even loyal to Florida. San Agustín officials worried about the instability of a network based on unreliable sources.

In Apalachicola, a western region the Spanish had never controlled, Florida officials could not merely adapt an existing system as they had done in Guale. San Agustín officials had to configure, create, and establish a new network. They hoped that this network would have clear Spanish nodes strategically situated throughout la tierra.

\(^{77}\) “Andrés Ranson…” March 18, 1686, AGI 58-2-6, bnd 2462-a, Reel 17, Stetson Collection PKY.
adentro; these nodes were to connect Indian towns directly to Spanish authority. The following chapter chronicles the Spanish efforts in Apalachicola. Designed to establish a firm cordon in the region, the Apalachicola network would ward off English traders (and trading) and prevent western Florida from turning into Guale. The Spanish lacked the material goods necessary to rival their English neighbors, so they attempted to establish a network based not on trade, but on alliances— alliances that were increasingly defined in terms of news.
Chapter 3: Networked Apalachicola, Spanish Connections in Western Florida

“When I was in that [place] of San Luis, by virtue of the reports that I had, I urged your honors should believe that the English enemy was still in Apalchicoli… An Indian native to Sabacola… says he saw four Englishmen who were helping the Indians in the place of Osuchi… [Father Argüelles and I] persuaded and ordered said Indian, who, because he had seen them, he himself should go and tell it to your honor.”
— Fray Juan Mercado to Antonio Matheos, 1685

In the late months of 1685, Mercado, a friar in the Santa Cruz de Sabacola mission on the Chattahoochee River, reported on the ongoing English activity in the region. The news that “the English enemy was still in Apalchicoli” angered the already hot-blooded Antonio Matheos, lieutenant of Apalachee. English agents and traders, most notably Henry Woodward, had been slowly venturing away from the coast and into what the Spanish considered their western provinces of Apalachee and Apalachicola. Matheos deemed these South Carolinian intrusions a real threat and an affront to Florida’s authority.

The Spanish lieutenant embarked on two expeditions, the first in 1685 (before friar Mercado’s unpleasant report of English presence in Osuchi and Coweta) and the second less than a year later. Matheos’s journal and letters offer insight into a volatile man given the delicate task of inviting and securing Apalachee and Apalachicola allies, without alienating Indians who did not choose to embrace an alliance with Spain. Matheos failed at both of these tasks; his diplomatic style embittered existing friendship and estranged possible connections. His writings, however, reveal more than the poor decisions made by a capricious man. When read alongside the testimonies of the Yamasee spies hired to reconnoiter Apalachicola and the correspondence of Marcos Delgado, a Spanish soldier sent to destroy a French colony settled on Spanish lands, Matheos’s reports help address both San Agustín’s plan for western Florida and the practical (and difficult) implementation of those policies.

Taken together these three groups of sources provide a complex image of Apalachicola in the late 1680s. They show first and foremost a province on the eve of major change. Apalachicola, long considered el más allá, was becoming the focus of three imperial powers in the Southeast—by the early 1680s, Spain, France, and England were all surveying the area. Second, the reports of Matheos and Delgado as well as the testimonies of the Yamasee spies emphasize the power possessed by that the native

populations of Apalachicola. These Indians’ decisions to trade, relocate, or war, had a profound impact on English, Spanish, and French efforts in the region. And third, these sources reveal the careful Spanish efforts to network this western province. The Spanish hoped to establish, for the first time since the founding of San Agustín, good communication between Apalachicola and San Agustín. Although the explicit object of Matheos and Delgado’s journeys was to locate and secure Indian allies, both of these agents concluded that friendship with Apalachicola rested on procuring clear, easy communication between Indian country and Spanish towns.

The Spanish had attempted to remain informed of the developments in eastern Florida through a complex network of mobile informers; in western Florida, San Agustín officials sought to establish a different type of communication infrastructure. Rooted in loyal Indian towns and Spanish missions, and operated through reliable-controllable-individuals, the Spanish networks in Apalachicola were based on physical control of space. As Spanish presence in and influence over Guale collapsed under pressures from South Carolina traders and hostile Indian groups, Florida officials looked to Apalachicola with a mixture of fear and hope. In the early 1680s, the Spanish only had a tenuous hold on the region, but the English presence was even smaller. The Spanish thus tried secure key Indian alliances and forge connections to, in, and with Apalachicola before the English (or perhaps the French) got the upper hand.

A networked Apalachicola was an Apalachicola the Spanish could travel, understand, and control—an Apalachicola closed to other European powers. Establishing reliable communication networks in the region was therefore a type of preemptive strike on English expansion. Florida officials did little to hide their intentions in Apalachicola and much to try to establish some form of Spanish control over this increasingly contested province. But instead of cultivating relations with the Indian populations and learning how to best connect Spanish needs with Indian interest (and vice versa), Florida officials tended to focus on Apalachicola not becoming English and not becoming French. This negative emphasis both shaped and limited Spanish engagement in the area.

Troubles in Apalachicola

Spanish hold in western Florida had never been particularly strong. Franciscans had started their missionizing efforts only in 1633; their mild success was followed by both an increased military presence in the region and by an Indian uprising in 1647. In 1679, Spanish friars had once again entered Apalachicola, but unaccompanied by a military escort, their efforts to obtain converts and set-up missions remained limited. Few Indians joined the Franciscans and the friars struggled to visit, let alone connect, surrounding towns to a Spanish doctrina. Convinced that Apalachicola Indians “had shown great inclining” to the friars and to baptism, Governor Marques Cabrera was

5 John H. Hann, The Native American World Beyond Apalachee: West Florida and the Chattahoochee Valley (Gainesville: University of Florida, 2006); Galgano, Feast of Souls: Indians and Spaniards in the Seventeenth-Century Missions of Florida and New Mexico, 93.
saddened but not discouraged by the failures in Sabacola, a vibrant Apalachicola town on the Chattahoochee River. So in March of 1681, a second group of Franciscans, led by friars Francisco Gutiérrez de la Vega and Miguel Abengojar (and this time accompanied by soldiers) traveled again to Sabacola. Their efforts were better received. By that summer they had managed to convert over 30 people. Encouraged by their success, fray Gutiérrez urged the governor to visit the province, “because your governorships visit is what is needed to speak and persuade these Indians” to remain loyal to the Spanish. But by the time this hopeful message reached the Spanish governor, the tide had once again turned in Apalachicola.\(^6\)

Tense relations between friars and Indians, coupled with the unsteady leadership of Apalachee lieutenant Matheos, encouraged the Apalachicolans to end relations with San Agustín, removing all friars and Spanish officials from their towns. To house the few converts who wanted to follow and relocate with the Franciscans, the Spanish established the mission of Santa Cruz de Sabacola in 1681. Located below the confluence of the Flint and Chattahoochee rivers, this mission was eighty miles south of where the friars had originally hoped to conduct their missionizing efforts and even further removed from the main Indian towns in Apalachicola. It was from this new mission as well as from existing posts, such as San Luis de Apalachee (near present day Tallahassee), that the Spanish hoped to build their ecclesiastical and military influence over the region.\(^7\)

But instead of increased converts, the Spanish were met by growing contention. Florida’s efforts to missionize and better control Apalachicola became both an exercise in persuasion and a competition. The Spanish had to first convince Apalachicola Indians, who simultaneously dealt with a several European powers, that Florida was the most superior. And then, the Spanish officials had to struggle with the burgeoning presence of English and, beginning in the mid-1680s, French trade. Just as South Carolinians were establishing Port Royal in what had been Spanish Guale, Robert Cavalier de La Salle led a French expedition intended to settle in the mouth of the Mississippi River.\(^8\) Though La Salle’s settlement was short-lived and ill-fated, French efforts in the area persisted, hoping “to profit from the disarray of the Spanish monarchy.”\(^9\) Spanish Florida, once the lone European power in the Southeast, was now engulfed by French and English rivals.

As Spanish hold in eastern Florida diminished, Florida officials refocused their energies on Apalachicola and Apalachicola Indians. These Indians would later become

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\(^6\) Don Juan Marques Cabrera a SM, December 1680 in Bolton, "Folder 3-7: Documents Concerning the Settlement of Florida, English Encroachments, and Indian Troubles," Folder 3.; Letter from Fray Juan Francisco Gutiérrez de Vega, July 12, 1681 in Ibid., Folder 3.; see also Hoffman, *Florida's Frontiers*, 160-1.

\(^7\) Antonio de Arredondo, *Demostracion Historiographica... March 20, 1742*, ed. Herbert E. Bolton, *Arredondo’s Historical Proof of Spain’s Title to Georgia, a Contribution to the History of One of the Spanish Borderlands* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1925), 45-54. Missions in the are included Sanata Cruz de Sabacola (small and large), San Nicolás de los Chacatos (on Apalachicola River), San Carlos de los Chacatos (on Apalachicola River), and San Carlos de Sabacola (also called Sabacola Chuba).


\(^9\) “…et à profiter des désordres de la monarcie d’Espagne…” Letter from Governor of Saint-Domingue to Ministre de la Marine, October 29, 1699 in Ibid., 357.
known as the Creeks. But in 1680s, they were composed of two distinct groups. The first were nine or ten villages along the Chattahoochee, villages which the Spanish grouped together under the label Apalachicola; and the second were several northern towns, which the Spanish and the called the Province of Coweta or Casista. Apalachicola as well as northern towns were not only numerous, but also had access to vast hunting lands and deerskins.

English traders like Henry Woodward saw the province of Coweta as the gateway to a deerskin trade that could span all the way to the Mississippi River. Woodward was not alone in this assessment. The Scottish settlers who established the town of Port Royal in the mid-1680s also noted the importance of these Creek towns. In March of 1685, William Dunlop, one of the founders and leaders of this colony, reported that:

the Indians of that countrie [Apalachicola and Coweta]… are desyrous of trade and comerice with his Majestie’s subjects here, which if effectuated wold be a matter of vast importance… We are in order to this plan laying down a method for correspondence and trade with Cuita [Coweta] and Cussita [Casista] nations of Indians, who leive upon the passages betwixt us and New Mexico, and who have for severall yeirs left off any comercie with the Spaniards.

Dunlop emphasized the importance of Indian trade with the powerful and numerous inhabitants of Coweta and Casista. The Scottish settlers deemed a trading partnership with these former Spanish allies “a matter of vast importance” because “laying down a method for correspondence and trade” with these Indians would not only enrich Port Royal, but would also hinder any reconciliation between Florida and Apalachicola. In a double victory for the English, an agreement with the Creeks would help South Carolina grow as it hurt Florida’s chances to secure the west.

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11 Other towns Coweta/Cowetas, Casistas (spelling var ies), Tasquique, and Colone; Coweta and Casista were the two main towns, hence the province bears their name. These towns spoke Muskoee language, not Hitchiti.

12 The English would refer to the Apalachicola as Cowetas (Coweta) or Kashitas (Casista). But for the sake of clarity, I will use one common spelling. By 1690, the English began calling Coweta Indians, “Ocheese Creeks” (after the Ocmulgee River, which was then referred to as Ocheese); and then eventually these groups became merely known as the Creeks. The Spanish never adopted this label. But by 1730, the Spanish were speaking of Uchisi (their version of Ocheesee) when they referred to the Creek.

13 Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, the Rise of the English Empire in the American South 1670-1717; “Lord Cardross and William Dunlop to Peter Colleton,” in Scottish Historical Review (March 27, 1685), 104 emphasis mine.

14 There was tension between Charles Town and Port Royal. The Scots actually captured Woodward, arguing that he did not have the right to trade in the area. Woodward’s imprisonment displayed both the hostility between English towns and the general confusion in the region as to who and how was to govern the Indian trade. During Woodward’s time in Port Royal, he met Niquisaya, who led him to the Yamasee. Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763, 42. See also, Chapter 4.
The importance of Apalachicola was not lost on the Spanish. Though Dunlop’s letters as well as Woodward’s efforts seem to indicate that Apalachicola and Coweta Indians welcomed English traders and shunned Spanish endeavors, the relations in this region were not so simple. In the fall of 1679, friars in the towns of Sabacola and Apalachicola were threatened and eventually removed by Coweta Indians; however, within a matter of months a Sabacola cacique arrived in San Agustín, extending an open invitation to Spanish soldiers and Franciscans.\textsuperscript{15} Between 1683 and 1685, San Agustín welcomed at least three delegations of Apalachicola and Coweta Indians seeking an alliance with Florida.\textsuperscript{16} These delegations illustrate two related points. First, Indians in the Chattahoochee were willing to ally with South Carolina as well as Florida, and second, by late 1680s, the nature and extent of these alliances was yet to be determined.

![Figure 2.2— Map of Georgia Country in Spanish Day (Herbert Bolton)](image)

Governor Pablo Hita y Salazar tried to influence Apalachicola-Spanish relations so they would be favorable to Florida. The western provinces were no longer \textit{el más alla}; the interactions between Indians (in particular, Apalachicola and Coweta) and English

\textsuperscript{15} Don Pablo Hita y Salazar reporting on the return from Apalachicola of Fray Jacinto Barrada, with his testimony. March 8, 1680 in folder 3 Bolton, “Folder 3-7: Documents Concerning the Settlement of Florida, English Encroachments, and Indian Troubles.” Reports from Apalachicola [Chichimecos in San Jorge] January 25, 1682, bnd 2241 54-5-11/95, Stetson Collection Reel 16, PKY.

\textsuperscript{16} For these delegations visits to San Agustín see: SD-226, pg. 204 [54-5-11] Don Pablo Hita Salazar reporting on the return from Apalachicola of Fray Jacinto Barrada, with his testimony March 8, 1680 in folder 3 Ibid. in Ibid.

\textsuperscript{17} Herbert E. Bolton, \textit{Arredondo's Historical Proof of Spain's Title to Georgia, a Contribution to the History of One of the Spanish Borderlands} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1925), xvi.
and French traders not only affected how the Spanish corresponded with (any of) those groups, but also reverberated through the whole of the Southeast. After all, it was Indian groups in Apalachicola and Apalachee that were raiding the Spanish missions of Guale; and it was the Yamasee cacique Altamaha, leader of the destructive assault against the Spanish mission Santa Catalina de Ahoica, who welcomed English trader Henry Woodward during his first expedition to Apalachicola. Supplied and encouraged by South Carolina traders, the actions of Apalachicola and Coweta Indians affected the safety of all of Spanish Florida.

But even when English goods did not turn Indians into Spanish foes, Florida officials found that South Carolina’s trade affected the type of relationships and commitments Apalachicola Indians were willing to have with the Spanish. Indians who had been allies with, or at least had tolerated Spanish efforts, were still willing to receive Spanish gifts and envoys, but also sought similar arrangements with the English. There was a diminishing exclusivity to Florida’s Indian relations. The western provinces had long been considered the future of Florida—a site for expansion and connection to the larger Atlantic world. This future was no longer for the Spanish alone.

The Spanish, however, were not the only ones seeing their interactions redefined by English goods. Governor Hita y Salazar commented how inter-Indian relations were also changing. In one instance, trade with South Carolina had helped unify rival Indian nations: “the enemy Chichimecos, Uchizes and Chiluques, which were previously at war…were all interacting and trading in Good Friendship… and they had all made peace with [each other] and agreed to friendship with the English.” The “Good Friendship” among Chichimecos, Uchizes, and Chilque was bad news for Florida. These longtime enemies had finally come together, but under an English banner. As soon as the “three enemy nations declared their friendship [to South Carolina and to each other]… [they] entered united for the first time [to attack] the Island of Guadalquini.”

These former enemies celebrated their friendship by attacking Spanish holdings. Even when not directly aimed at injuring Florida, English commercial activities still negatively impacted Spanish efforts.

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20. Hita y Salazar to King. Oct 31, 1671. AGI SD 839, Folio 273-274v, Reel 8, PKY. “que si llegaran a reconocer el Rio de Maubila [Mobile] que es halla cinquenta leguas de Apalachee y su boca es de la profundidad que manifiestacon su opulencia de inteligencia y mana pudieran disponer fortificacion que quieren decir, ay puesto muy competente a la boca del Rio y hallarse en la Ensenada Mexicana donde pudieran tener su correspondencia en Jamaica la Triga y otras partes que franceses y Yngleses posegen y todo se puede remediar fortificando con tiempo a Apalachee.”
21. Documento 9, Carta del governador Pablo de Hita Salazar to SM San Augustine. May, 14 1680. AGI SD 839 [ 58-1-26] in Serrano y Sanz, Documentos Historicos De La Florida Y La Luisiana, Siglos Xvi Al Xviii. 216-19. “enterandome por dos partes los enemigos Chichumecos, Uchizes y Chiluques, que todos estaban en guerras, y los Chiluques y Uchizes comunicables, tratando y comerciando con estas provincias en Buena Amistad, solo los chichumecos fueron siempre enemigos, y el ano pasado hizierons todos paz y asentaron Amistad con los ingleses; “se han declarado este ano estas tres naciones enemigas, pues entraron unidos la primera ves en la isla de Guadalquini.”
South Carolina’s seemingly endless manufactured goods, especially compared to the limited supplies available in San Agustín, were a powerful force in western Florida. By the mid-1680s English trade was becoming ubiquitous throughout the Southeast. If the Spanish wanted to compete with South Carolina, if the Spanish wanted to retain not only influence but also physical presence in Apalachicola, they needed to act quickly.

**Antonio Matheos, English Threats, and Yamasee Spies**

Lieutenant Matheos sought to remove Woodward and all other South Carolina trader from western Florida. He hoped to achieve this goal by removing all foreign influence from Apalachicola. This exclusivity was easier for the Spanish to want than to achieve. Matheos found evidence of commerce with South Carolina in almost every Apalachicola town, but the lieutenant failed to apprehend Woodward or any other English trader. From small trifles that adorned caciques to entire Indian towns suddenly unwilling to cooperate with Spanish efforts, Matheos knew that non-Spanish traders were making headway in this western province. Governor Marques Cabrera sent Matheos to uproot these English weeds and uncover the Indian towns responsible for protecting these dangerous traders.

Though little is known about Matheos, his writings reveal an inflexible, condescending, and self-assured officer. Matheos did not hide his disdain towards the Indian populations; he referred to them as “dogs” and childlike. Surrounded by an apathetic and increasingly hostile Indian population, the Spanish lieutenant begrudgingly consented that the support and cooperation of Apalachicola Indians was central to the success of his mission. Woodward’s presence in the region had heightened both Matheos’ disdain towards Indians— for Indian willingness to welcome the English was just another sign of their weakness—and his belief that without clear Indian support the Spanish would lose not only Apalachicola, but also Apalachee. Since the lieutenant believed that the Indians were weak and easily persuaded, he thought that the most effective strategy the Spanish could employ was to remove temptation: eliminate all English presence.

Matheos was determined to find and eradicate the English agents. As much as Matheos complained about the general and insurmountable perils of la tierra adentro, he found English traders intolerable. Unlike Indians, who were “gente sin razon” (people without reason), or the unexpected difficulties of the “untamed lands” [malesas], the English agents were a variable that the Spanish lieutenant felt he could (or should) be able to control. Matheos had no excuses. He was a Spanish soldier with experience and connections. If anyone was going to catch Woodward, or any of his followers, it was going to be Matheos. But Woodward proved remarkably elusive. And every time Matheos failed, his inability elevated the English power and improved their chances with the Apalachicolans- and Muskogean- speaking northern towns of Coweta and Cussita.

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23 "Those episodes generated considerable intelligence-gathering by the Spanish and British designed to divine each other’ intentions and, for the Spaniards, to monitor the Chattahoochee River people’s compliance with promises given to sever contact with the British," in Hann, "Cloak and Dagger in Apalachicole Province in Early 1686," 76.
In his first expedition up the Chattahoochee River, Matheos found little more than abandoned towns and Indians unwilling to cooperate with his requests.\textsuperscript{24} Although certain that the English were around, all Matheos gathered were denials and false reports. While in the town of Tasquique, he captured some Indians who had been with the English, but in “their declarations none spoke with clarity, each one contradicted what the other stated.” Apalachicola Indians not only withheld whatever they knew about the traders’ whereabouts, but these Indians also tried to confuse Matheos with misinformation. “They say so many lies,” Matheos complained about the Indians he interrogated, “that listening to them would have left me without better judgment.”\textsuperscript{25} But Matheos had to place his “better judgment aside” because if he wanted to find the English, he had to listen.

Watching Matheos struggle to keep his wits about him while trying to find “noticias ciertas” (certain news), it was hard for the Apalachicola Indians not to see the lieutenant’s desperate need for information. After all, Matheos spent most of his time in Apalachicola taking declarations, reconnoitering additional trails, and recruiting spies—both Indian and Spanish. In almost every page of his correspondence Matheos’ commented on both his efforts to secure and the importance of information.\textsuperscript{26} Matheos assumed that his request for news was simple and that Apalachicola Indians were merely “mocking” him by refusing to give reports on the English, but from the Indians’ perspective, the lieutenant’s requests were anything but simple. Apalachicola Indians had to work hard and carefully if they wanted to welcome Matheos’ delegation while entertaining trade partnerships with the English.

Knowing when, if, and how much information to reveal allowed Apalachicolillas to develop alliances with both Florida and South Carolina. News was thus a valuable and powerful commodity for Apalachicolillas. Matheos’ gifts and promises were necessary, but not sufficient to purchase it whole. Though Matheos’ could perform “a good deed,” such as giving the Indians gamusas (skins), “the Indians would still not reveal the path that led to the English.” Withholding information allowed the Apalachicola not only to secure goods from Matheos and keep “the path that led to English” hidden, but also to engage a relationship with the Spanish from a position of power. It was Matheos and Florida officials who needed something the Apalachicolillas had; and it was these Indians’ prerogative to share the information, or not.

As Matheos traveled among Chattahoochee towns, he began to realize that he was on unfriendly turf. The lieutenant protested that “no path” he traveled “would lead [him] to certain news.” Although this phrase sounds abstract, there was nothing symbolic about Matheos’ statement. “Certain news” connoted friendship. And finding neither verifiable reports about the English nor a path that could lead the Spanish party to the enemy surely

\textsuperscript{24} For other attempts to coerce Indian informants see, DuVal, \textit{The Native Ground, Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent}, 33-60; Levy, \textit{Fellow Travelers: Indians and Europeans Contesting the Early American Trials}, Chapters 1 and 2.

\textsuperscript{25} Carta del Teniente de Apa.,[lachee] La entrada que hice en Apalache. Oct 4, 1685. AGI SD 839, folio 517, Reel 9, PKY. “ellos dicen tantas mentiras q a haverles casso de ellos me hubiera traydo sin juicio”

\textsuperscript{26} Carta del Teniente de Apa.,[lachee] La entrada que hice en Apalache. Oct 4, 1685. AGI SD 839, folio 517, Reel 9, PKY. “reciviendoles las Declaraciones ninguno hablo con forma porqu cada uno decia en contra del otro.”
meant that Matheos was traversing through unwelcoming, if not hostile, lands. But determined to learn the whereabouts of the English traders and, in particular, stop the efforts of Woodward, Matheos headed to Coweta. In this main Creek town, the lieutenant distributed Spanish goods, hoping to loosen both Indian tongues and whatever agreement Coweta had reached with Charles Town. Matheos assumed that despite his earlier struggles, he would be welcomed, his goods graciously accepted, and, after the powerful Coweta cacique embraced Florida, other towns would follow suit.

The events unfolded somewhat differently. As Matheos approached the town, three Indian men bearing “a white cross” came to greet the Spanish party. Although Spanish delegations often traveled holding a cross to signal their peaceful intentions, it was Coweta Indians who bore the symbol. These Indians’ actions might have surprised Matheos, since there were no missions or Franciscans in Coweta. Furthermore, it was probably not incidental that the cross was white, a color emblematic of peace in both Spanish and native societies. These Indians, who were aware of Matheos’s travels and quite possibly of his intentions, were imitating a common Spanish ritual to showcase their want for diplomacy and nonviolence. But in addition to the cross, these men handed Matheos “a written paper, which I [the lieutenant] did not understand” since it was in English. Eager to know its meaning, Matheos sent to governor Marques Cabrera to be translated.

This “written paper” was from Henry Woodward. The note mocked Spanish efforts and promised that next time Spanish and English forces met in Apalachee, Woodward would be better supplied and armed. Though neither the Coweta men bearing the letter nor Matheos could understand the content of the message, these delegates had given the Spanish lieutenant a message from the very man he had been trying to apprehend. The exchange of an English note complicated the purpose of the “white cross.” Displaying a Spanish symbol for peace, the Indians also revealed their contact with Woodward. Whether intentional or not, the Cowetas were delivering a mixed, albeit very telling message: they wanted a nonviolent friendship with Florida and trade with South Carolina. Matheos might have urged Coweta to accept only Spanish

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27 Carta del Teniente de Apa.[lachee] La entrada que hice en Apalachicolí. Oct 4, 1685. AGI SD 839, folio 517, Reel 9, PKY. “ni por esta Buena obra fue posible darme racon del camino que llevaba a los Yngleeses.”


29 Ibid. The Coweta men were probably mimicking the Spanish or Apalachee converts processions they had seen; they might have also seen similar displays in Sabacola.


31 Papeles de los Ynglees escritos a los Caciques Apalachicolí traducidos en Castellano September 2, 1685. AGI SD 839, folio 515 Reel 9 PKY “Me pesa mucho que el venido con tan pocos a companiamento lo no esperar su venida de VM o ire seoa que vine a conocer esta tierra sus montañas y costa de la mar y Apalachee, espero en Dios de verme con VM de SU Mag bien acompañado…” translated by Carlos Robson.

influence, to bear only the “white cross,” but the Indians were intent on carrying Woodward’s note and trade with the English. To make headway in Apalachicola Matheos needed to be able reconcile the Indians’ increased options in goods and alliances with the needs and wants of Florida. The lieutenant needed to tread carefully.

But Matheos was not a very subtle man. As soon as he entered the town, Matheos “grabbed a woman, and thinking that I was going to kill her, the Indians who had been with me, came to me. [A]nd, without me asking anything, they told me the English and [their] Indians were in a Palenque, but did not know where it was.” Matheos was, at first, pleasantly surprised. It seemed that his own entourage had news of the English. However, with word of English activity also came news that English and Coweta leaders threatened death if the location of their traders was revealed. It seemed that English traders, much like the Spanish agent, charged a similar price for friendship: information. Information which Matheos wanted to obtain, Woodward needed to remain quiet, and Coweta controlled.  

Although Matheos claimed that the Cowetas’ sudden outpour of information was voluntary, “without me asking,” it was only after the Indians assumed the life of this Coweta woman was in jeopardy that they spoke of an English Palenque. The sudden willingness to collaborate speaks volumes about what the Cowetas took to be Matheos’s priorities: find the English at any cost. The lieutenant followed the Indians’ testimony to Tasquiique, one of the Muskogean speaking towns in northern Apalachicola. But by the time the Spanish party arrived, the English had again fled. Angry, Matheos called the woman he had “grabbed” earlier—she now appears to have been his prisoner. Matheos ordered her to “speak with clarity and reveal where the Palenque was.” The Spanish agent was convinced she possessed knowledge of the English whereabouts since she “had been daily talking with all her relative and neighbors,” and one of them surely must know where the English were hidden.

Matheos believed that through these Indian connections and inter-town relations, the Coweta woman could have easily learned where the English had been hiding. For the Spanish, the fact that Indians possessed their own, more complete, extensive, and better connected networks was both useful and bothersome. Matheos believed, like other Spanish agents had in the early entradas, that Indians possessed the information the Spanish wanted and needed; but more than Indians withholding valuable knowledge, Matheos assumed that Indian networks, the connections his Coweta captive had, could produce as well as locate and retrieve the information he needed. It was not simply that Apalachicolas had a better, inherent understanding of the Southeast; these Indians had the

33 Carta del Teniente de Apa[ilachee] La entrada que hice en Apalachicoli. Oct 4, 1685. AGI SD 839, folio 517, Reel 9, PKY. “coxi a una mugger y pensando que la queria mata la gente que iba conmigo se vino a mi sin preguntarle nada me dixo que los ingleses y Indios estaban en un Palenque pero no savia a donde estaba yba el camino y que el no haverno dicho nadie esta avia sido por que se havia hechado panda de la vida a que me lo dijera fuera hombre o mujer pero ella con el miedo no me lo avia podido encubrir...”

34 The word Palenque literally refers to a fence or a palisade, but it was often used to refer to small towns/runaway settlements.

35 Carta del Teniente de Apa[ilachee] La entrada que hice en Apalachicoli. Oct 4, 1685. AGI SD 839, folio 517, Reel 9, PKY. “me hablara con claridad y me dijera a donde estava el Palenque” ; “determine entrar de dias hasta el lugar de Apalachicola o hasta donde hallara noticias ciertas de lo que avia aunque habia enviado un correo al dicho cacique de Apalachicola,” who had headed back to San Luis. The cacique in Apalachicola was Pentocoio, see Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763, 45.
means to obtain all and any piece of news. Indian networks could satisfy Matheos’s informational needs, even as these needs evolved and changed.

Matheos first demanded, then bargained, and eventually pleaded with his captured Coweta prisoner. Yet all that this woman and her relatives would (or could) reveal was that English traders were somewhere in the Apalachicola province; neither the path that led to them nor their exact location was certain or revealed. Matheos pushed forth, resolved to find these seven (some reports list four) traders. He was “determined to keep moving inland until the place in Apalachicola [where the English were] or until he found certain news.” But he found neither. There were no English, no allies, and no certain news.

Eventually an exhausted and flustered Matheos held a general meeting with the caciques of Coweta, Casista, and several Apalachicola towns. Through this general junta Matheos hoped to obtain “certain news” and establish the “path [that] would lead” to good and open communication— in essence he hoped to accomplish what had eluded him as his delegation moved from town to town. At the junta, Matheos received a welcoming reception and promises of loyalty to Florida; the lieutenant’s anxiety seems to have calmed. He had failed to remove the English traders, but he had succeeded in both recruiting Indian allies and showcasing a renewed, serious, and even militaristic Spanish interest in the region. But never one to exercise patience, Matheos threatened the caciques of Apalachicola that unless they were honest— their promises of friendship with Florida and enmity towards South Carolina were true— “everything would turn to blood and fire.” The caciques readily agreed to the lieutenant’s terms and Matheos felt convinced that, on some level, Florida’s strategy had worked. His expedition had been a quick and well-armed response to English presence in the region, and as soon as the Spanish had entered Apalachicola and flexed their military muscle, the South Carolinians scattered. Although the English traders were still at large, the Spanish had shown they were still a force to be reckoned with. Matheos declared victory and returned to San Luis de Apalachee.

The lieutenant had barely set foot in the Spanish fort when the English traders came out of the Montes and reinitiated their activities. The “Montes,” literally meaning the hills, had been a term employed to describe both the type of geographical landform and a more ambiguous place that extended beyond Spanish control, influence, or even access. Since the Montes were impenetrable by the Spanish, they where were Indians seeking to avoid conversion ran to, where criminals hid, where English traders waited for

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36 Carta del Teniente de Ap[alachee] La entrada que hice en Apalachicoli. Oct 4, 1685. AGI SD 839, folio 517, Reel 9, PKY. “que todo se pasaria a sangre y fuego” A Chisca Indian shows up, saying he ran away from his nation; it is unclear if another Indian, or this Chisca, is from Zaccocola and has had contact with Marcos Delgado. This Indian reports that the English are coming, and that Matheos has been betrayed by the cacique of Apalachicola, Pentocolo. There is one English trader Tasquique, another in Coweta, and two in Colome.


38 The Spanish often had other names for the “Montes.” In other parts of Latin America, the land beyond Spanish control was “la montaña,” see Robert Patch, *Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1648-1812* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), 46; Sellers-Garcia, "Distant Guatemala: Reading Documents from the Periphery", 100-6.
Spanish forces to retreat. As soon as Matheos departed Apalachicola, South Carolina traders went back to work, building a blockhouse and even a fortification near Coweta. Though Matheos had tried to connect Apalachicola to San Agustín (and to San Luis de Apalachee), the English were constructing their own networks.

Matheos did not sit idly by. The lieutenant continued gathering and receiving second-hand reports on English activity, determined that once he re-embarked on his mission to apprehend English traders, he would have better control over the location, movement, and intention of the enemy. Matheos received letters from friars stationed in Santa Cruz de Sabacola, such as the one cited at the beginning of the chapter that commented on ongoing English trade and construction especially in the northern provinces of Coweta. Matheos gathered reconnaissance from the spies he had hired during his first expedition and he also began employing Sabacola and Apalachee Indians to scout the region. Furthermore, the lieutenant traveled briefly to Sabacola, where he met and interviewed Pentocolo, chief of Apalachee. Although Matheos remained wary of this chief, fearing that he might be representing the interests of the cacique of Coweta or other Indian leaders aligned with South Carolina, Pentocolo seems to have had his own agenda. Pentocolo was careful about what he revealed, almost never speaking of English activities and thus not jeopardizing his relations with Coweta or Charles Town; but he became a frequent companion of Matheos’ forays and fashioned himself a mediator between Florida and the increasingly factious Apalachicola province. This position gave Pentocolo some authority, especially vis-à-vis the mightier cacique of Coweta, and also proved lifesaving during Matheos’ second and more violent expedition.

With all these new updates of English activity, Matheos felt prepared for a second journey. He was furious, ready for the “blood and fire” he had threatened. Having tried persuasion and friendship, the lieutenant vowed that this time, he would not be as accommodating. More than apprehending English traders, Matheos now wanted to secure the “submission” of Apalachicola and called for another “talk.” Though Pentocolo and other chief were present for this junta, the four most northern towns of the province of Coweta did not send delegates. Their absence was a thorn in Spanish plans and a personal insult to Matheos’ authority. Matheos did not tolerate their impertinence and launched an attack against: Coweta, Cussita, Colome, and Tasquique— Matheos spared most of the southern towns, including Pentocolo’s town of Apalachicole. The Spanish party found the four northern towns empty, but they still reduced them to ashes. Matheos decided to punish Indians who favored South Carolina as well as those who simply refused to align with Florida. Matheos made destruction the only alternative to friendship with San Agustín.

In his violent attacks Matheos again failed to find the English traders. Although this time, he did stumble upon an English store, which he gladly seized and raided. In Matheos hands this fortunate event turned into disaster. Instead of giving these confiscated goods to the leading Indian caciques, Matheos decided to distribute these

39 Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763, 43.
40 Fray Juan Mercado (from Santa Cruz de Sabacola), November 27, 1685 in Bolton, "Folder 3-7: Documents Concerning the Settlement of Florida, English Encroachments, and Indian Troubles," Folder 4.
41 Carta del Teniente de Apalachee La entrada que hice en Apalache. Oct 4, 1685. AGI SD 839, folio 517, Reel 9, PKY.
42 Declaración del Casique de Apalachicola. n.d.1686. AGI SD 839, folio 542, Reel 9, PKY. See also, Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763, 44-47.
goods as he saw fit. Abandoning protocol and precedent, the lieutenant decided to give goods to those Indians who were openly loyal and friendly to Florida. Spanish goods (or confiscated English goods) would only be given to those Indians who, in Matheos’s view, merited them. 43

Although this strategy seems logical enough, it was doomed from the beginning. Matheos ended-up alienating important Indian towns and favoring instead Indians who were not the strongest or leading voices in the region. To make matters worse, Matheos was not the only European distributing goods among Apalachicola Indians. 44 Woodward, who was in the area, also used gifts to secure alliances; yet by favoring the leading caciques, this English trader gained more and more powerful allies. Matheos’s actions, rooted both in his disdain for Indians and in his frustrating experience in Apalachicola, had negative consequences. Convinced that the right decision was to strengthen and validate relations with loyal Indians, Matheos’ actions sent a confusing message.

Matheos’ gifts showed that the Spanish were willing to reward allies. Yet what constituted a Spanish ally seemed very narrowly defined, and any Indian who did not collaborate with Matheos in the way that he deemed appropriate could be labeled hostile and attacked. Compared to Woodward, Matheos secured fewer and less loyal allies—“the strong ties” the lieutenant had established were not as binding as he had hoped.

Domingo Leturiondo, who through the 1680s served as Defender of the Indians, argued that Matheos’ approach was not sound. Leturiondo advocated for peace and, rather than attacking towns like Cussita or Coweta that did not welcome the Spanish, he urged for the development of trade, so that these powerful Indians would want to interact with San Agustín. It seemed hard to believe that Indians whose towns had been burned by the Spanish would be so impressed by or so fearful of Matheos that they would join his cause— especially when English traders seemed to be offering similar, if not better, goods with fewer limitations and less aggression. But Leturiondo’s pleas were lost. Instead of encouraging friendship with the Spanish, Matheos destroyed towns of potential Indian allies— Indians who would remain removed from Spanish influence until the Yamasee War (1715-1717). The lieutenant had obtained the alliances of selected towns, but instead of establishing a wide network through Apalachicola, he had burned vital nodes and severed crucial connections.

In spite of his personal failures, Matheos continued searching for Indian towns who would pledge their loyalty to San Agustín and exclude all English traders— towns that would enable the Spanish to network the province through strong alliances. In 1686, after burning the four major Apalachicola towns, Matheos decided to adopt a less conspicuous and much less costly approach: he employed spies. He hired four Yamasee spies to scout Apalachicola for potential allies who could be bound together in an anti-English alliance.

43 Facing a growing unknown, the Spanish employed a common strategy: they brought their allies— who they knew and trusted—as close to San Agustín as possible. The Spanish countered the English threat by strengthening their strong ties and close connections.

44 For other examples of the importance of personality/ individual agency in the Spanish conquest, see Inga Clendinnen, Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1570, 2 ed., vol. Volume 61 of Cambridge Latin American studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 67.
The spies engaged in at least two reconnaissance missions in 1686. There is little personal information known about these four men besides the fact that they were listed as Yamasee, knew how to travel along the Chattahoochee River and among Apalachicola towns, and understood several Indian languages as well as Spanish and possibly some English. Although not personally venturing out of San Luis de Apalachee, Matheos’s strategy for controlling Apalachicola remained the same: first, create strong and clear relations with Indians who welcomed and submitted to Spanish care, and second, ignore and punish towns that chose to form other arrangements, whether those were partnerships with English or French forces or simply a refusal of friendship with San Agustín. But instead of locating clear nodes that could be connected in a tight Spanish network, the Yamasee spies found divisions and internal tensions budding in Apalachicola.

Matheos had ordered the spies to visit as many towns along the Chattahoochee as possible, including the ones he had recently attacked. It is not surprising that the spies did not receive much welcome in either Coweta or Cussita; Indians in these northern

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45 Map adapted from John H. Hann, "Cloak and Dagger in Apalachicole Province in Early 1686," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 78, no. 1 (1999).
46 It is a complicated label because the Yamasee were not yet “confederated;” for a discussion of Yamasee origins see Hoffman, *Florida's Frontiers*, 155.
settlements told the spies that since they “were from Apalache and, consequently, their
enemies” they would not be permitted in the town.\textsuperscript{47} Disregarding this warning, the spies
decided to test their luck and, following Matheos instructions, they traveled northward.
They arrived just in time to find Coweta and Cussita engrossed in “playing el juego de la
pelota.” This game, unimaginatively dubbed by the Spanish as “the ball game,” had been
an issue of contention between Indians and Franciscans. Missionaries considered the
game sinful and sought to eradicate it; however, this game had persisted. Resembling the
modern game of lacrosse, “el juego de la pelota” was a very physically demanding
activity often played between towns to solidify relations or resolve tensions.\textsuperscript{48}

The fact that Coweta and Cussita were engaged in this relationship strengthening
activity when these spies arrived is particularly revealing. Unmoved by the presence of
the spies, Coweta and Cussita Indians continued playing the game, demonstrating their
unity in the face of opposition. The spies sat waiting for the game to finish, “without
anyone having come to speak to them during this meantime, although one of these spies
had some relatives there.”\textsuperscript{49} The spies might have hoped that their “relatives” would have
helped them gain insight into these towns; yet their personal bonds were not enough to
mitigate the anger Coweta and Cussita felt towards the Spanish and, in turn, to Indians
who allied with San Agustín. The spies reported that, “in addition to not having anything
to eat in the wake of its burning, no one would speak to them because they knew that they
were coming on some investigation.” Coweta and Cussita, hungry after the burning of
their fields and aware that they were under “some investigation,” remained silent.\textsuperscript{50}

The other two towns attacked by the Spanish, Tasquique and Colome, proved far
more welcoming to the Yamasee spies. The caciques of Tasquique and Colome told the
spies that “although the Christians had burned their villages, they had patience [with
them], because they [themselves] had their guilt, although the ones entirely responsible
were the caciques of Casista and Cabeta, who had deceived and entangled all the rest in
bringing the Englishmen and forcing them to receiving them.”\textsuperscript{51} The caciques of
Tasquique and Colome recognized Matheos strategy, excused, or at least tolerated, his
violence, and admitted that they bore some of “the guilt” for the tense relations with the
Spanish. The actions of Casista and Coweta, on the other hand, were inexcusable. In their
desire for English goods, Casista and Coweta had “entangled” all of Apalachicola; Casista
and Coweta had gained influence and firepower, while Colome and Tasquique had paid
the cost. The declarations by Colome and Tasquique headmen revealed that Apalachicola
towns were not unified. While Coweta and Casista denied entrance to the Spanish, the
caciques of Tasquique and Colome pledged an alliance with Florida. These factions
enabled the Spanish (and the English) to get their foot in the door, but eventually

\textsuperscript{47} Quoted from source in Hann, "Cloak and Dagger in Apalachicole Province in Early 1686," 82.
\textsuperscript{48} Some Indian groups referred to this game as “Little brother of war,” see Thomas Jr. Vennum, \textit{American
Indian Lacrosse: Little Brother of War} (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1994).
\textsuperscript{49} Antonio Mathoes to Juan Márquez Cabrera. May 19, 1686, reprinted in Hann, "Cloak and Dagger in
Apalachicole Province in Early 1686," 82.
\textsuperscript{50} Antonio Mathoes to Juan Márquez Cabrera. May 19, 1686, reprinted in Ibid., 82. The fact that neither
casista nor Coweta were rebuilt probably indicates that these towns moved eastward, see Thomas Nairne,
\textit{Nairne’s Muskogean Journals: The 1708 Expedition to the Mississippi River}, ed. Alexander Moore
(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1988).
\textsuperscript{51} Antonio Mathoes to Juan Márquez Cabrera. May 19, 1686, reprinted in Hann, "Cloak and Dagger in
Apalachicole Province in Early 1686," 83.
undermined Florida’s efforts to, as Paul Hoffman has argued, “incorporate the Apalachicola into the inland frontier.” Hoffman, *Florida’s Frontiers*, 162.

San Agustín could establish individual connections to specific towns. But no singular trade or communication network could bind the whole province.

As proof of their good intentions, the caciques of Tasquique and Colome provided the spies with vital information. The headmen told the Yamasee spies about an English trader who had been hunting near “the Chicassa of Calosa” and about the gunshots they had heard just over the Flint River—only several miles east of the Chattahoochee. 

Although the caciques expressed uncertainty as to whether these were English or Indians (Chichimeco or Chisca) shots, they were certain that English traders and soldiers were close to their towns. This was just the kind of report the spies wanted to hear, and they rushed to Apalachee to share their findings with Matheos. But in Matheos’s eyes, Tasquique and Colome had made one too many promises to the Spanish.

Matheos disregarded this news as having “little foundation.” The reports of English activity had come from Indians seeking Spanish favor. These caciques wanted only Spanish goods and protection; they did not have Spanish interest at heart. Matheos told the Yamasee spies that since “their brothers and relatives there [in the town rumored to be housing the English]...[have] said nothing at all to them,” he concluded that this report was probably false. As he had done with the Coweta woman captive, Matheos placed his trust on the Indians’s kinship networks; the lieutenant believed that these inter-Indian connections would afford him with reliable news. Matheos dismissed the warning from the caciques of Colome and Tasquique because it could not be confirmed by more dependable Indian sources. Since the goal of Matheos’s reconnaissance was well-known and he never hid his desire to apprehend South Carolina traders, the lieutenant needed to be wary of the source and bias of his news. He could not merely accept and/or reward every report of English activity because if he did, his supplies would run-out quickly and he would have more reports than he could process or pursuit. Matheos instructed that “as to the gifts that your lordship says are to be given to them, it appears to me that it will be better not to give them anything unless one shows signs that he deserves it.” 

The uncorroborated warning of Colome and Tasquique did not really “deserve it.”

The four spies had decided to reconnoiter the province as individuals, rather than as a group. This arrangement enabled them to cover more ground and visit more towns. The first two reports came from the two spies who had traveled to the northern Chattahoochee towns and had observed Coweta and Casista playing *el juego de la pelota*; another spy, who was a cacique, had traveled to Ocute and decided to survey the region from that town—if his findings were ever recorded, they have not been found. The other report to reach Matheos came from a spy who traveled past Coweta and into the Yamasee towns. The spy who traveled to the Yamasee towns, unlike those who had journeyed to Coweta and Casista, did not send introductory correos to the headmen of the town. Quite to the contrary, the spy headed to the Yamasee *casillas* (little houses) by concealing his identity. When asked why he had traveled so far without any companions, the Yamasee spy replied that he wanted to leave Apalachee and Spanish influence behind, “and that he

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52 Hoffman, *Florida’s Frontiers*, 162.
53 Antonio Mathoes to Juan Márquez Cabrera. May 19, 1686, reprinted in Hann, “Cloak and Dagger in Apalachicole Province in Early 1686,” 83.
54 Antonio Mathoes to Juan Márquez Cabrera. May 19, 1686, reprinted in Ibid., 86.
had fled from his companions for this reason.”55 Since he had severed personal ties with the Spanish, this spy was warmly welcomed into several Apalachicola towns that actively traded with the English.

In spite of the kind reception, the scout felt that further precautions were warranted. He “placed a Gamusa [skins] over his shoulders into to disguise himself [even] more for everyone in that place ordinarily dressed in this fashion.” The disguised worked. The spy fooled a young warrior, who “took the spy to be a native of that country since neither his tongue nor dress was strange.”56 As he followed this young man back to town, the spy came face to face with far more reliable evidence of English trade: “the Yameses were carrying twenty-seven muskets (escopetas) and thirty pistols (pesttolas) and one machete, each one a hat and waist-jackets (justadores).”57 English goods as well as English traders were everywhere. The spy even conversed with one such trader, who commended the Indian for leaving the Spanish and told him be in “good cheer,” for more goods and trade were on the way.

During his stay, the Spanish agent also heard reports of the joint Yamasee-English attacks against the Spanish towns in Santa Catalina Island. This violence had been particularly devastating for the Spanish. Not only was Santa Catalina Island home to the largest of Guale’s missions, but the attack had been carried-out by the powerful Yamasee Indians, who until recently had allied with the Spanish. Though not every Yamasee favored San Jorge—this spy hired by Matheos was also Yamasee—relations between Yamasees and San Agustín soured after 1684. As this spy overheard boasts of more Yamasee-English attacks to come, he rushed to Apalachee.

Matheos was keener on this spy’s report. The scout had seen and even conversed with the English traders. Through his warning of the dangers to come, this spy had provided Matheos with more than the latest news; his report had also given Matheos a way to test the veracity of recent Indian promises. The cacique at Coweta, for example, had vowed that he would send word to the Spanish as soon as he heard or knew of English activity in the region. Matheos now knew about English presence and their whereabouts; the cacique of Coweta needed to send a similar report, “and if he does not do so, there is no need to provide proofs of his tricks (trapanzas).” His dishonestly would be revealed by the lack of “good communication.”58

Although Matheos was never able to apprehend Woodward, the information gathered by his spies confirmed the existence and importance of English trade connections (after all, Coweta and Casista had chosen destruction over cessation of trade). Furthermore, the Spanish spies helped Matheos distinguish true, loyal Indian town from those just pretending friendship— a distinction Matheos had had a hard time making on his own. As English and Spanish agents vied for access and control, Indian

55 Antonio Mathoes to Juan Márquez Cabrera. May 21, 1686, reprinted in Ibid., 89.
56 Autos y la entrada de los enemigos Yngleses en la provincial de Timucua, Apalachicoli, y Coweta…March 29, 1686, AGI SD 839, folio 630-4, Reel 9, PKY. “escondio la conga flecha y carcase y tiro la buelta de ducho lugar de Apalachicola poninedose una Gamusa sobre los hombros para disimular mas porque andan ordinariamente de esa manera todos los de aquella provincia y yendo cerca de dicho lugar encontro a n muchacho que lo tube a dicha espia por natural de aquel pais pa no estrañarlo en el traje ni en la lengua”
57 Antonio Mathoes to Juan Márquez Cabrera. May 21, 1686, reprinted in Hann, “Cloak and Dagger in Apalachicole Province in Early 1686,” 90.
58 Antonio Mathoes to Juan Márquez Cabrera. May 21, 1686, reprinted in Ibid., 92.
towns competed with each other; southern Apalachicola looked unkindly towards their northern brethren, and allies turned into foes.

The “good communication” Matheos’ had longed for was threatened by the competition with South Carolina and by the increasing factions within and among Indian towns. Though in the late 1680s Spanish Apalachicola was not as destroyed as Spanish Guale — provided that Florida’s holdings in this western province were far fewer and less established than those on the Atlantic coast—, the tight Spanish network Matheos sought to establish in Apalachicola was far from complete. The lieutenant had gathered the support of some, select headmen and had established a network of communication with a handful of towns. But by dealing in absolutes, forcing Indians to either join Florida or face destruction, the lieutenant had not only failed to establish an exclusively Spanish network, but had also encouraged towns like Coweta and Casista to seek friendship with other European forces. By the late 1680s, the Spanish were just one of many players competing over the Chattahoochee Valley.

Marcos Delgado and “Opening roads” to Nowhere

The English were not Florida’s only European rival in Apalachicola. French plans to settle western Florida had finally taken flight in the 1680s. Rumors of French intentions had grown louder, and by the mid-1680s these threats were all that the Spanish in western Florida could hear. French vessels had been spotted surveying the Gulf of Mexico; a Spanish pilot captured by French forces came back to San Agustín with reports of a potential French settlement; and French pirates apprehended in La Chua Rancheria confirmed such intentions. In 1686, as Matheos’s spies surveyed Apalachicola, Governor Marques Cabrera ordered Antonio Delgado to uncover the efforts of La Salle.59

In 1684, La Salle sailed to the Southeast to establish a French colony on the Mississippi River. Overshooting their intended destination, the party landed instead near present-day Galveston, Texas. Within three years, the colony had crumbled. The French leader had been murdered and the few settlers who had managed to survive the disease ridden area had either joined or been killed by neighboring Indians.60 The Spanish, unaware of the demise of the French endeavor, sent several expeditions to find and destroy this settlement; though most parties were organized in Mexico, Marcos Delgado led the only party that departed from Florida.

Delgado’s journey into western Florida (and present day Alabama) was the first Spanish entrada into this region since the journey of de Soto and Luna over 130 years prior.61 The region had welcomed these early conquistadors with disease, death, disappointment— a far cry from the glory, God, and gold they had envisioned. It was thus unsurprising that the cash-strapped Florida colony had little incentive and even less capacity to continue exploration of the area. The coming of the French, however, gave

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59 There were several missions (all unsuccessful) to find the French; most left from Mexico, but Delgado departed from Florida; Dunn, Spanish and French Rivalry in the Gulf Region of the United States, 1678-1702: The Beginnings of Texas and Pensacola.
60 The ruins were uncovered in 1689, Ibid.
Florida a reason that outweighed its lacking ability. Delgado’s mission, following in the footsteps (or missteps) of the previous entradas, was, on many levels, a complete failure.

Delgado failed to find the French or any trace of European settlement. He failed to reach Mexico, which was his secondary objective. He spent a large part of the journey ill, and the remaining part of his time bartering for basic necessities, such as food and water. However, in his many disappointments there were also minor triumphs. Delgado made contacts and alliances with Tawasa and Mobile Indians. Like Matheos, Delgado sought to create a Spanish-allied network that linked Apalachee, in his case, with the Mississippi River. Offering goods and promises, Delgado tried a less violent approach to opening communications and binding Indian towns to Spanish loyalty. This strategy was as much rooted in Delgado’s belief that peaceful dealings would bring better relations as it was necessitated by his vulnerable and weak position. When the Spanish were not searching for food, means of transportation, and guides who could lead them to the French settlement, they were trying to obtain reliable news about the tribulations that awaited them. In fact these ordeals were related; good communication could not produce corn, but “certain news” could produce a friendship that led to food, support, and survival.

As Delgado made his way westward from Apalachicola, his official objective to find and expel the French morphed into the far less ambitious, but practical need to establish good and clear communications with western Indians. Though three European powers expressed interest in this region, none had an established presence or a repertoire with the native populations. Instead, western Florida was plagued by rumors of French activity, possible English attacks, and even potential Spanish raids (supposedly led by Delgado himself). Thus Delgado had to manage two related goals. First, he had to disprove false reports concerning Spanish actions, and second, he had to distinguish the real dangers from the imagined or feared threats.

Though the first objective was the more straightforward of two, explaining Spanish intentions was not a simple task. Many groups reacted with mistrust towards Delgado’s message of peace. Mobile Indians explained that their hesitation was based on their first-hand experience. They had “heard of the friendliness of the Christians,” but once in Apalachicola they had witnessed Matheos’s attacks and brutality. The Mobile then concluded that the Spanish were no better than the English, except “that the presents of the English were better, that in trading gave more powder, balls, and muskets.” Having to choose between two aggressive European partners, the Mobiles preferred the one who gave them more ammunition. Delgado did not deny that the English had better presents, but he reminded the Mobile that it was English and Chichimeco attacks that had pushed them from their lands. In the context of English actions, the poorly-supplied

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62 Tawasa (also known as Tavasa), on the confluence of Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers, was the location of the Upper Creeks. John R. Swanton, “Comments on the Delgado Papers,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 16, no. 2 (1937): 127.
63 Most of the journal is concerned with the struggle to find food and locate welcoming hosts. These concerns underscore the difficulty of traveling through the region—a difficulty that was shared by Spaniards and Indians alike. Drought and failed crops coupled by slaving raids had made life for Creeks and Indians east of the Mississippi particularly challenging.
64 Reports which were both spread by the English and by the actions of Matheos himself, Boyd, "Expedition of Marcos Delgado, 1686."
65 Delgado’s Report, Accompanying a Letter from Don Juan Márquez to SM. January 5, 1687. In Ibid., 28.
Spanish were the lesser of two evils. The Spanish soldier promised that relations with Florida “would be quiet and peaceful, and that the friendship of the Christians was not like that of the English.” In a world fraught with uncertainty, “quiet and peace” were desired qualities. The Mobile consented and thus “opened the road to their lands and provinces.”\textsuperscript{66} An “open road” meant open exchange and communication; an open road was a sign of peace.

Delgado’s second objective, to tell rumor apart from fact, to discern when a threat was real or merely a mirage created by the competing interests in the region, depended on opening these roads. Delgado had to first, find these paths between and among towns, a feat unto itself, and then make sure that these trails (and the settlements they connected) were in fact open to and for Spanish travel. Before departing San Luis de Apalachee, ten Pensacola Indians arrived to the Spanish town and, when they learned of Delgado’s plans to travel overland via Pensacola, they attempted to dissuade him. The Indians insisted that there was no food along the trail and even if Delgado reached Pensacola, the Indians there would not be able to feed him having recently endured a difficult harvest.

But Matheos, who was with Delgado at the time, was unmoved by these Indians’ warnings. Matheos simply replied “that the Spaniards should go to his village or that we have to lose his friendship.” In his typical character, Matheos offered the Indians no alternative. Denying Delgado access to Pensacola was like a denial of the established friendship with the Spanish. Matheos stated that if they wanted Florida’s friendship, business, and goods, the Pensacola Indians needed to keep an open road. After his demands, the lieutenant gleefully remarked that the Indians “knew not where to turn nor how to mollify him,” and eventually agreed to Delgado’s request.\textsuperscript{67} Matheos’ threats had kept the road opened for the Spanish.

Another of Delgado’s successes came towards the end of his journey, when he helped to reconnect a severed path. After a difficult journey he had reached the edge of the Apalachicola province, and expressed the desire to travel further west to Mobile. Though the Indians on the Tallapoosa and Coosa River had welcomed the Spanish, they explained to Delgado he could not penetrate any further. Four chiefs met Delgado in Culassa, a town on the Coosa River, and warned him that “Movilia Indians” had recently killed a “two of the companions and one of them was a Christian called Clemente.”\textsuperscript{68} These Indians told Delgado that the Mobile Indians were warlike and had no regard for Christians.

Delgado sent couriers and spies into the region, but instead of hostile Indians, the Spanish found “provinces very deficient in provisions.”\textsuperscript{69} Though the Spanish party had struggled all trip to secure enough food and water, Delgado believed that by sharing whatever goods and provisions he had, he could ease the tensions between these two warring nations and find the path to Mobile. Against the advice of the Indians of Tavasa, he summoned the Mobile chiefs.

\textsuperscript{66} Delgado’s Report, Accompanying a Letter from Don Juan Márquez to SM. January 5, 1687. In Ibid., 28.
\textsuperscript{67} The importance of open paths and recognition of certain towns over others parallels the story Josh Piker tells in Joshua A. Piker, ““White & Clean” & Contested: Creek Towns and Trading Paths in the Aftermath of the Seven Years’ War,” Ethnohistory 50, no. 2 (2003).
\textsuperscript{68} Social/Cultural institutions were falling apart, “weeping and they said to me they would no be consoled because they could not revenge the deaths of their relatives,” Boyd, "Expedition of Marcos Delgado, 1686," 16.
\textsuperscript{69} Letter from Marcos Delgado to Juan Márques Cabrera. October 15, 1686. In Ibid., 10.
And they came. Chiefs from Thome, Ysachi, Ygsusta, and Canuca arrived, and, as soon as they saw the Spaniards they rejoiced much and to me they said that it appeared that they had come forth from a very dark night, for they came very gloomy and melancholy fearing treachery that might be plotted to kill them as at other times had attempted those of this province because they are their mortal enemies and that at all times they kill them.70

Morning had arrived. The “dark night” was over. The Mobile rejoiced to see that the Spanish were in fact there, that Delgado had not been some premise devised by the Creeks to start a war. After the Mobile declared their peaceful intentions, Delgado held talks between the two groups. The Spanish agent argued that prolonged fighting had led to miscommunication, which had fostered mistrust among the groups and created ignorance of the land, its resources, and of the paths that crossed it. Peace and good communications would solve both mistrust and ignorance. Unlike Matheos, who had navigated the divided Apalachicola province, Delgado had first brought Indians together to establish an information network. As Mobile and Creek chiefs embraced and “clasped hands in friendship,” Delgado cried victory.

But it was an empty cry. As soon as Delgado asked the chiefs of now friendly Mobile for help crossing their land, they kindly and honorably declined. Peace or no peace, the Mobile cacique insisted that there was not enough food in the province to sustain the Spanish party. Furthermore, the Mobile were at war with the Chata (Choctaw), who, the Mobile caciques assured Delgado, would not be amenable to a Spanish party travelling through their lands. Delgado was now faced with the exact same dilemma he had encountered when he had started his journey. This time Mobiles, rather than Pensacolas, argued that although they were friendly to the Spanish, they could not assist Delgado in his travels across their lands. The roads might have been open, but they led nowhere.

Delgado decided not to press his luck. Instead of warning the Mobile that denying Spanish access was an affront to Spanish friendship, as Matheos had done with the Pensacola, Delgado acquiesced to his new allies’ request.71 Instead of clear alliances and a network bound to the Spanish, this soldier had allowed for communications that depended, almost exclusively on the grace and goodwill of Indians. Delgado asked his new allies about French efforts in the region and with relief recorded that Mobiles “have never [even] heard rumors of a settlement of Spaniards, neither of English nor of any other nation.”72 Long ago a vessel had been seen off the gulf, but it had been years since any European had entered the land.

Delgado was content. His journey had not been a failure; he had not reached La Salle’s colony simply because there were no French or English settlements in the province. But he decided to conclude his report with a positive, rather than negative

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70 Delgado’s Report, Accompanying a Letter from Don Juan Márquez to SM. January 5, 1687. In Ibíd., 19.
71 In fact, food, or the lack thereof, was a constant strain on Delgado’s progress. This recurrent need emphasizes the dire situation of the region.
assertion. Delgado stated “we have passed to overcome the greater difficulties so that today communication will be easy.” He had not dislocated the French, but had cleared difficult paths, opened roads, and established better communication. Rather than eliminating the competition, which Matheos inadvertently proven to be a losing strategy, Delgado had secured important friendships and strengthened existing bonds. By opening communication, he had secured peace and friendship. By securing peace and friendship, he had opened communications.

But these were communications that the Spanish did not oversee or even participate in. Though Matheos expressed frustration by this lack of control over Indian country and Delgado seemed to have more readily accepted a weaker position, neither one succeeded in securing “good communication” between Indians and Spanish. Establishing a Spanish network in Apalachicola was trickier than predicted; Matheos and Delgado needed to do more than urge, barter, and even demand Indians to ally with Florida. The Spanish had to work with Apalacheo Indians in ways they had never done in Guale, Timucua, or even Apalache. Florida had to accept ambiguous friendships, welcome mixed messages, and even open roads that, at least for the Spanish, led nowhere. In the face of French and English threats, few Spanish officials found this uncertainty comforting. And by 1690, with the abandonment of Apalachicola Fort, it was clear that the Spanish efforts in western Florida had been unsuccessful.

A Fallen Fort, a Worthless Node

Seeing their efforts in western Florida obtain only limited results, Spanish officials thought it wise to establish a fortified garrison in the area. The hope was that constant and military Spanish presence would deter English incursions, also encourage Indian loyalty, and showcase Spanish dedication to the region. Constructed in 1689 under the guidance of Captain Enrique Primo de Ribera, Fort Apalachicola seemed a clear success at first. From this garrison, the Spanish easily secured a trading and military alliance with the Apalacheo Indians; interacting frequently with these Indians and even exchanging news and gifts, Captain Ribera was proud of the Spanish success. But appearances were deceiving.

In the late 1680s, South Carolina traders were expanding rapidly into the area. Don Francisco de Romo, Captain of Apalache, produced a worrisome report that despite all Spanish endeavors, “commerce” between English and Spanish Indians was only growing. The Fort Apalachicola’s second commander, Don Faviano de Angelo, expressed little concern; the Spanish had established a clear presence in the area and had built a positive and regular repertoire with Apalache Indians. Perhaps Angelo, not wanting to disappoint his superiors, kept all his reports favorable, silencing any mention of brewing discord. But even the most attentive and honest commander could have

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73 Delgado’s Report, Accompanying a Letter from Don Juan Márquez to SM. January 5, 1687. In Ibid., 29.
74 Hann, “Cloak and Dagger in Apalachicola Province in Early 1686,” 76 “This renewed Spanish interest, although did not lead to end of European presence in the region, it “generated considerable intelligence-gathering”.
75 Trip to Apalachicola of Capitan Primo Enrique de Ribera, June 8, 1690, AGI 54-5-12/116, bnd 2907, Reel 21, Stetson Collection, PKY
76 Don Francisco de Romo, Captain of Apalache, September 29, 1689, AGI 54-5-12/97, bnd 2852, Reel 20, Stetson Collection, PKY
missed the small glimpses the Spanish received into the Indians’ future decisions. Florida
officials had reports, for example, that the four towns burned by Matheos were not
rebuilding or preparing for the harvest. These actions, or rather inactions, hinted that
Coweta and Casista Indians might be planning to move their location of their towns. 77
But as much as the Spanish could speculate about the meaning of these Indians’
activities, San Agustín had no hard facts. 78

All seemed quiet in Apalachicola; all seemed agreeable to the Spanish. Until
1691, when the Spanish officers in Fort Apalachicola awoke to a shocking realization: the
Apalachicolans, the very same Indians who had vowed loyalty to Florida, were gone.
Cowetas and Apalachicolans had relocated near the Ocmulgee, Oconee, Ogeechee, and
Savannah Rivers—closer to South Carolina’s profitable trade. 79 John Stewart, a Scottish
trader, reported that the Coweta “being 2500 fighting men, [had] deserted the Spanish
protection and com’d setl’d 10 days Jurnay nearer us to Injoy the English frier
protection.” 80 Apalachicolans and Cowetas had “deserted the Spanish” and moved to
where English goods were more easily accessible. Though the Spanish failed to read the
small signs, the success of the Apalachicola and Coweta Indians’ stealth relocation
speaks more of the Indians’ ability and care, than of Spanish incapacity to assess the
situation.

The cleverness of Apalachicolans’ deception, however, did not comfort Florida
officials. They had missed a mass exodus occurring under their very nose. What good
was a Spanish fort if it could not even keep track of what was occurring in its own
backyard? Florida governor Quiroga y Losada decided that it was better to abandon the
outpost and take it down so that “enemy Indians could not be capable of making the fort
theirs.” Quiroga y Losada feared that the garrison, an ineffectual monitor of friendly
Indians, would easily fall under enemy fire. The governor ordered the careful dismantling
of the outpost so that this failed experiment could, in no way, be turned against Florida. 81

Fort Apalachicola, a carefully constructed Spanish node in Apalachicola, no
longer stood by mid-1692. The Spanish efforts to connect, communicate, and network
Apalachicola had mostly failed. Though Spanish Franciscans, soldiers, and agents had
journeyed through the region, Apalachicola Indians had made their own decisions about
which relations to protect, when to honor those alliances, and what information to share.
As Fort Apalachicola had demonstrated, Spanish nodes, let alone an entire network, were
worthless without Indian support. The Spanish were active and present in western
Florida, but removed from Coweta, Casista, and other burgeoning hubs of exchange, they
were also increasingly isolated. The Spanish could stand in Apalachicola, but by the
1690s, they stood alone.

77 Antonio Mathoes to Juan Márquez Cabrera. May 19, 1686, reprinted in Hann, “Cloak and Dagger in
Apalachicole Province in Early 1686,” 83.
78 Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763, 49-52.
79 Hahn, “The Mother of Necessity: Carolina, the Creeks, and the Making of a New Order in the Southeast,
1670-1763,” 95.
80 “Letters from John Stewart to William Dunlop,” The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical
81 “de forma que no pueda capz de poder defenderse n haserse fuerte [de] las naciones de Indios enemigos
en ella” El gobernador Diego Quiroga y Losada decide Evacuar el presidio de Apalachicola, April 10,
1692, AGI 54-5-13, bnd 3067, Reel 22, Stetson Collection PKY.
Chapter 4: The Carolina Connection, English Networks in the Southeast, 1670-1711

“I never repented so much of anything, my Sins only excepted, as my coming to this Place…The People here, generally speaking, are the Vilest race of Men upon Earth they have neither honour, nor honesty nor Religion enough to entitle them to any tolerable Character, being a perfect Medley of Hotch potch made up of Bankrupts, pirates, decayed Libertines, Sectaries and Enthusiasts of all sorts… [they] are the most factious and Seditious people in the whole Worlds.”
—Gideon Johnston, 1708

“English Officers are appointed over the Indians… This is reckon’d a very considerable Part of our Strength, for there being some thousands of these, who are hardy, active, and good Marksmen, excellent at an Ambuscade, and who are brought together with little or no Charge… [Together] Our Forces entirely broke and ruin’d the Strength of the Spaniard in Florida, destroy’d the whole Country, burnt the Towns, brought all the Indians, who were not kill’d or made Slaves, into our own Territories, so that there remains not now, so much as one Village with then Houses in it, in all Florida…”
— Thomas Nairne, 1710

Gideon Johnston and Thomas Nairne were contemporaries describing the state of South Carolina forty years after settlement. Johnston, a missionary for the Society of the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG), could only see the disarray of Charles Town. South Carolinians had no “tolerable Character.” Johnston deeply regretted being assigned to the region. He believed that there was no hope for this deplorable place. Nairne, an Indian trader, Commissioner, and member of the House of Commons, disagreed. He saw strength where Johnston saw debauchery. While Johnston criticized the actions of “the Vilest race of Men upon Earth,” Nairne praised South Carolina’s potential.

To improve the conditions of the “most factious and Seditious people in the whole Worlds,” Johnston called for stricter control of Indian traders and advocated for government oversight. Nairne praised the expansion of South Carolina, arguing that “a very considerable Part of [English] Strength” came from the very Indian trade that Johnston so deeply abhorred. Indian relations were not the cause of South Carolina’s troubles, Nairne insisted, they were its source of strength. The contrast between these two men was more than a mere difference of opinion. The tensions between wanting to carefully monitor the “Hotch potch” that comprised South Carolina and enabling this “Medley” to seek profit were representatives of a much larger struggle.

2 Thomas Nairne, A Letter from South Carolina... (London: Printed for A. Baldwin, 1710), 30-34.
3 Alan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, the Rise of the English Empire in the American South 1670-1717 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), for more on Naire see Chapter 6.
Since the 1670s, the English expanded relentlessly into the Southeastern interior.\(^4\) In a short time Charles Town had successfully redefined the networks that had previously bound the region. South Carolinians orientated the Indian trade away from Spanish Florida and English Virginia and, in the process, developed their own, extensive, and profitable trade connections. South Carolina’s commercial and communication networks afforded the English a wide, albeit fragmented view of the Southeast. These networks were far-reaching, but they were also diffused and unregulated. This chapter argues that South Carolina’s economic initiatives established a trade that was immensely lucrative, but fostered relations that were hard to control, to monitor, and even to discern. There was great peril, not just power, in the networks established by the English.

**Untrustworthy Indians, Unknown Connections, and Certain Enemies**

The first decades of English settlement in South Carolina were marked by uncertainty, wars, and disruption. The English had a limited understanding of what the territory recently dubbed “Carolina” encompassed or who the various Indian groups who lived in the region were. To make sense of a world they knew little about, the English turned their gaze to their Spanish neighbors. San Agustín became a point of reference, a lens through which the English both evaluated their surroundings and sought to understand their native neighbors.\(^5\)

The fear of Florida filtered how the English saw and positioned themselves in the Southeast. In one of the earliest letters from South Carolina, Joseph Dalton described the precarious state of the new colony, “here settled in the very chaps of the Spaniard whose clandestine actions both domesticke and forraigne are not unknown.”\(^6\) This often-cited quote has been used to emphasize proximity between Spanish and English settlements in the Southeast—Charles Town was less than 300 miles from San Agustín and over 500 from the nearest English hub: Jamestown. Dalton’s comment about the colony’s location


\(^6\) Joseph Dulton, "Joseph Dalton to Lord Ashley," in *Collections of the South Carolina Historical Society* (Charleston: South Carolina Historical Society, 1897), 183.
was more than a mere geographical observation. His remarks juxtaposed English experience with Spanish actions.

Dalton revealed that, as little as he understood about the Southeast, one point was clear: Charles Town was “Settled in the very chaps” of a known enemy. Uncertain about South Carolina’s capacity for survival, Dalton had no qualms about the danger posed by the Spaniards and their “clandestine actions.” The danger of having a Spanish neighbor was undeniable. While the physical closeness did little to foster amity between Spanish and English settlers, it did provide South Carolina with a way to understand the region. Florida operated like a lens that focused South Carolina’s otherwise blurry understanding of the region. The “not unknown” Spanish threat afforded English explorers and early colonists a tangible way to make sense of a vast and unfamiliar world.\(^7\)

But as this lens focused, it also biased English understanding. Fear of Spanish Florida colored William Hilton’s 1663 exploration of Carolina.\(^8\) Sailing along the Combahee River (near St. Helena Sound), Hilton encountered a party of Edisto Indians. The Edisto claimed to have taken prisoner several English castaways and requested payment for the prisoners’ safe return. Hilton refused. He dismissed the Edisto allegations as fictitious, merely the work of manipulating San Agustín officials. Hilton was certain that there were no English hostages, simply a Spanish ploy to undermine English exploration. Convinced that there was something deceitful about an Indian delegation that arrived in the cover of night and aware that no other English vessel had been in the area, Hilton decided to deny the Edisto’s demands.

A day after dismissing the Indians, Hilton’s conviction faltered. The Edisto produced an English captive who readily confirmed the Indians’s claims. There were, in fact, several English held hostages and, to make matters more complicated, Spanish officials had little to do with the actions of the Edisto. Hilton had been wrong. San Agustín had not instructed the Edisto, as Hilton had suspected; the Indians had acted on their own accord. Although Spanish metals adorned almost every Indian delegate who came aboard the English craft, Spanish presents did not translate into Spanish ability to influence or control this Indian group. The Edisto interacted with, but were not close allies of the Spanish. After several failed attempts to use Edisto Indians to open communications with San Agustín officials, Hilton began to understand that the simple dichotomy he had assumed was true—Indians allied with the Spanish would be hostile and Indians disconnected from San Agustín would prove loyal friends—did not hold-up.

The European goods held by the Edisto were not a sign that these Indians collaborated with the Spanish, but rather, that the Spanish collaborated with the Edisto. San Agustín officials were not dictating Indian actions; Hilton soon learned that the Spanish officials were complying with Indian demands and were instructing the English to do the same. “Wherefore I advise you,” wrote captain Antonio Argüelles, “that if these Indians (although Infidels and Barbarians) have not killed any of the Christians, and do require as a gift or courtesie for those four men, four Spades, and four Axes, some

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\(^7\) Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492-1830*, 217.

\(^8\) This was Hilton’s second journey. He had briefly surveyed the area a year earlier. After his 16662 journey, Hilton had produced a description of Cape Fear that had inspired a group of Massachusetts Puritans to briefly relocate to the area. During his second voyage, Hilton notes the abandoned “English cattle” that roams the area.
Knives, and some Beads,” it would be in the English interest to pay the ransom.\(^9\) Argüelles explained that he had been ransoming English captives for quite some time and, by presenting the Edisto with the requested goods, Hilton would be merely continuing a benevolent Spanish policy. Surprised and somewhat bewildered by the Edisto’s strength, the English explorer paid the requested sum. Rather than foiling an evil Spanish plot, Hilton had discovered the power of Southeastern Indians.

\[\text{Figure 4.1— “A plan of the town & harbour of Charles Town,” (1711)\(^{10}\)}\]


This is not to say that the Spanish sat quietly by. Argüelles’ correspondence to Hilton critiqued, at every turn, the English inability to navigate the region. Argüelles used Hilton’s misreading of the Edisto to argue that without Spanish support the English would be lost. “And if you have none that can interpret the Spanish Tongue,” the captain concluded one of his letters, “you may write in your own, for here are your Countrey-men that can understand it; but if you can, let it be in Spanish.” Argüelles requested a Spanish translator knowing full well that there was no one among the English who could “interpret the Spanish Tongue”—one of the captain’s earlier letters had been returned with a note explaining that the English lacked a Spanish interpreter. Argüelles mocked the linguistic limitations of Hilton’s party. The Spanish not only held several English “Countrey-men” hostage and could read, write, and negotiate in English, but San Agustín officials also had a better understanding of the wants and needs of the local populations. Argüelles used Hilton’s misdealings with the Edisto to flaunt Spanish superiority.

In turn, Indians, like the Edisto, folded the Spanish-English animosity into their own agendas. If early English colonists and explorers viewed Spanish Florida as a beacon that steered them through the fog of colonization, Indians followed the same guiding light. Indians employed a similar framework to communicate with the English and secure a better position with South Carolina. Stephen Bull, deputy to Lord Ashley and one of the first English settlers to South Carolina, recounted an early interaction with Indians in Albemarle Point. Henry Brayne, captain of the English frigate Carolina, encountered a group of Indians and, assuming their friendliness, began to approach them. Brayne was stopped by “one of our owne Indians” who cried-out “those are enemy Indians!” Though many of the early letters from Carolina tended to praise English ingenuity and ability, Brayne had almost fallen victim to a simple “ambuscade.” The English captain had been unaware of the peril at hand until “one of our Indians,” probably a Sewee, warned the trusting captain that he was opening his arms to an Indian group who did not intend to reciprocate his kindness.

The Sewee had known that the approaching Indians were “Spanishe Indians,” and thus rightly assumed that they posed a danger to captain Brayne and his men. When Bull described this encounter, he used it to praise English strength, recalling how the “Spanishe Indians” had fled in haste after “seeing the scalinge of our great gunns.” English might, however, was not the only lesson to be learned. Brayne’s run in with “Spanishe Indians” exposed a big gap in English understanding. The English lacked the basic, yet vital ability to distinguish Indian friend from foe. The Sewee had to help the English make that elemental distinction. These Indian allies had warned Brayne of the imminent dangers and, in the process, displayed a clear awareness of how to represent the Southeast—its land, people, and connections—in terms that would resonate with the English.

The Sewee did not identify who these Indians were, only that they had a connection to San Agustín. They adopted a framework readily recognizable to the

11 For more on the Captain see, Patrick Melvin, "Captain Florence O'Sullivan and the Origins of Carolina," The South Carolina Historical Magazine 76, no. 4 (1975).
12 Gene Waddell, Indians of the South Carolina Lowcountry, 1562-1751 (Columbia: University of South Carolina, Southern Studies Programs, 1980), 286-98.
English: Spanish and “Spanishe Indians” were treated as foes; groups who had no understanding with the Spanish were considered friendly. “Wee doe much creditt” the Sewee’s news Bull declared, “for there was noe variance in all Indians daylie reports.”

The Sewee had warned the English about unfriendly natives, provided information on San Agustin, and had done so with “noe variance.” South Carolina settlers, incapable of properly evaluating their surroundings, relied on Indians not only to learn recent, local, and important developments, but also to situate these developments in a context that made sense. This is what the Sewee did. They offered South Carolinians detailed and regular news expressed through an anti-Spanish rhetoric. During early interactions between the English and Southeastern Indians, the formula was simple: to become an English ally, Indians had to be willing to mobilize manpower as well as information against the one, “not unknown” enemy: Spanish Florida.

**Henry Woodward and Trade as Communication**

English mistrust of Spanish Florida proved a useful framework only for a brief time. After the settlement of Charles Town in 1670, South Carolina-Indian relations grew and developed into an extensive Indian trade. The lens of Spanish Florida quickly became too narrow; English traders had to adapt new ways of conceptualizing and networking the region. In 1671, Sewee Indians reported on the state of St. Helena, by describing the activities of “ye Westoes[,] a ranging sort of people reputed to be Man eaters.” Instead of contextualizing their news in terms of European alliances, the Sewee established their “daylie reports” in the context of inter-Indian relations. In this case, the enemy was not the Spanish, but the dreaded “Man eating” Westos. The Westo threatened the Sewee’s well-being: they “had ruinated yt place killed seu’al of those Indians destroyed & burnt their habitation.” The Sewee insisted that the English had to care about these “Man eating” Indians because, by harassing an English ally, the Westos presented a threat to the recently settled Chares Town. To not repeat the earlier follies of Hilton and Brayne, South Carolinians needed to understand inter and often intra Indian relations. As English traders journeyed inland and began establishing a commercial exchange with Westos, Savannahs, Creeks, Yamasees, and Chickasaws (among others), the trade of deerskins and slaves— rather than the fear of Spanish Florida— filtered South Carolina’s understanding of the Southeast.

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14 Ibid., 195.
17 Careret, "Collections of the South Carolina Historical Society."); West, "Letters of Early Colonists, 1670."
Perhaps the most famous early trader was Henry Woodward. Only scattered and somewhat fantastical details are known about Woodward’s early experiences and trials. He traveled to North America in the 1666 expedition led by Robert Sandford. Before making landfall, Woodward had informed Sandford that he intended to stay and explore the region. Sandford wrote, “Mr. Henry Woodward, a Chirurgeon, had before I settout assured mee his resolucon to stay with the Indians if I should thinke convenient.” Woodward was resolved to stay and learn the Indian languages and ways. Although the Cusabo Indians kindly greeted him, Woodward’s stay was short-lived. In less than a year, he was captured by the Spanish and was taken to San Agustín as a prisoner. His time in the Spanish presidio also proved brief. Woodward made his escape onboard Robert Searles pirate vessel, which attacked Florida in 1668.

Undeterred by his experience, Woodward returned to Carolina again in 1670—his “resolucon to” the region was strong. Perhaps he thought his experience with the Indians would improve his position with the Lord’s Proprietors. Perhaps he sought to secure early rights to the promising Indian trade. Perhaps he was just a young man seeking adventures. Whatever his motives, Woodward worked hard to become an instrumental agent for South Carolina and, until his death in 1690, he was one of the most influential traders of the Southeast. He brought Indian trade to the center of English activity, and English activity to the heart of the Indian world.

Woodward interacted with some of the most powerful Indian groups in the region, taking particular care to understand the inner-workings of Indians relations. Not the only and certainly not the last Carolina Indian agent to be mindful of Indian-Indian exchanges, Woodward was definitely a master. In his 1674 journal, he noted different methods the Westos used to communicate, from “long speeches” to drawings “uppon trees (the barke being hewed away) the effigies of a bever, a man, on horseback and guns, Intimat ing thereby as I suppose, their desire for freinship [sic.], and comerse wth us.” Attempting to read the “hewed away” bark, Woodward concluded that these signs pointed to the Westos’ “desire for freinship [sic.], and comerse.” Unsurprisingly, the Indian’s message corresponded perfectly with English interest in trade. Woodward, however, seemed aware of his own intervention, adding “I suppose” after his statement and recognizing the bias of his interpretation.

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18 Although there is no book-length study on this leading trader, Henry Woodward is present in almost every single work discussing the Southeast. From Verner Crane’s 1929 South Frontiers to William Ramsey’s 2008 The Yamasee War, Woodward makes his mark. For the importance of this elusive trader see Timothy Paul Grady, "Henry Woodward: Carolina’s First Diplomat" (paper presented at the American Society for Ethnohistory, New Orleans, 2009).


20 For more on this attack see Chapter 2.

21 Juan Márquez Cabrera to King, March 19, 1686, Full Legajos, SD-839, 555-6, Reel 9, PKY “por las lenguas que save y gran capacidad e yngenio parece tiene” [for all the tongues he knows and for the great capacity and ingenuity he has.]”

22 Henry Woodward, "A Faithfull Relations of My Westoe Voaige, by Henry Woodward, 1674," in Narratives of Early Carolina, 1650-1708, ed. Alexander S. Salley (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1911), 130. Although Woodward supported peaceful relations with the Westos, he managed to open a trade arrangement with the Savannahs. After the 1680 Westo War, the Savannah-English connections allowed South Carolina to begin trading with Indian groups along the Chattahoochee Valley, like the Creeks.
Woodward’s efforts with the Westos and later with the Savannahs (Shawnees) proved vital to South Carolina’s early expansion. The strategic location of these groups allowed them to serve as gatekeepers of trade: facilitating or restricting relations with more distant Indian nations, like those settled along the Chattahoochee River. In his time with the Westos, Woodward reported on the activities of a Savannah delegation. The Savannahs’ arrival to Westo towns during Woodward’s visit was not coincidental. The Savannah probably had dual goals: establish a firmer alliance with the powerful Westos on the one hand, and make their willingness to trade be known to South Carolina, on the other. To prove their good-intentions and demonstrate their importance, power, and far-reaching connections, the Savannah delegates gave the Westos news of a coming attack. The Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Cussetaw [Cussita] were plotting against the Westo. Savannah settlements were scattered across several locales, which made these Indians privy to a great deal of news. Alan Gallay contends that, while the fragmented nature of the Savannahs was not particularly a new or distinct feature, unlike other “splintered” groups, the Savannahs had been able to remain connected among their scattered communities.

The Westos responded carefully to the Savannah’s warning. The Westos made a point to, in the face of danger, showcase their power. The Westos refortified their homes and displayed the goods they had received from the Spanish. Woodward recognized the Westos’ strategy. They were demonstrating that they were not scared by flaunting their connections and “commerce with white people like unto mee, whom were not good [the Spanish].” Westos strength could be found in their alliances; they were networked across the dispersed Savannah communities, connected to Coweta and other Apalachicola towns, and intertwined in the trade of two imperial rivals.

Woodward tried and did situate the Westos within an Indian context. This was just a larger and far more complex context than the trader had anticipated. Woodward worked to gain access to and then carefully reorient these extensive and far-reaching inter-Indian alliances to favor Charles Town. Instead of disregarding existing alliances and connections, as the Spanish had, this savvy trader tried to work through them. South Carolinians did not try to convert Indians or order their relocation; the English built their Indian friendships through a more seductive and lucrative approach: trade. The English traders tried to convince Indians, although not always peacefully, to look to Charles Town as the source of goods, allies, and strength.

23 Both Westos and Savannahs were relatively recent arrivals to Carolina. Westos were a northern group fleeing developments and raids of the Iroquois Confederacy, see Eric Bowne, *The Westo Indians, Slave Traders of the Early Colonial South* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2005), 35.; the Savannahs were from the Ohio Valley and had become a more scattered group as a result of the Iroquois War, see Daniel K. Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse, the Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, Published for The Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, 1992).

24 Although the Westo and Savannah languages were mutually unintelligible, the Savannahs communicated their news with signs. Woodward, "A Faithfull Relations of My Westoe Voaige, by Henry Woodward, 1674," 133.

25 Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade, the Rise of the English Empire in the American South 1670-1717*, 55.

By the 1680s, Woodward was traveling deep into the Southeast and interacting with numerous and distant Indian groups, like the Chickasaws. The Spanish watched in horror as native groups they had barely managed to get acquainted with were now becoming fast partners of the recent English arrivals. The Spanish considered Woodward a very capable and dangerous man. He represented a significant change from previous English explorers; unlike the Hilton or Sandford parties who struggled to communicate with the Indians, Woodward worked hard to know the land, the people, and their connections—interfering and often hindering Spanish efforts to do the same.

27 SCDAH, Henry Woodward’s Account Book [page 1].
Woodward’s exploration of the Southeastern mainland had encumbered Florida’s
networks, interfering with governor Pablo Hita y Salazar and Antonio Matheos’ plans to
connect Apalachicola to San Agustín (see Chapter 3).

When Woodward’s actions in Apalachicola are read from Spanish documents, the
English trader appears conniving, vile, and responsible for corrupting Indians who would
otherwise remain loyal to Spain. The same events considered from English perspective
hint only at South Carolina’s success and uninterrupted westward march. But when
Woodward’s successful journey is considered alongside Matheos’ failures, what becomes
clear is neither the agent’s cunningness nor English might. Rather, it is the willingness
and initiative of Apalachicola Indians that becomes evident. The towns of Coweta,
Cussita, Colome, and Tasquique welcomed and housed Woodward. These four northern
towns, which refused Matheos’ advances and were burnt to the ground for their
resistance, were complicit in the trade arrangements the English secured. By supporting
and enabling Woodward’s endeavors, these northern Apalachicola towns defined the
parameters of South Carolina’s trade. Indians in Coweta, Cussita, Colome, and Tasquique
determined the paths Woodward could travel and the connections he could build. English
traders could try to give shape to Indian alliances and connections, but they still operated
within Indian made boundaries.28

Woodward perpetually pushed the limits of these boundaries, exploiting any
opportunity to expand the reach of South Carolina’s commercial capacity. In 1685, the
trader used his time in Stuart’s Town to broker better relations with the Yamasee Indians.
The Yamasees, a powerful and numerous nation, had recently broken ties with the
Spanish and had relocated closer to the new Scottish settlement. Stuart’s Town officials
wanted Yamasee friendship and trade for themselves. It was no surprise then that
Woodward, working with Charles Town’s interests in mind, was not welcomed in the
area. The English agent was even briefly imprisoned, supposedly for lacking proper
trading permits. Woodward’s jail time revealed not only the bitter competition between
the English and Scottish settlements, but also the importance and profitability of Indian
trade—a trade important enough to fight over and profitable enough to affect the
influence, safety, and prominence of the town that controlled it. Woodward had no
intention of giving Stuart’s Town the upper-hand.29

While in the Port Royal area, the English trader was fortunate to meet Niquisaya,
chief of one of these recently resettled Yamasee groups. Niquisaya, now living close to
English settlements, had connections to the Spanish in the south and to the Apalachicola
in west. With this chief’s help, Woodward was finally able to open English trade with
Apalachicola; South Carolina, as a result of its new Yamasee connections, had access to
the prominent town of Coweta. The relationship between Woodward and Niquisaya

28 For a discussion on Indian made boundaries see: Juliana Barr, “Geographies of Power: Mapping Indian
Borders in the “Borderlands” of the Early Southwest,” William and Mary Quarterly 68, no. 1 (2011).
29 “Lord Cardross and William Dunlop to Peter Colleton,” in Scottish Historical Review (March 27, 1685).
Lord Cadross, though he issued a warrant for Woodward’s arrest, argued that division between Charles
Town and Port Royal was harmful. “It will never been the true interest of any of us to let jealousies arise
among us,” wrote Cadross, “especially at this time when we have ground to apprehend the invasion of a
foreigner.” In William J Rivers, A Sketch of the History of South Carolina to the Close of the Proprietary
Government by the Revolution of 1719. With an Appendix Containing Many Valuable Records Hitherto
governor and grand council.
underscored three important developments. First, their friendship reveals that Yamasees were transitioning away from Spanish care. Though not all Yamasee had (or would) embrace an alliance with the English, by relocating near Port Royal, this never-missionized Indian nation was letting San Agustín know that Spanish promises, goods, and protection were no longer enough. 

Second, Woodward needed Niquisaya to reach Coweta. Even though Woodward was an experienced agent, Indian guides were needed for the successful travel, exploration, or trade of the Southeast. Indian guides were also needed as attachés, helping Woodward secure a warm welcome into Coweta. So third, Niquisaya’s knowledge of and access to Coweta revealed the intricate connections between Yamasees and Creeks. Had

30 Steven C. Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 42. For more on the Creek-Yamasee connections see: A.S. Salley, ed. Journal of Colonel John Herbert, Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Province of South Carolina October 17, 1727, to March 19, 1727/8 (Columbia: Historical Commission of South Carolina, 1936), Feb 10, 1727 24-4.; Thea Perdue, Cherokee Women, Gender and Culture Change, 1700-1835 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 92.
32 John E. Worth, The Struggle for the Georgia Coast: An 18th-Century Spanish Retrospective on Guale and Mocama ([New York]; Athens: American Museum of Natural History; distributed by the University of
Woodward wanted to trade with the Cherokees or Catawbas, Niquisaya would have been of little help. The rise of English trade, the influx of European weapons, and the growing demand for Indian slaves had pushed Yamasees and Creeks closer together. Creek-Yamasee alliances were very much a product of the massive changes in the region. 33

The Southeast was changing, perhaps changing too much for Spanish comfort. Woodward’s success, the relocation of Yamasee Indians, and the open defiance of the four northern Apalachee towns, convinced the Spanish that they needed to act. In 1686, governor Juan Márquez Cabrera ordered an attack. The Spanish led two raids that decimated Port Royal and naval invasion to Charles Town that, due to unwelcoming weather, never reached the intended port. The English were outraged and surprised. The House of Commons turned the Spanish attack into an opportunity to stress the constant, terrifying, and Catholic threat faced by South Carolina, request more weapons for the safety of the frontier, and address the importance of a seemingly unrelated issue: news.

The 1686 attack became a rare moment in which South Carolinians thought aloud about the value of communication.

Whereas, our enemy the Spaniard hath, in a hostile manner several tymes made incursion into this his Majestie’s Colony, robbing and burning several of the inhabitant’s Houses, pillaging their stores, murthering and carrying away divers of his Majestie’s subjects, all which, or the great part thereof, hath happened for want of a speedy communication of the allarum to the northern inhabitants of this Collony. 34

The Spanish attack had caused the destruction of the English town, but the House placed a “great part” of the blame on English lack “of speedy communication.” The English who had become accustomed to securing all the allies they wanted and receiving all the news they needed, were left “wanting” — wanting for stronger protection and wanting for speedier communication. 35

After the 1686 attack, fear was rampant in South Carolina. The investors of the Scottish settlement worried about the unprofitability of their venture; members of the House of Commons feared that the Spanish would attempt to regain control over Guale (present day Georgia); and English traders were concerned that powerful Indian groups, like the Yamasee, would view the destruction of Port Royal as a sign of South Carolina’s weakness. But the debates of the House of Commons also revealed a different kind of fear: Charles Town officials believed that San Agustín officials had out-informed them. While a Spanish attack was, in itself, not all that surprising, the fact that Spanish forces

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35 SCDAH House Assembly of Journal, 1709, February 19, 413.
had landed during the peak of a yellow fever outbreak was. 36 Florida seemed to have an intimate knowledge of Charles Towns. In 1686, this knowledge had caused the ruin of a small, Scottish town, but, had the weather been more inviting, the Spanish could have caused greater disruptions.

The House of Common pondered what would happen if “French and Spaniards may have notice of the war between the Crown of France and Spaine five or six months before we may.” Without “speedy communication” South Carolina would be defenseless. The English had to find ways to remain not only informed, but also better informed than the Spanish, or it “[would] be too late to raise money to finish places of Defence, and to provide other necessaries when the enemy is in sight.” 37 More than a want for information, the English articulated a fear of not-knowing. While Florida officials cared about securing news, South Carolinians were concerned with the information others could mobilize. This subtle distinction—worrying about having news as opposed to worrying about what others knew—hinted at the different objectives of Florida’s and South Carolina’s information networks. The Spanish wanted to be able to communicate, the English wanted to be able to commerce.

To protect their commercial endeavors and prevent the French and Spanish from out-informing them again, the English argued that Port Royal needed to be resettled. Major William Dunlop, one of the founders of the Scottish colony, explained that the greatest loss would not come from Spanish violence, but from letting the land become fallow and the Indian connections idle. Dunlop pointed to the simple fact that the Spanish had wanted to invade, but had managed to only destroy the settlement. Florida had proven incapable of holding onto the land. While the Spanish attack had forced the Scots to relocate, Yamasee Indians had remained in the area. By deserting this southern hold, Dunlop argued, the English would be jeopardizing their relations with the Yamasee precisely at a time when the Spanish had shown that they were still a force be reckoned with. To know more of the Spanish, of Indian attacks, and of the Southeast in general, the English needed to maintain their Indian alliances.

Trade, Slavery, and Expanding Networks

Trade networks crisscrossed through colonial Carolina. By the mid-1680s Henry Woodward, as well as other traders like John Stewart, had helped forge relations with Creeks, Yamasees, and Savannahs; by the mid-1700, agents like Thomas Nairne and John Wright had connected Charles Town to groups residing far away, like the Choctaws, Chickasaws, and were slowly making headway with Cherokees. Trade paths and trading towns connected South Carolina to the large interior. Commercial exchange was “the Original great tye between the Indians and Europeans.” 38 The power and importance of

38 Report of John Stuart to the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations on the Southern Indian Department, March 9, 1764, quoted in Kathryn E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, the Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 26.
this “great tye” could not be overstated. Trade with Indian groups brought wealth and growth to South Carolina.

The importance of Indian trade was not only apparent at the time, but was also central to how South Carolina saw and represented itself. A 1736 article from the South Carolina Gazette recalled how Indian trade was “of the greatest Importance to the Wellfare of this Province... but principally,” it was “the Means by which we keep and maintain the several Nations of the Indians surrounding this Province in Amity and Friendship with us, and thereby prevent their falling into the interest of France and Spain.” South Carolinians understood that the wealth brought by the trade, “near one 5th part of the Returns we make to Great Britain,” was insignificant compared to the safety and imperial position it afforded the English. It was through these commercial networks that South Carolina established itself as an important force in the Southeast.

Trade also brought knowledge. As South Carolina agents traveled through the backcountry, they uncovered a great deal about their surroundings and their neighbors. The connections these men forged allowed, and at times required, the English to develop a more sophisticated and acute understanding of the region. But this learning process—the ways in which information was gathered—was seldom described. English officials openly discussed the exchange of goods and slaves, the benefits of this commercial enterprise, and the ways to regulate trade, but issues of information were simply assumed. The spread and acquisition information was implicit, not explicated. South Carolina’s communication networks were everywhere, yet nowhere in sight.

These powerful and seemingly invisible communication networks were hidden in plain sight. They rested on top of an unstable, yet ubiquitous commercial foundation: Indian slavery. The trade of Indian slaves, as Alan Gallay has demonstrated, connected South Carolina to every corner of the Southeast and granted the English access to many, different, and distant Indian groups. Indian slavery led to the creation of new alliances and rivalries; it (temporarily) empowered a handful of Indian groups and victimized many others; and this trade transformed local affairs into international and imperial contests. But the redefinition of Southeastern relations came with a heavy price. Anthropologist Robbie Ethridge described how “the inauguration of commercial trade and its attendant colonial struggles created ‘shatter zones,’ or large regions of instability from which shock waves radiated out for sometimes hundreds and hundreds of miles.” Indian slavery—and the violence, competition, and warring it triggered—shattered the Southeast. As the Table details, the Indian slave trade was a massive enterprise; one that proved dangerous, divisive, and hard to control.

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40 The reason for this invisibility lies in the sources. Unlike Spanish materials which include extended and explicit discussions on the value and acquisition of news, South Carolina documents remain quiet. The difference between South Carolina and Florida sources stress not an English lack of preoccupation with information acquisition and transmission, but rather, it reflects the different kinds of communication privileged in each colony.
41 Ibid., 9.
42 Ethridge, “Creation the Shatter Zone: Indian Slave Traders and Collapse of Southeastern Chiefdoms,” 208.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Places/People</th>
<th>Low Range</th>
<th>High Range</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>15,000-20,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas, Taensa, and Tunica</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Petite Nations</em> (Lower Mississippi)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2-3,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuscaroras and allies</td>
<td>1,500-2,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Westo</td>
<td>1,000-1,200</td>
<td>1,800-2,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>20,000-28,200</td>
<td>41,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piedmont, Creek, Savannah, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Mocama, Guale, and other</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24,000-32,200</strong></td>
<td><strong>51,000</strong></td>
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*Table 4.1— Southern Native Americans sold in the British slave trade, c. 1670-1715 (Made by Alan Gallay, Indian Slavery)*

The Lord Proprietors hoped that by establishing a monopoly over the Indian trade they could regulate the lucrative enterprise. They argued that their motives were “not merely a design of gain.” The Proprietors insisted that they cared about safety. By restricting trade, they were trying to limit what would otherwise be an endless cycle of “furnishing a bold and warlike people with arms and ammunition and other things useful to them.”

Two early Indian wars, the Kussoe War (1671) and the second Westo War (1680-2), had demonstrated the destructive consequences of Indian slavery. The Lord Proprietors were deeply angered by these Indian conflicts, which had been initiated and waged with complete disregard to the Proprietors’ orders. Writing about the war with the Westo, the Proprietors complained that “we cannot well judg whether this warr w as made upon a reall necessity for the preservation of the Collony, or to serve the ends of Pitculr men by trade.”

Little is known about the Westo War and even less about the Kussoe War, but the motivations behind these costly conflicts were, at best, dubious. To protect Indian trade, South Carolinians were arming neighboring Indians, weakening and then

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43 Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade, the Rise of the English Empire in the American South 1670-1717*, 299.
45 For more the Kusseo War see Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade, the Rise of the English Empire in the American South 1670-1717*, 51-4. For the Westos see Bowne, *The Westo Indians, Slave Traders of the Early Colonial South*, 89-115.
betraying native allies, and placing the needs of “Pticlur men” ahead of “the preservation of the Collony.”  

Indian slavery could engine South Carolina’s growth, but the Lord Proprietors feared that unless this trade was regulated, these commercial exchanges were going to lead to ruin, rather than profit. But a trade monopoly established by a governing body located hundreds of miles away was not very effective. This regulatory law faced fierce opposition on the ground, especially from the Goose Creek Men, a group of powerful men (many from Barbados) who settled near the Goose Creek area. Members of this faction, like James Moore, Maurice Matthews, and Arthur Middleton, not only held positions of power, but also became preeminent traders and slavers. These individuals disregarded the Proprietor’s trade monopoly and sought private gain from Indian slavery. With so many competing interests, historian Robert Weir contends that “it was just as well that survival did not depend entirely on the Carolinians’ own unity.” Safety, unity, and peace were relegated as secondary concerns because there was money to be made and profits to reap.

In South Carolina, where trade was a proxy for communication, sharing news was rarely advantageous or rewarded. Unlike in networks guided by political or religious interests that had incentives for moving information up the chain of command, in an economic model, keeping and even hiding knowledge could lead to greater, albeit personal rewards. The Spanish needed and depended on noisy networks; lack of news or quiet nodes was cause for alarm. For the English, silent networks were working networks. They indicated seamless and flowing exchange. The different private parties operating and vying for control of the Indian trade stood to gain by competing rather than collaborating. Silence and secrecy became the norm in South Carolina’s communication networks.

Indians, Indian agents as well as traders who were instrumental in connecting Charles Town with the interior and expanding English influence, only reluctantly revealed their exploits. In order to learn details of their whereabouts, transactions, or partnerships, Charles Town officials had to compel these men. In November of 1700, the House of Commons ordered traders to report on the actions and known abuses of fellow traders.

Ordered that all traders that are now in the settlement or hereafter shall be within this settlement before the next sitting of the assembly shall attend the said committee at the dwelling House of Capt Job Hows Speaker and

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49 Oatis, A Colonial Complex, South Carolina’s Frontiers in the Era of the Yamasee War, 1680-1730, 35. The efforts of these local traders soon became connected to manufacture enterprises in Europe; Sirmans, Colonial South Carolina, a Political History, 1663-1763. truly expanded the extent of the Indian trade, from 1700-1715. For more on the Goose Creek Men see M. Eugene Sirmans, Colonial South Carolina, a Political History, 1663-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), Chapter 2.
shall give information to the best of their knowledge of all the misdemeanors of all traders, with the strength and confederation of all Indians with whom we have now a correspondence to as many of the said traders as he can find, who are hereby required to attend upon the said committee.\textsuperscript{51}

Requesting traders to report on each other bore limited results; there were little benefits to informing on the abuse of others and no enforceable repercussion for keeping quiet or lying. But for all their recalcitrance, traders and Indians agents remained a primary source of knowledge for the English colonial government. Through a lens of trade, traders informed each other and the House of Commons about the relations there were developing in the interior.

As South Carolina’s eyes and ears to the interior, traders played a determining role in what the House knew as well as in what it could and could not achieve.\textsuperscript{52} Away from the small and scattered English settlements, traders were needed to both ensure Indian allegiance with English interests and keep Virginian, Spanish, and increasingly French competitors at bay. Both of these important roles were contingent on the successful exchange of goods: to monitor the headways made by competitors, South Carolina traders reported on the European goods already in Indian possession;\textsuperscript{53} to establish and maintain viable alliances, traders relied on a steady supply of European goods.\textsuperscript{54}

At the onset of Queen Anne’s War (1702-1712), one of the first actions by South Carolina’s government was to recruit Indian agents and traders to secure the alliance of powerful Indians groups like the Yamasee. The House,

Ordered that there be sent to the Yamasees a person from the Government one hundred weight of powder and one hundred and fifty weight of shott, with One Great Grun, five hundred of flints and two gross of knives by our James Stanyarne, who is hereby required to carry the same, and assure the said Yamasees of our Friendship and assistance.\textsuperscript{55}

To retain the Yamasee as allies and to prevent them from joining the enemy, the colonial government needed to provide them with “assur[ance]... of our Friendship and assistance;”\textsuperscript{56} or in other words, they needed to provide the Yamasee with goods. Members of the House of Commons placed a long order for ammunition: including 6 guns of 24 pounds, 6 guns of 18 pounds, 6 small field pieces, and as much powder and bullets as could be sent.\textsuperscript{57} Justifying their large request to the Lord Proprietors, English

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{51} SCDAH House Assembly of Journal, 1700, Nov. 15, 272 [359].
\item \textsuperscript{52} SCDAH House Assembly of Journal, 1711, June 21, 565. Traders were asked to monitor relations that were far away from Charles Town.
\item \textsuperscript{53} SCDHA House Assembly of Journal, 1702, Jan 20, 288; SCDAH House Assembly of Journal, 1712, May 24, 43-44.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Although the goods South Carolinian traders brought were not new to the Southeast, the rates with which they traded guns and alcohol were unlike anything the Southeast had experienced before.
\item \textsuperscript{55} SCDHA House Assembly of Journal, 1701, August 27 398.
\item \textsuperscript{56} SCDHA House Assembly of Journal, 1701, August 27 398.
\item \textsuperscript{57} SCDHA House Assembly of Journal, 1701, August 28 408.
\end{itemize}
officials explained that South Carolina was “a frontier to the Spaniards and French, who have promised to attack us, and have lately tempted their Spies to withdraw the Ya-ma-see Indians from us, and so to invite the other Indians to make war upon us.” South Carolina might have been a “frontier to the Spaniards and French,” but the threat emphasized by the House of Common and the one for which all the ammunition and weaponry was needed was the Yamasee. To wage a successful war against the Spanish, South Carolina needed Indian support.

South Carolina’s connection to Amerindians was further emphasized in a 1708 questionnaire. The Lord Proprietors had sent an inquiry about the state of the colony, asking about its demography, geography, and commerce. Though neither the queries posed nor the answers provided were particularly surprising, a note added at the very end reveals the centrality of the Indian trade. “[H]aving answered the several queries stated to us by Your Lordps in the best manner wee are at present capable of,” explained South Carolina officials, we “humbly crave leave to superadd an account of the Indians or allies our Trade and Commerce with one another and their Consumption of our Goods.”

The Lords Proprietors had not prompted the colonists to discuss their Indians relations, but the House of Commons offered a detailed account of the Indian populations that surrounded Charles Town and described the intricate “Trade and Commerce” these groups had with each other and with the English— in fact, this unsolicited information was the longest of all the questionnaire’s responses. This “superadd account” revealed both the growth South Carolina was experiencing and the importance of the exchange of deerskins, slaves, and goods to that expansion.

Trade was central to the making of South Carolina. These commercial networks afforded the House many advantages, such as allowing South Carolina to connect with distant regions, form many alliances, and increasingly, dictate who its Indian allies were. When Apalachee Indians finally decided to ally with the English in 1706, “Indian Traders… [were] commanded and the said Appalachees advised to a free trade for guns and ammunition shall not be granted them till we are better assured of their sincerity to us.”

By limiting the extent and type of trade Apalachees could have with Charles Town, the House of Commons managed to welcome the Apalachee while also keeping this former Spanish ally at arm’s length. With the aid of traders, the government intertwined its economic desires with its political imperatives.

Expansive trade networks gave South Carolina both access to Indian goods, lands, and alliances, and the means to control these relations. In 1700, two unnamed Indians had tried to recruit “a small nation of Indians living” near Charles Town to join the “Great many Nations of Indians [that] had already agreed & confederated to make war & cut off all ye white men.” When a planter overheard this Indian plan, he “imprudently… Came to Charles Town & there reported it in such a frightful manner as his fear had suggested it to him, not leaving room for any doubt ye Truth thereof.” The House of Commons listened to this man’s frantic report, but responded with calm. The government explained that this “small nation of Indians” traded actively with the English, and instead of joining “the Great many Nations,” these Indians had come to Charles Town earlier and reported

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58 Records in the British Public Record Office Relating to South Carolina : 1663-[1710] Proprieties BJ Vol. 9 pg. 82 Carolina September 17, 1708, 207.
59 SCDAH House Assembly Journal, 1704 April 26-May 6, October 4-November 6; House Assembly of Journal, 1704, April 27, 232.
on the developing plot. As frightening as the prospect of a “confederated” Indian force bent on “mak[ing] war & cut[ting] off all ye white men” was, the English felt that their trade alliances would protect them; their Indian allies had too much at stake to betray South Carolina.60

South Carolinians had come a long way from their uncertain settlement in 1670; they no longer confused Indian foes for friends. But the House’s ability to calm the anxieties produced by two Indians did not mean taking lightly the “frightful” reports of Indian dissatisfaction or war. The English treated the spread and control of false or misleading information very seriously. The House of Commons passed several acts that “Restrain[ed] ye: Spreading [of] false News.” These laws, which punished individuals for starting or perpetuating hurtful rumors, were often written in conjunction with statutes regarding mobility. Divulging misleading information might seem like a minor offence compared to the “Takeing away Boats and Canoos,” for example, but “false news” could prove as harmful to English society as theft. 61

Governor James Moore implored South Carolinians to cease “spreading false reports” about Indians, Spaniards, and about the government itself. For “nothing,” he argued, “Conduce[d] more to the Disturbing the Peace and breach of Charity and Divideing us further amongst our Selves” than rumors.62 Moore’s statement might seem hyperbolic, but he needed to convince traders who had made a profit through secrecy and lies that there were severe repercussions for “spreading false reports.” The governor insisted that South Carolinians would benefit from being honest, collaborating, and sharing what they knew. The English needed to stand united, for in spite of the strength of its individual traders and agents, divided, this southern colony could fall.

The problems with these expanding networks became clear during Queen Anne’s War. As reports reached Charles Town that war had broken out in Europe, Governor James Moore urged South Carolina to join the fight.63 In 1702, he led an invasion of San Agustín; Moore was convinced of English strength and Spanish vulnerability. The governor vowed that the war would be easy, the siege short, and the plunder bountiful.64 All his promises proved wrong. Within five days of his departure, the difficulties of the endeavor had become all too clear. “I have had a tedious duty, and uneasy journey,” complained the colonel, and “through the difference between the whites, and between

60 SCDAH House Assembly of Journal, October 1, 1700, 144.
63 This war, which lasted 10 years, became known as the War of Spanish Succession in Europe and Queen Anne’s War in the English colonies.
Indians and Indians, bad way and false alarms, I do labour under hourly uneasiness."65

The uneasiness among his troops was only the beginning of Moore’s misfortune. The siege proved longer than anticipated and it failed to capture San Agustín; the invasion cost almost four times more than expected; and instead of showcasing English strength, the expedition had unintentionally bolstered Florida’s reputation.66

In 1704, Colonel Moore (no longer governor) decided to try again. Armed with a personal vendetta against Spanish Florida, 50 English soldiers, and approximately 1,500 Indian warriors (mostly Creek and Yamasee), Moore set his sights not on San Agustín but on Apalachee.67 Apalachee had been a site of Spanish missionary for over 100-years and though the region had important mission centers like San Luís de Apalachee (near present-day Tallahassee), there were no major fortifications in the area.68 Moore set his sights on this relatively unprotected region; from 1704 to 1706, Apalachee endured numerous and violent attacks. The Spanish recounted with horror Moore’s devastating raids, “they have destroyed everything, killed many Indians and have taken a total of 500 [Apalachee] prisoners."69 Florida’s Governor José de Zuñiga y Cerda was shocked by English brutality. Moore’s forces captured as many individuals as they could lay hold to, destroyed missions and settlements, and tortured Spanish friars and Indian converts.70 For two years, Apalachee burned. Moore’s raids comprised one of the largest, bloodiest, and most successful slaving raids in colonial North America. No more than 200 Apalachees survived and the Spanish hold in the region seemed permanently lost.71

Although South Carolina’s 1702 invasion of San Agustín had been had a miserable failure, Moore’s raids on Apalachee afforded the English unparalleled success. A 1710 pamphlet by Thomas Nairne praised the attacks,

66 Mark F. Boyd, "The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702: A Report to the King of Spain by the Governor of East Florida Translated By," The Florida Historical Quarterly 26, no. 4 (1948): 348. Moore’s forces had managed to surround and stage a successful siege of the Spanish presidio, but South Carolina’s militia soon found itself suffering from lack of provisions. Lacking food and supplies, the Spanish and English forces were at a standstill. When a Spanish vessel from Havana arrived before South Carolina’s could replenish Moore’s troops, the English army retreated. Moore returned to Charles Town disgraced, facing charges of misappropriation of the plunder for his personal enrichment. The failure to capture the enemy’s main stronghold proved to be a recurrent pattern for Spanish-English interactions in the Southeast. In 1686 and 1706, the Spanish failed to capture Charles Town. In 1702 and 1739 the English led unsuccessful attacks against San Agustín.
68 At its height, San Luis de Apalachee had Housed over 1,000 Indian and Spanish settlers.
69 “Todo lo han destruido, muertos muchos yndios y ll evadonse por todos mas de quininetos prisioneros” Governor Zuñiga y Cerda to the King, March 30, 1704, 58-1-20/92, bnd 4101, Stetson Collection, Reel 29, PKY.
70 Ibid.; English attack, August 22, 1704 58-1-27/71 bnd 4157, Stetson Collection, Reel 29, PKY.
These Expeditions have added very much to our Strength and Safety: First by reducing the Spanish Power in Florida so low, that they are altogether uncapable of ever hurting us; then by training our Indians Subjects in the Use of Arms, and Knowledge of War, which would be if great service to us, in case if any Invasion from an Enemy; and what is yet more considerable, by drawing over to our Side, or destroying, all the Indians within 700 miles of Charleston. This makes it impracticable for any European Nation to settle on that Coast.72

South Carolina had not only destabilized the Spanish hold over the region, Moore’s expeditions had also eradicated all enemies from the backcountry. South Carolina was now a colony bordered by allies. With the aid of their “Indians Subjects,” the English could help deter the advances of any other European power or threat. Nairne as well as others traders understood and represented Moore’s raids as a clear victory for South Carolina—a victory that allowed the English to expand further inland, secure new goods, and forge new connections.73

But not everyone in South Carolina saw the Apalachee raids in this manner. Charles Town officials expressed anxiety rather than relief over the events at Apalachee. While the destruction of Apalachee displayed South Carolina’s military might, it was unclear to the governor and the Lord Proprietors what advantage, if any, these distant lands and native groups gave the English. Chickasaws, Choctaws, Alabamas, and Natchez were powerful nations that could increase Carolina’s access to skins and slaves as well as help check the expansion of French traders and Spanish agents. But Chickasaws, Choctaws, Alabamas, and Natchez were powerful nations that were not easily controlled.74 South Carolinian officials had to balance the demands of these new, potential friends with the requests and needs of their already established Indian allies—some of whom, like the Creeks (in particular the Alabama and Tallapoosa Creeks), had very troubled relations with these distant groups.75 South Carolina’s networks were not only growing, but they were becoming more diverse.

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72 Nairne, A Letter from South Carolina... 34.
73 For an example, see Thomas Nairne, Nairne’s Muskogean Journals: The 1708 Expedition to the Mississippi River, ed. Alexander Moore (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1988).
75 Groups, like the Uhaw, who had rarely appeared before Charles Town, suddenly requested to relocate with Yamasee; and the English had to appease the demands of Creeks. A.S. Jr. Salley, ed. Journals of the Commons House of Assembly, for 1703 (Columbia: The State Company,1934/1703), 48.
Since the beginning of the Indian trade, Charles Town officials had wrestled with how to regulate and exert power over the colony’s booming commercial networks. Moore’s raids encouraged the trade to grow and expand even further beyond government control. In 1704, Job How, speaker of the House, complained about the problems caused by these successful attacks in Apalachicola. He worried about the money needed to continue waging Indian wars, the difficulty of monitoring the events that occurred so far away, and the problems of these new Indian “allies.” As Apalachee prisoners flooded into Charles Towns, How complained that,

they have all the opportunities to see the whole province and know all our circumstances. Besides those that are brought by land from Apalatche have an opportunity to know and learn the roads and get acquainted with the several Nations of our friendly Indians which we conceive might in time prove fatal to us if these Indians should once leave our alliance and join our Enemies.

How feared that Apalachee Indians were learning more from their imprisonment and journey across English lands, than South Carolinians were gaining from the enslavement of Apalaches. Trade was bringing profit to the individual traders, but jeopardizing the security of the colony as a whole.

The Apalachee raids brought this tension to the surface. On the one hand, there was economic gain: trade bridged distances and connected the English with Indian groups living as far away as the Mississippi River. On the other hand, there was regulation: English officials wanted to monitor the actions of traders and the nature of the exchange. Discussing the implications of trade in a broader colonial contest, Paul W. Mapp has argued that “where there were profits to be made, government tended ultimately to become involved. These relationships between lucre and state within polities inevitably produced repercussions outside them.” And so it was in South Carolina. The House of Commons ultimately became involved in the affairs of individual traders; when the House finally passed “An Act for Regulating the Indian Trade and Making Safe to the

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76 SCDAH John Archdale Papers (1690-1706), 9. Essay about virtue of better trading with Indians, nd, circa 1696, suggesting the centralization of trade and the issuing of licenses. There were also recurrent discussion in the Journals of the House of Commons; see Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, the Rise of the English Empire in the American South 1670-1717, 208-13.
77 House Assembly of Journal, 1704, Nov. 6, 294-5/P43-44.
78 There was also growing concern about Virginian traders exchanging goods and securing loyalties with Indians who lived in the Carolinas. South Carolinians blamed Virginians for dividing Indian loyalties. For example, Virginian traders were seen as responsible for Savannahs choosing to relocate away from the Savannah River see, James Hart Merrell, “The Indians’ New World: The Catawba Experience,” The William and Mary Quarterly 41, no. 4 (Oct., 1984): 56-7.; For disputes with Virginia traders see Salley, ed. Journals of the Commons House of Assembly, Beginning August 13, 1701 and Ending August 28, 1701, 8. Furthermore, in 1706 a joint Spanish-French force attacked Charles Town. Although this invasion was considered part of the larger struggle of Queen Anne’s War, it was also seen as retaliation for the 1704-1706 Apalachee raids. The actions of Indian traders had repercussions across the Southeast; Charles Town was not immune.
Public” in 1707, this law “produced repercussions outside” the intended consequences, impacting relations in all corners of the Southeast.

The 1707 Regulating bill advocated for a more active and involved government. The act had many practical regulations, such as the establishment of a Commissioner of the Indian trade and the requirement of trader licenses. But it was also very condescending; it began by stating that “those persons that trade among the Indians… lead loose, vicious lives, to the scandal of the Christian religion.” The House, acting as a moral authority on the behalf of the greater public, sought to control these “loose, vicious” persons. The Commissioners of Indian trade had their first meeting on September of 1710. Their goal was to address complains and bring justice. Gideon Johnson, a missionary for the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG), urged for regulation, arguing that it was “the Scandalous Lives of those very Traders, who are a Wretches sort of Men” that interfered with Indian conversions and soured all Anglo-Indian relations.

The Commissioners soon found, however, that monitoring an exchange that been free from intervention for so long was no easy feat. The Board faced challenges at every turn and, unsurprisingly, the effect of government regulation was minimal. This resistance hinted at the many divisions in colonial South Carolina, division that became more obvious as each faction attempted to wrestle the trade and its profits for themselves. Traders used the Commission not to report wrongdoings, but to compete with each other. Thomas Nairne used his position as the first Commissioner of Indian Trade to attack governor Nathaniel Johnson. Nairne disapproved of the governor’s policies and reprimanded the traders backed by Johnson. The agent argued that the governor was concerned with goods and profit, not legality. In 1707, the governor struck back; under his orders, traders John Dickson and Edward Griffin testified against Nairne and accused him of treason. Nairne was briefly thrown in jail and the regulating of the Indian trade was thrown in disarray. South Carolina was polarized by efforts to regulate these commercial connections.

But Johnson, much like Nairne, could not command complete authority over such a divided colony. Nairne, in spite of being imprisoned and the subject of some damaging allegations, still managed to secure a seat in the House of Commons. His imprisonment, election, and release further revealed the divided nature of South Carolina’s governing body. What was supposed to be a way of regulating traders became yet another tool for traders to attack each other and compete for a better position. Traders frustrated the government’s efforts to get a better handle over the profitable, expansive, and increasing volatile Indian trade. Rather than imposing order, the 1707 Regulation bill exposed the chaos behind South Carolina’s engine for growth.

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80 Thomas Cooper and David J. McCords, *The Statutes at Large of South Carolina, 10 Vols.*, Vol. 2 July 19, 1797, Act 269.
The control over Indians, trade, and the connections that made South Carolina wealthy was dispersed among many, bitterly divided individuals. The Commission of Indian trade had attempted to concentrate the knowledge of these men; those efforts had failed. South Carolina, it seemed, could neither regulate nor centralize its networks. It was the decentralized nature of Charles Town’s connections that had allowed the English to expand quickly and to reach many places; but, as the 1686 attack of Port Royal had demonstrated, it was also the decentralized nature of the English communication networks that had hindered South Carolina’s ability to respond to threats in a prompt or cohesive manner.

The works of economist Frederich Hayek have offered the traditional argument in favor of non-centralized information networks; Hayek praised networks in which “practically every individual has some advantage over all others in that he possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be made only if the decision depending on it are to him or made with his active cooperation.” When no one is the ultimate informer, the power of information could be shared. Hayek warned, however, that decentralized information networks were effective only when individuals, “each of whom possesses only partial knowledge,” collaborated and willingly interacted with other—freely making their partial knowledge whole.\(^{85}\)

Collaboration did not prove to be South Carolina’s forte. If the 1707 Regulation bill had taught the Charles Town governing body anything, it was that the individual traders preferred to compete with each other; these men were satisfied with possessing only partial knowledge about the lands and Indians of the Southeast and advocated developing a fragmented policy to deal with the problems of the region. The failures of the Indian Trade Commissions served to underscore its own unimportance. Since the 1680s, South Carolina had been experiencing a boom in trade, alliances, and land acquisition without enforcing any regulations. And by the mid-1710s South Carolina was an unstoppable, expanding force that refused, even chided efforts to monitor the Indian trade.

South Carolina’s Tuscarora War

South Carolina involvement in the Tuscarora War solidified the colony’s preeminence in the Southeast.\(^{86}\) North Carolina, unprepared and overwhelmed by the chaos of the war, looked to its more powerful colonial neighbors for support. While Virginia did little to help (except keep northern Tuscarora factions from joining the war), South Carolina proved ready to aid its debilitated northern neighbor. This rare moment of inter-colonial cooperation showcased South Carolina’s strength and military might. The networks and alliances South Carolina had forged gave this southern colony immense confidence in its abilities. The House of Commons believed that even relations that extended far beyond its territory and economic arrangements could be swayed by South Carolina’s influence. Although Charles Town leaders, like (acting) Governor

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Robert Gibbes and Indian commissioner to the Yamasee Thomas Nairne, recognized the limitations of their knowledge, South Carolina officials no longer expressed fear of this uncertainty. Through their existing relations, strength, and firepower, South Carolina believed they could suppress the conflict consuming North Carolina. Unlike in the 1686 invasion, when the House of Commons worried about their lack of information and adhered to the principle: “what you don’t know might kill you,” South Carolina was now governed by a slight variation of that saying: “you can kill what you don’t know.” And they did.

![Figure 4.4— “The Death of John Lawson” at the Eve of the Tuscarora War, 1711](image)

South Carolina sent two military expeditions to North Carolina. Colonel John Barnwell led the first group, which arrived in January of 1712; the second expedition, commanded by James Moore (son of the former governor), reached Tuscarora country a little over six-month later. The vast majority of Barnwell’s 500 men and of Moore’s

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87 Drawing by Baron Christoph Von Graffenried. Image courtesy of North Carolina State Archives, Division of Archives and History. Marjorie Hudson, "Among the Tuscarora: The Strange and Mysterious Death of John Lawson, Gentleman, Explorer, and Writer," *North Carolina Literary Review* 1, no. 1 (1992): “Baron Christoph Von Graffenried’s drawing, The Death of John Lawson, depicts Von Graffenried, his servant, and John Lawson being held captive by Tuscarora Indians shortly before Lawson’s death. In the center of the drawing, the three prisoners sit, hands bound, near a fire. The Tuscarora dance and play drums in a semi-circle on the right, and one Indian stands in the center, holding what appear to be a hatchet and a knife, near two dead animals impaled on sticks. Four Tuscarora in a line on the left seem to be guarding over the prisoners. A few Indian buildings are scattered across the top and bottom of the drawing.” Vincent H. Todd and Julius Goebel, ed. *Christoph Von Graffenried's Account of the Founding of New Bern* (Raleigh: Edwards & Broughton Printing, 1920).

800 soldiers were Indian (mostly Yamasee, Yuchi, Cusabo, and “Essaw” Indians). These companies were numerous, strong, and militarily successful. Yet Barnwell and Moore complained about the quality of their warriors; these Indians were “unwilling to proceed into unknown Country” without incentive and English guidance. Barnwell was particularly distressed by the high rates of desertion, especially after the Indian soldiers obtained Tuscarora plunder or captured some slaves. The Indians, English officials lamented, seemed more concerned with securing bounty than winning the war.

The colonel’s disdain towards his Indian soldiers was not, however, indiscriminate. Barnwell made distinctions among his many Indian warriors. He noted that some Indians were more loyal than others. Barnwell particularly praised the efforts of his loyal “Yamasee Company;” unlike other Indian groups, “my brave Yamasees told me they would go wherever I led them. They will live and die with me.” In June of 1711, one group of Yamasees delivered two Spanish spies they had apprehended; English officials commended the Yamasees’s actions, for “great is the consequences of the Spaniards at St. Augustine knowing of this Indian War and the preparations we are making.” The English feared that San Agustín, upon learning of the Tuscarora “War and the preparations… [the English were] making” would attack a distracted Charles Town. By capturing the Spanish spies, these Yamasee Indians had helped protect Charles Town. Yamasee loyalty during the Tuscarora War had convinced Barnwell, as well as many other Charles Town officials, that the Yamasees were vital English allies.

Four years after singing Yamasee praises, the English found themselves engaged in a bloody and violent war against Yamasee Indians. Barnwell himself led major campaigns against them. The Yamasees were not as willing to “live and die” with the English as the colonel had thought. But in 1712, as Yamasees and South Carolinians fought side by side, the destruction of the Yamasee War was inconceivable. South Carolina was strong; made that way by the steady and profitable relations it had forged with neighboring Indian nations, from the Westo to the Savannah, from the Creek to the Yamasee. Seeing their northern neighbor engulfed by Indian warfare, South Carolinians viewed their own situation with a misguided sense of calm.

Instead of fear, Charles Town officials expressed relief by the stability of South Carolina. In the late spring of 1711, the speaker of the House proclaimed,

The Country (praised be God for it) is in a flourishing condition, abounding with a great trade with almost all parts of America and most parts of Europe in amity with us, and some parts of Africa and have

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89 The war-ravaged government of North Carolina, though grateful for South Carolina’s support, was unable to support or even feed the army coming to their rescue. Joseph W. Barnwell, “The Second Tuscarora Expedition,” The South Carolina Genealogical Magazine 10, no. 1 (1908): 56.; Extract from letter of President Pollock, December 23, 1712. NC Records Vol 1, 892; “The Tuscarora Expedition, Letters of Colonel John Barnwell,” The South Carolina Genealogical Magazine 9, no. 1 (1908): 30-1.
91 Ibid., 30.
92 SCDAH House Assembly of Journal, 1711, June 14, 557-8; SCDAH House Assembly of Journal, 1711, November 9, 596.
93 SCDAH, Record in the British Public Record Office Relating to South Carolina Vol. 7, 1717-1720. April 20, 21, 28, 1719. Extracts of letters relating to the Indian war in Carolina. April 20 (Monday), Santa Maria Col Barnwell to Governor Johnson. 186-9.
nothing more to take care of than the encouraging the continuance thereof and our safety more especially within Lands (of this Province) for the regulating the Indian traders to prevent offences done by the Indian traders done to the Indians in amity with us that may not only put us out of fear of their being our enemies, but give us assurance of their assistance in removing our enemies the French and Spaniards from Moville and them parts.  

The speaker reveled in the “flourishing condition” and the “great trade” that connected South Carolina to “almost all parts of America.” The more South Carolina became comfortable with its achievements—with its growth, trade, and partnerships—the less English colonists reflected on the potential perils that surrounded them. Charles Town was blinded by the success and profits of its commercial networks. While able to criticize North Carolina’s shortcomings, South Carolinians proved far less capable of considering their own risks. It was only in hindsight that the seemingly insignificant troubles South Carolina had encountered during the Tuscarora War, such as Indian groups deserting English ranks and acting in their own interests, would be deemed important.

There were, however, fleeting mentions of growing dissatisfaction. Even in his celebratory marks about the state of the colony, the speaker of the House noted the danger of traders, who needed “regulating.” Governor Charles Craven had also delivered a powerful message to the House of Commons, in which he criticized traders who used the chaos of war to pursue their own interests. Craven angrily explained that “the discouragement they [traders] gave the Indians contrary to my orders, prevailed on several to stay at home” and not fight against the Tuscaroras. The governor concluded that “this is the highest contempt that can be shown to the Government, and what is more a growing Evil & of so pernicious consequences that if not timely prevented will endanger the safety of this province.”

Indian traders brought money, connections, and helped the colony achieve a “flourishing condition;” but, according to the governor, the self-serving actions “endanger[ed] the safety of this province.” The government did manage to punish six traders to the Cherokee and five to the Creek who had tried “stopping the Indians from marching against the Tusqueroras.” Trading far away from Charles Town, many of traders remained unscathed by the government’s fines and threats. Others, like John Dickson and Thomas Welch, were so well-connected that their contemptuous actions often went unpunished or simply ignored. Governor Craven feared that there would be long-term repercussions for the trader’s “contempt.”

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94 SCDAH. House Assembly of Journal, 1711, May 5, 551-2 [300-302].
95 "The Tuscarora Expedition, Letters of Colonel John Barnwell," 32.
97 Dixon refused to aid Theophilus Hastings in the recruitment of Creeks during the Yamasees War; Dixon was later employed to deliver trade goods to Thomas Welch, who was attempting to broker better relations with Choctaws and Chickasaws. See SCDAH House Assembly of Journal, 1709, February 19, 413; alliance and block French efforts, see Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, the Rise of the English Empire in the American South 1670-1717, 281.
98 SCDAH House Assembly of Journal, 1712, December 2, 122-3. In regard to the Cherokees there were: Stephen Trumball, Mr. Samuel Richinson, Mr. Eliaza Wiggin, Mr. Alex Long, Mr. Gerard Ditton, Mr. Samuel Douglas—(information reported by Robert Card [and Benjamin Clea]). For the Creeks there were:
By the end of the Tuscarora War, the colony’s commercial and political interests were aligned, but they did not perfectly overlap. There were clear divisions within the colony—tensions, which even during war time, could not be reconciled. Quarrels between and among traders, and between traders and government officials, had existed and divided South Carolina long before the Tuscarora War. But the persistence and even intensification of these divisions during a moment of conflict underscored that for all its strength, South Carolina was undercut by deep internal factions. Just as Barnwell prided himself with having the Indian companions most loyal to South Carolina’s mission against the Tuscaroras, other traders attempted to secure the friendship of Indians like the Creeks and Cherokees by making promises (and threats) that ran counter to the orders of the governor. Some traders were even accused of hurting Yamasee allies. In previous wars, such as during the outbreak of Queen Anne’s War (1702) or James Moore’s attack of San Agustín (1702) and his subsequent raids into Apalachee (1704-1706), South Carolinians had gone to great lengths to secure the allegiance of Yamasees. At first, the Yamasee-South Carolina alliance during the Tuscarora War seemed no different. However, reports of Yamasee desertion coupled with accusations of trader abuse revealed a growing rift in this partnership. This tension was further emphasized when a large Yamasee force arrived in Charles Town in 1712. The Yamasee warriors demanded payment for their wartime service and hoped to obtain justice, if not retribution, for abuses they had endured. The meeting was riddled with anxiety. The size of the Indian delegation was not incidental; the Yamasee were displaying their nation’s might and sending a clear message to their English partners: the Yamasee were strong. Empowered and armed to protect South Carolina, Yamasees were determined to protect their own interests. The Tuscarora War was a great moment of strength for South Carolina. English success, however, was fraught with strain. When the war ended, South Carolina declared victory, seeing only its strength and none of its weakness. This nearsightedness proved to be a deadly mistake. Four years later, when South Carolina faced an internal and far more formidable adversary, the English realized, a little too late, that their confidence and power had been built on a fractured foundation. Privileging certain

99 The English feared that a more powerful Indian nation would take the place emptied by the Tuscaroras. “And if the five nations of Indians should come and destroy the Tuscaroras they would not only have all the advantage of the slave but by presenting a privilege in the Tuscarora Country that they had conquered…” feared the House of Commons. Traders, Indian allies, and the government needed to rally together if they wanted to destroy an Indian threat. SCDAH House Assembly of Journal, 1712, August 5, 96.

100 SCDAH House Assembly of Journal, 1710, October 11, 475. Calling Capt Maggott because he knows of “abuses committed amongst the Yamasee.”

101 Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, the Rise of the English Empire in the American South 1670-1717, 280 with 40% of traders going to the Yamasee.

102 SCDAH House Assembly of Journal, 1712, April 5, 12; SCDAH House Assembly of Journal, 1712, November 18, 108; Oatis, A Colonial Complex, South Carolina’s Frontiers in the Era of the Yamasee War, 1680-1730, 84-91.

103 There was real concern that after the Tuscaroras were destroyed, the Iroquois would claim their land and raid the region. The English did want to have hostile Indians as neighbors, but South Carolinians did not want weak native allies either. SCDAH House Assembly of Journal, 1712, August 5, 96.
sources and perspectives over others, South Carolina’s communication and trade networks had given Charles Town a skewed and biased view of the Southeast, silencing the discontent that was quickly brewing. By 1711 the English knew a lot more about far less.
Chapter 5: Collapse and Reconstitution: Communication Networks during War, 1715-1725

“The Indians seemed very ready to come to a good agreement and reconciliation, and having prepared a god supper for our Messengers, all went quietly to rest; but early next morning their lodging was beset with a great number of Indians, who barbarously murdered Captain Nairn [sic.] and Messieurs John Wight, and Thomas Ruffy.”

– “An Account of the Breaking out of the Yamassee War in South” (1715)

When Thomas Nairne and John Wright, two respected Indian agents, were killed in the Yamassee town of Pocotalico on Good Friday of 1715, it seemed that everything the English had known (or thought they knew) about South Carolina was wrong. The English felt betrayed and overwhelmed by Indians they had once trusted. South Carolinians saw the expansive trade networks that had allowed them to gain access to Indian lands, goods, and slaves quickly spin out of control. The petrified colonists believed the Yamassee attacks were nothing short of a “barbarous and inhumane Indian Warr formed and carried on by a universal Confederacy of the Indian Nations.” South Carolina’s government clamored that the whole world had turned against them; a “universal Confederacy” of Indians planned to annihilate all English colonists.

Historians, such as Steven Oatis and William Ramsey, have dismissed such panicked allegations. Oatis and Ramsey have argued against this “universal” conspiracy theory. By describing the nuances of Indian involvement, the “schizophrenic” English policies, and the quarrels among South Carolinians, Oatis and Ramsey have emphasized the complexities of this conflict. They have rightly argued that labeling the Yamassee War “universal” only gives credence to English paranoia and overlooks the complexities of Indian actions and decisions. Yet despite its intricacies, for many English colonists the Yamassee War felt universal. This conflict engulfed the whole colony and its effects reverberated throughout the Southeast. The war reminded the English that for all their strength and connections they could be (and almost were) overpowered. The loose,

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2 Although there are only a handful of studies that focus exclusively on the war, this conflict has figured prominently in histories of the Southeast. For the original study of the Yamassee War see Crane, The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732; and for more recent treatment Oatis, A Colonial Complex, South Carolina’s Frontiers in the Era of the Yamassee War, 1680-1730; Ramsey, Indians of the Southeast.
3 South Carolina Department of Archives and History (SCDAH from here) BPRO, Volume 6, 1711-1716. William Rhett to King. August 1715, 116-117.
4 Oatis, A Colonial Complex, South Carolina’s Frontiers in the Era of the Yamassee War, 1680-1730, 10; Ramsey, Indians of the Southeast, quote from 97, 124-5.
5 For similar discussions about “the actual” compared to “the felt” impact of Indian warfare see: Jill Lepore, The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1998).
individual networks of trade and communication that had enabled South Carolina to grow exponentially had suddenly become a liability.

This chapter is about the collapse and reconstitution of the English networks. First, it describes how the Yamasee War (1715-17) destroyed South Carolina’s trade and communication networks detailed in the previous chapter. Second, it examines the many different, often contrasting, reconstitutions that took place in the war’s wake. In the aftermath of this bloody conflict, the South Carolina government attempted to impose stricter regulations on Indian affairs and made a concerted effort to centralize decision making. Yet the English bent on centralization starkly contrasted with Amerindian attempts to network alliances. This chapter explains the individual endeavors of South Carolinians and then of American Indians groups to forge information networks during the first two decades of the eighteenth century. It shows the messy efforts to establish and obtain “good communication.” The Yamasee War profoundly affected the Southeast and, as this chapter argues, it redefined the value of “good communication” and forced Indians in the Southeast, as well as their European counterparts, to reconsider the value and power of information.

**English Networks and the Yamasee War**

The killing of Thomas Nairne and John Wright was both a product and a reflection of the complex communication system that had been in place at the onset of the Yamasee War. Sent to ameliorate the deteriorating relations with the Yamasees, each delegate arrived at the town of Pocotalico with different ideas about Indian affairs, with different perspectives on the rising tensions, and thus with different messages to deliver. For all of Nairne’s insistence on friendship, Wright had come to Indian country with less amicable intentions. “Mr. Wright said that the white men would come and [fetch] the Yamasees in one night, and that they would hang four of their head men and take all the rest of them for Slaves, and that he would send them all off the Country.” While one agent promised peace, the other threatened the lives of Yamasee headmen; while one vowed that Charles Town meant no harm, the other declared that Yamasees would become slaves; while Nairne tried to work with the Yamasees, Wright sought to assert English authority. Though deadly for Nairne and Wright, this mixture of messages was not unusual. Contradictory communication was emblematic of Yamasee-South Carolina relations, and a common occurrence in South Carolina’s Indian affairs at large. The growing number of unregulated traders, each with their own concerns and ambitions, created a disjointed Indian policy. As different voices competed for prominence in Indian country, English diplomacy became muddled and unclear.

Nairne and Wright were merely the first victims of cluttered communication. After the attack at Pocotalico, Yamasee braves went after other English traders and settlers scattered throughout the backcountry. War descended on South Carolina with

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7 Huspaw King to Charles Craven, enclosure in letter of Capt. Jonathan St. Lo to Burchett, July 12, 1715 in Ibid., Appendix.
8 SCDAH. *House of Assembly Journal, 1728* "the state of the Indian Trade among the Cherokees and are informed that the irregularity among those Indians’ chiefly arise from the great number of traders.” April 13, 1728.
terrifying suddenness. Some South Carolinians with fortuitous connections managed to escape the initial violence. William Bray, who at the outbreak of the war was in northern Florida trying to catch runaway slaves, avoided certain death after heeding a warning from his wife, who had heard from a “friendly Yamasee” that Creeks, frustrated by the current trade conditions, intended to turn against the English. Similarly, Samuel Warner, a trader in Apalachicola, was saved by reports from friendly Indians. Though these men had made a living negotiating the elements and people of the backcountry, their lives were spared by serendipitous luck; they had stumbled upon the right information at the most appropriate of times. The good fortune of these men, however, was not widely shared. The outbreak of the war exposed the dependence and vulnerability of most Indian traders. By eliminating the people who had (or claimed to have) access to Indian leaders, trade, and talk, Yamasees destabilized English networks of communication. The individuals targeted by the Yamasees had been not only the most valuable allies in the fight against Indian enemies, but also the means to make sense of Indian conflict. Fleeing or dying with these traders were the connections South Carolina had relied upon. Losing these individual nodes and lacking any centralized communication system, Charles Town began waging the Yamasee War in the dark.

Most of the English frontier towns were completely unprepared for the war. The colonists who managed to escape Indian attacks had received last minute warnings from traders who were themselves fleeing death. The lives of Mr. Guy, a missionary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel stationed at Port Royal, and his parishioners were spared when two traders (a man and boy), warned the colonists about a large group of Yamasee braves heading towards their settlement. Some inhabitants of Port Royal received a frantic warning from Seymour Burroughs, one of the survivors from the unfortunate delegation to Pocotalico. Described as “a strong robust man,” Burroughs managed to flee from the Yamasee settlement, avoid most of the Indians’ gunfire, though “One [shot] took him though [sic.] the cheek,” and report the events that had transpired to John Barnwell, the largest planter and land holder in Port Royal. Together Burroughs and Barnwell notified colonists in the surrounding areas of the impending danger; though “several hundred of English lives were saved” by their warnings, most of the inhabitants of Port Royal were not so lucky: at least 80 were killed and the whole town was destroyed. This was the second time Port Royal had been razed to the ground. Just like in the Spanish attack three decades earlier, a foreign force had easily overwhelmed this southern English settlement—and once again the destruction, “all which, or the great part thereof, hath happened for want of a speedy communication.” In 1716, as in 1686, the English lacked any organized way of sending “alarum”; they depended on individual informers, who, as it turned out, were not as informed as the South Carolina government had thought.

10 "An Account of the Breaking out of the Yamasee War in South Carolina Extracted from the Boston News of the 13th of June, 1715."
11 Thomas Cooper and David J. McCords, The Statutes at Large of South Carolina, 10 Vols., p. 23-4. February 20, 1686, emphasis mine.
12 Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” Hayek and other information theorist praised the decentralize information (as a way to democratize systems and fight authoritarian control), but the
Charles Town received only one warning about the war. Cuffy, a Yamasee, possibly from the Lower Town of Euhaw, was rewarded with a coat for “bringing the first intelligence of the Yamasee Indians’ design to massacre the English.” Governor Craven listened to Cuffy’s intelligence with great care, but before he could organize a delegation or enact any new policy to calm the mounting displeasures among Yamasees and Lower Creeks, word reached Charles Town of the destruction of Port Royal. John Snow, an English sentinel, was also dead. The governor abandoned any diplomatic approached and ordered Colonel Mackay to attack Yamasee towns. Mackay and his scout John Palmer—who go on to lead some of the most punitive raids against Yamasee Indians living in Florida—embarked on several daring and successful attacks. Cuffy’s report had come too late. The Yamasee War had begun, and with it, the rapid dissolution of English-Indian alliances. South Carolinians, who had been so certain of their strength and power at the end of the Tuscarora War (1711), were now trying to salvage any alliance they could secure. “Precarious” became the adjective of choice when describing the networks English delegates and soldiers had to tread.

While the unstable nature of English networks was nothing new, the Yamasee War made their instability impossible to ignore. In 1715, Commander Redwood “was foolishly betray’d by credulity… listening too much to the insinuations of making Peace disarmed his own men, and suffered the Indians to come amongst them.” Luring the English with “insinuations of peace” and taking advantage of English “credulity,” Yamasee forces proceeded to massacre Redwood’s regiment. That same year, Captain Thomas Barker and his men were also led into a trap by an Indian guide. It was not merely that South Carolinians were unsure who to trust, it was that the mechanisms they had in place to evaluate such promises were gone as well. To win, or even to weather the war, South Carolina needed to reconnect the dissolving networks or else forge new ones. As friends turned to foes, as a “universal Confederacy” of Lower Creek and Yamasee Indians attacked English traders and towns, the government at Charles Town realized that finding new allies would be safer and quicker than remedying old ties.

Securing an alliance with Cherokees or, at the very least preventing this large Indian nation from joining Creek-Yamasee forces, became a matter of survival for South Carolina. Since “the Northern Indians have not since appeared against Us,” wrote attorney general George Rodd, “We are in hopes, the Cheroquese will be Our Friends.” But despite Rodd’s hope, the lack of Cherokee violence did not translate into Cherokee

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15 SCDAH BPRO, Volume 7, 1717-1720, Charles Town Governor Robert Johnson to the Board of Trade, June 18, 1718, 134-6; SCDA JCHA, Papers from Joseph Larzon, June 3, 1724.
17 SCDAH BPRO Volume 6, 1711-171, July 19, 1717, 103-108.
friendship. At the outbreak of the war, Cherokee and South Carolina relations had been limited; and while both sides had been aware of the other, the English had made only small inroads into Cherokee trade and lands. In the winter of 1715, the unfortunately named Colonel George Chicken traveled to the Lower Cherokee town of Tugaloo to establish friendship with the Cherokees and, more importantly, to determine whether this nation “would aseast us ageanst ower Enmies ore noe.”\textsuperscript{19} South Carolina officials and Chicken himself were perfectly aware that these new friendships could not be mirror images of previous arrangements. In the midst of war, death, and rumors, Charles Town wanted to establish more direct connections with Indian country. Unlike the contradictory addresses delivered at Pocotalico, Chicken needed to offer the Cherokees a clear message of strength, unity, and friendship. These open, straight paths would help curb the static that had previously interfered with Charles Town’s messages.\textsuperscript{20}

Colonel Chicken was not in luck. He was not the first Englishman to reach Cherokee country. Alexander Longe, trader to the Cherokee, at “the warres first breaking out… [had] tould theas pople that ye English was goeing to macke wars with them and that they did design to kill all their head warriers.”\textsuperscript{21} As soon as the Yamasee War begun, Longe fled to Cherokee country and spread misleading reports about Charles Town’s intentions. There was personal motivation behind this trader’s reckless actions. Fearing reprimand for his unsanctioned attack of a Euchee town, Longe had sought refuge with the Cherokee—a refuge that would be secure if the Cherokee refused to welcome any other English agent. Longe thus told the Cherokee that Chicken “design[ed] to kill all their head warriers.” To protect himself, Longe tried to turn Cherokees against Charles Town. As Chicken tried to persuade the Cherokees that they would benefit from an alliance with South Carolina, the colonel also had to dismiss Longe’s rumors and present himself as the true voice of Charles Town. It was through him, and not through individual traders like Longe, that the English spoke and negotiated. Supporting Chicken’s authority was a force of 300 colonists led by Colonel Maurice Moore, younger brother of former governor James Moore. The English had gathered all those men in the hopes that marching with such a sizeable force would both display South Carolina’s strength and impress the Cherokees. The theatrics seemed to have worked, and the Cherokees dismissed Longe’s reports and readily agreed to an alliance with the English.

The Cherokee were perfectly happy to extend “white flages” to the English delegation and offer proof of their friendship, such as keeping South Carolinian traders alive. But Cherokee headmen showed no inkling of reworking or relinquishing their existing connections. Opening communication, Chicken discovered, was not the same as establishing a straight and clear network. The English could be included as allies, but on Cherokee terms. The colonel urged the Cherokees to consult, or at least inform, the English before making any major decisions, and “not to make war or peace without ye Consent of ye English.”\textsuperscript{22} Good communication, as much as a military alliance and future

\textsuperscript{19} November 30, 1715. Colonel George Chicken’s Journal in Ibid., 330.
\textsuperscript{21} Colonel George Chicken’s Journal in Cheves, "A Letter from Carolina in 1715 and Journal of the March of the Carolinians into the Cherokee Mountains in the Yemassee Indian War," 334-5.
\textsuperscript{22} January 23, 1715. Colonel George Chicken’s Journal in Ibid, 343.
trade, was at the heart of the new relations Chicken wanted to establish. The colonel reminded the Cherokee of how one of their peace delegations had met “2 Rogues of negroes run away from ye English…[who] told them a parcell of Lies, which hindred their [Cherokee] coming & … It was a long while before they came or that we had any news from them.” 23 The Cherokees had firsthand experience with the problems caused by rumors; their own efforts to open relations with South Carolina had been “hindred” by self-serving informers carrying “a pacell of Lies.” To eliminate the dangers of misleading reports, Chicken insisted that the Cherokee needed to establish a straight path to Charles Town. Too many voices, as the Cherokees themselves had learned in their dealings with trader Alexander Longe and with these “2 Rogue” fugitive slaves, could tangle talks and complicate friendships.

The Cherokees refused Chicken’s terms. They vowed to “make war or peace” as they saw fit and, in an act that seemed nothing short of open defiance, the Cherokees prepared for an unsanctioned war against the Creeks. Though the Cherokee headmen had not received English “Consent” for this attack, they argued that their actions were necessary for they had “no [other] way of getting Slaves to buy ammunition & Clothing.” 24 Ironically, Cherokee leaders cited the trade with South Carolina as their reason to refuse Chicken’s request and proceeded to attack a Creek delegation visiting the town of Tugaloo. 25 The attack at Tugaloo was a mixed blessing for the English. On the surface, the murder of the Creek delegation demonstrated Cherokee support for South Carolina. Colonel Moore recalled how the “Charikees were upon the point of falling upon Our men but as providence Order’d it they chang’d their minds and fell upon the Creeks and Yamasee who were in their Town and killed every man… since which the Cherokees have been carry[ing] on the war against their and our enemies.” 26 Moore praised divine providence; in the last minute Cherokees had “chang’d their minds” and switched alliances. Though Moore celebrated the fact that South Carolinians and Cherokees now shared common enemies, the events at Tugaloo also displayed Cherokee willingness to act without (and against) English approval. Cherokees had “chang’d their minds” and made their own decisions. Cherokee actions were a reminder that this powerful nation would not seek English “Consent” before making “war or peace.” Peace (or war) with the Cherokee would be conducted as the Cherokee saw fit.

They were not the only Indians to think this way. Creeks Indians also approached South Carolina in a similar manner. Like their northern neighbors, Creeks were not entering a friendship with the English in order to make concessions. What is surprising about the position of the Creeks is that they, unlike the Cherokee, had not remained allied with South Carolina. Until the summer of 1717, Creeks had been fighting alongside the Yamasee. When they re-opened communication with the English after having killed many colonists and orchestrated deadly attacks, the Creek did not apologize for their

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24 Chief Cherry Heague of the Cherokee from the town of Chota protected English traders to showcase his support for South Carolina. Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763, 89.
25 SDAH BPRO, Volume 6, 1711-1716, March 15, 1716. 155-161, Colonel Maurice Moore reports on his expedition to the Cherokee and the events at Tugaloo.
digressions; instead, they made demands. Their strong stance reveals both the power of the Creeks, even as they waged a losing war, and the relative weakness of South Carolina, even as the fighting turned in favor of the English. Governor Robert Johnson did not want to continue fighting a bloody and costly war; he readily welcomed Creek promises of peace, even with all their caveats and conditions.

Charles Town officials knew that in spite of their friendship with the Cherokee, who were “the most potent nation,” South Carolina was still vulnerable. There were at least “fifteen other Nations with whom we are still at war are far more powerfull than they [Cherokees] and we together.” The English still had more enemies than friends. That is why when Bocatio, an Upper Creek Indian, arrived at Savannah Fort and displayed interest in and willingness to forge peace with South Carolina, the English were delighted. Their enthusiasm quickly damped as Bocatio began his talks with conditions, rather than offers. The Creek delegate made it perfectly clear that peace would not come “before their corn is ripe.” Peace would happen when, and only when, the Indians were ready. Furthermore, Bocatio insisted that in their friendship with South Carolina, the Creeks would “not assist the sd Cherokees nor Cattawbas.” This was a major demand. Bocatio outlined the boundaries of Creek friendship. The Creeks would ally with South Carolina, but that friendship would not shape how Creeks interacted with other Indians—in particular groups like the Cherokee and Catawba, who the Creeks regarded as enemies.

If the English wanted friendship with the Creeks, they would have to comply with Creek requests. “We are in such a straight,” complained Indian agent Mr. Joseph Boone, “that we know not what to do, nor how to turn our selves.” Refusing Bocatio friendship would mean condemning South Carolina to prolonged fighting with a powerful nation; but accepting his conditions, implied agreeing to peace and diplomacy in Indian terms. Then things got complicated. “[V]arious rumors spread abroad in Town and Country” that Bocatio’s promises of peace had not been sanctioned by Brims, the mico of the principal Lower Creek town of Coweta. It seemed that Creeks themselves, or at least the most important headmen, had not requested peace. “Very desirous of being rightly informed,” the House of Commons sent experienced Indian trader Captain John Jones to learn “the truth of that affair” and determine whether the Creeks wanted friendship or not. Discerning the “truth” amidst “the various rumors” and wartime violence was no simple task.

Captain Jones’ mission, the first one to Creek country since the murders of Nairne and Wright, was a litmus test for Creek-South Carolina relations. But even more fundamental than that, Jones’ mission was about establishing communication; without clear exchange, Creek-South Carolina diplomacy would collapse before even starting. Well-received and welcomed, Jones began reconnecting the networks between Charles Town and Creek Country, in particular with Coweta. But more than re-opening old avenues of exchange, Jones had to forge new paths and understandings. Since former relations and promises had resulted in war, Charles Town strove to secure paths that were simpler and clearer (both to understand and to regulate). The Captain believed that he

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28 SCDAH BPRO, Vol. 7, 1717-1720, June 8, 1717, Unknown writer to Mr. Boone 49-52.
29 SCDAH JCHA 1717, May 29, 1717.
30 Hahn, *The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763*, 95.
achieved just that. He declared that a peace delegation would be sent to Charles Town by early summer and that the rebuilding of connections was well under way.  

Jones was partly right. Creeks were rebuilding and re-conceptualizing their relations, but not in ways that exclusively benefitted the English. A large contingency of Creeks, which Jones had not been able to meet, was still allied with the Spanish; and others seemed intent on joining the Senecas in waging war against the Cherokee, an important English ally. Realizing the limitations of the assurances secured by Jones, the government at Charles Town sent Indian trader Theophilus Hastings and Colonel John Musgrove to Creek Country. They two men were selected for their familiarity and personal connections to the Creeks; as known and respected traders, Hastings and Musgrove hoped to finish the job Jones started.

But Hastings and Musgrove found the task at hand much harder than they anticipated. Many paths into and through Creek were closed to these English agents. In the Lower Creek Town of Cussita, the English agents offered the Creeks a white flag as a symbol of their good intentions; Cussita Creeks “replied with a red flag.” The Lower Creek town did not welcome the English delegation. Hastings and Moore were forced to travel further inland before they found a town that allowed them access.  

And when they were finally allowed in, it was clear that their connections, rather than expertise were responsible for the agents’ admittance into the Creek town.

The English owed their welcome into Coweta to Coosaponakesa. This young Creek girl, daughter of an English trader and a Creek woman who was Brims’ sister, was betrothed to Musgrove’s son— she would eventually marry him and become known as Mary Musgrove. This union, between Coosaponakesa and Musgrove junior, bound Brims, mico of Coweta, and Musgrove in kinship. Musgrove and Coosaponakesa’s marriage thus eased Creek-South Carolina relations and facilitated Musgrove and Hastings’s admittance into Coweta. To succeed in their diplomatic mission, the English agents needed to proceed through Creek country in Creek terms. If they wanted to reestablish connections between Coweta and Charles Town, Hastings and Musgrove had to operate within Indian parameters.

In the decade following the Yamasee War, Indian agents, such as Musgrove, Hastings, and Chicken, struggled to regulate inter-Indian relations. Though they began laying the groundwork for connecting Charles Town with Cherokee and Creek towns, they could not establish the clear, uniform, and more centralized network the House of Commons had hoped for— a network that would afford South Carolina more loyal allies and diminish the miscommunications that undermined English diplomacy. “Good communication,” as English dealings with Cherokees and Creeks demonstrated, was easier to desire than to obtain. Chicken as well as other Charles Town agents might have wanted to impose a particular type of diplomacy and communication, but it was the Indians who dictated the terms of engagement. And these terms were not static. The Yamasee War also compelled Creeks, Yamasee, Cherokees, as well as smaller

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33 For more on Mary Musgrove see Hahn’s forthcoming book, *Mary Musgrove, A Life on the Southern Frontier*.  

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134
Amerindian groups in the region to reshape their relations with each other and with the larger Southeast. Just as the English were trying to centralize and regulate information, Indian themselves were renegotiating their own networks of communication.

**Interconnectedness of Indian Networks**

The English were not the only ones experiencing the dissolution of their networks, or the only ones attempting to reconstitute old connections and find new allies. Indian groups, like the Yamasees, Cherokees, and Creeks, were also busy forging their own networks. Though inter and intra Indian relations were nothing new, the Yamasee War offers a unique opportunity to explore Indian-made, -sustained, and -defined networks.

In 1715, a joint Yamasee and Creek delegation arrived in San Agustín and explained that war with South Carolina was imminent. Once mighty raiders of Spanish Indians and missions, Yamasee and Creek Indians now appeared in the Spanish presidio

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34 “Maps of Spanish Florida,” John E. Worth (University of West Florida), accessed January 13, 2011, http://www.uwf.edu/jworth/spanfla_maps.htm “Missions, 1565-1763. This map shows the known or projected locations of selected Spanish missions across greater Spanish Florida during the First Spanish period, including early efforts by Jesuits and secular clergy, as well as later missions established by Franciscan friars (only provincial designations are provided in most cases, since individual mission names are too numerous for the map).”
seeking protection and aid. In their pleas before San Agustín officials, the Indian delegates argued that their partnership with South Carolina had resulted in goods and (temporary) strength, but also in isolation. Yamasees and Creeks had become closer to the English, but disconnected from the larger Southeast.\textsuperscript{35} The Florida officials noted that, while the Yamasee and Creek delegates required an interpreter to communicate with them, these Indians had clear command of the English language.\textsuperscript{36} This brief comment about the linguistic abilities (and limitations) of Yamasees and Creeks revealed the connections these Indians had prioritized, and those they had forgotten. By 1715, when these Indian delegates sought to reenter into an alliance with Florida, an entire generation of peoples had been removed from Spanish policies and Spanish forms of communication.

The delegation was comprised of two Yamasee leaders: Alonso, mico of Ocuti, and Gabriel, son of a Yamasee chief, and two Apalachicola (Creek) headmen: Istopoyole of the town of Nicunapa and Yfallaquisca (also known as Brave Dog), the leading war chief of Satiquicha.\textsuperscript{37} The four Indian delegates offered to reopen communication with the Spanish. Alonso, Gabriel, Istopoyole, and Yfallaquisca had gathered the support of 161 towns and represented the interests of over three-thousand Indians.\textsuperscript{38} As a token of their loyalty, the headmen gave Florida’s Governor Francisco Córcoles y Martínez eight strips of deerskins with knots tied to them. Each knot stood for an Indian town that had supported the Creek-Yamasee delegation to San Agustín. The governor gladly counted 161 knots for the 161 towns.\textsuperscript{39}

These deerskins with knots were more than a mere gift; they were also hints of an Indian network. The eight-strips of deerskins revealed the careful connections that Yamasee and Creek delegates had managed to establish between and among their towns—towns bound together in their resolve for war against the English and in their loyalty to the Spanish. Although the knot is a powerful symbol of determination, unity, and fixity, the alliances of these towns were far more fragile than the strings of deerskin displayed. Governor Córcoles y Martínez might have assumed that he was gaining the commitment of 161 Creek and Yamasee towns, but this Indian network was far more complicated and tenuous. After all, the headmen gave the governor eight separate strips that were not tied together, but presented independently. The knots, as much as they emphasized Indian dedication to a cause, also underscored the individuality of Indian towns. It was easy for the governor to count 161 different knots; it was easy for him to identify 161 different towns. The sheer number as well as the distinctiveness of each knot, rather than their unity, was stressed in the delegation’s gifts.

This symbol was then good at explaining the interconnectedness of this region from an Indian perspective. Rather than a set policy, these knots recognized the sovereignty of 161 towns and the shared pressures they faced, without detailing what

\textsuperscript{35} For the changes in trade partnership see, Braund, \textit{Deerskins and Duffels, the Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815}, 28-40.

\textsuperscript{36} Yamasee Testimony, July 5, 1715 bnd 4776 58-1-30/42, Reel 36, Stetson Collection, PKY.

\textsuperscript{37} “El Gobernador Francisco...” July 5, 1715, AGI SD 843 Folio 426-436, Reel 13, PKY.

\textsuperscript{38} At that time San Agustín had a population of 1,500 and Charles Town of 5,500; representing over 3,000 Amerindians, the Indian delegates had brought together a sizeable force. Peter H. Wood, “The Changing Population of the Colonial South, an Overview by Race and Region, 1685-1790,” in \textit{Powhatan’s Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1989), 60-1.

\textsuperscript{39} Yamasee Testimony, July 5, 1715 bnd 4776 58-1-30/42, Reel 36, Stetson Collection, PKY.
each town would do or how it would act. While there are no records of the moments in which these knots were successfully tied, one can imagine Indian headmen travelling from talofa to talofa, calling for council meetings, and attempting to sway a town’s alliance.\textsuperscript{40} These meetings, journeys, and councils— all the knots added to the strands — were well-concealed from the watchful English. Although Yamasee and Creek delegates traveled the same paths and into the very towns where English traders conducted their business, South Carolinians were unaware of this forming alliance. Built by and through influence, these Indian headmen formed a network throughout the Chattahoochee Valley that included thousands of people, but remained invisible to the English.

Although 161 towns agreed to friendship with Florida, many more were probably visited and some towns refused to become a knot in this growing network. There are hints of failed Indian alliances in colonel Chicken’s 1715 journal to the Cherokee. Chicken, attempting to find allies among the Cherokee, made note of a Creek embassy that arrived with similar intentions. Although the Cherokee had kindly welcomed the English colonel and had expressed a clear partiality towards South Carolina, Creek delegates still urged their northern neighbors to kill the English and join them in war. Aware of Chicken’s presence, the Indian delegates knew that their chance for success was, at best, limited. The Cherokee refused the Creek offer and murdered the Creek delegation that had arrived at the town of Tugaloo.\textsuperscript{41} Competing with South Carolinians, Creeks headmen were unable to persuade Cherokees to join their network. There were thus no Cherokee towns represented in the deerskin strings given to Florida’s governor— there were no Cherokee knots.

The gaps in the Indian network did not bother Governor Córcoles y Martínez. Florida officials were simply elated that, in a reversal of half a century of decline, Indians were coming to San Agustín for friendship, rather than war. The Spanish were finally gaining Indian allies— and powerful allies at that. But the Florida government soon found that these new allies expected a great deal from the Spanish. Indian friendship, not livelihood or loyalty, was open for negotiation. Although Yamasees and Creeks had initiated the diplomatic talks, these headmen expected and demanded that the Spanish accommodate to their needs. The Yamasee, who were in great need of supplies and protection, accepted Spanish goods, but refused to relocate closer to San Agustín. A 1717 census conducted by Joseph Primo de Rivera revealed that in spite of the governor’s high hopes, Yamasees did not “embrace the Holy Faith” or set-up communities “close to the presidio.”\textsuperscript{42} Yamasees proved to be an important ally for the Spanish, but an ally that, while in need of and grateful for Spanish support, refused to relinquish its autonomy.\textsuperscript{43} Yamasees and Creeks were looking for a reconfiguration, not a reconstitution, of their relations.

\textsuperscript{40} Talofa: Creek word for Town.
\textsuperscript{41} Colonel George Chicken’s Journal in Cheves, ”A Letter from Carolina in 1715 and Journal of the March of the Carolinians into the Cherokee Mountains in the Yemassee Indian War,” 345.
\textsuperscript{42} For a survey and population census of these towns see efforts by Joseph Primo de Rivera in April 18, 1717. Stetson Collection Reel 36 and Hann, John H. ”St. Augustine’s Fallout from the Yamasee War By.” The Florida Historical Quarterly 68, no. 2: 181-201, 80.
\textsuperscript{43} Herbert Eugene Bolton, ”Folder 14: Documents Concerning Property Right in Florida 1716-1764 Fray Joseph Ramón Escudero to Marqués De Monteleón, Spanish Ambassador at London,” in Bolton Papers (Bancroft Library). Bancroft Library. Escudero notes: “aunque ya no son muchas personas son valientes y estan muy agraviados de Ingleses” (although they are not many, they are brave and opposed to the English).
The Spanish welcomed Indian promises, even with all their caveats. Seeking to capitalize on the deteriorating relations between South Carolina and Apalachicola and Apalachee Indians, the Spanish organized expeditions into Indian country. Much like Chicken’s efforts to open communication with the powerful Cherokee, the Spanish ordered Lieutenant Diego Peña, along with four other experienced soldiers, to obtain the friendship of Indians in the “tierra adentro” (the backcountry). Accompanying the delegation was Chislacaliche, mico of Sabacola old town, who told San Agustín officials that there were many Indian towns that wanted friendship with Florida, but had refrained from approaching the presidio, uncertain if the Spanish would welcome them. According to Chislacaliche, Indian towns along the Chattahoochee River had “h[e]ld back from pledging their obedience [to San Agustín] because they do not know whether they would be well or ill received.” Peña’s task was to persuade these Indians to not “hold back” and establish firm ties with Florida.  

Governor Olivera y Fullana instructed Peña to spread word of the opportunities, goods, and protection that awaited Indians if they allied with San Agustín. Since the “main object of this trip” was to convince the “many caciques and Indians [of the] provinces or towns which desire peace [of] our friendship and trade,” Peña had strict orders to conduct himself and his men with the highest degree of decorum and “take particular care to respect and to speak with courtesy.” The Spanish governor hoped that Peña’s journey would bolster Spanish-Indian relations. Reconnecting San Agustín with Coweta and other Lower Creek towns meant that the Spanish, for the first time in over thirty-years, would have a presence, a say, and knowledge of Apalachicola.

The journey of Lieutenant Peña began smoothly. His attentive and flexible approach was a refreshing contrast to the last and somewhat disastrous Spanish venture in Apalachicola. Antonio Matheos’ 1686 expedition had left a trail of rubble and ashes, costing Florida valuable allies and giving the Spanish a dubious reputation that had proven difficult to erase. But by 1716, the Southeast was a different place. Peña remarked on both the recent disarray and growing diversity of the region—he noticed Timucuas, Alafayes, and Mocamas, all who were relatively new to the area, and he also commented on the ubiquitous presence of Yamasees within Creek settlements. Yamasee headmen, like Jospo and Pilitinvo, were particularly keen on friendship with Florida, a friendship that was, as these men plainly stated, rooted in “desolate” condition of their people. Adapting to this new Southeast, Peña had to be inviting and welcoming as he simultaneously displayed strength. The Spanish lieutenant walked that thin line with utmost care.

Almost two months after leaving San Agustín, he arrived at Coweta and spoke to Brims. Peña stressed the importance of this mico, “to whom all render submission,” and Brims himself went out of the way to showcase his far reaching influence. When Peña conveyed Florida’s renewed and more serious interest in the region, Brims sent word of

44 July 21, 1716, AGI SD 843, Folio 462-517.
45 “Autos y demas diliegencias sobre la venida de los Indios a dar la obediencia,” July 21, 1716, AGI SD 843, Folio 462-517, Reel 13, PKY. Chislacaliche suggested that the Spanish message of peace would be better received if it was delivered by an official envoy.
47 “Testimony of Alférez Pedro de San Turxo and Gil Hermoso de Mendoza,” January 18, 1717, Reel 36, Stetson Collection, PKY.
the Spanish promises to the distant towns of Tallapoosa (Upper Creeks). This act
demonstrated both Brims’ loyalty to Florida (since the mico was propagating the Spanish
message of friendship) and the far reaching extent of the mico’s personal influence.48
Peña neither missed nor dismissed Brims’ gesture. Contrasting with Brims’ ability to
communicate across Creek country, the access and reach of the Spanish lieutenant was
limited. All of Peña’s efforts were mediated by Indian leaders; it was the Creeks’ own
initiatives, rather than Spanish efforts, that enabled or complicated Spanish headway in
Apalachicola.

When Brims urged Peña to send a letter to the governor of Pensacola announcing
the recent friendship between Lower Creek and Spanish forces, the Spanish lieutenant
found himself in a bind. Eager to detail his success in Indian country and comply with the
mico’s request, Peña could not exchange information in a manner he considered safe. The
Spanish lieutenant could neither control the spread nor the content of his message, since
he relied on Indians to carry and transmit his news. Peña commented on how “I did this
[sent the letter, but] I could not reveal myself to the governor of Pensacola for the reason
they might give the letters to the English to read, and I be injured.”50 Unlike Brims who
could just send word to wherever he wanted, Peña had to be more cautious. The
lieutenant’s life, what he knew about his surroundings and hosts, and even what news he
could transmit to his superiors in Pensacola and San Agustín all depended on Creek

48 Boyd, "Diego Peña's Expedition to Apalachee and Apalachicola in 1716," 25.
49 The circles are the main Spanish, English, and French hubs in the area. The triangles are Indian towns on
the Chattahoochee visited by Peña. Map adapted from William Russell's, The History of America, From Its
Discovery by Columbus to the Conclusion of the Late War, 1778.
50 Boyd, "Documents Describing the Second and Third Expeditions of Lieutenant Diego Peña to Apalachee
and Apalachicolo in 1717 and 1718," 122.
friends. If the Spanish wanted to spread word of their intentions, they needed Brims. He held “the key” to all the lands.\footnote{Ibid., 120, Peña argued that Brims was responsible for letting English traders into Creek Country; Ibid. he having the key.”}

But Brims turned this key whichever way he saw fit. From Coweta, the mico embarked on an aggressive networking campaign.\footnote{Steven Hahn argues that since the Muskogee Language did not have a word for “emperor,” Brims probably considered himself “a mico thlucco, or a ‘big chief’” see Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763, 72-3.} Almost as soon the main fighting of the Yamasee War had subsided, Brims reopened relations with the English, sending Ouletta, his son, to a very welcoming Charles Town.\footnote{SCDAH JHCA, November 6 and November 7 1717 and McDowell Jr., ed. Journals of the Commissioners of the Indian Trade, September 20 1710-August 28 1718, November 9, 1717.} In 1717, the Creek Emperor began trading with the French, who constructed Fort Toulouse on the confluences of the Coosa and Tallapoosa River, on Tallapoosa land—a land that, as Brims had shown Peña, fell under his control.\footnote{The growing French influence was noted by both Spanish and English traders; Daniel Thomas, Fort Toulouse: The French Outpost at the Alabamas on the Coosa (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1989).} In addition, Brims sent several Creek delegations to Spanish towns. Tickhonabe, Creek headman of Tallasee, led a group of Creeks from Pensacola all the way to Vera Cruz, where they met the viceroy of Mexico, the Marquis de Valero. Brims also appointed Chipacasi, known to the English as Sepey Coffee and to the Spanish as the usinjulo of Coweta, as an official commissioner to Mobile, Pensacola, and San Agustín. Interacting with Spanish, French, and English officials, Brims was developing a complex policy of neutrality and leading the Creeks to assume a pivotal place in the post-Yamasee War Southeast.

Brims saw Coweta as an important hub, perhaps even as the most important, but he regarded its centrality not simply in terms of the European nodes he had simultaneously connected, but also with respect to the intra-Creek and inter-Indian relations he forged. To maintain the former, Brims sent delegations to both Lower and Upper Creek, keeping a balance among important towns such as Cussita, Coweta, and, eventually Okfuskee. And to stay atop of inter-Indian affairs, Brims rigorously networked alliances with other Indian groups. The mico forged alliances with the neighboring Alabama and Tallasee Indians as well as with distant nations, such as the Choctaw and the Iroquois. The exchanges between Brims and Seneca headmen, who wanted to wage war against Cherokees, and with Choctaw leaders, who wanted protection from the Chickasaws (who were allies of the Cherokee), influenced Coweta’s position on both the Cherokee and on the Creek-Cherokee peace urged by South Carolina. In addition to negotiating with three European powers, the mico of Coweta maintained both his influence and the influence of the Creek nation.\footnote{Brims sent Ouletta, his son, to a very welcoming Charles Town; these relations can be in SCDAH JHCA, November 6 and November 7 1717 and McDowell Jr., ed. Journals of the Commissioners of the Indian Trade, September 20 1710-August 28 1718, November 9, 1717. In 1717, Brims also began communication with the French, who had begun construction on Fort Toulouse, as well as with neighboring Alabama and Tallasee Indians. Tickhonabe of Tallasee, who under Brims’ recommendation, traveled with a group of Creeks to Vera Cruz and met the Viceroy of Mexico the Marquis de Valero. Brims also appointed Chipacasi, known to the English as Sepey Coffee, as an official commissioner to Mobile, Pensacola, and San Agustín. Brims also engaged in diplomacy with Indian groups like the Choctaws, who had not previously interacted with the Creeks with any regularity.}
Peña witnessed some of these dealings firsthand. “The province was restless,” the Spanish Lieutenant noted, as an English party, probably led by John Musgrove and Theophilus Hastings, made their way to Upper Creek Towns. Peña saw some Creeks eagerly welcoming English traders, others speaking of a French alliance, and Brims still promising friendship with San Agustín. Even when spouting their loyalty to Spain, Peña believed Creeks had their own agenda. When the chief of Ocomulque refused to welcome English traders, he used his connections with Florida as an excuse. He tauntingly told the South Carolinians that “nothing was lacking because he frequently visited San Agustín.” Upon hearing the headmen’s refusal, the English “exhibited much malice” and vowed to kill any Spanish trader. Fearing for his life, Peña had to avoid the main towns. As he traveled through perilous side trails, under the protection of Indians he was suppose to be protecting, Peña saw himself (and the Spanish) on the losing end of Creek diplomacy.

Competing with French and English goods and promises, Peña’s message had become harder to hear. The networks were saturated. While Brims seemed to be able to maneuver and thrive among the pressures brought on by increasing nodes, the Spanish grew increasingly frustrated. Peña had attempted to rectify relations between Florida and Lower Creeks by correcting stories of Spanish maltreatment and spreading positive news of San Agustín. Yet traveling along the same Creek paths and using the same avenues to spread news were English agents. These South Carolinian traders had been telling Lower Creeks that Peña’s message of friendship “was senseless” and, just like the all previous Florida promises, it “was false.” For every rumor Peña corrected, several more took its place. Brims informed Peña that without constant remainders and goods, without a permanent Spanish fort that could routinely supply the Lower Creeks, rumors of Spanish weakness would persist.

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56 Serrano y Sanz, Documentos Historicos De La Florida Y La Luisiana, Siglos Xvi Al Xviii, 227-42, Documento 13, Diario del Viaje Que hizo el teniente Diego Peña, entry of September 1, 1717.
57 Ibid. Peña remarked on the multiple native groups who moved in, out, and through Creek Country. Although the Spanish Lieutenant mostly commented on the multiple European powers that Brims reached out to, these alliances allowed Creeks to cultivate and seek new relations with Indian towns and groups. For example, after South Carolina traders were welcomed in Upper Creek country, Upper Creeks began developing more active and peaceful relations with Cherokees. Similarly, as Tallapoosa towns vied for French goods, they began having more regular interactions with Choctaws.
59 Ibid., 123.

Peña wanted to eliminate competition, centralize Brims’ leadership, and relocate Creeks towns closer to the Spanish. To obtain these goals, Peña advocated for the building a garrison, Fort San Marcos, on the Apalachee River. “[T]he Indians…[would thus] come with confidence in having protection with the Spaniards.” By merely standing, Fort San Marcos could achieve what no agent’s “talk” ever could: show Spanish strength and commitment. The Spanish agent was playing into Brims’ multi-front approach; Peña understood that while he could not control the game, he could try to make the Spanish an important player. Furthermore, Creeks leaders themselves, like Chislacalisque and Chipacasi, who welcomed Peña’s message and sought an alliance with the Spanish, knew that unless Florida provided some infrastructure, the Creeks who favored a partnership with the English would never be persuaded. Without a garrison that could regularly provide Creeks with European goods, the headmen who had pushed for relocation closer to the Spanish would be discredited. The construction of San Marcos began in the spring of 1718; Primo de Rivera led the construction. Chislacalique, who had helped triggered the Peña expedition, arrived during the fort’s construction and urged Rivera to journey to Sabacola in order to secure Spanish loyalty in the area. In Sabacola, word reached Rivera of the Coweta Resolution (March 23, 1718). Thus, it was clear even
Brims had turned rumors to his advantage. By transforming the seemingly uncontrollable spread of information into the culprit of bad-relations, he had found a way to secure personal leverage.\textsuperscript{61} The mico's mastery at molding the many relations at his disposal is perhaps best seen during, what historian Steven C. Hahn has called, "the Coweta Resolution."\textsuperscript{62} The early months of 1718 had been a particularly demanding time for Brims. A new Spanish delegation led by Don Juan Fernández de la Orta had arrived in Coweta late January; this small Spanish party hoped to establish friendship between Spanish Pensacola and Coweta. As Brims made assurances to the Spanish ambassador in Coweta, an English party led by John Musgrove reached Cussita. The English captain also wanted to demonstrate his colony’s commitment to Brims and obtain promises of friendship. Making the circumstances even livelier, a French officer from Fort Toulouse arrived in Coweta at this time; he invited the Creeks to Mobile. Brims had to three empires in his doorstep, requesting entrance and promising goods.

In the hands of a less capable leader, these competing powers would have overwhelmed the Creeks. But Brims developed a way to bring together these international, yet deeply local connections. In March 23, 1718, the mico called for a gathering of the Creek towns and discussed the fate and future of Creek relations with Europeans. Although the specifics of this meeting are not clear, Brims “fashioned a diplomatic policy that colonial officials and subsequent historians called neutrality.”\textsuperscript{63} Brims was careful not to try to centralize or create a singular network. On the contrary, Brims consciously and with great dexterity re-imagined the networks that bound and supported his people.\textsuperscript{64}

Brims’ power radiated from his ability to get the talk to move through him and Coweta. The rumors, lies, and misrepresentations were not a sign of chaos; they allowed Brims to accept English, Spanish, and French friendship as well as the responsibility that these friendships bestowed, without comprising his autonomy. Since it was not in the interest of the mico to refuse a special connection, friendship, or trade offer, Brims had to learn to welcome European support without succumbing to European control. Brims found this balance possible through the diffuse and dynamic networks he established. These complex relations meant that it was not enough for the English, or any other European power, to identify an Indian headman and court him; if South Carolina wanted to secure the friendship of the Creeks, the English needed to work with and through a Creek network—a network maneuvered and influenced by Brims.

As the English urged the Creeks to centralize, as the Spanish demanded the unquestioned loyalty of Apalachee and Apalachicola Indians, and as French traders tried to make headway in the Chattahoochee Valley, the mico pushed for diffusion. The

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\textsuperscript{61} For a similar example about the use and power of rumor see Gregory Evans Dowd, "The Panic of 1751: The Significance of Rumor on the South Carolina-Cherokee Frontier," \textit{The William and Mary Quarterly} 53, no. 3, Indians and Others in Early America (1996, Jul.).

\textsuperscript{62} Hahn, \textit{The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763}, 114.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 117.

wrangling and uncertainty did not undermine his role as an Emperor; this was how the Creek “empire” worked. The increasing divisions reflected the dynamic and highly local nature of Creek leadership; leadership which allowed, or rather, required each town to cultivate the relations that best served them.

New Connections: Coweta and Charles Town

The networks that spread through the Southeast were therefore tentative and always changing. To remain an active and influential node, Brims had to constantly make and mend alliances. In the summer of 1721, the Creek emperor tried a new approach. He sent Ouletta, his second son, to Charles Town. While English agents had journeyed to Creek country, Ouletta was the first major Creek delegate to travel to Charles Town since the outbreak of the Yamasee War. “I am glad that you, being the Head Man’s Son, are here to carry this Talk,” confessed Governor Francis Nicholson. Tired of disputes and in search of a singular voice, Nicholson, much like colonel Chicken had argued six years earlier, articulated the need for a reliable network, which could in turn produce reliable informers. “I am told,” explained Nicholson to Ouletta, “that several of your head men have several (times) [traveled] down here to received the talk (that) has been given. But am told that, when they went home, only the People of their Town took Notice of the Talk that they brought up with them.” Nicholson believed that Ouletta, “being the Head Man’s Son,” possessed the proper temperament and authority to ensure that many towns “took Notice of [Charles Town’s]… Talk.” By reestablishing good communication, Nicholson believed that Ouletta would make Creek-South Carolina relations “as strait as they were before the late Difference between us.” “Straight” relations, uncomplicated by rumor or misleading informants, would usher in an era of peace.

But clear communications seemed to benefit Charles Town more than Coweta. After sending word with Ouletta, governor Nicholson called for a general assembly of all the Indian leaders who had heard the delegate’s news. Any Creek headmen who did not make an appearance in Charles Town “shall [be] look[ed] upon as if they were no willing to have a thorough friendship for the English.” Since Ouletta supposedly had the power to make all Creeks “take Notice,” a town that did not send an embassy would be dubbed unfriendly. The “Straight talk” validated the authority of Brims and Ouletta, but also tested their power as leaders. The failure of a Creek town to send delegates to Charles Town revealed both the town’s intentions and the limited reach of Brims and Ouletta’s influence. By establishing good communication, the English were not just attempting to remove the anxiety and tension caused by rumors and misinformation. Nicholson was also trying to establish a network of information through which the English could communicate reliably and regularly. Creating a trusted periodicity of exchange enabled

65 For an extended discussion of the meaning and power of the term “empire” see the introduction of Pekka Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
South Carolina to make stronger alliances as well as develop the means through which those allies and connections could be evaluated.\textsuperscript{68}

Creating networks that fostered good communication was extremely challenging. In May of 1722, Ouletta was back in Charles Town to reaffirm Creek-South Carolina friendship. As a token of his appreciation, governor Nicholson gave Ouletta:

\begin{quote}
\begin{itemize}
\item two Plates with our Kings arms cutt on them, and of which if you, at any time, send down as a token by anybody that you shall with any business to me, which on producing, we shall mind and give credit to what he says, and bring from you, without which we shall take no notice of any Message that may brought to us.\textsuperscript{69}
\end{itemize}
\end{quote}

Although gift-exchange between Europeans and Indians was nothing new, especially not as a way to foster friendship, these plates served a new role. They were a communication tool. The plates acknowledged Ouletta’s role as a carrier and transmitter of the English talk, and opened communication between Coweta and Charles Town. But this gift also offered a way to monitor those exchanges. For without these plates, without Ouletta’s sanction, Nicholson would “take no notice of any Message.” “Minding” only the messages delivered by readily identifiable informers, who were either Ouletta or had been selected by Ouletta himself, the governor tried to discourage disparity in the voices that reached Charles Town.\textsuperscript{70} These plates served to establish a clear, straight talk.

Pleased by this gift and the recognition of his authority as an official information carrier, Ouletta told Nicholson that there was now “a firm and lasting Peace concluded between us.” But as Ouletta attempted to deliver the English talk through Creek towns, it became perfectly clear that the relations between South Carolina and Creeks were neither firm nor lasting. First of all, Ouletta could not and did not spread word of South Carolina’s peaceful intentions to \textit{all} Creek towns; some towns were excluded. While some of his selections could be explained: the Alabamas had not heard the news because the Alabama King had recently died and their town was without clear leadership, and the Abekas had refused Ouletta’s invitation, claiming that they had heard “the Talk already,” Ouletta could not justify all of his exclusions. Upper Creeks in particular complained that Ouletta, a Lower Creek, had purposefully failed to call upon them. Although Ouletta insisted that he had visited Upper towns, he acknowledged that neither the Dog King nor other leading headmen had been present when he attempted to delivered the Talk. Ouletta’s decisions about which towns to include, when to visit them, as well as which

\textsuperscript{68} Easterby, ed. \textit{Journals of the Commons House of Assembly, November 10, 1736-June 7, 1739}, Governor Nicholson’s talk to the Creek Indians, July 8, 1721, 111-12.; Document 14, Governor Nicholson’s talk to the Creek Indians, July 8, 1721, Robinson, ed. \textit{North and South Carolina Treaties, 1654-1756}, 106-08.

\textsuperscript{69} Document 16, Governor’s Nicholson’s Speech to Oulettta, May 25, 1722, and Document 17, Ouletta’s Response to Governor Nicholson, May 26, 1722 Robinson, ed. \textit{North and South Carolina Treaties, 1654-1756}, 106-08.

\textsuperscript{70} Ouletta did not always succeed in making the sole bearer of new; there were other Creek headmen attempting to weave a network of allies through Creek Country. Oulathcee, Captain of the Upper Creek Town of Tukabatchee, and Cusabo, the mico of the Lower Creek towns of Cussita, were also forging their own connections. In 1723, Oulatchee had traveled to Charles Town and engaged in talks with Nicholson, but “on return [to Creek country] hid it.” Ouletta, hearing “several storys” of what the English talk had been, was left uncertain about what arrangements the Captain of Tukabatchee had reached with Charles Town.
leaders to summon, revealed the inner workings of a carefully constructed Lower Creek network. Governor Nicholson was right to assume that Ouletta’s privileged status would help promote Charles Town’s talk. Ouletta’s powerful kinship connections did make him influential. But they also made him biased and selective.

Ouletta used his special authority to try to convince some Cussitas delegates that the English talk “was rotten at the root.” Intercepting Techequachee, Louichachee, Lowkephee and Offulquachee on their way to Charles Town, Ouletta “Instead of… giving them the straight Talk,” claimed that “soon [there would] be a War with the English.” Conveniently forgetting to mention the warm welcome he had received, Ouletta depicted Charles Town as a hostile place. The English, the Lower Creek delegate insisted, were not to be trusted. Persuaded by Ouletta’s claims, Techequachee returned to Indian Country. But the other three men continued to Charles Town “to know the truth themselves.” This truth, it so happened, was drastically different than the one described by Ouletta. The Cussita delegates found a governor who welcomed Creek delegations and wanted to foster trade relations. It was not the English talk that “was rotten at the root;” it was Ouletta’s.

As Louichachee, Lowkephee and Offulquachee described Ouletta’s behavior, Nicholson became enraged. The governor had been betrayed by his most trusted informer. But Ouletta’s actions were not (merely) an affront to English authority; they were part of a larger power struggle within the Creek nation. Ouletta’s encounter with Techequachee, Louichachee, Lowkephee and Offulquachee had taken place at a time of conflict between Brims and Cusabo. Cusabo was mico of Cussita, a neighboring and rival town to Coweta. Cusabo had challenged Brims’ authority by allying with the Upper Creek Towns of Abeka and Tallapoosa and make good on an old Creek promise: make war on the Yamasees. Though South Carolina officials had stated that attacking the Yamasee was a prerequisite for friendship with the English, Creeks, and especially Brims, had ignored this condition. By 1723, Nicholson had lost his patience, and commanded that Ouletta “fall upon them [Yamasees]; they being our Enemies, and consequently yours.” The English governor even threatened to embargo Creek towns who sympathized with the Yamasee.

In the governor’s frustration, Cusabo saw opportunity. By raiding Yamasee towns and assisting South Carolina, Cusabo managed to gain the support of Nicholson and to avoid the trade embargo now facing Coweta. For Nicholson, these attacks were “confirmation of the truth.” Instead of “straight talk,” Cusabo offered the governor “straight action.” Cusabo’s actions spoke louder than Ouletta’s promises. Without plates “to give credit” to his message, Cusabo had found another way to engage with the English. The mico of Cussita positioned himself in open defiance to Brims, and stood to gain from his new relationship with Charles Town.

It comes as little surprise then, that Ouletta, son of Brims, tried to derail the efforts of Cussita delegates working for and in Cusabo’s interests. To retain Coweta’s

71 Document 18, Ouletta to Governor Nicholson, October 24, 1723 Robinson, ed. North and South Carolina Treaties, 1654-1756, 111.
72 SCDAH BPRO, Vol. 10, 1723, November 16, 1723, “Memorandum At the Committee of Indian,” 178-182.
73 SCDAH BPRO, Volume 10, 1723, November 19, 1723. Ouletta’s answer to the Governor, 183-4.
influence, he strove to limit Cussita’s connections with Charles Town. Ouletta hoped to hold-on to his role conveyer and thus controller of English talk. But his attempts failed. As the Cussita delegation continued on the journey to Charles Town, disregarding Ouletta’s warnings and threats, it showed that Coweta could neither control English talk nor what all Creeks knew about South Carolina.

Several months later, Cusabo intensified his challenges to Brims’s authority. The mico of Cussita murdered a Yamasee embassy headed to Coweta. Killing a delegation invited and protected by his rival town, Cusabo displayed his power and confidence. But Brims was not without allies. As Cusabo attempted to launch subsequent raids on Yamasee towns, the Cussita mico found his old friends, the Tallapoosas and Abekas, reluctant to join him and “of a quite contrary opinion than what they [had] promised.” As much as Cusabo tried, he could not convince these Indians to attack the Yamasee. It seemed that Brims, “endeavoring to prevent” Cusabo’s attacks had made “a false report that the Cherokees were discovered in the Woods.” While Tallapoosas and Abekas vowed to fight against the Yamasees in the near future, they refused to participate in Cusabo’s raids until the Cherokees were dealt with. The actions of the Tallapoosas and Abekas reveal both the existing ties between Creek and Yamasees and the continual mistrust of the Cherokee for Creek Indians preferred to go after the Cherokee even if the “reports were false,” than to attack a “real” enemy. Brims’s interference had worked; the emperor had successfully countered Cusabo’s powerful actions with false news.

Governor Nicholson was frustrated. Some Creeks had taken arms against the Yamasee, but many Lower Creeks, the closest ally of the Yamasees, remained uncommitted to the cause. And in the case of Brims, more than uncommitted, the headmen seemed actively opposed. For every step forward the English achieved, there seem to be more steps taken back. Six years after the Yamasee War, six long years of (re)negotiation with the Creeks, Nicholson was exactly where he had started. Internal Creek struggles had complicated Creek-South Carolina relations, and in spite of English attempts to establish a “straight talk,” Charles Town was once again enmeshed in a complex network of communication.

South Carolina’s dealings with the Creeks in the early 1720s exposed the difficulties of securing clear communication and the highly local nature of information. As the English attempted to navigate the plethora of networks that connected the Southeast, they uncovered the many and the often conflicting ways in which information and informers moved. Unable to control all those variables, the English needed to learn to manipulate these intertwined connections. Establishing a network of communication was about more than creating a regular and reliable exchange; it was about developing a way through which friendship could be measured, promises accounted for, and power evaluated.

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75 Hall, Zamumo’s Gifts: Indian-European Exchange in the Colonial Southeast, 141.
76 SCDAH BPRO, Vol. 10, 1723, October 25, 1723, Creek Talk, 175-77.
Between 1721 and 1723, Francis Nicholson received two Indian maps. The first map described Siouan-speaking groups, which South Carolinians collectively referred to as Catawbas (although in the map, Catawbas are identified by thirteen different town names).\textsuperscript{79} The second one depicted the Chickasaw Nation.\textsuperscript{80} These Indian maps look radically different from their European counterparts. Representations of geopolitical, not geographical spaces, the Catawba and Chickasaw maps emphasized the strength of Indian country, and served as didactic tools. They instructed South Carolinians on how to engage in Indian trade and diplomacy; the maps were native guides to Indian relations.\textsuperscript{81}

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\textsuperscript{79} See Figure 1, John O.E. Clark, ed. \textit{100 Maps: The Science, Art and Politics of Cartography Throughout History} (New York: Sterling Publishing, 2005), 439.


\textsuperscript{81} Clark, ed. \textit{100 Maps: The Science, Art and Politics of Cartography Throughout History}, 132. St. Jean, "Trading Paths: Mapping Chickasaw History in the Eighteenth Century," 771. It is important to remember that these maps were not isolated productions; they were created with a political purpose and with an intended English audience in mind. These artifacts were very much a product of the 1720s; they reflect the social and political dynamics of the time.

\textsuperscript{82} “A Map Describing the Situation of the several Nations of Indians between South Carolina and the Massisipi; was Copyed from a Draught Drawn upon a Deer Skin by an Indian Cacique and Presented to Francis Nicholson Esqr. Governour of Carolina.” Unidentified Chickasaw mapmaker c. 1723.
The Catawba and Chickasaw Nations were not the only ones providing detailed instructions for Indian-English relations. Governor Middleton, who had recently replaced Nicholson and was interim governor until a royal appointment arrived, issued his own rules of exchange. Middleton sent captain Tobias Fitch and the experienced colonel Chicken to instruct Creeks and Cherokees respectively on the proper ways to engage with South Carolina.\(^83\) The purpose of these delegations was Talk, not trade. Much like the Catawba and Chickasaw maps, the missions of Fitch and Chicken were didactic exercises.\(^84\)

These agents journeyed to Indian country to address issues of trade, traders, and warfare; but above all else, Fitch and Chicken had to remind Creeks and Cherokees of South Carolina’s strength and prerogative. But unable to locate any identifiable representative for either the Cherokee or Creek Nations, the English agents were uncertain who exactly needed reminding. Chicken eventually convened “the whole [Cherokee] Nation” and decided to appoint a “king.” The colonel,

informed them [Cherokee] that as Crow was their King and made by them and Approved off by the English, that I Expected they would look upon him as such, otherwise they would be no people.\(^85\)

Crow, though “approved off by the English,” did not possess any tangible authority. Chicken was the first to admit that King Crow was “more under the Comands of his Subjects than they are under him.”\(^86\) Fitch faced similar problems in Creek Country. Emperor Brims was aging and his influence was fading with him.\(^87\) The lack of clear leadership and the disorder of Indian country affected the reach of the agents’ message. How could the delegates establish “good communication” if they did not even know who they were suppose to communicate with? Fitch and Chicken failed to centralize Indian authority or locate a central leader who could relay and enforce South Carolina’s requests.\(^88\) Competing, rather than removing rumors, the agents had difficulty establishing “Straight Talk.”

The Catawba and Chickasaw maps represent visually the complexity of the communication networks Chicken and Fitch attempted to control. Crisscrossed with lines, the maps depict not only the actual trails that linked the region, but also the paths that the mapmakers deemed viable and travelable. The message of the maps was clear: if South Carolinians wanted to negotiate with any specific town or headman, they needed to

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\(^84\) For a longer description of the efforts of Tobias Fitch and George Chicken see Oatis, *A Colonial Complex, South Carolina’s Frontiers in the Era of the Yamasee War, 1680-1730*, 238.

\(^85\) “Colonel Chicken’s Journal to the Cherokees, 1725,” 109.

\(^86\) Ibid., 136.

\(^87\) Brims lacked a clear successor since some of his main supporters, such as Ouletta and Chipacasi, had died.

proceed in the manner outlined by these maps. This was a frustrating message for Chicken and Fitch to hear, especially since most of these trails linked Indian towns to each other or to a main Indian settlement, not to the English (there was only one road leaving from Charles Town). The lack of trails connecting smaller Indian towns to English settlements did not mean that Indians from those places were unable to reach Charles Town or that South Carolina agents could not travel to these smaller towns; rather, the roads represented in the maps were the only ones that the mapmakers considered appropriate.

It was through those paths and those paths alone that traders like Fitch and Chicken could penetrate Indian country. In the Catawba map, the trails from Charles Town to the Cherokee and, through them, to the Chickasaws are included; however, English connections to the Creeks, enemies of the Cherokees and the Catawbas, were not.

Figure 5.4—Catawba (1725)

89 St. Jean, "Trading Paths: Mapping Chickasaw History in the Eighteenth Century," 761; Waselkov, "Indian Maps of the Colonial Southeast," 478. Although the focus was on Indian country, both maps stressed the relations with the English. In the Chickasaw map, the word used for river is “Okahinnau,” rather than the traditional Chickasaw word for river: abookoshi. Okahinnau, a combination of the Chickasaw words oka (meaning water) and hina (meaning road), hints that the depicted trails were supported and designed through trade. More than mere abookoshi, the rivers included in the Chickasaw map were actually networks of trade. The Catawba map also included a discussion of the main economic activities that bound Catawbas to the English; right outside of Charles Town, Catawbas depicted an Indian hunting a deer and an English vessel departing. Catawbas connected their hunting of deer and an English vessel departing.

90 In the maps, the lines reached, but did not traverse the circles; the maps detailed the ideal way the English were supposed to reach Indian country. But in order for trade to occur, the English had to break the circled boundaries; Indians and English had to create places of interactions.

drawn. Catawbas were neither oblivious to nor in denial of the existence of Creek-South Carolina relations, but the mapmakers validated South Carolina’s connections with their allies and silenced English relations with Catawba foes. The flow and nature of the networks depended on who was drawing the map.

Chicken and Fitch wanted to be the ones who determined the shape of these networks. Indian agent Joseph Boone argued that South Carolina could achieve this networking power through careful maneuvering:

[B]oth nations [Cherokees and Creeks] are very numerous and mortal enemies to each other. This makes the matter of great weight to us how to hold both as our friends, for some time, and assist them in cutting one another throats without offending either. This is the Game we intend to play if possible.92

Helping Creeks and Cherokees cut “one another throats without offending either” and maintaining the friendship of both was no easy “Game;” yet it was the task Fitch and Chicken intended to carry-out. As these agents negotiated with Creeks and Cherokees, Fitch and Chicken found that their separate missions had a better chance of success if they joined forces. In their goal to establish “Straight Talk” between Indian country and Charles Town, these agents realized that they had to forge their own circuitous connections. Hence when Fitch learned of a planned Upper Creeks raid against the Cherokees, the agent decided to prioritize South Carolina’s larger interests, and not the friendship of the Indian nation he was visiting.93

Instead of following Indian guidelines, the English captain decided to open his own communication channels. Fitch hired Chickasaw carriers to send word to colonel Chicken of the Upper Creek attack. Chicken quickly informed the Cherokees of the impending danger. “If the Cherokees upon knowing this would raise a strong party and keep good Scouts they might give the Creeks such a blow as they would never be able may be able to get [sic.] over,” explained Chicken, “but if they dont [sic.] them take what falls.”94 Chicken’s warning gave Cherokees a choice: trust English intelligence or suffer the consequences. The Cherokee wasted no time; they “raise[d] a strong party and ke[pt] good Scouts,” and when the Upper Creeks arrived, the Cherokees were well-prepared.

The Upper Creeks angrily informed Fitch that their attack had failed. “They [Cherokees] ware in forts as though they expected our coming,” the Upper Creeks protested. They accused Fitch of “giv[ing to] your king [an] Account of [our] Designes and… Sen[ding] it to your Beloved man that is at the Cherokeys.” Having received several speeches about the value and importance of “Straight Talk,” Upper Creeks felt betrayed by the captain: “Now I think its Strenge Friendship that you pretend to us.”95 A strange friend indeed would expose important plans and endanger the life of ally. But Fitch insisted that there had been no deception; he had always been honest about how information flowed and had never hidden his connection to Charles Town. While Upper

92 SCDAH BPRO, Volume 7, 1717-20, Charles Town, Letter to---- from Joseph Boone, 15-16.
93 "Colonel Chicken's Journal to the Cherokees, 1725," 133.
94 Ibid., 144.
95 "Captain Fitch's Journal to the Creeks," 198.
Creek warriors had understood this hierarchy, they had assumed that information would be carried up the chain of command: from Fitch to Charles Town, from the governor to King. They had not anticipated that the captain would spread word as he saw fit. Upper Creek leaders “did tell you [Fitch] to send to your King, but then we thought we were Sending to our friend and not to the Cherokeys.” By sharing their plans with Fitch, the Creeks believed they were maintaining “good communication” with the English, “our friends;” instead, the Cherokee, “the enemy,” had received protection. The communication had been good, but not for the Upper Creek.

Fitch argued that the Cherokees had probably uncovered the Upper Creek raid in the same manner Creeks themselves learned of Cherokee plans. He insisted that,

for the Custome with us is the Same as with you; when there is any talk Sent down our King Calles the Beloved men Together and when they have Seen the Talk and Considered it amonge themselves then they give it out to Every Body and there might have happen’d Some Cherokeys Tradours down and may Carr the Talk home to the Cherokeys; for you find the Traders her When they Come from our great Town if they here anything of the Cherokeys they tell it you, and its as like the others may tell the Cherokeys.

The captain explained that there were simply too many connections and alliances to properly monitor them all; and, using a logic similar to the one Brims had employed in the past, Fitch stated that the uncontrollable spread of news was a common peril in the volatile and fluid backcountry. But while Fitch’s explanation resonated with Brims’ arguments, it was not true. Fitch had sent carriers detailing Upper Creek intentions to both Charles Town and Chicken. While some Indian traders might have also cautioned the Cherokee towns about the potential threat, the first news of the attack arrived via the two Chickasaw Indians sent by Fitch. Though Fitch had described the movement of news as arbitrary— some traders go the Cherokees, others to the Creeks— reports of the Upper Creek attack had not spread by chance. Fitch emphasized the randomness of information spread, but it was clear to everyone— to the Cherokees who had been warned, to Chicken who had received the news, to the Chickasaw messengers who were allies of the Cherokee and hostile to the Creek, and to the Upper Creeks whose plans had been foiled— that choices had been made along the way. There was intention and purpose, not chance, in the spread of this information.

Fitch was not only interfering with the inter- and intra- Indian relations that had enabled Indian headmen like Brims to construct their networks; the English agent was trying to influence the network itself. By sending “an Account of [Creek] designes” to colonel Chicken, Charles Town, and the Cherokees, Fitch had betrayed Creek trust, gained Cherokee support and, more importantly, asserted his ability to communicate through Indian country. Rather than sending news through the appropriate channels or travelling on the paths outlined by the Indian maps, Fitch had carved his own connections. He sought to forge paths that linked Charles Town to wherever the English needed and to whomever they deemed important. Building on top, through, and across Indian networks, Fitch gave Charles Town a clearer, albeit not more direct control of

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96 Ibid., 199.
97 Ibid., 199.
communication. The decade long struggles after the Yamasee War revealed that the “Straight Talk” with Indian allies was anything but straight. English efforts to negotiate with Indian groups and (re)center Charles Town seemed only to underscore the complexity of those connections.
Chapter 6: Networks of Power, Information, Slavery, and War in the 1720-30s

Wee have formerly complained of their [Florida] receiving and harbouring all our runaway Negroes, but since that, they [Spanish] have found out a new way of sending our own slaves against us, to Rob and Plunder us…We are not only at a vast expence in Guarding our Southern Frontiers, but the Inhabitants are continually allarmed, and have noe leizure to looke after their crops.¹

– South Carolina Governor, Arthur Middleton (1728)

The firmness, bravery and honor of the officers, the love, valor energy of the troops, militia, free Negroes & convicts have been great… and even to the negro slaves a particular anxiety & desire have been observed in all to see the enemy here, to advance and attack them; and it has gratified me very much that under all the circumstances in which we were placed and during the whole time of the siege not one deserted from here; and lastly believe that the small galleys have been of much service to me, for it I could have raised the siege without them they have done better than those of the English.²

– Florida Governor Manuel de Montiano (1739)

There was nothing new about Arthur Middleton’s complaints. He worried about the “vast expence in Guarding [the] Southern Frontiers” and the “continually allarmed” state of the inhabitants. South Carolina had always been an unstable, unsteady place; the governor’s grievances were as old as the colony itself. But Middleton’s concerns were infused with a new anxiety. A hostile Spanish neighbor and an unregulated frontier seemed to jeopardize more than the safety of South Carolina. It was the future of African slavery and the growth of a rice economy that were now at stake. Middleton reframed South Carolina’s priorities through the lens of slavery. Slavery was a prosperous economic model that needed to be protected because it afforded South Carolina great wealth, but by the same token it also exposed the English to considerable risks— risks that Spanish Florida eagerly exploited.

Manuel de Montiano, governor of Florida from 1737 to 1749, recognized the value of courting and keeping fugitive slaves who escaped from South Carolina. In his letters to Don Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas, Captain-General of the Island of Cuba, Montiano commented on the loyalty of “negro slaves” to the Spanish and praised their bravery during the 1739 English siege of San Agustín. More than any other Spanish soldier, these runaway slaves had “particular anxiety… to see the [English] enemy” in

² Official letters from Don Manuel de Montiano, Governor of East Florida, to Don Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas, Captain-General of the Island of Cuba. Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library, The University of Georgia Libraries. (Official Letters from now on), July 28, 1740, Letter # 205.
Spanish lands. These former slaves fought tenaciously to prevent their former masters from taking both the Spanish presidio and their newly obtained freedom. The “negro slaves” transformed their “particular anxiety” into military might and, as the governor boasted, “not one deserted from” San Agustín.

In the early decades of the eighteenth century, and gaining momentum after the Yamasee War (1715–7), African slaves became a more pronounced element in the Spanish communication networks. As informers, runaway slaves enabled San Agustín to gain intimate knowledge of English efforts in the Southeast. Runaway slaves, alongside select Indian informers, helped the Spanish make sense of the region reshaped by the destructive Yamasee War. This conflict had realigned loyalties—Yamasees now allied with the Spanish, Creeks were divided, and Cherokees favored the English, to name a few changes. Beyond securing new native allies, the Spanish gained a clearer sense of who these allies were, how they could be connected with San Agustín, and who could be depended on for news. By the 1730s, Florida had developed stronger ties but to fewer Indian groups. Spanish conversations about the acquisition and spread of news were now mixed with discussions about reliability. San Agustín officials became increasingly satisfied with knowing less about the English, if this sacrifice implied that the gathered information that was verifiable, true, and relevant.

South Carolina networks also underwent important changes in the aftermath of the Yamasee War. As the English looked west and began settling the backcountry, they struggled to protect their growing and profitable institution of slavery. South Carolina needed a communication network that reflected its new focus on safety and control. Charles Town officials gradually abandoned their more inclusive and flexible approach to information gathering, in favor of more structured, English-centric network connected by forts and towns. These communication networks reflected South Carolina’s increasingly aggressive emphasis on expansion, safety and, more importantly, control—control of information, of the people who spread it, and of the effects of news. In short, Charles Town officials had to establish networks that accommodated and took into account the growing slave population.

In the 1720s and 30s, the information connections, needs, and concerns of the Spanish and English were changing. These large and complicated processes came to a head in the unlikeliest of places: the struggle over Fort King George. The 1725 debates over this garrison brought to the surface the different purposes of Florida’s and South Carolina’s communication networks. As San Agustín and Charles Town officials fought over the fort, important distinctions in the Spanish and English networking strategies became evident. It was here, in the negotiations over an inconsequential garrison on the Altamaha River, that Florida and South Carolina began to articulate the parameters and

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purposes of their changing connections. And it is here, that this chapter starts. The fight over this garrison became a proxy for a much larger conversation about how the region was to be connected and demarcated. Fort King George helps frame a much larger debate about who was to be included and excluded from the communication networks sprawling throughout the Southeast.

“The confines and boundaries of the land,”5 the struggle for Fort King George

Fort King George was a product of the Yamasee War. This garrison was built on the mouth of the Altamaha River, a region formerly controlled by Yamasees. In fact, it was located in the southernmost edge of that region. South Carolina’s message in constructing this outpost was clear: if “to the victor go the spoils,” then the English would claim the lot. This southern colony would not tip-toe where it thought it was entitled to tread. Completed in 1721, this garrison had the dual purpose of securing South Carolina’s interest in the area and curbing the influence of French Indian traders who had recently emerged as the leading threat to English development and growth.6 A declaration of South Carolina’s newfound position, Fort King George was also a statement of the colony’s future aggressive and expansive intentions in the region.

Colonel John Barnwell, known as Tuscarora Jack for his involvement in the Tuscarora War, oversaw the construction of the garrison. This three-storey wooden structure watched over the waters of the Altamaha, St. Simons Island (to the east), and the vast marshes that seemed to engulf the garrison.7 Barnwell, although no stranger to this area, seemed, in his words, “perplexed” by the large cypress swamps that extended for miles. Barnwell had previously reconnoitered the region in 1716, as he searched in vain for a faction of Yamasees led by the elusive Huspaw King.8 Five years later, Barnwell could recognize some lingering traces of Indian presence, but the “Indian field [had] gown [sic.] up with Small Bushes,” and he could not find any Indian towns or their residents. Whether he knew it or not, Barnwell was staring at an effect of the Yamasee War.9

5 Arredondo, Demostracion Historiographica... March 20, 1742, 175.
7 Mention prevention from Spanish attacks and recent French encroachments; Ledward, K. H., ed. Journal W, Journals of the Board of Trade and Plantations. Vol. 4, Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, 1925.
9 Ibid; Crane, The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732, 238. The Zápala and Asao mission ruins were also close to the fort.
Warfare had pushed Indian groups farther south, and the area had been vastly depopulated. Fort King George was far not just from English settlements; this outpost was also out of the way from most Indian towns. This isolation, although a problem for supplying the fort, did not seem to concern Barnwell, whose distrust and disgust for his own company was only rivaled by his contempt for Indians allies. The colonel’s own experiences during the Tuscarora and then the Yamasee War had led him to become suspicious of Indians. His mistrust only grew when the six Creeks hired to guide Barnwell’s expedition quickly abandoned him. Barnwell, flustered by their departure, thought it was indicative of the inconsistent and unpredictable nature of Indians. For the Creek Indian guides, however, their departure probably had more to do with the South Carolinian’s nature than with their own. The colonel and his men, a disorderly and drunken group, had also done little to recommend themselves and had provided no assurance that this fort would in fact materialize.

10 John Barnwell, "A Plan of Fort King George's Fort at Allatamaha, South Carolina. Latitude 31 Degrees 12 North," (Georgia Department of Archives and History1722).
11 See Tuscarora War section in Chapter 4 as well as Joseph W. Barnwell, "The Second Tuscarora Expedition," The South Carolina Genealogical Magazine 10, no. 1 (1908).
13 The English and Spanish had made previous promises to construct garrisons, trade houses, and even towns on this region. See Verner W. Crane, "Projects for Colonization in the South, 1684-1732," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 12, no. 1 (1925, Jun.); Crane, The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732, 164.; Henry A. M. Smith, "Beaufort: The Original Plan and the Earliest Settlers " The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine 9, no. 3 (1098).
Barnwell eventually found two Indians, one Tuscarora and one Creek, who were willing to remain in his service. But the colonel remained skeptical and declined any further Indian involvement. Barnwell even decided to turn away a group of Creeks who vowed to support English efforts in Fort King George—a decision that probably angered the soldiers at the dangerously understaffed garrison and must have shocked members of the House of Commons, who had been trying, with very limited success, to court and secure trading partnerships with the Creeks. When asked to explain his dismissal of Indian aid, Barnwell responded that he “did not much care, that they [Tuscarora] and the Creeks should be much more acquainted then they are.” While he wanted friendship between South Carolina and the Creeks, Barnwell also understood all too well the dangers of inter-Indian relations. If Indians were going to forge alliances, Barnwell insisted that those accords, for the safety of South Carolina, had to be made through the English. The English colonists had to be able to monitor, if not dictate, the terms of those “acquaintances.” The whole point of Fort King George was to establish English influence in the region, not foster inter-tribal communication.

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Rejecting Creek aid, Barnwell still found himself in need to finish the construction of the garrison. What he did next does not seem all too surprising; he turned to the closest English town, in this case the town of Beaufort, and hired out two of Mr. Duvall’s African slaves who were sawyers. Slaves, like these two unnamed sawyers, were not an uncommon feature of South Carolina’s backcountry. In spite of regulations and penalties against using slaves in Indian affairs, many traders took their slaves with them, and used them as packhorse-men, guides, guards, and even as interpreters (as Chicken and Fitch had lamented). Barnwell’s decision to employ slave, as oppose to Indian aid, might have been based on personal experience or on his distrust of the particular group of Creeks who approached him— after all the Lower Creeks in the region were profiting from trade with groups openly hostile to the English. But whatever the motivation, Barnwell’s decision resonated with a larger and profound shift occurring in South Carolina.

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17 Fort King George Historic Site - Fort Area, Image courtesy of Georgia State Parks.
18 "Fort King George, Journal of Col John Barnwell (Tuscarora) in the Construction of the Fort on the Altamaha in 1721,” 196.
19 South Carolinians attempted to limit Africans knowledge of the interior. The English believed that slaves who knew little of the land and native groups in the region would not flee into the unknown; or if they did, they would be easily apprehended. Furthermore, the English feared Indian-slave collaboration. Wood, *Black Majority, Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion*, 116; William S. Willis, "Divide and Rule: Red, White, and Black in the Southeast " *The Journal of Negro History* 48, no. 3 (1963).
20 SCDAH, BPRO Vol. 10. 1723, “To Mr. John Bee in Charles Town in South Carolina with Care Deliver from Ocheese River These,” July 30, 1723, 128-32.
By the time Barnwell and his men secured the last cypress beam to the Fort King George structure, South Carolina had been a slave majority for over a decade. In fact, some of the earliest laws, policies, and decisions made in the colony had anticipated the development of a large slave system in the region. So Barnwell’s preference—his selection of slave sawyers rather than Indian aid—was by no means out of place or incoherent; what was new, was that this selection was, for the first time, possible. South Carolinians, as most of their fellow colonists, would continue relying on Indians all through the period leading to the American Revolution (and even beyond), but with its recently-established, more secure, and more powerful stand after the Yamasee War, this southern colony sought to assert and redefine its control over its vast territorial claims.

African slaves took the leading role in that redefinition. For all the risks of using black slaves, there were many advantages—most, like Africans’ limited knowledge of the territory or the lack of connection with other local groups, read as if they were textbook explanations for the development of a slave system that favored African, rather than Indian, slaves. There was a chance that Barnwell reasoned through these benefits and ultimately decided to hire two slave sawyers rather than employing Creeks, but the only explanation he clearly articulated was one of control. While Creeks could have served as scouts, interpreters, and even fort builders, their employment would foster relations that South Carolina could not properly monitor and, as evidenced by their untimely departure, Indian autonomy compromised English authority. So Barnwell chose slaves. He limited Indian participation, and favored a source of labor he could better control.

Compared to the Creeks, slaves tended to know less about the land and had a more limited grasp of Amerindian relations; but the English asserted more direct power over their slaves. After the devastating Yamasee War, South Carolinians preferred to create circumscribed yet secured communication networks. Rather than connecting through nodes that were hard to monitor, like Indian traders or Indian towns, Charles Town officials decided to expand through slavery. Like Barnwell, South Carolinians were content with knowing less, if they could more easily control what they knew. English networks were not merely built with the help of slaves, but also and more importantly, for the purpose of protecting of slavery.

The prioritization of African slavery was neither blatant nor hidden; it was folded into the everyday intricacies of colonial South Carolina and reflected in the communication structures developed by Charles Town officials. In the early decades of English settlement, slaves held many occupations—such as ferrymen, cattlemen, and guides—that were instrumental in the spread of news. “[L]ocal letters,” for example, “were entrusted entirely to Negro boatmen and runners throughout the colonial period.” But beyond needing slaves to spread news, South Carolinians relied on slave

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But by the 1720s, as South Carolinians moved more aggressively into the interior, the English developed networks of information that while dependent on slave informers, were mostly and primarily concerned with the protection of slavery. Fort King George was an English node in an otherwise unregulated frontier; the impetus for building this garrison was to control the frontier and limited or, at least, monitored the mobility of slaves.  

Florida’s governor, Antonio de Benavides, chose Fort King George as the place to take a firm stand against English advances and, inadvertently, to make a stand against slavery. He knew that if South Carolina was allowed to expand without opposition, it would only be a matter of time before San Agustín faced danger. Furthermore, English expansion threatened Florida’s new ally and source of strength: refugee Yamasee Indians. In the aftermath of the Yamasee War, Yamasees had severed ties with the English and relocated closer to Spanish lands. Their towns, just north of the Spanish presidio, had given the Spanish a small, but important advantage: a buffer of Indians fiercely hostile to the English now stood between Charles Town and San Agustín.

Yamasees however, did not take readily to their buffer role. Only a fraction of the Yamasee groups chose to relocate close to the Spanish presidio, but the remainder settled over 150 leagues away in Apalachee. When they had a choice, the Yamasees elected to live far from the Spanish presidio and, as evidenced by a 1717 census conducted by Joseph Primo de Rivera, they proved very unwilling to be missionized. In spite of their limited embrace of Spanish care, governor Benavides had refused to aid any English efforts to capture these renegades and, by protecting these Indians, Florida had thus dubbed any English attack against Yamasees: an attack against Spanish allies and property. While this Spanish interference did more to annoy than to discourage English attacks against Yamasee Indians, South Carolinians viewed Florida’s threat with care. Charles Town officials, still hurting from the Yamasee War, were not too eager to engage in yet another conflict. Constructing Fort King George on the Altamaha River allowed the English to circumvent open engagement, while still jeopardizing Yamasee autonomy and safety.

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25 Although Fort King George was not explicitly connected to the expansion of slavery, the garrison’s raison-d’être, from its construction to its defense, reflected the growing importance as well as the centrality of African slaves in South Carolina. Wood, Black Majority, Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion, 277. JCHA, November 15, 1726- March 11, 1726/7. Salley, ed., 147-9.
26 Even though Florida had been on the receiving end of South Carolina’s aggressive growth, the Spanish governor envisioned that the Yamasees, who were openly and fiercely hostile to the English, could serve as an allied force and as a barrier. He believed that “Yamasee, people who are much feared by the English, and who Catechized by our friars, have embraced our Holy Faith and have remained [in] a short settlement close to this presidio,” could provide San Agustín with the buffer it so desperately needed. Friar Pulido Report, March 11, 1723, AGI-SD bnd 5070 58-2-16/9, Reel 38, Stetson Collection, PKY.
27 For a survey and population census of these towns see efforts by Joseph Primo de Rivera in April 18, 1717, Stetson Collection Reel 36 and Hann, John H. "St. Augustine's Fallout from the Yamasee War By." The Florida Historical Quarterly 68, no. 2: 181-201.
28 Yamasee worked to maintain their autonomy. They lived with other Yamasees and, compared to the Guale Timucua, Apalachee listed in Primo’s census, they were the less Christians. “The Yamasee worked hard to preserve elements of their political structure, entrusting each of their settlements to the care of a principal headmen and several distinguish advisors.” Ibid.
The debates over this garrison began sometime in the first week of February of 1724 when, much to the surprise of the English soldiers manning Fort King George, a Spanish diplomatic party managed to march undetected to the very entrance. A fort designed to counter or, at the very least, warn against foreign presence had let Don Juan Mexia, Don Juan de Ayala, Juan de Sandoval, Don Josef Rodriguez Menéndez, Don Alonzo de Avila Saavedra, and Don Francisco Menéndez Marqués approached within the shadow of the gates. As Captain Edward Massey, the second commander of the fort reported, the garrison was so “incapable of defence” and so incapable of monitoring “any part of its trade [that] it might as usefully have been placed in Japan.” Spanish presence at Fort King George was an embarrassing oversight by the English soldiers.

The Spanish, after being detained and imprisoned by the surprised English soldiers, made three demands: dismantle Fort King George, remove any and all English settlements from Florida territory, and, more importantly, establish a clear boundary between South Carolina and Florida. Francis Nicholson, governor of South Carolina, welcomed the Spanish delegates, but refused to address any of the Spanish demands. The governor feared the implications of these negotiations; if he reached any agreements, however beneficial they were, these accords could potentially curtail future English expansion. Nicholson quickly dismissed the three Spanish demands, claiming that he lacked the appropriate approval to make such decisions. But in the spirit of peace and “good communication,” the English governor vowed to continue diplomatic talks with Florida.

It was unclear, however, what those talks would be about. Florida wanted a border; South Carolina refused to discuss the issue. Benavides wanted Fort King George dismantled; Nicholson argued that the removal of the fort was not an option. South Carolina and Florida could only agree to disagree. The diplomatic talks could have ended there, but Nicholson used Fort King George as an excuse to demand an explanation, if not reparations, for what he considered to be the most grievous offense committed by Florida: refusing to return fugitive slaves. In his letter to Benavides, Nicholson claimed to be:

much surprised at the treatment given to Capt. Watson when I sent him in a Publik [sic.] capacity, to make a Demand of some slaves that run from this Government and that not long since that Cherekleecheee with a party came into this settlement, killed some of our People and carried a Negro Slave, which he presented to Your Excellency and likewise that some of our runaways from Fort King George and other places are now Entertained at San Agustín therefore I hope and Expect your Excellency will cause all those people to be Sent hither by Sea, or Secured till wee can send for them.  

28 SCDAH BPRO, Vol. 11, 1723-25, A letter from Fort King George by Charles Huddy, February 9, 1723/4, 36.
29 Arredondo, Demostracion Historiographica... March 20, 1742, 172-3.
30 SCDAH BPRO, Volume 12, 1725-27, Edward Massey to “Sir.” April 26, 1727, 247-250.
31 SCDAH BPRO, Vol. 11, 1723-25, “Letter by Francis Nicholson,” February 24, 1724 32; for more on Captain Watson see SCDAH BPRO, Vol. 7, 1717-1720, “John Cockran and John Drake Committee of the Assembly to Mr. Boone,” March 8, 1718, 998-8; and for more on Cherekleecheee see Mark F. Boyd,
Nicholson accused the Spanish governor of both “entertaining” slaves and supporting notorious Yamasee chiefs, like Cherekeeleechee, who not only killed “some of our people,” but also engaged in slave raiding.

The governor of South Carolina thus “hoped and Expected” that in accordance with Anglo-Spanish peace, Florida would return these runaway slaves. Nicholson even gave the Spanish diplomats “a paper with the names of seven slaves who have fled said government and also [the names] of their masters who demand their return.” 32 Menéndez Marqués, who had led the Spanish party to Charles, found himself on the defensive. But the Spanish diplomat masterfully countered the governor’s claims by protesting against what the Spanish considered to be the most grievous offense committed by South Carolina: inciting Indians against Florida settlers and native allies, especially Yamasees. Menéndez Marqués recalled how “in that same council,” in which the fate of the fugitive slaves was addressed, “we discussed the hostilities by Uchises [Creeks] Indians and other who take actions against this [Spanish] jurisdictions carrying out English goals.” 33

The more Nicholson clamored for the return of fugitive slaves, the more Menéndez Marqués accused South Carolina of abusing Indians allied with Florida. The lively discussion about fugitive slaves and Yamasee Indians relegated Fort King George to the background—the insignificance of the fort itself became painfully clear when, during the second bout of diplomatic talks in 1725, the fort burned to the ground, but the debates ensued. 34 Yamasees and runaways became the centerpiece of the negotiations, providing insight into the most fundamental needs of each colony. Fort or no fort, Florida wanted the cessation of English attacks against Yamasee Indians; and above all else, South Carolina insisted on the return of runaway slaves. 35

These seemingly unrelated discussions brought to the surface the priorities, fears, and organizing frameworks of each colony. For the Spanish, the struggle over this garrison underscored Florida’s continuing dependence on Indian informers and on the traditional methods of reconnaissance, such as spies, diplomatic parties, and prisoners of war. For South Carolina, this fort exposed a new type of network, woven through English nodes designed to limit Indian participation and African involvement—a network that

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32 November 2, 1725, AGI-SD AGI 58-1-31/3 bnd 5158, Reel 39, Stetson Collection, PKY
33 Ibid.
34 SCDAH BPRO Volume 12, 1725-27, September 23, 1727, 246. After an investigation, it was concluded that there had been no arson or foul play. The only problem had been that the soldiers manning the fort had not gone to the aid of the garrison quick enough: “The men were not so active as they might have been in extinguishing the fire in hopes by the destruction of the fort.” Massey sympathized with the soldiers and none were prosecuted. Quote from: SCDAH BPRO, Volume 12, 1725-27, Edward Massey to “Sir.” April 26, 1727, 247-250.
35 Neither of those requests was particularly new. Spanish Florida had issued a cédula in 1693 welcoming runaway slaves; and English colonists had infiltrated and injured Florida’s relations with neighboring Indian groups since the creation of South Carolina. For more on the Spanish policy regarding slaves see Jane Landers, "Spanish Sanctuary: Fugitives in Florida, 1687-1790." The Florida Historical Quarterly 62, no. 3 (January) (1984); Jane Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999).
protected slavery as it expanded, and expanded slavery as it protected. From Charles Town’s vantage point, Fort King George was a node, a stepping stone, in an English network expanding west and attempting to (finally and definitely) assert influence over the “debatable land.” From San Agustín, Fort King George was a source of interference. It corrupted the Spanish signal in the region.

In a surprising turn, it was South Carolina’s governor who first conceded during the negotiations. Before escorting the diplomats back to Florida, he vowed to reissue “clear orders… so that no damage whatsoever would befall this [San Agustín] presidio” or on Spanish Indians. Nicholson never explained the reasoning behind his promise, but he probably assumed that limiting the attacks against Spanish holdings and Indians, or at the very least pledging to do so, was the surest way to secure the return of runaway slaves—of course, there was a chance the governor had simply grown tired of the Spanish diplomatic party who had stayed over a month in Charles Town at South Carolina’s expense.

But a year after Nicholson’s promise of “no damage” against Spanish lands and allies, conditions had scarcely changed. Yamasee Indians still suffered from English attacks and runaway slaves not only remained in San Agustín, but new fugitives were welcomed and protected. So in September of 1725, with South Carolina showing no signs of abandoning Fort King George, Benavides sent a second delegation to Charles Town. Led by Joseph Primo de Rivera and Menéndez Marqués, this group of diplomats received the same tasks and instructions that Benavides had given to the earlier expedition: demand the destruction of Fort King George and establish a clear boundary between the colonies. There was, however, one important addition: this second delegation was ordered to reach an agreement regarding the fugitive slaves.

In their runaway slave policy, the Spanish diplomats had finally found a way to assert some influence over the seemingly unstoppable South Carolina. This influence would later manifest itself in tangible ways: it was a runaway slave living in San Agustín who played a decisive role repelling colonel John Palmer’s raids (1727-8) against the Yamasese and black soldiers were instrumental in defeating the invading English forces in 1739.


37 November 2, 1725, AGI-SD AGI 58-1-31/3 bnd 5158, Reel 39, Stetson Collection, PKY.

38 Bessie Lewis, *The Story of Old Fort King George: The First English Settlement in the Land Which Is Now Georgia* (Copyright Bessie Lewis, 1932), discusses how South Carolinians had to pay the cost of lodging the Spanish party.


40 Documento 14, Testimonio de los autos y demas dilencias… June 10 and August 18, 1724 in Manuel Serrano y Sanz, *Documentos Historicos De La Florida Y La Luisiana, Siglos Xvi Al Xviii* (Madrid: Librería General de Victoriano Suárez, 1912), 243-60.

41 The raids led by Colonel John Palmer had early success. The colonel led “an expedition of 100 militia and 200 Indians against the Indian towns near San Agustín. On March 9, he won a decisive victory against the Yamasee stronghold, Nombre de Dios, just north of San Agustín. The surviving Yamasees fled to San Agustín where they joined Benavides in safety behind the walls of Castillo San Marcos. Palmer burned Nombre de Dios, destroyed the chapel, and retreated, carrying off the few altar ornaments and statues. “The
the dangers of slavery and English ability to contain the sprawling intuition. In the negotiations over Fort King George, Benavides realized that these slaves were Florida’s most valuable asset. He vowed not return these fugitives as long as English colonists threatened Spanish Indian allies, in particular Yamasees Indians.

If the construction of Fort King George and South Carolina’s subsequent attacks against the Yamasees, such as efforts led by Colonel Palmer, showed that South Carolina had the ability to jeopardize and, quite possibly, destroy the Indian alliances Florida was trying to rebuild, the Spanish slave policy gave Florida ammunition to fight back. If the construction of Fort King George and South Carolina’s subsequent attacks against the Yamasees, such as efforts led by Colonel Palmer, showed that South Carolina had the ability to jeopardize and, quite possibly, destroy the Indian alliances Florida was trying to rebuild, the Spanish slave policy gave Florida ammunition to fight back. Benavides’ decision to free runaways not only complemented earlier Spanish efforts to protect African fugitives, but also reinforced those precedents with a clear policy. Because South Carolina damaged (and was damaging) populations within the Spanish jurisdiction, Florida was not going to return the runaway slaves in San Agustín. The delegation of Joseph Primo de Rivera and Francisco Menéndez Marqués even had instructions to spread word in Charles Town of Spanish welcoming policies regarding African slaves; the Spanish government was attempting to destabilize a vital aspect of South Carolina society and economy.

Although the debates over Indians and slaves seem unrelated to the fate of an ineffectual outpost, it was during these discussions, that the stakes and implications of this English fort became the most clear. Florida and South Carolina had come together to talk about a garrison, but ended up addressing much larger issues: their place in the Southeast, their obligations to each other, and their respective relations with Indians and slaves. As South Carolina fought to protect slaves at any cost (at one point even threatening to keep Spanish, not merely Indian captives, if the runaway slaves were not returned) and as the Spanish emphasized the safety of their Indian allies, San Agustín and Charles Town officials fought over their different priorities and understandings of the region. The remainder of the chapter separates the networks that Fort King George intertwined, detailing first the Spanish and then the English efforts to establish communication networks in the 1720s and 30s.

Spanish News in a Changing Landscape

In the wake of the Yamasee War, the Spanish viewed information both as a commodity and as a valuable tool that could be wielded against the enemy. The sudden importance San Agustín placed on good communication did not, however, reshape the means through which the Spanish had previously acquired and transmitted news. In the 1730s, just as they had done for the previous half-century, Florida officials relied on a
network based on individual informers; the Spanish still primarily depended on the efforts of spies, sentinels, and prisoners of war to learn to latest.

There were, however, two important changes in the Spanish communication infrastructure. First, the Spanish started relying on news from a new type of informer: fugitive slaves from South Carolina. African slaves were unlike other captured prisoners; not only was their return more complicated and often unlikely, but English obsession with re-apprehending these men and women increased the value and demand for runaway slaves. Second, the Spanish began depending on specific Indian informers. Rather than allowing anyone to carry and transmit news, the Spanish turned to Indian caciques exclusively loyal to San Agustín. The Spanish communication network still operated through the efforts of a wide array of Indian informers, but by targeting and employing certain key individuals (and dismissing the reports of others), the nodes in the Spanish network became less fluid and more fixed. Through these contracted, limited, and supposedly trustworthy informers, San Agustín officials received more standardized and regular reports—reports that for all their regularity (or, because of it) were fragmented and biased.46

Fugitives Slaves as Sources of Intimate Knowledge

In October of 1687, a group of nine slaves (six men, two women, and one child) arrived in San Agustín seeking asylum.47 They had traveled over 250 miles by land and sea to reach Florida, obtain their freedom, and, as their testimonies claimed, to practice Catholicism. These African slaves explained that they had fled their English masters, managing to escape not only the tyranny of slavery, but also of Protestantism. No sooner had the Spanish welcomed these fugitives, their English masters were at the gates of San Agustín clamoring for the return of their missing property. Governor Diego de Quiroga y Losada refused to surrender these slaves, offering instead to reimburse the South Carolina masters for their loss. This exchange created an ambiguous but important precedent regarding runaway slaves in the colonial Southeast. Freedom or, at least, not a return to English hands was promised to African fugitives who reached Florida.48

Although the English viewed Spanish Florida as a haven for runaway slaves, it was South Carolina’s opposition to these welcoming policies, more than Spanish willingness to protect African fugitives, that played a hand in shaping the measures adopted by San Agustín.49 The first Spanish cédula (decree) regarding runaway slaves

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47 “Governor Quiroga addressed the crown, reporting the arrival of certain Negro slaves who came from San Jorge to become Christians,” Feb. 24, 1688 in Wright, “Dispatches of Spanish Official Bearing in the Free Negro Settlement of Gracia Real De Santa Teresa De Mose, Florida.”
48 Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida, 29-60.
49 As Florida wrestled with what to do with runaways from South Carolina, Spanish Santo Domingo experienced an influx of runaway slaves from French Saint Domingue. Since both colonies were Catholic, the Spanish could not invoke the same argument to protect Saint Domingue runaway slaves as they had for retaining South Carolina slaves. Beneficial in Florida, governor Benavides understood that a welcoming policy towards fugitive slaves in the Southeast might have a negative impact in the Spanish Caribbean. Spanish treatment of slaves was therefore not universal across the Spanish empire. John TePaske, "The
was not published until November 7, 1693—five years after the arrival of the first fugitives. And the Spanish themselves debated at length over the fate of the fugitives. There was not an immediate and certainly not an inherent belief that harboring these English slaves was good for San Agustín. For one, the Spanish government did not want to antagonize the powerful English planters. But also, Florida colonists were hesitant about welcoming blacks to Spanish society.

Florida’s attitudes and policies towards these fugitive men and women were developed in an *ad hoc* way. In 1693, the Spanish entertained the idea of freeing runaway slaves; but in 1689, governor Quiroga y Losada considered selling and even re-enslaving the African fugitives; and in another occasion, San Agustín officials offered to purchase escaped slaves from their English masters—a policy that was practiced intermittently until 1731. Governor Benavides urged the Spanish King that instead of issuing an official decree, Florida officials needed “to make resolutions that his Majesty considered most beneficial to the nature of each case [of fugitive slaves reaching San Agustín], and to the circumstances in which it [the arrival of the slaves] occurred.” By treating runaway slaves on a case by case basis, the governor believed that the Spanish could better accommodate to the changing circumstances. If Spain was at peace with England, Florida officials would endeavor to return fugitives; if Europe was at war, Benavides would refuse to return any runaways.

But the more English slave-owners clamored for the return of their property, the more the Spanish opened their doors to runaways. As English wealth and power became increasingly tied to African slavery, the Spanish abandoned their *ad hoc* policies. Benavides, who had championed a more flexible approach, began advocating for a stricter and far more explicit Spanish policy regarding fugitives. The Spanish governor vowed that South Carolinians were “not to be compensated in any fashion” for the loss of their slave property. By 1731, Benavides had fully reversed his position on the issue and cited San Agustín’s long-held custom of protecting fugitives in order to refuse English efforts to repossess runaway slaves. San Agustín’s promises of freedom (even if these promises were not complete or immediate) undermined the authority of South Carolina planters and gave fugitive slaves an obtainable goal.

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51 “El Consejo de Indians a S.M.” April 12, 1731 in Wright, "Dispatches of Spanish Official Bearing in the Free Negro Settlement of Gracia Real De Santa Teresa De Mose, Florida." For 1693 cédula see Document 4, June 8, 90, p. 158, for re-enslaving see Document 3, August 16, 89, and for reversal of unofficial policy see Document 8, April 12, 731.

52 “Recommendations on how to deal with English slaves,” April 12, 1731, AGI 86-5-21/33 bnd 5310, Reel 40, Stetson Collection, PKY. Benavides details that “VM tomar la resolucion que considere mas combeniente a la naturaleza de casa uno de los casos, y a las circunstancias del tiempo en que sucedieren.”

53 Ibid.

54 The Spanish believed that relying, showing, and asserting legal precedent was a reliable strategy for warding off English aggressions. The Spanish employed a similar strategy in their debates over Georgia; the English did not find this legal strategy convincing. Herbert E. Bolton, *The Debatable Land: A Sketch of the Anglo-Spanish Contest for the Georgia Country* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1925).

San Agustín officials treated slaves who ran away from South Carolina as captured prisoners and valuable informers. With time, especially with the development of rice agriculture and solidification of a plantation economy, slaves, who had either been captured or, more importantly, those who had escaped, became increasingly important sources of information. Benavides vowed to welcome all runaways and decreed that, unlike in the past, “the English would not be informed of the slaves who received refuge” in Florida. By limiting English knowledge of the whereabouts and conditions of their runaway slaves, the governor made the already tense relations with South Carolina even more charged. Benavides was not merely offering slaves a safe haven; he was interfering with English ability to control slavery.

Runaway slaves, though in many ways similar to prisoners of war, were unique informers. First, most fugitives willingly reached Spanish lands and were not too keen on leaving. Second, the process of returning or exchanging these captives was far more complicated and rarely carried out. And third, South Carolina masters spent an enormous amount of time and effort in attempting to secure the return of runaway slaves—especially when compared to English attempts to obtain the release of other captives. The English determination seemed surprising and even obsessive to the Spanish, but when situated in the larger context of the growth and profit of slavery, the relentlessness of South Carolina’s planters makes perfect sense. The remainder of this section will thus connect the expansion of African slavery with the important, yet problematic role of runaway slave informers.

English preoccupation with protecting African slavery permeated all aspects of South Carolina life. This rising concern was even apparent in places where it had previously been silent. The 1725 journals of Indian traders Tobias Fitch and George Chicken, for example, hint at the importance of African slavery. Concerned with Indian affairs and trade, these journals nonetheless chronicled South Carolina’s growing investment in slavery. Colonel Chicken routinely complained about traders who, in defiance of Charles Town’s laws, brought their slaves into the backcountry and made them work as guides, messengers, guards, loaders and unloaders of the horse packs, and even as interpreters. Although Chicken recognized that traders greatly benefited from having slaves in Indian Country, he worried about the implications and inadvertent advantages slaves would receive. Chicken worried about the uncontrolled interactions among slaves and Indians. The Colonel feared that:

the Slav’s that are now come up talk good English as well as the Cherokee language and I am Afraid too often tell falcities to the Indians which they are very apt to believe, they being so much among the English.
Chicken was concerned with the slaves’ ability to communicate with Indians and the Indians aptitude to believe the “falcities” related by slaves.

Lies spread by slaves could jeopardize South Carolina’s relations with the powerful Cherokees, but the interactions between blacks employed in the backcountry and Indians went both ways. Slaves could provide Indians with information about the English settlers, “being so much among them,” and Cherokees could tell slaves about the topography and geography of the region, the friendliness of certain Indian groups, and the location of other European powers. This knowledge exchange, carried out in the Indian language, could have taken place in front of English traders, but evaded their control. Slave knowledge could unsettle Cherokee-South Carolina relations; Cherokee information could disrupt the slave-master power dynamic.

Captain Fitch was also confronted by slave presence in Indian country. But Fitch did more than complain about the use of slaves; unlike Chicken, Fitch attempted to regulate the movement and access of these black men and women. Within a month of reaching the Upper Creek town of Okfuskee, Fitch learned of the arrival of a Spanish delegation to Coweta; the party was composed of two Spanish, four Indians, and one “negro.” Fitch became fixated on the danger posed by this man. Describing the Spanish as “shy” and their slave as “Bould,” Fitch voiced his intentions to capture this slave, and asked for Creek collaboration. Brims, chief of the town of Coweta, quickly realized that Fitch’s request was, in fact, a demand; with a force of 100 Indians, Brims aided Fitch in the apprehension of this Spanish slave. The Spanish were surprised by the capture of a member of their party and by the sudden turnabout face of Indians who had so graciously welcomed the Spanish into Creek towns. When the Spanish attempted to negotiate the return of this slave, the English captain proved unbending. Fitch informed the Spanish that no amount of money and no claims of this slave’s good Christian nature would alter his fate in bondage. If the Creeks had been unsure about the value South Carolina assigned to slavery, Fitch’s actions left no room for doubt.

Indians began using the weight the English placed on slavery for their own agendas. During one his final meetings with Fitch, the Dog King, a principal of the Lower Creek Town of Pallachocola [Palachuckaly], told the English agent, “I have heard that the Chocktawes makes as good slaves as Negroes.” The Dog King tried to convince Fitch to attack the Choctaws by appealing to South Carolina’s hunger for black slaves. Comparing Choctaws to “negro slaves,” the Dog King revealed not only his dislike towards the Choctaw nation, but also displayed a larger awareness of the changes taken place in South Carolina. African slaves were not a new feature, but rather a new power to the Southeast. As South Carolina became increasingly concerned with controlling this

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60 Ibid., 150 September 18, 1725; Fitch, "Captain Fitch's Journal to the Creeks,” 196-7. Fitch recalls how the Creek and Chickasaws Headmen attempted to trick him by conducting negotiations solely in the Chickasaw language. Fitch’s interpreter, however, caught the trick. Fitch made his white messenger repeat in “Indean Tongue the same words that he heard spoke in the Square by the head men... When the Indeans found that he had Rehears’d it they Seem’d to [be] under Some Concern, but Still Denied the words.” After this treachery, Fitch stated to the Creeks, “You see that I write everything down that you say, therefore I shall not forget your promises...”


62 Ibid., 207.
power, Spanish officials as well as Indian leaders began redefining their captivity practices in order to accommodate to and take advantage of the importance of black slavery.  

Through the return (or the refusal to return) of fugitives, Indians brokered their own agreements, asserted their authority over the backcountry, and demonstrated their own autonomy (vis-à-vis the slave’s captivity). While Brims had shown his friendship to Fitch by helping the English captain capture a “Spanish negro,” not all Creek leaders adopted the approach of the mico of Coweta. Squire Mickeo, a Lower Creek, not only refused to return a slave belonging to the French, but also “Imediately assisted him with Cunnue and provissions.” This French slave had wreaked all sorts of havoc for the English: he had traveled from Fort Toulouse to the Lower Creeks, intercepted an Indian war party sent by the English to attack the Yamasees, and persuaded some of these 70 warriors to abandon their plans. When Fitch attempted to apprehend this meddlesome slave, the King of Pallachocola “Cutt the Rope [that bound the slave] and threw it into the fire… [and] Told the White men that they [Creeks] had as good Guns as they, and Could make as good use of them.” Squire Mickeo freed the French slave and, through this act of defiance, displayed the Creeks’ military might. To complicate matters even further, the Spanish slave Fitch had captured earlier managed to escape his English captors and fled to Squire Mickeo, who once again refused Fitch’s demands for the runaway. 

Brims and Squire Mickeo took opposite strategies when it came to returning slaves to the English. But both caciques understood that their actions shaped their relations with Charles Town— how Indians treated runaway slaves played a role in how South Carolina, in turn, treated these native groups. In his last speech to the Creeks, Fitch voiced his displeasure at the lack of a unified Creek policy regarding runaway slaves. While Creeks had agreed to two major English requests— they had attacked Yamasee settlements and they had even entertained the idea of peace with the Cherokees— Fitch deemed the Creeks undependable allies because they refused to consistently return fugitive slaves. When it came to runaways, there was no clear precedent Creek leaders followed.

Creeks were not the only Indian nation to deal with the issue of runaway slaves. Cherokees also struggled with South Carolina’s demands to apprehend and return fugitives. The Cherokee, much like the Creeks, developed an ambivalent policy regarding runaway slaves. In 1730, Cherokee leaders, Scayagusta Oukah (Tassetsa), Scali Cosken (Ketagusta), Tethtone, Clogollliah, Colannah, and Oucounacou, addressed English complaints about the lack of Cherokee collaboration in apprehending runaway slaves. “This Small Rope which We shew you,” the Cherokee caciques stated, “is all We have to bind our slaves with, and may be broken; but you have Iron Chains for yours, However if we catch your slaves, We shall bind them as We can.” These Indians vowed to try to “catch slaves” who fled the English, but on Cherokee terms: “We shall bind them as We

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63 Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity, 150.
64 "Captain Fitch’s Journal to the Creeks," 199.
65 Ibid., 205-6.
66 Ibid., 210.
67 BPRO 23, September 9, 1730, Whitehall. Extracts from Meetings of His Majesty’s Commissioners for Trade and Plantations Volume 14, 1730
can.” Cherokee commitment was only as strong as “small rope,” not an iron chain. Cherokees transformed their inconsistent runaway slave policies into diplomatic leverage.

Since South Carolinians valued their slaves so much, exchanging African captives became the easiest and most definitive way Indians had to communicate their alliances, positions, and intentions. In 1717, Augustus, a Christian Indian who had been chief of Tama during the devastating Yamasee War, decided to abandon his alliance with South Carolina; to prove his friendship to the Spanish, he presented lieutenant Diego Peña with slaves he had captured from South Carolina. Peña was happily surprised by this turn of events. Although Augustus had many credentials that recommended him to Spanish care, Peña cited the exchange of the fugitive slaves as the clearest indication that Tama Indians were sincere and intended to remain loyal to San Agustín.

The very existence of fugitive slaves destabilized the system that was fueling English growth. Although South Carolinians worried more about the power structure that runaway slaves jeopardized than about the information these bondsmen and women could supply, fugitive slaves nonetheless served as valuable informers. During the 1706 Spanish and French invasion of Charles Town, runaway slaves not only deserted English plantations to join the enemy, but also proved to be important sources of information. Florida soldiers learned a great deal about English strength and strategy from slaves who fled into Spanish and French camps. Spanish officers had “overheard them [some slaves] say that the government of San Jorge had order all the English from [nearby] plantations to be rounded-up because there were not enough men in the [main] plaza.” The forces led by Luis Rodríguez and Juan Francisco Pérez even relied on runaway slaves to coordinate an attack with their French counterparts. But not all news delivered by runaways was positive. A group of fugitive slaves told the Spanish and French forces that “about eighty English with some Indians had departed to make war against Mobile.” The French had hesitated invading Charles Town for fear that South Carolina would retaliate by launching an attack against an unprotected Mobile. The report from these slaves seemed to confirm that fear.

The English also depended on black informants who could move around the city without causing too much suspicion. On the eve of the English counterattack against the Spanish and French armies, Nathaniel Johnson, governor of South Carolina (1703-1709), received an update from a “Negro from the Neck,” who reported “that the Enemy consisting of about one hundred and sixty men had been on shoar all that night [and] had killed a great many cattle fowls and other stock and were seemingly feasting and making merry.” After receiving this intelligence, Johnson organized a surprise raid against the “feasting” enemy forces and overwhelmed his Spanish and French rivals. South

70 “Oyo decir que el governador de San Jorge havia mandado recojer todos los Ingleses de los plantajey tambien oyo decir que havian salido como ochenta yngleses con numero de Indians a dar Guerra a la Movilia” “Notary Juan Solana reports on 1706 invasion,” October 26, 1706, AG I 58-2-3/32, Reel 30, Stetson Collection, PKY.
Carolinians depended on slaves to supply and transmit local information; after all, slaves could and did move around the province and, unlike Indian couriers, slaves lived within English territory, within English towns. Slaves were the colony’s majority and defining characteristic—a colony which was, after all, “more like a negro country than like a country settled by white people.” Slaves had intimate access to the lives, preoccupations, and decisions of their masters.

The Spanish and French sought and appreciated the slaves’s intimate knowledge of the English. And although San Agustín officials paid special attention to reports delivered by slaves, runaways were not considered dependable informers. As grateful as Spanish governors were when a fugitive slave reached the presidio, Florida leaders viewed these reports as valuable, but unpredictable sources of news. Spanish did not and could not routinely rely on fugitive slaves for information. For regular reports on English activities and whereabouts, the Spanish turned, as they always had, to Indians.

But in the aftermath of the Yamasee War, the Spanish began treating Indian informers differently. Experiencing an increase in Indian alliances and connections, San Agustín officials became more discriminating about who these Indian informers were. Unlike in the 1680s and 90s, when the Spanish employed a wide array of Indian scouts, spies, and correos (couriers), in the 1720s and 30s, the Spanish relied only on a handful of individual Indians to serve as informers. The experiences of specific Indian informers can thus be traced through the sources—their struggles not only reveal the changing conditions of the region, but also exposed changes to how the Spanish sought and evaluated news.

Indian Informers and Corrupting the Source of Information

San Agustín officials turned to their Indians allies for regular reports on English activities, but Spanish relations with neighboring native nations were far from regular. Competing with English and French efforts to secure native alliances, the Spanish often settled for arrangements that were, at best, tentative. Before the Yamasee War, the Spanish had to choose forging precarious alliances or having no connections whatsoever; unsurprisingly, the Spanish had always opted for the former; Florida officials had preferred tenuous Indian relations, especially with powerful groups like the Creeks, to forsaking any potential alliance. Decentralized and fluid networks had given the Spanish access to a lot of information; but these channels of information had simultaneously made San Agustín subject to a network that the Spanish could not fully control.

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76 From the creation to the destruction of missions in Guale, Timucua, and Apalachee, and from the diplomatic journeys of Spanish agents (like, Matheos and Peña) to the building of a fort in Apalachicola, San Agustín officials had attempted different ways to networks la tierra adentro.
In the 1720s, San Agustín officials altered their networking strategy. Instead of welcoming the reports of any and all Indians, the Spanish began advocating the virtue of loyal and straightforward alliances—a type of communication that Creek Indians referred to as “straight Talk.”

“Straight Talk” implied establishing connections that were simple, clear, and reaffirmed the amity of the parties involved. In the 1770s, English agent John Stuart described how through these open communication networks, the English had created a “path [to the Creeks] Clear and Free from thorns and bad weeds.” Physically as well as figuratively, “straight Talk” was intended to enable easier correspondence. But Stuart stressed that maintaining these paths “Clear and Free” was an ongoing and collaborative enterprise. Europeans as well as Indians had to “Join in Endeavours to keep it [communication] Straight and White.”

San Agustín officials, much like their counterparts in Charles Town, worked to establish “Straight and White [peaceful]” networks with Indian country.

In the aftermath of the Yamasee War, the Spanish and English networking approaches paralleled each other. There is no evidence to suggest that these colonial rivals were consciously imitating each other’s policies. Florida and South Carolina had merely reached a similar solution, but derived by two very different equations. The English, flustered and overwhelmed by the Yamasee War, wanted a communication network that offered them safety and clarity; the Spanish, empowered by the late Indian war and emboldened by the sudden increase in Indian allies, strove to assert their newfound authority over the region. Direct and clear communication networks were the answer for both of these dilemmas.

If for South Carolina establishing “straight Talk” was about removing the “thorns and bad weeds” caused by both misinformation and lack of information; for the Spanish, tighter connections were about reestablishing their authority over Guale and western Florida. In 1738, Governor Juan Francisco Güemes y Horcasitas of Cuba described the “seven conditions” required for a Spanish communication network to develop in the Southeast. Of the seven criteria, two required the Indians who corresponded with the Spanish to ban “English or other foreigners in their pueblos.” The Spanish would no longer compete with European powers; Indians had to be exclusively allied with Florida. Three conditions detailed by Güemes y Horcasitas were about establishing a “perfect friendship and obedience” with the Spanish crown. Indians were not only to be “loyal and sincere,” but also completely “dependent on the Florida government.” Florida officials now required their Indian informers to be subservient to the Spanish Crown. The networks of information the Spanish built to and from Indian country rested on two pillars: restriction of foreign interference and complete loyalty to San Agustín; the remaining two conditions outlined the consequences for any Indian nation who refused the aforementioned terms.

79 John Stuart to David Taitt, from Mobile, January 20, 1772 Ibid., 547.
80 Governor Juan Francisco Güemes y Horcasitas to Marques de Torrenueva, April 14, 1738 St AGI 87-1-2/111 bnd 5716, Reel 43, Stetson Collection, PKY. Condition one and four dealt with eliminating non-
While neither of these conditions was particularly new, their enforceability was. By eliminating the confusion caused by static and competition, the Spanish hoped to establish Straight Talk with Indian country. Governor Güemes y Horcasitas believed that these clear and strong ties with Indian allies would not only afford the Spanish better control over the region, but would also supply Florida with regular information. On the one hand, the governor was right. A communication network built on a handful of trustworthy nodes provided the Spanish with easily accessible and dependable reports. But on the other hand, by favoring reports from loyal Indians, the Spanish were confined to the biases of their allies. San Agustín officials could better monitor the sources of their information, but the type and variety of news they received became more constricted. In other words, these guaranteed, reliable reports were not always accurate. 81

San Agustín favored strong, clear, and thus more easily regulated ties, to wider, decentralized, and thus more competitive connections. In exchange for information they could regulate, the Spanish accepted a fragmented view of the region. 82 As Florida officials privileged a specific type of Indian spy, they began to bias a specific type of news. In the Spanish sources from the 1720s and, especially from the 1730s, the experiences of individual Indian informers become easier to find. The sudden discussion of these privileged Indian informers indicates an important shift in both the kind of Indians who were selected to serve as informers and the importance placed on the services they rendered.

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81 For the virtue of decentralization see David Hancock, "The Triumph of Mercury: Connection and Control in the Emerging Atlantic Economy" (paper presented at the Atlantic History: Regional Networks, Shared Experiences, Forces of Integration, Harvard University, 2007, June 21-3).


83 Bolton, Arredondo's Historical Proof of Spain's Title to Georgia, a Contribution to the History of One of the Spanish Borderlands, xviii.
The Spanish now attempted to network Apalachee and Apalachicola through the efforts of Indians like Francisco Jospoque. Jospoque, an Apalachee Indian in his mid-thirties, had forged a close friendship with Spanish authorities and it was Florida officials, not native leaders, who placed him in charge of the mission town of Nombre de Dios. The authority of Jospoque was based, almost entirely, on his relation to the Spanish and to the Catholic Church. The Spanish gave Jospoque power and, in return, he was to protect Spanish interest and provide San Agustín with the latest news. Francisco Jospoque was not alone; Governor Güemes y Horcasitas as well as his Florida counterpart Manuel de Montiano relied on other loyal Indian leaders, such as Quilate cacique of Apalachee, Ysques cacique de Achito, Chislacaliche of Coweta, and Chocate and Yahoulakee pro-Spanish leader of Coweta. These leaders promised that “if there was any news among the nations they would immediately reveal it” to the Spanish. Florida based their information network on the regular correspondence of these caciques.

In San Marcos de Apalachee, the Spanish appointed an official Indian informer. “Don Captain Jul., a Christian Indian of the Uchisa Nation, who is kept in that garrison for being a reliable man because if there is [ever] any news among the [Indian] nations he immediately reports it and if he… is sent to the provinces to spread [the governor’s] words, he does so with much punctuality.” Don Álvaro Lopez de Toledo, Lieutenant of the San Marcos fort, praised Don Captain Jul. and urged the new governor, Francisco del Moral Sánchez, to continued employing this Uchise informer. Lopez de Toledo explained that it was through the regular news of select Indian informers, like Don Captain Jul., that the previous administration in San Agustín had remained informed about developments in la tierra adentro (the backcountry). The Spanish depended on the information brought by these prominent and loyal individuals.

Several related patterns can be discerned from the experiences of these caciques. First, the Spanish recruited and depended on a special type of informer; while Florida officials might have accepted and heeded reports from a wide array of individuals, the Spanish reconstructed their network of communication through the regular correspondence from these loyal and powerful Indians leaders. Second, the Spanish expected more from their allies. Loyalty and information were the non-negotiable price

84 “To Don Antonio Benavides from Francisco Jospoque,” January 12, 1734, bnd 86-7-21, Reel 40, Stetson Collection, PKY. Jospoque was considered a good candidate for cacique and informer because he was the legitimate child of Francisco Joseph and Agustina Maria, both “royal Indians who were Roman Catholics.” Although his parents are identified as “nobles,” it is unclear what Jospoque’s relationship to Yuchi (Creek) leadership was.

85 “Si ay alguna nobedad entra las naciones la delcara inmediatamente,” Letter from San Marcos about Indians, July 29, 1734 bnd 5376 86-7-21/7, Reel 40, Stetson Collection, PKY; See also “The Trials of Captain Don Isidoro De León,” The Florida Historical Quarterly 35, no. 3. Translated and edited by Lucy L. Wenhold, with an introduction and additional notes by Albert C. Manucy (1957); Steven C. Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 165.

86 “Captt, Jul. Indio Christiano de la Nacion Uchisca el qual se mantiene en esta guaricion por hombre de satisfacción por que si ay alguna nobedad entra las naciones la delcara inmediatamente y si a su SS se les ofrece despacharlo a las provincias con palabra lo hace con much puntualidad.” “Al Governor Francisco del Moral Sánchez” July 29, 1734 bnd 5376 86-7-21/7, Reel 40, Stetson Collection PKY.

87 “Lo asia con el antecesor de V como pude Ynformarse de los oficiales de esa plaza.” Ibid.

88 Though many of these leaders were not Catholic, they tolerated missionary activity and presence. All of these Indian leaders had reached some understandings with Franciscans.
these Indians had to pay to be included in the Spanish network. Third, Spanish Indians received clear incentives—from coveted goods to appointments to positions of power—in exchange for their information. More than in previous decades, the Spanish understood and treated information as a commodity that could be purchased and then (hopefully) secured.

But by investing in particular Indians, the Spanish became complicit in the information these Indian leaders provided. So fourth, the more San Agustín officials rewarded particular informers, the more willing the Spanish were to believe these reports. More often than not, the Spanish deemed the news delivered by these paid-informers as true and complete. San Agustín leaders treated these informants and their information as if they were completely unbiased. And finally, since Indians informers became visible and identifiable figures, they also became victims of their own privileged position. Many of the Indian leaders who were instrumental in sustaining a Spanish communication network paid dearly for exchanging information with San Agustín. Their towns, families, and people fell victim to the special and tight bond these Indian caciques had developed with the Spanish.

Perhaps Juan Ygnacio (sometimes spelled Ignacio) is the best example of the new type of Indian informer employed by Florida. Although not a well-known figure today, Juan was instrumental to the survival of Spanish Florida in the 1730s. A thirty-five year old Uchise (Creek) Indian from the town of Pocotalaca, Juan had lived all his life in the vicinity of the Spanish. He spoke Spanish fluently and probably had facility with a number of other languages. A student of the Southeast, Juan spent time not only getting to know the land, but also learning about the different, complex, and ever changing relations that defined the region. During his lifetime, Juan had witnessed massive changes to Florida, such as the decimation caused by joint English-Indian attacks, the consolidation of mission sites, and the arrival of new Indian groups (such as the Yamasees)—this Uchise Indian had firsthand experience with the major changes that had shattered and reconstituted the Southeast.

Juan’s capacity to read and weather change made him a valuable informer. His incredible success in obtaining the latest news led Spanish governor Manuel de Montiano to believe that if Juan Ygnacio could not find the information, no one could. In the late 1730s, the Spanish governor sent Juan to spy on English activities. Juan traveled through the open roads without a disguise, hoping for an encounter with the rumored enemy. It did not take long before he stumbled into an English party. Juan approached

89 “To Don Antonio Benavides from Francisco Jospoque,” January 12, 1734, bnd 86-7-21, Reel 40, Stetson Collection, PKY.
90 For discussions on the problems and stakes in hiring informers, see Stephen C. Mercado, "Reexamining the Distinction between Open Information and Secrets," Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 2 (2005); C. A. Bayly, “Knowing the Country: Empire and Information in India," Modern Asian Studies (Special Issue: How Social, Political and Cultural Information Is Collected, Defined, Used and Analyzed) 27, no. 1 (1993).
91 Many of these informers came to San Agustín pleading for protection. See “To Don Antonio Benavides from Francisco Jospoque,” January 12, 1734, 86-7-21, Reel 40 Stetson Collection, PKY; “Letter from San Marcos about Indians,” July 29, 1734 bnd 5376 86-7-21/7, Reel 40, Stetson Collection, PKY; and "The Trials of Captain Don Isidoro De León."
92 Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763, 164.
93 Serrano y Sanz, Documentos Historicos De La Florida Y La Luisiana, Siglos Xvi Al Xviii, Documento 15, Relacion del Yndio Juan Ygnacio de los Reyes, Vecino del Pueblo de Pocotalava San Augustine, August 30, 1738, 260-4.
the South Carolina traders and introduced himself as a Spanish fugitive; he explained that he had murdered another Indian and now needed protection from San Agustín officials. Juan had selected this false identity carefully and, according to his testimony, the traders proved easy to fool. The English were especially drawn to the fact that Juan seemed vulnerable and in need of their help. Juan, placing himself at the mercy of these traders, had made the English feel in charge.

The English agreed to protect Juan, but in return, they asked him to provide them with information about San Agustín. Juan, hired by the Montiano to spy on South Carolina, now had to furnish the English with reports on the Spanish. Colonel John Cochran, who was heading the English operations near San Simón Island, interrogated the Uchise fugitive. The English colonel began by inquiring after the military strength of the Spanish. At first, Juan responded coyly, claiming he knew much of San Agustín, but little of military matters. By fashioning himself as a disinterested, but knowledgeable individual, Juan molded himself into the type of informer the English wanted. Cochran fell right into Juan Ygancio’s trap. Never doubting Juan’s intentions, the English colonel confidently trusted this Uchise Indian.

Juan conveyed his information very strategically. He exaggerated the military capacity of Florida, overstating the armaments, equipment, and men in the Spanish garrison—Juan wanted to intimidate the English colonel and his men. He was careful, however, not to overplay the strength of the Spanish to unrealistic levels, lest his English host would begin to find his reports suspicious. As Juan described the presidio’s might, he also revealed that the impressive forces at San Agustín were still waiting for the situado (royal subsidies).\footnote{Amy Turner Bushnell, "Situado and Sabana, Spain's Support System for the Presidio and Mission Provinces of Florida," \textit{Anthropological papers of the American Museum of Natural History} 3, no. 74 (1994); Engel Sluiter, \textit{The Florida Situado: Quantifying the First Eight Years, 1571-1651} (Gainesville: University of Florida Libraries, 1985); John J. TePaske, "Economic Problems of Florida Governors, 1700-1763," \textit{The Florida Historical Quarterly} 37, no. 1 (1958).} Florida was militarily strong, but it still needed outside support to survive. Juan’s reference to the situado was brief, and it is unclear if the English understood or took note of this statement. Juan’s comment seemed targeted more to Montiano than to Cochran. The Uchise Indian was letting his Spanish employer know that he understood how Florida worked. Juan was privy to Spanish strengths as well as weaknesses.

After his brief meeting with colonel Cochran, Juan moved through English lands without difficulty. Just like the cacica of Yspo had done in the 1680s, Juan entered in and out of English spaces without complications. In the fifty years between Pamini and Juan’s travels, South Carolinians had developed a more careful understanding of the Southeast, commanded more control over the region, and had forged alliances with powerful Indian nations like the Creek and Cherokee. But, as Juan’s experience demonstrated, the English still had a difficult time reading Indian loyalties and intentions. And just as easily as he entered into English confidence, Juan left his trusting hosts behind. Before departing, the Spanish spy told colonel Cochran he intended to go hunting and then fishing, but would return within days. Announcing his arrival and explaining his departure, Juan Ygnacio was not a very subtle spy—nor did he need to be. His openness granted him access to the very information the Spanish wanted to learn.
There are, however, no English sources (found to date) that mention Juan Ygnacio. Colonel Cochran does not discuss this Uchise Indian and neither do records in Charles Town. There are several possibilities for this omission. Cochran might have not wanted to record English dependence on information from a Spanish Indian— especially an Indian who disappeared from English control as quickly as he had entered into it. Or maybe the colonel did not deem his dealings with this Uchise Indian worth noting. But perhaps it was Juan who was lying. Maybe his success with the English was so impeccable because it had, in fact, never taken place. The evidence does not fully support either possibility, but it does reveal the limitations of the communication networks developed by the Spanish. Employing only a handful of trusted informers, San Agustín officials had few ways of corroborating Juan’s account and thus tended to both privilege and trust news that corroborated Florida’s existing fear of South Carolina.

When Juan Ygnacio returned to San Agustín, he was interrogated by Montiano. The governor’s questions echoed the concerns of the English colonel. Montiano wanted to know about the strength and intentions of the English. Juan confirmed the governor’s worst fears. The Uchise informer emphasized the militaristic nature of his English hosts. “Not by day or by night do they cease their talks of [invading] Florida,” impressed Juan to governor Montiano.95 South Carolina’s aggression towards their southern neighbor could be seen in all their policies; perhaps most egregious was the English payment for Spanish and Spanish Indian scalps. If Juan made a mistake, his head was literally on the line. Governor Montiano often worried about losing this loyal, valuable Indian to the perils of the Southeast. Before sending Juan on a mission, Montiano had to consider whether it was in the Spanish best interest to endanger the life of this informer or to wait until the situation stabilized. For Montiano, sending Juan meant learning the latest developments faster. The information gathered by Juan gave the Spanish the capacity to assess the situation more adequately and form an appropriate response; but Juan ran enormous risks by serving as a Spanish informer. He could be captured or killed at any time. Montiano had to constantly consider what was more detrimental: losing this Uchise Indian or not having the needed information.96

Loyal and devoted to the Spanish, Juan also served his own interests. In 1738, he was appointed as the main Indian guide for Alonso del Toro’s expedition. Toro’s party traveled with supplies from Cuba to Apalachicola in the hopes of securing allies among the Creek. An able guide, Juan helped the Spanish party negotiate the difficult landscape and its complex relations. However, Juan carefully selected the towns del Toro’s party visited and thus influenced where and to whom Spanish promises, goods, and communication reached. Juan very clearly privileged some Indian alliances over others.97 He was not merely guiding del Toro’s party through Indian paths; he was shaping how the Spanish connected to the Southeast.

Juan’s decisions were not necessarily Machiavellian. He was Uchise; he had close connections to the Lower Creeks, most likely spoke their dialect, and probably had kin ties to those towns. It is not too surprising then, that Juan led del Toro through paths that

95 “que ni de dia Ni de noche dejaban la conversacion de la Florida” Serrano y Sanz, Documentos Historicos De La Florida Y La Luisiana, Siglos Xvi Al Xviii, Documento 15, Relacion del Yndio Juan Ygnacio de los Reyes, Vecino del Pueblo de Pocotalava San Augustine, August 30, 1738, 260-4.
96 Official Letters, June 17, 1738, Letter #57.
97 April 14, 1738, St AGI 87-1-2/111 bnd 5716, Reel 43, Stetson Collection, PKY.
reinforced the importance of Coweta, a major Lower Creek town—but also a town that
the Spanish themselves had long identified as prominent and worth courting. But it does
not matter if Juan had no premeditated bias, no ulterior motives to his selections; as a
guide and informer, he constantly made choices, prioritizing certain information over
other. And by simply trusting Juan, the information he brought, and the networks he
carried, the Spanish officials made Juan Ygnacio’s preferences seem natural. San
Agustín officials obscured the arbitrariness of the Uchise’s preferences.

Apalachicola and Apalachee Indians, however, were painfully aware of Juan
Ygnacio’s selections. These were the Indian nations who had suffered as a result of
Juan’s choices. The Tallapoosa Indians revealed their displeasure that Juan had not come
among them to deliver the Spanish talk. The Tallapoosas had wanted to establish clear
connections to the Spanish, but Juan had gone to “Cowetas and to the Uchises” instead.
The Tallapoosa’s complaint emphasized the power of this informer. Since the Spanish
sent Juan only on the most important missions, a visit (or lack thereof) by Juan served as
a litmus test of how San Agustín prioritized the specific Indian group or town. The
Tallapoosa believed that they had cultivated less than favorable relations with the Spanish
because “the right informer” had not traveled to their towns.

Tickhonabe, a Tallapoosa chief, also expressed frustration with the larger Spanish
communication network. Tickhonabe praised the virtues of the decentralized connections
of the past; the Tallapoosa chief recalled a time when he could have forged alliances with
multiple European powers without jeopardizing his relations to any particular group.
Tickhonabe admitted that “he was allies with the French…but that [alliance] did not
deprive him of having communication with the Spanish.”

The Spanish governor disagreed; friendship with the French implied no connection to San Agustín. But it had been Juan Ygnacio, not Montiano, who had decided to exclude the Tallapoosa from del Toro’s journey. While Juan had deprived the Tallapoosa from a connection to the
Spanish, he had led del Toro to other Indian towns, like Coweta, which had clear
agreements with other rival European powers. Juan was not objecting to French or even
English interference in Indian towns, he merely preferred Coweta to Tallapoosa, Lower
Creeks to Upper Creeks.

Juan’s choices, though rooted in intra-Indian relations, reflected larger changes to
Florida’s communication network. Like Juan, Spanish officials were making choices
about the paths that would allow “straight Talk.” the Indian groups that would sustain an
exclusive partnership to Florida, and the individual informers that would help forge these
strong ties. By the 1730s, the Spanish were constructing a new kind of communication
network. San Agustín officials developed smaller, tighter, and easier to regulate
connections; they favored loyalty over expansion. The Spanish focused on making their
information networks more dependable, but reliability did not necessarily lead to
accuracy.

98 For Spanish discussion about the problems of select informers, see comments by “Governor Manuel de
Montiano,” August 14, 1739 St AGI 87-3-12/6 bnd 5855, Reel 45, Stetson Collection, PKY: “Me hallo con
distintas noticias comunicadas por sujetos de confidencia dirigidos a persuadirme afirmativamente que
llega a tanto desahogo y audacia el travieso genio de Don Diego Oglethorpe.”
99 “por que ellos estaban agregados a el Frances (y replico diciendo) que era verdad pero que estos no les
priban la communication con el Español que antes les mandan que ablan con ellos,” May 18, 1738, bnd
87-1-3/48, Reel 43, Stetson Collection, PKY
English Networks: Security, Settlement, and Slavery

In the immediate aftermath of the Yamasee War, as the English attempted to regain control of the region and struggled to understand what had gone so horribly wrong, South Carolinian officials openly discussed the value and importance of information. But when the dust settled— when it became clear that for all its losses, South Carolina was the undisputable winner of the war — the concerns about acquiring and protecting information no longer seemed pressing. Almost overnight, the reflexive English discourse about the value, need, and importance of information disappeared. South Carolina’s changing relation to news was not because the English had suddenly found a way to secure all the information they needed; nor was it the result of South Carolina abandoning all efforts to remain informed. Rather, South Carolinians’ struggle to obtain and send reliable news became combined and competed with other preoccupations. In the second and third decade of the eighteenth century, the need and quest for information became entangled in discussion about security, settlement, and slavery.

These three interconnected issues reveal a reorientation of English concerns from external expansion to internal developments. Since its founding, South Carolina had focused on extending its influence and borders, but in the wake of the destruction caused by the Yamasee War and as rice cultivation began to bear significant profits, Charles Town officials slowly turned inwards. Although South Carolinians would continue advocating expansion— and with the settlement of Georgia, English growth in the Southeast seemed even more pronounced than in the past— English priorities shifted. During the 1730s, as internal concerns took center stage, South Carolinians reevaluated their relationship to information and to their existing communication networks.  

Forts and Towns, Reimagining the Backcountry

After the Yamasee War, South Carolina officials began forcefully articulating the importance of safety. Though there is nothing surprising about the emphasis on security (especially in the wake of a bloody war), the sudden push for defense and internal protection seemed like a reversal of the colony’s unabashed expansion. Yet these protective policies, in particular the careful monitoring of Indian affairs, the establishment of a military cordon along the frontier, and the settlement of key regions were about creating a different type of expansion— a different type of networked Carolina. Claiming to be protecting their internal economic developments, Charles Town officials established firm boundaries, especially with the Spanish, and promoted the settling of the backcountry. 

100 Sirmans, Colonial South Carolina, a Political History, 1663-1763, Chapter 146-51, and 73-88.
Robert Johnson, who served as South Carolina’s governor from 1730 to 1735, encouraged the development of several townships. Beginning with Purrysburg established in 1732, Johnson invited white settlement along the frontier. He viewed these towns in terms of defense; the towns were to protect South Carolina as well as its booming plantation economy from hostile Indians neighbors and competing European powers. The cultivation of rice had grown steadily since the 1720s and by the middle of the eighteenth-century there were close to 4 million acres of cultivated rice listed in the tax rolls. As rice agriculture expanded, so did the slave labor that made this cash crop possible and profitable. By 1710, South Carolina had a slave majority and within three decades, the high demand for slaves had led South Carolina planters to import directly from Africa. Rice and slavery transformed South Carolina into a wealthy and powerful colony.

But to continue flourishing, South Carolina’s economic model needed protection. The settlements encouraged by Charles Town officials were intended to create a non-Indian buffer between the English and the uncertainties of the Southeast. Florida officials, however, did not care about the reasons behind English expansion. For governor Francisco del Moral Sánchez the establishment of new English town had less to do with protecting slavery than with encroaching on Spanish lands. Moral Sánchez remarked on the military nature of these frontier townships; after all, most of these new towns were located near military structures. Purrysburg was settled close to the Palachacola Fort, Saxe Gotha by the Congarees garrison, New Windsor near Fort Moore, and Amelia was located on the heavily traveled Cherokee trading path. A series of new forts and towns became a way for the English to mark their boundaries, extend their trade and diplomatic relations, and establish an English and military presence in the interior. In the 1730s, for the first time and in a very real way, the backcountry was becoming part of South Carolina.

Between 1715 and 1730, South Carolina constructed over 30 forts. Fort Moore, for example, was built in 1715 to protect Savannah Town, a major trading outpost. Although this garrison was erected as a war measurement, Fort Moore proved to be an important node in English relations with Creeks, Cherokees, and it was also the site of the first negotiations with the distant Chickasaws—almost all traders and Indians moving from those Indian towns to Charles Town passed through Fort Moore. While the

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102 Sirmans, Colonial South Carolina, a Political History, 1663-1763, 167.
103 For more on this Swiss settlement see, Arlin C. Migliazzo, To Make This Land Our Won: Community, Identity, and Cultural Adaptation in Purrysburg Township, South Carolina, 1732-1865 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2007).
105 Wood, Black Majority, Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion, 157.
106 “Declarations about Georgia,” August 4, 1735 St AGI 58-1-31/36 bnd 5401, Reel 41, Stetson Collection PKY
107 Sirmans, Colonial South Carolina, a Political History, 1663-1763, 167; Hall, Zamumo’s Gifts: Indian-European Exchange in the Colonial Southeast, 158. “Johnson’s plan was the first to expressly replace Indians with colonists as defenders of that empire.” Crane, The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732, 293-4.
108 The Squirrel King (Chickasaw) began negotiations with South Carolina in 1723; and in 1730, he would help in the development of 11 townships that would, eventually, compete for trading profits with Augusta. When Charles Town embargoed Creeks towns in 1723, trade to the Chickasaws continued from the
majority of forts were garrisoned as temporary war measures, at least 10 were built or refortified as a postwar strategy to establish clear hubs of English power in Indian country. These forts were South Carolina’s attempt to transform the lessons of the Yamasee into actual policy. Strategically scattered throughout the region, these garrisons helped combine the English goals of expansion and protection. Many of these outposts served a symbolic, rather than practical, purpose; yet their impact should not be understated.

South Carolinians believed that the only way to successfully eradicate the dangers posed by having a Spanish neighbor was to no longer have a Spanish neighbor. Charles Town officials wanted to establish a permanent colony to serve as a buffer zone between themselves (their plantations, slaves, and source of profit) and San Agustín. On March 10th of 1733, less than one month after Savannah, Georgia was established for that purpose, the South Carolina Gazette proudly proclaimed:

We have already begin to find the good Effects of the Colony of Georgia; Abraham de Buc, a French Roman Catholic, and Edward Gilbert, two prisoners who… took Shelter in the vast Woods to the Southward, where they continued committing Disorders…[were] overtaken in their way to St. Augustin… [and] they surrendered without Resistance, and were brought by them to Mr. Oglethorp[e].

The “good Effects” of Georgia were clear; it could regulate the frontiers, enclose movement, and dissuade dangerous individuals from heading south. Furthermore, Georgia’s charter had purposely banned slavery, making any Africans or African-Americans who entered the province easily discernable as fugitives. With the establishment of Georgia, there was no longer “Shelter in vast Woods to the Southward” for outlaws and runaway. While South Carolinians viewed Georgia as an important source of protection, the Spanish considered the settlement of Savannah as well as the establishment of military garrisons along the frontier as an invasion. South Carolina’s actions were not defensive; they were aggressive. It was not long before Spanish and English colonies were at war.

confines of this outpost. The Squirrel King needed English protection. Choctaw-French forces had been attacking the Chickasaws since the early 1720s (wars that would continue until 1725).

109 Larry E. Ivers, Colonial Forts of South Carolina, 1670-1775, South Carolina Tricentennial Commission (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970), 3, and 37-76 for a description of the forts. These forts signaled that the territory was under English control, discouraging encroachment from French and, to a lesser extent, Spanish intrusions.

110 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 158.

111 "March 3-10," South Carolina Gazette 1733. The March 3-10, 1733

112 E. Merton Coulter, ed. The Journal of Peter Gordon, 1732-1735 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1963). “The prohibiting of negroes,” a policy which infuriated many of Georgia’s early settlers, was issued as a way keep this colony safe. Georgia founders wanted to avoid the problems and anxiety that now plagued South Carolina.

113 "March 3-10." The March 3-10, 1733
The Different Information Needs: the Invasion of 1739

When England and Spain went to war in 1739, James Oglethorpe wasted no time in organizing an attack against Spanish Florida. Oglethorpe, governor of the new colony of Georgia, rallied a sizeable force against San Agustín. Florida’s governor, Manuel de Montiano, was convinced that this bout of English aggression would be San Agustín’s last. The Spanish were weak; and their pleas for additional weaponry, soldiers, and any type of supplies had fallen on deaf ears. With an English blockade closing the communication channels to the interior and to Cuba, Florida’s days seemed limited. Anticipating the English forces, Montiano attempted:

to procure by every possible means a knowledge of the condition of the new settlements of Port Royal and Purisburg: if they have had any reinforcement of troops, or if any maritime forces have arrived, and of what character they are, with the most minute accounts that can be acquired from the most faithful and careful channels, that we may be able to inform his majesty: I assure you that of all the difficulties which surround one here, the greatest is the want of an intelligent person for these intrigues.  

Montiano complained about the condition of his colony. He was lacking men, weapons, and supplies, but what he needed most was information. “Greatest is the want,” Montiano implored Cuba’s governor, “of an intelligent person” who could report on the maritime strength, troop number, and condition of the English. The Spanish needed the “most minute accounts…acquired from the most faithful and careful channels” in order to properly defend themselves from Oglethorpe’s forces. Though needing and wanting information about the enemy during wartime was not too surprising, Montiano’s comments revealed that San Agustín officials would not welcome just any news. The Spanish governor privileged only certain information brought by specific, appointed, and “intelligent” informers. Montiano’s decisions about both the importance of news and who could deliver it echoed the larger Spanish attitude regarding information in the 1730s.

Montiano endeavored to protect the “faithful and careful channels” of information and fought to “establish the communication with Apalache” by constructing of two forts: Fort Pupo and Fort Picolata. “The said forts Picalata and Pupo,” explained Florida’s governor, “were erected for the sole purpose of defending and sheltering the couriers who went to & came from Apalache from the continual attacks of the Indians friendly to the English.” Correos needed protection not only because they suffered from “continual attacks,” but also because open (as well as regular and reliable) communication with Apalache served as a defense against the English. Information gave the comparatively weaker Spanish colony an advantage over the sizeable English enemy.

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114 Fear of a Spanish neighbor had filtered South Carolina’s early perceptions of the Southeast. By 1730, the English felt more secured. Rather than a shaping force, the English considered Florida a hindrance to South Carolina’s expansion. See Chapter 4.
115 *Official Letters*, June 3, 1738, Letter # 45, emphasis mine.
Oglethorpe was determined to see his foray into Spanish Florida succeed. Although the governor mostly worried about having ample supplies and men to sustain the invasion and subsequent attacks, he also understood that to defeat San Agustín he needed to isolate the garrison and sever its communication networks. The English military focused on laying siege to the Spanish garrison, blockading the port, and capturing Fort Pupo and Picolata. In the early weeks of the war, the English strategy worked flawlessly. A delighted Oglethorpe detailed how in the chaos of war, “the Spanish at San Francisco de Pupo… seeing some of our [English] Indians took them for

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Spanish Indians” and opened the fort’s gates. Fort Pupo, designed to protect Spanish informers, had welcomed the enemy in. The English had easily overwhelmed the Spanish fort, removing one of the few military defenses San Agustín had managed to build and destroying a key node in Spanish communication network. “The English have occupied the whole river of St John with their vessels,” lamented Montiano, “and that their navigation on the southern part tends to embarrass the communication with Apalache, to render the Uchees friendly to them, and to make captive any courier who may go or come.”

The English controlled the region, constricting the information that moved in and out of San Agustín and limiting the alliances the Spanish could establish.

Oglethorpe had not only “embarrassed” Spanish efforts to communicate with the Indians, but had also managed to, in the process, secure the friendship of the powerful Uchees (Creeks). “I cannot express to you the confusion of this place,” Montiano complained, “here the only defence is its fortress, and all the rest is open country.” Montiano even sent his most reliable Indian informer, Juan Ygnacio, so that he “might learn the state and condition of the citizens of those colonies, as well as their ideas and intentions. [But] [t]he said Juan Ignacio assured me he could not accomplish that object.” Without forts or allies, without safe channels of communication, the Spanish were faced with the daunting task of controlling “open country.” In the 1730s, San Agustín officials had managed to reduce the number of informers, relying instead on a handful of loyal, “intelligent” persons; officials like Montiano had selected forts, missions, and towns where the correos would stop; and the Spanish had limited the connections their Indian allies had with other European powers. These restrictions had given San Agustín officials more reliable information, but a less flexible system—a Spanish information network that, like the one that had been in place in the 1670s, easily crumbled under English pressure.

As their networks failed, the only remedy the Spanish could devise was to cease all communication. Seeing their “safe channels” destroyed, Montiano decided that no news coming in was better than having their own information intercepted by the enemy. Montiano found some relief when he confiscated a copy of the South Carolina Gazette. As he scoured through the newspaper for information about San Agustín, the governor happily concluded that the English, though better supplied, “had not the least knowledge of what was going on, as may be seen by their Gazette.” Montiano viewed South Carolina’s ignorance as an advantage for Florida. If information in English hands was a sword wielded against the Spanish, then insufficient information helped dull the blade.

Information also played an important, albeit different role for Oglethorpe’s invading forces. The English governor, much like his Spanish counterpart, struggled to establish “safe channels” of information, attempted to forge connections with Apalachee, and suffered setbacks when his correspondence was intercepted. But if the Spanish viewed information as an end unto itself, the English considered it only a means. Information was necessary to conquer the Spanish and to destroy hostile Indian

121 To weather the siege, Montiano relied on the efforts of Juan Ignacio. See Official Letters, August 19,1739, Letter #157; quote from February, 23, 1740, Letter #187.
122 Official Letters, June 3, 1738, Letter # 45.
groups; but information alone was not sufficient. Unlike the correspondence of Montiano, which is replete with references about acquiring, spreading, and retaining news, Oglethorpe discussed the value and importance of information only tangentially during the 1739 siege.

South Carolina officials equated this latest attack against Spanish lands and allies, Oglethorpe’s hostility towards Indian groups who refused to ally with Georgia, and the expansion of English territorial claims, with the protection of slavery. Through a rapidly expanding slave system, the English re-networked the Southeast: they integrated the backcountry, established new settlements, and centralized their colonial power. Slavery, as the English had demonstrated during the Fort King George debates, was a stand-in for how the English were (and were planning to) define their place in the region. Even when pushing outwards and invading a neighboring colony, the English were looking in—preoccupied with the familiar concerns of settlement, safety, and in particular slavery.

The 1739-40 invasion of the Spanish colony, like previous English attempts to conquer Florida, proved to be a disaster. Although Oglethorpe had almost no trouble taking the posts and missions that surrounded the presidio, the fortification itself offered a much bigger challenge. Oglethorpe could lay siege to San Agustín, but could not capture it. After a two-week blockade, the English forces, with little supplies and fearing the coming hurricane season, withdrew. The Spanish governor moved quickly to try to reconnect the severed communication channels. Montiano, with the help of Juan Ygnacio, “[t]ook care to send immediately an express to the Uchees to give them information of all that they may separate themselves from the friendship and service of the English, and to offer to regale them if they chose to come and visit me.” By reestablishing these networks, the Spanish hoped to remedy the embarrassment caused by the English attack and to capitalize on South Carolina’s military failure.

The different responses to and relations with information during the 1739 invasion resonated with the larger changes to Spanish and English communication networks in the two decades following the Yamasee War. By 1730, Florida and South Carolina had distinct networks of communication—not only in who these networks included, but also in the role information played in each colony. The Spanish prioritized news from loyal Indian allies and runaway slaves, hoping to create an exclusive, controllable network. Information was the shield and lifeline of the precarious Spanish hold over the Florida. South Carolinians treated news and the networks that facilitated its spread as necessary, but no longer a vital component of English expansion. With the rise

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124 SCDAH House of Assembly, April 4, 1728. The English argue that controlling hostile Indians, diminishing Spanish influence, and protecting slavery were one in the same.
125 August 16, 1739, St AGI 86-7-21/18 bnd 5859, Reel 44, Stetson Collection, PKY.
of slavery, South Carolina began prioritizing the regulation, rather than the acquisition, of information.\textsuperscript{130} The Spanish and English communication networks thus help underscore the competing, yet increasingly connected priorities of these two rivals.

\textsuperscript{130} The internal focus did not mean that the English ceased expanding westward or that the alliances South Carolina had in place were perfect. The deaths of traders like Matthew Smallwood or Simon Leach revealed the bad paths and weak ties that the English needed to improve. See South Carolina Gazette, December 23-30, 1732. “Last Week we had Advice from Alex. Wood, from the Upper Creeks, that Simon Leach, his License Man, Robert Johnson.-- Lewis, together with a half Breed, Brother to James Welsh, deceased, were found dead, about half way in the Path, between the Cousa and the Chickasaws, with their Heads cut off, and their Horses and Goods carried away; it is supposed done by Chactaws, at the Instigation of the French.”
Epilogue: The Stono Rebellion and the Power of Information

On September 9th, 1739, a group of slaves near Charles Town, South Carolina, revolted against their masters. After killing over twenty whites and destroying several plantations, the slave rebels marched south, hoping to reach Florida and obtain their freedom. Historians have discussed the implications of this insurrection; they have argued about its meanings, and even debated about Stono’s connections to a broader Atlantic context. But inside all of their analyses lies an unexplored assumption about slave access and use of information. By simply taking for granted that slaves somehow knew about both Spanish presence and policies, historians have overlooked one of the most fascinating elements of the Stono Rebellion, a moment when the enslaved managed to overpower the enslaver not only in force, but also in information.

As the Stono rebels acquired, interpreted, and acted upon a Spanish edict promising freedom to any runaway slave who reached Florida, their South Carolinian masters remained ignorant of the mutinous scheme unraveling beneath their tightly-gripped whips. The Stono rebels even managed to surprise William Bull, the Governor of South Carolina. He was returning to Charles Town from a trip to Georgia when he encountered the large, organized group of armed slaves. He fled for his life, narrowly escaping death. Bull, the highest ranking British official in the colony, was supposed to be in charge of the province and informed of important developments. Instead, he was overwhelmed and outsmarted by the lowest members of the society he governed. The Stono rebels had employed news of Florida—knowledge that white South Carolinians had tried in vain to suppress—for their own advantage and to the detriment of their masters.

In the immediate aftermath of the Stono Rebellion, the colonists did not blame the insurrection on the information network they had developed and were dependent upon and, far less, did the English settlers find fault in their slaves, who had turned this knowledge exchange into a source of power. South Carolinians pointed their fingers at

1 Some scholars, like Peter Wood (Black Majority, Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion), stress the significance of this uprising; others, such as Robert Olwell, argue that the slave revolt “was not responsible for everything that came in its wake… Nor was Stono the only problem that South Carolina faced.” (25) Robert Olwell, Masters, Slaves, and Subjects, the Culture of Power in the South Carolina Low Country, 1740-1790 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 25; Wood, Black Majority, Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion.
5 While there were some indications of slave unrest in the months leading to Stono, these incidents are less reliable since they were remembered after the insurrection. Some examples can be found in “Journal of William Stephens” in The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia, vol. 4, Stephen’s Journal, 1737-1740, ed. Allen D. Candler (Atlanta: Franlin, 1906), 275, 283-84; Wood, Black Majority, Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion, 310.
6 Lt. Gov. Sir William Bull to the Board of Trade, Charleston, October 5, 1739 as cited in Smith, ed. Stono, Documenting and Interpreting a Southern Slave Revolt, 16-17.
the Spaniards. It was them, their Catholic neighbors, who had lured the slaves away from British control. Although the colonists had long complained about the destabilization caused by Spanish presence in Florida, in the days following Stono, South Carolinians did not cite seventy years of aggression between the two European powers as the cause for the slave revolt. Rather, the English colonists referenced a specific edict. They blamed a “Bando” issued by governor Montiano for encouraging slaves to abandon their masters, insurrect in revolt, and flee for Florida.

This Spanish edict was not a paranoid construction developed by South Carolinians after the revolt. In the months leading to the Stono Rebellion several mentions of this Spanish mandate appear in personal correspondence and in the minutes from the colonial government. Even though no copies of the Bando have been found, a discussion from the House of Commons detailed the impact of this proclamation.

That an Edict or Mandate by Order from his Catholic Majesty hath been published at the Castle and Town of St. Augustine… That the Great Industry and Art have been used by the Spanish Government to make the said known throughout the Province, in Consequence of which Encouragement several Negro Slaves…[who] have been there openly received, made free, and declared Subjects of the Crown of Spain.

The members of the House of Commons were terrified by the implications of an edict promising to treat runaways as “Subjects of the Crown of Spain,” which meant that these slaves would not only be “made free,” but would also be invited to join the military and bear arms against their former English masters. Furthermore, South Carolinians were particularly concerned about “the Great Industry and Art” used by the Spanish colonists to spread word of this edict. While this remark might have been made to emphasize the cunningness of Florida’s settlers, it also pointed at a true fact. It did take “Great Industry” to spread news, any news, throughout South Carolina. It especially took “Art” to use the same (and only) avenues of information which the British colonists traveled, evading capture and censor.

Knowledge of this edict was the ammunition that loaded the most powerful weapon owned by slaves: hatred of slavery. Governor Montiano noted that the fugitives who reached St. Augustine were “Well informed… of the Royal proclamation, [and had]
Slaves not only gathered this information, they had made it relevant— transforming a Bando into a battle cry. And while being informed of the Spanish policies neither caused the Stono Revolt nor led the uprising, it did empower and make more dangerous a group of people who were already threatening to the white minority. Spanish “Industry and Art” tied together with the hunger for freedom that starved South Carolina’s slaves proved to be a dangerous combination for the English setters.

Thus the Stono Rebellion underscores all the main concepts of this dissertation: the intricate and multilevel networks of communication that crisscrossed the Southeast, the struggles to control information, and the tangible power of this seemingly ephemeral commodity. First, this uprising hints at the complicated process through which information was gathered and transmitted. The edict employed by the slaves involved in the Stono uprising had been issued by a foreign government located almost 300 miles away and had passed through many hands (and ears) before reaching the rebels. Second, this revolt serves as a way to understand both the importance and difficulty of regulating the flow of information. Although Spanish and English officials had to rely on these mobile individuals to ensure the successful transmission and acquisition of intelligence, both colonial governments remained wary of placing information, one of their most vital necessities, in the hands of people they did not fully trust or control. Third and finally, this revolt underscores the importance and power of being informed. Knowledge was a valuable commodity, which granted great possibilities and advantages. After all, slaves had used news of a Spanish proclamation to rise-up against their masters and fight for their freedom.

After Stono, one of the first acts issued by the House of Commons was to silence any information about the revolt. By killing anyone who had participated or was assumed to be an accomplice, South Carolinians hoped to prevent questions, calm anxieties, and justify the actions of the white executioners, who had left no witnesses who could testify against them. Sentencing the rebels to death was only the first of a series of coercive measures adopted by South Carolina. In the aftermath of this insurrection, the House of Commons passed a stricter slave code and even established a limited quota on the importation of Africans, attempting to control a black population that had grown beyond the grasp of colonial authority. Yet all these measures proved to be temporary. By 1739, slavery — its wealth and dangers— had become an essential part of the low-country economy and life.

As South Carolinians evaluated their conditions and attempted to reassert control over the black majority, the British colonists continued not only to depend on black messengers, but also to consider them as reliable informants. James Oglethorpe, governor of Georgia, heard about the Stono Revolt from several parties; but the report he took down and held-up as true came from the lips of a slave. Oglethorpe was on a military expedition in western Georgia when he first received word that a slave insurrection had taken place near Charles Town. Some traders on board a “Boat going to Fort Augusta…

10 “Noticiosos… De esta Rª gracia, Solicitan por quantos medios les son imaginables ponerse en fuga.” Wright, "Dispatches of Spanish Official Bearing in the Free Negro Settlement of Gracia Real De Santa Teresa De Mose, Florida."
11 McCord, ed. The Statutes at Large of South Carolina, 416; Smith, ed. Stono, Documenting and Interpreting a Southern Slave Revolt. There is little documentary evidence of the uprising. See Ibid.
told [him] the Negroes in Carolina has raised up in Arms and killed about forty White People.” Shocked by this news, Oglethorpe decided to travel to Fort Prince George to verify the information. As soon as he arrived at the garrison, Oglethorpe found all the proof he needed: “thirty men [had] come from Purysburg t[o] Strengthen the Fort” and protect it from the slave insurgents who were still roaming the countryside. Although Oglethorpe interacted with these “Purysburg” men, he did not record their version of the Stono uprising.

The story of Stono Rebellion that the governor of Georgia chose to write in his journal and correspondence was related to him by an unnamed black man. This man told Oglethorpe that,

> what was said of the Negroes Rising in Carolina was True and that they had marched to Stono Bridge… Burning of House[s] and Committing other Outrages, and that One hundred Planters who had assembled themselves together pursued… [the] Villains [who had] attempted to go home but were taken by the Planters who Cutt off their heads and set them up at every Mile Post they came to.\(^{12}\)

If the rebels’ heads “at every Miles Post” were a sign of white power and authority, the fact that Oglethorpe had received this information from a slave showed that the interconnectedness, inclusiveness, and dependency created by a communications network was harder to sever-off.

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