Title
Policy Paper 44: Mapping the Hinterland: Land Rights, Timber, and Territorial Politics in Mozambique

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1gn0g8k4

Author
Hughes, David McDermott

Publication Date
1998-09-01
Mapping the Hinterland: Land Rights, Timber, and Territorial Politics in Mozambique

David McDermott Hughes

Policy Paper #44
September 1998

David McDermott Hughes is assistant professor of human ecology, Cook College, Rutgers University and was a 1998-99 IGCC MacArthur Scholar.

The author is grateful to the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, the John T. and Catherine C. MacArthur Foundation, and the Hewlett Foundation for their generous support of this publication. Author’s opinions are his own.

Copyright © 1999 by the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
CONTENTS

Preface
Mapping the Hinterland: Land Rights, Timber, and Territorial Politics in Mozambique...1
INTRODUCTION.................................................................1
A CHIEFTAINCY AT THE CROSSROADS..............................3
INVENTING A TIMBER CONCESSION..................................6
MAPPIERS IN A WORLD WITHOUT BORDERS.......................8
   Bannerman and Land-Use Planners...............................9
   Matose and Makuku.................................................10
   Mapping Gogo.......................................................12
TERRITORIALIZING GOGOI................................................14
CONCLUSION..................................................................18
References.....................................................................19
THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE ON GLOBAL CONFLICT AND
COOPERATION.................................................................23
ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING AT IGCC....................................24
CURRENT PUBLICATIONS..................................................25
PREFACE

Post-Cold War Africa faces many challenges as it moves out of the shadow of the superpowers. The artificial national boundaries created by European colonizers in the nineteenth century continue to shift and change, often accompanied by devastating ethnic violence, and always accompanied by displacement of people. As the flow of refugees continues across the borders, it has created problems for both those who stayed and those who return. And as borders shift and change, so do attitudes about land and what it means. Who holds the land? Who should hold the land?

This policy paper by David McDermott Hughes examines the shift in attributes of chiefly power in Mossurize, a district on the western border of Mozambique. In the course of mapping Chief Gogo’s land, Gogo’s people and Hughes wrestle with some larger questions: How are territory and power defined in Gogo’s land? How do they interact? What are the potential consequences of this rapid transformation to a territorial mentality? Hughes compares Mozambicans’ attitudes toward land allocation and returnees with that of their close neighbors across the border in the vicinity of Vhimba, Zimbabwe. Hughes’ findings and his use of geomatics have implications for appropriate partnership between states and non-governmental agencies beyond the borders of Africa.

Mapping the Hinterland: Land Rights, Timber, and Territorial Politics in Mozambique continues the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California’s publishing and research efforts in the area of ethnic and internal conflict, complementing the work of other IGCC researchers, including David A. Lake, Donald Rothchild, Ronnie Lipschutz, and Beverly Crawford. Readers may find of interest: African Conflict Management and the New World Order, by Edmond J. Keller (IGCC Policy Paper 13), Designing Transitions from Civil War by Barbara F. Walter (IGCC Policy Paper 31), which examines the 1992 Mozambique Peace Agreement in light of credible commitment theory, and Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security, ed. Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner, 1996).

IGCC is especially grateful to the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for funding the MacArthur Scholars in Regional Relations, and the Hewlett Foundation for generous support of research on the environment and security.
MAPPING THE HINTERLAND: LAND RIGHTS, TIMBER, AND TERRITORIAL POLITICS IN MOZAMBIQUE*

David McDermott Hughes

Introduction

How do people come to consider territory as an object of power and wealth? This process, aptly described by Peter Sahlin (1989:1–7) for Spain and France (cf. Vandergeest and Peluso 1995), contains two geographical paradigm shifts. First, zonal boundaries become more (but not entirely) linear. That is, people cease to think of spatial limits as hazy frontiers of settlement. Instead, they discover or invent demarcated lines to separate one polity from another. The second shift concerns the interior of those boundaries—the content of a polity. Leaders and followers who previously identified power as jurisdiction over subjects come to associate it with the administration of territory. In the Pyrenees, Spain and France became territorial in the course of two centuries of political development and national identity formation. This paper examines a rather more rapid transformation that began in the mid-1990s in south-central Mozambique. In Gogoi (Mossurize District, Manica Province—see Map 1), land-grabbing and efforts to arrest it have propelled the formation of a territorial mentality. In a lightening-fast ideological and material sea change, territorial claims, maps, and cadasters (property maps with registers of owners) are becoming the order of the day in Gogoi and other parts of Mozambique.

*For assistance in the field, I thank Roberto Agnoletto, Samuel Duhe, Melanie Hughes McDermott, Bernardo Melo Meque, Ana Paula Rei, Muino Amarchande Taquidi, and the Centro de Informação e Educação para o Desenvolvimento. This research was assisted by a grant from the Joint Committee on African Studies of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies, with funds provided by the Rockefeller Foundation. At the University of California, Berkeley, the Center for African Studies, the Portuguese Studies Program, and Department of Anthropology provided further support for research. Finally, in the writing phase, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation supported my work. For helpful comments, I am indebted to James Bannerman, Sharad Chari, Elizabeth Celso, Louise Formann, Christine Hasford, James McCarthy, Melanie Hughes McDermott, Donald Moore, Jennifer Pournelle, Janet Sturgeon, Ken Wilson, and an anonymous reader. This paper is a adaptation of Chapter 6 of my Ph.D. dissertation (1999): Frontier dynamics: struggles for land and clients on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, University of California, Berkeley.
Three distinct political and social movements in the aftermath of Mozambique's civil war\(^1\) (1979–1992) brought land to the forefront in Gogoi. First, refugees and displaced people returned to Gogoi or entered it for the first time. In a polity suddenly freed from the burden of wartime forced labor, these immigrations gave new prominence to the issue of land allocation. Second, subsequent to the signing of the 1992 peace accords and the 1994 elections, South African and Zimbabwe timber companies scouted Mssorize District and, in 1996, one laid claim to Gogoi itself. Finally, and largely in reaction to these logging operations, development professionals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) joined with the provincial government to map chiefdoms\(^2\) to protect lands from expropriation. In 1997, a team of fieldworkers (including the author) assisted Chief Gogoi to map his nyika—his country.

The cross-border movement of Zimbabwean expatriates to Gogoi and nearby chiefdoms was critical. The loggers and the field staff of the NGO projects were Zimbabwean or, at the very least, had lived and worked for some time in Zimbabwe. Why should these Zimbabweans and (what I shall call) quasi-Zimbabweans, rather than Mozambicans, have politicized territory? As demarcators of land, Mozambican organizations and individuals were handicapped in relation to their Zimbabwean counterparts in a number of ways. On the practical level, poor roads between Gogoi and the provincial capital Chimiso, a shortage of qualified provincial staff competent in the N'dau language\(^3\), and Gogoi's history as a rebel stronghold kept government personnel at arm's length.\(^4\) In addition—and more important for the purposes of this study—Mozambican civil servants had little experience in land alienation, rural boundary disputes, and squatting. Zimbabweans, who remembered the white alienation of the best of their land in 1890s, saw their own history replaying itself in the forests of Mozambique.

My discussion begins with the condition of Gogoi’s chiefdom at the end of the war, proceeds to the activities of the timber company in Gogoi, and then to three mapping projects in Mssorize and neighboring Susundenga district. This history demonstrates how the menace of enclosure and movement against it territorialized Gogoi’s polity.

---

1. Use the term “civil war” only as a shorthand. Throughout the war, the rebels received substantial assistance from Rhodesia, South Africa, Malawi, and Kenya.
2. To avoid unnecessary confusion, I use the British colonial term “chief” as shorthand for the multiplicity of N’dau and Portuguese terms extant in the area. Likewise, I designate as “headman,” the deputies of Chief Gogoi.
3. N’dau is a dialect of the Shona language group represented in east-central Mozambique and in the western and northern two-thirds of Zimbabwe.
4. The District Administrator described the northern part of his district as a “zone que tem problemas” or “prob-

---

A Chiefdom at the Crossroads

In the early 1990s, at the onset of peace, Gogoi’s chiefdom reached an unprecedented turning point. The demobilization of the rebel army (Resistência Nacional de Moçambique or Renamo) left Gogoi free of demands for forced labor. The pre-colonial Gaza-Nguni state and, from the 1890s onward, Portuguese colonials had employed chiefs to extract labor in various ways.\(^5\) Only the interlude of rule by the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) between

---

lem area” (Gogoi notes: 19). In mid-1995, a Renamo contingent supported by chiefs held nearby Dombe, preventing government officers from assuming their posts. By late 1995, bandits were operating in Dombe and in northern Mssorize. So serious was the threat (an attack actually having occurred in Vimbha in 1996), that the Mssorize District Administrator forbade me from carrying out any research in Chief Mafusi’s area. We compromised on Gogoi—since its location along the national highway improved security—with the condition that the DA was not liable for expenses of repatriating my corpse. (See “Dombe reclaimed,” Beira Corridor Group Bulletin (Harare), October 1995, 7; Victor Machiria, “Bando armado ataca e assalta Dombe,” Noticias, 2 November 1995, 1; “Situacao em Dombe volta a normalidade,” Noticias, 3 November 1995, 1, “Dombe revisited,” BCG Bulletin (Harare), December 1995, 6; and “Suspected Chimwenje gang shoots two dead,” Sunday Mail (Harare), 5 May 1996.)

---

5. For general descriptions of these periods, see Liesegang 1967; and Newitt 1981 and 1995.
independence in 1975 and the start of the war four years later broke that chain. Frelimo had, however, replaced forced labor with other compulsory programs aimed to settle people in villages. Then, in the 1980s, Frelimo instituted forced labor for military purposes. When Renamo conquered Gogoi in 1987, it similarly pressed men into service. Now, no one from outside was attempting to exercise control over the people of Gogoi. Chief Gogoi himself was, at last, uncumbered by external demands for field hands and labor quotas. Of course, his role in Portuguese colonialism and Renamo’s drafts had so conditioned this form of rule as to become inseparable from the concept of chieftaincy itself. Now, the sudden end of forced labor detached Gogoi and the meaning of his office from their moorings.

Additionally, Gogoi had left his area for a safer region during the waning years of the war. (Two of his three deputies, or headmen, had been absent as well.) After the peace accords, he returned from the Buzi River Valley to resume his duties as chief. What were those duties to be? The answer is still unclear. The three factors mentioned above—the return of displaced people, the entry of loggers, and the intervention of mappers—have each played a role in shaping chiefly power and power in general in Gogoi. All of these events were, to greater and lesser degrees, territorial. Each politicized land.

Of these factors, the return of refugees and displaced people was the least prominent. In the immediate post-war years, land allocation to returnees did not appear to create conflict in Gogoi. This finding is all the more surprising given that returnees and other migrating smallholders were stirring up a great deal of trouble in other parts of Mozambique. Alexander (1994:19ff) writes of tangled disputes in Sussundenga District. There, colonato settlements of immigrant Portuguese farmers from the 1960s and Frelimo’s ‘communal villages’ had concentrated people. In-migration here added a layer of counter-claims to land claims, on top of the claims of the original chiefs and subjects. During the war, the original occupants fled, but others took their place. In 1993 and the years following, farmers returned to find their fields occupied. Myers (1994:14ff) documents the same conflicts in the lower Limpopo Valley (Gaza Province), as do he, Eliseu, and Nhachungue (1993:100ff) along Manica’s Beira Corridor. In the densely populated, demographically turbulent corridor, chiefs and headmen exercised so little authority over land that urban “weekend farmers” cleared plots at will (Effler 1995:7). Even more shocking, displaced people in Mavita (northern Mosurize) cultivated in sacred groves. Thus, amid claims based on autochthony, colonial and post-colonial legal precedent, and simple occupation, nearly anyone could find a foothold—or reasonably demand one—on the land. Smallholders in these areas competed with each other for land, and they competed fiercely.

Conditions in Gogoi and most of northern Mosurize differed markedly. First, since the colonatos were intended for commercial agriculture, the Portuguese government had no reason to install them in this remote area. Second, Frelimo failed to install the communal villages: people refused to move, and Frelimo soon retreated as Renamo advanced. Third, there could be no weekend farmers because the rising waters of the Buzi River obstructed rainy-season commuters from Espungabera. Such urban-based entrepreneurs, moreover, were far more likely to live in distant Chimoio from whence agricultural ventures in Gogoi were an absurd proposition. Fourth and most important, the cycle of migration, combined with low population density in Gogoi, simply did not bring wartime residents and post-war migrants into conflict. People certainly fled, abandoning their fields during the war, but new residents did not take their places. As a Renamo area, Gogoi did not offer the security of a Frelimo stronghold, like Sussundenga center, the northern parts of Sussudenga, the Beira Corridor, and the Limpopo settlements.7 After

7Another element in the Corridor—not mentioned in the text because its existence was debatable—is the emigration of Zimbabwean smallholders to farming areas north of Matapiapia. (See “Rural folk scramble for land in Mozambique.” Horizon (Harare), November 1994, 8–9; Severino Sumbe. “Zimbabwano na están a usurpar terras em Mosâmbic,” Domingo (Maputo), 29 January 1995.)

8For obvious reasons, a disproportionate amount of the research on rural society concentrated on Frelimo-
the cease-fire, newcomers—mostly from dry Machaze District to the south—did mingle with returnees, but land was plentiful. Why would a migrating family want to live on a plot with possible claimants when plots with no such lieners were available? In the same vein, chiefs and headmen were not con-
strained to allocate “abandoned” land when undeniably vacant areas abounded. Whereas in the Limpopo valley and the Chimoio environs smallholders were in conflict, in Gogoi they readily accommodated one another.

Land allocation in Gogoi in the mid-1990s also differed markedly from that in Vhimbha, the Zimbabwean border area only 30 km distant. Vhimbha headmen, like their counterparts in Gogoi, allocated land in a way that maintained social harmony, but because of Vhimbha’s high population density, they achieved that result by different means. Headmen have settled some migrants—especially Mozambicans—inside Chimanimani National Park and the private Hayfield B estate. These allocations helped limit crowding within the communal land. Thus, in neither Vhimbha nor Gogoi did the claims of migrants overlap substantially with those of long-standing residents.

Land allocation in Vhimbha had a second purpose. Headmen intentionally revived and intensified a different kind of conflict, the turf battles between “squatters” and state and private title-holders of Ngorima’s “lost lands.” Moreover, they hoped to win their turf battles. As a result of these kinds of conflicts, Vhimbha residents associated immigration with categories of land—communal, national park, and private—and with their corresponding borders. Indeed, the meetings and speeches of Vhimbha leaders focused on land and completely ignored any issue of distinctions among the inhabitants (notwithstanding the practical significance of the nationality of the migrants for choice in land allocation). The Zimbabwean “land complex” had twisted migration into a territorial issue.\(^8\)

Gogoi residents, in contrast, associated migration with categories of people. Most obviously, people in Gogoi use a special term for newly arrived migrants: \textit{muhlafa}. This word is not known in Vhimbha, nor do people in Vhimbha use any synonym for it. A \textit{muhlafa} is a new resident (not a returnee), and the term implies a probationary status. After some time—variously cited as a month, a year, or one harvest—the \textit{muhlafa} ceases to be denoted as such. He or she then enters the residual category of commoner resident in Gogoi. Both office-holders and commoners talked excitedly about the arrival of numerous \textit{muhlafa} from points north and south of Gogoi. Indeed, Headman Bundua regretted very much that his colonial-era salary had been abolished; for it would have increased as the number of his subjects increased. For Bundua, \textit{muhlafa} augmented wealth in people. Post-war immigration thus did not substantially stimulate territorial politics in Gogoi.

Nonetheless, demographic turmoil could not fail to raise challenging questions. Such a mass exodus followed by mass return had not occurred in Mossurize since Ngunyane, the last Gaza Nguni king, evacuated in 1888. The return of refugees and displaced people forced Gogoi’s headmen to consider the status of abandoned fields. Headman Hlengana found a rule of thumb: after four or five years, the original occupant forfeited the land, although, upon return, that family was entitled to an equivalent parcel. As explained above, headmen could and did avoid repossessing fields. Yet, the apparent possibility of reallocating fields shifted attention to headmen’s powers over land. What was previously implicit became more explicit. Immigration also raised the specter of conflicts over land that were scarcely known before. Unexpectedly, then, the \textit{muhlafa} prepared headmen and their subjects for forms of rule and contestation based on the control of land. Their faint imaginings were to become vivid as the timber industry moved into Gogoi.

---


I am using the singular noun in place of the plural. Although entirely ungrammatical, this form is simpler to the non-reader of Shona.
Inventing a Timber Concession

Continental Timbers, Limited, was not new to Gogoi. In 1946, this South African firm had established two subsidiaries—Companhia de Madeiras de Moçambique (CMM) and Serração Portuguesa de Revue—with head offices in Mozambique’s second city, Beira. These companies held concessions in Sofala and Manica Provinces, including one in Chief Gogoi’s area. They cut the hardwoods; independently contracted sawmills in the concession areas milled the logs for Continental’s subsidiaries. In this way, and by handling the exports of other outfits, these companies became by 1975 one of the largest exporters of timber from Mozambique (Pinto 1961:29). Although Frelimo nationalized both CMM and the Serração Portuguesa de Revue, market reforms have given the former new life. In 1995, Continental teamed up again with a newly privatized CMM. In the years since, CMM is again cutting hardwoods in Manica and Sofala Provinces. In Gogoi, CMM now operates its own mobile sawmill. Although equipment and transport problems had prevented the company from breaking even as of 1997, it was also assembling a heavy, fixed, high-capacity mill.

This kind of “colonization” invites comparison with earlier drives to the north. Current references to the “second Great Trek” recall the first Afrikaner migration from the Cape Colony to the interior—accompanied by much bloodshed—in the 1830s. In the 1890s, another generation of voortrekkers came to what is now the vicinity of Vhimba with an oral tradition of “war and land” (Palmer 1971). Now, a hundred years later, South Africans are obtaining land on a massive scale in Mozambique.10

10 For example, “Afrikaners on a second Great Trek,” The Economist, 30 August 1997, 30.

11 It is impossible to estimate the extent of South African land-holding. Many data are not centralized, and South African-owned firms often register themselves as Mozambican businesses. The most noted areas are Niassa Province, where the governments of Mozambique and South Africa negotiated for an explicitly Afrikaner settlement, and the scenic coast of southern Maputo Province (on the latter, see Brouwer 1998; Massinga 1996; and McGregor 1997).

For the most part, their acquisitions are peaceful. Rather than forceful land grabbing and evictions, what ties CMM to the trekkers is a more elementary concept and intention—to demarcate and own the land. John, the manager of the Gogoi mill—a non-Afrikaner white who grew up on an estate in eastern Zimbabwe—expressed the strongest interest in owning land. A family friend of the owner of Continental Timbers, he remembered the 99-year lease granted under the Portuguese government. So did Piet, the owner’s son, then based in the CMM’s Beira office. In 1997, both Piet and John thought that the National Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife had re-activated that lease. John, therefore, believed himself to be managing a sizeable and nearly permanent forestry concession.14

This interpretation led to a massive misunderstanding between CMM and provincial forestry and wildlife officials. Ana Paula Reis, head of the Provincial Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife, had granted CMM a one-year cutting license for certain volumes of six species of timber. This license would expire on 31 December 1997 and, Reis affirmed, its renewal would depend upon CMM’s adherence to the forestry regulations. Of course, CMM could have acquired a multi-year concession by going over Reis’s head directly to high-level forestry and wildlife officials in Maputo. This kind of irregularity was not unprecedented. Yet CMM does not appear to have made deals in Maputo. Its executive director, a Mozambican, confirmed that CMM had obtained only a license. The company was, he said, in the process of gaining a concession with the understanding of a “preference” from the Manica provincial governor. At the sawmill itself, the Mozambican bookkeeper likewise knew of no concession or lease. Thus, Mozambicans in CMM as well as in the government held to one account. John and Piet, 13 John and Piet (below) are pseudonyms.

14 I use pseudonyms for both of these individuals.
Zimbabwean and South African, believed with equal conviction that CMM held the land.

In practice, this disagreement centered on definitions. Simply stated, Piet and Ana Paula were using different units of measure. When Piet discovered that the mapping project would protect sacred forests from logging, he was incensed. Had CMM not paid for each and every hectare of its “concession,” he shouted at me as we crossed paths at the border post. He was ready to ask for a pro-rated refund of forest charges based on the land he was losing. Yet, he was wrong: Reis had charged him by the cubic meter of raw logs.15 He would be entitled to nothing for lost territory. In any event, I calmed him by assuring him that the forests were “small”—in hectares, that is, but certainly not in cubic meters!

Reis could not have charged Piet by the hectare even if she had wanted to. Her office had no figures on the area of CMM’s operations in Gogo. Neither that office nor the Provincial Services of Geography and Cadaster could lay its hands on a technical description, listing coordinates or natural boundaries of the logging zone. Hence, Forestry and Wildlife’s only map of forestry areas—showing that CMM, Carlos Venichand (another South African firm), and Madeira Alicantara de Messica had neatly partitioned northern Mossurize—was largely symbolic. The only copy of the map, at a useless scale of 1:250,000, resided at Chimio headquarters, more than 200 km (over dirt roads) from any officer who might have detected logging outside the appropriate zone. Hunting licenses were even less geographical. Denominated in species counts, they followed district lines or had no boundaries at all, and they could easily overlap with timber licenses. Obviously, this superimposition of resource rights rules out any possibility for land ownership in an exclusive sense.

How, then, could John be so misguided? Clearly, his cadastral mindset did not prepare

---

15The Manual de Legislação Florestal (DNFB 1987:16) distinguishes clearly between licaesias simples for which only taxa des corte (cutting charges) apply and concessões for which rendas de terreno (rent for terrain) also applies.

him for Mozambique. That territorial sensibility instructed him to buy land—a certain number of hectares within known and demarcated borders—from Ana Paula Reis. Sometime after that exchange, he or a CMM co-worker drew the boundaries on a 1:50,000-scale map and tacked it to the wall of John’s sawmill office. Yet Reis had sold him no land. The two parties to this transaction simply understood it differently. In this way, John and Reis replayed the encounter of Zimbabwean headmen and Mozambican refugees. Those refugees came to Vihimbo to seek the rights of a client; the headmen used their submission to grab land. In Gogo, the disjunction is equally sharp but reversed. The newcomers to Gogo—Zimbabwean and South African expatriates—came to grab land while the government authorities intended to sell them other rights. Like the New England Indians Cronon (1983:70) describes, Mozambicans sought to share with outsiders overlapping rights to plants and animals. Cadastrally-minded colonists thought the Indians were selling (very cheaply) the land itself. In the same vein, John and Piet ascribed to themselves the position of land-owners, ignoring the Mozambican stuff above and below them who knew better. Their inability to speak or read Portuguese and their disdain for all Mozambicans—and particularly those in government—helped maintain their ignorance.16

16Their belief appears more reasonable if one takes into account three factors. First, the Governor might have given some kind of verbal encouragement that a concession would be forthcoming. He did, after all, attend the opening ceremony of the mill. Non-speakers of Portuguese might easily interpret the “ preference” (mentioned above) as consent. Second, it is difficult to underestimate John and Piet’s disregard for legal institutions and contracts in Mozambique. They avoided the district government in Espungabera. For that reason, and because they often allowed their visas to lapse, they regularly crossed the border at the police check-point at Mpengo rather than the immigration border post at Espungabera. As regards the concession, the moral right of CMM to its colonial concession and the fact of CMM’s presence on the land certainly outweighed legal formalities for these “men of action.” Finally, the legal system of concessions is murky in Mozambique, even to those who try to understand it. The District Administrator in Espungabera firmly believed that CMM did obtain a concession. Central government will or may already be involved since it must approve the more expansive concessions. Debates in Maputo can confuse the issue.
This misunderstanding had serious political consequences for the residents of Gogoi. In ways more decisive than posting his “concession” map, John acted as if Gogoi’s chieftdom was his. When his dog ran away, he confiscated smallholders’ snares that would injure it. To the hunters’ protests, he announced that he had bought the land, the animals, everything. Snares, in other words, were his business: they affected the king’s game on the king’s estate. Even more threateningly, John planned to develop his land. He and Piet spoke of eucalyptus plantations to the southwest and a game preserve to the northeast. They assured me these areas were only secondary forests for which the farmers had no use. Smallholders, in fact, collected edible plants, building materials, and the like from precisely this kind of forest; so CMM’s plantings would have amounted to an enclosure of the commons.

John recognized this possibility, but felt he had the right to plant where he wanted to and evict people if necessary. To Gogoi residents, these schemes of timber plantations were a nightmare come true. They associated eucalyptus, wattle, and pine with the Border Timbers estates in Chimanimani and Chipinge Districts in Zimbabwe. In their view Mozambique was mercifully free of (white-owned) estates and the expulsions they caused. As more than one farmer opined “we farm where we want to,” and, for this reason, Mozambique was deemed superior to Zimbabwe. Now, the most ruinous aspects of Zimbabwe were creeping east of the border.

Mappers in a World Without Borders

At the same time, however, other Zimbabweans and Zimbabwean-influenced people were entering Manica Province with the stated or implicit intention of thwarting the threatened enclosures. Between 1994 and 1997, three distinct development projects—with German, Swiss and Italian support—undertook this work in Mossurize and southern Sussundenga Districts.

Although they were influenced from abroad, these projects were not transnational institutions or participants in a generalized global discourse of development (Escobar 1995). Ferguson (1992:17–21), for example, writes of an impersonal, “unauthored . . . constellation” (Ibid, 21) of agencies that systematically expands state power while deadening political contestation. Of course, an international trend in development policy toward community-based management of natural resources did inform planning in Manica. Elsewhere this trend has bolstered government control (Ribot 1996). Yet, on the ground and in personal, idiosyncratic ways, a cadre of Zimbabweans and what I will call “quasi-Zimbabweans” implemented the mapping projects. Past experiences in Zimbabwe’s communal lands had taught these people to think territorially, even cadastrally. In a distant sense, they were orphans of the Rhodesian enclosures. They opposed the enclosures across the border and did so in a highly political and sometimes conflictual fashion. In so doing, these individuals exploited two advantages unavailable to CMM: first, the ability to make maps and, second, an alliance with the Mozambican state agriculture, forestry and wildlife offices.

To establish claims, land-grabbers and counter-grabbers must map. The Rhodesian trekkers, for instance, got their plots by taking them forcefully from Africans, but the land stayed out of African hands, even as the Afrikaners went bankrupt, because of the property survey. John and Piet seemed not to understand the long-term importance of such a cadastral move. The map at the mill office notwithstanding, CMM had never documented its forests, its ownership of land, or its boundaries in Gogoi. CMM might have done so by making a forest inventory and timber harvest plan, requirements for the concession they thought they already had. CMM, then, left the field open to other Zimbabweans who would fill the cadaster with smallholders’ claims. “Maps,” as Turnbull (1989:54) writes, “have power in virtue of
introducing modes of manipulation and control that are not possible without them.” In Gogoi, the property map could prove mightier than the sawmill.

Maps could also be powerful and legitimate because the Mozambican state supports them. The map-makers coordinated their efforts and often worked in the field with staff of the Manica’s Provincial Directorate of Agriculture and Livestock (DPAP). In 1994, a loose collaborative group—including the DPAP and many Zimbabweans and quasi-Zimbabweans—formed in Manica and devoted itself to trying to enlarge the role of smallholders in the management of forests and in the enjoyment of their benefits. This alliance is new and quite unusual. Elsewhere, in Thailand and Indonesia, for example, the state forestry office has overridden local claims to land and trees, selling huge forests to timber multinationals. In such countries, advocates for local rights engage in “counter-mapping” against state policies (Peluso 1995). Mozambique, however, is a more complex and contradictory place. The very same office that gave CMM its timber license joined with a foreign-funded project to undermine the expansion of that license into a concession. Additionally, the National Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife in Maputo took an active part in debate on the draft land law. Adopted during this project, the law recognized smallholders’ rights to land. CMM, therefore, may have had its secret allies in Chimoio or Maputo, but those alliances were strictly informal. They could not and have not generated official documents or lasting property maps. The maps generated by these projects—essentially a rudimentary cadaster—required the overt, explicit recognition and cooperation of relevant civil servants.

They also required the cooperation of chiefs, headmen, and other smallholders. As explained above, these figures were not nearly as accustomed as were Zimbabweans—say, Vhima headmen—to thinking in territorial terms. At least until the end of the war, power in these polities depended upon control of people and labor much more than it did upon control of contested hectares. These Zimbabwe-inspired mapping projects, then, created misunderstandings and baffle-

ment among precisely the people they intended to benefit.

Some tackled the paradigm difference more directly than others. Bannerman’s single-handed mapping of chieftaincies throughout Manica Province avoided the worst of the issue by not demarcating the boundaries between chieftaincies. Matose and Makuku’s rural appraisal in Sussundenga District probably encountered the problem but, it appears, evaded it by reinterpreting locally drawn sketches. My own project, finally, nearly ran aground on these shoals: Gogoi’s leaders delimited their land with only the most vague frontiers of settlement. As is explained in a later section, the project and the impending alienation of their land by CMM eventually convinced them to discover or invent borders—this is, to territorialize their polity.

**Bannerman and Land-Use Planners**

James Bannerman—to start with the least explicitly territorial project—was and is an expert on and aficionado of chieftaincies. Having emigrated from Britain to Rhodesia, he developed this interest as an agricultural officer in Victoria Province (now Masvingo) in the 1970s. On field visits, Bannerman collected oral history and interviewed chiefs and elders of Hlengweni. Bannerman documented the genealogy, migration, Confederation, and conquest of the major dynasties. He also placed every chief on eighteenth-century, nineteenth-century, and current maps. After independence, he served the government of Zimbabwe as provincial resettlement officer for Manicaland. In this capacity, he was tasked with unraveling the Jamesonian legacy: that is, with resettling communal land farmers to white estates whose owners fled or were killed during the war. Squatters complicated his job immensely. Before he and his staff could select and physically install farmers who qualified according to official criteria, smallholder families simply moved onto the estates. Bannerman was, then, obliged to take part in the kind of kilometer-by-kilometer turf battles characteristic of Vhima. Disillusioned with the resettlement process, Bannerman left government service in 1987.
Nearby Mozambique soon drew Bannerman back into historical research and planning. In 1992, the Mozambique Agricultural and Rural Reconstruction Programme (MAARP) recruited him for ecological and social studies. Funded by the German agency GTZ (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit), this program assisted various departments of provincial government in planning nearly every aspect of rural development. Again, Bannerman concentrated on chieftaincies. His maps include every colonially recognized chief and many headmen in the Mossurize, Sussundenga, and Barue districts. Additional maps show rainfall, soil types, roads, farming systems, ecological zones, and official land-use categories. This comprehensiveness is all the more surprising given that Bannerman did not have access to the aerial photographs used by some government departments in Maputo. Driving the length and breadth of the province, Bannerman assembled site specific geographical knowledge equal to nearly a century of Portuguese and post-colonial efforts (see, for example, Bannerman 1993 and 1996). Ultimately and especially with regard to chiefs, Bannerman’s most lasting contribution was to provide basic territorial knowledge for an eventual cadaster.

MAARP itself was as territorial and roughly as Zimbabwean as Bannerman himself. The deputy director (below a German) was Zimbabwean. He and other senior staff split their time between headquarters in Chimoio and a second office in Mutare, the Zimbabwean border town where their families lived. Before the hiring of more Mozambicans, Bannerman himself described MAARP’s staff as “probably a little too much Zimbabwean orientated” (pers. com. 1997). In addition to its personnel, some of MAARP’s plans implicated Zimbabwe. In the border area west of Gogoí, a long-delayed scheme proposed one-hectare family tea plots. The Zimbabwean Tanganda Tea Company would purchase the farmers’ inputs and then, under an exclusive contract, buy their crops. This program sounded suspiciously like Portuguese forced cotton cultivation, but more closely resembled Rhodesian and Zimbabwean land-use planning. While Portuguese agriculturalists had not cared where smallholders planted cotton, their anglophone counterparts tried periodically to reorganize production into arable and grazing blocks. Hence, the zoning of tea, combined with its Zimbabwean connection, led farmers in Mossurize to fear that their land would be taken. In the worst case, then, MAARP’s planning reminded Mozambicans of the Zimbabwean enclosures. In the best case, even Bannerman’s work on the geography of chiefship—which he distinguished quite clearly from the tea proposal—had something in common with it. Under MAARP’s Zimbabwean umbrella, both projects were vaguely cadastral: in one case for chiefs and in the other for crops, they implied the demarcation of land.

Matose and Makuku
Bannerman’s work fell short of land demarcation because he did not map the boundaries of chieftaincies. A second Zimbabwean-influenced project inaugurated this much more difficult form of geographical research in Sussundenga in 1994. Saiiti Makuku and Frank Matose, both of the Zimbabwean Forestry Commission’s Forest Research Centre, played a leading role in this study. At the plantation-oriented Forestry Commission, they had already opened a Pandora’s box of controversy on indigenous methods of forest management. Matose and Makuku were equally sensitive to property and territorial issues. Matose (1990:177) had decried smallholders’ “annexation” of shared those closest the border—of Espungabera, Chiurumui, Dacata administrative areas. Each family would use five hectares divided as follows: one for tea or coffee, one for other crops, and three for grazing. As of late 1996, the legal rights of families to their five-hectare blocks were unclear, as was the form of tenure of the investment (i.e. as a concession or otherwise). (See “Projecto de chá e café ocupará um terço de Mossurize,” Diário de Moçambique (Beira), 12 September 1996, 1). What was clear was that smallholders would be compelled to participate. Given their apparent assent at meetings organized for that purpose, the District Agricultural Officer determined that, “São poucos as possibilidades de negar”—“There are few possibilities for them to refuse” (Interview with Benjamin Ngwenya, Espungabera, 13 March 1997).
woodland in Shurugwi District (cf Matose 1994). In order to prevent this kind of privatization, he (1990:178) wrote, “there is need for greater involvement by traditional leaders like chiefs and kraal-heads [headmen].” Likewise, Makuku’s short article on Bikita, Zimbabwe, commenced with the declaration: “For many generations past, traditional leadership systems have been the nucleus for preservation and sustained management of resources which occurred within territorial boundaries under chieftain rule” (Makuku 1993:18). This manifesto contained two ideas new to Mozambique: 1) that chiefs and headmen could and should manage forests; and 2) that chiefly authority existed within discrete spatial limits. For places less thoroughly investigated than Shurugwi and Bikita, the research agenda was clear.

Matose and Makaku came to Sussundenga District, Mozambique, in late 1994 as members of a joint Zimbabwean-Mozambican team. They and other Zimbabweans, in fact, led the team. Earlier that year, the World Bank had selected the Chimanimani uplands in Sussundenga as one of three “transfrontier conservation areas” to be established in Mozambique under the auspices of the National Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife. (Environment and Development Group 1994) From Zimbabwe, the bank and the directorate sought rural researchers to work with communities and to train Mozambicans to do the same. Because the World Bank could not readily fund such preparatory activities, the Harare office of the Swiss-based World Conservation Union (IUCN) sent ten professionals to Sussundenga. Zimbabweans, who comprised six of the ten, predominated numerically as well as linguistically. Whereas all but one Zimbabwean spoke Shona fluently, none of the Mozambicans could function in the language. Nor did the Mozambicans possess substantial experience in rural social research. Led, therefore, by Zimbabwean expatriates, the project encapsulated a teacher-student relationship of which the Mozambicans soon tired.

19In particular, they tired of the virtually obligatory use of English as the language of instruction.

Specifically, Matose and Makuku taught the techniques of rural appraisal they had used in Zimbabwe. Beyond those methods, it seemed as if they imported their conclusions from Zimbabwe as well. The group investigated natural resources, resource use, settlement patterns, decision-making structures, and population movements in two areas of the Sussundenga District, Mavita at its northern end and Dombe to the south. Their report, Makuku, Matose, and Mushove (1994), finds that “traditional leaders” allocate land to migrants, restrict the harvesting of forest products in various ways, and conduct ceremonies in sacred forests. Thus, “[t]here is no doubt that traditional institutions have a strong role to play” in the conservation of natural resources.” Further, “The state institutions will need to... work together with the local [traditional] institutions in a collaborative role as equal partners” (Ibid, 6). Matose and Makuku, then, contributed to a nascent debate on local governance in post-war Mozambique. To old-style socialists—who had attacked the chiefs as obscurantists—their rehabilitation was revolutionary.

In fact, the maps are as revolutionary—and more so, from the perspective of property—than the report’s text. The maps create, perhaps fabricate, territorial entities. Makuku, Matose, and their colleagues asked informants to draw their natural resources and the “areas of jurisdiction of the different local leaders” (Ibid, 6). Maps included in the report demonstrate varying degrees of cadastral knowledge and betray varying degrees of authorial intervention. When asked to draw jurisdictions, men in Dombe indicated chiefs with triangles and settlement with dots clustered around the triangles (Map 2). Do the resulting splotches represent jurisdictions? They do only in the sense of power over people (or power over dots). Since the map shows no boundaries between the chiefs, it seems clear that the artists of Dombe did not associate their polities with territory. Another jurisdictional map from Ndongwe, however, is unambiguously and suspiciously cadastral. The map divides Chief Ndongwe’s area (just north of Dombe) into seven long-lots abutting the Mussapa River (Map 3). Dotted lines separate the domains which each bear the name of a headman (sabuku). Did the team
members who went to Ndongwe “tidy up” a map that originally looked as territorially vague as the Dombe representation? Given the bird’s-eye view in the map, its northward orientation, and the correct relative positions of roads, rivers, and towns (all of which are absent on the Dombe map), the researchers probably did reinterpret the local drawing for a property-minded readership. If they did so, Makuku and Matose committed the same error as did John and CMM: they assumed bounded, non-overlapping spaces. They simply misread Mozambican political geography through a lens of past enclosures elsewhere. If, on the other hand, the report’s map is true to the original, then Ndongwe men were starting to consider territory in a political light. Next time, their dotted lines might be solid.

Mapping Gogoi
The third and final mapping initiative—my own work in Gogoi—grew indirectly from Matose and Makuku’s visit to Sussundenga. In addition to methods of rural appraisal, the Transfrontier Conservation Project imported expertise in community-based resource management from Zimbabwe. Officials imagined that the celebrated CAMPFIRE Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) program could guide the work in Chimanimani. In mid-1994, the World Conservation Union organized a workshop in Manica for this purpose. It invited Marshall Murphree and Calvin Nhira of the Centre for Applied Social Sciences of the University of the Zimbabwe, the agency most involved in evaluating community-based resource management in Zimbabwe. Marshall Murphree, in turn, invited me. As a result of that workshop, the Transfrontier Project asked me to carry out a “socio-economic assessment” on both sides of the Rusitu River. Smallholders on the

---

20 The Centre was a member of the CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) Collaborative Group. The idea of the workshop originated with Joseph Matowanyika, a Zimbabwean employee who had recently finished a geography dissertation (1991) on territorial cults and indigenous methods of resource management in Nyanga District, Zimbabwe.

21 This segment of the valley actually lay just outside the transfrontier conservation area. However, given the tourist potential of the Zimbabwean botanical reserves, the World Bank officer in Maputo thought such a study worthwhile.
Zimbabwean bank, in Vhinda, taught me the importance of land alienation and territorial politics. My writings from that initial fieldwork (Hughes 1995a:30–31 and 1996:39) advocate the return of alienated land to Vhinda residents. Applying this logic to Mozambique, my next report to the World Bank (1995b:10) recommended the guarantee of smallholders’ land rights as a pre-condition to any other activities in the Transfrontier Project. In 1996, I proposed a mapping project in Gogoi to do just that, and the Harare office of an Italian NGO funded it.22

The project also attracted the attention of the Mozambican government because it represented a trial implementation of those clauses of the draft land law that recognized communities’ rights to land. Hence, the Chimoio office of Forestry and Wildlife contributed a fieldworker to the team,23 and, office, Roberto Agnoletto, an Italian and former member of a forestry cooperative, had started CIES’s activities in Mozambique.

22The organization was CIES (Centre for Information and Education for Development). It had started activities in Southern Africa with a small project in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe’s second city. The head of the Harare

23The Ford Foundation funded the costs of that fieldworker as a grant to the Provincial Services of Forestry and Wildlife. Again, a quasi-Zimbabwean was involved. Although born in Malawi and educated in Britain, Ken Wilson had conducted Ph.D. research in Zimbabwe on smallholders’ farming systems and use of wild plants and animals (Wilson 1990). He worked
as soon as the 1996–1997 rains ended, he and an Italian-sponsored fieldworker accompanied me to Gogoi. From its inception, our project fought enclosure. The Italian NGO and I chose to work in Gogoi, in part, because it was the only area of the district actively logged. CMM was cutting timber there, and we knew that it sought to expand its operations. Under the new land law, Gogoi residents could protect themselves from expropriation by documenting their residence on the land and their opposition to timber plantations and other disruptive activities. Our project, therefore, intended to generate maps that the government of Mozambique would recognize. Residents of Gogoi would draw their land on the ground or on paper, and, using a geographic positioning system, we would compile a 1:50,000-scale map compatible with the standard topographical sheets. Our final team member, Melanie Hughes McDermott, had employed such technology—sometimes called “geomatics”—in a similar project which obtained land and resource rights for indigenous people in the Philippines. She trained the team in geomatics and oversaw its initial cartographic efforts. Finally, we expected representatives from Gogoi to deliver copies of their hand-drawn maps, the geomatic maps, and other materials to the provincial heads of Forestry and Wildlife and of Geography and Cadaster. This complex project confused the team at times and often bewildered Chief Gogoi and subjects completely. Nonetheless, in the end it accomplished what it set out to do. In the process, the project territorialized Chief Gogoi’s polity.

---

Territorializing Gogoi

Chief Gogoi, his headmen, and others involved in the project came, in fits and starts, to understand the value of turf and means by which to hold onto it. This transformation took place on two levels. First, Gogoi and some of his people acted: they grasped the idea of enclosures, they took part in the effort to map against them, and, for now, they registered their claim in the cadaster. Second, the maps acted. “All maps,” Harley (1989:11) writes, “state an argument about the world and they are propositional in nature.” The maps that Gogoi’s leaders drew—and the team elaborated—stated and created the smallholders’ claim to land. Like a signpost or a fence, they established property for all to see—including the surprised and pleased people of Gogoi (cf. Rose 1994). Gogoi’s people were surprised because their politics had not previously focused on territory. Like the probably tidied-up map of Makuku and Matose, this project’s intervention virtually manufactured territoriality where it had been only latent before. At the beginning, however, Gogoi residents misidentified the project’s main issue in ways characteristic of their non-territorial politics: first, as labor, second as trees and third as sacred forests.

The project first and unavoidably addressed the need for local staff. To Gogoi residents, then, we fell into the well-known category of labor recruiters. Upon arrival in Gogoi, we had informed the chief that we would hire a guide, a cook, and a guard and asked for his recommendations. He chose a son as our guide, and that son together with our team found a cook and guard, confirming our selection with Chief Gogoi himself. Without intending to, we recapitulated the hiring practice of Renamo and of the Portuguese administration: in a certain, formal sense, we recruited our labor through the chief. Coincidentally, CMM had also followed this established custom. In their case, the chief had called a meeting to announce that CMM was offering employment—news disseminated more bluntly as, “The sawmill wants people.” Of course, neither our

---

26 “Serasawe inoda vandu.”

---

for Ford as program officer in Harare and, when that office moved, in Johannesburg.

21 The Carlos Venichand firm did not realize its cutting rights in Mafussi and Mpengo because the terrain made the extraction of logs from forested areas impossible. Madeira Africana de Messica held rights in Mmissuruze and Sussundenga districts but was felling only in the latter.

22 Geomatics are now widespread in land rights projects in Southeast Asia and Latin America (see, for example, Cultural Survival Quarterly 1995).
project nor the sawmill was demanding forced labor. This distinction regarding the nature of the labor seemed less important than the form of its procurement. We had won local approval by doing what only Frelimo, among labor-seekers, had refused to do. We had acknowledged the chief’s power over people.

The project, nonetheless, moved rapidly to issues besides labor. Again, however, the project and Gogoi’s people rode on different tracks. The opening meeting, held at Chief Gogoi’s compound, turned the attention of the roughly 150 lookers-on to natural resources and their ownership. Ana Paula Reis, the provincial head of forestry and wildlife, declared, “We [the government] are not the owners of the land. You who live here are.”27 Unfortunately, the remainder of her speech and the public reaction to it focused on trees. Interrupting Reis, one man asked for clarification: does this talk of community-managed forests mean that he may demand payment for the cutting of trees in the vicinity of his fields and homestead? The audience grew excited at the prospect of charging CMM by the log. Reis and the other government and NGO officials intended that people should benefit from sustainable commercial use of the forest, but they expected that people would do so as a community rather than individually. Responding the question of tree sales, Benjamin Gemo, provincial head of Geography and Cadaster, admonished, “The tree belongs to the community. It does not belong to João [the equivalent of Joe Blow or Joe Bloggs].”28 People did not or did not want to understand.

In part, they missed Gemo’s point because his notion of “community” was foreign to them. Gemo, whose position made him the most sensitive to territory in the provincial government, was referring to a community of place. He assumed that proximity and residence within “topographical limits” gave Gogoi people a common identity and interest. Logically, that interest should include geographical issues and the management of the community’s common landscape. Gogoi residents differed with Gemo’s notion of community in two senses. First, their community was the polity of Chief Gogoi’s subjects. In other words, they did not identify, first and foremost, with a community of place. They were members of the collectivity circumscribed by leaders’ jurisdiction over people. Given this kind of community, Gogoi residents—differing with Gemo in the second sense—did not associate the resources and activities in and around one’s field with Chief Gogoi. Trees and their products were not normally the chief’s business; so what could cutting them have to do with the “community” led by him?

The project answered that question by concentrating on religious matters rather than on the economics of natural resources. Before the first public meeting, the chief had expressed fears that CMM would cut in sacred forests.29 As he and his headmen explained, the loggers of the 1960s and early 1970s had done that and, consequently, caused many forests to cease to be sacred. Chiefs and headmen—the organizers or performers of kupira (propitiating ceremonies)—resented this disenchanted profoundly. Their involvement made sacred forests an issue of the Gogoi polity or, as Gemo had gropingly insisted, a “community” concern. Our team, therefore, introduced the project as a means for change such that, “...the company [CMM] will be required to obey your wishes. It will not be permitted to cut in sacred forests or to cut sacred trees or trees that you use...”30 People appreciated this objective immediately. In meetings at chief Gogoi’s homestead and at those of his three headmen, men discussed these forests volubly. Ignoring our additional interest in areas used for fuel wood, hunting, and so on, Gogoi’s people sketched maps on the ground, in the dirt, or

---

27 “Os donos da terra não somos nós. São vocês que vivem aqui.”
29 These forests cause fear. People associate them not so much with who lives there (although some are inhabited by spirits of the pre-colonial era) but rather by what strange, seemingly supernatural phenomena occur there, such as constant rain, strange noises, strange winds, and so on.
30 “... company yacho ichanfana kuteera zvido zvenyu. Hatschavumiri kutema makwasha akakosha kana mimbutsu yakakosha kana mimbutsu inoshandiswa nemi.”
on loose pieces of paper that showed almost nothing but sacred zones.

Although a step in the right direction, these maps of sacred forests were not fully territorial. I had expected that sacred forests would be zones of a number of hectares’ size within clear boundaries. Nyakwawa, the forest I knew from Vhinde, had been expansive. Although sometimes in a flexible fashion, Vhinde people had demarcated this and other forests using the Rusitu and Haroni Rivers and smaller streams. To my surprise, only one of 12 sacred forests in Gogoi corresponded to this model. That forest, Mabombe contains 250 hectares of woodland lying between the Nzuwe stream, a dry stream, and the Sitatonga ridge. Two of the remaining smaller forests cover at least one hectare. More typically, nine of the “forests” are not forests at all. They are stands of trees or even one tree, often next to streams or pools. Five *mupanga-panga* (*Milletia stuhlmannii*) trees, for example, sprouted from the grave of Mangwenje, so the hallowed ground bears his name. Finally, single *muvava* (*Khaya nyasica*) trees constitute the two smallest sites, considered sacred simply because ceremonies are performed there. The team collected a set of coordinates for each of these nine sites and added them as dots to our “cadstral” version of the locally drawn sketch maps. Thus, halfway through the project, we had produced an official representation of Gogoi’s “territory” that showed three bounded forests (Mabombe, Pabungu, and Matikaha) and nine points (Map 4).

Our interlocutors left us equally unsatisfied on the question of boundaries. On a sketch map where we expected sharp limits, Gogoi encircled his country with a broken, indeterminate frontier. Headmen Hlengana, the only one of Gogoi’s three headmen who was able to draw a map at all, likewise left a large gap to the northwest. In response to further prodding, Gogoi and Hlengana named various streams and dry-stream beds that would close their circles. However, the streams did not connect, they did not flow in the directions indicated, and, given the topography, they could not possibly form an unbroken chain. Gogoi, at last, told us that he did not know his northern boundary and we must go there to ask Headman Matsikiti.

Yet Matsikiti also confessed bafflement. Only the families actually living on the frontier, he said, knew precisely where it was. In the meantime, we had also followed the chain of command upward to the government *chef de poste* (the lowest-level functionary) and district administrator. They had referred us back downwards. The knowledge about boundaries, the *chef de poste* told us, “is there, in the field.” Ultimately, the “field” meant, quite literally, the cultivated fields of Gogoi’s far-flung subjects. Thus, as far as the leadership was concerned, people—or the remotest hinterland of members of Gogoi’s polity—delimited that polity spatially.

This kind of fuzzy frontier came about because settlement preceded demarcation. Gogoi’s polity formed and developed according to the pattern of fission and secession common elsewhere in East and Southern Africa. At the turn of the century, Gogoi split from Mafussi and went south. Subsequent Gogoi title-holders prevented secession only by allowing their younger brothers to leave the *dzimbahe* (the central, capital part of the chieftdom) and assume authority as headmen in the outlying areas. As Kopytoff (1987) writes, this kind of fragmentation slowly populates the “interstitial frontiers” between chiefly seats. In colonial Mozambique those frontiers did not need to be primarily territorial. Since obligations of forced labor defined the Gogoi polity, Gogoi’s chieftdom ended where his ability to compel labor ended. The degree of demarcation, therefore, varied with population density. In Gogoi’s heartland, where settlement is much denser, headmen probably agreed on borders in order to avoid overlapping claims to labor. Their sketch maps for the project often placed streams between headmen’s areas or between them and the *dzimbahe*. As a result of dense settlement, frontiers had become solid and physical. In the sparsely populated hinterland, on the other hand, physical demarcation was not necessary. Until 1997, the outermost extent of headmen’s areas and of Gogoi’s chieftdom remained a matter of conjecture.

31 “Está lá, no campo.”
Frontiers of this kind do not help a chief wage territorial battles. In the worst case, the people holding the frontier go elsewhere, causing territory to shrink. Wartime exodus had already affected all of Gogoi’s area and probably deepened doubt regarding its northern fringe. Now, that lack of specificity threatened to undermine the first cadastral effort to establish and defend Gogoi’s land. Gogoi would have been in a much better position if his boundaries had existed prior to or independent of settlement. In Vhimbwa, for example, Headmen Tiyekiye knew that the Chisengu River was his northern limit. To claim the territory thus circled, he settled squatters in the uninhabited stretch between his legal border and his desired border. Of course, Tiyekiye exploited his unchecked authority to settle Mozambicans where he wished. Neither Gogoi nor his headmen wielded this kind of authority over land allocation to anyone. Therefore, a his-
losing the non-sacred parts of the land. To close this loophole, the mapping project changed course. Expanding beyond the male leadership of Gogoi, we worked with groups of men and women to generate matrices of resource use. Using stones and drawings, smallholders made correlating charts showing the usable (sometimes saleable) plants and animals that they obtained with land types (Hughes and McDermott 1997: App. 15–21), demonstrating the necessity of fields, mountains, wetlands, primary forest, and a number of secondary forest types for local livelihood. This information, submitted to the government along with the maps, filled Gogoi’s vacant lot with actual and potential commercial and subsistence zones, all reserved for the people of Gogoi. Just as important, at least some Gogoi residents knew the value of their work. Rehearsal with the presentation of the maps and matrices to the provincial government, sons and brothers of Chief Gogoi and his headmen declared, “We will not sell the land!”

Conclusion

Has the project, then, protected Chief Gogoi’s area from CMM and others? The outcome is not yet clear, and, in particular, government has not ruled on Gogoi’s non-sacred areas. In July 1997, at the conclusion of the project’s fieldwork in Gogoi, the leadership showed its maps and matrices prematurely and unofficially to the Mousurize District Administrator (DA). Their discussion, which included a Mozambican representative of CMM, centered on sacred forests. The DA affirmed that CMM would not be allowed to cut in these zones. Reported to Piet, this remark raised the fears of lost hectares referred to above. At the same time, the DA—who shared Piet’s mistaken belief that CMM had a concession—opined that the company could still plant exotics on uncultivated land. The DA thus recognized local people’s rights of occupation, but he also reserved for CMM the privilege of eventually enclosing forest commons.

The response of the provincial government will be even more determinative. Ana Paula Reis and Benjamin Gemo accepted the maps and matrices in an official ceremony the following month. The project then moved on to Makuyana’s area and produced the same cadastral documents there. Eventually, the project will map the bulk of Mousurize District. Will provincial officials recognize the full implications of Gogoi’s, Makuyana’s, and other areas’ documents?

These officials (with the exception of Gemo) are, after all, products of Mozambique’s non-territorial politics. To enforce Gogoi’s cadastral effort, they would need to start to think in hectares. They would also need to think in terms of exclusive ownership rather than in terms of overlapping use rights. In theory, the transformation is already well underway: Mozambique’s Land Law of 1997 recognizes precisely the form of maps and documents produced by the Gogoi’s project. In practice, however, the Mozambican state is betwixt and between. It is only beginning to retrace the sea change experienced in Gogoi: shifting from rule based on categories of people to rule based on the management of zones of land.

Did the expatriates close the frontier? This question has two parts. First, there is the issue of quickening frontiers until, in minds and on maps, they are the solid lines of drawn borders. Then comes the possibility of claiming interiors so as to constitute the territory and its ownership. John and Piet believed that the indistinct edge of their timber area was a property line, but they convinced no one but themselves. In their own minds, those mappers treated frontiers as borders and the interiors as property. By the end of the project in Gogoi, the local leadership had also started to think in this territorial fashion.

On paper, as well, the project and Gogoi’s leadership had achieved a cadastral

---

32 “Hatilengesi nyika!”

33 This statement was, nonetheless, a compromise. A few months earlier, the DA had speculated he would villagize smallholders in southern Mousurize in order to make way for a hunting concession.

outcome: they had registered the commons against any possible timber or hunting concession. Yet Gogoi and his people have claimed territory only by the skin of their teeth. By legal means and perhaps by the kind of land-grabbing already attempted, CMM will doubtless try to establish a concession. The enclosures, one is inclined to think, are moving like an unstoppable juggernaut through Southern Africa.

Policy-makers have the ability and the authority to stop enclosures. Unfortunately, the government of Mozambique and its overseas donors have done more to encourage land-grabbing than to discourage it. In 1996, the National Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife opted for a policy of facilitating investment in the natural resources sector. At the same time, the World Bank funded a Transfrontier Conservation Areas Project with the same objective (I worked on this project before coming to Gogoi). Both of these initiatives mean well: they intend to create employment in rural areas and, though partnerships between businesses and communities, to provide profits directly to smallholders. How will these partnerships work? Here, the real conditions of rural Mozambique cast doubt upon the policymakers’ ideal. Smallholders and timber companies such as CMM make unlikely bedfellows. The company covets the smallholders’ land, and—unless NGOs intervene—the company has vastly greater resources in money and political connections. There is little to stop businesses from using “partnership” as a subterfuge for land-grabbing. Government can prevent such theft from occurring. Prior to any partnership, government should guarantee the inalienable land rights of local inhabitants. Ironclad legal safeguards may be able to prevent the seizure of Mozambique’s hinterland by Afrikaners and other entrepreneurs. Without state-backed safeguards, evictions are sure to ensue.

This call for state intervention flies in the face of much current wisdom on governance. In Mozambique’s—and much of the world’s—post-socialist era, international donors advise that central government step aside, deregulate, and allow communities, local government, and the private sector to solve a society’s problems. George Bush’s “thousand points of light” should shine in even the remote corners of Africa. Yet, in many places, corporations clearly “outshine” communities, local governments, and NGOs. Rarely do these latter parties have the knowledge to distinguish between genuine and spurious business partnerships. Moreover, even local government frequently lacks the legal authority to impede an investment, however damaging to local people. In an unregulated market, businesses such as CMM will surely take land and other spoils. Only central government can prevent this outcome and the ensuing misery of rural Mozambicans. The state must come back in.

References
Effler, Dirk. 1995. “Land use and tenure issues in selected areas in the districts of Gondola and Mossurize, Province of Manica.”


